Integrating Muslims into Western Societies: Transatlantic Policies and Perspectives

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For Presentation at the Eleventh Biennial
European Union Studies Association International Conference

Los Angeles, California
Saturday, April 25, 2009

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the extent to which Muslims are integrated in Western societies by comparing their experiences in the United States and Europe. It utilizes and assesses country-level data, such as public opinion polls, figures on discrimination, and data on participation in society, in order to draw comparisons between these two regions. First, integration debates and approaches are reviewed in order to provide a framework for comparison. Second, public opinion surveys are interpreted to see how factors affecting the Muslim community differ between the United States and Europe. Third, the United States and United Kingdom - countries that both espouse multiculturalism - are used as case studies to see how Muslim integration compares over time and in relation to the general public. Findings suggest that the inclusion of Muslims in U.S. society has been more successful on the whole, while European countries continue to struggle with eliminating large differences between the Muslim community and the general public. Moreover, Muslims in the United States seem to face less discrimination than other minorities, and their experience appears to be improving over time. In contrast, discrimination against Muslims in the United Kingdom is more severe than other religious groups, and seems to be remaining constant.

INTRODUCTION

Muslim integration into Western societies has become of increasing importance to policymakers and researchers since 9/11. The idea that exclusion of Muslim communities from mainstream society threatens international security has gained particular currency in Europe as a result of attacks in Amsterdam, Madrid, and London and riots in Paris. That most of those involved in these terrorist incidents were European citizens of Asian or African descent brought many to question integration and immigration policies and the extent to which these policies can foil a future "homegrown" attack.

Terrorism in Europe has prompted several researchers to examine Muslim integration in the West (Haddad and Smith 2002; Malik 2004a; Angenendt et al. 2007; Sinno 2009). Yet these studies tend to concentrate on integration within individual countries rather than in cross-national comparison. A notable exception is Cesari (2004), but her study underscores the transformation and reconciliation of Islam in the West, rather than the extent to which Muslims are included into Western societies. In contrast, Schain's (2009) analysis focuses specifically on Muslim

integration and provides a useful critique of how France, Britain, and the United States "manage difference" in national policies. Some have exclusively researched integration in Europe (Malik 2004b; Nielsen 2004; Fetzer and Soper 2005; Klausen 2005; Tausch et al. 2007; Israeli 2008). Others have looked at the U.S. case (Hasan 2000; Abdul-Ghafur 2005; Cateura 2005; Verbrugge 2005; McCloud 2006). Though these studies provide rich descriptions of the Muslim experience in these respective regions, they do not elicit insight gleaned from transatlantic perspective.

In this study, I aim to contribute to research on Muslim integration by employing a comparative case study analysis to observe how integration differs between the United States and Europe. I operationalize integration by considering opinions of Muslims and the general public, figures on discrimination, and data on participation in society, such as education and employment. Much of this analysis focuses on providing interpretation of open-source data that allows for two types of comparison. First, some data allow for direct comparison between the United States and Europe and usually come from transatlantic public opinion surveys. Second, other data allow for analysis of Muslim integration within a specific country over time or in relation to the general public or another minority group. This approach standardizes the way in which comparison between two countries can be achieved. Some academic research, like Cateura's *Voices of American Muslims*, and governmental reports, such as the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia's "Perceptions of Discrimination and Islamophobia," provide detail on discrimination against Muslims, but do not put this discrimination in context by establishing a point of reference. It is true that Muslims in the West face discrimination, but to what extent? How does Muslim integration in Europe and the United States differ?

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I consider debates and approaches relating to integration in order to provide a framework for studying the Muslim experience. Second, I analyze the results of a series of Pew surveys in order to make general comments on the extent to which Muslims are included in U.S. and European societies. Third, I specifically examine the cases of Muslim integration in the United States and the United Kingdom by examining opinion surveys, incidents of discrimination, and levels of access to society. This approach allows the two states to be compared systematically. Finally, I conclude by offering three key observations on integration in the United States and Europe.

INTEGRATION DEBATES AND APPROACHES

Angenendt (2007) identifies three debates that underscore the relationship between immigration, integration, and security as they relate to the Islamic challenge in Europe. They are particularly useful in contextualizing the transatlantic comparison of Muslim integration.

The first debate links immigration to terrorism (Angenendt 2007). This is an association that Chebel d'Appollonia and Reich (2008) refer to as the "securitization of immigration." The 9/11 attacks highlighted vulnerabilities in the U.S. border control apparatus and demonstrated that terrorists could circumvent the immigration system.   Thus, the United States made immigration a key component in its post-9/11 counterterrorism policy. The connection between immigration and security became clear when the responsibilities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were transferred to the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Some Europeans have followed the U.S. lead, resulting in what many refer to as "Fortress Europe." For example, as the gateway between North Africa and Europe, Spain has implemented more restrictive immigration policies to control the flow of immigrants, especially

since the 2004 Madrid bombings. Those that subscribe to this debate argue that tough immigration policies can mitigate the risk of terrorism.

The second debate centers on how Islam is changing Europe's "cultural security" (Angenendt 2007). Some argue that the increasing presence of Muslims in Europe is eroding the conventional European ethos, pointing to Denmark and Turkey as illustrations. In Denmark, the provocative depictions of Mohammed in 2005 and politician Geert Wilders' incessant anti-Islamic diatribes exemplify tensions between the Muslim community and Danish society. Though these views may be the exception rather than the rule, Denmark also struggles with aspects of Islamic culture, including arranged marriages and wearing the *hijab*. Moreover, Turkey's accession to the European Union is another point of contention. Some do not want to see Turkey become European, insisting that Europe is a "Christian club." Austria's opposition to Turkey's accession is widely believed to be rooted, at least in part, in Islamophobia. For some Europeans, Jimenez (2008) argues, "the possibility of 70 million Turkish, mainly Muslim, people becoming part of the EU poses a cultural threat."

The third debate cuts between the first two arguments and highlights the marginalization that some Muslims experience while living in Europe (Angenendt 2007). The logic follows that disenfranchisement leads to anger, which induces acts of aggression and violence. The London bombings in 2005 and the assassination of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 – both homegrown terrorist incidents – lead some to believe that exclusion from mainstream society breeds Islamist militancy. Robert Leiken (2005), from the Nixon Center, for example, endorses this belief in his contentious *Foreign Affairs* article, "Europe's Angry Muslims." He affirms, "As a consequence of demography, history, ideology, and policy, western Europe now plays host to often disconsolate Muslim offspring, who are its citizens in name but not culturally or

socially." Similarly, Shore (2006) contends that Europe is "breeding bin Ladens." Proponents argue that the way to prevent terrorism is by constructing effective social integration policy and promoting participation in public life.

The United States and Europe generally agree that integrating Muslims is necessary in its own right in order to increase satisfaction and social capital among Muslim populations, regardless of whether social exclusion breeds terrorism. But approaches to integration have varied considerably across the West. The more common policies include assimilation, multiculturalism, and guest worker programs, and each adopts different goals and produces varying results.

France espouses assimilation. This is marked by *laïcité* and republicanism, which establish a strong separation between church and state, guarantee citizens the right to express their faith, but exclude religion from public policy (Gallis et al. 2005). Schain (2009, 5-6) argues that France extends neither privilege nor protection to ethnic and religious groups. As such, France does not adhere to quota systems or affirmative action, believing that equal rights foster equal opportunity (Gallis et al. 2005). For example, the government prohibits Muslim girls from wearing the *hijāb* in schools (with few exceptions) and maintains no state-funded Islamic schools (Fetzer and Soper 2005). Though religious diversity is encouraged outside the public sphere, all are expected to learn French and adopt French values.

Contrary to the French model, Britain has advocated multiculturalism, which promotes "tolerance and integration while allowing immigrants and ethnic groups to maintain cultural identities and customs" (Gallis et al. 2005, 12). This approach fosters recognition of British norms and values, but encourages the preservation of personal culture and advocates anti-discrimination. Individualism, diversity, and group membership are equally stressed in both

private and public life. Similarly, the United States has promoted multiculturalism. Schain (2009, 32) observes that multiculturalism in the United States developed out of the civil rights movement and race relations in the 1960s, which shaped integration of immigrant communities by "providing a strong, pro-active national anti-discrimination structure." Contrary to the United Kingdom, in the United States, diversity is not always appreciated, but is common, while tolerance is not always granted, but is expected.

Guest worker programs became widespread across Europe after the Second World War when reconstruction was necessary, economies were strong, but labor was scarce. Immigrants traveled to Europe to fill labor shortages, but were required to return home after a few years. In this sense, guest worker programs did not have a strong integration component because immigrants were never meant to live in European societies permanently. The Turkish population in Germany is illustrative. Laurence (2007, 62) notes:

> German leaders would be well advised to concentrate on the practical concerns that undermine social cohesion: political alienation, overzealous policing, and socioeconomic inequality. Germans' caution at embracing Turks as a minority community and insistence on rupture with the home country were often perceived as indifference; politicians' repeated criticism of 'parallel societies' did nothing to eliminate their existence. The fundamental problems of Turkish Germans and other Muslims are rooted in disenfranchisement, social discrimination, and the lack of economic and political integration, not religion.

For years, Germany did not engage its Turkish minority, refusing to address problems that arose from these co-existing societies. Though recent attempts aim to alleviate this effect, problems from this dual society persist.

Minkenberg (2008) has constructed a typology to help capture the relationship between countries' immigration and integration approaches (Table 1). Although it is based on policies of the 1990s, his analysis remains useful today. France's immigration policies, for example, continue to be more open in comparison to other European countries like Denmark and Germany. Yet its level of cultural integration remains low in contrast to Britain and the United States. This is not surprising since its strategy has encouraged assimilation and prohibited

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special rights for religious groups. Moreover, Denmark continues to impose strict limitations on immigration. For example, in the 2007 election, the Danish People's Party, which advocates tight restrictions on immigration, took 13.8% of the vote, remaining the third largest party in Denmark.

However, 9/11 and subsequent terrorist incidents challenge how consistent this typology continues to be. France has recently begun to debate positive discrimination approaches and has reached out to the Muslim community by spearheading the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman*. Moreover, the U.S. immigration stance has toughened since 9/11 and all immigration services have been folded into the Department of Homeland Security, lending support to the idea that immigration has been securitized. In comparison, Britain has added civic integration dimensions to its multiculturalism approach since the 7/7 London bombings, and the Muslim Council of Britain in particular has become essential in establishing communication between the Muslim community and government in recent years. Finally, Germany's immigration policies traditionally have been restrictive, but recent efforts have aimed to moderate them, especially toward the Turkish population.

THE MUSLIM EXPERIENCE IN TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE

Understanding Muslim integration in the context of a specific country has been the primary focus for those interested in the subject. However, comparing the Muslim experience in a cross-national study is equally important since it offers a frame of reference for evaluating integration. Over the years, the Pew Research Center has provided public survey data that offers insight into Muslim integration in both the United States and Europe. Surveys ask for perspectives from Muslim communities and the general public and information on social

inclusion factors, such as income. As suggested by the data, Muslims seem to better integrated in the United States than Europe.

Table 2 provides information on Muslim populations in the United States and Europe. In comparison, the Muslim presence is much lower in the United States. The difference between the United States and France is especially stark (under 1% compared to nearly 10%). Population differences can be explained by the massive immigration movement that took place during the post-war European reconstruction effort where nationals of former European colonies (mostly Muslim) traveled to Europe to provide labor. Immigrants included Turks to Germany, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to Britain, Algerians to France, and Moroccans to France and Spain. Many of these immigrants chose to stay permanently and had children who developed a Muslim-European identity. Peach (2007) provides a helpful illustration of immigration to Europe (below). The United States, in contrast, did not undergo a similar influx in Muslim immigration.

U.S. and European views on Muslims are presented in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6. Americans believe that Muslims aim to adopt national customs much more than Europeans do. In the United States, less than half of the public believes that Muslims want to be distinct from society, which differs significantly from the view in Europe. Approximately two-thirds of Britons and Spaniards and three-fourths of Germans believe that Muslims want to be separate from society. This may be the result of larger and more noticeable Muslim populations. Moreover, the trend is similar when observing how Americans and Europeans view their relations with Muslims. The United States is more likely to see relations as strong than European countries are (France is the exception) and less apt to see relations as poor. This seems to suggest that the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the United States have better interactions than in Europe. Furthermore, Europeans generally view Muslims more negatively than Americans do. In 2008, less than one quarter of Americans held unfavorable views toward Muslims. The rate is double in Germany and Spain. What is also striking is that since 2004, attitudes in the United States have improved toward Muslims (31% unfavorable to 23% unfavorable) while those in all four European countries have deteriorated. Finally, most European countries view growing Islamic identity as "bad," especially in Spain (82%), Germany (83%), and France (87%). This seems to lend support to the debates about integration - that Islam threatens traditional and cultural views of security in Europe.

The way in which Muslims perceive their identity varies between the United States and Europe as well as among European states. Public impressions of Muslims may be instructive in determining the extent to which Muslims identify with their respective national cultures. Tables 7 and 8 show figures on Muslim identity. Although U.S. Muslims believe that being devoutly

Muslim conflicts with living in modern society more than French or Spanish Muslims, they are less likely to hold this view compared to British or German Muslims. This may indicate that Muslims in Britain and Germany have not reconciled Islamic and national identities to the extent that others have. Moreover, Spanish, German, and British Muslims think of themselves as Muslims "first" and then as members of their respective countries. The trend is reversed in the United States and France. Muslims in these two countries identify themselves with their country "first" and then as Muslim. In the United States, differences across religions - as well as race - are common, which may explain why Muslims primarily relate to the country. Contrarily, France's policy of assimilation mitigates differences by refusing to recognize religious factors in public life, which may actually produce a similar outcome experienced in the United States. Finally, Muslims in the United States and Britain are more likely to be concerned about Islamic extremism. This is not surprising since policies against Islamist extremism have been most prominent there.

Public perceptions on the Muslim community help to identify the extent to which Muslims are included in their communities. How Muslims compare to the general public in terms of earned income is also important because it speaks beyond discrimination and to active participation in society. Table 9 compares income levels between Muslims and the general public in the United States and Europe. As can be seen, income levels are most even in the United States across all three income categories; the lack of difference is actually remarkable. On the whole, Muslims earn as much as the public in the United States. In contrast, income levels are not highly unequal in Europe. In Germany, the public earns more than twice as much as Muslims in the highest bracket; in Spain, more than four times. Although income disparity is most striking in Germany and Spain, it also exists in France and Britain. Approximately 20%

more Muslims in France and Britain fall into the lowest income bracket compared to their respective publics. Disparities in income levels seem to highlight the difference between Muslims and the public in Europe, perpetuating Muslim exclusion and reinforcing negative stereotypes of Muslims and mainstream society.

Schain (2009) offers a heuristic to understand the successes and failures that countries have had in overall integration (Table 10). Although it does not exclusively do so, his analysis can be applied to the Muslim experience. He claims that the United States has achieved success in both "cultural and value" and "socio-economic" integration. The United Kingdom, he contends, has achieved success in socio-economic integration, but not cultural and value integration. He posits that the opposite is true for France, and that the Netherlands has failed at both. Though these observations are fairly reliable, they are not without complications. Muslims in Britain and France have equally faced economic challenges, especially in obtaining access to incomes comparable to the public. Moreover, more French than British share concerns with the growing Islamic identity, which may hinder France's progress in cultural and value integration. Nonetheless, comparing Muslim integration between the United States and Europe as considered in terms of public opinion and income levels points to the conclusion that the U.S. Muslim integration experience has so far been more successful.

UNITED STATES AND MUSLIM INTEGRATION

The Muslim population is much smaller in the United States than in Europe, making up less than 1% of the total population. In Europe, it ranges between 2.3% and 9.6%, depending on the state. But what does the Muslim population look like in the United States? Tables 11, 12, and 13 provide some descriptions. Most are first-generation immigrants arriving primarily from

the Arab region or South Asia, and particularly from Iran or Pakistan. Others are U.S. citizens, but children or grandchildren of immigrants. Most first-generation Muslims immigrated to the United States in the 1990s and 2000s. Despite the fact that two-thirds of Muslims in the United States come from other countries, three-fourths are U.S. citizens.

Notable differences between U.S. Muslims and the general public are age and race. Over half of U.S. Muslims are under 39 compared to only 40% of the public. 13% are over 55 in relation to 30% of the public. It is evident that many U.S. Muslims are young, especially in comparison to the public. Moreover, racial compositions between Muslims and the public also differ. There are twice as many Whites in the general public than the Muslim community. Accordingly, there are over twice as many Blacks and four times as many Asians in the Muslim population than the general public. Moreover, the majority of native-born Muslims are Black. These figures show that the Muslim community in the United States is much more diverse than the general public in terms of racial composition.

The comparison between the United States and Europe in the second section gives indication that Muslims are more integrated into U.S. society. Here, I hope to provide additional insight into the U.S. Muslim experience by considering integration over time, in relation to other minority groups, in terms of access to societal goods, and as perceived by both the Muslim community and the general public. This should give more meaning and richness to the nature of Muslim integration in the United States.

An appropriate starting point is to compare incidents of discrimination over time and across minority groups. Table 14 shows the number of incidents of discrimination that the Muslim, Black, Jewish, male homosexual, and Hispanic communities experienced from 2001 through 2007. These figures are reported to the FBI by law enforcement agencies. As such, they

are undoubtedly under-representative of all discriminatory acts. However, they should be consistently underreported across time and minority groups, which allows for a fairly accurate comparison. Muslims experienced fewer incidents per year among all groups, which is to be expected since they are the smallest of the five minority groups. The number of anti-Islamic incidents in 2001 compared to subsequent years is particularly noteworthy. In 2001, nearly 500 incidents were reported, compared to only 155 in 2002. However, the hostile response that the Muslim community faced directly after 9/11 helps to explain why so many incidents occurred in 2001. Although discrimination decreased for all groups over the time period, it was most pronounced for the Muslim community, which fell by 76%. Even if 2001 is considered anomalous (because of 9/11), anti-Islamic discrimination still decreased by 26% from 2002 to 2007. Over the same period, discrimination against male homosexuals decreased by only 6%, while all other forms of discrimination actually increased. This may indicate that the situation for Muslims is improving, while discrimination against other groups is decreasing or remaining fairly constant.

Pew provides additional information about how Muslim Americans compare specifically to African Americans in terms of discrimination (Table 15). Survey respondents were asked to report if they felt like they were treated or viewed with suspicion, called offensive names, singled out by police, physically attacked or threatened, or mistreated by any combination of these four. In all five categories, the Muslim community fared better. Nearly 10% of Muslims felt like they had been singled out by the police - the rate is double for the African American community. Only one quarter of Muslims experienced suspicion compared to one third of African Americans. On average, it seems that Muslims suffer less discrimination than African Americans, at least as reported by this study. One explanation may be that there are simply more

African Americans than Muslims in the United States and that their higher visibility attracts more attention, including racism.

Table 16 provides figures on how the American public views Muslims and how it views Muslim Americans. Most Americans hold a more favorable opinion of Muslim Americans than Muslims (53% compared to 43%). This may indicate that Americans view Muslim Americans as more integrated or less extreme than Muslims in general or that Americans know more Muslim Americans than Muslims, thereby, viewing them more favorably.

Aside from discrimination and public opinion, integration can be measured by the degree to which Muslims participate in society, especially in terms of education, employment, and household income (Table 17). By and large, education levels between the general public and Muslim community are comparable. In fact, although the differences are small, more Muslims have high school degrees as well as some graduate education in relation to the general public. Employment rates are also similar, although more of the general public is employed full-time. Finally, household income levels between the public and Muslim population are even, differing only by 1% in the top four brackets and 2% in the bottom. These figures suggest that levels of participation in society are similar between the Muslim community and general public.

Muslims' perspectives on life in the United States may be the best indication of integration because they encapsulate the tradeoff between advantages and setbacks. Table 18 gives details on how U.S. Muslims view a range of issues compared to the public. Views between the groups are similar. Although the public rates its communities, personal financial situations, and happiness higher than the Muslim community, these differences are small. Moreover, more Muslims believe that they can get ahead with hard work than the general public

and also feel more satisfied with the status of the United States. Despite small degrees of variation, Muslims' viewpoints are relatively in line with the public.

Evaluating data points to the conclusion that the Muslim experience in the United States seems to be improving over time (or at least remaining constant) and that Muslims may be better integrated than other minority groups, especially since 9/11. Undoubtedly, some Muslims feel discrimination and alienation, but as a community, their situations appear comparable to those of mainstream society.

UNITED KINGDOM AND MUSLIM INTEGRATION

The United Kingdom has a large Islamic population (Table 19). After Christians and nonbelievers, Muslims make up the biggest religious community in the country, constituting approximately 3% of the general public in England and Wales. Moreover, like in the United States, the Muslim community is young (Table 20). Over half of the Muslim population in England and Wales is 24 or younger. An approximate one third is between 25 and 49. Only 11% of the Muslim population is 50 or older. 89% of the Muslim population is under 50 compared to only 66% of the general public. Furthermore, Table 21 provides information about ethnicities of the Muslim population in England and Wales. Nearly three-fourths of the Muslim population is Asian. Of this group, most are Pakistani (58%), Bangladeshi (23%), or Indian (12%). This is not surprising given Britain's former rule over South Asia and that many South Asians relocated to Britain after the Second World War to fill labor demands. In contrast, the number of Muslims that are White or Black is much smaller.

According to data, discrimination in the United Kingdom seems to be worsening. Although the United Kingdom Home Office - the department responsible for immigration,

counterterrorism, and police - does not specifically report on anti-Islamic incidents of discrimination, it does provide information on racially and religiously aggravated incidents (Table 22). Figures suggest xenophobia is on the rise in England and Wales. In 2001-02, the number of incidents recorded by the police reached almost 15,000. This escalated to nearly 26,500 by 2007-08 - an increase of 77% over six years.

In contrast to the Home Office, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) does provide specific information on Muslim victimization. The CPS is the governmental department that is responsible for public prosecution of people charged with criminal offenses in England and Wales. In its annual reports, it provides information about the religious orientation of crime victims. Table 23 gives figures on the number of victims of religiously aggravated incidents in England and Wales from 2004-05 through 2006-07. Though the percentage of victims that are Muslim appears to be remaining stable across time, it is by far the largest of all religious victimization. For example, in 2006-07, the number of Muslim victims comprised 63% of all victims harassed because of their religion and 74% of all victims harassed because of their religion *in cases when their religion was indeed known*. This seems to suggest that harassment is directed toward Muslims far more than any other religious group.

Discrimination is only one facet of integration and cannot capture the Muslim experience in the United Kingdom alone. Like in the U.S. case, participation in society must also be considered. Tables 24, 25, and 26 provide insight into the extent to which Muslims are socially included in their environment by considering access to education, employment, and healthcare. Across all ages, Muslims have fewer educational qualifications than the general public. The differences are striking. One third of Muslims between 25 and 34 have no educational qualifications. This is three times as large as the general public in the same age range. 47% of

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Muslims between 35 and 49 have no qualifications, compared to only 22% in the general public. Nearly three-fourths of Muslims between 65 and 74 have no skills, compared to 63% of the general public. These statistics clearly indicate that the Muslim community does not have the same opportunity to education as the general public does.

Economic activity rates also vary substantially between Muslims and the public. Only half of Muslim males between 16 and 24 are economically active in relation to 68% of the wider society. 70% of Muslim males over 25 are economically active, but this is still 5% lower than the public. Muslim female rates are considerably lower in both age brackets, but this should be expected in light of Islamic traditions that affect a Muslim woman's economic activity, such as obtaining permission from her male guardian to work and maintaining her commitment to the family. Moreover, unemployment rates in England and Wales are much higher for Muslims. Nearly one in five Muslim males between 16 and 24 are unemployed – this is 8% higher than the wider society. The rate is lower for Muslim males over 25, but it is still approximately three times higher than the general public. 16% of Muslim females between 16 and 24 and 14% of those over 25 are unemployed. These rates are much higher in relation to the public. It is important to note that although a low economic activity rate for Muslim females is expected given the propensity for many Muslim women to stay at home to raise their families, the unemployment rate shows that for Muslim women who do want to work, access to employment is much more difficult.

Finally, how Muslims rank in comparison with the general public on "limiting long-term illness" provides indication on the extent to which they enjoy adequate health. The United Kingdom's Office of National Statistics defines this illness as "A self assessment of whether or not a person has a limiting long-term illness, health problem or disability which limits their daily

activities or the work they can do, including problems that are due to old age." Across all age brackets, more Muslims have limiting long-term illnesses than the general public. The difference is most stark in the 50-64 and 65+ brackets. However, this should be considered in context. Many older Muslims in the United Kingdom were born in other countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh; therefore, their illnesses are most likely a result of health deficiencies faced there, rather than in the United Kingdom. That the number of Muslims under 49 with limiting long-term illnesses is comparable to that of the general public suggests that younger Muslims face no more threats to their health than the society at large.

In short, the Muslim experience in the United Kingdom is poor. Muslims face prejudice more than other religious groups and confront severe barriers to integration, such as obstacles to education and employment opportunities. Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest that the situation is improving over time.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Placing Muslim integration in transatlantic perspective generates some preliminary findings. First, in general, the United States seems to fare better with integrating Muslims in comparison to Europe. Fewer Americans view Muslims negatively or as trying to be distinct from society. More Americans view the growth of Islamic identity positively than Europeans do. And only the image of Muslims in the United States has improved over the past few years. In his observation, Barrett (2007, 77) comments, "Overall, the immigrant Muslims of Western Europe have remained poorer, less educated, and more socially marginalized." This may be a result of the capability of U.S. Muslims to reconcile their religious beliefs with American culture. The Council of American-Islamic Relations (2006, 4) observes, "New Muslim thinkers are provoking

debate and counter arguments, often leading to renewed understanding of Islam's congruence with modernity. More and more Muslims in America are thus being better able [to] balance between the demands of their faith and the challenges of modernity." U.S. Muslims seem to be achieving more success in striking a balance between their religious identities and national expectations.

Second, despite different approaches to integration, the United States and France are similar in a couple of ways. The U.S. and French publics equally believe that relations between Muslims and Westerners are "good." Moreover, roughly the same percentages of Muslims in the United States and France view themselves as Muslim first and then as a part of U.S. or French society. This is most likely a result of successful multiculturalism in the United States and the minimization of religious differences in the French public arena. In the United States, differences are common and thought to be celebrated. In France, they are underestimated and often disregarded. This approach contrasts to the British case in which differences between Muslims and the wider society are blatant and often antagonistic.

Third, and more specifically, Muslim integration seems to have been more successful in the United States than the United Kingdom. Muslims face less discrimination than other minorities and there is evidence that the situation is actually improving over time. In general, Muslims have similar levels of access to societal needs, such as education and employment, as the wider U.S. public. Contrarily, discrimination against Muslims in Britain is high and remaining constant. There is a large difference between Muslims and the public in terms of educational qualifications and employment, although health (at least measured as limiting long-term illness) is similar between younger Muslims and Britons.

The impact of post-colonial immigration on Europe helps to explain why the United States and Europe differ in their experiences with Muslim integration. In ways, Europe has much more to address as it finds its way in effectively embracing its large Muslim communities. It is unfair to say that the U.S. approach toward Muslims has been so much more effective in achieving integration, but the platform for participation that women, African Americans, and other groups that have experienced marginalization has made it much easier. This is not to say that the United States should carry on with the status quo. The government should not condone the need to construct a coherent integration policy because it believes that the traditions of diversity and expected tolerance preclude it. In contrast, Europe must continue to amend its concept of identity. This is necessary because when Muslims become an integral constituent of European culture, they will be more represented in national policy. Current trends suggest immigration to Europe in the future will unlikely decrease, and second- and third-generation Muslims will continue to face challenges reconciling traditional European values with the customs of the countries from which their parents and grandparents came. As such, policy at both the EU and national levels must persist in meeting the needs of Muslim communities.

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Table 1

Typology of Immigration and Cultural Integration Policies, 1990s

Immigration Policies	Cultural Integration (Religious and Cultural Group Rights)		
	Low	*Medium*	*High*
Restrictive	Switzerland	Austria Denmark Germany Norway	
Moderate	France Ireland Portugal	Belgium Great Britain Finland Italy Spain	
Open		United States	Australia Canada New Zealand Netherlands Sweden

Source: Michael Minkenberg. (2008). "Religious Legacies and the Politics of Multiculturalism: A Comparative Analysis of Integration Policies in Western Democracies." In Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective. Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia and Simon Reich (eds). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. p. 53.

Table 2

Muslim Populations in the United States and Europe

	%
United States	0.6
United Kingdom	2.8
France	8 - 9.6
Spain	2.3
Germany	3.6
Denmark	5
Austria	4.1

Sources: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 10.; *BBC News*. (2005). "Muslims in Europe: Country guide."

Table 3

Relations between Muslims and Westerners

	Generally Good	Generally Bad
	%	%
United States	32	55
Great Britain	28	61
France	33	66
Spain	14	61
Germany	23	70

Source: Pew Research Center. (2006). "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other." Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Table 4

Views on Society and National Customs

Muslims in your country mostly want to . . .

	be distinct from society	adopt national customs
	%	%
United States	44	33
Great Britain	64	22
France	53	46
Spain	67	21
Germany	76	17

Source: Pew Research Center. (2006). "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity." Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Table 5

Unfavorable Views of Muslims

	2004	2008
	%	%
United States	31	23
Great Britain	18	23
France	29	38
Spain	37*	52
Germany	46	50

*Figure from 2005

Source: Pew Research Center. (2008). "Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the Increase in Europe." Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Table 6

Views on Islamic Identity		
Is growing Islamic identity good or bad?		
	Good	Bad
	%	%
United States	37	46
Great Britain	27	59
France	11	87
Spain	13	82
Germany	11	83

Source: Pew Research Center. (2006). "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity." Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Table 7

Islamic Identity and Modern Life			
Is there a conflict in being a devout Muslim and living in modern society?			
	Yes	No	Don't Know / Refused
	%	%	%
U.S. Muslims	32	63	5
British Muslims	47	49	4
French Muslims	28	72	0
Spanish Muslims	25	71	4
German Muslims	36	57	7

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 32.

Table 8

Islamic Identity and Extremism		
	Think of Self As Muslim First	Very Concerned about Islamic Extremism
	%	%
United States	47	51
Great Britain	81	52
France	46	35
Spain	66	29
Germany	69	29

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 3.

Table 9

Income Levels in United States and Europe	Muslim	General Public
United States	%	%
$75,000+	26	28
$30,000 - $74,999	39	39
< $30,000	35	33
Great Britain		
£40,000+	13	23
£20,000-£39,999	26	38
< £20,000	61	39
France		
€29,500+	20	32
€17,500-€29,499	35	41
< €17,500	45	27
Spain		
€21,500+	7	26
€14,500-€21,499	20	24
< €14,500	73	50
Germany		
€30,000+	12	26
€18,000-€29,999	35	39
< €18,000	53	35

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 19.

Table 10

Two Dimensions of Integration Success / Failure

Success in Cultural and Value Integration

+	-	Success in Socio-Economic Integration
United States	United Kingdom	+
France	Netherlands	-

Source: Schain, Martin A. (2009). "Managing Difference: the Success and Failure of Integration Policy in France, Britain, and the United States." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association. New York, NY. p. 44.

Table 11

U.S. Muslims: Generation, Location of Birth, Arrival Year, and U.S. Citizenship

	U.S. Muslims			U.S. Muslims
Generation	%		Country of Birth (Cont'd)	%
First	65		Lebanon	4
Second	7		Yemen	4
Third	28		Bangladesh	3
			Iraq	3
Born in . . .			Bosnia & Herzegovina	3
United States	35			
Arab Region	24		Year of Arrival	
South Asia	18		2000-2007	18
Iran	8		1990-1999	21
Europe	5		1980-1989	15
Other Africa	4		1979 and Earlier	11
Other	6		Native Born	35
Country of Birth			U.S. Citizen	
Pakistan	8		Yes	77
Iran	8		No	23
India	4			

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 15.

Table 12

U.S. Muslims: Gender, Age, and Family Status

	U.S. Muslims	General Public
	%	%
Male	54	48
Female	46	52
18-29	30	21
30-39	26	19
40-54	31	30
55+	13	30
Married	60	57
Divorced	6	11
Separated	3	2
Widowed	3	6
Never Married	28	24

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 16.

Table 13

U.S. Muslims: Racial Composition

Race	U.S. Muslims			General Public
	Total	Foreign Born	Native Born	
	%	%	%	%
White	38	44	31	77
Black	26	10	56	11
Asian	20	28	2	5
Other/Mixed	16	18	11	7

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 17.

Table 14

Incidents of Discrimination against Select Minority Groups, 2001-2007

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Anti-Islamic	481	155	149	156	128	156	115
Anti-Black	2899	2486	2548	2731	2630	2640	2658
Anti-Jewish	1043	931	927	954	848	967	969
Anti-Male Homosexu	980	825	783	738	621	747	772
Anti-Hispanic	597	480	426	475	522	576	595

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2001-2007). "Hate Crime Statistics." Annual Reports.

Table 15

Encounters with Intolerance

	Muslim Americans	African Americans
	%	%
Treated or Viewed with Suspicion	26	33
Called Offensive Names	15	20
Singled Out by Police	9	20
Physically Attacked or Threatened	4	10
Any of the Above Four	33	46

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 38.

Table 16

	Favorable	Unfavorable	No Opinion
Views of Muslims and Muslim Americans			
Views of Muslims	%	%	%
August 2007	43	35	22
March 2002	47	29	24
Views of Muslim Americans			
August 2007	53	29	18

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Benedict XVI Viewed Favorably but Faulted on Religious Outreach, Public Expresses Mixed Views of Islam, Mormonism."

Table 17

	U.S. Muslims	U.S. General
Education, Employment, and Income		
Education	%	%
Graduate Study	10	9
College Graduate	14	16
Some College	23	29
High School Graduate	32	30
Not High School Graduate	21	16
Employment		
Employed Full-Time	41	49
Employed Part-Time	16	11
Not Employed	43	40
Household Income		
$100,000+	16	17
$75,000 - $99,999	10	11
$50,000 - $74,999	15	16
$30,000 - $49,999	24	23
Less than $30,000	35	33

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 18-19.

Table 18

Views on Life in United States	U.S. Muslims	U.S General
American Work Ethic	%	%
Can Get Ahead with Hard Work	71	64
Hard Work Is No Guarantee of Success	26	33
Neither / Don't Know	3	3
Rate Your Community		
Excellent / Good	72	82
Fair / Poor	27	18
Don't Know / Refused	1	--
Personal Financial Situation		
Excellent / Good	42	49
Fair / Poor	52	50
Don't Know / Refused	6	1
Satisfied with State of United States		
Satisfied	38	32
Dissatisfied	54	61
Don't Know / Refused	8	7
Would You Say You Are . . .		
Very Happy	24	36
Pretty Happy	54	51
Not Too Happy	18	12
Don't Know / Refused	4	1

Source: Pew Research Center. (2007). "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." p. 2.

Table 19

Population of England and Wales by Religion

Religion	England Number	England %	Wales Number	Wales %	England and Wales Number	England and Wales %
Muslim	1,524,887	3%	21,739	1%	1,546,626	3%
Christian	35,251,244	72%	2,087,242	72%	37,338,486	72%
Buddhism	139,046	0%	5,407	0%	144,453	0%
Hindu	546,982	1%	5,439	0%	552,421	1%
Jewish	257,671	1%	2,256	0%	259,927	0%
Sikh	327,343	1%	2,015	0%	329,358	1%
Any Other Religion	143,811	0%	6,909	0%	150,720	0%
No Religion	7,171,332	15%	537,935	19%	7,709,267	15%
Religion Not Stated	3,776,515	8%	234,143	8%	4,010,658	8%
TOTAL	49,138,831	100%	2,903,085	100%	52,041,916	100%

Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). "Census 2001." Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009. Table S103.

Table 20

Muslim Population in England and Wales by Age

Age	Muslim Number	%	General Public Number	%
0-15	522,860	34%	10,488,736	20%
16-24	281,624	18%	5,677,802	11%
25-49	567,182	37%	18,464,534	35%
50-59	81,944	5%	6,553,316	13%
60-64	36,510	2%	2,544,754	5%
65-74	42,850	3%	4,367,032	8%
74+	13,652	1%	3,945,742	8%
TOTAL	1,546,622	100%	52,041,916	100%

Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). "Census 2001." Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009. Table S103.

Table 21

Ethnicity of Muslims in England and Wales

Ethnicity	Number	%
White	179,773	12%
Mixed	64,262	4%
Asian	1,139,065	74%
Indian	*131,662*	*12%*
Pakistani	*657,680*	*58%*
Bangladeshi	*259,710*	*23%*
Other	*90,013*	*8%*
Black or Black British	106,345	7%
Chinese or Other Ethnic Group	57,181	4%
TOTAL	1,546,626	100%

Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). "Census 2001." Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009. Table S104.

Table 22

Incidents of Racially or Religiously Aggravated Harassment in England and Wales

2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	2005-2006	2006-2007	2007-2008
14,975	16,910	20,975	23,363	26,605	28,485	26,495

Source: Kershaw, Chris, Sian Nicholas, and Alison Walker (eds). (2008). "Crime in England and Wales 2007/08: Findings from the British Crime Survey and Police Recorded Crime." Home Office. Table 2.04. p. 46.

Table 23

Victims of Religiously Aggravated Incidents in England and Wales*

Religion**	2004-2005 Number	2004-2005 % of All Cases	2004-2005 % Where Religion Is Known	2005-2006 Number	2005-2006 % of All Cases	2005-2006 % Where Religion Is Known	2006-2007 Number	2006-2007 % of All Cases	2006-2007 % Where Religion Is Known
Muslim	23	68%	77%	18	42%	82%	17	63%	74%
Christian	4	12%	13%	3	7%	14%	3	11%	13%
Sikh	0	0%	0%	1	2%	5%	1	4%	4%
Hindu	2	6%	7%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%
Mormon	1	3%	3%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%
Buddhist	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	--	--	--
Jewish	--	--	--	--	--	--	2	7%	9%
Unknown	4	12%	N/A	21	49%	N/A	4	15%	N/A
TOTAL	34	100%	100%	43	100%	100%	27	100%	100%

*As Prosecuted by the Crown Prosecution Service.

**Religion Represents Victim's Actual or Perceived Religion.

Sources: Crown Prosecution Service. (2006). "Racist and Religious Incident Monitoring." Annual Report 2005-2006. Management Information Branch; Crown Prosecution Service. (2007). "Racist and Religious Incident Monitoring." Annual Report 2006-2007. Management Information Branch.

Table 24

Muslims with No Educational Qualifications in England and Wales by Age

Age	Muslim Number	Muslim %	General Public Number	General Public %
16-24	61,373	22%	901,267	16%
25-34	101,651	35%	928,265	13%
35-49	128,738	47%	2,389,522	22%
50-59	43,608	53%	2,587,051	39%
60-64	23,631	65%	1,365,523	54%
65-74	31,136	73%	2,765,414	63%

Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). "Census 2001." Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009. Table S158.

Table 25

Economic Activity of Muslims in England and Wales by Gender and Age

	Male				Female			
	16-24		25+		16-24		25+	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Economically Active								
Muslim	69,370	49%	268,026	70%	51,133	36%	99,263	29%
General Public	1,948,330	68%	11,707,975	75%	1,741,871	62%	9,624,025	59%
Unemployed								
Muslim	12,964	19%	36,593	14%	8,106	16%	13,752	14%
General Public	206,965	11%	587,242	5%	119,753	7%	347,382	4%

Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). "Census 2001." Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009. Table S153.

Table 26

Health of Muslims in England and Wales by Age

	0-15		16-49		50-64		65+		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Muslim	522,860	5%	848,810	4%	118,454	1%	56,502	1%	1,546,626	3%
General Public	10,488,735	100%	24,142,336	100%	9,098,068	100%	8,312,775	100%	52,041,914	100%
With Limited Long-Term Illness										
Muslim	24,578	5%	98,239	12%	54,614	46%	35,079	62%	212,510	14%
General Public	451,162	4%	2,327,268	10%	2,421,527	27%	4,284,900	52%	9,484,857	18%

Source: UK Office for National Statistics. (2001). "Census 2001." Accessed from Nomis on March 20, 2009. Table S152.