


The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Published every two months

N° 129 - SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1991



IMMIGRATION

MEETING POINT: Glyn Ford

Glyn Ford is the leader of the 45-strong European Parliamentary Labour Party and also Deputy Leader of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament. Coming from a part of the United Kingdom (Greater Manchester) with a large minority population, he has seen at first hand how racial prejudice can poison the atmosphere and provoke tension and fears: it has made him a strong opponent of racism and xenophobia for many years. It was no surprise when he was appointed Rapporteur for the EP's Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia. **Pages 2 to 5.**



COUNTRY REPORTS




FIJI: The peaceful coexistence of two major cultures — Fijian and Indian — was seen by many as the decisive factor in making Fiji a relatively well-off developing country since it gained independence in 1970. Yet in 1987, two successive coups put an end to its reputation as a model multiracial society. While many changes have affected political

life, including a new Constitution promulgated in July 1990, the economy too has been reoriented. **Pages 9 to 21.**

TONGA: Internal pressure for change seems to be building up in a, so far, unusually conservative and stable Tonga. While many a Pacific neighbour has been faced with socio-political upheavals in the past few years, the last of the Polynesian kingdoms seemed protected from the winds of change that blew elsewhere. Yet now, the powers of its monarchy, judged by many to be the most extensive in the world, are being questioned by many commoners in search of greater democracy and more accountability in government. **Pages 22 to 33.**



DOSSIER: Immigration



Immigration — an awkward subject from a development perspective for Member States? The debate on the issue has come to the fore as the Community prepares to abolish its internal frontiers in 1993, and at a time of less favourable economic outlook. The Courier publishes a series of articles and points of view as a contribution to this debate. **Pages 40 to 77.**

DEVELOPING WORLD

More than a billion human beings do not have a dollar a day for their livelihood. Why? This is the question the World Bank asks in its latest report on development in the world. The answer should be sought in the interaction between the State and the market to promote development. **Pages 82 to 83.**

'How are the people faring?' The UNDP world report on human development brings a message of hope: it is political bankruptcy and not lack of financial resources that is responsible for the devaluation of human life. **Pages 84 to 87.**

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IMMIGRATION



Several generations of immigrants are involved in the economic and social life of the Community. On Belgium's national holiday, Africans, Arabs and others mingle in the crowd. Here, a mother wearing the traditional headscarf displays the Belgian flag on the push-chair, while her other children have clearly opted for western style garb. Integration is not just a political issue — there is also the 'generation-gap'

The debate on immigration is a powder keg. It is not that the governments and peoples of the Community have become anti-immigrant in principle. If things are turning sour, it is because there is a problem — a real problem.

Whatever their legal status and wherever they come from, foreigners on national soil have always been seen in varying lights. The opinion in the Community at the moment is that the economic capacity for welcoming new inhabitants from outside has virtually reached saturation point — and many of those who have already settled here, it is suggested, have not yet been fully integrated. So the discussion, which turns, roughly on the number and degree of involvement of foreigners in society, is real, complex and inevitable. The same is true of the solutions but these still have to be found. And since immigration is a problem which goes beyond both the national and the Community framework, effectiveness is not just the affair of the Member States or the Community as such. Immigration is 'international', as Bernard Kouchner, for one, has said, and the Community is no more 'a fortress' in this than in economic matters. Every Member State has its immigrant 'suppliers' which tend to follow the same historical, economic and even cultural patterns. The links are almost magnetic.

Another important point is the democratic deficit — or in many cases, the complete absence of democracy in the countries of origin; a fact which tends only to be brought up in discussions about political refugees. But it is obvious that, although economic considerations always crop up, they are not the whole story and that, basically, economic developments are determined more by political systems than the converse. The 'democratic deficit' may well have discouraged economic initiative and helped speed up emigration. As the poet put it, 'poverty seems to bear down less harshly in the

PHOTO MAPEZ

sun' but it is ever more tolerable when accompanied by freedom and democracy. So economic difficulties are not the only reason for the migratory pressure being put on the Community from all four corners of the world.

The big question, therefore, is what the Community is going to do with the millions of foreigners installed, entirely legally, on its territory — and finding a proper, permanent answer is no easy matter.

The debate on the place and role of foreigners goes back a long way. The Greeks and Romans, and later the Christians, thought foreigners were barbarians and Rome, according to the historian Bossuet, even became 'their prey'. What did the Romans do then? And what can the Community do now? As Dante said about the Romans' solution in the 'Divine Comedy': *'What are we going to do now the barbarians aren't there any more? They may have been the solution ...'*

This dossier, long-planned but appearing at a time when immigration is a major governmental concern, is not an ethical discussion, but an investigation of the technical, historical and cultural aspects of the question. ○ LUCIEN PAGNI

Dossier's content

Readers will find hereafter a major historical article by Claude-Valentin Marie, a sociologist who specialises in immigration matters, followed by a description by the UN Organisation for International Migration, of the world trends in migration (B. Ghosh) and two official views by the Rt. Hon. Mrs A. Rumbold M.P. (Home Office) and J.H. Matheson, Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors (Brussels). We also publish the views of a Turkish immigrant residing in Germany and of EP and ESC conferences on the subject. (See also, the interview with Glyn Ford on page 2.)

A second series of articles describes the economic, social and cultural aspects of immigration.

Finally, we reproduce a chart on the origins and the size of the resident non-European population in the 12 Member States.

Immigration — an awkward issue

by Claude-Valentin MARIE (*)

They are not foreigners and not really immigrants either, yet they do come from somewhere else — the Caribbean and so their culture is a paradox in which they juggle with the reality, values and culture of France, adding a flavour of their own. This long-played game may give us a chance (an irony of history, this) to bring the idea of paradox back into French thinking on the subject of, if not immigration then certainly assimilation. Indeed, many people see this as the only way to solve the problems.

Let us start with assimilation and, above all, with those positive claims of assimilation by devotees of Caribbean identity. This is not what it seems. It is not just one more expression of their culture of paradox, but a more fundamental need to make clear that there is no conflict between assimilation and difference, any more than there is necessarily a correlation between assimilation — integration v. difference-exclusion. In this light, assimilation is a people's opportunity or indeed its right to drink at every fountain in the world and to nurture its own special genius — which will only flourish, in its difference, if there is dialogue and if there is exchange.

Having underlined this positive dimension, let us say straight away that the characteristic ambiguity of the Caribbean reality does not always work quite so positively and that it is not always a benefit to the West Indians. One example of this is the everyday experience of people from Guadeloupe and Martinique, who are often treated as 'foreign immigrants' in France, although they have always been and in many cases have always wanted to be French. They may have been slaves more than 300 years ago, but they are French and they have been French citizens for a very long time. Slavery was abolished in 1848, but it is still alive in everyone's memory. Yet after abolition — and this is another paradox — former male slaves could join the community of citizens, while female slaves in France and the colonies could not, a situation which lasted for some time.

(*) The author is a sociologist. His article is published with the kind permission of 'L'Événement Européen', 62 bdv Garibaldi, F-75015 Paris, France.

These one or two historical facts help situate the ideas discussed in this article, in which we attempt to decide who is foreign and who is not, who is an immigrant and who is not and who assimilates who and what as well as to determine who is a citizen and who is not — or, more precisely, to what extent nationality is the necessary and sufficient condition for full access to the status of citizen.

But things are not as simple as they seem. The status of citizen and the enjoyment of the attendant rights have never been given clearly or once and for all. They are neither consubstantials of nationality nor exclusively based on a principle of territoriality (1). They are, first and foremost, the prize of democracy and democracy has to go on fighting for them today, as is clear (paradoxically) from the increasing tendency for citizens to decline to use their civic and political rights and for non-nationals who do not enjoy such rights to set too much store by them. The call for votes for foreigners (benefiting from an extension of the rights of citizenship without actually claiming them by obtaining the relevant nationality and swearing total allegiance to the sovereignty of the State) is a perfect illustration of this. It reflects the need for some and the risk for others of a complete overhaul of democratic organisation-manifestation to bring it into line with the changes in the organic composition of our societies. Although the idea seems legitimate and therefore a distinct possibility for nationals of Northern States, the same is by no means true in the case of foreigners from the South — hence the issue is not just voting rights for foreigners, but voting rights for all foreigners.

The 'Others' and the fantasy of the Others

Let us use the example of Caribbean immigration in France again to stress the relative value of ideas of nationality and citizenship and foreigner and immigrant.

(1) Remember votes for women, for example, and the two categories of voters during the colonial era in Algeria, where citizens were divided into those of French origin, who were in voters' college one, and the rest, who were in voters' college two and had fewer rights.

DOSSIER

For years the criteria of nationality, and citizenship therefore, created a radical difference between people who came in from the Caribbean and immigrants from elsewhere. It was particularly clear on the job market. Although both groups were called on to perform the same economic functions, the nationality distinction made it possible to put them into different sectors of activity and prevented (for a long while) any real competition between them.

The foreign workers, some of them ex-nationals who had become foreign (Algerians, for example), were systematically channelled into unskilled jobs in the private sector. The others, West Indians who were nationals but immigrants nonetheless, were recruited *en masse* into the public sector, always to do unskilled work.

The big difference between the two was not so much income as status ⁽²⁾ — that status of civil servant, which the West Indians saw as a symbol lending credence to their illusion of never being taken for socially underprivileged foreign immigrants. However strong this illusion may have been, it was powerless to neutralise the real effects of the identical incomes of the two groups and, in a social set-up where everything had to be paid for, it brought home the reality — which in this case meant the relations of proximity (and the tendency to take one for the other attendant on virtually identical housing prospects).

When West Indians look for somewhere to live, they soon find out that the man in the street cannot really tell them from immigrants from Africa. He classifies them both as black and makes no distinction between them when refusing what he often sees as unreasonable demands. The distinction which West Indians thought was taken as read on the job market does not therefore apply to housing and, far from keeping apart from the 'foreigners' with whom they were anxious not to be lumped, they find themselves stuck together with them in the same low-cost housing in the same suburbs and seen as being part of the same immigrant society. Their ideas of dissociation and separation are as nothing and their behaviour towards the 'real' foreigners — i.e. Africans and North Africans — is highly disagreeable

⁽²⁾ Renault's workers did not necessarily earn less than welfare nurses in Paris or people in ministries.



Photo MAPEZ

A meeting point for Africans in Brussels, 'Capital of Europe'. The signboard and name of the area are written in lingala (language spoken in the Congo, Zaïre and part of Central Africa). 'Nganda' means 'pub' and 'Matongé' is the name of the most popular area in Kinshasa (Zaïre)

as a result. Many West Indians take French rejection and go one better. They hope not to be thought of as foreigners themselves and so their relations with the 'Others' are never direct, but advertised via the fantasy of the Others.

This brings us to the more specifically racist aspect of our subject. The following questions are the basis for our discussion — How do the victims of racism behave? How do they personally process what is said about them? What picture do they form of themselves and the others from what the dominant group says about them?

The case of West Indians, especially from Martinique, is very telling here. From the start of the colonial era, they had better schooling than was available in other colonies and some of them were soon able to obtain posts of responsibility (including as governors) in Africa. The Africans were supposed to be their cousins, but the West Indian officials' behaviour towards them was far worse than that of the white colonials, because they were violently opposed to the idea of being taken for 'inferior' Blacks by the Whites. They saw the Blacks not for what they were, but through the eyes of a third party, the Whites, whom they hoped and

tried to be like. This is entirely typical of the sort of relations which the colonial situation generated.

Immigration to some extent embodies this three-way model inherited from the colonial era. It has been made more complex over the past 10 years by the changes which have affected 'foreign immigration' — a misnomer if ever there was one, because, as already mentioned, many of those who came to work and then settled in France were not foreigners in the first place and as many more, who were foreign at the time or became so in the interim, are not now. The case of the Algerians is typical. Before independence (1962), they migrated as French nationals, free to move about the national territory as they liked, but with independence, they automatically became foreigners. However, the Algerian community which settled in France is now partly of French nationality again because of the children born there and this of course affects immigrants from the Caribbean. As long as the Algerians were actually foreign and, as such, denied access to the civil service, they were no

competition for the West Indians in this respect, but this is no longer the case. Unlike their parents, West Indian youngsters (born in France or the Caribbean) who want to join the civil service now have to compete with perfectly legitimate competition from youngsters who were born in France of Algerian parents and are therefore French and on an equal footing with all other nationals when it comes to applying for jobs as public servants.

Unfindable immigration policies

Since many once-foreign migrants have obtained or regained French nationality and since both the French and foreigners who came now have children, most of whom were born in France and are of French nationality, what looked like a problem of foreigners is in fact more and more one of French populations of foreign origin. So when we talk about immigration, whom do we mean? Do we mean foreigners? If so, which ones? Do we mean immigrants? And can children born in France be immigrants?

The 1982 census showed that 25% of foreigners living in France were actually born there, as were 40% of under-18s of foreign parentage and 80% of all under-10s. These figures are of course outdated, but they point up the extent of the change in immigration since 1974. Many saw the decision of the French authorities (and all European governments) to suspend or halt worker immigration as a major break with the past and it indeed was a turning point in the country's employment policy — although certainly not its immigration policy.

Bringing in foreigners is not necessarily running an immigration policy and running an immigration policy is not necessarily bringing in foreign workers. Labour policy and immigrant policy are not to be confused, as the case of Germany so clearly shows.

In the early 1960s when the Berlin Wall went up, the source of migrants from East Germany dried up. The Federal Republic encouraged its businessmen to go in for massive recruitment of foreigners and therefore signed more bilateral agreements to cater for its shortage of labour and ensure that the economy expanded. However, the German authorities were very clear about the fact that these agreements (the one with Turkey is a case in point) were labour agreements and

nothing to do with immigration — a clear principle which, however (another paradox), failed to save Germany from the impasse in which it is currently defending the unrealistic principle of a labour policy which makes no reference to an immigration policy and even less to the Turkish population living on its territory.

The German concept of nation, people and community is behind an attitude which rejects all idea of foreign workers and their families settling permanently on German soil (and ultimately becoming naturalised) and the State refuses any sort of integration policy for populations it feels should go back where they came from. As a result, the 2.5 to 3 million Turks in Germany have never been called immigrants. They are 'guest workers' and the fact that they have been there for 20 years has not prevented the German Chancellor from saying that 'Germany is not a country of immigration', thereby emphasising the discrepancy between reality⁽³⁾ and his ideological picture of the German nation.

The recent events in Eastern Europe have complicated the situation further and made the German position even less acceptable. Anyone from the Eastern bloc who can claim German origin is considered to be a member of the German people whom it is the nation's duty to welcome — which guarantees immediate access to both the German national territory and the national community. So a Romanian or a Bulgarian whose presumed German origins go back three or four generations can arrive in Germany without knowing anything about it and sometimes not even speaking any German and immediately have more rights than a Turk who has been living there for 20 years or has children born there.

This idea, part of the philosophy of German society, of separation of *Volk* and *Reich*, with *Volk* taking precedence over *Reich*, means that nation, people and territory are organised in a very particular way, with essential categories attendant on the right to nationality on which the links between the individual

⁽³⁾ Interestingly, Michel Rocard, as Prime Minister of France, echoed Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and told the House that France 'is no longer a country of immigration'.

and the State are founded. So there is a clear distinction between the German-origin foreign populations from Eastern Europe and the foreign Turks born in Germany. A settlement policy is on the cards for the former, even if it does entail managing the national populations differently, but the fiction of a strict labour policy is maintained for the latter, with no prospect of equal rights with nationals.

In both principles and effects, this situation is rather different from the one obtaining in France now, where the labour policy has involved communities some of which, apparently, have seen their nationality change over the past two or three decades.

Between 1917 and 1962, Algerians arriving in France were treated as their status as nationals dictated. They were important to France's proper management of its labour problems and the Evian agreements attempted to keep the benefits, so Algerians were awarded a special status as distinct from all other foreigners — who had to comply with the provisions of the 1945 Ordinance, whereby they were subject to a double check, once of their status as worker (under the Ministry of Labour) and once of their presence in the territory (under the Ministry of the Interior). So, until 1984, any foreigner living in France had to have two permits (valid for a year and for three to 10 years), although of course obtaining a residence permit depended on having a work permit.

Not only were the first and second work permits issued for restricted periods⁽⁴⁾. There were regional and professional restrictions too. Only a permanent (10-year) work permit valid for all professions and all areas gave the migrant worker any real possibility of organising his career in space and time. On top of that, work and residence permits ran for different periods of time⁽⁵⁾. In their

⁽⁴⁾ The holder was only entitled to work in a wage-earning capacity for one year in a given profession in a given region. Any change of region or profession or extension of the length of his stay automatically put him in an irregular situation, *de facto* and *de jure*. The holder of a so-called temporary (three-year) permit could work either in any profession in one region or in one profession in any region.

⁽⁵⁾ A worker could well have an outdated residence permit and lose his entitlement to even a still valid work permit. If unemployed, he could have his work permit suspended or withdrawn and thereby lose his entitlement to a residence permit.

principles, the checks on the geographical and social mobility of all foreign workers in France which this system entailed were not so different from the South African arrangements. Their complexity easily explains the problems these workers have had making plans in a situation which leaves so much room for administrative arbitrariness. The single work/residence permit brought out in 1984, with a blanket two-year period of validity, simplified things and gave foreigners under common law greater autonomy when it came to organising their lives on French territory. It nonetheless maintained the principle of dual management by the Ministries of Labour and the Interior.

Algerians, with their special status, were not subject to this and only came under the Ministry of the Interior, with a residence permit authorising them both to live and work in France for either one year or 10 years. It is easy to see why Algeria tried to free its nationals from common law obligations (in this case the 1945 Ordinance). The paradox is that, since the Ministry of the Interior had the worst of reputations in immigration matters, the fact that it was the only authority looking after them was an advantage.

The uncertainties of nationality

The Algerian situation, which is already an exception as far as the laws governing foreigners are concerned, is made even more unusual by the additional effects of the nationality code — a combination the main result of which is to multiply the number of different statuses in the Algerian population, and often even in individual families, according to date of arrival in France and date and even place of birth.

Those born in Algeria before 1962 who came to France before or after that date and opted to keep their French nationality are officially French citizens (this is the case of the Harkis⁽⁶⁾). They differ from those who opted for Algerian nationality in 1962 and came to work in France as foreign nationals with Algerian resident status. The legal situation of the children of these two groups of people is more complicated, despite the fact that their socio-economic situation is virtually

identical. There are no legal problems for the children of Harkis or French Moslems — they are French. But children of Algerians born after 1962 are divided according to whether they were born in France or Algeria. Those born in Algeria are of Algerian nationality, like their parents, but any brothers, cousins or friends who were born in France are automatically French under Article 23 of the nationality code whereby anyone born on French soil of French-born parents is French.

Take the example of an Algerian family living in France with two children born since 1962, one in Algeria and one in France, and a third, born in Algeria where he was looked after by his grandparents until after his 18th birthday. The first child will be Algerian and, must, like his parents, have a residence permit if he is to comply with French requirements. The second is French and free to move about as he pleases, just like any other French citizen. The third, however, of Algerian nationality, is too old to come in under family grouping arrangements and would not be authorised to settle in France without first obtaining a residence permit just like any other foreign worker.

France's immigration arrangements for Algerians would be unimaginable in Germany. France and Germany in fact have entirely different immigration management models (although they are the basis on which the realities of Europe tomorrow must be discussed) due to a combination of two fundamentals — the labour policies which dominated the whole period of economic growth and the rules of access to nationality in effect today.

Every developed country of Europe has exploited its sovereignty to the full with a labour policy and laws and regulations to control entry to and residence on its territory. No-one in the 1960s and 1970s ever expected the nationality access rules to be as important as they are today. The provisions indeed suggest that prospects for foreign migrants to Europe (and their children) will differ considerably from one country of the Community to another.

The combination of the foreign population control arrangements and the nationality code (which each country of the Community is updating in a specific way) brings us back to the original ambiguity and we shall illustrate it this

time, for France, with cases which can be observed in a single group or even a single family. We want to know who is an immigrant, who is foreign and who is French and this brings us back to the fundamental question of whom we mean when we talk about immigration.

Ironic return of the colonial question

To convey the full complexity of foreign immigration in France, we should add that Tunisians and Moroccans are not in the same situation as Algerians. Unlike Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco were never French departments and their nationals are not covered by the same provisions of the nationality code — or the foreign population control arrangements.

The same would have been true of New Caledonians if they had gained independence. As nationals of an overseas territory, they, like Tunisians and Moroccans, would not have had the advantages attached to the status of overseas department (particularly Article 23 of the nationality code) — which would not be the case of people from Martinique or Guadeloupe if they found themselves in a similar situation.

As things stand, the marks left by colonial history are proving to be more than lasting — something amply confirmed by Britain, which stands out from France and Germany as much for the different laws on nationality and foreigners as for its particular history of immigration so highly dependent on a colonial past.

Most immigrants to Great Britain have been from former colonies of the Empire which became members of the Commonwealth, being thus both nationals of their countries of origin and subjects of Her Majesty — a status entitling them both to go freely to the United Kingdom and settle and work there and, most important, obtain British nationality.

So, when the UK brought immigration to the fore (in the early 1970s), it was not aiming to decide how to handle foreign immigration proper, as its immigrants were subjects of Her Majesty, citizens and foreigners and its immigrant control policy was less a remould of the laws on the entry and residence of foreigners as a questioning of access to British nationality. So Britain's nationality debate started in 1970, although the issue only

⁽⁶⁾ NDT — Harkis, retired soldiers, are Algerians who were recruited into the French army as auxiliaries during the Franco-Algerian war.




Photo MAPEZ

Young Algerians born in Europe. 'A new social and legal order is appearing in Europe, thus bringing progress and freedom — but under conditions amounting to a reinforcement of segregational mechanisms'

began to be of political concern to the French in 1985-86. One of the big things about the British case is that it forces us to realise that there are organic links between entry control (with illegal entry as the central issue) and the right to nationality (as related to colonial history) (7). The weight of the colonial status, present or past, on the status of immigrants in France and the United Kingdom would be unthinkable in Germany, with its entirely different concept of nationality and colonial past.

So the observable outlines of our subject are not the result of chance or particular economic circumstances, but the lasting results of history. Nothing we are experiencing today on the immigration front is of the epiphenomenon order. All the people now settled in Europe after the big waves of migrant labour of the post war years are there because the history of Europe has led them there. People from the former British colonies did not go to France and neither did people from former French colonies go to Britain. In the Caribbean, people left Trinidad and Jamaica for London at almost the same time as they left Puerto Rico for New York, Suriname

for Amsterdam and Martinique and Guadeloupe for Paris.

Europe and illegal entry

Now that the Single Act is about to bear its ultimate fruit, France and indeed all the countries of Europe are focusing their thinking on population movements from the Third World on illegal entry. The spectre (in all senses of the word) of illegal entry is the yardstick by which all assessments of non-western population movements — be they involving political refugees or a long association of labour immigration with Europe — are judged. What does the Single Act have to say about it?

In recommending greater freedom of economic exchange and enlargement of the scope of individual freedoms, the Single Act is in line with the fine humanistic spirit of the Helsinki agreements, building a Europe which gives practical shape to the idea of freer movement of ideas and people — with the single reservation that the movement in question is only for Europeans, as the Schengen Agreements make clear. Seen from this point of view, Europe is in fact displaying the twofold ambition of having more trade, more dialogue and more freedom (the Single Act) and more closure, more control and more population selection (Schengen), pushing

down the Berlin Wall with one hand and putting a Maginot Line round its external frontiers with the other.

A new economic, social and legal order vaunting the merits of a labour market where there are no barriers to movement is being created and it invites everyone to build its future by grasping opportunity in whatever part of Europe it may occur. But at the same time, it is an order which has renewed the machinery of exclusion by refusing to allow everyone to have this freedom. Neither a Turk who has worked in Germany for 20 years nor any child of his born there will have the right to settle in France or anywhere else in Europe — unlike his German friends and colleagues. We are back to European-wide selective mobility limitation, and social mobility restriction therefore, along the lines of the French system, with all its residence and work permits, which we mentioned earlier and which was in fact abolished following the young immigrants equality march of 1983 exactly 10 years before entry into effect of the Single Act.

Let us return to the example of the Algerians. Children born in France of Algerian parents are French and will therefore be able to go to Germany or anywhere else in the EEC and settle and take jobs there if they want to. Any brothers or sisters born in Algeria are Algerian and not Community citizens and will be denied this possibility, just like Turks born in Germany. So, after 1992, the future of a foreigner in Europe will differ greatly according to nationality, date of birth and country of residence in Europe. A new social and legal order is appearing in Europe, thus bringing progress and freedom — but under conditions amounting to a reinforcement of segregational mechanisms.

And what about integration? Who will be the best integrated? Those who benefit from the advantages offered by Community law or those who do not? And what of those who claim equal rights, firmly and sometimes violently? Will their vehemence be the next sign of non-integration? Will there still be a problem of cultural difference or discrimination in respect of real rights? There are as many risks of discrimination, exclusion and marginalisation in tomorrow's Europe as there are laws on foreign populations, and codes on nationality and non-Community nationalities in every country of Europe. And that is not chance either. It is our historical heritage. ○ C.-V. M.

(7) C-V Marie — Entre économie et politique: le 'clandestin', une figure sociale à géométrie variable in *Pouvoirs* No 47 — 1988 — pp 87-91.

Trends in world migration: the European perspective

by Bimal GHOSH (*)

International migration is not a new phenomenon but it has now emerged as a major global issue, affecting nearly all parts of the world. The causes and conditions of contemporary movements have become increasingly complex, just as their consequences portend to be more far-reaching than they have ever been in the past. How the new challenges and opportunities of world migration are going to be handled by the sending and receiving countries has now become a matter of critical importance.

In the 19th and the earlier part of the 20th century, 50 million people from Europe — Irish and German nationals, followed by Italians, Greeks and East Europeans — migrated to North America. The movements carried with them the resonance of the words enshrined in the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty — *'Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free'*. There was a wide, if numerically less important, movement of people in the wake of the Second World War. Between 1947 and 1951 more than one million displaced Europeans were resettled across countries and continents — including 329 000 in the United States; 182 000 in Australia; 132 000 in Israel; 123 000 in Canada, and 170 000 within Europe. As the Soviets consolidated power in the years that followed, there was a continuing flow of refugees from the East. More recently, in the 1960s and early 1970s more than 10 million guest workers and their dependents, mostly from southern Europe and developing countries, moved to western Europe.

These earlier migratory movements, to cite at random only a few, were not necessarily smooth; nor were the causes that generated them always happy. But, barring a few exceptions, both the sending and receiving countries found them manageable, as they generally served as a balancing force between their respective needs. They were thought to be useful for

economic growth and conducive to both social dynamism and cultural diversity in the host countries. Politically, in the context of the Cold War, outmigration from the East was perceived as a flight for human freedom, and therefore worthy of full Western support. All in all, up to the early 1970s, the general attitude towards international migration was positive.

A changing panorama

By the late 1970s the situation was changing. In West Europe, economic downturn and shrinking employment opportunities following the first oil shock in 1973 put a halt to the recruitment of foreign workers. The fall in labour demand and the disappearance of West Europe's readiness to accept migrant workers were, however, not as sudden as it is sometimes imagined. In the 1950s and the 1960s, West Europe did not witness any significant demographic change which in itself could create a labour shortage. But during the period, an extraordinary supply of external capital and the economic expansion that followed, created an additional demand for labour. This could not be matched from the available labour supply or from an adequate rise in productivity; the recruitment of foreign labour was a logical consequence. As the 1973 hike in the oil price made its impact, the process came to an end. But the restrictions on foreign recruitment were at least partly also the result of a perception of high political and social costs of immigration — a perception which had been gaining ground over some time in several West European countries. In practice, however, the situation evolved differently. Despite the falling labour demand in West Europe, the ban on foreign recruitment and the encouragement given, as in Germany, for foreign workers to return, not only did the inflow of migrants persist, but it picked up again from the early 1980s. Why and how did it happen?

Since the 1960s an increasing migratory pressure was building up in many parts of the developing world. Initially, it was closely associated with the decolonisation process. Protracted struggles for

independence and bitter domestic strife over the political and social system in both old and emerging nation states, converted comparatively stable regions into areas of extreme social and political volatility. In some regions, as in Africa, ethnic and tribal conflicts, added to this instability. All this generated both internal displacements and massive migratory movements across countries. But most of these external refugee movements — with such exceptions as the Vietnamese boat people and the Chilean refugees — were contained at the regional level within the developing world. Of the two million people who have left Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos since the end of the Vietnam War, more than one million have been resettled in western countries, over 300 000 in China and the 450 000 are scattered in the region. Some 4.5 million Afghan refugees are still in Pakistan and Iran. The developing world, it is worth noting, continues to carry the vast bulk of the world's refugee population, now numbering 15 million.

But by the late 1970s other powerful push factors were also at work in the developing world. Alongside political conflicts and a growing trend towards suppression of democratic freedom and flagrant abuses of human rights, there was a continuous process of demographic expansion, famine and economic deprivation, and serious environmental degradation, including desertification, in a number of developing countries. Not infrequently, there was an interplay of these factors: political upheavals thwarted economic development, refugee movement led to environmental degradation, and the result was a vicious circle forcing an increasing number of people to flee. Although today several million of them are migrant workers within the developing world, economic prosperity and political stability of western countries served as magnets for many others. Modern means of transport and communication helped accelerate their movement to the West.

Defiance of regular migration procedure

But avenues for regular immigration were not many. In West Europe, after the

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


Photo OIM

A number of illegal and legal Vietnamese migrants have entered Europe and the United States. Here we see legal migrants on their way to the USA

of migrants by established criteria became more and more difficult due to the complex interrelationship of underlying causes or motivations of migration.

Faced with an increasing flow of people seeking entry, West European countries tightened their immigration policies and control. But, the push factors in the sending countries were too strong. Increasingly, the migrants sought irregular channels of entry in defiance of immigration rules and control mechanisms — a process in which networking with the resident migrants in West Europe played an important part. There was thus a growing number of irregular migrants comprising both new arrivals and those whose tourist visas or short-term employment contracts had already expired. A related development which helped irregular migration was the economic transformation of southern Europe. By the late 1970s Italy and Spain, for example, had become both immigration and emigration countries. With less vigilant border control and increasing opportunities for clandestine work in the informal or less regulated sectors, they became places of attraction for irregular migrants. Despite its amnesty programme of 1985-86, Spain today is supposed to have an irregular population of between 300 000 and 350 000 (an EC study puts the figure much lower — between 72 000 and 124 000). Out of an estimated 600 000 to 1 million irregular migrants, Italy may have attracted 300 000 applicants under its latest amnesty programme of 1990. Reliable figures are hard to come by. According to one recent estimate which puts these figures much higher, there are as many as three million undocumented migrants in the European Community alone.

In the past irregular migration in Europe was largely linked to international flows of labour such as the guest workers programme. But since the late 1970s it also converged with the inflow of asylum seekers. Many of the asylum seekers, when rejected or even before rejection, became clandestine workers and swelled the ranks of irregular migrants. In the first half of the 1970s, only 16 000 asylum seekers arrived in West Europe each year; by the period 1985-89, the average annual number increased to 200 000. In 1990 the number of asylum seekers including those from East Europe was hovering around 450 000 in industrial Europe or more than half the total

guest workers programme had come to an end, for those who wanted to migrate the main, if not the only, option available — aside from family reunification — was entry through the asylum procedure. Migrants from Turkey, Yugoslavia and the Maghreb countries, who had followed the Italian and Spanish workers in West Europe by the late 1960s, were soon joined by many more from far-flung parts of the developing world. Some of the new entrants were admitted under the family reunification schemes. But there were

numerous others — from, for example, Central America, Iran, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Zaire — who were seeking entry through the asylum procedure. Many of them were victims of severe economic deprivation, generalised violence and repression, but they did not meet the strict definition of refugees as laid down in the UN Convention of 1951. Increasingly, migratory movements bypassed the policy of planned and orderly migration. Immigration laws were ignored or overwhelmed as identification

annual number of immigrants (0.7-0.9 million). If industrial Europe and North America were combined, the figure could well be 550 000 or more than one-third of total annual immigration of foreigners.

In North America and Australia

The pressures which were building up since the late 1970s in the developing world for outmigration to the industrial north — the South-North flow — also affected North America and Australia. But wedded to a long tradition of immigration, and with less economic and labour market constraints, they reacted somewhat differently. The suppression in all these countries — Canada in 1962, the USA in 1965 and Australia in 1972 — of national-origin quota systems, prompted a steady increase in the number of immigrants from the developing regions. US flows from traditional sending countries in Europe became less important than in the past. In the 1950s immigrants from Europe and Canada accounted for 66 per cent of the total inflow in the USA. In the 1980s their share had fallen to 14 per cent.

But even with this increase in the regular flows from the developing world, since the 1980s, North America has been facing the same problems of illegal migrants and asylum seekers as West Europe. In the early 1980s the USA had several million illegal migrants from neighbouring countries, and even after large-scale legalisation, it is now estimated to have 2.5 million irregular migrants — a higher proportion of the national work force than in the West European countries. The long and porous borders and less effective control mechanisms are not the only reasons for higher incidence of irregular migration in the USA — it also reflects a more relaxed US attitude towards irregular migration. However, as their numbers swelled rapidly in recent years, the concern about irregular migrants has also been increasing in the USA. Attention is being focused, as was done, for example, by a Congressional commission in 1990, on the economic disparities between North America and its neighbouring countries as one of the root causes of such unauthorised migration.

Although numerically less important, the inflow of asylum seekers in countries of North America has created a situation similar to that in West Europe. In the United States, the asylum crisis began

shortly after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. The government became overwhelmed when 125 000 Cubans entered as asylum seekers. The Cubans and later Haitian boat people who had entered the USA prior to 1980 were recognised as special entrants, and measures were taken to discourage the inflow of new asylum seekers. But the flow persisted, especially with large numbers of Central Americans pressing for admission. But since most of them had fled from generalised violence, civil war or desperate economic conditions, and not fear of personal persecution, the rate of rejection became increasingly high. Canada too faced new pressures of asylum seekers; its liberal approach to asylum was an attraction even for some of those who had originally landed elsewhere — like several thousand Salvadorians from the USA and the boatloads of Sri Lankans and Sikh migrants from India who travelled through Germany. In response, the government revised and tightened the asylum rules and procedures, but the pressure continues.

A landmark in East-West migration

1989 was a special year in world migration. During that year a total of 1.3 million people from the Warsaw Pact countries left for the West. In the Cold War years, regular emigration from the Eastern bloc of Communist countries had been seriously constrained. True, during this period there were several waves of migration following the suppression of political unrest — from Hungary in 1956; from Czechoslovakia in 1968; and from Poland in 1956, 1968, and 1981. There was also a large outflow from Poland in 1985 following the introduction of liberal passport policies and the German Democratic Republic had witnessed a continuous outward movement until the erection of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961. Occasionally, in the context of East-West negotiations, the Soviet Union issued a few thousand extra exit visas for special ethnic groups. But never since 1951 had so many people from the East moved to the West in a single year as in 1989. In fact, from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, the average annual outflows of people from the Warsaw Pact countries did not exceed 100 000 people.

Among the 1.3 million people who moved in 1989 to the West, 720 000 were East Germans and ethnic Germans from

East Europe, 320 000 were Bulgarian Turks, (of whom nearly half returned to Bulgaria) 80 000 were asylum-seekers, mainly Poles, and 137 000 were Soviet Jews (who left for the USA, Israel and Greece). Dramatic changes in East and Central Europe, marked by a process of political liberalisation and easing of emigration, alongside new trends in East-West relations, unleashed these movements. Movements of people themselves contributed to the liberalisation process, as symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1961 when 30 000 people crossed the border within hours of its opening.

Soon this westward exodus generated movements also across the eastern region. Hungary witnessed an inflow of 30 000 ethnic Hungarians from Romania as refugees; 40 000 Poles moved to East Germany (the GDR) to take up jobs left open by the German exodus. Tens of thousands of Serbs in Romania (and Kosovo) arrived in Serbia in Yugoslavia. And, internal displacements — such as the uprooting of 400 000 people following conflicts in Armenia and Azerbaijan — were emerging as a potential source of pressure for external migration.

These migratory trends, although somewhat tempered by German reunification, persisted in 1990-1991 and look set to continue in the coming years. As things stand now, rising ethnic and political tensions in several countries, soaring unemployment and mounting social hardships linked to the transitional phase of economic reconstruction, continuing environmental degradation and the political and economic uncertainty that tends to threaten the Soviet Union are causing concern — both in West and East Europe.

Causes and conditions of migration

What then are the roots of migration? The general causes of international migration as revealed by the major outflows in the past are well known. But the complex manner in which different causes and contributing factors act and interact with each other in the context of specific migration flows defies generalised simplification.

Contrasting economic, demographic and labour market conditions between countries generally encourage migration. These contrasts are easy to discern. Global population is expected to increase



Photo MAPEZ

A Gypsy mother and child on a street in Brussels. For these people, migration constitutes a way of life. How are they going to cope with the new legislation of 1993?

\$17 000 in the high income countries stands in striking contrast with \$750 in the developing countries. The gap is much wider for sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia where respective incomes per head do not exceed \$350 and \$320. Just as economic growth within the developing region remains unevenly distributed, the income distribution in many developing countries continues to be highly skewed. Such economic disparities are often reinforced by differences between industrial and developing countries in the social services and amenities available to the general public. These economic and social inequalities, alongside a heightened awareness of them, resulting from spread of education and wider use of mass media, notably television, even in some of the remotest parts of the developing world, are clearly among the main sources of pressure for the South-North movement.

The push and pull effects of these imbalances are often modified — they could be reinforced or weakened — by other factors, including migration policies and practices of sending and receiving countries. Labour market and economic imbalances, for example, accelerate inter-country movements of people, as was the case with West Europe's guest workers programme in 1960-73, when they are sustained by active immigration policies and other inducements of the receiving country. Conversely, regardless of the willingness and absorptive capacity of the country of destination, people may leave their homelands under the compulsion of exceptional circumstances. These could include armed conflict, civil strife, political and social repression; ethnic and communal hostilities and violence; famine, pestilence and extreme poverty; natural disasters, persistent environmental degradation and erosion of the life-sustaining eco-system.

Historical and cultural links, prior migration experience, social networking and other structural factors often play their part in influencing migratory movements. Prior movements of people and links established over time, for example, can create their own dynamic and foster further migration. External cultural penetration and acquired patterns of consumption and aspirations, helped by the demonstration effect of previous migrants, can induce people to look for opportunities outside the home country. In such a situation, economic disparity

from 5.2 billion at present to 8.4 billion in 2025. The population in industrial countries will grow by 147 million during this period to 1.35 billion. By contrast the increase in the developing region, will be of the order of 3.0 billion, and will far exceed the industrial nations' total population. The developing country share in global population could jump from 68 per cent to 84 per cent in 2025. Population in the industrial countries is ageing, but the developing world is expecting an increase in younger population. The present age structure in most developing countries means higher birth rates, even if

fertility rates fall, and a spectacular increase in the labour force in the coming decades. The imbalances will be dramatic. In 1990 the industrial world had a labour force; of 586 million. The developing country labour force, 1.8 billion in 1990, will increase by 360 million by 2000 and by 733 million by 2010. Thus, in 20 years the increase in the number of job-seekers in developing countries should be well above the industrial world's total active population today.

The economic gaps too are staggering. The annual income per head of more than

may not be the only or even the main consideration; and the poorest may not be among the first to move out. An improved economic situation in the home country may not restrain migration, but could even help it by enhancing the financial capacity of people to migrate, as may have been the case in Mexico which witnessed continued migration despite strong economic growth in the 1960s and most of the 1970s.

On the other hand, restored confidence in the home country economy and optimism about future prospects at home may restrain emigration and could even encourage return migration, although economic disparities, within certain limits, may continue to exist between the countries concerned. The return of 650 000 Greeks from all over the globe especially North and West Europe during 1971-85, the slowing down of Italian emigration from 1967 and similar trends in Spain and Portugal from the mid-1980s are cases in point.

Discerning the future challenge in Europe

— East European and Mediterranean flows.

How these and various substratum causes and conditions of migration act and interact with one another, and with what effect, can only be assessed in the context of specific migratory flows. As West Europe stands today face to face with two major migratory movements — one from East Europe and the other from the southern and eastern rim of the Mediterranean, it is interesting to analyse how even the same sets of factors — demographic, economic, political and ethnic — are going to influence their future trends differently.

— Demographic profiles.

The demographic profiles of East and West Europe — annual increase in population, age structure and fertility rate — are largely symmetrical, and the minor demographic differences that exist at present will not by themselves be a major source of migratory pressure in the coming years. True, there will be a slight bulge in the population structure resulting from an increase in the number of young people, aged 15-25, in countries like Poland and the Soviet Union but it will not be markedly visible before the turn of the century. Demographic imbalances between the southern and eastern Mediterranean region and industrial Europe, on the other hand, hold the potential of enormous pressure for out-



Material poverty alongside with cultural and intellectual richness — the latter is often the sole wealth of immigrants.
Above: an African cultural event in Paris

ward migration. Population in the Mediterranean region increased three times faster than in industrial Europe during 1960-70; the increase will be 17 times faster in the 1990s. Countries like Austria, Sweden and Germany will probably show no increase, or even a slight fall, in their population by the year 2000. During the same period the population in Libya will increase by 43 per cent; in Syria by 40 per cent; in Sudan by 33 per cent and in Algeria by 31 per cent.

On the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the average woman has five children; in industrial Europe, she has between one and two. This high fertility rate, coupled with the young age structure of the population, is leading to a massive increase in the Mediterranean

region's labour force. Industrial Europe's labour force increased by six million during 1960-70; it will grow only by 1.7 million in the 1990s. By contrast, the southern and eastern Mediterranean region's labour force, which increased by 7.4 million during 1960-70, will grow by 22.4 million in the 1990s. This imbalance — which is far more pronounced than the gap between the industrial and developing countries in general — will certainly add to the migratory pressure, especially from the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

Economic disparities

What about the economic factors? They will certainly continue to encourage movements of people both from East Europe and the Mediterranean region towards industrial Europe, although the manner in which they will influence the two flows will not be the same. Compared to industrial Europe, both East Europe and the Mediterranean region are poor, but the latter is even poorer. In 1988, according to OECD Figures, the average person's income in East Europe was roughly one-third of that in industrial Europe. In the Mediterranean region it was about one-eighth. In absolute terms the income difference doubled between 1960-1985. There are no indications that the income disparity will narrow in the near future.

Thus, judging by the extent of economic disparities, the economic affluence of industrial Europe could be a stronger magnet for the people in the Mediterranean region than those in East Europe. But the push effects of the current economic realities, on the other hand, would be more powerful in East Europe than in the Mediterranean region. The main reason for this is the sudden and painful thrust of the region's economic reforms as part of its transition to the market system. As the countries launched these tough measures, and made their strides towards market economies, their real output shrank by more than 8 per cent in 1990; the decline, will persist, though more modestly, at least for the coming two years. Consumer prices, which rose by 34% in 1990, will jump by a further 45% this year. Meanwhile, joblessness has been increasing throughout East Europe. It could exceed 4 million in East European countries and 5.3 million in the Soviet Union this year, and might reach, according to one estimate, 14 million or 21 per cent of the working population in Eastern Europe and 30-40 million in the Soviet Union by 1994.

An important point to note is that these changes are happening to people who have lived under command economies and state paternalism for more than 40 years. Their sudden exposure to unemployment, inflation and a rupture of social security arrangements are adding to their restlessness and sharpening their urge to look for opportunities elsewhere. These push factors are reinforced by the explosion of exaggerated expectations about the West. Significantly, the Soviet authorities are pondering a projected departure of between 4 and 6 million people in the coming years, possibly after the new emigration law comes into force in 1993. Clearly, as foreshadowed by the age structure, occupational profiles and geographical origins of some of the recent migrant groups, a large part of the eastern migration will continue to be motivated by economic considerations. All this seems to suggest that the current and impending economic difficulties will make East Europe more volatile than the southern Mediterranean region.

The situation in East Europe could however change significantly after the mid- or late 1990s. Calculations diverge, but there are indications that by that time, most Central-East European countries (the Soviet Union is a special case) will be over much of the difficulties of the transition, and that their economies could well be on the road to recovery and positive growth. At that point, economic migration could stabilise. In the southern Mediterranean region, by contrast, the migratory pressure resulting from economic factors encouraging migration are likely to be more stubborn and could persist over a much longer period, unless of course, new and more innovative measures are initiated.

Nationalist and ethnic ferment

Turning to the political and ethnic factors, several countries in the southern Mediterranean region, notably Lebanon and Sudan, have long been disturbed by political upheavals which have caused both internal displacements and external migration flows. In many parts of the region, political and religious tensions and suppression of democratic rights still continue and these remain a potential source of political instability and migratory pressure. But, for the time being and barring new developments which cannot be predicted, it looks as though these may not explode into mass exodus. The situation in several east Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, is

very similar to that in much of East Europe, including the Soviet Union. Almost all these countries hold the potential of increasingly serious nationalist and ethnic conflicts, and if they erupt into large-scale violence, mass exodus may be unavoidable. Several of these countries also have large ethnic groups who are likely to make use of the newly found freedom of movement to migrate even without violent conflicts and internal dislocations.

Three large minority populations in the whole region — ethnic Germans (3 million in Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union), Jews (1.5 million mainly in the Soviet Union), and the Armenians (3.5 million in the territory of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the Soviet Union) — are West-oriented, have been traditionally mobile and have strong political and ethnic links in western countries. The continuing outmigration of these people — ethnic Germans to Germany, Jews to Israel and the USA, and the Armenians to France and the USA — will gather further momentum if there is a deterioration in the region's political, economic or environmental situation. But these are not the only minorities who may be ready to move out. Several other minority groups — notably, the 2.5-4 million Gypsy population scattered all over the region, 2 million Hungarians in Romania, 600 000-700 000 Turks in Bulgaria and 250 000-400 000 Greeks in Albania — feel vulnerable to ethnic conflicts and xenophobic tensions. They may be induced or compelled to seek opportunities elsewhere within the region or in West Europe.

But the problem of ethnic minorities which is endemic, complex and widespread goes far beyond this. Nearly, all the states in East Europe, including the Soviet Union, even the relatively homogeneous Poland and Hungary, are ethnically diversified societies. So are Albania and Yugoslavia. Taken together, the ethnic minorities account for a large proportion of the national population in these states — 64 per cent in Yugoslavia; 48 per cent in the Soviet Union; 36 per cent in Czechoslovakia and so on. The tensions among these ethnic groups — often reinforced by religious and linguistic differences and worsened by conflicts and suspicion rooted in history — are being fuelled by nationalist sentiments and secessionist tendencies. Likewise, separatist forces are seeking support from

ethnic groups. From all indications, ethnic factors are set to play an increasingly important part in national and local politics.

But since ethnic groupings often cut across the territorial boundaries of individual republics or provinces, they can also complicate and counteract the nationalist tendencies, by demanding autonomy within the republic or establishing links outside. Sixty-five million Soviet citizens — 25 million Russians and 40 million non-Russians — live outside their ethnic territories. All the six Union Republics which now claim complete independence face battles with their minorities — most of which demand autonomy or seek to remain part of the Soviet Union or of Russia. Yugoslavia faces a similar situation: its Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic is made up of Croats, Serbs and Moslems. Serbia's minority groups include Albanians, Hungarians and Croats, Croatia has 600 000 Serbs as one of its minority groups and the pattern is the same in the rest of the country. If this makes the ethnic and nationality tensions highly explosive, it must not be forgotten that many minorities have close ethnic links across neighbouring countries — Macedonian Greeks and Turks in Bulgaria; Greeks in Albania; Albanians in Yugoslavia (Kosovo); Rumanians in Moldova — are some of the examples. In such a setting ethnic conflicts and potential irredentism could, if rekindled by aspirations long embedded in history, lead to violent challenges to existing frontiers and unleash instability and disorderly movements of people.

True, the Soviet people, with the exception of the Armenians, Jews and ethnic Germans, do not have a long tradition of migration. It is also true that to a large extent, ethnic and nationalist tensions in the countries of East Mediterranean and East Europe have so far been contained within the regions. But it would be unwise to assume that this will continue to be so. History shows how quickly exodus psychosis can take hold. If the ethnic and political pressures reach a breaking point and erupt into violence, aggravating economic dislocations and environmental degradation, there could be waves of migration flowing over the rest of Europe, both East and West. ○

B.G.

Britain's ethnic minority communities

By the Rt Hon. Mrs Angela RUMBOLD M.P. (*)

This article describes the pattern of immigration to the United Kingdom, the ways in which members of the ethnic minority communities have settled here and the steps which the United Kingdom government as a whole — involving all the relevant departments and agencies — has taken to assist the process of their integration.

Immigration to the UK

Since the Second World War millions of people have migrated to Western Europe from countries in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, mainly to meet labour market shortages. It has been estimated that there are now about 60 million people of ethnic minority origin in Western Europe, including Britain.

Large scale migration to Britain started as a result of labour shortages after the Second World War; though some earlier settlers had come from the West Indies during the war to volunteer for service in the armed forces. From the mid 1950s there was substantial migration particularly by those who were British subjects from the new Commonwealth; first from the mid 1950s to the early 1960s from the West Indies and Guyana; later, from the Indian sub-continent and subsequently Asians from East Africa. Head of household immigration has now virtually ceased, except for those seeking asylum whose numbers have grown rapidly in recent years — and for people with special skills who are eligible for work permits. These communities have become well established, with population growth arising mainly from births to those already settled, though there are still some new arrivals as a result of marriage and, for Bangladeshis in particular, a process of family reunion.

The peak periods of arrival for the different ethnic minority groups were as follows:

West Indians

About two-thirds (150 000) of West Indians arrived in the period 1955-64 and about two-thirds (150 000) of West Indians arrived in the period 1955-64 and a quarter (55 000) in the following decade. Although the arrival of women reflected family reunion, in many cases

the women came to work in their own right. Adult immigration has been very low since the early 1970s.

Indians

1965-74 was the peak period of immigration when one-third (132 000) of Indians arrived; a quarter (85 000) had arrived in the previous decade and a further quarter (85 000) arrived in the following decade. These data relate to persons born in India and include those who entered the UK via East Africa (see below). As with immigration from the rest of the Indian sub-continent, arrivals in recent years have been mainly spouses and fiancé(e)s. The number of children has declined substantially reflecting the fact that most of the spouses have been newly married and thus have not brought children with them on arrival.

East African Asians

Nearly all East African Asians are of Indian ethnic origin. Three quarters (142 000) of those born in East Africa arrived in this country in the late 1960s and during the 1970s. This period covered the forced exodus of United Kingdom Passport Holders from Uganda and the process of 'Africanisation' in Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi.

Pakistanis

Over a third (70 000) of Pakistanis arrived in the period 1965-74 and over a third (75 000) in 1975-84. Thus immigration from Pakistan tended to lag behind that from India. (Pakistan ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth in 1971, but rejoined in 1989.)

Bangladeshis

Similarly, immigration from Bangladesh tended to lag behind that from Pakistan with over a third (28 000) arriving in the fifteen year period 1965-79 followed by nearly a third (24 000) in the five-year period 1980-84. Reflecting the later immigration from Bangladesh, most of the children who have arrived from the Indian sub-continent in recent years have been from Bangladesh.

Besides these communities, there are also:

- longstanding ethnic minority communities of trading and seafaring origin

(Somalis, Cypriots, Afro-Caribbeans) in ports like London, Liverpool and Cardiff.

- refugees and asylum seekers. These include Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Vietnamese, Iranians, Sri Lankans and many others.

- a shifting population of students, businessmen and wealthy expatriates from many different countries.

Some 2.6 million people in the United Kingdom are of ethnic minority origin — 4.7% of the total population. Just under a half of the total ethnic minority population were born in the United Kingdom, and nearly 75% are British citizens.

Population distribution

Nearly 70% of members of the ethnic minority communities live in the metropolitan areas, as compared with just over 30% of the white population. They make up 14% of the population in Greater London, 13% in the West Midlands and 7% in West Yorkshire; but only 2% outside the metropolitan counties. Well over half of West Indians live in Greater London, and over half of Bangladeshis; Pakistanis, in contrast, are spread much more widely, with their largest concentration in the West Midlands and West Yorkshire.

While most Asians are more likely than white people to live in owner occupied housing, and Afro-Caribbeans in rented, often council owned flats, the great majority of both groups live in poorer quality accommodation than the rest of the population in comparable forms of housing or tenure.

Age. The ethnic minority population is younger overall than the white population. The age profile of different minority groups differs, with more recently arrived groups like the Bangladeshis having some 47% aged under 15.

Employment. Around a quarter of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men are self-employed, against 15% of the white population. West Indians are found mainly as employees. Though Indians are slightly more likely than whites to have non-manual jobs and young Asians generally are increasingly entering white

(*) Minister of State at the Home Office.



Photo MAPEZ

'The UK government's fundamental objective is that Britain should be a fair and just society where everyone, irrespective of ethnic origin, is able to participate freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation (...)'

collar occupations. West Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are very much less likely to do so.

Unemployment. Through most of the 1980s the average unemployment rate of members of ethnic minorities was twice that of white people, regardless of age or the level of qualifications; by 1988 the up turn in the economy was beginning to reduce this difference. However, there are marked variations between different communities. Averages of 1987-89 survey results show that at 10% the Indian unemployment rate for men is closer to that for the white male population (9%), while that for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis is as high as 25%. The Afro-Caribbean men's unemployment rate, at 18%, is twice that of white men.

Unemployment is worse among the young. 21% of ethnic minority young people aged 16-24 who are available for work are unemployed, as against 12% of white young people. Again, however, there are differences between different groups.

Racial discrimination. Research (particularly Black and White Britain: the third PSI study, Heinemann 1984) and studies and investigations carried out by the Commission for Racial Equality and others have shown that racial discrimination remains a major reason for the differences between white and ethnic minority experiences in employment,

housing and other services, and that it affects people of all the minority races, the well qualified as well as those without qualifications. The economic prospects of many members of the ethnic minority communities have also been disproportionately affected by the economic problems of the inner cities where many live, by the shrinkage in demand for unskilled labour, and by structural changes in some industries in which some communities have traditionally found work.

Nevertheless, while discrimination and disadvantage remain major problems, there are some encouraging signs. Because most of the larger ethnic minority communities in the United Kingdom originate from the Commonwealth they have always, whether or not they become British citizens, been entitled to vote and take part in public life. Men and women from many different communities are making their mark, not only through success in their careers, but through voluntary and public service. Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords now have members from the ethnic minorities. The number of ethnic minority councillors in local government is continuing to grow (and many have moved into senior positions), as is representation on the boards of public bodies, and in other public appointments. Nearly 2% of magistrates, 1% of solicitors and some 6% of barristers, are now from the ethnic minorities, and progress

to the judiciary has started. Recruitment to the police from the ethnic minority communities is rising. The processes of change within our society, as within the economy, are beginning to reflect its multiracial character.

Race relations: The government's commitment

The UK Government's fundamental objective is that Britain should be a fair and just society where everyone, irrespective of ethnic origin, is able to participate freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation while having the freedom to maintain their own religious and cultural identity. Members of ethnic minorities, a growing proportion of whom were born in the United Kingdom, are an integral part of British society.

The government sets the framework for such a policy by ensuring that its general policies and programmes, including the special initiatives it is taking in the inner cities, benefit all sections of society. The government also supports legislation, institutions and programmes which are targeted directly at tackling racial discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity and at racist actions threatening public order.

The main instrument against racial discrimination is the Race Relations Act 1976. This makes racial discrimination unlawful in employment, training and related matters, in education, in the provision of goods, facilities and services, and in the disposal and management of premises. The Act gives individuals a right of direct access to the civil courts and industrial tribunals for legal remedies for unlawful discrimination. It does *not*, however, make provision for positive discrimination, which is expressly outlawed.

The Race Relations Act also established the Commission for Racial Equality to help enforce the legislation and to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups generally. The Commission has a general responsibility for advising the government on the working of the Act and it is also a principal source of information and advice for the general public about the Act. The Commission has discretion to assist individuals who consider they have been discriminated against.

The Commission, which is an independent body, is funded by the Home Office and will receive some £14 million grant-in-aid in 1991-92: of this nearly £4 million supports a network of local Racial Equality Councils throughout the country, with which the Commission works in close partnership.

In addition, the Public Order Act 1986 which makes unlawful, incitement to racial hatred, came into force on 1 April 1987.

However, the UK government believes that good community relations cannot be established solely by legislation or by administrative measures. They must evolve from mutual understanding and respect among people of all races, which in turn requires a freedom from fear of racial violence, hatred or harassment and the removal of other barriers to equality of opportunity.

There must be a commitment to achieving these goals on the part of all concerned: central and local government; other public agencies; the private sector both as employers and as providers of services and facilities; the voluntary sector; the media; and, of course, the ethnic minority communities themselves.

The UK government welcomes the contribution to national life already being made by many members of ethnic minorities, and positively encourages members of ethnic minorities to become active citizens, participating in and contributing to mainstream economic and social development. It supports programmes designed to develop confidence, competence and self help among members of the ethnic minorities, to ensure fair access to services and training for employment and to encourage enterprise.

Government action

The government believes that ethnic minority needs should, wherever possible, be met from main public sector programmes, since the basic needs of members of ethnic minorities for education, employment, training, housing, health or social services are common to the whole community. Members of the ethnic minority communities contribute through tax and other charges to the funding of main public sector programmes, and are fully entitled to expect that in planning and delivering services for the community as a whole, central and local government will take the presence of

ethnic minority communities into account and make fair and appropriate provision, as for any other citizen. Nevertheless, the government recognises that additional assistance may be necessary in some areas of provision.

The main thrust of government funding in respect of such provision is delivered by Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966 which allows for the payment of grant to local authorities who are required to make special provision in the delivery of their services for people from the New Commonwealth whose language or culture differs from that of the rest of the community and who are disadvantaged as a result. The government believes that Section 11 has an important role to play in assisting ethnic minority communities to enter fully, and benefit from, the mainstream of national life.

At present over £100 m is paid in support of some 12 000 additional local authority posts. About 80% is spent in education, mainly in the teaching of English, with the rest spent in additional provision in social services, housing, business and employment.

In October 1990 the government announced new arrangements for the administration of the grant to take effect from April 1992. These new arrangements concentrate upon more effective delivery of grant. These require those bidding for money to set recognisable targets and objectives and to monitor the work of their proposed projects. The emphasis for the grant will be on practical projects designed to meet identified needs such as lack of English or low achievement in schools. Projects are judged against particular criteria set out in detailed policy statements sent to local authorities, and all projects will regularly need to take account of the views of those who benefit from the project. The new arrangements seek also to ensure increased involvement of the voluntary sector in local authority projects.

Legislative change is recognised as desirable in due course, but the scope of any legislative change would need to be carefully considered. It would, however, be likely to remove the restriction of the payment of grant to New Commonwealth citizens only, and to enable the payment of grant through other bodies, as well as local authorities.

In the meantime the government has introduced a new Ethnic Minority Grant, effective from April 1992, which will be paid through Training and Enterprise Councils to fund employment, training and enterprise projects based in the voluntary sector. The new grant is payable for projects designed to meet the needs of all ethnic minority communities and is not restricted to those of Commonwealth origin.

The UK government's aim is to help the members of such communities to benefit fully from opportunities for educational, economic and social development. To this end the grant has provided, and will continue to provide, support in the teaching of English, in strategies aimed at improving educational performance and in tackling particular needs which arise where economic, social or cultural differences impede access to opportunities or services.

Training and Enterprise Councils

The newly-formed Training and Enterprise Councils are the key to achieving the broad objectives that the government has for training and enterprise in England and Wales. (In Scotland, Local Enterprise Companies perform a similar function.) TECs are employer-led bodies with a board of directors drawn mostly from local private sector employers. The programmes run by TECs aim to equip people with the skills in demand by employers. In planning the training and enterprise provision it intends to offer, each TEC must carry out an assessment of the training needs of its local labour market. This must take into account the needs of all sections of the community, including those from ethnic minority groups. The Race Relations Act allows TECs to run training provision restricted to a particular racial group where this group is under-represented in the local or national labour market.

Home Office Ethnic Minority Business Initiative

The Home Office also provides funding — £1.1 m this year — for direct grants to support projects aimed at reducing racial disadvantage. Grants are provided primarily to ethnic minority-led and other voluntary organisations working mainly in the inner cities, often in partnership with other government de-




Photo MAPEZ

Fashion knows no boundaries. This Black Beauty shop in Brussels could equally be in Shepherd's Bush (London), Barbès (Paris) or Amsterdam

partments, local authorities, the private sector and/or charitable trusts.

Many of the projects fall within the ambit of the Home Office's Ethnic Minority Business Initiative (EMBI) which was set up in 1985. It is recognised that some ethnic communities face particular disadvantages in setting up in business, and EMBI seeks to improve the access of ethnic minority businesses to business development services, and help them participate fully in the mainstream of business life. Support is given to five ethnic minority-led Local Enterprise Agencies (which provide advice, support and training for small businesses), in multi-racial areas of London, Birmingham and Bristol, and for some outreach workers in other mainstream enterprise agencies, whose purpose is to encourage prospective and existing ethnic minority businesses to make use of the agency's services.

The Initiative has, with the help of a Planning Group including representatives from the ethnic minority business world and other Government Departments, hosted two Conferences—in May 1989 and February 1990. These brought together ethnic minority business men and women, key people from the financial services sector and Government and private sector initiatives for business development to focus on the potential and needs of new and developing ethnic minority businesses. A third conference is due to be held in November 1991.

A small independent Development Team was set up in August 1989, following the first conference. The team is working to heighten awareness of the particular needs of ethnic minority small businesses, and, in partnership with other agencies, to help increase the contacts and flow of business between black and Asian entrepreneurs and the wider business community. It has, for example, helped set up a local purchasing scheme, and has run a series of workshops for bank managers. The Team is currently working with Training and Enterprise Councils to seek to ensure that their individual enterprise strategies recognise the needs of ethnic minority entrepreneurs. The Team's work is likely to continue until early 1992.

Inner city initiatives

The government pursues a range of initiatives aimed at the problems of the inner cities, where a high proportion of the United Kingdom's ethnic minority population live. The priorities for action are to encourage enterprise and help new and existing businesses; to improve job prospects; to improve conditions by tackling dereliction, developing sites and improving housing; and to make inner city areas safe and attractive places to live and work.

The Urban Programme, for example, was the first major public spending programme targeted solely on the inner cities. Grant is provided for urban regeneration projects targeted at priority

groups and areas in 57 local authorities. Although not primarily designed to help race relations, the Urban Programme recognises the special needs of ethnic minority communities and over £30 million was spent on projects specifically benefiting ethnic minority groups in 1989-90. Other government programmes such as the Department of Trade and Industry's Inner City Task Forces are specifically designed to maximise involvement of local people and public and private sector bodies. Task Forces and the Department of the Environment's City Action Teams seek to increase enterprise, employment and training opportunities for all the local population, particularly those from ethnic minority groups.

The Home Office's Safer Cities Programme is designed to tackle crime and fear of crime in 20 selected inner city areas and includes a number of local schemes aimed, for example, at tackling racial harassment.

The pilot of an exciting new inner city initiative called City Challenge was launched by Michael Heseltine, the Secretary of State for Environment, in May 1991. Fifteen Urban Programme authorities were invited to take the lead in preparing plans for the regeneration of deprived areas which are critical to the quality of life of their cities, drawing on the talent and expertise of local people, the private sector, academic communities, statutory agencies and the voluntary sector. The best 10 programmes (selected at the end of July) will have the opportunity of a share in £75 million in 1992-93, top sliced from the Department of the Environment's inner city resources. Some of these programmes include multi-racial areas. Continued funding will normally be available for up to five years. Depending on the success of this pilot, and the local authorities concerned have responded very positively to the initiative, it is intended to introduce a wider City Challenge Scheme next year.

The aims of fair and equal treatment for all, and of eliminating unlawful discrimination are only gradually being achieved, but their benefits, in avoiding waste of talent and efforts, and maintaining social harmony, are now widely recognised. There is a long way to go before members of our ethnic minority communities achieve their full potential in the economic, social and cultural life of the country, but the trends are encouraging. ○

A.R.

The immigration issue in the Community

An ACP view

by James Henry E. MATHESON (*)

Migration patterns both within and outside of Europe have often been a response to differences in socio-economic and political situations between countries and regions. In earlier years, we have seen legions of European migrants respond to the positive attraction and opportunities offered by North America and Australia. Since the 1960s, Central Europe has similarly exercised a 'pull' effect on migrants from Southern Europe, notably Yugoslavia and Turkey. Indeed, host countries have formulated quite liberal policies designed to govern the stay of such migrants as temporary or short-term workers.

More recently, the developments in Eastern Europe seem likely to herald added dimensions to the immigration phenomenon as new migrants respond to their new found freedom of movement by moving into Western Europe in search of a better standard of living and personal fulfilment. Coinciding with the migrations westward within Europe, have been movements to Europe from countries of the developing world by people who are reacting to adverse economic situations. These have been brought about by several factors: the impact upon their societies of international economic conditions and environmental degradation as well as internal conflicts with their attendant threats to, and violation of individual human rights. Population explosion in some developing countries as well as labour shortages in some sectors of the Community have also been contributory factors. (1)

The cumulative effect of such migration has been immense with the structures and policies of the recipient countries being placed under tremendous strain to handle what has become almost a spontaneous resettlement. Thus, many countries have sought to respond by

implementing stricter immigration policies and systems of control. Accordingly, as legal entry becomes more difficult to obtain, the number of illegal migrants has grown with many migrants resorting to the use of available asylum procedures to gain entry.

In the interim, the increasing immigration pressure from developing countries is being considered an important factor leading to an increase in social and racial tension, in some recipient countries, to such an extent that immigration has become an explosive issue in national politics. A Report prepared for the European Commission has characterised the immigration issue as a 'hot potato' in some Member States, expressing a fear that it was becoming a subject of a 'political logic' rather than a 'technical logic' needed to help identify and solve important problems. (2)

(2) 'Policies on Immigration and the Social Integration of Migrants in the European Community', Brussels, September 1990 (SEC(90) 1813 FINAL)

The ACP migrant

Figures on ACP migrants within the Community are not readily available. The figures provided by the Commission Report suggest that non-European residents within the Community totalled 7.9 million in 1988, of which 2 227 552 were from Africa, mainly North Africa. The figures for the rest of Africa, South of the Sahara including South Africa, was 422 606 — about 5% of the resident non-European population. As the vast majority of the population of the ACP States comes from Africa, and it has been Africa which has been most subject, in the ACP, to recent waves of migration, it can be argued that it would be that continent which would provide the greatest proportion of ACP migrants to Europe. Thus, the proportion of all ACP migrants could reasonably be expected to be only slightly higher than that in the Commission Report.

The definition of a migrant, within the ACP terminology, covers three broad categories: legal (and illegal) immigrants; migrant workers and students. The latter



PHOTO MAPEZ

ACP immigrants in town, doing as every parent!

'The figures for Africa, south of Sahara including South Africa, were about 5% of the resident non-European population' in 1988

(*) Ambassador of Guyana to the BENELUX, Germany, Norway and the EC, Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors (Brussels).

(1) Background Document by the International Organisation for Migration: 9th IOM Seminar on Migration, No 4, Geneva, December 1990.

two categories represent groups which reside legally within the Community, albeit for pre-determined periods, but they are the groups which come most readily to mind when one thinks of ACP migrants. They are also groups which often seek to transform themselves into legal (or illegal) migrants by attempting to stay on in the host countries upon completion of their agreed stay.

ACP concerns

The ACP Group of States has, on many occasions, expressed concern at the situation of ACP students and migrant workers residing legally within the Community. The Group has, during sessions of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers and at meetings of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, drawn attention to the plight and living conditions of their nationals within the Community.

The areas of concern to the ACP Group have been several including the following:

a) **Freedom of Entry:** Concern has been expressed at the restrictions imposed on the entry of ACP nationals to Member States of the Community following recent waves of migration from East and Central Europe, from the traditional supplying areas of the Mediterranean region and some ACP States. Those restrictions also hinder the entry of students and asylum seekers.

b) **Freedom of Movement:** Several Member States of the Community grant only short or medium term residence permits which restrict the migrants to specific jobs or, sometimes, to specific places. Restrictions on job or professional mobility severely inhibit social mobility and make integration difficult. A lack of freedom of movement will maintain the fragmentation of the labour market within the Community, thus perpetuating a situation in which immigrants remain at the bottom of the social and economic ladders.

c) **Education:** The ACP Group has been concerned at the relative scarcity of educational opportunities available to migrants. The Group has emphasised that greater attention should be paid to vocational training and retraining to enable immigrants to keep abreast of developments, especially technological changes, so as to make them competitive with the nationals of Member States in which they live.

d) **Housing:** The living conditions of immigrants in inner cities where housing, health and educational facilities are inadequate have been a major source of concern. The absence of an integration policy, backed by housing plans for immigrants, is a root cause of the immigrant 'ghetto' now found in most cities within the Community.

e) **Growing Phenomenon of Racism:** Racism and xenophobia have been on the rise in spite of their condemnation by all parties. The European *Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia* was adopted in June 1986 by the European Parliament but since then, acts of personal harassment, physical attacks, discrimination in housing, employment and pay have not declined. On the contrary, they have been reported in increasing numbers.

f) **Civil and Political Rights:** Immigrants have been excluded from exercising most political rights in their host country. Such rights have been made available in some Member States but they are made conditional on the acquisition of nationality of the host country, which is likely to be a long and tedious process.

ACP quest for better treatment

The ACP Group has considered that the protection of the rights of migrants should be discussed in the context of human rights norms which have been accepted by all States party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations. Thus, in the Lomé IV Convention, the provision dealing with the situation of students and migrant workers has been linked with the commitment of the Contracting Parties to the obligations under '*..... international law to strive to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on ethnic group, origin, race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion or any other situation.*'⁽³⁾

Under that provision, the Member States (and/or, where appropriate, the Community) and the ACP States '*... will continue to ensure, through the legal or administrative measures which they have or will have adopted that migrant workers, students and other foreign nationals legally within their territory are not subjected to discrimination on the basis of racial,*

⁽³⁾ Article 5, paragraph 2, Fourth ACP-EEC Convention

religious, cultural or social differences, notably in respect of housing, education, healthcare, other social services and employment.'

Those elements are enshrined in a provision which, situated in the main body of the Convention, represents an improvement over the Lomé III Convention which relegated the subject of students and migrant workers to its Annex IX.

Annex V of Lomé IV extends the fundamental freedoms, as they derive from the general principles of international law, to workers legally carrying out an activity within the Community. It also provides for measures to assist non-governmental organisations in the Community to improve social and cultural facilities for workers who are ACP nationals and provides for financial support for programmes aimed at the training of ACP nationals returning home to permit their re-integration in '*well-defined fields*'.

ACP States have agreed to discourage their nationals from irregular migration into the Community. It was also agreed that matters relating to the situation of students and migrant workers should be referred to the Council of Ministers 'as appropriate'.

Both parties have agreed, in Annex VI of Lomé IV, to accord to workers legally employed in each others' territory, treatment free from discrimination with respect to working conditions and pay as well as social security benefits linked to employment. That provision shall not affect the rights and obligations of ACP States and Member States of the Community where those agreements provide for more favourable treatment for nationals of ACP States and of Members States. It is agreed that matters relating to employment, pay and social security would be resolved, if necessary, through bilateral negotiation.

While Lomé IV does represent some improvement upon its predecessor, Lomé III, in its provisions on migration issues, it is fairly restrictive when compared with the standards set by the international community. There is some scope for improvement.

That fact has not been missed by the Joint Assembly of ACP-EEC Parliamentarians which has debated the issues relating to the situation of ACP nationals and other immigrants generally, at many of its sessions. During its meeting in

Luxembourg in September 1990, the Joint Assembly approved a Resolution, ACP-EEC 186/90/fin, on 'Immigrant Rights' which, *inter alia*, expressed the wish that all Member States begin the process of regularising the situation of all political and economic immigrants who are 'correctly working and residing illegally in the country concerned'. The process was to be 'simple, rapid and generalised, without restrictive clauses, and to be carried out with sufficient publicity

Member States were also invited, in the Resolution, to do the following:

- Undertake a policy of integration which guaranteed equal rights and treatment for all residents.
- Recognise the inalienable right of families to live together.
- Define long-term immigration policies which ensure family reunification as well as the enjoyment of other rights by immigrants.

International standards

As noted earlier, the link between the protection of the rights of migrants and the obligation and commitment to human rights under international law has been recognised in Lomé IV. The partners, the ACP States and Member States of the Community, are thus committed to the observance of the international standards set by the United Nations and its agencies, notably the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in Geneva, in the formulation and implementation of policies regarding the welfare of migrant workers. Such standards, as detailed in various United Nations and ILO Conventions, are universal and represent the minimum standards below which treatment of migrants should not fall.

The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 and the Migrant Workers Convention (Supplementary Provisions), 1975 are two instruments adopted by the ILO which, together with two Conventions on Social Security, have set out the minimum standards to which those states which subscribe to the principles of international law, should adhere.

A draft United Nations Convention, currently being negotiated, seeks to extend basic human rights not only to legally resident migrants but also to undocumented or irregular migrants. Under this draft Convention, additional rights would be accorded to lawfully



Photo MAPEZ

A need for education, employment and... leisure

resident migrants while recognition would be given to the rights of several categories of migrant e.g., frontier workers, seasonal workers, project-tied workers.

One helpful observation, from the ACP perspective, which suggests itself, is that all Member States of the Community which have not yet ratified the ILO and United Nations Conventions should consider doing so soon and should then ensure that their provisions are effectively applied in their countries. (4)

The Single Market and migration policy

The advent of the single, internal market makes it a matter of urgency that Member States review their migration policies. When the internal frontiers are finally removed, the solution of the immigration problem in one Member State will probably become a matter for all Member States. It is also likely that the achievement of the single market will increase the attraction of the Community as a venue of new migration, particularly if the single market of the Community demonstrates the expected growth while conditions in the developing world stagnate or worsen.

There is a certain concern among the ACP States when note is taken of

(4) Eight Member States have ratified the 1949 ILO Convention while only six have ratified the 1975 ILO Convention.

declarations such as that in an Appendix to the Single European Act:

'Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States to take measures as they consider necessary for controlling immigration from third countries, and to combat terrorism, crime, the traffic of drugs and illicit trading in works of art and antiques'.

One must respect the right of states to protect against the recognisably negative effects of most of the areas listed in the Appendix but it must surely be viewed as unfortunate that immigration has been lumped together with criminal and other undesirable activities. More specifically, the declaration seems to give the freedom to a particular Member State or group of states to formulate laws relating to immigration and implement them irrespective of whether they conflict with Community law or not.

There are several proposals now being made which will demand urgent Community attention as they will materially affect a frontier-free Community (5).

a) The abolition of controls on the movement of non-EEC nationals from one host state to other EEC states. Such a development would increase economic and social mobility. The access to employment in other EEC States would be improved if restrictions which limit

(5) The proposals are partially drawn from the World Employment Programme, ILO, 1990 and other sources.

immigrants to specific jobs over a specific time period in one country are lifted.

b) The opening-up of employment in the public sector to non-EEC nationals (i.e., outside the sectors which are considered sensitive in terms of policy-making).

c) In accordance with the principle that the family is to be protected by the society and the State, Member States should consider facilitating the reunification of families of all migrant workers legally residing in their territories.

d) The international dimension of irregular migration requires that ACP and Community States cooperate fully in the fight against illegal entry and migration. It is desirable, however, that, after having resided in a Member State for a certain period of time, the migrant can claim certain fundamental rights, including rights arising from the exercise of remunerative activity. The position of the irregular migrant should, therefore, be regularised after a certain period of stay. A few Member States have already begun the process.

Harmonised legislation on immigration

Migration policy in the Community, post-Single Market, can be either a common policy adopted at Community level or a harmonisation of national policies or a mere coordination of national policies. What that policy should be based on is a realisation that some level of immigration to the Community is inevitable for economic reasons prevailing both in the host and sending country, for reasons of international cooperation and for humanitarian reasons.

The efforts being made, thus far, to forge varying levels of common or shared policy have all presented problems. The Schengen Agreement adopted by the Benelux, France and Germany (and possibly soon by others) and the Draft Convention for the Crossing of Borders (not yet made public) have both been highlighted by Amnesty International as posing particular problems if enacted as proposed. So, too, has the Convention for the Determination of the State Responsible for Examining Requests for Asylum (Dublin).

Areas such as refugee determination, sanctions against transporters, refusal of entry, deportation of refugee seekers and differing standards of admission of non-EEC nationals, have all been pinpointed as matters of concern.

The 'Brain-drain'

A matter of continuing concern to ACP States has been the search for a solution to the outflow of skills and the encouragement of a return of skilled personnel who can contribute to the economic and social life of their states. The ACP has called on the Community, in the past, to cooperate in finding a solution to that problem.

Some measures which can be taken and which may help include —

- the allocation of meaningful resources for education and training at home;
- financial and technical resources to encourage South-South education and training exchange;
- support for initiatives aimed at creating training-cum-research internships based

on technical cooperation in the developing countries, all concepts whose aim is to facilitate the return and effective reintegration of qualified nationals;

- the avoidance of the use of skill-based criteria in Community integration policy for admitting new immigrants such as engineers and scientists.

The immigration pressure now coming from developing countries is the result of complex factors, including some outside the control of developing countries.

The continuing affluence enjoyed by EC Member States has become a magnetic attraction for immigrants from elsewhere, just as Europeans were attracted, in the not too distant past, to other parts of the world.

Some observers of the migration problem have agreed that the solution to the problems lies in continued expansion of aid. This is to be considered a long-term solution. Such cooperation should, in any event, be combined, in the short-and medium-term, with common management of migratory flows, some experts believe.

In recommending a major role for aid, the disruptive influence of the international environment, in particular, the continuing fall in commodity prices and the worsening in the terms of trade of the developing countries, has not been adequately highlighted. The recent spread of economic deprivation in the developing countries, including the ACP States, can be traced partly to this factor. Assistance programmes in population control have also been mentioned as an important element in future cooperation aimed at improving the standard of living of the developing countries, thereby enabling them to retain at home the skilled and professional services which will contribute to the well-being of their population.

There is a need for consultation between the Community and independent bodies concerned with refugee matters regarding the design of policies and procedures governing refugees' entry and their protection under international law. The need to refine immigration policies generally and streamline the implementation of such policies should take into account the long-standing historical and cultural relations between Member States and ACP States and the need for the latter to acquire necessary technology and know-how for their own development. ○

J.H.E.M.



Photo MAPEZ

While limitations may be applied to ACP nationals' movement in the Community, there is an increase of specific food product imports

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Thirty years of Turkish immigration

by Dr Ataman AKSÖYEK (*)

October 1991 brings round the 30th anniversary of the Recruiting Agreement between the Republic of Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany and we would like to mark this anniversary by reviewing how migration from Turkey developed. At the time the Agreement was signed, and in the first ten years thereafter, it was clearly assumed, particularly by the migrants concerned, that emigration would be a temporary phenomenon.

On the German side, the expectation was that the Recruiting Agreement would channel as many healthy young workers as possible into manufacturing. Also, importing labour was profitable for the host country since it eliminated the need for the kind of investment normally required to prepare the human being for the labour market. As a 1971 colloquium in Tarquinia in Italy showed, educating an Italian until he was 18 cost LIT 6 million.

For the Republic of Turkey, the aim was to reduce unemployment and increase the inflow of foreign currency.

And the migrants themselves were hoping to return with big savings and then to set themselves up independently.

The post-war period was characterised by heavy investment and the founding of many new undertakings, all possible, *inter alia*, because of the Marshall Plan and other reconstruction programmes financed by various western countries. A feature of this period of expansion was the enormous demand for labour which the domestic population was unable to satisfy, *inter alia* because of the particular demographic circumstances, because the legal ages for leaving school and training college had been raised and the working week shortened from 46.1 to 41.1 hours and because Germany was rearming (this alone made 500 000 people unavailable for the labour market). The first Recruit-

ing Agreement was negotiated with Italy in 1955 and was followed by the one with Turkey in 1961 and others with Yugoslavia and Spain. With these Agreements the Federal Republic returned to a tradition of the *German Reich* inside whose borders there were half a million immigrants in 1895. Just before the First World War, the figure was as much as 1.2 million.

After the building of the Wall in August 1961, the possibility of making good labour shortages from the ranks of refugees also dried up. From then on the labour market began to be characterised by a duality based on nationality. Promotions now went to German workers and staff whilst the physically demanding work, which was frequently also more dangerous and more likely to have a deleterious effect on health, was done by the foreign labourers.

Trends in the migration from Turkey

At least three phases can be distinguished in the history of migration from Turkey:

From 1961 to the 1966/67 recession

During this phase, all parties, namely the two governments, the migrants and the entrepreneurs in the Federal Republic, worked on the principle of rotation, it being assumed that the migrants would be working only temporarily in the Federal Republic (i.e. two-three years each). The recruiting centres opened by the Federal Republic in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir applied very strict selection standards to the migrants. They had to submit to health checks and show evidence of skills before they could obtain the 'longed-for' permit. As a result, in their own country, the migrants were among the best qualified people. Furthermore, their departure did not significantly reduce unemployment. Most of the migrants had jobs and, because of their qualifications, were generally not easy to replace.

The rotation principle manifested itself particularly during the 1966/67 recession.

From 1968 to the recruiting ban in 1973

This period was characterised by massive recruitment after the end of the recession because of the Federal Republic's great need for labour. It was a question of having to meet growing demand. As a result, qualification requirements for migrants were lowered, and there was another difference — by contrast with the early migrants, most of the newcomers came from country areas.

During this period employers also started coming round to the view that the rotation principle held disadvantages as well as advantages for production.

At this point there was still no question of women immigrants. There were very few families among the migrants.

1973 to the present day

Following the recruiting ban, the pattern of migrant workers' movements from Turkey changed. Further recruiting was now no longer possible and the years 1970s became a period of consolidation. With the exception of 1975 when some 140 000 migrants returned to Turkey, there were no significant numbers of returnees. The characteristic of this period was that, on average, the immigrants stayed in Germany longer and brought their families over to join them, as was possible after 1974.

By the mid-seventies at the latest the migrations had turned into immigration.

Efforts by the Federal Government to promote a return to the country of origin, particularly after the change of government in the eighties, were only temporarily successful in producing a situation where departures exceed arrivals and the number of Turks living in Germany decreased in real terms. In 1985, after dropping to an all-time low, the number of Turks in Germany began increasing again steadily and by December 1989 the Federal Republic of Germany had a total of 1.612 million immigrants from Turkey. Some 36% of this immigrant population are employed persons subject to the laws on social

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insurance (as compared to 60% in 1973) and approximately 64 000 are unemployed.

With one in three immigrants in the FRG coming from Turkey this makes Turks the largest immigrant group in the country.

The demographic characteristics of this population are coming increasingly to resemble those of the indigenous German population.

The proportions of women and men (47 and 53% respectively) are now almost the same as for the German population. 49 000 of the children born in the Federal Republic in 1989 were born to Turkish immigrants. All these figures show that these immigrants regard the FRG as their hearth and home rather than as a temporary place of abode. Further evidence is the time they stay in the Federal Republic. As is clear from studies, 60% of the Turks in the Federal Republic have been there for ten years or more.

Another indicator suggesting immigration rather than temporary migration is that 45 000 immigrants from Turkey have bought a home in the Federal Republic and that this trend is on the increase. A total of 135 000 immigrants from Turkey have opened building society accounts.

Unemployment does not automatically mean a return to Turkey as used to be the case in the sixties and early seventies.

The second generation

For the so-called second generation, the tendency to regard the Federal Republic as their home is even stronger. For them Turkey is, at best, a country where they go on holiday or where most of their relatives live. But it is not a realistic alternative. Only momentarily, when they are frustrated with the situation in the Federal Republic, will they say that they are considering returning to Turkey to live.

Most of the second generation arrived here as small children or were born here and they find themselves at the centre of much tension and conflict. On the one hand these young people no longer have language difficulties, are increasingly better educated and their expectations as regards jobs, training and social life are very similar to those of young Germans. On the other hand Turkish young people constantly see their German peers being



Photo MAPEZ

Turkish immigrants in Europe — In Germany 'most of the second generation arrived as small children or were born there and they find themselves at the centre of much tension and conflict'

given priority when it comes to jobs, places on training courses or accommodation. Unlike their parents, they are also in closer contact with their German peers and are therefore much more aware of being passed over.

To all this must be added the economic and social problems that have resulted from unification with the former GDR and the growing racism and xenophobia increasingly to be met in certain layers of German society.


Vocational diversification

Over the years immigrants from Turkey have increasingly diversified into different vocational areas so that the Federal Republic of Germany now has some 4 000 Turkish teachers, 953 doc-

tors, 500 social workers, 150 artists, 200 trade union representatives, 30 members of the professions and some 130 free lance journalists — these figures including both men and women.

Another interesting phenomenon is that more and more immigrants to the Federal Republic are building up independent businesses. Thirty years ago nobody would have dreamt of a development of this kind. From a study carried out by the Centre for Turkish Studies in Bonn it can be seen that in 1990 there were 33 000 independent entrepreneurs among the Turkish immigrants (there is a total of 140 000 immigrant undertakings in the FRG). This particular sector of independent entrepreneurs, 30% of whom are under 35 years old and 10% women, is constantly growing and has

TURKISH IMMIGRANTS IN EUROPE (%)



Source: Maine - Maastricht 1990

become an important factor in the economy of both the Federal Republic and Turkey. Most of the undertakings are in tourism, food, restaurants, retailing and the services sector. Whereas immigrants from Italy, Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia have concentrated on four sectors, immigrants from Turkey have set up independently in a total of 55 sectors.

Their undertakings are significant for the economy as a whole. For instance, they have created more than 100 000 new jobs. According to the study by the Centre for Turkish Studies, their 1988 turnover was some DM 780 000 and an average DM 174 000 was invested per undertaking. The equivalent sum for 1990 was DM 5.7 billion and it is estimated that their combined volume of consumption amounted to more than DM 25 billion. In the meantime their ranks include 12 specialist tour operators who sold more than 200 000 package trips to Turkey in 1989.

Largely through the work of general consulates, a whole infrastructure for small and medium-sized business is developing and businessmen's associations are being formed whilst at the same time business consultancies are being formed and Turkish banks are opening more and more agencies and branches in the Federal Republic. Surveys made in 1990 show that there is also a marked tendency among independent entrepreneurs to invest in the former GDR.

Foreigners in the FRG at the beginning of 1990 (4 845 900 in total)

Turks	1 612 600
Yugoslavs	610 500
Italians	519 500
Greeks	293 600
Poles	220 400
Austrians	171 100
Spaniards	127 000
Dutch	101 200
Britons	85 700
Americans (US)	85 700
Iranians	81 300
French	77 600
Portuguese	74 900
Moroccans	61 800
Vietnamese	33 400
Sri Lankans	32 700
Czechs	31 700
Hungarians	31 600
Lebanese	30 100
Tunisians	24 300
Indians	23 900
Afghans	22 500
Rumanians	21 100
Japanese	20 100

Source: Federal Statistics Office.

The Federal Republic's policy on foreigners

Although, as we have seen, there is a clear tendency for Turkish immigrants to

settle in the Federal Republic, this fact continues to be ignored by the Federal Republic's current policy. There is still no question of introducing a policy on foreigners; the latter is still primarily dictated by the labour market.

Opportunities for participating in politics are also extremely limited. Many immigrants become members of political parties — for instance 2.5% of SPD members (i.e. 24 000) are foreigners. A recent judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court nevertheless still refuses immigrants the right to vote or stand in local elections. Yet in the Netherlands this is an undisputed component of local government. Local councils in Germany have foreigners' advisory committees, but then, that is the point — they are only advisory.

In spite of protests by organisations representing immigrants, charitable associations, churches and trade unions another restrictive law on foreigners was adopted in 1990. This remains entirely true to the tradition which started with the adoption of the 'Preußisches Allgemeines Landrecht' of 1794 and has been maintained to the present day by way of the special laws promulgated by imperial Germany. In this connection it is frightening to realise that the policy regulation on foreigners issued in March 1938 was retained by the newly founded Federal Republic in 1951.

The general tenor of the law has never changed. Now, as then, the main interest is in economic matters, not in the human beings affected by the law. Granting a person the right to reside in the country is regarded as a favour but the uncertainties surrounding the law governing the residential permit still remain, as does the State's power of decision — termed its discretionary powers. Even under the new law on foreigners the latter are still regarded first and foremost as disturbers of the peace and integration means toeing the line, with the possibility that this may be 'rewarded' with citizenship once the previous nationality has been renounced. Like all other immigrants from non-EEC countries, Turkish immigrants belong to the group with the fewest rights and greatest uncertainty as regards residential status, even if they have lived in the Federal Republic for years.

On 15 July 1991 the Federal Government's appointee with responsibility for foreigners and the integration of foreign

workers and their families resigned her post, giving the following reasons:

1. her office was understaffed as she had at her disposal a total of only four executive and no administrative officials;
2. the work of her office had been rendered particularly difficult by a lack of support by the Federal Government and the political parties. 'All those working for peaceful coexistence in our society feel let down by the people who are officially responsible.'

Mrs Funcke expressed the hope that the step she was taking would finally highlight the need for 'rethinking policy on integration and migration and adapting it to the tasks in question'. Mrs Funcke gave as a further reason for the resignation the fact that the growing xenophobia in the new Federal Länder represented a danger signal. The aim of guaranteeing immigrants legal and social equality had to be clearly demonstrated both in law, e.g. through an anti-discrimination law and a law on the right to settle, and through official public action.

Turkish immigrant organisations

The first Turkish immigrant organisations were established in the late sixties and early seventies. The founder members were usually migrants with a good command of German who, through the self-help organisations, helped their compatriots with their many day-to-day problems.

In the seventies and eighties the nature of these organisations changed as, following the military coup of 21 March 1971 and the coup of 12 September 1980, many political refugees came to the Federal Republic. This was a period when political developments in Turkey were as much a focus of activity as working for equal rights in the Federal Republic. The late eighties saw the further expansion of these organisations. Discussions on the nature of an immigrant organisation took a new direction. The most important outcome was a decision that the organisations should concentrate primarily on the independent representation of the interests of immigrants in their host country as it was assumed that immigrants would be staying for long periods. The immigrant organisations play a big part in articulating the interests of immigrants in public. In many instances they act as trail blazer — in other words their demands are taken up by trade unions, with which the organisations



Photo MAPEZ

'Although there is a clear tendency for Turkish immigrants to settle in the Federal Republic of Germany [as well as everywhere in Europe — above in Brussels], this fact continues to be ignored by the current German policy'

generally have close contacts, and by political parties.

The immigrant organisations receive hardly any support from the authorities. They have to cover running costs and activities from members' contributions and this greatly restricts their ability to act. A comparison with conditions in other EEC countries shows that of all immigrant organisations, those in the Federal Republic have the greatest difficulties to face.

What was originally officially established in October 1961 as a system of foreigners taking short-term employment in the Federal Republic first became an institution and has now turned into a process of immigration.

The immigrants are an important factor in the manufacturing sector and contribute in the same proportion as the native population to tax revenues.

The demographic figures for immigrants from Turkey are coming into line with those for the indigenous population. The immigrants are still at a disadvantage (jobs, housing and social status) and the problems are getting worse as a result of the process of integrating the former GDR.

The Federal Government's policy is unable to deal with the changes. The Federal Republic is still not recognised in law as an immigration country.

The second generation regards the Federal Republic as its home. The young people are better educated and their expectations with regard to jobs and living conditions are greater and resemble those of their German peers. They are more directly aware than their parents of the discrimination and growing xenophobia.

Where work is concerned, the Turkish immigrant population has diversified. Turks no longer work exclusively in manufacturing; the tendency to seek employment in the services sector is growing.

The independent entrepreneurs are an entirely new phenomenon and are a factor in the economic expansion of both the Federal Republic and Turkey.

We are at the threshold of a new, multicultural and multicoloured Europe. Immigrants from non-EEC countries who are contributing their share to the building of the new Europe should not be the object of discrimination; they should have equal rights. ○ A.A.

An EP and ESC Conference in Luxembourg

The Community Social Charter should apply to all workers

by Francis WHYTE (*)

'Migrant workers from third countries' was the topic of a conference organised by the EC Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the European Parliament in Luxembourg, in June 1991.

Migratory patterns (causes and trends), right to social protection, standards of living and living conditions; right to education and vocational training, access to employment; right of entry and residence, right to reunite families; right to freedom of movement; civil rights, the situation of immigrant women, political and social integration: each of these topics was the subject of a debate introduced by an expert and presided over by an MEP or an ESC member.

For their first joint conference ever, the ESC and the European Parliament had chosen a particularly difficult topic. A few days before the conference started, an outburst of violence had taken place between 'second generation' youngsters and French police in a Parisian suburb.

In fact, the two opening speakers were French: Nicole Péry, who spoke on behalf of EP President Baron Crespo, and François Staedelin, ESC President. It was significant that both of them should recall the old French May 1968 slogan of *'Vivre et travailler au pays'* ('live and work in one's own country'), reminiscent of the Larzac farmers' non-violent resistance to the planned extension of a French Army training camp...

Practical solutions were what François Staedelin expected from this conference ('Community solutions, for it is all too easy to say this is a national problem'). He suggested one or two himself: Western European firms should invest in Eastern Europe to help workers carry on working and living in their country. He also suggested that the EC should have a lodging policy: *'The Coal and Steel Community had one, why not the Economic Community?'*

As for Nicole Péry, she suggested that all cooperation agreements between the

EC and an Eastern European or Southern Hemisphere country should include a clause on migrant workers.

Both speakers agreed that the EC should remain open to migrants, *'but the EC must say under what conditions'*, stressed François Staedelin.

'Vivre et travailler au pays?' Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg Finance and Labour Minister seemed to agree with the slogan. He informed the conference that on 23-24 April, EC Labour ministers had made it clear to their Eastern European counter-parts, that they did not want the EC to become the *'natural recipient'* for *'migratory presswags'* coming from Eastern Europe. Instead, EC Member States should coordinate the type of on-the-spot training they are prepared to give to Eastern European workers. One of the arguments put forward by Mr Juncker was that the EC wanted to carry on welcoming refugees from all over the world seeking political asylum.

One of the most spectacular practical suggestions was that put forward by Belgian expert D. Pieters of creating a 'thirteenth' social protection system specially for migrant workers, instead of harmonising all twelve Member States' systems. 'Harmonisation would lead to such a complicated system that it is better to look for an alternative', he stressed.

The International Labour Organisation should be involved in the way the EC helps third countries, so that the social partners there may play a consultative role, suggested B. Mourgues (Workers' Group, France), who had just come back from a meeting with Maghreb area trade-unions in Tunis: *'They all fear that Europe will close its doors after 1993'*.

Other speakers suggested concentrating EC financial help on countries with the greatest emigration potential. But B. Fayot (Socialist, Luxembourg) recalled that Northern States had already tried to influence policies of 'under-

developed' States in the past with disastrous effect, especially in the field of demography. For people who had already emigrated to the EC, he advocated participation rather than paternalism: 'It is up to public services in the welcoming States to respect the language and culture of the migrant workers'.

The Shengen Agreement criticised

'You can teach us as many languages as you like', replied a representative of a migrant workers organisation. *'It will not make us feel equal. We carry our passport on our face'*.

Third country migrant workers should be able to move around the EC just like any other Community citizen, said A. Amato (Workers' Group, Italy), rapporteur of the ESC's own-initiative opinion adopted last April. They should also be able to work anywhere in the EC.

Mr Bomtempi (GUE, Italy) suggested drawing up a charter of fundamental rights for citizenship in Europe (*'and not European citizenship'*). He also sharply criticised the Shengen agreement signed at the beginning of the year by the Benelux, France, Germany and Italy to allow free circulation between themselves: *'This agreement abolishes the principle of controlling the legal basis of administrative procedures'*.

One of the most lively interventions was that of young French Green MEP, Mrs Tazdaït. She suggested that in the future, a Commission Vice-President should be appointed to deal with migratory patterns and racism.

Domingo Segarra (GUE, Spain) said that the next EC treaty should include a chapter recognising citizenship to those who are working in the Community.

'I've never seen such unanimity before in favour of a fairer treatment for the EC's eight million immigrant workers', said Vasco Cal, a Portuguese trade-unionist,

(*) ESC Press Service.



The ice cream trade — one profession which has benefited from free movement

Chairman of the ESC's Social Affairs section, interviewed by Reuter straight after the conference.

Indeed, all the participants agreed that it was high time a 'positive' image be given of migrant workers and their families. As Vasco Cal said in his conclusion: *'The immigrants contribute positively to the economic development and the construction of the type of open, pluricultural societies which characterise the EC. Their contribution to social security schemes can solve the financial problems caused by the EC's demographic deficit. The role of immigrants must be enhanced in the eyes of Member States' public opinion. This will help change mentalities, improve integration and fight racism'.*

'It is necessary to harmonise and even coordinate Member States' policies when they affect immigration. Cooperation and development policies should encourage potential migrants to stay at home and help those who want to go back. All agreements on immigration should become multilateral. National social security systems of EC and EFTA Member States should converge. Policies dealing with visas, asylum, residence and family grouping should be coordinated, taking into account ILO conventions and recommendations'.

More should be done to collect data on immigration at EC level. Each Member State should be encouraged to have a national immigration policy. At the same time, the first steps must be taken towards a Community immigration policy which would provide the legal framework to solve all the problems raised during the conference.

There was consensus on the principle of equality of treatment for the immigrants and their families who are legally established in a Member State. This should have an effect on social policy, access to education, health, security on the work place, social security and free circulation within the EC.

The Charter of fundamental social Community rights should apply to all workers, to counter atypical and clandestine work which most migrants come across.

The best way to counter racial discrimination is to help immigrants integrate social structures such as unions, associations, existing educational and professional training systems. They must have decent lodging and health protection.

The status of migrant women should not depend on their family situation. Their integration problems must be dealt with specifically.

Civil rights and the right to vote in local and municipal elections is also a good way of integrating migrants who have definitely settled down in a Member State.

As Vasco Cal said at the end of his conclusion, *'the fact that for the first time, the European Parliament and the EC Economic and Social Committee have taken the initiative of organising together a conference clearly shows to the EC decision-makers that members of the EP and socio-professional representatives of the EC agree on how important those problems are and how urgent it is to deal with them in an appropriate way at Community level'.*

'There will be other, more specific conferences', promised Wim Van Velzen, Chairman of the EP Social Affairs Commission. He stressed the necessity of a Charter of migrant citizens' rights and an EC action programme to help migrant workers be more informed. Considering most migrants are here to stay, the EC must design a policy for the second and third generation descendants of the first wave of migration. Although a few migrants' representatives were present, the conference revealed how difficult it was to have a genuine migrants' representation. This problem will become a crucial issue in the future, he predicted. ○

F.W.

An OECD analysis

The new context of international migration

An international conference organised by the OECD took place in Rome on 13-15 March 1991. We publish below a résumé of three interventions on 'A new context for international migration' by Giovanni Falchi, 'Economic development and national and international policies' and migration by Juhani Lonnroth and 'Integration policies in OECD countries' by Thomas J. Alexander. The different contributions to the Rome conference will shortly be published by the OECD. (1)

Demographic imbalances coupled with economic imbalances have a considerable impact on emigration pressures, although not to the same extent everywhere. When the gulf between one region and another widens, the effects on migratory flows create complex and difficult situations. In the developed countries, which have taken many immigrants in the past and still do so today, the structural adjustment now taking place is creating labour requirements that differ in quantity and quality from those of the last three decades. It also means that they will be unable to provide work for the growing numbers of young people in the developing countries who risk swelling the ranks of the unemployed and the would-be migrants.

Today immigration can no longer be seen solely in terms of labour. The migration process as a whole also involves social policy, which could not meet its goals if confronted with a massive influx of new immigrants. A complete switch from demand-led migration to one determined essentially by supply would be bound to swell the flows of clandestine immigrants, whereas the governments of the developed countries are doing all they can to stem those flows and to prevent employers engaging undeclared workers.

Emigration will not solve the problems of underdevelopment, rising under-employment and the economic imbalances between the North and the South. A new form of co-operation between developed and developing countries is now essential.

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


Photo MAPEZ

Should these attractive immigrant children feel African, Caribbean... or European?
'One of the underlying causes of migration is recognised to be the differential of wealth between nations. The question therefore is whether development cooperation might be a means to stem migration flows from the poor to the rich countries'

With the help of the developed countries, the developing countries should orient their economic growth more specifically to job creation and setting up social and institutional structures capable of slowing down demographic pressures. There are some important examples: some countries in Asia are experiencing rapid demographic change alongside remarkable economic growth. The countries in Southern Europe which were traditionally emigration countries have now become immigration countries.

The recent changes in the nature of migratory flows have led most governments to revise their forecasts. The massive flows of those seeking asylum in the OECD countries is driven by economic rather than political considerations, and this trend may well call into question the very principle of right of asylum. The political changes in Eastern Europe have created great uncertainty about East-West migratory flows. For example, the difference between the minimum and maximum figures of potential Soviet

emigrants is so wide that it is practically impossible to plan migration policies.

Nevertheless, the freedom to travel sanctioned by the democratic change now under way in the East European countries cannot be taken in the present situation to mean freedom to settle in the more developed countries. Recent multinational negotiations have aimed at contributing to better control of migratory flows and to the exchange of information on the economic and social policies to promote employment as the best alternative to East-West migration.

Despite the many studies and analyses of migration, some questions still remain unanswered, largely, no doubt, because migration is an economic, social and cultural phenomenon that builds up over the long term. Because of the fact that the democratic countries respect humanitarian principles and because of the networks established by migrants, the issue of migration mobilises interest

groups which sometimes makes the introduction of restrictive policies more difficult.

Economic development and national and international policies

One of the underlying causes of migration is recognised to be the differential of wealth between nations. An obvious question therefore is whether development cooperation between the industrialised and the developing countries might be a means to stem migration flows from the poor to the rich countries. The evidence shows however that the link between economic development and migration is not a straightforward one but can be paradoxical. In other words, better economic performance resulting from development cooperation could — at least in the short run — accelerate migration flows rather than reduce emigration pressures. Even the rapidly growing countries of South East Asia continue to be emigration countries because earning differentials with receiving countries have persisted.

Apart from differential demographic trends, there are other factors which — for the time being — operate against a narrowing of per capita incomes and thus a reduction of potential migration flows from the South to the North. To name a few: due to the indebtedness of many developing countries capital flows go in the wrong direction, i.e. from the South to the North; information technologies permit considerable flexibility of enterprises in responding cost-effectively to demand shifts and do not favour the reallocation of enterprises to developing countries; often foreign direct investments are not forthcoming because of insufficient infrastructure and inconsistent domestic policies in the developing countries; the informal sector has absorbed considerable labour surpluses in the developing countries but does not provide sufficient earnings to prevent poverty and marginalisation.

In spite of these difficulties it would be wrong to give in to pessimism. New policy initiatives, both in the sending and receiving countries could redress the situation to a considerable extent and eventually contribute to a curbing of migration pressures. To this end, the receiving countries would have to take into consideration the migration implications of all their policies but, most of



Picture showing immigrants' business in 'Matonge' (the nickname for the African residential area of Brussels). 'Do immigrants depress the labour market and do they compete with the host country's nationals?'

all, trade policy. Protectionist attitudes towards the developing countries would further fuel emigration pressures in these countries.

The developing countries would have to create domestic conditions which would be attractive to foreign private investors and would have to opt for a development model which favours job creating growth and human resource development. To achieve the latter they would have to be assisted by the industrialised countries through appropriate foreign aid; technical assistance and other cooperative arrangements. This type of assistance should not be general but specific and adapted to national, sectoral and regional circumstances.

It has to be considered however that developing countries might not be inclined to adopt such a policy because emigration, in the short term, represents a source of foreign exchange. It will be important, therefore, to achieve a balance of net-benefits for sending and receiving countries from such international cooperation arrangements. Searching for equitable outcomes for both sides will also enhance the positive — creative and enriching — effects which international migration can generate. These positive effects are becoming more and more apparent in the migration of skilled labour between industrialised countries where the contours of an international labour market are gradually taking shape. In the developing countries emphasis on human resource development and 'skill exchange' with the developed

countries can counter the effect of the 'brain drain' and reinforce economic development.

Integration policies in OECD countries

Do immigrants depress the labour market and do they compete with the host country's nationals? When growth is strong and many new jobs are being created, it seems that immigrant workers play an essential complementary role in the short term and that their presence does not lead to wage cuts for nationals or long established immigrant populations.

In European and Asian countries where the economy and the labour market are in the throes of change, low-paid and/or poorly qualified nationals may find themselves in competition with not only legal but also illegal immigrants. However, where the presence of immigrants, as it sometimes does, generates jobs for them (notably in certain traditional industries and in services), this may allow nationals, especially those who do not want to accept uncongenial or badly paid jobs, to climb up the occupational ladder (though an analysis over the long term, focusing on specific groups would not necessarily come to that conclusion). In certain immigration countries, improving the employment situation of foreigners and young people of foreign origin is still a matter for concern, and efforts to provide training to help them acquire more marketable skills and to combat the discrimination they sometimes suffer are key elements of integration policy.

Managing migratory flows provides a challenge for the authorities responsible for supervising and regulating them, and all the more so when the immigration possibilities fall far short of the expectations of the many potential migrants concerned. Countries which have been experimenting for some time with migratory flow management policies now recognise the importance of pragmatism and take care to draw up realistic policies so as not to leave the field free for demagogic arguments. Some Southern European countries have had to bring in a brand new migration policy post-haste, against a background of accelerating flows of all kinds. Sometimes, of course, they have based their policies on the experience of other countries, but they also have to innovate. While concern to view migration and development as a whole is necessary, emergencies still have to be dealt with swiftly, as recent events have proved.

In designing their policies to manage migratory flows the countries concerned must take effective steps to control illegal migration, and this may even involve a partial overhaul of organisation of production. At the same time, policies have to be clearly explained, since their success depends on an understanding attitude on the part of the host country population, both native and immigrant.

Throughout their stay in a host country, immigrants go through many and varied experiences. The uncertainties of their lives explain the complexity of their social needs. Their integration demands both individual and collective action. In all countries, social policies for integration are in practice based partly on common law and partly on specific measures. The day-to-day integration of immigrants requires first the application of basic principles — for instance, upholding equality of rights and duties, campaigning against all forms of economic or social discrimination. It is also necessary to introduce social policies to improve the quality of life for immigrants and their children, raising levels of education and vocational training.

Successful integration also depends on the immigrants themselves, and especially on the young and women. In every immigrant community there are outstandingly dynamic people whose efforts to promote integration deserve to be supported and encouraged.○

Immigration and Economy

Immigration as a factor of development

by Jean-Claude CHESNAIS (*)

Although the EEC countries decided to stop more workers coming in 15 years ago, immigration is still of prime concern to public opinion. The migration attendant on imbalances between North and South cannot be stemmed and conventional means of control are stretched to their limits. Does this mean we should share the present pessimism about the dangers of immigration?

Culturally speaking, this is no small problem, bearing in mind the relative homogeneity of the way Europe has been peopled so far, but as far as the economy is concerned, we feel that fears are exaggerated in the case of both home and host countries. The usual comparison between the interests of one and the costs to the other does not apply here, for the migratory exchange may well be to the advantage of both suppliers and receivers.

Let us look briefly at one or two aspects of migration in Europe since World War II. The first country of immigration in absolute terms, and by a long chalk, is Federal Germany, with a migratory balance of close to 9 million over the 1950-89 period (and this does not include the years immediately after the war when there was an influx of German refugees from the eastern territories). In contrast with the dominant views of the experts of that era, the common view of economic historians today is that this wave of immigration was one of the contributors to the German economic miracle, as by altering the breakdown between wages and profits to the benefit of investment, it stimulated growth.

Two other cases worthy of consideration here are the countries with the biggest percentages of foreigners in their

work force — Luxembourg and Switzerland, the most prosperous nations of Western Europe. This prosperity of course attracts workers from abroad, but is it not also (partly at least) the result of the economic activity of those foreigners, with all the flexibility that it brings to the economic machinery and the opportunities of promotion it offers the native populations. The case of Luxembourg and Switzerland suggests that, once an active, pragmatic immigration policy reflecting the needs of the economy has been set up, the host country can compensate for any weaknesses and increase its wellbeing by using immigrant labour. After all, why do those economic practitioners, the businessmen, call on foreign workers? Clearly because they have qualities the national workers do not have — which goes for the highly qualified as well as for the poorly qualified and unskilled who are in the majority, whom we hear less about but who make up the bulk of the migrant population, as they have always done. Once they have used up the pool of flexible, hard-working labour from the rural areas, heads of firms have to look to less demanding sources of workers. Unskilled labour for poorly paid jobs is increasingly difficult to find because of the massive increase in the time which both girls and boys spend in education in European societies and an increasing number of what are deemed to be degrading jobs, many of which cannot be mechanised, are being neglected. Japan is facing this at the moment, for it too has become a country of immigration over the past decade. Does it mean that immigration is inevitable once a certain degree of demographic maturity has been achieved? The development of the phenomenon in Southern Europe and East Asia alike suggests that it is. Immigration can only be avoided with structural reforms which are very costly in social and political terms.

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A link in the international chain (2)

Let us now look at the countries of departure. The argument about the cost of the brain drain is common today, with poorly developed nations worried about losing their best people and compromising their chances of development for some time to come. This could indeed be the outcome, particularly if the host country is not democratic and has no proper development policy and no opportunities to offer its young people, but it assumes that all migrants intend to break their ties and settle abroad for good. However, migration is in fact a step-by-step process which reflects trends in the comparative situation of host and home countries and there is usually a great deal of coming and going if circumstances are right. Lastly, many migrants go home, armed with knowledge, know-how, training and money, sooner or later.

Migration is a long period of learning, a link in the chain of international exchange, and the visible consequences are small in comparison with the hidden, non-measurable consequences which go deeper and are no doubt more important in the long run. It is a process of transmitting ideas and values and it helps change behaviour and customs in the countries affected by emigration, altering outlooks and passing on hitherto unknown reflexes and habits and thereby indirectly speeding up innovation. Lastly, it creates the strongest support for the establishment of exchanges of all kind between host and home country. Immigrants are human vehicles of technical progress and, as such, unwitting cooperation operatives. There again, the secular experience of the major European countries of emigration suggests that the pessimism of the current thinking on migration is relative. None of them Ireland, Italy, Spain or Portugal — have been condemned to under-development. What is more, their performances over the past 20 years have been outstanding. Not long ago, they were still being called 'traditional', but they have caught up in many ways and stepped resolutely into modernism. Is it really likely that migration did more to hinder this development than hasten it?

(2) Ed. subtitle.



The Courier

The textile industry is one of the main utilisers of immigrant manpower in the Community — Above: a fashion show of African pattern dresses

With demographic inadequacy in Western Europe and poverty in Eastern and Southern Europe, immigration is going to be increasingly important and it could act as a lever for cooperation and development if it is properly designed.

But everyone must be aware of what everyone else is contributing, otherwise difficulties of cultural understanding will be further complicated by biased economic judgments. ◊

J.-C. C.

International cooperation — an alternative to worker migration?

by Georges TAPINOS (*)

International migration brings two nations into contact with each other and the bilateral home country-host country idea was the natural approach to it for many years. However, the field of analysis broadened when the phenomenon generalised in the 1950s to mid-1970s and began to be regulated by conditions on the employment market in labour-seeking countries in the same region, *inter alia* Western Europe and the Gulf. There is no shortage of arguments to prove that the interdependence of the economies of North and South is reason enough to take the world system as a pertinent level of analysis. However, since both economic growth and policies in the host countries are decisive, a world-style approach could well mask the logic — i.e. the particular concepts, institutions and practices — of each system of migration.

This article is based on experience of labour markets linking Western Europe, the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa — which in no way affects the specific nature of such conclusions as may be drawn.

Given that the old countries of immigration have stated their intentions of keeping their frontiers closed to any further immigration on a major scale, it is perhaps worth considering international cooperation — i.e. opening to trade, capital movements and aid especially — as an alternative to worker migration.

We shall attempt to answer this question by looking at, first, the changes which have led people to abandon the idea that migration could help the poor countries take off in favour of an alternative strategy based on international cooperation, second, the possibility of migration starting up again and how such

cooperation would be affected if it did and, lastly, the conditions and limitations of an efficient cooperation strategy aimed at reducing incentives to emigrate.

Emigration and development — a new paradigm?

History shows emigration to be a desperate measure; an individual way of responding to the impossibility of national development in countries striving to become rich. Emigration, overlooked by the classic theory of international trade and challenged by Malthusianism as a factor which reduces demographic pressure and lastingly raises the standard of living, was long considered as a substitute for development. More recently, in the 1950s (and until the frontiers were closed in 1974), when more workers moved about Western Europe than ever before, people fondly imagined — or hoped — that the international mobility of workers might help transmit development. They saw migration as an international resource allocation procedure which both reduced wage gaps and ultimately did something about the cause, i.e. the surplus demand for labour in one group of countries, the North, alongside a surplus of workers and extremely ill-distributed income and possessions in the other group, the South. Emigration from the South both cuts employment and under-employment and boosts the marginal productivity of the non-migrant population. By sending money home, expatriates increase the purchasing power of those who stay, directly in the case of their families and indirectly in the case of the rest of the population, and, if the migrants are from the underprivileged classes, the distribution of wealth is improved too. Productive use of wage transfers home encourages capital accumulation and, ultimately, migrants who come back familiar with work in industry and perhaps even professional qualifications change the system of production. So a

growth process comes about and migration unites the interests of North and South.

But there were sound reasons for doubting the analysis involving a break in the assumptions about behaviour and unheard-of efficiency in the mechanics of the adjustment behind the phenomenon — on which this reassuring apologia was founded. Would migrants aiming to make their families better off really turn into investors or captains of industry and prefer ploughing their savings into productive investments to improving their families' everyday purchasing power? And why should the resource allocation processes which were ineffective or missing at the time of emigration suddenly be there to help *per capita* GDP improve? What has always happened is that the facts of the migratory movements have tempered optimism, as the migrants and their families have seen their situations bettered, but there has been no significant effect on the critical variables of development in the home countries.

Trade and investment as an alternative to emigration

In the mid 1970s, changes to the domestic and international economic environment (with the arrival of the baby boom generations on the employment market, more women working, a change in supply behaviour, slower economic growth and the reorganisation of industry) and an awakening to the dynamics of migration (family grouping attendant on worker entry, higher social spending and ethnic diversification) induced the countries of immigration to close their frontiers, triggering a problem of substitution and delocation. There was mention of a new international division of labour, with a reduction in the numbers of foreign workers and a go-home incentive policy, with national workers replacing foreign ones, various activities being shifted to the Third World, a return to special-

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PHOTO MAPEZ

Young Arabs in the northern area of Brussels.

'The presence of foreigners (in the Community) should, even without newcomers, be taken into account given the natural growth of immigrant populations'

isation reflecting the natural distribution of input, the development of trade and a growth in investment in the poor countries. The nature of the projected changes was not entirely unambiguous, for it was as much a question of anticipating the consequences of closed frontiers as of imagining what the desired changes actually ought to be. But it is important to remember that, at the time, when economic growth was on the wane, employment was decreasing and unemployment was rising, the idea of migration starting up again seemed entirely out of the question — and, to some, for good and all.

This new 'international division of labour' did not live up to expectations as far as the old countries of emigration were concerned. Much was made of attempts to relocate some industries there using returned emigrants and financial help from the ex-host countries, but the

disappearance of the expression itself is sufficient indication of what happened and confirms the trend in the economic indicators. Many countries of the South put up a poor economic performance in 1973-86 and the rate of growth in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa over the period as a whole was negative. The Mediterranean countries fared better, but North Africa, despite an improvement in *per capita* product, failed to generate enough growth in its agricultural product and had an industrialisation policy which was unable to absorb unemployment and under-employment. There was no narrowing of the gap between town and country, that critical factor in domestic and international migration, while food dependency worsened and the external debt grew. This, often dramatic, situation led to structural adjustment policies. The international organisations advocated them to bring about truer prices and cut back on the public sector and they often

freed more labour than they absorbed. The social movements which shook some countries in the Mediterranean (Algeria, Tunisia and Yugoslavia, for example) underlined the ever-widening gap between aspiration and reality — to a very large extent the consequence of the social change induced by the emigration itself and sustained by the maintenance of the many links with the communities abroad. So there was ultimately more incentive to emigrate than before.

Development aid makes emigration less attractive?

Things changed again in the mid 1980s, undermining a complex and sometimes contradictory series of factors which heightened uncertainty about the potential prospects of development. In most of Western Europe — the EEC and Switzerland, let us say — the root of the problem was concern about an increase in the foreign population and the fear that more clandestine immigration would upset the social and political balance. In fact, migration before and after the closing of the frontiers made a significant contribution to increasing the foreign population — which was of course to consolidate naturally, even without any new arrivals from abroad, and both the perception and the prospects of the future of migration altered. Two things were decisive here. Letting in workers inevitably also involved letting in their families to join them, which of course meant more people on the job market in time. Once the workers were in, there was less room for manoeuvre and there were many attempts at keeping the families out and bringing in go-home incentive policies. But democratic States have to stop somewhere and immigration policies cannot be boxed off from the political system. Once the workers have arrived, authorities which fear they are losing control of immigration may well step up their closed-frontier policy more than is economically desirable.

This could be beneficial to cooperation policies from some points of view. The affirmation of the need for a new international division of labour when the frontiers closed in 1974 had more to do with intent and was also designed to get over the bad conscience of the developed world. There is more chance of actually getting a cooperation and development aid policy, aimed at making emigration

less attractive, to work if it looks as though it serves the interests of the developed countries themselves. In this new economic situation, things would be fairly clear if the idea was to prevent all forms of immigration, but, today, as happened before 1973, some countries (Germany, Switzerland and soon many more) are finding tension on their job markets, with demand greater than supply. Fresh arrivals are not excluded, provided numbers and characteristics can be kept under control. The problem is no longer one of substituting trade and capital flows for immigration, but of encouraging aid and keeping a certain amount of immigration — something particularly difficult to achieve now that, on top of the endogenous factors encouraging the flow to increase again, there are exogenous factors too. Among the most unambiguous indications in this area are the exceptionally large increase in the number of people applying for asylum (121 000 in Federal Germany in 1989, for example) and the extent of unemployment among migrants officially settled (60 % of the workers officially assimilated in Italy in 1986-87 for example, were jobless).

Things are changing in a new context. Following the idea that take-off in the countries of origin would be helped first by emigration and then by the development of trade and capital flows coupled with the resettlement of returned emigrants, the view now is that cooperation policies which foster development in the poor countries and keep the population at home will make emigration less attractive and retain the possibility of partly opening the frontiers again to avoid tension on the labour market.

The Community's big date — 1993

The second point to remember is that the Single Market comes into being on 1 January 1993. What the Community has said about this is at total variance with the fears of the countries of the South. Although the Single Market only affects them indirectly, the relations of dependence and the amount of trade involved are enough to make them very worried. More than half of sub-Saharan Africa's exports go to the European Community and 65% of its imports come from it. Although its share of exports to the EEC

followed much the same trend from 1975 to 1983, its share of imports from the EEC increased considerably. A look at the situation by country and by product shows that the general effect of the Single Market (mainly from the harmonisation of VAT and the laying down of common standards) should be moderate and in any case not involve any trade diversion. However, inferring that greater demand in the EEC countries (as a result of greater growth) would have a significant effect on sub-Saharan Africa's exports to the EEC is, bearing in mind the minimal elasticity of the commodities which make up the bulk of them, indulging in mere speculation.

Trends in invisibles should vary. Tourist earnings should grow as Africa becomes more competitive than Southern Europe, while transfers from emigrants are expected to decline as the movement slows down, people stay away longer and many of them settle abroad for good. Third countries are particularly worried about private investments, fearing that political instability and an uncertain economic future will lead investors to prefer the Community, where there are benefits to be had from the Single Market. And investors have never had a preference for the former countries of emigration.

How will 1993 directly affect migration? Understanding the implications for the international movement of labour involves looking at Europe's timetable for economic unification. Obstacles (tariff barriers and quotas) to the free movement of goods were in fact removed before the free movement of workers was organised, with more intra-Community trade and fewer differences in standards of living as a result. This in turn made emigration look less attractive and converging economic trends, and a decline in fecundity in the South especially, enhanced the tendency. Ultimately, the Treaty of Rome reduced the incentive for Community nationals to move about within the Community, in accordance with the customs union theory.

At the same time, trade within the Community increased to the detriment (in relative terms at least) of trade with third, less developed countries. Emigration to the EEC, which they saw as a way of overcoming their commercial disadvantage, was possible until the mid-1970s thanks to the heavy demand for

labour in the Community, where the percentage of foreigners from third countries (including Greece, Portugal and Spain at the time) rose considerably.

The same is bound to happen in the future. The Single Market will not generate any major increase in the number of wage-earners who move about the Community, but there will be more immigration from third countries, particularly since the countries of Southern Europe are in fact permeable in this respect.

The limits to the closing of frontiers

The conditions for a resurgence of migration are there but does this mean that it will actually happen? The answer, now and in the future, will depend on the developed countries of Western Europe. The efficiency of frontier-closing policies is likely to be impeded by three things — the new ways the labour markets work, the shifting of the demarcation line between Northern and Southern Europe and the refugee admission procedures. Will they weaken or reinforce cooperation policies?

In the years when growth was strong, immigration reflected a world-wide employment market imbalance and the demand for foreign labour might have been expected to disappear when the 1970s were over and unemployment increased. However, there were profound changes to the employment market at the same time, with, in particular, more part-time work, more sub-contracting and an extension of the informal economy. They were a reflection of the way the production system was organised and not the result of immigration, but they do explain a demand for foreign labour in some sectors at a time of mounting unemployment.

Europe's North-South divide has shifted and the southern countries — Italy, Greece and Spain which were formerly places of emigration *par excellence*, have become countries of immigration in their turn. For the past few years, they have had foreign workers coming in, something they were never prepared for and find difficult to cope with, and although they have made the relevant legal arrangements recently, their attitude is very much shaped by the tradition of defend-



Photo MAPEZ

Apart from the clothing and the arts industries, the immigrant population has provided the Community with a considerable increase in imports of tropical foodstuffs. This picture, taken in Brussels, shows that products such as the African gooseberry, also known as the Cape gooseberry or Physalis (left), carambola, also called star fruit (right), as well as goyave and dwarf bananas are now commonly found in retail shops

ing their own emigrants. The countries of Southern Europe could be the way in for migrants, following the tradition of certain sectors of activity.

The last thing is the influx of people wanting asylum. The closing of the frontiers, which leaves the potential migrant no other choice than to enter illegally and ask for asylum, has destroyed the traditional distinction between political and economic migration. Although the division was never entirely watertight, it was not without its *raison d'être*. By proclaiming liberal policies and giving applicants the maximum guarantees, some States are faced with a major problem which will of course lead them to change their regulations in the end. The fact that appeals against official decisions to refuse people buy time, encourages fresh entries, lengthens the whole process and has the adverse effect of worsening the situation of genuine refugees. Application assessment procedures designed to handle a few political refugees without any major risk of error do not work with large numbers of people from different parts of the world and without the information the authorities need to form

a proper judgment. The countries concerned are very worried about this and have taken steps to speed up the procedures and put a limit on acceptances, in the hope of ultimately looking less attractive to potential migrants.

Refugees and illegal entrants are in much the same situation. In many cases, refugees who are refused admission after months of waiting already have jobs and have little chance of leaving the country and the decision makes their situation illegal. Conversely, the only way open to illegal entrants who cannot expect to legalise their situation but want to stay permanently is in fact to apply for asylum as refugees.

It is tempting to think that a strategy based on a cooperation policy and acceptance of a limited number of immigrants would be more promising, but the opposite is more likely. All things being equal, as long as going for mobility makes a share in wealth less improbable and the time it takes to get it potentially shorter, even a limited opportunity to emigrate will still be very attractive. The cooperation policy would then make departure easier, which is why it may be

essential to have the constraint of no opportunity to emigrate to make cooperation policies efficient. The success of international cooperation would then depend on how successful frontier closure was.

America seems to give the lie to this, for it both has a policy of cooperation and trade with the countries of the Third World and (thanks to the 1965 amendment, reinforced by recent legislation) maintains a high level of legal immigration. But it is a contradiction only in appearance. The real comparison with the European model has to focus on the migration of labour from Mexico, one or two states of Central America and the Caribbean, which developed outside the system of preferences along lines similar to those found in Europe. A similar dilemma occurs too, as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 is there to show. Frontier control and cooperation policy, clearly, are closely linked.

From a strictly economic point of view, mobility of input and free trade in products can be seen as alternative strategies leading to an identical result — greater well-being for the trading partners. In practice, and for reasons which have as much to do with political and cultural considerations as with factors overlooked by economic theory (the behaviour of potential migrants, for example), the various strategies have followed each other according to the demands of the labour-seeking countries. The new paradigm which is emerging looks at the incidence of international cooperation as an alternative to emigration and at least has the merit of emphasising that the migration issue is second to the development issue. Although people tend to move because of the imbalances between the rich and the less developed countries and the fact that they do so improves the resources of both migrants and their families, development, ultimately, is the only way. Cooperation policies may well be necessary, but, during the transitional period (which will probably last a few decades), they are just as likely to encourage the international mobility of labour as inhibit it. So, however necessary and complementary border restriction policies and cooperation policies may be, they will not in themselves prevent emigration from the less developed nations to the rich ones, particularly those in Europe. ◊

G.T.

Paris, capital of African culture?


by Rémy BAZENGUISSA GANGA (*)

Paris became the capital of African culture in the early 1980s. A close look at the phenomenon shows it to reflect a variety of aspirations but no overall unity on the part of either Africans or Parisians. For the former, it means relations between the races and cultures and between the various African immigrants themselves. Black Mode, for example, which the second generation of West Indians and Africans borrowed from the Black Americans, is a direct reaction to the mounting intolerance which emerged from the crisis of the 1980s. Black Culture is for a better understanding of Africa. World Music, on the other hand, wants to cross music from the west and elsewhere, but currently mainly from Africa and France. Lastly, the Congolese Snappy Dressers, who come to Paris for their haute couture fashions, are in fact objecting to the 'Uncle Tom' image which they feel is personified by the Soninka road-sweepers of the capital.

These cultural developments have affected the Parisians a lot and white youngsters, for example, are now side by side with black youngsters in the often violent Zulu Bands. Typical of the African influence is what is happening in design, where black models have been a huge success in fashion parades since the late 1970s. Paco Rabanne, who is behind this movement, uses African girls, he says, because *'the colour of their skin gives them a sensuality white women don't have. It's true. There are very simple aesthetic things involved. You don't notice a white woman's teeth or the whites of her eyes... Technically, black women's teeth stand out naturally. What I mean is that there is a natural contrast in their faces. You see it straight away...'*. Back in 1982, people running model agencies were already saying black is beautiful. *'These girls aren't just lovely. They are spectacular, long and slender with a bearing and a silhouette straight from the deserts of Africa... There is more to it than good*

looks. You have to know how to move and, to these willowy beauties from Burundi and Sierra Leone and Senegal and Togo, it comes naturally'... The vocabulary sug-

gests the exotic and it is cleverly done, because, when it comes to morphology, the criteria and the canons of beauty are the same as for western models.



Historically, Paris has always provided a suitable climate for diversified cultural development. Within the city, and in contrast with much of Africa itself, the use of art and music as instruments of social criticism has blossomed. Pictured here are Zaireans — a group which enjoys growing influence in the French capital.

(*) The author, who is from Congo, is a researcher at the INST in Paris.

Painting and sculpture is the other field in which African influence is prominent, with various European artists getting through their crisis years by harking back to ancient African works. These are primitive pieces manifesting primary instincts or expressing feelings of a being entirely prey to primeval, wild and magic forces, and their inclusion in the highly controversial Magicians of the Earth exhibition at the Pompidou Centre in 1989 is telling. The title says it all by focusing on the ritual function of works and implicitly making the primitive arts a reference in the production of visual objects. However, the attraction of this sort of art apparently has nothing to do with the concerns of the artists, but, more prosaically, with those of the art dealers, who have made the thing fashionable.

So, although the various people involved are all under the influence of African culture, their ideological and commercial strategies differ. They cannot agree on one image of this culture. The urban bands' redevelopment of black culture has different aims from the primitivism of Parisian painters and sculptors. There is no direct link between the claims of the Snappy Dressers and the exotic aspirations of the Parisian designers. And first and second generation African immigrants cannot agree either.

The fact that Paris is, ambiguously enough, a high spot of African culture is nothing new. The 'negro vogue' of the inter-war years and the Paris School's discovery of what it called negro art at the turn of the century both helped rehabilitate African culture and the movement gathered momentum in the 1920s and 1930s, although by then as part of a more general move to improve the standing of all things black on all continents. In a world in the throes of moral, economic and political crisis, the black contribution stood for the future of mankind. As a famous art critic put it in 1929, 'negro art is the lifegiving sperm of the Occident' and the blacks indeed represent this future by virtue of their primitiveness that is to say their spontaneity, their authenticity and their fraternity in the face of the great, cold, dehumanised, ethnocidal, nihilistic machines of the West.

But let us not forget that, in the eyes of most French people, the development of all things black goes hand in hand with mounting paternalism and racialism, pure and hard. Its effect is enormous,



Photo MAPEZ

More and more in the Community there is a sustained interest in African, Caribbean and Afro-European music. Above: a successful record shop at Porte de Namur, Brussels

particularly among the intellectuals and artists of Paris, who will be echoed by their opposite numbers from the colonies — French citizens, no less. Thus, this idea of black culture as the seed of the future of mankind was taken up by Sartre and culminated in some of the claims of negritude.

Towards Afro-European culture?

The originality of the present movement is rooted in the extent of African immigration, since immigrants update the Frenchman's image of Africa, which is no longer dominated by the idea of seeking the future of mankind, but by cultural cross-breeding. The workers themselves are doing a lot for this resurgence of African culture. The most important thing is what this cross-breeding means and what it represents to the people calling for it. We shall investigate the French point of view solely to see how the French are evolving in relation to the cultural forms of Africa.

Pop music is a fine example and a good illustration of the problem. African musicians have to go to Paris. Most famous artistes stay there for a while, but the most important thing is to produce records (etc) there, as the working conditions in the Paris studios are the best. Above all, artistes emigrate in search of international fame and there are leading French musicians — Pierre Vassiliu, Jacques Highelin, Bernard Lavilliers, Alain Bashung and so on — to record with them or take care of their arrangements. French song-writers are looking for African rhythms which, they maintain, are closer to primary vital forces and they want them not to devalue African culture but to add to French music. If there is still any misunderstanding as to the aims of the African and French musicians — the former are looking for international acclaim and the latter for universality through a merging of cultures.

This quest for cultural intermingling is more global and it affects the popular perception of African music. In spite of the fact that immigrant African musicians are united in their aims, they express different cultural experiences when they play. The most commonly broadcast music in France only features two countries of West Africa — Senegal and Mali — and the best-known artistes are Touré Kunda (Senegal), Mory Kanté (Guinea), Salif Keita (Mali) and Youssouf N'Dour (Senegal). This West African music, typically, is a successful marriage of European and African instruments (the Kora, the balafon etc) and of voices influenced by African folksingers and Islam, so, far from being just traditional, it is the fruit of a perpetual reinterpretation of contributions from outside.

However, contrary to what one might think, this is not the music most Africans listen to, for best-loved in the French-speaking countries is music from Central Africa, especially Zaire and Cameroon. There are artistes from these countries in Paris too, but they never reach the popular TV or radio channels. Yet they are on in the capital, playing at dances and drawing in Africans and more and more Parisians, and the western influence on their music is increasing too. They only play western instruments and their singing bears the mark of Christian choirs — borrowings triggered not by alie-

DOSSIER

nation, but by a desire to use playing and dancing to express another kind of autonomous African cultural experience by impregnating and reinterpreting cultural patterns of the West.


Their lack of success is surprising on more than one count. Some of the well-known musicians, including the great Kallé and Manu Dibango, were already forming the African Jazz Group — which did not have much of a following or any influence on the French — in Paris back in the 1960s. And in the early 1970s, Tabu Ley (Zaire) was the first African to be invited to play at Olympia, attracting very few connoisseurs, while Manu Dibango was the first African to play in the United States, at Carnegie Hall in 1972.

If Paris is the capital of African music, as the papers say, one may well wonder what Africa the French think this means. Is it an imaginary Africa born of the problems of immigration or is it an Africa attracting increasing interest in some of its cultural and artistic values?

The French listen to quite different music from the majority of Africans and this indeed suggests the existence of an imaginary Africa. It is interesting here, to listen to what Maory Kanté, currently the best known African musician in France (he sold as many records as Michel Sardou in 1990 and was in the Top 50 in 1987), has to say about this. He is 'switched on', as they say in the media and he personifies the French preoccupation with a culture mix and the form this ought to take.

This idea is crystallised in World Music. Most of the non-western group leaders are African — Youssouf N'Dour, Ray Lema and Salif Keita, for example — and they play African instruments and have a thorough knowledge of the traditions of their respective countries. World Music, on the other hand, is a kind of immigrant's revenge. *'The blacks are taking the name of France all over the world today. I get reporters from all over the world coming to talk about World Music — of which Paris, thanks to one or two of us, is now the capital. Somewhere I've got the feeling I'm working for France'*, says Zaire's Ray Lema.

The resurgence of African culture in France only really became important 10 years ago when there was a change in the status of immigrants and the way they were perceived. The immigrants' culture



Even in the fashion world, the 'Sappers' style, which was launched by people living beside the River Congo, has seen its greatest success in Paris.

also benefits from the new means of expression which the free radio law of 1981 brought in, as their music was then broadcast by channels like Tropic FM and Radio Nova and many French people discovered an African reality which metropolitan France had known very little about before.

The Africans are no longer 'ashamed' of their culture and the French like it more and more. And the same goes for African food and cuisine and African films and plays too...

Cultural cross-breeding involves the precise dose of exoticness which the French can cope with when they approach immigrant culture. It is evolution through assimilation, not acceptance, yet it is not to be viewed as something negative, for it is the possibility of genuine mutual understanding and it is through the redevelopment of primitive art that Africa's contemporary sculpture and painting are appreciated. And it is World Music that is bringing traditional African sound to the world. ○

R.B.G.

NON-COMMUNITY NATIONALS WITHIN THE EEC (1988-90)

Gildas Simon
Migrinter and Cartography Laboratory
of Politers University
(Source: Sopeml and others)

