

THE COMMUNITY AND A EUROPEAN  
SECURITY POLICY

SPEECH GIVEN  
BY  
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OF THE  
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
TO  
THE MID ATLANTIC CLUB  
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1.

MANY WHO ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THEREFORE AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITY THAT HAS TRADITIONALLY SURROUNDED A DEFINITION OF THE TERM SECURITY, OR EVEN WORSE, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMUNITY, MAY HAVE BEEN SURPRISED THAT I SHOULD CHOOSE SUCH AN ISSUE AS THE SUBJECT OF MY TALK TODAY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IT IS NOT TO BE PROVOCATIVE OR TO DOWNPLAY THE VERY SERIOUS SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES THAT FACE THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, BUT BECAUSE AT THIS MOMENT IN TIME CURRENT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE POINT URGENTLY TO THE NEED FOR THE COMMUNITY TO BEGIN TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY THAT IT HAS LONG AVOIDED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SITUATION DEMANDS THAT EUROPEANS BEGIN TO DEVELOP A COMMON AND A MORE INDEPENDENT APPROACH TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF WESTERN SECURITY.

/IF I REFRAIN

2.

IF I REFRAIN FROM DESCRIBING UNITED STATES - EUROPEAN RELATIONS AS BEING IN A STATE OF CRISIS IT IS BECAUSE THAT TERM DOES NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE DYNAMIC THAT IS CURRENTLY AT WORK. THE WORD CRISIS SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN AND DRAMATIC CHANGE - HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE PROBLEMS WE SEE TODAY REFLECT TRENDS WHICH WILL SLOWLY BUT IRREVOCABLY CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF WESTERN SECURITY.

IT IS HOW THAT CHANGE WILL TAKE PLACE, HOW EUROPE WILL RESPOND AND THE ROLE THAT THE COMMUNITY SHOULD PLAY THAT I AM CONCERNED WITH TODAY.

LOOKING AT THE CURRENT STATE OF ATLANTIC RELATIONS IT IS EVIDENT THAT ATTITUDES

AND PERSPECTIVES

3.  
AND PERSPECTIVES ON EITHER SIDE OF THE ALLIANCE ARE BADLY OUT OF PHASE, OUR OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS NO LONGER RUN PARALLEL, WE NO LONGER SEE THE WORLD IN THE SAME WAY. THE PHRASE THAT "WHAT UNITES US IS GREATER THAN WHAT DIVIDES US" HAS AN INCREASINGLY HOLLOW RING. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO PUT THE CURRENT SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE IT IS WORTH REMEMBERING THAT WE HAVE BEEN HERE MANY TIMES BEFORE. THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP HAS ENDURED SEVERAL SEVERE JOLTS AND MANY OF THE CURRENT ISSUES HAVE BEEN AROUND FOR A LONG TIME.

BUT, IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT THE RECONCILIATION OF PAST DISPUTES HAS ONLY BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE BOTH SIDES HAVE DEMONSTRATED FLEXIBILITY AND A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE, AND BECAUSE A DEGREE OF DIVERSITY HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS INEVITABLE

IN AN ALLIANCE

4.  
IN AN ALLIANCE OF FIFTEEN SOVEREIGN AND  
EQUAL NATIONS. UNFORTUNATELY THE POLITICAL  
ENVIRONMENT THAT HAS PERMITTED THE ATLANTIC  
ALLIANCE TO RECONCILE DIVERGENT VIEWS, OR  
TO ACCOMODATE AN "AGREEMENT TO DISAGREE,"  
HAS CHANGED IN A DRAMATIC FASHION. DEFENSE  
AND THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP HAVE BECOME  
THE OBJECT OF INTENSE PUBLIC INTEREST AND  
OF CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC CRITICISM. THE  
COMBINED EFFECT OF FOREIGN POLICY DISPUTES  
AND WORSENING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS HAS BEEN  
TO HARDEN OFFICIAL ATTITUDES AND POSITIONS.  
UNDER THE GLARE OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY GOVERNMENTS  
HAVE LOST THEIR ABILITY, AND IN CERTAIN  
INSTANCES, THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MANEUVER  
AND TO COMPROMISE IN ORDER TO SECURE  
AGREEMENT AND ACCOMODATION.

IN MY VIEW THREE FACTORS ARE  
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NEW SITUATION IN WHICH  
/WE FIND OURSELVES

5.  
WE FIND OURSELVES. FIRSTLY, THE SHEER  
NUMBER OF DISPUTES THAT AFFECT US - THESE  
ARE MORE WIDE RANGING AND PROFOUND THAN  
PREVIOUSLY, AND THE RESULT IS THAT OUR  
POLITICAL SYSTEM IS IN DANGER OF BEING  
OVERLOADED.

SECONDLY, THE FACT THAT WE DISAGREE  
ON AN ISSUE THAT IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE  
EXISTENCE OF THE ALLIANCE - THE POLICIES  
THAT THE WEST SHOULD BE FOLLOWING TOWARDS  
THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR  
ME TO ANALYSE THE MANY DISPUTES THAT REFLECT  
THE DIVERGENCE OF VIEW CONCERNING THE SCALE  
OF THE THREAT AND THE RESPONSE THAT IS  
REQUIRED, YOU ARE BY NOW FAMILIAR WITH THEM.

WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS HERE IS  
THAT THE IDEALOGICAL CONVICTION OF THE REAGAN  
ADMINISTRATION HAS EFFECTIVELY POLARIZED  
A DIVERGENCE WHICH HAS LONG BEEN APPARENT -

NOTABLY THE FACT

6.

NOTABLY THE FACT THAT THROUGH GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE THE EUROPEANS HAVE DEVELOPED CLOSER LINKS TO THE EAST AND THAT THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT CREATED BY THESE LINKS HAS INEVITABLY ALTERED EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF THE SO-CALLED SOVIET CHALLENGE. THIS PROCESS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN EFFECTIVELY OBSCURED AND ACCOMODATED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE FRAMEWORK. WHERE IN THE PAST THERE WERE AMBIGUITIES, WHERE DIFFERENCES WERE LEFT UNEXPLORED, NOW UNDER THE RELENTLESS PRESSURE OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THE LINES OF DIVISION ARE SHARPLY DEFINED.

THE DETERMINATION OF THIS ADMINISTRATION TO IMPOSE ITS WORLD VIEW AND TO EXERT WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP, LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE AND ACCOMODATION. THE LOW

/TOLERANCE LEVEL

7.

TOLERANCE LEVEL FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT SEE THINGS THE SAME WAY MAKES THE RECONCILIATION OF SENSITIVE ISSUES DOUBLY DIFFICULT.

THIS IS, AFTER ALL, THE CRUX OF THE GAS PIPELINE ISSUE - BOTH SIDES CAN RATIONALISE THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS BY REFERENCE TO EVENTS IN POLAND OR AMERICAN GRAIN SALES, BUT THE BASIC ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS MORE FUNDAMENTAL. IT CONCERNS THE EUROPEAN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE THESIS PREVALENT IN MANY QUARTERS HERE THAT THE WEST IS IN A STATE OF PERMANENT CONFLICT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, A CONDITION THAT DEMANDS THAT ALL OUR POLICIES ARE COORDINATED WITHIN A STRATEGY AIMED AT CHECKING, COUNTERING, OR UNDERMINING THE SOVIET SYSTEM. TO MOST EUROPEANS THIS APPROACH IS AS UNACCEPTIBLE AS IT IS DANGEROUS.

THE THIRD AND POTENTIALLY MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THE CHANGED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CONCERNS PUBLIC OPINION.

/ON BOTH SIDES

8.

ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC INTEREST IN DEFENCE AND THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP HAS INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. GOVERNMENTS NOW FACE THE UNENVIABLE TASK NOT ONLY OF RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO OF REGAINING THE SUPPORT OF THEIR PUBLICS, MANY OF WHOM ARE DISILLUSIONED AND FRUSTRATED WITH CURRENT POLICIES.

IN EUROPE, THE ANTI-NUCLEAR PROTEST MOVEMENT HAS BECOME AN ESTABLISHED FEATURE OF OUR POLITICAL LIFE, IT REPRESENTS AN INFLUENCE THAT NO GOVERNMENT CAN AFFORD TO IGNORE, AND ALREADY IT HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON ALLIANCE POLICIES. SUDDENLY, WELL-ESTABLISHED PRACTICES AND POLICIES ARE UNDER CHALLENGE, SUDDENLY, ALLIANCE POLICIES WHICH IN PREVIOUS YEARS WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED UNNOTICED ARE UNDER SCRUTINY. SUDDENLY, ALLIANCE LEADERS HAVE REALISED THAT PUBLIC

/SUPPORT FOR

9.

SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE CAN NO LONGER BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE HAS BROUGHT DEFENSE OUT OF THE SHADOWS, IT IS NO LONGER THE FORGOTTEN CHILD OF NATIONAL POLICY.

I SHALL REFRAIN FROM COMPARING THE FREEZE MOVEMENT HERE AND THE ANTI NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN EUROPE. I SHALL ONLY COMMENT THAT FOR EUROPEANS THE GROWTH OF THE FREEZE MOVEMENT WAS A REASSURING DEVELOPMENT, BECAUSE IT SHOULD HAVE PROVED TO AMERICANS THAT THE THOUSANDS OF DEMONSTRATORS IN EUROPEAN CITIES LAST YEAR WERE DEMONSTRATING OUT OF REAL CONCERN OVER NUCLEAR POLICY, AND NOT BECAUSE THEY WERE INTIMIDATED BY, OR SUBSERVIENT TO, OR EVEN IN THE PAY OF, THE SOVIET UNION.

THERE IS AN IMPORTANT LESSON TO BE DRAWN FROM THE CURRENT UNREST BOTH HERE AND IN EUROPE OVER NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THAT IS THAT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

POLICIES CAN ONLY

10.

POLICIES CAN ONLY BE SUSTAINED IF THE GENERAL PUBLIC CAN IDENTIFY WITH THE OBJECTIVES AND THE MEANS OF THAT POLICY. THE SPECIAL AND TERRIBLE NATURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS INEVITABLY MADE THE TASK OF EXPLAINING OUR DEFENCE STRATEGY PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, THE SUDDEN PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR CURRENT POLICIES HAS MADE THIS TASK DOUBLY URGENT.

DEFENCE POLICY IS NO LONGER THE PRESERVE OF A SMALL GROUP OF SPECIALISTS TALKING A LANGUAGE AND LIVING IN A WORLD THAT ONLY THEY UNDERSTAND. IT IS NOW A MATTER OF MASS CONSUMPTION AND PARTICIPATION. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT IF WE ALLOW OUR STRATEGY TO BE DOMINATED BY SCENARIOS THAT ARE AT THE EXTREME END OF THE THREAT SPECTRUM AND WHICH HAVE LITTLE RELEVANCE TO POLITICAL REALITY. IF WE ARE TO REGAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE, THEN OUR DEFENCE POLICIES MUST BE BASED ON RATIONAL ASSESSMENTS AND

SCENARIOS,

11.

SCENARIOS, AND WHICH INVOLVE POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS THAT ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POLITICAL EXPERIENCE OF OUR SOCIETIES.

JUST AS BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC HAVE EXPERIENCED THE ANTI-NUCLEAR PHENOMENA, SO EQUALLY BOTH SIDES ARE EXPERIENCING THE PROBLEM OF DECLINING ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE EFFECT THAT LOW OR NEGATIVE GROWTH HAS HAD ON THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR DEFENCE. SINCE THE LATE 1970'S, EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO RESPOND TO AMERICAN PRESSURE FOR GREATER EXPENDITURE ON DEFENCE, ARGUING THAT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS RULED OUT FURTHER INCREASES. NOW, AS THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENCE PROGRAMME BECOME EVIDENT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO EXPERIENCING THE RESTRAINING HAND OF ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCE. HAVING DETERMINED TO REBUILD AMERICAN MILITARY

POWER.

12.

POWER, IT IS EVIDENT THAT EVEN WITH THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN EXPENDITURE CURRENTLY PLANNED, THE ADMINISTRATION WILL NOT BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ALL ITS OBJECTIVES.

HOWEVER, ANY SATISFACTION THAT WE EUROPEANS MIGHT DERIVE FROM THE SIGHT OF THIS ADMINISTRATION GRAPPLING WITH WHAT FOR US HAS BECOME A FAMILIAR DILEMMA OF MATCHING RESOURCES WITH REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE SHORTLIVED. THE DILEMMA FACING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL CERTAINLY HAVE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR US - NOT ONLY WILL IT INCREASE THE ALREADY SEVERE PRESSURE FOR EUROPEANS TO DO MORE FOR WESTERN DEFENCE, BUT IF HARD CHOICES HAVE TO BE MADE WITHIN THE AMERICAN DEFENCE BUDGET, THEN IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT PRESSURE WILL CERTAINLY BE STRONG TO PLACE THESE RESOURCES IN AREAS OF GREATEST NEED - AND THIS IS

UNLIKELY TO

13.

UNLIKELY TO BE AMERICA'S SO-CALLED "WEALTHY ALLIES".

PUBLIC INTEREST HAS ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO THE QUESTION OF ALLIANCE SECURITY, NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT HAS BEGUN TO CHALLENGE EXISTING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT DEFENCE BUT BECAUSE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC PUBLIC OPINION HAS BEGUN TO QUESTION THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF DIFFERENCES OVER SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY AND ECONOMIC POLICY HAS BEEN TO RELEASE, ON EITHER SIDE, THE STEREOTYPES AND MISPERCEPTIONS THAT LURK BENEATH THE SURFACE OF THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP.

HERE IN THE UNITED STATES, THE LAST

TWO YEARS

14.

TWO YEARS HAS SEEN AN ALMOST ENDLESS STREAM OF PUBLIC CRITICISM, AS REPRESENTED IN THE MEDIA AND ON CAPITOL HILL, CONCERNING THE WORTHINESS OF AMERICA'S ALLIES. THE PERCEPTION THAT THE EUROPEANS ENJOY A "FREE RIDE" IN DEFENCE WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, REFUSING TO SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES IN CRITICAL FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES HAS BECOME ALL PERVASIVE.

THIS IS, OF COURSE, A FAMILIAR REFRAIN. THE IDEA THAT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO NATO IS A "GIFT" THAT THE UNITED STATES MAKES TO EUROPE IS NEVER FAR FROM THE HEART OF ANY AMERICAN CRITICISM OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. AN INTERESTING COMMENT ON THE NATURE OF THE PUBLIC DEBATE HERE HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY THE PRODUCTION BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE OF TWO SUCCESSIVE REPORTS ON ALLIANCE BURDEN SHARING. THESE REPORTS HAVE PRESENTED A

THOROUGH AND

15.

THOROUGH AND COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE OF BURDEN SHARING. THE REPORTS FOR 1981 AND 1982 BOTH EMPHASIZED THE TREMENDOUS COMPLEXITY INVOLVED IN ATTEMPTS TO COMPARE ALLIED DEFENCE EXPENDITURES, BUT BOTH ALSO STATED THAT WHEN ALL RELEVANT CRITERIA WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE DOING "AT LEAST" OR "ROUGHLY" THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE DEFENCE BURDEN. YET DESPITE THIS JUDGEMENT, THE PERCEPTION THAT THE EUROPEANS DO NOT PROVIDE ENOUGH FOR THEIR OWN DEFENCE REMAINS VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED, AND CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM CONTINUES AS IF THE REPORT ON BURDEN SHARING DID NOT EXIST.

THIS CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE NATO COMMITMENT WILL INEVITABLY BECOME MORE INTENSE AS AMERICA'S ECONOMIC WORRIES BECOME GREATER AND AS THE NEED FOR CHOICE IN DEFENCE PRIORITIES BECOMES OBVIOUS. AMERICAN

FRUSTRATION WITH



16.

FRUSTRATION WITH THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IS FURTHER FUELED BY ECONOMIC DISPUTES WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AS THESE REINFORCE THE AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE UNBALANCED NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP - IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THE EUROPEANS ARE TOUGH COMPETITORS WHILE IN THE SECURITY FIELD THEY CONTINUE TO APPEAR AS SUPPLIANTS.

CRITICISM OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP HAS ALSO GROWN IN EUROPE, BUT FOR RATHER DIFFERENT REASONS. EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION HAS BECOME CRITICAL OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP INASMUCH AS IT IS SEEN TO INVOLVE UNACCEPTABLE POLICIES SUCH AS THE CURRENT DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS THE NUCLEAR GUARANTOR OF THE ALLIANCE, THE UNITED STATES OBVIOUSLY BECOMES THE CHIEF VILLAIN IN THE ANTI-NUCLEAR DEBATE. BENEATH THIS EUROPEAN CRITICISM, THERE EXISTS A FUNDAMENTAL AND, IN MY VIEW UNJUSTIFIED, RESENTMENT THAT

ALLIANCE POLICIES

17.

ALLIANCE POLICIES ARE DICTATED BY THE UNITED STATES AND ARE CHIEFLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE UNITED STATES - HENCE, THE ARGUMENT THAT CURRENT AMERICAN STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO LIMIT ANY FUTURE CONFLICT TO EUROPEAN TERRITORY. THE COMBINATION OF THIS PERCEPTION AND A CONFRONTATIONAL AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION PROVIDES THE INGREDIENTS FOR THE GENERAL UNREST THAT EXISTS IN EUROPE TODAY.

THE CHALLENGE THAT CONFRONTS WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS IS TO REBUILD PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN OUR SECURITY FRAMEWORK AND TO DEVELOP A SECURITY POLICY THAT IS RELEVANT TO THE EXPERIENCE AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR PEOPLE, AND CONSISTENT WITH OUR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES.

BECAUSE OF THE BASIC DIFFERENCES THAT EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE ON THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

I BELIEVE

18.

I BELIEVE THAT THE SOLUTION TO THIS DILEMMA, BOTH FOR EUROPE AND FOR THE ALLIANCE, IS FOR EUROPEANS TO DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF WESTERN SECURITY, AN APPROACH THAT WOULD DERIVE FROM EUROPEAN ASSESSMENTS AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE COORDINATED EUROPEAN APPROACH WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES.

FIRSTLY, IT WOULD PERMIT EUROPEANS TO PLAY A MORE EFFECTIVE AND ASSERTIVE ROLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE WILL ONLY CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IF EUROPEAN INFLUENCE CAN ENSURE THAT ALLIANCE POLICIES TAKE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF EUROPEAN INTERESTS.

IN THIS RESPECT

19.

IN THIS RESPECT, SEVERAL IMPORTANT ISSUES CONFRONT THE ALLIANCE WHOSE RESOLUTION COULD BE CRITICAL IN SUSTAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE.

FIRSTLY, THE QUESTION OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND THE RELATED PROBLEM OF CREATING A VIABLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE POSTURE IN EUROPE.

AS A RESULT OF THE ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN EUROPE, THERE ARE SIGNS THAT THE ALLIANCE IS LOOKING FOR WAYS TO REDUCE THE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE ADVOCATED THE ADOPTION OF A "NO FIRST USE" STRATEGY. OTHERS HAVE RECOMMENDED THE REDUCTION OF BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE BELIEF THAT THESE SYSTEMS NO LONGER OFFER A PRACTICAL OR CREDIBLE OPTION FOR NATO. PARALLEL TO THIS PROCESS IS A NEW EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES. WE SHOULD AVOID RUSHING TO HASTY JUDGEMENTS THAT A CONVENTIONA

DEFENCE IS NEITHER

20.

DEFENSE IS NEITHER FEASIBLE NOR AFFORDABLE - WE SHOULD FIRST CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT DEGREE OF INSURANCE WE REQUIRE AND THEN EXAMINE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EXPENDITURE.

SECONDLY, THERE IS THE RELATED ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. WHILE WE CAN HAVE LITTLE IMPACT ON THE START NEGOTIATIONS, THE INF TALKS CONCERN US DIRECTLY. BECAUSE OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN MODERNISATION AND ARMS CONTROL IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIANCE / ARMS CONTROL POSITION REMAINS CREDIBLE. IN THIS SENSE, WHILE THE ZERO OPTION CONSTITUTED A USEFUL TACTIC IN THE PUBLIC RELATIONS BATTLE, FEW BELIEVE THAT IT REPRESENTS A REALISTIC OUTCOME. WE MUST REMEMBER THAT THERE IS NOW A THIRD FORCE AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE - OUR PUBLIC OPINION. THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR POSITION RESTS ON US LOOKING BEYOND THE ZERO OPTION TO CONSIDERING WHAT BALANCE OF FORCES WOULD NOW BE ACCEPTABLE. EUROPEANS MUST NOT BE CONFINED TO THE ROLE OF SPECTATORS, EVEN CLOSELY INFORMED

21.

SPECTATORS, WE MUST PRESS FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE WITHOUT PROGRESS DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

THESE ARE BUT TWO ISSUES ON WHICH EUROPEANS MAKE THEIR VOICES HEARD. HOWEVER, EUROPEAN INFLUENCE WILL ONLY BE EFFECTIVE IF IT IS UNITED.

A MORE COHERENT EUROPEAN APPROACH COULD HAVE TWO IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC OPINION. FIRSTLY, IT COULD CONVINCED THE AMERICAN PUBLIC THAT THE EUROPEANS ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THEIR OWN DEFENSE AND SECONDLY IT COULD GENERATE PUBLIC SUPPORT IN EUROPE BY DEMONSTRATING THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY IS DERIVED FROM EUROPEAN ASSESSMENTS AND ANALYSIS. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THE VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF A SERIOUS ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT IN FRANCE, WHERE FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE QUITE CLEARLY FOR FRANCE AND FRANCE

ALONE.

FINALLY, IF ONE NEEDS TO SEEK FURTHER JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A MORE ASSERTIVE AND INDEPENDENT EUROPE, THEN ONE NEED LOOK NO FURTHER THAN THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN DIGNITY AND SELF-RESPECT. IT IS NOW TIME FOR EUROPE TO ADOPT A RESPONSIBILITY COMMENSURATE WITH HER ECONOMIC STATUS, TIME THAT SHE SHOULD PLAY A MORE INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, OFFERING TO MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SUCH AS THOSE OF LATIN AMERICA IF NOT A THIRD WAY, AT LEAST AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TWO SUPER POWERS.

WHATEVER THE DESIRABILITY OF GREATER EUROPEAN COHESION IN SECURITY POLICY, IT WOULD BE WRONG OF ME TO IGNORE THE VERY REAL PROBLEMS THAT LIE IN ITS PATH. THE MOST OBVIOUS OF THESE CONCERNS THE GROUPING OF EUROPEAN NATIONS  
/SUCH A DEVELOPMENT

SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD INVOLVE. AS THE TITLE OF MY TALK INDICATES, I BELIEVE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY MUST EVENTUALLY BE ASSUMED BY THE IO OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. IN THIS RESPECT WE MUST BUILD ON THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL CO-OPERATION. THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS IN HARMONIZING VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS. THIS CO-OPERATION PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE ENLARGEMENT OF COMMUNITY INTEREST INTO THE FIELD OF SECURITY, INDEED RECOGNITION OF THIS NECESSITY HAS ALREADY BEEN SIGNALLED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WHEN THEY MET IN LONDON LAST OCTOBER, AND THE GENSCHER/COLUMBO INITIATIVE CONTAINS A SIMILAR RECOMMENDATION. AS A MEASURE OF HOW FAR

/WE HAVE COME

24.

WE HAVE COME, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE TEN YEARS AGO THAT A GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD HAVE RECOMMENDED A MEETING OF THE DEFENSE MINISTERS OF THE TEN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION. THERE ARE OF COURSE STRONG POLITICAL DOUBTS AND HESITATIONS ON THE PARTS OF MANY NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AS TO JUST WHERE THIS PROCESS COULD LEAD. BUT THERE IS ALSO INCREASING SUPPORT AS THE DILEMMA OF OUR EXISTING STRUCTURE BECOMES MORE AND MORE APPARENT.

I REALIZE THAT FOR MANY OF THE PROFESSIONAL EUROPEAN WATCHERS IN THIS AUDIENCE, THESE IDEAS WILL SEEM FANCIFUL AND REMOTE FROM POLITICAL REALITY. HOWEVER, NONE OF US SHOULD UNDERESTIMATE THE PUBLIC PRESSURES THAT ARE BUILDING AND TO WHICH WE AS POLITICIANS MUST RESPOND. IN EUROPE, MOMENTUM IN THE DIRECTION OF WHICH I AM TALKING IS ALREADY DISCERNIBLE, IT HAS BEGUN WITH THE PEACE

/MOVEMENT AND THEIR

25.

MOVEMENT AND THEIR EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO OUR EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. INDEED IT IS IRONIC THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT REPRESENTS THE FIRST ATTEMPT TOWARDS DEVELOPING A COHERENT EUROPEAN APPROACH TO SECURITY. IF MOVEMENT IS DISCERNIBLE ON THE LEFT OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM AS A REACTION TO THE EXCESSES OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, IT CAN ALSO BE SEEN ON THE RIGHT WHERE MANY BELIEVE THAT EUROPE SHOULD PREPARE FOR THE DAY WHEN, FRUSTRATED WITH EUROPEAN PASSIVISM, THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS ITS TROOPS.

WITHIN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ITSELF THERE ARE SIGNS OF A DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD IN THIS DIRECTION. THIS AUTUMN FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT WILL RECEIVE A REPORT ON EUROPEAN SECURITY FROM A DANISH RAPPOREUR, NIELS HAAGERUP. I HOPE THAT IN THIS, AND IN OTHER WAYS, WE CAN ENCOURAGE DISCUSSION

/AND DEBATE OF

AND DEBATE OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCEPT.

IN CONCLUSION LET ME REITERATE MY BELIEF THAT THE CHALLENGES THAT FACE US TODAY, PARTICULARLY THE NEED TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC OPINION, DEMAND A NEW RESPONSE AND NEW INITIATIVES. THE ERA OF BILATERAL RELATIONS WHICH HAS SERVED US FOR THE PAST THIRTY YEARS IS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT TO COPE WITH THE MULTITUDE OF TRANSATLANTIC PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS. WHATEVER THE DOUBTS, WHATEVER THE INSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES, WE IN EUROPE MUST ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY WE HAVE FOR SO LONG IGNORED - THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON APPROACH TO OUR OWN SECURITY. IN MY VIEW IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A CONSENSUS FOR WESTERN SECURITY BUT ONLY IF THIS POLICY REFLECTS THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NEEDS OF THE SOCIETY IT IS PROTECTING, AND IF ITS MEANS ARE

/SEEN TO BE

SEEN TO BE PROPORTIONATE TO ITS ENDS. THIS POLICY CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED FROM WITHIN, IT CANNOT BE IMPOSED FROM THE OUTSIDE.

GREATER EUROPEAN CO-ORDINATION AND COHERENCE OVER SECURITY POLICY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, INDEED IT COULD GREATLY STRENGTHEN IT. ON THE OTHER HAND THE TRENDS TOWARD SEPARATION ARE VERY EVIDENT, BOTH IN THE NUCLEAR DISCONTENT IN EUROPE AND THE CRIES FOR TROOP WITHDRAWALS HERE. IF WE ARE TO AVERT THIS PROCESS THEN WE MUST ACT NOW.