




# The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Published every two months

No 93 - SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1985




**10 YEARS**

## THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BELGIUM  
DENMARK  
FRANCE  
GERMANY  
(Federal Rep.)  
GREECE  
IRELAND  
ITALY  
LUXEMBOURG  
NETHERLANDS  
UNITED KINGDOM

## THE 66 ACP STATES

ANGOLA	GHANA	ST. VINCENT & GRENADINES
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA	GRENADA	SAO TOME & PRINCE
BAHAMAS	GUINEA	SENEGAL
BARBADOS	GUINEA BISSAU	SEYCHELLES
BELIZE	GUYANA	SIERRA LEONE
BENIN	IVORY COAST	SOLOMON ISLANDS
BOTSWANA	JAMAICA	SOMALIA
BURKINA FASO	KENYA	SUDAN
BURUNDI	KIRIBATI	SURINAME
CAMEROON	LESOTHO	SWAZILAND
CAPE VERDE	LIBERIA	TANZANIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	MADAGASCAR	TOGO
CHAD	MALAWI	TONGA
COMOROS	MALI	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
CONGO	MAURITANIA	TUVALU
DJIBOUTI	MAURITIUS	UGANDA
DOMINICA	MOZAMBIQUE	WESTERN SAMOA
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	NIGER	VANUATU
ETHIOPIA	NIGERIA	ZAIRE
FIJI	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	ZAMBIA
GABON	RWANDA	ZIMBABWE
GAMBIA	ST. CHRISTOPHER & NEVIS	
	ST. LUCIA	



### FRANCE

*(Overseas departments)*

Guadeloupe  
Guiana  
Martinique  
Reunion  
St Pierre and Miquelon

*(Overseas territories)*

Mayotte  
New Caledonia and dependencies  
French Polynesia  
French Southern and Antarctic Territories  
Wallis and Futuna Islands

### NETHERLANDS

*(Overseas countries)*

Netherlands Antilles  
(Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustatius)

### DENMARK

*(Overseas territory)*  
Greenland

### UNITED KINGDOM

*(Overseas countries and territories)*

Anguilla  
British Antarctic Territory  
British Indian Ocean Territory  
British Virgin Islands  
Cayman Islands  
Falkland Islands and dependencies  
Montserrat  
Pitcairn Island  
St Helena and dependencies  
Turks and Caicos Islands

This list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future.

The *Courier* uses maps from a variety of sources. Their use does not imply recognition of any particular boundaries nor prejudice the status of any state or territory.


## MEETING POINT: Lorenzo Natali



Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of Development since January, Mr Natali is still relatively unknown in ACP States. In a long interview with *The Courier*, his political and philosophical views on development emerge. **Pages 2 to 7**

## COUNTRY REPORTS: Tonga

The last of the Polynesian kingdoms, lying just west of the international dateline, is the first country to greet each new day. Monarchy is deeply embedded in the country's conservative and traditional social fabric, as is religion. HM King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV and HRH Crown Prince Tupouto'a comment on the country's outlook and put Tonga-EEC-ACP relations into perspective. **Pages 14-26**




## Western Samoa

The first independent Polynesian nation is still, fundamentally, run by a pyramidal hierarchy of some 13 000 matai or heads of extended families. In the early 1980s Western Samoa faced both political turmoil and

economic collapse. Austerity measures—and the IMF—were brought in and, as Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana explains, stabilization and consolidation are now preparing the country for further much desired growth. **Pages 27-37**

## DOSSIER: The ACP Group

By way of a contribution to the 10th anniversary celebrations of the ACP Group, *The Courier*, for the first time, has dedicated its dossier to the Group, and given the floor to its main protagonists. It is not an exhaustive account but will, we hope, through personal reminiscences, give our readers a better insight into what appears today to be a novel political phenomenon in South-North and South-South relations. **Pages 48 to 91**



## CTA Bulletin



A new permanent feature making its first appearance in this issue containing information provided by the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation. To day: "Auxiliary veterinary staff for new livestock policies in Africa". **Pages 103 and 104**

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
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## LORENZO NATALI

## The politician and his philosophy of development

In a long interview with *The Courier*, Lorenzo Natali, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Development since January, explains the philosophy behind his actions, firmly in the humanist tradition and for which he has worked for the past 40 years.

Mr Natali is also responsible, and has been since 1976, for matters concerning the enlargement of the Community. This year saw the successful conclusion of negotiations which had lasted eight years and which, in some respects, will directly affect ACP countries.



EEC/Lambiotte

► *Spain and Portugal have recently signed treaties of accession to the Community. As Commissioner with responsibility for the negotiations—as previously for those which led to Greek accession—how do you see this historic event?*

— The process of Community enlargement began, you will remember, with the simultaneous accession of three northern countries: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. It was immediately apparent to all concerned that an internal north-south re-balancing operation was needed to reassert fully the old continent's historical identity and commitment to the values of civilization and democracy and to restore harmony to its institutional instruments of peace and pro-

gress. With the accession, first of Greece, and now of Portugal and Spain, that re-centring operation has been accomplished: it is now a question of exploiting the immense potential of this event—a demonstration of great vitality by a Community which many insist on viewing as immobile or in crisis—and the opportunities it offers for furthering the achievement of the grand project of political mediation that the European Community connotes. To be sure, in future, agreement will have to be sought between a larger number of partners and certain integration processes could become slower and more complex: but in future, too, we can rest assured in the knowledge that all the solutions adopted are representative, and within the capabilities, of a society which—par-

ticularly among its younger generations—has already shown that it thinks, and hopes to prosper, within a single, continent-wide frame of reference. I believe that it will henceforth be increasingly difficult for the governments of the Member States to disregard the European dimension to their political activity, a dimension manifest in day-to-day economic developments and sanctioned—through their direct election of a European Parliament—by 320 million European citizens.

► *Will this enlargement work out as positive or negative for our ACP partners? What is your view of the problems cited by the ACP?*

— Certain concerns expressed by some of our ACP partners, particular-

ly relating to trade, are legitimate and understandable. These countries are, at the same time, fully aware of the potential benefits of access for their products to a significantly enlarged Community market. The Commission fully appreciates the need to find a just balance between these two sides of the coin. Already, when negotiating certain preferential concessions for the Mediterranean and EFTA countries, we ruled out any arrangements which were in conflict with the interests of the ACP. In the coming months, we will be going into this whole area in detail when drawing up the protocol of adaptation of the Portuguese and Spanish accession agreements to the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention.

The quality and intensity of our relations with the ACP lead me to believe that this new occasion for dialogue, too, will produce mutually advantageous solutions commensurate with the specific needs of all the parties concerned.

► *A profound humanism seems to colour your approach to Third World questions. You said once that you were prompted to accept your new brief within the Commission by primarily spiritual considerations. Could you explain a little the philosophy that guides you?*

— I look on myself essentially as a politician who—as a result of a deeply spiritual upbringing and deeply spiritual personal convictions—has for 40 years been active in the service of mankind and society, first in my own country, Italy, and now for Europe. Even when the cultural wisdom of the day was inclined to give precedence to so-called “modern” values such as the rational and the scientific approach, I have always felt, in conscience, bound to champion the fundamental human values, man’s need for individual and collective affirmation and the preeminently moral role of politics. The human condition, both in its revealed and mysterious parts, I hold to be structurally and intimately one, above and beyond the various distinctions (of geographical origin, race, custom or religion) superimposed on it for convenience’s sake. The fact that history, through a series of by no means inevitable coincidences, has “divided” the world into areas

blessed with progress or afflicted with underdevelopment cannot and must not be used to deny our common involvement in a single human adventure on this planet. The successes and failures of this adventure to date must be weighed in the same scales: the interdependence of the political and economic destinies of the world is leaving less and less place, or legitimacy, for autocratic solutions, while—since Hiroshima—dramatic awareness grows that for the first time our future is global, in the sense that the alternatives offered by this future—self-fulfillment or self-destruction—will affect the whole of mankind.

**“A more disinterested and tolerant kind of understanding, greater respect for cultural identities and more truly pluralist attentiveness”**

► *Confronted with the harsh realities of the situation and the obstacles of all kinds in the way of development, how can your approach contribute to an improvement in the situation or increase the effectiveness of the efforts of all concerned?*

— Consistently applied, my approach serves above all to banish any spurious distinction between a culture of progress and a culture of development—that strange phenomenon which, too often, has led the North on the grounds of its “higher” cultural pretensions, to export models (whose practicability remains far from proven even in the North) indiscriminately to the South, rather than proposing a dialogue on the universal values which inspire these pretensions. A broad, all-inclusive view of the problems and difficulties facing modern man, both in the North and South, will facilitate the search for solutions and joint instruments, the pooling of resources and the co-implementation of projects on an ever-larger scale. Pursued in this spirit, the very ideal of cooperation is likely to emerge stronger and firmer, pragmatic and fruitful: no longer merely economic, merely altruistic, cooperation will strike root in the consciences of those engaged in it, making them sharers in the same choices and aspirations and helping them penetrate the daunting communication barriers separating them in areas probably only requiring a more disinter-

ested and tolerant kind of understanding, greater respect for cultural identities and a more truly pluralist attentiveness. This intellectual and cultural task of restoring to politics its implicit moral vocation is one which we in the West, and particularly in Europe, must have the courage to undertake without further delay: otherwise, paralysed by our addiction to logic-at-all-costs, we will, I fear, soon have small cause to pride ourselves on a “progress” which is increasingly cynical, dehumanized and exclusivist or to proclaim a “superiority” which cannot export its accomplishments and blessing to less-favoured regions of the globe. For their part, the people of these regions must be able to draw from cooperation—besides the experience of “felt” solidarity—firm grounds for greater confidence in themselves and in their own capacity for development; they must be able to rediscover the value and flavour of their own cultural traditions, rather than being caught up in macro-projects that exceed their powers and resources, or being browbeaten with comparisons which—in statistical terms or those, at least, of the exact sciences—can only serve to reinforce their casting in the role of losers. I realise that this order of reflections may seem unproductive, at least in the short term, to “pure” development technicians but, in pursuing the chimeras of theory, we have all made too many mistakes over the years and wasted too many opportunities not to think that perhaps the time has come to base our North-South Dialogue on new foundations, less aseptic than those the analysis laboratories can be expected to come up with. Such is the cultural challenge facing us, starting with the implementation of Lomé III.

► *One of the first things you had to do in your new job was to produce and implement the Community’s emergency plan for Africa. You went out there, to the countries worst affected by famine and drought, and reported on it to the last European Council in Milan. Can you briefly, tell us, what your main conclusions were and how the European Council reacted?*

— Public opinion focused particularly on the industrial problems discussed in Milan, didn’t perhaps take much notice of the resolution on famine in Africa that the Heads of State

and Government took at the Council.

But two important things did not escape the notice of those interested in drought and famine in Africa. First of all, the Commission and the Member States said the results of the Dublin Plan were positive. We know the emergency isn't over, of course, and we know that the situation is still the same, but we also know that, without the contribution that the whole Community made and without the work put in by all those, near and far, who implemented the emergency aid, the tragedy would have reached unbearable proportions. And second, the Community as a whole firmly decided to do something to stop catastrophes like this from happening again.

Of course, this is an enormous task and that is why a clear political desire to implement a coordinated global strategy emerged to combat the drought in the short and the long term.

The problem is that so long as we, donors, go on acting separately, we will never be able to make a decisive attack on some of the root causes of desertification—the deterioration of the environment, for example. There has to be a common doctrine in this field, as in others, to regulate what the African countries do and what the donors do. Defining this doctrine and, above all, undertaking to apply it for a long period are targets the Milan Council set themselves and they do, I think, meet the three basic conditions of any development campaign—coordinating efforts, concentrating means and making sure everything is coherent.

► *Though emergency aid to meet immediate needs constitutes a moral duty when millions of men, women and children are suffering from hunger, long-term measures to prevent the recurrence of such disasters are also vital: how can short- and long-term aims be reconciled with the resources available?*

— The problem of reconciling the short and long terms is more complex than might at first appear.

The situation seems simple: part of the population is stricken by drought and must therefore be fed and provided with the means to get back to work. So food aid, seeds and missing

equipment (having been abandoned or sold) must be distributed immediately in order to get production going again. The long term, on the other hand, requires the implementation of measures to restructure the economy in such a way as to prevent disasters such as we have lately witnessed from recurring.

But realities on the ground are more complex than this theoretical summary of them. Attending to immediate requirements is certainly imperative, particularly as far as food aid is concerned, but very often regenerating traditional productive patterns through supplies of seeds and agricultural equipment is not the best solution.

In my travels I have noted a keen awareness of this problem among those in charge on the spot.

The drought has thrown into disarray traditional production methods which are in part directly responsible for the present crisis. Over-intensive exploitation of the soil is clearly a root cause of desert encroachment.

To tide such production methods over with short-term aid is to risk institutionalizing a state of affairs which current events teach us we must change.

The unthinking reconstitution of the Sahel's livestock herds in the wake of the 1974 drought is, in my view, an excellent example of how in future we must not proceed.

The ideal, then, is to provide for

immediate needs but with our sights at the same time on what the country's reformed productive structure must be in the long term. An example on these lines is the Commission's support in Niger for "out-of-season" crops, which the Niger Government sees as one of the future growth points for the country's agriculture.

► *There is general agreement today that responsibility for the ACP's underdevelopment does not lie in one quarter alone: mistakes have been made on both sides. Do you see the most serious of these as having been the result of bad policy decisions on development objectives and priorities or of inadequate financial and technical assistance?*

— Attempts to apportion the blame in this area always threaten to turn into demagoguery. Of course, bad decisions have been made by both local authorities and aid organizations but what is to be gained by constant reminders of the greater or lesser degree of guilt of one or other party?

Nor should it be forgotten that even the most serious analyses, if too concerned with apportioning blame, are only too likely to be exploited and misrepresented by those with a higher stake in scandal than in the truth.

Rather than indulge in idle speculation, I would recommend the objective analysis of specific facts. Over-generalizations must be put aside. The question I put to my colleagues is why in a certain country, under given cir-



*Mr Natali in his office, in the company of Ambassador Munyeshyaka of Rwanda*

cumstances, a certain type of economic decision has not yielded the results expected and what measures must be taken to remedy matters. It is then up to us to discuss the situation with the government in question and to agree on what is to be done.

► *The emphasis of Lomé III is firmly on food production and food security. Do you believe that, this time, the correct policy choice has been made?*

— Galbraith once remarked that everyone is a financial genius until they fail. We spoke just now of past policy decisions which turned out to be ill-advised: There may have been a few Cassandras in the wings at the time but these were decisions backed by the great majority of “experts” with excellent, and thoroughly convincing, arguments. There is no need to list by name the illustrious personalities of the scientific and political worlds who have, at various times, in turn avouched that the developing countries future lay, now in industrialization, now in exports, now in agriculture, etc., etc.

This inglorious list would include many economic mandarins. All these fine schemes turned out to be off-target and only partial successes owing to the determination of those taking the decisions to pursue theory to the letter rather than consider the realities of the situation in the beneficiary country.

To your question, therefore, I would prefer to answer that food security asserted itself as an objective following a joint analysis by the ACP and ourselves. Here I must pay tribute to the efforts of Mr Pisani, my predecessor as Member of the Commission responsible for development, for having focused the attention of all those involved on a problem whose primary importance became manifest even before the drought. Food security was therefore an obligatory choice but will prove a worthy one only if we succeed in giving it real body. It is up to the ACP and the Community to do this by devising and implementing effective measures on the ground.

► *A first series of Sixth EDF programming missions is under way and has already led to the finalization of indicative programmes in a number of ACP countries. Are you satisfied with*



*Lorenzo Natali on a field trip: visiting a refugee camp in Ethiopia*

*the results so far and do you think that the new approach decided on jointly by the Community and the ACP is proving a success?*

— The results of the programming missions carried out to date have been excellent. I refer not just to the content of the indicative programmes—which show a marked emphasis on agricultural development—but also to the atmosphere in which these missions were conducted. Dialogue between ACP authorities and the Commission has been free of those problems which some had feared in the past. We all remember the ideological polemics generated by the Commission’s famous “policy dialogue” during the Lomé III negotiations. Perhaps the terminology chosen did not properly express the Commission’s real intentions: the result in any case was long and difficult discussions between the Commission and the ACP. On the ground—during the programming missions—it was possible to separate the wheat of real issues from the emotive chaff which both sides may previously have invested in the question. The problems to be faced and resolved were analysed jointly with each side clearly defining its obligations in pursuit of jointly agreed objectives. And the undertakings made cover not just individual projects—as might have been the case in the past—but whole programmes of interrelated measures.

This is the fruit of one of the principles of Lomé III programming—the

concentration or focusing of aid—which the ACP so far appear to wish to respect totally. But let us not congratulate ourselves prematurely: good programming is just the beginning of a process whose success it will only be possible to judge once we have committed and spent the funds allocated to the country in question. Only then will we be able to see whether this important Lomé III innovation is to yield the fruit it so far promises to bear.

And to this end the spirit of cooperation animating the two sides must be sustained all the way along.

### **“Africa’s is a changing reality”**

► *Development is the affair as much of individuals and groups as of governments. Often the state tends to have a monopoly on initiatives. What is your view of this and, in particular, of the role of intermediary social structures?*

— Let us restrict ourselves to the archetypal case of Africa: it is clear that the manner in which the decolonization of Africa has been rapidly accomplished, while almost everywhere seriously disrupting the traditional societies of that continent, has failed to offset this with a sure and steady development within these societies towards democracy and pluralism. This has generated a radical socio-cultural void in which the task of social “reconstruction” has been undertaken—

with mandates of widely varying validity—by elite groupings which have been forced to have recourse to centralization and single-party systems, African versions of totalitarianism. In this state of affairs—which must strike us as crude and authoritarian but against which it is best to suspend all ideological recriminations as a list of those responsible would, I suspect, point the finger both north and south, west and east—in this state of affairs, those wishing to provide development aid had no option but to deal with the governments of the said centralized states which are, for that matter, themselves “victims” of systems which, in the absence of any broad or solid consensus, are inevitably acutely strife-torn. But Africa’s is a changing reality: precipitately, confusedly, spontaneously, under the pressure of events engulfing whole regions of the continent and punishing the many veilities and omissions of the past, a new phase of heightened awareness is, it seems, being ushered in: alongside the central political elites—who appear to have grasped the need to cast the net of legitimate power more widely—new social forces and intermediate social structures are emerging, in the areas of production and organized labour, administration and regional government. I believe it in conscience to be our moral duty to foster this emergent pluralism in whatever way we can—in so far as the states in question themselves concentrate internally on

this new and significant development opportunity.

**“The need to give more systematic attention to the human factor in development”**

► *For the first time in ACP-EEC relations, the new Convention devotes a whole chapter to cultural and social cooperation. Do you believe that these provisions can genuinely have an effect on the quality of development operations and what, in your view, should be done to this end?*

— The inclusion in the Convention of a new title on “cultural and social cooperation” reflects both the ACP’s and the Community’s new awareness of the need to give more systematic attention to the human factor in development. Development, it is recognized, must be centred on man himself and rooted in each people’s culture. This means reinforcing and mobilizing the human potential available and better organizing structures and institutions. Achievement of these objectives will require the implementation, by the ACP, of policies and measures aimed at enhancing their human resources so as genuinely to permit each population group to increase its creative capacities, fulfil its cultural identity and exploit its potential dynamism to the full.

Specifically, a number of elements will have to be studied systematically

when drawing up the indicative programme of each country and when devising each individual project. First, the constraints imposed by demographic structures and trends, by migrations and changing urban and rural population patterns must be studied as must, secondly, the degree to which the basic needs of the various sections of the population can be satisfied, particularly as regards food, health and water supplies and housing.

The social situation of the various sections of the population, especially as regards employment and unemployment, particularly among the young, and the status and role of women must also be considered.

The measures adopted will, therefore, have to be adapted to the cultural milieu: on the one hand, as regards the manner in which types of social relations, value systems, ways of life, modes of thought and know-how affect the development process—particularly through creativity and innovation—and are themselves affected by this process and, on the other hand, the manner in which the local cultural heritage can be integrated and enhanced in each development operation.

In this context, the participation of the local populations in the various development programmes and operations and the efficiency of the self-development structures imply not just that the population concerned must be associated in such actions from the point of their conception but also that their own initiatives and organizations must be given direct encouragement and support.

Such is the machinery at our disposal in the work ahead. It should permit us both to explore new means and better exploit existing possibilities. It is through such a framework that best advantage can be drawn from the system of microprojects, which already proved itself under the first two Conventions and which makes it possible to support the initiatives of small population groups which have taken the improvement of their lot into their own hands. It goes without saying that the work of the NGOs, which operate outside the Convention, will be considerably facilitated as will any initiatives taken by ACP-EEC economic and social sectors (Article 23 of Lomé III).



Photo: C. Pavard

*“Food security asserted itself as an objective following a joint analysis by the ACP and ourselves”*



The plan of campaign, then, has been mapped out. It is now up to us both—ACP and Commission—to give it concrete reality. Such will be our fundamental task in the years to come.

► *Coordination has become a key word, both for Community aid and the bilateral aid of the Member States. Do you not agree that considerable progress has still to be made in this field?*

— The Commission made coordination one of the major topics of the Milan Council. The reason is clear: Africa's problems are enormous, the means of the individual donors limited. Uncoordinated action is going to make little impression. We are therefore all "condemned" to collaborate if we wish at last to begin to solve Africa's problems. Sadly, however, the self-evidence and universal recognition of these facts has not hitherto yielded equally indisputable results.

In reality the various donors have each their own development policy—how this comes about can be understood intellectually—but also, let us be blunt, their own interests and a kind of administrative "imperialism". Meeting, in theory, to coordinate their various efforts, each in practice attempts to coordinate the other donor's policies with his own.

This is a reality which we must not try to ignore. How is it to be tackled? In my view, by the beneficiary country exercising its proper function of guiding the donors' operations, giving clear indications on the respective role to be played by each so as to support its own development policy.

This requires, however, that such individual decisions spring from an analysis of the situation which is shared by all involved. The beneficiary country must therefore take whatever steps are necessary to arrive, through discussion, at the definition of a development policy which commands the allegiance of all the donors who will then implement it according to their various individual procedures, technical approaches and preferences.

The two essential elements, then, are the central role of the beneficiary country and agreement between donor and recipient on a single development policy: and such are the cornerstones



Photo: EEC/Lambiotte

*"I think the best way of fighting apartheid today is to make sure that the collective conscience of our peoples is fully aware of how incompatible apartheid is with our view of life"*

of Lomé. Thus it can be said that, if coordination is to become an operable reality, the spirit of Lomé must extend to all the donors currently operating on the African continent.

#### **"Apartheid: there are no compromise solutions"**

► *The ACPs are trying very hard to get the Community to move from word to action on apartheid. Don't you think it's about time it gave them a positive, practical response?*

— Apartheid is a system that both should be and is being condemned.

There is no need for me to express here my total rejection of a type of government that denies the humanism to which I am so deeply attached. What I said in answer to your previous questions amply illustrates the extent to which apartheid is the antithesis of everything on which my political and moral creed is based.

This is why I maintain that there is no future for apartheid. As I said, it is doomed to disappear. But when? You have just referred to practical measures that should be taken to hasten the fall of the system. The Commission has already made a clear stand. The words are firm and unequivocal. We have not just to condemn the situation, that goes without saying. We have to act.

The Commission has clearly stated that, if nothing changes, then Community economic measures against South Africa will be unavoidable and this could well mean the whole range of

sanctions the European Parliament and the UN Security Council proposed and some Member States are already applying. The Commission is ready to make proposals along these lines to the Member States.

Alongside all this, it must continue with its campaign to combat apartheid by offering economic support to the Front Line countries in the shape of regional aid to SADCC, sending relief to refugees and financing the work of organizations that oppose apartheid by peaceful means.

There is one comment I should like to add on the value of economic sanctions and it is this. Considered as nothing more than a technical means of forcing a situation, they are probably only relatively effective. But if the South African Government sees the sanctions as a clear expression of an unreserved and unanimous position on the part of the West, then their effect is far greater, as in this case, it is a whole moral code that is confronted by its opposite and, as the past has shown, there are no compromise solutions and the fight goes on to the bitter end.

Public opinion is still not wholly up in arms against apartheid and our efforts may still seem to lack proper support. This is why I think the best way of fighting apartheid today is to make sure that the collective conscience of our peoples is fully aware of how incompatible apartheid is with our view of life. This is the aim I shall tirelessly be working towards ◦

Interview by Fernand THURMES



## Live Aid – The biggest televised live performance in history

On 13 July at 12 noon, the biggest show on earth was launched in front of 72 000 people in London's Wembley Stadium and, linked by satellite communications, about 90 000 in Philadelphia's John F. Kennedy Stadium. Television, using 14 global satellites, the largest number ever used, linked in more than 1.5 billion viewers all over the world, in 160 countries. At one point, it was estimated that 78% of all the world's television sets were tuned in to this, the biggest televised live performance in human history.

What had linked all these people? Was it the prospect of seeing performances from 60 of the world's best-known pop stars, from Adam Ant to Ultravox, and including the surviving Beatles, the Rolling Stones, Joan Baez and Bob Dylan? Hardly. Live television is not the best medium for enjoying rock music, and, as one commentator put it, "the concert showed with merciless clarity the toll of time on musicians". Was it, then, the hope for profits? Again, the answer is no. The twin events in London and Philadelphia, quite apart from local efforts as far apart as Ireland, the USSR and Australia, cost \$ 4 million to stage, but technicians, pop stars, promoters and distributors provided their services at cost, and nobody charged a fee, nor did anybody take a penny in profits.

The link between the people of the world is their humanity, and it was forged on 24 October 1984 when the BBC showed a harrowing film of the effects of the drought and famine in Ethiopia. One person watching was Bob Geldof, Irish-born singer for the British group the Boomtown Rats. He had found his own answer to the normal questions posed by the film – "What can I do?" or "How can I help?". Within days, he and another singer, Midge Ure of Ultravox, composed a song called "Do They Know It's Christmas/Feed the World". Within a month, on 26 November 1984, Geldof and Ure had contacted 40 of Britain's top performers and they produced a recording and video of the song that had been written. The song became a world-wide hit, selling 5.5 million copies, and raised £ 8 million. So far, this is what all pop stars dream of – fame, success and material rewards.

But, under Geldof's guidance and inspiration, the 40 stars, the techni-

cians and producers, had provided their services free, and the £ 8 million was given to the Band Aid Trust, a charity founded by Geldof and Ure to provide money for famine relief in Africa, principally in Ethiopia.

Volunteer workers began contacting the field agencies already at work in Ethiopia to determine immediate needs. They then formed committees and began liaising with NGOs in the UK. Since November, three cargo ships became operational, seven emergency flights were arranged and the £ 8 million are being spent on food, medical supplies and logistical support.

Geldof's initiative, and the enormous success of the venture, spurred on emulation on the other side of the Atlantic. The formula was maintained—that of highly popular entertainers singing for famine victims—but was modified and refined by American marketing techniques. On 28 January 1985, some 45 American pop stars recorded a song called "We Are The World", the profits to be channelled to a trust, similar to Band Aid, called USA for Africa Foundation. The sales of the single record and of the album which followed it were only a small part of the phenomenon—dozens of products and promotional tie-ins focussed on the pop heroes and the identification with the cause of African famine victims. T-shirts, sweatshirts, posters, an official book and a film about the making of the hit record all generated

massive profits, bigger than usual in such marketing events, because all services were given free. Spin-offs included the mobilization of industry, commerce and youth in a sustained effort to raise money and put it to optimum use. Similar efforts were started in Canada, Australia and Germany, and in April 1985 a group of 45 Latin American recording stars began their own analogous contribution entitled "Cantare, Cantaras".

And so to the greatest show on earth. In terms of statistics, it exhausted superlatives—40 miles of cable laid in Wembley linking 1 200 speakers, ticket sales of \$ 7 million in the USA for the concert, £ 4 million in the UK.

At one point, telephone pledges of money were being received at the rate of 22 000 every five minutes! Thirty NGOs were linked, through the agency of Interaction, the national association of US-based NGOs in the USA, and the Band Aid Trust in the UK, to receive and expedite the aid to the critical areas. Bishop Desmond Tutu, Coretta King (widow of Martin Luther King) football star Pelé and peace campaigner and Nobel Prize-winner Linus Pauling all joined in with television appeals. Britain's Prince Charles and Princess Diana attended the Wembley concert, and Geldof sat at their side in the royal box. One performer, adding to the galaxy of high technology, sang at Wembley and then boarded a supersonic Concorde aircraft and sang again in Philadelphia, and was seen

in both places on giant "Diamond Vision", screens each one 140 feet across!

What is the real significance of the Live Aid concert, apart from the staggering display of organization, technology and enthusiasm? British Development Minister Timothy Raison was asked for his views about it and replied that concern for the Third World had, in Britain at least, been "seen as a rather middle-age, middle-class phenomenon" until the emergence of Band Aid. Now, he said, youth had been mobilized, and their energy and idealism had, even if only for a short, intense burst, been concentrated on the problems of famine in Africa.

As of the end of July, two weeks after the concert, the estimated funds raised by the concert stood at £ 13.4 million (\$ 18.8 million) in the UK alone, and at around £ 50 million (\$ 70 million) world-wide. In the USA, the estimated receipts for USA for Africa Foundation for 1985 are as high as \$ 250 million from sales of franchised material quite apart from the concert. Aid will be spread, in consultation with NGOs on the ground, between the various stricken countries and between immediate relief, agricultural supplies and long-term economic development. All in all, therefore, Live Aid is the starting point for at least two highly significant shifts. The first is the mobilization of the talent and idealism (and the purchasing power) of the young—a large sector of Western society which had hardly been touched before. The second is the regeneration of managerial techniques among NGOs, both in their raising of funds and in their application on the ground.

Those who decry the medium of television as a crass, commercialized example of pandering to the lowest common denominator of taste should remember two things. Bob Geldof was galvanized into action by TV coverage of the famine in Ethiopia; and his response was the most massive use of television the world has ever seen, to raise not only money, but also the level of awareness of how the whole world is diminished by a tragedy in one part. ○ T. GLASER



Some of the sixty stars on parade—Bob Geldof at extreme right

## Fisheries in Lomé III – a sector on the move

By Tim CLARKE (\*)

On 10 and 11 July, the Commission played host to the first-ever meeting of fisheries development experts from all the Community Member States dealing with fisheries development aid. It was the culmination of a series of bilateral meetings between the Commission and some Member States which had examined the Lomé III articles relating to fisheries.

The encounter had a very positive feedback—one of the main points to emerge was the extent to which Member States complement each other in their areas of specialization. Belgium, for example, puts emphasis on fish farming, the Netherlands on inland water fisheries, Denmark on integrated artisanal fisheries projects, Italy on the nutritional benefits of landing more fish. It was agreed that the Commission would be the central point for the collation and diffusion of information on bilateral fisheries projects. At the meeting itself, the Commission undertook to coordinate its fisheries development mission to Mozambique with Danish and UK bilateral schemes which were about to be launched there. It was further agreed that a special post-programming meeting would be held at Easter 1986 to evaluate practical steps taken, and that the July date for the general coordination meeting would become an annual event.

Fisheries is on the move. Always seen as at best a marginal activity, the sector has been neglected for many years. Even in those countries where fisheries have a profound role to play, too often fishermen are seen as colourful but essentially backward and independent people, more fit for adorning tourist postcards than deserving of technical and financial support.

Thankfully this situation is changing. In recent months great strides have been made in bringing fishing communities and fisheries back into the limelight. It now no longer makes sense to talk about food self-sufficiency without considering the contribution that fisheries and fish-farming can make to achieving this goal.

### 1984 — a turning point in fisheries management

There is no doubt that the World Fisheries Conference in Rome, organized by the FAO, played a decisive role in focussing minds on the potential of fisheries for alleviating under-nutrition and poverty. Yet whilst the strategy adopted by the Conference—

and later in December also by the UN General Assembly—was warmly applauded, the FAO “action programmes” for implementing the strategy were widely regarded as an inadequate response, both technically and financially, to the enormity of the needs.

In December 1984, the EEC and ACP States came up with their own response. For the first time, a special chapter devoted to fisheries was included in the Lomé III Convention. The principles laid down in the Con-

vention were partly inspired by the World Fisheries Strategy but also reflected the particular nature of EEC/ACP relations in this sector.

Since then, interest has not waned. The European Parliament, keen to make its own contribution to the debate, adopted a report on 18 April 1985 calling for the implementation of the principles of the World Fisheries Strategy and called upon the Community to improve the volume and effectiveness of its fisheries aid to developing countries.

In May, the Quimper Chamber of Commerce hosted a meeting between representatives of Chambers of Commerce in France and francophone Africa which was devoted to fisheries—and to the Lomé III Convention in particular. A fisheries sub-group has now been created which will meet on a regular basis to exchange information on this topic.

### EEZs—a major impact on fisheries development

What is behind all this activity?

Undoubtedly the driving factor behind these changes has been the establishment on a progressive basis of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

As far as the Community is concerned this has had a major impact. The Community, which traditionally derived a significant part of its catch from its distant-water fleet, has been obliged to re-draw its fishing boundaries so as to focus its fishing activities within its own 200-mile EEZ. This has involved a painful process of re-struct-



*“In Africa alone, 50% of the total African catch comes from inland lakes and rivers” — A fishing village on Lake Kyoga in Uganda*

(\*) Administrator, CEC Directorate-General for Development.

turing the fleet and re-defining priorities. At the same time, the Community, which has exclusive competence in this area, has tried to establish new contractual agreements with third countries (including several ACP countries), not only to provide guarantees for access of its own fleet to traditional fishing grounds, but also to regulate the activities of non-EEC vessels fishing in Community waters.

This package of measures for rationally exploiting the Community's own marine resources was finally agreed by the 10 Member States on 25 January 1983 after some 13 years of debate. Within the last few months these measures have been modified to deal with the forthcoming entry into the Community on 1 January 1986 of Portugal and Spain—both significant fishing nations.

It should perhaps be recalled that the Community is at present a net fish importer, and that the present trade deficit is continuing to widen. By 1982, the fish trade deficit had reached ECU 1 600 million. Amongst ACP countries the principal exporters to the Community are the Ivory Coast, Senegal and Mauritania—tuna being the prime product. As far as exports from the Community are concerned, the main ACP recipient has been Nigeria.

Whilst the Community has seen its fishing opportunities severely reduced as a result of the introduction of the 200-mile EEZs, the ACP countries on the other hand, have seen their opportunities expanded. Since 90% of the world's fish catch is fished within the 200-mile fishing zone, coastal and island states now find themselves in a position where they have a legal obligation to control and manage the exploitation of fisheries resources within the waters under their jurisdiction.

Whilst this provides a very real incentive to develop national and regional fisheries development capacities, it presents at the same time many difficulties. Of the 15 million tonnes of fish caught in ACP waters (a fifth of the world catch), only 10% is caught by ACP fleets. The rest is caught by third countries. The Community fleet plays a relatively minor role (about 2% of the catch in ACP waters is fished by Community vessels; with the enlarged Community, however, this increases to 10%).

This table provides an indication of the geographical and sectoral spread of EEC fisheries aid to ACP countries:

**Prime purpose of the project**

1. Research and resource evaluation
2. Resource management
3. Training
4. Institution building
5. Provision of fishing equipment, boats, etc.
6. Improvement of fish conservation methods
7. Creation of fish market and port facilities
8. Rehabilitation of fish processing factories
9. Boat repair
10. Introduction of new technologies
11. Overall fisheries development
12. Fish farming and aquaculture
13. Technical Assistance

**Region concerned**

Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, Papua New Guinea (research boats), Lake Victoria, Indian Ocean  
 Cameroon, Sudan, Gulf of Guinea, Malawi, Guinea  
 Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Solomon Isles  
 Pacific Region (FFA, IMR)  
 Gabon, Ghana, Kiribati, Mauritania, Mozambique, Uganda, Zaïre  
 Malawi, Sao Tomé and Príncipe  
  
 Barbados, Guyana, Tonga, Trinidad  
  
 Angola, Guinea Conakry  
  
 Angola  
 Sierra Leone  
 Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Somalia  
 Benin, Ivory Coast, Kiribati, Malawi  
 Burkina Faso, Seychelles, Vanuatu, SADCC

(Actions run by Non-Governmental Organization are not included in this table).

The pressure for exploiting their own marine resources becomes all the greater when one considers that over the last ten years many ACP countries have changed from fish exporting nations to fish importers. This clearly has consequences, not only nutritionally but also in terms of utilization of scarce foreign exchange.

The establishment of a fisheries administrative structure, and indeed a national fishing capacity, is however a long and arduous task. Few ACP countries currently have the necessary human, technical and financial resources to do this themselves.

Of course, one should not ignore the importance of inland fisheries and fish farming, which have not been so directly affected by the Law of the Sea regulations. In Africa alone, 50% of the total African catch comes from inland lakes and rivers. In one third of all African countries, the inland fisheries catch represents 90% of the total fish catch.

**Lomé III—emphasis on mutual interest and food security**

It is against this rapidly changing background that the EEC and ACP governments have set their fisheries development priorities for the future.

The key article is Article 15:

“the aim of cooperation in fisheries shall be to help the ACP states to develop their fishery resources in order to expand production for domestic consumption as part of their efforts to achieve increased food security and increase production for export. Such co-operation shall be designed to serve the mutual interest of the Parties, in accordance with their fishery policies”.

This is expanded upon in Articles 50 to 59 which emphasize in particular:

- rational exploitation of fisheries resources;
- food security and improved nutrition;
- increased production for export.

Particular attention will be given to regional cooperation, research, training, resource management and protection, and conservation. The conditions governing fisheries agreements—for example, financial compensation, training of nationals, observers, etc. are also set out in detail (\*).

To arrive at such consensus is no mean achievement, considering the

(\* The prime Articles of concern are 15, 26, 28, 43, 50-59, 103, 113, 190, Protocol 1, annexes XXX, XLIX, L and LIV.

tremendous diversity of fishing activities and interests. How can the priorities needed for a country like Rwanda, with a per capita fisheries consumption of 0.3 kg/yr, be consonant with those of a country like the Seychelles, with a consumption of 90 kg/yr?

Similarly, in the Pacific, where small island states have jurisdiction over vast areas of ocean, the potential for tuna fisheries development is considerable. But the risks are great and the stakes high. Tuna fishing is a cut-throat business where competition on the world markets can turn profits into losses in a frighteningly short time.

The Convention therefore tries to embrace such divergences and diversity within an overall framework which provides enough flexibility to match varying needs.

At the same time, it places particular emphasis on the concept of mutual interest, and—borrowing from other articles in the Convention—on food security for the most needy. It is regrettable, in this latter context, that so often planners, usually from agro-economic backgrounds, “forget” the role that fish play in maintaining a balanced diet, particular in relation to the provision of animal protein and mineral nutrients. In Africa and the Caribbean for example, fisheries departments are generally run by a handful of motivated but financially starved administrators. This situation is bound to change somewhat, with the advent of new-found political “respec-

tability” for the sector, but it is likely to be a long haul.

### Past EEC aid to the fisheries sector — some conclusions

A previous article in *The Courier* (issue No. 85 May-June 1984) has already provided an overview of past fisheries aid (See Table on previous page for indication of EEC fisheries aid).

As was indicated in that article, some 40% of EEC fisheries aid under Lomé II is at present devoted to artisanal fisheries development, and 80% of Lomé II fisheries aid goes towards projects in Africa. Amongst international donors, the Community and the Member States combined rank in purely quantitative terms as one of the most important—if not the most important—fisheries aid donors.

No formal evaluation of the overall programme has been undertaken, although this is currently under consideration.

Some conclusions, nevertheless, can be drawn (these are neither spectacularly “new”, nor are they specifically related to fisheries, but they are important to keep in mind—they were approved in general terms at the meeting of Community fisheries experts in July referred to previously). These include:

— the identification phase is absolutely crucial to a project's future long-

term success;

— the active participation of the fishing community both in the project's identification, planning and implementation is vital. As a general rule, target groups should contribute, either in kind or financially, to the project;

— the project should be based upon the technology and knowhow which exists already, and any changes or improvements should only be introduced progressively;

— the starting-point for any project should be a prudent evaluation of commercially-exploitable fish resources. Any proposed increases in production should err on the side of caution;

— the use of local materials for construction (of houses/boats etc.) should be maximized, as well as the use of local labour;

— the whole production chain from fish capture, to fish processing and marketing should be considered as an integrated whole;

— the project should be adapted not only to the absorption capacity of the target group, but also to that of the administration;

— special emphasis should be placed upon practical on-the-spot training and on institution-building;

— the commercial aspects of a project (fishing vessel management, fishing equipment and fish product sales etc.) should best be left to the private sector;

— each project should have inbuilt evaluation machinery, foreseen in the project's budget, for regular fine-tuning of the project's objectives;

— regional projects, whilst more difficult in general to administer, are deserving of special support, particularly where they would promote better resource management, more efficient exchange of scientific and technical information, and greater utilization of limited human and financial resources.


This list is not, of course, exhaustive but it is illustrative of the desire of all fisheries administrators to improve the *quality* of aid.

### Lomé III fisheries aid — some priorities for the future

It is too early to say yet what level of aid will go to the fisheries sector



Two forms of fishing boat contrasted—a boatbuilding yard at Dak Doy in Angola



*Drying fish at Gunjur in the Gambia*

under Lomé III, or indeed what the nature of such aid might be. This will depend upon the results of the present programming missions and the extent to which ACP partners seek to promote fisheries development on a national or regional basis.

From the foregoing, however, it is clear that:

- there exists a range of activities in this sector that could be developed;
- great care is needed in ensuring that any aid allocated is spent in the most effective manner.

In a nutshell, this means better value for money, and better use of limited human and financial resources. It means more coordination between donors, and a greater pooling of information and experiences between donors and recipients.

At a European level for example, there are numerous individuals, insti-

tutes, organizations, voluntary groups and educational establishments that constitute a human resource that has hardly been tapped. If a means could be found of motivating and activating this resource—through either formal or informal channels—significant advances could be made.

The same is certainly true in Africa and elsewhere where highly capable and qualified people can be found, but are too infrequently engaged in project preparation and implementation.

Fish conservation is a case in point. Numerous bilateral and multilateral programmes exist in Africa and elsewhere for reducing fish wastage—often by improving traditional technologies of smoking, salting or drying. Yet cross-fertilization of information on this topic is virtually non-existent. Where it does exist, it is through heavy bureaucratic publications—usually compiled by a western expert—which



*Beach seining in the Seychelles*

circulate in academic circles rather than in a format than can be readily digested at the beach level where it could have an impact.

In conclusion, therefore, Lomé III provides a powerful tool for bringing about significant advances in fisheries development. Whilst each case must be treated very much on its own merits and within its own context, the Commission would like to see particular emphasis placed on the following areas:

- *resource surveys*: low-cost stock assessment, harmonization of statistical data gathering and exchange of information;

- *improved boat design*: more energy-efficient boat propulsion and construction methods based on existing production methods and use of local materials; introduction of sails, diesels, etc. where appropriate (in-board and outboard);

- *improved fishing techniques*: particularly for artisanal fisheries development;

- *reduction of fish wastage*: through improved methods of drying, salting and smoking;

- *marketing* development and promotion of South/South trade;

- *training* of fisheries administrations, particularly in developing countries themselves;

- *information exchange*: promotion of scientific and other literature for improving exchange of fisheries information between anglophone, francophone, lusophone and hispanophone developing countries;

- *management of fisheries resources* and long-term development planning including establishment of legislation for the conservation of stocks and regulation of fish catches;

- *regional cooperation*, particularly in relation to countries bordering shared fish stocks (coastal, lacustrine, fluvial), and support for regional fisheries institutions in, for example, the Pacific, the Caribbean, West Africa and the SADCC region.

Much energy has gone into reaching agreement on the form and scope of fisheries aid under Lomé III. What is now needed from administrators, politicians and fishing communities alike is some creative thinking to translate the principles laid down in the Convention into viable, autonomous, long-term actions. ○ T.C.

## TONGA

The scepter'd  
isle  
where the dawn  
first breaks



Tourist office - Tonga

*The Royal Palace in the capital Nuku'alofa*



Lying just west of the international dateline—which goes out of its way to avoid cutting the archipelago into two—and thus being the first country to greet each new day, Tonga is the last of the Polynesian kingdoms.

With a royal lineage dating back a thousand years, it is a constitutional monarchy proud of its history: Tonga, unlike any other Pacific country, has never been anyone's colony and has played a role in Polynesian history transcending its size. In the 13th century, for instance, Tonga's rulers were able to reign over a far-flung South Pacific realm thanks to the expert navigating skills of their subjects.


The monarchy is deeply embedded in the conservative and traditional social fabric, as is reli-

gion. Tonga is, indeed, a deeply believing Christian country where, even nowadays, on Sundays all activities other than church-going and praying come to a complete standstill.

Tonga lives principally off its fertile soil, which allows mainly for subsistence farming, and off such traditional exports as coconut products, bananas and, increasingly, vanilla.

Tourism and, even more, small export-oriented manufacturing industries are economic runners-up but as some observers state—not without a hint of irony—Tonga's best exports may very well be Tongans, as the remittances of some 30 000 emigrants working abroad constitute a major source of income for this fragile, yet viable, economy.





## Half a world away

Part of this fragility may be attributed to the country's geographical composition and situation: Tonga is an archipelago of 171 islands, stretching from north to south over about 560 km and lying about 1 500-1 600 km north-east of Auckland, New Zealand. The islands fall into three main groups: the Tongatapu group in the south, Ha'apai in the centre and Vava'u in the north. In total they cover a land surface of 669 km<sup>2</sup> and a sea area estimated at 362 600 km<sup>2</sup>. Most islands are raised coral with soils developed from volcanic ash, while a few are volcanic in origin. Soils are generally very fertile but availability of water is a problem as there is little running water.

Tongatapu, the largest island (256 km<sup>2</sup>) has in fact no running water and strikes the visitor as being, for the greater part, surprisingly flat. Here, on the northern side we find Nuku'alofa, the capital and main seaport. From the point of view of relations with Europe and with the EEC, in particular, Nuku'alofa can claim to be the ACP capital most remote from the hub of European decision-making in Brussels. Lying as it does 19 000 km away, it is practically Brussels' antipode!

According to a mini-census held in 1984, over two-thirds of the total 96 400 Tongans, a typical Polynesian people, live in the main island Tongatapu (66 300, of whom 21 700 in

Nuku'alofa); about 15 000 live on Vava'u and some 8 500 on Ha'apai. Despite a growth rate of over 3%, the total population remains fairly stable due to emigration. Some 30 000 Tongans live overseas, mainly in New Zealand, Australia, Hawaii and on the North American continent. Within the country, the population tends to shift more and more to the main island, the capital being the main pole of attraction.

## "The Friendly Islands"

This flattering and wholly justified name was given to Tonga by Captain James Cook during his visits to the islands in the 1770s. Tonga's recorded history began, though, when the Dutch navigators Schouten and Lemaire first landed in 1616. However, as archaeological evidence shows, settlement of the islands must have started around 1140 B.C. When Westerners finally arrived, they found a highly developed monarchical system, the dynasty of the Tui Tonga or "ruler" of Tonga, said to be of divine origin as the monarch was the son of the Creator God. However, within the dynasty there was often rivalry between various branches for outright power, culminating in civil war from the 1790s to the 1820s. In 1826, the young chief of Ha'apai, Taufā'ahau, member of the Tui Tonga family, defeated the heir to the Tui Tonga line and became ruler of the whole country. Baptised a

Christian in 1831—a Wesleyan mission had established itself in Tonga in 1826—he chose the name George, after the King of England. In 1845 he was formally proclaimed King George Tupou I and thus became the direct founder of the present royal family. Much influenced by Wesleyan Methodism, which is the dominant religion even today, he initiated a great many social and cultural changes and set Tonga on the path to modernization. Not only did he abolish, as early as 1862, the system of semi-serfdom, he also introduced written codes of law. By 1875 he had a complete constitution drawn up, under which Tonga became a constitutional monarchy. This constitution also embodied a system of land tenure which is still in force: every male Tongan reaching the age of 16 is entitled to apply for a rural tax allotment of 8¼ acres (3.34 hectares) and a town allotment of ⅓ acre (0.16 hectares).

In order to avoid German colonization, Tonga placed itself under British protection, and in 1900 signed a Treaty of Friendship and Protection, despite the fact that prior to that it already had treaties with both France and Germany. Full "independence" was achieved in 1970. Never having been anybody's colony, Tonga is very much used "to doing its own thing", as Crown Prince Tupouto'a puts it.

While referring to it as a feudal system may be putting it too strongly, it



Tourist office - Tonga

*Tonga's "Stonehenge", the massive Ha'amonga trilithon*

is nevertheless a fact that the monarchy has far-reaching powers under Tonga's constitutional system. The King is responsible for appointing the Cabinet, which at present consists of the Prime Minister, his brother, and seven ministers, including one of his sons, Crown Prince Tupouto'a, who is responsible for Foreign Affairs and Defence. Ministers hold office until retirement age. The governors of Ha'apai and Vava'u, also appointed by the King, serve as ex officio Cabinet members. When chaired by the King, Cabinet becomes the Privy Council, the highest executive authority. The Legislative Assembly consists of the Cabinet Ministers and 9 representatives of the hereditary nobility—elected by the current 33 nobles—and 9 representatives of the people. The latter are elected as independents—Tonga has no political parties—by universal adult suffrage.

### **A dualistic economy with limited resources**

To judge the health of Tonga's economy by the classic signs—balances of trade and of payments, growth rates etc. might sometimes seem a futile exercise. Life in Tonga, even if it isn't always "paradise" is by no means unhappy. People in the islands live well, generally, and such notions as starvation or severe deprivation are unknown. Yet in this classical dualistic economy, with a largely predominant subsistence sector and a slowly but gradually developing cash economy, there certainly are aspirations for

further development and "modernization".

Resources are limited, though the country could, in theory, be self-supporting in terms of basic needs from an agricultural point of view, and produce enough cash crops to generate export income. In practice, of course, there are a number of constraints, not least the distances between and relative isolation of the islands. Tonga's geography gives rise not only to problems of transport and communication because of its small and scattered domestic market, but there are also problems with productivity, quality control and marketing, motivation and training of skilled manpower and lack of indigenous management expertise. There are such things as development plans and target growth rates, but in general terms, the "Tongan way" isn't really a planned one, as Crown Prince Tupouto'a stressed in his interview (see p. 20).

As William Harris, Director of Central Planning, explained "development is not just an economic process, but is a multifaceted process. There should be no romanticized concept or even patronising about our development, as we definitely have our own aspirations. Our cultural and social structure lends itself to economic development as we are sufficiently adaptive, flexible and conditioned to progress. Development here is certainly indigenous but maybe not traditional".

Finance Secretary Selwyn Jones found the country remarkably healthy

from a financial point of view. Foreign reserves hold up very well and are worth over five months of imports, Tonga's trade balance has consistently shown large deficits, but remittances from abroad and aid keep the current account looking good. "Until about 20 years ago, Tonga was independent of aid; now financial aid is quite important and probably even more will be needed in future" declared Mr. Jones. Total aid from the main donors, basically Australia, New Zealand, the EEC and some of its Member States, averaged over T\$ 14 million<sup>(1)</sup> a year for the period 80/81-82/83 (financial years).

In 1982/83 Tonga's GDP at current prices reached T\$ 76.6 million—or almost T\$ 800 per capita—with overall agriculture, including forestry and fisheries, making up about half of total GDP. In the 1970s the economy grew at an average 3.8% p.a. as against the target 5.5% foreseen in the third development plan. In the early 1980s Tonga suffered a double shock: in 1982 cyclone *Isaac* hit the archipelago at 220 km per hour, resulting in a death toll of 64 and causing massive damage to housing and crops; in 1983 a prolonged drought depressed the economy even further. It was quite impossible, therefore, to reach the targets of the fourth development plan and both national disasters probably contributed to making Tongan decision-makers somewhat sceptical as to the whole idea of "planning".

As a consequence of their combined effects, exports dropped considerably while imports rose equally sharply and for some time Tongans even had to face food shortages, now however overcome.

Unemployment is officially estimated at 12-13% in recent years. Being defined as "those looking for work and not currently employed", unemployment is not, however, considered a real problem since the whole population is, in one way or another, committed to subsistence farming.

### **Pressures on land**

Agriculture is the backbone of Tonga's economy. Accounting for half of GDP, over 70% of the population der-

(1) Tonga's national currency is the pa'anga (T\$) subdivided into 100 seniti; 1 ECU = 1.105 T\$ (= 1.105 Australian \$) - August 1985.

ive their livelihood from it. Most crops are grown for local consumption, while coconut-based products, (mainly copra, desiccated coconut and coconut oil) bananas, vanilla, root crops—in particular kava—and some fruit and vegetables constitute the main exports.

Almost all farming is done by small-holders, this mainly due to the constitutional land tenure system referred to earlier. The whole land ownership system, closely intertwined as it is with the social hierarchical structure of Tongan society, has recently come under strong pressure, however. Indeed the exercise of allocating in principle 3.34 hectares—a so-called 'api—to every male, has become very difficult as almost all available land has been attributed. As a result, some Tongans farm on so-called "gardens", 'api which aren't used often because their holders are abroad, but this doesn't really give the farmer any long-term security. And insecurity as to long-term land tenure is a major constraint in agriculture. Larger commercial farming is also very limited, as land is already so fragmented by law. Those tilling "borrowed" land invest little—again for reasons of security of tenure.

Tomasi Simiki, Director of Agriculture, agreed that there are "obvious problems in terms of land ownership"



WFP - Julio

*As early as at school age both boys and girls learn the basics of farming*

but also felt that "a lot more can be done in terms of fighting underutilization of land and low productivity".

The potential for greater agricultural output is there: fertile soils and a climate suited to agricultural production most of the year.

The coconut industry plays a key role both in the domestic and in the export-oriented economy. Much of its products are locally used in food or drink, in cooking or in animal feed-stuffs. Coconut products, on the other hand, account on average for about 70% of export earnings, in normal times that is, when cyclones like *Isaac*

in 1982 or *Eric* earlier this year, do not interfere with production. Almost every part of the coconut palm is used, the stems serving as firewood or timber (Tonga is said to be one of the biggest world producers, with the Philippines, of coconut timber) and the fronds finding their way into thatched roofs or handicrafts.

*Isaac*, causing a two-year slump in output by destroying a significant number of coconut trees, aggravated the need for more replanting since many over-mature trees already needed replacement. Generally speaking, the aim of the country is to process coconut products as much as possible up to the finished product stage (soap and other cosmetics for example), so as to avoid fluctuations in world prices of coconut oil in particular.


The banana industry is in ever greater need of revitalization: production is now a mere fraction of what it was in the mid-1960s, with a peak of almost 20 000 tons in 1967. New Zealand is an assured market outlet for high-quality Tongan bananas—they in fact subsidize every crate of them. Here again *Isaac* was a major setback to the revival of the industry, destroying 90% of the crop. Higher yields and better quality are still the targets, but crops diseases, irregularity of shipping services, natural calamities other than cyclones such as drought, lack of skilled manpower, of facilities and of a coordinated approach make it difficult to reverse the decline in the industry.

In any discussion of other crops capable of bringing in export earnings



Tourist office - Tonga

*There is a clear need for making artisanal fishing more effective to meet local demand and cut down fish imports*



Tonga Chronicle

*Manufacturing has experienced rapid development since 1975. Above, HM King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV inspecting one of the SCAN Tonga excavators which are exported to Europe*

to Tonga, the same parameters are always put forward: if you want to overcome isolation and remoteness from possible market outlets, you go for a non-bulky, non-perishable, high value crop. Vanilla is a crop which meets these criteria and has, for that reason, been quite a successful venture since its introduction in the early 1950s. Another so-called coconut intercrop being promoted is kava. The root of the plant, crushed, serves to make the kava drink popular in Tonga at social and ceremonial occasions, as it is elsewhere in the South Pacific. Tongans—as well as other Pacific islanders—do not want to be deprived of its delights when abroad which, together with the fact that developed countries use kava for pharmaceutical products, means that there is scope here for extension and exports. Other rootcrops, fruits and vegetables will be further promoted also in so far as they meet the criteria referred to, or can serve more directly the development of local agro-industries.

As far as fisheries are concerned, Tonga's substantial resources are commercially underdeveloped. Most efforts have been concentrated on developing effective artisanal fishing and trying to increase catches for local

consumption, since imports of fish products still represent a considerable expense. Overall fisheries facilities and infrastructure are being improved, notably with EEC help, to boost this sector.

### Manufacturing and tourism, runners-up

Although unemployment is not yet a real social problem—there is always emigration as a way out—and could so



**Dr. Langi Kavaliku**  
*Minister of Education, Works and Civil Aviation*

far be seen more in terms of under-utilization of human resources, there is still a certain pressure for job creation in sectors other than agriculture, due to the shortage of available land. Before 1975, the country had virtually no industrial base; since then Tongan industry has experienced rapid development, as it was recognized as a means of diversification. Policies were worked out, legislation was passed on fiscal incentives and protective measures for investors, a Development Bank was set up and the so-called Small Industries Centre—an industrial estate—(on Tongatapu) saw the light of day. To date almost 180 industrial development licences have been granted, some 40 for tourism facilities, the remainder for manufacturing industries. Investors from 14 foreign countries have already established themselves in Tonga thanks to the country's open policy towards foreign investment, given its obvious need of capital, technology, possible markets and managerial skills. Representatives of this sector, such as Industrial Promotion Officer B. Savae, are clearly hopeful that the industrial momentum will be kept up and even stimulated further. Another industrial estate will be opened on Vava'u. Some 1 500 islanders are now employed in the sector, whether in agro-based, import-substitution or export-oriented industries. A wide variety of products now find their way out with a "Made in Tonga" label, varying from sports goods, knitwear, snack foods, passion fruit juice, watches (assembled here) to mini-excavators. The latter, produced by a Swedish-Tongan company are even exported to Europe—a fact of which Tonga is proud, and rightly so! Seaweed processing, production of fibre-glass reinforced items (e.g. skis and bows), construction of bus bodies and car silencers are in the pipeline and other industrial ventures such as an oxygen plant, a small brewery etc. are being studied for their feasibility. Dormant local entrepreneurship can still be motivated, but bearing in mind the lack of capital and skills, joint ventures seem most appropriate.

The biggest complaint, here again, is access, be it shipping—though the Pacific Forum Line has been a positive breakthrough here—or, in particular, air services. This complaint is shared by those involved in tourism develop-

ment, since over the past few years a number of carriers have cut down their services to Tonga. Problems with landing rights, airport infrastructure but perhaps most of all economic viability, make Tonga a difficult place to reach. For Semisi Taumoepeau, Tonga's Tourist Officer, "this lack of access certainly puts a brake on tourism which, if this bottleneck were overcome, could continue growing as a foreign exchange earner". In 1983 foreign exchange earnings from tourism were estimated at no less than T\$ 6.2 million. The continued growth of the total number of visitors over the past few years is to be explained principally by expanding cruise ship traffic. Air visitors have remained fairly steady as a proportion of total visitors (about 15% in 1982 and 1983 when all visitors totalled respectively 82 000 and 92 000). "Despite our problems and handicaps in the field of tourism, this sector has grown by an average 8% over the past 5 years and there is definitely scope for further maximization of our tourist potential", Mr Taumoepeau added.

Hoping for a possible spill-over effect of the recent Qantas-Air Pacific cooperation deal (see Fiji report — Courier no 92) and the consequent increased seat capacity to "nearby Fiji", he also felt that in terms of long haul services—and therefore tourism—the South Pacific islands should promote and sell themselves even more as a group, an idea certainly shared by others, as the Tourism Council of the South Pacific is to receive ECU 3.2 million of EEC aid for this purpose.

There is a definite need for a more efficient air transport network in the area. Any traveller trying to cover a few countries in a minimum amount of time will fully agree with that, having suffered a combination of last-minute cancellations, "uncivilized" early morning departures or late night arrivals, or interminable waiting in some forgotten terminal...

Dr. Langi Kavaliku, Minister of Education, Works and Civil Aviation regretted that, in terms of air transport, "Politics have come into the plane! After most Pacific States achieved independence, concrete attempts in running a regional airline soon broke up, mostly for political reasons. Perhaps now, so many years



*More and more tourists every year get to know the "Tongan way"*

later, a more realistic approach to the economics of regional air services will be possible". He added that SPEC had in fact been asked to do a study on the feasibility of such a venture and on improved coordination of existing air services.

Meanwhile, Tonga has started its own national airline "in order to provide efficient and reliable air services within our own country", as Minister Kavaliku stressed. Already a Spanish 28-seater Casa C212 has been acquired—for a total price of U\$ 2.3 million covering the plane, options and spares—for the future "Friendly Islands Airline" (the name wasn't a certainty yet). "In view of the size of Tongan passengers, seating may well be reduced to only 22 seats!" the Minister casually added... Another aircraft may be purchased later if financing can be found. Tonga intends to make its airline a 51% government/49% private-owned undertaking, which will have to run on a commercial basis. Negotiations are going on at present to assure the necessary technical and managerial assistance. The whole idea is, of course, to provide better links between the scattered parts of the country in order to fight the drift to Tongatapu and boost local development in the other islands.

### An "off-shore" future

Apart from developing agriculture, tourism or the manufacturing sector,

Tonga also puts much hope on two ventures which are both off-shore, one in the proper sense of the word as it concerns the search for oil in the off-shore area, the other in a symbolic sense as it concerns the establishment of Tonga as an offshore banking and finance centre. On the latter, legislation has already been passed, bearing in mind as one spokesman remarked "the perception that money is neutral, just as long as you can retain your own integrity...", but one gets the impression it hasn't been very actively pursued up to now. Oil search is for its part certainly a permanent leitmotiv for Tonga's top decision makers who place great faith in the area oil survey being carried out by an American consortium. Oil seepage here and there gives every reason of course to go on looking for what could become—who knows?—Tonga's bonanza.

Up to now, however, life has already been good to Tonga, a country which so far has derived most of its strength from its tradition. If the name of the capital Nuku'alofa really means "place of love", Brussels' antipode certainly leaves Westerners wondering about the sweet life of the South Pacific. Yet, in the foreseeable future, Tonga, too, will increasingly be caught between preserving its own traditions and going ahead on the path of modernization. Surely the "Tongan way", though not always easy to grasp for an outsider, will come up with its own answer. ◊ Roger DE BACKER

## Royal points of view

### Interviews with HM King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV and HRH Crown Prince Tupouto'a



Tonga Chronicle



The Courier

#### HM King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV

► *Your Majesty, Tonga has never really been a colony. Has that given it an advantage over other islands which have been?*

— Oh yes, it has. It means that in some countries there is a sort of ... what shall I say ... a certain amount of hostility because they had to force the imperial powers to give them independence: they had to revolt. This wasn't the case in Tonga. Our relationships with other countries—with our neighbours in Australia for example—have always been calm, and cordial.

► *Maybe one of the country's main problems is the shortage of land?*

— Yes, that's perhaps so. But on the other hand, we have enough land for developing a basis for light industry, but not perhaps for the extension of agricultural projects. We have good opportunities of developing marine in-

Tonga, the last Polynesian kingdom, is now a hereditary constitutional monarchy, ruled by King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV. In 1962, he succeeded his mother, the legendary Queen Salote, who had been on the throne since 1918. The present monarch's ancestors go back about a thousand years. Crown Prince Tupouto'a, educated in England and Switzerland, holds the portfolios of Foreign Affairs and Defence. He is a familiar figure in ACP-EEC circles, known for his sophisticated, urbane approach to life and for his conversation, frequently spiced with witty remarks and *bon mots*.

Both the King and his heir answered a few questions, put to them by *The Courier*, on their country's economic prospects and commented on Tonga's relationship with the EEC.

dustries like fishing, and shipping, though.

► *One of the biggest resources is really the sea... oil, perhaps, or minerals?*

— Well, we know that there are minerals of different types on the top of the seabed. A recent survey by an American team has revealed that the prospects for oil appear to be very good. In some places oil is even seeping up.

There seems to be quite a bit of volcanic movement under the sea: there is a volcanic chain on the west, and the eastern chain is mostly coral, but basically volcanic underneath, and then overlaid with coral limestone. This coral limestone may be a big source-rock for petrol.

► *How do you view relationships in terms of development with neighbouring countries in the South Pacific area? Could there be more joint ventures like the Pacific Forum Line, for instance?*

— I think so. We work on the basis of friendship and cooperation with the other island states. We do help each other in times of disaster. We helped Fiji when they had a hurricane. So far our help has been limited to these occasions.

► *Would there be any chance of a regional airline at some stage?*

— Well we've tried it, but failed. That's why we are starting off a national airline; but we will undoubtedly cooperate more and more.

► *For nearly 10 years, Tonga has had close cooperation with the European Community through the Lomé Convention, and has played an active role in it. How do you view overall cooperation with the EEC so far?*

— We were, of course, helped by the EEC in many things and we are buying capital goods from the EEC like ships, and aircraft. We are far apart, but on the other hand, we have treaties of friendship with three coun-

tries in the EEC—Great Britain, France and Germany—which go back a hundred years to the past century. So we have a long period of friendly relationships, certainly with those three leading countries in the EEC. And we have very good relationships with others, too.

## HRH Crown Prince Tupouto'a

► *Your Royal Highness, you are a well-known figure on the ACP-EEC scene. How would you characterize that relationship on the eve of the coming into force of a new Lomé Convention?*

— I can only speak for Tonga, and say that we're perfectly satisfied with the way things have gone. We have no great complaints.

► *Tonga may well be the ACP State furthest away from Europe. What led it to join the Lomé grouping, and what has come out of that in terms of contact with other nations?*

— I don't think one can classify the effectiveness of Europe's intervention by geography. But I suppose it's an historical thing that we've traditionally had very friendly relations with Europe over the last hundred years or so. We've had bilateral treaties of friendship with France, Germany, England and the United States, all during the last century; so it was a natural development. And we were invited to become members, I suppose!


► *But what has this meant to you in terms of having contacts, not just with Europe, but also with people from Africa and the Caribbean?*

— I think you'll find in the Pacific that Europe is the outsider which can do no wrong—merely because it is an outsider. It's a good balance, perhaps, to the influences which we're traditionally subject to, of our larger neighbours. And I think it's a good thing.

► *So it's a sort of third way out?*

— Yes. It's one of the ways out.

► *You are reported as being of the view that regional funds under Lomé should be reduced so as to increase the individual country allocations. Can*



Tonga Visitors Bureau

*The Royal tombs. Tonga's kings can trace their descent back for almost a thousand years*

*you explain your own philosophy on this problem?*

— Well, when I said that, I was, I think, expressing the generally held view in the Pacific—it was never meant to be applied to any other region. Over the years, when regional cooperation was such a fashionable word, people said: we'll lump all these countries together because they are geographically close to each other. Or we'll force them to cooperate by allocating this amount for regional cooperation, and that amount for national development. But in the case of the Pacific, where circumstances are very much different from Africa, for instance—you know all the countries in the Pacific are in the relatively early stages of economic development—we actually had trouble trying to find viable regional projects. So you have a situation whereby countries are putting forward projects which, strictly speaking, should really be from a country allocation, but trying to give it some kind of regional connotation in order to activate the regional fund. Well, I don't think it was meant to be like that at all, and if there was any fault at all, I think it was in the original assumption that there was a need for this much expenditure in regional cooperation, and only a small expenditure on national allocation.

► *More generally speaking, how do you see your country's own future, both in terms of domestic development and of its relationships with other Pacific countries, and the ACP-EEC context as a whole?*

— That's really several questions. But firstly, I think that relations with the EEC are trade relations. We value our trade relations more than the aid which we get from the EDF, and it's really up to us to find ways of increasing our production, our quality control, pay attention to these in order to be able to export to Europe to try and balance our trade a bit. I think if you drive around Tonga, and see the things that we are doing, you'll find that we're probably one of the few ACP countries which manages to sell their machinery to Europe—something which we are actually terribly proud of.

As for Tonga's position within the region, I think you'll find that Tonga used to be a very important and influential country in the region, because of its unique history, which has become not so terribly important, and not so influential after the Second World War. I think that the most any country can do, or the most important role of any government, is to manage the economy well, and avoid making spectacular promises, and certainly avoid trying to keep them, having made them! I distrust spectacular progress in development, of deliberately planned steps in a country's life. So, as long as one can ensure at least a slight increase in prosperity, as long as people are confident that their life savings are not going to be wiped out because of some stupid economic policy, or borrowing too much, or borrowing more than one can afford, or being forced to devalue one's currency... as long as the people know that they are



*Crown Prince Tupouto'a at the signing of the Lomé II indicative programme with Mr M. Hauswirth, Deputy Director-General for Development (left) and Mr J. Sylvain, EIB Co-Manager for ACP-OCT Operations*

not going to lose anything in the future and that actually there is every possibility of increasing their wealth, however slightly, they will have confidence in the economy—which is a very important step in implementing your development projects.

► *So you are looking not just for political stability, but also for economic stability and a slow but sure pace of development?*

— I think spectacular progress is something that—I'm sure it happens—is quite rare. And I think that politicians and government ministers have a responsibility not to allow their rhetoric to run away with them.

► *In what main sectors of the economy do you see steady progress possible?*

— It will appear in the future that the manufacturing sector would have the highest rate of growth. But that's only because it started from a much lower level. Although agriculture is also very important, it must keep pace with demand. It does appear to us that for a small island country, isolated from its markets, being an agricultural exporter is not really all that viable.

► *Will the opening up of the outer islands, notably through the new domestic airline, bring about developments in the tourism sector?*

— Well, I hope so. But let me tell you that the government has had to be dragged screaming and kicking into the airline business. We never wanted to go into it at all, as our record will

show. It's merely a measure of our frustration—desperation, if you like—because of the terribly bad services we had from commercial airlines. I don't really blame them, because it's always a bit of a marginal operation. Commercial companies always started off with trying to run routes on a shoe-string budget, being perhaps a little overcautious. And so every single one of them has been undercapitalized. So we have to capitalize our airline, the government airline, properly, so that we can at least have a fifty-fifty chance of not losing money. But if you look around the world today the airline business is not one of the most profitable, and very few airlines actually are profitable. So we've actually been forced to go into this airline.

► *Could you say a few words about how the economy performed under the previous development plan and what the main guidelines are in the new development plan?*

— Firstly, development planning, I suppose, is a little bit like being pregnant, in that you can never be a little bit planned. You either have a planned economy, or you don't. In this respect, we haven't actually kept absolutely to the development plan, because circumstances—natural disasters, devaluation of currencies of our neighbours, strong US\$ etc. all these things seem to have contrived not to allow us to implement fully what we had planned. I don't think that our economic progress should be judged according to how we succeed in relation to the plan. But I think the economy is recovering ... should I say the

economy is recovering in spite of the plan, rather than because of it!

► *Other possible ventures seem to be, on the one hand, the potential of sea resources—be they mineral or oil or seaweed—or, on the other, "off-shore" banking for which an act has recently been passed. When can we expect this potential to be exploited?*

— All these things are, first of all, merely businesses, and one policy which our Government has is that we don't believe in subsidies of any kind. Having said that, of course, I can reel off about two or three subsidies... but never mind. I think that the problem with developing those is being able to get together the right people who are good managers, people who are familiar with the international capital market; people who can negotiate land, marketing, processing, etc. and forget about such buzz-words as localization, which I certainly don't believe in at all. I don't think one should employ people merely because they're your own nationals. Of course it's nice, but you have to start off with the expertise, and if you don't have the expertise, you have to employ foreigners, which Tonga has no problem with at all.

► *What is the outlook for young Tongans? Is there a problem with unemployment, or with answering the aspirations of the young Tongans for the near, and not-so-near, future?*

— Well, let us refer to the historical perspective. I suppose you can say that Tonga's population has remained steady over the past ten years or so, because of emigration. But, in a very practical sense, of course, you can't increase the amount of land available: yes, you can improve agricultural methods in order to increase output. But a growing young unemployed population is certainly not unique to Tonga—Europe knows all about that. There really isn't any other solution except that they must be invited to work terribly, terribly hard.

► *But Tonga has this possible way out: emigration, and the remittances of migrant workers seem to be quite important for the economy.*

— Yes, but then Europeans also emigrate to Australia... o

Interview by R.D.B.



## Maintaining handicraft traditions

*It is generally recognized that Tonga produces some of the finest handicrafts of the South Pacific, whether pandanus crafts, tapa cloth, wood carvings or jewellery. As Tonga makes its transition to a money economy, handicraft sales are providing a regular income for many families. They also reflect the relationship of Tongans with both the land and the sea, which provide them with the materials for their craftsmanship. The following article, highlighting in particular pandanus crafts and tapa cloth, is based on a brochure on Tongan handicrafts prepared for the Kingdom by the Australian Development Assistance Bureau.*

In the cool hours of the early morning in the villages of Tonga, one often hears the pounding of tapa makers. Traditional crafts are still a vital part of the islands' society. They play a central role in funerals and weddings, in gift-giving and celebration. Almost every young woman growing up in the Kingdom learns how to weave and paint tapa at her mother's knee. Learning these skills is part of the routine of life.

In Tonga such things as heredity, blood relationships, background and rank are still of real importance. It was the wise and beloved Queen Salote, mother of the present King, who set up committees to record and safeguard Tongan history and Tongan traditions, such as music, dancing and

the making of handicrafts. She herself composed and played her own music, wrote poetry and encouraged the wearing of traditional dress.

She stressed the need for preserving welcome ceremonies and hospitality, and fostered the training of special people with the responsibility of safeguarding the best of Tongan traditional life.

Although many of the islands are of coral origin, several are volcanic and very fertile, with luxuriant crops. Conditions are ideal for the flourishing of paper mulberry, breadfruit and pandanus trees, so there is plenty of material for the plaiting of mats and the making of tapa cloth.

As the majority of the people live in

a multitude of small villages, they play and work communally, sharing their skills and thus producing traditional Tongan tapa, mats, jewellery, carvings, etc., of excellent quality and artistic taste. Tongan social and ceremonial occasions are usually a time of feasting and a time for exchanging gifts, and this has encouraged the retaining of ancient skills and the maintaining of the finest of handicraft traditions. But there is a growing interest by Tongans in producing handicrafts for general sale now that it is realized there is a demand for them outside Tonga. Generally they are restricted to what they can grow and make within the home, the village or the community, and seldom is any piece duplicated. Handicrafts may appear identical, but close inspection will reveal a number of slight differences that prove each piece to be unique.


Thus in Tonga the beauty of the South Pacific is recaptured in the work of the people. Still using ancient methods, skilled fingers create intricate and finely woven mats, hats and baskets; craftsmen cut, chisel and smooth the finely grained woods; happy women chant as they beat and decorate the tapa cloths. Raw materials are stripped from the abundant native trees, prepared, dried and used; the juices of seeds and bark are boiled to colour and decorate and adhesive comes from roots and tubers.

### Pandanus and the crafts it serves

The pandanus palm is cultivated widely in Tonga. It is tough, durable and pliable. With it the Tongans weave fine mats, baskets, table settings, handbags, toys and even soft clothing—all of such fine craftsmanship that Tongans of high birth treasure them to the point of passing them down through the family.

These weaving skills produce handcrafted products often so precise in their finish that they are sometimes mistaken for machine-made items. Of course, they are not. Tongan handicrafts are made by hand with personal effort and pride, much skill and time.

When the living pandanus leaf is ready it is cut close to the ground. It is then stripped of the sharp thorns along



Tonga Visitors Bureau

*"Large baskets, such as laundry containers, are usually woven on to a core of coconut ribs"*

the two edges and the centre rib down the back of each leaf. There are several ways in which the material is now prepared. Often the leaf is boiled in water for a few minutes, then bleached to a very light shade by immersing it in sea water and drying it in the sun. Other leaves may be matured in the dark under a house or in the shade in order to darken the material.

Each style of pandanus has its special use. The finest, such as *kie*, becomes, after a long process of treatment, a gleaming white product called *fihu*. The threads of this type are so fine that an almost silken white cloth is produced when it is woven.

*Paonga* is the name given to the dark, chocolate-brown strands seen in the *fala tui* mat. This type of mat has long-wearing qualities as it is double-woven. The underside is of fairly wide strips often in light *tofua* colouring. The top side is usually woven with narrow strips. The dark *paonga* is used as a background to the lighter pandanus worked into the delicate patterns of the design, or vice versa. Today some really fine circular floor mats are available.

Many types of basket are made in Tonga. Large baskets, such as laundry containers, are usually woven on to a core of coconut ribs. This gives the basket the necessary solidity. Shopping baskets and handbags are usually plaited, but some are woven; in some, the basic pandanus weaving is covered with tapa. Most items, such as trays, waste-paper baskets, fruit and flower baskets, are woven over coconut leaf ribs. Other items made from woven pandanus are slippers and animal toys. Hats, in a number of attractive shapes, dolls and belts are usually made of plaited pandanus.

The women weavers of Tonga are highly imaginative. Under the stimulus of growing overseas interest in their skills, some are creative far beyond ordinary craftsmanship. Yet all their work remains within a generic style which is probably dictated by the basic materials employed: the pandanus and coconut trees of Tonga.

## Tapu making

Tapu cloth is made and used throughout Tonga. It is made from the paper mulberry (*Broussonetia papyri-*

*fera*), which is grown on the more fertile soils of the higher islands. Called *hiapo* in Tonga, this plant provides two particular varieties, *Lau Mahae-hae* and *Lau Ma'opo'opo*, for the making of tapu. The whole cloth is known as *ngatu* because Tongans use the word tapu for the undecorated border only. The *ngatu* is always handmade and remains an important component in the social life of the Kingdom. For such events as a wedding, a royal occasion or a funeral, large amounts of this handmade cloth are necessary as gifts.

When they are mature, the slim



*Giving the final touch to a large tapu. "For such events as a wedding, a royal occasion or a funeral, large amounts of this handmade cloth are necessary as gifts"*

mulberry trees are cut near the ground and the bark is removed. This consists of a rough outer bark and a fine inner bark. These are allowed to dry for a day or two and the outer bark can then be easily peeled away. The inner bark, approximately 2 metres long by 10 centimetres wide, is beaten upon a long anvil, the *tutua*, with an oblong mallet of ironwood called an *ike*. The *ike* is a four-sided beater, sometimes of toa wood, with a rounded handle. Three of its sides have varied widths of longitudinal grooves for the preliminary steps in the beating of the bark fibres. The fourth side is smooth for

the final beating which will felt the material together.

When the bark is beaten out to about 45 centimetres, the women take two of the widths and place them one on top of the other. The more ragged top-ends are folded inwards, making four thicknesses. The more even base-ends remain at two thicknesses. They are felted together by further beating on the *tutua* to become one strong and supple length of fine cloth called *feta'aki*. The *feta'aki* are then pasted into long strips, later measured and marked as *langanga*. Length after length of these *langanga* are rubbed down over *kupesi* tablets. A *kupesi* tablet is often formed by sewing with *sennit* (coconut fibre) over the flexible mid rib, the *tui'aniu*, taken from the coconut palm frond, in order to fix it to a base called *papa*. This base, which can be a matting made from plaited or woven pandanus, thus becomes an uneven surface on which the tapu is placed to get a rubbing. These *kupesi* provide the design of the tapu.

The glue used in tapu or *ngatu* making is obtained from the half-cooked and peeled tubers of the tavioka (manioc root) or the arrowroot (*Tacca pinatifida*). The women rub the juice over the tapu, then smooth the edges to be joined by rubbing firmly with a dampened tamping cloth made from a piece of *feta'aki* material.

As the large tapu is continuously stretched, glued, rubbed and pulled forward by a team of women sitting on each side of the *kupesi* board, the *kupesi* patterns are rubbed up with coconut husk fibres or with tamping cloths of *feta'aki* impregnated with vegetable dye. The designs are repeated in horizontal bands for the entire length. After the cloth is bonded together it is allowed to dry in the sun, but it is not yet finished. At this point the final free-hand artwork is done. The tapu makers accentuate and fill in the various designs with strong colours. The dyes used come from the red juice of the inner bark of the mangrove, the black kernels of the candlenut, etc. Obtaining the required colours is a long and painstaking process and much patience is needed.

Tongan tapu cloth is firm yet flexible. It comes mostly in warm brown colours but some cloth is bright with richer colours highlighted in stark black. ○

## EEC-Tonga cooperation

By Steffen STENBERG (\*)

The first time Europeans ever sighted any of the islands of the Tongan archipelago was in 1616, when a Dutch expedition crossed the Pacific to the East Indies. The early relations between the Kingdom of Tonga and Europe recall famous names like those of James Cook and William Bligh of the *Bounty*. The Kingdom of Tonga, which became a constitutional monarchy in 1875, signed a treaty of friendship with Britain in 1900. In 1958 a new treaty of friendship was signed between the Kingdom of Tonga and Britain, but in 1970 Tonga celebrated its re-entry to the comity of Nations and joined the Commonwealth.

With this historical background, it was natural for Tonga and the EEC to reconfirm the links through the Lomé Convention, which Tonga joined in 1975.

In terms of financial contribution under the Lomé Convention, the Kingdom of Tonga received ECU 3.2 million under Lomé I and ECU 4.1 m under Lomé II. In addition, Tonga has received emergency aid totalling ECU 1.6 m, loans from the European Investment Bank for the Tonga Development Bank, amounting to ECU 2 m, and STABEX transfers of ECU 5.2 m.

By May 1985 the European Community had provided Tonga with a total of ECU 16.1 m.

### Lomé I (1975-1980)

The Indicative Programme of financial aid under Lomé I for Tonga amounted to ECU 3.2 m, of which ECU 3.1 m was in the form of a grant.

The development problems of Tonga are greater than those of many other developing countries, due to a series of constraints:

- great distances from major markets;
- wide dispersion of the islands in-

side the Kingdom, which leads to a widely dispersed and fragmented domestic market and high transport costs;

- dependency for export earnings upon a few agricultural products (bananas, coconut products), which in turn leads to dependency on world market prices;
- vulnerability to natural disasters.


The Indicative Programme of Lomé I reflects the development potential of Tonga, giving main emphasis to productive sectors like fisheries, agricul-

ture, manufacturing and the overall problem of communication.

Vava'u is a group of islands north of Tongatapu and the capital Nuku'alofa. Vava'u is a major producer of copra and vanilla, as well as the second tourist destination in Tonga, and requires special attention to the efficiency of the transport system. The financing of the wharf in Neiafu, Vava'u (ECU 1.0 m) was made in order to ensure safe and economic handling of the in-and-out flow of passengers and goods. By contributing to the economic growth of Vava'u, the drift of population from the outer islands like Vava'u to Tongatapu and particularly to the capital, Nuku'alofa should be eased. This urban drift is not only a problem for the outer islands but also for the capital.

The Tongan economy is largely based on agriculture and the manufacturing sector is very small. In order to provide new sources of medium- to long-term finance to meet the planned growth in these sectors, the establishment of an institution like a development bank became crucial. The European Development Fund therefore financed a line of credit of ECU 130 000 to the Tonga Development Bank to provide it with additional resources for financing the technical assistance requirements of local small and medium-sized industries. This line of credit proved to be a good multiplier project, not only because it helped to get TDB off the ground, but also because it helped to attract the attention of

(\*) Principal administrator, Directorate-General for Development.



This workshop is part of the EEC's assistance to the Ministry of Public Works



Tonga received STABEX transfers totalling ECU 5.2 million (Lomé I and II) principally for copra and coconut products, bananas and vanilla (above)

<b>Lomé I (1975-1980)</b>		<i>000 ECU</i>
<b>A. National Indicative Programme</b>		
Multiannual training programme	60	
Wharves and Fisheries studies	145	
Trade promotion study	33	
Equipment for Ministry of Works	1 376	
Line of Credit to Tonga Development Bank	130	
Vava'u Wharf	1 000	
Dredging study	53	
Faua Fisheries Harbour	380	
Balance	23	
Sub-total		3 200
<b>B. Stabex</b>		
1976 Copra	832	
Bananas	73	
1978 Bananas	245	
1979 Vanilla	58	
Sub-total		1 208
<b>C. Exceptional Aid</b>		
Earthquake 1977		<u>165</u>
<b>Grand total Lomé I</b>		<b>4 573</b>

<b>Lomé II (1980-1985)</b>		<i>000 ECU</i>
<b>A. National Indicative Programme</b>		
Faua Fisheries Harbour	2 920	
Unallocated	1 180	
Sub-total		4 100
<b>B. Stabex</b>		
1980 Coconut products	602	
1982 Copra	1 685	
Coconut	392	
Bananas	223	
Desiccated coconut	365	
1983 Copra products	733	
Bananas	11	
Sub-total		4 011
<b>C. Exceptional Aid</b>		
Hurricane Isaac 1982		1 400
<b>D. European Investment Bank</b>		
2 loans to Kingdom of Tonga and to Tonga Development Bank		<u>2 000</u>
<b>Grand total Lomé II</b>		<b>11 511</b>

other investors, like the European Investment Bank.

In order to ensure the implementation of—in particular—development projects, the EDF financed the purchase of equipment for the Ministry of Works (ECU 1.43 m). The project aimed at reducing investments costs, as well as reducing bottlenecks, as construction and maintenance were often delayed because of frequent breakdowns of equipment in use.

The value of the exports of copra, bananas and vanilla make up 60-70% of the total export earnings, these depending primarily on world market prices, and secondly on the quantity exported. The scheme for the stabilization of export earnings (STABEX) is therefore of major importance to Tonga. Tonga received STABEX transfers for copra, bananas and vanilla in 1976, 1978 and 1979, totalling ECU 1.2 m.

Finally, Tonga was granted exceptional aid of about ECU 200 000 for the repair of damage to schools and hospitals following an earthquake in 1977.

### Lomé II (1980-1985)

The Indicative Programme of Lomé II for Tonga was ECU 4.1 m, all in the form of grants. The major part of this programme was used to promote one of Tonga's biggest potentials in terms of development: fisheries. Generally speaking, the resources of the South

Pacific have so far not been exploited by the people who inhabit the area, but by the major fishery nations of the world. The islanders have stayed relatively close to the shore, largely because they lacked both the techniques and equipment to fish the deeper reserves close by or the surface fish further away, and also lacked the means to land fish and conserve it in significant quantities. With this background and in order to diversify its economy, Tonga has embarked upon a fisheries development programme. This programme includes boat-building and repair services, training, extension services, marketing and infrastructure.

Fish has always been an important staple food in Tonga, but due to lack of port and cool-storage facilities, very little fish moves into Nuku'alofa's under-supplied market. By tradition, fish is landed at the most convenient point and sold by fishermen directly to the consumers in a very short space of time. In Nuku'alofa, fishing boats often do not even reach the shore but fishermen sell their product offshore from their boats. The result is that in good weather there might be sufficient fish, and during poor weather there is a shortage. Overall supply does not meet demand by a long way and large quantities of canned and frozen fish are imported as a source of protein.

With the purpose of encouraging fishing as a commercial venture and to


help satisfy the demand in the capital for locally-caught fish, the European Development Fund financed the construction of Faua small boat fishing harbour in Nuku'alofa, with fish market and cold storage facilities. The total cost of the project is ECU 3.3 m, of which ECU 2.9 m is from Lomé II and the balance from Lomé I.

On the night of 2/3 March, 1982, Hurricane *Isaac* passed through Tonga and wrought enormous damage. A wind of about 150 km an hour, increasing to 200 km an hour, blew down coconut trees, severely damaged crops and destroyed or severely damaged about 20% of the housing stock. Tonga was granted ECU 1.4 m as EEC emergency aid, which was used to purchase materials to construct 1 000 low-cost hurricane relief houses. Tonga received STABEX transfers for bananas and coconut products in the years 1980, 1982 and 1983, totalling ECU 4 m. The STABEX transfers for 1982 reflected the damage to crops caused by Hurricane *Isaac*.

In the Lomé II period, the European Investment Bank has granted substantial loans to the Tonga Development Bank. In two steps, the first in 1981, the second in 1983, EIB provided ECU 800 000 to the Kingdom of Tonga in order to increase the latter's shareholding in TDB, and ECU 1.2 m to TDB in order to help provide credit to local small and medium-sized enterprises. ○

S.S.

# WESTERN SAMOA



W. S. Visitors Bureau

*The new Fale Fono or Parliament House, home to Western Samoa's lively politics*

## Matai country on the threshold of recovery

The world famous author of such classics as "Treasure Island" and "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde", Robert Louis Stevenson—buried in 1894 on a hillside near Western Samoa's capital Apia— may have called Samoa "a simple and sunny heaven" in his time; today the modern world has caught up with this Pacific "paradise" and added a new dimension.

Now, in the 1980s, life in the villages may still look simple, but Samoan politics, certainly in recent years, are by no means simple. The sunshine is definitely there still—to the envy of Westerners less favoured by its warmth—yet calling it a storm seems to come short of what happened to the economy: overheating followed by a collapse in the early '80s.

### "The cradle of Polynesia"

Within the whole of the South Pacific region, Western Samoa occupies an almost central position, lying just east of the international dateline (GMT -11), some 2700 km north of New Zealand and about 8000 km away from mainland USA. Its relatively homogeneous population—about 90% purely Samoan—was estimated at 160 000 in 1984. Though the natural growth rate of population is high, 2.9%, the actual rate is around

0.8% only, as emigration has a cushioning effect on population pressure. In terms of geography, Western Samoa distinguishes itself from most of its neighbours: instead of a widespread archipelago, the total surface of some 2840 sq. km mainly is accounted for mainly by two larger islands Upolu (1118 sq. km) and Savaii (1708 sq. km) and seven smaller ones, only two of which are inhabited. Just over a quarter of the total population lives on Savaii, while most others live on Upolu, with a heavy concentration

To say that Western Samoa is the only Pacific country to appear—sadly enough—on both the UN's lists of least developed countries (LLDCs) and most seriously affected countries (MSAC), speaks for itself.

The present government, headed by Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana which came to power on 30 December 1982, set out on a new course termed "austerity", decided on what it felt were badly needed economic readjustments and called upon the IMF for support. Apparently the harsh cure went down well with Samoans, as in February of this year he won a landslide victory at the polls putting him in the seat to further stabilize and consolidate the economy and to make Samoa "live up to its means again".

around Apia, the capital. Generally speaking people live in the coastal areas, as the islands are of volcanic origin with rugged interiors covered by lush tropical forest and fringed by coral reefs.

Western Samoa's past—and present—cannot be separated from that of nearby American Samoa, only some 65 km away at its closest shore. Their histories are closely intertwined, as are their family links even today, and it is only by an "accident" of history that they split in 1899. In that year, the

# WESTERN SAMOA

three powers involved, the United Kingdom, Germany and the USA, made a "deal" (in which Samoans had no say) putting Western Samoa under German rule and leaving Eastern Samoa to the USA, making it, nowadays, the only US territory south of the Equator. American Samoa (seven islands with about 35 000 people) has evolved in quite a different way from its brother country with Coke, baseball, disco-music in public transport ... and the greenback which does much to help it survive, as they receive over US \$ 2000 of US "aid" per head.

Little is known of the ancient history of the Samoan Islands but Samoan myths and legends have many references to Fijian influence. Around 850 A.D., legends speak of a powerful ruler called Pili. When he died, however, his four sons started quarrelling over the size of their piece of the "cake". Around 950 A.D. the Tui Tonga conquered Samoa and ruled it for over 300 years, until Samoans finally united their forces and threw them out.

The Dutch explorer, Jacob Roggeveen was the first to discover the Samoan islands in 1722, followed later that century by French navigators such as de Bougainville. Around 1830 European missionaries started settling in, propagating their Christian message and their values of colonialism. By the mid-19th century German planters and traders were beginning to make their way to these parts of the

world, and made Apia their main centre of Pacific interests. Other Western nations showed an increasing interest in the area, the United Kingdom and the United States in particular, and managed to establish their influence by exploiting the divisions between traditional Samoan factions squabbling for power and control. Finally the three of them made the "deal" referred to above and left Western Samoa under German administration. When World War I broke out in 1914, New Zealand took over, and in 1918 Western Samoa was placed under a League of Nations mandate administered by New Zealand, becoming a UN Trust Territory in 1948. Finally, independence was gained in 1962, making Western Samoa the first independent Polynesian nation.

## Matai country


Even today "to be or not to be ... a matai" seems to be the question in Western Samoa. Though basically Polynesian—the Samoan language is believed to be the oldest form of polynesian speech in existence—the "fa'a Samoa" or Samoan way of life stands quite apart from all other societies in the Pacific by its distinctive system of chieftainships. In its pyramidal hierarchy of graded titles—mainly of two kinds, titular and orator chiefs—traditional authority is vested in so-called matai, heads of extended families or aiga. All such aiga, which are the basic units of life in the 362 villages and

which may comprise several Western-style families, appoint by consensus at least one matai. At present there are some 13 000 matai. These matai, in whom land ownership is vested, assume wide responsibilities for their families, be it in economic, social or political affairs. When they join at village level to form a fono or matai-council they even exercise legal powers vis-à-vis village rules.

Westerners may think of it as to some extent a system of built-in social security whereby the matai looks after the well-being of all his aiga-members. Though still deeply entrenched in Samoan customs, the whole matai structure has come under pressure: young Samoans educated abroad may hesitate to take up the "burden" of matai-ship as it entails such heavy responsibilities.

Voting in national elections is restricted to matai only: they elect (normally every three years) among themselves 45 of the 47 members of the Legislative Assembly, the remaining two being elected on the individual voters roll by universal suffrage of part-Samoans and Samoan citizens of other origin.

Within 45 days of the election, a majority in the Fono or Parliament elects, by secret ballot, the Prime Minister who then selects the other Ministers. Whereas previously one could not really talk of political parties but rather of like-minded factions of matai-representatives in the Fono, the 22



February election of this year witnessed the emergence of such parties. The present Prime Minister, Tofilau Eti, heads the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), and former Prime Minister and opposition leader, Tu-puola Efi, leads the Christian Democrats (CD), a party created only some three weeks before the last elections in which the HRPP obtained a 15-seat majority. In practice things are, however, less clear-cut and so far the matai have kept politics very lively indeed. Daily politics may now become even more polarized by the emergence of the party system and the whole political horizon may even be broadened as some leaders seem to push towards universal suffrage for all.

## Economic readjustment

“Western Samoa, like many other small and under-developed nations is at the crossroads of development. Two decades or more of economic development has given these countries some of the more obvious features of development yet the big breakthrough has eluded them and they still remain under-developed in respect of the more significant sectors of their economy. The recent sharp decline in the terms of trade of developing countries, high real interest rates, and the enhanced cost of debt servicing have sharply underpinned the need to review growth strategies or face the prospect of economic stagnation and decline. The latter prospect is even more real in those countries which have a small modern sector and an equally modern welfare system superimposed on a large semi-subsistence sector. Western Samoa today, in many respects, approximates this situation. Faced with these circumstances Western Samoa has a choice: on the one hand, we could ignore the stark facts of economic life—as we have done in the recent past—and see our standard of living and with it, our hopes and aspirations, for a better future decline, or on the other hand, we could make bold decisions and implement the policies that reduce the causes of our poverty and economic backwardness. The latter is the only responsible course as far as this Government is concerned”. This excerpt from the 1985 budget speech of the Minister of Finance, Tuilaepa Sailele, accurately sums up the present mood among Western Samoa’s deci-



Savali

*Matai or heads of extended families play a key role in Western Samoa's society*

sion-makers: no more living beyond the country’s means internally and restoring credibility with trading partners externally.

The need for economic readjustment made itself felt quite sharply: “The world economic recession of 1980-82 had a traumatic effect on the Western Samoan economy and was largely responsible for the failure of the economy to live up to the expectations embodied in the Fourth Development Plan (1980-84)” according to the Fifth Development Plan (DP5) (1985-87) assessment of the previous plan period. While DP4 put a 4.7% real GDP growth rate forward as a tar-

get, GDP in fact declined by 2.3% annually (1980-83). Real output declined and, financially speaking, Western Samoa was walking a tightrope: inflation rose to 25%, external deficits became quite sizeable, payment arrears accumulated and foreign exchange reserves dropped to a critically low level covering only some two weeks of imports. As Minister Sailele put it, “the balance of payments got into the worst situation ever since independence!” In those early '80s the country could hardly pay for the oil imports needed to keep the economy going, for lack of foreign exchange, and the oil companies tightened the screw by demanding to hear the sound of cash upon delivery...

What does a country do in the face of such financial troubles? ... One of the few ways out to support one’s own national readjustment efforts is to turn to the IMF. This is what Western Samoa did, thus becoming probably the only South Pacific country to call upon the Fund’s stand-by loan agreements. Austerity and cutbacks soon became familiar to Western Samoa. New duties and taxes were introduced, government expenditure was restrained, imports restricted and the tala <sup>(1)</sup>, Western Samoa’s national currency, was devalued several times. The tala ceased, in fact, to be tied to the New Zealand dollar on 1 March of this year and its value is now determined by reference to a basket com-



The Courier

**Tuilaepa Sailele**  
*Minister of Finance*

(1) Western Samoa’s currency is the tala (WS \$) subdivided in 100 sene; 1 ECU = WS \$ 1.82 — August 1985.

# WESTERN SAMOA



Sevalli



Sevalli

*The new 1985-87 Development Plan stresses the strengthening and expansion of the two major tree crops, coconut and cocoa, as the most immediate task*

posed of currencies of its main trading partners. The new policies started paying off and previously negative trends were gradually reversed: by 1983 the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP had been cut back to only 2.2%, down from a high 16.2% in 1981; real GDP growth at last showed signs of improvement, picking up by 0.5% in 1983 and 2.2% in 1984; inflation was brought down to 12% last year. The politics of austerity achieved the much desired economic turnaround and, as Kolone Vaai, Financial Secretary, remarked with a touch of satisfaction, "Foreign exchange reserves were built up again to about WS \$ 32 million representing close to four months' worth of imports". Debt service payments as high as 61% of exports of goods and services and a total outstanding external debt representing 80% of GDP at end-1984 still represent a cloud on the economic horizon.

## A dominant primary sector

The state of health of Western Samoa's economy is largely determined by the performance of its primary sector which accounts for about half of GDP, produces directly or is the basis for 90% of all exports and provides a livelihood for about 70% of the population. Subsistence agriculture plays a key role in this sector, hence the importance of the aiga or extended family-unites and of the rural villages in general. Apart from producing enough to meet their own needs they have been increasingly able to produce surpluses and the participate more and

more in the cash economy by supplying produce like taro, bananas, fish, fruits and vegetables to the local market. They also play a role, of course, in terms of production for export but in this field one's attention gets more drawn to the operation of WSTEC, the government-owned Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation. These old German plantations were seized after the First World War and today constitute the largest single productive entity in the country, controlling about 30 000 acres or 20% of the country's total cultivated area, and the main commercial supplier in the export sector. Operating 13 plantations and four cattlefarms, WSTEC is mainly involved in coconut, cocoa and to a far lesser extent, coffee production. "A clear weakness has been WSTEC productivity upon which so much hope has been placed for future major increases in export production... Recognizing that a long gestation period is involved in much of WSTEC's development activities, there are few signs to show that WSTEC is prised to realise its potential in the immediate future and contribute significantly towards increasing exports". If WSTEC's performance so far has been disappointing, still according to the DP4 review, one should bear in mind that WSTEC is now rehabilitating a great many existing plantations and trying to develop new areas for cultivation. It will, therefore, take more time to consolidate these efforts before the Corporation finally responds to the hopes placed in it. Agriculture Director Tupuola Tavita, for instance, stressed "the importance of WSTEC's

effort for trying out new coconut hybrids as their field trials have shown that their productivity could be four times higher than that of the normal local coconut species, which bears only after five years as against only three years for the new hybrids".

In terms of exports, coconut products constitute the leading revenue earners while other major exports are taro, cocoa, timber and veneer, bananas, beer and cigarettes. In 1984 all exports totalled a value of WS \$ 33.7 million, up by almost 32% against the 1983 total of WS \$ 25.5 million. Of this 1984 total, coconut products represented WS \$ 23 million with WS \$ 20.8 million for coconut oil (Western Samoa ceased exports of copra to process it locally), WS \$ 0.6 million for coconut meal and WS \$ 1.7 million for coconut cream.

Most of these agro-based exports have known their ups and downs in terms of local production and marketing, but they also make the country very vulnerable by its dependence on world commodity price fluctuations.

Coconut oil prices, for instance,—fortunately for Western Samoa in this case—went from a low average annual price of US \$ 464 per metric tonne in 1982 to US \$ 1176 in 1984. In fact, compared to 1983, Western Samoa exported last year 1700 metric tonnes less of its main export coconut oil (only 10 500 metric tonnes in 1984) but considerably improved prices made earnings rise by 87.5% over the previous year.

Due to bad weather conditions, cocoa exports fell by 62% down to only



703 tons last year and despite better prices they earned only WS \$ 2.4 million against WS \$ 4.2 million in 1983. Cocoa production, therefore, seems to be continuing its downward trend—production still averaged about 5 000 tons some 15-20 years ago—mostly due to a failure to replace aged cocoa trees. The agricultural census planned under DP5 will, among other things, allow government to assemble the necessary data to plan future restoration and possible expansion of cocoa production.

Bananas are not doing nearly so well and DP5 even states that “judging from current performance it seems doomed as an export crop”. “A combination of low prices and high costs of inputs have made their production barely economical” felt Agriculture Director Tupuola Tavita. Bananas registered the worst export performance in 1984, their 22 191 exported cartons brought in only WS \$ 0.16 million, whereas in 1983, 84 479 cartons still raised WS \$ 0.58 million in export earnings.

In the past six or seven years taro—a rootcrop popular as a staple food among Polynesians—has responded well to increased demand, particularly in New Zealand and Hawaii, its production benefiting locally from low costs and from suffering from fewer diseases than in most other Pacific countries. Though future expansion will remain limited because markets are, last year it still earned a welcome WS \$ 3.6 million making it the second single best export earner then after coconut oil. As the Minister of Economic Affairs, Pule Lameko, pointed out: “It may be very worthwhile exploring possibilities for further processing of taro, such as producing taro flour, taro chips, etc..., and trying to explore other markets such as Australia and mainland USA, the latter by using our close links with American Samoa”.

Passion fruit production has known rapid expansion; its juice is supposed to be an aid to slimming, a trend on which Western Samoa was able to cash in.

Producing coffee of the robusta type also seems to raise much hope and over the next few years planted acreage will be increased in order to raise production but, though the po-

tential is there, the new Development Plan clearly stresses the strengthening and expansion of the two major tree crops, coconut and cocoa, as the most immediate task.

Meat imports have surged in recent years as local meat production, particularly of beef and poultry, comes short of meeting local demand. Although Western Samoa has the smallest EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) of the Pacific—only 37 000 sq. miles—there is a great deal of tuna fish in its waters. The whole of the fisheries sector has in fact experienced rapid growth with total fish catch having doubled over the past five years to reach about 3 200 tonnes (1983) of which 2 300 tonnes of tuna. Imports of fish and fish products have therefore dropped and Government is keen on promoting import substitution even further by properly “harvesting” its sea.

Despite a major bush fire on Savaii in 1983, destroying over 1700 hectares of forest, Western Samoa has made much progress over the past few years with its reforestation schemes, with assistance mainly from New Zealand and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Not only did the rate of commercial exploitation increase considerably, but forests were also cut down to clear land for agricultural purposes. At that rate of removal estimates show that Western Samoa's indigenous wood resources would be depleted by 1995. So replanting programmes were quickly pushed forward in order to fight deforestation and subsequent problems of water conservation, and also to continue being able in future supplying the domestic market with sawn timber as well as exporting timber.



The Courier

**Pule Lameko**  
*Minister of Economic Affairs*

## Industry and energy

Industry makes only a modest contribution (about 6%) to Western Samoa's GDP. Some expansion has taken place, particularly in the area of import substitution and extended local processing of raw materials, but according to Economic Affairs Director Hans Kruse, “Constraints such as the small market size and the difficulty of competing with others when facing high freight rates due to relative isolation, constitute real bottlenecks for further growth”. Currently some 1500 people are employed in this sector.

Over half of the manufacturing sector is concentrated in the food, beverage and tobacco sector. Apart from a veneer mill, the most important industrial venture under the previous Plan period was the establishment of Samoa Coconut Products Ltd. This coconut oil mill was financed by New Zealand, the ADB and Government and has a capacity of processing 22 500 long tons of copra per year (1 long ton or 1 016 kg of copra, when processed, turns out about 60% oil, 30% cake and 10% waste). Recently the EEC funded the expansion of the mill's storage capacity. As Ernesto Bauzon, Manager of the mill, underlined: “Considerable benefits were derived from this mill as it generated extra foreign exchange income and created almost 100 permanent jobs, going up to 140 in peak periods”. Western Samoa normally has little difficulty in selling its high quality oil: the price it gets is another matter, however, determined largely on commodity markets like London, Rotterdam, Hamburg and Chicago. “If, way back, in Apia we want to go into the market at a good price—which varies almost by the hour—availability of freight capacity poses a major obstacle to seizing the opportunity” Mr Bauzon felt.

In terms of energy, Western Samoa succeeded in making a great step forward towards self-sufficiency by putting great emphasis on hydro-based electricity generation. “The state of our economy and in particular of our foreign exchange reserves in the early '80s, and the availability of an indigenous source of energy, water, dictated our priority interest for hydro-power” explained John Worrall, General Manager of the Electricity Power Corpora-



Savali

*The Government is cautious about tourism development as it does not want the country's way of life socially or culturally disrupted*

tion (EPC), a statutory government-owned body. Several hydro-schemes were launched with considerable EEC assistance, in order to cut down the oil imports bill. It is targetted in another three years' time to be reliant on indigenous power, mainly hydro-power but also supplemented by a wood fired power station, initially to be fuelled by senile coconut trees, later by scrap fuel and newly planted eucalyptus. "Three years ago, 25% of all our oil petroleum imports were used for generating power, and 80% of that power came from diesels; today only about 6% of all our imported oil petroleum products are used for generating power and only 20% of our power still comes from diesel engines" stressed Mr Worrall, not failing to remark, however, that, due to a few devaluations, "those 6% now cost us almost as much as the 25% in the old days..." Even if Western Samoa's hydro-schemes are both particular—there are no dams or holding back of the water, only the flow of the rivers is used in the wet season—and expensive—a tough environment with porous volcanic soils, small rivers and a lot of bedload sometimes blocking the turbines—last year's foreign exchange savings already topped WS \$ 3.3 million and the coming on stream of the Sauniatu scheme will raise this to close to WS \$ 5 million. In order to tap its hydro potential even more, a new project is now under consideration involving a new approach for Western Samoa: the Afimalu Pump Assisted Storage Hydro Scheme. A small dam would be built high up in the mountains; in the wet season, surplus hydro energy at times of overcapacity, for instance during the night, would be used to pump up

water and store it in a 5 million cubic metre reservoir; in the dry season the reservoir would be tapped to generate hydro-power, thus trying to phase out the seasonal differences in energy supply and reducing reliance on diesel power even further.

### Controlling the growth of tourism

"We don't want to put all our eggs in a tourism basket, but we do want a controlled growth and development of our tourism" felt Vensel Margraff, Chief Tourism Officer. Though firmly believing in the potential of this sector—which now represents some 6% of GDP—Government does not want the way of life of Polynesia's cradle socially or culturally disrupted. Mr Margraff estimated gross tourism revenue at about WS \$ 5 million for 1984, but one has to bear in mind an import component of about 50%. "So far this sector has been heavily reliant on assistance from the international community, be it the UNDP and WTO who assisted us with a 10-year Tourism Master Plan, or the EEC in terms of promotion, for instance at the Berlin Tourism Fair or the Sydney Travel Show, or in a regional context through the Tourism Council of the South Pacific" outlined Mr Margraff, though leaving some doubts as to the regional approach... "We are all at such different stages of tourism development, with such different priorities...". While one of the main international hotels was privatized only recently, a new one is now—at last, after being in the pipeline for almost 10 years—under construction, thanks to a package of incentives to a US hotel group: the

Royal Samoan Hotel, with an initial 250-bed capacity. Some tourist operators already established look on this new development with a worried eye, not least Aggie Grey, famous since she started a hamburger stand which became very popular in World War II among US servicemen, and now running her own, almost legendary, hotel. Tourism-related developments, apart from the obvious need to improve on imports leakages, are mainly in the field of access and transport: the upgrading of the Faleolo airport to take bigger aircraft and, of course, better services by air carriers, be it the national one, Polynesian Airlines, or others. Most visitors (totalling 36 700 in 1983) now come from American Samoa (38.7% of the 1983 total), though this is a sort of "domestic" tourism; other main tourism markets are New Zealand, North America (USA and Canada) and Australia. New Zealand has a big "ethnic" market, but air fares seem somewhat prohibitive. One really wonders whether in the Pacific flying doesn't go by a somewhat modified adage: ours not to reason why, ours but to pay and fly...


### The primary goal: increasing production

Having come to grips with economic reality, Western Samoa's authorities have put a firm hand on the tiller to steer the country in a new direction, while preserving and building on its traditional matai system. In the near future they will continue to rely as heavily as up to now on foreign aid and on remittances from Samoans abroad, which traditionally offset a good deal of the country's classic trade deficit (WS \$ 52.9 million in 1983, but remittances totalled WS \$ 31.5 million). At least the country of the "Tusitala" or "teller of tales" as they called R.L. Stevenson, no longer believes in economic tales itself but rather in the sometimes harsh reality of readjusting and tightening the belt in hopes of better times. Better times which all feel will only come when the heart of the problem is solved: increased production. The awareness is clearly there that only a strategy with this as its major goal is capable of achieving a secure and stable economic climate, itself the basis for the desired long-term growth. ○ R.D.B.

## “Our main reliance is on the ability of our people to cultivate the soil”

### An interview with Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana

“On March 19, in a packed and tense Parliament, the leader of the Human Rights Protection Party, Hon. Tofilau Eti Alesana was elected unopposed as Prime Minister for the next three years. This was the first time in 14 years that a Prime Minister has been selected without parliamentary voting”. Anybody knowing how complex Western Samoa’s daily politics are, will agree that this quote from the March edition of *Savali*, the Government’s information paper, accurately describes the Prime Minister’s power base following the February elections. Indeed, Tofilau Eti, now 61, was returned to power, yet everybody knew he stood for an energetic approach to the country’s economic difficulties, putting forward austerity as the right medicine. He now has the firm intention, as he emphasized in this interview with *The Courier*, of further consolidating and stabilizing the economy after the deep slump of the past few years.



The Courier

#### “Significant signs of improvement”

► *Prime Minister, could you give me an outline of the principal tasks your government faces?*

— Well, as you perhaps know, I first took up the post of Prime Minister in late 1982. Most of my Government’s proposals for the restructuring of the economy of Western Samoa were first voiced in the Legislative Assembly when we discussed the Budget for 1983, in the course of my budget speech. I was still, then, Minister of Finance, in addition to being Prime Minister. Most of the speech was strongly related to the country’s economic restructuring measures. And it was not quickly and easily received in the House, especially by the Opposition Party. Nevertheless, the austere measures that were included in my budget speech were passed and approved. The other task I have given great attention to is how to make the country as a whole become fully aware of the reasons for the measures and to make it understood what their effect on the country’s overall economy will be. The work of 1983 and 1984 culminated in the General Election of 1985, when we first gave the test to the country to express freely, by their vote, which way they favoured—whether they favour the stagnation of our economy, or whether they favour the measures introduced by the Government. It has resulted in a remarka-

ble gain in seats in Parliament. It was quite a remarkable triumph on the part of the Government and means that my colleagues and I will continue in our work. What I emphasized in 1983/84, was that it was about time for the Government and the country, working hand in hand, to stabilize the economy. And by the end of 1984, we saw that it was well stabilized. Now, with the return of my party to power, we are looking forward to a period of consolidation, to consolidate what we have achieved during the last 18 months in power. All the plans we have in mind are now geared to consolidation not only of the economy, but at the same time of the trust, the faith, and the stability of Samoa in the eyes of foreign agencies around the world, such as for example, the EEC, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the various United Nations technical organs. And I have seen the effect of this because it was shown through the response of world agencies to work hand in hand with Western Samoa with our effort to consolidate our economy.

To sum up our plans for the future: we are not thinking of re-introducing new harsh measures. I think it is about time for us to keep to the tune that we had been introducing in 1983/84, and at the same time looking at the possibility of showing the people that, because of their support, the economy has now shown significant signs of im-

provement. This was portrayed in the area of our foreign exchange earnings. When we came into power our international debt was substantial and the country was not in any position at all to pay these debts. Now all those debts and other related international debts are wiped out completely, and we have earned a foreign exchange reserve of about 30 million—which is still, I feel, a very insignificant sum if we compare it to the future demand by the country for more imports. I am also seriously worried about world commodity prices, because if ever the US\$ becomes slightly slumped from its present exchange rate, commodity prices for most of our exports will be seriously affected.

► *Given that possibility, will you then try to promote more agricultural production?*

— Exactly, yes. I am thinking of offering more incentives and also of attracting more support through the understanding of the community as a whole, so that the government is not working alone in this. It has to be given support in that area, and I am planning to introduce legislation to enable the responsibility now being undertaken by the Government for many years in the past, to be decentralized, giving some recognition to the utilization of the authority vested upon the traditional chiefs and orators, as well as the women’s committees, in the outlying areas. I did, in fact, discuss this with

the Rural Development and Internal Affairs Committee we have established, and also with the Attorney-General. I hope that the coming session of Parliament will be the time to discuss such legislation, because the earlier the better, and I really would like to encompass the whole country into supporting this philosophy. I believe that the support will be there, if more explanation was given to the people on how badly their assistance was needed by the Government.

### **Emphasis on hydro-electricity**

► *In the past two years you have put considerable emphasis in your policies on the development of hydro-electricity. Does the Government intend to continue this emphasis?*

— Yes. The main reason is obviously that it would assist us immensely in our drive to make great savings in foreign exchange. You may be fully aware that up until 1981, about 80% of energy production was oil-based. This year, already, a reduction to 30% is foreseen. So this is something for which we are very thankful to the EEC, because with their assistance, we managed to have the Samasoni hydro-power scheme, as well as the nearly-completed Sauniatu project. When this goes on stream in the very near future, I believe that there would be another drastic reduction in the use of oil as a means of generating energy. So we are strongly appreciative of assistance from the EEC in this field. But I have the feeling that under the Lomé III Convention, the sum earmarked for Western Samoa should be spread to include water supply for drinking purposes, because I have a very strong prediction that water supply could be broken down in the country, maybe in another four to five years.

Another area in which I am now seriously considering introducing legislation in the coming session of Parliament is the conservation of our forests, because right now there is a flagrant over-utilization of our forests. At present intending planters are cutting down the forest not knowing that the immense amount of trees they fell will reduce considerably the amount of water withholding into the earth.

### **More self-participation**

► *Can you also tell us a little about your rural development programmes?*

— Well, emphasis is still continuing on the increase of diversified agricultural crops. Our agricultural sector is mostly geared to copra production and cocoa. But attention must be given to the introduction of other crops—crops that are known already to be viable, such as avocados, which are not yet regarded commercially as another good, exportable commodity, and limes, although they grow abundantly here. There are various other crops which could be grown commercially. I have strengthened the powers of our Internal Affairs Department to englobe rural development. Now, I strongly feel that the Government should encourage more self-participation on the part of the villages, districts and individual growers, and at the same time, the Department of Internal Affairs, together with the Rural Development Committee, should not concentrate on introducing the new philosophy of the Government by words only, but at the same time with action.

In the meantime, our boat building scheme has fallen down significantly due to poor management. So we really need revitalization of that important aspect in our rural area—fishing—because it would greatly help the reduction of imports. You know that our population now stands at about 170 000. So it could easily be accommodated in a kind of programme where the Government can greatly assist, not only in the provision of the boats themselves, but at the same time, the price for those articles should be manageable by the buyers, by those who are interested. We need some assistance in that field, and any assistance that would be forthcoming in this particular field would, I believe, never be put in utilization in a way that would result in a vain effort by the Government and the donor concerned. I have had talks with the FAO representative here in Samoa. So the issue is being left in abeyance until further discussion of how the Government will restructure the management of such a project. In fact I would like to restructure management in general in order for it to become more decentralized. Hopefully, if legislation was passed, then people will come to be aware of how to meet the officials in the departments, rather than for them to come directly and see me. They


should see those who are under the level of politicians because it would be easier for them. It would also avoid political influence, and I believe the more we can avoid political involvement in decisions on the development of a country, the better the country would be. Because you know how politicians are!

► *Are you saying that Samoa may be over-politicized?*

— Well, ... I have been in politics for quite some years now, since 1957, and I know that political influence sometimes transcends the right thing to do. I don't mean to say that politicians always do wrong, you know. But there are some pertinent areas where officials should play their role before politicians step into them. Because of political rivalry, the importance of where the assistance should go sometimes gets left out. That is what I meant. I think we need more proper channels for getting things done, firstly by the officials, the heads of departments, and only after that by the politicians. So I am a believer in that, I don't want my position as Prime Minister to override the need for people to go and see the officials dealing with the matter before they take their problems up to a political level.

► *What are the prospects for the development of tourism?*

— You know that with the approval of the Government budget last year, and also for the budget of this year, we agreed that a substantial sum of money should be provided by the Government from its meagre resources in order to get more tourism development. That means that we feel that tourism is another area that we should look into to achieve a better outlook for our foreign exchange earnings. At the same time we introduced a bill into Parliament enabling an United States hotelier to establish himself here in Samoa. But, at the same time, I'm also seriously considering introducing more legislation to provide protection for the country from the possible ill effects of tourism such as the effect on customs and traditions. But all in all, I think this is the same answer that most of the South Pacific countries would give. I don't accept the theory that we should rely entirely on the tourist industry to increase our



EPC

*The coming on stream of the Sauniatu hydro-electric scheme will bring about "another drastic reduction in the use of oil as a means of generating energy"*

ability to earn foreign exchange. As I said before, our main reliance is on the ability of our people to cultivate the soil.

## Between Samoans

► *How would you describe your relationship with American Samoa?*

— This was another focal point of mine when I took over as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. I thought that only through further negotiations between American Samoa and Western Samoa, not as an American territory and an independent state, but as Samoans to another Samoan group of people, would more understanding be created. The people of American Samoa have greater access to the United States, and we have greater access to the European Economic Community in comparison with American Samoa. So I thought that it would be advantageous to both sides. At the same time some restrictions have been placed by the American Samoan authorities banning the free visits of people from Western Samoa to American Samoa. I think there should not in any way be any restrictions. I, for my part for instance, have a lot of relatives in American Samoa and almost every Samoan has relatives on either. In our Citizenship Law there is a particular clause giving the right to the Minister of Immigration, or the Minister of Citizenship, at his own discretion, to afford citizenship status—Western Samoa citizenship status—to a national of American Samoa who may apply for Western Samoan citizenship. So we have taken a step already—this was our 1982 re-

vised Immigration Act and Citizenship law. But on the part of American Samoa, the people of Western Samoa are only allowed to visit there for three days. Any extension to that time is always subject to the approval of the authorities over there. I thought that it was an unbalanced type of arrangement. So I discussed this already with the Governor of American Samoa. There is also the question of the free flow of exports from Western Samoa to American Samoa. American Samoa is only 40 miles coast to coast from Western Samoa, and if we think of the kind of commodities which are readily available in Western Samoa, and which they could import, well I think it would be very wise for them to lift the restrictions that are now placed, and which delay the importation of these goods into American Samoa. So now we will have another meeting between the two Samoas to take place there in the month of June<sup>(1)</sup>. I think the question of importation will be seriously discussed then. Also we will have some more discussions on the economic issues, because when we met last year, the American Samoan people requested us to allocate 1 000 acres of land for them to cultivate here. The Governor who presented the request on the part of American Samoa is no longer in office now. I think the request will be renewed by the new governor, when he comes. We have a surplus of land here, especially government land, so we might consider allocating them to cultivate. But I believe that the more we can regularize the

(1) This interview was conducted on 24 April 1985.

contacts between the two Samoas, the better it will be for the future of the two.

## A philosophy of democracy

► *You are a relatively small country, far away from Europe. You have just established an embassy to the European Community in Brussels. What does your relationship with the EEC, including your membership of the ACP Group, mean to Western Samoa?*

— Well, our decision to establish a diplomatic office in Brussels means that we recognize the value of the European Community and their assistance to Western Samoa. When making our decision we first considered the balance of how much we would spend in setting up an office in comparison with how much we receive under the Lomé Conventions. Also in terms of the bilateral aid from some of the European nations to Western Samoa, as for example the Netherlands and West Germany. The distance between this country and Europe is, as you say, enormous. So the only way we can get ourselves a little bit closer to European countries is to establish there. Information that we seldom used to receive from Europe, because we had no representative there, is now starting to come over regularly to Western Samoa. That helps to enhance a good relationship between Europe and Western Samoa. You know that I have made it explicitly clear in the past, that I don't want to see Samoa as a country that is floating between the Eastern and the Western blocs. It is one of our constitutional declarations that we will become and stay good allies of countries whose attitudes towards democracy are similar to those of Western Samoa. The European Community has the same philosophy of government as that which we have adopted in our constitution. So we welcome a warm relationship. The same applies to our relationship with the United States, to Australia, and to New Zealand. I have declared that Western Samoa is an aligned country. I don't believe in the word non-aligned. I believe that we have aligned ourselves and that differences of opinion, if they arise, can always be ironed out basing ourselves on that same philosophy of democracy. ○

Interview by R.D.B.

## EEC-Western Samoa cooperation

By Steffen STENBERG (\*)

Little is known of the Samoa group of islands in pre-European times, although Samoan legends indicate relations, in various ways, with Fiji and Tonga. The first European navigators to sight Samoa date back to the 18th century, but it was not until the mid-19th century that much was learned of the group. In 1838 an important event took place when the captain of a British ship concluded a commercial treaty with leading chiefs—a code of “Commercial Regulations” by which, in consideration of the ships paying harbour dues when using the ports, foreign interests should be protected.

Between 1900 and 1914, Western Samoa was administered by Germany and subsequently by New Zealand, under the League of Nations and UN trusteeship, until independence in 1962.

Despite the distance, a substantial proportion of Western Samoa’s agricultural exports has always gone to Europe, underlining the trading relations commenced with the “Code of Commercial Regulations”. Western Samoa therefore naturally joined the Lomé Convention in 1975.

In terms of financial contributions under the Lomé Conventions, Western Samoa received ECU 4.6 million under Lomé I and ECU 6.2 million under Lomé II. In addition, Western Samoa has received Stabex transfers totalling ECU 7.7 million, emergency aid of ECU 200 000 and loans from the European Investment Bank of ECU 3 million.

By June 1985 the European Community had provided Western Samoa with a total of ECU 21.7 million.

### Lomé I (1975-1980) and Lomé II (1980-1985)

Agriculture is the most important sector of the economy of Western Samoa and accounts for over one half of employment and domestic output. Close to 90% of total exports are either directly or indirectly based on agri-

culture. The economy therefore depends almost entirely on outside factors such as world market prices, over which the country itself has no control. The economic development of Western Samoa in the past years has not lived up to expectations. Apart from the above-mentioned dependence on agriculture, the reasons for

this performance are as follows:

- adjustment problems associated with the increase in oil prices;
- difficulties of financing payment deficits in capital markets dismayed by the sheer size of accumulated debts;
- relatively weak economic performance of some of the major industrialized countries.


The development plans of Western Samoa reflect these problems, as they have put emphasis on:

- increased agricultural production
- a rural development programme
- industrial development
- efforts to reduce dependence on imported fuel.


The National Indicative programmes of Lomé I and II reflect these objectives and priorities. Western Samoa has substantial hydro-electric potential due to its topography and high rainfall. The bulk of financing from EDF under both Lomé I and Lomé II has been used to develop this potential. Hydro-electricity is nothing new to Western Samoa and indeed the first generating unit, installed in 1928, was a water-fed turbine.

Firstly, the EDF financed a master plan study for hydro-electric development up to the year 2000. This study led to the financing of the construction of the Samasoni hydro-electric project (ECU 2.385 million). For geological reasons, water storage capabilities are limited in Western Samoa. Conse-

(\*) Principal administrator, Directorate-General for Development.



Priority has been given to the development of hydro-power. Above, the turbine, governor and generator unit of the Sau-niatu hydro-electric scheme



This tanker, paid for out of EDF funds, carries the coconut oil from the copra crushing mill to storage tanks on the wharfside in Apia

<b>Lomé I (1975-1980)</b>	
	<i>000 ECU</i>
<b>A. National Indicative Programme</b>	
Masterplan study for hydro-electric development	80
Detailed design for Samasoni and Fale-ole-Fe'e hydro-electric schemes	152
Samasoni hydro-electric scheme	2 385
Detailed design for Sauniatu hydro-electric scheme	172
Microproject programmes	690
Multi-annual training programme	130
Line of credit to the Development Bank of Western Samoa	890
Balance	101
Sub-total	4 600
<b>B. Stabex</b>	
1975 Cocoa	277
1976 Copra	1 332
Wood	349
1977 Bananas	99
1978 Cocoa	780
Sub-total	2 837
<b>Grand total Lomé I</b>	<b>7 437</b>

<b>Lomé II (1980-1985)</b>	
	<i>000 ECU</i>
<b>A. National Indicative Programme</b>	
Multi-annual training programme	100
Sauniatu hydro-electric scheme (*)	5 632
Bulk storage and handling facilities for coconut oil and copra pellets	900
Balance	50
Sub-total	6 682
<b>B. Stabex</b>	
1980 Cocoa	1 223
1981 Copra	809
Cocoa	915
1982 Copra	877
Cocoa	562
Sub-total	4 386
<b>C. Emergency Aid</b>	
Forest Fire 1983	200
<b>D. European Investment Bank</b>	
Sauniatu hydro-electric scheme	3 000
<b>Grand total Lomé II</b>	<b>14 269</b>

(\*) Includes project-linked 1981 Stabex allocation of ECU 482 625)

quently full use cannot be made of hydro-power during the dry season, when water flow is substantially reduced. The Samasoni hydro-project was a so-called run-of-river scheme, with an installed capacity of 1.8 MW under the most favourable conditions. Samasoni (together with Fale-ole-Fe'e hydro-electric scheme) reduced the share of imported diesel oil in electricity generation from about 80% in 1980 to about 40% in 1984. This development was followed up under Lomé II by the construction of the Sauniatu hydro-electric scheme with financial contributions from the European Development Fund (ECU 5.6 million) and the European Development Bank (ECU 3 million). This project, which was inaugurated in May 1985, has a total installed capacity of 3.5 MW and will further reduce the share of imported diesel oil in electricity generation to 20%.

With reference to the objectives of the Western Samoa Development Plan to promote a rural development programme and industrial development, EDF financed a line of credit to the Development Bank of Western Samoa (ECU 890 000). The line of credit reached a broad spectrum of the economic life of Western Samoa and the 26 sub-loans included financing of transport, workshops, agricultural production, freezing facilities, etc. The

smallest loan was around ECU 2 200, the largest ECU 34 000 and the average loan size was ECU 10 700.

The microproject programmes financed under Lomé I (ECU 690 000) are also a contribution to the rural development programme in order to increase output from Western Samoa's village economy sector and to foster a procedure of planning from below. The EDF-funded microproject programmes provided financing for 260 projects distributed to 96 villages on the islands of Upolu and Savaili. The types of projects included piggery development, coffee, poultry, fishery, banana, taro, cocoa, plantation improvements, weed control, shelter and storage sheds, etc.

One of the objectives in the industrial field is to encourage processing of local raw materials. The government has therefore constructed a crushing mill to provide local processing of the country's foremost export product—copra; and to replace copra export with oil and pellets. In relation to this project, the EDF financed a bulk storage and handling facility for coconut oil (ECU 900 000). The project includes a 1 500 tonne and a 1 000 tonne storage tank, pelletizer bulking and handling equipment, and buildings. The installations, located on the wharfside in Apia, will enable storage and loading on board ship of the en-

tire export production of the copra crushing mill.

### Stabex

As mentioned above, the economy of Western Samoa has been based historically, on export of copra, cocoa and bananas to New Zealand and Europe. These three commodities account for over 85% of all agriculture export earnings and are subject to wide price fluctuations in the Western industrial markets. Changes in demand create a very unhealthy economic environment. Without a steady source of export earnings, future planning, budgeting and balancing of financial resources must operate with great risk and uncertainty. The stabilization of export earnings scheme of the Lomé Convention (Stabex) is therefore of great importance to Western Samoa, not only in financial terms, but also in terms of the efforts undertaken to stabilize the economy of the agro-industry and of the country. Western Samoa received a total of ECU 7.7 million under Lomé I and Lomé II for copra, cocoa, wood and bananas.

After a forest fire in 1983, the EEC provided ECU 200 000 as emergency aid for the purchase of water pipes, food and medical supplies. ○ S.S.

# Record harvests in Zimbabwe: a success story

by F. NAGEL (\*)

After three successive years of drought necessitating imports and exceptional food aid, Zimbabwe is expecting, after a good rainy season, a bumper maize crop estimated at between 2.5 and 3 million tons in 1985—possibly the highest ever. White maize is the staple food of the 7.8 million inhabitants of the country. It is produced both on modern commercial farms (4 500) and, increasingly, by small farmers in the so-called communal lands, where the majority of the population lives (750 000 households).

Wheat, the second important staple food, becoming increasingly popular,

(\*) Agricultural Adviser, EEC Delegation in Zimbabwe.

is expected to reach production levels in 1985 that are near targeted consumption levels—210 000 tons production against a consumption of 220 000 to 240 000 tons.

Cotton production, which is increasing steadily, is expected to hit a record production of over 300 000 tons of seed cotton, a 60% increase compared with five years previously.

Tobacco production was and is controlled and limited to about 90 000 to 110 000 tons, but sales prices and the total value are also expected to reach record levels this year. Flue-cured tobacco, still exclusively produced by large commercial farmers because of its high technicality and capital requi-

rements, has seen the value of its production increase from 82 million to an estimated 280-300 million Zimbabwe dollars during the period from 1979 to 1985.

What are the reasons behind this development and what conclusions can be drawn?

The reasons are certainly not that Zimbabwe is endowed with more favourable climatic and soil conditions than her neighbours. Only about 15% of the country's soils are considered arable and two-thirds of the country is too dry for commercial dryland crop production and, therefore, has been recommended for grazing and livestock production.


Three years of uninterrupted drought from 1982 to 1984 have highlighted its vulnerability and the fact that the country borders and includes semi-arid zones to the south.

**Table 1: Maize sales to grain marketing board 1979-1985 ('000 tons)**

Year	Commercial Farms	Communal Farms	Total	B as percentage of C
	A	B	C	%
1979	474	38	511	7
1980	729	86	815	11
1981	1 651	363	2 014	18
1982	1 022	369	1 391	27
1983	464	152	616	25
1984	555	370	925	40
1985	1 030	894	1 924	48
				(estimate)

**Table 2: Cotton production development 1980-1985 ('000 tons)**

Year	Commercial Farms	Communal Areas & ARDA Estates	Total	B as percentage of C
	A	B	C	%
1979	133	32	165	19
1980	148	37	185	20
1981	122	77	199	39
1982	105	49	154	32
1983	112	57	169	33
1984	139	111	250	44
1985	170	151	321	47
				(estimate)



*Smallholder farmers stocking their maize harvest*



**Table 3: Development of agricultural production prices 1980-1985**  
(Zimbabwe dollars per ton)

Year	Tobacco (*)	Cotton (**)	Maize (**)	Wheat (**)
1980	795	375	85	135
1981	1 827	400	120	165
1982	1 677	515	120	190
1983	1 885	515	120	220
1984	2 065	570	140	250
1985	2 850 (estimate)	670	180	285

(\*) Tobacco free market price.  
(\*\*) Cotton, maize and wheat controlled prices.

**Table 4: Loans granted by AFC 1979/80 to 1984/85**  
(million Z\$)

Year	Commercial Farms		Communal Farms		Resettlement		Total	
	No. (000)	Value	No (000)	Value	No (000)	Value	No (000)	Value
1979/80	2,2	73,7	4,4	1,6	—	—	6,6	75,3
1980/81	2,5	86,8	21,3	7,9	—	—	23,8	100,7
1981/82	2,1	88,1	33,7	13,6	0,9	0,42	36,7	102,1
1982/83	1,7	88,7	41,8	17,7	4,2	1,5	47,7	107,9
1983/84	1,3	102,2	52,5	29,3	18,3	8,5	72,1	140,0
1984/85	?	106,0	65,8	32,0	20,0	12,0	(E)90,0	150,0

### Reducing the imbalance

Zimbabwe has inherited from its colonial past a large commercial farming sector, farming on better soils, with modern infrastructure, which was and is generally considered to be the backbone of the agricultural industry through its high percentage of market production and possibility of capital accumulation. Research, extension, credit, input supplies and crop marketing organizations have been created for and supported by this sector. Farm equipment and fertilizer factories, as well as processing industries, have been mainly developed by demand and through supplies of this sector.

Since independence in 1980, the government's main objective is to maintain the productivity of the modern farming sector but at the same time to reduce the existing imbalance in land ownership and improve the production, income and wellbeing of the vast majority of small peasant farmers. Instead of a drop in agricultural production, as with a number of other developing countries which have to rely exclusively on smallholder farmers, agricultural production is on the increase.

Table 1 shows the sharp increase in maize sales from communal areas since 1979 from 38 000 tons to an expected 894 000 tons in 1985 with an increasing share in the overall marketed production.

From an importer of maize in 1983 and 1984, Zimbabwe has become an exporter in 1985.

A similar spectacular production increase also holds true for cotton.

Cotton is used for the national textile industry and for export. The contribution from the smallholder sector is growing very fast and has led to nearly double the harvest since 1979 (Table 2). The trend seems to have only been slowed down by the influence of drought in 1982 and 1983.

From the above examples of maize and cotton production, it follows that small peasant farmers can and will increase their production if conditions are right.

Preconditions quoted most often are favourable agricultural producer prices, input availability and reliable market facilities.

Table 3 shows that producer prices for maize and wheat from 1980 to 1985 have more than doubled from Z\$ 85 to Z\$ 180 per ton and Z\$ 135 to Z\$ 285 respectively, while prices for cotton in the same period have gone up by nearly 100% from Z\$ 375 to Z\$ 670 per ton.

Input availability depends not only on physical existence of inputs, but also on purchasing power. Figures in this field, that is agricultural credit, speak for themselves. While the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) prior to 1979/80 has practically not provided any credit to smallholders, loans to this sector have increased from 4 400 in 1980 to 85 800 loans in 1985, resettlement farmers included. The annual volume of credit to smallholders has now reached Z \$54 million compared to Z \$ 106 million Z\$ to the commercial farming sector (see Table 4).

Marketing is the responsibility of Marketing Boards, parastatal organiza-

tions with the task of buying all cotton and maize on offer at guaranteed prices through a system of depots and collection points distributed all over the country.

### Incentives to production

The increase of intake by Cotton and Grain Marketing Boards from communal lands since independence shows clearly that a considerable effort has been made to extend and increase services to smallholder farmers. Quantities of cotton taken in have tripled between 1980 and 1983 (Table 2) and maize deliveries have increased ten-fold in the same period (Table 1).

It is thus clear that the agricultural success of Zimbabwe has its reasons and that record harvests did not come about by chance. A well designed production-oriented policy can be seen as the main element in this success story, which is owed mainly to a whole set of components, such as producer prices conducive to higher production, an efficient marketing system, access to credit, inputs and the performance of the extension services. The availability of consumer goods also plays a role as an incentive to production.

It is important to know that, according to recent declarations by the Government, the authorities will continue to improve agricultural land use methods and systems in the highly populated communal lands to ensure their lasting productivity—a task which will not prove easy under the prevailing poor, sandy soil conditions, and the tendency, found everywhere in Africa, of over-grazing and depletion of land resources. ○ F.N.

# Erosion on the coast of West Africa: the situation in Togo

Alfred LAMERS (\*)

Erosion along the coast is a problem that has been bothering the countries on the Gulf of Guinea, particularly Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, for some time.

The situation in Togo has become more worrying over the past year or two and erosion is now threatening installations that are of vital importance to the economic, urban and cultural wellbeing of the country.

As is often the case in situations of this kind, the culprit is human interference in the natural functioning of the sedimentation system and here:



- the building of the Akossomba dam on the Volta in Ghana, which has considerably slowed down the speed at which sediment is carried to the estuary, thus upsetting the sedimentation system in the west-east current parallel to the coast (the Guinea Current) east of the mouth of the Volta towards Togo;

- the building of the port of Lomé (with a protective 1300 m dyke perpendicular to the coast) which has prevented (or at least considerably diminished because part of the sediment in suspension goes round the entrance to the port) sediment coming through and created a large amount of silting west of the port and a lot of erosion to the east.

The first major complex to be threatened by erosion was the Tropicana holiday village 18 km from the Ghanaian frontier. Here, the coastline has retreated by about 100 m, close to the club facilities (bungalows, the pool etc) and there were fears that the complex would disappear in the short term.

However, since 1983, erosion has practically halted with the appearance of beach rock which acts as a protection and considerably slows down the encroachment of the sea.

But beach rock does not occur everywhere and it may be so far in-



1985  
Coastline

1978  
Coastline

(\*) Engineering Adviser, EEC Delegation in Togo.

land that it cannot be relied upon to appear soon and have the beneficial effects it can bring. In cases of this kind, erosion continues unabated.

So, in 1981, the Togolese Government very wisely decided to build a new road, parallel to the coast, about a mile inland to replace the old Benin-Ghana road, which was on the sea and attracted a lot of tourists as a result (see photo no 1).

The new road between the Tropicana (KP 18) and Aného (KP 48), which was fully financed by the EDF, was opened on 26 June 1984 (see photo 2).

Two months later, in August 1984,

about 100 metres of the old road was swept away by the sea — which encroached at the rate of something like 20 m every 24 hours.

Another site under threat is the Kpémé phosphate loading wharf. About 2.5 million t of phosphates are exported from here every year. This represents roughly half of Togo's export earnings, so any disruption would have very serious consequences for the country. As things stand, emergency measures (rock filling) are being taken as it was feared the foundations might collapse.

The ongoing study (France is financing this) suggests that the ultimate an-

swer is to build several groynes out at right angles to the coast so that sand builds up around the whole phosphate handling complex (i.e. over about a kilometre).

The groynes, however, may turn out to be a mixed blessing. If the area under threat is properly protected, then the problem simply occurs in unprotected areas. In a case in point, the town of Aného could well suffer, as here there are old buildings of some historical value (a church that dates from the period of German colonization, for example) that are already in danger.

The ongoing study aims to find an optimal solution whereby the whole of the Kpémé-Aného area can be protected. One thing is sure — whatever system is adopted, it is bound to have an effect on the coast of Benin.

However, the coast of Benin has fewer facilities calling for major defence measures, so the erosion could be allowed to develop, at least for a while.

But the problem of erosion along the coast of West Africa is an eminently regional one which demands very close collaboration to prevent a chain reaction which, in the case of Togo, for example, has been partly caused by an investment in Ghana, which could well have an effect on part of the Benin coast if it were not reduced.

Note too that there is also cause for concern by the city of Lomé (0-4.4 km from the Ghanaian frontier), where the coast receded by 20 m in 24 hours, threatening the four-lane highway along the sea front (the Marina, which the EDF financed in 1982-83).


However, as the sea has also deposited similar amounts of sand in the same places at other times of the year, the situation seems to be more or less stationary at the moment. The EDF is nonetheless paying for a study which is currently being run, at the Togolese authorities' request, to get a better idea of how the area will develop.


There is no doubt that the erosion of the coast will continue to be of concern to the Governments of the various countries affected and that some systematic protection will have to be set up soon — an expensive business for which external aid will certainly be sought. ○ A.L.

1.



2.





## The Caribbean

### A different kind of research

A scientific conference on Caribbean agricultural production systems and development alternatives was held at the Université Antilles-Guyane in Martinique from 9-11 May this year. Regional organizations—particularly DAC (the Caribbean agricultural body) and GRET (a research and technological exchange body, which is a French NGO)—ran it on a joint basis for researchers and practitioners, regardless of geographical and linguistic affiliations. The English- and French-speaking research workers in the Caribbean traditionally meet on separate circuits and this was the first time both had come to one of the countries of the region to discuss their experience together. Although not all the countries were represented, their involvement was assured, as 50 or so papers were sent in and, from this point of view, the event really broke new ground. The conference also attracted researchers from outside the Caribbean—cooperation officers on teams working locally and other staff, most of them from NGOs, research centres and universities in Canada, the USA and France.

#### Look before you leap

The idea of the conference was to discuss and outline answers to the crucial questions facing the Caribbean—the major export crops crisis (the decline of sugar cane and bananas, the world coffee market prices etc), the slump in national production, especially of food, the drain on the rural community and more, with the failure of various internationally-financed development schemes adding to the difficulty. An analysis has suggested that the main reason for poor results is a lack of involvement and the failure to take the logic of anticipated achievements into account. This has led many people who operate in rural areas to say that a knowledge of the realities of farming and peasant practices is a vital precursor to any scheme. It would seem both necessary and urgent to attempt to reorient agriculture and revitalize it with a view to self-sufficiency in food. This, then, was the background to the conference, the main

aims of which M.A. Bary described in this way: “Essentially what we wanted was to bring researchers and developers together so that they could compare approaches and problems... make sure that research achievements and even development thinking took the realities of the peasant environment into account... What we had to do was analyze the contributions and limitations of the new Farming System Research”.

But over and above this grasp of reality, there is one essential thing outstanding and that is the choice of schemes. Should we be raising the technical and economic barriers that prevent the farmer from reaching his targets or should we put priority on the production systems that best reflect the political aims of the region or nation? Should we choose between systems that do most for the peasant, for the market or for export? Are the three really incompatible? Perhaps we should be trying to take them one at a time. What we are actually aiming at is greater understanding so we can make a better job of transferring technical and economic models that have proved their worth elsewhere. Is not the problem more one of popularizing techniques and improving communications between the researcher and the farmer? Should we be trying to get farmers to make radical changes to their methods and conform to a pre-established model so they fit in with national policies or should we try to understand and lend support to their ways without any reference to national imperatives? These are just some of the questions that participants intended to discuss at the conference.

#### Intervention is difficult

Three main topics were outlined so the different problems could be taken separately. They were: R & D in the peasant environment with some practical cases of R & D in the field, analysis and ideological foundations of “Farming System Research” and national and regional development policies and training and research facilities.

This is not the place for a descrip-

tion of all the papers and speeches that followed.

They tended to emphasize the following questions—What is the best way of getting a modernization policy to succeed in a traditional economy? How can the idea of one or more development alternatives to the production of commodities for export be got across? What is the best way of rethinking all this in the light of the potential revealed by a study of the rural environment? (The potential exists, although it is under-utilized, and it is currently in considerable danger). How can we manage to define one or more development alternatives in the global society?

#### A fund of experience

As often happens at meetings of this sort, many more questions were raised than answered, although the very fact of stating the problems and thinking about them is surely a first step. For Didier Pilot of GRET, the conference had “solved nothing at all. It was an opportunity to get together and talk... There is no point in waiting for agricultural research to ‘save’ Caribbean farmers all by itself. The problems involved in revitalizing agriculture here are more economic, political and social than purely technical”. The system of report and debate, partly in view of the short time available, did not seem the best way of bringing out the potential of participants. But the conference did, Lucien Degras (INRA, Guadeloupe), felt. It reveals “that people are waking up to a problem which has not been a dominant feature of the approach of many research institutions... It gives us new ideas and outlines other methods for us... In short, it is an opening for us”. The uniformity of the islands of the Caribbean proved to be only apparent and to hide a more complex situation and a diversity of statuses, customs and languages—and, of course, problems. What was novel about the meeting is that it provided an opportunity for the different pieces of the mosaic to be put together and to set a new dynamic movement in motion, although, of course, it all has to go further and be spread wider. The inter-Caribbean bulletin and the setting up of an information exchange network are the cornerstones of a task for the future. ◊

Danièle MAGLOIRE

## Milan Summit: "The moment of truth"

It was not, perhaps, the most auspicious choice of venue for a European summit on which high hopes for progress towards European Union had been placed: a 15th century castle in Milan fought over through the centuries by rival European armies... While the 10 EEC Heads of State and Government fell short of actual battle at the June 28-29 meeting—they are, after all, supposed to be on the same side—they were, at the very least, in considerable disarray at the end of their encounter, with some claiming victory and others furious at, as they saw it, having been outmanoeuvred. The controversy centred principally on the calling of an intergovernmental conference to draft a treaty on a common foreign and security policy and to work out amendments to the Treaty of Rome required for changes in decision-making procedures and was such that it overshadowed the summit's not inconsiderable achievements. The first of these was the boost given to pressing ahead with preparing the ground for a single market in the Community by the year 1992. The second was the support for a collective effort to master new technology, to ensure that European competitiveness in the field was maintained, if not increased. The third, in response to the famine in Africa, was the unequivocal support given by the leaders of the Community to a Commission proposal for a special reserve allocation making it possible to mobilize 500 000 tonnes of cereal equivalent over and above its normal aid programme.

For the Portuguese and Spanish Prime Ministers, attending as observers until their countries' accession to the Community in January 1986, the Milan initiation to European summitting cannot have been particularly encouraging. It has, nonetheless, often been the case that the Community makes most progress when least expected—such as at the Fontainebleau summit in 1984—and least progress when most expected.

While Milan was seen in three European capitals—London, Copenhagen and Athens—as belonging firmly to the latter category, in the other seven Member State capitals it was hailed, with varying degrees of conviction, as a success. The vote taken on whether to hold an intergovernmental conference was carried by seven to three, distinguishing, in President Mitterrand's words, "those in favour of a strong united Europe from those who are hanging back".

For Signor Bettino Craxi, Italy's Prime Minister and Chairman of the Council, the summit had "swept away paralysis and introversion" and represented "a significant step forward". (It is certain that without the Italian Pre-

sidency's forceful chairmanship of the summit the vote would never have taken place). The West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, saw Milan as "the moment of truth" at which for better or for worse—long-stifled differences between the Member States on fundamental reforms came to the surface. Denmark's objections to the proposals were said to have stemmed from certainty that the proposed changes to the Treaty would never receive the required consent from the Danish Parliament. Britain would have welcomed certain, more limited institutional reforms, including a wider use of the Treaty as a means of achieving them. By a supreme irony the calling of the conference was a decision taken on a majority vote—and not an unanimous vote (the first time such a thing has happened at European summit level) and was subsequently said by the reportedly infuriated British Premier to have been "illegal".

Whether legitimate or not—Signor Craxi noted that the required majority as laid down in Article 236 of the Treaty had been obtained—the decision to hold the conference was taken



*For the first time, Spain and Portugal attended an European summit as observers. Above, Bettino Craxi (left), Italy's Prime Minister, welcoming his Spanish counterpart, Felipe Gonzales*

with, as its mandate, to work out (a) a treaty on a common foreign and security policy, and (b) "amendments to the EEC Treaty... required for the implementation of the institutional changes concerning the Council's decision-making procedure, the Commission's executive power and the powers of the European Parliament and the extension to new spheres of activity in accordance with the proposals of the Dooge Committee and the Adonnino Committee... and taking into account certain aspects of the Commission proposal concerning the freedom of movement of persons".

### A "two-tier" Europe?

Talk of moving towards a "two-speed" "two-tier" Europe or a Europe of "variable geometry" as the jargon of the day would have it may, however, be premature. This, in any case, was the view of Senator Dooge (Irl), the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs whose report proposed the conference as the best way in which to launch a new era of European political and economic cooperation.

Asked if the Milan decision marked the beginning of a two-speed Community, Senator Dooge replied: "I think it would be very wrong to think that

Britain, Denmark, and Greece are necessarily not going to move". And, indeed, when the dust at Castello Sforzesco had settled, Mrs Thatcher duly confirmed that the United Kingdom would attend. Greece, which had vehemently opposed the conference proposal, also confirmed later that its government would, nevertheless, be present. The Portuguese and Spanish governments would also be invited and were almost certain to take part along with the original seven. The conference will therefore take place, and only when its results are submitted for decision to the leaders at the next European Council in December will it be possible to judge as to whether the initiative taken by the majority in Milan was, in the long run, well- or ill-founded.

### **Amid the controversy, major agreements reached**

While the institutional debate tended to dominate the summit, important agreements were reached on new technology, on the internal market and on measures to combat the current famine in Africa. The summit also approved proposals contained in a report by the Committee for a People's Europe on citizens' rights, culture, youth, education and sport and instructed the Commission and the Member States to act upon those proposals. The general economic and social situation prevailing in the Community was debated, and the Council of Finance Ministers was invited to consider the extent to which the convergence which had already been achieved between the Member States in the field of inflation and imbalances made it possible to intensify the battle against unemployment. Finally, in the interests of safeguarding the system of multilateral trade, Community leaders expressed their "serious concern" at the large surpluses Japan continued to run with the rest of the world.

### **A true common market by 1992**

The achievement of a genuine single market for goods and services is, of course, no new objective, but the Milan summit did give efforts to create such a market a strong political push, instructing the Council of Ministers to initiate "a precise programme of ac-

tion with a view to achieving completely and effectively the conditions for a single market in the Community by 1992". Whether or not this will be possible may depend greatly on what is accomplished in the way of institutional reform: many of the measures required to break down the various physical, technical and fiscal barriers to a true Community common market need unanimous approval, with the result that some — such as the proposed directive on a common market in insurance services — have already awaited decision for more than 10 years.

### **Backing for "Eureka"**

Unanimous and enthusiastic support was given by the Council to a coordinated European approach in technology. The Council particularly welcomed the French-initiated programme for advanced technological research known as "Eureka" and the Commission's constructive proposals along similar lines. A collective effort was seen by the EEC leaders as being vital both in the face of what was perceived as a widening technological gap between Europe and its American and Japanese competitors and with an eye to creating a single Community market in the field of technology. A meeting of EEC Ministers for Research was to be convened in Paris in July and would be open to non-EEC European countries. Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway had already indicated their interest, in principle, in participating in joint European projects.

### **More food aid for famine victims**

Finally, reviewing the Development Commissioner's report on European aid to Africa's famine victims, Community leaders welcomed the fact that the objective of the so-called Dublin Plan had been achieved in that 1.2 million tonnes or their equivalent had been mobilized. Distribution was proving a heavy problem, however, given the difficulties of access to the affected regions and the capacity of the ports to clear grain shipments. About 700 000 tonnes of cereals were reported by Mr Natali to be held up at the time in African ports. The Commission was, he said, doing all in its power to alleviate the difficulties by

strengthening lorry services and paying for national transporters, but new food aid requirements might arise if the rains proved inadequate for a good harvest at the end of the year. With this in mind, the European leaders welcomed the Commission's proposal for a special reserve allocation making it possible to mobilize an additional 500 000 tonnes of cereal equivalent and instructed the Council meeting on Development to examine the proposal as a matter of urgency.

### **Plea for greater coordination amongst donors**

In a more general vein, leaders reaffirmed their conviction of the need for a coordinated strategy against short- and long-term drought and stressed that all possible support be given to African countries' efforts to achieve food security. In the field of environmental protection, in particular the battle against desertification, the Council considered it vital, in the light of the importance of present requirements, for all European aid, Community and bilateral, "to give priority to that type of action, to give long-term commitments and to organize their contributions coherently by setting up an appropriate coordination structure".

In Milan, as elsewhere, unity among the Community leaders proved easier to obtain when they looked to areas of concern beyond Europe's own frontiers than when they looked at their relations with each other. Certainly their collective support of further measures to fight the famine in Africa was strong and unequivocal. Even within its borders, though, there was unity on pushing forward to achieving a truly free market within the 10 — soon to be 12 — Member States. Indeed, the "moment of truth" when it came, was not so much over progress towards unity within Europe, but towards union, with the Milan summit revealing as never before the gap between those in the Community who are willing to accept a measure of federalism and those who are not. The next summit, in Luxembourg in December, looks set to be a cliffhanger. The European Community in the 1980s appears, in the words of the old Chinese curse, to be doomed to live in "interesting times". ◦

Myfanwy VAN DE VELDE

## EEC-ACP trade – EEC imports up 28% in the first half of 1985

Provisional estimates for the first quarter of 1985 indicate EEC imports from the ACP running at 28% above their level in the first quarter of 1984. This is a substantially greater increase than the rise in imports from developing countries generally (19%) or the rise in imports from industrialized countries (16%). EEC exports to the ACP continued to recover from their depressed levels of 1983/84. Provisional estimates suggest a 26% improvement in the first quarter compared with the same period of 1984, as against a rise of 14% for exports to all third countries. In spite of these good export figures, the Community's trade deficit with the ACP widened.

### Community trade with ACP: huge deficit in 1984

Provisional estimates for 1984 were given in the May-June issue of the *Courier*. With reported data now available for all EEC members, a more detailed examination of EEC-ACP trade in 1984 is now possible. EEC imports from ACP rose 27% to ECU 24.7 billion, as against an 11% rise in imports from all developing countries. EEC exports to ACP, on the other hand, only rose 3% to ECU 16.3 billion, a lower growth rate than the rise in EEC exports to all developing countries (up 6%), and a much lower rate than for imports. As a result, the Community's trade deficit with ACP increased from ECU 3.7 billion in 1983 to a record deficit of ECU 8.4 billion in 1984.

Looking at the breakdown of trade by broad ACP region, the percentage of EEC-ACP imports, exports and trade deficit attributable to each zone were:

### EEC trade with ACP West Africa

In 1984, nearly 60% of EEC imports from the ACP countries came from West Africa, though less than half of EEC exports to the ACP went there. In fact exports to the zone actually fell by 7%, whilst imports from it rose by 27%. Thus the trade gap between the Community and West Africa more than doubled in 1984 to ECU 6.6 billion.

The principal products imported by the Community were petroleum (65% of total imports), cocoa (8%), iron ore (4%), coffee (3%), wood and aluminium (2% each). As the chart shows, the top two currency earners did quite well in 1984, petroleum exports to the EC growing by 31%. Cocoa exports had an even better year, with a 53% rise. Iron ore exports grew modestly, coffee and wood exports were static, but aluminium exports, in contrast to those of the Caribbean and Pacific zone, did well with a 52% rise in 1984.

### EEC trade with ACP Central Africa

About one fifth of Community-ACP trade was with the Central African states. EEC imports grew fastest from this ACP zone in 1984, rising 35%. Exports to it were up by 16%, which was about the same growth rate as for all EEC exports. As with ACP West Africa, the Community's trade deficit with the zone more than doubled in 1984, to reach ECU 1.4 billion.

The Community's main imports were petroleum (32% of the total), coffee (14%), copper (12%), cocoa (8%), wood (6%), petroleum products and cotton (2% each) and precious stones. As the chart shows, imports of petro-

leum, coffee and cocoa grew rapidly. Petroleum imports grew by 34%, coffee by 37% and cocoa by 56%. Cotton imports from both Central Africa and West Africa almost doubled in 1984. On the other hand imports of petroleum products fell by 20%.

### EEC trade with ACP East and Southern Africa

ACP Eastern and Southern Africa supplied 15% of EEC imports from the ACP and accounted for 23% of the Community's exports to the ACP in 1984. EEC imports from this zone rose by 22% and exports grew by 9%. In 1983, the Community had a ECU 0.4 billion trade surplus with this zone, which in 1984 was reduced to near balance.

The leading products from this zone were coffee (26% of the total), tea (11%), copper (10%), sugar (9%), cotton (4%) and tobacco. EEC imports of coffee and tea were up 42% and 97% respectively, but copper imports declined by 10%. Cotton imports, up 42%, did not grow as fast as those from West and Central Africa, whilst sugar imports grew by only 15%, a lower increase than EEC sugar imports generally (up 35%).

### EEC trade with ACP Caribbean and Pacific

About one twelfth of EEC trade with the ACP was with the Caribbean and Pacific countries. Imports from them grew by 19% in 1984, whilst exports rose by 23%. The Community's trade deficit with this zone increased marginally to ECU 0.5 billion.


Important products from this zone include petroleum products (19% of the total), sugar (16%), aluminium (8%) and copper (8%). Imports of petroleum products rose by 57% in 1984, compared with a 16% increase of EEC imports from all third countries. EEC sugar imports from the Caribbean and Pacific were 44% higher. Aluminium imports, however, fell 24% even though EEC imports from all third countries were 16% up, and imports of copper fell by 5%. ○

	Imports	Exports	Trade deficit
ACP West Africa	58.5	48.5	77.9
ACP Central Africa	19.0	20.1	16.9
ACP East and Southern Africa	15.0	22.8	-0.2
ACP Caribbean and Pacific	7.5	8.6	5.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0




**Loading an EEC-bound ship at Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria**  
*In 1984 nearly 60% of EEC imports from the ACP countries came from West Africa*


**EEC IMPORTS FROM WEST AFRICA**  
 billion ECU




**EEC IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL AFRICA**  
 billion ECU



**EEC IMPORTS FROM EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA**  
 billion ECU



**EEC IMPORTS FROM CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC**  
 billion ECU





**Official Manual of European Parliament 1984**, 2nd legislature period 1984-1989. Published by the Secretariat-General of the European Parliament, Luxembourg, Office des publications officielles, L-2985 Luxembourg, 1985, 333 pages (appears in the seven Community languages). — 333 pages — ECU 7.78 — 1985.

The European Parliament is continuing the tradition in publishing this manual to cover the current period of legislature (it also includes additional notes to deal with changes since 1 December 1984). The work contains in particular all the MEP's biographies, lists the composition of the Parliamentary organs, gives details of the organization of the services of the Secretariat-General and the Political Groups, and also mentions several useful addresses. This is an essential tool for all those who follow Community activity.

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Tommaso PADOA-SCHIOPPA — **Europe, monnaie et politique économique**, with a foreword by François-Xavier Ortoli, Collection: "Perspectives Européennes". The Commission of the European Communities, Brussels — 213 pages — ECU 7.50 (340 BF) — 1985

The ECU featured on the cover of this book is a "doubloon" bearing the portrait of Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor: this coin was valid throughout the vast Germanic Holy Roman Empire. The coin is a rarity owned by the Banca d'Italia and was the symbol of an ambition for unity and power. In fact, the author of this book works for the Banca d'Italia (as one of its two deputy Director-Generals) and, as people will remember, he was the Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the European Commission from 1979-83. These years saw the "take-off" of the European Monetary System. The articles included in this book—with one exception—were written during the period mentioned and they are divided into three parts:—monetary questions in Europe;—international monetary problems;—economic policy and institutions. They are therefore particularly valid both as a testimony to one

of those rare achievements—although not yet fully completed—of which the Community can be proud, but also as a warning against the easy "laissez-faire" option on international economic and monetary relations. This subject is still one of today's burning issues since attempts to introduce a semblance of order into the international monetary "non-system" seem doomed to failure. When Padoa-Schioppa remarks that plurinational economies—those in which we live—are at the crossroads, he is only saying that a choice—which is becoming an increasingly difficult choice—must be made since, as he himself writes:

"The plurinational economies have reached a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, national sovereignty is officially uncontested and uncontested and is even strengthened by increased government and public interest in economic questions; on the other hand, sovereignty is being increasingly undermined as economic interdependence grows". If we wish to avoid a catastrophe (what Padoa-Schioppa euphemistically describes as "a serious deterioration in trade and financial relations"), we should make wise and bold use of the two essential policy ingredients which are, Padoa-Schioppa explains, regulations and institutions.

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François VISINE — **Forty Years of Europe**, (40 ans d'Europe), by Editions de l'Imprimerie St-Paul s.a., Luxembourg — F 810 — 1985

The work combines historical synthesis and reflexion. The author, a long-time specialist on European affairs, focuses what he has to say on the major events in the construction of Europe and on the current situation and outlook for the future. He puts the accent on the need to work towards European Union and ultimately to create a European pillar to the Atlantic Alliance. This is backed up by a fairly detailed chronological list of events and a useful glossary of common abbreviations. This new book is thus of particular interest to students, journalists, teachers and people, especially in union and political affairs, who have

imperative reasons not just to understand the European phenomenon but also to help organize it in a fundamentally humanist way—the only thing, ultimately, that can guarantee the freedom and the dignity of nations.

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Rudolf HRBEK, Wolfgang WESSELS (Editors) — **"EG-Mitgliedschaft: ein vitales Interesse der Bundesrepublik Deutschland?"**, Europa-Union Verlag-Europäische Schriften des Instituts für europäische Politik, Band 62, Bonn — 544 pages — 1984.


The European Community system in its capacity as a framework for the solving of problems is still of major importance for the Federal Republic of Germany, and the draft treaty of European Union approved by the European Parliament basically corresponds, through its guidelines, to West Germany's vital interests.

As regards Community politics, a gradual process of integration may be considered to be an acceptable ultimate option, given that it would provide for continued unification around the hard nucleus of Europe. Seen from Bonn, Franco-German co-operation undeniably has major priority.

These are some of the conclusions of this book, which was edited by Mr Hrbek and Mr Wessels with the participation of around 15 committed authors who are well known on the European political scene. The question of whether West German participation in the EEC is still a vital interest for the country is met with a positive response, in terms of the economic, social and commercial aspects of European integration, as well as from the point of view of the objective of political integration.

The names of the contributors to this book, which is particularly important given the context of this present crucial period for the future of Europe, are as follows: D. Dettke, C. Deubner, F. Franzmeyer, K.W. Grewlich, B. May, H. Michaelis, K. von Moltke, K.O. Nass, E. Regelsberger, P.-W. Schlüter, E. Schulz, B. Seidel, and W. von Urff.

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Guyana Info Service

*Family photo of the signatories of the Georgetown Agreement that set up the ACP Group on 6 June 1975*

## THE ACP GROUP

Ten years! It calls for more than a few speeches and a cocktail party—and, indeed, the Group's commemorative programme goes on for a whole year, until 6 June 1986. Festivities give way to work. There are things to do and get under way, groundwork for the future, over the next 12 months, as this 10th anniversary clearly marks the end of one era and the beginning of another in the ACP Group.

History may sometimes change its course unspectacularly, but in no less fascinating a manner for all that. Europe spent centuries self-interestedly helping tear a continent—Black Africa—apart. Now the chance happenings of its internal development have enabled it—still in its own interest but the interest is shared this time—to provide the unique opportunity of a large-scale joint political enterprise to that continent and to sister countries in the Caribbean and the Pacific.

The ACPs did not let the opportunity slip. Indeed they grasped it, going further than the Community had originally imagined. So what might have been just one more historical fact, the official establishment of the Group on 6 June 1975, became unshakeable reality, an original political phenomenon in international South-North and South-South

relations which sets an example and will make history in its turn.

At the start of a new phase, the Group is resolutely geared to the future and ready to make use of its 10 years of experience. So far it has concentrated on ACP-EEC cooperation but now it is determined, also, to give more practical shape to the other objective the founding fathers set it—cooperation between the ACPs and between all developing countries, something that will consolidate the Group's *raison d'être* outside ACP-EEC affairs. This desire to forge ahead is its might and it should also enable it to adopt its institutional infrastructure very soon, in the light of the hoped-for internal strengthening and of all its aims for the future.

Throughout this past decade, *The Courier* has been as faithful a reflector as possible of ACP-CEE cooperation and of the work of the Group. It is now proud to present this special dossier, the first of its kind. Is it all there? No, but these personal recollections give a detailed enough picture for our readers to understand the Group and to want to know more. It all adds up to a painting from *The Courier* to the ACP Group. Happy Birthday! F. THURMES



*A view of the meeting in Georgetown on 5 and 6 June 1975*

Guyana Info Service

## A positive experience and a future to build

The Group of sister nations of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific celebrated its 10th anniversary in June. Bearing in mind the extraordinary diversity of the signatories of the Georgetown Agreement, this first decade has to be hailed as a great success. It is difficult for even a small group to get on together and the difficult is all the greater when the aim is to get 66 different countries, scattered across the globe but united in their concern for development, to speak with one voice.

In 1975, when our ACP Group started, the main idea was to establish new, profitable trade relations between the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific and the Member States of the EEC. Today, reality really does

by Pascal NZE,  
President-in-Office  
of the ACP Council  
of Ministers

(1 February — 31 July 1985)

reflect our original intentions. The ACPs have gone beyond the bounds of North-South cooperation and established economic and cultural links that give our Group the strength of a unity that has been achieved in spite of an international crisis that aggravates differences and heightens egoism.

However, failure is the only possible conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the past development decade, even taking account of the contribution ACP-EEC cooperation has made. World Bank figures in fact suggest that

per capita GNP grew by an average of only 0.8% in the ACP countries, as against 2.7% in the developing world as a whole, and was negative, even, in the least developed nations. And food production decreased by 1% over the same period.

The international crisis and the commodity price slump are, of course, the main culprits for the deterioration of trading positions that has increased ACP debt to unmanageable proportions. In 1982, for example, ACP reserves, where they existed, only represented an average of two months' imports.

The Member States of the European Community were also suffering from the world crisis and did not give the ACP countries enough aid to make up

for the deterioration in the terms of trade.

Yet, the industrialized countries of Europe do feel solidarity with the development of the ACP Group. There are too many links, not just historical, but social and cultural too, for the Convention between these two sets of countries not to look beyond material considerations and focus on man himself.

This is what we were pleased to find throughout the negotiations that led to the signing of Lomé III in December 1984.

Both the ACP Group and the Community had great ambitions for the new Convention and it was not, alas, possible to fulfil them all. We were expecting a new and exemplary charter for North-South relations, and, although the results do not live up to our hopes, Lomé III is an undeniable success in comparison with the previous Conventions, particularly bearing in mind the diversity of the countries involved.

The socio-cultural cooperation in Lomé III and the special provisions on fighting drought and desertification are an example of how the agreement has developed towards ideas that are centred on man.

The ACP Group no longer comes cap in hand. It has become one of those actually involved in shaping a new, fairer and better balanced international economic order and, in this sense, there is no doubt that Lomé III is an instrument of economic, cultural and human cooperation that is innovative compared with previous Conventions.

The National Assemblies of the States concerned are now examining the new Convention. Some of them have already ratified it and others are about to do so. I hope we will have the number we need—two-thirds of the ACPs have to ratify for Lomé III to take effect—and I hope all the ACP countries realize that ratification is urgent if our agreement is to enter its legal phase soon.

I should not like to present this short examination of the current ACP situation without giving an illustration of how difficult it is to reach a common position in a Group as diversif-



*The President of the ACP Council at the 10th anniversary celebrations of the Georgetown Agreement, ACP House, Brussels, 6 June 1985*

ied as ours. The mandate of the Group's Secretary-General has come to an end and we now have to find someone to fill the post. The appointment is made by a two-thirds majority of the Council of Ministers and we have two candidates, one from a French-speaking country of Africa and one from an English-speaking country in the Caribbean. This apparently minor problem—when compared to all the economic, social and cultural things the Group has to worry about, at least—has interfered with certain of our discussions in the Group, as the two-thirds majority has not been reached.

I think this is something we have to transcend. We have managed to speak with one voice on the international scene in discussions affecting our cultural individuality, our national sovereignty and our desire for humanism and justice and we must not let a problem of internal organization upset this balance. I hope a satisfactory way out for us all can be found at the next meeting of ministers in Zimbabwe in October. It will be a test of the strength or the weakness of our solidarity.

In spite of these disagreements, which are unavoidable in a complex Group of this kind, the outlook for us in the second decade, I think, is extremely promising. The Georgetown

Agreement is positive and unique in the history of international economic relations. The Group is linked to the Community through the Lomé Convention and it has set aside individual concerns in order to concentrate on joint interests on a number of occasions. This could never have happened without the political will and the seriousness and the selflessness which each of our States have shown in developing our big ACP family. There is no reason why we should not go further along the same path.

One of the first things we have to do in the coming decade is place more emphasis than we have been doing on the proper development of our economic, trade and cultural relations within the Group and on making the most of our own potential. This task, which needs to be done at both bilateral and regional level, is a vital one and we have to get on with it and show what we can do.

Getting Lomé III under way in the light of the prescribed bases and assurances is also a means of doing this. The new Convention should be an opportunity for the Group to progress and move on to new stages of development, combining our efforts with those of our European partners.

The path to development is long and full of pitfalls and there will be plenty of occasions for internal strife. The challenge is great and our will must be greater—as, indeed, must our sense of devotion, which should make it possible—for our deepest concerns for our countries and peoples to materialize in economic equilibrium and respect for mankind.

If, at the end of the decade we are now beginning, what we have achieved in the ACP-EEC framework and in our internal relations and South-South cooperation is negative, our Group, which can only exist on solid foundations, will ultimately break up.

If, on the contrary, it is positive—and I know we all hope it will be—it will lead to a tightening of the internal links in our Group with a view to a fairer, more humane future, a living example of the North-South dialogue that is the surest way to establish a new international economic order. ○

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# The birth of the ACP Group

by Seydina OUMAR SY (\*)

The 10th anniversary of the Georgetown Agreement is an important event from many points of view. Those au fait with the machinery and institutions of the Lomé Convention tend to be familiar with this Agreement, but the originality and practical formulation of its content and its political dimension deserve to be better known both in Europe and the ACP countries themselves. It is a basic document which has turned the initially very divergent African, Caribbean and Pacific negotiators of 1973 into a Group whose identity and autonomy have strengthened constantly over the intervening 10 years.

It was at the Messina Conference, when negotiations on the creation of the EEC were drawing to a close, that the French Delegation brought up the issue of relations between the emergent Six and the overseas countries under the legal jurisdiction of France and Belgium.

Some people saw this as an attempt on the part of the French to get part of the financial aid it gave to its ex-colonies paid by its European partners, in exchange for privileged access to their markets. The proposal was not greeted with enthusiasm by either Germany or the Netherlands, but, thanks to good relations between Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, the Six ultimately included the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories, a kind of charter, as Part Four of the Treaty of Rome.

There was no doubt as to the generous spirit behind this, but it was clearly in Europe's interest, as history was to prove, and what began as only an outline was to become second in importance only to agriculture on the Community policy front and it was to develop over the years, becoming the Yaoundé policy when the first cooperation agreement was signed in the capital of Cameroon on 20 July 1963 and the Lomé policy when Lomé I

was negotiated, and then signed in Togo in 1975.

## Yaoundé

Yaoundé knew where its limitations were and it feared the future. Critics did not mince their words in analysing this first stage of cooperation between the EEC and the AASM, but it is well worth remembering that this period, between the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the signing of the Yaoundé Convention (1963), was the one in which the Associated States got their independence!

After the joy and the euphoria, there they were suddenly faced with political upheaval, the difficult job of training people to control the administrative and institutional machinery so they could create and lay proper foundations for the rational organization of the State. Given this exceptional historical context, it is easy to understand that the negotiations for the first Yaoundé Convention could not be run in an atmosphere that was receptive to a macro-economic vision. But it was

by no means a failure. The merit of this first experiment between the EEC and the AASM is that it actually existed and that it paved the way for the future. Although Yaoundé was in fact an extension of Part Four of the Treaty that had been adapted to a new political and legal context, it contained a new expression of equality raised to a fundamental dimension—the spirit of partnership.

Five years later, at Yaoundé again, a second Convention was signed on 29 July 1969. It was more elaborate and it reactivated the Association in clearer and bolder terms and the "Associated" African and one or two other States realized what cooperation was all about. And Yaoundé II was a great catalyst of this surge of unity (in spite of what was sometimes severe criticism on the part of detractors who were unfamiliar with the text and failed to understand the spirit behind it), particularly as it was already apparent that the Convention was an instrument that would make it possible to "further the economic and social development of the Associated States by increasing their trade and by implementing measures of financial intervention and technical cooperation".

During this period, when Euro-African relations were redefined and ren-



Brussels, 26 July 1973: Seydina Oumar Sy (first left), Senegal's Ambassador to the EEC, discusses a point with Wenike Briggs, Nigerian Federal Trade Commissioner and spokesman for the African countries, under the watchful eye of Babacar Ba, Senegalese Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Jean Poisson, Ambassador of Niger (seated) and Benié Nioupin, Ivory Coast's Ambassador in Geneva

(1) Ambassador of the Republic of Senegal and doyen of the ACP Diplomatic Corps in Brussels.




Photo J. Guyaux

*Family snapshot: the negotiators in the Palais d'Egmont*

ewed, Europe made a Declaration of Intent, adopted by the Council of Ministers on 2 April 1963, showing its willingness to seek, in a favourable spirit, through negotiations with third countries that so desired and had economic and production structures similar to the Associated States, to conclude agreements along lines to be updated elsewhere within the framework of Protocol 22 (see below). The political import of this Declaration was clear. It was immediately followed by exploratory talks with Nigeria and with Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika and, on 24 September 1969, Uganda, Kenya and by then Tanzania signed an agreement with the EEC in Arusha, giving them trade benefits similar to those the Community gave the Yaoundé signatories.

So the opening of the Association to the Commonwealth countries does not in fact date from the UK's accession to the EEC in 1972, but from the time of the first negotiations between the UK and the Six and the bases for cooperation between the AASM and the Commonwealth countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific were ultimately very dependent on their outcome.

Although there was an AASM Secretariat-General and a Representation of the East African Community in Brussels, there was little contact between them and this meant that a certain amount of misunderstanding, some of it semantic in origin, was allowed to grow up and even remain.

So the word "Association" had a suspect ring to it as far as the English-

speakers were concerned and the divergent interests (reciprocal or reverse preferences, for example) and the fact that neither the Africans, nor the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific had any experience of working together opposite the Europeans, who themselves had fairly different Latin and Anglo-Saxon approaches to cope with, were genuine problems in the early days.

The concept of Euro-Africa, for example, was not well received by the associable countries of the Commonwealth who saw it as the perpetuation of the links of dependency of which the Yaoundé Convention was, in their eyes, a fine illustration.

### Protocol 22

Article 61 of Yaoundé II said the Convention would expire on 31 January 1975—hence the importance of Protocol 22 to the Act of the Accession to the Communities of the United Kingdom (22 January 1972), whereby the independent Commonwealth countries were given the opportunity to reformulate their relations with the EEC in the spirit of the EEC Council's Declaration of Intent of 1963. The United Kingdom was thus to bring in its wake a large number of Commonwealth countries to the negotiating table, as France and Belgium had done with their ex-colonies.

They had three options:  
— "participation in the Convention of Association which, upon the expiry of the Convention of Association signed on 29 July 1969, will govern

relations between the Community and the African and Malagasy States which signed the latter Convention;

— the conclusion of one or more special conventions of association on the basis of Article 238 of the EEC Treaty comprising reciprocal rights and obligations, particularly in the field of trade;

— the conclusion of trade agreements with a view to facilitating and developing trade between the Community and those countries".

Lastly, the Protocol made special mention of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland and the Community said it was willing to seek appropriate solutions for the specific problems arising from the special circumstances of these countries, which are in a customs union with a third country "not eligible for association" (that is to say South Africa).

The associables, which had not been sparing in their criticism of the Yaoundé policy, were going to have to make a decision on the various options. It is worth noting here that Mauritius, which stood at an English- and French-speaking crossroads, had already joined the Convention.

The countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific accepted the Community's invitation to negotiate at the same table.

### The search for cohesion

The preparatory conference at which the enlarged Community had their first discussions with the Asso-

ciated States and the independent countries of the Commonwealth thus took place in Brussels' Palais d'Egmont on 25-26 July 1973. Without any prior consultation, there were three successive speeches by Fijian PM Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara for the Pacific and Ministers Shridath Ramphal for the Caribbean and Wenike Briggs for Africa—who mentioned the eight principles adopted at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in May earlier that year.

As was to be expected, there were incredible difficulties, including one bone of contention called the system of reverse preferences, applied under the Yaoundé Convention.

Some people wanted to see this principle maintained for political reasons, while others thought reciprocity was out of the question on moral grounds, bearing in mind the inequality of the trading partners, but the Africans met in Dar-es-Salaam in early October 1973 and managed to overcome this obstacle with a surge of common political will when appeals from Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Babacar Ba, the President of the AASM Council of Ministers, enabled the differences to be ironed out.

### Speaking with one voice

The psychological misgivings which existed in spite of cultural complementary, if not common cultural origins, gradually gave way later to regular contact and consultation during the 2nd ACP-EEC Council of Ministers. The African group negotiating with the Community adopted a position seeking greater and more effective cohesion between the three parties dealing with the Community. It did this at its Council in Addis Ababa on 20-22 February 1974 and, in Brussels, on 27 March that same year, Babacar Ba, the spokesman of the African group of countries, was able to tell the Community that the outcome of the Ministerial Conference in Ethiopia was a stronger and more consolidated group. "Thus you have before you", he said, "not three groups expressing harmonized positions with one voice, but a single group of ACP countries which wanted to recognize their common destiny and the unshakeable desire to

achieve positive results at these negotiations".

This was a decisive step. One voice and one voice alone was to speak for all the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific in discussions with the Nine. It was a timely awakening. In its unequal relations with Europe, the group had realized that unity and an inter-ACP cooperation strategy alone would get results and lay the irreplaceable foundations of development.

### Lomé I

A start had been made and other ACP ministerial meetings followed Addis Ababa, in Dakar in June and December 1974 and Accra in February 1975. There were also ACP-EEC sessions in Brussels in July and October 1973, Kingston in July 1974, Brussels again in January 1975 and, lastly, on 29-31 January 1975, this time at the level of the Community and the Bureau of the ACP Council of Ministers (enlarged to include the ACP Chairmen of ministerial committees). On 28 February 1975, 44 ACP countries signed the first Lomé Convention with Europe and, in Brussels on 11 April and 16 May, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau acceded too. What a lot of ground had been covered!

The signing of the first Convention was the culmination of the joint labours of ACP and European leaders whose main characteristic was their conviction that economic cooperation based on mutual respect was one of the keys to the development of the newly independent countries. These men and women included the Ministers Babacar Ba (Senegal), Percival J. Patterson (Jamaica), Ratu Sir K. K. T. Mara, KBE (Fiji) and Major Felli (Ghana) and the Ambassadors Olu Sanu (Nigeria), Frank Francis (Jamaica), Gratien Pognon (Benin), Simon Nko'o Etoungou (Cameroon), J. O'Neil Lewis (Trinidad & Tobago), Siaka Coulibaly (Ivory Coast), Jean Poisson (Niger), K. Dagadou (Togo), Emile Kassa Mapsi (Gabon), Laurent Nzeyimana (Rwanda), Mohamed Omar Giama (Somalia) and the late Alionne Cissoko (Mali), to name but a few, and they were of inestimable importance in preparing and finalizing the work. As I represented Senegal in Brussels, from July 1973 I was able to

do my best to help the search for this new approach to North-South relations.

But opposite us we also had men and women with a similar commitment to this approach. In the Commission, Jacques Ferrandi, Hans-Broder Krohn, Maurice Foley, Jean Durieux, Erich Wirsing and Philippe Soubestre, the Deputy Chef de Cabinet of Claude Cheysson, the real leading light, generated a genuine spirit of partnership and it is one that has gone on developing, as the negotiations for Lomé II and III showed.

### The Georgetown Agreement

As Lomé I negotiations proved to be an enriching common experience, the ACPs were unwilling to give up when things were going well and they grasped the opportunity which history offered of altering the dimension of the relations between them. As Pathé Diagne wrote, they refused to be also-rans, completely dependent for their development and forced, essentially, to contribute to the equilibrium and prosperity of Europe but wanted instead to be a means of South-South cooperation.

On 6 June 1975, five months after Lomé I was signed, the ACPs sealed their "common destiny" with an agreement. The imperious necessity of having a permanent structure to deal with joint action in both cooperation between the ACP countries and relations with the Community had led the signatories of the Convention to institutionalize their Group. Its aims, as the Agreement says, are to foster and strengthen the solidarity that exists between them so as to contribute to the development of substantial, close, economic, commercial and cultural relations between the ACP States and between the developing countries in general, developing to this end an exchange of information between the ACP States in the fields of trade, technology, industry and natural and human resources, contributing to the promotion of effective regional and inter-regional cooperation between the ACP States and the developing countries in general, strengthening the links between the regional organizations to which they belong and promoting a new international economic order.

The ACPs reasserted the need for inter-ACP cooperation as thus defined a short time later, when they adopted the Suva Declaration (in Fiji) and the Montego Bay Declaration (in Jamaica) on how exchanges between them should be achieved. Genuine progress has been made since with the finalization and implementation of this ambitious programme. And we hope that, in the course of 1985, we will move on to further decisive stages in inter-ACP economic relations.

The dynamic will that has been generated and sustained over 10 years has resulted in a commitment, indeed the ambition, to create a vast geopolitical framework that goes beyond traditional relations with the EEC. Quite recently, this cooperation has been extended to include culture and human rights, perhaps, ultimately, the most significant things Lomé III expresses. This is one of the most important first results to be achieved with the Community, as man is, after all, at the very centre of all we do. There is a real feeling of satisfaction now we are celebrating the 10th anniversary of our Group—the formation of which was no easy matter, when, in spite of the higher cultural, political and economic interests we had in common, we did not know each other very well.

Like any human achievement, the Georgetown Agreement could be better. It is for the men and women whose daily work is to build this great edifice, today as they did yesterday, to get substance from it and to do so with conviction, of course, but also—and this is most important—in a spirit of brotherly solidarity. And here we have every reason to rejoice at the way things are developing in our States and among our European partners, who quite justifiably feel that the strengthening of our Group will make for better cooperation.

So the search for greater internal cohesion, a greater understanding of each other and of our economic and human problems and proper economic, political and cultural cooperation between our States is one of the most exciting tasks the ACP Group will have to accomplish over the coming decade. And it is the main condition of the success of our relations with the EEC. o

S.O.S.

# The Georgetown Agreement

Guyana, 6 June, 1975

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES, hereinafter called the "ACP Group",

HAVING CONTRIBUTED, through united and concerted endeavours to the acceleration of the process of solidarity of developing countries,

HAVING REGARD to the ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé,

TAKING into account the objectives of the international and regional organisations to which the ACP States belong,

DESIROUS of consolidating and strengthening the existing solidarity of the ACP Group,

RESOLVED to promote and develop greater and closer trade and economic relations between the ACP States,

DETERMINED to promote effective regional and inter-regional co-operation among the ACP States,

DETERMINED to ensure that the Convention of Lomé contributes fully to the realisation of the common aspirations of countries of the developing world,

RESOLVED to establish the Group of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States to achieve the above objectives as a process towards the realisation of the new international economic order,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

## The organisation and objectives of the ACP Group

### Article 1

#### The Group

There is hereby formally established the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States which shall be known as the "ACP Group".

The Members of the ACP Group shall be the African, Caribbean and Pacific States which are signatory to the Convention of Lomé and to this Agreement.

Any other State which accedes to the Convention of Lomé may become a member of the ACP Group in accordance with Article 22 of this Agreement.

The ACP Group shall have legal personality. It shall have the capacity to contract, acquire, and dispose of movable and immovable property and to institute legal proceedings.

### Article 2

#### The objectives of the ACP Group

The objectives of the ACP Group shall be as follows:

- (a) to ensure the realisation of the objectives of the Convention of Lomé,
- (b) to co-ordinate the activities of the ACP States in the application of the Convention of Lomé,
- (c) to determine joint positions of the ACP Group vis-a-vis the EEC on matters covered by the Convention of Lomé,
- (d) to promote and strengthen the existing solidarity of the ACP Group,
- (e) to contribute to the development of greater and closer trade, economic and cultural relations amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to this end to develop the exchange of information amongst the ACP States in the fields of trade, technology, industry and human resources,
- (f) to contribute to the promotion of effective regional and inter-regional co-operation amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to strengthen the links between the

respective regional organisations to which they belong, (g) to promote the establishment of a new world economic order.

## Chapter II

### Organs of the group

#### Article 3

The organs of the ACP Group shall be the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.

The Council of Ministers shall take steps to ensure a liaison with the members of the ACP States in the Consultative Assembly set up by the Lomé Convention.

The Organs shall be assisted by a General Secretariat of the ACP Group.

### The Council of Ministers

#### Article 4

The Council of Ministers shall consist of a member of the Government of each of the ACP States or of a representative designated by the latter.

#### Article 5

The Council of Ministers shall define the broad outlines of the work to be undertaken for the attainment of the objectives specified in Article 2 of this Agreement.

It shall periodically review the attainment of the objectives set out in Article 2.

#### Article 6

The Council of Ministers may delegate to the Committee of Ambassadors any of its powers.

#### Article 7

The Council of Ministers shall elect its Bureau at the end of each ordinary session of the Council of Ministers.

The Bureau shall be composed of six members designated as follows:

- four from Africa,
- one from the Caribbean,
- one from the Pacific.

The Council shall elect its President from among the members of the Bureau on a rotation basis between Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Groups.

#### Article 8

The Council of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session once in each six months.

In addition the Council may meet in special session whenever necessary on the decision of the President after consultation with all the members of the Bureau.

#### Article 9

The acts of the Council of Ministers may take the form of a decision, resolution or recommendation.

#### Article 10

Decisions made by the Council of Ministers shall be arrived at on the basis of a consensus of the members.

However, under special circumstances and after consultation, decisions may be arrived at by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Council.



*Article 11*

The Council of Ministers shall adopt its rules of procedure.

**The Committee of Ambassadors***Article 12*

The Committee of Ambassadors shall consist of an Ambassador or other representative of each of the ACP States.

*Article 13*

The Committee of Ambassadors shall assist the Council of Ministers in the performance of its functions and shall carry out any mandate entrusted to it by the Council of Ministers.

In particular the Committee of Ambassadors shall ensure the implementation of the Lomé Convention.

The Committee of Ambassadors shall present to each meeting of the Council of Ministers a report of its activities.

*Article 14*

There shall be a Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors which shall co-ordinate the work of the Committee of Ambassadors.

The Bureau of the Committee of Ambassadors shall be composed of a Chairman and five Vice-Chairmen who shall hold office for a period of six months.

*Article 15*

The acts of the Committee of Ambassadors shall take the form of a decision, resolution or recommendation.

*Article 16*

Decisions made by the Committee of Ambassadors shall be arrived at on the basis of a consensus of the members.

*Article 17*

The Committee of Ambassadors shall adopt its own rules of procedure.

### Chapter III The ACP General Secretariat

*Article 19*

The ACP General Secretariat for servicing the organs of the ACP Group shall be located in Brussels, Belgium.

*Article 19*

The ACP General Secretariat, under the authority of the organs of the ACP Group shall:

- monitor the implementation of the Lomé Convention,
- service the organs of the ACP Group and the joint institutions established under the Lomé Convention, and
- carry out such tasks as may be assigned to it by the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.

*Article 20*

The Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Committee of Ambassadors, shall determine the organisational structure of the ACP General Secretariat; and define its staff regulations.

*Article 21*

The Council of Ministers shall establish the financial regulations and the budget of the ACP General Secretariat.

Each ACP State shall contribute to the budget in accordance with provisions established by the Council of Ministers.

**Chapter IV****Final and general provisions***Article 22*

A State which accedes to the Lomé Convention may accede to this Agreement, with the approval of the Council of Ministers. The new State shall assume all the rights and the obligations arising from this Agreement.

*Article 23*

Regional bodies of the ACP States shall be entitled to participate as observers in the meetings of the organs of the ACP Group.

*Article 24*

The provisions of this Agreement may be amended by a decision of the Council of Ministers.

*Article 25*

The working languages of the ACP Group shall be English and French. A delegation may oppose the examination of any text if it has not been drawn up in both languages.

*Article 26*

This Agreement is open for signature at the ACP General Secretariat from the Sixth day of June, 1975, being the date on which the approved text, in the English and French languages, was initialled in Georgetown, Guyana.

This Agreement shall come into force two months after signature thereof by at least two-thirds of the Member States of the ACP Group.

## The Suva Declaration

Fiji, 14 April, 1977

**THE ACP COUNCIL OF MINISTERS:**

RECALLING the declaration of Heads of States, Heads of Governments and Government Ministers of ACP Countries manifesting the political will of the ACP States to strengthen cooperation among themselves for their individual and collective benefit;

CONSIDERING the steps already taken to consolidate and strengthen the existing solidarity of the ACP Group in the conclusion of the Georgetown Agreement formally establishing the ACP Group;

MINDFUL of the need to translate into practical action the principles of collective self-reliance and of self-determination by the ACP countries to reinforce their unity and capacity for joint action;

HEREBY DECLARES THE ADOPTION OF THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME OF ACTION.

### The Action Programme for Intra-ACP Cooperation

The Action Programme deals with six major sectors of cooperation among ACP countries, viz.:

(1) Transport, communications and other services;

- (2) Trade;
- (3) Development of Intra-ACP Enterprises and Cooperation in production;
- (4) Development finance;
- (5) Technology, know-how, and technical assistance;
- (6) Cultural, Scientific and Educational Cooperation.

#### 1. Transport, communications and other services

An essential complement to the development and strengthening of trade cooperation, as well as to the development of intra-ACP enterprises and cooperation in production, is the implementation of appropriate measures in the service sectors, particularly shipping, air and land transport, communications and banking, insurance and credit.

In respect of shipping and shipping services, the ACP would need to examine and to identify the particular measures necessary for assisting the following main areas:

(i) the expansion of trade between the ACP countries;

- (ii) intra-ACP cooperation in production;
- (iii) the stimulation of exports from ACP countries to third countries;
- (iv) cooperation in import policy and practice among ACP countries.

Related studies on alternative means of transport and the creation, improvement, or adaptation of port facilities, will also have to be undertaken.

The question of transportation is fundamental to the development of intra-ACP cooperation. With regard to new trade flows between the ACP countries, much will depend on the availability and cost of the transport services. Thus the ACP will need to determine to what extent the lack of these services or their cost constitutes a barrier to the expansion of trade in ACP commodities. The ACP would also need to examine the existing and potential trade routes and the cargo flow estimates to determine the traffic demands in relation to the existing shipping tonnage owned by ACP States.

With respect to the stimulation of exports from ACP to third countries, and the coordination of export policies and practices by ACP States, studies will initially centre around the considerable savings

that might be made by ACP countries from cooperative efforts in the bulk handling of homogenous cargoes moving in large quantities and the aggregation of mixed liner cargoes on a regional or sub-regional basis. Such investigations should also illustrate the economic feasibility of establishing or strengthening regional shipping lines serving the different areas of the ACP. The importance of communications networks between the ACP countries as a basic precondition for the development of intra-ACP cooperation in trade production, is all but equalled by that of the services such as insurance, banking and credit. The machinery for increased functional cooperation between these sectors of the ACP States should therefore be considered at an early stage.

## 2. Trade

Having regard to the need for a fair distribution of the benefits of such a programme among the regions of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, measures in this area must be designed with a view to:

- (i) the strengthening of the collective bargaining power of the ACP countries in their export and import trade with the industrialised countries and their ability to exploit more fully available opportunities in the markets of those countries;
- (ii) the liberalisation of trade among the ACP countries and between the ACP countries and other developing countries. The mechanism for such trade liberalisation would be the adoption of an ACP-wide scheme for the provision of a distinct margin of advantage in favour of ACPs and other developing countries' supplies from developed countries care being taken to ensure an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of the scheme among the individual participating countries. The scheme need not necessarily aim at full trade liberalisation but could be restricted to immediate and realistic targets;
- (iii) the full utilisation of those measures in the Lomé Convention (eg. as in Article 7 (2) (b) of Title I) which offer direct support to the expansion of ACP trade, of the GATT protocol of December 8, 1971 relating to Trade Negotiations among Developing Countries and other international arrangements providing special support for intra-developing countries' trade.
- (iv) the adoption of active measures of trade cooperation between the ACP States such as the conclusion of medium and long-term contractual arrangements as a means of directly expanding intra-ACP trade flows and of developing new trade flows. These arrangements can involve commitments to supply and purchase specific commodities within mutually agreed price ranges over given periods of time;
- (v) the strengthening of cooperation between ACP producers for joint action aimed at improving and stabilising prices, at cooperation in processing, at product improvement, at providing technical support and at direct marketing distribution and shipping. Such efforts would have the result of reducing the traditional dependence on the marketing systems and distribution channels of the developed countries, especially those organised through the intra-firm transactions of transnational corporations and through commodity markets or exchanges controlled by the developed countries; and of increasing the share of the value-added retained by ACP countries. Joint ACP marketing and market intelligence services should also be contemplated in this regard;
- (vi) the full exploitation of the provisions of the Lomé Convention relating to the accumulation of processing and cumulative treatment in respect of exports to the European Community;
- (vii) the identification of the possibilities for the production of and the trade in goods deriving from the particular specialisation of ACP States and the scope for complementarity between various sectors of different ACP countries;
- (viii) the identification of specific obstacles to the initiation and expansion of trade between the ACP countries and taking the necessary steps to overcome the obstacles;
- (ix) the initiation of effective intra-ACP cooperation in developing a system of payments arrange-

ments for trade, by means of a network of clearing arrangements at the regional and sub-regional levels, by the development of closer linkages between these arrangements, and by the development of closer links between the central banks of ACP countries with a view to furthering the principle of collective self-reliance.

## 3. The development of intra-ACP enterprises and cooperation in production

Central to the strategy for the achievement of the objectives of intra-ACP cooperation is the development of multinational Intra-ACP Enterprises for production. The development of such complementary productive capacity is a major precondition for the satisfactory development of the resource endowments of many ACP States, for the expansion and diversification of intra-ACP trade, as well as for the enhancement of the position of ACP trade in the markets of third countries.

Article 8(a) of Protocol No 2 of the Lomé Convention makes basic provision for financial support in the setting up of "regional and interregional enterprises"; such initial impetus as represented by these resources should be fully utilised in the achievement of this major objective.

The process of identifying opportunities for establishing such enterprises should be given immediate expert attention so that there can be early initiation of intra-ACP collaboration and negotiations for the establishment of appropriate intra-ACP enterprises in the fields of natural resources, technology, management, finance, markets etc. The balancing of the interests of participating countries should not be overlooked and emphasis might be more wisely placed on factor complementarity rather than on equity financing in the creation of these enterprises.

Collaboration should also be strengthened in relation to the development of infrastructure and services such as hydro-electric plants, road networks, telecommunications, water development, airline and shipping services, insurance, finance and banking institutions and technological and research services. Special concern for the benefits of the least developed, island and land-locked countries should continue to be a major preoccupation of such collaboration.

Regional and sub-regional plans for the production of food for home consumption should also be the subject of exchanges and collaboration between ACP countries.

As a first step, inventories of possible Intra-ACP Enterprises in all these fields should be drawn up in cooperation with regional and sub-regional financial institutions—and if possible with national development banks. The gathering of technical data essential to this exercise must be undertaken immediately, together with the organising and updating of relevant data available in U.N. Agencies and financial institutions, such as the World Bank Group.

## 4. Development finance

In the field of development finance, provisions already exist in the Lomé Convention under which direct financial support is available for the furtherance of intra-ACP cooperation. Apart from this, an early start should be made within the ACP Group to ensure greater collaboration and cooperation in respect of the individual aid programme now being established under the Lomé Convention. In addition, machinery can be instituted within the ACP Secretariat for maximising the benefits to ACP enterprises arising out of the provisions of the Convention relating to invitations to tender in respect of EEC-financed projects.

Other measures aimed at improving the availability of capital on terms more favourable to the

ACP countries might be contemplated, and whenever possible, with the cooperation of other developing countries. Intra-ACP cooperation, in the context of cooperation with other developing countries, could;

- (i) provide for balance-of-payments adjustments assistance,
- (ii) support stabilisation of commodity export prices at equitable and remunerative levels and
- (iii) serve as a framework for long-term development finance.

Experience regarding monetary and financial measures now in existence or under contemplation in various regions or sub-regions of the ACP could be shared on a systematic basis with a view to their deepening and widening for the benefit of the ACP States jointly and severally.

## 5. Technology, know-how and technical assistance

Intra-ACP technical cooperation projects are a vital part of Intra-ACP cooperation. They are already envisaged under the Lomé Convention and this can be used as a basis for the development and expansion of technology transfer among the ACP States. The measures to achieve this could include:

- (i) Increased flow of technologies and know-how evolved within the ACP or other developing countries;
- (ii) Exchange of information and expertise in respect of available technologies;
- (iii) Technical assistance, in particular through the exchange of experts, advisory services and training courses;
- (iv) the utilising of the services of engineering design and consultancy firms in ACP or other developing countries which could provide the appropriate technology and ensure the maximum component of indigenous equipment;
- (v) Collective efforts at joint projects for the acquisition and development of technologies for utilisation in more than one country;
- (vi) The elaboration of preferential arrangements for the development and transfer of technology among themselves and the establishing of regional and sub-regional centres for development and transfer of technology which could serve as essential links with centres in other countries.

A start can be made by preparing files on available expertise within the ACP countries, such files drawn up with the assistance of the regional and sub-regional groups as well as the information now available in regional and international organisations.

## 6. Cultural, scientific and educational cooperation

The development of programmes and the establishment of machinery within the ACP Group for educational, scientific and cultural exchanges must be contemplated at an early date. In this regard, the ACP Secretariat, in collaboration with appropriate regional institutions, might initially be used as a clearing house for the exchange of information as to possibilities in this field.

As far as practicable, the initial steps in the realisation of these measures should give emphasis to and be built on regional cooperation.

In all undertakings in the context of the Action Programme, the problems of the least developed, landlocked, semi-landlocked and island countries must continually be borne in mind and therefore efforts must be made to define the measures which would be of benefit to those countries within the action programme of intra-ACP Cooperation.

THE ACP STATES ACCEPT THE ABOVE AREAS AND METHODS OF COOPERATION AS CONSTITUTING THE FOUNDATION OF THEIR EFFORTS AT COOPERATION AND SELF RELIANCE, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH THEY WILL STRIVE TO BUILD A STRONG AND UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF NATIONS. ○

# Structure and functioning of the ACP Group

by N.M.C. DODOO (\*)

## Status

The ACP Group of States is basically a Third World organization. It is an inter-governmental organization comprising the developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific which have at the same time a special relationship with the European Economic Community in the Lomé Conventions.

By the end of the negotiations for the Lomé I Convention, the ACP Group of States had emerged *ipso facto* as a coherent group. The Georgetown Agreement of 6 June 1975 was to formalize the ACP Group in order to give a legal effect to its existence.

It should also be recalled that Protocol No 2 of the Lomé I Convention had recognized in its preamble that the ACP States would establish a coordinating body of a Council of Ministers, a Committee of Ambassadors and a Secretariat. The Protocol accordingly provided for the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by such coordinating bodies. There is no doubt that the Georgetown Agreement was very much influenced by the Lomé I Convention.

## Membership

The founding members of the ACP Group were the signatories of the Georgetown Agreement. These were also countries signatories to the Lomé I Convention.

In terms of Articles 1 and 22 of the Georgetown Agreement, any country wishing to accede to the Georgetown Agreement must first accede to the Lomé Convention.

At the time of the signing of the Georgetown Agreement in June 1975, there were 46 member countries which constituted the ACP Group.

During the period of the Lomé I Convention, 13 countries acceded to the Georgetown Agreement bringing the membership of the ACP Group up to 59. During the period of the Lomé II Convention, five more countries ac-

ceded to the Georgetown Agreement bringing the number to 64. The latest additions to the ACP Group were, Mozambique and Angola which became signatories to the Lomé III Convention. Thus, the ACP Group has grown from an original membership of 46 countries to 66 countries at the present time.

## Objectives

The objectives of the ACP Group as provided for in Article 2 of the Georgetown Agreement are as follows:

- (a) to ensure the realization of the objectives of the Convention of Lomé,
- (b) to coordinate the activities of the ACP States in the application of the Convention of Lomé,
- (c) to determine joint positions of the ACP Group vis-à-vis the EEC on matters covered by the Convention of Lomé,
- (d) to promote and strengthen the existing solidarity of the ACP Group,
- (e) to contribute to the development of greater and closer trade, economic and cultural relations amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to this end to develop the exchange of information amongst the ACP States in the fields of trade, technology, industry and human resources,
- (f) to contribute to the promotion of effective regional and interregional cooperation amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries in general, and to strengthen the links between the respective regional organizations to which they belong,
- (g) to promote the establishment of a new world economic order.

The first three paragraphs of the objectives of the ACP Group which relate solely to the Lomé I Convention are often cited in support of the view held in some quarters that the Georgetown Agreement seems to place more emphasis on the Lomé Convention than on intra-ACP cooperation.

The historical connection with the Lomé Convention cannot be denied. But as can be seen from the last four paragraphs of the objectives of the ACP Group, the architects of the

Georgetown Agreement were more concerned with the development of intra-ACP cooperation in particular and cooperation amongst developing countries in general. The ACP Group has always been mindful of the important role of intra-ACP cooperation in advancing the social, cultural and economic development of the ACP countries.

Towards this end, therefore, the ACP Group elaborated upon the Action Programme for intra-ACP cooperation by the adoption of a Declaration in Suva, in April 1977.

## The Suva Declaration

The Suva Declaration adopted by the Council of ACP Ministers embraces six major sectors of cooperation among the ACP States. These are as follows:

- (1) Transport, communications and other services,
- (2) Trade,
- (3) Development of intra-ACP enterprises and cooperation in production,
- (4) Development finance,
- (5) Technology, know-how, and technical assistance,
- (6) Cultural, Scientific and Educational Cooperation.

The Suva Declaration is one of the basic instruments of the ACP Group; and the Georgetown Agreement should always be read in conjunction with it.

## The Montego Bay Plan

It is important to recall that in July 1980, the Council of Ministers held a Special Session on Intra-ACP Cooperation at Montego Bay, Jamaica. There it adopted a series of decisions concerning programmes and practical measures described as the Montego Bay Plan for the Implementation of the Suva Declaration and Programme of Action.

These programmes and practical measures adopted for the advancement of intra-ACP cooperation will be a subject of review and evaluation at the Special Session of the Council of Ministers on Intra-ACP Cooperation

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EEC - DEBAIZE

*ACP-EEC Council of Ministers in session at ACP House*

due to take place in Harare, Zimbabwe, in October 1985.

### **Organs of the ACP Group**

The principal organs of the ACP Group as provided for in Article 3 of the Georgetown Agreement are the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.

#### **The Council of Ministers**

The Council of Ministers is the supreme organ of the ACP Group. The Council consists of a member of the Government of each of the ACP States or of a representative designated by the ACP State.

The Council meets twice a year.

#### **Functions**

The function of the Council is to define the broad outlines of the work to be undertaken for the attainment of the objectives of the ACP Group.

The Council examines at its meetings a report submitted by the Committee of Ambassadors in respect of the latter's activities in pursuance of

the objectives of the ACP Group.

The report of the Committee of Ambassadors covers activities in the framework of ACP-EEC cooperation, intra-ACP cooperation and internal matters pertaining to the ACP General Secretariat.

The Council also considers special reports from the ACP Sugar Ministerial Group on the Sugar Protocol as well as from the ACP Ministerial Article 108 Committee.

It should be mentioned that the Article 108 Committee under the Lomé II Convention examines the annual report on the management of Community financial and technical aid and proposes suitable measures to improve the implementation of financial and technical cooperation.

The Council also examines global issues such as the North-South dialogue, the situation in Southern Africa, and the questions of drought, famine and desertification, to mention a few.

The Council pronounces itself on the reports submitted to it. It may take note of the reports generally and the developments which have taken place.

It may, for example, endorse actions taken and adopt such decisions and resolutions as necessary. Where appro-

priate, it may give further directions, instructions and further mandates and guidelines to the Committee of Ambassadors and to the Secretariat for follow-up work. It approves the budget of the ACP General Secretariat.

### **The Presidency and the Bureau**

The Council has a Bureau of six members which is elected every six months: four from Africa, one from the Caribbean and one from the Pacific.

The Council elects its President from among the members of the Bureau on a rotation basis between Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Group.

The President of the Council presides over the meetings of the Council. In his absence, one of the members of the Bureau of the Council acts in his stead. The President of the Council is the principal spokesman on the joint positions of the ACP Group.

It is a well-established practice that the President convenes the meeting of Council after consulting the members of the Bureau. The Bureau is responsible for the coordination of the work of the Council and in particular in submitting to the Council the proposed agenda for the Council meeting.

Apart from the above, no other expressly stated powers or tasks seem to be given to the President of the Council or to the Bureau of the Council unless of course Council specifically so directs. Thus a decision of the Bureau is merely in the nature of a recommendation to Council for consideration.

### Decision-making process

Decisions made by the Council are to be arrived at on the basis of a consensus of the members. The Council seems to have experienced no difficulty in reaching a decision by consensus generally. In practice, the President of Council summarizes the conclusions of Council as he perceives them or is able to discern from the interventions in Council. Naturally, if the President's summary meets with the feeling of Council, there will be no objection or reservation. In those circumstances, the President's summary or summing up would be taken as the consensus of Council regarding the particular question, matter or issue.

Indeed even if a reservation is registered but is clearly explained or understood that it is for the record only, such a reservation does not stand in the way of a finding of consensus. It does mean, however, that a single State which is not prepared to compromise or accept the predominant prevailing view can prevent or withhold a decision being arrived at by consensus.

It is the singular achievement of the ACP Group that in its 10 years of existence it has practised the democratic approach to all matters and it has managed to secure a consensus decision. Council has been obliged, however, to resort to voting on certain occasions. The decision-making process of Council provided for in Article 10 of the Georgetown Agreement reads as follows:

"Decisions made by the Council of Ministers shall be arrived at on the basis of a consensus of the members.

However, under special circumstances and after consultation, decisions may be arrived at by a majority of two thirds of the members of the Council".

It is to be noted that voting is not mandatory. Consequently, when Council is unable to secure a decision

by consensus, initially it is not bound to have recourse to voting. It may explore all possibilities including behind the scene consultations with a view to ensuring that ultimately a consensus can be reached or that a compromise can be found when the matter is taken up again in Council.

If Council must of necessity take or find a decision, then Council may decide (which decision in itself must be by consensus) to proceed to voting. Having decided to reach a decision on a particular issue by voting, Council must be deemed indirectly or tacitly to have pronounced itself that the issue in question constitutes a special circumstance. In terms of Article 10 of the Georgetown Agreement, a decision is secured under those circumstances by a majority of two thirds of the members of the Council.

### The Committee of Ambassadors

The Committee of Ambassadors consists of an Ambassador or other

representative of each of the ACP States.

### Functions

As provided for in Article 13 of the Georgetown Agreement, the Committee of Ambassadors assists the Council of Ministers in the performance of its functions and carries out any mandate entrusted to it by the Council of Ministers. The Committee of Ambassadors, in particular, ensures the implementation of the Lomé Convention.

The Committee of Ambassadors also assists the ACP members of the ACP-EEC Assembly under the Lomé Convention in their work. This task is, indeed, important in view of the fact that these members do not have the same facilities as have their colleagues from the European Parliament.

In the exercise of these functions, the Committee of Ambassadors assisted by the ACP General Secretariat carries out such tasks and takes such actions as necessary in pursuance of the objectives of the ACP Group.

As pointed out elsewhere, the Council of Ministers meets twice a year. This means that in between sessions of



*ACP House in Brussels*

the Council, the Committee of Ambassadors is effectively the only organ for the implementation of the objectives of the ACP Group. Considered against this background and the structures designed for the organization of its work, the Committee of Ambassadors emerges as an extremely important executive organ.

### The chairmanship and the Bureau

The Committee of Ambassadors has a Bureau which is elected every six months: four from Africa, one from the Caribbean and one from the Pacific. It elects its Chairman from among the members of the Bureau on a rotation among 6 regions as follows: West Africa, the Caribbean, East Africa, Central Africa, the Pacific and Southern Africa.

The Chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors presides at all meetings of the Committee. In his absence one of the members of the Bureau of the Committee acts in his stead. The Chairman of the Committee is the principal spokesman on the joint positions of the ACP Group at the level of the Committee of Ambassadors.

The Bureau coordinates the work of the Committee of Ambassadors. It has no decision-making powers.

### Subcommittees

The Committee of Ambassadors organizes its work through the 10 subcommittees of the Committee of Ambassadors which it has established. These subcommittees handle the various subjects matters falling within the scope of the objectives of the ACP Group. The subcommittees accordingly relate to the following subjects:

1. Trade cooperation
2. Customs
3. Stabex and mineral products
4. Sugar
5. Financial and technical cooperation
6. Least developed, landlocked and island countries
7. Industrial cooperation
8. Agricultural cooperation
9. Intra-ACP cooperation
10. Administration and finance.

The first eight subcommittees are designed to monitor the implementation of the Lomé Convention and en-



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*A cross-section of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers with the author of this article, Mr Dodoo (third from left)*

sure compliance with the provisions of the Convention.

The subcommittee on Intra-ACP Cooperation initiates and undertakes such tasks as necessary in pursuance of the objective of the ACP Group in the field of Intra-ACP Cooperation.

The subcommittee on Administration and Finance handles certain internal ACP matters as concern the ACP General Secretariat, staff recruitment and budgetary questions.

In addition to the subcommittees, there may be a number of ad hoc bodies, working parties and expert groups set up by the subcommittees themselves and in some cases by the Committee of Ambassadors.

There exist, for example, certain permanent working groups within the Subcommittee on Trade Cooperation dealing with rum, bananas, General Scheme of Preferences and the evolution of ACP-EEC trade.

### The Enlarged Bureau

This is a procedural mechanism established by the Committee of Ambassadors aimed at ensuring greater preparation and effectiveness in the work of the Committee of Ambassadors. It is a meeting of the Bureau together with the Chairman of the 10 subcommittees mentioned above. It reviews the work of the various subcommittees and assists the Bureau, for example, in proposing the programme of work of the Committee of Ambassadors.

The Enlarged Bureau has no decision-making powers. It can only make

recommendations to the Committee of Ambassadors.

The subcommittees organize their own work. They meet as often as necessary when there is no meeting of the Committee of Ambassadors.

A subcommittee has its own Chairman and two vice-chairmen.

The subcommittees have no power to take decisions. They report on their work to the Committee of Ambassadors and may submit proposals or recommendations in relation thereto. Any decision based on the work of the subcommittees rests with the Committee of Ambassadors.

### Meetings of the Committee of Ambassadors

The Committee of Ambassadors meets on the average every two weeks. Among the agenda items for its consideration, the Committee of Ambassadors examines the various reports received from the subcommittees and takes a position on them. It also considers any suggestions and recommendations from the Bureau and from the Enlarged Bureau.

### Decisions of the Committee of Ambassadors

In accordance with Article 16 of the Georgetown Agreement, decisions made by the Committee of Ambassadors are reached on the basis of a consensus of the members.

It is to be noted that no voting seems to be contemplated or envisaged, and indeed none has taken place.

## The ACP General Secretariat

As provided for in Article 3 of the Georgetown Agreement, the organs of the ACP Group are to be assisted by a General Secretariat of the ACP Group.

Article 19 of the Georgetown Agreement sets out the functions of the Secretariat as follows:

“The ACP General Secretariat, under the authority of the organs of the ACP Group shall:

- monitor the implementation of the Lomé Convention,
- service the organs of the ACP Group and the joint institutions established under the Lomé Convention, and
- carry out such tasks as may be assigned to it by the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors.”

Pursuant to the enabling provisions of the Georgetown Agreement, the Council adopted the Decision relating to the Organization of the ACP General Secretariat.

This Decision is one of the basic instruments of the ACP Group although it appears not to be sufficiently known. It is to be mentioned that this instrument was a subject of exhaustive discussion at the Council meeting in Georgetown in June 1975 and was finally adopted in Malawi in December 1975.

This instrument set out in greater detail the role, the functions and duties and the organizational structure of the ACP General Secretariat. Certain functions of the Secretariat which are not specified in Article 19 of the Georgetown Agreement but feature in the instrument include the following:

“(c) to carry out the development and the application of the Georgetown Agreement;

(d) to carry out studies and submit such proposals as may assist in the steady promotion of inter-ACP Cooperation in all fields, especially trade, and the development of cooperation with other developing countries in general.”

It is significant to observe that it is this instrument which refers for the first time to the post of Secretary-General of the ACP General Secretariat.

## The Secretary-General

In accordance with its organizational structure, the ACP General Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General appointed by the Council of Ministers. Until February 1985, there was also a Deputy Secretary-General; but that post is now abolished.

As Head of the General Secretariat the Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the ACP Group. He is responsible for the staff of the General Secretariat. He is also responsible for the sound financial management of the Budget of the ACP General Secretariat.

The senior staff of the Secretariat are appointed by the Committee of Ambassadors on the recommendation of the Subcommittee on Establishment and Finance. It is to be mentioned that the Secretary-General assists the Subcommittee on Establishment and Finance in the recruitment procedures by the drawing up of a short list of the candidates.

The supporting staff of secretaries and local personnel are recruited by the Secretary-General.

## Structural organization

There are three broad divisions within the ACP General Secretariat. These are as follows:

### (1) The Trade Division

This division includes all trade questions including commodities, trade promotion and customs matters. It services the subcommittees on Trade, Trade Promotion, Customs, Stabex and Mineral Products, Sugar and the other Commodity Protocols.

### (2) The Development Division

This division services the subcommittees on Financial and Technical Cooperation and the Article 108 Committee, Industrial Cooperation, Agricultural Cooperation and the Least Developed, Landlocked and Island Countries.

It has a separate section which services the subcommittee on Intra-ACP Cooperation.

### (3) The Administration, Finance and Legal Division

This division is responsible for all

administrative, financial and legal matters. It is responsible for all conference, linguistic and secretarial services as well as for all press and information matters. It services the subcommittee on Establishment and Finance.

## The budget of the ACP Secretariat

Each year, the Secretary-General is required to present to the Committee of Ambassadors his Budget proposals for the Secretariat together with the Secretariat's programme of activities for the year covered by the Budget proposals.

After its examination and endorsement, the Committee of Ambassadors transmits the budget proposals to the Council of Ministers for consideration and adoption.

The budget of the General Secretariat is funded by contributions partly from the ACP States and partly from the EDF within the framework of the Lomé Convention.

## Submission of reports by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General is required by the Staff Regulations of the ACP General Secretariat to submit six-monthly reports to the Committee of Ambassadors on the organization and functioning of the Secretariat.

## Accountability of Secretary-General

The Secretary-General is accountable to the Council of Ministers and in the periods between their sessions to the Committee of Ambassadors.

## Remarks

As can be seen, the ACP Group is unique in concept. Its basic instruments are designed to the Group's own circumstances and situation.

The ACP Group is a clear political manifestation of South-South dialogue which had come to stay and must be preserved. Surely the ACP House in Brussels, which is the seat of the ACP General Secretariat and the nerve centre for many ACP activities, has come to symbolize this unity and solidarity and permanence of the ACP Group. ○ N.D.

# Unity and cohesion of the ACP Group

by Raymond CHASLE (\*)

In his historic speech on the occasion of the official opening of the Ministerial meeting which concluded the Georgetown Agreement, thereby officially institutionalizing the Group, the President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the late President Forbes Burnham, expressed the view that, "Although their actions and programmes should be planned in relation to their common relations with the Community, the ACP should grant absolute priority to the maintenance of cohesion among members of the group and the development of their relations among themselves and with developing countries in particular". The essence of this statement has been incorporated in the Georgetown Agreement which was adopted on the 6th June 1975.

Furthermore, at the 13th Session of the Council in Suva (Fiji) in 1977, the Council reiterated "the need to translate into practical action the principles of collective self-reliance and self-determination by the ACP countries to reinforce their unity and capacity for joint action".

## The language factor

Perhaps one of the most enriching things about the Group is the language factor. The French-speaking African countries, initially members of the Yaoundé Convention, welcomed enlargement of the association to the English-speaking countries which had forged special links with the Commonwealth with open arms.

The differences of approach which the two linguistic groups had to fundamental issues were not related to their belonging to specific linguistic blocs, but stemmed rather from the structural set-up in which they found themselves. There were also cases where conceptual differences emerged from connotations linked to certain terms, as, for example, when the English-speaking Africans were unwilling to accept the term "association" and preferred the term "partnership".

With the accession of Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola, a third linguistic group has come into being within the ACP Group. The three constituent entities of the ACP Group are culturally different among themselves, but the differences are smaller than those which exist between the ACP Group and the Community and its Member States, despite the sharing of English, French and Portuguese.

## Diverse situations and problems

The Pacific countries of the Group, despite a close relationship with Australia and New Zealand, have a special interest in delineating themselves from countries which, despite their geographical location, belong to the western world and are associated with the North.

The Caribbean countries, on the other hand, despite their links with the United States of America, also have a special interest in affirming their cultural identity and entertaining a special relationship with the African and the Pacific countries and, as members of the ACP Group, with the Community.

Many of the developing island countries of the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are hit by tropical storms of great intensity and suffer periodically from disasters. Being landlocked, as a good number of the ACP countries of the African continent are, is a serious obstacle to development and regional integration. And all those in the category of least-developed countries also have serious problems to face. They have a heavy burden of debt and are more affected by the world crisis which has brought down earnings from exports of primary products.

The diversity and particularity of these problems, which are also a permanent challenge to the Group, giving rise to much of discussion and detailed examination, have ultimately



*Wenike Briggs (Nigeria), then Federal Commissioner for Trade and spokesman for the African countries (at the opening conference of the ACP-EEC negotiations in July 1973)*

(\*) Ambassador of Mauritius in Brussels.



strengthened Group unity, with all parties closing ranks to defend their various causes together.

A distinction must be made between problems which are common to all ACP States and in respect of which the ACP sometimes make maximum demands and problems which are specific to certain countries, groups of countries or regional groups and for which special solutions have to be negotiated. There are specific protocols for this purpose and they take individual interests into account.

There is also the question of homogeneity. The ACP countries have a common determination to reduce the frailty and vulnerability of their economies. They are conscious of the need to break ties and eliminate all forms of excessive dependency. There is a com-

mon interest in protecting the relative margin of preference they have painfully secured on the markets of the Community while continuing their fight in international fora for the improvement of the fate of the populations of the Third World. This situation has been recognized in an important Resolution adopted in Manila by the Group of 77.

was held on 25 and 26 July 1973 in Brussels by the EEC on the one hand and the Associated African, Malagasy and Mauritian States plus the States mentioned in Annex VI of the Treaty of Brussels on the other, Mr Wenike Briggs, Commissioner for Trade and spokesman of the African Group, told the Community that, following the failure of UNCTAD III in Santiago, the OAU had adopted a Declaration on UNCTAD and this process had resulted in the adoption of the African Declaration on Cooperation, which defines the basic principles for collective or individual action of the African States in the field of cooperation and development.

Further, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU had, at their last summit in Addis Ababa in May

(d) the revision of provisions relating to movements of payments and capital;

(e) access to financial and technical assistance from the EEC, which should not be subjected to any particular form of relationship;

(f) free access to the Community market for all African products, including agricultural, processed and semi-processed products, whether or not covered by the common agricultural policy;

(g) stable, equitable and remunerative prices for their products on the EEC market in order to enable them to increase their export earnings;

(h) no agreement with the EEC should ever affect intra-African cooperation.

At the Brussels Conference of July 1973, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister of Fiji, spoke on behalf of Tonga, Western Samoa and his own country, saying that, although these island States were separated by hundreds of miles of ocean, they had a long common history marked by friendship and rivalry. As a result of the influence that metropolitan colonial powers exerted more and more at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th, direct contact with immediate neighbours had become less and less frequent, while new channels of communication were established with other regions. However, the situation had evolved during recent years, he stressed. Former relations had been re-established and regional cooperation reinforced thanks to the South Pacific Forum and its economic extension, the South Pacific Bureau, which had been established in 1972.

The Ministerial spokesman for the Pacific generally echoed the same concerns as those expressed by the African spokesman.

In his declaration, the spokesman for the Caribbean, Mr S. S. Ramphal, Foreign Minister of Guyana, recalled that the history of the Caribbean States and the destiny of their populations had been moulded by Spain, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, France and Denmark and that the Caribbean islands had been a theatre of European war in the 17th and 18th centuries.

It is worth recalling that the Caribbean group on that occasion com-



Jean Guyaux

*"The Caribbeans were determined to pursue the greatest possible drive for coordination and unity with the African and Pacific States"*

mon interest in protecting the relative margin of preference they have painfully secured on the markets of the Community while continuing their fight in international fora for the improvement of the fate of the populations of the Third World. This situation has been recognized in an important Resolution adopted in Manila by the Group of 77.

### Common aims and a single spokesman

At the opening conference which

1973, decided that the African States should negotiate with the EEC on the basis of the following eight points:

(a) non-reciprocity of trade and tariff concessions granted by the EEC;

(b) extension to third countries, on a non-discriminatory basis, of the provisions relating to the right of establishment;

(c) the review of rules of origin in order to facilitate industrial integration and of originating status to be conferred upon all products produced in one or more African countries on the basis of jointly defined criteria;

prised the four new independent states—Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—and the eight other members of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), the non-independent states of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, St-Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, St Lucia, Montserrat and St Vincent.

Participation of independent and non-independent states which had the status of associated states in accordance with Part IV of the Treaty of Rome was intended to appear as a distinct entity *vis-à-vis* the Community and to ensure that relations with the Community did not stand in the way, but rather be of such a nature as to facilitate the process of regional economic integration.

The Caribbeans were determined to pursue the greatest possible drive for coordination and unity with the African and the Pacific States. On behalf of the sugar-producing states of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the Caribbean spokesman requested that the Community take the necessary steps to start as early as possible on specific negotiations in respect of the import into the Community of 1.4 million tonnes of sugar. Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs had been specifically mandated by all the countries to raise the sugar issue.

Mr S.S. Ramphal declared at the third OAU Trade Ministers Conference in Dar-es-Salaam in October 1973:

"At all levels and in all forms it is an essential element of Caribbean endeavour that we should maintain and secure the largest possible area of unity with an Africa that is already united.

It is our considered belief that the united front presented to the Community on behalf of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States has dramatically altered the balance of negotiating strength around the conference table in Brussels".

At the ministerial negotiating meeting held in Brussels on 17 and 18 October 1973, Citizen Namwisi Ma Koye, State Commissioner for External Trade in Zaïre, was elected to speak on behalf of the three groups—African, Caribbean and Pacific. This was internationally recognized as a success for the whole Group, which



*"The ACP are very much alive to the possible consequences of misunderstanding or disunity while there is a need to maintain a united front and present coherent approaches"*

had adopted a unified approach. A new situation was, therefore, created which was to change the *rappports de force* and considerably reinforce the bargaining power of the Group.

It has since been the practice to have a single spokesman for the whole group of ACP countries. The President of the ACP Council is assisted by ministerial or ambassadorial spokesman who are responsible for dealing with sectoral problems or have special competence in certain specific areas.

At the above meeting, the ACP spokesman mentioned the Group's awareness of the Community's specific responsibilities on account of the geographical and historical links between the two groups of countries and the commitments entered into by the EEC and its common concern for non-interference with the formulation of their own development strategies and their own judgement of priorities. He also echoed their rejection of reciprocal trade advantages, their insistence on the free-access principle, the stabilization of export earnings from commodities, the need for overall contractual relations with the EEC within a framework acceptable to all other developing countries and the quest for more satisfactory models of relations

than those which had hitherto governed relations between developed and developing countries. It was this set of basic principles, it must be underscored, that has enabled the ACP Group to constitute itself and to maintain and develop its unity and cohesion.

### Regional and intra-ACP cooperation

This desire for cooperation has been strengthened from one Convention to another and has culminated in the enlargement and scope of regional cooperation which should reinforce the unity and cohesion of the ACP Group of States. Regional cooperation henceforth provides explicitly for inter-regional as well as intra-ACP cooperation. Article 103 of the new Convention provides not only for the assessment and utilization of dynamic complementarities, both existing and potential, in all appropriate sectors, acceleration and development within ACP regions and between the regions, but also for the reinforcement among the ACP States of a network of links between the individual countries which have common characteristics, affinities and common problems, with a view to solving them.

The common ACP positions defined in their relations with the Community are not solely directed at improving their position on the Community market and securing benefits from their links with the Community, but also at providing enlarged opportunities for reinforced cooperation and promoting regional economic integration.

### Lomé III—defining common positions

Despite the sensitive nature of such issues as women and development, refugees and returnees, the integration of the cultural dimension in ACP-EEC cooperation, sometimes diverging approaches in response to certain Community proposals relating to policy dialogue, human rights and the conflicting interests in certain mechanisms of the Convention, such as Sysmin, the ACP countries have never been conceptually so well equipped to define and defend the ACP position as they were at the Lomé III negotiations. Never before have they been so



*"Tribute must be paid to the perspicacity, statesmanship and inventiveness of ACP representatives in handling issues, narrowing down areas of disagreement and reconciling different points of view"*

intent on their quest for a more satisfactory model of relations and a more dynamic type of cooperation.

Enriched by the experience resulting from their own partnership and their joint partnership with the EEC, they had developed an awareness that they could not stake their future on the economic recovery of the countries of the North or on the pace of such a recovery. They had realized that, against the background of a situation of world crisis, characterized by inflation and recession, tensions, both political and economic and the absence of any indication of a narrowing of the gap between the North and the South on essential issues, they had to redefine the type of relations they had to enter into with the Community. Given the failure of the western model of development, they had a special responsibility to create conditions conducive to the reinforcement of national, regional and collective self-reliance and to ensure that the new Convention provided a set of measures and instruments that were supportive of the self-reliant development which would enable the whole Group to intensify its relations in meaningful spheres of ac-

tivity. Self-reliance was also understood to be a cultural process, fostering autonomy, first and foremost, and ensuring full participation in the joint decision-making process. Anything that might constitute direct or indirect intervention in the process in train therefore had to be categorically fought and rejected, without the slightest compromise. It was indeed recognition of the principle of more autonomous development as a cultural process involving greater utilization of existing capacities, the judicious prospecting and exploitation of natural resources and the need for modernization without westernization that made it possible to attenuate differences of opinion on the integration of the cultural dimension in the new relations with the EEC.

### The higher interest of the Group

Just as the ACP consider the unity and cohesion of Europe essential for its involvement in world affairs, Europe, at the highest political level, has realized that unity and cohesion of the ACP Group are to be preserved and

reinforced in the better interest of Europe, the ACP and their partnership.

The ACP are very much alive to the possible consequences of misunderstanding or disunity while there is a need to maintain a united front and present coherent approaches. Experience over the years has taught them to turn a deaf ear to divisive rumours and confusing half-truths and to be on the alert in order to resist external pressures dictated by overt or implicit strategies and interests, which, if yielded to, can only result in temporary accommodation, erosion or loss of advantage and lead in the longer term to fragmentation and disruption.

The permanent dialogue, established through the ACP institutional set-up and infrastructure, provides scope for data collection, the comparison of views and experience, the sharing of knowledge and a gradual opening to new concepts, ideas and approaches, thereby strengthening ACP positions.

In regard to the preservation and reinforcement of unity and cohesion, tribute must be paid to the perspicacity, statesmanship and inventiveness of ACP representatives in handling is-

sues, narrowing down areas of disagreement and reconciling different points of view. It is very fascinating to watch the interpersonal and intergroup psychology at play in which palaver tactics, deferral strategy, humour and even self-mockery are utilized in situations which could end up in dismay or disarray in order to avert visions of disunity, ease tension and defuse explosive issues.

More generally, ACP representatives can be said to have developed a sense of responsibility and commitment to the Group, transcending national interests, and this prompts them to refrain from intemperate initiatives and irreparable moves which can pose a threat to unity and even to existence.

### Prospects of improvement

After 10 years' existence, the ACP countries also realize they must stand back and take a lucid and self-critical look at the functioning of their institutions. They are conscious of the need for major restructuring, for a redefinition of the roles of the various institutions, for a considerable reinforcement of the Secretariat, with enhanced status and responsibilities for the Secretary-General. The Group is fully aware of the need for a fair and equitable distribution of privileges and responsibilities and has instituted a system of rotation for the presidency of the ACP Council and, with regard to the recruitment of personnel for the Secretariat, attention is paid to a fair geographical distribution of the posts. It is, however, extremely important to improve upon this situation in order that the principle of equal rights, not only for all regions but also for all individual states, is respected.

Even if effective intra-ACP cooperation is still some way beyond the horizon, the ACP are equally conscious that they must brace up to the new situation, which calls for the translation of words into deeds. It is now more necessary than ever, in the light of the problems of hunger, famine and drought, for the political will which inspired several ministerial resolutions on these issues to be given concrete expression—which can only be done by involving our capitals to a much greater extent in the work being carried out by the Group in Brussels.

In order to ensure the continued ex-

istence of the ACP Group as an independent entity representing the interests of developing countries alongside and beyond its partnership with the EEC, it is extremely important that these structural and functional changes be introduced. A proposal made a few years ago on the convening of a summit meeting of ACP Heads of State and Government has been recently revived. Such a high level meeting would give the Group the necessary political impetus.

There is growing realization among the ACP that the Group must not confine itself to reacting to proposals and leaving the intellectual input, e.g. the drafting of the Annual Report to the

following the last ACP ministerial meeting in Brussels, which spilled over to Luxembourg prior to the last Joint ACP-EEC Council in July 1985, there is growing realization that the time of hypothesis and conjecture is past.

The extraordinary ministerial meeting scheduled for Harare in October 1985, which will be devoted to a relaunch of intra-ACP cooperation, especially in anticipation of the entry into force of Lomé III, and which allows increased scope and opportunity for such cooperation, should set the scene for definite major shifts of opinion which will enable us to achieve unanimity.



MAPEZ  
 "... the comparison of views and experience, the sharing of knowledge... thereby strengthening ACP positions"

ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, to the Community.

Although there is perhaps not much cause to be proud about the appointment—or non-appointment—of the Secretary-General of the ACP, it must be acknowledged that, beyond the differences, there are points of agreement:

- (a) There is a need to adhere strictly to the principles laid down by the founding fathers of the Georgetown agreement, the instrument which has laid the foundations for the development of mutual cooperation and understanding;
- (b) the preserving of the unity of the Group and its institution is an absolute, overriding necessity, one that takes precedence over regional, national and individual considerations.

There are strong indications that,

By way of conclusion, the following extract from Alpha Yaya's article: *De-main: un exemple de coopération internationale*, which appeared in *Eurafrique* shortly after the October 1973 negotiating meeting, is, in our view, most appropriate.

"For Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the meetings with Europe to redefine their economic relations must, to a certain extent, enable them to make a fresh start. Although the present cohesion seems natural to some, it is nevertheless a victory and one that may have an impact in fields outside relations with Europe... Quelling all suspicion and wariness and doing away with all consequences of a by-gone past to make way for confidence in man... is a *sine qua non* of any decisive step towards a shared desire". ○

R.C.

# The ACP Group and the European Community

by Harold SAHADEO (\*)



*The ACP group face to face with the Community, partners firmly linked by friendship and cooperation*

The ACP and the EEC countries have just celebrated 10 years of cooperation under two Lomé Conventions and have signed a third Convention which will be effective up to February 1990. The ACP-EEC relationship has resulted in the institutionalization of the ACP Group of States with the signature of the Georgetown Agreement on June 6 1975. On the 10th Anniversary of the signature of the Georgetown Agreement it is an honour and a privilege for me to hold the office of Chairman of the Committee of Ambassadors, one of the organs established in the Agreement charged with the achievement of the objectives of the Group.

With the experience of the implementation of Lomé I and II one can take stock of the achievements of ACP-EEC cooperation and look at the prospects for the new Convention. The Lomé I Convention which improved on its predecessors, the Yaoundé Conventions and the Arusha Agreement, was proclaimed as a "model" of relations for industrialized and developing countries. While

the model has not been copied by other developed and developing countries, it is nevertheless used by the Community as a guide in defining its relations with other Third World countries, notably the Maghreb and Mashreq states in the Southern Mediterranean. It has also enabled the Community to plan a coherent approach to the challenge of enlargement with the forthcoming membership of Spain and Portugal of the Community.

The deteriorating economic situation in many ACP countries and the worsening food crisis with the drought and famine in the Sahel region of Africa have influenced the course and content of the negotiations for the third Convention. While the mood in the developing countries focussed on development, their more urgent objective is the survival of their economies.

The countries of the ACP Group occupy some of the most strategically important areas of the world. The Caribbean countries hold the key approaches to the western hemisphere. As A. T. Mahan, writing on the colonial wars of the European powers in the 18th century, noted: "the real military

usefulness of the West Indian ports in this war was as an intermediate base between Europe and the American continent..."<sup>(1)</sup> What was true of the Caribbean at the time of the American revolution is still relevant in the nuclear age. Again, according to Allen, Rummel and Wessels, the Lomé Convention provides the Community with a particularly useful collective instrument to develop a new independence of world economies<sup>(2)</sup>. A former President of the European Council of Ministers described the Convention as a "unique system of cooperation of the highest political significance and which we regard as our common heritage"<sup>(3)</sup>.

European involvement in the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries has a long history dating from the discovery of the New World in the 15th century with the settlements of European colonists in the islands of the

(1) Mahan, Alfred Thayer — *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1660-1783)* — Little, Brown & Company, New York, 1980.

(2) Allen, Rummel and Wessels — *European Political Cooperation: Towards A Foreign Policy For Western Europe* (Butterworth, London, 1982).

(3) *The Courier* — ACP-EEC Convention, Lomé III, January/February 1985.

(\*) Ambassador of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors.

Caribbean and the mainland in the 16th and 17th centuries, the development and growth of the sugar industry in the 18th century resulting in the forced migration of the people from the African continent with the dreaded "middle passage" culminating with their enslavement on the plantations.

### The Lomé I and II Conventions

The Lomé I negotiations were conducted between 46 ACP and nine EEC countries. Christopher Stevens has noted that, for the negotiations, the colonial factor mentioned above was modified in two important respects<sup>(4)</sup>. One was the desire of some Community states for Europe to have its own "sphere of influence" expanding through the Mediterranean to Africa. The other was the difference in economic structures between the former colonies in Asia and Africa and, one might add, the Caribbean and Pacific states. The Community was willing to extend a preferential trade régime to the ACP states since they would only be able to take limited advantage of it. The catalyst for the first negotiations was the British application for membership of the European Community. The long and arduous sessions held between ACP and EEC representatives produced an agreement providing for cooperation, with the free access of ACP products to the Community, the principle of non-reciprocity acknowledged and the softening of the rules of origin. Restrictions in the trade regime were applied to ACP products which could compete with Community farm products protected under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the possible use of the safeguard clause, which reserves the right of the Community to suspend free access if this led to serious disturbances or jeopardised financial stability.

Special trade protocols were negotiated in Lomé I for products of interest to the ACP such as sugar, rum and bananas, thus preserving the traditional pattern of ACP trade with the enlarged Community. The protocol on ACP-EEC sugar has been described as the backbone of ACP-EEC coopera-

tion. The sugar protocol has a unique place in ACP-EEC relations. The protocol itself is of unlimited duration and its application reaches beyond all the Conventions so far signed. It guarantees the purchase of agreed quantities of sugar, 1.3 m tonnes, from ACP sugar-producing countries at a price to be negotiated with the Community. The implementation of the sugar protocol has however led to disappointment for ACP countries who became dissatisfied with the annual negotiations on the price for their exports. They claimed that they were frequently not able to negotiate the guaranteed price offered by the Community and the promise of consultations between the two sides was honoured more in the breach than in the practice.

The rum protocol seeks to preserve the interests of traditional suppliers of this product. Here also problems arose over the question of quotas and the

Lomé II, in the words of one of its negotiators, represented an improvement, though modest, on Lomé I. Some of the improvements in the trade field were the better terms of access for bovine meat and the provision of higher annual rates of increases in the quotas for rum. The STABEX list was extended to cover more products with more financial resources.

SYSMIN was instituted to assist ACP states which have suffered a decline in their capacity to export mineral products to be able to re-establish the viability of their mining sectors or to remedy the harmful effects of serious disruptions affecting these sectors and beyond the control of the states themselves. The implementation of SYSMIN in ACP countries raised hopes of the system's ability to maintain productivity of mineral resources and secure a good level of earnings. It is expected that the SYSMIN scheme



*Harold Sahadeo attending a meeting at ACP House*

absence of an EEC definition of what constitutes rum.

On the other hand the scheme for the stabilization of export earnings, STABEX, one of the innovations of the Lomé Convention, experienced greater success. STABEX does not stabilize the prices for the products to which it is applied, but it helps ACP states by guaranteeing a stable level of earnings determined according to criteria laid down in the Convention. Disbursements of funds to recipient states were often quicker than for other schemes.

can be transformed into a success story during the course of the present Convention.

Other areas of cooperation in Lomé II, notably fishing and industrial cooperation, did not achieve their objectives. The hopes of greater diversification of ACP-EEC industries and the development of small and medium sized enterprises in the ACP states with EEC participation did not materialize.

A significant initiative undertaken by the Commission during the Lomé II period was the proposal by Mr Pis-

(4) Stevens, Christopher — *The New Lomé Convention: Implications for Europe's Third World Policy* (CEPS, Bruxelles, 1984).

ani to promote food self-sufficiency and food security in certain ACP states. The proposal meant a switch from large-scale capital projects to the promotion of rural development schemes in the countries to which it is applied. This was a noteworthy initiative which should be extended to cover more ACP countries and to increase regional and sub-regional food production. The concept of food strategies should be implemented with greater vigour during the lifetime of Lomé III.

### The Lomé III Convention

The ACP Group in September 1983 approached the negotiations for a new Convention conscious of the economic crisis facing most of their countries and the expectation that if cooperation with the Community could not promote genuine economic development at least it could establish the means for survival. Several innovations were introduced in the Third Convention in addition to the acquired benefits, the "acquis", of the previous two Conventions.

The Lomé III Convention spells out the underlying political principles and objectives of cooperation—promoting and expediting the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states and to consolidate and satisfy their relations in a spirit of solidarity and mutual interest; the exercise of ACP-EEC cooperation on the fundamental principles of equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence. ACP States should determine their own development principles, strategies and models for their economies and societies; emphasis should be placed on more self-reliant and self-sustained development based on their own cultural and social values, their human capacities, their natural resources and their economic potential.

The fourth clause in the preamble to the Convention stressed that both sides reaffirmed "their adherence to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations" and their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women of all nations, large and small.

In the trade field the regime for sugar and bananas continued, the former

with the problem of price negotiations. Improvements have been made in areas such as rum, rice and bovine meat. There is also the possibility to coordinate aid and trade through the food aid programme, sectoral programmes and food strategies. The critical concern for ACP States is to convert these promises into realities.

The two sides have also agreed on the important subject of agricultural products. There are two facets in this field. The first is the preferential access of ACP agricultural products in the Community market. The Community has undertaken to give speedy replies (within six months) to such requests and applications for more favourable tariff arrangements and will take account of concessions granted to other developing countries and the possibilities of exporting in the off-season. The second is the request by the ACP to purchase available agricultural products in the Community at preferential prices. An expert group will study and make recommendations on the sale of these products such as wheat and rye flour and dairy products.

The agreement on private investment in sectors such as industry, fisheries, shipping, cultural and social exchanges, if realised during the implementation of Lomé III, would make a great impact on ACP-EEC cooperation.

Perhaps the key area in ACP-EEC cooperation is that of financial and technical assistance, where the record over the past 10 years calls for improvement. The modest outlays for a group of countries which has increased from 46 in 1975 to 66 in 1985 have not been disbursed to the satisfaction of the ACP States. For Lomé II, ECU 4 636 m were provided for aid to the ACP. However, up to the end of 1984, only ECU 3 102 m have been identified as commitments and ECU 1 454 m actually disbursed.

It is evident that the aid procedures with the EDF should be streamlined to attain the objectives of the Third Convention. Both sides should ensure that the provisions of the Lomé III Convention, the scope and management of projects and programme, in ACP states, the joint evaluation, the ending of bureaucratic red tape should lead to effective implementation of financial cooperation, in areas such as

STABEX, SYSMIN and the national indicative and regional programmes.

### Implementation of the Convention

The highest authority established under the Convention is the Council of Ministers of the two sides which meets annually. The proceedings of the Council are valid only if half the members of the Council of the European Communities, together with one Member of the Commission and two-thirds of the members representing ACP Governments are present. As far as is known, this legal provision has been observed. However not much acrimony has been shown in recent years by several ministers who delegated the task of attendance to their representatives. The nature of the Council's work over the recent years has become stereotyped and is repetitive of the negotiations already conducted by the Committee of Ambassadors. There is urgent need to review the agenda of the Council to ensure that this institution supervises the working of the Convention and takes measures necessary for the attainment of its objectives.

The ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors meets every six months and is now more active in the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. The relations between representatives of the ACP Group and the officials of the Commission have been marked by a close camaraderie. This has contributed to the quick settlement of many problems in ACP-EEC cooperation. The Consultative Assembly took important initiatives in the renewal of the Convention to widen the scope of cooperation and to include topics such as world hunger, the situation in Southern Africa, the struggle against apartheid and the establishment of a new international economic order.

The tasks of ACP-EEC representatives in the implementation of Lomé III will not be easy. They have been charged under the new Convention to make man the centre of cooperation. They will need to devise new approaches, build new bridges of understanding between the poor nations of the south and the industrial economies in the north to achieve real progress after a decade of working together. ○

H.S.

# INTRA-ACP COOPERATION

## “The future solution lies in what we can do among ourselves”

by Joseph W.N. NYAGAH (\*)

Many observers of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) see the Group simply in terms of its relationship with the European Community and, therefore, with the Lomé Conventions. This is hardly surprising as it is this aspect of ACP activities which receives maximum publicity; unfortunately this may also promote the limited view that ACP exists to secure and develop an aid-trade relationship with the EEC. As we celebrate this year the tenth anniversary of the founding of our Group, it is important that we now begin to focus more than we have done in the past on another aspect of ACP activity, viz, South-South cooperation. Experience and history have amply demonstrated the mutual benefits obtained by member states of such organizations as the EEC, OECD and COMECON in the northern hemisphere. Surely the success of these organizations must stimulate the ACP Group to attempt a similar achievement.

The ACP Group is part and parcel of the Group of 77 of Non-Aligned States. All our efforts must, therefore, be seen as an attempt to supplement or support the larger goals of the Group of 77. One major goal for the Group of 77 is to encourage increased South-South cooperation in all areas, in addition to North-South dialogue. The ACP Group must reinforce this goal and in this respect is fortunate in having one added advantage over and above all the other international organizations of the Third World—it has a permanent structure in Brussels. The developing countries should, therefore, take full advantage of this existing structure. They should also take advantage of the special relationship that exists between the ACP and the European Communities in their attempts to reach the larger goals.

For the ACP Group to achieve its

(\*) Ambassador of Kenya, Chairman of the Intra-ACP Cooperation sub-committee.

targets in the South-South cooperation, it requires the involvement of not only the national institutions, but also the regional institutions located in the ACP countries. Many of the regional organizations concentrate their efforts on solving the problems peculiar to their own areas and fields of competence. The ACP is supra-regional and must, therefore, act as a coordinator in assimilating the various regional contributions towards an intra-ACP goal. The ACP Group, therefore, plays a catalytic role in bringing all these groups together. This catalytic role must be emphasized if the intra-ACP cooperation goals that we have set for ourselves are to be reached. It is of prime importance that we involve our regional organizations in most of our future meetings and seminars in order to be thoroughly conversant with the objectives of our regional groups and to discuss the implementation of these objectives. Only then can we face the European Community and others and speak with real authority.

The ACP Group has set up a programme of action in order to foster further cooperation among its members. But before we look at this planned programme, a brief review of our past activities is necessary.

### Past activities

The Georgetown Agreement which formally set up the ACP Group foresaw the need for intra-ACP cooperation. The coming together of so many countries, with varied backgrounds, was in itself a major achievement. It is not, therefore, surprising that within a short time the Group passed the *Suva Declaration and Programme of Action* (1977) which identified the following six priority areas for cooperation:

- i) transport, communications and other services;
- ii) trade;
- iii) development of intra-ACP enterprises and cooperation in production;
- iv) development finance;
- v) technology, know-how and technical assistance; and
- vi) cultural, scientific and educational cooperation.

The Group has since arranged several meetings, seminars and studies focussing on these priority areas. The *Montego Bay Plan* (1979) attempted to give some practical application and direction to the Suva Declaration. Although the ACP has been accused of holding too many meetings “with no actual results”, it has nevertheless been necessary to have them in order to give it direction. Without these meetings and studies, we would not have been in a position to make the various decisions that we have made in this field.

It is sometimes difficult to define the success or failure of a meeting. But if we look at it from the point of view that the ACP is acting as a catalyst to ensure that the broad goals of the



“This catalytic role must be emphasized if the intra-ACP cooperation goals that we have set for ourselves are to be reached.” J. Nyagah with (right) the doyen of the ACP Ambassadors, Seydina Oumar Sy



Group of 77 are achieved, then it has met with much success. For example, in the field of air transport over the last decade, inter-regional movement has been considerably facilitated. We are not claiming that this is because of the two meetings (at Bangui and Addis Ababa) which the ACP organized on air transport services, but they must have contributed to the little success. The forthcoming similar meeting, to be held at Paramaribo, Suriname in September 1985, will also go some way in encouraging intra-ACP airline and civil aviation cooperation. It is with this goal in mind that we are requesting the governments to send the chief executives of their airlines and directors of civil aviation departments to this meeting in order to ensure effective follow-up on the various decisions on their return to their capitals. We are also hoping for a large representation from all the three regions. This is because the last similar meeting at Addis Ababa was attended primarily by African delegations. We are also expecting that there will be good mix of airline and civil aviation personnel in order to have a fuller and more balanced discussion. This would lead to more practical recommendations which can be more easily implemented in the ACP capitals.

In the field of trade, the ACP Group has made some good progress and has gone beyond the stage of the Nairobi, Montego Bay, Lomé and Brussels meetings. A Conference of the ACP Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Other Economic Operators was set up in July 1983. It currently has a liaison office in Nairobi. The Conference has been encouraging each region to set up a Chamber and in this field it has been successful. It has also been encouraging the establishment of these Chambers in those countries where they did not exist. In those regions such as Eastern and Southern Africa, where there were overlapping Chambers or similar institutions, the Conference is involved in coordinating them. Finally, the liaison office is currently involved in the exercise of compiling a directory of all its members. Such a directory is an essential item if inter-regional business is to flourish. All these are positive actions but there have also been some drawbacks. These include lack of funds to undertake all the intended programmes. The current Pre-

sident has been using his own national Chamber's funds to keep the institution going. The meagre \$ 100 annual contributions from members have come in very slowly. The result is that the Conference has not achieved as much as it had expected to by now. It is expected that soon the EEC will finance a consultant to assist the Conference in laying its foundation properly. Even securing this assistance has been slow due to bureaucratic delays. It is expected that following the completion of the consultant's work, a meeting of the Steering Committee, and then the full Conference, will be held.

The ACP Trade and Investment Bank project has been in the pipeline for some time. This project was considered a priority when it was realized that no matter how much political goodwill existed, without finance nothing would materialize. The establishment of such a Bank was recommended by a UN Group of experts but the ACP Group wanted to be more certain that it would work. Consequently a Jamaican consultant was appointed to study the project in greater detail. This report will form the basis of future discussion and decisions insofar as this project is concerned. We would expect that a final decision on this will be made by the ACP Council at Harare in October 1985. The political goodwill for the Bank project to be approved is there, although there would be much work to be tackled before it became operational.

Two meetings were held in 1981 and 1982 in Brussels to study the questions of technology, know-how, technical assistance and cultural, scientific and educational cooperation. Some of the ideas and concepts which emerged from these meetings formed the basis of the negotiations for Lomé III. A good example is the new cultural chapter in the Lomé III Convention. Many of the recommendations which were made by the two seminars will take some time to implement. The ACPs must be prepared to provide the information that is required in order to complete some of the work. Information gathering within the ACP Group is often a slow process and efforts must be made to overcome this problem otherwise our work will be delayed. Despite this problem the ACP recently produced a directory of

institutions of higher learning in their countries. This was yet another valuable achievement.

As can be seen, the ACP Group has met with some degree of success in spite of the lack of funds, the lack of reliable information and an over-dependence on the North; this success can be attributed to members' desire for cooperation. We shall now turn to the future and see how we can move even faster in the field of intra-ACP cooperation as we enter our second decade.

### Future plans

Despite the criticism that "the ACP holds too many meetings", this is an approach that we shall continue to use—primarily because this is the only way in which we can bring the various groups together. The regional organizations form the basis of our intra-ACP cooperation and we shall have to involve them more and more in our arrangements. It will be necessary to invite them to participate in our discussions with other groups and to cooperate with them later at the implementation stage. The future will, therefore, see more meetings involving experts such as the one planned for air transport services. The general governmental officials and diplomats will, of course, continue to lay the policy guidelines. The more we are able to organize such meetings and seminars, the more we will be able to play the role of the catalyst. Important scheduled activities in the coming year include the following:

#### a) ACP Air Transport Services meeting

To be held in September 1985 at Paramaribo, Suriname. This is a follow-up meeting to the earlier ones held in Bangui and Addis Ababa. This meeting is expected to come up with practical recommendations which the participants will be expected to implement on their return to their countries. The expected participants normally meet in other forums such as AFRAA, AFCAC, CARICOM, IATA and ICAO, but a meeting under the auspices of the ACP should encourage and strengthen South-South cooperation. The subjects to be covered by this meeting will include:

- the establishment and strengthening of coordinating bodies at intra-ACP levels;

- operational measures to be undertaken; and
- developmental measures to be undertaken.

## b) Special session of the ACP Council on Intra-ACP cooperation

Scheduled to be held at Harare in October 1985. The purpose of this ministerial meeting will be to review the progress achieved so far in this field. The session is also expected to give new impetus and direction to our future cooperation activities. The six areas that were identified by the Suva Declaration will be analysed in great detail together with any new ones that might be introduced. Preparations for this meeting are already under way.

This is a crucial meeting as it will devote most of the time to this single subject—a clear indication of the importance which the ACP Group attaches to South-South cooperation. The session will include representatives of many of our regional organizations involved in such wide activities as transport, trade, finance, agriculture, remote sensing, education, etc., in addition to our regular national government officials.

## c) 10th ACP anniversary celebrations

As we celebrate our 10th anniversary, it is our hope that the interest in ACP that will be generated will result in bringing our people closer together. Part of the problem of the ACP is that not too many people know about it, even in our own countries. The publicity associated with the anniversary will, hopefully, correct this situation. Once more officials of our governments are aware of ACP and its aspirations, then it will be easier for them to understand the need for cooperation with their other ACP colleagues.

The celebrations will be used to reach not only the officials but journalists, the general public and even schoolchildren in our own countries. We shall be organizing a quiz for our high school children which will focus on knowledge of ACP countries. We plan to arrange a seminar for journalists from ACP countries to expose them to the Lomé Convention and our intra-ACP aspirations. Finally, we plan to have a special issue of stamps in our countries in addition to a press and publicity campaign.

We hope that as a result of these celebrations our people will be more aware of the ACP Group and consequently cooperation will be increased.

## The role of the European Community

As argued from the beginning, many observers see the ACP in terms of its relationship with the EEC. Indeed, we are in daily contact with each other and we aim to continue to work closely with the EEC in our implementation of intra-ACP activities. The EEC is a North-North cooperation arrangement and it therefore understands when we also talk about South-South dialogue. The EEC, using the European Development Fund (EDF) regional fund, is already active in this area. Some of the projects already mentioned above, plus others, have benefited, both financially and technically, from these EDF regional funds and the Lomé III Convention has placed an even greater sum of money under the EDF.

For the future, it is of prime importance that the ACP should try as far as possible to identify regional projects along the lines of the Suva Declaration priorities. It is essential that the regional projects are selected with careful attention to these priorities. The EEC, which also utilizes the same funds, must identify its projects using similar guidelines. Finally, we welcome cooperation in the field of fight-

ing famines and desertification in Africa—both important ventures which the regional fund will be financing.

The ACP Group should be able to exist with or without the Lomé Conventions. It is for this reason that we should use all the means available from the EEC and others, in order that we may strengthen our institutions. We have no reason to believe that Europe would be unhappy with this. If anything, the Europeans normally give us encouragement because they recognize the complementarity of such an arrangement. It is often claimed in many international forums that our present joint arrangement is a model in North-South dialogue. In the end our success would also be the success of the European Community.

## Conclusion

The Lomé Conventions have given us a good opportunity to come together and work with our European partners. We should take advantage of this coming together in order to forge more links at the intra-ACP levels, and indeed with the other Third World countries. After 10 years we know most of our handicaps but one of our greatest strengths is the *political goodwill* to stay and work together.

We have already made an impressive beginning in intra-ACP cooperation, but much remains to be done. It is essential to complete the work on restructuring the Secretariat, incorporating the various recommendations that have been made in the past. The end product will be a strong intra-ACP Cooperation department which will be responsible for the organization of our work in the coming years.

We must make dramatic efforts in our cooperation. The Lomé III negotiations in the field of trade were extremely difficult. We must assume that the next negotiations in trade areas, especially following the enlargement of the EEC, will be even more difficult. The future solution, therefore, lies in what we can do among ourselves. It is the political goodwill referred to above that we shall require in abundance as we go to Paramaribo, to Harare, as we celebrate our 10th anniversary, and, finally, as we enter the next decade. ○

J.N.



Photo: Ministry of Information - CAR

*A cross-section of the first ACP experts meeting held in Bangui (CAR) in 1978 on Transport and Communications in the ACP States*

# The ACP Group and its future in the wider international context

by Edwin W. CARRINGTON<sup>(\*)</sup>

The Tenth Anniversary of the ACP Group is a genuine occasion for congratulation as well as for reflection. This Grouping of 66 developing countries—45 from Africa, 13 from the Caribbean and 8 from the Pacific—emerged on the international scene in 1975 through what could be considered a quirk of history. It was European commercial, military and cultural rivalry from the 16th to 19th centuries that had divided and built up insuperable barriers between the peoples of these countries. And it was European reunification, particularly in the form of the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community that was to initiate a process that led to the coming together of these countries and peoples.

In this re-linking process, there was always a historical emotional undertone, particularly due to the relinkage of the African with those of the Caribbean. In a sense, their coming together symbolized a reversing of the "middle passage"—the route through which Caribbean slave economy was supplied by European entrepreneurs with African labour for the production of rare staples—sugar, indigo, etc.—for European profit. The important role which sugar again played in this recent coming together is no mere reminder or coincidence. It is more so an eloquent testimony to the slave/colonial legacy of the bulk of these societies and economies.

The creation of the ACP Group would be of dubious value if it were to leave unchanged the root elements of that condition, or worse yet, would be definitely pernicious if it were to represent merely a ratooning of that historical situation.

## The ACP – its membership and numerical importance

The ACP is comprised of 66 developing countries. This represents ap-

<sup>(\*)</sup> Deputy Secretary-General from 1976 to February 1985 and since then interim Secretary-General of the ACP Group.

proximately 40% of the UN membership and half of the developing world of sovereign nations. Thus in the "Group of 77" the ACP contribute well nigh one half of the membership and nearly the same in the Non-Aligned Movement.

As members of the UN family, the ACP contribute in nearly the same proportion to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and somewhat less to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Only 34 of the 66 ACP States are members of the GATT. The ACP are also equally numerous in their participation in UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, the International Trade Centre (ITC), and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ACP enjoys formal observer status at the United Nations.

Given the interregional composition of the Group, its members, not surprisingly, can be found in a number of groupings, apart from those of the UN family. In some cases, the entire membership of the Group is made up of ACP States. In Africa, all countries south of the Sahara with the obvious exception of South Africa, are members of the ACP Group. Thus, the OAU (Organization of African Unity), the ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) are comprised of states which are nearly all ACP States. For regional groupings such as ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), the CEAO (Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest), the Mano River Union, UDEAC (Union Douanière Economique de l'Afrique Centrale) and the CEPGL (Commission Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of East and Southern Africa, all the members are ACP States.

In the Caribbean, all but one Member State of CARICOM (Caribbean Community) — namely, Montserrat — are members of the ACP. All but two are also members of the OAS (Or-

ganization of American States), at least five of them are members of SELA (Latin American Economic System), and all thirteen Caribbean ACP States are members of the CCDC (Caribbean Coordinating Development Committee).

In the Pacific, the eight ACP States are members of the eleven-member SPEC (Bureau of the South Pacific for Economic Cooperation).

In a North-South context, 29 of the ACP States are members of the Commonwealth Group, while at least 21 are members of the Franco-African Summit.

Finally, it is through their relationship with the EEC as set out in the Lomé Convention, that the Group found its basis for coming into being. Taken overall, it is clear that the ACP Group of States, with its population of 410 million or 15% of the developing world's population, belongs to a plethora of groupings and that these memberships provide wide scope for influencing others, as well as for being widely influenced in regard to a number of international issues.

## Weight and direct influence

The ACP's weight of membership in these various bodies does not correctly reflect the weight of direct influence of ACP States in most of these bodies. Invariably, the membership weight far exceeds the direct influence which the ACP States may be able to exercise in such bodies. Apart from the purely ACP bodies and bodies of nearly total ACP membership, this is almost always certainly the case. In all UN bodies, for example, this phenomenon of large numbers and modest if not small direct influence would be present. This is another way of saying that small, poor countries have limited direct influence in international affairs. The ACP has within its grouping, some of the smallest states of the world, and three-quarters of the world's least developed, according to the UN list.

But there is a distinction which can be made between direct influence in the sense of power, and general influence in the sense of example and precept. And in this latter sense, the ACP's general international influence may be much greater than its direct influence.

This flows from the fact that the ACP is not without its significant achievements. First of all, while the possibility of coming together was offered by the events of the early '70s regarding European integration, the grasping of that opportunity and its effective utilization, was by no means automatic or inevitable. After so many hundred years of colonialism, it might have been more in the nature of things if rivalry, suspicion and division, etc, had taken the upper hand and led to segmented and fragmented approaches to the establishment of new relationships with the EEC, by the various geographic regions. That the ACP statesmen of the day chose the route they did and went even further and institutionalized the ACP Group, set the Group the objectives they did, and created the institutional structures they did, does call for recognition and acclamation of the wisdom and vision of the Group's Founding Fathers.

That the Group has survived ten years despite all its internal differences and the external pressures to which it is subjected, is not only a cause for some measure of self-congratulation, but also a sign of hope. The fact that, over the period, the Group has negotiated two more Lomé Conventions and adopted a cooperative self-reliant charter for development (the Suva Declaration and Programme of Action) provides some basis for the realization of that hope.

### Achievements

What exactly is there in these achievements to justify hope — if indeed hope is ever based on justification?


In its preparations for its negotiations for a Third Lomé Convention, the ACP Group itself acknowledged that:

"It is one of the achievements of international relations at the particular juncture of the last quarter of the 20th century that the leaders of the Member States of the European Economic Communities, on the one hand, and of the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, on the other, successfully negotiated for their peo-

ples, an arrangement which, with some justification, could claim to have taken a significant step towards establishing a new model of relations between developed and developing states, compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order."

Putting together as they did, a legally-binding contractual agreement, on the basis of equal partnership, incorporating the features of preferential treatment for the ACP and non-reciprocity in their trade relations, an operational mechanism for stabilizing a major part of the ACP States' export earnings, all reinforced by a commitment to transform industrially the economies of the ACP States, have taken the relationship, created and implemented by the ACP and the EEC, beyond that existing anywhere else in the international community.

Even the approach to this relationship, namely Group to Group, genuine negotiations and not gratuitous conferment of a beneficial entitlement from one group on another, goes further than other approaches as far as a basis for establishing equitable relationships between the developed and developing countries is concerned.



*Edwin Carrington with Mr Rabbie Namaliu (PNG), President of the ACP Council of Ministers during the last phase of the negotiations for Lomé III*

The priorities set out in the Suva Declaration and Programme of Action, namely, cooperation in trade, transport and communications, development finance, joint production, technology and technical assistance and in education, science and culture, reinforce the North-South Cooperation enshrined in the Lomé Conventions. The initial efforts, such as the establishment of the Federation of ACP National Chambers of Commerce, Industry and other Economic Operators, designed to give substance to these undertakings, call for full support and acceleration.

All has, however, not been success for the ACP. And in a number of ways, the Group stands in danger of falling victim of its limited success to date, against the background of hopes which may be somewhat exaggerated.

There was no doubt that the arrival of the Group on the international scene in the early 1970s with its unique progress in North-South relations, which the Lomé I Convention signified, raised hopes of the Group being in a sense a champion for Third World aspirations and not merely a privileged club. For that and for a number of other reasons such as its embracing of the bulk of the world's

least developed countries, its inclusion of many of the world's smallest and newest nations, its ambitious interregional composition, its initiative in establishing its own institutions, especially a Secretariat, of which the wider Third World have been speaking for nearly two decades without action, many felt that the Third World may have found its pacemaker.

The Group, not surprisingly, enjoyed a certain honeymoon in the international community. But this particular honeymoon—like all others—has come to an end, and the ACP is now expected to deliver. It is now expected to make its full contribution in the UN agencies, and in the regional bodies of which its states are members. Specifically, one of its key bodies, viz. its Secretariat is expected by the international community to develop into a Centre

of Excellence which alone would justify the faith and the hopes which its creation implied.

In all these areas the ACP is, however, yet to justify these hopes. Indeed, some of them are somewhat outside its scope. For one thing, it must be noted that the ACP does not function *as a group* within the wider international bodies in which it enjoys membership. It does not in any formal sense, or systematic manner serve as a "similarizing" agent among the various regional units, in the sense of orienting them to share a common or at least similar position on the major international issues of the day. This would have resulted in the putting forward of a common viewpoint when the various regions come together in wider fora, and thus in a greater influencing of international positions. As a Group, the ACP has hardly ever been endowed with such a mandate (1).

On the other hand, there is a grave danger at times of ACP States taking positions at wider international fora diametrically opposed to those to which they subscribe as ACP Group, within their closer ACP/EEC relationship. In part this is due to the fact that the logical technical and ethical justification of the special derogation which fully justifies the ACP/EEC arrangements has not been sufficiently clearly and widely spelt out despite the adoption of principles such as that enshrined in decision N° 96 of UNC-TAD (2).

The ACP is therefore yet to fulfill, in the international arena, the positive role which its large number makes possible and justifies. Also, it is yet to remove lingering doubts about what is sometimes perceived and misconstrued as inconsistency between its position and that of the Group of 77. There is, of course, no real inconsistency.

At the regional level, save in relation to negotiations for the Lomé Convention, the Group has not drawn

(1) It should not be expected that the ACP, as a Group, would be able to pursue all aspects of international economic cooperation among all its members. The specific tasks which the Group must undertake as a Group, must be realistically and clearly reaffirmed.

(2) In that decision, the need for special treatment to be granted to certain countries among the developing countries is fully recognized.



*North-South dialogue: the ACP Committee of Ambassadors meets the Brandt Commission (1980). Right, Willy Brandt and left, L.B. Monyake, then Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors*

from the regional bodies, the substance of their major concerns and preoccupations, nor fed into those bodies its priorities, visions, and possibilities for assistance. Thus it has not effectively brought the different ACP regions together nor gotten sufficiently together with them.

### The future

The ACP, in essence, has only been functioning fully at the level of its relationship with the EEC. Consequently, it tends to be seen by various bodies—regional and international—as having a viable existence only within this context. The time has fully come, therefore, for an evaluation of the Group, by the Group.

First of all, the existence of the ACP must be viable at its regional roots. This implies greater emphasis on matters concerning regional and interregional cooperation; greater participation in the regions' activities, awareness of their concerns and incorporation of their preoccupations in ACP work programmes. This calls, first of all, for more efficient and effective ACP institutions.

Secondly, this evaluation would seem to suggest wider geographic/political contact for the ACP as a Group than merely with the EEC.

Thirdly, this evaluation seems to call for closer coordination between ACP Brussels, ACP Geneva and ACP New York. Of course, this can only be possible with more effective contact between ACP capitals and their various missions. It also calls for closer

concertation with the ACP-EEC bodies including the CDI and the CTA.

Fourthly, this evaluation requires even within the ACP-EEC framework, a demonstration that influence runs both ways — the ACP being able sometimes to influence Community positions on the wider international issues, and not just be seen as a body of captive states open to the EEC's influence.

Finally, and at the root of all of this is the need for the ACP to be better known by the ACP nations — politicians, officials, businessmen and ordinary people. This knowledge will come not only by propaganda material, but by practical action by the ACP, touching the livelihoods of the average man. What specific fields of action and how these can be undertaken constitute the next act of statesmanship which those who direct their ACP affairs would need to demonstrate.

It is no mean task and many may claim that in the ACP, the Group may have set itself too high a standard. But given the objective conditions of the ACP States, like those of most developing countries the ACP States cannot settle for less. They certainly cannot afford the luxury of pampering themselves.

There is still the confidence that countries with men visionary enough to create such a group would not flinch at taking this necessary follow-up step, however arduous. That is the task for the second decade of the Group. That is the task on which to reflect, while savouring the modest success of the first decade. o E.C.

# Genesis and reality of the ACP Group

## A European eyewitness

by Dieter FRISCH (\*)

Josua Cavalevu, until recently far-off Fiji's Ambassador to the Community, liked to recount the legend whereby his ancestors came from somewhere near Lake Tanganyika in East Africa. The people of the Caribbean are aware of their West African roots: history, alas, gives them reason for being so. But the Africans have discovered their common destiny once more since independence. The countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the ACPs as they are called, do not see themselves as a group that was formed due to an accident of history, a need to organize their relations with the EEC together. Their unity is something more profound, more authentic and more historical than that. But unity was by no means obvious at the outset. For centuries, the ACP countries were divided by ethnic, religious and linguistic barriers and by the artificial barriers of colonization as well and they had to discover each other once more before they could achieve it.

I witnessed the exciting genesis of the ACP Group.

### Genesis

It was the European Community which supplied the pretext for the formation of the Group. It was the European Community, which, on the first enlargement, when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark were to join the Six, in 1972 proposed the negotiation of cooperation relations to the Commonwealth countries. History was repeating itself. Something similar had occurred in 1958 when the EEC was formed and, after the first wave of independence in Africa, it led to the Yaoundé Convention, an association between the Community and 18 African States and Madagascar (the AASM), which, with the exception of Somalia, were all French-speaking.

(\*) Dieter Frisch, Director-General of Development at the Commission since 1982, was the Community negotiator for Lomé III. At the time of the first ACP-EEC negotiations, he was head of the Development Policy Division and, as such, followed the genesis of the ACP Group closely.

Yaoundé II expired on 31 January 1975.

This was the background against which the famous Protocol 22, an integral part of the Acts of Accession of the three new Member States, was drawn up. It offered 20 Commonwealth countries a three-way choice for the organization of their relations with the enlarged Community:

- participation in the association agreement that was to govern relations with the AASM once Yaoundé II expired;
- the conclusion of special association agreements involving reciprocal rights and obligations, particularly in the matter of trade;
- the conclusion of trade agreements.

The events of 1972 and '73 were to show that the Community had made a political error—the fact that it had made a unilateral job of defining the three formulae was seen by the potential candidates for negotiations with the EEC (they were called the *associables*) as an indication that it did not really want to negotiate with, but almost dictate to, them. They thought the first formula meant joining Yaoundé as it stood. But Yaoundé was popular with some and much decried by others. The critics saw it as a form of cooperation that had not really managed to rid itself of the colonial past and criticism focused on the Yaoundé trade arrangements which were based on the idea of a free-trade area, involving liberal treatment in both directions and giving rise to reverse preferences in favour of European exports in most of the Associated States. And other aspects of it, which, like the right of establishment, were largely misconstrued, were belittled. The very idea of association aroused controversy and the English-speakers, who looked upon it as second-class membership, rejected the term.

The second formula was compared to the Arusha system. The Arusha Agreement, between the Community and three countries of East Africa (Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania), had

been in existence since 1969. This was a preferential trade agreement with no financial or technical cooperation and like Yaoundé it was based on the principle of a free trade zone and therefore involved preferential treatment by both sides. There was doubt about the third formula and rightly so—what could a trade agreement that was, by definition, non-preferential actually involve?

So 1972 was a year of perplexity. The various parties stared at each other. The Yaoundé associates feared their advantages might be diminished and insisted on their acquired rights and one Head of State went so far as to defend reverse preferences as the indefeasible mortar of the Association. The Commonwealth Secretary-General led the opposite faction—no trade preferences for Europe! What was the point of the Community trying to explain that Yaoundé involved no obligation to give it trade preferences, as the case of Congo-Kinshasa, Togo and Somalia proved...

It looked like impasse. Some people were already resigned to—or perhaps actually wanted—separate negotiations between French-speakers, English-speakers, progressives and conservatives from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. But there was no future to that. So the positive outcome, which, thanks to the staying power of one or two far-sighted figures, occurred in 1973, an historic year, was little short of a miracle. The February 1973 meeting in Accra (Ghana), which was called on the eve of the ministerial session of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) by Robert Gardiner, the Executive Secretary of the organization, was the opportunity for hand-picked African delegates to spend a week of free discussion under the calm chairmanship of K.B. Asante, then the First Secretary at the Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of the future of Africa's relations with Europe. The encouraging conclusions the meeting reached were put before a meeting of African Ministers held in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) in April following a de-

cision by the Heads of State of the OAU. And April was also the month when a delegation of associates, led by Robert Ouko, the Minister for Economic Affairs of the East African Community and President in Office of the AASM and Rwanda's Minister D. Gashonga, assisted by the indefatigable Djim Sylla, the AASM Secretary, was held in Kigali in Rwanda. Lastly, in May 1973, the Heads of State of the OAU met and adopted an eight-point charter for the negotiations with Europe. This was also the opportunity to cut a Gordian knot—Nigeria, which has so far hesitated about getting involved in talks with Europe, acceded to the presidency of the OAU... and took over the part of leader of the negotiations being prepared!

A number of things emerged clearly from these meetings—practically all the countries of Africa wanted to negotiate with Europe. They intended to present a united front and refuse to negotiate in groups. They wanted

association with all the countries in question (AASM and Protocol 22 countries) that were interested and even with other African nations with comparable production and structures. Without referring to the three options again, the Commission proposed a model that could provide a global response to all the concerns of all the countries.

ACP witnesses have told me that, afterwards, this change frankly facilitated the consensus which the OAU reached in May 1973. Now we can admit that the European leaders had their doubts as to the Caribbean and the Pacific wanting to form a joint group with the Africans at the time. So it is all the more remarkable that, in July of the same year, when the negotiations opened in Brussels, the Community of the Nine had 43 countries to deal with—the 19 AASM (Mauritius was the 19th), the 20 "Protocol 22" countries (including Mauritius), the Bahamas (which had become inde-



**D. Frisch (right) and H. Shearer (Jamaica), then President of the ACP Council of Ministers**

*"The Community cannot fail to take notice of positions that are firmly expressed with one voice..."*

straight negotiations, rejected the idea of any formulae that Europe might invent and were looking for a form of global cooperation that included some financial cooperation. They also wanted non-reciprocal access to the European market...

On the European side, the Community had realized in February 1973 the dilemma in which it had placed its partners. The Commission drew the relevant conclusions and, in a memo to the Council in April proposed the negotiation of a renewed and extended

pendent meanwhile) and four non-AASM, non-Protocol 22 countries of Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia, Liberia and Guinea-Conakry). This was the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries which negotiated the Convention signed at Lomé on 28 February 1975—which has gone down in the history of our relations as Lomé I.

The ACP Group was born.

It was set up officially by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975.

## The reality

I witnessed the genesis of the ACP Group and I have since witnessed the way its EEC partners see it every day, so I should like to highlight one or two things that strike me particularly.

Because the ACP Group is a large group, it has real bargaining power with the Community. And it knows it. This is clear from negotiations such as those of 1983-84 that led to Lomé III and it is clear from the daily life of the joint institutions. The Community cannot fail to take notice of positions that are firmly expressed, with one voice, in the name of 66 States, even if the problems only concern some or even one of the Group. Would Kenya have got favourable arrangements for its strawberries if it had taken on the European colossus alone? The weight of the Group is characteristic of our relations and one aspect of a new international economic order!

The Group's solidarity is impressive. There is nothing surprising about the representative of Fiji, a country that has never known what it is to be hungry, making a vibrant appeal on the Group's behalf to get the Europeans to help the drought victims in Africa, nor of the representative of Senegal, which does not export sugar, speaking out on behalf of the ACPs that do. Nor of the representative of Ethiopia, which might well be reluctant on doctrinal grounds, negotiating the chapter of Lomé III that deals with private investment on behalf of the ACPs. The Group respects the diversity which exists, naturally enough, in 66 countries. Without any loss of unity, it allows specific groups of members to form to deal with regional interests, with particular subjects (sugar, Stabex, Sysmin and so on) and with cultural affinities. And of course it takes account of the fact that Ambassador Seydina Sy goes to the mosque on Fridays when it arranges its timetable.

The ACP Group has shown a great ability to innovate and be imaginative. It has built on what our cooperation has already achieved, consolidating it constantly, and never hesitated to hold things up to question or seek different ways out. The enrichment that Lomé III brings is as much its work as the Community's. The ACPs have a practical and pragmatic way of looking at things and they leave rhetoric and



*Mr Frisch (fourth from left), negotiator for the Community of Lomé III*

doctrinal discussions for the big international meetings. This is not to say that they do not seek to discuss the major political themes that concern them, South Africa and discrimination against their nationals, say, with the Community. A good example of this pragmatism is the way in which the delicate matter of private investment was discussed by the ACPs, without any ideological problems, at the Lomé III negotiations.

Their negotiating skills make them respected and even feared. See what happened when the Community launched the idea of human rights during the Lomé III negotiations and they took the matter up, extended its scope to include economic and social rights, brought in the rights of their own citizens in Europe and got a vigorous condemnation of apartheid included as an integral part of the Convention. The role of individuals is often decisive, too. Look at the personal weight behind Nigeria's Ambassador Sanu during the negotiations for Lomé I. We all know how the oldest member of the ACP Group, Seydina Sy, the Ambassador for Senegal, is looked up to. We have the perseverance of one man, Mauritian Ambassador Raymond Chasle, to thank for the cultural chapter of Lomé III. And these are only one or two. The ACP Group has learned to use the strength of personalities such as these for the common good.

The ACPs have confidence in their spokesmen. It would be impossible to overestimate the effort the ACPs have to put into achieving an internal consensus before they can present the united view of 66 countries. But their spokesmen speak with the voice of au-

thority once this is done. I shall never forget the final sessions of the Lomé III negotiations when my partner, Yaya Diarra, Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors, and I, without any specific negotiating mandate, tried, at our own risk, to seek the components of an overall compromise on the last important outstanding problems. We ultimately came up with a compromise and the Group then rubber-stamped the work of its spokesman without so much as altering a single comma. The Community, fortunately, did the same.

The ACP Secretariat has become vital to the efficiency of the Group. Under the leadership of such people as Tiéoulé Konaté, Tom Okelo-Odongo and Edwin Carrington, it should provide a stable, expert infrastructure for the ACP institutions—whose officers change. It is no easy task. The balance there has to be between the different nationalities and regions, between the French-speakers and the English-speakers and the Portuguese-speakers, is not always compatible with optimum effectiveness. But the life of an organization as vast as this is made of compromise—as the Community well knows. The Secretariat, which began at the dawn of Lomé as a tiny team led by Djim Sylla virtually alone, has, like the institutions of the Community, become a real piece of administrative machinery today, which needs a proper manager at its head. May the ACPs always be wise enough to choose the best candidate!

They have got their language problems under control. With its tangle of seven (soon to be nine) official languages, the Community cannot fail to

be jealous of the way 66 countries function with only two, French and English. Will the ACPs please take a word of advice from a friend—never make languages a question of principle. Carry on being pragmatic! You will get your building finished while the Community ends up like the people who built the Tower of Babel!

Relations between the ACP States have an increasingly important part to play in the life of the Group and North-South relations have their vital complement in South-South relations. This is a more recent trend and it is reasonable that it should be so, as the ACP Group had to start by forging an identity through its cooperation with Europe. Today, the principle of collective self-reliance, which Lomé III stresses so strongly, is clearly leading the Group to discuss ACP problems in an ever more practical way. The meeting on ACP air transport it is running in Suriname in September is a good example of this.

And lastly, the ACPs are creating an impression of greater self-assurance and serenity on the international scene. Once upon a time they were not always comfortable in international meetings where their solidarity with other developing countries and the defence of their specific interests put them in a dilemma. Now they seem aware of the fact that the cooperation model which they have devised with their European partner and which is kept constantly updated can, far from upsetting other people, serve as a reference. Is there not talk of a Stabex-type system in UNCTAD? Are the ACPs not using Lomé procedures to mobilize the Community for international negotiations such as those on the Cocoa Agreement? Are they not right to be proud of the fact that, in the midst of an international economic crisis and at the height of an austerity drive, they have managed to negotiate a satisfactory and innovative Lomé III? There is no problem of compatibility between Lomé and the search for broader international solutions. As in the Community, the false dilemma between a regional and a world-wide approach in development cooperation disappeared a decade ago. The ACP Group has consolidated, become organized and gained in diversity, strength and serenity through Lomé I, Lomé II and Lomé III. It has become a political reality. I have been an eyewitness. ○

D.F.



# Viewpoints

**P.J. PATTERSON** (\*)

## Major challenges face the ACP

The 10th Anniversary of the ACP group provides an occasion for sober reflection and muted celebration by all those who were involved in its formation and have contributed to its growth in succeeding years.

When the negotiations, eventually to culminate in the signing of Lomé I, first began, it was evident that the collective strength of all the non-European countries and territories was necessary to enhance their bargaining positions. While this was obviously desirable, it was only attained eventually with considerable effort and determination.

That we were able after conclusion of the Convention to create a formal institution, as the Georgetown Accord reflects, is testimony to how much has been achieved in the interim to transcend the barriers of colonial origins, geography, language and political systems.

The founding fathers of the ACP recognized that peculiar quirk of history by which Europe that had separated us for centuries now offered that unique occasion of bringing us together in a common framework. But they also appreciated that the rationale of the Group could not be confined to its relationship with Europe and should extend to include our own relationships among ourselves.

Although the strains to be expected in any grouping of sovereign countries have appeared from time to time, the ACP has maintained its cohesion. Despite the justifiable concern that initial aspirations still remain to be fulfilled, the ACP can point to modest gains.

The ACP Group was formed in a decade where there was at least some



*P.J. Patterson (centre) in the chair at an ACP-EEC Council in Brussels in July 1978*

recognition of the need to make that first small step to improve the international economic relationship between the rich developed countries of the North and the poor developing countries of the South.

The ACP Group contributed in large measure to this awareness and is entitled to much credit for the bold and innovative departures heralded by the Lomé arrangements.

It must be accepted, however, that the Lomé arrangements could never provide the full answer to or substitute for the global negotiations which are necessary to transform existing international economic institutions and create an economic system that is just and equitable for all nations.

A further breakthrough is now required by the ACP Group especially at a time when action and even the dialogue for a reform of the international economic system appear to be at complete standstill. The accumulated experience of three successive negotiations and the availability of a permanent framework of Ministers and Ambassadors serviced by a qualified, professional Secretariat, render the ACP Group well suited to initiate further

advances in a realignment of international economic power.

The 10th Anniversary coincides with the completion of negotiations for an enlarged Community to include Spain and Portugal. Enlargement is unlikely to create new problems but is sure to exacerbate those which already exist. It will be more difficult to deal with the problems of restructuring, especially in sectors where there is considerable spare production and major competition problems at international level. The original instruments of integration will need to be reviewed. The changes required in an enlarged Community could have far-reaching implications for the ACP.

By now, the ACP is well aware that the relationship we seek with Europe cannot be based on the inequalities of the past. The arrangements for effective and increased ACP-EEC cooperation must rest on the sure foundations of mutual dependence between the two groups of countries.

In the decade ahead, major challenges face the ACP. The most formidable but stimulating is whether it can be the vehicle for meaningful cooperation among ACP countries in the

(\*) Former Deputy Prime Minister of Jamaica, President of the ACP Council of Ministers during the negotiations of Lomé I (1974).

fields of industry, agriculture, finance, research and technology. Its aim must be to support regional and sub-regional programmes so as to encourage collective self-reliance, promote south/south endeavours and reduce dependency on the more developed

countries. To achieve this, existing structures will need strengthening.

The imperative which summons us is how to meet the immediate concerns of today and yet manage to look ahead to the years beyond. o P.J.P.

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## **Ratu Sir KAMISESE MARA(\*)**

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### **The Pacific role in the ACP**

To begin at the beginning, it was a dull afternoon at Lancaster House in London in June 1971, and an anxious meeting of British Commonwealth sugar producing countries was being invited to exchange the cosy security of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement for what we all saw as the rather precarious and uncertain future of association with the European Economic Community. In the end, though not wholly convinced, we decided to put our trust in the United Kingdom's assurances and go in.

Overall and through thick and thin, this trust has not been misplaced; for though we have had many discussions, debates and arguments with the EEC, the pledge on what was to us the all-important issue of sugar quotas has stood the test of time. At a time when world prices are abysmally low, it is a market which we cannot value too highly.

Then in 1973 we began going to Brussels with Western Samoa and Tonga where we joined the African countries, covered by the Arusha and Yaoundé Conventions and our Commonwealth colleagues from the Caribbean for discussions with the EEC. This was a new and rewarding experience for us, for though we had had contacts with African countries on a Commonwealth level, here we were working with them day after day, and I might add, night after night, on matters of common vital economic concern to our countries, and we came to appreciate their dedication and their staying power; perhaps most important of all we came to know them as friends.

From the West Indies, too, our Caribbean friends played their full part, ever ready to give eloquent expression to our views, or lighten tense moments with a metaphor from the cricket field.

I had the honour of leading our small Pacific group, and I would like to pay tribute to all our colleagues in the ACP (for by October we were a united body, all 46 of us, with one spokesman and proud of our acronym) for the courteous hearing they were always ready to give to our small voice and their readiness to take our views into account.

Early discussions in Brussels seemed to achieve little progress, but a joint ACP-EEC Ministerial Conference in Kingston, Jamaica in July 1976 marked a decisive turning point. That was where we reached agreement in principle on the political guidelines about the nature of the new agreement.

With the greatest respect to our European friends there always seemed to be more progress when we could get them on the ground as it were. Perhaps we, too, tended to be rather stifled in Brussels. I certainly felt that the two ACP-EEC conferences we have had the honour to host in Fiji were eye-openers not only to the EEC but to our ACP partners. In particular in 1977 when they came upon us in the midst of a Government crisis. They said they would never have known about it if they had not read about it in the papers. Well, bigger countries than ours have crises made like that! But both in Jamaica and Fiji the EEC delegates had the opportunity to see at first hand the people and countries that they aimed to help.

At all events we all returned to Brussels after Kingston perhaps with a new understanding of what was required from the agreement, and it was eventually finalized in the early hours of February 1st, 1975. By then, of course, its scope had greatly widened. For a wide range of exports from the ACP countries, duty-free and unrestricted entry into the markets of the EEC would be allowed. Sugar, rum and bananas would enter under special regimes.

The provision of aid to the ACP was included as an important adjunct and through it we could look to the EEC for help with feasibility studies, economic research, the services of advisers and technicians and the granting of scholarships and training. Nor is such assistance limited to government projects. Local government authorities, development banks, cooperatives, local companies—particularly those of small and medium size—and groups and even individual producers are eligible for aid. The whole package may be open to debate on its size or the tape with which it is wrapped, but there is no doubting the rich variety of its contents.

The fund for relief of natural disasters is of particular interest and benefit to the Pacific, set as we are in a hurricane-prone area, and we have already been generously assisted more than once.

Apart from the special arrangements on sugar, for Fiji and other island states in the Pacific, and indeed in the ACP as a whole, one of the most satisfying features of the Lomé Convention was its recognition of the special needs and problems of developing island countries alongside those of the least developed of developing countries. This is quite unique and I hope that the United Nations and individual donor countries will also be able to emulate it.

Perhaps I can conclude with a word on STABEX, that admirable scheme aimed at stabilizing the earnings of ACP countries from their exports of certain products to the EEC. This is of particular interest to the Pacific in connection with a price crop like copra so vulnerable to volatile world markets.

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(\*) Prime Minister of Fiji.

Once again, it was a dull afternoon, this time in Jamaica. I was late back from lunch and was astonished to be greeted on taking my seat in the Fiji delegation by the words, "It's your turn to speak, Sir". "What about?" I asked. "STABEX", they said, and thrust some papers at me. I knew that I could not hope to master and deliver a reasoned brief on STABEX in such a situation. But I had grasped the fundamentals of the scheme and what it could mean for the Pacific—indeed for all the ACP countries. So I really felt that though I only spoke briefly I really spoke from the heart. It may even have been a bit emotional, but it was received with acclaim by the ACP and with understanding by the EEC. "It's your turn" has become rather a standing joke with us, but it cannot disguise the feeling of satisfaction of having contributed to this important agreement.

Since then, we have had Lomé II and we look forward in due course to Lomé III and beyond. But now we

have a firm political framework and association to work on and it is more a matter of adjustment, fine tuning, and, of course, the quantum of finance.

To my mind the greatest achievement was to start off from scratch with 46 widely different ACP countries and weld them into a unit which could match the EEC and prove worthy partners in the great joint enterprise.

Today, there are 66 countries in the ACP. That Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific have been able to come together as equal partners in the ACP, united by our collective desire for the closest degree of co-operation with the EEC, is indeed a remarkable and an outstanding achievement in any international endeavour. And I think we can be proud of the part that we South Sea islanders have played and continue to play, and, above all, of what has been perhaps our major contribution to the negotiations — the Pacific Way. ○

R.K.M.

## S. RAMPHAL(\*)

### The ACP – the early years

In responding to the invitation to contribute to this special issue of the ACP-EEC "Courier" commemorating the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the ACP, my thoughts naturally go back to the meeting of ACP Ministers in Georgetown in mid-1975, which I had the honour to chair. It was that meeting which established the ACP as a permanent body and envisaged for it a role both within and beyond the Lomé Convention. But my thoughts go back beyond that meeting to the earliest days of preparation for negotiation with the EEC consequent on the enlargement of the Community. That process from mid-1972 to early 1975, was one of sparkling success for the welding of the negotiating countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific into an effective negotiating group. There are not many examples of such success in the whole course of North/South deliberations.

While others will write in this issue of the last 10 years, I choose instead to reflect on the earlier years which made it possible for us to have Lomé I. I do so with no illusions about that first Convention or its successors. At Lomé in February 1975, I myself described the Convention as essentially "a promise". Over the years since then, that promise has been broken from time to time; certainly some of its highest expectations have remained unfulfilled. The "spirit of Lomé" has not always burned brightly in the Council chambers of Brussels. And the highest objectives of the Georgetown Agreement are themselves still to be attained. As the ACP look to the years ahead and reflect on both the shortcomings and the undoubted achievements of the decade just ended, what is perhaps needed most is confidence and inspiration. The experience of the last 10 years can help to supply them—as other contributions to this issue will, I am sure, demonstrate. But



Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (right), spokesman for the delegation of the Pacific States at the opening of the Lomé I negotiations in Brussels in 1973

(\*) Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Lomé I negotiations; at present Commonwealth Secretary-General.

they can be powerfully reinforced by the experience of the "pre-Lomé" years, which were the years of the making of the ACP.

On the evening of Wednesday, 9th August, 1972, in Georgetown, Guyana, at a point almost equidistant from Africa and the islands of the Pacific, the Foreign Ministers of eight Commonwealth Caribbean and African States met and talked about possible negotiations with the EEC consequent on the enlargement of the Community.

The talks were held in the private office of then Prime Minister of Guyana, the Honourable Forbes Burnham, at his residence in Georgetown, during the course of a reception hosted by the

*colleagues from the Caribbean in those discussions. These are not formal discussions. They are not secret discussions. They are just talks to see if we can get other people to pool their resources with ours in relation to the negotiations that lie ahead."*

That informal discussion was the beginning of a process that led eventually to the pooling of the resources of all the African, Caribbean and Pacific States—"Associates" and "Associables", "French-speaking" and "English-speaking", "AASM" and "Commonwealth Members"—in the negotiations with the EEC that ended in the Lomé Convention.

That process of unification—for such it was—added a new dimension

countries, so comprehensive and so innovative a regime of economic relations. It was a new, and salutary, experience for Europe; it was a new, and reassuring experience for the ACP States. Through that process of unification, the Third World moved away, however fractionally, from the periphery of economic power to which the existing international system assigns it, and to which traditional methods of imposed economic arrangements have effectively confined it. Altogether, the ACP-EEC negotiations, quite apart from their outcome in specific terms, represent a wholly new, progressive and promising development in the field of multilateral economic relations.

The negotiations took place against the background of not inconsiderable pressure from the EEC for their urgent commencement and for their being channelled into the pre-determined contours of Protocol 22—contours that themselves tended to highlight distinctions between the "Associates" and "Associables". As it transpired, these divisive "options" under Protocol 22 (for inclusion in a revised Yaoundé Convention, for a separate Arusha-type Convention under Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome, or for a simple Trade Agreement with the Community) were never exercised by the "Associables"—despite Community mythology to the contrary. What eventually emerged at Lomé was the sui generis Agreement for which the ACP initially contended.

At Brussels, in July 1973, the first meeting took place between the Ministers of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the Ministers of the Community. For the Europeans, it was the beginning of the negotiations; for the ACP it was talks about talks. But whether it was the one or the other, a much more significant trend was discernible—a trend which the negotiations later confirmed and which had a decisive influence on their outcome. The European statement, relying heavily on generalization, if not indeed on ambiguity, bore all the marks of internal Community conflict; the ACP statement—three separate statements delivered by spokesmen of Africa ("Associates" and "Associables" making a single speech) the Car-




Jean Guyaux

*Shridath S. Ramphal (left) and Ivar Noergaard (Denmark), then President of the Community's Council of Ministers, at a press conference on 26 July 1973 after the opening of negotiations for Lomé I*

Prime Minister in honour of the delegates attending the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned countries. The talks themselves were chaired by Guyana's Foreign Minister, who had earlier explained the purpose of the discussions to his colleagues on the Council of Ministers of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) in the following terms:

*"I intend to make use of the meeting of Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers in Guyana to talk with all our colleagues from the Commonwealth about the EEC. I hope that we can involve all our*

*to the quest of the Third World for economic justice through international action. It may well have inaugurated an entirely new phase in the evolution of an acceptable international development strategy. Its significance, however, derives not mainly from the terms of the negotiated relationship between the 46 ACP States and the EEC, but rather from the methodology of unified bargaining which the negotiations pioneered. Never before had so large a segment of the developing world so effectively negotiated with so powerful a grouping of developed*



*Colour and charm also characterize events organized by the ACP within the framework of cooperation with the Community*

ibbean, and the Pacific—revealed clearly perceived objectives and bore all the marks of internal coordination and consistency. It was really at that moment of revealed unity that the ACP was conceived; for although the Brussels meeting with the European Council of Ministers had been preceded by a caucus of the “Associates” and “Associables” at which a united African Group approach had been laboriously worked out, it was the demonstrated effect of unity achieved that provided the catalyst for unity resolved.

From that time onward there was no turning back to separateness. At the next joint ACP-EEC Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in October 1973, the ACP case presented by three voices in July was now urged by one voice—that of the then current Chairman of the African Group. This was in response to a specific Caribbean offer that the demonstrated unity of the ACP Group be symbolized and formalized by such a single presentation.

Thereafter, throughout the discussions, the ACP never negotiated otherwise than as a Group and spoke always with one voice. It was often an African voice, sometimes a Caribbean or a Pacific voice; but always a voice that spoke for the ACP.

In the end, at the final negotiating session in Brussels, the Ministerial spokesmen of the ACP on whom rested the responsibility of negotiating with European Ministers on behalf of the entire Group, came from such varied backgrounds as Gabon (Financial and Technical Co-operation), Mauritania (Institutions, Establishments, etc.), Guyana (the Trade Regime), Fiji and Jamaica (Sugar) and Senegal (Coordinating ACP Chairman).

The unity of interests of the ACP became more manifest as the negotiations lengthened and, as was so clearly revealed in the ultimate stages when a product of interest to only one region (rum) threatened to frustrate the eventual consensus, neither regional nor

linguistic affinities, neither separate national interests nor past associations, neither personalities nor cultural patterns, were allowed to supersede the interest of the Group as a whole.


The Lomé Convention was not perfect. It did not meet all the aspirations of the ACP as a significant segment of the developing world. But it was a point of departure in the relations between the developing and the developed States. That it was such an innovation and represented such a promise derives in the main from the process of unification described above—a process that brought together 46 developing states in a uniquely effective manner to meet the challenge of negotiating with the European Economic Community—a significant segment of the developed world that had itself so rightly turned to integration in answer to the challenge of survival. The challenge remains the same, so does the solution to which the ACP had turned over a decade ago. ○ S.R.

## T. KONATE (\*)

A Secretariat  
at the service  
of the Group

The Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries was set up, as an institution of the Group, by the Georgetown Agreement which was signed in the capital of Guyana in June 1975. The need for such a structure became apparent when the 46 countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific undertook to present a united front and adopt a common platform to negotiate and sign the first Lomé Convention with the Nine in February 1975. The technical unit set up for the duration of the negotiations convinced the ACPs of the need for and usefulness of a properly-organized secretariat to monitor the implementation of the Convention. The decision that was then taken was a particularly bold one in that there was no precedent for it in cooperation between developing countries. For various reasons that are outside the scope of this article, the countries in what is called the Group of 77 have so far not managed to get themselves a permanent secretariat to coordinate and harmonize their action, as the industrialized countries in the OECD have done. The absence of such a secretariat is the Achilles heel of this Group, which, by its size and heterogeneity, can well be compared to the ACP Group—which includes more than half the developing countries of the world. The history of international economic cooperation has shown us that whenever it is reduced to the adoption of resolutions and motions expressing the political desires of the various parties, these resolutions and motions rapidly become dead letters if they are not taken up by the appropriate institutions.

It was no doubt with this in mind that the Founding Fathers of the ACP Group decided that, without a permanent secretariat, it would be virtually impossible to ensure the lasting maintenance of the political will and soli-



*Tiéoulé Konaté, the first Secretary-General of the ACP Group. On his right, Satya Nandan, former Ambassador of Fiji in Brussels*

arity of so many countries that were spread over three continents and had different economic strengths, populations, political regimes, working languages and vernaculars. It is that the ACP Group's cohesion, its survival and its bargaining power depend on the institution of a secretariat that is both an administrative link between the member countries and a place where they can meet and consult each other.

So the ACPs showed laudable foresightedness when they decided to set up a permanent Secretariat that could back up their political desire to cooperate, take over the practical political and technical job of organizing their solidarity as far as the EEC was concerned and, lastly, promote ACP cooperation beyond the bounds of Lomé.

With the Secretariat, the ACP Group has an institution it has entrusted with the technical work of:

- expressing their common positions at the ACP-EEC negotiation meetings dealing with renewal of the Convention;
- closely monitoring the implementation of the various chapters of the Convention and alerting the relevant ACP authorities when any measure is likely to affect their interests;
- lastly, providing secretarial services for all meetings of ACPs and with our European partners in Brussels and the ACP countries that agree to host them, thereby making it possible to go beyond tourist considerations and popularize the image of ACP-EEC cooperation.

The Secretariat has also done its best to improve and strengthen the provisions of the Convention and, in accordance with the Georgetown Agreement, to promote South-South cooperation, as the Suva Declaration illustrates.

To achieve its vast ambitions, the Group had to create a proper headquarters—ACP House—from scratch and get itself a competent staff that was representative of the different regions and working languages. Because of its permanency and its neutrality, the Secretariat is, we feel, vital not just to the cohesion of the ACP Group, but to the continuation of the ACP-EEC dialogue, for, without it, there would be a serious imbalance between a Community that has the support of a strong and experienced executive (the Commission and the Council Secretariat) and an ACP Group represented by Ambassadors who are, by the very nature of their functions, subject to frequent changes of posting. The dialogue would turn into one disastrous misunderstanding if the ACPs did not also have a permanent structure, with the confidence and respect of the member countries, to monitor developments.

For me, it was an exacting but enriching experience to have been the first to have the honour, as Secretary-General, to serve as a link between the ACP countries and, with my friend and colleague Gonzague Lessor, to work to bring them closer to the European Economic Community in a framework whose exemplary nature I am pleased to underline. ○ T.K.

(\*) Former Secretary-General of the ACP Group (August 1796 - August 1980).

## T. OKELO-ODONGO(\*)

### The importance and role of the ACP General Secretariat

The ACP Group of States was established in 1975 by an Agreement signed in Georgetown, Guyana.

The Group, which now consists of 66 Member States from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific is served by a Secretariat of about 70 staff based in Brussels, Belgium.

The objectives of the Group are to monitor the Lomé Convention, to promote closer economic cooperation among the ACP States, and to work towards the achievement of a New International Economic Order.

For the last 10 years, the tiny ACP Secretariat of less than 20 professional staff has managed to perform the gigantic task of serving the entire ACP institutions. It must be admitted, however, that during the negotiations of the Lomé Conventions, for example, without the assistance from friendly organizations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the UN agencies, and indeed, from the EEC itself, the ACP Secretariat would have been completely overwhelmed.

Normally the ACP Group works through negotiating meetings held between themselves and the representatives of the EEC. An average of five major meetings are held every year and, in between, several hundreds of crucial meetings and discussions are held at the sub-committees level.

The meetings of the ACP could not be held without the work of the ACP Secretariat. The Secretariat is responsible for organizing all the meetings and for keeping all the records. Without it, the Committee of Ambassadors, the Council of Ministers and the Joint Assembly could not function. The Secretariat is the executive body of the ACP Group. It is through it that the ACP acts. It is the permanent and continuing organ of the Group and a depository of all its vital documents.

(\*) Former ACP Secretary-General (August 1980 - February 1985).



Thomas Okelo-Odongo (left) and Hugh Shearer (Jamaica)

The Secretariat coordinates the work of the different ACP institutions and maintains contact with ACP Member States, regions and other organizations.

Despite its importance to the Group, the ACP Secretariat is one of the most neglected institutions. Its small number of staff have to cope with the numerous and ever-increasing demands of the ACP Group which, on the other hand, is rapidly growing. Its tiny linguistic group, for example, must cater for simultaneous interpretation and translation of the documents for meetings held at the rate of ten meetings per week. Its 20-odd professionals have to work round the clock to try to keep pace with the European Commission and the EEC Secretariat. Indeed, for this tragically small staff, work at the ACP Secretariat is like a nightmare.

Lack of clear demarcation of duties and responsibilities between the ACP General Secretariat and the Committee of Ambassadors is a unique ailment of the ACP Group. This problem has stunted growth and development at the ACP General Secretariat and has paralyzed the post of the ACP Secretary General. Some members of the Committee of Ambassadors believe that the Committee is responsible for the day-to-day running of the ACP affairs and therefore also in charge of administration. They see the post of Secretary-General as no more than that of a "glorified clerk". They do not accept his role as a substantive representative of the ACP Group. This

conflict in the ACP Group must be resolved. It is like a cancer, continuously eroding the efforts of the Group in endeavouring to achieve its objectives.

Ten years after the establishment of the Group is an opportune time for taking another look at the role of the ACP institutions, vis-à-vis the achievements and the failures of the Group. Further, at this point in time, the ACP Group is going through a critical stage—its solidarity is threatened by regional differences demonstrated by its recent difficulties in appointing a Secretary-General.

The ACP Secretariat, as a neutral and a non-political organ, has the greatest potential for cementing ACP's solidarity. The Group needs this to be able to maximize their benefits from Lomé III which has just been signed. They also need greater solidarity in the face of the enlargements on both ACP and EEC sides.

For the Secretariat to successfully play its important role, it must be strengthened and reformed. The Secretary-General, once appointed, must be given full authority to administer the Secretariat without interference and to represent the Group in appropriate places. Above all, the Secretariat must be accepted by the Group as a fully-fledged organ of this Group.

There is faith that the wisdom which guided the founders of the ACP in establishing the Group will guide them once again to give the Group a new life. o

T.O-O.

## C. CHEYSSON (\*)

### A veteran remembers

*The Courier* is celebrating the ACP Group's 10th anniversary and it has asked me to look back... The first thing that comes to mind is the gestation of the Group. It took two years and it started in 1973.

When I arrived at the Commission in Brussels in the late spring of '73, I found a group of AASM consisting of

though feelings towards their French-speaking African brothers were divided, they were frankly hostile to the European Community—which they did not know a great deal about, although they remembered the detestable commercial cooperation agreement with East Africa and denounced the manoeuvres aimed at obtaining an exclusive trading area by forcing a customs preference for imports from Europe on its African partners in exchange for a preference for African products entering the Common Market.

An additional protocol to the Act of Accession by which the United King-

stand by part of Africa, combined with the no less firm African determination to present a united front to the foreigners, was a major political opportunity.

However, the Europeans still had to agree to encourage African unity and be able to understand and appreciate the political value of a common African front. Convincing them was not easy, as the natural tendency was to divide the partners, and the Community countries were used to dealing with the African countries, even those with whom they were friendliest, separately. And it was even more difficult to convince them because of the high price Europe had to pay before it could count on there being a reliable union of African nations for the Community to deal with. It had to renounce reverse preferences (there was no way the English-speakers would accept that), push up the European Development Fund by a massive amount and treat the new arrivals in the same way as the AASM.

The clouds cleared suddenly. The Community's Council of Ministers agreed to what the vast majority had rejected a few weeks before and all the independent states of Black Africa were invited to attend, together, on a footing of complete equality, a conference to decide on the future of cooperation between the Community and Africa (and the Caribbean and the Pacific).

This sudden European awakening was at once matched by a no less remarkable development on the African side. Africa was being challenged to present a united front and it took up that challenge! The African spokesman was the President of the largest country of the continent, the state that had so far shown the greatest opposition to the Yaoundé formula, and it was he, General Gowon, then President of the Organization of African Unity, who decided that Africa as a whole would embark on negotiations with Europe.

Thus, on 23 July 1973, in the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels, the first conference between Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific and the European Communities began.

The rest we know... o C.C.



EEC/Van Parijs

*"The first thing that comes to mind is the gestation of the Group. It took two years... The rest we know..."*

#### Claude Cheysson signing the first Lomé Convention

the Community's associates in the Yaoundé Convention, all of them French-speaking, and representing only part of Africa south of the Sahara.

Alongside them—it would be better to say opposite—were the other Africans, almost all of them English-speaking. Their attitude to the AASM varied from frank hostility to a group they found incompatible with the assertion of African unity to indifference and even a certain interest in the financial advantages of Yaoundé. Al-

though they hoped to see the reverse preferences dropped... This firm

(\*) European Development Commissioner from April 1973 to May 1981.



E. PISANI (\*)

## The ACP: an everyday North-South Dialogue


One of these days I shall have to tell the story of those 40 months I spent with them, for them and against them. I shall have to tell of the immense warmth that comes over me when I think of them, of our discussions together, of the things we built together, of our difficulties and of our joys.

There is nothing more artificial than this Group, which so unassumingly stretches through all the oceans of the globe. It has Nigeria and Zaïre and Ethiopia and it has Dominica and Tuvalu. It has people who speak English and people who speak French and people who speak Portuguese. And above all, it has desert and it has luxuriant vegetation. It has those whom a patient policy may lead to prosperity and it has others, who, seemingly desperate, are hurling themselves against the combined forces of a hostile nature. It has people who say they are socialists and people who say they are liberals. Some of them are.

The prime merit of the agreements that bind us is the duration, or, to be more precise—because they did not want this duration—the more or less automatically renewable nature of the Convention. The exhausting negotiations we have every five years are essential, because they are an opportunity to do good things better, but they are unimportant too, because no-one is prepared to divorce. And the duration, be it lasting or repetitive, has one major virtue and that is that it irons out ideological conflicts or rather pushes them into the background. The Convention lasts, in spite of the political vicissitudes of the partners. Cooperation is not a reward. It is not a certificate of good conduct. It cannot become a threat. It is there and it endures.

Let us look beyond appearances. Cooperation, without in fact saying so, lays the foundations of a kind of right

(\*) Development Commissioner from May 1981 - December 1984.



*"The exhausting negotiations... are essential, because they are an opportunity to do good things better, but they are unimportant too, because no-one is prepared to divorce." Above, Edgard Pisani (centre) with Archie Mogwe (Botswana) and Y. Haralambopoulos (Greece) at the opening of the Lomé III negotiations.*

to aid which is also a right to development. When will the rest of the world follow suit? It is high time it did.

The second virtue of the privileged relations between us is that they enable us all to say what we think, as there is no quarrel that could come between us. This is why we were able to have two fundamental debates—the discussions on human rights and on policy dialogue, difficult discussions which were held in Fiji and Luxembourg and Brussels as well as in Lomé without ever degenerating into confrontation. Topics of this sort are banned from the UN because they are unavoidably strategic and ideological and therefore dangerous. And they are banned or frowned upon in bilateral cooperation, where they become ambiguous.

It is in this dual debate, that has been going on for less than a year, that the ACP Group has been at its best.

Some claim parliamentary traditions as their inspiration, some are working towards them, some reject them and others violate them. But they all agreed on one thing—that human rights and the internal policy of each of the States were outside the scope of the Convention. They would not be discussed. And faced with European opinion, with the Community and the Member States, they formed a united front because they were wary about clauses being misused later to justify interference in their affairs.

The Community took a firm but not

hard-line position. It pointed out the merits of the dialogue and the common humanistic aims and, little by little, the debate was defused. Friendship and the fact that there could be no question of bad faith enabled a sound agreement to be reached. The common aim is for man to flourish and this is something everyone is working towards, starting from his own particular situation and travelling at his own particular pace down his own particular path. The essential thing is to keep moving ahead. Human rights are not a state, but a conquest and everyone, and we mean everyone, has to fight it again every day. Policy dialogue (not political dialogue) is a revelation. It allows for adjustment and it makes for greater understanding and greater effectiveness. It will never impose conditions unless it ceases to be a dialogue. It is a common quest—and how much discussion it has taken to understand each other on it!

How far does the Group's unity go? How far will it go? There are no ideological or linguistic threats, although it could be at risk from the diversity of situations, which mean a diversity of demands, and from the contradictions of Europe itself.

Let us not fail in our respect for this Group that has grown and developed—Angola and Mozambique are the latest arrivals—and been tireless in calling for a new international order, practising the North-South dialogue every day. ○ E.P.

**L. NATALI (\*)**

## Decisive ACP contribution to Community development policy

The common aim of the ACP Group and the EEC is to create a model for North-South relations that can stand as an example in the search for a fairer and better balanced international economic order. With a vast and ambitious target of this kind, both parties have to be cohesive and organized if they are to achieve their legitimate aspirations and I, personally, am pleased to see that, in its 10 years of existence, the ACP Group has become a firm political reality.

The ACP-EEC system of cooperation, in all its complexity and diversity, is the—always perfectible—result of the thought we have put in together and the lessons we have learned from what we have done together. It has been formalized in successive negotiations, which, although sometimes difficult, have always been founded on mutual respect between equal partners. The ACP Group has played a vital part in defining the contractual links that typify the Community's cooperation policy today and the links have got stronger and more diverse from Lomé I to Lomé III, remaining true to the original idea of cooperation that is based on dialogue, reciprocal obligations, predictability, mutual respect and equality among partners, a lengthy process to which the Group's contribution has been a decisive one.

The priority at this time is to implement Lomé III as effectively as possible. The institutional framework of the Convention gives us the opportunity to develop the vital dialogue on the guidelines of our cooperation and any improvements that can be made to its machinery. As always, we know we shall get solidarity and innovation from the people we are dealing with and we are delighted about it.

The institutions also give us the chance of regular, direct contact with ACP leaders, giving us a personal view of their countries and a personal touch

to our cooperation. This is important because, with many countries bound by the same contract, it avoids the risk of reducing everything to the abstract notions of maps and statistics. The regular meetings of the joint institutions and the representativity the ACPs ensure for their spokesmen have meant that this direct contact can be

established on solid foundations and so yield the maximum.

The most promising aspect of the rise of the ACP Group is the prospect it opens up of the development of its own South-South cooperation. Personally, I hope that the aims in this area become as ambitious as those we have jointly set for North-South cooperation and can rapidly be put into practice as an example to all developing countries. The specific aim of Lomé III is, after all, to promote a more autonomous and more self-sustaining kind of development in the ACPs in the light of their own potential. ○

L.N.

**M. FIORET (\*)**

## The richness of the exchange of ideas

When opening, with President Nze, the 10th ACP-EEC Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 21 June, I highlighted the fact that it coincided with the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Georgetown

agreement of 6 June 1975, an anniversary inviting a few reflections on development over the past 10 years.

It is a source of satisfaction for both the Community and the associated countries to witness the internal dialogue which Lomé has brought into being between the countries of the various regional ACP groups, a dialogue which until then had lacked a suitable forum, given the objective difficulties of overcoming long-established barriers and constricting habits.

From this intense dialogue, the ACPs have acquired a greater self-awareness, while the Community has sought to acquire a better understand-

(\*) Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy, former co-Chairman of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers



**Mario Fioret at the Joint Committee meeting in Bujumbura in 1985**  
*"Lomé brought into being an internal ACP dialogue"*

(\*) Commissioner for Development, Commission of the European Communities.

ing of what it can do and what, in a cooperation context, has general and permanent value. This unique and novel approach was handsomely vindicated in the negotiations for renewal of Lomé II, in which progress was all the more fruitful where openness and comprehensiveness characterized relations between the participating countries.

The fruits of this internal dialectic were seen in the richness of the exchanges of ideas between Community and ACP representatives and these positive effects will undoubtedly continue with the implementation of Lomé III.

The successive Conventions have enriched debate within the ACP-EEC Council and the ACP internal consultation machinery has made it possible to give collective strength to the visions and proposals of individual states. Interaction between the two groups has grown strongly and now covers a wide variety of areas of common interest.

Ten years of Georgetown Agreement has meant the shared experience of two Lomé Conventions and the negotiation of a third.

The two sides must now develop operational instruments permitting the practical, efficient and unambiguous achievement of the objectives enshrined in the Third Lomé Convention. In this new stage of ACP-EEC relations, the internal consultation and motivation mechanisms will have an important role to play and should accordingly be the focus of our attention.

The experience of 10 years of cooperation could prompt us to identify some of those factors both in the internal consultation and evaluation processes and in the functioning of the joint institutions which have played a key role in the success of the system engendered by Lomé. The efficacy of new methods of cooperation will depend on the frankness and comprehensiveness of the dialogue, and the incisiveness of the results achieved on the harmony and strength of the underlying will. For this reason the Georgetown Agreement does not concern the ACP countries alone, and for the same reason the Community values it as a factor vital to the achievement of common objectives. ○ M.F.

## J. WEYLAND (\*)

### The keystone

Lomé III was signed within about six months of a date of great importance in ACP-EEC relations—the 10th anniversary of the Georgetown Agreement, which set up the ACP Group, on 6 June 1975.

Those African countries and Madagascar which had links with the European Community under the Yaoundé Convention and those which along with Caribbean and Pacific states had privileged relations with the United Kingdom in the Commonwealth decided to take an historic step. This was a bold initiative as well, for the countries of Africa, faced with the prospect of a new kind of relations with the Member States of the European Community, taken as it was without regard to the many geographical, historical and cultural differences between them.

On this, their anniversary, I should like, on behalf of my colleagues on the Committee of Permanent Representatives, to extend my warmest congratulations to them.

A forum for discussion such as the ACP Group has become a keystone in the gradual deepening and strengthening of relations with the countries of the Community.

(\*) Permanent Representative of Luxembourg and co-Chairman of the ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors.

In this process, the ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors, the body that combines the ACP Ambassadors to Brussels and the Permanent Representatives of the Member States of the EEC, has played a very important part, since its members are, indeed, a factor of continuity and a point of reference in any activity relating to our cooperation.

Unlike the Ministers, whose only opportunity for making or renewing contact is their annual meetings, the Ambassadors are actually involved in day-to-day discussion which, more than anything, is the guarantee of the success of our endeavours.

The importance that the Council of Ministers attaches to our Committee is apparent from its decision to delegate various of its powers to the Ambassadors and thus enable them to take decisions on matters that are, in fact, within its jurisdiction. And I should like to remind you here of the decision the Committee took on 22 February this year on the transitional measures require until such time as all the Member States have ratified the new Convention.

At a time when we are embarking on a new phase of ACP-EEC cooperation, and one which I hope will be fruitful, and when the ACP Group begins its second decade of existence, during which I hope it will boldly continue along the same path, I should like to say how happy I am that I shall shortly have the honour and pleasure of co-chairing the next meeting of the Committee. ○ J.W.



Messrs J. Weyland (left) and J. Poos, respectively Chairmen of the Committee of Permanent Representatives and the EEC Council of Ministers

*"Boldly continue along the same path"*

K. FOCKE(\*)


## A constructive interaction

Since 1979 I have had the exceptionally valuable experience, as a Member of the European Parliament, of serving in a North-South parliamentary assembly set up under the Lomé Convention. Such cooperation is both fascinating and unique of its kind in the world. Instead of having Europeans sitting on one side of a table and ACP representatives on the other, the two work *jointly* for the better implementation of the Lomé Convention, make *joint* recommendations for the next Convention—as they did for Lomé III—and *jointly* criticize both European and ACP bureaucracies. Differences of opinion and differences in voting patterns cut across both groups, with a marked tendency among the Europeans, particularly following the first direct elections, to divide according to party groupings in contrast to a much greater degree of across-the-board solidarity, even on issues involving conflicting interests, among the ACP representatives.

This solidarity, no longer just a common negotiating position (represented above all by the ACP ambassadors in Brussels) in connection with the Lomé Convention, is today more broadly based. Increasingly the practical framework of the Convention grouping them together is leading to exchanges of information and experience between ACP states, increasing their consciousness of common problems and tasks, broadening their knowledge and understanding of one another and fostering a sense of unity among the ACP which is sure to benefit their cooperation with one another as well as ACP-EEC cooperation.

The fact that the OAU Conference in July in Addis Ababa singled out rural development and food production as priorities under both self-help and foreign aid programmes is not unrelated to the gradual emergence of the same priorities in the context of ACP-EEC cooperation. I mention this not to start some chicken-or-egg argument

(\*) Chairman of the Development Commission of the European Parliament.



European Parliament

*“Such cooperation is both fascinating and unique of its kind in the world”*

as to which came first but to underline the constructive interaction taking place.

From the Ferrero report on combating hunger to the various Chasle reports on regard for socio-cultural identity, parliamentary collaboration under the Lomé Convention has led, among the ACP, to a greater understanding of the problems and greater self-awareness and, among the Europeans, to a strengthening of national and regional identities. And—as in all spheres of life, whether personal, cultural or political—as a personality or identity grows stronger, the greater is its capacity for interaction and cooperation.

The ACP Group is a good example for us European parliamentarians.

G. BERSANI (\*)

## A joint effort

One of the most original aspects of the Lomé Convention is its joint democratic institutions, and a great deal of far-sightedness was needed to think of this from the start, even before the signing of Yaoundé.

Since I, myself, was involved in the initial phase of emergent cooperation between the European Community and a group of African countries, I feel I can testify to the decisive contribu-

(\*) Co-Chairman of the ACP-EEC Joint Committee.

When it is functioning well, without internal dissensions, cooperation with it is even more fruitful. The ACP parliamentarians' experience with us has been the same in reverse, with all-too-divergent political or ideological viewpoints obscuring a common cause.

Though initially many dissensions were incomprehensible to the other side, the number of North-South friends, capable of explaining and acting as go-betweens, is growing, as the number of Lomé veterans—people who have grasped both the political and personal psychologies of their opposite numbers and who can work for compromise solutions.

The ambassadors are learning that they cannot use the Joint Assembly as just another negotiating venue. The number of parliamentarians—and, incidentally, of women—participating on the ACP side is growing, further consolidating the sense of unity within the ACP Group. The European parliamentarians are becoming straighter in their dealings with the ACP, less tolerant of political opportunism; they perceive more clearly nowadays that credibility (e.g. consistent voting patterns in the European Parliament) is vital to good cooperation.

Ten years of working with the ACP Group: naturally there have been ups and downs but, all in all, it has been a personally enriching experience, fuelling one's political determination to push on with our cooperation in the twin causes of peace and development.


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K.F.

tion which the first parliamentary group made to the initial agreements and to the vital moments of its development.

I well remember the decisive role played by my illustrious African colleagues at the time. The names of Alioune Sissoko (Mali), Philippe Yacé (Ivory Coast), Kasongo (Zaire), Tandeg Muna (Cameroon) any many others are all part of the history of EEC-Africa relations. This year, we are celebrating something memorable—the 10th anniversary of Lomé I and of the forming of the ACP Group.

With the expansion of the 19-strong AASM group into the 46-strong ACP group of Lomé I and the 66 signatories of Lomé III, the whole of independent



G. Bersani with his ACP opposite number, M. Butagyira (Uganda) in Rome in 1982

*"The cohesion and creative force of the ACP Group have thus played a historic role..."*

Africa, a large part of the Caribbean and many of the countries of the Pacific have become partners in development, in association with the 10 (soon to be 12) countries of the EEC.

The Convention embraces almost half the countries of the world and, something which is worthy of particular note, the majority of the nations of the Third World.

The creation of such a vast associative structure, consisting of a number of exemplary governmental, parliamentary, social, economic and cultural institutions, is one of the most important and encouraging contributions to international cooperation.

I look upon the ACP Group's delightful headquarters in Brussels as, in

a way, my own home. I am, and I shall always be, grateful to my ACP colleagues and friends for the frank and cordial atmosphere in which we have so often discussed and solved naturally complex and therefore generally difficult problems together. It is this genuine spirit of collaboration in which the MPs of both Groups have continued to play a leading and often decisive role which has given the Convention, despite its relatively modest financial and technical means, an extraordinary and creative dynamism and a force of attraction that the facts have borne out.

The campaign against hunger, the emergency measures, Stabex, Sysmin, industrial cooperation, the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural

Cooperation, the new food strategies, the dialogue with the unions and economic operators, cultural cooperation, greater EIB involvement, the enhancement of the role of women in development, commercial cooperation, the anti-desertification and environmental campaigns, the proposals on fisheries and the decisive proposals on a strong regional policy are just some of the aims we have achieved together—often at the initiative of the ACP Group and with its decisive contribution.

The secret of Lomé's relative success is not just the accession of all the countries concerned (we are awaiting anxiously, it is easy to understand why, the entry of Namibia when it is finally free), but—and this is most important—the force of attraction which it exerts on an increasing large part of the bilateral cooperation of the Member States and various international institutions. This success is largely due to the ACP Group's contribution in the various institutions of the Convention and to the deep-seated feeling we all have of Lomé as a joint effort, something that has been created, built up, defended and developed together.

And here, the ACP Group has special merit—just think of the many continents and countries and the variety of cultures and races it represents.

The cohesion and creative force of the ACP Group have thus played a historic role and this is something to be recognized with gratitude, respect and sincere friendship ○ G.B.



## The story of the ACP logo

After the signing of the First Lomé Convention in February 1975, the happy result of solidarity and cooperation among countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific grouping, these states agreed to pursue the institutionalization of their forum and to jointly optimize the implementation of the new ACP-EEC agreement. It was against this background and in keeping with this determination, that the ACP countries sought to have a symbolic logo reflect their aspirations. In anticipation of the June Georgetown meeting, they commissioned a young Guyanese artist, Cicely Gouveia to submit a design which would graphically portray the link between the three geographic areas. Several ideas were submitted by her but in

the end, the one which is now regularly seen in most ACP publications, was selected for use. It consists of two basic elements — three co-existing globes, depicting the component regions of the group and by their obvious similarity, testifying to the common purposes of the ACP. The flowing and even lines which form the letters ACP are also intended to suggest harmonious cooperation.

The artist who conceived this popular and striking design, Cicely Gouveia, was born in September 1946 in Georgetown. She studied commercial art in the United States and subsequently served a special attachment to the Manhattan School of Printing and the New York Institute of Advertising. Thereafter, she worked as an art director at "Design and Graphics", a government-owned advertising agency. At the time of submitting her design, she was the manager of that organization. Today, 10 years later, she is pleased and proud in the knowledge that her creation continues to play a part in promoting closer intra-ACP relations. ○

# World Bank: World Development Report 1985

Strong economic growth, low inflation and financial stability can be attained, and international capital can resume its productive role in economic development. These are the conclusions of *World Development Report 1985* "International Capital and Economic Development" published by the World Bank.

The policy choices of governments—of developed as well as developing countries—will largely determine whether the global economy will attain faster and more stable growth and whether creditworthiness will improve for every group of developing countries, the staff study says. These goals can be achieved in the next five years, the Report contends, and offers a "realistic" set of assumptions in support of economic scenarios that lead to these goals.

"The financial links between industrial and developing countries have become as integral to the world economy as trade has hitherto been", the report states. "The world has made progress in overcoming the financial difficulties of the early 1980s, but it still has much to do. Debt cannot be seen in isolation, as something that occasionally becomes a "crisis", needing urgent attention".

About 100 developing countries have thus far avoided debt-servicing difficulties, the study points out, despite a dramatic increase in debt reschedulings in this decade. The number of formal reschedulings for World Bank members rose from an average of fewer than four a year in 1975-80 to thirteen in 1981 and thirty-one (involving twenty-one countries) in 1983). At least that number of debt negotiations took place in 1984, but formal agreement was reached on only twenty-one, involving sixteen countries, by the end of last year.

The report labels the next five years as ones of "transition", in which about two-thirds of the debt of developing countries will have to be rolled over or amortized. The study praises the "constructive and collaborative actions taken by debtors, creditors and international agencies in recent years" in dealing with the debt situation. It urges that these actions—including multiyear debt reschedulings—not only be continued but that they be extended to several middle-income countries and to many low-income African countries "in which debt-servicing difficulties and development

problems are intertwined", and which are pursuing sound economic policies.

"External finance can act as a shock absorber", the Report states, allowing countries to gradually adjust to changes in the economic environment, which many did. But some countries, the study observes, have used borrowing to avoid adjustment and subsequently have had to make even more drastic and costly adjustments when debt-servicing difficulties emerged. This contrast emphasizes that "foreign borrowing is not a painless or riskless alternative to adjustment".

"Dramatic though the recent growth of foreign borrowing has been, it is not unprecedented", the Report says, and provides a comprehensive historical perspective of international finance. There are some differences, the study points out, between the past and the situation that emerged in the 1980s that help to explain why developing countries have become more vulnerable to debt-servicing difficulties:

- loans have far outstripped equity finance;
- the proportion of debt at floating interest rates has risen dramatically;
- maturities have shortened considerably.

A major and disturbing difference today is that many of the countries with debt-servicing difficulties are in the low-income group. This is partly because their aid receipts have been erratic and many borrowed on commercial terms and accumulated large amounts of debt.

Difficulties notwithstanding, the

study maintains that the benefits which developing countries derive from their links with industrial countries depend on three variables: policies of the industrial countries; policies of the developing countries; and the financial mechanisms through which capital reaches the developing countries.

### Policies of industrial countries


The industrial countries' policies singled out in the Report as beneficial for developing countries "would also foster stable and non-inflationary growth in industrial countries and would create a more liberal trading environment. They would therefore benefit industrial and developing countries alike". The pace of economic growth in the industrial countries affects the exports of the developing countries; interest rates and exchange rates in industrial countries affect their costs of borrowing. For the future, the Report states, two areas of industrial country policy are particularly critical for developing countries: real interest rates and protectionism.

An analysis of protectionism in the Report concludes that if industrial countries increase barriers to exports from developing countries, it would threaten the "creditworthiness of these countries, and by straining the ability of major debtors to repay their debts, the stability of the global financial system", in addition to the well-known detrimental effects on the economies of the industrial countries themselves. No government is being asked by the study's recommendations to act against its own long-term interests.

### Policies of developing countries

While more expensive oil, historically high real interest rates, prolonged recession and greater protectionism affected all developing countries in the period 1979-84, the study notes, countries that ran into debt servicing difficulties were not necessarily those that had suffered the biggest shocks. "They were countries that had borrowed and failed to adjust or had not tackled the new problems with sufficient urgency", the report says. Among these

## FINANCIAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Net of Debt Service)



were the low-income countries of Africa, several of whom used foreign finance partly for consumption and also for investment in large public projects, "many of which contributed little to economic growth and to increased exports needed to service the debt".

Some countries which encountered debt-servicing difficulties, including some of the major debtors, pursued fiscal and monetary policies that were too expansionary to achieve a sustainable external balance, the study says. Their exchange rates were overvalued and they pursued inappropriate trade policies that prevented exports from competing on world markets and which encouraged capital flight. Increases in investments were not matched by domestic savings efforts.

The Report reviews the diverse experience of developing countries and emphasizes certain basic lessons for policy. One is the need for flexibility. Foreign finance requires both borrowers and lenders to take account of uncertainty. The Report asserts that "the best way of doing so is to be able to respond flexibly to changes in the external environment". Second, policies required to make the best use of external finance are essentially the same as those required to make the best use of domestic resources:

- key economic prices must be aligned with opportunity costs;
- overvaluation of exchange rates should be avoided and trade policies should be appropriate;
- efforts to raise domestic savings

should be strengthened; "the correct role of foreign finance is to supplement domestic savings, it must not substitute for savings".

Effective management of capital inflows is an essential part of sound macroeconomic management, the report insists. Many countries have failed to manage capital inflows effectively because of inadequate data, lack of technical expertise about financing options and an absence of institutional arrangements to integrate debt management with macroeconomic decision making.

### Financial mechanisms

From a longer term point of view, a critical policy question is: how can the stability of external capital flows be enhanced and lending by banks be restored? The answers lie in five areas:

- Longer maturities. The World Bank and regional development banks will remain the primary sources of longer-maturity capital for developing countries in the next few years, and need to have their financing capabilities enlarged.
- Hedging. Instruments for hedging interest rate and exchange rate risks that already exist in financial markets should be used in lending to developing countries.
- Commercial risk sharing. Increases in private direct and portfolio investment as well as the introduction of equity-based instruments in lending to developing countries are desirable.
- Secondary markets. The phased

development of secondary markets could, in the long run, increase the stability of financing flows and provide an extra indicator of country creditworthiness.

— Aid volume and effectiveness. Low-income countries need considerably more aid than is available at present. The effectiveness of aid can be improved by donors lending for development objectives and within programmes agreed upon with recipients.

### 1985-1990

In analysing the global economic outlook for the next five years, the report employs two simulated economic environments. In the "High" simulation, the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of the industrial countries grows at an average annual rate of 3.5% and the GDP of all developing countries at a robust 5.5%. Inflation in industrial countries remains below 8% and the real interest rate declines to 2.5% from the 6.8% average experienced in the period 1980-85. In the "Low" simulation, industrial country GDP grows by only 2.7% annually, on average, and the GDP of all developing countries, by an annual average of only 4.1%. The real interest rate remains virtually unchanged from recent levels. Export growth of developing countries in the High simulation averages 6.7% yearly but only 3.5% in the Low simulation.

Both cases assume that developing countries will continue their present course of policies, which in many cases imply substantial reform and adjustment.

The challenge, the Report states, of the next five years is to ensure that the world at least reaches the High simulation; this depends on the policy choices made by governments. Neither simulation promises any relief in the bleak outlook for many low-income African countries, however. Indeed, in the High simulation, average per capita incomes stagnate at the present reduced levels. In the Low simulation, per capita incomes continue their decline. Additional external assistance, over and above that projected in the High simulation, will be needed to sustain the major policy and programme changes Africa must undertake to resolve its problems. ○

# DAC - 1984 development assistance report

Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the countries of DAC (\*) came to \$ 28.6 billion last year, an increase of \$ 4 billion (about 4%) over 1983.

These figures were released in June by DAC President, Rutherford M. Poats. The increase in Official Development Aid also resulted in a 6% rise in real terms during 1984, a trend that is expected to be maintained in 1985. The DAC report also says that, for the first time in five years, there is a clear improvement in the effort the industrialized countries of the West are making for the economic development of the Third World.

However, the picture is not an entirely rosy one, as estimates show that the total net amount of the financial resources (all sources) and bank loans, exploitation and direct investments in the developing countries dropped by something like \$ 10 billion last year and stand at \$ 95 billion now.

The Netherlands leads DAC donors with 1.02% of GNP and they are followed by the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark and Sweden) and

France, which give more than the minimum 0.7% of GNP laid down some 20 years ago. But in absolute terms, the total increase in aid has been due, essentially, to the considerable expansion of the volume of aid from the USA, Japan, Italy, Canada and the Netherlands and Denmark.

The non-DAC countries, outside COMECON (eastern Europe), also put

up a less good performance in 1984 than they had done the two previous years, although their contribution still represented more than 3% of their GNP and Kuwait came up near the 4% mark, with 3.8%.

The COMECON countries gave \$ 3 billion in 1983 and \$ 2.9 billion in 1984, \$ 2.4 billion of it coming from the USSR and 0.5% from the other countries, particularly the GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (see table 3).


## The ODA league table

Germany's ODA, which had risen consistently since 1980, dipped for the first time in 1984, both in real terms (-5%) and as a percentage of GNP (from 0.48% down to 0.45%), primarily because of the accidental time-tabling of multilateral contributions and an increase in repayments. The country's current medium-term assistance plan provides for an average annual increase in aid funds of 3.5% until 1987.

The increase of 5% in national currency terms of Australia's ODA, which stood at 773 million dollars, was, in fact, a slight drop in real terms


(\*) The members of DAC, the Development Assistance Committee, are as follows: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, The Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA.

**Table 1 - ODA from DAC members in 1984**



(\*) Not including Overseas Departments and Territories.

**Table 2 - ODA by major group of donors (ODA at 1983 prices and exchange rates)**



(a) Bilateral assistance from multilateral Agencies.  
(b) Bilateral assistance and ODA contributions to multilateral Agencies.



**Table 3 — Net ODA contributions  
from non-DAC countries**

		1975	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
OPEC countries	\$ '000 000 000	6.27	9.66	8.37	5.83	5.43	4.54
	as % of GNP	2.93	1.84	1.51	1.02	1.04	0.86
including:							
Kuwait	\$ '000 000 000	0.96	1.14	1.15	1.17	1.01	1.02
	as % of GNP	7.26	3.52	3.63	4.60	3.86	3.81
Saudi Arabia	\$ '000 000 000	2.70	5.78	5.58	3.91	3.66	3.31
	as % of GNP	7.61	4.95	3.49	2.54	3.29	3.29
U A E	\$ '000 000 000	1.05	1.05	0.80	0.40	0.36	(0.04)
	as % of GNP	11.69	3.82	2.60	1.34	1.44	(0.17)
COMECON countries	\$ '000 000 000	1.51	2.66	2.92	2.93	3.04	2.92
	as % of GNP	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.16
including:							
USSR	\$ '000 000 000	1.27	2.13	2.41	2.40	2.58	2.45
	as % of GNP	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18
Other non-DAC donors	\$ '000 000 000	0.46	0.50	0.56	0.55	0.38	0.50
	as % of GNP						

from the 1983 level, and a diminution in the proportion of GNP devoted to aid, from 0.49% to 0.45%.

In 1984, Austria's ODA disbursements forged ahead. They grew by 23% in real terms carrying the proportion of GNP devoted to development assistance from 0.23% in 1983 to 0.28% in 1984.

In 1984, Belgium's ODA stayed at roughly the same amount of national currency as the previous year, but dropped 4% in real terms to \$ 434 million. ODA as a percentage of GNP dropped from 0.60 in 1983 to 0.56 in 1984.

Canada's assistance went up by 16% in real terms to reach US \$ 1.6 billion and from 0.45% to 0.50% of GNP. The emergency food aid provided for Africa helped with this.

Denmark's ODA reached \$ 449 million in 1984, an increase of 22% in real terms and an improvement in the percentage of GNP (0.73% in 1983 and a new high of 0.85% in 1984). This country's development assistance is increasing sharply following the recent decision to devote 1% of GNP to the aid budget by 1992, but the outstandingly large increase of 1984 is largely due to the combined payment of multilateral contributions.

American ODA went up by 8% (4% in real terms) to \$ 8.7 billion, although the percentage of GNP stayed at the

1983 level of 0.24%. The increase in spending is largely due to a substantial improvement in bilateral aid in the form of grants (including emergency food aid supplied to sub-Saharan Africa).

Finland's ODA increase since 1978, the year the authorities undertook to reach the 0.7% target by the end of the present decade, has been one of the fastest and most sustained among DAC members.

France's ODA, including aid to the Overseas Departments and Territories, has gone up by 14% in terms of national currency and 7% in real terms, in spite of a cut in the contributions to multilateral organizations. The target is to get ODA for the independent countries, i.e. excluding the OCT, to 0.7% of GNP by 1988. On this latter basis, then, this country's development assistance increase is 17% in national currency and 9% in real terms, reaching 0.52% of GNP as against the 0.48% of 1983.

### The 1984 DAC record-holders

Italy holds the DAC record for its increase in ODA—which went up by 39%, bringing the percentage of GNP spent on aid up from the 0.24% of 1983 to 0.32% in 1984. Other important increases should be made as the medium-term plan is implemented

and in line with the major special emergency aid programme which Parliament adopted in March this year.

Japan's ODA increased by 14% (real terms) in 1984 to reach \$ 4.3 billion, making this country DAC's second biggest donor. This contribution represented 0.35% of GNP, as against 0.32% in 1983, a development largely due to a large increase in multilateral ODA, particularly to IDA. Bilateral donations also increased substantially.

Norway's ODA in 1984 dropped by 6% in real terms and its percentage of GNP went down from 1.09% in 1983 to 0.99%. Accidental factors were behind this and the basic trend in net payments is still one of sustained increase.

ODA from New Zealand, which had been dropping as a percentage of GNP since the '70s, continued to decline in 1984, reaching 0.27% as against the 0.28% of 1983.

The Netherlands has been giving 0.7% plus since 1973. In 1984, ODA contributions increased by 16% in real terms and represented 1.02% of GNP (as against 0.91% in 1983), mainly because of major increases in bilateral aid in the form of grants and loans. The trend will no doubt continue because the Government wants to plough 1.5% of the GNP into development cooperation.

Although the UK's ODA was slightly better in national currency than its 1983 figure, it decreased by 3% in real terms and the percentage of GNP went down from the 0.35% of 1983 to 0.33% in 1984. This was primarily due to a cut in bilateral aid (loans and grants) and accidental cuts in multilateral contributions.

Sweden's ODA contributions again registered a slight drop in 1984, as they represented 0.80% of GNP in comparison with the 1983 figure of 0.84%, largely because of a temporary deviation from the 1% target.

Switzerland's ODA stayed at the 1983 level as far as national currency was concerned, but registered a slight decrease on percentage of GNP, dropping from 0.31% (1983) to 0.30% (1984). This is primarily because of the timetabling for Switzerland's payment of bills due at sight to the regional development banks. ○

## Women: still the second sex

### Nairobi Conference brings the UN Women's Decade to a close

Nairobi has had a colourful summer. For two weeks, in July, the city became alight with Asians in graceful saris, Japanese in bright kimonos, Bolivians in felt bowler hats, Arab women in robes and chadors and rucksacked, denimed, sandaled Americans. For most cities the sudden descent of some 15 000 visitors on their hotel and transport systems would create enough shockwaves for a year, but the people of Nairobi are obviously gluttons for punishment: hardly had the thousands of women left the city when thousands of men appeared to take their place. The latter were ecclesiastics gathering in Kenya's capital for a conference at which Pope John Paul II was present: the former were participants at the United Nations End of Women's Decade Conference, held from 15-26 July in the Kenyatta Conference Centre and chaired by the late President's daughter, Margaret Kenyatta, and at the Non-governmental Organization (NGO) Forum which took place alongside it from 10-19 July.



Tanzanian Inf. Dept. - J. Lukuwi

Earlier in the year, organizers of the UN conference had feared that the end-of-decade meeting might prove to be a well-publicized waste of time and money. There was anxiety, particularly on the part of the United States and West European nations, that essential issues would be lost from sight and that political wrangling might dominate the Nairobi meeting as it had the mid-decade meeting in Copenhagen five years previously. The leader of the U.S. delegation, Maureen Reagan (one of a number of Presidents' or Prime Ministers' daughters or wives representing their governments) had already threatened to pull out if political issues were allowed to predominate. The running of the official, UN conference and the NGO Forum together does seem, with hindsight, to have been a mistake. Not only did the unexpectedly large number of participants at the Forum (an estimated 13 000) lead to a serious shortage of accommodation (a total débâcle was avoided only by UN and Forum participants doubling up in every available hotel room in the city), but, with the UN delegates' statements and positions prepared in advance, there was little chance of feedback from the Forum being taken up in the resolutions

to be voted at the Conference's conclusion.

In the event, however, there was no time for the large number of resolutions put forward (105) to be voted by the plenary session, anyway. If the Conference delegates began the discussions somewhat bleary-eyed, through lack of proper sleep, they ended them even more bleary-eyed, with the massive 372-paragraph, document on "Forward-looking Strategies of Implementation for the Advancement of Women for the Period up to 2000" being adopted at 5 a.m., only, on the final day. The resolutions, it was decided, would be added as appendices to the final document and transmitted, as such, to the UN General Assembly. That "Forward-looking Strategies" was adopted at all, and unanimously at that, was an expression of how badly the participants wanted Nairobi to mark an important step in the formation of an international women's movement. It also meant that, on the whole, the conference was considered a success.

#### Clashes over political issues

With 160 or so nations participating, of every possible political shade,


some at open war with each other, even, it would have required a miracle to avoid confrontation. It began, predictably, when one of the two committees set up to examine, paragraph by paragraph, the "Forward-looking Strategies" document came to the section on "Areas of special concern". With American and Nicaraguan, Iraqi and Iranian and Israeli and Palestinian delegates present, it was hardly surprising that furious debate ensued when issues such as "Women in areas affected by armed conflicts, foreign intervention and threats to peace", and "Children under apartheid" and "Palestinian women and children" arose.

Moslem, Third World and East European representatives walked out when the delegate from Israel rose to speak. Many Third World delegates launched into bitter attacks on American foreign policy and virtually all participants condemned the injustices of apartheid. The U.S. clashed head-on with many Third World and Arab government representatives over the use of the word "zionism", which in the Forward-looking Strategies document had been equated with the word "racism", and only extremely deft diplomacy on the part of the Kenyan delegation enabled that particular is-

sue to be successfully defused. The word "racism" was used, finally, with—in effect—delegations being persuaded that they could interpret the word as they thought fittest). For many, however, there could be no useful discussion of women's issues without discussion of political issues. For the Group of 77 (the non-aligned countries), in particular, there was no hope of the objectives of the decade—Equality, Development and Peace—ever being achieved if these vital areas of concern were not debated.

### Some gains, some losses

All this heated discussion might have made the end-of-decade conference look pretty much the same as the Copenhagen conference or, for that matter, the conference in Mexico City which had opened the decade in 1975. What, one might have wondered, had changed in ten years? One visible change, perhaps significant, perhaps not, was that, whereas in Mexico City and Copenhagen men were still doing most of the talking, in Nairobi (and this was particularly true of the Forum) women were clearly to the fore. In many fields of women's rights or welfare progress had, manifestly, been made, though in almost all cases the message was that there was still a great deal left to do. While the yardsticks for measuring this progress obviously varied enormously according to individual countries' levels of development, women's literacy rates, life expectancy and levels of education had risen throughout the world. In Africa, female literacy rates had grown by 9% between 1970 and 1980 and were expected to rise by a further 13% by 1990, by which time they would still be only 40%, however. The number of countries with equal pay laws had risen to 90 by 1983, but women continued to earn only 73 cents for every dollar earned by a man. Advances had been made, though, in constitutional and legal equality for women and men, with 80 countries having ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Countries which had not ratified included the United States and the majority of Moslem nations. The spread of Islam fundamentalism in the past ten years, radically redefining as it has the role and rights of millions of women, constituted what



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*Delegates to the NGO's Forum '85 gather on Nairobi University's campus*

much of the rest of the world regarded as one of the biggest casualties of the decade in terms of the women's movement. Equality had also proved harder to attain—even where laws existed—where certain religious, social or cultural traditions remained strong, with women themselves often objecting to the most strongly outside interference in ancient rites. Dowry systems, for example, have been banned in India for 25 years, but Indian women continue to be beaten or burned, even, in family disputes over dowries. Female circumcision is outlawed in much of the African continent, but continues to be practiced widely, often in unhygienic conditions and sometimes with fatal consequences.

### Family planning — little progress

As regards family planning—perhaps one of the most fundamental of women's rights—little real advance had been witnessed: while the average number of children wanted by women worldwide has dropped from 6 to 4 in the space of a generation, half of those women wanting to limit the size of their family had no access to contraception. While women now represent half the world's enfranchised population, the Conference found that there had been "no consistent increase over the decade" in the number of women politicians in the developing world, with the exception of Cuba. Fewer wo-

men were serving as heads of government in 1985 than in 1975.

So, while the decade had seen some clear gains, there had also been serious losses, and the overall conclusion was that there remained a long, long way to go. Women in general (on paper at least, and even if it came as a surprise to many of them) remained overworked, underpaid, undervalued and under-represented. That this could be seen, on paper, was in itself one of the decade's achievements. Worldwide statistics relating specifically to women were hitherto virtually non-existent. Ten years in the spotlight has changed that, at least. The decade 1975-85 was, above all, an era of consciousness-raising. Strategies for the future have been designed and, while the document agreed in Nairobi is not legally binding on governments, it offers real prospects of achievements by the end of the century. Ninety per cent of the world's governments now have agencies—some, admittedly, rather modest—dealing exclusively with the promotion of women's rights and women's welfare, and they will not be short of work.

As Leticia Shahani, Secretary-General of the Conference said, "After 1985 we will be impatient for action. It is not sufficient just to have an issue. Now we want something concrete". Equality, Development, and Peace by the year 2000 is asking a lot, but... nothing ventured, nothing gained. ○ M.v.d.V.

## AFRICAN STYLE AND RHYTHM IN EUROPE



Photo Gamma-Paris

*The Touré Kounda Group from Senegal, seen here in Paris... Europe is learning to appreciate, and to play, African music*

Europe, like America before it, is discovering the advantages of culture mixes and here, as in the USA, music is the first field to be affected, although there are famous precedents, Picasso, for example, in painting. Black African music has overturned European concepts of "good" (i.e. symphonic) music and the beat is now the basis of Europe's most popular sound. What could be more natural than that? Music is life and music is evolution. African music is alive and black European music appears to be one of the

### The Epic of African music in Europe

Espace Balard, Paris. The henceforth famous Touré Kounda (it means "elephant family" in Soninke) intones "Nidiaye natalia ak Touré Kounda", an aggressive Afro-reggae number that rivets the three thousand hysterical fans. A highly spectacular show in which the three Kounda brothers openly invoke Djamba Dong, the spirit of their native Casamance. A way-out sound, a crackle, a bang of drums, riffs from the brass, voices from Africa... Touré Kounda is the up-and-coming group.

London. Excitement in the air at the Lyceum—a sell-out for King Sunny

(1) First printed in the April 85 issue of Thirty Days of Europe.

Adé, the reigning monarch of Juju Music, in concert. Black market tickets go for pounds and pounds. London's Nigerian colony has come, of course, but there are crowds of whites too, spurred on by the rock press that has sent Juju Music to the top of the African charts...

Be it Brussels or Bonn or Rome, the scene is the same. The syncopated, colourful beat is all the rage. The never-ending waves of African music roll on, an infinitely changing beat, a straight-from-the-shoulder mix of traditional and highly sophisticated jazz and politics and the fairground. In their traditional dress, their sober suits or their tennis gear, Manu Dibango, Franco, Fela and Mory Kanté are astounding and compelling. Their pride, usually

richest, most alive and most beautiful sounds. One French TV commentator speaking of Sade, the Nigerian singer with a British mother, said that, when Europe espouses Africa, one of the prettiest women with one of the best voices in the world is the result. And the same is true for culture and civilization.

This splendid article<sup>(1)</sup> by Ekanga Shunga (Zaire) describes the epic of African music and fashion in Europe and the extraordinary change in outlook that goes with it.

backed with humour, is great. They are showmen and steeped in swing but they have only one thing in mind—to get the history, the struggles and the claims of black people known the world over.

Rock is dying, black American music is marking time and music lovers, in search of a new sound and a fresh breath of life, are turning to African music, the new frontier of today.

Look at all the jazz festivals that now have Africa on their programmes. Look at this growing business which, revealingly, combines efficient professionalism and talent both young and old. Bill Laswell, the American who produced Herbie Hancock's "Rock It", last year's great smurf hit, has just made a Touré Kounda recording and

cut a disc of Herbie Hancock performing with Manu Dibango. Celluloïd, the Paris record house that specialized in rock, is now getting a full African catalogue together and the Island label in London is playing the Afro card for all it is worth, while, in the States, Atlantic has seen the way things are going and got in fast. It all adds up to the African sound being all the rage. And the same goes for the black culture the continent knows so little about.

What is behind this craze? Many things. For a start, there is nothing much new on the western market where various cultural trends are increasingly African-inspired. And the big cities are becoming rallying points for Africans of all races and nations, who converge, get organized and forge for themselves a black identity.

The first immigrant workers arrived at the turn of the century, African students followed after the Second World War and it is all gradually changing the landscape and creating new infrastructures and new needs. And it has produced the shops selling exotic products and fabrics, the hairdressers and the restaurants which flourish around veritable ghettos with their own laws and codes of behaviour. Take the Matongué (Kinshasa's red-light district) of Brussels, Barbès in Paris and Brixton and Notting Hill in London, all of them often transit points for new arrivals. People from all over the black world come here, turning them into melting pots in which all cultures, every nation and every style, come together. In these "Third World" cities, Europeans are disconcerted and out of their depth. Cosmopolitanism of this order looks hysterical and irrational and many of them prefer to pass by on the other side, but others—and their numbers are mounting—stop to discover new horizons.

Paris, to give the most significant example, has many Africas. There is the Africa of the hawkers and peddlers and clandestine restaurants, still hiding in the immigrants' hostels, the broken-down hotels of the Goutte d'Or and the shops of tailors and sellers of pagnes, those magically coloured cloths, and the indigo and natural bazins which are twisted to make the wonderful tall African head-dresses. There are everyday "African prints" with their impressive motifs, some



Flex Features Ltd-London

### The singer Sade (Nigeria)

*One of the loveliest of Afro-European melodists*

called "My husband is capable" and "Your rival will fall in the fire". Then there is the Africa of show business and fashion, the exciting nights of Keur Samba and St Cyr, with its famous names, like Chris Seydou and Almen Gibirila, high-priests of fashion and the hyper-switched-on look.

World famous Chris Seydou, the 34 year-old king of couture, creates clothes inspired by African craftsmanship, long, flowing red and black crêpe-de-chine boubous, bouffant and waist-nipped and embroidered with traditional motifs and shapes, spots and native lozenges, an Africa of stylized, up-to-date, superb tradition! Why Paris? "I need it for success and for my quality image. I am at home in Abidjan. That is still my place of creation, but I feel restricted there ...".

It was Almen, the designer, who had the idea of getting 40 typical, black models together to form the cooperative agency, Black Experience. "I wanted to get black models away from the stereotyped jobs they were always stuck with and get them respect. I wanted to take them away from chocolate and Uncle Tom. The idea is both an artistic and a cultural one. In creating clothes, in the relationship

with my models, in the image of them I want to get across to the press and the media, the important thing to me is always to show off all the richness and the difference of black culture. I only ever use black models, because the clothes I create—they are partly inspired by my African roots—look good on them, even the restrained and classic styles". With her sarouels and the sand and ochre of her folded foulards, Almen, from Benin, makes you love the Sahel and all that is Africa ... "I set up in Paris", she says, "because you have to start in style and make your mark. I live African-style with my husband and my friends and my models. I eat African, I dance African and I create African. I just use Paris, that's all ..."

Behind these gurus of fashion, there is a handful of designers—Giselle Gomez, Vicky Toudou, Motse Akanati and so on—all trying to get Africa into the canons of Paris couture. But, strange to say, it is the non-Africans who have had all the glory and reaped the fruits of this source of inspiration. It is the Paco Rabannes and the Yves Saint-Laurents of this world and, above all, it is the Japanese, Kenzo, Issey Miyaké and Yoshi Yamamoto. The sound of the balafon can be heard

## ARTS & CULTURE

through the creations of some of the biggest names on the international fashion scene.

So Africa now belongs to us all and it is carving out a niche for itself in the western way of life. In their time, the poetry of Léopold Sédar Senghor, "L'enfant noir" by Camara Laye, the tales of Birago Diop and Sembene Ousmane's "Les bouts de bois de Dieu" have brought international acclaim for their authors—who could not always rely on them being printed and distributed at home. One or two publishers in the city, Stock, Seuil and Belfond, for example, are trying to bring the litany of the young writers from Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Congo and Zaire, who send off hundreds of manuscripts every day, into the public eye... This is literature we shall be hearing a lot about.

Negro art, which has its place on the walls of the experienced collectors, has

long been a familiar sight and, with the indivisible links it has, through Braque and Picasso, with modern painting, it stands in the Hall of Fame of the arts today. Things are quite different in the African film industry, its output being virtually non-existent if you listen to many westerners and even some Africans. But the films are there! They are surprising in their originality and technical standards and they convey the richness and cultural variety of a whole continent—as witness Senegal's Sembene Ousmane's "Le Mandat", "Xala" and "Emitai", Mauritanian Med Hondo's "West Indies" and "Soleil O", Nigérien Oumarou Ganda's "Le Wazou Polygame", Malian Souleymane Cissé's "Baara" and "Finyé" and more. The seventh African art even has its own Cannes, in the shape of FESPACO, the Ouagadougou pan-African film festival which began in 1969 and is held every two years, bringing together record numbers of English- and

French-speaking film makers from all over Africa. And in 1985, FESPACO opened its doors to the black diaspora from the Caribbean and Brazil too.

So why do all these films not get shown on European screens? Money, say some, and bad organization, say others. But one thing is clear. These so-called minority films are hard hit by the laws of the commercial circuits and, paradoxically, it is the non-commercial circuits that offer salvation, as they have efficient ways of distributing films from Africa and all over the Third World. And there are organizations in Paris that put a lot of more or less voluntary work into distributing African films free—ATRIA (a technical association for audiovisual research and information), CAC (the African film-makers' committee) and the Ministry of Cooperation film library. Through their films, their public can discover and get to know the culture of other countries. The French TV channels are doing their bit too, and French viewers have seen "Baara" by Souleymane Cissé (Mali) and Jacques Champreux's television adaptation of Cheik Hamidou Kane's "L'Aventure Ambiguë", a film that has been slammed by some critics but nonetheless displays fine talent from the Ivorian actor Sidiki Bakaba.

So can we talk about a black cultural revolution? No doubt. But there is one important thing to bear in mind and that is that Europe, Paris particularly, is a springboard for most Africans, whatever their field—art, journalism, publishing, fashion and especially music, which, as we know, makes things sweeter. In Paris 10 years ago, African musicians had to follow the Anglo-Saxon lead, as Manu Dibango and the great Myriam Makeba did, if they wanted success and the privilege of being broadcast on France-Inter. That was the time when England had its black heart in Brixton and Notting Hill and British Reggae, the new sound, was born. But now Paris has taken over. Show Biz, the black craze and free radio have given a great boost to African music made-in-Europe.

A real movement is taking shape—not a vogue or a fad, but recognition, at last, of a dazzling culture in its own right. Paris, with open arms, is the capital of a continent in exile. ○

Ekanga SHUNGU



Photo Gamma-Paris

*The saxophonist Manu Dibango (Cameroon). He is regarded as a star in Europe, and America has not resisted his hit "Soul Makossa"*



It represents an attempt to address, in the information field, the three major effects of the acculturation of African film and TV material — lack of means of production, lack of a distribution network, and a paucity of development themes. It is, in the spirit of Lomé III, an attempt jointly to overcome these three problems. And it plans to do so in a spirit of cooperation and not cultural domination; cooperation is, after all, a universal theme.

What is Contact Magazine? It will be a 15-minute magazine in 16 mm, colour, distributed on videocassettes (BVU or U-MATIC, PAL, SECAM, NTSC) and produced monthly in English or French. In addition to the monthly cassette, it is hoped that, from time to time, depending on resources, special features will be commissioned and distributed. In addition, Contact Magazine will offer a distribution service which will loan short films, concentrating on the work of ACP directors or NGO productions. This last feature is well worth noting—the existing URTNA network is short of funds, and of 20 000 hours broadcasting, only 1% is exchanged, and that is mostly sporting material.

What are the main targets for Contact Magazine? The godfather of the scheme, Hubert Ferraton, Head of the Commission's Development Information Service, estimates that ACP television networks are the prime target, followed by ACP cinema groups and by the non-commercial sector. This latter would include schools, training

centres, and cultural centres, both EEC and ACP, within the limits of what is financially possible.

Many of our readers will be familiar with "Europe Pictorial", the EEC's audio-visual magazine produced in Europe which has been distributed to television networks and cinema chains throughout ACP States. For some time now, a new format has been called for, a situation made more urgent by the cultural cooperation provisions of the Lomé III Convention, which state that it aims at the "promotion of the cultural identities of the ACP States' peoples, with a view to fostering their self-advancement and stimulating their creativity". It is hardly surprising that, in the light of this, a call has recently gone out to television producers, film-makers and the like in ACP countries, calling for help in producing a new magazine; for creative ideas, for distribution and networking ideas, and, in general, for cooperation on the broadest scale. The call has come from the Commission, where a replacement for "Europe Pictorial" is in the final stages of launching. The replacement is called Contact Magazine, and if the necessary support is forthcoming, it could prove an interesting monument of North-South cooperation in the field of information. Launching is scheduled for October.

The resources available to Contact Magazine are dependent on the interest shown in the project, both in EEC and ACP Member States. It is, in concept, the only joint Commission/EEC Member States operation in the field of information. Furthermore, if there are no ideas on topics or presentation forthcoming from ACP States, then its future cannot be assured. The purely EEC budget has been set at ECU 700 000 per year, and half of this budget will go towards distribution costs and the manufacture of copies for distribution. Member States of the EEC will contribute in different ways, depending on the resources available. However, one of the aims of Contact Magazine, as set out in its launching brochure, is the involvement "as far as possible, of film directors and technicians from the ACP Group".

The sort of topics which Contact Magazine is designed to cover are development problems and lessons, innovative projects and experiments in regional cooperation. There will also be room for cultural spotlights and the creative arts, as well as a look at the European Community as an experiment in regional cooperation and integration. For regular readers of *The Courier*, and even more so for its editorial team, there is a measure of satisfaction in knowing that we must be doing something right. Contact Magazine is "borrowing" quite a number of our titles, and there are even plans

afoot to launch a series of "Country Reports"!

The scheduled programmes for Contact Magazine for its first year of operation include the following:

- South-South information: a look at what happens when Senegal wants some TV footage on elections in Kenya. Do they get in touch? No—the Visnews tapes are called for from London; they go to Paris and thence to Dakar. And then, another aspect of the scene documents a TV team from Togo covering Lomé III negotiations in Europe.
- Medical Equipment for the Third World: French legislation obliges hospitals to change their equipment every five years. This material is in perfect working order and sorely needed by cash-starved African medical services. How a French group sends 400 tons of this much-needed material every year to where it will do the most good.

Other topics proposed include research in the service of development, the campaign against desertification, Operation Flood—a campaign to use food aid to boost milk consumption and production in India—and regional cooperation.

Contact Magazine's aims and methods are ambitious, and its means modest—at the moment. In the long run, its means will be the ACP film world, producers, technicians and distributors, and they are by no means negligible. *The Courier* wishes its sister magazine the best of luck for a successful launch, a strong build-up and a long and fruitful existence. ○ T.G.

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René-Jean DUPUY & Daniel VIGNES — *Traité du Nouveau Droit de la Mer* (Treaty on the New Law of the Sea). Droit International collection, Economica-Bruylant, Paris & Brussels — 1447 pages — FF 350 — 1985

Until only a few years ago, the law of the sea was based on simple and very ancient principles. It was one of the most stable areas of international law because the way the sea was used and its resources exploited had undergone virtually no change and there were relatively few countries, the maritime powers, which had both coastlines and powerful navies, deriving the principal benefits from it. Today, the upheavals that the law of the sea reflects are the result of the expansion of maritime techniques and of the greater numbers and variety of the people involved.

The new actors on the international stage were above all the developing countries, and the questioning of the law of the sea was seen largely as opposition by them to the system set up by the great powers. Nine years of multilateral negotiation finally led, in December 1982, to a new Convention on the Law of the Sea and the emergence of a new maritime law. A one-dimensional law, linked basically to activity on the surface, has been supplanted by a multi-dimensional law which covers the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed as well. The importance of this development for LDCs is obvious, and the refusal of certain industrialized countries to sign the Convention is eloquent witness to this fact.

The "Treaty on the new Law of the Sea" looks at this development both from a legal and an historical point of view. But it goes beyond mere commentary on the new Convention, and includes an overview of maritime law including the web of customary law which exists on this subject. For all those with an interest in the subject it constitutes a most important working instrument. It is the work of a team of 24 experts, of 18 nationalities, working under the direction of Professor T.J. Dupuy and of Daniel Vignes, better known to our readers as the current EEC Co-Secretary of the ACP-EEC Council, and Director of Cooperation

at the EEC Council. Before assuming his present job he was a Director in the Legal Service at the EEC Council and by virtue of that, responsible for the coordination of EEC Member States participating in all the sessions of the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

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J.A. MBEMBE — *Les jeunes et l'ordre politique en Afrique noire* (Young people and the political order in Black Africa). Logiques Sociales collection, l'Harmattan

Below the level of the State, often, at the very heart of the youth policies designed for them, young people manage to express their experience, devise new social and cultural practices and produce languages whose myriad meanings call out to be interpreted. How do they go about contesting or getting round the injunctions of the African powers? How do they cope? How can we detect and gauge the nature or the extent of the conflicts and the rupture that set them against the methods of government used in the countries of Africa? What tactics do they use to indicate their support and their connivance at the way political order is organized in Black Africa today? Where should we look to see the quite original nature of their social demands?

This essay, on the independence generations, gives an idea of the complexity of the changes going on in the way young people relate to the State and society in Black Africa today. The author sets out an analysis which, without denying the many forms of external dependence, nevertheless chooses to see Africa as prime mover and subject, not just victim, and highlights the strength of the links which make the vital reorganization of African political societies one of the essential conditions of their economic development in this day and age.

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J. Sholto DOUGLAS and Robert A. de J. HART — *Forest Farming*. Intermediate Technology Publications, 9 King Street, London WG2E 8HW — 204 pages — £ 5.95 — 1984

Forest farming or agroforestry opens up new avenues for the future. Not

only might it offer permanent solutions to the problems of much famine and malnutrition now afflicting vast numbers of human beings, but it can, if properly applied, conserve and bring into fruitful being large areas of presently wasted and barren lands and provide constructive and profitable employment for millions of farmers, forest workers and their families, so contributing to the progress and prosperity of all countries.

This new edition of *Forest Farming* contains additional material on the concept and methods of agroforestry and multiple usage systems which combine and integrate farming, silviculture and where desired, livestock husbandry, together with pasturage and ancillary industries. The book lists extra economic tree and shrub species, sources of seed supplies in most countries of the world, names and addresses of institutions and organizations concerned with forest farming as well as incorporating numerous practical notes and other further details of value to readers, all of which supplement and enhance the usefulness of the original work.

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
Bernard & Geneviève PIERRE — *Dictionnaire Médical* (A Medical Dictionary). L'Harmattan, 7, rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 75005 Paris, France — 860 pages — FF 60 (US \$ 10) — 1984

There are a vast number of tropical medical terms and they are often difficult for the young doctor and more difficult for the student of medicine to understand. And when French is not the native language of the student, the problem is greater still.

These two authors have therefore tried to provide medical students and doctors with a work of reference that is right for local conditions. The dictionary is also intended for nurses, health technicians and anyone else anxious to further his medical knowledge.

A knowledge of medical vocabulary is by no means the door to the use of esoteric and pretentious jargon: this is even less acceptable now than it was. Quite the contrary, knowing the medical terms means having a clear idea of what one is talking about and thus





### Auxiliary veterinary staff for new livestock policies in Africa (\*)

Livestock in sub-Saharan Africa plays a substantial role in both the economic and the social development of millions of people, especially in rural areas. The total annual value of production of this sector, including meat, milk, eggs, skins and hides, is estimated at five billion US dollars. Something like the same figure, expressed in money terms, can be put on the value of animal traction and natural manure used as fertilizer. The combination of the livestock sector to the GDP of various African countries ranges from 4% to 24%. The 150 million or so head of cattle in regions south of the Sahara are significant not only directly for their contribution to the human diet but also for the intensification of agriculture through the increasing numbers used for animal traction. They play an important role, moreover, in foreign exchange earnings and in balancing payments.

#### Livestock: a vulnerable asset

The sector constitutes, however, a highly vulnerable asset, both for the individual African farmer and for the economy as a whole.

One of the most fundamental problems in the sector in Africa is the inadequacy of animal health services. These have steadily deteriorated in the past decade, contributing to outbreaks of serious diseases such as rinderpest, sometimes in epidemic proportions.

It was for these reasons that the EEC/ACP Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA), together with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and the Institut d'Élevage et de Médecine Vétérinaire des Pays Tropicaux (IEMVT), organized a seminar in Bujumbura last October.

In addition to identifying and analysing the particular problems of the sector, the seminar set out to find ways of overcoming these problems and to devise strategies which would ensure balanced and sustained growth in the sector.

Since important decision-makers from the African countries concerned,


(\*) Findings and recommendations of a seminar held in Bujumbura, Burundi, in October 1984.

European donor countries, the European Community and international organizations participated in the seminar, its findings and recommendations should be of great interest to African countries restructuring their livestock sector.

#### Present difficulties of the sector

Participants in the seminar highlighted some of the present difficulties of the sector, including the persistence of epidemics despite annual vaccination campaigns and the free veterinary services offered in a number of African countries. Further problems were caused by the fact that, because of the difficult climatic conditions in rangelands, herders and their animals tended to leave their traditional rangeland in search of better conditions in regions where water and fodder are easier to find. This made the control of movements of herds from one country to another for veterinary reasons virtually impossible to achieve.

In addition, the challenge of the tsetse in forest zones and the control of



One of the main constraints to livestock development is the persistence of epidemics despite vaccination campaigns

ecto- and endo-parasites remained major obstacles to the development of the African livestock sector.

Participants estimated that growth rates of cattle herds had declined, on average, from 3.7% per annum during the decade 1960-1970 to 2.1% p.a. between 1970 and 1980 due to higher death rates and lower birth rates of animals.

Studies of the present position of animal health services suggest a variety of problems including both shortage of staff and shortage of money. In general it was felt that the services still reflect the situation that prevailed when they were created some 60 to 80 years ago, and they no longer correspond to today's requirements nor will they cater for future needs.

Livestock services in Africa are staffed in various ways. An optimal ratio, suggested by the participants, was one veterinary surgeon for 250 000 and one field officer for 12 000 animals. According to this standard, in the humid and semi-humid zones of Africa too many veterinary surgeons are employed, whereas in the Sahelian zone the number of field officers is too low. In the Sahelian zone in particular, the large number of categories of employees in these services, ranging from vets and senior livestock officers to livestock officers, senior livestock technicians, livestock assistants, veterinary assistants and vaccinators, complicates good personnel management.

Budgets for livestock services in African countries range from 0.2% to 1.5% of total government budgets, percentages which by no means reflect the importance and the potential of the sector for the economy and for society, as a whole. Of the limited funds available, between 75% and 90% has to be spent on personnel costs, leaving only 10-25% for equipment, inputs and services.

In most African countries, the administration has a monopoly on importing, distributing, and, sometimes, on selling inputs such as drugs, vitamins, mineral salts and other items. Inputs in the majority of the west and

central African countries are, theoretically, free of charge. Due to severe budget limitations, however, inputs at farm level are often not available at all or only in inadequate quantities. In a few countries, veterinary inputs have recently been sold to herdsmen.

The lack of laws governing the use of veterinary drugs has had the effect, in some countries, of stimulating the growth of private enterprise. They do not always function as well as they might, however.

Recent observations from vets in Africa, and results from pilot projects, suggest that a growing number of herdsmen are able and willing to pay for inputs which they deem to be effective and that new approaches to distributing inputs to groups and associations of herdsmen, on a paying basis, appear to be feasible. From a scientific point of view, excellent drugs and vaccines are available and the users recognize their value.

### New policies are feasible

Based on these findings and on their own experience, participants concluded that a restructuring of the livestock sector and of livestock services is required and that this is administratively feasible. Auxiliary veterinarian staff would play a major role in these restructured services.

Restructuring the sector should, the participants concluded, take account of the fact that veterinary services and inputs are no longer available free of charge, except in very special cases. Private initiatives should therefore be encouraged. State and parastatal monopolies on imports, distribution and sales of inputs would gradually be phased out.

One of the keys to the successful implementation of any such new policy would be the provision of an effective human link between the public services and the herdsmen. This could be achieved through auxiliary veterinary officers and basic veterinary health centres. These auxiliary veterinary officers would be responsible for selling drugs and other products, but not drugs considered dangerous.

They could also dispense first aid, be responsible for the identification and control of endo- and ecto-parasites (tick dips) as well as provision of vaccinations against contagious dis-




Photo GTZ

*Auxiliary officers would be responsible for first aid as well as for vaccinating against certain contagious diseases*

eases such as anthrax, blackquarter and haemorrhagic septicaemia as well as participate in national vaccination campaigns.

The payment system for such auxiliary officers can vary according to the local situation. They may be paid in cash or in kind by farmers' organizations, or they may be paid on the basis of services rendered or products sold.

### New form of training

Instead of the traditional two to three years of training, the seminar concluded that new forms of training may be more effective and appropriate for the creation of this new cadre of auxiliary veterinary staff. They suggested a two- to four-week basic training course, followed by continuous in-service training. The advantage of such training over the traditional system would be that the auxiliary officers keep in continuous contact with the groups they are serving; constant turnover of personnel would also be avoided. The training programme itself will need to differ from the traditional form of instruction. It has to be recognized that the candidates, who would ideally come from the ethnic groups for which they will work and would speak the local languages, will have had little or no formal education. However, they will have a good practical knowledge of animal health care

and will be able to recognize the main animal diseases.

Locally available data on animal diseases should be used for the preparation of these training programmes.

The basic animal health care centres, which would be operated by the auxiliary veterinary officer, should be provided with elementary veterinary equipment and tools as well as with a stock of safe drugs and other inputs.

Basic animal health care systems can only work properly where farmers participate fully in them through associations, cooperatives etc., including the acceptance of financial responsibility; where an appropriate legal framework exists; where quality and price control for services and inputs is conducted through state authorities and where there is constant supervision of the auxiliary veterinary officers by state veterinary surgeons.

The participants concluded the seminar by formulating 16 detailed recommendations for a new policy for organizing the livestock sector in Africa. A summary report of the seminar is available in French or English from CTA. A similar seminar for those African countries which were not able to participate in the Bujumbura seminar will be held from 25-28 September 1985 in Malawi. ○

Dr. W. TREITZ

# THE CONVENTION AT WORK

## Lomé III: Programming of Community Aid

Six months after the signature of the new Convention and while it does not come into force until the start of next year, depending on the rate at which ratifications proceed, the joint programming exercise for Community aid is already in full swing. At the time of going to press the exercise had led to 11 ACP countries establishing their Indicative Programmes.

This is an important step, because it constitutes the first real test of Lomé III, in terms of implementing this new approach, this new method of cooperating, jointly established with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of cooperation. (See article on "Programming of Community Aid—a new approach" in *Courier* No. 91). It is a first test in terms of choice of priorities, of concentrating aid, and of discussions and commitments on diverse aspects which must be taken into account, and with firm deadlines, so that the priorities jointly agreed can be achieved.

The first results seem most encouraging, indeed exemplary. In all cases, the Commission's and the European Investment Bank's programming missions had been meticulously prepared. The high level contacts and the meetings in each one of the countries took place in an excellent atmosphere of mutual confidence, friendship and understanding of each other's point of view. On each occasion the two delegations examined the various aspects of cooperation between the ACP country concerned and the Community, with particular emphasis on those aspects linked to the implementation of Lomé III. There was an in-depth exchange of views on the development objectives and priorities of each country in order to ensure the optimal utilization of the various possibilities for cooperation provided for in the Convention. These exchanges also covered the possibility of reinforcing regional cooperation at the level of the sub-region of which the various countries formed a part.

Thus, for 11 countries, at the end of negotiations between the two delegations, the Indicative Programme of

Community aid was signed. *The Courier* reproduces below the essential elements as they were made public in the joint press communiqués.

It should be remembered that the sum indicated for each country does not include additional resources which could be made available to ACP countries during the life of the Convention in the form of non-programmable aid administered by the Commission such as Stabex transfers, emergency aid, food aid, etc. On the other hand, the EIB could contribute, from the resources which it manages, to the financing of productive investment projects which meet the criteria and conform to the statutory rules of the Bank and the provisions of the Convention. If, in the case of certain countries, an indicative amount is shown as regards loans, it is nonetheless subject to the presentation and acceptance of financing projects before becoming definitive.

These clarifications made, here is the list of the first Indicative Programmes drawn up. *The Courier* will bring you other Programmes as they are agreed, in future issues.

### Mali

Mali will be receiving the sum of ECU 136 m (about CFAF 46.5 billion) as programmable resources under Lomé III.

This sum comprises:

- ECU 117 m (equivalent to CFAF 40 billion) in the form of grants;
- ECU 5 m (equivalent to CFAF 1.7 billion) in the form of special loans;
- ECU 14 m (about CFAF 4.8 billion) in the form of risk capital managed by the European Investment Bank.

Community aid will be concentrated on food strategy. It will take the form of contributions towards creating and improving conditions for food production by optimal use of surface and sub-surface water, by promoting an environment favourable to the development of agriculture, the fight

### Also in the yellow pages

#### The Convention at work

- I. Lomé III programming
- IV. EDF financing
- IX. Parliamentary fact-finding missions

#### General information

- X. 21st OAU Summit
- XII. Extension of the Cocoa Agreement

#### European Community

- XIII. The Ten and South Africa
- XIV. Mr Nakasone visits the Commission

against desertification and the carrying out of the necessary accompanying actions.

In addition, the EIB may help to finance, from the resources under its management, productive investment projects which meet its criteria and statutory rules and which conform to the provisions of the Lomé III Convention.

The Bank considers the integration of this operation in this area as a first priority where the projects presented to it meet its criteria and concern the sectors set out in Article 197(5) of the Lomé III Convention.

It is to be noted that the sum of ECU 210 m could be set aside for regional projects in countries of the West African sub-region.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed in Bamako on 5 July 1985 by Mr Alioune Blondin Beye, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on behalf of the Republic of Mali, by Mr Dieter Frisch, Director-General for Development on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, and by Mr Dieter Hartwich, Director of Extra-Community Financing at the EIB on behalf of the EIB.

### Senegal

Senegal will be receiving the sum of ECU 97 m (equivalent to CFAF 33.2 billion) as programmable resources under Lomé III.

This sum comprises:

- ECU 87 m (equivalent to CFAF 29.8 billion) in the form of grants;

— ECU 10 m (equivalent to CFAF 3.4 billion) in the form of special loans.

Cooperation between the Republic of Senegal and the Community will cover food security policy and the fight against desertification. It will be concentrated for the most part on the Lower Valley of the Senegal River.

The chosen approach will be multi-sectoral. To cover the rehabilitation of the region, support will be required at all stages in agricultural production, infrastructure and catering for the basic requirements of the population (water, health, education, etc.).

Moreover, in order to increase the impact of the fight against desertification, optimal use of available water resources in the area bordering on the Lower Valley will be sought by means of small hydro-agricultural village schemes.

Finally, since the expansion of agricultural production forms part of the national plan for cereal production, the aid will contribute, through the intervention of the common fund from the resale of food aid, to the restarting and regulation of the local grain market. It should be noted that since this fund is financed from the sale of food to the population furnished by the main donors, of which the EEC forms a part, this fund will be administered jointly with the Government of Senegal.

Moreover, the European Investment Bank could make available, from resources which it manages, finance for productive investment projects which meet its criteria and statutory rules and which conform to the provisions of the Convention. The Bank indicated a sum of the order of ECU 25 m (CFAF 8.5 billion).

The EEC delegation indicated that a sum of ECU 210 m (equivalent to CFAF 71.9 billion) could be set aside for regional projects in West Africa. The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed by Mr Mamoudou Touré, Minister of Economy and Finance and interim Minister for Planning and Cooperation on behalf of Senegal, and Mr Dieter Frisch, Director-General for Development on behalf of the Commission of the European Economic Community and Mr Dieter Hartwich, Director of Extra-Community financing on behalf of the EIB.

## Malawi

Malawi will be receiving the sum of ECU 114 m (approximately Kwacha 140 m) as programmable resources. Of this amount, ECU 87 m in the form of grants managed by the Commission: ECU 15 m in the form of special loans managed by the Commission, and ECU 12 m in the form of risk capital, managed by the EIB.

The Community's aid would be focused on the development of agriculture and rural areas in order to support Malawi's priority by development policy for balanced growth between productive and social areas, better mobilization and management of resources and equitable distribution of economic and social benefits to raise the living standards of the least privileged members of society.

In addition, the European Investment Bank will be able to help finance, from the resources under its management, productive capital projects which meet its criteria and statutory rules and which conform to the Convention.

The two delegations also exchanged views on ways of stepping up regional co-operation in the Southern African sub-region. The Community delegation stated in this context that a sum of ECU 110 m (equivalent in local currency to Kwacha 136 m) could be

earmarked for regional operations in Southern Africa.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed on 11 July jointly by Mr E. Bwanali, Minister of Finance on behalf of the Malawi Government, by Mr Maurice Foley, Head of the Community Delegation, on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities and by Mr Martin Curvan for the EIB.

## Burundi

Burundi will be receiving the sum of ECU 108 m as programmable resources under Lomé III.

This sum is composed of:

- ECU 86 m in the form of grants;
- ECU 10 m in the form of special loans;
- ECU 12 m in the form of risk capital managed by the EIB.

Projects will be aimed primarily at reinforcing the socio-economic infrastructure, the protection and conservation of the countryside and the forests of the country, the development of agriculture for food, livestock and fisheries, and the improvement of distribution networks.

In addition, the EIB may contribute, from resources under its management, to the financing of productive investment projects which meet its criteria



*The signing of the Indicative Programme of Dominica by Michel Hauswirth (left), Prime Minister Eugenia Charles and John Ainsworth, while the National Authorizing Officer, M. Harris, looks on*

and statutory rules and which conform to the provisions of the Convention.

It should be recalled that a sum of ECU 185 m has been set aside for regional cooperation in East Africa.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed in Bujumbura on 13 July 1985 by Mr Mathias Sinamenye, Minister in charge of Planning at the President's Office on behalf of Burundi, Mr Michel Hauswirth, Deputy Director-General for Development on behalf of the Commission, and by Mr Michael Nevin for the EIB.

### Central African Republic

The Central African Republic will be receiving the sum of ECU 70 m (about CFAF 24 billion) as programmable resources under Lomé III.

This sum is composed of:

- ECU 62.5 m (about CFAF 21.5 billion) in the form of grants;
- ECU 7.5 m (about CFAF 2.5 billion) in the form of risk capital managed by the European Investment Bank.

The sector in which the Community's financial aid is judged to be most appropriate is rural development, with the accent on developing agricultural and animal production, on the improvement of marketing and on projects aimed at improving the living conditions of the rural population. There is also scope for projects for the conservation of the natural heritage in threatened areas.

In order to secure the optimal use of Community funds, a concentration on the eastern part of the country is considered advisable. Apart from that, priority will be given to opening up the southern part of the country.

In addition, the European Investment Bank may help to finance productive investment projects.

The two delegations also held an exchange of views on the possibility of stepping up regional cooperation at the level of the Central African sub-region. The EEC delegation indicated that a sum of ECU 80 m (about CFAF 27.4 billion) could be set aside for regional projects in Central Africa.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was jointly signed on 18 July in Bangui by Mr Guy Darlan on behalf of the Central African Republic and by Mr Maurice Foley and Mr Jus-

tin Loasby on behalf of, respectively, the Commission of the European Communities and the European Investment Bank.

### Mauritius

Mauritius will be receiving the sum of ECU 29 m (currently equivalent to 329 m rupees).

This sum is composed of:

- ECU 19 m (equivalent to 215 m rupees) in the form of grants;
- ECU 10 m (equivalent to 114 m rupees) in the form of special loans. The conditions of these loans are: term of 40 years, grace period of 10 years and 1% interest.

Community aid will be concentrated to up to 80% of the sum indicated, on the Government's stated first priority, which is the fight against unemployment and the search for lasting improvements in employment prospects, by focusing the Community's programme of assistance on two main areas:

- rural desertification, specifically by support to cooperatives and small farmers;
- industrial promotion and the development of small manufacturing and service industries.

Commission projects will include, among other things, the provision of credit facilities and supporting measures such as technical assistance and professional training as well as the supply of necessary equipment and infrastructure.

Twenty per cent of the total sum allocated will be devoted to financing specific projects and to national support for regional projects, principally those under the aegis of the Indian Ocean Commission.

The EIB will contribute from the resources under its management to productive investment projects which meet its criteria and statutory rules and which conform to the provisions of the Lomé III Convention. It was pointed out that under the current circumstances the Bank could consider a sum of the order of ECU 15 m (currently worth about 170 m rupees) from the package of measures which it has at its disposal (loans from its own resources and risk capital). The Mauritian delegation confirmed that it would be presenting projects to the Bank in the following areas: aid to small and medium-sized industries via

national financing institutions, agro-industry and energy.

The EEC delegation pointed out that ECU 26 m (currently equivalent to 294 m rupees) could be set aside for regional projects.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed in Port Louis on 22 July 1985 by Mr Seetanah Lutchmeenaraidoo, Minister of Finance and Dr Beergoonath Ghurburun, Minister of Planning and Economic Development on behalf of Mauritius, by Mr Michel Hauswirth, Deputy Director-General for Development (heading the EEC delegation) on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities, and by Mr Jacques Sylvain, co-Director of Extra-Community Financing, on behalf of the EIB.

### Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania will be receiving the sum of ECU 169 m (about T. Shs. 2.130 m) as programmable resources under Lomé III.

This sum is composed of:

- ECU 152 m (about T. Shs. 1.916 m) in the form of grants;
- ECU 17 m (about T. Shs. 214 m) in the form of risk capital, managed by the European Investment Bank.

The Community's aid would be focused on agriculture, especially on improving food security, through appropriate action in the areas of high potential, and on the coffee sector which is Tanzania's main foreign exchange earner. Since agriculture is heavily dependent on the state of transport, high priority will be given to the rehabilitation of the transport network and to the improvement of transport facilities to sustain agricultural development.

The two delegations also held an exchange of views on stepping up regional cooperation in the sub-region. The Tanzanian delegation indicated the main areas of priority (improvement of the transport system serving the landlocked countries, regional activities related to agriculture, and training). The Community delegation indicated that the Lomé III Convention will make available a provisional amount of ECU 185 m (about T. Shs. 2.330 m) for the East Africa region.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed jointly on 25 July on behalf of Tanzania by Mr Ru-

tihinda, on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities by Mr Frisch (head of the Community delegation), and by Mr Curwen for the European Investment Bank.

### Grenada

Grenada will be receiving the sum of ECU 5 m as its programmable financial package.

This sum will be composed of

- ECU 4.5 m in the form of grants;
- ECU 0.5 m in the form of risk capital, managed by the European Investment Bank.

The co-operation between Grenada and the Community will be concentrated in the framework of the Third Lomé Convention, on the development of the infrastructure (roads) in particular in the Parishes of St. Patrick and St. Andrew. Approximately 80% of the resources managed by the Commission will be devoted to this purpose.

In addition, the European Investment Bank may help to finance productive capital projects.

Furthermore a sum of ECU 72 m (approximately EC\$ 145 m) would serve as basis for the establishment of regional cooperation programmes.

The Indicative Programme of EEC aid to Grenada was signed in St. George on 29 July by Ben Jones, acting Prime Minister of Grenada, Michel Hauswirth on behalf of the Commission and John Ainsworth on behalf of the EIB.

### St. Lucia

St. Lucia will be receiving the sum of ECU 5.5 m (equivalent to approximately EC\$ 11 m) as programmable resources.

This sum is composed of:

- ECU 5 m in the form of grants;
- ECU 0.5 m in the form of risk capital, managed by the European Investment Bank.

Following their exchanges of views, the two delegations agreed that this aid would be focused on rural development.

In addition, the European Investment Bank will be able to help finance, from the resources under its management, capital investment in certain productive facilities that conform to the Third Lomé Convention.

The two delegations also held an ex-

change of views on ways of stepping up regional cooperation in the Caribbean sub-region. The Community delegation stated in this context that a sum of ECU 72 m (approximately EC\$ 145 m) could be considered as a basis for the establishment of regional cooperation programmes.

The Indicative Programme of Community aid was signed on 31 July on behalf of St. Lucia by the Honourable John Compton, on behalf of the Commission of the European Communities by Mr Michel Hauswirth, and by Mr John Ainsworth for the European Investment Bank.

### Dominica

Dominica will be receiving the sum of ECU 5.5 m (equivalent to approximately EC\$ 11 m) as programmable resources.

This sum is composed of:

- ECU 5 m in the form of grants;
- ECU 0.5 m in the form of risk capital, managed by the European Investment Bank.

The two delegations defined the development of agriculture and tourism as the focus their cooperation, and 75% of the grant was reserved for upgrading of the country's feeder road system with the aim of improving access to existing or new areas of agricultural production and tourism.

Microprojects, to improve living conditions in the rural areas, training and trade and tourism promotion were defined as other priority areas for use of EEC aid funds.

In addition, the European Investment Bank will be able to help finance from the resources under its management, capital investment in certain productive facilities that conform to the Third Lomé Convention.

Furthermore, a sum of ECU 72 m (approximately EC\$ 145 m) would serve as basis for the establishment of regional cooperation programmes, and the two delegations exchanged views on ways and means of stepping up regional cooperation in the Caribbean.

The Indicative Programme of EEC aid to Dominica was signed on 2 August on behalf of the Government by Miss Mary Eugenia Charles, on behalf of the European Communities by Mr Michel Hauswirth, and by Mr John Ainsworth on behalf of the European Investment Bank.

### St. Vincent and the Grenadines

St. Vincent and the Grenadines will be receiving the sum of ECU 5.5 m as its programmable package.

This sum will be composed of:

- ECU 5 m in the form of grants, managed by the Commission;
- ECU 0.5 m in the form of risk capital, managed by the European Investment Bank.

Cooperation between St. Vincent and the Grenadines and the Community will concentrate.

Measures will include—within the context of an overall programme of land reform—the promotion of a viable small farm sector, the provision of infrastructure, agricultural diversification and the improvement of marketing facilities and services.

In addition, the European Investment Bank may help finance productive capital projects.

Furthermore ECU 72 m (approximately EC\$ 145 m) will be earmarked for regional cooperation in the Caribbean.

The Indicative Programme of EEC aid to St. Vincent and the Grenadines was signed jointly on 7 August by Prime Minister James Mitchell, Michel Hauswirth and John Ainsworth.

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## EDF

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**Following favourable opinions from the 202nd and 203rd meetings of the EDF Committee, the Commission has just decided on financing for the following schemes.**

### Somalia

**North-West Agricultural Development Project**  
Fifth EDF  
Grant: ECU 7 600 000

This project (PDANO) is the main agricultural operation in northern Somalia. It covers the North-West and Adwal regions and its headquarters are at Hargeisa. During the first phase,

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(\*) The Community's financial commitments are expressed in ECU (European Currency Unit). The current rate of exchange is ECU 1 = EC\$ 2.00007.

satisfactory progress was made with watered crops, cereal production (for food) increased considerably and irrigated horticulture was begun.

PDANO II will continue with both watered and irrigated crops. IDA and FIDA will continue operations in the watered agriculture sector and the EDF (parallel financing) will concentrate on irrigated horticulture. The main aim of the EDF project is to boost the small farmers' output of fruit and vegetables for the local market and possibly export, which should push up rural and urban income and raise the standard of living. It covers the period 1985/86-1989/90.

## Tanzania

### Road between Idetero and the Mufundi paper-pulp mill

Fifth EDF

Special loan: ECU 4 120 000

This is additional funding to be used for the road between Idetero and the Mufundi mill, which is needed urgently since the factory, which has been financed by a consortium of funders (\$ 250 million), is finished and ready for operation.

## Lesotho

### Extensions to the rural clinic modernization programme

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 641 000

This follows on from a 4th EDF project to rehabilitate 20 rural clinics. The idea is to modernize a further 11 clinics, primarily by renovating and repairing the buildings and installations.

The project also includes installing a new district health office in an area which has not had one so far. All the clinics will be fitted out with furniture and equipment and two heavy-duty vehicles will be supplied for project implementation and health coordination in the district.

## Bahamas

### Animal feed pilot project

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 200 000

The aim here is to provide additional financing for the construction and launching of an animal feed pilot plant (offal factory), the cost of which has increased following design changes.

The overall aim of the project is to supply 1100 t p.a. of balanced feed for 13 500 pigs—about 20% of national demand.

## Fiji, Kiribati, PNG, Solomon, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa

### Pacific Forum Line (Containers, Phase III)

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 3 200 000

The idea of the Pacific Forum Line (PFL), which is jointly owned and run by 10 countries of the region, is to provide regular sailings between them and thereby promote balanced development there. Since it was set up in 1978, PFL has had a considerable effect, especially on the standard of maritime services offered to the smallest countries, and there has been a spectacular increase in the quantities freighted. However, it has been unable to cover costs, largely because of under-capitalization, but it does make a vital contribution to regional integration.

The aim of Phase III is to replace the integral containers which the company hires by ones which it owns, thereby cutting the rental bill and improving company profits.

## Equatorial Guinea

### Training for road maintenance staff

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 100 000

This project, which follows on from a 4th EDF scheme, involves providing road maintenance staff with training that the national education system is not in a position to offer.

It is urgent to train these staff if the deterioration of the road system is to be halted and the country is to have the technical means of monitoring future road projects and ensuring they are maintained.

The staff in question, who will have the backing of technical assistance officers, will consist of a road maintenance team attached to the Public Works Delegation in the continental region of Equatorial Guinea. This team will repair about 100 km of laterite roads.

## Rebuilding of two bridges

Fifth EDF

Grant: 800 000

The idea here is to rebuild two bridges on the Malabo-Luba road on Bioko Island over the Rivers Tiburones and Alena.

The road network has to be improved if agricultural and commercial activities, particularly between Malabo and the island's second town, Luba, are to be maintained and improved.

## Rwanda (Sysmin)

### Development of cottage industry in the tin mining sector

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 840 000

The Community has decided that Rwanda's application for financial assistance from Sysmin (Lomé II) can be granted. The Government has asked for the money to go to two schemes to help make the mining sector viable once more and the first of these is aimed at revitalizing the independent craft-type mines which have seen their output drop by 85% over the past five years.

The project involves providing technical assistance, tools and small items of mining equipment.

It should push up the production of cassiterite and tantalite by about 95%, create 320 new jobs and increase the average daily income of a thousand or so people up from ECU 0.8 to ECU 1.5.

## St. Christopher & Nevis

### St. Johnston's Primary School

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 834 000

The aim here is to build a new primary school for about 530 pupils in the village of St. Johnston's in the suburbs of Basseterre, the capital. The project will replace the existing dilapidated, overcrowded buildings, which are totally unsuitable for proper teaching, by a new school on the same site.

## Wallis and Futuna

### Electricity supplies on Futuna

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 200 000

The project is sited on Futuna, in

the French Pacific territory of Wallis & Futuna. The island is 180 km<sup>2</sup> in area and the estimated population was around 4100 in 1982. There is no electricity supply network, merely one or two private generators.

The aim in this case is to run Phase I of the supply programme.

## French Polynesia

### Tahiti Slaughterhouse

Fourth EDF

Grant: ECU 70 000

Special loan: 1 200 000

This is a project to provide Tahiti with a modern slaughterhouse to meet the needs of the producers of poultry, pigs and cattle of the Windward Group and to put an end to unofficial slaughtering that is carried out in conditions of doubtful hygiene.

The building will be in the hands of the Rural Economy Department, which will run the studies and be responsible for works supervision.

## Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia & Dominica

### Campaign against moko disease

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 900 000

The banana sector is currently threatened by a withering bacterial disease commonly called moko, which causes early yellowing of the leaves and rotting of the flesh of the fruit. Contaminated plants have to be destroyed early on to prevent spread.

A first EDF aid scheme showed that the effects of the disease had to be brought down to a level at which the Windward Islands Banana Growers Association can continue its eradication campaign.

The project aims to continue to fight the disease and prevent it spreading from Grenada to the other islands in the group.

## Caribbean — ACP cocoa producers

### Cocoa Research Unit

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 624 000

This is a two-year continuation of a Community scheme to help the Cocoa Research Unit (CRU).

The idea is to help set up the Inter-

national Cocoa Genebank Trinidad (ICGT) to preserve, assess and provide ACP producers with cocoa plants so they can run selection and genetic improvement programmes to meet their specific needs.

## Mauritania

### Nouadhibou Maritime Vocational Training Centre

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 500 000

Potential is such that the fishing industry should be one of the main sectors of the Mauritanian economy and one of the keys to its foreign trade in the long term.

A shortage of national staff is currently holding back development, however, and this project involves starting up training for deck and machine-room workers at the Maritime Vocational Training Centre (CFPM) in Nouadhibou, catering for 167 students (including 80 boarders).

The project is to fit up existing buildings, build new ones and supply teaching materials and furniture, a trawler and technical assistance with the training course.

## Gambia

### Roads in Upper River

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 750 000

The aim here is to build and renovate 83 km of roads in the Sandu and Wuli areas of the Upper River Division. By making these areas accessible, the project will help:

- boost the production and marketing of harvests and the marketing of cattle;
- improve access to training centres and health facilities;
- cut the costs of vehicle utilization.

## Chad

### Priority action programmes in the live-stock sector

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 5 300 000

The idea of these priority action programmes is to rehabilitate the veterinary infrastructure, give support for organization of the 1985/86 vaccination campaign, train herdsmen in the pastoral units, sink and repair 179

wells in the Kanem and Batha districts and provide support for the Farcha Laboratory.

This will mainly involve supplying materials and equipment, logistical means, vaccine and medicines and the technical staff needed to sink and repair the wells.

## Burkina Faso

### Drinking water supplies to the rural populations in Yatenga (Phase II)

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 5 000 000

This is a project to meet the drinking water requirements of the rural populations in the Yatenga area of Burkina Faso. It is the second stage of the project to supply drinking water to rural populations in both Yatenga and Comoé.

Continuation of the project is possible because results so far have been very encouraging and also because needs are far from being met. Phase II is confined to Yatenga, the province with the fewest modern water points, where substantial efforts have been made to get the local people to take over responsibility for them.

The plan is to provide 280 water points to supplement the 400 that have already been installed.

The ultimate aim is to integrate these water points into the rural environment so the users themselves take over maintenance.

## Sierra Leone

### Back up to the Ministry's geological prospection

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 300 000

The idea here is to run a training-technical assistance programme (including the development of infrastructure) to improve the running of geological prospection operations and enable the Ministry to carry out efficient cartographical, prospection and mineral exploration schemes and offer proper technical services for other projects and exploration activities. The country's ability to exploit its mineral resources will be greater as a result and the Government's negotiating position vis-à-vis existing private concessionaries and possible partners in joint ventures will be improved.



## Sao Tomé & Príncipe

**Water supplies for Trinidad and S. Jao dos Angolores**  
Fifth EDF  
Grant: ECU 450 000

The aim in this case is to re-establish a water supply system in two population centres in the rural hinterland of the island of Sao Tomé.

Technical assistance for the national water board has also been provided for, so a management-tariffing system whereby operating costs can be covered by water rates can be introduced.

Each centre needs:

- a water collection system;
- a purification system;
- a reservoir;
- a supply network comprising public fountains, taps in front of the doors of private houses and individual connections in homes.

## Somalia

**Assistance with the rinderpest eradication campaign**  
Fifth EDF  
Grant: ECU 207 644

This involves supplying materials for the national eradication campaign aimed at overcoming the problems currently facing cattle exports.

Herding is Somalia's main economic activity and it represents about 50% of GDP and more than 80% of export earnings.

## Botswana

**Rural Training Centre in Francistown**  
Fifth EDF  
Grant: ECU 1 025 000

The project was designed to back up the rural development campaign, i.e. to provide rural services, create jobs and boost production and rural incomes, and it aims to update and improve the quite outmoded training facilities at the Francistown Rural Training Centre, with a view to giving farmers from the area better training and spreading techniques more efficiently through one-week crash courses for men and women and adult education courses for agricultural demonstrators.

Both labour and installations are covered. ○

## EIB

### Madagascar: industrial rehabilitation

With a view to assisting in the rehabilitation and modernization of a textile mill at Antsirabé, in central Madagascar, the European Investment Bank has advanced a loan of ECU 6 million to the Government of Madagascar which will pass the proceeds on to the final beneficiary and project promoter, "la Cotonnière d'Antsirabé" — Cotona. The project will serve to modernize an industry which uses locally-produced cotton and makes a major contribution to the country's balance of payments.

Granted under the terms of the Second Lomé Convention, the loan has been made available for 15 years on concessionary terms and is drawn from risk capital resources managed by the EIB. With a workforce of 2 770, Cotona operates the integrated textile mill at Antsirabé as well as cultivating cotton over an area of about 2 200 hectares. In 1984 it produced about 39 million metres of some 50 types of fabric comprising printed cloth, grey and dyed yarns and man-made materials. One of Madagascar's two leading textiles manufacturers, the company sells 80% of its output on the national market.

The project is aimed at renovating or replacing certain equipment and improving the performance of the spinning and weaving departments. This industrial component (part of an overall scheme also embracing agricultural investment to step up cotton production) is costed at ECU 24 million and is also attracting assistance from the International Finance Corporation (an arm of the World Bank) and France's Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique.

This loan brings the total amount provided by the EIB in Madagascar since 1981 from risk capital resources to ECU 21.32 m: 8 m went in 1984 to the Bankin'ny Industria for rehabilitation of small- and medium-sized enterprises in the industrial, agricultural processing and mining sectors; 5 m in 1983 for modernization and extension of a commercial shrimp-fishing operation at Nossi-Bé; 150 000 in 1982 for a mining study; and 2.17 m in 1981 for a study concerned with developing indigenous energy resources. ○

## LOME III

### Ratification round-up

Article 286.1 of the Lomé Convention signed on 8 December 1984 states: "This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the second month following the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification of the Member States and of at least two thirds of the ACP States, and of the act of notification of the conclusion of this Convention by the Community".

With a view to the entry into force of Lomé III in 1986, the race is on to deposit the instruments of ratification before the end of 1985. Two thirds of the ACP States means 44 States—below is the state of advancement of ratification at the time of *The Courier* going to press:

ACP country	Date of ratification
Seychelles	7 January 1985
Sudan	5 April 1985
Swaziland	15 April 1985
Guinea	13 June 1985
Ethiopia	27 June 1985
Uganda	3 July 1985
Nigeria	8 July 1985
Sierra Leone	22 July 1985
EEC country	Date of ratification
Ireland	3 May 1985
Denmark	17 June 1985

The Treaty of Rome (Article 238, para 2) stipulates that the Communities may enter into treaties after consultation with the Parliament based on a proposal from the Commission. The proposal of the Commission was made on 19 April 1985, the Parliament's favourable opinion was given on 12 July. ○

## ACP EMBASSIES


**New Ambassadors from Cameroon, Ghana, Grenada and Mozambique have just presented their credentials to the Presidents of the Council and the Commission of the European Communities.**

### Cameroon

Zachée Mongo So'o, Cameroon's latest Ambassador to Brussels, is a 54-year-old legal specialist who trained at the University of Rennes (France)

and the Ecole Nationale de la France d'Outre-Mer.


From the Vice-Presidency of the Douala Court of Appeal, he went to successive appointments, in 1962-68, as Head of Mission, Director of Administrative and Legal Affairs in the Office of the President of the Republic, Head of the Civil Cabinet and Secretary-General of the Presidency. In 1968, he joined the Government as Minister of Education, a post he kept until 1974 when he became Minister responsible to the President for Relations with Parliament. He was later seconded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, in 1976, appointed Ambassador to Gabon, a post he held until coming to Brussels.



*The Cameroon Ambassador in conversation with Mr Jacques Delors, President of the Commission*

### Ghana

Joseph Ahwa Laryea, a 49-year old philosophy graduate and a qualified civil administrator, takes over from J.B. Wilmot as Ghana's Ambassador in Brussels. Most of his professional career has been in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, both abroad—he has served in Embassies in Belgrade, Paris, the Hague and Bonn and in the High Commission in London—and in Accra, where was Director of Administration and Personnel, Director of Economic Relations and Director of the Passport Division.



### Grenada

Oswald Moxley Gibbs, Grenada's new Ambassador, knows Brussels well and is familiar with ACP-EEC relations, as he followed the Lomé I negotiations and ACP-EEC meetings until 1978. He has been High Commissioner to London and was Ambassador to Belgium in 1977.

Mr Gibbs, a 57-year-old economics graduate, has previously had a number of posts of responsibility at the Commission for the Eastern Caribbean Governments in London. Since 1979, he has been a consultant, most recently on missions to inventory industrial opportunities in Bahamas, Grenada, Guyana and Suriname.

*The new Ambassadors of Ghana (above) and Grenada (below) with Jacques Delors*



### Mozambique

Mozambique is now represented in the EEC by a woman, Frances Vitoria Velho Rodrigues, who graduated from the University Development Institute in Geneva in 1977 to join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she was head



**Mrs F. Velho Rodrigues**

of the Department of International Economic Relations, becoming an Ambassador in 1980. ◦

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## FAMINE

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### Two Parliamentary fact-finding missions to Ethiopia, Chad and Sudan

Two fact-finding delegations, one headed by Mrs Focke (SOC-D) and the other by Mr Fellermaier (SOC-D), visited Ethiopia and Sudan and Chad and Sudan, respectively, between 29 June and 7 July in order to carry out an on-the-spot investigation into the situation of these three countries, which are particularly hard-hit by drought and famine. The Members' investigation focused on the fight against malnutrition, the fate of the refugees, the transport of food aid, the coordination of aid such as structural measures for the rehabilitation of the areas affected and the reintegration of the populations affected.

When the two delegations returned, the European Parliament unanimously adopted a resolution advocating a number of measures to improve the effectiveness of Community aid. Although Members were able to confirm on the spot that Community aid, which makes a substantial contribution to the fight against hunger and is gratefully acknowledged everywhere, was arriving at ports in a relatively

satisfactory manner, there were still problems with distribution because of the serious shortage of transport. There is an alarming imbalance between the quantities of goods supplied and the availability of transport. Supplies are piling up in the ports due to the shortage of lorries, spare parts, tyres and petrol as well as to the lack of aeroplanes or of trains.

The Parliament therefore called on the Commission, the Council and the Member States immediately to take the requisite emergency measures to ensure a substantial increase in transport capacity for all types of transport.

The Parliament also considered that both donors and recipients have concentrated too much on emergency aid in the form of food aid without taking the necessary measures in good time to ensure a good harvest this year and next year. Insufficient harvests must be expected, even if the rains are good, as a result of areas remaining uncultivated for lack of seeds and simple agricultural tools.

The Parliament also calls on the Commission, the Council and the Member States, therefore, to make a major effort to get cultivation going again.

It urges the Community and its Member States to make greater efforts to link emergency aid with adequately-funded medium-term development projects (e.g. "Food for Work"), the aim being to achieve self-sufficiency of food supplies.

Finally, the Parliament hoped that in addition to Ethiopia, Chad and Sudan, these projects will be extended to include all African countries similarly affected by famine. ◦

### Special logistical aid programme for the transport of aid in Africa

**The Commission has just decided on an emergency scheme to provide ECU 19.5 million-worth of logistical aid with channelling relief in a number of countries of Africa, as follows.**

#### Sudan - ECU 8 million

The scheme aims to channel aid from Port Sudan to the Darfur area in the west by providing:

— an air bridge (5-6 planes), able to transport 250 t products per day, for four months, starting in July;

— a community road bridge able to handle 7000 t per month in the beginning.

#### Ethiopia - ECU 8 million

— An air bridge (three planes for five months) to supply the towns of Axum, Mekele, Lalibela and Maichew-Mehoni.

— Road transport—a contribution to the UN fund to finance relief transport by truck.

#### Niger - ECU 1 million

Contribution to an internal relief transport programme which the Niger Government is organizing.

#### Mali - ECU 1.2 million

Contribution to the Timbuctu supply operation.

#### Mauritania - ECU 1 million

Contribution to the internal programme to transport relief from the Member States.

#### Logistics experts - ECU 0.25 million

Six months' financing for logistics experts sent out to seven countries (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia and Mozambique). ◦

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## STABEX

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### Second tranche for 1984

The Commission has just decided on a second tranche of Stabex transfers for seven ACP countries.

This year, the Commission has received 47 applications from 16 ACPs for transfers relating to 1984 and 30 of them have had to be rejected. However, on 21 June, four transfers for a total ECU 6.4 million were decided for Cape Verde, Comores, Ethiopia and Western Samoa (see Courier n° 92, page VI) and this tranche includes the following countries and products:

<b>Grenada</b>	ECU
Fresh bananas	238 623
Cocoa beans	537 027
<b>Benin</b>	
Oil cakes	510 647

**Burundi**

Cotton (not carded or combed) 586 670

**Comoros**

Vanilla 3 553 153

**Sierra Leone**

Coffee 5 192 233

**Tanzania**

Cashew nuts and kernels 2 744 648

**Togo**

Coffee 7 984 610

Total 21 347 611

There are, therefore, still five applications outstanding for Stabex 1984.

**EMERGENCY AID****Refugees on the China Sea**

The Commission has just decided to send ECU 100 000-worth of emergency aid to Médecins du Monde for its work for refugees in the China Sea.

The money will go towards the cost of renting and running the ship which housed 520 refugees—visas have already been obtained for entry to their host countries—between 30 April and 9 June.

**UNRWA and Angola**

Two other emergency food aid schemes have also been decided. The first involves 2000 t cereals and 300 t sugar going to UNRWA for Palestinian refugees in the Lebanon and the second 1200 t cereals, 500 t pulses and 200 t milk powder for Angola, where it will mainly be distributed to drought victims in the province of Namibia as part of a Food for Work programme.

with which the problems were analysed and the thoroughness of the programme of action that was adopted, leading to speculation that Africa may have at long last reached the turning point in its political and economic history—thanks mainly to the recommendations of a seven-nation ministerial steering committee.

It is a well-known fact that most of Africa's economic woes are due to factors outside the control of government: the persistence of severe drought and other natural disasters such as cyclones and floods; the deep world recession in which African economies are hardest hit and the inequitable international economic system in which terms of trade have continued to deteriorate for the continent in conjunction with an increasing burden of debt. But African Heads of State and Government have acknowledged what critics have been saying for a long time that, in addition to these outside factors, "domestic policy short-comings have brought most of our countries near to economic collapse." They realize that only through closer cooperation and major reforms in agriculture can the continent recover from its economic crisis and famine and be on course for a self-reliant and self-sustained growth and development.

While reaffirming its commitment to the principles and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos which it says are "more valid today than ever before" the summit outlined four areas of priority that Africa will concentrate on during the next five years. They are: "special action for improvement of the food situation and the rehabilitation of agriculture; measures for alleviating external debt burden; measures for a common platform of action at sub-regional, regional, continental and international levels; and measures for action against the effects of the destabilization policy of South Africa on the economies of Southern African States".

**Agriculture: 20-25% of total public spending**

African leaders expressed gratitude to the international community for its generous response to the current famine and urged it to keep the assistance flowing in view of the magnitude of the catastrophe. They have, however, vowed to go beyond the emergency

**FOOD AID**

The Commission has just made the following allocations under the 1985 food aid programme the budgetary value of which is approximately ECU 68.5 million.

	Cereals	Milk powder	Butteroil	Vegetable oil	Sugar
Sierra Leone	6 000	—	—	—	—
Ethiopia	—	600	300	300	—
Somalia	18 000	1 000	300	—	—
Madagascar	15 000	200	—	—	—
Comoros	1 000	100	—	—	200
Kenya	11 000	—	—	—	—
Lesotho	3 000	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	8 000	500	—	—	—
Egypt	120 000	1 500	2 000	—	4 000
India	—	15 000	2 000	—	—
Sri Lanka	40 000	—	—	—	—

**GENERAL INFORMATION****OAU's 21st Summit****Getting to grips with economic problems**

Even before they gathered for the 21st summit of the Organization of African Unity, which took place in Addis Ababa from 18 to 20 July, African leaders' determination to face squarely the continent's mounting economic problems was not in doubt. They had given notice to that effect in November last year at the 20th session when they brushed aside a number of controversial political matters, admitted to its fold the Sahrawi Arab De-

mocratic Republic (the issue that had bogged down the Organization for almost a decade) and reserved the 21st summit for discussion of Africa's economic situation. It would have been the height of irresponsibility to have done otherwise at a time when parts of the continent are in the throes of drought and famine and are the focus of massive international relief operations. What came somewhat as a surprise was the realism, the frankness

and get to the root of problem—to rehabilitate agriculture. They would do this through the provision of incentives to farmers and the strengthening of infrastructure: intensified search for, and better utilization of water resources, provision of storage facilities and improved distribution systems. They have pledged to gradually increase to between 20 and 25% within the next four years the share of agriculture in the total public expenditure of their various countries.

In the light of the experience of the past and current outbreaks of famine in Africa, the summit recognized the need to establish, urgently, at national levels, early warning systems and institutions capable of providing early assistance to famine victims, and at sub-regional and continental levels, mechanisms that would enable co-ordination of actions.

It should be recalled that at the November 1984 summit a special OAU Emergency Assistance Fund was set up to which many countries have contributed and from which a certain amount of aid has been dispensed to countries most affected by drought and famine. Following an agreement signed at the end of this year's sessions between the OAU Secretariat and the African Development Bank (ADB), the latter has been given the responsibility of managing the fund.

### **A moderate position on external debt**

Africa's debt was no doubt the summit's most hotly debated issue. Its total external debts, which amounted in 1984 to US \$ 158 billion, is expected to exceed US \$ 170 billion by the end of this year. Debt servicing alone is currently running at almost US \$ 20 billion annually. This, coupled with "the deteriorating terms of trade and consequent reduction in export earnings for debt servicing, unprecedented rises in interest rates, sharp exchange rate fluctuations, the deteriorating terms of borrowing and the reduction in the flow of concessional resources", have resulted in net capital out-flow from the continent, a heavy drain that would negate any development effort. It was for this reason that some countries wanted a more radical stance: either to repudiate the debt or call for a long moratorium or adopt a "payable when able" policy. But the OAU adopted a moderate position instead, calling for an international conference

on Africa's debt to be convened urgently to provide a forum for international creditors and African borrowers to discuss with "a view to arriving at appropriate emergency, short-, medium- and long-term solutions to alleviate the problems". It hopes most urgently that the debts of the least development countries can be converted into grants (26 of the 36 LDCs are in Africa), that debts can be re-scheduled on a multi-annual basis with a repayment period of at least 15 years and a grace period of not less than five years. It expects the IMF to reactivate its Trust Fund and the World Bank to bring down the ceiling of eligibility to enable more African countries to qualify for IDA's concessional loans. The summit has asked the OAU Chairman and Secretary-General to begin the necessary contacts to set up the meeting. It has also asked the Secretary-General in co-operation with the Executive Secretary of the ECA (Economic Commission for Africa) to initiate moves towards the convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly on the critical economic situation in Africa. Member States, meanwhile, have been advised to improve their ability to manage debt, cut down on external loans and invest any money borrowed on foreign exchange generating projects.

### **Coordination at regional and continental levels**

The summit recognized the need for concerted and harmonious measures in achieving these objectives. It urged every Member State to establish or strengthen a national mechanism responsible for sub-regional, regional and continental co-operation projects and programmes and to ensure proper follow-up in international negotiations. The conference left no one in doubt of Africa's determination to reinforce regional cooperation. Each African State is expected to ensure that domestic economic policies in the coming five years are geared towards the priority areas outlined by the conference. Closer co-operation and coordination are also expected of all African countries at international conferences. To this end, a permanent Steering Committee has been set up to monitor the implementation of the decisions arrived at, give constant attention to issues of African economic development and coordinate the positions of Member States at major international negotiations.

### **Southern Africa**

The situation in Southern Africa, the most thorny and the last great political challenge for the OAU, particularly in terms of liberation, had even an economic overtone for the 21st summit in the light of South Africa's destabilization and economic sabotage of the countries in the sub-region. Since the 20th session the apartheid regime has raided Botswana and (repeatedly) Angola and it is known that Lesotho, Mozambique and Seychelles, to mention a few, have been victims of South Africa's acts of aggression. In all cases economic sabotage has been proved beyond doubt. With the independence of Namibia still blocked by Pretoria and riots, killings of unarmed demonstrators, assassination and persecution of black leaders the order of the day in South Africa, together with the installation of a state of emergency, the OAU expressed in the strongest terms its outrage and indignation. It condemned South Africa's acts of terrorism and the Reagan Administration's policy of constructive engagement with the apartheid regime which it said has emboldened the racist regime "in continuing to defy international public opinion". It proposed the convening of a world conference on sanctions against South Africa, in collaboration with the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations, to coincide with the 10th anniversary of the Soweto uprising in June 1986. Meanwhile, it has mandated the African Group at the UN to step up the campaign for the total isolation of South Africa and has pledged to lend financial and material assistance to countries which are victims of the apartheid regime's destabilization policy to help them with the heavy cost of rehabilitation. It has also reaffirmed its support for the Liberation Movements in their struggle against the racist regime. ○ A.O.

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## **STABEX**

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### **Extend the system to all LDCs, says the Commission**

The Paris Conference on the Least Developed Countries in September 1981 called on the developed world to investigate how to help the LDCs to make up for the damage they suffered through loss of foreign exchange earnings on their commodity exports and to report on it to UNCTAD VI.

The Community response was to express willingness to make a positive examination of the best ways of meeting this request, in particular by deciding what arrangements might be made to extend Stabex-type provisions to those LDCs that did not belong to Lomé II.

A common position did not emerge at UNCTAD VI in June 1983.

The Commission has just adopted a Council communication which could be a basis for discussion in an attempt to give a positive response at the next UNCTAD meeting in Geneva from 30 September—11 October this year.

The UN list of LDCs contains 36 countries, 27 of them from the ACP Group and therefore covered by the system under the Lomé Convention. Any extension would cover the nine following countries—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Haiti, the Maldives, Laos, Nepal and the two Yemens.

The Commission points out that any extension should cover the 48 products listed in Lomé III plus jute and its derivatives.

The Council communication also refers to the financial implications of such an extension, an estimated ECU 90 million for five years.

The Commission therefore proposes that the Community and its Member States take the opportunity at Geneva to:

- announce their intention of unilateral implementation of a Lomé III-Stabex-type system for all LDCs not currently covered and to contact these countries with a view to agreeing on the practical methods of application;
- launch an appeal to the commodity-importing countries to join in this;
- state that they are willing to join any importing countries interested in this approach to discuss the best methods of administrative cooperation when it comes to the effective operation of the various schemes that could well be run in parallel. ○

## AID TO NON-ASSOCIATED COUNTRIES

### Guidelines for 1985

The Council adopted guidelines for financial and technical aid for non-

associated developing countries this year in July.

They are similar in scope to those adopted last year, stressing rural projects, especially schemes to improve the food situation in the recipient countries. The needs of the least developed countries and the most underprivileged sections of the population will be the focus of Community concern and special attention will continue to be paid to the non-associated DCs on the UN least-advantaged list.

The appropriations in the budget for 1985 amount to ECU 268 million, broken down as follows:

	ECU 000 000
Reserve fund for disaster (5-6%)	13 to 16
International agricultural research (2.5% approx.)	6 to 7
Programme management (3% max.)	5 to 8
Asia (75%)	± 168
Latin America (20%) <sup>(1)</sup>	± 45
Africa (5%)	± 11

Details of allocations will be decided by the Commission in the light of availability and the stage reached by projects that meet the criteria of policy and co-financing possibilities.

<sup>(1)</sup> Not including additional aid to be allocated to Central America.

### Financing decisions

**The Commission has just decided, in the framework of its programme of technical and financial assistance for developing countries, to make the following grants:**

#### Bhutan

##### Rural Water Supply and Sanitation

Grant: ECU 4 500 000

The project aims at strengthening the supply of safe water and at improving the sanitary conditions in villages throughout the Kingdom of Bhutan. It consists of:

- the construction of around 460 new gravity feed village water systems;
- the installation of other drinking water schemes (30 tubewells, 20 rain water storage schemes, 25 hydraulic ram pumps);
- measures to test and improve the quality of water;
- the installation of latrines, backed by a health education campaign;

— a training programme for field staff.

The estimated number of beneficiaries is 115 000 (water supply) and 4 000 families (sanitation).

### Consultative Group on Research Aid

#### International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)

Grant: ECU 6 300 000

This programme is a continuation of the Community aid initially accorded in 1977 to the International Agricultural Research Centres which come under the auspices of the Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).

The five research agencies concerned are: the International Centre for Tropical Culture (CIAT) based in Colombia, the International Potato Centre (CIP) in Peru, the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in India, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines and the International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR) situated in the Netherlands.

The Community contribution is ECU 6 300 000, representing 5.5% of the estimated budgets for these centres for 1985.

### All eligible Non-Associated Countries

#### Services of External Experts

Grant: ECU 4 000 000

The aim of the funds allocated to this general item is twofold, namely: (i) to finance studies and technical assistance by expedited procedure and with a maximum EEC contribution of ECU 0.5 m in each case; (ii) to enable the Commission to install in the countries receiving such aid, particularly in the regional Delegations, a small number of development specialists. ○

## EEC-MOROCCO

### Community aid for training in Morocco

The Commission has just decided in the framework of the EEC-Morocco Cooperation Agreement to make a

grant of ECU 33 m to a technical and vocational training scheme in Morocco.

The project provides for Community participation in the establishment of 10 Institutes of Applied Technology (IAT) and 13 Professional Qualification Centres (PQC) forming part of the multi-annual programme for the development of technical and vocational training in Morocco. ○

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## COCOA

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### International Agreement extended

The International Cocoa Council met in London from 8-19 July this year and decided to extend the 1980 Agreement for a further year on the

same terms as in July 1984, i.e. with continuing suspension of the purchase of buffer stocks.

The Council was unable to revise the intervention price range. However, an investigation led it to conclude that the 1980 Agreement had been unable to meet its aims, in particular because of perturbation on the exchange markets and the absence of any provisions to allow for the price range to be brought into line with what was happening on the market.

This, something all the members of the Agreement had noticed, could well make the ongoing negotiations for a fourth Agreement easier and on 19 July, Mr Montes (Guatemala), the conference chairman, was able to state his intention of proposing that the Conference continue again in February 1986. ○

The Commission repeated its total disapproval of apartheid in all its forms and expressed its great disappointment at the attitude the South African authorities had adopted in refusing to take any notice of the fundamental claims of the black population or the repeated appeals of world opinion to abolish apartheid.

The Commission closely associated itself with the requests the Member States had in relation to political cooperation.

It reiterated its call to South Africa to change its attitude as quickly as possible, saying that, unless it did so, economic sanctions would be unavoidable. It also felt that the Community should prepare for this and plan Community economic measures in the light of what attitude the South Africans took.

Two days later, on 2 August, the Luxembourg Presidency issued the following communiqué: "The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community and of Spain and Portugal have decided to send the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands, plus a member of the Commission of the European Communities, to Pretoria to discuss the recent serious developments in South Africa in the light of the concerns the Ten have expressed in their recent declarations.

The South African authorities have agreed to receive this Delegation and the visit will be taking place after the proper preparation." ○

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## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

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### South Africa: the Ten recall their Ambassadors for consultation

The proclamation of a state of emergency in South Africa and the arrest of hundreds of anti-apartheid militants was greeted with unanimous condemnation by the international community. Europe reacted through its institutions and its Member States and the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the European Community and Spain and Portugal met briefly to examine the serious developments of the South African situation on 31 July 1985, in Helsinki, at the occasion of the 10th anniversary celebrations of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

They took note of the debate and of the resolution of the Security Council.

They confirmed their common attitude as it is expressed in their declaration of 22 July 1985, and, in particular their strong condemnation of the proclamation of a state of emergency in important parts of that country.

They also condemned the refusal of the South African government to have talks with Bishop Tutu. They called upon that government to open a dialogue with all the representatives of the black majority, including those who

are in prison and whose liberation they have requested on 22 July.

The Ministers exchanged information about the measures taken or envisaged with respect to South Africa.

They noted that all Member States apply certain restrictions in their relations with South Africa.

The ministers asked the political committee to establish an inventory of these measures, and to hold a full discussion of policies which the Ten might pursue and of measures to take in order to contribute to the abolition of apartheid.

They decided to summon their ambassadors to come for consultations to attend this meeting.

The ministers asked the political committee to report to them at their next meeting.

On the same day, Mr Willy De Clercq, the External Relations Commissioner, summoned the South African Ambassador to inform him that the Commission strongly deplored both the way the situation has deteriorated over the past few months and the proclamation of a state of emergency.

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## CO-FINANCING

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### Italy-EEC outline agreement

An outline agreement on the co-financing of development projects and programmes was signed by Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Foreign Affairs Minister, and Lorenzo Natali, Commission Vice-President, in Rome on 12 July. The agreement is a response to a resolution the Council of Ministers adopted in June earlier this year, calling for better coordination of cooperation schemes and policies by the Commission and the Member States, co-financing being one of the best ways of achieving this. Italy will be making something like ECU 165 m available to the Commission during

the five years of the agreement. This is to be managed by the Commission, which will use its own development project and programme management procedures. The Italian authorities reserve the right to approve the Italian-financed contracts, which should, in principle, involve contributions (mainly equipment) of Italian origin. ○

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## GSP

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### 1986 GSP Proposals

The Commission recently adopted its proposals to the Council for the 1986 generalized scheme of preferences (GSP). These proposals, which fall within the framework of the general guidelines for the period 1986-90 presented to the Council in May and take account of Portugal's and Spain's accession to the Community, represent an improvement on the 1985 offer of some 10%. The overall preferences package for 1986 amounts to ECU 19 000 million, compared with 18 000 million in 1985.

The Community is thus pursuing its open-door trade policy with respect to the developing countries' exports: this newly proposed improved offer aimed particularly at the Asian and Latin American countries, the main beneficiaries of the GSP, follows on the heels of the improvements to the trade arrangements of the Lomé Convention and the Commission's recent proposals concerning access for agricultural products from the Mediterranean countries. The GSP provides for duty-free access for all manufactured goods, including sensitive sectors such as textiles, footwear and steel products, which are wholly or partially excluded by other tariff preference donors. In the agricultural sector the Community offers reduced import duties on nearly 400 products.

### Industrial products

In accordance with its guidelines adopted in May, the Commission proposes:

- an up-dating of the value or volume of existing quotas and ceilings on the basis of real patterns of trade, which will make it possible to offer substantial increases for a number of these products, with the exception of steel;

- a general improvement in the preferences for the neediest developing countries and in particular: the withdrawal of 19 products from the list of sensitive products and a significant drop in the number of individual country quotas, leaving 37 in total (—47 are to be abolished and 10 new quotas introduced for the most competitive countries in the sensitive sectors);

- a small number of exclusions from preferences for certain products in the case of countries which, according to objective criteria (penetration rates equivalent to 20% of Community imports), have achieved a degree of competitiveness equal or superior to that of the Community in these products.

Lastly it is proposed to make a general increase in the preferential ceilings to take account of Portugal's and Spain's accession.

### Textiles

The Commission proposes to increase certain ceilings for MFA products in accordance with the Council's decision in 1984 and also to make an across-the-board increase of 1.42% in all ceilings to take account of the accession of Portugal and Spain.

### Agricultural products

For the five agricultural products subject to GSP quotas the Commission proposes an adjustment in the limits to take account of enlargement. It also proposes to include five new products (meat offal of bovine animals and horses, trout, asparagus, mandarins and clementines) which will be of special benefit to the Latin American countries. ○

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## PARLIAMENT

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### EP calls for solidarity week

At its session in July the European Parliament, in adopting a report drawn up by Mrs Konstantina Pantazi (SOC-GR), called for the organization in every Member State of a week of solidarity between the children of Europe and those of the Third World. This event should be under the auspices of the Community and organized in conjunction with schools and youth associations, in particular.

According to the Parliament, it is vital to educate and inform young Europeans at a very early age about the reality of the developing countries. In this spirit, the Members call on schools and youth associations to step up their contacts with the children of foreign workers and other children and young people from the Third World who are living in Europe to ensure their integration and facilitate their stay in Community countries. ○

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## VISITS

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### Visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Mr Yasuhiro Nakasone to the Commission

The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Nakasone, visited the Commission on 19 July 1985.

He had talks with President Delors and took part in a round table discussion with Commissioners De Clercq, Narjes, Cockfield and Cheysson. The talks continued in the evening during a dinner offered by President Delors at which the discussions centred on EEC-Japan bilateral relations, and in particular trade questions, international economic questions, including notably the new GATT Round and other topics of mutual interest such as scientific research and the enlargement of the Community.

Over the last 10 years the Community and Japan have considerably developed both their trade relations and their cooperation in other fields.

Relations have nevertheless been overshadowed by the problem of Japan's growing trade surplus with the Community, which is arousing increasing concern within the Community. ○

### Chronic imbalance

Trade between Japan and the Community has increased spectacularly in the last 15 years, but essentially to the benefit of Japan.

From \$0.5 billion in 1970, the Community's trade deficit with Japan rose to \$7 billion in 1978 and \$12.2 billion in 1984, with a concomitant decline in import/export cover ration from 70% to 36%. ○



# INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES

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CDI

BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS IN BRIEF ● NEWS

## FRENCH FIRMS TAKE INITIATIVE

A new type of industrial promotion meeting took place in Marseilles, France, in June.

The meeting grew out of an initiative taken by firms in the south of France, grouped together under a regional organization called ADECI (l'Association pour la Coopération Industrielle Internationale).

The role of ADECI is to promote industrial cooperation between SMI's in the south of France and developing countries. Last year, it provided CDI with a list of proposals from SMI's interested in industrial cooperation with ACP enterprises.

CDI subsequently selected 30 proposals from this list which it circulated to its antenna organizations in francophone ACP countries. The proposals covered the manufacture of agricultural machinery, construction materials, health care products, industrial equipment (boilers, detergents, electric cable, etc.), household items, engineering products (maintenance workshops, cycles, etc.).

Following a study of the responses to these proposals, CDI invited twelve ACP entrepreneurs to travel to Marseilles for in-depth discussions on the proposals with French companies on the 10th, 11th and 12th June.

These discussions took place in the context of an information meeting on ACP countries and the CDI, organized in conjunction with the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce and Industry. As a result, two letters of intent were signed between ACP and French companies and four others are under preparation.

Some of the ACP entrepreneurs who have not yet reached agreements with French companies nevertheless found their visit to Marseilles worthwhile, particularly because of the opportunities it offered for meeting businessmen from other ACP countries with whom they hope

to conclude commercial or technical agreements. CDI has frequently noticed that South-South industrial cooperation quickly takes off once ACP economic operators are brought together.

The ACP partners confirm their interest in learning of further industrial cooperation proposals from EEC countries involving joint venture arrangements. Such proposals are particularly interesting if they come from SMI's and if they envisage setting up plants with the minimum viable capacity.

In view of the promising results from the Marseilles meeting, CDI hopes that European companies will continue to come forward with industrial proposals which CDI can circulate among ACP entrepreneurs.

Regional or national organizations in the EEC are likewise welcome to come to CDI with industrial cooperation proposals on behalf of their members.

## VISIT FROM WORLD BANK VICE-PRESIDENT

Mr. Jose Botofogo, Vice-President for External Relations at the World Bank and Mr. Bernard Snoy, Chief of the Finance and International Relations Division in the World Bank's European office, visited CDI on July 9th.

The purpose of their visit was to discuss cooperation between the World Bank and the EEC, along with trade and industrial development issues.

They briefed the CDI Directorate about:

- the World Bank's new \$ 1.2 billion special facility for the development of sub-Saharan Africa
- the new proposal to establish a Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
- a programme of action for the stable development of Africa south of the Sahara.

It was agreed that CDI should reactivate its contact with the Africa Division of the World Bank to cooperate with the above schemes.

## APPOINTMENTS TO CDI'S JOINT GOVERNING BOARD

The ACP-EEC Committee on Industrial Cooperation meeting on 18 July appointed 10 EEC members to the CDI Governing Board, in accordance with article 73 of the third Lomé Convention.

The ACP members of the former CDI Advisory Council have been appointed to the Board on a provisional basis, pending the final nomination of ACP members at a later date.

The first meeting of the Board will take place in Brussels on October 3rd and 4th 1985.

The Governing Board is an innovation of Lomé III. It combines some of the old functions of the Committee on Industrial Cooperation (CIC) and the CDI Advisory Council.

The functions of the Board are to advise and back up the Director and to take decisions concerning the approval of budgets and annual accounts, the establishment of programmes of activities, the approval of the annual report and the establishment of CDI's organizational structures, staffing policy and establishment plan.

Members of the Board are chosen on a personal basis on the grounds of their experience in industry, banking or industrial development planning and promotion.

The Board will eventually have 12 ACP and 12 EEC members. Representatives of the European Investment Bank and the Commission of the European Communities will also take part in the Board's proceedings.

The 10 EEC members now fully appointed to the Board are as follows:

*News in Brief continues on page 2.*

News in Brief continued from page 1

Mr. W.A. de Jonge (Netherlands)  
 Mr. Michel Deflortrie (Belgium)  
 Ms. Marina Flenga (Greece)  
 Mr. Joorn B. Jensen (Denmark) (\*)  
 Mr. Alan McGarvey (U.K.)  
 Mr. Mario Pedini (Italy) (\*)  
 Mr. André Robert (Luxembourg)  
 Mr. Yves Salmon (France)  
 Mr. Morgan Sheehy (Ireland)  
 Mr. Ulf R. Siebel (Germany)

## DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH COOPERATION DIRECTOR

Mr. P. Ménéchal, Deputy Director for industry and infrastructure in the development cooperation service of the French Ministry of External Relations, met CDI Director Dr. A. Akinrele in June, to review existing collaboration.

The Ministry's FAC (Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération) credit line for joint FAC/CDI operations, was particularly examined.

The conditions of this fund require that jointly-supported projects be financed by matching contributions from CDI and FAC. Dr. Akinrele pointed out that this condition effectively meant earmarking a portion of CDI's limited budget for projects with French firms, and that this would be difficult to sustain with other EEC member states.

It was agreed that when this credit line is exhausted, that it will be renewed under a broader collaboration agreement to be defined by the Ministry and CDI before the end of the year.

This agreement will include the support of the Ministry for External Relations for CDI cooperation with French regional and national bodies. ■

### CALL TO EEC INDUSTRIALISTS

*Use your production know-how to expand via an ACP country  
 Let CID promote your production proposals.*

**REQUEST A PRODUCTION PROPOSAL FORM FROM CID**

(\*) All in this list, with the exception of Messrs. Jensen and Pedini, were members of the now defunct CDI Advisory Council.

## INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

By Danielle Wilson, formerly of CDI's Industrial Information Service.

This article is based on Ms. Wilson's contribution to the 6th National Congress on Information and Documentation, held in Versailles (France) last June.

The equation INFORMATION = POWER has become commonplace. However, the transfer of technology to developing countries can be achieved in an equitable manner if it is combined with the relevant information and the appropriate communications technology.

The Third Lomé Convention, in the chapter on industrial cooperation, pays particular attention to the intensification of "the regular exchange of information" between ACP and EEC partners. CDI's Industrial Information Service operates to this end.

Technical and economic information provided by CDI to government bodies, financial institutions, chambers of commerce, public or private enterprises in the ACP states are divided into three broad categories:

- technological information on manufacturing processes adapted to local production scales;
- information on EEC enterprises and consultants who may be able to provide the know-how or equipment for the implementation of a project;
- statistical information on production and markets.

This information is sent on request following research work adapted to each specific case.

The information circulated in this manner throughout 66 ACP countries aims at providing enquirers with data available throughout the world, to help them to come up with some generative ideas and to assist them in making choices, according to the specific needs and the resources available locally.

### DECISIVE ROLE

In the implementation process of an industrial project, information can play a decisive role especially at the decision-making stage, in the choice of the process to be adopted and during start-up. Information about the available range of technologies makes it possible to be selective with regard to technical and economic options.

The information provided must meet a certain number of criteria: it must be reliable, understandable and immediately exploitable in the appropriate language. Above all, it must be adapted to ACP needs which may be different from those of industrialized countries, to fa-

cilitate enquirers in deciding on the type of action to be undertaken.

As regards "adapted" technologies does a significant stream of information not flow from the ACP states themselves? This interactive aspect of the exchange of information can lead to the development of pooled ACP-EEC resources.

### CREATING AWARENESS

The problem often lies in knowing whom to turn to and what are the available sources. Training of both documentalists and users can encourage the use of information systems and lead to an awareness of the importance of information in the economic life of a country or region.

Authorities play a significant role in this awareness. Thus, it is the responsibility of the State and the regional and local organizations to encourage the establishment of public, university or even private libraries in the ACP countries.

At the national level there is need to define a policy permitting an increased diffusion of existing and future information systems.

### TECHNOLOGICAL DELAY

The slow development of information and communication technology in ACP countries restricts the use of information systems. One is confronted with a technological delay which can only be overcome by reliance on industrialized countries, as telecommunications, hard- and software, require an acquaintance with new technologies not yet mastered by developing countries. However, the sooner ACP countries master telematics the sooner will information circulate, to help them to make the appropriate technological choices.

At the signing of the Third Lomé Convention, Mr. Edgard Pisani said: "The continuity of the Community's development policy is based on faithful adherence to an overall concept of cooperation which is itself founded on dialogue, equity and mutual respect of the partners within a contractual framework". This concept applies in particular to information, the tool "par excellence" of dialogue. ■

**ADAPTED TECHNOLOGY****POWER PLANT FIRED BY RICE HUSKS**


**A European company offers its cooperation for the setting up of a power plant using rice husks as well as other agricultural waste such as bagasse, coffee husks and corn cobs.**

Such a power plant, with a capacity of 1250 kW, has been in operation in Surinam since 1975. The installation comprises two boilers, one steam turbine generator, a rice husk storing and feeding system and gas filters.


The rice husks are burned in a specially designed furnace and the heat emitted by combustion is utilized to heat the water in the boiler which produces steam to feed the electrical energy generator.

The power plant is located next to a rice mill and has a consumption of approximately 3.5 tons of rice husks per hour. The electricity produced satisfies the requirements of the rice mill and also covers about 40% of the needs of the town of Wageningen, the third largest town in Surinam.

It is estimated that in ten years of operation, the power plant saved an equivalent of 20 million litres of fuel oil. The plant is operated by staff of



*The Surinam plant and its turbine generator.*



*And furthermore...*

*ACP sponsors are invited to contact CDI for further details of any technology outlined in this section.*

*CDI can provide assistance towards implementation.*

*EEC industrialists who have developed adapted technologies can benefit from CDI's services for the circulation of their technologies in ACP countries.* ■

the rice mill, principally the technical manager and 4 operators, who spend part of their time on the power plant.

For a new plant, the cost of equipment would amount to Ecu 1 000 000 (\*). To this should be added approximately Ecu 300 000 (\*) for insurance, freight, engineering and installation costs. This size of investment corresponds to the savings on fuel oil over three years. Moreover, the process helps to solve environmental problems caused by the accumulation of agricultural waste. ○ ■

(\* The value of the Ecu is given on page 8.

## **OFFERS FROM ACP SPONSORS EEC INDUSTRIAL PARTNERS WANTED**



**EEC industrialists are invited to contact CDI, quoting the reference number, in response to any offer outlined in this section.**

**However, CDI will only reply to enquiries if EEC industrialists give brief descriptions of their current operations and are prepared to provide the kinds of cooperation requested by the ACP sponsors.**

*Organizations reprinting these offers in their own publications are asked to ALWAYS include the CID reference numbers.*

### **Printing services. Nigeria – 660.NIA.1.SER.**

A joint venture partner is required for the production of text books, magazines, exercise books and other paper products. Locally produced products do not at present meet more than 60% of the demand. The project will be located in Ibadan. A preliminary study (needing updating) is available.

### **Starch and glucose syrup. Nigeria – 660.NIA.22.FOO.**

A joint venture partner is sought for the production of starch and glucose syrup for the local market. The expected capacity of the plant is: starch 3000 tonnes a year; glucose syrup 1500 tonnes a year. The local market requires 48 000 tonnes a year of starch and 11 500 tonnes a year of glucose syrup.

### **Animal feed. Kenya – 660.KEN.5.AGR.**

A joint venture partner is required for the plant producing 4 tons per hour of animal feed (for poultry, cattle, pigs). The main raw materials (maize germ, blood meal, sunflower cake, barley) are available locally.

### **Expansion of wood processing plant. Papua New Guinea – 660.PNG.1.TIM.**

A joint venture partner is required for the production of laminated timber, vacuum pressure treated products, furniture, kiln-dried timber. Actual turnover is about Ecu 480 000 (\*). The joint venture partner will be expected to conclude a management as well as a marketing agreement for both overseas and the local markets. The minimum equity involvement of the foreign partner should be 25%. ○

(\* For the value of the Ecu see page 8. ■

# ENERGY TECHNOLOGY AND ACP STATES

By Dr. I.A. Akinrele, Director, CDI

In this article, Dr. Akinrele surveys the requirements of the energy-deficient ACP countries. He demonstrates their need for new sources of energy; and for transfers of technology and investment to tap their enormous potential to supply their own needs. Finally, he indicates that CDI has a helpful role to play in this area. The article was originally delivered as a paper during the Flanders Technology Fair, Ghent (Belgium), in February 1985.

The ACP States are diverse and heterogeneous in terms of their human, natural and physical resources as well as development strategies; for example, they range from Tuvalu, an island State in the Pacific with a population of 8 000 people, to Nigeria in West Africa with a population of over 82 million. The ACP States in total are estimated to have a population of about 368 million and account for up to about 60% of all developing countries.

Most of the ACP countries fall under the group known as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and therefore their energy consumption profile can be related to the following features:

- populations of low density scattered over enormous land areas;
- low energy consumption per person;
- lack of widespread electricity supply systems;
- a high proportion of their needs are those of a rural society.

The economic recession experienced by the industrialized countries (which has been associated with the onset of high petroleum oil prices) has had a tremendous spill-over effect on the ACP States. Apart from some 10 oil producers, all ACP States are net energy importers. The development of their productive and service industries has largely depended on petroleum energy technology which in many cases absorbs over 50% of their gross export earnings. Therefore they need to find alternative technologies which can use new and renewable energy sources.

## ENERGY DEFICIT

The energy demand and supply of ACP States can be roughly equated to that of Africa where 44 of them are located.

The commercial energy production of this group was estimated to be 15.1 quadrillion BTU for 1982, which is about 5.3% of total world production.



*Dr. Isaac Adedayo Akinrele.*

This is expected to reach a value of about 30.2 quadrillion BTU in the year 2000, which will constitute about 7.2% of world production.

The ACP States of Africa required 7.3 quadrillion BTU in 1982 and are expected to require 28.4 quadrillion BTU in the year 2000. Thus, a growth rate of 3.9% in production and 5% to 6% in consumption are forecast.

Currently, the ACP States in aggregate terms have the lowest energy consumption and output per capita and can be considered as energy deficit countries.

Conventional energy in the form of coal, oil, petroleum, liquified gas, liquified nitrogen gas and nuclear energy provide the main source of supply for ACP industrial and urban energy needs in Africa. The largest consumption is for primary metals to the tune of about 152 trillion BTU in 1975 and estimated to increase to 590 trillion BTU in the year 2000. This again projects a growth rate of 5.6%.

It is forecast that export demand for diesel power plants will fall because many ACP countries can no longer afford the fuel and transportation costs occasioned by the generation of electricity in isolated areas. Many large towns have extensive suppressed loads and load sheddings.

Transmission equipment currently

used in industrialized countries is too expensive for ACP States; so safe alternative measures for cheaper transmission to meet the ACP countries' level of economic development must be found.

If we look at individual countries we see a pattern of energy consumption which reveals a skewed resource derivation. Because the populations of these countries are largely in the rural areas, it is known that most of their energy needs are met by wood, particularly in those countries lying in the tropics and on the equator.

The burning of fuelwood, on the other hand, has brought economic and ecological disasters to some African States. This manifests itself in the form of desertification, deforestation and drought.

## EXAMPLE OF KENYA

Take a country like Kenya, for example, where energy consumption in 1983 totalled 5.1 million tons of oil equivalent, of which 75% was accounted for by wood. Hydro-electric and geo-thermal energy accounted for 5% and oil for 19%.

Although crude oil imports fell by 10% in volume between 1982 and 1983, transport, industry and electricity depended on oil for some 80% of their energy needs.

Geo-thermal drilling now provides some 12% of Kenya's electricity with 2 units generating 30 MW of power and another 15 MW station due to start up in 1985.

National hydro-electric potential is known to exceed 700 MW, but lack of finance is slowing development.

## ACP ENERGY RESOURCES

The ACP States are in fact endowed with really enormous potential in energy sources. These include fossil fuels, hydropower, geo-thermal, solar, wind, and biomass.

African Heads of State have recognized their capacity to produce energy from their own resources and to utilize it for development. They have said: "Africa's underdevelopment is not inevitable. Indeed, it is a paradox when one bears in mind the immense human and natural resources of the continent. In addition to its reservoir of human resources, our Continent has 97% of world reserves of chrome, 82% of platinum, 64% of world reserves of manganese, 25% of world reserves of uranium and 13% of world reserves of copper without mentioning bauxite, nickel and lead; 20% of world hydro-electrical potential, 20% of the traded petroleum oil in the world (if we exclude the USA and USSR), 70% of world cocoa production,  $\frac{1}{3}$  of world coffee production, 50% of palm produce, to mention just a few".

These resources have been largely untapped for energy, except for the fossil fuels and hydropower which were developed to support large industries in the mining, exporting and urban service sectors.

The need to bring the majority of ACP populations into the modern economy has again created an awareness of the need to transfer as well as develop appropriate energy technologies for the rural sector.

This means that the non-conventional sources hitherto unexploited

such as solar, wind, biomass and micro-hydraulics, would have to come to the forefront of the energy development programmes of the ACP States. However, the relevant technologies (which have largely been developed in industrialized countries) will need to be adapted to the socio-economic conditions of the ACP States.

In a survey carried out recently, over 200 research projects were recorded as being in progress in ACP and EEC countries, concerning new energy sources for developing areas.

The priority needs are: new sources of energy and appropriate technologies to cater for domestic cooking, transport of goods in rural areas, lighting, hot water production, refrigeration and air-conditioning, drying of agricultural produce, water distillation; also supply, transportation and distribution for villages, pasturage and irrigation.

#### ACP-EEC COOPERATION

The ACP States, in developing the terms of their cooperation with the EEC under the Third Lomé Convention, established a special Chapter on energy development. The objectives of this Chapter are stated as follows:

"In view of the seriousness of the energy situation in the majority of the ACP States, owing partly to the crisis caused in many countries by dependence on imported petroleum products and the increasing scarcity of fuelwood, the ACP States and the Community agree to cooperate in this area with a view to finding solutions to their energy problems.

"In ACP-EEC cooperation particular emphasis shall be placed on energy programming, operations for saving and making efficient use of energy, reconnaissance of energy potential and the economically and technically appropriate promotion of new and renewable sources of energy.

"The Community and the ACP States recognize the mutual benefits of cooperation in the field of energy. Such cooperation shall promote the development of the ACP States' conventional and non-conventional energy potential and their self-sufficiency, and shall be directed at the following goals in particular:

- (a) promoting economic development by exploiting domestic and regional energy resources;
- (b) improving living conditions in urban and suburban areas and in rural communities by taking due account of the energy component in the various cooperation measures;
- (c) protecting the natural environment, notably by mitigating the im-

*Assembling solar collectors in a CDI-assisted project in Kenya. (See page 6).*

*Continued on page 6.*





*Combustible briquettes produced from coffee husks in a CDI-assisted project in Rwanda.*

*Continued from page 5.*

pact of population pressure on biomass consumption, particularly fuel-wood".

## THE ROLE OF CDI

The Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) was set up under the Lomé Convention to provide assistance for the establishment of new industries and the strengthening of existing ones. It has also been involved in promoting the development of appropriate energy technologies and their transfer to ACP States.

In the eight years since the establishment of CDI, various interventions have been undertaken within the energy sector. Highlights of this activity are:

### GAMBIA

In 1984 CDI financed the implementation of a pilot **fuel-gas generator** using groundnut husks, to supply energy to a tannery in Banjul. The installation is operating but not at full capacity due to the low level of energy required by the tannery.

### KENYA

Implementation study and testing programme for the production of **briquettes from papyrus** and its utilization for domestic cooking (1982-1983). A pilot plant will be operational in 1985.

CDI also located a suitable local partner and assisted in financing a feasibility study and technical assistance, to start the production of **solar collectors** in Kenya (in 1984). A local technician was also trained.

### RWANDA

CDI carried out a feasibility and implementation study for a **coffee-husk briquetting** project. On the basis of the conclusions of the study, CDI assisted with the setting up of a pilot plant which started production in December 1982.

### CARIBBEAN

In 1983 CDI carried out a feasibility study for the manufacture of **products related to renewable energy** in the Caribbean region (i.e. solar collectors, gas generators, wind generators, etc.). It is expected that one group of these products will be produced from 1985 onwards, in a joint venture with a European company. Manufacture of other products is envisaged for 1987.

### SEYCHELLES

In 1979, CDI co-financed a study on the **gasification of coconut shells** for the generation of electricity. This study was updated in 1983 with CDI assistance and pilot plant tests were made on coconuts. The project is being reviewed by the Seychelles Government.

### UGANDA

CDI assisted in the preparation of a feasibility study for **charcoal production from coffee husks**. Production is expected to begin in 1985.

### WESTERN SAMOA

CDI provided technical information on production of **biomass burners** to a Western Samoan company and identified EEC companies interested in the project. The objective was to adapt the biomass burner developed by the Samoan company to other applications such as cooking stoves, bakeries, etc.

### ZIMBABWE

A Zimbabwean company and a prospective Danish partner are now examining the possibility of manufacturing **solar refrigerators**. The main problem the partners are trying to solve is the reduction of costs to ensure the economic viability of the project.

### WEST AFRICA

Windmill energy. A Belgian group has expressed interest in the production of **windmills** for the Sahel and CEAO markets. With the support of CDI, the group is planning to install a demonstration mill in Mali, and the results obtained may lead to the production of windmills by the end of the year.

## CONCLUSION

The heavy reliance on non-commercial fuels in the rural areas of ACP States implies a relatively small use of commercial energy.

Estimates of the amount of energy required for subsistence vary with circumstances and with the assumptions on which calculations are based. Several studies concur, however, that approximately 300-400 kgce per capita per annum could coincide with a minimum provision of food and shelter in a rural agricultural setting.

On the other hand, initial findings of a study by the Overseas Development Council of the United States, suggests that the standard of living rises sharply when energy consumption increases above a threshold occurring at approximately 1,200-1,400 kgce per capita.

Viewed against this background, the average per capita energy con-

sumption of many ACP States at 100 kgce must be considered extremely inadequate to meet basic needs of food and shelter.

The advent of new energy sources thus constitutes an important new element to reduce this deficit. It also provides the first opportunity to introduce modern, adapted and efficient techniques in a meaningful way into the traditional economy, as well as providing a driving force towards new methods of production and new lifestyles.

Access to the relevant energy technologies will require the cooperation and investment support of developed countries. The industrialists and donor countries of the EEC will have to be the prime movers in this challenging but necessary task. ■



*Pilot fuel-gas generator installed with CDI assistance in Gambia.*

## TRAINING

# CDI ASSISTS ACP SHOE MANUFACTURERS

CDI provided training in Europe for personnel from 3 ACP shoe companies during February and March. The training took place in the shoe section of Wellingborough College, UK.

The trainees were:

### Zimbabwe

Declan Kelly, Production Manager in a family shoe factory, employing 78 people.

His interest in the training programme was to discover ways to clear a bottleneck in the "clicking" department where the uppers are cut. As a result of his training his

firm's output has increased by over 60%.

### Fiji

Narendra Deoji, Director with responsibility for production in a family business employing 15-20 people.

His training was to improve pattern-making, styling and the selection of raw materials.

### Ethiopia

Chuffa Alemayehu, Head of the Production Operations Division, in the National Shoe and Leather Corporation which has 6 000 employees, 8 tanneries, 6 shoe factories and one leather goods factory.

The training was to enable Mr. Alemayehu to study techniques for upgrading his company's shoe products to exportable quality. After his period in Wellingborough College, he spent four weeks in a UK shoe factory.

### Ethiopia

Solomon Mebrahtu, Quality Control Chemist in a tannery belonging to the National Shoe and Leather Corporation.

Mr. Mebrahtu was trained in the quality control of leather via laboratory tests. He supplemented his training in Wellingborough College with additional training in a German laboratory. ■



*Two of the shoe making trainees in the workshop at Wellingborough College UK. Left: Mr. Narendra Deoji. Right: Mr. Chuffa Alemayehu.*



## JOINT VENTURE PROPOSALS FROM EEC FIRMS ACP ENTREPRENEURS, PLEASE REPLY

### INFORMATION REQUIRED OF ACP ENTREPRENEURS WHEN REPLYING

The proposals outlined below have been put forward by EEC firms interested in establishing joint venture operations in EEC countries.

ACP entrepreneurs interested in any proposal are invited to write to CDI quoting the reference number.

CDI will not be in a position to act upon letters received unless ACP entrepreneurs provide all the information requested in the box opposite.

It would also be useful if they enclosed any complementary information, including the latest balance sheet.

Please ALWAYS mention the CDI reference numbers when reproducing these proposals. All equipment costs are quoted in Ecus (European currency units). The value of the Ecu may be easily ascertained from its relationship to other European currencies. Thus on 29 July 1985

1 Ecu = £ 0.556008  
FF 6.82853  
DM 2.24462

- Show why it would be justifiable to manufacture the products in question in your country, e.g. give market data, indicate that raw materials or components are available locally, etc.
- Describe your present activities plus your industrial and/or commercial experience.
- State how much capital you yourself could contribute.
- State the maximum portion of the equity your country legally allows to an EEC partner.
- Can you obtain finance and if so from where?
- If you need a foreign loan or supplier's credit, can you obtain a local guarantee?
- Is your project a national priority?
- Outline the incentives your country offers to foreign investors.

PRODUCTS	REFERENCE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	MINIMUM CAPACITY	MINIMUM INVESTMENT REQUIRED FOR EQUIPMENT	TYPE OF COOPERATION OFFERED
Processing of roots and tubers (cassava, yam), production of gari	85/19 FRANCE	650 kg of fresh roots for the production of gari or flour.	About Ecus 145 000	— joint venture — training — management
Plasticized bituminous rolls for water-proof roofing	85/20 ITALY	100 000 rolls a year (1 000 000 m <sup>2</sup> ); but the standard plant capacity is 300 000 rolls a year (3 000 000 m <sup>2</sup> ).	Ecus 1 351 000	— joint venture — training — know-how
Assembly of microprocessor-controlled telephones	85/21 GERMANY	1 500 units a year.	Second-hand equipment about Ecus 70 000	— joint venture — marketing — know-how
Wooden products	85/22 GERMANY	Flush doors: (24 000 a year). windows: (360 000 units a year). chairs/armchairs: (75 000 a year).	Ecus 325 000 Ecus 305 000 Ecus 245 000	— joint venture — equipment — technical assistance

### CDI ASSISTANCE TO JOINT VENTURES

- CDI can assist the formation of ACP-EEC joint ventures by:
- financing in-depth evaluations of industrial proposals;
  - co-financing feasibility studies and market studies;
  - acting as an honest broker during negotiations;
  - obtaining independent evaluations of the value and suitability of second-hand plant;
  - locating sources of finance;
  - contributing to the cost of business trips to allow prospective partners to meet;
  - helping to draft legal agreements using standard models;
  - providing funds for training and short-term expertise during commissioning and start-up.



# OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

No. 29 — September 1985

(position as at 22 August 1985)



## EEC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

### Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979) and Lomé III (8 December 1984), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC in 1976 and 1977;

— the non-associated developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

### Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

### Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

### Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth. : Responsible Authority  
Int. tender: International invitation to tender  
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)  
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender  
TA: Technical assistance  
EDF: European Development Fund  
mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr. Franco Cupini  
Directorate-General for Development  
Commission of the European Communities  
(ARCH.25/1-2)  
200, rue de la Loi  
B-1049 Brussels

who will pass on requests for information to the services in charge of projects. Please cover only one subject at a time.

# Sectoral Index

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>AGRICULTURE</b></p> <p>Irrigation and soil development, infrastructures, improvement</p> <p>Coffee, tea, tobacco, cereals, coconuts, ground-nut, maize, sugar, cotton, palm-nuts, rice, rubber, potatoes, citrus fruit</p> <p>Seed and crop protection, environment</p> <p>Agro-industry</p> <p>Forestry</p>	<p>Barbados, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Togo, Zambia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, India, Mozambique, Thailand, Pakistan, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica</p> <p>Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, P.N.G., Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Suriname, Zimbabwe, CILSS, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Thailand</p> <p>Bahamas, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Comoros, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Tanzania, Niger Basin Authority, CILSS, Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bolivia, Nicaragua, China (People's Rep.), Yemen, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala</p> <p>Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Togo, Morocco, Thailand</p> <p>Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Fiji, Nigeria, New Caledonia, Niger Basin Authority, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, Kenya</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>STOCK FARMING-FISHING-PISCICULTURE</b></p> <p>Improvement</p> <p>Veterinary projects</p> <p>Processing industry</p>	<p>Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Comoros, Djibouti, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kiribati, Jamaica, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Zaire, Congo, Gabon, Sao Tomé &amp; Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea, Tunisia, Angola</p> <p>Kenya, Zambia, Suriname, 28 African Countries, Eastern Africa, ICIPE, Malawi-Zambia-Zimbabwe, Chad, Egypt, Mozambique</p> <p>Madagascar, Tonga, Neth. Antilles, French Polynesia, Angola, Bahamas</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>RURAL HYDRAULICS</b></p> <p>Wells, bores, pumps, pipes, small dams</p>	<p>Botswana, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Lesotho, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Montserrat, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Bhutan</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>TOWN WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE</b></p> <p>Water supply, pipes, drinking water</p> <p>Sewerage, waste water, collectors, pumping stations, treatment</p>	<p>Madagascar, St. Christopher &amp; Nevis, Sao Tomé &amp; Príncipe, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Lebanon</p> <p>Cape Verde</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS</b></p> <p>Houses, schools, hospitals, buildings, laboratories</p>	<p>Belize, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, Central African Rep., Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe, CEAO, Maritime Transport Conference, OCAM, UDEAC, MRU, Eastern Africa, CARICOM, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Colombia, Nepal</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>TRANSPORTS AND COMMUNICATIONS</b></p> <p>Roads, bridges, airports, railways, ports</p>	<p>Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Cameroon, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, P.N.G., Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Tonga, Zaire, Guyana-Suriname, Niger-Nigeria, Senegal-Guinea, Djibouti-Ethiopia, Kenya-Uganda-Burundi-Rwanda, Eastern African Countries, Swaziland-Lesotho, CARICOM, Pakistan, Nicaragua-Honduras, Central African Rep.-Congo</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>TELECOMMUNICATIONS</b></p> <p>Radio, telephone, satellites, hertzian</p>	<p>UAPT, Sierra Leone</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>ENERGY</b></p> <p>Power stations, dams, electrification</p>	<p>Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, P.N.G., St. Christopher &amp; Nevis, Somalia, Suriname, Zaire, Zambia, O.M.V.G., Egypt, Wallis and Futuna</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY</b></p> <p>Solar, wind-wills, biomass, gas, geothermics</p>	<p>Guinea, Senegal, Suriname, Indian Ocean ACP Countries, Pacific OCT</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>MINING</b></p> <p>Soil survey, research, geophysical survey,</p> <p>Infrastructure, production, processing plants</p>	<p>Mali, Rwanda, Uganda</p> <p>Ghana, Rwanda, Zambia</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>MAPPING</b></p> <p>Soil-Air</p>	<p>Botswana, Congo-Gabon, Mali</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>INDUSTRY</b></p> <p>Plants, productions</p>	<p>Burundi, Malawi</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>TRADE, INDUSTRY, TOURISM, INVESTMENT PROMOTION - MANAGEMENT - MARKETING - S.M.E. TRAINING</b></p>	<p>Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sierra Leone, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Neth. Antilles, Pacific ACP Countries, UDEAC, Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Banco Centro-Americano, Andean Pact., China (People's Rep.), Thailand, Costa Rica, N.A. Dev. Countries</p>

# ACP STATES

Each project has a specific code which later will be used to identify project under a data processing system.

★ Denotes new projects

## ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

**Livestock development — Phase I.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. T.A.: Darudec (DK). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF AB 5003 A3a

**Road Reconstruction.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost 3 mECU. Study: GEOPROGETTI (I). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF AB 5002 A2d

## BAHAMAS

**Fruit crop nursery.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 1.016 mECU. EDF 0.510 mECU, local 0.506 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. T.A.: Short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF BM 5003 A3a

**Animal feed plant.** 0.200 mECU. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF BM 5001bis A3a

## BARBADOS

**Orchard fruits programme.** Estimated cost 0.55 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision last quarter 85. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF BAR 5006 A3a

**Speightstown fishing port.** Construction of a jetty and market centre. Estimated total cost 2.9 mECU. EDF 1.575 mECU, local 1.325 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision last quarter 85. Project stage identification. EDF BAR 5003 A3a

## BELIZE

**Belize College of Arts, Science and Technology (BELCAST).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Works and supplies. T.A. for tender dossier and plans: short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF BEL 5001 A6b

## BENIN

**Djougou-Porga road.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Intermittent road improvements over 180 km. Works: Int. tender foreseen in the 2nd half 85. 4th EDF. EDF BEN 4013 A2d

**Dassa-Parakou road renovation.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Reinstatement and asphaltting of 75 km of the road. Estimated total cost 55 mECU. Estimated EDF participation 18 mECU. Co-financed by IBRD and possibly by CEDEAO, BOAD and FADES. Economic study: SEDES (F). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF BEN 5005 A2d

**Upgrading of health service infrastructure in Porto Novo Hospital.** Resp. Auth.:

Ministère de la Santé Publique. Estimated cost 10 mECU: renovation and construction of the hospital building and equipment. Project on appraisal. Works: Int. tender with prequalification, launched (conditional) in August 84. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF BEN 5010 A7a

**Parakou polytechnical complex.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Moyen, Général, Technique et Professionnel. Total estimated cost 6.9 mECU. Construction of 8 000 m<sup>2</sup> of pedagogical and administrative buildings and hostels. Supplies and equipment. Technical and architectural study: Arch. VINOUE (Local). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 4th EDF. EDF BEN 4011 A6b

**Cotonou maternity hospital.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 2.5 mECU. Works: Acc. tender. Equipment: int. tender in '85. T.A.: TECHNO-SYNESIS (I). Project in execution. 4th EDF. EDF BEN 4010 A7b

**Livestock development in the Borgou region.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Fermes d'Etat, de l'Elevage et de la Pêche. Numerical and stabilizing cattle improvement for meat production increase. 5.950 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF BEN 5001 A3a

**National Parks development and environment protection.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 3.525 mECU. T.A. and equipment for roads and T.A. for scientific actions and Fauna and Flora protection. T.A.: Restr. tender after prequalification. Prequalification done. 5th EDF. EDF BEN 5003 A8f

## BOTSWANA

**Village water supplies.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. Planning Study: DECON-FLOTO (D). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF BT 5017 A2b

**Sheep and Goat development. phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Animal Production Division and Animal Production Research Unit (APRU). Estimated total cost 2 mECU. EDF 1.6 mECU. Local 0.400 mECU. Works, supply of materials and equipment and T.A. Project in execution. T.A.: GITEC (D). 5th EDF. EDF BT 5002 A3a

**Airborne Geophysical Survey.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs. 1.980 mECU. Int. tender with prequalification launched in June 85. Airborne magnetic survey of 72 000 km, interpretation and electromagnetic survey of selected target areas. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF BT 5016 A3i

**Services to livestock owners in communal areas (SLOCA), Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4.100 mECU. Works by acc. tender, supply of vehicles

and equipment by int. tender. T.A. 5th EDF.

EDF BT 5003 A3a

**Francistown Rural Training Centre.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 1.245 mECU. EDF 1.025 mECU, local 0.220 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF BT 5018 A6b

★ **Wildlife tourism environment.** T.A. in the area of Tourism and Wildlife. Estimated cost 1.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF BT 5019 A8f

## BURKINA FASO

**Development of the Douna plain.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 10 mECU. Irrigation and drainage works, supply of equipment, inputs and T.A. Int. tender for works launched in May 84. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF BK 5009 A3e

**Young farmers' training.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. 2.880 mECU. T.A., works and equipment. T.A.: C.E.R.E.D. (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF BK 5010 A6ci

**Development of traditional poultry farming.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 0.750 mECU. Supply of equipment, vaccines and vehicles. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF BK 5015 A3a

**Increase of food emergency stocks at the O.F.N.A.C.E.R.** 2 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution. 958-BK 5017 A3f

**Drinking water supply in the Yatenga region. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Boreholes and wells. Supplies. All by int. tenders. Date financing decision, July 85. 5th EDF. EDF BK 5016 A2b

## BURUNDI

**Institut Universitaire de Sciences de l'Education (IUSE).** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale — 0.7 mECU. Construction and equipping of educational buildings (general teaching classes, laboratories, workshops). Int. tender dossier: TETRA Consultants (Lux). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF. EDF BU 4124 A6b

**Faculty of agronomy.** Technical and architectural study. BRUSA-PASQUE (I). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF BU 5017 A6b

**Improvement of the social and economical conditions in the Imbo-Centre in relation with the rural development of the East Mpanda.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 8.5 mECU. Health programme, sewage, feeder roads, buildings, works and

supplies. Study by SFERES(F). T.A.: Short-list drawn up for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF BU 5002 A8c

**Food strategy. Priority measures.** Resp. Auth.: Government and Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.4 mECU. Opening of an internal road towards the east of the country (Ruyigi-Gitega). Hillside pond protection in the Ruyigi province. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.

958-BU 5018 A8f

## CAMEROON

**Fishery development in the Lagdo basin.** Resp. Auth.: Mission d'Etude de la Vallée Supérieure de la Benoué. Stabex 81. Estimated total cost ±3 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, FAC, local and NGO ±1 mECU. Fisheries research, monitoring and T.A. T.A.: Restr. tender, short-list drawn up. 5th EDF.

EDF CM 5017 A3d

**Yaoundé — Ayoas Road — Technical study.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports. Estimated cost 0.860 mECU. Technical study for the execution and preparation of the tender dossier. Restr. tender. short-list drawn up. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF CM 5019 A2d

## CAPE VERDE

**Praia electrification.** Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat au Plan. 2.050 mECU. Supply of a generator-set and electrical equipment by int. tender launched in July 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF CV 5007 A2ai

**Reafforestation and anti-erosion constructions in the south-west of the Santiago Island.** Special hunger programme. 0.500 mECU. Project in execution.

958-CV 5009 A8f

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

**Renovation and equipment of Lycée Technique de Bangui.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education. 0.800 mECU. Supply of equipment and renovation works. Studies: O.R.T. (UK). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision: 3rd quarter 85. 5th EDF.

EDF CA 5006 A6a

**Paediatric complex in Bangui and Provinces.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 2.4 mECU. Buildings and supply of equipment. Works: acc. tender launched. Supplies: int. tender. T.A.: CHEVAU (F). Project in execution.

EDF CA 5012 A7b

**Reafforestation and assistance to the forestry inspectorate.** 0.500 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.

958-CA 5016 A3c

★ **Upgrading of the R.N.S.** Estimated cost 0.900 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of road equipment and vehicles by int. tender foreseen in september 85. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September-October 85. 3rd EDF.

EDF CA 3001 A6e

## CHAD

**Priority actions programme in the educational field.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de la Reconstruction. Estimated cost 5.2 mECU. Works, supplies, scholarships and T.A. T.A.: short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF CD 5003 A6a

**Agricultural programme in the Sudan zone.** Estimated cost 5.5 mECU. Different actions for: organizing the peasantry, stocking and marketing, utilization of improved seeds and production techniques. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 5th EDF.

EDF CD 5010 A3b

**Fittings of the Public Works laboratory.** 0.200 mECU. Rehabilitation, supply of equipment and vehicles. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF CD 5009 A2d

**Rehabilitation of hospital and health sector.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Travaux Publics, de la Santé et Médecins sans Frontières (MSF-B). Estimated total cost 5.590 mECU. EDF 4.560 mECU, MSF(B) 0.505 mECU, Aviation sans Frontière (F) 0.100 mECU, local 0.425 mECU. Works by direct agreement or direct labour. Supply of medical equipment, supplies, medicines by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF CD 5011 A7a

**Livestock priority actions programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Elevage. Estimated cost 5.3 mECU. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.

EDF CD A3a

## COMOROS

**Soil and plantations protection and rehabilitation in the Domoni Region (Anjouan).** Special hunger programme. 0.300 mECU. Project in execution.

958-COM 5012 A8f

**Small stock-farming promotion in Anjouan.** Estimated cost 0.200 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

EDF COM 5010 A3a

## DJIBOUTI

**Revitalization and improved use of the doum palm plantations.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 0.750 mECU. 1st stage: study for preserving and making better use. After the study a pilot programme to improve project. Only for the study 0.200 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.

958-DI 5006 A3a

**Administrative training centre.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Fonction Publique. Construction of two buildings. Estimated cost 0.560 mECU. Cofinanced by EDF and France. EDF 0.270 mECU. Works and supplies. Works by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF DI 5004 A6e

**Ranch construction.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Studies and Works. Works by int. tender. 1.030 mECU. Date financing decision May 85. 5th EDF.

EDF DI 5005 A3a

## EQUATORIAL GUINEA

**Rural interventions.** Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.

EDF EG A3a

**Rural development in the Bata district.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Elevage et du Dév. Rural, Ministère de la Santé. 1.350 mECU. Study by BDPA (F). T.A.: Short-list already drawn up for restr. tender. 5th EDF. Project in execution.

EDF EG 5004 A3a

**Rebuilding of two bridges over Tiboures and Alena in the Bioko Island.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Constructions Civiles. 0.800 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Tender dossier by Peter Fraenkel (UK). Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.

EDF EG 5002 A2d

**Malabo's electrification (Phase II).** Estimated cost 3 mECU. Purchase of generator sets, repairing of the power-station and town mains extension. 2 int. tender launched in June 85. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

EDF EG 5003 A2ai

**Cocoa-tree plantations rehabilitation on Bioko island.** Estimated total cost 22.6 mECU. EDF 1.2 mECU. World Bank 13 mECU. OPEC 1.4 mECU, BADEA 3.9 mECU, local 3.1 mECU. EDF part: supply of fertilizers. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

EDF EG 5008 A3a

**Assistance to the road maintenance service in Rio Muni. 2nd phase.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.1 mECU. T.A., training and purchase of road equipments. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.

EDF EG 5009 A2d

## ETHIOPIA

**Coffee improvement (phase 2).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development. 27.2 mECU. Works, supplies. T.A.: Short-list already drawn-up. Int. tender for fertilizer, insecticides, launched in June 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.

EDF ET 5002 A3a

**Construction and equipment of one agricultural research station in Bale-Arsi.** Resp. Auth.: Institute of Agricultural Research (I.A.R.). Special hunger programme. 1.5 mECU. Project in execution.

958-ET A3c

★ **Rural Water Supply.** Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Water Works Construction Authority. 1.9 mECU. Supply of equipments. T.A.: J. Taylor and Son (UK) and GITEC (D). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.

EDF ET 5016 A2b

## FIJI

**Forestry Logging Training School.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Forestry 0.400 mECU. Constructions and supply of equipment. Works by direct labour. Supplies: int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF FIJ 5005 A3c

## GAMBIA

**Brikama College, phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Communications. 1.925 mECU. Construction and equipment of academic and residential buildings. Works by mutual agreement. Equipment for phase II: int. tender, 3rd quarter 1985. 4th EDF. EDF GM 4005 A6b

**Upper River Division feeder roads.** Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. Estimated cost 2.750 mECU. Construction and reinstatement of 83 km in the Sandu and Wuli districts. Works by direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF GM 5014 A2d

## GHANA

**Central and Accra Regions Rural Integrated Programme (CARRIP).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Prefeasibility study for potential projects within the two regions, with the aim of improving the food situation in Accra and other coastal towns. Halcrow-U.L.G. (UK). Study: rehabilitation irrigation project: HED-ESELSKABET (DK). 5th EDF. EDF GH 5025 A3e

**Aveyme livestock development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3.2 mECU. Works, supply of vehicles and equipment, T.A.: ORYX (I) 5th EDF. EDF GH 5015 A3a

**Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. Vehicle Workshop.** Resp. Auth.: Cocoa Marketing Board. (CMB) 2.936 mECU. Stabex 81. Completion and construction of workshops. Supply of equipment and T.A. Works by acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender. T.A.: direct agreement. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GH STA 5019 A3e

**Second Line of Credit to the National Investment Bank (NIB).** Resp. Auth.: Development Service Institute of NIB. 2.9 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GH 5013 B3a

**Assistance to Ghana Stone Quarry and KAS Products Ltd.** Resp. Auth.: Bank for Housing and Construction. 1.670 mECU. Stabex 81. Equipment and spare parts. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GH STA 5020 A4a

**Line of Credit to the Agricultural Development Bank.** Resp. Auth.: Agric. Dev. Bank (ADB) 6mECU. Purchase of marine diesel engines, spare parts, fishing nets, and T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GH 5009 A5a

**Agricultural Rehabilitation through the Rural Banks Scheme. Phase II.** Supply of

equipment to small scale farmers and fishermen. T.A. 8.760 mECU. T.A.: short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GH 5004 A5a

**Supplementary finance for Twifo Oil Palm Development.** Resp. Auth.: Twifo Oil Palm Plantation Ltd. (TOPP). 5.043 mECU. Infrastructure, housing construction by direct labour. Supply of crop inputs, vehicles, tractors and T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GH 5003 A3a

**Supply of materials and equipment for increasing food production and reducing post-harvest losses.** Estimated cost 2.600 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution. 958-GH 5027 A3f

★ **Twifo smallholder Oil Palm Project.** Resp. Auth.: TOPP. 3,715 m ECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85. 5th EDF. EDF GH 5021— STA A3a

## GUINEA

**Land development in Kankan and Labé regions. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et des F.A.P.A. Valuation: MacDonald and Partners (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF GUI 5030 A3a

**New energy research and test.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Energie et du Konkouré. Study on hand by A.I.D.R. (B). 5th EDF. EDF GUI 5006 A2a

**T.A. to the Dir. Gen. de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme. Development of provincial centres.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat. Estimated cost ±6 mECU. Aerial survey, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Date financing decision June 85. 5th EDF. EDF GUI 5017 A8b

**Ignace Deen hospital renovation in Conakry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 5 mECU. Works and supplies by int. tender. Works: int. tender. launched in December. Works supervision by restr. tender. Short-list done. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GUI 5026 A7a

**Drillings in the Siguiri region.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, des Eaux, Forêts et FAPA. Estimated cost 1.7 mECU. 116 drillings with hand pumps. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GUI 5027 A2b

**Educational Project.** Estimated cost 2.767 mECU. Building renovation and supply of equipment. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF GUI 5028 A6d

## GUINEA BISSAU

**Health infrastructures.** Resp. Auth.: Commissariat d'Etat au Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 1.9 mECU. Construction and equipment of 2 district hospitals, 4 health

centres and staff housing. Supply of equipment: int. tender on 2nd half 85. T.A.: Ass. Engineers (I). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF GUB 5006 A7a

**North-East forestry development.** Resp. Auth.: Commissariat général au développement rural. Study under way by Atlanta (D). 5th EDF. EDF GUB 5004 A3c

**Rural hydraulics.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des ressources naturelles. Estimated cost 1.4 mECU. Construction of big diameter wells (1.5 m) about 120 wells in the GABU region. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 3rd quarter 85. 5th EDF. EDF GUB 5005 A2b

**T.A. for the reform of trade.** Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry and 2 state companies: Kelvingate (UK). T.A.: short-list done for restr. tender. 5th EDF. EDF GUB 5009 A5c

## IVORY COAST

**Coffee-shrub regeneration programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture and SATMACI. ±7.7 mECU. Stabex 81. Supply of equipment, fertilizers and pesticides. Int. tender launched in March 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF IVC STA 5017 A3a

**Prawn farming pilot farm.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated total cost 1.405 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF IVC 5019 A3d

## JAMAICA

**Citrus fruit production improvement.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated cost 3.5 mECU. Equipment, training and T.A. Credit line. T.A.: Short-list already drawn-up. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF JM 5004 A3a

**Coffee development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 3.7 mECU. EDF 3.5 mECU. Local 0.2 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and credit line. T.A.: Short-list already drawn up for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF JM 5005 A3a

**"Public Health Laboratory Services".** Construction and supply of equipment for a new laboratory in Kingston. Training. Estimated total cost 5.230 mECU. EDF 4.900 mECU. Local 0.300 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF JM 5011 A7a

**Bee-keeping Development Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 1.270 mECU. Supply of vehicles, T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. 4th and 5th EDF. EDF JM 5013 A3a

## KENYA

**Eldoret Polytechnic.** 6,5 mECU. Construction, supply of equipment (pedagogical)

and T.A. Works by acc. tender. Tender already launched. Supervision of works : Hughes and Polkinghorne (UK). Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF KE 5010 A6b

**Veterinary investigation laboratory Mariakani.** Adm. Resp.: Ministry of Livestock Department. Veterinary Department. 3.4 mECU. Construction of a veterinary investigation laboratory. Supply of materials and equipment. T.A. Materials and equipment : int. tender launched in September 84. T.A. : direct agreement. Project in execution. 5th FED.  
EDF KE 5003 A3a

**Turkwell hydro-electric project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy. Feasibility study and final study design : PREECE CARDEW RIDER (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF KE 5014 A2a

**Strengthening of existing facilities for research in the field of public health.** Construction of a laboratory by int. tender. Work supervision : Dalgliesh Marshal (UK). 1 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF KE 5019 A7a

**Line of credit to the "Small Scale Enterprises Finance Company" (SEFCO).** Resp. Auth.: Development Finance Company of Kenya. 0.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF KE 5020 A4b

## KIRIBATI

**Fishing-boats.** Estimated cost 2.8 mECU. Purchase of 2 boats, 26 m. each. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF KI 5002 A3d

## LESOTHO

**Rural hospitals improvement programme. 5th phase.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Rural Development. 0.641 mECU. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF LSO 5009 A7a

## LIBERIA

**Buto oil palm. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4.2 mECU. Continuation of the existing project in connection with the construction of an oil mill. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A. : Short-list done for restr. tender. Date financing decision June 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF LBR 5004 A3a

**Development of Harper Port.** Resp. Auth.: National Port Authority. Estimated cost 12.4 mECU. Rehabilitation and fendering of the existing jetty, dredging in the harbour basin, services. Int. tender with prequalification. Prequalification done. Supervision of works : short-list done for restr. tender. Date financing decision June 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF LBR 5017 A2d

**Rural Water Supply.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Rural Dev. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF LBR 5018 A2b

## MADAGASCAR

**Rehabilitation of «Centre Semencier Riz» in Marofarihy.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Agricole et de la Réforme Agraire. EDF 1.630 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. T.A. : Short-list already drawn up for restr. tender. Int. tender for supplies launched in June 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5015 A3a

**Assistance to the Malagasy handicrafts industry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie. Estimated cost 1 mECU. Supply of raw materials for handicrafts by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5017 A4d

**Food strategy. Priority measures.** Special hunger programme. 1.9 mECU. Project in execution.  
958-MAG 5022 B1a

**Ambositra water supply.** Estimated total cost 3 mECU. EDF 1.9 mECU, local 1.1 mECU. Renovation of the whole water system for private and industrial needs. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5019 A2b

**Maize seed centre.** Estimated cost 0.800 mECU. Rehabilitation of Tindoha centre, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5021 A3a

**Micro and mini hydro-electric power stations development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie de l'Energie et des Mines. Soc. JRAMA. Total estimated cost 1.3 mECU. EDF 1 mECU, local 0.300 mECU. Study on micro and mini power stations. Restr. tender after prequalification by short-list. Prequalification launched in July 85. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5018 A2a

**SOMAPALM rehabilitation. Phase 2.** Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. To improve cultivation, plants and cost prices. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5020 A3a

**Slaughter-house rehabilitation in Antananarivo, Mahajanga and Morondava.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Animale et des Eaux et Forêts, Direction de l'Elevage. Total estimated cost 9.070 mECU. EDF 7.570 mECU, France 0.200 mECU, local 1.3 mECU. Works by acc. tender, supply of equipment by int. tender. T.A. by direct agreement. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG 5024 A3a

**Intermediate level health infrastructure strengthening.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. Works for Ihoisy and Maevatana hospitals. Int. tender foreseen in September 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAG A3a

## MALAWI

**Salima Lakeshore Agricultural Development Division (SLADD) Phase IV.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost : 19.1 mECU. EDF 9.5 mECU. Local

9.6 mECU. Works, Supplies and T.A. Project in execution. T.A. : restr. tender, short-list drawn up. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5001 A3a

**Central and northern region fish farming development, training and research.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost : 3 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5019 A3a

**Strategic fuel reserve.** Resp. Auth.: Office of the President and Cabinet. Contingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU. Construction of tanks farm for gasoil, petrol, ethanol. Associated infrastructure and equipment. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5020 A2a

**Small Enterprise Development Organization of Malawi (SEDOM) - Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Sedom secretariat. EDF 4.8 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of vehicles and equipment by int. tender in '85. T.A. : Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5021 A4e

**Ntchisi Project Area. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 6.4 mECU. EDF 4.0 mECU, local 2.4 mECU. Works, supplies and operating costs. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5022 A3a

**Improvements to Mpemba staff training college.** Estimated cost 0.700 mECU. Works and infrastructures Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5026 A6b

**Nkhotakota Rural Development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Total estimated cost 9.32 mECU. EDF 4.820 mECU, local 4.5 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5027 A3a

**Mwansambo Rural Growth Centre.** Resp. Auth.: OPC, Rural Development Division. Estimated cost 1 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAI 5028 A3a

## MALI

**Strengthening of sanitary infrastructure in the Niore region.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé et des Affaires Sociales et Ministère des Transports et T.P. 2.570 mECU. Buildings, equipment, training. Architectural and technical studies: GOUSIER (F). T.A. : Short-list already drawn up. 4th EDF.  
EDF MLI 4016 A7a

**Geological and mining research. Western Mali 1.** Resp. Auth.: Direction Nationale de Géologie et des Mines (DNGM)). 7.3 mECU. Geological and mining mapping, gold mine research by boring, supply of laboratory equipment. Geological mapping by restr. tender. Boring by int. tender. Supervision of works by direct agreement. Equipment by int. tender. Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF MLI 5015 A4a

**Support to the food strategy. Phase II.** Special programme hunger. 3 mECU. Project in execution.  
958-MLI 5019 B1a

**Support to the reafforestation programme and to the fuel-wood saving programme. Phase II.** 0.300 mECU. Special hunger programme. Date financing decision December 84.  
958-MLI 5020 A8f

**Rural hydraulics programme.** Estimated cost  $\pm 6$  mECU. 300 wells and pumps. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF MLI 5017 A2b

**Assistance to the governmental policy for markets liberalization. Purchase of cement.** Estimated cost 3 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF MLI 5018 A4c

## MAURITANIA

**Extension of Kaédi regional hospital.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.925 mECU. Construction, equipment and TA for Kaédi hospital (100 beds). Works under way. Medical-technical equipment int. tender, foreseen in the 3rd quarter 85. 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF MAU 5018 A7a

**Small dams construction in the Hodhs region.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement rural. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Study under way; Binnie and Partners (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAU 5001 A3a

**Aioum El Atrouss hospital.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.050 mECU. Renovation and supply of equipment for 3 buildings. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAU 5012 A7a

**"Centre de Formation Professionnelle Maritime de Nouadhibou (C.F.P.M.).** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 2.5 mECU. Construction, supply of equipment and purchase of a wooden-trawler, T.A. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF MAU 5014 A6d

**Renewing of the "Reafforestation Fund".** Special programme hunger. 0.500 mECU. Project in execution.  
958-MAU 5019 A3c

## MAURITIUS

**Development of Ile Rodrigues.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3 mECU. Development centred on agricultural production. Economical and technical study, on the way. T.A.: Luxconsult (Lux.). 5th EDF.  
EDF MAS 5001 A3a

## NIGER

**Air Valley development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 2.052 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works. Construction and equipping of wells. Equipping and operation of nurseries. T.A. and training. Works and equipment: int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF NIR 5002 A3a

**Rural health programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales. 4.5 mECU. Construction of a medical centre in Mirria and 14 rural dispensaries, supply of equipment and T.A. Works: acc. tender. Supply of equipment, medicines, vehicles and motor-cycles: int. tender. T.A.: restr. tender short-list done. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF NIR 5013 A7a

**Training for Cooperatives.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 0.800 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A. by restr. tender. Supplies by int. tender or direct agreement. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF NIR A3b

**Renewing of the "Reafforestation Fund".** Special hunger programme. 500 mECU. Project in execution.  
958-NIR 5018 A3c

**Rural Development in the Zinder Department.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF NIR 5019 A3a

**Area extension in Tillakaina.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 0.330 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF NIR 5020 A3a

## NIGERIA

**Kaduna afforestation project.** Resp. Auth.: Federal Department of Forestry. 9.4 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. T.A. restr. tender shortlist done. 5th EDF.  
EDF UNI 5001 A3c

**Mambilla tea irrigation.** Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Beverages Production Company Ltd. Estimated total cost 4.4 mECU. EDP 3 mECU, local 1.4 mECU. Works and supplies. Supply of irrigation equipment by int. tender, conditional, launched in June 85. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF UNI 5004 A3a

## PAPUA NEW GUINEA

**Magi highway.** Resp. Auth.: Department of Transport. 3.5 mECU. Upgrading and sealing of a road section. Works: int. tender foreseen 2nd half '85. 5th EDF.  
EDF PNG 5006 A2d

**Diesel Power Replacement Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Electricity Commission (ELCOM). Estimated cost 4.850 mECU. 4 small hydroelectric power plants with transmission lines extensions from existing grids. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85 for the 1st power plant. 1st int. tender (conditional) foreseen in June 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF PNG 5011a A2a

## RWANDA

**Development of the small scale tin industry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, des mines et de l'artisanat.

2.840 mECU. Sysmin. Works, supplies, training and T.A. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF RW 5016 A4a

**Food strategy. Priority measures (continuation).** 3 mECU. Special programme hunger. Project in execution.  
958-RW 5021 B1a

## ST. CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS

**Nevis Water Supply Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works 0.750 mECU. Installation of storage tanks and piping. Works by direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF SCN 5002 A2b

**Electricity Supply Project.** Resp. Auth.: Electricity Dept. Estimated cost 1.662 mECU. Upgrading electricity supply system. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. Supplies: int. tender (conditional). 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF SCN 5001 A2ai

**Construction of the Johnston's Village Primary School.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, Health and Social Affairs. Estimated total cost 0.900 mECU. EDF 0.834 mECU, local 0.066 mECU. Works: acc. tender. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF SCN 5003 A6d

## ST VINCENT AND GRENADINES

**Livestock development project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.415 m ECU. Works, equipment and supply of vehicles. T.A.: shortlist already drawn up. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF SVG 5003 A3a

**Tourism development project.** Resp. Auth.: Department of Tourism. 0.125 mECU. Upgrading Department of Tourism and preparation of promotion material by CEGOS (F). 5th EDF.  
EDF SVG 5005 A5c

## SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

**Water supply for 2 rural centres.** Resp. Auth.: EMAE Direction (Empresa de Agua e Electricidade). Cofinancing EDF — Portugal. EDF 0.450 mECU. T.A. Works and supplies by int. tender. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF STP 5007 A2b

## SENEGAL

**New energy research and test in rural region.** Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Recherche Scientifique. 1.5 mECU. Creation of pilot unit for solar energy, biomass and wind energy. Studies, T.A. and equipment. Studies: AGIP-AFOR (I). Equipment: int. tender in 85. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF SE 5005 A2a

**Trade Promotion programme.** Resp. Auth.: Centre Sénégalais du Commerce Extérieur. 1.083 mECU. Actions for productions, marketing and T.A. Contract: direct agreement or restr. tender. 5th EDF.  
EDF SE 5016 A5d

- Podor rural irrigated areas. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Société d'aménagement du Fleuve Sénégal et de la Falémé (S.A.E.D.). Estimated cost 2.4 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of motor-pumps by int. tender launched in May 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SE 5029 A2b
- Consolidation of the livestock development programme.** Resp. Auth.: SODESP. Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Study under way by BESSEL Ass. (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SE A3a
- Artisanal fishery development in the Casamance Region.** Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Pêche Maritime. Total cost 2.443 mECU. EDF 1.6 mECU, C.C.C.E. (F) 0.843 mECU. Works, supplies and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85. 5th EDF. EDF SE 5024 A3a
- Study on irrigated rural units in the Podor region. (Senegal River Valley).** Resp. Auth.: S.A.E.D. Estimated cost 1 mECU. Soil survey, mapping, preparation of the tender dossier, economical study. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF. EDF SE 5030 A3a
- SIERRA LEONE**
- Rural hydraulics.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Estimated cost 1.55 mECU. Construction of water points for villages with 2000 inhabitants. Study to prepare project and appraisal: IWACO (NL). 5th EDF. EDF SL 5001 A2b
- Kambia Fishery Development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 0.900 mECU. Construction of 2 buildings and a boatyard, supply of boats, motors, vehicles and T.A. T.A.: Short-list already drawn up. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5019 A3d
- Economic study of the Sambamba-Kabala Road.** Short-list already drawn up. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5027 A2d
- Buildings for Njala University College (N.U.C.).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 2.5 mECU. Construction of academic block and student hostel, supply of equipment and work supervision. T.A.: OLU WRIGHT ASS. (ACP). 5th EDF. EDF SL 5022 A6b
- Rubber development project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Estimated cost 5 or 6 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5023 A3a
- Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications Network.** Resp. Auth.: Post and Telecommunications Dept. Estimated cost ±9.5 mECU. Study to prepare technical specifications and int. tender dossier: short-list done for restr. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5024 A2c
- Port Loko rural development programme.** Estimated cost 5.8 mECU. Infrastructures, T.A., training and supplies. Project stage identification. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5006 A3a
- Support to the Geological Surveys Department.** Estimated cost 1.30 mECU. T.A. and training, supply of equipment. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5016 A4a
- Creation of regional centres for small enterprises.** Estimated cost 1.25 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5017 A4d
- Rural health development programme.** Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Buildings, equipment and training. Project state: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5025 A7a
- Tourism development project.** Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. for Ministry of Tourism and supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5026 A5c
- SOLOMON ISLANDS**
- Coconut industry development project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Natural Resources. Study under way. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SOL 5009 A3a
- SOMALIA**
- Bardheera Dam.** Resp. Auth.: Bardheera Dam Authority (BDA). 600 mECU. (Estimated) Dam Project 500 mECU. Powerline to Mogadishu 100 mECU. Funding: EDF, Italy, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Abu-Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, Isl. Dev. Bank. Local. Power and river regulation for agricultural development. Construction of a concrete gravity dam with hydro-power station, associated infrastructure and electrical transmission lines. The dam will provide water, flood protection and power for up to 223 000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Civil works: first int. tender launched in 1984. Transmission lines int. tender in 1985. Equipment: powerhouse main equipment and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 1985. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int tender in 1986. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5003 A2a
- Mogadishu Institute of Statistics.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost: 1 mECU. Supply: int. tender in 85. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF. EDF SO 5005 A6b
- "Aula Magna" Mogadishu National University.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. ±2.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF. EDF SO 4015 A6b
- Upgrading of the road Afgoi-Shalambok-Goluen.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Works by int. tender in 85. Supervision of works. Studies: OLU WRIGHT ASS. (ACP). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5017 A2d
- Grapefruit Development Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3.8 mECU. Works supply of vehicles, equipment and rural inputs. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5009 A3a
- Food Early Warning System.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF ±3.1 mECU. Supply of meteorological and office equipment and T.A.: Short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5015 A8f
- North-West agricultural development project.** Estimated total cost 36 mECU. EDF: 7.6 mECU, World Bank 14.9 mECU, IFAD 9.9 mECU, local 3.6 mECU. Infrastructural work and supply of equipment and T.A. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5016 A3a
- Rinder pest programme assistance.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Livestock 0.207 mECU. Stabex 81. Supply of vehicles and equipment by int. tender. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF SO STA 5018 A3a
- SUDAN**
- Nuba Mountains Rural Development Project. Interim phase.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 2.200 mECU. Supply of equipment and vehicles by int. tender, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SU 5019 A3a
- Block trains for Emergency Food Delivery.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Sudan Railway Corporation. 10 mECU. Supply of equipment tools and spare parts for locomotives, track improvements, communications and signalling and T.A. All by int. tenders or direct agreements. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SU 5023 A2d
- SURINAME**
- Rice project at Coronie.** Resp. Auth.: Ministerie van Landbouw, Veeteelt, Visserij en Bosbouw. 7.650 mECU. Rice production developments. T.A. short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. 3rd and 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5002 A3a
- Biomass energy project at Wageningen.** Resp. Auth.: Government. Installation of an energy generator on the basis of rice husks. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5009 A2a
- Artificial Insemination Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries 0.7 mECU. Building of a new station and provision of equipment and material. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5010 A3a
- Rehabilitation of the road Burnside-Wageningen.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Planning. Estimated total cost 5.5 mECU. Study to be done: technical



methods for the implementation of the project. Short-list foreseen in 85. Project on appraisal. 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF SUR 5011 A2d

## SWAZILAND

**Rural hydraulics.** Resp. Auth.: Rural Water Supply Board. Estimated cost 2.456 m ECU. Study construction, works supervision. 12 villages. Supply of equipment and material. Study and works supervision: short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF SW 5001 A2b

**Smallholders Support Project, Credit and Marketing.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 3.550 mECU. Works, line of credit, T.A. and training. T.A.: short-list already drawn-up. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF SW 5005 A4e

## TANZANIA

**Technical teacher training college, Mtwara.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.4 mECU. Training facilities for technical teachers. Classrooms, laboratory and workshops, dormitories and sanitary block, administration. Total area 3,765 m<sup>2</sup>. Equipment: int. tender with possibility of direct agreement depending on nature of supply. Supplies: direct agreement, all in '85. 4th EDF.  
EDF TA 4011 A6c

**Mtwara water supply.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. 5 mECU. Works: drilling of new wells, and constructions. Supply of equipment and T.A. Drilling activities and power supply connections by direct labour. Other works: int. tender in '85. Supplies: int. tender in '85. Supervision of works: G.W.E. (D). 5th EDF.  
EDF TA 5003 A2b

**Irrigation micro-projects in Pemba.** 1.103 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.  
958-TA 5015 A3a

**Banana improvement and pest control (Phase 1).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 3.740 mECU. EDF 3 mECU, local 0.740 mECU. Supply of pesticides, vehicles, equipment by int. tender. T.A. by direct agreement. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF TA 5008 A3a

**Ports of Zanzibar and Pemba.** Estimated cost 10.17 mECU, T.A. for management, organization pricing and financial systems, training. Restoration of infrastructure. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.  
EDF TA 5024 A2d

## TOGO

**Provisions improvement for Agou oil palm plant.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. EDF 5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF TO A3a

**Enquiry into consumer expenditures.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan, de l'Industrie et de la Réforme Administrative. Estimated total cost 1.3 mECU. EDF 1 mECU, Local 0.3 mECU, T.A. to produce, collect and treat statistical data, training and supply of equipment. T.A.: short-list done. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF TO 5011 A1e

## TONGA

**Supply of a dredger.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 0.500 mECU. Technical study: EUROCONSULT (NL). Int. tender foreseen 2nd half '85. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF TG 5002 A2d

**Faua Fisheries Harbour.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 3.3 mECU. Construction of a new fisheries harbour, repair yards, fish market and wholesale store with ice-making equipment. Int. tender for the supply of sheet steel piles launched in November 83 (conditional). Supply of cooling and ice equipment int. tender in 85. Works by direct labour. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF TG 5001 A3d

## TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

**Training programme, health sector.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Environment. 1.2 mECU. Training awards, laboratory equipment (sound-meters, chemical chromatographs, spectrometers) by int. tender. Short-term T.A. to coordinate and establish new laboratory. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF TR 5003 A8c

## UGANDA

**Rural health programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Local Government. 3.1 mECU. To improve health care in rural areas. T.A.: KIT (NL). Project in execution. 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF UG 5013 A7a

**Kampala-Masaka Road. 2nd section.** Upgrading of the road over 60 km. Study: short-list done. Estimated cost 0.200 mECU. Works by int. tender foreseen in 2nd quarter 85 (conditional). Estimated cost 10 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF UG 5003 A2d

**Conservation of natural resources.** Resp. Auth.: National Board of Trustees of the Uganda National Parks. Estimated cost 3.1 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, training and T.A. Int. tender for supplies launched in March 85. T.A.: M. EVANS (UK). Project in execution. 4th EDF.  
EDF UG 5015 A8f

**Line of credit to the Uganda Commercial Bank. UCB.** Resp. Auth.: UCB. 4.3 mECU. Line of credit, training and T.A. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF UG 5018 A5c

**Support to mining research.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands Mineral and Water Resources. Estimated cost 0.900 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF UG 5019 A4a

## VANUATU

**Public Works plant project.** Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. (P.W.D.). Estimated cost 1.2 mECU. Supply of bulldozers, graders, tractors and spare parts. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF VA 5005 - 4002

## ZAIRE

**Kalemie port rehabilitation.** Resp. Auth.: Département des Transports et Communications. 6.5 mECU. 2 Int. tenders (conditional) launched in March 84. Works and supplies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. Regional project. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5215 A2d

**Banana deep water port.** Resp. Auth.: Département des Transports et Communications. Economic and financial evaluation: SEMA (F). 5th EDF.  
EDF ZR 5013 A2d

**Butembo-Beni hydro-electrical development.** Preliminary study done by Tractiionnel (B) on local funds. Detailed economic and technical studies: WLPV (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF ZR 5006 A2a

## ZAMBIA

**Animal vaccine unit production.** Laboratory construction. Supply of equipment and T.A. Estimated cost 3.79 mECU. EDF 3 mECU, local 0.79 mECU. T.A.: short-list already drawn up. 5th EDF.  
EDF ZA 5018 A3a

**Mkushi electrification.** Estimated cost 6.07 mECU. EDF 3.07 mECU. Cofinancing needed. Study on hand: MERTZ-McLENNAN (UK). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.  
EDF ZA 5007 A2a

**Animal health improvement.** Special hunger programme. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
958-ZA 5022 A3a

**Environmental conservation measures.** 2 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.  
958-ZA 5023 A8f

★ **Rehabilitation of the Zambian Copper & Cobalt Mining Industry. II.** Resp. Auth.: Z.C.C.M. Sysmin. 28 mECU, Italy 4.5 mECU. Local 4.9 mECU. EDF part supply of equipment by int. tender or restr. tender or direct agreement. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF ZA/SYS/5024

## ZIMBABWE

**Rural clinics.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4.5 mECU. Construction and equipment of 64 rural clinics and 128 staff houses. Works: direct labour. Equipment: int. tender 2nd half 85. (Non-associated dev. countries budget).  
ALA ZIM 8041 A7a

**Small-holder Coffee and Fruit Development Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and Rural Development. Estimated total cost 5.85 mECU. EDF 4.2 mECU, local 1.65 mECU. T.A.: I.R.F.A. (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF ZIM 5006 A3a

## Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

### NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

**Curaçao slaughterhouse.** Resp. Auth.: Departement voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, Willemstad, Curaçao. cost 3.45 mECU. Work plans: Bureau T. Janga (Local). Works by int. tender foreseen in the 2nd half 85. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF NEA 5012 A3a

**Line of credit to the Aruba Dev. Bank to improve agriculture livestock and fishery.** Resp. Auth.: Departement voor ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Estimated cost 0.3 mECU. Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.  
EDF NEA 4003 A5a

### FRENCH POLYNESIA

**Tahiti territorial abattoir.** Resp. Auth.: Service de l'Economie Rurale, Papeete (Tahiti). Secrétariat d'Etat des Départements et Territoires d'Outre-Mer, Délégation de la Polynésie Française, Paris. Cofinancing with France. 1.270 mECU. Date financing decision July 85. 4th EDF.  
EDF POF 4003 A3a

**Pearl and mother of pearl handicraft centre.** Estimated cost 0.450 mECU. Building construction. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF POF 5004 A3d

### NEW CALEDONIA

**Reafforestation programme.** Resp. Auth.: Territoire de la Nouvelle Calédonie des Eaux et Forêts. Estimated total cost 4.7 mECU. EDF part ±3 mECU. Cofunding with France, CCCE (F) and Local. 3.000 ha plantation "Pin de Caraïbes" with all necessary infrastructure and investment. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF NC 5003 A3c

### MONTERRAT

**Water Supply Project.** Resp. Auth.: Montserrat Water Authority and Ministry of Public Works. 1.1 mECU. Project planning :

Short-list already drawn up for restr. tender. Project on appraisal. 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF MON 5001 A2b

### PACIFIC OCT

**Regional programme rural photovoltaic electrification.** Resp. Auth.: SPEC. Estimated total cost 4.365 mECU. EDF 3.184 mECU. T.A.: short-list done for restr. tender. Supplies by int. tender launched in January 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5715 A2a

### WALLIS AND FUTUNA ISLANDS

**Futuna electrification.** 1.2 mECU. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF WF 5002 A2a

## Regional Projects

### O.C.A.M.

**Institut Africain d'Informatique (I.A.I.).** Resp. Auth.: I.A.I. secretariat in Libreville-Gabon. 2.33 mECU. Building extensions. Supplies: int. tender launched in June 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5218 A6b

### CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. — CONGO

**Aid to the "Service Commun d'Entretien des Voies Navigables. (SCEVN).** Estimated cost 5.1 mECU. Supply of equipment and improvement of the maintenance base in Bangui. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5202 A2c

### MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CEAO

**ESITEX Ségou (Mali).** Resp. Auth.: CEAO Secretariat. Management training for textile industry. Complex construction in Ségou. Supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5118 A6d

### WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE MINISTERIELLE SUR LE TRANSPORT MARITIME

**Académie régionale des Sciences et techniques de la mer in Abidjan.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Marine, Ivory Coast. Estimated total cost 32 mECU. EDF part for pedagogical equipment 2 mECU. Int. tender (conditional) foreseen early 85. Works, T.A. and other equipment: BAD, Japan, Norway, UNDP, France and local. Date financing decision March 85. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5134 A6b

### GAMBIA — SENEGAL (O.M.V.G.)

**Bridge barrage on the river Gambia.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost in 78: 60 mECU. Foreseen funding: F.R.G. 20 mECU. Canada 21.7 mECU, USA

11/22 mECU, Technical study: DHV-Rijks-waterstaat-Waterloopkundig Laboratorium Delft (NL). For Phase I — Phase II: Rhein-Ruhr (D). Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5110 A2d

**Agronomical study for the area concerned by the bridge barrage.** Short-list already drawn up. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG A3a

### GUYANA — SURINAME

**Guyana — ferry-link.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Ministerie van Openbare Werken. Link ferry on Corentine river. Study under way by C.A. Liburd and Ass. + Sescon Group (ACP). Project on appraisal. 4th EDF.  
EDF REG 5602 A2d

### MEMBER COUNTRIES OF M.R.U. (MANO RIVER UNION)

**Telecommunication and Postal Training Institute (TPTI) of the MRU.** Resp. Auth.: MRU Secretariat in Freetown. Extensions, supplies and training. Estimated total cost 8.5 mECU. EDF 2.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5104 A6b

### NIGER BASIN AUTHORITY

**Protection and reafforestation in the "Haut Bassin Versant du fleuve Niger en Guinée".** Works, supplies and T.A. Estimated total cost 1.5 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5112 A8f

### ZAIRE — CONGO — GABON — SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE — EQUATORIAL GUINEA — CAMEROON

**Fishery development in the Gulf of Guinea.** Estimated cost ±5 mECU. T.A. to prepare these projects: S.G.T.E. (F). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5206 A3d

### SENEGAL — MAURITANIA

**Establishment of cultivated areas in the Senegal River Valley.** Special hunger programme. Project in execution.  
958-REG 5140 A3a

### TOGO — MALI — BURKINA FASO — NIGER — CHAD

**Agricultural products regional transit centre, in the Lomé port.** Resp. Auth.: Ministères du Plan. Estimated total 7 mECU with cofunding. Technical and economic feasibility study: Bureau SATEC (F). Project stage: identification. 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF REG 5125 A3a

### BURKINA FASO — CAPE VERDE — CHAD — GAMBIA — MALI — MAURITANIA — NIGER — SENEGAL

**Establishment of a regional plan for food policy and ecology.** Special hunger programme. Project in execution.  
958-REG 5141 A8f

## MEMBER COUNTRIES OF UDEAC

**Sub-Regional Institute for Applied Technology and Planned Economy (ISTA).** Resp. Auth.: ISTA Secretariat in Libreville-Gabon. Estimated cost ±6 mECU. Building centre construction and T.A. for 3 actions. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5210 A6b

**Informations and trade promotion industrial investments in central Africa.** Resp. Auth.: Regional authorizing officer: Gabon. 1.020 mECU. T.A.: CGCE (ACP). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5048 A5d

## PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES

**Pacific Regional Tourism Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Tourism Council of the South Pacific (TCSP) and SPEC. 3.2 mECU. Study to be done: data base, organization and strategy. Short-list already drawn up. for restr. tender. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5714 A5c

**University of the South Pacific. Agricultural, Rural and Marine Resources Programme. Stage II.** Resp. Auth.: SPEC. 0.830 mECU. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5707 A6b

**Pacific Forum Line (PFL).** Purchase of containers. 3.200 mECU. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5716 A2d

## MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CEAO AND CILSS

**Construction of Centre Régional d'Énergie Solaire (CRES) in Bamako, Mali.** Estimated total cost 30 mECU. EDF part. 2.270 mECU. T.A. and equipment. Int. tender for vehicles launched in January 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5107 A2a

## MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CILSS

**Provisional survey of natural renewable resources in the Sahel.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Estimated cost 6 mECU. EDF ±2 mECU. Setting up of an observation unit to forecast crop production. Remote sensing by satellite, air survey and ground control. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5116 A8f

**Millet, maize, sorghum and niébé project.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Estimated cost 2 mECU. To provide improved varieties for farmers. Local tests. Purchase of vehicles and equipment and to take charge for local tests control staff. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5116 A3a

**Setting up of a system to estimate cereal stocks in private hands.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Estimated cost 1 mECU. EDF 0.5 mECU FAC 0.5 mECU. Creation of a system to monitor permanently the global availability of food stocks. T.A. and equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5116 A3a

**Fight against drought in the Sahel.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Estimated cost 1 mECU. T.A. and experts for the CILSS Executive Secretariat. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5116 A8f

**Regional coordination of food production and distribution of improved cooking stoves.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. Studies on food marketing, pricing and trading. Studies and aids for improved cooking stoves distribution. Estimated cost 0.276 mECU. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5116 A3a

## MEMBER COUNTRIES OF U.A.P.T.

**Satellite telecommunications project.** Resp. Auth.: U.A.P.T. Secretariat in Brazzaville. R.P.C. Parametric study on the way by national organizations of I, UK, F and D. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5307 A2c

## EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

**Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania.** Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 2.0 mECU. Widening of the capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5311 A6b

**Kabale-Gatuna Road.** Resp. Auth.: Uganda Government. Estimated cost 2.5 mECU. Asphalted of the road (21 km) up to the Rwanda border. Study to be done: final dossier and tender documents. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5329 A2d

## INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES

**New and renewable energy programme.** Resp. Auth.: AIRDOI-COI. 1.7 mECU. Supply of gaz-generators vehicles and wind-generators. T.A.: CREUFOP (F). Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5503/80 A2a

## DJIBOUTI-ETHIOPIA

**Djibouti-Ethiopia Railways. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: CFDE (Compagnie du Chemin de Fer Djibouti-Ethiopie). Estimated total cost 28 mECU EDF 15 mECU, France 13 mECU. Supply of rails, wagons and equipment. Int. tender foreseen in 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5301 A2d

## KENYA — UGANDA — BURUNDI — RWANDA

**Turbo-Webuye Road.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works, Kenya. Estimated cost 10.50 mECU. Works and supervision. Works: int. tender launched in May 85. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5334 A2d

**Refurbishing of Burundi's Highway I between Bugarama and Akanyaru (80 km) (Northern Corridor).** Estimated cost 2.2 mECU. Int. tender launched in May 85. Geotechnical supervision by Burundi National Laboratory. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5335 A2d

## 28 AFRICAN COUNTRIES

**Pan-African campaign against rinderpest.** Resp. Auth.: OUA and IBAR. Estimated total cost for 1st year 53 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5007 A3a

## SWAZILAND — LESOTHO

**Matsapha Airport.** Construction of a control tower, equipment and T.A. Estimated total cost: 31 mECU. EDF 2.1 mECU. Int. tender launched in February 85. EDF part: date foreseen for financing decision 2nd quarter 85. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5408 A2d

## MALAWI — ZAMBIA — ZIMBABWE

**Regional Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Technical and financing responsibility: Zimbabwe national authorizing officer. 19.150 mECU. Works by direct labour. Vehicles, veterinary products, aerial spraying and equipments by int. tender. T.A. by direct agreement. Date financing decision May 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5420 A3a

## MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CARICOM

**Regional hotel trade school in St Lucia.** Resp. Auth.: Caricom Secretariat. Estimated total cost 0.9 mECU. EDF 0.2 mECU. Work financed locally. EDF part: supply of pedagogical equipment, furniture and 1 vehicle. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5635 A6d

**Assistance for Point-Salines International Airport-Grenada.** Resp. Auth.: Caricom Secretariat and Grenada Int. Airport Authority. EDF part 1.74 mECU, T.A. and supply of radio and electronic navigational equipment. T.A. by direct agreement. Equipment by int. tender. Date foreseen for financing decision 3rd quarter 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5608 A2d

**Moko Disease Control.** Resp. Auth.: Windward Islands Banana Growers Association (WINBAN). 0.900 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5675 A3a

## CARIBBEAN AND ACP COCOA PRODUCERS

**Cocoa Research Unit (CRU), Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: CRU in Trinidad. 2.624 mECU. Works, supply of equipments and agricultural inputs, T.A. and training. Date financing decision July 85. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5043 A3a

# MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

## EGYPT

**Soil improvement programme in Ka-freeel-Sheikh Governorate.** Resp. Auth.: Executive Authority for Land Improvement Projects (EALIP). Provisional amount 8 mECU. To reclaim an area of 65 000 acres of saline soil, located in Hamouli district of the Kafre-el-Sheikh Governorate. Short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. MMI EGT 1001 A3e

**Improved of agricultural input storage facilities in the Daqhalia Governorate.** Resp. Auth.: Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit. EEC Contribution 6 mECU. Construction of warehouses. Works: int. tender launched in March 85. Project in execution. MMI EGT 1003 A3f

**Egyptian Renewable Energy Development Organization. EREDO.** Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Government. EEC contribution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equipment for the centre. Works and supplies: int. tender with prequalification foreseen in 2nd half 85. T.A.: GET/KFA (D). MMI EGT 1002 A2a

**Feasibility study for Thermal Power Station at Sidi-Krir.** Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Electricity Authority. Study for a 1200 MW thermal power station. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Short-list already drawn-up. MMI EGT 2004 A2a

**Export Promotion.** Resp. Auth.: Egypt Export Promotion Company (EPEC). T.A. to the EPEC. 0.920 mECU. Short-list already drawn up. Project in execution. MMI EGT 2005 A5e

**Kom-Ombo Soil Improvement Study.** Resp. Auth.: EALIP. 1 mECU. Project in execution. Short-list drawn up. MMI EGT 2003 A3e

**Animal feed improvement.** Resp. Auth.: Research Institute for Animal Production (RIAP) — Cairo. EEC Contribution 2.4 mECU. T.A., supply of equipment and training. Project in execution. MMI EGT 2001 A3a

## LEBANON

**Industrial planning and industrial census.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie. 0.518 mECU. Foreign expert to supervise local experts for census. Mission in Lebanon 2 months EEC contribution covers all expenses for foreign expert and  $\pm 50\%$  of total cost of the project. Project on appraisal. MMI LE 1001 A1b

**Aid for the Union Nationale de Crédit Coopératif (UNCC).** 1.4 mECU. Line of credit to the UNCC and T.A. T.A.: M. DE CLERCQ (B). MMI LE 1002 A3b

**Primary and secondary schools rehabilitation.** Resp. Auth.: Conseil du Développement et de la Reconstruction (CDR). Estimated total cost 35 mECU. EEC contribu-

tion 16 mECU. Works by acc. tenders with local contractors after prequalifications. Date financing decision March 85. MMI LE 2001 A6a

## ALGERIA

★ **Training for heavy industry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie Lourde(MILD). 3.9 mECU. T.A., training, supply of pedagogical equipment. Project on appraisal. MMI

★ **Training for Ministry of Public Works.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Direction de la Formation. EEC contribution 2.75 mECU. T.A., training, scholarships and supply of pedagogical equipment. Project on appraisal. MMI

## MOROCCO

**Interventions for Laboratoire de Technologie des céréales de Rabat.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 0.790 mECU. Equipment, T.A. and training. Supply by restr. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: short-list already drawn up. MMI MOR 1001 A3e

**Credit for small farmers.** Resp. Auth.: Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole (CNCA). Estimated total cost 33 mECU. EEC contribution 24 mECU. Date financing decision October 84. MMI MOR 2001 A5a

**Vocational and technical training.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement et Formation Professionnelle. EEC contribution 19 mECU. Works in execution. Supplies: 2 int. tender launched in June 85. Trainers training to be done. Date financing decision June or July 85. 5th EDF. MMI MOR 2002 A6d

## TUNISIA

**Participation in creating 3 Training Vocational Centres: in Nabeul, Menzel-Bourguiba, Zaghuan.** Resp. Auth.: O.T.T.E.E.F.P. (Office des Travailleurs Tunisiens à l'Étranger de l'Emploi et de la Formation Professionnelle.) EEC Contribution 3.87 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Supplies: int. tender for Nabeul foreseen in 2nd half '85. T.A.: A.A.B. (D). MMI TUN 1001 A6d

**Purchase of 10 ocean trawlers.** Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Dév. Agricole (BNDA). Estimated total cost 8.5 mECU. EEC 2.25 mECU, EIB 4.55 mECU, Local 1.7 mECU. Project on appraisal. MMI TUN 2003 A3d

**Experimental station to compost household refuse in the city of Tunis.** Special hunger programme. 0.800 mECU. Project in execution. 958-TUN 0001 A2a

**Date-palm plantations study project in Régime Maatoug.** Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Dév. Agricole (B.N.D.A.). 1.9 mECU. Feasibility study, drillings and access roads. Works by direct labour. Project on appraisal. MMI TUN 2001 A3a

**Rural credit project to benefit small holders.** Resp. Auth.: B.N.D.A. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Project on appraisal. MMI TUN 2002 A3a

**Water resources research and training study.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated cost 2.2 mECU. Supply of soil equipment and data system. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. MMI TUN 2004 A2b

**Evaluation of soil resources and their liability to desertification in Southern Tunisia.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Estimated cost 1.2 mECU. EEC 0.500 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. T.A. and training. Supply of specialized equipment. Project on appraisal. MMI TUN 2005 A3c

## JORDAN

**Research Programme into Agricultural Production in the semi-arid zones and areas suffering from desertification.** Special hunger programme. 0.700 mECU. Project in execution. 958-JO 0001 A3a

**Yarmouk University — Faculty of Science.** Resp. Auth.: University of Yarmouk. 2.5 mECU. Supply of equipment for laboratories by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender: short-list done. Project in execution. MMI JO 2001 A6c

**Business training centre at Sahab.** Resp. Auth.: Vocational Training Corporation. 1 mECU Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date estimated for presentation for financing 2nd half 1985. MMI JO 2003 A6a

★ **Faculty of Engineering and Technology, University of Jordan, Phase II.** 2 mECU. Supply of equipment, A.T. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85. MMI JO A6a

## SYRIA

**ISSAT. Institut Supérieur des Sciences Appliquées et de Technologie.** Resp. Auth.: State Planning Commission. Estimated total cost 22.2 mECU. EEC part: supply of teaching and training equipment for the institute. Project on appraisal. MMI SYR 2002 A6b

**Euphrates drainage and irrigation.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Irrigation. General Organization for land development (GOLD). Estimated total cost 134.9 mECU. EEC 10 mECU, EIB 20 mECU, local 104.9 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85. MMI SYR 2003 A3a

**Rural Water Supply Suweida Region.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Administration and Ministry of Housing and Utilities. Estimated total cost 8.1 mECU. EEC 3.2 mECU, local 4.9 mECU. Project in execution. MMI SYR 2001 A2b

# Non-associated developing countries

## ANGOLA

**Assistance to the fishing and fish-processing industry in the Namibe Province.** Resp. Auth.: Ministerio das Pescas. Estimated total cost 7.730 mECU. EEC 6.760 MECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA ANG 8415 A3d

**Rural Water supply.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et des Ressources Naturelles. HYDROMINA. Parallel cofinancing with UNICEF. EEC contribution 2.250 mECU. Study, T.A. and supply of hand-pumps, tubes, drilling equipment, vehicles. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision September 85.  
ALA ANG 8425 A2b

## MOZAMBIQUE

**Rural development in the Moamba District.** Resp. Auth.: Ministerio da Agricultura. Estimated total cost 9.15 mECU. EEC 7.5 mECU. Supply of equipment, rural inputs and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA MOZ 8333 A3a

**Environmental conservation measures: fight against tse-tse infestation.** 1.5 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.  
958-MOZ A3a

## BANGLADESH

**Small-scale irrigation sector project.** Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB). Estimated total cost 82 mECU. EEC contribution 12 mECU. Cofinancing with ADB (Asian Dev. Bank). Works, supply of equipment and vehicles, T.A. and supervision. Works: acc. tender. Supplies: int. tender, 2nd half 85.  
ALA BD 8112 A3a

**Building of storage for fertilizers.** Resp. Auth.: Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC). Cofinancing: EEC and Netherlands. Total cost 4 mECU. EEC 2 mECU Netherlands 2 mECU. EEC part: Works by int. tender. Netherlands part: buildings and T.A.  
ALA BD 8201 A3f

**Rangpur. Rural Development Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Central Coordination Committee. (CCC). Total cost 40 mECU. EEC 27 mECU, NL 7 mECU, local 6 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender or direct agreement. Project on appraisal. Date estimated for presentation for financing 2nd half 85.  
ALA BD A3e

## CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP.)

**Fruit Cultivating and Preservation Techniques.** Estimated total cost 4.350 mECU. EEC 1.650 mECU. Cofinancing with Italy. T.A. and transfer of technology. Project in execution.  
ALA CHN 8337 A3a

**Flood forecasting and management of Beijiing River.** Estimated total cost 5.5 mECU. EEC 1.7 mECU T.A. and transfer of technology. Project in execution.  
ALA CHN 8338 A8g

**Prawn farming development.** Estimated cost 0.700 mECU. Supplies and T.A. Project in execution.  
ALA CHN 8341 A3d

**Hainan Cashew Development.** Resp. Auth.: Prefecture of the Autonomous Department of Li and Miao National Minorities. Estimated total cost 2.350 mECU. EEC 0.800 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution.  
ALA CHN 8340 A3a

**Beijing Vegetable Seedling Production.** Estimated cost 1.2 mECU. Supplies and T.A. Project in execution.  
ALA CHN 8339 A3a

## INDONESIA

**Baturraden Dairy Development.** Resp. Auth.: D.G. for livestock services. Estimated cost: 8.385 mECU. EEC 4.4 mECU, Italy 0.41 mECU. Construction, infrastructure, supply of equipment, T.A. supplies: int. tender launched in May 85. T.A.: IFAGRARIA (I).  
ALA IND 8012 A3a

**Bali Irrigation Sector Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. DG for Water Resources Development. EEC 12 mECU. ADB ± 37 mECU. Local ± 55 mECU. Rehabilitation and expansion of 50 village-level irrigation schemes, establishment of a water-management training centre, and establishment of climatological stations. T.A. Works: acc. tender.  
ALA IND 8114 A3a

**Provincial Irrigation Development (Western and Central Java).** Resp. Auth.: D.G.W.R.D. Estimated total cost 423.6 mECU. EEC 26.3 mECU, World Bank 232.6 mECU, local 164.7 mECU. EEC part: dam construction and T.A.: study, execution project and tender dossier. Project stage: identification.  
ALA IN A3a

## INDIA

**Development of Water Control Systems for diversification of crops in Maharashtra.** Resp. Auth.: Irrigation Department of the Government of Maharashtra. EEC contribution 15 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Date financing decision March 85.  
ALA IN 8418 A3a

## YEMEN

**Seed production centre.** Estimate 7.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date estimated for presentation for financing 2nd half 1985.  
ALA YAR A3a

## PAKISTAN

**Karachi fishing port.** Resp. Auth.: Fishery department of the Sind Province. Estimated cost 12 mECU. New facilities: quay, boat repair yard, fish-shed, dredging. Rehabilitation of existing facilities, equipments and TA. TA: Prof. Dr. Lockner & Partners (D). Works and supplies in 85.  
ALA PAK 8101 A3d

**Irrigation project in Palli and Lehri.** Resp. Auth.: Department of Irrigation and Agriculture Baluchistan Provincial Government. Estimate ± 10 mECU. Works and infrastructures. Studies for the execution and supervision of works. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA PAK 8422 A3a

## NEPAL

**Nepal Administrative Staff College. NASC.** Resp. Auth. NASC Secretariat. Estimated total cost 6.5 mECU. EEC 5 mECU, U.K. 1.5 mECU. Renovation and construction works, supply of equipment and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA NEP 8407 A6b

**Soil and water conservation in Bagmati Watershed.** Special hunger programme. 5.5 mECU. Project in execution.  
958-NEP 8401 A3a

## BHUTAN

**Water supply.** Resp. Auth.: Inter dep. Commission on water and sanitation. Works by direct labour. 4.5 mECU. Supplies int. tender or direct agreement. T.A.: UNICEF. Date for financing July 1985.  
ALA BHU A2b

## THAILAND

**Rubber smallholdings yield improvement.** Resp. Auth.: Rubber Research Centre (RCC). Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. EEC 1.8 mECU, Local 1.8 mECU. To introduce and popularize new tapping techniques to improve the yield of old rubber trees before their felling. TA: Harrison Fleming (UK). Tenders in '85.  
ALA TH 7910 A3a

**Oilseed crop development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture — Oilseed Project Steering Committee. Total estimated cost 4.2 mECU. EEC 3.3 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A.: Short-list already drawn up.  
ALA TH 8203 A3a

**Mae Nam Chi River Basin. Water Management Development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Royal Irrigation Department. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. EEC 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution.  
ALA TH 8412 A3a

**Strengthening of planning capacities for diversification and rural development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 2 mECU. T.A. for coordination, management, training needs, project identification and planning. T.A. for central and peripheral computer system for rural areas. Training and supply of computerized equipment. Date financing decision April 85.  
ALA TH 8420 A3a

#### NICARAGUA — HONDURAS

**Bridges reconstruction.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 3.2 mECU. Reconstruction of 3 bridges. Works, T.A. and site supervision. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA NI 8209 A2d

#### BOLIVIA

**Food strategy. Environment protection.** Special Hunger Programme. Project in execution.  
958-BO 8403 A8f

#### MEMBER COUNTRIES OF PACTO ANDINO

**Technical cooperation (industry and economic planning).** Resp. Auth.: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima-Peru. Estimated total Cost: 1.7 mECU. EEC 1.1 mECU. To place experts, equipment and T.A. and training at Junta's disposal. Contracts, T.A. and experts by the Junta and the EEC.  
ALA JUN 8107 A4a

**Andean Programme for technological development (Rural PADT).** Resp. Auth.: Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Lima-Peru. Estimated total Cost: 7.560 mECU. EEC 3.927 mECU. Supply of equipment, training and T.A. Vehicles purchase: int. tender. T.A.: Short-lists to be drawn up by the EEC and decision by the Junta.  
ALA JUN 8108 A3a

**Regional programme for technical cooperation: food strategy.** Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. EEC contribution 7 mECU for European T.A. and supply of data-computerized equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.  
ALA JUN 8406 B1a

**Regional programme for technical cooperation: industry and sub-regional exchanges.** Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. EEC Contribution 7 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.  
ALA JUN 8503 A4a

#### COSTA RICA — HONDURAS — NICARAGUA — PANAMA — DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

**Latin American qualified nationals reinstatement in 5 Central American countries.** Resp. Auth.: CIM (Comité Intergouvernemental pour les migrations). 1.4 mECU. Reinstatement of 75 qualified nationals via CIM. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA CIM 8302 A8b

#### COLOMBIA

**Reconstruction Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Corporation de Reconstruction de Cauca. Total cost 5.9 mECU. EEC 3.9 mECU. EEC part: supply of materials and T.A. Project in execution.  
ALA CO 8403 A8a

#### BANCO CENTRO-AMERICANO DE INTEGRACION ECONOMICA

**Support for SME in Central America.** Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision 2nd half 85.  
ALA BCI 8414 A4a

#### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

**Integrated rural development pilot project in Western Cibao.** 6 mECU. Special hunger programme. Project in execution.  
958-DO 8402 A3a

#### COSTA RICA

**Productive projects programme for refugees in Costa Rica.** T.A. and line of credit. 3.6 mECU. Project in execution.  
ALA CR 8501 A8b

★ **Integrated rural development of the region of OSA/GOLFITO.** Total cost 21.635 mECU. EEC 9.95 mECU. Supply of equipment, infrastructural works, maintenance, lines of credit and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85.  
ALA CR 8506 A3a

#### PANAMA — COSTA RICA — NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA

★ **Regional programme of technical cooperation for food security.** Resp. Auth.: CADESCA (Comité de accion para el desarrollo economico y social de centroamerica — Panama). Total cost 9.07 mECU. EEC 4.82 mECU, France 0.350 mECU, local 3.9 mECU. T.A. training and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing decision October 85.  
ALA REG A3a

#### NICARAGUA

**Marketing and trade improvement programme and post harvest losses reduction for base seeds.** 2.5 mECU. Project in execution.  
ALA NI 8502 A3f

#### NON-ASSOCIATED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND BODIES ELIGIBLES FROM EEC

**Services provided by outside experts.** Resp. Auth.: Commission of the European Communities. 4 mECU. 1mECU for missions and studies of short duration and 3 mECU for long-term installation of development specialists. Date for financing July 1985.  
ALA REG A1b

## INTERNATIONAL CALLS FOR TENDER

All international calls for tender (int. tenders) referred to in this Operational Summary are notified in due time in the Official Journal (O.J.) of the European Communities' «S» supplement.

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making decisions easier and, ultimately, doing more to improve public health—which must be the intrinsic aim of all we do.

The authors have tried to be as clear as possible without losing any of the requisite scientific rigour. They have highlighted the often logical relationship between the medical and non-medical meanings of the terms explained and included a large number of examples to make the user's job a more pleasant one.

○○○

**Ground water in hard rocks.** Studies and Reports in Hydrology n° 33 — 228 pages — UNESCO, 7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris, France — FF 100 — 1984

This book is intended primarily to fill a gap in the knowledge of ground water hydrology. Current manuals and technical books used by geologists, hydrologists and engineers contain relatively little specific information on the subject of the occurrence, exploration and development of ground water in hard rock areas, that is, mainly igneous and metamorphic rocks of the Precambrian shields areas. On the other hand, a vast amount of research, exploration and development has taken place at random all around the world, in the course of the last 10 or 15 years, with variable results.

The purpose of the book is to inform water resources specialists, physical planners, and water policy decision makers, especially in developing countries, of the possibilities, both real and limited, of finding and developing groundwater resources in what has been previously considered one of the least promising hydrological environments, and to draw their attention to the complexity, sophistication and costs of the technologies involved. While most of the material deals with the scientific and technological of the occurrence of groundwater in hard rock areas and related exploration and development activities, some planning and economic aspects are also considered.

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**Edward D. MILLS — Design for holidays and tourism** — Butterworth Design Series, Butterworths, Borough

Green, Sevenoaks, Kent TN15 8PH — 150 pages — £ 30.00 — 1983

The holiday and tourism industry has enormous growth potential, as working hours get shorter and travel and communication become cheaper and easier.

Holiday travellers are seeking rest and relaxation in increasingly remote and hitherto unspoilt parts of the world, and this is usually welcomed by the host countries, because of the added income and employment opportunities thus created. When tourism invades a new area it can do immense damage, and eventually destroy the very attractions that the tourists wish to enjoy; this is the dilemma of the expansion of tourism.

This book examines the problems, and seeks to offer solutions whereby good design, and an understanding of the problems of building in sensitive areas can help to avoid the destruction caused by visitors and tourists to an area which has not prepared itself for them.

It will be of particular value to architects, planners and local authorities; also promoters of tourism, especially those responsible for historic buildings which suffer from tourism but depend on it for survival. Conservation groups will also find it extremely relevant to their activities.

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**Anne-Marie MUREAU — L'Europe Communautaire dans la négociation Nord-Sud.** (The European Community in North-South negotiations—ambitions, interests and reality.) Preface by

#### THE COURIER

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Edgard Pisani. PUF-Paris — 276 pages — FF 160 — 1984

Is the European Community seeking outside its frontiers the success that seems to be eluding it inside them?

Enjoying a special relationship with the Third World, a world economic power that signed the Lomé Convention, the European Community has, on a number of occasions, attempted to revive interest in a dialogue which was running out of breath. It did so out of ambition and necessity. Ambition to perform a role, to be listened to, to be followed. Necessity of guaranteeing sources of supply of raw materials, to ensure outlets for its products and to maintain its economic presence and political role where they are under threat. But the crisis impelled the Community onto the rockiest ground, setting at naught the vision of imagination and progress that it had always wanted to be. At certain moments of the North-South negotiations, sign of some European independence raised hopes and drew attention, but these were dashed by hesitation and withdrawal under the pressure of more powerful interests.

The question is raised in the book as to whether the Ten will, in the context of the North-South dialogue, display a greater solidarity in trying to solve their institutional and political difficulties, and whether the Third World, which is gradually coming to be a drain on the international exchequer, could become at once the catalyst and the objective of Europe's aspiration towards a more independent existence.

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