# COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 

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Under Article 4 of its Decision 74/120/EEC of 18 Februaryr 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the Member States of the European Becnomic Community, as amended by its Decision 75/787/ERC of 18 December 1975, the Council, acting on a proposal from the Comission and after consulting Parliament and the Economic and Social Comnttes, is required, during the fourth quarter, to adopt an annual report on the economic situation in the Community and to set the economic policy gridelines to be followed by each Member State in the following ycar. Once the report has been adopted by the Council, the respective governments must bring it to the attention of their national parliaments so that it may be taken into account in budget debates.

The guidelines contained in this draft may have to be adjusted to take account of economic developments wher the Council carries out its amual examination of the econcmic situation in the future ${ }^{(1)}$. 12 October 1977

PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DECISION of 1977
adopting the annual report on the economic situation in the Community and laying down the economic policy guidelines for 1978

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN CONDUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the Buropean Economic Commity,

Having regard to Council Decision $74 / 120 /$ EEC of 18 February 1974 on the atteinment of a high degree of convergence of the economic policies of the Member States of the European Economic Community (1), as amended by Council Decision 75/787/EEC (2), and in particular Article 4 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament (3),
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Comittee (4),
Whereas, in adopting Council Decision 77/492/EDC of 25 July 1977 (5), the Council approved the anelysis of the economic situation set out in the Commission Communication of 7 July 1977 concerning in particular the preparation of the public budgets for 1978; whereas, in accordance with thet Decision, the Member States shall pursue economic policies in conformity with the guidelines on the preparation of the public budgets for 1978, which are specified in the Annex to the said Decision;

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

## Article 1

1. The Council hereby adopts the annual report on the economic situation in the Community es contained in Sections I and II of the Annex and lays down the guidelines to be followed by each Member State in its economic policy for 1978, as shown in Sections III and IV of the Annex.
2. This Decision is addressed to all Member States.
(1) O.J. No L 63, 5.3.1974, p.16.
(2) O.J. NO L 330, 24.12.1975, p.52.
(3) O.J. NO
(4) O.J. No
(5) O.J. No L 204, 10.8.1977, p.6.

## I. THE ECONOKTO SITUATION TN THE COUNTY

1.1. In terms of the objectives fixed, developments so fer in 1977 have been both positive and new tive. Whilst growth hs been slack and conditions on the l bour market have deterior ted, there hove ot the same time been significant grins with regard to the balances of payments, and also on the prices front.
1.2. During the summer, industrial production in the Community barely exceeded the peak reached in 1974. The growth in the Community's real gross domestic product was in fact only about 3 g between the third quarter of 1975 - the time when the recovery began to get under way - and the same quarter of 1977. This rate is rather lower than the rate normally recorded two years after the lower turning point of a business cycle has been passed, although activity had never previously declined by so much as in 1974-75.

In the past recoveries have always engendered an improvemont - sooner or later - in the employment situation. This time, the number of persons in paid employment has in fact fallen a little, end the unemployment rate has gone on increasing in most of the Member States, this being mainly owing to higher productivity reserves and the increase in the size of the labour force. For the Community as a whole, the rate was $5.6 \%$ in the third quarter of 1977, compared with $4.8 \%$ two years previously.
1.3. This disappointing performance is accounted for by the inadequacy of the feedback effect and growth diffusion which were features of preceding cyclical recovery phoses. The booster effects on fixed investment demand stemming initially from the need to rebuild depleted stocks and from the recovery in consumption demand, and subsequently from the consolidation of export demand, have fallen short of needs.

The spontonoous fnotore which normelly drive forward economic ectivity will romein veak in the second holf of the yerr. However, a number of developnents should combine to produce more favourable conditions; these include the effects of measures adopted earlier and the relaxation of monetary policy since early 1977, which, though only moderate, has been fairly general.

In most of the member countries, the two demand components most likely to provide more support for the economy in the second half than in the first half of 1977 are private consumption and public expenditure.

The recovery in industrial investment should continue at an appreciable rate in the United Kingdon and Ireland. In certain Member States (Italy, Denmark), the economy will be uore influenced than in the past by restrictions introduced previously.
1.4. With regerd to external peyments, the Community's deficit countries (United Kingdom, Italy, France, Ireland and Denmark) taken together should reduce by more then half their total current eccount deficit for the full year (1). France's current account deficit should be a good deal lower in 1977 than in 1976 ( $\$ 5800 \mathrm{million}$ ). The United Kingdom and Italy will probebly echieve or come neer to equilibriun on their current accounts, contrasting with their deficits in 1976 ( $\& 2500 \mathrm{milli}$ on for the United Kingdom and $\neq 2800$ for Italy). The surplus countries (Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands) will see only a slight drop in their aggregate surplus as compared with 1976. The current balance of the Community taken as a whole should show a deficit of about $\$ 2000$ million in 1977 .
1.5. With regard to price and income trends, the upward movenent in wholesale prices, consumer prices and earnines has gradually slowed down in most of the countries (2). In 1977, the consumer price level in the Commuity will have increased by approximately $9.5 \%$ the rate of inflation will probably be lower than this for the second half-year taken as a whole, The United Kingdom, Italy and Ireland, in particular, have achieved considerable success in their efforts to stem the upward price movement.
(1) Cf. Table 1.
(2) Ci. Tables 5 and 7.
1.6. In 1977, the rate of economic growth for the Coramunity considered as a thole vill probeivly be only about 2.5 , compered with about $4.7 \%$ in 1976 (1).

This disappointing performence is largely a result of the need to combat inflation and restore external payments situations which have led the deficit states to maintain restrictive monetary and budgetary policies. At the same time, the overall effect of policies to restore their economies to a sound footins conducted by the deficit countries have not been offset by more expensionery policies in the "stron currency" countries. In the Federal Republic of Germany, public-sector deficits have been scaled down at a rate which cen be regarded as very fast, given current needs.

Consequently, to achieve the growth objective set for the $1976-30$ period - which would be needed to reduce unemployment from the rate of $5.4 \%$ now expected for 1977 to a rate of $3-4 \%$ by 1980 - the volume of the Community's gross domestic product would have to expand in the coming three years at an annual rate of some $5-6 \%$. But the present outlook suggests a growth rate of something between only $3 \frac{1}{2} \%$ and $4 \%$ for the full period 1976-30, unless there is a suistantiel change in economic policy and an improvement in the social consensus.

The share of gross fixed investment in aross domestic product: will probably fall short of $21 \%$ in 1977, although the fourth programme calls for a figure of $23 \%$ in 1980. To obtein this last figure, the expension in terms of volume of fixed investment should, in the coming three years, be running at at least 7\%; in fact, it was only $3 \%$ in 1976 and vill probably be down to $1 \%$ in 1977.

In comins years, additional apprenticeships and jobs for an annuel increment of 600000 to 800000 . persons will heve to be created. In view of population trends, the anual accrutl of employable persons will rise steadily to more than a million in the eighties.

[^0]1.7. The impaot of atmuctual difficulties on the economy, particularly on unemployment, has increased. It is true that structural problems had been building up in all the Member States well before the economio crisis. But mounting prices for raw materials, the unexpected leap in oil prices, the effects of persistent inflation, the marked changes in exchange rate relationships over the last few years, the general recession in 1974 and 1975, and the increase, in many doveloping oountries, in export-orientated prodiuom tion oapacity, have all helped to make the need for structural adaptation a matter of muoh greater urgency.

All the Member States, without exception, are now in a transitional phase during which demand, production, employment and income structures are undergoing extensive ohange. Economic and psychological obstacles are also hampering their efforts to reduce dependence on outside energy sources. In many areas, no solution has been found to the wide range of structural problems, and as a result uncertainty and cyclical weaknesses have generally become more severe.

## IT. BCONOMTC OUTLOOK ATD OBJECTIVES FOR 1978

2.1. This report outlines the economio prospeots for 1973, t"kins into account economic policy initiatives already
lnom (1). Tt then esteblishes " "normetive scenrio" which, if followed, could well restore economic trends to a normal course and bring actual developments closer to those which re desircble if the objectives set out in the fourth medium-term economic policy progrenme fre to be met.
2.2. The development of world business activity foreseen for 1978 will probably be rather hesitant. The difficulties hempering the mein industrialized non-member countries in their efforis to mrintain (United Stetes) or restore (Japen and Ceneda) sufficient vigour in domestic demrnd are being compounded by those Which $\rho$ firly lerge number of small industrielized countries heve to contend with in their orn efforts to improve their external coounts without impiring unduly economic cotivity ct home. The moderading influence which this situntion is bound to heve on trede trends will be all the greater, if, os is likely, the growth of imports mede by the OPAC countries slows dom. With regerd to the developinc countrios trken as a whole, the volume of their seles is unlikely to rise sherply given the sluggish economic growth in the industrielized countries, and the foreseenble upwerd movement of rer materinls' export prices will be e good deel less ropid then vas the oese until April lest year (2). All in 21 , if the Communty fails to restore imports in terms of volume to sufficent level, it must be assumed that the slowdow in world trade which began in 1976 will continue in 1978. Leaving aside Community purchases, the volume of world.imports will probably grow by only 6


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(1) Such initiatives include the meesures ennounced in Fronce at the end of August, and those thich the Federal Germen authorities implemented in Mreh and others which they emounced in Septenoer. (2) Cf. Chert \(A\).
(3) Cf. Toble 2.
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2.3. Given the foreseeable internations environment and the measures announced or already taken, that autonomous demand forces now emerging the Community undergo no radical change:
(i) the rate of growth of the gross domestic product in real terms of the Community could well reach $3 \frac{1}{2} \%$ in 1978 , or about one percentage point more than in 1977 ( $2 \frac{1}{2} \%$ );
(ii) the number of the wholly unemployed (1977, about 5.9 million) in the Community may be expected to go on increasing; with so many firms working well below capacity, the expansion of production will entail hardly any increase in the number of persons employed; the number of employable persons will increase in 1978 by 500000 to 600000 persons. but not all of these will in fact join the labour force;
(iii) the inflation rate at consumer level may be put at about 8 to $8.5 \%$ (Community average). Declining raw materials prices, generally adequate harvests, and the slowdown in the upward movement of wholesale prices and industrial prices which got under way in the second half of 1977, are all factors favouring what may well be a more substantial improvement, but this can be secured only if further progress is made in curbing the upward movement of wage costs;
(iv) the Community's balance of payments on current account will probably show a surplus, partly because of the moderate trend in domestic demand in the deficit countries and partly because of the growing contribution of North Sea oil. Given the moderate expansion of production, there is little reason to expect any substantial change in the overall situation of the surplus countries total balance of payments as compared with 1977.
2.4. The real GDP growth of about $3 \frac{1}{2} \%$ in 1978 now foreseeable assuming that the Member states economic policies are not changed, would not be enough to bring many firms back to capacity working. In these circumstances, conditions on the labour market would continue to deteriorate. In most of the Member states no stabilization, much less an improvement, in the underlying employment situation can be expected unless a moderate cost trend and lasting GDP growth in terms of volume of at $4-4 \frac{1}{2} \%$ are achieved, and full employment cannot be restored without a much higher medium-term growth rate.

The persistent weakness of demand and pronounced under utilization of production capacity could well aggravate the ageing of plant and equipment and weaken the Community "s ability iv to compete on world markets. Inadequate investment would make the creation of new jobs more difficult in coming years; and unduly slow expansion of production capacity would further delay the structural adaptation processes which are indispensable.
2.5. Since the end of 1976, the development of economic activity has fallen well short of forecasts and objectives set, expansion having failed to achieve sufficient buoyancy in those countries in which overall disequilibria have been least severe. What is therefore now needed is a "normative scenario" for growth.

This "normative economic scenario" for 1978 should include, for the Member States and the Community, a combination of realistic objectives compatible as between themselves and between the various countries. The scenario should provide a policy basis for lasting and sufficient growth and for higher employment am provided for in the fourth medium-term economic policy programme.

It will entail a coordinated economio polioy pumsued by the Member States whioh will not only reinforce the tandenoy for inflation rates to fall but will also add vigour to growth foroea in the Comminty as the year progresses.

These objectives should be the following:
(i) a real GDP growth rate for the Community taken as a whole of $4 \%-4 \frac{1}{2} \%$.
(ii) a halt to the spreading of unemployment and an improvement in the situation on the labour market;
(iii) narrower disparities between the payments balance positions of the various Member States, and an overall Community payments position either in balance or even in deficit;
(iv) a rate of inflation down to 7 to $8 \%$ for the Community average (compared with about $9 \frac{1}{2} \%$ in 1977) and a narrower spread between
....... the extremes, down to a range of under $4 \%$ to $10 \%$ ( $4-18 \%$ in 1977).
a) General guidelines
3.1. These objeotives are by no means out of reach in 1978 if all the Member States pool their efforts. At the present time demand is slack all over the world, and no country, however important its contribution to world trade, can hope to revive economic activity by itself. On the other hand, if the Member States coordinate among themselves and work together with the other industrialized countries, they can mutually strengthen the multiplier effects of the measures they take, instil new confidence in managements and consumers on a lasting basis and thus achieve the growth objectives set without jeopardizing fundamental equilibria.

Responsibility for supporting internal demand at an appropriate level lies first and foremost with the Member States whose balances of payments are relatively strong. However, as the adjustment processes gradually progress, other Community countries will be able to use the room for manoeuvre becoming available to contribute to reinforcing business activity.
3.2. Council Decision $77 / 492 /$ FEC of 25 July 1977 , on the preparation of public budgets for $1978^{(1)}$, provides for fuller use of budgetary policy as an instrument of growth.

The deterioration of economic prospects for next year in relation to those forecast at the end of the spring of 1977 means that this Decision must be implemented more vigorously.

This is clearly necessary in the Member States still running current account surpluses and whose price trends are still relatively favourable. In the other Commanity countries, the question that must be considered is how far the restrictions applied to encourage the restoration of macro-economic equilibria can be relaxed without departing from the present target.
$(1)_{\text {O.J. No. L }} 204$ of 10.8 .1977 , p. 6.
3.3. In wiew of the ghoterall in overall denand, promotion op pmathe
 consumption must aiso be stimulateds but case mat be taken to avoid boosting wage cobtz, In this comection, the adaptation of peranal income tax would in several Member States, be a useful tool, particularly if lowand medium-income groups are given priority, so as to avoid merely increasing saving.
3.4. A laxge number of legal and administrative obstacles (incluciag hold-upa in consultation procedures of various kinds) are delaying the implementation of public investment achenes. Inis is a dangerous development: the paralysis of an instrument which has traditionally played an important role during times of economic difficulties is liable not only to slow down aotivity but, also to generate disequilibris in a subaequent phase of the oyole, when the planed expenditure is in fact disbursed. To combat this danger, Member States and the Communty bodies ghoula poci theix efforts to convince the publio of the need for an investment policy, partioularly in the energy seotor, and to induce all the weaponsible agencies, partioularly the local authorities, to adopt patterns of behaviow more olosely in line with cument economio needs.
3.5. Generally speaking the increase in the net borrowing requirement of the central govermment engendered by the implementation of these recommendations an be largely covered by non-monetary means: in view of the weakness of business investment and ample household saving, it is safe to assume that the scope for long-term financing will be gradually improving in most of the Member States and that the situation on the financial markets will remain relaxed.

The present situation is in fact apparently sound: in general the monetary financing of this needs of the Treasury has contributed, so far this year, only to a limited extent to the increase in the money supply ( $M_{2}$ ).
3.6. Monetary policy will have to be geared to growth and price targets. Smooth progress at the right tempo of the main monetary aggregates is an essential condition for a healthy and lasting recovery. Changes in the aggregates should be properly related to specific situations in each Member State, especially the balance of payments situation. If monetary norms were fixed and published, the two sides of industry would have a useful point of reference for determining wages and prices, and inflationary expectations would be tempirsd. The need to fucilitate the recovery is not, therefore, an argument against monetary norms, but rather an argument for them.

Early in 1978, such norms should be adopted, in quantitative form, at Community level after consultation of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks, and of the Monetary Committee. This is an important aspect of the establishment of a Community strategy designed to improve the convergence of the economies ${ }^{(1)}$.
3.7. The task of getting the economy moving again and of restoring confidence cannot be discharged by the authorities working alone: the success of efforts to achieve the growth goals set and to improve the employment situation will depend on the active partioipation and support of the social partners. Shouldering their responsibilities together, the social partners must face up to the hazards of the current economic trend and the difficulties resulting from the need for medium-term structural change. Wage claims should be properly related to produotivity gains and should allow for tax concessions and stability requirements. Only in this way can the upward cost movement be slowed down, and firms' profits, the propensity to invest, and the competitivity of the Member States be improved.
.../....
(1) Improving coordination of the national economic policies (Commission
communication to the Council, 5 October 1977, coN $77 / 443$ final).
3.8 The cooperation of the aooial partners will be particularly relevant to the implementation of a specific employment policy. An expansion of only moderate proportions, on the soale expected for 1978, will have no immediate impact on unemployment. With so many firms working well short of capacity, a large part of the increase in demand will initially entail only increased productivity gains, an increase in capacity utilization rates, and an improvement in profits, and only later actually compel firms to take on more workers.

This means that new measures in the area of employment policy are needed. These should be of three kinds.

There must first of all be greater emphasis on developing vocational training and retraining and on improving the effeotiveness of employment exchanges.

All the member countries have taken measures to boost job creation, especially for young people. These measures should be followed carefully and their results examined, particularly from the point of view of their effectiveness for thos concerned, but also with a view to Community cooperation.

Finally, in the present situation, any measures taken to reduce working hours should be as flexible as possible, should avoid all forms of administrative constraint and should be restricted to particularly arduous jobs.

The Community instruments (Social Fund and Regional Fund and EIB) should make a substantial contribution to this action, and the Community institutions must also ensure that the implementation of national instruments is properly coordinated, taking account of their effect on amployment.
3.9. Struotural measuree are neaded to meke supply more flexible and to facilitate structural change. These should include:
(i) the implementation of an investment policy based inter alia on the Commanity financing instrument for improving structures, proposed by the Commission;
(ii) a more vigorous drive to achieve energy savinga and to develop replacement forma of energy;
(iii) enoouraging research into and the applioation of new technologies;
(iv) gradual elimination of the large number of administrative obstadea whioh hamper investment by complicating licensing procedures;
(v) elimination of aiscrimination on the financtel maxkets; provision of tax facilities for small and medium-sized firms, and measures to encourage the establishment of new fimma
3.10. Various measures of a general nature designed to encourage investment have been taken or are envisaged at national level. While they are in line with the needs of the economy, they may nevertheless entail the risk of Member States seeking to outbid each other in this field or that the inter-industry cost patterm will be distorted. The right way to teckle this problem is to improve coordination of aid measures at Commanity level and to ensure that more information is available.
3.11. The danger that the business tread may slacken in the Community can be avoided only if the growth of world trade makes a sufficient contribution to economic activity in the Member States. This presupposes continuing growth in the United States, a recovery in domestio demand in Japan and the elimination of the difficulties besetting the smallindustrialized countries and the non-oil-producing developing countries. Imports by the latter countries must be encouraged by an improvement in development aid. Last but not least, everything must be done to combat proteotioniat behaviour pattems.

## b) The guidelines for Member States

3.13 In Denmark, the economic situation in mid-summer was marked by a relatively low level of activity, a persistent, upward trend in unemployment ( $6 \%$ of the labour force), some increase in the rate of inflation and a still quite substantial current account deficit (equal to almost $4 \%$ of GDP). The authorities, naturally anxious to reduce unemployment, have had to take account of the external constraints, whioh has ruled out any across-the-board reflation. The programme approved by the Danish Parliament in late summer complies with this necessity since it calls for tighter domestic demand management to curb imports and scale down the payments deficit. At the same time, selective measures have been taken to stimulate employment by stepping up public-sector investment and creating public-service jobs as well as providing general incentives for private investors through the tax system. These incentives, coupled with the recent adjustment in the exchange rate of the krone following the devaluation of the Swedish krone, are strengthening the competitive position of Danish industry.

The action taken is not expected to have any appreoiable impact on the general profile of economic activity, and growth will probably remain sluggish. There is expeoted to be only a moderate improvement on the investment front, and private consumption may well actially decline for a short while. All in all, gross domestic product will probably increase by barely $2 \%$ in real terms in 1978 as a whole. Thanks to both the shift in resources away from consumption to exports and the less rapid pace of imports, the current account deficit is expected to narrow appreciably. Success of this strategy will, howecer, hinge on more buoyant growth in the world economy. The combined irpact of the new measures and of the devaluation will add moe than $4 \%$ to the upward movement of consumer prices on an annual basis. As a result, prices are expected to climb by some $10 \frac{1}{2} \%$ as in 1977. Apart from the influence of the changes of indirect taxation and the excinange rate it is reckoned that the underlying rats of price momentum during the year.

The recent budgetary policy measures outlined within the Framework of a medium term programme feature an increase in indirect taxation stemming from a higher vaT rate ( $18 \%$ instead of $15 \%$ ), from a greater burden of specific taxes on certain goods and services, and from an increase in some public-service charges and registration duties. The measures also include more generous depreciation arrangements and additional funds earmarked in the budget for expenditure on transfers and public investments schemes. Together, these measures should make it possible to keep the central government deficit to DVr. 10,000 million in the 1978/79 financial year, a lower figure than initially forecast. Taking into account the substantial surpluses of the local authorities, the supplementary pensions scheme and the National Bank, it is expected that the improvement of the public sector position from 1977 to 1978 should reduce the overall public sector deficit to a level below 1 per cent of GDP.

For the purpose of achieving the priority target of a gradual return to external equilibrium, incomes policy should comply strictly with the settlement on incomes this spring. In this way, there will be no need to take further restrictive measures. The upward movement of costs and prices must be stemmed if full advantage is to be taken of the competitive edge gained by the three krone devaluations made since October 1976.

As for monetary policy, it would be advisable to maintain the tight controls on domestic credit so as to encourage capital inflows, with domestic credit being channelled towards export industries. The aim of financing the central government deficit by non-monetary means should be maintained, with the growth in the money supply being held down to that of gross domestic product in money terms, to prevent the success of the adjustment measures undertaken being jeopardized by excess liquidity.
3.14 In the Federal Republic of Germany the rate of growth has continued to falter. The expansion of export demand has lost momentum and the propensity to invest - suffering from the deterioration in the general economic climate and from the spurt in the upward wage cost movement - is also tending to weaken. Implementation of the budgets of the central, Land and local authorities made no net contribution to economic activity in the first six months of 1977, mainly because tax revenues rose faster than expected, but also partly because developments on the expenditure side were hesitant. With demand sluggish, managements were reluctant to step up output. And this meant that no further progress was made in eliminating unemployment either. Overall, gross domestic product in real terms will probably grow by about $3 \%$ in the current year, a figure a good deal lower than the target fixed at the beginning of the year. The balance of payments on current account will probably close with a surplus of about DM 8000 million. But the upward movement in consumer prices has slowed down further, and the average rate for the year will be less than $4 \%$.

If progress is to be made in eliminating unemployment, a GDP growth rate of at least $4 \frac{1}{2} \%$ would have to be aimed for in 1978. The Federal Government agreed in September 1977 on additional measures to strengthen growth and employment. These include, for private consumers, wage and income tax concessions and, for firms, the depreciation rules will be relaxed, assistance for research and development will be doubled, credit facilities will be made available for the establishment of new firms and grants will be provided for energy-saving investment projects. The authorities plan not only full disbursement of budget appropriations for 1977 but, at Federal level, for 1978, an expansionary budget is being prepared (increase in expenditure of more than $10 \%$ ), which is to be supported by the Länder and the local authorities. This means that the overall expenditure of the central and othe aithorities could well increase by a good deal more in 1978 ( 9 ma $9 \%$ ) than in 9977 ( $5 \frac{1}{2}-6 \%$ ). The net borrowing requirement of the Federel ad Länder authorities alone will probably inorease in 1978 by about DM 10000 million, to DM 45000 million.

All in all, the set of measures, which is exnoc ${ }^{2}$, produce multiplier effects particularly with resard to the $\quad$. 3 of investment, covers a total of about DM 11000 millira, to whi : chould be added, for 1978, the volume (about DN 5000 million ) of expenditure generated by tax and budgetary positions already adoptod in the spring.

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Whether these measures will suffice to generate growth of about $4 \frac{1}{2} \%$ is not, however, certain. In this connection, it is of particular importance that planned fander and munioipality expenditure should be disbursed more quickly than in the past. In addition to overall measures to boost demand, selective measures to assist the labour market will also be needed to achieve a better mutual adaptation of supply and demand on the labour market.

Those responsible for monetary policy should take account of the more dynamic performance of the economy, and take as working hypothesis accelerated real growth of at least $4 \frac{1}{2} \%$.

Any improvement in growth and employment will depend largely on the outcome of the next round of wage negotiations. The tax reliefs approved should make it easier for the two sides of industry to adjust wage claims and pricing policies to the requirements of the economy. Individual firms should also take advantage without delay of investment incentives introduced. A matter of particular importance for future growth is that administrative and other obstacles to investment, which at the present time are not only holding up investments totalling DM $10-15000 \mathrm{milli}$ ( 15 in the construction of power stations, but are delaying other projeots as well, including road building, should be eliminated as quickly as possible.
3.15 In France the only component of aggregate denand to make any substantial contribution to increased activity in 1977 was exports. Investment has been affected by the weakness of demand. Admittedly the measures taken to sustain the rate of activity during the year have not yet produced their full impact. In response to the weakness of economic activity unemployment oontinued to worsen until the middle of the year.

The low growth in demand has meant that the volume of imports has been modest, so that despite some worsening in the terms of trade, essentially due to the fall in the franc in 1976, and the rapid rise in the prices of tropical foods, the trade defioit has narrowed considerably.

While the rate of growth of both real and money wages has greatly moderated in 1977 and the prices set by public authortities have had some moderating impact, the overall consumer price index has suffered, particularly in the first half of the year, from rapid price inoreases in food, although the norm has been barely exceeded in the case of manufactured goods. In the latter months of this year inflationary pressures should diminish, but also next year the lagged effects of the moderation in current wage settlements, the slight fall in the cost of credit, the strength of the franc and the falls in prices of jaported raw materials in 1977 as well as improved productivity, should be reflected in lower rates of price increase. This continuing slow-down ahould permit a further restraint in next year's wage settlements.

Both the early success obtained in reducing the inflation rate and in moving towards external equilibrium would be compromised by too much stimulatory action. But the authorities could find some room for manoeuvre with the balance of trade moving towards equilibrium and the expected budget deficit for 1977 at less than 1\% GDP. Moreover the French economy possesses large reserves of productivity which must be used in the struggle against inflation.

The govermment budget for 1978, which has recently been tabled, incorporates a target of $4.5 \%$ growth in the volume of the gross domestic
product. Should the economy not move in line with this forecast, additional measuresmight prove justified during the year to sustain the recovery, subject to the international context and progress towards reducing the rate of inflation. These measures should include particularly aid to firms to develop their training programs and to expand their hiring of young people who have previously not had a job. It would be also valuable to develop the public retraining programs.

The general stance of monetary policy should be maintained. However, to prevent the selective credit policy producing lasting distortions in the productive system, the system of oredit controls might in the event have to be revised. Moreover interest rates are now at a level compatible with the objectives for the balance of payments and the exchange rate of the franc.
3.16. In Ireland, growth should oontinue at an appreciable rate during the months ahead under the combined impaot of a rapia expansion of industrial and agricultural exports and a further sharp increase in investment. In addition, private consumers' expenditure is likely to accelerate at the beginning of 1978 owing to the effect on incomes of measures planned by the Irish Government, which will also stimulate public consumption. For 1978 as a whole, GDP should grow at a rate sufficient to reduce unemployment, taking account of the prospective increase in the labour force. The sharp expansion of overall demand will entail a substantial increase in imports, and despite an improvement in the terms of trade, the balanoe of payments will move further into defioit.

Under these conditions, economic policy will have to be based primarily on a careful regulation of domestic demand so as to avoid the dangers inherent in overmstimulation of consumption demand. Although it would bring about a temporary improvement in the employment situation, such a development would ultimately necessitate undesirable measures to curb activity.

Incomes policy should aim to achieve greater moderation in wage agreements. Nominal pay increases should, in 1978, be kept within the limits envisaged by the government. Linked with tax concessions as already proposed this would allow real increases in take-home pay.

Within this context budgetary policy should be framed in such a manner as to give maximum effect to govemment policy aimed at employment stimulation, which implies, in particular, a very tight management of nonpriority expenditure. Given the appreciable reduction in the net borrowing requirement of central government in 1976 and again in 1977, which has brought this figure to below $11 \%$ of gross national product (as against $16.8 \%$ in 1975 ), some increase could be envisaged for 1978. On the receipts side, if reliefs in income taxation are such as to favour a moderate development of gross incomes, while at the same time improving disposable income, further progress should be made towards widening the basis of tax assessment.

With regard to monetary policy, bank lending to the private sector should increase roughly in line with GDP in value so as to keep pace with the upturn in the economy. However, this aggregate would have to be restricted if too much liquidity were oreated as a result of Treasury borrowing. Owing to the substantial loss of liquidity as a result of the balance of payments deficit, the rate of growth of the money supply should, as in 1976 and 1977, be lower than that of GDP in value.
3.17. In Italy, the uptum whioh began in 1975 fjst decelerated aharply and then gave way to recessive tendencies during the fixst half of 1977, mein? y
 tended to rise, inflation slackened During the first hale of the yeary ftalian exports grew rapidly whereas imports slowed sharply owing to the slackening of domestic activity. The current account therefore improved appreciably and the lira remained remaxkably stable.

The improvement in internal and external equilibrium was caused majnly by the austerity policy pursued by the Italian government since last autumn. It is already anticipated that the fall-off in domestic demand during this year will make it possible to achieve the main goals agreed for 1977 with the Community as regards consumer prices and the current account.

If the progress made to restoring equilibrium is to be consolidated however a cautious approach to short-term economic policy will be needed in the remainder of 1977 and in 1978.

Short-term economic policy must aim for the objectives fixed last May in connection with the new Community loan to Italy (a surplus on current account of at least Lit 1000000 million in 1978 and consumer price rises limited to $8 \%$ between December 1977 and December 1978) 1 . Policy should therefore aim to limit the growth of internal demand while at the same time encouraging productive investment and tempering the growth of unit costs.

## the <br> competitive position should be continued, particularly

 in agriculture, in the energy field and in industries whose products must be adapted to the changing pattern of demand. Specific action to bolster investment in the building and construction industry would be appropriate, since this would provide employment for appreciable numbers without increasing imports to any marked degree.These objectives can hardly be achieved in 1978 without a major contribution from public finance policy. The aim should be, among other things, to limit the State budget deficit to the order of Lit 10000000 millions, which implies further substantial efforts to increase public revenue. But above all it is necessary to obtain a marked reduction in the rate of growth of expenditure, both at the level of the State and other public authorities and success here will depend on a series of
 mecoushichethon of cortan promties, a polioy of genexally curbing the gowth of expenditare mill zevortheless hevs to be reconoiled with the need for men
 aector.

The oredit pollicy to be purcued in 1978 must follow its present restriotive line such thet the rate of increase in the money supply ( $M_{2}$ ) be kept appreciady below thet of gross domestic product in value. In order to avoid undesirable outflows of short- and long-term capital, interest rates will have to be kept at an appreciably higher level than in Italy's principal partner countries, particularly in view of the heavy short-term external indebtedness of the banks. In the event that further progress is made is reducing inflation, the absolute level of interest rates could be noticeably reduced.

Under the likely assumption that, largely due to the continued strength of exports, the economic situation will tend to improve after the end of 1977 , these policies as a whole should allow a real growth of gross domestic product of more than $2 \%$ in 1978.
3.18. In the Netherlands, the forecasts,based on downwardly-revised assumptions in respect of world trade, hold out little hope of any spontaneous improvement in the economic situation during the 18 months ahead. Real gross domestic product is likely to grow by $2 \frac{1}{2} \%$ in 1977, a much lower rate than originally forecast. As far as the prospects for 1978 are concerned, everything indicates that, in the absence of additional measures to bolster activity in the Community as a whole, the rate of growth will again fall well below the minimum required to prevent a further increase in unemployment, the rate of which, for 1977, will probably be about $4.6 \%$ of the active population.

The Netherlands appear to be well placed to give a stronger impetus do demand. In point of fact, the rise in consumer prices has remained fairly modest (due, in part, to the appreciation of the guilder since autumn 1976, but also to a slowdown in the growth of wage costs) and the balance of payments will probably remain in surplus in 1977 despite the fact that exports mariked time in the first half of the year. The general government net borrowing requirement in 1977 should not exceed approximately $3 \%$ of gross domestic product, a relatively low figure given the economic context.

Accordingly, economic policy should do more within the framework of joint action in a certain number of Member States, to stimulate activity in 1978. Since, however, it is important to avoid a situation in which the rise in public expenditure assumes a permanent character, the action of the authorities should be reversible. Moreover, since the possibility of expanding private investment seems limited in the short term, it will be necessary to encourage private consumption. This support might take the form of a lessening of the income-tax burden and a reduction in social security contributions, to the extent that such measures can be coupled with further moderation in the rise in nominal incomes, so as to improve the medium-term prospects for employment and productive investment. Taking into account the increased VAT on energy products proposed in the 1978 draft budget, which is designed to bring about structural adaptation, the central government net borrowing requirement will thus increase from $F L$, 7,500 million in 1977 to FL 12,000 million in 1978 ( $4.2 \%$ of GDP).

The financing of such an increase in the public sector deficit is consistent with the monetary policy pursued since the spring of 1977, which is tending to reduce the liquidity of the Dutch economy. This policy must, however, be administered flexibly so as not to impede economic recovery.

Finally, it is essential that the effort which has been made, through the budget, to bolster activity should be accompanied by moderation in the rise of wage costs.
3.19. In Belgium, economic activity has tended to level off since the beginning of the year, while unemployment has continued to increase. In 1977 real gross domestic product should grow by some $21 / 2 \%$, a rate well below the original forecasts. The trend of activity holds out little hope of any marked spontaneous acceleration in the rate of expansion in 1978. Economic policy should, therefore, seek to establish an environment more favourable to economic activity and to restore the confidence of firms and households.

Belgium is one of a group of countries whose balance of payments has remained favourable; the current account will be in balance in 1977 and could show a surplus in 1978. The upward movement of prices has slowed down: the year-to-year rate of increase had fallen to approximately $6.5 \%$ in september 1977. The existence of a heavy budget deficit - the rapid increase of which in recent years is largely due to the effects of built-in budget stabilizers and of measures designed to sustain activity through public investment and aids to expansion - limits the possibilities for the authorities to take action to stimulate the economy. The draft budget for 1978 foresees an expansion of public investment programmes and includes a scheme for the absorbtion of unemployment (which will affect about 80,000 people), as well as a partial and regressive indexation of income taxes. Other fiscal measures are proposed, with the objective of limiting the net borrowing requirement of the Central Government to Bars 185,000 million (or $5.9 \%$ of GDP, compared with $6.5 \%$ in 1977). As a result, largely, of expansionary measures taken nationally and within the Community, such a deficit is compatible with a growth of GDP in real terms of $3 \frac{1}{2} \%$ in 1978. If such a growth rate were not to be attained, the deficit must be expected to deteriorate, given the particularly marked influence of the automatic stabilisers.

A deficit even of the above size might still be financed by monetary means if the economic situation were to emerge as less favourable than is hoped at present. A rate of increase of credit granted by financial intermediaries to households and undertakings of the same order as that of the value of gross domestic product would reserve a sufficient margin for the financing of investment.
3.20. Economic developments in Luxembourg in 1977 give no indications of recovery, so far, and there is nothing to suggest an appreciable upswing between now and the end of the year. While domestic demand should remain relatively buoyant, mainly owing to the healthy performance of investment (primarily rationalization investment in the iron and steel industry), exports will probably increase at only a moderate pace. The growth of real gross domestic product should be around $11 / 2 \%$ in 1977 and the present outlook suggests only a weak acceleration in 1978. The fall in the total number employed and the increase in unemployment may continue, and the difficulties which certain firms have to contend with are likely to persist.

In these conditions, selective measures to assist employment will probably be necessary for some time to come. Since, moreover, a heavier tax burden must be avoided in the short term, some increase in the central government borrowing requirement, not exceeding Lars 1,900 million, must be accepted.
3.21 Since the end of 1976, there has been a substantial improvement in overseas confidence in the United Kingdom economy which has transformed its financial situation. This followed the approval by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the tightening of monetary and budgetary policy for the following two years announced by the UK Government in the second half of 1976. As a result there has been a strong demand for sterling, a massive increase in official reserves, a rapid fall in interest rates, and present indications are that the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and the expansion of domestic credit for the financial year 1977/78 will be well within the limits agreed with the IMF. In contrast to the continued improvements in financial indicators, the level of output contracted somewhat in the first half of the year, when private consumption and both private and public investment fell sharply, before recovering singificantly in the second half-year. Between 1976 and 1977, the rate of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) is likely to be only about $\frac{1}{2} \%$. This increase will be entirely due to a sustained movement of resources into the balance of payments, largely the result of increased North Sea oil production and the strong growth of manufacturing exports. The current account for 1977 is expected to show a deficit of about $\ddagger \frac{1}{2}$ billion, an improvement of about $I 1$ billion over the previous year. Against the background of low economic growth, unemployment has continued to increase and the rate of price inflation, although falling markedly in the second half of the year, is likely, for 1977 as a whole, to have been twice that recorded in the UK's principal competitor countries.

The outlook for 1978 is largely dependent on the growth of earnings during the coming months. If the rate of increase in earnings, between July 1977 and July 1978 is not significantly different from the Government's target of $10 \%$, the British economy could record a rate of growth of GDP of about $2 \frac{1}{2} \%$ whilst inflation could be reduced to about $10 \%$. There could be a large surplus on the current account of the balance of payments of some ゅ 1 billion. In such circumstances, there would be sufficient room for manoeuvre to enable reflationary measures to be introduced without jeopardising the economic policy objectives agreed with the IMF and without aggravating inflationary pressures.

However, at present, such a forecast should be treated with caution If the growth of eamings does not remain within the limit indicated by the authorities, the atill fragile success obtained in the fight against inflation would be threatened once again. With such an outlook, the economy would be stimulated by concunption-led growth and the introduction of reflationary fiscal measures would no longer be appropriate; the Government might even need to consider cancelling the automatic adjustment of tax allowances.

Until such time as it becomes clear that more moderate trends in wage and price inflation have become firmly established, the authorities should continue to follow the monetary and fiscal policies outlined in the Letter of Intent to the IMF which have made such an important contribution towards restoring overseas confidence. This would imply that the rate of growth ${ }^{*}$ in the money supply as broadly defined (sterling M3), through the fiscal year 1978/79, should remain below that of GDP in value terms.

In any event, unemployment must continue to be tackled in the short term by improving employment support schemes.
IV. CONCLUSTONS

The main danger of the present situation is that demand will mark time at a level at whioh the eoonomy's kuilt-in adjustment mechanisms, and the propensity to consume and to invest, are no longer sufficient to ensure lasting, self-supporting growth and to stop the spread of unemployment. The tendency towards protectionism and towards stop-gap defensive measures is gaining strength both within firms and at national and international level. The ability to make struotural adjustments is gradually disappearing. Consequently, in the long term, an ever-lax ger mass of structurally unemployed could well be added to the cyclical unemployment resulting from an under-utilization of capacities. Problems which originally appeared to be mainly short term are liable increasingly to assume a more permanent nature.

The diffioulties, internal and external in origin, which are confronting the Member States as a whole, call for a Community strategy to be implemented to give aupport to economic activity.

Efforta should continue to place primary reliance on private and public investment. In several member countries, however, having regard to the low level of capacity utilization, it is also necessary to support private consumption. In order to prevent the resurgenoe of inflationary pressures this action should be reversible and implemented in a manner which does not accentuate the wage and salary cost push. Measures in the employment and training areas should complement demand management polioy. A retum to protectionism would only serve as a useless palliative and would create in its wake even more serious difficulties.

The measures to support economic development, which will be graduated aocording to the partioular positions of the various Member States, should facilitate a return to a sustained and stable growth path bolstered up by a greater degree of convergence of the economies within the Community.


## TABLE 1

DEvELOPMENT OF THE PRINGIPAL MACRO-ECONOMIC AGGREGATES IN THE COMMNNTMT

(1) Over the previous year.
(2) The rate of unemployment indicated in parenthesis is that obtained by adopting for Italy data prepared by the Ministry of Labour instead of ISTAT. 1977: estimates.

## Source: Departments of the Commission.

TABLE?
PROLUCTION AND TRADF, IN THE WORLD ECONOMI


World prices of raw materials (in \$)


Source: HWWA.


- Graph B
-RESULTS OF THE BUSINESS SURVEY OF COMMUNITY INDUSIRY (1)

(1) Excluding construction, food, beverages and tobacco.
TABLE4.
DEVELOPMENT OF UHHPLOMENT IN THE COMUNITY
Unemployment rates ( 1 ) since 1974

(1) Number of registred unemployed as of oivilian labour force. Seasonally adjusted. As definitions are not uniform, unemployment rates are not comparable from country to country.
Source: FIROSTAT and departments of the Commission.

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Schaubild:C - Graph C - Oraph1qua C
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ARBEITSLOSIGKEIT-UNEMPLOYMENT-CHOMAGE

Mio

M: Honmes - Male - Männer
F: Femmes - Female - frauen

EUR 9
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3. 

2

1


 Seasonally cCisited (iolust monthe, mowing overeded Oesoisonnolise (iderniere mout; moyinne mobul)

Uu*lle Sourve: EUROSTAT
TABLE 5

(1) Quarterly indices.
2) Quarterly variations.
(3) Up to August.
Source: WUROSTAT.
TABLE6
DEVELOPIERT OF THE MATN COMPONEUTS OF COMSUMER PRICES IN THE COMGNITY

|  | Total |  |  |  |  | FOODSTUFFS |  |  |  |  | NONLFOODSTUFFS |  |  |  |  | SERVICES |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |  | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |  | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |  | 1974 | 1975 | 1976 | 1977 |  |
|  |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Jan. } \\ & \text { July } \end{aligned}$ | July |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Jan. } \\ & \text { July } \end{aligned}$ | July |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{\|l\|} \hline \text { Jan. } \\ \text { July } \\ \hline \end{array}$ | July |  |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Jan. } \\ & \text { July } \end{aligned}$ | July |
| Denmark | 15.3 | 9.6 | 9.0 | 10.6 | 11.4 | 12.1 | 10.0 | 11.1 | 14,6 | 17.5 | 19.1 | 7,8 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 14.8 | 12.7 | 7.9 | 10.3 | 11.2 |
| FR Germany | 7.0 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 4,0 | 4,3 | 5,0 | 5,4 | 5,4 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 8.7 | 5.9 | 3,8 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 7.5 | 6.5 | 4.8 | 4.7 | $4 . \varepsilon$ |
| France | 13.6 | 11.7 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 10.1 | 12,3 | 11,2 | 10,7 | 12.9 | 15.3 | 16.0 | 11.5 | 7,8 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 12,5 | 13.2 | 12.0 | 10,2 | $9 . \varepsilon$ |
| Irelend | 17.0 | 20.9 | 17.9 | 15.3 | 14.0 | 14.5 | 20.9 | 15.8 | 16.2 | 15.1 | 23.0 | 21,4 | 15.3 | 15.2 | 15.2 | 14,1 | 22,9 | 24,6 | 14,7 | 12. |
| Italy | 19.2 | 17.0 | 16.7 | 20.0 | 18.8 | 18.7 | 18.5 | 17,5 | 20.9 | 21.1 | 25.5 | 14.3 | 16.9 | 22.6 | 19.8 | 14.2 | 20,1 | 16.6 | 17,0 | 15.7 |
| Hotherlands | 9.8 | 9.9 | 8.9 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 6.0 | 7.7 | 9.6 | 7.9 | 8,9 | 10,8 | 10.1 | 8,3 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 9.1 | 12.7 | 10.3 | 8,9 | 8, $\varepsilon$ |
| Belgium | 12.7 | 12.8 | 9.2 | 7.5 | 7.2 | 9.3 | 11.4 | 12.5 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 14.0 | 11.3 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 14.3 | 15.0 | 10.3 | 11.2 | 11.6 |
| Luxembourg | 9.5 | 10.8 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 9.1 | 10.5 | 17.6 | 7.9 | 7,8 | 10.0 | 10.7 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 9.9 | 12.5 | 11.9 | 10.7 | $9 .:$ |
| United Kingdom | 16.0 | 24.2 | 16.5 | 17,0 | 17,5 | 16,5 | 25,1 | 19,4 | 20,7 | 22,0 | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : | : |
| Community | 13.0 | 13.8 | 11.3 | 11.9 | 12.1 | 11.9 | 14.0 | 12.9 | 14.2 | 15.4 | 15.1 | 10,1 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 9.3 | 11.0 | 12.5 | 10.5 | 10,1 | 9.7 |

Sou:ce : EUROSTAT
data not available.
TABLE $\quad 7$
EVOLUTION OF WAGE COSTS IN THE COMMUNITY (1974-1977)
(Percentage change on preceding year)

Source : Commission.
TABLE 8
development of taports and exports in value teras (Intra and extra cee)

|  |  |  |  |  |  | M P 0 | 0 RT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | X | 0 R |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | 1974 | 1975 |  |  | 1976 |  | 97 | $77($ |  |  | xtr | 197 |  | 197 |  | 76 |  |  |  | 7 | 3) |
|  | In | Ex | In ${ }^{\text {ax }}$ | In | Ex | In | Ex | In | -x | in | $\pm$ | In | Ex | In | \#x | In | Ex | In | E ${ }^{2}$ | In | Ex | in |  |
| Dermark! | 3.3 | 3.5 | 27,828, | 4,8 | 3,123 | 23.717 | 717.2 |  |  |  | -15,1 | 24 | 3.2 | 178 | 30,8 | 17,7 | 8,8 | 6,5 | 3.5 | 16,1 | , | -1/s, | -18, |
| FR Germany- | 24.2 | 23,1 | 17, 39,1 | 12,1 | 5,813 | 13.2 | 219.4 |  |  |  |  | 28, 8 |  | 27, |  | -1,5 | 4, 0 | 17.4 | 7,6 | 10,2 |  | 0,8 | 8 17.0 |
| France | 18.2 | 17,7 | 22,867,9 | 4,8 | -0,1212 | 21,317 | 17,9 | 2,4 | 2,4 | 11.6 | -1,6 | 17, 4 |  | 22,2 | 37.6 | 4,6 | 22.7 | 7.3 | 4,7 | 20,2 | 12, | -0,4 | 23, |
| Ireland | 1.9 | 0,8 | 30.553,6 | 0,0 | -3.912 | 12,1120, | 110.9 | 08.0 | -2, 1 | :10,4 | 7.0 | 1.4 | 40.5 | 22,0 | 35,5 | 28,6 | 4.4 | 0.1 | 23. | 213, | 45, | 34,5 | 63,0 |
| Italy | 12.6 | 15.1 | 23,265,2 | -5.4 | -7.412 | 25, 12 | \|12,8 | -9.3 | -0. 226 | 26.7 | 25,8 | 9.9 | 912. | 24.1 | 50,1 | 13.4 | 14,9 | 13.6 | 1.5 | 11, | 15,2 | 415.2 | 64,2 |
| Ne therlands | 13.8 | 9.1 | 27, $0^{48,7}$ |  | 6.61 | 11,1 | 128,8 | 2, | 44323 | 38.6 | 28. | 516,8 |  | 34,3 | 46,2 | 6,6 | 5,5 | 16,3 | 10,4 | 5,7 | , | -0.4 | -3, |
| BLEJ | 14,3 | 6.5 | 25,8,56,8 | 3.3 | -0.7 | 18.1 | 125.1 | 18.8 | 37.61 |  | -7,4 | 14.2 | 26 | 20.8 | 41.5 | 2.4 | -0,6 | 20.3 | 2.8 | 10, | 17, | -2, | 40, |
| United Kingdom | 11,7 | 24. | 27, 845.2 | 6,1 | -5.2 | 4,8 | 6,1 | 84,8 |  |  | 23,4 | 9,2 | 18, | 30,7 | 24,9 | 9,5 | 14,9 | 16,9 | i,0 | 45, | 11, |  | 6, 34, |
| $\%$ of total | 100 | 100 | 24.350,7 | 5.2 | -0.41 | 14.6 | 14.7 | 10.4 | ¢ $\cdot \mathrm{P}$ | 7.0 | 2.3 | 100 | 100 | 26.2 | 27,5 | 4.8 | 10,3 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 2.7 | 2. 1 | 3.2 |  |
|  |  |  | 145.953 .1 | 48.0 | 52. | 9.3. | 51.6 | 48. ${ }^{\text {F }}$ | 戠.喪: | \% 3.9 | p1.1 |  |  |  | 19,3 | 49,1 | 50.9 | 51.5 | 43A | 451.9 | 8,1 | 510 |  |
| (1) Caloulatel on the basis of data expressed in US dollars.(2) Relative parts in 1974.(3) Seasonally adjusted data; quarterly variation expressed at en annual rate. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sources Eurostar and Departnents of the Commission. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

(1) Community: extramcommunity trade.
Source: EUROSTAT and departments of the Comission.
TABLE 10



|  | Money supply (1) |  |  |  | Short term interest rates (2) |  |  |  | Long terminterest rates (3) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Dec. '75 | Dec. '76 | March'77 | Latest menth know | Dec. ' 75 | Dec.' 76 | Dec. '77 | Latest month known | Dec. ' 75 | Dec. ${ }^{\prime} 76$ | Dec. ' 77 | Latest month know |
| Denmark | 25,1 | 11.5 | 9,0 | 8.5(5) | 3,0 | 13,50 | 13,5 | 18,0(9) | 13,2 | 15.2 | 15.5 | 15.8(9) |
| FR Germany | 8.6 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 9.9.(5) | 3.9 | 5.0 | 4,5 | 4,0(5) | 8.6 | 7.4 | 7,0 | 6.1 (5) |
| France | 15.9 | 12,8 | 12,3 | 8,7(4) | 6.5 | 10,4 | 9,7 | 8,6(5) | 10,2 | 11,0 | 10.9 | 11.0(9) |
| Ireland | 20.7 | 14.3 | 15,3 | 15,4(6) | 10.9 | 14,8 | 10,8 | 7,6(8) | 14,6 | 15,5 | 12.7 | 13,6(8) |
| Italy | 23.5 | 22.3 | 21,7 | 23,4(4) | 8.3 | 16,8 | 16.5 | 13.4(4) | 10,5 | 14,2 | 14,8 | 14.4(9) |
| Netherlands | . 5.7 | 22,7 | 24,4 | 14.8'(8) | 4.4 | 6,4 | 5,5 | 2.7 (5) | 7.7 | 7.5 | 7.6 | $6,7(5)$ |
| Belgium | 17,2 | 13.4 | 12,4 | 12,4(7) | 3,9 | 7,4 | 5,5 | 5.0(5) | 8.5 | 9,3 | 9.1 | 8,6(5) |
| United Kingdom | : 7.9 | 11.9 | 6.4 | 6.4(5) | 10,2 | 13,8 | 9,7 | 6,7(4) | 14,8 | 15,5 | 13.3 | 13,1(5) |

[^1]

Graph D
Exchange rates
(ureighted change in \% since Ist Quarter 1972; wrighting according to structure of exports)


[^0]:    (1) Cf. Table 1.

[^1]:    (1). M2; United Kingdom, Ireland and FR Germany: M3; percentage change on corresponding month of previous year.
    (2) Day to dey money rates; monthly average; Denmark: last day of month.
    (3) Yield on bonds.
    (4) July. (5) August. (6) May. (7) March. (8) June. (9) September.

    Source: Departments of the Commission.

