

Directorate-General

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and Information

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EUROPEAN YOUTH AND THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPEFirst results of an international survey

In June 1967 a group of specialists in youth problems (senior civil servants of the Member States of the European Community, educationists, teachers and research workers in the field of social psychology), who had met in Brussels in response to an invitation from Directorate-General for Information, suggested that an international survey of the attitudes of young people towards European integration<sup>1</sup> be carried out in the six Common Market countries.

The final results will not be available until next year when a survey will have been made with a representative sample of the population aged between 18 and 30 years. The survey of young people may perhaps even be extended to cover the adult European population with special attention being paid to industrial workers and farmers in order to provide useful comparisons based on age and socio-occupational situation. However, a pilot survey involving 486 young people in the 15-16 and 19-20 age groups, who were interviewed in the countries of the European Community in March and April 1969, has provided a few general figures which are interesting though for the time being only tentative.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A similar survey has been carried out in Great Britain at the suggestion of Professor Ronald Inglehart (Department of Political Science of the University of Michigan) and others may be undertaken in various Council of Europe countries.

<sup>2</sup> As this was a pilot survey with a small sample, the breakdown of the results according to country would not be significant. This is why, as a general rule, only aggregate results are quoted here. The final survey will, of course, not only enable the results to be broken down according to country, including Luxembourg, but will also make it possible to provide very detailed analyses (see next page for the rest of this note).

These results are of two kinds: some concern the general characteristics of the young people questioned as they have been noted and "photographed" through the analysis of the 486 replies; the others consist of the product already obtained from initial processing with a computer that had the effect of reducing the mass of information collected to a few explanatory hypotheses for the purpose of more detailed research later on.

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<sup>2</sup> Note continued from the preceding page

The sample used was equally divided both between the two age-groups and between the sexes. Most of the young people questioned were unmarried (98%) and lived with their parents (95%). More than half were children of manual workers (28%), office workers or medium-grade supervisory staff (27%); 12% belonged to the families of shopkeepers or craftsmen and 15% the families of senior executives, managers, senior civil servants or professional men; finally, only 7% were farmers' children, a figure which is certainly too low. 63% of these young people are students and 80% consider they belong to families which are "quite well off" (72%) or "rich" (8%), whereas 20% come from families which are "not doing too well" or "poor".

The survey was carried out by specialized institutes belonging to the Gallup International and International Research Associates - Europa networks led by a co-ordinating committee comprising Melle Hélène Riffault (IFOP, Paris), M. Robert Gijs (INRA, Brussels), Professor Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan) and M. J.R. Rabier (European Communities, Brussels).

I

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE YOUNG EUROPEANS QUESTIONED

Information media and youth movements

More than eight out of <sup>of</sup> ten of the young people questioned watch television news broadcasts at least once per week: 50% watch them every day and 32% once or twice per week.

Radio and daily newspapers take the second and third places as sources of information.

On the other hand, barely three young persons out of ten belong to any kind of youth movement or organization. The highest membership is to be found among movements or organizations which are concerned with sport.

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OUT OF 100 YOUNG EUROPEANS (15-16 and 19-20 years)

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	Watch television news broadcasts	Listen to radio news broadcasts	Read the political news in the daily newspapers
(a) every day	50	39	22
(b) once or twice <u>per week</u>	32	24	36
(c) less often	11	Figures as on original 15	
(d) never	7	21	13
		16	

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Belong to a youth movement or organization	28
Do not belong to any movement or organization	72

Types of movements or organizations mentioned by the 28% who are members<sup>1</sup>

(i) sporting	28%
(ii) religious	24%
(iii) recreational	23%
(iv) educational	12%
(v) political	8%
(vi) other	5%

Figures as on original

Satisfaction with life and optimistic outlook

Nearly nine young persons out of ten (86%) say they are very happy (32%) or fairly happy (54%). Six out of ten (61%) think that their living conditions will be better in ten years' time; 13% think that they will still be the same and only 5% think that they will be bad.

When they were asked what they would most like to know about their future the young people questioned quoted the following in order of preference:

1. Future job and success in their work.
2. Marriage and family life.
3. Living conditions (pay, welfare).

National pride without nationalism

Six Young people out of ten (63%) say they are proud of their country but one in four (26%) say they do not care. Less than 10% are not proud of their country.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Some Young people gave several replies.


<sup>2</sup> The survey in Great Britain shows that the percentage of young people who say they are proud of Britain is much higher : 83% .

Why are they proud of their country? Simply because it is their country, because they were born there, are their usual replies; or again because it is a free country with a history and one that is good to live in.

The following are the main reasons for pride in their country given by the young people of the various countries and the level of frequency of the replies:

	<u>Average</u>	<u>Germany</u>	<u>Belgium</u>	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Netherlands</u>
Because it <u>is</u> my country, because I was born there	1	2	1	2	1	2
It is a country where people are free	2	3	3	3	3	2
Because of our historic past	3	3	5	7	2	-
Because it is a beautiful and pleasant country	3	-	3	1	4	1
Because it is a country of great prosperity and socially advanced	4	4	2	9	5	2
Because of our good reputation abroad	5	6	4	4	6	3
Because of our achievements in the cultural, scientific and technical fields	6	4	6	5	7	-
Because I prefer our way of thinking	6	5	6	6	8	4
Because it is a peaceful country	7	7	4	8	8	7
Because our country plays an important role in world affairs	8	-	5	8	7	4

Figures as on original



As can be seen, the role of a country in world politics is nowhere given pride of place. But whereas young Belgians and young Italians put an obvious reason to the fore, namely: "Because it is my country", young French and Dutch people more frequently emphasize the beauty and pleasantness of their countries, the Dutch also prizing their country's peaceful nature. In the case of the young Germans, prosperity and the progress of social policy are of prime importance.<sup>1</sup>

Interest in current affairs, politics and responsiveness to world events

Two questions, concerning how well-informed the persons questioned were related respectively to the attitude of young people towards the student demonstrations and the interest shown in events in Czechoslovakia.

Six young people out of ten are in favour of student demonstrations (17% very much in favour, 43% largely in favour). However, the reason put forward in the first place is that schools and universities must be reformed. Those who criticize these demonstrations (30%) do so mainly because they disapprove of violence.

Two thirds of the young people questioned followed the events in Czechoslovakia with interest: 28% with keen interest and 37% with moderate interest.

Half (48%) of the young people said they kept themselves informed on politics without participating in them personally, but 39% left politics to those more competent than themselves. Only 7% considered themselves to be politically committed whereas 6% were disgusted with politics.

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<sup>1</sup> In Great Britain the flat statement "Because it is my country" far outweighs all the others.

In the opinion of these young people a good citizen is first of all someone who takes an interest in politics, votes at elections and respects the laws.

The government's priority tasks are to defend the less privileged citizens, to keep order within the country and maintain the country's interests abroad while also contributing to the building of Europe and to aid to the developing countries.

In spite of what might seem to be a certain degree of national orthodoxy, young people or at least some of them are aware that "all is not going as well as one would like in the world". The three fields in which efforts should be made that are the most often quoted are: hunger in the world, the expansion of education and the banning of atomic armament; the problems of employment and those of building a political Europe take only second place.

Nearly 70% of the young people questioned consider that their political ideas are almost, or in part, the same as those of their parents. Only 16% disagree, feeling that the generation gap is wide.

Whom can one trust?

One of the important yardsticks of the attitude of a personality towards others, both within the group to which he belongs and in international relations, is what is known as social trust: whom can one trust?

The attitudes in this respect of young Europeans aged 15-16 and 19-20 have been ascertained and quantified by means of two sets of questions. These results will be correlated, at the next stage of the analysis with the replies to the questions concerning the building of Europe.

Within their national society young people appear to place their trust, in the following order, in:

	Great trust	Some trust	Total
their parents	78%	19%	97%
people of their own age	22%	51%	73%
<del>youth movements</del> their teachers	22%	52%	74%
religious authorities	16%	43%	69%
industrialists	18%	40%	58%
members of parliament	8%	41%	49%
government ministers	4%	40%	44%
protest students	4%	39%	43%
leaders of student movements	8%	30%	38%
trade-union leaders	7%	30%	37%
	7%	29%	36%

Figures as on original

With regard to the few great political movements chosen in the survey because they have a fairly similar meaning in the various countries of Europe, the degrees of trust are as follows:

	Great trust	Some trust	Total
Socialist	6%	41%	47%
Communists	5%	21%	26%
Right wing	3%	20%	23%
Pro-Chinese	2%	7%	9%

Figures as on original

Lastly, in the international field, the peoples in whom the young Europeans would be prepared to place trust are, in order, as follows:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Excluding the opinions expressed by young people of Common Market countries with regard to their own countries.



	Great trust	Some trust	Total
British	28%	53%	81%
Americans (USA)	27%	51%	78%
Belgians	24%	52%	76%
Dutch	21%	53%	74%
Scandinavians	25%	45%	70%
Germans	20%	49%	69%
French	Figures as on original.		65%
Rumanians	15%	50%	65%
Rumanians	8%	37%	45%
Spaniards	6%	39%	45%
Italians	7%	37%	44%
Africans	7%	37%	44%
Greeks	8%	32%	40%
Russians	5%	28%	33%
Turks	4%	19%	23%
Chinese	4%	13%	17%

### The Common Market and United Europe

Seven to eight young people out of ten can name some Common Market countries but only 47% could name all.

Nearly five out of ten (46%) consider that the Common Market has so far had a favourable effect on their general living conditions; an almost equal percentage (45%) observed no effect or expressed no opinion; only 9% feel that the Common Market is actually harmful.

Although economic Europe, the Common Market, is a known reality, only two thirds of young people (64%) have already heard of schemes for the political unification of Europe.

With regard to the enlargement of the Common Market, seven young people out of ten (73%) would be glad to see Great Britain and Ireland become members; about five out of ten are in favour of membership for the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and Austria.

Ideas concerning which countries would possibly constitute a political Europe are much more vague:

Firstly, the restriction of political Europe to the six Common Market countries is approved by only a small minority (6% of the young people questioned).

In the opinion of 33% of the poll, a United States of Europe should comprise all the countries of geographical Europe, including the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

22% would accept the countries of Eastern Europe but not the Soviet Union and 17% all countries of Europe except those of the Eastern bloc.

Lastly, 21% would restrict political Europe to the six Common Market countries plus Great Britain.

In short, two thirds of those in favour of enlarging Europe would exclude the Soviet Union.

Concerning this united Europe, whose geographical outlines are still uncertain, one young person in two thinks he will see it achieved within his lifetime; nearly nine out of ten are in favour of it and six out of ten feel that it is a very important political objective. How is it conceived from a political point of view?

Replies to a series of questions show that the political make-up of a united Europe is much clearer than its geographical outlines:

- (a) If a United States of Europe were established now, nearly nine out of ten (89%) young persons questioned would be in favour of their country becoming a member (very much in favour: 59%, in favour: 30%);
- (b) Two thirds of young people (65%) would be in favour of a European army which would combine the armies of the various countries of Western Europe (very much in favour: 33%, in favour: 32%);

- (c) Half of them (50%) think that the government of a united Europe should, with regard to certain important problems, have the right to take decisions which would override those of the Governments of their own countries;
- (d) More specially, two thirds of the young Europeans (64%) are in favour of a European government which would deal with the most important questions, whereas each country would keep a national government which would deal with local problems.

Out of 100 young Europeans (15-16 years and 19-20 years) the proposition in favour of each of the following schemes was:

There is no European government, but the national governments meet regularly to try to adopt a common policy	19%
There is a European government which deals with the most important questions, but each country keeps a national government to deal with its own particular problems	64%
A European government deals with all questions and the member countries no longer have any national government	9%
In favour of none of these schemes	2%
Did not know or did not reply	6%

The matters which should be dealt with by the European government or remain the responsibility of the national government are indicated below:

Out of 100 young Europeans (15-16 years and 19-20 years)

the following felt that \_\_\_\_\_ decisions in the following fields should be taken:

	By the European government	By the national government	Did not know
Foreign policy	78%	13%	9%
Highway code	72%	23%	5%
Maintenance of order and civil liberties	61%	30%	9%
Length of military service	55%	37%	8%
Level of taxation	45%	Figures, etc. 43%	12%
Level of wages	44%	48%	8%
Date of school holidays	40%	53%	7%
Educational reform	35%	60%	5%

This gives a clear picture of the structure of a federal Europe within which the central government would assume certain common responsibilities (foreign policy, defence, maintenance of order and safeguard of civil liberties), whereas the national governments would retain broad powers in fields such as the economy, taxation, wages and education.

Another question concerning the principal symbols of sovereignty provides us with similar results: 53% of the young people questioned are in favour of a European currency but practically as many are in favour of retaining the national flags for major ceremonies (51%) and against merging national sports teams into a European team at the next Olympic Games (47%).

Europe. to what purpose?

This question is often asked. It is an important one, as a society can cohere and maintain itself only if its members have a certain historic plan in common. How did our young people react to this?

First of all a very large proportion of them (88%) agreed with the proposal that "each people must be allowed to retain its own identity". In correlation with this idea, 78% reject the suggestion that "the unification of Europe is impossible since we speak different languages".<sup>1</sup>

The main justifications for building Europe are the following:

the brotherhood of Man: "to unify Europe is to teach men to be more brotherly" (88%);

political effectiveness: "our States are no longer of suitable size; nowadays, thinking on a larger scale is required" (79%);

economic rationality: "a unified European economy would mean more channels for trade and therefore more jobs" (77%); in a united Europe goods will be purchased at lower prices" (69%);

peace in the world: "a united Europe is a first step towards world peace" (77%).

The comparison of the "disunited States of Europe" with America or the Soviet Union underlies these justifications: three quarters of the young people questioned considered that "a united Europe would be a third force equal to those of the United States and the USSR" (76%) or that "joint scientific research on a European scale would enable us to catch up with the Americans" (74%).

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<sup>1</sup> It may be noted that whereas 36% of the young people speak no language other than their mother tongue, 36% speak one other language and 28% more than one other language. The foreign languages most commonly spoken in Europe are English (72% of those who speak one or more other languages), French (45%) and German (24%).

These results concerning the attitudes of young people are very interesting. Comparison of the replies of young people of 15-16 and 19-20 years of age (April 1969) with those made by their own parents to the same questions in July 1968 would appear to confirm the view that young people born since 1945 are more "European" than the adults.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Out of 100 persons questioned:

Germany		France		
Young people	Parents	Young people	Parents	
92	91	83	65	are in favour of a united states of Europe
72	54	57	49	are in favour of a European army
50	37	48	46	favour certain decisions being taken by a European government
	Figures, etc.			
58	31	35	21	consider that the Common Market has hitherto exerted a favourable influence

Source: Document communicated by Professor Inglehart; the July 1968 results come from sample surveys comprising approximately 2 000 persons in each country, made by the Institute für Demoskopie and the Institute français d'opinion publique.

II

TENTATIVE INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

How does one become "European"?

The purpose of the investigation carried out is not only, as it were, to "photograph", as many public opinion surveys do, the attitudes of young people towards the unification of Europe nor even briefly to study the probable effects of sex, age, socio-economic or socio-cultural environment, etc. The aim was to ascertain for the first time the exact meaning of the words "Europe" or "Europeans" for the young generations, exactly what young people understand by "union", "unification", "integration", etc., the motivations which underlie the attitudes expressed, the centres of interest of those to whom the "European" informational and educational messages are directly or indirectly addressed and the effect of the various channels of communication.

During the exploratory stage of the investigation, which comprised 192 "depth" interviews carried out by professional psychologists, a complete set of hypotheses was drawn up concerning:

- (a) the prior conditions for the formation of a pro-European outlook and more especially the influence of a complex of attitudes which might be called "political cosmopolitanism", and the ability to identify oneself with distant or abstract political aims, i.e. the opposite of parochialism;
- (b) the emotional (trust in others: "social trust") and cognitive (level of education and information) elements of political cosmopolitanism;
- (c) the various motivations of pro-European attitudes: security, well-being, need for identification, desire for freedom, etc.;
- (d) the effect of social environment: family, school, youth organizations, mass media, etc.

An initial analysis by computer of the 486 replies to the pilot questionnaire has specified groups of items which form hierarchical scales among themselves.<sup>1</sup> Each scale is composed of a group of items between which there is a significant correlation and whose most "difficult" item, i.e. the one which has proportionally received the smallest number of positive replies, determines the replies to the "easier" questions which make up the rest of the scale. In as far as a scale of this kind approximates to the ideal and perfectly graded scale, it constitutes a unidimensional scale, i.e. it measures a basic dimension in the field studied. The various dimensions are not strictly independent of each other as would be the case in a factor analysis, but each one measures something specific which distinguishes it from the other things.

By this "blind" analysis, carried out by purely mathematical processes, without any research hypotheses being introduced into the programme, it has been possible to trace eight dimensions that are independent to a certain extent, which taken together constitute, as it were, the infrastructure of the attitudes expressed. We would make it clear that it is not a matter of categories of young people but of factors explaining the attitudes of the young people questioned.

#### Eight dimensions of attitudes towards Europe

The eight dimensions traced are analysed below and each comprises the number of positive replies to the various items of which it is composed and the percentage of these replies compared with the total number of persons questioned (N = 486).

(I) The dimension of political conservatism expresses attachment to the established order. A relatively large group of young people questioned (93%) considered that the main task of the national government is to keep order in the country. A group within this group considered it important that its country should play an important part in world politics, etc. Underneath, a "hard core" (34% of the young people questioned) not only

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<sup>1</sup> This tentative analysis was supervised by M. Robert Gijs, Director of INRA-EUROPA (Brussels). In no circumstances can it be considered complete or final.



replied positively to the preceding items but expressed the opinion that as things are at present, everything is going all right and there is no reason to make changes. This latter attitude emphasizes the conservative nature and what may well be authoritarian tendencies of those young people who set particular store by the maintenance of order, value highly their country's role in the world, advocate a strong army and are hostile to student demonstrations.

Items	N = 486	%
Agrees that "the Government must above all keep order within the country" — — — — —	450	93
Considers it important that his country should "play a great part in world politics" — — —	330	68
Considers it important that his country "should have a strong army" — — — — —	256	53
Feels hostile to the students who have demonstrated for a year in the country of the person questioned and in many other countries	195	40
Agrees with the statement that "as things are at present, everything is going all right for us; so why change?" — — — — —	165	34

figures-as-usual

(II) The dimension of socio-economic conservatism expresses the idea that there is nothing to be gained by making changes. The great majority of the young people questioned say they are happy but many are opposed to the presence of foreign workers and to the idea of decisions being taken abroad. The deep motivation is revealed in the items which show the high ranking of being able to buy a car and of the endorsement of the status quo.

Underlying this dimension we find here (and we shall see this later on as the basic characteristic of ethnocentrism) the idea that the unification of Europe is impossible because of the diversity of languages. This finding is not surprising in view of the importance of the "mother" tongue for the cultivation of the sentiment of national identity... symbolically, for comprehension between one person and another.

The dimension examined below nevertheless stands apart from ethnocentrism (even if the same nucleus of symbolic expression underlies it) owing to the concern, emphasized here, to preserve a certain standard and a certain form of welfare.

Items	N = 486	%
Is not unhappy ...	481	89
Has "in principle nothing against the foreign workers" but considers that "there really are too many in our country"	264	54
Agrees that "in a united Europe we shall in any case be obliged to accept decisions taken abroad" ...	256	53
Considers it important to be able to buy a car (or a new car) ....	248	51
Agrees with the statement that "as things are at present, everything is going all right for us; so why change?"	165	34
Agrees that the unification of Europe is impossible owing to the different languages	82	17

Figures, etc.

(III) The dimension of pro-European political commitment, which might also be described as the dimension of progressive Europeanism, expresses a firm will to promote the unification of Europe even at the price of temporary personal sacrifices, a basic attitude which appears to be accompanied by a fairly pronounced political commitment or at least a marked interest in politics and by a certain readiness for a change in, or even protest against, established situations and authorities.

Items	N = 486	%
Does not agree that "the unification of Europe is impossible as we speak different languages" -----	404	83
Does not agree with the statement that "as things are at present everything is going all right for us; so why change?" -----	321	66
Sympathizes with "the students who have demonstrated" for a year in his own country and in many other countries -----	291	60
Considers himself politically committed or keeps himself informed of politics without participating in them personally -----	265	54.5
In favour of "the national currency being replaced by a European currency" -----	260	53.5
Does not agree with the statement: "in principle I have nothing against the foreign workers, but there really are too many in our country" -----	222	46
"So much in favour of the unification of Europe." that he is ready to accept temporary personal inconveniences (as for example the fact of having a little less money available) so that it may be achieved -----	156	32

(IV) The dimension of economic interest in Europe

The question here is not so much a desire to preserve an acquired prosperity to the point of feeling European integration to be a menace, but rather a favourable attitude towards the enlargement of the economic area of our countries. The abolition of the economic frontiers should enable the price of goods to be reduced. Geographical mobility is accepted, at least within one and the same country. This attitude appears to be accompanied by a certain interest in politics and even by a political commitment. Underlying this dimension an attitude symbolically in favour of replacing the national flag by a European flag is to be found.

This dimension seems to fit a set of attitudes favouring the Common Market, with the economic objective prevailing over the political objective proper.

Items	N = 486	%
Agrees that "States of the size of our own are no longer adapted to the conditions of the modern world; nowadays we must think on a large scale" ....	381	78
Agrees that "in a united Europe it will be possible to buy things more cheaply" ...	334	69
Considers himself politically committed or keeps informed of politics without participating in them personally ...	265	54.5
Would move if he were certain "of finding in another region" of his country "a more interesting life" than the one he can hope for by remaining near to his home	247	50
In favour of "the national flag being replaced by a European flag at major ceremonies" ...	159	33

(V) The dimension of optimism with regard to a united Europe.

does not signify any commitment or precise interest as the two preceding dimensions do (III and IV), but it, none the less goes as far as expressing itself, as dimension III (pro-European political commitment) does, by the acceptance of temporary personal sacrifices.

This dimension seems to reflect a tendency to overlook the obstacles: no specific reasons, no concrete proposals but only an optimistic denial of the obstacles mentioned in the questionnaire (new conflicts within Europe or with countries outside it, the resistance of national egotisms, opposition to decisions being taken abroad).

Items	N = 486	%
Does not agree that "to try to bring together such different countries in a united Europe would risk provoking fresh conflicts and wars" ...	361	74
Does not agree that "a united Europe could appear as a menace to other countries and provoke fresh conflicts" ...	357	73.5
Does not agree that "the peoples of Europe are much too selfish to be able to close ranks and move forward together" ...	257	53
Does not agree that "in a united Europe we would in any case be obliged to accept decisions taken abroad" ...	230	47
So much in favour of the unification of Europe "that he is ready to accept temporary personal inconveniences so that it may be achieved" ...	156	32

(VI) The universalist pro-European dimension is based on favourable attitude towards three measures of integration which are both spectacular and at the same time symbolic: a European currency, a European sports team and a European flag. European integration is considered important as a first step towards world peace. This is the dimension of universal solidarity.

Items	N = 486	%
Considers it important that "the European countries should get together in a united Europe" . . . . .	442	91
Agrees that "a united Europe is a first step towards world peace" ... . . . .	375	77
In favour of "the national currency being replaced by a European currency" ... . . . .	260 Figures, etc.	53.5
In favour of "the national team being incorporated in a European team at the next Olympic Games" ...	161	33
In favour of "the national flag being replaced by a European flag at major ceremonies" ... . . . .	159	33

(VII) The dimension of European "supranationalism" differs from the preceding dimensions and even from those which like dimension III (pro-European political and progressive commitment) and dimension V (pro-European optimism) are founded on the same basic attitude: acceptance of personal sacrifices so that the unification of Europe may be accomplished.

This dimension, whose importance will appear more clearly in the course of the analysis, reflects support for concrete measures (European army, European currency, supranational government) cosmopolitan motivation. It also differs from the dimension of pro-European political commitment (III) through its less progressive colour: the members of this group apparently feel that Europe should be integrated through the normal working of the political institutions without it being necessary to make it a matter of marked personal commitment.

Items	N = 486	%
Considers it important "that the European countries should get together in a united Europe" ...	442	91
Agrees that "the Government must above all help to build a united Europe"	431	87
In favour of "the principle of a European army which would combine the armies of the various countries of Western Europe" including that of his own country ...	318 Figures, etc.	65.5
In favour of "replacing the national currency by a European currency" ...	260	53.5
In favour of "the government of a united Europe having the right to take decisions concerning certain important problems and that these decisions should override those of the national government" ...	245	50.5
"So much in favour of the unification of Europe that he is ready "to accept temporary personal inconveniences so that it may be achieved" ...	158	32

(VIII) The dimension of ethnocentric conservatism relates to a level of socialization, markedly centred on the nation as a community having in every way a destiny of its own, with its interests, its language, its originality and doubtless its superiority. The ethnocentric attitude is tinged with pessimism as to the possibility of breaking out of the circle of the national community and with a certain aggressiveness towards the foreigner whose intrusion into the homeland is resented as a threat to the security and identity of the native citizen. The desire for prosperity (purchase of a car) and the will to preserve the present state of affairs under which one feels at ease and secure are clearly discernible. The dominant factor seems to be the need to safeguard the originality of the national community and to obviate all that might threaten this originality. The unification of Europe is symbolically considered to be impossible owing to the differences of languages, but underlying this basic attitude are motivations other than those in dimension II which tended to express a socio-economic conservatism, the fear of losing advantages secured in the past. In this case it is less a question of material advantages and the standard of living to be preserved than of more essential values lying deep in the emotions: the sense of life, as expressed by identification with the nation ("mother-country", "mother-tongue") and doubtless, in psycho-analytical terms, with parental figures.

Items	N = 486	%
Agrees that "each people should be allowed to retain its own originality" ...	430	88.5
Has "in principle nothing against foreign workers", but considers that "there really are too many in our country" ...	264	54
Considers it important to be able to buy a car (or a new car) ...	246	50.5
Agrees that "the peoples of Europe are too selfish to be able to close ranks and move forward together" ...	229	47
Agrees with the assertion that "as things are at present everything is going all right for us; so why change?"	165	34
Agrees that "the unification of Europe is impossible as we speak different languages" ...	82	17



Conservative attitudes and pro-European attitudes

The eight dimensions, which, we would recall, were not defined as initial hypotheses but deduced as a result of a statistical analysis of collected data, may be classified in two main categories: some (dimensions I, II and VIII) appear to characterize various forms of conservatism the chief features of which are respectively political, economic and ethnocentric; the rest (dimensions III, IV, V, VI and VII) appear to characterize various forms of Europeanism, i.e. interest in and/or commitment to the unification of Europe as it is perceived, imagined, hoped for or desired

In order to obtain a clearer picture, the statistical analysis of the data had to be taken further, first by establishing the relationship between the eight dimensions.

1. In the first place, a strong positive correlation between the three dimensions of conservatism (I, II and VIII) was observed. In particular, the interviewees who report that they are not unhappy now and that there is no reason to change the present state of affairs, i.e. those we have termed "socio-economic conservatives" (dimension II), also have a high score on the scale of ethnocentrism (dimension VIII); the more they are satisfied with the degree of welfare attained and hostile to change, the more of them there are (relatively) who want each people to preserve its own originality, consider that the peoples of Europe are too selfish to close ranks and move forward together and feel that the unification of Europe is impossible owing to the diversity of languages. As has been seen, the language obstacle is the symbolic expression of these two forms of conservatism.

The inverse relation has also been confirmed: the higher the score on scale VIII the higher it is on scale II.

The affinities between dimensions I and II, on the one hand, and I and VIII on the other are less pronounced but are there all the same.

2. The dimensions of conservatism have a strong negative correlation with the pro-European dimensions and particularly with political Europeanism of a progressive type (III) and European supranationalism (VII)

In particular, those who are conservative with regard to the present state of affairs are more frequently hostile to any political commitment to the unification of Europe.

Without studying this finding more thoroughly here, we may note that the frequency of hostile attitudes towards pro-European political commitment or supranationalism appears to be higher than the frequency of hostile attitudes towards conservatism among the persons who are attached to the two pro-European dimensions. In other words, and bearing in mind the fact that these two groups of attitudes are opposed to each other, it is likely that there are relatively more conservative attitudes among the pro-Europeans than pro-European attitudes among the conservatives. Only through a more precise analysis will it be possible to trace the attitudes and motivations of these conservative pro-Europeans and to measure the size of this group in a strict typology of Europeanism.

3. How do the pro-European dimensions (III to VII) relate to one another?  
Each of them must be examined.

(1) Pro-European political commitment of a progressive type (dimension III) shows a strong positive correlation with "supranationalism" (dimension VII)

It even appears that this latter dimension plays a leading part: the higher the score of persons on the scale of European "supranationalism" the more often they will have a high score on the scale of pro-European political commitment. The inverse relation is confirmed to a slightly lower degree. In other words, one may be in favour of the political unification of Europe, with the progressive connotations we have found by studying dimension III and nevertheless not take one's theoretical support to practical conclusions in respect of the political institutions which might contribute towards unification.

Although dimensions III and VII are founded on the same basic attitude - support for the unification of Europe, which, as some of the interviewees say, would go as far as temporary acceptance of personal sacrifices, as for example the fact of having a little less money - this shows that the dimensions are really different.

A more thorough analysis will show whether dimension III corresponds to more "leftist" political attitudes and dimension VII to more "reformist" attitudes.

(2) Pro-European economic interest (dimension IV) shows a strong positive correlation with "supranationalism" (dimension VII) and more still with the progressive type of political commitment (dimension III)

The correlation between dimension III and dimension IV is not as strong as the inverse correlation: a person may favour a progressive type of pro-European political commitment without being especially motivated by the economic advantages of the unification of Europe; on the other hand, those who are motivated by the economic purpose of integration will also most frequently be motivated by its political purpose.

(3) Pro-European optimism (dimension V) shows a strong positive correlation with "supranationalism" (dimension VII) and still more with the progressive type of political commitment (dimension III).

These three dimensions have, moreover, the same basic attitude in common: the acceptance of temporary sacrifices to assist the unification of Europe.

The correlation between dimension V and each of the other two is stronger than the inverse correlation. Those who are in favour of supranational integration of Europe or who are politically committed to this course are not necessarily optimistic to the extent of denying the difficulties inherent in such an undertaking. On the contrary, the optimists will most frequently be advocates of supranational integration or even be militating on behalf of the European political project.

(4) Pro-European commitment of a universalist type (dimension VI), the key feature of which is a certain sense of universal solidarity and the acceptance of European symbols, also shows a strong positive correlation with "supranationalism" and political commitment of a progressive type.

The correlation between dimension VI and each of the other two is stronger than the inverse correlation. As in the preceding case, it can be seen that those who are in favour of the supranational integration of Europe or who are politically committed are not necessarily motivated by a universalist aim. On the contrary, like the optimists characterized by dimension V, pro-European universalists are often advocates of integration or are even politically committed.<sup>1</sup>

(5) The supranational type of Europeanism (dimension VII) seems to be a key dimension for our investigation.

This dimension has a negative correlation with the three dimensions of conservatism (I, II and VIII) and a strong positive correlation with all the dimensions of Europeanism, especially with the dimension of pro-European political commitment.

As has been seen above, the correlation between dimensions III and VII is not as strong as the correlation between dimensions VII and III: "supranational institutionalists" are more often "pro-European progressives" than vice-versa.

On the other hand, persons who show high scores with dimensions IV (economic interest in Europe), V (optimism) and VI (universalism) will more often be "supranational" than the opposite.

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<sup>1</sup> It would still be necessary to study in greater detail the interrelations between dimensions V and VI, which have certain emotional overtones, maintain comparable relations with the dimensions of pro-European political tendency, but which are nevertheless quite distinct.

Dimension VII, which expresses a complex of realistic attitudes applied to precise, concrete matters (European army, European currency, European government) appears to us to illustrate a type of political commitment with a rational basis, less tinged with ideology and progressive convictions than the commitment corresponding to dimension III and very different from both the mere interest in Europe of the Common Market (dimension IV) and the optimistic (dimension V) or generous (dimension VI) enthusiasm for an ideal Europe.

(See diagrams 1 and 2)

Reference marks for quantification

As the only results available relate to a limited sample (486 youths and girls aged 15-16 and 19-20), it would be unwise to presume to evaluate in order the number or percentage of persons concerned in any of the dimensions which the statistical study of the replies has disclosed.

Let us merely note that in our sample the "conservatives" amount to approximately one third: 34% of the replies state that there is no advantage to be obtained from change and half of them (17%) add that the unification of Europe is impossible owing to language differences. But this nucleus of conservatives is to be found in the mass of all those who consider that the first task of the government is to preserve order, who are satisfied with their lot and attach importance to safeguarding the originality inherent in each people.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For information, the percentages of the positive replies to the two above-mentioned questions in the various countries, are as follows:

	Ger- many	Bel- gium	France	Italy	Nether- lands	Aggregate	UK
No advantage to be obtained from change	47%	46%	22%	18%	44%	34%	29%
Unification impossible owing to language differences	18%	18%	18%	12%	22%	12%	23%

Figures, etc.

Diagram No. 1

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

BETWEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF CONSERVATISM<sup>1</sup>

Socio-economic conservatism

(II)

Political  
conservatism

Figures as on original

Ethnocentric  
conservatism  
(VIII)

Diagram No. 2

INTERRELATIONSHIPS

BETWEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEANISM<sup>1</sup>

Progressive political  
Europeanism  
(III)

Supranational  
Europeanism  
(VIII)

Diagram as on original

Optimistic  
Europeanism  
(V)

Economically  
motivated  
Europeanism  
(IV)

Universalist Europeanism  
(VI)

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<sup>1</sup> Positive relationships.

The "hard core" of the "Europeanists" is at least about a third, as 32% of the young people questioned say they are prepared to accept personal sacrifices so that the unification of Europe may be accomplished and 33% are in favour of replacing the national flag by a European flag at major ceremonies.<sup>1</sup> In order to ascertain how much greater this hard core is than the third of the sample it would still be necessary to see to what extent these two replies overlap or not.

On the other hand, however, we know that out of three of our pro-European dimensions (III, VI and VII) there are 53.5% of replies in favour of replacing the national currency by a European currency and that out of two dimensions (III and IV) there are 54.5% of young people who consider themselves to be politically committed or who keep abreast of politics without personally taking part in them. We may therefore consider that over half of the young people questioned have a relatively strong pro-European attitude and that at least a third constitutes a "hard core".

This would leave the following to be investigated:

- (a) the breakdown and the mode of expression of the third of the young people questioned who are neither fundamentally conservative nor fundamentally pro-European;

<sup>1</sup> Percentages according to country, for information purposes:

	Germany	Belgium	France	Italy	Netherlands	Aggregate	UK
Prepared to accept personal sacrifices	28%	32%	28%	44%	19%	32%	29%
In favour of the European flag	40%	28%	32%	35%	24%	33%	16%

Figures, etc.

- (b) the way to influence these attitudes and in particular those of young people who show both pro-European and conservative tendencies.  
(See Diagrams 3, 4 & 5)

Problems to be studied at European level

Pending the results of a more detailed analysis we can already elicit tentative guidance by examining the distribution of the average scores on scales III (progressive type of pro-European political commitment) and VII ("supranationalism") in accordance with various psycho-sociological criteria.

- (1) According to age - The difference is not very marked; nevertheless, those aged 19-20 appear to be slightly more "European" than those aged 15-16.
- (2) According to sex - The boys appeared to be distinctly more "European" than the girls. This result would still have to be verified in relation with other variables.
- (3) According to the number of brothers and sisters - Only children, or those having only one sibling appear to be more "European" than those who have more than two siblings. Here again a verification against other variables would be required.
- (4) According to the occupation of the head of the family - Children whose fathers are senior executives, members of high grade supervisory staff, senior civil servants or professional men are more often "European" than other children.
- (5) According to religion - The Catholics appear to be more "European" than the Protestants or those professing other religions. But those who belong to no religion, do not know or do not reply have scores similar to those of the Catholics. Here the results should be checked against church attendance. (Of the young people who say they profess a religion, i.e. 88% of the sample, more than half say they are church-goers, i.e. they attend services at least once per week.)



Diagram No. 4

CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES

Socio-economic  
conservatism  
89%

Political  
conservatism  
93%

Ethnocentric  
conservatism  
89%

Diagram as on original

Argument based on  
language differences  
17%

Why change?

34%

Diagram No. 4

PRO-EUROPEAN ATTITUDES

Supranational  
Europeanism  
91%

Optimistic  
Europeanism  
74%

Universalist  
Europeanism  
91%

Diagram as on original

Economically  
motivated  
Europeanism  
78%

Progressive  
political  
Europeanism  
83%

Prepared to accept  
personal dis-  
advantages  
32%

Prepared to accept  
the replacement of  
the national flag  
33%

(6) According to a subjective estimate of the prosperity of the family<sup>1</sup> - The young people who consider they belong to a "rich or very rich" family are much more frequently "European" than the others. It should, however, be noted that these young people also have a slightly higher score on the scale of political conservatism; on the other hand, they are less satisfied with the present economic situation (or more concerned about the advantages of a wider market) and less ethnocentric.

Verification of these results against other variables (level of education, exposure to information media, etc.) is desirable.

(7) According to exposure to information media - The influence here appears to be very marked: young people who watch television every day and, above all, those who read the political columns of the newspapers every day more often appear to be "European". On the other hand the influence of the radio is slight.

(8) According to the present occupation of the persons questioned - Young people who are still studying are more often "European" than those who have finished their studies. Verification in relation with age would be necessary as the situation is of course different according to whether the young people are aged 15-16 or 19-20.

(9) According to the type of educational institution attended by those who are continuing their studies (i.e. 63% of the sample) - The young people who attend an institution of higher education or a university are more often "European" than the others.

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<sup>1</sup> The question asked the young persons to place themselves on a scale ranging between "poor" and "very rich".

(10) According to membership (of those who are continuing their studies) of an association or union of pupils or students (i.e. only one pupil or student out of ten) - Hardly any difference

(11) According to the type of the last institution attended by those who have finished their studies (37% of the sample) - Young people who have attended a technical or trade school or a higher non-university institution have a higher score on the scales of Europeanism.

(12) According to membership (of those at present working, i.e. 39% of the sample) of a trade union organization. Young people who say they pay a trade-union subscription, i.e. nearly a quarter of those in employment appear to be less "European" and more "conservative" than those who pay no subscription.<sup>1</sup>

(13) According to the occupation they would like to follow later on, for instance ten years hence - Relatively ambitious young people, who hope to become executives, managers, engineers, senior civil servants or members of the professions are more frequently "European".

These results should be verified in relation with other variables, especially the occupation of the head of the family and the present status of the interviewee.

(14) According to whether the person questioned has or has not heard about plans for the political unification of Europe - Young people who have already heard about these schemes, i.e. 64% of the sample, have a relatively higher score on scales IV, V, VI and VII but a lower score on scale III. Subject to a more detailed analysis, this would tend to emphasize that the dimension we have designated as that of pro-European political commitment comprises a degree of "progressive" idealism which is not necessarily based on concrete information.

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<sup>1</sup> The negative correlation with the trade-union membership of young people in employment, compared with the small membership of associations of pupils or students would appear to call for closer examination. Moreover, in this connection there is a lack of breakdown of scores relating to membership of a youth organization.

Another point is that those who have not yet heard about these schemes have higher scores on the scales of conservatism than those who have heard about them. By means of a more precise analysis it should be possible to obtain a better idea of the proportion of the poorly informed "conservatives" who nevertheless show commitment or interest with regard to the political unification of Europe.

(15) According to whether the person questioned can or cannot name the countries which belong to the Common Market - Young people who gave a correct reply, i.e. 47% of the sample, have higher scores on the scales of Europeanism, especially on scale III.

This result appears to contradict the preceding one. In order to obtain a clearer view it would be necessary to be able to differentiate between and compare the attitudes of those who:

- (i) have already heard about the schemes for a politically united Europe and can name the countries of the Common Market;
- (ii) can name the six countries but have not heard about the schemes for a politically united Europe;
- (iii) have heard about the schemes for a politically united Europe but cannot name the six countries;
- (iv) cannot name the six countries and have not even heard about the schemes for a politically united Europe.

Better still, it would be advisable to devise an information index also using the replies on the interest shown in the events in Czechoslovakia.

(16) According to the attitude towards the future membership of the Common Market - The overall results are difficult to interpret. It appears that the young people who desire or anticipate the enlargement

of the Common Market to include the socialist countries and the Soviet Union have a higher score on the scale of Europeanism.

These results should be checked against other variables and in particular political preferences and degrees of information.

(17) According to the attitude with regard to the various plans for the unification of Europe: inter-governmental co-operation, federal type of European government, unitarian type of European government, none of these plans - The young people who advocate the plan for a unitarian type of European government, i.e. 9% of the sample, have the highest scores on the scales of Europeanism. The large number who advocate a federal European government, i.e. 64% of the sample, come immediately afterwards, except with regard to dimension III in which the second place is taken by those young people who agree with none of the three plans put forward. Here we have fresh confirmation of the idealistic nature of this dimension of pro-European "progressivism".

(18) According to the number of languages spoken apart from the mother tongue - The young people who speak one language other than their own, i.e. 36% of the sample, generally have higher scores on the scales of Europeanism than those who speak more than one other or only their mother tongue. These results may be due to the composition of the sample which is not proportional to the numbers in the corresponding age classes in each of the countries of the European Community.

(19) According to the trust which the peoples of the countries of the European Community (other than their own) inspire in the young people - No significant effect.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> We do not yet have at our disposal the distribution of the trust inspired by the various peoples of the world. These results might be very revealing.

(20) According to the trust which various categories of persons inspire in the young people - Unless the results are re-examined in relation to other variables, the only data which we can note at present show that the scores in the scales of Europeanism, especially in scales III and VII, are particularly high among the young people who express fairly great or great trust in the leaders of the student movements or in the protest students.

Obviously, this result will have to be controlled in relation to the degree of information, the degree of interest in politics, political preferences, etc. Thus, while dimension III comprises an item which measures the sympathy with student demonstrations, this is not true of dimension VII.

(21) According to the scales of attitudes constituting the idea of the "good citizen" - The young people for whom a good citizen is one who "dares to protest against the government when something is going wrong" have a higher score in the scales of Europeanism, but those for whom the idea of the good citizen has more traditional characteristics (political commitment, community spirit, respect for the freedom and beliefs of others) have fairly scores. On the other hand, those for whom a good citizen is one who "loves his country, is proud of it and defends it against foreigners" have the lowest scores.

Owing to the nature of the question, which was an open one, and the large number of replies which could be given by each interviewee, it would be advisable to establish a typology of the good citizen and investigate the scores of Europeanism for each of these types.

(See appended table).

Problems to be studied at national level

As we have already pointed out the analysis which has just been made concerned all the replies obtained at a total of 486 interviews in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. In view of the small number of persons questioned in each country we have not compared the results country by country. Nevertheless, we have the initial results of a factor analysis carried out at our request by Professor Ronald Inglehart and based on the replies obtained in Germany and France as well as in Great Britain. The hypotheses which result therefrom appear to be the following:

1. In each of the three countries, the readiness to accept personal sacrifices in order that the integration of Europe may be accomplished is of significant importance in the pro-European dimension of attitudes.

2. In France, the attitudes towards Gaullism - measured by the replies to the question "For which party would you be the most likely to vote if elections were to take place tomorrow?" - are in correlation with a relatively high degree of trust in the Parliament and the Government and with certain pro-European attitudes, favourable opinions regarding the effects of the Common Market, the creation of a United States of Europe, a European army, etc. Furthermore, Gaullism is associated with attitudes expressing attachment to the symbols of national independence (the flag, the currency and the army) and with distrust of the Russians. Perhaps an attempt ought to be made to seek the explanation to this apparent contradiction by analysing the components of Gaullism among young French people: on the one hand a tendency towards open-mindedness and towards Europe in the well-established part of the middle class and, on the other, a more national (or nationalist) tendency on the part of young people of the lower middle class and the working class, who have been drawn to Gaullism on the rebound after May 1968.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See R. Inglehart: Post-Bourgeois Radicalism in France; to be published in The American Political Science Review.

3. Both in Germany and Great Britain trust in the Russians is in positive correlation with pro-European attitudes: the integration of Europe does not appear as an anti-Soviet reply but as the expression of openness beyond the nation. Furthermore, it is only in Germany that the positive appreciation of the effects of the Common Market is strongly associated with the idea that the integration of Europe would be a means of accelerating scientific progress, but this factor is only based secondarily on pro-European replies: this may be the reflection of the aspiration after a wider and more significant role for the nation.

4. In Great Britain, as in France, the relationship between trust in the national political system and pro-European attitudes is important but the interpretation which may be placed on it is different. Among young British people, trust in Members of Parliament and the Government is an important dimension but the correlation with Europeanism is low. Moreover, while in France trust in the Germans is associated with the main factor of Europeanism - acceptance of personal sacrifices accompanying the integration of Europe - and trust in the Russians is associated with a certain fear of the possible consequences of integration, in Great Britain this double trust is associated with a pro-European tendency.



Provisional conclusions

We have already said that the present analysis is of a temporary nature. Using available data, it must first of all be supplemented by a hierarchical analysis to allow the persons questioned to be classified on strictly independent unidimensional scales and by the establishment of a typology of the various forms of Europeanism. These studies should provide answers to the questions we asked ourselves when we carried out this unprecedented survey or when we examined the first results.

1. We have at hand an initial "grid" giving the interpretation of the opinion polls which for about twenty years now all confirm the existence in all the countries of the European Community of a considerable percentage of "advocates of the unification of EUROPE", although it cannot be precisely said what this means.<sup>1</sup>

The eight attitude dimensions - three corresponding to rather conservative (or ethnocentric) tendencies and five to pro-European tendencies - will doubtless have to be made more precise, but failing evidence to the contrary it is clear that a distinction can henceforth be drawn between:

- (i) a concrete, rational Europeanism which is relatively confident in the working of the political institutions and probably centred on the European Community cautiously extended;
- (ii) an abstract and more ideological Europeanism, inspired by progressive and perhaps "Leftist" ideas;

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<sup>1</sup> This is no criticism of the method of the surveys, but is due to inadequate preparation of those which have been carried out and inadequate interpretation of the data collected.

- (iii) an optimistic Europeanism which is all the more enthusiastic because it does not see or underestimates the obstacles;
- (iv) a realistic Europeanism, with mainly economic motivation, which regards a United Europe and the Common Market in particular as a means of adapting our countries to the conditions of the modern world;
- (v) lastly, a Europeanism with cosmopolitan motivation, for which a united Europe is a first step towards world peace.

As we have emphasized, it is, at the present stage, not a matter of constituting a typology of the informants but of outlining a typology of the replies, or, more precisely, of the dimensions of attitudes. One person may belong to several dimensions.

2. The prior condition to the formation of pro-European attitudes which has been called "political cosmopolitanism" overlaps in practically all of these dimensions. It will be necessary to ascertain its precise operational value by re-examining its emotional component (social trust) and its cognitive component (degree of education and information).

With regard to the former an index of social trust will have to be drawn up in order to establish a typology of the persons questioned in accordance with the extension, the direction and the degree of their trust in foreign peoples and in the various categories of persons who make up their universe of relations or chosen social images. We have already mentioned a fact of the highest interest: the correlation between, on the one hand, the trust which nearly four young persons out of ten express with regard to the leaders of the student movements and/or the protest students and, on the other, the dimensions of pro-European attitudes.

With regard to the cognitive component of cosmopolitanism we have noted a difference, which remains to be defined as to its nature and scope, between the fact of being able to name the Common Market countries and the fact of having heard about schemes for the political unification of Europe.

In the first place we have before us a concrete and precise piece of information which is supplied by practically one young person out of two and corresponds to a relatively high score of Europeanism. In the second place it is a matter of more widespread (more than six young persons out of ten) but vaguer information of less immediate concern, not rated so highly by the mass media and accompanied by a score of Europeanism below the average. By drawing up an index of political information whose various values would be related to the scores of Europeanism it should be possible to clarify this question and better to direct a European policy of information.

3. The pro-European motivations which the detailed psychological surveys of the exploratory stage revealed to us (security, well-being, need for identification, desire for freedom, etc.) meet again in our eight dimensions with a positive or negative value as far as the pro-European tendency is concerned. They are henceforth much more precise. Precise analysis still needs to be made regarding how certain motivations may underlie different or even opposite attitudes: the motivation of well-being, for example, is found again among the determinants of acquired advantages and among those of Europeanism with a predominating economic factor; another example is that the need for identification may lead to national identification (ethnocentric conservatism) or European identification ("supranationalism").

Subsequent research must be designed to pinpoint accurately the various factors which may contribute to the formation of one attitude or another (or scale of attitudes) starting from some motivations or others in relation to:

- (a) events (historical or current) and the centres of interest they create;
- (b) the information obtained by the persons questioned;
- (c) if possible, the psychological characteristics of the persons questioned, in as far as the data collected is adequate for this;

(d) the situation of the persons questioned and particularly their age, sex, standard of education, membership of youth or other organizations, political tendency and the difference felt between this tendency and that of their parents, etc.<sup>1</sup>

Very special attention will have to be given to the relationship which appears to exist between "Leftism" (sympathy towards the protest students, idea of the good citizen as being someone who dares to protest) and pro-European attitudes. According to the hypotheses of Professor Inglehart, the fact that economic concern disappears after a certain level of satisfaction of material needs has been attained probably has the effect of freeing energies which might, at least in theory, be channelled in a pro-European direction.<sup>2</sup> It was noted that the wish to do away with frontiers appeared in France as a secondary theme in the revolt of May 1968 after the overall protest against the "repressive society". It seems to remain a secondary element in the political tendencies of young French people with regard to Europe. It would be the task of a well-designed education and information policy to ensure that the protest energies freed in the new middle classes by liberation from the elementary needs should find an outlet in a "progressivist" or even a "protest" support for the scheme of building a United Europe.

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<sup>1</sup> Various investigations suggest that the standard of education exerts a predominant influence among adults in two ways.

On the one hand, by stimulating interest in political problems and improving the aptitude to follow and understand them, a high standard of education directly influences pro-European attitudes.

On the other hand, however, a high standard of education usually leads to the attainment - or the hope of attainment - of a high standard of living and to more favourable appreciation of the first achievements of the Common Market and thus indirectly influences pro-European attitudes.

Cf. Ronald Inglehart: Regional Integration, Political Development and Public Opinion, unpublished study. Madison (Wisconsin), April 1969.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. R. Inglehart: Post-Bourgeois Radicalism in France.

When these detailed investigations have been successfully concluded by processing the available data, the conditions necessary for embarking on the last stage of the work will all be fulfilled: by investigating a representative sample of the young inhabitants of the six countries of the European Community this stage will consist in testing the hypotheses and quantifying the results.

It is then that the decision will have to be taken whether or not to extend this investigation to the population as a whole in order to obtain useful comparisons between "young people" and "adults", young students and young workers, young farmers and older farmers, young people who are members of organizations and those who are not. These are all problems which are insufficiently understood and which have not yet been properly stated; to solve them is of very great importance for the formulation and implementation of a coherent policy for educating and informing young Europeans.

J.R. Rabier.

Table No. 1

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL VARIABLES WHICH APPEAR  
TO INFLUENCE CONSERVATIVE OR PRO-EUROPEAN  
ATTITUDES

Variables		N	%	Average scores on the scales:	
				of conser- vatism	of Euro- peanism
Total number of persons questioned		486	100	2.9	3.2
=====					
Age	15-16 years	244	50	3.0	3.2
	19-20 years	242	50	2.8	3.3
Sex	male	243	50	2.8	3.2
	female	243	50	3.0	3.0
Number of brothers and sisters	none	96	19	2.9	3.4
	one	121	25	2.7	3.0
	two	103	21	3.0	3.0
	more than two	172	35	3.1	3.0
Figures, etc.					
Occupation of the head of the household	farmer	35	7	3.5	2.8
	senior executive	39	8	2.4	3.3
	senior civil servant, professional	33	7	2.7	3.4
	shopkeeper, craftsman	58	12	2.8	3.2
	office worker, medium grade supervisory staff	130	27	2.6	3.3
	manual worker	139	28	3.1	3.2
	retired, no occupation	49	11	2.9	3.2
	Religion	Catholic	350	72	2.9
Protestant		81	8	3.2	3.0
other religion		8	1	2.5	2.5
no religion		47	10	3.0	3.2

(continued on next page)

Variables

N % Average scores on the scales:  
of conservatism of Europeanism

Whole group		486	100	2.9	3.2
Indirect assessment of income	poor	95	20	2.8	3.3
	comfortably off	346	71	3.0	3.2
	quite rich	44	8	2.5	3.5
Exposure to information media	<u>Watch TV</u>				
	every day	241	50	2.9	4.0
	1 or 2 days per week	157	32	2.8	3.1
	less often, never	88	18	3.1	2.8
	<u>read the political news</u>				
	every day	109	22	2.4	2.0
	1 or 2 per week	144	30	2.7	3.5
	less often, never	233	48	3.4	2.9
	<u>listen to radio news</u>				
	every day	188	39	2.9	3.3
1 or 2 days per week	118	24	2.9	3.4	
less often, never	180	37	2.9	3.4	
Present occupation	studying	305	63	2.9	3.4
	have finished studies	181	37	3.8	3.8
School or University	secondary school	96	20	3.1	3.1
	technical or trade school	93	15	3.0	3.3
	non-university institution for advanced training	100	20	2.2	3.5
	university	35	7	2.2	3.7

Contd.

Headings as on previous page

Membership of an association of pupils or students	pay subscriptions	32	11	2.6	3.5
	do not pay	273	89	2.7	3.4
School or University	primary school	80	44	3.6	2.8
		40	22	2.8	3.1
	secondary school, grammar school, etc.				
	technical or trade school				
	non-university institution for advanced training	61	34	3.2	3.1
Membership of a trade-union organization	pay subscriptions	46	25	3.6	2.7
	do not pay	135	75	3.2	3.0
Contemplated occupation	senior executive	68	14	2.8	3.4
	senior civil servant				
	professional	84	17	2.3	4.0
	shopkeeper, craftsman	29	6	3.1	3.0
	office worker, medium grade				
	supervisory staff	168	35	2.8	3.3
	manual worker	47	10	3.5	2.9
Knowledge of schemes for the political unification of Europe	have heard about them	812	64	2.7	3.3
	have not heard about them	174	35	3.2	3.1
Knowledge of the six Common Market countries	correct replies	229	47	2.5	3.5
	incorrect replies	259	53	3.1	3.0
Attitude towards the future composition of the EEC	Great Britain, Ireland	353	73	2.8	3.4
	Scandinavian countries	243	50	2.8	3.5
	Spain, Portugal	177	37	2.7	3.6
	Switzerland, Austria	225	46	2.7	3.5
	Greece, Turkey	94	19	2.5	3.7
	East Germany	110	33	2.5	3.6
	URSS and the Eastern bloc	118	24	2.5	3.8
	United States, Canada	57	12	3.2	3.4
None	22	6	3.3	2.0	

contd.



Headings, etc.

Whole group		91			
Attitude with regard to various plans for the unification of Europe	Inter-governmental co-operation	19	3.1	3.1	
	federal Europe	310	64	2.9	3.3
	unitarian Europe	45	9	2.6	3.9
	none of these plans	11	2	2.6	2.9
	do not know	29	6	2.4	1.6
Number of languages spoken apart from the mother tongue	none	172	36	3.1	3.0
	one	177	36	2.9	3.4
	more than one	157	28	2.8	3.3
		Figures, etc.			
Trust in various peoples	Dutch	310	74	2.4	3.5
	Italians	153	44	2.9	3.4
	Germans	219	69	2.8	3.3
	French	250	65	2.8	3.3
	Belgians	314	75	2.9	3.4

Contd.

Headings, etc.

Whole group

parents	great trust	380	78	3.0	3.1	
	some "	90	19	2.5	3.5	
	other reply	18	3	2.6	3.4	
teachers	great trust	129	26	3.2	3.1	
	some "	210	43	2.9	3.2	
	other reply	149	31	2.7	3.3	
people of your own age	great trust	129	29	3.0	3.4	
	some "	250	54	3.0	3.2	
	other reply	107	22	2.6	3.2	
Trust in various categories of persons	trade-union leaders	great trust	35	7	3.5	3.0
	some "	139	21	3.0	3.3	
	other reply	312	64	2.7	3.3	
religious authorities	great trust	89	18	3.1	3.0	
	some "	195	40	3.0	3.3	
	other reply	204	42	2.6	3.3	
leaders of student movements	great trust	35	7	2.7	3.7	
	some "	145	30	2.7	3.4	
	other reply	305	63	2.8	3.1	
protest students	great trust	33	8	2.3	3.3	
	some "	147	30	2.2	3.4	
	other reply	301	62	3.1	3.4	
government ministers	great trust	22	4	3.6	3.0	
	some "	186	39	3.2	3.2	
	other reply	228	47	2.6	3.3	
members of parliament	great trust	24	4	3.7	3.1	
	some "	193	46	3.1	3.2	
	other reply	202	56	2.7	3.3	
industrialists	great trust	38	8	3.4	2.9	
	some "	201	41	3.7	3.2	
	other reply	249	51	2.7	3.3	

Headings, etc.

Whole group

	takes part in public life	12	2.5	2.7	3.5
	respects the law	115	24	2.7	3.3
	serves the common interest	91	19	2.7	3.6
	respects the freedom and beliefs of others	79	16	2.7	3.5
	is hard-working				
<u>Idea of good citizen</u>	loves his country and defends it against foreigners	76	16	3.0	3.3
	dares to protest against the government	41	8	3.0	2.7
	conventional ideas,	31	6	2.2	3.7
	dislikes trouble	23	5	2.9	3.0