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**Back to Historical Comparative Analysis:
A “European Dream-Search Approach”**

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I. Introduction

The Single European Act, as well as the creation of the European Union, has rekindled debate on approaches to EU/EC studies since the early 1980s.¹ Based on a general review of this debate, I rethink the value of these American-advocated and theory building-oriented approaches. These approaches have without a doubt enriched the subject and the methods of EU/EC studies, but they have also brought about some unexpected consequences that might prevent scholars from deepening their knowledge of European integration. In order to compensate for this insufficiency, the author tries first to prove it inappropriate to treat the EU/EC as a continent-sized nation building project or a specific international cooperation movement. On the assumption that European integration is unprecedented, and the EU/EC is *sui generis*, the author proposes a historical comparative analysis approach based upon comparison among different events in European integration history. Following the comparison, a review of the development of integration ideas over the past five hundred years will permit the author to present the concept of “constitutional sovereignty building” as a starting point for EU/EC studies. Based on this new concept, several hypotheses will be deduced, which are later put to test. Finally, some tentative but very interesting, conclusions will be established that could help improve understanding of the European integration movement and advance EU/EC studies.

II. Some remarks on American-led approaches in EU/EC Studies

Since the Schuman Declaration in 1950, American scholars have without a doubt dominated EU/EC studies outside of Europe. Among students of EU/EC studies outside of Europe, Ernst Haas, the pioneer of the integration theories, may be more well-known than Jean Monnet, the founding father of the European Communities (Community ?).

“Although in Europe the adherents and opponents of a European federation have been discussing issues of European integration, admits one of the leading scholars in Europe, the debate has been primarily a political one; the scholarly debate so far has taken place mainly in America.”²

¹ For such reviews, see Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, London: Macmillan, 2000; Helen Wallace and William Wallace, *Policy-Making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 3-36.

² Karl Kaiser, “L’Europe des savants: European integration and the social sciences,” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 4, 1964, p. 43.

As a result, numerous approaches or theories have been presented by American scholars in order to offer a “scientific explanation” of EU/EC history. These theories can be divided into three categories, based upon a comparison of their starting points. The first category starts with the assumption that the EU/EC can be analyzed more or less as a nation or quasi-nation building project. In his famous 1958 book, *The Uniting of Europe*, Ernst Haas explained Western Europe’s evolution from the Schuman Declaration to the Common Market based on the assumption that Europeans were undertaking a continent-sized federation building project.³ Instead of force used as an engine for unification, as in historical nation building, integration theory emphasizes a peaceful path. The strategy, based on sectoral integration, would be accompanied by a series of “spill-over” effects and finally lead to general economic integration. Such a supranationalist approach had been severely criticized even before it was presented by Haas. After the EDC⁴ project was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954, “the term supranationalism was just like a taboo among the adherents to European integration,” said Max Kohnstamm. ‘I felt like I was plagued at the conference in Messina and nobody dare to approach me.’”⁵ The approach offered by E. Haas, namely neofunctionalism, was challenged by other approaches as well as by EU/EC development after de Gaulle was elected president of the French Fifth Republic in 1958. Moreover, since the mid 1960s, European integration began to stagnate and experience frustrations. In 1971, Haas began to doubt the value of integration theory building as a whole, and that of neofunctionalism in particular.⁶ Four years later, the man who gave birth to integration theory declared its end in his book entitled *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*.⁷ The publication began a decade of silence in EU/EC theoretical debate. Not until the Single European Act appeared the agenda of European integration did American scholars resume their theorizing of EU/EC history. The assumption that the EU/EC could be treated as a nation building project seems to have been abandoned by those who made an effort to reestablish the neofunctionalist approach.⁸ It is those scholars who try to explain the EU/EC as a governance⁹ or an

³ Ernst Haas, *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

⁴ European Defense Community.

⁵ “Interview de Max Kohnstamm par Roberto Ducci et Mme Maria Grawia Melchionni le 27 septembre 1984”, *Série d'histoire*, Archives de la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne.

⁶ L. N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold eds., *Regional Integration: Theory and Research*, (M.A. USA: Harvard University Press, 1971).

⁷ Ernst Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1975).

⁸ See Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, “Europe before the Court: a Political Theory of Legal Integration”, *International Organization*, 47(1), winter 1993, pp. 205-293; Dorette Corbey, “Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration”, *International Organization*, 49(2), spring 1995, pp.253-284; Geoffrey Carrett et al., “The European Court of Justice, National Government, and Legal Integration in the European Union”, *International Organization*, 52(1), winter 1998, pp. 149-176; Michael Huelshoff and Thomas

institutional complex base their theoretical construction upon the supranationalist assumption, implying that the European integration has never ceased to evolve into a super-Nation no matter what its denomination or structure is.¹⁰

The second group of scholars bases its analysis upon the anti-thesis that the EU/EC could never be treated as a nation, a nation-building project or even a quasi-nation. For though a form of European integration was launched with treaties under international law, it is only a form of international cooperation between sovereign states. Even if the EU/EC is armed with institutions more complex and cooperation more close than any other international organization, it still should be treated as a form of international cooperation, which facilitates the explanation of its history and its functioning. This approach became well-known even before the Schuman Declaration. While David Mitrany advocated “international functional cooperation” in the 1930s, transnational integration was regarded only as a short cut, rather than an alternative to international cooperation.¹¹ During the sixties, realists interested in the Common Market and led by Stanley Hoffmann severely criticized the idea of supranationalism. According to Hoffmann, those who emphasized supranational institutions, the influence of their leaders, or some mysterious interior force such as the “spill-over” effect, completely misunderstood EU/EC history and misled EU/EC studies.¹² As long as international society remains an anarchic jungle and the state still stands as its vital pillar, any action in this jungle cannot be well explained but on the basis of those interest-minded states. European integration advanced when the participant nations were able to reach a compromise, but stagnated or even collapsed when such efforts failed. That is why the Common Market was founded, but the Fouchet project failed. These arguments have reappeared in EU/EC studies since the early nineties in the form of intergovernmentalism, presented by Andrew Moravcsik.¹³ Even with modifications, this approach continues to explain the EU/EC according to

Pfeiffer, “Environmental Policy in the EC: Neo-functionalist Sovereignty Transfer or Neo-realist Gate-keeper?”, *International Journal (Toronto)*, 47(1), winter 1991-1992, pp.136-158; Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC”, *Millennium-Journal of International Studies*, 20(1), spring 1990, pp. 1-22.

⁹ W. Sandholtz and A Stone Sweet, *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

¹⁰ P. Hall and P. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, *Political Science*, 44(5), 1996.

¹¹ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966[1944].

¹² Stanley Hoffmann, *The European Sisyphus: Essay on Europe, 1964-1994*, Boulder (CO): Westview, 1995.

¹³ Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act”, in R. Keohane and S. Hoffmann eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change*, Boulder(CO): Westview, 1991; “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33(4), 1995.

Hoffmann's logic that European integration should be treated as an international cooperation movement manipulated by powers. To the extreme, it is a specific one.

Based the assumption that the EU/EC is something unprecedented and incomparable to any existing international subjects, the third group of scholars defines the EU/EC as *sui generis*. Such an assumption permits scholars to present new ideas which could better describe and explain the EU/EC history and functioning. For Karl Deutsch, EU/EC represents the ideal type of "security community," in which no member will resort to war as a solution to conflicts with any other members.¹⁴ Donald Puchala regards the EU/EC as a "concordance system," which offers member states an occasion to exchange ideas, negotiate, and together find common solutions. This whole process concerns multilateral interactions, the pattern of which differs from case to case.¹⁵ Some argue that the EU/EC could be well analyzed on the basis of assumptions from regime theory. According to the latter, international relations are not only regulated by law or force, but also by some basic principles, behavior codes, action norms and procedural rules. All these compose different regimes once they are implicitly accepted by their members.¹⁶ For others, the EU/EC is "less than a federation [but] more than a regime."¹⁷ The EU/EC is sometimes treated as a complex of institutions, of which the structure and rules limit its members' actions and orient the integration movement.¹⁸ This thesis encounters, however, opposition from adherents to the "policy community approach," which emphasizes on the policy-making process. It is this process, rather than its institutional structure or legal regulations, that gives birth to community policies. Without enough attention paid to political bargaining, the policy community approach argues, the institutionalists will never discover the real engine of European integration.¹⁹

The above approaches or theories are mostly presented by American scholars. These American-led approaches have abundantly contributed to EU/EC studies around the world. First, as opposed to most European scholars, Americans can keep their distance from political debate over the EU/EC. They had no obligation to argue for the EDC in the fifties, or the Euro in the nineties, while few European scholars of EU/EC studies could escape political debate over such hot issues. As a

¹⁴ Karl Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area --- International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton(New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 1957.

¹⁵ Donald Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, No: 1972, pp. 167-184.

¹⁶ S. Krasner ed., *International Regimes*, Ithaca(New York): Cornell University Press, 1983.

¹⁷ William Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

¹⁸ P. Hall and P. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", *Political Science*, Vol. 44 No. 5, 1996.

¹⁹ J. Richardson ed., *European Union: Power and Policy-Making*, London: Routledge, 1996.

result, the Americans enjoy value-free research on the EU/EC, which facilitates their theoretical thinking about this integration movement. Quite often, European scholars, motivated by their political attitudes toward European integration, are busy defending or attacking various treaties or EU/EC policies.

In addition, the behaviorist revolution has penetrated EU/EC studies, where it has triggered a methodological revolution. While European scholars still prefer to explain the EU/EC on the basis of its historical context or legal structure, Americans have enlarged EU/EC studies by employing all the methods developed in behaviorism. EU/EC studies has since then been oriented toward a theoretical construction, which permits scholars to discover general rules of European integration.

However, some unexpected consequences have also come about. As all these approaches aim to construct a theory or establish general rules, they easily, if not consciously, encourage scholars to deepen their knowledge of integration theories, while neglecting historical studies of the EU/EC. As a result, scholars are encouraged to present first a logical framework and then “find” (if not “select”) facts to justify it. American scholars in EU/EC studies are therefore busy presenting new “isms,” which means that they take innovative approaches. This brings me to wonder if this trend results from the characteristics of the American academic market. Since this market is larger and far more liberal than that in Europe, American scholars are obliged to register their own trademarks as soon as possible. That is the rule for survival in a competitive environment and explains why all the above-mentioned approaches seem to be personalized: Haas is synonymous with neofunctionalism, Deutsch with the communication approach and Moravscik with (liberal) inter-governmentalism. At the same time, International Relations and International History are separated in the U.S., as two unrelated disciplines. The former emphasizes theoretical construction, while the latter focuses on historical research. However, EU/EC studies needs both approaches.

Theory-oriented approaches have also encouraged scholars to base their conclusions about the EU/EC upon comparative analyses. Most often scholars prefer to compare integration movements in different regions, such as in Asia-Pacific, North America, South America and Eastern Africa. On the assumption that EU/EC is a transnational economic cooperation regime or an international regime, scholars do comparative analyses of the EU/EC, OECD, ASEAN, NAFTA and even APEC.²⁰

²⁰ W.D. Coleman and G.R.D. Underhill eds., *Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia and the Americas*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Based on another assumption that European integration is similar to historical nation-building, the EU/EC can be compared to the USA in the eighteenth century or Switzerland in the nineteenth century.²¹ Nevertheless, all these comparisons are increasingly open to doubt, for the cases upon which all such analyses are based are events with different historical backgrounds and unrelated contexts. If such differences could never prevent comparative studies, I doubt if this is the best way for comparative analysis in EU/EC studies to be undertaken.

Table 1 American-led Approaches in EU/EC Studies

Groups	Starting Point	Comparative Bases
Group I	EU/EC as nation building	Historical Comparison
Group II	EU/EC as international cooperation	Horizontal Comparison
Group III	EU/EC as <i>sui generis</i>	Innovative

III. Back to historical comparative analysis for EU/EC Studies

The above remarks on the American-led approaches do not aim to deny their contribution to EU/EC studies around the world. They gave rise to theoretical thinking in this area of study, which then provided the impetus for research on regional integration or cooperation movements outside Europe. The comparative analyses have, at the same time, enlarged the research basis of EU/EC studies and enriched the subjects within as well.

However, even based on the assumption that the general rules or theory itself could advance the work of EU/EC studies, such comparative analyses should be made within the historical context of European integration. While events with different backgrounds are chosen to be compared and analyzed, events in EU/EC history could without doubt supply scholars with better bases for comparison. Moreover, as European integration advances, it seems more and more reasonable to treat the EU/EC as an entity *sui generis*. It is more and more difficult to analyze this unprecedented entity in comparison with any other entity in history or outside Europe. All this brings me to suppose that a comparative analysis based on research of EU/EC history is the best compensation for the theory-led approaches.

Such a historical analysis could start with a comparison of separate trends toward

²¹ A. Sbragia ed., *Euro-Politics*, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992. 以及 G. Marks, "Does the European Union Represent an *n* of 1?", *European Communities Studies Association Review*, 10(3), 1997.

European integration from the fifteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, ideas about integration were replacing the search for a unified Christendom as the best way to protect the continent from ceaseless wars. From the early seventeenth to late eighteenth centuries, thinking on integration was renewed with the following concepts: sovereignty, brought about in the aftermath of the Westphalia Peace, and the republican and democratic theories advocated by the pioneers of the Enlightenment and the federalist dream brought into reality with American independence. From then on, the integration movement was aimed at reorganizing the sovereign states in Europe into a unified federal republic.²²

Nonetheless, nationalism became the political mainstream in Europe after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. As this trend proved to be irresistible, integration was reinterpreted as compatible with national independence. Several of those who devoted themselves to national unification or liberation in Italy, Germany and Poland were advocating, at the same time, an integration movement. L. Feurbach and F. Freiligrath, two German revolutionary leaders, created the “Ligue internationale de la paix et de la liberté” in 1848 and published the integration review, *Les Etats-Unis d’Europe*, in 1867.²³ For them, European integration could not only facilitate the national movements in their own fatherlands, but also guarantee the fruits of such movements.

The war of 1870 completely disillusioned integrationists, squashing their optimistic expectations. From then on, nationalism dominated Europe, pushed aside ideas about integration, and brought about the two world wars. The 1920s witnessed a certain revival of integration ideas as part of the inter-War idealism. The integration idea reached its peak when Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi published his well-known pamphlet, *Pan-Europe*, in 1923 and founded the *Mouvement pan-européen* one year later.²⁴ The failure of this movement and the weakness of the Council of Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War gave rise to another integration strategy, advocated by Jean Monnet and put into action by Robert Schuman in 1950. Since then, the EU/EC has been interpreted as an anti-thesis of nationalism, as well as the only way toward European reconciliation and revival.

²² Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, Leicester and London: Leicester University Press, 1992, pp. 30-76.

²³ Pierre Achard, *L’intégration économique européenne*, Paris: Service de Polycopie, Fondation des Sciences Politiques, 1982-1983, p. 4.

²⁴ See Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe*, Paris: PUF, 1988[1924].

Based on this retrospective, two conclusions can be drawn about the characteristics of ideas about European integration. To begin with, all of these ideas are part of Europeans' efforts for long-term peace among the nations of the continent. Integration was evidently not the only way toward a durable peace. But, while all the other solutions, such as balance of power, collective security, arms control, international arbitration and even the League of Nations proved to be incapable of keeping peace in Europe, the integration idea has become the last hope for achieving reconciliation and keeping peace between the once belligerent states. As a result, European integration has been, since it was launched in 1950, represented as the only guarantee of "reconciliation, peace and prosperity," which could vanish immediately if the EU/EC were to collapse. In short, as integration has become the only way toward reconciliation and peace on the continent, Europeans' several century dream for peace has prevented the EU/EC from disintegration or collapse.

At the same time, ideas about integration have shown themselves to be very powerful integrating different streams of thought, particularly those developed from the political mainstream, over the past five hundred years. Integration has been consequently regarded as compatible with demands for sovereign independence, democratic politics, federal spirit, European revival, anti-Nazism and regional peace. Moreover, integration has been crowned as a remedy for all those ideas today condemned as evil by Europeans, such as imperialism, militarism, nationalism, fascism and extremism. Different from historical nation-building, which quite often resulted from wars, European integration has since its beginning advocated a peaceful search for continental unification. It has also filtered all the important political thought of the past five hundred years and absorbed only the positive ideas. Those who oppose European integration are often labelled nationalists or extremists, meaning that they represent out-of-date or negative political ideas.

The above review permits the author to conclude that the EU/EC cannot be studied as a supranational building project. For European integration was launched on the assumption that the nation is not the ideal entity for human society and nationalism can easily be oriented toward war. As a result, the EU/EC aims at establishing a durable peace on the continent, lest Nazism or nationalism reemerge. The assumption that the EU/EC can be analyzed as a continent-sized supranational construction in comparison with the nation-building projects of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries implies that a new nation named "Europe" is under construction and a supranationalism is developing. These conclusions completely neglect the

development of ideas about European integration in the past five hundred years and contradict the basic assumptions upon which European integration was launched.

The same review has also falsified the hypothesis that European integration can be studied as a movement for international cooperation or transnational organization. As the EU/EC consists of sovereign states, it does possess some traits of an international organization. However, once it was created, this transnational cooperation was immediately transformed into an unprecedented integration, which differs from any traditional inter-state cooperation. This transformation in European integration is a transnational movement that is based on Europeans' five-hundred-year-old search for peace integration through unification. It has been transformed because all the other ways toward once zealously advocated and followed by Europeans failed. After the Second World War, Europeans need an unprecedented guarantee of peace that would be distinct from traditional nation-building or international cooperation projects, for both had proved to be impotent vis-à-vis wars launched in the name of nationalism.

In addition to the falsification discussed above, a new concept for EU/EC studies can be deduced from this review of the development of ideas about European integration. As integration was launched with the intention of establishing a durable peace on the continent and was intended to oppose ideologies such as nationalism and facism, the movement since 1950 has been motivated, as well as regulated, by these very ideologies. They become, therefore, something like the "unwritten constitution" of European integration. Though there is neither a treaty nor an agreement explicitly codifying all these principles, they seem to have been followed by all member states of the EU/EC. These principles which have been implicitly dominating European integration can then be defined as the "constitutionalness" of the EU/EC, enjoying the regulating power of a constitution but without its denomination.

Such "constitutionalness" has developed since the late fourteenth century and was clarified in the Schuman Declaration as follows.²⁵ Before all, integration is not an end in itself but only a process toward a durable peace. "A united Europe was not achieved," declared Robert Schuman, "and we had war." In other words the EU/EC is never merely an economic organization, even if it is always occupied with economic affairs. Secondly, since its beginning, the final goal of the EU/EC has

²⁵ "Déclaration de M. Robert Schuman du 9 mai 1950", Parlement européen, *Recueil des documents institutionnels de la Communauté de 1950 à 1982*, Luxembourg: Parlement européen, 1983, pp. 38-40.

been a European Federation, even though the precise content of such a federation has always been open to debate. Consequently, all economic integration consist of steps “in the federation of Europe.” Thirdly, European integration could never be achieved without reconciliation between France and Germany. For the “coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany.” That means that European integration has, since its origin, been based upon Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation. Fourthly, European integration could not “be made all at once, or according to a single plan.” “It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity,” meaning that European integration cannot be achieved through either the Pan-European Movement or federalism, but through the functionalist approach presented by Jean Monnet. In addition, a common transnational authority will be created in order to deepen and guarantee integration, which makes the EU/EC distinct from other international cooperation projects. In the end, European integration should be “open to the participation of the other countries of Europe,” which inevitably implies later enlargements. Member states could impose upon other European countries the conditions of accession to the EU/EC, but they can never deny the fact that all European countries are qualified to participate in European integration, for that principle is part of the “constitutionalness” of the EU/EC since its beginning.

The Schuman Declaration could therefore be deemed to be a certain “Charter” in the history of European integration. On the one hand, it summarizes the ideas or thought about European integration since the late fourteenth century. On the other hand, it clarifies the “constitutionalness” of the EU/EC, as well as its direction and objectives, which have been well followed in the past fifty years and never cease to regulate EU/EC development.

With such “constitutionalness,” Europeans have been building the EU/EC as a sovereign polity. It distinguishes itself from the traditional nation building project in that the belief upon which integration was launched violently opposes nationalism. It also distinguishes itself from the establishment of international organizations, for it possesses a certain sovereignty. In the case Van Genden Loos (1964), the Court of Justice made it clear that,

“the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.”²⁶

²⁶ Court of Justice, Case 26/62, judgement, 05/02/1963.

One year later, in the Costa case, the Court of Justice imposed the principle of superiority of EU/EC law over the laws of member states.²⁷ Though this principle has never ceased to be challenged by the institutions of member states, it continues to prevail inside the EU/EC. Consequently, the EU/EC constitutes a new sovereignty in the international community, even if it does exist only in limited fields. However, this sovereignty has been built only under the authority of the “constitutionalness” clarified in the Schuman Declaration. For example, all European countries possess the right to participate in the EU/EC, even if this is not included in the treaties establishing the EU/EC. If the EU/EC could refuse the application from Tunisia in 1986 only because the latter is not a European country, it could not refuse the application from Turkey for the same reason. As the “constitutionalness” imposes such rights on all European nations, the EU/EC never ceases to enlarge.

IV. The EU/EC as a “constitutional sovereign polity”

The above analyses bring the author to suppose that the EU/EC could be studied as a “constitutional sovereign polity with neither written constitution nor nation.” According to the same logic, European integration could be viewed a “European constitutional sovereignty building process.” The European search for a durable peace through unification constitutes the core belief of this building process. In other words, unification serves peace, and not the reverse. As a result, it can be deduced that this sovereignty building project is a reluctant process, for no member state is willing to cede sovereign rights to the institutions of the EU/EC. They were forced to do so because since World War II European integration has become synonymous with reconciliation, peace and prosperity. The collapse of European integration means bringing all these good things to an end, which is unacceptable.

This brings the author to conclude that the force of European integration comes from a deep fear Europeans hold over the collapse of the EU/EC. For the EU/EC is the last hope for maintaining a durable peace in Europe, and integration advances at the moment that European *acquis* are open to threat. When these *acquis* are under attack or threat, member states cannot but deepen the integration, lest the EU/EC collapse or disintegrate. This deduction does not therefore intend to abandon the realist assumption that all states act on their own interest calculations. On the contrary, it is based on such calculations that the states agree to be integrated. However, it may be argued that even if this “fear of collapse” could well explain the

²⁷ Court of Justice, Case 06/64, judgement, 15/07/1964.

beginning of European integration it, poorly explains the later development of integration. Most member states joined the EU/EC only for economic profits or political purposes having nothing to do with the zeal for a durable peace with a federation of Europe. Nonetheless, states can become members of the EU/EC only provided that they have accepted all the *acquis* of European integration. Such *acquis* include all existent institutions and legal obligations explicitly presented, as well as the “constitutionalness” implicitly imposed. This means that all member states have to participate in this constitutional sovereignty building project even though that is not their original intent or they are reluctant to do so. This process could be named the “socialization” of the member states. No matter what their motive, the member states cannot but participate in the building process as regulated by its “constitutionalness.”

The fear of the collapse of the EU/EC could reach its peak on the eve of its enlargement, in the aftermath of the transformation of the international system under which integration is taking place, or after some effort to disintegrate the EU/EC prevails. The three moments become, as a result, occasions of deepening integration. Some hypotheses can now be put forward to explain why European integration never ceases to deepen and enlarge.


First, a positive correlation exists between deepening and enlargement, for the more member states participate in this sovereignty-building project, the less possible it is that the structure can be replaced, and its basis becomes consequently more solid. In addition, when more states become members of the EU/EC, it becomes less possible for individual member states to could succeed in stopping the integration movement. In the formula “ $n/N=C$,” “N” represents the totality of member states of the EU/EC, “n” means those that oppose integration, and “C” is the probability that the member states of “n” will succeed in stopping integration. Provided that “n” remains the same, a negative correlation exists between “N” and “C,” meaning that, in an enlarged EU/EC, it is more difficult to stop the trend toward integration. As the enlargement is part of the “constitutionalness” of this sovereignty building project, and the collapse of the latter is unacceptable, member states have no choice but to deepen the EU/EC before to admitting new members.

Secondly, a positive correlation exists between the transformation of the international system under which integration is taking place and integration itself. This means that all such transformation threatens to shake the EU/EC and give rise to the weakening of this constitutional sovereignty building project. The EU/EC is

then forced to deepen its integration in order to strengthen this building process, lest the transformation of the international system shake or weaken it.

Thirdly, the attack on the EU/EC which aims to reorient integration out of the constitutional sovereignty building process will ironically help launch further integration. As the collapse of European sovereignty building remains unacceptable, the weak points of the EU/EC can be brought to light under such attack. While the fear of collapse helps the EU/EC resist this attack, worries about a similar attack in the future will facilitate further integration. In addition, the longer and further integration continues, the more strength it has to resist such attacks (Figure 1).

Figure 1- Correlation between the integration process and its resistance against attack



These hypotheses are now open to test based upon a comparative analysis of EU/EC history. Does European integration further as the expectation for enlargement rises? In the past fifty years, the EU/EC has undertaken four enlargements, in 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995. However, an analysis of the correlation between enlargements and deepening should also focus upon the founding period between 1950 and 1952, the “incorporation” of the former DRG in 1990, as well as the coming eastward expansion. As a result, the enlargements can be chronologically divided into six different periods (Table 2).

Table 2 Enlargements of the EU/EC

Years	Member States
1950-1952	From two to six
1961-1973	From six to nine

1975-1981 From nine to ten
1977-1986 From ten to twelve
1990-1995 From twelve to fifteen
1995-2002 (predicted) from fifteen to nineteen

During the founding period, between 1950 and 1952, an important step toward further integration was taken in order to consolidate the emerging Community. That step was the creation of the Court of Justice, which is out of concern in the Schuman Declaration, agreed upon only by France and Germany. According to Jean Monnet's proposal, it is a supranational administration, rather than a judicial institution, and is the successor to the Inter-Allied Authority in Ruhr and the guarantee or the *acquis* of European integration. However, as four more countries decided to participate in the Community under construction, Monnet seemed to worry about further integration. He then accepted the advice of the American jurist Maurice Lagrange that a Court of Justice should be created in the emerging Community. The latter, according to Mr. Lagrange, would play the same role as that of the Federal Supreme Court in the federation of America.²⁸ As integration began to surpass Franco-German relations, a simple administrative authority could no longer serve as the ideal framework for this Community-building process, and it was consolidated with the creation of the Court of Justice in order to begin multilateral integration.

The first enlargement of the Communities after their establishment began with the British effort to join the Common Market, beginning in 1961 and ending in 1973 when Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark became full members of the Communities. These twelve-year-long negotiations witnessed the beginning of the Common Market, the establishment of the CAP, the achievement of the Customs Union and the failure of the Fouchet Project. Was all such effort to deepen integration made under pressure over future British accession to the Communities? This position seems to exaggerate British influence on European integration in the sixties if it is claimed that all such progress in integration of this period owes a good deal to the potential enlargement toward the UK. However, even before the Treaties of Rome entered into effect, Great Britain intended to participate in European integration in the end. "The British shall come back," said Jean Monnet in 1958, "if the Common Market succeeds."²⁹ Moreover, British insistence on a loosely organized free trade zone was familiar to all

²⁸ "Entretien avec Maurice Lagrange par Antoine Marès, 23/09/1980. », FJ M ; « Mémoire de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman, 04/12/1950 », *Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Correspondance 1947-1953*, Lausanne : FJ M, 1986, pp. 77-78.

²⁹ Archive de la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne. AML 313/109.

the pioneers of European integration, as well as those who wished to exploit integration in favor of national glory. In order to consolidate the newly born Common Market, lest the latter be transformed into a free trade zone, the two above-mentioned groups composed a strange coalition between the late fifties and the mid-sixties. They came into conflict vis-à-vis the British application for the Communities, but both insisted that the British be admitted once they accept all the *acquis* of the Common Market. In order to guarantee the *acquis* of the Communities in the aftermath of the British accession, the six member states were inclined to consolidate the *acquis* as much as possible before the British joined. The CAP and the Customs Union were thus achieved, while the Fouchet Project for political cooperation failed. At the moment when Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland were admitted to the Communities, they had no choice but to adopt the CAP and the unique customs.³⁰

The next wave of enlargements rose toward southern Europe, which resulted in the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the Communities. As the GDP per capita of these three new member states was under the average level of the Common Market, their accession gave rise to debate over the CAP, the subsidies and the budget. All these questions were combined with the British demand for a review of the CAP and the contribution. Not until the summit of Fontainebleu in 1984, where a final compromise was reached and accepted by Thatcher,³¹ was the green light given for the admission of Spain and Portugal to the Common Market.

Next came the northward and eastward enlargements, including the incorporation of the former East Germany into the Communities in 1990. The creation of the European Union, proposed in 1989 conjointly by Mitterrand and Kohl and achieved in November 1993, represented evidently the reaction of the twelve member states to the sudden disintegration of the East bloc.³² While German unification became inevitable and the former East bloc a zone of influence for its western neighbors, the latter had no choice but to consolidate and deepen integration before its enlargement toward all corners of Europe. The Common Foreign and Security Policy was inaugurated in 1993 before the Communities embraced their neutral neighbors two years later. Some fundamental values of Western Europe, such as democracy, respect for human rights and freedom of expression were codified in the treaties

³⁰ See Geoge Stephan ed., *Britain and the European Community: the politics of semi-detachment*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

³¹ Andrew Moravsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act", *op. cit.*.

³² Geroges Soutou, *Alliance incertaine: les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands*, Paris: Fayard, 1996.

constituting the Communities only at the point when the European Union was to extend toward the young democracies of Eastern Europe.

As for the test of the formula $n/N=C$, a comparative analysis of the Luxembourg compromise in 1966 and the Ioannina compromise in 1994 would be helpful.³³ The former was launched by De Gaulle, while the latter by John Major. Both aimed to raise the threshold for resort to the qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers, lest member States cede more power to the Communities. De Gaulle succeeded for, at that moment, the other five member states could not continue their integration without French participation. In other words, French or German membership was indispensable to the integration between six countries. However, this indispensability declined as Europe extended from six to nine, and then to twelve. John Major enjoyed, therefore, far less privilege than did De Gaulle in the sixties in his effort to slow down the entry into effect of the qualified majority vote in the Council. The Ioannina compromise remains a historical document without raising the threshold for resort to the qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers.

Concerning the correlation between the transformation of the international system and European integration, we should first review international history since 1950, and then pick up the transformation periods. The first transformation period was the years between 1958 and 1962, which were marked by the acceleration of conflicts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as the division between Mao's China and Moscow. The superpowers were indirectly involved in the Qimoy crises of 1958, directly engaged in the Berlin crisis of 1961 and were on the verge of war in the Cuba missile crisis in 1962. The increasing hostility between the superpowers and the unilateral actions of the U.S. in the above crises brought the French president to suppose that France, as well as the whole of Western Europe, could be reluctantly dragged into wars having nothing to do with or, even worse, against their own interests. This fear echoed the German chancellor's worries, proving true in the Berlin crisis during which the American government refused to help Germans at the risk of war against the Soviets. Then, at their Rambouillet summit in 1960, the two European leaders decided to begin political cooperation among six member states of the Communities.³⁴ Such cooperation would lead to the establishment of the European Political Union, which marked the first step toward

³³ For the Luxembourg Compromise, see Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe*, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1983, pp. 315-330. For the Ioannina Compromise, see Philippe Manin, *Les Communautés européennes*, 5e éd., Paris : Pedone, 1999, p. 206.

³⁴ For Fouchet Project, see Couve de Murville, *Une politique étrangère 1958-1969*, Paris: Plon, 1971, pp. 356-360; Robert Bloes, *Le plan Fouchet et le problème de l'Europe politique*, Bruges(Belgique),

European independence from American political influence in world politics. In conclusion, the transformation of the international system between 1958 and 1962, which was marked by the acceleration of hostility between two superpowers, led the European leaders to deepen regional integration as a reaction to this transformation.

The second transformation period occurred between 1968 and 1973, a period that was characterized by American decline in its economic and political influence in world affairs. The double deficits (trade and budget) of the American government brought the world to doubt, in late sixties, if the Bretton Woods System could survive without change. At the same time, the Vietnam War cast a shadow on American capabilities and will to defend the Western world against communist expansion. In order to protect Europe from the coming financial turbulence, the Werner Project was presented and then adopted by the Council of Ministers. This project aimed to establish the Economic and Monetary Union within ten years. At the same time, political cooperation, which became taboo after the Fouchet Project failed in 1962, was timidly resumed in 1970 and the member states decided to hold a summit at least twice a year after 1974. The correlation between the decline of American political influence and the beginning of European political cooperation seems less evident than that between the dollar's weakening and the Werner Project. The enforcement of political cooperation inside the Communities was part of George Pompidou's strategy. After his succession to De Gaulle, Pompidou learned well that the British accession to the Common Market was irresistible and Germany began emerging as a dominant economic power in the Communities. He insisted in consequence that the British be admitted to the Communities only after the political cooperation mechanism and regular summit were well established. Only under such circumstances could the governments of member states, particularly France, continue to orient the integration movement.³⁵ As a result, the expectation of enlargement and the impact of international transformation together led to the establishment of political cooperation between member states of the Communities.

As far as the 1989-1991 period is concerned, the transformation of the international system was without doubt far more evident than before. The East bloc was liberated from communism as well as Soviet domination. Germany achieved its unification and the Cold War Era ended in Europe. Then the Soviet Union collapsed in the aftermath of a coup d'Etat which ironically had tried to save it. German unification and liberation of the East threatened the regional system established by the

Collège d'Europe, 1970.

³⁵ P. Gerbet, *op. cit.*, pp. 364-381.

Communities. The former posed a severe test to the integration power of the Communities, which were created as an ideal solution to the *Deutsche Frage*. Now it was under doubt whether the framework created since 1950 could well “digest” German unification. The latter gave rise to debate over eastward enlargements and the frontier of the European Communities. In the face of these challenges, European leaders chose to deepen integration in order to anchor the new Germany in the Communities and strengthen them before embracing their eastern neighbors. The Maastricht Treaty was therefore signed in 1991 and the European Union was founded in 1993.³⁶

Next comes the question of whether attacks upon the EU/EC will ironically help further integration. Three cases should be analyzed from integration history: the failure of the EDC, the empty chair crisis and the budgetary quarrels between England and other member states. The failure of the EDC in 1954 brought an end to the sectoral integration approach and Jean Monnet was forced to resign as president of the High Authority of the ECSC. However, the established Community did not disintegrate. European integration never stopped, but just left its place to the “common-market-led” approach. The latter aimed to enlarge the economic basis of integration as much as possible before any political integration was launched. The triumph of the common-market-approach over sectoral integration was related to the failure of the EDC. Not until this failure had the Monnet method ever been challenged, which emphasized a series of sectoral integrations rather than general economic integration. However, Monnet’s strategy was discredited by the failure of the EDC and this gave rise to the idea for the organization of a common market among Europeans. Monnet opposed this proposal, judged it too risky, and advocated the creation of an atomic community. As his approach was discredited in the aftermath of the EDC event, Monnet did not enjoy the same influence as he had between 1950 and 1952. Both projects for the creation of the Common Market and an atomic community were then presented at the Messina conference, resulting in two separate treaties instituting the EEC and EAEC, respectively, in 1958.

De Gaulle launched the second attack against integration between 1963 and 1965, the target of which was to brake and alienate European integration. The Elysee Treaty, signed in 1963, represented De Gaulle’s intention of inaugurating bilateral cooperation instead of multilateral integration as the leading political force in Europe. In other words, European integration could since then have been oriented under the dual alliance of France and Germany, which would without doubt have ended the

³⁶ Hubert Védrine, *Les mondes de François Mitterrand*, Paris: Fayard, pp. 423-480.

integration spirit. De Gaulle's ambition was later frustrated by the Bundestag, which added a preamble to the Elysee Treaty making it clear that the Treaty would under no circumstances damage European integration. Later, in November 1963, Adenauer was obliged to resign and the Treaty has since then been limited to cultural exchange and regular consultation.³⁷ In addition, those who supported integration launched a counter-attack. On the one hand, they urged that negotiations in Brussels on the subject of British entry into the Common Market be concluded as soon as possible. They wanted to see the Franco-German leadership balanced by Great Britain. On the other hand, they echoed the MLF project presented by the American government as a counterbalance to the potential Franco-German bilateral alliance. This counter-attack was launched, of course, on the assumption that the Atlantic Alliance was the indispensable framework for European integration.

Two years later, De Gaulle provoked the empty chair crisis immediately after the Commission had presented its propositions with the intention of enlarging the Commission's power and imposing the qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers. The French government then demanded a general review of the Communities. The crisis ended with a compromise among the six member states, which implicitly excluded the qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers. De Gaulle has received a lot of criticism for his deep-rooted skepticism about European integration; however, the counter-attack was not launched from the front, but from the rear. All the French, as well as European, supporters of European integration were mobilized against De Gaulle in the French presidential campaign in 1965. This was part of the efforts at negative integration, meaning efforts to eliminate obstacles to Community-building.

As far as the budgetary quarrels, the British effort implies its intention to reorient the Communities into a loosely organized free trade zone. Different from De Gaulle's empty chair strategy, the British governments preferred to block any further integration if the budget problem was not satisfactorily solved. The British complaint resulted in the creation of a "repayment mechanism" in 1974 and the Regional Development Fund in 1975 as the first step toward more fair budget policy in the Communities. With this Fund, the Communities began establishing a common policy for regions. British opposition to the Communities rose after the "Iron Lady"

³⁷ For the Elysée Treaty, see Hungdah SU, *Jean Monnet face à la politique européenne du général de Gaulle(1958-1969)*, Thèse doctorale de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Thèse à la Carte, Lille(France): Atelier National de Reproduction des Thèses de l'Université Charles de Gaulle, 2000, pp. 183-192, 462-468.

came to power in 1979 with her skepticism about European integration. Thatcher did not enjoy the privilege that De Gaulle had in the sixties. If the latter could still launch attacks on the front, the former could only act defensively with the intention of continuing the status quo in the Communities without any further integration. But even this defensive front collapsed while the French and German governments allied to force Thatcher to accept a compromise on the subject of the budget in order that the Single European Act could be launched.

The above-mentioned hypotheses and tests, developed on the basis of the assumption that the EU/EC can be treated as a constitutional sovereignty building project, bring the author to reach some tentative conclusions, as follows.

First, European integration is an accumulative movement. As integration moves forward, its resistance against attacks becomes enforced. That means that the more integration advances, the less likely it is to move backward.

Secondly, the EU/EC is an unbalanced construction. As European integration has been giving priority to mutual reconciliation and peacekeeping inside the Communities, this is a movement that is evidently “interior-oriented” rather than “exterior-oriented.” Integration aims to establish its interior sovereignty, not its exterior sovereignty. This imbalance explains well why the Common Market could be well advanced in establishing a common trade policy.

Thirdly, there is a positive correlation between deepening and enlargements. The expectation of enlargements furthers integration in order that the Communities can adapt themselves to the new situations and prevent the collapse of integration. It can be deduced that the EU/EC will continue to deepen as it expands to the borders of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, not until the EU/EC enlarges to the Balkans will an integrated army be established inside the Communities. Not until its enlargement reaches the borders of Russia’s zone of influence will the CFSP of the EU be substantiated.

Fourthly, the EU/EC is not inclined to be a continent-sized super-nation, for integration is based upon its opposition to nationalism and fascism.

Finally, the European integration model cannot be transplanted to other regions of the world, for it is developed in the unique context of European history. No other regions enjoy the same context.

IV. Conclusion

A general review of American scholars' efforts in EU/EC studies since the late fifties has brought the author to doubt that theory-led approaches are the best way to study European integration. Without denying the value of those approaches, the author has found that the majority of theorists incline to construct their theoretical structures before detailing studies of EU/EC history. They risk, in consequence, "selecting" facts to justify their theories. In addition, the EU/EC is often compared to integration movements in other regions, as well as to historical nation building projects. These doubts lead the author to search for a new starting point, based on historical comparison, for EU/EC studies. With a detailed analysis of the belief systems behind European integration, which developed over the past five hundred years, a new concept is presented. The EU/EC is viewed as a "constitutional sovereignty with neither written constitution nor nation." And European integration is regarded as the building process of this sovereignty. From this concept, some interesting hypotheses are then deduced, which are put to test based upon a comparative analysis of EU/EC history. Finally, some tentative but important conclusions are drawn. With these conclusions, the EU/EC can be better described and explained, while they also constitute the starting point of a new approach. In conclusion, constitutional sovereignty building based upon historical comparative analysis merits more research in EU/EC studies.