


EUROPE AS SEEN BY EUROPEANS

European polling 1973-86



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Europe as seen by Europeans European polling 1973-86

(Second edition)

Manuscript by Jean-Claude Deheneffe, completed in March 1986.
Introduction by Jacques-René Rabier.

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
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Introduction



by Jacques-René Rabier

All administrative authorities need not only to be able to inform, but also to seek information. Although the European Community institutions still have only limited powers, they nevertheless made it one of their primary concerns from the very outset to keep the European public informed about the aims and results of their actions; they were also anxious to keep their collective finger on the pulse of European needs and expectations.

For many years the relationship between the institutions of the European Community and the citizens of the Member States was channelled principally through an assembly of representatives appointed by the national parliaments. Since 1979, the

European Parliament, which fulfils a number of the functions proper to the national parliament in any democratic society, has been directly elected by the people entitled to vote in national elections. But even before the introduction of universal suffrage as a feature of European Community democracy, a system of regular surveys of attitudes and opinions had been established along the same lines as those carried out in Western democracies for decades; these became the *Eurobarometer* opinion polls.

What are they? What they are not is a cut-price referendum, or a collection of expert opinions; still less are they an attempt by an influential or intellectual elite to manipulate the general public. They are simply a means of studying scientifically — with all that implies in terms of rigour and precision — what ordinary men and women think about the problems that affect them most closely.

The mechanics of the opinion poll are well known; they consist of administering an oral questionnaire to a number of individuals, specially selected as a representative sample of the population being studied. To put it another way, each individual in the surveyed population must possess an equal chance of being questioned: whatever the sampling technique actually employed, a representative sample of a national population would have to contain proportions of men and women, people in the 15 to 24 and 50 to 55 age brackets, workers and employers, urban and rural inhabitants, people living in the various regions, etc., more or less equal to those in the population as a whole according to the most recent census figures.¹

Opinion polls first made their appearance in the United States 50 years ago and they still bear the name of their inventor, George Gallup. After the war, the technique spread throughout Europe and all the non-totalitarian countries. The 1950s saw a boom in the demand for attitude surveys, not only from business, but also from interest groups, political parties and governments. The institutions of the European Community began to use them as early as 1954, but it was not until 1973 that they took their present form. And the history of their development is not without interest.

The development of studies of European public opinion from a haphazard practice to a systematic policy is the product of two almost simultaneous, and certainly cumulative, influences: one was the pressure exerted by the European Parliament, even before it was directly elected; the second was the enlargement of the European Community of Six to include three new members: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom.

The European Parliament has always kept information policy (which is the Commission's responsibility as the executive body of the Community) under very close

¹ See Appendix.

scrutiny. And it was Parliament which, early on in its life, expressed its support for an on-going, in-depth survey of European public opinion in order to keep the citizens of Europe better informed.

In 1972, for example, the rapporteur of the European Parliament's Political Affairs Committee received the unanimous support of parliamentarians in saying that:

'Opinion polls are a crucial source of feed-back. Your Committee notes that, since the adoption of the European Parliament's Resolution of 24 November 1960, a number of opinion polls have been conducted and their findings published. Further surveys are being planned. Your Committee hopes that the Executive will expand these opinion polls into a regularly and systematically used instrument, and that it will make the complete findings regularly available.'¹

The year 1972 also marked a watershed in the consultation of the population as a whole in the historic undertaking which is the construction of a united Europe, the hallmark of whose early stages had been a degree of 'elitism'.² It was in that year that five referendums were held in Western Europe on the accession of the new members to the European Community: a referendum in France to assess the degree of popular support for enlarging the Community and the French Government's policy towards Europe; and four other referendums in Ireland, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland respectively — the first three on whether or not to become full members of the Community, the last on a simple association agreement. The 'in-or-out' issue was also a matter of intense concern to the British public, decided by a vote in favour in the House of Commons.³

The 'man-in-the-street' thus made his voice heard in a number of countries on the subject of Europe and the Community. It was not surprising therefore that even before (let us not forget) the decision had been taken to have a directly-elected European Parliament, the resolutions demanding regular and systematic opinion polls, designed and conducted throughout the Community according to a common programme, had been implemented.

The first survey for the nine Member States of the newly enlarged Community was conducted in September 1973, and *Eurobarometer* proper was born in spring 1974. Since then, with unflinching regularity, these surveys, conducted in April and October,

¹ Report of W. J. Schuijt on information policy (Doc. 246/71, 7 February 1972, p. 14).

² The existence of this 'operating elitism' should not be permitted to blind us to the fact that the institutions of the European Community, created between 1950 and 1957, were established by democratic procedures: governmental initiatives and ratifications approved by the national parliaments of the countries concerned.

³ The referendum in the United Kingdom did not take place until two and a half years after accession — in June 1975.

have been providing the Community institutions, other bodies, the press and the public itself with valuable twice-yearly information on the thoughts, feelings, hopes and fears of Europeans on the entire spectrum of matters dealt with by the Community or likely to impinge on related concerns: the socio-political climate, attitudes to European unification and Community solidarity, opinions on a variety of aspects of existing or proposed policies, and so on and so forth. The title *Eurobarometer* was not an arbitrary choice: like the barometers used over the past three and a half centuries by physicists and meteorologists to measure atmospheric pressure, it gauges as accurately as possible the changing strength of attitudes to Europe and the Community.

In autumn 1980, just a few months after its accession to the Community, the surveys were extended to include Greece. Since then, a number of questions have also been asked in Spain and Portugal concerning their proposed membership. In October–November 1985, just before these two countries joined the Community, *Eurobarometer* was enlarged once again.

Technically speaking, and without wishing to get lost in a morass of detail, the surveys are carried out among individuals aged 15 and over. An identical set of questions, carefully designed to be the same for all countries, is put to representative samples of the population in each of the countries; each national sample — different each time — thus constitutes a scale model of the population of the survey country. Almost 12 000 individuals are interviewed in their homes by professional interviewers employed by 12 national survey institutes, all selected by tender. Since 1973, some 250 000 people have thus been given the opportunity to express their opinions on questions which are asked either each time or from time to time, sometimes on specific issues (where the questions may be asked again at a future date if it seems appropriate) and sometimes on new issues arising out of European events.

Whenever the subject of opinion polls is raised, two questions immediately spring to one's lips: 'How reliable are the findings?' and 'What use are they?'. I propose to try and answer both these points here.

As to their reliability, the non-specialist reader will form his own opinion once he has read this booklet. At this stage, suffice it to point out that social scientists are increasingly relying on opinion polls as a means of studying topics across a broad spectrum: social questions such as retirement age, part-time working, capital punishment, abortion, protection of the environment, attitudes to the family and optimum family size; product images and buyer intention; the impact of advertising campaigns, the image of an official body and propensity to join; media audiences (for a newspaper, radio station or television programme); popularity ratings (of the government, a political party, a personality, a policy, etc.). In theory at least, there is no limit to their scope, provided the objectives are clearly defined and questions correctly formulated (i.e. relevant, unambiguous, comprehensible and socially

acceptable to the interviewees). If so many qualified researchers — and those who fund them — have faith in opinion surveys, then that is at least one proof of their reliability. But as with any measuring equipment, including the household barometer, it has its limits of reliability — which are, however, well-established.² The interpretation of results, whether offered by the press or by the investigators themselves — should, like all information, be examined with a critical eye. No more, no less.

The second question — ‘What use are they?’ — is not so easily answered. It could be asked of any form of research: is the ultimate objective simply to satisfy the curiosity of the researcher, to further strengthen the power of the decision-makers, or to improve man’s estate? A vast question!

In the present case, the objective defined by the European Community is clear and unambiguous: to improve the institutions’ knowledge of the people for whom they are responsible in order to provide better information on the policies affecting them and on the bodies who initiate, decide on and carry out those policies. The findings of these opinion polls also form part of this social communication circuit; that is why they are not only published in a form accessible to the general public but are also made freely available to interested researchers, under the control of the international scientific community.²

The *Eurobarometer* findings are thus used in a number of immediately identifiable ways:

- (i) The institutions of the Community use them as a basis — more or less — on which to formulate policies and sound out public feeling. This is particularly true of the public information policy although this is far from being an isolated instance: Commission departments are making increasing use of *Eurobarometer* and Parliament also employs it to investigate public awareness and views of its role.
- (ii) The findings which journalists consider of most interest to their readers are published — more or less accurately — in the press and are referred to on radio and television.
- (iii) National bureaucracies, political organizations, professional bodies, trade unions and other groups all make use of selected findings of particular interest

¹ The reliability of survey findings depends principally on sample size rather than the sample/whole population ratio. The *Eurobarometer* surveys are based on a sample of 1 000 individuals in each country except the United Kingdom (1 300 including over-representation for Northern Ireland) and Luxembourg (300). A note in the Technical Appendix specifically states that percentage differences below 5 points are not normally considered statistically significant.

² *Eurobarometer* surveys are circulated free on demand. The original data, which are stored on magnetic tape, are freely available for consultation by researchers worldwide and are being used more and more as time goes on.

to them. They may even be used by a political party to build up a clearer picture of its grass roots support, with further analysis by its own research department. If any government agency or organization of any kind needs information from a number of countries on an issue already discussed in the European surveys, it may well be in its interest to use questions in a tried and tested formulation, or, as the case may be, to formulate an entirely different set of questions. In 1985, for example, a study of public awareness of the European currency unit (ECU) was carried out for a group of banks.

- (iv) Social scientists can now mine an extraordinarily rich seam of international information dealing with a wide range of issues — particularly changes in attitude towards the same issues in different countries.
- (v) Finally, suggestions for questions to be incorporated in future *Eurobarometer* surveys are welcomed from any individual or group, who may also take the initiative into their own hands and put pressure on both public and private bodies to conduct surveys they consider of value.

*
* *
*

When the initiators of any given social communications policy present the results in this way, the reader is quite entitled to suspect them of exaggeration. And that is why we prefer to leave the last word with others.


At a meeting in Brussels in 1983, the senior executives of the national information services of the European Community countries were unanimous in saying how valuable they considered the regular polls of European public opinion conducted under the name *Eurobarometer*.

More recently, the major British news weekly, *The Economist*, in a reference to *Eurobarometer* stated that Europeans should be better informed about one another's countries: '*Eurobarometer* needs expanding for better pan-European polling.'¹ This expansion will certainly not take place tomorrow since opinion polls are based on the assumption that the people they interview are free to express an opinion. There is scope for increased international cooperation on research with all countries where this freedom exists. But, however desirable such broader cooperation may be, it should not blind us to the fact that *Eurobarometer's* main function is to provide the citizens of the Member States and of the Community with information on their attitudes to one another, their perceptions of the problems facing them and the vision of the future capable of inspiring their support.

¹ A People's Republic of Europe', *The Economist*, 22 February 1986, p. 18.

This booklet aims to make this instrument of research and action more accessible to the ordinary reader. It shows how Europeans see themselves; Europe will become truly viable only if we all lend a hand to making it so. Let us leave the last word with the great European writer who died recently, Denis de Rougemont, by saying to every reader of this brochure who is also a citizen of one of the 12 Member States of the Community: 'Europe is your affair'.

I — The resilience of European public opinion



By and large, Europeans support the idea of a united Europe. That is the message which stands out from the 25 surveys carried out in this series since the early 1970s.

Whether or not the resilience of public opinion in this area is based on a misconception of the real implications and their probable political and economic impact is of little importance. The European public makes its voice heard as both an actor in,

and a spectator of, the political scene. That opinion represents the deep-rooted attitudes of the European population. And it is from those attitudes that the politicians and decision-makers should draw their inspiration.

The results of the surveys analysed in this booklet demonstrate that even the thorniest of those problems which jam the machinery of European administration still find broad support among the European public. This is particularly true of a European currency, the European passport, a European law-enforcement area and the fight against unemployment.

All of these themes show that the idea of European citizenship has not only permeated all strata of the population to varying degrees but has also taken deeper root than sound common sense might lead one to think. Some of the results are quite simply astonishing and seem to indicate that 'being a European' is as much a matter of feeling as of logical reasoning.

Has Europe already become a nation to which we are attached, heart and soul?

A European currency

Long before the President of the European Commission publicized the benefits of a single European currency in 1977, European public opinion had already declared itself strongly in favour of such a system.

The question asked was:

The nine countries of the European Economic Community (Common Market) are together dealing with a number of shared problems. Could you tell me if it appears very important to you, important, of little importance, or not at all important:

— *to create a single European currency to replace all the national currencies of the Member States, including your own?*

TABLE I
For a European currency¹

| | Autumn 1974 | Spring 1975 | Autumn 1975 |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Very important | 18 | 25 | 25 |
| Important | 29 | 32 | 33 |
| Fairly important | 25 | 22 | 20 |
| Not important at all | 28 | 21 | 22 |

¹ Overall results for the Community weighted according to the relative size of each country in it. For an equal number of interviews, therefore ($\pm 1\ 000$), an Italian reply, for example, is attributed a weight five times that of a Belgian reply.

Taking into account only that segment of the public who considered it 'very important' or 'important', it remains a fact that 47% (autumn 1974), 57% (spring 1975) and 58% (autumn 1975) of respondents were in favour of introducing a single European currency.¹

Condensing the data provided in Table 1, then, we find that, between autumn 1974 and autumn 1975, public opinion on the creation of a European currency was:

| | | |
|-------------|---|-----|
| For | : | 54% |
| Indifferent | : | 22% |
| Against | : | 24% |

Compare that distribution with the replies received in autumn 1976 to a question on the same topic, but phrased differently and offering different response options, and the subtle differences cannot be ignored. Thus the question:

Would you be in favour of, against, or indifferent to having your national currency replaced by a European currency?

received the following replies:

| | | |
|-------------|---|-----|
| In favour | : | 50% |
| Indifferent | : | 7% |
| Against | : | 43% |

A comparison of the results from the 1974-75 surveys with that of 1976 shows the following breakdown:

TABLE 2
**Comparison of attitudes to a European currency
 according to two differently formulated propositions**
 (%)

| | 1974-75 | 1976 |
|-------------|---------|------|
| For | 54 | 50 |
| Indifferent | 22 | 7 |
| Against | 24 | 43 |

While the proportion of interviewees in favour of introducing a single European currency remained relatively constant (50% in 1976 against 54% in 1974-75), the percentage of those against increased significantly, drawn mainly from the 'middle ground' of those previously indifferent.

¹ In order to simplify the presentation of the tables, percentages have been calculated only on the number of replies actually received. Where the number or 'no replies' is statistically significant, however, it is indicated in brackets.

This swing was principally attributable to the way in which the question was phrased and the approach adopted. Whereas the three surveys carried out in 1974-75 emphasized the *creation* of a European currency, the 1976 poll stressed the *suppression* of the national currency. While the difference in emphasis had no adverse effect on that part of public opinion already in favour of creating a European currency, it did have the effect of mobilizing the indifferents to seek refuge in resistance to change.

It is worth recalling that Table 2 clearly shows more than half of our European interviewees supporting the creation of a European currency.

Such a result, remarkable in itself, merits closer analysis. On the one hand, the European public appears certainly more constant than the Community's Finance Ministers, however the data are analysed (unweighted per country, weighted average for the Community, broken down by sex or age, etc.). The fact that over half the European public agree on the idea of a strictly European currency unquestionably points to a lively degree of interest in it at a time — 1974-76 — when the idea had not been officially mooted. Even the ECU (European currency unit) had not yet made its appearance.

No one, however, should be tempted to conclude from this that a European currency is a matter of fundamental concern to Europeans. In a list of the problems with which the European Community is concerned, ranked in descending order of importance, the creation of a European currency is at the bottom of the list.

TABLE 3
Importance attached to the different problems being dealt with by the European Community

| Rank | Concern | Index ¹ |
|------|---|--------------------|
| 1 | Common fight against rising prices | 2.64 |
| 2 | Introduction of a common policy for protecting nature and fighting pollution | 2.26 |
| 3 | Protection of consumers against fraudulent selling and misleading advertising | 2.21 |
| 4 | Working out a common energy supply policy | 2.19 |
| 5 | Achieving a common foreign policy in discussions with America and Russia | 2.04 |
| 6 | Coordinating social policies | 1.98 |
| 7 | Modernizing European agriculture | 1.97 |
| 8 | Reducing the differences between regions | 1.85 |
| 9 | Introducing a common policy on aid to the underdeveloped countries outside Europe | 1.57 |
| 10 | Introducing a single European currency | 1.52 |

Sources: Eurobarometer No 4, autumn 1975 and Eurobarometer No 5, spring 1976.

¹ 'Very important' = 3; 'important' = 2; 'fairly important' = 1; 'not important at all' = 0; the index therefore varies between 0 and 3.

Since those surveys were carried out 10 years ago, the European institutions have introduced the ECU, which may be seen as the forerunner of a European currency. The extent to which it has been accepted was tested in 1985 in seven Community countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Great Britain) using both approaches, namely *replacement* of national currencies by a European currency and use of a European currency *alongside* national currencies.¹

The questions asked were as follows:

Would you be for, against, or not mind either way if your national currency were replaced by a European currency? (The wording was the same as in autumn 1976.)

Would you be for, against or not mind either way if, as well as the existing national currencies, one could freely use a European currency which would be accepted in all the countries of the European Community?

TABLE 4
Attitudes to a European currency (%)

| | Replacement of national currency by a European currency | | Use of national currency alongside a European currency |
|-------------|--|------|--|
| | 1976 | 1985 | 1985 |
| For | 50 | 35 | 63 |
| Indifferent | 7 | 24 | 18 |
| Against | 43 | 41 | 19 |

Although the percentage opposed to the replacement of national currencies has remained more or less constant (43% in 1976 and 41% in 1985), there has been a swing from support to indifference. This would suggest that, as the project takes shape, indifference increases while opposition remains virtually static.

There appears to be considerably greater support and slightly less indifference for the idea of a European currency coexisting with national currencies.

This confirms the trend which emerged in 1976: it is easier to support a European currency when there is no danger to one's national currency (and all the symbolic importance attached to it). This is borne out by the fact that the stronger a national currency on the foreign exchanges (an objective recognition of value), the greater the attachment to it and the weaker the support for a single European currency, as can be seen from the following comparison between the responses in Germany and Italy to the two questions asked in 1985.

¹ Study published as a supplement to *Eurobarometer* No 23 and sponsored by: Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Brussels; Crédit agricole, Paris; and Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie Lombarde, Milan.

TABLE 5
Views on a European currency in two countries
(by strength of national currency on the foreign exchanges)


(%)

| Spring 1985 | Replacement of national currency by a European currency | | Simultaneous use of national currency and a European currency | |
|-------------|---|---------------------|---|---------------------|
| | Germany strong currency | Italy weak currency | Germany strong currency | Italy weak currency |
| For | 15 | 63 | 46 | 80 |
| Indifferent | 25 | 20 | 30 | 13 |
| Against | 60 | 17 | 24 | 7 |

A breakdown of public opinion in the Community on the introduction of a single European currency by various social demographic factors reveals that, while age has no effect, men with a better than average education, a high income and a responsible job who are pro-European are more likely to go along with the idea of a single European currency.

A great majority in favour of the European passport

The reduction of customs formalities is one of the tangible signs of unification of which Europeans are most keenly aware. From a practical point of view, one might



even class it as one of the few visible achievements having a perceived impact on the life of the European 'man-in-the-street'.

In spring 1981, we asked our interviewees:

Are you for or against the idea of a European Community passport which would replace the national passport (of your country)?

TABLE 6
Attitudes to the European passport in 1981 (%)

| | | | | |
|--------------------|----|-------|----------|----|
| Very much for: | 38 | Total | For: | 74 |
| Somewhat for: | 36 | | Against: | 26 |
| Somewhat against: | 13 | | | |
| Very much against: | 13 | | | |

Three quarters of the Europeans we interviewed in 1981 were in favour of the idea of a European passport. The replies themselves revealed a remarkable degree of internal consistency with only a barely perceptible decline in support amongst the less-educated and those aged 60 and over.

The same subject was tackled in spring 1984, this time using the following question: *Are you for or against (giving) all citizens of European Community countries the possibility to get a European passport which allows them to travel without hindrance in the 10 countries?*

TABLE 7
Attitudes to the European passport in 1984 (%)

| | |
|----------|----|
| For: | 88 |
| Against: | 12 |

Once again, the wording of the question influenced the results. In 1981 explicit mention was made of *replacing* the national passport, but this was not done in 1984 so that interviewees could assume that national passports would continue to exist alongside the Community passport.¹

While we have concentrated in this section purely on the European response, there are also interesting conclusions to be drawn from a country-by-country breakdown of the replies. In 1981 support for a European passport was more marked among

¹ The Member States have now decided to harmonize their passports and issue a sort of European passport to their nationals.

the six founder countries of the European Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) than among the more recent members but three years later, in 1984, only Denmark remained fairly uncommitted, with all the other countries recording support of around 80% and in some cases far more.

TABLE 8
Support for the European passport by country in 1984
 (in increasing order of degree of support)

| Rank | Country | Support (%) |
|------|----------------|-------------|
| 1 | Denmark | 62 |
| 2 | United Kingdom | 78 |
| 3 | Germany | 88 |
| 4 | Netherlands | 88 |
| 5 | Belgium | 89 |
| 6 | Ireland | 91 |
| 7 | France | 92 |
| 8 | Luxembourg | 93 |
| 9 | Greece | 96 |
| 10 | Italy | 97 |

A European law-enforcement area

In spring 1985, as it has been seven years earlier, European public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of automatic extradition between Member States.

The question was:

It has been suggested that people sought after for crimes committed in one member country of the European Community who have taken refuge in another country should be automatically handed back to the country which wants to put them on trial. Are you completely for, somewhat for, somewhat against or completely against this idea?

TABLE 9
Attitudes to a European law-enforcement area

| | Spring 1978 | Spring 1985 |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Completely for | 70 | 66 |
| Somewhat for | 22 For = 92 | 27 For = 93 |
| Somewhat against | 4 | 5 |
| Completely against | 4 Against = 8 | 2 Against = 7 |

Clearly, European public opinion overwhelmingly supports the creation of a European law-enforcement area for nationals of all countries. Differences between the two polls are not significant, except in Germany, where the number of those 'completely for' has declined, and Denmark, where it has increased at the expense of those against. The differences in opinion are more striking when the answer to the question are analysed by the interviewee's influence on others (i.e. leadership rating) and position on left-right political spectrum. This may be a move which is approved by the general public (no doubt because it is not fully aware of the difficulties or implications), but is likely to come up against resistance on the part of some opinion leaders and left wingers (approximately 80% approval in those groups compared with 93% overall).

Priority for Community action

Europeans are quite willing to entrust their destiny to the Community rather than to national governments. In the case of the serious problem of unemployment this has been confirmed by the outcome of six polls conducted since 1976.

On all six occasions, the question was couched in similar terms along the following lines:

In your opinion, is it better for the member countries of the European Community to deal with unemployment together or for each country to take decisions separately?

TABLE 10
The best way to fight unemployment

| | Autumn 1976 | Autumn 1978 | Autumn 1982 | Spring 1983 | Autumn 1984 | Autumn 1985 |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Combined action (European) | 42 | 53 | 62 | 71 | 64 | 65 |
| Independent action (national) | 58 | 47 | 38 | 29 | 36 | 35 |

The reveals a striking change in public opinion. Having witnessed the failure of national attempts to solve the scourge of rising unemployment, the European public is coming to place the confidence it has lost in its national governments in the Community (a shift of 23%). Unemployment has moved from being a merely national problem to being one of wider Community concern, an attitude also found in

spheres as disparate as water pollution, the protection of endangered species or the search for alternative forms of energy.

The high level of support for joint action in areas other than unemployment is just as striking. In 1985, in answer to the question whether they would prefer joint (Community) action to separate (national) action irrespective of the issue, a large majority supported acting together.

TABLE 11
Separate or joint action to deal with certain problems

| | | (%) | |
|----|---|-----------------|--------------|
| | Problem | Separate action | Joint action |
| 1 | Helping the Third World | 13 | 87 |
| 2 | Fighting terrorism and crime | 16 | 84 |
| 3 | Protecting the environment and fighting pollution | 21 | 79 |
| 4 | Developing scientific research | 22 | 78 |
| 5 | Guaranteeing energy supplies | 23 | 77 |
| 6 | Helping the least developed regions | 31 | 69 |
| 7 | Fighting unemployment | 35 | 65 |
| 8 | Fighting rising prices | 35 | 65 |
| 9 | Protecting national security against external threats | 36 | 64 |
| 10 | Protecting the consumer against false or misleading advertising | 45 | 55 |

Although the survey was carried out some weeks before Spain and Portugal joined the Community, it covered the two prospective members as well. Their views on separate or joint action are not significantly different from those of the rest of the Community, although the proportion of 'don't knows' in Portugal is higher. Both countries, like their Community partners, think that the subjects listed would be better dealt with at Community than at national level.

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
It is clear, therefore, that Europeans view the European forum as more appropriate than the national one for certain matters and that the steps taken at European level to solve certain problems attract greater credibility than independent action by national governments. And the more pressing the problem in the eyes of the European public, the greater the credibility attached to a European solution.

The European public's perception of the magnitude of a problem is at least as important as its objective seriousness in justifying recourse to combined action.

It is also clear that, since the founding of the European Community, a European spirit has begun to grow up amongst its inhabitants. It is a spirit based more on economic ties than on political solidarity and consists of an informed mixture of a feeling of European citizenship (whether through a European currency or passport) and affirmation of a national or regional identity.

The future growth of the European spirit and the resilience of the idea which is its corollary are wholly dependent on the affirmation of binding economic and political ties forged with respect for the integrity of the identity of the individual — be it cultural, linguistic, regional or whatever.

II — Underlying attitudes to the European Community



The most striking trend is the surprising consistency of attitudes towards the European Community. Even the well-established tendency of enthusiasm to dissipate with time has not eroded the underlying belief of our interviewees in the unification of Europe.

Throughout the turbulent journey towards European unification, the ups and downs, the crises and setbacks, the faith of the European public has remained unshaken. Neither the energy squeeze, the trade disputes with America and Japan, the steel crisis nor the world recession have succeeded in undermining the underlying confidence in the European Community.

We shall be looking at these deep-seated attitudes through four particular themes. Firstly, we shall be examining the spectrum of opinions, hopes and beliefs about a united Europe — a sort of climate, general feeling and consensus of opinion — and gauging the degree of support for European unification. Our second field of examination revolves around the far more concrete and specific question (and one in

which the personal involvement of the interviewees is a crucial factor), the attitude to one's own country's membership of the Community. The third theme is the feeling of having benefited — more or less than other countries — from Community membership. And the fourth will consider reactions if the European Community were to be scrapped. These four themes will illustrate the depth of the attachment felt by Europeans for the Community.

However (and this will be examined separately), it would not be correct to conclude from this consensus that European public opinion is monolithic. Differences of opinion and feeling are in clear evidence, principally attributable to national, cultural or other sociological differences.

Thirty-five years of large majority support for a united Europe

The question has been put on a number of occasions since 1973 and even well before:

In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe? If for, are you very much for or to some extent for? If against, are you very much against, or to some extent against?

While admittedly couched in very general terms, the question is nevertheless interesting on at least two counts. Firstly, it is not restricted in ambit to a concrete achievement (the European Community) but probes further to examine a general feeling, possibly emotional to some degree, of support for the ideal of a united Europe. And secondly, we now have available data on this question going back over almost 35 years.

The positive attitudes towards the unification of Europe since 1952 can be clearly seen when depicted in graph form. The findings do not differentiate according to the number of countries polled (4 countries from 1952 to 1967, 6 countries in 1970, 9 countries from 1973 to 1980, 10 countries from 1980 to 1985 and 12 from autumn 1985) since that is not statistically significant one way (relative weight of countries most in favour) or the other.


The findings are quite remarkable: support for a united Europe has varied over the past 30 years only within a bracket of 81 to 91%, with an average of 87% in favour.

What, then, are the obstacles to the Community fully achieving the goals laid down in its founding treaties?

Graph 1

**Trends in support 'For the unification of Europe'
between 1952 and 1985**

(%)



Firstly, and this should not be underestimated, 15% of those interviewed were not drawn, or not at all drawn, by the European ideal. That represents a powerful degree of inertia in the population of Europe. Secondly, and equally important, are the national, regional and cultural feelings which were unquestionably pushed into the background in the first flushes of Community enthusiasm. Each person perceives loss of identity in his own, subjective, way.

However that may be, it too constitutes to varying degrees a further form of passive, or even active, resistance to understanding between peoples.

For or against membership of the Community

Here, the aim has changed from assessing whether the climate of opinion supported or opposed an ideal to eliciting opinions on an established fact:

Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership of the European Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

This question has been asked regularly each year since 1973. Graph 2 illustrates the number of those who thought is a 'good thing'. Once again, the constancy of the opinions stands out: over the past 12 years, the trend has moved only within a bracket of 68 to 54%.

The arithmetic mean for the Community over the years is thus:

| | |
|----------------------|-----|
| Good thing | 61% |
| Bad thing | 14% |
| Neither good nor bad | 25% |

Despite the relatively stable opinions, Graph 2 does reveal a slight downward trend in support for the Community, offset by a rise in the 'neutral stance' (neither good nor bad) rather than those expressing outright opposition.

This graph, again, demonstrates the existence of a positive attitude, although it is less pronounced than support for the ideal of a united Europe.

Benefits of Community membership

More precisely that the previous question (is membership of the Community a good or a bad thing?), the benefits which Community membership is felt to have brought measure the degree of reasoned and objective support enjoyed by the Community in each Member State. This is not emotional support for an idea or an achievement but a cool analysis of the advantages of membership. The question was asked in the following terms:

Taking everything into consideration, would you say that your country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?


This question has been asked on five occasions since spring 1983. There has been little change from one survey to another, with almost two thirds of Europeans feeling that their country has benefited from Community membership.

Analysis of these results by country (Graph 3) shows that a majority in all countries except the United Kingdom think that their country has benefited from membership of the Community. This feeling varies depending on when the survey was carried out, but only within narrow limits. Only in two countries, Belgium and Germany, have the variations exceeded 20%.

Graph 2

What the public thinks of membership of the European Community

Membership of the Common Market¹




¹ The average of opinions in the 9 Member States of the European Community (1973-80) and following the accession of Greece in 1981 in the Member States.

TABLE 12
Feeling that one's country has benefited from membership of the Community
(Community as a whole)

(%)

| | Has benefited | Has not benefited | Don't know |
|-------------|---------------|-------------------|------------|
| Spring 1983 | 68 | 32 | (23) |
| Spring 1984 | 61 | 39 | (24) |
| Autumn 1984 | 58 | 42 | (18) |
| Spring 1985 | 61 | 39 | (18) |
| Autumn 1985 | 64 | 36 | (17) |



Reactions if the Community were to be scrapped

This question sought to shift the emphasis away from the positive aspects (trends in attitudes towards a project or an achievement) towards the negative, and purely speculative, possibility of the European ideal being cast aside.

The question:

If you were to be told tomorrow that the European Community (Common Market) had been scrapped, would you be very sorry, indifferent (not caring either way) or relieved?

has been put regularly in the same form 16 times since 1973. The findings are:

TABLE 13
Attitude to the scrapping of the Community (EUR 6 and Community)

(%)

| | Aut. 1973 | Spring 1974 | Aut. 1974 | Spring 1975 | Aut. 1975 | Spring 1977 | Aut. 1981 | Spring 1981 | Aut. 1982 | Spring 1982 | Aut. 1983 | Spring 1983 | Aut. 1984 | Spring 1984 | Aut. 1985 | Spring 1985 |
|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|
| EUR 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Very sorry | 47 | 65 | 65 | 60 | 56 | 57 | 49 | 51 | 53 | 49 | 54 | 51 | 51 | 49 | 52 | 56 |
| Indifferent | 41 | 30 | 31 | 35 | 40 | 38 | 44 | 45 | 42 | 44 | 43 | 43 | 44 | 47 | 44 | 40 |
| Relieved | 12 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Community | EUR 9 | | | | | | EUR 10 | | | | | | | | | EUR 12 |
| Very sorry | 47 | 55 | 56 | 56 | 53 | 51 | 42 | 43 | 45 | 43 | 46 | 45 | 44 | 43 | 46 | 48 |
| Indifferent | 41 | 31 | 34 | 34 | 37 | 36 | 40 | 43 | 41 | 40 | 44 | 42 | 44 | 46 | 42 | 41 |
| Relieved | 12 | 14 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 13 | 18 | 14 | 14 | 17 | 10 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 |

The negative reaction to scrapping the European Community ('relieved') correlates fairly closely to negative responses on other fronts at between 10% and 15%. The truly significant difference, however, lies in the ground lost by the positive response ('very sorry') to the neutral ('indifferent'). However, given that the question is hypothetical, it should come as no surprise that 4 out of 10 respondents prefer to wait and see.

It is interesting to note that, when the question was asked in autumn 1985 in Spain and Portugal, both about to join the Community, negative attitudes ('relieved') were below the Community average but indifference was much higher.

TABLE 14
Comparison of attitudes to the scrapping of the Community in Spain,
Portugal and the Community of Ten (Autumn 1985)

(%)

| Autumn 1985 | Spain | Portugal | Europe of Ten |
|-------------|-------|----------|---------------|
| Very sorry | 43 | 30 | 48 |
| Indifferent | 50 | 60 | 41 |
| Relieved | 7 | 10 | 11 |
| Don't know | (18) | (18) | (10) |


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- Sustained but weak opposition
- Dwindling support (but still the vast majority)
- Increasing indifference

Attitudes to the European Community can be broadly divided into these three groups, which cumulatively represent the underlying attitudes of the European public.

The clear message to 'Europe' of the 25 surveys analysed in this booklet is that its population consists of 14% of people opposed to, 25% indifferent to and 61% in favour of continued and increased European integration.

But the corollary of dwindling support is not increased opposition. Rather, the disaffected and perturbed are moving to occupy the middle ground of indifference.



Support for the European ideal remains more alive in the six founding countries than in the more recent members.

The findings need to be interpreted in the light of established realities and developments. The European Community is no longer a far-fetched idea, still less a dream. It has become a reality; a work of Man, endowed with all his weaknesses and imperfections. And in the face of that, enthusiasm must begin to wane slightly.

Nevertheless, there can be no escaping the conclusion that while the European ideal may no longer be fresh, it is enduring.

European opinion and national opinions

Whether European or national, public opinion is not monolithic. Customarily, the findings of international surveys are presented on a country-by-country basis; but it would be dangerous to conclude from that that the contacts are first and foremost German, French or Italian rather than men and women, young or old, wealthy or poor, educated or uneducated. And the same applies to European opinion, which, after all, is only the collated opinions of individuals (men and women, young and old, etc.) from various countries.

But — and without wishing here to delve into that form of sensationalism which describes any country as more receptive to an idea than any other or which attempts to rank nations according to problems — it must still be admitted that nationality is one of the significant variables in shaping attitudes.

It was a significant factor in the replies 'very satisfied' received to the question:

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied, with the life you lead?

The feeling of satisfaction was considerably more marked in the smaller countries of the Community (Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ireland — but not Belgium) than in the bigger ones (United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy). More northerly countries tended to score higher than those in the south (Denmark and the Netherlands amongst the smaller countries; the United Kingdom and Germany amongst the larger).

The latest results from Greece (about 15% very satisfied), Spain (23%) and Portugal (3%) further undermine the explanation by size of country but confirm that, in Europe, satisfaction with one's life is an essentially northern feeling, perhaps linked with the Protestant ethic or the democratic tradition of certain countries.

TABLE 15
 'Very satisfied' with life

| Country | (%) | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | 1973 | Spring 1975 | Autumn 1977 | Autumn 1978 | Spring 1979 | Spring 1981 | Spring 1982 | Spring 1983 | Spring 1984 | Spring 1985 | Autumn 1985 |
| Belgium | 43 | 39 | 46 | 46 | 42 | 36 | 29 | 23 | 30 | 26 | 18 |
| Denmark | 51 | 51 | 52 | 57 | 51 | 59 | 57 | 54 | 56 | 63 | 55 |
| Germany | 16 | 13 | 24 | 20 | 24 | 16 | 20 | 18 | 20 | 24 | 14 |
| France | 15 | 16 | 13 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 16 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 10 |
| Ireland | 53 | 36 | 42 | 41 | 37 | 34 | 40 | 35 | 36 | 31 | 25 |
| Italy | 8 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 9 | 13 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 15 | 10 |
| Luxembourg | 40 | 26 | 38 | 34 | 33 | 40 | 39 | 38 | 38 | 39 | 41 |
| The Netherlands | 41 | 33 | 44 | 44 | 46 | 44 | 42 | 39 | 44 | 40 | 35 |
| United Kingdom | 33 | 32 | 31 | 32 | 27 | 32 | 36 | 29 | 32 | 33 | 30 |

But national public opinion is no more homogeneous than European opinion. Both are shaped by the interplay of the entire spectrum of trends followed by young and old, the educated and educationally-deprived, opinion leaders and others.

One thing all surveys agree on, however, about the opinion leaders — that is, those people whose professional lives lead them to exercise greater influence on others' opinions than others do on theirs — is that their behavioural patterns differ sharply from those of the rest of the country. Whatever nationality they may be!

The opinion shapers in the *Eurobarometer* surveys are identified by their propensity not only to initiate political discussions among their circles of friends, but also by their propensity to convince others of their own deeply-held convictions.

A breakdown of the support for the unification of Western Europe into the replies given by opinion leaders and those given by the rest of the population reveals sharp differences in opinion between the two groups.

The opinions of opinion leaders, who make up on average 12% of the total population, contrast strongly with those of their fellow citizens. The precise degree may vary between countries but the phenomenon itself is constant.

Clearly, nationality is not the only variable by which opinions are shaped.

The discrepancies in the national findings would appear to depend more on variations in political, socio-economic and cultural climates than on differences in basic mentality. In general the regions of a single country present wider variations than do the national averages and even more marked variations can be perceived between social groups (young people, the well educated, opinion leaders, rural populations, etc.).

TABLE 16
Support for the unification of Western Europe by leadership rating in 1981

(%)

| Country | 'Very much for' | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| | Leaders | Rest of pop. | Pop. as a whole |
| Belgium | 42 | 17 | 18 |
| Denmark | 24 | 16 | 17 |
| Germany | 52 | 29 | 31 |
| Greece | 35 | 28 | 30 |
| France | 22 | 15 | 16 |
| Ireland | 39 | 19 | 20 |
| Italy | 45 | 34 | 36 |
| Luxembourg | 57 | 42 | 45 |
| The Netherlands | 35 | 29 | 30 |
| United Kingdom | 28 | 16 | 17 |

Those who are, or perceive themselves to be, more advantaged and those with responsible positions tend to be markedly more in favour of the Community, whatever their nationality.

The traditional method of presenting the findings of international surveys by country and only by country conceals — by its design — the similarities or differences between social groups.

III — A people's Europe



The European institutions are constantly seeking ways of improving the Community's image in the eyes of its citizens. On a number of occasions in the past few years the Heads of State or Government of the Member States have stressed the need to fulfil the expectations of the people of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen the Community's identity and its public image.

It is hardly surprising that within each country support for the idea of a Community symbol correlates with general support for European unification and for Community membership.

In spring 1984 European public opinion was offered eight symbols to see whether it supported various ways of giving concrete form to European integration.

TABLE 17
Attitudes to the symbols of European integration

(%)

| | For | Against |
|---|-----|---------|
| <i>Supposing you were asked to vote on the following ideas; which would then apply to all countries equally in the European Community. Would you vote for or against?</i> | | |
| To give all citizens of European Community countries the possibility to get a European passport which enables them to travel without hindrance in the 10 countries | 88 | 12 |
| To have a European currency as well as our own, with notes and coins that could be used everywhere in the 10 countries of the European Community in the same way we use our own (national currency) | 73 | 27 |
| In the next Olympic games, instead of 10 teams representing the 10 European countries, send one European team representing the best of the European Community as a whole | 29 | 71 |
| Make it possible to arrest and bring to trial anyone accused of a serious crime, even if they have taken refuge in another country of the Community | 90 | 10 |
| To have only one ambassador to represent the 10 countries of the Community in Washington or in Moscow | 30 | 70 |
| A firm hiring staff can choose people from any country of the European Community as well as (nationals) | 68 | 32 |
| – You receive the same social benefit and payments as in the other countries of the Community neither more or less | 76 | 24 |
| It will be forbidden to prevent products of another country of the European Community from being sold here | 54 | 46 |

This table reveals broad agreement on five of the eight proposals: the European law-enforcement area, the European passport, a 'social' Europe, a European currency and the free movement of workers are symbols which already have a hold on public opinion. Opinion on a sixth — free trade across frontiers — is more or less equally divided. But the two most 'symbolic' symbols — a European ambassador and a European team in the Olympic Games — are unequivocally rejected. Does this mean that some symbols are more resistant than national sovereignty itself? Here too, opinions seem to be formed at least as much by emotions as by objective factors. In 1976 the following question on the national flag was asked:

Are you for or against, or have you no feelings one way or the other about the national flag being flown under a European flag on ceremonial occasions?

Despite the mention of two flags in the question, almost one European in two (46%) rejected the idea of flying the European flag above the national flag.

These figures from 1976 confirm the reluctance of Europeans to give up certain national symbols but — and this is confirmed by the 1984 survey — this does not in any way prejudice their willingness to renounce certain prerogatives or aspects of sovereignty for the good of the Community.

What's in a name: the European Community

A different way in which the Community institutions take concrete form is through the name given to them. A wide variety of names including Common Market, European Economic Community, Europe of the Ten, Europe of the Twelve and the EEC, has been used and many of them are still current.

In 1984 and 1985 two questions, worded in different ways but designed for the same purpose, were asked.

In 1984: *Your country and nine other European countries belong to 'the European Community', which is also called 'the Common Market', or 'EEC' or 'The Ten'. Among these names is there one you prefer and which one?*

In 1985: *Your country belongs to the 'European Community', which is also called the 'Common Market'. Which of these two names do you personally prefer?*

TABLE 18
'European Community' or 'Common Market': preferences in 1984 and 1985
 ('Don't knows' and other names excluded)

| | (%) | |
|--------------------|------|------|
| | 1984 | 1985 |
| European Community | 71 | 74 |
| Common Market | 29 | 26 |

The preferred name, 'The European Community', has connotations of common interest, agreement and unity.

What brings people together is preferred to either economic concepts ('Common Market', 'European Economic Community') or names stressing diversity ('The European Communities', 'Europe of the Ten'). The choice of a name is not as neutral as one might think and follows the pattern set by the decisions taken by Parlia-

ment and the Council of Ministers in 1978 to unite the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) under the same title.

Abolition of checks and formalities at the Community's internal frontiers

Two Europeans in three support the abolition of checks and formalities at the Community's internal frontiers. This is shown by answers to the following question, which was asked in spring 1985:

It has been proposed that we could get rid of all police and customs controls for citizens of member countries of the European Community when they travel between these countries. Are you very much for, rather for, rather against or very much against such a decision?

TABLE 19
Abolition of checks and formalities at the Community's internal frontiers

| | Spring 1985 |
|-------------------|-------------|
| Very much for | 33 |
| Rather for | 31 |
| Rather against | 20 |
| Very much against | 16 |

However, this general support for abolishing customs formalities masks certain divergences attributable to nationality or age group, to cite but two examples. If we construct an index of agreement to the abolition of frontier formalities, the results for the different categories vary considerably.¹

Table 20 shows that a 50-year-old Belgian strongly in favour of European unification would be much more likely to support abolition of customs formalities than a 20-year-old Briton who is against European unification.

¹ The index is constructed by giving 4 points to 'very much for', 3 points to 'rather for', 2 points to 'rather against' and 1 point to 'very much against' and excluding 'don't knows'. The total number of points is then divided by the number of individuals involved. The range of the index is thus 1 to 4.

TABLE 20
Index of support for the abolition of frontier formalities by category

| | Category | Index |
|----------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| | | Community as a whole |
| Nationality | Belgium | 3.38 |
| | Germany | 3.29 |
| | Luxembourg | 3.06 |
| | Greece | 3.02 |
| | Netherlands | 2.94 |
| | France | 2.93 |
| | Italy | 2.72 |
| | Ireland | 2.38 |
| | Denmark | 2.12 |
| | United Kingdom | 2.04 |
| Age bracket | 15-24 | 2.73 |
| | 25-39 | 2.80 |
| | 40-54 | 2.84 |
| | 55 and over | 2.79 |
| Support for European unification | Very much for | 3.05 |
| | Rather for | 2.74 |
| | Rather against | 2.47 |
| | Very much against | 2.22 |

So, while we think in general that young people are more enthusiastic about the European idea and hence about its symbols, the opposite is true in this case: young people aged between 15 and 24 are slightly less in favour of abolishing customs formalities than their elders, even though they tend to travel more.

*
* *

Although the people of the Community are strongly attached to some symbols of national sovereignty, there is no doubt that other expressions of sovereignty could be transferred to the European Community. In the public's view, a people's Europe already exists in the case of social, monetary and legal issues and the free movement of goods and persons. It is therefore up to the institutions responsible to give concrete form to these aspirations. Will the people's Europe outstrip political Europe?

IV — A European Parliament: for what?



As we have already seen, in general the European public supports efforts to unify Europe and is in favour of decisions being taken jointly by the Community (in fields as varied as the European law-enforcement area and a 'social' Europe). What does it think about the Assembly of the European Community: the European Parliament? Does it feel that this is where Community decisions are taken?

The European Parliament: unflagging public hope and spasmodic awareness

It is extremely interesting to compare Parliament's present role with public aspirations for it. The scale of Parliament's role in Community life at the moment is very different from the one people would like to see it play. Two questions were asked to gauge both sets of attitudes:

How important would you say the European Parliament is in the life of the European Community today: very important, not very important, or not important at all?

Would you, personally, prefer that the European Parliament played a more or less important part than it does now?

TABLE 21
Index of Parliament's present and future roles

| Spring 1983 | | Spring 1984 | | Spring 1985 | | Autumn 1985 | |
|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|-------------|--------|
| Present | Future | Present | Future | Present | Future | Present | Future |
| 2.69 | 3.33 | 2.55 | 3.28 | 2.67 | 3.33 | 2.63 | 3.28 |

In order to compare replies on Parliament's present and future roles, an index was produced for each question. It ranges from 1 to 4; the mid-point is therefore 2.5.

While the score for Parliament's present role is slightly above the mid-point, ranging from 2.55 to 2.69, the score for its future role is much higher and, ranging from 3.28 to 3.33, virtually constant for the four surveys. Aspirations far exceed current performance and show an act of faith (or of hope) on the part of the European public.

To complete the picture, it should be noted that in spring 1983 the score for the current role of the *national* Parliament was 3.16 (compared with 2.69 for the European Parliament at that time).


But, present and future roles aside, how well known is the European Parliament? Does media coverage get through to the public? To find out, the following question has been asked on 11 occasions since 1977:

Have you recently seen or read in the papers, or on the radio or television anything about the European Parliament, that is, the parliamentary assembly of the European Community (Common Market)?

As Graph 4 shows, public awareness of Parliament fluctuates widely, rising sharply at European election time (spring 1979 and spring 1984) and dropping shortly after-

Graph 4

Public awareness of the European Parliament
(1977 - 85)



wards. The graph shows the percentage of people claiming to have recently read something about the European Parliament in the papers or heard something about it on the radio or television.

Public awareness of Parliament throughout the Community over this period averages out at 57%. Table 22 shows the results broken down by country.

It is interesting to note that the three top and two bottom places in this list and in the table assessing the perceived benefits of Community membership (Table 13) are occupied by the same countries: the top three countries (Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands) also feel they have benefited most from Community membership; the bottom two countries (the United Kingdom and Greece) are those where perception of the benefits is lowest; the positions of Denmark and Ireland (where average awareness is greater than in Belgium and Germany) are also the same on both lists.

TABLE 22
Average public awareness of the European Parliament by country
(1977-85)

| | | (%) | |
|-------------|----|---------------------|----|
| Luxembourg | 69 | Denmark | 58 |
| Italy | 61 | Germany | 57 |
| Netherlands | 59 | Belgium | 54 |
| France | 58 | United Kingdom | 51 |
| Ireland | 58 | Greece ¹ | 50 |

¹ From 1982 to 1985 in the case of Greece.

The logical interpretation of the link between the two attitudes is that support for the European Community correlates positively with interest in one of its institutions (Parliament). This appears in fact to be true, particularly in Luxembourg and Italy.

The work of the European Parliament: judgment reserved

A question asked in spring 1983 indicates how Parliament's activities are seen by the general public:

All in all, do you consider that the European Parliament is or is not doing a good job?

TABLE 23
Views on the work of the European Parliament

| | (%) |
|-------------------------|------|
| Is doing a good job | 59 |
| Is not doing a good job | 41 |
| Don't know | (38) |

Another way of assessing the public's view of Parliament is to look at the impression of Parliament received from press, radio or television coverage. The following question has been asked on four occasions since 1982:

If you have recently seen or heard in the papers, or on the radio or TV, anything about the European Parliament has what you read or heard given you a generally favourable or unfavourable impression of the European Parliament?

It should be remembered that the following table reflects the views only of those who have actually read or heard something about the European Parliament

TABLE 24
Impression of the European Parliament from the media
Replies by those who had read or heard something

(%)

| Impression | Autumn 1982 | Spring 1983 | Spring 1985 | Autumn 1985 |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Generally favourable | 32 | 40 | 33 | 39 |
| Neither favourable nor unfavourable ¹ | 30 | 27 | 32 | 29 |
| Generally unfavourable | 38 | 33 | 35 | 32 |

¹ Spontaneous reply.

(that is, 54% in autumn 1982, 37% in spring 1983, 61% in spring 1985 and 53% in autumn 1985), since it is not possible to have a view on something about which one has not heard.


The public's judgment of the work of the European Parliament is therefore somewhat reserved.

*
* *

Despite this, the public's expectations of Parliament are surprisingly (and consistently) high.

Whatever the polling period the European public seems to expect a lot of Parliament. Although awareness of the institution through media coverage increases strongly at election time, public expectations of its work do not vary — they remain consistently high, showing the extent of the European public's aspirations for Parliament.

V — Community enlargement: welcome to Spain and Portugal



Spain and Portugal joined the European Community on 1 January 1986. The Community began with six Member States; the first enlargement in 1973 brought in Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom; Greece joined in 1981; and finally Spain and Portugal became members in 1986 bringing the number of countries working

together 'to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared'¹ to 12.

Attitudes of the Ten

How do Europeans feel about the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community?

In autumn 1977, we asked our interviewees:

Three European countries — Greece, Portugal and Spain — have recently applied to join the European Community (Common Market). Do you, personally, think that Greece's entry into the European Community will be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

And Portuguese entry?

And Spanish entry?

Bearing in mind that in 1977 Greece was not yet a full member of the Community but only an applicant for membership, our respondents thought as follows:

TABLE 25
Attitude to the accession of Greece, Portugal and Spain to the European Community

| | Good thing | Bad thing | Neither good nor bad | No reply |
|----------|------------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| Greece | 42 | 20 | 38 | (23) |
| Portugal | 43 | 21 | 36 | (22) |
| Spain | 48 | 20 | 32 | (20) |

In other words four Europeans in five either positively supported or were indifferent to Portuguese and Spanish accession, with the positive reactions outnumbering the negative by more than two to one.

This general welcome for Spain and Portugal is confirmed by further findings collected in 1983 and 1985.

Thinking about Spain joining the European Community, are you strongly for, somewhat for, somewhat against or strongly against?

And thinking about Portugal (. . .)?

¹ Preamble to the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.

TABLE 26
For or against the accession of Spain and Portugal to the Community

(%)

| | Spain | | Portugal | |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Autumn 1983 | Spring 1985 | Autumn 1983 | Spring 1985 |
| Strongly for | 23 | 32 | 22 | 31 |
| Somewhat for | 49 | 46 | 49 | 48 |
| Somewhat against | 16 | 15 | 17 | 14 |
| Strongly against | 12 | 7 | 12 | 7 |

Comparing the figures for 1977, 1983 and 1985, we can see that, following a slump in 1983 probably due to the protracted and intricate nature of the negotiations, by 1985 support had regained its 1977 level. Expressing the scores for the three years as an index from 1 to 4 gives the following results:

TABLE 27
Index of support for the accession of Spain and Portugal

| | 1977 | 1983 | 1985 |
|----------|------|------|------|
| Spain | 3.04 | 2.82 | 3.01 |
| Portugal | 2.96 | 2.80 | 3.04 |

There is no doubt that, at least since 1977, public opinion in the Member States has accepted and indeed been keen on the idea of Spain and Portugal joining the Community. Did the institutions turn a deaf ear? Or, more likely, were negotiations concerned with something more than mere agreements in principle?

Reactions in Spain and Portugal

Between 1980 and 1985 a number of surveys were carried out in Portugal and Spain parallel to the *Eurobarometer* polls. The aim of these surveys, which used a restricted sequence of questions, was to investigate Spanish and Portuguese attitudes to the prospect of joining the Community.

The prospect was viewed favourably in both countries, although a higher degree of involvement was discernible in Spain than in Portugal, where as many as 50% of our interviewees were indifferent or refused to reply.

The Spanish view the European Community as a bulwark of democracy, as helping the country's economic development and strengthening Spain's voice in world affairs; whereas in Portugal, the primary motivators are economic (increased choice of consumer goods, and energy supply) and political (giving Portugal a role in the world).

One of the questions asked in Spain and Portugal dealt with attitudes to joining the Community; it is phrased in similar terms to that put to interviewees in the Member States (see Chapter II).

Generally speaking, do you think your country's membership of the European Community (Common Market) will be a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

TABLE 28
Comparison of opinions on the accession of Spain and Portugal with attitudes to membership of the individual's own country

| | Good thing | Bad thing | Neither good nor bad | No reply |
|---|------------|-----------|----------------------|----------|
| Spanish opinion on Spanish membership | 54 | 6 | 18 | 22 |
| Portuguese opinion on Portuguese membership | 28 | 9 | 16 | 47 |
| Membership of own country | 54 | 14 | 25 | 7 |

(%)

While more than half our Spanish interviewees supported their country's moves to join the Community, a correlation did appear between the rise in those undecided ('neither good nor bad') and the protracted accession negotiations. The same correlation appeared in the Portuguese survey. The majority of respondents in Portugal thought accession a 'good thing', but almost half our interviewees did not reply to this question.

Leaving aside the high to very high non-response rate, there was no significant difference between the opinions of the Spanish, the Portuguese and individuals in the 10 Member States as to the benefits of Community membership. In all cases the percentage of the public considering it a 'good thing' outweighed the uncommitted and the antipathetic.

The Community of Twelve

Should we now talk of the Community of Ten plus two or of the Community of Twelve? The concept of union is undoubtedly preferable to that of addition.

To check on this, it is useful to compare the replies to questions on a number of current problems in autumn 1985 in Spain and Portugal with the average in the other Member States.

Here are a number of present day problems. For each one would you tell me if it is better that decisions about it should be taken by each country separately or by the member countries of the European Community (Common Market) acting together?

TABLE 29
Acting together to deal with certain problems
Comparison of views in the Ten, Spain and Portugal

(%)

| | The Ten | Spain | Portugal |
|--|---------|-------|----------|
| Reducing the differences between regions | 69 | 71 | 71 |
| Protecting the environment and fighting pollution | 79 | 79 | 84 |
| Fighting rising prices | 65 | 74 | 70 |
| Stimulating the economy so as to help fight unemployment | 65 | 75 | 74 |
| Developing scientific and technical research | 78 | 86 | 89 |
| Fighting terrorism and crime | 84 | 85 | 83 |
| Guaranteeing energy supplies | 77 | 82 | 79 |
| Helping the Third World | 87 | 92 | 91 |
| Protecting national security against external threats | 64 | 71 | 68 |
| Protecting consumers against misleading advertising | 55 | 67 | 68 |

The differences of opinion between Spain and Portugal and the Community of Ten are very slight and, curiously enough, in nearly all cases reflect greater confidence by the new members in action taken together at Community level. Average support for joint action in the Ten whatever the problem, runs at 72% whereas in Spain and Portugal it is 78%.


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The process, the ultimate aim of which is the construction of a united Europe, is moving forward, actively supported by the great majority of Europeans.

More than three quarters of the population of the 10 Member States welcomes Portuguese and Spanish membership of the Community.

Similarly, the majority of the public in both Spain and Portugal support their countries' accession to the European Community (and this figure has risen steadily since the beginning of 1985) even if, in many cases, membership is not one of their principal preoccupations.

VI — Europeans and the future



The 'United States of Europe'

European attitudes to Parliament's attempt to create a true political entity are of particular interest. There are two ways of gauging opinion on this subject: acceptance or rejection of the idea of a 'United States of Europe' and the feeling that one's own country must take part if political union is to have any meaning.

One quarter of Europeans — ranging from 66% in Denmark down to only 11% or 12% in Belgium, Germany and Ireland — reject the idea of a 'United States of Europe'.

Graph 5

Public opinion in the European Community about the unification of Western Europe




TABLE 30
Attitude to the idea of a 'United States of Europe'

(%)

| | Autumn 1984 | Autumn 1985 |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Good idea | 59 |
| It depends ¹ | 17 | 15 |
| Bad idea | 24 | 27 |

¹ Volunteered.

There would therefore appear to be slightly less public support for the realization of the European ideal in its political form than there is for the way it operates at present, mainly on the basis of economic solidarity. In case you have forgotten, those opposed to the present situation totalled 14% (as against 25% in the case of the plan for political union), those indifferent 25% (as against 16%) and those in favour 61% (as against 59%).

It is interesting to see what proportion of the supporters of political union consider participation by their own country and the other individual countries essential to the creation of a 'United States of Europe'.

TABLE 31
Participation in a 'United States of Europe'
(% of nationals and % of Europeans)

| Country | Participation absolutely essential | |
|----------------|------------------------------------|----------------|
| | % of nationals | % of Europeans |
| Germany | 98 | 90 (1) |
| Luxembourg | 95 | 38 (8) |
| France | 87 | 87 (2) |
| Belgium | 84 | 51 (6) |
| Netherlands | 82 | 55 (5) |
| Greece | 76 | 29 (10) |
| Denmark | 76 | 39 (7) |
| United Kingdom | 67 | 69 (37) |
| Italy | 54 | 61 (4) |
| Ireland | 33 | 29 (9) |

These findings present some worrying features: why do 95% of the inhabitants of Luxembourg regard their country's participation in the 'United States of Europe' as absolutely essential while only 38% of Europeans consider it necessary? Why do only 33% of the Irish support the idea although in general they are fairly pro-European?

TABLE 32
A 'United States of Europe': time-scale for attainment

| | (%) |
|-------------------------|-----|
| In the next 10 years | 9 |
| 10 to 15 years from now | 16 |
| 20 to 30 years from now | 23 |
| Several generations | 25 |
| Never | 27 |

These striking discrepancies are due to the fact that Table 31 covers only those who support political union and consider that creation of a 'United States of Europe' should go forward. Another factor is that the more important a country's geographical position and the larger its population, the more Europeans as a whole consider its participation essential.

Moreover, although 59% of the public accept the idea of a 'United States of Europe', only a fairly small proportion expect to see it achieved this century.

The idea of political union is very much alive and acceptable to 6 Europeans in 10 but only 25% of the population expect to see it achieved this century; one in two consider that it will take several generations or possibly never be achieved.

Public priorities: job creation and social welfare

A question asked in spring 1984 investigated the areas on which the public felt the countries of the Community should concentrate:

Of the following areas, on which two do you think the countries of the European Community working together should concentrate their efforts in the next 5 or 6 years?

TABLE 33
Priorities for joint action: results for the Community
and highest and lowest scores¹

| | Community | Highest score | Lowest score |
|--------------------------------|-----------|------------------|-----------------|
| Creating jobs | 77 | Ireland (88) | Greece (51) |
| Social welfare | 28 | Luxembourg (49) | Italy (18) |
| Defence | 20 | France (27) | Luxembourg (8) |
| Agriculture | 20 | Greece (33) | Luxembourg (10) |
| Help to poorer parts of Europe | 17 | Greece (34) | Netherlands (9) |
| Scientific research | 16 | France (25) | Ireland (6) |
| Help to the Third World | 15 | Netherlands (23) | Belgium (7) |

¹ Since it was possible to give two answers, totals exceed 100.

One problem stands out clearly from the others in all countries: job creation, followed, admittedly at some distance, by social welfare. The relative importance of the other problems depends on the countries involved: agriculture in Greece and Italy, defence in France and the United Kingdom, scientific research in France, and help to the Third World in the Netherlands.

Europeans want the Community to deal with the problems which affect them directly (unemployment, social security) rather than engage in solidarity-building measures (whether internal or external), which they consider less pressing.

How will the European Community look in 10 years' time?

In 1981, a question was put containing three hypotheses:

Here are three ways in which the European Community might develop in the course of the next 10 years. Can you tell me which of these three is the most likely to happen?

- 1. The ties between the member countries of the Community will get weaker because, in these times of great difficulties, each country will be thinking above all of its own interests.*
- 2. Cooperation between the countries belonging to the Community will carry on more or less as it is now.*
- 3. The ties between the member countries of the Community will get stronger because, in these times of great difficulties, the member countries will become more and more aware that they cannot solve their problems on their own.*

28% of Europeans opted for the first alternative ('ties will get weaker'), 38% chose the neutral option ('carry on as it is now') and 34% the third ('stronger links').

In other words, more than 7 Europeans in 10 feel that links between the Member States over the coming decade will be at least as strong as they are now.

That is a challenge to the future for the European Community. The European public believes in it; and one token of that faith is the general willingness of Europeans to see the Community taking combined action to tackle unemployment.

Hopes and fears for the future

What are likely to be the forces for change in the lives of Europeans during the coming decade.

In spring 1982, *Eurobarometer* asked its interviewees two questions about their hopes and fears for the future. Those who replied showed a broad level of agreement.

The three most recurrent 'hopes' were:

- (i) scientific and technological developments (selected by 39% of Europeans),
- (ii) understanding and goodwill between fellow citizens (35%),
- (iii) prospects for improved living standards (31%).

The three principal fears were:

- (i) rise in crime and terrorism (71%),
- (ii) rising unemployment (66%),
- (iii) despoiling of natural life (57%).

Interestingly enough, the principal hopes and fears are all economic and social. Politically-oriented possibilities were less frequently selected.

Both in today's world, and that of the coming decade, 'economics' prevail over 'politics'.

The full findings of the questions on the hopes and fears of the European public confirm the lack of response generated by political topics.

Hopes

Here are a certain number of things which might bring about changes in the next 10 or 15 years in the way people live in your country. Which of them in your opinion are the most promising, offering the most hope for the future?

| | Findings (%) |
|--|--------------|
| 1. Scientific and technological developments | 39 |
| 2. Changes in moral values (in your country) | 21 |
| 3. Prospects for the standard of living (in your country) | 31 |
| 4. The unification of Europe | 17 |
| 5. Understanding and goodwill amongst the people of your country | 35 |

| | |
|--|----|
| 6. Changes in relations between East and West | 25 |
| 7. Understanding between the industrialized countries and the Third World ... | 27 |
| 8. Relations between local and regional authorities and national government .. | 17 |
| 9. The quality of life | 30 |
| 10. None of these | 9 |

Fears

Here are some kinds of fears which are sometimes expressed about the future, say in the next 10 or 15 years, of the world we live in. I would like you to tell me which of the following really concern or worry you.

| | Findings (%) |
|--|--------------|
| 1. More and more artificial things are coming into the life we lead (housing, traffic, food) | 41 |
| 2. The despoiling of natural life and the countryside by pollution of all kinds ... | 57 |
| 3. Increase in unemployment as a consequence of the automation of jobs | 66 |
| 4. Your country's loss of influence in Europe | 14 |
| 5. Prolonged breakdown in supplies of oil and natural gas | 23 |
| 6. The invasion of your country by low-priced products from the Far East | 20 |
| 7. A critical deterioration in international relations | 35 |
| 8. A rise in tensions between different groups in your society resulting in serious and lasting disorders | 38 |
| 9. A reduction in the influence of Western Europe in the world | 10 |
| 10. The risk that the use of new medical or pharmaceutical discoveries may severely affect the human personality | 29 |
| 11. Rise in crime and terrorism | 71 |

The great causes

What are the great causes of today which Europeans consider worth fighting for? In 1982, we asked:

Which of the ideas or causes in the following list are sufficiently worthwhile for you to do something about, even if this might involve some risk, or giving up other things?

| | Findings (%) |
|--|--------------|
| 1. Sexual equality | 16 |
| 2. Protection of the environment | 35 |
| 3. World peace | 67 |
| 4. Struggle against poverty | 40 |



| | |
|------------------------------------|----|
| 5. Our country's defences | 23 |
| 6. My religious faith | 16 |
| 7. The unification of Europe | 11 |
| 8. Freedom of the individual | 40 |
| 9. Human rights | 44 |
| 10. Revolution | 3 |
| 11. None of these things | 7 |

In all countries without exception, one great cause stands out from all the others — that of *peace* (selected by 67% of all interviewees), followed by four others with relatively little to choose between them: human rights, the struggle against poverty, the freedom of the individual and protection of the environment.

An interesting comparison can be made between the number of Europeans choosing peace, and those fearing a third world war within the next 10 years.

The perception of the risk of a third world war, which showed a marked increase between 1977 and 1980, has tended to drop again since then.

TABLE 34
A third world war within the next 10 years?

(%)

| | Autumn 1977 | Spring 1980 | Autumn 1981 | Autumn 1982 | Autumn 1983 | Autumn 1984 | Autumn 1985 |
|--|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Those considering a third world war probable | 14 | 34 | 24 | 18 | 19 | 13 | 11 |

The fact that 67% of Europeans would be prepared to work for peace should be set beside the fact that 18 Europeans in 100 consider a third world war probable. War and peace are clearly subjects of deep concern to Europeans, who are prepared to take active steps to preserve peace.

*
* *

The prospects for the European Community over the next 10 years, then, seem set to be a process of continued integration in the face of increasing indifference. The European mood is less one of wanting to construct Europe than to get on with living in it.

Their hopes and fears for the future are principally economic and social; they think much less in political terms. But Europeans are still prepared to make an active stand for the great causes which most closely affect their lives — such as that of peace.

Technical appendix

I — Surveyed population, size of the samples, dates of fieldwork

| Year | Number of countries | Size of samples | Date of fieldwork |
|------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|
| 1973 | 9 | 13 500 people | September 1973 |
| 1974 | 9 | 9 300 people | March-April 1974 |
| | 9 | 9 100 people | October-November 1974 |
| 1975 | 9 | 9 400 people | May 1975 |
| | 9 | 9 150 people | October-November 1975 |
| 1976 | 9 | 8 600 people | May-June 1976 |
| | 9 | 9 200 people | November 1976 |
| 1977 | 9 | 9 050 people | April-May 1977 |
| | 9 | 8 900 people | October-November 1977 |
| 1978 | 9 | 9 350 people | May 1978 |
| | 9 | 8 800 people | October-November 1978 |
| 1979 | 9 | 9 000 people | April 1979 |
| | 9 | 9 000 people | October 1979 |
| 1980 | 9 | 8 900 people | April-May 1980 |
| | 10 | 10 000 people | October-November 1980 |
| 1981 | 10 | 9 900 people | April 1981 |
| | 10 | 9 900 people | October 1981 |
| 1982 | 10 | 11 700 people | March-April 1982 |
| | 10 | 9 700 people | October 1982 |
| 1983 | 10 | 9 500 people | April-May 1983 |
| | 10 | 9 700 people | September-November 1983 |
| 1984 | 10 | 9 700 people | March-April 1984 |
| | 10 | 9 900 people | October-November 1984 |
| 1985 | 10 | 9 900 people | March-April 1985 |
| | 12 | 11 800 people | October-November 1985 |

An identical set of questions is put to representative samples of the population aged 15 years and over in each of the countries; each sample — different each time — thus constitutes a scale model of the population of the survey country. The surveys are carried out by professional interviewers in the homes of the selected interviewees.

The poll is conducted by national survey institutes, all members of the 'European Omnibus Survey'. All the institutes comply with the standards set by the European Society for Opinion and Marketing Research (Esomar). They are selected by tender.

II — List of institutes carrying out the surveys

March 1986

| | |
|----------------------------|--|
| Belgique/België | Dimarso |
| Danmark | Gallup Markedsanalyse |
| Deutschland | Emnid-Institut |
| Ellas | ICAP Hellas |
| España | Instituto de Investigacion Gallup |
| France | Institut de sondages Lavalie |
| Ireland | Irish Marketing Surveys |
| Italia | Istituto per le ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opinione pubblica (DOXA) |
| Luxembourg | Institut luxembourgeois de recherches sociales (ILRES) |
| Nederland | Nederlands Institut voor de Publieke Opinie (NIPO) |
| Portugal | Sociedade de Estudos para o desenvolvimento de empresas (Norma) |
| United Kingdom | Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) |
| International Coordination | Helene Riffault (‘Faits et Opinions’, Paris) |

All *Eurobarometer* data are stored at the Belgian Archives for the Social Sciences (1, Place Montesquieu, Bte. 18, B-1348 Louvain-La-Neuve).

For all information regarding opinion surveys carried out for the Commission of the European Communities, please write to J. R. Rabier, 200 rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

III — Sampling

The sample has been designed to be representative of the total population aged 15 years and over of the 12 countries of the Community. In each country a two-stage sampling method is used:

Geographical distribution

For statistical purposes the European Community divides Europe into 140 regions. The survey takes place in 138 of these regions (Corsica and Valle d'Aosta are excluded).

In each country a random selection of sampling points is made in such a way that all types of area (urban, rural, etc.) are represented in proportion to their populations.

The interviews are distributed over some 1 350 sampling points.

Choice of interviewees

For each survey the number of individuals indicated by the master sample for each sampling point is interviewed. The individuals to be interviewed are chosen either:

- (i) at random from the population or electoral lists in those countries where access to suitable lists of individuals or households is possible: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands; or
- (ii) by quota sampling; in these cases, the quotas are established by sex, age and profession on the basis of census data: Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, the United Kingdom; or
- (iii) by a method combining the two preceding ones ('random route'): Germany, Spain, Greece, Portugal.

IV — List of publications based on Eurobarometer surveys

March 1986

- *Les Européens et l'unification de l'Europe/Europeans and European unification* (FR/EN).
Survey for February/ March 1970, Brussels, June 1972, 240 pp.
- *L'opinion des Européens sur les aspects régionaux et agricoles du Marché commun, l'unification politique de l'Europe et l'information du public* (FR).
Survey for July 1971, Brussels, December 1971, 64 pp.
- *Satisfaction et insatisfaction quant aux conditions de vie dans les pays de la Communauté européenne* (FR).
Survey for September 1973, Brussels, June 1974, 120 pp.
- *L'Europe vue par les Européens* (FR).
Survey for September 1973, Brussels, August 1974, 48 pp.
- *Eurobarometer* (Published in all the official Community languages).
Biannual surveys published regularly since June 1974.
- *Femmes et hommes d'Europe/European men and women* (FR/EN).
December 1975, 215 pp.
- *Le consommateur européen/European consumer* (FR/EN).
May 1976, 175 pp.
- *La perception de la misère en Europe/The perception of poverty in Europe* (FR/EN/DE/NL/DA).
March 1977, 144 pp., 2nd edition (FR) September 1981.
- *La science et l'opinion publique européenne/Science and European public opinion* (FR/EN/DE/IT/NL).
October 1977, 98 pp.
- *Les attitudes de la population active à l'égard des perspectives de la retraite/The attitudes of the working population to retirement* (FR/EN/DE/IT/NL/DA).
May 1978, 52 pp.
- *Les attitudes du public européen face au développement scientifique et technique/The European public's attitudes to scientific and technical development* (FR/EN).
February 1979, 67 pp.
- *Femmes et hommes d'Europe en 1978/European men and women in 1978* (FR/EN).
February 1979, 248 pp.

- *Chômage et recherche d'un emploi: attitudes et opinions des publics européens* (FR with abstracts in EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).
September 1979, 74 pp.
- *Les Européens et leurs enfants/The Europeans and their children* (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).
October 1979, 102 pp.
- *Les femmes salariées en Europe: comment elles perçoivent les discriminations dans le travail/European women in paid employment: their perception of discrimination at work* (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).
December 1980, 72 pp.
- *Les Européens et leur région: étude exploratoire sur la perception des disparités socio-économiques/Europeans and their region: public perception of the socio-economic disparities: an exploratory study* (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA).
December 1980, 62 pp.
- *L'opinion européenne et les questions énergétiques/The European public opinion and the energy problem.* (FR/EN with abstracts in the other Community languages).
October 1982, 79 pp.
- *Les jeunes Européens: étude exploratoire des jeunes âgés de 15 à 24 ans dans les pays de la Communauté européenne/The young Europeans: exploratory study on young people aged from 15 to 24 years in the countries of the European Community* (FR/EN/DE/NL/IT/DA/GR).
December 1982, 139 pp.
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
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