Structural Funds, Pro-European Opinions, and Turnout in the European Parliament Election: Evidence from the British Election Studies

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I. Introduction

One of the primary missions of European Union(EU) is to enhance economic welfare for its member states. Indeed, as Eichenberg and Dalton remark, "if the EU has promised anything, it has promised the enhancement of member-states' national economic welfare."(Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993:551). The introduction of single European market, for example, is intended to remove all the barriers to the movements of capital, labor, services, and goods, hence facilitating free trade among member states. Moreover, in order to mitigate negative effects of the single market, structural funds are distributed so as to compensate those who would loss out in the integrated market. While structural funds are well accepted as a means to balance regional differences in economic development, their effects on public attitudes toward the EU are less recognized. Given that economic prosperity and development are central motivations for European integration, it seems reasonable to assume that citizens base their evaluations of the EU on economic benefits associated with EU's integrative and distributive policies.

Previous studies have shown that public supports for European integration were associated with citizens' assessments of national and personal economic conditions at both aggregate and individual levels(Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Gabel and Whitten, 1997, Gabel, 1998b) Moreover, supports for the EU membership were found to be correlated with economic benefits derived from various integrative policies, such as market liberalization policy and single market program(Smith and Wanke, 1993; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel , 1998b). While some studies using national budget return as a proxy for EU's distributive policy confirmed indirectly its influences on citizens' supports for integration, their empirical results were not in consistency. For example, in Eichenberg and Dalton's study, national budget return is not statistically significant in explaining pro-EU attitudes(Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 523-4). In contrast, Anderson and Richert find that national budget return has significant impact on pro-EU opinions in 1982 and 1990, but virtually no impact at all in 1986(Anderson and Richert, 1996: 241-2). While contextual factors were invoked to explain these contradictory results, no theoretical elaboration has been done with

regard to the relationship between pro-EU attitudes and EU's distributive policies. Moreover, due to data limitations, only a couple of studies examine the impact of EU's specific policies on pro-EU opinions(Whitten, Guy, and Gabel,1996; Franklin and Wiezien,1997). In this paper, I attempt to redress these deficiencies by investigating into the controversial relationship between support for European integration and EU's structural policy.

Unlike previous studies that used national budget returns to infer direct benefits of EU's distributive policies, in this paper I confine myself to examining the effect of structural funds. Because national budget returns lump together effects of various distributive and non-distributive policies, they may be poor indicators for distributive policies. To avoid confusions, I simply investigate one specific distributive policy. Moreover, unlike previous studies that used cross-national and cross-temporal research designs(be they pooled data or not), in this paper I only concentrate on spatial impact of structural funds in one specific country, namely, Britain. In Britain, public supports for European integration and turnouts in European elections are found to be one of the lowest in the EU. One scholar even deliberately excludes Britain from his recent study(Anderson, 1998). However, Britain, apart from being an influential member state of the EU, consists of several features that deserve our detail examinations. First of all, since Mrs. Thatcher's outright insistence on 'money back' from the EU budget allocations, British citizens have constantly been exposed to media reports about EU's distributive policies(Gamble, 1998) Thus, they are more likely than other EU citizens to be sensitive to substances of budget returns as well as relative allocations of structural funds.

Secondly, British attitudes toward the EU are more balanced. Unlike its many continental partners whose opinions tend to skew toward an outright favoritism for European integration, British citizens' attitudes toward the EU provide a lot variations for statistical analyses. Thirdly, British attitudes toward the EU are known for their volatility in temporal dimension, subjecting to the influences of short-term political events(Dalton and Duval, 1986). Indeed, volatile citizens in Britain provide fertile grounds for studying opinion changes in a very short electoral cycle, say five years in the British context. Finally, Anderson correctly points out that in Britain major political parties, either the Conservative or the Labour, had advocated against European integration at some stages(Anderson, 1998: 577). In contrast, anti-European parties in the continental Europe tend to be small and anti-establishment. For the sake of comparability in cross-national studies, Britain is often excluded from analyses. However, such exclusion may convey a false impression of universal favoritism

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toward European integration. In this paper, I pick up what is left unanalyzed in Anderson's recent study and attempt to show that economic benefits derived from EU's structural funds can have a major impact on British attitudes toward the EU.

II. Data and Methods

In order to show changes in British attitudes toward the European Union, the data used in this study are drawn from the 1992-1996 British Election Panel Study(BEPS). In the 1992-6 BEPS, 3534 interviews were completed in 1992, representing a 73% of response rate. The initial respondents were re-interviewed in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996. Since the 1993 wave is a short postal one and contains no information about European integration, it is excluded from the current analysis. Therefore, I rely on the rest of four waves that were carried out by face-to-face interviews. Of these 3534 original respondents, 2277 participated in the 1994 wave of interview. Because respondents from Scotland were over-represented in the sample, the Scottish samples were weighed down to adjust this bias. For details of the BEPS, please refer to the Centre for Research into Elections and Social Trends, Nuffield College, Oxford.

The 1992-6 BEPS data are chosen because of the following reasons. First, the data were collected during the period of a long-standing Conservative rule. After thirteen years of the Conservative rule in 1992, uneven regional developments in Britain had become well known with the South East of England monopolizing most resources while other regions suffering from declines. Given greater disparities of regional economic developments, people in those areas or regions receiving EU funds are more likely to appreciate EU's presence. Secondly, given that changes in British opinions toward the EU are usually examined at the aggregate level, the BEPS data provide us with an unusual opportunity to examine opinion changes at the individual level. Thirdly, unlike data drawn from the Eurobarometer, the BEPS data contain a lot more information about domestic politics. Since European citizens' attitudes toward the EU are generally structured by domestic institutions and politics(Anderson, 1998; Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Reif and Schmitt, 1980), the BEPS data are superior to the Eurobarometer.

I will begin with basic data explorations by outlining changes and continuities of citizens' attitudes toward European integration between 1992 and 1996. Next, a series of crosstabulation analyses are provided to show the spatial dimension of British attitudes toward European integration as well as spatial turnout patterns in the 1994

European Parliament(EP) elections. Furthermore, a dummy variable will be used to indicate contextual influences of structural funds. The dummy indicates areas eligible for receiving funds according to the criteria of objective 1, 2, and 5b in the 1994-9 allocation plan of structural funds. Instead of using budget returns of regional GDP as a proxy, I use this dummy variable for a simple reason. Given that citizens are generally unaware of complex budget issues(Anderson, 1998), I assume the contextual effect of structural funds is no more than a positive publicity of EU's presence in those areas eligible for funding. Under this assumption, a dummy variable is sufficient to indicate the contextual effect of structural funds. Having specified the principal independent variable, I will look into the relationship between pro-EU opinions and turnouts in the 1994 EP election on the one hand, and the contextual effect of structural funds on the other. These bivariate relationships will be further subject to tests in a multivariate model. Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) multivariate regressions will be used to find the contextual effect of structural funds on pro-EU opinions while simultaneously controlling for other intervening influences.

III. Spatial Dimensions of Pro-EU Opinions in Britain

It is well known that during the 1980s there was regional polarization of voting patterns in Britain, with Labour votes concentrated on northern and urban constituencies and Conservative votes on southern and rural constituencies(Curtice and Steed, 1988; Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp, 1988). Moreover, regional divide of voting patterns in Britain was found to be correlated with regional economic polarization(Johnston, Pattie, and Russell, 1993; Pattie and Johnston, 1995). For example, during the 1980s, there was a negative relationship between support for the government and the level of unemployment(Owens and Wade, 1988). In addition, analyses of voters' economic perceptions revealed different regional patterns. That is, voters in depressed regions were likely to feel that economic situation had deteriorated and would also get worse in the future(Johnston and Pattie, 1989). Finally, even though individual characteristics were controlled for, voting decisions in the 1992 British general election were still influenced by regional economic conditions(Pattie and Johnston, 1993). Given that regional divide of voting patterns was much related to regional economic conditions in Britain, it would be worthy of finding spatial differences in pro-EU opinions and their associations with EU's structural policies.

Several studies have reported the impact of EU's structural policies on British local governments. For example, Martin and Pearce explored the extent to which

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EU's structural policies affect inter-authority cooperation among local governments in England and Wales(Martin and Pearce, 1994). John investigated into the relationship between European integration and sub-national partnerships in London and the South East region(John, 1997). Goldsmith examined the changing role of British local governments in the context of the EU agenda(Goldsmith, 1997). Although it seemed recognized that EU's structural policies had affected British local governments in various ways, there has been so far no study dealing with their influences on spatial differences of pro-EU opinions in Britain. What follows is an account of spatial differences of pro-integration attitudes in Britain.

In the BEPS, a number of measures are constructed to ask respondents to place themselves and the parties on 11-point scales running from two contrasting policy options. The exact question wording with regard to European integration at the end-points of the scale is as follows:

Britain should do all it can to unite fully with the European Community(coded 1) or Britain should do all it can to protect its independence from the European Community(coded 11).

This question is similar to that asked in Eurobarometer, namely, "In general, are you (very much/ to some extent) for or against efforts being made to unify Western Euope?" While this question is often regarded as affective support for European integration(Inglehart and Rabier, 1978), it is adopted partly because there is no question asking utilitarian support for the EU in the BEPS. Moreover, according to Eichenberg, the bivariate correlation between this measure of affective support and that of utilitarian support of European integration is .78(Eichenberg, 1998: 18).[1] In other words, to some extent the unification question taps both affective and utilitarian sentiments. However, since two measures of "integration" are not exactly the same, it has been shown that the influences of economic conditions or evaluations on affective support for European integration are less stronger than those on utilitarian measure of integration(Eichenberg, 1998: 20-1). Bearing in mind the risk of underestimating the impact of economic concerns, I now report mean scores of responses to the unification question in the BEPS.

(Insert table 1 here)

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[1] The question wording of utilitarian support of the EU in the Eurobarometer is as follows: General speaking, do you think that(your country's) membership in the European Community(Common Market) is a good thing, neither good nor bad, or a bad thing?

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As table 1 shows, mean scores of support for European integration increase from 5.98 in 1992 to 6.85 in 1996. That is, British attitudes toward European integration had gradually moved to the negative extreme in this period. Moreover, since standard deviations of mean scores maintain at about 3.36 from 1992 to 1996, the variations of respondents' negative opinions were quite stable during this period. The similar trend can be found if we examine percentage changes in respondents who hold the most extreme positions. From table 1, we know that those who extremely supported for European integration decreases from 14.9% in 1992 to 7.8% in 1996, whereas those who were extremely against European integration increases from 19.4% in 1992 to 23.5% in 1996. In sum, if there is anything conclusive from above statistics, it is that British citizens became less supportive for European integration.

Is this national trend of anti-EU opinion preserved across regions in Britain? Figure 1 displays changes in 'net support' for European integration in each British standard region. The 'net support' is calculated by subtracting the percentage of respondents who hold positive opinion toward European integration from the percentage of respondents who hold negative opinion.[2] Notice that the term 'region' is defined by the British government as territory using for its own standard planning, administrative, and statistical purposes(Martin and Pearce, 1994). Therefore, English regions do not entail any constitutional status nor actually determine regional economic plans. Bear this in mind, I now report the finding. Figure 1 shows that in every standard region there was a significant decline in terms of net support for European integration during the 1992-6 period. However, the drop of net support for European integration varied from region to region. For example, in the North the drop of net support was rather mild, only reaching 4.8%. In the East Anglia, by contrast, the drop of net support between 1992 and 1994 amounted to 31.9%. In most regions, the most significant drop of net support appeared in 1994. Moreover, in many regions negative net support reached its highest point in 1996. Judging from the above statistics, we may conclude that British attitudes were indeed leaning against European integration between 1992 and 1996.

(Insert figure 1 here)

However, if we compared the percentage of net support across regions, we would

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[2] This operationalization of net support for European integration is widely used by Eichenberg and other scholars. It proves to be a robust measure. See Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993: 518; Eichenberg, 1998: 8.

find some interesting patterns. For example, as figure 1 shows, respondents from the North West were generally more supportive for European integration, since the percentages of its net support always maintained at positive level throughout the whole period. Moreover, Scottish people expressed more support for European integration than people living in other regions between 1992 and 1995. However, they turned against European integration in 1996. Coincidentally, most areas in Scotland and in the North West also received various amount of structural funds from the EU. It would seem reasonable to assume that EU's structural funds had some effect on these two regions' net supports for European integration. However, this alleged relationship may be spurious, as some regions, such as Wales, and Yorkshire & Humberside that received structural funds from the EU, did not support European integration at all. Indeed, Wales was one of the most Eurosceptic regions in Britain. In order to show precisely the relationship between structural funds and regional supports for European integration, some match of data regarding the allocation of structural funds to each British standard region is needed. Unfortunately, the European Commission does not provide "allocation" data in accordance with British standard regions. Consequently, I have to rely on the Commission's allocation map of structural funds and match it with British constituency map.[3] Since areas eligible for receiving funding from the EU(according to the allocation map of structural funds) are treated as having an equal publicity of EU's presence, respondents living in these areas are coded as one in a dummy variable. In order to maximize EU's presence in Britain, respondents living in areas that participate in the INTERREG II of the Community initiative are also coded one in the same dummy variable.

Table 2 compares 'net support' for European integration in areas eligible for EU's structural funds with that in ineligible areas. As table 2 shows, respondents living eligible areas for structural funds(SF) are more likely than those living in ineligible areas to support European integration. Although respondents living in SF areas are likely to support European integration, they are unable to reverse the tide of Euroscepticism in Britain. As shown in table 2, the net support in SF areas fell from 5.7% in 1992 to −10.2% in 1996.[4] However, the drop of net support in SF areas was less dramatic than that in non-SF areas, where net support for European integration fell from 4.5% in 1992 to −21.1% in 1996. It seems that living in SF areas itself may moderate respondents' anti-EU attitudes. If the above conjecture is confirmed, then

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[3] The allocation map provided by the European Commission denotes areas eligible for assistance from objective 1, 2, and 5b of structural funds. This map can be downloaded from the following internet address: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/sg/aides/images/en/g01b.jpg>

[4] Notice that the 1994-9 allocation plan of structural funds had not been finalized in 1992. I include the 1992 SF-areas simply for the convenience of comparison. It also shows the base line of spatial

we might as well believe that structural funds have a significant impact on pro-EU opinions in Britain.

(Insert table 2 here)

Unfortunately, there are reasons to suspect that the above conjecture is spurious. Although the net support for European integration in SF areas is higher than that in non-SF areas for every year, the differences in net supports between SF and non-SF areas are not very large. Indeed, my previous crosstabulation analyses(from which net supports in table 2 are derived) revealed that only in 1996 did the differences between two types of areas reach statistical significance.[5] Moreover, since areas eligible for EU's structural funds are by definition areas suffering from underdevelopment or economic declines, the alleged effect of structural funds on pro-EU opinions may be an artifact of depressed economy in those areas. To control for the effects of this economic factor and other intervening variables, we have to construct a multivariate regression model, a task to be followed in the next section.

Before concluding this section, I now draw your attention to some spatial patterns of turnout in the 1994 European Parliament(EP) election. First, drawing from my crosstabulation analyses, of respondents living in SF areas 52.6% voted in the 1994 EP election and 47.4% abstained. Similar figures can be found in non-SF areas, where 54% of respondents voted and 46% abstained. Thus, turnout levels in the 1994 EP election did not appear to vary with the distinction between SF and non-SF areas. Secondly, in every British standard region (except the North West and Yorkshires/Humberside) the proportion of respondents who voted was higher than that of abstained. However, regional turnout patterns did not appear to correspond to regional economic conditions or eligibility of receiving structural funds.[6] Consequently, turnout problem will be excluded from the rest of my analyses.

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differences of pro-EU opinions in Britain.

[5] No matter integration variable and SF-area variable are treated as nominal or ordinal variables in crosstabulation analyses, phi-coefficients and Spearman correlation coefficients are very small throughout the whole period of examination. Phi-coefficients are .052 in 1992, .08 in 1994, .056 in 1995, and .097 in 1996. Spearman correlation coefficients are -.006 (sig.= .836) in 1992, -.021 (sig.=.36) in 1994, -.019 (sig.= .452) in 1995, and -.063 (sig.= .02) in 1996. Therefore, only in 1996 did correlation coefficient reach statistical significance.

[6] For example, no structural funds were allocated to areas in the South East and Greater London. However, residents in these two areas were as likely to turn out as did those living in Scotland and the North, where structural funds were present. To save the space, I do not present the results of my crosstabulation analyses. However, they are readily available from the author on request.

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IV. Constructing a multivariate regression model

Let me concentrate the rest of my analyses on explaining variations of pro-EU opinions and their alleged relationship with EU's structural funds. Previous studies have established a basket of variables affecting pro-EU opinions. At the aggregate level, for example, variables like national budget returns, regional economic conditions, intra-EU trade volume and balance, proximity to other member-states in border regions, and WWII death per capita were among most cited variables affecting pro-EU opinions(Eichenber and Dalton, 1993; Eichenberg, 1998; Gabel and Palma, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997). However, due to difficulties of matching these contextual data with the BEPS, I only include one contextual variable, namely, "sfarea" representing areas eligible for EU's structural funds as well as areas participating in the Community initiative, INTERREG II. The rest of independent variables are mainly drawn from previous individual-level studies.

As early as 1970, Ronald Inglehart contended that well-developed cognitive skills are necessary for understanding complex process of European integration (Inglehart, 1970). According to Inglehart's theory, as a citizen's cognitive mobilization increases, he is more familiar with and hence more likely to support for European integration. Following Inglehart's specification, cognitive mobilization is defined by the frequency of discussing political matters with other persons. There were questions exactly asking the frequency of discussing political matters in the 1995 and 1996 BEPS. In 1992, however, respondents were asked to name three persons with whom they had discussed important matters. They were also asked to indicate the frequencies of discussing political matters with these three persons. An index of cognitive mobilization, "cogmob," is created by adding the frequencies of political discussion with these three persons. Another related measure is "polint" (i.e. respondents' interest in politics). The more respondents are interested in politics, the more they are informed with the EU, and the more they are likely to support for integration.

Inglehart also proposed a distinction between 'materialist' and 'postmaterialist' values. He and his colleagues argued that postmaterialists are more likely than materialists to be attracted to European integration, because EU represents a reform movement toward a less nationalistic and more egalitarian society(Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991). While the existing empirical evidence about their hypothesis is not conclusive(Janssen, 1991; Anderson and Reichert, 1996), the hypothesis itself is worthy of our examination. Again following Inglehart's specification, materialist and

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post-materialist values are measured by a survey question which asks respondents to name the first and second desirable political aims from a list of options. These options are: (a) maintaining order; (b) giving the people more say in important government decisions; (c) fighting rising prices; (d) protecting freedom of speech. If (a) or (c) were named as their first two choices, then call them materialists. If (b) or (d) were chosen, then call them post-materialists.[7] Two dummy variables, "material" and "psmater," are used to denote materialists and postmaterialists.

Given that economic benefits were primary motivations for European integration, there was no surprising that almost all previous studies included some economic variables, among which national, regional, and personal economic evaluations were most cited at the individual level studies(Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Gabel and Whitten, 1997; Anderson, 1998). However, due to data limitations, most of these previous studies confined themselves to retrospective economic assessments. In BEPS, both prospective and retrospective economic assessments are available from 1994 to 1996, hence providing unusual opportunities to compare their explanatory power. Moreover, in the 1992 BEPS, retrospective evaluations on regional economy were provided, allowing us to examine this potential confounding factor. Finally, following the distinction between egocentric and sociotropic economic voting(Key,1966; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983), a distinction between assessments on personal(or household) economic condition (income) and national economy was also made in BEPS. Consequently, a number of variables like "rtrgb," "rtrper," "rtrreg," "prsgb," and "prsper," are used to indicate retrospective and prospective evaluations on GB economy, personal income, regional economy respectively. We expect that people who have negative judgements about their personal economic conditions are likely to support European integration.

In addition, Gabel and Palmer propose an utilitarian model in which citizens who benefit from EU's integrative policies are likely to support European integration (Gabel and Palmer, 1995). According to this model, citizens' support for European integration is positively related to their levels of education and occupational skills. Moreover, as movement toward single market and monetary union, wealthy citizens are likely to benefit from investment opportunities provided by capital liberalization. However, citizens with low income are likely to be hurt, as their wage levels will be constrained by fast capital movement. In other words, variables like "incq"(quartile

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[7] There are some doubts as to whether this survey question in fact measures materialist and post-materialist values(Duch and Taylor, 1993). However, for the sake of comparison, I simply adope Inglehart's original specification.

income), "educ"(3 education levels) and occupation categories should have positive impact on public support for integration. Following Gabel's specification, various dummies are adopted to indicate professionals and managers ("proman"), salaried non-manual workers ("salary"), manual workers ("mnwork"), and the unemployed ("unemp"). "Farmer" category is also selected as farmers generally obtain subsidy from EU's common agriculture policy. Obviously, respondents' ages will be correlated with the above individual socio-economic characteristics. Thus, I also include "age" as a controlled variable.

Apart from utilitarian model and economic concern, Anderson contends that citizens in Europe are *not* particularly well informed about the EU(Anderson, 1998: 572-3). Consequently, their attitudes about advantages and disadvantages of integration are likely to be structured by domestic politics and institutions. Anderson argues that supports for democratic system, for incumbent government, and for establishment party are often used as proxies by citizens to evaluate the EU(Anderson, 1998: 576-7). Following Anderson's spirit but not his specification, I use various survey questions to tap these three types of supports. First, since no question regarding satisfaction with British democracy was asked in BEPS, I have to rely on a different question that asks respondents whether agree or disagree with a proposal to let parties aimed at overthrowing democracy stand in general elections. I must concede that this question may lead to a misunderstanding of protecting rights to political participation. However, to tolerate different opinions is one thing, but to overthrow democracy is entirely different matter. If people cherish democratic ways of life, they may as well disagree with the above proposal. Given that the EU is suffering from 'democratic deficit', it is likely that people cherishing democratic values (i.e. disagree with the proposal) may hold anti-EU opinions. I use "supdem" to denote this variable.

Secondly, there is no question asking respondents about satisfaction with incumbent government in BEPS. However, respondents were asked to evaluate various images of the Conservative government. When respondents considered the Conservative as incapable of strong government, they might mean to dissatisfy with the performance of the incumbent during the period of 1992-6. "Constr" is used to stand for this variable. Thirdly, unlike their continental partners, establishment parties in Britain were known for their anti-EU stances. As Anderson expected, in Britain supporters for establishment parties might be as likely as supporters for anti-establishment parties to oppose integration. For this reason, Anderson's specification is not appropriate in British context. Instead, I use party identification as a proxy.

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Given that British people's opinions are often shaped by political parties, party identification may inform their opinions about European integration. In fact, as Heath et al. show, British people are able to identify correctly each party's position on European integration (Heath, Jowell, Taylor and Taylor, 1998). In particular, Scottish Nationalist Party(SNP) is known for their seeking independence from the rest of the UK, hence making Scotland as an independent state in the EU. It would be very interesting to find whether SNP identifiers are more likely to than others to support integration. Here I use "snpid" to indicate SNP identifiers. Similarly, "conid," "labid," "lbdmid," "pcid" and "othid" are used to indicate Conservative, Labour, Lib-Dem, Plaid Cymru and other parties' identifiers.

In addition, other potential confounding factors specific to Britain need to be controlled for in the multivariate regression model. Firstly, national identity matters. Britain consists of three nations, namely, England, Scotland and Wales. Residents in Britain may also be originated from Ireland or other nations. They may hold different opinions toward the EU. The most notable case is that people who consider themselves as Scottish or Irish may be more likely to support European integration than do English or British. For this reason, I create several dummies such as "ideng," "idgb," "idscot," "idirish," "idwelsh" and "idelse" to represent English, British, Scottish, Irish, Welsh, and other nationalities. Secondly, during the period of 1994-6, the impact of Tony Blair on British politics was notable. Various empirical studies using BEPS have found the "Blair effect" on voting decisions (Huang and Mclean, 1997). Given that Mr. Blair conveyed young, dynamic, smart and pro-Europe images, it would be interesting to find any Blair effect on pro-EU opinions. I use "blreff" to denote such Blair effect.

Finally, a few words about dependent variable, "integ" are necessary. In the previous section, European integration was measured by a thermometer with 1-11 scale to indicate integration-independence dimension. Now, for the convenience of interpretation, I reverse the coding scheme and make 1 stand for independence extreme and 11 for integration extreme. Moreover, since this thermometer question was asked only to a half of total samples in the 1992 BEPS, I use an alternative measure of integration, "alting" to increase the sample size. In any case, replacing "integ" with "alting" does not alter the final result.[8] What follows is the multivariate

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[8] The exact question for "alting" is: "Do you think that Britain's long-term policy should be…(1) to leave the European Community; (2) to stay in the EC and try to reduce its powers; (3) to leave things as they are; (4) to stay in the EC and try to increase its powers; (5) to work for the formation of a single European government?" Heath et al. used the above question as a substitute for the same reason(Heath, Jowell, Taylor, and Thomson, 1998). I have checked the result of original regression(with "integ" as

OLS regression model:

Integ= a+ b1(sfarea)+ b2(cogmob)+ b3(material)+ b4(psmater)+ b5(rtrgb or prosgb)+ b6(rtrper or prsper)+ b7(supdem)+ b8(constr)+ b9(blreff)+ b10(polint)+ b11(party identity)+ b12(occupation category)+ b13(income quartile)+ b14(education category)+ b15(age category)+ b11(national identities)+c,

Where a is constant; bi is coefficient for each independent variable, and c is an error term. For details of variable coding, please refer to appendix A.

V. Results and Discussion

Table 3 presents results of four multivariate OLS regression models, one model for each years. Notice that the 1992 model is slightly different from the rest of three models. Apart from dependent variable being different, "sfarea" is not included in the model. This is because that the 1994-99 eligible areas for structural funds had not been finalized in 1992. To show any regional concerns of economic welfare at the individual level, I use "blmreg" as a proxy. The variable "blmreg" is an interaction variable with regard to retrospective evaluations on regional economy and blame(or credit) the government for regional economic conditions. Unfortunately, "blmreg" is not significant in explaining pro-EU opinions. Moreover, in order to show any impact of security concerns on pro-EU opinions, I use a variable "safwar" to denote respondents' evaluations on how safely Britain was away from war since the last general elections. This variable is only available in the 1992 BEPS. Given that previous cross-national studies showed a significant impact of WWII death per capital on pro-integration opinions(Gabel and Palmer, 1995), it is bewildering why "safwar" is not significant in predicting pro-EU opinions in Britain. In fact, there is a good reason to believe that British security concerns are not tied up with the EU, but with the NATO. Perhaps this explains why "safwar" is not significant.

(Insert table 3 here)

In the 1992 model, moreover, we also find that national identities are predominant variables in explaining pro-European integration. However, the result is not what we expected. While being Scottish or Irish is likely to support for European integration as expected, being British, English, or Welsh also incline to support integration. It seems that whether one support integration or not has nothing to do

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dependent variable). And the result is virtually identical with that of regression with "alting" as dependent variables.

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with the differences in national identities. In 1992, all nationalities support integration. However, if we put "sfarea" into the model, we would find that the effect of national identities disappears. Only in 1995 were Scottish identifiers or identifiers with other nationalities more likely to support for European integration. This is expected given our theoretical concerns about the differences in residence of SF areas and non-SF areas, rather than differences in nationalities. However, only in 1996 did "sfarea" reach statistical significance, meaning that people living in SF areas are more likely than people living in non-SF areas to support European integration. The effect is significant even after controlling for other potential confounding variables. Why is the effect of "sfarea" on pro-EU opinions confined to the year of 1996? An educated guess could be that it took time for the publicity effect of structural funds to affect British opinions. When projects related to structural funds began to be implemented, residents in those SF areas might believe that they indeed obtained benefits from the EU. Consequently, they were less willing to express anti-EU opinions, given the prevalence of Euroscepticism in Britain. Looking the lagged effect of structural funds from another perspective, we can find that the variable "sfarea"(sig.=.116) in the 1994 model narrowly misses the cut of 10% significance level. In fact, in 1994 there was an European election and the allocation plan of structural funds might be discussed in the public campaign. Yet, the effect of structural funds was barely significant. At the current stage, we are simply unable to tell whether there is any lagged effect of structural funds. To confirm this hypothesis, we need a length period of longitude data. Nevertheless, the spatial effect of structural funds on pro-EU opinions seems to exist in 1996, and to a less extent in 1994.

Table 3 also displays a consistent effect of postmaterialist values on support for European integration. In the four models examined, postmaterialists are more likely than others to support for integration, thus confirming Inglehart's hypothesis. However, Inglehart's cognitive mobilization hypothesis is not confirmed in the 1992-6 BEPS data. The variable "cogmob" is not significant in three models.[9] While discussing political matters may not be significant in explaining pro-EU opinions, interest in politics("polint") has positive effect on pro-EU opinions. If a person's interest in politics is related to her cognitive skills, then we may as well assume that cognitive skills have indirectly effect on pro-EU opinion. We may need further exploration for this linkage.

From table 3 we know that Anderson's proxy hypotheses are partially supported in the British context. In his original formulation, system support for democracy

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[9] No question about discussing political matters was asked in the 1994 BEPS.

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("supdem") and government support for the incumbent ("constr") are both insignificant in explaining support for European integration. But I must concede that the variables here are not exactly the same as Anderson's specifications, in which respondents were asked whether to satisfy with democracy and with the incumbent government. For this reason, I do not argue that Anderson's hypotheses are not confirmed. In fact, his hypothesis on party as a proxy is partly confirmed in the 1994 and 1995 models. In 1994 Conservative identifiers were less likely to support European integration, whereas Labour identifiers were more likely to support integration. In 1995 Conservative identifiers appeared less supportive for integration. Another domestic factor specific to the British context is that of Blair effect. From 1994 to 1996, those who believed that Blair would be a good Prime Minister were more likely to support European integration. Blair effect is not large, but it is consistently significant in explaining pro-EU opinions in Britain. Given this significant Blair effect, we may as well revise Anderson's proxy hypothesis by adding Blair effect in the British model.

Examining all variables relating to Gabel's utilitarian model, we may be disappointed by many insignificant coefficients. Except professionals and managers in 1992, all occupational categories have virtually no impact at all on pro-EU opinions. Only in 1992 and 1994 were those who in top two quartiles of income categories were more likely to support European integration. To some extent, Gabel's hypothesis for the effect of educational skills seems to be supported in the 1994-6 models. In 1994 and 1996 those who received education below middle and high school levels were significantly less likely to support European integration. In 1995 those who had college or post-graduate education were also more likely to support integration. However, education is also correlated with skills of cognitive mobilization. It is not clear whether the significant effect of education categories is derived from utilitarian concerns or from cognitive mobilization. A further investigation into their linkages is obviously needed. But for the moment, I have a better explanation as to why Gabel's utilitarian variables are not significant. Given that the dependent variable "integ" measures more about affective support for European integration, there is no surprise that utilitarian variables have virtually no effect on pro-EU opinions. In fact, affective measure of European integration is more likely to be influenced by Inglehart's postmaterialist values and cognitive mobilization, whereas utilitarian measure of European integration is likely to be affected by various economic concerns (Eichenberg, 1998). Gabel's own tests of five theories by using "membership benefit" measure of European integration also reveal stronger economic effects and weaker postmaterialist and cognitive mobilization effects(Gabel, 1998a).

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The current study also confirms Eichenberg's and Gabel's contentions that measurement of the dependent variable about European integration matters. Here, I find stronger effects of postmaterialist values and cognitive mobilizations, but weaker effects of utilitarian or economic concerns. Moreover, in another regressions (which results are not shown in full here), I find not only retrospective but also prospective evaluations on national and personal economic conditions are *not* significant in explaining pro-EU opinions in Britain. With only one exception, that is, in 1995 people who expected their personal economic conditions would become better next year were more likely to support integration.[10] Apart from this exception, economic evaluations appear to have no impact on the support for European integration.

Finally, the goodness of fit of four models seems to be low, as adjusted R-squares ranging only from .081 to .152. Thus, I am aware of the possibility of leaving out significant variables in my multivariate regression models. However, given the guidance of all available theories on the support of European integration, I simply test the validity of various theory-informed variables without seeking to find the perfect model for the support for European integration. Moreover, if comparing our model fitness with that of other models proposed by Anderson and Reichert, and Gabel and Whitten, one can find that the goodness of fit of my models is about the same or even better with theirs. For these reasons, we may have some confidence about the results reported in the above models.

VI. Conclusion

In 1994-9 structural funds amounted to one-third of the total EU budget, reaching 141 billion of Ecu. Given this large amount of EU budget distributing for regional development purposes, it is hard to believe that structural funds have no impact on public opinions toward European integration. While the impact of structural funds on local government and politics has been examined thoroughly by many scholars, none of them account for the potential effect of structural funds on pro-EU opinions. Moreover, the effect of specific integrative and distributive policies is seldom examined in the literature of public support for European integration (Eichenberg, 1998: 13). This paper is the first attempt to account for the effect of

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[10] The standardized coefficients of prospective economic evaluations, "prsper," are .019(sig.=.469) in 1994; .084(sig.=.002) in 1995; .028(sig.=.354) in the 1994, 1995, 1996 models. No "prsper" available in the 1994 BEPS. All other variables in these three models are exactly the same as table 3. Other coefficients and their significance levels are almost identical with those in Table 3. Therefore, I do not report the results of full models.

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structural funds on pro-EU opinions.

While the usage of the 1992-6 BEPS data limits our generalization across EU member states. However, panel data give us advantage to observe opinion changes at the individual level without running into problems of ecological fallacy. As reported above, the impact of structural funds on pro-EU opinions in Britain was significant in 1996, and to a less extent in 1994. In other words, those who live in SF areas are more supportive for European integration than are those who live in non-SF areas. This effect is significant even after controlling for various confounding variables. Moreover, this publicity effect of structural funds may be delayed for about two years, though this conjecture need to be further examined by a lengthy period of data. Two implications arise from this significant finding. Firstly, If British people living in SF areas are more likely to support integration than are those living in non-SF areas, then a policy implication for the EU is that giving more SF money to British people may mitigate their Euroscepticism. Moreover, since British people's support for European integration is generally among the lowest in Europe, citizens living in other European countries are likely to react the same positive way to the EU if given sufficient structural funds. Secondly, this significant finding also implies that British people are not different from other citizens in Europe in terms of using economic benefits derived from the EU as a vintage point to evaluate integration project. In this sense, the paper redresses what was left out in Anderson's recent study, namely, British people's attitudes toward European integration(Anderson, 1998). Finally, since the effect of "sfarea" is not consistent across four years, I think Anderson and Reichert are correct in arguing that pro-European opinions varies with time, hence cross-temporal designs may leave out important variables in explaining pro-EU opinions (Anderson and Reichert, 1996). For example, a significant variable like Blair effect is likely to be left out in cross-temporal and cross-national studies.

The current study also subjects several theories about the support for European integration to empirical examinations. My findings are as follows. First, Inglehart's theories about postmaterialism and cognitive mobilization hypotheses are generally supported by the BEPS data, whereas Gabel's utilitarian variables appear to have little effect on pro-European opinions. However, the relative explaining power of two competing models can be attributed to the differences in using affective or utilitarian measures of European integration. It is recognized that the use of unification measure of European integration (as does in this paper), may underestimate the effect of economic variables. Indeed, not only subjective evaluations of both national and personal economic conditions but also personal socio-economic characteristics are not

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significant in four regression models. However, given the possibility of underestimating economic variables, I do not argue against the utilitarian model. The utilitarian model simply needs to be examined with a more appropriate dependent variable of integration. Nevertheless, my finding sheds some light on the measurement problem of the concept of European integration. In fact, even if most of economic variables are not significant in explaining pro-EU attitudes in Britain, the significant coefficient of "sfarea" in 1996 seems to point to an indirect effect of economic concerns on European integration. This contention deserves our full attention.

Secondly, Anderson's proxy theory of the support for European integration is partially supported by the BEPS data. While British people's attitudes toward the EU are certainly structured by domestic politics, they do not appear to vary with system support for democracy and government support for the incumbent. Instead, some evidence in my regression models suggests that Conservative identifiers are less likely to support European integration, whereas Labour and SNP identifiers are more likely to support for integration. In addition to party proxy, I also find a leadership proxy, namely, the Blair effect. The Blair effect that is found elsewhere deserves our special consideration when we examine the recent trend of pro-European opinions in Britain. Moreover, since this significant finding is robust and consistent even after controlling for other influences, we may as well add a leadership proxy to Anderson's theory.

Finally, with regard to turnout in the 1994 European Parliament election, I find no specific influence of structural funds on turnout levels in my bivariate analysis. As a result, I devote most of my analyses on the problem of pro-European opinions. If turnout level confers certain democratic legitimacy to the EU, then one policy implication arises from this study. Given that turnout does not vary with areas eligible for structural funds, then the distribution of structural funds does not seem to have helped to promote participation in the EP elections in Britain. In other words, to enhance EU's democracy, money from structural funds is not enough in Britain. Perhaps, more transparency and responsiveness of the European Commission is necessary. For the moment, we need further studies about other member states in order to conclude that money from structural funds is indeed not enough to buy democracy for the EU.

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Extremely for integration	Neutral	Extremely against integration
92	5.98 (1402)	3.53	14.9% (209)	16.7% (234)	19.4% (272)
94	6.45 (1827)	3.34	9.7% (177)	15.8% (289)	19.6% (359)
95	6.66 (1505)	3.36	8.1% (121)	13.8% (208)	20.9% (314)
96	6.85 (1368)	3.39	7.8% (107)	12.4% (170)	23.5% (322)

Table 1: Respondents' positions on European integration (mean scores) and the percentages of respondents who hold the most extreme positions.

Note: N. is included in the parenthesis.

Source: BEPS.

	1992	1994	1995	1996
Non-SF areas	4.5%	-8.2%	-13.3%	-21.1%
SF areas	5.7%	-4.2%	-9.8%	-10.2%

Table 2: Net support for European Integration in areas eligible for EU's structural funds, 1992-1996.

Note: Notice that the 1994-9 allocation plan of structural funds had not been finalized in 1992.

Source: BEPS

| | 1992 | | 1994 | | 1995 | | 1996 | |
| | dep: Alting | | dep: integ | | dep: integ | | dep: integ | |
Variable	Standardized Beta	t	Standardized Beta	t	Standardized Beta	t	Standardized Beta	t
sfarea			.038	1.572	.020	.774	.055	1.927**
cogmob	.015	.610			.050	1.535	.022	.609
material	-.015	-.645	-.040	-1.646*	-.024	-.918	-.045	-1.575
psmater	.042	1.767*	.099	4.009***	.099	3.685***	.081	2.743**
rtrgb	-.033	-1.377	.002	.059	.029	1.056	.008	.268
rtrper	.012	.475	.033	1.326	.040	1.508	-.012	-.417
blmreg	.022	.981						
supdem	-.024	-1.025	-.013	-.530	-.033	-1.268	-.046	-1.594
constr	.024	.985	-.004	-.138	.009	.305	.008	.255
safwar	.010	.428						
blreff			.084	3.119**	.065	2.192**	.063	1.979**
polint			.091	3.553***	.018	.549	.062	1.699*
conid	.000	.003	-.247	-1.968**	-.379	-2.675**	-.131	-.633
labid	.064	1.215	.182	3.342***	.032	.512	.025	.366
lbdmid	.034	.813	.067	1.487	-.026	-.536	-.064	-1.229
snpid	.021	.719	.007	.234	-.011	-.345	.006	.177
pcid	.035	1.518	-.002	-.086	.022	.805	.035	1.190
othid	-.100	-.694	.234	1.753*	.158	1.052	-.060	-.281
farmers	.041	1.105	-.017	-.440	-.028	-.741	-.005	-.114
proman	.216	1.726*	-.032	.234	.192	1.578	.157	1.150
salary	.183	1.528	-.016	-.124	.165	1.438	.066	.514
mnwork	.204	1.596	-.004	-.028	.158	1.312	.133	1.007
unemp	.060	1.559	.001	.015	.095	2.826	.049	1.383
incq2	.011	.384	.055	1.801*	.004	.120	-.038	-1.053
incq3	.077	2.525**	.079	2.520**	-.035	-1.024	-.006	-.158
incq4	.071	2.266**	.060	1.869*	.035	.956	.021	.520
educ1	-.002	-.065	-.109	-3.013**	-.074	-2.342**	-.136	-3.322***
educ2	-.031	-1.049	-.105	-3.424***			-.187	-5.238***
educ3					.148	5.051***		
age	-.149	-5.148***	-.048	-1.568	.001	.029	.001	.026
idgb	.453	2.163**	.104	.543	.330	1.582	.223	1.055
idirish	.131	2.586**	.076	1.568	.095	1.847	.058	1.055
idscot	.294	2.542**	.117	1.131	.196	1.806*	.130	1.178
idwelsh	.140	1.810*	-.001	-.008	.081	1.039	.045	.586
ideng	.359	1.877*	.031	.177	.225	1.164	.173	.891
idelse	.156	2.868**	.061	1.205	.110	1.954*	.081	1.528
Adjusted R-Squares	.081		.124		.152		.129	
df	32		32		33		33	
N	1819		1582		1352		1148	

Table 3: Results of Multivariate OLS Regression Models, 1992-96

Notes: *→p<.10; **→p<.05; ***→p<.001

Source: BEPS

Figure 1: Regional Dimensions of Net Support for European Integration in Britain, 1992-96

Regions

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
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Appendix A:

The Coding Scheme of Variables

sfarea
.00: ineligible areas; 1.00: eligible areas for structural funds
Cogmob92
.00: no mobilization; 9.00: largest cognitive mobilization
cogmob94
.00: never talk; 1.00: seldom; 2.00: sometime; 3.00: often
material
.00: others; 1.00: materialist
psmater
.00: others; 1.00: postmaterialist
rtrgb
1.00: got weaker; 2.00: stay the same; 3.00: got strong
rtrper
1.00: fallen behind price; 2.00: kept up with price; 3.00: up more than price
blmreg
1.00: regional economy bad, not govt's fult; 10.00: regional economy good, govt's credit
supdem
-1: no self-completn; 1: agree strongly; 2:agree; 3:neither; 4: disagree; 5: disagree strongly; 8: can't choose; 9: not answered
constr
1: not capable; 2: neither or both; 3: capable str. govt
safwar
1: increased a lot; 2: increased a little; 3: stayed the same; 4: fallen a little; 5: fallen a lot; 8: don't know; 9: not answered
blreff
1: very bad; 2: fairly bad; 3: neither good/bad; 4: fairly good; 5: very good
polint
1: none at all; 2: not very much; 3: some; 4: quite a lot; 5: a great deal
conid
.00: others; 1.00: conservatives identifiers
labid
.00: others; 1.00: labour identifiers
lbdmid
.00: others; 1.00: lib-dem identifiers
snpid
.00: others; 1.00: snp identifiers
pcid
.00: others; 1.00: plaid cymru identifiers
othid
.00: others; 1.00: other parties' identifiers
farmers
.00: others; 1.00: famers
proman
.00: others; 1.00: professional and managers
salary
.00: others; 1.00: salaried workers

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mnwork
.00: others; 1.00:manual workers
unemp
.00: employed; 1.00: unemployed
incq2
1.00: less than 10000; 2.00: 10000-19999; 3.00: 20000-31000; 4.00: 32000 and up
incq3
1.00: less than 10000; 2.00: 10000-19999; 3.00: 20000-31000; 4.00: 32000 and up
incq4
1.00: less than 10000; 2.00: 10000-19999; 3.00: 20000-31000; 4.00: 32000 and up
educ1
.00: others; 1.00: finished school at 14
educ2
.00: others; 1.00: finished school between 15-17 years old
educ3
.00: others; 1.00: finished school at 18 or up
age
1: 18-24; 2: 25-34; 3: 35-44; 4: 45-54; 5: 55-59; 6: 60-64; 7: 65 and up
idgb
.00: others; 1.00: British identifiers
idirish
.00: others; 1.00: Irish identifiers
idscot
.00: others; 1.00: Scottish identifiers
idwelsh
.00: others; 1.00: Welsh identifiers
ideng
.00: others; 1.00: English identifiers
idelse
.00: others; 1.00: other nationalities identifiers