

Support, (Mostly) Yes – But For What?
Multilevel Governance, Policy Competencies
and European Public Opinion

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Scholars and practitioners of European integration of long recognized public opinion as a key aspect of the process. Academics have formalized what politicians recognize intuitively: namely, that any political enterprise (partially excluding those based on a coercive maintenance of its existence) requires a certain degree of public support, or at least a “permissive consensus”, in order to underwrite its continuing health and longevity. David Easton and Jack Dennis recognized this principle decades ago, labeling it “diffuse support”, and arguing for its potentially crucial role, particularly during moments of duress for the polity in question, when such support “forms a reservoir upon which a system typically draws in times of crises, such as depressions, wars, and internecine conflicts, when perceived benefits may recede to their lowest ebb” (Easton and Dennis, 1969: 63).

Europe – the European Union – is a strange beast in the polity jungle, with a strange relationship to its body politic, but the laws of political physics make no exceptions, and in the long run the EU can no more escape the gravitational pull of public opinion than can Germany or France. For this reason, from the earliest days of public opinion surveying by Eurobarometer and its predecessors, leaders of the European integration project have gone to considerable lengths to take the public’s temperature with respect to this process and the various institutions and policies it has yielded. Scholars have also make good use of this data, and a body of literature has now emerged examining the various dynamics, attributes and effects of European public opinion on integration questions. Still, to a certain degree our knowledge of public attitudes towards European integration and EU institutions exists at a relatively broad level of focus, not unlike the attitudes of the public themselves, whose tendency is towards generalizations not necessarily based on high levels of knowledge regarding the target of those opinions. Moreover, these broader approaches to attitudes among European citizens do not necessarily move us further in the direction of understanding the degree and content of public support for European integration, nor do they contribute much to the resolution of related theoretical debates, or to the tracking of certain political and social attitudes of more general consequence.

This study seeks to fill some of these gaps through an examination of attitudes toward European integration at a more detailed level, with particular attention to public preferences as to which level of governance in Europe should be responsible for various policy competencies. An examination of this data not only reveals public preferences on specific policy questions, but also points to the broader nature of public opinion and concerns in Europe, the possibilities of, and limitations to, further integration, and some clues as to how theoretical debates over the meaning of European

integration which have engaged scholars for decades play out on the ground, amongst the citizens who have inherited this new polity.

Europeans' Attitudes Towards Europe

It may be useful, for heuristic purposes, to conceive of Europeans' attitudes towards Europe as existing in something of a hierarchical structure, moving from general to specific, from the broadly emotive to the more focused cognitive.¹ One can distinguish four broad levels or categories of opinion which might be arrayed in such a hierarchy. The broadest, most emotive, and least cognitive of these is identity, which describes the degree to which Europeans are attached to Europe, and to which they feel or consider themselves to in fact be Europeans. This question has not attracted the degree of attention other public opinion issues have, but has nevertheless been examined in a handful of studies, as early as Inglehart's (1977), and as recent as Green's (2000), with notable work by Hewstone (1986) and by Duchesne and Frogner (1995) in between. Generally, the studies reveal that a European identity does in fact exist (to the surprise of some), but that it is not a widespread phenomenon, that it does not appear to be growing over time, and that it tends to be found more often among certain cohorts – such as elites, cosmopolitans, post-materialists, those left-of-center ideologically, and those living in southern European member-states – than others.

The second level of opinion towards Europe is comprised of general attitudes towards the European Union itself and the ongoing process of integration. Most work to date on the question of public support for the EU is focused at this level, and makes repeated use of a handful of questions regularly appearing in Eurobarometer surveys, such as: "Generally speaking, do you think [your country's] membership in the Community is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?", and "In general, are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?", and "If you were told tomorrow that the European Community had been scrapped, would you be sorry about it, indifferent, or relieved?"

Notable among those studies which have examined public support for integration is Eichenberg and Dalton's (1993), which suggests that such support is conditioned by the respondent's nationality, the current economic climate, the presence of EU-related events and related public discourse, and the effect of certain international relations factors. Another study by Wessels (1995) turns more in the direction of respondents' personal characteristics, such as educational level, sex, degree of post-materialist orientation, level of political involvement, and ideology. Deflem and Pampel (1996) echo many of those associations of demographic and other characteristics with support for European integration, while Gabel (1998), on the other hand, emphasizes the personal instrumental benefits

¹Admittedly, however, such a structure may bear little resemblance to either Europeans' opinions about Europe, or their sense of how their own opinions are ordered, to the extent they've considered such matters at all.

respondents might expect from integration (operationalized as occupation and class) as the determining factor in a test of five competing theories of support for Europe.

A third level of public opinion towards the EU and European integration is similar to the second, yet still distinct (although, again, the subtleties of such nuances may be far more apparent to those scholars who interpret public opinion data, than to those respondents who provide it). Where questions in the second category addressed the extent to which the very existence of European institutions is supported, those comprising the third category assume that existence, and address the issue of the public's preferred general distribution of power between Europe and its member-states. In other words, these survey questions go directly to the heart of an issue always at the core of debate in situations of multilevel governance. In concrete terms, the questions ask respondents to allocate more or less power to one or the other polity. In the abstract, however, they may be thought of as measures of the vision Europeans hold for Europe itself, with specific reference to where the EU should be placed on the continuum between confederalism and federalism.

This question of the vision of Europe has, of course, never been very far from any of the more specific policy and scholarly debates regarding European integration. It lays at the core of different national approaches to Europe, ranging from the Thatcherist vision of a minimalist polity – essentially a free-trade area with little or no supranational power – to the federalist dreams of Spinelli (and now Schröder as well?). It is part and parcel of the deepening vs. widening debate. For scholars, it maps rather neatly over the views of neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists, and the respective international relations paradigms with which these schools are associated. And, finally, this question of Europe's preferred general character lurks beneath more specific debates over the potential migration of policy competencies, such as responsibility for monetary policy and the development of a single currency.

Such specific questions comprise the fourth and most focused level of public attitudes toward the European Union and the process of integration. Should Europe handle foreign policy, or should the member-states retain that power individually? Is it the EU's responsibility to fight unemployment, or is this a national-level competency? Are environmental issues best handled regionally, or should member-states go it alone? These and myriad other questions about the preferred responsibility for specific policy competencies can be and have been asked of Europeans, and their responses provide an interesting insight into the vision Europeans possess of how to effect multilevel governance, as well as other matters.

The focus of this study is thus on the examination of these third and fourth levels of public opinion regarding European integration and EU institutions. Each are discussed in turn below, and are then followed by an analysis of the demographic and attitudinal characteristics which are associated with opinion tendencies on these questions, and an examination of the trajectory of such opinions over time. Finally, a discussion of the significance of these findings – both for the integration project itself, for scholarly debate over its nature, and for wider trends in public opinion – concludes the study.

The analysis of these questions is based on data contained in a series of Eurobarometer survey data sets. A wide variety of these data sets have been searched to find relevant data, with the resulting subset included in this study, ranging chronologically from Eurobarometer 3, fielded in May of 1975, to Eurobarometer 47-2, conducted in April and June 1997. The study employs percentage frequency, cross tabulation and OLS and logistic regression analyses in order to interpret the data from the ten surveys treated within.

What is to be expected regarding the attitudes of Europeans on preferences for general and specific powers at the European level? Given the general tendency of Europeans to remain aloof from the integration process, per Lindberg and Scheingold's "permissive consensus" notion (1970), and even to know very little about that process and the EU itself (Sinnott, 1997), it is reasonable to expect similarly benign attitudes on the general question of whether greater or lesser powers should migrate to Brussels. In other words, it is hypothesized that Europeans will generally support the status quo, rather than preferring more or less power in the hands of the EU.

Substantively, in terms of specific competencies, Europeans might be expected to follow their national leaders with regard to the amounts and kinds of powers those leaders are willing to transfer to the EU. Thus far, the process of European integration follows a logical pattern, given the historical premise of a Westphalian tradition of national sovereignty now straining in the wake of, first, the disaster of earlier fratricidal conflict, and second, a shrinking and increasingly competitive and globalized contemporary international milieu. If public opinion follows the arc of integration history, driven by these tectonic-level political tendencies, we might expect Europeans to generally favor common policy in domains less core to the very constitution of their respective states, and where the greatest returns might be produced by collaboration and a yielding of sovereignty. In particular – as has certainly been the case for fifty years – economic competencies might be most ripe, in public's mind, for supranational integration, along with such other areas as environmental protection and competitive trade policies. At the same time, Europeans might be expected to resist wholesale transfers of sovereignty when it comes to issues of high politics, such as defense, security and foreign policy.

Finally, with respect to demographic and attitudinal factors associated with preferences for greater levels of integration, certain relationships might also be hypothesized. Those characteristics already generally associated with favorable attitudes towards Europe should certainly apply with respect to specific competencies as well. Thus, elites, men, those on the ideological left, those in southern member-states, post-materialists, and members of certain other cohorts should be expected to be more favorable across a variety of competencies to the notion of transferring policy authority to Brussels. In addition, citizens of the smaller European states may be particularly favorable to widening EU capacities, given the expanded political and economic leverage which might be associated with such changes, and given the relatively smaller amount of national power at stake, compared to that of a France or Germany or Britain.

**Public Opinion Towards Europe, Level Three:
Attitudes Regarding the General Distribution of
Powers In Europe's Structure of Multilevel Governance**

Does Brussels have too much power? De Gaulle thought so, as did his successor in the role of chief eurosceptic, Margaret Thatcher. Meanwhile tabloids continually sound that theme in Britain and elsewhere, relentlessly excoriating "Eurocrats" for crimes of waste and arrogance. But what do the people of Europe say on this question? A good deal of data, from a number of surveys, permit a substantial and robust answer to this question to be articulated. Tables 1-5 in this study address the question of general distribution of power in a federal, or federal-approximating, Europe, with data ranging chronologically from Eurobarometer 4, fielded in late 1975, through Eurobarometer 47-2 of Spring 1997, and utilizing a variety of question formats.

In the Eurobarometer 4 survey, respondents were asked: "Taking into account the great problems facing [country] at this time, which of these three ways would you prefer to solve the problems?"

1. The [national] government should act independently in [the country's] own best interests.
2. The nine countries of the Common Market should get together before taking action but each government should have the final say on what happens in its own country.
3. It will be necessary for all the citizens of the member countries to elect a single parliament and for this to evolve quickly into a true European government."

Table 1 presents the percentage responses to this question, arrayed by nationality of the respondent. Arguably, by invoking the specter of *national* problems, the question prompt biases the data toward national responses to those problems. And yet moderate support for Europeans solutions can already be seen at this relatively early stage of the integration process, well before the SEA or monetary union, back when Europe had only just completed its first enlargement. The overriding sentiment, however, seems to be the predicted status quo arrangement, nodding toward integration or at least consultation, but retaining sovereignty at the national level. Nearly half of the sample adopted this middle ground position. Rather remarkably, however, more than a quarter of Europeans in 1975 sought considerably stepped-up integration – expressed in the rather bold language of "a true European government" – as the solution to national problems, while about one-fifth expressed the starkly sovereign preference of the national government acting independently.

In terms of the distribution of preferences by nationality, the rather typical pattern associated with public opinion questions concerning all things European is again manifested in Table 1. This pattern follows a rough geographical gradient, with enthusiasm for Europe increasing as one moves from north to south. In any case, the country whose citizens are most often most enthusiastic about

Europe once again claims that title in this survey, as more than half of all Italians opt for the highest level of integration. Meanwhile, among euroskeptics, all the usual suspects are present in Table 1, as only ten percent or less of Britons, the Irish and Danes opted for the most amount of integration, a third of the number making that choice in the next highest country (Luxembourg, at 30.9 percent).

Nearly a decade later, a similar question was asked of respondents in Eurobarometer 19 of April 1983. This was still prior to the EU project's *relance*, but not by much, and Europe was now comprised of The Ten. This survey put to respondents the following prompt: "There are several ways of thinking about the future of the European Community. Which of the following three statements is the one that comes closest to your own opinion?"

1. The European Community should not only have a parliament reflected as now, but also a proper government that would have the last word in important areas.
2. The European Community should continue as it does now, playing its own part with the power it has at the moment.
3. The real power to decide should always lie with the governments of the member-states.
4. Other answer (volunteered)."

The distribution of responses to this question is presented in Table 2. The main difference between this question format and the earlier one is that the middle choice now speaks to the quasi-federalist power-sharing status quo, rather than a more confederalist consultation process. It is perhaps for this reason – assuming the two question formats from different decades and using different samples can even be compared – that approximately one-third of the support for the centrist position found in the first table migrates to the national sovereignty position in the second. Thus, in Table 2, nearly 40 percent of the overall sample favors maintaining all real power at the national level. Meanwhile, the rough north-south European integration support gradient once again appears in Table 2.

Another decade later, in the summer of 1994, another similar question was asked of Europeans with respect to their general preferences for the appropriate level of decision-making. By this time, much had transpired since the data presented in Table 2 had been collected. The Single European Act had been adopted and then implemented by 1992, and the Maastricht Treaty had brought Europe to new pinnacles of integration, renaming it a Union and launching the single currency project. Moreover, Europe by this time had long been a community of 12 member-states. Perhaps most pertinent, however, public opinion regarding the European project appeared to reach new heights at the start of the decade, only to fall again in the wake of Maastricht. It was in this general context that respondents were presented with the following prompt: "There has been a lot of discussion recently about the European Union (European Community). Some people say that too many issues are decided on by the European Union (European Community), other say that more issues should be decided on by the European Union (European Community). Which of the following statements

comes closest to your view?

1. Too many issues are decided on by the European Union (European Community).
2. The number of issues decided on by the European Union (European Community) at present is about right.
3. More issues should be decided on by the European Union (European Community).
4. On some issues there should be more European Union (European Community) decision-making and on other issues there should be less [spontaneous].
5. I have not really thought about it.”

The distribution of the responses to this question, broken out by national sub-samples, is presented in Table 3. Perhaps the most remarkable finding to emerge from this data is that, by far and away, the most popular choice among Europeans (more than a fourth of them) is that they haven't considered the question. Even at this time of highest visibility for European integration, either or both of Lindberg and Scheingold's and Sinnott's findings about public attitudes toward European integration appear to remain highly applicable. Moreover, presumably, had such an option been actively presented in the prior survey questions examined, this many or perhaps an even greater number of respondents would also have similarly punted. In any case, for those surveyed in Eurobarometer 41-1 who had thought about this question, the overall responses are very evenly distributed, with 17 percent of the total sample electing each of the first three choices (the EU makes too many decisions, the EU makes the right number of decisions, the EU should make more decisions), and another 12 percent also staking out a middle position, but this time on an issue-by-issue basis.

As far as the national tendencies go, some aspects of the familiar pattern are apparent in Table 3, though with perhaps less clarity than in previous tables. Some of this blurring is perhaps driven by the high numbers of respondents who had not thought about the question. Germany, for example, typically exhibits a moderate number of euro-enthusiasts, but in this survey its 11.7 percent favoring more issues to be decided by the EU is down at the level of the traditional eurosceptic states, Denmark, Ireland and Britain. But fully a third of German respondents – the most of any country – had not thought about this question. While, next-door, in Denmark, the least number of respondents made that choice relative to the other countries in the survey. No doubt the Danish referenda on Maastricht contributed highly (and apparently very negatively) to the visibility of the EU decision-making powers question, though it is still hard to imagine that half-again as many respondents in Germany – one of the original Six, and one of the two historically key states in the integration process – had not thought of this issue, as compared to Greece or Portugal.

Table 4 presents data from another series of questions in the same survey. Here, people were asked to identify three issues of importance to them from a list of about a dozen choices, some of which were general (e.g., fighting crime, securing stable prices, etc.), and others specific to the respondent's country.² Respondents were then asked, for each of their three self-identified most important issues, to choose which level of governance they thought "most appropriate" to deal with the issue – regional, national or European. The results of the survey questions are shown in Table 4, in the aggregate and by nationality. The structure of the question format doesn't reveal whether respondents want to locate more or less power in the hands of the European Union, but it does show comparative preferences for levels of governance to handle respondents' most pressing problems.

The nation-state remains the preponderant choice for all issue levels, with about 42 percent of the entire sample making that choice, on average, across the three issues. In contrast, only 12 percent favored regional solutions, but more than a third – 34.2 percent – opted for the problems to be addressed by the EU. In this table, much of the typical national distribution pattern no longer appear to be present. Instead, interestingly, some (though not all) of the smaller states – the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and Greece – are among those most favoring European solutions. Another trend of interest, though of small proportions and possibly a statistical fluke, is the increase in preference for the European solution as respondents move down their list of problem priorities (and the inverse relationship for regional governance), suggesting that the less prominent the problem, the more likely respondents are to prefer that it be handled at the European level.

Finally, Eurobarometer 47-2, fielded in the Spring of 1997, gave respondents an opportunity to compare national and European institutions in terms of general trust. The prompt posed to respondents read: "Many important decisions are made by the European Union. Do you feel you can rely or not on each of the following institutions to make sure that the decisions taken by the European Union are in the interest of people like yourself? Can you rely or not on ... ?" Choices then included the European Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers, and the respondent's national government and parliament. Table 5 presents the results of the survey. Here, the lead story would appear to be the general lack of differentiation between the five institutions surveyed. In each case, more respondents expressed reliance on the institutions than say they cannot rely on it, but the margins are never very wide. And, comparatively, all five institutions are relatively close in the evaluation of respondents, with the two national ones garnering slightly more trust, and the Council of Ministers slightly less. Nationally, some rather clear patterns emerge, but their logic at some general, non-idiosyncratic level is unclear. Respondents in Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden and, to a bit lesser degree, Ireland, exhibit little trust for most any of these institutions, at either level. On the other hand, respondents in The Netherlands, Italy, and Portugal seem to possess broad levels of reliance in the institutions to look out for them, across the board. The French exhibit generally higher levels of trust in European institutions, while the Germans, Austrians, Greeks and, of course, the Danes express the opposite conviction. Finally, the British seem to be particularly high on their

²The overwhelming single choice for most important issue was "fighting unemployment", which garnered 51 percent of responses to the number one problem question, and 74 percent of the total of 300 percent of responses to all three questions.

national government and parliament, while Spanish respondents trust European institutions, but not their own at the national level.

What can be learned from the data found in these five tables, taken from surveys ranging from 1975 through 1997? The surveys posed different, but related questions, utilizing different formats, and polling different numbers of respondents in different aggregations of member-states, thus making comparative analysis of the data a rather perilous enterprise. Yet, the theme of a status quo moderation seems evident in every case. That is, it would appear difficult to make the argument, based on any of this data, that a strong consensus exists either in favor of significantly enhancing the general powers of the European Community/Union, or of diminishing them. Per the suggestions of Lindberg and Scheingold, the European public appears broadly and somewhat distantly satisfied with existing levels of integration, at whatever moment the question is asked. As hypothesized, Europeans express different degrees of support for decision making at the European level, but in the aggregate, little sentiment for wholesale restructuring of Europe's (con)federal bargain, at any time along its evolution.

Public Opinion Towards Europe, Level Four:
Attitudes Regarding Which Polity
In Europe's Structure of Multilevel Governance
Should Handle Specific Competencies

If European attitudes toward the general degree of power which should be possessed by Brussels are benign and static, as the above analysis suggests, that may in part be because of the very scope of the questions measuring those sentiments. Perhaps these same respondents feel strongly that some competencies should belong to Europe, and equally strongly that some should not, and have simply aggregated those opinions into the sort of medial responses evident in the data reviewed above.

This question can be addressed by examining a series of Eurobarometer data sets, ranging over a twenty year period, each of which includes a battery of questions allowing respondents to allocate a series of policy competencies to their respective preferred polity. These question series are found in Eurobarometers 3 (May 1975), 10 (November 1978), 19 (April 1983), 24 (October 1985), 36-0 (Fall 1991) and 42-0 (November 1994). The prompt format varies slightly³ and the list of

³The prompt employed in the respective surveys was:

Eurobarometer 03: "Would you please look at this list of problems. For each of the problems, can you tell me if, in your opinion, it would be better to deal with it by combined action through the

competencies sometimes varies considerably from survey to survey, but the general thrust of the questions is the same, asking respondents to articulate their preference for whether the EU or the national government should handle each competency. Percent responses to these questions are presented in Table 6, where they have been grouped for interpretive purposes into two domains: traditionally domestic issues, and security and foreign policy issues. Within the first category, moreover, primarily economic issues have been listed first, with the remaining assortment of domestic issues following.

The data in Table 6 tell a remarkable and unexpected story, and several important general observations emerge from an initial cursory glance at the table. To begin with, though Europeans appeared generally satisfied and lacking strong preferences when it came to the general question of power allocation between polities, when it comes to specific issues, much of that tepidity disappears. That is, quite a number of the response pairings in Table 6 demonstrate a strong imbalance in one direction or the other between those favoring the European solution, and those opting for the national.

But what is certainly most remarkable, coupled with this robustness of preference, is the general direction of that preference. Surely those acquainted with the general tenor of European opinion about EU institutions would have expected that the preponderance of competency assignments would have gone to the national governments, not only because of historical inertia and the tradition of those governments handling such functions, but also because of the low regard in which European institutions are often held by the body politic. In fact, however, just the opposite is the case, and rather emphatically so. In gross quantitative terms, of the 65 choices presented to respondents and summarized in Table 6, in only 19 cases do Europeans prefer that the competency be handled by their national government, and several of those by only a slight margin. In other words, when articulating their preference for which level of governance should handle various policy competencies, more than

Common Market or rather by an action of our own government independently of other countries?"

Eurobarometer 10: "Would you prefer that decisions on how to deal with this problem were taken by the European Community as a whole, or by each country separately?"

Eurobarometers 19 and 24: "Here are a number of present day problems. For each one would you tell me if it is better that decisions about it should be taken by each country separately or by the member countries of the European Community (Common Market) acting together?"

Eurobarometers 36-0 and 42-0: "Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union, in 42-0]. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Community [Union, in 42-0]?"

two-thirds⁴ of the time, Europeans chose the EU. Moreover, repeatedly they did so in dramatic margins of twice, and often even more, the proportion favoring the national governments handling of the competency. This, alone, is a rather startling finding of public opinion regarding European integration.

It is also one which is difficult to reconcile with the findings of the previous analysis, and with the general lack of enthusiasm often found with regard to European integration and institutions. In this respect, one is reminded of the proverbial contradictory attitude ascribed to the American public by scholars of US politics. It is often said that Americans hate Congress, but always seem to love their individual congressional representatives. In the same fashion, then, perhaps Europeans are unenthusiastic about the notion of enhancing the general powers of Brussels, but when it comes to *specific* issues, frequently find wisdom in doing just that.

Whatever the explanation, it is certainly unexpected that Europeans desire to invest so much authority, as an aggregate of individual policy area choices, in their supranational government. But the story becomes even more remarkable upon closer examination of this general tendency, with specific reference to the substantive configuration of competency assignments. Quite unlike the hypothesized structure of preferences, in which those policy areas nearest to the heart of national sovereignty – i.e., those in the realm of high politics – would be least popular as choices for communal administration, the data in Table 6 display more or less the exact opposite tendency. That is, in the domain of security and foreign policy issues, every single competency choice in every single survey administration – with one narrow exception – witnessed a desire by respondents for handling by the European Union, not their respective national governments. On the general question of foreign policy, for example, in the latest iteration shown on the table (Eurobarometer 42-0, from November 1994), nearly 60 percent preferred that Europe handle the competency, almost three times the number who would rather have seen it in the hands of the national government, the traditional proprietor of this key responsibility. Moreover, in the previous iterations of the same question from 1975 and 1991, the imbalance favoring Europe was even more lopsided. Even when it comes to strengthening military defense, immigration policy, or fighting terrorism – all key security issues traditionally handled by national governments – time and again Europeans expressed a preference for Brussels handling these matters.

Moving down the traditional hierarchy of high and low politics, the frequency with which Europe is chosen as the preferred policy manager decreases in the realm of economic issues, but the EU's preponderance still remains. It is Europe which Europeans overwhelmingly want to take the lead in fighting price increases and unemployment, and in promoting regional development to narrow the gap between the richest and poorest parts of the member-states. It is also Europe, and again

⁴Since these 65 tests sometimes involve repeated iterations of questions addressing the same competency through several or more surveys, this is neither a formal nor an unbiased measure of public opinion on this question. However, it should also be noted that the multiple survey effect cuts both ways. In any case, nuances aside, the two-thirds figure is a handy way to summarize what appears to be a very clear and robust tendency.

overwhelmingly, whom respondents preferred to handle other key governmental tasks, such as managing energy supply, modernizing agriculture, and protecting the environment. It is only when we arrive at the domain of social issues and welfare state management, finally, that this remarkable tendency is reversed. When Europeans are asked about the prospects of integrating education, health and social welfare, media rules or cultural policy, they once again display lopsided preferences, but this time in the other direction, favoring national management of these policy domains.

Thus the overall directionality of Europeans' preferences for the distribution of various governmental competencies appears to be precisely the opposite of that hypothesized. In short, the higher the politics, the more support for handing the portfolio to Brussels. Bread-and-butter issues of social policy and welfare state services, on the other hand, should remain squarely in the hands of member-state governments, according to those polled. Nor does it seem likely that this unexpected phenomenon can be explained as an artifact of either survey timing or question format. In fact, the data range across six surveys spanning two decades time, and most of the question formats seem rather unambiguous in terms of contemplating responsibility for policy management at either governmental level, rather than, say, some form of intergovernmental cooperation or collaboration.

There is, finally, some additional data related to this question that may mitigate the apparent findings presented in Table 6. In Eurobarometer 30, fielded in the Fall of 1988, respondents were asked a question not unlike the general preference for more EU power questions discussed in the previous section: "Are you in favor of going even further than the Single Common European Market towards the unification of Europe?" For those answering affirmatively (57.3 percent overall – see Table 7), this question was followed by another, asking "In which direction mainly?" Respondent choices, of which several were possible, included:

"A collective organization for defense.

A collective economic and social policy particularly in the area of employment.

A single European currency, the ecu.

A single common foreign policy for relationship with the countries outside the European Community.

A reinforced common regional policy particularly for the regions in economic and social difficulties.

Other [specify]."

As Table 7 demonstrates, the most popular choice by a considerable margin was economic and social policy, somewhat contrary to the findings in Table 6. However, that data suggested the general preference for European handling of economic (as opposed to social welfare) issues, including unemployment, which is the emphasis of the favored response choice in Eurobarometer 30.

Moreover, the responses in the last six columns of Table 7 came from only those respondents answering affirmatively to the initial question, shown in the first column. In other words, the distribution in Table 7 reflects the preferences of self-selected integration enthusiasts, a different group than the at-large samples found in Table 6. In sum, then, while the Eurobarometer 30 data may mitigate somewhat the tendencies emerging from the six surveys in Table 6, the volume of the latter group and the somewhat anomalous nature of the Table 7 data suggest that the original remarkable findings of Table 6 remain applicable.

Support By Whom? And When?

Two final questions are worth investigating empirically before concluding the study with a discussion of its implications. First, do those who support the migration of competencies to Brussels share any demographic or attitudinal characteristics that might allow predicting such preferences? And, second, has the degree of support for Europe's handling of these responsibilities changed over time?

To address the first question, the same data from Eurobarometer 36-0 that is presented in Table 6 was employed. A summary variable was created, and scored with one point for each of the 12 competency areas respondents assigned to Europe. This measure became the dependent variable in an OLS regression model, the results of which are presented in Table 8. Overall, though the entire model is highly significant, its adjusted R square of .1155 suggests that it is not explaining a great deal of the variance in the dependent variable. As to the specific independent variables, some of the relationships predicted on the basis of other European public opinion research are manifest, while others are not. Support for European integration is often an elite phenomenon, and in this model shows itself positively associated with the respondent's income level, at a very high level of significance. Self-assigned class and education, on the other hand, are not significantly related to the tendency to assign more competencies to Europe. The latter non-relationship is particularly mystifying, as education is often strongly related to favorable attitudes towards Europe. The explanation for this puzzle may lie in the interaction between these three independent variables. Meanwhile, three other variables expected to show a strong relationship to the dependent variable in fact do so in this model. They are the size of the respondent's town, a rough measure of cosmopolitanism, Ron Inglehart's postmaterialism indicator, which is a highly robust predictor of attitudes towards Europe, and the instrumental variable, which measures the degree to which the respondent believes his or her country has benefitted from European integration.

The respondent's sex is also a perennial predictor of attitudes towards Europe, and once again Table 8 demonstrates that men are more favorable to European integration than are women. With respect to ideology, the 10 point left-right spectrum upon which respondents coded themselves was divided into three dummy variables, for left, center, and right. The center was excluded from the model as a baseline, with a prediction that those to the left would be more favorable to European management of policy competencies, and those to the right less so. As it turns out, respondents in the right-wing

category are not appreciably different from the baseline group, due to poor statistical significance associated with the IDEORITE variable. For those on the left, however, the direction of the parameter is the reverse of what was predicted, although the level of statistical significance is marginal. Finally, each respondent was coded by nationality, and a dummy variable was created for each member-state. All of these variables were included in the model, with the exception of the one for Belgium, which was left out as the baseline group. The data in Table 8 indicate that very few of the other countries can be meaningfully disaggregated from this baseline of Belgian respondents, because of very poor levels of statistical significance. The exceptions are the usual suspects, Italy on the high side, and Denmark and Britain on the low side, with respect to favoring an increased number of competencies assigned to Europe. Finally, Table 9 represents an attempt to disaggregate the data in Table 8, by constructing a logistic regression model for each of the 12 individual competency variables against the same independent variables included in the OLS model. But little additional information emerges from this analysis, beyond the patterns already evident in Table 8.

The last empirical question to be addressed concerns the degree to which support for policy competencies migration to the European level has changed over time. The data presented in Table 6 allow only a very partial answer to this question, given that appearance of the specific competency choices in the surveys is rather irregular, and that different though related question formats were used in most of the surveys (see footnote) where they do appear. Indeed, between these twin liabilities, it is difficult to derive much in the way of longitudinal analysis from Table 6. As a general rule, however, it does appear that preferences are relatively stable where competency questions show up repeatedly, such as with regard to environmental protection, though there are exceptions to this tendency. It also seems to be the case that support for European handling of these competencies had generally diminished by Eurobarometer 42-0, in late 1994. This can be said with more assurance, since the same question format was used in Eurobarometers 36-0 and 42-0, and since many of the same competencies were tested. Very likely this development had much to do with the Maastricht ratification debacle, and might thus represent a fleeting period effect when subsequent data are examined. In any case, however, the structure and nature of the data otherwise afford little else in the way of conclusions which can be drawn about the longitudinal direction of support for European governance.

Europe, Policy Competencies and Public Opinion: **Putting the Data in Context**

The foregoing analyses have pointed to interesting and unexpected attributes of the public's opinion regarding European institutions and the process of integration on the continent. Because some of the data point in different directions than others, and because public opinion information can be notoriously unreliable in measuring the concepts intended by social scientists, it is important not to claim too much from the data, nor with too much assurance, in interpreting these findings. Still, the array of respondents' preferences with regard to the assignment of specific policy competencies is in

particular rather surprising, seemingly robust in appearance, and therefore significant in its implications. Three such implications appear most prominent.

The most obvious of these concerns the possibilities for European integration. Previously, public support has been generally characterized more by a sense of tolerance and indifference than enthusiasm. That characterization remains true, based on the findings of this study, where the general thrust of integration is at question. Here, Europeans seem to prefer a rather static Europe, of neither wholesale growth, nor the institutional dismantling preferred by the minority eurosceptic cohort. For some reason, though, this general attitude masks what appear to be often strongly preponderant sentiments favoring integration in the more specific form of various policy competencies. In short, the European integration project may have far more latitude for development than has been previously implied by either the notions of permissive consensus, by or poll data showing only moderate general support.

Secondly, to the extent that the theoretical debate on the nature of European integration pitting scholars from the intergovernmentalist camp against neofunctionalists still resonates, these findings would appear to vindicate the latter group to a certain extent. If the public favors trusting the European Union with responsibility for important competencies, such attitudes seem quite likely to be based in part on previous positive experiences and perceptions of integration to date, rather than upon some blind leap of confidence in turning over authority in key areas to unknown actors and processes. As such, and should such responsibility transfers occur, a sort of 'spillover' at the level of public opinion may be said to have occurred. In any case, minimally, it is difficult to reconcile a European public which favors supranational management of security and foreign policies with an intergovernmentalist vision of jealously-maintained national sovereignty.

Finally, perhaps most intriguing is this character of European public opinion about specific competency transfers, in which the policy domains traditionally at the core of national sovereignty – defense, security, foreign policy – are those which the public appears to favor most for migration to Brussels. This suggests two very interesting further implications. First, that Europe is conceivably ripe for an American-style federalism, in which management of high politics issues and economic concerns would be handled by Brussels, while social welfare and cultural policy would remain in the hands of the member-states. Additionally, these findings amplify the suggestions of Dogan (1994), Inglehart (1977) and others that a cultural sea change has occurred with respect to the content and depth of political identification in Europe. Citizens willing to give away control of security concerns to a supranational polity are citizens, it would seem, who would be very unlikely to be mobilized in the name of national loyalties in the same fashion their parents and grandparents once were. Indeed, so sweeping and profound is this change alone that, though it does not exist today, the polity apparently envisioned and favored by a preponderance of Europeans would certainly well justify the moniker of "The New Europe".

Table 1
Problem Solving Preferences
Eurobarometer 4, October-November 1975
(Percentages)

<u>Country</u>	National Government Act <u>Independently</u>	Nat'l Gov't Consult, Then Act <u>Independently</u>	European Government <u>Necessary</u>	None of These <u>These</u>
France	16.4	38.4	42.3	2.8
Belgium	18.1	43.9	33.4	4.6
Netherlands	13.7	51.6	31.5	3.3
Germany	15.9	46.1	32.7	5.3
Italy	12.3	28.9	52.5	6.3
Luxembourg	16.2	48.3	30.9	4.5
Denmark	24.8	58.4	7.1	9.8
Ireland	36.7	52.9	10.1	.3
<u>United Kingdom</u>	<u>39.2</u>	<u>49.2</u>	<u>10.2</u>	<u>1.4</u>
Total	22.9	45.9	27.2	4.0

N = 8043

Table 2
Future Preference for the EC
Eurobarometer 19, April 1983
(Percentages)

<u>Country</u>	National Government Retain <u>Real Power</u>	Status Quo w/EC Retaining <u>Current Powers</u>	Proper European Government w/Last Word	<u>Other</u>
France	30.2	31.4	37.0	1.3
Belgium	22.5	36.2	40.3	1.0
Netherlands	25.9	36.1	35.6	2.3
Germany	27.4	32.7	38.8	1.1
Italy	21.4	19.6	58.8	.2
Luxembourg	42.3	29.6	26.2	1.9
Denmark	63.3	29.2	6.5	.9
Ireland	45.1	34.4	18.6	1.9
United Kingdom	55.8	26.2	17.1	.9
<u>Greece</u>	<u>54.1</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>28.1</u>	<u>0.0</u>
Total	39.1	29.4	30.5	1.1

N = 7972

Table 3
Preference for EU Power
Eurobarometer 41-1, June-July 1994
(Percentages*)

	<u>Too Many Issues Are Decided on by the EU</u>	<u>The Number of Issues Decided on by the EU Is About Right</u>	<u>More Issues Should Be Decided on by the EU</u>	<u>On Some Issues More EU Decisions, On Others, Less</u>	<u>Have Not Thought About It</u>
France	14.7	14.2	16.9	21.9	27.0
Belgium	12.9	18.2	19.4	9.6	29.8
Netherlands	11.1	17.7	33.3	4.3	28.2
Germany	15.6	18.3	11.7	11.8	33.5
Italy	5.6	13.6	27.1	18.5	20.2
Luxembourg	20.1	17.3	16.0	15.9	22.5
Denmark	55.1	22.8	5.1	2.0	12.2
Ireland	17.5	19.6	12.4	3.4	31.5
United Kingdom	39.0	17.1	12.1	3.0	24.9
Greece	12.0	18.5	36.2	4.9	20.1
Spain	10.2	21.3	15.5	9.1	24.9
<u>Portugal</u>	<u>7.7</u>	<u>16.9</u>	<u>10.5</u>	<u>5.0</u>	<u>22.0</u>
Total	17.2	17.0	17.3	11.8	26.5

N = 11493

* Excluded row percentages are from "don't know" and "no answer" responses.

Table 4
Most Appropriate Level For Dealing With
Respondents' Most Important Issues
Eurobarometer 41-1, June-July 1994
(Percentages*)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Regional Government Should Solve</u>				<u>National Government Should Solve</u>				<u>European Government Should Solve</u>			
	<u>1st Issue</u>	<u>2nd Issue</u>	<u>3rd Issue</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>1st Issue</u>	<u>2nd Issue</u>	<u>3rd Issue</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>1st Issue</u>	<u>2nd Issue</u>	<u>3rd Issue</u>	<u>Mean</u>
France	18.7	14.2	11.8	14.9	37.7	42.6	41.8	40.7	34.9	34.9	37.5	35.8
Belgium	7.8	5.9	6.3	6.7	36.7	36.8	34.7	36.1	18.7	33.7	34.8	29.1
Netherlands	9.7	7.6	5.8	7.7	38.2	35.5	37.9	37.2	46.1	48.9	48.3	47.8
Germany	11.7	11.3	9.8	10.9	42.3	39.1	35.9	39.1	33.4	38.2	41.3	37.6
Italy	13.7	12.3	10.7	12.2	39.5	39.0	36.3	38.3	35.2	36.5	39.8	37.2
Luxembourg	7.5	7.9	6.1	7.2	35.7	32.1	27.3	31.7	51.4	53.0	57.7	54.0
Denmark	9.2	8.1	6.8	8.0	45.5	44.7	45.9	45.4	41.3	41.8	41.5	41.5
Ireland	10.2	9.6	8.8	9.5	46.1	47.8	46.0	46.6	29.7	29.6	30.4	29.9
United Kingdom	21.5	18.0	17.6	19.0	49.6	54.7	50.9	51.7	19.4	17.5	20.6	19.2
Greece	5.8	4.4	2.7	4.3	36.4	33.5	34.4	34.8	47.8	52.7	52.8	51.1
Spain	8.2	6.0	6.4	6.9	44.3	44.4	45.5	44.7	33.4	32.6	29.1	31.7
Portugal	8.1	6.7	5.6	6.8	45.5	45.2	39.7	43.5	32.1	35.0	40.8	36.0
Total	13.9	11.8	10.6	12.1	42.2	42.8	40.8	41.9	32.6	33.9	36.0	34.2
N =	First Issue: 11356				Second Issue: 11329				Third Issue: 11186			

* Excluded row percentages are from "don't know" and "no answer" responses.

Table 5
Reliability of European and National Institutions
To Make Decisions in Respondents' Interests
Eurobarometer 47-2, April-June 1997
(Percentages*)

<u>Country</u>	<u>European Commission</u>		<u>National Government</u>		<u>European Parliament</u>		<u>National Parliament</u>		<u>Council of Ministers</u>	
	<u>Can Rely On It</u>	<u>Can-not Rely On It</u>	<u>Can Rely On It</u>	<u>Can-not Rely On It</u>	<u>Can Rely On It</u>	<u>Can-not Rely On It</u>	<u>Can Rely On It</u>	<u>Can-not Rely On It</u>	<u>Can Rely On It</u>	<u>Can-not Rely On It</u>
France	46.3	27.1	49.2	36.7	50.5	25.8	50.8	32.4	47.0	25.9
Belgium	40.3	38.8	18.1	70.7	36.1	43.2	23.4	59.0	28.9	48.8
Netherlands	59.4	23.2	72.5	18.1	63.6	21.0	66.9	20.6	58.4	22.0
Germany	26.5	38.5	37.2	43.6	28.2	39.2	37.8	41.1	22.1	38.9
Italy	51.5	15.0	51.8	30.0	50.6	17.0	48.2	32.2	48.3	15.9
Luxembourg	32.8	29.9	30.5	44.7	31.2	31.5	27.0	44.4	28.0	29.9
Denmark	30.1	54.5	46.9	45.8	31.2	52.0	54.8	36.4	31.7	43.3
Ireland	45.4	37.6	33.6	56.9	44.9	38.3	35.7	53.1	39.1	43.2
United Kingdom	44.3	29.8	58.8	31.2	46.7	29.1	56.4	32.2	44.9	29.0
Greece	43.2	47.4	46.7	49.3	50.0	41.5	51.6	43.6	42.6	44.9
Spain	46.3	26.0	33.1	50.1	47.3	25.3	27.0	44.9	40.7	26.4
Portugal	56.8	20.7	71.1	20.4	53.7	27.4	68.5	21.6	50.5	28.0
Austria	23.3	44.3	47.9	32.1	26.2	43.4	43.9	32.6	26.8	36.6
<u>Sweden</u>	<u>18.3</u>	<u>37.8</u>	<u>23.9</u>	<u>54.2</u>	<u>19.4</u>	<u>36.9</u>	<u>27.1</u>	<u>49.2</u>	<u>16.5</u>	<u>36.1</u>
Total	40.0	34.2	44.3	42.2	41.1	34.3	44.4	39.0	37.3	34.1
N =	13118		13115		13114		13118		13095	

* Excluded row percentages for each pair of responses are from "don't know" responses.

Table 6
Preference for European or National Responsibility
To Make Decisions in Various Competency Areas
Eurobarometers 3, 10, 19, 24, 36-0 and 42-0
(Percentages*)

<u>Competency</u>	<u>EB-03</u>		<u>EB-10</u>		<u>EB-19</u>		<u>EB-24</u>		<u>EB-36-0</u>		<u>EB-42-0</u>	
	<u>May 1975</u>		<u>Nov 1978</u>		<u>April 1983</u>		<u>Oct 1985</u>		<u>Fall 1991</u>		<u>Nov 1994</u>	
	<u>EC/</u>	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/</u>	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/</u>	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/</u>	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/</u>	<u>Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/</u>	<u>Nat'l</u>
	<u>EU</u>	<u>Gov't</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Gov't</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Gov't</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Gov't</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Gov't</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Gov't</u>
<u>Traditionally Domestic Issues</u>												
Regional												
Development	51.2	32.1	28.9	57.0	57.3	29.3	62.8	28.7				
Fighting												
Rising Prices	70.7	22.5	52.5	37.9	64.5	28.1	62.0	32.3				
Reducing Income												
Inequalities			40.6	42.2								
Fighting												
Unemployment			47.8	43.0	64.9	26.9	62.2	31.8			40.8	45.6
Currency									53.5	39.0	44.0	39.2
VAT Rates									48.5	41.0	39.5	41.8
Industrial Policy											42.5	40.4
Workers Board												
Participation									35.4	51.1	26.5	52.0
Energy Supplies												
Policy	70.3	18.2			70.0	19.7	71.7	20.3				
Modernizing												
Agriculture	53.1	34.6										
Protect												
Environment	66.8	24.4	54.2	37.5	69.8	22.8	75.5	19.5	68.7	27.9	53.9	32.3
Make Decisions												
for More Reg'l												
Self-Gov't			18.1	60.2								
Protecting Public												
from Fraud			37.8	50.7			52.8	39.5				
Scientific												
Research							72.1	18.6	73.2	19.9	64.1	19.7
Health & Social												
Welfare									34.7	61.1	24.1	62.4
Education			33.7	52.7					33.7	62.1	24.9	61.0
Workers' Health												
& Safety											31.5	54.5

Table 6 (Continued)
Preference for European or National Responsibility
To Make Decisions in Various Competency Areas
Eurobarometers 3, 10, 19, 24, 36-0 and 42-0
(Percentages*)

<u>Competency</u>	<u>EB-03</u>		<u>EB-10</u>		<u>EB-19</u>		<u>EB-24</u>		<u>EB-36-0</u>		<u>EB-42-0</u>	
	<u>May 1975</u>	<u>Nov 1978</u>	<u>Nov 1978</u>	<u>April 1983</u>	<u>April 1983</u>	<u>Oct 1985</u>	<u>Oct 1985</u>	<u>Fall 1991</u>	<u>Fall 1991</u>	<u>Nov 1994</u>	<u>Nov 1994</u>	
	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	<u>EC/ Nat'l</u>	
	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	<u>EU Gov't</u>	
<u>Traditionally Domestic Issues (Continued)</u>												
Press Standards or Media Rules								41.1	50.6	35.5	46.9	
Data Protection								36.3	50.0			
Cultural Policy										27.6	56.4	
Fight Drugs										63.1	23.1	
<u>Security and Foreign Policy Issues</u>												
Foreign Policy	67.5	15.9						68.8	22.6	59.2	22.6	
Helping 3rd World Countries		65.9	18.3	69.1	17.6	80.4	11.2					
Defending Against Superpowers		61.2	24.2									
Strengthening Military Defense		50.0	33.2	62.3	25.4	60.1	31.7	49.1	46.5	41.5	43.3	
Fighting Terrorism						79.3	15.7					
Third World Cooperation								77.7	15.9	66.2	17.4	
Immigration Policy										43.3	41.1	
Political Asylum Policy										45.3	37.9	
Controlling MNC's		53.5	25.0									
N =	8002- 8953	6820- 7987		8474- 9065		10745- 11248		11068- 12366		13095- 14427		

* Excluded row percentages are from "don't know" and "no answer" responses.

Table 8
Factors Associated With Number of Competencies
Preferred To Be Handled by The European Union
Eurobarometer 36-0, Fall 1991
(OLS Regression Model)

R Square	.1198
Adjusted R Square	.1155
Standard Error	3.0752
F =	27.8504
Signif F =	.0000
N =	4296

<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>SE B</u>	<u>Sig T</u>
CLASS	-0.072	0.052	0.166
EDUC	0.014	0.021	0.503
INCOME	0.214	0.049	0.000
TOWN	0.177	0.061	0.004
AGECAT	-0.018	0.015	0.242
IDEOLEFT	-0.240	0.124	0.053
IDEORITE	-0.176	0.132	0.182
INSTRUM	1.415	0.104	0.000
SEX	-0.218	0.095	0.023
POSTMAT	0.659	0.078	0.000
FRANCE	0.391	0.361	0.279
NETHLNDS	0.012	0.398	0.976
GERMANY	0.017	0.356	0.962
ITALY	0.814	0.369	0.028
LUXEMBRG	-1.943	1.724	0.260
DENMARK	-2.213	0.458	0.000
IRELAND	-0.669	0.625	0.285
UNTDKING	-1.066	0.362	0.003
GREECE	-0.187	0.443	0.673
SPAIN	0.713	0.383	0.063
PORTUGAL	-0.634	0.440	0.149
(Constant)	4.471	0.457	0.000

Table 9
Factors Associated With Preferences for Individual Competencies
To Be Handled by The European Union
Eurobarometer 36-0, Fall 1991
(Logistic Regression Models)

	<u>Security & Defense</u>			<u>Environment Protection</u>			<u>Currency</u>			<u>Third World Coop'n</u>		
	Model Chi ² = 340.694			Model Chi ² = 318.371			Model Chi ² = 758.672			Model Chi ² = 288.652		
	Model Chi ² Sig = .0000			Model Chi ² Sig = .0000			Model Chi ² Sig = .0000			Model Chi ² Sig = .0000		
	N = 5348			N = 5368			N = 5149			N = 5259		
<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>
CLASS	-0.061	0.031	0.048	0.011	0.034	0.758	0.044	0.033	0.179	-0.024	0.042	0.563
EDUC	0.005	0.012	0.696	0.032	0.014	0.025	0.044	0.014	0.001	-0.022	0.018	0.205
INCOME	0.084	0.029	0.004	0.146	0.032	0.000	0.074	0.031	0.017	0.209	0.040	0.000
TOWN	0.086	0.037	0.020	0.031	0.041	0.451	-0.003	0.040	0.933	0.074	0.051	0.143
AGECAT	0.009	0.009	0.297	-0.032	0.010	0.002	-0.011	0.010	0.273	-0.018	0.012	0.153
IDEOLEFT	-0.093	0.074	0.206	-0.153	0.082	0.062	-0.011	0.081	0.894	0.021	0.106	0.844
IDEORITE	-0.267	0.080	0.001	-0.043	0.088	0.623	-0.278	0.084	0.001	-0.267	0.102	0.009
INSTRUM	0.436	0.062	0.000	0.571	0.067	0.000	0.828	0.065	0.000	0.745	0.082	0.000
SEX	-0.117	0.057	0.038	-0.129	0.063	0.042	-0.185	0.061	0.002	0.071	0.078	0.364
POSTMAT	0.417	0.047	0.000	0.255	0.053	0.000	0.280	0.051	0.000	0.222	0.065	0.001
FRANCE	-0.598	0.212	0.005	0.406	0.219	0.064	0.635	0.219	0.004	0.628	0.278	0.024
NETHLNDS	0.253	0.239	0.290	1.135	0.267	0.000	-0.214	0.239	0.371	-0.261	0.296	0.378
GERMANY	-0.141	0.210	0.502	0.571	0.217	0.009	-0.074	0.215	0.732	-0.037	0.269	0.890
ITALY	-0.094	0.216	0.662	0.622	0.224	0.006	0.822	0.226	0.000	1.159	0.299	0.000
LUXEMBRG	-0.516	0.979	0.598	-0.570	0.980	0.561	-0.850	1.001	0.396	-0.390	1.176	0.740
DENMARK	-0.760	0.271	0.005	-0.464	0.277	0.094	-0.228	0.280	0.416	-0.885	0.323	0.006
IRELAND	-1.227	0.378	0.001	-0.539	0.371	0.147	-0.053	0.384	0.890	0.119	0.499	0.811
UNTDKING	-0.863	0.213	0.000	0.424	0.220	0.054	-0.923	0.219	0.000	0.404	0.276	0.143
GREECE	-0.797	0.256	0.002	0.147	0.267	0.582	0.144	0.265	0.586	-0.439	0.317	0.166
SPAIN	-0.376	0.224	0.094	0.800	0.237	0.001	0.308	0.232	0.184	0.090	0.288	0.756
PORTUGAL	-0.714	0.254	0.005	-0.151	0.260	0.561	-0.191	0.263	0.468	-0.018	0.331	0.958
Constant	-0.639	0.267	0.017	-0.450	0.284	0.113	-0.782	0.279	0.005	0.115	0.352	0.744

Table 9 (Continued)
Factors Associated With Preferences for Individual Competencies
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(Logistic Regression Models)

	<u>Health & Soc Welfare</u>			<u>Education</u>			<u>Press Standards</u>			<u>Scientific Research</u>		
	Model Chi ² = 389.507 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5337			Model Chi ² = 298.230 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5342			Model Chi ² = 233.561 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5161			Model Chi ² = 273.856 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5237		
<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>
CLASS	0.038	0.032	0.238	-0.031	0.032	0.333	0.057	0.031	0.065	-0.060	0.038	0.118
EDUC	-0.023	0.013	0.071	0.001	0.013	0.915	0.001	0.013	0.920	0.016	0.016	0.331
INCOME	0.043	0.030	0.150	0.079	0.030	0.008	-0.001	0.029	0.987	0.196	0.036	0.000
TOWN	0.153	0.038	0.000	0.149	0.038	0.000	0.056	0.037	0.133	0.035	0.046	0.442
AGECAT	0.018	0.009	0.062	0.012	0.009	0.217	-0.026	0.009	0.004	-0.030	0.011	0.007
IDEOLEFT	-0.076	0.076	0.319	0.033	0.075	0.660	-0.121	0.074	0.104	0.146	0.096	0.130
IDEORITE	-0.089	0.084	0.286	0.065	0.083	0.437	0.130	0.081	0.108	-0.061	0.095	0.521
INSTRUM	0.665	0.066	0.000	0.631	0.066	0.000	0.406	0.063	0.000	0.708	0.074	0.000
SEX	-0.111	0.059	0.059	-0.063	0.059	0.283	-0.227	0.057	0.000	0.009	0.071	0.903
POSTMAT	0.241	0.049	0.000	0.175	0.049	0.000	0.174	0.048	0.000	0.124	0.058	0.033
FRANCE	0.055	0.229	0.810	0.642	0.230	0.005	-0.034	0.208	0.869	0.126	0.279	0.652
NETHLNDS	0.267	0.248	0.283	0.272	0.252	0.281	0.025	0.230	0.914	0.121	0.313	0.698
GERMANY	0.511	0.225	0.023	0.444	0.228	0.052	0.068	0.206	0.742	-0.501	0.273	0.067
ITALY	1.182	0.230	0.000	1.025	0.232	0.000	-0.325	0.212	0.125	0.294	0.287	0.306
LUXEMBRG	0.077	1.052	0.941	0.331	1.021	0.746	-0.379	0.999	0.705	-0.169	1.241	0.892
DENMARK	-0.817	0.328	0.013	-0.128	0.302	0.672	-1.173	0.287	0.000	-0.540	0.339	0.111
IRELAND	0.134	0.392	0.732	0.133	0.397	0.738	-0.285	0.369	0.439	0.159	0.522	0.761
UNTDKING	0.167	0.229	0.467	0.018	0.233	0.939	-0.581	0.210	0.006	-0.218	0.278	0.433
GREECE	1.049	0.267	0.000	0.868	0.269	0.001	0.071	0.254	0.780	-0.242	0.329	0.463
SPAIN	0.773	0.238	0.001	0.978	0.241	0.000	0.307	0.221	0.164	0.078	0.295	0.791
PORTUGAL	0.688	0.265	0.010	0.652	0.269	0.015	-0.407	0.253	0.108	-0.083	0.334	0.804
Constant	-2.204	0.286	0.000	-2.273	0.287	0.000	-0.342	0.265	0.197	0.530	0.343	0.123

Table 9 (Continued)
Factors Associated With Preferences for Individual Competencies
To Be Handled by The European Union
Eurobarometer 36-0, Fall 1991
(Logistic Regression Models)

	<u>Value Added Tax</u>			<u>Foreign Policy</u>			<u>Worker Participation</u>			<u>Data Protection</u>		
	Model Chi ² = 728.114 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5090			Model Chi ² = 258.114 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5187			Model Chi ² = 192.598 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 4971			Model Chi ² = 250.607 Model Chi ² Sig = .0000 N = 5004		
<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>S.E.</u>	<u>Sig</u>
CLASS	-0.040	0.033	0.231	-0.036	0.036	0.327	-0.024	0.032	0.442	-0.026	0.032	0.413
EDUC	0.008	0.013	0.572	0.010	0.015	0.524	-0.022	0.013	0.087	0.038	0.013	0.003
INCOME	0.073	0.031	0.018	0.057	0.034	0.096	0.033	0.030	0.269	0.032	0.030	0.290
TOWN	0.077	0.039	0.051	-0.000	0.044	0.998	0.051	0.038	0.175	0.057	0.038	0.136
AGECAT	-0.002	0.010	0.875	0.010	0.011	0.340	0.005	0.009	0.584	0.001	0.009	0.956
IDEOLEFT	-0.043	0.080	0.594	-0.160	0.089	0.071	-0.059	0.075	0.430	-0.181	0.077	0.019
IDEORITE	-0.061	0.084	0.465	-0.070	0.092	0.445	-0.078	0.083	0.345	0.102	0.082	0.216
INSTRUM	0.706	0.066	0.000	0.652	0.071	0.000	0.565	0.064	0.000	0.460	0.065	0.000
SEX	-0.185	0.061	0.002	0.142	0.068	0.035	-0.125	0.058	0.032	-0.212	0.059	0.000
POSTMAT	0.393	0.051	0.000	0.197	0.056	0.000	0.269	0.048	0.000	0.211	0.049	0.000
FRANCE	0.583	0.235	0.013	0.145	0.265	0.583	0.158	0.220	0.473	-0.315	0.216	0.146
NETHLNDS	0.129	0.261	0.623	0.037	0.294	0.900	-0.298	0.244	0.222	-0.496	0.237	0.037
GERMANY	-0.762	0.227	0.001	-0.268	0.260	0.302	0.153	0.218	0.482	0.101	0.214	0.638
ITALY	-0.586	0.234	0.012	0.605	0.276	0.028	0.345	0.224	0.123	0.177	0.221	0.423
LUXEMBRG	-2.282	1.153	0.048	-0.525	1.119	0.639	-1.186	1.253	0.344	-1.068	1.106	0.334
DENMARK	-1.217	0.287	0.000	-1.214	0.311	0.000	-1.404	0.329	0.000	-1.422	0.301	0.000
IRELAND	-0.553	0.384	0.150	-0.253	0.448	0.572	0.132	0.382	0.729	-0.735	0.390	0.059
UNTDKING	-1.483	0.231	0.000	-0.428	0.262	0.103	0.022	0.221	0.921	-0.484	0.217	0.026
GREECE	-1.076	0.274	0.000	-0.874	0.300	0.004	0.430	0.266	0.106	-0.005	0.265	0.986
SPAIN	-0.387	0.243	0.112	0.206	0.281	0.463	0.210	0.233	0.367	0.251	0.229	0.273
PORTUGAL	-1.152	0.274	0.000	-0.259	0.311	0.406	-0.130	0.264	0.623	-0.556	0.266	0.036
Constant	-0.295	0.290	0.308	0.200	0.324	0.538	-1.106	0.278	0.000	-0.752	0.274	0.006

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