

A2024

the courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC—EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Published every two months

No 72 — MARCH-APRIL 1982





**LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES**

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BELGIUM
DENMARK
FRANCE
GERMANY
(Federal Rep.)
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
UNITED KINGDOM

THE ACP STATES

| | | |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|
| ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA | GRENADA | SENEGAL |
| BAHAMAS | GUINEA | SEYCHELLES |
| BARBADOS | GUINEA BISSAU | SIERRA LEONE |
| BELIZE | GUYANA | SOLOMON ISLANDS |
| BENIN | IVORY COAST | SOMALIA |
| BOTSWANA | JAMAICA | SUDAN |
| BURUNDI | KENYA | SURINAM |
| CAMEROON | KIRIBATI | SWAZILAND |
| CAPE VERDE | LESOTHO | TANZANIA |
| CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC | LIBERIA | TOGO |
| CHAD | MADAGASCAR | TONGA |
| COMOROS | MALAWI | TRINIDAD & TOBAGO |
| CONGO | MALI | TUVALU |
| DJIBOUTI | MAURITANIA | UGANDA |
| DOMINICA | MAURITIUS | UPPER VOLTA |
| EQUATORIAL GUINEA | NIGER | WESTERN SAMOA |
| ETHIOPIA | NIGERIA | VANUATU |
| FIJI | PAPUA NEW GUINEA | ZAIRE |
| GABON | RWANDA | ZAMBIA |
| GAMBIA | ST. LUCIA | ZIMBABWE |
| GHANA | ST. VINCENT & GRENADINES | |
| | SAO TOME PRINCIPE | |



FRANCE

(Overseas departments)

Guadeloupe
Guiana
Martinique
Reunion
St Pierre and Miquelon

(Overseas territories)

Mayotte
New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

NETHERLANDS

(Overseas countries)

Netherlands Antilles
(Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustatius)

UNITED KINGDOM

(Overseas countries and territories)

British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Brunei
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
St Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla

This list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future.

ILO — Since its creation in 1919, the International Labour Organization has played a major role in the defence and the improvement of working and living conditions of workers. It is the only tripartite agency of the UN, bringing together governments, workers' representatives and employers. The North-South dialogue is one of the priorities of the International Labour Office, which is the ILO's permanent body, and in an interview with the *Courier* Francis Blanchard, its director-general, discusses the ILO's approach. **Page 3**



Jamaica — The most populous ACP country in the Caribbean, Jamaica experienced eight consecutive years of economic decline in the 1970s. Production of nearly all its main exports fell during the decade, inflation and unemployment rose, and many Jamaicans left. To reverse this, the government has launched an economic recovery programme. Our feature covers the main sectors of the economy and in an interview Prime Minister Edward Seaga outlines his government's plans to bring Jamaica back to economic health. **Page 7.**

Rwanda — Rwanda is a real nation state in the sense that has generally been given to that phrase: a recognized territory and people, one language and a common culture. A lush country in the heart of Africa — the "land of a thousand hills" as it is called — Rwanda nevertheless faces serious problems because of the shortage of arable land, the rapid growth in population and the fact that it is landlocked. As the government was organizing elections to the national development council and starting a major reform of education, the *Courier* interviewed President Juvénal Habyarimana on the results of his eight years in power. **Page 25**



Europe — On 19 January 1982 the 434 members of the European Parliament elected the Dutch socialist Pieter Dankert as their President (speaker) in succession to Simone Veil, who had held the post since the Parliament was directly elected for the first time in June 1979. In his opening speech Pieter Dankert said he hoped to see the Parliament gain "political legitimacy" as a result of the 1984 elections and go beyond its present "formal legitimacy". As the new co-president of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly as well, he said that North-South relations were among his main priorities. **Page 43**



Dossier — Our dossier this time is devoted to the problems of the 31 poorest countries on the planet, those which in UN language are called the least developed countries (LLDCs). All the experts are agreed that they cannot solve the complex development problems they face on their own. Substantial international help is essential, and it was this that was at the centre of the discussions which were held last September in Paris at the UN conference on the LLDCs. **Page 48**



THE COURIER

**AFRICA - CARIBBEAN - PACIFIC
— EUROPEAN COMMUNITY**

No 72 March-April 1982

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Foreseeing the future the better to change it

There are some books, with probing analyses, new thinking and particular intellectual stringency, that must not be missed. Early last year, the *Courier* looked at Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber's *Le Défi Mondial*, an international best-seller that had come out a few months before. In this book, the author and his team argued that the world economy was polarized around three groups of countries—the crisis-ridden West; the non-oil producing nations of the Third World, which do not know how to meet their most basic needs; and OPEC, which has more money than it knows what to do with and has both energy and investment, "the two keys to the wilting international economy". One of the main points was that everything had to be done to convince the OPEC countries of their responsibility vis-à-vis development.

A lot of criticism was levelled at *Le Défi Mondial* because its description of the situation was more convincing than its proposed solution, which emphasized computerization practically to the exclusion of anything else. But the book, which read like a novel about the modern world, was not without the dynamism and the optimism that we need today to force us to think about the factors of unity in a multipolar world and to encourage us to move on from gloomy thinking to action.

Jacques Lesourne's excellent *Les mille sentiers de l'avenir* (A thousand paths to the future), although more difficult to read, is also a stimulating work, the personality of the author being a guarantee of the high standard and stringency of the powerful thought it contains. Lesourne, now professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, introduced France to operational research and was both director-general and chairman of one of the country's biggest think tanks. But his main claim to fame is to have directed the OECD's interfuture project (1976-1979), the most important international prospective study ever run. Since its official report came out, he has put two more years into creating *Les mille sentiers de l'avenir*.

In this fascinating book, the world of today is treated as a system, a "set of elements linked by a set of relations". It is a difficult world in which there are five major challenges—the rise of the Third World, coexistence with the USSR (that "conservative heir to the October revolution

whose military power increases as the messianic strength of its ideology wanes"), competition between the developed nations, the continuing emergence of new social demands as values change, and relations with the ecosphere, the balance between non-stop consumption and a finite world.

Lesourne thinks the future of the industrialized societies is much less a question of the scarcity of physical resources—particularly minerals—which worries him little, than of changes in the international system and in the forces of change within these societies.

With the relative decline of the superpowers and the rise of the Third World, we are on the way to a multipolar, interdependent world, to "an international system, grouped around the Third World, the USA, the USSR, Japan and the EEC, that is increasingly difficult to control". And the defects in the control mechanism are becoming apparent. Every country finds the international system unpredictable and a source of vulnerability, and there is a growing contradiction between the interdependence of nations and the principle of national sovereignty. Changing values in the industrial societies are generating more social demands, while increasing constraints make adaptation difficult. And the individual has a growing desire to be free of the ties of the society of the past, coupled with a desire to be rooted in a cultural identity. And the answer to multipolarity? A new hierarchy of 'solidarity' and a programme that can be summed up as the 'seven circles' of cooperation.

It is impossible to summarize a book of this kind. To do so would be to detract from its fullness, its host of comments, such as: "The major event of the last few years is the timid, uneven beginning of the decline in the birth rate in the Third World", or again: "Providing information is not a minor task. Interdependence is increasing tenfold the information needed to run a firm"—and a country too, of course.

The book gives an outstanding glimpse of the future, enabling us, as Gaston Berger has put it, to take stock of what is to come and thus to change it. Jacques Lesourne makes this quite clear in his last sentence: "Try to foresee the future the better to change it". ◦

ALAIN LACROIX

Economic and social progress go together

Interview with Francis Blanchard Director-general of the International Labour Office

The main aim of the International Labour Organization (ILO) is to promote social progress. The ILO has played an important part in protecting and improving working and living conditions since its creation in 1919, which confirmed trends in social thinking that began with the industrial revolution of the previous century. The ILO is unique, its tripartite structure providing a platform for permanent dialogue between governments, workers and employers, and some 147 countries currently send tripartite delegations to the international labour conferences held every year.

The ILO's principal activities include drawing up programmes and policies on the fundamental right to work, establishing international labour standards and seeing they are applied, and running a vast technical

cooperation programme that also takes in training, research and information.

Because of the interdependence of employment and the international division of labour, the problems of the North-South dialogue are the top priority of the International Labour Office (also the ILO), the organization's secretariat in Geneva.

Francis Blanchard has been firmly pro-Third World throughout his long career at the ILO and he is backing the Third World in any economic improvements or new deal at international level. In this interview he outlines the ILO's approach to the problems of development in interdependence and shows where social conscience figures in all this.


Tripartism — a privilege

► *The ILO is unique in that it is the only tripartite organization in the UN. Is it possible for the three partners, the governments, the employers and the workers that is, to agree on a new international division of labour, particularly when it comes to industrial redeployment?*

— Yes, the ILO is indeed a tripartite organization. Is that good or bad? Well, I believe it is a considerable source of strength. And it is also a source of complication, obviously, as once you involve more people, you run the risk of creating areas of conflict and tension. But I think this is only a very small drawback compared to one advantage that I think is a deciding factor. In the face of social problems, i.e. problems to do with labour, it is an advantage to be involved not just with the authorities, but the employers and the workers as well. I think we have led people today to rely too much on the welfare state. The state has a very important role, and it will be more so, but there is no reason to imagine that everything depends on it. To put it briefly, faced with our development tasks, when you think about this enormous problem of North and South and the new international economic order—although I don't really understand what that is supposed to mean—you realize just how important it is to bring the people who produce, consume and distribute every day (in our case, the

employers and the workers) into this discussion on the societies of tomorrow, on this new international economic order. This therefore means involving them in the action too.

There is something very original in what the employers and workers do in their negotiations on the ILO governing body. When it comes to the problems of the Third World and the new inter-



Francis Blanchard
Director-general of the International
Labour Office since 1974

national economic order, I should say that the ILO offers a better framework than the purely governmental organizations for the work that has to be done to help the Third World countries speed up their development. Let me give you an illustration of this. Development obviously means infrastructure, investment and growth, the transfer of resources and technology. Alongside all this, the important thing is the human factor. Economic achievements can be impaired if, as is happening at the moment, there are shortcomings in the way human resources are used—i.e. in training. This is where we at the ILO perhaps have the advantage over other institutions. For several years now we have been trying very hard to contribute to the discussions on development strategy and on the North-South dialogue and we want to be even more involved.

Playing with words to avoid the problems

► *You seem to have some doubt about the meaning of the terms "international division of labour" and "new international economic order", which are in current use today.*

— I am wary of them, it is true. I am perhaps a bit wary about the way some expressions are used and sometimes misused. We don't want words, we want facts. I can see that the words "new international economic

order" are wonderful and nicely in line with the aspirations of the men and women of our times. But I want to know what they actually mean. And I see that the same question was asked at Cancun.

I am not against the idea of a new international economic order, but I don't want us to bandy the term about and stop there. It is wrong to play with words in order to avoid the problems. "International division of labour" is another expression that can be both meaningful and ambiguous. At all events, there is one definition of the term which I dislike—the one involving certain activities being allocated, meted out by region and by country. I will have nothing to do with this kind of philosophy or doctrine. But I am much more willing to accept the idea of an international division of labour which involves people, particularly in the West, agreeing to the countries of the Third World speeding up their industrial development, expanding their production apparatus and thereby being producers and consumers on the world market, and becoming competitors.

Third World, third power

This alters the conditions in which the world economy has functioned since 1945, of course. There is no longer just one power, the USA of 1945-50 and the 1950s. There are two or three or four. I can see at least three. The power of the West is technological power and control over the financial markets. The oil producers have the power attendant on their control of the energy resources. The third power, not an imaginary one, is the power of the Third World, which simply comes from its existence and specific weight, as well as from the fact that the Third World is progressing slowly, in spite of the crisis and in what are often tragic, dramatic conditions, but progressing nonetheless. This view is a reasonable basis for facing up to the hard facts of a world which is much more inward-looking. It is a world in which, as far as labour is concerned, everyone has to share in the enormous task of speeding up the development of our planet over the next 20, 30 or 50 years. How long it takes is an important factor, but we shouldn't be laying down any particular time for it. What we do know is that the job has to be done and it could be done faster. What we suspect is that we have the means of achieving a great ambition for our planet. And at the same time, there are a number of horrid constraints—including the mad arms race.

In saying this, I am pointing out that there are two discussions going on in

"Poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere ..."

"All human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material wellbeing and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity ..."

"The attainment of the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of national and international policy ..."

Declaration of Philadelphia (1944), annexed to the ILO Constitution.

the world at the moment. The funny thing is that they are like two trains on parallel tracks that never meet. On the one hand there is the debate on development, which is public and aired in the media every day, and, on the other, there is the debate on disarmament, which is secret. No one knows what is going on. All we know is that no progress is being made because the weapons bill is getting tragically larger. These two debates are completely separate and it makes the first of them, on development, Kafka-like, almost paltry; so much time, energy and hope has gone into the development theme, yet we still seem to accept a situation in which more and more money is spent on arms. This is not just due to the four nuclear powers. It is due to many countries, including the poorest ones. The sums spent on arms are enormous and out of all proportion to those that would be needed to generate a spectacular economic take-off in an appreciable number of developing countries.

Correlating economic and social development

► *Isn't there a danger of economic progress and social development getting out line in the developing countries?*

— Let's look at the facts, as we at the ILO can look at them. The Organization was remarkable in the field of social research from the time it was set up in 1919 until 1950. It was the best, if not the only, laboratory for social policy and labour policy in a world which was very little concerned with such problems. It took World War I to get the movement under way. Second, during that time, the ILO was concerned with laying down international standards to protect workers against sickness, the risk of industrial accident, exploitation and so on. Then in 1950, after World War II, it was faced with a

quite different world from when it was set up.

That was when we made a fundamental choice. We decided that as well as carrying out international research and laying down international standards, it was absolutely essential for us to be involved in international cooperation, something that would help the developing countries to apply the principles of the international labour conventions. There were enormous demands for training and we couldn't satisfy them all. And I mean training in the broadest sense of the term, of course, technical training and vocational training for technicians, foremen and technical cadres, managers for the administration of firms, education for the workers and even training for employers. We went into all these fields one after another. The theory at that stage was that, in 20 years time, we would, with this technical cooperation, have helped train technical cadres and teachers. And the official theory—which I never believed—was that, in 20 years time, we would be able to withdraw as these countries would by then have mastered the technologies and be able to develop them. Now, 20 or 30 years later, we can see that the situation is completely different from what we anticipated.

And what is this situation? The more we advance, the more training is needed and the more qualifications at higher levels are required. As far as the Third World is concerned, if we had five or ten times more resources, we could still use them—or these countries could use them. Thirty years ago, the industrialized countries were going through a period of economic euphoria, with minimal unemployment, and thought they had their means of education and training taped. But here in 1981, we can see that a shortage of education and training is not just something that occurs in the developing countries. The industrialized countries experience it too. Hundreds of millions of unemployed people are affected by the obvious disparity between the training available and the demand for it.

Now to get back to your question ... The danger, and one that is sadly apparent in many countries, is that, while we have great hopes of economic expansion and we want growth to start again, there is a disquieting gap between this drive for economic development and the fact that, socially speaking, there is a considerable delay when it comes to developing human resources and social infrastructure.

This means that we are trying to develop our activity and get the countries

to develop it. But it is extremely difficult to do so in training and working conditions in countries which are industrializing fast. We have to stop thinking of Brazil, India, Pakistan, Venezuela and Mexico—I could name 10 more—as underdeveloped countries. They're not. They have extraordinarily sophisticated industrial sectors where there are problems of working conditions, hygiene and industrial safety.

Another sector which seems to be fairly bad in many countries is social protection, in which I include social security. I don't mean that we are frantic for social security. We very often warn people to be careful if they are in countries which might ruin themselves to set up or maintain social security systems, because they can't afford to run them. We think that social protection, properly speaking, is something that should be part of any decent social and economic policy in the developing countries and elsewhere. And I could give other examples to show that there has to be some sort of correlation between economic development and social development.

Protectionism, no — industrial reorganization, yes

► *As things are at the moment, with the world crisis, employers have an increasing tendency to protect themselves against some of the countries that are becoming industrialized, and in Europe the workers very often back them up. Is the ILO for or against protectionism?*

— We are firmly against it. We haven't always said so firmly enough, perhaps, but an important text like that of the World Employment Conference in 1976 contains a clear warning against it. There is no doubt about where the ILO stands on protectionism. But having said that I also have to say that, although our position as an institution is clear and firm, that position is the concern of the governments, the employers and the workers that make up the ILO—i.e. it comes from 147 countries all told. Practically speaking, the problem is much more complicated.

There is a very strong protectionist tendency in Europe at the moment, and for quite good reasons given the objective state of crisis, as they say. Take textiles or any other sensitive area of industry, or take the poor regions, and you will see dramatic situations that probably justify temporary protectionist measures. But I hope these measures will not become permanent, because that would mean that protectionism would get a hold, like a disease, and develop.



Zimbabwe Min. of Information

“The more we advance, the more training is needed and the more qualifications at higher levels are required”

Developed countries benefit more than Third World countries from international trade

So we have to be very careful—for another reason as well. At Geneva, we have run little-publicized but very thorough studies into the effect of competition from the Third World on the Community, particularly in four of the member states (Germany, France, the UK and the Netherlands), and to see what effect the development of production and exports from these countries has on the countries of the Third World. These very sound studies, which are still going on, show clearly that the industrialized countries have got infinitely more out of the development of their trade with the developing world than the developing world has got out of them. This has to be repeated time and time again. And, without wishing to extrapolate or draw conclusions of a universal nature, this nevertheless confirms that, even in a situation of economic recovery, if this currently catastrophic tendency towards little or no growth could be reversed, then I am sure that the industrialized countries would benefit from developing their trade with the Third World and speeding up the development process in the developing countries. I liked what President Mitterrand said about this: helping the Third World is helping ourselves. This is clear, straight-from-the-shoulder language and it was perhaps meant for a

Western audience rather than a Third World one. Although we have to make progress with the problems of poverty and unemployment—and here I mean unemployment in both North and South—I think we have to open up our markets.

Within the ILO itself, I must admit, the situation is somewhat paradoxical: while our official position is anti-protectionist, there are different shades of opinion amongst both our employers and our workers. As far as the workers are concerned, this is something of a tragedy, as there is a feeling of solidarity between the workers of the North and South. But it is true that, in the textile industry, the iron and steel producing areas and many other places, they have a bread and butter problem. This is where it would be a good idea—and the ILO is working on it and I am determined to develop the possibilities—to get to the root of these problems, clarify the facts and provide data which can be used to create more voluntarist policies and, in the case of the industrialized countries of the West, the sort of policies that are much more geared to industrial reorganization. It is essential, in the countries of West Europe in particular, to understand that we have to grasp the chances of tomorrow.

Development cannot just be granted

► *You said recently that, if the basic needs of the poorest are to be met, then social structures in the Third*

World have to be changed. Could you comment on this?

— We have run extremely thorough analyses of the poverty situation, of unemployment and underemployment all over the world. They were discussed at the 1976 conference. Attempts at finding a solution to this problem should be based on the idea of meeting the needs of the poorest, and gradually getting them to join the production and consumption circuit via the creation of jobs. This is the ILO's idea. I make no attempt to hide the fact that it has given rise to misunderstandings. Some people have seen it as a step dictated by the West. That is completely wrong. It is an idea that is linked to other things, because it all forms an action plan which is, to my mind, properly balanced and contains the transfer of resources. This idea comes from the basic notion that development cannot just concern the elite or a minority alone. Development cannot just be brought about by ultra-sophisticated technology. Development cannot just be granted, and it certainly cannot be decreed by an elite or a political hierarchy or a dictatorship. Development means meeting basic needs and it has to be based on the involvement of the urban and rural masses. This is why we are so keen on the rural areas—although we are basically an organization that serves the industrial world. It is also why we are so keen on what is called the informal sector in the big towns. This is how the satisfaction of essential needs is brought into development as a key element.

International labour standards: the developing countries need time

► *And what about the problem of the application of international labour standards?*

— This is the knotty problem to end all knotty problems, but my answer is an extremely simple one. Things being what they are today and the North-South dialogue being what it is—in a state of impasse for the time being—and the Lomé Convention, very happily, being a fortunate if small exception, all I can say is that it is not possible to force people to apply social standards, be they ILO standards or someone else's, to commercial concessions. This is why I have always been sceptical about the chances of this kind of negotiation in GATT. Not because I have reservations about GATT, but because I don't believe in the possibility of a constraining, give-and-take kind of negotiation that can be enforced. From that point of view, I am by no means

“ A universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice.

“Conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled... an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of workers when employed in countries other than their own, recognition of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value, recognition of the principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical education ...”

ILO Constitution

surprised at the liveliness of the reactions of those who are calling for social clauses to be included. This is the case with organizations like the CISL and the CMT that are impassioned defenders of the workers' interests. But I can also see that, on the other side, the developing countries are reacting in an extraordinarily lively manner.

So does this mean—and perhaps you think I am being negative here—that nothing can be done? The problem is not one that can be solved by force, by a simple balance of forces. Time is the most important element. We in the West cannot expect the developing countries, and some of them in particular, to take only a few months or years to reach the levels of development that we often forget took us so long to attain. I should very much like to see us look at what the situation was like in France, say, when Louis XV died. We would find that, at that stage, there was famine in Touraine, although France was probably rich and grew corn that it didn't manage to transport anywhere... Unfortunately there are far too many people in the West who are anxious, impatient, and want these countries to reach a level of political and social awareness all at once. And social conscience is something fairly new in the world we live in. We only acquired it at the end of the 19th century, at the beginning of the 20th century. So the time factor is important.

A minimum of patience and understanding

So what I say is that the ILO, as it proves year after year, has many ways (its standard control and application machinery, its direct contact missions that I am increasing in the developing countries) of contributing to getting the principles laid down by the international standards followed in everyday practice. And if the movement is to be speeded up, our organization has to expand its technical cooperation, provided, once again, there is a minimum of patience and understanding. The hard facts, including the time element, have to be made to reflect the whole meaning of the concept of social clauses. What I mean is that we are not all standing in judgement. As far as international relations are concerned, what we have to do is learn to cooperate. An institution like the ILO can, because of its tripartite structure, its traditions and its discipline, and because of its desire to adapt its means to new situations, help the Community and the ACP countries to reach these objectives.

And I should add that, if we get back to the old rate of growth and if the industrialized countries accept the idea of speeding up development in the Third World—which could only improve the West's problems of unemployment—we should see that the Third World would be in much more of a hurry to apply international standards than we now imagine, because none of the countries of the Third World has denounced the agreements ratified by the colonizers. They could have done. But none of them has. That is not to say that they apply them to the letter, but I wonder just how many countries in the world today do apply the international conventions absolutely properly. Very few, I can tell you. There is convention 87 on trade union freedom, which is the most ratified and the most frequently violated. But that doesn't bother me at all. I am delighted it has been ratified because that shows that everyone is pro-trade union freedom. Everyone is pro-virtue but very few people are virtuous. That is why this convention is the most frequently violated. It's a pity, but it's nothing unusual in the world today. So, you'll no doubt say, "It's a flop". But no, it isn't a flop. It's a daily battle, one we are fighting there in Geneva, in the field of trade union freedom. And I am sure that in 20 years' time, even if we may not have won the battle, we shall certainly have made some progress. ◦

Interview by
Roger DE BACKER

JAMAICA

“Out of many, one people”

When Christopher Columbus first sighted Jamaica on 5 May 1494, an observer wrote: “silhouetted against the evening sky, arose, sheer and dark, green Xamayca (Jamaica), the fairest island that eyes have seen: so mountainous the land seems to touch the sky; very large, bigger than Sicily, and full of valleys, fields and plains”.

The European discovery was the beginning of the story of the peopling of modern Jamaica. There were already people there—the Arawak Indians. However, by the mid-17th century, after 150 years of Spanish rule, there was not one pure-blooded Arawak left. Today, they are remembered in the coat of arms of modern Jamaica.

The sugar boom

Shortly after the first Spanish settlers came the first African slaves. But it was not until after the English forces sent by Lord Protector Cromwell conquered the island in 1655 that the number of slaves rose dramatically and the great age of sugar began. For a while Jamaica became the world's largest producer of sugar. Fortunes were made by the sugar plantation owners during the 18th century and many of them became famous in London society for their great wealth. It was based, however, on a brutal system which increasingly came under criticism. By 1807 a majority had been built in the British Parliament in favour of reform and the slave trade was abolished throughout the British empire. Abolition of slavery itself came 30 years later and the great sugar boom was over.

Indian and Chinese contract labourers were brought in to save the great sugar estates, without success, but their arrival added to the racial mix. In the Jamaica of today a few of the splendid plantation houses remain to remind people of the past, and sugar is still a major product, though economically its importance is much reduced. For good or ill “King Sugar”, as it was known in the 18th century, was the single most important creator of the racial mix that now makes up the population of Jamaica. What it did not provide, nor anything since, was a good enough living for the majority of Jamaicans. Emigration began after emancipation, to Latin and North America and other parts of the Caribbean, and has remained an option which many Jamaicans have taken advantage of in this century. Some 2.2 million people live in Jamaica, but there is a similar number of Jamaicans abroad. Despite this they remain passionately Jamaican and for many the island is still “home”. Ja-

maicans have a reputation for being industrious and have acquired an ability to survive. Despite the economic decline of the 1970s, over 40 000 small businesses still remain in Jamaica, and there is an aggressive private sector which is trying to respond to the present government's desire to turn Jamaica into a manufacturing and exporting country.

Slavery has left its scars, but the present population, with all its diversity, does have a common identity, which is proclaimed in the national motto, “out of many, one people”. And 300 years of British rule have, rather unusually, left an affectionate view of the former colonial power and a strong and determined attachment to parliamentary government.

The first Jamaican house of assembly was set up in the reign of Charles II in 1664. Jamaica could have gone the same way as many of Britain's American colonies in the 18th century, for relations were often strained between the Kingston assembly and the imperial government. The break did not come then, however, and the assembly lasted until 1865 when, after the Morant Bay riots, which gave Jamaica its first national martyr Paul Bogle, Jamaica became a crown colony.


The assembly had represented only the mixed race and white elite, and was abandoned in favour of a non-representative system, with a powerful governor, which London believed would stimulate economic progress and restore order. But local interest in representative government had not disappeared and elections with a wider suffrage were reintroduced in 1884.

The advent of universal suffrage

In the present century popular political movements developed early, primarily around trade unions. When a new constitution based on universal suffrage was introduced in 1944, a two party system began to flourish. Although Norman Manley's People's National Party came to power in 1955, it was Alexander Bustamante's Labour Party which was to form the first administration in an independent Jamaica in 1962.



Columbus arrives in the Caribbean in 1492 and meets his first Arawak Indians. The only Arawaks left in Jamaica today are on the national coat of arms



The treadwheel (above) was one of the brutal aspects of slavery on the sugar plantations. That inhuman use of people is now long past and Jamaica today prefers to recall its great ethnic and cultural diversity, illustrated below on a bank note



Polarization

The Jamaica Labour Party remained in power for 10 years after independence, but the end of this period saw an increased sharpening of the differences between the governing party, by then led by Hugh Shearer, and the opposition People's National Party led by Michael Manley. The PNP had moved left and the electorate was in a mood for change. The PNP came to power with a majority of 21 in the house of representatives. The 1976 general election again sharpened the differences between the two parties, and the country's close relations with Cuba, which Michael Manley had actively encouraged, became a central issue. In a record poll the PNP increased its majority to 34.

Economic decline

Partly because of the oil crisis (Jamaica is almost totally dependent on imported oil) and partly, in the view of the present government, because of ideology and mismanagement, the 1970s were not happy times for the Jamaican economy. For eight succes-

sive years there was negative growth. A chronic shortage of foreign exchange starved industry and agriculture of the inputs they needed and emptied the shops. Production of the country's main exports fell and many skilled Jamaicans left the country. Unemployment and inflation rose. It was against this background that the 1980 election was fought and it produced a landslide for the JLP, which took 51 of the 60 seats.

Economic recovery programme

The new government under Edward Seaga began a programme of economic recovery. The main tasks were to tackle unemployment, reduce inflation and secure foreign exchange to allow both industry and agriculture to re-equip and to allow imports of food and raw materials. New credits were secured from friendly countries such as the United States and Venezuela, and the United States also agreed to buy extra Jamaican bauxite for its strategic stockpile. Government strategy depends to an extent on a revival of tou-

"The efforts at promoting deeper consciousness of our national heritage have taken a major turn with a serious programme being developed for exploration, restoration and development of major historical sites at Seville, Port Royal, Spanish Town and Drax Hall.

"The value of Seville has been enhanced against the background of the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus, in nine years time.

"Seville was the second oldest place of settlement in the New World, the place where Columbus spent the longest period in his journey as a result of being marooned here for one year, and the first settlement in which communities of the Old and New World interacted through the Spanish and Arawak settlements.

"The historical value of this site is enormous and assistance has already been pledged by the Spanish government to develop it.

"A study on all the important sites in Jamaica with significance to our national heritage has recently been concluded and will form the basis of a major project for their development.

"This programme includes the development of projects to enhance our understanding of the historical connections and acculturations derived from the Spanish, English, African and other influences on our cultural heritage."

Prime Minister Seaga,
November 1981

rism, which appears to be underway, and of the world market for bauxite-alumina, which is more problematical. The sad decline in sugar and banana production will take time to reverse, but meanwhile the government is looking to non-traditional agricultural exports and manufactures to fill the gap.

Economic problems, social unrest and political polarization have not destroyed Jamaica's sense of nationhood nor threatened its longstanding democratic traditions. The level of sophistication at all levels of Jamaican society has prompted some to describe it as "a developed country which is poor". Despite the very serious difficulties Jamaica now faces, there is a belief in the country and in some quarters abroad that the downward economic spiral can be reversed. It is on this return of confidence that the new government places much of its hope for the future.

o IAN PIPER

"The Caribbean is the next area in which dramatic growth can take place"

Interview with the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Edward Seaga

Edward Seaga has been in national Jamaican politics for a long time. Elected to the house of representatives almost 20 years ago, he has served continuously since then both in government and opposition. He began his political career in 1959 when the leader of the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), Sir Alexander Bustamante, asked him to serve as a nominated member of the Senate. At 29 he was its youngest member. He was elected to the lower house in the independence election of 1962 and was appointed firstly minister of development and welfare, and then from 1967 minister of finance and planning. Although the JLP was defeated in the elections of 1972 he retained his seat, becoming leader of the opposition in 1974.

His first electoral experience as leader of the JLP was not very encouraging. In the 1976 elections Michael Manley's ruling People's National Party (PNP)

increased its majority. Edward Seaga retained his seat, however, and, despite the setback, the leadership of the JLP. He became Prime Minister four years later, on 30 October 1980, after the JLP's landslide victory.

During the 1970s Edward Seaga was involved in the development of Jamaica's financial institutions, promoting the country's historical and cultural heritage, and initiating rural and urban community development.

As Prime Minister, Mr Seaga now faces the difficult task of reversing Jamaica's economic decline of the 1970s. In the following interview with the *Courier* he explains his government's policies during the first 15 months of office and the prospects for Jamaica's economic recovery.

► *Prime Minister, can I start with some background: why in your view were the 1970s years of economic decline in Jamaica?*

— Well, there were several reasons. One had to do with factors that were non-economic. The decline began, to a certain extent, when the government's ideological drift in the direction of Cuba, and a Cuban-type model, was seen to be in earnest. The closer the last regime established itself with Cuba, the more the investment and business sectors reviewed their perspectives and shortened their outlook for the future. There came a time when it was not possible to look further downstream than a few months, or a maximum of one year, with any certainty. This foreclosed many investment options, and therefore dried up investment flows. At the same time it set in motion the reverse trend, that of capital and skills fleeing the country. These all had a debilitating effect on the economy. On the other hand, the economy itself was very badly managed. Perhaps, again, ideology was the root cause, because it was managed against a set of ideological principles that made it difficult for the economy to continue the rates of growth that it had been accustomed to in the past. There was considerable overspending in relation to our revenue potential.

There was a considerable expansion of the public sector to undertake new roles which we had neither the skills nor the resources to afford, and overall the management of the economy, in its blow-up version with an expanded public sector, simply collapsed under the weight of not being able to make ends meet.



Edward Seaga
Prime Minister of Jamaica

JIS photo

Closing gaps

► *What, then, have been your priorities since you came to power, and how would you sum up your economic policy?*

— We have inherited three gaps that are critical and have to be closed as a matter of priority. The first of these is the foreign exchange gap, the second the fiscal gap, and the third, the unemployment gap.

Let's start with the unemployment gap. During the period 1972-1980, unemployment in absolute terms increased by 50%. The target which we have set ourselves to achieve in this five-year period is to reduce unemployment from a rate of some 26% down to 15%. In order to do this there must be the creation of new jobs. To create new jobs means investment and growth. We have set ourselves a target of \$4.5 billion of new investment in the three-year programme up to 1983/4 in order to help us to create new employment. Foreign exchange is a vital part of the investment programme, because without it we cannot import raw materials or service the needs of the economy. Hence, we have to close the foreign exchange gap and this, of course, has been our major concern so far. We've had to borrow because the earning capacity of the

economy is not there: it cannot react immediately with increased foreign exchange earnings. There are one or two sectors from which we can hope to get early improvements in earnings; tourism, which has rebounded quite nicely, and the mining sector, which would have done extremely well had it not been for a world slump in mining which has cut back production. We are, however, still holding our own and keeping to past levels of performance rather than suffering an absolute decline. But new investment is the fuel that will create new earning capacity in industry, in agriculture and in mining for the future.

In so far as the fiscal gap is concerned, we have had a very heartening year in that revenues have responded very dramatically. We had planned to close this gap in three years and it definitely appears to be possible. Our revenues continue to respond to the new buoyancy and lift that there is in the economy.

► *Taking up first, of all the point about foreign exchange, would it be correct to say that the success or failure of your strategy primarily depends on the state of the world bauxite market, which is beyond your control?*

— Yes and no. The short-term market is in difficulty. There have been severe cut-backs. But due to the purchase of bauxite for the strategic stockpile which Washington recently agreed to, we have been able to overcome the effect of much of the reductions. What we have not been able to do is to increase production. The Washington purchase has not entirely overcome the cut-backs, but together with other initiatives it will. We are looking at a rather stable position in the short-term, where there is a down-turn in commercial purchases but an up-turn in public sector purchases. In the longer term, our target of doubling alumina capacity for the 1980s from the current 2.5 million tonnes to 5 million tonnes still has very bright prospects. In fact we hope this year, 1982, to complete the financial arrangements for the first major expansion in the alumina sector towards this goal of 2.5 million additional tonnes.

► *Apart from what you are doing at home, are there any changes in the organization of the world bauxite market which you think would make the future more certain for Jamaica?*

— Well, we have been exploring new outlets. We will be having a much closer trading arrangement with Venezuela, both for bauxite and alumina. We have had sales of alumina to Venezuela in the past, but not of bauxite.



At the opening of parliament, Prime Minister Seaga (centre) leads his cabinet to the house of representatives

We are exploring other options and new contacts in this field, dealing, for example, with firms that are in the spot market. Our strategy is to expand the range of contacts so as not to be dependent upon a limited number whose problems can greatly affect us. We intend to spread our options and our risks across a wider front.

A reverse brain drain

► *On your point about unemployment, you spoke in your annual review to the house of representatives of encouraging a reverse brain drain. In view of the level of unemployment, is that either desirable or necessary?*

— It is very desirable. Jamaicans who left were largely people who had skills. The shortage of skills is as much a problem as the shortage of capital, and encouraging the return of Jamaicans with skills is vital to the pace at which we can implement our development programme.

► *Would you say that the present foreign exchange controls and tax system act as disincentives to successful Jamaicans to come back?*

— I don't think it has so much to do with the foreign exchange or tax system as the fact that professional Jamaicans who migrated have settled into different income levels abroad. They have acquired material possessions, houses, and picked up obligations such as mortgages. Once that happens it is not very easy to pull up roots. They didn't leave here overnight, it took them time to get rid of

their possessions and so on, and it isn't easy to return overnight, but many are making the effort. The considerations of tax and foreign exchange would come somewhere in the overall assessment of the position, but the number one problem that they face is the obligations that they have taken on, the schools that their children are going to and all the other things that go with having settled into a new country. Pulling up those roots is difficult.

► *What can you do to encourage them?*

— Well, for instance, those who are coming back are allowed to bring back all their personal possessions duty-free, and to bring back a motor vehicle duty-free. There are also things that encourage them which the government need not be involved in, such as the quality of life in Jamaica. Most Jamaicans who live overseas continue to express a preference for the quality of life that they knew in their own country, as I guess all people do. They are never quite happy living in a foreign country. They do so because in many instances they find it more advantageous, but when circumstances permit they want to return.

A new prospect of economic growth

► *When do you think that Jamaica could get back to the levels of production that it had before?*

— If you judge production by output as measured in terms of GDP, during the 1960s we averaged a rate of

growth in GDP of 6% per annum in real terms. In the 1970s we had eight consecutive years of negative growth. Last year we recorded growth for the first time in nine years. To return to a level of growth of, say, 6%, would, I think, require three years. Moving from marginal growth this year, I think there will be a further increment next year, and by the third year we should be up to a level of about 6%.

► *One of the issues on which you fought the last general election was putting goods back into the shops. How successful has that been, and what has the cost been to the country?*

— It has been very successful. The issue that we raised was not so much goods in the shops as basic food items and absolute necessities. The country had been starved of basic food items over a number of years. In such circumstances the people who live in the remoter rural areas feel the impact even more, because what is available for distribution tends to go to the periphery of the urban areas. We have restored full supplies in basic food items, as a result of which even the smallest shop on the tallest mountain is now fully stocked with basic food supplies. These are items that can't be grown in Jamaica. They are not suitable to our climate or our soil. But they are basic food items to the people. New supplies have reduced the level of discontent, which was one of the prevailing features of the past regime, and this has given us a much more stable society in which to begin the job of reconstruction. So the benefits have to be assessed not just in terms of satisfying the need for commodities, but in terms of the psychological impact that they have in stabilizing society. The cost has been well worth it because it has removed the threshold of discontent and agitation which resulted from shortages and other frustrations.

► *The past shortage of foreign exchange had, in fact, encouraged domestic food production. Is there now a danger that the reverse will happen?*

— We are talking of different kinds of food altogether. While it is true that one or two items are interchangeable, for example, one would eat more bananas if there were less rice, most of the items that we are talking about are not items that are interchangeable. There are meats of various kinds, salted meat, which is the only kind of meat that can be imported for the rural areas where there is little refrigeration, and so on. The level of output last year in the small farm sector which grows

domestic foodstuffs continued to show a good performance, and we have no reason to believe that this will fall.

Foreign support beyond expectation

► *Have you been satisfied with overseas response to the change in Jamaica's economic strategy?*

— I think the word is much more than satisfied. The level of goodwill that has flowed for Jamaica since the beginning of the term of office of this government has been beyond expectation. We have had tremendous expressions of goodwill from virtually all quarters, and a good deal of that goodwill has been backed up with financial support. Some of it has not, but nonetheless goodwill still has, whether backed by financial support or not, an element of support in terms of the strategies that you are pursuing.

► *And what of the relationship with the EEC countries, and with the other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries?*

— On the whole the EEC countries continue to give the levels of support that they have been giving in the past. In one or two instances it has not been as much, and in one or two instances it has been greater. But in general terms the level of support continues. Our relationship with the ACP countries continues at the same high level that it has been in the past, because in the previous term of office of the JLP in the 1960s, we established those links ourselves, diplomatically. Although Lomé

was not in being at that time, we nonetheless established the relationship diplomatically by our links with the Organization of African Unity, and of course, our membership of the non-aligned movement and so on. We continue to have the same level of participation, and the same extent of diplomatic interchanges and relationships, with those organizations.

The Caribbean can achieve dramatic growth

► *More locally, does Caribbean cooperation offer any particular advantages in terms of your economic recovery programme?*

— We've taken a far more active position in the Caribbean. This is because we consider that the Caribbean is the next area in which dramatic growth can take place. If you look at the areas in which dramatic growth is taking place, specifically the South-East Asian states which are now labelled the new industrial countries, the Caribbean has all the makings of the kind of success story that has taken place there. It has the giant market place of North America in close juxtaposition which it can manufacture for and export to. By virtue of its association with the EEC it has preferential tariff treatment in EEC markets. It therefore stands in a position where, by international sub-contracting or by production sharing arrangements, it can become a substantial offshore production centre for the US market and the EEC.


I don't think I need to spell out the



JIS photo

Bustamente port in Kingston

"Foreign exchange is a vital part of our investment programme because without it we cannot import raw materials or service the needs of the economy"



JIS photo

Training the next generation—but it is equally important to bring back the skilled members of the older generation who have left the country

motivation that would lie behind that. It should be remembered that the Caribbean economies have grown up over the years with a different strategy which in my mind was necessary at the beginning. They started with a strategy of import substitution, that's to say creating domestic industries to produce items which would have been imported. It was justified on the ground that there was a saving of exchange on the imported item. Of course, it did a bit more than that, it created a body of industry and employment, perhaps more so than saving foreign exchange. It was justifiable because, since you have within your own control the legislative power to close your borders by various types of protective devices, to enable you to set up the industries that would enable you to put your people to work and save some foreign exchange by domestic import substitution, it was the easiest place to start. However, the Caribbean markets are very small, and when you close your borders, you close your borders in terms of the level of production for those markets. The 1960s and 1970s showed that the Caricom market is not big enough to enable you to produce and employ enough. Consequently, that strategy has run its race, and has still left large numbers of unemployed. We must therefore turn to a different strategy, one which will give us a bigger market place while still enabling us to earn more foreign exchange and employ more people. Obviously that market place is the world or the region around you.

So we must convert the Caribbean to export-oriented rather than import substitution economies, and it is this structural adjustment which Jamaica is now undertaking. Over a period of time we expect to be able to remove all the barriers, or virtually all the barriers, that exist to imports, and to convert

domestic production to export-oriented markets. That will enable those export-oriented industries to produce more for the bigger market place, and to employ more. This, of course, is not being done overnight. It's a five-year programme, and it's being done on the basis of studies being conducted for every step before it is taken, taking one sub-sector at a time. The textile and garments sub-sector comes first, then the footwear sub-sector next, then the building material sub-sector follows, and so on. Over a period of time we hope to be able to put in place a new range of export manufacturing industries which will have a wider world to sell in and much more employment capacity.

► *And what role is there for the private sector in all this?*

— That role is for the private sector.

► *As you are almost totally dependent on imported oil, will energy create a problem?*


— For a small country we have a most comprehensive energy plan worked out for alternative new and renewable sources of energy. I presented that plan to the special United Nations conference on new and renewable sources of energy in Nairobi in August last year. It deals with just about every possible type of energy that can be harnessed. Not just listing them, but identifying where they can become projects, determining the extent to which they can come on stream in substitution for oil, with planned targets for this decade and for the decade up to the year 2000. We are not basing our energy proposals or our energy forecast on the discovery of oil. If that happens then, of course, we would be overjoyed. But our energy proposals are based on new and renewable sources of energy of all types—hydro,

coal, peat, solar, wind, biomass and biogas.

Restoring initiative and self-improvement


► *To an outsider, the last elections seemed to be a confrontation of ideologies. Would you say that your policy since that election, particularly in such things as increased privatization, is in a sense an ideological reaction to what went before?*

— It's not an ideological reaction, it's an ideological action. The last seven years were the ideological reaction. From the 1940s, the modern era for the Caribbean, the group of countries in the area, of all language groups, have followed the same strategy as the group of countries in South-East Asia. That is to say, a market economy backed by a democratic parliamentary system. The Caribbean countries have followed a strategy in which the private sector was the productive sector. The government played a regulatory role in the interests of the consumers and workers of the country, and also participated in the productive sector of the economy as and when it was needed. That strategy took us right through the 1960s throughout the entire Caribbean, except in Guyana, where deviations began to occur as far back as the late 1950s. The Cuban revolution started an entirely different trend to an essentially planned economy, one in which there is an allocation of resources, not resources reacting to supply and demand. Cuba, however, was isolated in its strategy. In the 1960s we enjoyed buoyant rates of growth, improved our foreign exchange reserves, maintained inflation within single figures, and so on. And this was the general pattern throughout the Caribbean. But we failed to reduce unemployment. In the 1970s the government that came to power in Jamaica deviated from this development strategy and reacted by moving closer to the Cuban model, firstly in policy statements, then, bit by bit, in setting up the apparatus that would be needed for the transformation process to take place. While doing so, as I said earlier, it certainly limited the extent to which capital wanted to become involved in the development of the country. Indeed on the negative side it scared capital away. Since resuming office, what we have done is to restore Jamaica to the path in which private enterprise, private initiative and the reward for private initiative become the basic motivational forces. The last half of the 1970s created a feeling that the state would take care of you. A "freeness mentality" developed. You didn't have



JIS photo

Prime Minister Seaga shows local and foreign businessmen around a sugar complex. On the right, David Rockefeller. The sugar industry is in need of investment and reorganization to bring production up to past levels



JIS photo

Part of the national capital, Kingston

to work, you'd be taken care of provided you did the right things politically. The political system was supposed to take care of everyone. Of course it couldn't. Any person could see that.

We have now restored the discipline of initiative and hard work. Not completely, but we have made a marked move in that direction which is very noticeable. What we have done is to restore to Jamaica what is a natural motivation of the people. The people are naturally motivated to improve their standards of living by self-improvement. Not that they're oblivious to the patriotic feelings that come with national improvement. But they are intensely motivated by self-improvement, and for that one has to have personal reward. So we have restored that. We have also managed resources on a much better basis. And we are changing the import substitution strategy of the 1960s to one of export thrust, which will give us wider scope to generate new foreign exchange and new employment. So we haven't reacted, we have simply restored Ja-

maica's development strategy to the stable path it once knew.

► *Would it be true to say that you are pursuing a parallel course to that of President Reagan, and maybe even Margaret Thatcher, in the sense that you are trying to change people's attitudes at all levels?*

— Before President Reagan came on the scene, before Margaret Thatcher came on the scene, we had been doing this. And if there had never been a President Reagan or a Margaret Thatcher we would still be doing it.

Inflation already below 5%

► *Given the inevitable time lag between what you're trying to do now and the results in a few years time, do you think that you and your party can hope to reap the political benefits at the next general election?*

— Well, what are the benefits that we have already reaped? There is a much more relaxed atmosphere, for

which people are very thankful. We had spent eight and a half years in almost constant tension. We have restored basic supplies which did not exist over the last five years. We have restored hope for the future so that people are now planning, building, and focussing their attention on the positive rather than the negative. Attention is not now on how to get out of the system but how to operate within it, and to develop it. These are intangibles, but we also expect to improve our budgetary performance, and the performance of the economy generally. Last year Jamaica, I believe, had few equals anywhere in the world. We came from a background of eight years of consecutive negative growth to a positive year of growth. We came from a background of inflation that averaged 30% per annum over the last five years to a figure which is projected to be under 5% for 1981. I don't know of any other free world country that has achieved a level of under 5% inflation in 1981. We came from a situation in which there was virtually no new investment coming into the country to one in which we are overwhelmed by the flow of investment. One can call it a flood. I've had to set up an agency entirely devoted to dealing with new investment proposals. There are some five hundred proposals before that agency totalling over \$800 million.

We have come from a position in which the capacity of the tourist industry and of manufacturing were so under-utilized that they really did not offer much hope for the future. They were less than 50% utilized. The tourist industry has rebounded back now, and this year it looks as if we are going to be well above 50% overall utilization, and in the winter season we are aiming at around 70%. Manufacturing industry is responding to the new flow of raw materials, and its own capacity is being increased with existing machinery. The talk everywhere is of new investment. We have searches for oil going on offshore and onshore simultaneously. We are expanding our major mining sector, through new alumina plants. We have expansion programmes in industry. We have expansion programmes in agriculture and in just about every sector, including housing and construction. Expansion is in the wind. Those are all positives where we had negatives before. In political life, five years is a long time, a very long period to look ahead. All I can say is that if these positive trends continue there will be absolutely no reason why the people will not benefit very generously from them. And to the extent that they benefit they will obviously be satisfied. ◊

Interview by I.P.

Agriculture still central to economic recovery

Although bauxite-alumina and tourism offer the best short-term hope of an increase in foreign earnings, and the small manufacturing, forestry and fishing sectors are expected to contribute significantly to stimulating economic growth and employment, agriculture remains crucial to the government's plans for economic recovery.

The recent record in agriculture has been poor. As the Prime Minister pointed out in his speech after one year in office, "agriculture is at once the largest employer of labour and the most chronically depressed sector of our economy.

"When we took office last November, we found cause for dismay on every hand—little fertilizer, agricultural chemicals, vehicles, machinery or spare parts. There were not even the simplest of tools—cutlasses and files. Nearly all farming institutions were in decline or collapsing and thieves ram-paged both through farm credit institutions and the farmers' fields.

"A combination of bad weather, disease, ruinous programmes and scandalous mismanagement had brought our export agriculture to such a pass that it will be years before it can be restored to health".

The production figures for the main export crops speak for themselves: sugar-cane, the most important single employer, down from 4.2 million tonnes in 1970 to 2.9 million by the end of the decade; bananas, from a peak of 384 000 tonnes in 1971 down to 172 000 tonnes by 1979; citrus down from 158 000 tonnes in 1971 to 70 000 tonnes by the end of the decade. Of the lesser products, only coffee and ginger production were higher at the end of the 1970s, coconut about the same, after big falls in some years, and cocoa and pimento down after a variable performance. On the other hand, production of domestic food rose, partly in response to the problems of importing food because of foreign exchange shortages.

Major restructuring of sugar industry

Despite its decline, sugar is still the most important crop in Jamaica. At its

present level of production, however, it is not viable and major restructuring of the sugar industry is underway. The cooperatives, which went bankrupt owing over \$ 82 million, have been disbanded. The total debt of the industry as a whole was over \$ 200 million by 1980. The low productivity of the industry is also crippling. The Prime Minister made a stark but telling comparison recently with Barbados, "which produced 150 000 tons of sugar from 40 000 acres of land and operates six sugar factories, while Jamaica is producing 200 000 tons of sugar from 120 000 acres and operating 12 sugar factories". The government is providing the inputs—fertilizer, adequate transport and irrigation—but has put a time limit on the revival of the industry. "The sugar industry", said Prime Minister Seaga, "has one last chance to redeem itself from all the bad management, insufficient work, poor cultivation and inadequate supplies of the past".

Foreign exchange problems

Dr Percival Broderick, the agriculture minister, is directing the changes in policy. The immediate problem, as in other areas of the economy, is getting

foreign exchange to pay for the inputs. In an interview with the *Courier* he explained the impact of the change of government: "Agriculture is in the forefront of the administration's development process. We have received what I consider a reasonable allocation of foreign exchange, considering the size of the foreign exchange budget. Naturally we would like to get all of it as we have never concealed our greed and our wish to be able to produce and to succeed.

We have no hang-ups about the appetite we have to succeed. We could use all the foreign exchange that there is. I think it is fair to say that we have done well in the past year. We have been able in sugar to bring transport trucks back into service. We have been able to stabilize fertilizer inputs and to bring in spare parts to get the sugar factories going and repair machinery. All those things have to be imported.

I think that we have done well, and I know that next year the Prime Minister himself has indicated that agriculture will still continue to receive high priority treatment. So we are very optimistic".

Apart from ending the cooperatives, the government is looking for major improvements in cultivation and in the factories.

"We're looking seriously at the management level within the factories,



Agriculture minister Percival Broderick meeting farm workers (left) and inspecting a tractor from the EEC



JIS photo



JIS photo



Jamaica is successfully developing what are called non-traditional exports. The three examples here are cucumbers, pumpkins and sweet peppers

and have said that each one has to become a profit centre. In other words, we are not going to look at the combined receipts of the factories and share the earnings. We shall look at each factory's profits to determine what people shall earn.

The budget cannot stand continuing losses

"It is going to be important for factories to perform efficiently because we're not going to be prepared, as a government, to carry an industry indefinitely which continues to accumulate huge losses. The budget cannot stand it. It's as simple as that. So everybody who is in the industry, whether they are workers in the field, workers at the factory level, whether they are employers at any level within the industry, will have to understand that the whole survival of their industry is going to be won on a cooperative basis between government, unions and management. We're not selling the factories. We're not selling the lands, but we are looking at divesting management. We would like, for instance, to be able to attract a high level of management within the sugar industry. Sugar is a huge employer of labour in Jamaica. I think the sugar industry employs directly some 50 000 people. If you use the multiplier effect in respect of the numbers of persons who indirectly benefit, there are roughly 300 000 persons involved in the industry. So we have a vested interest in keeping that industry going.

"We are in discussions with the

Ministry of Local Government in respect of roads. This is very critical in terms of the industry. It needs proper roads for the trucks to have accessibility to the farms. We must reap cane on time because the time when you reap determines the optimum juice quality, which is important again in respect of earnings. Also I think it is important to mention that we've had to look at the administration. You'd be surprised how many millions of dollars you can save from the entire system by tightening up the administrative structure. Finally I think one should say that the object of all this is to bring back our cane production levels. We're down to



Good roads are essential to the revival of the sugar and banana industries


some 2.5 million tonnes of cane producing 200 000 tonnes of sugar. This year we are projecting some 210 000 tonnes. We are looking at a four-year period where we ought to be back at 300 000 tonnes. It is at that level that the industry can be considered to have recovered", Dr Broderick said.

Jamaica was not able to fill its EEC sugar quota on time last year, and there will be a problem again this year. Ironically, trying to fill the quota means that Jamaica has to import sugar for its domestic needs.

Restoring banana production

Jamaica is not supplying its traditional banana markets either. Dr Broderick explained what had gone wrong and his ministry's plans to restore productivity.

"The banana industry was hit by two disasters. One was the previous administration. One was hurricane Allen. I think if one were to look at the banana industry on a comparative basis with the other industries that had a difficult time, it would be apparent that the banana industry is at a much more critical level than any other industry, because it is so highly technical an industry. This year our production is estimated at some 21 000 tonnes. The government's programme is to bring banana production back to 150 000 tonnes, for which we have assured markets in the United Kingdom. We have recently been negotiating a banana-growing project, between the United Brands Company, banana producers and the government, to develop



JIS photo

Packing Jamaican bananas for export. It is quality that counts for the consumer

5 000 acres of pure stand bananas, yielding some 15 tonnes per acre. We have identified the land, we have identified the funding, and it's a matter now of determining the pace at which we are going to go into that production because one doesn't just get up and plough 5 000 acres and put in so many thousand banana trees. In respect of the bananas which are presently in the field, there are presently some 17 000 acres of land, projected to yield some 53 000 tonnes. We have broken down the production of the existing acreages. In 1982, we expect to produce 34 000 tonnes of exportable fruit. In 1983, 87 000 tonnes. Come 1984, the banana-growing project would begin to impact on our export volume. At the end of four years we will have reached 150 000 tonnes, which is the market that is available to us in the UK.

"We have serious problems in keeping that market open and negotiations are going on at the very highest level. We have to thank the Ministry of Agriculture in the UK for having stood up for us in respect of the assured market. We hope to get extensions in the hope that our production will recover. But we have real difficulties. We have to bring in the inputs like we did in sugar. We have to look at supplies of parquat, sleeves and boxes to ship in, irrigation and supplies of fertilizers. You have to deal with the technique of handling the bananas from the field to the

Jamal: building a literate nation

Jamaica has a reputation for well-qualified staff in the public and private sectors, government and education. Although there was an exodus of skilled people during the difficult economic times of the last decade, many have remained. The present government hopes many of those who left will return, and if they do they could contribute directly to the success of the economic recovery programme.

Despite the reputation, however, many Jamaicans cannot read or write. In 1970 it was estimated that half a million adults were functionally illiterate and in 1972 a national campaign to overcome the problem was begun. In 1974 this became the Jamaican Movement for the Advancement of Literacy, or Jamal for short.

Since then 206 000 students have passed through Jamal's literacy courses, and there are currently 116 000 students in class. About one third of the funds come from government; the rest come from private donations and in financial and technical assistance from the European Development Fund, UN agencies and individual countries—Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the USA. Jamal also depends on the voluntary service of nearly 6000 teachers and the free use of 4 000 premises throughout the island.

Continued support

Although Jamal was set up by the previous government, it has benefitted from continued support since the political change in 1980. While leader of the opposition, Edward Seaga had said, "a literate population is the infrastructure of nation building. The Jamal literacy programme, within the resources available at this time, has achieved creditable results towards this goal and should receive support from every level within the community".

Jamal produces all its own teaching materials (EEC aid has gone mainly towards equipment for the print shop) and gives basic training to its teachers. Some former students have in turn become literacy teachers. The material is geared towards everyday life in Jamaica, and is itself educational, broadening the student's knowledge and awareness. A newspaper helps maintain momentum in the organization. If the dedication and enthusiasm of the headquarters staff is anything to go by, the literacy campaign will not falter for lack of initiative. It is cash that is the problem.


After 10 years of operation the need for the campaign remains because of the number of youngsters leaving school illiterate. This is a problem which the government will have to face. If it is a matter of the limited money available, Jamal has shown what can be done on slim resources. o I.P.



Photo Jamal



JIS photo



Both the banana and sugar industries, which are large employers of labour, have been in decline and are now undergoing major changes to boost production

wharf because you're transporting a fruit that is very delicate and highly perishable. Our fruit is in serious competition not only with other fruits, as the fresh fruit market goes, but in terms of what the British housewife sees as the sort of banana that she would like to place on her table".

Maintaining quality

The agriculture ministry is also putting emphasis on inland transport so that bananas can be moved quickly to the ports when a ship is due. Delays can mean an early ripening of the crop and a decline in quality which is unacceptable to importers. The minister explained what had been happening. "When bananas arrive in London, you don't have to ask which is a Jamaican banana, you can do it by the smell test. When it starts to ripen it starts to smell of ripe banana, and that happens when you haven't got the fruit from the field to the ship in under 36 hours... The problem we have in shipping is due to our low yields. We have to share space

on a ship from somewhere else which makes planning difficult".


Since hurricane Allen, the banana industry has been trying to restore quality. Too many Jamaican bananas have been undersize for export markets and affected by spot disease. Spot control by spraying has become expensive but is essential if Jamaican bananas are to get back their former markets. A major government control programme is now underway.

Non-traditional products

The government has begun a research and nursery production programme to expand output of coffee, cocoa and citrus, all of which grow well in Jamaica. But there is great enthusiasm too for what are called non-traditional crops, products which have not in the past been grown commercially. A 600-acre experimental horticultural site has been set up to determine what could be grown best. "It could be a real foreign exchange earner", said Dr Broderick. "We are very

jealous of the fact that when you look at the North American market you see all these products that have come from places like Colombia, and you know that their cargo planes are flying right over you with all that foreign exchange. It's then we feel we are not taking advantage of our ideal geographical position and ideal climatic conditions".

The biggest barrier is the high cost of starting horticultural projects, but there has already been an upturn in production of non-traditionals from existing producers. Encouraging non-traditional exports is an important part of the national export plan, and the Jamaica National Export Corporation's preliminary report for 1981 shows a 26.8% increase in the value of food exports for the first 10 months of the year. Food represented over a quarter of total non-traditional exports and processed foods were the most important, accounting for \$J 18.3 m of the \$J 56.4 m. The main processed food exports were fruit juices and preserves, bakery products and chocolates.



JIS photo



The difficulty of extending sea fishing is being overcome by fresh water fish farming

Interestingly, although non-traditional exports to Caricom rose in general by 21 % last year, food exports rose by an impressive 147 %. Almost half of all non-traditional exports go to Caricom markets.

Other resources

Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee grows well and has a very high reputation, but the amount produced is very small, only 2264 tonnes in 1979. Most of it goes to Japan. Because of its qualities it commands a high price and an expansion of production, regardless of the state of the world coffee trade, is in Jamaica's interest. Cocoa production, on the other hand, is currently affected by poor cultivation and disease, and farmers are often discouraged by the time lag between planting and cropping. Nevertheless, conditions are good for cocoa production and the Ministry of Agriculture plans to improve inputs and guidance to farmers.

With the recent upturn in jam, juice and preserve exports, citrus also offers possibilities for future expansion, as do spices, coconuts and tobacco, all of which have had variable production records in the last ten years. Forestry is also a potential money-maker.

An island, but little fish

Despite the fact that Jamaica is an island, its fishing industry is not well developed. Some attempt is being made to promote offshore fishing with German help, but the agriculture ministry is also keen on developing inland fisheries. A programme using freshwater fish of the tilapia type is under way and should be producing three million pounds (weight) by 1983.

Inland fishing is just one of many possibilities for increased food and crop production in Jamaica. Whether livestock, fish or agricultural production the main aim of the government is to create the right circumstances for production, through action on land use, inputs, extension services, marketing and so on. But the government can only do a certain amount and it depends heavily on a positive response from the private sector. The encouragement of non-traditional products has already made a good start; the revitalization of the important banana and sugar industries, however, will take time, given the setbacks both have experienced over the last decade. It is important that the revitalization of agriculture succeeds for it is clear that in the medium term it could contribute significantly to two of the government's main objectives—the stimulation of exports and the creation of employment. ○ I.P.



Dunns River falls

Tourism

**“We're more than a beach.
We're a country”**

The PR man's slogan to attract tourists to Jamaica is trying to widen the country's appeal. But it confirms one thing that is well known already; Jamaica has good beaches. The slogan is not trying to play them down. Many, if not most tourists are sun-seekers. But even the most devoted beach addict sometimes wants some variety, and Jamaica's tourist promoters believe that the country's people, history, physical diversities and culture offer it.

1981 saw an upturn in what had been a depressed tourist industry, and new publicity campaigns on television in North America and Europe are aimed at maintaining that recovery. This is important to the government because full use of Jamaica's tourist infrastructure is one of the most immediate ways of increasing the flow of foreign exchange into the country. While agricultural exports will only recover after a number of years of improvements in organization and inputs, and while the

bauxite-alumina industry waits for an upturn in demand, tourism offers immediate prospects for recovery. The infrastructure is already there but has been under-utilized. The violence which occurred during the abnormally extended election campaign in 1980 received too much publicity in the countries to which Jamaica looks for its tourists. Reports of shortages of basic essentials dissuaded visitors. There was also increased competition in the Caribbean and a recession in the USA.

North America, the most important market

A return to the more usual atmosphere of “relaxed efficiency”, as it has been put, combined with a major publicity effort, has restored the tourist sector to health. Given its proximity to the United States and the regular air links with Miami and other North American cities, it is to the American market that Jamaica looks for most of its tourists. In 1980 North Americans accounted for 60 % of the trade. The change in government, and Prime Min-

ister Seaga's friendly reception in Washington, must also have helped Jamaica's image in American eyes. Hotel occupancy in 1980 fell to a worrying 44%, but although figures for 1981 are not yet available, estimates reveal a substantial recovery. During Christmas 1981, for example, occupancy was over 60%.

Economic impact



The decline in the number of tourists in 1980 had less impact than might have been expected on the inflow of funds. Visitor expenditure actually rose, reaching an estimated US\$ 241.7 million, although this was considerably less than what it could have been. Employment in the sector was not so fortunate, falling by 18% to less than 10 000. A similar impact was felt by those who indirectly depend on the tourist trade—transport operators, retailers and so forth. The revival in tourism will be good news for those on the north coast, where the industry is concentrated. It is estimated that tourism accounted for about 17% of all exports of goods and services in 1981, a figure which will increase to about 23% by the middle of the decade. With a population of about 2.2 million, Jamaica receives some 600 000 tourists every year. It can and will encourage more to come. Although the tourist infrastructure is already well developed along the northern coast (between Negril and Port Antonio), there is plenty of room for further development without the coast and the beaches becoming overcrowded.

Varied attractions

The beaches and the sea provide the main interest for the tourist. The principal centre is Montego Bay, which offers a range of accommodation from the super luxurious to the relatively modest.

Apart from the beach there are many sporting facilities—tennis, golf, sailing, water-skiing and so on. Ocho Rios, further east, is more up-market than Montego Bay, boasting expensive villas and hotels, while Negril in the west is a more casual resort which puts the emphasis on its easygoing atmosphere and small-scale development.

Jamaica is a beautiful island and apart from its dramatic coast it offers many inland sites of natural beauty. There is also its history and culture, especially its music, which is now known world-wide. A tourist to Ocho Rios can visit Discovery Bay, where Columbus landed in 1494, or see the tomb of Bob Marley, the reggae superstar.



Jamaica's beaches (top) are world famous, but there are many other attractions for the tourist. Rose Hall (centre), near Montego Bay, is one of the many great houses. Costumed guides take visitors around this restored 18th century house which is reputed to be haunted. Inland (bottom) there are many scenic spots and guided raft trips, such as this one on the Rio Grande near Port Antonio, is one way to see them

Pirates and planters have left their mark

Spanish Town-Port Royal is one of the best places to be reminded of Jamaica's past. The Spanish ruled the island from here. Port Royal became famous for its pirates: the most celebrated, Henry Morgan, was the son of a Welsh farmer who had been shipped to Jamaica as a bond servant. He escaped and soon began his pirate career. His most celebrated exploit was the sacking of the city of Panama. This put him in difficulty with the London government which had a peace treaty with Spain, but Morgan survived the problem emerging not only as *Sir Henry*, but as Governor of Jamaica as well!

Spanish Town has the oldest cathedral in the western hemisphere and an attractive Georgian square. In classical style is the memorial which recalls Admiral Rodney's sea victory over the French in the Caribbean in 1782. Inland too, there are many splendid buildings dating from the 18th century sugar boom, while in parts of Mandeville visitors could believe they were in an English village.

The friendliness is still there

Jamaica has had a bad press in recent years because of the level of crime, some of it violent. An effort has been made to control it more effectively, and since the main problem is in Kingston where one third of the population lives and where unemployment is a serious social problem, it has not had too serious an impact on the tourist areas (except in 1980 during the election campaign).

Jamaica's tourist authorities like to emphasise the essential friendliness of the island, and it certainly seems true that the average Jamaican openly welcomes visitors. Self-confidence and a pride in being Jamaican have left few complexes about the colonial past to sour people's attitude to foreigners. Perhaps it has something to do with the fact that in the select world of international cricket, the West Indies are second to none. The reputation of the cricket heroes is part of Jamaica's national pride as is the fact that its music is now world famous.

All this is the intangible side of tourism, which the Jamaican Tourist Board has tried to bring out in its latest campaign in the USA. If early results are reliable, the message is getting through and the board is confident that the tourist sector will expand and provide Jamaica with a growing amount of much-needed foreign exchange. ○

I.P.

Jamaica Tourist Board

Mining and energy

Importing oil to export bauxite

Jamaica has one of the largest deposits of bauxite in the world but not a drop of oil. It was therefore hard hit by the energy crisis that began in 1974 (imported oil represents over 95 % of its energy needs) and the subsequent recession, which struck the industrialized countries, meant a fall in demand for aluminium and therefore the bauxite from which it comes. In the longer term the government intends to considerably diversify its sources of energy, and the Prime Minister himself attended the UN conference on new and renewable sources of energy to present Jamaica's plans. The economic need for such diversification is clear. In 1973, 17 % of Jamaica's export earnings went on paying for oil imports. By 1980 that had risen to 47 %.

Oil, then, is Jamaica's most costly import while bauxite/alumina is its main export earner. The bauxite/alumina industry is important to the government's plans for economic recovery since it provides a significant flow of tax revenue and foreign exchange. In 1980 the industry accounted for 9 % of GDP.

Major reserves

Known reserves of bauxite in Jamaica exceed 2000 million tonnes, which ranks it among the top handful of producers. With annual production running at between 11 and 12 million tonnes Jamaica is also the world's third largest supplier and could continue producing at that rate for 150 years.

The bauxite itself is spread across the centre of the island from north to

south. It is on the surface and does not have the so-called "overburden", or cover, which is found in many other producing countries. Half of the bauxite is shipped unprocessed to the United States but half is processed into alumina in four refineries with a total production capacity of 2.7 million tonnes a year (see diagram). The bauxite when mined is bright red in colour, but the refined alumina is a fine white powder. Five tonnes of Jamaican bauxite produces 2 tonnes of alumina, which in turn produces 1 tonne of aluminium when smelted. There are, however, no smelters in Jamaica, mainly because of energy constraints.


The role of the companies

Bauxite mining in Jamaica is quite recent. Three North American companies

came to Jamaica after the Second World War. Reynolds of the USA began exporting bauxite in 1952 and Kaiser, also from the USA, a year later. A Canadian firm, Alcan, was the first to export alumina. By 1957 Jamaica was the world's largest producer of bauxite. The world's largest aluminium company, Alcoa (USA), also set up in Jamaica, but not until the 1960s.

If the aluminium industry is taken as a whole—which it has to be since there is no real separate market for bauxite—then Jamaica is involved in the first two stages: mining, and refining into alumina. Taxing the companies has always been a problem because of the difficulty of separating out their profits on part of what is, in essence, an integrated process from ore to ingot. This led the former government, faced as it was by the oil crisis, to impose a levy indexed to the price of aluminium on the American market. It also bought back the land where the mines are situated, substituting 40-year leases, and took shares in the companies' operations. The ownership of the mineral had been vested in the British crown since colonial days but was transferred to the Jamaican government at independence and therefore presented no problem.

The levy created some friction between government and the companies and also pushed up the cost of the bauxite, which had been among the cheapest in the world. This, combined with a slowdown in demand, led to a fall in Jamaican production from 15 m tonnes in 1974 to 11-12 m tonnes a year in the late 1970s.



One of the processing plants which turn bauxite into alumina. This uses half of Jamaica's oil imports




Because it is mostly under a thin layer of topsoil, Jamaican bauxite is relatively easy to mine

Attractiveness of Jamaican bauxite

The bauxite levy was reduced in 1979 as the recession hit demand for aluminium. The processing of bauxite into alumina was also costing more since it depended entirely on imported oil. Add to this the fact that Jamaican bauxite is of middle quality, and there was reason to be concerned about future sales. Jamaican bauxite does have certain advantages, however, which keep the interest of aluminium producers. Firstly, the reserves are substantial and provide opportunities for long term investment. Secondly they are on the surface, reducing mining costs. Thirdly, since the island is small, internal movement is easy, and once at the ports Jamaica is well placed, close to the main North American market, which cuts down ocean transport costs. Finally, although the grade is not of the highest, the silica content is low which makes processing easier. The molecular structure, which is trihydrate, requires less heat and pressure to process.

Problems of the market


The world recession has produced a drop in demand for many of those products—household goods, cars, cans and so on, in which aluminium is used. Nearly all the aluminium plants have been cutting back production and this has filtered back to the bauxite and alumina producers. For Jamaica, cut-



Bauxite being transported by rail

Alcan

JIS photo



backs in production do not greatly affect employment, since only some 6000 people are employed by the industry, but it does directly affect the balance of payments and supply of foreign exchange. Had not the new government been able to negotiate with the Reagan administration in Washington the supply of an extra 1.6 million tonnes of Jamaican bauxite for the American strategic stockpile, then prospects for 1982 output would have been very much poorer than the ± 11 million tonnes expected. The government plans to expand production, and marketing opportunities are constantly

being sought. A sustained growth in production will depend on industrial expansion, particularly in North America and Europe, and the consequent rise in demand for aluminium. As long as a malaise hangs over the bauxite-alumina industry, one of Jamaica's main hopes for economic recovery will be uncertain.

New energy plan

Petroleum represents over 98% of commercial energy consumption in Jamaica. Before 1973 that presented no great problem since the cost never


rose above 10% of the total import bill. The oil crisis changed all that and by 1980 oil represented 38% of Jamaica's total import bill. The need to find local sources of energy became urgent.

Last August Prime Minister Seaga presented his government's plan on energy to the United Nations conference on new and renewable sources of energy. It is still hoped that oil will be found in Jamaica or in the seas around the country, but no one can be certain of that. The plan therefore aims to diversify commercial energy, and to increase the use of other specific non-commercial types of energy. (At present household consumption is also heavily dependent on imported oil. The figures are oil-fueled electricity, 50.9%, various petroleum products 40.6%, wood and charcoal 8.5%.)

Important timelag

Diversifying sources of energy cannot be achieved overnight, and Jamaica's plans are therefore divided into three development stages between now and the end of the century. In view of the government's desire to see sustained economic growth, there is little room for reducing overall energy consumption in the first phase up to 1985. In this early period some energy conservation is possible, and public utilities and some industries, such as cement, will use more coal. There is also some scope for small-scale solar water heaters and smaller hydro-projects.

In the mid-term (1985-1990) the expansion of coal will continue, including coal-fired electricity generators; ocean



Solar water heating installations at the Mallards-Hyatt hotel in Ocho Rios

thermal (OTEC) energy will be started and the large-scale Blue Mountain hydro project get off the ground. There are also plans to develop biogas, biomass fuels from vegetable oil, and to extend solar power.

In the longer term the government plans to set up a diversified range of renewable and non-renewable energy sources. The importance of each type will depend on research and development work that has already started.



Electricity generation for private homes and industry is oil-fired. The national energy plan aims to diversify towards domestic and renewable sources of power

Non-renewable energy

Jamaica's only known source of carbon energy is peat which by 2000 could be supplying 2% of energy requirements (it is estimated that energy needs will rise by 145% in the period 1980-2000). Oil will still represent almost three quarters of the energy used which demonstrates the urgency of oil and natural gas exploration which was resumed in 1978. Conversion to coal in electricity generation and some industries, including perhaps alumina processing, would cut costs, but coal would still have to be imported, eating up foreign exchange, and future international demand for coal and its effect on prices is uncertain. A switch to coal would also involve providing port facilities to handle the imports and other conversion costs.

Renewable possibilities

Because of its location, Jamaica can obviously harness solar energy and projects have already been undertaken particularly in hot water heating for hospitals and hotels. Solar pond and photo voltaic schemes have also been started. Trials of wind energy are planned while an OTEC case study for the 1980s makes Jamaica one of the few developing countries where this is to be tried.

Studies are to be undertaken on the possibilities of producing alcohol from biomass by using sugar cane and cassava and on a number of biogas projects.

Finally geothermal and hydropower are both feasible, the largest being the planned Blue Mountain hydro-electric and water supply scheme.

Force of circumstances

Ironically, the very existence of Jamaica's major export—bauxite-alumina—has emphasised the country's dependence on imported oil. Alumina production is very fuel-intensive, consuming half the nations' oil imports. Faced with an oil crisis, the economy naturally faltered.

But the very fact that it was not exporting oil like neighbouring Trinidad, Venezuela and Mexico has forced Jamaica to look seriously at its energy future. The result has been a plan of great diversity and the initiation of a number of projects and studies. Should Jamaica find oil of its own it would be a great relief. But with or without oil, by the end of the century Jamaica should have a limited number of alternative, and mainly renewable, sources of energy. ○ I.P.

EEC-Jamaica cooperation

The relationship between Jamaica and the European Community was developed in 1976 with the ratification of the Lomé I Convention by the government of Jamaica. The delegation of the Commission was also established in 1976 as part of a broad expansion of relationships between the European Community and a number of ACP states.

Lomé I

An indicative programme was formulated under Lomé I using a planning figure of 20 million European currency units (ECU). The main areas of concentration agreed upon were projects in export promotion, education and training, agriculture and microdam construction. The table indicates the distribution of resources under the indicative programme as well as an analysis of commitments and disbursements by project as at 31 December 1981.

A few illustrations of project implementation may be taken by a brief reference to two or three projects. Turning first to the field of education and training, the Jamaican government took full advantage of the resources available under the multi-annual training programme. Training was organized at the national, regional and European levels. In addition, project support for the Jamal Foundation (adult literacy) was concentrated in the provision of equipment, holding of seminars and short courses for large numbers of voluntary teachers. A third element in the education field was finance for the construction of school buildings to be used for pre-primary education. This took the form of replacing, upgrading and construction of schools and the supply of modern teaching material.

In the field of agriculture, the EDF financed a banana project whose original objective was the establishment of 2 000 acres of estate cultivation. Involvement in bananas was designed as a contribution to the revival of banana production which has witnessed a decline in recent years. The EDF has made available ECU 3 367 000 for this project much of which has been devoted to land preparation, buildings, transport, field equipment and irrigation layout systems. Technical assistance has also been provided to strengthen the managerial and technical aspects of the project.


A third important field has been the collaboration between the Jamaican government and the European Community in export promotion. The table il-

lustrates that a total of ECU 2 790 000 has been committed to this sector. Of this figure ECU 1 million has been channelled as a loan to the Jamaica Export Trading Company (JETCO) and is successfully used as a revolving fund for the pre-financing of exports to small and medium-sized producers. Other elements of the trade promotion programme, undertaken through the Jamaica National Export Corporation (JNEC), have covered overseas promotional missions, market research and technical studies, seminars and technical assistance. Collaboration in this field is accelerating and will probably provide a fruitful area for financing under Lomé II.

It is hoped that the existing uncommitted balance of ECU 3 260 000 will shortly be programmed, as well as a substantial approved line of credit originally destined for the Jamaica Development Bank (JDB) but which has been held up for institutional and procedural reasons.

Lomé II

In preparation for collaboration under the Lomé II Convention, negotiations took place in March 1980 between the government of Jamaica and the EEC Commission. A programming mission assisted in the development of a formal indicative programme, based upon provisional planning figures of ECU 24-



JIS photo

The EDF has committed ECU 3 m to a 200-acre banana plantation

27.5 million. The sectoral distribution arrived at was as follows:

- Agriculture: 40% (ECU 9.6 m)
- Export development: 10% (ECU 2.4 m)
- Education and training: 20% (ECU 4.8 m)
- Living conditions: 10% (ECU 2.4 m)
- Contingencies: 20% (ECU 4.8 m).

With the change of government which took place in late October 1980 and the redirection of the economy which followed it, the formulation of projects within the above sectors has advanced slowly. It is possible that some redistribution of the sectoral percentages will take place as a reflection of the priorities followed by the present government. An important element is the development of a three-year public sector investment programme which will provide the framework for the integration of development finance into the government's overall investment programme. Notwithstanding the time



A Jamal class in action. The ECU 831 000 provided by the EDF has gone mainly on printing equipment

EEC indicative programme for Jamaica

(Financial situation in January 1982)

| | Amount ECU | Loan Grant | Committed | Disbursed |
|------------------------------------|-------------------|------------|------------|------------|
| 2 000 a — Banana plantation | 3 067 000 | L | 3 000 000 | 1 419 000 |
| Technical assistance — Banana | 300 000 | G | 81 000 | 15 000 |
| Microdam project | 1 009 000 | G | 1 009 000 | 919 000 |
| | 2 700 000 | L | 2 700 000 | 2 494 000 |
| Trade promotion | 1 000 000 | L | 1 000 000 | 1 000 000 |
| Training | 2 790 000 | G | 2 686 000 | 2 400 00 |
| Adult literacy | 930 000 | G | 831 000 | 780 00 |
| Early childhood schools | 930 000 | G | 630 000 | 400 000 |
| Line of credit | 1 860 000 | L | 0 | 0 |
| Microprojet | 363 000 | G | 363 000 | 174 000 |
| | 16 739 000 | | 13 050 000 | 10 242 000 |
| Available for future programming : | 3 261 000 | | | |
| TOTAL | 20 000 000 | | | |

Other funds within the Lomé Convention :

Emergency aid : 1 175 000

Stabex : 3 238 000

Outside the Convention: Food aid ± ECU 3 m (1981), ± ECU 10 m since 1976

which has passed since the original negotiations of the indicative programme, the formulation of the multi-annual training programme is developing smoothly. Various project ideas are under examination, especially in agriculture, and sector studies have been identified in the coffee and citrus industries, as was envisaged in March 1980. In addition the Commission is currently examining a request for technical assistance, training and equipment for the newly established Board of Revenue.

European Investment Bank (EIB)

The EIB has recently mobilized an exploratory mission to Jamaica in order to have a preliminary assessment of the areas in which the bank might become active under Lomé II. This mission, in November 1981, was successful in acquiring detailed understanding of the government's investment priorities in various sectors, and it is to be hoped that precise investment opportunities will soon be brought to the point of final negotiation.

ROGER BOOTH
EEC delegate in Jamaica

Profile of Jamaica

Area: 4 411 sq. miles (11 424 km²)

Population: 2.2 million

Kingston 800 000 (capital)

Montego Bay 45 000

Mandeville 15 000

Population growth 1.4

Density 191 per km²

(438 per km² for arable land)

Independence: 6 August 1962

Government: Bicameral parliamentary democracy

Head of state: H.M. Queen Elizabeth II

Governor-general: Rt. Hon. Sir Florizel Glasspole

Prime Minister: Edward Seaga (Jamaica Labour Party)

Leader of the opposition: Michael Manley (People's National Party)

State of the parties: JLP 51 PNP 9

Languages: English and a local Creole

GDP per capita: US\$ 1330 (1980)

Exports: US\$ 992 m (1980 estimate)

Imports: US\$ 1 196 m (1980 estimate)


Balance of payments: US\$ 228 m (1980 estimate)

Main exports: Bauxite/alumina, manufactures, sugar and bananas

Main imports: Fuels, food products and manufactures

Main trading partners: United States, EEC, Caricom

Currency: Jamaican dollar (J\$1.00 = ECU 0.51 = US\$ 0.52 approx.)



RWANDA

The shadow of Malthus over a genuine hope of economic progress

The big political event in Rwanda in mid-January this year was the investiture of the parliament elected last December. The setting up of the National Council for Development, as they call it here, is the final stage in the process of democratization of the regime established in 1973 after a military coup. All its members belong to the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), but they were not the MRND's only candidates. They were chosen in a proper electoral competition—probably less because of their individual programmes and more because of the voters' preference for one or other of the two candidates in each constituency. One of the surprises of the vote was that five of the 64 deputies are women. This is particularly important bearing in mind Rwanda's history and social set-up. If we are to understand the often dramatic events that have taken place in Rwanda over the past 23 years, it is perhaps a good idea to go over the country's basic social organization.

The weight of the past

Rwanda is a veritable nation as those in the industrialized world understand the term. It is a recognized territory, it has a people, a language and a cultural community and this means it has assets which few African and not all European countries enjoy. But, in its development of the past 20 years, this country has almost collapsed under the weight of its economic and social past. The Rwandan people, made up of two tribes, the Hutu and the Tutsi (who spoke the same language), had for years known a feudal system. The Tutsi minority (16%), which came from Ethiopia three centuries earlier, had all the economic power, essentially in the form of land and cattle, and the hereditary power of the monarchy. Cattle, a symbol of power in the system of serfdom, became a link between the Tutsi aristocrats and the Hutu servants. The Hutu could become masters, although, in doing so, they lost their ethnic and cultural identity and stopped behaving like Hutu. The fact that the king held all economic and social power, some of

which he delegated to members of the Tutsi people, gave the impression that everything belonged to the Tutsi. This system was maintained under the period of German colonization in the 1880s. It was strengthened after 1918 when Rwanda became a League of Nations trust territory under Belgian mandate and the feudal system and colonial power, typified by an unfair educational system, helped maintain and strengthen Tutsi supremacy right up until 1959.


The sermon that fired the spark

In 1959, the feeling of frustration amongst the Hutu was profound and there was an obvious desire for social change. The Hutu were encouraged in this by the various liberation movements in Africa in the late 1950s and in particular by what was happening in neighbouring Congo. These movements often occurred on two fronts—against the Tutsi minority and against the trustee, which, it was felt, shared responsibility for the situation. However, it is thought that the revolution of 1959 would not have taken place at that particular time if the Hutu had not been encouraged by a sermon from the head of the local Catholic church one Sunday, wherein he called for respect for human rights and equality. There was apparently no intent to incite the Hutu to rebellion, but the sermon reflected the deep-seated emotions of



King Kigeri V, Rwanda's last monarch, seven months before the Hutu uprising in November 1959. Below, a UN mission halted in July 1960 by Hutu republicans calling for independence





Counting votes at the National development Council on 28 December 1981

many of the majority tribe. And, in addition to this anodine event (which nevertheless revealed the great tension between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority, that had so far had the backing of the Belgian authorities), there was the rapid change in the attitude of the Belgians, who lost no time in jumping on the revolutionary band wagon. This was the turning point, the beginning of the painful events that finished with the fall of the monarchy (the king died in July 1959 and was never succeeded) and the proclamation of the republic in January 1961. But the proclamation was questioned by the Tutsi intellectuals, and even one or two Hutu leaders; the UN organized more elections and this time the Hutu won and proclaimed independence on 1 July 1962.

So Rwanda, which was able to avoid the awful warring factions that so many African countries knew, was profoundly torn by the inertia of an outmoded feudal system and the inevitable consequences of the minority imposing its law on the majority.

Twenty years on: peace again

Rwanda will be celebrating its 20th anniversary of independence next July. This is also the eighth year of the second republic, which was proclaimed in 1973 after the period of instability that followed on from independence. But what strikes the visitor to Kigali today is the real feeling of peace reborn, in spite of one or two periodic upheavals in the political life of the country (see interview with President Habyarimana). And it is more or less certain that the main concern of the government and the people at the moment is less a fear of political struggle than a fight for economic survival.

The economy and demographic growth

Rwanda has been called "a huge garden" and the whole of this small

country (26 638 km²), all of it hills, is indeed being cultivated. Subsistence farming on a very wide scale occupies more than 95 % of the population and, government sources suggest, this means that there is only 1.3 ha of arable land per inhabitant. The diminishing quantity and quality of land is a major drawback and a real source of concern for the government. Only 1 385 400 ha at most will be available in the long term out of a total area of 2 560 000 ha. This land that could be used for farming and herding is, of course, unevenly distributed. The savanna region in the east seems of less agricultural interest (80 people per km²) than the central plateau and the lava regions that are more fertile and attract more farmers (320 and 390 people per km² respectively). This uneven distribution of good land and the agricultural community leads to overcropping.

The first result is a gradual drop in yield of the main products. This handicap is accompanied by erosion in the catchment areas due to landslides,

etc., which is a considerable problem in a hilly country of this kind. The result is gullying of the slopes and, as no suitable development work has been carried out on the valley floors, something like 35-40 % of the useful land is lost. And then, throughout the country, the right crops are not always grown on the right land because of the tendency for families to seek a certain self-sufficiency and to grow everything on their land so as to be as independent in food as possible. Unlike many countries both large and small in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World, Rwanda has no large-scale farming or herding concerns. The biggest estate in the country, and maybe the only one, is no more than 20 ha. The idea of land reform is meaningless in Rwanda and the people are surprised to hear it mentioned.

The other reason for land being put to bad use is the excessive demographic pressure, which forces people to make maximum use of the plots which are, generally speaking, very hilly. So all this led to the sort of farming systems that, it has to be admitted, were one of the foundations of monarchic power.


The reduction in food production (by about 41 % in 1976 to 35 % in 1978) of course led to a clear drop in farming incomes and in the amount of food available to the population, as the table below shows.

Banana and manioc production have not decreased, but these products are not staple foods in Rwanda. However, beans, which, with sweet potatoes and potatoes, form the basic diet of the local people, are constantly on the decrease.

Agricultural production, 1976-1979 (t)

| Product | 1976 | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 |
|--------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Bananas | 1 820 163 | 1 896 258 | 1 931 712 | 2 022 985 |
| Beans | 227 572 | 238 520 | 234 919 | 180 660 |
| Peas | 55 292 | 53 945 | 49 236 | 38 506 |
| Groundnuts | 13 378 | 15 055 | 14 283 | 15 708 |
| Soya | 3 823 | 4 636 | 2 986 | 3 893 |
| Sorghum | 156 257 | 165 415 | 182 913 | 162 502 |
| Maize | 69 346 | 75 623 | 74 478 | 83 348 |
| Yardgrass | 2 841 | 3 144 | 2 838 | 2 176 |
| Wheat | 3 008 | 3 692 | 3 657 | 2 976 |
| Paddy rice | 2 668 | 3 265 | 3 288 | 3 494 |
| Sweet potatoes | 777 478 | 786 700 | 857 968 | 867 558 |
| Potatoes | 148 208 | 154 208 | 218 703 | 214 917 |
| Manioc | 313 467 | 333 247 | 287 244 | 504 665 |
| Yams | 14 294 | 5 591 | 5 396 | 3 372 |
| Fruit & vegetables | 53 600 | 55 003 | 56 500 | — |
| Salad greens | 43 500 | 44 999 | 48 000 | — |

Source: UN, 1981.



Terraced hill farms

Rwanda's countryside looks the same everywhere

An increase in quality

The waning of agriculture and stock-raising and the population explosion (an increase of 3.7% p.a.) are the two problems the government has to solve if it is to ensure that the nation gets enough to eat. No more land can be brought under cultivation. The population problem is still a difficult one to solve in the medium and long terms, given the importance of the traditions whereby population control is unknown. Yet for many experts who have come from many places to help Rwanda with its agricultural problems, and for the local authorities too, the answer to the country's food problem is a substantial drop in the birth rate. A gradual reduction in the population would appear to be decisive as far as the implementation and the success or failure of the third five-year plan (1982-86) is concerned. Rwandan planners say that GDP over the period of the third plan should go up by around 4.8% p.a., and 3.3% in agriculture. But the population will be increasing by 3.7% p.a.; so, the plan designers say, demographic pressure looks as though it will continue to create strong tension between agricultural production and the demand for food products in the coming years. Hence, it is felt, the need for the plan to aim primarily at self-sufficiency in food, and for any activity in the hitherto neglected industrial sector to be confined to providing basic infrastructure in line with the real possibilities (raw materials, particularly agricultural ones, cadres, etc.) of the country. This, then, is a rough outline of

government policy in this field at the moment.

Rwanda's first real famine was in 1943, when many people migrated, forming the large Rwandan communities in the neighbouring countries, particularly in Zaire where they are a million strong. A look at the development plan for Rwanda-Urundi (3 million inhabitants with 80 people per km²) that the colonial authorities drew up in 1951 shows that the country was bound to reach demographic saturation and expected to have a huge famine in the following 10 years. In 1961, international experts were of the same opinion and drew the same conclusions. In 1971, the story was heard again. So the same comments on Rwanda's demographic and agricultural development have been made every 10 years since 1951, but the predictions have never come to pass. Hence the very serious suggestion that Rwanda really could meet most of its basic food requirements, although this would mean making what EEC Commission delegate Michel Courtier and various other experts in Kigali call qualitative improvements to agriculture. Technologically, they feel, Rwanda still has a lot of agricultural potential. Most importantly, it should be noted that none of the country's food farms has ever used chemical fertilizer. Second, quality must also be improved by rationalizing crops and using the products better. Bananas and sorghum, for example, are excellent and plentiful foods. They are in fact used not to feed the population but to make beer; in some areas, sorghum is looked upon as something

for poor people or children to eat. So a considerable effort has to be put into the agricultural policy and into the education of the population.

The same sort of thing would be necessary in stock-raising, where national potential is excellent, particularly when it comes to cattle (630 000 head in 1979), goats (820 000 head) and sheep (270 000 head). There are also 110 000 pigs and large numbers of poultry.

Export crops

The fact that agricultural production has been geared to food crops has not discouraged the government from growing export crops. As it is hilly and, in particular, has noticeable climatic variations, Rwanda is unable to grow a wide range of export products, but conditions are suitable for arabica coffee, tea and pyrethrum (used in pesticide). Special boards, called OCIR (industrial crop offices of Rwanda), are in charge of tea and coffee production and marketing. Coffee is the country's biggest export product and it is entirely produced by family smallholdings (31 197 ha currently under cultivation)—although there are one or two Umuganda plantations (community undertakings shared by officials and other workers alike). Coffee production (25 000 t p.a.) is improving and the top quality product is exported to the USA (50%) and the international market. The increase in coffee production has enabled Rwanda to get its International Coffee Agreement quota pushed up.

Tea, also of high quality, is grown on plantations financed by the EEC (currently the most productive) and other countries, such as Libya. But, unlike coffee production, tea production has reached a ceiling, for a number of reasons. First, because none of the increasingly expensive fertilizers is used (1 kg of fertilizer costs RwF 90 and 1 kg of raw tea is sold at RwF 13). Second, processing is difficult and the factories do not get regular supplies of spare parts and the quality of the tea to be exported suffers as a result. Third, facilities are under-employed and only function at 20% capacity. Lastly, and perhaps most important, there is a short-term economic problem with tea as the prices are fixed on the London market and, as sterling has dropped, Rwandan producers now get less income because their currency, which is tied to the American dollar, is strong. In January 1981, for example, the producers got RwF 220 per kg of tea sold, but by November they were only getting RwF 172. And tea is Rwanda's third export product after coffee and minerals (cassiterite and ferberite in



EDF photo

Drying pyrethrum in a peat-fired oven

particular), which account for something like 16% of GNP.

A tea official said the OCIR's bad management has something to do with the bad results in this sector. It is not clear how responsibility is to be shared by the administrators, the producers and the industrial agents in the factories, all of whom come under the OCIR, and so there is confusion about who is to do what. This leads to paralysis right through the production process. It is a real handicap for such a large management body (9 176 ha under cultivation) in the third sector of the country's economy. The OCIR tea budget was Rwf 1 800 million in 1981.

At one stage there were fears for the economic future of pyrethrum, but since the specialists found that synthetic pesticides were less suitable for preserving farm products, particularly food products, interest has been rekindled and the EEC will be helping Rwanda get production under way again.

Great energy potential

Population growth and its effects on food production are major worries for the Rwandan government. But population pressure is not really an insurmountable problem because of the scope for modern agricultural methods,

and the country apparently has other major resources, particularly HEP and methane.

More than 90% of the energy consumed in Rwanda is electricity and the development of it, bearing in mind Rwanda's many waterfalls and rivers, could cut imports considerably in the long term. The HEP potential has been put at 200 MW, of which around 20 MW were available in 1980, the most important stations being Ruzizi I (a second phase is due to be completed soon) and Mukungwa. The Tanzanian and Rwandan governments have just signed an agreement on building a large HEP and irrigation dam on the Rusumo on the south-east frontier of Rwanda. This is a large undertaking which has taken many years of negotiation to settle, Rwanda having been against the idea because it meant flooding several thousand hectares of land near Kigali. This recent agreement now satisfies the Rwandan authorities, in particular by offering them some compensation. The extent of this is not being publicized, but it is thought that the settlement and naturalization of some 30 000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania may be involved.

There is a second source of energy in Rwanda—the methane gas from Lake Kivu in the west between Zaire and Rwanda. The deposit is a considerable one, an estimated 60 000 million m³ (45 million t oil equivalent) that is renewed regularly. Both countries will be exploiting the gas and they will divide the methane, amounting to 45 million m³ p.a., equally. The final studies on tapping this energy were financed by the EDF. However, it should be stressed that the advantage of Lake Kivu gas is not so much that it can be used as energy, but that it can be processed to make nitrogen fertilizer. The demand for chemical fertilizer in agriculture will be considerable if the country is to meet the growing demand for food from a population that will top 8 000 000 in 25 years' time. And demand will also be high in Zaire too. A Rumanian engineer from UNIDO will shortly have finished installing the gas tapping equipment and the first place to benefit will be the Gisenyi brewery.

There is peat, of course, in almost all the valleys, particularly in the Kanyuru marshes (in the south) and the volcano zone. The peat reserves have not yet been assessed, but there could be as much as 6 000 million m³. Wood, the people's main source of energy, is getting rarer all the time and peat could usefully replace it in small and medium-sized firms and in homes in rural areas. It has already been in use in 22 EDF-financed pyrethrum drying plants since 1977. If it is to be used in industry, it



AAA photo

Coffee, Rwanda's principal export, only brings in a low income for the peasants because of the fluctuation of prices and currencies

will have to be coked by the well-tried Irish method.

Communications

The other concern of the Rwandan authorities is the fact that their country is landlocked and the government's whole policy is aimed at reducing the serious effects of this, both at home and abroad. Kigali, the capital, is 1650 km from the port of Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) and 1700 km from Mombasa (Kenya), so the whole of the country's domestic distribution and foreign trade depends on reliable communications by road, rail and air.

At home, the government has made a big effort, with help from bilateral sources and the Community, and this has enabled many trunk roads to be built to the main areas of agricultural and export crop production. These roads, it should be added, are also the national sections of the main regional highways that will link Rwanda to the neighbouring countries, and particularly to the two main ports through which Rwandan goods come and go. The Rwandan sections of the central (Kigali-Dar-es-Salaam) and northern (Kigali-Mombasa) corridors have already been



Photos Orinfor

Cattle ownership gives social status: Rwanda has considerable stock-raising potential

or are being completed. And the same goes for the extension to the central route to Burundi. Transport is so crucial to Rwanda that the first impression is that the many Rwandan, Kenyan and other trucks are almost part of the countryside.

Air links and telecommunications do not yet reflect the importance of Kigali in the region. The capital's airport cannot cope with dense traffic because the ground infrastructure is inadequate, but a major international airport project is now being run and should be finished in three years' time. But Kigali already gets its DC10s and the national airline (Air Rwanda) has a Boeing 707, with three flights a week to Kenya and one to the Netherlands. Telecommunications are to be improved in the second half of 1982, when a satellite will be coming into operation, and by 1984 all the old telephone exchanges will have been replaced. Broad international cooperation, with China in particular, will be involved in improving the Rwandan telecommunications network. All this should help overcome the problem of being landlocked at both economic and political level.

Regional cooperation

Although it may not be immediately obvious, Rwanda's geographical situation could make the country a very important crossroads in geopolitics in central, southern and even eastern



Photos Orinfor

Lorries are the main means of transport in Rwanda

ing his idea of good neighbourliness. Rwanda and Tanzania form the OBK (the Kaegera Valley Development Organization), a technical body similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority in the USA, with the aim of promoting purely economic projects in the Kagera river valley area in the south-east.

The CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lakes), which combines Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire) is a more advanced economic organization aimed at creating and developing the means of economic, technical and cultural integration in the three states and any other members. CEPGL headquarters are in Gisenyi (Rwanda) on the shores of Lake Kivu, where the executive secretariat is headed by David Mpfubusa (Burundi). Since it was formed five years ago, the CEPGL has run a number of schemes, which include being involved in the methane operations in Gisenyi. It has also provided financial and technical help with the construction of joint industrial firms, the building of faculties of medicine and pharmacy, the harmonization of the customs regulations of the member states, the provision of electricity supplies and the setting up of a faculty of agronomy. The



EDF photo

Peat could be an alternative fuel to charcoal, now in decline

Africa. Kigali is increasingly important as an almost obligatory stopover for aircraft going to and from the Indian Ocean. And Air France has already opened two hotel Méridiens in Rwanda!

With the skilful diplomacy of President Juvénal Habyarimana, Rwanda can be a model for broad-based regional cooperation. Since becoming head of state in 1973, President Habyarimana has been very successful in his policy of cooperating with the countries around Rwanda and develop-

aim of the community, the executive secretary said, is to create a large community market between the members so as to generate industrialization in the region. But Mr Mpfubusa did not try to hide the fact that his biggest problem is a shortage of financial and human means. The CEPGL works regularly with the EEC, through the Commission delegate in Kigali, and the example of Europe when it comes to pushing on with the construction of a community can be a great help. The CEPGL development bank, in Goma (Zaire), could



Air transport is one solution to Rwanda's landlocked situation

also benefit from the means and experience of the EIB.

With a view to a sound regional policy and to assertion of the country's role as one open to its neighbours and the world in general, Rwanda was represented at the 17th summit of UDEAC heads of state in Libreville (Gabon) in December 1981. Other heads of state, in particular from Angola, Chad, Sao Tomé & Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea, were there, as were representatives from technical cooperation organizations. At the end of the meeting, the various delegations agreed to set up an economic community of central African states, as the OAU directives adopted in Lagos had said. This economic community, the final declaration stated, would be an important sub-regional structure which should help with the establishment of the Africa common market mooted at Lagos and in the Monrovia Declaration. The first combined meeting of ministers to decide on implementation of the declaration was due to be held in Libreville in early February this year. The UDEAC heads of state were also invited to the summit meeting of presidents of member countries of the CEPGL, which was scheduled for the second half of January in Gisenyi (Rwanda).

So the President Habyarimana's policy of broad regional cooperation, being open to the outside world and working for peace, combined with the country's very central geographical position, could make a considerable contribution to neutralizing the problems of being landlocked and even turn them to

some advantage—although this may only be in the long term.

Educational reform


The strengths and weaknesses of the Rwandan economy have already been described and the former are considerable. But there would be no point in assets without the financial means, and especially the human ones, to make the most of them.

The government is aware of the great importance of training young people for the economic and political transformation of the country and it has decided to bring about a radical change in the education system Rwanda has had for several decades. This reform is one of the pressing topics of discussion among the local people and the experts in Kigali. What is it all about? The government wanted to do away with a system of education which consisted of pushing all the children into primary school, then secondary school and then higher education, with the usual batch of dropouts at each stage. All that system did was get successful children to complete their courses between the ages of 18 and 22 without obtaining any vocational training. All the dropouts had but one choice—state employment (or, more surely, no job at all).

as the head of state said, enables them to go back to the land without feeling they have been wasting their time. The new system also means they can fit back in the family unit more readily and take part in farming activity (see interview with President Habyarimana).

The reform has provoked a lot of controversy in Kigali. But, as the head of state said, the reform is a basic, flexible one that will have to be adapted gradually during implementation.

The thing people complain about most is the fixed percentage of Tutsi students who can go into secondary schools and on into higher education, as this may penalize very bright children to the benefit of mediocre children from another social class. Such a system also encourages competition and emulation in one group alone, as the good and the very good vie for places. A third consequence is that, ultimately, the best pupils may well always be the Tutsi, as the brightest amongst them will get on to courses alongside Hutu who have not been subject to such harsh competition. This sort of thing has already occurred in other countries of Africa. But the big question is whether the educational reform will give the Rwandan children in general a little hope.



*Rwandan schoolchildren
Eyes on the subject and on the future. Will educational reform give them a better start in life?*

The government wanted to do away with the long course that was pointless in so many cases. So it introduced a primary school course that was two years longer than the previous one (eight years instead of six), spending the last two years on craft and agriculture. Those who fail to make the 10% who go on to secondary school thus get an introduction to farming which,


As an adviser with the European delegation said in Kigali recently, the reform is still a very courageous thing that many other African countries would not have attempted.

And courage is the hallmark of the way of life of the Rwandan—whose "country of a thousand hills" is no Eldorado. ◊

LUCIEN PAGNI



(Top right) An Umuganda (collective work) session, with President Habyarimana (3rd from right); above, growing tea on the hillsides and the marshy valley; below, part of the Franco-Rwandan Cultural Centre in Kigali



A glance at...

Tourism

Rwanda has great tourist potential. The rugged countryside is perhaps like Switzerland and the climate and the desirable houses down palm-lined avenues in Gisenyi and other towns on Lake Kivu are even reminiscent of France's Côte d'Azur. None of this has escaped the notice of the big airlines and one of them, Air France, has just built its second Hôtel Méridien in Gisenyi.

The country's facilities are not yet up to handling the potentially enormous leisure industry, but it now looks as though Rwanda can build up a big tourist trade over the next 20 years. But not just any tourist trade.

ments signed before the American dollar rose now bring in 30% less in RF terms. Coffee and tea exporters are the hardest hit and the country's emergent industry is affected too, as the Rwandans do not want to spend 20-30% more on factories which cannot be guaranteed successes. As one top official said: "Although our financial management is sound, we are still short of talented people to manage the economy, so industrial take-off is not on the horizon yet". This clearly sums up the problem of a strong currency and inadequate financial support—which, however, is better than the other way round, with inflation and speculation ruining the currency for good.

The local currency

The Rwandan franc (RwF) is tied to the American dollar and the Central Bank of Rwanda is making a very successful job of managing it. Unlike many non-convertible currencies in the Third World and elsewhere, the Rwandan franc is strong. The recovery of the dollar in recent months has something to do with this, but the main reason is the government's monetary policy and, they say in Kigali, the great skill of the governor of the Central Bank.

All this makes for easier trade with the neighbouring countries, whose businessmen are very keen to get Rwandan money, and Rwanda's big towns are often well supplied as a result.

However, Rwanda imports more from countries with international currencies, these being its main customers. Changes in the exchange rate mean that financing agree-

Kigali: peace, quiet and only one traffic light

Kigali, born with political independence in the 1960s, is the capital. Like all Rwanda's centres, it is on two hills, each commanding a view over the whole town. With its 120 000 inhabitants, it is small, which is an asset. Everything is on a human scale and people from Lagos, Douala and Abidjan dream about empty roads like those in Kigali and, of course, about its open spaces. How many ACP capitals have only one traffic light—in front of the presidential palace! How long can things go on at this pleasant pace? The government has already done some town planning, so they say, to cope with demographic pressure in the towns, so we must hope that its plans manage to combine the advantages of the big city that Kigali will be tomorrow with those of the small capital it is today.

o L.P.

President Juvénal Habyarimana

A policy of internal democracy, good neighbourliness and openness


In this interview, the President of Rwanda outlines the country's domestic and international policy.

► *After independence in 1962, Rwanda went through a long period of upheaval that was due less to human failings than to the political and economic structures inherited from colonialism. How is the present situation as regards national unity and the Rwandan people's responsibility for their future?*

— I shan't go over the whole history of Rwanda. You must know something about it and you know that, just over 20 years ago, we were under a feudal monarchy monopolized by the Tutsi people, who are in a minority in our country. This feudal monarchy stayed in power until 1959, when there was a social revolution and the people decided they wanted a democratic, republican system. This led to trouble, of course, and there were refugees as a result, who found refuge in the neighbouring countries. This too led to rancour, some of which still survives even today. But the revolution at least gave us a chance to get a democratic process going and it was given a further boost in 1975 when our party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), which tries to reflect all opinions and create national cohesion and unity, was formed.

In the MRND, we have continued with the democratic process, electing our cell leaders and sector advisers. In 1978 we organized a referendum, as you know, to get our constitution adopted and, on 4 December of the same year, we held our presidential elections. And lastly, we have just elected our representatives for the National Development Council. That then is the kind of democratic process we have set in motion in Rwanda and, thanks mainly to the creation of the MRND, it has enabled us to get the whole population moving so we can rely on ourselves first and foremost.

► *So you have gone a long way towards achieving unity in your country, but are there still any major obstacles to total unity? You also mentioned the*



President Habyarimana

election of the National Development Council which is, I think, the final step in the establishment of democratic institutions. What are the priorities of this new council?

— The National Development Council is our legislative assembly and what a legislative assembly has to do, obviously, is pass laws. Now as to your question about whether there are any major obstacles to the general unity of the Rwandan people—well, I can't see any. The aim of our movement is to bring all the children together, boys and girls. That obviously doesn't mean that everything's rosy and we only have saints in Rwanda. Of course not. And here I am thinking of the subversive attempt to destroy and overthrow the regime in April 1980, although I don't consider that to be an obstacle. It was just an accident along the way. When I say I don't think that everything in Rwanda is rosy, what I mean is that we have a refugee problem left over from the 1959 revolution and the upheavals that followed it. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans had to leave the country and go to neighbouring lands. And they're still there.

There are two sorts of refugees. A minority, who still dream about taking

power in Rwanda and make subversive attempts and sometimes armed attacks to try to get back. We try to stop them, to quell their ambition by a policy of good neighbourliness with the countries around us and, very fortunately, we are good friends with those countries. The other refugees, and they are in the majority, have settled in the host countries. What we hope is that these host countries help them to get settled. Several of them have, particularly Tanzania, which has just granted Tanzanian nationality to 36 000 refugees, and we hope other people will follow this example. The aim of our policy is to make these refugees feel at home in their host countries. The refugees are a serious problem for us and we want them to settle where they are, since our country is 100% occupied. There would be all sorts of difficulties if the refugees came back, but the big problem would be the land. The policy we are hoping to develop, and I have given instructions to this effect, is to allow any refugees who are not a danger to Rwanda to come home to see any relatives who still live here.

► *Does this mean that your government considers the refugees as Rwandans whenever they come back?*

— They are refugees and refugees of course have a particular status—otherwise they wouldn't be called refugees. But I have called for measures, and they have been taken, to allow all those who represent no danger to the regime to come back and visit their country and their family.

► *What else has the movement you set up in 1975 achieved?*

— You've just spent nearly a week here. You've been all over Rwanda and seen just what we have done. What I can say is that, thanks to the movement and to our philosophy of counting on ourselves first and foremost, we have produced what we call Umuganda, the community work through which everyone is involved in the building of our country. Umuganda has enabled us to achieve certain things that you can see for yourself, particularly the schools we have built, the health centres and the roads and the administrative offices in the communes. They are examples of what we have been able to achieve with community work. We would never have been able to achieve them if we had just sat back and waited for foreign aid. We still need foreign aid, of course, because we do not have enough means of our own to meet all our needs, so we have to count on foreign aid—particularly

that from the EDF, which we appreciate a great deal.

Demographic policy

► *The population explosion is said to be one of the barriers to economic progress in your country. Do you believe this? And if so, what solutions do you envisage?*

— Yes, I am willing to admit that Rwanda's population growth is a barrier to development. It's not the only barrier, of course, but it is one of the things impeding our progress. As we see it, what we have to do is strike some sort of balance between national production and national consumption as regards both quantity and quality. For the moment, alas, national production is way behind demand and so we have to act on two fronts. First, we have to do something about production, particularly food production; obviously it has to go up, which is why we have put priority on our development plans in agriculture.

We are also seeking ways of doing something about population growth and we have set up the National Population Office (ONAPO) to reflect seriously on the problem, to advise us and to guide our action. For the moment, we are still making the people aware of the problem. We have to change their outlook gradually, so they can understand the population problem, because, as you know, the Rwandans are like most Africans in that they want lots of children. That's not a bad thing in itself. It's good, because children are a strength. But they have to be fed. We are looking into methods of birth control, because we don't agree that just any methods of keeping the birth rate down are good. Some methods are in contradiction with our culture and our outlook and others look more like commercial propaganda. What we want to do is find methods of birth control that are in keeping with our outlook and our culture, methods that are not destructive. We think it is illogical to spend hundreds of millions of francs on preventing a child from being born rather than on feeding him once he comes into the world. The methods have to be really effective as far as the economy is concerned and they have to be in line with the sort of demographic policy that reflects our cultural demands.

► *Your other big problem, and it's no less serious, is that your country is landlocked. What are the main consequences as far as the economy is concerned and how do you think Rwanda can get on top of the problem?*

— Yes, Rwanda is landlocked and it

is a considerable brake on our development. You know that we have to go 1700 km to the Indian Ocean if we want to get our food supplies and export our tea, our coffee and our minerals. And that means the whole transport process is slow and the costs are high. It's a real handicap for our economy and for development in general.

How to reduce the effects of being landlocked?

What can we do about it? Nothing. We shall always be landlocked. But we are trying to reduce the effects of it, in a number of ways. First, by organizing better transport. We have set up a multinational road haulage company and we have an emergent air transport company; both these are attempts at improving our contact with the outside world. On the domestic front, we are trying to improve our road infrastructure. Our current programme involves improving all the main trunk roads to make regional trade easier and to make it easier to get to and from the countries around us.



The new school syllabus is based on farming and craftwork

Another thing I should mention, something else connected with being landlocked, is our policy of good neighbourliness, which has brought us various transit facilities. We are negotiating, mainly with the countries in the east—Uganda and Kenya, that is—to have even more facilities. So far Kenya

has let us have a plot in the port of Mombasa to build a storage shed for our imports and exports and this is thanks to our policy of good neighbourliness. We are also encouraging regional organizations to help the development drive. So we, Zaire and Burundi have formed the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL), and we have the Kagera River Valley Development Organization, which combines Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda. These are some of the things we have done to counter the drawbacks of being landlocked.

To sum up then, I should say that the organization of transport, the improvement of the domestic road infrastructure and our policy of good neighbourliness and involvement in regional organizations are our main means of improving the situation at the moment. We also have a policy of being more open to the outside world, particularly in UDEAC (Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa), although we aren't all that optimistic about this as, in spite of the fact that it certainly makes it easier to handle certain problems, through force of numbers, the means of communication with the member countries are weak. That's the first reason. The second is that, as far as Rwanda and Burundi and a large part of Zaire are concerned, our interests lie to the east. We lean more to the Indian Ocean than to the Atlantic. All our supplies come in through ports on the east coast and that is where our exports go out. So, although we are very interested in UDEAC—and the Libreville declaration of December 1981 is quite clear about this—we are not looking upon it as a universal panacea. It certainly can't solve all the problems.

Education to prepare the child to go back to the land

► *How does educational reform fit into your current development strategy?*

— This reform was defined in 1973, earlier even, for, as I told the CND recently, it was back in 1970 that the planners said our educational structures had to be changed because they were based on a colonial system that prepared primary school children for secondary school and secondary school children for university. But not all primary school children can go into secondary education; only a small minority can. If we do not want to concentrate on this small minority, we have to look for the kind of system that spends a lot of time on the majority of children of school age who have to go



Loading up Rwandan pyrethrum for shipment

UNIDO photo

back to the land, to the hills (1). Of course, the few who can go on to secondary school must not be neglected. That's the principle of the thing. But as the majority of children have to go back to work on the land, to be craftsmen and to live in rural areas, we want to give them basic ideas about farming and craft so that when they leave school they will be useful individuals and useful members of the community in which they live.

That is the outline of the reform. We have been thinking about it since 1973 and we have taken various decisions since 1977. They're not infallible, of course. When you go on a journey, you sometimes take the wrong road and go right instead of left. The important thing is to realize in time, to constantly discuss things with the experts and to make the relevant modifications. But the key to our reform is to get the child to fit into his own surroundings by giving him the sort of education that will be useful both to him and his country.

► *In other words, the present reform is flexible and will be adapted in the light of your experience.*

— A new educational reform may take 10 or 15 years, because every time you have to adapt and readapt the aims to avoid being trapped in a vicious circle.

(1) In Rwanda, the notion of a village is unknown, as people live on and talk about the hillsides.

► *You mentioned this reform in your 8 January speech to the CND. What are the aims other than to provide eight years of schooling?*

— We have an eight-year primary school course. The first six years are for a basic grounding, and years seven and eight build on it and give some notions of farming and craft, so the child is better prepared to go back to the land. After that, there is what we call an integrated rural course lasting three years. We are working on it now. It was due to start in 1981, but unfortunately the schools weren't ready in time. We have some that were built by the EDF, in particular, and with aid from the Americans and the UN. The government has voted a fairly large sum of money for them too.

Changing South Africa's policy

► *Bearing in mind your geographical position and your policy of being very open to Africa and the world in general, how do you see relations between the African states when it comes to problems like apartheid and the last colonial withdrawals? And what about the international economic and monetary situation which, as you know, considerably penalizes the countries of the Third World and those of Africa in particular?*

— I see apartheid with the eyes of an OAU head of state. I see it as you

see it, as a blight on humanity. We think it is completely wrong to judge someone, to judge his worth, according to the colour of his skin. It is a total aberration and we can only deplore a policy that goes against millions of men, women and children in the south of the continent. We call on all those who can influence the leaders of South Africa to get the system changed, because we are convinced that if real pressure is brought to bear, they will be forced to change.

I am optimistic about Namibia because some leaders and the Namibians themselves are taking steps to do something about it. Namibia will perhaps be independent this year and that will be a good thing because it will open the way for action against South Africa itself. South Africa absolutely has to change its policy.

► *But there is more than just Namibia to decolonize...*

— Yes. There is Western Sahara, of course. But there too, I think there is going to be a meeting in Nairobi in February to sort out the referendum on this old Spanish colony. Morocco has agreed to the principle of the referendum and the king, Hassan II, was at the OAU summit in Nairobi. So it has been agreed and the King of Morocco is not going to go back on his word. He has made a promise and he will stick to it. What has to be done now is to make the arrangements for the referendum. And I think that, there again, we can expect the referendum to be held this year. Rwanda has always supported the principle of self-determination in Western Sahara. We have said that the people of Western Sahara, however many there may be, should be consulted. I think the problem should be solved this year by the referendum that the OAU wants and to which the various parties involved (and the King of Morocco, in particular) have agreed.

As to the monetary situation, I am frankly less optimistic. You know very well what relations between North and South are like. Egoism is still a feature of the North-South dialogue. The haves want to keep what they've got and try to get even more from the have-nots. And in spite of all the meetings, I can't see any way out yet. They say that the Cancun discussions were more frank and that progress was made, but I don't know what progress. We could talk for years without the system changing. The poor go on getting poorer and the rich go on getting richer, particularly when it comes to their one-sided fixing of the prices of our raw materials. The examples are there for all to see. The price of our coffee goes up and down, the price of our cassiter-



Production of beans and maize, Rwanda's staple crops, has been falling

ite gets lower all the time and so does the price of our pyrethrum. But the finished products we import, made from our raw materials processed in the rich countries, get dearer all the time.

► *Do you think the answer is to be found in North-South negotiations alone or do you feel that perhaps the South can do something of its own to alter the system?*

— I think the South has already started to do so. Or Africa has, at least. What I am thinking of is the Lagos summit on the economy of the continent. We drew up a plan of action which, to my mind, is a strategy aimed first at developing trade between ourselves and then at encouraging regional organizations and structuring them better. After all, they are the foundation for broader economic cooperation between all the countries of Africa. Generally speaking, the South defines certain tactics within the framework of the Group of 77, but the dialogue with the North is vital, as international relations demand it. Neither side can afford to simply take it or leave it. But I should like to say that there can be no question of us in the South being the losers for ever.

European aid is very much appreciated — but it needs increasing

► *What do you think about Community aid to your country?*

— As I said at the beginning of our talk, we very much appreciate the aid the European Community provides. Obviously the EEC is not the biggest donor. It is behind Belgium and Germany. But as far as the standard of contributions and the way projects are implemented in the field go, I must say, the EDF is out in front. We are not just

interested in having programmes included in bilateral negotiations. These sometimes get behind at the actual implementation stage. But this doesn't happen with the EDF. As you know, this aid is aimed at three main sectors. Since 1958, when we first began cooperating with the EDF, the main schemes have been to do with rural development—except when we had to channel a lot of the money into energy infrastructure projects, such as the Mukungwa dam, which accounted for a lot of the aid at the time, as we were faced with a fairly serious energy deficit in the short term. And a lot of European aid has gone to education, particularly the faculty of medicine and the old National Institute of Education which has just merged with the university.

What I can say is that the amount allocated under the 5th EDF is inadequate because some of the schemes were supposed to be carried out under the 4th. As you know, we had problems with one French company (2) and this led to extra costs as well as other difficulties, as the firm is asking for nothing short of RF 2 000 million more—which is likely to eat into the amounts allocated under the fifth EDF. Add to that the schemes that have already been programmed, the water supply project, for example, and we are up past the prescribed limits.

That is why I want to take this opportunity of telling the EDF authorities that we very much hope to see our allocation increased, as what we have to aim at is completion of the programme as it stands. We must not be

(2) The firm failed to adhere to the specifications drawn up by the experts responsible for the infrastructure feasibility project in Rwanda and this led to extra costs, which the firm is claiming from the Rwandese government. This is now the subject of a court case.

content with the nominal amount we have been given, as there are the effects of inflation to take into account. And a lot of time and money goes on studies. I might add that the experts, the expatriates in Rwanda, cost an awful lot and it is perhaps there that adjustments should be made to take erosion into account in the studies, so they can be done more cheaply and more quickly.

► *You mention how EDF funds are eroded by inflation. This was the subject of a lot of discussion at the Lomé II negotiations and it will no doubt come up again when any further agreements are renewed or renegotiated. Have you any suggestions for the period after Lomé II, which will soon be with us?*

— I haven't really given the matter much thought, so I haven't many suggestions to make. But what I can say about the things we've been discussing is that the European Community ought to have more effect. It must have a greater influence on the North-South dialogue. Not enough notice is taken of it in these discussions, where it does in fact have an important part to play.

As to the future of the Lomé Convention, we've given the matter some thought, but not enough. We have to think more about it and pay more attention to the worst-off countries in the ACP group. There are poor countries and some are very poor indeed; among the very poor ones, there are the landlocked ones, and they have other, more serious problems. The measures taken so far are inadequate. More thought has to be given to them and we, the ACP countries, have to make a contribution, perhaps a bigger one than the others, to this period of reflexion.

Interview by L.P.

EEC-Rwanda cooperation

A history of solidarity

The 24-year old association of Rwanda with the European Communities is an exemplary history of solidarity.

Going beyond the common cause, cooperation, a certain shared vision of things, emerges; or, better still, an awareness of the paths that lead to a future of progress.

The Bible says that "...your old men (shall) dream dreams, your young men (shall) see visions". So it is hardly surprising that the modern beginnings of the 1950s (on the one side, Rwanda emerging from the limbo of static tradition and marching towards new independence; on the other, a young Europe ridding itself of its old ways) have been less fruitful in what they have actually achieved than in their sharing of a vision of the future.

The history of this solidarity reflects the various stages of this march into the future.

In 1958, Rwanda, a very densely populated country, had two essential things to do. One, develop new lands to ensure the social promotion of families and push up food production and, two, modernize the mainly agricultural economy by integrating it into the money economy and international trade.

Hence the clear, deliberate commitment of solidarity by Europe on these two topics for the first cooperation programme (1958-1962):

- for example, by setting up farming communities (and everything that went with them: economic and technical assistance with the crops, human establishments and social infrastructure) in a totally undeveloped area, the Mayage-Bugesera. This covered tens of millions of hectares and was a master scheme from which many other projects sprang;

- setting up big tea-growing complexes at Mulini, Gisakura and Shagasha, which are still the backbone of Rwanda's tea industry.

It is interesting to pick out from this short description the fact that, right from the outset, the standard alternatives (problematics, dialectics or what you will), i.e. food crops and export crops, were clearly and simply set out. And the Community helped Rwanda attack both sides of the problem at the same time.

The second cooperation programme (1964-69), covering the Yaoundé I period, continued the work of the first (concentrating on peasant farmers and tea-growing), although it put greater emphasis on the promotion of export crops.

Thus the great 9000 ha pyrethrum operation was born. This scheme enabled 6000 peasant families to be settled at the foot of a volcano chain, at an altitude where the air was cool and damp and the climate ideal for pyrethrum flowers, which are dried in peat-fired ovens before going to be processed in a plant a few kilometres away.

At this stage, new needs (energy, infrastructure and industry) appeared, in the classic manner, in the country's development process. So the EEC, which was also aware of the urban development that would inevitably upset Kigali, the new capital, naturally helped Rwanda here too.

This was the reason for schemes such as those to supply electricity to the south (Guyangugu and the area around it and Butare-Gikongoro), the north (Ruhengeri) and centre (Gitarama-Gatumba), and the one to build an industrial zone in Kigali itself.

It goes without saying that in both the first and the second programmes, a




The director of the new EIB-backed Rwandan foundry takes the minister of natural resources and the EEC delegate on a tour of the works

place was given to training, through the building of schools and colleges, the organization of in-service courses and the provision of study grants.

The third cooperation programme (1971-75), which took place during the Yaoundé II period, continued the work of the first two programmes, but expanded so that more progress could be made with transforming the production and social structures and the peasants could be more fully motivated. The farming communities became cooperatives, "village" fields were developed around the industrial tea plantations for families to take charge of their own tea-growing and training became more vocational (i.e. the system was in a better position to meet specific needs—retraining for teachers in primary schools specializing in rural studies and training for primary teachers, secondary teachers and doctors).

Similarly, greater priority was put on infrastructure schemes. The classic exponential development of infrastructure requirements is observed once a certain economic and social life occurs, and this promotes the movement of goods and persons, which is particularly necessary in Rwanda, a very compartmentalized country. This is why a number of studies were financed (on the Kigali-Burundi highway, for example) and a certain amount of work carried out (including the completion of the interconnexion of the two HEP stations at Ntaruka in the north and Mururu in the south, thereby forming a framework for the subsequent provision of energy supplies to the whole country).

The continuing cooperation of Rwanda and the EEC through the maze of



The first smelted tin begins to blow on 21 January 1982 at 6.30 p.m.

programmes and projects that go to promote planned development continued under Lomé I (1976-80), and this time there was a very clear priority on major infrastructure:

— the north-south highway from Kigali to Butare was extended, with regional funds, to Burundi, thereby forming an important part of the northern link (Mombasa-Bujumbura);

— the Mukungwa HEP station was built, thus completing the existing electricity production facilities and enabling Rwanda's requirements to be met until 1986.

Agriculture — basis of the government's global policy

Nevertheless, in spite of this momentary need to concentrate on infrastructure, loyalty to the original view of agricultural development meant that a number of major schemes could be continued. They included the extension of family tea crops, the construction of a new tea factory, assistance with pyrethrum-growing and the provision of water supplies in the Mayaga region, where the first farming communities had been set up 20 years previously.

Educational policies outlined in the previous programme were given practical form when the faculty of medicine was built on the Butare campus and a national institute of education went up on the Ruhengeri campus.

Lastly, the EIB intervened for the first time in Rwanda with risk capital to enable a tin foundry to be built. This enterprise is something of a national première in an essentially agricultural country like Rwanda, as it represents the possible industry of the future.

Today, with Lomé II (1980-85), the EEC and Rwanda, partners who have put 20 years of constructive effort into laying certain foundations (at different levels and in different sectors) on which to build the country's development, are still faced with the big, permanent problem of self-sufficiency in food which, whatever is accomplished elsewhere, is always the most basic condition of national expansion. This is why the accent was put on key schemes such as:

— the development of the Crête Zaire-Nil chain, aimed at improving both the quantity and quality of the food produced, including research into growing at altitude, the development of new land, family settlement, establishing the natural balance (reafforestation), improving communications, etc.;

— the integrated development of the Butare prefecture which, in view of the density of its population, the urban framework, the spontaneous transformation of growing methods, etc., is an

example of what Rwanda will be in 20 years time. This shows just how important the scheme is. It combines the promotion of food production (in rice fields in particular), job promotion schemes, urban organization, the provision of facilities and more;

— water supplies for a vast region, the Bugesera, where recent settlement has interfered with the balance of water resources.



Tea, Rwanda's third biggest export, is produced in family plots. The EDF has participated in financing a number of plantations but the management of this sector needs improvement

There will of course be more projects to equip the country (electricity supplies and roads) and back up its training drive (extension of the university campus at Ruhengeri, the construction of a technical school, etc.), as well as to provide the essential facilities for the local authorities, which are the basis for the ongoing major structural reform. Microprojects and co-financing with NGO schemes are the main methods used in this latter case.

This, then, is a brief outline of how Rwanda, with Europe's help, is moving towards progress.

Not only are there constant developments, a sign of dynamism, and a real awareness of the needs and essentials at each stage, but there is also, and this is something we are very much concerned with in this article, a joint commitment to objectives and perseverance along the chosen paths. This is real solidarity and it is quite different from the more common sort of relations, where a needy state and a funder get together on a one-off dossier.

This solidarity is not only apparent in the programmes which the two partners have drawn up together. Quite different fields—food aid, emergency aid, Stabex, NGO aid, aid for regional projects and so on—all show evidence of it.

Food aid — 15 schemes, involving something like 20 000 t of food products, were run between 1973 and 1981.

The counterpart funds obtained from the sale of some of these products (and genuinely co-managed by the two partners) were injected into land improvement schemes, corn development schemes and projects to upgrade


marshland, build storage sheds and so on. In short, they went to operations that would provide a direct boost for food production.

Exceptional (or emergency) aid — There have been four schemes of this kind. They were to cope with epidemics and, for the major part of the aid, to help with communications in Rwanda, which is landlocked and was directly affected by the difficult situation in Uganda. Strategic fuel depots were set up with this in mind. Fifty trucks were supplied, an air bridge established and more than 12 million litres of fuel flown in.

Stabex — Rwanda has received two Stabex payments. One, in 1979, was for pyrethrum and the other, in 1981, was for coffee.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) — So far, 41 such schemes, which the EEC has co-financed with NGOs from the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, France, the UK and Germany, have been run to provide help with basic social and economic problems.

Regional projects — Since 1976, when the regional fund to finance operations common to a number of countries was set up, Rwanda has been involved in 13 Community-financed regional schemes. Some of them were



A bird's eye view for EEC Commission delegate Michel Courtier author of this article

capital investments (in particular road infrastructure) and others were studies in preparation for investments that are to be made in the coming months.

All in all, Europe's solidarity with Rwanda has resulted in a total of something like ECU 2 000 million being channelled into the republic over the past 24 years.

But the story is not over. Only the first chapters, although maybe the most essential ones, have been written.

Let us try and imagine what this solidarity will be like in the years to come. What effects will it have and where?

This kind of analysis means leaving aside the assumption that more money would lead to growth, financial means only being means among others. Once the field of analysis is clear, then what we have to do is consider, not the means, but the driving force, the fundamental ability to progress, and the choice of targets, without which means would only produce illusions.

So what is it that, in a constant and somewhat ontological way, constitutes the real capital on which the dynamics of even greater solidarity can be founded and thanks to which targets that will get people moving can be defined?

Rwanda: a nation and a country

- Rwanda has a fairly large population (5 200 000, or 197 people per km²). The Rwandans are firmly attached to the land and to their traditions and so they will not be irremediably unsettled by the radical changes that will have to be made in their farming methods, by any move to jobs in craft or industry, by converging on villages, by the inevitable growth of the towns or anything else.

They are a rural people whose lives will always be those of the countryside

and whose main products will be food crops. But they will still be drawn along by currents that will pull them strongly in new directions.

- Rwanda is a nation that is centred on deep-rooted and highly civilized traditions, and imbued with the strength that comes from a history lived to the full, with a clear collective awareness of the challenges which the immediate future holds. It has faith in the unshakable power of this rare combination of a people in a nation, an indestructible human resource and something of irreplaceable value.

- And lastly, Rwanda is a geographical entity, which can be seen in two different ways.

First, and contrary to the standard (imported?) idea whereby it is landlocked and so more or less forced to go in for some kind of dependent development, a look at the map will show that Rwanda is in a very good position, in the heart of a vast region where its role as a cultural, economic, monetary and communications link is already fairly well established and where, bearing in mind what are recognized as being its great potentialities (its population, minerals, energy, strong and varied agriculture and natural transport connexions), a new future is now thought to be a practical proposition. Rwanda knows this. But perhaps it has not yet adjusted to it.

It is, of course, already an active member of two regional organizations (The Economic Community of the Great Lakes and the Kagera Valley Development Organization), but will it discover that, beyond regional projects, however important they may be (take the creation of a plant to produce fertilizer from methane from Lake Kivu for example), there exists one major plan. And that is the possible internal development of market capacity in this region of Africa, which is perhaps the biggest opportunity for genuine self-generated progress (food production included) and for the development of Rwanda.

But Rwanda is also a country where people are scattered and, as a result, small family-sized schemes will always be essential to help meet the great production target and achieve self-sufficiency in food, as well as to maintain the traditional set-up while gently bringing about a change in outlook, in knowledge and in behaviour alongside the above major structural changes at grass-roots level in both the nation and the region.

Let us take a small, but very practical, example. In a balanced view of development, it should be as important, for Rwanda's energy independence, to

exploit methane from Lake Kivu or the many HEP resources that have so far been listed at regional level as it is to promote the domestic use of small earth stoves (see photo overleaf) that cost next to nothing and are designed to halve the quantity of wood needed for cooking. Their mass utilization would help conserve bioenergy resources (50 000 ha of forest every year), have an effect on the climate and encourage soil conservation.

Will solidarity between Rwanda and the Community be apparent in these fields (the acquisition of new professional capacities as well as the continuing aim of self-sufficiency in food) and these areas (large-scale regional schemes and small-scale hillside schemes) in the future?

Without answering the question, we can quote St Exupéry, that great poet of action, who said that founding the future meant thinking about the present first, just as building a ship means preparing the slipway first. Well, in 25



Pyrethrum is a flower from which insecticides are extracted, preferable to chemical insecticides because of their natural quality. Rwanda is increasing production thanks mainly to an EDF contribution



A simply-made oven that can save more than half the fuel usually burnt

years, Rwanda has got its slipway prepared and the launching of the ship (the people and the nation) has begun.

European solidarity will be there

when the ship is floated and, later, when it is manned for its great voyage.

○ MICHEL COURTIER
EEC Commission delegate in Rwanda

Main EEC schemes in Rwanda, 1958-1980

National programme

1. Rural development: Tea — 7 plantations (2070 ha industrial blocks and 1940 ha village plots); 4 factories with a total capacity of 4200 t; 10 000 families involved.

Farming communities — Mayaga-Bugesera: 28 400 ha; 4 500 000 coffee bushes+food crops, 1 400 km tracks, 200 km water pipes, 15 storage sheds, 4 dispensaries, 8 schools, 14 200 families involves.

— Pyrethrum zone: 9 000 ha (120 km tracks, 31 buildings (sheds, schools, etc.), 8 drying plants, 5 900 families involved.

2. Energy infrastructure — 307 km of overhead lines with sub-stations, dispatching centres and transformers. Interconnexion of two HEP plants and the attendant buildings and roads.

3. Roads and industrial infrastructure — Kigali-Butare highway — 120 km+bridges and channels.

— Gatumba bridge and access road.

— Kigali industrial zone (25 ha).

4. Education: Construction of the Butare agricultural technical school (150 boarders). Construction of the Kigali girls' high school (320 boarders). Construction of the Butare faculty of medicine (150 students). Construction of the Ruhengeri national institute of education (230 boarders). Award of

more than 3000 study grants. Training courses for cadres for agricultural cooperatives. Training courses for rural craftsmen.

5. Supply of various technical assistances for the ministries of planning and public works and the Electrogaz company.

Regional programme

Selection of schemes with which Rwanda is directly involved: Aid and technical assistance for IAMSEA (African & Mauritian institute of statistics and applied economics) in Kigali. Pre-feasibility study of the exploitation of methane from Lake Kivu. Construction of the Butare-Burundi frontier road (33 km). Study of conditions of distribution of biogas production. Study of conditions of distribution of generator gas production. Architectural study of the new IAMSEA buildings. Study of the Ruzizi II HEP plant.

Stabex

Compensation for the drop in pyrethrum export earnings in 1978.

EIB loan (risk capital)

Funds granted to the Société Minière du Rwanda to build a tin foundry.

Food aid

20 000 t products.

8 projects (financed from counterpart funds) in agricultural production.

Emergency aid

Campaign against cholera and meningitis.

Purchase of 43 trucks.

Supply of 11 million litres of fuel.

Construction of strategic fuel tanks.

Flying in fuel.

Co-financing with NGOs

41 schemes.

Indicative programme under Lomé II (1981-85)

National programme

(ECU 72-80 million)

1. Rural development (38 %)

Agricultural development and opening up of part of the Crête Zaire-Nil chain.

Regional development of the Butare prefecture.

Water supplies in central-northern Bugesera.

2. Road infrastructure (22 %)

Cofinancing for the rebuilding of the Butare-Cyangugu (Zaire frontier) road.

3. Education (14 %)

Equipping the Butare faculty of medicine.

Extensions to the university (Ruhengeri campus).

Construction of a technical school.

Construction of and equipment for 40 integrated rural and craft education centres.

Specific training cycles.

Study grants.

4. Energy infrastructure (10 %)

Construction of four 30 KV lines (170 km).

5. Microprojects (2.5 %)

6. Line of credit for SME (2 %)

7. Technical cooperation (5 % approx.)

8. Miscellaneous & reserve fund (7 % approx.)

Regional programme (provisional)

Co-financing of the Ruzizi II HEP plant.

Continuation of studies in preparation for using methane from Lake Kivu.

Land communications (northern link via Mobasa and central link via Dar-es-Salaam).

Assistance for IAMSEA.


Construction of new IAMSEA buildings.

Stabex (already implemented)

Compensation for drop in coffee export earnings in 1980.

EIB loans, food aid, emergency aid, co-financing with NGOs, Sysmin, etc. — schemes are both possible and foreseeable but cannot be programmed. ○

Profile of Rwanda



Area: 26 338 km²

Population: 5 200 000 (1981 estimate), increasing by approximately 3.2% p.a.

Capital: Kigali (Pop. 120 000 approx.)

Currency: Rwandan franc (tied to the US\$: US\$ 1 = RF 92.84 on average)

Languages: Kinyarwanda (spoken by the whole population) and French (for administrative purposes). Kiswahili is also common.

Member of: OAU, OCAM, CEPGL (Rwanda, Burundi & Zaire), OBK (Kagera River Valley development scheme — Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania & Uganda).

GDP: RF 76 413 m (1978)
per capita RF 15 855 = US\$ 172

Economy: 93% of the population work in agriculture.

Main food crops:
bananas, beans & peas.

Cash crops (1980):
coffee (17 889 t);
— 60-70% of export earnings;
tea (6 628 t);
pyrethrum (938 t);
quinquina (820 t).

Minerals (1980):
cassiterite (tin): 2 129 t
ferberite (wolfram): 678 t

Trade balance

| | 1979 | 1980 |
|---------------|--------------|----------|
| | (RF million) | |
| Exports (fob) | 18 838 | 12 402 |
| Imports (fob) | - 14 807 | - 18 177 |
| | + 4 041 | - 5 775 |

Balance of payments (balance of current transactions in RF million)

| | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 |
|--|---------|---------|---------|
| | - 4 335 | + 4 346 | - 4 448 |

External debt: Current external public debt at end 1980:

RF 15 663 million.

Servicing of external debt:
3.6% of export earnings in 1980.

Budget: Ordinary budget 1980:

FR 11 100 m (expenditure).

Development budget 1980:
RF 2 113 m




School attendance rate: 56%

Distance from ports:

Dar es Salaam-Kigali: 1 650 km

Mombasa-Kigali: 1 700 km

(Top to bottom) Hillside habitat; Kigali; the market; Tuva craftwork; electricity station



Photos Orinfor

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

ACP-EEC Joint Committee

Salisbury, Zimbabwe, 1-5 February 1982

Representatives of 40 ACP states and 61 members of the European Parliament were welcomed "with joy and pride" to Zimbabwe in February by Prime Minister Robert Mugabe. The ACP-EEC Joint Committee meets routinely twice a year, but this was an outstanding session in several respects.

The decision to meet in southern Africa focussed particular attention on the political issues of this region. While much ground was covered on practical areas of ACP-EEC cooperation — energy, food, cultural and industrial cooperation, sugar and the implementation of Lomé II — the highlight of the meeting was the Joint Committee's call for economic sanctions "to be incorporated into a programme of increasing pressure on South Africa".

It was the first time all seven political groups in the European Parliament had accepted the application of economic

sanctions against South Africa. They also demanded international observance of UN embargoes on arms, oil and nuclear assistance for South Africa. However, there was a balance of emphasis to be struck at the meeting between squeezing the South African economy and expanding the economies of the other southern African countries, to wean them off their dependence on Pretoria. Seven of the nine SADCC countries (see box) are party to the Lomé II Convention. Italy, the last EEC country to ratify Zimbabwe's accession to the Convention (effective from March 1982), managed to do so shortly before the Joint Committee meeting, leaving only Angola, Mozambique and, one day perhaps, Namibia as possible Lomé candidates in Africa.

The resolution adopted in Salisbury "advocates increased economic assistance to all signatories of the Lomé Convention in southern Africa", even though the Community's hands are somewhat tied at this stage midway through Lomé II. Financial limits under the individual indicative programmes

SADCC

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference is a political and economic grouping which now includes Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Virtually all these countries have stronger economic links with South Africa than between themselves, particularly because of the disruption of transport links since 1975 through Angola (to the Atlantic) and Mozambique (to the Indian Ocean). SADCC aims to change this.

Broadly, SADCC is an extension of the front-line states group into a regional economic cooperation organization. Its major policy declaration, *South Africa — towards economic liberation*, was adopted at a summit in Lusaka in April 1980, when it was also indicated that democratic governments in South Africa and Namibia

would be welcome to join. In July 1981 agreement was reached in Zimbabwe on a decentralized set of institutions including an annual summit, a ministerial council and a standing committee of officials. President Masire of Botswana is chairman of the summit for the first three years. One sectoral commission has been established, the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission, based in Maputo.

SADCC has initiated consultations with a wide range of donor agencies, offering a first opportunity for financial pledging in November 1980 (see *Courier* no. 66). At a follow-up meeting a year later, the EEC Commission had a first exchange of views on SADCC regional programmes to be funded under Lomé II. Total EEC aid in all forms allocated to SADCC countries under Lomé I (1975-80) was ECU 548.4 m. ◊

Source: EEC Commission.

Also in the yellow pages

The Convention at work

- V. EDF financing
- VII. EIB commitments
- X. Senegal: President Diouf in Brussels
- XI. Pisani visits southern Africa

General information

- XII. Food aid programme for 1982
- XIV. Non-associated developing countries

European Community

- XVI. Thorn outlines 1982 programme
- XVII. End of the British presidency

CID

- XIX. Industrial opportunities

have already been fixed: for the seven SADCC countries in Lomé, the total is bracketed between ECU 409-460 m, including ECU 60-70 m for regional projects. Programmed EEC aid to non-Lomé countries is limited to what is available, or can be rescheduled, under the allocation for "non-associated" states: this only amounted to ECU 4.4 m for Angola and Mozambique under Lomé I (1975-1980), although these two countries received 10 times that sum in food aid. EEC aid to non-associated countries, instituted by the European Parliament in 1976, is "poverty-oriented" and depends partly on co-financing. Africa is only due to receive 5% of it in 1982 (Asia 75%).

The way for the 26-point Joint Council resolution "on the southern African situation", unanimously adopted with five abstentions, was paved by an ACP-EEC fact-finding mission to Angola, Zambia and Zimbabwe from 23 January to 1 February 1982. The mission was launched by the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly at its last meeting (Luxembourg, September 1981) and led by the Joint Committee co-chairmen, Francis Butagira (Uganda) and Giovanni Bersani (Italy), with seven ACP and nine EP members. Hopes were expressed that the mission should complete its tour of the other front-line states, redefined under the resolution as "countries affected by South African acts of aggression". The Consultative Assembly has not cleared this second tour, but EEC development commissioner Edgard Pisani was due to make his own tour of Angola and Mozambique straight after the

Robert Mugabe



Ministry of Information, Zimbabwe

"While some pursue the arts of peace and seek to focus human energies and resources on human development, others appear bent on stirring up strife and fanning the flames of war..."

Pretoria would have us participate in a nakedly neo-colonial project under its patronage called "a constellation of southern African states". However, the nine of us in this region are determined both severally and collectively that through SADCC we promote genuine, effective cooperation which will lead to the stable growth of our economies...

We in Zimbabwe fought a protracted struggle of national liberation over 15 years of sacrifice, privation and suffering until we grasped victory barely two years ago. But this victory, momentous and historic though it

was, was for us only the first step along the road... To build a new Zimbabwe, our people have been enjoined to put aside the animosities and hatred of the Rhodesia of yesterday...

We appreciate and greatly value our admission to the Lomé II Convention... our hosting of this meeting is in a real sense an expression of our appreciation of and commitment to this form of cooperation among states at different levels of development and with different social systems... We are not dogmatists. We are not anybody's carbon copy...

The relationship between the ACP and the EEC has to be viewed in a global context... There is clearly abundant room for improvement in all the areas of our joint cooperation".

Joint Committee meeting. Before leaving, he made clear to a press conference that his mission was "not to get these two countries into Lomé" but to look at the links between their economies and those of the Lomé SADCC states, to meet their leaders and generally to sound out their feelings on Lomé and on regional cooperation. He would be going as much as an ACP as an EEC representative, he felt.

The idea of a fact-finding mission to South Africa itself was notably condemned as "hypocritical" by ambassador Sy of Senegal, although two British conservative MEPs (Pearce and Fergusson) were due there after the meeting to discuss southern Africa and "encourage the liberal elements in South Africa".

"Historic" resolution

Closing the Joint Committee meeting, the co-chairmen described the resolution on southern Africa as "historic". Mr Bersani claimed that the fact-finding mission had allowed the delegates to move on from declarations of principle to concrete measures. To the extent that history is made of facts, it remains to be seen how these concrete measures are implemented. The call for sanctions is addressed to "all nations" and, as Mr Pearce made clear in reporting for the fact-finders, such an embargo can be seriously compromised if only a very few nations disregard it; yet Zimbabwe itself still gets 32% of its imports from South Africa.

Besides condemning, inviting, expressing and so on, the delegates asked for reports from the ACP-EEC bodies. One (EEC Commission and ACP Secretariat) will cover the implementation of the code of conduct recommended to European companies in

South Africa. Another (EEC Commission) will analyse "the effects of economic sanctions against South Africa and on the economies of the EEC and ACP countries". Perhaps most "concrete" of all, the resolution calls for the establishment by the Consultative Assembly of "a special committee to follow up the policies pursued by the EEC member states vis-à-vis South Africa and to consider concrete proposals to take additional steps to increase the pressure on South Africa with the objective of eliminating apartheid".

The "historic" nature of the Joint Committee meeting in Salisbury must lie in the considerable weight of opinion it represents. The delegates represented a third of the countries of the world, and as Mr Pisani concluded, "the meeting was only historic in that the fact-finding mission allowed such a diverse and contradictory meeting to reach such a significant majority in its resolution on the situation in southern Africa".

If the Joint Committee was diverse and contradictory by nature, its atmosphere was nonetheless harmonious. Converging on Zimbabwe's green and pleasant capital, coinciding with the southern African fact-finders, a working party on hunger arriving from Mali and other representatives and preparatory groups, the delegates "got through more work in four days than many institutions get through in much longer", to quote Mr Bersani. This must be encouraging for the new European Parliament president, Piet Dankert, and for the ACP Secretariat, which helped organize the meeting, even if it was the airlift of a reputed nine tons of equipment (including 3000 pencils) by the Parliament that mainly provided the material back-up. Salisbury's hotels were overloaded, with delegations from Mozambique and Cuba in town at

the same time, and transport to the university was not easily arranged, but this was the best-attended and probably most efficient Joint Committee meeting yet. Most of the ACP states not represented were distant islands and only Greece was not present among the EEC Ten. Altogether, the Lomé Convention now includes almost half the countries in the UN.

The wider perspective

The European press naturally wanted to know how much the meeting had cost the EEC tax-payers. Euro-MPs Barbara Castle and Derek Enright (British socialists) have asked for a breakdown of the cost, while reserving judgment on whether it was justified. But the cost-effectiveness of the meeting cannot be quantified financially. The southern African resolution was "the most important thing we've done in the past year", in Mr Bersani's view, while the other six resolutions adopted contained "a series of very important statements". Mr Butagira, who complained in his opening speech of a Western "conspiracy of silence" on South African violations, confirmed that the delegates had come "particularly to find solutions to South African acts of aggression" and considered there to have been "historic unanimity".

The question of cost-effectiveness might be fair in view of the European Parliament's search for its essential role, but it appears very trivial in the wider context of the Joint Committee's meeting in Zimbabwe. The political and moral alienation of the South African government by the EEC is to an extent completed by the European Parliament's acceptance of its economic alienation through sanctions. Nor was the principle of economic pressure in

doubt; the question was whether sanctions will put sufficient leverage on Pretoria to justify the increased hardship they will entail for the people of the region, and ACP delegates felt this sacrifice would be willingly borne. Stability in southern Africa might be effectively promoted through the kind of regional approach of which Lomé II has given the EEC experience, and if the Lomé formula can help the SADCC countries overcome their economic dependence on South Africa, the outcome should be not a set of resolutions but the consolidation of what Mr Pisani called an Atlantic alliance, between Europe, Africa and the Caribbean.

Africa contains a third of the world's mineral wealth, yet scarcely 10% of all prospecting is carried out there. Southern Africa is particularly rich in minerals and farmland, and Mr Pisani looked forward to the day when a new railway would open up the region's resources from ocean to ocean. This will not be for the near future, the commissioner warned, but such is the perspective in which the Joint Committee's work may be placed. Zimbabwe's conciliatory approach to reconstruction gives further hope for the stability and confidence required for the economic development of the region, as was recognized by the many delegates who paid tribute to their host country in Salisbury.

Looking ahead

The efficiency of the meeting was largely due to the practice of confiding particular issues to fact-finders and working groups. The only apparent procedural complication concerned the working group on industrial cooperation, where, exceptionally, 10 ACP delegates were considered necessary to cover all the ACP regions as against

nine Europeans. The question of the tenth ACP voting right occupied most of the time scheduled for setting up the group.

The Joint Committee's increasing confidence was reflected in the first report debated, on the implementation of Lomé II, where rapporteur Willem Vergeer looked "beyond" the Convention rather than presenting a draft resolution reviewing the whole range of ACP-EEC activities. His report suggested a more flexible formula for a future convention, covering more developing countries on a more case-by-case basis and including such questions as the environment, migrant workers and grass-roots organizations. Looking at the Joint Committee itself, the report suggested strengthening its role of initiating and preparing action through working groups — if the secretariat can handle any more — and giving more attention to following up proposals. Meanwhile, the Consultative Assembly might play a more political role, establishing overall guidelines rather than examining details. As regards Lomé II, Mr Vergeer admitted that there is little room for change at this halfway stage but wondered whether its "philosophy of development — rural transformation, agriculture, training, etc. — is being reflected in the implementation of the projects". He called for an overall development strategy and considered the next few years a "unique opportunity" to set its guidelines.

The chairman of the EEC Council of Ministers, Paul de Keersmaecker (Belgian state secretary for European affairs and agriculture), emphasised the progress made in the implementation of Lomé II. On behalf of the ACP-EEC Council and in the absence of his opposite number, Mali's foreign minister Blondin Beye, Mr de Keersmaecker first

saluted Zimbabwe as "a new frontier of freedom" and expressed the ACP-EEC ministers' appreciation of the choice of this newest Lomé country as the venue for the meeting. Mr de Keersmaecker then outlined the principal concerns of the ACP-EEC Council over the past year:

- Agricultural cooperation. A project for a technical centre for agricultural and rural development is successfully under way.

- Stabex. The amount available for export compensation has been reduced, causing difficult problems, but the EEC Commission may be able to work out new possibilities.


- Sugar. The new mandate given to the Commission to negotiate the guaranteed price of sugar is "good news" and shows that the common examination of problems can lead to mutually acceptable solutions, even if sacrifices are necessary.

- Southern Africa. The EEC means to give aid "without reserve, considering the geographical context" to help Zimbabwe's economic development, and considers it important to support SADCC.

World hunger

The ad hoc working group on hunger came to Salisbury from Mali, home of their chairman Boubacar Kassé, where they had finalized a draft resolution at their sixth meeting. Presenting their report, Italian communist Bruno Ferrero hoped the proposals were "as concrete as possible". Hunger had worsened since the 1974 World Food Conference and the fight against it should now be the main priority; "the noose is tightening around the neck of the developing world", he said. Although political and natural catastrophes were partly responsible, the

Edgard Pisani



"This southern quarter of Africa is a source of both fascination and anguish to us, for we recognize it as capable of producing the best and the worst... The best because nature has endowed it with extensive resources and because, with its complementary civilizations and races, it is potentially a harmonious society in control of its own identity and resources. The worst, too: the diversity and consequent contradictions in the society which inhabits this region may lead to it becoming engaged in a struggle which will inflict suffering on this region and threaten world peace..."


South Africa is involved in military activities and acts of sabotage, in economic manoeuvres and acts of aggression whose aim is not to strengthen its own security... Above all, its objective is to prevent sou-

thern Africa from becoming independent of South Africa...

The European Community considers the fight against apartheid to be a fight for man's elementary dignity... European opinion is moving towards a tougher economic and political stance in dealing with South Africa, while South Africa carries on down its unlawful and irrational road...

Political liberation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for development... From national independence and respect for human rights to development, to economic autonomy and to stability — this is the line our action should take...

Nothing will deter us from pursuing our efforts; they follow logically from our being here together and from our conception of the world, from our conception of man". ○



The ACP-EEC Joint Committee in session at the University of Zimbabwe

root causes of world hunger were to be found in the mechanisms of the international economy. Political will and concrete action were required to solve the problem, Mr Kassé added.

A long resolution on the fight against hunger was adopted in Salisbury. It "considers that the scourge of hunger can be more effectively tackled within the framework of the establishment of a new international economic order" and calls on the EEC to meet the aid targets of 0.7% (Pearson), 0.15% and 0.01% (Paris Conference on LLDCs) of GDP while waiting for the UN global negotiations to start, as well as to look at financing facilities for Third World debts, energy bills and balance of payments problems. The resolution stresses the "pressing need for appropriate national food strategies" to be drawn up by the ACP countries and implemented with EEC help. A technical centre for agricultural and rural cooperation (Lomé art. 88) should be established immediately, in the ACP countries.

ACP food production, processing, marketing, security and price-fixing should be "organized and consistent" and in some cases agrarian reform is essential, the resolution says. Rural communities must be directly involved in development programmes. Research and training is of "paramount importance". Progress has been made on EEC food aid, although a wider range of products should be used and more food aid should be available to countries sheltering refugees. Food aid "must not be determined by political factors". The Community should "take a more active part in the various multilateral negotiations" and join the International Sugar Agreement. The resolution "hopes that the present reform of the common agricultural policy will be completed, account being taken of the objectives of Community development cooperation policy", and "demands that the Community market be kept open for agricultural exports from the ACP states and that the EEC draws up appropriate mechanisms and strategies with a view to stabilizing supplies

of agricultural products to the ACP states".

Commissioner Pisani said pilot food schemes would be backed by the EEC in several ACP countries this year. Any new international economic order should primarily concern food and agriculture, he felt.

Cultural cooperation

Culture is increasingly discussed as a possible field of ACP-EEC cooperation. Ambassador Raymond Chasle of Mauritius laid the groundwork for this with a comprehensive report last year, and at Salisbury he urged wider distribution of the report "for fear it will remain a dead letter". The cultural dimension should be "an integral part of the spirit of the next convention". Doubts had been expressed about ACP-EEC cultural cooperation in view of the lack of intra-ACP cooperation in this area, but the ACP Council of Ministers has asked the ACP ambassadors to look into this in the light of a recent intra-ACP seminar, the ambassador said. The EEC Commission is also following up the Chasle Report. The Joint Committee unanimously adopted a resolution on cultural cooperation which:

- Expresses the wish that ACP-EEC cultural cooperation "should be the subject of joint and detailed consideration by the ACP countries and the EEC both within the framework of the implementation of the second Lomé Convention and in all subsequent negotiations";
- "Urges that the third Convention should include, where appropriate, specific provisions relating to the cultural dimension of the development of the ACP states" (e.g. in research, science, education, appropriate technology, information, inter-cultural relations and "the preservation of the culture of migrant workers").

Dissolving the sugar problem

If cultural cooperation is part of the brave new future to which some delegates pointed, sugar has been a da-

magingly awkward issue in the past. "We have to recognize that the sugar problem is now considered by the ACP countries as a key test of European goodwill," Mr Bersani said. However, the Community's decision not to discriminate against ACP raw sugar in relation to white sugar helped clear the way for the adoption of a resolution which:

- "Demands that prices for the 1982-83 marketing year be rapidly fixed;
- Calls for real joint negotiations in future on the guaranteed price for ACP sugar, having regard to all relevant economic factors;
- Decides to set up an ad hoc ACP-EEC contact group to examine all relevant aspects of the present situation and its perspectives;
- Stresses the importance to world market stability of the participation of the Community in the International Sugar Agreement".

The resolution also calls for favourable EEC consideration for sugar from Kenya, Congo, Suriname and Uganda, and reminds the Community that its own sugar price-fixing affects the guaranteed ACP sugar price. An ACP-EEC 'contact-group' has been set up to follow the sugar dossier.

Energy cooperation

World hunger brought the European Parliament more attention than any other development issue on which it worked last year. Energy is another vast issue and a report on ACP-EEC energy cooperation was one of the major documents of this first Joint Committee meeting in 1982. Mr Mugabe pointed out in his opening speech that Zimbabwe spends 30% of its foreign exchange on oil and "measures to solve these problems are no longer an affair of the Third World alone". Sudanese ambassador Nuri Siddig presented a 40-point resolution on energy cooperation which:

- Requests EEC help for drawing up ACP energy inventories;
- "Insists on the energy component being included for consideration in every project submitted under Lomé II";
- Gives top priority to new and renewable energy and recommends appropriate technologies to avoid the "extensive damage" sometimes caused to ACP industry and agriculture by big energy-consuming schemes;
- "Hopes for the rapid opening of global negotiations that would include, inter alia, discussions on energy issues";
- Supports the creation of a World Bank Energy Affiliate or similar fund to help the developing countries;
- Asks the Commission to come up with concrete energy proposals for the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly in September 1982.

In adopting the resolution, the Joint Committee also asked for regional cooperation on as wide a scale as possible for big energy projects. Speakers stressed the need to promote energy-saving measures and to follow up the proposals.

An ACP-EEC bank

The chairman of the EP development cooperation committee, Michel Poniatowski, put forward the well-received idea of a Eurafrikan trade and investment bank which would primarily help the ACP countries to acquire foreign exchange. "The idea is to create an instrument which would contribute to the ACP countries' development by increasing, or saving, their foreign currency reserves, and promoting trade in particular", Mr Poniatowski told the *Courier*. The EP development cooperation committee will examine how to set up such an ACP-EEC bank, to which the EIB and many commercial banks might be glad to contribute capital as share-holders. The banking experience and networks thus combined should relieve the "dramatic" problem of the ACP countries' access to foreign exchange, and help them develop trade links in products other than the traditional big commodities, Mr Poniatowski felt.

Industrial cooperation

The working group on industrial cooperation met effectively for the first time at Salisbury, chaired by ambassador Afolabi of Nigeria. The meeting adopted a resolution which underlines the need to give greater priority to this kind of cooperation and asks the group to see how the Community could settle a series of agreements leading to more European investment in ACP development. A report on textile imports by the Community was referred to the working group pending the current multifibre negotiations.

Global negotiations

Finally, a resolution on the global negotiations for a new economic order, tabled by the Communist and Allies Group, was partially adopted after the submission of several amendments, but without much debate. The resolution expresses concern about the failure to start the UN global negotiations and the maintenance of existing trade patterns whereby "the developing countries are seriously penalized". Mention of a "political world order" was dropped under an amendment which "takes the view that the implementation of the Convention of Lomé, like the requisite changes in ACP-EEC cooperation, requires substantial progress to be made at world level by the establishment of a new international economic order". Paragraphs criticiz-

ing the World Bank and calling for greater democracy in the IMF were left out of the vote, while an urgent appeal was made to the Lomé signatories "to do their utmost to ensure the early opening of the global negotiations without any prior conditions being set".

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Closing the Joint Committee meeting, Mr Butagiyira, who has parliamentary experience as speaker of the Ugandan Assembly, said he was "impressed by the speed and efficiency of its work", which was "a model" for the future of North-South relations. One ACP delegate complained that the ACP countries were "more and more represented by their ambassadors in Brussels", but the atmosphere of the meeting was notably cooperative throughout, with a shared strength of feeling directed at the issues, not the procedures, of the debates. The next ACP-EEC Joint Committee and Consultative Assembly meetings are due to be held in Europe on 29 September to 1 October and 4-6 October respectively. The ACP group has put in a bid for Rome as the venue, and Jamaica has been mentioned as the possible host of the next Joint Committee meeting in the ACP countries. ○

BARNEY TRENCH

EDF

The Commission of the European Communities has adopted financing decisions under the third, fourth and fifth EDFs, concerning the following projects approved by the EDF Committee at its 163rd and 164th meetings.

Botswana

Poultry development

Grant: ECU 750 000 — Fifth EDF

The purpose of the project is to increase poultry production in Botswana and to help the country to move progressively towards self-sufficiency in this sector.

EDF financing will cover:

- the purchase of a hatchery
- the construction of a poultry abattoir
- the construction of a breeder farm
- the purchase of basic materials necessary for operation.

Sudan

Technical assistance for Sudan Rural Development Company

Grant: ECU 1 200 000 — Fifth EDF

The aim of European Community financing is to give support in the form of expert technical assistance to the

Sudan Rural Development Company Ltd (SRDC), whose role is to foster rural development.

The technical assistance will cover the provision of three experts to the SRDC for a four-year period.

Belize

Supplementary financing for Radio Belize rural broadcasting

Loan on special terms:

ECU 225 000 — Fourth EDF

The purpose of supplementary EDF financing is to assist the Belize government to improve the transmission of the National Broadcasting System. The project should enable Radio Belize broadcasts to cover nearly the whole territory of Belize and provide good reception.

This project has already received financing in 1979 (ECU 420 000) but inflation and the increased cost of equipment, installations and spare parts have resulted in an overrun in excess of the amount initially earmarked for the execution of the project.

Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta

African Centre for Patent Documentation and Information

Grant: ECU 1 207 000 — Fifth EDF

In order to increase the role played by the African Centre for Patent Documentation and Information (CADIB) within the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) in Yaoundé, the EDF is providing a grant to cover:

- the construction of premises (equipment, furniture)
- technical assistance
- a financial contribution to get the project on its feet.

Senegal

Trade promotion programme

Grant: ECU 1 083 000 — Fifth EDF

The aim of EDF financing is to:

- diversify and intensify Senegal's trade
- reduce the dependence of its foreign trade on its two basic products (65% of the country's export earnings come from groundnuts and phosphates).

Various technical assistance measures will be carried out over a four-year period in the following fields:

- assistance to export companies
- development and diversification of foreign markets
- efforts to increase companies' know-how (financial and technical management)
- the search for new sources of finance for export marketing.

Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Seychelles, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe

Provisional overall amount for the financing of awards in the academic years 1981-82 and 1982-83

Grant: ECU 1 970 000 — Fifth EDF

EDF financing will go towards training people in various economic sectors. Special emphasis will be placed on training in the country in question (where practicable) and in other ACP states or in neighbouring developing countries, i.e. ASEAN states.

All ACP states (regional project)

Participation by ACP states in international trade events

Grant: ECU 2 115 000 — Fifth EDF

The purpose of EDF financing is to provide the ACP states with effective financial and technical assistance, within the framework of regional cooperation, to enable them to organize their participation in international trade events.

The financing of the ACP states' participation in trade fairs and exhibitions will cover:

- rental of the sites
- construction and decoration of stands
- the compiling of the documentation needed on the stands.

Gabon

Mitzi rubber-growing project

Grant: ECU 1 815 000 — Fifth EDF

Loan on special terms:

ECU 1 815 000

Total: ECU 3 630 000

The aim of the project is to set up a 3 300 ha rubber plantation in the province of Woleu N'tem near Mitzi, which when fully productive will yield approximately 8 000 t of rubber annually.

The project will comprise two investment stages. The first, covering the period 1981-85, will involve the establishment of the plantation units. The second stage, after 1986, will involve setting up the processing plant.

Community aid covers the first stage and will be used primarily to finance preparation of the plant stock and purchase machinery, lorries, tractors and miscellaneous equipment.

Senegal

Kedougou-Saraya road

Grant: Third EDF: ECU 1 300 000

Loan on special terms:

Fourth EDF: ECU 4 200 000

Total: ECU 5 500 000

The project aims to improve the existing 61.5 km track between Kedougou and Saraya in eastern Senegal.

These improvements will be funded by the EDF and will include:

- construction of bridges over the Gambia and Diaguirri and drainage structures
- earthworks and the reconstitution of the carriageway of the track.

Guinea

Village water engineering

Grant: ECU 3 500 000 — Fifth EDF

This EDF financing is intended for a village water engineering programme designed to supply most of the rural population of Guinea with drinking water.

It will concentrate on the Fouta Djallon area and on Upper Guinea. Altogether 460 water points (180 wells and 280 boreholes) are to be installed in these areas and a further 405 natural springs are to be developed.

The EDF will finance:

- the purchase of drilling equipment for the wells
- the sinking of the necessary boreholes
- technical assistance.

Zambia

Maize development project

Grant: ECU 5 550 000 — Fifth EDF

The purpose of this project is to initiate further rural development in Chamuka in Kabwe District and Lunchu in Mkushi District to improve farm incomes and contribute towards national maize production.

The EDF funding will provide the means to improve communications within the area, build marketing depots, motivate and mobilize extension services, organize credit and marketing and increase the availability of animal draught power. Technical personnel will assist in project implementation and a decreasing contribution to fuel costs will be made.

Sudan

Grant: ECU 12 million — Fifth EDF

Second phase of a scheme to create a tea plantation in the south of the country. During this phase an additional area of 360 hectares will be planted (75 hectares have already been planted). The EDF will contribute to the work of getting the ground ready, looking after the bushes, setting up a production unit for food and vegetable gardens, the building of a processing plant.

Central African Republic

Grant: ECU 9 250 000 — Fifth EDF

The building or reinforcement of 23 bridges on the national route 2 (Bangui and Bangassou) and national route 3 (Bossembele and Garoua-Boulai). Re-

placement of these old bridges should facilitate, in particular, marketing of agricultural produce and communications with the capital.

Chad

Grant: ECU 7 796 000 — Fourth EDF

An urgent programme planned in the context of the national reconstruction programme. The main aims are to satisfy food requirements, to encourage investment and to strengthen the structure of the Ministry for Planning and for Reconstruction.

Ivory Coast

Grant: ECU 3 million — Fourth EDF

ECU 4.5 million — Fifth EDF

The funds are to complete the Marahou ranch scheme, which already received financial assistance in 1974. The area of the ranch is to be extended to 82 000 hectares and the EDF will contribute to the cost of the basic work (paths, pastures, etc.), to infrastructure (housing accommodation, sheds etc.) and to equipment and technical assistance.

Sierra Leone

Grant: ECU 3.8 million — Fifth EDF

A multi-annual training scheme designed to raise the literacy level, to support the rural development programme and to improve the qualifications of middle management workers.

Upper Volta

Grant: ECU 1 838 000 — Fifth EDF

The development of 170 hectares downstream from the Dakiri dam. The programme includes the creation of an irrigation and drainage network, a system of access paths and also the provision of the technical supervision and equipment required.

Togo

Grant: ECU 1.1 million — Fifth EDF

The funds are for the construction of a bridge on the river Kara, so as to provide access to Guerinkouka and the surrounding area which has significant agricultural potential. The construction of this bridge should also help to slow down the rural exodus of young people and enable the local people to have better access to the administrative, medical and educational facilities of Lama-Kara.

Dominica

Grant: ECU 162 000 — Fifth EDF

The grant is for a multi-annual training scheme in the fields of public health, administration and agriculture.

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Loan for the Kenyan cement industry

The European Investment Bank, the European Community's bank for long-term finance, is providing a loan for the equivalent of ECU 6.5 million, under the second Lomé Convention, for converting to coal-firing and uprating the capacity of two oil-fired rotary kilns at the Mombasa cement works.

The funds have been channelled to Bamburi Portland Cement Company Ltd., established in 1951, whose main shareholders are Blue Circle Industries and Cementia and the government of Kenya. The credit has been advanced for 12 years, with interest payable at 8% after deducting an interest subsidy financed from the European Development Fund.

The works, costed at about ECU 24 million, will help to reduce the country's dependence on oil imports, while boosting the capacity of the factory from 800 000 to 1 m tonnes. Technical improvements are also included in the project. Following completion of the venture, output from the cement works should reach 1.4 m tonnes, close on 50% of which will be earmarked for export, chiefly to the Gulf states, Reunion, Mauritius, Sri Lanka and neighbouring African countries. On the environmental side, the company has planned measures to ensure that dust emissions do not exceed the strictest European standards. It also systematically rehabilitates disused quarries.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) are also financing the venture.

In 1977, the EIB made a loan of ECU 3 million in support of Kenya's cement industry. The project involved uprating the capacities of the East African Portland Cement Company Ltd. at Athi River, near Nairobi, whose main shareholders are the same as in the case of Bamburi Portland Cement Company Ltd.

Loan for oil exploration in Tanzania

The EIB has made a loan for the equivalent of ECU 7.5 million for oil exploration in Tanzania, off the island of Songo Songo in the Indian Ocean.

The funds have been advanced to Tanzania in the form of a conditional loan for a maximum term of 15 years at an initial rate of 2% which may subsequently be raised to 8%. The operation has been financed from risk capital provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB. The government of Tanzania will on-lend the funds to

the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, a public undertaking responsible for hydrocarbons exploration in the country.

The EIB funds will help to finance the second phase of development of the oil field, for which an initial conditional loan for ECU 350 000 was provided by the bank in 1980. The works involve drilling three new wells to a depth of 3 000 m and completing evaluation of the oil and natural gas potential of the field, where the presence of hydrocarbon deposits was proven by previous exploration.

The scheme is scheduled for completion by early September 1982 and will involve a total capital outlay of more than ECU 40 million. The World Bank, via the IDA (International Development Association), and the OPEC Special Fund are also co-financing the venture.

Small and medium-sized business ventures in Lesotho

As part of financing provided for under the second Lomé Convention, the European Investment Bank has agreed to lend the equivalent of ECU 3 million to support small and medium-sized enterprises in Lesotho.

The funds have been made available to the Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC), a public undertaking and the main source of finance for small and medium-scale investment projects in the industrial, agro-industrial, mining and tourism sectors in Lesotho. Drawn from risk capital resources provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB, the credit has been offered in the form of a global loan. The proceeds will be deployed, subject to EIB approval, in individual amounts for financing equity participations in enterprises and loans for investment in production plant or industrial buildings up to a total of ECU 2.5 million, and the balance of ECU 500 000 will be used for financing feasibility studies.

The term of EIB financing will vary between 10 and 25 years, depending on how the funds are actually used, the rate of interest applicable being 2% for feasibility studies, loans and equity participations, and 8% for industrial buildings.

LNDC is receiving technical and financial assistance from international sources including loans granted by the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

Loan for copper production in Zambia

The European Investment Bank, the European Community's bank for long-term finance, has advanced the equivalent of ECU 25 million, under the se-

cond Lomé Convention, for recovering copper from tailings in Zambia.

The borrower is Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines, 60% of its capital being held by Zambia and 40% by Zambia Copper Investment Ltd. The funds have been made available for 15 years at 8% after deducting an interest subsidy financed from the resources of the European Development Fund.

The project involves processing tailings deposited on dumps between 1939 and 1974, and recovering the metal. The tailings, with a copper content varying from 0.4 to 0.5%, are leached, i.e. treated with sulphuric acid, and the metal dissolved in this solution is then recovered by electrolysis. This method has been used since 1974 to treat new tailings from the Chingola ore-dressing plants in the Zambian copper belt and has already enabled more than 480 000 tonnes of metal to be recovered.

The works part-financed by the EIB and costed at ECU 230 million focus on uprating capacities at Chingola with a view to processing around 750 000 tonnes of old tailings a year and producing an annual 30 000-45 000 tonnes of copper as from mid-1984. The project represents the only feasible short-term solution for maintaining Zambian copper sales, which account for 95% of exports from this landlocked country; hence, it will have a significant impact on the balance of payments, while also creating 300 jobs.

The International Finance Corporation and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) are also co-financing the venture, amongst others.

Loan for the extension of a hydro-electric scheme in Fiji

Under the terms of the second Lomé Convention the European Investment Bank has also granted a loan for the equivalent of ECU 12 million to finance the third and final phase of a hydro-electric scheme in Viti Levu, the largest and most populous of the Fijian islands.

The funds go to the Fiji Electricity Authority, a public undertaking responsible for both generation and distribution of electricity in Fiji. The loan has been granted for 15 years at an interest rate of 8%, after deduction of an interest subsidy from European Development Fund resources.

The main feature of the project being financed by the EIB, the total investment cost of which is estimated at ECU 54 million, is the driving of a 7-kilometre tunnel to divert water from one river into another currently being dammed to supply the head water for a

new power station, so increasing its capacity and raising the output of electricity.

The first two phases of the scheme covered construction of the dam, power station and production tunnels (phase I) and their improvement and enlargement (phase II), in order to exploit the maximum potential of the site. The first two generating sets of the 4 x 20 MW units to be installed at the plant are due to come on stream at the end of 1982. EIB financing for the first two phases was provided in 1978 and 1980, with loans of ECU 12.5 and ECU 11.5 million respectively.

With the completion of the additional phase of investment in 1984, electricity demand in Viti Levu island, hitherto covered by oil-fired generating units, will be met in full by power from the hydro-electric scheme.

The Asian Development Bank, Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) and the Fiji government are also providing finance for this third phase of investment.

Loan for mining project in Papua New Guinea


The European Investment Bank, the European Community's bank for long-term finance, has made available the equivalent of ECU 52 million under the second Lomé Convention to help finance mining of a gold-bearing copper ore deposit in Papua New Guinea.

A conditional loan for ECU 12 million financed from risk capital provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB has been granted to Papua New Guinea (in principle, for 20 years) to assist it in funding part of its equity participation in OK Tedi Mining Ltd. which will implement the scheme and operate the mine.

A loan of ECU 40 million has been advanced for 15 years from the EIB's own resources (i.e. chiefly the proceeds of its borrowings on the capital markets) to Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), which is arranging a syndicated loan provided by German banks. The funds are to be on-lent by KfW under a contract to be concluded with OK Tedi Mining Ltd., whose shareholders include Metallgesellschaft AG, Degussa AG und Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft.

This is the first loan under article 59 and annex XXXI of the second Lomé Convention which provide for additional EIB support for mining and energy projects of mutual interest to ACP states and the Community.

The deposit, located in the west of the country near the Indonesian border, contains estimated reserves of around 400 million tonnes of ore with varying gold and copper contents, the upper layers containing the most gold. Pro-



The Ok Tedi mining project in Papua New Guinea is in the difficult terrain of the highlands

duction is expected to reach 175 000 tonnes of concentrate (32% copper content) per annum in 1987, rising to more than 360 000 tonnes of concentrate as from 1990. During the initial years of working, the mine will also yield gold and molybdenum concentrate. 1 000 jobs will be created by 1985, increasing to more than 1 800 by 1990.

The government of Papua New Guinea attaches top priority to this project which will substantially benefit the country's public finances, balance of payments and economic development in general. Infrastructural works implemented with a view to working the deposit will also help to develop, particularly from the agricultural viewpoint, a fairly remote and very sparsely populated region. Exports of part of the copper concentrate to Europe should provide EEC industry with reliable copper supplies at varying stages of ore processing and help to widen its range of suppliers.

EIB helps set up a development bank in the Comoros

On behalf of the Community the EIB has acquired a holding of 50 million Comoran francs (equivalent to ECU 170 000) in the recently-formed Comoros Development Bank (CDB), using the risk capital resources it administers under the terms of the second Lomé Convention.

The CDB has been set up to promote the economic development of the Comoros by means of loans, guarantees and equity participations in support of projects in various sectors of the Comoran economy; as it gets under way

it will have the benefit of technical assistance financed from the Community's European Development Fund (EDF).

The CDB will have 300 million Comoran francs capital; its majority shareholders will be the state and the Comoros Central Bank, while the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (France) will also hold an interest. Its creation stems from a feasibility study financed by the EIB in 1980, also from risk capital resources.

Loan for constructing hydro-electric power station in Western Samoa

The European Investment Bank has made a loan for the equivalent of ECU 3 million, under the second Lomé Convention, to assist with constructing a hydro-electric power station on Upolu Island in Western Samoa.

The operation, the EIB's first in this Pacific state, has been mounted in the form of a subordinated loan (i.e. repayable only after priority-ranking loans have been paid off) granted for 20 years at 2% from risk capital provided for under the Convention and managed by the EIB.

The funds have been borrowed by the state-owned Electric Power Corporation, responsible for the bulk of the country's energy production facilities. The works, scheduled for commissioning in early 1984, involve installing two 1.75 MW generator sets on the Falefa river, 18 km east of the capital Apia, along with construction of a canal 670 m long, a 280 m tunnel and ancillary equipment. The project is costed at a total of ECU 7.4 million.

There are also plans for European Development Fund grant aid support for the power station which will help to reduce the country's dependence on oil imports. ○

OTHER AID

Emergency aid for Niger: ECU 800 000

The Commission has granted Niger ECU 800 000 of emergency aid under article 137 of the Lomé Convention.

The money will be used to supply animal feedingstuffs, in a move to alleviate the consequences of drought in Niger.

Emergency aid to Madagascar

The Commission has approved ECU 200 000 worth of emergency aid for Madagascar under article 137 of the Lomé Convention.

The money will pay for a proportion of the pesticides the island needs (their total cost has been estimated at ECU 560 000) to cope with an increase in the locust population which is threatening local food supplies.

Emergency food aid for the refugees in Somalia

The Commission has submitted a proposal to the Council to provide 1 000 tonnes of sugar as emergency food aid for the refugees in Somalia. Despite a drop in numbers there are still about 700 000 refugees in the camps and their food requirements for the first quarter of 1982 have not yet been covered. This aid, which is worth ECU 400 000, will be distributed by the UNHCR.

Emergency aid for Zaire

The Commission has decided to grant emergency aid totalling ECU 50 000 to Zaire under article 137 of the second Lomé Convention.

The aid is to be distributed via Comide (Coopération missionnaire au développement) to combat a serious epidemic of dysentery currently raging in the Shaba region. It will involve the supply of medicines and may also include medical technical assistance.

Mauritania

Also under article 137, the Commission has granted ECU 60 000 to help the victims of the flooding at Kaédi following the breaching of the dyke of the Gorgol agricultural area.

Seychelles

An amount of ECU 200 000 is to finance various repairs to the facilities at Mahé international airport following the damage caused by the recent events there.

Emergency aid for Montserrat

The Commission has decided to grant emergency aid of ECU 80 000 to Montserrat under article 117 of the Council decision on the association of the overseas countries and territories (OCT).

The aid is to go towards the urgent repairs needed to help the population following the widespread damage to the country's infrastructure caused by the recent severe rainstorms.

Swaziland

The Commission has decided to grant aid totalling ECU 30 000 to Swaziland under article 137 of the second Lomé Convention.

The aid will cover medical supplies to combat an outbreak of cholera in Swaziland where, according to the WHO, 238 cases have been reported since October 1981.

Mauritius

The Commission has also agreed aid worth ECU 35 000 for Mauritius under article 137. The aid will help repair the damage caused by hurricane Dania on Rodrigues island. In particular it will be used to help the livestock farmers and repair essential infrastructure.

Madagascar

The Commission has also decided to grant Madagascar emergency aid of ECU 100 000 under article 137.

This will be a contribution to the government aid programme for the 50 000 people made homeless as a result of flooding caused by several cyclones. ○

STABEX

Solomon Islands

The Commission has approved an advance payment of ECU 400 000 to the Solomon Islands against loss of earnings on copra exports for 1981.

The loss of export earnings is due to a fall of about a third in the price of copra from the level recorded in the reference period.

Dominica

The Stabex system is aimed essentially at stabilizing the ACP countries' earnings from exports to the Community of products on which their economies depend. Article 27 of the second Lomé Convention states that, if so requested by an ACP state, the Council may decide, on the basis of a report drawn up by the Commission, to apply the system to exports of a given ACP state's products to other ACP states. For the first time such a request has been received from an ACP state, Dominica, and the products in question are coconuts and coconut oil.

Production of these commodities, which are exported essentially to other ACP countries, will drop considerably in the next few years as a result of the hurricanes which hit the island in 1979 and 1980, destroying 70 % of the plantations.

On the basis of the information presented by Dominica, the Commission agreed in its report to the Council that exports of these products to other ACP countries should be covered by Stabex. ○

Kenya

The Commission has adopted a decision on the payment of an advance of ECU 7 500 000 to Kenya in respect of losses on coffee export earnings in 1981.

Although the volume of exports fell, the main reason for these losses is the level of prices, which continue to be inadequate. ○

LOME III

Edgard Pisani favours convention of unlimited duration

Edgard Pisani has begun a tour of the capitals of EEC countries to sound out the ten governments on preparations for Lomé III between the EEC and the ACP countries. The European Commission is to deliberate on this in May, concentrating on the basic orientations of the Convention. The first step in his tour was the Hague, where Mr Pisani spoke with the Dutch minister for co-operation, Mr Kees Van Dijk.

Mr Pisani is said in particular to have expressed the opinion that the new Convention should not be limited to five years, but should be of unlimited duration, although some provisions (in particular financial grants) should be renewed every five years. The Dutch minister is said to have recalled the traditional position of his country, which, in opposition to the geographically-limited policies of the EEC concerning cooperation and development, favours a "world-wide concept". ○

TRADE UNIONS

Thirty trade unionists from Africa, the Caribbean, Pacific and Europe held a two-day meeting in December to review the operation of the Lomé Convention and how the trade unions could be more closely involved in it. The meeting included representatives of the Organization for African Trade Union Unity (OATUU), the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Confederation of Labour (WCL).

During the discussions the unions met Edgard Pisani, the EEC commissioner responsible for development. They told commissioner Pisani that they would like to make the trade union consultations with the ACP-EEC institutions more regular and effective by, for instance, annual meetings with the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly. ○

Dieter Frisch
New director-general
for development
in EEC Commission



EEC /Debaize

On 20 January the European Commission appointed Dieter Frisch director-general for development to replace Klaus Meyer. Mr Frisch knows DG VIII, the Commission's directorate-general for development, since he has spent 13 of his 24 years in the Commission working on development problems.

After studying modern languages and economic and political science at the universities of Frankfurt am Main, Heidelberg and Bonn, he began his career as a freelance interpreter, entering the services of the EEC Commission when it was set up in 1958.

Dieter Frisch began in the directorate-general for personnel and administration, moving in 1960 to competition policy and then to development in 1964. For the first four years in development he was assistant to the director-general Heinrich Hendus, who

died in February (see page XVIII). He was then head of the study and development division until 1973, head of the development policy division until 1975 and finally in charge of basic policy and coordination of member states' policies until 1977. In this role he took part in a number of international North-South negotiations and undertook many missions in the developing countries, particularly in the ACP states.

In 1977 he was promoted to the level of director, moving at the same time to the budget directorate-general where he was responsible for financial interventions and administrative expenditure.

Dieter Frisch took over development on 1 February. He is German, aged 51. Among those in the directorate-general who know him he has a reputation for good-humoured firmness, easy personal contacts, enthusiasm and professional ability. ◊

EEC-SENEGAL

President Abdou Diouf
in Brussels

"Relations between Senegal and the EEC are set fair. Prospects for developing cooperation still further are very good", said Abdou Diouf, President of Senegal, after his talks with EEC commissioners Ortolí and Pisani in Brussels. The President also said that the two sides share very largely the same views with respect to the worrying questions which arise as a result of the economic crisis and the need for re-launching a dialogue between North and South. President Abdou Diouf, who also held talks with Belgian government and business representatives, and met King Baudouin, informed the Commission of the almost completed setting up of the Senegambian confederation and of certain problems specific to West Africa.

Questioned on the future working of the Lomé Convention, President Diouf said that this system of development cooperation can be improved upon: for example, Stabex is a good idea but it can be used to greater advantage than is the case at present. For the 1980/81 agricultural year Senegal actually received only 48% of the assistance that it should have received to compensate for the loss in revenue from export of groundnut products. On the question of a future Lomé Convention, Mr Diouf thinks that the idea of making it permanent should be considered, even if certain of its provisions are reviewed periodically.

On the question of the enlargement of the EEC to include Spain and Portugal, President Diouf indicated that the harmful effects for the ACP countries had been looked at and that studies should be carried out between the EEC and the ACP states to clarify the extent of these effects immediately.


On the desirability of the accession of Mozambique and Angola to the Lomé Convention, President Diouf spoke in favour of an enlargement of this nature.

Mr Pisani called for a consistent Community policy on sugar. In the view of the Commissioner, the problem of the difference between the price rise for beet sugar and for cane sugar con-

ceals another problem which is more fundamental: that of the direction which the EEC intends to give to its agricultural production. "The time has come for harmonization of internal and external agricultural policies", he said.

During the visit to the Commission by President Diouf, three financing agreements and a new fisheries agreement were signed between the EEC and Senegal.

The Kedougu-Saraya road project involves improvement works on the existing track, at an estimated cost of ECU 500 000. There is also a trade promotion programme and an intensive cereal production project (see pages V-VI).



President Abdou Diouf of Senegal with development Commissioner Pisani during their press conference in Brussels

EEC-Senegal fisheries agreement

A new fisheries agreement between the Community and Senegal was also signed on 21 January. Representing the Community, Mr Kontogeorgis signed on behalf of the Commission and Mr Le Poivre, deputy permanent representative for Belgium, signed on behalf of the Council. Mr Mamadou Touré, minister for the plan and cooperation, signed for Senegal.

The agreement is valid for two years — from 15 November 1981 to 14 November 1983. It governs in particular the fishing arrangements which will enable vessels from the Community's member states to fish in Senegalese waters and sets the financial compensation due in return. At present, the Community fishermen affected are the French, the Greeks and the Italians.

The new arrangements have been worked out in the light of the experience gained with the previous two-year agreement and are better designed to suit the needs of the fishermen. ○

ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE

Pisani visit

The most appropriate and natural means of establishing broadly based and effective cooperation between Angola and Mozambique on the one hand and the European Community on the other is by accession to the Lomé Convention. There are other possibilities, it is true, but they would not open up such a large field of potential. This was the message transmitted to the Angolan and Mozambican authorities by Edgar Pisani, the EEC commissioner responsible for development during an official visit he has just made to these two countries, the only two in southern Africa which have not joined the Lomé Convention. Mr Pisani's visit enabled the authorities of these two countries to become better informed of the possibilities of cooperation with the EEC. This cooperation is at present modest.

During his talks with President Samora Machel, and President dos Santos, as well as with the Ministers, Mr Pisani was told that there was a general preference for concluding bilateral agreements with the Community. They consider that agreements like the one concluded between the EEC and Algeria would be better suited to their particular requirements and situation. Mr Pisani expressed doubts as to the possibility of implementing effective bilateral agreements for two African countries south of the Sahara. The financial

sums granted by the Community in the context of bilateral agreements would be nothing like as great as those which are made available within the terms of the Lomé Convention.

Pending possible developments, Mr Pisani and the Angolan and Mozambican leaders identified the possibilities for cooperation which exist at present. Mr Pisani mentioned the regional cooperation schemes in the Lomé Convention which could benefit Angola and Mozambique.

Mr Pisani said that the Commission remained fully prepared to act to the advantage of the Southern African Development Cooperation Council (SADCC) which groups together all the countries of Southern Africa, both at central level (its seat is in Botswana) and at sectorial level (Mozambique is responsible for the coordination of SADCC transport projects while Angola is the coordinator of activities in the field of energy.) ○

ACP COMMITTEE OF AMBASSADORS

First meetings of 1982

The Brussels ACP ambassadors met on both 7 and 14 February. The discussions were dominated by their wish to see a special meeting of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers to discuss the problems of the Stabex system and the guaranteed price of sugar. They deplored the slowness in calling the special session and stressed the urgency of the matter and their desire to reach agreement with the Community.

The committee also discussed the work for the Joint Committee of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly in Salisbury, Zimbabwe, between 1 and 5 February 1982. The general secretariat of the ACP group in Brussels, which for the first time was acting as co-secretariat for the Joint Committee meeting, brought the ambassadors up to date on the plans for the Salisbury meeting and the fact-finding trips visits to the front line states.

The ambassadors were also given information on the visit to ACP House of President Abdou Diouf of Senegal.

The committee then moved on to add the final touches to the texts of the decisions and resolutions taken during the 28th session of the ACP Council of Ministers in Maseru, and discussed its short and medium-term programme of work. A report was given by the delegation which had visited Germany under the auspices of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (see below).

Finally the committee welcomed the new ambassador from Togo, Mr Ayao-vi Adodo.

ACP delegation in Germany

In late December an eight-man ACP delegation headed by Ambassador Sy of Senegal, the chairman of the ACP committee of ambassadors, paid a three day visit to Germany at the invitation of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (1) to have talks with representatives of the German parliament and government, and German institutions involved in development in developing countries.

The first major meeting was with Alvin Bruck, the secretary of state in the economic cooperation ministry to discuss the Lomé relationship and the German contribution to development in the ACP states. In the discussion ambassador Sy put emphasis on practical ways of helping the ACP states to sell in the EEC market. He believed the present trade promotion facilities to be totally inadequate. Mr. Bruck agreed on the need for improvements. The two sides also discussed the workings of Stabex, Sysmin and the sugar protocol, and the particular problems of world hunger and the plight the least developed countries.

Discussions were widened during a meeting with Dr Lautenschlager, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, to cover the North-South dialogue after Cancun, the enlargement of the EEC, and the possible inclusion of Angola and Mozambique in Lomé II. On the last point the German minister repeated his governments support for the inclusion of the two southern African states, but insisted on respect for the so-called Berlin clause in annex XXXV of Lomé II on the status of Berlin.

The ACP delegation also had meetings with the German development company DEG (Deutsche Entwicklungsgesellschaft) and the international development foundation DSE (Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklung), before paying a brief visit to West Berlin.

After the visit, the delegation outlined six ways in which the visit could be followed up:

— The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has indicated a capacity as well as a willingness to provide the ACP Secretariat with technical assistance in the setting-up of an archives division. The secretariat may wish to consider following-up this question.

— The Federal Republic of Germany is willing to sympathetically consider (through its secretary of state, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) an ACP request for assistance in the setting up of a trade data system for the ACP Secretariat.

(1) The foundation, which has close ties with the German social democratic party (SPD) is named after the first President of the Weimar Republic (1919). It carries out education and research on social and political matters and tries to promote international understanding.

The secretariat may also wish to pursue this question.

— The ACP may wish to consider inviting the DSE to participate in the group of experts' meeting on customs cooperation and rules of origin due to be held in February 1982 at ACP house. Given its wide experience in this area, the ACP may stand to benefit from DSE's participation.

— Consideration may also be given to requesting the DSE to provide places in some of its training courses for ACP staff, including the secretariat staff, in specific fields where the need is felt, such as in administration, etc. In pursuit of this type of action, the ACP Secretariat may, however, wish to establish more structured relations with this and similar institutions, through its secretariat.

— The ACP Secretariat should seek to ensure that its internal organization is such as to allow it to be aware of and to be able to both take advantage and advise ACP states of the relevant training possibilities offered by such institutions, not only in Germany, but also by other EEC member states, or international organizations such as UNCTAD, UNIDO, FAO, etc., especially where these offers do not impose financial burdens on the ACP.

— Finally, ACP representatives may wish to consider drawing attention to their governments to the possibilities offered. ○

SUGAR

Agreement on guaranteed prices

The ACP states and the EEC agreed on 19 February 1982 to the guaranteed prices for ACP sugar during the 1981/82 season.

The negotiations were concluded at ACP House in Brussels after starting in April 1981. They had been resumed on 19 February after an interruption of almost eight months. The difficulties which the Community had faced were explained by the EEC agriculture commissioner Poul Dalsanger but the long delay had caused great concern and damage said the ACP side. The agreement was signed by Sir Satcam Boolel of Mauritius on behalf of the ACP Group and by Mr Dalsanger on behalf of the EEC. The prices agreed are ECU 38.94 per 100 kg for raw sugar and ECU 48.16 per 100 kg for white sugar. These prices represent an increase, backdated to 1 July 1981, of 8.5% and 8.3% respectively. In a declaration after the signing the ACP spokesman said that the ACP countries had formerly accepted the Community's offer but this acceptance did not prejudice the established ACP position which

was that economic factors should be taken into account in fixing, by common agreement, the price for ACP sugar. "If we accept your offer on this particular occasion," Sir Satcam said, "it does not mean that we believe that this condition has been met."

The Minister also expressed the satisfaction of the ACP states on Zimbabwe's accession to the Convention and to the protocol on sugar. He also welcomed a representative from Belize who had taken part in the negotiations for the first time.

The ACP states and the Community then went on to discuss formally the re-examination of the protocol as foreseen under article 2. The deadline set by this article has thus been respected and an ACP-EEC sub-committee has been mandated to continue the examination. ○

ZIMBABWE

Notification of accession

On 30 January 1982 the representative of the European Communities deposited at the secretariat of the ACP group "the act of notification of the conclusion by the Community of the agreement on the accession of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the second Lomé Convention". This agreement was signed in Brussels on 4 November 1980.

The deposit of this notification marked the completion of the procedures required for ratification of the ac-



Johannes Grieshaber of the EEC Council secretariat depositing Zimbabwe's instruments of ratification of Lomé II with Edwin W. Carrington, ACP deputy secretary-general

cession agreement, which will enter into force on 1 March 1982, i.e. the first day of the second month following the date on which the act of notification of conclusion by the Community was deposited. The accession of Zimbabwe brought the number of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries belonging to the Convention to 61, including the 58 original signatories. Procedures are also underway for the accession of Antigua and Barbuda, and Belize, to the Convention, bringing the number to 63. ○

GENERAL INFORMATION

Food aid programme for 1982

The Commission has forwarded to the Council its proposals on the food aid programmes for 1982.

These proposals involve the allocation of the following quantities:

- cereals: 1 087 963 t
 - milk powder: 150 000 t
 - butteroil: 45 000 t
- representing a total of ECU 701.9 million in budget appropriations.

These programme proposals come very soon after the Commission proposal on a plan to combat hunger in the world. Accordingly, they stick closely to two guidelines of that plan, namely to "do more" and to "do better".

Doing more

The first operation under the plan to combat hunger involves the allocation of supplementary exceptional food aid

worth ECU 40 million to the least developed countries (see table overleaf).

In the present proposal, the Commission envisages an increased cereals food aid programme involving 1 087 963 t compared with 927 663 t in 1981.

Doing better

The programmes put forward by the Commission have two new aspects designed to ensure a more consistent approach to allocation based on:

- (i) an indicator establishing average import requirements over the last three years;
- (ii) the most recent data available for the current year.

In addition, to enable closer account to be taken of changes in the situation, it is proposed to increase the amount

Allocation of exceptional food aid for the least developed countries

Direct operations (ECU 23.5 million)

| Recipient country | Product | Estimated maximum quantity (tonnes) | Maximum amount (mill. ECU) | Channel |
|--------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Bangladesh | Oil | 6 500 | 4.00 | direct |
| Benin | Cereals | 3 000 | 0.50 | direct |
| Cape Verde | Rice | 500 | 0.28 | direct |
| Central African Republic | Various products | | 0.12 | direct |
| Chad | Sugar | 800 | 0.26 | NGO |
| Comoros | Rice | 900 | 0.40 | direct |
| Ethiopia | Cereals | 17 500 | 3.50 | direct |
| Guinea | Cereals | 4 800 | 0.80 | direct |
| Guinea-Bissau | Rice | 900 | 0.40 | direct |
| Haiti | Oil | 100 | | |
| | Rice | 400 | 0.23 | NGO |
| Upper-Volta | Oil | 650 | 0.40 | direct |
| Lesotho | Sugar | 700 | 0.23 | direct |
| Maldives | Sugar | 100 | 0.03 | direct |
| Mali | Various products | | 0.40 | direct |
| Nepal | Oil | 400 | 0.25 | direct |
| Niger | Cereals | 4 000 | 0.66 | direct |
| Uganda | Beans | 500 | | |
| | Sugar | 1 200 | 0.75 | WFP |
| | Sugar | 3 000 | | |
| Somalia | Flour | 3 700 | | |
| | Oil | 2 000 | 3.00 | direct |
| Sudan | Sugar | 1 500 | 0.50 | direct |
| Tanzania | Cereals | 18 000 | 3.00 | direct |
| UNHCR (displaced persons Laos) | Rice | 1 000 | 0.45 | International organization |
| Reserve | | | 3.34 | |
| Total | | | 23.50 | |

Operations carried out via the international emergency food reserve (WFP implementing body): 100 000 tonnes cereals equivalent

(16.5 million ECU)

| Recipient country | Product | Estimated maximum quantity (tonnes) | Maximum amount (million ECU) |
|-------------------|---------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Cape Verde | Maize | 7 500 | 1.65 |
| Comoros | Rice | 700 | 0.33 |
| Ethiopia | Wheat | 18 000 | 2.97 |
| Guinea | Rice | 1 100 | 0.49 |
| Guinea-Bissau | Rice | 1 800 | 0.82 |
| Haiti | Wheat | 3 000 | 0.49 |
| Upper Volta | Sorghum | 3 770 | 0.82 |
| Nepal | Wheat | 3 600 | 0.66 |
| Niger | Sorghum | 2 200 | 0.49 |
| Somalia | Beans | 2 300 | |
| | Oil | 2 700 | 3.30 |
| Sudan | Wheat | 5 000 | 0.82 |
| Chad | Sorghum | 11 200 | 2.47 |
| Yemen (South) | Oil | 550 | 0.33 |
| Reserve | | | 0.37 |
| Total | | | 16.50 |

Boubou Hama dies



On 29 January, Boubou Hama died in Niamey at the age of 76. He was for 14 years president (speaker) of the Niger national assembly, and well known in European parliamentary circles because of his involvement in the activities of the Yaoundé Conventions.

Internationally he was known for his extensive knowledge of oral tradition, which resulted in several dozen literary and historical works. In recognition of his contribution, the Niger government has decided to create a literary prize in his honour. ○

of the reserve available for special requirements and unforeseen circumstances, thus giving the whole programme greater flexibility.

Cereals

The total quantity of cereals food aid proposed for 1982 is 1 087 963 t, an increase of 17% on the 1981 figure.

The Commission considers that this is the minimum the Community can provide given the greatly increased cereal import requirements of the developing countries. The FAO estimates those requirements at 105 million t for 1981/82, reflecting an ongoing increase. Of the above total figure, 26 million t is required for the low-income countries for which the Community aid programme is intended.

A total of 46 countries have presented requests for aid amounting to 2.1 million t—to which have to be added requests from various humanitarian organizations.

The breakdown proposed by the Commission is based on the same criteria as in previous years: basic nutritional requirements, economic development and external finances. Broadly, it is as follows:

— **Direct allocation to countries:**
667 000 t

The proposed country allocations show the following features:

— 100% is for countries with a *per capita* GNP not exceeding \$ 730 and 63% is for the poorest countries in this group, where *per capita* GNP does not exceed \$ 370;

— 37% is for ACP countries, slightly more than in 1981. 43% is for least developed countries and 42% is for Sahel countries.

— **Allocation to organizations:**
236 000 t

World Food Programme, UNRWA (Palestinian refugees), UNHCR (Refugees in Pakistan and Thailand), Red Cross, non-governmental organizations.

— **Reserve:** 184 963 t

This is for emergency operations or requirements not yet determined at the present time or to support food strategies forming an integral part of the Community plan of action to combat hunger in the world.

Milk products

This year the Commission is again proposing milk powder aid of 150 000 t. The capacity to use and absorb this product—under proper conditions—is less than the theoretical requirements. For this reason, moreover, it is proposed to grant the maximum proportion of this aid to international organizations which have the programmes and staff to cope with these special requirements, and to supply direct to applicant countries only those quantities which they can guarantee will be properly used either through carefully structured social programmes or by the dairy industry.

The breakdown of the aid is as follows:

63 800 t to international organizations
69 650 t to applicant countries
16 550 t to the reserve.

As regards butteroil, the 45 000 t proposed would be allocated as follows:

13 400 t to international organizations
29 805 t to applicant countries
1 795 t to the reserve.

ECU 40 million special aid

Once the relevant budgetary decisions had been taken and the member states had been consulted, the Commission decided on the allocation of this exceptional aid on 22 January, mainly on the basis of shortfalls in food products and the ability of the countries to finance imports. Some of the aid (a contribution equivalent to 100 000 tonnes of cereals at a cost of ECU 16.5 million) is to go towards the World Food Programme for action connected with the International Emergency Food Reserve. ○

MAGHREB/MASHREQ

Cooperation agreements

The Commission has taken the following financing decisions.

Morocco — Grant: ECU 790 000

This aid will supply the Rabat cereal testing laboratory, the only official national laboratory doing analyses of cereals and cereal products, with equipment and scientific apparatus to enable it to become fully operational by extending its testing and research work on agri-foodstuffs.

It will also provide technical assistance and training and retraining for local staff to familiarize them with the new equipment.

Lebanon Grant: ECU 300 000

This additional finance will be used to extend the scope of the multiannual training programme presented by Lebanon in order to cope with priority training requirements in the following spheres:

merchant navy training
teacher training
short-term technical assistance in order to determine the training requirements for small business.

Lebanon has already received ECU 200 000 for its awards programme to cover:

— short training courses in data processing
— teacher training
— merchant navy training.

Emergency aid for Algeria and Morocco

The Commission has decided to provide emergency aid of ECU 150 000 for Algeria and ECU 300 000 for Morocco.

This aid will help to meet the priority needs of the population, in terms of a balanced food diet, following the severe drought of 1980-81, which took a particularly heavy toll of stock-farmers.

The number of stock-farmers affected by the drought is estimated to be 150 000 in Algeria and 1 000 000 in Morocco. ○

NON-ASSOCIATED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The Commission has taken a number of decisions for the financing of projects under the 1981 programme for non-associated developing countries.

India: ECU 7 000 000

The project is aimed at regenerating cultivable land damaged by erosion and reducing flood risks in both the long and the short term by reforestation and measures to conserve the soil and water resources.

India: ECU 36 000 000

The project involves financial aid for importing nitrogenous fertilizer into India.

IRRI (International Rice Research Institute): ECU 1 500 000

The IRRI is an international institute in the Philippines specializing in rice research.

The EEC contribution will cover some of its training and basic research activities in 1982.

ICRISAT (International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics): ECU 1 200 000

ICRISAT is an institute in India specializing in research into five crops (sorghum, millet, pigeon peas, chick peas and groundnuts).

The EEC contribution will cover some of its basic research costs in 1982.

CIP (International Potato Center), Peru: ECU 800 000

The EEC financing is for the CIP's research activities in 1982, particularly: physiology and formation, and regional research.

CIAT (International Centre for Tropical Agriculture), Colombia: ECU 1 400 000

The EEC contribution will cover research to be carried out in 1982 into the improvement of two basic food crops: beans and manioc.

IICA (Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences): ECU 1 600 000

The project will benefit the countries of the Central American Isthmus (Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica). The Institute will be responsible for a training and support project for peasant producer associations.

Ecuador: ECU 3 000 000

This project involves a financial contribution to Foderuma (a rural development fund), which is a direct offshoot of the Ecuadorian government's Central Bank and whose role is to contribute towards the development of marginal rural communities.

Andean Pact: ECU 3 927 000

The project will be implemented by the Junta for the five countries of the

Andean subregion (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela) and is aimed at improving rural technology to help the poorest sections of the population.

ASEAN: ECU 4 300 000

This project involves stepping up training and R & D activities with a view to solving the problem of post-harvest losses caused by poor conditions for processing or storage, parasites or a deterioration in quality.

Philippines: ECU 7 100 000

This project will be spread over seven years and includes an integrated development programme for the central and southern regions of the island of Palawan, mainly involving agricultural improvements and the upgrading of the transport and health infrastructure.

Palestinians living in the occupied territories: ECU 1 650 000

The project will provide funds, via the Jordan Cooperative Organization, for the rural Palestinians living in the occupied territories in order to improve agricultural production and marketing, land development and the rural infrastructure.

All NADCs: ECU 1 500 000

This amount is earmarked for the financing of studies and technical assistance which will enable the preparation of development projects with a view to obtaining finance for them.

All NADCs: ECU 2 000 000

These funds are to enable Commission staff responsible for administering financial and technical aid to the non-associated developing countries to have recourse to experts and consultancy firms in order to help in the identification, appraisal, follow-up and monitoring of projects.

Bangladesh — Grant: ECU 12 000 000

This aid is for a project designed to improve the water engineering infrastructure in relatively small-scale irrigated areas in Bangladesh. It comprises some thirty sub-projects covering a total area of 100 000 ha, involving work to improve flood protection, drainage and irrigation infrastructure and the installation of small-scale pumped irrigation equipment.

Indonesia — Grant: ECU 12 000 000

The money will be used for an irrigation project on Bali involving the rehabilitation and expansion of some 50 village-level irrigation schemes covering a total of 24 000 ha, together with back-up activities, including the establish-

ment of a water-management training centre.

Dominican Republic

The Commission has approved a grant of ECU 4 800 000 for a project in the Dominican Republic.

The aim of the project is to create a 1 900 ha irrigation scheme in the south-west of the country fed from a system of wells and boreholes and backed up by social infrastructure and other support measures. This will improve the living standards of 11 000 people in the most desolate part of the country.

Emergency aid for Vietnam

The Commission has decided to grant emergency aid totalling ECU 300 000 (1) to three non-governmental organizations in support of their relief work for the people of Vietnam. Caritas Germanica, the Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement and Oxfam (UK) are each to receive ECU 100 000 as a contribution to their programmes to supply hospitals with the drugs and medical instruments they lack. The relief supplies will be distributed free of charge directly to the beneficiaries.

This Community operation is consistent with similar humanitarian assistance already approved by several member states.

Emergency aid for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan

The Commission has decided to grant emergency aid totalling ECU 633 000 for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

This aid will be made available to the UNHCR as a contribution to its 1982 programme for refugees.

The programme, amounting to over ECU 64 million, provides for a whole range of measures, in particular: supplementary food: ECU 16 million
construction of shelters: ECU 8.5 million
clothing and footwear: ECU 8 million
health: ECU 7 million

The number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan increased, according to the Pakistan authorities, from 1 650 000 in February 1981 to 2 377 000 at the end of November.

It will be recalled that, in June and August 1981, the Commission made available to various organizations a total of ECU 15 million for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Emergency food aid for displaced persons within El Salvador and refugees in Honduras

(1) Under article 950 of the budget: "Aid to disaster victims in developing and other non-member countries".

The Commission has decided to provide the following emergency food aid:

— 2 500 t of cereals, 100 t of red beans and 100 t of milk powder to the UNHCR for its action to assist the 20 000 Salvadorian refugees in Honduras, whose living conditions are extremely precarious;
— 2 500 t of cereals, 300 t of red beans, 400 t of milk powder and 300 t of butteroil to the Catholic Relief Service for its action to assist the displaced persons within El Salvador—estimated to number 200 000.

The value of the aid is estimated at ECU 2 800 000.

Since December 1980 the Commission has already supplied aid to the people of El Salvador totalling ECU 4 300 000 made up of:

— ECU 3 000 000 in food aid,
— ECU 1 300 000 in cash to humanitarian organizations.

Emergency food aid for Angola and Namibian refugees in Angola

The Commission has taken two decisions to grant food aid to Angola.

The first involves 3 150 tonnes of cereals, 350 tonnes of milk powder and 200 tonnes of butteroil for people from southern Angola who have had to flee from incursions by South African troops into Angolan territory and are now in makeshift camps.

The second involves the distribution by War on Want of aid for 60 000 Namibian refugees, mainly women and children, who are in camps in the interior of Angola. The aid involves 2 695 tonnes of cereals and 5 000 tonnes of butteroil.

The cost of the two operations is ECU 2.4 million. ◊

GROUP OF SEVEN

The Group of Seven (1) held its last quarterly meeting at the end of November 1981 under the chairmanship of Jacques Feyerick President of CEDIOM (Belgium) and the Nigerian ambassador in Brussels Peter Afolabi. In front of a number of ACP ambassadors the problem of joint ventures was discussed. The chairman's speech and the discussion which followed centred in particular, on the delicate question of cooperation between the two sides. There were also observers from the EEC Council and Commission and from the Centre for Industrial Development and

(1) The Group of Seven includes: Afrika Institut (Netherlands), Afrika-Verein (Germany) Centre pour l'étude et le développement des investissements outre-mer (CEDIOM, Belgium), Comité internationale de l'Afrique noire (CIAN, France), East Africa Mauritius Association and the West Africa Committee (Great Britain), Assafrica (Italy).

the European Investment Bank. The Group of Seven also prepared its programme for 1982.

The first meeting of the year will be held in Brussels in April under the new chairman Senator Pedini (Assafrica-Italy) a member of the European Parliament. The main question under discus-

sion will be the transfer of technology. Documents which are already in preparation will be sent to members soon. A final text will then be drawn by the group's secretary-general Mr. Hopfen. Once approved by Senator Pedini the text will be sent to ACP ambassadors in time for the April meeting. The usual observers will also be invited. ○

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

“The Community is in danger”

On 16 February Commission President Gaston Thorn made a speech to the European Parliament to outline the Commissions plans for 1982. Extracts from his speech are printed below:

“The Community is in danger. Within its frontiers cohesion is compromised by the economic crisis which is rousing the old demons of protectionism, the illusion that salvation lies in going it alone. Outside, the Community is having to contend with the aggressive behaviour of its trading partners just when it should be working for the survival of its traditional industries and promoting the rise of those which hold the key to industrial development in the future.

“The problems are awesome and forbidding. They are often spoken of in terms of a radical change of structure or the need to reshape our civilization. But I am not here to preach defeatism. The political options that I will put to you can, indeed must, serve as a springboard for the revitalization of the Community. The Community must emerge from its present tribulations more united, more confident and more assertive on the world scene. The alternative is irreversible decline for the nations of Europe.

“The economic situation within the Community is still disturbing. In fact it worsened in some respects during 1981. I am thinking above all of unemployment, which has reached proportions unprecedented since the end of the war. At the end of last year no less than 10 260 000 people were looking for work. That's 9.2% of the active population and an increase of 28% in one year!

“The Community could not survive the destruction of the single market. If it were to founder, the Community's policies — the common commercial policy for instance — would lose their *raison d'être*. Even the common agricultural policy, founded on the twin pillars of free internal trade and Community preference, would not last long. Re-

cent events illustrate this all too clearly.

“Our relations with the United States and Japan are getting more and more strained as the crisis bites deeper. A major dispute is building up over the trade balance.

“I might be less concerned about the trade problem if our differences of opinion with the United States did not extend to such major issues as North-South relations, and if the international situation were not so unstable.”

The May mandate

“The best way of ensuring the survival of the CAP is to make the adjustments which its success demands calmly and before it is too late.

“But to do this we must have a clear idea of the kind of agriculture Europe wants. The modernization process on which competitiveness depends must be pursued, but it must be reconciled with the need to avoid a massive flight from the land which would be quite unacceptable in the present situation.

“But taking the step of proposing new own resources is much more than a budgetary matter. It means persuading the member states, national parliaments and public opinion that the Community has something to offer which warrants a further transfer of resources. This House and the Commission is now faced with a new imperative: to put a convincing Community project to our people. This must surely be the overriding priority for the remainder of your term of office and ours.

“My immediate aim is to try to persuade governments to come to an overall agreement as soon as possible, at the latest at the European Council in March. The talks which Mr Tindemans and I will be having with the member states in the weeks ahead will enable us to see how far their views coincide on revitalization of the integration process and how the idea might be made more attractive to the general public.”

Economic recovery

“For many years now the Community has made nothing like full use of its economic potential. This has led to a seemingly inexorable rise in unemployment. There is little inclination to invest because industry sees no point in increasing production capacity when existing plant is already lying idle.

“Hopes of a recovery have been dashed time and again. Moderate growth was forecast for 1981, but the economy contracted instead. A few weeks ago we were still hoping for a 2% increase in GDP in 1982; it now seems that this forecast might have to be revised downwards.

“The time has come to take a critical look at our economic policies. I am not suggesting that we should abandon our policies of restraint and control, particularly on money supply, public finance and incomes. Those policies are still essential, even if we can be forgiven for being somewhat discouraged by the fruits they have borne so far.

“But, while we continue a policy of restraint, we must also try to create a more favourable environment for employment and investment. We cannot afford to sit back and wait for growth to return of its own accord when the present process of adjustment is complete.

“The reasons why I lay such emphasis on investment and employment is that they are both the main goal of our economic policy and the best way of achieving it. I am duty bound to make unemployment the focal point of our concern in order to avoid leaving our young people a legacy of submission and humiliation. Our societies must show that they are resilient enough to bounce back.

“We must build our economic future ourselves, and not wait for Providence to reveal to us once again the lost secret of growth. The crisis will not go away unless we have a strategy to drive it away, and the heart of this strategy must be top priority for investment.

“This is not a new idea. It was the theme in the foreword to the fifth medium-term economic policy programme. Along these lines, then, I propose that a plan be launched at Community level to give new impetus to investment by providing Community contributions to top up national measures.”

Internal action

“The action which the Community will have to take is on two fronts. Firstly, on the internal front, the following measures would be required:
— improvements to the internal coher-

ence of the system (adjustments to the process of creating ECUs, consolidation of the existing mechanisms by the development of intra-marginal intervention in Community currencies);

- promotion of the use of the ECU;
- tangible progress in achieving convergence of economic performances (because any strengthening of the system is doomed to failure if the method and the results of coordinating policies are not considerably improved)."

External dimension

"But there is an external dimension to development of the EMS, which is particularly critical in the present world situation: the gradual establishment of effective monetary cooperation, organized in the first instance with the United States, will be a vital factor in the success of the EMS in the near future. For many months now the Commission has been pressing for talks on changes to be made in relations with the dollar: today the need for these talks is more urgent than ever.

For the Commission, this restatement of European monetary identity, which is undeniably fraught with problems, has a double symbolic value since it affects both mutual solidarity and discipline."

Third World

"The current deadlock in the North-South dialogue makes the consolidation and expansion of organized cooperation between the Ten and the various groups of developing countries more urgent than ever. If the Community does not wish to lose the political credibility built up on the strength of its development record, it cannot afford to abandon its objectives for the North-South dialogue, as set out in the report endorsed by the European Council in June last year; it can act either on its own, or in conjunction with its Western partners or in association with like-minded oil-producing countries, but act it must.

"The Commission would like to organize a debate, involving Parliament and the Council, to formulate the nucleus of its development policy for the eighties. It will present the relevant proposals by the summer. At the same time it will press on resolutely with the campaign to combat hunger in the world, notably by means of the plan of action adopted by the Council at its instigation in November.

"We have talked of the tensions affecting relations with our major Western trading partners, with the Eastern bloc and with the developing world; there is a lesson to be learned from all three. And it is this: more than ever before, the Community must react with a single voice to events on the international scene, and adopt a single, coher-

ent position, to defend its legitimate interests and affirm its political and cultural identity.

"It is clear from my analysis that the Commission has a special mission at this juncture: to convince the member states and the general public that there is no alternative to the Community, that it is the only effective remedy for the ills that plague us.

"The Community has two options: it can admit defeat in the face of centrifugal forces, or it can fight on to attain a higher level of integration and development.

"For the Commission there is no choice. It cannot contemplate surrender. It will fight on." o

BRITISH PRESIDENCY

Renewal, enlargement and identity

On 31 December 1981 Britain's second term in the EEC presidency came to an end.

When Britain took the chair last July Lord Carrington warned against exaggerated hopes over what any presidency could achieve in the short space of six months. The key note for the British contribution was to be continuity and the efficient conduct of the Community's business.

In the "trptych" which Lord Carrington suggested in his speech to the European Parliament on 8 July 1981 as a basic framework for the future development of the Community, the three elements were "renewal", "enlargement" and "identity".

The basis for "renewal" was the review of policies under the 30 May mandate, on which it had been agreed that conclusions should be reached by the end of the year. Unfortunately this was not possible. However, despite the predictable intervention of holiday periods, and changes of government in several countries, involving inevitable reassessments and changes of policy, good foundations were laid for the remaining work under the Belgian Presidency (1 January — 30 June 1982).

As the British Prime Minister told the European Parliament on 16 December 1981, when she reported on the outcome of the 26/27 November European Council, if a venture as bold and imaginative as the European Community is to endure, then it must adapt to changing circumstances and to the hopes of generations yet to come. Renewal is the pathway along which this essential adaption will be achieved, both by reviewing financial policies in accordance with the man-

date and, in the longer term, by means of further development.

Renewal also involves completion of the framework provided for in the Treaties including among other things, agreement on a common fisheries policy, and the completion of the internal market. Some headway was made during the British presidency on these matters, but the Community was unable to make a sufficiently urgent response to the pressing need for real progress in these areas which are becoming increasingly vital for the future of the Community.

Some progress

On fisheries, there was some useful progress on marketing, for example. On the internal market, there has been a little progress towards a single market in goods and services, but not-tariff barriers to trade within the Community still exist and the progress made towards liberalization in such fields as air transport and insurance, to which the Presidency attached priority, did not go far enough to enable agreement to be reached.

More progress was made in certain other areas, however, including two issues vital for an industrialized grouping like the Community: advanced technology, particularly research and development, and energy, where there were valuable discussions about how to restructure energy economies away from oil.

There were also significant achievements in areas where the Community citizen can himself benefit directly, particularly on the environmental front, with useful decisions taken on pollution control and public safety, and in the field of social affairs.

Major task

On "enlargement" the work of preparing the way for Spain and Portugal to join the Community has been taken forward in some significant respects and at the European Council meeting in London the ten heads of state and government confirmed their political commitment to complete the accession negotiations. The Belgian and Danish Presidencies have a major task to perform if the desire of Spain and Portugal to accede at the beginning of 1984 is to be made a reality.

On the point of identity, Lord Carrington argues that the Community should exert an influence on world affairs more consonant with its leading position as the world's largest economic grouping, trading entity, and donor of aid to the developing world.

Decisions were taken on ways to improve the Community's programme of aid to less developed countries. There was agreement on important trade

matters, including the multi-fibre arrangement, trade with Japan, and export credits. Additionally the Community made distinctive contributions to a number of multilateral meetings, including the Ottawa Summit and the Cancun meeting in Mexico.

Particularly important for the future, was the London report which marked a significant advance in political cooperation, providing the machinery for the Ten to react quickly to an international crisis and to speak with a strong and single voice in the forum of world affairs. The Ten have cooperated closely on a wide range of international problems, in particular the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Middle East, Afghanistan and towards the end of the year in particular, Poland. The common positions adopted by the Ten on such issues now play an important role in world affairs and enable the views of the ten member states of the Community to have a much greater effect than would otherwise be possible. ○

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

World hunger

The international "aim survival 1982" campaign, which this year aims at saving at least five million people threatened with death by starvation, opened in Brussels on 1 March. Several initiatives mark the beginning of the campaign:

- 13 Nobel prizewinners associated themselves with the appeal from 54 Nobel prizewinners launched last year;

- 1 200 Italian mayors and the world association of municipalities (whose president is Mayor of Verdun) addressed a petition to the European heads of state and government and to the European Parliament for its resolution for exceptional action to combat world hunger to be translated into action;

- a meeting on the campaign's aims and means took place on 3 March between MEPs and national MPs and Nobel prizewinners Lord Noel-Baker, Abdus Salam, Maurice Wilkins;

- the French Dominican Father Cardonnel is starting a fast to support this campaign. Meanwhile, 101 MEPs have tabled a proposal for a resolution demanding of the Commission what the Parliament had already asked it in October 1981: to submit a draft to the Council within thirty days for the survival of 5 million peoples in 1982.

Wide parliamentary support

Among the signatories, in addition to Mr Pannella, chairman of the "development" committee, Mr Poniatowski, co-chairman of the ACP/EEC Joint Committee, Mr Bersani, the Parliament's general rapporteur on world hunger, Mr Ferrero, rapporteur on the same theme for the ACP/EEC Assembly, Mrs Focke and Mr Robert Jackson, general rapporteur for the EEC budget in 1982. ○

The death of Heinrich Hendus

Just a month after Dieter Frisch became director-general for development in the EEC Commission it was learnt that the first person to hold that post, Heinrich Hendus, had died in Bonn. Mr Frisch had been assistant to Mr Hendus and paid the following tribute to his former head.

"The sudden news of the death of our former director-general, Heinrich Hendus, has brought back a memory of someone who for many years directed the work of the Commission's development directorate general.

"All those who knew him and had the privilege of working with him will, I am sure, be saddened by his loss and recall with affection the life of this great man.

"He was a man of great simplicity and great culture. His formal education was in law, history and literature, but his curiosity took him far beyond that. He was fascinated by geology and botany. He was, in short, a whole man of the sort that is rarely found today.

"He came to the Commission in the early days, when everything had to be improvised, and put together a team. He had to overcome the early difficulties of bringing together people of diverse backgrounds. He rejected all compromise with the forces of national interest in the firm belief that there should be a European development policy.

"Once he left Brussels Heinrich Hendus became ambassador to Morocco, before going into retirement. He retained his fresh intellectual approach even then as I myself was able to witness just before the accident which brought his life of accomplishment to an end. He will not be forgotten.

Dieter Frisch

Corrections

On page 8, column one of issue No 71 a line was unfortunately dropped in the interview with US assistant secretary of state for economic and business affairs, Bob Hormats. Line 10 of his reply should have read:

"We support these programmes for humanitarian reasons because Americans care deeply about those suffering from poverty, hunger and malnutrition..."

In issue 71 on page 85 we referred to the "International Agricultural Development Association". This should have read "International Association for Rural Development". ○

PRIZES

Press prize

The European Press Prize for 1981 was awarded to Emanuele Gazzo, the director-general of Agence Europe on 13 February during a ceremony in Antwerp organized by the Movement for a United States of Europe. Mr Gazzo, Alain Poher (president of the French Senate) and Professor Van de Meerssche of Leuven University were also installed "e merito et honoris causa" as members of the Senat d'honneur européen.

IDR

The ambassador of Senegal, Seydina Oumar Sy, the current chairman of the ACP committee of ambassadors was awarded the Institute of Diplomatic Relations gold medal on 17 February, for his efforts to create greater understanding among nations.

Ambassador Sy, in accepting the medal, said he regarded it as an honour to all those in his country who had worked to give Senegal the reputation of open country seeking international cooperation.

Paul-Henri Spaak Prize 1982

The Paul-Henri Spaak Foundation has decided to award the Paul-Henri Spaak Prize to Alfred Grosser, Professor at the Institute of Political Studies Paris, for his work as a whole.

One of the author's latest substantial contributions was entitled "Les Occidentaux" and is an analysis of transatlantic harmonies and antagonisms. ○

Centre for
Industrial Development
(ACP-EEC Lomé Convention)



Centre pour le
Développement Industriel
(Convention ACP-CEE de Lomé)

INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES

N° 25 — March 1982

EEC industrial partners wanted

TANZANIA

Animal feed millmix machinery Ref. 82/lb

A private manufacturer of maize grinding mills and agricultural implements wishes to diversify his production to include millmix machinery for animal feed. Estimated production is 120 units per year with 50 per cent being earmarked for the export market. This production will be incorporated into the present manufacturing operations, utilising existing equipment facilities and factory buildings. The company also has experience in general mechanical engineering and steel fabrication.

Joint venture participation is invited from EEC manufacturers of this type of equipment.

Manufacture of appliances Ref. 82/2b

A state development corporation is interested in promoting the establishment of assembly manufacturing operations in Tanzania for refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners and water coolers. Projected output is 21,000 units annually broken down as follows: refrigerators—10 000 units; freezers—5 000 units, air conditioners—1 000 units and water coolers—5,000 units.

90% of this production is to be sold on the local market.

A pre-investment study indicated total investment required is approximately US\$ 5 million with estimated employment of 170 workers. The state corporation is interested in setting-up this project on a joint venture basis with established EEC manufacturers.

Interested EEC firms are invited to contact the CID.

Bicycles Ref. 82/3b

A Tanzanian state corporation is interested in obtaining technical assistance, training equipment, materials and components for expanding the production capacity of an existing bicycle manufacturing plant. Present production is 30,000 bicycles per year. The proposed expansion is expected to increase output to 100,000 bicycles annually, the estimated size of the domestic market. One third of this production is however expected to be exported.

Manufacturing and market data are available. Interested EEC manufacturers are invited to contact the CID.

ETHIOPIA

Metal furniture Ref. 82/4b

A private Ethiopian manufacturer of metal furniture such as beds, tables and chairs wishes to expand his range of products. The existing production is at present being relocated to a new factory which will include chrome plating facilities. Technical assistance, product designs, supply of equipment and training of workers are requested from EEC furniture manufacturers, particularly for office furniture. A pre-feasibility study is now being prepared.

Interested EEC firms are asked to make contact.

KENYA

Stainless steel products Ref. 82/5b

A private company in Kenya already engaged in sheet metal working and structural steel fabrication is interested in manufacturing specialised products such as domestic boilers and stainless steel processing equipment for the food and chemical industries. Existing production operations are being relocated to a larger industrial site and new equipment is being introduced for handling larger capacity work.

Preliminary market and investment studies are being prepared. Interested EEC firms are invited to make contact.

MALAWI

Lubrication oil blending and recycling Ref. 82/6b

The Malawi Development Corporation is looking for a joint venture partner for a lubrication oil blending and recycling plant. Estimated capacity: 2 000 tpa. The partner should be willing to participate in the financing of a study relating to a blending plant and the updating of an available study on recycling.

SAINT LUCIA

Fruit processing Ref. 82/7a

The Saint Lucia Development Corporation would like to develop the cultivation and processing of passion fruit and sorrel. Envisaged capacity: 70 000 gallons per year. Markets: local and export. A joint venture partner is required.

The Saint Lucia Development Corporation intends to process 7 to 10 000 tons of bananas available on the island into animal feedstuff, flour, fibres. A joint venture partner is required.

LESOTHO

Silver jewelry

Ref. 82/8c

The Lesotho Development Corporation and a private industrialist request technical and commercial assistance for a small existing firm manufacturing silver jewelry. The firm's present turnover is US\$ 60 000.

MALAWI

Iron foundry

Ref. 82/9b

The Malawi Development Corporation and Indebank request managerial assistance as well as a 40% participation in the equity of an iron foundry, the buildings of which are under construction. Envisaged capacity: 1 000 tpa.

BURUNDI

Tannery

Ref. 82/10a

A local hides collection company would like to establish contacts with a joint venture partner who could provide technical and commercial assistance for a tannery with a capacity of about 300 000 m²/year.

LESOTHO

Sheep skins processing

Ref. 82/11b

The Lesotho Development Corporation requests assistance in the design and manufacture of sheepskin products (car seat covers, jackets, etc.) and their export to Europe for an existing firm capable of processing 10 000 skins per year.

TONGA

Leather saddles and harnesses

Ref. 82/12a

A small existing private firm requests assistance for the manufacture and marketing of leather saddles and harnesses. The present capacity is 13 to 60 units per week.

FIJI

Artisanal covers and wall carpets

Ref. 82/13a

A private firm requests marketing assistance for covers and wall carpets with Masi designs. The present capacity is 100 units per month.

Industrial cooperation offers from EEC firms

Air based solar collectors

Ref. 82/14b

A German civil engineer offers joint venture and/or technical cooperation for the manufacture and installation of air based solar collectors and systems for drying of agricultural products and water heating. The offer includes technology transfer, technical and commercial management, and training of local manpower.

Pre-cast concrete products

Ref. 82/15b

A German civil engineer is looking for a potential joint venture partner in ACP countries in the building and construction industry to produce pre-cast cement products such as concrete pipes for sewerage and irrigation, etc.

ACP firms interested in this offer should supply the CID with full information on their current activities and with basic

data on the prospects for manufacture of pre-cast cement products.

METAL PROCESSING INDUSTRIES

Production and assembly of irrigation and pumping equipment

Ref. 82/16b

A Danish company specialising in production of irrigation and pumping equipment is interested in participation with know-how and technology for the establishment of local manufacture of these components.

It is anticipated initially to supply components from Denmark for local assembly, and a local production should gradually be established.

Small and medium scale foundries

Ref. 82/17b

A Danish firm specialised in ferrous and non-ferrous foundries of relatively small scale is interested in participation with know-how, technology and training in the establishment of local production in ACP countries.

The intended production will primarily be based on scrap material thus diminishing requirements for imported raw materials.

Agricultural implements and machinery

Ref. 82/18b

A group of Danish firms with comprehensive experience in the design and manufacture of implements and machinery for soil preparation, crop and food processing, transport, pumping, etc. is interested in participation with ACP companies with know-how, technology, and training for the establishment of local production units.

Interested ACP parties should contact the CID and provide information on:

- The intended product range
- The estimated annual demand
- The present local production/import
- Their commercial and industrial experience and activities

Fabrication and maintenance shops for railway wagons

Ref. 82/19a

A French company specialized in the construction and maintenance of railway wagons as well as studies for and the implementation of building and repair shops for wagons, wishes to participate with designs, know-how and equity capital in the establishment of such workshops in ACP countries.

Interested parties should provide full details on their business activities and experience, and preliminary project information to the CID.

CID activities in the field

— To demonstrate for industrialists and financiers the type of assistance CID can provide —

The following chapter summarises CID activities during the period January and February 1982 in relation to studies, project identification and substantiation in favour of new industrial enterprises, and the reinforcement of existing industries. It only covers major interventions which required

missions by industrialists and consultants to ACP countries. In all cases but a few, both ACP and EEC cooperation partners are available. This report therefore appears merely for the purpose of information on on-going projects: it is meant to give industrialists and industrial promotion officers examples of the work of the CID, and not as an invitation to equipment manufacturers and consultants to offer their services.

New joint ventures

Contracts for the following studies cofinanced by CID were recently concluded and field work has started:

- *Sudan*, shoe and boots manufacture (feasibility study);
- *Zaire*, small boatyard for construction of fishing boats on Lake Tanganyika (feasibility study).

Furthermore, independent experts appointed by CID at request of ACP sponsors have evaluated CID-cofinanced feasibility studies and EEC cooperation offers for three tannery projects, and have submitted positive conclusions and recommendations for implementation:

- *Gambia*, setting-up of small tannery with Belgian partner;
- *Djibouti*, hides collection and tannery, French partner;
- *Niger*, large tannery, probably French partner.

Reinforcement of existing industry

Expert missions were sent to the following countries to assist existing enterprises in solving technical, commercial or managerial problems:

- *Guinea-Bissau*, oxygen and acetylene plant
- *Gambia*, paint factory
- *Kenya*, vegetable canning factory
- *Madagascar*, paperboard factory
- *Nigeria*, meat processing factory
- *Rwanda*, banana processing plant

In-plant training

In-plant training with financial support from the CID is presently under way for the following projects:

- *Nigeria*, glass blowing industry, 1 technician trained in Holland;
- *Tanzania*, leather industry, 3 technicians trained in Europe (Germany, Holland, Italy, UK).

Results of CID assistance

Senegal — Agricultural implements (SISMAR)

SISMAR (Société Industrielle Sahélienne de Mécaniques, de Matériels Agricoles et de Représentations) was recently established in Dakar with a share capital of F CFA 250 million. SISMAR has taken over the factory of the former company SISCOA and has started production in January 1982. About 100 persons will be employed.

The CID supports the production start-up by part financing expatriate staff to train Senegalese workers and to reorganise the production facilities. It is also planned to integrate an existing foundry into SISMAR. The relevant studies were cofinanced by CID. Furthermore, SISMAR is planned to become the technical support base for smaller workshop and metal processing operations in The Gambia and Mauritania

for which studies are under way with assistance from the CID.

Shareholders of SISMAR are:

- Chanic: 33.8%
- Société Belge d'Investissement Internationale (SBI): 17.2%
- Compagnie Sénégalaise d'Entreprise (CSE): 35.0%
- Banque Nationale de Développement du Sénégal (BNDS): 14.0%

Mauritius — aquaculture (Cameron Hatchery Co. Ltd.)

The CID has assisted this company in training Mauritian personnel and in purchasing scientific and training equipment. The aquaculture prototype is now in production with an annual capacity of 5 000 Kgs of freshwater prawns. Investment was about US \$ 70 000.

Results of the prototype production are expected in March 1982. If positive, a fresh water prawn aquaculture industry at commercial scale will be established. EEC firms interested to participate in this development as joint-venture and marketing partner are invited to contact the CID.

Cameroon — integrated wood carbonization (SNCB)

Following the approval of KfW to grant a soft loan for the financing of this project, engineering work has started early 1982 and the plant is planned to become operational in 1983.

Total investment will be approximately US \$ 1.3 million. By way of pyrolysis, the plant will convert annually 10 000 tons of wood waste from a saw mill into heating gas, fuel oil and charcoal worth about US \$ 1.3 million, and thus help to improve the energy supply situation in Cameroun. 33 new work places will be created.

The CID has financed the feasibility study and assisted to raise loan finance. Technical partners are CARBON/HELUCO of Germany.

Implementation of industries on basis of CID's adapted technology profiles:

Congo — Cement tiles

This plant is under construction and will start production in 1982.

Burundi — Cement tiles

The CID has financed the graining of one technician in a similar plant in Rwanda, and is financing the visit of an engineer to Burundi to start up operations in March 1982.

Uganda — Mini brick plant

The Uganda Development Bank (UDB) and a private Ugandan investor have decided to set up a mini brick plant with a capacity of 3 million bricks per year, on the basis of a CID modular profile and a pre-feasibility study undertaken by CID during the temporary attachment to CID in 1981 of a UDB staff member.

Total investment will be about US \$ 220 000 of which CID will cover US \$ 55 000 for services and technical assistance to implement the project. The UDB participation of US \$ 110 000 will be covered by an EDF line of credit.

CID missions in eastern and southern Africa

Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe

During December 1981, Dr I. A. Akinrele, deputy director of the CID and Mr. G. Aylmer, technical operations division visited Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The mission was one of a series to ACP states to prepare a programme of work and activities for the Centre during Lomé II. Its objectives were to improve on performance compared with Lomé I and to establish a more effective and positive role in assisting the industrialization efforts of the countries visited.

Initial meetings were held with the relevant ministries in order to define the continuing programme of work. This was followed by meetings with trade associations, development banks and centres of technology to ensure that the Centre fully appreciated the local situation and the particular problems of developing industries especially those of the smaller businessman.

As a result of these meetings, the CID has been able to build up an action programme establishing:

- a) the industrial project priorities for which CID assistance is required; and
- b) an inventory of existing industries that are in need of rehabilitation, expansion, diversification or restructuring.

In addition, the Centre has built up a number of key contact points in each country that will help with the many interventions requested during the visit.

During the mission, the delegation was impressed by the way in which each country has realistically approached the problems of industrialization although faced with numerous difficulties such as:

- a) shortage of foreign exchange;
- b) limited number of skilled management and manpower;
- c) limited export markets for manufactured products.

In particular, the problems of the emerging local businessman have been recognized. He traditionally has a trading background and now wishes to enter manufacturing.

The governments in the countries visited are making greater efforts to encourage this change by legislation, offering favourable loan terms from the development banks and making available financial and technical advice by setting up small industries advisory services.

Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi

These countries were visited by Mr Wolfgang Ulbrich, deputy manager of the CID's industrial studies division.

In meetings with ministries, industrial development corporations and the private sector, the situation of projects already assisted by the CID was reviewed, and a programme for further promotion measures, studies and implementation assistance was established.

Furthermore, the CID received various new requests both for the promotion of new projects and the up-grading of existing industries.

Several projects in the field of metal processing and agricultural machinery and implements were subsequently discussed at the CID's metal industries sectoral meeting in Brussels, on February 1 and 2, 1982, and preliminary co-operation agreements, to be followed by feasibility studies, were reached between representatives from Swaziland and Malawi and European industrialists.

Rwanda, Burundi

From 30 November to 11 December 1981, Mr. Jean-Marie Delchambre of the CID's industrial studies division visited

Rwanda and Burundi, on a project promotion and identification mission.

This mission made all interested parties more aware of the various types of assistance the CID can provide and the part it can play in the industrial development of these two landlocked and least favoured countries.

It appeared from the systematic analysis of all projects, both from the public and private sector, that industrialisation in these countries requires sustained CID assistance. Financial institutions have also asked the CID to support their action in assisting small and medium-sized enterprises.

In this regard, the CID proposal for an industrial cooperation expert programme (ICEP) was warmly received and considered one of the conditions for the continuity of the industrialization efforts undertaken by these two countries.

It was noted that all ministers and officials met during the mission have a very favourable attitude towards mixed companies.

The CID has indeed been requested to identify EEC industrial partners who might participate in state enterprises.

The numerous private sector industrialists met were most satisfied with the CID's assistance and continue to request its help for a wide range of activities from the identification of adapted industrial equipment to the identification of financial, technical and commercial partners and training assistance.

Meeting with the general secretariat of the CEPGL

Mr. Jean-Marie Delchambre also had a meeting with representatives of the general secretariat of the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes — Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands lacs — in Gisenyi.

A programme for the future collaboration between the two organizations was drawn up.

Adapted technologies for ACP countries

The high level of demand for volumes I and II of the Inventory of Adapted Technology resulted in a number of projects being promoted and subsequently implemented. In addition, a number of requests have been received for other technology profiles. This has stimulated the CID to extend its programme aimed at the identification, distribution and promotion of the relevant technologies.

Consequently, a provisional edition of the third volume of Inventory was presented at the CID's seminars in the Pacific (Fiji, October 1981) and in the Caribbean (Jamaica, November 1981). It contains 13 technology profiles selected according to the original criteria, which can be summarised as follows:

1. The technology should have been implemented in other industrialized or developing countries.
2. A low level of investment should be required (small and medium industrial projects).
3. The technology should supply the basic needs of the population.
4. Maximum use of local raw materials and resources should be made.
5. Import substitution (saving of foreign exchange) should be a feature of the project.
6. Simple production process should be involved.

In the near future, other profiles will be added to the provisional edition in order to publish a final edition containing



The audience at the plenary session of the CID's first metalworking industry sectoral meeting at its Brussels offices 1-5 February 1982

Technology profiles presented in volume III (provisional edition)

| | Capacity | Fixed investment U.S. dol. | Working capital U.S. dol. | Total investment U.S. dol. | Employment |
|--|-------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Rice processing — Boilerless par-boiling system | 600 kg/h | 4 400 | 250 | 4 650 | 3 |
| 2. Reconstituted milk plant | 4 500 t/year | 1 278 000 | 231 000 | 1 509 000 | 27 |
| 3. Pasta production | 150 t/year | 85 000 | 9 000 | 94 000 | 10 |
| 4. Small-scale canning fruit | 180 t/year | 22 300 | 11 700 | 34 000 | 15 |
| 5. Vitreous china sanitary ware | 20 160 units/year | 763 000 | 62 000 | 825 000 | 31 |
| 6. Wood wool/cement slab manufacture | 760 t/year | 280 000 | 36 000 | 316 000 | 28 |
| 7. Manufacture of overalls | 90 000 u/year | 183 000 | 250 000 | 433 000 | 29 |
| 8. Grinding discs and cutting wheels | 402 500 u/year | 503 000 | 76 000 | 579 000 | 12 |
| 9. Lens grinding | 12 000 pairs/year | 8 600 | 3 100 | 11 700 | 3 |
| 10. Pharmaceutical tablets | 2 470 000 u/year | 600 000 | 210 000 | 810 000 | 32 |
| 11. Briquettes from agricultural waste | 1 320 t/year | 198 000 | 6 200 | 204 200 | 12 |
| 12. Microplant for ethyl alcohol production | 50 000 l/year | 44 400 | 5 300 | 49 700 | 13 |
| 13. Tableware production | 1 400 000 u/year | 1 000 000 | 102 000 | 1 102 000 | 44 |

around 20 profiles. In the meantime, the provisional Volume III can be obtained on request, for limited distribution.

It should be brought to the attention of the ACP promoters that provisions have also been made by the CID to assist them in different stages of the promotion and implementation of projects deriving from its activities, such as:

- preparation of feasibility studies;
- contracts and negotiations with the technology suppliers.;
- start-up and finalization of production;
- training of technicians.

The CID welcomes contributions of suitable profiles from industrialists and institutions from the EEC and ACP countries. This will enable us to continue to promote industries which meet the criteria described above.

The CID holds metalworking sectoral meeting 1st-5th February, 1982

On 1st February, Dr Isaac Akinrele, deputy director of the CID opened the first meeting on the metalworking industries sector organized by the CID in the framework of the second Lomé Convention, at its Brussels offices.

Months of planning

The meeting was the culmination of months of CID planning, involving expert missions to East and Southern Africa, to identify potential industrial opportunities in metalworking, and four experts' missions to EEC countries identifying potential partners for these projects.

Plenary session

Dr. Akinrele, welcomed seventeen visitors from Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe whose project opportunities in metalworking had been identified. Similarly the nineteen representatives of EEC metalworking firms who had shown interest in industrial co-operation with ACP countries. Dr. Akinrele highlighted the importance of the metalworking sector as a springboard to ACP development in other industrial sectors. He expressed the CID's hope that the contacts established at the seminar would mature into productive ACP-EEC associations.

Wolfgang Ulbrich, deputy head of the CID's industrial studies division gave seminar participants an indication of the broad range of services the CID were able to make available to ACP and EEC partners in industrial ventures. He emphasized the flexibility of the CID's services and that they were related to the unique nature of any individual partnership.

Jens Mosgard, director of the CID drew the attention of EEC participants to the potential in ACP co-operation both for winning new markets, and as a solution to the current difficulties being experienced by EEC industry. He also informed the audience of the enlightened attitude taken by many ACP countries towards private investment from the EEC. Mr Mosgard emphasized the need for "engineering and development enterprises" in ACP countries as a necessary growth point for technical knowhow and general engineering skills.

Following these contributions from the CID, Dr Akinrele invited questions and comment from the audience and a lively discussion continued for more than an hour.

Valuable contacts

After this plenary session, the participants adjourned and, with members of the CID staff, were able to meet and discuss their individual plans with prospective ACP or EEC counterparts. These discussions were the core of the seminar and early indications are that a number of constructive and productive relationships were created. Participants from all ACP countries attending the seminar were able to establish initial working relationships in projects ranging from an iron foundry to tractor assembly, and from refrigerator manufacture to the manufacture of storage tanks. The CID expressed to all participants its determination to do its part in helping these early relationships grow to fruition.

Following the conclusion of individual discussions, ACP participants were taken on visits to factories in France, Belgium and the Netherlands to explore further co-operation with the companies owning these factories and to observe European metalworking methods.

On Friday 5th February participants re-convened at the CID's offices in Brussels to review the weeks activities. Initial reactions were that valuable contacts were established, potential joint ventures are likely for a number of the projects, and considerable technical know-how will be transferred. The seminar also gave the ACP participant an awareness of projects and the problems of neighbouring countries.

Future meetings

The CID has been encouraged by the success of this meeting and is confident that planned promotional meetings in France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany during the coming months will also benefit from the extensive identification work done in East and Southern Africa, the EEC and other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

The value of the concept of sectoral meetings in the metalworking industry has been proven and a further meeting is planned for UDEAC and CEPGL member countries, again in the metalworking industry sector. The building materials sector may well be covered at the same time.

Towards the end of 1982 agro-industry and food processing sectors will be the subject of a meeting for ECO-WAS countries.

New offices for the CID

The director, Jens Mosgard and the deputy director, Dr Isaac Akinrele and the staff of the Centre for Industrial Development were honoured by the presence of many distinguished guests at a reception to inaugurate the opening of the CID's new offices in the Rue de l'Industrie in Brussels on 28 January.

Guests were given conducted tours of the offices by members of the staff and informed of the many services the CID provides to firms and individuals from the ACP and EEC states to stimulate industrial cooperation between them.

A QUICK RESPONSE

If you are interested in any of the items mentioned under "Industrial Opportunities", send us a letter or a telex quoting the reference and we will send you further information when it is available.

Please state your name and full address (on telexes), and inform us of your activities and your specific interest in the respective subject(s).

Address all correspondence to:

**Centre for Industrial Development
"Industrial Opportunities"**

28, rue de l'industrie — 1040 BRUSSELS — BELGIUM

Telex No. CDI 61427

Telephone (02) 513 41 00

TOGO

A history of the cotton trade

Although Togo's cotton output dropped in 1975-76, largely because of the weather, it went back to past the 20 000 t mark in 1979-80 and prospects for the coming years are good. But extending cotton growing and popularizing the use of draft animals can often be difficult, even today, and the problems are not so very different from those encountered at the turn of the century.

The effects of the American Civil War

Cotton has been grown in Togo, as it has in other countries of western and central Africa, for many years, since the 17th century at least. The original aim was to supply the weavers of traditional fabrics and it was not until 1862-64, during the American Civil War, that Togo exported its first cotton. The American cotton harvest dropped from 2 000 million lb in 1862 to 143 million lb in 1865 and it took until 1972 to get back to the 1862 level (1). The situation for the European textile trade, which very much depended on American cotton, was catastrophic. The American Civil War brought about a considerable drop in the output of the European textile industry and it had social repercussions too, as 250 000 workers were laid off and 73 factories closed down. This first cotton famine, as it was called, led to a considerable effort being made to obtain the product in other countries. Big companies were set up, in England in particular, to encourage people in other parts of the world to grow the crop and eastern and western India, Asia minor, black Africa, Egypt and the other countries of the Mediterranean, South America and Japan produced as much as 11 times their previous output. But of course prices went up too— from 14 to 40 cents.

In Togo, a number of Africans planted large cotton fields and sent

(1) This is from an article by A. Kratz, the Commission delegate in Togo. Mr Kratz had the backing of the Togolese authorities and was thus able to have access to the national archives in Lomé, where the documents of the period are in German, his mother tongue.

their production by sailing ship to Liverpool, but a few years after the American Civil War the situation changed and exports were no longer a paying proposition. Cotton was once more grown for local demand alone, although it remained a sound basis for the subsequent development of a large-scale export industry. And it had been shown that agricultural production could be rapidly generated simply by the price to the producer.

The so-called cotton famine created by the Civil War was maintained, at a lower level, by the increasing gap between world production and consumption. Between 1869 and the turn of the century, American home consumption rose by 60 %, while there was a 12 % drop in output. Faced with this, the colonial powers of the time, Britain, France and Germany, did their best to promote cotton growing in their colonies, particularly those in Africa.

The decision to develop the cotton trade is taken in May 1900

In May 1900, the Colonial Economic Committee in Berlin (an association of representatives of trade and industry particularly interested in developing overseas territories) decided that cotton should be grown on a large scale in Togo, with the help of black American experts. The decision had the firm backing of the German government and the Tuskegee Normal and Industrial Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama, organized the appointment of staff as well as the purchase of American seed and of agricultural equipment (particularly for draft tillage), gins and cotton presses. The American experts, led by James N. Calloway and accompanied by two cotton planters (John Robinson and Alben Burks) and a mechanic (Shephard Harrie), left New York on 3 November 1900, travelling via Hamburg, to reach Lomé on 30 December. Calloway, just like the experts of today, had his reports to write.

After this first experiment, he suggested that it would be better to use horse-drawn equipment, but said that draft tillage could only be introduced

on a wide scale if efficient means of combatting sleeping sickness were available.

Although draft tillage failed in 1901, a continuing effort was made to get animals used. One of the American experts said in his report that carts went back empty at the beginning, but now they had things in them for the return journey, so that transport costs had been cut. Some of Togo's roads, he said, were very good, and in the two years he had been there the road network, particularly the bridges, had been considerably improved.

According to the Calloway report, hand gins were sent to Aného, Kpémé, Kété-Krachi, Kpanedo and Yende and small hand presses were also supplied. This equipment, which was simple and right for local conditions, yielded good results.

The varieties of cotton introduced in Togo tended to suffer from the high humidity during the rainy season, so a particular effort was put into cross-breeding to produce new strains.

On 31 March 1903, the governor-general of Togo, Mr Horn, called a conference on cotton when the following principles were laid down:

- The introduction of cotton-growing among the native farmers was both possible and extremely important for Togo. The possibility of European plantations successfully growing cotton later on was not ruled out.
- Strong support from the colonial administration was vital for a number of years to ensure that cotton-growing was right for the peasant masses.
- Areas in the interior could grow cotton, provided European products, and particularly salt, were used to fill the cotton carts on their return journeys.
- The Lomé-Misahöhe railway had to be built rapidly if the cotton industry and the colony in general was to be developed.
- It was vital to construct cart tracks and, in particular, bridges, starting in the south and the centre of the country.
- Dr Schilling's anti-sleeping sickness campaign was important for the whole colony and for cotton-growing in particular.
- It was extremely important for the cotton industry for genetic improvements to be made to the draft animals.
- Work at the experimental and training centre in Tové had to be continued and extended.

— No more American farmers should settle until the final results of the ongoing experiments were available (2).

— The ginning stations had to be extended.

— The 25 pfennig per three lb cotton paid to the peasants had to be maintained irrespective of the price on the international market. Furthermore, the peasant farmers had to receive the requisite amount of seed when selling cotton.

This conference confirmed the policy of making Togo a cotton producer and all the decisions on infrastructure (railways, roads, etc.) taken afterwards took it into account.

The other European powers followed Togo's lead and began to introduce large-scale cotton-growing in their colonies. The British Cotton Growing Association was set up in England in May 1902 with a view to reducing dependence on America and it test grew cotton as a cash crop in the Yoruba and Benue areas of Nigeria. The British policy of the time was pro-native planters and it was up to the Europeans to buy, gin and press the cotton. The idea of contracting with black American planters to get them to set up in Africa came up but had to be dropped because of transport problems. On 14 January 1903, France's Association Cotonière Coloniale was set up with the aim of getting local people to grow cotton following good results with groundnuts (peasant production up to the 125 000 t p.a. mark) in Senegal.

All the European organizations that were set up to introduce cotton as a cash crop in the countries of Africa were private bodies. Almost all the considerable amount of money required was collected by the textile industries in the various countries concerned.


After 1902, when Togo exported its first cotton, both production and exports developed well.

Exports kept pace with production, as the table shows: (exports in kg)

| 1902 | 1903 | 1904 | 1905 |
|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| 14 453 | 32 108 | 108 169 | 127 160 |
| 1906 | 1907 | 1908 | 1909 |
| 161 443 | 277 903 | 417 571 | 510 752 |
| 1910 | 1911 | 1912 | 1913 |
| 470 470 | 517 473 | 548 716 | 503 338 |

Production fell off in 1910 and 1913. In 1910, this was because rainfall was poor and, as there were large numbers

(2) The American expert mission proper ended in 1904. After this, the colonial authorities themselves took over the job of spreading cotton growing among the Togolese. The American experts dealt with test plantations, ginning and training (particularly at the Notsé school of agriculture).



Cotton bale press being used in Tové in 1903

of people working on the Lomé-Atakpamé railway, and they needed feeding, it was decided to push up food production for them, to the detriment of cotton. The drop in 1913 was due to the great drought of 1912. There were also decreases in the Kpalimé (Misahöhe) area, the great forest zone of Togo, where peasant farmers turned to the more profitable cocoa.

There were increasing problems with getting the local people to use draft


animals and the authorities were forced to cut back a lot in the centre and the south because of sleeping sickness. Meanwhile, in 1908, 10 ginning mills with hydraulic presses were opened.

One of the important things for the expansion of the cotton industry was the availability of cheap transport and so the Cotton Consumers Association, backed up by the Colonial Economic Committee, asked the German parliament for 8 million marks (to be financed by a public loan, the interest to be covered by Togo's customs receipts) to build a railway over the 125 km between Lomé and Kpalimé. This was opened in January 1907. Even more important for the cotton industry was the opening of the Lomé-Atakpamé (162 km) railway, called the cotton line, in April 1911. The Lomé-Kpalimé link was called the cocoa line and the country's very first railway, the 44 km between Lomé and Aného, opened in July 1905, became the coconut line. These railways were soon completed by a good network and a number of feeder roads.

After the First World War, cotton growing continued to develop well:

| Year | 1920 | 1925 | 1930 | 1935 | 1936 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Cotton(t) | 880 | 1873 | 4016 | 3276 | 4331 |

The rapid development after 1925 was due to expansion in the Sokodé region. But the first attempts at getting peasant farmers in southern and central Togo to use draft animals failed and the Africans went back to their manual methods. Togo is introducing draft animals in these regions again today, but it is well aware that a considerable effort is called for to make the campaign a success. o A.K.



Cotton field in Togo



European Parliament

Dutch socialist Pieter Dankert elected President

Mr Dankert calls for
"more efficiency and less
bureaucracy" in facing
today's social realities

The 434 Euro-MPs elected their new president on Tuesday 19 January: on the fourth ballot, Dutch socialist Pieter Dankert beat his main opponent, Egon Klepsch, a West German Christian democrat. So Dankert, with 191 votes to 175, now takes over from Simone Veil, who has been president of the European Parliament since the first direct elections in June 1979. He will hold the post until the next direct elections in 1984.

The European Parliament also elected its 12 vice-presidents. They are Mr Pflimlin, Lady Elles, Messrs Estgen, Vandewiele, B. Friedrich, Gonella, Klepsch, Jacquet, Lalor, Møller and K. Nikolau, and Mrs De March.

A tenacious and experienced partisan of Europe

Pieter Dankert was born in Friesland in northern Netherlands. His wife Paulette is from the French Pyrenees. They and their three children live in Edam, the northern Dutch town famous for its cheese.

Dankert, a history teacher, started being active in politics in 1958, in the Dutch socialist party (PvdA). In 1965-1971, he was the party's secretary for international affairs and, because of this, he was also on the Socialist International bureau and in the liaison office of the socialist parties of the EEC.

He was a member of the second chamber of the Dutch parliament from 1968 to 1981 and chaired its foreign affairs committee in 1973-1980. At

one stage, he was chairman of the National Defence Committee and his interest in international relations led him to be particularly active in East-West and US-Europe relations and in nuclear strategy. He is executive chairman of the Dutch Institute for Peace Issues (NIVV) and a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies. He has also been on the executive of the Atlantic Committee, on the central committee of the European Movement and in the Assembly of the Council of Europe.

In 1977, he extended his parliamentary and political experience by becoming a Euro-MP and was elected a vice-president after the first direct elections by universal suffrage in 1979.

Since then Mr Dankert has built up his reputation as a defender of the Parliament's budget powers, with the particular aim of getting the institution more influence and more credibility with the European voter. He is aware of the constraints imposed on the European Parliament by the Treaty of Rome, but he has been tireless in drawing attention to the fact that the Parliament, alongside the other Community institutions (particularly the Council of Ministers and the Commission) is the natural spokesman of the people of Europe.

From formal to political legitimacy

In what was generally seen as a tough inaugural speech, Mr Dankert thanked Simone Veil, his predecessor, for having given the Parliament "an individual identity in the Community and in the outside world" and then went straight to the heart of his subject mat-

ter. The European Parliament, he said, could not "rest on its laurels". Its present inadequate authority and power should not prevent it from getting political legitimacy in the 1984 elections, something more than the purely formal legitimacy it had today. And to do this in a realistic manner, Mr Dankert went on, "our foremost priority must be to strengthen our links with the electorate" by concentrating more on "the areas of concern to our electors".

The Polish crisis, hunger in the world, the arms race, violations of human rights, not only in Turkey, and Europe's place in the modern world were so many more reasons for the European Parliament to take the initiative. "The paralysis that has characterized the Community in recent years means that it is even more necessary for this parliament to point the way"—both inside the Community and out.

Unemployment in the EEC has gone past the "psychological threshold" of 10 million and the Community is facing inflation and the problems of industrial renovation and energy. Mr Dankert thinks it is up to the European Parliament to give national policies a European dimension. This means recasting the common policies via budget reforms at Community level.

Political priorities and inter-institutional relations

"The mandate of 30 May (the re-launching of Europe), the accession of Spain and Portugal and relations with the Third World should, in my view, be the main political priorities of this par-

liament in the next two and half years", Mr Dankert said.

This means finding new instruments, in addition to the budget, "to carry out our desires and the hopes of the Europeans". Which in turn means there is a problem of the Parliament's position vis-à-vis its main institutional contacts, the Council and the Commission. Although the Commission calls itself a natural ally of the Parliament, it does not always behave as such, Mr Dankert said, and he felt the Commission should preserve its independence vis-à-vis the Council just as it did vis-à-vis the Parliament. As far as the Council was concerned, Mr Dankert wanted to see a return to the spirit and the letter of the EEC treaties. The vast numbers of informal proposals which got nowhere and the continuing, rigid use of the unanimous vote when a majority one would so often be more appropriate impede real progress in Europe and should no longer be the rule, he felt.

The politico-economic crisis, which will probably be with us until the MEPs come to the end of their term of office in 1984, offers new opportunities and forces the Parliament to look for ways of running new schemes that are in direct relation to the social realities of today, Mr Dankert said.

This will have a direct effect on the way the Parliament operates, so the new president will be aiming for "more efficiency and less bureaucracy" in this "most complex parliament of Europe". Mr Dankert will be fighting to speed up the decision on the seat of the Parliament, which is a delicate matter: the committees meet in Brussels, the secretariat is in Luxembourg and

most of the sessions are held in Strasbourg.

Mr Dankert, who told the MEPs "I want to be the president of all of you", ended his speech by emphasizing that the 1984 elections would only be a success if the voters were convinced that the Community needed its parliament, elected by universal suffrage; so it was the duty of the Euro-MPs to "persuade the voters" of how important it is.

Co-chairman of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly

Mr Dankert's election to the presidency also made him the new European co-chairman of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly. Half the members of this body are Euro-MPs and half are representatives of the ACP countries (two from each). North-South relations are part of Mr Dankert's priority objectives, as he stressed in his inaugural speech.

"In the debate on world hunger, this parliament has demonstrated its ability to draw up a concrete programme of action on cooperation with the Third World, which is looking more and more towards the Community to break down the North/South division and ideological alliances based on East/West relations".

Piet Dankert's interest in international affairs and his lifetime's experience in the field mean that the ACP countries will find him a willing listener to their problems, someone who is aware of their specific characteristics. They will certainly appreciate the strength of his belief in international cooperation.

Renewal of the Committee on Development and Cooperation

The Committee on Development and Cooperation now has the following 34 members:

Socialists (9)

Robert Cohen (NL)
Derek Enright (UK)
Ludwig Fellermaier (D)
Katharina Focke (D)
Gérard Fuchs (F)
Ernest Glinne (B)
Heinz Kühn (D) — 3rd vice-chairman
Pietro Lezzi (I)
Charles-Emi Loo (F)

European People's Party (9)

Giovanni Bersani (I) — 1st vice-chairman
Jean Lecanuet (F)
Rudolf Lüster (D)
Victor Michel (B)
Angelo Narducci (I)
Renate-Charlotte Rabbethge (D)
Willem Vergeer (NL)
Kurt Wawrzik (D)
Rudolf Wederkind (D)

European Democrats (5)

John de Courcy Ling (UK)
Paul Howell (UK)
Christopher Jackson (UK)
Andrew Pearce (UK)
Alexander Sherlock (UK)

Communists (4)

Jacques Denis (F) — 2nd vice-chairman
Tullia Caretoni Romagnoli (I)
Bruno Ferrero (I)
Paul Vergès (F)

Liberals (3)

Ulrich Irmer (D)
Michel Poniatowski (F) — chairman
Victor Sablé (F)

European Progressive

Democrats (2)

Xavier Deniau (F)
Gérard Israel (F)

Independents (2)

Luciana Castellina (I)
Marco Pannella (I)



In the fourth round of voting, Dutch Socialist Pieter Dankert became the successor to Simone Veil as president (speaker) of the European Parliament to the applause of his colleagues

Eurobarometer

Public opinion in the European Community

This survey, conducted in the field in October and November, makes a new and important contribution to what the peoples of Europe know about each other and especially about their attitudes to the Community. For the first time, some of the questions asked in the member states (including Greece since October 1980) were also asked in Spain and Portugal. This does not mean that these two countries now take part in the Eurobarometer survey but it is a step in that direction.

This report on European public opinion contains four chapters:

1 The mood of Europeans. — Compared with previous surveys, this chapter has been extended to include the results of an investigation of Europeans' hopes and fears for the year that is about to begin (1).

2 Agreement or disagreement on the main socio-political problems. — This chapter is new. It continues a line of research begun in 1979 in connection with the first direct elections to the European Parliament.

3 Attitudes to Europe and the Community. — The constant monitoring of these opinions is the main function of Eurobarometers. This time, in addition to the usual questions, which derive a great deal of their value from the fact that they have been asked every six months since 1973 or even earlier, two new ones were introduced: one on the development of relations between the countries of Western Europe over the last 25 years and one on the prospects for the development of the Community over the next ten years.

4 Reactions in Spain and Portugal to the prospect of joining the Community.

The mood of Europeans

What do Europeans expect from next year? For most of those who commit themselves, the reply is quite clear: 1982 will be worse than 1981.

(1) Annual survey carried out by Gallup International Research Institutes which have kindly made available to us the results for the Community countries.

Unemployment will increase, as will strikes and industrial disputes; there will be economic difficulties at home and trouble and international discord throughout the world.

Nevertheless, this pessimism—or rather this concern caused by events as reported in the press—is no greater this year than last. In fact overall there would appear to be slightly less worry about unemployment compared with a year earlier.

As would be expected, views about what the coming year has in store differ appreciably from country to country, and a comparison with the end-1980 results reveals no consistent pattern of change.

As last year, the countries which are most uneasy are Belgium and the Netherlands, while Greece is by far the least pessimistic, followed by France. These two countries have, of course, recently experienced major political

The Commission of the European Communities has been running the Eurobarometer public opinion polls in the spring and autumn of each year since late 1973. Greece was included in the poll for the first time in autumn 1980.

An identical questionnaire for each country is given to representative cross-sections of the public aged 15 and above. These cross-sections are worked out separately each time to give a balanced sample of public opinion. For the latest poll, 9 912 people were professionally interviewed at home between 8 October and 20 November 1981.

The polls were supervised by professional institutes, conforming to the requirements of the European Society for Opinion and Market Research (ESOMAR), in each of the ten EEC countries. These national institutes, chosen by tender, form the "European Omnibus Survey" association.

As usual with this kind of research, the Commission has no political responsibility for the way the questions are formed, the conclusions or the comments presented by the Eurobarometer polls.

changes. The fact that the survey was conducted in Greece at the same time as the election campaign probably goes a long way to explaining the extremely optimistic expectations expressed.

During recent years a number of international events have revived fears of a third world war. This fear remained slight between 1971 and 1977 but increased sharply from autumn 1977 to spring 1980. Concern in autumn 1981 lay between the levels observed in the two previous surveys.

Respondents' satisfaction with the way democracy works in their own country is an interesting indicator. As previous surveys have shown, this feeling varies in intensity from one country to another: Denmark and the Netherlands are countries with a high degree of satisfaction, while Italians are the most dissatisfied.

A comparison of results obtained in April and October 1981 shows a significant increase in the average level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in France. According to their political persuasion, a large proportion of those who were "dissatisfied" before now say (or, to be precise, said in October) that they are "satisfied" while conversely some (although a smaller proportion) of those who were "satisfied" before are now "dissatisfied". This is an empirical observation of the way the level of political satisfaction alternates.

Agreement or disagreement on some important problems

At the time of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, research was carried out into what were perceived as the most important socio-political problems (other than the building of Europe) in the member states.

The line of research is now continued with an eye to preparations for the elections in 1984.

To summarize, there appear to be two distinct divisions between the protagonists in the debates; the traditional division on the problems of the industrial society of yesterday and today (more equal distribution of income, more state intervention in the economy, etc.) and another, of more recent origin, on the new problems, in particular the development of nuclear energy an issue which divides the traditional political groupings themselves.

The analysis of the correlation between a favourable attitude towards the Community and views on each of the main socio-political problems pro-

duces some particularly interesting findings. If the results for all the member states are taken together, it is seen that those who are most favourably disposed to the Community are also likely to support increased environmental protection, more economic aid to the Third World and the development of nuclear energy and are more likely to oppose further nationalization of private industry (1).

Attitudes towards Europe and the Community

As in previous surveys, the purpose of this part of Eurobarometer is both to compare and investigate.

Comparison reveals that the decline in support for European unification and the Community which was evident in April has not continued. In most countries, especially in Germany, the ground lost has been regained. We shall have to wait for the next Eurobarometer in spring 1982 to see whether the "reservoir of goodwill" available to decision-makers on European matters has been breached or not (2).

On average, 74% of those interviewed now say that they favour the movement towards European unification while only 13% oppose it. On the second question, 53% of respondents consider their own country's membership of the Community "a good thing" and 14% "a bad thing".

While in all countries a majority of those interviewed supported the principle of European unification, those giving a definite answer in Denmark were almost equally divided between supporters and opponents of membership (31% against 29%) while opponents in the United Kingdom had a clear lead (31% against 27%). But in the United Kingdom too, there seem to be signs of a shift away from opposition and towards uncertainty (or indifference).

By means of a very detailed analysis of replies to a question proposing a number of possible advantages of Community membership it has been possible to identify the main reasons underlying a positive attitude towards the Community. In most countries, the leading opinion is that by acting together the Community members should be better able to cope with the world economic crisis.

In Germany the main reason seems

(1) Researchers will be given unrestricted access to all data; it will then be for them to analyse in greater depth the findings for their own countries.

(2) A survey shows the situation at a given moment, two successive surveys allow a line to be drawn but only with the third survey can a curve be drawn and hence a tendency (or a change of tendency) be noted.

to be that, thanks to the common market, consumers are offered a wider selection of products in shops.

In France and Luxembourg the Community is primarily perceived as an organization which permits the country to play a more important part in the world.

Greeks expect the main advantages of accession to be in the economic field, the development of agriculture, and, in the political field, improvements in the way democracy works.

Naturally, the fact that one reason is singled out as the most widely held view in a particular country does not mean that the others are not represented as well. In any case, these analyses will have to be repeated to see if they are confirmed.

Spain and Portugal

The public supports membership in both countries, but the degree of involvement is very different.

Public opinion in Spain has a very similar profile to that in the member states. Although a large majority of Spaniards still feel only slightly concerned, the percentage of those who feel very concerned by Community matters is higher than in most of the member states (30% of those interviewed as against only 9% in Belgium).

Furthermore, 36% of Spaniards said they "strongly support" European unification as compared with an average of 31% in the member states.

Finally, 52% of Spaniards think that membership will be "a good thing"—this is in line with the average in the Community at present.

In Portugal, while those in favour of membership far outnumber those against, there is a very large proportion of "don't knows". There are some possible explanations for this: a lower average level of education than elsewhere and less exposure to the information media, but the fact remains that the majority of Portuguese do not regard Community membership as a burning issue.

Further analysis shows that those Spaniards who are well informed and in favour of accession (characteristics which often go together) see the Community as a means of safeguarding democracy, stimulating economic development and enabling their country to play a bigger role in world affairs. In Portugal, economic considerations are paramount but the large proportion of "don't knows" means that these results must be interpreted with caution: the trend is in favour of the Community but the pattern is not yet clear. ○

Jean-Paul PIGASSE — **Les Sept Portes du Futur (Seven doors to the future)** — Editions Albin Michel, 22 rue Huyghens, 75041, France) — 29 pages — 1981

Scientific discoveries abound and around us we see technical breakthroughs shaping the world of tomorrow. But we are hesitant. We wonder what the future holds and, ultimately we expect science to give us something it is powerless to yield—a meaning to life. This is the view of Jean-Paul Pigasse.

Yet mankind has never had so many keys to the doors to the future, he says.

So, he believes, we must see just how we can guide the most fundamental technological revolution we have ever known, not just to obtain an exhaustive list of all foreseeable scientific and technical achievements (a whole library would not be enough for this) but to try to get a clear picture of the way things are developing.

○○○

Claude GAILLARD — **Les Communautés Européennes, les organisations africaines et l'émergence d'un nouvel ordre international (The European Communities, the African organizations and the emergence of new international order)** — Preface by M. Guernier, founder member of the Club of Rome — Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion (SNED), 3 boulevard Zirout Youcef, Algiers & Editions Sibad, 1 & 3, rue Feutrier, 75018, Paris — 424 pages — 1981

In the year 2000, the experts say growth should be 2% p.a. in the Third World and 4-5% in the industrialized countries. This should give a *per capita* GNP of around \$600 in the Third World and \$8 000 in the industrialized world. So the 1-10 gap of the seventies will inevitably widen to 13.

Of course—and there is always discussion about this—the constant increase in the opulence of some and the constant increase in the poverty of others is by no means a source of peace and equilibrium in the world.

This means that the international system itself is wrong. It is dialectically unsound because of the contradiction in its geographical hyperstructure and the expression of its economic development course.

This in fact is what the North-South dialogue (feared by the partisans of the

Books about Europe

myth of non-stop growth, that economic dream and a pure product of liberalism according to the author) is all about and it is a dynamic aspect of the thinking of the seeker who is anxious to achieve concertation—which is not just a topic of conversation for blasé diplomats—throughout the UN system.

Claude Gaillard, an internationally-known economist and political commentator, who is also a specialist in African affairs and a teacher at the University of Algiers, tries, in this book to set concertation between the European Communities and the African organizations against the background of an economic situation likely to give rise to a new international order.

This view of Euro-Africa is tied up with everything that is at stake in the North-South dialogue because Europe cannot survive without Africa's raw materials. This is how the author sees the problem.

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The European Community's Transport Policy — Office for Official Publications of the European Communities — BF 40 — 37 pages — 1981

Transport contributes 6% of the gross Community product and thereby holds a larger share than agriculture, which accounts for 5%. Some 6 million people are employed in the transport sector, a million of them in the railways of the member states. The volume of goods transported throughout the length and breadth of the European Community was 6 500 million tonnes in 1974; the figure is expected to exceed 9 000 million tonnes in 1985.

These facts and figures illustrate the importance of transport and the need to integrate it into the European Community. It is no accident that the EEC Treaty specifically states that a common transport policy must be created. Does such a policy exist?

This brochure explains the workings of the transport policy in the European Community in terms intelligible to the layman. Some progress has been made but a great deal yet remains to be done. The brochure also gives the reader some idea of the many problems — old and new — which beset the transport sector and must be solved either at member state or at Community level.

Current problems include: overloading of road infrastructure, structural problems in inland waterways, deficits of the railway companies, problems

raised by the explosive increases in energy prices, competition in shipping by some of the state-trading nations, safety of shipping problems at the frontier crossings, prices charged by the airlines, etc.

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The European Community's Budget — Office for Official Publications of the European Communities — BF 40 — 54 pages — 1981

The European Community's budget now represents a tidy sum — close on ECU 20 000 million in 1981. But this is less than 1% of the gross domestic product of the ten member states, whereas national budgets account for between 32 and 56% of GDP depending on the country.

There is a strong temptation, particularly when times are hard, to make the Community budget the scapegoat for a number of ills afflicting public finances. This booklet explains the revenue and expenditure systems of the European Community.

The bulk of the Community's revenue is made up of customs duties and agricultural levies charged on imports of products from non-member countries, and a proportion of member states' VAT receipts — up to the equivalent of a 1% rate.

The European Parliament now plays a greatly increased role in preparing and monitoring the budget. The Court of Auditors keeps a very close watch on the implementation of the budget.

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The European Community's Legal System — Office for Official Publications of the European Communities — BF 40 — 43 pages — 1981

Written and unwritten sources of law, supplementary sources of law, decisions taken by member states' representatives meeting within the Council: the sum of these sources is the legal system of the European Community. More than thirty years after the signature of the Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community and twenty-five years after the signature of the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, Community law has become a reality for every citizen.

This booklet describes the legal nature of the European Community. It is intended primarily for the layman and tries to make Community law, which to some extent governs our daily lives,

intelligible to anyone who wishes to acquaint himself with the subject.

It is made clear to the reader that the European Community is a Community based on law, with all that this implies in terms of safeguards both for states and ordinary citizens.

Community law is an independent legal system. Nevertheless, there is a constant interplay between Community law and national law, as a result of which conflicts can and do arise. That these can be solved is due entirely to the precedence of Community law over national law. This brochure also explains the fundamental rights and freedoms enjoyed by European citizens.


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David CALLEO — The German Problem Reconsidered — Cambridge University Press, Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP — 239 pages — 1980

In this provocative book, David Calleo surveys German industry not to present new material, but to look afresh at the old. He argues that recent explanations of Germany's external conflicts have focussed on flaws in the country's traditional political institutions and culture. These German-centred explanations are convenient, Calleo notes, for they tend to exonerate others from their responsibilities in bringing about two world wars, as well as to legitimize subtly the outcome of these wars, namely the American and Russian hegemonies in Europe. As a result of this approach, the big questions in German history are still answered with the aging clichés of a generation ago, despite the proliferation of German historical studies.

These broad speculative essays, through which David Calleo hopes to encourage a more balanced understanding of Germany's position in modern history, are less obviously tailored to fit the preconceptions of Germany's victors and also more relevant to the future. He maintains that Germany's history of aggression, as well as the Nazi horrors, should be regarded not only in the light of the domestic German character but also within the context of the evolution of the Western national states and the geopolitical issues that that evolution inevitably poses. In this perspective the book discusses Imperial Germany's development and policies, Hitler's geopolitical ideas and policies, Germany after World War II, and the Federal Republic's probable options if present international trends continue.

The least developed countries in the 1980s



Clearly there are different stages of underdevelopment, even if the criteria for dividing them cannot always be agreed and even if the differences seldom appear in the studies and statistics on the developing countries. Yet this idea, now a common one, took some time to gain currency. And, curiously enough, even the LLDCs themselves, for reasons of solidarity, were against the idea of sub-categories within the group of underdeveloped countries as a whole. In this dossier on the LLDCs, Marie-Claude Smouts charts the painful process which, after several UNCTAD meetings, finally culminated in a UN conference in Paris.

Representatives of UN member countries and a number of other international organizations spent half last September discussing all aspects of LLDC problems and ended by adopting an action plan for the present decade to help the countries in the group. This is the Substantial New Programme of Action.

The Paris conference was a turning point, certainly. But although the Community has recognized the specific nature of the handicaps the LLDCs have to contend with, it would be a mistake to think that it is just a question of time and that all we have to do is sit back and wait for the projected measures to come into effect. There is more to it than that. Although the results of the UN conference on the LLDCs are good in some respects (internal reorganization, follow-up, etc.), they are inadequate when it comes to the amount of aid needed for the new action programme. This, at all

events, is the opinion of the LLDCs and of UNCTAD deputy secretary-general Jan Pronk, a leading member of the conference and of the meetings that led up to it.

In an interview with the *Courier*, Jan Pronk explains why he thinks the amount of money promised to the LLDCs is small and why the rich countries seem likely to react sharply. The distress of the group of countries we prudishly call the LLDCs is so great and their economies so crisis-ridden that their very survival is at stake. So how could the international community stand by and watch them founder, particularly since these countries have agricultural potential and mineral and energy resources that interest the developed world and could be capitalized on quickly?

But we have to move fast if we want to disprove what President Mitterrand of France said in his opening speech to the conference: "The anti-poverty war is getting stuck in the trenches. On one side there are the rich, managing their crisis with the faint-heartedness of an eternal convalescent struggling from setback to slight improvement and back to ill health again. On the other side there are the poor, with their daily ration of distress, grubbing for enough to sustain them until the next day".

This dossier on the LLDCs, 22 of which are in the ACP group, should provide greater insight into the situation of these countries and show what has been done and what is being done to assist them.

The story of a controversial concept

by M. C. SMOUTS (*)

The Paris conference set the political seal on the notion of a "least developed country" and put an end, for the time being at least, to the long-standing debate about creating a special sub-category of underdevelopment which began with UNCTAD I.

An ambiguous problem

It was the representatives of group B countries (OECD members at UNCTAD) which first brought up the problem of LLDCs in 1964 during the first international trade reform conference. France and Belgium in particular pointed out that the countries of the Third World would not all get the same benefits from a standard system of trade preferences, as the more developed among them could account for almost all the preferential quotas allocated by the industrialized countries. What was needed was a graduated and selective system of preferences, granted by country and by product, which would take account of the rights of the least developed countries.

Although the idea was technically sound, it inevitably looked like political manoeuvring to divide the developing countries. Not only did the major Third World nations (Brazil, Argentina, India, Egypt) refuse to entertain any sub-categories in underdevelopment, but the majority of the delegations present, including those from the African states actually concerned, came out against any discrimination between Third World nations by the industrialized nations. The developing countries wound up UNCTAD I with a joint statement, three of the 10 paragraphs of which affirmed their solidarity, their cohesion and their unity.

However, the special problems of countries still in the early stages of development were recognized and the last-minute adoption of a 15th, vaguely worded, general principle later enabled the UNCTAD secretariat to say that special attention had been given to the LLDCs ever since the Conference was set up. What was very clear at the beginning was that the problem was an ambiguous one — and it still is. Group B countries felt that recognition of the particular characteristics of LLDCs meant recognizing that the more advanced of the developing countries had duties towards them, especially when it came to moderating their demands to help the less developed countries. For the Group of 77, on the other hand, it meant the industrialized countries making a bigger effort to see that all the developing countries got the same kind of benefits. The search for solutions to help the LLDCs should in no way lead to the adoption of a system that helped them alone. Lastly, the general claims of the 77 should be a means of airing the particular problems of the LLDCs.

So the creation of a special LLDC category created diplomatic problems and, in the 1960s, neither the 77 nor the group B countries really wanted it. Significantly, the meeting of the 77 in Algiers in the autumn of 1967, which did the groundwork for UNCTAD II, "did not have time" to go into the question in detail and the Algiers charter only mentioned it in very general terms. The 77's positions were prepared

by a restricted working party of 19 countries, with only one or two LLDCs and no French-speaking African countries at all. Under the personal authority of UNCTAD secretary-general Raúl Prebisch, the New Delhi conference of 1968 was an occasion for various objections on the theory to be raised. UNCTAD II adopted a very general resolution (24 (II)), asking the secretariat and the international organizations to try and identify the least developed countries and recommending that special measures be introduced to help them in all areas of UNCTAD activity.


Although this was vague and not really indicative of any firm political will, it did start the bureaucratic ball rolling; the analysis of the concept of LLDCs was taken further and progress was made with the examination of the special measures envisaged for these countries as a result.

Criteria for defining an LLDC

On 13 December 1968, the UN General Assembly invited the secretary-general to make a thorough examination of the special problems facing the LLDCs and to recommend special measures to help them. It was to do this in consultation with the specialized organs, the regional economic commissions, the Development Planning Committee, the group of experts already set up by the Trade and Development Board and various other consultants. The list of bodies concerned showed the complexity of the institutional network by which the problem was to be handled.

The Development Planning Committee (of independent economic experts) was invited to investigate the problems of the LLDCs by U Thant. It set up a working party of five of its members, with Jean Ripert in the chair, and this came up with the method for defining LLDCs in March 1970. In the

Four heads of state from the Third World at the opening of the Paris conference: President Pereira of Cape Verde, King Birendra of Nepal, President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Arap Moi of Kenya. Only three of their countries are officially "least developed" — Kenya is the odd one out



UNESCO — Michel Claude

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spring of 1971, the Development Planning Committee brought out a list of 25 countries (including five African states in the franc zone) which could be classed among the least developed of the developing countries. There were three main criteria:

- *per capita* GDP of not more than \$ 100;
- manufacturing industries representing not more than 10% of GDP;
- a literacy rate among the over-15s of not more than 20%.

This idea of a choice of restricted criteria satisfied the group B countries, which did not wish to see the list lengthened too far. The developing countries, on the other hand, called for further examination of the criteria and suggested a far broader definition of the notion of LLDC. Resolution 2768, which the General Assembly adopted on 28 November 1971, approved the basic list of 25 countries, but recognized that it might be amended.

It satisfied the industrialized countries by inviting the Development Planning Committee to carry on looking at the criteria under ECOSOC supervision. The UNCTAD secretariat had a limited part to play in seeking new criteria.

Since the 77 felt they were unable to influence the criteria enough, they pushed their claims for a longer list of beneficiaries with three categories — least developed, island and landlocked countries. UNCTAD resolutions taken in Santiago, Chile (62 (III)) in 1972 and Nairobi (98 (IV)) in 1976 covered all three categories in the same text, without taking account of the heterogeneity of their economic situations. Although group B countries managed to get people to agree to a distinction being made between the special measures for LLDCs and specific schemes for island and landlocked developing countries at UNCTAD IV, it was not until UNCTAD V in 1979 that the specific features of LLDCs were clearly recognized and the 77 gave them a separate part in their programme (the Arusha programme, adopted by the fourth meeting of ministers of the Group of 77, 6-16 February 1979). So far, there has been only limited recognition of the idea of LLDCs at the UN and the addition of seven countries to the list since 1971 has not altered the criteria for identification.

The definition the UN adopted in the text of its international strategy for the third development decade (5 December 1980) was rubber-stamped in Paris. It is a compromise between the big countries of Asia (India, Pakistan, Indonesia, etc.), which want the poverty of the people taken into account, the countries of Latin America (which has only one country on the present list) and the industrialized nations, which are insisting upon the structural handicaps definition to keep the number of LLDCs down. As often happens at the UN, the text does not come down firmly on one side or the other. The LLDCs are simply stated to be the countries which are the poorest, the weakest economically and with the worst structural problems.

An action programme and a special conference

Until 1979, the examination of special measures to help the LLDCs depended on the general policy measures which the industrialized countries adopted for the developing world as a whole. Hence the catalogue nature of the first recommendation for special measures for the LLDCs.

Although everyone involved agreed that countries and international organizations should do more for the LLDCs, the countries of the West and the 77 differed in the way they thought they should go about it. The West thought the LLDCs should figure larger in the national programmes and international financing organizations, with better use being



“Least”, “less” or “under” developed though the Third World may be, shouldn’t there be an “over” developed category for some of the industrialized countries?

made of existing resources. The Group of 77, which was anxious to ensure that any schemes to help the LLDCs were not to its own detriment, thought the global programmes should be extended and a special fund set up for the LLDCs. This fundamental difference has never been ironed out.

So, although the UNCTAD and UN General Assembly resolutions have always been unanimous, they have never reflected any determination on group B’s part. They have been no more than outline texts laying down guidelines for action, without any firm commitments. And the special fund has still not come to pass. The Nairobi Conference (Resolution 98 (IV)) again asked developed countries with market economies to give the LLDCs a bigger share of their official development aid — allocating the frequently promised 0.7% of GNP, essentially in the form of grants. The resolution (122 (V)) adopted at Manila in 1979 went further, again mentioning the 0.7% target, but calling for a particularly vigorous effort to see that a substantial proportion of this aid went to the LLDCs. The donor countries, it said, should double their official development aid to the LLDCs as soon as possible. The most interesting result of Manila was the decision to launch a detailed action programme for the least developed countries.

Compared to previous resolutions, which were very much influenced by UNCTAD’s approaches and methods of negotiation, resolution 122 showed clear progress in its attempt to conceptualize and specify the nature of the problems facing the LLDCs. In particular, the accent was on the need to alter the main structural characteristics of the LDCs and the Substantial New Programme of Action for the 1980s reveals a desire to reflect on the causes of underdevelopment and how to cope with it, something which goes beyond the standard debate on the volume and terms of aid to which the discussion is too often confined.

Most important, however, the decision to call a UN conference on the LLDCs in 1981 reflected an awareness of the dramatic situation in which these countries find themselves — if not of a shared desire to remedy it. o M.C.S.


The LLDCs: some facts and figures

Even in extreme poverty, it is still possible to distinguish between the "haves" and the "have-nots" and opponents of the creation of a special LLDC category admit the fact. The group of least developed countries is not a homogeneous one, that much is clear, and it by no means includes all the underprivileged of our planet. There is a considerable difference between Bangladesh, with its 90 million people, and Western Samoa, with only 160 000; between the Sudan, with an area of 2 500 000 km², the biggest of the LLDCs, and the Maldives, which barely cover 300 km²; and between the fertile but overcrowded land of the Ganges delta and the tempestuous desert of the Sahel.

Such differences are easy to underline and they have not escaped the notice of the people who fought in the international organizations to establish this category of 31 countries (21 in Africa, eight in Asia, one—Haiti—in Latin America and one—Western Samoa—in Oceania), which contain an estimated 270 million people (1979) or 12.5 % of the total population of the Third World.

Common features

But they have a lot of things in common too, in spite of the fact that the definition of an LLDC is admittedly rather arbitrary. As UNCTAD sees it, these countries have a very low rate of economic growth (often not even keeping pace with population increase), agriculture predominates, they depend on one or two export products and have very little industry. They have only embryonic health services, they are



Drought is one factor to blame for reduced food production in some LLDCs



EDF photo

Most LLDC exports are agricultural commodities, such as these groundnuts in Upper Volta

short of drinking water supplies and educational coverage is poor—a combination which gives a very short life expectancy. And the problems are bigger for the four island and the 15 landlocked countries.

These are, undeniably, the poorest countries in the world. The gap between them and the industrialized countries is an ever-widening one and they are being increasingly outdistanced by the rest of the developing countries. In the 1970s *per capita* GNP in the least developed countries went up by only 6 % p.a., whereas the figure for the other developing countries was 40 %. In 1979, GDP (constant values) in the least developed countries was \$ 183, but it was \$ 674 in the developing countries as a whole. In 1970, the figures were \$ 172 and \$ 522 respectively and *per capita* GDP in the LLDCs only went up \$ 13 in 10 years, whereas the figure for the developing countries as a whole was \$ 152.

Population growth

OECD secretary-general Emile Van Lennep has outlined the consequences of this situation. The LLDCs, he says, are faced with serious economic difficulties in three key sectors—investment via domestic savings, import financing via export earnings and the servicing of debt via loans at market rates. This low productive investment financing potential has had dramatic effects right across the economy, particularly in agriculture where it has restricted purchases of fertilizer, pesticides and machinery and kept the provision of credit for capital equipment down. It is here, and in certain natural disasters (drought in the Sahel, for example) and exceptional circumstances (war in Uganda and in the Horn of Africa), that the causes of stagnation and the deterioration, even, of food production in the LLDCs should be sought.

Table 1
Some social figures for the LLDCs (1980)

| Country | Population (million) | Per capita GNP (\$) | Adult literacy rate (%) | Life expectancy at birth (years) | Population with drinking water supplies (%) | Doctors per 100 000 inhabitants | Daily calorie intake (% of requirements) |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|---|
| | 1980 | 1978 | 1975 | 1978 | 1975 | 1977 | 1977 |
| Afghanistan | 15.94 | 241 | 12 | 42 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 110 |
| Bangladesh | 90.25 | 118 | 26 | 47 | 53.0 | 7.9 | 78 |
| Benin | 3.43 | 224 | 11 | 46 | 20.0 | 3.7 | 98 |
| Bhutan | 1.20 | 103 | .. | 41 | .. | .. | 88 |
| Botswana | 0.81 | 632 | 31 | 48 | .. | 9.6 | 94 ^a |
| Burundi | 4.11 | 146 | 25 | 45 ^b | .. | 2.0 | 97 |
| Cape Verde | 0.30 | 160 ^c | 37 | 60 | .. | 12.9 | .. |
| Comoros ^d | 0.40 | 248 | 58 | 46 | .. | 7.2 | 81 ^a |
| Ethiopia | 31.06 | 143 | 20 ^f | 39 | 6.0 | 1.4 | 75 |
| Gambia | 0.60 | 244 | 6 | 41 | .. | 7.4 | 97 ^a |
| Guinea | 5.06 | 262 | .. | 43 | 10.0 | 6.5 | 84 |
| Haiti | 5.01 | 278 | 23 | 51 | 14.0 | 16.8 | 93 |
| Upper Volta | 6.15 | 126 | 5 | 42 | 10.0 | 1.8 | 79 |
| Lesotho | 1.33 | 145 | 55 | 50 | 17.0 | 5.4 | 99 |
| Malawi | 5.80 ^b | 175 | 25 | 46 | 33.0 | 2.1 | 90 |
| Maldives | 0.15 | 147 | 82 ^a | 47 | 15.0 ^e | 6.4 | 90 ^a |
| Mali | 7.00 | 131 | 10 | 42 | 9.0 | 4.2 | 90 |
| Nepal | 14.30 | 119 | 19 | 43 | 9.0 | 2.8 | 91 |
| Niger | 5.54 | 220 ^g | 8 | 42 | 27.0 | 2.4 | 91 |
| Uganda | 13.00 | 280 ^g | 35 | 53 | 35.0 | 3.6 | 91 |
| CAR | 2.42 | 248 | .. | 46 | 16.0 | 5.7 | 99 |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 3.75 | 83 | .. | 42 | .. | 4.6 | 94 |
| Tanzania | 18.50 | 263 | 66 | 51 | 39.0 | 6.5 | 89 |
| Rwanda | 5.13 | 188 | 23 | 46 | 35.0 | 2.7 | 98 |
| Samoa | 0.16 | 520 | 100 | 68 | 60.0 ^h | 34.7 | 82 ^a |
| Somalia | 5.00 | 130 ^g | 60 | 43 | 33.0 | 6.4 | 88 |
| Sudan | 18.00 | 320 ^g | 20 | 46 | 46.0 | 11.5 | 93 |
| Chad | 4.40 ^b | 188 | 15 | 43 | 26.0 | 2.4 | 74 |
| Yemen | 6.50 | 447 | 13 | 39 | 4.0 | 7.2 | 91 |
| Democratic Yemen | 1.90 | 316 | 27 | 44 | 24.0 | 12.6 | 81 |

Source: — UNCTAD secretariat (data from the statistical office of the UN and the World Bank and notes from the various countries).

^a 1974-1978.

^b 1979.

^c 1977.

^d Not including Mayotte, except for the 1980 population figure (Total population without Mayotte = 0.35 million).

^e GNP.

^f 1980.

^g In rural areas.

Table 2
Principle export products from the LLDCs
(decreasing order of value, 1975, \$'000 000)^a

| Cus- toms Tariff Refer- ence | Goods | Value of exports (\$'000 000) | | As % of total LLDC exports | | As % of exports of the same goods from all the developing countries | | As % of world exports of the same goods | |
|--|--|-------------------------------------|---------|-------------------------------|--------|--|-------|---|-------|
| | | 1975 | 1977 | 1975 | 1977 | 1975 | 1977 | 1975 | 1977 |
| | Total goods listed | 2 819.7 | 3 995.3 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 1.33 | 1.49 | 0.32 | 0.36 |
| 071 | Coffee | 426.4 | 1 295.2 | 15.12 | 32.42 | 10.36 | 10.85 | 9.47 | 10.02 |
| 263 | Cotton | 375.4 | 614.5 | 13.31 | 15.38 | 15.82 | 22.00 | 8.36 | 13.32 |
| 221 | Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit | 263.1 | 180.8 | 9.33 | 4.52 | 17.64 | 9.76 | 5.03 | 2.46 |
| 332 | Petroleum products | — | 182.3 | 7.52 | 4.56 | 1.26 | 1.09 | 0.61 | 0.46 |
| 001 | Live animals | 116.6 | 83.4 | 4.14 | 2.09 | 43.15 | 24.02 | 4.58 | 2.72 |
| 653 | Textiles other than fabrics of cotton | — | 101.4 | 3.22 | 2.54 | 10.38 | 8.12 | 1.10 | 1.06 |
| 121 | Unmanufactured tobacco | 89.8 | 125.0 | 3.18 | 3.13 | 9.91 | 11.80 | 3.59 | 4.86 |
| 051 | Fresh fruit and fresh and dried nuts | 84.9 | 36.7 | 3.01 | 0.92 | 4.42 | 1.49 | 1.61 | 0.60 |
| 074 | Tea and maté | 78.2 | 124.0 | 2.77 | 3.10 | 9.51 | 8.04 | 8.19 | 7.04 |
| 283 | Minerals and concentrates of common non-ferrous metals | 76.5 | 26.5 | 2.71 | 0.66 | 3.07 | 0.87 | 1.28 | 0.42 |
| 264 | Jute | 69.0 | 128.1 | 2.45 | 3.21 | 56.58 | 81.50 | 53.10 | 78.52 |
| 656 | Articles wholly or mainly made of textiles, not included elsewhere | 68.0 | 80.6 | 2.41 | 2.02 | 13.37 | 11.88 | 4.23 | 3.84 |
| 211 | Raw hides and skins | 55.5 | 61.2 | 1.97 | 1.53 | 28.48 | 29.68 | 4.43 | 2.96 |
| 075 | Spices | 53.3 | 55.7 | 1.89 | 1.40 | 11.01 | 8.52 | 9.67 | 7.41 |
| 292 | Raw vegetable materials not included elsewhere | 53.1 | 54.9 | 1.88 | 1.38 | 10.85 | 8.57 | 2.15 | 1.67 |
| 054 | Fresh, frozen or simply preserved vegetables | 51.2 | 37.2 | 1.82 | 0.93 | 5.35 | 2.56 | 1.47 | 0.80 |
| 341 | Natural gas and manufactured gas | 45.4 | 39.4 | 1.61 | 0.99 | 3.65 | 1.90 | 0.83 | 0.43 |
| 042 | Rice | 44.5 | 42.7 | 1.58 | 1.07 | 4.97 | 3.00 | 2.15 | 1.69 |
| 265 | Vegetable fibres other than cotton and jute | 44.2 | 28.6 | 1.57 | 0.72 | 22.27 | 17.16 | 13.48 | 8.83 |
| 061 | Sugar and honey | 40.4 | 18.7 | 1.43 | 0.47 | 0.46 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.25 |
| 081 | Food to be used for animals | 37.0 | 45.0 | 1.31 | 1.13 | 2.73 | 1.69 | 0.90 | 0.64 |
| 421 | Fixed vegetable oils | 34.9 | 10.8 | 1.24 | 0.27 | 6.67 | 1.17 | 1.47 | 0.37 |
| 667 | Pearls and precious stones | 34.4 | 39.2 | 1.22 | 0.98 | 7.08 | 4.91 | 0.64 | 0.39 |
| 052 | Dried fruits | 28.2 | 83.8 | 1.00 | 2.10 | 16.90 | 31.63 | 6.61 | 13.67 |
| 657 | Carpets, mats and matting | 19.2 | 39.9 | 0.68 | 1.00 | 5.27 | 5.24 | 0.96 | 1.37 |
| 655 | Special fabrics and allied products of textiles | 17.6 | 18.1 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 9.91 | 7.43 | 0.76 | 0.66 |
| 611 | Leather | 17.2 | 56.2 | 0.61 | 1.41 | 4.16 | 7.55 | 1.12 | 2.45 |
| 072 | Cocoa | 13.6 | 15.7 | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.71 | 0.45 | 0.59 | 0.37 |
| 031 | Fresh and simply preserved fish | 12.7 | 21.3 | 0.45 | 0.53 | 0.89 | 0.95 | 0.31 | 0.36 |
| 212 | Untreated furskins | 12.5 | 18.4 | 0.44 | 0.46 | 63.08 | 71.42 | 1.65 | 1.74 |

Source — Figures calculated by UNCTAD on the basis of data from the UN statistical office.
^a Data for 25 of the LLDCs representing more than 90% of the total exports of the LLDCs. Principal exports means those accounting for more than \$ 12.5 m in 1975.

Table 3
GDP, agriculture and the manufacturing industries


| | Per capita figure in Eurodollars (constant, 1978) | | | | Annual growth rate per capita % 1960-1979 |
|---|---|----------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|---|
| | Estimated figures | | | Projection ^a 1990 | |
| | 1960 | 1970 | 1979 | | |
| 1. GNP | | | | | |
| LLDCs | 167 | 172 | 183 | 193 | 0.5 |
| All developing countries | 402 | 522 | 674 | 903 | 2.7 |
| Socialist countries in Eastern Europe | (1 475) ^b | (2 524) ^b | (3 731) ^b | (6 381) ^b | 5.0 |
| Developed countries with market economies | 4 425 | 6 423 | 8 127 | 11 615 | 3.3 |
| 2. Agricultural production | | | | | |
| LLDCs | 100 | 96 | 86 | 79 | -0.8 |
| All developing countries | 114 | 118 | 117 | 118 | 0.1 |
| Socialist countries in Eastern Europe | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.1 |
| Developed countries with market economies | 268 | 305 | 347 | 404 | 1.4 |
| 3. Value added in manufacturing industries | | | | | |
| LLDCs | 8 | 12 | 15 | 22 | 3.4 |
| All developing countries | 54 | 86 | 125 | 203 | 4.7 |
| Socialist countries in Eastern Europe | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.8 ^c |
| Developed countries with market economies | 1 118 | 1 847 | 2 359 | 3 632 | 4.0 |

Source — UNCTAD secretariat estimates, based mainly on data from the statistical office of the UN and the World Bank.

^a Projection based on the 1960-1979 growth rate.

^b Provisional estimate (GNP) per capita.

^c Total for industry.



FAO photo - F. Botts

High population growth rates in most LLDCs put more pressure on food production

Table 4
External aid to the LLDCs in 1979
(Net payments in \$'000 000 at 1980 prices)

| | \$'000 000 | % |
|--|------------|--------|
| <i>Total external aid</i> (Grants & loans, net amounts) | 6 597 | 100.0 |
| <i>Total aid on liberal terms</i> | 5 944 | 90.1 |
| DAC | 5 022 | 76.1 |
| of which: | | |
| bilateral | 3 166 | 48.0 |
| multilateral | 1 856 | 28.1 |
| of which: | | |
| technical assistance | 1 221 | 18.5 |
| other grants | 2 597 | 39.4 |
| loans | 1 203 | 18.2 |
| OPEC | 767 | 11.6 |
| of which: | | |
| bilateral | 656 | 9.9 |
| multilateral | 112 | 1.7 |
| Socialist countries of Eastern Europe | (54) | (0.8) |
| China | 101 | 1.5 |
| <i>Amount of aid at market rates</i> | (652) | (9.9) |
| Official loans: DAC | 183 | 3.3 |
| Official loans: OPEC | 120 | 2.1 |
| Export credit (guaranteed from private sources) | 442 | 7.9 |
| Miscellaneous | (-93) | (-1.4) |

Source — UNCTAD secretariat, based on information from the OECD and the World Bank.

Table 5
Aid provided on liberal terms^a
to the LLDCs as a percentage of the
GNP of the donor countries

| | 1975-1979 (average) | 1979 | As a reference — total amount or resources provided on liberal terms to the developing countries as a whole, as a percentage of the GNP ^b of the donor country | |
|--|------------------------|-------|---|--------|
| | | | 1979 | 1980 |
| <i>Members of DAC^c</i> | | | | |
| Norway | 0.229 | 0.276 | 0.93 | 0.82 |
| Sweden | 0.228 | 0.267 | 0.94 | 0.76 |
| Netherlands | 0.184 | 0.229 | 0.93 | 0.99 |
| Denmark | 0.198 | 0.216 | 0.75 | 0.72 |
| Belgium | 0.121 | 0.127 | 0.56 | 0.48 |
| United Kingdom | 0.089 | 0.116 | 0.52 | 0.34 |
| Canada | 0.107 | 0.112 | 0.46 | 0.42 |
| Germany | 0.082 | 0.093 | 0.44 | 0.43 |
| Australia | 0.042 | 0.064 | 0.52 | 0.48 |
| France | 0.070 | 0.064 | 0.59 | 0.62 |
| <i>DAC average</i> | 0.058 | 0.062 | 0.35 | 0.57 |
| Finland | 0.057 | 0.058 | 0.21 | 0.22 |
| Switzerland | 0.043 | 0.047 | 0.21 | 0.24 |
| Japan | 0.029 | 0.045 | 0.26 | 0.32 |
| New Zealand | 0.055 | 0.038 | 0.30 | (0.27) |
| Austria | 0.013 | 0.023 | 0.19 | 0.23 |
| Italy | 0.026 | 0.023 | 0.08 | 0.17 |
| United States | 0.030 | 0.020 | 0.20 | 0.27 |
| <i>Members of OPEC^d</i> | 0.281 | 0.222 | 1.51 | 1.45 |
| <i>Socialist countries of Eastern Europe^{e,f}</i> | .. | 0.003 | 0.12 | 0.12 |
| <i>China^e</i> | .. | 0.035 | 0.08 | .. |

Source — UNCTAD secretariat, based on information from the OECD and the World Bank.

^a Net payments, including contributions made via multilateral institutions.

^b OECD estimates, including aid to southern Europe, Israel and Vietnam.

^c In decreasing order, by relative level of aid in 1979.

^d Data collected from the report by the DAC chairman on resources contributed on liberal terms by Algeria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Qatar and Venezuela.

^e Loans only. No figures are available for the grants.

^f Data for 1978.

And the LLDCs, like all the developing countries of course, have fast population growth.

Increase in food production has kept pace with population growth in only five countries—Afghanistan, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi and Sudan. All the others have food deficits, sometimes leading to famine and always making the situation difficult and forcing the governments to resort to expensive imports and to food aid from rich countries and charitable organizations. Alongside this, there is growing pressure on land in the LLDCs. There is an increasing tendency to ignore the need for fallow years, the soil is deteriorating (as on the Mossi Plateau in Upper Volta) and the fields are getting smaller. In Burundi, a country with 4 110 000 people living in an area of 27 000 km², the population density is 175 per km². More than half the country's farms have less than 0.6 ha of arable land and, by 1990, there will be 200 000 families looking for farmland—which will mean a further splitting up of plots.

In a recent report on sub-Saharan Africa, published under the direction of Elliot Berg, the World Bank made some really frightening projections. If the present birth rate continues,

a country such as Tanzania (one of the eight examples in the report and the only LLDC on the list), which has a population of around 19 million at the moment, will have 37 million by the year 2000 and 54 million by 2010—in less than 30 years. Similar projections can be made for most of the rest of the LLDC group. The food situation is cause for concern now, so what will it be like then? Over the coming harvests, i.e. before May-June of this year, Tanzania, with estimated annual requirements of about 600 000 t of cereals, will have to import something like 250 000 t. At the end of the seventies, the LLDCs spent 28% of their export earning on food bills, which represented 15% of their total expenditure. The cereal shortfall alone was 2.4 million t in 1979/80 and, if current trends continue, UNCTAD estimates, it could be more than 10 million t by the close of this decade.

Energy is the other big item on the LLDC budget. The successive increases in the price of oil have had dramatic effects on these countries' economies. In 1979, Tanzania spent 1 400 million shillings on importing petroleum products, almost 30% of its 4 500 million shillings-worth of export earnings. The figure is believed to stand at 50%

now, so it is practically impossible to finance development schemes from national resources.

Yet the LLDCs are not totally without resources. But their exports are nearly all agricultural raw materials with prices that fluctuate a lot, with a clear tendency to drop. Coffee is at the top of their export lists (value-wise 32 % of the total), followed by cotton (15 %) and oil seeds (4.5 %) and most of the produce is exported with minimal or no processing, so the LLDCs get very little added value and the profits of processing go to other people.

Large amounts of aid, but ...

The LLDCs have the minerals that bring wealth to so many other developing countries, but they still account for only a small percentage of exports in the group as a whole, in spite of the fact that they are important to a third of the members. Mining is often on a small or individual scale, but there are great potentials for 25 of the LLDCs to become major mining countries, as they have impressive deposits of iron, gold, copper, bauxite, uranium, coal, oil, gas, nickel, diamonds, tungsten and so on. And prospecting, which is by no means extensive at the moment, could surely come up with more.


However, there is no shortage of obstacles—poor infrastructure and poor energy supplies, for example—to be overcome. Almost all the experts agree that the LLDCs can only provide a part-answer to the problem, that more is needed than a reform of internal structures and that foreign aid will be essential for some time to come. But this foreign aid, it has to be admitted, has not been wanting so far. In 1978, the *per capita* figure was \$ 16, almost level with *per capita* export earnings, which stood at \$ 18. In 1964/65, aid was \$ 10 *per capita* and exports \$ 24, which is clear proof that foreign aid is figuring larger in the LLDCs foreign exchange resources.

... mostly it is tied

This aid is almost entirely in the form of grants or soft loans, but because in the majority of cases it is tied, the LLDCs do not get all they might from it. They are prevented from getting their supplies from other markets, even if the prices are cheaper there than in the donor countries, and there is a temptation for funders to go for projects that boost exports without taking the priorities of the recipient state into account. Aid also tends to be provided on a very piecemeal basis, with each developed country financing those projects that are of particular interest to it. In Tanzania, for example, 19 donors are financing about 87 agricultural projects, which makes it very difficult to standardize equipment.

Donors

It is very hard for the LLDCs to avoid this. Because they are so poor, they are unable to do what the other developing countries do and borrow on the money markets. Some of them cannot even put up their contribution to foreign investments or pay recurring project costs. Hence their willingness to use foreign aid for this and their insistence on trying to get the developed countries to keep their word on the long-promised 0.7 % of GNP as official development aid. So far only four countries have reached or gone past the UN figure. They are Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark—also those which channel the largest percentage of their aid to the LLDCs, something in excess of the 0.15 % of GNP suggested for the mid-eighties at the meetings that prepared the Paris Conference and of the 0.20 % of GNP planned for the rest of the decade.



EDF photo - F. Delorenzi

Tea plantation in Rwanda. Commodity price fluctuations are another problem for LLDC exports



The Comoros, one of four island countries among the 31 LLDCs

The members of the OECD's Development Aid Committee (DAC) are the LLDCs main providers, contributing more than three quarters of all the aid they receive. Around 11.5 % comes from OPEC and the rest from cooperation with China and the countries of Eastern Europe. The success of internal reorganization policies, which the deterioration of the LLDC economies has forced upon them, and ultimately, the progress they can make in the coming years will depend on a substantial increase in foreign aid to them. ○

AMADOU TRAORE

What did the Paris conference achieve?

by A. CHAMPMARIN (*)

When this article appears, the least developed countries of the world will no longer be in the headlines and many people will have forgotten the Paris conference. The meeting is over and done with, of course, but the Substantial New Action Programme for the LLDCs in the 1980s, which it produced, must now be put into effect. And it is vital to 300 million people that it actually come to something.

Diplomats from North and South are now distributing the programme to development organizers in all the countries concerned, so now is perhaps the time to look at what the UN conference in Paris actually achieved.

Everything pointed to failure six months ago, yet what might be called the contract-conference finished, at the appointed hour, on a diplomatic success. But the real work, honouring the contract now and over the next 10 years, has still to be done.

Why was failure likely?

Rarely had things looked so bad for a special UN conference and today's results can only really be appreciated if they are seen against the situation as it was in May and June last year.

The very idea of LLDCs had been the subject of controversy and discussion for some time and decency alone enabled that issue to be put provisionally aside. Many countries of North and South alike had only paid lip service to the restrictive list of LLDCs produced by the UN General Assembly 10 years ago, and some of them were against the principle of dividing up the developing countries in this way, fearing for the unity of the Group of 77. Others were more concerned about the criteria defining this group of super-poor countries that were to be given special attention, finding them generally too narrow and geographically uneven. Such doubts were still being expressed at the summer session of ECOSOC on the eve of the conference.

So, by calling for solidarity from the other countries, including the developing ones, with the LLDCs, the conference was going against both the transparent desire of certain of the great Western powers to avoid further financial commitments to the Third World and similar attitudes in the countries of East Europe. It was expected to make OPEC worried about seeing the spotlight on its responsibilities as regards the LLDCs' energy problems and on its members' vocation as aid donors. Lastly, it made the rest of the developing countries, from richest to poorest, fear that aid would be reorganized to their detriment under LLDC pressure.

And on the LLDC side, it was by no means sure that people were ready to use the conference to object to the unsuccessful

model of development and society adopted so far, or that they had anything to put in its place. So there was a great temptation, willingly fostered by the UNCTAD secretariat, to put all the LLDCs' problems down to external causes and still to try to solve them by massive increases in external aid.

Only three months before the conference, it was by no means clear how it would actually be run: Would it discuss the development of the LLDCs and would it discuss external aid for this development? How many action programmes would be adopted? One or 31? Should donors' commitments be practical and specific (i.e. on given projects and given countries) or could they be expressed in general terms? Would the LLDCs form a special group or would they be represented by the Group of 77? Would there be a new programme for immediate action, as some countries requested?

The UNCTAD secretariat did not come up with much of an answer (1). Two of the three sessions of the preparatory committee were held without the secretariat proposing even an outline of the action programme for the 1980s and the last session did not even have this vital topic on the agenda. The focus was on a report by the secretary-general of the conference, a paper that was not without interest, but which was primarily aimed at justifying the tight hold the body should have over the institutional follow-up of the conference (in spite of the protests of the other UN institutions).

As well as this institutional preparation, there was the very considerable amount of work that most of the LLDCs put in to analysing and reflecting on the situation. Consultations were held at the suggestion of a preparatory committee and at the initiative of the French delegation, and these were an opportunity to establish a dialogue between each of the LLDCs and their friends and partners outside. This was very positive, in spite of the shift of emphasis that ensued when the meetings were held a long way from the countries concerned. But since none of this yielded any overall analysis of the problem, it was left to the people at the third preparatory meeting to hastily produce the various elements of the action programme.

A diplomatic success

Two weeks was all the time the conference had to transform this difficult situation into success. We were all haunted by the memory of the final preparatory session in Geneva where the Group of 77 did not overcome their internal tension and say what they felt until two days before the end.

But the prologue and the raising of the curtain gave a certain amount of hope to the actors. At the meeting of top officials chaired by Sweden's ambassador Everlof on 28 August, the pitfall of a new programme of immediate action was avoided and agreement was reached on a realistic agenda. On the morning of 1 September, representatives of 110 nations, including the heads of state of Cape Verde, Kenya (chairing the OAU), Nepal and Rwanda heard the French President commit participants to solidarity and shared responsibility. President Mitterrand confirmed that France would reach the international official development aid target of 0.7% of GNP by 1988—which meant doubling its

(*) The author, a socio-economist, was actively involved in the production of "Quelle coopération pour quel développement?", a collection of essays on the LLDCs which came out, under the direction of Gabriel Mignot (now delegate-general for employment in France), in 1981.

(1) See the author's article on the LLDCs in international negotiations and the temptation of multilateral neocolonialism in the collection called *Quelle coopération pour quel développement?* (Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Editions Economica, Paris, August 1981).

aid (French overseas countries and territories not included).

This gave the political impetus, and a series of speeches of various tendencies and making various commitments followed, although the two session committees lost no time in getting down to work on what proved to be a drafting marathon, based on the texts submitted at Geneva in early July and on the many documents that had subsequently been produced to provide further details and clarification. At this stage the Community had a star role to play thanks to the combination of proposals from some of the member states (the host country in particular) and from the representatives of the Commission and the presidency.

In spite of the inevitable tension, there was a good working atmosphere at the committees and specialized sub-groups and the responsible attitude of the participants made it possible to look at all the questions thoroughly before they were taken up by the small meeting of "friends of the president", which represented all the different groups of countries. Jean-Pierre Cot, the French minister for development and cooperation and chairman of the conference, assisted by ambassador Stéphane Hessel, lessened the differences and paved the way for the ultimate consensus in the last hours of the conference.

The meeting ended with a text on the Substantial New Programme of Action being adopted with no formal reservations whatsoever—much to the relief of everyone involved and thanks to the sacrifices that they were all called upon to make. The document it referred to was of course a little composite as far as form went, but it was thorough, if not complete, when it came to the content.

Positive results

Although the results of the conference are far from what the LLDCs and the UNCTAD secretariat hoped, they are still very positive. The Paris meeting:

- drew the attention of the whole of the international community to the lot of these countries, which, in many cases, are struggling for survival, and made the LLDCs a special category, once and for all, within the UN framework;
- made it possible to establish a general conceptual framework (diagnosis and measures) that is in line with the specific realities of extreme cases of underdevelopment;
- clearly highlighted the co-responsibility of the LLDC authorities and the members of the international community as regards implementing the action programme;
- stated a certain number of alternative targets for official development aid to these countries. France played a decisive role here in getting the 0.15 % of GNP target agreed to by all the member states of the EEC;
- launched a certain number of new ideas—for example, an export earnings stabilization system for the LLDCs that would be financed by their main trading partners;
- lastly, laid the foundations for institutional arrangements for the timetabling of the action programme.

However, reservations on the part of some of the industrialized countries prevented agreement on firm commitments on the volume of aid, as it left the donor countries simply to make (in addition to the 0.15 % of GNP and the doubling of aid) a "special effort to step up their contributions".

The success of the Paris conference was, as was to be expected, perhaps only a diplomatic one. No one was willing to take responsibility for failure in what was a difficult phase of the North-South dialogue, and for such an honourable cause. But who will take the responsibility for a proper success over the coming years?

Honouring the contract

The search for some sort of balance between the LLDCs' commitments on their internal policies and the international community's undertakings on cooperating with the group's development was the big innovation of the conference. Thus the LLDCs and their partners made a sort of contract. What they have to do now is honour it.

As far as the LLDCs are concerned, the only thing that is likely to generate a self-sustaining process, the basis all lasting development, is a new type of development that is original and specifically adapted to their various conditions but based on the needs, activities, potential and organization of the rural communities. In most cases, this means changing the balance of power and the terms of trade between the urban groups, where the state power and the privileges that go with it are generally to be found, and the rural groups (the farmers, herdsman and fishermen) whose income and economic behaviour shape, in particular, the degree of self-sufficiency in food. Development of this kind, the seeds of which are planted in the SNPA, is clearly laid down in the OAU's Lagos Plan.

This new type of development, which should generate internal markets for craft, trade and industry, also means a new type of cooperation. Most of it is still to be defined, but it should, typically, be properly involved at local level from the time the schemes are identified right through until the post-evaluation stage. This is much more demanding for all the partners than conventional technical and financial cooperation.

Change can no more be banked on in the industrialized countries either.

The declarations made at the closing session by the representatives of the USA and the industrialized countries of East Europe show that these nations (unlike the countries of the Community, of northern Europe and Japan in particular) do not intend to make any special efforts for the LLDCs.

EEC target

The EEC countries have taken a collective decision—no easy matter—to channel 0.15 % of their GNP into the development of the LLDCs as part of the 0.7 % target. Some (Denmark and the Netherlands) do this already and others have fixed the date by which they will be able to do so (1985 in the case of Belgium and France and 1990 in the case of Ireland and Italy). They have said they are ready to see what arrangements can be made to stabilize earnings from LLDC exports of primary products and how the benefit of Stabex-type measures can be offered to non-ACP members of the LLDC group. The EEC will also be looking into how to improve its generalized system of preferences.

The provisions on following up the conference, both generally and as far as each individual LLDC is concerned, mean that more or less constant pressure can be put on each of the partners (including the LLDCs) to see that their general commitments are transformed into specific decisions. The consultation meetings for each country will provide opportunities for a joint examination of remarks, priorities, lessons learned, suggestions and intended financing. They will also be the occasion for cooperation in the fullest sense of the term and for encouraging, more particularly, those countries that have taken the strategy outlined in the SNPA seriously.

A reversal of past trends can only be achieved in this way and the global examination scheduled for halfway through the decade (1985) will show what success it is having.

o A.C.

A "Substantial New Programme of Action" for the 1980s

The UN conference on the least developed countries in Paris last September adopted what is called the Substantial New Programme of Action (SNPA) for the LLDCs in the 1980s. This is a detailed list of measures which can be grouped in three categories:

- reforms of policies and structures to be implemented at national level in each LLDC;
- international support, particularly the financing needed to carry out the programme;
- measures to ensure that the decisions taken at the conference are implemented, i.e. a follow-up mechanism.

The SNPA is a document running to some 40 pages, the main points of which are as follows.

National measures

The totally inadequate levels of living that now exist in the least developed countries are a cause for grave concern to the international community. The means for overcoming acute hunger and malnutrition, disease, illiteracy and all other manifestations of poverty should be made available to these countries. The least developed countries have primary responsibility for their overall development and the domestic policies they pursue will be of critical importance for the success of their development efforts. However, the international community, in particular the developed countries and relevant international organizations as well as the developing countries in a position to do so, and non-governmental organizations, will have to provide substantial assistance to these countries to overcome their poverty. Concerted international action in support of national efforts is required to bring about structural transformation of the economies of the least developed countries, to reverse current trends towards a decline in *per capita* food production, to accelerate agricultural and industrial growth, to promote the development and improved utilization of human resources, to achieve sustained and self-reliant development, and to provide for increased and direct expenditures on the improvement of socio-economic conditions during the 1980s. Efforts must be expanded in order to ensure broadly-based participation in development, concurrent and consistent with the equitable distribution of the gains from socio-economic development.

Transformations, as necessary, have to be effected with regard to the full sovereignty of least developed countries over their national resources, the establishment of a system of social and economic planning and programming and the implementation of socio-economic reform.

Food and agriculture

Agriculture and fisheries feature among the essential social and economic priorities for the development of the least developed countries, both as a means of satisfying the most

fundamental human needs and as a basis for economic growth. Although more than 80 per cent of the people in these countries depend on agriculture for their livelihood and on an average 50 per cent of gross domestic product originates in this sector, productivity in agriculture is extremely low because of several bottlenecks, including inappropriate, defective and inefficient techniques of production as well as very weak agricultural support institutions and lack of infrastructure and other agricultural inputs. In addition, in many of these countries agriculture is specially vulnerable because of the threat of desertification and because of very limited irrigation facilities as well as of the vagaries of nature. The performance of most of these countries in this sector during the last two decades has been characterized by negative growth of *per capita* food and agricultural output. Many have also experienced rapid population growth compounded by rural exodus, increased urbanization, chronic food insecurity, stagnant or deteriorating nutrition well below minimum standards, a stationary volume of agricultural exports with declining terms of trade, and rapidly rising imports of food and agricultural commodities, especially cereals.

Food strategies

In view of the above situation, it is necessary that the agricultural sector continue to receive the highest priority in the national development strategies of the least developed countries. In particular, one of the first objectives for these countries should be to increase their food production so as to improve the nutritional situation of their populations, especially the most vulnerable groups, and diminish their dependence on external supplies. In this context, the World Food Council has emphasized the concept of a national food strategy in the context of national programmes in order to raise food issues to the highest policy levels and ensure a more co-ordinated approach to all aspects of food production and distribution, nutrition and national food security. Within the framework of their national development priorities and programmes, least developed countries should therefore prepare strategies, plans and policies for the agri-

Rain-fed rice in Mali: the SNPA puts stress on food production



EDF photo - Michel Drachousoff



Animal traction (here, in Tanzania) is one farm technique that could be more widely developed in the LLDCs

cultural sector, giving particular attention to food production and distribution, which will:

- provide a framework for the identification and preparation of investment projects and help mobilize additional domestic investment resources and external financing; and
- aim at attaining greater food self-sufficiency as soon as possible and thereby at eliminating hunger and malnutrition as rapidly as possible and at the latest by 1990.

Food security

Achievement of food security should clearly be one of the prime objectives in the agricultural sector. This requires that adequate food supplies be reliably accessible at prices that can be afforded by those who require them. To achieve the goal of food security in the least developed countries, programme and policy action at the national level is required, as well as the help of the international community, as is emphasized in the *Plan of Action on World Food Security* endorsed by the conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Every least developed country should take important initiatives to reduce its dependence on food imports, more particularly because of the changes they entail in food consumption patterns and the various dislocations they may lead to in the food sector of the developing countries and the need to reduce foreign exchange outlays. In addition to the primary objectives of increasing agricultural production, initiatives should include efforts to expand and appropriately distribute local, national, subregional and regional food stocks, taking into consideration capacities and techniques at the local level; to train personnel in the management of these stocks; and to strengthen early warning systems through improved information gathering and reporting on food crops and on stocks.

Food production

The pre-condition for an improvement in food production is the demonstration of a strong political will (a) to direct adequately, and where necessary to increase budgetary resources to agriculture as well as to related activities such as livestock production, fishing and forestry; (b) to institute policies, especially on prices, which *inter alia*, will provide incentives for production, achieve an appropriate balance between crops for domestic consumption and crops for export and encourage small farmers and co-operatives to

increase productivity; (c) to set up effective mechanisms for the drawing-up and implementation of the necessary programmes. Major emphasis in the decade of the 1980s will be given to increasing substantially agricultural production, aiming at an annual rate of increase of 4 per cent or more.

Arrangements for implementation, follow-up and monitoring

Given that one of the essential objectives of the Substantial New Programme of Action is to provide new orientation and impetus to development efforts of the least developed countries and to international co-operation in support of these efforts, it is important that it provide for sustained processes of co-operation and review at the national, regional and global levels.

National level

The government of each least developed country should establish a focal point for continuing contact with its development partners, both bilateral and multilateral, concerning the review and implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action. It may also be found useful to create an intragovernmental working party of relevant ministries, including the office responsible for the administration of foreign assistance and that responsible for planning, where this has not yet been done, so as to assist the focal point in co-ordinating the work at the national level.

As a mechanism for regular and periodic review and implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action, governments of the least developed countries, after consul-

The LLDCs should reduce their dependence on foreign production inputs



tations as appropriate with relevant United Nations and intergovernmental agencies and donor countries, may establish aid consultative groups or other arrangements where they do not already exist. It should be open to the least developed countries which are not covered by existing arrangements to invite actual and potential donors and trade partners; United Nations organs, organizations and bodies; international and intergovernmental organizations; and neighbouring countries as appropriate to join in establishing suitable new consultative arrangements. Where arrangements already exist (such as World Bank Consultative Groups, United Nations Development Programme Round Tables and the Club of Sahel) consideration should be given to strengthening and broadening them in order to review the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action in specific least developed countries.

In view of the responsibility of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in the global review, the secretary-general of UNCTAD should be invited, as necessary, to be represented at the review meetings at the country level for mutual information purposes.

These reviews should take place at appropriate intervals at the initiative of the interested least developed country, which may seek assistance from the lead agency for its aid group in organizing them. These reviews should be devoted to the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action at the country level and will, in particular, concentrate on:

- (a) a review of the country's economic and financial situation, and of external assistance;
- (b) an assessment of progress in the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action in the least developed country concerned and consideration of a detailed annual or mid-term plan elaborating the economic and financial strategies, priorities and objectives and the requirements of external resources to support the implementation of these plans and programmes;
- (c) securing assistance for the implementation of plans and programmes for the period under consideration;
- (d) a review of the aid conditions, terms and modalities, including technical assistance, in the light of the guidelines contained in the programme, in order to see what further steps, if any, may be needed to ensure their more effective application;
- (e) consideration of ways and means of assisting the least developed countries to expand their trade in existing and in new markets.

The first round of such country reviews should take place as soon as possible and preferably by 1983.

For each review meeting a report should be prepared by the government of the least developed country concerned providing an assessment of the current economic situation and the immediate and long-term requirements for assistance in the light of its own priorities and programmes. In the preparation of this report the government concerned may request assistance from the relevant organizations of the United Nations system.

Some least developed countries, in consultation with their development partners, may find it convenient to synchronize their meetings in time and venue. In such cases, the least developed countries and lead agencies concerned may call for assistance on the relevant regional commissions or intergovernmental organizations of a regional character, who are urged to provide the required assistance.

Regional and global levels

The continuing interaction between specific implementation activity focused at the country and regional level and the




Photo: Gambia Information Services - Madoun Sobbe

Their low revenue levels do not allow the LLDCs to finance their own development programmes without external aid

global monitoring of progress will be crucial to the success of the Substantial New Programme of Action. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development should play the focal role in elaborating the detailed arrangements at the global level for implementation, co-ordination and monitoring of the programme.

A mid-term global review of progress towards the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action should be undertaken in 1985. It will also readjust as appropriate the Programme of Action for the second half of the decade in order to ensure its full implementation.

The conference recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the intergovernmental group on the least developed countries of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development should meet at high level in order to carry out the mid-term review and consider the possibility of holding a global review at the end of the decade, which might, *inter alia*, take the form of a United Nations conference on the least developed countries. The results of the mid-term review should be made available to the General Assembly, so that they would be taken fully into account in the process of review and appraisal of the implementation of the international development strategy. In discharging its responsibility, the intergovernmental group on the Least developed countries will consider the reports from aid consultative group meetings, contributions from all relevant agencies referred to it in paragraph 122 and analyses of issues from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as referred to in paragraph 121.

The global monitoring arrangements will review progress made in the implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action by the least developed countries and their development partners, and in particular:

- (a) review progress at the country level thus far in the decade;
- (b) review progress in international support measures, and particularly in official development assistance;
- (c) consider measures, as necessary, for ensuring the full implementation of the Substantial New Programme of Action over the decade.

Transfer of financial resources

Financial assistance requirements and policies

The least developed countries themselves will adopt vigorous measures for mobilization of their domestic resources. However, in view of their very low income *per capita*, with the bulk of the population far below a minimum standard of nutrition, health, education and housing, and of the very high proportion of population in the subsistence sectors, it would be impossible for these countries to mobilize sufficient resources domestically for the purpose of implementing this programme of action. The detailed estimates of requirements by the least developed countries have been presented to and noted by the conference, as well as macro-economic projections. Strong and immediate expansion of support for the least developed countries is crucial if they are to reverse the present trend of fast deteriorating socio-economic situations.

Therefore a substantial transfer of resources from the international community, particularly the developed countries, will be required in order to implement effectively the above programme, especially its immediate action component, as described below. The least developed countries have presented, during the preparatory stages of the conference, country programmes according to which their external financing requirements for the first half of the 1980s would be 85 per cent higher in real terms than those for the past five years (which averaged \$ 6.6 billion at 1980 prices) and would represent an extra requirement of \$ 5.7 billion on average per year, while in 1990 total concessional assistance flows should rise to \$ 24 billion at 1980 prices.

The conference recognizes that only a substantial increase in official development assistance in real terms during the present decade will enable the least developed countries to achieve the objectives of their country programmes within the framework of the Substantial New Programme of Action. As large a proportion as possible of these increased transfers of resources should be disbursed urgently and effectively in order to meet immediate needs and to provide the necessary momentum to the development efforts of the least developed countries. In order to achieve this result, all donors have agreed to make a special effort to increase their contributions. In this regard, all donor countries reaffirm their commitment to the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product for over-all official development assistance, as envisaged in the provisions of paragraph 24 of the International development strategy for the third United Nations development decade. Within the framework of the general increase, the flows of official development assistance will be increasingly directed towards the least developed countries. Specifically, in this connection most donors of official development assistance will devote in the coming years 0.15 per cent of their gross national product to the least developed countries. Others will double their official development assistance to the least developed countries in the same period. Taken together, these efforts are likely to achieve, by 1985, a doubling of official development assistance to the least developed countries, compared to the transfers to them during the last five years.

The balance-of-payments position of the least developed

countries is extremely precarious, and these countries are now only able to finance half their imports out of export earnings. Over the past decade, the import costs of the least developed countries have risen by \$10 billion (from £ 3 billion in 1980 to \$ 13 billion in 1980), with only a small increase in the real volume of such imports (and an actual decline in *per capita* terms). In view of this situation, all donors and others in a position to provide assistance will consider the establishment of facilities for providing such assistance, taking into account the special needs of the least developed countries.

Increased allocations to least developed countries in multilateral programmes

In view of the special difficulties of the least developed countries in obtaining access to non-concessional assistance, multilateral assistance agencies should direct to the least developed countries a substantial and increasing volume of concessional assistance. These agencies are requested to consider increasing the share of these countries in their programmes of concessional assistance.

To this end, the resources of the World Bank Group, particularly the International Development Association and of regional development banks, should be significantly increased, taking into account structural transformation needs, the rate of inflation and energy requirements; in particular, the sixth replenishment of the International Development Association, as already agreed, should be completed as rapidly as possible. Governments should thus channel a substantial part of their aid through existing multilateral agencies.

Due account should be taken of the needs of the least developed countries when considering the need for, as well as the objectives and modalities of, new multilateral assistance facilities.

New mechanisms for increased financial transfers to the least developed countries

It is recognized that the present level of official development assistance is insufficient to meet the growing requirements for external assistance of the least developed countries. Therefore, the discussions in the respective international forums regarding possible new mechanisms for mobilizing increased financial transfers to developing countries should take into account the large needs of the least developed countries. In this connection, relevant competent international institutions should continue their concerted efforts to consider new mechanisms and arrangements, which include proposals for, *inter alia*, international tax schemes for development, further gold sales by the International Monetary Fund, the linking of the creation of special drawing rights to development assistance, and the use of interest-subsidy techniques.

In view of the fact that concessional resources constitute a major source of external financing for least developed countries, the conference notes with interest that, in May 1981, the joint ministerial committee of the boards of governors of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the transfer of real resources to developing countries (development committee) decided, in principle, to establish a task force to carry forward and widen the continuing study of the problems affecting the volume and quality and effective use of concessional flows. The conference welcomes the continuing study of concessional flows in the development committee. ○

Reforming the monetary, financial and trading systems

Interview with Jan Pronk Deputy secretary-general of UNCTAD

► *Has anything changed for the LLDCs since the Paris conference?*

— Indeed something has changed. The two major decisions made to the benefit of the least developed countries are the following: firstly, it has been decided that for all of the least developed countries, aid consortia can be established. There are a few aid consortia in the world, not many of them from the least developed countries. The creation of aid consortia has always resulted in guaranteed and increased aid flows. Least developed countries need a lot of aid. They were more or less forgotten. The establishment of the aid consortia is to be chaired by the World Bank, or by UNDP or by other organizations that could really help them in guaranteeing an increased aid flow. Secondly, a decision has been made to increase aid to the least developed countries. The whole idea was to triple it by the middle of the 1980s. That has not been decided. A number of countries have announced that they are going to double their aid. Some other countries have announced that their aid to the least developed countries will be about 0.15% of the national income of the donor countries; it will result in an increase in overall aid, but less than is necessary. Anyway, it is an increase. Thirdly, the overall Substantial New Programme of Action, which has been decided upon, will be an important plank for the activities to the benefit of the least developed countries for the next 10 years, I would say.

► *What has happened since the conference?*

— The conference took place in September. The results have to be endorsed by the UN General Assembly, where some decisions can be made on the institutional follow-up. Secondly, we have in the meantime asked all the individual least developed countries what their views are with regard to the specific country-by-country follow-up, whether they really want to have a consortium, in which way, or whether they are quite content with the existing structures. Thirdly, the first aid consortium since the Paris conference, the Nepal consortium, is being set up today (3/12/81).

► *Despite a general agreement, the Immediate Programme of Action was never implemented. Are you convinced the SNPA will not have the same fate?*

— That is possible. If it is not monitored politically in the next years there is a risk that the Substantial New Programme of Action will go the same way. The Immediate Programme of Action was an important result of UNCTAD V, but it was a side effect in that the main political focus was on other issues. This substantial programme of action with the least developed countries is the result of a UN conference which took place in the open light, highlighted very much. It will be much more difficult for the developed countries just to forget the Substantial New Programme of Action, which is the result of a negotiation, in the same way as they forgot or "neglected" the Immediate Programme of Action.



*Jan Pronk,
a former Dutch
development
cooperation
minister*

► *The volume of aid agreed in Paris is much less than the LLDCs had expected. Don't you think it's too little to allow the big changes that are needed?*

— Yes. I can say that without any hesitation. We have made our calculations in UNCTAD and it is necessary to triple the volume of aid. The line of reasoning is as follows: the import costs of least developed countries have risen so much in the course of the last years, not only of oil but also of basic food imports and some essential capital goods necessary for their economic development, that doubling the aid right away will be necessary in order to keep them merely at the level of what I am accustomed to call stagnation, low growth rates. Any increase of aid over and above doubling would help them to increase their economic development, and to reach higher growth rates. In order to attain reasonable growth rates more in line with the growth rates targetted under the third UN development decade, we reckon tripling would be necessary. We have made calculations on the basis of assumptions of the offers which had been made, more or less concretely. Some countries were very concrete, others were less concrete, at the conference in Paris. And our calculations are that if we add up all optimistic assumptions the increase in aid in real terms in 1985 will be 60%. If we add up all pessimistic assumptions, it will be no more than 30%. Both increases fall short of doubling the present aid flow. I can only hope that this is not the final word and that the system of aid consortia, which is going to be established on the basis of the other main decision of Paris, will increase the overall aid flow more than has been promised at the conference.

► *Will all the LLDCs receive enough ODA?*

— One of the problems is that the small amount of aid which they are receiving is being unequally distributed amongst them. Some countries hardly receive any aid per capita. To a certain extent that's due to the small country effect: small countries have received more per capita aid than the bigger countries. But that is not the only explanation. The global monitoring of the substantial programme of action may also provide us with an instrument to distribute aid a bit more equally, fairly, amongst them.

► *It seems that the price of some major LLDCs' cash crops will decline in the future, yet there is no sign that the common fund will be operating soon. In addition, Stabex has shown some weaknesses. Could the shortfall in export earnings that would follow endanger the implementation of the SNPA?*

— Oh yes, indeed. And for that reason, because we made some assumptions for the years ahead, we said that tripling is indeed necessary. It's to compensate for future shortfalls. I don't dare to speak about quadrupling, yet I have to say that on the basis of our calculations, quadrupling would be necessary by 1990. The future still looks grim for the least developed countries. People should not think that the UN conference in Paris was a big success. It was a bigger success than many other conferences that have taken place during recent years, but for the least developed countries the future is still grim. They may benefit quite a lot from the common fund. True, it's not yet in operation. We have at the moment nearly 70 signatories, we need 90. We are proceeding in the right direction. There will be a major problem with the United States, because they have to participate in the common fund. A lot of political pressure has to be exerted. I am more optimistic since the common fund played a major role in the discussion at the Cancun summit. I really expect that the global negotiations will be launched soon and that the whole thing will also result in a quicker implementation of the common fund than we thought possible around a year ago.

► *We are at the end of 1981. Don't you think a year has already been lost in the decade for the LLDCs and that the targets set up for 1990 might be achieved only later?*

— This year has not been lost. We lost the year 1980, especially because the Immediate Programme of Action was not fulfilled. But let's forget that very bad spot in the behaviour of the rich countries. Let's not look backwards. This year has been used very well in terms of the preparation of the Paris conference. The political situation for the least developed countries in the years ahead will be different as compared to the years behind us, due to the very specific preparation for this conference. But the whole thing now has to be translated into increased aid flows. If you mean that, you are quite right and I am not getting tired of hammering on about that necessity.

► *Doesn't the SNPA establish a development pattern for all the LLDCs regardless of their differences?*

— No. It is an overall Substantial New Programme of Action, which is different from many other international resolutions which have been decided upon because quite detailed discussion on the domestic policies has also taken place. It is quite important that the relation between the domestic and the international policies should be discussed. If we only had this substantial programme of action, it would be too global, and a bit rigid, for all of them, because there are many differences between the African and Asian countries: big ones and small ones, countries with hardly any resources, some others with promising resources for the future. But the fact is that the whole conference has been different from any other UN conference in focussing on the individual problems of all the individual least developed countries separately. The conference has been prepared on a country-by-country basis. The follow-up will mainly take place in a country-by-country framework. In my view, this means the international community can really tailor its policies to the specific needs of all individual least developed countries separately.

► *Will financial aid to the LLDCs depend on the implementation of domestic reforms? If so, don't you think that's the end of the non-interference policy?*

— I wouldn't be afraid of some interference in the framework, whereby the least developed country has equal footing in the discussion. It is a fact, let's not tell too nice a story, that the least developed countries really did not carry out the right domestic policies. Allow me not to mention names. I always said that the majority did, and that for them the biggest problem was that when they started to implement good policies, they were caught in a very difficult international setting created by other countries. But some countries really could improve their domestic policies, for instance, by giving higher priority to food production, to rural development. A link, on the basis of a kind of condition, between aid and domestic policies would be wrong. But a discussion, that's what I would like to call it, on the relation between domestic policies and international policies, including resource flow increases, can only be to the LLDCs' benefit. No discussion should take place without them. But the framework of aid groups and aid consortia which is in existence for some countries already has shown that such a discussion is really quite beneficial. I can mention one example. I think that one of the most effective aid consortia has been the Indonesian one, the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia). For more than 10 years discussions of the domestic policies have taken place. The Indonesians could answer all questions, took fierce stands. They didn't allow intervention, but discussion of domestic policies could take place on an equal footing in a situation of equality. And the resource flow to Indonesia has increased enormously.

► *The SNPA contains a whole range of measures to fight the energy crisis in LLDCs. A few weeks before the Paris meeting, a UN conference in Nairobi failed to devise ways and means to solve those problems. What evidence do you have that the SNPA energy aspect will be fulfilled?*

— No evidence. It's a political matter; a political translation of the results of the conference has to take place. That can be done in the framework of the decisions which have been made and particularly the global monitoring in 1983. There will be political discussions at UNCTAD VI in 1985, there will be a mid-term review in 1987, and a long-term review, which means that there are political data whereby all countries will really have to explain why they fall short of their promises. And then they will be challenged to change their policies again by the international community. And also in the aid consortia themselves. I think it is quite an opportunity for institutional political pressure on the international community to really take the problems of the least developed countries seriously. The follow-up review of the appraisal and commitments procedure really marks a difference as compared to all other United Nations conferences which have taken place.

► *Are you optimistic about the financial transfers to the Third World?*

— I am not optimistic at all. The overall transfers are inadequate. The problems of all the countries in the Third World, not only the least developed countries, are enormous; total balance of payments deficits of all developing countries in 1981 are 100 billion dollars. The international community is hardly in a position to finance that. There is an institutional gap. We don't have the institutions at the moment to channel surpluses to deficit countries. We've now made a beginning with the problems of the least developed countries. We have to take major steps in reforming the international monetary, financial and trading systems, otherwise many developing countries will go bankrupt in the mid-'80s. Many people in developing countries are already the victims of inadequate international institutional and political change. ○

Interview by A.T.

The Common Fund for Commodities and the Least Developed Countries

by J.D. CUDDY (*)

The Common Fund for Commodities is one of the first concrete manifestations of the new international economic order on which so much stress has been laid by the international community, and the developing countries in particular, during the past seven years. That a fund should be negotiated to serve as a key instrument in the field of commodities was agreed at the fourth session of UNCTAD, held in Nairobi in 1976. After arduous negotiations, agreement was finally reached on the establishment of the fund in June 1980.

The present note discusses the structure of the fund, including its two distinct accounts, its financial structure and its voting structure. It then examines the prospects for the fund's entry into operation, and concludes with an attempt to assess the significance of the fund, particularly for the least developed countries. Given the constraints of space, the discussion is very compressed, and readers desiring more detail should contact the UNCTAD secretariat directly.

Structure of the Common Fund

(a) The first account

Once the agreement establishing it has entered into force, the Common Fund would set up and maintain two separate accounts. Through its first account, it would contribute to the financing of international buffer stocks and internationally coordinated national stocks within the framework of international commodity agreements and arrangements (ICAs). With regard to international buffer stocks, however, the resources of the first account would be available only to those ICAs based upon the principle of joint buffer stock financing of ICAs by producers and consumers, in this connexion, levy-based (e.g. cocoa) are deemed to be jointly-financed.

ICAs to be associated with the first account of the fund would be required to deposit with it in cash one third of their maximum financial requirements and would be entitled to borrow the remaining two thirds from the first account against pledges of callable capital by the participants in the ICAs and of stock warrants. For this purpose the fund is authorized to raise the requisite resources through borrowing. Lenders to the first account could be national governments or their agencies, international financial institutions, and the commercial capital markets.

(b) The second account

Through its second account, the fund would finance measures other than stocking. These would be commodity development measures, aimed at improving the structural conditions in markets and at enhancing the long-term competitiveness and prospects of particular commodities, and



WFP photo - Mattioli

The rice harvest in Mali: a regulatory mechanism in the international market is as necessary for the LLDCs as the mechanization of agriculture

would include research and development, productivity improvements, marketing and measures designed to assist vertical diversification (as a rule by means of joint financing or through technical assistance). Such measures would need to be jointly sponsored and followed up by producers and consumers within the framework of international commodity bodies meeting agreed criteria. Moreover, the fund is to give "due emphasis" to commodities of interest to the least developed countries in determining its priorities for the use of the resources of the second account.

The activities of the second account of the fund would also include the promotion of coordination and consultation with regard both to measures other than stocking, and to their financing. This would endow the fund with a broad "commodity focus", thus distinguishing it in a very fundamental way from other international institutions whose focus is essentially on countries. Provision has consequently been made for a close working relationship with such institutions and for the avoidance of duplication of their activities. It is further envisaged that the second account would undertake the joint financing of projects in association with other entities.

(c) Financial structure

The agreed financial structure of the fund involves direct government contributions to its capital of \$ 470 million, of which \$ 400 million is to be allocated to the first account and \$ 70 million to the second account. There would be additional voluntary contributions to the second account, for which a target of \$ 280 million has been agreed, making a total of \$ 350 million for the second account. Provision has also been made for the pledging of voluntary contributions and for the periodic replenishment of the resources of the second account. Of the \$ 400 million allocated to the first account, \$ 300 million would be contributed in cash and promissory notes to be encashed as and when needed by the fund for its first account operations, and \$ 100 million as callable capital to back the fund's borrowing in regard to the first account.

(*) Commodities division, UNCTAD.

Assuming that all 163 states listed in the fund agreement were to join the fund, the total capital of \$ 470 million would be distributed among countries on the basis of 32.6 per cent for the developing countries, 51.4 per cent for developed countries with market economies, 9.8 per cent for the developed countries with centrally planned economies, 3.4 per cent for China and 2.0 per cent for other countries. The distribution within these groups of countries was determined at the negotiating conference by the groups themselves. It should also be noted that the OPEC Fund for International Development has offered to pay the capital subscriptions of the least developed countries plus five other poor developing countries, thus eliminating the financial burden of the Common Fund for these countries.

(d) Voting structure

Votes would be allocated among the members of the fund in such a way that when all 163 states had joined, 45.2 per cent of the total votes would be held by the developing countries, 40.3 per cent by the developed countries with market economies, 8.1 per cent by the developed countries with centrally planned economies, 2.6 per cent by China, and 3.8 per cent by other countries. This would make the fund unique among international financial institutions, since for the first time the developing countries would have a decisive voice in decision-making. Decisions would nevertheless, wherever possible, be taken without a vote. The most important decisions, including constitutional decisions and decisions with significant financial implications for member states, would be taken by a majority of three-fourths of total votes cast. Other decisions, depending on their relative importance, would be subject to a majority of two-thirds of total votes cast or by a simple majority. The least developed countries, as a group, would hold 10.55 per cent of the total votes in the fund if all 163 states joined the fund. This is a significant share of the votes, and should ensure that their interests are well taken into account in fund decisions.

Prospects for the Common Fund

The fund agreement was opened for signature at UN headquarters in New York on 1 October 1980. At the time of writing (1 December 1981) the agreement had been signed by 73 states, including 24 of the least developed countries. Of the 73 signatory states, 14 states had also ratified it. In addition, the EEC has signed the agreement on its own behalf. Ratification of an international treaty is frequently a long process, so it is natural to find its pace slower than that of signatures. The Cancún summit meeting, held in October 1981, agreed on "the need to complete procedures for bringing the Common Fund into operation", and the United Kingdom, France and Austria announced their intentions to ratify the fund agreement. A number of other countries, including several industrial countries accounting for significant shares of the fund's capital, are known to have initiated ratification procedures in their domestic parliaments.

The fund agreement will enter into force when it has been ratified by 90 states accounting for two-thirds of the fund's directly contributed capital, the present signatories account for 69.1 per cent of this capital. The initial target date for entry into force is 31 March 1982. Should this target not be reached, provision has been made for two possible extensions of the date, after which the fund agreement would lapse.

It seems unlikely that the agreement will enter into force by this initial target. In the nature of things, much will depend upon the five countries whose capital subscriptions to the fund are the greatest—USA, Japan, USSR, Federal Republic of Germany and France, in that order—since they



Millet cultivation by resettled nomads in Mauritania

together account for 38.6 per cent of the fund's capital. Of these, all but the USSR have signed the fund agreement; Japan has ratified, and France (as noted earlier) has indicated its intention to ratify. Taking into account expectations that states which have pledged contributions to the fund and the remaining least developed states would ultimately ratify the fund agreement, present indications are that, if the USA should ratify the fund agreement during the course of 1982, the fund should become operational by early 1983.

The significance of the Common Fund

The establishment of the fund would represent a significant innovation in international institutions concerned with economic cooperation. Unlike some of the existing institutions in which developing countries have only a peripheral role, these countries would be participating in the Common Fund as important partners with developed countries. They would be providing a sizeable portion of the fund's resources and would have adequate voices in the process of decision-making. The innovative character of the fund would not be confined to the greater participation of developing countries in its financial and management structures. Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that it would be an international cooperative endeavour which would take into account the interests of all countries and whose operations would provide substantial benefits for both developing and developed countries.

The Common Fund would play an important role in providing greater stability and strength to the international markets for commodities of export interest to developing countries. By providing finance on attractive terms for the support of prices through international commodity agreements, it would be able to play the role of a catalyst in bringing about such agreements. The participants in ICAs would now need to raise only one third of the financial requirements in cash and they would have the prior assurance of securing the balance from the fund on reasonable terms. Such an assurance would be a crucial factor in facilitating the successful conclusion of negotiations on individual commodities. In view of the agreement on joint financing by producers and consumers, this means that producing countries, most of whom are poor developing countries, would have to provide in cash only one-sixth of the total financial requirements. Moreover, even this contribution could, if the appropriate

Increasing the absorptive capacity for development assistance to the least developed countries: a crucial challenge

by D. CAULFIELD and A. NGORORANO (*)

Initially the discussion of the problems relating to absorptive capacity was not focussed specifically on the least developed countries but on the aid absorption constraints facing the developing countries in general. However, the very limited capabilities of the least developed countries to plan, prepare, negotiate assistance programmes, identify projects and to administer and execute them, as well as the need to modify assistance policies and procedures in the light of the particular problems and needs of these countries, clearly justify the special attention that is being accorded to this category of countries in the further discussion of absorptive capacity.

Elements of a strategy to increase absorptive capacity

Pursuant to UNCTAD conference resolution 98(IV), the secretary-general of UNCTAD convened in October/November 1977 a special meeting of representatives of multilateral and bilateral financial and technical institutions with representatives of the least developed countries. The meeting addressed itself inter alia to central issues confronting both the least developed countries and the donor community in their efforts to increase the absorptive capacity for development assistance in these countries. The results of this meeting have paved the way for the ongoing discussions on this subject both in UNCTAD and other development assistance institutions. During the United Nations conference on the least developed countries, held in September 1981, several proposals on the improvement of aid modalities as well as of the domestic development efforts in the least developed countries were agreed upon as part of the Substantial New Programme of Action for the 1980s (SNPA). Their implementation should not only improve the quality of aid but also contribute positively to a greater absorptive capacity of development assistance.

Other initiatives in this area include the adoption by DAC member countries in 1978 of a recommendation on terms and conditions of aid, which specifically endorses special terms for the least developed countries. The DAC member countries furthermore reached an agreement in 1979 on guidelines on local and recurrent cost financing and on improving aid implementation, from which least developed coun-

conditions are met, be re-financed through the buffer stock facility of the International Monetary fund. This contrasts with the situation in the past whereby the producers were required to provide 100 per cent of the mandatory contributions whilst contributions by the consumers were voluntary.

To obtain a rough idea of the amount of finance which would be mobilized by the fund, suppose that, in addition to the existing ICAs in which stocking provisions are provided (tin, rubber, cocoa and sugar), agreements with stocking arrangements were finally negotiated for the remaining "core" commodities identified in UNCTAD studies as suitable for stocking, viz. tea, coffee, cotton, jute, hard fibres and copper. Then something on the order of \$ 2-3 billion would be deposited in the fund by the associating ICAs, and the fund would raise about \$ 4-6 billion on the capital markets. When one adds to this the fund's original capital resources of \$ 750 million, the total is in the range of \$ 7-10 billion, a significant amount.

The Common Fund would also make a significant contribution to the economic development of developing countries through financial assistance from its second account for measures other than stocking which have hitherto received inadequate attention. The establishment of the second account would increase the relevance of the Common Fund for a large number of developing countries, particularly the relatively poorer among them who might not readily benefit from stocking operations.

With regard to the least developed countries in particular, it is of considerable interest to note that, relative to their total trade, they are significant net exporters of the 18 commodities on which focus has been centred in UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodities (1), which gave birth to the Common Fund. These 18 commodities account in aggregate for 59.2 per cent of the least developed countries' total exports, and for only 7.1 per cent of their imports (based on 1970-79 averages). For many least developed countries, the dependence is extremely high; for example, the 18 commodities account for more than 80 per cent of total exports for a quarter of the least developed countries. Only four least developed countries are net importers of the 18 commodities and in every case the amounts are small and a result of imports of sugar. It is therefore clear that the least developed countries stand to gain substantially from a series of effective commodity agreements or arrangements financed through the first or second accounts of the Common Fund.

Conclusions

In sum, the Common Fund is an international financial institution of very considerable potential in the field of commodities, with the special characteristic that the voice of the developing countries will be heard with vastly more authority than in existing financial institutions, since these countries have a dominant share of the votes. In addition, the fund contains provisions explicitly designed to promote the interests of the least developed countries, which, as a bloc would hold a considerable share of the total votes in the fund. Furthermore, if the least developed countries (as several have already done) take advantage of the offer of the OPEC fund for International Development to pay their capital subscriptions, this voice in the fund would carry no financial burden. ○ J.D. CUDDY

(1) These commodities are: bananas, bauxite, cocoa, coffee, copper, cotton and cotton yarn, hard fibres and products, iron ore, jute and products, manganese, meat, phosphates, rubber, sugar, tea, tropical timber, tin, vegetable oils including olive oil, and oilseeds. This list is not, however, exhaustive, and other commodities could come under the first or second account of the Common Fund (e.g. wheat, pepper, etc.).

(*) D. Caulfield is head of UNCTAD's special programme for least developed, land-locked and island developing countries. Mr Ngororano also works for that programme.

tries should benefit. The UNDP report on "consultations on more uniform or standard procedures to facilitate the administration of development cooperation" is also noteworthy in this connexion. An attempt is made below to highlight the main elements that underlie this concerted effort to increase the absorptive capacity for aid.

Removal of constraints in planning, preparing and negotiating assistance programmes and identifying projects.

The lack of adequate skilled manpower is a key factor in limiting the absorptive capacity for development assistance. Donor institutions are therefore called upon to help increase the local capacity to identify, prepare and implement programmes and projects. Indeed donors should, as a deliberate policy, be involved in project planning activities. This would, as a general rule, accelerate the approval of projects. Such practice would be made considerably more viable if the field officers from donor countries or institutions were not only high-ranking but were accorded greater decision authority.

The donor institutions should also make efforts to simplify the aid planning and negotiating process so as not to overburden the already weak administrative structures in the least developed countries. In this connexion, donors should provide opportunities to least developed countries to become acquainted with their aid policies and programmes. Furthermore, the criteria for assessing the viability of projects by donors should be made much more flexible, particularly to support certain types of projects with a low rate of return but which can bring about structural changes in the economy.

The least developed countries on their part should endeavour to strengthen their aid receiving procedures, particularly through the introduction of longer-term planning. They should do everything possible to build up their manpower capabilities through the provision of effective on-the-job training facilities and minimizing such practices as frequent transfers of trained personnel. They should furthermore identify major new investment opportunities such as rural development projects, natural resource development and public work projects. If such projects are planned to fully involve the rural local participation they could offer considerable opportunities to increase the absorptive capacity by tapping new development potentials.

Modifying assistance policies and procedures

The adjustment of donor policies and practices to the special problems of the least developed countries can enhance their absorptive capacity. Some of the measures that some donors are already undertaking, or those that still need to be implemented in this connexion, include the following: To support the long-term planning efforts of the least developed countries the likely level of aid to become available over a number of years should be indicated by donors. The unpredictability of assistance flows seriously hampers systematic planning. Further efforts by donors should therefore be made to establish budgetary mechanisms which ensure a more continuous and predictable flow of resources and which strengthen the commitment of least developed countries and thus improve their aid absorptive capacity. In providing resources to the least developed countries, all donors should endeavour to do so in the form of grants and loans on highly concessional terms. Such assistance should, to the maximum extent possible, be on an untied basis.

Donors could also enlarge the absorptive capacity of these countries if more resources could be channelled to local financial intermediaries such as development finance

companies, agricultural credit organizations and commercial banks. Furthermore, given the overextended administrative capabilities of the least developed countries, donors should endeavour to channel more resources through multilateral agencies or within the framework of multidonor assistance programmes, as such a practice would reduce the burden of dealing with a large number of donors.

In view of the limited capacity of the least developed countries to mobilize domestic resources, and mounting pressures on development budgets, donors should increase their contribution to local-cost financing. The acute budgetary limitations in the least developed countries call for more donors to meet recurrent costs, for the completion, maintenance and operation of projects. These costs are particularly high with respect to social infrastructure projects, where least developed countries need to undertake extensive investments.

Another important element of assistance programmes relates to the need for more non-project financing. Whereas the role of project assistance will continue to be dominant, there is a need for more resources for non-project programmes or sectoral support to the least developed countries. With the serious balance of payments situation in these countries, such financing can help meet acutely needed imports. Part of these resources could be used to support the foreign exchange needs of small producers who generally have little access to donor project programmes. Furthermore, such financing could be used for meeting local and recurrent cost expenditures. It is interesting to note that the World Bank's newly introduced structural adjustment lending (SAL) is particularly designed to provide foreign resources to meet some of these needs.

Aid coordination

Because the aid strategy of individual donors varies in a number of respects, the concept of aid coordination on the part of donors has not always been popular. Furthermore, the recipients themselves may not always be keen on aid coordination because they may prefer to deal with donors on an individual basis. However justified such views might be, there is now a general recognition that the increasing number of donors has made the task of satisfying the many donor requirements related to project identification, appraisal, implementation, monitoring etc., a formidable one for the least developed countries. Indeed some mechanism for harmonizing donor aid procedures and practices exists in the DAC and should be strengthened. This should facilitate a larger inflow of resources to the least developed countries. Furthermore, the danger of donors concentrating on a limited number of development fields to the neglect of others, which are nonetheless of importance to the economy, would be minimized.

Better coordination between donors and recipients of aid is also of great importance where mutual contacts are weak. Donor representation in the least developed countries is often very scant, as is their familiarity with these countries' particular problems, development objectives and priorities. A deliberate policy on both sides to intensify the development dialogue is required.

The Substantial New Programme of Action for the 1980s for the least developed countries adopted in Paris in September calls for a greater increase of resource transfers to the least developed countries to meet immediate needs and to provide the necessary momentum to the development efforts of these countries. However, in order to ensure that such resources are disbursed rapidly and absorbed effectively, improvements in aid practices and management by both the least developed countries and their development partners are essential. ○ D.C. and A.N.

Community cooperation with the least developed countries

The 31 UN least developed countries are very much at the heart of the Community's development policies: 22 are African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) and 9 are developing countries in Asia and Latin America (1).

In 1980 the European Community committed \$ 490 m of assistance to the least developed countries. The Community is thus the least developed countries' second largest multi-lateral donor, after the International Development Agency of the World Bank.

Its main instruments are the Lomé Convention, the European Investment Bank, the programmes for food aid, emergency aid, co-financing with NGOs as well as the programme for the non-associated developing countries (2).

With 35 to 40 % of their total trade being with the EEC, the least developed countries have their largest trade partner in the Community. Most of their exports enter the EEC market duty free, either under the Lomé provisions or the GSP rules.

The Lomé Convention

In 1975 a strategy for preferential treatment and support for a large number of African, Caribbean and Pacific least developed countries (3) was written into the first Lomé Convention. This was subsequently reinforced in Lomé II. This is the first instrument of development cooperation that recognizes the concept of "least developed country" as a policy concept.

Financial cooperation. The privileged treatment in favour of least developed countries is apparent in all aspects of cooperation but is of particular importance in the field of financial cooperation. This is reflected in their share of the allocation of funds for the country indicative programmes: in Lomé I the 22 least developed ACPs received 56.3 % of total amounts committed as of June 1981 (or ECU 997 m), while in Lomé II they have been allocated 56 % of funds (or ECU 1306 to 1483 m) (4).

It should be recalled that the 22 least developed ACPs represent some 41 % of total ACP population.

Several Lomé provisions of general application (i.e. for all ACP countries) are of particular relevance to the least developed: for instance the programming exercise undertaken between the Community and each ACP country at the beginning of the Convention earmarks the amount of funds the country in question will receive during the life of the Convention, i.e. the following five years. This long-term assurance of funds is thus an important element for effective medium-term planning: between Lomé I and Lomé II the main priority has switched from industrialization, rural production and infrastructure to the rural sector, transport and communications.

As regards aid modalities, the Lomé provisions for all ACP countries are extremely liberal overall, but nevertheless contain certain preferential clauses for the least developed. Of the various types of aid, the least developed countries have

a priority call on grants (5) and risk capital (i.e. equity participation in the capital of industrial concerns). Furthermore, the standard conditions for loans (40 years maturity with 10 year grace period and interest charge of 1 %) are softer (0.75 % interest) for the least developed. With regard to project aid, the Convention provides for the possibility of covering 100 % of costs, including local costs and—exceptionally for the least developed—recurrent costs on a diminishing scale.

As for invitations to tender, they are open to all Community and ACP undertakings (6) and subsequent payments are made directly to the executing company, thus avoiding any advance by the ACP country concerned. In addition, the least developed are able to benefit from derogations allowing the participation of third country firms in tendering, as well as for a simplified tendering procedure.

Stabex. The scheme for the stabilization of export earnings was introduced in Lomé I and further improved in Lomé II. Its aim is to provide a remedy against the adverse effects of unstable export receipts from a series of products—now numbering 44—due either to fluctuations in demand (which to date have accounted for circa 1/3 of transfers) or to variations in supply (to date about 2/3 of transfers).

The conditions for benefitting from the scheme are considerably more favourable for the least developed countries, having been further improved in Lomé II: the dependence threshold (the percentage of exports the product has to account for in relation to total exports) and the trigger threshold (the drop in export earnings of a product in relation to average past earnings) are now 2 % (against 6.5 % for the other ACP). Moreover, transfers to the least developed are made in grants while the others receive interest-free loans. The special difficulties of the least developed countries are taken into consideration for the criteria to be applied for the addition of new products, as well as for the reduction of transfers due to the insufficiency of funds; and eight least developed countries have benefitted from a derogation allowing coverage of exports to all destinations rather than (as is the general rule) to the Community.

The first five years of operations of the Stabex system (7) show that it has turned out to be an important means of helping many of the weaker countries: over this period 18 of the 22 least developed ACPs benefitted from transfers totalling ECU 202 m, or 51.8 % of total Stabex transfers, with the Sahel countries benefitting most (44 % of the total). One of the most noteworthy features of the system is the speed of disbursements: almost all transfers are made within nine months of presentation of the request.

(1) Afghanistan, Bangladesh, *Benin*, Bhutan, *Botswana*, *Burundi*, *Cape Verde*, *Central African Republic*, *Chad*, *Comoros*, *Ethiopia*, *Gambia*, *Guinea*, *Guinea-Bissau*, Haiti, Laos, *Lesotho*, *Malawi*, *Maldives*, *Mali*, *Nepal*, *Niger*, *Rwanda*, *Somalia*, *Sudan*, *Tanzania*, *Uganda*, *Upper Volta*, *Western Samoa*, Yemen AR, Yemen PDR. (ACP countries in italics).

(2) The Lomé Convention and its attendant European Development Fund run for 5 years while the other programmes are financed out of the regular Community budget on a yearly basis. For its part the EIB administers some of the EDF money and lends from its own resources (see table).

(3) The Lomé definition is broader than the UN one and covers 36 countries.

(4) The two largest beneficiaries of the country indicative programmes in both Conventions are Ethiopia and Tanzania, both least developed countries.

(5) The overall grant element of Community aid (EDF, budget, EIB) to the 31 least developed countries in 1979 was 99 %, against an average of 95.6 % for DAC countries.

(6) Firms of the recipient country have a 10 % price preference over other offers, which explains the important share (about 30 %) of contracts won by ACP firms under Lomé I.

(7) Cf. the comprehensive report on Stabex 1975/79: COM(81)1104 of 13 July 1981.



Sysmin aims to safeguard the ACP production capacity in certain minerals, such as copper (here in Zambia)

Sysmin. Whereas Stabex ensures that the countries producing agricultural raw materials have more stable incomes, Sysmin aims at the safeguard of the mining potential of certain minerals. The system tends to concentrate on the more serious cases: for the Community to provide assistance to a country, the product in question must account for at least 15 % of export earnings (for the least developed: 10 %) and there must have been a drop of 10 % in production or export capacity. Aid is in the form of project loans repayable over 40 years with a 10 year grace period and an interest rate of 1 % (0.75 % for the least developed). Sysmin was introduced for the first time in Lomé II and the first loans were made in 1981. Its total funds for the five years amount to ECU 280 m.

Besides safeguarding the existing mineral potential through Sysmin, Lomé II contains several provisions for encouraging the development of mineral and energy production from which the least developed countries will certainly benefit (cf. next section on EIB).

The European Investment Bank

The European Investment Bank operates in the ACP countries using funds from the Bank's own resources or drawing on EDF money earmarked for the purpose. Loans from the Bank's own resources benefit from interest subsidies out of an EDF grant allocation that sets an 8 % interest ceiling for ACP borrowers. The EIB also handles risk capital assistance provided for in the EDF.

The Bank's sectorial priorities as well as the lower grant element of its resources explain its relatively low involvement in the 22 ACP least developed countries: during Lomé I, 15 countries received globally some ECU 64 m or 13 % of total finance provided by the Bank.

The resources managed by the Bank under Lomé II have

nearly doubled, to ECU 1162 m. In addition, a declaration annexed to the Convention foresees the possibility for the Bank to lend further sums from its own resources (up to ECU 200 m) for mining and energy projects. The EIB resources will therefore remain concentrated in the same sectorial priorities but with an added emphasis on mining and energy.

Financial and technical cooperation with non-associated developing countries

The Community aid programme for the developing countries in Asia and Latin America started in 1976. It has grown from a budget of ECU 20 m in 1976 to ECU 145 m in 1980 and a further increase is envisaged. During the first five years, seven of the nine non-ACP least developed countries received assistance worth ECU 59.5 m of commitments, or 15.7 % of total commitments.

The aid provided under this programme is in the form of grants and focuses on poorer countries. It is meant essentially for rural development and for improving food production; it may cover local costs as well as, under certain conditions, maintenance and operating expenses.

As regards procurement, it is open not only to contractors in the Community but also in the recipient country. In exceptional cases it may be possible to accept tenders from other developing countries which are in receipt of Community aid.

Food aid

The Community food aid programme is a major component of Community development assistance: started in 1968 with a programme of \$ 20 m, it had grown to a budget of \$ 409 m in 1980 or 17.5 % of total Community assistance in that year.

Practically all least developed countries—whose food production is more often than not very precarious—are in receipt of food aid. Jointly they receive between 20-25 % of the total.

In November 1980, following the adoption in the European Parliament of the Ferrero resolution on hunger in the world, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution which opens up two new major opportunities:

- better food aid planning through multi-annual programming;
- the use of food aid to build up security stocks for emergency situations on a country or regional basis.

More recently, as a follow-up to the Paris conference, the Commission has taken two new initiatives (8) for launching a plan of action to combat world hunger. The main lines of its proposal, now in front of the Council, are twofold:

- to grant an exceptional allocation worth some ECU 40 m of food aid intended for the least developed countries and to contribute 100 000 tonnes of cereals to the International Emergency Food Reserve;
- to join Community and member states' efforts in order to support food deficit developing countries in the implementation of their national food strategies. In this context member countries would make efforts to achieve the 0.15 % target of ODA in favour of the least developed countries.

Emergency aid

The Paris programme for the least developed countries recognizes that these countries are susceptible to major natural disasters and have been affected by conflicts creating serious refugee problems. The Community emergency assis-

(8) COM(81)546 and 560.

tance (9) has been established with these preoccupations in view; it takes the form of aid in kind and may be channelled directly or through international NGOs.

In recent years most of the 31 least developed countries have benefitted from such assistance and have been receiving some 20% of total allocations.

Co-financing with NGOs

For the last five years the Community has been operating a programme of co-financed projects with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The Community contribution is in the form of grants and normally covers up to 50% of total costs.

The least developed countries usually receive between 1/4 and 1/3 of funds committed.

In general NGOs tend to promote rural development and education/training, although they have also shown some interest in new sectors such as child care and renewable energy resources. NGOs in fact show a high degree of flexibility and capacity to respond to local needs and initiatives.

Trade

The European Community is by far the largest trade partner of the least developed countries: in 1979 they exported to the Community a total of \$ 2 300 m (\$ 1 800 m from the 22 least developed ACPs), or 36.9% of their total exports. In the same year they collectively imported from the Community some \$ 4 500 m worth of goods (of which \$ 3 300 m for the 22 least developed ACPs), or 35.4% of their total imports.

(9) The emergency assistance comes from two sources: the EDF for the ACP countries and the budget for the others.

99.5% of ACP exports enter the Community market duty and quota free



Emergency aid in Niger. In recent years most of the 31 LLDCs have benefitted from such help from the EEC

As far as access to the Community market is concerned, the 22 least developed countries which are parties to the Lomé Convention benefit from its liberal trade provisions; in fact 99.5% of ACP exports enter the Community market duty and quota free, the remainder being products covered by the common agricultural policy.

Special rules apply to beef and veal (preference for imports of given quantities) and agreement has been reached on the additional protocols for bananas (export promotion), sugar (guaranteed delivery and removal of given quantities at fixed prices) and rum (zero-rated imports of given quantities). All such agreements but the last one are relevant for some least developed countries.

The Lomé Convention, moreover, establishes pragmatic rules of origin which make it easier to grant reasonable derogations to the least developed countries' exports.

The other nine least developed countries benefit from the Community GSP and in particular from its more favourable clauses for the least developed. At present some 98% (10) of their exports enter the Community market duty free, and there are proposals to improve the 1982 GSP scheme which would bring duty exemption to 99%.

Of the trade with the non-ACP least developed countries, only two products are subject to quantitative restrictions by virtue of bilateral agreements: jute and textiles from Bangladesh and textiles from Haiti.

Both ACP and non-ACP least developed countries benefit from the trade promotion programme of the Community. ○

A. TINCANI

(10) Some 77.5% of their 1979 exports were products from SITC chapters 25 to 99 which entered the Community market at zero rate. The remaining 22.5% were products from chapters 1 to 24, of which only 2% were neither covered by the GSP nor the zero rate of the Common Customs Tariff.



Ministry of Information Niger

Community development cooperation policies with the least developed countries: instruments and activities

| Recipients | Lomé Convention | | | Other |
|-------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| | Trade | Financial and technical cooperation | Sectors | |
| ACP least developed countries | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Special attention in the application of safeguards (Art. 15) 2. More flexible rules of origin (Art. 30.4 of Protocol 1) 3. Special provisions for trade promotion (Art. 21.k) 4. STABEX <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lower dependence and trigger thresholds (Art. 46.1) • Grant aid (Art. 46.1) • Possibility to apply exports to all destinations (Art. 46.3) • Priority attention in the case of insufficiency of funds or for adding new products (Art. 46.2) 5. SYSMIN <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low dependence threshold (Art. 53) • Softer loan terms (Art. 56 and 106.3) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Country programmes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Priority attention in allocation of resources (Art. 106.1) • Priority call on grants (Art. 106.2) • Softer loan terms (Art. 106.3) • Possible assistance in definition of programmes and projects (Art. 108.3) • Special difficulties of LLDC to be considered in project evaluation (Art. 112.3) • Special priority for micro-projects (Art. 145) 2. Aid modalities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coverage of running and supporting costs possible (Art. 152.2 and 153) • Simplified tendering procedures (Art. 129) • Third country tendering possible (Art. 125.4) 3. Technical cooperation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Special focus on LLDC problems in studies (Art. 139.4) • Special priority in training schemes (Art. 141.6) 4. Assistance on debt possible (Art. 107) 5. Priority claim on regional funds (Art. 135.2) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Special attention in industrial cooperation (Art. 82) 2. Special attention in agricultural cooperation (Art. 90) 3. SYSMIN (cf. trade column) 4. Emergency aid p.m. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. EIB loans from own resources, p.m. 2. Food aid, p.m. 3. Co-financing with NGOs, p.m. |
| Non-ACP least developed | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Special provisions under the GSP 2. Jute and textiles agreements 3. Trade promotion, p.m. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Programme for the non-associated developing countries, p.m. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The non-associates programme to focus on rural sector, p.m. 2. Training activities for the non-associates, p.m. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Food aid, p.m. 2. Emergency aid, p.m. 3. Co-financing with NGOs, p.m. |

NB. Pro memoria items are meant to give a fuller picture of Community development policy even though they do not contain special provisions for the least developed countries.

The European Parliament and the LLDCs

Interview with Euro-MP Robert Cohen

As Europe shivers through the winter and nearly a decade of recession, will public opinion support an increase in aid to the Third World? A strong argument up to now has been the need to revive the international economy by increasing the purchasing power of the developing countries, but for many people in the LLDCs it is a matter of survival rather than buying more foreign products. The European Parliament is the voting public's forum in the EEC, but what power does it have to influence meetings such as the Paris conference? Dutch Socialist Robert Cohen covered the conference for the Parliament and believes European public opinion will support more aid for the least developed countries.

► *Do you feel there's much point in defining an arbitrary number of countries as "least developed", rather than tackling poverty wherever it is to be found? After all, more of the world's poorest people live outside the 31 LLDCs than in them.*

— Yes, I feel there is some point in listing these countries, even if I'm not in total agreement with the list. Some countries are poorer than others for various reasons — historical, maybe colonial, although it may also be due to their not having been colonies — and this has been recognized by most developing countries themselves. That might be considered a concession made at the Paris conference by the developing countries, in that the separate list could be detrimental to the political cohesion they have always maintained.

Ambiguous

► *Might it also be detrimental to the economic prospects of the developing countries not included in the list?*

— Certainly. More concessions were made by the South than by the North at the Paris conference. If, as a follow-up to the conference, we do increase our aid to the poorest countries, the others may receive less. The Group of 77 were aware of this but nonetheless accepted the "least developed" category, even if the list is slightly arbitrary and maybe out of date. All the industrialized countries really agreed was to increase their aid to the LLDCs, but nobody made it clear whether this meant an increase in overall aid, and the conference allowed this ambiguity to remain. Trade concessions were equally vague, and the European Parliament will be checking what is actually done in this respect, for instance as regards generalized preferences and the multi-fibre agreement.

► *The European Parliament was only represented at the Paris conference as an observer. As your report comments, this lack of official status at international meetings limits the Parliament's usefulness as a participant. What can it do to provide a follow-up to the conference?*

— All we can do, as usual, is try to formulate policies which we hope will be adopted by the EEC Commission and Council, or at least provide new thinking. For instance, our resolution on world hunger last year led to Commission proposals which have been partly accepted by the Council. I think we should do the same as regards the LLDCs and insist on trade measures which will benefit them.

Extending Stabex

At any rate, everything the Parliament says has a different moral and political legitimacy than a Commission proposal; our proposals are not binding, but they carry a moral weight and they have some practical implications as well. For instance, we support the idea of extending Stabex to all LLDCs, which was proposed at the conference, and the Commission is to study this idea. But we went further, noting the problems of Stabex in its present Lomé context and calling for the Commission's study to look at other possibilities of alleviating slumps in Third World export receipts. As regards food aid, we felt that the Community's ECU 40 m offer for 1982 should not just be a one-off operation, made possible by a budget carry-over from 1981, but that food aid to the LLDCs should be a permanent part of aid programmes.

► *You say the European Parliament's proposals carry the "moral weight" of European public opinion. Do the majority of EEC voters approve of giving more aid and trade concessions to the Third World?*

— It's difficult to say, but I have the impression that where there are real needs, as in the LLDCs, the majority of EEC voters are still willing to help out — especially when aid is associated with the problem of world hunger. This is not to say that food aid is the ultimate solution, but it is necessary until the starving countries can feed themselves. I'm not so sure that the majority of people in the EEC would accept a greater liberalization of trade with the countries that have already achieved a fair degree of industrialization, but as regards the least developed countries, I think people are still generous enough to help.

► *Over the next few years, when the Substantial New Programme of Action must be implemented, will the European Parliament be an effective lobby group for the LLDCs among the international organizations?*

— We have not been so far. We were unable to play an active part in the preparation of the Paris conference and could only present reports, before and after. As regards such conferences, in future we should try to come into the picture at a much earlier stage, although I'm not sure exactly how, and also to make our position clearer — I had the impression in Paris that nobody knew we were present at the conference. We were observers like any non-governmental organization. This has mainly to do with the institutional build-up of the Community, but it is a problem and we will have to tackle it. ○ Interview by B.T.



Photo Hubert

Menotti Bottazzi

Keeping the authorities and the general public in the picture

Interview with NGO leader Menotti Bottazzi

It has only taken a few years for the NGOs, the non-governmental organizations, to make their mark as full partners in the world of development cooperation where, for some time, their amateurism (matched, it is true, by their unshakeable faith) made many an expert smile. Today, they can even be essential intermediaries in assistance schemes in some countries, and there is now general agreement that they are fast and efficient and that they work at grass roots level to improve the lot of the most underprivileged.

CCFD, the Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development, is the biggest NGO in France. Its secretary-general, Menotti Bottazzi, who enjoys telling people that he is French even if his name might suggest otherwise, has been particularly well prepared for this crusade "to sow the seeds of hope" by his career as a miner (12 years down a potassium mine) and his experience as a union militant (eight years with Action Catholique Ouvrière). As he said in an autobiographical work: "Whatever I do, I shall always be concerned with the people of the Third World, the marginals of our planet".

Menotti Bottazzi is also vice-chairman of the NGO liaison committee, which coordinates NGO activities in the countries of the European Community. In an interview with the *Courier* in Paris last December, Mr Bottazzi outlined the main sectors of NGO activity.

— We have three main fields of activity. First, everything to do with rural life and, more particularly, food. We have a lot of projects, activities, in this field. Sector number two—and I don't know whether this is in order of importance—is everything to do with education, training projects for children and adults. Number three is everything to do with health, and here I should point out that we make a special effort with prevention and health education. There are many other things too, but let us say that the important ones are, undeniably, rural development, education and health.

► *Don't you have the impression that the NGOs are now looked on as a panacea in the world of development?*

— I should like to make clear just what we do think, because our ideas are often thought to be a bit quaint, a bit ecological if you like. What I really think, and experience has shown it to be the case in a way, is that NGO work is very important because it is close to the people. Our projects get people involved. I should also like to underline the fact that these activities should, ideally, be pilot schemes. What we are aiming at is not for the NGOs to be a universal panacea, but to get the states, governments, authorities and inter-governmental bodies to take charge of these problems.

We have no illusions. Even if everything we do is properly done—which isn't always the case—we can only be a drop in the ocean. We are only small organizations that want to be dynamic and gear what we do to everyday reality, and

we shall only be really effective if the authorities and the states and the inter-governmental systems follow up what we do. We also hope that we can influence what is being done at international level, otherwise there is a danger of our action going wide of the mark. What we do, I think, is very important, but we can only get right to our target if we manage to get everything on the move. And everything means the governments, the authorities and so on.

► *Aren't you a bit overawed by your success?*

— Not at all. I hope it continues. But I also hope that the leaders of the NGOs, myself and others, are clever enough to realize that we are not working for our own glory.

► *Are NGOs fashionable because the industrialized countries don't want to increase the aid they give in a time of crisis, but to channel what they give, through you, to basic schemes?*

— Some people think like that, maybe. There's no point in hiding it, is there? I also think—and here I am speaking for my NGO and perhaps for the all NGOs of the North—that we will show our sincerity and our ability to understand the problems of our time if we can avoid reducing our aid to the Third World, as there are a certain number of obstacles in the North that are important, crucial even, when it comes to the harmonious development of the peoples of the world. So I think it would be quite wrong for us to become an alibi

or a conscience-saver for our governments and our authorities and that we ourselves have to think about the sort of commitments that are being made, about the cooperation that is planned and, most important, about internal changes in our methods of production and consumption and in our international policy, so that a cooperation policy is not just another way of prolonging political colonialism via economic colonialism.

Doing more than collecting money

► *This means doing far more than just collecting money.*

— Of course it does. I should even go so far as to say, without wishing to minimize the funding of projects, which is still among our most important activities, that finance is one part of an overall policy. Often it's the most spectacular part, the most visible one, but it is not the most important thing. Far from it. The work I do here, for example, as secretary-general of the Catholic Committee against Hunger and for Development, is much more a question of information; getting public opinion moving and putting the authorities in the picture. I think that is what gets us moving—far more than the idea of collecting money and transforming it into projects in the Third World. If we only did projects we would perhaps be using only 10% or 20% of our time. The essential thing is the information we give, making people aware of the situation, and this desire we have to work for the political and economic change that has to come in our own countries.

► *Your action in the field tends to be limited to running small projects, although they are very numerous. Isn't that prejudicial to the countries being assisted?*

— Yes, I think it is. We have to say these things with a lot of humility because it would be wrong to forget that, in a way, many aid schemes are a carry-over from aid given to the whites who used to live in the Third World. This is particularly true of the countries of Africa where there were missionaries and people in other walks of life who wanted

money from their fellow citizens back home. Fortunately, this gradually changed and local people took over from the whites. But what still hasn't been settled is this double policy. The NGOs are anxious not to disperse their aid and to look after their customers, and they also want their activities to fit in with the development plans of the individual countries.

I also think, perfectly honestly, that there are two shortcomings. One is insufficient coordination to get the NGOs working within development plans, and the other is the lack of any coherent development plans in some countries. We have to go on making an effort at these two levels and we are ready to do so now, just as we are ready to do more work with the authorities in our countries to make development policies more coherent and to be more involved with the governments in the countries of Africa and elsewhere.

"Graveyards are the only place you don't get politics"

► *So you are prepared for political action?*

— Yes, I am. We already do act politically. Graveyards are the only place you don't get politics. You get politics everywhere else and I can't say it worries me overmuch.

► *Hasn't this attitude of yours been a nuisance sometimes in the developing countries?*

— Not to us or to me directly, but perhaps to a certain number of groups we usually call our partners and with whom we work. You have brought up a very important point here, which was the subject of a lot of discussion at the conference on the LLDCs. I don't think development comes from the outside. Not at all. I am French and I wouldn't claim to be able to develop Mali or Upper Volta or Niger or India or Vietnam. What I do think is that I, as a Frenchman, can provide aid and display solidarity with the people working in Mali and Upper Volta and Niger, with the people involved in the development of their own agriculture, health facilities, education or whatever. So I can back these people up—and that in fact is what we do.

One of the characteristics of the NGOs is their diversity. There are confessional organizations, private foundations, Red Cross societies and bodies that help refugees and provide assistance for underprivileged children. What they have in common is their generally small scale of operations, which can make them particularly effective, and the fact that their aid is nearly always in the form of grants.

In Lesotho, one of the most active of the NGOs is the Save the Children Fund (SCF), which, as its name suggests, caters primarily for children, especially the worst-off of them, the sick and the parentless, whom it takes in, cares for and educates. But children are not its only concern and many adults get their wheelchairs, orthopedic boots, crutches and so on from the SCF too.

The SCF has two children's villages. One, for 70 sick children, is combined with a craft workshop, and the other, housing 54 orphans, is associated with an agricultural project. In both these cases, the SCF looks after the education of the children in its care and sees they get a job. The former is, for obvious reasons, in the capital, this being the only town with the medical facilities to treat handicapped children. Its vocational training workshop gives them an opportunity to learn how to make spinning wheels, which are much in demand in the local mohair industry, and basic furniture. There is also a craft workshop where curtains, clothing, cushions and whatever else the customer cares


to order can be made. The children make the everyday articles they need themselves and they also manage to meet a certain local demand—which brings in some money.

The principle of self-sufficiency also guides the centre for young orphans at Masité (40 km from the capital) and the farm attached to it. This farm is run by an ex-student who has studied agriculture and it provides most of what the small community needs. The land was a gift from the village chief, something he must now be proud of as the whole village benefits from the facilities (a tractor, a cereal mill and dams) at the centre.

The SCF also helps a home for handicapped girls, young shepherds who spend winter in the mountains with nowhere to shelter from the cold, and the training centre for the blind.

Most of the money comes from abroad. The budget runs to 110 000-120 000 Rand every year and only 3000-4000 of it is collected in Lesotho itself—although this is no surprise, bearing in mind how poor the country is.

Lesotho could not do without the help of the Save the Children Fund at the moment. Without it, its young handicapped people would be prisoners in the distant hills with no prospect of getting any education (schools are often a long way off) or of being independent one day. ○ A.T.



Menotti Bottazzi during a visit to Cambodia

If there are people who come up against problems, it is perhaps because they don't always have a good enough idea of what the general options are. But I also think, a bit harshly maybe, that all too often government plans don't take enough notice of what the people think and that the people don't have enough say in devising the programmes. This is something that was stressed at the Paris conference on the LLDCs. We got a lot of delegates from the countries of the South to come because the NGOs in the South must have the opportunity to say what they think.

"The people really must be involved"

Generally speaking, the people really must be involved. They must be able to say what they think in the towns and in the country. They must give their opinions on agricultural and social projects. They must be able to be heard. It mustn't just be the ministers, the governments and their experts who get to state their case. Development plans mustn't be drawn up without the help of the very people concerned. This is what we believe. It is very important and it would be wrong to try to hide the fact that it sometimes causes friction between us and the authorities.

► *Why does an NGO in the Third World need the patronage of an NGO in the North to get certain funds?*

— This is a very important problem. The aid we and other NGOs give directly is not tied. The only condition is that these NGOs have to be working for the development and the promotion of their people. But it is quite true that it is not possible for an NGO in the Third World to get aid or grants directly, particularly as far as the Commission is concerned. I know the problem well because I am on the NGO liaison committee. They have to go through European NGOs—NGOs from the North, if you like.

I think, to be quite honest, that there are advantages and disadvantages to this. The advantages are that the activities of NGOs from North and South can be boosted. And another positive thing is that, as I see it, it counters the latent desire of the governments and inter-governmental organizations to take the NGOs over. There is always the danger of them saying that they give us aid and they give us money and so he who pays the piper calls the tune. Those are the advantages, as I see it. Now the disadvantages are that it in-

creases the size of the network a bit and, particularly where the NGOs in the North aren't aware of the problem, it prevents the NGOs of the South from developing and it interferes with their autonomy. One of the criteria we work by is that we have to make the creation and the life of the NGOs in the South easier. I think the problem is a very important one and there is still a long way to go. For example, I went to two seminars we organized in Brussels on the negotiations for Lomé II and, clearly, we didn't manage to get the NGOs from the ACP countries terribly interested, perhaps, I think, because these NGOs aren't well enough established there. So there's a lot of ground to cover.

► *It seems that NGOs, or some of them at any rate, are taking part regularly in the big international conferences which that are so often accused of being ineffective, and that they enjoy it.*

— There may be a danger of that, but I haven't developed a taste for it myself yet. I am not against the big conferences, but I do deplore pointless speechifying and God knows that a lot of it goes on and that there are a whole lot of hurdles to jump before you can get down to business. Anyway, the fact that there are big conferences to talk about a certain number of important topics, the LLDCs, energy, population, food and so on, is a good thing. Nations have to communicate with each other and conferences are one way of enabling them to do just that. But we have to fight against pointless speechifying and receptions and all those rather useless things and get down to brass tacks. You were right to emphasize this problem. I think it's useful for the NGOs to go to these conferences—where they don't get involved in this speechifying and all these diplomatic trappings—all this socializing I was going to call it. They can be real, effective representatives, perhaps not of the people because that would be pretentious, but of certain specific sections of the population nevertheless.

To get back to the conference on the LLDCs, we invited various rural leaders; people who live with the peasants and are involved in rural schemes, some who work in training schools and other who organize various groups and came to tell us about their everyday experience with the people actually concerned. What has to be done is to see that these big conferences are attended by people with specific knowledge about certain sectors and certain geographical facts, people who can talk with other representatives from the NGOs and the authorities and with representatives from the ministries and the governments, and pressurize to get development plans geared to the needs of the most underprivileged of the local populations and not just those in the towns.

There are a lot of problems in the towns, I know, but I should say that one of the problems of the Third World is that towns are always developed to the detriment of the country. And if we get ourselves to fit the big conference mould, then we may well go wide of our target. Quite honestly, I think that there is no danger of that yet, but we do realize the risk is there.

"We should like to trouble the North's conscience"

► *The NGOs aren't satisfied with the place they have been given in the 'substantial new programme of action'.*

— No they aren't, not at all. I was at nearly all the conference and I think there were some things that were very good and others that weren't so good. The good ones first. It was the first time at a big international conference that the NGOs had a chance to say what they thought on the committees (and there was a fight to get them on) and in the plenary session as well—where I myself had the honour and

the pleasure of speaking on behalf of the NGOs. The bad thing was that we did not get to be officially involved in checking that the stated aims were being reached and that the communities concerned really are benefiting from the projects. Once again, the NGOs do not want to overstep the mark. We are non-governmental organizations and we don't want to change our status. But I think we have the advantage of representing certain sections of the population and standing for certain hard facts that officials and others aren't so familiar with, and I think it would be extremely interesting too for the authorities and the governments and the inter-governmental organizations to be questioned sometimes—although we don't want to replace them. That's not our job. Not at all.

I know something about the famous SNPA and my view is that, there again, it would be a good idea to involve the NGOs a little because the governments of the South forget that we don't just want to make them feel good. We should like to trouble the North's conscience a bit because we are working to get our authorities and our governments to remember that they, for example, have committed themselves to giving 0.15% of GNP to the LLDCs—but without taking it from the 0.7% which goes to the countries of the South as a whole. This is a serious commitment, I think, and we in the NGOs are urging our authorities to stick to their commitments. We are also running an information campaign to put public opinion in the picture, so the government is backed up by an active general public that knows what's what.

But it's by no means sure that it will be so. We are in the throes of an economic crisis and the danger is that it will be every man for himself. People will say: "We've got problems of our own so the others will have to look after themselves". And this brings us to another problem. Interdependence. For about 15 years now I have been involved with these problems and I am fairly much in agreement with what President Mitterrand says. He sees cooperation in terms of reciprocity. This is not something I'm blasé about because I don't really believe in altruism in a field of this kind. We are perfectly well aware that we financed part of our own development by exploiting the Third World.

► *If this argument of investing in the Third World to get its economy off the ground is taken to its limits, doesn't it mean selling ready-to-use factories that these countries don't actually want but which would stimulate the North's economy?*

Mutual interest

— You're right there, and I've got something to say about it too. I think this is a central issue. As far as international relations are concerned, if we want proper collaboration between North and South, it has to be based on mutual interest. If it is, then I think there is a chance of it being sound and lasting.

Let's look at this a bit more closely. First of all, we are in a state of interdependence and we need each other. The people and the countries of the South have a number of assets. The most obvious one is oil, but they've got more than that. They have raw materials and they have minerals and agricultural products and more. So we need them and they need us. We've maybe only seen one side of the coin, that they need us, but we certainly need them just as much. That, I think, has to be brought home to people. And second, with this mutual interest and mutual need, this interdependence, in mind, we have to start practical negotiations and make whatever changes are called for at home. I should say that if these countries are to develop, and particularly if they are to develop their industry, then they have to have the benefit of



Improving rural conditions is one of the CCFD's three principal activities

added value, instead of us always getting it. That seems reasonable to me. You can't have development otherwise. If the countries of the Third World just go on supplying raw materials to the North, then industrialization will go on happening in the North and the international division of labour as it is now will go on keeping these countries poor. That much seems obvious.

But at the same time, it means making one or two changes to our agriculture, to our methods of production and our methods of consumption. This, as I see it, is where it all hinges. This is where the real problems are. The countries of the Third World also need equipment. That isn't to say that they have to be sold ready-to-use factories. They want power pumps, they want irrigation equipment and so on and we can partly help meet these needs, relaunching our own economies by means of the supplies and helping develop the countries of the South, because the needs of these countries are enormous. The problem, to my mind, is that we have to avoid any idea of domination and superiority, any unconscious colonialism that may still be there. What I should like to make clear is that the needs, the real needs that have to be satisfied in the Third World and in our countries too, are large enough to enable the Third World economies to develop and ours to do better—provided an attempt is made to meet the real, and immense, needs of the people.

We also have to take another look at the whole system of domination, the unequal terms of trade as it is currently organized. This is a bit of a pipe dream, I realize, because, at the same time, a certain number of structural reforms are called for in our countries of the North, in the way the international system works, in trade relations, in the monetary system, and in the countries of the South too. I think we need change in the countries of the south if the needs of the people—and not just the élite—are to be met. There has to be change in the countries of the North too, a change in the methods of production and consumption. We have to be brave enough to call a halt to our organized waste in the North. And changes are also called for in international relations, which means in international agencies like the World Bank, in the international monetary system. A tall order you'll no doubt say, but I realize that this is the root of the problem and these are the lines on which we have to go on working. ◦ Interview by A.T.

Conclusions of the World Bank report on development in sub-Saharan Africa

by Yves FRANCHET (*)



At the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Belgrade in September 1979, the governors of the African countries that are members of the Bank asked the president to run a special study on the economic problems of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and to produce an action programme to help them overcome a situation which, if the annual World Bank reports were anything to go by, was getting worse every year. This report, on accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa (an indicative programme for action), was drawn up by a team headed by professor Elliot Berg and came out at the end of last year.

Publication coincided with the end of the conference on the LLDCs in Paris in September—which recommended, in particular, that international aid to these countries be stepped up. Many of the LLDCs are in sub-Saharan Africa. The Bank's report began with an analysis of the historical constraints affecting the development of this part of Africa and went on to suggest how the situation might be improved by a series of national measures backed up by more, priority international aid. The conclusions refer to a geographical area containing 39 countries, so what is perforce a general approach must be adjusted to fit the individual features of each particular country. Although many of the measures outlined in the report can be applied as they stand in a large number of the countries in question, the adjustment of the conclusions to specific situations will be discussed in the coming months by the World Bank and the member countries which want to put all or part of the proposed development strategy into practice.

Many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have only been independent since early in the 1960s. Over the past 20 years, the fundamental problems they have had to face have been those of creating political and economic unity and developing their basic infrastructure and human resources, so production has taken a back seat. Considerable progress has been made in the basic sectors. Many more people are literate and many more go to school, life expectancy is greater and there is a lot more infrastructure. But the world economic crisis which has affected the economies of developed and developing countries alike since the early 1970s

has been particularly hard on sub-Saharan Africa. The recession in the industrialized world, the oil shocks, the relatively slow growth of trade, higher interest rates and the slump in the prices of some of the raw materials that constitute the basis of these countries' exports have resulted in a slow increase in *per capita* GDP—which increased by only 0.8% in 1970-79, although it went up much faster in other parts of the Third World (1.5% in southern Asia, for example). In the low-income countries of the region, the figure even dropped, by 0.3%.

International aid *per capita* in the region was, on average, higher than in other regions of the same level of development. Yet in spite of these relatively substantial volumes of aid, production stagnated and public finances and the balance of payments often got very much worse. There are few prospects of improvement over the coming years—unless relatively radical measures aimed at internal and external change are brought in to alter present development trends.

Internal measures

Internal measures can be used to improve the situation in three sectors—foreign trade, the management of the public sector and the promotion of agriculture.



WFP photo - M. Cherry

The World Bank stresses agricultural development as one of the essential internal policies for sub-Saharan Africa (photo: multi-purpose agricultural training in Ghana)

(*) Deputy-director of the European office of the World Bank in Paris.

Foreign trade

The report underlines the fact that import protection machinery and the exchange rate policies of the past 20 years have over-protected industry, put a brake on agriculture and absorbed a large part of the administrative means available. Many countries have allowed their currencies to be over-valued, introduced import licencing systems and put high customs duties on imports of basic and intermediary products and low ones on consumer goods and food. This has a negative effect on agriculture. The peasants have to pay a lot for local and imported products while the prices of their own exports are kept down. The measures also generate capitalist-type development by lowering the relative cost of capital goods. The attendant controls also keep many managers away from other vital sectors of the economy.

Management of the public sector

In most of the countries studied, the state machinery has come to play an important part in administration, in the management of the economy and in the productive sector too. But since that state machinery is short of qualified cadres and often lacks experience in setting up the procedures for arbitration, decision and control, it is often inefficient in managing rare resources and in ensuring that they are put to the best use in the priority sectors of development. It often, for example, fails to tie up medium- and long-term planning with short-term economic uncertainties. And too little attention appears to be paid to translating development plans into concrete projects. Analyses of the effects of the economic policy (particularly as regards prices and the exchange rate) on the various partners are rarely carried out and rarely taken into account. The para-public sector has developed very quickly, but firms often have disappointing results and may even be a serious handicap to the development of particular sectors, if not to the balance of public finances as a whole.

Given these difficulties, stronger management, a clarification of relations between the state and the firm and perhaps the closing down of one or two of the firms should make the whole of the public sector much more effective.

Promotion of the agricultural sector


Agriculture is at the heart of the economy of the countries in question, here and agricultural production is the most important activity when it comes to economic growth and the expansion of employment. Yet in many of the countries, the economic policies of the last 30 years have not been primarily aimed at boosting this production, in some cases they have been an impediment to growth.

Particular examples are:

- inadequate prices to the producer, over-valued currencies and tax systems that discourage production or divert it from the official circuits;
- insufficient volume of investments;
- inefficient, unsuitable marketing and input supply networks.

A concerted improvement in these policies and a re-definition of the respective roles of the private and public sectors would have a considerable effect on the growth of agricultural production.

The report also recommends improving the way available means are used to develop human resources via the adoption of more suitable policies. Take the example of given financial means. The promotion of rural health schemes, for example, does more to improve health and lower the death rate than the development of costly urban hospitals.



In the last 20 years, schooling has made great progress in Africa south of the Sahara (photo: EDF-financed school in Bamako, Mali)

External means

The adjustment of economic policies and the transformation of administrative networks will mean that the governments of these countries will have to display a firm political will, as what has to be done is to question all the practices and habits that are increasingly incompatible with the economic situation. This will sometimes lead to higher costs in the short term, for example more imports if the import policy is liberalized and almost always high investment costs.

So, there are only small chances of extra national savings and the international community therefore has to help push up growth by pushing up the amount of aid it gives. The World Bank report on Africa recommends that this aid be doubled by the end of the 1980s and shows that this increase, combined with more suitable economic policies, will lead to better prospects of growth in the medium term. Further justification for more international aid is also to be found in the vulnerability of most of the populations concerned and in their potential for greater involvement in trade and world growth. The report echoes one of the conclusions of the Paris conference on the LLDCs here.

This conclusion was immediately incorporated in the Bank's activities in sub-Saharan Africa. At the annual meeting of the Bank in Washington last September, Mr. W.A. Clausen said that aid to sub-Saharan Africa was one of the Bank's three priorities, the others being energy and rural development. ○ Y. F.

Small and medium-sized enterprises: their role in the development process

by Dr F. J. VAN HOEK (*)

Although the slogan "small is beautiful" is more and more fashionable, among both bilateral and multilateral aid suppliers, as well as many governments of developing countries, their policies and programmes still seem to have as leitmotiv that, after all, "large is better". Full attention is paid, in many cases, to large export-oriented plantations of cash crops, and to photogenic industrial complexes which are too large for the domestic market and too costly to be effectively competitive on the international market. Nevertheless, small and medium-sized enterprises, however defined, have an evident importance in the development process of both developed and developing countries.

What is an SME?

Whether it is defined according to the number of persons employed or according to annual revenue, as a basic rule, an SME is an enterprise that does not dominate its own sector of activity, be it in agriculture, manufacturing, trade or services.

Even in such a highly industrialized society as the United States, the importance of these small and medium-sized enterprises is enormous:

- leaving aside the agricultural production sector, some 60% of the active population of the United States is employed in small and medium-sized enterprises;
- between 1969 and 1976, these same enterprises have created an additional 6 million jobs, while "big business" contributed almost none;
- more than 10 million small and medium-sized enterprises represent some 97% of the total number of non-agricultural firms in the United States, and contributed around 45% to its GNP;
- more than half of all post-war innovations and patented inventions found their origin in the small and medium-sized enterprises.

(*) Dr van Hoek is a director in the EEC Commission's directorate-general for development.

This kind of development and the consequent role of the small and medium-sized enterprise can only be ensured by a clear political awareness of its developmental contribution through the integration of this sector's needs into the more global policies concerning supply from abroad, financing and marketing, as well as education and training; the latter should develop a respect for manual work instead of perpetuating the traditional admiration for the administrative function.

Whatever socio-political model has been adopted, developing countries should realize that only through appropriate policies and institutional measures can the SME sector be helped to overcome the problems and constraints that presently prevent it, in many developing countries, from playing its proper role as a full partner in the national development process. With appropriate governmental policies and action, as well as external assistance where needed, the SME sector will contribute to the creation of employment, to a better use of indigenous managerial and entrepreneurial competence, to domestic savings and investments, and to the evolution of a "domestic" technology.

SMEs in the rural sector

Case studies undertaken in recent years in Africa and Asia reveal that the major or secondary occupation of about half the labour force in the countryside is in non-agricultural activities.

Any rural development policy that tends to ignore the presence of small and medium-sized enterprises in the countryside is thus doomed to fail, as it ignores also the fact that in quite a number of developing nations at least 20% of the labour force in the countryside is primarily engaged in non-farm activities, while limited evidence indicates that at least 10 to 20% of the rural male labour force undertake non-farm work as a secondary occupation.

Hence, non-farm activities already constitute an important source of family revenue in rural areas; their expansion can contribute to increased employment opportunities in rural areas and thus help alleviate the burden of a continuous rural exodus on the national economy, thus avoiding the very high social cost of rapid urbanization and the continuously growing unrest resulting from high and rapidly rising rates of urban unemployment, which may constitute a serious threat to political stability. The obvious, but still often neglected, need in any rural development programme is therefore the creation of even more non-farm jobs, which generally will be in the SME sector.

Holding down unemployment

In terms of employment, it should be recognized that, even if the potential for employment creation by the modern industrial sector can be increased — by higher rates of capital formation and by creating the necessary incentives for adopting more labour-intensive production method — the expansion of the many-sided SME sector will probably constitute the only means to stop a continuously growing rate of unemployment, assuming that even increased food and agricultural production will not necessarily create the additional jobs that are required to satisfy demand stemming from a rapidly increasing labour force.

Although situations differ considerably from one country to another and also between the various sectors of activity within the same country, there is strong evidence that small and medium-sized enterprises do have a greater overall, as well as direct, employment generation effect than large firms. The SME sector relies more on domestic inputs — including raw materials which might otherwise not be used — produced by domestic labour, while it often also generates and supports still more labour-intensive service jobs in a proportion comparable to large, capital-intensive industries.

Developing managerial skills

A second contribution the SME sector makes to development is its contribution to the mobilization and development of indigenous managerial and organizational capabilities and competence. It is often taken for granted that developing countries suffer from a chronic shortage of such talent. This may be true in respect of managerial and entrepreneurial capabilities required for the efficient running of large modern industrial complexes. But is it also true for the development of the SME sector?

Direct observation in many developing countries would certainly not justify a plain affirmative reply to this question. Rates of attendance in the formal educational sector seem to show no correlation with the availability of such talents, nor the attendance of technical and vocational training courses before the establishment of the small enterprise. This may evidently have an effect on the quality of the output, as well as on standard of organization of the production process, such as keeping excessive stocks, inefficient lay-out of whatever machinery is used and inadequate maintenance of tools and machines.

Owners with a minimum level of functional literacy will undoubtedly perform better than illiterates and lack of education may limit the possibilities for expansion and diversification of the small enterprise with the risk of being supplanted. Nevertheless, the large network of small and medium-sized enterprises that one finds in most developing countries and which, for lack of access to commercial and public funds, have — according to a survey made in several African countries — drawn more than 80% of their initial investment from personal savings supplemented by loans or gifts from relatives, is in itself a proof of personal initiative that is too often ignored.

In addition, it should be stressed that the SME sector constitutes — through a more and more widespread system of apprenticeship — a primary vehicle for providing technical training.

Contributing to savings

Another SME contribution to the national development process is its contribution in *domestic savings*. There is evidence from many developing countries that the highest rates of saving can be found among the owners of small and medium-sized enterprises while the rate of saving by civil servants and employees is much lower, if not negative.



Caribbean craftsman. SMEs make an important contribution to output and employment

Even if this motivation to save may partly stem from the lack of access to funds from commercial banks or public sources of finance, to a much larger extent it finds its origin in the determination to safeguard one's own property and financial security, as well as in the desire thus to reach a higher echelon in the social hierarchy.

If small-scale enterprises are usually more labour-intensive than large firms, this often stems from the fact that these enterprises use relatively simple machinery, which in many cases can either be produced domestically or easily copied in case of replacement. Even in the least developed countries one finds small machine and repair shops which, apart from being labour-intensive themselves and an excellent training ground for mechanical skills, will be called upon by small entrepreneurs to work out certain modifications to the existing equipment so as to better suit their needs. Hence, small-scale enterprises contribute much more to the creation and development of appropriate domestic technology than the large-scale industries that use highly sophisticated machinery and provide little support to the development of local machine working and of mechanical skills.

SMEs can face discouragement from government

It seems evident that a flourishing SME sector can only exist if it gets the necessary support, from government and from foreign aid suppliers. It

should be recognized that in many developing countries, the SME sector has developed notwithstanding the partisan climate in which it found itself.

Economic policies in many developing countries are often biased in favour of large imported industrial complexes, often for reasons of a political nature. Governments may declare themselves in favour of supporting small and medium-sized enterprises; in practice, however, they do not seem to take concrete steps in that direction, and even pursue policies that directly or indirectly penalize these enterprises, which do not have the same bargaining power as the large industrial companies.

Tariff structures still encourage the import of sophisticated machinery and equipment while preventing, or at least penalizing, imports of more simple machinery that is more relevant and an indispensable base for the activities of small and medium-sized enterprises. There are still developing countries that classify sewing-machines as luxury consumer items, regardless of the fact that they constitute the principal fixed capital investment of so many small-scale enterprises.

Other handicaps for the development of the SME sector are the preference given in the public policies of many developing countries for the supply of institutional credit at low levels of interest to large firms; the subsidized provision of public services — such as power, water and transport — that are of much more importance to large than to small-scale enterprises; and government-financed vocational schools that usually provide the skilled manpower for large firms, while the owner of the small-scale enterprises carries the burden of apprentice training. Aid agencies practise similar discrimination in favour of large enterprises through tying aid to imports of modern capital equipment, applying sophisticated criteria and procedures for the appraisal of projects that otherwise could benefit from direct or indirect lending, and by concentrating assistance on education and training in the formal sector.

There has been some change in attitudes in recent years, both at the governmental level and on the side of both bilateral and multilateral aid suppliers. Let us hope this trend continues. The appearance or reinforcement of a group of responsible, competent and dynamic independent entrepreneurs will constitute a stabilizing factor as far as political and economic structures are concerned, as well as the most appropriate means to promote development from within rather than from without. ○ F.J.v.H.

Assessing NGO schemes and micro-projects

What is the best way of assessing the effect of EDF-financed micro-projects and NGO co-financed schemes on the overall development of the ACP countries and their peoples? This is an interesting question because there is always a tendency to wonder just how useful development schemes in the Third World are and what sort of results they really have. For several years now, Charles Van der Vaeren and his team at the EEC Commission's development directorate have been trying to come up with an answer, and their most recent report on the subject was completed in September 1980. Some of their considerations on the effectiveness of these projects and the problems of implementation are set out below.

In all but a very few cases, the NGO schemes achieved the material results planned in the applications for financing more easily than the big projects. The tendency is towards faster completion — although some micro-projects have proved the exception to this rule. Both systems are fairly efficient ways of improving the standard of living of the most underprivileged populations and of making a better job of meeting their essential needs, particularly in rural areas and in the fields of public health, food production and water supplies. So the direct aims of the projects are usually achieved, the report concludes, and both types of scheme provoke or pave the way for the mobilization of the resources of the basic communities involved.


Financing

Before looking at one or two of the important factors on which the success or failure of the NGO schemes and micro-projects depend, it would be as well to go over some of the financial arrangements. The money (a global allocation) is usually paid over to help the efforts being made by members of the

basic community, without there being any need to define specific operations beforehand. Funds can be used by the NGO or the local authorities, as the projects are implemented by the communities themselves. Regular assessment of results enables a check to be made on project progress.

Economic effects. — A large number of NGO schemes and EEC micro-projects have both direct and indirect economic effects — higher income, for example, access to credit, an apprenticeship leading to a job and so on.

In many cases, the report emphasizes, the project helps push up people's own production capacity, although this occurs more with minority groups, peasant farmers or young people, for example, than with whole communities. Thanks to new, widely available services, there has been a better distribution of income in almost 50%



An EDF hospital in Ngaoundéré (Cameroon)

The assessment of the effect of hospitals still raises some problems, especially as far as their efficiency is concerned

of cases — although greater inequality (a concentration of privileges) was recorded in four projects.

| Micro-projects | | |
|-----------------------|---|---|
| Sector | 28 micro-projects visited % (number) | All micro-projects 1976-1978 % (number) |
| Agriculture | 21% (6/28) | 10 |
| Water supplies | 21% (6/28) | 23 |
| Production | 7% (2/28) | 8 |
| Storage and marketing | 7% (2/28) | 8 |
| Social infrastructure | 32% (9/28) | 39 |
| Roads and bridges | 11% (3/28) | 12 |

| NGO projects | | |
|---------------|--|---|
| Sector | 24 NGO projects (assessed (% of financial volume)) | All NGO projects 1976-1979 (% of financial volume) |
| Agriculture | 30 | 32 |
| Education | 11 | 27 |
| Public health | 19 | 18 |
| Economic | 4 | 7 |
| Social | 36 | 16 |

Besides analysing the effects and results of the projects the evaluators also looked at the factors which determine their effectiveness, and this brought out a number of points. The integration of the projects into development plans in general has been variable and in many cases not very good. There is very little real coordination between different NGOs and between the NGOs and the various governments and government departments.

In most cases, simple techniques which local people can easily assimilate, often using traditional equipment, have been chosen. The NGOs have often introduced and promoted appropriate technology — an elementary rice mill, for example — but, in three projects, they have obliged people to use fully imported equipment (solar energy pumps).

Spin-off

There has been relatively little in the way of spin-off. Project innovations have only been occupied in three cases and no one has duplicated the schemes. Of course, it is early days yet, but NGO projects tend to be hampered by being viewed as aid schemes because of the amount of foreign funds

that the leaders (19 out of 26 were foreigners) obtain — conditions that the local population is ill-placed to achieve.

The lasting operation of the schemes and micro-projects is by no means always assured. Waiting for long-term

Ex-post evaluation

The ex-post evaluation programme is usually as follows:

- The aims and the methods of achieving them are determined.
- A representative sample of the projects or schemes/countries is isolated for detailed examination.
- Missions go out and draw up reports by project, by group of project or by country.
- The various reports are synthesized and conclusions drawn.
- The conclusions are discussed with experts from the nine member states, and guidelines suggested by the assessments are laid down on a joint basis with a view to orienting future aid to the sector or aspect in question.
- The guidelines are discussed

with ACP experts so as to decide on joint policy for future projects and schemes.

- The guidelines are adopted by the joint institutions of the Lomé Convention (the ACP-EEC Council).
- A handbook for the design and assessment of other projects of the same type is drawn up, or contributions are made to drawing it up, in close collaboration with the operational services.
- Throughout the whole process, the Commission, the national authorities in the recipient countries and the various institutions involved (the EEC Council, the ACP-EEC Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the EDF Committee, the Court of Auditors, etc.) are kept informed.


aid seems to be one of the things preventing projects from becoming autonomous — which only one or two projects ever manage to do, the report says. Generally speaking, projects that organize grain storage, saving, credit or marketing are more likely to become autonomous, but other sorts, particularly integrated development programmes and health schemes, tend to remain dependent on external sources of financing.

The table overleaf shows the assessment and ex-post assessment process laid down in article 118 of Lomé II.

Agricultural projects

As assessment of agricultural projects has also been undertaken. It emerges from this that agricultural projects can only be fully effective if they are fitted into general development policies which match the progress of the rural sector with that of the rest of the economy. The assessors feel that such policies must include the coordination of the various sectoral schemes, a national land use policy, the allocation of substantial national resources to the rural sector and a range of complementary incentives for food production. The latter may include a better supply of farm equipment, improved infrastructure, freeing prices and increasing credit facilities, and a revision of land ownership and fiscal practices. o L.P.

(See also p. 84)



Rural school in Kolwezi (Zaire)

There is a good deal of interest in educational micro-projects and NGO school projects, which have convincingly proved their value

Implementation of the Lomé Convention : evaluation

| Type of evaluation | Lomé II | Objective | Criteria for evaluation | Approach | Responsibility | Source of financing | Feedback | Presentation of results |
|--|--------------|---|--|---|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| <p>Evaluation during implementation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - concomitant evaluation - intermediate evaluation | Art. 118 (1) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To guide implementation & make any adjustments | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adaptation to the aims & priorities of economic and social development - Comparison of results & effects with specific aims & general targets of economic & social development (effectiveness) | <p>By individual project/ programme</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Delegation of service - Implementation of management body collaboration on method with VIII/EV | EDF | <p>Direct to the decision-making powers: Commission & ACP country, by joint agreement</p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluation report at agreed intervals - Information EDF Committee |
| <p>Ex-post evaluation</p> <p>(a) <i>After completion of project or scheme</i></p> | Art. 118 (2) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Orientation of future aid (methods, management & policies) in the light of experience | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Suitability & yield of means and methods used in relation to desired results (effectiveness) - Influence of projects on efficiency of institutions & economic operators in the recipient countries & consequences for their ability to develop on their own | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By sector (representative sample of projects) - By aid instrument - By country - By project of pilot programme | <p>VIII/EV in close collaboration with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational service - Delegation & jointly with the recipient states | Commission budget | <p><i>Phase I</i> — analysis & synthesis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational services/relevant Commission (Belgium inc.) & ACP departments <p><i>Phase II</i> — guidelines:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relevant departments in EEC and ACP countries - Political instances: EEC Council, ACP-EEC Council, European Parliament | <p><i>Phase I</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - evaluation reports by project or country - summary reports with conclusions <p><i>Phase II</i>:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - guidelines emerging from evaluation <p><i>Parallel to I & II</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - contribution to report Art. 41 (I) - report Art. 119 (II) - inform EDF Lomé II committee (AIF '79 Art. 21) |
| <p>(b) <i>After completion of a project or scheme constituting an important phase in a long-term operation</i></p> | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preparation of a new phase of the operation (new project) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adaptation to constraints & to national resources, in particular availability of staff & other means, particularly financial & institutional ones required for operation & maintenance (viability) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By individual project or programme | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Operational service - Delegation & jointly with the recipient states | EDF or Commission budget | <p>Direct to decision making powers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Commission (director-general of relevant department) - ACP state - EDF Committee | <p>Evaluation report & recommendations</p> |

An EDF course on cooperatives

by Peter YEO (*)

The European Development Fund recently financed a 10-week course on the management of agricultural cooperatives at the Cooperative College, Loughborough, in England.

The most significant fact about all courses at the international cooperative training centre of the Loughborough Cooperative College is the rich experience of the people who come on them. For example, the current course financed by the EDF attracted 16 people from 15 Third World countries, the majority from the African continent and two from the South Pacific. Five are senior managers of cooperative unions, two are trainers from cooperative colleges and nine are government officers employed to promote agricultural cooperatives. Their average age is well over 30.

One course member is a fisheries expert. There is special knowledge of credit and audit. Three have had training in non-market industrial countries and one in America. One has direct experience of a French-influenced cooperative system. With a group like that, the staff build on the experience of the course members rather than just teaching.

The college is proud that it learns from its course members. All the staff of the international cooperative training centre have worked with cooperatives in Third World countries, and they travel frequently to renew their experience, but their additional qualification is that they listen to what course members say.

Knowledge gained from the people who come on one course is made available to future courses. Duplicated handouts are amended in the light of comments made in discussion. One of the first case studies used in this course was an adapted version of one written at the centre by a Jordanian. Understanding of another, which was based on material collected in Mauritius, has just been enormously improved by discussion with a fresh group of experienced people. The most

effective "in-tray" exercise the centre uses was written by people doing courses there.

There is a good library on management of cooperatives and detailed reading lists are provided. There are also first class facilities for closed circuit television and most other types of audio-visual aid, but the most important resource remains the direct field experience of the teaching staff and course members.

Since relevant field experience is the most important factor governing admission of course members, levels of academic knowledge can vary quite widely. To minimise the problem this could cause, a programme of directed private study is offered so that everyone can bring themselves up to the common starting point by a mixture of basic reading and tutorials. In this course, most people found that they needed to brush up their knowledge of book-keeping or of interpretation of accounts. But a few chose economics or agronomy or cooperative principles or office management. It is very noticeable that, provided this opportunity for catching up is given, people with comparatively few previous qualifications often contribute most to the course.

The course is not primarily concerned with British cooperative experience, but all course members spend a week attached in groups of two or three to a British agricultural cooperative and there are several other study visits.


Towards the end of the course, each participant is asked to prepare and read a brief action paper outlining the steps he or she intends to take on returning home to implement what has been learnt on the course. This serves

an obvious purpose in encouraging action, but it also forms part of an evaluation process by which the course organisers can learn the strengths and weaknesses of what has been arranged.

The final days of the course are spent in Brussels, so that course members can learn at first hand of the assistance available from the EEC for cooperatives in developing countries. Sponsorship of a complete course in Europe is only one of the possible forms of aid. One among many others is provision of scholarships for individuals to attend courses. People currently working with cooperatives who want to know more of courses available at the international cooperative training centre may find that the EEC delegate in their country has the information. Alternatively they can write direct to the Cooperative College, Stanford Hall, Loughborough, UK. It is important to emphasise that only people currently working with cooperatives should apply.

The philosophy expressed here is particularly appropriate to the type of international sponsorship represented by EDF. The 10 EEC countries jointly provide the money. An institution in a member country assembles the most experienced staff it can find, without regard to nationality—only half the centre's teachers are themselves British. The staff then aim to help developing countries to help themselves by giving people from the countries concerned opportunities to exchange, within a structured framework, the knowledge they have gained from practice. It is *international* and it is *cooperative* in more senses than one.

o P.Y.



Lecture/discussion on management of cooperatives at Loughborough

(*) Senior tutor, ICTC, Stanford Hall.

Cultural exchange in the Indian Ocean

by Raymond CHASLE (*)

With their intermingling of races, their ready contact with the outside world and their time-honoured connexions with people from all over the globe, even the most distant parts, the countries of the Indian Ocean are perhaps in the best position to use their wealth of experience to question the present cultural situation and take a frank look at the types of consumption that increase business profits and red tape, at technological development models, at educational models that reproduce the ways of thinking and the organization of space and time of the industrialized countries, and at the institutional models of the North.

The islands of the Indian Ocean have not attracted much attention from sociologists or anthropologists. In *L'Ethnographie devant le Colonialisme*, Michel Leiris deplored the fact that ethnographers confine themselves to folklore and the study of the societies that are the least affected by Western civilization, passing over those that have evolved and lost their tribal character. As Leiris sees it, the fact that certain cultural traits persist among "evolved" peoples, in spite of their intercultural borrowings, suggests that what survives after this decanting process is that which is least affected by the currents of history and constitutes "the particular way of being a human being".

Identity, authenticity, integration and universality

The cultural patterns of the Indian Ocean can and should lead to reflection and permanent dialogue aimed at assertion of identity and authenticity, free from any introspection; at integration in the multi-faceted mobility of a world not seen in terms of Western values

(*) Ambassador Chasle is the Mauritian representative to the EEC. This paper was first presented to the Colloque Internationale d'Aix-en-Provence (4-5 December 1981), organized with the help of the EEC, on "Europe and the Indian Ocean as a particular example of North-South relations".

alone; and at universality as "an extensive process generated by the spread of all living and individual cultures".

Because of their history, these islands in the Indian Ocean have one or two special things in common and there are similarities between them and their mainland neighbours. So the region is a broad, original geo-cultural area.

These countries have shared the same destiny. They have seen slave traders and migrant workers. Some people have come in from Europe and some have moved from island to island, or between the islands and the countries of East Africa. Indonesians and Malayans have come to Madagascar, Asians and Africans to Mauritius and Reunion, Africans and Arabs to the Comoros and Africans to the Seychelles; there have been Indians, Chinese, Madagascans and Europeans as well. In spite of what is often very strong endogamy, this has led to an ethnic mix of varying degrees, often yielding cultural blends, the extent and significance of which we are only just beginning to gauge.


The Indian Ocean has an old civilization of sea-goers and traders, who were based in a handful of towns and the islands nearest the continent before spreading, in the 18th century, to other islands in the area. People moved from one island to another at various times during the colonial era and throughout history. They have gone overseas because of economic constraints, or because of fears of hegemony and losing the advantages that went with their rung on the social ladder; they have been drawn by the real or imagined attraction of a better standard of living, particularly in the countries that colonized them.

The French, Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese have maintained contact with their home countries and this, coupled with exchanges between emigrants and their families, has shaped behaviour and played a part in perpetuating and developing cultural situations.

The linguistic situation is a complex one. Madagascar has an Indonesian-type language, the unity of which has not been affected by African imports or a range of dialects. The Comoros have a Bantu-type language with Arabic borrowings; there are variations between the way people speak on Grande-Comore and Anjouan, Mohéli and Mayotte, and there are clear affinities with the Swahili spoken in the various countries on the coast that have been influenced by the Arab community. In Mauritius, where English is the



Craft centre in the Seychelles



Volcanic landscape in the Comoros

official language, the commonest European language is French; Creole is the *lingua franca* of the whole Mauritian community, there is Bhojpuri, the commonest language among the country's Indians, and many other languages, including Hindi and Urdu, are spoken as well. In the Seychelles, Creole is now an official language, along with English, and French is also spoken. So European, African and Asian languages all overlap on the islands of the Indian Ocean.

It should be remembered that Reunion, once considered as France's representative in the Indian Ocean, "is now the farthest outpost of Western civilization" there. And Swahili, the *lingua franca* of Tanzania ever since the 19th century, is, along with English, an official language in this country and in neighbouring Kenya. Gujerati, Hindi, Punjabi and Urdu are also used by minorities in East Africa.

Creole

Creole, which has become a language for political and cultural purposes in this part of the world, is in increasingly common use at public meetings, in the media and in written texts, although there is no standardized spelling. So the language that was once for simple every-day use, and considered either as something to be ashamed of or made fun of, is now the

carriage for the re-emergence of a folk culture that had been marginalized and in some cases wiped out.

Meetings of Creole speakers in recent years have been an opportunity for representatives from the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean to wake up to the need to continue their research into the common origins of Creole and the


people who speak it. Creole, in fact, which varies from one country to another and has much more local variation than dialects spoken on islands many miles from each other, is an excellent field for ethno-linguistic investigation.

There is also a rich oral tradition, with tales, legends, puzzles and proverbs, but an analysis of the different islands and countries of the area has yet to be carried out.

Religion has played a great part in preserving culture, as it has in the development of cultural cross-breeds. Islam has influenced Ethiopia, the cradle of Christianity, and Tanzania and Djibouti as well. It is the official religion of Somalia and very much alive in the Indian Ocean today. Christianity has often altered customs and ways of life, although original cultural traits have in many cases survived.

And then there is the phenomenon of exchange between the spheres of Christian, Animist, Islamic and Buddhist influence.

So it would be wrong to speak of French, Chinese or English culture, or of Indian or Islamic culture either. Each culture that has come in has undergone major and sometimes radical transformation. Even European institutions such as the police force, the army, the legal system and the parliaments, which have simply been transplanted to these countries, have been marked, to varying degrees, by national experience and sensibility. They must be studied, sociologically speaking, not by reference to the mother-culture in the foreign country, but in the light of the



The city of Djibouti

social standards and values of the host country—which gives them their own special form, the development of which will now be increasingly a matter of self-determination.

The ancient rites and customs reflecting common interests and local events have, very largely, survived, in spite of conversions and the dogmatic stringency of the new religions. Even better, neighbourly relations have enabled beliefs and ways of feeling to be assimilated, in spite of clashes and tensions, and in many cases it is reasonable to talk about cultural strata that escape ethnic or religious classification and constitute a new kind of solidarity that makes for easier integration in the national future.

Towards organized sub-regional cooperation

All the cultures that have stood up to colonization and dominant cultures are now confronted with homogenization, a kind of levelling, and they are perhaps more vulnerable to westernization now that they have gained independence, because of the harmful influence of increasingly ill-ordered tourism and of the media, which exalt new styles of consumption, new ways of life and introduce new cults whereby false foreign values are set up and national values decried. More could be done about these dangers if the countries of the Indian Ocean cooperated among themselves to ensure mutual respect for sovereignty and individuality, to assert their identity, to gauge the risks of socio-cultural destruction and to join together to seek a new development model that takes hard geo-cultural facts into account.

There is still time to take stock of the dangers before the communications network (particular by satellite) is extended and new, ill-adapted technologies come to aggravate a situation of cultural aggression that will be increasingly difficult to dominate in the future.

The limited attempts at economic integration of the East African Community and the Indian Ocean Tourist Alliance were, by their nature, doomed to failure. Greater bilateral cooperation and the establishment of regional multi-lateral cooperation between countries united by geographical proximity, common interests and sub-regional affinity is a must for the Indian Ocean.

A cooperation body uniting the countries of the Indian Ocean would be a solid link between them and make for the sort of cultural and economic cooperation that would not be affected by a mere change of political regime.



Mauritius Government Tourist Office

The Mauritius Institute building houses a natural history museum, a public library and an art gallery

Experts from the African islands in the Indian Ocean and the countries on the east coast of Africa, all members of the ACP group, met in the Seychelles in 1980. The meeting identified a certain number of sectors in which these countries could cooperate in the future, in particular transport, communications, fishing and training.

A recent seminar in Brussels, attended by university experts and officials from the ACP countries, discussed the problems of research, education and training and its conclusions and recommendations were put to the ACP Council of Ministers in Maseru, Lesotho.

The problems and prospects outlined at the Seychelles meeting will be gone into further at a meeting of ministers to be held in one of the countries of East Africa in early 1982. On this occasion, a regional cooperation action programme will be defined and it will include the decisions taken by the ACP ministers at Maseru. This first ministerial meeting of East African ministers will also look into the question of the institutional infrastructure required to follow up any decisions and recommendations taken at the political level.

Only organized sub-regional cooperation will enable this area to assert its specific characteristics and achieve genuine economic and cultural independence. This cooperation, geared to a permanent dialogue between the various countries involved, would open the way for a pooling of the financial resources that are limited at national level and of the human and intellectual

resources that complement them in so many fields. The countries of the region could then launch broader, better-coordinated joint programmes, with the help of international and regional organizations, dealing with communications, research, the transfer of technology, industrial complementarity and tourism.

The body that was set up would encourage daily exchanges of information and foster contact between research centres and professional groupings—which could then make practical use of the idea of self-centred development in their particular fields. Inter-cultural events could be organized to spread greater knowledge about the music, drama and art of these countries. Exhibitions, cultural weeks, sports events, exchanges of radio and TV broadcasts, visits by groups of actors and musicians and exchanges of publications and experts in the fields of education, literacy, rural development, innovation and the transfer and adaptation of technology could all be organized.

Experiments in co-production to promote both films and books could be run. All this would promote endogenous development and encourage the mutual appreciation of cultures, which is a powerful factor of unity. By asserting themselves in the fullness of their authenticity, the very original cultures of the Indian Ocean should make it possible to achieve a harmonious balance between authenticity and openness to the universal civilization faster and more easily, thereby making a positive and dynamic contribution to the establishment of a new international cultural order. ○ R.C.

GLOSSARY

150 key words of the Lomé II Convention

The figures refer to the articles of the Convention.

A

Accelerated procedure

- Microproject programmes: 114 (2)
- See also "Invitation to tender".

Acceptance:

- provisional: 112 (4) (j)
- final: 122 (4) (j)

Accession

- see "Convention - Lomé II"

ACP states — least developed, land-locked and island: penultimate recital and 155

- safeguard measures: 15, Annex XX
- trade promotion: 21, Annex XXX
- Stabex: 46, 47
- Sysmin: 53
- industrial cooperation: 82, Annex XI
- agricultural cooperation: 90
- financial & technical cooperation: 93 (5), (6), 106, 107, 108 (3), 112 (3), 125 (4), 129
- regional cooperation: 133, 135 (2)
- technical cooperation: 139 (4), 141 (6)
- microprojects: 145
- financing of project (support costs): 152, 153
- origin of goods: Protocol No. 1 (Art. 30)
- joint declaration: Annex XI

Advances

- emergency aid: 137 (7)
- Stabex: 40 (3)
- Sysmin: 55

Aid: Repayable, see "Loans, Risk Capital"; Non-repayable, see "Grants".

Agro-Allied Industry (agro-based/agricultural industry): 66 (d), 73 (c), 84 (d), 101 (2)
— see also "Cooperation/Agricultural"

Amounts of financial assistance available to ACPs

- total: — annex XXXI (3), annex XLIII
- EDF: 95 (1)
- EIB: 95 (2), 59, Annex XXXI (2)
- grants: 95 (1) (a)
- special loans: 95 (1) (a)
- risk capital: 95 (1) (a)
- STABEX transfers: 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 95 (1) (b)
- CID: 81 (5)
- Sysmin transfers: 51, 54, 95 (1) (c)
- regional cooperation: 133 (2)
- emergency aid: 137 (3)
- micro-projects: 145 (2), 146 (1) (b)
- trade promotion: 22
- costs of Commission delegations: annex XXXI (1) and (3)
- adjustment of: 151
- overall: 114 (1), 144 (3)

Authorization: 121 (1), 122 (3)

Appraisal of projects and programmes: 108 (4) (c), 110 (2), 111 (1) (b), 112, 113, 122 (2), 123 (2)
— small and medium-sized undertakings: 144 (5)
— advance timetables: 110 (2)

Arbitration

- in EDF-financed contracts: 132, Annex XIII
- other disputes such as interpretation or execution of the Convention: — see "Disputes".

Authorizing officers

- chief: 117 (2), (4), 121, 122 (1) (b), 123 (2) (a), (e)
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BOOKS

Elikia M'BOKOLO — Le Continent Convoité (The coveted continent) — Etudes Vivantes, 19, rue de l'Ancienne Comédie, 75006, Paris, France — 280 pages — 1980

By 1980, Africa had known independence for 20 years, during which time it had more than 50 coups d'état and hundreds of political crimes, executions and assassinations. The backcloth to these dramas was the stagnation of the conditions in which the people had to exist and the merciless rivalry of the big powers, says Mr M'Bokolo.

Africa is far from ticking over smoothly. But, contrary to what is usually thought, this instability and these tensions did not start yesterday. Indeed, they date back to the very beginning of the century.

This clear, concise work only takes such historical facts as are necessary to our understanding of Africa today, showing how the political development of the continent relates to economic and social changes. A study of the various states and major geo-political regions is completed by an outline by Mr M'Bokolo of Africa's cultural and political heritage, of its power structures and the state, the quest for unity and individual identity, and interference from foreign powers.

○○○

Jacques NUSBAUMER — L'enjeu du dialogue Nord-Sud — Partage des richesses ou guerre économique (What is at stake in the North-South dialogue — Sharing wealth or waging economic war?) — Preface by Arthur Dunkel, director-general of GATT — Economica, 49 rue Héricart, 75015 Paris — 570 pages — 1981

Permanent negotiations are under way between the Third World and the industrialized world. The aim is to set up a new international economic order whereby the world's wealth will be redistributed to benefit the poor. The means are a reorganization of the machinery of the world economy. The answers the developing countries suggest involve forcing redistribution through intergovernmental action. The industrialized countries are unhappy with the idea of a redistribution of wealth based on need and not merit, and they reject over-zealous supranational intervention that would endanger the market economy. They counter the principle of redistribution, on which Third World claims are based, with the principle of accumulation, on which their own development was built.

For the author, a top GATT official, the North-South dialogue therefore looks as though it is off to a bad start. But the stakes are high. The disparity in standards of living leads to tension which can lead to 'introspection' — which is synonymous with economic war. So negotiations have to be got off to a fresh start on more promising foundations, setting aside things which people object to and which make for acrimonious discussion. This book analyses the main themes under discussion, shows where people diverge and suggests a more rational approach to help get us out of the state of impasse.

○○○

René LENOIR — Les Cerisiers d'Ighil (The cherry trees of Ighil) — Editions Fayard, 75 rue des Saints-Pères, Paris, France — 270 pages — 1981

Just after the Second World War, all the young people who went off to work in what remained of the colonial empires had been brought up to think that the West held the keys to power, development and progress.

René Lenoir was one of them. But, having been born in North Africa, he was aware of the values of other civilizations. What happened in many countries showed him that servile imitation of the industrialized countries, be they Marxist or capitalist, was not what the Third World wanted.

This book is the story of his discoveries. It shows the range of ways men live, eat, work, organize and enjoy life.

He praises the diversity of cultures, which he sees as the only guarantee of survival. He also sounds the alarm about threats to this diversity, at the time of the North-South dialogue, and catalogues a number of positive, practical proposals.

○○○

Christopher STEVENS — EEC and the Third World: A survey — Editions Hodder & Stoughton, Mill Road, Dunton Green, Sevenoaks, Kent — 150 pages — £ 5.00 — 1981

The survey aims to pull together the many strands of EEC (and where relevant, member state) policies and actions that affect the Third World. It brings to this analysis the weight of research being undertaken in European centres and elsewhere, and appears at a time when particular interest has been generated in the relationship between North and South by the report of the Brandt Commission. Its underlying

philosophy is that the EEC and the Third World have mutual interests but no assumptions are made that either harmony or conflict of such interests is inevitable. In detail, it explains the scope and terms of the new Lomé Convention, leading the reader through the labyrinth of the EEC's commercial relations with developing countries, and examines the impact of enlarging the EEC to include Greece, Spain and Portugal. It reviews EEC-Third World interests in the fields of industry and energy.

Christopher Stevens is research officer at the Overseas Development Institute and a research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies. His publications include *Food Aid and the Developing World* (ODI/Croom Helm) and also *The Soviet Union and Black Africa* (MacMillan).

○○○

Yves-Emmanuel DOGBE — Fables africaines (African fables)—Books I, II & III—Editions Akpagnon, 678, av. de Bir-Hakeim, 77350, Le Mée-sur-Seine—102 pages—1980

These fables, like all other fables, are for people of all ages. They were produced 15 years ago in answer to a need for an African complement to the eternal La Fontaine, whose poems the author, then a young teacher, gave to his pupils to stimulate their poetic sensitivity and their moral sense.

The fable is the best way literature has of highlighting our ridiculous individual and social shortcomings. Which is why Aesop, the moralist and philosopher, was such a remarkable figure and so important in society and literature in ancient Greece. The writer of fables speaks with a strong voice, revolutionary we might say today, and Aesop did not claim that language was all that was best and worse for nothing.

These African fables come to swell the army of other fables that we all know and to fight against the individual and collective behaviour that makes our world less human.

○○○

J. ALVAREZ-PEREYRE — Les guetteurs de l'aube — Poésie et apartheid (The dawn watchers — Poetry and apartheid) — Presses universitaires de Grenoble, B.P. 47 X, 38040 Grenoble Cedex — 464 pages — 1979

There comes a time in the history of the oppressed when national conscience, before taking up arms, ex-

presses its hopes and its suffering through the mouths of its poets. In South Africa, poetry has been particularly important as both witness and accuser as the press, through being too explicit, is gagged and the oppressed cannot say what they feel in either parliament or their place of work. And an additional ambition has been to mobilize energy, with the admirable confidence of one anxious to assume this power in the face of those totalitarians who wish to silence him.

South Africa is rattling its chains. The world has woken up to the fact since Soweto, but its poets (black, white and half-caste) had already predicted the storm, just as now they are announcing that dignity has been retrieved and that liberation will soon be with us. It is their still largely unknown voices that we find on these pages. It is their story that is told. It is their daily life, with inequality as the byword, that emerges. "I accuse", they all say. They all explain why and the most recent of them say how urgent it is for change to be wrought.

This book was published with financial help from UNESCO and assistance from the international French language council.

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I. ROTSART DE HERTAING & J. COURTEJOIE — **L'Enfant et la santé: notions de pédiatrie (Health and the child — notions of pediatrics)** — Bureau d'Etudes et de Recherches pour la Promotion de la Santé, B.P. 1977, Kangu, Mayumbe, Zaire — 480 pages — \$ US 10, Bfrs 300, FF 43 — 1980

The International Year of the Child showed just how important early life is and how big a problem it is in the world today.

The authors of this work seek to provide something practical and as much as possible complete on tropical medicine for a public as wide as possible, and to link medicine to many other aspects of social, economic, psychological and cultural life.

What was needed was to put everyday data about children against the background of public health in general, so as to bring out the relevant priorities and responses—which tend increasingly towards integrated medicine that includes prevention and family education as well as treatment. International plans could well emerge in the field of mother and child welfare. The birth and development of the child in the family are propitious moments when it comes to health education, as both parents and children are highly motivated.

Training for ancillary medical staff should pay particular attention to these questions. People will only take notice of what doctors and nurses say if their human and technical ability generates a climate of positive confidence.


Child health promotion involves lowering the infant death rate, a pre-requisite of proper social progress.

Caring for children is very much a matter of routine and it is just as important to encourage the sort of behaviour that will foster better health.

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Jean CHAPPELLE — **Le peuple tchadien, ses racines et sa vie quotidienne (The origins and daily life of the Chadian people)** — Editions l'Harmattan, 7 rue de l'Ecole-Polytechnique — 75005 Paris — France — 303 pages

Chad is unfortunately known to the outside world these days because of the long civil war which has brought misery to its population and prevented any hope of an economic advance. The various stages of the Chad civil war are well known. Less well known, perhaps, are the characteristics and past of the various groups that make up the Chad population. This book is not intended to be a background to the present events in Chad but for anyone who seeks to understand what has happened in the last decade it will prove invaluable.



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Peter BARTELMUS — **Economic Development and Human Environment**

— Hurst and Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1-2 Henrietta St, London WC1 8PS — 196 pages — 1980

The developing countries cannot evade pollution in a planet they share with the industrialized world. However, their environment is relatively pure and the earlier they take measures to safeguard it, as they seek to industrialize, the better.

The better not only from an ecological point of view but also from political considerations, given the upshot of ecological movements all over the world.

Not many books have been written on this subject, especially on its consequences in the developing countries. Kenya is a case study. For this reason this book is welcome, although the author's mode of expression (could it be due to translation?) is unlikely to promote its popularity in English-speaking Third World countries. It appears to be directed to academics and has plenty of diagrams and statistics.

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Koenraad VERHAGEN — **Guidelines for the preparation and appraisal of cooperative development programmes and projects** — Plunket Foundation for Cooperative Studies, 31 St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3LF, England — 25 pages — 71 — 1981


This is the second in a development series and is aimed at providing practical help to people involved in economic development through cooperatives. It outlines clearly and concisely the various factors which affect the development of cooperatives, such as economic circumstances, political and administrative structures, historical factors and what might be called "socio-cultural" conditions. The author describes the strategies and the back-up necessary to promote the development of cooperatives. There is also advice on how to establish a degree of self-sufficiency.

This book will be particularly useful to those in charge of cooperatives or involved in development projects which include cooperatives, since it not only analyses the circumstances in which such people will be working but also presents a number of alternative strategies.

It covers a series of practical questions which will be of great use to those preparing projects and also those involved in post evaluation of cooperative projects.

The author, Koenraad Verhagen, is a former researcher at the International Cooperative Alliance and is currently

Operational summary of EEC-financed development schemes



OPERATIONAL SUMMARY No. 9 – March 1982

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

- the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975) and Lomé II (31 October 1979), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;
- the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC in 1976 and 1977;
- the non-associated developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the recipient country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth. : Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
TA : Technical assistance
EDF : European Development Fund
mECU : Million European currency units

ACP STATES

BAHAMAS

Food technology laboratory. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Nassau. 0.466 mECU. Establishment of first food technology laboratory in the Bahamas, Gross area 520 m² consisting of a chemical and microbiological laboratory, pilot processing plant, store rooms and offices. Building construction: acc. tender. Equipment and fittings: restr. tender. TA: two food technologists specialist in processing and in standards and quality control. Tenders: 1st half '81. Contracts: in '82. 4th EDF.

BARBADOS

Oistins fisheries project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 0.950 mECU. Local 0.450 mECU. Construction of the western complex of the existing fish market, jetty construction, erection of a fish-handling centre, sellers' stalls, shops, 80-vehicle car park and a boat repair yard. Work contracts already awarded. Equipment: int. tender in several lots in '82. Minor equipment: restr. tender or direct agreement in '82. 4th EDF.

Integrated rural development of Scotland District, phase 1. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total amount of 12.5 mECU. EDF 1.225 mECU. EDF part: Constructions (bench terraces, ditches, small dams, feeder road), 190 ha reafforested areas, two tree nurseries, T.A. Works by direct labour. Supplies: Restr. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: Short-list already drawn up. Date financial decision october '81. 5th EDF.

BENIN

Djougou-Porga road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Intermittent road improvements over 180 km. Economic study: SEDES Consultant (F). Technical study: BELLER Consultant (D). 4th EDF.

Dassa-Parakou road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 0.7 mECU. Reinstatement and asphaltting of the road (210 km). Economic study: SEDES Consultant (F). Technical study to be done: restr. tender after prequalification. 4th EDF. Works 5th EDF.

Upgrading of health service infrastructure in Porto Novo Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. Porto Novo: renovation and construction of the hospital building and equipment. Technical and architectural studies: Cabinet SODOGANDJI Consultant (Local). Complementary study on hand. 4th EDF.

Parakou polytechnical complex. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Moyen, Général, Technique et Professionnel. Construction of 8 000 m² of pedagogical and administrative buildings and hostels. Supplies and equipment. Technical and architectural study: Arch. VINOUE (Local). Project on

appraisal. Date foreseen for financial decision 2nd half '82. 4th EDF.

Cotonou maternity hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. ±1 mECU. Works: Acc. tender. Equipments: int. tender in '82. Date foreseen for financial decision: 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

Continuation and extension of fishery development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Fermes d'Etat, de l'Elevage et de la Pêche. Estimated cost: ±2.5 mECU. Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st quarter '82, 5th EDF.

Livestock development in the Borgou region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Fermes d'Etat, de l'Elevage et de la Pêche. Numerical and stabilizing cattle improvement for meat production increase. Study on hand: SCET International (F). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Geological mapping and mining research between 9th parallel and Ocean. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat. National mineral resources development. Drowning up a geological chart, surveys, supplies. Project clearly identified, 5th EDF.

Rural Hydraulics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique and Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Water points. Establishing a maintenance service. Nationals training. Works, supplies and T.A. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

BOTSWANA

Poultry-farming development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.750 mECU. Supply of equipment and possibilities for T.A. Date financial decision: January '82. 5th EDF.

BURUNDI

Consolidation of tea production. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 8.9 mECU. To increase productivity and to improve quality production of tea projects previously financed. TA foreseen for 6 years, '81 to '86: A.H.T. (D). Crop inputs: int. tender '81 to '84. 4th EDF.

Institut Universitaire de Sciences de l'Education (IUSE). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale — 0.7 mECU. Construction and equipment of educational buildings (general teaching classes, laboratories, workshops). Architectural and technical studies: TETRA Consultants (Lux). Evaluation study: DURIAU (B). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Rural development of East Mpanda. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Development of 5 950 ha of land — irrigation, construction of a road network, socio-economic infrastructure, for a population of 5 320 families (of which 3 835 are to be installed). Duration 7 years. Estimate 30.8 mECU. Cofinanced project. Foreseen

funding: IFAD 10.5 mECU — Local 7.0 mECU — AFDF 6.9 mECU — EDF 4.3 mECU — OPEC 1.5 mECU — PAM 0.6 mECU. Project clearly identified. 5th EDF.

High altitude foodcrop production. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. First phase (4 years), estimate 8.3 mECU. Cofinanced project. Production of selected seeds, their distribution and commercialization of surplus products, fertilizer and plant-health products, training. Foreseen funding: Local 0.4 mECU — USAID 4.1 mECU — EDF 3.8 mECU. Financial agreement between USAID and government signed on April 1980. For EDF: project clearly identified. 5th EDF.

Livestock development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated Cost: ±1 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Study on hand: SEDES Consultant (F). Date foreseen for financial decision: 1st half '82. 4th EDF.

Remera tea factory. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Tea factory building for 600-700 tons/year. Project clearly identified. 5th EDF.

Ngozi-Kayanza electricity supply. Resp. Auth.: REGIDESO. Estimated cost ±2 mECU. Construction of electric lines. Supplies: int. tender, 1st half '82. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Tora region electricity supply. Resp. Auth.: REGIDESO. Estimated Cost ±2 mECU. Construction of medium voltage electric lines. Study on hand by Carlo Lotti: (I). 4th EDF. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Bujumbura naval ship yard. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports. Study on hand by I.P.G. (D). 4th EDF.

CAMEROON

Douala-Yaoundé road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. Construction of a modern road and new bridge (±219 m) over Dibamba-river. Estimated cost: 211 mECU. Cofinancings: Af.D.B. BADEA, FRANCE, EDF, NEDERLAND, ABU-DHABI, KOWEIT, IDB, WORLD BANK, CANADA. Local. EDF: ±4.1 mECU for the bridge. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Extension of Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Éducation. Construction of 3 050 m² of pedagogical buildings (EDF part) and construction of 1 560 m² of administrative buildings, plus equipment (GOC part). EDF 1.5 mECU, Local +FAC 2.6 mECU. Technical and architectural studies: Buban Ngu Design Group Consultant (Local). Works: acc. tender. end '81. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Rural development in the North-West Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Cofinanced project. Increase of production of agricultural foodstuffs, improvement for professional training of staff of the extension service, rural credit to promote

foodcrop development and coffee production, and repairing regional road network. Funding (estimated): EDF 8.92 mECU, Local 7.74 mECU, IFAD 8.37 mECU, KfW (D) 6.62 mECU. Works: direct agreement. after acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender and direct agreement. T.A.: Agrar und Hydrotechnik (D) Int. tender: 1st half '82.

Transcam — realignment of Eseka-Maloume railway. Resp. Auth.: Office des Chemins de Fer Transcamerounais (OCFT). Geotechnical study: Coyne et Belier (F). 4th EDF. Works foreseen 2nd quarter '82, 5th EDF with cofinancing. Estimated cost: ±86 mECU. Works: int. tender with pre-qualification foreseen, 1st quarter '82.

Rural development in the Benoué upper valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture and Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat. (Mission de développement de la Benoué - Garona). Strengthening, continuation and extension current operations. Study on hand: IFAGRARIA (I). 5th EDF.

Rural development in Logone and Chari departments. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. (SEMRY). Continuation and extension current operation, study on hand: Hydroplan (D) - 5th EDF.

CAPE VERDE

Sal international airport improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et Communications. Technical study financed by Italy. Partial financing envisaged. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Underground water research in the Praia region. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat du Plan. Study: BURGEAP (F). Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

Praia water supply and sewerage. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat on Plan. Study on hand: Definition portion of works to execute and definition management structure. Bureau W.P.W. (D). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Renovation and equipment of Lycée Technique de Bangui. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. Supply of equipment and renovation works. Studies: O.R.T. (UK). Date foreseen for financial decision: 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

College of Education in Bangui (Lycée d'application de l'E.N.S.) Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. Building and equipment of the school. Study to be done: technical and architectural study. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Bridge building on RN3 and RN2. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 9.250 mECU. Building and strengthening of bridges. Works: int. tender launched in February '82. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 5th EDF.

Damara-Sibut Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Travaux Publics. Repairing and main-

tenance (±109 kms). Project clearly identified. 5th EDF.

Rural development in the coffee region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. (AD-ECAF). Continuation current operations. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Livestock development at Ouaka and Basse Kotto. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'élevage. 3.4 mECU. Works, supply of: vehicles, equipment, furniture and T.A. Works, by direct labour, supplies: int. tender. T.A.: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision, 2nd quarter '82. 5th EDF.

CHAD

Priority actions programme. 7.796 mECU. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 4th EDF.

COMOROS

Economical and technical study to assess harbour infrastructure in Grande Comore and in Mohéli. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Maize development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated Cost 1.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

CONGO

Sibiti-Bihoua-Loudima Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated Cost: 20 mECU. Reconstruction of the section Sibiti-Bihoua (20 km) and construction of a new road Bihoua-Loudima (57 km). Technical study and tender dossier: B.C.E.O.M. (F). Project on appraisal. (Prequalification for Loudima-Indo launched January '82).

Continuation to improve sanitation of the M' FOA river in Brazzaville. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 2.5 mECU. Construction of a concrete bed and a service gravel-road. T.A. Works: int. tender, 1st quarter '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Date financial decision end October '81. 5th EDF.

Sanitary and social actions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. Study and construction of the Ouesso hospital and construction of the Ecole de formation paramédicale et médico-sociale J.J. Loukabou (Brazzaville). Appraisal of the project after sanitary programming and technical studies. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

DJIBOUTI

Support to the livestock service for anti-ticks baths network settlement. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Study on the way by F.A.C. (F). Project clearly identified. 5th EDF.

Medical equipment for the Peltier Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. Project clearly identified. 5th EDF.

ETHIOPIA

Health project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4.3 mECU. Construction and equipping of two rural hospitals and a school for laboratory technicians in Addis Ababa plus the supply of laboratory equipment to the Central Laboratory in Addis Ababa. Studies: architectural design. Norman and Daurbarn (UK). Establishment of list of equipment: Mr V. Welles (UK). Works: int. tender launched Sept. '81. 4th EDF.

Cotombie — Combolcha power line. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of National Resources and Energy. Construction of a 300 km 135 KV power line. Feasibility study: ACRES (Canada). Study: final design and tender documents: directly by GOE and LAHMEYER, Consultant (D). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Fishery Development. Resp. Auth.: Fisheries Development and Marketing Corporation. 2.078 mECU. EDF 1.513 mECU, Local 0.565 mECU. Supply of equipments, facilities and T.A. Supplies: int. tender in '81 and '82. T.A.: GOPA (D). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Amartis river diversion. Resp. Auth.: E.E.L.P.A. Ethiopian Electrical Power Authority. Estimated cost: 10 mECU. Dam and tunnel. Study and T.A.: short-list already drawn up. Works: int. tender in '82. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Electrical tariffication study. Resp. Auth.: E.E.L.P.A. Short-list not yet drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Addis-Ababa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Addis-Ababa Water and Sewerage Authority (AAWSA). Estimation: ±53 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. foreseen end '81, 1st quarter '82. Date financial decision: July '81. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Coffee improvement (phase 2). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development. 27.2 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 5th EDF.

FIJI

Central Division Roads. Resp. Auth.: Government of Fiji. Construction of a modern earth road. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

GABON

Reafforestation (improvement of the reafforestation brigade's activity in the 1st zone). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF part for renewing and completing equipment. Project stage: identification. Study: short-list already drawn up. 5th EDF.

Hevea-cultivation in Mitzic. (HEVEGAB) Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Cofinanced project. CCCE - BAD - EDF - FAC and Local. Estimated cost ±50 mECU. EDF part 3.62 mECU. Plantation of 3,300 ha heveas. Supply of equipment (lorries, tractors

machines): int. tender, launched January '82. T.A. envisaged, financed by CCCE(F). Date financial decision, January '82. 5th EDF.

GAMBIA

Brikama College, phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Communications. 1.925 mECU. Construction and equipment of academic and residential buildings. Works by mutual agreement. Equipment for phase II: int. tender 1st half 1982 4th EDF.

Banjul sewerage and drainage project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated Cost: ± 15 mECU. Cofinancings: BAD/FAD 7.3 mECU, EDF 3.5 mECU, KFW (F.R.G.) 3.3 mECU, Local 0.9 mECU. Construction of a sewerage and drainage network, 2 pumping stations. T.A. and training. T.A.: short-list already drawn up. Works: int. tender, 1st half 1982. Financing decision for EDF: May '81. 5th EDF.

GHANA

Central and Accra Regions Rural Integrated Programme (CARRIP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Prefeasibility study for potential projects within the two regions, with the aim of improving the food situation in Accra and other coastal towns. Study: rehabilitation irrigation project: HEDESELSKABET (DK) 4th EDF. Study: 3 integrated projects: short-list already drawn up. 5th EDF.

Oil palm development in Ghana. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Study of state farms oil palm plantations as a basis for a possible rehabilitation and development programme (Pretsea excepted). Consultant: Harrison Fleming (UK). 4th EDF.

Pretsea oil palm plantation rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 7.390 mECU, EDF 1.910 mECU, Local 5.480 mECU. Complete rehabilitation of 4 500 hectares of oil palm plantation and of an existing oil palm extraction mill at Pretsea. Supplies funded by EDF. Int. tender: on 1st half '82. Works financed by GOG: restr. tender. T.A.: Harrison Fleming (UK) selected. 4th EDF.

GRENADA

Eastern Main Road Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 2.5 mECU. EDF 1.440 mECU, Local 1.060 mECU. Geotechnical study: Geoproggett Consultant (I). Works: Contracts already awarded. Supply: Equipment for public works, int. tender in '82. 4th EDF.

Phase 2. Repairing and strengthening of a section of the circular road. Estimated cost 1.350 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Hillsborough Jetty. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost 0.337 mECU. Construction of a jetty for goods and passenger handling. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

GUINEA

Land development in Kankan and Labé regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et des F.A.P.A. 2.5 mECU. 1st phase. Cultivation of 1 000 ha of hydro-agricultural land by rural development brigades. Works, supplies, furnitures and vehicles and T.A. Work and supply: int. tender and acc. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: CEDRAT (F). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

2nd phase. Estimated cost: 5 mECU. Hydro-agricultural land improvement by controlled flooding. Carrying out of plan: Bureau EUROCONSULT (N). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Renovation and extension of the SO-GUIPLAST plastics factory. Resp. Auth.: Government of Guinea. 13 mECU. Fundings: EDF 5.8 mECU, Iraq (E.I.F.D.) 4.7 mECU, Local 2.5 mECU. Engineering, training, provision of services, renovation work, supplies and installation of auxiliary equipment: int. tender launched. Supply and installation of plastics production equipment: int. tender following E.I.F.D. regulations, end '81. 4th EDF.

Dairying in Guinea. Resp. Auth.: Premier ministre. Dairying improvement for population nourishment. Study in progress: pasteurized milk reconstitution unit by Danske Mejeriers Arkitektkontor (DK). Project stage: identification, 4th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Eaux, Forêts, et des FAPA. Estimated total cost ± 12 mECU. EDF 3.5 mECU and 1.5 mECU (microprojects amount), UNEF (United Nations Equipment Fund) 1.8 mECU, USAID and UNICEF ± 2.6 mECU. Local ± 2.5 mECU. Construction of 460 water points (180 wells and 280 drills) and improvement of 405 sources. EDF part. EDF works: direct labour. T.A.: mutual agreement. UNEF: supply of drill equipment int. tender with UNEF rules. UNICEF: supply of different equipment and manual pumps: int. tender with UNICEF rules. USAID: management for direct labour: direct agreement. Date financial decision: January '82. 5th EDF.

Cotton development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Eaux, Forêts et FAPA. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Rural infrastructure, supply of rural inputs, equipment, vehicles and T.A. Project on appraisal, 5th EDF.

Town planning and construction of council houses. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat. Estimated cost 9 mECU. Buildings, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

GUINEA BISSAU

Improvement of small scale fishing in Cacheu. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat d'Etat pour la pêche. 1.970 mECU. Improvement of infrastructure and equipment. Cold factory. Works: Acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender in '83. T.A.: direct agreement june '82. Project on appraisal. 4th and 5th EDF.

North-East rural development. Resp. Auth.: Commissariat Général au Développement Rural. Estimated Cost: 10.8 mECU. EDF 6.8 mECU, F.A.C. 4 mECU. Crop production development (cotton, pea-nut, cereals) by harnessing cultivation, rural credit and correct crop trading. Supply of crop inputs by int. tender in '81 and '82. T.A.: by C.F.D.T. (F). Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st half '82. 5th EDF.

Rio Campossa Bridge. Resp. Auth.: Commissariat d'Etat aux Travaux Publics. Bafata-Bambadinca Road. Works, supply may be, T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Health infrastructures. Resp. Auth.: Commissariat d'Etat aux Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 1.9 mECU. Construction and equipment of 2 district hospitals, 4 health centres and staff-housing. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

North-East forestry development. Resp. Auth.: Commissariat général au développement rural. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des ressources naturelles. Estimated cost 1.4 mECU. Construction of big diameter wells (1.5 m) about 120 wells in the GABU region. Works: int. tender, 1st half '82. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

GUYANA

East Bank Berbice rural development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Works: feeder roads, infrastructure. Supply of fertilizers and equipments. T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Faculty of Agriculture. Estimated cost 0.695 mECU. Construction, supply of equipment and supervision of works. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Rehabilitation of sewerage and water supply systems of Georgetown. Estimated cost 1.9 mECU. Laying sanitation pipes, construction of water supply wells. Supplies and T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Upper Demerara Forestry Project. Supplementary Financing. 1.95 mECU. EDF Part. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 5th EDF.

IVORY COAST

Human hydrolics improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et Ministère des Travaux Publics, des Transports, Construction et Urbanisme. 13.500 mECU. Works: 299 wells, 801 drillings, water tanks, bore-holes. Supply of 1,400 manual pumps. T.A. For drillings and big wells: int. tender launched November '81. Supplies (manual pumps and pedagogical equipment) int. tender launched January '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Date financial decision octobre '81. 4th and 5th EDF.

Trade promotion programme. Resp. Auth.: Centre Ivoirien du commerce Exté-

rieur (CICE). EDF part 2.325 mECU. Local 8 mECU. EDF: vocational training actions (seminars and training) and products promotion (studies, marketing) and monitoring. T.A.: foreseen until end '83 for european offices and until end '85 for CICE in Abidjan. T.A.: direct agreement after prequalification. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

Consolidation of Marahoué Ranch. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la production animale. (SO.DE.PRA) 13.600 mECU. EDF 7.5 mECU. Local 6.1 mECU. Land improvement works, infrastructure, equipments and T.A. Supplies: int. tender in '82. Works: direct labour. T.A.: mutual agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 4th and 5th EDF.

Extension of "Lycee Sainte-Marie of Abidjan". Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. 2.050 mECU. Construction and equipment of laboratories and specialized rooms. Works: acc. tender in '82. Supply of equipments: int. tender in '82. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 3rd and 4th EDF.

KENYA

Machakos integrated development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning and Community Affairs. 23.140 mECU. EDF 17.700 mECU, and Kenya government and farmers' contributions 5.440 mECU. Main elements are water development (construction of earth dams and other low-technology water schemes), agricultural (crop and livestock) improvement, soil conservation and strengthening of local community institutions and services. Works by acc. tender in 1981 and 1982. Supplies (cotton insecticides and crop inputs) by int. tender 1981/82, 1982/83. TA awarded to Salzgitter Consultant (D). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Geophysical survey (Kerio Valley). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning. 1.0 mECU. Survey to identify mineral prospects in the Kerio Valley. Study: restr. tender. Date financial decision: 2nd quarter '81. 4th EDF.

Smallholder rice, Nyanza Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4.350 mECU. Rehabilitation of 4 smallholder rice schemes (650 ha). Study on the way: NEDECO (N). Works, supplies and T.A. Date financial decision, october '81. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

Kenya Trade Promotion. Resp. Auth.: Kenya External Trade Authority. 1 mECU. T.A. for sales and marketing missions, provision of equipment and materials for the Training Division. Date financial decision 1st half '81. 5th EDF.

Development of the Kisii Valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Provincial Irrigation Unit (PIU). Total estimated cost 7.906 mECU. EDF 4.822 mECU, Netherlands, 2,087 mECU, local 0.997 mECU. Works: irrigation and draining construction of buildings and storages. Supply of tractors and lorries. T.A. foreseen with Netherland

aid. Works: int. tender or direct agreement considering size. Supply: int. tender and direct agreement. Date financial decision December '81. 5th EDF.

Sergoit-Tamback Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and communications. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Bitumized road \pm 30 km. Works and supervision. Prequalification foreseen in '82. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82. 5th EDF.

Eldoret Polytechnic. Estimated cost. 6 mECU. Construction, supply of equipment (pedagogical) and T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Veterinary Investigation Laboratory Mariakani. Adm. Resp.: Ministry of Livestock Department. Veterinary Department. 3.4 mECU. Construction of a veterinary investigation laboratory. Supply of materials and equipments. T.A. Materials and equipment: int. tender 1st quarter '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Date financial decision december '81. 5th FED.

KIRIBATI

Rehabilitation of the South Tarawa telephonic network. Resp. Auth.: Controller of Telecommunications of the Ministry of Communications and Works. 2.894 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of equipment int. tender mid-'82. Supervision of works: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial agreement 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

LESOTHO

Maseru airport. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communication. Estimation 34 mECU. Provision of a modern international airport 15 km south of Maseru. Foreseen funding: Lesotho 2.2 mECU - Saudi Fund 7.4 mECU - Kuwait Fund 3.1 mECU - ABE-DA 4.4 mECU - OPEC 2.2 mECU - Abu Dhabi 0.6 mECU - ADB 7.7 mECU. EDF 3.0 mECU - Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Rural Primary Schools Improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 0.400 mECU. Construction and furnishing of ten 2-classroom units. Works: acc. tender or direct agreement. Supplies: direct agreement. Date financial decision october '81. 4th EDF.

Feasibility study for the project: "Lesotho Highland, Water Scheme". Resp. Auth.: Ministry of water resources, energy and mines. Estimated cost \pm 5 mECU. Short-list will be drawn up after int. tender foreseen on 1st or 2nd quarter '82. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st half '82. 5th EDF.

Mohale's Hoek - Quthing road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and communications. Reinstatement of a road. 50 km. Estimated cost \pm 15 mECU. EDF contribution estimated for \pm 8.5 mECU. Cofinancing needed. Project stage: identification 5th EDF.

Basic Agricultural Services Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agricul-

ture. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and monitoring. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

LIBERIA

Coffee and cocoa development project at Zwedru and Plahn. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture 5.7 mECU, EDF 2.9 mECU, Local 2.8 mECU. To develop 980 hectares of robusta coffee and 1 320 hectares of cocoa in Grand Gedeh and Sinoe countries. Works by acc. tender. — Supplies by int. tender in '82. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Buto palm-oil project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 1,100 ha plantations. Study: short-list already drawn up. 4th EDF.

MADAGASCAR

Development of coconut palm plantations in Sambava. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Réforme Agraire. 5.757 mECU. Creation of 2 000 ha new plantations. Equipment, crop inputs, infrastructure. Works and equipments: int. tender, launched. Crop inputs (fertilizers and pesticides): int. tender, 1st half '81, '82, '83, '84. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Development of Namela Plains. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Réforme Agraire. Hydro-agricultural development of 700 ha. Study: Bureau SOMEAH-SOGREAH (local + F). Rural engineering works. Supply of rural equipment. T.A.: short-list already drawn up. Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

Hydrological study of Basse Betsiboka Plains. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Réforme Agraire. Study to improve knowledge of Basse Betsiboka hydrology. Estimated cost 0.2 mECU. 4th EDF.

Rural hydraulic. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Réforme Agraire. 7 mECU + Local. Irrigation improvement for traditional rice-plantations in the Hauts Plateaux. Works by direct labour in '81 up to '85. Supply of means of transport and equipments: int tenders in '81 up to '83. T.A.: short-list already drawn up. Date financial decision, december '81. 5th EDF.

Sambava oil-palm factory study. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Réforme Agraire. Preliminary study: I.R.H.O. (F). Study to be done: faisibility. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Bridges over RN 5A, Isesy-Vohemar. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost \pm 9.750 mECU. Reinstatement and construction of bridges. (15). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Supply of pharmaceutical and medical products and analysis of the industrial sector rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Gouvernement de Madagascar. 2.165 mECU. Supply by int. tender of special milk and products for children, medical fabrics. Industrial

sector expertise by direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision february '82. 5th EDF.

MALAWI

National rural development programme, phase I Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Integrated rural development programme financed in parallel with other donors. Infrastructural improvement, roads, housing, boreholes. EDF 7.9 mECU, UK 9.0 mECU, Germany 5.1 mECU, IBRD 14.6 mECU. CIDA 2.0 mECU, USAID 0.6 mECU, Local 7.5 mECU. Int. tender for vehicles and equipment during 1982. TA: Huntings Consultant (UK). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Blantyre-Mwanza road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Reinstatement and asphaltting of the road (± 95 km). Economical study: Hoff & Overgaard Consultant (DK). Technical study: short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Chirimba Industrial estate. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning. 3.205 mECU. Provision of land infrastructure for an 80-acre industrial estate. Study: feasibility, design, tender documents, S.W.K. consultant (UK). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Dairy cattle development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Cross local bovine breed with european dairy breeds. Study to be done: factibility. Short-list already drawn up. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Improvement of district hospitals and health centres. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Building of small district hospitals and health centres. Works, supplies and T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

MALI

Strengthening of sanitary infrastructure in the Niore region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé et des Affaires Sociales et Ministère des Transports et T.P. 2.570 mECU. Buildings, equipments, training. Architecturals and technicals studies: GOUSIER (F). Date financial decision end of october '81. 4th EDF.

N'Dama Yanfolila operation. 2nd phase. Resp. Auth.: Direction Générale de l'Elevage. 3 mECU. Production of race N'Dama improved begetters and cattle for harnessing. Valuation and orientation study: I.E.M.V.T. Consultant (F). Rural engineering works. Supply of equipments. T.A. Date financial decision end october '81. 5th EDF.

Rice Ségou Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 14 mECU. Hydroagricultural improvements. Social-economic and topographic study: HYDROPLAN Consultant (D). Works: int. tender, launched sept. '81. Supply of agricultural equipment: int. tender and mutual agreements, 4th quarter '81. T.A. and monitoring: direct state supervision in '82. Date financial decision, october '81. 5th EDF.

Sevare-San road repairing. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et Equipment.

Complementary study: short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF. Works by int. tender. 4th and 5th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Industriel et du Tourisme. Direction de l'Hydraulique. Estimated cost: 3.4 mECU. Water-points. Study: situation of the hydrolic sector in the project area. Short-list already drawn up. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

MAURITANIA

Extension of Kaédi regional hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.925 mECU. Construction, equipment and TA for Kaédi hospital (100 beds). Works: direct agreement. Medical-technical equipment int. tender, 1st half '82. TA: INTER G (F). 4th EDF.

Monitoring for small irrigated areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost: 3 mECU. T.A. and monitoring, direct agreement, 4th quarter '81. Supply of agricultural input and pumping equipment: int. tender, 1st quarter '82. Works by direct labour. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Regeneration of Gum-tree plantations. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated Cost: 1.5 mECU. Feasibility study: Bureau COURTOY (B). Works. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Settlement of the National Management and Maintenance Service for the sanitary infrastructures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 0.670 mECU, Equipement and medical stores, vehicles and T.A. Supplies: direct agreement. Vehicles: restr. tender. T.A.: 2 Technical trainers for 2 years. Short-list already drawn up. Date for financial decision end october '81. 5th EDF.

Gorgol pilot area rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Study to be done. Short-list not yet drawn up. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Small dams construction in the Hodhs region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement rural. Estimated cost 3.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Nooukchott - Rosso Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 21 mECU. EDF contribution estimated for ± 5 mECU. Cofinancing needed. Repairing and reinstatement. Technical study necessary. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Livestock development in the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 3.943 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Supply of vehicles, equipment and veterinary products, int. tender 1st half '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Works by direct labour. Date foreseen for financial decision March '82. 5th EDF.

MAURITIUS

Mauritius housing project. Resp. Auth.:

Mauritius Housing Corporation and the Ministry of Housing, Lands and Town and Country Planning. 3.2 mECU. Financing (for low income households) of approximately 1 250 housing units. Infrastructure work for urbanisation and service plots: int. tender, in '82. Consultancy service: HILL (UK) — APPEL (D). 4th EDF.

Development of Ile Rodrigues. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Development centred on agricultural production. Economical and technical study, on the way; VINK (NL). Date foreseen for financial decision: 2nd quarter 82. 5th EDF.

Investments and trade promotion. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Industry. (Investment Promotion Unit and Export Promotion Unit). 1.610 mECU. Contracts by direct agreements. Date financial decision end october 81. 5th EDF.

Strengthening of the sanitary infrastructure. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Estimated cost 3 mECU. Reinstatement and extension of 3 hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of equipment, supervision of works. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

NIGER

Development of modern rice-growing on Niger river. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Office National des Aménagements Hydro-Agricoles (ONAHA). 5.5 mECU. Development of 375 ha in fully controlled water to allow double annual rice cultivation. Works and supplies: int. tenders in '82. Technical supervision and monitoring: BELGROMA (B). 4th EDF.

Namarde Goungou Area. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost: 3 mECU. Hydro-agricultural improvement (± 170 ha) under full water control. Works and supplies (irrigation and drain network). Int. tender, first part launched december '81. (2nd part foreseen March-April '82.) T.A. and monitoring: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision february '82. 5th EDF.

Main lines for regional development of areas affected by Kandadji Dam. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, des Transports et de l'Urbanisme. Consultancy service (study): Main lines: GIBB (UK). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Air Valley development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated cost 2.8 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hydraulique. 300 drills in the Zinder region. Hydrogeological study and tender dossier: Bureau GKW (D). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

NIGERIA

Hydraulic development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. Estimated Cost: 2.350 mECU. Equipment for Technological Institute of Kaduna. T.A.: Bureau M.R.T. (UK and Nigeria). Supply of drilling equipment; int. tender: 1st quarter '82. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Development of beef and veal production. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 1.868 mECU. Project to consider possibilities to develop cooperative ranch. Study to define project: Bureau Hunting (UK). Supplies: restr. tender in '81. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Foodstuffs production on the south coast. Resp. Auth.: Department of Primary Industry. Estimated cost 2.200 mECU. Development of seasonal cultivation and marketing. Technical and economic studies. Definition of the project: Produce Studies Ltd. Consultant (UK). Date foreseen for financial decision: 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

Momote airport. Resp. Auth.: Department of Transport and Civil Aviation. Estimated cost 0.930 mECU. Reconstruction and sealing of runway. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

RWANDA

Bugesera water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Construction of a drinking-water network in Bugesera. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Development of Zaire Nil Crest. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture 13.8 mECU. Développement of agricultural production and social-economic infrastructure. Feasibility study: SCET International (F). Date financial decision end October '81. 5th EDF.

Complementary funding for Faculté de Médecine in Butaré. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. 0.650 mECU. Supply of scientific equipment. Int. tender launched December '81. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

Transmission-lines study in secondary centres. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Economical and technical studies to be done. Short-list not yet drawn up. 5th EDF.

IPN of Ruengeri - vocational school. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. Estimated cost 0.970 mECU. Works, equipments, expert's mission. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Cyangugu-Butare Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 74 mECU. Reinstatement and asphaltting of the exiting hearth road. (153 km). Economical study: SEDES (F). Technical study part Butare-Ntendezi: DHV (N) on 4th EDF. Cofinancing: World Bank, BAD, Kuwait Fund (possible). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

ST LUCIA

Livestock development project. Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of rural development. Estimated cost 0.860 mECU. Extension project zone. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

ST VINCENT AND GRENADINES

Union Island clinic. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Estimated 0.450 mECU. To improve health care at the remote Union Island by establishing a new clinic (total gross area ± 400 m²) and also housing accommodation for the staff (± 300 m²). Studies: design and tender documents: Tomlin, Voss Associates (Local). Works: acc. tender, 2nd half '81. Equipments: int. tender in '82. Financing decision on June '81. 5th EDF.

Improvement of the general hospital at Kingstown. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.550 mECU. Follow-up of phase 1 financed from 4th EDF. New extension. Studies. Master plan for the extension: Watkins, Gray Woodgate (UK). Works: acc. tender, 2nd half '81. Equipments: int. tender in '82. Financing decision June '81. 5th EDF.

SAO TOME PRINCIPE

Oleagineus cultivation Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated Cost: 3-4 mECU. EDF ± 2.16 mECU, Local 0.9 or 1.9 mECU. Selected oil palm-tree plantations over 300 to 500 ha. Works, supply and T.A. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 5th EDF.

SENEGAL

Increase of cereal-growth in S.O. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 4.68 mECU. Preparatory study: SODEFITEX (Senegal). Hydro-agricultural improvements in small areas. Works by direct labour. Supply of crop inputs and pumping equipment: int. tender in '82. T.A. and monitoring: direct agreement in '82. Short list: not yet drawn up. Date financial decision January '82. 5th EDF.

Study on water supply to the ISC industrial complex. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. Direction de l'Hydraulique Urbaine et Rurale. (D.H.U.R.). 1.1 mECU. Technical studies, T.A. and drilling into the quaternary and into the Maastrichtian. Works: restr. tender for quaternary and int. tender for Maastrichtian. Studies and T.A.: short-list already drawn up. Tenders and contracts '81-'82. 3rd EDF.

Kedougou-Saraya road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de T.P. Partial reinstatement. Kedougou-Dianke Makam. 5.5 mECU. Works: int. tender on June '81. Date financing decision January '82. 3rd and 4th EDF.

Rubber tree plantation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. T.A.: short-list not yet drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Sewerage of the "Gueule Tapée" district. Resp. Auth.: Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Construction of canalization and pipes for rain waters. Improvement of the sewage network. General study: NEDECO (NL). Definition study and tender dossier, short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

TAIBA "ICS" complex water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Factory water supply with 5 drills distance 20 km and a pipe of 500-600 mm. Study about phreatic sheet and water transport: ARLAF (F) and Beller Consult (D). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Rural Hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. Directeur de l'Hydraulique. Construction of 21 drills. Study for phreatic sheet and modalities for execution. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Trade Promotion programme. Resp. Auth.: Centre Sénégalais du Commerce Extérieur. 1.083 mECU. Actions for productions, marketing and T.A. Contract: direct agreement or restr. tender. Date financial decision January '82. 5th EDF.

SEYCHELLES

Redevelopment of Victoria Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Estimated cost 6 mECU. EDF 2.4 mECU, ADB (African Dev. Bank) 3.6 mECU. Renovation and new constructions, supply of medical equipment. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

SIERRA LEONE

Forest resources development in Sierra Leone. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Feasibility study in order to analyse the forest resources and submit proposals for their further development. Study: Consultant Atlanta (D). 4th EDF.

North-western integrated agricultural development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Four-year integrated programme to develop mangrove swamps, upland crops, coastal fishing, infrastructure. Estimated Cost: 6.03 mECU. EDF 4.9 mECU. Local 1.13 mECU. Works: acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender. T.A.: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision, February '82. 4th and 5th EDF.

Koinadugu integrated agricultural development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 7.080 mECU, EDF 5.9 mECU, Local 1.180 mECU. Four-year integrated programme to develop inland swamps, upland crops, livestock sector, infrastructure, marketing and credit system. Works: restr. tender. Supplies: int. tender, 1981 and 1982. TA: Carl Bro International (DK). 4th EDF.

Koinadugu - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Study on hand: Carl Bro International (DK). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Support for existing educational institutions. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 2.050 mECU. Water and electricity supply and equipment for Njala University College, building and equipment of additional hostel accommodation at several teacher training colleges. Njala University: works for water supply, int. tender in 1982. Agricultural equipment: int. tender, in 1982. Teacher training colleges - building works: int. tender, in 1982. 4th EDF.

POTORU Rubber project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and forestry. Cofinanced project with CDC (UK) and CCCE (F). Estimated cost 2.3 mECU for EDF part. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Construction of water points for villages with 2000 inhabitants. Study to prepare project and appraisal: IWACO (NL). Date foreseen for financial decision 3rd quarter '82. 5th EDF.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Forestry Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forestry Division. 0.625 mECU. Establishment of 1,800 ha of tree plantations (mahogany and teak). Associated infrastructure and equipment. Works: direct labour. Equipments: direct agreement on 81,82 and 83. 4th EDF.

SOMALIA

Saakow rural experimental centre. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Creation of an irrigated area (60 ha) with all facilities and equipment. Aim: agronomical experiments. Study: Bureau Nuovo Castoro (I). Estimated total cost: 5.026 mECU. EDF: 4.950 mECU. Local 0.076 mECU. Works: 4 kms of tracks, pump station (180 l/s) electric power station (120 KVA). Supply of: agricultural equipment, 3 tractors, vehicles, furnitures... T.A. Land improvement works and estate infrastructure: contracts on awarding. Supplies: int. tender end 2nd quarter '82. T.A.: short-list not yet drown up. Date financial decision, october '81. 4th EDF.

Bardheera Dam. Resp. Auth.: Bardheera Dam Authority (BDA). 433 mECU. (Estimated) Dam Project 349 mECU. Powerline to Mogadishu 84 mECU. Funding: EDF 44 mECU, Italy 36 mECU. Germany 32 mECU, France 18 mECU, Saudi Arabia 18 mECU, Local 20 mECU. Total 168 mECU. Power and river regulation for agricultural development. Construction of a concrete gravity dam with hydro-power station, associated infrastructure and electrical transmission lines. The dam will provide water, flood protection and power for up to 233 000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Consultancy services: restr. tend. procedure after prequalification. Prequalification made. In a second stage, 5th EDF. Project the consultant will supervise construction. Civil works: first int. tender during 1982. Transmission lines int. tender in 1982. Equipment: powerhouse main equipment and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 1983. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int tender in 1984. Study: 4th EDF. Works: 5th EDF.

Mogadishu Slipway. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning. 3 or 4 mECU. Construction of a slipway and ship repair facilities in Mogadishu harbour. Feasibility study to be done. Short-list already drown up. Date foreseen for financial decision: in '82, 4th EDF.

Mogadishu Dairy. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry. Estimated cost 3.81 mECU. EDF 1,250 mECU. EIB 2.56 mECU. Rehabilitation of the existing dairy. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Supplies, int. tenders 1st quarter '82. T.A.: short-list not yet drown up. Date financial decision october '81. 4th EDF.

Mogadishu Institute of Statistics. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost: 0.700 mECU. Works: acc. tender on july '81. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

Goluen-Gelib Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Complementary funding. EDF 18.976 mECU. Project in execution 4th EDF. Complementary funding 4th and 5th in october '81.

Golwein - Bulo - Mererta development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture 8.5 mECU. Grapefruit plantations. Supervisions: Agrotec (I). T.A.: I.R.F.A. (F). Supply of equipment: int. tender launched end '81. Project in execution. 2nd, 3rd and 4th EDF.

Development of pheniculture (date-palm). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost 2 mECU. 1000 ha plantation in the North region. Supply of equipment, machines, inputs, rural monitoring. T.A. to define, may be French aid. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Mogadishu water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning. Estimated total cost 38.5 mECU. EDF 6 mECU. Foreseen cofinancing, World Bank, Arab Funds et Local. New drills and strengthening of existing network. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82. 5th EDF.

SUDAN

Jebel Marra rural development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. 15.043 mECU. EDF 11 mECU. Local 4.043 mECU. Agricultural extension and improvement or rural infrastructure (road improvement and maintenance, forestry programme, community development programme). Works: project building, and houses (new + rehabilitation) int. tender. first quarter '81. Supplies: vehicles, trucks, animal cultivation equipment, furnishings, int. tenders in 1981 to 1983. TA: Hunting Technical Services Ltd (UK). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Nuba Mountains rural development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. 6.650 mECU. EDF 5.5 mECU. Local 1.150 mECU. Introduction of improved farming techniques and systems in two nucleus development centres of the Nuba Mountains region. Works: contracts already awarded. Supplies: vehicles, furniture and animal traction equipment, int. tenders in 1981, 1982. TA: SATEC Consultant (F). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Gum arabic development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. Rehabilitation of gum arabic pro-

duction in the Sudanese gum belt (including production and marketing aspects). Preliminary study: gum arabic development in North Kordofan Province. Bureau GITEC (D). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Juba airport. Resp. Auth.: Civil Aviation Department. 21.5 mECU. EDF 16.3 mECU. Local 5.2 mECU. Construction of a new airport. Consultant: bureau NACO (N). Works: Contracts on awarding. Supply: int. tender in '82. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

University of Juba, phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 7 mECU. Additional facilities on the new campus for a capacity of about 400 students: 3 hostels, (1 100 m² each) dining hall and kitchen (360 m²), 3 college buildings (1 850 m²), 21 staff houses (each 170 m²). Works including infrastructure for water, sewerage and electricity: int. tender in 1981. Equipment: int. tender in 1982. Work supervision: IWACO (NL). 4th EDF.

Four higher secondary technical schools. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 6.3 mECU. Renovation and new constructions of four existing schools, each with a capacity of 324 students. Works contracts already awarded. Equipment: int. tender in 1982. Supervision of works: GBWA Int. (Irl.) Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Juba-Laboni road study. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Technical study and design for improvement of ±106 km feeder road in Southern Sudan. Study: Bureau GITEC (D) 4th EDF.

Upper Talanga Tea Project - Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Natural Resources 12 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Supply of vehicles, agricultural machinery, equipments, material inputs, int. tender 1st half '82. Other works by direct labour or restr. tender or direct agreement. T.A. mutual agreement in '82. Date financial decision February '82. 5th EDF.

T.A. for Sudan Rural Development Company Ltd. (SRDC) and Sudan Rural Development Finance Company Ltd. (SRDFC). Resp. Auth.: Sudan Development Corporation. SDC. 1.2 mECU. Provision of three experts for 4 years. Date financial decision January '82. 5th EDF.

SURINAME

Rice project at Coronie. Resp. Auth.: Ministerie van Landbouw, Veeteelt, Visserij en Bosbouw. Rice production developments. Study on the way. EUROCONSULT (NL). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

SWAZILAND

Teacher training college at Nhlanguano. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2.5 mECU. Construction and equipping of a fully residential teacher training college with a capacity of 400 students. Works: contracts already awarded. Supervision: Consultant Design + Planning International DPI (Local). Equipment: int. tender 1982. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost 2.38 m ECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

TANZANIA

Coffee improvement programme. Resp. Auth.: Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT). 25.434 mECU. EDF 12.677 mECU. Local 12.757 mECU. To increase quantity and quality of coffee production in the main coffee areas of Tanzania by improving the extension services, supply of farm inputs, provision of training facilities, renovation of central pulperies and road improvement. Works: Contracts already awarded. Supplies: tenders launched December 1981. T.A.: Mr. Maxwell (UK). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Coffee improvement programme phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Coffee Authority of Tanzania (CAT). Extension and intensification of the activities promoted under the phase 1. The programme will cover improvements in production (through extension services, inputs, supply), roads and storage facilities. CAT will itself prepare the phase 2 project. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Agricultural development project in Iringa region. Resp. Auth.: Iringa Regional Development Directorate. 6.5 mECU. To increase agricultural productivity in the Iringa Region, through strengthening of the extension services, improvement of infrastructure and supply of farm inputs. Works: contracts awarded. T.A.: Agrar und Hydrotechnik (D). Supplies: driers for pyrethrum, int. tender launched December 1981. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Iringa integrated rural development, phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Iringa Regional Development Directorate. 19.325 mECU. To extend and intensify the activities currently being carried out under phase 1. Main elements are strengthening of extension services, provision of farm inputs, extension of the oxen cultivation programme, improvements of the road system and promotion of animal production. Study; project preparation. Agrar und Hydrotechnik (D). Date foreseen for financial decision: February '82. 5th EDF.

Lusuhunga-Bukombe road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 20 mECU. Bitumen road of 127 km. Works: Int. tender prequalification launched end of September '81. Supervision of works: restr. tender in 1981. Regional Project. 4th EDF.

Technical teacher training college, Mtwara. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.4 mECU. Training facilities for technical teachers. Classrooms, laboratory and workshops, dormitories and sanitary block, administration. Total area 3 765 m². Works: contracts awarded. Equipment: int. tender with possibility of restr. tender or direct agreement depending on nature of supply. Supplies: restr. tender. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Extensions to the Mbeya Water Supply System. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 4.050 mECU. Con-

struction of an abstraction point, a pipeline, a pumping station, reservoirs. Supplies and site supervision. Works and supplies: int. tender after prequalification launched October '81. Contracts: Jennings and O'Donovan (Irl). Date foreseen for financial decision: 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

Mtwara Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 5 mECU. Works: drilling of new wells, and constructions. Supply of equipment and T.A. Drilling activities and power supply connections by direct labour. Other works: int. tender in '82. Supplies: int. tender in '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Date financial decision, October '81. 5th EDF.

Vehicle repair project. Resp. Auth.: National Transport Corporation (NTC). 13 mECU. Recovery and repair of equipment in the transport sector. Supply of engines, gearboxes, space-parts. Supplies: int. tender and direct agreement 1st quarter '82. Date financial decision end October '81. 4th EDF.

TOGO

Cattle-raising in palm plantation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 1.136 mECU, EDF 0.884 mECU, Local 0.252 mECU. Stock-farming under palms to improve meat production and to make industrial palm plantation maintenance easier. Study: project plans, Bureau SOTED (Local). Works: direct labour. Supplies: vehicles, int. tender in 1982. Supplies, equipment and cattle purchase: direct agreement. 4th EDF.

Adele Ranch. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 3.207 mECU, EDF 2.788 mECU, Local 0.419 mECU. Establishment of a cattle ranch for local supply of oxen, improved heifers and breeding bulls, surplus for local slaughter and market. Works: direct labour. Supply: graders and vehicles, int. tender, 1st half '82. T.A.: zoo-consult (I). Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Strengthening and improvement of 3 roads. ESP. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, des Mines, de l'Énergie et de Ressources Hydrauliques. Afiao-Avezopo road (19 km) - Lomé-Kpaliné road (118 km) - Atakpamé-Blitta road (100 km). Works: int. tender foreseen 1st quarter '82, conditional upon provisional finance. 5th EDF.

Kara bridge. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, des Mines, de l'Énergie et de Ressources Hydrauliques. Access roads and bridge (150 m). Int. tender foreseen in '82, conditional upon provisional finance. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

Rural Development of Kara Valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 4.277 mECU. EDF 2.888 mECU. Local 1.339 mECU. Supplementary infrastructure, training and monitoring. Works by direct agreement. Equipment and supplies by int. tender. T.A. Date financial decision December '81. 5th EDF.

Rural hydrolics. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost

4 mECU. Construction of ±300 drills, supply of manual pumps and training. Drills: int. tender, 1st quarter '82. Date foreseen for financial decision, 2nd quarter '82. 5th EDF.

TUVALU

Funafuti power plant. Complementary funding. 5th EDF. 0.185 mECU. Following tender results.

UGANDA

Kampala-Masaka road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Housing. 5 mECU. Repair and asphaltting of 60 km and supervision of works. Works: int. tender in 1981. Supervision of works: SAUTI (I), 4th EDF.

Nutritional rehabilitation centres. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works. 1.100 mECU. To improve health care in rural areas and to reduce malnutrition (particularly widespread among children). Contribution and equipping of 10 centres. Supply of 30 vehicles for health inspectors. Works: acc. tender. Supply: int. tender in '82. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Lake-Katwe Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Housing. 1.4 mECU. Gravel road, 24 km. Works: direct labour. Supplies of graders, int. tender launched '81. T.A.: Carl BRO (DK). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

Coffee rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 25 mECU. Works, equipment, training and T.A. Works by direct agreement. Supplies: int. tender or acc. tender or restr. tender. T.A.: short-list not yet drawn up. Date financial decision end October '81. 4th EDF.

Karamoja Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 4.400 mECU. Constructions and Civil works. Transport, Equipment, Supplies, Training. T.A. by Lutheran World Federation. Equipment and supplies, int. tender. Date financial decision December '81. 5th EDF.

UPPER VOLTA

Stock-farming in Hauts Bassins and Comoé ORD. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture (Direction services élevages). 1.961 mECU. Improvement of traditional breeding conditions and continued development of animal-drawn tillage. Various works and supplies: direct agreement. Supply of means of transport: int. tender, 1st quarter '82. T.A.: G.Z.T. (D). 4th EDF.

Mine of Poura rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Commerce, du Développement Industriel et des Mines. Estimated Cost: 46.1 mECU. EDF (4th EDF): 3.55 mECU for road and power station. Int. tender for supply of 4 generator 900 KW: launched August '81. (5th EDF). Estimated 4.14 mECU for assessment of the worker's town. Study underway. Other fundings: CCCE 9.3 mECU, BOAD 3.1 mECU, private investors 2 mECU, coframines and others

2.8 mECU, IDB 2.7 mECU, Local 8.3 mECU. Project on appraisal. 4th and 5th EDF.

Improvement of Dakiri plain. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 1.838 mECU. Hydro-agricultural improvement (± 200 ha). Irrigation and drain network. T.A. and monitoring. Works: int. tender, 1st half '82. T.A. direct agreement. Date financial decision, february '82. 5th EDF.

Extension of Lycee Technique de Ouagadougou. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Travaux Publics. Building of the boarding-school for 360 students. Works, supply of equipments. T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Kompienga Dam. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics des Transports et de l'Urbanisme. Cofinanced project. Estimated cost ± 84 mECU. Earth-dam construction, access road non asphalted ± 18 kms, two groups of alternators 7800 KVA each, transmission power lines. Works: restr. tender after prequalification foreseen 1st quarter '82. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Development of the Douna plain. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du développement rural. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Irrigation and draining works, supply of equipments, inputs and T.A. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

WESTERN SAMOA

Oil and Cake storage and handling facilities for the copra mill. Resp. Auth.: Samoa Coconut Products Ltd. 0.850 mECU. Storage tanks for copra oil and handling equipment. Shed for storage of pelletized cake. Study for supplies: Proses (Malaysia) financed by ADB. Study to be done for sheds. Short list not yet drawn up. Works: acc. tender 2nd half '81. Supplies: int. tender, '82. Date financial decision end october '81. 5th EDF.

Sauniatu Hydro Electric Scheme. Resp. Auth.: Electric Power Corporation (EPC). Estimated Cost 7.1 mECU. EDF 4.1 mECU, EIB 3 mECU. Two power station of 1.75 MW each. Headpond, tunnel, penstock powerhouse with turbines and generators and transmission lines. Equipments, supervision of works and training. Design study completed by Mander, Raikes and Marshall (UK). Preliminary works and access road: acc. tender 2nd half '81. Main civil works: int. tender after prequalification. Prequalification: launched august '81. Int. tender: '82. Supplies: int. tender: in '82. Supervision of works: in '82. Date financial decision: end of september '81. 5th EDF.

VANUATU

Rice study. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Feasibility study on hand at Big-Bay-Santo. GITEC (D). 5th EDF.

ZAIRE

Extension of Kinoisé market garden's. Resp. Auth.: Département de l'Agriculture (Centres des Produits maraichers: CECO-

MAF). 7.880 mECU. EDF 4.85 mECU. FAC and local 3.03 mECU. Development of three valley floors to grow vegetables and fruit. Area 3 000 ha, of which 185 ha intensive cultivation and pisciculture and 584 ha orchards, rest for protection. Works: acc. tender 2nd half 1981. TA: FAC (F). Projet in execution. 4th EDF.

Akula-Gemena road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Upgrading and asphaltting of the road (115 km). Economic study: Bureau SPE (Local). Technical study: LUXCONSULT (Lux). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Thé Butuhé. Resp. Auth.: Département de l'Agriculture (Commission Agricole du Kivu). Estimated Cost: 2.5 mECU. Strengthening and prosecution existing projects. T.A. for management and trading. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Mwebe-Batshamba Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Travaux Publics. Part (81 km) of the national road Matadi-Shaba. Prequalification launched in july '81. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st or 2nd quarter '82. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Kalemie port rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Département des Transports et Communications. Estimated cost not available. Study on the way by CADIC (B). 4th EDF regional. Project stage identification. 5th EDF.

Banana deep water port. Resp. Auth.: Département des Transports et Communications. Feasibility study: SEMA-TRACTION-NEL-OTUI (F.B.F.). 4th EDF. Complementary technical study to be done on 5th EDF. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Cacao-trees at Bulu. Resp. Auth.: CACAOZA-Département de l'Agriculture. Strengthening and continuation existing operations. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Palm-trees at Gosuma. Resp. Auth.: PALMEZA-Département de l'Agriculture. Strengthening and continuation existing operations. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Retraining of teaching and technical staff attached to the National Vocational Training Habitants. (I.N.P.P.). Resp. Auth.: Direction I.N.P.P. 0.730 mECU. Training, T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A.: direct agreement. Supply: int. tender in '82. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

Lubutu-Oso-Wankale Road. Prequalification launched january '82.

ZAMBIA

Supplementary financing for the construction of five Rural Health Centres. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 2 mECU. Works: direct labour. Supply of equipment and medical stores: acc. tender or direct agreement. Date financial decision, october '81. 5th EDF.

Maize development project. Resp.

Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development. Total cost 6.540 mECU. EDF 5.55 mECU, Rocaf 0.99 mECU. Works: construction housing and office accommodation, marketing depots, feeder roads. Supply: 4 WD vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles. T.A. Works: acc. tender or direct agreement end 81 or 1st quarter '82. Supplies: int. tender in '82. T.A. short-list not yet drawn up. Date financial decision January '82. 5th EDF.

Zambia Marketing and Trade Promotion. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Zambian Export Promotion Council. 0.795 mECU. Product Development and Marketing. Marketing management. Trade Fairs — Tourism planning and promotion. Contracts by direct agreement. Date financial decision December '81. 5th EDF.

Rice Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Water Development. 4 mECU, EDF Part. Local 1.135 mECU. Works: access roads, marketing depots, housing. Supply of equipments, agricultural inputs, T.A. Supply of vehicles: int. tender. Works: acc. tender or direct labour. T.A. direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

Animal Vaccine Unit Production. Laboratory construction. Supply of equipment and T.A. Estimated cost 3.560 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, local 1.560 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Mpongwe electrification. Estimated cost 5.5 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Mkushi electrification. Estimated cost 6.07 mECU. EDF 3.07 mECU. Cofinancing needed. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Mine industry (copper-cobalt) rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Government of Zambia. Total estimated cost 85.346 mECU. EDF part 55 mECU. Supply of equipment int. tender 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

ZIMBABWE

Study Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. (MEPD). 1 mECU. 3 Studies: Intensive Rural Development Area 3 (IRDA 3), Mashouland East. Pungwe / Honde Valley Development Study, near Umtali. Smallholder Irrigated Coffee Development, in Victoria and Midlands Provinces. T.A.: Short-list already drawn-up. Date financial decision 1st quarter '81.

Technical Assistance Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning (MEPD). 0.500 mECU. To prepare agricultural projects. Contracts: direct agreement. Date financial decision: 1st quarter '81. 5th EDF.

Educational Facilities and Equipment. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Manpower Planning and Development. 3 mECU. Building of Technical College and supply of equipment and furniture. Works: acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender. Date financial decision: 1st quarter '81. 5th EDF.

Rural Clinics. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4.5 mECU. Construction and equipment of 115 rural clinics and 230 staff houses. Works: direct labour or direct agreement. Equipments: int. tender. Date financial decision: 1st quarter '81. 5th EDF.

Intensive Resettlement Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning and the Agricultural and Rural Development Authority. (ARDA), 4 mECU. Resettlement of some 18,000 smallholder families. Works: access roads, water supplies, fencing, schools... Supplies: int. tender or direct agreement. Works: direct labour. Date financial decision: 1st quarter '81. 5th EDF.

Countries acceding to Lomé Convention

BELIZE

Three junior secondary schools. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Works. 1.250 mECU. Technical and practical skills in rural areas. Classroom blocks, workshop blocks, principal's house. Works: direct labour. Supplies: furniture and equipment, restr. tender or direct agreement. Project in execution. 4th EDF.

Supplementary Financing for Radio Belize Rural Broadcasting. Cost 0.225 mECU. Date financial decision January '82. 4th EDF.

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

St Martin Airport. Resp. Auth.: Departement voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking. 7.292 mECU. Construction of new air terminal. Study and works. Study: execution, Flughafen Frankfurt (D). Works and supplies in '82. 4th EDF.

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Tahiti territorial abattoir. Resp. Auth.: Service de l'Economie Rurale, Papeete (Tahiti). Secrétariat d'Etat des Départements et Territoires d'Outre-Mer, Délégation de la Polynésie Française, Paris. 0.850 mECU, EDF 0.730 mECU, Ministère Français de l'Agriculture 0.120 mECU. Modern abattoir to replace old slaughterhouses and improve hygienic conditions for meat provisioning. Capacity 2 000 cattle and 13 000 pigs per year. Works: int. tender 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

REUNION

Hydro-agricultural development of Bras de Cilaos. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'agriculture. 2.650 mECU. Installations of a first section of water-supply network. Supplies and ductlaying and accessories, int. tend. in '82. 4th EDF.

WALLIS and FUTUNA ISLANDS

Poi-Tuatafa track. Resp. Auth.: Administration territoriale. 0.665 mECU. Construction of a track suitable for motor vehicles, 8.4 km. Works: acc. tender end '80. Supplies: int. tender in '82. 4th EDF.

Mata Utu road system. Resp. Auth.: Administration territoriale. 0.850 mECU. Local roads and drainage road system. Total length 10 km of which 2 km to be asphalted. Works: acc. tender end '80. 4th EDF.

NEW CALEDONIA

Inshore aquaculture. Resp. Auth.: Direction territoriale des Services Ruraux. Estimated cost 0.459 mECU. Creation of pilot fishery station. Supply of equipment. Modalities to be decided. Date foreseen for financial decision 2nd half '82. 5th EDF.

Regional Projects

BELIZE

Caricom grains project, pilot farm. Resp. Auth.: Carribean Development Bank. Estimate 2.145 mECU. EDF 1.826 mECU. Works: acc. tender 1st quarter '82. Supplies: equipment and vehicles: int. tender 1st quarter '82. 4th EDF.

COMMISSION DU FLEUVE NIGER (CFN) IN NIAMEY

Hydrological forecast system of river Niger basin. Resp. Auth.: CFN. 6.8 mECU. EDF 1.5 mECU, UNDP, OPEC, CFN, member states 5.3 mECU. To provide CFN possibilities to take hydrological dates on the whole Niger basin. Supplies: hydrometrical instruments, means of transport, equipment for teletransmission, supplies, int. tender in 1981. T.A: supplied by Organisation Mondiale Météorologique (UNDP funds), direct agreement. 4th EDF. Phase II. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. EDF 1.5 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

DJIBOUTI — ETHIOPIA

Djibouti-Addis railway. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports — Ministry of Transport. 9.8 mECU Railway, short-term, rehabilitation. Study: Carlo Lotti (I). Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 4th EDF.

U.D.E.A.C. HARBOUR ZONE — DOUALA HARBOUR (CAMEROON)

Creation of U.D.E.A.C. harbour zone. Resp. Auth.: Ministères des transports de Cameroun-Rca-Tchad. Estimated cost 8.84 mECU. EDF 6.08 mECU. Cofinanced with BDEAC and Cameroon. Works: access road, railway, upgrading and hydrolics works. Int. tender launched in June '81. Submissions study and awarding of the contracts on the way. Date foreseen for financial decision February '82. 4th EDF.

FIJI — TONGA — WESTERN SAMOA

University of the South Pacific — agricultural and marine resources programme. Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). 3.2 mECU. Buildings and teaching facilities, vehicles and small vessels, technical assistance and programme finance for: development of Marine Resources Centre, Fiji — Rural development Centre, Tonga — Applied Agricultural Research Programme, Western Samoa. Contracts for work and equipment already awarded. TA for Fiji: four man years in marine biology and fishing technology from Europe and study programme assistance. For Tonga: five man years for the centre director and technologist and study programme assistance. For Western Samoa: four man years in plant breeding and agricultural economics. Experts: Prof. DUPHORN (D) — MUNCH — PETERSEN (DK). 4th EDF.

O.C.A.M.

Building and equipment of Institut Africain et Mauricien de Statistiques et d'Economie Appliquée in Kigali. Resp. Auth.: I.A.M.S.E.A. 3.2 mECU. Pedagogical, administratives and hostel buildings (5,000 m²). Correspondent equipment supply. Studies: a) Programming. b) Architectural and Technical. Bureau SPADOLINI E GORI (I). Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82. 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF ORGANISATION AFRICAINE POUR LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE (O.A.P.I.)

Building and equipment of Centre Africain de Documentation et Information en matière de Brevets. Resp. Auth.: O.A.P.I. 1.207 mECU. Construction of 1,358 m² of buildings, and supply of equipment. Technical and architectural study: BRUSA PASQUE (I). Date foreseen for financial decision, January '82. 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF CEAO

ESITEX Segou (Mali). Resp. Auth.: CEAO Secretariat. Management training for textile industry. Complex construction in Segou. Supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

Ecole des Mines et de la géologie, Niamey. Resp. Auth.: CEAO Secretariat. Creation of a school for 350 students coming from CEAO countries. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

GAMBIA — SENEGAL (O.M.V.G.)

Bridge barrage on the river Gambia. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost in 78: 60 mECU. Foreseen funding: F.R.G. 20 mECU. UK 4.4/8.8 mECU. Canada 21.7 mECU, USA 11/22 mECU, Technical study: DHV-Rijkswaterstaat-Waterloopkundig Laboratorium Delft (NL). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

GUYANA — SURINAME

Guyana — ferry-link. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics and Ministerie van Openbare Werken. Link ferry on Corentine river. Study to be done: economic and technical. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

UPPER — VOLTA — NIGER — TOGO

Fada-Border Niger Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost: 28 mECU. Construction and surfacing of the road for 171 km. Possibility of partial financing on 5th EDF. Economic and practical study completed. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

SOMALIA — DJIBOUTI

Somalia-Djibouti Road Link. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Economic study: Economic Consultant (UK). Technical study to be done. 1.200 mECU. Short list not yet drawn up. Date financial decision, October '81. 4th EDF.

TOGO — BENIN

Integrate development of the Mono Valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministères des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost: 170 mECU. Construction of a dam and a hydro-electric power plant of 2 x 30.7 MW. Foreseen funding: World Bank, EEC (EDF + EIB), France, FRG, Canada, ADB, UNDP. Feasibility study done. Completion envisaged 1982/85. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

RWANDA — ZAIRE

Hydro-electric development « Ruzizi II ». Resp. Auth.: Ministères des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost: 50/60 mECU. Economic and technical studies (4th EDF): Bureau Tractionnel (B) and R.R.I. (D). Construction of a central hydro electric plant of 35 MW. Foreseen funding: EDF, ADB. Works: int. tender prequalifications. Pre-qualification made. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

Methane gas from Lake Kivu. Resp. Auth.: CEPGL and Commission mixte de 2 pays. Estimated cost: not available. Pre-feasibility study underway. (Studies 4th EDF). Foreseen funding: EDF, Belgium. Project stage: identification, 5th EDF.

TROPICAL AFRICA REGIONAL PROJECT

Rice, mais, niébes, soja improvement programme. 1st phase. Resp. Auth.: I.I.T.A. (Institut International d'Agriculture Tropicale) à Ibadan. Nigeria. Estimated EDF contribution 2.250 mECU. Experimentation and demonstration improved varieties. Works, supplies and experts recruitment by I.I.T.A. with local agreements. Int. tender in '82. 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF CIADFOR

Extension of A.N.F.P.P. (Agence Nationale de formation et de Perfectionne-

ment Professionnels) in Libreville. Extension and modernization and new complex building in Oloumi. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

SENEGAL — GUINEA

Tambacounda-Labe road Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Upgrading and asphaltting of the road (455 km). Economic study: SONED (SE). Technical study to be done. Short list not yet drawn up. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

BURUNDI — TANZANIA — ZAMBIA

Mpulungu Harbour. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Power, Transport and Communication. 2.24 mECU. Works, Supplies, T.A. Date financial decision july '81. Equipment: int. tender launched end of january '82. 4th EDF.

GABON — CONGO

Construction and equipment of a boarding section at the Ecole des Postes et Télécommunications in Libreville. Resp. Auth.: Office Postes et Télécommunication. (O.P.T.). 2.020 mECU. Buildings Boarding facilities 976 m², restaurant-cultural complex 430 m². Equipment. Supervision of works. Date financial decision june '81. Works: acc. tender launched on april '81. Supplies: int. tender in '82. 4th EDF.

17 COUNTRIES:

BENIN — CAMEROON — CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CHAD — CONGO — GAMBIA — GHANA — IVORY COAST — LIBERIA — MALI — MAURITANIA — NIGER — SENEGAL — SIERRA LEONE — TOGO — UPPER VOLTA — ZAIRE

Academie Régionale des Sciences et Techniques de la Mer in Abidjan. Resp. Auth.: Conférence Ministérielle des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre sur le transport maritime. Extension and renovation of the school. For EDF: supply of pedagogical equipment and TA. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

TOGO — MALI — UPPER VOLTA — NIGER — CHAD

Agricultural produce regional transit centre. Resp. Auth.: Ministères du Plan and Ministère Affaires Economiques for Niger. Harmonization of stocking possibilities for the population and trade improvement. Technical and economic feasibility study: Bureau SATEC (F). 4th EDF.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Foot-and-mouth disease prevention. Resp. Auth.: Development Committee. Study to be done: Feasibility. Short-list already drawn up. Project stage: identification. 4th EDF.

BOTSWANA — ZIMBABWE

Regional project foot-and-mouth disease. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 24.510 mECU, EDF 14.330 mECU, GOB 8.167 mECU, GOZ 2.013 mECU. Supply of equipment and vaccines. Date foreseen for financial decision 2nd quarter '82. 5th EDF.

SEYCHELLES — MAURITIUS — COMOROS — KENYA — SOMALIA — TANZANIA — MADAGASCAR

Telecommunications for flying airways in the Indian Ocean. Resp. Auth.: Civil Aviation Departments, Directions de l'Aviation Civile. Supply and installation of telecommunication equipment. Study: preliminary appraisal, Mr. Durieux and Amory (F). Technical detailed study: SOFREAVIA (F). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.

MADAGASCAR-SEYCHELLES

Ecole Maritime de Majunga. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. Managerial staff training for mercantile marine and fishery. Supply of a school-vessel and equipment. T.A. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

ACP STATES

Assistance to the professional ACP-EEC organizations concerned by improvement of the production and products commercialization on foreign markets. Resp. Auth.: COLEACP-FEDEAU. And the association for the improvement of the commercialization of products like coffee, cacao, oleaginous and cotton. 2.770 mECU. Date financial decision, October '81, 5th EDF.

SENEGAL — GAMBIA GUINEA BISSAU

Dakar — Banjul — Bissau Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministères Travaux Publics of the 3 countries. Asphalted road between Mandine Ba (Gambia) and Sao Vicente (Guinea Bissau). 129 km. Estimated cost 30 mECU. EDF 10 mECU. Technical study on hand. Project stage: identification 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF CEAO AND CILSS

Construction of Centre Régional d'Énergie Solaire (CRES) in Bamako, Mali. Estimated total cost 30 mECU. EDF part. 3.5 mECU. T.A. and equipment. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF ECOWAS — CEDEAO

Wireless beam telecommunications. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat Ecowas. Cedeao. Estimated cost 32 mECU. EDF 5 mECU. Equipment: int. tender launched end of february '82. Date foreseen for financial decision 2nd quarter '82. 5th EDF.

SENEGAL — IVORY COAST — CAMEROON — NIGERIA

Chemical industries in Senegal. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. Total estimated cost 275 mECU. EIB 20 mECU. Phosphoric acid and fertilizer factory. Infrastructure: harbour terminal, water supply, railway network — Project stage: identification. For EDF part see SENEGAL: TAIBA "ICS" project.

EASTERN AFRICA COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for eastern africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 3.5 mECU. Widening of the capacity. Construction of class-room, offices and housing. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF ASECNA

Air safety. Supply and installation of flying assistance equipment for several airports. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

DJIBOUTI — ETHIOPIA — KENYA — SUDAN — SOMALIA — TANZANIA — UGANDA

Prevention against noxious migratory animals in eastern africa. Resp. Auth.: Desert Locust Control Organization for eastern africa. Construction of buildings, storage, for pesticide, aircrafts, equipment for vaporization, vehicles and T.A. Total estimated cost 5.45 mECU. EDF 2.5 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

KENYA — TANZANIA

Regional Health Improvement Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health, Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Extension of the regional centre at Nairobi and construction of a centre in Dar-el-Salam, T.A. and supervision of work. Works: acc. tender. Contracts: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st quarter '82. 5th EDF.

ACP COUNTRIES

International trade fairs participation. 2.115 mECU. Date financial decision January '82. 5th EDF.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF CARICOM

Development of the regional trade promotion services in the Caribbean region. Resp. Auth.: Caricom Secretariat. 1.8 mECU. T.A. project. Contract: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision January '82. 5th EDF.

Assistance to Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI). Resp. Auth.: CARDI Secretariat. EDF part 3.035 mECU. T.A. equipment and training. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82. 5th EDF.

ANGUILLA — ARUBA — BONAIRE — CAYMAN ISLANDS — CURACAO — MONTERRAT — SABA — ST. KITTS/NEVIS — TURCS AND CAICOS

OCT participation at the Caraipe's Village in the "Bourse du Tourisme" I.T.B. in Berlin. 0.090 mECU. Date foreseen for financial decision janvier '82. 5th EDF.

TANZANIA (BURUNDI — RWANDA — ZAIRE — ZAMBIA)

Tanzania Railways Corporation Project (T.R.C.). 10 mECU. Maintenance and improvement of the railway. Works, supply of equipment. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82. 4th EDF.

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Livestock development study for vine-growing reconversion areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Révolution Agraire. 0.095 mECU. Possibilities for development of dairy cattle. Study to determine project contents: SCET International (F) Project stage: identification.

Study for artificial insemination development in Algeria. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Révolution Agraire. 0.080 mECU. Study to establish an artificial insemination service. Short list already drawn up. Project on appraisal.

Scientific cooperation programme with O.N.R.S. and trainers' training. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique (M.E.S.R.S.) 4.300 mECU. Scholarships, T.A. experts and supply of equipment. For scientific equipment int. tender. Date financial decision october '81.

Rural managers' training. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, de la Révolution Agraire et des Forêts. 4 mECU. T.A. with trainers and technical equipment. Supplies: direct agreement. T.A.: Contracts: from '81 to '83. Date for financial decision october '81.

Contribution towards the extension of two training centres for fishermen (Annaba and Beni-Saf). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et de la Pêche. Secretariat d'Etat à la pêche. 0.600 mECU. Supply of pedagogical equipment and T.A. Supply: int. tender. launched in november '81 T.A.: short-list not yet drawn up. Date foreseen for financial decision 4th quarter '81.

EGYPT

Soil improvement programme in Kafre-el-Sheikh Governorate. Resp. Auth.: Executive Authority for Land Improvement Projects (EALIP). Provisional amount 9-

14 mECU. To reclaim an area of 65 000 acres of saline soil, located in Hamoule district of the Kafre-el-Sheikh Governorate. Feasibility study of the project: Euro Consult (N). Project on appraisal.

Improved of agricultural input storage facilities in the Daghalia Governorate. Resp. Auth.: Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit. Provisional amount 4.5-8 mECU. Feasibility study of the project: Berlin Consult (D). Project on appraisal.

Developing Vocational Training for Industrial Trades. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources. (Productivity and Vocational Training Department — PVTD.) 2 mECU. Community's contribution over a period of 3 years for TA and equipment. T.A.: direct agreement in '81. Equipments: int. tender in '81.

Sinai Water Resources Study. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Irrigation's Water Research Centre. Total Cost: 3.75 mECU. EEC Contribution: 2 mECU. Equipments, and T.A. over 3 years. Equipment: int. tender launched January '82. Int. tender for vehicles launched in october '81.

Helwan waste water Project. Resp. Auth.: Government of Egypt. Estimated Cost 125.040 mECU. EEC Contribution estimated 31.540 mECU. Nederland 2.660 mECU. Construction of a sanitation system within an area of 9,500 ha. Collector mains, pumping stations and treatment works. Works and supplies: int. tender 1st half 1982.

Intervention programme for investments promotion and for cooperation at companies level. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economy and External Trade, Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources. 2 mECU. T.A., training and investment promotion. Project on appraisal.

Egyptian Renewable Energy Development Organisation. EREDO. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Government. Estimated total cost 10.741 mECU. EEC contribution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equipment for the centre. Works and supplies: int. tender in '82. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82.

JORDAN

Assistance to the Jordan Valley Farmers' Association. Provisional amount 1.5 mECU. Resp. Auth.: National Planning Council (NPC) and Jordan Valley Farmers' Association (JVFA). To assist the JVFA in the implementation of an agricultural machinery repair and servicing centre, and a vegetable seeding propagation unit. Study: feasibility of the project, Minister Agriculture Int. (UK). Project on appraisal.

1 Secondary Industrial School (SIS). Resp. Auth.: National Planning Council (NPC) and Ministry of Education. EEC 0.950 mECU. School for technical education at secondary level at Mafrag. Buildings to be financed by Jordan. Training and TA programmes also. Study: to identify and define project: Tema Consultant (I). Financial decision: november '80. Supply: int. tender launched august '81.

2 Trade Training Centres (TTC). Resp. Auth.: National Planning Council (NPC) and Vocational Training Corporation. Cost estimate 1.650 mECU for EEC. The TTCs offer apprenticeship in cooperation with local trade and industry. One TTC for about 400 boys at Zarqa. One TTC for about 400 girls in Amman. Buildings to be financed by Jordan. Training and TA programmes also. Study to identify and define project, TEMA Consultant (I). Date for financial decision, in 1982. Project on appraisal.

Faculty of Engineering and Technology. University of Jordan. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. EEC-Contribution: 6.68 mECU. Supply of Laboratory and workshop equipment and T.A. over 5 years. Jordanian Government will finance buildings. Supplies: int. tender launched in august '81 and february '82 T.A.: Contracts in '81 and '82.

Faculty of Science-Yarmouk University. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 2.5 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Supplies: int. tender launched in august '81. T.A. contracts in '81 and '82. Project in execution.

2 Vocational Training Schools. Resp. Auth.: National Planning Council (NPC) and Vocational Training Corporation. Estimated cost. 1.200 mECU. (EEC part). Construction and equipment 1 school for 700 boys at Zarqa and at Amman for 700 girls. Training and T.A. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82.

Jordan Valley Transplant Production Unit. Resp. Auth.: Jordan Valley Authority. Estimated total cost 2.210 mECU, EEC part 0.950 mECU. Supplies, construction greenhouses, irrigation. T.A. Supply: int. tender, 1st half '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Date financial decision january '82.

LEBANON

Industrial planning and industrial census. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie. 0.518 mECU. Foreign expert to supervise local experts for census. Mission in Lebanon 2 months. EEC contribution covers all expenses for foreign expert and $\pm 50\%$ of total cost of the project. Project on appraisal.

Aid for the Union Nationale de Crédit Coopératif (UNCC). 1.400 mECU. Line of credit to the UNCC and T.A. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82.

MOROCCO

Nador and Safi water supply. Resp. Auth.: Office National de l'Eau Potable (ONEP). Ministère de l'Équipement et de la Promotion Nationale. Estimated cost 20.890 mECU, EEC 15.5 mECU, Local and Saudi Fund for Development 5.390 mECU. SAFI: water supply extension, partly service main, partly treatment and pumping station. NADOR: Regional water supply realization, service mains and treatment and pumping station. Works and supplies except pumping station and electrical connections: several int. tenders in 1981. For Nador launched in july '81.

Monitoring and equipment of 10 Instituts de Technologie Appliquée (ITA). Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Travail et de la Formation Professionnelle (MTFP). 34.510 mECU. EEC 15.500 mECU, Local 19 mECU. Community's contribution for technical and teaching equipment, training of instructors and TA at the beginning of the project. Equipment: int. tender in several lots in '81. TA: direct agreement in '81, '82 and '83.

Intervention for Laboratoire Officiel d'Analyses et de Recherches chimiques de Casablanca. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.200 mECU. Equipments: int. tender in '81. T.A. and training. T.A.: ICON INST. (D). Project on appraisal.

Interventions for Laboratoire de Technologie des céréales de Rabat. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 0.790 mECU. Equipment, T.A. and training. Supply by restr. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: short-list not yet drawn up. Date financial decision, november '81.

SYRIA

Scientific and Technical Cooperation with CERS. (Centre d'Études et de Recherches Scientifiques.) EEC part 4.820 mECU. Studies, T.A., training and supply of scientific equipment. Last int. tender launched january '82 for teledetection.

Assistance to the Damascus and Aleppo Intermediate Institutes of Technology. (CIIT.) 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Supply: int. tender foreseen 1st half '82.

TUNISIA

Sewerage scheme for 17 towns. Resp. Auth.: Office National d'Assainissement (ONAS). Estimated cost 40 mECU, EEC 24 mECU, Local 16 mECU. Improvement of the sewerage system (mainly for sewerage and rainwater) for 17 towns. Service mains extension, building of purification stations. Study: to define programmes and prepare the implementation project: SAFEGE (F). Funding phase 1 end 1980 (12 mECU). Phase 2: 2nd quarter 1982 (12 mECU). Works: int. tenders, several lots in '81. 3 Tenders launched in august '81 and 2 in september '81.

Expansion of industrial development activities. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, des Mines et de l'Énergie. Agence de Promotion des Investissements (API) and the Banque de Développement Économique de Tunisie (BDET). 0.630 mECU. TA and studies. Contracts by direct agreement in '81.

Participation to create 3 Training Vocational Centres: in Nabeul, Menzel-Bourguiba, Zaghouan. Resp. Auth.: O.T.T.E.E.F.P. (Office des Travailleurs Tunisiens à l'Étranger de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle.) EEC Contribution 3.870 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Supplies: int. tender in '81 and '82. Contract T.A. and training, '81 and '82. T.A.: A.A.B. (D). Project on appraisal.

TURKEY

Mining Renewal Equipment and Spares. Resp. Auth.: Turkish Coal Enterprises (T.K.I.). Estimated Cost 16 mECU. EEC 16 mECU. Equipments: dump trucks, electrical excavators, bulldozers, associated spares. Equipments: int. tender launched February '82. Date for financial decision july '81.

Beypazari Lignite Project. Resp. Auth.: T.K.I. Estimated Cost 55.7 mECU. EEC 22 mECU, Local 33.7 mECU. EEC part: Equipment supply for: development, mechanised face, conventional face and auxiliary. Equipments: int. tender in '82. Date for financial decision july '81.

Electricity Transmission Line Project. Resp. Auth.: Turkish Electricity Authority. (TEK). Estimated cost 72 mECU. EEC 16 mECU. Upgrading of existing transmission lines and supply of equipment. Construction of new transmission lines. Italian aid foreseen for 5.2 mECU. Supply and works: int. tenders in '82. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st quarter '82.

Beypazari Lignite Project - T.A. Resp. Auth.: T.K.I. 2.6 mECU. T.A. with 7 experts. T.A. and training. Date foreseen for financial decision, 1st quarter '82.

Lignite Exploration Project. Resp. Auth.: Mineral Research and Exploration Institute of Turkey (M.T.A.). Estimated cost 25.5 mECU. EEC 8 mECU. Local 17.5 mECU. EEC part: Equipment supply: core barrels, drill pipes, drill collars, rock bits, core bits, Equipments int. tender launched december '81. Date for financial decision july '81.

Non-associated developing countries

BANGLADESH

Tea rehabilitation project. Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh Tea Board (BTB). EEC 6.6 mECU, UK and Local 55.680 mECU. Purchase of machinery for tea factories. Call for quotation in EEC member states and Indian subcontinent in 1981 and '82.

Cotton Development project. Resp. Auth.: Cotton Development Board. Estimated Cost: 13.500 ECU. EEC 6.5 mECU, Local 7 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. Works. T.A.: direct agreement or int. tender in '81 works and supply procedure to be determined.

Small scale irrigation sector project. Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB). Estimated total cost 82 mECU. EEC contribution 12 mECU. Cofinancing with ADB (Asian Dev. Bank). Works, supply of equipment and vehicles, T.A. and supervision. Works: acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender. Date foreseen for financial decision december '81.

BURMA

Palm oil development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forest. Estimated cost: 16.300 mECU. Financing: EEC 4.9 mECU. Switzerland and local 11.40 mECU. Expanding production for domestic consumption. Supplies and T.A. Supply: int. tender '81 and '82. T.A. short-list already drawn up.

Pump Irrigation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forest. Estimated Cost: 31.5 mECU. ADB 19 ECU. EEC 5.5 mECU. Local 7 mECU. Works: irrigation and related facilities. Supply of equipment and T-A. Works and supplies: int. tenders following EEC and ADB procedures. T.A.: contracts following ADB procedures. All items in '82. Date for financial decision for EEC: october '81.

INDONESIA

Pilot project on integrated soya and foodcrops development in Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: DG for economic, social and cultural relations (Department of Foreign Affairs). EEC 4 mECU. Local 1.4 mECU. To investigate the feasibility of arable cropping (mainly soya) and establish a seed multiplication centre in Jambi Province (Sumatra). TA: contract awarded. Works: direct labour. Supplies: int. tender or restr. tender to be determined in '81 and '82.

S.E. Sulawesi transmigration and area development project. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General of Transmigration. EEC - 3 mECU. Islamic Development Bank, Local 44.943 mECU. Contribution to a settlement programme consisting of studies for future development and local costs for housing, land irrigation, roads. Consultancy services (studies) restr. tender. Works: direct agreement 2nd half '81 or '82.

Lower Citanduy Irrigation. Resp. Auth.: D.G. for contagious diseases control. Estimated cost: 76.9 mECU. EEC 3.8 mECU, ADB 42.4 mECU, Local 30.7 mECU. Construction of irrigation and drainage canals, feeder roads, village water supplies for 287 villages in S.W. part of C. Java. Works: acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender in '82.

Baturraden Dairy Development. Resp. Auth.: D.G. for livestock services. Estimated cost: 8.385 mECU. EEC 4.4 mECU, Italy 0.410 mECU. Construction, infrastructure, supply of equipment, T.A. Works and supplies: int. tender 1st half '82. T.A.: direct agreement 1st half '81.

Bali Irrigation Sector Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. DG for Water Resources Development. EEC 12 mECU. ADB ± 33 mECU. Local ± 55 mECU. Rehabilitation and expansion of 50 village-level irrigation scheme, establishment of a water-management training centre, and establishment of climatological stations. T.A. Works: acc. tender. Date foreseen for financial decision december '81.

INDIA

Supply of fertilizer. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 36 mECU.

Supply: int. tender for EEC countries members and India in '82. Date financial decision december '81.

Afforestation, soil and water conservation. Resp. Auth.: States Forestry Departments. EEC contribution 7 mECU. Works by direct labour. Date financial decision december '81.

PAKISTAN

Baluchistan livestock development. Resp. Auth.: Provincial Government of Baluchistan. The Department of Fisheries and Livestock. The Baluchistan Development Authority. EEC 6.7 mECU, ADB 5.8 mECU, Local 1.4 mECU. Development of rangeland for sheep and goat production, construction of kid and lamb fattening units at selected locations, development of the dairy sector, establishment of local vaccine production, construction of a feedmill, training and consultancy services. Works, supplies and consultancy services, int. tenders. Dates unknown. Project managed by ADB.

Rural hydraulics programme in Baluchistan. Resp. Auth.: Rural Development and Local Government Department. Irrigation and Power Department. (KDLG) and (I.P.D.) Estimated cost: 25 mECU. EEC 4 mECU, UNICEF and Local 21 mECU. Construction of 180 small drinking water supply. Supplies: int. tender, 2nd half '81 or '82.

Emergency Programme-drinking water supplies for refugees areas (NWFP). Resp. Auth.: UNICEF. Estimated Total Cost 6 mECU. EEC 2.7 mECU. Cofinancing with Unicef. Supplies, drilling works, T.A. Supplies: int. tender. Drills: acc. tender. Works: direct labour. Date for financial decision 2nd half '81.

Karachi fishing port. Resp. Auth.: Fishery department of the Sind Province. Estimated cost 45.5 mECU. ADB 24.8 mECU, EEC 12 mECU, Local 7.1 mECU, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 1.6 mECU. EEC part: new facilities: quay, boat repair yard, fish-shed, dredging. Rehabilitation of existing facilities, equipments and TA. Date foreseen for financial decision 2nd half '81.

SRI LANKA

Mahaweli Ganga development. Resp. Auth.: Mahaweli Development Board (MDB). Integrated rural development project. 43 000 ha area with a population of 140 000. Priority to food crops development. EEC 2 mECU, IDA 87.2 mECU (joint funding EEC-IDA, IBRD, UK, N, Canada, USA). EEC contribution for social infrastructure and civil works. Modalities: World Bank procedures.

Integrated rural development in the Mahaweli Ganga region. Resp. Auth.: Mahaweli Development Board (MDB). Estimated cost 9 mECU, EEC 2 mECU. Development of 2 326 ha irrigated land and rehabilitation of 1 910 ha deteriorated land. Socio-economical infrastructure to allow settlement of 12 000 rural families. TA: FAO.

Eastern Region rehabilitation project. Ministry of Coconut Industries. EEC 3 mECU, Italy 0.375 mECU, small UK and FAO contributions, balance up to 7 mECU financed by Sri Lanka government. Rehabilitation of coconut plantations devastated by a cyclone and diversification of agriculture in the same region. Feasibility study financed by Italian bilateral aid executed by AGROTEC (I). Works: direct labour Supplies: modalities for tenders to be determined, first quarter '81.

THAILAND

Cooperation training and marketing. Resp. Auth.: National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperation (BAAC). EEC 3.037 mECU. To provide training facilities for the personnel of agricultural cooperatives and equipment for cooperative marketing unit. Int. tender in '81 or '82.

Rubber smallholdings yield improvement. Resp. Auth.: Rubber Research Centre (RCC). Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. EEC 1.8 mECU, Local 1.8 mECU. To introduce and popularize new tapping techniques to improve the yield of old rubber trees before their felling. TA by direct agreement. Supplies: modalities of tenders to be agreed between EEC Commission and government. Tenders in mid '81, '82, '83, '84.

HUAY-MONG-Irrigation and drainage Scheme. Resp. Auth.: National Energy Administration. Estimated Cost: 25 mECU. EEC 11 mECU, A.G.C.D. (B) 1.8 mECU. Works, T.A. and Supplies. Contracts and int. tender for works and supplies, 2nd half '81 or '82.

Seed production centre for the Southern Region. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Estimate of Cost: 3 mECU. EEC 2.2 mECU. Construction of a centre for the production and distribution of improved qualities of rice seeds. Equipments and T.A. Works and infrastructure: acc. tender. Equipments: int. tender and direct agreement. T.A.: direct agreement. Date foreseen for financial decision 1st half '82.

THE PHILIPPINES

Bicol River-basin Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Public Highways. Estimated cost: 53.6 mECU. EEC 4.5 mECU, ADB and others 35 mECU. Irrigation and drainage facilities, village water supply, feeder roads to serve an area of 17,000 ha in S. Luzon. Works: direct labour or acc. tender in '81 and '82.

Crop protection Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost: 8.596 mECU. EEC 3.5 mECU, F.R.G. and Local 5.096 mECU. Strengthen and expand the existing crop protection service. Works and supplies (vehicles and equipment). Way of execution to be determined. Timing: '81 and '82.

Palawan Integrated Area Development. Resp. Auth.: National Council on Integrated

Area Development (NACIAD). Total cost 78 mECU, EEC contribution 7.1 mECU, ADB 43.05 mECU and GOP 27.85 mECU. Small-scale irrigation works, agricultural intensification and diversification, livestock, transport development, health facilities, training and monitoring. Project duration 1982-1988. Works: partly int. tender, partly direct agreement or acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender or direct agreement. Administrative arrangements, excluding EEC int. tenders, concern full responsibility of ADB. Date financial decision december '81.

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC (YAR)

Resource investigation for agricultural planning in the Wadi Rasyan Basin. Resp. Auth.: Tihama Development Authority, Ministry of Agriculture. Studies concerning physical characteristics, natural resources and potentialities of Wadi Rasyan Basin and preparation of first development plan. Studies: Consultant DHV (N).

ASEAN

Regional collaborative study on aquaculture. Resp. Auth.: The ASEAN Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry (CO-FAF). EEC 0.300 mECU. To assess the present and future potential of rural aquaculture in the ASEAN countries, and in particular study means of developing existing applied research training and extension facilities in this field. Contract will be awarded by mutual agreement to a mixed team composed of ASEAN and EEC experts. Last quarter of 1980 or '81.

Scientific and Technological Cooperation Programme. Resp. Auth.: ASEAN-Committee on Science et Technology (COST), EEC 2.8 mECU. Training, T.A., Studies, seminars. During 2 years starting from 4th quarter '81. Contracts for T.A. and studies will be negotiated by the Commission of CE after agreement with COST.

Regional Collaborative programme on grain post harvest technology. Resp. Auth.: Sub-committee on Food Handling (SCFH). Cost 4.3 mECU. EEC 4.3 mECU. T.A., training and research. For supplies: int. tender or direct agreement to be determined. T.A. to be decided by S.C.F.H. Date financial decision december '81.

HAITI

Integrated rural development of Asile region. Présidence de la République. Estimated cost: 12 mECU. Foreseen financing: EEC 5 mECU, IDB 7 mECU. Feeder roads, rural monitoring, irrigation, social infrastructure. Financial decision: 1st quarter '81.

Public health and drinking water in rural area. Resp. Auth.: Département de la Santé Publique et de la Population. Estimated cost: 4.893 mECU. EEC 1.6 mECU, IDB 3 mECU. Drinking water supply system for 100 rural communities. EEC contribution to supply equipment and accessories. Int. tender for supply launched on september '81.

Training and research for rural production development. Resp. Auth.: Département de l'Agriculture, Ressources naturelles et Développement Rural (DARNDR). Cost: 0.412 mECU. EEC 0.300 mECU, France 0.112 mECU. Construction of tank and reservoirs and wells. Contracts and supplies, direct agreements. 2nd and 3rd quarter '81.

HONDURAS — COSTA RICA

Regional grains stocking and trading programme. Resp. Auth.: (Banco Centroamericano d'integracion economica). Total cost: 21.43 mECU. Financing: EEC 1.80 mECU, IDB 15.18 mECU, BCIE — BANAFOM — CNP 4.45 mECU. In Honduras building of 6 complementary grain-stores, in Costa Rica 7 grain-stores with a capacity of 46 000 tons (total). IDB envisages partial reallocation of Costa Rica project for Nicaragua.

LATIN AMERICA

Rural micro-projects. Resp. Auth.: Ministerios de la Agricultura. IDB special fund. EEC contribution for the programme 2 mECU. To be decided.

NICARAGUA

Training assistance to ENABAS (Empresa Nicaraguense de Alimentos Basicos). Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de Comercio Interno and ENABAS. Estimated cost: 0.850 mECU. EEC 0.850 mECU. Training assistance: 2 long-term and 6 short-term experts. Amount foreseen for TA: 0.600 mECU. Construction, equipments, materials: 0.250 mECU (local contracts). Date foreseen financial decision: 2nd half '81.

BOLIVIA

Irrigation Programme Altiplano-Valles (Cochabamba). Resp. Auth.: Service National de Développement Communautaire (S.N.D.C.). Cost: 9 mECU. EEC 2 mECU, KFW (F.R.G.) 6 mECU, Local 1 mECU. Construction of small dams and irrigation canals. Works by direct labour. (Outstanding project).

EQUADOR

Irrigation in Chambo. Resp. Auth.: Institut National Equatorien de Ressources Hydrauliques (I.N.E.R.H.I.). Cost: 5.92 mECU. EEC 2.9 mECU. Repairing and extension irrigation system. T.A., training and supplies. Works, direct labour or direct agreement: 2nd quarter '81. Supplies: acc. tender, 2nd quarter '81. T.A. and training different phases in '81 and '82.

Foderuma (rural micro-projects). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Total cost 3.4 mECU. EEC 3 mECU. Local 0.4 mECU. Works, supplies (tractors, lorries, motor-cultivators, waterpumps) training and T.A. Supplies: int. tender in '82. T.A.: direct agreement. Date financial decision, december '81.

COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF PACTO ANDINO

Technical cooperation (industry and economical planning). Resp. Auth.: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima-Peru. Estimated total Cost: 1.7 mECU. EEC 1.1 mECU. To place experts, equipment and T.A. and training at Junta's disposal. Contracts T.A. and experts by the Junta and the Commission of EC. Date for financial decision october '81.

Andean Programme for technological development (Rural PADT). Resp. Auth.: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima-Peru. Estimated total Cost: 7.560 mECU. EEC 3.927 mECU. Supply of equipment, training and T.A. Vehicles purchase: int. tender. T.A.: Short-lists to be drawn up by the Commission of EC and decision by the Junta. Date financial decision, december '81.

CENTRAL AMERICAN ISTHMUS (HONDURAS — PANAMA — NICARAGUA — COSTA RICA)

Support for peasant producer association. Resp. Auth.: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas (I.I.C.A.). Total cost 2.9 mECU. EEC contribution 1.6 mECU. Parallel cofinancing with the French Republic and the governments concerned. T.A. and training. T.A. contracts decided by IICA on basis EEC short-list. Date financial decision december '81.

IRRI — International Rice Research Institute — Los Banos — Philippines.

Research support. Resp. Auth.: IRRI secretariat. EEC contribution 1.5 mECU for genetic evaluation and utilization — water management and training and scholarships. Date financial decision december '81.

ICRISAT — Institut of Crops Research for the Semi-Arid Tropics. Hyderabad-India.

Research support. Resp. Auth.: ICRISAT secretariat. EEC contribution 1.2 mECU. Different studies and scholarships. Date financial decision december '81.

CIP — Centro Internacional de la Papa (Potato). Lima-Peru.

Research support. Resp. Auth.: CIP secretariat. EEC contribution 0.800 mECU. Physiology and regional research and training. Date financial decision december '81.

CIAT — Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical — Cali — Colombia.

Research support. Resp. Auth.: CIAT secretariat. EEC contribution 1.4 mECU. To improve bean and cassave production. Date financial decision december '81.

ALL NON-ASSOCIATED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Administration of Aid — Consultancy services and monitoring. Resp. Auth.: EEC Commission. 2 mECU. Recruitment individu-

al expert, or consultancy firms for diagnostics, projects appraisal, follow up and technical and administrative monitoring of exe-

cution. Date financial decision december '81.

Studies and technical assistance. Resp.

Auth.: Interested countries and EEC Commission. 1.5 mECU. To finance studies and T.A. Date financial decision december '81.

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LAST MINUTE

GABON

Mining and geological inventory in 3 sections. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines et du Pétrole. Direction Générale Mines et Géologie. Section 1: Radar survey done. Section 2: Aerial-geophysical survey to be done. (Terms and conditions EDF-GABON cofinancing to be established). Section 3. Soil prospection (FAC-GABON). EDF part 5th EDF.

SENEGAL

New energy research and test in rural region. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat d'Etat à la Recherche Scientifique. 1.5 mECU. Creation of pilot unit for solar energy, biomass and wind energy. Studies T.A. and equipment. Studies: short list not yet drawn up. T.A.: direct agreement end 82. Equipments: int.

tender end 82. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

ZAIRE

Health centres equipment in 5 rural areas: Lighting and refrigerators with solar energy feeding. Resp. Auth.: Département Santé. 1.7 mECU. Supplies: int. tender foreseen 2nd half 82. Date foreseen for financial decision 3rd quarter 82. 5th EDF.

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Gas-generators and electro-generators powerstations in the Touamotou Islands. Resp. Auth.: Assemblée Territoriale des Touamotou. 0.460 mECU. Supply of gas-generators fed with charcoal from coconut waste and coco-trees wood waste. Int. ten-

der foreseen 2nd half 82. Date foreseen for financial decision 3rd quarter 82. 4th EDF.

REGIONAL PROJECT

(WESTERN SAMOA — FIJI — SOLOMON — KIRIBATI — TUVALU — PAPUA NEW GUINEA — TONGA)

Renewable energy development project in the South Pacific. Resp. Auth.: SPEC (South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation). 6.2 mECU. Creation of pilot units for ocean energy, gas, small stations 25 kW fed with wood waste. Photovoltaic generators 20 kW and wind-generators 15 kW. Prefaisibility study on the way: LAHMEYER and DORNIER (D). Works, supply and T.A. Supplies: int. tender 1st half 1983. T.A. end 82 or 1st quarter 83. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

working for the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam. He has a wide personal experience of cooperatives in a variety of developing countries and has been actively engaged in overcoming the type of problems faced by those trying to bring people to work together.

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René DUMONT and Marie-France MOTTIN — **Le mal-développement en Amérique Latine (Maldevelopment in Latin America)** — Editions du Seuil, 27, rue Jacob, 75006, Paris — Bfrs 418 — 282 pages — 1981

Underdevelopment is tragic. Because of it, millions of human beings die in a Third World that is constantly pillaged and that René Dumont has tirelessly defended for years. But the word 'underdevelopment' is no longer right for new situations and for certain countries that are now being dragged towards tragedy of another sort.

Sophisticated industries can go up without the poverty of the slums going down. Cars and computers can roll off the production line without any improvements being made to the daily distress of the poor. Whole sectors can be developed along Western lines and hunger among the peasant classes only be aggravated. In this book, René Dumont and Marie-Claude Mottin give 'maldevelopment' as a new concept to describe this new situation and the state of impasse to which it leads.

In Mexico, Colombia and Brazil, where the authors made a lengthy study trip, maldevelopment is rife. Whole sectors of the economy in the hands of multinationals and their local allies have been modernized. Megapolis on megapolis has been built and motorways have cut through the forests. But at the same time, the lot of small farmers chased from the land, of children in the Sertao and of Indians in Amazonia has got steadily worse.

Everywhere a Westernized facade and one or two misleading statistics hide rampant injustice. And the violence of the wealthy, they argue, gets stronger. In Brazil, where there are now two societies side by side, some people are ready to make the peasants go even more hungry by taking sugar cane to propel the city-dwellers' cars. Here, as elsewhere in South America, spreading famine is nurturing violence, the authors claim.

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Yves LACOSTE — **Unité et Diversité du Tiers Monde — III. Foyers révolutionnaires dans les montagnes — Amérique Latine et Afrique du Nord (Unity and diversity of the Third**

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World — III. Revolutionary centres in the mountains — Latin America and North Africa) — Librairie François Maspéro, 1, Place Paul-Painlevé, Paris — FF 385 — 204 pages — 1980

Latin America seems very different from the North Africa and Middle Eastern group of countries as far as both natural conditions and cultural characteristics go, but together, these two big geopolitical units form the most modernized, most urbanized part of the Third World. They have the closest links with the Western industrialized countries and most of the countries in these regions have *per capita* GNPs that are way beyond those in the rest of the underdeveloped countries of the world.

But socially speaking, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East are the areas where needs emerge the fastest and where the inherent contradictions of the international crisis of underdevelopment are the clearest cut. This dialectical crisis is not present to a uniform extent in all the countries concerned, Mr Lacoste argues. It is latent in some regions and tensions occur in certain places.

In many of the countries of Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, he says, revolts and insurrection have occurred in the mountains. Is this mere chance? Is it for simple tactical reasons or are there more complex geographical causes? And are just any mountains potential centres, he asks.

Over the last few decades, most of the movements have been put down sooner or later. But some of them have been successful, spread revolution throughout the land and triggered emulation elsewhere. Bloody failures have shown that it is not an easy matter, particularly if the geographical conditions, that go a long way to making the development of these hotbeds of revolution possible, are not properly analysed.

The method of analysis, which was set out in volume I, is used in volume III to show why two very famous breeding grounds for revolution—the Sierra Maestra, where Fidel Castro launched the Cuban revolution, and the Grande-Kabylie, one of the bastions of the Algerian war of independence—were successful.

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Etudes africaines en Europe — Bilan et inventaire (African studies in Europe) — Volume I — ACCT, 19 avenue de Méssine, 75008 Paris & 22-24 bvd Arago, 75013 Paris — 1981

This is the culmination of the project to outline and promote African studies that was launched by the Cultural Cooperation Agency, with the collaboration of the Association for African inter-cultural linguistic studies (AELIA), the International African Institute (IAI) and the Centre for African Studies (CEA) in 1980.

Here, for the first time, is a specialists' quantitative and qualitative assessment of the European studies and research on Africa. It covers 12 countries—W. Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Sweden—and gives a list of all the centres and research workers concerned with human and social sciences in Africa for each. However, volume I does not include the relevant details for France, as the whole of volume II is devoted to this.

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
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
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
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