

European Communities

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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

# Working Documents

1982 - 1983

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16 July 1982

DOCUMENT 1-436/82

REPORT

drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee

on the situation in Poland

Rapporteur: Mr P. DESCHAMPS

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Resolution adopted at the Aitting of 16 September 1982 annexed.

The proposals for resolution listed below were referred by Parliament to the Political Affairs Committee:

- on 14 October 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81)
- on 16 December 1981, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81)
- on 17 February 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81).
- on 14 June 1982, the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-110/82)

The Committee on Budgets was asked for its opinion on this last motion for a resolution.

At its meeting of 27 and 28 October 1981, the Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up a report on the situation in Poland.

On 28 January 1982, Mr DESCHAMPS was appointed rapporteur.

The Political Affairs Committee considered the present report at its meetings on 24 - 26 February 1982, 28 - 30 April 1982 and 23 - 25 June 1982. At this last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution which follows by 16 votes to 7.

The following took part in the vote: Mr Rumor, chairman; Mr Deschamps, rapporteur; Mr Baillot, Mr Cariglia, Mr Croux (deputizing for Mr Schall), Lord Douro, Mr Fellermaier (deputizing for Mr Brandt), Mr Fergusson, Mr B. Friedrich, Mr Gawronski (deputizing for Mr Bettiza), Mr Habsburg, Mr Hänsch, Mr Herman (deputizing for Mr von Hassel), Mr Israel (deputizing for Mr de la Malene), Mr Katzer (deputizing for Mr Klepsch), Mrs Lenz, Mr Mommersteeg (deputizing for Mr Antoniozzi), Mr Moorhouse (deputizing for Lady Elles), Mr Penders, Mr Prag (deputizing for Lord Bethell), Sir James Scott-Hopkins, Mr Seefeld (deputizing for Mr Schieler), Mr Walter (deputizing for Mr Motchane), Mr Wedekind (deputizing for Mr Barbi).

The opinion of the Committee on Budgets will be published separately or delivered orally in the House.

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ANNEX I: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81)

ANNEX II: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81)

ANNEX III: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81)

ANNEX IV: Motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-310/82)

A

The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

on the situation in Poland

The European Parliament,

- A recalling its resolutions
- of 9 April 1975<sup>1</sup>, of 11 May 1977<sup>2</sup>, of 10 May 1978<sup>3</sup> and of 15 October 1980<sup>4</sup> on security and cooperation in Europe,
  - of 18 September 1980 on human rights in Poland<sup>5</sup>
  - of 17 December 1981 on the situation in Poland<sup>6</sup>
  - of 17 December 1981 on the refugees from Poland<sup>7</sup>
  - of 21 January 1982 on declaring a day of solidarity with the Polish people on 30 January 1982<sup>8</sup>
- B having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ISRAEL on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81),
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr ROMUALDI and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81),
  - the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs MACCIOCCHI on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81),
  - the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr GAWRONSKI on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-310/82),
- C having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-436/82),
- I. As regards the CSE
- A. in the awareness, as the democratic Assembly representing the conscience of the people of Europe, of its role as the defender of basic freedoms wherever they are threatened and regardless of the geographical situation of or the political system in the countries concerned,
- B. in the awareness that the crisis in Poland is an expression of the growing difficulties of the Communist system in Eastern Europe that will burden East-West relations and weigh heavily on the policy of security and cooperation in Europe,

<sup>1</sup> OJ No. C 95/28

<sup>2</sup> OJ No. C 133/32

<sup>3</sup> OJ No. C 131/47

<sup>4</sup> OJ No. C 291/24

<sup>5</sup> OJ No. C 265/53

<sup>6</sup> OJ No. C 11/86

<sup>7</sup> OJ No. C 11/81

<sup>8</sup> OJ No. C 40/25

- c. whereas the repressive measures taken by the Polish leadership under pressure from and with the support of the Soviet Union constitute an infringement of human rights and of the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in July 1975,
  - d. in the conviction that the Polish tragedy can not be removed from the context of the Helsinki Final Act and that in signing those agreements, the European Community entered into formal commitments in the matter of compliance with human rights (by all signatories),
  - E. whereas the military take-over on 12-13 December 1981 and the introduction of martial law are not simply an internal Polish problem, the specific responsibility of the USSR in those events calling for a clear, firm and strong response,
  - F. whereas liberties in Poland have, to an increasing extent, been wilfully suppressed, requiring specific measures to persuade the military junta to loosen its hold on the country,
1. Condemns the proclamation of martial law in Poland and the situation it has produced as a threat to cooperation and security between peoples;
  2. Considers that a return to the spirit of Helsinki on the part of all signatories is an essential part of detente;
  3. Recalls that detente is incompatible with the idea that there are 'spheres of influence' in the world in which infringements of the basic principles of Helsinki are justifiable and where other rules apply;
  4. Recalls the more fundamental point that detente, as manifested in the whole range of mutual commitments of which it consists, is indivisible;
  5. Declares that in its view, any distinction between political, military, humanitarian and economic and commercial detente is unacceptable; and since the various aspects of detente cannot be pursued in isolation or out of step, failure to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms affects economic cooperation,
  6. Stresses, nevertheless, that the primary aim of the policy of the Ten remains that of helping the Polish people along the path of democratic renewal;

II. As regards the USSR

- A. having regard to the specific responsibility of the USSR in the present situation in Poland;
- B. noting that through direct interference and covert intervention, the USSR
  - (a) for a period of 18 months systematically pursued a policy designed to threaten and pressurize Poland, a country in the process of democratic renewal;

- intimidatory military exercises at its borders and even on Polish soil;
  - the official declaration by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party demanding that 'the course of events be turned back',
  - the press campaign against the freedom movement begun in Poland,
- (b) gave active political support to the decision to take and the implementation of the measures that were introduced on 13 December 1981,

7. Takes note of the decisions to restrict certain imports from the USSR taken by the Council of the Community on 15 March 1982 after the Member States had jointly acknowledged the responsibility of the USSR for what had happened in Poland;
8. Demands that the interest rates on credit granted by EEC Member States to the USSR be brought into line with those on credit granted to other industrialized countries;
9. Should the present situation in Poland persist, demands a fundamental reassessment of the EEC's entire economic policy towards the USSR;

### III. As regards Poland

Noting that:

- A. the process of renewal in Poland had been underway for 18 months without call for or resort to violence (on the part of the free trade union movements, notably Solidarity),
- B. but the continuation of martial law may well create an explosive situation,
- C. in effect, the continuation of martial law brings with it further cases of infringement of the most basic human rights and the rights of citizens,
- D. continuation of martial law also hinders economic revival.

Expresses its indignation that:

10. The militia continues to intern people for the opinions they hold;
11. The special courts set up under martial law render summary justice;
12. The number of cases of arbitrary dismissal is increasing;
13. The 'declarations of loyalty' which officials, magistrates, journalists, teachers and those engaged in scientific research are required to make are a violation of conscience;

14. The disbandment of the Union of Polish Journalists and its replacement by an officially appointed body simply represents a take-over of the media: press, radio, TV;
15. The campaigns in the press, radio and television, now in the hands of or subject to the military, to discredit the leaders of Solidarity are growing louder;
16. It is also the continuation of martial law that allows the military junta in power to step up its attempts to break the solidarity of the Polish people and, more especially, the solidarity between workers and intellectuals, through discriminatory measures, assignment to different camps and the imposition of different conditions of internment;

#### IV. Martial law

- A. whereas it is impossible to accept this growing oppression,
- B. whereas the numbers of detainees released are insufficient,
17. (a) wishes first to express its respect for the courage shown by those in Poland who continue to fight for the preservation of liberty;
- (b) pays special tribute to the determination shown by Lech Walesa and the leaders of Solidarity who are either interned or operating in clandestinity;
18. Recalls the urgent appeal it made in Strasbourg on 17 December 1981 for
  - (a) the repeal of martial law,
  - (b) the immediate release of prisoners,
  - (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the representatives of the Polish people (government, church, Solidarity);
 Insists on the following demands in particular:
19. Internees must be released and they and their dependants should receive compensation;
20. The trade union law being drafted by the Polish Diet should not only enshrine the established fact of trade union pluralism but also effectively restore the right to a trade union that has already been created and made legal;
21. The right of association must be restored in all sections of the population, particularly in the case of young people who are wholly excluded from public life outside the ruling party;
22. Freedom of information must be ensured by allowing foreign journalists to enter, freely travel and freely report in Poland and by reinstating the union of Polish journalists;

V. Economic aid

A. whereas the resumption or extension of political and economic relations with Poland must be made contingent on the extent of the change in the present situation,

23. Hopes that the West will be ready to grant substantial economic and financial aid to Poland if a decisive change takes place in which the processes of democratic renewal begun in August 1980 are resumed;

24. Recommends that the political and economic authorities of the West adjust their decisions on economic and financial cooperation with Poland in the light of developments in the internal situation of the country;

25. Demands that, notwithstanding the measures referred to in Section II and in paragraphs 8 and 9 in particular, no new offers of credit and aid in any form whatsoever be made for the time being - with the exception of food aid sent through charitable organizations;

VI. Humanitarian aid

A. whereas it is necessary to step up humanitarian aid to the Polish people,

B. whereas, regardless of the situation, solidarity with the Polish people implies that food aid and humanitarian aid should continue,

26. Approves the measures taken by the Council of the Community on 23 February 1982 to continue providing direct humanitarian aid;

27. Advocates support for all forms of private aid to Poland and, more specifically, that the transport costs of aid organized by private individuals should be charged to the appropriate items of the Community budget;

28. Calls on the governments of Member States which have not yet done so to facilitate the sending of gift parcels by private individuals, by assuming direct responsibility themselves for the postal charges involved;

C. whereas it is necessary to arrange also for humanitarian aid to Polish refugees,

29. Reminds the Council of the Community of its commitment to look into what can be done to ease the situation of Polish nationals outside Poland who do not wish to return in the present circumstances;

30. Calls on the Community Member States to join the non-European countries that take immigrants in accepting the tens of thousands of Polish refugees who are still living in refugee camps in Austria;



31. Specifically requests that long-term visas be granted to those Polish nationals in the Member States who wish to postpone their return to Poland without applying for political asylum;
32. Calls for continued assistance to Polish students and graduates for studies at universities in the West;
33. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Community Member States meeting in political cooperation and to the Council and the Commission.

## EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

### INTRODUCTION

The Political Affairs Committee decided to draw up the present report on the situation in Poland: after Parliament had voted a number of separate resolutions in connection with major developments in Poland, and particularly the proclamation of the state of siege on 13 December 1981, it was felt necessary to examine the factors which allowed such a situation to arise and to try to assess how it is likely to evolve in the future.

Such an analysis is the aim and the subject of the present explanatory statement. The practical conclusions drawn from this analysis are presented in the form of a resolution.

Our Parliament cannot regard the proclamation of the state of siege in Poland and its consequences as that country's internal affairs. These events cannot be considered outside the wider context of East-West relations or of the policy of détente, and least of all can they be isolated from the Helsinki Final Act, of which they constitute a flagrant violation.

The political, social and economic divide between East and West, due above all to the misinterpretation of the Yalta and Helsinki agreements by the USSR, creates a state of permanent tension which the peoples inhabiting Central Europe have to endure.

But, more than ten years ago, the era of confrontation gave way to that of détente. The Helsinki Final Act of 1973 was to confer legal status on the de facto state of détente at the same time as it asserted the fundamental rights of the peoples of Europe.

Within the last two years, however, the policy of détente has suffered the gravest set-backs, for which the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the recent events in Poland are 'directly responsible' (Declaration of the Franco-German Summit of 25 February 1982).

More specifically, several months after the military 'coup' and the coming to power of the junta, the situation in Poland, as the Conclusions of the European Council of 29-30 March 1982 stated, continues to weigh heavily on East-West relations and to affect the relations of the Ten with Poland and with the USSR, which country bears an undoubted responsibility for this state of affairs.

Nevertheless, and despite the set-backs, the guiding principles of the policy of détente - firmness with moderation, remain valid. 'We must not respond to these reverses by a return to the cold war or by opting for confrontation. That would be a dangerous and sterile reaction. It would mean the renunciation of all active policy. The response should, on the contrary, consist in a policy in which firmness in defence of our interests and ideals goes hand in hand with the encouragement of a policy of moderation and a permanent offer of mutually advantageous cooperation'<sup>1</sup>.

It is in the latter spirit that this explanatory statement and motion for a resolution deal both with the problem of measures vis-à-vis the USSR and that of conditional economic aid for Poland.

It is in this spirit too, that after a brief summary of the 'changed course' of Polish history after 13 December 1981, an analysis is undertaken of the fundamental constituents of Polish society (the Church - Solidarity - Youth) and the role they should play in the search for a 'national reconciliation' that will safeguard the freedoms that have been regained.

## SECTION I

### SOCIALIST POLAND: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

#### CHAPTER I : YALTA AND SOVIET DOMINATION

##### A. 'Breaking out of Yalta means breaking out of the Yalta myth'

(J. Laloy)

When the last two years' events in Poland are discussed, reference is often made to the Conference at which the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom met in the Crimea from 4 to 11 February 1945. And it is true that it is impossible to obtain a true appreciation of the present situation, search for its fundamental causes, or try to forecast its future development, without referring to the Yalta Agreements. But it is important to know exactly what they comprise and to avoid misinterpretations.

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<sup>1</sup> P. CORTENIER, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the FRG: lecture at the Institut français de relations internationales, Paris, on 16 February 1982

It is an over-simplification to present the Yalta Agreements as a sharing-out of Europe and the world between the United States and the USSR, a binding and definitive division that nothing and no-one can challenge today without taking the responsibility for jeopardizing Peace. Certainly no written document, no evidence, no record exists to support that myth. Actually, the reality behind the Yalta Agreements was not a carve-up but rather a recognition of facts. And, incidentally, what the Soviet system is striving for is not to divide Europe into two blocs but to obtain dominant and sovereign influence over the whole of Europe by claiming a right of intervention here, a right of oversight there.

In February 1945, Poland with the whole of Eastern Europe, except for a large part of Czechoslovakia, was held by the Red Army. It was thus not a question of what Britain and America would allow Russia to do in Poland, but what the United Kingdom and the United States could persuade the Soviet Union to accept with regard to that country.

B. The Yalta Agreement on Poland

A special chapter of the Agreements was devoted to Poland and it laid down:

1. its provisional territorial status (the Curzon Line to the east, substantial territorial gains to the north and west); the final outline of the western frontier would not be determined until the Peace Conference;
2. the form of the future government, to be set up on a democratic basis and to be representative of the Poles in Poland and abroad;
3. the obligation of this 'provisional Polish Government of national unity' to hold free and unconstrained elections on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

The United States demanded that the elections be held under international supervision, but this was rejected by Molotov on the pretext that 'it might be offensive to the Poles', as it implied that they were subject to the control of foreign diplomatic representatives.

Both Roosevelt and Churchill stressed that one thing was certain: the Poles should have a relationship of the closest friendship with the USSR based on a genuine desire for cooperation, but within the framework

of a truly democratic system. Churchill, in particular, insisted vigorously that he was more interested in 'Poland's sovereignty and independence' than in the question of the frontiers. He wanted Poland to be 'mistress of herself and captain of her soul' (E. Stettinius, 'Yalta', Paris 1951, p. 151). To Stalin, on the other hand, the Polish question was 'a strategic question of security'. The USSR, he said, wanted a strong independent and democratic Poland which could help to protect the Soviet Union. To this end he wanted to establish a 'security ring' of countries on its borders.

C. Yalta: not a conspiracy but a misconstruction

For the Soviets, Poland was to become, first and foremost, a security buffer that could be relied on both militarily and ideologically. The Americans and the British, who readily accepted that the Polish Government must not be hostile or unfriendly towards the Soviet Union, did not regard this as conflicting with the requirement that the government should be democratic, representative of the whole nation, sovereign and free.

The misunderstanding, deliberately engineered by the Soviets from the outset and thereafter maintained by them and by those prepared to govern Poland on their behalf, remains at the root of the present drama. On the Soviet side, Poland's membership of the eastern military alliance and of the Soviet system is regarded as irreversible. Western democrats, while they do not challenge the allegiance of Poland and other Eastern European countries to the Warsaw Pact, do not see this as precluding an internal evolution of the system of government.

At the time of the Yalta meeting, the Russians were in a position to dominate Europe. Soviet influence would reach as far as Soviet arms could penetrate. The only choice before Roosevelt and Churchill was between war and compromise. Once the alternative was posed in those terms, geographic and strategic facts automatically tipped the balance towards acceptance of the ambiguous compromise.

D. Liberties stifled in stages

A continuous presence of Soviet forces in Poland since 1944, an agreement on mutual friendship and economic cooperation with the USSR concluded in 1945 and renewed in 1965 - these are the crucial elements of the situation in Poland which was now to remain under the dominant

influence of the Soviet Union. Poland, a nation renowned for its deep love of freedom, was from 1945 onwards deprived of freedom to choose either its government or its destiny.

A people's referendum in 1946 confirmed the structural economic changes in Poland, but the first elections to the Diet did not take place until the beginning of 1947. The opposition got 38 seats out of 432. There was no international supervision. It was the last occasion when a legally recognized opposition was allowed to manifest itself before it was suppressed by the regime.

In 1952 a Constitution was voted making the Polish State a 'people's democracy where the power belongs to the workers of the towns and the countryside'. As for civic freedoms, while the letter of the Constitution and the law guaranteed all the freedoms of a democratic system and adhered to the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, regulatory practice restricted human rights to ensure security of the regime and the established order.

When, in 1976, the 1952 Constitution was reformed, two essential points of the Soviet interpretation of the Yalta Agreements were confirmed:

1. the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) became 'the political force leading the nation in the construction of Socialism';
2. friendship and cooperation with the USSR, as well as peaceful co-existence with states possessing a different social system, were raised to the status of fundamental principles.

This was a decisive turning point and clear-thinking Poles knew it. But, despite the protests of the intellectuals (the 'Letter of the 59') and vigorous criticism by the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Wyszynski, the new Constitution was adopted by the Diet in February 1976.

From that moment onwards, scope for the Polish regime to evolve, whether to meet the needs of economic development or to satisfy the social, cultural and spiritual aspirations of the people, became considerably reduced.

Any attempt by the Polish nation to free itself of the constraints of a rigid and inefficient system would now be thwarted, domestically, by restrictive juridical and constitutional interpretations and meet

with Moscow's accusations of 'disrupting the established military balance' from outside. Any such movement, therefore, would be brutally repressed by the hardliners at home and provoke threats from 'our great allies' in the Socialist camp.

On 23 June 1981 Pravda published a reminder of this coincidence of Socialism's military and ideological frontiers. The Soviet paper claimed that imperialist circles were trying to use the 'Polish breach' to change the status quo in Europe. It accused the imperialists of 'preparing long-term plans to weaken the Polish link in the Socialist community'. Their aim, wrote Pravda, was to 'upset the established pattern of power in Europe and launch an offensive against the post-war order'. But, added the paper, 'the principle of the inviolability of frontiers has become the cornerstone of security in Europe'.

## CHAPTER II : THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE POLISH MODEL

### A. The 'system' in its orthodox form

Since Yalta, and especially since the 25th CPSU Congress held in 1976, the Soviet Union has been busy unifying the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe by integrating them increasingly within a common system of which the Warsaw Pact and COMECON are the two pillars. Each Socialist state must totally accept the 'rules of the game' which the USSR laid down many years ago for the Socialist system as a whole. One of the basic rules is joint responsibility for upholding the 'system' within each country.

Poland did not and could not enjoy any special status in that respect and would not be allowed to distance itself in any way from the 'community'.

It is fully subject to the principle of progressive integration in the Soviet Socialist model. The Soviet leaders have, indeed, constantly stressed that Poland was the pivot of the 'security zone' which the USSR was constructing along its western frontiers. Since the purpose of this East European buffer is to constitute an advance military defence line for Soviet territory and an ideological barrier isolating the Soviet peoples from Western influence, there could be no question of allowing Poland any special freedoms in either of these domains.

Since 1968 the Polish leadership has in fact frequently proclaimed that it accepted this overall system unquestioningly and embraced it in all its aspects.

It is one of the characteristics of the Soviet version of Socialist internationalism that it is the foundation of inter-state relations among Socialist countries as much as of those between the parties.

It thus represents a new and more constraining system of relations within the Socialist camp.

B. 'The Polish model'

Nevertheless, simultaneously with these developments, there has evolved within this Socialist community of East European countries a 'Polish model' which differs in several points from the Soviet one.

Among its specific features the following are the most notable:

- an agriculture which is, for the most part, uncollectivized;
- a Church, socially cohesive and independent of the State, which claims to speak for the nation;
- an intelligentsia which asserts its duty to criticize.

The Church, the intelligentsia, the peasants are three of the fundamental components of Polish society; and the somewhat paradoxical essence of the 'Polish model' is the following: the all-powerful Socialist State, constitutionally incapable of any accommodation with a civil body which might influence or moderate it in any way, has been obliged, since 1956, to cohabit with a nation thus composed.

The political characteristics of this model are thus the following:

- the State has to make concessions to this civil body even as it vainly attempts to reduce its strength;
- there is a search for a compromise between Party and Nation, aimed at restoring the authority of the Party over the nation, but also at gaining the latter's confidence;
- efforts are made to achieve at least the appearances of a social consensus.



The concessions which the Party has had to make to the nation during, or in consequence of, various crises (1956, 1970, 1975-76, 1980-81) have on each occasion been chipped away, but have proved lasting in their essentials.

### C. The conflict

Since August 1980 the widespread working-class 'revolt' which led to the establishment of a trade union movement free of Party control has been putting the finishing touches to the Polish 'heterodox' model. Heterodox, because the idea that a workers' movement could exist, and not only as a permanent interlocutor for the authority, but also as a key participant in the decision-making process, is a phenomenon entirely alien to the Soviet system.

Individual farming, the status of the Church of Poland, a degree of freedom accorded to the intellectuals, and so on - these were accommodations which did not affect the core of the political system. But the nature of that system was changed, and profoundly, by the emergence of independent trade union forces. Thus, the Party might allow the Church to have a voice in recognition of its historical role in Poland, and also because the Church did not attempt to set itself up, in virtue of that role, as a fully active partner on the political stage. But, in a state supposed to be constructed in accordance with the Communist blueprint, the working class is not at the periphery, but is 'of' the system itself, and the Party's power is legitimized by its identification with the workers.

When this identification ceases, the source of the Party's legitimacy is cut off.

It was thus the events of August 1980, without parallel in the whole Communist world, have created a totally unprecedented situation.

Until that moment, the Polish 'system' had specific features which might not be tolerated outside Poland, but which nevertheless could be accepted within that country, since they were generated by factors specific to its national life.

The events of 1980, however, went much further in posing a fundamental challenge to the system. 'These events have shaken the very foundations of the system in which we live. The cardinal principle of the functioning of every social institution - the principle of the

State's monopoly in the areas of organization, information and decision-making - has been challenged' (J. Kuron, 'Un chemin sans retour', Esprit, January 1981, p. 68).

The Soviet press was quick to note the point, stating (Pravda, 1.9.80, article by Petrov) that the strikers' demands had 'political aspects which concealed counter-revolutionary aims' and that they were seeking to have 'an anti-Socialist opposition legalized'.

Evidently, in the view of the Soviet press, the strikes were 'not due to any failures in the political system, but to errors in management and distortions in the methods and in the Socialist approach' (Pravda of 31.8.80 and 1.9.80).

It fell to the Italian Communist Party, in its continuing confrontation with Moscow, to provide the best analysis of the situation. Posing the question: 'What is the origin of the crises which periodically break out in one or other country that calls itself Socialist? Is there not perhaps a much deeper reason which is to do with the Soviet model itself?', it spoke of the authoritative pronouncements of Moscow which had transformed the thoughts of Marx and Lenin from instruments of analysis into dogmatic ideological systems. More specifically in connection with the Polish crisis, the Italian Party stated: 'The real problem is basically this: a refusal to accept that the process of renewal should question a particular model, its essential structures and the ideological system which underlies it' (Unità, 26.1.82).

### CHAPTER III : THE ECONOMIC FAILURE

Today the Party is trying to put the blame for its own mistakes on the nation.

But, contrary to what those in power would like to be believed, the disintegration of the Polish economy did not begin in August 1980, but in the middle of the 1970s. And it was caused, not by the independent trade unions but by centralized and inefficient management. Only a thoroughgoing reform both of the economy and of the State could have remedied the situation.

A. A genuine dynamism marred by grave mistakes

Undoubtedly, social and political developments in Poland throughout the Seventies testified to a desire on the part of the leadership to modernize the country, and, on the part of the population, to acquire rapidly the consumer benefits it had so long been denied.

After the stagnation and discouragement characterizing the end of the 'Gomulka era', this was a period of lively economic activity, at least until 1975-76.

Unfortunately, this dynamism was accompanied by errors and constraints which eventually were to prove fatal and result in the present situation.

1. When, at the beginning of the 1970s, Gierek launched Poland on a course of unprecedented economic development, he did so at the price of an external debt which grew from year to year until it achieved intolerable proportions.
2. Moreover, the investment policy of the 1970s was totally chaotic, while the agricultural policy resulted in a critical shortage of food.
3. Another negative factor was the existing price system, which was arbitrary and contrary to every economic law. But if the necessary price changes were to be accepted they would have had to be introduced as part of a radical reform of the entire economic system.
4. Beginning in 1976 the energy crisis came to compound the existing deep-rooted structural crisis, which indeed it helped to reveal.
5. As in other parts of Eastern Europe, the worsening economic situation was most acutely felt as a shortage of food products.

Among the causes of the economic crisis in Eastern Europe must be counted, as we know, excessively centralized planning, corruption, nepotism and profiteering, low productivity of investments and of labour. But, in addition, one must not forget the inflation-generating energy shortages and the fact that booming East-West trade had made the Socialist countries more sensitive to changes in the world economic environment.

B. The consequences of these mistakes

Neither the strategy of rapid economic growth introduced in 1971, nor the 'changed course' of 1976 (reduction of growth rates and of imports, development of export industries, accelerated output of consumer goods) could unblock the stagnation in every sector of economic activity or significantly improve living standards, which are still lower than in the GDR, Czechoslovakia or Hungary.

Poland, once a major exporter of food staples, has now been forced to import them; though rich in natural resources, the country seems unable either to organize its industrial output or to make foreign trade the motor of economic expansion.

The inefficiency and total stagnation of Poland's economy mean that, far from achieving growth, or even zero growth, it is simply not capable of securing its citizens' subsistence.

## SECTION II

### 'NORMALIZATION'

#### CHAPTER I: PRELIMINARIES TO THE MILITARY 'COUP'

##### A. Two extremisms

Shortly before 13 December 1981 two radical tendencies emerged in Poland<sup>1</sup>.

##### 1. Solidarity

Lech Walesa was having difficulty in restraining his own 'hardliners' who were now openly calling for 'the Communist Party incapable of rising to the demands of the situation to be swept away'. On the one hand, Solidarity had become a popular movement, indeed it came to voice the feelings of a whole nation, and at its meetings political debates were taking place that, had the country a different socio-political structure, could have been held in a different forum. On the other hand, Authority, bogged down in its internal contradictions, was proving incapable of starting a genuine and constructive dialogue with Solidarity and the Church; its proposals for a 'national understanding' did not ring true (witness the historic meeting of 4 November between Jaruzelski, Glemp and Walesa).

Solidarity, a spontaneous mass movement, had not prepared any organized system of clandestine opposition: any such preparations would have been totally contrary to the movement's nature, obsessed as it was with democracy of procedure and openness of debate. While Solidarity expected an early confrontation, it had not foreseen the possibility of an 'internal normalization' in the shape of a military takeover. When it came, it caught Solidarity totally off its guard. Furthermore, the sudden communications clampdown completely disrupted such orders for a general strike and passive resistance as it did issue.

##### 2. The Party

Within the Party, too, there was a radicalization of opinion. Split between the hardliners and the moderates, unable to conceal its uncertainties and its contradictions, obliged to change its First Secretary twice, the Party had been succumbing on all fronts for eighteen months. At the same time, the economic crisis was reaching catastrophic proportions.

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<sup>1</sup> cf. Le Monde diplomatique, January 1982

The authorities have never, in fact, accepted genuine consultation, they have never recognized Solidarity as a partner.

The version of a 'front of national reconciliation' which they proposed to Solidarity lacked credibility: they were asking a trade union of 10 million members to allow itself to be represented on, - and thus to endorse - a typically Communist and totally unrepresentative 'front', comprising a number of organizations which were feudatories of the Party. Admittedly, this imbalance would be partly offset by the requirement of consensus for every major decision. Solidarity could also count on the support of the representative of the Church and of that of the intellectuals. But this did little to diminish the flagrant disproportion in the composition of the proposed 'front'.

In any case, within a fortnight of these pseudo-negotiations, the Party Plenum was demanding from the Diet that it pass an emergency law which would have effectively abolished the democratic gains of the Gdansk Agreements. In a letter to the Deputies, Monsignor Glemp asked them not to vote for the law. The vote had not taken place by the time December 13th arrived.

#### B. Preparations for the military takeover

The Party was no longer in control: either over the nation or over itself. But if Communist power had lost all authority, it still held the instruments of force: the militia and the army.

It controlled the military/security apparatus and, in the last resort, it could rely on the support of the Soviet Union. Set up by the Soviets to serve their own designs, this apparatus had been conceived from the outset as an instrument that, together with the Party, would ensure Soviet domination over Poland. It had taken part in the invasion on Czechoslovakia in 1968 and it had fired on a defenceless crowd in Gdansk in 1970.

### CHAPTER II: 13 DECEMBER 1981

#### 1. The logic of force

The logic of liberty gave way to the logic of force. The only internal resource that Communist power still had available, was that of repression. So came the military 'coup'. And so the regime admitted that 'its sole foundation was brute force' (C.Castoriadis, 'Le plus dur et le plus fragile des

regimes', Esprit, March 1982, p. 141). The Party's naked power was revealed - and seen to be nothing but armed force. The political men simply stood back, hoping to be reinstated by Jaruzelski and the other military leaders, Party members all.

'Normalization' was the abolition of the democratic renewal and a return to the norm - which, in a Communist regime, inevitably means the leading role of the Party in the nation's life. In his speech on 13 December 1981 the Chairman of the Military Council of National Salvation (W.R.O.N.) thus defined the purpose of the state of siege: 'The measures which have been taken today serve to safeguard the essential conditions for a Socialist renewal'.

General Jaruzelski went on to say that 'none of Poland's problems could, in the long term, be resolved by force' and that they could only be solved on the basis of a national accord, the principle of which he maintained and confirmed. This was why, he said, they were 'not seeking revenge' and there would be 'no return to the improper methods and practices of before August 1980'. He repeated these statements before the Sejm on 25 January 1982.

## 2. The legal authority invoked

Actually, General Jaruzelski's assumption of emergency powers was formally perfectly legal. 'It would, in fact, be difficult to condemn a military coup d'état in a country where one de facto power displaces another. It would mean conferring the semblance of legitimacy on the preceding regime, which itself had been imposed upon the people in no more democratic a manner than its present successor' (M. Tatu, 'Et le Parti?', Le Monde, 16 December 1981).

Art. 33, para. 2 of the Constitution of 14 February 1976 permits the proclamation of a state of siege: 'The Council of State (the collective Head of the Polish State) may proclaim a state of siege....., if considerations of defence or of security of the State so require'.

Art. 33 point (1) deals with the state of war (stan wojny) and point (2) with the state of siege (stan wojenny).

Power to declare the state of siege is discretionary and is vested in the Head of State (the Council of State) alone. The conditions required for its proclamation are, in any case, far from restrictive. Nevertheless, Gen. Jaruzelski thought it wise to have the takeover endorsed by a vote of the Diet on 25 January 1982.

### 3. The nature and methods of repression

The scope of repressive measures based on the 'state of siege' is considerable:

- Trade union activities, strike action and political activity have been made illegal.
- Military tribunals operate in accordance with an emergency procedure. Judgments pronounced at the conclusion of such expedited proceedings are not subject to appeal, except by the State prosecutor.
- The Poles are experiencing a classical military occupation which has plunged the whole nation in despair and hate. Restrictions on movement, patrolling and checks by the military, censorship of letters, interruption and tapping of telephone communications, personal and domestic searches, 'inspections' of farms, arrests for infringements of the martial law, withholding of passports, refusal of entry to foreign press representatives, censorship of the domestic press - all these create an intolerable situation for the Poles, even if they do manage occasionally to circumvent some of the prohibitions.

## CHAPTER III: THE 'CHANGED COURSE'

### A. Deadlock

#### 1. Continuing repression

The dismemberment of Solidarity and of the opposition circles has not resolved a situation which was already deadlocked.

Six months after the takeover:

- thousands of interned trade-unionists are still waiting to be set free;
- many political sentences are still being issued under the emergency procedure;
- 'declarations of loyalty' are still being wrested, under threat of dismissal from their jobs, not only from civil servants, but also from judges, journalists, teachers and even scientific research workers;
- the purges continue and affect even those moderates who might serve as intermediaries in starting a dialogue;
- the universities' autonomy has been destroyed. During the period when they had regained academic independence, the university Rectors had been properly elected by the University Councils. The Rector of Warsaw University has now been removed by the authorities. Indignation among the academic body was such that his appointed



successor was unable to find candidates for the posts of his assistants. Just recently the Gdansk Rector has been removed from office and replaced by an appointee of the authorities.

## 2. The dialogue that never was

Although the internment of its officials, and especially of Lech Walesa, was a heavy blow to Solidarity (which has been 'suspended' but is still legal), and although the authorities are doing their best to disrupt its organization, the movement remains - and the events of 1 and 3 May last proved it once again - an important and vigorous expression of national feelings, which are in total opposition to those now in power.

The authorities, on their part, even as they resume appeals for a 'front of national unity', are helping to consolidate, by their continued purges, a 'rejectionist front'. Even the official press openly bemoans the political isolation of the rulers. Trybuna Ludu ('The Peoples Tribune'), the organ of the Party's Central Committee, however, deplores 'the spirit of resistance to reality' which the Poles are supposed to exhibit, and calls for a 're-education of the Polish society'. There is now virtually no popular participation in public affairs and authority has no contact with any truly representative social groups.

The whole nation has gone dissident.

Not that, today, there is any movement towards a head-on confrontation, an insurrection or even active mass resistance - what is taking place is rather a movement of 'internal emigration'. It effectively completes the cleavage between the Nation and the State, thus paralysing the latter. Indeed, the erosion of power of those formally in charge has gone so far that they seem unlikely ever to regain it - either as civil administration or as 'Party with leading role'.

All this reduces the prospects for the dialogue necessary both for economic recovery and for regaining national sovereignty, with those freedoms which had been recently won. Nor can the situation change as long as authority continues to assert that 'the common aim of all Poles (sic!) in this decade is continued Socialist renewal' and that their 'common good is in the sovereign Socialist State' (Committee for trade union affairs of the Council of Ministers' Proposals concerning the trade union movement', March 1982).

B. No visible solutions

1. 'Exceptional' and 'Provisional' powers which seem likely to last

(a) Six months after the military takeover, the steady strengthening of coercive measures has considerably undercut hopes for any 'imminent' liberalization.

The rule of force progresses by its own logic: the state of war declared against the workers and the intellectuals has now been extended to the peasantry, whose independence, together with that of the Church, constitutes the main defence against the regime's hold over the nation. Following the militarization of the key sectors of industry, army 'operational groups' are now checking what stocks are held by the private farmers, who work over 70% of the agricultural land, and what output they produce. However, there has been no formal requisitioning so far.

Since hostility towards the rulers remains acute both in cities and in the countryside, the Army will remain to the fore: 'The Army and the Military Council of National Salvation are the two guarantors of the existence and the functioning of a strong State today' ('Draft Long-term action programme of the P.U.W.P.', Le Monde, 25 March 1982).

(b) This continuation of the 'state of war' carries the risk of ultimate civil war.

First, because, as the Polish Catholic Union deputy, J. Zablocki, said in the Diet on 25 January 1982: 'The price of the state of siege is the restriction of civil rights and the interruption of the dialogue between Authority and the Nation'. It also entails a double danger: on the one hand, that 'those in power will acquire the habit of arbitrary government which takes no account of public opinion because it is not carried on in the open and is not subject to public control'; and, on the other, that 'the nation will become accustomed to a situation in which Authority is regarded as an external, foreign, element, either mandated by the people nor responsible before it'.

Lastly, it is not at all certain that a protracted state of siege under Gen. Jaruzelski's rule will be tolerated either by the Party 'reactionaries' or by the Kremlin, for, in the long run, the 'military option' is a dangerous one and 'the new role assigned by Jaruzelski to the Army is likely to put ideas into the heads that wear the peaked caps - not only in Poland but also in other Warsaw Pact countries' (M. Tatu, Le Monde, 14 March 1982).

## 2. Indispensable reforms - still on the way.....

(a) The economic reform, regarded as the main hope for getting the country out of the crisis, and initially scheduled for 1 January last, has to all intents and purposes been postponed.

The regime confines itself to sermonizing which falls on deaf ears: 'Increased output is the first priority for all the patriotic forces of the country' ('Proposals concerning the trade union movement' from the Committee for trade union affairs of the Council of Ministers, march 1982).

The system has thus so far resisted all fundamental reform. A show of reform is, nevertheless, being made in some areas, not least as regards efforts to get agriculture production going:

- on 25 and 26 March 1982 the Diet adopted a number of acts concerning agriculture, and considerably improving the situation of the individual farmers. Private farms, which have now been recognized as 'a durable element of the economic system' can now have an area of up to 100 ha, as against 20 ha heretofore. Regulations on regrouping of land holdings - the main purpose of which until now had been to make life for private farmers more difficult - have also been eased. These measures are clearly meant to be tokens of goodwill towards the farming community and to some extent they reflect points in the agreements signed with Rural Solidarity in February 1981;
- also on 25 and 26 March the Government presented an agricultural development programme until 1985 meant to make the country gradually self-sufficient in food. This aim also seems to be at the back of one of the texts on 'the protection of agricultural land' voted by the Diet which gives the State greater power of control over land use;
- on 7 April 1982 a Socio-economic Consultative Council 'inspired' by one of Solidarity's demands, was set up under the auspices of Parliament. However, what Solidarity had demanded was the creation of a second Chamber to represent the trade unions.

### SECTION III

#### POLISH SOCIETY: IT TAKES TWO TO 'DIALOGUE'

Socialist Authority and a recently muzzled Nation are eyeball to eyeball in Poland today.

This fact is the fact from which must start any search for co-existence, for a modus vivendi based on a finely balanced equilibrium between Authority on the one hand and the vital forces of the Nation: Church, trade unions, intellectuals, young people, etc., on the other.

If this is to be achieved, the conditions must be created for a national 'accord' as to the remedies that can be applied. One of the essential conditions is that public opinion should be voiced, which implies the abolition of censorship and ending the State monopoly of the information media.

#### CHAPTER I: THE CHURCH

##### A. The Church - rooted in history and in the people

1. The Church in Poland is a special case in the Socialist camp. Historic developments have conferred on Polish Catholicism an altogether extraordinary social strength: enough to recall that 80 - 85% of Poles consider themselves as believers. In the other Socialist countries, where the Church is subservient to the State, there has never been such a degree of identification between national consciousness and religious conscience. The exemplary conduct of the clergy in the resistance against Hitlerism, the memory of men like Mgr. A.S. Sapieha, Archbishop of Krakow, or Maximilian Kolbe, have meant that the people could recognize the Church as its own. What is more, since the end of the Second World War, the Church has come to represent national legitimacy in the face of rulers seen as representatives of a foreign interest.

One paradoxical result of the Communist social revolution of 1944, which deprived the people of the traditional support of the propertied classes, was to strengthen its union with the Church. Vatican II provided doctrinal backing for the Church's new social awareness. The Church in Poland thus enjoys not only its traditional social prestige, but is seen as the only independent institution within the country, a unique source of inspiration and standard reference for the opponents of the official ideology.

Even the secular Left admits that it cannot imagine a Poland without the Church and the influence it exerts.

2. In recent years, the partial removal of a number of constraints of every kind (financial and administrative obstacles to the construction of Church buildings, denial of access to the information media and to education, harassment of youth organizations and of workers taking part in religious observances, etc.) placed by the State on the propagation of its doctrine and teaching, has enabled the Church to voice even more clearly the demands of the people and to point out social needs. But while socially committed - and thereby gaining even greater confidence in the eyes of the people - the Catholic community knows that precisely because it has the potential to become a dominating force within the nation means that it must not engage in political action. While stoutly opposing the ruling Socialist ideology, the Church in Poland accepts it as a political and social fact of life.

3. Nevertheless, if the Church, as a general rule, avoids all political confrontation:

- it does not flinch from taking a public stand on such fundamental matters as freedom of elections and freedom for trade unions, or from taking up the cudgels on behalf of independent farmers (Declaration by the Episcopate in the public debate on the constitutional revision of 1976);
- similarly, the Church advocates democratization by the extension of civil liberties and an evolution of the existing political system, but at the same time it is careful not to put forward larger but unrealistic, political or social demands;
- moreover, while the Church has rejected illusory and dangerous temptations of any, even temporary, political cooperation with the Government, it does support the authorities' efforts to increase the State's economic potential and hence national independence. That, patently, was the attitude of Cardinal Wyszynski who, speaking of the needs of the whole nation, reminded the strikers of August 1980 that nothing can be obtained without work;
- finally, while the Church refuses to take up for itself a strictly political role which does not belong to it, it wants to see, in line with its advocacy of fundamental civic rights, the laity being given a recognized and representative place in the nations' political life.

## B. The Church - an indispensable partner

1. The Church, which always exerts a calming influence in times of serious tension, is incontestably a permanent factor of social stability in Poland. At the same time it remains fundamentally committed to democracy and respect for the human person. Already at the time of the 1976 strikes, the Church had called on the authorities to end repression and proclaim an amnesty. Today again, it is actively engaged in aiding the victims of repression.

Proclaiming its desire to protect human rights, the Church refuses to adopt a neutralist position, which would lose it credibility in the eyes of the nation, and it is able to exercise effective pressure for democratization.

2. Since the introduction of the state of siege the Church has not ceased to call for realism and levelheadedness: "Sagacity means action in a premeditated manner and not merely responding to slogans such as : 'Now or never', 'all or nothing'," Mgr Glemp said on 7 March 1982. After the violent demonstrations on 1 and 3 May last, he emphasized the point again in a speech to young people: 'We cannot afford today the luxury of ill-judged, unreasonable or hasty actions, for they carry too high a price' (9 May 1982).

Indicating a long-term strategy, the Primate of Poland preaches national reconciliation: 'The Government, the Church, the trade unions and the young generation should thus be united in social concord' (7 March 1982) and he solemnly offers himself 'for the service of national understanding' (11 April 1982). But the Church also reminds those in power today that, as ever, the success of any plan for national recovery depends essentially on the rulers' ability to win the whole nation over to this cause. But how can there be confidence in a political system in which not all citizens can fully enjoy their rights and where, in particular, those who are believers 'become second or third-class citizens and are deprived of their chances of social advancement, professional career and the opportunity to hold certain offices of responsibility' (John Paul II, speech to the UN, 1979).

3. On 5 April last the Catholic Hierarchy adopted as their own the 'theses on social concord', drawn up by the Polish Primate's lay councillors, which set forth the hopes for democratization contained in the Gdansk agreements.

The Church has thus consistently insisted both on the need for, and possibility of a compromise - which the authorities apparently will not hear of. The Church's most ardent wish is that society should not be divided, 'with, on the one

side, rulers who order and compel and, on the other, subjects who cannot speak but only hate' (Mgr Glomp, 6 January 1982).

### C. Conclusion

Because of its attitudes and its principles, the Church in Poland today represents:

- an essential factor in the dialogue with Authority
- a factor of support for the people and for Solidarity
- a factor of moderation: 'Poland has already spilled too much blood for freedom' (John Paul II)
- a factor of steadfastness in the defence of human rights and the rights of workers.

## CHAPTER II : THE FREE TRADE UNIONS

### A. Trade Unions in the Soviet Communist system

#### 1. What they must be

- In the Soviet system, trade unions must be Socialist in character, comply with the Constitution (which acknowledges the dominant role of the Party) and observe the unity of the trade union movement.
- Moscow also recalls that Lenin was fiercely opposed to trade unions which are 'free in relation to the final objectives of the working-class struggle to achieve Socialism and Communism, or independent of the interests common to the entire working class. Such a point of view was and still is either a bourgeois provocation of the worst kind or an utter and servile misunderstanding of yesterday's slogans. (Pravda, 25.9.80)
- Not only is the concept of free trade unions rejected, the possibility of conducting negotiations with strike committees is also excluded.

#### 2. What they may not be

The very concept of independent trade unions<sup>1</sup> is a challenge to the omnipotence of the Communist Parties which see in them a facet of society no longer under their control.

<sup>1</sup> In the USSR, these trade unions have always been referred to as 'independent' in inverted commas or as 'so-called independent'

From the Socialist point of view, such a splitting of power is heresy, the acknowledgement that there are two supreme authorities, not one.

The Polish example is a clear warning to the Soviet leaders : where a Communist Party tolerates the genesis and growth of a popular movement - whatever its nature may be - which is outside the control of the Party, the Party's authority over society is reduced and the Party becomes the target of the workers' movement instead of its spearhead.

### 3. 'Compulsory' reintegration

When the Gdansk Agreements were signed, each of the former trade unions declared themselves to be 'independent and self-governing'. The trade union leaders voted to withdraw from the central trade union organization (CRZZ).

The next phase witnessed the promulgation of the order for unity in the trade union movement.

At the VIIth plenary session of the PUPP's Central Committee, the present Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Rakowski, referred to the need to adapt the new trade unions to the political system and not the system to the trade unions. But in 1980, Solidarity had some 7 million members out of a total workforce of 16 million. It was thus too powerful an organization to coexist with the rules in force.

### B. Solidarność (Solidarity)

The history of Solidarity, its development, the hopes it engendered in Poland and the rest of the world, its leaders, especially Lech Walesa, their struggles, successes and internment, the indomitable resistance of a starving but unbowed nation which had tasted the freedom of which it had been deprived and was determined not to have it taken away again, whatever the cost : all that is common knowledge. We shall, therefore, do no more than draw practical conclusions from these events and make proposals designed to safeguard for Poland in the future : respect for human rights, the survival and reconciliation of the Polish nation, the freedoms it has regained and the development of its economy.



But Solidarity has now become so representative of the Polish people, the free and self-governing trade unions have become such a major objective that it is necessary to explain briefly why this trade union movement has also become an essential feature of Polish society and an indispensable partner in the dialogue between Authority and that society.

Solidarity is a trade union movement that has taken on the dimensions of a great popular movement which voices the feelings of a whole nation and proposes a specific concept of society.

The events which took place in Poland in 1980/1981 constitute a civil revolution, a peaceful revolution against the injustice and indifference of the political system.

The movement began in the factories and then spread until it embraced virtually every sector of society, from the trade unions to the various professional organizations.

The dynamism engendered by the strikes in the summer of 1980 'is visible simultaneously in various spheres : the workers' movements, the democratic opposition and national emancipation movements, spheres which at times overlap so much that they are almost entirely indistinguishable and at others so separate that in some aspects they are in opposition to each other'. (K. Pomian, Pologne - Défi à l'impossible ?, Paris, 1982, pp 227-228)

1. A 'real' trade union ....

- (a) by virtue of its origins - it was created by the workers for the workers.

The first strike (1-8 July 1980) was called simply to support wage claims submitted principally to offset the increases in the price of foodstuffs, especially meat.

But soon the claims began to extend to genuinely popular and trade union issues : excessive working hours, low wages, foodstuffs becoming increasingly scarce and expensive, an increase in the number of accidents at work, submission to 'Socialist working discipline' and increased output at all costs.

The widespread strike in Gdansk in mid-August 1980 was not, however, called for economic reasons but on proper trade union grounds : it demanded the reinstatement of two militants, Lech WALESA and Anna WALENTYNOWICZ, who had been dismissed from their jobs.

On 31 August, the strikers and the Government signed the Gdansk Agreements.

On 22 September a national confederation of independent trade unions - Solidarnosc - was formed, 35 independent trade unions combined to form it, and Lech Walesa was elected chairman.

- (b) by virtue of its composition : for the first time, workers and intellectuals joined together in a common struggle to ensure respect for their rights.

It is, of course, true that intellectual movements, such as KOR, had assisted interned strikers as long ago as 1976, and others had devised educational and cultural courses to teach the working class about their freedoms (e.g. the Scientific Education Society).

However, it was after Gdansk and the birth of Solidarity that this collaboration between workers and intellectuals was organized on a permanent basis.

- (c) by virtue of its recognition by the law of the land

23 September : submission to the Warsaw district court of the formal application for the registration of this free trade union

24 October : acceptance by the district court of the application, but with the addition by the district judge of a reference in the union's Constitution to the dominant role of the Party

10 November : the Supreme Court overturns the judgment of 24 October and formally registers Solidarnosc.

It took three months of campaigns, discussions and strikes to achieve that success.

It is vital to note that although the military junta has 'suspended' the activities of Solidarity, it has still not yet dared to withdraw its recognition in law. 'We must not forget that this trade union has become and still is the authentic representative of the working class, and that this fact has been acknowledged and confirmed by Authority'. (Pope John-Paul II).

- (d) by virtue of its recognition as the body representing Polish workers in international trade union organizations

The attendance of Lech Walesa and other leaders of Solidarity in Geneva, Rome and Paris, and their participation in demonstrations organized by international trade union bodies has clearly shown that they are full members of the world trade union movement.

- (e) by virtue of its claims

The Gdansk Agreements clearly set out the Polish Government's acknowledgement of the right to establish independent and self-governing trade unions, the right to strike, the limits on censorship, the reinstatement of workers dismissed from their jobs, access to the mass media and the release of political prisoners.

Of course, none of that was conclusively acquired when the Agreements were signed, and none of it really ever will be. But the aim of the trade unions, and in particular of Solidarity, was precisely to secure the legal ratification of the commitments undertaken by the Government when it signed the Gdansk Agreements.

- (f) by virtue of its aims

The events in Poland have demonstrated the deep-seated opposition of the working class to the official trade unions. That is why the workers' principal objective is now to demand free and self-governing trade unions.

Soviet-style trade unions, on which the official Polish trade unions are modelled, are based on three principles which ultimately deprive the working class of one of its major achievements of the 19th century :

1. the institutionalization of the supremacy of the Party over the trade unions;
2. the supremacy of administrative and management staff over shop-floor workers in the factory's trade unions branches;
3. the supremacy of the 'higher' echelons in the trade unions over the factory branches.

Centralism is another factor, in addition to the dual subordination of the trade unions, which deprives the working class of genuine representation. What is more, centralized trade union activities prohibit any inter-factory liaison and hence any agreement or spread of ideas between trade unions in different undertakings, branches of industry or regions.

The demand for independence is therefore a crucial objective and a prerequisite for genuine working-class trade unionism.

In short, the workers' demands are designed to throw off the triple yoke which shackles the working class : rejection of the subordination of the trade union to the Party apparatus, abolition of the predominance of management staff in trade union factory branches, and abolition of centralism.

2. Solidarity has developed into a broadly-based social, national and popular movement

(a) by virtue of the number of its members

In a short period of time, the membership of Solidarity has risen to more than 8 million. It has therefore become by far the most representative workers' organization.

(b) by virtue of the popular support it has received

Solidarity represents the struggle of the Polish people for bread and freedom. It is an attempt to reform the political system progressively and peacefully.

Developments in Poland have occurred in the form of a simple 'logic of freedom', gradually winning over the whole of society to its concept of a democratic Poland.

Born in the factories and shipyards, Solidarity has never contented itself with simple demands for improvements in working conditions. Since its formation it has expanded its activities which are, above all, anti-totalitarian in nature.

- (c) by virtue of the organization with which it has equipped itself at all levels

The junta arrested and interned more than 7,000 of Solidarity's leaders in its attempt to stifle it, but it has not succeeded in killing it off. Although its leaders have been assigned to different camps under more or less severe conditions, kept in isolation and some - as first announced on 11 June - treated in psychiatric hospitals, the organizations's vitality has not been destroyed.

#### SECTION IV

##### ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS OF THE TEN

##### CHAPTER I: MEASURES VIS-A-VIS THE USSR

1. Measures in the area of trade were already envisaged at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 4 January 1982.

(a) The Ten undertook first of all to consult with the United States so as not to hinder American measures against the USSR. But no specific action was subsequently envisaged at Community level to give effect to this undertaking.

(b) The Ten would subsequently consider 'measures concerning credit [...] and measures concerning the Community's commercial policy with regard to the USSR.'

##### 2. Practical measures

(a) The intentions of the Ten had first practical application in the Council decision of 15 February 1982 (with Greece voting against) whereby the Commission was authorized to renegotiate the OECD consensus on export credits so as to have the USSR classed in Category 1 of purchaser countries, which would mean raising the rate of interest by a quarter of a point ....

(b) On 22 February 1982 the Council of Ministers decided to take measures of sufficient economic impact to represent a 'serious political signal' manifesting displeasure with the USSR.

For the first time in its history, the EEC decided, instead of liberalizing, to restrain its commercial exchanges with state-trading countries.

(c) On 15 March 1982 the Council decided to reduce imports of certain products from the USSR.

In practical terms, the Council of Ministers of the Ten adopted on 15 March 1982 (with Greece voting against) two regulations under Article 113 of the Treaty providing, first, for a reduction of imports of certain products originating in the USSR and, secondly, suspending these measures in respect of Greece<sup>1</sup>.

The regulation lays down the following restrictions on import arrangements with the USSR:

- for 19 products currently liberalized at Community level, a 25% reduction of imports compared with 1980. The volume of trade involved is about 319 million ECU (initial Commission proposal: 39 products with a trade volume of 491 million ECU);
- for 40 products, currently subject to quotas in some Member States and liberalized in others, a 50% reduction in the volume of imports compared with 1980. The volume of trade involved is 128 million ECU (Commission's initial proposal: 55 products with a trade volume of 340 ECU).

The volume of imports envisaged would be 447 million ECU per year (on the basis of 1980 figures) out of a total volume of Community imports of 10,800 million ECU, or approximately 4% (the Commission's initial proposal: 832 million ECU, or approximately 8%). Now, 80% of Community imports originating from the USSR consist of raw materials (9%) and energy products (70%), while the regulation concerns only luxury articles and manufactures (omitting products originally included in the list, such as furs, motor cars, watches, etc.). Moreover, the regulation provides for derogations in favour of contracts already in force and export licences already granted. And - the regulation provides that these measures will remain in force only until December 1982.

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<sup>1</sup> This derogation was justified by the stage currently reached in the gradual integration of Greece in the Customs Union and by the special situation of Greece's trade with the USSR and other East European countries.

### 3. Impact modest but not negligible

Their restricted scope and duration, the exclusions in favour of existing contracts, and the nature of the products which they affect, make these Community measures appear modest, which they in fact are.

(a) But if they are modest they are neither negligible nor useless - as witness the USSR's accusations of 'a blow struck at trade relations' which they have aroused. It should be noted at this point that the measures concern national trade policies: there is no contractual relationship between the Community and the USSR, the latter having consistently refused to recognize the EEC. Thus the Community has not infringed any rule of international law.

The economic impact in the Community of measures against the USSR at the purely commercial level was bound, in any case, to be relatively limited for objective reasons: exclusion of tariff measures, existing contracts, current licences, etc.

At present the USSR's balance of trade with the Community is positive and shows a surplus of several thousand million dollars - thanks to which it is able to purchase American, European and Japanese technology or agricultural products from all over the world.

By reducing this surplus we have been able to affect directly this purchasing power without harming either output or employment in the Community.

Nevertheless, the Ten top the list of the USSR's Western trade outlets, and, in comparison, the American measures have a very limited economic impact as far as American interests are concerned.

(b) In any event, the economic aspect of the sanctions, although not negligible, cannot be regarded as the most important.

The political impact is undoubtedly more significant. It is encouraging to note that there is general consensus (apart from the case of Greece) as to the political advisability of the sanctions! Initially, one or two Member States had let it be understood that they would probably not be able to participate in the measures proposed.

The fact that they were finally brought round to the majority opinion must be inscribed to the Community's credit as a demonstration of Community political solidarity - which was the principal aim of the Ten in this case.

#### 4. Should we go further?

The question now before us is whether, and by what means, political pressure on the USSR can be increased and a greater margin of freedom of manouvre for the authorities in Poland be encouraged without provoking direct USSR intervention.

Experience shows that sanctions are only effective if they are concerted, complementary and loyally applied by all concerned. The first series of measures introduced by the Ten were so applied. To increase pressure on the USSR a second series of economic measures might now be envisaged in which the emphasis would be placed not so much on limiting or freezing imports, but on the granting of future credits by the West to the USSR. In that case steps must be taken to ensure that the unanimity continues both in the decisions and in the implementation. Care must also be taken that the measures taken by the Europeans are closely concerted with the United States, whose first set of economic measures is very different from the European one.

The United States have essentially concentrated on measures affecting exports of their advanced technology and energy-industry products. In contrast, the Ten - the Soviet Union's main market in the West - have introduced measures affecting imports of Soviet manufacturers.

It seems, however, certain that the Western European countries will not give up the plans for the Soviet gas pipeline and all the possibilities it opens for its own technology exports.

It follows that if in this area, as in the areas of credit, effective sanctions are to be introduced, it is essential that they should be coordinated.

### CHAPTER II: AID TO POLAND

#### A. Food aid and economic support

##### 1. Before the introduction of martial law (13 December 1981)

At the European Council in Luxembourg (December 1980) the Nine responded to requests for economic support addressed to them by Poland. The Council of Ministers



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**RESOLUTION**  
on the situation in Poland

*The European Parliament,*

A. recalling its resolutions

- of 9 April 1975 <sup>(1)</sup>, of 11 May 1977 <sup>(2)</sup>, of 10 May 1978 <sup>(3)</sup> and of 15 October 1980 <sup>(4)</sup> on security and cooperation in Europe,
- of 18 September 1980 on human rights in Poland <sup>(5)</sup>,
- of 17 December 1981 on the situation in Poland <sup>(6)</sup>,
- of 17 December 1981 on the refugees from Poland <sup>(7)</sup>,
- of 21 January 1982 on declaring a day of solidarity with the Polish people on 30 January 1982 <sup>(8)</sup>,

B. having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Israël on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-591/81),

the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Romualdi and others on the state of emergency in Poland (Doc. 1-891/81),

- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mrs Macciocchi on the situation in Poland (Doc. 1-1035/81),
- the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr Gawronski on aid for Poland (Doc. 1-310/82),

C. having regard to the report of the Political Affairs Committee (Doc. 1-436/82),

I. As regards the CSCE

- A. in the awareness that the crisis in Poland is an expression of the growing difficulties of the Communist system in Eastern Europe that will burden East-West relations and weigh heavily on the policy of security and cooperation in Europe,
- B. whereas the repressive measures taken by the Polish leadership under pressure from and with the support of the Soviet Union constitute an infringement of human rights and of the Final Act of the CSCE signed in Helsinki in July 1975,
- C. in the conviction that the Polish tragedy cannot be removed from the context of the Helsinki Final Act and that in signing those agreements, the European Community entered into formal commitments in the matter of compliance with human rights (by all signatories),

<sup>(1)</sup> OJ No C 95, 28. 4. 1975, p. 28.

<sup>(2)</sup> OJ No C 133, 6. 6. 1977, p. 32.

<sup>(3)</sup> OJ No C 131, 5. 6. 1978, p. 47.

<sup>(4)</sup> OJ No C 291, 10. 11. 1980, p. 24.

<sup>(5)</sup> OJ No C 265, 13. 10. 1980, p. 53.

<sup>(6)</sup> OJ No C 11, 18. 1. 1982, p. 86.

<sup>(7)</sup> OJ No C 11, 18. 1. 1982, p. 82.

<sup>(8)</sup> OJ No C 40, 15. 2. 1982, p. 25.

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- D. whereas the military take-over on 12-13 December 1981 and the introduction of martial law are not simply an internal Polish problem, the specific responsibility of the USSR in those events calling for a clear, firm and strong response,
- E. whereas liberties in Poland have, to an increasing extent, been wilfully suppressed, requiring specific measures to persuade the military junta to loosen its hold on the country,
- F. whereas the ruthless suppression of the demonstrations which took place on the second anniversary of the Gdansk agreements indicate a new attack on the rights and freedoms of the Polish people,
1. Condemns the proclamation of martial law in Poland and the situation it has produced as a threat to cooperation and security between peoples;
  2. Considers that a return to the spirit of Helsinki on the part of all signatories is an essential part of detente;
  3. Points out that the policy of repression in Poland is putting the policy of detente in Europe at risk;
  4. Recalls the more fundamental point that detente, as manifested in the whole range of mutual commitments of which it consists, is indivisible;
  5. Declares that there is a connection between political and military detente and economic and technological cooperation on the one hand and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms on the other;
  6. Stresses, nevertheless, that the primary aim of the policy of the Ten remains that of helping the Polish people along the path of democratic renewal;

## II. As regards the USSR

- A. having regard to the specific responsibility of the USSR in the present situation in Poland;
- B. noting that through direct interference and covert intervention, the USSR
- (a) for a period of 18 months systematically pursued a policy designed to threaten and pressurize Poland, a country in the process of democratic renewal:
    - intimidatory military exercises at its borders and even on Polish soil,
    - the official declaration by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party demanding that 'the course of events be turned back',
    - the press campaign against the freedom movement begun in Poland,
  - (b) gave active political support to the decision to take and the implementation of the measures that were introduced on 13 December 1981,
7. Takes note of the decisions to restrict certain imports from the USSR taken by the Council of the Community on 15 March 1982 after the Member States had jointly acknowledged the responsibility of the USSR for what had happened in Poland;
8. Supports the decision of the Versailles Summit to coordinate the credit policy of the main industrial Western democracies and Japan towards the USSR;
9. Recognizes that, should the present situation in Poland persist, there will be a demand for a fundamental reassessment of the ECC's entire economic policy towards the USSR and other Eastern European State-trading countries, notwithstanding the benefits both to the Community and Eastern Europe of the development of trade;

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### III. As regards Poland

Noting that:

- A. the process of renewal in Poland had been underway for 18 months without call for or resort to violence (on the part of the free trade union movements, notably Solidarity),
- B. but the continuation of martial law has created an explosive situation,
- C. in effect, the continuation of martial law brings with it further cases of infringement of the most basic human rights and the rights of citizens,
- D. continuation of martial law also hinders economic revival,

Expresses its indignation that:

- 10. The militia continues to intern people for the opinions they hold;
- 11. The special courts set up under martial law render summary justice;
- 12. The number of cases of arbitrary dismissal is increasing;
- 13. 'The declarations of loyalty' which officials, magistrates, journalists, teachers and those engaged in scientific research are required to make are a violation of conscience;
- 14. The disbandment of the Union of Polish Journalists and its replacement by an officially appointed body simply represents a take-over of the media: press, radio, TV;
- 15. The campaigns in the press, radio and television, now in the hands of or subject to the military, to discredit the leaders of Solidarity are growing louder;
- 16. It is also the continuation of martial law that allows the military junta in power to step up its attempts to break the solidarity of the Polish people and, more especially, the solidarity between workers and intellectuals, through discriminatory measures, assignment to different camps and internment and pressure on some Solidarity members to go into exile against their wishes;

### IV. Martial law

- A. whereas it is impossible to accept this growing oppression,
  - B. whereas the numbers of detainees released are insufficient, and the thousands of new arrests made following recent events are no more justified than those which have been made since 13 December 1981,
17. (a) wishes first to express its respect for the courage shown by those in Poland who continue to fight for the preservation of liberty;
- (b) pays special tribute to the determination shown by Lech Walesa and the leaders of Solidarity who are either interned or operating in increasingly difficult circumstances;
18. Recalls the urgent appeal it made in Strasbourg on 17 December 1981 for
- (a) the repeal of martial law,
  - (b) the immediate release of prisoners,
  - (c) the resumption of the dialogue between the representatives of the Polish people (government, church, Solidarity);
- Insists on the following demands in particular:
- 19. Internees must be released and they and their dependants should receive compensation;

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20. The trade union law being drafted by the Polish Diet should not only enshrine the established fact of trade union pluralism but also effectively restore the right to a trade union that has already been created and made legal;
21. The right of association must be restored in all sections of the population;
22. Freedom of information must be ensured by allowing foreign journalists to enter, freely travel and freely report in Poland and by reinstating the union of Polish journalists;

#### V. Economic aid

- A. whereas the resumption or extension of political and economic relations with Poland must be made contingent on the extent of the change in the present situation,
23. Hopes that the West will be ready to grant substantial economic and financial aid to Poland if a decisive change takes place in which the processes of democratic renewal begun in August 1980 are resumed;
24. Recommends that the political and economic authorities of the West adjust their decisions on economic and financial cooperation with Poland in the light of developments in the internal situation of the country;
25. Demands that, notwithstanding the measures referred to in Section II and in paragraphs 8 and 9 in particular, no new offers of credit and aid in any form whatsoever be made for the time being — with the exception of food aid sent through charitable organizations;

#### VI. Humanitarian aid

- A. whereas it is necessary to step up humanitarian aid to the Polish people,
- B. whereas, regardless of the situation, solidarity with the Polish people implies that food aid and humanitarian aid should continue,
26. Calls on the President of the Commission of the European Communities to submit a report to it on:
  - (a) special aid in 1981,
  - (b) general food aid in 1981;
27. Expects that the President of the Commission will also give details of food aid in 1982;
28. Approves the measures taken by the Council of the Community on 23 February 1982 to continue providing direct humanitarian aid;
29. Advocates support for all forms of private aid to Poland and, more specifically, that the transport costs of aid organized by private individuals should be charged to the appropriate items of the Community budget;
30. Calls on the governments of Member States which have not yet done so to facilitate the sending of gift parcels by private individuals, by assuming direct responsibility themselves for the postal charges involved;
- C. whereas it is necessary to arrange also for humanitarian aid to Polish refugees,
31. Reminds the Council of the Community of its commitment to look into what can be done to ease the situation of Polish nationals outside Poland who do not wish to return in the present circumstances;

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32. Calls on the Community Member States to join the non-European countries that take immigrants in accepting the tens of thousands of Polish refugees who are still living in refugee camps in Austria;

33. Specifically requests that long-term visas be granted to those Polish nationals in the Member States who wish to postpone their return to Poland without applying for political asylum;

34. Calls for continued assistance to Polish students and graduates for studies at universities in the West;

35. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Political Cooperation and to the Council and the Commission.

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