BALANCING A DIFFERENT WORLD?

BRITAIN BETWIXT AMERICA AND EUROPE

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Abstract:

Even though European and US approaches to international relations were distinguished during the Cold War (Buzan 1993), those divergences magnified after the Cold War, in turn raising questions if the attention should continue to be on *systemic* influences or power rivalry (Mearsheimer 1991; Waltz 1993), or elevate *social* factors like identities (Cox 1986; Wendt 1996). Complicating the theoretical puzzle was an empirical enigma: Do these paradigms reflect policy-makers's preferences or public opinion? Through a study of two issues of high politics (second Iraq war, Israel-Palestine imbroglio) and two of low (International Criminal Court establishment, Kyoto Protocol ratification), this study finds widening gaps between (a) policy prescriptions and public opinion; (b) *American* versus *European* viewpoints; (c) Britain's US allegiance and insufficient European identities; (d) theories and realities, with the latter needing more than a single paradigm to be fully understood and the former becoming too dissected and diluted to meaningfully explain and predict. Simultaneous *balancing*, *bandwagoning*, and *straddling* may be the order of the new era.

Introduction:

Wither American-European relations in the twenty-first century? Against the background of incremental europeanization,[1] the end of the Cold War,[2] and increasing post-Cold War US unilateralism,[3] how fares the historically special United Kingdom-United States relationship?[4]

Turn-of-the-century events and developments portray a picture of the United States and Europeans headed in different directions. Beginning with the headline news of the day, a possible US-led war with Iraq not only split the European Union down the middle, but also threw NATO into an unprecedented tailspin. Crossing over to Palestine, the United States actively resists European solutions, in spite of the Quartet to which both belong. Leaving issues of high politics aside, US-European divergences are also evident, for example, with respect to ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC): US desires for exceptional treatment in both varies with the broader

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[1]Acknowledged by none other than a forceful advocate of intergovernmentalism a decade ago. See Andrew Moravscik, "Despotism in Brussels? Misreading the European Union," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 3 (May-June 2001): 114-122, esp. the first paragraph. Then contrast with his more conservative analysis in "Negotiating the Single European Act:national interests and conventional statecraft in the European Community," *International Organization* 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991):19-56.

[2]Some talk about the relative disorder prevailing, as John Lewis Gaddis, "Towards the post-Cold War world," *At Issue: Politics in the World Arena*, eds. Steven Spiegel & David J. Previn (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, 7th ed.), 27-42; while others predict the inevitable return to power politics pitting Europeans in whatever capacity against Americans, among other types of conflicts. See John Mearsheimer, "Back to the future:instability in Europe after the Cold War," *The New Shape of World Politics: Contending Paradigms in International Affairs* (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1997), 101-57; ---------, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000); and Christopher Layne, "The unipolar illusion:why new great powers will rise," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993):5-51. Also useful is Richard Rosecrance's incisive critique of Mearsheimer's cited book, particularly for a theme central to constructivism, which this paper later elaborates: the neglect of issues of low politics by realist authors. See "War and peace," *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (October 2002):137-66.

[3]Theme examined by Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the unipolar moment:realist theories and US grand strategies after the Cold War," *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War*, eds. B. Kapstein & Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 138-81.

[4]That it is historical and special is brought out by a number of authors, though not always carrying the same tone, in *The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945*, eds. William Roger Louis & Hedley Bull (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1986).

inclusive approach of not just the European Union, but also of a large number of its individual members, if not all!

Questions arise if these reflect superficial policy or deeper underlying differences. Do they represent post-Cold War tendencies towards countervailing power or the explosion of divergent value-and-belief systems now the Cold War no longer contains them.[5] After the Cold War, for example, Hedley Bull's conception of a rule-based anarchical *society*, without being picture perfect, explains routine international relations dynamics better than Kenneth Waltz's parsimonious anarchical *system:*[6] It makes room for identity to be included in the analytical framework, thus admitting the multiple manifestations of a typical state; but by emphasizing only interests, neorealism closed doors not only to interests reflecting low politics, but also to countries not engaged in the balance-of-power game. Barry Buzan's valiant distinction between American and English schools of international relations may resonate louder on the European continent if the strength of European resistance of US policy options, as mentioned previously, is greater than the British![7] This is precisely the puzzle addressed here: Do the contemporary US-European policy differences correspond to previous theoretical tenets and expectations, and are corresponding British preferences fundamentally different from the Europeans? Even more at the core of the puzzle, do policies reflect majority preferences?

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[5]Note Anthony Blinken's rejection of the divergence thesis in "The false crisis over the Atlantic," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 3 (May-June 2001):35-48.

[6]Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, 2nd ed.), esp. part I; and Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[7]"From international system to international society:structural realism and regime theory meet the English school," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (Summer 1993):327-52.

Particularly the second question revisits the deeper historical role of Britain as the balancer of European powers.[8] Against the background of Britain opting out of the European Union currency integration, at least for the moment, and broader support for a wider, as opposed to a deeper, European membership policy, with particular reference to Turkey's application,[9] the frequently asked question is how European are the English! Britain's twentieth century embrace of the United States in what could rank as the mother of special global relationships also complicates its European credentials. Given the unprecedented emergence of a unipolar power distribution in an anarchical world, would British interests be better served identifying with the US in policing the world, which the Europeans find increasingly difficult to accept, or with the Europeans with significantly circumscribed roles, goals, as well as capacities, and potential competition with the US? Or will it do what it did best throughout the modern state era: juggle the options to enhance whatever its ongoing interests may be?

Without empirical testing, an area traditionally short-shrifted in analytical attention, theoretical arguments become rudderless, thereby questionable reflectors of reality and predictors of future policy directions. The purpose is to generate additional hypotheses of transatlantic relations rather than provide any final answers, a caveat whose relevance lies in the fact that empirically supported theoretical propositions amidst the ever-increasing and ever-complicating international relations dynamics today no longer facilitate adequate

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[8]On this point, one can turn to a virtual armada of works, for instance, Henry Kissinger, *The World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and A.J.P. Taylor, *Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918* (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford University Press, 1980); among others.

[9]See, for instance, John Henley, Jeevan Vasager, and Ian Black, "Turkey demands talks on joining EU," *Guardian,* November 27, 2002, from wysiwyg://6/http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,7369,848560,00.html; and "Turkey entry 'would destroy EU'," *BBC News,* November 8, 2002, from wysiwyg://14/http://news.bb.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2420697.stm

comprehension. Probing the shape of a forest with entirely different species of trees makes less sense than to perhaps trace the length, breadth, and survivability of each tree specie. In other words, it may be entirely possible for competing theoretical strands to simultaneously explain various portions of any given phenomenon, and thereby coexist, in today's whirlwind world.

Drawing largely from the literature, this study specifies some of the theoretical tenets relevant to explaining broader European-US relations, then applies them to a comparative study of four policy issues: the Kyoto Protocol, establishing the ICC, resolving the Israeli-Palestine imbroglio, and waging war against Iraq. Policy preferences direct attention not only to decision-makers, but in the most democratic moment in human history, to the public as well. Distinguishing between these levels, for the lack of a better term, informs us if the terms *America* or *Europe* or *English* we routinely talk about refers to elected officials, the public at large, or a convenient analytical abstraction!

Accordingly, the first section below spells out the theoretical arguments to be utilized, followed by a survey of comparative public opinion. The third section summarizes the four cases examined, leaving for the fourth to examine how the tenets explain the cases. Conclusions are then drawn, and implications projected.

Theoretical Inheritance:

How policy-makers interpret external relations/dynamics inform us of the nature of state-society relations/dynamics. As filters between the internal and external domains, they determine the relative weight of both, whether outside developments should mobilize domestic resources, or whether public opinion should dictate the length, breadth, and depth of international involvements. Democratic public opinion also imposes foreign policy imperatives: Countries, very much like people, express their preferences according to some

previously established rules, then tabulate, under routine circumstances, the majority will. Under emergencies, of course, the rules are relaxed, such as for Franklin D. Roosevelt to be president for four terms, or Cold War rivalries suspending the *make-the-world-safe-for-democracy* maxim.[10] How emergencies are defined is a function of both objective and subjective considerations, the former if overwhelmingly determined by irrefutable developments, such as the impact of 9/11 hijack crashings, the latter when perceptions, *a prior* or *a posteriori*, gain the upper hand, such as the Cold War cliché of *better-dead-than-red*, or more recently George Bush's *with-us-or-against-u*s crusade.[11] In the absence of public opinion as a barometer, interpretations of external power balances may be interpreted objectively from the distribution of capabilities, or subjectively from the policy-maker's perceptions of the gap between actuality and expectations.

With external circumstances opening a second foreign policy option, theories diverge on which part of the equation to prioritize. Waltz's well-known *outside-in* approach emphasizes the objective considerations, and even makes decision-makers instruments of the fluctuating power balance rather than the determinants. It was a popular, even briefly powerful, explanation of the Cold War during the 1970s and 1980s. Reduced to the structure of the international system and the interaction of countries within it, Waltz's version of what came to be called neorealism, successfully challenged the original tenets of

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[10]Similar theme embedded in the popular book by Peter L. Bernstein & Henryk K. Senkiewicz, *Friendly Dictators: 36 of America's Most Embarassing Allies/Trading Cards* (New York: Eclipse Books, 1991). More broadly, see the nature of forces resisting the United States in Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., *Anti-Americanism in the Third World: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1985); and the inherent distinction between authoritarian versus totalitarian governments shaping US foreign policy during the Cold War in Jeanne Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force*, 2 vols. (New York: Transaction, 1987).

[11]On Bush, a fascinating piece by Sebastian Mallaby, "A single-minded man," *The World in 2003* (London: The Economist, 2002), 23-24. How his approach adopts a civilizational approach reminiscent of Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1998) thesis, and why Tony Blair's Britain is an eager advocate is brought out by Elaine Monaghan & Philip Webster, "Bush:civilized world to move on Iraq today," *Times of London*, November 8, 2002, from wysiwyg://35/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-473270,00.html

realism, yet could not explain how and why the bipolar distribution of the Cold War broke down in the mid-1980s nor the role of economic capabilities generally, but more particularly in triggering the Soviet collapse. His neglect of *inside-out* parameters was part of the problem. Foreign policy determined on the basis of domestic calculations, he argued, missed the key dynamic of international competitiveness, much like the inability of a firm to dictate market prices under competition. Other *systemic* interpretations were rejected since logic was confined to adding up the parts. Waltz's system went beyond: It represented more than the sum of the parts.

Even then, it was severely challenged by what was dubbed the *English school.* Military capabilities were not the be-all nor end-all, according to this point of view. States also negotiate, generating rules to govern their behavior, thus opening up another dimension in their bid to be the most competitive. Waltz's anarchical setting is not displaced, but more real-life activities are brought in, including the subjective preferences of decision-makers rather than the exclusively objective considerations of capabilities or the power distribution. This *societal* conception was broader than Waltz's system, considered many more types of state interaction, and in doing so, gave *inside-out* dynamics as fair a share of air-play as *outside-in* dynamics. Reflecting the international society thesis, constructivism, which has its own *conventional* and *critical* subsets,[12] captures a wider spectrum of variables and interpretations. Placing greater emphasis on identities, it

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[12]For a discussion of the more extreme version, see, for example, Robert W. Cox, "Social forces, states, and world order:beyond international relations theory," *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 204-54; and the conventional viewpoint comes out in the works of Buzan, for instance, "Peace, power, and security:contending concepts in the study of international relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 21, no. 2 (1984), and ----------, *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CA: Lynne Rienner, 1991), esp. ch. 1. One of the better summaries of both types, itself a comparative study of neorealism and constructivism, is by Ted Hopf, "The promise of constructivism in international relations theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998):171-200.

challenged the Waltzian paradigm of the anarchical international structure determining state policy options by positing a relationship based on mutual constitution: states affect the structure just as the structure affects the state.

Both conceptions have strengths and weaknesses. Waltz's explained bipolarity better than most other paradigms, but as an American explaining a phenomenon in which the United States triumphed, his views are mistakenly labeled the *American* view. As becomes evident, his view matched perfectly that of the several US presidents during the Cold War without always capturing sways in public moods.[13] The systemic approach failed to predict not only the end of the Cold War, as indicated before, but also the causes. Most discomfiting is its post-Cold War irrrelevance: The challenge of neorealist tenets,[14] of whatever stripe, by terrorism, Islam, globalized forces, among others, cannot make his a practical or dominant guide today. Is it still influencing policy-makers? If it is, reconsidering the European challenge helps. For a start, during the Cold War, the European approach increasingly admitted inside-out dynamics into many calculations of outside-in dynamics. For another, its emphasis on rules and identities make it more relevant to ongoing developments, and thereby, thirdly, it facilitates a paradigmatic dialectic. Finally, it dampens the privileged position Waltz had given military capabilities. However, like Waltz's systemic argumentation, the societal school is, at best, thin in explaining such new international relations variables as terrorism, Islam, and globalization forces. Even the growth of contemporary trade-blocs, built as they are on various forms of identities,

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[13]Comes out implicitly but conspicuously in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[14]Only to acknowledge neorealism had not completely buried the realist school of thought. For a sense of the revival of the realist school of thought, prompted by the intellectual debate distinguishing *offensive* from defensive *realism*, see Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling realisms," *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997):445-77; and Jeffry W. Taliaferro, "Security seeking under anarchy," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/2001):128-61.

reduces the scope of international relations/dynamics, and thereby the theoretical scope of the international society school. For example, Dutch foreign or economic policy preferences may be subordinated either to European counterparts, or the interests of the dominant European Union members, and may even be better explained from those perspectives than one focusing on Amsterdam dynamics. Mexico, under NAFTA, may be headed in a similar direction, towards international relations irrelevance, owing to its single-minded North American pursuits.

Borrowing from the crisp comparisons/contrasts of Ted Hopf,[15] Table 1 identifies some of the tenets and characteristics of neorealism and constructivism, the two most developed offshoots of the *American* and *European* viewpoints. These clarify if *American* and *European* policy preferences live up to paradigmatic tenets or not.

Table 1 about here

Neorealism and constructivism, the two most cogent explanations of the US and European approaches to international relations, may offer more than policy-making relevance: As an analysis of public opinion in the two continents below shows, the growing gap between policy-makers and the public may partly be explained by the different approaches adopted. Kenneth Waltz successfully argued how the Cold War bipolarity could be accounted for by neorealism, a claim vindicated in part by the automatic collapse of neorealism once the Cold War evaporated. Yet 9/11 not only revived military considerations at the forefront of US policy-making, thereby giving neorealist thinking a possibly new lease of life, but also revealed, from the enormous post-Cold War

expenditures on weapons, the strong military pressures for which neorealist thinking is appropriate attire. The consequence is a discomfiting disjuncture between a population striving to reach out in as many directions as the forces of globalization, liberalization, and democratization will allow, and policy-makers with sticky feet, conservatively preserving past plans and programs rather than adjusting to contemporary changes and imperatives. If that is the US malaise, Europeans are not exempt: Especially amidst the rapid europeanization of the 1990s, devolution suggests the public's capacity to drift from policy-makers's directions faster than before.

Table 1 both summarizes and amplifies hitherto discussions. Whereas for neorealism states remain the dominant actor whose concerns for survivial lead to constant adjustments to the shifting balance of power, constructivist interpretations offer broader and more flexible outlets from a similar background: States are not only not alone as dominant actors, but they also adopt rules, norms, and practices to break out of the anarchic system. Thus, while for neorealists state interests become the be-all and end-all of all goals and relations, constructivists pay more attention to identities of individuals and groups. In turn, identities shape interests rather than be defined by them, permitting any given state to have multiple identities: It is able to reproduce itself under constructivism, which it cannot under realism, and opens up many other dimensions of relations than be simply based on power calculations. The Netherlands, for example, is a state, also a member of the European Union, NATO, the UN, and so forth, a simple case of multiple identities for just one state. As the fourth dimension shows, power is material for neorealists, but both material and discursive for constructivists. This latter approach helps accomodate the many states uninterested in power-play, for example, New Zealand, not to mention the many groups

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[15]Hopf, *op. cit.*

liberated by the Cold War from forcibly created state-nations as a step towards obtaining their own nation-states, as in the cases of Bosnia or Belorussia.

A neorealist, then, is perpetually locked within the anarchical framework, but constructivists, because they see anarchy as what states make of it, offer possible exits. A similar logic explains the security dilemma, seen by neorealists as permanently plaguing all countries, but whose notion of permanence is seriously challenged by constructivists. In a nutshell, then, the parsimony of neorealism is attractive to theory-building, which was relevant during the identity-suppressing Cold War, but with so many hidden or new dynamics dynamics ever since, both theory-making and neorealism need to adjust to the complications. Because it caters to such a loaded, inter-subjective, and value-laden agenda, constructivism may be a step or two ahead in explanatory and predictive capacities, yet still fall behind in presenting a complete theoretical framework. Seen better as an approach, it informs us more about politics and culture, in that order of importance. Its more multidimensional outfit also makes it more relevant to such post-Cold War dynamics as nationalities seeking identity, individuals searching new thresholds, globalization constantly imposing new challenges, liberalization fluctuating just as constantly between opportunities and constraints, and democratization opening more options and choices for each person.

Public Opinion:

What do the public in either bloc say about each other, themselves, the several crises beholding them, and in general? A joint survey by the Chicago Council of Foreign

Affairs (CCFR) and the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF),[16] conducted in June 2002, sheds interesting light. Called *Worldviews 2002*, this quadrennial exercise examined six European countries and the US,[17] revealed arguable gaps between the two blocs, highlighted more convincing disjunctures between policy-makers and the public at large in both blocs, and acknowledged British exceptionalism without making it an over-riding factor. These are discussed broadly by first pointing out some caveats. First, the sample size is too small to permit robust conclusions/implications, and even points to how different methodologies yield different results. Second, references to the *American* or *European* views show how imperfect these terms actually are, particularly the latter. Third, the surveys were prompted by quite different considerations and questions than those explained in this particular study, prompting this study to use the survey merely to illustrate and not convict, and in fact necessitating complementary data and analysis. Fourth, not all questions asked can be addressed in this one paper, and so their selective treatment assumes in-depth back-up evaluation of the actual survey itself. Finally, since almost all figures are proportional, the relevant symbol for it, (%), is largely omitted; and where there are exceptions to it, such as in scale measurements, this will be indicated.

The findings are examined in six tables. Table 2 gives the broader European picture vis-a-vis the United States, while Table 3 addresses the specific issues of this study. Likewise, tables 4 and 5 focus on individual EU members broadly and with specific attention to the issues being discussed in this paper, respectively. Finally, tables 6 and 7 address the United States, generally and with regards the specific issues, respectively.

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[16]*Worldviews 2002: Comparing American and European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy*, 3 parts (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2002). From http://www.worldviews.org.index.htm

Each part is specified with the relevant tables, but please see the methodology sections of each.

Almost a century after the Paris Peace Conference brought World War I to some kind of a closure, Europeans and Americans continue to see and sense global dynamics differently. Although Table 2, as with all other tables in the study, heavily reflects attitudes affected by 9/11, we still capture noteworthy comparative nuances. Distinguishing between hard and soft issues,[18] that is, issues of high and low politics, respectively, Table 2 reveals one underlying consequence of the Cold War: It pushed Europeans to embrace and campaign on behalf of the softer issues while Americans were equally decisively pushed in the other direction. This is striking since Europe is not only the cradle of the modern state system, but also the part of the world most repsonsible for holding the *realpolitik* philosophy aloft so loudly for so long, while the United States, lacking any hostile neighbors, historically championed idealism,[19] from John Locke's state of nature and Adam Smith's perfectly competitive market to Woodrow Wilson's world government.

Table 2 about here

Turning to the first dimension, nine sources of possible threat are evaluated in both countries. Americans perceive seven of them to be more threatening than Europeans, with global warming and transatlantic economic competition being the only issues over which Europeans are more concerned than Americans. Only two hard issues elicit a majority European perception of threat: international terrorism (64%) and Iraq developing weapons

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[17]The six are: France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland, the last a non-member presently. Emphasis is placed here on the first three, although others will be referred to selectively.

[18]Terms used here in the same sense as Joseph S. Nye in *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8-12.

[19]For useful contrary insights, see "Old America versus new Europe:who has been lying about whose age?" *Economist*, February 22, 2003, 32.

of mass destruction (57%), with global warming interestingly being the third-ranked possible threat (49%). The corresponding American viewpoints are, respectively, 91%, 86%, and 46%. Compared to the Europeans, a majority of Americans see a threat wherever a hard issue exists, from Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (42 for Europeans:67 for Americans), India-Pakistan tensions (30:54), China as a world power (18:56), Islamic fundamentalism (47:61), and immigration (37:60). As the second dimension shows, twice as many more Americans see military strength as being more important than economic strength, compared to the Europeans. While military capabilities bring results much quicker, Europeans tend to prefer long-term solutions, evident with the fourth and fifth dimensions: Their preference for the military to be utilized for famine relief (88%), uphold international law (80), liberate hostages (78), and bring peace in areas of civil war (72) are higher than corresponding American preferences of 81, 76, 77, and 48, respectively. This European tendency to grapple with underlying causal factors, rather than superficial, is also evident in how terrorism is to be combatted: Americans prefer air-strikes to destroy camps more than Europeans (87:68), ground-troops doing likewise (84:69), restricting immigration (77:63), and assassinating individual leaders (66:57); but Europeans are more inclined towards helping less developed countries to improve their economies to pre-empt terrorism (91:78), than seek a trigger-based solution, which is an orientation consistent with their broader kinder, gentler approach to capitalism compared to their US counterparts.[20]

More than twice as many Europeans see US world leadership as undesirable as Americans (31:14), as the sixth dimension indicates--a pattern reflected also in the eighth dimension showing twice as many Europeans as Americans preferring two superpowers

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[20]Terms from *Newsweek* cover story on Europe, entitled, "Slow Europe:so long , American rat race! Across the continent, people and governments are choosing a kinder and gentler capitalism," July 2, 2001.

(65:33). Although the US preferences supporting the strengthening of international institutions are higher than the European, shown in the third dimension, clearly the militaristic approach to doing so raises more questions than they resolve as to how efficacious those institutions would perform and under what kind of US scrutiny.

Table 3 corroborates these general observations with the specific cases examined in this paper: Twice as many more Europeans as Americans do not want the US to invade Iraq (26:13), but only half as many Europeans as Americans believe US should invade, even if by itself (10:20), and even with UN approval, US invasion is less liked in Europe than in the US (60:65). Turning to the other Middle East crisis under scrutiny here, 72% of Europeans favor Palestinian statehood, as compared to 40% of Americans, while less than half of Europeans as Americans are opposed to statehood (14:35). Finally, George W. Bush's policy preferences are generally not popular, more so across Europe than in the US: More Europeans dislike six of his policy positions tabulated, from issues of high politics to low, than they approve; while in the US, Bush's position on three hard issues (relations with Europe, international terrorism, and war in Afghanistan), are more popular than his preferences for the soft issue of global warming. Strikingly, Bush's handling of the Iraqi issue and the Arab-Israel conflict are unpopular in the United States too, by wide margins of 33:61 and 25:65, respectively.

Table 3 about here

It is much easier treating Americans as a homogeneous unit than Europeans. Tables 3 and 4 disaggregate the European viewpoints into those of six members, three of which are more emphasized here than the others: France, Germany, and Great Britain. The others, the

Italy, Netherlands, Poland, and Europeans collectively, provide a perspective. The underlying messages are as follows: (a) Great Britain stands out as a European exception more often than the other dominant countries, France and Germany, but perhaps not to a critical extent. (b) France represents the European viewpoint more robustly than the other two large members. (c) Germany seems to be sandwiched in between both the relatively more cosmopolitan British viewpoints and the relatively more European French viewpoints. (d) The smaller countries have lesser room for policy manuverability, as the case of the Netherlands suggests. (e) Forthcoming members, such as Poland here, carry the potentials of not only complicating standard European viewpoints/standpoints, but also of reopening balancing tendencies within the European Union which the Cold War did so much to reduce to insignificance over forty-odd years.

Table 4 about here

Where standardized European figures are available, as in the first, second, eighth, and tenth dimensions, Britain's exceptional position seems clear. Wheras 33% of Europeans polled in these six countries wanted cut-backs in defense spending, only 21% of Britons did. France's 23% reflects a position dictated by its independent nuclear capability, and Germany's 45% similarly reflects its subordinate post-World War II military role, as the US and NATO called the shots during the Cold War. Created to safeguard the west against communism, even NATO, which fought its first war after the Cold War ended, was

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bedeviled with a lack of solidarity and purposes before 9/11.[21] Both British and French favor expanding defense spending more than the European average of 22%, British by 24%, French by 28%. In terms of the US as the only superpower, the French are the least enthused (only 3%), as compared to 22% for Germans and 20% for Britons, both ranking above the European average of 14%; and with regards the US being a superpower alongwith the EU, France is even more enthusiastic than Britain, with 91% in favor as compared to 56% for Britain. While this suggests the more independent and assertive role the French wish the EU to have vis-a-vis the US, surprisingly, it also conveys British reluctance for Europe to balance the US, a function Britain possibly prefers to keep to itself: Almost four times as many more British see the importance of the US compared to the French, as the fifth dimension indicates (15:4), while the third dimension, measuring temperatures toward countries, shows the US receiving 68% support from Englishmen and 60% from the French, a difference perhaps not as significant as current sways tend to have us believe! The last column suggests greater British support for non-economic international institutions than French (81:67 for the UN, 66:52 for NATO), but only slightly lesser British support for economic institutions than French (50:59 for IMF, 52:53 for the World Bank). Although British positions paralleling US positions and preferences, which I show later, indicate a greater Anglo-American than an Anglo-European identity, this aggregate view is misleading because it conceals wider, perhaps deeper, issue-specific variations, which gets to the heart of the post-Cold War theoretical and empirical problem: the multiple identities possible, just as constructivists predict!

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[21]Bruce W. Nelan, "NATO's new challenge," *Time*, Special issue, (Winter 1998-1999), 50-54; and Johanna McGeary, "The policy bomb:A week of gruesome bombing is a haunting overture to NATO's 50th-birthday party," *Time*, April 26, 1999, 15-17.

France is the most reluctant European country tabulated to cut back economic aid to other countries (2%), and the most willing to expand (55), suggesting its larger global goals and possible roles, as well as a colonial past it wishes to remain attached to more intensively than Britain might want to do with its own, as the corresponding figures of 31% and 22% indicate. The European standards of 23% and 31% offer a broader perspective. Balancing the *global* French orientation is a *European* counterpart, suggested in the fourth dimension. The French see European, German, and French influence on the EU as being greater and British and US influence as being lesser than Britons do. Indicators suggest Europe as a prize French policy instrument, at the least.

Germany is the most conservative of the three bigger members with regards defense spending (cut-back favored by 45%, expansion by 14%), helping other countries economically (29% favor cut-backs, 20% expansion), in staying out of global involvement (23%, compared to 12% for France and 15% for Britain), or in global commitments (65% in favor, 86% in France, 82% in Britain). Increasing German ambivalence pits a chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, who wishes to play a larger global role, and a public losing faith in economic revival.[22] Power, as Peter Katzenstein observed, seems to have been eliminated from the German vocabulary in favor of *political responsibility,*[23] which might be a bitter pill for the US to swallow since chancellors, particularly given Schroeder's opposition to war in Iraq during his recent election campaign, may have less manuverability to shape foreign policy if military-based decisions are involved. Be that as it may, although Germans are closer to the British over the US as the only superpower (22% versus 20%,

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[22]This is the underlying message of *Business Week*'s lead article of a cover story on Germany, titled, "Germany:can Europe's top economy lead the continent to reform?" November 19, 2001, 18-25.

[23]"United Germany in an integrating Europe," *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, ed. Katzenstein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 2, but see 1-48.

respectively), or in conjuction with the EU (48 versus 56), both shown in the eighth

dimension, and in strengthening economic international institutions (41 versus 50 for IMF,

47 versus 52 for the World Bank), it is closer to France over supporting non-economic

international institutions (75 versus 67 for UN, 62 versus 62 for NATO), as the tenth

dimension shows. Strikingly, those descending from the German Democratic Republic

resist the United States more than either their Federal Republic of Germany counterparts or

former Warsaw Pact compatriots--an observation not deduced from the *Worldviews 2002*.[24]

Since the EU is made up largely of relatively smaller countries revolving around the

Big-Three,[25] information on Italy and the Netherlands are merely suggestive of the rest of

Europe. Both countries are, of course, vastly dissimilar themselves in terms of size, ethnic

composition, uniformity of economic development, and historical influences exerted.

Nevertheless, further broad observations may be drawn from Table 3. Like Germany, both

favor defense cut-backs more than the EU as a whole (52% for Italy, 38% for the

Netherlands, 33% for EU), and are even more reluctant to expand defense spending than

Germany and the EU (12% for Italy, the Netherlands 6%, EU 22%, and Germany 14%).

Italy is more willing to expand economic aid than cut back (45:15), just the reverse of the

Netherlands (6:38) and Germany (20:29), and similar to the French approach (58:2). Both

are particularly warm towards the EU (Italy 84%, Netherlands 70%), and feel the influence

exerted by the EU is greater than their British, French, and German counterparts feel. Like

France, they rate the EU importance highly (Italy 77, Netherlands 88, France 93), would

not like to see the US as the only superpower (7, 11, 3 respectively), strongly support joint

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[24]Richared Bernstein, "The Germans who toppled communism resent the U.S.," *New York Times*, February 21, 2003, from wysiwyg://16/http://www.nytimes.com/200...ernational/europe/22GERM.html?tntemail1

[25]Observation parallels Moravscik's treatment of Single European Act analysis. See *op. cit.* (1991).

EU-US superpowership (76, 59, 91, respectively), prefer, by wide margins, to be involved in global events (90:7, 72:24, 86:12, respectively), and rate US importance far lower than the EU (15:77, 9:88, 4:93, respectively), and also much less than the British or Germans do (20:55, 37:56, respectively). These patterns convey strong commitment to Europe, tepidity towards the United States, and desires for high global engagement and enthusiasm.

Poland's case is interesting. It is the largest East European candidate member, and given its uncomfortable Cold War memories, the type of a EU member most desirous of warm US relations and/or presence. Certainly its support for the US position over Iraq,[26] as contrasted to the French,[27] strengthens this argument. Nevertheless, the polls show a greater tendency towards French positions, cooler attitudes towards the US, and a generally conservative international relations approach, one reason why polls and the methodology used in generating them should be treated with circumspection. Compared to the EU average, Poles are more willing to expand defense spending (45:22) and less willing to cut back than any other EU country (14:33); yet, its reluctance to give economic aid (44:23), or expand economic assistance (12:31) are also the lowest of any EU member tabulated, hinting at the reluctance of candidate members in general to share the European pie with non-members. Although the influence exerted by the US is perceived to be higher than EU influence (8.8:7.5), the importance given the EU is far larger than to the US (69:11)--data closer to the French responses than to the German. Although Poles are not as eager as the British or Germans to see the US as the only superpower (12 in favor, as opposed to 20, 22, respectively), they are more favorably inclined than the British and Germans to share

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[26]Just an inkling of this is portrayed by Craig S. Smith, "Poles cherish U.S. as friend, fondly recalling its support," *New York Times*, February 22, 2003. From: wysiwyg://2/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/22/international/europe/22POLA.html?th

superpower status with the US (63 versus 56 and 48, respectively). Finally, Poles are just about as tepid towards strengthening international institutions as the French. Polish identity with the French rekindles pre-World War II balance of power alignments,[28] a useful hindsight since the country between both, Germany, shares what is perhaps the most critical bilateral alignment within the EU, that with France. Poland's membership distances it from Russia, no doubt, but whether it augurs well for the Franco-German special relationship, and thereby EU's future welfare, remains a wildcard at present. Jacques Chirac's admonishing of Central and East European candidate EU members for supporting the US probably affects Poland more negatively than any of the other countries,[29] but also reaffirms the Franco-German relationship and sustains an age-old *de haut en bas* French attitude.[30]

Table 5, addressing the specific issues of this study, reiterates Poland's more conservative positioning: Its views on Iraq more often than not reflect the collective European view, as for example, favoring US invasion, even if alone (10% for both), opposing US invasion (26 for both). Although it is second only to Italy in describing Bush's foreign policy handling as being *excellent* (7% versus 10) and leads all other members in branding Bush's foreign policy as *good or better* (62), it does not identify with other interests of the US: Only international terrorism is seen by a majority of Poles as a source of possible threat; none of the others command a majority perception, indeed some of them important to the US are unimportant to Poles, such as Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (45:86), the Arab-Israel conflict (20:67), Islam fundamentalism

[27]See, for example, Frank Pellegrini, "The French suggestion:France tries to scoop the U.S. and inflence Has Blix with a plan to beef up the current inspection regime," *Time,* February 11, 2003, from wysiwyg://7/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,85999,421920,00.html?cnn=yes

[28]Niall Ferguson, "Europe's response to Iraq reflects an old rift," *New York Times*, February 23, 2003, from wysiwyg://7/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/weekinreview/23FERG.html

[29]See Eleanor Levieux & Michael Levieux, "No Chirac didn't say 'shut up'," *New York Times*, February 23, 2003, from wysiwyg://10/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/weekinreview/23LEVI.html

(19:61), or immigration (30:60). Polish views are generally closer to the French than to Britons or Germans, with one exception: Like the British or Germans, two out of every three Poles see US leadership as desirable, less than half of French feel likewise. Other than that, the different perceptions of threats suggests three arguable categories: Germany, Great Britain, and Italy categorize them highly, especially of military-based threats directly involving the US; Poland typifies the low categorization almost universally; and in between France and the Netherlands round off the medium-ranged threat perceptions. One might argue, France, and candidate or small-sized member states like Poland and the Netherlands, respectively, have little to gain from identifying with the United States over possible military conflicts, whereas Britain and Germany may be keeping their options open.

Table 5 about here

European opposition to war is much more pervasive and deeply-felt, as a different poll, obtained from *BBC News*, shows. In Germany, 57% found the US as "a nation of warmongers," while 54% Berliners had "mostly negative" connotations of the US. Although Bush's *new Europe* might have provided him the crucial support in conducting a war, the people in those East European countries do not support war, even if under UN auspices: 38% in Romania, 28% in Bulgaria, 20% in Estonia, and 23% in Russia. By comparison, 77% of Irish were found to be against war, 72% Portuguese, 78% Finns, 79% Danes, 79% Italians, 81% Luxembourgers, 81% Swedes, and 85% Austrians.[31] European

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[30]Literally "from high to low," or "from the lofty to the lowly." See Ferguson, *op. cit.*

[31]William Horsley, "Pollls find Europeans oppose Iraq war," *BBC News*, February 11, 2003, from wysiwyg://16/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2747175.stm

antipathy towards war is consistent with constructivist arguments, which, by placing the US in poorer light, may actually make US neorealist instincts harder to dissolve or dilute.

US perceptions catalyze Europeans, as Tables 6 and 7 suggest, the former broadly, the latter on specific issues from this study. Table 6 clarifies the ghost of 9/11 in the United States: terrorism is not only the biggest problem confronting the country, but also responsible for defining several top issue priorities, for example, elevating defense in the first dimension, recharging the Middle East and immigration as problem areas in the second dimension, identifying both the sources of military threats and regions of the world needing extra attention in the third dimension, and loading the top-priority policy agenda with military-based issues, thereby relegating issues of low politics to the back burner in the fourth dimension. Table 6 is a picture of the United States on a solo but determined crusade in which allies, diplomacy, and non-military issues are but incidental: If these play a part, it is only because hard US interests make them necessary! Comparable 1998 data also suggest militarization is not a new orientation, but this time serves a more specific function than in the past. One might even argue how US militarization continues to shape culture, defined loosely here as the human interaction with the enviroment, even after the Cold War. This may become one significant step towards manachaenism: either strong support for one position, in this case militarization, or strong opposition against its alternative, whatever that may be, with very little in between, where the crucial shades of gray formulate! This, in turn, may hypothetically explain the great divide between US policy-makers and public opinion: Neorealist thinking is trapped in the institutions of policy-making and with policy-makers, while the public partly wish   to move in constructivist directions, as support for the peace movements this Valentine weekend indicated, but also partly and reciprocally

feed into the neorealist mentality, for example, by berating anti-Americans or foreign protestors abroad more harshly and excessively raising the patriotism/protectionism ante.

Table 6 about here

Table 7 illustrates the paradoxical desire to work out the problems collectively and the willingness to stand alone and face those problems individually. Over a possible war with Iraq, for example, the polls are not far different from those across the Atlantic: A small minority favors invading Iraq (13%), a slightly larger proportion favors invading alone, if need be (20), and two out of three support invasion with UN approval and/or support of allies. Even more eye-catching, about two-thirds favor supporting the Kyoto Protocol, while an even larger body calls for participation in the ICC. In the second dimension, the UN gets much higher public support than one would reckon from policy-makers, which is also true for traditionally close countries, Canada, Britain, and Germany. One would not get the same impression from comments of the Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, for example, chastizing Germany for its position on Iraq,[32] or from the much more rigid border controls imposed on Canada than on Mexico,[33] the two US neighbors. Even in the final dimension, Bush's handling of foreign policy issues is not very popular, with the only bright spots being relations with Europe and international terrorism: Of course, Europeans by and large do not believe transatlantic relations have been enhanced under Bush, but, like

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[32]Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld rebukes U.N. and NATO on approach to Baghdad," *New York Times*, February 8, 2003, from wysiwyg://5/http://www.nytimes...com/2003.international/middleeast/09RUMS.html?th

[33]The following case illustrates a broader problem. Jim Rankin, "Canadian in passport fiasco:humiliation by immigration staff," *Toronto Star*, February14, 2003, from wysiwyg://25/http://www.torontostar.com...11_pageid=968332188492&col=968793972154

Americans, they know terrorism to be the scourge of the time, and therefore the need to rally behind measures aimed at eliminating it.

Table 7 about here

Empirical Cases:

All four cases are fairly well known and elaborated elsewhere. Here they are simply summarized before the theoretical analysis.

War with Iraq:

UN Resolution 1441 is not the first UN resolution defied by Iraq,[34] nor is it eliciting the kind of unanimous Security Council support the United States is used to getting after the Cold War. Iraq's violation of 17 resolutions, going back to UN Resolution 660 of November 29, 1990, virtually guarantees a significant US retribution. Sponsored by both the US and Great Britain during Fall 2002, Resolution 1441 calls for "immediate, unimpeded and unconditional" weapons inspection, failing which "serious consequences" would result. France delayed passage until November 8 by demanding two resolutions, one for weapons inspection and the other, if needed, authorizing military measures, which both the US and Britain rejected. In exchange for French support, they agreed to not use military force until a weapons inspection report was filed, for which February 24, 2003 was set as the cut-off date. While Iraq branded the resolution as representing "the law of evil,"[35]

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[34]Text of UN Resolution 1441, and a good summary of previous resolutions in "Text of UN Resolution on Iraq," *Toronto Star*, November 8, 2002, from wysiwyg://35/http://www.torontostar.com...ll_pagepath=News/World&col=968350060724

[35]From "UN poised for vote on Iraq," *BBC News*, November 8, 2002, from wysiwyg://18/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2418975.stm; and "U.S., France agree on U.N. resolution on Iraq," *CNN*, November 7, 2002, from wysiwyg://85/http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/11/07/iraq.resolution/index.html

Russia only grumbled about the inevitability of military action, China remained passive, and Syria, the Arab representative in the Security Council, eventually went with the flow.

Hans Blix's January 27 report acknowledged the lack of full Iraqi support, but also allayed any military responses by asking for more time. His fellow traveler, Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), went farther, indicating "war [was] not inevitable."[36]

More than the attitudes, the atmosphere was slightly altered by January 2003. Germany joined the Security Council as part of the routine rotation, and, together with France, provoked the US in canvassing for more inspectors. On another front, NATO's decision to shield Turkey from Iraqi attacks, under Article 5, was resisted by Belgium, France, and Germany, pushing the reluctant Bush and Blair to offer Iraq a "last chance."[37] Although the NATO deadlock was averted, with Spain's and Italy's support, Bush and Blair initiated precisely what they resisted in November, a second UN resolution, imposing a 3-week deadline for Iraq to fulfill UN requirements:[38] France and Germany, as well as Russia and China, stand in the way with varying degrees of resistance. At stake seems to be less the issues than the principles involved.[39] France's strong opposition may not be over issues: It merely seeks a 2-week extension beyond February 28, the date scheduled for

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[36]See "ElBaradei:war not inevitable," *CNN*, January 28, 2003, from wysiwyg://78/http://www.cnn.com/2003/US...spij.iraq.elbaradei.interview/index.html

Blix reports obtained from, "Statement by Hans Blix to the UN Security Council," 2 parts, *Guardian*, January 27, 2003, from wysiwyg://32/http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,883535,00.html

[37]"UN gets 'last chance' on Iraq," *BBC News*, February 22, 2003, from wysiwyg://66/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2790987.stm

[38]This does not necessarily mean theorientations of both are identical. Bush's single-mindedness and religious bent contrasts with Blair's increasing ambiguity and secular overtones. See Christopher Dickey, "The great divide," Newsweek, February 24, 2003, 11-15; and Alan Cowell, "Blair, the hawk, finds himself with some unlikely friends," *New York Times*, February 23, 2003, from wysiwyg://1/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/weekinreview/23COWE.html?tntemail1; and "Pope urges Blair to avoid war," *BBC News* February 22, 2003, from wysiwyg://28/http://news.bbc.co.uk_news/politics/2789503.stm

Blix's next report. While France has not officially ruled out war if Iraq does not comply with the resolution, it seems to be protesting the resort to force as the first option, and by extension, the world's most powerful country postulating that position against weaker countries and meeker friends. Jacques Chirac has public opinion behind him and his foreign minister, Dominique de Villepin, the diplomatic edge in the Security Council to cast France's first veto since 1956; and to cast it in the absence of significant policy difference shifts attention to belief-and-value systems, precisely what neorealism discounts but constructivism accents, since policy positions are hardly conflicting!

These undercurrents are not just French! While US Secretary of State Colin Powell is shifting from a dovish to a hawkish position, three countries with troops already dispatched for Iraq, Australia, Britain, and the United States, acknowledged, respected, but ultimately rejected the largest protest movements in recent memory--a pattern likely to be replicated elsewhere. For instance, close supporters Italy and Spain also faced some massive demonstrations, but did not compromise their positions. Canada typifies many of the so-called non-aligned countries: When push comes to shove, it will fall in line, even become actively involved, in spite of public opinion wishing a different approach.[40] Part of the reason may be US arm-twisting, as Powell demonstrated in November,[41] part may be the risk of alienating the US for someone as murderous as Saddam Hussein making little sense in defending principles, and part may simply reflect the post-Cold War

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[39]"Full speed ahead:America's strategy with Iraq," *Economist* February 22-28, 2003, 27-28.

[40]In Canada, for instance, 25% of the people support a war without UN support, 63% with it, 74% opposed without UN support, and 35% opposed regardless of the UN. See "War support hits new low," *Toronto Star*, February 22, 2003, from wysiwyg://84/http://www.torontostar.com...ll_pageid=968332188492&col=968793972154

[41]Steven R. Weisman, "How Powell lined up votes, starting with his president's," *New York Times*, November 9, 2002, from wysiwyg://1/http://www.nytimes.com/2002...ternational/09POWE.html?todaysheadlines

developmental upward-mobility experiences of many countries, thanks largely to US attachments and encouragements.[42]

Israel-Palestine Stalemate:

In spite of the 1994 Oslo Agreement,[43] Israeli-Palestinian relations have gone from the frying pan to the proverbial fire. The deal, so assiduously brokered in Madrid by a Norwegian rather than under Washington's auspices, was not expected to replace one of the twentieth century's sustained tinderbox with nirvana,[44] but neither was it expected to collapse so rapidly into almost total ruin. Future historians may point to the widespread outbreak of suicide bombings as the point of no-return: As a tactic, it baffled the highly competent Israeli military, and politicians simply could not comprehend it; but Israelis, from the center, right, and left, moved rapidly into an irreversible fortress mentality.[45] This is not to say the contentious issues in the agreement were not themselves poisoning the atmosphere: Whether it is the division of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements on occupied land, the emerging Palestinian objective of driving Israelis out of the land, return of Golan Heights, or more equitable sharing of water, the short-sighted and stubborn pursuits of both sides virtually guarantee another generataion of torn conditions!

If the suicide bombings and Israel's murderous responses provided the heat, the simultaneity of Ariel Sharon and George W. Bush at the helm provided the context: Both

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[42]Barbara Slavin, "US build war coalition with favors--and money," *USA Today*, February 25, 2003, 1A, publishes an interesting list of 30 countries supporting the US,what they are providing, and the benefits expected.

[43]Cecilia Albin succinctly summarizes the agreement's central points in "Justice, fairness, and negotiation:theory and reality," *International Negotiations: Actors, Structure/Process, Values*, eds., Peter Berton, Hiroshi Kimura, and I. William Zartman (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 257-90.

[44]On the origins and evolution of the conflict, see Adam M. Garfinkle, "Genesis," *The Arab-Israel Conflict: Perspectives*, ed. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (New York: HarperCollins, 1991, 2nd ed), 1-33; and Itamar Rabinovich, "Seven wars and one peace treaty," *ibid.*, 34-58.

[45]Jonathan Freedland, "For Israelis--and Jews everywhere--fear is now international," *Guardian*,November 29, 2002, from wysiwyg://6/http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/comment/0,10551,850410.00.html

were out to rewrite history in the region, Bush to finish what his father couldn't, that is, remove Saddam from office, and Sharon to finish what he himself couldn't in Lebanon in 1982, eliminate Arafat!

US interests in Israel are surprisingly recent. In 1956, it worked with its adversary, the Soviet Union, to disengage Britain, France, Israel, and the Arabs from the Suez War; but after the 1967 Six-Day War, especially under Henry Kissinger,[46] it sought a durable peace, which produced the 1978 Camp David Accords. However, Camp David could not become the crowning moment for either Jimmy Carter or Anwar Sadat: It neglected the Palestinians! While Carter lost the 1980 elections and Sadat was assassinated the next year, the key elements were refugee camp radicalization, exporting fundamentalism from Iran, and Sharon's crusade against both in Lebanon. By the time the first *intifada* began in 1987,[47] the Cold War was evaporating, leaving Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis exposed as never before. Adjusting to these developments, the Palestinian National Council called for a state in November 1988, while Arafat not only denounced terrorism, but also recognized Israel's right to exist through UN Resolution 242. Multiple-track peace efforts from October 1991 in Madrid engaged Israelis with the Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrians separately, while a multilateral track examined economic development, the environment, and refugees![48] The outcome was the 1994 Oslo Agreement, a five-year transitional agreement which was itself overtaken by other developments:[49] A new Palestinian generation, born and bred in the refugee camps, challenges Arafat's stale leadership for the

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[46]Edward R.F. Sheehan, *The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East* (New York: Reader's Digest, 1976).

[47]Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Palestinian intifida & Israel," *Arab-Israel Conflict*, 157-90.

[48]Foreign & Commonwealth Office Historical Background, "Middle East peace process:historical background," from: http://fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pag...erate/Show/Page&c=Page&cid010070293946444

[49]All these issues touched in Marwan Bishara, *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid: Prosepcts for Resolving the Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 2001).

limelight with more radical and Islamic alternatives; a flood of incoming Russian Jews needing housing, appropriately, on confiscated land; and when the Oslo Agreement had run its course, a second *intifada* was ready to explode.

Nevertheless, the Quartet formed between the European Union, United States, Russia, and the UN Secretary General, which seeks a road-map to peace and reports on the excesses committed by both sides,[50] instituted a Task Force on Palestine Reform (TFPR) only to fall victim of the US Iraqi campaign. When its December 2002 Washington meeting collapsed, Tony Blair proposed instead a conference of the protagonists in London the following January.[51] Bush applauded the initiative more than support the efforts. It was not just with Europeans but also Britons that the US had significant policy differences: Whereas the EU demands Israel stop constructing settlements and targeting Palestinian militants, the US is more willing to give Sharon an open hand with both. He even infuriated Blair and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw by vetoing Palestinian participation in the London conference. Following his own and decisive election victory, Sharon, ever the master craftsman, seeks a secretive but one-sided arrangement with the Palestinians. Arafat may have no choice but to go along,[52] but as in the past, exogenous developments may simply scupper any deals.[53] The fulcrum has shifted fundamentally from the Palestinian Authority to the refugee camps,[54] which no side is willing to understand or accept.[55]

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[50]Khaled Dawoud, "Hide and seek," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, December 19-25, 2002, from wysiwyg://97/http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2002/617/frl.htm

[51]"Mideast quartet' to meet in Washington," *CNN*, December 20, 2002, from wyswyg://121/http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/12/20/mideast.quartet/index.html

[52]"Q&A:Why has Arafat yielded power?" *Times of London*, February 14, 2003, from wysiwyg://15/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,343-577837,00.html

[53]This variable is highlighted most cogently by Rubinstein, "Transformation:external determinants," *Arab-Israel Conflict*, 59-93.

[54]Jonathan Cook, "Who will fall first?" *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, February 13-19, 2003, from wysiwyg://60/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/625/rel.htm

[55]"Carnage in Israel, conquest in Palestine:with neither Ariel Sharon nor Yasser Arafat vanquished, the violence soars," *Economist*, April 6-12, 2002, 22-23,

President Bill Clinton's attempts to revive the Camp David failed in 1999 precisely for those reasons; and although Bush became the first US president to call for a Palestinian state, which was at the Security Council on March 12, 2002, his administration is least likely to see it materialize because of the Iraqi preoccupation and for having tilted the playing field too heavily in Israel's favor to elicit any genuine Palestinian acceptance. George Tenet's efforts to stop the bloodshed and George Mitchell's to restore the *ante bellum* 1967 status quo are still US goals,[56] but Sharon, who constantly slips through their fingers,[57] is in control of all the cards--and a Palestinian state independent of his control is not one of them. In turn, the Europeans are puzzled why the US cannot rein Sharon in,[58] especially when he is under indictment in Belgium, when he leaves office, for crimes committed twenty years ago in Lebanon.[59]

International Criminal Court:

Though a direct product of the 1998 Rome Conference,[60] the ICC traces its roots to the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals terminating World War II. Efforts made then to formulate the statutes of an international criminal court to complement the UN system of collective security, were thwarted, just as the effectiveness of the UN was itself, by the Cold War. Even though a draft statute was prepared by 1951, it wasn't until the Cold War ended, 1989 precisely, when the UN General Assembly authorized the International Law Commission (ILC) to engage in ongoing international criminal investigations. Two *ad hoc*

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[56]"America and the conflict:zigzagging," *Economist*, April 6-12, 2002, 25, Special Report on Israel-Palestine conflict.

[57]Marwan Bishara, "Back to the future," *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, November 14-20 November 2002, from wysiwyg://56/http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2002/612/op5.htm

[58]"Friendly fire:why Palestine divides Europe and America," *Economist,* April 20-26, 2002, 9.

[59]Marlise Simons, "Sharon faces Belgian trial after term ends," *New York Times*, February 12, 2003, from wysiwyg://1/http://intimes.com/2003/02/13/international/europe/13BELG.html?th

[60]I have relied on Marc Weller, "Undoing the global constitution:UN Security Council action on the International Criminal Court," *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002):693-712.

tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, established under UN Chapter VII, paved the way

for the ILC submission of another draft in 1994.[61] This was adopted in Rome on July 17,

1998, by a 120-7 vote, with 21 abstentions, leaving countries until December 31, 2000 to

sign on, and necessitating sixty ratifications to make it functional. By signing on the very

last day, yet refusing adamantly to ratify it, the United States got the ICC off to a very

dubious atart, even though 120 countries, including EU members, have ratified the Statute.[62]

Bill Clinton may have signed the Statute as a parting policy measure of his tenure as

president, but George W. Bush had no qualms in placing the ICC exactly where he thinks it

belongs in the pantheon of US interests: in the lower rungs. The US both sought

exemptions for its peacemakers in Timor and Bosnia-Herzegovina and vetoed the Bosnian

extension mandate even though US troops continued with Bosnian operations. Special

treatment for the US, and the subordination of collective pursuits, especially as they pertain

to forging common laws and rules, to US priorities, bedevil ICC functions.[63]

Under the Statute, a number of provisions specifically identify a wide variety of

punishable crimes: genocide, aggression, violation of laws and customs during armed

conflict, against humanity, and so forth.[64] A complementarity clause allows member states

to exercise jurisdictional authority first. Inability or the unwillingness to do so, or even

inadequate task performance, shifts the crime to the UN Security Council, which under

Chapter VII, is empowered to establish an investigative tribunal. Complying with these

procedures obligates states to not contract out of the main body of international laws, also

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[61]Philippe Kirsch, "The International Criminal Court:current issues andperspectives," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 3-12.

[62]For more details, see Roy S. Lee, *The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute--Issues, Negotiations, Results* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999).

[63]Other countries objecting to the ICC are China, Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Yemen, and briefly, Israel.

[64]From M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed., *The Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Documentary History* (Ardsley, New York, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1998).

known as *jus cogens*, and promotes the universality docrine, that is, subject all perpetrators of crime to the same body of international laws.

The US feels challenged.[65] On the one hand, it feels the universality doctrine (a) violates the Lotus Principle, which permits states to legislate, adjudicate, and enforce its own laws abroad unless they collide with the rights of another state; (b) threatens the state's complete domestic jurisdiction and extension of its rights to protect citizens abroad; and (c) is too expansive a mandate, since it goes beyond traditional customary laws to creating treaties. On the other are its more specific objections: (a) US citizens cannot be exposed to criminal sanctions not established by the US Congress; (b) sovereign decision-making, rights of self-defense and US humanitarian and anti-terrorism operations are seen as being threatened; and (c) in the absence of checks and balances checks and balances, the ICC remains open to abuse, in addition to undermining the Securty Council.[66]

As with the hard issues, the ICC inherently reflects the perennial playing field problem in international relations The Benthamite *greatest-good-for-the-greatest-number* hope remains as chimerical in the twenty-first century as in the nineteenth for basically the same reason: The egotistical bug Thucydides, Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Carr, Morgenthau, and Waltz, among others, found to be permanently lodged in human instincts, also effectively weathers any liberalist/idealist encroachments! It is premature to say if the post-Cold War era of unbounded idealism, until 9/11 at least, is any different from similar occasions after the Pelopponesian, Thirty Years, Napoleonic, and the two world wars. At

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[65]Weller, *op. cit.*, 697-704.

[66]For a harsher summary of US objections, see article by US Under Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs under George Bush: John R. Bolton, "The risks and weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America's viewpoint," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 64, no. 1 (Winter 2001):167-80.

the same time, never before has the need for collective action to confront increasingly collective problems been more desperate.

Kyoto Protocol:

Much as with the ICC, the US seeks special treatment with the Kyoto Protocol (KP) as well. In fact, just like the ICC Statute, the Clinton administration signed the 1997 protocol to arrest global warming and treat climate change more urgently without heart, mind, and soul! It is another area of policy difference between the Americans and Europeans exposing more than superficial stances. The protocol obligates 38 individual countries to cut gas emissions by 5.2% of their 1990 levels by 2012, and since the US produces 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions in the world,[67] it is obligated to cut by 7%, as compared to 6% for the European Union. Whereas Bush sees the KP as being "fatally flawed,"[68] on behalf of the European Union, the British Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, called it "the only game in town."[69] With over 175 countries having signed it, ratification did not have to depend on the United States; and the EU gave it a strong boost with its own ratification in 2002. Nevertheless, without the US on board, the agreement could be severely undermined.

That is precisely what the US fears will happen to its own gas-emitting industries, particularly the automobile: Not only would the gas-guzzling large US cars have to be restructured, but also with one of the lowest fuel prices among the industrialized countries,

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[67]Britain, by comparison, has 1% of the world's population, but produces 3% of such emissions, India accounts for 15% of the population, but only produces 3%, while the US has 4% of the population but produces 25%. See "Q&A:The US and climate change," *BBC News*, February 14, 2002, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/americas/1820523.stm

[68]Alex Kirby, "The Bonn deal:winners and losers," *BBC News*, July 23, 2001, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/1452903.stm

[69]Kirby, "US facing climate isolation," *BBC News*, March 29, 2001, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/1249446.stm

the US would have to undergo a socio-economic revolution. A spin-off of the 1992 Rio de Janeiro UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and its Agenda 21 mandate, the KP was ratified not only to commemorate the tenth Rio anniversary, but also to fulfill the UN Millennium Declaratioin whereby heads of states and governments resolved to actively attach the KP to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This was facilitated by the Bonn agreement revising KP in July 2001. Although dubbed *Kyoto Lite* by Greenpeace, the Bonn agreement was premised on a EU-US *quid pro quo*: Desperate to finalize a deal, even without full US engagement, the EU allowed the Umbrella Group (Australia, Canada, Japan, and Russia) and the US plenty of carbon sinks, that is, forests/farmlands which absorb carbon dioxide. Since these five countries account for a huge geographical proportion of the industrialized countries which must cut emissions, the sinks provide them a safety valve against enormous potential industrial dislocations. Even the less developed countries, particularly the industrially polluting China and India, had plenty to gain: Two climate change funds, the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund and the Less Developed Countries Fund, made $530m available for emission measurement and creating cleaner technologies, respectively, in addition to luring OPEC members to diversifying oil as a fuel.[70]

By the time of the tenth Rio anniversary, celebrated through the Johannesburg summit of September,[71] Canada and Russia from the Umbrella Group were ready to become active KP participants, but the dominant theme still invoked the EU and the US: Whereas the former assumed leadership, the latter's continued abdication was not converted into resistance. Nevertheless, in a world of increasingly scarce resources and

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[70]"Bonn deal at a glance,"*BBC News*, July 24, 2001, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/1454612.stm

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time, elevating the importance of the environment may continue to be as uphill as in the past, given 9/11 and environment-threatening wars in Afghanistan and possibly Iraq.

Paradigm Application to Cases:

Returning to Table 1, the eight dimensions distinguishing neorealism and constructivism are applied to three broad cases here: the *American, European,* and *British.* None of these three are satisfactory labels, especially the *European,* which represents too many diverse countries to make any sense for a comparative study of different policies. The *American* is a more coherent label, yet could be fruitfully narrowed, as too the *British*: Both are too aggregate terms for countries in which democratization and multiple groups have tended to respond with ethnic/racial/national/geographic identities rather than statist. They are retained since, even with their imperfections, they simply illustrate, rather than summon battle lines. All three cases are seen from both policy-making (PM) and public opion (PO) perspectives for the four policy issues.

Table 8 about here

Turning to the first dimensions of actors/structures, a study of the four issues suggest (a) for *Americans,* neorealism continues to be the exclusive influence at the PM level and dominant at the PO level, the difference stemming from societal protest movements and soft-issue preferences, which admit non-state actors; (b) *Europeans* move beyond neorealist thinking convincingly towards broader constructivist considerations, as evident in the support for both the UN and societal or non-governmental engagements in various issues: and (c) *British* viewpoints reflect a greater disjuncture between PM and PO

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[71]Well summarized in "Sustaining the world's poor," *Economist,* August 31, 2002, 11.

levels, the former as in the *American* case, very neorealist, the latter stubbornly and formidably constructivist-based.

The second dimension mirrors the first: (a) Neorealism is the exclusive *American* consideration at the PM level in determining key concerns, but only dominant at the PO level; (b) *Europeans* at both levels move beyond neorealism towards constructivist identification, even by subordinating power-based considerations; and (c) *British* are very neorealist at the PM level for hard-issues, although over soft issues like ICC and KP, they are more *European* than *American* at both PM and PO levels.

With regards relations between interests and identities in the third dimensioin (a) the *American* viewpoint is exclusively neorealist over all four issues at the PM level, but only dominant at the PO level: (b) the *European* is just the opposite, reflecting identity-based interests on all four issues, suggesting a deep constructivist inclination; and (c) the *British* are divided more sharply between PM and PO levels, with the former reflecting the neorealist preference over hard issues and constructivist over soft issues, and the latter reflecting constructivist dominance.

In terms of power, the fourth dimension shows (a) *American* views at both PM and PO levels to be materialist, that is power- or profit-based; (b) the *European* counterpart emphasizing the power of practice at both levels, even though this discursive inclination ignores the material component in all four policy issues; and (c) the *British* divided between a mixed PM preference for material over hard issues and discursive over soft issues and a PO tendency towards the discursive.

How anarchy is interpreted in the three cases correspond to the previous observations: (a) *Americans* at both PM and PO levels sense it everywhere outside the US and in relations with the US over both hard and soft issues; (b) *Europeans* see it, if it exists,

emanating from US policy choices, but not touching every other country; and (c) the *British* feel it most over hard issues, but not the soft, at the PM level, but not at all with either at the PO level.

In turn, the security dilemma is a (a) constant fear and motivator at both *American* levels; (b) negligible factor at both *European* levels; and (c) mixed bag, for essentially the same reasons, at the different *British* levels as under anarchy and power interpretations.

Against that background, the (a) *American* perspective contains all the ingredients of theory-making, although the arguments to be postulated would be very tenuous; (b) the *European* perspective is, as observed before, too overloaded to be accommodated within any single theoretical perspective; and (c) the *British* reflect an even more unmanageable assortment of ingredients to permit any single coherent theoretical framework.

Finally, what seems to the post-Cold War relevance of each? (a) The *American* may find less post-Cold War relevance in shaping outcomes over the four policy issues, at the least, than during the Cold War, and for a future expected to demonstrate more flux, the *American* perspective is likely to shed even less light and command less relevance. (b) The *European* offers a better post-Cold War fit, but is nowhere near to offering an adequate comprehensive picture. (c) The *British* may become the least relevant to explaining policy outcomes, but the prototype for other would-be aspirants, such as Australia and India, or countries unwilling or unable to disengage from the US ties, such as Canada and Mexico.

In short, the British disjuncture stems from wanting to pursue too many goals in too different directions at the PM level and a public interested in too many issues with too dissimilar preferences than policy-makers. The British disease one century ago was its creeping economic and political uncompetitiveness in the international system; today it

represents a domestic divide over external issues sapping resources unnecessarily and limiting goals and roles also unnecessarily. Regardless of time, it is a contagious disease!

Conclusions:

When different countries move in different directions, circumstances begin to shape anarchic contours, cast a gloomy future shadow, and unnecessarily invite scrambles for pre-eminence; and as this study shows, the gap between anarchy and hierarchy, or disorder and order, respectively, may very well be bridged by coalitions of sorts based on identities. Since the costs of military identities in the post-Cold War era are prohibitively high, other alternatives must be explored just for survival's sake. A study of four issues from three policy-making and public opinion perspectives in two regions of the world suggest one broad outcome: By heeding public opinion, foreign policy becomes more viable, and in the long run compensates for the absence of military pre-eminence by unleashing the power of practice. Because states and policy-making are not perfect, the outcome is not inevitable. The findings of this study also suggest at least three types of state/policy-making responses to these circumstances: (a) defiance, (b) resistance, or (c) straddling.

Defiance is a response of the strong state, which, by virtue of its strength is unlikely to restrain its military capabilities or reputation to stabilize any threat. It is a defensive approach with regards reputation, but aggressive with capabilities. The United States alone has the capabilities for this type of response, and after the Cold War, particularly after 9/11, it has often demonstrated this response.

Resistance is a countervailing tendency, not in terms of military capabilities, but rather, in this age of democratization, through such social forces as public opinion. It does not have to represent either a status quo or a belligerent approach, and is more than mere balancing: Hitherto balancing has theoretically been seen in terms of military power, often

concealing a value system; but the key difference today is the power of public opinion--an issue discussed so frequently before, but either in abstract or top-down terms rather than the bottom-up, or representative, manifestations salient today. This is the approach of France and Germany in this study, perhaps broadly of continental European countries.

Straddling likewise is more than bandwagoning: the latter is a conscious choice, the former needs not necessarily be so since the policy-makers might not even either know what policy choice to select at any given time, or if he/she does know, be unable to adopt it becaue of either internal constraints, such as from public opinion, or external constraints, such as the policy adopted by another country. This is the most uncertain response and the most likely of would-be power aspirants. Great Britain illustrates this type, but many others could slide into it through their bilateral relations with the United States.

Ultimately, public opinion emerges as the strongest force against hard-issue choices of the US; and the degree of its success will be indicative of how close, or far, we are to Immanuel Kant's perpetual peace!

TABLE 1:
PARADIGM TENETS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

DIMENSIONS:	*NEOREALISM*	*CONSTRUCTIVISM*
1. Actors and Structures:	States are dominant actors, and their functions are determined by international competitiveness, and thereby the dynamic international structure	States are dominant actors, but recognize and interact with inter-state or intra-state groups as well as individuals; they possess a reciprocally determininstic relationship with the international structure
2. Key concern:	Interests, defined as power	Identities: through cognition or alienation
3. Relationship between interests and identities:	Interests determine identities	Identities determine interests to a larger extent than interests determining identities
4. Nature of power:	Material, whether economic or military; military power overrides economic power: reliance on ever-fluctuating balances of power	Discursive: power could be material, but also emerges from the power of practice, that is, from knowledge; attention not so much on balances of power as on balances of threat
5. On anarchy:	A natural condition within which relations between countries emerge and function	Depends on what states make of it, meaning it is not a natural condition within which states operate, but one they can also manage
6. On security dimemma:	Product of uncertainty in relations between states; no states can escape it	It may be a product of uncertainty, but can be managed, and not all countries face it constantly; some don't face it at all
7. Qualification as a theory:	Qualifies: establishes objective relationship between two variables and based on capability distribution, then tries to explain that relationship, generating degrees of predictability	Does not fully qualify as theory: More an approach through its reliance on values and inter-subjective inputs
8. Post-Cold War relevance:	Too parsimonious and too exclusived to explain the multiple post-Cold War identity crises	As an inclusive and heterogamous paradigm, challenges neorealism where it is wanting and is more suitable to capture the multiple post-Cold War dynamics

Source: Ted Hopf, "The promise of constructivism in international relations theory," *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998):171-200.

TABLE 2:
AMERICANS VERSUS EUROPEANS: PERCEPTIONS ON BROAD ISSUES

DIMENSIONS:	EUROPE:	UNITED STATES:
1. Perceptions of threats as being important (%):		
a. International terrorism:	a. 64	a. 91
b. Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction:	b. 57	b. 86
c. Arab-Israel military conflict:	c. 42	c. 67
d. India-Pakistan tensions:	d. 30	d. 54
e. China as world power:	e. 18	e. 56
f. Islamic fundamentalism:	f. 47	f. 61
g. Immigration:	g. 37	g. 60
h. Global warming	h. 49	h. 46
i. Economic competition (from US in Europe, from Europe in US)	i. 18	i. 13
2. Military-economic tradeoffs:		
a. Military strength more important:	a. 12	a. 27
b. Economic strength more important:	b. 84	b. 66
3. Strengthening international institutions:		
a. UN	a. 75	a. 77
b. NATO	b. 63	b. 61
c. WTO	c. 59	c. 63
d. IMF	d. 53	d. 42
e. IBRD	e. 53	e. 49
4. Use of military for:		
a. Famine relief:	a. 88	a. 81
b. Uphold international law:	b. 80	b. 76
c. Liberate hostages:	c. 78	c. 77
d. Destroy terrorist camps:	d. 75	d. 92
e. Bring peace in region of civil war:	e. 72	e. 48
f. Ensure supply of oil:	f. 49	f. 65
5. Means for fighting terrorism:		
a. Help poor countries improve economies:	a. 91	a. 78
b. Ground troops to destroy camps:	b. 69	b. 84
c. Air strikes to destroy camps:	c. 68	c. 87
d. Restrict immigration:	d. 63	d. 77
e. Assassinate individual terrorist leaders:	e. 51	e. 66
6. On US world leadership:		
a. Desirable:	a. 64	a. 83
b. Undesirable:	b. 31	b. 14
7. On European Union world leadership:		
a. Desirable:	a. 81	a. 79
b. Undesirable:	b. 15	b. 17
8. On superpowers:		
a. US as the only one:	a. 14	a. 52
b. EU and US:	b. 65	b. 33
9. On global involvement:		
a. Take active part:	a. 78	a. 71
b. Stay out:	b. 16	b. 25
10. Views of the other side being fair/unfair:		
a. Fair:	a. 43	a. 60
b. Unfair:	b. 44	b. 20

Source: *Worldviews 2002: American and European Public opinion & Foreign Policy,* (Chicago: CCFR/GMf, 2002), 9-13.

TABLE 3:
EUROPEAN VERSUS AMERICANS: PERCEPTIONS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES

DIMENSIONS:	EUROPEAN:	AMERICAN:

1. On Iraq:
    a. US should not invade:
    b. US should invade, even if alone:
c. US should invade only with UN approval and support of allies:
	a. 26
	b. 10
	c. 60
		a. 13
		b. 20
		c. 65

2. Palestinian statehood:
    a. Favored:
    b. Opposed:
	a. 72
	b. 14
		a. 40
		b. 35

3. Bush's foreign policy handling
(as ratio of good or better:fair or worse):
    a. Relations with Europe:
    b. International Terrorism:
    c. War in Afghanistan:
    d. Handling of Iraqi issue:
    e. Arab-Israel conflict:
    f. Global warming:
	a. 48:49
	b. 47:50
	c. 35:60
	d. 21:71
	e. 20:74
	f. 13:77
		a. 60:35
		b. 55:43
		c. 55:41
		d. 32:62
		e. 33:61
		f. 25:65

Source: *Worldviews, 2002*: *American and European Public Opinioni & Foreign Policy*, 16, 22-23.

DIMENSIONS:	*Gr:*	*Fr:*	*GB:*	*It:*	*Neth:*	*Pol:*	*EU:*
1. Defense spending:							
a. Cut-back:	45	23	21	52	38	14	**33**
b. Expand:	14	28	24	12	6	45	**22**
2. Economic aid to other countries:							
a. Cut-back	29	2	31	15	21	44	**23**
b. Expand	20	58	22	45	18	12	**31**
3. Temperature on:							
a. EU:	67	75	59	84	70	65	
b. US:	63	60	68	68	59	60	
c. GB:	60	57	x	62	63	57	
d. Fr:	59	x	55	61	58	59	
e. Gr:	x	62	54	60	61	51	
f. Israel:	32	43	43	42	48	29	
g. Iraq:	16	33	26	28	23	25	
4. Influence exerted by (max. 10):							
a. US:	8.7	8.8	8.9	9.3	8.7	8.8	
b. EU:	6.8	7.2	6.7	7.5	6.9	7.5	
c. Gr:	6.2	6.1	5.9	6.5	6.2	6.3	
d. Fr:	5.4	6.3	5.4	6.2	6.0	5.5	
e. GB:	6.2	5.8	6.9	6.9	6.4	6.3	
5. Importance of:							
a. EU:	55	93	56	77	88	69	
b. US:	20	4	37	15	9	11	
c. Both:	22	1	5	7	2	14	
6. On global involvement:							
a. Stay out:	23	12	15	7	24	18	
b. Be involved:	65	86	82	90	72	74	
7. EU leadership abroad:							
a. Yes, without doubt:	27	40	32	53	42	16	
b. Yes, but with reservations:	55	43	47	36	50	52	
8. United States:							
a. As only superpower:	22	3	20	7	11	12	**14**
b. Superpower with EU:	48	91	56	76	59	63	**65**
9. Determinant of world power:							
a. Economic:	a. 80	a. 89	81	88	89	83	
b. Military:	b. 16	b. 9	15	10	7	11	
10. Strengthening international institutions:							
a. UN:	75	67	81	82	76	69	**75**
b. NATO:	62	62	66	61	62	68	**63**
c. WTO:	56	58	59	66	69	50	**59**
d. IMF:	41	59	50	70	55	49	**53**
e. IBRD:	47	53	52	62	57	54	**53**

Source: *Worldviews, 2002: European Public Opinion & Foreign Policy* (Chicago: CCFR/GMF, 2002), 9-10, 12-16, and 27.

TABLE 5:
EUROPEAN UNION DISAGGREGATED: SPECIFIC PERCEPTIONS

DIMENSIONS:	Gr:	Fr:	GB:	It:	Neth:	Pol:	EU:
1. On using force in Iraq:							
a. US should not invade:	28	27	20	33	18	26	**26**
b. US should invade with UN approval :	56	63	69	54	70	53	**60**
c. US should invade, even if alone:	12	6	10	10	11	10	**10**
2. Bush's foreign policy handling:							
a. Excellent:	3	1	3	10	1	7	**4**
b. good:	33	20	27	47	27	55	**34**
c. fair:	50	53	44	28	58	22	**42**
d. poor:	12	21	22	9	12	4	**14**
3. Perceptions of threat:							
a. International terrorism:	63	60	74	67	54	55	**64**
b. Iraqi weapons of mass destruction:	60	43	75	57	52	45	**57**
c. Global warming:	47	52	52	64	42	24	**49**
d. Islamic fundamentalism:	55	46	55	48	47	19	**47**
e. Arab-Israel military conflict:	47	42	51	42	32	20	**42**
f. Immigration:	23	34	54	52	30	30	**37**
g. India-Pakistan tensions:	35	22	48	27	18	17	**30**
h. Globalization:	17	21	25	24	10	14	**20**
i. China as world power:	13	18	28	19	16	15	**18**
j. Economic competitiveness with US:	10	26	18	20	12	19	**18**
4. On US leadership:							
a. Very desirable:	11	10	28	24	21	13	**17**
b. Somewhat desirable:	57	38	44	39	54	51	**47**
5. Bush's foreign policy handling of:	Excellent:	Good:	Fair:	Poor:	Don't know:		
a. Terrorism:	11	36	33	17	3		
b. Arab/Israel conflict:	3	17	41	33	6		
c. Iraq:	3	18	39	32	8		
d. Global warming:	2	11	27	50	11		
e. Afghanistan war:	7	28	37	23	5		
f. Relations with Europe:	6	42	40	9	4		

Source: *Worldviews, 2002: European Public Opinion & Foreign Policy,* 19, 22, 23, 24, and 26.

TABLE 6: GENERAL AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

DIMENSIONS:	2002:	1998:
1. Biggest problems confronting the country:		
a. Terrorism:	35	NA
b. Economy:	22	11
c. Education:	11	15
d. Defense:	10	1
e. Foreign relations:	8	3
f. War:	7	1
2. Biggest foreign policy problems:		
a. Terrorism:	33	12
b. Middle East:	12	8
c. Unrest in Israel:	9	NA
d. Getting involved in other countries:	7	7
e. Immigration:	7	3
3. Threats to US vital interests:		
a. International terrorism:	91	84
b. Chemical and biological weapons:	86	76
c. Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction:	86	NA
d. Unfriendly countries developing nuclear weapons:	85	75
e. Arab-Israel military conflict:	67	NA
f. Islamic fundamentalism:	61	38
g. India-Pakistan tensions:	54	NA
h. China as world power:	56	57
i. Russia's military power:	23	34
j. Immigration:	60	55
k. AIDS, Ebola, and other such diseases:	68	72
l. Global warming:	46	43
m. Economic competition from Europe:	13	24
n. Economic competition from Japan:	29	45
o. Economic competition from low-wage countries:	31	40
p. Financial crises elsewhere:	25	NA
q. Globalization:	29	NA
r. World population growth:	44	NA
4. Goals of US foreign policy:		
a. Combat terrorism:	91	79
b. Prevent nuclear proliferation:	90	82
c. Protect US jobs:	85	80
d. Stop illegal drug flows:	81	81
e. Secure adequate energy:	75	64
f. Control illegal immigration:	70	55
g. Maintain military superiority:	68	59
h. Improve global environment	66	53
i. Combat world hunger:	61	62
j. Strengthen UN:	57	45
k. Defend security of allies:	57	44
l. Safeguard against global financial instability:	54	NA
m. Reduce US trade deficit:	51	50
n. Promote and defend human rights abroad:	47	39
o. Strengthen international law and institutions:	43	NA
p. Protect weaker countries from aggression:	41	32
q. Produce democracy abroad:	34	29
r. Improve standards of living of less developed countries:	30	29

Source: *Worldviews, 2002: American Public Opinioni & Foreign Policy,* 10, 12, 16, and 19.

TABLE 7: SPECIFIC AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS

DIMENSIONS:	RATINGS:
1. On US going it alone or with other countries:	
a. US should be pre-eminent world power in solving international problems:	1ª. 17
b. US should share with other countries in solving international problems:	1b. 71
2. In crises, US should:	
a. take action without support of allies:	2ª. 31 (2002), 21 (1998)
b. not take action without support of allies:	2b. 21 (2002), 72 (1998)
3. US should send troops to overthrow Saddam Hussein:	3. 75
4. The US should:	
a. Not invade Iraq:	4a. 13
b. Invade Iraq, even if alone:	4b. 20
c. Invade, but with UN approval and support of allies:	4c. 65
5. Participate in ICC:	**4. 71**
6. Support the Kyoto Protocol:	**5. 64**
Barometer of support for:	
a. UN:	a. 64
b. International human rights groups:	b. 63
c. International environmental groups:	c. 57
d. WTO:	d. 55
e. European Union:	e. 53
f. Multinational corporations:	f. 49
g. World court:	g. 49
h. Muslims:	h. 49
i. IMF:	i. 48
j. Palestinians:	j. 35
Barometers for countries:	
a. Canada:	a. 77
b. Great Britain:	b. 76
c. Italy:	c. 65
d. Germany:	d. 61
e. France:	e. 55
Barometers for leaders:	
a. Tony Blair:	a. 72
b. Gerard Schroeder:	b. 52
c. Jacques Chirac:	c. 59
As US vital interests:	
a. Great Britain:	a. 78
b. Germany:	b. 68
c. France:	c. 53
Influenced by (max=10):	
a. Great Britain:	a. 7.0
b. European Union:	b. 6.7
c. Germany:	c. 6.1
d. France:	d. 5.4
e. Europe more than Asia:	e. 58%

Bush's handling of foreign policy issues:	Good/ Better:	Fair/ Poorer:
a. Relations with Europe:	60	35
b. International terrorism	55	43
c. Arab-Israel peace:	33	61
d. Situation in Iraq:	32	62
e. Overall foreign policy:	53	44
f. Global warming:	25	65
g. Immigration:	27	70

Source: *Worldviews, 2002: American Public Opinioni & Foreign Policy,* 10, 12, 16, and 19.

TABLE 8: PARADIGMS APPLIED TO CASES

DIMENSIONS:	*American:*	*European:*	*British:*
1. Actors/Structures:	Exclusively neorealist at PM level, dominant at PO level	Predominantly constructivist at both PM and PO levels	Neorealism dominance, though not exclusiveness, at both levels
2. Key concerns:	Exclusively neorealist at PM level, dominant at PO level	Predominantly constructivist at both PM and PO levels	Mixed: Neorealist tendencies over hard issues (I,P), but constructivist tendencies over soft issues (C, K)
3. Relationship between interests and identities:	Exclusively neorealist at PM level, dominant at PO level: interests determine identities	Predominantly constructivist at both PM and PO levels: identities determine interests	Neorealist tendencies at PM level, though not necessarily at PO lelvel
4. Nature of power:	Neorealism dominant at both levels: material power	Constructivism dominant at both levels: discursive power	Mixed: Neorealism at PM level, constructivism at PO level
5. On anarchy:	Exclusively neorealist at PM level, dominant at PO level	Predominantly constructivist at both PM and PO levels	Mixed: Neorealism at PM level, constructivism at PO level
6. On security dilemma:	Exclusively neorealist at PM level, dominant at PO level	Predominantly constructivist at both PM and PO levels	Mixed: Neorealism at PM level, constructivism at PO level
7. Qualification as a theory:	Pieces of theory-making are there, but tenets likely to be very tenuous	Difficult to assemble into one coherent framework	Mixed: Neorealism barely explains PM level, but not PO level, outcomes
8. Post-Cold War relevance:	Not as much as during the Cold War; unlikely to be robust in near future	Better fit, without being perfect: constructivism gives it salience with *ifs* and *buts*	May be prototype of other industrialized states, either going with the US flow or aspiring would be powers

Legend: I= Iraq; P= Israel-Palestine conflict; K= Kyoto; and C= International Criminal Court, PM=policy-making, PO=public opinion