# A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION <br> IN THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRY FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 

In 1970 the Commission initiated a research programme on the evolution of concentration and competition in several sectors and markets of manufacturing industries in the different Member States (textile, paper, pharmaceutical and photographic products, cycles and motorcycles, agricultural machinery, office machinery, textile machinery, civil engineering equipment, hoisting and handling equipment, electronic and audio equipment, radio and television receivers, domestic electrical appliances, food and drink manufacturing industries).

The aims, criteria and principal results of this research are set out in the document "Methodology of concentration analysis applied to the study of industries and markets", by Dr. Remo LINDA, (ref. 8756), September 1976.

This particular volume constitutes a part of the second series of studies, the main aims of which is to present the results of the research on the evolution of concentration in the food distribution industry for the Jnited Kingdom.

Another volume, already published (vol. II: Price Surveys), outlines the results of the research on the distribution of food products in the United Kingdom, with regard to the evolution of prices and mark-ups, based on a limited sample of food products and on a limited number of sales points in the Greater London area.

Similar volumes concerning the structures of the distributive systems and the evolution of prices and mark ups have been established also for other Member States (Germany, France, Italy and Denmark).

# A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF CONCENTRATION <br> IN THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION INDUSTRY FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 

VOLUME I<br>Industry structure and concentration<br>by<br>Development Analysts Ltd., 49 Lower Addiscombe Road, Croydon, CRO 6PO, England.

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## PREFACE

The present volume is part of a series of sectoral studies on the evolution of concentration in the member states of the European Community.

These reports were compiled by the different national Institutes and experts, engaged by the Commission to effect the study programme in question.

Regarding the specific and general interest of these reports and the responsibility taken by the Commission with regard to the European Parliament, they are published wholly in the original version.

The Commission refrains from commenting, only stating that the responsibility for the data and opinions appearing in the reports, rests solely with the Institute or the expert who is the author.

Other reports on the sectoral programme will be published by the Commission as soon as they are received.

The Commission will also publish a series of documents and tables of syntheses, allowing for international comparisons on the evolution of concentration in the different member states of the Community.

## VOLUME ONE

## INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND CONCENTRATION

This Report
commissioned by the Directorate-General for Competition of the Commission of the European Communities has been carried out by Development Analysts Ltd., under the direction of R.W. Evely, B.Sc.(Econ.), in consultation with Professor P.E. Hart, B.Sc.(Econ.), of the University of Reading.

This Volume
is the first of two Volumes which concern the following topics:

Volume 1: a study of concentration at the industry scale for the UK food distribution industry, 1969-74.

Volume 2: a study of food shops' prices at the retail distribution level.

Volume Two
was published in November 1976 and comprises two parts, the first of which sets out the Methodology suggested by Dr. R. Linda, (Head of Market Structure Division, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels), for the analysis of Price Survey research as applied to food distribution. The second part presents the research findings of two Price Surveys conducted in one part of the United Kingdom during 1976 and was prepared by A.J. MacNeary, B.A., Development Analysts Ltd.

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## 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1.1: This Report deals with the recent trends in the food distributive trades of the United Kingdom, and changes in the level of concentration among the concerns active in this field, and forms Vol. I of a two-volume study. The accompanying volume, published in November 1976, reported on two studies of retail prices of food products among a sample of retail outlets in the Croydon area early in 1976 and six months later.
1.2: The distributive trades are an important sector of the United Kingdom economy, accounting in recent years for around one-tenth of the gross domestic product. They employ upwards of 3 million people, including the self-employed, or about one-eighth of the total labour-force. Food distribution accounts for about three-tenths of all those employed in the distributive trades, and of its own labour-force, nearly four-fifths are in retailing rather than wholesaling.
1.3: $\quad$ The costs involved in the physical transfer of foodstuffs from the farm, factory or port of entry to the housewife's shopping basket are a substantial part of the price that the consumer pays. The organisation of that process of physical transfer varies greatly from trade to trade: the channels of distribution are complex and diverse. And they have been subject to substantial changes since the end of World War II, with the emergence of new forms of selling at the retail stage as well as significant developments in the organisation and methods of physical distribution.
1.4: $\quad$ The main concern of this study has been to evaluate the changes in the degree of concentration within food distribution: are fewer and larger enterprises responsible for a greater proportion of total food sales today than was the case in the late 1960s? But the answer to this question is perhaps less important than an understanding of the longer-term factors and influences that have led to the outcome, since they are likely to point the way to further changes in the future. That is why this Report discusses in general the trends in food retailing during the last quarter of a century as a preliminary to a more detailed analysis of the changes in its several parts during the last $10-15$ years.
1.5: It is convenient to regard the food distributive trades as comprising grocers and provision dealers (to adopt the Census of Distribution terminology) on the one hand, and the more specialist fresh food traders on the other. The distinction has its disadvantages,
since the traditional boundaries between trade and trade, have become less marked with time, and in particular with the development of supermarkets and superstores selling a wide-range of both food and non-food items under one roof. The growing importance of non-food shops as outlets for food sales must not be ignored as a factor qualifying the significance of concentration within the food trades themselves.


#### Abstract

1.6: It is also convenient to recognise from the outset that the food trades comprise two sectors: a private sector and a Cooperative sector, the latter consisting of the Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. (and until its merger with the CWS, the Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. as well) and a large number of autonomous local retail Cooperative societies. It is necessary to stress that neither the wholesale nor any of the retail Cooperative societies have been included in the analysis of the financial measures of concentration. Their exclusion has been necessary for two reasons: first, because their retail non-food activities represent, in aggregate, as much as 45 per cent. of their total sales, and secondly, because there is no satisfactory way of apportioning their capital assets or profits between food and nonfood distribution. However, the Cooperative societies' activities are the subject of a separate chapter, and the largest retail societies have been included with the larger private concerns in an assessment of sales-concentration in the grocery trade.


1.7: It is, of course, true that product-diversification is also a characteristic of several of the leading food distributors in the private sector. This may be further complicated by a high degree of vertical integration into food processing. * Wherever possible, the food distribution interests of such concerns have been segregated from the rest in this study, but in some instances this has not been feasible and they have had to be treated as a whole.
1.8: It will also be appreciated that the financial measures of concentration relate not to the whole of food distribution but only to that segment which comprises the larger of the quoted and unquoted companies in the private sector. The sales concentration ratios for the retail grocery trade and other food distributors presented in chapter 9 are similarly confined to the larger enterprises and not to the whole. While this means that the concentration-ratios relate to only part of the whole of the trades or activities under consideration, they are still a valid measure of the extent to which market conditions are changing at the top end of the sizedistribution of businesses.

The Arrangement of the Report
1.9: With these general observations as background, it may be useful to present next a list of the chapters and an indication of their subject-matter.

Chapter 2 deals with the growth in retail trade of food and non-food shops during the past 25 years, the division of retail sales of food between the private and Cooperative sector, and within the private sector between food shops and nonfood shops, and among food shops, as between grocers and the fresh food retailers.

Chapter 3 concentrates attention on the private sector grocery trade, with particular reference to the changing shares of the independents and the multiples and their operational performance.

[^0]Chapter $4 \quad$ looks at the size-distribution of the grocery multiple organisations, and variations in performance according to size, based on number of branches and total sales.

Chapter 5 identifies the leading grocery multiple concerns, considers their growth in recent years and the emergence of new competition.

Chapter 6 deals with the independent grocery sector, the development of voluntary group trading and cash-and-carry wholesaling, and the structure of grocery wholesaling.

Chapter 7 turns to consider the fresh food trades, dealing separately with each as far as the organisation of the retail and wholesale trade is concerned.

Chapter 8 covers the Cooperative sector of food distribution, and identifies the leading retail societies as well as the role of the Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd.

Chapter $9 \quad$ assesses changes in the division of the retail food trades as between multiples, Cooperative societies and independents from 1961 to 1975, the decline in the number of major buying points, expenditure on advertising, and presents sales concentration-ratios among the larger grocery retailers and other food distributors in recent years.

Chapter 10 describes the results of the computer-generated financial measures of concentration, using the standard EEC methodology, for a sample of the larger quoted and unquoted food distributors.
1.10: Each chapter includes a number of tables, and the sources on which these are based are brought together in Appendix 2.

Summary of Findings
1.11: The main findings of this Study can be briefly summarised as follows:
(A) Changes in Retail trade in Great Britain has risen in volume at an average retail trade, 1950-75 rate of 2.3 per cent. a year between 1950 and 1975, but sales of food shops by under 1.3 per cent. a year.

The private sector has increased its share of total retail food sales during the 1950-75 period at the expense of the Cooperative societies, but an increasing proportion of the private sector's food sales have been going through non-food shops, whose share of total food sales doubled to 13 per cent. in 1975.

At the same time, food sales have dropped from 89 per cent. of the private food shops' trade in 1950 to $82 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in

1975, largely because of the increasing importance of non-food items stocked by supermarkets.

Grocers' shops have increased the volume of their total sales by 86 per cent. since 1950, in marked contrast to a rise of only 8 per cent. for the fresh food retailers.
(B) The private grocery trade

With a fall of one-quarter in the number of grocery shops between 1950 and 1971, the average sales per shop increased by nearly $1 \frac{1}{2}$ times in real terms. Between 1957 and 1971, the multiples' sales per shop rose by 9 per cent. a year in real terms, as compared with only 2 per cent. for the independents.

With fewer but larger shops, the multiples' share of the private grocery trade nearly doubled from 29 per cent. in 1950 to 57 per cent. in 1975; the number of multiple concerns halved during the same period.

The multiples' gross margins were higher in 1971 than in 1957-66, but those of the independents rose more during the same period. The buying-power of the multiples derived from their large volume of sales contributes to their further growth through pricecompetition.
(C) Concentration and performance among multiple grocers
(D) The leading grocery multiple concerns

The number of grocery multiples with 100 or more branches fell from 35 in 1961 to 19 in 1971, but their combined share of the multiples' trade rose from 70 to 75 per cent.

The size-group which secured the largest increase in both average shop sales and sales per person between 1961 and 1971 were those with 20-49 branches; in 1971, this group also had the shops with the highest average sales.

Variations in the sales of the multiple organisations is mostly attributable to the number of branches they operate, and the largest multiple organisations (with over $£ 50 \mathrm{~m}$. sales) enjoyed the highest gross margin ( 20.5 per cent.) in 1971. When the rate of stock-turn is also taken into account, however, gross profitability is about 15 per cent. above the average for organisations with sales of $£ 10-20$ millions.

The 5 multiples with the largest sales in 1971 were:
Tesco
Allied Suppliers
J. Sainsbury

International Stores
Fine Fare

Since 1971, Allied Suppliers has become part of Cavenham Group and International Stores has been acquired by BritishAmerican Tobacco Co., with some changes in rank-order.

There were another 13 multiples in 1971 with sales of $£ 20-50$ millions; the 10 leading concerns being:
(E) The independent grocery sector

Key Markets
Waitrose
Safeway
Pricerite
Bishop's Stores

Wm. Jackson<br>Cater Bros.<br>Budgens<br>David Greig<br>F.J. Wallis

The largest increase in sales in the 1971-74 period among this group was achieved by Safeway, Key Markets, Waitrose and F.J. Wallis. Mergers and acquisitions have played a notable part in Key Markets' growth.

While the average growth in sales of these medium-sized multiples exceeded that of the largest, their record was bettered by the 10 smaller multiples. The fastest-growing concerns were:

| Wm. Morrison | Lennon |
| :--- | :--- |
| Hillards | Amos Hinton |

In addition, the 1968-74 period saw the emergence of major new concerns, notably Asda, Kwik-save, Bejam and Carrefour.

The overwhelming majority of independent grocers are singleshop businesses, and in 1971 they had higher gross-margins than the rest with up to 9 shops each.

The decline of one-quarter in their number of independent grocery shops between 1961 and 1971 is not attributable only to the competition of the multiples. Many have disappeared through redevelopment; even more from the inability to generate the working capital to improve their businesses.

Voluntary group trading has aimed at assisting the survival of the minority of businesses who have joined a group. It would appear that the main benefits have been not so much on the side of buying as in raising finance for improved premises and advice on merchandising and stocking.

Help for the smaller grocer has come from the development of cash-and-carry wholesaling, and perhaps lessened the importance of belonging to a voluntary group.

These developments involving grocery wholesalers have contributed to substantial changes in the organisation of the private wholesale trade, with mergers and acquisitions playing a major part in relative growth among the leading concerns.
(F) The fresh food trades
(G) Cooperative societies
(H) Sales concentration in the retail food trades

Considerable diversity exists in the experience of the fresh food trades. With the exception of dairymen, the volume of sales have been falling.

The share of the multiples rose among butchers, dairymen and probably greengrocers between 1961 and 1971, but since 1971 the position is somewhat uncertain.

In 1971, three concerns were responsible for 55 per cent. of the multiple butchery trade, and mergers and acquisitions have been important since then. Similarly, about 60 per cent. of bread sales were controlled by three groups in 1969, and their share may have risen to over 75 per cent. by 1974. Among dairymen, the five largest multiples accounted for 60 per cent. of the private trade in 1971.

The sales of the Cooperative societies declined from 11 per cent. of total retail trade in 1961 to $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1971. The volume of their retail food sales declined by three-tenths between 1961 and 1971, and by a further one-seventh to 1975.

The number of Cooperative societies has been reduced by amalgamation from 835 in 1961 to 313 in 1971, and over the same period, the share of Cooperative sales held by the six largest societies more than doubled to 34 per cent.

As far as Cooperative food sales are concerned, the share of the six largest societies rose from 25 per cent. in 1968 to over 38 per cent. in 1975, and that of the four largest from under 21 per cent. to nearly $32 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Taking the retail food trades as a whole $z_{z}$ the multiples' share has been rising long-term at the expense of the independents and the Cooperative societies:
Multiples'
share

In 1971, the 81 largest food retailers - 36 multiples and 45 Cooperatives - accounted for well over one-third of the total food trade.

Similarly, one-third of the total grocery trade was controlled by 19 multiples in 1971, and over two-fifths if the larger Cooperatives are included as well.

Buying power has become increasingly concentrated in fewer hands: compared with 1400 major buying points being responsible for 70 per cent. of grocery trade in 1965, over 80 per cent. is now represented by about one-quarter of that number of buying points.

While advertising on press and TV by food retailers rose from under $£ 4$ million in 1968 to over $£ 15$ millions in 1975, in relation to their level of sales, such expenditure is very small.

Among the grocery retailers (including Cooperative societies) with sales of over $£ 20$ millions, representing 45-55 per cent. of the grocery trade), the share of the 4 largest concerns has tended to fall, but that of the 8 and 12 largest to increase between 1969 and 1975. This confirms the tendency for the medium and smaller grocery multiples to grow at a faster rate than the largest concerns.

Among other private food distributors, there was also a downward trend in sales concentration between 1969 and 1973, but a slight reversal in 1974.
(I) The Computergenerated measures of concentration

Taking food distribution as a whole, and confining the analysis to the more important quoted and unquoted companies with combined sales which doubled from $£ 2,000$ to $£ 4,000$ millions between 1969 and 1974, the share of that turnover held by the four largest concerns decreased slightly between 1969 and 1974, although concentration rose but equally slightly in terms of the 8,10 and 12 largest firms.*

Turnover is only one of nine indicators for which changes in concentration has been measured over the 1969-74 period; in terms of the concentration-ratios for the 4 and 8 largest firms, the evidence on any change is inconclusive, although increasing the number of firms to which the ratio relates tends to result in a rise in the concentration-ratio itself.

The general finding, after taking the possibility of sampling errors into account, is that concentration between 1969 and 1974 cannot be said to have increased or decreased significantly (in the statistical sense) except in terms of the share of the 20 largest firms.

Thus, the general conclusion is that there was no significant change in concentration between 1969 and 1974 as far as this sample of the

[^1]larger private food distributors is concerned. This outcome has not resulted from any lack of growth among the largest firms, but rather from the more rapid growth-rates achieved by the smaller concerns during this period.

## Conclusion

1.12: $\quad$ This Study has looked at concentration in the food distributive trades at several different levels and from various points of view, and an apparent paradox emerges as a result. There is no doubt that at the retail level the share of the multiples has continued to increase since 1971 just as it did between 1961 and 1971, both in the grocery trade and for all food shops taken together. Thus, the multiple organisations, their numbers declining as the result of rationalisation and amalgamation, are more important today than five, fifteen or twentyfive years ago. At the same time, the larger enterprises among them, whether taken in the context of the grocery trade, the whole of food retailing, or indeed, food distribution generally, have not increased their combined share. Thus, while the multiple sector has increased in relative importance, concentration within that sector has not changed significantly in recent years.
1.13: The explanation of this paradox appears to rest primarily on the fact that the largest retail enterprises have tended to grow more slowly than those of medium or small to medium size, at least during the period covered by this study. It is often said that entry to retailing is comparatively easy, although it is equally true that survival as a small shopkeeper, particularly in the food trades, has become more and more difficult in recent years. But once established as a multiple food retailer there seems to be a good chance of making the grade and expanding the business as fast as the cash-flow or access to new capital allows. And the odds would also seem to favour the concern which is building-up a business more or less from scratch, rather than the longer-established concern which has to contend with a legacy from its past.
1.14: Part of the explanation of the relatively slow growth of the largest enterprises is almost certainly attributable to their mixture of older premises (often too small for efficient operation) with modern, purpose-built large food stores. It is significant, in this connection, that both International Stores (since its acquisition by British-American Tobacco) and the Cavenham Group have embarked on the systematic closure of their smaller shops, and their replacement by larger units of the superstore type. While in the short-run shop closures may mean a loss of sales volume overall, they can also contribute to a greater financial strength as a preliminary to renewed growth. Thus, it may be that redeployment of their resources into fewer but more profitable outlets could mean the attainment of a faster rate of growth by the larger enterprises between 1975 and 1980 than occurred in the previous five years or so.
1.15: Even so, it does not follow that higher concentration at the top end of the size-distribution of food retailers will result anymore than it did in the recent past. The impact of the "innovators" in food retailing - like Asda, Carrefour, Bejam and Kwik-Save cannot be ignored; indeed, the possibilities are that the identity of the leading six food retailers will change, if that has not already happened.
1.16: $\quad$ The realities of market power may be much greater than either the level of concentration or changes in that level may suggest. The concentration of large-scale buying power into fewer hands is already highly significant as far as the food processors and other manufacturers will testify. What is more, the degree of concentration undoubtedly varies from one part of the country to another. The multiples which operate nationally are the exception rather than the rule, and the majority of the fastest growing concerns have at most regional market territories.

Thus, it may very well be that in certain parts of the country the degree of concentration is much higher than might be inferred from this "national" analysis. How much higher is a question that awaits further study, although part of the answer insofar as it is reflected in shop-prices may be forthcoming from current work on variations in retail prices charged by grocery outlets of different sizes in different locations in Greater London, Greater Manchester and in West Central Scotland.

2: CHANGES IN RETAIL TRADE, 1950-75
2.1: The first Census of Distribution for Great Britain was taken in 1750, and in the following quarter of a century there have been a further four full or sample Censuses in 1957, 1961, 1966 and 1971. The intervening years have also been covered by a regular monthly statistical series on retail sales, but for the broad picture of the main changes in retailing since the immediate post-war years it is sufficient to look at the Census years together with the data for 1975.
2.2: The level of retail trade in Great Britain, at current prices, increased fivefold from $£ 5,170$ millions in 1950 to $£ 28,483$ millions in 1975, but in volume terms, the rise was just under four-fifths, or an average of 2.3 per cent. a year. From Table 2.1 it will be seen that the trade of food shops (including market traders) at current prices increased faster than the trade of non-food shops (including general mail-order houses) between 1950 and 1957, but considerably more slowly between 1957 and 1975.
2.3: In terms of the volume of retail trade, however, the sales of food shops have represented a declining share of total retail turnover since 1950. Between 1950 and 1961, their share fell from 47 per cent. to 46 per cent., but during the next decade, it dropped to 40 per cent. and in 1975 stood at 36 per cent. Indeed, it can be seen from Table 2.2 that the volume of food shops' sales in 1971 was less than 6 per cent. higher than in 1961 (equivalent to under 0.6 per cent. a year) and in fact was lower in 1975 than in 1971. If population-growth is taken into account, the volume of food shops' sales per head amounted to as little as 0.5 per cent. for the whole of the 1961-71 period, falling between 1971 and 1975 by over 2 per cent. This makes a complete contrast to the 1950-61 period when food shops' sales per head rose by nearly one-quarter, or by 2 per cent. a year.
2.4: The volume of non-food shops (including mail order) sales increased by 3 per cent. a year between 1950 and 1961, improving slightly on that rate taking the 1960s as a whole, and increasing to over $3 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. a year in the four years between 1971 and 1975. Thus, whereas the non-food shops have shown a reasonably consistent and relatively high rate of growth during the past quarter of a century (although varying from year to year to a much greater extent than the periodic changes suggest), the volume of sales by food shops has been growing only very slowly for the greater part of that period, and in recent years has been falling.
2.5: The items stocked and sold by food shops are not, of course, confined to fresh or processed foods, any more than the sales of non-food shops comprise everything but foods. The Censuses of Distribution provide data on the sales of broad groups of commodities by different types of shops, and the total retail sales of food through shops are compared in Table 2.3 with the total estimated household expenditure on food. This shows that between 1950 and 1966 the tendency was for a growing proportion of household food spending to be reflected in retail sales through shops, but that since 1966 their share has remained around $89 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
2.6: At the same time there have been changes in the division of these retail food sales through shops of different types. As can be seen from Table 2.4, the share of the Cooperative societies ${ }^{1}$ outlets fell substantially from $18 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1957 to 11 per cent. in 1971, although it had not fallen further by 1975. In the private sector, however, the most striking feature is the extent to which non-food shops have increased their share of retail food sales: namely, from $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1961 to 11 per cent. in 1971, and to an estimated 13 per cent. in 1975.
2.7: $\quad$ The distribution of food sales among the non-food shops has also changed considerably since 1961 as can be seen from Table 2.5. About one-half of these food sales were contributed by confectioners, newsagents, tobacconists in 1961 and 1966; by 1971, their share had fallen to two-fifths and in 1975 to little more than one-third. A growing share of these food sales, on the other hand, came from variety and other general stores (such as F.W. Woolworth, British Home Stores) and clothing shops (such as Marks \& Spencer), rising from one-third in 1961 to over two-fifths in 1971, and continuing to increase to 1975. The other category of traders which have increased their relative importance as food outlets are miscellaneous non-food shops, largely attributable to chemists' shops selling ranges of dietary and dietetic foods.

## Diversification within Food Shops

2.8: While a growing proportion of retail food sales has been reaching the public through non-food shops, sales of food have been contributing a smaller share of the total sales of food shops. Thus, it can be seen from Table 2.6 that whereas food accounted for around 90 per cent. of the food shops' sales in 1951 and 1957, its share had dropped to $84 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1971 and to an estimated $82 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1975.
2.9: $\quad$ The main types of commodities which have become relatively more important in the sales of food shops during recent years are household cleaning supplies, drugs and toilet preparations, clothing and footwear, and hardware, gardeners' and decorators' supplies. These four broad categories of goods accounted for about one-eighth of the nonfood sales of food shops in 1961; by 1971, their combined share had increased to nearly twofifths. Alcoholic drinks also became more important during this period, increasing their share from 14 per cent. in 1961 to nearly 18 per cent. in 1971. On the other hand, tobacco sales through food shops, which accounted for nearly two-thirds of their non-food turnover in 1961, had dropped their share to two-fifths in 1971, despite an increase in their volume.
2.10: The diversification of the stock-range of food shops generally is the main reason why their turnover has increased more than household food expenditure between 1961 and 1975. Indeed, the increase in the sales of non-food items through food shops between 1961 and 1975 was larger than the extra food sales of non-food shops.
2.11: The broadening of the range of non-food items stocked, however, has been much more marked in the case of grocers and provision dealers than among the other kinds of food traders, such as dairymen, butchers, bakers, fishmongers and greengrocers. From Table 2.7, it will be seen that whereas there was no change in the relative importance of food sales by other food shops between 1961 and 1971, their share of the grocers' trade fell from 85 per cent. to 79 per cent. in the same period. Since 1971, however, it is estimated that the food sales' proportion for other food shops has fallen to 95 per cent., but accompanied by a further fall in their relative importance for grocers and provision dealers as well.
2.12: It will also be noted from the total sales for the two broad groups of food shops in the private sector, as shown in Table 2.7, that grocery and provision dealers have increased their relative importance. In 1950, they accounted for about 54 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and in 1961, nearly 58 per cent. of the total food shops' turnover, but by 1971 they had a share of nearly $64 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and in 1975, more than $66 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
2.13: Experience has varied among the constituent trades making up other food retailers in the private sector as can be seen from Table 2.8. Between 1950 and 1961, the share of bakers' shops in total sales by other food retailers fell from 20 per cent. to $14 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent., although they have subsequently slightly improved their relative position. Fishmongers and greengrocers declined in relative importance, too, between 1950 and 1971, although they have held their own in recent years. Only butchers, however, have shown a consistent improvement in their relative position, increasing their share from $31 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1950 to 41 per cent. in 1961 and to 45 per cent. in 1975.
2.14: It might be expected that relative price-changes will have accounted for some part of the changing shares experienced by the various other food retailers. Certainly price-changes for the main commodities stocked by the different categories have varied considerably at different time during the past quarter of a century. Thus, from Table 2.9 it will be seen that for the whole group of other food retailers prices rose by 4.2 per cent. during the 1950-61 period as compared with 3.6 per cent. a year during the next 10 years. The faster increase between 1950 and 1961 is attributable in part to the reduction in food subsidies from the equivalent of 15.7 per cent. of actual household food spending to 6.2 per cent. Between 1971 and 1975, however, the group average price-increase was 14.4 per cent. a year, despite the fact that food subsidies rose from the equivalent of 3.2 per cent. of actual household food spending in 1971 to 8.6 per cent. in 1975.
2.15: Among the constituent trades, the price-increases for the principal items sold by dairymen have been consistently below-average in each of the three periods, while those for butchery have been consistently higher. The increases in prices for fish and fruit and vegetables have been particularly large during the 1971-75 period, while bakery products have had above-average price-increases since 1961. It is also worth noting from Table 2.9 that grocery prices rose more slowly than the commodities sold by other food retailers between 1950 and 1961, but at a faster rate during the other two periods.
2.16: When price-changes are taken into account, the volume of sales by other food retailers in the private sector rose by only 0.6 per cent. a year between 1950 and 1971, and, as can be seen from Table 2.10, they are estimated to have fallen by about 1.2 per cent. a year between 1971 and 1975. Moreover, only dairymen have consistently increased their share of the other food retailers' trade: from 14 per cent. in 1950 to 22 per cent. in 1975. Butchers had no larger a share in 1975 than they did in 1961, for despite a $3 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. increase in the volume of their sales between 1961 and 1971, by 1975 they had
fallen to $4 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. below their 1971 level. Fishmongers and greengrocers have both seen their shares of the other food retailers' trade fall in each of the three periods, although bakers, after suffering a substantial fall in their share between 1950 and 1961, have not fared so badly since then.
2.17: The plain fact is that other food retailers collectively have lagged far behind grocers and provision dealers in their volume increases in sales. Thus, from Table 2.11 it can be seen that the private sector grocers registered a 54 per cent. rise in their volume of sales between 1950 and 1961, when that for other food retailers rose by only 11 per cent. Between 1961 and 1971, the grocers' volume of sales increased by 20 per cent. as compared with under 3 per cent. by other food retailers. And since 1971, when grocers' sales have risen slightly, those of other food retailers fell by over 5 per cent.
2.18: Indeed, grocers and provision dealers have been making substantial inroads into the markets of the various other food retailers. This can be plainly seen from Table 2.12 which compares the grocers' and other food shops' shares of retail sales of five product groups characteristic of the latter's trade in 1961 and 1971. Thus, for example, it will be seen that grocery shops more than doubled their share of fish, poultry and game sales between 1961 and 1971, thereby accounting for the larger part of the share loss suffered by other food retailers. Indeed, with the exception of bakery products, grocers accounted for a larger share of these sales in 1971 than in 1961, increasing their overall claim from 20 per cent. in 1961 to 25 per cent. in 1971. Even so, the share loss sustained by other food retailers was even higher at 9 per cent., indicating that the sales of their principal products by non-food shops, as well as by grocers, had increased more during this period than they had through their own outlets.

## Conclusion

2.19: There have been distinctly different trends, therefore, in the trading patterns of grocers and other food retailers during the last quarter of a century. The latter's volume of trade has not expanded nearly as fast as that of grocers, and their sales of food have continued to represent all but a small fraction of their total turnover. Grocers, on the other hand, have widened their stock-range to the point where food sales account for little more than three-quarters of their total trade, and an increasing part of their food sales comprises the staple lines of other food retailers. Their ability to stock and sell more of a wider range of goods, however, would not have been possible without the changes in technology (and the larger premises required to take advantage of them) that have changed dramatically not only the grocery outlets but also the structure of the whole trade.

TABLE 2.1

Retail trade, at current prices: 1950-75

Great Britain: $£ M$ ns.

|  | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| TOTA.L RETAIL TRADE | 5,170 | 7,793 | 9,125 | 11,689 | 16,276 | 28,483 |
| Food shops <br> Non-food shops | 2,145 | 3,464 | 3,997 | 4,831 | 6,481 | 11,220 |
| $\quad$Food shops as percent <br> of Total | $41 \frac{1}{2}$ | $44 \frac{1}{2}$ | 44 | $41 \frac{1}{2}$ | 40 | $39 \frac{1}{2}$ |



TABLE 2.2

Retail trade, at constant (1971) prices: 1950-75

Great Britain: $£ M$ ns.

|  | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| TOTAL RETAIL TRADE | 9,859 | 11,845 | 13,322 | 14,881 | 16,276 | 17,686 |
| Food shops     <br> Non-food shops 4,657 5,503 6,127 6,329 <br> 6,481 6,381    <br> Food shops as percent <br> of Total 47 $46 \frac{1}{2}$ 46 $42 \frac{1}{2}$ | 40 | 36 |  |  |  |  |

Per annum rates of change
(\%) during period ended:
TOTAL RETAIL TRADE

| 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 2.1 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 2.4 | 2.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | -0.4 |
| 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 2.7 | 3.7 |

TABLE 2.3

Household expenditure and retail sales of food: 1950-75

|  |  |  |  | Great Britain: £Mns. |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| Household expenditure on <br> food | 2,332 | 3,947 | 4,256 | 5,187 | 6,805 | 11,782 |
| Retail sales of food <br> through shops | 2,017 | 3,353 | 3,771 | 4,641 | 6,082 | 10,520 |
| Retail sales as percent of <br> household expenditure on <br> food (\%) | $86 \frac{1}{2}$ | 85 | $88 \frac{1}{2}$ | $89 \frac{1}{2}$ | $89 \frac{1}{2}$ | $89 \frac{1}{2}$ |

TABLE 2.4

Division of retail sales of food, by type of outlet: $1950-75$

|  | Great Britain: £Mns. |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| - | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| Retail sales of food | 2,017 | 3,353 | 3,771 | 4,641 | 6,082 | 10,520 |
| Co-operative Societies | 371 | 622 | 627 | 623 | 673 | 1,158 |
| Private Sector: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Food shops Non-food shops | $\begin{array}{r} 1,514 \\ 132 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2,468 \\ 263 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 2,866 \\ 278 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 3,570 \\ 448 \end{array}$ | 4,752 657 | 8,016 1,346 |
| Percentage Shares: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Co-operative Societies | 182 | 182 | $16 \frac{1}{2}$ | 132 | 11 | 11 |
| Private Sector: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Food shops | 75 | 731 | 76 | 77 | 78 | 76 |
| Non-food shops | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ | 8 | $7 \frac{1}{2}$ | 912 | 11 | 13 |

TABLE 2.5

Division of non-food shops sales of food: 1961-75

Great Britain

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | $1975$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $£$ Mns. at current prices |  |  |  |
| Private Sector: |  |  |  |  |
| Sales of food in non-food shops | 278 | 448 | 657 | 1,346 |
| Percent. attributable to: | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| Confectioners, newsagents, tobacconists | 51 | 50 | 40 | 34 |
| Off-Licences | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Department stores | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Variety and other general * | 33 | 36 | 41 | 44 |
| Miscellaneous non-food shops | 3 | 2 | 7 | 10 |
| Mail order | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

* Includes Clothing Shops.

TABLE 2.6
Relative importance of sales of food in food shops' sales: 1950-75

Great Britain

|  | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Private Sector: <br> Food shops' sales <br> Sales of food in <br> food shops | 1,705 | 2,730 | 3,231 | 4,042 | 5,609 | 9,719 |

TABLE 2.7
Private sector food shops' sales, by broad group of shops: 1950-75
Great Britain $\begin{array}{llll}1950 & 1961 & 1971 & 1975\end{array}$
$£ M_{n s}$. at current prices
Private Sector
Total Sales:
Grocers \& provision dealers
Other food retailers

|  | 1950 | 1961 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | £Mns. at current prices |  |  |  |
| Private Sector |  |  |  |  |
| Total Sales: |  |  |  |  |
|  | 928 | 1,869 | 3,615 | 6,474 |
| Other food retailers | 777 | 1,362 | 1,994 | 3,245 |
|  | 1,705 | 3,231 | 5,609 | 9,719 |
| Sales of food as proportion of total sales: |  |  |  |  |
|  | .. | 85 | 79 | 77 |
| Other food retailers | . | 98 | 98 | 95 |
|  | . | $88 \frac{1}{2}$ | $84 \frac{1}{2}$ | 82 $\frac{1}{2}$ |

TABLE 2.8
Private sector: Sales of other food retailers, by type, 1950-75

|  | Great Britain |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | 1950 | 1961 | 1971 | 1975 |

$£ M n s$. at current prices

| Total sales of other food retailers | 777 | 1,362 | 1,994 | 3,245 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Share of total sales by: | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| Dairymen | 171 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 19 | 20 | 18 |
| Butchers | $31 \frac{1}{2}$ | 41 | 43 | 45 |
| Fishmongers | $7 \frac{1}{2}$ | 51 ${ }^{1}$ | 4 | 4 |
| Greengrocers | $23 \frac{1}{2}$ | 20 | 18 | 18 |
| Bakers | 20 | 141 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 15 | 15 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

TABLE 2.9

Annual percentage increases in prices of main commodities stocked by different types of food shop, 1950-75

|  |  | Per cent. a year |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $1950-61$ | $1961-71$ | $1971-75$ | Whole <br> period <br> $1950-75$ |
| Food Shops | 3.2 | 4.4 | 15.2 | 5.5 |
| Grocers \& Provision Dealers | 2.5 | 4.9 | 15.5 | 5.4 |
| Other food retailers |  |  |  |  |
| Dairymen | 4.2 | 3.6 | 14.4 | 5.6 |
| Butchers | 3.6 | 1.9 | 7.2 | 3.7 |
| Fishmongers | 5.6 | 4.1 | 15.4 | 6.5 |
| Greengrocers | 2.4 | 4.6 | 16.1 | 5.4 |
| Bakers | 3.2 | 3.0 | 16.7 | 5.2 |
|  | 3.8 | 4.7 | 15.5 | 6.0 |

Source: Based on Retail Prices Index.

TABLE 2.10

Private Sector: Volume of sales of other food retailers, by type of shop, 1950-75

Great Britain

|  | 1950 | 1961 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

$£$ Mns. at 1971 prices
Private Sector

| Total sales of other food retailers | 1,752 | 1,946 | 1,994 | 1,899 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Share of total sales by: | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| Dairymen | 14 | 16 | 20 | 22 |
| Butchers | 38 | 43 | 42 | 43 |
| Fishmongers | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 |
| Greengrocers | 20 | 19 | 18 | 16 |
| Bakers | 21 | 16 | 15 | 15 |
|  |  |  |  |  |



TABLE 2.11
Changes in volume of sales of private sector food shops, 1950-75

|  | All Food <br> Shops |  | Grocers and <br> Provision <br> Dealers | Other <br> Food Shops |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $£ M n s$. | Index | $£ M n s$ | Index | $£ M n s$. | Index |
| 1950 | 3,701 | 100 | 1,949 | 100 | 1,752 | 100 |
| 1961 | 4,953 | 134 | 3,007 | 154 | 1,946 | 111 |
| 1971 | 5,609 | 152 | 3,615 | 185 | 1,994 | 114 |
| 1975 | 5,533 | 150 | 3,634 | 186 | 1,899 | 108 |



## TABLE 2.12

Grocers' shops share of principal commodity groups of other food shops, 1961 and 1971

|  | Grocers and <br> Provision <br> Dealers |  | Other <br> Food <br> Shops |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1961 | 1971 | 1961 | 1971 |
| Fresh milk and cream | 7 | 12 | 92 | 86 |
| Meat | 9 | 17 | 89 | 81 |
| Fish, poultry and game | 14 | 29 | 84 | 63 |
| Fresh fruit and vegetables | 20 | 33 | 74 | 59 |
| Bakery products | 44 | 40 | 46 | 48 |
|  |  | 20 | 25 | 76 |

Source: Based on Censuses of Distribution, 1961 and 1971.

## 3: THE PRIVATE GROCERY TRADE

3.1: The effects of what is frequently described as "the retail revolution" are more plainly to be seen in the grocery trade than anywhere else in retailing. Twentyfive years ago, grocery shops looked very little different from what they did before the outbreak of war, although there were fewer of them as the result of air-raids on the one hand, and restrictions on the building of new shops outside the 'blitzed' cities and new housing estates on the other. An extensive range of foodstuffs, including meat, bacon, fats, eggs, cheese and tea, were still rationed, and with continuing shortages of other processed foods, supplies were allocated by manufacturers on the basis of pre-war purchases. Price controls which fixed retail margins, continued at least as long as rationing.
3.2: Largely frozen in its pre-war posture, the grocery trade comprised about 128,000 shops in 1950 with average annual sales of around $£ 9,000$ (or about $£ 15,200$ at 1971 prices), and over one-half of them had annual sales of $£ 5,000-£ 25,000$ (or $£ 10,000-$ $£ 50,000$ at 1971 prices). In the next seven years, with an end to rationing and pricecontrols, and the lifting of building restrictions in 1954, the number of grocery shops increased, and at the same time, as Table 3.1 shows, the volume of sales per shop increased by over one-quarter. After 1957 the number of grocery shops began to fall, comparatively slowly at first but by nearly three-tenths over the fourteen years to 1971. During the same period, the average sales per shop nearly doubled in real terms.

The advent of self-service
3.3: During the 1950s, the major change was the development of selfservice. In 1950, there were only 600 self-service shops in Britain, mostly conversions within existing shop-premises and mostly to be found in the larger towns. By 1957, their number had increased to over 3,000 in the grocery trade, of which the Cooperative societies claimed more than three-fifths. Four years later, the number of grocery self-service shops had trebled, and those in the private sector had risen from 1,200 to 5,400. Moreover, in 1961, only onetenth of all the private self-service grocery shops qualified as supermarkets in that their sales area exceeded $2,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft.
3.4: While the number of private self-service grocery shops rose between 1961 and 1966 from 5,400 to nearly 14,000, the proportion of supermarkets among them rose
from one-tenth to one-seventh, thereby enlarging their share of the private sector's grocery trade from 44 per cent. to just over 50 per cent. Unfortunately data on self-service trading in 1971 from the Census of Distribution for that year are still not available, but the Institute of Grocery Distribution has estimated that the number of multiple grocery self-service shops in 1975 amounted to 8,150 (or nearly nine-tenths of all their grocery shops), and that the number of their supermarkets (with over 2,000 sq. ft . sales area) was around 4,150 , more than double the 1966 total for the whole of the private sector.
3.5: Even more important, the average size of the multiple grocers' supermarkets in 1975 was 6,100 sq. ft., with 45 per cent. of them having sales areas in excess of $4,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . Since 1971, in addition, superstores and hypermarkets (defined here as stores with at least 30 per cent. of their turnover in food and with sales areas of more than $25,000 \mathrm{sq} . \mathrm{ft}$.) have become an important element in grocery retailing. Such multiple grocery outlets with these characteristics accounted for 5 per cent. of their 1,890 supermarkets of more than $4,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . sales area.
3.6: In the 1950s, there was far from universal enthusiasm for self-service among established traders:
"Some of the larger and more traditionally minded multiples regarded self-service with suspicion and publicly doubted whether they had any value in their own organisations. The pace-makers were, apart from the major pioneers among Cooperative societies, relative newcomers to retailing who had confidence that what had succeeded in the United States would ultimately become established in this country."*

Even so, the ability to convert existing premises, and even embark on the fitting-out of a rented purpose-built store, demanded considerable financial resources which the larger retail organisations were more likely to command than the smaller independent grocer. Thus, it was the multiples' grocery shops which expanded fastest throughout the $1957-71$ period. From Table 3.2 it will be seen that the number of persons per shop for the independent grocery shops only rose above its 1957 level after 1967, and then by a modest amount, whereas the numbers per shop for the multiples increased from under 7 to over 11 between 1957 and 1966, and then again to over 20 by 1971.
3.7: Part of these increases in persons engaged, however, may be attributable to larger numbers of part-time staff employed by multiples, but the underlying trend towards larger shops is also evident from the relative changes in the average sales per establishment. Thus, from Table 3.3 it will be seen that for the whole of the 1957-71 period, the average annual increase was 4.8 per cent. for all grocery shops in the private sector, but for the multiples, it was as high as 9.2 per cent. as compared with 2.1 per cent. for the independents. Moreover, it will be noted that between 1966 and 1971 when the annual increase for independents fell compared with the preceding periods, that for the multiples continued to rise.

[^2]Changes in structure of the grocery trade
3.8: The changes in the general structure of the private grocery trade from 1957 onwards can be seen from Table 3.4. The number of multiple organisations has fallen by nearly one-half from 256 in 1957 to 135 in 1971, while the number of independent businesses dropped by one-seventh between 1961 and 1971. The multiples' share of the private grocery shops, after increasing between 1957 and 1961, was back to the 1957 level of 11 per cent. by 1971. But their share of the private grocery trade which stood at 29 per cent. in 1957 had risen to 37 per cent. by 1961 and 43 per cent. in 1966, equivalent to a rate of just over 3 per cent. a year. But even this rate of advance was exceeded between 1966 and 1971 when the multiples' share rose to 51 per cent., as well as for the more recent period with its further rise to 57 per cent. in 1975.
3.9: There are many reasons why the advance of the multiples in the grocery trade has been so substantial, involving as it has done an increase in their bargaining strength vis-a-vis the food manufacturers. According to the National Board for Prices and Incomes (PIB):
> "By concentrating on creating larger shops - with their accompanying economies of scale - in important shopping centres, and in some instances, increasing the number of outlets under their control, the more enterprising multiple companies rapidly expanded their trade. The extension of prepackaging of food by manufacturers was an important factor since it assisted the development of self-service and hence of the supermarket. The large retailers' growing volume of sales placed them in an even stronger position to bargain with the manufacturers. "*
3.10: This increased bargaining strength was deployed in two main directions: first, to gain more favourable buying terms and other concessions in delivery and sales promotion, and second, to secure supplies from manufacturers of goods packed under their own labels which could be sold at prices lower than the manufacturers' ${ }^{2}$ brands and sometimes with a higher profit-margin. Moreover, the multiples' increased buying power contributed to the final breakdown of resale price maintenance in the grocery trade, since manufacturers were loth to take action against a high-volume distributor for selling below the "fixed" price.
3.11: In pursuing a policy of "price-cutting", the supermarkets followed "the traditional pattern of other newcomers in the past: to consolidate their foothold and expand their share of the market, competition in price with the orthodox outlets was essential ..... To convert to self-service or open a supermarket meant spending money, and to obtain a reasonable return on this capital expenditure required a high level of sales. Price competition was the answer."**
3.12: The level of capital expenditure (net) by the private sector grocers expanded very considerably during the latter part of the 1960s. From Table 3.5 it will be

[^3]seen that it rose from under $£ 38$ millions in 1966 to over $£ 58 \frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1971 , an increase of 55 per cent. as compared with a 50 per cent. rise in sales during the same period. But the net capital spending by the independents actually fell between 1966 and 1971, so that the multiples' spending doubled, and taking into account their decline in numbers their average spending rose by over 175 per cent.
3.13: It will also be seen from Table 3.5 that there were significant changes in the breakdown of the grocery multiples' net capital expenditure between 1966 and 1971, most notably in respect of the balance of spending on new as against existing buildings. Even in 1966 the net spending on existing buildings represented only 1 per cent. of the total, but by 1971 where disposals far outweighed acquisitions, it had been transformed into a negative item. New buildings, however, increased their relative importance from under two-fifths to nearly three-fifths of total net capital expenditure by multiple grocers, with plant, machinery and other capital equipment showing a substantial increase as well.
3.14: $\quad$ Not only did the independent grocers collectively spend less in total in 1971 than in 1966 (although given the likely decline in their numbers, the average spending will have risen), but the relative importance of their expenditure on new and existing buildings also fell. Also noteworthy is the much greater proportion of total capital spending by independents going on vehicles (around 36 per cent.) than applied in the case of the multiples (5-6 per cent.), indicative of the latter's tendency to contract-out their distributive operations to specialist firms.

## Margins and Costs

3.15: The increased degree of price competition has not been reflected in any diminution of percentage gross margins for either multiple or independent grocers between 1957 and 1971. From Table 3.6 it will be seen that the gross margin of multiple grocers remained virtually unchanged between 1957 and 1966, but increased sharply to 19.7 per cent. in 1971. In the first of the two periods, the largely static gross margin of the multiples was accompanied by a rise in the rate of stock-turn, although between 1966 and 1971 it fell by one-eighth as the gross margin rose. Both these changes are likely to have been associated with the widening of the multiples' stock-range to include products with higher-margins but lower rates of stock-turn.
3.16: Perhaps surprisingly the percentage gross margin of the independent grocers, after increasing faster than that of the multiples between 1957 and 1966, rose from 14.8 per cent. in 1966 to 20.1 per cent. in 1971 , the latter level being above the multiples'. But their rate of stock-turn also fell between 1966 and 1971, although to a less marked degree than occurred for the multiples.
3.17: It will also be seen from Table 3.6 that the multiples' labour costs raitio rose from 7.7 per cent. of sales in 1957 to nearly 8.5 per cent. in 1971, but that this increase was less than the overall improvement in the percentage gross margin during the same period. The labour costs ratio for the independent grocers, however, was much the same in 1971 as it was in 1957, but significantly higher than in 1966. The marked difference in the labour costs ratio of the two types of retailer is, of course, attributable in part to the working proprietors and unpaid helpers helping to man the independents' shops.
3.18: Unfortunately the Census of Distribution provides no data on other operating costs or on net profit-margins among different trades and types of retailer, but the National Board for Prices \& Incomes included results for only a small sample of multiple grocers, which must for that reason be regarded as illustrative rather than definitive. The results for nine multiple companies (and one Cooperative society) as given in the PIB report* are presented here in Table 3.7. It will be noted that the gross profit-margin did not change much during the four years covered, but that operating costs tended to rise, with littled variation among their components. After increasing between 1967 and 1968, their combined net margin rate fell to 1970, but given the increase in turnover (at current prices), the actual rise in net profits was nearly one-half.
3.19: The return on capital employed (i.e. fixed and current assets less current liabilities (excluding long-term bank overdrafts) rose from 13.6 per cent. in 1967 to 14.3 per cent. in 1968, falling marginally in 1969. The PIB report stresses, however, that one of the peculiarities of food retailing is that current assets (i.e. stocks, debtors and cash) tend to be lower than current liabilities (i.e. suppliers and other creditors), so that in effect retailers obtain part of their working capital from their suppliers. Furthermore, it emphasises that it found an "extremely wide range of rates of return" between different multiple grocers, and that the return on capital is "highly sensitive to small changes in prices. For instance, a reduction in prices and net margins of 1 per cent, would have reduced the average return on capital of the respondent companies in 1969 from 14.2 per cent. to 8 per cent."
3.20: The high sensitivity of the return on capital to price-changes has many implications as far as the operations and policies of the multiple grocers are concerned. It is evident from the PIB Report that not only the method of trading (i.e. counter-service, self-service or supermarket) and locational factors (i.e. the absence or presence of competing supermarkets) can significantly affect the achieved levels of gross and net margins for individual multiple grocery branches. For a sample of 80 branches of multiple grocers, the levels of gross and net margin and rate of stock-turn were as shown in Table 3.8. It will be seen that the percentage gross margin was not always higher for branches without supermarket competition than where such competition existed, unlike the net profit margin which was higher in each of these situations. What is more, the net profit margin was highest for their supermarkets ( 5.2 per cent.), and higher for other self-service shops ( 5.0 per cent.) than for counter-service shops ( 4.3 per cent.), and the same was true for the rate of stock-turn.
3.21: The comparative results of this sample of 80 multiple grocery branches with 726 independent grocers' shops in 1970 are shown in Table 3.9. For selfservice shops, the percentage gross margins for the multiple branches are substantially higher than for the indeperidents, as are the net profit-rates and the rates of stock-turn. For the counter-service grocery shops, on the other hand, the multiples' gross margins and stock-turn rates are higher than those of the independents, although their net margins are substantially lower. Given that the multiples predominant in supermarket operations (where the net profit-rate is above average) and that their counter-service shops are dwindling in numbers, it is clear that they have an advantage over the independents which derives from the size of their shops and their methods of operation.

[^4]3.22: Over and above that advantage, however, are the benefits which flow from their overall size, which not only relate to economies in operation but, as the PIB report rightly points out, from the deployment of their buying power. Thus, the PIB found that "on some products the larger retailers are probably able to obtain aggregate additional discounts of between 10 and 15 per cent. (calculated on the retail price of the product) beyond those obtainable by shops which can only buy in minimum case-lots." In addition, the multiples can increase the number and range of their own label products, whict the PIB considered accounted in 1970 for 15-20 per cent. of the value of all packaged grocery goods (excluding the Coop brands).
3.23: The use of their buying power to extract additional discounts from their suppliers or to obtain those higher margins on own label products constitutes a large part of the explanation why the multiple grocers can offer price-reductions without necessarily putting at risk the level of their return on capital. Another reason is that pricereductions on carefully selected lines for specific periods in the form of "special offers" can result in an increase in the volume of sales which more than compensates for the reduction in their gross margins.
3.24: There is no doubt that, by and large, the multiple grocers are in a far better position than the independents to pursue such policies, and that their increased buying power not only derives from their larger sales potential but in turn contributes to its further growth. The question that remains is equally evident: do the economies of scale increase with the size of the whole organisation, or is there some point at which diseconomies commence to operate? The next chapter explores the Census of Distribution data on the multiple grocers to see if there is any sign of an answer to this question.

TABLE 3.1

Private Sector grocery trade: Total sales and number of establishments, 1950-75

|  | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Total sales (£Mns.) <br> No. of establishments (000s) | 928 | 1,568 | 1,869 | 2,399 | 3,615 | 6,474 |
| Sales per establishment <br> constant (1971) prices <br> (£000) | 128 | 135 | 132 | 109 | 98 | $\ldots$ |



## TABLE 3.2

Numbers engaged per establishment: 1957-71
$\qquad$
Persons engaged per establishment:
Independents
$\begin{array}{llll}2.9 & 2.9 & 2.9 & 3.4\end{array}$
Multiples
6.9
8.1
11.120 .6
$\begin{array}{llll}3.4 & 3.6 & 4.1 & 5.3\end{array}$

TABLE 3.3
Annual percentage-increases in sales per establishment, 1957-71

| $1957-$ <br> 1961 | 1961- <br> 1966 | 1966- <br> 1971 | Whole period <br> $1957-1971$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |

Sales per establishment:
annual percentage-increases

| Independents | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 2.1 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Multiples | 7.7 | 9.4 | 10.1 | 9.2 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| All | 4.3 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 4.8 |

## TABLE 3.4

Private Sector grocery trade: Organisations, establishments and sales of independents and multiples.

|  | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

No. of organisations:

| Independent Multiple | $256$ | $\begin{array}{r} 95,308 \\ 238 \end{array}$ | 187 | $\begin{array}{r} 82,531 \\ 135 \end{array}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% |

No. of establishments:

| Independent | 89 | 87 | 88 | 89 | . |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Multiple | 11 | 13 | 12 | 11 | . |

Total sales:

| Independent | 71 | 63 | 57 | 49 | 43 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Multiple | 29 | 37 | 43 | 51 | 57 |

No. of establishments
Total Sales


TABLE 3.5

Net capital expenditure of multiple and independent grocers, 1966 and 1971

|  | Multiples |  | Independents |  | All: Private Sector |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1966 | 1971 | 1966 | 1971 | 1966 | 1971 |
| Net capital expenditure (£Mns.) | 21.71 | 43.35 | 16.09 | 15.30 | 37.80 | 58.65 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| New buildings | 39.6 | 59.0 | 19.5 | 17.2 | 31.1 | 48.1 |
| Existing buildings (net) | 1.0 | -23.4 | 15.7 | 12.4 | 7.2 | -14.1 |
| Vehicles (net) | 6.2 | 5.3 | 35.5 | 36.1 | 18.7 | 13.3 |
| other capital equipment (net) | 53.2 | 59.1 | 29.3 | 34.3 | 43.0 | 52.7 |
|  | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |

TABLE 3.6

Private Sector grocery trade: gross margins, rate of stock-turn and labour costs - ratio, 1957-71

|  | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | As percentages of sales |  |  |  |
| Gross margin: |  |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 17.6 | 17.7 | 17.8 | 19.7 |
| Independents | 14.4 | 15.2 | 14.8 | 20.1 |
| All | 15.4 | 16.1 | 16.1 | 19.9 |
| Rate of stock-turn | Times per annum |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 13.3 | 12.7 | 14.4 | 12.6 |
| Independents | 15.1 | 15.3 | 15.8 | 15.4 |
| All | 14.5 | 14.2 | 15.2 | 13.8 |
| Labour costs - ratio: | As percentages of sales |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 7.70 | . | 8.38 | 8.48 |
| Independents | 4.12 | .. | 3.37 | 4.10 |
| All | 5.19 | . | 5.53 | 6.35 |

## TABLE 3.7

Multiple grocers: Sales, margins and costs, 1967-70

|  | 1967 | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sales: |  |  |  |  |
| Food | 549 | 608 | 683 | 770 |
| Non-food | 54 | 60 | 76 | 89 |
| Total | 603 | 668 | 759 | 859 |
|  | As percentages of total sales |  |  |  |
| Gross margin | 19.3 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 19.7 |
| Operating costs: |  |  |  |  |
| Shop payroll | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 7.4 |
| Occupancy | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.2 |
| Warehouse \& transport | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 |
| Head Office | 2.3 | - 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.6 |
| Other (incl. depreciation) | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.7 |
|  | 17.1 | 17.2 | 17.3 | 17.4 |
| Net margin (before tax \& interest) | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 |
| Return on capital employed (\%) | 13.6 | 14.3 | 14.2 | N.a. |

TABLE 3.8

Gross and net margins and stock-turn of multiple grocery branches, 1970

|  | Gross margin | Net margin | Rate of stock-turn |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Supermarkets: | \% | \% | Times per annum |
| With other supermarket competition | 18.3 | 5.1 | 21.3 |
| With no supermarket competition | 17.7 | 6.3 | 25.9 |
| All | 18.3 | 5.2 | 21.6 |
| Other self-service shops: |  |  |  |
| With supermarket competition | 16.9 | 4.4 | 19.2 |
| With no supermarket competition | 17.2 | 7.1 | 23.4 |
| All | 16.9 | 5.0 | 20.1 |
| Counter-service shops: |  |  |  |
| With supermarket competition | 16.7 | 3.6 | 16.2 |
| With no supermarket competition | 20.3 | 5.3 | 19.7 |
| All | 18.2 | 4.3 | 17.5 |
| All multiple branches | 17.9 | 5.1 | 21.0 |

TABLE 3.9

Gross and net margins and stock-turn of multiple branches and independent grocery shops, 1970

|  | Gross margin |  | Net margin |  | Rate of stock-turn |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mult. | Indpt. | Mult. | Indpt. | Mult. | Indpt. |
|  | Percent on sales |  |  |  | Times per annum |  |
| Supermarkets | 18.3 | .. | 5.2 | . | 21.6 | . |
| Self-service shops: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| With supermarket competition | 16.9 | 12.9 | 4.4 | 3.5 | 19.2 | 16.1 |
| With no supermarket competition | 17.2 | 13.6 | 7.1 | 5.6 | 23.4 | 15.1 |
| Counter-service shops: |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| With supermarket competition | 20.3 | 14.3 | 3.6 | 7.0 | 16.2 | 14.3 |
| With no supermarket competition | 18.2 | 13.6 | 5.3 | 8.1 | 19.7 | 13.4 |
| All | 17.9 | 13.8 | 5.1 | 6.1 | 21.0 | 14.5 |

## 4: CONCENTRATION \& PERFORMANCE AMONG MULTIPLE GROCERS

4.1: The expanding share of the private grocery trade claimed by the multiplesthas been accompanied by an increasing degree of concentration among the mulfiples themselves. From Table 4.1 it will be seen that the number of multiples with 100 or more branches fell from 35 in 1961 to 19 in 1971 (or by over two-fifths), but that their combined share of multiple grocery sales increased at the same time from 70 per cent. to 75 per cent. Indeed, it will be seen that the increase in the share of these larger multiples was mainly at the expense of those at the opposite end of the size-scale with 1019 branches.
4.2: The size-distribution of the 19 multiple organisations with 100 or more branches in 1971 is shown in Table 4.2 (comparable data for 1961 are not available). The four largest grocery multiples, each with 500 or more branches, accounted for about 57 per cent. of the total outlets, sales and persons engaged of the 19 organisations taken together. Or, in terms of the multiple grocery trade as a whole, these 4 multiple concerns were responsible for more than $42 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the sales from a slightly smaller proportion of the total establishments.
4.3: Between 1961 and 1971, there will have been changes in the identity of the multiple grocery concerns within any specific size-group (in terms of the number of branches operated), but it is still relevant to note that the size-group which has shown the largest increase in average sales per establishment (at constant prices) during this period are the multiples with $20-49$ branches. As Table 4.3 shows, average sales per shop more than trebled for this size-group between 1961 and 1971, and despite the relatively high increase in the number of persons per establishment, the level of sales per person engaged increased by about one-ninth in real terms. Although the multiples with 100 or more branches achieved the second highest increase in sales per establishment ( 150 per cent.) between 1961 and 1971, the average number engaged rose more sharply with the result that their real sales per person were lower in 1971 than in 1961. Indeed, the overall importance of the multiples with 100 or more branches meant that the fall in their real sales per person engaged was sufficient to offset the rises in the latter achieved by the other categories, with the result that overall real sales per person were about the same in 1971 as in 1961.
4.4: As far as the situation in 1971 is concerned, Table 4.4 shows that the multiples with the highest average sales per establishment, as well as sales per person engaged, were again those with 20-49 branches. The average numbers engaged per shop by the largest multiples with 500 or more branches was only slightly higher than in this category with 20-49 branches, but the former's sales per shop were about one-ninth lower on average. This might suggest that the largest multiple grocery organisations operated branches whose sizes and methods of operation varied to a greater extent than those of the smaller multiples.
4.5: Certainly there is no doubt that the number of persons per shop, and average sales per person tend to increase with the average sales per shop. Although information specific to multiples is not available, Table 4.5 gives the Census data for grocers and provision dealers irrespective of ownership for those size categories which are, however, most typical of the multiples' operations. This shows, for example, that the numbers engaged per shop with sales of $£ 1-2$ million are nearly twice as many as in shops with sales of $£ 500,000-£ 1$ million. Similarly, sales per person are positively correlated with average sales per shop. This lends strength to the proposition that the relatively low sales per person of the larger multiples are attributable to the wider range in the average size of their shops as well as in their individual methods of trading.
4.6: $\quad$ Not that the grocery multiples with 20-49 branches are at the top of the league by every indicator of comparative performance. From Table 4.6 it will be seen that while their net capital expenditure per shop in 1971 compared well with the largest multiples, their average gross margin ( 18.8 per cent.) was slightly lower than for the organisations with over 500 branches ( 19.1 per cent.) and significantly lower than for those with 200-499 branches ( 23 per cent.). In terms of rate of stock-turn, the performance of the organisations with 20-49 branches was matched by those with 200-499 branches, although the stock-turn rate for the very largest multiples was considerably lower than both. However, the gross margin and stock-turn rate of the multiples with $50-99$ branches were also higher than for the 20-49 branch group.

The largest multiples
4.7: The criterion of size so far adopted has been the number of branches, which enables the multiples to be precisely distinguished from other private grocery businesses. The alternative and possibly more meaningful size criterion is the organisation's total sales within the grocery and provisions trade, although it is not possible to be precise about which organisations with any given level of turnover are multiples as distinct from independents. It appears reasonable to assume, however, that all the organisations with total sales of $£ 2$ million and over are multiples (i.e. they have 10 or more branches), and in fact there were 74 grocery businesses with at least that level of turnover in 1971. The other 61 organisations with 10 or more branches can then be held to account for the residue of the multiple grocery trade.
4.8: There were, as Table 4.7 shows, 5 multiple grocery organisations in 1971 with sales in excess of $£ 50$ millions, with a 57 per cent. share of the multiples' trade, equivalent to 29 per cent. of the whole private sector's turnover. Similarly, over four-fifths of the multiples' trade (or about two-fifths of the whole private sector) was accounted for by the 19 largest multiples, each with sales of over $£ 20$ millions. Their share of the total persons engaged was in line with their share of total sales; the proportion of the total establishments somewhat lower.
4.9: From Table 4.8 it will be seen that the 5 largest multiples had average sales more than 15 times the overall average, mainly due to the larger number of branches controlled by them but also partly attributable to the above-average size of their branches. In the next size-category, the average sales of the 14 organisations were 2-2 $\frac{1}{2}$ times greater than the overall average, wholly attributable to the greater number of branches under their control. Indeed, it can be established that virtually the whole of the variation in the average sales of the multiple organisations is attributable to differences in the number of branches that they operate, and that variations in the average size of these branches are relatively unimportant.
4.10: The average amount of net capital expenditure per branch in 1971 was highest for those multiples with sales in excess of $£ 50$ million, and also well above average for the multiples with sales of $£ 10-20$ millions. In fact, the largest multiples by size of turnover accounted for 62 per cent. of the multiples' net capital spending in 1971, a larger proportion than their share of total sales. From Table 4.9, it will also be seen that these largest multiples also achieved the highest gross margin on sales of 20.5 per cent., and since their rate of stock-turn was below average, this may be attributable to a diversification of their stock-range into non-food items (with higher margins but lower rates of stock-turn) as well as to the utilisation of their buying power. Otherwise the highest gross margins were achieved by the multiples with £2-5 million sales, although their rate of stock-turn was also comparatively low.
4.11: As far as retailers are concerned, however, what matters more than the gross margin rate or the stock-turn rate in isolation is the combination of the two as a determinant of gross profitability. By that indicator, the most successful performances are the multiples with sales of $£ 10-20$ millions in 1971 with a gross profit-index of 115.5 , as compared with 96.6 for those with sales of $£ 50$ million and over.* However, on this test it would appear that as far as gross profitability is concerned, a broad distinction can be drawn between multiples with sales of $£ 10$ million and over, whose weighted gross profit-index is about 102, and the smaller multiples whose weighted gross profit index is under 85.

[^5]TABLE 4.1
Multiple grocers: Number of organisations and establishments, and annual sales, by size of organisation, 1961 and 1971

| Organisations with: | No. of organisations | No. of establishments | Annual Sales |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 19611971 | 19611971 | 1961 | 1971 | 1961 | 1971 |


| $10-19$ <br> $\quad$ branches | 113 | 63 | 1.53 | 0.8 | 52.7 | 89.6 | 8.3 | 4.8 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $20-49$ | 68 | 39 | 2.07 | 1.21 | 85.5 | 251.1 | 13.5 | 13.6 |
| 50-99 <br> 100 <br> and over <br> 22 | 14 | 1.54 | 1.01 | 50.6 | 122.3 | 8.0 | 6.6 |  |
|  | 35 | 19 | 9.88 | 7.65 | 445.7 | 1389.5 | 70.2 | 75.0 |
|  | 238 | 135 | 15.02 | 10.76 | 634.5 | 1852.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |



## TABLE 4.2

Larger multiple grocers: Number of organisations and establishments, annual sales and persons engaged, 1971

|  | No. of <br> organisations | No. of <br> establishments | Annual <br> sales <br> $£ M n s$. | Persons <br> engaged <br> Thousands |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Baæfor percentages: | $\ldots$ | 7653 | 1389.5 | 168.8 |
| Organisations with: <br> $100-199$ branches <br> $200-499$ <br> 500 and over | 8 | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |

## TABLE 4.3

Percentage-changes in sales and persons engaged per establishment, and sales for persons engaged: 1961-71

| Organisations <br> with: | Sales per <br> establishment (at <br> constant prices) | Persons <br> engaged <br> per <br> establishment | Sales per <br> person <br> engaged <br> (at constant <br> prices) |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $10-19$ branches | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| $20-49$ | 83 | 69 | 8.3 |
| $50-99$ | 204 | 174 | 10.9 |
| 100 and over | 129 | 121 | 3.6 |
| All | 150 | 162 | -4.6 |

## TABLE 4.4

Sales and persons engaged per establishment, and sales per person engaged, 1971

| Organisations <br> with: | Sales per <br> establishment | Persons <br> engaged <br> per <br> establishment | Sales per <br> person <br> engaged <br> £000 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $10-19$ branches | 1000 | 11.1 | 9.1 |
| $20-49$ | 202.4 | 21.7 | 9.5 |
| $50-99$ | 121.0 | 16.5 | 7.4 |
| $100-199$ | 149.3 | 16.6 | 9.0 |
| $200-499$ | 180.2 | 24.6 | 8.1 |
| 500 and over | 172.2 | 22.0 | 8.2 |
| All |  | 20.6 | 8.4 |

TABLE 4.5
Grocers and provision shops: Number engaged per shop and average sales per person, by sales per shop, 1971

| Sales per shop | Persons engaged <br> per establishment. | Sales per person <br> engaged <br> $£ 000$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $£ 50-100,000$ | 7.9 | 8.6 |
| $£ 100-200,000$ | 14.6 | 9.4 |
| $£ 200-500,000$ | 31.3 | 9.8 |
| $£ 500-£ 1 \mathrm{mn}$. | 62.0 | 10.9 |
| $£ 1 \mathrm{mn} .-£ 2 \mathrm{mn}$. | 123.2 | 11.7 |
| $£ 2 \mathrm{mn}$. and over | 195.1 | 12.4 |
|  | 16.8 | 9.8 |

TABLE 4.6
Net capital expenditure, gross margin and rate of stock-turn, by size of organisation, 1971

| Organisations <br> with: | Net capital <br> expenditure per <br> establishment | Gross <br> margin <br> on sales | Rate of <br> stock-turn | Gross <br> profit <br> index |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| $10-19$ branches | $£ 000$ | $\%$ | Timesp.a. |  |
| $20-49$ | 2.0 | 15.5 | 13.4 | 83.7 |
| $50-99$ | 4.7 | 18.8 | 14.7 | 111.3 |
| $100-199$ | 2.6 | 21.1 | 15.6 | 132.6 |
| $200-499$ | 2.5 | 15.7 | 13.0 | 82.2 |
| 500 and over | 4.8 | 19.0 | 14.7 | 136.2 |
|  | 4.6 | 19.7 | 12.6 | 82.3 |
| All |  |  |  | 100.0 |

TABLE 4.7
Multiple grocers: number of organisations, establishments, persons engaged and total sales, by sales of organisation, 1971

| Organisations with sales of: | No. of organisations | No. of establishments |  | No. of persons engaged |  | Total Sales |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Thousands | \% | Thousands | \% | £Mns. | \% |
| £50 mn. and over | 5 | 4.61 | 43 | 126.5 | 57 | 1051.8 | 57 |
| £20-50 million | 14 | 2.61 | 24 | 51.7 | 23 | 432.9 | 24 |
| £10-20 | 10 | 0.69 | 7 | 15.4 | 7 | 138.3 | 7 |
| £5-10 | 13 | 0.79 | 7 | 10.8 | 5 | 92.9 | 5 |
| £2-5 | 32 | 0.86 | 8 | 10.6 | 5 | 98.3 | 5 |
| Under £2m | 61 | 1.20 | 11 | 6.6 | 3 | 38.3 | 2 |
|  | 135 | 10.76 | 100 | 221.6 | 100 | 1852.5 | 100 |

## TABLE 4.8

Multiple grocers: average sales, number of establishments, persons per establishment and sales per person, by sales of organisation, 1971

| Organisations with sales of: | Sales per organisation |  | Establishments per organisation |  | Average persons per establishment |  | Sales per person engaged |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | £Mns. | Ratio | No. | Ratio | No. | Ratio | $£ 000$ | Ratio |
| $£ 50 \mathrm{mn}$. and over | 210.4 | 15.3 | 922 | 11.53 | 27.44 | 1.34 | 8.31 | 0.99 |
| £20-50 million | 30.9 | 2.3 | 187 | 2.34 | 19.81 | 0.96 | 8.37 | 1.00 |
| £10-20 | 13.8 | 1.0 | 69 | 0.86 | 22.32 | 1.08 | 8.98 | 1.07 |
| £5-10 | 7.1 | 0.5 | 61 | 0.76 | 13.67 | 0.66 | 8.60 | 1.03 |
| £2-5 | 3.1 | 0.2 | 27 | 0.34 | 12.33 | 0.60 | 9.27 | 1.11 |
| Under £2m | 0.6 | * | 20 | 0.25 | 5.50 | 0.27 | 5.80 | 0.69 |
|  | 13.7 | 1.00 | 80 | 1.00 | 20.59 | 1.00 | 8.36 | 1.00 |

[^6]
## TABLE 4.9

Multiple grocers: net capital expenditure, gross margin and rate of stock-turn, by size of organisation, 1971

|  | Net capital expenditure per establishment | Gross margin on sales | Rate of stock-łurn | Gross <br> Profit <br> index |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | £000 | \% | Timesp.a. |  |
| $£ 50 \mathrm{mn}$. and over | 5.83 | 20.5 | 11.7 | 96.6 |
| £20-50 million | 3.56 | 18.5 | 14.8 | 110.3 |
| £10-20 | 4.58 | 18.5 | 15.5 | 115.5 |
| £5-10 | 2.76 | 16.8 | 12.1 | 81.9 |
| £2-5 | 1.38 | 18.8 | 11.4 | 86.3 |
| Under $£ 2 \mathrm{~m}$. | 0.52 | 17.0 | 12.7 | 87.0 |
| All | 4.03 | 19.7 | 12.6 | 100.0 |

## 5: THE LEADING GROCERY MULTIPLE CONCERNS

5.1: $\quad$ According to the 1971 Census of Distribution there were 4 private multiple grocery organisations with more than 500 branches each (with over $42 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the multiples' sales), or if annual turnover is taken as the size-criterion, the 5 largest organisations, each with sales of over $£ 50$ millions, were responsible for 57 per cent. of the multiples' sales. Another 14 organisations had sales of $£ 20-50$ millions in 1971, so that about 14 per cent. of the grocery multiple concerns accounted for 83 per cent. of the multiples' trade in that year.
5.2: In Table 5.1 an attempt has been made, within the limits of the available data, to classify the multiple grocery organisations according to their 1971 sales and the number of their branches. The list of organisations is not complete, and in some instances (indicated by brackets around the name of the organisation) their turnover has been deduced rather than extracted.
5.3: It will be seen that there are 5 concerns shown as having more than 500 branches in 1971 as compared with 4 in the Census. On the one hand, the number of branches reported as being operated by Allied Suppliers, International Stores, Tesco and Moores Stores comes close to the Census total for the 4 largest; on the other hand, Fine Fare claimed at least 1,000 branches which would have put it in second place between Allied Suppliers and International Stores. There appears no doubt, however, that the 5 largest organisations by sales in 1971 were Tesco ( $£ 300$ millions), Allied Suppliers ( $£ 273$ millions), J. Sainsbury ( $£ 262$ millions), International Stores ( $£ 126$ millions), leaving about £90 million for Fine Fare in fifth place. Four out of six leading multiples in 1971 were long-established grocery businesses: namely Allied Suppliers, International Stores, Moores Stores and J. Sainsbury; the other two had grown to that eminence in the post-war years.

Allied Suppliers Ltd.
5.4: $\quad$ Allied Suppliers Ltd. started life as a private subsidiary company of Home and Colonial Stores Ltd. which was established in 1888, and by 1920, it was one of the six largest grocery concerns each with more than 400 branches: the others were the

International Tea Company, Thomas Lipton, Maypole Dairy, the Star Tea/Ridgways/James Pegram group and the Meadow Dairy/Pearkes Dairies group.*
5.5: In 1924, Home and Colonial acquired a substantial but minority interest in Maypole Dairy Co. Ltd., while Meadow Dairy Co. Ltd. concluded a management agreement with Liptons in 1927. Two years later, Home and Colonial acquired a controlling interest in Meadow Dairy, and the three associated companies sold their teapacking and blending businesses to the newly-created Allied Suppliers Ltd. and Home and Colonial took a direct interest in Lipton, so that by 1932 it could claim to be an organisation controlling 3,685 shops in the United Kingdom. D During the depression of the 1930s, Home and Colonial fared badly, and at its 1936 annual meeting, the chairman complained that "the organisation of the group had not kept pace with its size. The body had grown rather too big for the brain." Rationalisation and modernisation effected the desired improvement, and by 1939, the Home and Colonial group is estimated to have controlled 28 per cent. of the multiple grocery branches. ${ }^{+}$
5.6: During the war the number of branches operated was reduced by "a policy of judicious concentration" and by enemy action as well, but with little effect on its share of the total multiple grocery branches. During the post-war years Home and Colonial strengthened its position in Scotland by acquiring Galbraith's Stores Ltd., Andrew Cochrane Ltd., A. Massey \& Sons and R. and J. Templeton Ltd., and in 1960, it was renamed Allied Suppliers Ltd. Between 1953 and 1958, its net assets increased from $£ 24.4$ millions to $£ 28.8$ millions, rising further to $£^{\prime} 2.2$ millions in 1960 , or by one-third during the whole period.
5.7: During the 1960s, the Company embarked on a rationalisation of its retail outlets, with the closure of the smaller uneconomic outlets being accompanied by conversions of others to self-service, and the opening of supermarkets. Thus, it would appear that between 1962 and 1965, the total number of grocery branches under its control (including those in Eire and Northern Ireland) was reduced from 3,500 to 2,800, the proportion using self-service increasing from only one-fifth to nearer one-half during the same period, with the number of supermarkets rising from 30 to over 210. By 1968, its net assets stood at over $£ 50$ millions, its gross income at around $£ 10$ millions was about double its level ten years earlier, and its sales were in excess of $£ 250$ millions.

International Stores Ltd.
5.8: $\quad$ The international Tea Company and the Star Tea Company (with its Ridgway and Pegram interests) merged in 1928 to give the concern close on 1,000 branches, in second place to the Home and Colonial group. Six or seven years later, International acquired control of John Quality Ltd., the grocery chain subsidiary of Selfridge \& Co. Ltd., and George J. Mason Ltd. with nearly 400 shops in the Midlands, Lancashire and Wales. Earlier in 1930, there were negotiations to merge the Home and Colonial group with International Tea, but these proved abortive. Nevertheless, by 1939, J.B. Jefferys estimates that International Tea controlled about 10 per cent. of all the multiple grocery outlets.

[^7]¢ Richard Evely: Concentration in UK Multiple Shop Traaing (Cartel, Vol. 2 No. 2, October 1951).

+ J.B. Jefferys, op.cit, Table 28, p. 142.
5.9: In the immediate post-war years, International acquired two oldestablished grocery businesses: Harvey \& Shillingford Ltd. and Payantake Ltd., and by 1953 its net assets at $£ 12.1$ millions were one-third higher than in 1948. By 1960, they had risen to $£ 15.2$ millions (less than one-half those of Allied Suppliers), having grown by about one-seventh since 1953. The number of its branches remained more or less static between 1962 and 1965, but its net assets in 1965 had increased to $£ 21.2$ millions. By 1968, its sales had reached nearly $£ 107$ millions, its net assets more than $£ 23$ millions and its gross income stood at around $£ 4 \frac{1}{2}$ millions, slightly less than double its level ten years earlier.

Moores Stores Ltd.
5.10: The grocery and provisions business of Moores Stores Ltd. was established on Tyneside in 1907, and when it became a public company in 1935 it had 114 branches although its operations were still confined to the N.E. Coast. Acquisitions brought an increase in the number of outlets but equally important a geographical spread of its interests during and after the war, and by the early 1950s it owned or controlled at least 600 shops, many of them retaining their trading names of Farrands, Binyons, John Kay, T. Seymour Mead etc.
5.11: In 1958, the net assets of Moores Stores Ltd. stood at under f. $2 \frac{1}{2}$ millions, but soon after began the series of acquisitions which were to boost its net assets to over $£ 10$ millions by 1964. Indeed, in the three years 1961-63 more than $£ 3$ millions was spent on acquisitions. Among the retail grocery companies acquired during this period were Hay \& Co., Hanlons Ltd., J.D. Marsden Ltd., John Rowntree \& Sons Ltd., George Eriscoe Ltd., Thrift Stores Ltd., H. Garon Ltd., John Favours, George Barr and A.E. Smith (Manchester) Ltd. At about this time, the total number of grocery outlets reached a peak of more than 1,000; by 1968, they had started to fall as the result of rationalisation and conversions to self-service. In 1968, Moores Stores' net assets were slightly under £1C millions, and its sales at just over $£ 50$ millions were less than one-half those of International Stores and about one-fifth those of Allied Suppliers.

### 5.12: It is convenient at this point to mention the interest in Moores

 Stores Ltd. held by Wright's Biscuits Ltd. which in 1968 amounted to 42 per cent. of its issued share capital. The total net assets of Wright's Biscuits were about the same as Moores Stores in 1958 (at around $£ 2 \frac{1}{2}$ millions), and it pursued a similar programme of acquisitions to bring its net assets to $£ 7 \frac{1}{2}$ millions by 1965, taking over James Duckworth Ltd., W. Pink Ltd., Gallons Ltd., Thomas \& Evans (the grocery division of the Beechams Group), S. Driver \& Co. Ltd., and W. Morton \& Sons Ltd. Its net assets remained at around this level between 1965 and 1968 when it was operating 680 grocery outlets (as compared with a peak of over 720), with total sales of about $£ 25$ millions. Thus, with over two-thirds of the number of outlets operated by Moores Stores, Wright's sales were only about one-half the others.J. Sainsbury Ltd.
5.13: The first Sainsbury shop opened in 1869, and by 1914 the business had nearly 120 branches, mostly in the London area. In 1922, it was incorporated as a private company, and it did not "go public" until more than fifty years later in 1973. Unlike the multiple concerns so far considered, mergers and acquisitions played little or no part in the development of what fundamentally remained a family business despite a growth in the number of branches to more than 250 in the early 1960s.
5.14: In 1965, the total sales of J. Sainsbury Ltd. amounted to over £115 millions from a total of 253 outlets, of which nearly one-half were still counter-service shops. By 1968, total sales had increased by 43 per cent. to more than $£ 165$ millions, of which over three-fifths was contributed by 82 supermarkets, with $570,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . of sales area. Although the total number of Sainsbury shops had fallen slightly by 1968, their geographical spread had extended into the East and West Midlands, East Anglia and the South West.

Tesco Ltd.
5.15: Although the first Tesco shop was not opened until 1931 and the total sales of Tesco Ltd. were little more than $£ 1 \frac{1}{4}$ millions in 1948, they had reached over $£ 24 \frac{1}{2}$ millions by 1961. Its net assets grew from under $£ 600,000$ in 1954 to over $£ 4.2$ millions in 1961, when it operated 340 shops. Acquisitions had played some part in that growth: Tesco acquired Burnard Stores in 1956 and A.J. Williamson in 1959, followed two years later by John Irwin and Harrow Stores. But a noticeable feature of its growth was the importance attached to self-service and supermarkets. Thus, between 1961 and 1966, as its sales more than quadrupled, the number of its supermarkets rose from 30 to 120 . The major acquisition during this period was Charles Phillips \& Co. Ltd. in 1964, which brought about 100 modern self-service shops and supermarkets under Tesco's control.
5.16: By 1967, Tesco's turnover had reached $£ 136.3$ millions, over $5 \frac{1}{2}$ times its 1961 level and its net assets amounted to $£ 21.3$ millions. In the following year, Tesco acquired the Victor Value interests with a 1967 turnover of about $£ 40$ millions, and a chain of 280 shops including the Swettenhams and Anthony Jackson/Foodfare outlets. In this way, Tesco's net assets were increased to nearly $£ 32$ millions in 1968, and its total sales boosted to close on $£ 191 \frac{1}{2}$ millions through $750-800$ shops, placing it second only to Allied Suppliers in terms of sales, and third (after Sainsburys) in terms of net assets.

Fine Fare Ltd.
5.17: Originating in the late 1940s when a number of small food stores controlled by the Welwyn Department Store were formed into a separate company, Fine Fare Ltd. was registered in 1953. At that time, it had only 350 employees, but it embarked on a series of acquisitions of long-established grocery companies in different parts of the country. These included Cooper \& Co.'s Stores Ltd. (with over 180 outlets in Scotland in 1961), L \& N Stores Ltd. (with nearly 50 shops on the N.E. Coast), Joseph Burton's (East Midlands), Scott's (Merseyside) and Forest Stores. By 1964, its turnover was around $£ 40$ millions, more than doubling in the next four years after its acquisition of Elmo Stores (34 stores) in 1967. By 1968, Fine Fare was occupying fifth place among the leading grocery multiples in terms of sales, but in terms of net assets it was probably in fourth place, in front of International Stores and after Tesco.

Changes among the "Top 6", 1968-74
5.18: Between 1968 and 1971, the increase in combined turnover for the 6 largest multiple concerns was nearly one-half, but as can be seen from Table 5.2, the increase for Fine Fare was very much higher than this average while J. Sainsbury and Tesco also had a better than average performance. Acquisitions played no part in the growth of the latter two firms during this period, as distinct from Fine Fare whose sales (and net assets) were boosted by its acquisition of the interest of Melias Ltd., and Wm. Cussons/J.C. Carline from Great Universal Stores. The other noteworthy changes were the absorption of both Moores Stores and Wright's Biscuits by Cavenham in the course of 1971, and International Stores
acquisition of 31 branches of Granville Supermarkets Ltd. and 35 Kibby supermarkets from Unigate Ltd. during the same year. The result of these changes was to place Tesco at the top of the sales league in 1971 displacing Allied Suppliers from that position, with Fine Fare exchanging the fifth for the fourth place with International Stores.
5.19: During the next three years, the average increase in sales for the 6 listed firms was 53 per cent. Following its acquisition of Moores/Wrights in 1971, Cavenham acquired Allied Suppliers at the beginning of 1972, and by 1974, its sales placed it in third position after Tesco and Sainsburys, the latter two firms increasing their turnover more or less in line. The other noteworthy change among the listed firms concerns International Stores, which was acquired by the British-American Tobacco Company in 1972, and in the following year itself acquired Pricerite Ltd. (which had a turnover of nearly £35 million in 1971); this takeover explains the comparatively large increase in International Stores' sales between 1971 and 1974.
5.20: Some indication of the fundamental changes in the size-distribution of outlets which underlay the 1971-75 growth of the two largest concerns can be seen from Table 5.3. The total number of stores operated by Tesco was reduced from 791 to 744 during this period, but those with 5,000 sq. ft . or more of sales space rose from 272 to 326 . The total selling space in these larger stores increased by nearly three-fifths as compared with a one-fifth rise in numbers: the average size from $9,550 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . in 1971 to nearly 12,640 sq. ft. in 1975. The supermarkets of J. Sainsbury rose by nearly one-half (from 112 to 163), but their floorspace doubled during the same period: their average size went up from 8,210 sq. ft. to 11,290 sq. ft . It is also striking that whereas Tesco possessed no stores with over 30,000 sq. ft. in 1971, by 1975 over one-fifth of their larger stores' floorspace was contributed by 22 stores of that size. Thus, the increasing size of the stores being opened in order to attain economies of scale at that level have been an important factor in the overall growth of the leading multiples.

## THE MEDIUM-SIZED MULTIPLES

5.21: Apart from Moores Stores, the largest multiples so far considered all had sales of over $£ 50$ millions in 1971, but as can be seen from Table 4.7, there were another thirteen multiples with sales of $£ 20-50$ millions in 1971 according to the Census data. The probable identity of these thirteen medium-sized multiples is shown in Table 5.4, and within this group very considerable changes occurred between 1968 and 1974 which it is proposed now to review.

Key Markets Ltd.
5.22: It is convenient to begin with Key Markets Ltd., the retail grocery and provisions division of Fitch Lovell Ltd., which was formed in 1963 by the amalgamation of four companies: Green \& Dyson Ltd. (147 shops), World's Stores ( 212 shops), Walkers, and Hales and Partners. By 1968, the turnover of the group was about $£ 35$ millions; three years later it had increased to nearly $£ 48$ millions. But in 1974 the sales of Key Markets Ltd. had risen to over $£ 120 \frac{1}{2}$ millions, and its net assets to over $£ 17 \frac{1}{2}$ millions as compared with $£ 7 \frac{3}{4}$ millions in 1971. In this growth, acquisition played a major part, the businesses being acquired having themselves been the subject of a series of take-overs.
5.23: The vehicle for these take-overs was the old-established business of Wrenson's Stores Ltd. with a chain of small grocery shops and a turnover of around $£ 5$ millions in 1971. In April 1972, the Wrensons business was acquired by two brothers who had some
ten years or more previously built up the Adsega chain of grocery outlets in the North West which they had sold to Tesco in 1964. The Green brothers themselves parted company with Tescos soon afterwards but as soon as their contracted period of exclusion from activities within the grocery trade expired, they came back to acquire Wrensons and shortly afterwards the $T$. Redman chain of 70 grocery shops. But this was only the beginning.
5.24: In July 1972, Wrensons made a successful bid for David Greig Lid., itself a medium-sized multiple with a 1971 turnover of $£ 24$ millions with some 134 outlets. This organisation gave Wrensons at the time it "went public" in October 1972 a total of 266 grocery shops, of which 62 were self-service shops with more than $2,000 \mathrm{sq} . \mathrm{ft}$. sales area. Less than a year later, the group adopted the name of David Greig Ltd., claiming a turnover of over $£ 50$ millions.
5.25: At the beginning of 1974, David Greig Ltd. was the subject of an agreed bid of $£ 12 \frac{1}{4}$ millions by Combined English Stores Ltd., but after a period of controversy about the validity of the projected trading profit figures, the shareholders of Combined English Stores Ltd. rejected the proposed takeover. Next to appear as a potential buyer was Fitch Lovell Ltd. and its bid of $£ 6$ millions was accepted in April 1974. By absorbing David Greig Ltd.'s interests, Key Markets Ltd. raised their sales potential from $£ 70$ millions to over $£ 110$ millions, doubled their number of outlets, and increased their sales space from under $700,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft. to over $1,200,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft. Thus, in 1974 Key Markets' total turnover exceeded $£ 120$ millions, nearly $3 \frac{1}{2}$ times its 1968 level.

Budgens Ltd.
5.26: Another medium-sized multiple in 1971 which has also seen substantial growth in recent years, largely attributable to acquisitions, is Budgen, part of Booker McConnell Ltd.'s retailing activities. Booker McConnell began to diversify into food distribution in 1957 when it acquired Alfred Button Ltd., which included 100 counter-service grocery shops operated under the name of Budgen. However, it was not until 1970 that the momentum towards expansion commenced, first by its acquisition of the David Harris business (operating as $C \& Q$ and Kingsway), and in the following year, Williams Bros. with 78 grocery and 42 butchers' shops from the Sheppey Trust. By these acquisitions, Budgen doubled its turnover to $£ 26$ millions in 1971, and with its purchase of part of Unigate's retail interests as well as Adkins of Cambridge, it boosted its turnover to over $£ 30$ millions. In 1973, it added Bateman \& Sons with 31 supermarkets and 17 self-service shops to bring its total grocery outlets to 278 at the end of that year, producing a 1974 turnover of $£ 45$ millions, nearly three-quarters more than in 1971 and possibly $3 \frac{1}{2}$ times more than in 1968.
5.27: Apart from its grocery interests, Booker McConnell have an extensive chain of health food shops, operating mainly as Holland \& Barrett, as well as Realfoods, Health and Heather and Prana, with over 120 outlets. These are not treated as part of its grocery distribution activities, but since health food shops are included under the heading of "grocery and provision dealers" in the Census, it is relevant to note that Holland \& Barrett's sales in 1974 were $£ 4 \frac{1}{2}$ millions as compared with under $£ 2$ millions in 1971.

## The Others

5.28: The increase in sales of other medium-sized multiples (with the exception of ASDA, about which more later) are shown in Table 5.3 for both the 1968-71 and the 1971-74 periods. The fastest-growing among those listed in both periods was Safeway Food Stores Ltd., a subsidiary of Canada Safeway Ltd., which bought its first UK store in the
early 1960s and by 1974 was operating 77 supermarkets throughout England and Scotland. There was also an impressive growth in sales achieved by F.J. Wallis Ltd., the smallest of the medium-sized multiples in 1971. Largely based in Essex and Greater London, F.J. Wallis Ltd. had total sales of under $£ 6$ millions in 1965 which were increased to $£ 11 \frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1968, and then increasing nearly threefold in the next six years. The fourth concern for which sales data are shown for both periods in Table 5.4 is Bishop's Stores Ltd., which besides operating retail grocery outlets has delivered wholesale business (Harvey, Bradfield \& Toyer Ltd.) and a cash-and-carry wholesaler (HBT Trademarkets Ltd.).

### 5.29: The second largest of the medium-sized multiples in 1971 was

 Waitrose Ltd., a subsidiary of the John Lewis Partnership, but despite doubting its sales in the next three years, it was displaced by Safeway and ranked third in 1974. While the John Lewis Partnership developed its food retailing interests through Waitrose, another department concern - the Debenham Group - entered the food trade through the acquisition of Cater Bros. (Provisions) Ltd. in 1972. Prior to that date, Cater Bros. had expanded its sales by three-quarters between 1968 and 1971.5.30: $\quad$ Taking the 7 listed medium-sized multiples for which sales data are shown for the 1968-71 period in Table 5.4, the weighted average increase in their turnover works out at 47 per cent. Again, for the 7 multiples where sales data are shown for the 1971-74 period, the increase comes to 107 per cent. Furthermore, for the 4 concerns where sales data are shown throughout the 1968-74 period, the weighted increase during the six years amounts to 220 per cent. While the 1968-71 increase is only slightly higher than achieved by the largest multiples during the same period, the position was vastly different in the 1971-74 period. Whereas the largest multiples registered a weighted sales increase no more than two-thirds between 1971 and 1974, the medium-sized multiples more than doubled their turnover.
the smaller multiples
5.31: Even the relatively large increase in sales achieved by the mediumsized multiples was exceeded, however, by the smaller multiples listed in Table 5.5. For the 1968-71 period, the weighted increase in sales of the 9 concerns was 76 per cent. (as compared with 47 per cent. for the medium-sized), and in the 1971-74 period, the 8 survivors for the whole of the 1971-74 period together with Kinlochs, had a weighted increase of 111 per cent. (slightly higher than for the medium-sized). Indeed, for a constant sample of 8 concerns, the 1968-74 weighted increase in sales works out at 272 per cent. as compared with 220 per cent. for the constant sample of the medium-sized multiples.
5.32: Taking the period as a whole, the fastest growing concerns were Wm. Morrison Supermarkets Ltd. and Hillards Ltd. Both had turnovers in excess of $£ 6$ millions in 1968 and are largely based in Yorkshire. Hillards have, however, the larger number of stores, and following the appointment of a Receiver for Brierleys Supermarkets, it acquired 5 of its supermarkets in June 1974, thereby extending its operations into the Midlands and bringing its total sales area in 1975 to over $390,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft. as compared with Wm. Morrison's 272,000 sq. ft.
5.33: Another two supermarket concerns listed in Table 5.5 had 1974 sales approaching $£ 30$ millions, representing increases of around $2 \frac{1}{2}$ times their 1968 turnover. The Lennons Group Ltd. started as wholesalers in 1900 but developed retail outlets in the NorthWest between the wars, and in 1975 were operating 34 supermarkets as well as a chain of 49 retail off-licences. Amos Hinton \& Sons Ltd. is an even older established business trading in

North East England with over 40 stores and nearly $200,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . of sales area in 1974.
5.34: The largest of the smaller multiples listed in Table 5.5 throughout the 1968-74 period is Gateway Securities Ltd., operating mainly in the South and West of England. Between 1962 and 1966 it increased the number of its outlets from 19 to 42, and in 1971 to 95 with a total sales area of 300,000 sq. ft . During 1974 it acquired a substantial interest in Bishop's Stores Ltd.
5.35: Both Wm. Low \& Co. Ltd. and Laws' Stores Ltd. had 1968 sales in the region of $£ 6$ millions, the former being the only Scottish multiple grocery concern of any consequence outside the major groups; the latter operating mainly in the North East, with some small representation (through acquisition) in Scotland. There has, however, been a marked difference in their rates of growth between 1968 and 1974: whereas Wm. Low quadrupled their sales during this period (giving it the third fastest growth-rate), Lows increased their turnover by under $1 \frac{1}{2}$ times, the smallest rise with the exception of the Londonbased Cullen's Stores Ltd. which operates mainly through smaller and more traditional grocery shops.
5.36: It must be stressed that the 1974 rankings by sales as shown in Table 5.5 refer only to the concerns listed, and certainly there were other concerns in that year with higher sales than some of those named. One such was Oakeshotts Ltd., the retail grocery subsidiary of Barker \& Dobson Ltd. (formerly S \& K Holdings Ltd.), which had sales of $£ 14.2$ millions in 1974. This company had brought together some 180 shops previously trading under 31 different names, including United Counties, Baylis, Stevenson \& Rush. Another was Downsway Supermarkets Ltd., an associate of Union International Group Ltd., which acquired Platt's Stores Ltd. and C.H. Kaye (St. Albans) Ltd. in 1974, to give it a turnover of $£ 10.9$ millions in that year, an increase of one-half compared with 1971.
5.37: In addition, however, there are some firms identified by name in Table 5.1 which have not been dealt with so far, notably ASDA and Kwik-Save, and others which have emerged and become prominent since 1971, such as Bejam. To these concerns attention can now be directed.

## THE INNOVATORS

5.38: Two of these multiples - ASDA and Kwik-Save - are examples of major price-discounters trading from large premises in "off-beat" locations; the other Bejam - is the major operator in the fast-expanding freezer centre market.

Asda
5.39: In the early 1960s, Associated Dairies Ltd., one of the larger dairy concerns, found that its chain of meat and bakery shops throughout Yorkshire was being hard pressed by the growing numbers and competition of the supermarkets. Rather than going into the supermarket field itself, Associated Dairies went one stage further, deciding to embark upon discount food retailing through larger stores. At first, however, the stores which were opened remained larger supermarkets rather than "superstores" in terms of the accepted definition of at least $25,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . of sales area. But the situation changed when in 1966 Associated Dairies Ltd. acquired an 80 per cent. stake in the GEM superstores, set-up a few years earlier by an American company and operating on a concessionary basis without much success. By the end of 1966, Asda Stores Ltd. (established in May 1965) were operating six supermarkets under the name of ASDA Queens as well as the three GEM superstores (with a combined sales area of nearly 135,000 sq.ft.).
5.40: The expansion of its interests gathered momentum in 1969-1971. In the course of those three years, Asda opened 12 superstores (with a total sales area of over 360,000 sq. ft.), largely in Lancashire and Yorkshire but with others further south at Bloxwich (West Midlands) and Lincoln. In the next three years, 1972-74, another 8 superstores (with 214,000 sq. ft . sales area) were opened, together with another 8 large supermarkets (with nearly 154,000 sq. ft. sales area). The majority of these new stores were again located in Yorkshire and Lancashire, although one had been opened in Scotland (Edinburgh) and another in South Wales (Newport). Thus, at the end of 1974, Asda was operating 19 superstores with a combined sales area of $657,500 \mathrm{sq} . \mathrm{ft} ., 10$ large supermarkets with 198,000 sq. ft. sales area, and 19 medium-sized supermarkets with another 198,500 sq. ft . This total sales area of over $1,050,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . was nearly one-quarter of that operated by Tesco, but well over one-half that of Sainsbury's at the same date.

### 5.41: Unfortunately separate turnover and other financial data are not

 available for Asda stores, but there is no doubt that they have contribuied predominantly to the growth in Associated Dairies Ltd.'s turnover since the mid-1960s. In 1966, that turnover amounted to under $£ 20$ millions, but by 1968 it had risen to over $£ 34$ millions, and in the next three years rose rapidly to $£ 95$ millions in 1971. In the 1971-74 period turnover more than doubled to $£ 221$ millions, and in 1975 when it reached $£ 312$ millions, it was reported that only one-fifth was attributable to its traditional dairy trade.5.42: It appears probable, however, that the Asda stores' turnover in 1968 was around $£ 10$ millions (or under one-third of Associated's total sales), but that by 1971 it may have reached $£ 50$ millions (or more than one-half). Similarly, by 1974 the Asda sales could have been approaching $£ 150$ millions, or about two-thirds of Associated's total, and will have certainly exceeded $£ 200$ millions in 1975. Indeed, it has been reported that by the end of 1976, Asda ranked third among the private grocery multiples in terms of its sales, as compared (on the basis of a 1974 turnover of $£ 150$ millions) with being the sixth largest in 1974.

Kwik Save Discount Group Ltd.
5.43: In 1959, Value Foods Ltd. opened a grocery shop at Rhyl in Flintshire, and by 1964 was operating from supermarkets in North Wales with total sales of around $£ 800,000$. During 1965, it was decided to adopt a policy of heavy discounting on a limited number of national brands, and the existing supermarkets were converted into discount stores trading as Kwik Save (the title adopted by the company itself in 1970). By 1968, there were 17 Kwik Save stores with a combined turnover of $£ 6.2$ millions, but three years later there were 30 stores (with 170,000 sq. ft . sales area) and a trade of $£ 15$ millions.
5.44: Early in 1973, Kwik Save's founder, Mr. Albert Gubay, left the company for New Zealand, prompting concern as to the future growth and profitability of the company. In the event, any fears have proved to be unfounded. In 1972, the sales were nearly $£ 22 \frac{1}{2}$ millions and pre-tax profits just over $£ 1 \frac{1}{2}$ millions; by 1974, sales had nearly doubled to $£ 40 \frac{1}{2}$ millions (and pre-tax profits increased to $£ 2.7$ millions) on a sales area of 397,000 sq. ft. in 55 stores. Between 1974 and 1976, sales more than doubled to nearly £92 millions from 93 stores, largely concentrated in the North West, North Wales and the West Midlands, with a sales area of 510,000 sq. ft . Thus, on the basis of its 1974 sales, Kwik Save would have ranked among the medium-sized multiples (as covered by Table 5.3), as compared with being included among the smaller multiples in terms of its 1971 sales.

## Carrefour

5.45: In 1972, the first of the Carrefour hypermarkets, so well-known in France and other countries on the Continent, opened at Caerphilly, north of Cardiff, in South Wales. This hypermarket, as well as two others opened in Telford (October 1973) and Eastleigh (July 1974), are operated by Hypermarket (Holdings) Ltd., of which 90 per cent. of the share capital is held by Wheatsheaf Distribution \& Trading Ltd., and the other 10 per cent. by the French company, Carrefour SA.
5.46: The three hypermarkets have a combined sales area of 157,000 sq. $\mathrm{ft} .$, and in the year to end-February 1976 their total sales amounted to $£ 33.2$ millions, as compared with $£ 21.9$ millions a year earlier and $£ 11.1$ millions the year before that.
5.47: In addition to the Carrefours, however, Wheatsheaf Distribution \& Trading Ltd. have other retail grocery interests, namely the chain of Challenge supermarkets and the shops in Scotland acquired with the business of Johnston's Stores Ltd. $\ln$ 1974, the turnover of Wheatsheaf represented by the Carrefours and other retail interests amounted to nearly $£ 31$ millions, which would have placed it among the smaller multiples as listed in Table 5.4.

## Woolco

5.48: Another concern with a number of stores of hypermarket size is F.W. Woolworth \& Co. Ltd. The first of these stores, known as Woolco department stores, were opened at Oadby (Leicestershire), at Thornaby (Teeside), and on the outskirts of Bournemouth, with a combined gross area of over $300,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft. By the end of 1974, there were 9 Woolco stores (including one converted city centre unit) with a gross area of nearly $880,000 \mathrm{sq} . \mathrm{ft}$. It is probable that the equivalent sales area of these 9 units was around $575,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft., more than $3 \frac{1}{2}$ times that of the Carrefours but under three-fifths of that of the Asda superstores and supermarkets.
5.49: Sales data are not available for the Woolco stores, and although the space allocated to food in the Woolco stores is substantial, the relative importance of food to total sales is thought to be much smaller than in the Asdas or Carrefours. Thus, it is not possible to produce any reliable estimate of either the total trade or its food component to compare the Woolco with the other types of large food outlets.

Bejam Group
5.50: This company did not commence trading until April 1968 when it sold frozen meat and vegetables along with domestic freezers from a warehouse, followed a few months later by the opening of its first retail outlet at Edgware in North London. By the end of its first year's trading (end-June 1969), it had five outlets with under 12,000 sq. ft . of sales area, and its sales of $£ 270,000$ were split between food and freezers in the ratio of 55:45.
5.51: Two years later in mid-1971 the total number of outlets had been increased to 27 , the sales area to $63,500 \mathrm{sq}$. ft ., and the sales to over $£ 3 \frac{3}{4}$ millions, of which food accounted for over 75 per cent. But this was still only the beginning. By mid1974, annual sales were over £24 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions (of which nearly 90 per cent. came from food) done through 78 freezer centres with a total sales area of around $200,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft., doubling in the next two years to $£ 52 \frac{3}{4}$ millions on a sales area of over $390,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . in 116 centres.
5.52: There are, of course, other freezer centre operators other than the Bejam Group. Indeed, at the end of 1974 there were around 1,000 such centres in the UK, the most important operators after Bejam being Cordon Bleu Foodmarkets Ltd. (with 32 centres at that time), Dewhurst Freezer Food Centres (52), Dalgety Frozen Foods Ltd. (28) and Cooperative societies.* According to estimates by Ross Foods Ltd., sales of frozen foods (excluding carcase meat, poultry and ice cream) to home freezer centres increased more than threefold between 1971 and 1974 (from £15 millions to $£ 48$ millions), while Birds Eye Foods Ltd. have estimated that in 197316 per cent. of household consumption of frozen foods were sold through freezer centres. ${ }^{+}$

[^8]TABLE 5.1

Larger Grocery Multiples, by number of shops and annual sales, 1971.

| Sales | Over <br> £50m. | £30-50m. | £20-30m. | £10-20m. | Under <br> Shops |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 500 and <br> over | Tesco <br> Allied <br> Suppliers <br> International <br> Stores <br> Fine-Fare | Moores <br> Stores |  |  |  |
| $200-499$ | J.Sainsbury | (Key Markets) | (Unigate) | Wrights <br> Biscuits |  |
| $100-199$ |  | Pricerite <br> Bishop's <br> Stores | (Express <br> Dairy) <br> David Greig <br> Budgen | Walter Willson <br> Gateway | W.H.Cullen <br> Wrenson's |
| $50-99$ |  | Safeway | F.J.Wallis <br> Wm. Jackson | Williams <br> Bros. | Oakeshotts <br> Kinlochs <br> T. Redman |
| $30-49$ |  | Waitrose <br> (ASDA) | Cater Bros. | Amos. Hinton <br> Lennons <br> Hillards <br> Wm. Low <br> Kwik-Save | Downsway <br> Laws Stores |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Under 20 |  |  |  |  |  |

## TABLE 5.2

Changes in rank by sales and net assets of 6 largest grocery multiples, 1968-71 and 1971-74

| Top 6 in order of net assets: | Sales: |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Rank in: | Sales: \% change | Rank in: |
| 1968 | 1968 | 1968-71 | 1971 |
| Allied Suppliers | 1 | +40 | 2 |
| J. Sainsbury | 3 | +59 | 3 |
| Tesco | 2 | +57 | 1 |
| Fine Fare | 5 | +136 | 4 |
| International | 4 | + 5 | 5 |
| Moores/Wright | 6 | - 3 | 6 |
| "Top 6" |  | +49 |  |
| 1971 | 1971 | 1971-74 | 1974 |
| Allied Suppliers | 2 | * | * |
| Tesco | 1 | +72 | 1 |
| J. Sainsbury | 3 | +70 | 2 |
| International | 5 | +99 | 5 |
| Fine Fare | 4 | +50 | 4 |
| Cavenham | 6 | +16 7 | 3 |
| "Top 6" |  | +53 |  |

* Acquired by Cavenham in 1972
\& Sales increase based on Cavenham + Allied Suppliers in 1971

TABLE 5.3
Changes in number and average size of Tesco and J. Sainsbury stores, 1971-75

| No. of <br> Stores |  | Sales <br> Floorspace | 1971-75 <br> Percent change |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1971 | 1975 | 1971 | 1975 | Stores | Floorspace |

TESCO:

|  | 791 | 744 | 3.70 | 5.10 | -6 | +38 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| All | 791 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Under 5,000 sq.ft. | 519 | 418 | 1.10 | 0.98 | -19 | -11 |
| Over 5,000 sq.ft. | 272 | 326 | 2.60 | 4.12 | +20 | +58 |

Percent of stores over 5,000 sq.ft.
\% \% \% \%

| $5-10,000$ | 66 | 55 | 47 | 31 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $10-15,000$ | 21 | 21 | 27 | 20 |
| $15-20,000$ | 4 | 8 | 8 | 11 |
| $20-30,000$ | 9 | 10 | 18 | 17 |
| Over 30,000 | - | 7 | - | 21 |

J. SAINSBURY:
$\begin{array}{lllllll}\text { Supermarkets } & 112 & 163 & 0.92 & 1.84 & +46 & +100\end{array}$

## TABLE 5.4

Changes in sales and rank-order (by sales) of medium-sized multiple grocers, 1968-74

| In order of |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Percentage increase in sales | 1974 Sales | Ranking by |  |  |  |
| 1971 sales | $1968-71$ | $1971-74$ | $1968-74$ | £Millions | Sales, 1974 |


| KeyMarkets | 37 | 152 | 345 | 121 | 1 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Waitrose | $\ldots$ | 117 | $\ldots$ | 85 | 3 |
| Safeway | 109 | 160 | 442 | 93 | 2 |
| Pricerite | 31 | $*$ | $*$ | $*$ | $*$ |
| Bishop's Stores | 43 | 60 | 129 | 52 | 4 |
| Wm. Jackson | $\ddot{2}$ | 52 | $\ldots$ | 47 | 5 |
| Cater Bros. | 75 | $\neq$ | $\neq$ | $\neq$ | $\neq$ |
| Budgens | $\ldots$ | 73 | $\ldots$ | 45 | $\neq$ |
| David Greig | 1 | $\neq$ | $\neq$ | $\neq$ | $\neq$ |
| F.J. Wallis | 83 | 108 | 280 | 44 | 7 |

[^9]TABLE 5.5
Changes in sales and rank-order (by sales) of the smaller multiple grocers, 1968-74

| In order of <br> 1971 sales | Percentage increase in sales <br> $1968-71$ |  |  |  |  |  | 1971-74 | 1968-74 |
| :--- | ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | | 1974 Sales |
| :--- |
| £Millions |$\quad$| Ranking by |
| :--- |
| Sales, 1974 |

[^10]
## 6: THE INDEPENDENT GROCERY SECTOR

6.1: The main developments as far as the number of independent grocers and their share of the private grocery trade have already been established in Chapter 3. Between 1961 and 1971, the number of independent grocery businesses fell from over 95,300 to around 82,530 , or by more than one-eighth, and the number of shops operated by them from 116,600 to 87,000 , a fall of one-quarter. During the same period, their combined share of the private grocery sales declined from 63 per cent. to 49 per cent. (or roughly in line with the fall in the number of their shops), and in 1975 showed a further reduction to 43 per cent.
6.2: The independents are defined as businesses with up to nine establishments, but as can be seen from Table 6.1, the overwhelming majority of them are single shop concerns. Indeed, the proportion of all independent grocery businesses with only one shop increased between 1961 and 1971, and those with 2-4 shops declined by a matching proportion. In fact, the single-shop businesses also expanded their share of the independent grocery trade from under 81 per cent. to nearly $85 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. between 1961 and 1971.
6.3: The comparative performance of independent grocers in the three sizecategories is shown in Table 6.2. Overall their gross margin on sales improved from 15.2 per cent. in 1961 to 20.1 per cent. in 1971 (after falling to 14.8 per cent. in 1966). But the striking fact to be observed is that whereas in 1961 the percentage gross margin increased with the number of shops operated, the reverse was true by 1971. As far as their rate of stockturn is concerned, there was little overall change between 1961 and 1971, although there was some improvement for the larger independent businesses. Combining the gross margin and the rate of stock-turn, the independent grocers registered an increase in gross profitability of onethird between 1961 and 1971, as compared with only one-tenth for the multiples. Among the independents themselves, while gross profitability also rose for both the single-shop concerns and those with $2-4$ shops (but not for the remainder), the gross profit index shows that the single-shop concerns fared much better than the larger independent grocers.
6.4: The decline in the number of independent grocers and their share of the private sector's trade has not come about solely from the competition of the multiples, even though that may have been the most important contributory cause. Undoubtedly part of the reason for the decline in numbers has been redevelopment of the older residential areas of
the cities, and the redistribution of population that it has involved. According to one source, "between 1961 and 1971 one million dwellings were cleared with a loss of 55,411 independent retailers from the clearance areas",* and by the nature of things, a substantial proportion of these shops would have been grocers. Other contributory factors stem from the size of the shop itself: the difficulty of achieving a level of sales sufficiently large from the restricted amount of space available to generate the working capital required either to modernise the premises or to expand them.
6.5: So much can be seen from Table 6.3 which shows the average sales, gross profit and wages and salaries per shop for independent grocers within the three sizecategories, as derived from the 1971 Census data. The other operating expenses are based on costs' data from several sources, which indicate a small range around $5 \frac{1}{4}$ per cent. on sales. Thus, it will be seen that in 1971, the single-shop grocer might, on average, have had no more than $£ 2,190$ left after meeting labour and operating costs from which to pay himself and meet the interest charges on capital. The grocer with $2-4$ shops would be even worse off in terms of net profit per shop, although on average he would have had nearly $£ 4,900$ for his whole business. The larger independent, with 5-9 branches, would have obtained $£ 3,270$ per shop and nearly $£ 20,400$ overall in net profit. Even so, the larger independents' net profit-rate (on sales) at 5.3 per cent. would have been less than one-half that of the single-shop grocer. ${ }^{+}$
6.6: The low absolute levels of pre-tax net profit emphasises the difficulty that confronts the small-scale grocer anxious to modernise or to expand his premises. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising in the light of these figures to find that the single-shop grocer had, on average, a net capital expenditure of over $£ 160$ in 1971, and that the rest of the independent grocers spent about twice that amount per shop. But to the extent that the funds for investment are not created by the business itself, the independents are forced to seek finance elsewhere or forego the improvements they have had in mind.

## VOLUNTARY GROUP TRADING

6.7: One means by which the independent grocer has been able to secure financial assistance has been through becoming associated with a voluntary group. Voluntary groups began to be formed on the initiative of wholesalers at a time when they were becoming increasingly aware of the inroads which the multiples were making into the trade of the independents, the mainstay of the wholesalers' business. From a handful of voluntary groups in the middle and late 1950s - the pioneers were Peter Keevil, Kinlochs, the Danish Bacon Company, Stewarts and J. Evershed - their numbers and relative importance steadily increased. The term "group" is sometimes used to distinguish the associations which comprise

[^11]+ The PIB Report No. 165 (op.cit) estimated that in 1970 "the average net profits for voluntary group self-service shops were about $£ 1,900$ as against $£ 1,470$ for other selfservice shops; for counter-service we estimate that they were about $£ 1,300$ as against $\mathrm{£} 1,100 \ldots$ These average figures conceal very much lower profits in some shops... About one-third of the unassociated grocers in our survey were working proprietors owning only one shop. The average net profit in 1970 of these shops, before tax, including the proprietor's own remuneration, was about $£ 820$, and 30 per cent. of them had net profits of under $£ 500.1$ (paras. 104-105).
one wholesaler and a number of retailers from those where a number of wholesalers combine with each other to serve their retailer-customers (often referred to as a "voluntary chain", but it is intended to use "voluntary group" here to describe both types of organisation.
6.8: The basic mode of operation is an agreement between the individual retailer and the group wholesaler whereby the retailer undertakes to buy as much as possible from that source, or at least a minimum weekly amount. Although initially conceived as a means whereby wholesalers could gain a degree of purchasing loyalty from their retailercustomers in return for higher discounts or special terms, the groups have taken on increasingly the character of merchandising associations:
> "Sales promotions are organised covering the whole group and, in addition, the wholesalers provide advice and expertise on selling, shop planning, site evaluation and similar matters with the object of promoting the retailers' efficiency and increasing their sales. To the extent that they are able by these means to increase their turnover they place themselves in a stronger position to obtain better terms from manufacturers and, like the multiples, to introduce their own branded products in competition with the manufacturers' advertised brands."*
6.9: Another form of voluntary association are the retailers' buying associations comprising only retailers without any wholesaler-associate, some of which have established their own central warehouses. Fewer in number than the voluntary groups, they have had less impact on the grocery trade. However, as far as individual retailers are concerned, membership of the two types of association is not always mutually exclusive.
6.10: The relative importance of the independent grocery businesses belonging to voluntary groups, retailers' buying groups or both are shown for the Census years of 1961 and 1971 in Table 6.4. ${ }^{+}$The proportion of independent grocery businesses belonging to voluntary associations (either alone or as well as a retailers' buying group) rose to over $17 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1971 as compared with $14 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1961. On the other hand, the proportion belonging to retailers' buying groups declined from nearly 16 per cent. in 1961 to under 15 per cent. in 1971. Indeed, the most striking point to emerge from Table 6.4 is that the proportion of independent grocers not belonging to any form of buying association among the respondents remained unchanged at over seven-tenths over the 1961-71 period.
6.11: Moreover, the combined share of the independent grocery trade represented by businesses belonging to such associations remained virtually static at 41 per cent. between 1961 and 1971. Those businesses associated only with a voluntary group saw an increase from 17 per cent. to 20 per cent. in their share of the grocery trade between

[^12]|  | $\underline{1961}$ | $\underline{1971}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Organisations | $86 \%$ | $73 \%$ |
| Establishments | $86 \%$ | $74 \%$ |
| Sales | $88 \%$ | $76 \%$ |

1961 and 1971, but there was a more substantial fall from 19 per cent. to 13 per cent. during the same period for those associated only with a retailers' buying group.
6.12: Some part of the failure of voluntary group membership to increase in importance may have stemmed from the policies pursued by the wholesalers themselves in establishing more stringent conditions for entry into their schemes or for continuing existing membership. It will be noted from Table 6.5, for example, that the average sales per shop among members of the voluntary groups was $£ 14,900$ in 1961, about 70 per cent. more than the average for the remaining independent grocers ( $£ 8,800$ ); by 1971, the voluntary group members' average sales were nearer 75 per cent. larger than the rest.
6.13: The sales per shop of the businesses which belonged only to a voluntary group were, as Table 6.5 shows, 118 per cent. higher (at current prices) in 1971 than in 1961, a much larger increase than achieved by businesses which were members of a retailers' buying group or belonged to both types of association, namely around 85 per cent. In fact, the respondent businesses which were outside all such associations fared better than the latter two categories between 1961 and 1971, nearly doubling their 1961 sales per shop during the period.
6.14: In view of the ostensible purpose of the voluntary groups to improve the terms and conditions under which retailers can obtain their supplies, it is somewhat surprising to find that their members have done no better than the other respondent grocers as far as the rise in their percentage gross margin between 1961 and 1971 is concerned. Indeed, the 1961-71 increase in the gross margin of the members of the wholesaler-sponsored groups ( 4.5 percentage points) was substantially less than for businesses belonging only to a retailers' buying group (6.7) or to both types of arrangement (5.3).
6.15: It is only when the rate of stock-turn is brought into account that the performance of the voluntary group member in terms of gross profitability has improved to a greater extent than the outsiders. The gross profit index of the latter was higher than for the voluntary group members as a whole in 1961, but it rose more slowly in the next 10 years than the $45 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. increase for all types of voluntary group members together, to put them on a par in 1971. Similarly, while the wholesaler-sponsored voluntary group member had a higher gross profit index in 1961 than either of the two other categories of retailers belonging to buying organisations, his advantage was much more marginal by 1971.
6.16: It might seem reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the main benefits which the individual grocers' business derives from membership of a voluntary group stem as much from their "below-the-line" activities in advising on merchandising, stock selection and control, accounting procedures and in raising finance for shop-conversions and new equipment as from their advantages on the side of buying.
6.17: Comparable data to those given in Table 6.4 are not available for later years, but there is an alternative source of information, namely the A.C. Nielsen Company. According to the Nielsen Researcher, the voluntary group grocers' share of the independent sector's trade fell from 56 per cent. in 1971 to 51 per cent. in 1975, after more than doubling their share between 1961 and 1971. The problem is to know how to reconcile the Nielsen Researcher's figures with those derived from the Census of Distribution for the same years, more particularly since the differences between them are marked: not only in the absolute level of the voluntary groups' share in 1971 (i.e. Nielsen: 54 per cent; Census: $41 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.) but also the direction and magnitude of the 1961-71 changes (i.e. an increase by Nielsen of 29 percentage points as compared with virtually no change according to the Census).
6.18: Part of the difference in 1971 might arise from the omission of nonrespondents in the Census data, but to account for the whole difference, nearly 95 per cent. of the sales represented by the excluded traders would have to have come from members of buying groups. This possibility must be discounted, therefore, as the only explanation for the difference, and it certainly does not begin to match the disparity in the two sets of figures for 1961.
6.19: However, it is generally accepted that the voluntary group grocers' relative importance has declined in recent years, and possibly by as much as that of other independent grocers. Some part of the explanation undoubtedly lies in the other major change affecting the organisation of the independent grocery trade: namely, the development of cash-and-carry wholesaling to which it is now proposed to consider.

## CASH-AND-CARRY WHOLESALING

6.20: Cash-and-carry wholesaling has been described as "the equivalent of self-service in the retail trade, in that the retailer picks his own goods and moves them in his own transport. Its purpose was to reduce the growing pressure of overhead costs on the wholesaler and it offered him two main advantages. First it relieved him of the major portion of his labour and transport costs; and secondly, the retailer paid cash ..... In a position to sell at prices substantially below those of delivery wholesalers ... the cash-and-carry wholesaler offers the retailer - and particularly the smaller retailer - the additional benefit that he can obtain simple case lots without incurring a delivery charge which is normally made by delivery wholesalers for small shops. The retailer is thus relieved of the need to carry large stocks and he is able when necessary to top up his stocks economically."*
6.21: The development of cash-and-carry wholesaling commenced at about the same time as the voluntary groups, and by 1965, according to The Grocer there were 300-350 cash-and-carry depots being operated. In that same year, there were over 2,000 wholesale businesses dealing in groceries and provisions with total receipts of nearly $£ 2,000$ millions, but 53 per cent. of those receipts were accounted for by the 30 largest busiriesses with more than $£ 10$ million apiece, and over 70 per cent. by the 114 largest with more than £2 million each. ${ }^{+}$(These figures, however, include the receipts of Cooperative wholesaling activities).
6.22: By 1970, the number of cash-and-carry depots had increased to around 600 , according to A.C. Neilsen, with a turnover of $£ 420$ millions. The estimated turnover in 1970 of wholesale grocers and provision merchants according to the National Federation of Wholesale Grocers and Provision Merchants was about $£ 1,200$ million for the whole of the United Kingdom, so that cash-and-carry at that time was probably accounting for at least one-third of private wholesale grocery trade. $\varnothing$
6.23: Between 1970 and early 1975, A.C. Nielsen report only a negligible change in the number of cash-and carry depots, which is broadly confirmed by the

[^13]studies carried out by the Retail Outlets Research Unit (RORU).* However, the total sales floorspace represented by grocery cash-and-carry depots increased during the same period from about 11 millions sq. ft. in 1971 to $15-16$ million sq. ft. in 1975, an increase of around two-fifths. Similarly, the estimated 1975 turnover was more than double its 1970 level.
6.24: The growing importance of cash-and-carry to independent grocers as a source of their supplies is indicated by the A.C. Nielsen findings that whereas in 1967/68 29 per cent. of the independent grocers outside the voluntary groups were "heavy" users of cash-and-carry, the proportion had increased to 47 per cent. in 1970/71. While the proportion of "heavy" users among retailers belonging to a voluntary group was much lower (9 per cent. in 1967/68 and $11 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1970/71), those using cash-and-carry to some extent rose from 43 per cent. to 64 per cent. during the same period. Furthermore, it would appear that the proportion of all independent grocers patronising cash-and-carry depots has risen from under three-quarters in 1970/71 to over four-fifths in 1975.
6.25: The attraction of buying from the cash-and-carry to the independent grocer is, as previously indicated, two-fold: the cheaper prices at which large ranges of goods are available, and the opportunity to buy only as and when required. The ability of the cash-and-carry depots to sell more cheaply than the traditional wholesalers reflects the relative operating costs of the two methods of selling. The PIB obtained costs and margins data from seven major wholesalers, whose combined sales represented over one-fifth of the total private wholesale grocery turnover in 1969. The relative importance of their cash-andcarry operations ranged from 5 per cent. to 98 per cent. of turnover, but in Table 6.6 are shown the costs and margins data for their cash-and-carry operations on the one hand and delivered wholesaling on the other.
6.26: It will be seen from Table 6.6 that the operating costs-ratio of the cash-and-carry operations fell from 4.8 per cent. in 1967 to 4.3 per cent. in 1969, whereas for delivered wholesaling they rose from 7.2 per cent. to 7.6 per cent. during the same period. While maintaining their net profit margin at 1.5 per cent., the cash-and-carry operators were able to reduce their gross margins from 6.3 per cent. to 5.8 per cent. Those operating by the traditional methods, however, improved their net margins (but not to the level of the cash-and-carry operators) between 1967 and 1969, but their gross margins rose from 8.1 per cent. to 8.8 per cent. in the process.
6.27: Apart from the substantial differences in operating costs represented by the absences of transport expenses, the cash-and-carry operators had much lower payroll and general overheads than in delivered wholesaling, offset by higher occupancy costs which may reflect the need for cash-and-carry depots "to be sited in accessible and hence sometimes relatively expensive sites" as well as their layout and higher costs of heating and lighting. +

## the structure of grocery wholesaling

6.28: The changes that have occurred in the structure of grocery wholesaling stem partly from the introduction and rapid expansion of the cash-and-carry techniques, and partly from the development of wholesaler-groupings more often than not linked to the

[^14]voluntary groups of retailers. The analysis of these changes is further complicated by the number of acquisitions that have occurred among the wholesale companies, and the marked tendency for individual wholesalers to switch their allegiance from one group to another.
6.29: It is convenient to begin by establishing the relative sizes of the main individual wholesale companies in 1971, and the pattern of their increases in sales during the preceding and subsequent three years. These data are shown in Table 6.7, from which it will be seen that the largest sales in 1971 were achieved by Fitch Lovell Ltd., followed by Wheatsheaf (Wholesale) Ltd. and the Danish Bacon Company. Indeed, these three concerns accounted for 44 per cent. of the sales of the businesses listed in Table 6.7, and possibly over one-fifth of the total private wholesale grocery trade in 1971.
6.30: By 1974, however, Fitch Lovell had dropped to fourth place, and Wheatsheaf (Wholesale) had replaced them at the top of the sales league. In second place came Linfood Holdings Ltd. formed by the merger of Associated Food Holdings Ltd. and Thomas Linnell \& Sons Ltd. at the end of 1974, the former having itself acquired Upward \& Rich Ltd. (the 10th largest wholesaler in 1971) earlier in the year. Retaining third place was the Danish Bacon Company Ltd.
6.31: In the 1971-74 period, the fastest growth in sales among the top four companies was achieved by Wheatsheaf (Wholesale), with acquisition playing a comparatively small part in its development. This was in marked contrast, as already indicated, to the emergence of Linfood Holdings Ltd., but similar to the actual growth pattern of the Danish Bacon Co. Ltd. Moreover, whereas cash-and-carry wholesaling accounted for only a relatively small part of the latter's sales, it represented nearly two-thirds of the sales of Wheatsheaf (Wholesale) in 1974.
6.32: Exchanging fifth for sixth place among the grocery wholesalers between 1971 and 1974 was Alliance Wholesale Grocers Ltd., part of the Associated British Foods Group, operating both cash-and-carry and delivered wholesale depots. Its growth in sales at only 31 per cent. between 1971 and 1974 was far exceeded by Nurdin \& Peacock, operating entirely by cash-and-carry and increasing its depot floorspace by nearly two-fifths to nearly 1.3 million sq. ft. in 1974. Although Nurdin \& Peacock's percentage increase in sales during the 1971-74 period was the second largest among the six largest firms, it was considerably smaller than occurred among some of the others listed in Table 6.7.
6.33: Moving up from fifteenth place in 1971 to seventh in 1974 was Oriel Foods Ltd., following the acquisition of a controlling interest in that company by Mr. James Gulliver, the former chairman of Fine Fare Ltd. During 1973, Oriel Foods Ltd. acquired A.B. Gibson Ltd., and Carryway Ltd., and in the course of 1974, Morris \& Jones Ltd., although Oriel itself had been taken over by the RCA Corporation in the meantime.
6.34: The largest percentage increase in sales between 1971 and 1974 was achieved, however, by Makro, whose Dutch parent company is Steenkolen Handelsvereeniging (SHV). Its first depot was opened at Eccles, Manchester in 1971, and by 1974 it was operating six with over $800,000 \mathrm{sq}$. ft . altogether. The elevenfold increase in its sales to £55 millions in 1974 put it into tenth place among the wholesalers listed in Table 6.7, although it should be noted that in 1975 little more than one-half of its $£ 84$ million sales came from food.
6.35: Ranking higher than either Oriel or Makro in 1974 were the food wholesaling interests of Booker McConnell. In 1971, it ranked ninth among the listed firms,
but during the next three years it added to its existing delivered wholesaling (Alfred Button) and cash-and-carry (Cashmart) interests by acquiring Gardners (Bristol) Ltd. (from Unigate Ltd.) in 1972, Arthur Richardson \& Son Ltd. and James Harper \& Son (Edinburgh) Ltd. in 1974.
6.36: Three of the remaining firms shown in Table 6.7 more than doubled their sales between 1971 and 1974. Warriner \& Mason Ltd., a subsidiary of the tobacco firm, Gallaher Ltd., made only one small acquisition during this period, although early in 1975 it took over Budgetts (Cash and Carry) Ltd. from Barker \& Dobson Ltd., with a current turnover of around $£ 34$ millions a year. Batley's of Yorkshire Ltd. is exclusively a cash-andcarry wholesaler. Harvey, Bradfield \& Toyer Ltd. and HBT Trademarkets Ltd. engaged in delivered and cash-and-carry wholesaling respectively, are both subsidiaries of Bishop's Stores Ltd. Finally, Kinloch (Provision Merchants) Ltd. operates 11 depots directly, as well as another 4 through its subsidiary, Charles Arkcoll Ltd.

## THE MARKETING GROUPS

6.37: Close associations have developed between individual grocery wholesalers through their participation in marketing groups engaged in promotional and other joint activities, sometimes but not invariably related to the voluntary retail groups. These associations are, however, essentially loose, and individual companies move from one group to another at their discretion as well as a consequence of mergers and take-overs.
6.38: The identity of the leading marketing groups, listed in order of their 1971 cash-and-carry depot floorspace (and in all probability sales as well) is given in Table 6.8. The largest marketing groups in that year were Trademarkets, Capital and Value Centres: their combined floorspace was equivalent to over three-fifths of the total for all the listed groups, each having around 1 million sq. ft . or more. Three other groups - Keen Cost, ICCG and Big N - each with around 600,000 sq. ft. - accounted for another three-tenths of the total space.
6.39: By 1975, the three largest groups had a slightly greater share of total floorspace than in 1971, but Keen Cost had moved into second place with Capital slipping down to being fourth. Of the groups that existed in 1971, the largest increase in floorspace occurred for Keen Cost ( 1.62 million sq. ft.) followed by Trademarkets ( 0.87 million sq. ft.) and Value Centres ( 0.70 million sq. ft .). But in 1972 a new group, Landmark, was established which by 1975 had 600,000 sq. ft. placing it sixth among the eight leading groups.
6.40: The rise in prominence of Keen Cost is attributable in the main to Bookers and Oriel Foods. Bookers, after acquiring Gardners (Bristol) already a member of Keen Cost, transferred its own Cash mart depots away from Capital. Oriel Foods' takeover of A.B. Gibson similarly led to the latter's transfer from Trademarkets to Keen Cost, as well as bringing into Keen Cost, Morris \& Jones and Carryway Supplies. The merger of AFD and Thos. Linnell to form Linwood has made it the principal component of Value Centres, although the adherence of Misselbrook \& Weston also advanced its strength.*

[^15]6.41: Early in 1976 a new group - Nationwide Food Distributors - was formed by combining the interests of Alliance (which had hitherto not participated in group marketing) with Capital, enabling it to claim second place to Trademarkets, the margin between them in floorspace terms being very small. In addition, Landmark's floorspace was markedly increased by Lonsdale \& Thompson Ltd. joining its strength. Indeed, these changes could mean that the three largest groups - Trademarkets, NFD and Value Centres - accounted for close on two-thirds of the total floorspace covered by the leading marketing groups.

## VOLUNTARY GROUP LINKS

6.42: The links between the marketing groups and the retailers belonging to one or other of the "symbol" groups are shown in Table 6.9. Thus, the Mace retailers are linked with the wholesalers forming the Keen Cost group; the VG retailers with the Trademarkets group; the Spar/Nivo retailers with the Value Centres. It is worth noting that Kinlochs, as well as dealing with Mace retailers through its association with the Keen Cost group, has its own voluntary group, Wavy Line. In addition, Danish Bacon and Alliance each have their own voluntary group of retailers.
6.43: The figures given for the retailer membership of the various groups must be treated with some caution, since there is no regular information forthcoming about changes in membership over time.

## THE RETAILER BUYING GROUPS

6.44: Mention has been made already of the existence of retailer buying groups as distinct from the wholesaler-sponsored voluntary groups, such as Mace, VG, Spar/ Vivo. At the present time, there is only one such group of any significance in the grocery trade: Londis Holdings Ltd. Claiming a membership of 980 retailers, Londis had a turnover of just over $£ 12$ millions in 1973 as compared with $£ 9$ millions in 1971 and under $£ 7$ millions in 1969.

## TABLE 6.1

Independent grocers: number of businesses, establishments and sales, by number of shops, 1961 and 1971

|  | I Shop | $2-4$ <br> Shops | $5-9$ <br> Shops | All <br> independents <br> (Base for <br> percentages) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of businesses: | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |  |
| 1961 |  |  |  |  |
| 1971 | 94.4 | 5.3 | 0.3 | 95,308 |
| No. of establishments: | 96.6 | 3.1 | 0.3 | 82,531 |
| 1961 | 87.0 | 11.2 | 1.8 | 116,604 |
| 1971 | 91.7 | 6.9 | 1.4 | 86,987 |
| Total Sales: |  |  |  |  |
| 1961 | 80.8 | 14.5 | 4.7 | $£ 1230.5 \mathrm{~m}$ |
| 1971 | 85.4 | 10.2 | 4.4 | $£ 3211.5 \mathrm{~m}$ |

## TABLE 6.2

Independent grocers: gross-margins and stock-turn, by number of shops, 1961 and 1971


## TABLE 6.3

Independent grocers: Average sales, gross profit and net profit, per shop, by number of shops, 1971

|  | All | I Shop | $2-4$ <br> Shops | $5-9$ <br> Shops |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average sales per shop | 20.26 | 18.87 | 30.08 | 61.30 |
| Gross profit per shop | 4.08 | 3.89 | 5.38 | 9.99 |
| Wages \& salaries per shop* | 0.82 | 0.72 | 1.65 | 3.35 |
| Other operating expenses <br> per shop $f$ | 1.06 | 0.98 | 1.62 | 3.37 |
| Net profit per shop $\neq$ | 2.20 | 2.19 | 2.11 | 3.27 |

* Estimated: excludes proprietors' remuneration
$\neq$ Includes occupancy and general overheads, but excludes interest.
$\neq$ Before deduction of proprietors' remuneration, interest and tax.

TABLE 6.4
Voluntary groups in the independent grocery trade: 1961 and 1971


## TABLE 6.5

Independent grocers: Sales per shop, gross margin and stock-turn of all and voluntary group members, 1961 and 1971

|  | All respondent independent grocers | Indepe Wholesaler sponsored voluntary groups | grocers bel Retailers' buying groups | ing to: Both | All |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sales per shop (£000) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1961 | 10.5 | 14.5 | 14.5 | 19.1 | 14.9 |
| 1971 | 20.8 | 31.6 | 26.9 | 35.3 | 30.5 |
| 1961-71 percent increase | 98\% | 118\% | 86\% | 85\% | 105\% |
| Gross margin on sales (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1961 | 15.2 | 15.0 | 15.2 | 15.4 | 15.2 |
| 1971 | 20.1 | 19.5 | 21.9 | 20.7 | 20.1 |
| Rate of stock-turn <br> (Times per annum) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1961 | 15.3 | 15.3 | 13.3 | 12.9 | 14.0 |
| 1971 | 15.4 | 16.3 | 14.3 | 14.6 | 15.4 |
| Gross profit index |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1961 | 100.0 | 98.7 | 86.9 | 85.4 | 91.5 |
| 1971 | 100.0 | 102.7 | 101.2 | 97.6 | 100.0 |
| Change, 1961-71 (\%) | 33.1 | 38.5 | 54.9 | 52.1 | 45.4 |

TABLE 6.6
Operating costs of sample of grocery wholesalers engaged in cash-and-carry and/or delivered wholesaling, 1967 and 1969

|  | Cash and Carry |  | Delivered wholesaling |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1967 | 1969 | 1967 | 1969 |
|  | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| Gross profit margins | 6.3 | 5.8 | 8.1 | 8.8 |
| Operating costs: |  |  |  |  |
| Payroll | ... | 2.4 | ... | 3.9 |
| Transport | ... | - | ... | 1.6 |
| Occupancy | ... | 1.3 | ... | 0.5 |
| Other | $\ldots$ | 0.6 | $\ldots$ | 1.6 |
| Total | 4.8 | 4.3 | 7.2 | 7.6 |
| Net profit margin | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.2 |

TABLE 6.7

Changes in sales and rank-order (by sales) of grocery wholesalers, 1968-74

| In order <br> of 1971 <br> sales | Percent. increase in sales |  | Ranking |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |

* By 1974, AFH Ltd. and T. Linnell Ltd. (whose sales have been combined for 1968 and 1971) had been incorporated with other wholesalers in Linfood Holdings Ltd.
$+\quad$ This company was acquired by AFH Lrd. in 1974.
$\varnothing \quad$ Acquired by Oriel Foods Ltd. in 1974.

TABLE 6.8
Grocery wholesalers' marketing groups

|  |  |  | Floorspace: Cash <br> MARKETING <br> GROUP | 1971 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

TABLE 6.8 Cont'd...

| MARKETING GROUP | 1971 | 1975 | Floorspace: Cash <br> \& Carry depots only |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 1971 \\ \mathrm{Mn} \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1975 \\ & \mathrm{ft} . \end{aligned}$ |
| A \& O (Newga) | 26 members | 30 members | 0.39 | 0.38 |
| LANDMARK | Formed in 1972 | Claremont Marks <br> L.F. Jones <br> Stranraer Blochain/ Polenadic +11 others | - | 0.60 |

TABLE 6.9
Voluntary groups and wholesaler-sponsors

|  |  | Retailer members |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Symbol Group | Wholesaler-sponsors |  | 1975 |
| Mace | Keen Cost | 4,800 | 4,800 |
| VG | Trademarkets | 3,050 | 3,340 |
| Spar/Vivo | Value Centres | 4,050 | 4,000 |
| Wavy Line | Kinlochs | 1,600 | 1,790 |
| Alliance | Alliance | 1,300 | 1,300 |
| 4 Star Independent | Danish Bacon | 4,000 | 3,650 |
| APT | Capital | 1,750 | 1,700 |

## 7: THE FRESH FOOD TRADES

7.1: While grocers and provision dealers account for a growing proportion of the private sector food shops' sales, the other food retailers dealing mainly in fresh foods were still responsible in 1975 for one-third of those sales. In volume-terms, however, their 1975 turnover of $£ 3,245$ millions (at current prices) was nearly 5 per cent. lower than in 1971, and as Table 7.1 shows, it was also $2 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. lower than in 1961. Most of the constituent trades have suffered a decline in their volume of sales as compared with 1961, the decreases ranging from $2 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for butchers to a massive 35 per cent. for fishmongers, poulterers. Indeed, the 34 per cent. increase in the volume of dairymen's sales between 1961 and 1975 compares with a fall for the other four trades of nearly $9 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. during the same period.

## BUTCHERS

7.2: The largest single trade within the fresh foods group is butchery: in 1971 and again in 1975 it accounted for around 43 per cent. of the group's total sales. The basic data on the number of organisations, establishments and sales in the trade, and the relative importance of the independents and multiple businesses, are given in Table 7.2. Between 1961 and 1971, the number of establishments fell by nearly 13 per cent. and the number of organisations by about 10 per cent. The fall in the number of multiples from 85 to 71 was relatively greater ( $16 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.) than for the independents ( 10 per cent.), even though they were over 2,500 fewer in 1971.
7.3: $\quad$ The multiples' share of the total number of butchers' shops was higher in 1971 than in 1961, and their proportion of the private trade's sales increased from 16 per cent. to 19 per cent., remaining at that level in 1975. But it will also be seen from Table 7.2 that the difference in the average sales per shop of those belonging to the multiples on the one hand, and the independents on the other, tended to increase between 1961 and 1971. Even so, the typical multiple butchers' shop had sales in 1971 only $1 \frac{1}{2}$ times those of the average independent's outlets, in marked contrast to the $8 \frac{1}{2}$ times difference in average sales per shop between multiples and independents in the grocery trade.
7.4: The multiples enjoy a higher percentage gross-margin than the independents, although the difference between them was considerably narrower in 1971 than in
1961. On the other hand, the independents' rate of stock-turn is very much higher than for the multiples, although again the margin of difference has narrowed between 1961 and 1971 as the rate of stock-turn has fallen for both types of retailer. Combining the gross percent-age-margin and the rate of stock-turn establishes that the gross profitability index for the independents has fallen by nearly one-fifth between 1961 and 1971, as compared with less than one-tenth for the multiples. Even so, the gross profitability index for the independents was more than double that of the multiples in 1971.
7.5: According to the Census data, labour costs for the multiples in 1971 were 12.9 per cent. of sales as compared with 7.6 per cent. for the independents, considerably more than the 2.2 per cent. difference in their gross percentage-margins. Moreover, according to the Prices \& Incomes Board, the net profit margin for a sample of butchers' shops belonging to independent businesses was $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1969 as against 5 per cent. for the multiples' sample. *
7.6: Within the multiples' sector, the number of organisations with more than 50 shops has risen from 7 in 1961 to 9 in 1971, and their combined share of the multiples' trade has increased from $64 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1961 to 71 per cent. in 1971, largely at the expense (as Table 7.3 shows) of the smaller multiples with $10-19$ shops. The percentage gross margin was highest among the chains with $50-99$ shops, and since this size of organisation also had a rate of stock-turn higher than the multiples' average, their gross profitability index was 57 per cent. higher than for multiples as a whole. The largest multiple organisations (i.e. with 100 or more shops) had lower-than-average gross margins and rate of stock-turn, so that their gross profitability index was only three-quarters that of all multiples taken together.
7.7: $\quad$ While the Census of Distribution gives no data on the net margins of retail butchers, information is available at intervals for a period of sixteen years from official investigations of the meat trade. The period 1958-62 was covered by the VerdonSmith Committee ${ }_{;}^{+}$the three years 1967-69 in the PIB Report No. 165; and more recently, a Price Commission report has dealt with the 1971-74 period. $\varnothing$ All these sources show very large fluctuations in margins (particularly gross margins) from year to year among the sample of firms covered. Thus, it is more appropriate for comparative purposes to take the average margins for each of the three periods as in Table 7.4, while also showing the data for 1971 and 1974 separately.
7.8: It will be seen from Table 7.4 that in the 1958-62 period, the multiples had higher average gross margins than the independent butchers, but that in the 1967-71 period the reverse was true. Assuming that the samples are comparable, both types of retailer increased their percentage gross margins between the first two periods covered, but by 1971-74 the independents' margins had fallen substantially below the 1967-69 level whereas those of the multiples had risen slightly. Thus, once again the multiples had the advantage in terms of their gross margins. Even so, the gross margins of the independents in 1974 were slightly higher than for the multiples, since the latter's margins were substantially lower in 1974 than in 1971.

* PIB Report No. 165, op.cit, Table 7, page 79.
+ Committee of Inquiry into Fatstock and Carcase Meat Marketing and Distribution, Report (HMSO, Cmnd. 2282), February 1964.
$\emptyset$ Price Commission: Report No. 7. Prices and Margins in Meat Distribution (HMSO, 1975).
7.9: The percentage net margins of the independents have been consistently higher than those of the multiples throughout the period covered by Table 7.4, although the percentage-points difference between them fell from 2.70 in 1958-62 to 1.15 in 1971-74. Taking the latter period on its own, both independents and multiples had higher net margins in 1974 than in 1971, the difference between them remaining unchanged. It is also worth noting that the average net profit per shop of the independent retailers, according to the Price Commission report, increased from $£ 2,100$ in 1971 to $£ 3,500$ in 1974 (an increase of two-thirds), but the multiples' net profit per shop rose from $£ 1,600$ to $£ 2,800$ during the same period (an increase of three-quarters).
7.10: The conclusion of the Price Commission concerning both retail and wholesale margins (the latter are discussed later) was that:

> "... the trade operates in a competitive environment and that profits - and prices - are not unreasonable. In particular total net profits at all stages from the farm gate to the shop counter represent a small proportion of the total price ....."

The Leading Multiple Retailers
7.11: The leading multiple butchers in 1971 comprised the retail interests of the Union International Company Ltd. grouped under its subsidiary, J.H. Dewhurst Ltd., and trading under that name as well as Eastmans, R.C. Hammett, Alex Munro (in Scotland). Altogether J.H. Dewhurst was credited with 1,600 retail butchers' shops in 1971, and a 1971 turnover of over $£ 51$ millions. The second largest multiple was Baxters (Butchers) Ltd. with over 400 shops; in 1971, the company's total turnover (including its wholesaling activities carried on by Lea \& Baxter Ltd. and its cold-storage operations) came to £22 millions (an increase of nearly two-fifths compared with 1968). It is possible that around $£ 15$ million represented retail sales in 1971, no more than one-quarter of the Dewhurst turnover.
7.12: In 1971, the two retail butchery businesses of Fitch Lovell Ltd. West Layton Ltd. and R. Gunner Ltd. - together had a total of 270 shops, with combined sales in excess of $£ 10$ millions. Thus, these three concerns - Dewhurst, Baxters and Fitch Lovell - in all probability accounted for 55 per cent. of the multiple butchery trade, but little more than 10 per cent. of the total private butchery sales. The other multiple concerns with 100-200 shops in 1971 were Matthews (Butchers) Ltd., Louis C. Edwards \& Sons (Manchester) Ltd., and Strongs \& Bennett (Suppliers) Ltd.
7.13: A number of changes occurred during the 1971-75 period which are worthy of comment. In 1974, Baxters was acquired by Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd., while the two businesses of Fitch Lovell were consolidated as West Layton Ltd. In addition, Booker McConnell acquired the 42 butchers shops operated by Williams- Bros. Ltd. along with its grocery interests (see para. 5.24 above) in 1971, adding to it the butchery shops of Adkins (Cambridge) Ltd. to bring the number of shops up to 57 by 1974. Otherwise the important developments were the expansion of the meat retailing activities of Matthews Holdings Ltd. by its acquisition of a $37 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. equity interest in John Manson (Holdings) Ltd. operating 97 shops in the London area, and the expansion of Pork Farms Ltd. whose total turnover (including manufacturing) increased from $£ 5 \frac{1}{4}$ millions in 1971 to $£ 19 \frac{1}{2}$ millions in 1974.
7.14: The organisation of meat wholesaling, often combined with importing, is complex, and is undergoing a process of transformation which has been described in the following terms:

> "Today more fatstock are being produced domestically and a greater proportion is being sold through deadweight marketing channels... The majority of the private slaughterings in this country were carried out by a small number of large abattoirs... These abattoirs are increasingly being situated in the animal production areas, and owned or financed by large vertically integrated meat company groups, forming a direct chain of distribution from the farm to the retail outlet."
7.15: In 1965, according to the wholesale trades inquiry, there were over 750 wholesalers (including importer/wholesalers) dealing in meat in Great Britain, with total receipts of over $£ 550$ millions. The 10 largest wholesalers accounted for nearly one-half of the total receipts. ${ }^{+}$At about the same time, the Verdon-Smith Committee reported that the Imported Meat Traders' Association comprised 88 firms, but that the six largest concerns accounted for 80 per cent. of all imported meat. But the 88 members of the IMTS varied greatly in the scope of their activities: 21 were associated with refrigerating or exporting firms overseas, 18 acted as independent agents for overseas shippers, 11 combined both these functions and 38 were wholly independent wholesalers. $\varnothing$
7.16: The increasing importance of domestic production can be seen from the fact that home-produced beef and veal increased from three-quarters of total supplies in 1966 to well over four-fifths in 1974, and home-produced mutton and lamb from 45 per cent. in 1966 to 54 per cent. in 1974. The traditional importer, already hit by the ban on bonein imports from South American suppliers in 1968, has sought as a consequence of the shift in sources of meat supplies to become more involved in the home-killed fresh meat trade. This they have done by acquiring both slaughtering wholesalers (operating their own abattoirs) and non-slaughtering wholesalers who deal at meat markets as commission agents.
7.17: Some data are available on the gross and net margins of importers and wholesalers from the Verdon-Smith and the Price Commission reports for the 1958-62 and 1970-74 periods (Table 7.5). For importers, the average gross margin was 8.17 per cent. in 1960-62, although their average net profit margin was only 0.23 per cent. (in one year, it was a loss). By 1971-74, despite much lower gross margins, their net margins averaged 0.81 per cent., the actual level, however, increasing only from 0.66 per cent. in 1971 to 0.73 per cent. in 1974. For slaughtering wholesalers, the $1958-62$ average gross margins were 7.78 per cent. and net margins 1.68 per cent.; both were lower in the 1971-74 period, although in 1974 their gross margins were up on 1971 and their net margins about twice as large as three years earlier. Data on the margins of non-slaughtering wholesalers are only available for the 1971-74 period: their gross and net margins were above those of the wholesalers with abattoirs.

[^16]7.18: $\quad$ The largest concern in meat importing and wholesaling is Union International through W. Weddell \& Co. Ltd. (importing) and British Beef Co. Ltd. and W. Devis \& Sons Ltd. (wholesaler slaughterers). Thomas Borthwick \& Sons Ltd. have added slaughtering to their meat importing businesses, although their UK sales of £81 millions in 1974 represented only two-fifths of their total turnover. The leading wholesaler of domestic meat is the FMC Ltd., a company formed by the National Farmers Union in 1954, and which became a public company in 1962 after acquiring Marsh \& Baxter Ltd. In 1973, the FMC owned 100 abattoirs and packing stations as well as being Britain's largest bacon curers, and its total external sales doubled from $£ 133$ millions in 1968 to $£ 270$ millions in 1974.
7.19: Another concern with an important stake in the meat trade is S. \& W. Berisford Ltd. which operates as slaughtering wholesalers through City Meat Wholesalers Ltd., to which it added the Smithfield and Zwanenberg Group Ltd. in 1973. Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd., as an established importer of meat for wholesaling as well as processing, acquired the domestic slaughterers, the Chard Meat Co. about the same time.
7.20: The Meade-Lonsdale Group Ltd., which became a subsidiary of Spillers Ltd. in 1969 is heavily involved in the meat trade as cold-store operators, importers, slaughterers and wholesalers, while Matthews Holdings Ltd. operates as importers, slaughterers and wholesalers through Henry S. Fitter \& Sons Ltd. as well as a 39 per cent. interest in A.J. Mills (Holdings) Ltd., which operates meat wholesaling and importing businesses among its trading companies.
7.21: Another important wholesale business is Towers \& Co. Ltd., a UK subsidiary of the New Zealand company of the same name, whose turnover doubled between 1968 and 1974 when it amounted to $£ 20 \frac{3}{4}$ millions. Eastwood Thompson Ltd., a subsidiary of J.B. Eastwood Ltd. by acquisition of B. Thompson Ltd. in 1972 claimed an annual turnover of around $£ 50$ millions in 1975 as importers, exporters, processors and distributors of meat and poultry. Finally, mention must be made of J.E. Sanger Ltd., which was only incorporated in February 1969 but trading in chilled and frozen meat on an international scale achieved a sixfold increase in turnover between 1969/70 and 1974/75 when it came to over £29 millions.

Conclusion
7.22: Considerable changes have occurred in meat marketing in recent years, with consequential changes in the organisation of the slaughtering and wholesaling trade. At the retail end, the trade has been affected by loss of sales to supermarkets and the effect of rapid price-increases on levels of consumption. Smaller retail butchers have gone out of existence, but in the main, the principal change has been that the larger multiples have grown at the expense of the smaller multiples.

## GREENGROCERS, FRUITERERS

7.23: The number of greengrocers' and fruiterers' shops fell by over onequarter between 1961 and 1971, but perhaps even more noteworthy was the halving of the number of multiples in this trade from 37 in 1961 to 19 ten years later. Between 1961 and 1966, when the number of multiples fell by five, these organisations slightly increased their share of the total trade, but as Table 7.6 shows, in the next five years it fell from 7 per cent. to $4 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. No later data on the division of the trade are available from the official statistics, but the multiples' share in 1971 was smaller in this trade than any of the other fresh food traders with the exception of fishmongers, poulterers.
7.24: $\quad$ The average sales per shop of the multiple greengrocers were nearly nine-tenths higher than those of the independents in 1961, and in 1971, still as much as four-fifths higher. The multiples enjoyed higher gross margins than the independents in both 1961 and 1971, although the differential narrowed during the period. On the other hand, the multiples rate of stock-turn fell between 1961 and 1971, while that of the independents rose. Even so, the gross profitability index of the multiples was still 10 per cent. higher than that of the independents in 1971, as compared with 63 per cent. higher in 1961.
7.25: The PIB Report No. 165 showed that for a small sample of multiple retail greengrocers' shops, the gross percentage margin (on sales) averaged 30.1 per cent. in 1967-69, and that their net margins averaged 14.2 per cent. Another sample of independent greengrocers' shops with average gross margins of 22.1 per cent. had net margins averaging 9.7 per cent. But for three multiple greengrocery organisations whose gross margins averaged 31.8 per cent. over all their retail activities, the net margin was as slow as 0.2 per cent. for the same three years, 1967-69. A Price Commission investigation carried out in 1974 and 1975 however, presented the financial results for five multiple organisations in 1973 and 1974. On an average turnover of $£ 1.3$ millions for the two years combined, the weighted average gross margin came to 34.0 per cent., but the net margin (pre-tax) was still as low as 1.7 per cent. Even so, the return on capital employed at this level of pre-tax profits was 14.7 per cent.*
7.26: In 1961, out of the 37 multiple organisations there were only 6 with 50 or more shops, although the average number of outlets came to nearly 110 apiece. The leading specialist multiple retailers in 1971 were Gerrards Ltd. and T. Walton (London) Ltd. covering London and the Home Counties, Malcolm Campbell Ltd. (Scotland), Wm. Ross Ltd. (Lancashire and N. Wales) and Waterworth Bros. Ltd., a subsidiary of Fine Fare Lrd. (North Wales, North West and the Midlands). In addition, however, it is probable that most of the 350 outlets of MacFisheries Ltd. were classified to this trade in 1971 (see also para. 7.44 below).

Fruit and vegetable wholesaling
7.27: In 1965, there were 2,630 fruit and vegetable wholesalers in Great Britain with total receipts of $£ 468$ millions. There were, however, only 46 wholesalers with total receipts of more than $£ 1$ million, but collectively they accounted for one-quarter of the total trade. + In the Prices Commission Report No. 5, financial dara for 1973 and 1974 are

[^17]given for 7 national wholesale/distributive organisations, 18 regional market wholesalers (operating from one or two regional primary markets and selling both to retailers and other wholesalers, trading as secondary wholesalers for imported produce but as primary wholesalers for home-grown produce purchased direct from growers), and 16 regional distributive wholesalers operating outside markets and delivering virtually all their produce to retail and other outlets.
7.28: There were large differences in the turnover of the 7 national operators (averaging nearly $£ 18$ million per firm in 1973-74) and that of the 18 regional market wholesalers ( $£ 1.1$ million) and the 16 regional distributive wholesalers ( $£ 2.1$ million). As can be seen from the report, the percentage gross and net margins were highest for the regional distributive wholesalers, and their return on capital employed averaged 25 per cent. in the two years. The lowest margins were achieved by the regional market wholesalers, but their return on capital averaged about $28 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Finally, the national wholesale/ distributive organisations with lower net margins than the regional distributive wholesalers achieved the highest return on capital of over $31 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
7.29: Among the leading importers and/or distributors of fruit and vegetables are Geest Industries Ltd. and the Fyffes Group Ltd. (dominating the banana trade), Deltec Foods Ltd., T.J. Poupart Ltd., Glass Glover Ltd., Donald Cook Ltd. (part of Union International Ltd.), Fresco Foods Ltd., M \& W Mack Ltd., and before going into liquidation, the FPE Group Ltd.

## Conclusion

7.30: The greengrocery, fruiterers' trade is still predominantly the province of the small retail business. Multiples are less important than in most other fresh food trades, and there is only a handful of large multiples, none of them being national in the scope of their activities.
7.31: The retail bakery trade, according to the Census of Distribution, comprised nearly 15,600 shops in 1961, and after an increase in their numbers (unlike any of the other fresh food trades) to 1966, the total fell to 15,200 in 1971. The number of multiple retail organisations also increased between 1961 and 1966, but declined by nearly one-third to 108 in 1971. From Table 7.7, it will also be seen that after losing ground between 1961 and 1966, the independents' share rose above the 1961 level by 1971, although the trend was reversed again in the next four years. Even so, the multiples' share of the retail bakers' trade was only slightly higher in 1975 than in 1961.
7.32: It should, however, be noted at this stage that in 1971 the retail bakery shops belonging to the independents and the multiples accounted for under 45 per cent. of the private sector's trade in bakery products, as compared with 40 per cent. claimed by grocery shops.
7.33: The percentage gross margin of both multiples and independents was higher in 1971 than in 1961, the improvement being greater for the multiples. On the other hand, the stock turn rate slightly declined for both types of trade during the same period. Even so, the gross profitability index rose by $15 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. for the independents between 1961 and 1971, and by over 23 per cent. for the multiples, the latter increasing their advantage at the same time.
7.34: According to the Census of Distribution, there were only 25 multiple bakery organisations with more than 50 establishments in 1971, accounting for 57 per cent. of the multiples' trade. But the average number of establishments operated by these 25 large concerns was nearly 100 , and the turnover per organisation averaged nearly $£ 2 \frac{1}{2}$ millions. In fact, it is known that one concern - the Allied Bakeries Group, part of Associated British Foods Ltd. - alone had nearly 2,500 throughout the United Kingdom in 1971, while Spillers Ltd. through United Bakeries Ltd. had over 250 shops and Ranks Hovis McDougall (RHM) perhaps as many as 600 . Among other large retail bakers at that time were D.S. Crawford Ltd. (part of United Biscuits Ltd.) with over 230 retail shops in Scotland and A.D. Wimbush \& Son Ltd. with 120 shops in the West Midlands.
7.35: The circumstances whereby the large flour-milling combines became increasingly involved in the ownership of retail outlets have been described elsewhere. * Unfortunately, however, no separate sales or financial data are available for the retail bakery interests of the various groups, so that it is not possible to be precise about their relative shares of the trade's turnover. However, it is unlikely that the combined share of the three largest interests - Allied, United Bakeries, British Bakeries (RHM) - came to less than one-third of the total private retail bakery sales in 1971.
7.36: However, in terms of the total volume of bread sales - taking into account their sales through other than their own retail outlets - the relative importance of the three largest groups was considerably higher. According to a PIB report published in 1970, their combined share of the 1969 volume of bread sales was as high as 61 per cent. (See Report No. 151, Bread Prices \& Pay in the Bakery Industry).

[^18]By 1974, the indications are that their combined share had increased to 76 per cent. Furthermore, the largest of the three concerns in 1971 was British Bakeries (RHM) with 25 per cent. of total bread sales, but Allied Bakeries was close behind with 24 per cent. Each increased their share by 1 percentage-point between 1971 and 1974, but United Bakeries (Spillers) nearly doubled their share from 12 per cent. to 24 per cent. This has been due primarily to the Spillers' merger with J.W. French Ltd. in 1971, which gave them the bread-making businesses formerly belonging to the Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. and J. Lyons \& Co. Ltd. These last two named concerns had the third and fourth largest shares ( 7 per cent. and $1 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. respectively) of bread sales in 1969.
7.37: More recently, a report of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission on Flour and Bread* has been published, which suggests that the "Big Three" bakery groups were responsible for 62 per cent. of the total bread market in late 1976, with the remainder being divided between independent plant bakers ( 11 per cent.) and master bakers ( 27 per cent.). But whereas the "Big Three" held more than four-fifths of the standard bread market, their share of non-standard bread sales was less than one-quarter, the latter sector being dominated by the master bakers.

[^19]7.38: Between 1961 and 1971 the number of establishments - in the main, the depots from which milk delivery roundsmen operate - classified as dairymen in the Census of Distribution more than halved from over 7,000 in 1961 to 3,400 in 1971. There was also a fall in the number of organisations: the independents by nearly one-half to under 2,700 in 1971, and the multiples by three-fifths from 25 in 1961 to only 10 in 1971. As can be seen from Table 7.8, there was a substantial rise in the multiples' share of total sales between 1961 and 1966, but by 1971 part of their gain had been lost again and the indications are that the process has continued since 1971.
7.39: In part, these developments can be attributed to the closure of many of the retail shops (as distinct from depots) operated by some of the larger multiples since 1966, and the increasing proportion of sales of fresh milk and cream being sold through supermarkets and other grocery shops rather than by home delivery. In 1961, 92 per cent. of the private trade in fresh milk and cream went through dairymen and another 7 per cent. through grocers; by 1971, the dairymen's share had dropped to 85 per cent. and the grocers' share increased to 12 per cent. In addition, whereas nearly one-fifth of the dairymen's business in 1961 came from other goods (principally groceries) in 1971 their contribution was down to one-tenth, despite the efforts of dairymen to increase the sale of such items as bread, butter, eggs, yoghurt, chickens, potatoes on their house-to-house deliveries.
7.40: The most striking contrast between dairymen and other fresh food trades is the large size-difference that exists between the establishments of the multiples and the independents. In 1961, the sales per establishment of the multiples were already more than four times those of the independents, but by 1971, they were more than ten times as great. These size-differences relate to a difference in the function of the two types of dairymen: the independents are predominantly buyers and distributors of bottled milk; the multiples, on the other hand, are the processing dairies, heat-treating and bottling milk at central dairies and distributing the bottled milk to town depots from which the retail rounds are operated. For the latter, there are technological economies of scale in the processing dairies, with each being capable of supplying 20 or more satellite retail depots, while the daily gallonage handled by the latter is likely to greatly exceed that of the typical bottledmilk buyer.
7.41: From Table 7.8 it will be seen that both independents and multiples had substantially higher gross margins in 1971 than in 1961, the improvement being relatively greater for the multiples. Both also had higher rates of stock turn in 1971 as well, although the multiples' stock-turn rate rose by four-fifths as compared with only one-fifth for the independents. Consequently, the gross profitability of the multiples was three-tenths higher than than of the independents in 1971, whereas in 1961 the independents' gross profitability was one-sixth higher than the multiples.
7.42: In 1971, the five largest multiple organisations together accounted for 441 establishments and as much as 60 per cent. of the private dairymen's total turnover. The largest of these five concerns was Unigate Ltd. and the second largest, Express Dairy Co. Ltd., part of Grand Metropolitan Hotels Ltd. since 1969. In third place came Northern Dairies Ltd. (renamed Northern Foods Ltd. in 1971), followed by Associated Dairies Ltd. and Clover Dairies Ltd. With quite widely differing interests in milk wholesaling and manufacturing, these five concerns have continued to dominate the retail dairy trade since that date, although there are no separate sales or financial data available for this side of their operations.

## FISHMONGERS, POULTERERS

7.43: The smallest of the fresh food trades distinguished by the Census of Distribution comprises fishmongers and poulterers, and between 1961 and 1971 not only did the number of establishments classified as such fall by nearly one-quarter but the value of their sales rose by as little as 6 per cent. As can be seen from Table 7.9, sales did in fact rise by nearly two-fifths between 1961 and 1966, only to fall away again sharply in the next five years. In addition, the multiples' share of total private sector's sales rose from under $23 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1961 to nearly $36 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1966, but by 1971 their share had dropped to 4 per cent. This fall in the relative importance of the multiples derives, in part, from a drastic reduction in the number of their outlets (from 462 in 1966 to only 94 in 1971), but the average sales of the multiples outlet in 1971 were also under two-fifths of what they were in 1966.
7.44: While the leading specialist multiple in this trade - MacFisheries Ltd. - has closed a great many of its smaller shops, it is probable that changes in the product-range of its remaining larger outlets has led to their reclassification as either grocers or greengrocers, fruiterers (with fish) by 1971. Certainly the dramatic fall in the multiples' rate of stock-turn between 1961 and 1966 indicates a diversification of their range into other foods, and the fact that their 1971 stock-turn was closely comparable to its 1961 level suggests that those outlets still classified to the trade are again more specialised fishmongers' shops.
7.45: It is noteworthy, too, that in 1971 nearly four-fifths of the independent businesses had only one shop, as compared with little more than two-thirds in 1961, despite a 15 per cent. fall in the number of single-shop businesses during the same period. Moreover, with only 94 outlets belonging to 6 multiple organisations in 1971, it is evident that none of them has a large number of shops.

## SUMMARY

7.46: There is considerable diversity in the experience of the fresh food retail trades from many points of view. With the exception of the dairymen, the trend in the volume of sales between 1961 and 1975 has been downwards, and markedly so in the case of fishmongers, poulterers and greengrocers, fruiterers (see Table 7.1). While the number of retail businesses and establishments have fallen between 1961 and 1971 in all the fresh food trades, the decrease has been minimal in the bakery trade and comparatively small among butchers, whereas the fall in the case of the dairymen has been around one-half by both measures.
7.47: As can be seen from Table 7.10, the multiples share of trade sales rose among dairymen, butchers and, in all probability, greengrocers between 1961 and 1971, but declined in the bakery and fishmongery trades. Since 1971, however, the trend in the multiples' share has altered for the three trades where the data are available. The sales concentration-ratios for the largest multiples in four of the five trades are also given in Table 7.10, the trend being markedly upwards among dairymen and butchers, slightly downwards among greengrocers and markedly lower among fishmongers.

## TABLE 7.1

Changes in volume of sales by fresh food retailers, 1961-75

|  | £Millions at 1971 prices |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1961 | 1971 | 1975 | 1961-75 change \% |
| Dairymen | 311 | 396 | 418 | + 34.4 |
| Butchers | 837 | 858 | 816 | - 2.5 |
| Fishmongers, poulterers | 117 | 81 | 76 | - 35.0 |
| Greengrocers, fruiterers | 370 | 361 | 304 | - 17.8 |
| Bakers | 311 | 298 | 285 | - 8.4 |
| All | 1,946 | 1,994 | 1,899 | - 2.4 |



TABLE 7.2
Butchers: Organisations, establishments, sales, gross margin and stock-turn, 1961-75

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| No. of organisations: <br> Independents <br> Multiples | 26,188 |  |  |  |

Sales per shop ( $£$ )
Independents
Multiples

| 14.6 | 19.0 | 25.4 | $\ldots$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 21.2 | 28.7 | 39.6 | $\ldots$ |
| 15.3 | 20.2 | 27.2 | $\ldots$ |


| Gross percentage margin on sales (\%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Independents |  | 21.7 | 21.2 | 23.6 | $\ldots$ |
| Multiples |  | 25.1 | 25.4 | 25.8 | $\ldots$ |
|  | All | 22.3 | 22.0 | 24.1 | $\ldots$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |

Rate of stock-turn (Times per annum)
Independents

| 106.5 | 109.4 | 80.0 | $\ldots$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 38.7 | 33.2 | 34.4 | $\ldots$ |
| 81.3 | 77.6 | 64.0 | $\ldots$ |

TABLE 7.3
Multiple Butchers: number of organisations, establishments and sales, by number of shops, 1961 and 1971

|  | No. of organisations |  | Establishments |  | Total Sales |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1961 | 1971 | 1961 | 1971 | 1961 | 1971 |
|  |  |  | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| 10-19 shops | 63 | 45 | 20 | 142 | 22 | 16\% |
| 20-49 | 15 | 17 | 11 | 12 | $13 \frac{1}{2}$ | 121 $\frac{1}{2}$ |
| 50-99 |  | 3 |  | $5{ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ |  | 5 |
| 100 or more shops | $) 7$ | 6 | ) 69 | 68 | ) $64 \frac{1}{2}$ | 66 |
|  | 85 | 71 | - | 100 | 100 | 0 |
|  | 85 | 71 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

TABLE 7.4
Butchers: Gross and net percentage margins, 1958-74

|  | Average for period: |  |  |  | Actual: |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| $1958-62$ | $1967-69$ | $1971-74$ | 1971 | 1974 |  |  |

Gross-margins:

| Independents | 20.06 | 24.57 | 20.51 | 23.76 | 23.92 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Multiples | 21.86 | 23.17 | 24.46 | 25.75 | 23.56 |

Net margins:

| Independents | 6.66 | 7.37 | 5.41 | 5.40 | 5.93 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Multiples | 3.96 | 5.10 | 4.26 | 4.01 | 4.53 |

TABLE 7.5
Gross and net margins of wholesale butchers, 1958-74

|  | Importers | Slaughtering <br> Wholesalers | Non-slaughtering <br> Wholesalers |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Gross margins: <br> 1958-62 | $8.17 *$ | 7.78 | $\ldots$ |
| 1971-74 | 5.11 | 5.57 | 6.68 |
| 1971 | 5.25 | 5.25 | 6.62 |
| 1974 | 4.73 | 6.09 | 6.92 |
| Net margins: |  |  |  |
| 1958-62 | $0.23 *$ | 1.68 |  |
| 1971-74 | 0.81 | 1.29 | $\ldots$ |
| 1971 | 0.66 | 0.73 | 1.75 |

* Average for the three years, 1960-62 only.

TABLE 7.6

Greengrocers, fruiterers: Organisations, establishments, sales, gross margins and stock-turn, 1961-71

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of Organisations Independents Multiples | $\begin{array}{r} 26,582 \\ 37 \end{array}$ | $\cdots 32$ | $\begin{array}{r} 20,220 \\ 19 \end{array}$ |
| Number of Establishments | 31,441 | 25,861 | 22,902 |
| Total Sales (£ Millions) | 271.7 | 292.6 | 360.4 |
| Independents' share (\%) Establishments Total sales | $\begin{aligned} & 96 \\ & 93 \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 96 \\ & 93 \end{aligned}$ | $97 \frac{1}{2}$ $95 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Multiples' share (\%) Establishments Total sales | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \\ & 6 \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 4 \\ & 7 \end{aligned}$ | $2 \frac{1}{2}$ $4 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Sales per shop (£000) Independents Multiples | $\begin{array}{r} 8.4 \\ 15.8 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 11.0 \\ & 18.2 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 15.4 \\ & 27.9 \end{aligned}$ |
| Gross percentage margin on sales (\%) Independents Multiples | $\begin{array}{ll} 20.5 & \\ 27.8 & \\ \hline 21.0 \end{array}$ | 22.6 22.6 | $\begin{aligned} & 25.6 \\ & 31.9 \\ & \hline 25.9 \end{aligned}$ |
| Rate of stock-turn (Times per annum) Independents Multiples | $\begin{array}{r} 44.3 \\ 53.3 \\ \hline 44.8 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 53.1 \\ 48.8 \\ \hline 52.7 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 49.9 \\ 44.2 \\ \hline 49.6 \end{array}$ |

## TABLE 7.7

Bakers: Organisations, establishments, sales, gross margins and stock-turn, 1961-75

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of Organisations <br> Independents <br> Multiples | 8,214 | $\ldots$ | 8,132 | $\ldots$ |
| No. of Establishments | 138 | 157 | 108 | $\ldots$ |
| Total Sales (£Millions) | 15,583 | 16,513 | 15,211 | $\ldots$ |
|  | 198.4 | 262.6 | 298.0 | 497.7 |
| Independents' share (\%) <br> Establishments |  |  |  |  |
| Total sales |  |  |  |  |

Gross percentage margin on sales (\%)
Independents

| 40.4 | 40.6 | 47.3 | $\ldots$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 43.8 | 50.4 | 55.7 | $\ldots$ |
| 41.8 | 44.8 | 50.4 | $\ldots$ |

Rate of stock-turn (Times per annum)
Independents
Multiples

| 35.5 | 39.4 | 35.0 | $\ldots$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 48.8 | 46.7 | 47.3 | $\ldots$ |
| 40.2 | 42.3 | 38.6 | $\ldots$ |

TABLE 7.8
Dairymen: Organisations, establishments, sales, gross margins and stock-turn, 1961-75

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | ---: | :--- | ---: | :--- |
| No. of Organisations <br> Independents <br> Multiples | 5,066 |  |  |  |

Gross percentage margin on sales (\%)
Independents
Multiples

| 21.1 | 22.4 | 26.7 | $\ldots$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 20.1 | 24.4 | 26.0 | $\ldots$ |
| 20.5 | 23.7 | 26.2 | $\ldots$ |

Rate of stock-turn (Times a year)
Independents
Multiples

| 67.2 | 102.9 | 81.7 | $\ldots$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 59.9 | 57.9 | 108.4 | $\ldots$ |
| 62.4 | 67.4 | 99.3 | $\ldots$ |

TABLE 7.9
Fishmongers, poulterers: Organisations, establishments, sales, gross margins and stock-turn, 1961-75

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of Organisations Independents Multiples | $\begin{array}{r} 4,528 \\ 8 \end{array}$ | ${ }^{\cdots}{ }_{8}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 3,972 \\ 6 \end{array}$ | $\ldots$ |
| No. of Establishments | 6,100 | 5,538 | 4,658 |  |
| Total Sales (£Mns) | 76.6 | 106.1 | 81.4 | 131.1 |
| Independents' share (\%) Establishments Total sales | $\begin{aligned} & 91.1 \\ & 76.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 91.7 \\ & 63.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 98.0 \\ & 96.4 \end{aligned}$ | $\cdots$ |
| Multiples' share (\%) Establishments Total sales | $\begin{array}{r} 8.9 \\ 23.4 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 8.3 \\ 36.4 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 2.0 \\ & 4.0 \end{aligned}$ | $\cdots$ |
| Sales per establishment (£000) Independents Multiples | $\begin{array}{r} 3.3 \\ 33.1 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 13.3 \\ & 83.6 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 17.2 \\ & 31.1 \end{aligned}$ | $\cdots$ |

Gross percentage margin on sales (\%)
Independents

| 24.3 | $\ldots$ | 27.8 | $\ldots$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 24.7 | $\ldots$ | 30.5 | $\ldots$ |
| 24.4 | 25.9 | 27.9 | $\ldots$ |

Rate of stock-turn (Times per annum)
Independents
Multiples

| 133.0 | 98.3 | 73.9 | $\ldots$ |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 58.4 | 15.7 | 59.1 | $\ldots$ |
| 101.1 | 33.7 | 73.3 | $\ldots$ |

TABLE 7.10
Changes in multiples and largest multiples' share of fresh food retail trades, 1961 and 1971

|  | 1961 |  | 1971 |  | Trend in Sales Concentration |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. of organisations | Share of Sales | No. of organisations | Share of Sales |  |  |
| DAIRYMEN |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Multiples | 25 | 57 | 10 | 641 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | + | - |
| Largest Multiples | 12 | 47 | 5 | 60 | + | $\ldots$ |
| BUTCHERS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Multiples | 85 | 151 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | 71 | 19 | + | K |
| Largest Multiples | 7 | 10 | 6 | 121 ${ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | $+$ | $\cdots$ |
| BAKERS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Multiples | $138$ | $38 \frac{1}{2}$ | 108 | 361 | - | + |
| Largest Multiples | 7 | $7 \frac{1}{2}$ | 25 | 21 | ? | ... |
| GREENGROCERS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Multiples | 37 | $6 \frac{1}{2}$ | 19 |  | + |  |
| Largest Multiples | 6 | $3 \frac{1}{2}$ | 9 | $3 \frac{1}{2}$ | - | $\cdots$ |
| FISHMONGERS |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| All Multiples | 8 | 23 $\frac{1}{2}$ | 6 | $3{ }^{\frac{1}{2}}$ | - | $\ldots$ |

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text { K } & =\text { Constant } \\
? & =\text { Not certain } \\
\ldots & =\text { Unavailable }
\end{aligned}
$$

## 8: COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

8.1: Cooperative societies, wholesale and retail, play a significant role in food distribution in Great Britain, and in this Chapter it is intended to review the changes in their organisational structure and trade-shares that have occurred during the last quarter of a century. Historically, the development of cooperation commenced in productive activities with an involvement in retail trading as an offshoot, but it was in retailing that great strides were made in the latter half of the 19th century. Their methods of doing business changed little from their inception. The retail societies aimed:
"at providing their members with the necessities of life, charged at current market prices, and - a matter of principle - cash had to be paid for the goods, no credit being allowed. Any surpluses that might accrue were to be distributed to members as a dividend on purchases."*

By the turn of the century, the membership of the retail societies was approaching the 2 million mark, and their combined share of national grocery and other food sales was at least $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent., more than double the share of the food multiples. ${ }^{+}$
8.2: In the years immediately after World War I, the Cooperative societies' share of grocery and other food sales was still higher than that of the multiples, but the position was reversed by the end of the interwar-years when the multiples clained $16 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to the Cooperative's 15 per cent. The multiples continued to make headway in the years immediately after the end of World War II, but so did the Cooperative societies. According to the 1950 Census of Distribution, the Cooperative societies accounted for 23 per cent. of the sales of grocery and provision shops in that year and 16 per cent. of the other fresh food shops, or 20 per cent. of total food shops' sales. This compared with the multiples' share of 21 per cent. for grocery and provision shops, 15 per cent. of other fresh food shops, and $18 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of total food shops sales.

[^20]8.3: $\quad$ In 1950, there were 1,000 retail Cooperative societies with a total membership of around 10 millions. During the next decade, membership rose to 13 millions but the number of societies declined to 835 as a process of rationalisation by mergers among the smaller societies, or by small with larger societies, began to occur. Even so, more than one-quarter of the 835 societies in 1961 had fewer than ten shops, accounting for only $2 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total Cooperative retail sales of just over $£ 1,000$ millions. At the other extreme, there were 67 societies with more than 100 shops apiece which accounted for one-half of the total Cooperative retail sales.
8.4: The proliferation of very small societies had long been identified as one of the major sources of weakness within the Cooperative sector, faced with the growing competitive pressures from the multiples. Operating within a limited trading area, and effectively precluded from most of the competitive benefits to be obtained from bulk buying, the smallest societies tended to act as a drag on the Movement as a whole. Not that the larger societies were free of organisation and trading problems; the apparently strong as well as the obviously weak often found themselves with decreasing surpluses, and with them a shrinking dividend that they could declare for their members' benefit. As one commentator writing in the mid-1960s put it:
> "Inasmuch as the "dividend" is used as a means of attracting custom, every reduction is likely to lead to some, even if only marginal, reduction in trade, and this, in turn, in the given circumstances, is likely to reduce the dividend still further. A vicious spiral is set up from which cooperative societies find it extremely difficult to escape ..... As dividends and consequently trade fell off, the societies may have been tempted to maintain the allegiance of their members by paying dividends out of reserves, thus weakening further their ability to meet the challenge of competitors by judicious investment."*
8.5: An Independent Commission, chaired by the late Hugh Gaitskell, produced an authoritative diagnosis of the problems confronting the Cooperative movement in 1958, and in 1960 the Cooperative Union Ltd. produced a plan which recommended a progressive reduction in the number of societies to around 300. As can be seen from Table 8.1, this target was not reached until 1971, although the progress after 1966 when the numbers stood at just under 700 was rapid. Even so, in 1971 there was still around one-quarter of the existing societies with less than 10 shops, although the larger societies (with at least 100 shops) had increased their share of total Cooperative retail sales to nearly 62 per cent. as compared with 50 per cent. ten years earlier.
8.6: The total retail trade of Cooperative societies, as can be seen from Table 8.1, increased by one-fifth to nearly $£ 1,215$ millions between 1961 and 1971. But this represented a declining share of total retail trade: from 11 per cent. in 1961 to under $9 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1966, falling still further to $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1971.

[^21]Cooperative share of food sales
8.7: It has already been shown in Table 2.4 that the Cooperative societies' share of total retail food sales which stood at $18 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. as late as 1957, fell away to $16 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1961 and as low as 11 per cent. in 1971. Food sales have traditionally accounted for the largest proportion of Cooperative retail trade. In 1950, the food share was nearly three-quarters and in 1961, just over three-fifths, but by 1971 it was down to 55 per cent.
8.8: Perhaps the most striking indication of the Cooperative societies growing weakness during the 1960s can be seen in Table 8.2. In 1957, their total food sales came to $£ 621.6$ millions, but four years later they had increased by less than 1 per cent. to $£ 626.8$ millions. Between 1961 and 1971, they rose by under $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent., whereas price-increases during this decade would alone have produced a rise of over 50 per cent. In other words, the volume of Cooperative retail food sales declined by three-tenths between 1961 and 1971.
8.9: There have been some changes, however, in the composition of their food sales in both the long and the short-term. Groceries, processed meat and confectionery which accounted for 65 per cent. of Cooperative food sales in 1950 were down to 52 per cent. by 1966, recovering only slightly by 1971. On the other hand, sales of fresh milk and cream contributed $26 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of total food turnover in 1971 as compared with 20 per cent. in 1961 and 15 per cent. in 1950. Otherwise the changes have been comparatively small, apart from a drop in the relative importance of bakery products between 1966 and 1971.
8.10: The changes in the number of Cooperative retail shops in each of the food trades, and in their total sales, between 1961 and 1971 are shown in Table 8.3. Overall the number of food shops fell from nearly 33,000 in 1961 to just over 11,700 in 1971, a fall of nearly two-thirds. Each trade had fewer outlets in 1971 than in 1961, the relative decline being largest among greengrocers, bakers and fishmongers/poulterers. More striking is the decline in sales, even at current prices, of the same three trades, for despite increases of one-half in dairymen's sales and one-eighth for grocers, the overall increase in the sales of Cooperative food shops was under one-tenth.
8.11: Since 1971, the total sales of Cooperative food shops have risen to more than $£ 1,360$ millions in 1975, or by 71 per cent. at current prices. (The number of food shops, on the other hand, fell from 11,700 in 1971 to around 9,000). The percentageincrease for dairymen was 29 per cent.; for butchers 62 per cent.; for grocers, 88 per cent.; but for the other three trades combined, there was a fall of 22 per cent. Allowing for priceincreases, however, the Cooperative food shops' trade actually fell in terms of volume by over 15 per cent. between 1971 and 1975. This contrasts with a fall in the volume of multiple food shops' trade of $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. during the same period.
8.12: The Census of Distribution does not provide separate gross margin and stock-turn data for Cooperative food shops, but the Prices and Incomes Board data for 1967-69 suggest that the gross margins of a sample of Cooperative grocery branches at 16.7 per cent. were somewhat lower than achieved by a sample of multiple grocery branches ( 17.8 per cent.), while the Cooperative net margins at 3.9 per cent. compared with 5.3 per cent. for the multiples.*

[^22]The largest retail Cooperative societies
8.13: From the annual statistics published for individual retail Cooperative societies, it is possible to compare the degree of sales concentration among them and how it has changed during the last fifteen years or so. In Table 8.4 is shown the share of total Cooperative retail sales held by the 6 largest and the 4 largest retail societies at intervals during the 1961-75 period. Thus, the 6 largest societies in 1961 had a combined share of 16.6 per cent. of total Cooperative retail sales, and this had increased to 20.7 per cent. by 1966, without any change in the identity of these largest societies. Between 1966 and 1971, however, the share of the 6 largest rose dramatically to 34 per cent., while by 1975 it had risen to 37.6 per cent. By 1975, the Portsea Island Society which held fifth place in 1966 had fallen out of the top 6, while a new regional society - the North Eastern, formed in 1970 by the amalgamation of 33 societies, of which the largest was Newcastle ranked third after the Cooperative Retail Services Ltd. (CRS) and London. It should be mentioned that CRS Ltd. operates directly through some 27 branches in various parts of the country by virtue of taking-over the assets and liabilities of formerly autonomous societies which have at times in the past found themselves in financial difficulties.
8.14: For the largest societies it is possible to establish also how their combined share of total Cooperative food sales has changed since 1968, with the results shown in Table 8.5. Their share of food sales is slightly greater than their share of total sales, but the trend towards higher concentration in the largest societies is equally pronounced.

The Cooperative wholesalesale societies
8.15: The Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. (CWS) and the Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd. (SCWS) were both founded in the 1860s, to undertake the processing and production of goods for sale by the retail societies as well as carrying on activities as their wholesale suppliers. The retail societies were only under a moral obligation to buy through the wholesale societies, and with a widening range of commodities becoming available and a growing tendency for manufacturers to supply their largest custamers direct, their dependence on the wholesale societies tended to decrease.

### 8.16: In Table 8.6 are shown the turnover data of the two wholesale

 societies for the 1961-74 period, from which it will be seen that the increase in their combined sales (at current prices) was less than 11 per cent. during this period. In mid-1973, the activities of the SCWS were absorbed into the CWS, and by 1974, the turnover of the CWS amounted to $£ 912.6$ millions, or about one-half more than in 1971. In 1973, more than three-quarters of the combined turnover comprised the sales of the Food Division, and the CWS is credited with supplying over three-fifths of the retail societies' requirements of packaged foods and groceries.
## TABLE 8.1

Retail cooperative societies: Number and size-distribution, 1961 and 1971

|  | 1961 |  | 1971 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. of Societies | Total retail trade | No. of Societies | Total retail trade |
|  |  | $£ \mathrm{Mns}^{\text {c }}$ |  | £Mns |
| TOTAL | 835 | 1012.2 | 313 | 1214.6 |
|  | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| Societies with: |  |  |  |  |
| Under 10 shops | 27 | 2.5 | 24 | 2.2 |
| 100-199 | 65 | 47.5 | 62 | 36.0 |
| 100-199 | 8 | 50.0 | 10 | 27.7 |
| 200 or more | 8 | 50.0 | 4 | 34.1 |
|  | 100 | 100.0 | 100 | 100.0 |

TABLE 8.2
Retail cooperative societies: Total food sales, 1950-71

|  | 1950 | 1957 | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| Groceries, processed meats, <br> chocolate and sugar confectionery | 65 | $56 \frac{1}{2}$ | $55 \frac{1}{2}$ | 52 | $53 \frac{1}{2}$ |
| Carcase meat, fresh fish, poultry <br> Fresh fruit and vegetables <br> Bakery products | 11 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 |
| Fresh milk and cream | $2 \frac{1}{2}$ | $3 \frac{1}{2}$ | 4 | 4 | $3 \frac{1}{2}$ |
|  | 15 | 9 | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ | $8 \frac{1}{2}$ | $5 \frac{1}{2}$ |

TABLE 8.3
Retail cooperative societies: number and sales of food shops, 1961-71

|  | 1961 |  | 1966 |  | 1971 |  | 1961-71 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | No. of shops | Sales <br> £Mn | No. of shops | Sales <br> £Mn | No. of shops | Sales <br> £Mn | Percen <br> Shops | change <br> Sales |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  | \% | \% |
| Grocers | 13.92 | 488.1 | 12.82 | 485.5 | 7.75 | 549.9 | - 44 | $+13$ |
| Butchers | 6.00 | 67.8 | 5.31 | 65.2 | 2.85 | 49.0 | - 53 | - 28 |
| Greengrocers | 1.46 | 14.5 | 1.10 | 11.1 | 0.32 | 5.7 | - 78 | - 61 |
| Bakers | 1.15 | 38.5 | 0.98 | 36.8 | 0.30 | 12.8 | - 74 | - 67 |
| Dairymen | 0.70 | 117.9 | 0.66 | 147.2 | 0.45 | 177.6 | - 36 | + 51 |
| Fishmongers, poulterers | 0.17 | 1.3 | 0.12 | 1.3 | 0.05 | 0.8 | - 71 | - 39 |
| TOTAL FOOD SHOPS | 32.90 | 728.1 | 20.99 | 747.1 | 11.72 | 795.8 | - 64 | + 9 |

TABLE 8.4
Shares of largest Cooperative retail societies of total Cooperative retail sales, 1961-75

| 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |

Share of total Cooperative retail
sales held by:

| 6 largest societies | 16.6 | 20.7 | 34.0 | 37.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 4 largest societies | 13.5 | 17.1 | 27.6 | 31.2 |

Ranking of largest societies:

| London | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CRS | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| Birmingham | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 |
| RACS | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| Greater Nottingham | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Portsea Island | 6 | 5 | $(7)$ | $(8)$ |
| North Eastern | $\ldots$ | $\ldots$ | 4 | 3 |

## TABLE 8.5

Shares of 4 and 6 largest Cooperative retail societies of total Cooperative food sales, 1968-75

| 1968 | 1971 | 1974 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Share of total Cooperative food sales held by:

| 6 largest societies | 25.2 | 34.7 | 36.6 | 38.6 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 4 largest societies | 20.7 | 30.2 | 30.3 | 32.4 |

## TABLE 8.6

Turnover of Cooperative wholesale societies, 1961-74

|  |  | £ Millions |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CWS | SCWS | Combined <br> CWS and <br> SCWS |  |
| 1961 | 465.17 | 87.52 | 552.69 |
| 1966 | 490.94 | 90.35 | 581.29 |
| 1968 | 483.36 | 141.23 | 624.59 |
| 1971 | 526.02 | 85.77 | 611.79 |
| 1974 | 912.61 | $*$ | 912.61 |

* Included with CWS following merger in 1973.


## 9: SALES CONCENTRATION IN THE RETAIL FOOD TRADES

9.1: Having examined in some detail the structure and performance of the multiples and independents in the grocery and fresh food trades separately, and in the immediately preceding chapter, the Cooperative societies as well, the stage has now been reached where it is possible to look at the broad division of the food trades between the three kinds of organisations, as well as the level of sales concentration achieved by the largest concerns.
9.2: In Table 9.1 is shown the relative shares of the food trades held by the multiples, independents and Cooperative societies at intervals during the 1961-75 period. The advance of the multiples is clear: their share has risen from 25 per cent. in 1961 to 41 per cent. in 1975. The greater part of their gains has come from the independents, whose share fell from 57 per cent. to 47 per cent. during the same period, although the Cooperatives too have seen a reduction in their share from 18 per cent. to 12 per cent.
9.3: At the same time there has been a substantial fall in the number of businesses among each of the three organisations. The number of multiple organisations declined by over one-third between 1961 and 1971 from 537 to 349 , and the number of Cooperative societies by over three-fifths from 835 to 313 . Thus, whereas the multiples' and Cooperative combined share of 43 per cent. of food trade sales was shared among 1,372 businesses in 1961, their 49 per cent. in 1971 was handled by less than half that number. Among the independents, too, there has been a fall of over one-fifth in numbers between 1961 and 1971, although in 1971 at 141, 150 they represented all but 0.5 per cent. of the total businesses.
9.4: The relative importance of the larger multiple and Cooperative organisations in 1971 can be seen from Table 9.2. In that year, the 36 largest multiples accounted for $26 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the total food shops' trade and the 45 largest Cooperative societies for just over $7 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Thus, the 81 largest retail organisations together were responsible for well over one-third of the total food trade. At the other extreme, twofifths of the total trade was shared among nearly 133,000 single-shop independent businesses.
9.5: There have been, however, divergent trends as between the grocery trade and the fresh food trades as far as the division of sales between the three main types of
organisation is concerned. As can be seen from Table 9.3, the multiples' share of the grocery trade has risen from under $29 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in 1961 to over 49 per cent. in 1975, whereas since 1966 the multiples' share of the fresh food trades has fallen from $26 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to little more than 23 per cent. Once again, in the grocery trade the multiples have taken trade in greater measure from the independents than the Cooperatives. Indeed, the Cooperative societies succeeded in increasing their share slightly between 1971 and 1975. Among the fresh food trades, the independents' increasing share since 1966 has come from both the multiples and the Cooperative societies.
9.6: From Table 9.4 which relates to the grocery trade, it will be seen that the 19 largest multiple organisations alone accounted for one-third of the total sales in 1971, and that altogether well over two-fifths was controlled by these multiples and the largest Cooperative societies. This represents a high concentration not only of sales but also of buying power.
9.7: The tremendous changes in the concentration of buying power which has come about not merely from the advance of the multiples and the rationalisation among Cooperative societies but also from the activities of the voluntary groups can be seen from the data published by the A.C. Nielsen Company. From Table 9.5 it will be seen that there were 2,800 major buying points for the grocery trade accounting for 43 per cent. of total sales; by 1965, the number of points had halved but the proportion of total sales they represented had risen to 70 per cent. In the next five years, the number of major buyers had fallen to under 650 and their share of sales increased to 80 per cent. Indeed, 42 per cent. of the sales potential was held by just over 200 multiples, and another 23 per cent. by the 100 -odd voluntary group wholesalers.
9.8: Since 1970 the proportion of total sales represented by the major buying points has gone on increasing, albeit slowly. But more significant has been the fall in the number of those buying points from 647 in 1970 to 383 in 1975. The multiples' buying points have dwindled to 62, only three-tenths of their 1970 numbers, while their share of sales increased from 42 per cent. to 49 per cent. In fact, Neilsen credits the six largest multiples - Allied Suppliers, Asda, Fine Fare, International, Sainsburys and Tesco with one-third of the total grocery trade potential in 1975, leaving less than one-sixth to be shared among the remaining 56 multiple grocers.

Advertising expenditures
9.9: Between 1968 and 1975, the total expenditure on press and TV advertising by food retailers quadrupled, although there was relatively little change in its division between the two media, with press advertising accounting for three-fifths or more of the total. As can be seen from Table 9.6, the largest spenders have been the Cooperatives: nationally and locally, they accounted for over one-half of total food retailing expenditure in 1968, and still as much as one-third in 1975.
9.10: The total advertising spending of the eight multiple grocers named in Table 9.6 more than trebled from $£ 1.81$ millions in 1971 to $£ 5.87$ millions in 1975 . The two largest spenders - Fine Fare and Tesco - were together responsible for three-quarters of the named multiples' total in 1971, but their share had dropped to two-thirds by 1973, and in 1975 was down to one-half. This was principally attributable to the relative large increases in spending between 1971 and 1975 by Allied Suppliers and International Stores: in 1975, their shares of total advertising were $17 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. and $14 \frac{1}{2}$ per cent. respectively compared with 5 per cent. apiece in 1971.
9.11: It will also be seen from Table 9.6 that the voluntary groups rank comparatively high among the advertisers listed. In 1971, their combined expenditure amounted to $£ 865,000$, increasing thereafter by nearly three-fifths to $£ 1,363,000$ in 1975 .
9.12: In comparison with their sales, the levels of advertising expenditure by food retailers are very low. In 1971, the combined spending by the eight named multiples was equivalent to only 0.14 per cent. of their sales, and while the proportion rose after 1971, it was still as low as 0.19 per cent. in 1974 and 0.22 per cent. in 1975. The highest ratio of advertising to sales applied throughout to Fine Fare, but even in its case, it only fluctuated around 0.5 per cent. while for Tesco, it was about 0.2 per cent.

## Changes in sales concentration among grocery retailers

9.13: The next chapter of this Report comprises a detailed analysis of changes in concentration among food distributors using a number of different indicators, ranging from turnover to net profit and own means. The sample of distributors comprises quoted and unquoted companies but not Cooperative societies, the main reason for excluding the latter being the difficulty of apportioning their capital assets or profits between food and non-food distribution. Even among the quoted and unquoted companies, there are some integrated concerns whose financial data cannot be divided between their retail and other distribution activities, and which, therefore, have to be treated as a whole. Thus, given the fact that the measures of concentration presented in the second part of this Report relate to all the food distribution activities of the sample companies without distinction as between different trades or types of activity, it is instructive to examine the evidence of changes in concentration by the one measure (sales) whereby some sub-division of the sample as well as the inclusion of Cooperative societies becomes possible.
9.14: The first sub-division of the sample comprises grocery retailers whose sales exceeded £20 millions either in 1971 or in 1974 . From Table 9.7, it will be seen that there were 28 experiences in the sample in 1969, of which 6 were Cooperative societies. A seventh Cooperative society in 1971 entered the sample in 1971, and in the following year there was one "death" counterbalanced by one "death" among the private sector experiences. The subsequent fall in the sample to 26 experiences in 1974 and 1975 is attributable to two further "deaths".
9.15: The total sales covered by the sample amounted to $£ 1,513$ millions in 1969, more than doubling to £3, 119 millions in 1974. In 1971, the sample's sales were equivalent to about 47 per cent. of total grocery trade sales; by 1975 , nearer 52 per cent. Thus, it must be borne in mind that the sales concentration-levels presented in Table 9.7 refer to the top 45-55 per cent. of the grocery trade, and not to the whole. It will be seen that the share of the four largest experiences has fluctuated between 55 per cent. and 50 per cent. during the seven years 1969-75, with a downwards trend overall. For the eight largest experiences, there was a marked decrease in their sales concentration-ratio between 1969 and 1971, but if the 1975 provisional figures are ignored, there has been an upwards trend from 1971 through to 1974. The same applies to the share of the twelve largest experiences.
9.16: The Linda indices - which reflect the size-disparity of the experiences concerned - show an upward trend among both the four largest and the eight largest, but a marked downward trend among the twelve largest. This confirms the tendency already commented upon in Chapter 5 for the medium and smaller grocery multiples to grow at a faster rate than the largest concerns, as well as the entry of newcomers to the sample, such as Carrefour.
9.17: Apart from a number of entries to or departures from the 12 largest experiences, the number of experiences changing rank-order among them reached a peak of eight in 1971, the figures for the individual years being shown in Table 9.8. Two of the experiences among the top 12 in 1969 had disappeared through acquisition before 1974, and while there were four Cooperatives among the top 12 at the beginning of the period there were only two at the end. Two concerns - Fine-Fare and International - retained their fourth and fifth places throughout the period; otherwise, the changes in rank only amounted to one or two places.
9.18: The size-mobility among the experiences was greater taking the sample as a whole, as can be seen from Table 9.9. Once again the peak number of changes in rankorder occurred in 1971, when three-quarters of the experiences were involved in a change of rank. But the maximum number of changes in rank of 2 or more points occurred in 1975, and the next largest in 1972.
9.19: The two experiences with the greatest improvement in their ranking during the period were Asda and Kwik-Save with 14 points increase each; otherwise, the largest improvement of 7 points each were achieved by Safeways, Waitrose and Hillards. The largest falls in ranking, on the other hand, occurred for the Birmingham and Portsea Island Cooperative Societies with 10 points each.

Changes in sales concentration among other food distributors
9.20: A similar analysis has been carried out among other food distributors which may be regarded broadly speaking, as competitors with each other. The Cooperative Wholesale Society has been excluded partly by virtue of its predominant size compared with the other food distributors, but mainly because it is not competitive with the private sector businesses insofar as it does not supply private retailers but largely confines its activities to dealing with the retail societies.
9.21: Altogether the number of experiences included in this analysis, as can be seen from Table 9.10, increased from 17 in 1969 to 18 in 1971 (by the entry of Makro into the sample), but fell to 16 as the result of amalgamations in 1974. The total sales represented by the sample increased from $£ 623$ millions in 1969 to $£ 1614$ millions in 1974.
9.22: It will be seen that the sales concentration-ratio for the four largest experiences declined between 1969 and 1973, but increased slightly in 1974. The same downward trend was evident for the eight and the twelve largest experiences between 1969 and 1973, but the increase in 1974 was more marked for both groups than for the four largest.
9.23: The size-disparity of the four largest concerns at first increased, but since 1972 it fell markedly with the upward movement in the concentration-ratio. There was, however, comparatively little change in the size-disparity of the eight largest experiences up to 1974, when it fell significantly with increased concentration. Finally, among the twelve largest experiences, the Linda index rose between 1969 and 1971, fell between 1971 and 1973, and rose slightly in 1974.
9.24: Changes in the identity of experiences among the 12 largest were comparatively small, but as can also be seen from Table 9.11, there were considerable changes in rank-order among them in each of the years covered. Taking the whole sample, the proportion of experiences where the change in rank amounted to 2 or more points was, however, relatively small except, as Table 9.12 shows, in 1974.
9.25: The two experiences registering the greatest improvement in ranking were Booker McConnell (a gain of six places during the period), and Makro which had risen to twelfth position in the three years since it entered the field in 1971. The other noteworthy change was that second place in 1974 was held by Linfood, just ahead of Fitch Lovell, with Wheatsheaf continuing to hold the first position which it reached in 1970.

TABLE 9.1
Shares of food shops' sales, by type of organisation, 1961-75

|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TOTAL FOOD SHOPS SALES (£Mns) | 4,115 | 4,790 | 6,395 | 11,125 |
| Shares of sales by: | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| Multiples | 25 | 32 | 37 | 41 |
| Independents | 57 | $52 \frac{1}{2}$ | $50 \frac{1}{2}$ | 47 |
| Cooperative societies | 18 | $15 \frac{1}{2}$ | $12 \frac{1}{2}$ | 12 |

TABLE 9.2
Distribution of food shops sales, by type and size of organisations, 1971

|  | Food Shop | Percent. of |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of | Sales | Total Food |
| organisations | £Mns | Sales |


| Larger Organisations with more than 100 shops: |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 36 | 1,695 | 26.5 |
| Cooperative societies | 45 | 486 | 7.6 |
|  | 81 | 2,181 | 34.1 |
| Rest of large organisations: |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 313 | 697 | 10.9 |
| Cooperative societies | 268 | 300 | 4.7 |
| Single-shop independent <br> businesses |  |  |  |
| Other independent businesses (2-9 shops) | 8,225 | 654 | 10.2 |
| TOTAL | 141,811 | 6,395 | 100.0 |

TABLE 9.3
Shares of grocery and fresh food retailers' sales, by type of organisation, 1961-75

|  | Per cent. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1961 | 1966 | 1971 | 1975 |
| Grocers and provision dealers |  |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 29.4 | 35.8 | 44.3 | 49.2 |
| Independents | 50.0 | 47.4 | 42.5 | 37.1 |
| Cooperative societies | 20.6 | 16.8 | 13.2 | 13.7 |
| Fresh food retailers |  |  |  |  |
| Multiples | 19.7 | 26.5 | 24.4 | 23.2 |
| Independents | 66.6 | 59.7 | 65.0 | 67.7 |
| Cooperative societies | 13.7 | 13.8 | 10.6 | 9.1 |

TABLE 9.4
Shares of grocery shop sales, by type and size of organisation, 1971

|  | No. of <br> organisations | Grocery Shop <br> Sales <br> $£ M n s$ | Percent. of <br> Toral Grocery <br> Sales |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Larger organisations with <br> more than 100 shops: <br> Multiples <br> Cooperative societies | 19 | 1,390 | 33.3 |
|  | $\ldots$ | $\frac{347}{1,737}$ | $\frac{8.3}{41.6}$ |
| Remainder of large organisations: <br> Multiples <br> Cooperative societies <br> Single-shop independent <br> businesses <br> Other independent businesses <br> (2-9 shops) | 116 | $\ldots$ | 463 |

[^23]TABLE 9.5
Number of major buying points and share of grocery trade, 1950-75

|  | 1950 | 1965 | 1970 | 1972 | 1975 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | ---: |
| No. of major buying points | 2,800 | 1,400 | 647 | 535 | 383 |
| - Cooperatives | $\ldots$ | $\ldots$ | 336 | 264 | 227 |
| - Private sector |  |  |  |  |  |
| Multiples <br> Voluntary group wholesalers | $\ldots$ | $\ldots$ | 311 | 271 | 156 |
|  | $\ldots$ | $\ldots$ | 202 | 167 | 62 |

TABLE 9.6
Expenditure on press and TV advertising by food retailers

|  | 1968 | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Fine Fare | 233 | 533 | 774 | 816 | 1011 | 1042 | 1399 | 1746 |
| Tesco | 437 | 438 | 513 | 560 | 939 | 687 | 1056 | 1164 |
| Sainsburys | 102 | 167 | 122 | 86 | 152 | 185 | 156 | 489 |
| Allied Suppliers | 88 | ... | 179 | 89 | 201 | 221 | 640 | 1039 |
| International | 24 | $\ldots$ | 94 | 95 | 119 | 111 | 288 | 854 |
| Safeway | 68 | ... | 59 | 59 | 126 | 114 | 155 | 143 |
| Key Markets | 17 | ... | 41 | 41 | 45 | 55 | 128 | 201 |
| Asda | - | - |  | 67 | 192 | 174 | 306 | 237 |
| Above multiples | 969 | $\cdots$ | 1782 | $\overline{1813}$ | 2785 | $\overline{2589}$ | $\overline{4128}$ | $\overline{5873}$ |
| Spar | 101 | 202 | 196 | 296 | 208 | 219 | - | - |
| VG | 197 | 235 | 183 | 366 | 303 | 382 | 352 | 486 |
| Mace | 190 | 233 | 176 | 203 | 224 | 217 | 265 | 367 |
| Spar/Nivo | - | - | - | - | - | 104 | 351 | 510 |
|  |  |  |  | 865 | 735 | 922 | 968 | $\overline{1363}$ |
| Cooperatives |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| National | 882 | 1005 | 666 | 601 | 895 | 1333 | 1705 | 1973 |
| Local | 1300 | 1410 | 1622 | 1573 | 2090 | 1787 | 2079 | 3026 |
|  | 2182 | $\overline{2425}$ | 2288 | 2174 | 2985 | $\overline{3120}$ | $\overline{3784}$ | 4999 |
| TOTAL: FOOD RETAILING of which: | 3905 | 4989 | 5069 | 5442 | 7492 | 8215 | 10881 | 15103 |
| Press | 2549 | 3326 | 3717 | 4228 | 5539 | 5993 | 7846 | 1C598 |
| TV | 1356 | 1663 | 1352 | 1214 | 1953 | 2222 | 3035 | 4505 |

TABLE 9.7
Sales concentration among larger grocery retailers, 1969-75

|  | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 <br> provisional |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| No. of experiences | 28 | 28 | 29 | 29 | 28 | 26 | 26 |
| Total sales (£Mns) | 1513 | 1699 | 1970 | 2213 | 2554 | 3119 | 3865 |
| Concentration-ratios (C): | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| Share of 4 largest $\left(C_{4}\right)$ | 54.4 | 53.7 | 52.2 | 53.3 | 53.2 | 52.9 | 50.1 |
| Share of 8 largest (C8) | 74.5 | 72.9 | 70.2 | 70.9 | 71.6 | 72.7 | 70.7 |
| Share of 12 largest (Cl2) | 82.8 | 81.5 | 79.1 | 80.0 | 81.1 | 83.3 | 81.5 |
| Linda indices (L): |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathrm{L}_{4}$ | 0.369 | 0.348 | 0.334 | 0.374 | 0.374 | 0.384 | 0.391 |
| $\mathrm{~L}_{8}$ | 0.321 | 0.312 | 0.324 | 0.343 | 0.334 | 0.318 | 0.332 |
| $\mathrm{~L}_{12}$ | 0.321 | 0.310 | 0.302 | 0.305 | 0.300 | 0.289 | 0.276 |

TABLE 9.8
Changes in composition and rank-order among twelve largest grocery retailers, 1969-75

|  | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Entries to/departures <br> from Top 12 | - | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | - |
| Changes in rank among <br> Top 12 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 5 | - |

TABLE 9.9
Changes in rank-prder among larger grocery retailers, 1969-75

| 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 | 1975 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

No. of experiences among whole sample with changes in rank $14 \quad 18 \quad 22$ 21

16
17
11

No. of experiences with changes in rank of 2 places or more

5
9
9
10
6
8
11

## TABLE 9.10

Sales concentration among other larger food distributors, 1969-74

|  | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| No. of experiences | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 16 |
| Total sales (£Mns) | 623 | 719 | 824 | 941 | 1236 | 1614 |
| Concentration-ratios (C) <br> Share of <br> 4 largest (C4) | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| 8 largest (C8) | 46.1 | 45.0 | 43.8 | 41.5 | 41.4 | 42.1 |
| 12 largest (C12) | 91.0 | 89.7 | 88.1 | 86.5 | 84.8 | 90.9 |
| Linda Indices (L) | 71.2 | 70.8 | 68.0 | 66.7 | 73.2 |  |
| $\mathrm{~L}_{4}$ | 0.325 | 0.363 | 0.348 | 0.376 | 0.332 | 0.303 |
| $\mathrm{~L}_{8}$ | 0.211 | 0.210 | 0.202 | 0.203 | 0.202 | 0.174 |
| $\mathrm{~L}_{12}$ | 0.153 | 0.164 | 0.168 | 0.161 | 0.158 | 0.160 |

TABLE 9.11
Changes in composition and rank-order among twelve largest other food
distributors, 1970-74

|  | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Entries to/departures from <br> Top 12 | 1 | 1 | - | - | 2 |
| Changes in rank among <br> Top 12 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 8 |

TABLE 9.12
Changes in rank-order among larger non-food distributors, 1970-74

| 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

No. of experiences among whole sample with changes in rank 12

13
13
12
12

No. of experiences with changes in rank of 2 pts. or more

4
1
4
5
11

## 10: THE COMPUTER GENERATED MEASURES OF CONCENTRATION

## Introduction

10.1: The methodology ${ }^{+}$stipulated by the EEC Commission for the analysis of industrial concent ration requires that measures of concentration such as the traditional concentration ratio (CR), the coefficient of variation ( $V$ ), the Gini coefficient $(G)$ and the Linda (L), entropy ( $E$ ), and Hirschman - Herfindahl (H) indices be derived for selected variables and in relation to a sample of the largest firms operating in the industry selected for study. In addition, Linda Indices were calculated for each variable in each year for values of $\mathrm{N}^{*}=2 \ldots . \mathrm{N}$. For the purposes of this study of the UK food distribution industry nine variables representing alternative measures of firms' size have been used for a sample of 53 firms in 1969 and 44 in 1974. Bearing in mind the change in sample size between 1969 and 1974, mostly as a result of merger activity, as well as variations in the availability of data some 579 measures of concentration have been generated by the computer for 1969, and 487 for 1974. The full set of these measures for each year of the study period may be found in Appendix 4.
10.2: In total there are many thousands of estimates of concentration which have been prepared as part of a co-ordinated research project by the EEC on concentration in the food industry, using the same definitions and the same indices, to enable comparisons to be made between member countries. While it may be necessary to have all these measurements to ensure that comparisons can be made between countries, notwithstanding their different data bases, it is unnecessary to compare all the different measures available for the food distribution industry within a country. Thus, this Chapter aims to reduce the mass of alternative computations provided by the EEC to a few simple measures which summarise the level and changes in concentration in the UK food distribution industry in recent years.

## The Variables and Sources Used

10.3: The nine variables used as measures of firms' sizes are listed below together with definitions where clarification is necessary:

[^24](01) Turnover Total sales, excluding inter-group sales.
(02) Employment
(03) Wages and Salaries
(04) Net Profit

Cash Flow
Cash Flow, less depreciation provision, i.e. net profit before tax.

The definition used here is that given to us by the EEC. It is a gross cash flow comprising gross trading profits (after charging directors fees and emoluments, pensions to past directors, superannuation payments, compensation for loss of office, auditors' fees etc.) and other income (from investments and other sources) before allowing for depreciation provisions, plus prior year adjustments other than tax, less hire of plant.

Net expenditure on tangible fixed assets.
This EEC term is given as the sum of issued ordinary and preference share capital plus total reserved.
are fixed assets, after deduction of depreciation plus total current assets, less total current liabilities.
is taken as the sum of Cash Flow (05) and Wages and Salaries (03).
10.4: $\quad$ As with a previous ${ }^{+}$study which concerned the UK food processing industry the source of data for the quantitative analysis of the food distribution industry remains that of the records held by the Companies Division of the Department of Industry. However, within the Companies Division itself there are two records' systems from which the appropriate data has been extracted. In the first instance a system of Standardised Accounts are maintained relating to companies engaged in either the retail or wholesale distribution of food and where each firm had in 1968 net assets of $£ 2 \mathrm{~m}$. or more and/or gross income in excess of $£ 200,000$. For firms not meeting this size criteria recourse was had to the annual reports filed by each company as a legal requirement and available in the Public Inspection Rooms of the Department of Industry at Companies House in London. In total, the accounts of some 60 companies have been examined, 30 by the former method and 30 by the latter and a list of these is provided by Table 10.1. The reader will be aware that the Cooperative societies are absent from this list, the reason for which was given earlier at paragraph 9.13.
10.5: It was decided that recourse to the data of the Public Inspection Rooms should be made for two reasons; first of all, because some firms considered too small by the Standardised Account size criteria in 1968 had achieved considerable importance in UK food distribution by 1974. Secondly, and more importantly this source was used so that the quantified inputs represented as nearly as possible firms' food distribution activities. Some of the firms listed in Table 10.1 are known to be engaged in activities which extend beyond food distribution, for

[^25]example, backwards integration into food manufacturing and processing, and the relevant data for food distribution subsidiaries could only be identified through the inspection of separate accounts. The companies that were scrutinised in this manner may be identified from the list in Table 10.1 where the word "Distribution" appears in parenthesis after the company name. In this way the values attached to the variables used reflectas reasonably as possible firms' food distribution activities.
10.6: The use of data from the Public Inspection Rooms does create one problem; namely, that of non-availability of data on certain variables. The reason for this is that the Companies Act does not require subsidiary companies to disclose full details, and as far as this study is concerned this affects in particular the data on employment and wages and salaries, and hence value added.

The Number of Firms in the Sample and Values of the Variables Used
10.7: Whilst 60 firms were considered at some stage during the study period, the sample size has varied year by year. Table 10.2 shows the sample size ( $N$ ) in each year between 1969 and 1974 together with the values of the nine variables upon which the quantitative measures of concentration are based. The number of firms to which the values relate is given in parenthesis against each variable, any difference between this figure and the overall sample size $(N)$ is accounted for by the non-availability of data.
10.8: The data set out in Table 10.2 shows that the value of turnover for the food distribution sample firms increased from $£ 2,095.4 \mathrm{~m}$. in 1969 to $£ 4,402.4 \mathrm{~m}$. in 1974 or by a factor of 2.1 times. Net profits and cash flow also slightly more than doubled over the period whilst the greatest increase is attributable to net assets which grew by almost two and a quarter times. Value added increased by a factor of 1.89 and the fall in total employment was enough to enable value added per person employed to slightly double over the six year period.

Change in Composition of the Sample
10.9: The number of firms forming the sample in each year and the reasons for change as between, on the one hand, new entrants (births) and on the other merger activity (deaths), are set out in Table 10.3. Merger and acquisition activity has been of both an internal and external nature. Internal take-overs, that is within the sample of food distribution companies, first occurred during 1971 when Cavenham Ltd. acquired both Moores Stores Ltd. and Wrights Biscuits Ltd. In recognition of this, Cavenham (Distribution)enters the sample as a new enterprise in that year. During 1972, Cavenham (Distribution) went on to acquire Allied Suppliers Ltd. No other mergers or acquisitions occurred within the sample until 1974 when,
(i) Wrensons Stores Ltd, were acquired by Fitch Lovell (Distribution).
(ii) Gardners (Bristol) Ltd. and Arthur Richardson and Sons Ltd. were acquired by Booker McConnell (Distribution)
and (iii) during the same year that Upward and Rich Ltd. were taken-over by Associated Food Holdings Ltd., the latter merged with Thomas Linnell and Sons Ltd. to form Linfood Holdings Ltd. Linfood Holdings Ltd. therefore constitute a new enterprise admitted to the sample.
10.10: External take-overs, that is sample firms acquired by firms not previously engaged in the food distribution industry were first recorded during 1972 when Cater Bros.
(Provisions) Ltd. were acquired by Debenhams Ltd. - a company whose primary activity is the operation of non-food retail department stores as well as footwear manufacture. Then, during 1973, International Stores Ltd. were acquired by The British American Tobacco Co. Ltd. and again during 1974, Baxters (Butchers) Ltd. were acquired by Brooke Bond Liebig Ltd., a food processor. Notwithstanding these external take-overs, these three acquired enterprises remain separately identifiable in terms of the required quantitative data and are therefore not deleted from the sample. Also during 1974, Morris and David Jones Ltd. and Oriel Foods Ltd. were acquired by R.C.A. Corporation of America and because of this R.C.A. Corporation (Distribution) are admitted as a new enterprise.
10.11: Other reasons for changes in the composition of sample enterprises are that Brierley's Supermarkets Ltd. and F.P.E. Group Ltd. both went into liquidation during 1974 and Makro Self-Service Ltd. entered the sample in 1971 as an entirely new enterprise in UK food distribution.

The Direction and Change in Concentration
10.12: The remaining paragraphs of this Chapter are concerned with determining the direction and extent of change (if any) in the level of concentration in the food distribution industry between 1969 and 1974 as measured by the traditional concentration ratio (CR) and in the degree of oligopolistic inequality revealed by the Linda $\operatorname{Index}(\mathrm{L})$. The measures of $C R$ and $L$ generated by the computer for each of the nine variables in each year of the study period may be found in Appendix 4 , Table 3, but for ease of reference the CR series for 1969 and 1974 are reproduced here in Table 10.4. Similarly the $L$ series for 1969 and 1974 are reproduced here at Table 10.5.
10.13: The directions of change in $C R$ and $L$ for the $n$ ine variables and across successively larger values of $N$ are summarised in parts one and two, respectively, of Table 10.6. Focussing attention, first of all, on the directions of change in concentration shown in Table 10.6 (i) reveals that at $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ and $\mathrm{CR}_{8}$ five out of the nine variables registered increases in concentration between 1969 and 1974. Concentration has tended to increase at the level of the tenth and twelfth firm where six out of nine variables showed increases. At $C R_{20}, C_{30}$ and $C R 40$, all variables for which the comparison can be made indicate that concentration clearly increased between 1969 and 1974.
10.14: $\quad \ln$ Table 10.6 (ii) at L4 eight out of nine variables indicate that the degree of oligopolistic inequality fell between 1969 and 1974. This tendency is maintained by the majority of variables at $\mathrm{L}_{8}$ but reversed at $\mathrm{L}_{10}, \mathrm{~L}_{12}$ and $\mathrm{L}_{20}$. At $\mathrm{L}_{30}$ the eight variables are equally divided between increase and decrease. At $L_{40}$, the five variables for which the comparison can be made clearly reveal an increase in the degree of inequality.
10.15: The pattern of directions of change for the concentration ratios is on the evidence of Table 10.6 different to the pattern of changes in direction for the Linda indices. It is interesting to note that the concentration ratio on turnover at $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ fell from 41.3 per cent. in 1969 to 39.1 per cent. in 1974 (see Table 10.4) whilst at the same time the value of $L_{4}$ on turnover increased from 0.311 in 1969 to 0.328 by 1974 (see Table 10.5). This shows that while the share of turnover attributable to the four largest firms fell between 1969 and 1974 the distribution of that share amongst the four firms became less equal; in other words, concentration decreased and oligopolistic inequality increased. However, data for the top-eight firms shows that concentration over the six year period increased from 58.2 per cent. to 59.3 per cent. accompanied by a fall in the Linda Index from 0.269 to 0.237 .
10.16: The inconsistencies in the directions of change both within and between concentration ratios and Linda indices does not enable us to state with any accuracy whether or not there has been any significant change in concentration and industry dominance between 1969 and 1974. In Part One of our previous report on the food processing industry ${ }^{+}$, (paragraphs 5.23 to 5.25 ) it was explained why it is necessary to use statistical tests to ensure that concentration really has increased. Briefly, although the measures of size are strictly accurate from an accounting point of view, they are nevertheless subject to sampling error. The precise definitions of size chosen, the precise accounting years, the precise treatment of some items in the accounts, can vary. Thus the particular set of figures reported in the accounts, and reported for taxation, may be regarded as a sample from a population of figures which could have been reported. For example, a particular company's accounting year might end on 4th April 1974 and its accounts might be quite different if its year ended 31st December 1973. Its chosen accounting year must be regarded as a sample from all legal alternative financial years. Since the same applies to all companies, the measures of concentration based on their accounts must be regarded as point estimates surrounded by a band of sampling error. It is therefore necessary to estimate these bands of error, or standard errors, before we can be confident that a particular concentration measure really has changed. We must be confident that the observed change cannot be explained by changes in accounting methods, or in any other method, which contribute to sampling errors. This also explains why it is important to use those measures of concentration which have standard errors.
10.17: It is possible to determine standard errors of the mean change in concentration of the nine variables used to measure firms' size between 1969 and 1974. Such data is presented in Table 10.7 for successively larger values of $C R_{N}$ and where the mean difference in concentration ratios across all nine variables is denoted by $\bar{D}_{C N}$. The mean differences, $\overline{\mathrm{D}}_{\mathrm{CN}}$, need to be qualified by their standard errors, which indicate that only at $\mathrm{CR}_{20}$ and $\mathrm{CR}_{30}$ are the mean changes in concentration between 1969 and 1974 of +1.909 per cent. and +2.478 per cent., respectively, significant from a statistical point of view.
10.18: The average value of the Linda index, $L_{s}$, is defined as the arithmetic mean of Linda indices in the interval between $n^{*}=2$ and $n^{*}{ }_{m}$, where $n^{*} m$ is the number of firms against which the minimum value of a series of Linda indices is recorded. Detailed results on Linda indices for each variable in each year for $n^{*}$ hypotheses are presented in Appendix 4, Table $3 b$, whilst the $L_{s}$ and $n^{*}{ }_{m}$ values are tablulated at Table 4 in the same Appendix. For convenience, Table 10.8 sets out the 1969 and 1974 values of $L_{s}$ and $n^{*}{ }_{m}$ for each variable and it can be seen that between the two dates six out of the nine values of $L_{s}$ declined. The interval between $n^{*}=2$ and $n^{*}{ }_{m}$ is termed the oligopolistic arena and falls in $L_{s}$ imply a lessening in size disparity amongst the member firms. Of equal importance are the changes in value of $n^{*} m$, especially the increases in $n^{*} m$ which indicate a reduction in dominance through an expansion of the number of firms located in the oligopolistic arena. The variables for which such a phenomenon is most noteworthy are net profit (04) and turnover (01): the former showing an increase in this number from 5 to 31 , and the latter from 4 to 18. Whether such a finding is consistent with comments in Chapter 9 that smaller firms have experienced faster growth rates (as measured by turnover) than larger firms remains to be tested.
10.19: It is not possible to use the $L_{s}$ values as a basis for testing such differential growth rates, and neither is it possible to test for the statistical significance of any difference between $\mathrm{L}_{s}$ (1969) and $\mathrm{L}_{s}$ (1974) because the distribution of $\mathrm{L}_{s}$ is not normal. However, it is possible to determine statistical significance by using the summary measure of the Linda indices,

[^26]denoted by $L_{s}^{*}$ and defined as the arithmetic mean of all the Linda indices up to $N^{*}=42$, except for 1974 when the upper limit is $N^{*}=33$. The sampling distribution of $L_{s}^{*}$ is normal because it is an average of $L^{*} N$ and the Central Limit Theorem implies that, under very general conditions, the distribution of $L_{s}^{*}$ would tend to normality as the size of sample increases. That is $\operatorname{Var}\left(\mathrm{L}_{s}^{*}\right)=$ $\operatorname{Var}\left(\mathrm{L}_{\mathrm{N}}\right) / \mathrm{N}$ gives the variance of the sampling distribution of $\mathrm{L}_{s}^{*}$, so its standard error can be calculated.
10.20: Means and standard errors for $L_{5}^{*}$ (1969-1974) are set out in Table 10.9 for all the variables except gross investments (06), which has been excluded for lack of data. In terms of their direction of change, four variables show increases in $L_{s}^{*}$ and the other four show decreases. It is worth comparing the directions of change in $\mathrm{L}_{5}^{*}$ with those for the $\mathrm{CR}_{4} / \mathrm{CR}_{8}$ and $\mathrm{L}_{4} / \mathrm{L}_{8}$ set out in Table 10.10, from which it is evident that the pattern for all variables at $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ is perfectly replicated by $L_{s}^{*}$. Furthermore, four variables exhibit a consistent pattern in their direction of change measured by $\mathrm{CR}_{4} / \mathrm{CR}_{8}, \mathrm{~L}_{4} / \mathrm{L}_{8}$ and $\mathrm{L}_{5}^{*}$; namely, an increase for wages and salaries (03), own means (07), and net assets (11), and a decrease for net profits (04). However, for turnover (01) and employment (02) the comparability between $L_{s}^{*}$ and the other measures is less marked. That the results for $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ are consistent with $L_{s}^{*}$ is interesting because $L_{s}^{*}$ is tased on 42 enterprises ( 33 in 1974) whereas $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ is based on the top four enterprises, which may differ from variable to variable. Thus, the Linda measure $L_{s}^{*}$ also reflects the degree of concentration in the upper tail of the size distribution of firms, in addition to measuring the degree of concentration in the distribution as a whole.
10.21: In statistical terms only two of the variables in Table 10.9 have values of $L_{s}^{*}$ that were significantly different in 1974 from what they were in 1969; namely, own capital (07) and net assets (11). However, the same test that was applied earlier to the concentration ratios may be used here to determine if there has been any significant change in the mean difference between $L_{s}^{*}$ in 1969 and 1974; that is, to work in terms of the differences between $L_{s}^{*}, i(1974)$ and $L_{s}^{*}$,i(1969) across all eight variables (i.e. excluding gross investments). The mean difference in $L_{s}^{*}$ between 1969 and 1974 can be stated as +0.01824 , but with a standard error of 0.0156 may be said not to be statistically significant. This enables us to conclude that overall and irrespective of magnitude and direction there has been no significant change in concentration between 1969 and 1974.
10.22: Estimates of the coefficient of variation (V), the Gini coefficient (G), the Hirschman-Herfindahl statistic (H), and the entropy index (E) are given in Table 2 of Appendix 4 . These are in different units, and have different sensitivities to changes in N , so comparisons between them are difficult. Our previous study of the food processing industry ${ }^{+}$ showed how it was possible to reduce all these measures to the standard deviation of the natural logarithms of firms' size, denoted by $\sigma$, on the assumption that the distribution of enterprises were lognormal. For some purposes this asssumption is not justified because we are measuring only the relatively few comparisons in the upper tail of the distribution. However, for the present purpose of measuring concentration, this assumption is justified, and in the following analysis using the entropy index ( E ) derivations of $\sigma$ from E are based upon the following relationship known to hold in a lognormal distribution:
\[

$$
\begin{aligned}
E & =-\sum_{i} y_{i} \log _{e} y_{i} \\
& =\log _{e} N-\frac{1}{2} \sigma^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$
\]

## (Equation 1)

(Equation 2)
where $y_{i}$ is the market share of the ith enterprise. The EEC definition used in Table 2 of Appendix 4 is - 1000 in $\log _{10}$

+ Development Analysts Ltd. (1975) op.cit. p. 117.
10.23: After converting the values of E given in Table 2 of Appendix 4 to logse they may be substituted in Equation 2 which can be rewritten in terms of $\sigma$ to give the estimates of $\sigma$ for each variable in 1969 and 1974. This data is presented in Table 10.11 from which it can be seen that for eight out of the nine variables, $\hat{\sigma}(E) 1969>\hat{\sigma}$ (E) 1974. Whether or not these changes are statistically significant can be determined through formal F-tests applied to each variable. The results of such tests enable us to state with confidence that there was no significant change in business concentration for this industry over the study period. Such a conclusion is consistent with the earlier finding regarding $L^{*}$ s but conflicts with the mean change in the concentration ratio at CR20 given in paragraph 10.16 and Table 10.7. The explanation is that changes in the concentration ratio measure the extreme growth of the very largest firms and is influenced by exceptional events such as large mergers (i.e. Cavenham), whereas changes in $\sigma(E)$ are governed by the average growth of all firms of different sizes.

The proportionate growth of large and small firms
10.24: Questions such as, "Did the largest firms in the size distribution of enterprises increase their share of the market?" may be answered by reference to the concentration ratio. Equally important from the point of view of competition policy is the question: "Did large firms on the average grow proportionately more quickly than small firms?" The conclusions contained in the previous paragraph are compatible with the hypothesis that on the average the proportionate growth of the smaller firms in food distribution was the same as that of the larger firms over the period 1969-74. It is possible to give further consideration to such an hypothesis but in relation to only one measure of firms' size namely, value added (12). Value added being the sum of gross profits and wages and salaries reflects the contribution of an enterprise to the gross national product and may be considered preferable to using, say, turnover which may vary between enterprises depending upon the degree of integration. Whilst it is true that with value added expressed in money terms it is therefore affected by changes in prices, the use of the standard deviation of the logarithms, $\sigma$, overcomes this difficulty because it is not affected by changes in the general level of prices.
10.25: The hypothesis concerning differential growth rates of large and small firms may be tested using the following relationship: $\sigma_{t} / \sigma_{t-1}=\beta / p$, where $\beta$ is the regression of the logarithm of size at time $t$ on the logarithm of size at time $t-1$, where $\rho$ is the associated correlation coefficient and where $\sigma$ is the standard deviation of the logarithms on value added at $t$ and $t-1$. As explained in Hart and Prais $(1956)^{+}, \beta$ measures the proportionate growth of larger enterprises relative to small enterprises and $\rho$ is a measure of size mobility. It would be possible to use a rank correlation coefficient to measure changes in rank order, but because some enterprises are very close together in size and a very small difference in their respective growths can change their order, it is better to use $\rho$, which gives small weight to such small variations in growth and large weight to large variations in growth.
10.26: To find estimates for $\beta$ and $\rho$ it is necessary to turn to the original data on value added as it is not possible to determine $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\rho}$ from the tables in Appendix 4. There are 27 enterprises for which data on value added is available in both 1969 and 1974 and logarithms of these values has been used to derive the dynamic concentration parameters set out in Table 10.12. With the point estimate of $\beta$ at 0.8769 it may be suggested that the proportionate growth of the larger enterprises in food distribution was below that of their smaller rivals. However, $\hat{\beta}$ is not significantly below unity so the conclusion may be given that small and large

[^27]enterprises had similar growth rates between 1969 and 1974. The value of $\hat{\rho}=0.9402$ is significant so that it would seem that there was some change in the rank order of enterprises over the period regardless of the growth rates of large and small firms being on a similar scale.
10.27: These conclusions are, nevertheless, dependent upon only 27 pairs of observations on value added so that more reliable conclusions could be reached if data on more enterprises was readily available, especially over a longer time period of say at least ten years. This shortage of data does not affect $\hat{\beta}$ too much but it does have important effects on $\hat{\rho}$, so we do not yet have a satisfactory estimate of the standard error of $\hat{\beta}$

Profitability and Size of Enterprise
10.28: A! the measures of concentration in Appendix 4 are derived from univariate distributions of firms. To measure the relationship between two variables, such as profitability and size, it is necessary to have measures derived from bivariate distributions. An example of the use of such bivariate distributions to measure the relationship between profitability and size of enterprise in the food processing industry was given in paragraphs 5.40 to 5.44 of our previous report. ${ }^{+}$
10.29: A possible alternative method is used in Table 5 in Appendix 4 which ranks enterprises by different measures of profitability and by different measures of size. To illustrate this method let us consider the rate of profit on turnover, variable 04 divided by variable 01 , and denoted by RI in Table 5 of the said Appendix. This is probably the best of the measures of profitability in food distribution which are published in Table 5. The rank of R1 could be correlated with the rank of variable 01 or the rank of variable 04 . If the rank correlations were negative, for example, we might conclude that increases in the size of enterprise were associated with decreases in profitability.
10.30: It is tempting to use Appendix 4 Table 5 to calculate such rank correlations, but the temptation must be resisted. There are two fundamental reasons for this. First the rank correlations are influenced by insignificant changes in size which have a significant effect on rank. To overcome this problem, the product-moment correlation coefficient should be used. It is true that variables such as turnover (01) and profit (04) have very large dispersions, but the problem of the excessive weight of a few large enterprises can be overcome by using logarithms.
10.31: The second problem is even more serious. The correlation between a ratio, such as R1, with its numerator (04) may be quite different from the correlation with its denominator (01). This well known problem has been called "the Steindl paradox" by Johnston $\varnothing$ (1954) who explained why the relationship between labour productivity and size of manufacturing plant in the USA depended on whether the numerator (output) or the denominator (employment) is used to measure size. Thus we must not correlate, or even compare, R1, R2, R3 or R4 in Appendix 4 Table 5 with the sizes or ranks of their numerators and denominators.
10.32: A bivariate distribution of enterprises by the logarithm of their profits and by the logarithm of their turnovers would avoid the pitfalls of the Steindl paradox. It might be inconvenient to publish bivariate frequency distributions, but it is still possible to publish

+ Development Analysts Ltd. (1975) op.cir. pp. 125-128.
$\varnothing$ J. Johnston (1954) 'Productivity and size of establishment'. Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics pp. 339-361.
information on the mean of the conditional distribution of the numerator (04) given the denominator (01). The simplest way to do this is to regress the logarithm of profit $\left(\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}\right)$ for the ith enterprise on the logarithm of its turnover $\left(T_{i}\right)$. To smooth out fluctuations it is advisable to take averages of $P_{i}$ and $T_{i}$ over time so that $P_{i}$ is the ith firms' average profit in 1969 and 1974. $T_{i}$ is similarly defined.
10.33: The results of this logarithmic regression are set out in Table 10.13 from which it can be noted that there is a significant positive relationship between the logarithms of profit and turnover for the 35 enterprises for which this data was available in both 1969 and 1974. Furthermore, with the value of the regression coefficient $\hat{\beta}=0.9396$, which is significantly less than unity, it can be stated that a one per cent. increase in turnover is associated with a less than one per cent. increase in profit. It would appear therefore that profitability is dependent on the size of turnover.

Conclusion
10.34: This Chapter has applied normal statistical tests to various measures of concentration, derived from data on a sample of companies engaged in the UK food distribution industry, to determine whether or not there has been any significant change in the level of industry concentration between 1969 and 1974. It has not proved possible to present a straightforward and unqualified answer to the problem posed. The tests on $L^{*}{ }_{s}$ and $\hat{\sigma}(E)$ indicate there to have been no significant change in the average level of industry concentration during the study period. In addition, the test on $\hat{\sigma}$ for value added, the preferred measure of firms' size, also reached that same finding by concluding that small and large firms had similar growth rates irrespective of some changes in rank order. However, the need for a better estimate of the standard error ( $s(B)$ ) in the logarithmic regression on value added leaves the issue of whether small firms grew at a faster rate than larger firms unclear.
10.35: Notwithstanding these findings, the test on profitability and size of enterprise as measured by turnover does in fact point towards smaller firms having faster growth rates. Indeed, this view may be reinforced as far as turnover and profit are concerned, by reference to the change in $\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{m}}^{*}$ between 1969 and 1974 for these variables. This shows that the number of firms located in the oligopolistic arena increased by 14 for turnover and by 26 for profits. Furthermore, it was shown to be the case that no statistical difference in the concentration ratio (CR) was found amongst the four, eight, ten and twelve largest enterprises between 1969 and 1974, but that such differences arose at the twentieth and thirtieth largest firm. For this to occur smaller firms must have increased their share at the the expense of the larger firms.

## U.K. Food Distribution Companies forming sample for Quantitative Analysis

Tesco Stores (Holdings) Ltd.
J. Sainsbury Ltd.

International Stores Ltd.
Fitch Lovell (Distribution)
Danish Bacon Co. Ltd.
Wheatsheaf Distribution \& Trading Ltd.
Geest Industries Ltd.
Moores Stores Ltd.
Associated Food Holdings Ltd.
Morris and David Jones Ltd.
Fyffes Group Ltd.
Deltec Foods Ltd.
Nurdin \& Peacock Ltd.
Kinloch (Provision Merchants) Ltd.
R.H. Thompson \& Co. Ltd.
A. J. Mills (Holdings) Ltd.

Bishops Stores Ltd.
Waitrose Ltd.
Safeway Food Stores Ltd.
Matthews Holdings Ltd.
Cater Bros. (Provisions) Ltd.
Baxters (Butchers) Ltd.
Spar Food Holdings Ltd.
F.J. Wallis Ltd.

Gateway Securities Ltd.
Arthur Richardson \& Son Ltd.
T.J. Poupart Ltd.

Lennons Group Ltd.
Towers \& Co. Ltd.
Amos Hinton \& Sons Ltd.
Wm. Morrison Supermarkets Ltd.
Upward \& Rich Ltd.
Gardners (Bristol) Ltd.
Kwik Save Discount Group Ltd.
Hillards Ltd.
Joseph Stocks and Sons (Holdings) Ltd.
Morgan Edwards Ltd.
F.P.E. Group Ltd.

Cullen's Stores Ltd.
Glass Glover \& Co. Ltd.
Thos. Linnell \& Sons Ltd.
Londis (Holdings) Ltd.
Brierley's Supermarkets Ltd.
Walter Duncan \& Goodricke Ltd.
Oriel Foods
Laws Stores Ltd.

Wrensons Stores Ltd.
Bejam Group Ltd. Makro (Self Service) Ltd. Linfood Holdings Ltd.
Allied Suppliers Ltd.
Wrights Biscuits Ltd.
A.B.F. (Distribution)

Union International (Distribution)
Booker McConnell (Distribution)
Cater Bros. (Provisions) Ltd.
International Stores Ltd.
Baxters (Butchers) Ltd.
R. C.A. Corporation (Distribution)

Cavenham (Distribution)
TABLE 10.2

| Financial Data for the U.K. Food Distribution Industry |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  | (£000s) |  |
| Year | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| Sample Size (N) | 53 | 53 | 53 | 52 | 52 | 44 |
| 01 Turnover | 2,095,398 (53) | 2,348,212 (53) | 2,650,124 (53) | 2,943,645 (52) | 3,545,107 (51) | 4,402,355 (41) |
| 02 Employment (No.) | 168,718 (43) | 172,529 (44) | 177,029 (46) | 180,253 (45) | 191,090 (45) | 159,240 (34) |
| 03 Wages \& Salaries | 122,127 (43) | 137,496 (44) | 159,431 (46) | 171,949 (45) | 208,475 (45) | 233,827 (34) |
| 04 Net Profits | 52,406 (49) | 56,681 (50) | 67,602 (50) | 88,827 (50) | 109,609 (48) | 107,787 (40) |
| 05 Cash Flow | 70,219 (52) | 77,898 (51) | 91,212 (51) | 114,089 (50) | 179,827 (49) | 144,484 (40) |
| 06 Gross Investments | 33,996 (28) | 36,788 (28) | 39,261 (27) | 48,252 (27) | 55,434 (25) | 64,909 (21) |
| 07 Own Means | 230,764 (53) | 250,130 (53) | 308,397 (52) | 391,309 (51) | 424,473 (51) | 459,765 (40) |
| 11 Net Assets | 296, 150 (53) | 316,225 (53) | 398,039 (53) | 505,447 (52) | 576,543 (51) | 662,288 (41) |
| 12 Value Added | 182,473 (43) | 204,597 (44) | 236,828 (45) | 270,783 (45) | 329,807 (45) | 345,589 (34) |

SOURCE: Appendix 4 , Table 1.

TABLE 10.3
Sample Composition and Reasons for Change, 1969-74

| Year | Sample <br> Size | Births <br> $(+)$ | Deaths <br> $(-)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1969 | 53 | - | - |
| 1970 | 53 | 2 | 2 |
| 1971 | 53 | - | 1 |
| 1972 | 52 | - | - |
| 1973 | 52 | 2 | $10^{*}$ |
| 1974 | 44 |  |  |

* includes 2 companies which went into liquidation.

TABLE 10.4
Selected Concentration Ratios $\left(\mathrm{CR}_{4} \ldots \mathrm{CR}_{40}\right) 1969$ and 1974

1969

|  | $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{10}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{12}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{20}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{30}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{40}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| (01) Turnover | 41.3 | 58.2 | 64.9 | 69.6 | 82.3 | 91.3 | 96.1 |
| (02) Employment | 60.6 | 76.2 | 79.8 | 83.2 | 92.4 | 97.4 | 99.7 |
| (03) Wages \& Salaries | 57.1 | 72.7 | 77.5 | 81.4 | 91.2 | 96.5 | 99.6 |
| (04) Net Profit | 55.7 | 70.9 | 75.0 | 78.3 | 88.2 | 95.7 | 99.1 |
| (05) Cash Flow | 55.5 | 70.7 | 74.5 | 77.7 | 87.4 | 95.2 | 98.8 |
| (06) Gross Investments | 64.1 | 79.8 | 84.4 | 88.2 | 97.1 | .8 | .9 |
| (07) Own Means | 52.2 | 67.0 | 72.0 | 76.1 | 87.0 | 94.6 | 98.2 |
| (11) Net Assets | 49.9 | 67.4 | 73.7 | 78.1 | 88.1 | 95.0 | 98.4 |
| (12) Value Added | 58.9 | 72.8 | 77.1 | 80.9 | 90.9 | 96.4 | 99.5 |

1974

|  | $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{10}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{12}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{20}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{30}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{40}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (01) Turnover | 39.1 | 59.3 | 65.9 | 71.9 | 85.6 | 95.0 | 99.8 |
| (02) Employment | 59.7 | 72.9 | 77.7 | 81.8 | 93.4 | 99.4 | . |
| (03) Wages \& Salaries | 59.3 | 72.8 | 78.1 | 82.7 | 93.6 | 99.1 | . |
| (04) Net Profit | 55.1 | 67.1 | 71.7 | 75.8 | 88.6 | 97.6 | 100.0 |
| (05) Cash Flow | 50.5 | 65.4 | 69.9 | 74.1 | 87.6 | 97.6 | 100.0 |
| (06) Gross Investments | 76.8 | 89.1 | 92.4 | 95.1 | 99.9 | .0 | . |
| (07) Own Means | 60.5 | 72.4 | 76.2 | 79.7 | 89.8 | 97.2 | 100.0 |
| (11) Net Assets | 54.6 | 72.9 | 77.1 | 80.5 | 90.0 | 97.1 | 99.9 |
| (12) Value Added | 59.2 | 72.2 | 77.4 | 81.8 | 93.2 | 98.9 | .. |

SOURCE: Appendix 4 , Table 3.

TABLE 10.5
Selected Linda Indices (L4 .... L40) 1969 and 1974

|  |  | 1969 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{L}_{4}$ | $L_{8}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{10}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{12}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{20}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{30}$ | $L_{40}$ |
| (01) | Turnover | .311 | . 269 | . 231 | . 219 | . 182 | . 160 | . 155 |
| (02) | Employment | . 421 | . 426 | . 443 | . 402 | . 314 | . 313 | . 335 |
| (03) | Wages \& Salaries | . 432 | . 414 | . 382 | . 349 | . 287 | . 279 | . 273 |
| (04) | Net Profit | . 579 | . 477 | . 441 | . 404 | . 289 | . 233 | . 241 |
| (05) | Cash Flow | . 499 | . 473 | . 447 | . 409 | . 287 | . 225 | . 228 |
| (06) | Gross Investments | . 674 | . 523 | . 467 | . 417 | . 365 | . | .. |
| (07) | Own Means | . 414 | . 381 | . 347 | . 313 | . 246 | . 208 | . 213 |
| (11) | Net Assets | . 418 | . 339 | . 292 | . 280 | . 256 | . 220 | . 221 |
| (12) | Value Added | . 416 | . 468 | . 423 | . 374 | . 289 | . 282 | . 266 |


|  |  | 1974 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{L}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{10}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{12}$ | $\mathrm{L}_{20}$ | $L_{30}$ | $L_{40}$ |
| (01) | Turnover | . 328 | . 237 | . 215 | . 192 | . 172 | . 149 | . 163 |
| (02) | Employment | . 542 | . 475 | . 416 | . 371 | . 264 | . 285 |  |
| (03) | Wages \& Salaries | . 557 | . 457 | . 389 | . 340 | . 271 | . 288 |  |
| (04) | Net Profit | . 545 | . 436 | . 389 | . 343 | . 226 | . 190 | 2.068 |
| (05) | Cash Flow | . 509 | . 431 | . 382 | . 327 | . 213 | . 178 | . 381 |
| (06) | Gross Investments | . 962 | . 790 | . 725 | . 651 | . 832 | . ${ }^{\text {c }}$ | . $\cdot$ |
| (07) | Own Means | . 495 | . 555 | . 498 | . 433 | . 305 | . 245 | . 551 |
| (11) | Net Assets | . 454 | . 366 | . 380 | . 361 | . 290 | . 240 | . 470 |
| (12) | Value Added | . 651 | . 489 | . 409 | . 359 | . 268 | . 284 |  |

SOURCE: Appendix 4 , Table 3.

TABLE 10.6
Part (i): Directions of Change in Concentration Ratios, 1969-74

| Variables <br> showing: | $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{10}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{12}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{20}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{30}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{40}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Increase | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 5 |
| Decrease | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 0 | $0^{*}$ | $0^{+}$ |

* for 1 variable $C R=100$ per cent. at $N=28$ in 1974.
+ for 1 variable $\mathrm{CR}=100$ per cent. at $\mathrm{N}=21$ in 1974.
for 3 variables $C R=100$ per cent. at $N=34$ in 1974.

Part (ii): Directions of Change in Linda Indices, 1969-74

| Variables <br> showing: | $\mathrm{L}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{10}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{12}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{20}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{30}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{40}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Increase | 8 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Decrease | 1 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 6 | $4 \varnothing$ | $0 \oplus$ |

$\varnothing$ for 1 variable $L_{N}=21$ in 1974.
$\oplus$ for 1 variable $L_{N}=21$ in 1974. for 3 variables $L_{N}=34$ in 1974 .

TABLE 10.7
Means and Standard Errors of $C R_{N, i}(1974)-C R_{N, i}(1969)$

| $\mathrm{CR}_{\mathrm{N}}$ | $\overline{\mathrm{D}}_{\mathrm{CN}}$ | Standard Error |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ | +2.382 | 1.397 |
| $\mathrm{CR}_{8}$ | +0.952 | 1.636 |
| $\mathrm{CR}_{10}$ | +0.850 | 1.318 |
| $\mathrm{CR}_{12}$ | +1.076 | 1.084 |
| $\mathrm{CR}_{20}$ | +1.909 | 0.655 |
| $\mathrm{CR}_{30}$ | +2.478 | 0.374 |

$\bar{D}_{C N}=C R_{N, i}(1974)-C R_{N, i}(1969)$.

TABLE 10.8
Comparison between $L_{s}(1969)$ and $L_{s}(1974)$

| VARIABLE |  | $L_{s}$ (1969) |  | $L_{\text {s (1974) }}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{m}}^{*}$ | Value | $\mathrm{n}_{\mathrm{m}}^{*}$ | Value |
| (01) | Turnover | 4 | 0.4165 | 18 | 0.2497 |
| (02) | Employment | 3 | 0.5398 | 3 | 0.5279 |
| (03) | Wages \& Salaries | 4 | 0.5125 | 3 | 0.4641 |
| (04) | Net Profit | 5 | 0.6285 | 31 | 0.3232 |
| (05) | Cash Flow | 5 | 0.5711 | 6 | 0.5565 |
| (06) | Gross Investments | 6 | 0.6128 | 7 | 0.8830 |
| (07) | Own Means | 4 | 0.4945 | 4 | 0.6366 |
| (11) | Net Assets | 5 | 0.5009 | 8 | 0.4850 |
| (12) | Value Added | 3 | 0.4448 | 3 | 0.5297 |

SOURCE: Appendix 4 , Table 4.

TABLE 10.9
Means and Standard Errors of Linda Indices, $L_{s}^{*}$ (1969-74)

| Variable No. | 1969 | 1970 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 | 1974 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 01 | $\begin{gathered} 0.20560 \\ (0.01197) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19953 \\ (0.01180) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.19830 \\ (0.01158) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20638 \\ (0.01629) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20060 \\ (0.01326) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.20552 \\ (0.02001) \end{gathered}$ |
| 02 | $\begin{gathered} 0.36180 \\ (0.01919) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34943 \\ (0.01168) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34096 \\ (0.01040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35405 \\ (0.01541) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31161 \\ (0.01329) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35681 \\ (0.01918) \end{gathered}$ |
| 03 | $\begin{gathered} 0.32514 \\ (0.01208) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31542 \\ (0.01281) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32235 \\ (0.01194) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31309 \\ (0.01421) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.47195 \\ (0.03093) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34729 \\ (0.01734) \end{gathered}$ |
| 04 | $\begin{gathered} 0.33333 \\ (0.02009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33059 \\ (0.02268) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35676 \\ (0.01975) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.36113 \\ (0.02189) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32312 \\ (0.02030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.30165 \\ (0.02530) \end{gathered}$ |
| 05 | $\begin{gathered} 0.32310 \\ (0.02526) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31551 \\ (0.02052) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34021 \\ (0.02225) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33980 \\ (0.02115) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34035 \\ (0.01637) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.29598 \\ (0.02475) \end{gathered}$ |
| 07 | $\begin{gathered} 0.27802 \\ (0.01416) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27556 \\ (0.01382) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34040 \\ (0.01915) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.40400 \\ (0.02764) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.36485 \\ (0.02502) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.37741 \\ (0.02495) \end{gathered}$ |
| 11 | $\begin{gathered} 0.27655 \\ (0.01436) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.27078 \\ (0.16129) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32216 \\ (0.01777) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.34803 \\ (0.01797) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32272 \\ (0.01863) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33133 \\ (0.01925) \end{gathered}$ |
| 12 | $\begin{gathered} 0.32635 \\ (0.01120) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.32064 \\ (0.01241) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33306 \\ (0.01520) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.33780 \\ (0.01837) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.31423 \\ (0.01789) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.35979 \\ (0.02175) \end{gathered}$ |

SOURCE: Derived from Appendix 4 , Table 3(b)

TABLE 10.10
$\underline{\text { Direction of Change in } \mathrm{L}_{5}^{*} \text { compared with } \mathrm{CR}_{4} / \mathrm{CR}_{8} \text { and } \mathrm{L}_{4} / \mathrm{L}_{8} \text {, 1969-74 }}$

| Variable | $\mathrm{CR}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{CR}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{4}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{8}$ | $\mathrm{~L}_{\mathrm{s}}^{*}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 01 | - | + | + | - | - |
| 02 | - | - | + | + | + |
| 03 | + | + | + | + | + |
| 04 | - | - | - | - | + |
| 05 | + | + | + | + | + |
| 06 | + | + | + | + | + |
| 07 | + | + | + | + | + |
| 11 | + | + | + | + |  |

TABLE 10.11
Derivations of $\hat{\sigma}$ from $E, 1969$ and 1974

|  |  | logs. $e_{\mathrm{e}}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Variable | $\hat{\sigma}(\mathrm{E}) 1969$ | $\hat{\sigma}(\mathrm{E}) 1974$ |
| 01 | 1.16 | 1.01 |
| 02 | 1.43 | 1.28 |
| 03 | 1.36 | 1.28 |
| 04 | 1.43 | 1.24 |
| 05 | 1.44 | 1.20 |
| 06 | 1.32 | 1.45 |
| 11 | 1.37 | 1.38 |
| 12 | 1.38 | 1.31 |

SOURCE: Derived from Appendix 4 , Table 2.

TABLE 10.12
Dynamic Concentration Parameters for Value Added (12), 1969-74

|  | logs $_{\text {io }}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $N$ | 27 |
| $\hat{\beta}$ | 0.8769 |
| $s(\hat{\beta})$ | 0.0678 |
| $\dagger$ | 12.9336 |
| $\hat{\rho}$ | 0.9402 |

TABLE 10.13
Logarithmic regression between $\mathrm{P}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (profit) and $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{i}}$ (turnover), 1969-74

|  | logs. $_{\text {i0 }}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $N$ | 35 |
| $\hat{\beta}$ | 0.9396 |
| $s(\hat{\beta})$ | 0.0933 |
| $\dagger$ | 10.0707 |
| $\hat{\rho}$ | 0.8443 |


| Food Processors | Food Retail/Wholesale Interests |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Associated British Foods | Fine Fare* (incl. Melias) <br> Allied Bakeries Group <br> Alliance Wholesale Grocers* | Grocers <br> Bakers <br> Wholesale grocers |
| Cavenham Group | Allied Suppliers* | Grocers |
| Union International | J.H. Dewhurst* <br> T.W. Downs British Beef* | Butchers <br> Food distributors Wholesale butchers |
| Brooke Bond, Liebig | Baxters (Butchers)* | Butchers |
| Fitch Lovell | Keymarkets* (incl. D. Grieg) <br> West Layton* <br> Lovell \& Christmas and others* | Grocers <br> Meat <br> Food wholesalers |
| Ranks Hovis McDougall | British Bakeries | Bakers |
| Spillers | Meade-Lonsdale Group | Meat wholesalers |
| Associated Dairies | Asda | Superstores |
| Unilever | Mac Fisheries | Fishmongers |
| Booker McConnell | Budgen* <br> Holland \& Barrett* <br> William Brothers* <br> Booker Belmont* <br> James Harper \& Son(Edinburgh)* | Grocers <br> Health food shops <br> Butchers <br> Food wholesaling |
| Barker \& Dobson | Oakeshotts* | Grocers |

* Included in Food Distributions analysis

CHAPTER 2.

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 6

Tables 2.1-2.2

Tables 2.3-2.8

Tables 2.9

Tables 2.10-2.11

Table 2.12

Tables 3.1, 3.4

Tables 3.2-3.3, Based on Census of Distribution. 3.5-3.6

Tables 3.7-3.9 Prices \& Incomes Board Report No. 165.
Tables 4.1-4.6 Based on Census of Distribution.
Tables 4.7-4.9 DA estimates based on Census of Distribution.

DA estimates.
Annual reports of Tesco Ltd., and J. Sainsbury \& Sons Ltd.

Tables 6.1-6.2, 6.4-6.5 Census of Distribution.
Table 6.3 DA estimates based on Census of Distribution and PIB data.

Table 6.6
Prices \& Incomes Board, Report No. 165.

Table 6.7 DA estimates.
Table 6.8
Based on data in the two reports on The Density of Cash \& Carry Wholesaling by Manchester Business School, RORU. (see footnote to para. 6.23)

Table 6.9
CHAPTER 7

CHAPTER 8

CHAPTER 9
Tables 9.1, 9.3

Tables 9.2, 9.4
Table 9.5
Table 9.6
Tables 9.7-9.12

Trade sources.
DA estimates based on Census of Distribution and Retail Prices Index.

Census of Distribution.

See text, para. 7.7 and 7.17.
DA estimates based on Census of Distribution.

Census of Distribution.
DA estimates based on Co-operative retail societies' accounts.

Co-operative Statistics
Based on Census of Distribution and Dept. of Industry monthly series.

Census of Distribution.
Nielsen Researcher.
Various
DA estimates.

- symbols and formulae


## FORMULAE

(1) The Linda Index (L), is the arithmetic mean of the ( $n *-1$ ) ratios of oligopolistic equilibrium ( E ), each being previously divided by $\mathrm{n}^{*}$. The upper and lower limits of $L$ are $\frac{1}{n^{*}}$ and $\infty$, respectively.

$$
L=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n^{*}-1} \frac{E 0_{i}}{n^{*}}}{n^{*}-1}
$$

$$
\text { where, } \begin{aligned}
E 0_{i}=\frac{\frac{A_{i}}{i}}{\frac{A_{n^{*}}-A_{i}}{n^{*}-i}} & =\frac{n^{*}-i}{i} \cdot \frac{A_{i}}{A_{n^{*}-A_{i}}} \\
& =\frac{n^{*}-i}{i} \cdot \frac{A_{i}}{1-A_{i}}
\end{aligned}
$$

(2) The Coefficient of Variation (V)


$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { lower limit }=0 \\
& \text { upper limit }=\sqrt{(n-1)}
\end{aligned}
$$

(3) The Bini Coefficient (G)
$G=\frac{1}{n \cdot x} \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left[(i-1) \cdot F x_{i}-i \cdot F x_{i}-1\right] \begin{aligned} & \text { lower limit }=0 \\ & \text { upper limit }=\frac{n-1}{n}\end{aligned}$
(4) Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (H)

(5) Entropy Index (E)
$E=100 \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{x_{i}}{x} \log \frac{x_{i}}{x} \quad \begin{aligned} & \text { lower limit }=100(-\log n) \\ & \text { upper limit }=0\end{aligned}$

## SYMBOLS

| $n$ | the total number of units (firms) comprising the industry |
| :---: | :---: |
| n* | number of units studied - <br> - both for each hypothesis $2,3,4,8,10,12,15,20$ etc. <br> - or constituting the sample analysed. |
| $\mathrm{A}_{\boldsymbol{i}}$ | $\qquad$ i firms. |
| $\mathrm{A}_{\mathrm{n}}$ * | $=100 \%=1$ |
| L | the Linda index corresponding to the $\mathrm{n}^{*}$ hypothesis. |
| $L_{n}{ }_{m}$ | $=\quad$ the minimum value of the Linda index. |
| $\mathrm{n}^{*} \mathrm{~m}$ | $=$ number of firms corresponding to the minimum value of the Linda index in the sample analysed. |
| $L_{n}{ }^{*} h<$ | $=\quad$ the maximum value of the Linda index. |
| n* $h<$ | $=$ the number of firms corresponding to the maximum value of the L index in the interval between $\mathrm{n}^{*}=2$ and $\mathrm{n}^{*} \mathrm{~m}$. |
| $\mathrm{L}_{5}$ | $\begin{aligned} & =\text { the arithmetic mean of the } L \text { index, from } L_{2} \text { up to and } \\ & \text { including } L_{n}{ }_{m}^{*} \end{aligned}$ |


| EO |  | each EO ratio is expressed by the average size of the first $i$ firms and those of the ( $n^{*}-i$ ) remaining firms where $i$ successively assumes values from 1 (which expresses the relationship between the size of the first firm and the average size of all other firms in the sample of the industry studied) up to $n^{*}-1$; for this reason the number of EO relationships in question is $n^{*}-1$. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $X=x$ | = | total value of the variable in an industry |
| i | = | firm i |
| ${ }^{\text {i }}$ | = | value of the variable for firm i |
| $\mathrm{Fx}_{i}$ |  | total value of the variable up to unit $i$. |


| 01 | Chiffre D'Affaires | - | Turnover |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 02 | Effectif | - | Employment |
| 03 | Masse Salariale | - | Wages \& Salaries |
| 04 | Benefice Net | - | Net Profit |
| 05 | Cash Flow | - | Cash Flow |
| 06 | Investis Bruts | - | Gross Investments |
| 07 | Capitaux Propres | - | Own Means |
| 11 | Net Assets | - | Net Assets |
| 12 | Value Added | - | Value Added |



|  |  |  |  |  | $10 \mathrm{~N}$ | INOUS龺末*** | TRIELLE |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EVCLUTICN | OES | DCNNEES | glceales | : | TOTAL | DU | SECTEUR | ET | ECHANTILLON |

4909vix 331149
: CNITEC KIAGOCN
: CEVELCFPET ANALYSTSILTOI-LONORES
: FCCO-OISTRIBUTION


* .* .^
PAYS
INSIITUT SEC EUR
: LAITEC RIAGUCA
: CEVELCFFEAT ANALYSTSILTOI-LONCRES
: FCCO-CISTRIBLTIGN



IV/A-3

PAYS
INSIITUT
SECTEUR
U.A.E.
$* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *$
$*$ TABLEAU NC
$* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *$
EVCLUTION DE LA CONCENTRATION

## LAITED KINGOCN CEVELCPMEAT ANALYSTSITTOI-LONORES FCCOODISTRIBUTION <br> 


IV/A-3

CEVELCPFEAT ANALYSTSILTOI-LONDRES
FCCE-CISIRIEUYICN




UNITEC KINGOOM
CEVELCFPEAT AN
CEVELCFPERT ANALYSISILTCI-LUNORES
fCCD-Cistribution
 PAYS
INSTITUT
SECTEUK
U.A.E.


INDICES LINDA IL）ET RATIOS DE CONCENTRATION（CR） INDICES LINDA IL E
UAITEC KINGDGM
UNITEC RIRGOGM
：CEVELFPEPT ANALYSTSILTITI－LONDRES
FCCD－DISTRIBUTION
variabie：．．．．．．Effectif

 IECHANTILLON⿻三人日 IER MAXIMUM ：2EM MAXIMUM：MINIMUM



 7146 ： 0.33847 ： 2 ： 0.51471 ： $2: 0.51471: 3$ ： 0.39792
 $6145: 0.31698 * 2: 0.55238: 7: 0.55787: 3: 0.45848$
 $4145: 0.29872 * 2: 0.50800: 2: 0.50800: 4: 0.42134$


variable: 03 nasse smariale


INDICES LINCA ILI ET RATIOS DE COACENTRATION (CR)

UnITEC KIAGOOM
CEVELCFFEAT ANALYSTSILTOI-LONORES
FCCO-DISTRIBUTION
CEVELCFFEMT ANALYSTSILTOI-LONDRES
FCCO-DISTRIBUTION
**

IV/A-3


IV/A-3

## INDICES LINDA (L) ET RATIOS DE CONCENTRATION (CRI


feco-distaibution





1v/A-3
UHIIEC XINGOOM
OEVELCFFEAT AMALYSISILTOI-LONDRES
FCCD-DISIRIBUTION

##  <br> 

PAYS
INSIITUT
SECTEUR
UOAOE.


IV/A-3

$\begin{array}{ll}\text { PAYS } & \text { UNITEO KINGDOM } \\ \text { INSTITUT } & \text { : CEVELCFFENT ANA }\end{array}$
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IV/A-3

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10




Introduction

The two sets of tables which are the prime concern of this Appendix represent an extension of the analysis undertaken in Chapter 10 in that they are derived from the same quantitative data and refer to the same sample of firms. Thus, Appendix 5 Tables 1 and 2 present for 1969 and 1974, respectively, the sample firms in each of those years ranked according to their measures of comparative performance. The measure of performance computed for each firm conforms to that discussed at paragraphs 297 and 298 in the EEC's "Sixth Report on Competition Policy"*, and furthermore the format of the tables in this Appendix replicatesTable 10 on pages 166 to 167 of the Sixth Report.

## The Measures of Performance

Using the values of four variables, four ratios are required to be determined for each sample firm and expressed as a percentage, that is,

| Ratio R1 | $=\frac{\text { net profit }}{\text { sales }}$ | $\frac{(04)}{(01)}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Ratio R2 | $=$ | $\frac{\text { net profit }}{\text { own capital }}$ |
| Ratio R3 | $=$ | $\frac{(04)}{(07)}$ |
| Ratio R4 sales | $=$ | $\frac{(05)}{(01)}$ |
| $\frac{\text { cash flow }}{\text { own capital }}$ | $\frac{(05)}{(07)}$ |  |

The resultant percentages are ranked in descending order of size for each ratio and by adding the ranking for each firm on each ratio the ith firms performance score can be obtained. In turn, the performance scores are ranked enabling performance amongst the sample of firms comprising the UK food distribution industry to be compared. As well as showing the ranking and rates achieved by each firm on each ratio, Appendix 5, Tables 1 and 2 also indicate the absolute values and ranking for each firm on turnover, net profit, cash flow and own means.

[^33]APPENDIX 5, TABLE 1

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline \[
\begin{array}{|l}
\hline \text { Rank } \\
\text { in }
\end{array}
\] \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Score} \& Ratio \(\frac{04}{01}\) \& Ratio \(\frac{04}{07}\) \& \[
\begin{array}{|l|}
\hline \text { Ratio } \frac{05}{07} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\] \& Ratio \(\frac{05}{07}\) \& Turnover (01) \& \[
\begin{gathered}
\text { Net Profit } \\
(04)
\end{gathered}
\] \& Cash Flow (05) \& Own Capital (07) \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Name of Firm} \\
\hline Score \& \& Rank Rate \& Rank Rate \& Rank Rate \& Rank Rate \& Rank Value \& Rank Value \& Rank Value \& Rank Value \& \\
\hline 1 \& 14 \& 2 \& 4 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{46.54} \& 4 \& 29 \& 13 \& 14 \& 30 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{F.J. Wallis} \\
\hline \& \& 5.81 \& 69.04 \& \& 77.68 \& 14.16 \& 0.82 \& 0.93 \& 1.19 \& \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{2} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{17} \& 7 \& 1 \& 8 \& 1 \& 22 \& 10 \& 10 \& 43 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Booker McConnell (Distribution)} \\
\hline \& \& 4.21 \& 203.73 \& 5.10 \& 246.58 \& 23.36 \& 0.98 \& 1.19 \& 0.48 \& \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{3} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{24} \& 6 \& 5 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{5.11} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{6} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(36 \begin{array}{rr} \\ \& \\ \& 10.22\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\begin{tabular}{|ll}
22 \& \\
\& 0.45
\end{tabular}} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(24 \quad 0.52\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{36} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Wm. Morrison Supermarkets} \\
\hline \& \& 4.42 \& 54.72 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline 4 \& 27 \& 3 \& 10 \& 3 \& 11 \& 2 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(1 \begin{array}{ll}1 \& \\ \& 12.55\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{15.63} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{33.67} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Tesco Stores (Holdings)} \\
\hline \& \& 5.26 \& 37.28 \& 6.55 \& 46.42 \& 238.43 \& \& \& \& \\
\hline 5 \& 28 \& 5 \& 7 \& 6 \& 10 \& 48 \& 27 \& 32 \& 37 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Brierley's Supermarkets} \\
\hline \& \& 4.90 \& 44.43 \& 5.20 \& 47.22 \& 6.84 \& 0.34 \& 0.36 \& 0.75 \& \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{6} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{38} \& 10 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{ll}3 \& \\ \& 72.65\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{20} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{75.87} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{398} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{ll}31 \& \\ \& 0.27\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(33 \quad \begin{array}{rr} \\ \& 0.28\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{45} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Kwik Save Discount Group} \\
\hline \& \& 3.18 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{6} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{38} \& 29 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{lr}2 \& \\ \\ \& 138.39\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{56} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{218.48} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{3
187.96} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{28 3.56} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\begin{tabular}{ll}
4 \& \\
\& 5.62 \\
\hline 30
\end{tabular}} \& \multirow[t]{3}{*}{\begin{tabular}{ll}
18 \& \\
\& 2.58 \\
\hline 38
\end{tabular}} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Associated British Foods (Distribution)} \\
\hline \& \& 1.89 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \\
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{8} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{48} \& 15 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{\(\begin{array}{|rr|}8 \& \\ \& 43.54\end{array}\)} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{18} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{7

56.88} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$33 \quad 10.84$} \& \& \& \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Lennons Group} <br>
\hline \& \& 2.86 \& \& \& \& \& $\begin{array}{ll}28 & \\ & 0.31\end{array}$ \& $30 \quad 0.41$ \& 0.71 \& <br>
\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{59} \& 27 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{lr}6 & \\ & 53.37\end{array}$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$23 \quad 2$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{lr}3 & \\ \\ 81.45\end{array}$} \& 23 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{23} \& 22 \& 35 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Waitrose} <br>
\hline \& \& 1.95 \& \& \& \& 22.71 \& \& 0.68 \& 0.83 \& <br>

\hline \multirow[t]{2}{*}{10} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{62} \& 17 \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{|ll|}14 & \\ & 33.41\end{array}$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{193.57} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{12} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{| 34 |  |
| ---: | ---: |
|  | 10.66 |} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$30 \quad 0.30$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$31 \quad 0.38$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{$\begin{array}{ll}34 & \\ & 0.89\end{array}$} \& \multirow[t]{2}{*}{Towers \& Co.} <br>

\hline \& \& 2.81 \& \& \& \& \& \& \& \& <br>
\hline
\end{tabular}

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
APPENDIX 5, TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
Number of firms in Sample $=53$

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Rank } \\ & \text { in } \end{aligned}$ | Score | Ratio $\frac{04}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{04}{07}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{07}$ | Turnover (01) | Net Profit <br> (04) | Cash Flow (05) | Own Capital (C7) | Name of Firm |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value |  |
| 21 | 86 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 25 | 50 | 37 | 39 | 39 |  |
|  |  | 2.58 | 25.46 | 3.10 | 30.52 | 6.42 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.65 | Oriel Foods |
| 22 | 88 | 16 | 28 | 15 | 29 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 |  |
|  |  | 2.84 | 19.88 | 3.93 | 27.51 | 187.48 | 5.33 | 7.37 | 26.81 | Sainsbur |
| 22 | 88 | 21 | 23 | 23 | 21 | 53 | 48 | 52 | 53 |  |
|  |  | 2.24 | 24.00 | 2.98 | 32.00 | 0.27 | . 006 | 0.008 | 0.025 | Bejam Group |
| 22 | 88 | 24 | 15 | 31 | 18 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 10 | Union |
|  |  | 2.09 | 30.46 | 2.36 | 34.46 | 76.54 | 1.60 | 1.81 | 5.25 | (Distribution) |
| 25 | 92 | 12 | 35 | 11 | 34 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | International |
|  |  | 3.05 | 17.14 | 4.15 | 23.31 | 106.81 | 3.26 | 4.43 | 19.00 | Stores |
| 26 | 93 | 22 | 25 | 22 | 24 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 19 | Bishops |
|  |  | 2.21 | 22.06 | 3.08 | 30.77 | 25.22 | 0.56 | 0.78 | 2.52 | Stores |
| 27 | 98 | 25 | 21 | 29 | 23 | 13 | 11 | 12 | 15 | Morris and |
|  |  | 2.03 | 24.97 | 2.52 | 31.02 | 43.20 | 0.88 | 1.09 | 3.51 | David Jones |
| 28 | 100 | 33 | 16 | 34 | 17 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 14 | Whearsheaf |
|  |  | 1.52 | 29.59 | 1.99 | 38.84 | 76.03 | 1.16 | 1.52 | 3.90 | and Trading |
| 29 | 102 | 13 | 37 | 13 | 39 | 52 | 38 | 38 | 32 | Wrensons |
|  |  | 2.93 | 15.04 | 4.12 | 21.17 | 5.19 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 1.01 | Stores |
| 30 | 113 | 41 | 18 | 40 | 14 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 50 |  |
|  |  | 1.06 | 27.95 | 1.60 | 42.09 | 7.83 | 0.083 | 0.12 | 0.30 | Hillards |

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

| (All Values are in £m., and rates are per.cent.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Number of firms in Sample $=53$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| RankinScore | Score | $\text { Ratio } \frac{04}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{04}{07}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{07}$ | Turnover (01) | Net Profit (04) | Cash Flow (05) | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Own Capital } \\ (07) \end{array}$ | Name of Firm |
|  |  | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | , |
| 30 | 113 | 46  <br>  0.65 | 11  <br>  36.58 | 47  <br>   <br> 0.88  | 9 49.59 | 47  <br>  6.92 | 46  <br>  0.045 | 48  <br>  0.061 | 51  <br>  0.12 | Londis (Holdings) |
| 32 | 115 | 28  <br>  1.94 | 27  <br>  20.59 | 30 <br>  <br>  <br> 2.51 | 30 26.64 | 37  <br>  10.00 | 34  <br>  0.19 | 35  <br>  0.25 | 33  <br>  0.24 | Upward and Rich |
| 32 | 115 | 37  <br>  1.31 | 17  <br>  28.81 | $\begin{array}{r}41 \\ 1.50 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}20 \\ 33.05 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 41  <br>  7.80 | $\begin{array}{r}40 \\ 0.10 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 43  <br>  0.12 | $\begin{array}{r}46 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Joseph Stocks and Sons (Holdings) |
| 34 | 118 | 18  <br>  2.69 | 41  <br>  13.38 | $\begin{array}{r}17 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}42 \\ 18.89 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 24  <br>  20.30 | 21  <br>  0.55 | $\begin{array}{r}20 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}13 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Safeway Food Stores |
| 35 | 135 | 39 1.18 | 29  <br>  19.74 | 39 <br>  | 28 <br> 28.20 | 12  <br>  47.75 | $19 \quad \begin{array}{r}19 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $17 \quad \begin{array}{r}17 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 17 <br>  | Associated Food Holdings |
| 36 | 140 | 34  <br>  1.44 | 44  <br>  11.58 | $\begin{array}{r}26 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}36 \\ 21.93 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 26  <br>  17.58 | 32  <br>  0.25 | 29 0.48 | $\begin{array}{r}21 \\ \hline 2.19 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Cater Bros. (Provisions) |
| 37 | 142 | 32  <br>  1.63 | 43  <br>  12.30 | $\begin{array}{r}27 \\ \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 40 20.32 | 25  <br>  18.68 | $\begin{array}{r}29 \\ 0.30 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}26 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 20  <br>  2.47 | Matthews Holdings |
| 38 | 143 | 36 | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|}34 & \\ & 17.57\end{array}$ | 38  <br>  1.81 <br>   | 35 22.63 | $6 \quad 90.04$ | $\begin{array}{rr}8 & \\ \\ & 1.27\end{array}$ | $8 \quad 1.63$ | 87 | Fitch Lovell (Distribution) |
| 39 | 145 | $\begin{array}{ll}35 & \\ & 1.43\end{array}$ | 36  <br>  16.25 | 36  <br>   <br>  1.88 | 38 21.32 | 31  <br>  11.87 | 35  <br>  0.17 | $36 \quad 0.22$ | $31 \quad 1.05$ | Arthur Richardson \& Son |
| 40 | 151 | $31 \quad 1.68$ | 47  <br>  6.76 | $25 \quad 2.80$ | 4811.29 | 21  <br>  25.12 | 24  <br>  0.42 | $21 \quad \begin{array}{ll} & \\ & 0.70\end{array}$ | $9 \quad 6.23$ | Wrights Biscuits |

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 1 (Cont'd)
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| (All Values are in £m., and rates are per.cent.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Number of firms in Sample $=53$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank <br> in <br> Score |  | Ratio $\frac{04}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{04}{07}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{07}$ | Turnover (01) | Net Profit (04) | Cash Flow (05) | Own Capital (07) | Name of Firm |
|  |  | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value |  |
| 41 | 153 | 44  <br>  0.79 | 32  <br>  18.36 | 46 <br>  | $\begin{array}{r}31 \\ 25.57 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 45  <br>  7.09 | 45  <br>  0.056 | 46  <br>  0.078 <br> 44  | 49  <br>  0.30 | Glass Glover \& Co. |
| 42 | 164 | 40  <br>  1.08 | 38  <br>  13.64 | 42 <br>  | $\begin{aligned} & 44 \\ & 18.00 \end{aligned}$ | 46  <br>  6.92 | 43  | 44  <br>  0.099 | $42 \quad 0.55$ | Thos. Linnell and Sons |
| 43 | 165 | 38  <br>  1.19 | 46  <br>  7.59 | 35  <br>  1.97 | $46$ $12.51$ | 1111  <br>  51.32 | 17  <br>  0.61 | 13  <br>  1.01 | $\begin{array}{r}7 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Moores Stores |
| 44 | 169 | 49  <br>  0.01 | 49  <br>  3.05 | 52  <br>  0.07 | $19$ $33.33$ | 28  <br>  16.75 | 49  <br>  0.001 | 51  <br>  0.017 | 52 0.033 | Spar Food Holdings |
| 45 | 170 | 43  <br>  0.80 | 39  <br>  13.56 | $\begin{array}{ll} 45 & \\ & 1.11 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 43 \\ & \quad 18.82 \end{aligned}$ | 7  <br>  81.78 | 16  <br>  0.66 | 15  <br>  0.91 | 11 <br>  | Danish Bacon Co. |
| 46 | 173 | 47  <br>  0.49 | $\|$40  <br>  13.50 | $\begin{array}{ll}49 & \\ & 0.79\end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 37 \\ & 21.86 \end{aligned}$ | 38  <br>  8.61 | 47  <br>  0.042 | 47 | $\begin{array}{ll}48 & \\ & 0.31\end{array}$ | Gardners <br> (Bristol) |
| 46 | 173 | 42  <br>  0.96 | 42  <br>  12.46 | 44  <br>  1.19 | $\begin{array}{r}45 \\ 15.48 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 43  <br>  7.30 | 44  <br>  0.070 | 45  <br>  0.087 | 41  <br>  0.56 | F.P.E. Group |
| 48 | 185 | 45  <br>  0.73 | 45  <br>  11.31 | 48  <br>  0.80 | 47 12.34 | 19  <br>  26.83 | 33  <br>  0.20 | $\begin{array}{rr}37 & \\ & 0.21\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{rr}25 & \\ & 1.74\end{array}$ | A.J. Mills (Holdings) |
| 49 | 190 | 51 $\begin{array}{ll}51 & \\ & -0.16\end{array}$ | $\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ll}51 & \\ & -4.13\end{array}\right.$ | 37  <br>  1.82 | $\begin{array}{ll}51 & \\ & 4.59\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}32 & \\ & 10.97\end{array}$ | $\left\lvert\, \begin{array}{ll}52 & \\ & -0.018\end{array}\right.$ | $\begin{array}{ll}50 & \\ & 0.020\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}44 & \\ & 0.44 \\ \end{array}$ | T.J. Poupart |
| 50 | 195 | 48  <br>  0.27 | 48  <br>  5.52 | $\begin{array}{\|ll\|}50 & \\ & 0.45\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{cc} 49 \\ & 9.29 \end{array}$ | 18  <br>  30.83 | 42  <br>  0.082 | $41 \quad 0.14$ | 29  <br>   | R.H. Thompson \& Co. |

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 2

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 2 (cont'd)

|  | Score | $\text { Ratio } \frac{04}{01}$ | $\text { Ratio } \frac{04}{07}$ | $\text { Ratio } \frac{\square 5}{01}$ | $\text { Ratio } \frac{05}{77}$ | Turnover (01) | $\begin{gathered} \text { Net Profit } \\ (04) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Cash Flow } \\ (05) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Own Capital (07) | me of Firm |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Score |  | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Name of Firm |
| 11 | 61 | $\begin{array}{rrr}20 & \\ & 2.02 \\ & \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7 \\ & 47.10 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 25 \\ 2.34 \end{array}$ | 9 <br> 54.72 | 13 <br> 102.95 <br> 16 | 12  <br>  2.08 | 16 $2.41$ | 20 <br>  | Nurdin and Peacock |
| 11 | 61 | $\begin{array}{ll}12 & \\ & 2.75\end{array}$ | 16 $29.47$ | 14 <br> 3.62 | 19 $38.81$ | 16  <br>  83.22 | 10  <br>  2.28 <br>   | 13  <br>  3.01 | $13 \quad$13 <br>  | Matthews Holdings |
| 11 | 61 | $1 \begin{array}{ll}1 \\ & \\ & 9.05\end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 26 \\ & 20.41 \end{aligned}$ | $10.92$ | $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 24.63 \end{array}$ | 40 <br>  | $\begin{array}{lr}27 & \\ & 0.87\end{array}$ | 28 1.05 | 22  <br>   <br>  4.27 | Walter Duncan and Goodricke |
| 14 | 64 | $\begin{array}{rr}24 & \\ \\ 1.80\end{array}$ | 6 <br> 49.50 | $\begin{array}{rr} 27 \\ 2.22 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 7 \\ & 61.00 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 29 \\ 35.56 \end{array}$ | $31 \quad 0.64$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 30 & \\ & 0.79 \end{array}$ | $36 \quad 1.30$ | Hillards |
| 15 | 68 | 10  <br>  3.30 | 22 25.87 | 12 4.21 | $\begin{array}{r}24 \\ 32.97 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 28  <br>  36.95 | 21  <br>  1.22 | 24 <br>  | $\begin{array}{r}19 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Gateway Securities |
| 16 | 69 | $\begin{array}{ll}14 & \\ & 2.61 \\ & \\ 18 & \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 20 \\ & 27.24 \end{aligned}$ | 14 <br> 3.62 | $\begin{array}{\|r\|} \hline 21 \\ 37.02 \end{array}$ | 32  <br>  28.71 <br> 14  | 29  <br>  0.75 | $\begin{array}{rr} \hline 29 \quad 1.04 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{rr} \hline 28 & \\ & 2.75 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Amos Hinton and Sons |
| 17 | 77 | 18  <br>  2.22 | 23 24.83 | $\begin{array}{r}16 \\ 3.40 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}20 \\ 38.03 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 14  <br>   <br>  90.87 | 13  <br>   | 11. | 11 <br>  | Safeway Food Stores |
| 18 | 79 | 28  <br>  1.39 <br>   | $\begin{array}{r} 13 \\ 38.38 \end{array}$ | 35 <br> 1.99 | 54.73 | $\begin{aligned} & 8 \\ & 163.11 \end{aligned}$ | 11  <br>  2.27 | 9 <br>  <br>  | $15 \quad 5.92$ | Linfood Holdings |
| 19 | 81 | $\begin{array}{lr}8 & \\ \\ & 3.81\end{array}$ | $31$ $14.23$ | $4.81$ | $\begin{array}{\|ll} 34 & \\ 18.20 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 23  <br>   <br> 45.35  | $\begin{array}{ll}18 & \\ & 1.73\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{rr} 18 \\ & 2.18 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 7 <br>  <br> 12.13 | Baxters (Butchers) |
| 20 | 83 | $25 \begin{array}{ll} \\ & 1.71\end{array}$ | $10$ $41.87$ | 32 1.96 | 16 $47.81$ | 34 <br>  <br> 25.10 | 32  <br>  0.43 | $\begin{array}{ll} 32 & \\ & 0.49 \end{array}$ | $37 \quad$ <br>  <br>  | Joseph Stocks and Sons (Holdings) |

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

| (All Values are in £m., and rates are per.cent.) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Number of firms in Sample $=40$ |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rank <br> in <br> Score |  | Ratio $\frac{04}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{04}{7}$ |  <br> Ratio 05 <br> 1 | 05 <br> Ratio 07 | Turnover (01) | Net Profit (04) | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Cash Flow } \\ & (05) \end{aligned}$ | Own Capital (07) | Name of Firm |
|  |  | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value |  |
| 21 | 85 | $\begin{array}{rr}22 & \\ & 1.97\end{array}$ | 19 27.88 | $\begin{array}{r} 22 \\ 2.63 \end{array}$ | 22 37.31 | 5 <br> 277.60 | 5  <br>   <br>   | 5  <br>  7.31 | $\begin{array}{ll}5 & \\ & 19.59\end{array}$ | Fitch Lovell (Distribution) |
| 22 | 87 | $\begin{array}{r}9 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 32 \\ \quad 13.04 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $11$ <br> 4.34 | 35 16.93 | 2 <br> 445.30 | 2  <br>  14.87 | $\begin{array}{lr}2 & \\ & 19.31\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{lr} \hline 1 & \\ & 114.04 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | J. Sainsbury |
| 23 | 89 | 32  <br>   | 21 $26.32$ | $\begin{array}{r} 24 \\ 2.42 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 12 \\ 52.22 \end{array}$ | 12 <br> 126.63 | $\begin{array}{r}19 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 12 3.06 <br>   | 16  <br>   | Booker McConnell (Distribution) |
| 23 | 89 | 7  <br>   <br>  3.88 | $\begin{array}{r}  \\ \hline 9.73 \end{array}$ | $9$ <br> 4.51 | 38 <br> 11.31 | 41  <br>  9.50 | 33  <br>  0.37 | 34  <br>  0.43 | 24 <br>  <br> 10.78 | Cullen's <br> Stores |
| 25 | 91 | 17  <br>   <br>   | $\begin{array}{rr} \hline 33 \\ \quad 12.23 \end{array}$ | 10 <br> 4.47 | $31$ $26.26$ | 21  <br>  49.32 | 23 <br>  | 17  <br>  2.20 | $\begin{array}{r}10 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | Geest Industries |
| 26 | 92 | 15 <br>  <br>  | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 28 \\ \quad 19.20 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $17$ $3.16$ | 32 24.68 | $\begin{aligned} & 3 \\ & \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{lr}3 & \\ \\ & 10.52 \\ \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}3 & \\ & 13.53\end{array}$ | 3  <br>   <br>   <br>   | Cavenham (Distribution) |
| 27 | 93 | $\begin{array}{r}31 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $14$ $37.00$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 35 \\ \quad 1.73 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $13$ $50.35$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 6 \\ & 227.26 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r}8 \\ \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 7  <br>   <br>  3.93 | 12 <br>  | Whearsheaf Distribution and Trading |
| 27 | 93 | $\begin{array}{rr} \hline 21 & \\ & 2.00 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 25 \\ 21.62 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 21 \\ 2.92 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} \hline 26 \\ 31.57 \end{array}$ | 20 <br>  <br>  <br> 51.64 | $\begin{array}{rr}24 & \\ & 1.03\end{array}$ | 25  <br>  1.51 | 18  <br>   <br>  4.78 | Bishops Stores |
| 29 | 100 | 32  <br>   | $\begin{array}{r}38 \\ 8.11 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}5 \\ 4.90 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}25 \\ 32.67 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 18  <br>  64.89 | 28  <br>  0.79 | 10 3.18 | 8 | Fyffes Group |
| 29 | 100 | 30  <br>  1.29 | $18$ $27.97$ | $\begin{array}{r}34 \\ 1.86 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}18 \\ 40.38 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll}39 & \\ & 12.41\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}37 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | 38  <br>  0.23 | 38  <br>  0.57 | Glass Glover and Co. |

APPENDIX 5, TABLE 2 (Cont'd)
Number of firms in Sample $=40$

| Rank <br> in <br> Score | Score | Ratio $\frac{04}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{04}{07}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{01}$ | Ratio $\frac{05}{07}$ | Turnover (01) | $\begin{array}{\|c\|} \hline \text { Net Profit } \\ (04) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{\|c} \hline \text { Cash Flow } \\ (05) \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Own Capital | Name of Firm |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Rate | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value | Rank Value |  |
| 31 | 103 | 22  <br>  1.97 | $34$ $10.82$ | $\begin{array}{r}20 \\ 3.07 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r}37 \\ 16.82 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 7 \\ & \quad 223.31 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 6 <br>  | 6 <br>  | 4 <br> -40.70 | International Stores |
| 32 | 107 | 26  <br>  1.62 | $17$ <br> 28.90 | $36$ <br> 1.70 | $28$ $30.28$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 26 \\ & \quad 41.30 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 30  <br>  0.67 | $31$ $0.70$ | $\begin{array}{r}29 \\ \\ \hline\end{array}$ | A.J. Mills (Holdings) |
| 33 | 113 | $\begin{array}{ll}35 & \\ & 1.15\end{array}$ | $29 \begin{aligned} & 16.67 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 26 \\ 2.33 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 23 \\ 33.94 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 15 \\ & 85.24 \end{aligned}$ | 25  <br>  0.98 | $\begin{array}{rr} \hline 22 \quad \\ & 1.99 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 17 \\ & \hline 5.86 \end{aligned}$ | Waitrose |
| 34 | 119 | 29 <br>  | $\begin{aligned} & 27 \\ & \quad 20.32 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $33$ <br> 1.87 | $\begin{array}{r}30 \\ 27.93 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | $1$ $133.64$ | 14  <br>  1.82 | 15  <br>  2.51 | $\begin{array}{r}9 \\ \hline 8.97 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | R.C.A. Corporation (Distribution) |
| 35 | 122 | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 34 & \\ & 1.16 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 30 & \\ & 16.59 \end{array}$ | $29$ | $\begin{aligned} & 29 \\ & 29.20 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 36 \\ 20.78 \end{array}$ | $35 \quad 0.24$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 35 & \\ & 0.43 \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} 35 & \\ & 1.46 \end{array}$ | Towers \& Co. |
| 36 | 124 | 36  <br>  1.13 | 14 <br> 24.79 | $\begin{array}{rr} 37 \\ 1.40 \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 27 \\ & 30.73 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 9 \\ & \quad 153.15 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 17  <br>  1.74 | $19 \quad 2.15$ | 14 <br>  <br>  | Danish Bacon Co. |
| 37 | 126 | 40 | 40 | $\begin{array}{r} 40 \\ 0.04 \end{array}$ | 6 $63.64$ | 22 | 40 | $\begin{array}{ll}40 & \\ & 0.021\end{array}$ | $40 \quad 0.033$ | Spar Food Holdings |
| 38 | 141 | $\begin{array}{ll}37 & \\ & 1.02\end{array}$ | $37$ $8.69$ | 31 <br> 1.98 | $\begin{aligned} & 36 \\ & 16.92 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{rr} \hline 38 & \\ & 14.71 \end{array}$ | 38  <br>  0.15 | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 36 & \\ 0.29 \end{array}$ | $34$ $1.73$ | Laws Stores |
| 39 | 152 | $38 \quad$38  <br>  0.77 | $\begin{array}{r} 36 \\ \\ 8.94 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 38 \\ & \quad 0.78 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{ll} \hline 40 \\ & 9.03 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 33 \\ \quad 26.72 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 36  <br>  0.21 | $\begin{array}{ll} 39 & \\ & 0.21 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{rr} 30 & \\ & 2.30 \\ \hline \end{array}$ | Deltec Foods |
| 40 | 156 | 390 | 396 | $39 \begin{array}{r} \\ \\ 0.60\end{array}$ | $39 \begin{array}{rr} \\ \\ 11.28\end{array}$ | 27 39.22 | $\begin{array}{ll}39 & \\ & 0.13\end{array}$ | $37 \quad$  <br>   <br>  0.24 | $\begin{array}{r}33 \\ \hline\end{array}$ | R.H. Thompson \& Co. |

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[^0]:    * See Appendix 1 for food processors' interest in food distribution.

[^1]:    * These findings are in direct contradiction to the concentration data shown for food and beverage distribution in the United Kingdom in the Sixth Report on Competition Policy, Table 7, which indicated an increase in sales concentration for the 4 largest concerns from 40 per cent. in 1969/70 to 60 per cent. in 1973/74. These ratios were based on a smaller number of concerns at a preliminary stage of analysis, but even in terms of the data used were inaccurate for 1973/74 because of a computer error.

[^2]:    * William Tresise: The Retail Trade (Political Quarterly, Jan-March 1964).

[^3]:    * National Board for Prices and Incomes: Prices, Profits and Costs in Food Distribution, Report No. 165 (HMSO, Cmnd 4645, 1971), para. 17. ** William Tresise, op cit.

[^4]:    * PIB Report No. 165, paras. 42-60 and Appendix D.

[^5]:    * The gross profit index is calculated by relating the gross margin-rate $\times$ rate of stockturn for the individual size-categories to the gross margin-rate $\times$ rate of stock-turn for the whole of the multiples group.

[^6]:    * Less than 0.1 per cent.

[^7]:    * J.B. Jefferys: Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge University Press, 1954), pp. 139-140.

[^8]:    * Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Frozen Foodstuffs, (HC 674, November 1976), para. 64.
    + Idem. para. 32.

[^9]:    * Acquired by International Stores (British-American Tobacco) In 1973
    $\nrightarrow$ Acquired by the Debenham Group in 1972
    $\neq$ Acquired by Key Markets in 1974

[^10]:    * In liquidation, 1973

[^11]:    * R.K. Perry: quoted in The Grocer, 6 November 1976

[^12]:    * PIB Report No. 165, op.cit, para. 27.
    + The percentage-figures relate only to actual respondents, which represented the following proportions of the total independent grocery trade:

[^13]:    * PIB Report No. 165, op.cit. paras. 29-30.
    + Wholesale trades in 1965, Board of Trade Journal, 26 July 1968.
    $\emptyset$ PIB Report No. 165, op.cit, para. 63.

[^14]:    * RORU, Manchester Business School: The Density of Cash and Carry Wholesaling, 1971, Research Report No. 4 (Autumn 1971) and The Density of Cash and Carry Wholesaling, 1976, Research Report No. 14 (July 1976).
    + PIB Report No. 165 op cit, para. 75.

[^15]:    * For a detailed description of the changes in allegiance between 1971 and 1975, see D. Thorpe \& S. Thorpe: The Density of Cash and Carry Wholesaling, 1976 (Retail Outlets Research Unit, Manchester Business School, Research Report No. 14, July 1976). This Report has been a major source for information on the marketing groups.

[^16]:    * C.M. Palmer: Distributive Margins for Meat in Great Britain, (Agricultural Economics Unit, University of Exeter, Report No. 194, May 1975), p. 67.
    + The Wholesale Trades in 1965, op.cit.
    $\varnothing$ Committee of Inquiry into Fatstock and Carcase Meat Marketing and Distribution, (HMSO, Cmnd. 2282), February 1964.

[^17]:    * Price Commission: Report No. 5: Prices, Margins and Channels of Distribution for

    Fruit and Vegetables (HMSO, 1975)

    + Wholesale trades in 1965, op.cit.

[^18]:    * See Chapter 5: Grain Milling. A Study of the Evolution of Concentration in the Food Industry for the United Kingdom, Part 2, Vol. 1 (Commission of the European Communities, October 1975).

[^19]:    * Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Flour and Bread, (HMSO, 1977), Table 2.6, p.23.

[^20]:    * J.B. Jefferys: Retail Trading in Britain, 1850-1950 (Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 17.
    + J.B. Jefferys, op. cit., p. 19.

[^21]:    * Sidney Pollard: The Cooperatives at the Crossroads, Fabian Research Studies 245, 1965.

[^22]:    * PIB Report No. 165, Appendix E, Tables 4 and 6.

[^23]:    * Includes Cooperative Societies.

[^24]:    + Linda, R. (1976) Methodology of Concentration Analysis Applied to the Study of Industries and Markets. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.

[^25]:    + A Study of the Evolution of Concentration in the Food Industry for the United Kingdom. Part One: Industry Structure and Concentration 1969-72. Development Analysts Ltd. published by Commission of the European Communities, January 1975.

[^26]:    + Development Analysts Ltd. (1975) op.cit. p. 113.

[^27]:    + Hart, P.E. and Prais, S.J. (1956) The analysis of business concentration: a statistical approach. Journal Royal Statistical Society, Series A, Vol. 119. pp. 150-191.

[^28]:    

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[^29]:    CEVELCFPENT AMALYSTSILYCI-LONCRES FECD-CISTPIBUTICN

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    & \text { C5 CASH FLOW }
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    \end{gathered}
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[^33]:    * Sixth Report on Competition Policy, Brussels, Luxembourg. April 1977. Available from HMSO.

