# FIFTEENTH JOINT MEETING

of the Members of

# THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

and of the Members of

# THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

(STRASBOURG, 27 AND 28 SEPTEMBER 1968)

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*OFFICIAL REPORT OF DEBATES*


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## NOTE

This edition contains the original texts of the English speeches and translations of those delivered in other languages.

The latter are denoted by letters as follows :

(*F*) = speech delivered in French.

(*G*) = speech delivered in German.

(*I*) = speech delivered in Italian.

The original texts of these speeches will be found in the separate editions which are published for each language.

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Sitting of Friday, 27 September 1968

# FIRST SITTING

## FRIDAY, 27 SEPTEMBER 1968

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**IN THE CHAIR : SIR GEOFFREY DE FREITAS**

**President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe**

*The Sitting was opened at 3 p.m.*

### 1. *Opening of the Joint Meeting*

**The Chairman.** — I declare open the Fifteenth Joint Meeting of the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and members of the European Parliament.

### 2. *Exchange of views*

**The Chairman.** — In asking Mr. Wilhelm Dröscher to present his report, I was about to invite him to come to the Rapporteur's seat. In the European Parliament, however, I recall that a member presents his report from his own place. I was being very parochial and thinking only of our practice in the Assembly.

I ask Mr. Wilhelm Dröscher to present the report on the activities of the European Parliament from 1 May 1967 to 30 April 1968, Document 2425, and at the same time to introduce the theme, "Political conditions for the full development and broadening of the Community."

**Mr. Dröscher,** *Rapporteur of the European Parliament (G).* — Having been assigned the honour of presenting to the Consultative Assembly the report on the activities of the European Parliament from 1 May 1967 to 30 April 1968, I want first to commend to you the European Parliament's Document 100, which is in front of you. What we have here, in intentionally summary form, is a reference survey of the events of what was for all of us an important year and, for those who have to perform day by day the arduous Sisyphean labours involved, also an undoubtedly successful year. I should like to thank all those who have helped to produce this compendium.

"Success" is, however, a very relative term. For this very reason—because this gathering taking place once a year also offers us a unique chance of addressing the political representatives of the European peoples from the most effective of all platforms—for this reason, I have ventured to present a statement containing some thoughts about the political prerequisites for completing and enlarging the Communities with which perhaps not everybody will agree.

I have sought to display the full difficulty of the problems raised by the unification of Europe. I would not have done this so relentlessly, had it not been precisely the tradition of the Consultative Assembly and of the European Parliament to call political difficulties by their name with utter frankness, for all the world to see.

We must demonstrate with fervour that there is no other place where the peoples of Europe can become better acquainted with the problems and the various proposals for their solution than this gathering.

In this connection, the political events of the last few weeks were eminently calculated to make nonsense of an analysis which had to be prepared in June/July of this year.

If I am not scared about this, it is specifically because the statement is based on a recognition of the existing *asymmetry of power* in Europe. And one of its conclusions is that a defence policy is a major prerequisite for all measures of European unification policy.

But precisely on this account, I feel I may, and indeed I must, after what has happened in Czechoslovakia, make a few amplifying observations.

In my statement, I speak more than once about the helplessness of Europe as a consequence of its present state-structure. After the examples of the June war in the Near East, the aftermath of which has continued to have its impact on our security, and of the military coup in Greece, which does violence to one of the fundamental tenets of our Community in a country with which we have a relationship of association, there now comes the occupation just on our own doorstep.

I wonder whether anything like this could have happened if, instead of six different foreign policies, there had been a compact, viable political community, one that was, itself, conspicuously responsible for its own security and for that of Europe, and endowed with its own conscious organs.

Please don't misunderstand me: I am not of those who clamour for a military response to the challenge by the Warsaw Pact states. I consider any relapse into a policy of military demonstration entirely misconceived. What I do plead for, however, is an early and a convincing end to the power-political vacuum in Europe, which is continually being produced anew as a result of the divergences in the foreign policy aims of the Community nations. A working political community would have, even without any direct integration of military forces, a stabilising influence on the political situation. People would

have to reckon with the community, to include it in their calculations, just as it has become a matter of course to do economically the whole world over. At all events integration of defence forces—and I can say as much here even more clearly than in my statement—is the prerequisite for the functioning of a political community inasmuch as, manifestly, no community, no matter whether it be a single state or a group of states, can pursue an independent policy in critical situations and conjunctures unless it is master of its own foreign policy decisions.

In a world which is and remains threatened, in greater or lesser degree, by annihilation through atomic warfare—we should not forget this—in a world in which the use of force and war still belong to the weapons in our political armoury that have not yet been discarded, defence policy cannot be ignored at the hottest of all the danger-points marking the frontier between the two world powers.

If a political Western European Union were a *fait accompli*, there would be a sharp inflection from the position of "stormy" in the European barometer. Not least because the problem of Germany as the great bogey on the European stage would vanish into thin air—this cause of fear would be "wrapped up", absorbed into the integration process. With the military potential of Germany finally integrated into an overall European association, with the German army under joint European direction and not exclusively under German authority, the most suspicious of commentators and scaremongers could no longer speak of the German danger. Then, perhaps, one of the most potent causes of fear would be removed from European politics—a fear which, as we have only recently seen, in the age of the atom bomb can be a powerful political force of impulsion.

These thoughts seem to be confirmed by certain lessons to be drawn from the events of the last few weeks.

1. The political impotence of us Europeans has been demonstrated with frightening clarity. We shall probably have to wait a long time before knowing whether or to what extent

the two world powers have consulted together or agreed on their respective intentions. The super-powers must go on talking —that is required by the postulate, which both of them recognise, of humanity's will to survive—and, quite consistently, they have doubtless done so in this particular case; but how long, in a world which is being hurtled into entirely new conditions of living by the advances in science and technology, which must become "one world" if we wish to survive—how long can the responsibilities continue to be shouldered by only two governments?

2. No society has political influence unless it is capable of looking after its own security in the broadest sense of the term. That embraces a great deal, from the externals of military equipment to the social order worth defending—from the soldier, ready to do his duty, to the civilian for whom freedom means his own freedom and the freedom of others and who consequently measures up to the situation.

3. As a bulwark of European defence, the USA can only be reliable, in our sense, when its own interests are affected and chime with our own. This may take in quite a broad field; but it does not cover every conceivable possibility, especially since America is at present entangled in an extremely hazardous enterprise.

4. Hence our need, in foreign policy and defence policy, for a European conception of our own. I said somewhere in my statement that "Europe must be able to *conclude alliances* instead of depending on them as at present." Without doubt this conception would still for some time to come have to reckon with involvement in NATO. It would be irresponsible to construct it against the USA. But neither must it be directed against any other power. Its one and only task is to safeguard European interests. This desirable policy cannot be achieved solely with the instruments of classical diplomacy. The system remains *non-efficient* if it is exclusively based on inter-state co-operation.

5. With the events in Czechoslovakia we have had a demonstration of the limits to the possibilities of bilateral contact and

attempts at detente. Manifestly, it has not been possible seriously to risk a threat to the status quo maintained hitherto between the super-powers, and this will probably remain so in the future. Just so long as the existing power-relationships continue, any rapprochement, any contact in depth beyond a certain degree, indeed any really substantial trade policy only makes sense with the consent of the dominant power, and so of the whole bloc. But for that reason, too, the political Community, as the only possible viable partner in Europe, is an imperative necessity.

From these considerations, to which a great deal more might be added, it follows that we Europeans, who can freely determine our own destiny, have our obligation to fulfil, and we must take heed to create conditions such as provide in themselves a guarantee that our opinion and our interests in the political development of these decisive years are not just overlooked and disregarded.

Never in the history of mankind has participation in, and influence upon, the course of events been so important as in our time—that is clear to anybody who has to cope with the repercussions of the technical and scientific process of transformation which our generation is experiencing. This is a phase of history in which the political instruments of yesterday need to be adapted to the requirements of the twentieth century, the atomic age or post-industrial society—whatever you like to call it—if we are not to be dragged down into a terrible catastrophe.

It pertains to the philosophy of the age that the citizen is called upon, as never before in history, to recognise his responsibilities and not evade them.

If this holds good for those who have assumed responsibility for the *res publica*, it is particularly true of this Parliament and this Assembly.

We must now make good use of these fateful hours in which the peoples of Europe have been appalled by an occurrence that

has shown up, as nothing before ever did, their political powerlessness, and when they are ready to do something to change the existing situation in Europe. For our primary concern is not the status quo imposed on us by the world powers, neither in time nor in importance. The problem which is the most urgent in time, and the most important politically, is the status quo imposed on themselves by the European states, in that they are showing themselves incapable of making any further advance to an effective political Community.

As far as I am concerned, if there is one conclusion to be drawn from the shocking events in Czechoslovakia, it is not that we should hark back to a rabid anti-communism, revert to a cold war. No, certainly not a reversion to the cold war, but rather a logical continuation of the policy of détente. But, it must be a policy of détente pursued on a different basis than hitherto, not a policy of bilateral agreements between individual West European and East European states, but a policy of the West European community as a whole. Western Europe must get into the position of becoming an independent protagonist in the process of détente, a principal who has to be reckoned with, who has to be listened to—in Moscow no less than in Washington. The fact the East European states are subject to a communist regime is, as I have said in my statement, not the only reason for Europe's dilemma or for the fissure across the continent. Most of these problems would exist event if the Soviet Union had a feudal or liberal-capitalist regime. The real problem is that there is a world power in Eastern Europe, whereas in Western Europe there is no power that counts in world politics. The real problem is that in these circumstances there can be no counterpoise in Europe, and so no equilibrium of power, except through the presence of an extra-European state, and we know very well that this state—our ally, the USA—must necessarily pursue a policy geared not to European but primarly to American interests.

From this tension there emerges the task. The West Europeans must achieve new forms of political unity; not for the sake of practising power politics towards the East but—to quote

something that was once said by that great American President, John Kennedy—"in order to be possessed of that armoury of power failing which the mighty simply do not listen when they are spoken to".

You will have noticed, Ladies and Gentlemen, that my statement has not been fashioned as in previous years in the form of a report. The reason for that might well be that the reflections expressed in that statement, when it was drafted in June, were perhaps still too uncompromising, too provocative, too explosive for the normal tone of this gathering. Since then, however, we have everywhere been plunged into a discussion of the essential issues raised there. And so the question with which we are compelled here and now to concern ourselves is whether through the fright which all of us have had, there can result a new impetus for a real European policy. This meeting has the opportunity of pressing for a political common market, and of translating it into reality. But if this is to be achieved, there is a prerequisite—that we break through the national barriers, that we transcend the nation-bound areas of communication. It amounts to creating a European public opinion. The national power-monopolies—and this is bound up with this idea of a European public opinion and a new awareness on the part of the European peoples—can no longer be allowed to hold sway exclusively in separate compartments according to language, without regard for what is happening in the context of Europe.

Obviously, a decisive element in this new attempt to break down the barriers—and indeed one that demands the most urgent treatment—is confrontation with the vital issues affecting daily life in Europe and people's attitudes to them. From the economic point of view that is becoming easier every day. The social question, social tensions, are becoming internationalised through the current economic processes in the Community, and their impact will be felt beyond the bounds of the Community. Not only employers' associations and farmers but also the workers must, if they are not going to suffer injury in the integration process, take a harder look across the frontiers and commit themselves.

And so we were come back to the new "know-how" and sercurity preoccupations. We cannot any longer, as in the fifties—this has already been said—leave it all to our American friends. People now sense that we are called ourselves. This Parliament and this Assembly can assume a decisive role in this situation. We ourselves must break through the political barriers—and I am sure that the progressive elements in the press will support us, in that the practical requisites for a European public opinion transcending the language barriers must be created by the communication media. Certainly, we are also supported by the social forces which recognise that the inner tension, which history uses as a motive force, is no longer the tension between nations but can only be that which within the whole community of the European peoples culminates in the question as to who has power in our society and to what use it is put. The enduring conflict about the seat of power must be decided in this European community of ours, and then the younger generation will be lured into our wake by the reverberations of a meaningful argument and will play its part.

I am aware of the very real dilemma presented by what I have been saying, since processes such as this take centuries. We have seen this in the historical example of Switzerland. We have seen it in the United States of America. But we haven't time to wait for hundreds of years. We are called upon to conquer the problem in this generation or else travel a road the end of which no one can visualise. And so today is the crucial hour for us to raise our voices in our countries, and in our national parliaments, in order to draw public attention to this unique opportunity for arousing the public consciousness, for breaking through the frontiers, and to take positive action.

(*Applause.*)

**The Chairman.** — Thank you, Mr. Dröscher.

I shall now call Mr. Maxwell. He is the General Rapporteur of the Consultative Assembly and will present a report on problems and prospects for scientific research and technical develop-

ment as factors in the development of the political unity of Europe, Document 2446.

I am not sure at the moment who wishes to speak next. Since I have been in the Chair many different lists of speakers have been put before me and I have made one or two changes in the order to break up the language groups to make things a little easier for our interpreters and for those who do not speak all languages. It is now clear that Mr. Lücker wishes to speak and I will call him. I hope when Mr. Maxwell has finished speaking I shall have been able to arrange the list. I am trying to take account of the wishes of members of the Assembly and members of the Parliament, but there is also the question of language.

**Mr. Maxwell,** *General Rapporteur of the Consultative Assembly.* — Our colleague, Mr. Dröscher, has rightly drawn our attention to the fact that time is not on our side and stressed how necessary it is for us parliamentarians, Ministers or civil servants to do all that is in our power to persuade our administrations and to awaken the conscience of the people who vote for us of the need for Europe to take urgent positive steps to end the frontiers between us.

Following the Soviet Union's rape of Czechoslovakia, the ordinary man in the street in Europe is only too painfully aware of the desperate necessity to unite as the only way of preserving our freedom and our way of life and to prevent the general holocaust that a third world war would bring about. Unfortunately, speeches and reports of the kind that our colleague Mr. Dröscher has made have been all too many over the past three years, and I fear, as no doubt he does, that they will fall once again on very deaf ears and that progress for the unity of Europe will continue to be slow and painful; and whether we will, in fact, be able to achieve it in our lifetime cannot yet be foretold with any certainty.

The topic which I have been asked to introduce today, however, relates to science and technology and how these can play their role in bringing about a speedier unification of Europe.

I venture to say without being boastful about it that it may have more "sex appeal"—if I may call it that—to the electorate and the nations that make up our continent, for the reason that unless we in Europe bring about quickly in our governments, for instance, a better organisation of government procurement in science-based industries, such as nuclear reactors, civil and military aircraft and computers; and unless we do this fairly promptly, then it has been calculated by an authoritative committee set up by OECD, which is due to report under the chairmanship of Mr. Basil de Ferranti, some $25,000 million worth of orders for computers, civil and military aircraft and nuclear reactors will be placed by Europe over the next ten years; and that two thirds of these orders will be placed with American firms instead of with our European firms unless Europe has a united science policy, and unless it follows through with an appropriate industrial policy.

Consequently, if we are going to lose $25,000 million worth of orders to the United States over the next ten years in only those three industries, one can quickly work out for oneself that it means hundreds of thousands of jobs, tax revenues not received by European governments and thousands of our best and young brains emigrating to the United States. If Europe permits this kind of thing to continue it can only mean that we shall relegate ourselves to the status of a second-class continent and our citizens to the second-class status that goes with that.

It is for that reason that I believe that an attack on our problems via science, technology and industry, while in no way letting up on trying to solve our political difficulties, may be capable of yielding faster and better results than has been apparent until recently.

Since this is a joint meeting with our friends from the European Parliament, I hope they will forgive me an observation about how astonished I was that the authors of the Treaty of Rome should have overlooked completely the need for provisions to encourage scientific and technological co-operation among the states adhering to the Treaty. Except for one slight mention

of scientific research in agriculture, the Treaty is silent on this major issue. There are no provisions in the Treaty either for setting up the appropriate institutions or for the necessary rights of initiative for the Commission. The adhering states and the whole of Europe find themselves at a considerable disadvantage because of this lack of unified science and industrial policy in Europe.

It is now generally recognised that whereas nations may spend only between two and three per cent of the GNP on science and technology, that small percentage determines the direction of the whole of the national economy over the next ten years. Consequently, the whole problem of science policy, both nationally and internationally, has become of major importance in the last few years.

I am sure that nobody needs reminding of the importance of science and technology for the maintaining of the importance of the science of living. Our ability to defend ourselves from enemy attack and our ability to contribute to the raising of the standards of living of the poorer countries depend on our applying the results of scientific and technological research faster and better to solving industrial and production problems in our laboratories and factories and on the land. European co-operation in scientific and technological affairs can certainly make its positive contribution towards the achievement of European political unity.

If we are to overcome the so-called technological gap, halt the brain drain and assure for European industries the huge orders that are to be placed in Europe for technologically advanced products such as I have mentioned—reactors, aircraft and computers—we must bring about quickly a European science policy and an authoritative council to manage it, and improve our governments' procurement practices. I have already referred to the OECD Committee under Mr. Basil de Ferranti. It is known as the BIAC Committee. I strongly recommend my colleagues to read its report when it is published.

I draw attention to some of the present weaknesses of multilateral technological co-operation. To have countries adequately represented at relevant levels is an essential need for the smooth functioning of these bodies. Constant references back or reservations of positions because matters must still be discussed lead to painful delays in the operations of various councils and bodies. I do not need to remind those present that delays cost money, and sometimes the delays cannot be recovered even though one is willing to spend more money in order to catch up.

Even worse is the present tendency, so apparent with the creation of the European Space Conference, for delegates not to use such powers as they have but rather to state that everything must wait for the next Ministerial Conference. For instance, at the moment the Ministerial Conference is the only body aiming at unifying the space activities in Europe, but it is in a very precarious position. Between the Ministerial Conferences the alternates to the Ministers meet, and this is one of the most ineffective bodies that there are, partly through its size, partly through the level of representation and partly because of the splitting of delegations between science, technology and foreign affairs. I wonder how many of our colleagues realise that each of the member governments, including my own, is sending delegations representing the Ministry of Science as one group, representing the Ministry of Technology as another one and then representing the Foreign Affairs Ministry as another one. I can assure those present that when one gets all those three in a " bowl", hardly anything ever comes out of it.

One of the unmentioned but one of the most powerful arguments for the creation of a European Space Agency is that then the need for the Ministerial Space Conference would disappear and the Council of this organisation could carry out the whole business with the highest possible officials and the greatest efficiency. It reminds me of something I learnt from my father. He advised me—I have always followed this whenever I could—"When you have an opportunity of talking to the monkey or the organ grinder always go for the organ grinder."

I remind our colleagues of the urgent need for us as Europeans to exploit positively the huge previous investments made by our governments, jointly or individually since the end of the last war, in science and technology. It is clear that very large investments have been made by Europe over the last twenty years. The main task now is to exploit these investments to the full and not let political considerations stand in the way. These political considerations are usually quite simple, namely, that the aims of all European governments are not the same. This is natural and in many ways attractive, and sometimes even advisable.

The problem arises when the governments are not willing to compromise, when they say that things must be done entirely their way, as if the financial, political, or technical criteria applied by other European governments have any lesser validity. If progress is to be made, a real spirit of compromise is absolutely essential. It is pointless when a common project is considered if the country most advanced in that field says, "Why should I work with the others? I can make a better killing or a better deal out of this myself." But in different fields it is different countries that are leading, and if in each field each country adopts such a narrow-minded attitude it is absolutely certain that Europe will get nowhere in science or anything else.

The main advantage of co-operation over a broad field is that what one country loses by accommodating the contract wishes of another in the first instance, it gains in another field where it is not the leader. A Europe too narrowly conceived politically, economically, financially and technologically will not be a Europe at all, and if Europe remains divided in the matter of science and its applications each of us will make a worse deal than the worst deal we could possibly make by working together.

Europe cannot continue, as in the past, to be the greatest importer of inventions and the largest exporter of brains. That is the way to becoming a continent of second-rate nations and citizens. European firms will have to begin to amalgamate and merge across national boundaries in order to be able to command the necessary resources for both research and development

expenditure and to be able to compete effectively with their huge American competitors. The industries for which such amalgamation is most urgent now are aircraft, motorcars, computers and nuclear reactors. I noted with great satisfaction the other day that Fiat and a French motor company are beginning to have discussions about merging into a larger unit. I hope that this will prove to be correct and will be followed by even more mergers and amalgamations among other European firms, particularly in the fields I have mentioned.

It is not customary for a British Member of Parliament to pay compliments to France, but I should like to correct that. France deserves credit for having been one of the first countries in Europe to draw our attention to the need for a common science policy and a common industrial policy.

I should like to draw attention to a rather important initiative taken by Mr. Peter Smithers, Secretary General of our Council, concerning the Work Programme for the intergovernmental activities of the Council of Europe for 1968-69, in which he proposed the setting up of a working party of the Secretaries General of the various organisations concerned with science in Europe. The working party, which I am delighted to hear may be chaired by Professor Kristansson, Secretary General of OECD, whose great personal knowledge and competence in the field, as well as that of his staff, are very extensive, will be charged with the task of making an inventory and an analysis of those 25 European intergovernmental organisations that are now busy tackling in one way or another problems connected with the closing of the technological gap. I understand that the task of the working party, made up of the various Secretaries General of these organisations, would be to pass on to governments and interested organisations an inventory and analysis of what is now being done in Europe by these 25 organisations. This is an excellent initiative.

Through this Assembly these various international organisations already come together, because most of them report to the Assembly in one way or another. Therefore, if and when the

Secretaries General make their report and recommendations, we in the Council will be in a position to give Ministers our guidance on these important affairs in the field of science and technology.

The present situation of European co-operation in science and technology is characterised by the growing dissatisfaction of everyone concerned in the existing organisational set-up, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the increasing number of plans and projects to create new institutions to overcome the dilemma.

Believe it or not, generally speaking some 32 European countries pay for 25 different organisations, and the European policy-maker, even if he is convinced that international co-operation is necessary, finds himself in a situation in which he is bound to admit that the existing system of co-operation not only runs out of control but is to a large extent counter-productive.

As a personal and private venture, I have tried to question four governments—the appropriate Ministers and their senior officials—as to whether they really know what their country is contributing in total to what organisation, and what they are getting back in value. The Ministers rather sheepishly had to agree that if they could spare the time and find the necessary staff they would probably be able to put all this information together—if they could take it out from 500 different files, but that when they had the information they would not really know what to do with it. This shows how urgent and necessary it is that the work of these intergovernmental organisations should be made much more transparent, much more cost-effective, than at present.

The three main weak spots can be pointed out immediately. First, too many organisations achieve too little, if the total output is subject to a serious cost-benefit analysis. Secondly, there is no possibility whatsoever of adjusting or correlating the total output according to objectives and priorities. Thirdly, no machinery is devised to bring the private sector into play.

It is an extraordinary situation that, with the exception of ESRO and perhaps ELDO, these organisations appear to have no machinery by which they can bring the private sector into play. Although I do not expect my colleagues and friends from the European Commission to agree that Euratom has failed, if they were asked to say in all honesty why it has failed I am certain that one of the fingers would point to their lack of interest and lack of initiative in getting private enterprise involved with their planning and work.

Quite obviously, something must be done to remedy the situation. Nobody will deny that there are also political reasons which have led to this impasse, but there are also administrative, organisational and technical ones. Some of them really are stupid, and I am certain that the minute they are looked at they will be done away with.

What all European technological organisations need to learn is the necessity of getting their fingers dirty and to have a clear and evident competence if they wish to supervise and co-operate with industry successfully. It is no good setting up an intergovernmental organisation to buy highly complex plant and machinery or go in for huge research and development expenditure, if they turn out to be an idiotic buy, for all this effort is then just pieces of paper, instead of getting down with industry in partnership to work out the best way of doing the job.

European governments need to learn that European technological co-operation can be successful only by establishing much closer relations with the business community. It is necessary to establish an industrial policy worked out in common by government and the business community.

My report is only a modest attempt to hint at some of the problems which must be tackled if scientific research and technological development are to serve as factors in the political unity of Europe.

The reason why the European policy-maker cannot possibly at present succeed in using science and technology to that goal

is that he is deprived of any possibility of, first, having an overall view of all the programmes in which his country is involved; secondly, comparing and evaluating these programmes according to priorities; thirdly, adjusting and co-ordinating these programmes in accordance with the needs of his country on the one side and what he thinks ought to be the objective of international co-operation on the other; fourthly, reaching a consensus on and implementing European programmes governed by European strategies.

I hope that this brief personal summary will answer the many thousands of engineers and scientists in Europe whom I meet in the course of my work and who ask me, "Why cannot you politicians use science to bring Europe closer together more quickly?" The very nature of modern science and technology is such that it requires large-scale planning to operate effectively —yes, to operate at all. A comprehensive European programme is needed, in which the present technological activities and programmes of European countries, both national and bilateral, and of European organisations ought to become an integral part.

European policy-makers need a device which would enable them to conduct a comprehensive European science policy designed to put Europe's human, economic and material sources to better and more rational use. They must be put in the position to choose priorities rationally, to define and implement strategies and to keep control over individual programmes, in a way which is not hampered by the present confusion of international organisations but, on the contrary, makes international co-operation efficient and profitable to all.

I have already referred to the 25 international organisations working in this field. If members will examine the positions in their own countries they will be staggered to find how many councils or committees or government laboratories have been established. When they were established there was good need for them, but there is not a single government which knows how or has the machinery to kill such organisations once they have fulfilled their useful functions. Every government in Europe

would be grateful if an organisation such as I have described, a European council of science, were set up to advise on techniques to member governments on how, once having set up, say, a nuclear establishment at a cost of millions of dollars, only to find that it is a mistake or after it has fulfilled its purpose, to convert it from one mission to another. In Europe at present we have no answer to this problem, which is an urgent and pressing one for all our governments. A possible solution might be to bring all existing organisations under the umbrella of a European council, where high-level people meeting relatively rarely could maintain an effective control over the whole range of activities. The wider the field of competence of this council, the more flexibility there will be—the more possibility to fit in technical and economical developments.

In the last analysis, however, only a surrender of some sovereignty can possibly get over this inherently great difficulty of Europe, which leads to endless delays and passing up of real technological opportunities. The better the organisational structure, the more smoothly the council's function and the readier states will be to give up their sovereignty to it, and, without some such surrender it is impossible to carry out any work. Without some such surrender of sovereignty—which I express as not requiring unanimity in the council—progress is impossible. In the meantime, as a first step towards new solutions, the following should be done without delay.

First, we should take stock of the existing programmes. This would include an evaluation of the financial resources allotted and the facilities—hardware and manpower—available to them.

Secondly, we should make the present system transparent as far as decision-making, budgeting and programming procedures are concerned.

Thirdly, we should devise a procedure which provides for the planning and implementation of a comprehensive European science policy and obliges each individual organisation, existing

or to be created, to plan ahead objectively and analytically on an integrated system basis.

If we do not get down to fathering some such system by Europe within the next two years—three at the most—not only will we lose $25,000 million worth of orders in the three industries I have mentioned, but I believe that we shall never, certainly not for a lifetime, have a chance to use science and technology to help our European unity along.

**The Chairman.** — Thank you.

Does Mr. Illerhaus wish to raise a point of order?

**Mr. Illerhaus** (*G*). — May I raise a point of order, Mr. Chairman? I have discovered that 18 speakers have put themselves down to speak today. So that every one of them may have his share of speaking time, I should like to propose that you limit each speech to about ten minutes. This would mean that we should have three to three-and-a-half hours, and that every one would get his chance.

**The Chairman.** — Members of the Joint Assembly, as you know, we have very few rules for our meeting. It is now proposed that there should be a ten-minute limit to speeches. I take it that this would not apply to Rapporteurs or to our visitors, however.

Is that generally accepted?...

That is agreed to.

Perhaps, then, we should use the system we have tried as an experiment in the Assembly of the Council of Europe. It is a system of lights for indicating the length of time a member has been speaking. It is a fact—and as parliamentarians we know this—that everyone thinks that he is being concise but that his neighbour does not. I will call on a member of our Secretariat, Mr. Charitons, to explain the system of lights and

after that I will take a voice vote to see whether you think it a good idea.

(*Technical details are then given to the delegates.*)

**The Chairman.** — There are two points to emphasise. There is no orange light, so that a member cannot sprint to beat the red. Secondly, it is so devised—and this is only an experiment—that I am the only person in the Chamber who cannot see the light. I have to judge by other people's reactions what the colour of the light is.

Does the Joint Meeting agree to the experiment?...

That is agreed to.

I call Mr. Lücker.

**Mr. Lücker** (*G*). — The decision we have just taken compels us to emulate an Olympic runner in getting off our chests quickly what we want to say about the report by our colleague, Mr. Dröscher. He has presented a statement outside the normal procedure of our European Parliament. He said as much himself. I have a very special reason to affirm here, on behalf of my political friends, that they and I are entirely in agreement with Mr. Dröscher's analysis and with most of his weighty comments. The reason is that a communication has appeared in an important newspaper at home whose source, unfortunately, we cannot check. It says that the Christian Democrat members of the European Parliament would reject your report. You know, of course, that at the present meeting there is no provision for a formal debate; but I should like to put matters straight. We are largely in agreement with your analyses and commentary. But that does not prevent us from having different or qualified judgments and assessments on particular points.

Mr. Dröscher's report, it seems to me, is built on three fundamental premises.

In the first place, he asserts that the political and military commitment of the United States in Europe will be reduced as time goes on. One might add that this does not alter the fact that our ability to pursue a policy directed to further relaxation of tension and aiming at greater independence for Europe is only possible because of the military and political position of the USA, particularly in the nuclear field.

Mr. Dröscher's second fundamental premise is what he calls the basic lopsidedness of the pattern of power in Europe. On this point, too, we agree with him, and likewise over the conclusion which he draws that Europeans are called upon to create a counterweight to the Soviet Union's preponderance in Europe, so that Europe may once again find its way to a balance of power which at present we have to borrow from the other side of the Atlantic, in the shape of the United States presence in Europe.

If, however, Mr. Dröscher's first assumption is accepted, it leads to the conclusion that, to the extent that the United States presence is no longer available, some other structure must be devised to fill the vacuum, a structure which the Europeans themselves must install in its place. We agree with him, too, when he proclaims that this would not be a politically hostile act either to the USSR or to the USA; the only thing is that I would perhaps introduce a qualification to the effect that we do not see the two sides in quite the same perspective, and we know that a distinction has to be made between them on account of the political systems and for reasons of geography. We do realise too, however, that equilibrium in Europe, precarious and fluctuating though it be, is still entirely created by the presence of the USA and that, as Mr. Dröscher says, we must convert Europe's dependence on alliances into a capacity to conclude alliances.

The third point made by our colleague, Mr. Dröscher, is that the existing political structure has made it impossible for Europe in recent years to play its proper role. He pointed to the Near East and to Greece and, if this report had been drafted a bit

later, he would certainly have included the latest events in Czechoslovakia. All these are arguments and political affirmations—I think that in saying this I am not in any way detracting from Mr. Dröscher's report—which represent nothing new for our European Parliament; they are views which have been voiced by a large majority of our members and which—though in different phrasing and in another political connection—are likewise to be found in the European Parliament's latest general report.

Mr. Dröscher goes on then quite logically to the statement that at the present time there is serious anxiety about the political aims of the Rome Treaty. On that I should like to add straight away: it is this anxiety about the political aims of the Community which constitutes the whole dilemma in which Europe appears just now to find itself or—let us be quite frank about it—really does find itself. The distinguishing feature of this dilemma is that the central organs of our European policy, i.e. EEC and its institutions, stand in need of more political functions, more institutional substance, in order to be able to cope with the tasks of the future; yet, in the present circumstances, the member states themselves will not, cannot, or for various reasons simply refuse to, confer any more sovereign rights, any additional functions, on these European institutions. Actually, we can only make further moves towards economic and political integration —in this we are also in agreement with Mr. Dröscher's analysis— if somehow a common range of interests—excuse my plain speaking—can be retrieved in the appreciation of a common foreign and defence policy.

Now, why do I say that, Mr. Chairman? Well, in the European Communities we are on our way to completing the process of economic union. Everyone realises that completion of economic union is going to demand more in the way of political sovereignty than has been requested so far from the governments or surrendered by them. We recognise, too, that such success as has hitherto been attained in European unification has been more or less the consequence of a range of common interests. That is the case, for one thing, with the foundation of the Euro-

pean Communities. During the fifties the range of interests revealed a greater measure of agreement, and the individual successes were also in keeping with a range of interests that were entirely concordant. Today we observe, on the other hand, that, just because this concordance no longer obtains, we are compelled to witness in other sectors something like a process of renascent nationalism within the context of European unification.

In this connection, it was naturally a shock when the French Foreign Minister was reported a little while ago to have made a statement—I want to express this very cautiously—which explicitly calls in question the political aims of the Rome Treaty. He is reported to have said that his government no longer recognised the political philosophy of the Treaty of Rome. What does that mean, if that is really what he said? I think that we cannot simply bypass this statement, because it strikes at the heart of our present dilemma. Up to now things have worked out tolerably well, but we all know, as I have just been trying to make clear, that we still need in future, in our European institutions, more European policy-making than there has been hitherto or than could have been implemented.

With regard to this aspect of the matter, Mr. Dröscher made some rather strong criticism of the work of the single Commission. As regards monetary policy and the common agricultural policy, for instance, Mr. Dröscher, I would not be ready to go quite so far as you in criticising the Commission. It is my belief, and we have repeated this time and again, that we must cherish what we have achieved: these are noble successes for European unification, and we should not ourselves call them in question after the event; we have said this often enough today in this hall.

We cannot, Mr. Dröscher—you will not be surprised to hear this—subscribe to the substantive observations in your statement in connection with the agricultural policy. But I will not expatiate on this here because of the limitation on speaking time: we shall have plenty of other opportunities of doing so.

So, Mr. Chairman, let us go on to what Mr. Dröscher defines in his report as being the crucial question: is it possible, he says, for a range of common interests in foreign policy and defence policy to be recreated, or can it be somehow engendered? That is really the point which is at issue, the question-mark emerging from our latest general report. And I want to say that we believe—even though it seems difficult at the moment to achieve an agreed view—that the Foreign Ministers should none the less make a start on this task.

**The Chairman.** — I am very sorry to interrupt you, Mr. Lücker. If the rules were such, we would do it. If you would like just to add a word of thanks and so on, I should be very happy. Otherwise, I am sorry.

At the beginning of the meeting I said that I had a list of speakers. That list was in the order in which speakers had inscribed their names. As I said earlier, I decided to make certain small changes to take account of language. Since then nearly everyone who was down to speak early has asked to speak at the end, and nearly everyone who was down to speak at the end has asked to speak early. That is easy; but, unfortunately, there must be a middle, and I cannot eliminate the middle. I am very sorry that I shall not please everybody, but I will do my best. I am taking account of language.

I call Mr. Van Offelen.

**Mr. Van Offelen** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the reports and statements presented by Mr. Dröscher and Mr. Maxwell were very timely.

Indeed, the whole of Europe is at present faced with new problems. The Czech affair occurred at the same time as threats to other European countries.

Moreover, conflagrations are again breaking out in the Middle East. All this directly concerns us Europeans and must impel us to strengthen our bonds and those which unite all the

Atlantic nations. Added vigilance has become essential and it is this which Mr. Dröscher's report makes so highly topical, with its many ideas and suggestions on imparting new political " drive " to the Communities and enlarging them.

In that connection I should like to confine myself to two specific points. On the one hand there is the permanent problem —which concerns all the members of our two Assemblies—of negotiations between the Six and the Seven and other European states and, on the other, the question of imparting new political "drive" to the Six.

With regard, first, to the relations between the Six and the other European states, this added vigilance and the strengthening of bonds of which I have just spoken should lead us all to resume the dialogue as a whole and, more generally, the dialogue between the Six and the countries of Western Europe as a whole.

It will no doubt be difficult to recommence negotiations limited to customs formalities. We are aware of the many setbacks, from the failure to establish the large free trade area, to that of negotiations between the Six and the Seven and the lack of response hitherto to Great Britain's applications for membership.

Consequently, I am not sure that the resumption of customs negotiations would have any prospect of succeeding at present, and I think that we should seek other ways not connected with customs, more particularly ways of promoting scientific and technological co-operation which Mr. Maxwell spoke to us about so brilliantly just now.

In that sphere there are a number of possibilities: in the nuclear, aeronautics, and electronics sectors where the scale of the effort calls for intra-European co-operation far beyond that possible within the Six or even within the Seven. That co-operation should make it possible to create an atmosphere favourable to new talks between the Six and the other European countries, pending new negotiations on applications for accession to the Common Market.

Why not, indeed, institute consultations even on foreign policy? It was always thought that they would follow customs and economic negotiations. They could take place earlier in view of the circumstances and the new threats which weigh upon Europe as a whole.

That, in short, Mr. Chairman, was what I had to say on current problems between the Six and the other European countries.

I should now like to deal, at perhaps somewhat greater length, albeit, I hasten to assure you, within the time allotted to me, with some specific points which might be the subject of a new political "drive" of the Six.

I should first of all like to emphasise that this new political "drive" is based as always on economic questions which provide a starting point.

Well, we made a start in the customs sphere. We have achieved within the Six a customs union, and though not everything is yet perfect there, we can nonetheless be glad of a kind of economic miracle that has made it possible within a few years for goods, human beings and capital to circulate freely in six countries with a population of almost two hundred million consumers.

Thus, at the basis of political Europe is economic Europe. Much remains to be done, however, especially in the sphere of industrial concentration which is one of the aims of large markets and calls for the speedy preparation—it will be discussed in the Chamber in the near future—of a statute for a European society.

A genuine free market must be achieved by doing away with administrative and fiscal distortions and by instituting a common transport policy and, lastly, a true joint policy in monetary and current economic spheres.

With regard to energy policy, we in the Six have for several years now been trying to do something about coal. But there

are other sectors, particularly the oil sector, in which a whole series of measures should be taken to harmonise taxes and supply guarantees; and that of natural gas to which all Common Market consumers must have the same facilities of access.

Electricity and nuclear energy are two other sectors in need of a co-operation "drive".

Lastly, there is the problem of the leading industries. These are being more and more assisted by public authorities in all the countries, by means of loans and price and land concessions, in short by numerous economic measures which differ from one country to another, with ensuing economic distortions. In this field, too, there is need of a more effective Community policy.

It is also necessary to co-ordinate the policies of member countries of the Common Market in respect of public orders.

Lastly, since the United Kingdom is playing a leading role in advanced technology, co-operation with Britain and with those states which are not Members of the Six is essential.

Another sphere in which there is a growing need of a concerted economic policy is that of regional development. Most countries are at present pursuing a regional policy. To assist leading industries they use means which are clearly different, thereby giving rise to distortion in competition and, of course, making it more and more necessary to take concerted action.

Lastly, trade policy deserves especial attention, since trade policy is to some extent inevitably bound up with a common foreign policy.

That is why the task of negotiating a common trade policy of the Six must be a first step towards other paths. So long as we fail to pursue a common trade policy, we shall run the risk of allowing certain intra-Community protection measures to survive.

That, then, is what I wished to say on the subject of economic Europe. With regard to political Europe, a number of

things remain to be done about which we shall certainly be speaking at next week's session of the European Parliament. I refer, among other things, to the entry into force of the Treaty on the merging of the Community executives, the perennial problem of the Council of Ministers being able to take majority decisions so as gradually to evade the right of veto, the problem of a single Commission and the possibility of endowing it with the means to implement a Community policy and perhaps new powers enabling it to play a wider role; lastly, a problem of particular concern to us here: the European Parliament must be granted greater powers in budget and legislative matters —the European Parliament should be enabled to perform new functions—such as the investiture of the European executives, and need I say that, above all, it should be elected in the most direct manner possible so as to ensure that public opinion is concerned with the problems with which we have to deal.

The Commission must also be encouraged to consult both employers and labour, especially in agriculture, and youth organisations, in order to make public opinion more aware of European problems.

Finally, there are the two great aims of non-economic foreign policy and defence policy. But it is perhaps going rather far and being optimistic to mention them here.

In short Mr. Chairman—for I see the speaking-time allotted to me is coming to a close—after reading the two reports which have been submitted to us, I merely wished to emphasise that international circumstances are creating political and psychological conditions for a new European "drive".

With regard to relations between the Six and other European states, this new "drive" is possible forthwith in the field of technology, as Mr. Maxwell has very rightly said, and perhaps, too, in that of foreign policy.

This new "drive" of the Six implies that a large number of problems which are both economic and political shall be the

subject of concrete and immediate action. I should like to close, Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, by expressing the hope that the work of our Joint Meeting will provide effective encouragement for the governments and the European Communities.

(*Applause.*)

**The Chairman.** — I call Mr. Triboulet.

**Mr. Triboulet** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dröscher has presented an extremely interesting report on the work of the European Parliament and given a statement on the political conditions for rounding off the Communities.

I much regret the little incident which seems to have occurred in this connection: it is a purely personal statement. May I say that it would nevertheless have been better had this statement been adopted by the committees of the European Parliament; but in any case Mr. Dröscher's statement is of high quality and worthy of attention.

The European Democratic Union Group adopted a report by Mr. Jozeau-Marigné which was later the subject, on 10 May 1967, of a resolution on consultation of the European Parliament. We believe in the value of consulting the European Parliament, and we are glad that the number of consultations has risen from 47 two years ago to 78 during the present year.

We feel that these consultations are effective; they are not simply consultative, even if that is the legal definition; for how can one fail to recognise that the part played by the European Parliament, for example in the policy of the Six towards the eighteen African states, that the majority which gradually built up in Parliament in favour of generous and reasonable solutions and that the resolution adopted which even suggested the possible setting up of a stabilisation fund for tropical products, all show that the European Parliament has supported the governments in this field and made a very necessary contribution.

Similarly, in agricultural policy, need one recall that, for example, with regard to regulations on milk products, the European Parliament adopted attitudes which were quite different from those of the European Commission and that when all was said and done the Council of Ministers basically adopted the opinion of the European Parliament? I should like to point out in passing—it was more in the nature of a quarrel within the European Parliament—that the problem arose whether the European Commission should follow the opinions and votes of the European Parliament and submit the latter's views to the Council of Ministers. That has not always been the case. But the European Democratic Union feels that it would be advisable for the Commission to plead the cause of the European Parliament before the Council of Ministers in all important cases.

The European Parliament is required to cover a multitude of subjects. I shall confine myself in this very short speech to mentioning the philosophy of the innumerable tasks which face it: transport, power and countless others; but also regional planning, on which Mr. Dröscher has many apt things to say and which must be carried on to the benefit of peripheral or economically weak areas. This policy has only just been initiated. It still has to be implemented and here alone there is an immense task.

There are also employment policy, social policy and, of course, agricultural policy, an enormous edifice which has resulted, according to Mr. Dröscher, in prices which are perhaps too high. But he should not forget that in all these policies which we are pursuing we affect every individual European in his professional and private life and in his everyday existence. When we introduce a joint agricultural policy for the Six, we are trying to solve the most difficult social problem facing all industrialised countries, that is to ensure worthwhile prices for the agriculture of each of our Six States. It is a formidable problem and is not merely concerned with figures; it is mainly concerned with men.

May I, then, recall in the second part of my statement that if the European Parliament has a policy which affects every

European in his everyday life, for that reason alone it contributes towards the creation of a real and concrete Europe. We have been criticised for speaking of "l'Europe des patries". I heard Mr. Dröscher speaking of a Europe of states. "L'Europe des patries" has a much wider meaning. Incidentally, General de Gaulle denies ever having used that expression himself. However that may be, we always wanted to say the Europe of the peoples, that is to say the Europe of realities, the Europe of men. That is the truth. I believe that fatherlands, "les patries", mean fathers and sons, all those who work on European soil. We believe it is there that the true meaning of European policy lies.

We have already achieved much; there is still more to be done and we should like to enlarge our action and go far beyond the narrow frontiers of our six nations. We have been accused of making the entry of Great Britain subject to difficult conditions. But it is not we who put forward these conditions, it is the realities, the facts, since the living conditions of human beings are profoundly different in Great Britain and in continental Europe. Mr. Dröscher calls upon France and says: "If you were politically as determined to see Great Britain enter as you were to bring about an agricultural policy, Great Britain would be with us now!"

But there we were concerned with harmonising agricultural policies in six countries where the living conditions were very similar. The English way of life—I have many English friends and I have a great respect for them—, let us admit it, differs greatly from that of the continentals. Thus considerable difficulties arise, and I must admit that Mr. Dröscher had the courage to show that these difficulties were formidable and could only be overcome among the peoples. He said that the peoples were sovereign in Europe and they could not be reunited by a mere integration from above. He hit the nail on the head, for that is where the real problem lies. Yet this problem is even more difficult to solve at a time when everyone is raising objections, when far from drawing closer together, certain states are tending to divide on problems of language, religion, races in Africa, in short the difficulties are enormous. They can be resolved only by action on public opinion.

Again, Mr. Dröscher said in his report that it was only after a common and thorough public opinion had been formed that uniform policy was possible. Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, we all know what country we belong to—and I address our colleagues in the Council of Europe who represent a far larger number of nations than the members of the European Parliament—we must all contribute towards the formation of this common European public opinion which will enable us at least to achieve an effective union of Europe. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman.** — Thank you, Mr. Triboulet.

I call Mr. Blumenfeld.

**Mr. Blumenfeld** (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, I should like to refer to Mr. Maxwell's report on behalf of my political friends and myself, and to say that from my point of view there is very little to add, since the report sums up and illustrates the most important facts and data in an outstanding manner, and the clarity with which it deals with a whole series of difficult and complex questions could not be surpassed in the short time allowed to me and to other speakers, even if we were able to do so.

I should like to confine myself, therefore, to underlining a few of the things to which Mr. Maxwell has drawn attention and trying nevertheless to throw a little more light on one or two points.

First, I feel that Mr. Maxwell did very well in drawing attention so plainly to the barren, indeed dangerous dispersion of our forces. There can be no doubt that the existence of twenty-five or more European organisations is an absurdity. If you add to that the organisations, big and small, referred to by Mr. Maxwell in his report, which concern themselves in our respective countries with European as well as their own affairs, and, into the bargain, regard themselves as the centre of the world and their work as the most important being done anywhere, then I am bound to say that this can only end in disaster.

I think we should learn one thing from the development assistance policy which we have been more or less successfully pursuing in Europe during the past ten years: namely that in technology, in the development of research and science and in its industrial application and use, the main concern must be concentration. Otherwise, as Mr. Maxwell has said, we shall continue to have no success in wide areas of our development assistance policy. If I remember the figure correctly and add it to the one which Mr. Maxwell has given us, namely about forty thousand million dollars set aside for technology under the different European national plans, then I can only say: is that not a fantastic sum when the task before us is to concentrate and build up?

Mr. Maxwell rightly said that during the course of his inquiry not one single government, let alone a parliamentarian, was able to tell him how much the respective government or parliament was contributing towards the organisations which have been named, and such people were even less able to say what the results were or what tasks had not been successfully completed. If we muddled about like that as managers in industry, we should be absolutely certain of going bankrupt.

Therefore I agree with the proposal to set up a supreme European council which would, however, have to comprise people of first-class calibre if it were to exercise effective control and also to attempt to concentrate and co-ordinate these things so that we should no longer be dealing with 25 organisations but with a much smaller number.

I should like to refer to a question which does not yet seem to have been cleared up. Mr. Maxwell is certainly right when he says that the main task for Europe is to take decisions, and that one of the most important things to be done is to ensure that government authorities, industry and the economy are brought together and that there is genuine co-ordination. I should like to add that if it is also important to seek higher contributions from the individual countries, their governments or their parliaments, it is equally vital that, as a counterweight,

gains, too, should be divided up or shared. There are a number of ways in which this can be done from the technical or organisational point of view, and I shall not attempt to list them here. It is inadmissible that small European countries with their scientific or research institutes and apparatus, which are often extremely well developed, and their industries should be allowed to fall behind the large states.

But this raises a difficult problem and perhaps Mr. Maxwell could consider it once again. The big question here is how co-ordination can be achieved between industry and governments, and I should be grateful if that could be made even clearer. I myself feel that industrial production should not be handicapped by any restrictions in its efforts to produce all that we expect of technology as a whole in the future. Hitherto, however, that effort has been hindered by certain political principles put forward by governments. There are examples of excellent co-operation at government level with regard to research laboratories and industry, for example between the Benelux countries and Germany. Last year a model for this was put into practice. It could serve as a working hypothesis and perhaps as a signpost for the future in respect of other problems in this sphere.

Mr. Chairman, we have many categories of supranational questions in research and industrial application. May I just say that in my view nuclear energy, data processing and modern short range communications come into this group as far as Europe is concerned. All other problems are important but they are not in the category of supranational questions.

In the last one-and-a-half minutes, I should like to say a few words about Mr. Dröscher's report. While we are discussing here, the French President and the German Federal Chancellor have met and they are probably holding a private conversation at this very moment. Even if you have not read Mr. Dröscher's report, you will agree with me on the need for concerted political action after reading this outstanding analysis. Mr. Dröscher did not reach this conclusion; I should like to do so here. So far, every proposal we have made has been blocked by a veto; we can

overcome this obstacle by arranging for a conference of heads of governments within the larger framework of NATO, to be attended by the five countries and the three states which have announced their intention of applying for Community membership, namely Great Britain, Denmark and Norway. The conference could deal with technology, armaments, security and defence—the countries represented being also there in their capacities as Members of NATO. It might well be the first practical step towards overcoming the apathy and stagnation in our Europe of today. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman.** — Thank you, Mr. Blumenfeld.

I call Mr. Maxwell.

**Mr. Maxwell.** — With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a correction. Several members have asked me whether the European Council for Science which I mentioned had anything to do with our Council. The answer is no. It would be a quite separate council, relating to the co-ordination of science, not our Council.

**The Chairman.** — I now call Mr. Metzger and I will next call Mr. Finn Moe, if he is here, or Mr. Beauguitte.

**Mr. Metzger** (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I can straight away link up with what Mr. Blumenfeld said at the end of his speech. That the European Economic Community must be developed, and this means at the same time expanded, is the view of a large majority of us here in this hall. And there is also no doubt that the vast majority of our peoples are of the same opinion. We don't therefore need to go on producing arguments to demonstrate that the accession of Britain and the other countries wishing to join the Community is a matter of importance, not to say a matter of life and death, for Europe.

The position is, however, that here is something which we want to see happen but we are unable to translate the will into the deed, because of the veto of one man. Now, I know that

the Treaty that established EEC makes provision for such a veto, but, surely, such a provision was conceived in quite different circumstances. It is possible to misuse a statutory right, and I am certainly of the opinion that the present unconditional veto that has been applied is an abuse of that right.

I am not disputing the fact that there is provision in the Treaty for a veto on the access to the Community of other states. But, as things are, the veto is being exercised by one man to prevent even negotiations from starting. As a jurist I maintain that there is absolutely no warrant in the Treaty for a veto on negotiations, only a veto on negotiations about access. But this is all by the way.

In any event, we are not going to get any further, on account of this veto, and the question is: are we prepared to accept this situation in a spirit of resignation, are we prepared—to speak quite frankly—to let Europe go hang? Well, my answer is: no, we must find some alternative way. As you know, efforts are being made once again to take at any rate one step forward in the direction of trade agreements—and someone just now reminded us about the meeting at the summit of the French and German leaders which is taking place today. I have to confess that I am not very hopeful of progress being made along this path.

If we are to make any advance, there is need for action to be taken by the governments of the member states of the European Economic Community outside the Treaty. And the fact is that in relation to European unification there are quite a number of questions about which there is no provision for a settlement in the EEC Treaty. We have been talking, for instance, about technology. In addition to technology, there are a large number of political questions, and indeed economic questions, too, which are not covered by the Treaty. So why should not one or more of the governments take the initiative and promote a conclave of the governments—either at Prime Minister or Foreign Minister level—of the six member states, plus Britain and the other countries applying to join EEC—in order to discuss together what can be achieved outside the jurisdiction of the Treaty itself.

If something like this is done, then that solitary figure will be placed before the dilemma—either he excludes himself from the proceedings or he is ready to work in with the others. Or, to put it another way, he has to decide whether he wants to isolate himself—for none of us wants to isolate him. Everybody here would be very glad if he were ready to collaborate, if he were ready to co-operate in the construction of the Europe we want to see. But there is no reason why he shouldn't be required to face the dilemma, and if he is not ready to co-operate, well, the others should get on with the job. It is inadmissible that others should be denied the capacity for action just because one person is not ready to do the necessary.

In view of what I have just been saying, I don't think it is so much a matter of speculating whether the access of the applicant states, the expansion of the Community, is necessary. There can be absolutely no doubt about that. We have examined that issue, surely, quite enough. The question for us now is what ways can we discover to bring about that access to the Community of the states now outside. That is what we should be putting our minds to and, as parliamentarians, we have the possibility of bringing pressure to bear in our parliaments so that our governments will act.

We had a foreign policy debate yesterday in the *Bundestag* at Bonn, and it is no chance that both the party leader of the Christian-Democrat Group and his opposite number of the Social Democrats talked about the possibility of going ahead, in certain circumstances, and by-passing de Gaulle. Such a possibility is no longer to be excluded. The President of the French Republic must be placed in a cleft stick. As things are now he knows he can interpose his veto without running any risks; the others do not react. Hence, only when we make up our minds to react, to take action, to do something ourselves—conceivably without him—only then will he be put into the position, willy nilly, of really having to make a decision. The kind of thing that is going on at present cannot really be described as constituting a decision; it is simply a process of procrastination.

For this reason, I venture to make an appeal to my colleagues who have their say in their various parliaments at home, that they should make suitable representations in their parliaments to require the governments to act; that all these matters be first of all thoroughly sifted in a conference of Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers, so that at any rate an attempt is made to advance the European cause. This should be done, I contend, if necessary, outside the competence of the European Economic Community—though I do not mean, of course, that the link with EEC should be severed—on the contrary, there should be no question about its overall jurisdiction. I am entirely of the opinion that there could be a quite different interpretation from that which has operated up to now of the possibilities, including the legal possibilities of the Treaty. One need only reflect on the provision for majority decisions in the Council of Ministers —with regard to this aspect of the Treaty not only have all the possibilities not been exhausted, there has actually been action in breach of the Treaty. On this point, I suggest, we as parliamentarians are fully entitled to raise our voices and see that certain things which are necessary are done. This is the substance of my appeal to my colleagues here in this Assembly Hall. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman.** — Thank you, Mr. Metzger.

Since Mr. Finn Moe is apparently detained I will call now Mr. Beauguitte and after him Mr. Flämig.

**Mr. Beauguitte** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the study of Mr. Maxwell's report leads me to stress certain aspects of this discussion which seem to me of outstanding importance.

Do we really need yet another council to co-ordinate the work of the bodies concerned with scientific research and technology? In my view there are already sufficient bodies in existence, as witness the example of the nuclear and space fields.

A year ago I read out in this Assembly a list of bodies concerned with the subject, and they are legion.

What is really lacking, though, is the application of decisions taken at the level of institutional structures. I am suspicious of high-sounding terms such as "planning" or "the surrender of sovereignty". The methods of planning were defined long ago; as for the surrender of sovereignty, I need hardly tell you that it is already stipulated in the present conventions.

What, then, must we do?

In any event, I think it is time that we resolved to fill the gap existing between Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union in the field of scientific research and technology. That gap is largely due to inadequacy of the resources used and to what is called "the brain drain", and there can be no doubt that it is a grave impediment to economic development and, consequently, social progress in Europe. Within one or two decades Europe runs the risk of being an under-developed continent by comparison with the two giants, with all that that implies in the way of serious threats to our liberty and our independence.

Voices can be heard calling attention to the peril: I myself stressed it only forty-eight hours ago in an article published in *Les Dernières Nouvelles d'Alsace*, and entitled: "Des savants qui se sont dressés contre une réalité inquiétante" (An alarming reality: scientists up in arms).

Yet despite these persuasive voices, despite the scientists' arguments, the organisation of European scientific and technological co-operation is progressing only very slowly.

The causes are patent: they lie in national egoisms, and these must be swept aside: we must fix our aims beyond state frontiers and seek ways and means of promoting international teamwork between research workers, engineers and scientists.

The resources of science are too vast not to be used by what Louis Armand has called "brain storming".

That was the idea that Alexis Carrel was putting forward as early as 1936, the idea of a galaxy of engineers from different

branches comparing and contrasting their views so that they could propose to the helmsmen of the nations the course to be taken by human genius, to the greater benefit of mankind.

I appeal for an inter-European phalanx of pioneers in the higher knowledge, a band of dedicated men.

One of our main tasks is to extract from experimental theory the blessings that it can offer the masses, whilst eliminating from the application of discoveries anything which is contrary to the arts of peace; we must persuade our governments to devote themselves tirelessly to this objective of the first magnitude. In a society such as ours, culture is almost a luxury. Culture enriches the species; culture gives prestige to science, but is not its servant nor an aid to the achievement of its aims. Within our grasp, however, we have a remarkable factor making for a rapprochement. Science and its practical applications have no motherland. They are collective property. I am convinced that the political unity of Europe must be based on its scientific and technological unity; for the rational use of research has become the key to our hopes. Nay more—it is the key to economic unity, since once research is properly rationalised, it will powerfully stimulate production and trade, and lead to full employment, raising the material conditions of the needy. There is no alternative: the whole gamut of scientific research and technological development must be fully exploited till the whole continent works as one in all sectors. Here, indeed, he who hesitates is lost.

If the concept of fraternity, especially in the political field, is to be realised, it can only be through the practical achievement and diffusion of the blessings which progress confers. Let us join forces, and civilisation will advance all the faster along the path of its destiny! (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you Mr. Beauguitte.

I call Mr. Flämig.

**Mr. Flämig** (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few remarks about the admirable report by our colleague Mr. Maxwell. A few days ago, as you know, a Soviet space probe made a flight to the moon. The craft then came safely down to earth again. This is a tremendous technical achievement. And now the Americans are about to launch an Apollo Rocket carrying with it three men into space. Even the layman realises the terrific stake involved in this sort of thing, in the way of technological skills, scientific know-how and also financial resources. Thus we see development in space technology going forward with breakneck speed in both East and West. In the middle, between the two, is Europe. There has indeed been no lack of attempts over here in recent years to close the technological gap: but one has to admit that the results are scarcely encouraging.

The other day, Mr. Chairman, in this same hall, we listened to a report about the present condition of ELDO and ESRO. ELDO, as you know, is having some difficulties because Britain and Italy refuse to contribute any further funds. They contend that rocket development is uneconomic. And ESRO is stagnating because of the refusal of Italy to continue to take part in the execution of its programme. On top of this, the European Conference on Satellite Telecommunications, known as CETS, is also going through a period of difficulty. So far, the Europeans have not been able to agree on a common basis for the necessary world-wide negotiations. Besides this, once again you have Britain and Italy rejecting proposals for the development of a European relay satellite.

Things are not much better with regard to Euratom. Since 1 January 1968 Euratom has ceased to have a long-term research and development programme. France, we know, repudiates the supranational elements of the European Atomic Energy Community; and, as a result of this, naturally, its efficacy is impaired.

Then EEC, you will remember, within the context of its medium-term economic policy plans, set up a study group for scientific and technical development, known by the name of the Maréchal Group. This body made proposals, inter alia, for

a common European policy in respect of the following matters: data processing, telecommunications, transport, oceanography, metallurgy, environmental nuisances and meteorology. Well, as you all know, the work of this group is at the moment at a standstill. The Netherlands and Italy have stopped co-operating so as to apply pressure on the French to make concessions about the British application to join EEC.

Then in OECD we have Britain similarly showing the first signs of holding back in the sphere of scientific co-operation. In fact, of all the inter-state organisations, only two at the present time are working at all satisfactorily; they are the European Nuclear Energy Agency, a daughter of OECD, and the European Organisation for Astronomical Research in the southern hemisphere.

What is completely lacking in Europe is an industrial policy to complete the current scientific and research endeavour. That is the sorry state of affairs we are faced with today. And the reasons are pretty generally known. We, as parliamentarians, are agreed in saying that Europe cannot possibly make headway in these circumstances. And the technological fissure is getting wider before our very eyes. We had an admission of this last Monday in this august Assembly hall from the French Minister, Mr. de Lipkowski. Technical development speeds on its way inexorably, over our heads, and, unfortunately, it does not wait upon political decisions by European governments—which, anyway, up to now have not been forthcoming.

One thing comes out quite clearly from the excellent report supplied by our colleague Mr. Maxwell, and I find it quite frightening. He records the fact that confusion and dissatisfaction reign in the governmental sphere, no less in the European organisations—and that includes the Commission of the European Communities. From Mr. Maxwell's report, we gathered, did we not?, that it was manifestly quite impossible for our European governments to make unequivocal decisions. They haven't the necessary tools. No one, obviously, has an overall view of individual research programmes, on the national or the

international plane. Consequently, duplication and overlapping are unavoidable. Huge amounts of money are lost in the sand or disappear into the jungle of conflicting projects—for lack of co-ordination. Things just cannot go on like that.

I do so agree with my colleagues who have spoken about the political side. One thing that is essential is a new way of thinking over the whole range of international co-operation, but especially in the field of scientific and technological co-operation. We must also, however, be practical. I can say that we have been putting our minds to these things in the Committee on Science and Technology of the Consultative Assembly as also at WEU. I should like, if I may, to mention here briefly what our ideas are, and also to make a correction. In Mr. Maxwell's written report, on page 9, there is a reference to the proposal to form a standing committee composed of Ministers of Technology, within the framework of WEU, about which we had some discussion at committee level. I have to tell you that I shall not, after all, be making a proposal in this sense to the WEU Assembly. We have now reached fresh conclusions. Our proposal now is that senior governmental experts, not necessarily Ministers, should be brought together in a committee within some framework still to be determined. All I would say on this is that the desired framework must be wider than the Europe of the Six. And if possible it should also be wider than WEU, where Great Britain, as we know, is a full Member of the organisation. All countries without exception interested in the matter should have the opportunity of co-operating. The function of this committee of governmental experts would be to devise guide lines for common technological programmes and a common industrial policy. And another thing it would have to do would be to co-ordinate current programmes. No setting-up of new institutions, then—on the contrary—the application of flexible techniques. In those cases when all-embracing programmes prove to be incapable of realisation, there should be facilities for groupings with varying membership, always, be it said, with the purpose of securing maximum possible efficacy.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that this proposal fits in very well with what has been suggested by our colleagues Mr.

Maxwell and Mr. Beauguitte. You will note that in their conclusions they are demanding an analysis, sector by sector, of the whole range of European research programmes. This would apply to something like 25 European organisations concerned with one or another sphere of scientific and technological research.

A conspectus of this kind, Mr. Chairman, is the indispensable prerequisite for the formulation and long-term planning of common scientific and research policy goals for Europe. We are all of one mind on this—that Europe just cannot afford to sit idly by. Let us then at long last give her the tools so that she may finish the job. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman.** — I now call Mr. Rinderspacher.

**Mr. Rinderspacher** (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, we have heard a good deal this week from Ministers and parliamentarians about the so-called "new dimensions" in which Europe is now required to think. After the magic phrase "technological gap" which has now been firmly lodged in the public consciousness, the phrase "new dimensions" might well become the new slogan. It seems to me therefore sensible from the outset to demolish the mystique surrounding this new concept.

What, really, are we to understand by the phrase? At all events not, certainly, larger undertakings, heavier machines, more substantial markets, more generous supplies of funds and so on. It is much more a question of bringing out into the light of day the complicated structures and processes that exist, presenting them so that one can have an overall view of them and giving them a certain transparency, for the benefit of the governments and parliaments.

Now, this is simply not possible with traditional methods —the point has been stressed many times. It requires withal on the national plane—and still more so, of course, on the international—analyses of existing patterns, long-term forward

planning, not merely in respect of finance and budgeting but also looking ahead in terms of technological prospects. How, indeed, is a long-term science policy ever to be enunciated if there is no clear vision of the structures pertaining to current day-to-day research? How can new priorities be laid down when it is not known what is the ratio today between the resources being applied in the individual branches of research? Not only, however, do we lack information about the instrumentation of current research projects; who is there to supply us with a modicum of information about the research programmes? Whether it be the research programmes of the university laboratories, of industry or of state establishments, they are not devised so that they interconnect, nor do they bear evidence of co-ordination; and exactly the same criticism applies to the many international organisations and societies active in this field.

The situation being what it is, I find the contribution of the two Rapporteurs, Mr. Maxwell and Mr. Dröscher, outstanding. Mr. Dröscher has once again made it clear that henceforth there can be no separation between economic policy and political purpose. The Economic Community just cannot be brought to fruition without the adjunction of a Political Community whose coverage extends to both foreign and security policy. And Mr. Maxwell has made it clear that economic and industrial policy must necessarily be completed by a clearly-defined science and research policy, if Europe is to keep her feet on the ground. But so long as we have not tooled the instruments for defining such a policy, there is no hope of escaping from the dilemma portrayed here by several of our colleagues. And we must indeed recognise that the national parliaments can no longer exercise effective control. No Cabinet Office has the necessary overall view of the programmes supported by the various Ministers. How shall we know indeed which programmes, for example, in the field of oceanography are financed by the Ministry of Science, the Ministry of Economic Affairs or the Ministry for Overseas Development? And if, in the national context, there exists no comprehensive analysis of programmes and budgetary resources, how much less is such a thing discoverable on the international plane!

We cannot even imagine what fantastic amounts are spent by the world powers competing against each other in research projects having the self-same object, how much time and how much energy would be saved, and the process of development thereby accelerated, what capacity for the performance of other tasks would be released, only supposing there were an agreement on scientific and technological matters between Washington and Moscow.

Oh, I know, of course, how utterly utopian is any hope of attaining such a paradise. So, let us therefore get back to terra firma. Mr. Maxwell's report told us that there are 25 European organisations which in one way or another are concerned with specific lines of research. No country knows how many different organisations it participates in, or how many programmes covering one and the same sphere it is engaged in. Not even the Secretaries General of these organisations—as we have reason to know—are adequately informed about each other's respective programmes. And so long as they have not the information, naturally, they are unable to co-ordinate their programmes.

Wherefore I support up to the hilt Mr. Maxwell's proposal. The first thing we need in Europe is, as he suggests, a comprehensive and detailed statement showing what are the existing research programmes, what are the structures for decision-making and what are the priorities in the programme schedules for which budgetary resources are required. When once we have a balance sheet of this kind, we can work out some procedure making it possible to formulate a common European research policy. But only a balance sheet of this kind, which so far nobody has produced, will make possible a definition of those crucial centres of gravity which in the long-term context will pull Europe up technologically and scientifically to the desired level.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I have still one small question. Since we have the rare opportunity of having among us a distinguished member of the Commission, Mr. Hellwig, I venture to put the following query to the Commission of the European Communities. After the work of the Maréchal Group was

suspended, we understand, the Commission addressed to the Council of Ministers at the end of May a document listing the various questions involved in technological co-operation. What I want to know is, has the Council between then and now taken up a position with regard to that paper or if not when does it intend to pronounce on it? And what does the Commission propose to do if the Council, for the time being, fails to take a definite line about it? (*Applause.*)

## IN THE CHAIR : Mr. POHER

### President of the European Parliament

**The Chairman.** (*F*). — I call Mr. Reverdin.

**Mr. Reverdin,** *Chairman of the Consultative Assembly Committee on Science and Technoloy* (*F*). — Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not know what feelings those of you who are members of the European Parliament have in this Assembly hall. My impression, as a member of the Consultative Assembly who has been coming here for almost five years, is that it is often like being at the Wailing Wall. Session after session all through the discussions, a whole string of members from the United Kingdom come here to give vent to their impatience to join the Common Market. They are supported by numerous speeches given by their German, Italian, Belgian and Dutch colleagues. But all these colleagues know well that they cannot go beyond words, for no decisive voice is heard during such discussions. And the same thing is repeated time and time again.

It is surely to be admired that, in spite of everything, we do not give way to despair. At our last joint meeting we were dealing with the problem of the enlargement of the Communities which has been discussed for a long while, but in this enlargment business there have nevertheless been rather too many loaded dice and blocked moves. And you will agree that the representative of a very small country such as mine witnesses all that with some disappointment and, at the same time, with the profound feeling that having himself remained a spectator

of the game, he ought not really to speak as he has just done. If I have done so, it is because my European conscience cannot keep quiet. We are making no progress and that is tantamount to saying that we are going backwards. And yet, there is no lack of warning shots: technological gaps, space vessels, of which Mr. Flämig spoke, and which Europe does not have, although the moment is coming when man will land on the moon; the situation in the Middle East where everything is planned for us to set foot there, the occupation of Czechoslovakia. There are dangers in delay, and we know it. We should all like to act and we seek to do something in the field of science and technology, but we are "bogged down" in European contradictions. At the very moment when Great Britain is proposing we should set up a technical community she withdraws from the 300 GEV project of CERN.

Germany who is so active in this co-operation, makes its membership of this very modest European organisation on molecular biology subject to the adoption of the German language as an authentic language for the deed of foundation. The Maréchal Group is paralysed for reasons which are not always connected very directly with technological problems. France takes a grand view of things and has a certain tendency to confine grandeur to within its own frontiers.

Crisis is everywhere, the space crisis we are experiencing at the moment and which may or may not get worse.

What would Europe mean without launchers? It would certainly mean in the very near future a Europe dependent on the United States with regard to telecommunications and to a large extent for the diffusion of its culture, a Europe which is no longer a partner, but a dependency. Yet, if we are not partners of the United States, then that is the end of a true Atlantic community.

Mr. Maxwell has summed up this situation in a most impressive manner. The picture is rather gloomy, but my home town, Geneva, has the motto "Post tenebras lux".

We may hope that after having walked in the shadows we shall see the light of day. To be sure, there are difficulties, that is only natural.

From the domestic point of view, many countries have not yet chosen precisely their priorities. The moment is approaching when the credits for pure and applied research will no longer follow that ascending curve which has been seen in recent years and which made it possible to accomplish a thousand projects. Harsh choices will have to be made. And at that moment each country will be tempted to give national objectives priority over European objectives.

I imagine that many among you, especially those of German nationality, are quite familiar with the quaint feudal structure of the Holy Roman Empire. I feel that the structure of scientific and technological Europe today is not much less complicated than that of the Holy Roman Empire.

**Mr. Hellwig,** *Vice-President of the Commission of the Europe Communities (F).* — Neither are its politics...

**Mr. Reverdin,** *Chairman of the Consultative Assembly Committee on Science and Technology (F).* — As Mr. Hellwig so rightly says: neither are its politics, and that is very true.

And there is that fundamental problem constituted by the division of Europe. The Six, upon which so many things depend, are hesitating. No doubt because of industrial applications it is often easier to seek to keep numbers down to six and then gradually expand. But I am convinced that the true and only valid trend, the only one which would make it possible to mobilise our potential, is the open-door policy to enable all countries, if they so desire, to co-operate in programmes, whether they be connected with technology or pure research, on the understanding, of course, that in these projects commitments should also extend to the industrial aspect of the problem, otherwise we should be working in vain.

But let us beware! There are still prospects which will soon no longer be open to us. I mentioned in particular the case of rocket launchers. But in the field of nuclear reactors, too, where we have developed so many prototypes, the prospects of a truly European industry are not yet assured.

Yet, what is at stake, and Mr. Flämig and other speakers have recalled this fact, is whether we shall really remain partners. In fact, we are really concerned with our independence, an independence which, whether we like it or no, is guaranteed to a large extent by scientific and technological development.

To be sure, there are deep-seated trends in Europe which incline us towards what I shall call a Spanish mentality, that is to say a tendency to opt out of the world. But we are far too powerful to allow ourselves to retire from the scene. Europe cannot withdraw as Spain did some centuries ago.

And now, who is to take action? That is the problem. We all know that there is danger in delay. Fresh initiatives proliferate, that is only natural. It would be deplorable if these were competitive, for we would then be embarking on quarrels over priorities and copyrights.

I should like to say how much I appreciate what Mr. Flämig said, for he has drawn up a very remarkable report on all the problems of Western European Union. But it is not a question of knowing whether Western European Union, the Council of Europe or the Six should take the initiative. We must all pull together if we want to achieve something.

Three days ago, in this hall, we voted a recommendation which called—and Mr. Maxwell stressed this fact—for a survey of scientific and technological co-operation to be prepared and for guide lines to be traced which would permit Europe to make choices and exploit certain achievements to the full.

We can discuss whether experts or Ministers should be entrusted with the task. The main thing is that we should agree

on a procedure, that it should be open, and common to us all, that the three European Parliamentary Assemblies should all strive in the same direction and that we should stir up those within each of our countries who are naturally mainly concerned with national programmes by reminding them that these would be of no lasting significance if they did not lead to European programmes.

Just over a year ago, the Council of Europe set up a committee on science and technology which, within the framework of its general activities in support of closer European scientific and technological co-operation, is endeavouring to take action in its proper field and is crying out for collaboration with other similar bodies.

In his speeches to his countrymen about Philip of Macedon, Demosthenes shows admirably on several occasions what makes Philip so superior to his enemies, namely that when the opportunity occurs he nerver fails to seize it.

Yet, present-day Europe is far too much the Europe of lost opportunities. All around us, there are people who are able to seize opportunities much better than we have done. If we fail to restore a balance, particularly in the field of science and technology, it may well be too late. That is why all of us—and our little committee in the Council of Europe will do its bit—should endeavour to exercise all the moral and intellectual pressure of which we are capable to hasten the time when scientific and technological Europe will become a reality.

We are not starting from scratch. Many excellent things have already been done.

There are facts from which a lesson may be drawn, but nobody could say that he was satisfied with the present situation. We must all try to get out of it in order to do better. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Reverdin.

I call Mr. Hellwig.

**Mr. Hellwig,** *Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities (G).* — First of all, I should like to say how grateful I am to have the opportunity of speaking in this very important debate at the Joint Meeting of our two Assemblies —and, I hope, of contributing something to the discussion. Allow me to say a special word of thanks to the two Rapporteurs —and I hope Mr. Dröscher won't mind if I concern myself chiefly with Mr. Maxwell's report. My colleague, Mr. Martino, will be speaking to the political report, with particular reference to relations with non-member countries and the question of accession.

I should like to start with certain questions directly addressed to me. Mr. Rinderspacher, for instance, asked whether the Council had yet pronounced on the Memorandum submitted by the Commission on 15 May concerning special aspects of technological co-operation.

This was a supporting paper, submitted to the Council at the latter's request, to supplement the other documents dealing with the problem of accession. It has not yet been discussed in the Council, because the Council has not up to now had any further meeting devoted to these political problems—i.e. expansion of the Community and technological co-operation. The Commission, however, has taken its cue from the interruption of the activities of the Maréchal Working Party, of which we have heard quite a lot here, and has taken over the preliminary task of submitting to the Council its own thoughts on the results of the deliberations in this field to date. But the decisive element is, of course, that there should be a real discussion by the Council. So long as the Council continues to be occupied exclusively with difficulties about timing, so that its deliberations on this question cannot be resumed, it is going to be pretty difficult to obtain any results on the opposite side.

The situation will be rather different, of course, if there should be no return to the platform for discussion supplied by the Special Working Party on questions of research and technology, i.e. the Maréchal Working Party. We still have hopes,

however, that political wisdom will gradually prevail, especially after the events of this summer.

Now, as regards the situation in Euratom, I should make it clear that the research centres are not without a programme. For the year 1968, the current year, there is a bridging programme, and in this bridging programme we have a guarantee that our staff will continue personally to collaborate in all those joint undertakings and research contracts in which we were also involved financially at an earlier stage. At the present moment the only thing that has been suspended is the financial participation by Euratom in research projects which are being subcontracted for execution outside the organisation.

But this kind of co-operation through personal participation is still going on. What is lacking is an understanding, here and now, with regard to a new programme to cover several years, a so-called third five-year plan. The Commission will very shortly be putting forward the draft of a new plan to cover a number of years ahead, which it will refer to the Council in connection with the relevant draft budget.

Having said this, I shall now turn my attention mainly to the statement made by the Rapporteur while at the same time taking up some of the observations made during our discussion. The Commission would wish to place on record its special appreciation of the very frank and courageous analysis of the facts which the report supplies and to state that its own view with regard to the overall situation and the bulk of the conclusions drawn is not far removed from that of the Rapporteur; indeed, it is in agreement on many points. The Commission did in fact make an analysis of the various experiments made hitherto in co-operation—on more or less the same lines, though the presentation was somewhat different—and this was submitted to the Council on 15 May. We did not take up a position with regard to individual projects. Nor did we make any special plea *pro domo* for Euratom or for research policy in the Coal and Steel Community. But we did try to develop a critique representing our common view on the basis of the whole range

of experience that we have had hitherto in all these various types of co-operation. And the final conclusions which we reached in this way, without specifying any particular project—and which are to be found also in the Rapporteur's commentary—are as follows:

(1) excessive dispersion of effort—financial, personal and technical; (2) a feeling of insecurity with regard to the future of projects already undertaken, the requisite conditions for continuity simply not being there; (3) an inadequate analysis of sales possibilities, especially with regard to the market conditions obtaining as regards demand. For if large-scale equipment is to be ordered, demand must be aggregated. A glance at the conditions of the electrical industry makes it clear why there have not everywhere been really substantial large-scale orders from that side; and (4) insufficient and belated participation by industry in the projects.

If I have spoken of dispersion of effort as being the first point of criticism, this is because it makes a powerful impression when the Rapporteur talks about 25 organisations being concerned. Yet I am tempted to say that this is a very modest estimate. For you must add the fragmentation in the national sphere plus the fragmentation due to rivalries between national and European projects. And I think that in Euratom we have had some pretty significant experience in this field. I would say that this dispersion reflects, on the whole, a condition peculiar to the political and economic society of our time; for behind countless projects and organisations you will find little compartmentalised power-units, whether firms and industrial combinations, or administrative entities, islands of bureaucracy etc. There is no force capable of overcoming this state of affairs.

The second finding was that there is a lack of continuity, owing to the financing of all European research projects being tied to decisions taken from year to year. It is a deep-seated evil. If certain states suddenly withdraw from one organisation or another, that happens just because there are not commitments

covering a period of years; and conversely, domestic budgetary possibilities which change from year to year, understandably take a certain precedence. Here we must work on a medium-term view of what has to be done—and not simply on the basis of individual member states but also at the level of the European organisations. When I say this, I am thinking specifically of the Community of the Six. We are therefore unambiguously in favour of programmes and budgets covering a number of years.

Certainly, Euratom has shown the impossibility of a situation where budgetary decisions are tied up with programming decisions, and budgetary decisions can be taken by a majority whereas programming decisions require unanimity. With the unanimity rule for programming decisions of this kind—and this applies to many other organisations too—you will never get real decisions on priorities nor on a division of labour for the execution of the major projects.

The requirement of unanimiy for decisions on programmes as it has existed hitherto—and on this I can only subscribe to what the Rapporteur says in his summing up—is the sure way for Europe's ceasing to be viewed as an overall programme and being conceived merely à la carte, with the interested parties getting together only when they have a particularly keen appetite. Such is the critical situation besetting Euratom at the present time. There is mention of this in the report and I shall more to say about it later.

With regard to the third and fourth points in which deficiencies are evident—namely the absence of a long-term analysis of market openings—a survey of the problem from this market angle would very soon convince us that, precisely because of the small-state structure in Europe of which the President of the Commission spoke just now, the market pre-conditions for large-scale orders and for the corresponding demand are simply not there. We therefore invariably link up this argument with a statement of our goal—saying that the creation of an authentic large-scale common market within the context of an economic union is a decisive prerequisite for sales of the results of major

research and technology to be effected in line with the market demand.

Now we come on to the fourth item of criticism—and this point has been made again and again on all sides: the fact that industry has not been brought in or given an interest at an early stage. In this respect there is undoubtedly a major sin of omission, and it is conspicuous in the case of Euratom, because we have results of ten years of joint research to show. And those results, in terms of the fruits of research, are on the whole by no means so bad.

In the international context we have linked up with operations in the United States, Great Britain and other countries. Our research potential and its quality are recognised. In quite a number of sectors we are indeed ahead of American research; but the results have not been translated into terms of industrial production or marketing, so that we have today a profusion of prototypes scattered about, irrespective of whether the undertakings in question represent the first, second or third generation of reactor research and development.

And now I come on to the criticism which applies to us, specifically to Euratom. But I think that here you can count on a certain—how shall I say—self-criticism from our side. In connection with the research programme which we shall be submitting to the Council in early October, you will get a comprehensive report on all our experience in connection with the whole range of activities of Euratom up to the present date.

In that report the problem of nuclear research is tackled from the angle of industrial policy, energy policy and research policy in general, and it is very critical about what has or has not been achieved to date. The goal is the development of projects possessing greater industrial and commercial interest and reflecting greater elasticity and flexibility with regard to the further prosecution of research, in particular the development of prototypes.

To this end, we want to recommend the more elastic formula under Article 45 of the Euratom Treaty for the creation of "Joint Enterprises"; that is to say, we are anxious to move away from the bureaucratic context, with its substantial measure of state direction, in which so much has been done hitherto, and to advance towards a businesslike structure—to aim at the development of undertakings which shall be dedicated to the prosecution of the enterprise, enjoying overall freedom of action yet exposed to the normal risks of the market.

You will understand, Mr. Maxwell, if for this reason I would qualify your comment about Euratom. I think we must be quite clear what lies behind these critical phenomena. It is a problem which applies to all major research projects in Europe. We have to face the fact that a pattern of nuclear research has been devised in Europe which quite simply represents a top-heavy structure, in relation to actual industrial demand and available opportunities, so that we have today a surplus capacity both in equipment and in staff; and it is not a problem peculiar to Euratom.

The United Kingdom is faced by the same problem, as also are the United States of America. When budget resources become tight, then obviously there has to be a redistribution of those resources so that they become available in those fields where there is a specially urgent need for them.

From all this it is manifest that we have a major responsibility on the European plane, concerned as we are with questions of organisation, co-operation and the appeal that we make to the younger generation of research workers and teachers. What happens when, owing to the heavily political motivation of the development process hitherto, a large number of men can no longer find fulfilment in the research sector into which they have thrown themselves with idealism and fervour, assiduity and intelligence. We are faced accordingly with the question—and this is a problem affecting Euratom no less than our member states and other countries—to what extent a certain mobility in the research field and a spill-over into other kindred research

sectors might be possible. For us in Euratom considerations of this kind arise with regard to our research centres in the case of marginal spheres which are already being cultivated in connection with nuclear research: desalination (already mentioned in the context of oceanography), data processing, metallurgy, the technology of materials, biology in connection with the use of rays—as you see there are a whole lot of elements to be considered. I hope that we shall be able, in co-operation with the member states, to broaden our activities and transform the programme on these lines.

And now I come to certain comments which yet again attack the problem as to how things are to be organised in the future; these are relevant because the connection with industry has been specifically underlined by the Rapporteur and by several speakers in their use of the formula "industrial policy". This is undoubtedly a source of the greatest difficulties in our member countries and thus within the Community. The relationship between industry and the state, or between the private and public sectors, is very different as between one country and another. Undertakings, whether in private hands or under public ownership, which conform to the rules of the market have been quite rapidly integrated into the larger common market of our customs union. But bureaucracies, concerned to protect the right of intervention of the state and other public bodies, are much more difficult to integrate, and all our departments will have to face this problem in the second phase of the Community's development as it moves on beyond customs union to economic union.

As regards the organisational side of major research and development projects there is still one other factor to which I wish to draw your attention. We are continually hearing about the need for the interests of trade and industry to be harnessed to the public interest. But in this field, we have to look, I think, at the third, and what is perhaps the genuinely creative factor, namely the scientist, the researcher himself. So what we have to find is the appropriate form of organisation for a three-point pattern, a form of organisation fulfilling the following require-

ments: first, scientific freedom, without which the creative force of humanity cannot be fully enlisted; secondly, orientation of the economy towards the market—no longer, however, in relation to the traditional small-scale national markets but in relation to the large common European market and to the world market; thirdly, the public interest, which must remain safeguarded according to the political importance and the scale of public expenditure on administration and controls, but which at the same time embraces international co-operation—and not only in the European field.

We hope that, with the Joint Enterprises, and also by means of a certain reorganisation of our research centres, we shall be able to make some contribution to this development, on our side.

The proposal now is that there should be some kind of review of the projects already undertaken. I can say straight away that I am a hundred per cent in agreement with that. We ourselves have made an attempt of the kind. As I see it, there must be an analytical study of the profit and the loss, in other words, a comparative balance sheet needs to be drawn up if we hope to achieve real knowledge as to the functioning hitherto of the various existing procedures. So we fully endorse this initiative. I can underline what the Rapporteur says in his summing up, namely that the states must come to accept a system of majority decisions, and it must be understood that this implies a surrender of some sovereignty. I also endorse the Rapporteur's contention that existing investments must be properly used and exploited to the full. And, when I say this, I am thinking not only of investment in the sense of material outlay by the institutions but still more of the confidence and ability invested by those who are working with us.

Lastly, the question of broadening the area of co-operation. I must admit that in Euratom, although for years now there has been an extensive and wide-ranging programme, we have not, in fact, mastered the idea of the "juste retour" or quid pro quo. But the nuclear research sector has always been too limited in range for such squaring up of contributions and returns to

be possible. If this criterion of the "juste retour" is to apply, results will only be attainable over a broad field of co-operation in scientific and technical matters in which not only different national interests but also different national capacities can be taken into account.

I would likewise wish to endorse the conclusion with regard to closer co-operation between government and industry—to which I would add science itself, with its institutes and universities.

As far as the relationship of the government or the public sector to industry is concerned, out of the manifold formulas of which we have experience, I venture to draw your attention to one example which has made a most powerful impression on me: I refer to the relationship which obtains in the United States. We talk about the "technological gap" and *le défi américain*, but perhaps we should pause to reflect on the following fact: two thirds of the financial outlay for research and development in the United States comes from public funds. But the execution of the projects financed in this way is to the extent of two thirds in the hands of industry. This means that the state gives the money for one third of the operation but then, by and large, hands over to industry the responsibility for making the right use of that money. On this point one might consider whether the necessary elasticity and flexibility, i.e. the strict budgeting for success, is thereby achieved.

I will now amplify what I said about the comparative balance sheet, about comparative accounting. All of us face the same question—namely what are the criteria for a valid assessment of the success factor in this sphere of production known as "research". We all know that in production proper, if it is subject to the strict laws of the market and cannot take refuge in artificial protection measures, there is a built-in check on success. Research in many fields is not close enough to the market for the laws of the market to be effectively applied to estimate success. How are we to develop a system of assessing results, based on economic, technical and scientific factors?

My idea is that we must in this matter devise a somewhat mixed system. As far as achievement in terms of science is concerned, transparency, publicity, i.e. publication of results for inspection by the mass of competent fellow-scientists—these are the effective means of assessing results. Where economic results are in question, thought must be given to some means of estimating success in this way, especially if it is a matter of removing the so-called technical barriers to trade, unifying norms and so on. The fact is that behind the technical obstacles to trade, the *entraves techniques*, lies concealed in large measure the fact that national research and development achievements are protected, because otherwise they could not stand up to competition as measured by the international yardstick. And for this reason, precisely, the removal of these technical barriers to trade is one of the decisive infrastructure measures that are essential for the prosecution of major research and technology projects on modern lines.

But I do not quite agree with the Rapporteur and his proposals about setting up a Council. I hope I shall not be condemned for visualising a "Council of Councils" and for being afraid it would become Organisation No. 26 alongside the 25 we already have—rather as an attempt constantly being made, with some success, to make of Euratom with its claims as regards research activity a seventh Member: the pattern of six member states, plus Euratom as organisation alongside, without the co-ordinating role which was originally assigned to it by the Treaty. On this matter I should like to suggest how it will be possible to make headway in a different fashion. I am convinced that with the necessary self-criticism, and having in front of us the comparative data obtained from the sort of balance sheet I have been suggesting, we should find it possible to reach further conclusions.

I believe that by virtue of the process of clearing the terrain —because that is really what is in question—we have made a start in the right direction with the fusion of the executives of the three Communities. The next step will be the merger of the Treaties, with a single system of rules regulating the respec-

tive spheres of competence in this field. But we have gone further: I have already mentioned the critical report on the subject of Euratom, which we are presenting to match the new orientation of the amalgamated executives and which, we venture to hope, will provoke the necessary disquiet among the member governments so that real success may be achieved within the new context.

Now, as regards the question of co-operation between the Six and other European countries, I really need only repeat what the Commission said in its original opinion on the application by a number of countries to join the Community, what it repeated in its opinion of 2 April to the Council of Ministers and what it once more underlined in its Memorandum of 15 May. We hold that, even as things are, a variety of possibilities are open to the Community of the Six which have been used before and should be used again, in order to develop co-operation with interested third countries. A few examples are the treaties of co-operation concluded with the USA, the United Kingdom and Canada, and Britain's association in the technical and scientific Coal and Steel Committees. Then, there is the direct financial participation of Euratom in the execution of certain research projects in non-member countries, with arrangements for the secondment of staff. I am almost tempted to say: "where there's a will, there's a way" and, at the present moment, it seems to me that what is lacking is not the way but the will, and that this is the real reason why we are making no headway.

Nor do we think that this lack of will can be remedied by new proposals for new organisations. That is why we have spoken out against the idea of a new European technological community. Our view is that, if there is a real will, appropriate forms of co-operation between the three Communities and non-member countries could perfectly well be devised. It will, of course, require a minimum of—shall I say?—mutual respect and loyalty, precisely if we are to comply with accumulated obligations through the form already outlined of programmes and budgets extending over a number of years. And this co-operation, specifically with third countries, should, in our opinion,

embody without delay the co-ordination of commitments in the public sector: for that, if anything, is a potent instrument not simply for the division of labour which must be effected, but also in order to facilitate equalisation of the "juste retour" for, frequently, such equalisation may not be possible through research projects, but might be so in the form of production projects. That is why this aspect of the matter must be included in the range of considerations to be kept in mind.

And, finally, we take the view that it is a misstatement of the question to say that further modes of co-operation inside the Community of the Six must precede any talks with third countries.

We are of the opinion—we are indeed convinced—that it is possible to make headway simultaneously on both fronts and we have time and again urged the Council that the possibilities of developing co-operation in this way inside the Community should not be delayed by the question of accession of other countries to the Community; conversely, we have always maintained that there is no reason for delaying action with regard to the applications because of any idea that co-operation within the Community should take precedence.

Well, I think I can conclude my exposition. The President of the Commission has given us a quotation from antiquity, from Demosthenes. To illustrate the position in which Europe today finds herself, as I see it, I venture to answer with a saying attributed to Archimedes. One day a legionary of the new age—you will recall that the world of the Greek city states collapsed under the marching feet of those legionaries—strode into the study of Archimedes, the mathematician and physicist, and the latter was so absorbed and engrossed in his problems that he peevishly pushed him aside saying: "Don't spoil my circles." We all know what sort of end Archimedes came to.

Today, there are all too many among us who spoil their lives saying: "Don't spoil my circles", without giving a thought to what the consequences might be. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Hellwig.

I call Mr. Radoux and would remind him that according to the new ruling his speaking-time is limited to 10 minutes.

**Mr. Radoux.** — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should first like to say that I am full of admiration for the two Rapporteurs, since they were obliged to prepare their speeches in extremely difficult conditions because of the events which are now taking place in Europe.

Since I intend to express some disquiet with regard to the future of Western Europe, I should not like to begin without paying tribute both to the European Communities and the immense task they have accomplished and, in particular, to the excellent speech we have just heard from Mr. Hellwig. I should also not like to forget the great effort made by Great Britain and her friends in trying to accede to the Community.

The feeling which prevails after so much work in recent years is one of weariness; all too often we forget a few hours later what we promised here. We relapse once more into routine after promising ourselves to be reformers in the best sense of the word.

We Europeans pay great attention to others, we look at Moscow and Washington to criticise their attitude without realising that we could very much criticise ourselves for our own omissions. To watch what others are doing is a sign of weakness; we watch the achievement of the stronger nations because we are reduced ourselves to a state of helplessness.

Well, what is the Soviet Union doing; it moves like a spider emerging from its web when the web quivers, and if it can, it reduces to silence and stifles the intruder who has dared to upset it in its world which is presumed to be protected by a structure carefully erected over the past twenty years.

As for the United States of America, they often behave in different ways, because the United Nations, in which we must all continue to have faith, has shown so far it was incapable of

foreseeing and solving the problems with which it was faced. No doubt America would like to remain isolated, but events impel or force it to act.

And what about us? What have we been doing during that time? Oh, yes, we are still able to deliver in the economic or political fields very powerful blows to neutralise or paralyse one another. But, let there be no doubt about it, that does not make very much impression upon others, for separated and disarmed and politically disunited, we no longer have the strength to work out anything, let alone carry out what we might be able to do with regard to other countries.

I should first like to speak about France. I wish to make it clear that I am not anti-Gaullist. I approve the ideas upheld by the political group to which I belong and by my party. But, faced with an attitude which blocks so many things, which paralyses so many projects in respect of our relations with our British friends, I am a resigned man. And in addition to being resigned I am both unhappy and worried. Unhappy because nothing can be done if France does not make an advance. Worried because I am convinced that we are losing time which is so precious that Europe, whose unification may be closer than we believe, may eventually no longer be able to catch up, and that in the end we shall remain a brilliant second-class power; brilliant because we are what we are and have been, but nevertheless second.

A few years ago Mr. Michel Debré wrote a book entitled *Jeunesse, quelle France veux-tu?* (Young people, which France do you want?"). In one of his last paragraphs, admirably written, he said "Ah, if only there were a hundred million French people!" The answer to Mr. Michel Debré is that if France so desired there would be not a hundred million Frenchmen, but more than two hundred million Europeans, and on that day French youth, like the youth of other countries, would be satisfied. He added: "Efforts should be continued to build Europe." But he pointed out that it was not the Europe

we desired, the Europe of new institutions; it was the Europe of co-operation.

But, I hasten to add, my resignation is not that of a man retiring within himself and tasting the bitter fruits of loneliness. Even today, if we so desired, we could be more powerful than the most powerful countries in the world. Talleyrand, at the Congress of Vienna, had very few cards in his hand and yet he returned to France holding almost all the cards and leaving very little for the others who had begun before him and believed that he was going to lose and they were going to win. Cleverly he picked them all up.

As for our British friends, we are also a little tired of hearing about the brain-drain, of the young people who are leaving us because they are assured of a brighter future in the New World. To Mr. Wilson must be given the credit of being the first to realise one of the shortcomings of the Treaties of Rome—namely that of failing to foresee the irruption of science into Europe; and of having proposed a technological community. Mr. Wilson is absolutely right. But Great Britain is asking for everything. Failing that she has so far said that she will accept everything or nothing. This pragmatism has crossed the Channel and the logic seems to have been the first passenger on the new French hovercraft. Let me say what I think of this programme; and first of all I should like to quote Mr. Couve de Murville who was asked by a journalist on television a few days ago: "What, in your opinion, are the best qualities required of a politician and a Prime Minister? Is it health? intelligence?" As usual Mr. Couve de Murville did not reply directly, but he said: "I think you have forgotten one quality; sound judgment."

Well Gentlemen, as far as Great Britain is concerned, sound judgment consists in knowing that she may, if she wishes, join the Community. Sound judgment demands that we have another look today at the plans for political union. I am sure that when we have considered them, we shall find that not everyone was wrong on the one side, nor everyone right on the other.

I should like to put forward a proposal, in the belief that it would not deprive France of her prestige. Modestly, as a representative of a small country, I even believe that France would gain considerable prestige both in the present and in future by making concessions to her friends. As for England, what prestige whould she lose as an indispensable associate in the defense of Europe and an effective partner in the Mediterranean?

My proposal is, therefore, as follows. We Europeans, who have an inferiority complex, look at the bigger powers and are often one ahead in our claims but also often one behind in new ideas.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — May I ask you to conclude your speech Mr. Radoux.

**Mr. Radoux** (*F*). — That new idea—and with this I will conclude, Mr. Clairman—could be the one so many of us are thinking about. Everyone would take a step forward. The English would again become more pragmatic and the Continentals a little more logical. A group of Wise Men appointed by the seven governments and joined perhaps by representatives of other countries desirous of acceding to the Common Market might be set up.

What would its mission be? The Continentals, in addition to the arrangements which have been proposed, could make sure that there was no "arranger" and nothing "arranged" on either side. The British, instead of attaching so much importance to "all or nothing", could get us out of this frightful state of marking time. That would be a great compromise and would enable us to get together. The Five must say clearly to the sixth state that England must become part of Europe and that that is our objective.

But in order that Great Britain may accede to the Community, I firmly believe that the respective viewpoints must be brought closer together and that the British must accept the compromise.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — May I now ask you to conclude your speech, Mr. Radoux.

**Mr. Radoux** (*F*). — We should all gain by this compromise. We should astonish and impress the great powers. By looking at one another like china dogs we shall be playing other peoples' games for them and shall lose what we still have in the way of courage, desire to struggle, ambition to take stock of ourselves, becoming under-developed nations in comparison with those who will have conquered us once and for all. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — I call Mr. Cousté.

**Mr. Cousté** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is clear that three words and three ideas coincide when we reflect upon what has just been said on youth, research and the future.

The three words coincide and, to my mind, they are a reply to anything that can be said in pessimism and resignation.

Here, then, we have a Community which has just reached its tenth year and has had considerable success, which is now proceeding from customs union to economic union—a necessary step, to be sure—and will soon achieve political union.

Here, then, is a Community which, Mr. Maxwell tells us, did not foresee that research and technology are part of a common policy.

What importance can that have, once the six states have decided to set up common institutions for the precise purpose of encouraging, whenever necessary, whatever steps and initiatives are called for?

The cohesion of the six countries is shown by the fact that contrary to what some people think, for the first time attempts have been made to work out among the Six a common policy in research and technology. That was on 31 October 1967, before Mr. Wilson's proposal concerning European technology.

We must, after all, bear in mind—for it was a great surprise—the success about eleven months ago of the Conference

of Ministers of Science and Technology, which means that now we are no longer talking to no purpose, but know very well that research policy and industrial policy are institutionally bound up with economic policy, medium-term policy and Europe's future.

It is clear—since there is no gainsaying the evidence—that in the course of the past few months we have not seen the Maréchal Group complete its work. This, to be sure, is to be regretted, but merely because there are difficulties inherent in Great Britain's application to accede to the Common Market and because the consequences are feared by some of the partners, it must not be forgotten that in the last resort the broad outlines of this general policy were not only drawn up at the time of the Conference of Ministers, but that the Commission, which is the driving force of Europe and is required to put forward solutions, recalled on 2 April 1968 that there was no need of a technological community at a time when the Communities were being merged, as, too, would shortly be the Treaties.

In the memorandum which represents a request for consultation from the Commission to the Council on 15 May, we see very clearly set down the guiding lines of a common policy, that is to say, a lasting policy with the means and institutions to enable it to survive and overcome difficulties.

I hope, as indeed we all do, echoing what Mr. Hellwig has just said, that the Council will endorse this document and thereby commit the European Community not only to its policy for a European society which is necessary for the large mergers and large enterprises, such as are to be found in the United States, not only with regard to the European patent, which is equally indispensable, but also to its priority programmes which are precisely those of telecommunications, meteorology, and a series of other programmes which make up the six main chapters on research.

All this constitutes a policy, a hope and, with all the events recalled by Mr. Dröscher in his report, it may be said to bring out our responsibilities, which are made even greater as a result

of international tension. We parliamentarians, of course, believe that the political determination which we must now show more than ever—as must, too, the governments at meetings of the Council of Ministers—will make it possible to broach the problems with the resolve to succeed.

Our responsibility at this time is very great. But to believe that is possible to limit oneself to discussing 25 institutions in the field of research is to attempt to add up things of very different magnitude and importance.

Our essential aim must be to build a Europe of the six countries in all fields in which so much vigour and strength to that end have already been shown.

Yes we have confidence in Europe. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Coustè.

I now call Mr. Chapmann, who is the last speaker on the list for today.

**Mr. Chapman.** — I am very glad to see that Mr. Metzger and also Mr. Radoux are still here because I want to refer to what they have said.

I was particularly pleased with what Mr. Metzger said—that, in effect, we must stop complaining about the situation in divided Europe and that it is time for us to begin to forge the alternative lines of action now that the French veto seems likely to persist. I very much agree with what he said. We all share Mr. Dröscher's frustrations. We see Europe divided inside and unable to make progress. We see Europe unable to make itself felt in the world because of its division and powerlessness.

We must now begin to think of the next steps. I particularly welcomed what Mr. Metzger said, that yesterday in the German Parliament the German Foreign Minister and Chancellor began to hint that at last we were near the point where the Five must act without France. If Mr. Metzger is right about this, we may

at last be on the road to some creative achievement in Europe while it remains divided.

After all, what has happened in recent weeks? We all hoped that the Czechoslovakia affair would make a change in President de Gaulle. We said that perhaps that, at least, would make him realise that some kind of political unity must be forged in free Europe. But what did we find at his press conference on 10 September? He said to paraphrase him, "We have always been against the politicy of the blocs. Look at what we have done. We have withdrawn from the military arrangements of NATO. We have refused to have any supranational system in the Common Market. We are not prepared to have the United Kingdom in because that will bring America in by the backdoor." He went on to attack the action in Czechoslovakia, but at the end of all that he did not come to any alternative policy. It was all negative —destroy, destroy, destroy; create nothing new in Europe. That was de Gaulle's policy on 10 September at his press conference.

We come now to what has happened in Brussels today. Mr. Debré has turned down the German initiative for joint study of the possibilities of extending the Common Market. I tell Mr. Radoux that Mr. Debré has slammed the door on any kind of stage-by-stage entry for Britain into the Common Market. He is willing, he says, to have discussions with Britain about a reduction in customs barriers, but he is not prepared to have such discussions linked to eventual entry to the Common Market. So Mr. Debré has slammed the door once again today.

I would say in parenthesis to my friend Mr. Radoux that it is not the case that Britain wants everything or nothing. Mr. Wilson has said in answer to me in the House of Commons—and it is part of British policy—that Britain will accept a stage-by-stage entry, item by item negotiated over a period of years, provided that the whole process is linked to final entry into the Common Market. Mr. Radoux is in error in thinking that Britain wants all or nothing. We are prepared to negociate each stage over a period of time provided that we have the guarantee of final entry at the end of the whole process of harmonisation.

So I say to my German colleagues today: how much further are they going to be humiliated by the French position? They have been humiliated once again today by Mr. Debré. We in Britain have got to say that, however much we are determinated to fight for entry to the Common Market and however firmly our application will remain on the table, we have now to look to our friends in Germany and the remainder of the Five to make up their own minds. We cannot ask them to come immediately with us into other arrangements. That could be interpreted by General de Gaulle as our anxiety to break up the unity of the Common Market. We should be branded. We should be told that it was we who were trying to get a rupture in the Franco-German alliance by asking Germany to break away from France and come to some arrangements with the Five. Britain will come to arrangements with the Five if now we have to create them, but the initiative must come from the Five. Otherwise every possible exploitation will be made of the British position.

So I say to my friends in Germany, Italy and Benelux that we are now at the point, particularly after Mr. Debré's performance today in turning down all new initiatives in Europe, in turning down the German initiative particularly—and it was a very good one that was put up today—where we must think out clearly what we can arrange with the Five. It may be that we must have a package of some kind, some total package involving common items of foreign policy, a common approach to armaments and armament provision, certain common approaches to defence, common approaches to technology, perhaps an increase in the role of the European Parliament, possibly some element of a beginning in this total package of some supranational organisation able to take decisions on behalf of the whole Five. It is that kind of package that perhaps we have now to evolve as a solution finally to Europe for the coming years while de Gaulle's veto persists.

But I repeat that it is not for the British to make up this package. It is for the Five now to do it. We should be misinterpreted if we tried. We must look to our German colleagues particularly to take the lead and provide the initiative.

I do not mean that this would be a package denied to France. France would be invited to join, I hope, but it would be fully understood at the start, that if France refused, the Five would go it alone with Britain and other would-be applicants for entry into the Common Market.

Finally, I say to my friends that it may well be—I do not know—that before the Five take this final, perhaps irrevocable and very risky decision for the future of Europe, Britain must go and see de Gaulle once more. It may be that Mr. Wilson ought to go to Paris and have it out finally, particularly after Mr. Debré's performance today. It may be that Mr. Wilson ought to suffer the final rebuff. But, with the sort of arrangement that I have in mind, if the rebuff is final, if de Gaulle after Czechoslovakia and after anything else is still not prepared to do anything for the unity of Europe in the immediate future, if we are to go through with the final exercise of a face to face with de Gaulle in Paris, I hope it will be understood that the Five will then get busy as fast as they can to create the sort of package that we have been discussing here and that Mr. Meyers and others have mentioned in our debates today, and that we shall begin some form of new European co-operation even in the presence of President de Gaulle's veto.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Ladies and Gentlemen, two requests to speak have reached me for what, I presume, are personal reasons. They are from Mr. Cousté and Mr. Radoux.

I therefore call these two speakers, the time allowed them under the Rules of Procedure being five minutes.

**Mr. Cousté** (*F*). — You may rest assured, Mr. Chairman, that what I have to say will not take five minutes, but I must confess that I cannot allow the remarks made by Mr. Chapman to pass without a reply. I feel that he spoke on the spur of the moment, rather than after reflection, for I do not see how he can hope at the same time for accession of Great Britain to EEC and call for the latter's destruction. This, in my view, is something

inconceivable. I venture to emphasise that point simply and clearly, weighing my words carefully.

It is not true that the meeting of the Council of Ministers which has just taken place at Brussels, gestures were made humiliating partners in the Economic Community; nor were any "snubs", as you put it, proffered. There were simply, and that is normal, discussions among partners for the purpose of determining common policies and attitudes. Therein lies the objective of the European Economic Community, an objective which has its difficulties and its responsibilities.

That being the case, I believe very strongly that we European parliamentarians are intent upon finding the best solutions to the problem. But to seek to reinforce an institution, to benefit from its dynamic energy and strength while wishing to destroy its foundations, seems to me to be so contradictory that I felt it incumbent upon me, Mr. Clairman, to say so publicly. *(Applause.)*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Cousté.

I call Mr. Radoux, likewise for five minutes.

**Mr. Radoux** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, I was extremely embarrassed, I must admit, when I heard what our British colleague, whom I do not have the pleasure of knowing, had to say.

I am sure he is very familiar with Palmerston. I should like to remind him of the latter's words: "I shall not always have enemies, nor shall I have permanent friends."

I thought that British imperturbability would have made it possible for our colleague, sitting in this Assembly, quietly to recognise here today, in listening to the speakers, where to look for his enemies and where to look for his friends, and to know also who would be his partners tomorrow; something which, in the age in which we live, we should be aware of, although in his time Mr. Palmerston did not know.

I would, moreover, point out, while apologising for having to do so, that what you have just said, Mr. Chapman, reveals a certain lack of knowledge. It is the first time that, from an English source, I have heard speak of a package-deal. Even when Mr. Harold Wilson spoke of a technological community, he was well aware that it would be included in EEC, that is to say that it was a question of complete and full membership.

Therefore, I beg of you, on both sides, let us not continue with this little game, which is tantamount to dealing us a death blow, leading us to do nothing, and making us a laughing stock in this Assembly.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — The incident is closed.

That completes the list of speakers for today; the debate will be resumed tomorrow.

May I ask those who wish to speak tomorrow in the resumed debate to be good enough to put their names down before 10 a.m.

The next sitting will take place on Saturday, 28 September, beginning at 10 a.m., being resumed, if necessary, at 3 p.m.

I declare the Sitting closed.

*The Sitting was closed at 6.25 p.m.*

SECOND SITTING

SATURDAY, 28 SEPTEMBER 1968

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**IN THE CHAIR : Mr. DEHOUSSE**

**Vice-President of the European Parliament**

*The Sitting was opened at 10 a.m.*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — The Sitting is open.

## 1. *Resumption of the exchange of views*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — The next item on the agenda is the resumption of the exchange of views.

I would recall that yesterday a time-limit of ten minutes was fixed for each speaker.

I call Mr. Silkin.

**Mr. Silkin.** — I hope that I may be heard, even if I cannot be seen in this rather dark corner of the Assembly. I want to say a very few words, as leader of the British delegation to the Assembly of the Council of Europe, on two subjects which are linked with one another: the events which occurred yesterday during the meeting at Brussels, on the one hand, and the speech of my colleague, Mr. Chapman, who wound up the debate yesterday, and in particular certain observations of which I think led to a little misunderstanding.

Perhaps I can deal with those first—the remarks of Mr. Chapman concerning the speech of my good friend Mr. Radoux. I am sure that there was some misunderstanding between Mr. Radoux and Mr. Chapman. I understand that they have met and explained each one to the other since then, and that they are both very happy as a result, as am I. All that I have to say about that matter is that there is, I thing, nobody in this Joint Meeting whom the British would least wish to offend than our very good friend and colleague, Mr. Radoux, whom we have all known for a long time and who is a very good friend of Great Britain. I in particular have good reason to be grateful to him for his help in many ways.

What Mr. Chapman was seeking to convey yesterday was that the British attitude is not, and never has been, that we expect to enter the Community immediately and rule out any other alternative. When we speak about "all or nothing" what we mean—and I think always have meant, and certainly mean now—is that we will not be willing to accept in the end anything less than full membership of the Community. But we recognise that it may well be necessary and desirable, both in the interests of the Community and our own and those of our applicant partners, that the process of reaching full membership may have to be staged over a period during which adaptation would take place. Therefore, "all or nothing" is in a sense a misleading term, or at any rate an equivocal or ambiguous term, and I think it important that it should be fully understood and properly interpreted by all, so that it may not be used in any way as a reproach to the British and a ground for suggesting obstinacy on our part. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I go on to say something about the events of yesterday in Brussels which led to the latter part of Mr. Chapman's remarks. It is perfectly true, as stated by the speaker who followed immediately after Mr. Chapman, by permission of the Chairman, that all that was available yesterday was a short *Agence-Presse* report of what Mr. Debré had said in Brussels. Today we are in the more fortunate position of having a fuller report. I have seen a full account in *Le monde* this morning of what apparently took place. In essence, I do not think that the *Agence-Presse* report was other than an accurate summary of the report as given in *Le Monde* this morning. Therefore, I think that Mr. Chapman's comments upon it were, whether the members present agree with them or not, founded upon accurate material. None the less, we now have the fuller account and we can comment upon it.

I have always been one of those strongly in favour of the enlargement of the Community and of the creation of a united Europe, and as a first step to that the creation of a united Western Europe. I have always strongly believed that though there may be other methods of creating a united Western Europe than the enlargement of the Community, none the less that is the best method by far. It is the obvious method, the method of building on what already exists.

I have always recognised that this must inevitably give rise to problems on both sides, but it has always seemed to me that those problems are not insuperable and that if there is a real will to create a united Europe, then the only question is one of the choice as how that should come about and the obvious choice is the enlargement of the Community, and it follows from that that the problems must be resolved.

It is for that reason that when the President of France in 1963 gave his well-known press conference in which he declared his unwillingness at that time to agree to the British application which was then before the Commission, I took most comfort from that part of his remarks in which he said that although he

thought that at the time it would be wrong to enlarge the Community into something different from what it had been up till then, a Community of Six, and wrong to face an indefinite consequence of making it a community of ten or more, none the less he hoped that Great Britain would be able to come in in the future.

I was one of those who took great comfort from that and believe the General really meant it; and when he repeated it in his most recent statement concerning the second British application, again I took heart. I felt that one must accept the General's statement as representing his real belief. Indeed, when only the other day, in welcoming our new ambassador, he said that Britain and France had never been so close to one another as now, once again I took heart.

When I read what Mr. Debré had said yesterday, that priority must be given to the organisation of a Community before any question of parallel negociations for the enlargement of the Community can be considered and that one could not consider a study of the effects of enlargement (as I understand it) on the grounds that we do not know what the effect of that will be, because there has been no study of it, I could not fail to feel that that was hardly consistent with the logic one usually finds in the French mind.

I am much obliged, Mr. President. I am sorry if I have slightly exceeded my time. I will conclude by saying that, so far as the British position is concerned, the door has been shut and locked; and it has been really locked. But none the less our application remains on the table. If, however, the kind of statement that Mr. Debré has made is to be and to remain the policy of France, then we must regard ourselves as much freer than we have been in the past to enter into negociations and discussions with the partners of France. If France will not consider an enlargement with us, then we must consider it with whose who are prepared to do so.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Silkin.

I must communicate to the Assembly the following letter which I have just received from Mr. Reverdin, Chairman of the Comittee on Science and Technology of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe:

"Sir,

Yesterday Mr. Maxwell, Rapporteur of the Assembly, was recalled to London on urgent and unexpected business. He had to leave Strasbourg early this morning and asked me to beg you to be so good as to excuse his absence. He would be glad if you would kindly express his regrets and apologies to the Joint Meeting."

I thank Mr. Reverdin for his communication. Mr. Maxwell is, of course, excused.

I call Mr. Worsley.

**Mr. Worsley.** — It is a great pleasure to me to speak at this Joint Session. It is the first opportunity that I have had of attending such a session, being a new member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Therefore it is a great pleasure to me to have the chance of meeting with members of the European Parliament. If I may express a view without offence, I hope that the day will not be too distant when you gentlemen of the European Parliament may be able to achieve your aspirations to be a true Parliament of Free Europe and not only of a partial Europe.

I would like to address my remarks to Mr. Dröscher's report, and particularly to a matter which has been touched on by my colleague Mr. Silkin—the enlargement of the Community. I find myself very much in agreement with two of Mr. Dröscher's propositions: first, that greater integration in Western Europe, especially in the political field, is urgently needed, if as he rightly claimed in his speech yesterday afternoon, the events of August have confirmed his analysis of July.

At present I believe we claim too easily the privilege of criticising the Americans while failing to achieve that integration which alone could make us less dependent in the future. It is not anti-American to wish to see a united Europe, but it is anti-European to perpetuate our present divisions.

Secondly, I agree with what Mr. Dröscher said on page 6:

> "The reason for their unilateral suspension"—that is, the discussions on the enlargement—"lay in the sphere of foreign and defence policy and in the developments taking place there in the dissimilarity, if not conflict, between the foreign political options of the member state which forced the suspension of the negociations and those of the applicant states."

In other words, the reason for the failure of two sets of applications lies not in technical problems, problems which either have been or could be overcome, but in quite other fields. I would suggest in all humility to the Joint Assembly, therefore, that it is the task of every one of us who believes in the desperate urgency of European unity to try to establish just what these things are. And what better forum could there be than this for so doing!

Every one of us, I would suggest, must try to establish these reasons, and above all those representing, as I do, one of the applicant countries and those representing France. But I am bound to admit that I find it not easy to begin this dialogue. I feel a little like the man in the desert who has seen what he thinks is an oasis but finds it to be a mirage. In this issue, when one thinks that one has established a basic reason, one finds too often that something else takes its place.

Sometimes, Britain is said to be too close to America. It is true that we speak the same language—more or less. The Irish writer Bernard Shaw described us as two nations divided by the same language. Surely the reason must be more profound than that, especially now that the French aircraft industry has

cancelled a swing-wing aircraft project with Britain and taken one up instead with the United States.

Again, the reason is sometimes given as the reserve role of sterling. This is suggested to be a basic objection. Will the recent agreement in Basel end that objection?

Another reason given sometimes is our economic problems —as though we alone had economic problems. Would a satisfactory balance of payments on the United Kingdom account then solve the problem?

Yesterday Mr. Triboulet produced a new theory. He said that there were differences between the continental and the British ways of life and that these created great problems which were very hard to solve. He did not go on to say precisely what those difficulties were which caused, apparently, such terrible trouble in his mind. I wondered whether these difficulties perhaps included our strange habit of drinking warm beer with hops in it, or our eccentric habit of driving on the left. I wish that we could be told, because we need to know the true reason behind this attitude. We want no more mirages. We want to find the oasis. Then we can settle down together in mutual trust to solve the real difficulties. Otherwise one is bound to doubt, and the doubt is bound to grow, whether there is a true desire to expand EEC. Meanwhile—and this is the tragedy of the situation—bad feeling and mutual distrust unhappily increase from day to day.

I do not think that, at root, opinion in Britain about our application to join EEC has greatly changed. I think that last month's events have reconfirmed thinking people in the conviction that Europe must be united. But it would be foolish to deny that, on this issue, there is a lack of impetus and that there is disillusion which I think we share with perhaps every country in Europe.

We in this Assembly are working politicians and know that one cannot all the time stand on a political platform calling

for a gate to be opened which, as Mr. Silkin has said, seems firmly barred against one. I believe that this sense of disillusion is profoundly dangerous—indeed, that it could be fatal. I urge these two great Assemblies and their members to devote their energies to finding a way forward.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — I thank you, Mr. Worsley.

I call Mr. Merchiers.

**Mr. Merchiers** (*F*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like in the name of the group of Liberals and their associates to acquaint you with certain considerations with reference to Mr. Maxwell's report on scientific research. We can say of this report that it is drawn up in a very lively manner and is full of meaning, in spite of its concision. We would like to congratulate the author on a remarkable work which he introduced to us himself yesterday afternoon most brilliantly.

What should we conclude from this report? The author in analysing the present state of research and scientific progress in our countries of Europe did not wish to sound the alarm but rather to make us all aware of the efforts undertaken and at the same time of their relative efficacy, since the balance sheet which he has drawn up for us is as disappointing as it is realistic.

I would like to deduce a few guiding ideas from this report.

Europe, in the world competition, should be completely independent of the other blocs in order to realise by its own means the progress which is indispensable in peak scientific research.

Our Rapporteur, as also Mr. Reverdin, in his remarkable speech yesterday afternoon, quite rightly stressed that Europe is too powerful to abstain from this scientific and technological competition, even if it wanted to do so.

Whithout any doubt this report shows us that altough we may have reasons to be alarmed, there is no need to plunge into a debilitating pessimism.

Certainly the figures quoted are eloquent: 32 European countries are financing 25 different organisations. What does that mean? It means that all hope is certainly not lost, that contrary to what certain persons have written and said, the scientific spirit and inspiration have by no means abandoned our European soil.

Is it not indeed revealing to note that so many European countries, by their participation in these too numerous research projects, have proved that they were nevertheless conscious of this necessity? If Europe wishes to survive in this immense scientific competition which has, as it were, exploded, above all since the end of the second world war, it must be able to co-ordinate its efforts. What is striking, above all, is the fact that these efforts are dispersed, that these many initiatives, far too numerous, are disseminated without sufficient cohesion and above all without a guiding mind.

How many of these 25 research projects are overlapping? How much work is being carried out at the same time but in different places, work which, if it were properly conducted and co-ordinated, would obviate this profligacy of the mind and release scientists for other and far more important tasks.

The Rapporteur has rightly emphasised: first, that the technological gap in Europe is largely a divergence with regard to the techniques of organisation and management; secondly, that all European efforts with respect to science, research and technology are still at the stage of bilateral or multilateral co-operation.

That, in fact, is the real problem. It is the old spirit of independence of these peoples of Europe who have not yet completely forgotten that for many centuries they waged war against

each other, which is the fundamental reason why their actions are not based upon complete union and co-operation. We know that states which desire at the very beginning to create a spirit of association among themselves can do so only by means of restricted agreements, bilateral and later multilateral.

It is a first stage towards co-operation, but a stage where every country intends to maintain its complete independence, which necessarily limits the results of those efforts.

Is it astonishing, therefore, that, as pointed out in the report, there are only two technological organisations of a higher rank in Europe? And it is useless to say, as is stated for example in an exaggerated manner in the report, that "Euratom is a still-born child."

On the contrary, a positive and constructive spirit is necessary. A solution and methods of progress must be sought to reconstruct what is perhaps still chaos, maybe a chaos of quality, but one which, if properly conducted and guided, could become a fruitful source of knowledge and progress.

The 25 strategies of the 25 European scientific organisations, with their independent secretariats, jealous of their prerogatives, must not continue eternally to inspire the policy of the 32 states which are implicated. How can we discover in this jumble of organisations the necessary common denominator of their activities, that is to say, the European strategy which should preside over scientific research and progress?

Let us bear in mind what the force of circumstances has made of this scientific research in the two great unitary blocs which today still dominate the world. It is their cohesion, their co-ordination and their perfect internal collaboration which preserves them from fruitless efforts or duplication and which is able to place under the guidance of one mind the work that needs to be done.

Clearly, then, what Europe requires is the same care for cohesion and constructive programming.

We must be fully aware of the absolute necessity to create one or a few truly supranational organisations which must watch over the future and the interests of these old European lands.

For nearly ten centuries of civilisation this Europe of ours has given to the world the scientists and researchers of the highest reputation; she has been the universal guiding light of culture, progress and science and has laid the foundation of that scientific spirit which is the source and inspiration of progressive civilisation as we know in the world.

But this same Europe, too, has allowed herself to be out-distanced in the scientific race through her weakness and fragmentation.

Science is no longer a matter for individuals, however full of knowledge they may be, who in the past devoted their laborious lives to innovations likely to further the advance of science.

At present, science and technology are matters of complex research work in various sectors which overlap and supplement each other. Laboratory work is necessary together with teams of closely collaborating researchers, guiding and inspired by pre-established planning with a view to carrying out a precise programme.

This is the crux of the matter: that Europe has not yet been able to adapt herself completely to his method of co-ordinated work on account of its mosaic of states and their individualistic character. There is as yet in Europe little sign of that force, that transcendent organisation to which the many European countries engaged in scientific work could entrust their scientific thinking and programming and which would co-ordinate their efforts, indicate their aims and obviate costly duplication.

From all this, one conclusion, not scientific but political, emerges, and finds its proper place in this Assembly of those who are responsible for the destiny of Europe.

In order to put an end to this brilliant chaos, in which all those scientists of good will are working hard, we must put an end to this dispersion.

The Europe of the Six, a cohesive but not sufficiently powerful construction, must be consolidated and its guiding bodies must be able to win the confidence of the Six, not only in their power of reflection but above all in their power of decision.

Nevertheless, to realise the scientific renewal of Europe the Community of the Six no longer suffices. It must be enlarged by including countries, such as Great Britain, which have already given proof of their great technological qualities.

Our conclusion is, therefore, quite simple: expansion of the European idea and the necessary discipline to re-establish the greatness of our old continent. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — I thank you, Mr. Merchiers.

I now call Dame Joan Vickers.

**Dame Joan Vickers.** — I apologise for speaking from this place, Mr. Chairman, but I only had a chair and therefore no microphone. This reminds me to ask what is to happen about this building in the future. We come here only from time to time, but the staff have to work here all the year. I think that the unity of Europe would be improved if their conditions were better.

I congratulate Mr. Maxwell upon his document, which is in very clear language and in a manner which represents a new style in documents. I hope that the excellent speech that he made will have an impact and that this report will be studied and that action will be taken upon it.

Yesterday this hall was likened to a hall of lamentation. My lamentations join those of Mr. Dröscher because of the sincerity with which he drew attention to the lack of progress.

It was said by Mr. Triboulet "We are fond of the British but they have a different way of life." That is agreed; but during the 1939-1945 war many Frenchmen were only too glad to share our way of life. We then spoke the same language, and I hope that we shall do so again. It is just as important to speak the same language in peace as in war. Speaking perhaps as a woman, I have heard that Frenchmen consider us to be human. Indeed, Frenchmen often said "Vive la différence."

I commiserate with Mr. Dröscher. He has done a great deal of work and devoted much time to the problems with very little result. I would refer particularly to page 12 of the report on the Middle East problem. As is stated there, the problem can be solved only by means of a global treaty. What chance is there of action in the future? I hope that U Thant's call for a meeting in New York of America, Russia, France and Great Britain will meet with a response. Today the world is facing the most dangerous period in its history since the last war.

We have had the pleasure of hearing Mr. Eban here. He is reported to have said in Rome that he has a comprehensive plan for lasting peace. Let us hope so; but experience does not give much grounds for confidence. However, I hope that every possible action will be taken by the Council of Europe.

We discussed the other day the plight of the refugees in Biafra, but we seem to forget the plight of the Arab refugees. Action could be taken to help them with medical and other supplies, and this would also help the Israelis.

The Kennedy Round seems to be in difficulties. The report deplores that as a result of the merger of the executives it has not been possible for a single commission to proceed with the final study of the result of the Kennedy Round. How much longer do we have to wait for action?

With regard to trading with state-trading countries, what is the present policy? The report states on page 21:

> "In its new resolution Parliament stated its conviction that a common commercial policy towards Eastern Europe would make an important contribution to the improvement of economic and political relations between Eastern and Western Europe and the consolidation of the Community itself,"

I should like to know what Mr. Dröscher feels about that comment.

It is stated on page 30 of the report that:

> "Parliament stressed that the harmonious development of the European Community might be compromised if the Council of Ministers did not ask the Commission to submit without delay concrete proposals for the well-balanced regional planning of the Europe of the Six."

It goes on to state that Parliament regretted that, owing to insufficient action by the Council of Ministers and lack of co-operation between member states, the 1966 resolution on social and health protection had not brought any real progress. We have still had no final report on this subject. It was removed from our Council's agenda at the last conference. I am anxious to know, as the European Community was represented at the conference, what action is to be taken in this regard.

I do not think you will misunderstand me, Mr. Chairman, when I say that the whole report gives the impression of a feeling of anxiety and, to a certain extent, lack of security. If action cannot be taken and progress made more quickly in times of peace, how will matters fare in times of real difficulty?

We are grateful for the information that has been given by the Rapporteur and would like to know which countries, if any, are not really co-operating fully and what his suggestion would be for better working conditions in future.

The report refers to the political conditions for the full development and broadening of the Community. This can never take place, in my view, without the admission of Britain and some of our EFTA partners who wish to take a full part. Surely the time has come for the united Five to take action and, if necessary, to go forward on their own. I am convinced that this may have to happen. It will be for the benefit of Europe. NATO is a good example of this. Action has continued without one of the major Members of the Community.

I seem to be a very lucky: the light seems to have gone wrong, so I will just add one other point. Parliament also suggested in regard to health and social protection that:

> "the intensification of action to facilitate the integration of migrant workers and their families into their new working and living environment might be considered."

I should be grateful if this point could be further considered, as I think that if action is taken in time we may be able to obviate many difficulties that could arise.

I offer Mr. Dröscher my very sincere congratulations on being so frank and honest with us and on putting his report so clearly before us. I should like to emphasise the last paragraph of his statement, which says:

> "Finally, in respect of any concept of European policy, one must ascertain the nature of the political and social forces on which it is to be based, and the interests it is intended to defend."

In my country we have the interests of Europe at heart, and I hope sincerely that Europe will realise this. Unless Europe can speak with one voice I fear that we shall be lost in the future between the major powers.

My great plea is that, whatever form this may take, we shall concentrate on unity in Europe with all the countries concerned as soon as possible.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — I thank Dame Joan Vickers to whom the warning lights have shown their gallantry. (*Laughter.*)

I call Mr. Schulz.

**Mr. Schulz** (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, in his detailed and very revealing report Mr. Dröscher showed that the Europe of the Six, whose liveliest, most progressive and promising body is, in my opinion, the European Parliament, is—to use a somewhat slangy expression— bursting at the seams. Officially the Communities are required to concern themselves only with the tasks with which they were entrusted in the Rome Treaties, with creating an economic union and with the resulting consequences for the social life of the peoples concerned. Politics with a capital "P" were not originally covered within that framework. In this Assembly and on the same occasion two years ago in September 1966, I expressed my conviction that it would be unreasonable and an illusion to isolate completely the two areas, politics and economics, from each other. They are continuously overlapping.

But in recent years a further element of great importance has intervened, as we have seen from Mr. Dröscher's report. The European Parliament was required to formulate clear political opinions when faced with the challenges provided by the events in Greece or the latest crisis in the Middle East in the early summer of the last year. But Mr. Dröscher and the other colleagues of the European Parliament may well feel consoled. The Consultative Assembly debate which took place in this Chamber on Monday on the fate of Czechoslovakia has proved that this body of the Council of Europe, too, has gone beyond the limits of its official Statutes considered very closely questions of security.

Both European Assemblies which are gathered here today are thus to that extent going beyond the limits of their official competence. It seems to me even welcome that we can deduce from this fact how unwilling we are to engage in a self-indulgent

and self-sufficient contemplation of our own navels. The moment at which the need to go beyond these limits is established is, to my mind, an encouraging moment so long as the correct consequences are drawn from it.

Unfortunately, one important moment has already passed and no consequence has been drawn. On this occasion the two Assemblies should not have met at the end of September for their normal "Réunion-Jointe", they ought to have come together at the end of August for a joint session. Unfortunately that did not happen. (*Applause.*)

I should now like, Mr. Chairman, to say a few words about a report which made a strong impression on me and for which I am especially grateful because it made us aware of aspects concerning the future in a more vivid and convincing manner than I was able to do in January this year in my report on the Intergovernmental Work Programme of the Council of Europe. I am referring to the report of my colleague Mr. Maxwell. He was, I think, quite right to say that our emerging continent should always be in harmony with a developing society, with an ever-increasing industrial dynamism and its socio-political effects. And he pointed out that so far this is unfortunately far from being the case. I, too, have often felt deeply concerned at the multiplicity of our European organisations, but I freely confess that until I read Mr. Maxwell's report I did not know the exact number. The figure of 25 shocked me considerably. It proves how far the Europe of the bureaucrats has outgrown the Europe of the politicians for which we are striving and that naturally every European organisation or even every European mini-organisation is fighting for an extension of its official responsibilities which it then obviously has to defend against another European organisation.

From Mr. Maxwell's report we see that the technological gap about which we hear so much consists in the fact that Europe is not only lagging behind the United States but has hitherto even lagged behind its own potentialities, and the

frightening slowness of bureaucratic and administrative procedures stands out ever more painfully against the breath-taking speed of development which we see daily taking place before our eyes. I agree with Mr. Maxwell that it was important to say clearly that our inability to organise a political Europe was due not only to a lack of good will on the part of a number of member states, or to put it in other words, to a number of governments, but partly to our technological ignorance and our inability to deal with these problems in the right manner and to keep them constantly in mind when working for the political unification of Europe.

Perhaps, however, the pressing needs of the technological age could be helped, the tempo of European development speeded up, by reference to a political event with an unrivalled negative power of attraction. Mr. Chairman, I am thinking naturally of the crime committed in Czechoslovakia. In his report Mr. Maxwell has suggested that a council might be set up which should be given the necessary powers to enable it to deal independently with the far-reaching and large-scale developments of the future. He felt that the prerequisite for this would be to a certain extent the limitation of the national sovereignty of the states concerned. I agree with him completely in this. In fact I go even further. We should cease to talk shamefacedly about certain limits to sovereignty and should be quite clear that the Europe of the future can only come into being if we are prepared to sacrifice a considerable degree of national sovereignty.

In my opinion it would naturally be most desirable if such a council, as conceived by Mr. Maxwell, could be developed out of the European Parliament, could come out of our two Assemblies, could perhaps even, to a certain extent, be identical with them. But it would surely be an illusion if we placed our hopes on the speedy extension of the existing European Communities when the very events of recent days have taught us that the stubborn veto of the French Government is still in force and that it will continue not only to prevent any extension but to cause the existing Community, even internally to be politically less effective owing to the lack of genuine

democratisation that is necessary after the monstrous challenge of 21 August.

Mr. Chairman, I can only suggest one alternative; let us strive to create a new community which uses a maximum amount of energy, imagination, action and self-sacrifice to bring together foreign policy, defence and technology in our continent. The governments which were prepared to engage in such political collaboration—and that would be the first condition—would have to create an infrastructure with a definite time-table, so planned as to convert this collaboration into its logical consequence, the democratic federation of all the states taking part. The peoples of Europe, after the terrible experiences of this century and especially after those of recent years, are entitled to have a competent legislative body which would take political decisions, if necessary with only small majorities. They have a right no longer to be confronted with conferences of Ministers which are gradually sickening our public opinion since they repeatedly prove, and that includes the last one, to be futile because one government only has to object to a common measure and nothing happens.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to have substantiated my arguments rather more thorougly, but time forbids.

May I conclude with the sincere plea to the Rapporteur not to see this suggestion as more Utopianism which can lead to nothing. Even the Community of the Six was once based on a creative political idea, the Schuman Plan, and came into being as a result of that idea and so I am waiting now for the new plan on which the political federation of Europe can be based. If the governments are not ready for it, then our two Assemblies, even though they do not have large staffs at their disposal, should try to get down to the task from today onwards, with determination and tenacity. (*Applause.*)

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Schulz.

I call Mr. Federspiel.

**Mr. Federspiel.** — I would like to turn to the conclusions of Mr. Dröscher's statement on the political prerequisites for completing and enlarging the Communities. We have had further rude disappointements yesterday and today in respect of progress towards greater unity in Europe, and we shall probably have to live with that for some years to come. What can we do?

I believe we should welcome the many so far abortive attempts to prepare the way for enlarging the membership of the Communities, but I would like to look at the Communities from the outside, from the side of those countries which must stand and wait till the time comes when the doors of the Community will open. Do not think that we look at this without criticism. There are, in the Community, things which certainly need improvement. It is not in every respect an ideal world.

We could congratulate the Community on achieving an agricultural market, but the results of that agricultural market are certainly worth examining. Surpluses are piling up and production is taking a turn which does not increase trade; and we would be justified in coming to the conclusion that an agricultural market of the Six is not a sufficient market in itself —an internal argument for enlarging the Communities. I do not believe that even a Western Europe agricultural market would be sufficient. Two thirds of the world's population are starving and we are building up surpluses of unsaleable goods.

We have the tremendous catalogue of achievements of the Commission, of the organisation in Brussels, and much of that is impressive. But when we come down to conclusions we realise that most of this is inward-looking. It is quite naturally a question of building up the Communities from the inside. That is the task of the Commission and that is so far the aim of the governments. It is quite clear from yesterday's discussions in Brussels that it is certainly the aim of the French Government. What we are looking for from the outside are efforts on the part of the Communities to build up their contacts with the outside world.

We have seen certain attempts at scientific exchanges, but a great deal more could be done. We are speaking about European companies. Today one can form a European company with branches inside and outside the Community. Would it not be an appropriate task for the Communities to encourage and facilitate production enterprises, trading enterprises, across the frontiers of the Six? I believe that is a far more fruitful approach than our continued speaking of the political Community, of moving from the economic sphere into the political sphere.

What could we expect from political unity? Can we have a political Community without a policy? That policy must be a substantial and practical one. That brings me to my last point, the emphasis Mr. Dröscher places on the necessity of a common defence. We have tried in many ways, by reducing tariffs between the Six and the rest of the world, but that has failed. We have tried common enterprise in higher techniques, in industrial production, but those have been only very partially successful.

We have in these last months had the rude shock of force, of military power, being a major motive right in the middle of what we believed was a policy of détente and appeasement. I believe we must inspire our governments and the governments of the Six to look outside their own frontiers to the common defence of Western Europe and the requirements, social and economic, necessary to build up a common defence in which we are otherwise united. It might well be that this policy, in whatever way it might be approached, would be the road which we are all seeking, and to which Mr. Dröscher pointed, of achieving that greater unity which is a necessity unless we are to be overwhelmed by power in the future.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Federspiel.

We have now come to the end of the list of speakers.

I call Mr. Edoardo Martino, member of the Commission of the European Communities.

**Mr. Martino,** *Member of the Commission of the European Communities (I).* — Mr. Chairman, this Joint Session of the members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament is taking place at a crucial time for the unification of our continent and it is not therefore surprising that the discussion sometimes took on the nature of a self-examination.

Opening the discussion, Mr. Dröscher stated bitterly that Europe was incapable of fashioning its own destiny and facing its political responsibilities in the world.

And indeed, if we think of the powerlessness of our continent in the face of the grave events which closely affect us, we cannot fail to be deeply concerned and to experience that feeling of anxiety to which Dame Joan Vickers referred earlier. And yet it would be difficult to deny that considerable successes have been registered in the implementation of Community work and that some objectives have been achieved earlier than expected and to a greater degree than could have been imagined.

Mr. Cousté reminded us of this, and in essence the Rapporteur, too, recognised the fact.

But as Mr. Dröscher pointed out, the halo of such successes has become tarnished and it is increasingly more urgent to work out new strategies

I have no wish, Mr. Chairman, to deny the legitimacy of some of the requirements put forward by Mr. Dröscher in a courageous and almost brutal exposition, and I am completely in agreement with him when he reminds us that the obstacles overcome are minute compared to those which still loom up in front of us before our dream of European unity can become a reality.

I will say rather that the Commission of the European Communities, in a declaration published on 1 July last, after pointing out that on that very day the first great step towards the unification of the continent was taking place, recognised that Europe did not consist merely of customs tariffs but had to be the Europe of the peoples, of the workers, of youth, in a word, the Europe of human beings. And as far that Europe was concerned, everything, or almost everything remained to be done.

We said then that an immense task confronted Europeans. Once the customs union had been achieved it was necessary to bring about economic union: to elaborate or round off common policies—those to which Mr. Federspiel referred just now—which would transform the customs area into an economically organised continent.

Gradually the old national policies would have to be replaced by Community policies which alone could make the European area into an organised society with a general economic policy and built on a continental basis.

And we mentioned in particular three common policies. We said, Mr. Chairman, that after having done away with customs frontiers within the Community it was necessary gradually to abolish the fiscal frontiers without being subjected to formalities or controls at frontiers.

And it was also necessary to harmonise the monetary policies of the member states, in order to arrive, by means of monetary solidarity, at the creation of a common currency which was what Mr. Dröscher advocated in this statement.

Finally, Europe would have to make considerable progress in the field of research and technology, in order to raise itself to the level of the other great economic powers in the world. Everything that Mr. Maxwell said about the problems and prospects of scientific research and technological development, as factors in the political unity of Europe, does no more than

confirm the great importance of the problem and the urgent need to solve it.

Our Commission intends to speed up and multiply—these are the words which we used—approaches to the Council of Ministers to ensure that the Community makes marked progress in the preparation of economic, monetary, fiscal, social and other policies. We are also well aware that Europe must be provided with bodies which will enable it to become a politically organised continent, i.e. that it should be equipped not only with economic institutions but also with political institutions which will enable it to act and become what the historical declaration of 9 May 1950 called the "European Federation".

These institutions should not only have an economic character, as Mr. Federspiel advocated when stressing the fact, but should also have a political character because otherwise we should construct something very different from the European edifice which the founders of Europe hoped for, in which we have always believed and for which we are working.

Now, in order to do this, it is necessary not only for Europe to have federal institutions, but also that the Six states which today represent the first nucleus should welcome others which, dedicated to the democratic system, would be ready to accept the same responsibilities besides having the same rights.

That is the line which has always been taken by the European Parliament and it was this line which was naturally followed by the speakers who dealt with the Dröscher Report: MM. Lücker, Radoux, Van Offelen, Metzger and others.

If I recalled the declaration published on 1 July, I did so to demonstrate that on the essential points our Commission is in agreement with those who spoke in this Chamber on behalf of the members of the two Assemblies, and to point out, Gentlemen, that your concerns are ours and that together we can work fruitfully to bring about the completion of the work with which

the Treaties of Paris and Rome entrusted us: the unity of Europe. And "together" means by uniting all the creative forces which exist on our continent, casting aside resentment and malice.

I understand, Mr. President, the attitude of Mr. Silkin, Mr. Worsley and Dame Joan Vickers, the English parliamentarians who spoke this morning, and I was impressed, among other things, by the image used by Mr. Worsley for whom Great Britain's membership of the Community must not remain a vain mirage but must be transformed into a true oasis.

But I should like to address Mr. Chapman, in concluding my speech. He indeed seemed to be the most pessimistic of the English members. At least in the first part of his speech he spoke, in connection with the political action of Europe, of a sense of deep frustation. I should like to object to that, not just to take issue with him as did Mr. Lücker and Mr. Radoux, since it is easy to see that this sense of frustration exists and is very widerspread in Europe, but to tell him not to give way to it. In fact we are putting on constant and tenacious pressure; that is to say that we are preserving, in sprite of everything, a confident hope, and the future will show that we are right.

*(Applause.)*

**The Chairman** *(F)*. — I thank Mr. Edoardo Martino for his communication.

I understand that Mr. Reverdin, Chairman of the Committee on Science and Technology of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly will now speak in place of Mr. Maxwell.

**Mr. Reverdin,** *Chairman of the Committee of Science and Technology (F)*. — Mr. Chairman, that is not quite so. I merely wish once again to apologise on behalf of Mr. Maxwell, who after much hesitation finally decided yesterday evening that it was his duty to return to London today.

He asked me to convey his thanks to all who gave his report such close attention for which he was extremely grateful. Let me say here that that attention does not surprise me for it was an excellent report. It was the outcome of an attitude taken at the right time and Mr. Maxwell presented it to you with great verve and conviction.

More especially do I wish to thank Mr. Hellwig for the very precise and detailed reply which he gave, item by item, to the many questions raised by Mr. Maxwell. At the end of his statement we had the satisfaction of seeing, like two rivers arriving at their confluence, opinions converge both as regards the present unsatisfactory state of European efforts in the field of science and technology and the expediency of taking new measures to seek a way out of what no one can deny to be a state of confusion.

Nobody in this Chamber, it may happily be said, was able to detect the slightest anti-American bias in his remarks on technological questions. It is not a matter of beating the Americans or being able to vie with them, but of being truly partners and not candidates for the status of tributaries in the future. I believe that there is, fortunately, complete agreement on that point.

The most difficult question is, of course, to know what should be done. Those who are in favour of either a meeting of experts or a ministerial conference, have very rightly been warned—since such conferences merely throw dust into the eyes, as Mr. Schulz reminded us a moment ago, and do not lead to anything very much—about the inexpediency of setting up a 26th organisation. Nevertheless, to continue to work with 25 almost autonomous organisations, each of which has a life of its own and is represented in the countries by different officials, who make it their business, and in which what is often a very particularist spirit is created, is an error of management which will never deliver us from our present difficulties.

The conclusion which may be drawn from these discussions so far as science and technology are concerned is, I think, that

we have not yet found the formula which would allow us to impart greater unity to our efforts and thus make them more effective, for though our efforts are widely dispersed many of them are eminently valid. We must, therefore, show some imagination and also political determination.

In that respect—and this is my last comment—as the Representative of a country which is not a Member of the Community, I must say how much the present situation of the Maréchal Group is regretted nearly everywhere in Europe, both inside and outside the Community. Whilst the Conference of last October took decisions of principle, the feeling prevails that something is out of order and that if the machinery of European science and technology is not once again put into motion, there will be great difficulty in making progress in other sectors.

Once again I apologise for the absence of Mr. Maxwell and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Gentlemen, for your attention.

**The Chairman** (*F*). — Thank you, Mr. Reverdin.

We shall now hear the replies of Mr. Dröscher, Rapporteur of the European Parliament.

**Mr. Dröscher,** *Rapporteur of the European Parliament* (*G*). — Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, the debate just coming to its end was marked both yesterday and today by occasional bursts of passion, reflecting a confrontation or popular movement of our times which must not be allowed to die down merely because our own discussions here are over.

I myself should like to express my sincere thanks to the members who expressed opinions on the report which I had the honour to prepare. They have, in fact, made it easy for me to give my answer now. For the general agreement with the very critical and, as Mr. Martino said, sometimes almost brutal analysis of the situation shows that we are all aware of the gravity of the

situation and the task of this Parliamentary Assembly, namely that we must be the motive force—perhaps the decisive force—in the re-appraisal which will be taking place during the coming months and years.

Anyone who personally takes part in political activities, who is himself engaged in politics, naturally always has a feeling of dissatisfaction because—and I think it is true of us all—he never completely achieves the aim he has set himself. We repeatedly find that events prevent us from achieving what we really wish to achieve. If, in addition, we are faced with happenings as damping to our ardour as those of recent months, then it is easy to give way to a feeling of despair. But that is just what we must not do—and this was made clear in the discussion: we must not give way to despair and resignation. On the contrary it is up to this House and the political forces which we represent to take up the challenge of our time, to meet it—as Mr. Schulz so rightly said—by setting something in motion here, and not merely some Utopian scheme but action coupled with a willingness to achieve the utmost, to attain the limits of what is possible. Each of us must in his own way and within his own sphere of action try to set things in motion.

Now it is true to say that to engage in politics is, in the last resort, to look for and take decisions which will fit into the developments of tomorrow. That, after all, is our job—to analyse and then to take decisions which will still be the right ones tomorrow.

During the last two days we have discussed at length what decisions we should take here, and a number of ideas have been put forward.

In his report, Mr. Maxwell dealt with the oustanding importance of technological co-operation and how to fuse it with the political reality of tomorrow. From what I should like to call the rhetorical inter-action between Mr. Maxwell and Mr. Hellwig it became clear beyond all doubt that we can use that co-opera-

tion as one of the levers with which to perform our task. Technology will be one of the cornerstones of Europe's future unification. But before that there are questions which repeatedly confront us in the everyday life of politics, and unfortunately these everyday problems of politics also prevent a reasonable settlement of technological problems.

In his speech yesterday, Mr. Lücker touched on a number of points which were dealt with critically in my report, for instance as regards the successes scored by the Communities so far. Problems of agricultural policy and monetary policy were referred to. I know there are a variety of opinions about these matters, and I also know—and here we are all agreed, Mr. Federspiel has already said so—that with regard to the problem of agricultural policy we, in the Community, shall be engaging in further reflections in the coming weeks and months. We shall see that this example offers an opportunity within the Community to find new ways not only for international development but also with regard to our relations with outside states, because that must be one of the prerequisites for the full development of the Community.

I should now like to say a few words on Mr. Triboulet's remarks. Looked at in connection with what Mr. Lücker said with reference to the concern about the political aims of the Treaty and in association with the remarks made by Mr. Debré which are published in the press, Mr. Triboulet's words were, I thought, very interesting. If I understood him correctly, then the philosophy of the Treaty is not looked upon by his government so pessimistically or negatively as it appeared from certain press commentaries. That seemed to be worthy of note, just as did the fact that Mr. Triboulet underlined the role of this Parliament. I therefore hope that as far as the rounding-off of the Community is concerned—that is one of the two questions with which we are dealing—we can expect greater support for this role from our French colleagues.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Mr. Metzger spoke in what must be felt to be an exemplary manner of the task of a parliamentarian, to blaze the trail and to make statements which a member of

parliament is in a much better position to do than, for example, governments or diplomats. We are required to state our views clearly and publicly, and our very bluntness may well point the way for the governments. We should be thankful to Mr. Metzger for having spoken so plainly.

After a number of conversations with colleagues from the Christian Democratic Group in the German Federal Parliament, I feel that what Mr. Chapman said yesterday in connection with the role which he would give the Germans or like to see them play in the present situation should not be left unanswered. Mr. Radoux analysed Mr. Chapman's remarks critically yesterday. Clearly there were some misunderstandings due to language barriers as can be seen from the minutes. In connection with Mr. Chapman's statements I should only like to say that it cannot be the task of the Germans to act, for example, as the dynamiters of the Community. That cannot be the purpose of the Community policy of any of the Community's Members and it can certainly not be the task of the Germans.

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, a whole series of brilliant ideas have been put forward here, and there is no need for me to repeat them because anybody who wishes can read about them. No basically critical shots were fired at my report apart, perhaps, from the comment that it did not conclude with clearer proposals and clearer findings. Therefore I should like to add a few remarks on that point.

My task as Rapporteur was first to give something in the nature of a progress report on the European Parliament to the Consultative Assembly, which is the traditional task of this general report. This was done in Document 100 to which I referred on several occasions. The multiplicity of activities of the European Parliament makes it impossible to say something about them all here, apart from certain exceptions. Friends have told me that it would have been better to have spoken more plainly about the first outstanding achievement of the Community, namely its success in the Kennedy Round, which was itself a milestone in international negotiations because for the first

time the Six presented a united front. I did not dwell on the matter in this report because in the context of the general political topic set for this Assembly the chief call seemed to be for an analysis of the prerequisites for the full development and broadening of the Community, questions with which we have been basically concerned during the last two days.

I appear—and I said so yesterday in my introductory remarks—to have been outflanked in this analysis by the events in Czechoslovakia. But I believe that it was basically correct. These events have only really made more topical and plainer what was in fact taken as the basis for the analysis. Since the insecurity of our foreign and defence policies in Europe constantly reproduces the inability to develop and expand the Community we must remove these causes.

In conclusion, I should like to make it plain once more: there is no patent recipe, no general solution which can be simply taken up and treated as the egg of Columbus, but there is only the one mentioned by Mr. Schulz earlier, and I should like to say this once again: the courage to take up with renewed energy an idea which is not new in substance, but which in the present situation reveals itself as the crying need and challenge of our time; and we must plead its cause, not just in academic or political circles but in the street, in front of the peoples in all the facets of our nations' lives; we must turn this new movement into a popular cause, a cause for all the peoples of Europe, whose needs are paramount.

There is no reason to fear that we are talking of a Utopian illusion. A hundred and eighty years ago when the people were ruled by only one class, it was perhaps still Utopian to imagine that all could have a share in government. A new era has dawned from the socio-political point of view. What was still Utopian twenty years ago at the time of the Hague Conference, namely the idea that it was possible within two decades to create this Community which we now have in its economic reality, with all its importance, its fantastic importance for our peoples, has now been achieved. We can now set our sights to

take in the years ahead: and realise that we are dealing with a matter which may seem Utopian to some but which is the only way out of Europe's difficulties and therefore vitally necessary. Nor do we have centuries in which to achieve this aim, the only reasonable hope of our security and survival : it must, in fact, be achieved within our own generation, in the next twenty or thirty years. (*Applause.*)

## 2. *Closure of the Joint Meeting*

**The Chairman** (*F*). — The statement by Mr. Dröscher ends our debate.

According to the rules of procedure governing Joint Meetings no resolution or vote will be taken.

I therefore declare the Fifteenth Joint Meeting of members of the Council of Europe Consultative Assembly and of members of the European Parliament, closed.

The meeting is closed.

*The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.*