

Europeanisation and Higher Education

by

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INTRODUCTION

The signatories to the Bologna Declaration of 1999, and those states which have subsequently joined in the Bologna process, have committed themselves to the creation, by 2010, of a European higher education area. Most of the signatory states have subsequently promoted reforms which have been justified as steps taken in this direction. Superficially, at least therefore, some kind of process of Europeanisation is currently transforming previously national systems of higher education. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest that these appearances are misleading. We shall try to show that, in some cases, important reforms are in progress but that the problems which they address and the solutions which they offer are grounded in a national rather than a European analysis. In other cases we shall suggest that proposed reforms are relatively trivial and that therefore the European dimension is almost entirely absent from policy. Italy represents the first of these cases (important changes but problems and solutions which are distinctively national), and France represents the second case (a strong rhetorical commitment to the European objective which in practice requires relatively little policy change).

The argument is set out in the five sections of this paper. The first section provides a very brief factual background to the Bologna process. The second section discusses the concept of

Europeanisation. We need to be careful not to reject the possibility of genuine Europeanisation merely by defining the process too strictly. The purpose of this section is therefore to suggest as wide a definition of Europeanisation as possible. In this way we can make sure that nothing which might reasonably be considered as Europeanisation is neglected.

In the third section of this paper we shall examine the European rationale for the various planks contained within the Bologna process as augmented by subsequent meetings and declarations. The aim here is to show that there is no persuasive European rationale for most of the measures contained within the Bologna process. Clearly, the official statements of policy which are produced at meetings which carry forward the Bologna process, are designed to provide such a European rationale. The official view is that, if a variety of national changes are co-ordinated, a much greater European good can be realised. We shall try to show that, in fact, the real benefits of these reforms, when they are substantial, are going to emerge at the national level and most often for national governments.

In the fourth and fifth sections we shall examine the Italian and French cases in order to show that important changes are occurring in Italy but that the problems, and the solutions to them, are Italian and have been produced by Italian governments. By contrast, we shall argue that, in the French case, changes related to the European rhetoric are extremely limited. In addition, we shall try to show that the French government was tempted by the Italian route, namely the possibility of leveraging important and nationally required changes through resort to a European rationale, but that this attempt was rapidly abandoned in favour of a much more cautious approach.

SECTION 1 – The Background

The Bologna process, as it has now come to be called, actually began as a consequence of the coming together of the Ministers of Education of France, the UK, Germany and Italy in order to sign what was called the Sorbonne Declaration. The terms of the Sorbonne Declaration have been modified and added to by subsequent declarations in Bologna in 1999, in Prague in 2001, and in Berlin in 2003. No attempt will be made here to show how the ambitions of the process have expanded over time. Instead, I shall try to list the most important policy commitments which can be derived from these declarations. It should be remembered that the European Union, and the Commission, are only indirectly involved in this process and that therefore the declarations have no legal force. Compliance, whether by governments or universities, is therefore voluntary, at least in the sense of being not legally compelled.

By far the most important policy commitment contained in these declarations is the so-called three five eight formula. Strictly speaking, the three five eight formula should be understood in terms of credits required rather than years needed to obtain particular qualifications. A normal annual load in terms of the European credit transfer system is 60. Therefore, three years are normally required for a Bachelors degree, two further years for the Masters, and three further years for a PhD. The rationale underlying this limited degree of harmonisation is that, by the adoption of common labels and common definitions, the comparability and transparency of higher educational qualifications will be greatly increased and that this will open up national systems of higher education and promote mobility.

Signatories to the process are also committed to making available to students something called the Diploma Supplement. This is a document, rather like a transcript, which will contain a statement of credits obtained and marks awarded. This statement of credits and marks will appear in both a

nationally specific form and a standard European form, again with the purpose of facilitating cross-frontier mobility.

States have committed themselves to the introduction of the European Credit Transfer System and to making the Diploma Supplement available either on request, or to all students. The ECTS is designed to help students who spend part of their time abroad either in a BA or MA programme. It allows the sending institution to know exactly how much work the student has been required to undertake in the receiving institution. The ECTS also contains a system for grading student achievement. The system of grades runs from A to F (F is a failure), and is based, not on absolute marks or achievement, but on dividing a given cohort of students into pre-determined percentiles which are then graded from A to E.

In addition to these rather precise requirements, there is a commitment in the various declarations to a range of goals and values which are expressed in much more abstract terms. The notion of employability as an important objective, especially with regard to the BA, is strongly endorsed. Modularisation is favoured as a mechanism calculated to allow students to take more responsibility for the nature of their studies. The role of autonomous university institutions in elaborating the curriculum is also strongly endorsed. Many of the declarations also contain a strong commitment to higher education as a public good provided through public institutions.

SECTION TWO – The Concept of Europeanisation

The earliest conception of Europeanisation which one finds in the literature refer simply to the definition of European policy, at the European level, subsequently being implemented at national level and therefore producing changes in formerly national policy. This is what has sometimes been

described as a top-down conception of Europeanisation. In order to spread the Europeanisation net as widely as possible I shall try to indicate here a range of ways in which this initial, rather narrow and strict definition, can be extended.

The first extension which needs to be accepted is one which permits us to consider, as an aspect of Europeanisation, not merely top-down implementation but also the interactive processes between national and European level that may well have formed policy in the first place. Involved in this extension is the possibility that some nations may have been more crucial in determining what eventually became European policy than others.

A second extension allows us to include under the Europeanisation umbrella, those cases of policy which is labelled and legitimated in national terms but has its real origins in European processes. Such cases are, of course, most likely to occur in those nations which are least committed to the European ideal. This rather unusual case has been illustrated with respect to French defence policy.

A third extension ought to allow us to consider, as an aspect of Europeanisation, opposition, perhaps within the national framework, but targeted at specifically European initiatives. The point here is that Europe, and European policy, are at issue, and subjects of conflict. We might loosely describe this as a kind of negative Europeanisation but it is nevertheless genuine.

Fourthly, we ought to include under our Europeanisation umbrella, those cases of changes in policy or process which are unintended but which occur as a consequence of the implementation of some European policy initiative. For example, under this extension, we could treat as an example of Europeanisation, a shift of economic advantage in favour of one region and against another consequent upon the adoption of the single currency.

Finally, we might well extend our understanding of Europeanisation in order to include cognitive and normative changes, for example in the ways in which problems and solutions were understood, even if these intellectual changes did not immediately produce any policy change. In the case of higher education, for example, we might try to demonstrate the existence of a genuine degree of Europeanisation by suggesting that the ways in which particular national governments tackled their own educational problems were significantly influenced by lessons learnt from, or interaction with, European partners.

It is hoped that, in offering this definition of Europeanisation which has been extended as far as possible, we can avoid the possibility of failing to detect genuine Europeanisation by merely defining it out of existence. It is my hope that these extensions allow us to recognise the European dimension in whatever form it should appear.

SECTION THREE – Is There a Genuinely European Rationale Underlying the Bologna Process?

In this section of the paper we shall examine the genuinely European gains which the implementation of the Bologna process offers. We shall try to argue that these gains are relatively slight and that therefore the real motives and genuine benefits to be derived from implementation lie at the national, and not at the European level. Let us begin with the three, five, eight formula.

From a European perspective, the advantage of the three, five, eight formula is supposed to lie in the recognition of these different levels of achievement by participating nations. The point may be illustrated in more concrete terms. Let us consider the case of a young person graduating from a European university, perhaps after five years of successfully completed study, but obtaining a first

degree. According to the principles of the Bologna process, and if the five years have constituted 300 European credits, such a person ought to have his qualification recognised at the Masters level, and he ought therefore to be eligible to enter on PhD programmes in other countries. The danger against which Bologna seeks to protect students is that, in an earlier pre-Bologna period, institutions might have been inclined to reject this student's application to join a PhD programme on the grounds that he had only obtained a first degree, and that he therefore needed further study in order to complete a Masters degree before being eligible for a PhD programme. In Bologna terms, through the creation of a 'readable and comparable' system of diplomas, intra-European mobility can be encouraged. A moment's reflection will show that this argument holds very little water.

The crucial question is, what do we mean by recognition? If degrees awarded by European institutions were right-conferring, that is if they conferred rights of access either to employment or to further study in neighbouring countries, then the rationale stated above would hold true. But of course qualifications do not confer rights of this kind, and certainly not cross-nationally. With this point in mind it is necessary to re-state the rationale. A re-statement might be possible in the following terms. Our hypothetical student might be more likely to be accepted onto a PhD programme at the institution of his choice if the institution to which he had applied, being familiar with Bologna criteria, was more likely to recognise his five year qualification as a Masters rather than merely as a first degree. Of course, the institution might have had enough discretion and enough intelligence in the first place, without Bologna, to recognise that somebody who had successfully completed five years of study, was indeed properly qualified to enter a PhD programme. Understood in these terms, whether we are looking at study abroad or employment abroad, the gain achieved through adherence to the Bologna process seems relatively slight. Any appeal which the rationale possesses seems to lie in the ambiguity surrounding the use of the term recognition.

It should be remembered that creating three-year degrees is a major initiative for many European systems. In many of these systems the first degree was in theory supposed to take four or perhaps five years, but in practice often required one or two more years. The argument then of this paper is that the relatively small gains to be made in terms of mobility, which are advertised as the European dividend in these reforms, cannot be the real incentive for undertaking such complicated and major structural reforms. The real advantage of the three-year degree seems instead to lie in the possibility of much increased efficiency, with students obtaining a qualification and moving on to employment at much reduced cost both to the state and to themselves.

But those who believe in a genuinely European rationale for Bologna might point to the benefits to be derived from a general adoption of the European credit transfer system. Once again, it seems to me that, on closer examination, the advantages to mobility are relatively slight. If the process of Europeanisation in higher education does proceed as intended, most national governments recognise that it will introduce some elements of increased differentiation between educational institutions. Some institutions will be internationally more in demand and be better placed to secure foreign placements for their students, than others. Most student mobility is handled at present through bilateral agreements of institutions, and departments, who have come together on an agreed basis. The ideal underlying the ECTS is that such bilateral or trilateral agreements would no longer be necessary. Once students had European credits, which were generally recognised, they could move freely from one European university to another, confident in the knowledge that the institution from which they originated would recognise these credits and incorporate them into their final degree. This is the image which the rhetoric of ECTS evokes. But this picture unrealistically ignores distinctions of status and standards between different institutions. Institutions which believe themselves to be high in the national pecking order will inevitably seek to encourage student

exchanges with institutions elsewhere in Europe which they feel to be similarly placed. They will not be willing to accept unconditionally student applicants whom they consider to be less well qualified than their own students. The notion of some automatic recognition of the value of credits, based on the false analogy with a European currency, ignores these questions of status differentiation. Bilateral agreements between institutions and departments which know one another and have developed mutual trust will still be necessary in any conceivable future and therefore the gain, in terms of mobility, to be derived from the adoption of the ECTS, is much smaller than is often pretended. We shall see later, especially in the discussion of the Italian case, how a genuine national rationale for ECTS exists in some countries.

Another element in the European rationale under examination here concerns the objective of making first degrees especially relevant to the national or local labour market. If a European labour market existed, and it is the aim of Bologna to help to create such a market, then the benefits of more vocationally oriented first degrees would accrue both to national economies and to the European economy. Two points are worth retaining here. The vast majority of students will qualify and work in their home country so any of the alleged benefits to be derived from more vocationally oriented degrees will accrue predominantly to the national economy and only marginally to the European economy. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there are no mechanisms in Bologna which might suggest that the employability criteria is being taken seriously by policy makers. For example, there are no detailed specifications of what constitutes an employment friendly degree, or through what processes such degrees might be effectively devised, which are in any sense as concrete or as detailed as the requirements surrounding the ECTS and the three, five, eight formula. Most national governments in Europe are no doubt enthusiastic in their support for more vocational first degrees, but there is nothing in Bologna which helps them to achieve these outcomes. It therefore seems likely, and we already have some evidence to this effect, that the definition of new

curricular within the three year format will be dominated by the academic profession and existing academic disciplines. Most policy makers are perfectly conscious of this difficulty but it is one with which they must wrestle at the national level with whatever instruments lie to hand. The employability dimension in Bologna seems mostly rhetorical and therefore not susceptible of furnishing any genuine evidence of Europeanisation.

At this point in the argument it would be wrong to deny that governments, universities, and individual academics, especially in small countries, are genuinely interested in the promotion of cross-border mobility. However, such interest, and the measures taken to promote mobility, seem to me more often an example of internationalisation than of Europeanisation. Many of the University spokesmen with whom I have spoken in the collection of evidence for this paper, have shown a strong interest in transatlantic mobility, both for students and staff, and have underlined the importance and status of the leading American universities.

The final element in the genuinely European rationale for Bologna which we need to consider concerns the ability of European higher education to attract students from outside Europe. Spokesmen for the commission, and commission documents, often refer to the expanding international market in education and to the very large share of this market which is presently taken by the USA and some other English speaking countries. On this point the argument is that, if European degrees can conform to a more globally familiar pattern, they will be more attractive to overseas students, and European institutions will be in a better position to compete with their American counterparts. Research attempting to model the consumption choices of mobile overseas students does not give much support to this line of argument. The international market in higher education is extremely imperfect and consumers lack much of the knowledge which would be essential to the exercise of rationale choice. The radical simplification which therefore takes place

in the choice mechanism often treats price as a proxy measure of quality. The zero or purely nominal tuition fees charged by many European universities are therefore not as attractive as one might think at first sight. Another factor which weighs very heavily with overseas students is the recognition of any qualification they might receive in their home employment market on return. Here, the institution providing the education, rather than the continent in which it has been provided, seems more likely to be the key to employer recognition. There is no attempt so far, even on the part of the most enthusiastic Europeans, to claim that the three, five, eight formula contains any minimum guarantee of quality.

If the European rationale for the various elements in the Bologna process is unpersuasive, why is it so frequently employed? The answer, of course, depends on who is employing it. Spokesmen for European institutions, especially the commission, and especially when confronted by something like the Bologna process which proceeds entirely outside the EU constitutional framework, seem tempted by a European rationale because, for them, it is a way for constructing jurisdiction. Ministers in countries like Italy and Germany are presumably playing a quite different game. They are content that, insofar as there is a genuinely European element in Bologna, it should continue to be managed on an inter-governmental basis. Meanwhile, when attempting to implement unpopular reforms, they can try to use the European imperative as a passport to acceptance. The time has come to turn to our two short case studies.

SECTION FOUR – Italy

Italian governments have been concerned about the university system, and particularly about the very high drop out rate and long completion times for many first degrees, since at least the 1960s. The obvious solution to this problem at least, although very difficult to implement, has always

seemed the creation of a shorter degree. The essence of the Italian problem and a possible solution to it therefore predate the Sorbonne Declaration by many years. In fact, the then Italian Minister of Education had initially opted for a two year certificate rather than the three year Bologna first degree formula. But it seems that, once the Sorbonne meeting had taken place and the Declaration had endorsed the three year formula, he decided that his chances of achieving successful implementation would be considerably increased if he could tie reform to European compliance. The political technique of solving national problems through the implementation of nationally generated solutions but with enhanced chances of success by attaching the reform to the European motif is a familiar one in Italy. This was after all the technique which had been employed with some success with respect to the public deficit, convergence criteria, and the creation of the single currency. The peculiarity of the Italian situation lay in the existence of a clear but unsatisfied governmental demand for reform, a strong commitment to the European ideal which cut across the right-left divide, and the possibility, through the Sorbonne Declaration and the Bologna Declaration, of constructing a link between the problem and the solution via a European rationale. The crucial element in this argument so far is that the notion of a shorter degree with a vocational element in it, at least in theory, significantly pre-dates any discussion surrounding the Sorbonne Declaration.

But we can reinforce this argument with respect to the Italian case by showing how some elements in the Italian reform address specifically Italian problems rather than European problems. One of the best examples of the phenomenon can be found with respect to ECTS. The Italian Ministry has required all universities to provide descriptions of the new and old syllabuses which connect each module with its particular quota of ECTS. Naturally these syllabi will have to be devised in order to demonstrate that 60 European credits are earned per year. The process of reorganising curriculum and stating it in European credit terms is intended to help deal with the problems caused

by the dispersal of power held by different professors in different disciplines. New curricular can only be created by collective discussion, operating within the ECTS ceiling, at the institutional level. This is intended to act as a counterweight to an anarchical situation in which each professor was free to add new elements to his courses regardless of the impact which this might have on student workload and completion rates. In other words, ECTS can be made to play an important institution-building role and its function, if any, in promoting easier mobility is decidedly secondary. Italian governments are convinced that their universities require increased autonomy and an increased institutional reality and this is one route through which progress in that direction may be made. As to mobility, some of my interview evidence from Italy suggests that, both nationally and cross-nationally, it may well be reduced rather than increased by the implementation of ECTS and the three year degree because many academics are trying to fit into three years what they previously taught in four, and therefore feel that there is less room for permitted study abroad.

With respect to my earlier remarks about the vocationalisation of the first degree, the Italian case seems exemplary. The process for the revision of the curriculum seems to have been rather weakly supervised from the centre and external involvement, designed to promote the vocational element, seems often to have been weak in the face of the almost inevitable academic dominance of the syllabus writing process.

Nothing that is said here ought to be understood as pre-judging the extent of change which will actually occur within the Italian system. It may be that the national government will be to some degree successful and that, because of the existence of a new shorter degree, student completion rates will increase and student time spent at university will diminish. If so, we shall have to concede that resort to European rhetoric has assisted the implementation of a nationally conceived reform designed to deal with specifically national problems. I am reluctant to describe such a set of

circumstances as constituting any real measure of Europeanisation. If, on the other hand, as is perfectly possible and Capano is right in suspecting that professorial power will not be so easily vanquished, then perhaps little change will occur. Three year degrees will be written as if to contain exactly the same material as was previously taught in the first three years of the older degrees, and most students will try, at least, to stay on to complete what is now labelled a Masters. In this case, where there is little change, we should have to conclude that there had been much European talk but little genuine Europeanisation of higher education policy.

SECTION FIVE – France

We shall begin our discussion of the French case by a rather more detailed examination of the Athalie report which was produced for the Minister in 1998 and designed to suggest how the French system of higher education might be helpfully Europeanised. Athalie clearly wanted to suggest how French universities and Grandes Écoles might be made more internationally competitive and therefore more active within Europe. But as a man of the centre-left, working for a socialist Minister of Education, he also clearly wanted to use the European pretext as a means for solving certain very specifically French higher education problems. In the view of many on the left in France, including Athalie, the co-existence of a university system with a system of Grandes Écoles was open to a number of strong objections. Athalie's position was one which was very sympathetic to the universities and rather less sympathetic, although certainly respectful of, the Grandes Écoles.

In his report Athalie tried to suggest a number of reforms which he justified as necessary in order to endow France with an internationally or European-wide competitive system of higher education. If Athalie had been successful, which he was not, he would have been essentially using the Italian

technique in a French context, that is to say, he would have been using a European lever to successfully deal with a particular national problem.

We can illustrate this argument by describing the three most important changes recommended by Athalie for the Grandes Écoles and in all three cases not implemented. Firstly, leading Grande Écoles like ENA and Polytechnique were to lose their monopoly over recruitment to the Grands Corps. Access to these privileged civil service posts was to be opened to certain categories of university graduate. Secondly the qualifications awarded by the Grandes Écoles were to be fitted into a broad national scheme which would apply to both the universities and the Grandes Écoles. This, it was argued, would assist mobility as between the two branches of the French system, but would also assist cross-national student mobility. The argument here was that the Grandes Écoles were peculiar French institutions unfamiliar to overseas students, and that if the framework for their qualifications was fitted into one which was Europe-wide, it would become more comprehensible and more attractive.

Thirdly, and most controversially, it was suggested that the peculiar governance arrangements for the Grandes Écoles, which in some cases placed them under the tutorage of Ministries other than the Ministry of Education, be brought to an end by the establishment of joint departmental supervision, or by bringing them purely and simply under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. Such a proposal was inevitably going to give rise to the strongest expressions of disapproval by the CGE which collectively represents the Grandes Écoles in political discussions. The European trump card would indeed have needed to be an extremely powerful card in order to overcome such resistance.

Fourthly, it was suggested that the preparatory classes, which prepare students for the competitive entrance examinations organised by the *Grandes Écoles*, should be moved away from the lycées, where they are presently situated, and organised instead under university first cycle auspices. This too would clearly have brought the two branches of the system much closer together.

It is evident from this short and selective summary that Athalie was principally concerned with trying to cut the wings of the elitist *Grandes Écoles* and to incorporate them more fully into a national educational system under Parisian Ministerial control. Paradoxically, he was seeking to legitimate and justify such a reform by linking it, rather loosely, to a European motif which he hoped would overcome the normal Left-Right opposition of views on this question. Many of those closely associated with the *Grandes Écoles* and more sympathetic to their cause believe that they are sufficiently well known outside France to be able to recruit good European and international students on the basis of their individual institutional reputation for excellence. Exactly how integrating them more fully into a national or even European-wide system of higher education could enhance their ability to attract students is difficult to understand.

As I have already indicated, the most important recommendations in the Athalie report were not adopted even by a Minister of Education as bold and controversial as Allègre. We shall therefore now concentrate on those measures which were adopted and use this examination to demonstrate the specifically French features of the situation thus bringing out the contrast with the situation already described in Italy and underlining the importance of the national and the unimportance of the European context.

Traditionally, the French universities have suffered a high drop-out rate, especially in letters and humanities in the first cycle, and so there is a degree of resemblance between this problem as it

presents itself in the Italian and French systems. But here the parallel ends because the French adopted the notion of a shorter degree in order to try to deal with this problem as early as the 1970s. This was a two-year degree. It did not achieve the desired result because any syphoning out effect which may have been associated with it was completely swamped by a much stronger tendency for larger numbers of students to come into higher education and to stay on beyond the two year point in ever increasing numbers. Therefore, the attraction of a shorter degree as a rationalising and economising measure, which was so strong in the Italian and German cases, had no appeal in France since that measure had already been tried and failed.

We may now turn to the opposition which has been stirred up in France by the implementation of the three, five, eight formula even though the formula requires relatively little change in existing French practice. The point to be made here is that the nature of the hostility, expressed by student unions and teacher unions, has got nothing to do with Euro-scepticism or even the European dimension. Where a new curriculum has had to be devised, opponents have objected to the loose character of national guidance. In their view too much room has been given to the universities as individual institutions and the genuinely national character of qualifications has been consequently sacrificed. Unions have also been opposed to the way in which some degree of experimentation, naturally detracting from national uniformity, has been permitted. Finally, there is a well-grounded fear, expressed by both student and teacher unions, that the process of Europeanisation is destined to increase, in the long term, institutional differentiation. Such a possibility was openly acknowledged in the Athalie report and considered essential if France was to be internationally competitive, but it contradicts the strong attachment to equality through uniformity in certain left-wing circles.

Finally, a word about semesterisation. This may seem a rather boring nuts and bolts issue unworthy of our academic attention. But it does offer interesting lessons. In contemporary French discussion of the implementation of the three, five, eight system, or the LMD system as it is called in France, it is widely assumed that semesterisation is necessary in order to comply with ECTS and Bologna. This is simply untrue. There is nothing in the Bologna Declaration itself or any of the associated Declarations which requires semesterisation. Indeed, as one of my interviewees in a Dutch university commented, it would be extremely strange if such a requirement existed given that in his university at least, some Faculties followed a three term year and others a two term year, and efforts to achieve agreement on a common pattern had so far failed.

So if semesterisation is not required in compliance to Bologna, where does it come from in the French context. The answer is that it has its origins in negotiations between the Minister Bayrou and the student unions in the 1990s. The aim of semesterisation which appealed at that time was that it offered more flexibility to students and more frequent evaluation. At that time, no connection between Europe and semesterisation was made, even though Bayrou himself is a committed European. There seems precious little evidence of Europeanisation in any form here.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to argue in this paper that the Bologna process is European only in name. Problems and solutions appear distinctively national. In some cases, for example, the French, very little change is intended or likely to occur because the terms of the process were defined in such a way as to cause minimum inconvenience. In other cases, such as the Italian, where genuine reform is being attempted, the European dimension exists principally at the rhetorical level. Reforms which have

long been on the Ministerial agenda but never implemented are now re-labelled as European and therefore ipso facto desirable, in the hope that they can be more successfully implemented.

A final word on method. This paper has tried to examine the impact of one independent variable upon one dependent variable, that is the impact of Europeanisation upon some national systems of higher education. Such an approach is intrinsically biased in favour of exaggerating the importance of the one independent variable open to scrutiny. It would have been methodologically preferable to have examined the impact of a range of different variables on higher education provision. This would have made it easier to establish the relative importance or unimportance of the European dimension. If then, in using an approach which is likely to exaggerate the importance of Europeanisation, we have failed to discover its impact, then surely we can be all the more confident about the negative conclusions which we have reached. In this context at least, Europe seems to be a dog which is all bark and no bite.

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