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*Reforming the modes of US-EU cooperation: an assessment and
evaluation of the 1995 NTA*

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Recent international developments on specific environmental and defence issues (concerning respectively the Kyoto protocol and the US plan for the development of an anti-missile system) have been perceived by many in Europe as the resurgence of US unilateralism. Even if these events do not affect the core of US-EU relations, there is a growing anxiety about possible spill-over or domino effect. There is therefore a critical need for assessing and evaluating the record of the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA), established in 1995 to organise a closer partnership between the US and the EU.

1 Assessment of the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda

The general aims of the NTA were as typical as they were ambitious: to realize opportunities and meet challenges in terms of security, (economic) prosperity and (democratic) values for the transatlantic partners and for the world. More crudely and concisely put, the NTA's main ambition was to deal better with the externalities of US policies for the EU, and vice versa, as well as to address the effects of third parties' actions on US-EU interests. To achieve these aims, the NTA and its the Joint Action Plan (JAP) innovated at four levels.

Firstly, the NTA/JAP *created a global and adjustable framework* for action that provides a better overview of the relationship and an opportunity for horizontal coordination. The framework can be adjusted regularly to the problems of the moment thanks to a built-in, pre-defined follow-up mechanism: a US-EU 'Senior Level Group' of sub-cabinet officials and a 'NTA Task Force' of working-level officials that prepare US-EU summits, evaluate progress on the various topics listed in the JAP, and propose new objectives.

Secondly, the NTA/JAP *significantly upgraded the level of mutual commitments* between the US and the EU, from information and consultation to coordination and joint action. The magnitude of this upgrade must however be put into perspective. A close reading of the JAP indeed reveals the high heterogeneity of the commitments made. For some cases, means and deadlines are clearly identified, while, for many others, goals and time frames remain vague. All in all, the name given to the document is rather misleading: the targets set by the JAP have more to do with enhanced coordination and cooperation than with joint action.

Thirdly, the NTA/JAP *widened the scope of the relationship*. It assigns the rejuvenated US-EU Partnership to fulfil no less than 203 bilateral, regional and global objectives grouped around four main themes: 1) 'promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world'; 2) 'responding to global challenges'; 3) 'contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic cooperation'; and 4) 'building bridges across the Atlantic'. The third theme is clearly the

centrepiece of the NTA/JAP. This comes as no surprise considering the stakes and the high interdependence of the US and the EU in trade and investment, not to mention the fact that it also corresponds to the EU's core competencies.

Some of the items listed, mostly those touching upon bilateral (trade and economic) issues as well as regional issues limited to the EU's near abroad, have of course been the focus of EU-US relations for years. The addition of issues like the reconstruction of the Former Yugoslavia and the stabilisation of relations with Central and Eastern European Countries, or even Russia, merely followed that pre-established logic. The real novelty lay in the decision to broaden the range of issue areas expressly earmarked for regular transatlantic cooperation to other regions, as well as to transnational and global issues. The newly listed countries were mainly from the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and South East Asia, some of which had been incorporated into the NTA because they had caused serious transatlantic wrangling in the past. As to the inclusion of global issues, it reflected the progress of European integration in several fields, as well as the US willingness to control such progress by gaining some kind of seat at the table. Most were indeed related to the powers acquired by the EU under the Maastricht Treaty in security, justice and home affairs – the so-called 'second' and 'third pillar' of the Union (non-proliferation, international disarmament and arms transfers; fight against organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and illegal immigration, in particular). The inclusion of development cooperation and humanitarian assistance had more to do with the prospect of cost savings already mentioned.

Other areas that would *a priori* benefit from more discussion or cooperation were left aside. Monetary issues, agriculture, hard security or so-called rogue States like Libya, Iran and Iraq are obvious cases of deliberate exclusion. Two reasons came into play: the risk of derailing or duplicating the work done properly in other international forums; and the risk of jeopardising the take-off of the entire NTA by including highly contentious issues.

All in all, the NTA/JAP offers a balanced blend: it includes consensual issues on which agreement should be relatively easy to secure and divisive issues for which increased capacity in terms of early warning system, conflict prevention and crisis management would be a plus, while excluding potentially explosive ones. Precautions taken in the definition of the NTA/JAP's scope and level of commitments indicate that the agreement was deliberately tailored to secure a globally positive report card.

Finally, the NTA/JAP *called for the multiplication of structured dialogues*, adding to the extensive consultations among officials established by the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration. The creation or further development of transatlantic fora was encouraged, some of which were invited to

participate in the definition of transatlantic and global governance. This institutional option was part of a strategy intended to mobilise or shape public, business and political support, but without incurring the difficulties inherent to highly publicised negotiations. Structured dialogues such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and other such dialogues which emerged later, also seemed to have been conceived as a way of helping the development of the US-EU relations 'on the cheap'. Against limited funding and no power sharing, they could provide extra-expertise, serve as additional early warning systems, pre-empt backlash from last minute exposure to the public and, last but not least, contribute to (re)create a 'vibrant' transatlantic community.

To summarize, the NTA/JAP set a global and adjustable framework for the US-EU relationship; upgraded the level of commitments; widened the scope of items dealt at the US-EU level, and multiplied structured dialogues. According to some of its masterminds, the initiative mostly focused on process (meeting to create bonds): the new format of the relationship aimed at wider and deeper socialisation in order to improve mutual understanding and revitalise the 'Atlantic spirit', not to say nurture a sense of community. The exercise was however also about substance (meeting to decide on issues): the changes introduced by the NTA were expected to produce immediate results and concrete benefits.¹

1.1 Methodological Challenge

Cooperation as a generic term can have many meanings. In order to operationalize the concept and establish measurement standards, it has to be clearly defined. Robert Keohane has proposed a basic definition which has been largely accepted: 'cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations – which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation'.² While there are many reasons why actors cooperate, the concrete objective of cooperation is mainly to deal with externalities (*i.e.* minimise disturbances caused by policies) or make policies mutually reinforcing. Forms of cooperation are numerous: they range from sharing information in order to narrow down the range of 'acceptable' options by pressure or persuasion, *ex ante* consultation and negotiation of mutual reinforcement (*i.e.* adopting identical, complementary or subsidiary policies), *ex post* adjustment through mutual

¹ See P. Winand & E. Philippart, « From 'Equal Partnership' to the 'New Transatlantic Agenda': Enduring Features and Successive Forms of the US-EU Relationship », in E. Philippart & P. Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership. Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2001, pp.50-6.

² R. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.51-2.

concessions (*i.e.* avoiding or repelling antagonistic policies), up to joint-action.³ Students of international relations have developed a number of typologies on the topic. Decision-makers, however, too often discount them in favor of more 'immediate' classifications. The US-EU case is no exception to this rule.

After analysis of the diplomatic language contained in JAP, it appears that the drafters have resorted to eight types of action or levels of commitment ranging, which can be classified as follows (from 1-lowest to 8-highest): (1) statements of US and EU individual commitments; (2) information – exchange of information and/or information gathering; (3) dialogue; (4) consultation; (5) common encouragement and support for third parties' initiatives; (6) co-ordination of initiatives, positions – in particular in multilateral fora – and actions; (7) cooperation – including identification of means of cooperation; (8) joint action. For reasons of efficiency, this scale was used to measure each action envisaged by the JAP. Listed in Table 1 according to the structure adopted by the JAP, these measures give a comprehensive picture of the partnership's initial ambitions and expectations, sufficiently detailed and systematic as to provide an adequate point of reference for our assessment.

INSERT FIRST TABLE ranking by intensity the priorities defined in the Joint Action Plan attached to the New Transatlantic Agenda (December 1995).

2 Evaluation of the US-EU institutional format and policy output 1995-2000

2.1 An ever demanding institutional framework

Three questions will be examined here under. What is the general state of development of the NTA organizational framework? What is the nature of the new mode of US-EU governance? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the US-EU organizational framework?

2.1.1 What is the general state of development of the US-EU / NTA organizational framework?

As already mentioned in Section 1, the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration and the 1995 NTA/JAP marked an era of greater ambition for transatlantic cooperation and a new approach to policy-making: from then on US-EU ambitions were to be defined in a global and adjustable framework, with the involvement of a wider number of actors.

³ On consultation and adjustment, see R. D. Putnam and N. Bayne, *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven Power Summits* (London, Sage, 1987), p.260.

At intergovernmental level (i.e. among governmental players traditionally involved in the management of international relations – foreign affairs and international trade), these initiatives were initiated major developments. New levels of US-EU meetings were added. In addition, there were innovations in terms of the regularity, frequency and degree of formality of the meetings between US and EU officials. Summits, in particular, grew bigger, with massive pre- and post-summit ministerials. Another important development occurred in terms of a horizontal monitoring. The ‘Senior Level Group’ (General or Political Directors level) established itself as a central part of the system. The ‘NTA Task Force’ (Directors and officials level) in charge of preparatory and operational work was later flanked by a ‘Transatlantic Economic Partnership’ Steering Group – a part of the NTA reorganized in 1998. Indication of frequency: with two summits, four SLG meetings and six Task Force meetings on average, plus *ad hoc* meetings of the Steering Group, the number of meetings rose to well over twelve per year.

Besides these classical intergovernmental development, direct contacts between governmental bureaucracies with similar remit leading were encouraged on a much larger scale. These transgovernmental coalitions were in addition officially co-opted into the US-EU general framework. This opportunity was given and taken in the 1990s like never before: US-EU sectoral dialogues started between the Directorate General of the US Commercial Service and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Enterprise, the Department of Education and the Education and Culture DG, or the Labor Department and the Employment and Social Affairs DG; they further expanded between services in charge of competition, safety standards, humanitarian and development aid and environment. As to the other branches of government, the legislative and the judiciary, they were simply encouraged to develop their transatlantic contacts.

Finally, there was a substantial development at transnational level, with the multiplication of transatlantic dialogues. The opening of the NTA organizational framework to these stakeholders’ networks was selective. Governmental players had very different views on the nature and scope of the further involvement of civil societies, governmental actors displaying a tendency to co-opt actors from whom they expected some help in the negotiation.⁴

Findings on the general state of development of the US-EU / NTA organizational framework can be summarized as follows:

- the opening of the NTA framework went much further than initially envisaged.

⁴ See Bignami in Pollack Mark A. and Gregory Shaffer (eds.), *Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2001).

- Together with various incremental changes, this contributed to a thickening process of US-EU institutions – new elements being added rather than replacing existing ones (cf. for instance the duplication of work between the SLG and CFSP troika).
- The main institutional features of the framework are now well established. Of course, there are suggestions that the relationship reached some sort of saturation. This was confirmed during the US-EU ministerial of 6 March 2001, where the US mentioned the need to review the format and frequency of the summits. The European Commission's Directorate General for external relations and DG Trade, respectively headed by Chris Patten and Pascal Lamy, conducted its own assessment of the relationship. Released on 20 March, the Communication of the Commission in a more indirect way is proposing something similar, referring to a lighter summit choreography.⁵ On 8 April 2001, the General Affairs Council of ministers of the EU had a first formal exchange of views on the Communication: France backed the one summit per year option, Hubert Védrine suggesting that yearly summits could be organised under the auspices of two presidencies; the UK was the only government to follow suit. Most other Member States apparently were keen to hold on to the bi-annual format. On 16 May, in its conclusions on the institutional aspects of the Communication, the Council remained rather vague or even inconclusive. All in all, the protagonists only pleaded for relatively marginal changes and streamlining based on efficiency ground rather than any willingness to drift apart. This is a first indication of the resilience of the NTA structures on both sides of the Atlantic.

2.1.2 What is the nature of the new mode of US-EU governance?

Firstly, there is no indication of hegemonic bias, at least at the organizational level: the US and the EU are strictly on an equal footing. Furthermore the partnership formula respects the principle of the autonomy of the EU's development. Having more to do with cooperation than with integration, the scheme does not presuppose any pooling or transfer of sovereignty. In other words, it does not amount to a seat at the EU table for the US (and vice versa).

Secondly, the US-EU governance no longer fits into the classical mould of interaction between domestic politics and diplomacy, as described for instance in the two-level game conceptual framework proposed by Putnam.

⁵ Communication from the Commission to the Council reinforcing the Transatlantic relationship: focusing on strategy and delivering results COM (2001)154 final, Brussels, 20 March 2001.

- there was progressive shift to the trilateral format US executive + EU presidency + European Commission (odd nature of two of the chief negotiators)
- the US-EU transgovernmental networks have developed like never before. Some rapidly became very active and well structured, and also established themselves as rather independent from the NTA's central players. Networking among competition authorities is a good case in point. Trade or development aid sectors offer additional examples of well developed networks. Yet these exhibited less coherence. Many more networks remained either embryonic or very divided, and entangled in a rather classical form of intergovernmentalism, with the Senior Level Group Head continuing to act as the gatekeeper of the relationship. The case of the transatlantic transgovernmental network standards and certification issues is exemplary in many respects. So globally the level of 'nestedness' of these networks remained relatively low – their members continued to report to their central governments and/or to the intergovernmental substructures. These changes therefore have not led as yet to a significant increase of the technocratic input in US-EU policy-making, nor to the 'unbundling' of states into separate and functionally distinct parts. Action was even taken to re-politicize some policy areas, with the striking exception of foreign and security policies (i.e. the development of US-EU relations gives politicians the opportunity to firm their grip on independent agencies).
- the transnational networks or so-called 'structured dialogues' were given direct access to decision-makers. Several networks refused to be confined to the auxiliary role imagined for them by the European Commission or the US government. They even tried to instrumentalize one governmental side against the other in the pursuit of domestic objectives. The new participatory dynamics however did not push the logic of 'networks of networks' or 'meta-networking' to its ultimate expression. Despite a number of interesting ad hoc sectoral initiatives, projects of formal and systematic dialogue between the Dialogues indeed met with the skepticism or the reluctance of too many public and private players. Globally, the Dialogues as they stand today seem to have changed the pattern of intergovernmental negotiations.

Finally, traditional players nevertheless have retained a central role.

- Timetables and agendas are largely 'summit-driven', and the framework is still dominated by inter-governmental structures controlled by foreign policy and international trade officials circles.

- There is a 'bilateral' bias. Intergovernmental sub-structures are at the centre of a wide range of transgovernmental and transnational networks with whom they interact bilaterally. US-EU governance is nowadays organized in a 'hub and spokes' manner.

2.1.3 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the US-EU organizational framework?⁶

On the negative side,

- Agenda-shaping and agenda-setting mechanisms became more diffuse and complex, while the US-EU programming capacity remained unsatisfactory. Global programming requires institutions capable of aggregating many divergent interests. Some centralization of the processes is often indispensable to succeed in such an endeavour. Unfortunately the new structures contributed very little in this respect. As a consequence, the objectives defined in the NTA Joint Action Plan lack proper prioritisation, quantification as well as assessment of their internal consistency. Trade and investment are a partial exception in this respect (cf. the TEP Action Plan - TEPAP)
- Beneath the claim of a global framework, parallel tracks endured and elements of institutional specialization were even re-introduced, in particular with the TEP Steering Group.
- In addition, various efficiency and visibility problems demand additional adjustments. In particular, the way different NTA echelons interact remain problematic. There are cases of successful cooperation at technical (sectoral) working groups which does not translate at a higher level (SLG). The participation of sectoral responsables & experts to SLG meetings often is very limited. There is a relative indifference and/or limited capacity to aggregate interests which lead to status quo.

On the positive side,

- The combination of serial summitry, specific co-ordinating organs, trilateral format, and co-option of new categories of public and private actors significantly increased the level of US-EU socialization, awareness of the other side's views and mutual understanding.

⁶ For more detailed discussion, see Section 2 'The Evolution of the Format of the US-EU Relationship: Strengths and Weaknesses of the New Partnership Formula' of E. Philippart & P. Winand, « Ever Closer Partnership? Taking Stock of US-EU Relations », in E. Philippart & P. Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership. Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 392-426.

- It created the conditions for sustained momentum and more continuity in the policy process. EU-US relations, in spite of trade disputes and occasional manifestations of self-centredness or unilateralism, have been put on a relatively stable course.
- Early warning systems and conflict resolution mechanisms have also been improved over the years, as well as co-ordination and follow-up mechanisms (taking into consideration the extra-complexity introduced in the system by the increase in the number of items and players).

This makes that the record is globally positive.

2.2 A contrasted but globally growing policy output

To assess the results of US-EU cooperation is a difficult task. Studying the progress made over several years on each and every item of an agenda comprising around 210 issues if one takes into account the priorities added since 1995 constitutes a formidable workload. An efficient way to obtain a – very synthetic and often preliminary – approximation is to compare the Joint Action Plan attached to the New Transatlantic Agenda with the reports of the Senior Level Group assessing US-EU achievements and setting priorities every six months. By applying the scale mentioned supra to the new priorities and intermediary achievements listed in the successive SLG biannual reports, one can measure the fluctuations in US-EU ambitions, the pace of implementation of the NTA and take stock of the progress of the partnership (see comparison of the NTA's cumulated objectives and cumulated achievements 1996-1998 and 1996-2000).

Advantages and shortcomings of using the bi-annual Reports of the Senior Level Group.⁷ The reports represent a unique basis to measure the evolution of US-EU objectives and achievements. In terms of origin and format, they are indeed unusually constant: before each US-EU summit, a group of officials assess the past six months and draft 'new priorities' which will guide the work of the NTA for the next six months. Partially because of the stable make-up of the group, these assessments are written in a fairly standardised way. Accordingly, we have decided to use a scale which ranks cooperation by intensity and follows the diplomatic vocabulary in this matter.

If they offer undeniable advantages, the SLG reports also suffer from shortcomings that cannot be ignored in the analysis. The shortcomings of the approach can be summarized as follows. First

⁷ See E. Philippart, « Assessing, Evaluating and Explaining the Output of US-EU Relations », in E. Philippart & P. Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership. Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 55-60 and E. Philippart & P. Winand, « Deeds not Words : Evaluating and Explaining the US-EU Policy Output », in E. Philippart & P. Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership. Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 432-3.

of all, the reports establish no hierarchy reflecting the relative importance or scope of the various NTA targets. This would mean that, on aggregate, good performance in a trivial domain can compensate for underachievement on a crucial issue.⁸ Secondly, the quantitative assessment is based on a partial account of US-EU accomplishments – the SLG reports are indeed only concerned with ‘major achievements’. Moreover, insofar as the reports give no criteria regarding what is ‘major’ or not, the selection could be easily affected by the subjectivity of the SLG. Thirdly, reasonably detailed definition of objectives, criteria for success or timeframe are often missing in the reports. This is perhaps predictable insofar as the prime objective of diplomats and spin doctors is to produce ‘safe’ rather than precise prevision as well as ‘useful’ rather than accurate evaluation. Fourthly, the reports usually do not record failures, non-actions or so-called missed opportunities.⁹ As for the failures and non-actions, however, the fact that the silence of the reports on several areas listed for cooperation often is a sufficient indication. Finally, the analysis has to rely on official documents drafted by actors who have a direct stake in the assessment. One could therefore imagine, for example, the SLG adjusting the NTA objectives because political reasons demand that the US-EU record be embellished.

For these various reasons, estimates of intensity measures presented in the following tables have to be supplemented by assessments of the contents and scope of US-EU arrangements. Provided that this condition is fulfilled, these tables allow a clear delineation of dormant and active parts of the NTA, as well as areas of under and overachievement. The use of the bi-annual reports of the Senior Level Group and of the TEP Steering Group is an effective and efficient way to get the ‘big picture’ on US-EU policy output. All in all, this approach has more advantages than shortcomings.

INSERT COMPARATIVE TABLE 1996-1998 + TABLE 1996-2000.

If it is interesting to know what has been achieved exactly, the next step is to examine how that output compares in terms of performance. For example, it is not sufficient to know how many dispute settlements have been hammered out, one should in addition look at how much effort it took to reach these arrangements and what they are worth. Most analyses therefore evaluate policy decisions in terms of their effectiveness (capacity to produce a desired effect) and efficiency (amount of resources needed to deliver an effect). The policy output should be evaluated in relation with the

⁸ It is, for example, problematic that, in the calculations, joint distribution of humanitarian aid, say, in Ethiopia and the ‘Mutual Recognition Agreement’ concerning \$ 6 billion of US-EU bilateral trade are evenly weighted. Insofar as there were very few actions massively outdoing all the others, the number of cases calling for some kind of corrective coefficient is so far fairly limited.

⁹ Among the exceptions, see the ‘achievements’ section of the December 1999 SLG report. Under human rights, the report says that the parties ‘have frankly disagreed on several issues including the use of death penalty, ... treatment of religious minorities’.

workability and sustainability of the arrangements, their clarity of purpose, their consistency between different elements of US-EU cooperation, their continuity (that is 'maintenance of a long-term or strategic perspective'), their compatibility with the environment and the resources available, as well as their adaptability.¹⁰ Because of space constraints, this evaluation cannot be developed here. The reader will find two recent evaluations in Pollack Mark A. and Gregory Shaffer (eds.), *Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Press, 2001) and Philippart Eric and P. Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership. Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2001.¹¹

2.3 Did the NTA make a difference?

Some suggest that most of what was done from 1996 to 2000 would have been achieved with or without the NTA.¹² Counterfactual reasoning is a difficult exercise. I however suggest that the comparison of well-defined pre-NTA and post-NTA periods helps addressing that question, i.e. to say how much of US-EU cooperative performance could be attributed to NTA's institutional developments. It however presupposes that other main explanatory variables are properly isolated.

A first step is to make sure that the international environment of the selected periods are sufficiently comparable. Considering, on the one hand, that East-West relations were a major determinant in the Transatlantic relationship and, on the other hand, that the nature and extent of globalization has dramatically changed since the mid-1980s, the selection should be limited to the late 1980s onwards.

Among domestic variables, the US presidential cycle (including its partisan dimension) is said to be another major variable for US-EU policy output. The record of incoming versus incumbent presidential teams and of Republican versus Democrat administrations should therefore be compared.

Considering that the NTA has only been launched five years ago and considering that George W. Bush took office only recently, the following periods meet the criteria defined above: January to

¹⁰ The last five qualities are presented by Michael Smith as the components of a 'balanced foreign policy' (a standard notion used for comparative evaluation). M. Smith, 'Comparing Foreign Policy Systems: Problems, Processes and Performance', in M. Clarke and B. White (eds.), *Understanding Foreign Policy – The Foreign Policy Systems Approach* (Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1989), p.206.

¹¹ E. Philippart & P. Winand, « Deeds not Words : Evaluating and Explaining the US-EU Policy Output », in E. Philippart & P. Winand (eds.), *Ever Closer Partnership. Policy-Making in US-EU Relations*, Brussels, PIE-Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 431-455.

¹² See John Peterson in Pollack Mark (ed.), *The New Transatlantic Agenda at Five: A Critical Assessment*, Report of the 20 April 2001 Conference organized by the BP Chair in Transatlantic Relations, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Italy, forth.

June 1989, January to June 1993, January to June 1997 and January to June 2001. I suggest that the comparison of the US-EU record for those four periods would help identifying the impact of the US-EU structures on the transatlantic policy output. This research is under work and the results should hopefully be published later this year.

	Pre-NTA	Post-NTA
New team and/or first term	US-EU record under Bill Clinton's administration (January-June 1993)	US-EU record under George W. Bush's administration (January-June 2001)
Established team and/or second term	US-EU record under George Bush's administration (January-June 1989)	US-EU record under Bill Clinton's administration (January-June 1997)

This would be a good basis to review the validity of recent pre-positioning on the redefinition of the means and objectives of the US-EU partnership (in particular the Commission communication presented in March 2001). This would also be a good basis to offer more explicit and perhaps alternative recommendations.

Pascaline Winand and I hesitated over the title of your co-edited book. Should we put a question mark after 'Ever closer partnership' or not? We decided to suppress the question mark from the title insofar as the book was mainly an assessment of the Clinton years and that the partnership undeniably grew much closer. Considering the most recent developments, this might look as an unfortunate choice. I however believe that, irrespective of occasional sectoral setbacks, powerful structural forces still protect the relationship from any major split.

**Table 1. Joint Action Plan Attached
to the New Transatlantic Agenda (Dec. 1995)**

	Actions									Total	μ	σ
	Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
<i>I. Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development around the World</i>	65	17	0	4	5	14	15	20	8	83	4,9	1,4
<i>1. Working together for a stable and prosperous Europe</i>	17	4	0	3	2	3	4	10	1	27	4,5	1,4
a) Peace and reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia	5	2		1				6		9	5,2	2,6
b) Central and Eastern European Countries	5			1	1	1	1	2	1	7	5,7	1,7
c) Russia, Ukraine and the other New Independent States	5			1	1		3	2		7	5,6	1,4
d) Turkey	1	1				1				2	3,0	2,0
e) Cyprus	1	1				1				2	3,0	2,0
<i>2. Promoting the Middle East Peace Process</i>	9	4	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	9	3,2	2,0
		4				5				9	3,2	2,0
<i>3. Sharing responsibility in other regions of the world</i>	13	5	0	1	1	3	1	1	3	15	4,2	2,9
a) Rwanda - Burundi	1					1			1	2	6,5	1,5
b) Great Lakes (Central Africa, Congo, ...)	1					1				1	5,0	0,0
c) Angola - Mozambique	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
d) Nigeria	1	1								1	1,0	0,0
e) El Salvador - Nicaragua	1			1	1					2	3,5	0,5
f) Guatemala	1	1								1	1,0	0,0
g) Haiti	1	1								1	1,0	0,0

	Actions									Total	μ	σ
	Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8			
h) Cuba	1	1								1	1,0	0,0
i) Hong Kong - Macao (return to China)	1	1								1	1,0	0,0
j) Korean peninsula - Taiwan - South China Sea	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
k) Burma	1								1	1	8,0	0,0
l) Cambodia	1								1	1	8,0	0,0
m) East Timor	1					1				1	5,0	0,0
<i>4. Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance</i>	7	0	0	0	1	0	4	2	2	9	6,4	0,2
a) Development cooperation	4						3	1	1	5	6,6	0,8
b) Humanitarian assistance	3				1		1	1	1	4	6,3	1,5
<i>5. Human rights and democracy</i>	5	3	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	7	3,7	2,6
		3			1	1	1		1	7	3,7	2,6
<i>6. Cooperation in international organizations</i>	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	5	6,7	0,6
a) UN	3							3		3	7,0	0,0
b) OSCE	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
c) Bretton Woods institutions, OECD	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
<i>7. Non-proliferation, international disarmament and arms transfers</i>	9	1	0	0	0	2	4	3	1	11	5,7	2,0
a) Promotion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	1						1	1		2	6,5	0,5
b) Conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
c) Negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty	1								1	1	8,0	0,0

Actions

	Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total	μ	σ
d) Extension of the Missile Technology Control Regime	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
e) Revision of 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
f) Prevention of proliferation of Anti-Personal Landmines	1					1		1		2	6,0	1,0
g) Multilateral arrangement for (arms) export controls	1	1								1	1,0	0,0
h) Prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
i) Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)	1					1				1	5,0	0,0
II. Responding to Global Challenges	65	0	13	2	0	4	11	23	1	54	5,8	0,9
1. Fight against organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking	13	0	7	0	0	2	2	12	0	23	5,2	0,2
a) Organized crime	5		2					3		5	5,0	2,4
b) Terrorism	1		2					4		6	5,3	2,4
c) Drug trafficking	7		3			2	2	5		12	5,3	2,0
2. Immigration and asylum	9	0	4	0	0	0	3	2	0	9	5,0	2,6
a) Fight against traffic in illegal immigrants and women	2							2		2	7,0	0,0
b) Illegal immigration, asylum and migration flows	4		4							4	2,0	0,0
c) Refugees	3						3			3	6,0	0,0
3. Legal and judicial cooperation	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	7,0	0,0
								4		4	7,0	0,0
4. Preservation of the environment	8	0	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	8	4,5	2,1
			2	2			2	2		8	4,5	2,1

Actions

	Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total	μ	σ
5. Population issues	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	2	6,5	0,5
							1	1		2	6,5	0,5
6. Nuclear safety	3	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	4	6,0	0,7
						1	2	1		4	6,0	0,7
7. Health	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	4	6,5	1,1
						1	1	1	1	4	6,5	1,1
III. Contributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Cooperation	47	2	4	6	3	0	9	21	3	48	4,9	1,4
1. Strengthening the multilateral trading system	16	2	0	0	0	0	7	7	0	16	5,7	1,9
a) Consolidating the WTO	4						3	1		4	6,3	0,4
b) Uruguay Round unfinished business (telecom, etc.)	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
c) Financial services	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
d) Government procurement	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
e) Intellectual property rights (IPR)	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
f) New issues (environment, investment, competition, labor standards)	4	1					1	2		4	5,3	2,5
g) Market access: creating additional trading opportunities (ITA...)	2							2		2	7,0	0,0
h) International customs cooperation	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
i) Illicit payments	1	1								1	1,0	0,0

	Actions								Total	μ	σ	
	Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				8
2. The New Transatlantic Marketplace	28	0	3	5	3	0	1	14	3	29	5,7	2,0
a) Joint study on ways of facilitating trade	1								1	1	8,0	0,0
b) Confidence building	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
c) Standards, certification and regulatory issues	4							4	1	5	7,2	0,4
d) Veterinary and plant health issues	2							2		2	7,0	0,0
e) Government procurement	1						1			1	6,0	0,0
f) Intellectual property rights (IPR)	1				1					1	4,0	0,0
g) Financial services	1			1						1	3,0	0,0
h) Customs cooperation	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
i) Information Society, technology and telecom	6		1	3				2		6	4,2	2,0
j) Competition	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
k) Data protection	1			1						1	3,0	0,0
l) Transport	3				2			1		3	5,0	1,4
m) Energy	1							1		1	7,0	0,0
n) Biotechnology	2							1	1	2	7,5	0,5
o) Safety and health	2		2							2	2,0	0,0
3. Jobs and growth	3	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	3,3	1,8
a) Jobs and growth	2			1			1			2	4,5	1,5
b) Macroeconomic issues	1		1							1	2,0	0,0

	Actions								Total	μ	σ	
	Issues	1	2	3	4	5	6	7				8
IV. Building Bridges across the Atlantic	19	1	7	0	1	5	0	8	1	23	4,9	1,3
1. Transatlantic Business Dialogue	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	6,0	1,0
a) Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)	1					1		1		2	6,0	1,0
2. Broadening science and technology cooperation	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	5	6,0	2,0
			1					4		5	6,0	2,0
3. People to people links	9	0	4	0	0	3	0	2	1	10	4,2	1,5
a) Contacts between citizens	1					1				1	5,0	0,0
b) Education (higher education, vocational training, school...)	6		3			1		2	1	7	4,7	2,5
c) Cross-study of systems of government and communities	1		1							1	2,0	0,0
d) Sister cities	1					1				1	5,0	0,0
4. Information and Culture	5	1	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	6	3,5	2,1
		1	2		1	1		1		6	3,5	2,1
TOTAL	196	20	24	12	9	23	35	72	13	208	5,1	0,5

Remarks: μ : mean (average value). σ : standard deviation (the standard deviation is a measure of how widely values are dispersed from the mean).

Action (type of action and level of commitment):

1 = statement of US and EU individual commitments - 2 = information (exchange of information and/or information gathering) - 3 = dialogue - 4 = consultation - 5 = common encouragement & support for third parties initiatives and actions (e.g. support for UN Secretary General efforts in Angola) - 6 = coordination of initiatives & positions (in particular in multilateral fora) and of actions - 7 = cooperation (including identification of means of cooperation) - 8 = joint action

**Table 2. US-EU Partnership – Intensity of Actions:
Comparison Cumulated Objectives - Cumulated Achievements
(December 1995 - May 1998)**

	Actions						
	<i>In. Obj.</i>	<i>Cum. Obj.</i>		<i>Cum. Achiev.</i>			
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
I. Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development around the World	83	185	5,2	2,1	109	5,2	1,7
<i>1. Working together for a stable and prosperous Europe</i>	27	58	4,9	2,2	30	6,4	0,8
a) Peace and reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia	9	16	5,4	2,3	12	6,1	0,8
b) Central and Eastern European Countries	7	12	5,6	1,6	3	6,7	0,9
c) Russia, Ukraine and the other New Independent States	7	12	5,8	1,3	6	6,7	0,7
d) Turkey	2	7	3,4	2,3	3	7,0	0,0
e) Cyprus	2	8	3,5	1,7	3	6,3	0,5
f) South East Europe *	0	3	3,0	1,4	3	6,7	0,5
<i>2. Promoting the Middle East Peace Process</i>	9	15	3,7	2,4	9	5,3	1,2
	9	15	3,7	2,4	9	5,3	1,2
<i>3. Sharing responsibility in other regions of the world</i>	15	38	4,9	2,0	22	3,8	1,8
a) Rwanda - Burundi	2	4	6,3	1,3	1	7,0	0,0
b) Great Lakes (Central Africa, Congo, ...)	1	8	5,5	1,0	2	5,0	0,0
c) Angola - Mozambique	1	2	5,5	0,5	1	8,0	0,0
d) Nigeria	1	3	4,3	2,5	4	4,0	0,0

	Actions						
	<i>In. Obj.</i>	<i>Cum. Obj.</i>		<i>Cum. Achiev.</i>			
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
e) El Salvador - Nicaragua	2	2	3,5	0,5	1	4,0	0,0
f) Guatemala	1	1	1,0	0,0	1	6,0	0,0
g) Haiti	1	1	1,0	0,0	3	4,0	2,2
h) Cuba	1	1	1,0	0,0	3	2,3	0,9
i) Hong Kong - Macao (China *)	1	5	3,8	1,7	0	0,0	0,0
j) Korean peninsula - Taiwan - South China Sea	1	1	7,0	0,0	1	7,0	0,0
k) Burma	1	3	6,7	1,2	1	5,0	0,0
l) Cambodia	1	1	8,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
m) East Timor	1	2	5,5	0,5	0	0,0	0,0
n) Iran *	0	3	4,7	1,7	3	3,7	0,5
o) Lybia *	0	1	3,0	0,0	1	3,0	0,0
<i>4. Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance</i>	9	32	6,4	1,4	32	6,0	1,4
a) Development cooperation	5	15	6,6	1,0	13	6,0	1,4
b) Humanitarian assistance	4	17	6,2	1,7	19	6,0	1,5
<i>5. Human rights and democracy</i>	7	13	4,8	2,4	3	6,7	0,5
	7	13	4,8	2,4	3	6,7	0,5
<i>6. Cooperation in international organizations</i>	5	7	5,6	2,1	6	4,3	1,4
a) UN	3	5	5,2	2,4	2	4,0	1,0
b) OSCE	1	1	6,0	0,0	1	5,0	0,0
c) Bretton Woods institutions, OECD	1	1	7,0	0,0	3	4,3	1,7

	Actions						
	In. Obj.		Cum. Obj.		Cum. Achiev.		
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
<i>7. Non-proliferation, international disarmament and arms transfers</i>	11	22	5,8	1,8	7	2,8	3,2
a) Promotion of adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	2	2	6,5	0,5	0	0,0	0,0
b) Conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	1	1	6,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
c) Negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty	1	1	8,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
d) Extension of the Missile Technology Control Regime	1	1	6,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
e) Revision of 1972 Convention on Biological Weapons	1	2	7,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
f) Prevention of proliferation of Anti-Personal Landmines	2	6	5,5	1,7	0	0,0	0,0
g) Multilateral arrangement for (arms) export controls	1	4	4,8	2,5	1	6,0	0,0
h) Prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1	2	6,5	0,5	3	3,0	1,4
i) Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)	1	3	5,0	1,6	3	7,0	0,0
<i>II. Responding to Global Challenges</i>	54	122	5,6	1,9	49	5,3	1,9
<i>1. Fight against organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking</i>	23	56	5,6	1,9	21	5,8	1,7
a) Organized crime	5	16	6,0	1,8	5	5,8	1,2
b) Terrorism	6	17	5,4	1,9	6	5,2	1,6
c) Drug trafficking	12	23	5,4	1,8	10	6,2	1,8
<i>2. Immigration and asylum</i>	9	18	5,8	2,1	9	5,2	2,0
a) Fight against traffic in illegal immigrants and women (and children*)	2	10	7,2	0,4	4	7,0	1,2
b) Illegal immigration, asylum and migration flows	4	5	3,0	2,0	4	4,0	1,4
c) Refugees	3	3	6,0	0,0	1	3,0	0,0

	Actions						
	In. Obj.		Cum. Obj.		Cum. Achiev.		
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
<i>3. Legal and judicial cooperation</i>	4	5	6,4	1,2	3	3,3	0,5
	4	5	6,4	1,2	3	3,3	0,5
<i>4. Preservation of the environment</i>	8	28	5,3	1,9	9	5,0	1,8
	8	28	5,3	1,9	9	5,0	1,8
<i>5. Population issues</i>	2	2	6,5	0,5	0	0,0	0,0
	2	2	6,5	0,5	0	0,0	0,0
<i>6. Nuclear safety</i>	4	4	6,0	0,7	3	5,0	2,8
	4	4	6,0	0,7	3	5,0	2,8
<i>7. Health</i>	4	9	5,6	1,8	4	6,3	1,5
	4	9	5,6	1,8	4	6,3	1,5
<i>III. Contributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Cooperation</i>	48	126	5,3	1,9	56	5,0	2,0
<i>1. Strengthening the multilateral trading system</i>	16	51	5,1	1,7	18	4,4	1,5
a) Consolidating the WTO	4	15	4,5	2,0	4	5,3	1,3
b) Uruguay Round unfinished business (services a.o. telecommunications, maritime)	1	5	5,0	1,3	3	4,0	1,4
c) Financial services	1	4	6,0	0,0	1	6,0	0,0
d) Government procurement	1	2	6,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
e) Intellectual property rights (IPR)	1	1	7,0	0,0	2	5,0	2,0
f) New issues (environment, investment, competition, labor standards)	4	10	5,0	1,9	3	3,7	0,9

	Actions						
	In. Obj.		Cum. Obj.		Cum. Achiev.		
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
g) Market access: creating additional trading opportunities (ITA ...)	2	10	5,7	1,1	3	5,3	0,9
h) International customs cooperation	1	1	7,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
i) Illicit payments	1	3	4,0	2,2	2	6,0	0,0
2. The New Transatlantic Marketplace	29	63	5,5	2,0	34	5,6	1,7
a) Joint study on ways of facilitating trade	1	5	7,2	0,4	4	7,5	0,5
b) Confidence building	1	2	5,0	2,0	3	7,0	0,0
c) Standards, certification and regulatory issues	5	14	6,2	1,7	9	6,2	1,5
d) Veterinary and plant health issues	2	3	7,0	0,0	3	7,3	0,5
e) Government procurement	1	2	4,5	1,5	0	0,0	0,0
f) Intellectual property rights (IPR)	1	3	5,3	1,2	2	5,0	2,0
g) Financial services	1	1	3,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
h) Customs cooperation	1	2	7,0	0,0	3	7,7	0,5
i) Information Society, information technology and telecommunications	6	10	4,5	2,1	3	5,0	0,8
j) Competition	1	2	7,0	0,0	3	7,0	0,8
k) Data protection	1	3	3,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
l) Transport	3	7	5,0	1,6	1	7,0	0,0
m) Energy	1	2	5,0	2,0	0	0,0	0,0
n) Biotechnology	2	4	7,3	0,4	3	5,0	1,6
o) Safety and health	2	3	3,7	2,4	0	0,0	0,0

	Actions						
	In. Obj.		Cum. Obj.		Cum. Achiev.		
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
3. Jobs and growth	3	12	4,3	1,8	4	2,3	0,4
a) Jobs and growth	2	7	5,4	1,7	1	3,0	0,0
b) Macroeconomic issues (Euro*)	1	5	2,8	0,4	3	2,0	0,0
IV. Building Bridges across the Atlantic	23	62	5,7	1,9	29	6,5	1,5
1. Transatlantic Business Dialogue	2	12	4,9	1,0	8	6,1	1,5
a) Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)	2	8	5,3	0,7	6	6,0	1,4
b) Transatlantic Small Business Initiative (TASBI) *	0	4	4,3	1,3	2	6,5	1,5
2. Broadening science and technology cooperation	5	10	6,7	1,6	8	7,3	1,6
	5	10	6,7	1,6	8	7,3	1,6
3. People to people links	10	33	6,1	1,9	12	6,2	1,5
a) Contacts between citizens	1	12	6,8	1,1	3	7,7	0,5
b) Education (higher education, vocational training, school, stages...)	7	13	5,9	2,3	7	7,4	1,0
c) Cross-study of systems of government and communities	1	1	2,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
d) Sister cities	1	1	5,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
e) People with disabilities *	0	2	6,0	1,0	0	0,0	0,0
f) Non Governmental Organizations Dialogue *	0	2	5,0	0,0	1	5,0	0,0
g) Consumers Dialogue *	0	2	6,0	1,0	1	7,0	0,0
4. Information and Culture	6	7	3,7	2,0	1	8,0	0,0
	6	7	3,7	2,0	1	8,0	0,0

	Actions						
	<i>In. Obj.</i>	<i>Cum. Obj.</i>		<i>Cum. Achiev.</i>			
	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
5. <i>Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TLD) *</i>	0	6	5,3	0,7	1	5,0	0,0
	0	6	5,3	0,7	1	5,0	0,0
6. <i>Parliamentary Dialogue *</i>	0	1	5,0	0,0	2	6,0	1,0
	0	1	5,0	0,0	2	6,0	1,0
7. <i>Courts Dialogue *</i>	0	3	5,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
	0	3	5,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
TOTAL	208	495	5,2	2,0	243	4,9	2,0

* = Items added to the Joint Action Plan after December 1995.

US-EU Partnership

Intensity of Actions: Comparison Cumulated Objectives - Cumulated Achievements (December 1995 - December 2000)

	Actions					
	In. Obj.	Total	μ	σ	Total	Cum. Achiev.
	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
1. Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world	83	5,1	1,8	338	266	4,9
<i>1. Working together for a stable and prosperous Europe</i>	27	5,1	1,7	135	106	5,8
a) Peace and reconstruction in the former Yugoslavia	9	5,3	1,9	32	32	5,7
b) Central and Eastern European Countries / Baltic Sea region * (June 1999)	7	5,5	1,5	15	6	6,2
c) Russia, Ukraine and the other New Independent States	7	5,5	1,4	54	40	5,7
d) Turkey	2	8	3,5	2,1	4	5,5
e) Cyprus	2	15	4,3	1,6	6	5,8
f) South East Europe * (June 1996) / Albania * (May 1997)	0	11	4,6	1,4	18	5,9
2. Promoting the Middle East Peace Process	9	4,2	1,9	31	18	5,6
	9	4,2	1,9	31	18	5,6
3. Sharing responsibility in other regions of the world	15	4,7	1,8	63	62	3,5
a) India * (May 1998) - Pakistan * (December 1999)	2	3	5,3	2,1	2	5,5
b) Rwanda - Burundi / Great Lakes (Central Africa, Congo, ...)	1	14	5,4	1,2	3	4,7
c) Angola - Mozambique	1	5	4,6	0,8	3	6,0
d) Nigeria	1	3	4,3	2,5	6	3,3
e) El Salvador - Nicaragua	2	2	3,5	0,5	2	2,5
f) Guatemala / Colombia * (December 2000)	1	2	2,0	1,0	1	6,0
g) Haiti	1	1	1,0	0,0	3	4,0
h) Cuba	1	2	1,0	0,0	7	2,6
i) Hong Kong - Macao / China * (December 1996)	1	5	3,8	1,7	3	3,3
j) Korean peninsula - Taiwan - South China Sea	1	6	5,3	0,7	8	3,3
k) Burma	1	3	6,7	1,2	4	3,0
l) Cambodia	1	1	8,0	0,0	0	0,0
m) East Timor / Indonesia * (June 1999)	1	10	5,4	0,5	8	3,6
n) Iran * (June 1996)	0	3	6,0	4,0	8	3,8
o) Lybia * (June 1996)	0	1	3,0	0,0	4	4,8
4. Development cooperation and humanitarian assistance	9	39	6,3	1,4	36	5,9
a) Development cooperation	5	19	6,3	1,2	13	6,0
b) Humanitarian assistance	4	20	6,3	1,6	23	5,9
5. Human rights and democracy	7	18	4,9	2,1	7	4,7
	7	18	4,9	2,1	7	4,7
6. Cooperation in international organizations	5	13	5,0	1,8	13	4,7
a) UN	3	10	4,6	1,9	3	4,0
b) OSCE	1	1	6,0	0,0	1	5,0

	1	2	6,5	0,5	9	4,9	1,2
c) Bretton Woods institutions, OECD / NATO * (December 1999)	1	2	6,5	0,5	9	4,9	1,2
7. <i>Non-proliferation, international disarmament and arms transfers</i>	11	39	5,7	1,5	24	3,7	1,9
a) Promotion of adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	2	8	5,9	0,9	3	3,3	1,7
b) Conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	1	3	5,3	0,5	2	5,0	0,0
c) Negotiation on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty	1	1	8,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
d) Extension of the Missile Technology Control Regime	1	1	6,0	0,0	1	3,0	0,0
e) Convention on Biological Weapons / Chemical Weapons Convention * (May 2000)	1	3	6,3	0,9	1	5,0	0,0
f) Prevention of proliferation of Anti-Personal Landmines	2	6	5,5	1,7	1	6,0	0,0
g) Multilateral arrangement for (arms) export controls	1	8	4,9	1,8	5	5,0	1,4
h) Prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction	1	5	6,4	0,8	5	3,2	1,2
i) Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)	1	4	5,5	1,7	6	5,8	1,2
j) Spread and accumulation of small arms and light weapons control * (June 1999)							

	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
II. Responding to Global Challenges	54	204	5,8	1,7	90	5,0	1,8
<i>1. Fight against organized crime, terrorism and drug trafficking</i>	23	91	5,8	1,8	42	5,5	1,7
a) Organized crime	5	28	6,1	1,7	8	5,4	1,2
b) Terrorism	6	27	5,7	1,7	17	5,4	1,6
c) Drug trafficking	12	36	5,7	1,9	17	5,8	1,9
<i>2. Immigration and asylum</i>	9	33	5,9	2,0	13	4,7	2,1
a) Fight against traffic in illegal immigrants and women	2	19	6,8	1,3	5	6,8	1,2
b) Illegal immigration, asylum and migration flows	4	10	4,0	2,1	6	3,5	1,4
c) Refugees	3	4	6,3	0,4	2	3,0	0,0
<i>3. Legal and judicial cooperation</i>	4	7	6,6	1,0	4	3,0	0,7
	4	7	6,6	1,0	4	3,0	0,7
<i>4. Preservation of the environment</i>	8	53	5,3	1,6	22	4,6	1,5
	8	53	5,3	1,6	22	4,6	1,5
<i>5. Population issues</i>	2	2	6,5	0,5	0	0,0	0,0
	2	2	6,5	0,5	0	0,0	0,0
<i>6. Nuclear safety</i>	4	4	6,0	0,7	3	5,0	2,8
	4	4	6,0	0,7	3	5,0	2,8
<i>7. Health</i>	4	14	6,1	1,7	6	5,8	1,8
	4	14	6,1	1,7	6	5,8	1,8

	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
III. Contributing to the Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Cooperation	48	187	5,1	1,8	119	4,8	1,7
<i>1. Strengthening the multilateral trading system</i>	16	63	5,1	1,6	26	4,4	1,3
a) Consolidating the WTO	4	16	4,6	2,0	7	5,1	1,1
b) Uruguay Round unfinished business (services a.o. telecommunications, maritime)	1	5	5,0	1,3	3	4,0	1,4

c) Financial services	1	5	5,8	0,4	1	6,0	0,0
d) Government procurement	1	2	6,0	0,0	1	4,0	0,0
e) Intellectual property rights (IPR)	1	1	7,0	0,0	3	4,7	1,7
f) New issues (environment, investment, competition, labor standards)	4	17	5,1	1,7	6	3,8	0,7
g) Market access: creating additional trading opportunities (ITA ...)	2	12	5,6	1,1	3	5,3	0,9
h) International customs cooperation	1	1	7,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
i) Illicit payments	1	4	4,3	1,9	2	6,0	0,0
2. The New Transatlantic Marketplace	29	108	5,3	1,8	87	5,1	1,7
a) Joint study on ways of facilitating trade	1	5	7,2	0,4	4	7,5	0,5
b) Confidence building / Early warnings * (June 1999)	1	6	4,3	1,2	12	4,8	1,3
c) Standards, certification and regulatory issues	5	35	5,6	1,8	27	5,4	1,6
d) Veterinary and plant health issues	2	6	6,0	1,4	4	7,3	0,4
e) Government procurement	1	2	4,5	1,5	0	0,0	0,0
f) Intellectual property rights (IPR)	1	3	5,3	1,2	2	5,0	2,0
g) Financial services	1	2	3,0	0,0	1	4,0	0,0
h) Customs cooperation	1	2	7,0	0,0	3	7,7	0,5
i) Information Society, information technology and telecommunications	6	15	4,6	1,9	9	4,4	1,0
j) Competition	1	3	6,7	0,5	5	6,4	1,4
k) Data protection	1	8	4,8	1,8	3	4,7	0,9
l) Transport	3	7	5,0	1,6	1	7,0	0,0
m) Energy	1	3	4,7	1,7	3	5,0	1,4
n) Biotechnology	2	7	5,6	2,0	12	4,8	1,7
o) Safety and health	2	4	3,5	2,1	1	3,0	0,0
3. Jobs and growth	3	16	4,0	1,7	6	2,8	1,1
a) Jobs and growth	2	11	4,5	1,8	3	3,7	0,9
b) Macroeconomic issues / Euro* (May 1998)	1	5	2,8	0,4	3	2,0	0,0

	Total	Total	μ	σ	Total	μ	σ
IV. Building Bridges Across the Atlantic	23	104	5,5	1,7	69	5,8	1,7
1. Transatlantic Business Dialogue	2	19	5,1	0,9	13	5,9	1,3
a) Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD)	2	14	5,3	0,6	10	5,7	1,2
b) Transatlantic Small Business Initiative - TASBI * (June 1996)	0	5	4,4	1,2	3	6,7	1,2
2. Broadening science and technology cooperation	5	23	6,0	1,7	28	5,6	2,0
	5	23	6,0	1,7	28	5,6	2,0
3. People to people links	10	54	5,7	1,6	26	6,0	1,4
a) Contacts between citizens	1	14	6,6	1,2	3	7,7	0,5
b) Education (higher education, vocational training, school, stages...)	7	18	5,5	2,1	9	7,4	1,0
c) Cross-study of systems of government and communities	1	1	2,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
d) Sister cities	1	2	5,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
e) People with disabilities *	0	2	6,0	1,0	0	0,0	0,0

f) NGO Development Dialogue * (May 1998) / Environmental Dialogue * (dec. 1998)	0	9	5,3	0,7	7	5,4	0,7
g) Consumers Dialogue * (December 1997)	0	8	5,6	0,9	7	5,7	0,9
4. Information and Culture	6	8	3,9	1,9	2	6,0	2,0
	6	8	3,9	1,9	2	6,0	2,0
5. Transatlantic Labor Dialogue (TLD) * (June 1996)	0	10	5,5	0,8	2	5,0	0,0
	0	10	5,5	0,8	2	5,0	0,0
6. Legislators' Dialogue * (December 1997)	0	6	5,3	0,7	4	5,0	1,4
	0	6	5,3	0,7	4	5,0	1,4
7. Courts Dialogue * (December 1997)	0	3	5,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
	0	3	5,0	0,0	0	0,0	0,0
TOTAL	208	833	5,2	1,8	544	4,8	1,8