Understanding European Voting Behavior: An Examination of Ticket Splitting in European Elections

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Abstract

The European Union has come a long way since its inception. One area which has received little are the European Parliament elections. There has been even less attention given to explain the three propositions offered by Reif and Schmitt (1980) about European Parliament elections: 1) turnout will be lower in European Parliament elections than in national elections; 2) national government parties will suffer losses in European Parliament elections; and 3) larger parties will do worse and smaller parties will do better in European Parliament elections.

Before taking the next step forward it is important to look back and examine the basic premises of Second Order Elections. Several areas which have not been addressed deal directly with voter turnout and party vote. First, if government parties lose votes, do they lose votes to other parties? Or are votes lost because of low voter turnout? Second, if government parties do lose votes to other parties, is this loss significant? Third, do new and small parties really gain votes from larger parties or are voters who do not vote in national elections (and support smaller parties) deciding to vote in European elections? In other words, from where do small and new parties gain votes? Finally, if support for small and extreme parties does not increase over time, do the supporters of these parties change each election?

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The Past as Prologue: European Elections

The European Union has made enormous strides since its inception. Since the first elections held in 1979, the European Parliament has grown in both size and substance. With the passing of the Masstricht Treaty in 1992, research on the European Union has burgeoned. One area which receiving more attention is the way European's vote during European Parliament elections.[1] Scholars initially thought that EU parliamentary elections would be a sideshow to European politics. It has become obvious however that voters are taking the European Parliament elections very seriously than previously thought. However, the various theories concerning voter behavior remain largely untested.

What is known about European elections is largely based on the findings of Reif and Schmitt (1980), who examined the results of the 1979 European elections and compared these results with each state's previous national elections. The authors came to several conclusions about the European elections in relation to national elections: 1) there were lower levels of turnout, 2) small and new political parties received higher percentage of votes, 3) a higher percentage of votes were invalidated, and 4) government parties lose votes. Based on these findings, Reif and Schmitt have categorized European elections as Second Order Elections (SOE).[2]

Reif and Schmitt (1980) provide three explanations for these phenomena:

- discontented supporters who choose to abstain or support other parties to protest the government;
- discontented supporters who now prefer some other party and vote for it;
- the loss of tactical supporters who vote for government only in national elections.

The authors did however mention that when comparing European and national elections it is important to take into account the differences between European parties and national parties, as well as political stimuli.

While researchers have put much effort into examining and confirming Reif and Schmitt's work about second-order elections, there has been little effort to build on their research. Reif (1985) continued to investigate the SOE phenomena. Through the use of electoral statistics at the national level, he provides a strong defense of his earlier work differentiating first and second order elections. In addition, he shows the importance of the timing of elections (the electoral cycle) and uses this as an explanation about why European elections are second order elections.

Surprisingly, from 1980 to 1990, there were few articles or books which dealt with the European elections as being SOE. Most of the research after 1980 focused on explaining voting behavior or voter apathy toward the European elections. It was not until the 1990's that other aspects of voting behavior were explored. Niedermayer (1990), using aggregate data, showed how compulsory voting and concurrent national/European elections increases voter turnout for European elections. Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1990) examined SOE assumption in The Netherlands using Eurobarometer data to determine factors affecting vote choice.

Sinnott and Whelan (1992) questioned the validity of comparing national and European elections. Their research is based on the question that if there are known differences between both national and European elections is it correct to continue comparing the two? Should researchers use national elections as the norm to understand European elections? Would a better comparison be between sub national elections and European elections? The authors examined electoral wards in Dublin, Ireland using aggregate data on voter turnout along with descriptive

statistics for each ward. They concluded that at the smallest unit of analysis (electoral ward) it is possible to compare national and European elections.

Norris (1992) also questions the legitimacy of comparing national with European elections concluding that more integrated research designs are needed which would allow for comparison of European, national, regional and local elections. Reif (1997) defends his original research while acknowledging that many of the misinterpretations of his research can be attributed to misunderstanding of several of the concepts used in his research. He defends the use of survey data to better understand, " 'the nature of the voting act' and other features of the role of elections in democratic systems." (119)

Pinder (1994) questions one of the findings of Reif and Schmitt (1980) and Reif (1985), that small parties gain votes. His research examines if small parties have made major strides in European elections, or if small parties have stayed small in these electoral contests. He finds that while small parties do well in each individual election, there is no growth from election to election. In other words, small parties stay small and large parties stay large. Additionally, although extreme parties fare better at the European elections than in national elections, the European Parliament remains center focused.

Marsh, Van der Eijk, and Franklin (1996) use data from four European Parliament elections to provide a statistical analysis defending the second-order theory by showing the importance of the cycle or timing of the European Elections. They believe that, "the European elections might actually be better predictors of subsequent national elections than they are consequences of prior ones." (30).

Marsh (1998) tests the SOE model once again trying to understand voter behavior. In

particular Marsh focused on why voters shift support from big to small parties, from government to non-government parties, and from central to extreme parties. In his analysis, Marsh focuses on electoral cycles as the main explanation these behaviors in European elections. Marsh also validates Reif and Schmitt's findings, as well as van der Eijk and Franklin's adding that European elections can also be considered as "pointers to subsequent general elections." (608)

Only recently has there been research into why voters act the way they do. This research has borrowed heavily from literature on the United States elections, in particular Morris Fiorina and Gary Jacobson. Their theories of ticket-splitting have shown some initial success at explaining European voter behavior. However, the differences between parliamentary electoral systems and a presidential electoral system warrant careful attention when trying to fit any U.S. theories of ticket splitting to European elections [3]. Several theories been put forth which either incorporate the European electoral systems to U.S. based theories, or are solely based on the European experience. Two of these theories will be examined: policy moderation and cost sharing.

Modeling Ticket Splitting

Balancing: Policy Moderation

The first model is based on a model originated by Fiorina (1988, 1992). Fiorina explains ticket splitting as a policy balancing model which hinges on the idea that voters cast split ballots in an effort to moderate national policy. This theory has been used to show that voters use the European Parliament to balance against the current national governments. Using this theory, one

would expect a state to have a national cabinet favoring one side of the ideological spectrum, say conservative, and to have representatives in the European Parliament who are more liberally oriented.

One favorable aspect of this theory is that, since European elections are not held at the same time as national elections, voters have time to examine their national governments. The down side of the balancing theory is that the electoral laws and parliament type governing system allow for different coalitions to govern the state. In the case of a vote of no-confidence, the ruling coalition will dissolve and a new coalition will form. Coalition governments can include parties from different ideologies. This theory also assumes that voters will vote against their own political ideology. This is not always true. There may be some justification for this theory as the European Parliament becomes more influential and increases its authority over national governments. Balancing will be easier to prove now that each state uses the same proportional representation method to elect Members of the European Parliaments (MEPs).

Balancing: Public Goods and Cost Sharing

The second model explaining split-ticket voting is provided by Jacobson (1990). In this model, ticket splitting is a result of voters having conflicting expectation: voters prefer to pass the costs of providing services to others and will elect representatives who will keep the costs of these services low.[4] This model is particularly useful in explaining why issue specific parties do well in European Parliament elections.

The environmental parties of Europe, known as the "Greens," have done better in European wide elections than in national elections. Environmental protection has high costs

associated with it: restrictions on the use of natural resources, creation and implementation of industry-wide environmental protection standards, and public education (Carrubba and Timpone, 1999). Most people favor a clean environment, yet do not want to carry the burden of all the costs associated with enforcing environmental regulations. The European Parliament can set standards which all member states must follow, thereby sharing the costs among each state.

Another explanation is also feasible which does not align itself with the theory proposed by Jacobson. That is, sharing the costs of implementing environmental policies is a collective action problem (Olson, 1971). There is no guarantee that others states will implement the same environmental protection standards, or will implement any standards at all. The European Parliament, as a governing body, is used to ensure that states do not defect from the decisions decided upon.

Furthermore, while the Cost Sharing theory provides an explanation for parties which have narrow issue-oriented ideologies, it does not do as well in explaining why other small parties do well in European elections. National regional parties as well as extreme ideological parties also perform better at the European level than at the national level. Jacobson's model is not able to explain why this occurs.

What Still Needs to be Done

Despite all of the theories put forth to better understand European elections, much research is still needed to test theses theories. Arguably, before taking this step forward it is important to look back and examine the basic premises of Second Order Elections. Several areas which have not been addressed deal directly with voter turnout and party vote. First, if

government parties lose votes, do they lose votes to other parties? Or are votes lost because of low voter turnout? Second, if government parties do lose votes to other parties, is this loss significant? Third, do new and small parties really gain votes from larger parties or are voters who do not vote in national elections (and support smaller parties) deciding to vote in European elections? In other words, from where do small and new parties gain votes? Finally, if support for small and extreme parties does not increase over time, do the supporters of these parties change each election? Answers to these questions will tell us a) if voters are splitting their between national and European elections, b) which parties win, c) which parties lose, and d) how this happens.

Method and Data

There are two approaches towards studying electoral behavior. First, one can use individual level data by using survey research instruments. The advantage to this is that one can get a direct measure of sophisticated voting and respondent ideology. If voters cast their vote not for their most preferred party or candidate then they vote in a tactical fashion. However, a drawback of using survey data to observe individual behavior is the reliability and validity of the instruments.

Eubank and Gow (1983) and Gow and Eubank (1984) compare and analyze NES and actual vote results. They find that there is a pro-incumbent response bias in the NES and that this bias inflates the survey estimates of voting for incumbents. Because of this the validity of any research using survey instruments should be questioned. They propose and defend three causes for this bias: 1) the wording and placement of survey questions, 2) bandwagon effect of wanting

to vote for a winner, 3) time elapse after the elections which causes name familiarity. There analysis goes on to show that those less educated have the greatest bias.

Silver, Anderson, and Abramson (1986) examine survey respondents propensity to report "over-voting". They provide two reasons for this phenomena: 1) to please the interviewer, and 2) to appear to engage in socially desirable behavior. There research indicates that over-reporting is not related to SES demographics although race is a major factor. They show that by measuring over-reporting as individual behavior and not as an aggregate phenomena, the pattern of over-reporting is shown to be consistent with the understanding of individual motivations of political participation.

Wright (1990) tests to see if people report over-reporting for winning candidate. He believes that people over-report for three reasons: 1) to bandwagon with the winner, 2) instrumental effects, 3) non-intentional errors over time (media exposure of the winner). The mis-reporting does have consequences as it produces underestimates of the effects of national forces and overestimates of the impact of incumbency/candidate variables. He also shows that the report error is non random and therefore researchers must be sensitive to errors and biases.

Wright (1993) again tests the over-reporting vote choice over several decades testing pro-winner bias due to question order and wording, offices being contested, and time. He also looks at pro-incumbent bias caused by time elapse between election and survey. He shows that there is gross misreporting in voter choice, and that one should also question the accuracy and validity of "thermometer" questions which measure attitudes and perceptions. He proposes four solutions: do nothing, fix errors, gather better data, create better survey methods and questions.

Because of the potential for bias an initial examination of the survey data was performed.

This examination consisted of a comparison between the survey data and the actual votes received. The results of this comparison show differences between survey results and actual votes received. These differences may indicate a bias in reported voting behavior, and just sampling error. If there is bias in the data, the validity of this Eurobarometer as an accurate measure of voter behavior may be questioned.

Tables 1-12 about here [5]

An examination of Tables 1-12, comparing national election results to survey responses, shows several problems. First, there were difference between the actual vote and the survey responses. Each country had its discrepancies. It was not clear if major parties did lose votes or if minor parties gained votes. Each wave, indicating a separate time period when the survey was taken across all European Union countries, shows different results. Belgium, for example, shows that the Volkunie (VU) party received 8.0% of the vote in the elections help on December 13, 1987. However, the Eurobarometer shows that between 2.9% and 6.7% of those surveyed voted for this party. Not only is this amount lower than the actual votes received, but there is a substantial range of about 4 percentage points among the waves of the Eurobarometer.

The Socialist Party of France received 36.6% of the votes during the election of June 6, 1988 yet between 46.4% and 49.1% of those surveyed said they voted for this party. This is 10 percentage points higher than actual votes received.. Survey respondents favored the New Democracy Party of Greece between 29.4% and 39.6%, a range of more than 10 percentage points. However, this was still less than the actual votes received during the June 18, 1989 elections of 44.3%. This is even more puzzling considering that the European elections and national elections were held concurrently. One would not expect such a large range, nor such a

difference between actual and survey results for an elections that was held during that European elections.

A second problem is the lack of data in the Eurobarometer for national political parties. Part of this problem may be explained by the fact that most of the missing responses are for small parties, receiving 1% or less of the actual vote. Yet, there are many other small parties which did receive responses. However, there are some discrepancies which do need to be mentioned. First the Agalev Party of Belgium received 4.5% of the vote but did not have any survey responses. Also, the Christian Social Union (CSU)of Germany, which often runs with the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), was not given its own selection in the survey. It is impossible to determine then if a respondent voted for the CDU, or the CSU. The Coalition of Left and Progress, of Greece, received 13.1% of the actual vote, yet it was not until Wave 3 that there were any responses for this party. This is also true of the Green Alternative of Luxembourg, which received 3.7% of the vote yet did not have any survey responses until Wave 3.

Both the Greek and Luxembourg examples lead into the third problem: missing data for one or two waves of the Eurobarometer. There are several instances where a party receives survey responses for one or two waves yet goes unsupported for the remaining wave(s). Once again, this can be easily understood if the parties were small, receiving less than 1% of the actual vote, but it is more difficult to understand or explain for those parties receiving more than 1% of the actual vote. Furthermore, since one of the phenomena researchers have been exploring is the increase in support of small parties, the lack of data on small parties in this survey instrument makes this task difficult, if not impossible.

Tables 13-24 about here [5]

Looking at the data concerning European elections in each country, Tables 13-24, shows the same problems as found in the national election results. The Volkunie (VU) party in Belgium received 5.4% of the actual vote. However, the survey responses range from 3.3% to 6.0%, with 3.8% coming in Wave 3, immediately after the European election. The results for the New Democracy Party of Greece for the European elections are similar to those of Greece's national elections, although the range is not as large. There are also problems of missing data for small parties, combined data for political parties, and partial data depending on which wave of the Eurobarometer one uses.

Tables 25-26 about here [5]

The next step in this investigation into possible bias and error in this Eurobarometer data is to examine the average differences, for each country, between the actual votes received and the survey responses for each wave of the survey. Since Wave 3 was done immediately after the European elections it is expected that a respondent would remember their party choice and therefore the average difference would decline as the elections draws closer and reach its smallest level in Wave 3. Table 25 shows the average difference for European elections and Table 26 shows the average difference for National elections. The numbers in parentheses are the standard error as calculated by STATA. The method of computing this data was to subtract the survey response total from the actual vote total (data in tables 1-24). This was done for each wave of the Eurobarometer.

Actual Vote - Survey Response = Difference

Since I was not interested in the direction of the difference but the size of the difference, the absolute values of the difference was taken and then the average was computed. Any party which

did not have any survey responses were taken to be 0.0%.

$$\frac{\sum|\text{Difference}|}{N} = \text{Average Difference}$$

The results though do not confirm my hypothesis. The average difference is lowest for Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom for each country's respective European election, and Denmark, Italy, and Portugal for each respective national election. However, the average difference increases over each wave for Belgium, both elections, and for Ireland, the Netherlands, and Spain for their respective national elections. Finally, the rest of the countries show mixed results with the Wave 3 average difference being greater than Wave 1 for Luxembourg, both elections, and the United Kingdom, national election.

While this may not be an indicator of serious bias and errors in the responses, and therefore in any results using this Eurobarometer data, it is enough to raise questions about the data and presents a strong case for further examination. The nest step is to regress the Survey Results for each wave on the actual results. What should be expected is the R*2 to be close to one, and that the coefficient for the Survey Results be significant at the .001 level and be as close to one as possible. A correlation coefficient close to one would show that for every one percentage point the Survey Results increase, the actual results would also increase one percentage point. What is wanted therefore is as close to a one-to-one ratio as possible.

Tables 27 and 28 about here [5]

The results show that overall survey responses for the national elections are closer to the actual votes received than survey responses for the European elections. For national elections, the R*2 for the first two waves are closer to one than the European results and the correlation coefficients for the Survey Results are also closer to one. The third wave shows a dramatic

increase in the R*2 for the European election, from a low of .715 to .927, as well as an increase in the correlation coefficient, from .740 to .889. This is to be expected as the third wave of the Eurobarometer was taken after the election and the party choice would be more easily remembered by the respondents. However, the R*2 for the national elections, .920, is close to that of the European elections, and the correlation coefficient for Survey Results for national elections, .877, is also near the correlation coefficient for European elections, .889. The fact that the R*2 are close to one is a sign that there may not be any bias or errors in the Eurobarometer. However, the low correlation coefficients indicates that there may well indeed be a bias in this Eurobarometer data. Because this regression was performed on all countries combined, the next step is to run the same regression on each country.

Tables 29-30 about here [5]

The results of the European elections, Table 29, show that while most of the correlation coefficients for Survey Results are significant at the .05 level or higher, very few approach one. In only a small number of cases is this coefficient actually at or slightly above or below one. The ideal of a one-to-one ration is not being met. Furthermore, in only a few cases does the R*2 approach one. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Spain do not even have R*2's that reach 0.9, and the Netherlands and Portugal R*2's do not reach 0.95. This leaves half of the countries with R*2's close to one.

Examining the results for national elections shows much of the same. Most of the correlation coefficients are significant, although more at lower levels. And most correlation coefficients are farther from the ideal. Once again Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Spain do not have R*2's which reach 0.9, while the R*2 for Portugal and the United Kingdom do not reach

.095.

The results are ambiguous. These tests neither confirm nor deny the presence of bias or systematic error in the Eurobarometer data. This does not mean that Eurobarometer data should be used indiscriminately, or that this data should not be used at all. What is evident is the need for a more thorough examination of the data. The survey results for each country need to be tested against an "ideal" result. However, the intention of this paper was not to test the Eurobarometer data, but to propose a method of understanding voting behavior. It is this aspect of research which will be addressed in the remainder of this paper.

A second approach to understanding voting behavior and voting patterns relies on the use of aggregate data of election results. Aggregate data may be an indirect method to measure tactical voting, but it is far more reliable than survey data. Using the ecological inference solution provides an accurate description of who splits votes. The lower the level of data, the more accurate the results. For instance, state level data is not as useful or accurate as district level data.[6] Stated simply, ecological inference fills in the body of a table when the only information available is the marginals. A simply example is provided.

National Election

European Election		Party A	Party B	
	Party A	??	??	X^A
	Party B	??	??	X^B
		Y^A	Y^B	

The results of the two elections are known. Part A has received X^A votes in the European

election and Y^A votes in the national elections. The number of people voting for Party A in both elections would be in the upper left box with a range between Y^A and X^A. Ecological inference provides a way to fill in the body of this table. The lower the level of data (electoral ward and not national results) the smaller the range of options and therefore the lower the error in calculating each box.

Burden and Kimball (1988) apply Gary King's ecological inference (EI) solution to explaining split ticket voting in US elections. They do so by using electoral data gathered at the smallest level, making it possible to use hundreds of observations, something survey data cannot do, making it easier to generalize. They show that survey instruments have two serious problems: 1) surveys cannot decompose samples into smaller units of aggregation because of the number of cases needed for such analysis, 2) reports of voting behavior may be inaccurate in surveys.

This poses several problems in researching voting behavior in the European Union. First, the district sizes are not the same between national and European elections. This will void any attempt, let alone the results, of using district level data. However, some European nations such as Germany, maintain city level results. It will be those results which will be employed. I propose to use a diverse cross-section of cities which will allow a better understanding of regional differences as well as the impact of city sizes on voting behavior.

There are two additional problems which must be resolved. These deal with the nature of the use of ecological inference solution. Until now, the ecological inference (EI) solution to aggregate data has used only matrices of 2x2, 3x3, or 4x4 cells. This is convenient when examining the United States system. However, European electoral systems often have more than only 4 parties. Added to this is that parties either combine during national elections only to run

separately during European elections. The opposite also occurs.

The third problem concerns the style of matrix. All previous research uses square matrices. The number of parties involved in the European elections and in national elections are often times not that same. This would create a "non-square" matrix which would require. one of two adjustments to be made to this method of research. The first adjustment is to group parties according to ideology so that a square matrix can be created. This will take away the depth of analysis which is being sought in this research. Since I am looking at which parties gain or lose votes, and to whom, it is integral to use as much individual party data as possible. However, when examining ideological differences, it may become more convenient to group parties together.

The first task is to create a reliable large scale non-square matrix of various sizes in order to employ the EI solution. This will require careful consideration since this is unchartered territory. King (1997, 1999) has provided the theoretical underpinnings for such an evaluation. The next step is to create such matrices.

Testing Ticket Splitting

Balancing: Policy Moderation

Using EI, I theorize that national governing parties lose votes to parties which have different ideology. In order to determine party ideology, party election manifestos (coded by the Manifestos Research Group, MRG) will be employed. MRG data has already been shown to be a reliable method of indicating party ideology (Gable and Huber, na)

Also, since governing coalitions may have parties of different ideologies, smaller parties

within the ruling coalition may take votes away from the larger coalition parties. If this is the case, then the Policy Moderation theory will also be upheld.

> *H1: Parties with different ideologies than those of the ruling parties will take votes away from the ruling parties in European elections.*
>
> *H2: Parties within the governing coalition but with different ideology from the larger coalition parties will also take votes away from those parties in European elections.*

Balancing: Public Goods and Cost Sharing

Since this theory is based on the predication that parties with specific agendas surrounding a single issue area (such as environment or women's rights) will gain votes in the European elections, it should be found that such parties take votes away from the major parties within each nation. Not only will ruling parties lose votes, all parties with a large national support based on national electoral results will also lose votes. This may also be an indicator of sincere voting behavior since these parties are often "on the fringe" of receiving seats in the national parliaments. Since the levels of support for these types of parties are low in national elections, and if voters are tactical in national elections but sincere in European elections, single issue parties should do better in European elections.

> *H3: Single issue parties will take votes away from major national parties.*

Conclusion

What I originally set out to accomplish and what I have shown here is that using the Eurobarometer instrument without questioning its validity and accuracy brings with it risks of bias and unreliable results. This is not to question the validity of research, specifically the theories

being tested and the method of testing those theories, which has already been done using Eurobarometers. Rather, one needs to question the results of statistical analysis which use Eurobarometer data. Statistics are only as good or bad as the data being used. However, there are ways around the problems of using survey instruments. Fixing the errors and creating better survey instruments are two such solutions. Another solution is to use better, in some cases more highly developed statistical methods, to answer more complex questions.

As the European Parliament increases its ability to influence national policy, current theories of voting behavior may no longer hold. If in fact the European Parliament does become more powerful, and the European Union becomes more like a United States of Europe, then eventually voters may use national elections to either balance against the European Parliament or as a referendum for or against European Union policies.

Additional research is needed. As the European Union, and therefore the European Parliament changes, so will people's attitudes toward it. Only by challenging current political theory and methods on voter participation and split ticket voting will we be able to more definitively understand European voter behavior. U.S. oriented theories (Jacobson and Fiorinna) give us a starting point. It is our responsibility to continue what they have started.

To this extent, the use of ecological inference will give us a detailed picture of which parties are losing votes, and more importantly, to which party(ies) they are losing them. King (1997, 1999) has given us a starting point by providing the theoretical design to do this. What is needed is to successfully take his design from theory to practice.

END NOTES

1. The terms "European voter" and "voter" will be used interchangeably and refer to those people participating in European Parliament elections and should not be confused with people participating in their individual state Parliament elections. The terms European Parliament elections and European elections will also be used interchangeably.

2. "We can deduce several propositions which characterize regular differences between second-order elections results and first-order elections results. A) Lower Turnout. B) Brighter prospects for small and new parties. C) National government parties' losses." (Reif, 1985: 9)

3. Some researchers have termed the phrase "quasi-switching" to explain the same phenomena as split-ticket voting. This paper will dwell on a debate about semantics. Suffice it to say for the purpose of this paper I will use the more known term, split-ticket voting.

4. For a detailed description of this study testing both models read R. Michael Alvarez and Matthew M. Schousen, 1993, "Policy Moderation or Conflicting Expectations? Testing the Intentional Models of Split-Ticket Voting." *American Politics Quarterly* October, Vol. 21, No. 4

5. Data for this paper is from Mackie, Tom and Richard Rose. 1997. *A Decade of Elections Results: Updating the International Almanac*; Mackie, Tom, ed. 1990. *Europe Votes 3: European Parliamentary Elections Results 1989*; and Van der Eijk, Cees, Erik Oppenhuis, and Hermann Schmitt. EUROPEAN ELECTION STUDY, 1989 ICPSR Study No. 6146.

6. For a detailed explanation of the Ecological Inference Solution, read Gary King. 1997. *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press as well as Laura Langbein and Allan Lichtman. 1978 *Ecological Inference* (Sage University Paper series on Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences. No. 07-010). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage

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Table 1: National Elections

BELGIUM
(12/13/87)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Volkunie	8.0	5.9	6.7	2.9
Communist Party KPB/PCB	.8	.6	.5	.3
Party of German Speaking Belgians PDB	.1	-	-	-
FDF	1.2	1.4	.7	.9
Walloon Rally RW	.2	-	-	-
Christian People's Party CVP	19.5	20.0	16.7	13.7
Christian Social Party PSC	8.0	7.9	9.3	6.7
PVVor VLD	11.5	11.7	9.8	14.3
Reform Liberal Party PRL	9.4	10.7	8.2	5.7
Labour Party PVDA/PTB	.7	-	-	-
Socialist Worker's POS/SAP	.5	-	-	-
Ecolo	2.6	7.1	9.4	14.5
Agalev	4.5	-	-	-
UDRT/RAD	.1	.2	.2	.2
Vlaamse Blok	1.9	1.1	2.5	.8
Flemish Socialist Party SP	14.9	10.6	11.9	13.5
Francophone Soc. Party PS	15.7	19.1	19.4	24.3

Table 2: National Elections

DENMARK
(5/10/88)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Conservative People's Party	19.3	21.4	21.3	21.2
Social Democrats	29.8	23.1	25.2	27.2
Radical Liberal Party	5.6	6.4	6.6	5.9
Liberal Party	11.8	16.0	14.2	12.3
Communist Party	.8	1.1	.7	.9
Justice Party	-	.6	.1	-
Socialist People's Party	13.0	14.7	16.9	16.1
Left Socialist Party	.6	.7	.6	.7
Christian People's Party	2.0	1.4	1.9	1.7
Center Democrats	4.7	5.3	2.9	4.0
Progress Party	9.0	6.6	7.2	7.1
Common Course	1.9	.4	.4	.2
The Greens	1.4	1.7	1.1	1.6

Table 3: National Elections

FRANCE
(6/5/88)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Socialist Party PS	36.6	49.1	49.9	46.4
Communist Party PCF	11.2	7.8	6.6	5.8
Conservatives	2.7	-	-	-
RPR	19.1	18.8	18.8	19.3
Other Extreme Right	.1	-	-	-
Other Extreme Left	.4	.7	.8	1.3
Left Radicals	1.2	.1	1.1	.2
Greens Verts	.4	3.0	3.4	4.9
National Front FN	9.8	3.3	3.6	6.1
UDF	19.0	6.2/6.8	6.5/5.1	8.2/4.0

Table 4: National Elections

GERMANY
(1/25/87)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Social Dem Party SPD	37.0	46.4	48.8	45.3
Christian Dem Party CDU	34.5	40.7	38.8	38.8
Christian Social Union CSU	9.8	w/CDU	w/CDU	w/CDU
Free Democratic Party FDP	9.1	4.6	4.0	4.6
Bavaria Party BP	.1	-	-	-
National Dem Party NPD	.6	.5	.5	.4
Greens	8.3	7.3	6.9	9.5
Ecological Dem Party ODP	.3	-	-	-

Table 5: National Elections

GREECE
(6/18/89)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
KKE	-	12.9	14.2	-
Union of the Dem Centre EDIK	.1	-	-	-
Christian Democracy	.2	-	-	-
KKE Interior-Renewal	.3	3.2	3.7	.5
New Democracy	44.3	29.4	31.1	39.6
Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK	39.1	51.3	50.1	39.5
Liberal Party	.1	-	-	-
National Political Union	.3	.5	.2	.2
Independent Muslim List	..5	-	-	-
Democratic Renewal	1.0	-	-	.6
Ecological Movement	.1	-	-	-
Coalition of Left and Progress	13.1	-	-	17.2

Table 6: National Elections

IRELAND
(6/15/89)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Labour Party	9.5	7.1	6.4	9.5
Fianna Fail	44.1	52.0	57.5	50.1
Fine Gael	29.3	29.9	27.1	29.1
Worker's Party	5.0	2.9	2.8	4.7
Sinn Fein	1.2	-	-	.9
Green Party	1.5	.2	.2	.6
Progressive Democrats	5.5	6.1	5.1	3.0

Table 7: National Elections

ITALY
(6/14/87)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Socialist Party PSI	14.3	17.8	17.9	14.4
Republican Party PRI	3.7	4.9	2.9	2.9
Communist Party PCI or PDS	26.6	19.6	21.8	26.1
Sardinian Action Party PSDa	.4	-	-	-
Christian Democracy DC or PPI	34.3	38.1	34.3	35.7
Liberal Party PLI	2.1	1.9	1.6	1.1
Social Democrats PSDI	3.0	1.9	1.4	2.6
Italian Social Movement MSI	5.9	4.4	6.2	4.2
South Tyrol People's Party SVP	.5	-	-	-
Val d'Aosta Union	.1	-	-	-
Radical Party PR	2.6	.9	1.6	1.7
Proletarian Democracy DP	1.7	2.1	2.6	2.5
Venetian League	.8	-	-	-
Lombard League LN	.5	-	-	-
Piedmont-Regional Autonomy	.2	-	-	-
Piedmont	.2	-	-	-
Greens	2.5	3.9	4.2	4.2
Hunting-Fishing-Environment	.1	-	-	-

Table 8: National Elections

LUXEMBOURG
(6/18/89)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Christian Social Party PCS/CSV	32.4	35.8	44.8	33.3
Socialist Worker's Party POSL/LSAP	26.2	34.7	23.5	34.8
Communist Party PCL/KPL	4.4	3.1	1.6	1.4
Green Alternative GAP	3.7	-	-	10.5
Actional Committee	7.9	-	-	-
Ecologists of the North	1.1	3.6	8.2	-
Green List Ecological Initiative	3.7	-	-	1.9
Luxembourg for Luxembourgers	2.3	-	-	.5
Democratic Left	17.2	19.2	16.9	10.9

Table 9: National Elections

NETHERLANDS

(5/21/86)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Communist Party CPN	.6	1.2	.8	.6
Political Reform Party SGP	1.7	1.7	.7	.7
Labour Party PvdA	33.3	33.3	33.4	37.6
VVD	17.4	16.8	18.1	16.0
Reformed Political Union	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.2
Pacifists Socialist Party	1.2	2.6	1.9	2.1
Democrats 66	6.1	8.4	7.9	6.9
Radical Political Party PPR	1.3	1.9	1.7	1.9
Christian Democratic Appeal CDA	34.6	30.8	32.1	30.7
Reformed Pol Federation RPF	.9	.7	.7	1.1
Centre Party	.4	.1	.4	.6
Evangelical People's Party EVP	.2	.2	.2	.1
Socialist Party SP	.4	-	-	-
Centre Democrats	.1	-	-	-

Table 10: National Elections

PORTUGAL
(7/19/87)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Center Socialists CDS	4.4	8.2	4.3	5.1
Communist Party PCP	12.5	6.5	10.8	10.6
Social Dem Party PSD	51.3	42.6	45.0	44.6
Socialist Party PSP	22.8	38.4	36.8	34.6
Democratic Movement MDP	.6	.2	-	.4
Popular Dem Union UDP	.9	-	.7	1.0
Popular Monarchist Party PPM	.4	-	.2	.4
Christian Dem Party PDC	.6	.2	-	.2
Revolutionary Socialist PSR	.6	-	-	-
Socialist Unity Party POUS	.2	-	-	-
Democratic Renewal Party PRD	5.0	1.37	.7	1.2

Table 11: National Elections

SPAIN
(6/22/86)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Socialist Party PSOE	44.3	60.3	57.9	60.3
Communist Party PCE/PSUC	3.8	6.4	7.6	6.8
Catalan Republican Left	.6	-	-	-
Basque Nationalist Party EAJ/PNV	1.5	-	-	-
Popular Party PP	26.1	14.3	15.3	12.3
Andalusian Soc. Party PSA/PA	.5	-	-	-
Aragonese Regionalist Party PAR	.4	-	-	-
Basque Left	.5	-	-	-
Galician Nat. Popular Block BNPG	.1	-	-	-
Galician Socialist Party PSG	.2	-	-	-
Convergence and Unity CiU	5.1	-	-	-
Herri Batasuna	1.2	-	-	-
Valencian Union	.3	-	-	-
Dem and Social Centre CDS	9.2	6.6	7.6	7.9
Communist Unity	1.1	-	-	-
Galician Coalition	.4	-	-	-
Indep. Canary Island AIC	.3	-	-	-
Democratic reform Party PRD	1.0	-	-	-
Greens	.4	-	-	-

Table 12: National Elections

UNITED KINGDOM
(6/11/87)

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Conservative	42.3	47.7	48.0	45.5
Labour	30.8	30.41	31.8	34.2
Sinn Fein	.3	-	-	-
Scottish National Party	1.3	-	-	-
Plaid Cmyru	.4	-	-	-
Ulster Unionist	.9	-	-	-
Democratic Unionist	.3	-	-	-
Alliance Party of NI	.2	-	-	-
Social Democrats and Labor	.5	1.8	2.8	2.3
Green Party	.3	.3	.7	1.1
The Alliance	22.6	16.3	14.3	14.6

Table 13: European Elections

BELGIUM

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
CVP	21.1	17.4	17.2	14.6
PS	14.5	20.0	19.0	20.1
SP	12.4	10.8	8.6	12.7
PVV	10.6	12.2	12.6	11.9
PSC	8.1	7.6	8.4	5.9
AGALEV	7.6	-	-	-
PRL	7.2	12.8	7.5	4.2
ECOLO-V	6.3	8.2	14.1	17.4
VU	5.4	6.0	3.3	3.8
VL. BLOK	4.1	1.2	.2	1.6
ERE-FDF	1.5	1.2	1.7	1.4
REGEBO	.4	-	-	-
PVDA	.3	-	-	-
POS	.2	-	-	-
PTB	.2	-	-	-
LETD	.1	-	-	-
PH-HP	.1	-	-	-

Table 14: European Elections

DENMARK

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Social Democrats	23.3	20.9	24.9	20.7
Radical Liberal Party	2.8	3.6	2.8	2.7
Conservative people's Party	13.3	22.5	20.2	14.8
Center Party	8.0	4.6	2.7	7.6
Socialist People's Party	9.1	11.9	14.4	9.6
People's Party	18.9	9.7	7.1	**17.8**
Christian People's Party	2.7	.7	.5	**2.0**
Liberal Party	16.6	17.9	17.8	17.6
Progress Party	5.3	5.5	7.3	3.4

Table 15: European Elections

FRANCE

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
UDF-RPR	28.9	5.9	5.5	-
Majority for Progress for Europe	23.6	44.7	46.6	25.8
Europe and Fatherland	11.7	2.8	3.3	6.8
Greens	10.6	8.3	13.5	14.6
Centre for Europe	8.4	6.1	5.0	-
Communist Party	7.7	6.7	5.6	4.5
Hunting, Fishing Tradition	4.1	-	-	-
Worker's Struggle	1.4	-	-	1.9
Animal & Environment Protection	1.0	-	-	.9
Alliance	.8	-	-	.9
Movement for a Worker's Party	.6	-	-	1.1
Europe Renovation	.4	-	-	-
Generation Europe	.3	-	-	.1
Rally for a Free France	.2	-	-	-
Initiative for European Democracy	.2	-	-	-

Table 16: European Elections

GERMANY

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Social Dem Party	37.3	42.2	52.2	42.5
Christian Dem Party	29.5	33.5	32.5	33.1
Greens	8.4	7.7	6.2	10.4
Christian Social Union	8.2	w/CDU	w/CDU	w/CDU
Republicans	7.1	-	3.8	5.9
Free Democratic Party	5.6	5.4	4.0	2.8
German People's Union List-D	1.6	-	-	.7
Ecological Democratic Party	.7	.9	-	.8
Bavaria Party	.3	-	.1	-
Communist Party	.2	-	-	.2
Ecological Union	.2	-	-	.2
Christian Centre	.2	-	-	.1
Centre Party	.1	-	-	-
Mature Citizens	.1	-	-	-
Christian League	.1	-	-	-
New Consciousness	.1	-	-	-
Liberal German Labour Party	.1	-	-	-

Table 17: European Elections

GREECE

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
New Democracy	40.4	33.4	33.1	37.6
Panhellenic Socialist Movement	36.0	39.5	40.2	38.4
Coalition of Left and Progress	14.3	2.3	15.7	17.2
Democratic Renewal	1.4	-	.8	.4
National Political Union	1.2	.4	.1	.7
Alternative Ecologists	1.1	-	-	-
Greek Dem. Ecological Movement	1.1	-	-	-
Greek Socialist Movement	.7	-	-	-
KKE Interior-Renewal	.6	1.8	.8	.3
Greek Radical Left	.6	-	-	-
Ecological Movement	.4	-	-	-
Christian Democracy	.4	-	-	-
Liberal Party	.4	-	-	-
Direct Democracy	.4	-	-	-
Union of the Democratic Centre	.3	-	-	-
Unified Nationalist Movement	.2	-	-	-
New Politicians	.2	-	-	-
European Economic Movement	.1.	-	-	-
Independent Movement of Labour	.1	-	-	-
Union of Producers, Merchants and Consumers in Greece	.1	-	-	-
National Fighters' Party	.1	-	-	-

Table 18: European Elections

IRELAND

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Fianna Fail	31.5	49.2	41.5	41.1
Fine Gael	21.6	28.0	19.7	24.2
Labour Party	9.5	7.6	6.4	10.2
Sinn Fein	2.3	-	-	.5
Worker's Party	7.5	3.7	1.9	7.5
Green Party	3.7	1.0	1.6	3.8
Independents	11.9	-	-	5.5
Progressive Democracts	11.9	6.0	3.0	7.2

Table 19: European Elections

ITALY

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Christian Democracy	32.9	36.7	33.2	32.5
Communist Party	27.6	16.1	20.1	23.5
Socialist Party	14.8	22.6	20.6	13.4
Social Movement - MSI	5.5	4.4	5.6	3.5
Liberal and Republican Parties	4.4	5.0	1.9	-
Green List	3.8	6.2	8.4	-
Social Democrats	2.7	1.4	1.0	2.4
Rainbow Greens	2.4	-	-	2.1
Lombard League	1.8	-	-	1.5
Proletarian Democracy	1.3	2.2	1.9	1.4
Anti-Prohibitionists	1.2	-	-	1.0
Federalism	.6	-	-	.2
South Tyrol People's Party	.5	-	-	-
Pensioners' Party	.5	-	-	.4

Table 20: European Elections

LUXEMBOURG

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Christian Social Party	34.9	37.1	50.9	33.3
Socialist Worker's Party	25.4	27.5	22.9	32.8
Democratic Party	20.0	19.8	15.2	11.7
Green List Ecological Initiative	6.1	-	-	2.3
Communist Party	4.7	2.5	.6	.4
Green Alternative	4.3	-	-	11.2
Luxembourg for Luxembourgers	2.9	-	-	1.4
Green Alternative Alliance	.9	-	-	.9
Revolutionary Socialist Party	.6	-	-	.4
Why Not?	.2	-	-	-

Table 21: European Elections

NETHERLANDS

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Christian Democratic Appeal	34.6	28.5	32.1	28.3
Labour Party	30.7	33.2	33.8	35.4
People's Party for Freedom &Dem	13.6	16.1	16.4	14.1
Rainbow	7.0	-	-	8.7
D 66	6.0	11.4	8.2	7.4
Calvinist Political Parties	5.9	-	-	3.8
Centre Democrats	.8	-	-	-
Socialist Party	.7	-	-	.6
Initiative for a European Democracy	.4	.4	-	.5
God with Us	.4	-	-	.1

Table 22: European Elections

PORTUGAL

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
PSD	33.7	37.1	38.1	42.1
PS	29.5	39.6	37.1	31.4
CDU	14.9	6.7	12.3	10.7
CDS	14.6	10.4	8.2	8.6
PPM	2.1	.4	.4	1.5
MDP	1.4	.4	-	.6
UDP	1.1	-	.8	1.3
PSR	.8	-	-	-
PDC	.7	.7	-	.2
PCTP/MRPP	.7	-	-	-
POUS	.3	-	-	-
FER	.2	-	-	-

Table 23: European Elections

SPAIN

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
PSOE	40.2	55.0	52.1	51.7
PP	21.7	11.3	17.3	12.0
CDS	7.3	8.3	7.8	5.8
IU	6.2	8.9	9.1	7.3
CIU	4.3	5.5	4.4	3.6
HB	1.7	-	-	1.0
For the Europe of the Peoples	1.5	-	1.1	.8
Left of the Peoples	1.9	-	1.3	1.5
Nationalist Coalition	1.9	-	.8	1.7
PTE-UC	1.3	-	1.1	1.0
PA	1.3		.8	1.9
Ruiz-Mateos Electors' Assoc	3.9	-	-	-
LV	1.1	-	-	-
VE	1.0	-	-	-
FPR	1.0	-	.2	.2

Table 24: European Elections

UNITED KINGDOM

	ACTUAL	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Conservative	34.7	49.5	45.8	34.1
Labour	40.1	29.5	31.5	34.9
Green Party	14.9	4.1	3.8	15.9
Social and Liberal Democrat	6.2	10.3	12.8	7.4
Scottish National Party	2.6	-	-	-
Plaid Cmyru	.8	-	-	-
Social Democrat Party	.5	1.8	2.2	.7
Independents	.1	-	-	-
Independent Conservative	.1	-	-	-

Table 25

AVERAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL VOTES RECEIVED AND SURVEY RESPONSES for EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Belgium	1.95 (2.32)	2.22 (2.61)	2.53 (3.26)
Denmark	3.48 (3.39)	4.03 (3.69)	1.08 (.76)
France	4.51 (7.47)	4.81 (7.77)	3.86 (7.34)
Germany	1.66 (2.67)	2.16 (3.87)	1.46 (2.30)
Greece	1.52 (2.86)	1.00 (1.69)	.77 (.87)
Ireland	6.58 (5.55)	5.73 (4.01)	3.24 (3.42)
Italy	2.6 (3.21)	2.15 (2.27)	1.31 (1.61)
Luxembourg	2.17 (1.89)	4.24 (4.57)	3.42 (3.19)
Netherlands	3.13 (2.71)	2.58 (2.29)	1.80 (2.09)
Portugal	2.64 (3.32)	2.26 (2.53)	2.05 (2.69)
Spain	3.11 (4.05)	2.07 (3.03)	2.28 (3.51)
United Kingdom	5.02 (5.56)	4.74 (4.63)	1.31 (1.65)

Table 26

AVERAGE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL VOTES RECEIVED AND SURVEY RESPONSES for NATIONAL ELECTIONS

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Belgium	1.48 (1.69)	1.94 (1.91)	3.55 (3.70)
Denmark	1.68 (1.89)	1.51 (1.48)	1.03 (1.07)
France	4.09 (4.15)	4.41 (4.55)	4.04 (3.31)
Germany	4.24 (3.81)	4.54 (4.55)	3.70 (3.19)
Greece	8.62 (6.59)	8.38 (6.27)	1.08 (2.03)
Ireland	2.48 (2.76)	3.77 (4.81)	4.65 (2.32)
Italy	2.18 (2.06)	1.52 (1.53)	.93 (.54)
Luxembourg	3.54 (2.88)	5.06 (4.78)	3.98 (3.37)
Netherlands	.84 (1.15)	.70 (.77)	1.13 (1.45)
Portugal	5.50 (5.34)	3.94 (4.98)	3.64 (4.28)
Spain	8.25 (6.75)	7.45 (5.67)	8.53 (7.45)
United Kingdom	2.68 (2.95)	3.54 (3.36)	3.44 (2.76)

Table 27

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Constant	3.693 (.921) *	3.439 (.789)*	1.308 (.395) *
Survey Results	.740 (.045)*	.744 (.039) *	.889 (.024) *
R*2	.785	.815	.927
n	75	81	106

**p<.001; ** p<.01; ***p<.05*

Table 28

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS

	WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Constant	1.470 (.590) **	1.556 (.584) **	1.257 (.500) ***
Survey Results	.856 (.029) *	.848 (.029) *	.877 (.026) *
R*2	.903	.904	.920
n	90	90	97

**p<.001; ** p<.01; ***p<.05*

Table 29

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

		WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Belgium	R*2	.746	.646	.491
n=10/10/10	Survey Results	.796 (.164) *	.716 (.187)**	.589 (.211)**
	Constant	1.362 (1.869)	2.489 (2.078)	3.606 (2.409)
Denmark	R*2	.625	.587	.967
n=9/9/9	Survey Results	.725 (.212) **	.644 (.204) **	.998 (.069)*
	Constant	3.262 (2.798)	4.117 (2.780)	4.38 (.880)
France	R*2	.205	.187	.839
n=6/6/4	Survey Results	.252 (.248)	.229 (.239)	.667 (.206)
	Constant	12.010 (4.751)	12.106 (4.838)	4.766 (3.175)
Germany	R*2	.998	.976	.992
n=5/4/5	Survey Results	.864 (.020) *	.671 (.074)**	.852 (.043) *
	Constant	.790 (.501)	4.274(2.303)	1.018 (1.073)
Greece	R*2	.892	.948	.987
n=5/5/5	Survey Results	.924 (.185) *	1.002(.134)**	.996 (.071) *
	Constant	4.191 (4.295)	.466 (3.270)	-.282 (1.810)
Ireland	R*2	.969	.932	.959
n=6/6/6	Survey Results	.538 (.048)*	.632 (.085)*	.707 (.072)*
	Constant	5.711 (1.128)**	6.476 (1.621)**	3.202 (1.489)

**p<.001; ** p<.01; ***p<.05*

Table 29 continued

		WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Italy	R*2	.807	.885	.988
n=8/8/6	Survey Results	.885 (.176) *	.938 (.144) *	1.038 (.057) *
	Constant	1.157 (2.926)	.229(2.300)	.853 (.993)
Luxembourg	R*2	.997	.902	.853
n=4/4/4	Survey Results	.862 (.028) *	.568 (.132)***	.718 (.210)
	Constant	2.519 (.705)	8.526 (3.823	7.211 (5.065)
Netherlands	R*2	.923	.968	.929
n=5/4/5	Survey Results	1.094 (.181)**	1.082 (.137)***	1.001 (.159)**
	Constant	-2.556 (3.893)	-3.273 (3.452)	-.066 (3.425)
Portugal	R*2	.918	.951	.946
n=7/5/7	Survey Results	.751 (.100)*	.717 (.093)**	.795 (.084)*
	Constant	3.616 (2.108)	5.178 (2.303)	3.041 (1.731)
Spain	R*2	.855	.942	.894
n=5/5/5	Survey Results	.673 (.159) ***	.755 (.107) **	.714 (.141) ***
	Constant	3.946 (4.123)	2.242 (2.722)	4.451 (3.421)
United Kingdom	R*2	.714	.746	.988
n=5/5/5	Survey Results	.728 (.265)	.797 (.268)	1.118 (.069)*
	Constant	5.402 (6.976)	3.959 (6.866)	-1.526 (1.621)

*$p<.001$; ** $p<.01$; ***$p<.05$

Table 30

REGRESSION RESULTS FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS

		WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Belgium	R*2	.888	.824	.558
n=12/12/12	Survey Results	.917 (.102) *	.958 (.139) *	.634 (.178)**
	Constant	.440 (1.059)	.184 (1.391)	2.627 (1.968)
Denmark	R*2	.910	.937	.969
n=12/12/12	Survey Results	1.021 (.102)*	.975 (.079)*	.978 (.054)*
	Constant	-.086 (1.163)	.277 (.946)	.258 (.655)
France	R*2	.896	.872	.885
n=8/8/8	Survey Results	.725 (.100)*	.709 (.110)*	.775 (.113)*
	Constant	3.526 (1.948)	3.719 (2.157)	2.890 (2.117)
Germany	R*2	.985	.973	.982
n=5/5/5	Survey Results	.757 (.053)*	.736 (.070)*	.794 (.062)*
	Constant	2.822 (1.485)	3.316 (1.974)	2.227 (1.379)
Greece	R*2	.792	.828	.992
n=4/4/4	Survey Results	.890 (.322)	.922 (.297)	1.056 (..065)**
	Constant	2.207 (9.543)	1.367 (8.774)	-.072 (1.820)
Ireland	R*2	.991	.968	.993
n=6/6/6	Survey Results	.829 (.039)*	.752 (.068)*	.868 (.035)*
	Constant	2.234 (.970)	3.386 (1.785)	1.777 (.843)

**p<.001; ** p<.01; ***p<.05*

Table 30 continued

		WAVE 1	WAVE 2	WAVE 3
Italy	R*2	.934	.964	.992
n=10/10/10	Survey Results	.936 (.087)*	1.012 (.068)*	.964 (.029)*
	Constant	.723 (1.304)	.097 (.982)	.469 (.446)
Luxembourg	R*2	.969	.848	.895
n=5/5/4	Survey Results	.834 (.085)*	.747 (.182)***	.693 (.167)
	Constant	.177 (2.041)	.2.061(4.408)	6.100 (4.135)
Netherlands	R*2	.991	.994	.979
n=12/12/12	Survey Results	1.064 (.031)*	1.032 (.024)*	.988 (.045)*
	Constant	-.560 (.450)	-.351 (.359)	.029 (.679)
Portugal	R*2	.819	.843	.901
n=7/5/7	Survey Results	.894 (.187)**	.889 (.221)***	.952 (.141)*
	Constant	1.403 (4.143)	1.846 (5.870)	.731 (3.076)
Spain	R*2	.842	.847	.807
n=4/4/4	Survey Results	.649 (.198)	.697 (.208)	.638 (.220)
	Constant	6.628 (6.209)	5.429 (6.356)	6.919 (6.868)
United Kingdom	R*2	.958	.935	.943
n=5/5/5	Survey Results	.909 (.109)**	.894 (.135)**	.918 (.130)**
	Constant	1.742 (2.879)	1.848 (3.598)	1.356 (3.429)

*$p<.001$; ** $p<.01$; *** $p<.05$