
COMMISSION

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT - *WALTER Hallstein*
OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
TO THE JOINT SESSION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE
CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE
24 JUNE, 1960

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I.

1. It gives me both pleasure and satisfaction to address this House again today, where the Parliament of the European Communities - the Parliament of the nucleus of Europe, as we are proud to call this Community - and the Consultative Assembly of a wider group of European states have gathered together as a token of their solidarity. To us, the Commission of the European Economic Community, this solidarity is not only a matter of political convenience, it is part of our political conviction. We have therefore always been glad to take any opportunity to discuss with you the matters for which we are jointly responsible. I refer in particular to the development of the European Community itself and to the problems which are arising for us and for those around us - especially in Europe - out of the merging of the six states into one single economic area.

Eighteen months ago it fell to me to set forth before this Assembly the principles which we look upon as the most important elements of any such discussions. It was hardly a matter of chance that one year later, in January of this year, I was able from this place to give you a review in which the points tallied in the main with those made earlier; on the contrary, it suggests that our appreciation of developments was correct. Even today the main subjects for our discussion remain unchanged: there is, first, our proclamation of faith in the solidarity of

Europe; secondly, there is our resolve to talk business with our European friends and with all those who have a direct interest in European economic affairs; and finally - as the third point - there is our determination to match up to the world-wide obligations and ramifications of our Community in a liberal spirit.

We have not evaded the conclusions to be drawn from these principles. Linking them with our duty to make our Community stronger and stronger, we have made ceaseless efforts to keep the talks going and by fresh proposals to help the discussion forward both within the Community and beyond it.

If we look back, the line of development which we can trace both in the activities of the European Commission and in the debates of the European Parliament and of the Consultative Assembly seems to have been logical. It leads without détour to the point we have reached today, where all concerned realize that the pressing, the acute problem is to solve immediate practical questions. Maybe the European Commission was sometimes a pace ahead of the general discussion with its first two Memoranda on European problems and with its proposals for the speedier implementation of our Treaty; the endeavours of all concerned to see things from a realistic point of view have then always brought us all into line again.

It seems to me of particular importance that this development of our motives and concepts has been backed up and made fruitful by uninterrupted parliamentary discussion. There is certainly no need for me to go into the details of these debates when addressing the two European

Assemblies in whose midst they took place. Nevertheless I should like to say that the Commission of the European Economic Community has not only looked for guidance to what was said in its own Parliament but that it has followed with attention and great profit the discussions in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, at which there was a high standard of debate. I should like to make particular mention of the subtle analyses of Professor HECKSCHER, which give evidence of his high sense of realism. There are in particular two ideas of importance for the appreciation of the European situation as a whole which we think we can glean from the debates in the Consultative Assembly: first, that there are real technical difficulties which at present stand in the way of a comprehensive solution between the European Economic Community and the other Member States of the OEEC; second, that renewed efforts will be made to find a solution for the problems of trade which will be consonant with existing treaties, and with GATT in particular, and which will avoid major shifts of trade from a world-wide pattern to a European regional system.

2. What contribution can I make to this joint session today? The manifold points of contact, the analogies and similarities between our two spheres of responsibility do not make it easy to select those events and problems the discussion of which will give the most complete and, at the same time, the most up to date picture of

what is of common concern to us all. Let me begin with the event which has been of the greatest importance to the internal constitution of our Community, the speed-up in the implementation of our Treaty. In doing so I intend to show that this is not an act of egoism and ruthlessness, but an act of necessity and in the true interests of all, including those countries which are not members of the Community. Subsequently I should like to say something on the relationship of our Community with those around us, particularly those in Europe.

First, then, the acceleration of the Treaty. Why did we consider this proper, and what are its effects?

1. On the reasons for acceleration I can be brief. The duty laid upon the Institutions of the Community to ensure the implementation of the Treaty includes the duty to attain the prescribed objectives by the shortest route. Therefore the Treaty explicitly permits action speedier than that originally laid down in its timetable.

Economically, such action was justified, even necessary. Trade between the Member States of the Community has expanded to such an extent in the last year that the figures are evidence of the degree to which trade and industry within the Community are already setting their sights on the future common market, thereby psychologically and in practical fact anticipating the conditions of the future. In addition, current economic trends just now pointed in the direction of the reduced customs duties involved in the speed-up.

In the wake of this expansion of trade in the Community's economy, the way the economic policies of the Member States have drawn closer to each other after so short a period goes beyond anything considered possible at the time the Treaty was concluded.

Even some structural differences which still persisted between individual branches of the national economies have been increasingly levelled out in the course of this expansion.

Commercial policy in particular is one of the branches of economic policy in which adaptation has occurred. We have found that the views on commercial policy held by the Member States have come unexpectedly closer to one another in the first two years since the entry into effect of the Treaty. This applies not only to the relations between the Member States but also to their relations with non-members. Liberalization has been extended especially vis-à-vis those European countries who are members of OEEC and it has been raised to an almost uniformly high level. A further factor providing the Member States with instruments necessary for a real liberal commercial policy is to be found in the decisions on convertibility and the consequent measures of liberalization.

This then is what led us to realize that a shortening of the transition period was not only justified but necessary.

2. What will be the consequences of this quickened pace - how will they in the first place affect internal relations within the Community ?

a) Politically, the first and foremost fact to be noted is that the Brussels decisions of 12 May mean a strengthening of our Community. The first steps taken toward the establishment of the common external tariff - reduced by 20% - linked with the decision to speed up assimilation of the economic policies of the Member States, takes our six countries a large, I might even say a decisive, step further on the road to a new economic and commercial entity.

We have registered a further gain by realizing that the Institutions of our Community - Parliament, Council of Ministers and Commission - are coming more and more to represent one political will. This is a further element contributing to the internal strengthening of the Community.

Also, we have learned the lesson that in our Community there are no major and no minor partners, and that no attempt is made to pass over any one Member State, be it only on the moral or psychological plane. The ability of the Governments united in our Council of Ministers to reach a compromise in the exceedingly difficult deliberations which occurred between 9 and 12 May should put a stop once and for all to any talk of hegemonial trends in the structure of our Community.

- b) Economically, the reduction of customs duties in the Community will, by the end of next year, have reached at least 40% and this of course is of the greatest importance. Without doubt the complete elimination of industrial quotas within the Community by the end of next year will also greatly influence trade.

As you all know, the most difficult economic decision which the Governments of Member States had to take concerned agriculture. The Commission is very glad that in this field a compromise was found which serves to show that agriculture has its place in our system of integration, although that place naturally does not in all respects correspond to that of industry.

While this has been the clearest sign that the incipient customs union must have a counterpart in the organization of the economic union proper, that is to say in the harmonization of all spheres of economic policy, the Council of Ministers has reached the same conclusion for all other spheres as well, and the Commission will in the coming three months submit proposals calculated to encourage and expedite that process.

I can summarize what I have said about the significance of the speed-up for the internal situation of the Community by stating that our integration has again given proof of its dynamism, of the quality through which the work once begun moves forward to its full fruition under the impetus of its own inherent logic. As we have now learnt by experience, it is easier for our Member States to resolve the difficulties met in harmonizing particular aspects of economic policy if, instead of applying protective measures, they press resolutely forward in their search for answers to the problems of structural change at home and of new conditions in the field of trade and competition.

III.

I will now turn to the Community's external relations.

1. Here again, I should like first to say a few words about the effects of acceleration, and then I propose to place the issue in a wider and more general setting.

The Commission has always believed that the progress and consolidation of the Community will serve the interests of its neighbours also. This assumption is based on political as well as economic reasons.

In the first place, there is a causal nexus between the internal constitution of any political body and its external freedom to act. The European Economic Community is rather like a national state in that it can only maintain liberal external relations to the extent that its internal stability provides a safe foundation for such a policy.

Secondly - and this brings us to the immediate object of Community policy, namely economics - we expect that economic expansion, which must of necessity intensify and widen the external trade of the Community, will follow from any advance in integration.

There are already signs that our assumptions are realistic in both respects.

It is not by chance, but in accordance both with the inherent logic of developments and with the letter as well as the spirit of the Treaty of Rome, that the decisions on the speedier building of the customs and economic union are accompanied by decisions which serve the liberalization of trade throughout the world.

Let me mention the decision to make a provisional reduction of 20% in the common external tariff and to discuss in GATT the binding of this reduction on the basis of give and take.

I should further like to mention the objective set down in Article 4 of the Council's decision of 12 May 1960, which is that all quota restrictions of the Community vis-à-vis the Contracting Parties to GATT shall be removed. It is to be expected that industrial quotas vis-à-vis the OEEC and the dollar area will have been almost totally abolished by the end of 1961.

Similarly it is not by chance that the very remarkable expansion of trade within the Community is accompanied by an increase of trade with our partners outside the Community. The rhythm of this growth is not the same internally and externally. To look upon this as an injury inflicted upon our trading partners would, however, to be misrepresent the facts. In truth, the process of integration, with its inherent dynamism and the expansion which stems from it, is the mainspring of further developments in external trade. We must therefore not balance one increase against the other but must realize that the invigoration of the Community's internal economic life is - together with other factors - a causal, an essential element in the expansion of our external trade.

I should like to say no more about the immediate effect which acceleration is having and may continue to have on the shaping of our external relations and I would not deal with the question how we, broadly speaking, envisage the future of these external relations.

2. Discussion of such a subject is normally clothed in the accepted terms of classical commercial policy. I should like to move away from these terms a good deal and briefly to explain why. This explanation in fact brings me right to the heart of the problem.

The idea that shaping our internal relations is nothing other than commercial policy in the accepted sense of the word seems to me to be a source of quite a number of the misunderstandings which have existed between us and our trading partners, and some of which may still exist. The conventional forms of trade relations with other countries, such as traditional trade and shipping agreements, or commodity and payments agreements, are beginning to change their character in the modern world. It is no longer merely a question of extracting the maximum individual advantage from a bilateral exchange of concessions and thereby keeping bilateral equilibrium. Nowadays the focal issue is coming to be the endeavour to ensure uniform action on the part of hitherto divided economic areas so as to enable them to grapple with their internal and external problems. Policy on economic trends, monetary policy, price policy, all these are tackled jointly; policy vis-à-vis the new industrial countries and the development countries, especially in their capacity as producers of raw materials, and policy vis-à-vis the communist state-trading countries, these are all regarded as a matter of common concern; with some degree of exaggeration we might say that individual commercial policy is increasingly becoming common (international or supra-national) economic policy.

This change is intimately connected both with political developments and with technical progress. The political tension to which the free world is exposed forces it to move much more closely together than the national states had ever done under the system of classical diplomacy; the interlocking of world economies, which is a result of technical progress, makes it possible and necessary to design a new set of economic tools more varied than those of classical commercial policy and essentially different from them.

All this is very clearly reflected in the rules and the problems of an embryonic world charter for trade, which the free countries of the world have drawn up for themselves in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In the system of GATT, built upon the principle of the most favoured nation, classical commercial policy is progressively losing its original function and substituting a sort of multilateral automatism which considerably restricts the autonomous freedom of action of each Contracting Party. The pressure of this trend reveals with increasing clarity the real problems of our day. The speedier development of those partners still left behind is proving to be essential to the functioning of the system. Economic stability and continuous expansion in the developed countries are the second condition and are also essential if a mutually satisfactory solution is to be found for the problem of development.

I should like to base myself on these thoughts in defining the two great tasks with which we are faced: first, the gradual construction of a modern world economic policy, which in the immediate future will be largely a matter for concerted efforts on the part of the highly developed industrial countries; second, the tackling of a logical and effective development policy.

3. In my view we should consider from this angle the detailed questions with which we have to deal.

Before I turn to them I should like briefly to point out that in all those fields for which the term "commercial policy" has been retained in the accepted terminology our Community takes the stage acting as a unit. I would mention only a few facts which show how real this Community is in the field of trade: work has begun on the common customs tariff, its first reduction below the level set in the Treaty has been decided, the common liberalization of industrial goods is far advanced, the complete abolition of quantitative restrictions is planned, there has been a formal decision that commercial policy shall be harmonized in all important matters, especially so far as the relationship and organized co-operation with our Western partners - including those in Europe - is concerned; the Community participates as such in important negotiations (in GATT, in the negotiations on association of Greece, Turkey and Tunisia); harmonization of the action taken even in those spheres which formally are still matters of domestic concern is becoming more and more customary.

I should now like to deal one by one with the questions of Atlantic co-operation, especially the re-organization of OEEC, of European co-operation,

especially the problems of the Committee of Twenty-One, and briefly with what is happening today in the field of development policy.

a) I place Atlantic co-operation first, not only because co-operation amongst the highly developed industrial countries of the West is in the last resort the key to all the problems which the free world is facing; I place it first also because the action initiated in this connection seems to me to be the most important new element in contemporary events. I believe that this brief reference is sufficient, as I have frequently had the opportunity - here as elsewhere, for which I would like to thank you - of setting forth and explaining my conviction in this respect.

Now, however, we face the question of the actual form to be given to this Atlantic co-operation, and here we find differences of opinion. It is just these which most clearly reflect the facts of the present situation. Let me therefore go into them.

Whereas on the one hand there is the trend to preserve as fully as possible the content and the working methods of co-operation as practised so far within OEEC, there are on the other hand people who look on the confrontation of economic policies and the co-ordination of development policy as the first objective. Those who favour the second concept are often reproached with hostility to OEEC. The reproach is, however, quite unjust. To look towards the future does not mean to deny the past. The problem which we face will never be solved by declarations of

faith in OEEC or against it. It will be solved only if the objective of Atlantic co-operation and the conditions under which it is introduced are clearly understood.

I have already outlined the objective when I said that a successful development policy is a sine qua non of life - or perhaps I should say of survival - for the free world and that in turn the fulfillment of this condition depends on the industrialized states maintaining the health and efficiency of their economies by common efforts to ensure economic stability and continuous expansion.

The conditions under which this must take place are characterized by two facts which we should accept for what they are.

The first of my facts is that the acceptance of co-responsibility by the United States marks a change in the tradition of American external economic policy, the epoch-making importance of which can hardly be overestimated. The re-thinking of old-established concepts which has thus become necessary does not happen overnight across the Atlantic any more than it does over here.

In the same way as we have reason - every reason I should say - to welcome this new departure, we should take care not to ask too much of our new partner. Therefore the geographical widening of the area of co-operation will, at least for the time being, have to go hand in hand with a certain structural loosening. Those who are attached to the old forms - originally just because they were relatively loose - should

accept this with sound confidence in the future. Basically, these are only differences of degree which will not be of decisive importance in the long run.

The appreciation of my second fact is different. The new organization is being born into and having to operate in a changed world. The time of recovery in Europe is, after all, past and what has so far been the substance of co-operation - for instance, the problems of quotas and balance of payments - has all but evaporated. Thus what was yesterday the European and is today the Atlantic family of nations comes directly under the general rules of GATT, that is to say without any intervening preferential system. This constitutes the change of substance. From it conclusions must inevitably be drawn for the competence and the mechanics of the new organization. I think that these considerations clearly show the direction in which we are going.

Not only will the new organization, as I have said, be more supple in some respects than the old; it will at the same time be more outward and less inward looking, its relation to GATT will not be that of the exception to the rule, but it will fit into GATT; it will not evolve its own commercial policy but it will further the world commercial policy of GATT and make it more fruitful, whilst internally its first task will be to design a set of tools to serve a modern economic policy, not in order to be self-sufficient but with a view to the joint responsibility of all.

- b) I now come to the second set of problems, namely the questions of European trade.

I should like to distinguish two points: first, the general development as it appears in the work of the Committee of Twenty-One, and second the particular question of the closer approach of individual European countries - especially Great Britain - to the Community, which has been much discussed recently.

I am far removed from wishing once again to unfold before you all the problems of the Six and the Seven. The more so, because not only would I have to repeat what has been frequently said before, but because I believe that we all agree that we can better serve the cause if for a while we give precedence to practical questions over those of principle.

I think this is the most important thing that can at present be said on this point. I do so with satisfaction untinged with any *arrière-pensée*.

This may be appreciated if I recall a speech which our friend, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. WIGNY, made in this place last January. He pointed out that it was for the Community to present its partners in the world around it with a clear policy, because only such a policy would help the others in turn to take up a clear and constructive attitude. We have endeavoured to work out such a policy, which is by no means one of strength but one of firmness coupled with the desire to reach an understanding.

With the Council's decision of 12 May we have begun to implement this policy. A straight line leads us from this to the resolution adopted by the Committee of Twenty-One on 9 and 10 June, and this fully bears out what my friend WIGNY has said. I attach so much importance to the resolution of 9 and 10 June mainly because it shows very clearly how much calmer the atmosphere has become, to what extent dramatization and incrimination have given way to constructive realism and - by far the most important point - how much agreement has already been reached.

- There is agreement that the European conversations have been broadened into Atlantic conversations which include our friends from the United States and Canada and that everything must be done in accord with our American and Canadian friends;
- there is agreement that the talks between the Six and the Seven must be open to other interested parties also;
- there is agreement that all solutions of specifically European questions must respect the rules of GATT and take account of the interests of other countries;
- there is agreement that the objective must be to take practical steps by which to secure and extend the traditional pattern of trade, and to exclude or eliminate any possible difficulties;
- there is agreement that the best means to achieve this lies in the effective preparation of the fifth round of tariff negotiations in GATT;
- there is agreement, finally, that understanding and acceptance of what has to be done today and tomorrow does not exclude discussion of the long-term aspect of the problem, but that this is not the opportune moment to tackle the so-called wider solution by negotiation.

This is a sound, realistic, constructive basis. I am convinced that by building upon it we will make progress.

Yet, this new sobriety is only one of the psychological characteristics of the present situation. The other is no less important: it is the growing tendency in the public as well as amongst the governments of European states outside our Community to give serious consideration to the question of full membership. Great Britain offers the most striking example of this. I need not repeat what has been said so often: so far as the Community is concerned, the Treaty by which it is established is quite unequivocal in opening the door to all who are prepared to accept its rules. Nor need I repeat that we would consider it an act of historic importance if other European states, and in particular Great Britain, were to accept this standing invitation and were to espouse the political idea expressed in the Treaties of Paris and Rome and were to make up their minds in favour of membership.

It would be premature if I were today to offer practical comments on the several varieties of these trends before the frequently vague and contradictory ideas have been clarified. This goes in particular for the concept of joining only the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, which has been introduced by the Parliament of Western European Union. This is not a question which concerns the

European Economic Community in the first place. I would be in danger of anticipating a situation of which, it is true, I hope - I even expect - that it will have come about in the near future: I mean the situation in which the unity of our three Communities, which is already so impressively manifest in the legal and factual unity of other institutions - in particular of our European Parliament - will also be reflected in the establishment of a united Executive.

However, being an attentive observer of events, I should like to tell you this much: it is refreshing and encouraging to note that in the discussions going on in Great Britain to which I am referring this question is understood in all its breadth. It is not overlooked in the United Kingdom that our Communities are part of an entity and their fusion, their integration, is being constantly pushed ahead; it is realized that what we have built up is essentially political in character - this reflects the importance of the institutional structure - and that its inherent dynamism, or in other words its trend to expand further and further into the political sphere, must be taken into account. More than that even: we hear with great satisfaction that in particular the political content of our integration - the present as well as the expected future content - is in no way to be impaired. All this seems to us to be an indication that nothing has been overlooked and that the problem is being approached in the right way.

There is, however, still more than that to the European issue. Europe has not only prosperous, flourishing countries, which nevertheless have their economic worries, it also has countries struggling with heavy problems of development, many of them in a position which must be regarded as exposed in every respect. These are sometimes referred to as the "forgotten countries". I have two things to say on this point:

These countries must not be forgotten. They must not be forgotten because there is such a thing as European solidarity, and they should not even be forgotten if the other countries were inspired - and they are not - by no other criterion than self-interest.

The second point is - and now I am explicitly speaking on behalf of the Community - they have not been forgotten. Two of them have expressed the wish to associate themselves with us. The doors of negotiation have been opened to both.

The course of these negotiations has been followed with an attention which has not always been free from scepticism. We ourselves have never underestimated the difficulties, but nor have we ever doubted that the outcome would be successful. In the case of Greece we have now nearly reached this point.

I beg you to appreciate the political significance of this statement. The magnitude of the problem cannot, in such cases, be measured in population figures or square miles. It may well be easier to unite 80 million inhabitants of prosperous industrialized states in one free trade area than to find a solution for a single nation which has not much more at its disposal to solve its problems by its own efforts than the industriousness of its people and their determination to live their lives according to their own laws and their own great traditions, and the dynamic, imaginative energy of a government conscious of its responsibility.

In such a case association means more than this neutral term conveys in itself. It means: brotherly support. If we have succeeded by way of negotiation in removing all the difficulties except for a small residue and in starting on the draft of the association agreement, this - in retrospect - has been a great success achieved in a relatively short period, and it was possible only because both sides were filled with a sincere desire to agree.

This beginning encourages us to hope that in the coming negotiations with Turkey, too, we will make comparable progress, though some of the problems there are of a different nature and more extensive.

- c) I now come to the third group of problems in our external relations, which is the complex of questions concerning development. Perhaps I may first consider them in general terms, in order then to deal with the particular problems which the Community has to face in the associated Overseas Countries and Territories.

As has been frequently stressed before, co-ordination in this field - both within the Community and with the other industrial nations - is of special, I might say of decisive, importance. This is so first - and I think this is fairly evident - because the very scale of the problem allows of no other approach. Only if we join forces can we hope to measure up to the historic responsibility which has been placed upon us. However, co-ordination is necessary for yet another reason, which is perhaps not yet as fully recognized and acknowledged. There is general agreement that a kind of competition between the industrialized nations in the free world and the states of the communist bloc is a characteristic feature and at the same time a major political problem in this question of development. When the conditions and the prospects of this rivalry are considered, quantitative comparisons are generally made and the question is asked who has most to offer and who gives most. The comparison must, however, go further; it must, if we are to arrive at the right conclusion, cover the methods

applied by both sides. In saying this, I have already touched on the heart of the subject.

All development policy has a trade aspect and another aspect which can be summarized under the term "financial and technical aid". It is typical of the development policy of the state-trading countries in the Communist bloc that these two aspects have not only been co-ordinated but that, as a result of the special structure of their foreign trade, directed by the state monopoly, they practically coincide. In this way the communist countries can pursue a development policy without inherent contradictions. The economic system of the free world, which is built upon the principle of private enterprise, meets with very much greater difficulties in this respect. There always is the danger of some inherent contradiction between commercial policy and those other measures which constitute development "aid" in the narrower sense of the world leading to the latter being deprived of a considerable part of its efficacy. I should therefore claim that it is the most important problem of development co-ordination both within the Community and beyond it, among the industrialized states in the Western world to ensure that there is no conflict between measures of commercial policy and those of financial and technical assistance.

Here it will be necessary to find an answer to the question how and to what extent imports of produce from these developments

countries can be increased; this refers to all industrial raw materials and agricultural produce, semi-finished articles and finished goods.

Further, we will have to find an answer to the question of how prices for the most important raw materials produced in the development countries can be protected from undue fluctuation and stabilized at a level satisfactory to the producer as well as the consumer countries and not likely to lead to a distortion of the productive structure in the producer countries.

In the overall setting of development matters the problem of the associated territories in Africa is one for which the Community bears special responsibility. Conditions have changed considerably in this field since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome and this extremely important political development requires of the Commission and the other Institutions of the Community a policy which is at the same time positive and dynamic. This development, however, is not confined to those territories of Africa which are linked to the Community - and I think this is a point of very great importance. On the contrary, it covers the greater part of the entire continent. We therefore not only face the question of what should be the Community's policy with regard to that area for which it has a special responsibility, but at the same time we have to seek to fit this policy into a wider framework.

Thus the interest and the responsibility of Europe as a whole are involved and I should like to make two comments as follows:

- We must make sure that the economic development of the African areas concerned is more or less uniform, thereby creating the conditions for a general and harmonious political evolution in these countries.
- Secondly, we must make sure that co-operation which can already be seen among the African states can continue unimpaired and in a constructive spirit.

It follows from this that any solution which we may find for the countries associated with the Community must at the same time take into account the interests of the other African states.

This in turn means that any differences of opinion which may exist between European nations must not be transferred to their policies vis-à-vis the African countries. On the contrary, the similarities and the inherent connection between those tasks should become a means of achieving understanding among the European countries themselves.

This is all I have to say to you today when I consider from the point of view of our Community the whole field of joint responsibility embodied in this Assembly.

I am firmly convinced that Europe, the whole of Europe, will never be divided. We have too much in common, not only in the way of possessions but also in the way of tasks. These will compel us to act jointly. This is true of the purely political sphere, where nothing less than survival is at stake, and it is equally true in the economic sphere, where two things have to be done: first, we must reconcile the interests and the objectives of all the members of the European family - which in Europe will always be varied and vital in their diversity; secondly, we must master the enormous task facing this generation in its endeavour to establish a peaceful system.

To be tolerant of one another and to respect one another; to stimulate and to learn from one another; to set about our common duty together - this must be our watchword.
