

# **Images of Europe and Europeans: In-Group Trust and Loyalty for European Integration**

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## Abstract

Prior research on citizen support for European integration has primarily focused on individuals' evaluations of the process of integration or its institutions, with emphasis on the importance of direct benefits and costs integration can confer. These models do not consider individuals' evaluations of other European nationalities or of the member states. This paper will fill this gap in the research by formulating and testing a political cohesion model, which is complementary to preexisting models. The analysis synthesizes systems theory with political psychology to produce a core claim that the probability of supporting integration and developing a European identity increases with greater levels of political cohesion among European citizens and among these citizens and the European Union member-states. The development of political cohesion, as measured by the amount of trust in Europeans and member-states, is assumed to be reflective of positive images of these two types of subjects. Political cohesion is especially critical when individuals consider nationalities of the southern periphery given their lower economic development. Therefore, trust in southern EU nationalities improves the probability that an individual will have a European identity and support integration, more so than trust in the northern EU nationalities. In addition, integration's development is marked by changes in the allocation of sovereignty that is determined by the relatively more powerful European member-states. Therefore, positive images of the top EU powers, namely Germany and France, improves the probability of holding a European identity and support integration, more so than trusting the remaining members. The results hold even when controlling for demographic variables, political values, ideology, and the democratic deficit. Binary and ordered logistic regression analysis using data from the *Eurobarometer* surveys conducted in 1986, 1990, and 1992 to 1994 among the first 12 members of the EU support these claims.

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Neither the colourless vagueness of cosmopolitanism, nor the fierce self-idolatry of national-worship is the goal of human history. -Rabindranath Tagore

Nous ne coalisons pas les Etats, nous unissons les hommes. -Jean Monnet

### Introduction: Political community and the idea of a unified Europe

Early thoughts regarding European integration promoted an idealism of uniting a people by establishing a community of Europeans. However, research has since demonstrated that this goal is more pragmatic than idealistic in facilitating positive-sum transactions. A political community can only develop, within a democratic context, if it has support from those that comprise it (Easton 1965). Therefore, without a support for a political community, it may be difficult to see any significant degree of support for other components of the political system (Easton 1965: 189).

A political community comprises horizontal and vertical dimensions. Deutsch refers to a political community as a “people who have learned to communicate with each other and to understand each other well beyond the mere interchange of goods and service” (1953: 61). This definition captures the horizontal dimension of a political community, namely the amount of cohesion among individual citizens. Individuals are part of a defined community because they have developed a social-psychological attachment with one another through greater communication and understanding. What has often been referred to as a “we feeling” (Deutsch *et al* 1957: 36) has also been captured in other, more general, renditions of community (Taylor 1972; Harrison 1974).

Haas stated that a political community is in place when “specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space” (1958: 5). Etzioni adds that a

political community “has a center of decision-making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community...and it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens” (1965: 4). Both of these definitions rest on the need to identify a central node of decision-making. The problem with their definitions occurs when no single central node of decision-making is present. What if decision-making is decentralized? If we relax the notion of centralism, a political community refers to the cohesion among individuals and the decision-making hierarchy, which captures the second dimension (vertical) of a political community. Together, the horizontal and vertical dimensions are what Easton refers to as a political community: “that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor” (1965: 177). This emphasizes that individuals are drawn together for the purpose of operating in a common structure.

Deutsch *et al.* (1957) stated that full unity of two previously independent entities occurs when we witness both integration and amalgamation. Integration is similar to what I refer to as the formation of a horizontal political community. What is missing in their conceptualization is the link between the society and the decision-making hierarchy. In order to have amalgamation, or the merger of two or more units under a common government (Deutsch *et al.* 1957: 6), there may need to be some form of a vertical political community. Otherwise the operation of such a merger may be ineffective. In other words the links between individuals and the hierarchy may be so loose that a newly formed or amalgamated government may not have the stable support to endure moments of system stress (Easton 1965). This stress can result from many factors, but the key for this discussion is a stress resulting from unmet system demands. If demands placed on the system by individuals are not met, then support can decline. The system therefore lacks an

adequate internal maintenance mechanism, which in the long term improves the probability of system breakdown.

The ideas and practice of European unification is an example of political community building both in its horizontal and vertical dimensions. Jean Monnet and his cohorts in the pan-European movement held a vision that is reflected in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome: integration is a project for the establishment of a common people with a common government. The cohesion among individuals, as well as among individuals and the decisional hierarchy, would therefore be a source of support for European unification. Since this analysis is undertaken while Europe is “under construction” it is important to understand exactly what is referred to as the decision-making hierarchy, which is a key concept in understanding the vertical dimension of a political community. In a fully integrated system, this hierarchy refers to the power center(s) developed by a constitution. For example, the British political hierarchy has the cabinet and prime minister holding the top position in policy making, with the other institutions holding subordinate positions. In the case of the EU, decision-making is primarily in the hands of the member-countries themselves (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). They, through the IGCs and the European Council, determine the amount of sovereignty given to EU institutions as well as the direction of integration. Therefore, when referring to the term decision-making hierarchy, I mean the regional power hierarchy of EU member-states.

The central argument is that support for integration depends upon the formation of a European political community, either horizontally, vertically, or both. In doing so, Europeans develop an attachment to the idea of European unification. The foundation of this community is in the development of positive images of fellow Europeans and the member-states because such images broaden in-group membership. The remaining sections will go into further detail in

explaining the importance of in-group membership for an individual's motivation to adopt a European identity and support integration. Binary and ordered logistic regression analysis using data from the *Eurobarometer* surveys conducted in 1986, 1990, and 1992 to 1994 among the first 12 members of the EU support these claims.

### Self-interest and common interest motivations

Easton's (1965; 1975) theoretical work views public support as being either specific (also known as utilitarian support) or diffuse. This section differentiates the motivations of both types and concludes that given differing motivations, variables that explain one type of support may not be as powerful in explaining the other type. Specifically, motivations for utilitarian support are primarily self-interest in nature while diffuse (what I refer to as loyalty) stems from a common interest motivation. Utilitarian support results from an exchange where outputs (which can be economic or non-economic gains for the individual) are provided by the state in order to maintain the system through citizen support (Easton 1965: 157). Utilitarian support is especially popular among researchers in the context of European integration. They build upon the conceptualization of self-interest, which has long been the cornerstone of understanding political decisions (Olson 1965).<sup>1</sup> Researchers point to the fact that motivations for utilitarian support

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<sup>1</sup>The utilitarian support approach also stems from the endogenous political economy literature, which approaches the study of integration through a rational framework. It is closely related to other works that explain the behavior of domestic forces by looking at group motivations and their impact on national government decision (Downs 1957; Gamson 1961; Ames 1987; Levi 1988; Geddes 1994; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). The primary motivation of the political elite is either to remain in power or to allow a particular political party to remain in power. Therefore the politician will form coalitions among societal groups for this end. The wishes of the domestic forces need to be satisfied before the next turn in the political cycle occurs. Endogenous economic theory applies this logic to nation-state policy formulation regarding the global economy. Individuals form coalitions depending on their role in the economy (Stopler and Samuelson 1941). Such roles are economic factors (Rogowski 1989), economic sectors

arise from evaluations of the EU providing rewards that minimize any negative effects, including the changing role of the EU as integration evolves (Anderson and Reichert 1996). Feld and Wildgen's (1976) work shows a tie between support levels in the four core countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) to that of welfare increases in the early years of integration. The attempt at explaining support continued with Handley (1981) who descriptively notes that the economic downturns of the 1970's dramatically lowered support levels for the EEC. Eichenberg and Dalton's (1993) refined the testing of this argument by looking at the various levels of influence on support levels with similar results. Others have also built upon this method of analysis with similar results (Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Duch and Taylor 1997). Moreover, others have taken a more direct approach by examining an individual's socio-economic position and predicted the probability of their support given the individual's position in the economy and theoretical outcomes of the effects of market integration (Anderson 1991; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 1998).

Other individual motivations, while being self-interest in nature, are not necessary economic. The founders of European integration were driven by the memories of catastrophic wars and hoped that regional integration would be a vehicle for a permanent peace (Deutsch *et al* 1957; Haas 1958; Etzioni 1965; Mitrany 1966). Europeans also supported integration, in its early years, in part for its promise to prevent war (Hewstone 1986). However, with the passing memory of war and the end of the Cold War, physical security is not as strong a factor in supporting integration as it once was (Gabel 1998). Other benefits include a more effective form

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(Gourevitch 1986), or sectors that have specific assets (Frieden 1991). Each group will make their economic cost-benefit calculations and support foreign economic policies on this basis.

of governance that is lacking at the national level due to underdeveloped welfare benefits and high levels of corruption (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).

These studies provide insights into utilitarian support levels, but answer only a narrow range of questions and provide, at best, short-term explanations. Business cycles and other factors that lead to self-interest motivations help to explain utilitarian support, but may not be able to explain the support that will produce stability in the system in the long term. These models assume that individuals make no other calculations and beg the question if this alone is enough to explain support. While significant in their contribution, it tells us only part of the story behind citizen support. The other half of the story begins by understanding affective support.

Affective support is a “a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants” (Easton 1965: 273; 1975: 444). Affective support should not be equated with specific support because outputs themselves are not the focus of attention; it is the political object itself. Therefore affective support “is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs” (1965: 274). What “an attachment” refers to is not quite clear. He does mention that it is associated to a “sense of community” (1965: 325) but this concept also lacks specificity by leaving its definition as “the degree of solidarity” (1965: 184). In the simplest formulation, affective support occurs after a period of time when specific support is present (Easton 1965).<sup>2</sup> Affective support enters the picture when the political system has a “communal ideology” that promotes a common interest (Easton 1965: 333).

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<sup>2</sup> See Baker, Dalton, and Hildebrandt (1981) for the evidence of this process in the case of post-war Germany.

Therefore we have an association between the satisfaction with the object's outputs, new thoughts among individuals about this object, and a move from a self-interest mode of evaluation to a common interest mode. Common interest develops because there is a "sense of community" where individuals strongly identify with one another (Easton 1965: 326).

To overcome collective action problems, a political community would need to develop along common interest motivations. These motivations stem from a common identification, because without this identity formation all that can be predicted is short-term cooperation instead of community building (Deutsch 1957; Russett 1963; Lasswell 1972). Short-term cooperation or coalitions have relatively low levels of cohesion and tend, over time, to become unstable (Almond and Verba 1963; Gamson 1964). Since European integration is not an effort in short-term cooperation, its durability would lie in political community building. This community building relies on common interest motivations, which are dependent upon social identities. One will tend to develop common interests when one can conclude that one has a common fate with others. As Wendt argues, "identification is a continuum from the negative to the positive – from conceiving it as an anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self" (1994: 386). If Europeans develop a positive identification through the process of integration, then this will be associated with cohesiveness among those within a broad European political community. If this holds, it is possible to detect common interest motivations in addition to self-interest motivations for the citizenry's support for European integration.

Developing explanations for supporting integration by understanding the role of common interests are not new. One of the more cited sets of work in this area is the postmaterialist argument. Inglehart's (1971; 1977a; 1977b) explanation is that Europeans were socialized in an environment of high rates of economic growth. As a result individuals in the post-war era



developed a different set of values (different from prior generations) that are amiable toward the prospects of regional integration. These individuals personally identify with supranational institutions and thereby give the process their support. However, Janssen (1991) and Gabel (1998) dispute this claim with empirical evidence. Their research finds little evidence for the relationship between postmaterialism and support for integration. In fact, the little evidence that does exist indicates that postmaterialists are less likely to support integration. However, the problem here is not in the value of the postmaterialist explanation, but what it was trying to explain. Researchers used the postmaterialist variable in order to explain utilitarian support. However, the postmaterialist argument is not suited for such an explanation. Postmaterialism cannot tell us how postmaterialists or materialists reach their opinions (Rochon 1998). In fact, it may be possible for both value extremes to favor regional integration but for different reasons. It is easy to see that materialists would be in favor if they believe that regional integration will provide material and physical security. One can assume that postmaterialists would be in favor if they believe that it is a means to solve trans-national problems (e.g. clean air, water, etc.). This tells two things. First, we need to understand the dependent variable (the type of support) in order to develop explanations. Following this, loyalty requires a model that taps into the notion of common interests, a model that understands individuals' evaluations of the political community the European elite is trying to build. This requires a model whose primary concern is not what Europe can do for individuals, but what idea of Europe is in the perceptions of individuals.

#### A political cohesion model for EU loyalty

Research that looks at common interest motivations for individual support for integration has mainly focused on the role of factors that would impede the formation of the political

community. They echo the claim by Dahl (1989) that an attachment allows for easier rule because it adds legitimacy to the governors by the governed. They are also differentiated from prior work in that they do not focus on the non-EU level explanations for support. McLaren (2002) demonstrates that hostility towards other cultures determines attitudes towards the European Union. Carey (2002) also demonstrates that a strong national attachment lowers the probability that an individual will support regional integration. In addition, Van Kersbergen (2000) explains support for the EU by examining the role integration has in forming primary national allegiances. Their claim is that these attitudes pose a problem in developing a European identity and thereby lowers the chances of supporting the EU. The key here then is to explain European identity formation and how this explanation can in turn model support for integration. In doing so, we are shifting our attention away from direct evaluations of the EU and towards the evaluations of societal members in influencing support for the EU. The political cohesion model looks at the development of a political community and thereby focuses on common interests. In producing this model, I will also emphasize that common interest and self-interest are not mutually exclusive. By being part of a political community, an individual recognizes that her or his self-interest and the common interest are *interdependent*. It is this interdependence that produces the cohesiveness of the community.

The idea of integration and its support may require that individuals think of the project as a group effort and one based on long-term gains. The longer time horizon therefore requires individuals to support the idea of integration because it is a collective good requiring collective action. The establishment of a common identity would be a necessity to the establishment of a commitment to collective action and to promote this form of citizen support. Through a common identity, individuals are stating that individual problems are actually collective problems and that

countries need to forge links, by way of integration, if they are to be solved. Since a political community has two dimensions, the political cohesion model will need to take into account both dimensions.

The important first step in developing this model is to understand what a European identity is and what it is not. First, this identity is not associated with a foundational mythos, ethnic affiliation (Obradovic 1996), common language, or shared customs (Smith 1992), or any characteristic that we usually use for national identities (Zetterholm 1994; Cederman 1996; McKay 1996). However, it does have a similarity with national identities in that it is “imagined” and develops through the construction of a society (Anderson 1991). This notion of “imagined” speaks to the malleable nature of identity and is therefore a construction or adaptation to new political and/or economic realities rather than from biological or common blood rationalities. In its construction, individuals make choices as to who can and cannot belong to a specific identity. In fact, individuals may also choose to belong or not to belong given the characteristics of those who already claim the identity. This concept of in-group/out-group identity (who is and is not a member of group) will be shown as being important in the social-psychological dynamics within and among such groups in a political community.

The construction of a European identity has been associated with a common belief in liberal-democratic values (Moravcsik 1993; Beetham and Lord 1998), which have been codified in the legal formation of European citizenship. However, many EU citizens may not have this level of sophisticated understanding of identity given that they are not well informed (Anderson 1998). The more reasonable approach in explaining identity and its implication on support for integration is through the psychology of common interest evaluations.

Piaget (1965) stated that building attachments to groups is part of normal human behavior. These attachments promote cohesion among group members that are associated with the social-psychological phenomena of in-group bias and subjective images. One reason why an individual becomes a group member (the in-group) is due to an affective attachment (Terhune 1964; Winter 1973; Stogdill 1974; McClelland 1975; Bass 1981). An individual forms an emotional attachment because the group fulfills some symbolic value. At the level of national identity, individuals attach themselves because they see the nation as the embodiment of what is important (DeLamater *et al.* 1969). Also individuals will interact with individuals who are members of another group if this group's members share some commonality with in-group members (Brewer 1968). The members of both groups are more trusting of each other and thereby facilitating of cooperation among members. One often cited definition of trust is "the probability of getting preferred outcomes without the group doing anything to bring them about" (Gamson 1968: 54). That is, group members will not need to monitor each other because there is confidence that interests are aligned. Putnam (1993) shows that the level of trust one has for others produces effective institutional performance because of the higher probability of obtaining cooperation. It lowers the costs of association because of the perception that individuals will not cheat or defect. In paraphrasing Wintrobe (1995: 46), trust yields a stream of future returns on exchanges that would not otherwise take place because trust makes behavior predictable and stable. Therefore, groups may overlap to a certain extent to function not only as separate units but also, as an integrated unit when perceived similarities are present. When similarities are not present, overlapping memberships do not occur and group status becomes exclusive. The importance of similarities in building cohesion lies in understanding in-group biases.

In-group bias is a social condition in which individuals tend to favor members of their in-group versus others who are not members (the out-group members) (Tajfel 1978). In early psychological experiments individuals tended to give more rewards and side with other members of their group because of their affiliation. These biases occurred even when test subjects were only recently informed that they belong to a particular group and had never met or interacted with other in-group members (Tajfel 1978; Turner 1978; Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1982; Brewer and Kramer 1985; Messick and Mackie 1989). The cause of this bias, as put forth by Tajfel (1981; 1982), is due to positive evaluations individuals have for members of their group. They join and are identified by such groups because, as stated above, the group symbolizes a set of values. By associating with similar-valued individuals, self-esteem improves because values are reinforced. This self-esteem further improves when individuals make favorable comparisons between the in-group and out-group. Not only are they part of a subjectively valued group, the in-group is also subjectively judged as better than the other out-groups. Therefore, by tying an individual's social identity to the importance of the in-group, group maintenance or cooperation for group survival becomes important. To this end, individuals will tend to give favorable biases to fellow group members.

Since cohesiveness is a function of in-group evaluations associated with identity, it is important to revisit the possible phenomenon of overlapping in-groups. This is important in the context of integration because the formation of a European identity is not theorized to replace national identities but to coexist with them (Deutsch *et al.* 1957). This is where the concept of image becomes important. Kelman states that image

...refers to the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system. The core of an image is the perceived character of the object to which it refers – the individual's conception of what this object is like. Image is an

inferred construct, however, rather than a mere designation of the way the object is phenomenally experienced. (1965: 24)

Scott, more succinctly, defines "...an image of a nation (or of any other object) constitutes the totality of attributes that a person recognizes (or imagines) when he contemplates that nation" (1965: 72). In addition such an image is the "property of the individual who beholds the object" (Kelman 1965: 27) meaning that the image is not objective and may therefore be dependent on various factors. Individuals can therefore use images of other groups to formulate likes and dislikes for and positive or negative stereotypes of out-groups (Druckman *et al.* 1974; Hewstone 1986; Druckman 1994). Image therefore implies that multiple identities form as members of in-groups view the values of out-group members as similar and therefore compatible. Groups can, by this mechanism, tie themselves together in a unifying identity, in one extreme, much like individuals do with one another in forming group attachments. Recall that individuals tend to form groups, in part, because of emotional importance to the group's symbolic values. If a subset of such values is present in other groups, then a broader identity will form without necessarily dissolving prior identities. The individuals in the broader group (one that includes two or more in-groups) can now operate with similar cohesiveness as the individual in-groups.

In the context of European identity, an individual may adopt the broader identity when s/he has a positive image of other EU nationalities. This positive image may result from evaluations of similarity on a number of issues and thus an individual will tend to view other nationalities as more in line with the in-group versus an exclusive out-group identity. While Europeans may see some difference in tastes, such as food, music, art, etc., such differences would only limit the possibility of replacing the national identities with a European one. Where there are similarities, a cohesive political community can develop, along the horizontal dimension. This is a political community that develops due to greater trust among nationalities. Subjectively perceived dissimilar values

would produce lesser trust and lowers the probability of holding a European identity and supporting integration. Among the first 12 members of the EU,<sup>3</sup> individuals can subjectively perceive differences along a north-south divide. Images of southern nationalities as underdeveloped economically and holding Latin values are prevalent in the minds of some. The image of a more economically developed and non-Latin north would also point to significant differences among the peoples of Europe. Following the tenants social identity theory, members of these two groups may see these differences as blocks to forming a common identity. This attitude would be stronger with regards to the southern images than the northern images given the lower level of development of the southern European periphery. Therefore trust in the EU nationalities can be broken down into two variables, trust in northern and southern nationalities, along the latent dimension of the different images of these peoples. The probability of holding a European identity and supporting the EU will be greater when an individual trusts southern nationalities than trusting northern nationalities.

The vertical dimension of the political community requires an examination of individual perceptions of EU member-states. Positive images of these states are significant in the development of a European identity and support for integration given their key role in EU level decision-making. Neither support nor identity can develop if individuals have negative images of the member-states. However, each member-state does not have an equal weight in the decision-making process; therefore a positive image of the more powerful states is of greater importance.

The structure of the European system of states, like the global or other regional systems, is a function of power relations. This structure determines the outcomes through the opportunities it offers to, and the constraints it puts on, the leadership of each country (Lenin 1939; Waltz 1979; Organski & Kugler 1980; Keohane 1984; Keohane & Milner 1996). The organization of the

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<sup>3</sup> Due to data limitations, the hypotheses will only focus on the first twelve members of the EU.

international system is a hierarchy where the preponderant actor rests on top of pyramid-like structure, with weaker powers grouped beneath it, depending on their individual relative strengths (Krasner 1976; Keohane 1980; Organski & Kugler 1980; Gilpin 1981). The same description applies to the organization of regions around the globe (Lemke 1996; Tammen et al. 2000). However, as stated by Wendt (1992), the structure is important only due to the resulting influence it has on the actors involved. He hypothesizes that countries go through a process of socialization due their interactions within the structure. They are transformed "...by the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation, and by intentional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities" (Wendt 1992: 395).<sup>4</sup> A regional system is an environment where countries learn about their position relative to others and from this conclude what opportunities there are for cooperation as well as conflict. Relative wealth, population, and capabilities (among others) determine which country's preferences will be enacted and which ones will be held in check. The more powerful (the largest and wealthiest) will tend to have their wishes debated and implemented.

Functional outcomes of relations among countries, such as trade patterns, fall under the influence of this dynamic. In the EU context, each step in integrating the decision-making systems of member-countries is mainly due to the preferences of the more powerful members (Moravcsik 1991 & 1993). Since the project is one of voluntary cooperation, countries can and do opt-out of further integration if their preferences are not inline with the more powerful members. The propensity to integrate comes under certain structural conditions: a regional system must include both a set of asymmetrical power relationships and an associated satisfaction with how to develop integration (Efird and Genna 2002). The regional leader of the hierarchy strongly influences the

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<sup>4</sup> See also Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990).



institutional construction jointly through its preferences and its ability to foster stability (Krasner 1976; Keohane and Nye 1977).

In the quest for the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Germany played this role by first promoting and then requiring inflationary stability for the establishment of the euro (McNamra 1998). The establishment of the “inclusion criteria” (low inflation, fiscal deficits, and public debt) and European Central Bank autonomy were requirements insisted upon by Germany. Germany benefited in establishing the EMU due to its large share of total intra-EU trade (De Grauwe 1997). By changing the nature of monetary sovereignty along with the other eleven EMU members, Germany would garner the returns due to a common currency (Molle 1997), while still pursuing the monetary policy that it prefers.

The relevance of understanding the structure’s influence on integration, in this research, is due to its relationship with identity and support. More precisely, individuals’ images of EU member-states may influence the amount of trust they will have in them. Geva and Hanson (1999) have shown in experimental work that individuals’ reactions to events by countries do modify how they think of them. While their work focuses on crisis points, one can comfortably assume that influences on country image can also occur over a long set of iterated events such as those found in the process of integration. Therefore trust in the member-states would be divided along a latent variable that measures the member-states status within the Union. The more powerful countries would occupy one dimension (Germany and France), the small but wealthy countries in another dimension (Denmark and the Benelux countries), and the rest in a third dimension. In addition, trust for the more powerful members will have a greater influence in the probability of an individual holding a European identity and supporting integration given their greater role in the process of integration.

### Data description and testing procedures

The public opinion data come from multiple *Eurobarometer* surveys (1986, 1990, 1992-1994). The survey responses fall under the category of a repeated cross-sectional data set. Given the fact that no panel data are present (because different individuals are surveyed over the time frame) it would be inappropriate to consider the data as time series cross-sectional (Beck and Katz 1995). Therefore time series techniques and diagnostics would be inappropriate. As with most studies using secondary data, great efforts were taken to optimize the operationalization of the variables by following the suggestions made by Kiecolt and Nathan (1985). Special attention was given in selecting specific surveys so that the questions offered sound measures for the variables. Since all the relevant questions were not asked after 1994, the analysis includes only samples from the first twelve members of the EU. Some of the samples were collapsed while others were not included: The Northern Ireland sample was included in the British sample and the East German sample was omitted given its unique attributes.<sup>5</sup> I use a weighted variable so that no national population will be over or under represented in the data (the European weight) because all tests are at the individual level at a European-wide analysis.<sup>6</sup> This variable also adjusts for any over or under representation of socio-economic groups.

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<sup>5</sup> The East German sample may exhibit questionable results given its early phase of democratic transition and its recent membership, which may distort findings. One such fear is an inaccuracy of questionnaire responses due to the public's long legacy of authoritarianism.

<sup>6</sup> The nature of the hypotheses requires an individual level analysis. While some researchers believe that aggregation of individual level responses to opinion surveys remove random "noise" from the measurements (Page and Shapiro 1992; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995), recent research shows that the error associated with individual level variation may be systemic (Duch, Palmer, and Anderson 2000). Therefore aggregating the data would not remove any associated "noise," but instead may harm the robustness of potential results due to a lower number of observations.

OLS regression techniques are not permissible because the dependent variables are ordinal. Because they are not continuous, applying OLS techniques will produce inefficient coefficients that may lead to type one and two errors. The appropriate technique is to employ ordered regression models (Long 1997). When the dependent variables take on three or more values, an ordered logit model is used. A dichotomous dependent variable will require a binary logit model. Each model will be evaluated based upon its significance of explanation. The evaluations of the coefficients will be solely based on their significance and direction of signs. The independent variables will then be judged based upon their contribution to predicting the probabilities of the dependent variables.

#### Dependent variables

The dependent variables are utilitarian support for EU membership, loyalty for the EU, and European identity. Gabel (1998) determined through factor analysis that the following questions tap into the concepts of utilitarian and affective support. Each question is a “trend” question and normally appears in every *Eurobarometer* survey. For utilitarian support, the following question is used:

*Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European Community [European Union] is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad?*

1. *Good Thing*                      2. *Bad Thing*                      3. *Neither Good nor Bad*

The responses for this question were recoded so that “good thing” has a value of 3, “bad thing” has a value of 1, and “neither good nor bad” has a value of 2.

For loyalty, the following question is used:

*In General are you for or against efforts being made to unify Western Europe?*

1. *For very much*                      2. *For to some extent*  
3. *Against to some extent*                      4. *Against very much.*

The responses for this question were recoded so that larger values measure higher levels of support. They were then collapsed into two levels, 1 = no support and 2 = support.

To measure European identification, the following question is utilized in testing the hypotheses dealing with the horizontal community:

*Do you ever think of yourself as not only (NATIONALITY), but also European?  
Does this happen often, sometimes, or never?*  
1. Often      2. Sometimes      3. Never

The values for this variable were recoded so that higher values correspond to higher values of identity. Since this question was not asked in those surveys that measure individual trust in the member-states, a substitute is necessary. The following question also asks the respondent about his or her feeling on holding a European identity:

*In the near future do you see yourself as ... ?*  
1. (NATIONALITY) only                      2. (NATIONALITY) and European  
3. European and (NATIONALITY)        4. European only

### Independent variables

The following are the explanatory variables, each of which measures the respondent's trust for other EU nationalities and for the member-states. The former responses are utilized for the horizontal community hypotheses and the latter are utilized for the vertical community hypotheses.

The operationalization of the trust variable is through a series of questions asking the respondent to gauge his or her trust of other EU nationalities (1986, 1990, 1992-1994):

*I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all?*  
1. Lot of Trust                                      2. Some Trust  
3. Not Very Much Trust                        4. No Trust at All.

The respondents go through and assign a value of trust to each nationality including their own.<sup>7</sup> This variable therefore measures both trans-national trust levels as well as intra-national trust levels. Trans-national trust, the measure of importance for this research, is the trust one has for other Europeans that are not members of the respondent's nationality. Intra-national trust is the level of trust individuals have for those who are exclusively members of the respondent's nationality. Intra-national trust was coded as missing from the data leaving evaluations of trust for others outside the individual's nationality. This was done in order to remove any potential biases for large countries, which may have a large or small amount of intra-national trust. Without recoding these values, the results may be skewed in favor of the alternative hypotheses and would also add difficulty in interpreting the results. The values were also recoded so that larger values correspond to higher levels of trust.

This question was posed to respondents in *Eurobarometer* surveys conducted annually from 1992 to 1994 but were only asked in France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Britain, Denmark, Spain, and Portugal. The question asked the respondent the following:<sup>8</sup>

*Which, if any, European Community [European Union] country or countries do you think can be more trusted politically than others?*  
 0. Not mentioned    1. Mentioned

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<sup>7</sup> This is contrary to what is stated in the *Eurobarometer* codebooks. The codebooks state that individuals are not asked to rate trust for their fellow nationals. However a look at the data clearly shows that this is not the case. Researchers should pay close attention before using this variable.

<sup>8</sup> While this question does not directly ask if the member-states can be trusted in the context of the EU or integration, the years in which they were asked (1992 – 1994) were years of the deepening of integration (implementation of the Single European Act and the Maastricht debate). The public discourse in these years would therefore reflect the saliency of the EU.

The responses to this question also included individual evaluations of their home countries and therefore ran into the same operational problems. These responses were also coded missing using the techniques already mentioned.

### Control variables

The analysis requires the use of control variables so that the results are understood in the light of some prevailing hypotheses.

Education. To measure this variable, I use a standard question found in all *Eurobarometer* surveys since 1970: *How old were you when you stopped full-time education?* The responses are then collapsed into 9 groups: values from 1 to 8 begin with the age of 14 and end with the age of 21, with the value 9 assigned to those who finished after the age of 22. Individuals who are still studying are not coded. This may introduce error into the measurement because the hypothesized link with the endogenous variable is in regard to the amount of education and not when the individual finished formal schooling. Anyone who is still studying may have already been in school for some time and have reached a hypothetical threshold of having had enough education to influence the levels of loyalty, utilitarian support, and European identity. Unfortunately they will not be included because it is unknown where they are in their education.

Democratic Deficit. This variable attempts to capture the degree to which individuals are satisfied with democracy at the EU level. This question was asked in 1989 and then again in 1992 - 1995:

*On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Community [European Union]?*

- |                              |                                 |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. <i>Very satisfied</i>     | 2. <i>Fairly satisfied</i>      |
| 3. <i>Not very satisfied</i> | 4. <i>Not at all satisfied.</i> |

The democratic deficit is a widely talked about problem in EU politics (McCormick 1999; Schmitter 2000). The magnitude of the problem can be seen in the large public protests outside Council and IGC meetings. Rohrschneider's (2002) analysis indicates that there is a positive relationship between being satisfied with EU level democracy and support for integration. This variable was recoded so that larger numbers represent satisfaction with democracy at the EU level and therefore do not perceive a democratic deficit.

Age. This information, measured in years, is included in the regular set of demographic variables found in the *Eurobarometer* surveys. This variable would compare the expected results of the exogenous variables with the argument that the memories of WWII would be a factor in explaining the loyalty system variables. Although prior research demonstrates that this factor has diminished as the memory of the war fades (Gabel 1998), it is important to include this variable in the equations so as to control this factor.

Income. Respondents were asked to choose an income category that would include their annual household income. No specific hypothesis is developed here with regard to this variable's contribution to explaining support for integration and holding a European identity, although it may be valuable in understanding utilitarian support.

Postmaterialism/Cognitive Mobilization. The questions that measure these two variables are normally asked in these surveys. Please see Inglehart (1977b; 1990) for details on constructing these two variables. Both are hypothesized to be positively correlated with support and identity. However, as previously mentioned, research has determined that their explanatory values are not as significant as once first thought.

Ideology. Prior research demonstrates the negative association nationalism has on both identity formation and support (McLaren 2002; Carey 2003). One method to measure this

possible effect is through left-right self-evaluations. The respondents were asked to place themselves on a left-right continuum. The range is one to ten with ten being the most extreme rightist ideology. I hypothesize that the higher values of this variable will be negatively associated with holding a European identity and support for integration for reasons given in McLaren 2002 and Carey 2003.

Country and year effects. Country and year dummies are included in each of the models but the results are not reported due to space constraints. These dummy variables control for effects that are specific to either the countries in the analysis or the year of the surveys. In each regression the base country is that country whose mean on the dependent variable value is closest to the pooled mean. The base year is the first year of the survey.

#### Explaining support for the EU and European identity formation

The overall results of the analysis show that political cohesion is an important factor in explaining support for the EU and European identity formation. This holds for both sets of horizontal and vertical community hypotheses. The first step was to determine if the trust variables measured the latent dimensions described in the theoretical section. Trust in the EU-12 nationalities measures the cohesiveness of the horizontal community. However, this trust is thought to be divided along a north-south dimension. The maximum likelihood factor analysis (varimax rotation) presented in table one indicates that two factors do indeed underlie the trust variables. Trust in the northern nationalities group together in one factor loading while trust in the southern nationalities fall into another. This indicates that evaluations of these two groups take on different dimensions. The variables that measure trust in the northern nationalities were summed together and divided by seven or six to produce one variable. The variables that measure trust in the southern nationalities were summed together and divided by five or four to



produce a second variable.<sup>9</sup> By dividing the additive term by the appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to a range between one and four, thereby allowing comparability among the two. The reliability coefficients for both indexed variables are quite high ( $\alpha=0.82$  for the northern trust variable and  $\alpha =0.84$  for the southern trust variable), indicating a very good fit among the variable components (DeVellis 1991).

The second set of trust variables captures the vertical dimension. These questions asked the respondent to gauge the political trust worthiness of the EU-12 members. The variables were hypothesized to group together along power dimensions. The larger powers of Germany and France were hypothesized to fall into one group, the small but wealthy member-states would fall into a second group, and the remainder would be in a third grouping. The results presented in table two indicate that trust in these twelve member states do indeed fall into the three categories. Only one questionable entry in the factor analysis exists: Britain. Its factor loadings do not place it in any of the three tiers. This indicates that Britain does not fit the attributed latent variables. It may very well be that individuals see Britain as having a special role in the European hierarchy, a view stemming from Britain's often ambiguous stand on the progress of integration. Its position is often associated with Winston Churchill's famous remarks made in 1953:

Where do we [the British] stand? We are not members of the European Defense Community, nor do we intend to be merged in a Federal European System. We feel we have a special relation to both. This can be expressed by prepositions, but the preposition "with" but not "of" – we are with them, but not of them. (Quoted in Barber and Reed 1973: 25)

The reliability coefficients (alpha's in table two) for each of the groups are adequate for an additive index into three separate variables (DeVellis 1991). "Trust in member-states" is therefore broken down into three separate variables. Each of these variables includes only those

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<sup>9</sup> Recall that the respondent will only evaluate the trustworthiness of nationalities excluding her or his own. Therefore the scale is divided by (n-1) when that national's group is in the scale.

countries (excluding Britain) that fit into one of the three tiers. They are summed together and divided by the number of countries included. By dividing the additive term by the appropriate number, the range of the variable is restricted to a range between zero and one, thereby allowing comparability among the three.

Table three presents the first results of the ordered logit regression with utilitarian support as the dependent variable. Each of the two models is significant as shown by their respective chi-squares. Model one tests the relationship between trust for all EU-12 nationalities and utilitarian support. The sign of the significant coefficient is positive, indicating that the more an individual trusts members of other EU nationalities, the higher levels of utilitarian support. This result holds even while controlling for the other variables. The second column in table three shows the marginal changes in the predicted probabilities of respondents stating that their country's membership in the EU is a "good thing." Each value indicates the marginal change in this probability associated with the independent variable as it moves from its minimum to its maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their means. A respondent is about 43 percentage points more likely to find membership in the EU a "good thing" if s/he strongly trusts the EU-12 nationalities. Figure one illustrates the relationship of changing levels of trust in the EU-12 nationalities has on improving the probability that an individual will say that EU membership is a "good thing." At the lowest level of trust, the probability that an individual will say that membership is a "good thing" is slightly less than 0.50. However, at the highest level of trust, the probability that an individual will say that membership is a "good thing" increases to almost 1.00.

Model two in table three substitutes the EU-12 trust variable with those that measure trust in the northern and southern nationalities. The results fall along expected lines. Both variables

are significant and positive. The coefficient for the southern trust variable is larger than the northern variable. The difference is statistically significant ( $p = .0000$ ). The difference in the magnitude is also found in the marginal effects. As individuals' trust in northern nationalities moves from the minimum value to the maximum value, we see an approximate 18 percentage point increase in the probability that they will agree that membership is a "good thing." The same change in the values for trust in southern nationalities produces an approximate 24 percentage point increase. Figure two illustrates the pattern of predicted probabilities that an individual will say that membership in the EU is a "good thing" against the changing values of trust in all EU-12 nationalities (model one) as well as the changing values of trust in the northern and southern nationalities. The figure shows that the slope of the southern trust variable is steeper than that of the northern trust variable. In total, the results indicate the greater importance of trusting southern nationalities vis-à-vis northern nationalities in predicting the probabilities that an individual will say that EU membership is a "good thing."

Table four presents the results of the binary logit regression with loyalty as the dependent variable. Both models three and four are significant. In addition, the signs and significance of all the trust variables supports the hypotheses that higher trust levels are associated with higher loyalty levels. As trust in the EU-12 nationalities moves from its lowest to its highest value, we see an approximate 38 percentage point change in probability that an individual will support European unification. While both the northern and southern trust variables are significant and positive in model four, the southern trust variable's coefficient is larger and more statistically significant than the northern trust variable. The marginal changes show that a 10 percentage point increase in being loyal is associated with trust in northern nationalities, but a 22 percentage point increase with trusting southern nationalities, holding the other independent variables at

their means. The magnitude of this difference is illustrated in figure three. The three trust variables are plotted against the probability that an individual will support the efforts to unify Europe. The southern trust variable has a steeper slope than the northern trust variable indicating the greater importance in predicting loyalty.

Table five displays the results of the ordered logit regression with European identity as the dependent variable. The results indicate that the patterns shown in the previous tables and figures also hold for these models. Models five and six are both significant as determined by their respective chi-squares. The trust variables are each significant and positive. The marginal change in trusting all 12 EU member nationalities increases the probability of “often” thinking of oneself as European by about 30 percentage points. This relationship is stronger with regards to trusting southern nationalities as displayed in the predicted probabilities and figure four. While moving from the minimum to the maximum value of trusting northern nationalities produces an approximate 14 percentage point increase, trusting southern nationalities produce a 19 percentage point increase while holding the other variables at their means. Figure four illustrates the steeper slope for trusting the southern nationalities versus trusting the northern nationalities. Overall, trusting southern nationalities plays a strong role in providing utilitarian support, loyalty for integration, and holding a European identity.

The final set of steps of the analysis is the examination of the vertical community hypotheses. The trust variables in the remaining regressions measure the level of trust individuals have in the EU member-states. Table six displays the results with utilitarian support as the dependent variable. Models seven and eight are both significant as determined by their respective *chi-squares*. Trust in all EU-12 member-states clearly improves the probability that an individual will say the membership in the EU is a “good thing.” This is determined by the positive,

significant, and large coefficient. While holding all other variables at their means, trusting the EU-12 member states increases this probability by approximately 21 percentage points. Also important is the result of model eight. While trusting France and Germany does play a significant role in predicting the probability that an individual will give utilitarian support, the other trust variables are not significant. It was hypothesized that trust in France and Germany would play a larger role in this prediction, but the results indicate that trust in these two member-states plays the only role. Trusting France and Germany alone will increase the probability by about 12 percentage points while holding the other variables at their means.

This finding is also present in table seven, which presents the binary logit regressions for the loyalty variable. Both models nine and ten are significant. Trusting the EU-12 member-states is a significant in predicting the probabilities that an individual will favor the efforts in unifying Europe. There is an approximate 13 percentage point increase in the probability that an individual will support unification associated with the change in values in the EU-12 trust variable while holding the others at their means. As with the utilitarian variable, trusting the top European powers is the only significant variable among the three tiers. Trusting France and Germany produces an approximate 7 percentage point increase in the probabilities that an individual will support unification.

Explaining the probability that an individual will hold a European identity above a national identity also has the same pattern, as presented in table eight. Model eleven indicates that trusting the EU-12 member-states is significant in predicting the probability of holding a European identity above a national one. The probability of this happening increases by about 14 percentage points as an individual increases the amount of trust in the member-states. However model twelve shows that this is based upon trusting France and Germany. Trust in the top

European powers improves the probability that an individual will hold a European identity above a national identity by about 3 percentage points. In sum, trust in the EU member-states helps to predict the odds that an individual will support integration (both utilitarian and affective types) as well as helping to predict the probability that the individual will hold a European identity above a national identity.

### Conclusion

The political cohesion model can be an aid in explaining the probabilities for supporting the EU and holding a European identity. Greater levels of trust among individuals are significantly associated with higher probabilities of supporting integration and holding a regional identity. These findings hold in both the horizontal and the vertical conceptualizations of the political community. Along the horizontal dimension, trusting other EU nationalities is an important factor in predicting support and identity. This is especially the case regarding the levels of trust individuals have in southern nationalities. Given the lower level of economic development among the southern periphery countries, individuals that trust these nationalities are more likely to see the common interests involved in building an untied Europe. Along the vertical dimension, trusting other EU member-states also plays an important role in predicting support and identity. However, much more importance is placed at the individual level in trusting the leaders of European integration, namely France and Germany.

Two important items must be considered with regard to these results. Neither of these items would necessarily put into question the results found in this paper, but are important enough to consider. First, given that the surveys used in this analysis are about ten years old, we would need to obtain up-to-date data that indicates that the association between trust among Europeans and in member-states, identity, and support has not changed. However, there is nothing in the

model's logic that makes the arguments any less salient today. Also, year dummy variables were not significantly different from the base year, which indicates that there is a lack of temporal influence. However, more current data is an important way to determine if the findings of the early 1990s hold today.

Second, Europe is expanding further eastward. This fact may add complexity to model. Since trust in southern nationalities proved to be more important than trust in northern nationalities, it may be true that trust for the eastern nationalities may prove to be of even more important. If economic development is the key factor in understanding why trust in southern nationalities is more important, then trusting eastern nationalities may prove to be an even more important factor in identity and support due to their lesser developed economic status vis-à-vis the southern periphery.

Table 1Maximum likelihood factor analysis for trust in EU nationalities (varimax rotation)

<u>Trust in:</u>	<u>Factor loading</u>	<u>Factor loading</u>
Luxembourgiens	<b>.834</b>	.218
Belgians	<b>.798</b>	.303
Dutch	<b>.700</b>	.225
Danes	<b>.657</b>	.252
British	<b>.464</b>	.369
Irish	<b>.411</b>	.399
Germans	<b>.347</b>	.309
Spanish	.260	<b>.765</b>
Greeks	.193	<b>.762</b>
Portuguese	.304	<b>.683</b>
Italians	.211	<b>.619</b>
French	.326	<b>.507</b>

$\chi^2 = 691.8; df = 43; p < .000$

Trust in northern nationalities reliability  $\alpha = .82$

Trust in southern nationalities reliability  $\alpha = .84$



Table 2

Maximum likelihood factor analysis for trust in EU member states (varimax rotation)

<u>Trust in:</u>	<u>Factor loading</u>	<u>Factor loading</u>	<u>Factor loading</u>
France	<b>.643</b>	.070	.132
Germany	<b>.440</b>	.076	.006
Netherlands	.078	<b>.539</b>	.102
Denmark	.016	<b>.536</b>	.076
Luxembourg	.179	<b>.483</b>	.190
Belgium	.180	<b>.444</b>	.179
Portugal	.026	.168	<b>.572</b>
Spain	.244	.129	<b>.528</b>
Italy	.175	.053	<b>.525</b>
Greece	.020	.139	<b>.512</b>
Ireland	.030	.282	<b>.346</b>
Britain	.219	.101	.132

$\chi^2 = 223.2$ ; df  
= 33;  $p < .000$

Trust in top power countries reliability  $\alpha = .68$

Trust in middle power countries reliability  $\alpha = .61$

Trust in lower power countries reliability  $\alpha = .66$

Table 3

Ordered logit model: Utilitarian support for EU membership on trust for Europeans among the first 12 members

Independent variables	Model 1	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>	Model 2	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>
<u>Trust variables</u>				
Trust in all EU-12 nationalities	.725** (.094)	.429	--	--
Trust in northern nationalities	--	--	.309** (.102)	.182
Trust in southern nationalities	--	--	.415** (.089)	.236
<u>Political values and interest variables</u>				
Postmaterialism	-.115* (.056)	-.411	-.118* (.056)	-.042
Cognitive mobilization	-.160** (.053)	-.090	-.167** (.054)	-.094
<u>Demographic variables</u>				
Age	-.010 (.030)	-.009	-.012 (.030)	-.011
Education	.115** (.019)	.170	.114** (.019)	.170
Income	.067 (.044)	.037	.068 (.043)	.038
<u>Other control variables</u>				
Satisfaction with EU democracy	1.09** (.097)	.206	1.09** (.097)	.204
Left/Right self placement	-.014 (.023)	-.023	-.011 (.023)	-.018
$\tau^1$	1.26		1.20	
$\tau^2$	2.67		2.61	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.107		0.108	
$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)	435.7(19)**		438.6(20)**	
log likelihood	-1816.3		-1814.8	
N	2,496		2,496	

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*  $p \leq .05$ ;

Survey Years: 1986, 1990, & 1992

<sup>1</sup>Ordinal value of membership as a "good thing"

Table 4

Binary logit model: Loyalty for the EU on trust for Europeans among the first 12 members

Independent variables	Model 3	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>	Model 4	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>
<u>Trust variables</u>				
Trust in all EU-12 nationalities	.896** (.121)	.382	--	--
Trust in northern nationalities	--	--	.278* (.132)	.101
Trust in southern nationalities	--	--	.603** (.116)	.224
<u>Political values and interest variables</u>				
Postmaterialism	-.066 (.072)	-.014	-.070 (.072)	-.015
Cognitive mobilization	-.089 (.069)	-.030	-.103 (.069)	-.035
<u>Demographic variables</u>				
Age	.074 (.039)	.040	.072 (.039)	.039
Education	.121** (.025)	.109	.120** (.025)	.108
Income	.081 (.055)	.027	.083 (.055)	.028
<u>Other control variables</u>				
Satisfaction with EU democracy	1.49** (.134)	.176	1.48** (.134)	.175
Left/Right self placement	-.034 (.029)	-.034	-.026 (.029)	-.026
Constant	-3.48** (.623)		-3.33** (.629)	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.171		0.173	
$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)	390.7(19)**		395.7(20)**	
log likelihood	-945.4		-942.9	
N	2,496		2,496	

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses;

\*\* p ≤ .01; \* p ≤ .05; Survey Years: 1986, 1990, &amp; 1992

<sup>1</sup>Ordinal value of supporting European unification

Table 5

Ordered logit model: European identity on trust for Europeans among the first 12 members

Independent variables	Model 5	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>	Model 6	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>
<u>Trust variables</u>				
Trust in all EU-12 nationalities	.753** (.079)	.303	--	--
Trust in northern nationalities	--	--	.318** (.086)	.136
Trust in southern nationalities	--	--	.429** (.081)	.190
<u>Political values and interest variables</u>				
Postmaterialism	.225** (.063)	.071	.219** (.063)	.069
Cognitive mobilization	.388** (.045)	.177	.389** (.045)	.178
<u>Demographic variables</u>				
Age	.158** (.026)	.125	.159** (.026)	.126
Education	.080** (.014)	.102	.081** (.014)	.103
Income	.080* (.038)	.037	.081* (.038)	.038
<u>Other control variables</u>				
Left/Right self placement	-.041* (.020)	-.058	-.040* (.020)	-.056
$\tau^1$	4.39		4.37	
$\tau^2$	6.27		6.24	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.086		0.086	
$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)	479.3(18)**		479.5(19)	
log likelihood	-2559.0		-2558.9	
N	2,496		2,496	

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses;  
 \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*  $p \leq .05$ ; Survey Years: 1986, 1990, & 1992

<sup>1</sup>Ordinal value of often thinking of yourself as European

Table 6

Ordered logit model: Utilitarian support for EU membership on trust for European countries  
among the first 12 members

Independent variables	Model 7	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>	Model 8	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>
<u>Trust variables</u>				
Trust in all EU-12 members	1.11** (.185)	.206	--	--
Trust in top level members	--	--	.602** (.073)	.118
Trust in mid level members	--	--	.097 (.129)	.019
Trust in bottom level members	--	--	.310 (.215)	.059
Trust in Britain	--	--	.013 (.093)	.003
<u>Political values and interest variables</u>				
Postmaterialism	.010* (.047)	.044	.110 (.055)	.044
Cognitive mobilization	.221** (.032)	.146	.179** (.037)	.109
<u>Demographic variables</u>				
Age	.0571** (.018)	.062	.068** (.021)	.069
Education	.109** (.011)	.185	.092** (.013)	.145
Income	.054** (.025)	.036	.077** (.030)	.046
<u>Other control variables</u>				
Satisfaction with EU democracy	.833** (.062)	.172	.816** (.073)	.154
Left/Right self placement	-.097** (.014)	-.192	-.117** (.016)	-.216
$\tau^1$	.054		-.181	
$\tau^2$	1.39		1.23	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.070		0.059	
$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)	742.2(12)		450.8(14)	
log likelihood	-4957.8		-3619.5	
N	4,786		4,786	

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses;  
\*\* p ≤ .01; \* p ≤ .05; Survey Years: 1992, 1993, & 1994

<sup>1</sup>Ordinal value of membership as a "good thing"

Table 7

Binary logit model: Loyalty for the EU on trust for European countries among the first 12

Independent variables	Model 9	<u>members</u> Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>	Model 10	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>
<u>Trust variables</u>				
Trust in all EU-12 members	1.39** (.258)	.127	--	--
Trust in top level members	--	--	.713** (.099)	.065
Trust in mid level members	--	--	-.101 (.175)	-.010
Trust in bottom level members	--	--	.841 (.627)	.061
Trust in Britain	--	--	.324 (.741)	.028
<u>Political values and interest variables</u>				
Postmaterialism	.280** (.060)	.069	.280** (.075)	.052
Cognitive mobilization	.101* (.040)	.038	.0836 (.049)	.024
<u>Demographic variables</u>				
Age	-.022 (.023)	-.014	-.004 (.028)	-.002
Education	.057** (.015)	.056	.060** (.018)	.045
Income	-.062 (.032)	-.023	-.072 (.040)	-.021
<u>Other control variables</u>				
Satisfaction with EU democracy	1.10** (.087)	.123	1.36** (.115)	.114
Left/Right self placement	-.132** (.017)	-.156	-.134** (.021)	-.125
Constant	-.178 (.261)		-.636 (.324)	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.109		0.104	
$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)	631.1(12)		405.5(14)	
log likelihood	-2576.0		-1747.1	
N	4,786		4,786	

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses;  
 \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*  $p \leq .05$ ; Survey Years: 1992, 1993, & 1994

<sup>1</sup>Ordinal value of supporting European unification

Table 8

Ordered logit model: European Identity on trust for European countries among the first 12

Independent variables	Model 11	<u>members</u> Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>	Model 12	Predicted Probabilities <sup>1</sup>
<u>Trust variables</u>				
Trust in all EU-12 members	1.62** (.182)	.139	--	--
Trust in top level members	--	--	.419** (.096)	.031
Trust in mid level members	--	--	.479 (.551)	.038
Trust in bottom level members	--	--	.644 (.543)	.055
Trust in Britain	--	--	-.084 (.113)	-.006
<u>Political values and interest variables</u>				
Postmaterialism	.155* (.062)	.020	.032 (.070)	.005
Cognitive mobilization	.270** (.042)	.050	.281* (.048)	.061
<u>Demographic variables</u>				
Age	-.033 (.024)	-.010	.055* (.027)	.020
Education	.095** (.015)	.050	.068** (.016)	.040
Income	.119** (.036)	.022	.131** (.040)	.028
<u>Other control variables</u>				
Satisfaction with EU democracy	.541** (.073)	.033	.480** (.084)	.035
Left/Right self placement	-.096** (.018)	-.053	-.089** (.020)	-.057
$\tau^1$	1.16		.753	
$\tau^2$	4.14		3.76	
$\tau^3$	5.41		5.03	
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.090		0.060	
$\chi^2$ (degrees of freedom)	572.1(12)		296.9(14)	
log likelihood	-2949.4		-2337.6	
N	4,786		4,786	

Notes: Standard errors for coefficients are in parentheses; \*\*  $p \leq .01$ ; \*  $p \leq .05$ ; Survey Years: 1992, 1993, & 1994; <sup>1</sup>Ordinal value of European identity first, then national identity

Figure 1

Predicted probabilities of utilitarian support for the EU  
for changing values of trust in all EU-12 nationalities






Figure 2

Predicted probabilities of identifying EU membership as a “good thing”  
for changing values of trust in all EU-12, northern, and southern nationalities




Figure 3

Predicted probabilities of being in favor of EU integration  
for changing values of trust in all EU-12, northern, and southern nationalities





Figure 4

Predicted probabilities of “often” thinking oneself as European  
for changing values of trust in all EU-12, northern, and southern nationalities



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