

Waiting for a voice - the political opportunity structure of opposition to European integration in Germany.

CHARLES LEES

Abstract

The paper is built on four propositions. First, that there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, that at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the 'dark matter' of German politics. Third, that the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent 'enlightenment' of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, that these systemic disincentives are to be found within the formal institutions of the German polity. The paper posits the idea of 'hard' versus 'soft' Eurosceptical agendas, and 'demos constraining' versus 'demos shaping' strategies for their promotion. The paper argues that political agents' choice of strategy depends on the nature of the institutions available to them and the type of political opportunity structures they provide. Thus, the German system of federalism – which is moderately demos constraining – suggests a demos constraining strategy, whilst the Federal level party system – where the demos is shaped – makes a demos shaping strategy more appropriate. The paper concludes by arguing that the institutional configuration of the Federal Republic provides a poor political opportunity structure for Eurosceptic agendas, and that only 'soft' agendas – harnessed to demos constraining strategies – are likely to have any impact on the future development of the European debate in Germany.

Panel: 'Comparative Case Studies of Party-Based Euroscepticism'.

First draft. Any comments to Dr. Charles Lees, Lecturer in IR and Politics, School of European Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QN, United Kingdom.

Email: c.s.j.lees@sussex.ac.uk

Introduction

Euroscepticism - the 'dark matter' of German politics

At first glance, this paper is an exercise in counter-factual argument. In seeking to explain the political opportunity structure of Euroscepticism in the Federal Republic of Germany, one is not trying to describe the existence of a political phenomena but, rather, to account for its apparent absence. On the face of it, this would appear to be a difficult task. Political elites within the Federal Republic of Germany have always considered their country to be the *Musterknabe* (model boy) of the European Union. In no other large member state has the elite consensus around the European project been so stable. Even in France - the other motor of integration - there have been elite conflicts over the limits of political and economic integration, most notably within the Gaullist Right. Germany, by contrast, has enjoyed decades of cross-party consensus on the desirability of pooled political sovereignty and increased economic interdependence. The stability of this consensus has been enhanced by a compliant media, a relatively pro-European mood amongst the general public, benign institutions/norms of governance (multi-level governance analogous to the EU, a traditional wariness of populist politics amongst elites, and constitutional constraints on the use of plebiscites and referenda), as well as an open economy that has made the most of the opportunities presented by the Common Market and Single Market programmes.

But this is not the whole story, and there are two key factors that suggest that the potential exists for the emergence of a more 'sceptical' European agenda in the Federal Republic of Germany. The first factor is elite opinion itself. The consensus that coalesced around Germany's European policy has never been complete and is currently under some pressure. Elite opinion remains broadly pro-European but German unification, and the changes it has brought, have broken the cross-party consensus. On the Left, the Social Democratic SPD flirted briefly with a more sceptical approach to Europe in the mid-1990s, whilst the post-Communist PDS remains hostile to further integration (the Greens, by contrast, are very pro-EU). On the Right, the Christian Democratic CDU remains pro-EU but its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, is resisting some elements of the integration process (Bayern is increasingly proactive in forging cross-party alliances at the state level in order to

defend state interests and has also developed links with Jorg Haidar's Peoples' Party in neighbouring Austria). Thus, the stakes surrounding the debate have been raised. Last year's speech in Berlin by Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer, and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's more recent endorsement of an internal SPD discussion paper on political union are evidence that Germany remains at the vanguard of the push for further integration. However, the Schröder initiative in particular was seen in Germany as just as much an attempt to neutralise 'Europe' as an issue in the run-up to the 2002 Bundestag electionsⁱ, as it was a genuine contribution to the ongoing debate on political structures which is bound to precede the next Intergovernmental Conference in 2004.

The fact that the Schröder initiative was regarded as partly an election ploy is indicative of the second key factor in the equation: public opinion. Public opinion remains uneasy about the pace and scope of integration. Much of this unease is focused on the replacement of the strong D-mark with what is at present a chronically weak Euro, with a recent opinion poll showing 63% of the public to be opposed to monetary union. Such levels of opposition are nothing new: ever since the 1970s, roughly two-thirds of the German population have opposed the idea of monetary unionⁱⁱ. More recently the enlargement of the European Union has also become a moot point, with a substantial minority of those polled expressing some hostility to the projectⁱⁱⁱ.

Nevertheless, such a disjuncture between elite and popular opinion is not new in the Federal Republic and, in a polity where an incumbent government has only once been removed at the ballot box, elites have found it relatively easy to resist the siren call of populist politics. Thus, Euroscepticism remains the 'dark matter' of German politics - we cannot see it, but we must assume it is there. So why has it not found an effective political voice within the Federal Republic's demos?

Aims and Structure

The paper aims to account for the lack of a strong Eurosceptic agenda in Germany to date, as well as to provide some pointers as to where such an agenda might come from in the future. The paper takes a rational actor approach and works from the assumption that German politicians are as opportunistic as any others, and the lack of such an agenda is due less to their own 'enlightenment' on European matters and more to the pattern of institutional constraints found in the Federal Republic. In other

words, the coercive, normative and informational variables within the political institutions of the Federal Republic - what Kitschelt calls its political opportunity structure^{iv} - have, up to now, made the pursuit of a Eurosceptical agenda difficult, unrewarding and, for instrumental politicians, an irrational course of action.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the paper's theoretical grounding is set out - with a discussion as to how we can categorise 'Eurosceptic' agendas, why institutions are crucial to their success or failure, and, as a result, what constitutes a political opportunity structure. Following on from this, the core of the paper is given over to an analysis of the political opportunity structure in the Federal Republic of Germany. Finally, the paper concludes with an assessment of the future prospects for what remains at present a disparate opposition to the European project.

Theory

Defining Euroscepticism

The use of the phrase 'Euroscepticism' is problematic. It is not a social scientific term, but rather a self-ascribed categorisation that entered the political discourse towards the end of the 1980s and gained popular recognition during the Maastricht Treaty ratification process in the UK in the early 1990s^v. At the time, the term was an accurate description of the public pronouncements of those who identified themselves as Eurosceptics. These individuals were to be found mainly on the Right of the Conservative party (in particular, those associated with the Bruges group of Thatcherite MPs) and, to a lesser extent, what remained of the 'Bennite' left of the Labour party. However as the Conservative party drifted rightwards during the 1990s, the issue-salience of 'Europe' rose significantly and, as the Right grew in confidence, the discourse of Euroscepticism became one of outright Europhobia. At the same time, there remains a body of genuinely 'sceptical' MPs in all of the major parties. As a result, Euroscepticism *per se* is no longer a sufficient descriptive category and needs to be unpacked.

In recent years, a substantial literature has emerged examining the basis and extent of Euroscepticism in EU member states^{vi}. The approach and scope of this work

is heterogeneous, but a common theme throughout is that the configuration of party politics in specific member states goes a long way to determining the spread of party positions on Europe within the demos. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak continue this party politics focus and come to a number of explicit theoretical positions on Euroscepticism. Taggart and Szczerbiak start from a basic description of Euroscepticism as ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’^{vii}, and then develop a binary division between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. ‘Hard’ Euroscepticism is defined as the outright rejection of the integration project in its current form and opposition to their country joining, or remaining in the EU, whilst ‘soft’ Euroscepticism is contingent or qualified opposition. The authors then go on to further differentiate between two types of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism: that of ‘policy’ and ‘national interest’ Euroscepticism. Policy-based Euroscepticism is not incompatible with overall support for European integration, but focuses on opposition to the extension of EU competencies in specific policy domains. National-interest Euroscepticism is also compatible with overall support for European integration, but involves the use of rhetoric defending the national interest in order to shore up domestic support bases^{viii}.

For the purposes of this paper, the Taggart/Szczerbiak typology’s focus on party politics and division between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ variants of Euroscepticism works well as a robust and intuitively plausible basis for analysis. However, I consider the further division between ‘policy’ and national-interest’ forms of soft Euroscepticism to be superfluous. There are three reasons for this. First, the rhetorical use of the national interest in order to shore up domestic support is part of the basic toolkit of any serious politician - even the arch-integrationist Helmut Kohl resorted to it from time to time (for instance, during negotiations on the remit of the European Central Bank in the mid-1990s). In fact, it would be hard to find a politician of substance who has not indulged in this type of rhetoric and, given that practically all national politicians would fall into this classification, it is meaningless as a sub-category. Second, having discounted national interest rhetoric, I would suggest that all substantive objections to EU integration that fall short of ‘hard’ Euroscepticism are, in practice, objections about policy. These may be broad-brush objections about policy processes (such as the breadth and scope of EU competencies) and objectives (for instance, the overall shape of the EU’s political economy or its international role), or

they may focus on more specific policy domains (such as Justice and Home Affairs, or Labour Market policy). Nevertheless, they are policy-oriented objections that are qualified rather than absolute and, therefore, resolvable through negotiation at the inter-governmental level. Therefore, they remain compatible with the spirit of the EU project. Finally, if one accepts that the division between the ‘national-interest’ and ‘policy’ strands of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism is contested and not absolutely essential, it should be discarded on the grounds that it compounds the perennial comparative politics problem of ‘too many variables and too few cases’.

That being said, the simplified Taggart/Szczerbiak model can be adapted to provide three robust categories on which one can map the positions of political parties in Germany. These are set out in Table One, below.

Table One. A Typology of Party Positions on European Integration in the Federal Republic of Germany

<i>European Consensus</i>	<i>‘Soft’ Euroscepticism</i>	<i>‘Hard’ Euroscepticism</i>
SPD	Elements of SPD left	PDS
Greens	National-Liberal FDP	DVU/NPD/Reps.
FDP	Elements of CDU right	
CDU/CSU*	CSU <i>Landesverband</i>	

* the CDU and CSU are members of a joint Parliamentary faction in the Bundestag and are, therefore, effectively a single party at the Federal level.

The first, and dominant, category is that of the pro-European consensus, encompassing all of the mainstream parties at the Federal level of party politics. The second category is that of ‘soft’ Euroscepticism and encompasses elements of the SPD’s left-wing, the ‘national-liberal’ faction within the centrist FDP, parts of the CDU’s right-wing, and the dominant faction in the *Landesverband* (state party organisation) of the CDU’s sister party the CSU (led by Minister-President Edmund Stoiber). Of these it is the CSU *Landesverband* that is of the most interest, because it touches upon the issue of German federalism and the potential political opportunities that it might provide for a Eurosceptical agenda. This is discussed further later in the

paper. Finally, the third category encompasses the post-Communist PDS on the Left and the three far right parties, the DVU, NPD and Republican party. Of itself, this third category is less important than that of 'soft' Euroscepticism, because it is made up of the fringe parties of the Left and Right. However, the PDS' position is quite fluid at present and the possibility exists that it may escape its current pariah status and become a significant force to the left of the SPD at the Federal level (this is already the case in the eastern German states, where it 'tolerated' a Red-Green coalition in Sachsen-Anhalt during the mid-1990s and is currently junior partner to the SPD in the ruling coalition in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern). The implications of this - and that of all the parties' positions on Europe - are also discussed later in the paper.

Institutions as political opportunity structures

Implicit within this paper's focus on the political opportunity structures of Euroscepticism in Germany is the assumption that institutions are crucial to its success or failure. But what, in the context of this argument, constitutes an institution? One useful starting point is Peter Hall's structuralist definition of institutions which, he argues, includes 'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy'^{ix}. This approach is echoed by G. John Ikenberry, who argues that institutions operate on three levels: ranging 'from specific characteristics of government institutions, to the more overarching structures of the state, to the nation's normative social order'^x. Game theorists, on the other hand, tend to take a minimalist approach to institutions; for instance William Riker regards them as little more than 'congealed tastes'^{xi}, whilst Elinor Ostrom describes them as simply 'prescriptions about which actions are required, prohibited or permitted'^{xii}.

As already noted, this paper takes a rational actor approach in that it assumes that politicians are instrumental utility maximisers rather than cultural dupes. Nevertheless, institutions provide the arenas within which political agency is practised and they are more than just passive settings for such agency. Therefore, this paper works from the assumption that institutions are autonomous and, to an extent, 'are political actors in their own right'^{xiii}. As such, they constitute a series of veto points on political agency, often forcing politicians to adopt 'satisficing' strategies^{xiv}, in which the 'best' option is eschewed for one that is good enough. Thus, institutions

curb the behaviour of politicians: privileging path-dependent strategies which, in the context of this paper, tend to be ones that re-enforce the dominant pro-European consensus. The nature and scope of these institutions can be placed on a continuum, ranging from formal legally-codified practices through to more inchoate organisational networks and norms. However, for the purposes of this paper, it is the more formal institutions – and the practices and norms associated with them – that provide the critical mass that makes up the German political opportunity structure.

This focus on the more formal institutions is not incompatible with the paper's assumption that politicians are instrumental agents. After all, political opportunity structures are only important if there are political opportunists around to take advantage of them! By-and-large, the political opportunity structure literature has focused on the opportunities presented to social movements, but I would argue that they can also apply to political entrepreneurs using the more conventional route of party politics. For instance, Sidney Tarrow describes political opportunity structures as 'consistent....dimensions of the political environment' and goes on to say that 'state structures create stable opportunities, but it is changing opportunities within states that provide the openings'^{xv} for political action. These 'changing opportunities' come about through shifts in the configuration of institutional power, and can be grasped by social movements and political parties alike.

But what are the key institutions in which such shifts in the configuration of power might take place? For conventional political entrepreneurs, the arenas for political agency remain the core institutions of the formal polity. These core institutions – and political agents' strategies for utilising them - can be classified as either 'demos constraining' or 'demos shaping' in nature. This dichotomy builds upon the work of Alfred Stepan, who constructed a framework for the comparative analysis of federal systems by placing them along a 'demos-constraining-demos-enabling' continuum^{xvi}. To this category of demos constraining institutions, I have added a second category, that of 'demos-shaping', which should be interpreted as those institutions within which it is possible to shape or shift the parameters of power and discourse within the central demos (rather than constraining it from without). The new 'demos constraining-demos shaping' dichotomy maps onto the institutions of the Federal Republic as follows:

- Dimension one: German federalism as ‘demos constraining’, including the division of competencies between the Federation and the *Länder*, Bundestag-Bundesrat relations and state-level coalitions.
- Dimension two: the Federal party system as ‘demos shaping’, including the role of multi-party systems, proportional representation, political competition and election outcomes (coalition government).

Because institutions are path-dependent and the pro-European consensus is so entrenched, the paper works from the assumption that it is the ‘demos constraining’ dimension that holds the greater potential as a political opportunity structure (and, therefore demos constraining strategies that will be more successful). As a result, more space is given to assessing the potential of this dimension. The paper now turns to a detailed analysis of these two dimensions of Germany’s political opportunity structure.

German federalism and ‘demos constraining’ strategies

How ‘demos-constraining’ is German federalism?

The classification of state ‘types’ is the meat-and-drink of comparative politics and, more often than not, these typologies involve some kind of schematic about state structure and subsequent assumptions about the political consequences of such structures. This paper starts from the minimalist classification, which is uncontested within the comparative politics literature, of Germany as a federal state. In this, it shares six institutional characteristics with other modern federations such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Switzerland. First, in all of these states, there are at least two constitutionally-protected tiers of government, acting directly on the people. Second, the allocation of jurisdiction and resources to the tiers is constitutionally-codified. Third, where overlaps of constitutional jurisdiction exist, ‘federal comity’ is preserved through provisions for shared rule. Fourth, the composition and practices of central institutions include some degree of constitutionally protected representation of regional and minority views. Fifth, any

amendment of the constitution requires the endorsement of a stated proportion of the governments or electorates of the constituent units. Finally, in each of the constituent parts of the federation, there is an ‘umpire’ to adjudicate on constitutional matters (in Germany, this is the Federal Constitutional Court)^{xvii}.

That being said, however, all federations are not the same. William Riker dichotomises federal systems into ‘decentralised federalism’ versus ‘centralised federalism’^{xviii}. However, as already noted, for the purposes of this paper Alfred Stepan’s ‘demos constraining-demos enabling’ continuum is a more fruitful source of differentiation as it encompasses the idea of federalism as both an institutional restraint upon, and facilitator of, political agency. Stepan starts from the assumption that ‘all democratic federations, *qua* federations, are centre constraining’. There are four reasons for this. First, as noted above, federations are characterised by constitutional checks and balances that protect the powers of the constituent units against the centre. Therefore, the demos at the centre must accept that some issue areas are constitutionally beyond their jurisdiction. Second, the existence of constitutionally protected sub-national tiers of government means that the demos is diffused into multiple demoi and divided into multiple authority structures. Third, federal constitutions require a certain level of assent from the constituent parts before amendment is possible (remembering that the hardest rules to change are decision rules that require a positive vote from those who nevertheless benefit from the status quo). Finally, as a corollary to the previous three factors, federal constitutions tend to be more complex than those for unitary states. As a result, they tend to privilege the importance of the judiciary as an arbitrator of boundary disputes and enhance its status as a political actor in its own right^{xix}. Taken together, these four factors inherent to federalism provide a potential platform for the promotion of ‘oppositionalist’ agendas (such as Euroscepticism) against the consensus of the central demos. Not only, as Tarrow observes, do ‘decentralised states provide a multitude of targets at the base’^{xx} of the polity for interest groups promoting such agendas; they also provide constitutionally-protected and independently-resourced platforms from which to launch a more formal and institutionalised strategy of opposition^{xxi}.

Nevertheless, the question remains as to what extent does the specifically German system of federalism provide such a potential for opposition. In other words, where is the Federal Republic placed along Stepan’s ‘demos constraining-demos

enabling' continuum? Stepan operationalises his continuum by mapping the institutional characteristics of a number of modern federations (including the United States, Brazil, India, Austria, Belgium and Germany) onto four key variables, each of which comes with an *a priori* proposition about its demos-constraining qualities. These are set out in Table Two below.

Table Two. Stepan's Four 'Demos Constraining - Demos Enabling' Variables^{xxii}

<i>Variable 1:</i>	The degree of overrepresentation in the territorial chamber.
Proposition:	The greater the overrepresentation of the less populous states (and thus the underrepresentation of the more populous states) the greater the demos-constraining potential of the territorial chamber.
<i>Variable 2:</i>	The 'policy scope' of the territorial chamber.
Proposition:	The greater the 'policy scope' of the chamber that represents the principle of territory, the greater the potential to limit the lawmaking powers of the chamber that represents the population.
<i>Variable 3:</i>	The degree to which policy making is constitutionally allocated to super majorities or to subunits of the federation.
Proposition:	The greater the amount of policy making competencies that are constitutionally prescribed as requiring super majorities or as being beyond the lawmaking powers of the central government, the greater the demos is constrained.
<i>Variable 4:</i>	The degree to which the party system is politywide in its orientation and incentive systems.
Proposition:	The more political parties are disciplined parties whose incentive systems, especially concerning nominations, privileges politywide interests over provincial and local interests, the more politywide parties can mitigate the inherent demos limiting characteristics of federalism.

Overall, Stepan places Germany's system of federalism around the middle of his comparative ranking. In terms of the first variable, the degree of overrepresentation of the territorial chamber, the least overrepresented system is Belgium (with a Gini-

coefficient of overrepresentation of 0.015), whilst the most overrepresented is Brazil (with a coefficient of 0.52). Germany, by contrast has a coefficient of 0.32^{xxiii}.

Nevertheless, Germany's middle-ranking still represents a significant degree of territorial overrepresentation. For instance, under the 1949 Basic Law (amended after Unification), all German states have between three and six votes in the second chamber, the Bundesrat. Thus, the most populous state, North-Rhine Westphalia, has only six votes with which to represent 17,893,045 people. Similarly Bayern, another large state with a population of 11,993,484, also has six votes. At the other end of the scale the city-state of Hamburg, with a population of 1,705,900, has three votes - as does Bremen, the smallest of the German states, with a population of only 679,757^{xxiv}. To sum up, the demos constraining potential of this degree of overrepresentation is considerable.

In terms of the second variable, the degree of 'policy scope' of the second chamber, the Bundesrat's competencies are fairly modest. Unlike the United States, where the principle of 'symmetry of policy scope' has often led to legislative gridlock, the German system of federalism accords the Bundesrat much less policy scope - although this has changed recently. In the early years of the Federal Republic, only 40 per cent of Bundestag legislation required Bundesrat assent, but this rose to around 60 per cent in the 1990's. Moreover, much of this increased legislative consent ratio was the result of concessions won by the German states during the Maastricht Treaty ratification process. Bundesrat consent is now required when European legislation impacts on those policy competencies reserved for the constituent states (*Verwaltung als eigene Angelegenheit*), such as Education and Science^{xxv}. In addition to these enhanced 'European' powers, the tendency in recent years for there to be divided majorities in the two chambers has increased the importance of the Bundesrat's power of 'suspensive veto', which forces contested legislation to be considered by a joint committee. This tactic was used particularly effectively by the SPD, under the leadership of Oskar Lafontaine, in the last years of the previous Kohl administration in the mid-1990s and, to a lesser extent, by the CDU/CSU at present^{xxvi}.

Ranking of countries according to the third variable, the degree to which policy making is constitutionally allocated to supermajorities or to subunits of the federation, also places Germany about half-way along the 'demos constraining-demos enabling' continuum. However, analysis of this variable yields an interesting

dichotomy. On the one hand, Article 31 of the Basic Law states that ‘Federal law shall take precedence over *Land* law’, which means that, in terms of lawmaking power, the central demos is far less constrained in Germany than it is in, for instance, the United States. On the other hand, whereas in the United States many federal programmes are administered by federal employees, the vast majority of German federal programmes are administered by *Länder* officials^{xxvii}. This implementation function provides another set of veto points that potentially constrain the majoritarian pro-European consensus and provide a platform for alternative agendas.

Finally, in terms of Stepan’s final variable, the degree to which the party system is polity-wide in its orientation and incentive systems, Germany ranks highly. This means that, compared with other federations such as Brazil, India, and the USA, Germany’s party system displays strong centralising tendencies. Politywide parties control almost all of the seats in the two chambers and exert a high degree of party discipline over their members. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, the configuration of the German party system is not particularly demos constraining - although in recent years it has become more constrained as the Bundesrat has increasingly used its suspensive veto over Bundestag legislation^{xxviii}.

Consequences for demos-constraining Eurosceptic strategies

So what does Germany’s ranking along Stepan’s ‘demos constraining-demos enabling’ continuum tell us about the potential of German federalism as a political opportunity structure for Eurosceptical agendas? Here it is helpful to return to Taggart and Szczerbiak’s distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism.

As already noted, the party political champions of hard Euroscepticism are located on the fringes of the political spectrum. Of these, the far right parties (the DVU, NPD and Republicans) are not represented in the Bundestag and therefore have no direct influence within the central demos. On the other hand, the post-communist PDS is the fourth biggest party in the Bundestag with 35 seats. However, this support is almost exclusively concentrated in the ‘new Federal states’ of the former German Democratic Republic and strongly reliant on high shares of the vote in the eastern half of Berlin. Moreover, the PDS is highly dependent on directly-elected ‘constituency’ seats (allocated on the number of first votes cast) as well as the list seats (allocated through second votes) on which small parties normally rely.

What this means is that all of the 'hard' Eurosceptical parties are reliant on the territorial dimension of German federalism - albeit for different reasons. So what opportunities does this territorial dimension present? As far as the right-wing parties are concerned, the answer is very little. All three far right parties have been reasonably successful in gaining representation at the lowest levels of German governance, those of the *Kommune* and *Gemeinde*, but political activity at this level has little or no outside impact and is of no use in terms of agenda-setting. By contrast the *Land* level is a much more effective arena for political action, not least because of *Land* governments' direct input into national politics through the Bundesrat. However, where far right parties have entered *Land* legislatures (such as in West Berlin in 1989, when the Republicans gained 7.5 per cent of the vote and 11 seats in the state legislature^{xxix}), they have been shunned by the other parties^{xxx}. As a result, far right parties have never had the opportunity to shape the political agenda at any significant level of governance in the Federal Republic. Thus, they are insignificant as a platform for a serious challenge to the pro-European consensus.

The position of the PDS, however, is different. Despite initial predictions that it would disappear quickly after unification, the post-communists have consolidated themselves as a strong regional party in the new Federal states of eastern Germany^{xxxi}, to the extent that support for the PDS in some areas - such as parts of the former East Berlin - is well in excess of 30 per cent^{xxxii}. The PDS' strong showing in *Land* elections in the east has made them a significant player at that level of governance. As already noted, by the mid-1990s the party had taken on a 'kingmaker' function by 'tolerating' the formation of a Red-Green coalition in the state of Sachsen-Anhalt and, more recently, has been the junior partner in coalition with the SPD in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. This so-called 'Red-Red' coalition is regarded by some as the template for other coalitions in the east, most notably in the state of Sachsen where the PDS are the second strongest party after the CDU^{xxxiii}.

If the PDS could consolidate its position in the eastern states, it may well become a more significant player within the central demos. There are two reasons for this. First, as William M. Downs suggests, there are vertical linkages between national and sub-national governments. These are of a two-way nature, with the experience of sub-national government arrangements constituting a bottom-up flow of information - a 'feedback' effect - to national party elites and providing a template for future coalitions at the national level^{xxxiv}. Because of this, sub-national coalitions

have indirect ‘demos-shaping’ qualities. Second, the principle of territorial overrepresentation within the Bundesrat provides the potential for a small number of PDS-influenced states to wield a disproportionate influence within the second chamber and, therefore, exercise restraint on the central demos. This ‘demos constraining’ role could potentially be further enhanced by the delicate balance of partisan power within the Bundesrat, which enhances the role of small blocking minorities.

However, although the PDS has the potential to mount a significant challenge to the pro-European consensus, I do not believe that this will in practice be a ‘hard’ Eurosceptical agenda of the type described by Taggart and Szczerbiak. Again, there are two reasons for this. First, even with the enhanced European competences enjoyed by the German states, the salience of ‘European’ issues at the *Land* level remains quite low. There are certain policy domains, such as Education and Science, where the states complain of undue interference from the European Union, and they have been successful in getting the Federal government to take up these issues on their behalf. Nevertheless, these are not the kind of policy issues that would form the core of a fundamental challenge to the European project. Second, the PDS is not (and will probably never) be in a position to govern alone in any of the eastern states. Therefore, it must go into coalition with either the SPD or the CDU^{xxxv} and be bound by a formal coalition agreement. Given that, as already noted, the composition and performance of state-level coalitions have consequences at the Federal level, it is hard to imagine any circumstances in which the SPD would countenance entering into a coalition with the PDS without assurances from its junior partner that it would not question one of the fundamental orthodoxies of the central demos^{xxxvi}. Thus, if the PDS were to use the state-level to launch a challenge to the pro-European consensus, such a challenge would be of a pragmatic issue-by-issue nature rather than an all-out assault. In other words, the logic of coalition government rules out the possibility of using *Land* government as the platform for a hard Eurosceptic agenda.

Nevertheless, the *Land* level of governance has been used as a vehicle for policy-specific objections to the European project. In recent years, state parties of the SPD, CDU and CSU have all challenged aspects of the European integration process or clashed with the European Commission over particular policy areas.

The SPD’s brief flirtation with a more Eurosceptical position took place in the run-up to March 1996 state elections in Baden-Württemberg. The elections took

place during a period of high issue-salience for the topic of EMU and, encouraged by opinion poll data that showed that as much as 80 per cent of the population harboured doubts about the stability of the European currency^{xxxvii}, the local SPD attempted to exploit the issue during the election campaign. In a strategy endorsed by the party's national leadership, including Oskar Lafontaine and Gerhard Schröder, the state SPD's candidate for Minister-President, Dieter Spöri, likened EMU to a programme for committing harakiri! In particular, he questioned the timing and scope of the EMU process, arguing for a delay of at least five years and, in the meantime, a re-introduction of narrow currency fluctuation margins within the European Monetary System. On top of these specific proposals, Spöri expressed wider doubts about the advisability of going ahead with EMU without all of the major EU economies on board and poured scorn on the proposed name of the common currency, the Euro, which he said lacked appeal and was evidence of how 'unprofessionally monetary union had been prepared'^{xxxviii}. Spöri's criticisms of the EMU process were labelled populist by his opponents but, nevertheless, many observers believed that the state SPD would benefit from making EMU a campaign issue. But, in the event, the SPD's share of the vote dropped from 29.5 per cent in the previous election to 25.1 per cent. In fact, the only apparent beneficiary of the SPD's campaign was the far right Republican party, which gained 9.1 per cent of the vote. Subsequent analysis indicated that the SPD's stance on EMU was regarded as inconsistent and opportunistic and that only the Republicans, which had consistently opposed EMU, benefited from further raising the salience of EMU as an issue^{xxxix}. Not surprisingly, since 1996 the SPD has avoided a repeat of the Baden-Württemberg strategy.

The most notable example of a CDU state party defying the pro-European consensus also occurred in 1996, when the eastern state of Sachsen granted a subsidy of DM 779 million to Volkswagen, which operated a plant in the town of Mosel. In June 1996, the European Commission declared the subsidy illegal under EU competition law, prompting CDU Minister President Kurt Biedenkopf to issue a legal challenge to the decision^d. Although the issue was finally resolved, it generated much resentment about a perceived encroachment on the rights of the German states. Moreover, when the terms and conditions of EMU were being ratified by the Bundesrat in 1998, Sachsen was the only German state that abstained in the vote (all the others voted in favour) – indicating that the state government was still smarting from what it regarded as interference from Brussels.

Although embarrassing to the CDU's national leadership, the row over subsidies in Sachsen did not constitute a coherent critique of the dominant EU consensus. At present, the only state that has developed anything like an alternative agenda for the European Union is Bayern. As already noted, the state is governed by the CDU's sister-party the CSU, which is regarded as more conservative than the CDU on social and economic issues and fiercely defensive of Bayern's special status within Germany and, by implication, the EU. At the Federal level, the CDU and CSU operate as effectively a single party, with a joint parliamentary faction in the Bundestag. The CSU's self-ascribed role within this arrangement is as a 'conservative corrective' to the both the CDU's moderate wing and also, prior to the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition losing power in 1998, to the influence of the liberal FDP. However, the CSU's centre of gravity resides at the state level and here the CSU *Landesverband* articulates a more aggressively 'Bavarian' agenda. Amongst other things, this agenda feeds off the state's sense of 'otherness' within the Federal Republic and, as a rich state, resentment at the level of fiscal transfers between rich and poor states. Moreover, in recent years, Minister President Edmund Stoiber has reacted to the ongoing Europeanisation of policy-making in the Federal Republic by developing a 'Bavarian' position on some of the key areas of the European project. This process began in earnest following the post-1989 changes in central and eastern Europe, when Bayern came out clearly in support of the enlargement of the European Union. Bayern's position was often framed within a discourse that stressed the historical and moral responsibility of Germany to the region. However, underlying this were two elements of *realpolitik*. The first involved the need to stabilise the region and enhance Bayern's 'security', which the state government regarded as threatened by upheaval in the east. The second element involved the issue-linkage of enlargement to reform of the EU itself and, in particular, the rolling back of what was seen as Brussels interventionism. Over the decade, this discourse developed to the point that it has been described by Charlie Jeffery and Stephen Collins as 'an anti-interventionist position that has come close at times to UK-style Euroscepticism'^{xli}. Key positions adopted by Bayern include a re-emphasis of the principle of subsidiarity, reform of the system of structural funds, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (with a shift from funding production to income support for farmers), and restrictions on the free movement of persons within the Union. Taken together, these proposals look very much like the kind of 'soft' Eurosceptic agenda described by Taggart and Szczerbiak.

To sum up this section of the paper, Stepan's typology of federal systems highlights the potential for federal systems to act in a demos constraining manner. Moreover although Germany's system of federalism is not as demos constraining as, for example, the US system, it still retains significant demos constraining potential across Stepan's four variables. First, there is a reasonable level of territorial overrepresentation in the second chamber, which by definition constrains the central demos. Second, although the Bundesrat has a relatively limited degree of policy scope, it has been enhanced in recent years in the very areas that are central to developing a Eurosceptic agenda. Third, although only a modest amount of policy making is reserved for sub-units of the federation, the bulk of policy implementation is carried out by state-level personnel. Finally, although the incentive systems of political parties are generally federation-wide, state parties do enjoy a certain amount of political leeway (as the cases of Baden-Württemberg and Sachsen demonstrate). Moreover, in the case of the Bavarian CSU, it is the state *Landesverband* rather than members of the Bundestag which is the core ideological and resource base of the party.

Nevertheless, up to now the Federal dimension has not proved an effective platform for a coherent challenge to the pro-European consensus. So why is this the case? Somewhat trivially, one could point to the irony that, in practice, the principle of territorial overrepresentation actually works against such an agenda, given that Bayern - the most Eurosceptic state - is also a large state and therefore relatively underrepresented. More seriously, one could point to the gulf in economic development between eastern states like Sachsen and wealthy Bayern, which makes the formulation of a common position an uphill battle. Thus, although both states are critical of the European Union, Sachsen wants an increase in some aspects of Brussels' role - most notably through an increase in its share of structural funds - while Bayern wants to reduce it.

That being said, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the key factor in this equation remains that of party politics. By their very nature, challenges to the pro-European consensus must be mounted from 'outsider' positions away from the political centre, towards the left and right of the political spectrum. As a result, although there might be some degree of common grievance with Brussels, states governed by parties of the Left will have different interests than those governed by the Right, with different and often conflicting issue-linkages. Moreover, as already

noted, *Land* level coalitions cannot operate independently of the Federal level. Even within the demos constraining dimension of German federalism, the party system at the Federal level remains an independent variable. The federal dimension may constrain the central demos, but it is political agency within the Federal party system that shapes it. It is to this demos shaping dimension that the paper now turns.

The Federal level party system and ‘demos shaping’ strategies

The changing institutional dynamics of the German party system

Comparatively speaking, the Federal Republic has been classified as either a ‘two-and-a-half party system’^{xlii} or a three party system, with a smaller party (normally the liberal FDP) acting as the ‘kingmaker’ between the two big ‘catch-all’ parties^{xliii}, the SPD and the CDU/CSU. This triangular relationship is re-enforced by the Federal Republic’s Additional Member System (AMS) of proportional representation, which was introduced in 1953. With exception of a brief period of majority CDU/CSU government in the 1950s, Germany’s AMS system has produced election outcomes which make coalition government a necessity. AMS also produces ‘split-ticket’ voting, whereby voters divide their allegiance between the first (constituency) and second (party list) votes. Split ticket voting tends to benefit small parties like the FDP, Greens, PDS and, to a lesser extent, parties of the far right.

Because it is relatively proportionate, Germany’s system of AMS began to reflect the steady deconcentration of the party system itself. This has reduced the share of the vote enjoyed by the SPD and CDU/CSU^{xliiv} and further re-enforced the German party system’s tendency to produce coalition government. The process of party system deconcentration noted above was aggravated by the impact of German unification in 1990, which has effectively grafted on a ‘second’ party system in the states of the former East Germany, within which the PDS is a significant force.

Consequences of party system change on political competition

The overall effect of party system change on political competition in the Federal Republic has been two-fold. First, it has made the two big 'catch all' parties, the CDU and SPD, more vulnerable to political competition within 'their' wing of the party system. For the CDU, this has come not so much from the FDP, but from the far right parties. However, this has had no practical impact at the Federal level because none of these parties have scaled the Federal Republic's five per cent hurdle to electoral representation and, even if this was to take place, far right parties remain so far beyond the pale that they would never be considered a coalition partner.

For the SPD, on the other hand, the effects of party system change have been significant. Over the last twenty years, party system deconcentration, combined with the effects of unification, has meant that the SPD has had to face two new political competitors, the PDS and the Greens. Of these, the PDS is only beginning to emerge as a potential major player at the Federal level. The Greens, on the other hand, have posed a significant threat ever since they entered the Bundestag in 1983. In the 1980s, the SPD tried to counter the threat from the Greens by both adopting a 'Janus faced' ideological profile, by reaching out to the Green milieu along the 'post-materialist' ideological dimension and, at the same time, trying to reassure its core blue-collar electorate. This strategy was only a limited success and, in recent years, the SPD has re-adopted a more centrist political agenda under the rubric of the 'Neue Mitte'. At the same time, the Greens have moderated their ideological profile and entered into a national coalition with the SPD in 1998^{xlv}.

The second effect of party system change has been to undermine the triangular dynamic of party competition. As already noted, from the late 1950s to the early 1980s the party system was dominated by the two big 'catch-all' parties, with the FDP acting as the 'kingmaker' and 'liberal corrective' to its senior partner in coalition government. However, the last twenty years has been characterised by two 'systemic junctures'^{xlvi}: one when the Greens entered the Bundestag in 1983 and the other with the arrival of the PDS in 1990. Given that both of these parties are to the left of the SPD, the net effect has been to shift the centre of gravity within the party system leftwards. At the same time what had previously been a triangular system of political competition now shows signs of re-alignment into a more polarised 'two-bloc' system, with the CDU/CSU and FDP on the political right and the SPD, Greens, and PDS on the Left. It is too early to say if such a re-alignment is taking place, with

much depending on the outcome of the 2002 Bundestag elections. Questions remain as to whether the FDP can break out of the right-wing bloc, if the PDS is able to consolidate its position, and how the electorate reacts to such a stark choice between left and right? Nevertheless, in theory at least, such a change in the fundamentals of party competition has the potential to skew the dynamics of coalition formation within the system and, by implication, re-shape the demos.

Consequences of party system change on coalition outcomes

It is unclear, however, what consequences such changes will have for smaller parties within the party system or whether it will widen the ideological range of the coalition win-set enough to give the more Eurosceptical parties some leverage over the European debate. Under the old triangular party system, the two big ‘catch-all’ parties won the vast majority of votes cast but, in normal circumstances, neither the CDU/CSU or the SPD ever won enough seats in the Bundestag to form a majority government on its own. Therefore one or the other was forced to enter into coalition with the FDP. As a result, with only two exceptions, the FDP was a member of all governing coalitions that formed during this period^{xlvi}. Thus the FDP was an almost permanent feature of German government and, acting as a self-proclaimed ‘liberal corrective’ to its senior partner, moderated each successive coalition’s ideological position, thus lending continuity and path-dependence to government policy^{xlvi}.

In terms of coalition theory, as long as the triangular party system persisted, the FDP was the permanent ‘median party’ or ‘Mparty’ within the Bundestag. This meant it occupied a position towards the ideological centre of the legislature and no ideologically-connected majority coalition could form of which it was not a member^{xli}. However, with the two systemic junctures of 1983 and 1990, the three-party system expanded to become a five-party one, and the FDP’s ‘kingmaker’ role began to be eroded.

Nevertheless, the FDP remained the ‘Mparty’ – and remained in government – until the defeat of the Kohl government in the 1998 Bundestag elections. The fall of Kohl and the election of a new ‘Red-Green’ coalition was regarded by many observers as a break with the past, not least because – with the absence of the FDP – there was no continuity of membership between the outgoing and incoming coalitions. However, as Table Three (below) demonstrates, in an expanded party system the ‘Mparty’ remains in government, but the political centre has moved to the left and the

SPD is the new 'Mparty'. Thus, strictly speaking, the present 'Red-Green' coalition is a centrist one and consistent with the established pattern of coalition formation in the Federal Republic.

Table Three. Bundestag Elections 1983-98¹. The Persistence of the 'Mparty' in Coalition Government*.

	<i>Date of Bundestag Election</i>				
	06/03/83	25/01/87	02/12/90	16/10/94	27/09/98
	<i>Seats in Bundestag</i>				
<u>CDU/CSU</u>	244	223	319	294	245
<u>FDP</u>	34	46	79	47	44
<u>SPD</u>	193	186	239	252	298
<u>Greens</u>	27	42	8	49	47
<u>PDS</u>	---	---	17	30	35
<u>Total Seats</u>	498	497	662	672	669
<u>Minimum Winner</u>	250	249	332	337	335
<u>Mparty</u>	FDP	FDP	FDP	FDP	SPD
<u>Mparty(k)?</u>	No	No	No	No	Yes
<u>Coalition</u>	CDU/CSU- FDP	CDU/CSU- FDP	CDU/CSU- FDP	CDU/CSU- FDP	SPD-Greens
<u>Degree of Change</u>	None	None	None	None	Total

* Table adapted from Lees, C., 'Coalitions – beyond the politics of centrality?' in Padgett, S. and Saalfeld, T. (eds.), 2001: *Festschrift for Gordon Smith*. Frank Cass.

Consequences for demos-shaping Eurosceptic strategies

The persistence of the 'Mparty' in coalition outcomes in the Federal Republic has served to moderate government policy over time. Up until 1998, this role was performed by the FDP but has now passed, at least for the time being, to the SPD. Whether the SPD will retain this role or whether it will pass back to the FDP depends

on the SPD's performance – and that of the Greens and PDS – in future Bundestag elections.

But will either of these outcomes create the conditions for a successful Eurosceptic strategy? Moreover, is it more likely that such a strategy will come from the political left (the PDS) or from the Right (the CSU)? As far as the PDS is concerned, much depends on its ability to consolidate its position within the Bundestag. Yet even if it were to do so, it is still hard to imagine circumstances in which the SPD would need or want to go into coalition with it. There are two reasons for this. First, the PDS' democratic credentials remain dubious and its ideological position on many issues, including European integration, is anathema to the vast majority of Social Democrats and to voters in the former West Germany (who make up the bulk of the electorate). Thus, the SPD may consider the PDS a useful political ally within the arena of state politics in the former GDR, but at the Federal level it would be much more likely to choose the Greens or the FDP as a coalition partner. Second, in the unlikely circumstances of the SPD considering going into coalition with the PDS, it would be very much on the SPD's terms. Coalition negotiations in Germany tend to be long, drawn out, and end with the signing of a formal coalition agreement. This is because the stakes are so high. All parties have to be confident that co-operation is possible, not least because of the principle of ministerial autonomy (the *Ressortsprinzip*), which is protected in the Federal Republic's basic law. Given the tendency of parties to staff ministries with their own people, policy making can become a vehicle for inter-coalition rivalry. As a result, the distribution of ministerial seats between the parties is central to the coalition bargaining process and, once a formal agreement has been signed, it is hard to rectify mistakes. During negotiations, policy-specific sub-committees become the key gate-keepers within the process: not just in terms of the allocation of specific portfolios but also in setting the parameters of policy areas and the terms of reference between them. Under these circumstances, there would be no 'ad hocery' on the SPD's part: they would make sure that the PDS was kept on a short leash. Like the Greens before them, the PDS would have to moderate their stance or remain in opposition. This would leave little scope for anything other than the 'softest' of Eurosceptical agendas.

For the CSU, the outlook is not much more positive. Where the CSU does enjoy an advantage over the PDS is that it is accepted as a mainstream party and therefore does not have to moderate its position unduly to enter into government.

Nevertheless, in an expanded party system, the CSU finds itself numerically less significant and further from the political centre in ideological terms. As a result, its leverage within the system has been reduced. Moreover, it does not matter if the FDP or the SPD is the 'Mparty', as neither outcome enhances the CSU's reduced leverage. The current situation with the SPD as 'Mparty' thoroughly marginalises the CSU as a Federal player. But even if the FDP were 'Mparty' any coalition outcome involving the FDP would be a return to the status quo ante, with the centre privileged over the right-wing. In fact, the only set of circumstances in which the CSU would be in a stronger position is one of political meltdown on the centre-left, in which the FDP failed to enter the Bundestag, the SPD was severely weakened and the CDU became 'Mparty'. At present, it is hard to imagine such circumstances taking place.

To sum up, at first glance the German party system's system of proportional representation and pattern of coalition government would appear to offer opportunities for small parties pursuing a demos shaping strategy of Euroscepticism. After all, in other proportional systems such as Israel, small parties with relatively extreme agendas have been quite successful in skewing the terms of political debate in a way disproportional to their size and electoral impact. However, for the reasons noted in this section of the paper, this is not the case in the Federal Republic. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic, the pattern of party competition and coalition outcomes has been one that privileges the political centre. As a result, the party with the 'median legislator', the 'Mparty', has nearly always been in government. Up until 1998 the FDP was the 'Mparty', despite the breakdown of the old triangular system of political competition and the expansion of the party system from three to five parties. However, even with the election of Gerhard Schröder's 'Red-Green' coalition in 1998, the principle of centrality remains as the SPD is now the 'Mparty'. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the centre of the party system (as signified by the party with the 'median legislator') is going to be located within either the FDP or SPD. Given that both parties are, with some exceptions, pro-European in outlook, any coalition outcome that involves them will adopt a consensus position on 'European' issues. Therefore, one must conclude that the German party system provides a poor political opportunity structure for demos shaping Eurosceptic strategies.

Conclusion

This paper is built on four propositions. First, that there is a latent potential within the German polity for the mobilisation of what remains a significant level of popular unease about aspects of the ongoing process of European integration. Second, that at present this potential is unfulfilled and, as a result, Euroscepticism remains the ‘dark matter’ of German politics. Third, that the absence of a clearly stated Eurosceptical agenda is not due to the inherent ‘enlightenment’ of the German political class about the European project, but rather is the result of systemic disincentives shaping the preferences of rational acting politicians. Finally, that these systemic disincentives are to be found in the institutions of the German polity.

In order to demonstrate these four propositions, the paper adapts Taggart and Szczerbiak’s dichotomy between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptical agendas. But agendas are of little significance without a strategy for promoting them. Therefore, the paper builds on Stepan’s ‘demos constraining-demos enabling’ continuum and posits the idea of two types of strategies – ‘demos constraining’ and ‘demos shaping’. The choice of such a strategy depends on the nature of the institutions available to political agents and the type of political opportunity structures they provide. Thus, the German system of federalism – which is moderately demos constraining – suggests a demos constraining strategy, whilst the Federal level party system – where the demos is shaped – makes a demos shaping strategy more appropriate.

Armed with the distinction between agendas and strategies (and the four categories that go with it), the paper then assesses the potential and real levels of political opportunity inherent in the German system of federalism and the Federal party system. The paper’s findings are summed up in Table Four, below.

Table Four demonstrates that the institutions of the German polity do not provide fertile ground for the successful mobilisation of Eurosceptical agendas. This is especially true of ‘hard’ Euroscepticism, which has no purchase on either the demos constraining or demos shaping dimensions. However, this is not to say that ‘soft’ Euroscepticism does much better. The only tentative evidence of a ‘soft’ Eurosceptical agenda is to be found within the demos constraining dimension of German federalism. As for the demos shaping dimension, the logic of party

competition and coalition formation means that the German party system – at the Federal level at least – is not a happy hunting ground for Eurosceptics.

Table Four. The impact of Eurosceptic agendas and strategies within the German polity.

<i>Agenda</i>	<i>Strategy</i>	<i>Impact</i>
'Hard' Euroscepticism	Demos Constraining	Minimal
/ /	Demos Shaping	Minimal
'Soft' Euroscepticism	Demos Constraining	Moderate
/ /	Demos Shaping	Minimal

As the VW row in Sachsen demonstrates, individual *Land* governments have the potential to challenge aspects of the pro-European consensus. However, the chances of a coherent Eurosceptical agenda emerging from the German states are remote, not least because of the different levels of economic development between the states and the fact that they have different political agendas. At present, the only state that has developed a clear critique of some aspects of the European project is Bayern and that state, for many reasons, is *sui generis*. Taken in the round, the institutional configuration of the German polity makes it highly unlikely that the political class will ever be split over Europe in the way that has taken place elsewhere. As a result, the Federal Republic will almost definitely continue on its current course as the pace-setter of European integration, and German Euroscepticism will remain without a voice.

Endnotes

- ⁱ *Der Spiegel*. 07/05/01.
- ⁱⁱ see Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E., 1987: *The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community*. Allen and Unwin; 'Abschied von der Mark', *Die Zeit* 26/09/91; 'Abschied von der Mark?', *Der Spiegel* 14/12/91; 'Erst jetzt ist bei vielen der Groschen gefallen', *Frankfurter Rundschau* 14/12/91; Rheinhardt, N., 'A turning point in the German EMU debate: the Baden Württemberg regional election of March 1996' in *German Politics* 6 (1), April 1997: 77-99.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Attitudes towards enlargement of the EU are differentiated, depending on the candidate country. Thus, the entry of Hungary is favoured by 80 per cent of respondents. However, this falls to 59 per cent for Poland whilst - at the other end of the scale - 58 per cent oppose Turkey's entry and 64 per cent oppose that of Romania [Emnid. Umfrage vom 28. bis 30. April, 2001].
- ^{iv} Kitschelt, H., 1986: 'Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies' *British Journal of Political Science*. 16 (1)
- ^v see Milner, S., 'Introduction: a healthy scepticism?' in *European Integration* 22, 2000: 1-13.
- ^{vi} for work on western Europe, see Marks, G. and Hooghe, L., 'National parties and the contestation of Europe' in Banchoff, T. and Smith, M. P., (eds.), 1999: *Legitimacy and the European Union*. Routledge; Marks, G. and Wilson, C. J., 'The past in the present: a cleavage theory of party response to European integration' in *British Journal of Political Science* 30, 2000: 433-459. for work on eastern Europe, see Henderson, K. (ed.), 1999: *Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*. UCL Press; Szczerbiak, A. 'Europe as a re-aligning issue in Polish Politics', paper presented at the annual meeting of the Political Studies Association, Manchester, UK, April 10-12 2001. for work on the EU party system, see Hix, S. and Lord, C., 1997: *Political Parties in the European Union*. Macmillan.
- ^{vii} Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A., 'Parties, positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe', paper presented at the annual meeting of the Political Studies Association, Manchester, UK, April 10-12 2001: 5-6.
- ^{viii} *Ibid*.
- ^{ix} Hall, P., 1986: *Governing the Economy*. Oxford University Press: 19.
- ^x Ikenberry, G. J., 'Conclusion: an institutional approach to American foreign economic policy' in Ikenberry, G. J., Lake, D. A. and Mastanduno, M. (eds.), 1988: *The State and American Foreign Economic Policy*. Cornell University Press: 222-3.
- ^{xi} Riker, W. H., 'Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions' in *American Political Science Review* 74, 1980: 432-446.
- ^{xii} Ostrom, E., 'An agenda for the study of institutions', in *Public Choice* 48, 1986: 3-25.
- ^{xiii} March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P., 'The new institutionalism: organisational factors in political life', in *American Political Science Review*, 78, 1984: 738.
- ^{xiv} Simon, H. A., 1965: *Administrative Behaviour*. Free Press.
- ^{xv} Tarrow, S., 1994: *Power in Movement: Social Movement, Collective Action and Politics*. Cambridge University Press: 18.
- ^{xvi} Stepan, A., 2001: *Arguing Comparative Politics*. Oxford University Press.
- ^{xvii} see Jeffery, C. and Savigear, P. (eds.), 1991: *German Federalism Today*. Leicester University Press: 28.
- ^{xviii} see Riker, W. H., 1964: *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Little.
- ^{xix} Stepan, A., 2001 Op Cit: 335-6.
- ^{xx} Tarrow, S. 1994 Op Cit: 81.
- ^{xxi} see Lees, C., 'Social Democracy and Structures of Governance in Britain and Germany: how institutions and norms shape political innovation' in Martell, L. et al (eds.), 2001: *Social Democracy: Global and National Perspectives*. Palgrave.
- ^{xxii} Stepan, A., 2001 Op Cit: 340-1.
- ^{xxiii} *Ibid*: 342.
- ^{xxiv} all data on the population of the German states sourced from Webb, A., 1998: *The Longman Companion to Germany since 1945*. Longman.
- ^{xxv} see Jeffery, C., 1994: *The Länder Strike Back: Structures and Procedures of European Integration Policy Making in the German Federal System*. Centre for Federal Studies, University of Leicester, Discussion Papers In Federal Studies No. FS94/4.
- ^{xxvi} see Lees, C., 2000: *The Red-Green Coalition in Germany: Politics, Personalities and Power*. Manchester University Press.

- ^{xxvii} Stepan, A., 2001 Op Cit: 352-3.
- ^{xxviii} Ibid: 358.
- ^{xxix} Source: Presse- und Informationsamt des Landes Berlin, 1990.
- ^{xxx} see Lees, C., 200 Op Cit.
- ^{xxxi} Lees, C., 'Bringing the PDS into the coalition equation' in *German Politics* Vol. 4. No. 1. (1995): 150-154.
- ^{xxxii} see McKay, J., The Berlin Land Election, in *German Politics* 9 (1), April 2000: 123-138.
- ^{xxxiii} *Der Spiegel* 14/05/01.
- ^{xxxiv} Downs, W. M., 1998: *Coalition Government Subnational Style: Multiparty Politics in Europe's Regional Parliaments*, Ohio State University Press: 243 - 266.
- ^{xxxv} however, given that a CDU-PDS coalition is not a serious proposition, the 'Red-Red' option remains the PDS' only realistic route to power.
- ^{xxxvi} In the past, the SPD has taken an equally hard line with the Greens when negotiating coalitions at the *Land* level. For instance, in 1989 the Berlin SPD forced the fundi-dominated *Alternative Liste* to moderate its stance on NATO and the allied presence in the city before agreeing to enter into coalition with it [Lees, C., 2000 Op Cit].
- ^{xxxvii} see 'Kühle Realisten', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 15/11/95.
- ^{xxxviii} see 'Spöri gegen Harakiri', *Südwest-Presse* 11/01/96.
- ^{xxxix} see Rheinhardt, N. 1997 OpCit.
- ^{xl} see *Teilungsfolgen. Materialsammlung zum Streit um staatliche Beihilfe an die Volkswagen AG für ein Investitionsvorhaben im Freistaat Sachsen*. Dresden, Sächsisches Staatskanzlei, 1996.
- ^{xli} Jeffery, C. and Collins, S., 'The German *Länder* and EU enlargement: between apple pie and issue-linkage', in *German Politics* 7 (2), August 1998: 91.
- ^{xlii} Blondel, J. (1968). 'Party systems and patterns of government in western democracies'. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*. 1: 180-203. Reprinted in Wolinetz, S. B. (ed.) (1998) *Party Systems*. Dartmouth: 112.
- ^{xliii} Kirchheimer, O. (1966). 'The transformation of the Western European party systems' in La Palombara, J. and Wiener, M. (eds.). *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton University Press.
- ^{xliv} Padgett, S. 'The new German electorate' (1993a). in Padgett, S. (ed.), *Parties and Party Systems in the New Germany*. Dartmouth: 38.; also Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1990/1994/1998.
- ^{xliv} see Lees, C. 2000 Op Cit.
- ^{xlvi} Lees C., 'Coalitions: beyond the politics of centrality?' in Padgett, S. and Saalfeld, T. (eds.), 2001: *Festschrift for Gordon Smith*. Frank Cass.
- ^{xlvii} The two exceptions to this rule were, first, the third Adenauer administration of 1957-61 (the CDU/CSU won a big enough share of Bundestag seats to form a coalition without the FDP) and, second, the Grand Coalition of 1966-69 (a surplus majority coalition between the two big 'catch-all' parties).
- ^{xlviii} Combined with a pattern of decision rules and norms peculiar to the Federal Republic, the role of the FDP was central to the centrepetal dynamic within the German party system that Gordon Smith called 'the politics of centrality'. Smith regarded this as the Federal Republic's 'efficient secret', underpinning the remarkable stability of the Federal Republic's political settlement. See Smith, G., 1986, *Democracy in Western Germany* (3rd edition). Gower: 231-5.
- ^{xlix} In his 'Coalition Theories And Cabinet Formation' (Elsevier, 1973), Abram de Swaan constructed what he called the 'closed minimum range' of Cabinet formation. De Swaan's theory predicts that the winning set will comprise the minimal connected winning coalition with the smallest ideological range. This range is mapped along a single Downsian Left-Right axis, running from progressivism to conservatism and all parties are assumed to have preference orderings of all potential coalitions, based upon their relative proximities to the median or 'Mparty' (of both a given coalition and within the legislature as a whole). De Swaan's theory is often referred to as the 'median legislator' or 'median party' model because it is based on the assumption that the party that controls the median legislator in any potential coalition is decisive because it blocks the axis along which any connected winning coalition must form.
- ^l Source: Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 1983; 1987; 1990; 1994; 1998.