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## DO NUMBERS MATTER?

### THE CFSP AND THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF ENLARGEMENT

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**First draft, please do not quote. Comments most welcome!**

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## Too many cooks spoil the broth, or...?

In 1992, Simon Nuttall wrote that European Political Cooperation (EPC) would be at serious risk if the EC would accept “a significant number of new members”.<sup>1</sup> Today, when three new states have already joined the EU and the queue of applicant states is reaching an unprecedented length, most analysts of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) would certainly subscribe to Nuttall’s statement, and do so with more emphasis than ever before. The common view is that the next enlargement will “pose formidable problems for the EU”, especially since “[t]he difference between the fifth and previous enlargements is in the number of applicants”.<sup>2</sup> These statements about the effects of enlargement are probably not only correct, but also very intuitive and rather self-evident in most cases. They originate in the assumption that agreement is generally harder to reach between for instance twenty-five than between five. In other words, they focus on an effect of enlargement that could be reduced to a general discussion on a pure “numbers effect” on the cooperation in the second pillar.

These authors do of course not put forward claims about a reality as simple as that. Although being one of the most commonly evoked, the “pure numbers effect” is only one among many enlargement-related effects that may have an impact on the CFSP. As Roy Ginsberg has pointed out, “[e]nlargement, in the end, has contradictory effects on the EU”.<sup>3</sup> Most of these are also described individually and empirically in the existing literature. Some of the effects can be thought of as centrifugal forces, affecting the CFSP in a negative way, whereas others are centripetal forces, working to promote the second pillar cooperation. It is the interplay between these different forces that will, in the end, decide whether the future enlargements will lead to a state of “wider but weaker” or “the more the merrier”.<sup>4</sup>

There are, however, very few explicit theoretical discussions in the enlargement literature. This is perhaps particularly true for the writings on the CFSP and enlargement. There has been even fewer, if any, attempts to specify how the contradictory effects relate both to one another and to the end result that they have an effect on. We still know very

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<sup>1</sup> Nuttall 1992, p 321.

<sup>2</sup> Hill 1998, p. 21; and Ginsberg 1998, p. 210.

<sup>3</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p 214.

<sup>4</sup> Allen 1998.

little about the interplay and the possible dynamics in the process of enlargement. This paper is therefore an attempt to exploit the possibilities of “combining” the various contradictory effects, or at least some of them, into one explanatory model in order to structure the arguments and facilitate the analysis of future enlargements.

This paper starts with a general discussion about how the collective action literature has treated the issue of group size. This discussion then turns to deciding how applicable the general propositions of collective action are to the case of enlargement, and some suggestions are put forward on how the general model must be complemented with some additional assumptions before it can be used to explain the effects of enlargement. Then follows the main part of the paper: the narrowing down and specification of the model to fit precisely the issue of effects on the CFSP. In the end, it will be argued that the *net effect* of enlargement on the CFSP has, in three cases out of four so far, been positive. This due to a couple of different dynamic effects that could, by want of better concepts, be called the *shadow of enlargement* and *size adjustments*. These dynamics will under most circumstances offset the rather intuitive negative effects from the increase in number of participants. With this framework as a basis, the paper ends with a very brief look ahead on the next enlargement(s).

## Collective action and the importance of group size

### *The group size arguments*

The importance of group size is a highly controversial matter in the literature on collective action, and the basic reference point for much of the debate is Mancur Olson’s influential book *The Logic of Collective Action*. The general argument put forward by Olson is that “[t]he larger the group is, the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good, and the less likely that it will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good”.<sup>5</sup> The reasons for this are three “separate but cumulative factors”:

- (i) As group size increases, each individual’s net benefit from the public good will decrease and thus the gains from collective action are reduced.

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<sup>5</sup> Olson 1968, p. 36

- (ii) The incentives for any single individual to even provide a small amount of the collective good decrease with group size, as do the incentives to form sub-groups to overcome the size problem.
- (iii) In larger groups, the 'organisation costs' of providing the public good will be bigger (including the costs of communication and bargaining between group members).

The conclusion is therefore that very large groups will normally not "provide themselves with even minimal amounts of a collective good".<sup>6</sup>

Mancur Olson's claims have been questioned for a number of reasons, most of which seem to have their origin in the fact that the different *characteristics of public goods* are not sufficiently taken into the analysis. It has been pointed out that the above propositions are only true for goods of a certain character. All three propositions thereby become a matter for empirical analysis rather than an inherent part of a "logic of collective action".<sup>7</sup>

Michael Taylor has shown that three different properties of the collective need to be specified before assessing the predicted effect of group size.<sup>8</sup> First, the *degree of non-excludability* of the good is important. A good is said to be perfectly non-excludable if it is impossible (or prohibitively costly) to restrict the use of the good by any member of the group. A perfectly non-excludable good thereby provide the biggest chances for free-riding.<sup>9</sup> A second property is the degree of *indivisibility*. A good is perfectly indivisible if one member's consumption does not reduce the amount left for others to consume.<sup>10</sup> The opposite, a perfectly divisible good, is one where the consumption of one unit is precluding the availability to anyone else. In other words, it is no longer a collective but a private good. The third, and somewhat different dimension, is the degree of *rivalness*. A good has a high degree of rivalness if the consumption of the good reduces the benefit of the good to the other group members. The degree of non-rivalness often equals the degree of indivisibility, but need not necessarily do so. The degree of rivalness often follows some kind of threshold logic, so that the rivalness does not become an issue until a certain number of group members are consuming it (so called "crowding"). This property is

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<sup>6</sup> Olson 1968, p. 48.

<sup>7</sup> Hardin 1982, pp. 43ff and 126ff.

<sup>8</sup> Taylor 1987, p. 6f.

<sup>9</sup> This dimension of non-excludability is the one that equals Mancur Olson's definition of a collective good, being "such that other individuals in the group cannot be kept from consuming it once any individual in the group has provided it for himself" (1968, p. 35).

<sup>10</sup> This dimension is the one that seems to come closest to what others have referred to as an "exclusive" good. See for instance Chamberlin 1974.

different in that it does not relate to a property of the good *per se*, but rather to the actors' perceptions of the good.

Returning to Olson's first claim about decreasing net benefits as group size increases, it has been shown that it may only be true if there is some degree of divisibility and/or rivalness involved.<sup>11</sup> If the good is perfectly indivisible, the amount left for others are not affected, and if the good is not characterised by any rivalness the benefits to others should not be affected as group size increases.<sup>12</sup> Olson's second claim, that the likelihood of any individual member providing even a small amount of the good will decrease with more group members, is a logic result of his first claim. It is therefore, similarly, only applicable to goods that involve some degree of divisibility and/or rivalness. The third claim, that organisation costs will rise with more members, is probably the most intuitive one, and also certainly true for most cases of collective action. At least three different channels of influence are related to this claim. First, the recognition of opportunities for policy coordination and collective action becomes more difficult with increasing group size. Second, the likelihood of autonomous defection increases with group size. Third, an increase of group size will diminish the feasibility of sanctioning defectors.<sup>13</sup> There are however instances when returns to scale may set in to counter-balance the growing organisation costs. In those instances the incentives for an individual group member or sub-group of members to organise provision of the good may not necessarily decrease with growing group size.<sup>14</sup>

From the above it would thus seem that we have a framework from which a couple of conditional hypotheses about the "pure numbers-effect" of enlargement on the CFSP could be formulated. Judging from much of the writings on enlargement and the CFSP, this is also frequently but implicitly done. Applying this framework to the case of EU enlargement means however that one of the more crucial questions has been avoided. How applicable is this "theoretical construct" to the case of enlargement?

*All other things are not equal*

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<sup>11</sup> Hardin 1982, chapter 3; cf discussion in Taylor 1987, chapter 1.

<sup>12</sup> Taylor 1987, p 11.

<sup>13</sup> Oye 1986, p. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Hardin 1982, p. 43.

Much of the discussion and the arguments outlined above centres implicitly around static size. But enlargement is not a state, it is a very specific process of change to an ongoing cooperative arrangement, and we must somehow complement the framework to account for this. The collective action literature deals with the question: *is group A of five members more likely to be able to further its collective interest than group B of twenty members?* To ask about enlargement, on the other hand, is rather to ask and: *is group A less likely to be able to further its interest if its five members are increased to become twenty members?*<sup>15</sup> We must therefore consider how the differences between these two questions affect the applicability of the general arguments about size, and how the above framework can be extended to cover for the differences.

The difference has to do with the *ceteris paribus* assumption, which is normally used when answering the first question. Because we are dealing here with a dynamic situation, the assumption of all other things being equal must be somewhat relaxed in at least two respects. First, the very act of enlarging has an inherent time-component, which can not be disregarded in the analysis. Enlargement is as a new condition entering into an already ongoing “cooperation game”. What we are comparing is then not two different groups, but the situation *before* and *after* for a single group. Therefore, the importance of the perceptions about the future must be taken into account. The “shadow of the future”<sup>16</sup> is of course already existing in the original game, irrespective of enlargement, but here the question is how enlargement in itself affects the perceptions of the future and how that may affect the success rate of the cooperation.<sup>17</sup> The use of the shadow of the future as a discount parameter in game theory is based on the perceived frequency and/or durability of the cooperation, and is something that enlargement will not directly have an effect on.<sup>18</sup> We are rather looking for something of a cousin to the shadow of the future, with a similar mechanism but for different reasons. What enlargement will have an effect on is the perceived future success-rate of the cooperation. The pay-off structure is thereby affected, through issue-specific mechanisms to which we shall return in the next section.

The second relaxation of the *ceteris paribus* assumption has to do with a necessary distinction between “numbers” and “size”. Until now, the words “numbers” and “size” have been used interchangeably here, just as they are often done in the literature. It is

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<sup>15</sup> Cf. Hardin 1982, p. 45.

<sup>16</sup> Axelrod 1984, p. 126ff.

<sup>17</sup> Success, here, means only the fact that cooperation takes place, and is not used to say anything about the effectiveness or efficiency of the cooperation.

<sup>18</sup> Enlargement may indirectly affect the frequency and/or durability of the cooperation by affecting the institutions.

however doubtful if they should be treated as synonyms.<sup>19</sup> It is true that an increase in numbers results in an increase in size of the group, measured as numbers of players. But, the increase in size brings with it more than just increased numbers. Enlargement also means an increase in the geographical, economic, and political size of the group. The static discussion above about the possibilities for cooperation in large groups is built on the assumption that the “base” for the cooperation is not changing. In other words, the costs and benefits (for each participant) are assumed not to be affected in this respect. Analysing enlargement, however, means to look at the changes in one group, where a stable cooperation has emerged provided several formative factors, among which are economic, geographical and political size. It is then natural to assume that a change in these conditions could affect the stability of the cooperation, in both physical and psychological ways. Exactly how, and to what extent, will again depend on the nature of the collective good. And, exactly how these two relaxations of the *ceteris paribus* assumption are inter-related will also be issue-specific.

There is possibly also a third condition that need to be relaxed. In the static cases of two groups of different size, the institutional arrangements are also assumed to be equal. In the case of enlargement, on the other hand, the institutional arrangement will per definition change. There will actually be a change in the institutional order whether there is an institutional reform or not. In the absence of any reform each state’s voice will carry less weight after enlargement. If some changes are made to the decision-making system, these problems may be lessened to some extent, but if we assume that institutional design is one of the determinants for the success-rate, an increase in members must affect that determinant.

So, in order to determine the possible effects of enlargement on the cooperation in any specific issue-area, there are a number of “model specifications” that needs to be done. First, it seems crucial to determine the nature of the collective good. Depending on the properties of the specific good, we will expect different effects. Second, changes in the perceptions about the future cooperation will need to be defined and connected to the changes of the whole group in terms of several aspects of size. Third, something of an intervening variable exists in the form of institutional change. These specifications are of course all highly problematic, but that should not deter us from trying. Drawing some

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<sup>19</sup> A comment on the ways to interpret Mancur Olson’s use of the word “size” is provided in Taylor 1987, p.\_\_\_\_. That discussion is however not directly applicable here.

lessons from the four previous enlargements will at least produce a number of fairly reliable working hypotheses that could be used for a discussion on the effects of future enlargements.

## The CFSP and enlargement

### *The static effect of an increase in numbers*

The collective good produced (or at least aimed at) by the cooperation in the second pillar is *external security* in a broad sense, which must be considered a fairly non-excludable good. In fact, it is hard to imagine how the “use” of a secure external environment could be restricted to only some group members. Nor is external security of a divisible nature, since the “consumption” by one member does not reduce the amount left for the other members. Therefore, if these properties were the only ones that mattered, we should not expect Olson’s first two claims about the effect of numbers to any greater extent applicable on the CFSP. The third property however - rivalness - is arguably present in cooperation in security matters. The degree of rivalness depends on how the good is perceived by the actors involved, and may for instance contain status goals and national profile goals. Charles Lipson has pointed out that security negotiations are often associated with status goals as significant ends in themselves for the participating states. This is contributing to a lower success rate in security cooperation than in economic cooperation.<sup>20</sup> From some EU members’ point of view, the prospects of being known, seen and heard in the international community may for instance lessen with an increasing number of states taking turns with the presidency. It is therefore plausible to assume some degree of rivalness in the second pillar. It is however doubtful if this degree will increase as a result of enlargement. If we assume that it does not, we may specify our first working hypothesis as follows: *(1) enlargement does not affect the net benefit of the CFSP to the participants.*

Turning then to the rising organisation costs, the argument is built among other things on the assumption that more members means more diverse preferences among the participants. That too is a common assumption in the CFSP literature.<sup>21</sup> Again to quote

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<sup>20</sup> Lipson 1984, pp 12ff

<sup>21</sup> See for instance Weiler & Wessels 1988, p. 244f.



Roy Ginsberg: “enlargement increases the diversity of opinion and national interests within the EU, complicating—or even setting back—foreign policy consensus.”<sup>22</sup> There is however also evidence that new members change their preferences as a result of membership, which means that new states per definition need not have preferences that are outside the limits of the existing range.<sup>23</sup> Whereas Joseph Weiler and Wolfgang Wessels believe that enlargement clearly widens the range of interests represented among the member states, Simon Nuttall instead argues that the newcomers seem to place themselves somewhere well within the limits of the existing range of interests.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, the hypothesis derived from this reasoning will need to be conditional: (2) *only if the preferences of the new members are not found somewhere within the existing spectrum of preferences will the likelihood of collective action decrease as a result of enlargement.* The pure “numbers effect” needs thereby not necessarily be a negative one. Nonetheless, the possibility of these negative effects will set off other effects as well.

### *The shadow of enlargement*

Just as the future affects the present in any situation of iterated games, enlargement will affect the cooperation before it has actually taken place. The shadow of the future, as presented by Robert Axelrod, is a function of the frequency and durability of the interactions. The more frequent and durable the interactions are, the more will the future pay-offs be part of the calculation for the present “move”. The future will thereby affect the prospects for a cooperative outcome. Enlargement *per se* will however not change the frequency and durability, they must be assumed to be rather stable unless there is also an institutional adjustment. What will instead be affected are the perceptions of the success, or cooperative outcome, of the interactions.

There are supposedly two channels through which this “shadow of enlargement” has an effect on the pay-off structure. First, the perceived “general problems” related to the pure increase in numbers (as described above) can affect the choice. Expecting decreased prospects for agreement after enlargement may make the participants more intent on settling certain issues before enlargement actually takes place. The perceived pay-off for immediate cooperation could thereby be higher immediately before an enlargement,

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<sup>22</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p. 214.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Sjørnsen 1998.

<sup>24</sup> Weiler & Wessels 1988, p. 244f; and Nuttall 1992, p. 315.

which may help overcome differences among the participants. Observers have also pointed out that before enlargements, the present members seem to “play up their unity more than is justified by their own actual preferences”.<sup>25</sup> To what extent the fear of a worsening unity after enlargement have also helped in unlocking dead-locks in specific foreign policy issues must remain a question for more thorough empirical research.

Second, and maybe more important, is the perceived future behaviour of the applicants. If at least one of the applicants is thought to be less cooperative than any of the present members, this must clearly affect the pay-off structure negatively. This has partly to do with the nature of the CFSP, where the process of continuous cooperation has resulted in the creation of “process-generated stakes”, so that the cooperation *per se* has become important for the participants. The political will to agree on a common standpoint has often been so strong that the member have given the impression of being more intent on reaching a common position than on how to project the common position once it has been reached. Something of a club atmosphere has developed, and there is a “predisposition of diplomats to regard a failure to agree as the worst of outcomes”.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, if a future participant is expected not be cooperative this can affect the present pay-offs. States that have previously found it “costly” to align themselves with the EU core, but nonetheless have done so for the benefit of a united front, might start breaking the unity as well.<sup>27</sup> So, if the degree of unity is perceived to become lower after the enlargement, because of an uncooperative new member, the will to cooperate may be reduced already before the enlargement.

The applicant states clearly signal their willingness (or lack of willingness) to adjust to the CFSP years ahead of actual membership. This tendency, and the reactions by the members, can be visually illustrated by the states’ voting behaviour in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).<sup>28</sup> Voting behaviour may not be an ideal indicator, but because of the variety of issues covered in the UNGA it does at least allow us to get a rough picture of EU unity on an annual basis and of any broad changes in the individual members’ behaviour. Using three of the previous enlargements as illustrative cases can at least help support the argument.

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<sup>25</sup> Hill 1997, p. 88.


<sup>26</sup> Nuttall 1992, p. 282 and 314.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Nuttall 1992, p. 28.

<sup>28</sup> Strömvik 1998.


As shown in diagram 1 below, overall EU unity started to decrease two years before the Greek entry. Although this down-turn of the unity may have several causes, it is plausible to assume that the imminent Greek entry had a decisive effect. Broken down, the voting information also show that the similarity of Greek voting behaviour to that of the EC members was not very big during the 1970s, but the gap was widened even further in 1979-1980. At the same time, Denmark (among others) clearly changed its voting patterns too, allowing more divergence between its own voting behaviour and that of the other member states. Thereby, the deterioration in unity that was to be expected solely by the entry of Greece was dramatically reinforced. This may on the one hand be seen as typical illustration of the dynamics of the shadow of enlargement, but on the other hand, the second enlargement may have been something of a special case. Ahead of the third and fourth enlargement, the applicants were behaving rather differently.<sup>29</sup> Some three years before their entry, Spain and Portugal changed their voting patterns to move closer to the EC members, as did Austria, Finland and Sweden some three years ahead of their entry (for Sweden, see diagram 2). The years preceding these two enlargements were also characterised by an over-all increase in EU unity.

*Diagram 1. EU voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly*



<sup>29</sup> The first enlargement was not included in the above mentioned study (Strömviik 1998), but it is plausible to assume that at least

Diagram 2. Voting similarity between Sweden and EU in the UNGA



The relationship between these two channels of early influence on the cooperation can thus leave us with the following conditional working hypotheses: (3) *If the members perceive the applicant(s) to be cooperative, there will not be a decrease in unity before enlargement. There may even be an increase in unity, in order to demonstrate to the applicants the importance of the cooperation.* (4) *If the members perceive the applicant(s) to be non-cooperative, there will be a decrease in unity already before enlargement has actually taken place.* One important aspect when discussing the future enlargement(s) is therefore the applicants' willingness to cooperate, signalled by the applicants through the alignment of their foreign policies to the CFSP.

#### *Size adjustment*

The change in size, in terms of geographical, economic and political weight, also causes two different but related pressures on the CFSP, resulting in changes in the cooperative behaviour of the members. The first one is related to the members' perceptions of the value and need for the cooperation, and the second one is related to the external environment's perceptions of the cooperation. Borrowing terminology from Roy Ginsberg and Philippe Schmitter respectively, these "forces" will be labelled *self-styled logic* and

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Denmark, Norway and Ireland at least partly aligned their voting behaviour to the original Six during the first years of the 1970s.

*externalisation*. Both forces work to affect the power base of the EU as an international actor.

Each enlargement is followed by an increased “economic and political clout” for the EU.<sup>30</sup> On the economic side, there is the obvious result of making the EU more self-sufficient. Enlargement brings with it increased share of intra-EU trade to total EU trade, resulting in a higher degree of freedom for “independent” economic action. The previous enlargements have also had the related effects of making EU agriculturally self-sufficient and increased its share of world trade to become the world’s largest importer and exporter.<sup>31</sup>

On the political side, enlargement furthermore adds weight to the EU in international organisations, such as the UN and OSCE.<sup>32</sup> Since the start of EPC in the early 1970s, the EU has now also expanded its diplomatic reach to nearly all nation-states and a large number of international organisations, including other regional trade blocks.<sup>33</sup> With every new member, new “bridges” are also created between the EU the outside world.<sup>34</sup> After the first enlargement, UK for instance brought its strong ties with the Commonwealth states into the EPC, and Denmark did the same thing with the other Scandinavian states. The Greek entry resulted in a more acute EC awareness of the sensitive relations with Turkey and the Middle East in general. Stronger ties with for instance Latin America followed the entry of Spain and Portugal, and Sweden and Finland brought with them foreign policies that emphasised relations with for instance the Baltic States.<sup>35</sup>

For the CFSP, however, the increased political weight is only a latent asset that may or may not be realised. To have an effect on the CFSP, the question is if there is any specific relationship between increased economic and political clout and more foreign policy making. Thomas Pedersen, among others, has suggested that a higher self-sufficiency rate will make it less costly to pursue for instance protectionist policies towards outsiders. But in a strict definition of the CFSP, these policies are still trade-policies and not common foreign and security policy. So, it seems that the effect we might presume on the CFSP in this respect will not be so much one of more unity, but rather one of more weight to the decisions taken. Geographically, each enlargement creates new borders with the outside

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<sup>30</sup> Pedersen 1993, p. 44.

<sup>31</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p. 206.

<sup>32</sup> Pedersen 1993, p. 44.

<sup>33</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p 206

<sup>34</sup> Allen 1998, p 119.

<sup>35</sup> Allen 1998, p. 119; see also Ginsberg 1998, pp. 206-213.

world. The latest enlargement for instance gave the EU some 2,000 kilometres of border to Russia.

These three aspects of change in size may however also have political in terms of efforts at increased unity. The members' perceptions of the need for effective cooperation can clearly be affected by a change in size. The EU has for instance often acknowledged that its economic power has also meant political responsibilities.<sup>36</sup> For instance, when EPC was set up in 1970, the then Six stated that the "United Europe" was "conscious of the responsibilities incumbent on it by reason of its economic development, industrial power and standard of living" and that "Europe must prepare itself to discharge the imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role".<sup>37</sup> We may therefore assume that taken together, these forces can intensify one of the promoters of CFSP in general, namely that which Roy Ginsberg has called the *self-styled logic*. This logic, according to Ginsberg, "introduces the notion that the EC is capable of acting as a unit with its own regional interests to promulgate on an international scale".<sup>38</sup> With changed perceptions of what the EU can and should do, states may also change their behaviour to a higher degree of cooperativeness.

Another related effect, also linked to the increased "economic and political clout", is *externalisation*.<sup>39</sup> As the importance of EU grows by enlargement, outside actors will press for more contacts with the EU, thereby forcing the EU to provide more external relations. In the literature, externalisation refers mainly to external economic relations, but these relations may also generate spill-over to the foreign policy area. When new states enter the EU, new trade agreements have to be negotiated with outside actors who lose out on having former trading partners become EU members and thereby bound by the common commercial policy. And, as Ginsberg has pointed out, "[r]enewal of existing trade contracts opens a Pandora's box of expectations from outside partners".<sup>40</sup> These expectations will in turn pressure the EU to more foreign policy activities. We should therefore now be able to formulate a third hypothesis: (5) *Due to increased pressure both from within the EU and from the outside world, enlargement will result in an increase in EU foreign policy activities.*

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<sup>36</sup> Preston 1997, p. 171.

<sup>37</sup> The Luxembourg Report 1970, 1.4 and 1.9.

<sup>38</sup> Ginsberg 1989, p. 35.

<sup>39</sup> Schmitter 1969, p. 165.

<sup>40</sup> Ginsberg 1989, p. 155.

### *Institutional adjustment*

So far, there is one important part of this whole topic that has been avoided, namely the effect of enlargement on the CFSP institutions. Until now, various reasons for assuming direct effects on the provision of the collective good has been discussed, but these effects can also have an impact on the formal institutions, which may then affect the success-rate of the cooperation. Indeed, the nature of the institutional arrangements is often claimed to be one of the most important factors affecting the possibilities for provision of collective good in large groups.<sup>41</sup> The typical argument is that “[c]areful institutional design will be required to achieve the difficult balancing of decision-making efficiency and legitimacy (compliance) that is necessary for successful multilateralism with large numbers”.<sup>42</sup>

With respect to the CFSP, this is also one of the most common arguments. Most observers point to the need for institutional adjustment to offset the negative “numbers effect”, and argue that without institutional change, the second pillar cooperation will suffer hard from the next enlargement.<sup>43</sup> The link between institutional set-up and the success of cooperation is however not an undisputed one. On the one hand, few deny the importance of institutions in general, but on the other hand, the causal link between changing institutions and increasing success-rate has been questioned. Françoise de la Serre and Helen Wallace have for instance pointed out that “it is hard to argue that some form of predetermined enhanced cooperation provides a magic solution that will permit convergence in the policies and interests of individual member states of the EU”.<sup>44</sup> What kind of institutional changes that could have an impact on the CFSP is a matter of yardsticks and what kind of institutional change we would expect to be the optimal one. That issue can not be settled here, but what can be done within the limits of this study is to have a closer look into the relationship between enlargement and institutional change (effective or otherwise).

According to Christopher Preston, each enlargement has had a reinforcing effect on the inherent “systemic conservatism” of the EU system in general. Thereby, institutional reforms become more and more difficult to accomplish with every enlargement, especially

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<sup>41</sup> Olson 1968, p. 48.

<sup>42</sup> Kahler 1993, p. 322

<sup>43</sup> Hill 1998, p. 29

<sup>44</sup> de la Serre & Wallace 1997, p. 24.

if it involves decisions about an increased use of majority voting.<sup>45</sup> With specific regard to the CFSP, however, this argument of systemic conservatism may not hold, at least not to date. Ignoring (for obvious reasons) the QMV-dimension and typical supranationalism, there seems to be support that the contrary is actually the case. Within the CFSP-framework, there is now something of a “pre-existing culture of enlargement-driven reform”.<sup>46</sup>

Already the creation and early development of European Political Cooperation in the first years of the 1970s was at least to some extent a reaction to the forthcoming first enlargement. This fact has been expressly stated in the two first reports that laid the ground for today’s CFSP. The *Luxembourg Report*, presented in 1970, was written after Willy Brandt’s suggestion that the Six should “study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement”.<sup>47</sup> In the second document that codified the working procedures of the EPC, *the Copenhagen Report* from 1973, the Foreign Ministers wrote that: “At the time when the enlargement of the European Communities became a fact, paragraph 14 of the Summit Declaration in Paris on October 1972 required the Foreign Ministers to produce by June 1973 a second report on methods of improving political cooperation in accordance with the Luxembourg Report”.<sup>48</sup>

The trend of developing the procedural framework for EPC/CFSP in connection to each enlargement has since continued. In 1978, the problems highlighted by the Mediterranean enlargement, especially the question of how Greece would handle the EC-Turkey relations once it held the presidency, led for instance to the invention of the Troika.<sup>49</sup> The next report, *the London Report*, was, not surprisingly, produced in 1981, and introduced among other things a crisis procedure and codified the Troika formula. The next time the EPC procedures was under reformulation was in the process of formulating the Single European Act, which was again undertaken in the light of the upcoming third enlargement.<sup>50</sup> By its inclusion in the SEA, EPC was for the first time codified in a document connected to the EC. The Commission was for the first time allowed to be “fully associated” with EPC, and a permanent secretariat was set up in Brussels. The extent to which enlargement was also a decisive factor in the formulation of

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<sup>45</sup> Preston 1997, p. 191.

<sup>46</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p. 210.

<sup>47</sup> Nuttall 1992, p. 49.

<sup>48</sup> The Copenhagen Report 1973, preamble.

<sup>49</sup> Preston 1997, p. 172.



the new CFSP provisions in the Maastricht treaty is probably more uncertain, but it seems plausible to assume that even if these negotiations were not initiated in light of enlargement, they were conducted with enlargement in mind. The Amsterdam Treaty, again, can certainly be said to have been initiated in the presence of the enlargement process that was going on during the Maastricht negotiations.

Thus, there certainly seems to be some phenomenon that may be called an established reform-culture, but it still remains to be explained why. We may perhaps again use the concepts of the shadow of enlargement and size adjustment as the explanatory links. The fear of increased difficulties after enlargement, plus a “feeling” of more responsibilities among the members in combination with increased external pressure, may well serve to initiate reforms. The last hypothesis could therefore be formulated in the following way:  
*(6) Enlargement will produce at least some degree of institutional reform.*

#### The next enlargement(s)

To what extent, then, do we dare to use these hypotheses to speculate about the forthcoming enlargements? Is the next enlargement round going to be different in any crucial respect? According to most observers, the only big difference is in the large amount of applicants. The effects will to some extent depend on something which has not been discussed in this paper - the capacity of the EU to incorporate such a large amount of states at the same time. Whether there is a “threshold logic” for the number of members that can be included before the intergovernmental cooperation becomes completely deadlocked, due to rivalness or organisation costs, remains to be seen. On the other hand, if we are to trust the hypotheses generated above, it is possible that the fears are somewhat exaggerated in the literature.

First, the behaviour of the applicant states has changed during the last years. Most of the applicants have clearly started to align their foreign policies towards the CFSP. For instance, a change in their foreign policies in various international organisations, such as the OSCE and the UN is already visible.<sup>51</sup> Looking again at the voting behaviour in the UNGA, Paul Luif has showed that all present applicants except Cyprus have changed

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<sup>50</sup> Preston 1997, p. 172.

<sup>51</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p 209ff.

their voting significantly during the last decade, so that already in 1993 they were all closer to an EU majority than was the UK.<sup>52</sup>

The reasons for these changes are of course many, but one may well be the tendency discussed above, that this is a political price to be paid for gaining access to the economic benefits. But, we might also assume that for many of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), as well as for Cyprus and the Baltic States, the implicit security guarantees which the EU can be seen to provide, play a prominent role in their foreign policy deliberations. Therefore, it is not implausible to assume, as David Allen does, that “some of the potential CEEC applicants, particularly those with small, inexperienced, and underdeveloped foreign policy machinery, might be more willing to participate in a full-fledged European foreign policy than some of the present member states”.<sup>53</sup> Therefore, and at least with regard to the first upcoming enlargement round with some five or six new entrants, we should probably not expect any direct worsening of the CFSP.

Second, just as in the previous enlargements, we would predict new issues to be brought into the cooperation, or a stronger focus on some of the issues already on the CFSP agenda. For instance, tied to the enlargement process is the involvement in the peace process on Cyprus, and new CEECs will reinforce the need to elaborate more in detail the relations with Russia. The risk of otherwise alienating Russia if/when new states will join WEU will most certainly be a factor promoting more close relations between the EU and Russia.<sup>54</sup>

In addition to the above, and at least if we are to trust the trends from the previous enlargements, we should also expect the CFSP procedures to be revised again in connection to the next enlargement. The procedures may not be changed in a way that will allow for traditional QMV, but, as history has showed, there are numerous other ways of trying to improve an intergovernmental cooperation, and more ways will certainly be attempted. To what extent this will actually have any effect on the CFSP is however another matter. Therefore, if we are to believe in the predictive capacity of cross-time comparisons, we should therefore expect that new solutions will be found that will at least result in a non-deterioration of the CFSP.

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<sup>52</sup> Luif 1997b, pp 29f.

<sup>53</sup> Allen 1998, p. 110; cf Ginsberg 1998, p. 213.

<sup>54</sup> Ginsberg 1998, p. 212f.

## Conclusion

To sum up, and try to specify more parsimoniously the various effects discussed above, we may conclude that there are basically two broad reasons why enlargement will affect the CFSP. The first one has to do with the *changes in the constantly ongoing cooperation process* between the members. The prospect of new members entering the cooperation changes the “cooperation game” already before the enlargement has taken place. This shadow of enlargement becomes present in the decision-making process, and affects the possibilities of reaching unanimous decisions. The fear of even more difficulties to reach decisions after enlargement can make the present members decide on matters that would, without the shadow of enlargement, have been hard or impossible to solve. The only instant when the trend has worked the opposite way was when Greece entered the EC.

The second reason has to do with the *effects of the increased geographical, economic and political size* of the Union. This works through at least two different channels, pushing for a change in the EU’s international role. First, it generates a feeling among the members that this increase in size should be accompanied by more truly European initiatives in international affairs. Second, it may also generate increased pressure from the outside world on the EU to act in foreign policy matters.

We should, therefore, not be too sceptical about the forthcoming enlargement. Although there may be some kind of threshold logic inherent in this kind of cooperation, there are numerous other forces as well. We may so far assume that the effects that up until now have been a result of enlargement will continue to press for at least enough changes to maintain the levels of today. If the present applicant states are perceived to be willing to cooperate in the second pillar, then we may certainly again see new initiatives, both regarding procedures and policies, as a result of the forthcoming enlargement. It may turn out that in the case of the second pillar, widening also means deepening.

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