



FOOD for DEVELOPMENT

3

Food security in Ethiopia

dream or possible reality



For over twenty years the media has unanimously presented Ethiopia as being overwhelmed by famine and indescribable human suffering. Nevertheless the reality of the past few years would wipe away this picture. In 1995/96, Ethiopia had record harvests which allowed the EC to purchase 188,000 tonnes of cereals in the local market rather than importing it from Europe as part of its food aid to the country — a sign that the country will one day be able to ensure its own food security without external aid.





Concept, overall coordination and texts : Philippe Serge DEGERNIER - © PSD
Desktop publishing : Publiset & Associés

© EC, Brussels, 1997.

Reproduction is authorised, except for commercial purposes, provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium.

CONTENTS

FOOD SECURITY IN ETHIOPIA

- A COUNTRY RAVAGED BY 17 YEARS OF TOTAL NEGLECT 4
- ONE OF THE POOREST REGIONS IN THE WORLD 7
- THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF FOOD INSECURITY IN ETHIOPIA 9

THE ACTION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN ETHIOPIA

- THE COMMUNITY FOOD AID AND FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME 10
- THE EC'S MEDIUM TERM RESPONSE : THE MARKET SALE OF FOOD AID 11
- THE EMERGENCY FOOD STRATEGIC RESERVE 13
- A LARGE LOCAL PURCHASING CAMPAIGN 15
- THE EC'S LONG TERM RESPONSE : SUPPORT TO FOOD SECURITY 16
- "LOCAL FOOD SECURITY UNIT" 18

EUROPEAN COMMISSION
 Directorate-General for Development
 Food Security and Food Aid Unit
 200, rue de la Loi
 B - 1049 BRUSSELS
 Tel : +32 2 29 93224
 Fax : +32 2 29 93073

EC Delegation in Ethiopia
 Tel : +251 1 612511
 Fax : +251 1 612877
 Postal address : P.O. BOX 5570
 Addis Ababa
 ETHIOPIA

Local Food Security Unit
 Tel : +251 1 610912
 Fax : +251 1 612655
 Postal address : P.O. BOX 5570
 Addis Ababa
 ETHIOPIA





COUNTRY RAVAGED BY 17 YEARS OF TOTAL NEGLECT

Situated in the Horn of Africa, and cut through the middle by the great African Rift Valley, Ethiopia covers an area of just over one million square kilometres, with borders with Sudan to the west, Kenya to the south, Djibouti to the north-east and Eritrea to the north.

With the exception of the Ogaden plains (in the east) which are suited to nomadic animal husbandry, Ethiopia is primarily a mountainous country whose agricultural production varies with altitude.

Below 1,800 metres, cotton, tobacco and maize are grown, the richest areas are between 1,800 and 2,500 where production of cereals, fruit, vegetables and coffee (the principal cash crop) is possible. Above 2,500 metres, the climatic conditions allow only barley and animal rearing.

Despite having the necessary conditions for food security (vast tracts of arable land, a climate which is generally favourable to agriculture), a entire generation of the Ethiopian population fell victim to terrible famine due more to the political choices of the authorities than to climatic conditions. In 1974 a military coup d'Etat overthrew Haile Selassie's imperial regime, which foundered in the midst of a famine which claimed at least 200,000 lives. Power was monopolised by a committee — the Derg — of military personnel which established an authoritarian State based on socialist lines. In 1977 Lieutenant-Colonel Haile Miriam Mengistu emerged to take control of the Derg and tortured or eliminated his opponents. With Russian and Cuban support Mengistu imposed a totalitarian military regime to put an end to the various rebellions in the country, particularly in Eritrea, and to embark on a war against Somalia in 1977/78.


Victim of the drought in 1984.



In 1984/85 a famine of unprecedented scale took hold of the country, especially in the north, causing the death of hundreds of thousands of people. Drought was officially declared to be the cause of the crisis, but in fact a decade of policies pursued by the authorities was the primary cause. These policies brought about a fall in agricultural production because it was based on meeting the needs of urban consumers to the detriment of the small producers. Moreover, in the north of the country ravaged by the Eritrean's war of liberation, the policies of repression greatly enfeebled the local peasants who found their cereal stocks and their herds destroyed or commandeered by the military. As a result the peasants no longer had the necessary resources to survive the drought when it struck in 1983/4.

FACTS AND FIGURES

- **Land area** : 1,098,000 square kilometres.
- **Population** : 58 million inhabitants.
- **Capital** : Addis Abeba.
- **National currency** : Birr.
- **Annual inflation** : 3 %.
- **Languages** : English, Amharic, Oromo, Tigrenya, Somali, Afar, etc.
- **Per capita GNP** : US\$ 130.
- **Population growth rate** : 3.1 % per year.
- **Urbanised population** : 16 %.



© 1994 Magellan GeographixSM Santa Barbara CA

Throughout 1984 the government suppressed all information concerning the gravity of the situation. It was not until the end of 1984 that the first pictures were beamed around the planet and the international community set in train the distribution of approximately 1.200.000 tonnes of food aid throughout 1995. At this time, the government put in place a new policy to increase agricultural production and combat drought (and also to undermine the basis of rebellion in the regions concerned) by the transfer of 600,000 peasants from the relatively unproductive north to fertile lands in the south. This policy of forced relocation used the leverage of food aid to oblige famished peasants to leave their land and report to distribution centres which also served as transit centres. These population movements took place in deplorable conditions (forced relocation, separation of families, lack of basic facilities in the camps, etc.) with very poor results, since the displaced peasants did not have any experience of the new land which although described as fertile was often marshy or unhealthy. Unaccustomed to the climatic conditions, these peasants died from hunger or malaria, and suffered from the absence of arrangements for their arrival as well as

the hostility of the existing inhabitants. The main consequences of this operation were the destabilising of agricultural production in the north and the further impoverishment of the displaced populations.

Another government policy further destroyed the Ethiopian agricultural system — villagisation. Starting in 1985, the objective was to regroup the peasants from the rich central agricultural regions, who lived in dispersed habitations, and created new sites which according to the government were more suitable to their economic and



Unloading EC emergency aid in the region of Mekelle.



social development. This measure profoundly and permanently undermined Ethiopian society. Combined with the policy of relocation and with drought, it resulted in another foreseeable famine in 1987.

These policies linked with the struggle against the rebellion — 46 % of the Ethiopian State budget went on the war effort — pushed the essentially agriculture-based economy into chaos. The abandonment of the regime by its Russian supporters precipitated its fall. Although equipped with a powerful army, the Derg did not hold out long against the aggression of the combined Tigray,

Eritrea and Oromo resistance armies. In 1990 the Eritrean Liberation Front captured the port of Masawa and cut the Ethiopian army's supply lines, whilst the Tigrean Liberation Front advanced towards Addis Ababa. In May 1991 Mengistu fled the country and the rebel forces seized Addis Ababa. In July of the same year a national conference uniting the principal political organisations of the country named Meles Zenawi President at the head of a transitional government. This brought to an end 17 years of a dictatorial regime which, through its misguided policies, brought agricultural production and the entire economy to its knees.

ONE OF THE POOREST REGIONS IN THE WORLD



Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. The Human Development Index produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) puts Ethiopia at 161st place, out of 173 countries. Under the old regime, the Ethiopian economy's growth rate was one of the lowest of all developing countries. The per capita GNP stagnated between \$100 and \$125 and today even when compared with other developing countries in the sub-continent Ethiopia is still one of the poorest. The central planning policies of the old regime left the economy dramatically under-capitalised, uncompetitive, undiversified, and without markets. At the dictatorship's end, the economy was operating at only 10 % capacity.

Even in the area of external trade the country still specialises in agricultural products, with 50 % of exports made up of coffee, 15 % leather, and 7 % other agricultural products such as peanut seed, sugar, and vegetables. In contrast, the manufacturing sector remains under-developed and largely dominated by public companies. A lack of raw materials and foreign currency, obsolete machinery and a problematic energy supply are amongst the primary difficulties in this sector.

Despite its collapse during the 1980s, agriculture is still the pillar of the Ethiopian economy. This sector accounts for 90 % of the population. Despite significant investment in State farms carried out by the old regime, cereals — the staple food for the majority of the population — are mostly produced by relatively poor small producers, who are isolated and who work the land without any inputs. Unfortunately the small producers were ignored by the former regime for a long time and suffered from policies protecting the interests of consumers, (with an artificially low price), from the lack of investment in roads and transport, and from the lack of development of cereal markets.



Coffee harvesting. Coffee remains one of the main cash crop in Ethiopia.

Since the establishment of the new regime, reforms have been introduced to liberalise the economy and make it more competitive, in an effort to increase growth. To this end the Ethiopian Birr was devalued by approximately 50 % in October 1992, and a flexible exchange rate policy was adopted in 1993. Today macro economics are characterised by a real deregulation and foreign trade has improved. New codes governing investment, work and public companies were enacted in 1992. The transport sector has also been liberalised and subsidies for agricultural inputs have been progressively reduced. Moreover, as part of the process of tax reforms, the 30 % tax on commercial importation of cereals was brought down to 5 % in January 1996. This reform should substantially increase commercial imports, previously discouraged, and so reduce importation of food aid.



Because of the nature of the old regime, Ethiopia for a long time received the smallest level of external aid per capita of Sub-Saharan Africa. From the beginning of 1991, following the transition of power, and in order to make up for lost time, 11 donors launched a reconstruction programme (Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Programme - ERRP). This initiative was followed by an agreement between the Ethiopian government and the Bretton Woods' institutions on a programme for economic reforms. As a consequence the IMF released a structural adjustment facility. In this context, the EC gave its agreement in 1993 for a structural adjustment facility of ECU 75 million as a budgetary support for social expenditures. The objective of this allocation was to mitigate the burden of the economic reforms. In 1993 Ethiopia's donors meeting in the form of the Paris Club granted a significant easing of the country's debt. Unfortunately these reforms are not enough in the short term to end the country's food security problems.



The major aspects of food insecurity in Ethiopia

The majority of the Ethiopian population spends between 60 % and 70 % of the household budget on food. In urban and semi-urban areas, this proportion can rise to 80 %. Moreover, for the poorest of the poor, supplies of firewood represent a further 14 % of the family budget. This situation reveals the great vulnerability of the population to price rises and/or reductions in income. In these scenarios, being poor means being unable to cover the most basic physical necessities of life. At the moment 26 million people, almost half of the population of Ethiopia, are living in extreme poverty.

Each year 4 million individuals need to be assisted because they are unable to feed themselves. In times of drought, this figure rises to over 7 million. 75 % of people in a precarious food situation are classified as rural poor. The remaining 25 % are from urban populations. There is malnutrition in the population, even in years when the country is not struck by drought.

The country's structural cereals deficit (the balance between national consumption and the availability of food after importation) is in the region of approximately one million tonnes. During a year of normal production, even with an individual energy intake the equivalent of 80 % of the minimum level to lead a healthy and active life, the country's cereals deficit is estimated at 15 % of production. This deficit rises to 50 % (3 million tonnes) if one allows for a rise in calorific intake to the full 100 % of the minimum level (2,100 calories per person per day).

The country's chronic food insecurity is due to three factors which are distinct but nevertheless linked. First of all there is insufficient production/supply, with the development of supply being hampered by unsuitable agricultural production techniques, a high number of smallholdings which only allow traditional agriculture, environmental degradation, irregular rainfall, lack of inputs and credit, pre and post-harvest losses as well as undeveloped trading structures. On the demand side, the weak purchasing power created by the endemic poverty of the population is preventing the development of market conditions which could encourage an increase in production. Finally historical factors (with the economy having experienced years of negligence and war) plays on these first two factors since the country has to overcome several years of war, famines and neglect of food security. It goes without saying that the constant rise in population, which is greater than the rise in agricultural production, can only exacerbate this over-

whelming state of affairs through the effect on the environment and the degradation of soils caused by the extension of cultivated areas, and the destruction of forest caused by the collection of firewood.

Searching for firewood is one of the main causes of deforestation.




The vast majority of small producers are still involved in traditional farming.

THE EC'S FOOD AID AND FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME

Measures taken by the EC to resolve Ethiopia's food deficit and food security problems are a clear demonstration of the EC's new priorities for development aid — to integrate food aid as an instrument in support of a realistic policy of food security. On its own, a simple annual allocation of food aid cannot be a long term solution to significantly improve the food security of the Ethiopian population. Ethiopia has land which is productive enough to improve its agricultural production with appropriate techniques. With this in mind, since 1994 the EC has developed a two-pronged approach consisting of, in the medium term, the allocation of food aid to absorb part of the chronic deficit, and in the long term activities in support of a national food security policy. In this way the following actions have been funded :

- Market sales of food aid to partially cover the food deficit in urban areas, with the establishment of counterpart funds ;
- Partial restocking of the Emergency Food Strategic Reserve which is spread across the country ;
- An unprecedented campaign of local purchase to support the market and encourage production ;
- Food aid made available to NGOs (non governmental organisations) and the WFP (United Nations World Food Programme) to set up projects with a food component (to combat the food deficit) ;
- Through the use of counterpart funds, targeted budgetary support as part of the process of structural adjustment ;
- The financing of store construction as part of a programme to address the deficiencies in this area ;
- The financing of a study on the development of a long term strategy for food security ;
- The financing of government food security activities.



THE EXTENT OF COMMUNITY FOOD AID

In 1994 and 1995, Ethiopia was the largest recipient of Community food aid with a total of ECU 74.5 million in 1994 and ECU 75.6 million — more than 300,000 tonnes — in 1995 (this aid amounts to approximately 15 % of the total food aid budget in each year). Moreover, for the first time 188,000 tonnes was purchased in an unprecedented programme of local purchase.

THE EC'S MEDIUM TERM RESPONSE : THE MARKET SALE OF FOOD AID



Unloading EC food aid bought locally.



In 1994 and 1995 the EC allocated food aid (called direct aid because it is placed directly without passing through another agency to the government of the country concerned) in the form of cereals to partially cover the country's chronic food deficit. In accordance with its policy, the EC does not hand out its food aid freely in the country, but sells it so as not to upset the market and precipitate a fall in the price to producers and so reduce the income of small producers. The proceeds from the sale of this aid allocated to the Ethiopian government constitute counterpart funds that are used to provide targeted budgetary assistance as part of the national structural adjustment

programme. The aid is therefore structural and integrated into a wider policy of food security and the economic rehabilitation of the country.

In 1994, 13,000 tonnes of wheat (with a total value of ECU 26.5 million, freight costs included) was allocated to Ethiopia by the EC. An initial tranche of this aid (50,000 tonnes) was provided to partially cover the food deficit in Addis Ababa in June. It is at this period that the price of wheat fluctuates widely and impacts on the price of bread. This aid therefore contributed to a stabilisation of prices, enabling poor urban consumers to buy bread. A parastatal organisation (Ethiopian



Grain Trade Enterprise) effected the sale of the wheat to the mills who, in their turn, sold the wheat to the bakers owned by the city administration (under the kebele system). The second tranche, 80,000 tonnes of wheat, was provided to the Emergency Strategic Food Reserve in response to the first signs of a famine.

In 1995, the EC set aside a total sum of ECU 75.6 million to finance food aid amounting to a total of 292,304 tonnes as well as ECU 10 million to buy various products. Of this total, the EC provided 150,000 tonnes in direct aid, 96,304 tonnes via NGOs and 46,000 tonnes through WFP. The 150,000 tonnes of direct aid came in two equal tranches of 75,000 tonnes. One of these, as in 1994, was sold in the markets to increase the availability of bread to disadvantaged urban groups. This action also helped the country's balance of payments by avoiding additional imports of food. The other tranche went to restock the Emergency Food Strategic Reserve.



In 1996 no direct aid was allocated in the light of a record 21 % rise in agricultural production. The main cereals harvest went from 9.7 million tonnes in 1995 to 11.7 million tonnes in 1996. The provision of the second tranche of 75,000 tonnes for the national reserve was carried out during 1996 by local cereals purchase. So as not to swell the markets with food aid, only one indirect allocation of 88,000 tonnes of cereals via WFP and NGOs was planned over and above financial allocations to support other activities supporting food security.

THE EMERGENCY FOOD STRATEGIC RESERVE



For over twenty years in Ethiopia there has been a clear need for a food security reserve to deal with the chronic deficit in "effective demand" — that is to say the people's inability to obtain the food necessary to their survival, given their pronounced poverty (and therefore the weakness of their purchasing power). Following a study on the country's food security problems carried out by the United Nations in 1974 the Emergency Food Strategic Reserve (EFSR) was created in 1982, the principal objective being to ensure rapid provision of food supplies in case of sudden scarcity.



EFSR's warehouse.

Under the old regime the EFSR never functioned properly because, although the administrative procedures for releases of stock (including donor participation) were clearly and formally agreed, they were never applied to the satisfaction of the donors. Therefore, the EFSR was never able to achieve its objective of bringing real aid to those in need due to the lack of transparency in its management and the former regimes manipulation of the system in support of policies which were outside of its intended purpose (for example the relocation policy).

In October 1992 the EFSR came under independent administrative management and began to build a reputation for efficient and viable management which earned the confidence of the donor community. In that year the EFSR's capacity was set to rise to 205,000 tonnes in the short term, 307,000 tonnes in the medium term. The basis for arriving at the medium term objective

was a calculation of the quantity of food necessary to feed the vulnerable Ethiopian population for four months on 400 grams per person and per day. Four months was the minimum period before the government could receive aid from the donors in a time of crisis. The EFSR with the assistance of the donors (including the EC) and the Ethiopian government embarked on a vast programme of storage site construction which, at the end of 1995 took the storage capacity to 216,000 tonnes (capacity was only 36,490 tonnes in 1992). The locations of stores were chosen according to precise and rational criteria : to be close to regions repeatedly affected by drought, to be accessible to heavy goods vehicles, to give a reduction in administrative and operational costs and to allow for the planning of recycling or rotation of stocks. To this effect, stores were concentrated in five places : Mekelle, Kombolcha, Nazareth, Shasheme, and Dire Dawa.



*Stocking local purchases
carried out by the EC.*

In its 1994 programme the EC allocated 80,000 tonnes of food aid to the EFSR in response to the beginnings of a famine caused by a substantial drop in the harvest against earlier predictions, especially in the north of the country. At the same time a re-evaluation of vulnerable people (drought victims, the displaced and returnees, victims of war, etc.) was carried out in the country which showed that their number had risen by 25 % to reach over 6 million potential beneficiaries. This allocation enabled the EFSR to reinforce its capacity to intervene in the face of this increase in the number of people unable to guarantee their food needs.

These 80,000 tonnes were delivered in October/November 1994. From the point of view of mobilisation, this operation was novel in so far as it was the first time Community food aid to Ethiopia had been delivered to its final destination (instead of to the port of entry). Cargoes were delivered to four different places by journeys

of sometimes up to 1,000 kilometres by road. Despite the long journeys and working conditions which were often difficult, these transport operations suffered only small losses. The implementation of the operation was an undoubted success and led to close working relations between the EC and the EFSR. The EC has even become a member of the executive technical committee.

Given the success of the operation in 1994, the EC allocated 75,000 tonnes of food to EFSR in 1995 to cover shortages as necessary during the 1996 pre-harvest gap. This assistance increased the capacity of the EFSR to respond to shortages and was used in the form of loans to aid and rehabilitation agencies as they waited for the mobilisation of other sources of help. It is envisaged that the beneficiaries of this aid will receive food rations in return for developmental work according to the disaster management policy, under which beneficiaries should participate in job creation schemes.

A large local purchasing campaign

At the end of 1995 the Ethiopian harvest broke production records and resulted in a substantial tradable surplus. In fact the harvest was so good that there was some anxiety about keeping the market price above the cost of production so as to avoid any loss of farmers confidence in the emerging market as a place to sell their surplus.

The consequence of such a loss of confidence could have been a reduction in the areas cultivated the following season and therefore a drop in production.

In this light, and given the commitment of the EC to support the Ethiopian government in a policy of long term food security, the Commission decided to support production by a massive campaign of local purchases under direct and indirect programmes. This approach had the clear advantages of avoiding flooding the emerging market with large quantities of imported cereals and was also a lot cheaper. The operation covers a total of 188,000 tonnes of cereals of which 75,000 going to the Strategic Reserve (direct aid) and 113,000 tonnes going to WFP and NGOs (indirect aid). It supports the price to producers and therefore avoids a drop in production.




The EC provided also bags to suppliers involved in the local purchase operation.

This operation is the largest and most complex local purchase ever undertaken by the Commission. The management of these purchases was carried out in the field by a team of technical assistants specially assigned to the Community food aid programme. To make up 75,000 tonnes for the reserve 25 contracts (each for approximately 3,000 tonnes) were awarded and the deliveries of cereals to five different stores began in May 1996, lasting nine months. This division into lots of 3,000 tonnes was fixed on as being better adapted to the conditions of the Ethiopian cereals market.

The supervision of this operation necessitated an enormous investment of time from the team of technical assistants on the ground who had to ensure the quality (variable) of the food delivered (inspection, cleaning, fumigation). Nevertheless, the programme was greatly appreciated by all parties involved (private sector, State, and international). Moreover, thanks to the level of co-operation which exists between donors, most food aid programmes ear-marked for the country were either postponed or redirected so as not to flood the market.



Loading the first truck with EC local purchases.



THE EC'S LONG TERM RESPONSE : SUPPORT TO FOOD SECURITY

The Financing of a study on the development of a long term strategy for food security

For several years now it has been clear that the solution to the structural Ethiopian food deficit was not the delivery of large amounts of food aid but the design and implementation by the Ethiopian government of a food security strategy. In this light the EC commissioned a study ('European strategy in support of food security in Ethiopia' - ADE) of possible food security strategies in Ethiopia and passed it on to the government.

This study highlighted the structural weaknesses from Ethiopian agricultural production to effective demand. Nevertheless, the real rises in production (the main harvest in 1995 reached 9.7 million tonnes and 11.7 million tonnes in 1996) as well as the implementation of liberal economic policies made the maintenance of producer prices possible, which shows that the rise in production between 1994 and 1996 was stimulated as much by price incentives as by better climatic conditions.

This analysis led to the proposal of a three-tiered approach to improve food security in Ethiopia by addressing three different problems : How to



improve agricultural production ? How to improve access to this produce ? (or how to increase effective demand ?) How to manage the risks of crisis and how to manage crises should they arise ? To develop a strategy in answer to these questions, the study puts forward three propositions : to improve agricultural production you need the incentive of a higher producer price, to improve effective demand you need to develop income generating activities, and to respond to crises you need a system of disaster management based on an early warning system and means of immediate intervention, as well as an adequate rehabilitation policy.



Food for work programme.

The financing of government food security activities

The record cereal harvest of 1995/96 clearly showed that in favourable macro-economic and climatic conditions, Ethiopia can manage its own food security. It is therefore important to help the Ethiopian government put in place a viable food security policy through action other than the simple delivery of food. To this end, as part of its 1996 programme, the EC established financial assistance for five activities in support of the country's food security for a maximum of three years, with a total value of ECU 12.43 million (over and above some 88,000 tonnes of food aid indirectly allocated to WFP and NGOs).

These activities correspond to the European strategy of capacity building in the following areas :

- (I) General employment projects : Planning and implementation of projects designed to create jobs and increase incomes, allowing better access to food in order to minimise the distribution of free food aid ;
- (II) Improvements to the early warning system : establishment of a local level early warning system in the regions and improved promotion of its importance ;
- (III) Combined plan for the transport and organisation of aid : establishment of procedures for organisation and co-ordination between the parties responsible for transport and logistics of aid in order to improve efficiency in times of crisis ;
- (IV) Improvements in the agro-meteorology service : improvement and strengthening of services to improve the quality and availability of meteorological information so as to increase agricultural production ;
- (V) Evaluation and supervision of erosion/sedimentation problems : development of projects to check erosion to increase productivity and overall agricultural production.

“LOCAL FOOD SECURITY UNIT”

Technical assistance on the ground

Up until January 1995, all food aid operations in Ethiopia were overseen by a monitoring official in the EC Delegation in Addis Ababa. Given the growing importance and complexity of the programme, it was decided that a technical assistance unit would be attached to the delegation (the Local Food Security Unit) consisting of an agro-economist, an agronomist, and a monitoring officer. The unit was further strengthened with an expert to cover the implementation and supervision of the large programme of local purchase.

The activities of the technical assistance unit are very varied and demonstrate clearly the EC's new approach to food security and food aid ; participation in the development of a long term national food security policy, implementation of large local purchases, supervision of the sale of direct and indirect EC aid (implemented by the NGOs), implementation of planned actions in support of food security, publication of a monthly bulletin in collaboration with USAID on food security and early warnings, development of instruments of aid and harvest predictions.




Quality control carried out by inspectors from a monitoring company in the framework of the local purchase operation.



Pictures :

*Page 1 : FAO© , page 4 : UNO© , page 5 : WHO© , page 6 : EC© , page 7 , EC© , page 8 : EC©, EC© ,
page 9 : WFP©, ILCA© , page 10 : FAO© , page 11 : SGS© , page 12 : EC© , page 13 : SGS© ,
page 14 : SGS© , page 15 : SGS©, SGS© , page 16 : EC© , page 17 : FAO© , SGS© , page 20 : EC©.*



EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Development
Food Security and Food Aid Unit
200, rue de la Loi
B - 1049 BRUSSELS
Tel : +32 2 29 93224
Fax : +32 2 29 93073

EC Delegation in Ethiopia
Tel : +251 1 612511
Fax : +251 1 612877
Postal address : P.O. BOX 5570
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA

Local Food Security Unit
Tel : +251 1 610912
Fax : +251 1 612655
Postal address : P.O. BOX 5570
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA