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THE HOUSING OF MIGRANT WORKERS :
A CASE OF SOCIAL IMPROVIDENCE ?

Results of the enquiry on the housing conditions
of foreign workers in the European Community

THE HOUSING OF MIGRANT WORKERS: A CASE OF SOCIAL IMPROVIDENCE?

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- Position 1975 -

J. DELCOURT

in cooperation with:

Ch. OTTE-BROZE and A. SPINEUX

This report sets out the results of an inquiry on the housing conditions of migrant workers, carried out by a group of experts coming from all the Member States. These experts have carried out their task quite independently both of the Commission and of national administrations. The synthesis report, therefore, remains entirely the responsibility of its author.

F O R E W O R D

This study on the housing conditions of foreign workers, in particular those who are nationals of Member States, was carried out at the request of the Commission of the European Communities.

This summary report has been drawn up by the coordinator largely on the basis of national reports. A list of these reports and the institutions responsible for drafting and publication may be found on pages 3 and 4.

The aim of the study was to describe "the housing conditions of foreign workers who are nationals of Member or non-Member States with a view to pinpointing the difficulties they may still encounter as compared with national workers, and the reasons for such difficulties".

"In addition, the study was to put forward suggestions regarding the development of an action programme which would help to improve the housing conditions of foreign workers employed in the Member States".

The objectives were, therefore, to observe, interpret and explain housing conditions and propose courses of action designed to improve these conditions.

As regards method, it was specified that data would be collected by "sociological research carried out in the nine member countries of the Community, consisting of a sample survey and a study of objective factors".

This meant that the findings of the questionnaire survey were to be situated and interpreted in the light of facts and statistical data independent of the sample survey.

This sample survey was preceded by a pilot survey which enabled the questionnaire to be tested and the sampling method to be prepared.

The survey (800 respondents per country except Ireland and Italy with 600) was carried out in the nine countries from September 1974 to the end of May 1975. The team of experts from each country submitted its report at the end of December 1975.

In this way, a research operation which would have been impossible without financing by the Commission was completed. However, a comparative survey, involved much more: the agreement and understanding of a group of experts was necessary to make it a joint project in any real sense. In addition

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to language difficulties, there were differences in national conceptions of problems and ways of dealing with them scientifically.

The team of experts included anthropologists, social geographers, psychologists, economists and sociologists. Thus, language difficulties were compounded by differences in scientific terminology caused by the compartmentalization of the respective social sciences. All in all the results were positive: given time and discussion the different or opposing points of view proved to be complementary or mutually enhancing. Whilst not possible to resolve all the contradictions within the group, there can be no doubt that the exchange was valuable to all participants.

It is difficult in a summary report to describe the proceedings of a group without distorting the various insights provided by one member or another. To avoid giving an unfair slant, the reader is advised to refer to the national reports to obtain a better - and more detailed - understanding of the originality of the approach adopted by each expert.

Coordinator,

J. DELCOURT

List of national reports

BELGIUM

V. CAMPANELLI J. DELCOURT CH. OTTE-BROZE A. SPINEUX T. PALASTHY S. PANCIERRA P. DE VUYST	La situation du logement des travailleurs migrants, ressortissants de la Communauté Economique Européenne et des pays tiers.	Université de Louvain, Institut des Sciences du Travail LOUVAIN LA NEUVE (1348) Place Montesquieu, 1

DENMARK

J. BRUUS PEDERSEN E. GUDMUNDSSON G. HOLTEN M.T. DAMSGAARD R. JACOBSEN	Fremmedarbejdernes beoligforhold i Danmark	Institut for Organisation og Arbejdssociologi Handelshøjskolen KØBENHAVN (2000) Howitzvej 60

GERMANY

D. IPSEN H. GLASAUER R. SCHREIECK	Wohnsituation, Wohninteresse und Interessen-organisation ausländischer und deutscher Arbeiter	Institut für Sozialwissens-chaften der Universität Mannheim MANNHEIM (68) Schloss, Gebäude A 5

FRANCE

B. JOUSSELLIN M. TALLARD	Les conditions de logement des travailleurs migrants en France	Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur la Consommation C.R.E.D.O.C. PARIS (75013) 142, rue de Chevaleret

IRELAND

B.J. WHELAN J.G. HUGHES	A survey of returned and intending emigrants in Ireland	Economic and Social Research Institute DUBLIN (4) 4, Burlington Road

ITALY

A. SIGNORELLI M. Cl. TIRITICCO E. AMODIO S. ROSSI A. MARINARI G. NIGOSANTI	L'alloggio dei lavoratori migranti	Istituto di Sociologia, Università degli Studi di Urbino URBINO 39, via Bramante

LUXEMBOURG

M. BARNICH	Les conditions de logement des travailleurs migrants au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg	Commissariat de l'Immigration LUXEMBOURG 42, rue Glesener

NETHERLANDS

S.G.M. VERKOREN-HEMELAAR M. DE SMIDT	Onderzoek Huisvesting Buitenlandse Werknemers in de Europese Gemeenschap, deelonderzoek Nederland	Geografisch Instituut, Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht UTRECHT Heidelberglaan, 2

UNITED KINGDOM

D. CLARK V. KARN	Study on the housing conditions of migrant workers in Britain	Center for Urban and Regional Studies University of Birmingham BIRMINGHAM (B 29 7 DF) Selly Wick Road

SUMMARY

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CHAPTER 1: DIMENSIONS AND GROWTH OF FOREIGN WORK-FORCE IN THE EEC

A description of housing conditions for migrant workers in EEC countries, whether they be nationals of member countries or from outside, cannot be limited to an analysis of whether the buildings are in good or bad condition whether they are comfortable or uncomfortable or whether they have good or defective sanitation. Primary importance appeared to us to attach to the identification of the fundamental determinants of these conditions.

On this first chapter and the following ones, we propose to do this by emphasising the connexion, which exists between the housing conditions for migrant workers on the one hand, and on the other, their arise characteristics and the changes in their numbers.

The appreciable increase in 1965-73 in the number of migrant workers in the EEC countries was due to the considerable economic growth in Western Europe during the past 10 years. An additional explanation lies in the various conditions of underdevelopment prevailing in the "emigration countries" from which the manpower came.

Since 1974, however, measures have been taken in all the Community countries to limit the number of migrant workers admitted. One of the main causes for this limitation undoubtedly lay in the economic crisis from which western European countries are suffering, though conditions have also changed in various other ways. It is, nevertheless, a remarkable fact that the official stoppage of migration has not seriously affected the migrant manpower originating from the EEC countries.

It is an open question whether the ending of immigration can be regarded as permanent, so that the housing problems can be taken as settled for good. An attempt to find an answer to this is made in part 4 of the present chapter.

1. Immigration of migrant workers into the EEC

1.1. The number of migrant workers

According to figures put forward by the statistics division of the EEC, and the estimates of C.M.O.S. (continuous migration observation system, known also by its French initials S.O.P.E.M.I.) the number of migrant workers in EEC countries in 1975, including both Community nationals and those from other countries, was 6,119,797. The peak had been in 1974, when the number of these migrants was around 6.5 million.

The Italian contingent headed the list with more than 700,000 workers in the other Community countries. Next came the Turks (610,000) followed by Portuguese (574,000), Yugoslavs (493,000), Spanish (479,000), Algerians (445,000), Greeks (266,000), and Moroccans (190,000).

In the United Kingdom, using statistical estimates dating from 1971, there were 558,000 migrants of Commonwealth origin and another 452,000 from Ireland.

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Table 1. Migrant workers in EEC countries - 1975

Country of immigration / Date: -	Germany (1) 30-6-75	Belgium (1) 1974 av.(2) (2)	Denmark (1) 1-1-75	France (1) 1-1-75	Luxembourg (1) 1974 av. (2)	Netherlands (1) 15-9-75	United Kingdom (1) 1971	Ireland (1) 1975	Italy (1) 1971(av)	Total	%
Country of emigration:											
Portugal	70,520	4,000(a)	204	475,000	11,800	2,534	10,000	12	631	574,701	9,39
Spain	129,817	34,000	714	265,000	1,900	8,929	37,000(R)	18	2,006	479,384	7,83
Italy	297,079	90,000	809	230,000	10,400	9,000(B)	72,000(R)	216	—	709,504	11,59
Yugoslavia	418,745	3,000	4,627	50,000	600	7,926	4,000(a)	4	4,103	493,005	8,06
Greece	203,629	6,000	451	5,000	—	828	50,000	6	768	266,682	4,36
Turkey	553,217	10,000	5,693	25,000	—	22,203	3,000	40	317	619,470	10,12
Finland	5,000(2)	—	—	1,000(2)	—	—	1,000(2)	—	—	7,000	0,11
Morocco	16,298	30,000	824	130,000	—	11,835	2,000	—	—	190,957	3,12
Algeria	1,407	3,000	179	440,000	—	—	600	—	—	445,186	7,27
Tunisia	15,000(2)	2,000(a)	83	70,000	—	854	200	—	—	88,137	1,44
Others (incl. EEC)	360,023	48,000	27,616	214,000	20,600	51,391	1,486,205(B)	1,631	36,305	2,245,771	36,70
Total	2,070,735	230,000	41,200	1,905,000	45,300	115,500	1,666,005	1,927	44,130	6,119,797	100,00

Sources: (1) Internal EEC document: Employment of foreign workers (April 1976)
(2) C.M.O.S. - Report for 1975 (published by OECD).

Notes

R = rectified figure

Belgium: (1) Excluding frontier workers
(2) Including unemployed - estimate by Employment and Labour Ministry.

(a) Estimates of European Coordination Bureau

Denmark: (1) Excluding frontier workers and those from Scandinavian cap countries.

Germany: (1) Excluding frontier workers
(2) C.M.O.S. estimate (1975 report)

France: (1) Excluding frontier workers
(2) Estimates by Social Affairs Ministry

Ireland: (1) Excluding United Kingdom nationals

Italy: (1) Excluding frontier workers
(a) Estimate of European Coordination Bureau

Luxembourg: (1) Including frontier workers

Netherlands: (1) Including Belgian and German frontier workers
(b) Estimate by European Coordination Bureau as of the end of of 1974

United Kingdom: (1) Estimates of active foreign population born abroad by Ministry of Employment from 1971 census figures
(a) Estimates by European Coordination Bureau
(B) Including 631 workers born in Commonwealth countries.
(2) C.M.O.S. estimate (1975 report).

Table 1.1. UNITED KINGDOM - Active population born abroad - (from 1971 census)

Irish	452,000 (R)	Spanish	37,000 (R)
Australian))		Polish	78,000
Canadian,) New Zealand)	73,000	U S A	49,000
Other Commonwealth	558,000 (R)	U S S R	33,000
German	71,000 (R)	Others	208,005
Italian	72,000 (R)		1,666,005
Other EEC	35,000 (R)		

Source: Internal EEC document: Employment of foreign workers; April 1976
(R) = rectified figure

Table 2 shows the number of foreign workers in each country in 1975, and the proportion of these coming from outside the EEC.

It shows that the immigration from outside countries has predominated in practically every case, excepting only Luxembourg, where it represents 35,3% of the total and Belgium (43,5%). Immigration from outside sources is greatest in France (84,3% of the total), followed by Germany (79,2%), Denmark (68,8%), the United Kingdom (62,2%) and the Netherlands (56,9%).

Italy and Ireland are not normally regarded as outlets for immigrant manpower.

Table 2 - Distribution of foreign manpower in EEC countries 1975

Countries	Basis date I	Foreign manpower from: EEC II	Others III	Total foreign manpower IV	Col. III as % of col. IV	Foot-note refer
Fed. Germany	30-6-75 (1)	431,641	1,639,094	2,070,735	79,2	(1)
Belgium	1974 av. (1) (2)	130,000	100,000	230,000	43,5	(1) (2)
Denmark	1-1-75 (1)	12,851	28,349	41,200	68,8	(1)
France	1-1-75 (1) (2)	300,000	1,605,000	1,905,000	84,3	(1) (2)
Ireland	1971	35,527	6,876	42,403	19,4	(1)
Italy	1971 av.	18,100(a)	26,030	44,130	59,0	(1) (a)
Luxembourg	1974 av.(1)	29,300	16,000	45,300	35,3	(1)
Netherlands	15-9-75 (1)	49,800(B)	65,700	115,500	56,9	(1) (B)
United Kingdom	1971 (1)	630,000	1,036,005	1,666,005 (B)	62,2	(1) (B)
EEC	-	1,639,219	4,523,054	6,160,273	73,8	

Sources: - Internal EEC document. Employment of foreign workers, April 1976
- C.M.O.S. - 1975 Report (OECD Publication)

Notes: Germany: (1) Including frontier workers
Belgium: (1) Including unemployed, but excluding frontier workers
(2) Estimate by Employment and Labour Ministry

Denmark: (1) Excluding frontier workers and workers from Scandinavian countries cap

France: (1) Excluding frontier workers
(2) Estimates by Social Affairs Ministry

Italy: (1) Excluding frontier workers
(a) Estimates of European Coordination Bureau

Luxembourg: (1) Including frontier workers

Netherlands: (1) Including Belgian and German frontier workers
(B) End-1974 estimate by European Coordination Bureau

United Kingdom: (1) Estimates relate to active foreign population born abroad made by Employment Ministry using 1971 census figures
(B) Including 631,000 workers born in Commonwealth countries.

Table 3 shows the number of foreign workers in civilian employment in each Community country in relation to total population, total foreign population and the total numbers employed.

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TABLE 3. Population and civilian employment in EEC countries 1974, distinguishing foreign population and manpower (1974 averages, or figures for 30-6-74)

COUNTRIES	Total foreign manpower	Total civilian wageearners II	Total foreign population III	Total national population IV	Col. I % of col. II	Col. I as % of col.III	Col. III as % of col. IV
Fed.Germany	2,177,000(2)	21,626,000	4,127,000(a)	62,100,000	10.1	52,8	6,6
Belgium	217,000 (a) (1)	3,164,000	775,000(b)	9,800,000	6,9	28,0	7,9
Denmark	36,000	1,995,000	55,000	5,000,000	1,8	65,5	1,1
France	1,900,000 (a)	17,108,000	4,043,000 (a)	52,500,000	11,1	47,0	7,7
Ireland	42,403 (d)	1,119,531	137,296 (4)	2,978,248	3,8	30,9	4,6
Italy	44,000(3)	13,437,000	176,000(a)	55,400,000	0,3	25,0	0,3
Luxembourg	45,000	127,000	73,000(a)	360,000	35,4	61,6	20,3
Netherlands	119,000(a)	3,860,000	297,000	13,500,000	3,1	40,1	2,2
United Kingdom	1,665,000(e) (3)	22,790,000	2,274,000	56,100,000	7,3	73,2	4,1
EEC total	6,245,403	85,226,531	11,957,296	257,738,248	7,3	52,2	4,6

Sources: National series as published by Statistics Office of European Communities General statistics, Monthly Bulletin No. 4/1974
The data concerning foreign manpower were supplied by the National employment departments, in virtue of articles 14 and 19 of regulation No. 1612/68 relating to the free movement of workers.
P.WATHELET: "Les travailleurs migrants, phénomène de rencontre entre Wallonie et Europe". Colloque Wallonie et Europe. Louvain-La-Neuve, April 1975.

Notes

(1) Belgium: excluding foreign unemployed. The increase over previous years is probably due to regularisation measures affecting work contracts registered during 1974.

(2) Germany: the 1974 figure of foreign workers is that recorded as of end-September.

(3) Italy and United Kingdom: the most recent official figure of foreign workers was published in respect of 1971. The Commission analysis has taken the same figure as applicable to subsequent years.

(a) estimates

(b) estimates by the Commission based on data supplied by member countries for purposes of the Social Survey, 1974

(c) United Kingdom: active population including nationals of Commonwealth countries.

Foreign manpower in 1974 held 7.3% of the jobs in civilian employment. The figure was as high as 35.4% in Luxembourg, was above 10% in Germany and France and 7.3% in the United Kingdom. In the other countries the proportion was below the Community average.

The preponderance of workers in the foreign-born population is evident from the high proportion of the foreign population which is actually working. This proportion is highest in the United Kingdom (73.2%), while the Danish and Luxembourg figures are 65.5% and 61.6% respectively and Germany 52.8%. In the other countries there was a higher proportion of dependants among the total migrant population, or at any rate a higher proportion of immigrants not included as holders of employment contracts. Italy is the country with the smallest proportion of wage-earners among its foreigners (25%). After this come Belgium (28%), Ireland (30.9%) and the Netherlands (40.1%), while for France the proportion is 47%. The countries in which wage-earning workers form the biggest proportion of the foreign population are those most likely to recruit their immigrant workers from countries outside the Common Market.

1.2. The clandestines and the irregulars

The above data do not take into account seasonal migrants, nor cases of irregularity resulting from the fact that some people evade frontier control on entry: there are the clandestine immigrants. There are others holding permits as residents or visitors who prolong their stay beyond the time allowed, and yet others who go beyond the time limits authorised in their work permits. These cases of clandestine or irregular immigration, remain wholly outside the official count.(1)

(1) Alfred SAUVY and Jacques HOUDAILLE "L'immigration clandestine dans le monde in Population, July-October 1974; EUROFORUM, La politique de l'emploi dans les pays de la Communauté en 1975, Nos. 16/76 - 24.4.76, annexe 1. pp. 1 - 11, extracted from the Exposé sur l'évolution de la situation sociale dans les Communautés en 1975 (Brussels-Luxembourg, April 1976 pp. 44-54)

These clandestine workers exist only because they find employers who are seeking to avoid some of the costs of recruitment and to reduce their labour costs.

At, and just after the time when the immigration of workers was being suspended in several EEC countries in 1974, operations of "regularisation" in France resulted in 38,500 cases being legalized. In June 1975, a "mission for the protection of migrant workers" was appointed, under the direct responsibility of the Secretary of State dealing with immigrant workers. Its task is to coordinate the policies of various government departments combatting the traffic in manpower and the illegal employment of foreign workers, to collect information on the subject and to make proposals for improvements in penal and labour legislation. Two Bills (2) have just been adopted by the French Parliament. The first of these strengthens the powers for dealing with clandestine immigration and seeks to remedy the employment of foreigners with no work authorisations as scheduled by law, which was a main cause of such immigration. The second supplements the 1973 law on collective housing, seeking to put an end to the often scandalous conditions which forced a large section of the working population (including many immigrant workers) to live in lodging-house accommodation. It gives public authorities legal powers and material resources to re-house at short notice workers living in insanitary or overcrowded conditions. Both laws thus arise from the same desire — to provide better protection for foreign workers.

In Germany, the number of illegal entries of workers without working permits is estimated at between 150,000 and 350,000, or between 5% and 12% of the total number of foreign workers. This includes a great number of Turkish workers. To combat illegal immigration, new legislation came into force on 1st July 1975, providing heavy penalties.

In Belgium, the number of foreigners working illegally is estimated at 70,000, of which 20,000 are in Brussels. In July 1975, measures to clean up the position were taken and about 8,000 cases have been put in order.

In the Netherlands, too, a number of cases were regularised during 1975 (11,000 in the year up to mid-November).

The clandestine or illegal immigration of workers is thus quite an important factor. As will attempt to explain its evolution at a later stage, but it is obvious that the increase in immigration in recent years was due to the relaxation of controls and coincided with substantial manpower shortages.

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(2) Law No. 76.621 of 10 July 1976 (J.O. of 11 July)
Law No. 76.632 of 13 July 1976 (J.O. of 14 July).

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This increase was making for intolerable conditions in both employment and housing but the economic crisis, and the strict controls imposed, have now reduced its impact. Since even the migrant whose papers are in order finds housing conditions which often the lowest possible standards of comfort and cleanliness, it is easy to imagine what things must be like for the clandestine worker, with the constant fear of police raids and orders for summary conveyance to the frontier. These workers are thus wide open to blackmail by unscrupulous traffickers, and wholly dependent on the goodwill of landlords who are themselves liable to criminal prosecution for aiding and abetting illegal residents. One of the results is a level of rentals wholly out of proportion to what is provided.

1.3. Growth in foreign manpower

The figure of 6.1 million migrant workers in the EEC countries is thus only an estimate, but it is nevertheless impressive. It is the cumulative result of the growing number of regular or regularised entries recorded in the 1969-75 period (see table 4). In and after 1974, the fall in numbers has been exceedingly sharp, indicating a radical change in immigration policy in all Community countries.

Table 4 - Number of permanent foreign workers admitted to certain EEC countries 1965-75 (thousand)

Countries	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 (6mon (thsx2)
Germany	525.0	425.0	152.0	391.0	646.0	713.8	570.2	479.7	520.0	140.0	22.6
Belgium	32.0	24.0	12.0	8.0	8.0	4.3	4.7	4.5	5.8	6.1	4.5
France	152.0	135.0	108.0	97.0	168.0	174.2	136.0	18.0	132.0	64.4	24.8
Nether-lands	31.0	36.0	12.0	19.0	28.0	37.6	38.0	20.4	21.9	22.9	17.4
4 coun-tries total	740.0	620.0	284.0	515.0	850.0	929.9	748.9	602.6	679.7	223.4	69.3

Sources: - B. KAYSER, Les retours conjoncturels des travailleurs migrants. OECD, 1972, p.7

- P. WATHELET, Les travailleurs migrants, phénomène de rencontre entre la Wallonie et l'Europe, Symposium at Louvain-la-Neuve, April 1975. Annexe: table 3

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Table 5 shows the number of permanent workers newly entering some of the countries of the European Community. Over the four years 1970-73 the total is more than 3 million. The Table also shows the effect of the free movement of workers, which increases the proportion of migrants originating from Community countries by comparison with those from outside. This is because immigration from Community countries could not be subjected to a cessation order unlike immigration from outside countries.

Table 5 brings out the magnitude of the fall in these admissions. The 1974 total is lower than the previous year by 453,000; and the estimates for 1975, based on the first six months of the year, put the total at only 116,000.

TABLE 5 - Number of permanent workers newly entering EEC countries (1)

New migrants entered		of which: from EEC countries	
1970	946,000	205,000 =	22%
1971	767,000	197,000 =	26%
1972	623,000	195,000 =	31%
1973	738,000	228,000 =	31%
4 years:	3,074,000	825,000 =	27%
1974	285,000	122,000 =	43%
1975 (est)	116,000	-	-

Source: Internal EEC document V/51/75-S
Employment of foreign workers 1976, p. 34

2. Reasons for the migration boom

The remarkable rise in the number of migrant workers in the EEC had its roots in the continuous and accelerating economic growth in Western Europe during the years up to 1973. Another cause was the spectacular development in infrastructural construction needed for the purpose of full employment, as well as for economic growth and for the social well-being of populations. Indeed, the execution of these infrastructural contracts called for a reserve of foreign manpower, particularly since the local populations in the active age works are growing only slowly, and since local workers aspire to employment in other sectors.

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Without the migrant workers, the economic growth of Western Europe would have been checked, as would the sectoral and occupational mobility of national workers who seek steady jobs and wages in sheltered or expanding industries, offering satisfactory working conditions and better chances of promotion. Without the migrant workers expansion would have been nipped in the bud and the structural changes would have been more painful, because they would have happened more quickly and run deeper.

Immigrant workers enable a country to maintain and expend the industries which are fundamental to growth -- mining, steel-making, construction and transport. They are necessary because of the sensitivity and local knowledge of the national workers, who are quick to turn their backs on industries in structural decline, and on work which is unhealthy, dangerous, unduly heavy or dirty. They tend, too, to avoid unduly repetitive or automated types of work and to avoid industries unduly subject to swings in business conditions or those which require irregular hours or night work, and all forms of service and domestic work in homes or institutions. The more exacting preference in the work requirements of the national workers are largely due to the considerable rise in educational levels since the last war.

Manpower shortages have thus arisen as a result of economic growth, structural change and infrastructural policies, coupled with deep-seated alterations in the aspirations of the people. These shortages have affected industries which are economically or strategically vital and others which were already in decline; and the coming of migrant workers, whose requirements are usually less stringent, inevitably lightened the burden which would have fallen on the State. On the other hand, the very coming of the migrants to such industries tends to hasten the departure of local workers. This is the only possible explanation of the large number of jobs for which no applicants can be found among the national workers.

It is not enough, however, to say that migrant workers may be needed in industries affected by a conjunctural upswing or a structural down-turn. Such an explanation tends to mask or make light of other explanations based on conditions in the worker's own country.

In many of these countries there are underdeveloped areas where unemployment or under-employment is endemic and others where there are pockets of political resistance to widely different types of regime. This naturally makes for a good response to EEC manpower recruitment. The main explanation for the high level of migration lies, however, in the general state of underdevelopment, and most of all in the comparatively low wages, even when there are jobs to be had.

The immigration policies of EEC countries purport to adjust the flow of manpower to requirements for it and give regulative body to the will of sovereign States. Yet once a migratory flow has been established, it has a way of continuing of its own accord, wholly or partly escaping the regulation which are supposedly well known and respected by potential migrants, and in theory enforced by public authorities and employers. In actual fact any regulation tends to give rise to practices which may

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or may not comply with it, irrespective of any legal sanctions involved. Moreover, in day-to-day practice, rules and regulations can be simply ignored or by passed, both by individuals and by public or private authorities.

In the course of this research, a number of specialists pointed to the contrast between politically declared intentions and the results effectively attained. They also suggested that we should distinguish between the laws and regulation themselves, and the precedents and unofficial practices which are often better guides to the actual immediate interests of the various parties affected.

For example, the governments of the European Community have made reasonably clear pronouncements as to whether their immigration policies are moved by economic or by demographic considerations, and as to the volume of such immigration they consider acceptable (3). In Belgium, for example, as soon as demographic motives began to colour immigration policy, a definite increase was noted in the proportion of unmarried migrants. No doubt this was because the primary (or nearest) reserves of migrant workers had dried up or been closed.

Moreover, individuals and groups are sometimes helped and sometimes hindered by these national policies. Firms and employers with urgent needs for manpower are hostile, both to the protectionist and restrictive practices adopted by workers from their own nations, and to the restrictive practices adopted by workers from their own nations, and to the restrictions provided in the immigration laws. It is worth mentioning, in this connexion, that in the countries from which the workers come, there are a number of unofficial recruiting offices. In the same way there are migrants who, whether by invitation or on their own initiative, arrive in the host countries and set up a bridgehead, through which they bring in their parents, their friends and their neighbours. Thus, the combined effect of the distinction between various types of residents and work permits provided in the national policies and the tactics of the various social actors involved, is to set up in law or in fact a multiplicity of migrant categories enjoying greater or less degrees of privilege and suffering greater or less "persecution". The problems encountered by migrants, especially with regard to housing, depend directly on the category into which they fall.

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(3) Migration for demographic reasons may:
- give rise to the formation of colonies of population, as in Australia;
- do away with a decline in birth-rates, as was the case in Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg; or
- occasion or accentuate a population decline, as in Ireland (as opposed to Italy, where birth-rates continue to rise).

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3. The halt in migration

In all Community countries, measures have been adopted since the end of 1973 to restrict the entry of migrant workers. These are motivated by the economic crisis, and the fact that the unemployment rate among migrant workers is higher than the national average in pratically all EEC countries.

In Germany, immigration from non-Community countries was almost totally stopped in 1975. In the first nine months of the year there were about 17,000 admissions, among whom 5,300 were workers from countries with which Federal Germany has labour agreements. The high level of unemployment(at the end of September 1975, 113,000 migrant workers were unemployed) caused the number of foreign workers to fall to about 2,100,000 by the end of the third quarter, or half-a-million less than in September 1973.

In Belgium, the authorities blocked all immigration throughout 1975, except for specific jobs. Only 3,138 work permits were issued to new immigrants from countries outside the EEC. These were for skilled jobs, or for members of families authorised to join a worker holding a work permit of unlimited duration in the class valid for all occupations.

In Denmark, an earlier decision to stop all immigration except that from Scandinavian and Community countries was kept in force throughout 1975.

The French authorities also continued through 1975 the prohibition of immigration from non-community sources. During the first nine months of the year 11,551 permits were issued, three-quarters of which were regularisations. As from 1st July 1975, however, the immigration of workers'families was again authorised.

In Luxembourg, for the first time for some years, lack of jobs caused a definite setback in labour immigration, the only admissions being workers with a genuine skill or qualification. It is worth noting that Luxembourg has practically no non-European workers.

In the Netherlands, 1975 saw a 50% increase in immigration from Surinam; but apart from this, the immigration policy was restrictive. It is based on controlling foreign workers, both when they enter the country and when they take up jobs.

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The United Kingdom also operates immigration control, but this goes back to 1962. Some commentators ascribe the country's difficulty in sustaining continuous economic growth to its drastic immigration control, (4) presumably on account of the racial problems which have arisen (5). The opposite explanation may also be true — for recessions may bring racist reactions and set up a need for immigration control.

An analysis will be given later of the many causes underlying the slackening trend in immigration and the decisions to restrict it. The present problem is whether this may be regarded as the definite end of immigration; and if so, whether it means the housing problems are finally solved. As we shall now attempt to show, no interpretation could be more uncertain or less true.

4. A temporary or a permanent halt?

The economic crisis is, without doubt, one of the main causes for the abrupt halt in immigration in all the EEC countries. As an explanation, however, it is evidently incomplete, because there are many other factors and tendencies which play a determining rôle. The fact that the stoppage was virtually complete implies that peoples'perception of their interests had altered due to changes that had taken place quite apart from the crisis. To begin with, the free movement of manpower inside the EEC provides a standing reserve — not indeed of labourers, but of workers who can be quickly trained to skilled level. In recent years the migrant manpower from the EEC countries has been growing faster than that from outside countries, and it has not been affected by the official stoppage of immigration.

Up to about 1960, too, most of the new investment was for Europe's economic reconstruction; but after this, it tended to be for rationalising production and developing infrastructure. The necessary reserve of foreign manpower was all the bigger because of the manpower shortages in industries which were being abandoned by native workers. The completion of these types of investment leads to the current level of unemployment, which results from rationalising manpower utilization. Some experts are even now predicting that the end of the crisis will not bring a major fall in unemployment. Is this not another way of saying that a manpower reserve will have been reconstituted inside the system itself?

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(4) See: Western Europe's migrant workers — Minority Rights Group, London.
V. KARN and D. CLARK, Study of Migrant Workers (University of Birmingham, Centre for urban and regional studies) — September 1975.
An explanation is advanced for the mitigation of this restrictive policy by the Immigration Act, 1971.

(5) Stephen CASTLES and Godula KOSACK. The Function of Labour Immigration in Western European Capitalism. The New Left Review, May-June 1972 - pp. 3-22.

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Moreover, the active population of today is being augmented by the more numerous generations of children born after the war. These recruits to the labour market are the successors to the slump in births in 1930-45. The changed attitude towards excessive immigration is also caused by a certain xenophobia among local populations who are alarmed at unduly large colonies of foreigners, at the emerging cultural gaps and at the potential competition in the labour market.

Yet another explanation of the reversal of immigration policies and the current prohibitions lies in the growing tendency, for the foreign manpower to organise. Immigrants have become more fastidious about their working, housing and living conditions, and still more about the scantiness or absence of political and trade union rights. In recent years, there have been a number of significant events. Strikes have been led by foreigners; rent strikes have broken out in homes for unmarried workers (e.g. in France). Local groupings have been set up, as have various movements and pressure groups seeking to adjust the status of migrant workers and foreigners in general. In Belgium, the elections to the local consultative committees for immigrants resulted in considerable advances lug the forces of the extreme left and extreme right. This was proof enough of the mobilisation capacity in this section of the working population which consists both of Community and of non-Community immigrants (6).

Pressure for clarifying a new immigration policy could rise through the prospect of Community elections in 1978. In various highly industrialized areas, the migrant workers account for over 20% of the working population; and the recognition of their voting rights, at whatever level, would doubtless lead to definite political representation for such workers in Community countries. It is by no means sure that this additional weight in the political scale would leave the existing balance undisturbed (7).

These considerations are leading the various bodies responsible for immigration policy to produce a clear definition of the place and function of migrant workers in our economic system.

Lastly, it would be a mistake to underestimate the recent and future reactions of the country from which the migrant manpower originates. These countries have become increasingly aware of the social cost of emigration, its consequences for their own development, the counter-requirements they can put forward in this connexion and the value of the migrants as a political stake in discussions with the host countries. It is likely that the countries from which the workers emigrate will in future seek

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(6) V. CAMPANELLI and J. DELCOURT, Nomadisme institué. Statut et habitat des migrants en Belgique, Ed. C.E.R.S.E., Brussels 1976.

(7) Manuel CASTELLS, Travailleurs immigrés et lutte de classes, in Politique aujourd'hui, March-April 1975, pp. 5-27.
CEDETIM, Les Immigrés, Contribution à l'histoire politique de l'immigration en France (Lutter, Stock 2, Paris 1975).
D. IPSEN et al. Wohnsituation, Wohninteressen une Täteressenorganisation ausländischer und Deutscher Arbeiter, Mannheim University, 1975.

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to insist on more social clauses in the arrangement, providing for the training and occupational promotion of the migrants, job security, suitable housing, protection of savings, permission for families to accompany workers and the fixing of terms for their return.

In addition to these clauses there will be others calling for benefits under a number of heads, including the provision of equipment and the setting up of production and employment units in the countries of origin of the migrants. Looking ahead we can see how phrases such as "imported labour" and "immigration policy" will give place to the concept of "cooperation" and "general cooperation policy".

The new conditions do not imply that the block on immigration will necessarily be maintained, though it is quite probable it will remain in force for quite a long time (8).

There are some who think large-scale immigration has come to an end, and we have reached the phase of reexporting our imported manpower, or at any rate that part of it originating from outside countries and not enjoying the freedom of movement provided for EEC workers. Alternatively, this new phase may be one where here is no question of increasing the number of immigrants, but rather of making more rational use of those we already have. In any case we are coming into a period where changes in our migration policy will be necessary, where we will have to define it in general terms and allow for its causes and consequences, both to the emigration countries and to the hosts. In our view, these two groups of countries should meet and discuss the points of convergence and divergence of interest.

4.1. Suspension or repatriation

The radical course of sending home the foreigners, or even the long-term blocking of further entries, scarcely seems realistic. Reexporting the manpower would at once be stigmatised as the export of unemployment from the European countries and the transfer of its costs to the countries from which the workers came.

Moreover, the foreign workers are also consumers; and the advocates of their repatriation sometimes overlook the fall in demand and the possible collapse of consumer goods industries which might follow their departure and exacerbate the existing crisis. They tend, also, to ignore the place which immigrant workers occupy in the structure of national employment. Migrants were recruited for industries in which national

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(8) B. JOUSSELIN and M. TALLARD, Les conditions de logement des travailleurs en France. (Study by CREDOC, Paris, commissioned by the EEC 1975).

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manpower shortages had become chronic, because the local workers were seeking other jobs in expanding industries with more attractive working conditions and better chances of promotion.

Such proposals, also leave out of consideration the many contributions the migrant workers have made, not only to economic growth and to the level of production and consumption, but also their tax payments and contributions to the social security funds, and by making use of property which had lost its value in the eyes of nationals. Another factor overlooked is the real effect of the "political weightlessness" of the migrants, whose enforced political silence deprives the working class of part of its political influence.

The acceptance of such a plan would imply that future bottlenecks in the labour market could be dealt with, and that a solution would at the same time be provided for the labour problems arising in the countries outside the Common Market to which the workers were repatriated. All this would call for large investments and massive transfers of capital and productive capacity to the countries from which the migrants came. Of course, the export of capital to the borders of the Mediterraneen might be necessary for reasons of European military security.

In fact, the termination of immigration and the reexportation of the migrants and their families, would be possible only subject to certain conditions for which the political will and means are lacking.

Any such policy must presuppose a basic restructuring of the nation's means of production; and at least as far-reaching would be the restructuring of the machinery of State. The policy of supproting law profit industries (e.g. the mines, infrastructure, construction work and social housing) would become much more costly and would have to be cut back if migrant workers were to desappear.

A strict and continuous policy of closing the frontiers to new arrivals of migrant workers would imply not only the transfer of productive capacity abroad (i.e. to the migrants'countries of origin) but also the adoption of new labour-saving technologies at home. It would call also for the restructuring of public works policy; additional job-enrichment programmes (9); a considerable reduction in working hours (so as to bring in the national manpower reserves) and major wage increases for workers brought back into the industries which had been abandoned. A complete stoppage of immigration would set up strains in the labour market and very tough policies would be needed to resolve them otherwise than by spectacular wage increases.

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(9) Robert TAYLOR, The Volvo way of work, in "New Society", 15 April 1976 pp. 125-126.

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It thus seems that the right course for the EEC countries, rather than adopt a radical policy with all its drastic effects, would be to consider modifying their policy towards workers'immigration.

4.2. Modifications in Migration policy

Massive recourse to immigrant manpower is likely to be avoided in the future. It is probable, indeed, that the 1970-73 average of 700,000 new entries a year will never be repeated. Neither the trade unions nor public opinion would again accept any such lack of coordinated management. Even for employers, immigration brings no more than a temporary relief to the labour market strains, so that it is in no sence a permanent solution. In the longer term, immigration seems to cause enormous social problems, and to lead us into a blind alley.

Already the Common Market countries are looking for a way of securing control of the migration flows, since this is seen as the only way of ensuring acceptable reception and housing standards for those concerned. But a strict control over immigration does not automatically solve the problems, even though it may reduce their size and make it possible to deal with them. Control in itself is not enough, especially if the goals of the policy are not clearly defined.

In practice, the targets of an immigration policy may be purely economic or they may be both economic and demographic. For short-term economic purposes — i.e. for dealing with swings in the business cycle — countries prefer to encourage the immigration of single or unaccompanied men for periods subject to definite limits, depending on the immediate needs of a region or industry.

Immigration, may, however, also be intended as a way of ensuring population growth. In such cases measures are taken for workers'families to come with them. Such a policy is appropriate when the shortage of manpower is thought to be endemic.

The official policies of the European nations indicates that each has opted for one or other of the main alternatives.

Luxembourg, for example, is the country most definitely committed to a policy of family immigration. Recruitment is carried out in only a small number of countries, and the number of non-europeans among the migrants is lower than elsewhere. Federal Germany, on the other hand, aims at the temporary immigration of unaccompanied men, preferably

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unmarried. The policy of the Netherlands is very similar. The policy of France is the most ambiguous or flexible; for it has, over a long period, operated one immigration policy for bachelors and another for families. In this country the recent prohibition of workers'immigration is practically complete, but the restrictions on the entry of families were lifted after only a few months. There was only a very slight decline in family immigration in 1974, by comparison with previous years. This reflects the political desire to stabilise a contingent of immigrant workers who are likely to be needed in their present jobs for a long time to come.

This first modification of the policy objectives corresponds in practice with the interests of the different countries. Both in Luxembourg and in Belgium the age structure of the population is characterized by various gaps which it is sought to make good through the immigration policy.

In Federal Germany and the Netherlands, on the other hand, policy is primarily concerned with employment problems, in terms of business cycles and the labour force available. In neither country is there a serious population problem. In the Netherlands the birth-rate has been very high for a long time; and in Western Germany there has long been a considerable inflow of population from East Germany. The position in Denmark is similar to that in these two countries. In the United Kingdom the strict control of immigration is partly accounted for by the cacial problems which arise from the immigration of coloured persons, mainly from Asia. In consequence the entry of workers and their dependents is strictly controlled. The reuniting of families is limited because, in the last resort, this might hinder migrants in returning home.

The above are the main types of possible immigration policies, and the choices that the European countries seem, from official policy statements so far made, to have adopted. The distinguishing feature is whether the manpower requirement is temporary or structural.

In practice the temporary or more permanent character of a migrants entry depends on a great number of factors. Important among these are the degree of permanence in the job assigned to him, his job security and the stability as a resident to which it entitles him.

One way on another, quite a lot of the immigrants always end up, by settling permanently in the host country. Moreover, labour requirements, originally thought to be temporary, have a way of becoming permanent as time goes on. Insofar as the jobs given to the immigrants are those for which sufficient nationals have not applied, the coming of the immigrants ultimately facilitates, and indeed speeds up, the transfer of the nationals to other jobs.

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Return migration, according to duration of stay, of the 1960-1975 immigration cohorts of certain selected nationalities*). (Cumulative percentages)



*) Portuguese Spanish, Italian, Yugoslavian, Greek, Turkish, Moroccan

Source: Central Statistical Office

Nowadays all the countries using migrant workers consider a large part of this labour reserve — though not the whole of it — as satisfying a requirement which has become permanent. This often brings the expressed policies of immigration into contradiction with reality. All the national reports bear witness to this.

The apparently unconcerted choices made by the European nations, apart from the strict control of immigration, indicate the need for a reserve of temporary or conjunctural manpower and another of a more structural and permanent character dependent on the different requirements of the country's own economic system.

The first of these reserves consists of single or unaccompanied workers and its function is to absorb temporary shortages in the labour market. It is a comparatively unskilled reserve, essentially mobile and adaptable, moving frequently from one job to another. It is in fact against this particular reserve of manpower that the countries of Europe have decided to close their doors completely.

The second section is made up of workers with higher qualifications and skills, both from EEC countries and from outside. It is required for more closely defined tasks in jobs regarded as structurally necessary. These are longer-term immigrants and the immigration and integration of their families are authorised. It is on the basis of this two-fold approach that selective prohibitions and authorisations for the entry of migrant workers and/or their families have been handled since 1974.

For the two different contingents, there are necessarily very different conditions and policies affecting their housing, their training and ultimate repatriation.

Ideally however, immigration policy ought not to be considered unilaterally, nor related solely to the economic requirements and population problems of the countries which offer the jobs. It is a branch of social policy and should be settled with an eye to the aspirations, needs and problems of the migrant workers themselves. With this in view, it should be flexible, enabling the migrants to adjust their plans and choose at all times between temporary and longer-term residence. It should thus facilitate the immigration of the worker's family and provide for training schemes and the acquisition of new skills, whether with a view to repatriation or for settled residence in the host country.

Is this really no more than a pipe dream?

CHAPTER II - SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE IN THE EEC

This chapter describes the main characteristics of the foreign labour force-from the Community and elsewhere - within the countries of the EEC.

An attempt will be made to compare the characteristics of the foreign labour force as a whole with those of the migrant workers in the various samples on which the national surveys were based. Financial resources were limited and the size of the national samples - some 800 respondents per country - prevents them from being fully representative of the migrant labour force as a whole. However, the samples were taken from a limited number of regions meeting certain requirements - mainly as regards density of foreign population - and, generally speaking, from some of the biggest national groups.

Changes in the characteristics of the migrant workers will be described as far as available statistics allow, although the figures are by no means complete and mean that overall country-to-country comparisons are often out of the question.

The tables in this chapter refer only to those countries which receive or import migrant labour: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Ireland and Italy, the countries which send - or export - labour, confined most of their interviews to migrants leaving for or returning from other countries of the Community and for Switzerland.

The various descriptions and comparisons are based on statistical analyses and call for one or two remarks.

First of all, there is a steady, even noticeably increasing, flow of Community immigration due not only to the EEC Regulation of November 1968 granting freedom of movement for workers within the Community but also - and this is probably more important - to the effects of the economic crisis which began in 1973 and whose consequences are still being felt.

However, it would be wrong to think that freedom of movement and economic conditions go hand in hand with guaranteed job opportunity, job security and access to all the social and other benefits that go with them. Neither is it obvious that the best-qualified Community workers — i.e. those most likely to find jobs — are the ones who emigrate. Skilled labour is a priority requirement for any western economy. It is also worth noting that, in spite of restrictive measures against nationals from third countries, they still represent a very high proportion of the immigrant population.

Statistics show that migrants are, generally speaking, fairly young. They also show that there is a clear tendency for the migrant population - particularly those who migrated earliest - to grow older and more stable, probably becoming Community citizens with the right to be joined by their families.

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This is partly behind the hierarchy of positions and conditions of the various national groups - although freedom of movement and the right to bring members of the family into the Community do not necessarily put Community workers in a more favorable position. It all depends on the housing and the employment markets and on the job they can get. Xenophobia may also enter into it.

This chapter also reveals that there is a greater percentage of women migrants now - although numbers vary considerably from one country to another. This is not necessarily an indication of long-term stability, since it is a well known fact that many of the people seeking temporary work are single and married women.

Finally, there are still many migrant men — particularly from outside the Community — who are single or not accompanied by their families.

All these trends affect the migrants' accommodation problems and any housing policy should take this into account.

1. Origin (Community or non-Community) of migrant workers

The Community's foreign labour force grew continuously between 1958 and 1973, except for the crisis years 1966-1968.

But, although the overall trend was upwards, the extent of participation by migrant workers from Community countries decreased until 1970. As from 1971, they increased substantially due to the implementation of EEC Regulation No. 1612/68 of November 1968 providing freedom of movement within the EEC for Community workers. Since the end of 1973, there has also been the effect of the crisis and the various restrictions on immigration from outside the Community.

Table 6 below gives trends in the numbers of first work permits issued by the countries of the EEC. It does not refer to the foreign population as a whole but only to that percentage of the labour force which comes from abroad.

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TABLE 6: PLACEMENT OF MIGRANT WORKERS WITH FIRST WORK PERMITS (1), AND PERMANENT WORKERS ARRIVING IN THE MEMBER STATES FROM 1958 TO 1974

(Absolute figures in thousands)
(1960 = 100)

Year	Total EEC		of which Italians		Total 3rd countries		Grand total		3rd countries as % of total	Italians as % of total
	number	index	number	index	number	index	number	index	Total	EEC
1958	110,3	53,3	84,7	49,4	65,4	51,7	175,7	52,7	37	77
1959	94,4	45,6	73,3	42,8	57,3	45,3	151,7	45,5	38	78
1960	206,8	100,0	171,3	100,0	126,4	100,0	333,2	100,0	38	83
1961	228,5	110,5	205,5	120,0	207,3	164,0	435,8	130,8	48	90
1962	221,8	107,3	199,0	116,2	292,0	231,0	513,8	154,2	57	90
1963	181,7	87,9	158,4	92,5	334,0	264,2	515,7	154,8	65	87
1964	190,0	91,9	163,7	95,6	447,8	354,3	637,8	191,4	70	86
1965	260,9	126,2	234,7	137,0	452,3	357,8	713,2	214,1	63	90
1966	212,7	102,9	188,6	110,1	382,1	302,3	594,8	178,5	64	89
1967	96,4	46,6	74,7	43,6	189,8	150,2	286,2	85,9	66	77
1968	164,2	79,4	141,8	82,8	358,2	283,4	522,4	156,8	69	86
1969	166,4	80,5	145,2	84,8	693,1	548,3	859,5	258,0	81	87
1970	204,5	98,9	176,1	102,8	741,0	586,2	945,5	283,8	78	86
1971	197,5	95,5	166,0	96,9	569,7	450,7	767,2	230,3	74	84
1972	194,7	94,1	160,9	93,9	428,0	338,6	622,7	186,9	69	83
1973(1)	228,0	110,3	170,0	99,2	510,0	403,5	738,0	221,5	69	75
1974(1)	122,0	59,0	90,0	52,5	168,0	132,9	290,0	87,0	58	74

Source: EEC internal document - DGV (Social Affairs) Employment of migrant workers - April 1976, Tables 22 - 23, pp. 28, 29, & 32.
SOFEMI report 1975 - OECD

Notes: (1) 1973-1974: Estimates provided by the European Coordination Office.
- EEC workers: no longer needed work permits after November 1968.
- 1958-1972: six Member States
- 1973-1974: nine Member States.

This increase in Community recruitment should not, however, be exaggerated, firstly, because, 74% of EEC migrant workers still come from Italy, although this proportion has tended to decline over the last five years. It should also be borne in mind that between 1960 and the present day, recruitment in third countries rose to index 586.2 in 1970 and stayed at index 132.9 in 1974, whereas the index for recruitment in the Community was 98.9 in 1970 as compared to 1960 and only 59 in 1974.

2. Distribution of workers into those of Community and those of non-Community origin

Table 7 gives the distribution by country and by origin (Community or non-Community) of migrants working in the countries of the EEC since 1975.

TABLE 7: MIGRANT WORKERS BY ORIGIN (1975)

Host country	Workers from the EEC		Workers from non-EEC Europe		Workers from outside Europe		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	431.641	20.8	827.711	40.0	811.383	39.2	2.070.735	100.0
Belgium	130.000	56.5	47.000	20.4	53.000	23.1	230.000	100.0
Denmark	12.851	31.2	5.996	14.6	22.353	54.2	41.200	100.0
France	300.000	15.7	796.000	41.8	809.000	42.5	1.905.000	100.0
Luxembourg	29.300	64.7	14.300	31.6	1.700	3.7	45.300	100.0
Netherlands	49.800	43.1	20.217	17.5	45.483	39.4	115.500	100.0
United Kingdom	630.000	37.8	102.000	6.1	934.005	56.1	1.666.005	100.0
Total	1.583.592	26.1	1.813.244	29.9	2.676.924	44.0	6.073.740	100.0

Sources: EEC internal document: Social Affairs, April 1976 op. cit. see Table 1, Chapter I.

With the exception of Denmark, which has much more direct ties with the other countries of Scandinavia, the small Community countries have the highest percentage of Community workers in their foreign labour force — Luxembourg 64.7%, Belgium 56.5% and the Netherlands 43.1%.

Irish immigrants make the United Kingdom the big Community country with the highest percentage — 37.8% — of Community workers in its foreign labour force. Germany follows with 20.8% while France has, only 15.7%.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom has the most migrants from outside Europe — 55.1% of the total. Denmark follows with 54.2%, then France with 42.5%, the Netherlands with 30.4% and Germany with 39.2%

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France and Germany, with 41.8% and 40% respectively, recruit a very high percentage of their migrant workers from the non-Community countries of Europe.

Table 8 below gives the percentages of survey respondents coming from three regions of origin, compared with the overall percentages coming from these regions in 1975.

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TABLE 8: COMPARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT LABOUR FORCE BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND CORRESPONDING DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN NATIONAL SAMPLES IN 1975

Host country	% of labour force in employment and % interviewed											
	EEC origin			Non-EEC Europe			Elsewhere			Total		
	% in employment	No interviewed	% interviewed	% in employment	No interviewed	% interviewed	% in employment	No interviewed	% interviewed	% in employment	No interviewed	% interviewed
Germany	20.8	196	33.2	40.0	198	33.5	39.2	197	33.3	100.0	591	100.0
Belgium	56.5	143	19.8	20.4	305	42.2	23.1	275	38.0	100.0	723	100.0
Denmark	31.2	-	-	14.6	241	39.8	54.2	364	60.2	100.0	605	100.0
France	15.7	69	9.6	41.8	292	40.8	42.5	355	49.6	100.0	716	100.0
Luxembourg	64.7	298	42.6	31.6	402	57.4	3.7	-	-	100.0	700	100.0
Netherlands	43.1	47	8.3	17.5	125	22.2	39.4	392	69.5	100.0	564	100.0
United Kingdom	37.8	68	11.7	6.1	-	-	56.1	514	88.3	100.0	582	100.0
EEC	26.1	821	18.32	29.9	1.563	34.88	44.0	2.097	46.8	100.0	4.481	100.0

The cost involved in recruiting labour in the Community and outside the Community are different, although among the non-EEC recruits there are various ex-colonials who have to be treated in much the same way as workers from Community countries, and who have more or less the same rights as nationals. As far as third countries are concerned, obligations are, as a general rule, contractual ones within the framework of bilateral agreements. The United Kingdom is an exception here. The tendency to recruit more outside the Community could well be due to the fact that the wages now paid to workers within the EEC are higher and employers are seeking cheaper labour from third countries. Workers are normally only recruited in Community countries for certain small sections of the labour market where extra-Community labour, which is usually cheaper and less demanding, would not be suitable.

Community workers are under-represented in the sample. There is a greater proportion of people from other countries of Europe and workers from third countries, bearing in mind the percentage they represent of the foreign labour force as a whole. This is the case everywhere except Germany, where a stratified sample, with each category representing 33% of the whole, was used. This tendency in the distribution of the samples is due to the areas selected for sampling. In areas where there are large numbers of migrants, national workers are under-represented. So also are workers from other Community countries, who are the best integrated into the national economy: they usually have the best jobs; they stay longer in the host country: their families are usually with them; they tend to spread out over the national territory; and to integrate well into the national population. Therefore, sampling on the basis of areas means that the sample cannot represent the different categories of worker in their correct proportions. This method of sampling was used in all countries except Luxembourg, (where respondents were picked at random from both town and country areas) and the United Kingdom (where firms'lists of employees were used as the basis for the selection of both national and foreign workers).

The control group of nationals represented between 12.3% and 25%, according to country. It was chosen from the same area (as in Belgium, for example) or from a neighbouring area (as in the Netherlands). (10)

3. Variety of nationalities in the various host countries

Most migrant workers in the Community come from the Mediterranean area and it is only the United Kingdom and Denmark which recruit large numbers of workers from Asia.

The distinction between Community and non-Community workers is a fairly rough one in that those countries receiving or importing labour have

(10) See table 1 in annex to this chapter. It provides absolute figures and percentage for the various sections making up the sample in each of the countries concerned.

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immigration/reception policies that vary widely according to where the workers come from.

The Mediterranean countries fall into three main groups:

(1°) The Latin countries, which include, in addition to Italy, Spain and Portugal. These constitute a privileged recruitment area for countries like France, Belgium and Luxembourg.

(2°) The Mahgreb. The North-Africans come from former French colonies and therefore speak French — but the cultural gap between them and the Europeans is vast.

(3°) A third group of countries, comprising Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, where Germany and Denmark recruit most of their migrant workers.

The Netherlands, proportionately, has the most varied migrant population. Its policy is in complete contrast to Luxembourg's, where almost all immigrants are from Latin countries.

It is possible, of course, to classify labour-exporting countries in a number of other ways — such as on the basis of per capita GDP Here, as an example, is a classification of those Mediterranean countries that export labour and of the countries of the EEC.

TABLE 9 GDP PER CAPITA AT MARKET PRICES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES AND SOME COUNTRIES OF THE EEC (Europe, 1974).

Country	G.D.P. Thousand of millions Eur.	Population	G.D.P. per capita
Germany	304.9	62.054	4.913
Belgium	42.1	9.772	4.308
Denmark	24.5	5.045	4.856
France	213.0	52.507	4.057
Ireland	5.3	3.086	1.717
Italy	119.8	55.413	2.162
Luxembourg	1.7	357	4.762
Netherlands	55.4	13.545	4.090
United Kingdom	151.4	56.056	2.701
Spain	58.7	35.225	1.666
Greece	15.3	8.962	1.707
Portugal	8.9 (1973)	8.735	1.019
Turkey	23.5	38.270	614
Algeria			221 (1971)
Moroco			190 (1971)
Tunisia			221 (1971)

Source: Basic Community statistics

There is an obvious difference between European and non-European countries of the Mediterranean. This difference in level of economic development

Explains why the attraction of migration varies as between different labour-exporting countries and also explains the corresponding advantages to countries importing labour (11).

Table 10 shows how different countries recruit their labour from different parts of the world. It gives the five countries where each of the labour-importing countries of the Community recruit their biggest contingents and the number of respondents by nationality in the samples in each of the national surveys.

TABLE 10 - SIZE OF THE VARIOUS NATIONAL CONTINGENTS IN THE HOST COUNTRIES

(1°) GERMANY

Nationality	Number of migrant workers	
	in the country (1974)	in the sample (1975)
Turkish	590.000	197
Yugoslavian	470.000	-
Italian	370.000	196
Greek	225.000	198
Spanish	165.000	-
Total	1.820.000	591
Grand total	2.350.000	
% total/grand total	77.5	

(11) The attraction of industrialized countries does not, in fact, contribute to the long-term evening out in the level of economic development. For the costs of migration to developing countries see T. STARK, Migration and development, in "Migration News", 1973, pp. 15-18; G. TAPINOS, L'économie des migrations internationales, Armand Colin, Paris, 1974, pp. 20-25; C.C. ALMEIDA, Emigration, espace et sous-développement, in "Migrations internationales", Vol. XI, n°3, 1973, pp. 112-117.

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(2°) BELGIUM

Nationality	Number of migrant workers	
	in the country (1974)	in the sample (1975)
Italian	90.000	150
Spanish	34.000	150
Moroccan	30.000	150 North Africans
Turkish	10.000	100
Greek	6.000	-
	-	50 Portuguese
Total	170.000	600
Grand total	230.000	
% total/grand total	73.9	

(3°) DENMARK

Nationality	Number of migrant workers	
	in the country (1974)	in the sample (1975)
Turkish	5.730	-
Pakistani	4.980	321
Yugoslav	4.520	241
Greek	3.453	-
United Kingdom	2.515	43
Total	21.198	605
Grand total	35.927	
% total/Grand total	59.0	

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(4°) FRANCE

Nationality	Number of migrants workers	
	in the country (in 1974)	in the sample (in 1975)
Portuguese	475.000	210
Algerian	440.000	137
Spanish	265.000	-
Italian	230.000	69
Moroccan	130.000	75
Yugoslav		82
Tunisian		86
African		37
Total	1.540.000	696
Grand total	1.905.000	
% total/grand total	80.8	

(5°) LUXEMBOURG

Nationality	Number of migrant workers	
	in the country (in 1974)	in the sample (in 1975)
Portuguese	11.800	338
Italian	10.400	298
French	7.100	-
Spanish	1.900	64
Yugoslav	500	-
Total	31.700	700
Grand total	43.000	
% total/grand total	73.7	

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(6°) NETHERLANDS

Nationality	Number of migrant workers	
	in the country (in 1974)	in the sample (in 1975)
Turkish	22.288	159
Spanish	12.630	125
Moroccan	12.223	233
Yugoslav	8.449	-
Portuguese	2.580	-
Total	58.170	563
Grand total	121.094	
% total/grand total	48.0	

(7°) UNITED KINGDOM

Nationality	Number of migrant workers	
	in the country (in 1974)	in the sample (in 1975)
Irish	452.000	60
Italian	72.000	-
West Indian	66.000	210
Greeks	50.000	-
Pakistanis & Indian	49.000	102 + 187 = 289
Total	689.000	559
Grand total	1.665.005	
% total/grand total	41.3	

The national samples concentrated on the most numerous categories of migrant in each country; the only exceptions to this are France and Belgium.

The nationalities can be grouped in various ways. However, to attain the aims of the study and reveal the different treatment that different nationalities may get, it was decided that the tables in this summary report would distinguish between national (autochthone)and foreign (allochthone) workers. The foreign workers would be further divided into migrants from Community countries and migrants from third countries, and the migrants from third countries would then be sub-divided into those from Europe and those from further afield.

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Workers from the Community working in the seven states that import labour come from Ireland (to the United Kingdom) and Italy (to all the other countries where there is a large Community contingent). Denmark is the only country where Community migrants - because they were so few in number - were not included in the sample.

The non-Community countries of Europe are Spain, Greece, Portugal and Yugoslavia. The non-European countries are Southern Asie, which supplies workers for Denmark and the United Kingdom, and the Mahgreb and Turkey, (i.e. non-European Mediterranean countries) which supply workers to the other countries.

The aim of this classification is a heuristic one. Its purpose is to confirm or refute the existence of a hierarchy of positions and conditions according to the group to which migrants belong. The interpretation or explanation of theses differences may be in the conditions of departure of the migrants, the areas in which they settle, or in the varying treatment meted out to the different nationalities in the host country. Such variations in treatment are particularly apparent in the many social benefits and, most important, the possibility of re-uniting one's a family — whether just the wife or the descendents, ascendants and dependants as well.

4. The age pyramid (12)

An examination of the breakdown of the ages of the respondents reveals that the migrant worker population in the areas covered by the survey is much younger than the national population as a whole.

TABLE 11 - BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS (NATIONALS AND FOREIGNERS) BY AGE (1975)

Country	Foreigners				Nationals			
	under-45s		45 +		under-45s		45 +	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	479	81.1	111	18.9	121	64.2	80	39.8
Belgium	519	73.5	187	26.5	61	64.2	34	35.8
Denmark	541	90.3	58	9.7	98	50.7	95	49.3
France	590	82.3	126	17.7	82	75.1	27	24.9
Luxembourg	514	73.3	186	26.7	72	72.0	28	28.0
Netherlands	473	84.0	90	16.0	111	48.3	116	51.1
United Kingdom	409	70.5	171	29.5	105	51.7	98	48.3

(12) More detailed comparisons can be made by referring to table A 2 in annex to this chapter.

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Between 73% and 84% of migrants (according to country) interviewed were under 45, as against 50% to 73% of the nationals. The migrant population is, overall, younger. The migrant population is youngest in countries such as Denmark, where migration is a recent phenomenon. This is also true of countries like Germany, the Netherlands and France, where the migrant population is made up of a large number of unaccompanied men. It is worth mentioning that France and Luxembourg have the youngest control groups, which are very similar in age structure to the migrant population. The United Kingdom and Denmark have the oldest control groups, this being partly due to the areas selected and methods of sampling used.

At a later stage, it might be interesting to compare the various groups of migrants — Community, other European and non-European — with each other to see whether there are any major differences in age structure. On the assumption that the three groups followed in three successive waves, the Community group will be the oldest and the non-European group the youngest.

TABLE 12 - BREAKDOWN OF MIGRANTS FROM THE THREE MAJOR AREAS BY AGE (1975)

Host country	EEC workers		Other European workers		Workers from elsewhere	
	under 45	%	under 45	%	under 45	%
Germany	142	72.0	149	76.7	188	94.4
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	206	85.6	335	93.3
France	39	56.4	238	81.5	313	88.1
Luxembourg	172	57.7	342	85.0	-	-
Netherlands	39	84.7	102	81.6	332	84.7
United Kingdom	33	48.4	-	-	376	73.4

Table 12 reveals the following trends. First the percentage of workers of 45 and over is higher in the Community group. Then follow workers from the rest of Europe , followed by non-Europeans, who are the youngest on average.

However, if the columns for Community workers in table 12 are compared with nationals in table 11, France, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom emerge as exceptions to the general rule, since their control groups — made up of national — are younger than the groups of Community workers, although non-Europeans remain the youngest group.

Furthermore, national policies favour the settlement of immigrant workers recruited from those countries which are geographically closest, especially those where ethnic and cultural background is akin to that of the host country, whereas workers from other countries are forced to return periodically to their country of origin. It is therefore less common for non-Europeans to settle permanently. However, the conditions and structure

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of the labour market also affect the issue.

EEC social statistics can be used to calculate the percentage of the overall population in the 15 - 45 age group and this can then be compared with the number of under-45s interviewed.

This comparison is made in table 13, which reveals that the control group is relatively younger in all countries except Denmark.

TABLE 13 - PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS IN THE 15-45 AGE GROUP IN THE TOTAL POPULATION AND IN THE SAMPLE (1975)

Host country	Total population		% (1)/(2)	respondents under 45
	15 - 45	15 - 65		
Germany	21.287	39.089	54.5	64.2
Belgium	3.185	6.114	52.1	64.2
Denmark	1.683	3.202	52.7	50.7
France	17.354	32.137	54.0	75.1
Luxembourg	121	226	53.5	72.0
Netherlands	4.574	8.330	54.9	48.9
United Kingdom	17.750	34.977	50.7	51.7

5. Length of stay in host country (13)

There appears to be no general statistics on the length of time migrant workers usually stay in the host countries and there is, therefore, no basis outside the survey itself for comparing the respondent migrant population with all or part of the reference population.

Table 14 gives the breakdown of migrants interviewed by country of origin and length of stay in one of the countries of the Community.

(13) Table A3 in annex gives details of the breakdown of migrant workers according to the length of their stay and according to the category or region from which they come.

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TABLE 14 - DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS BY LENGTH OF STAY IN THE HOST COUNTRY AND BY CATEGORY OF COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (1975)

Host country	Community workers in residence				Other European workers in residence				Workers from outside Europe in residence				Total migrant workers in residence			
	pre-1970		post 1970		pre-1970		post 1970		pre-1970		post 1970		pre-1970		post 1970	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	151	77.0	45	23.0	159	80.7	38	19.3	120	60.6	78	39.4	430	72.8	161	27.2
Belgium	111	84.1	21	15.9	265	90.2	29	9.8	200	77.2	59	22.8	576	84.1	109	15.9
Denmark	-	-	-	-	121	50.2	120	49.8	39	10.7	325	89.3	160	26.4	445	73.6
France	64	95.5	3	4.5	189	65.2	101	34.8	255	72.0	99	28.0	508	71.4	203	28.6
Luxembourg	282	94.6	16	5.4	133	33.1	269	66.9	-	-	-	-	415	59.3	285	40.7
Netherlands	29	63.0	17	37.0	78	62.8	46	37.2	271	71.2	109	28.8	378	68.7	172	31.2
United Kingdom	66	97.0	2	3.0	-	-	-	-	502	97.8	11	2.2	568	97.6	13	2.4
Total	703	87.1	104	12.9	945	61.0	603	39.0	1387	67.1	681	32.9	3035	68.6	1388	31.4

It emerges from table 14 that 68.6% of respondents settled in the EEC before 1970, as opposed to 31.4% who have come here since. Nearly a third of the migrant population has thus arrived recently. Bearing in mind the considerable mobility of the migrant population and the enormous numbers migrating between 1970 and 1973, this percentage does not seem exaggerated, although, in many countries, the contingent of recent migrants interviewed was much larger. For example, in Denmark, 73.6 % of migrants have arrived since the beginning of 1970. In Luxembourg, the figure is 40.5%.

However, the most recent contingents are not well represented in the sample in the United Kingdom (2.4%) — although this is understandable in view of the anti-immigration measures that the UK has had for some time. Similarly, only 15.9% of the migrants interviewed in Belgium have arrived since 1970.

Table 15 shows that, the proportion of recent recruitment from countries outside Europe has gone up, in Germany, Belgium and Denmark. However, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands have recruited greater numbers of workers from non-Community countries of Europe.

Overall, recent immigration has involved few people from the Community, at least as far as one can judge from the samples. Non-Community Europeans and people from further a field represented 92.5% of the total, compared with Community workers who represented only 7.5%.

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TABLE 15 - CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONDENTS BY LENGTH OF STAY AND PLACE OF ORIGIN (1975)

Country	Date of entry	Community origin		Other European origin		Extra-European origin		Total migrant workers interviewed	
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	pre 1970	151	35.1	159	37.0	120	27.9	430	100.0
	post 1970	45	28.0	38	23.6	78	48.4	161	100.0
Belgium	pre 1970	111	19.3	265	46.0	200	34.7	576	100.0
	post 1970	21	19.3	29	26.6	59	54.1	109	100.0
Denmark	pre 1970	-	-	121	75.6	39	24.4	160	100.0
	post 1970	-	-	120	27.0	325	73.0	445	100.0
France	pre 1970	64	12.6	189	37.2	255	50.2	508	100.0
	post 1970	3	1.4	101	49.8	99	48.8	203	100.0
Luxembourg	pre 1970	282	68.0	133	32.0	-	-	415	100.0
	post 1970	16	5.6	269	94.4	-	-	285	100.0
Netherlands	pre 1970	29	7.7	78	20.6	271	71.7	378	100.0
	post 1970	17	9.9	46	26.7	109	63.4	172	100.0
United Kingdom	pre 1970	66	11.6	-	-	502	88.4	568	100.0
	post 1970	2	15.4	-	-	11	84.6	13	100.0
Community	pre 1970	703	23.2	945	31.1	1.387	45.7	3.035	100.0
	post 1970	104	7.5	603	43.4	681	49.1	1.388	100.0

6. Composition of the migrant family

None of the countries of the EEC, except France (14), keep statistics on whether migrants are alone of accompanied by their families. This is a regrettable gap in our statistical knowledge in the Community as a whole since these figures would enable us to assess the different housing problems of single and accompanied migrants. Most countries only keep figures on the sex and age of individual migrants — and this only gives a very rough idea of how often the wife or children and other dependants accompany the head of the family. 'Family' in this content may mean many different things — from the immediate relatives to the extended family.

In future, we should collect statistics on foreign families as well as on individual migrants. Such figures would be particularly useful in that they are the only means of answering a large number of questions arising from the analysis of data on the sex distribution and changes in the numbers of migrants.

Current data suggest that the proportion of women in the migrant population goes up even during times of crisis, although it varies considerably with nationality and origin.(15) Data from Germany illustrates these points. Drettakis has calculated the proportion of women between 1960 and 1972, among migrants living in Germany and coming from the six neighbouring countries — Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Switzerland, plus the United Kingdom and from six other countries — Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia. The results of these calculations are set out in table 16 below. The percentage of women went up considerably and fairly steadily over the period in question.

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(14) See ONI (National Immigration Office, France) statistics.
(15) E.G. DRETTAKIS, Changes in the Composition and Sectoral Distribution of Migrant Workers in West Germany, 1960-1972 in "Migrations internationales", vol. XI, n°4, 1973, pp. 192-204

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TABLE 16 - WOMEN WORKERS (PROPORTION OF WOMEN TO MEN) IN TWO CATEGORIES OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN GERMANY - TRENDS BETWEEN 1960 AND 1972

Years	Neighbouring countries	Southern countries
1960	0.367	0.089
1961	0.357	0.129
1962	0.366	0.181
1963	0.389	0.239
1964	0.404	0.267
1965	0.432	0.284
1966	0.460	0.325
1967	0.491	0.397
1968	0.479	0.415
1969	0.473	0.411
1970	0.462	0.402
1971	0.439	0.390
1972	0.444	0.408

Source: G. DRETTAKIS, op. cit. table 1 (c) page 194.

DRETTAKIS considers that the increase in the proportion of women in the migrant population in both the categories is a pointer to the structural and permanent nature of the settlement of migrants in Germany. However, although these rates have risen in a spectacular fashion (since they vary between 0.41 and 0.45 in 1972 while the figure for the national population is 0.56) the difference reveals that there is still a considerable number of single and unaccompanied men.

DRETTAKIS found that the proportion of women went up in 1967 — i.e. during the recession. This would suggest that it is usually single or unaccompanied male migrants who leave during a period of recession. DRETTAKIS also compares the proportion of women in particular groups of the foreign population. Differences between the various nationalities are considerable.

TABLE 17: WOMEN WORKERS IN 1960 AND 1972 IN VARIOUS MIGRANT POPULATIONS IN GERMANY

Country of origin	1960	1972
Italy	0.068	0.324
Greece	0.132	0.762
Spain	0.210	0.430
Turkey	0.075	0.296
Portugal	0.214	0.427
Yugoslavia	0.231	0.447

Source - G. DRETTAKIS, op. cit. table 3, page 198.

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Similar trends and similar differences are found in other countries. Tapinos has shown that both the proportion of workers in the population and the number of employed women are on the increase in France (16).

There are a number of reasons for this.

In the case of Community migrants, the arrival of the family is authorized by the Community Regulation on the free movement of workers from the Member States and it is simply considerations of probable length of stay and cost of installation which determine the unequal sex distribution of the migrants.

However, various other factors affect the situation of Community migrants. The same language in the host country and the country of origin — as in the United Kingdom and Ireland — may make it easier for women to emigrate, in which case they tend to gravitate to the jobs where a knowledge of the language is important. This is why there is a very large proportion of women in the Irish immigrant population in the United Kingdom (17).

For all workers from outside the Community, there is the effect of Community immigration policies — which may place restrictions on the wife and family accompanying the worker and which, for example, only provide certain social security benefits, such as family allowances and maternity grants, if the worker is accompanied.

In the case of workers from outside Europe and, in particular, from all the Mediterranean countries, the fact that our societies are permissive in their attitudes towards women and towards women workers may be an obstacle to the migrant worker being joined by his family. This is also true in the United Kingdom for immigrants from Pakistan, India and the West Indies.

However, the data suggest that between 1965 and 1973 — i.e. before it was decided to stop immigration — the proportion of women to men in the migrant population rose considerably. Tapinos (18) notes that there were substantially more women workers in the migrant population in France, number having risen from 19 500 in 1966 to 31 000 in 1970, probably for reasons other than a desire to unite the family and settle in the host country. Tapinos suggests that families are now being united for very different reasons. Until recently, the migrant worker took his wife and family with him and tried to settle them in the host country. Today, the wife is brought over so that more money can be accumulated over a shorter period, the length of the stay abroad reduced and the family taken home more quickly. Examples of both types of migration are found side-by-side today.

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(16) G. TAPINOS, L'immigration étrangère en France - 1946-1973, dans "Cahier INED, travaux et documents", n°71, P.U.F., Paris, 1975
(17) Rapport irlandais, pp. 8-11
(18) in the Review "Population", n°5, 1971

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But to add to the changes in the outlook and economic objectives of heads of migrant households, it seems likely that the arrival of more young people and children over the last few years has been in the objective interest of our countries and their economies, in that the likelihood of stabilizing what we hope will be a mobile and malleable labour force is considerably increased if migrant workers have the opportunity to bring their families with them. The arrival of more wives and children may also mean that more permanent residence permits have been granted — although this is by no means proven by current statistics. Finally, this feminization of the migrant population is also due to the relatively large increase in job opportunities for women in the west.

It is perhaps for these reasons that there are relatively few unmarried respondents in the samples. The figures are usually between 9% and 18%, according to country, although the French sample, with more than 46%, was an exception. This relatively low proportion of single and unaccompanied men did not tally with the bias towards accompanied or unaccompanied immigration in the policies of the various countries. The methods used to select the sample (from towns and districts where the immigrant population was high) may well have affected the proportion of single and unaccompanied migrants, given that hostels and other types of accommodation for the single man are distributed differently from family housing.

Tables 18 and 19 divide male migrants into those that are single and those that are accompanied by all or part of the family (19).

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(19) A more detailed analysis of the samples from this angle can be found in table A.4 & A.5 in annex to this chapter.

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TABLE 18 - DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS INTO SINGLE OR UNACCOMPANIED AND ACCOMPANIED BY ALL OR PART OF THEIR FAMILY (1975)

Host country	Workers	Single		Married but unaccompanied		Total single & unaccompanied		Married accompanied		Total	
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	Migrants	55	9.3	2	0.4	57	9.7	532	90.3	589	100.0
	Nationals	30	16.1	-	-	30	16.1	156	83.9	186	100.0
Belgium	Migrants	65	9.4	59	8.5	124	17.9	567	82.1	691	100.0
	Nationals	13	13.8	3	3.2	16	17.0	78	83.0	94	100.0
Denmark	Migrants	64	10.8	118	20.0	182	30.8	409	69.2	591	100.0
	Nationals	22	11.5	-	-	22	11.5	170	88.5	192	100.0
France	Migrants	132	18.5	198	27.8	330	46.3	382	53.7	712	100.0
	Nationals	21	19.6	1	1.0	22	20.6	85	79.4	107	100.0
Luxembourg	Migrants	21	3,0	-	-	21	3.0	679	97.0	700	100.0
	Nationals	21	21.0	5	5.0	26	26.0	74	74.0	100	100.0
Netherlands	Migrants	66	11.7	287	51.0	353	61.7	208	37.0	561	100.0
	Nationals	9	4.0	12	5.3	21	9.3	206	90.7	227	100.0
United Kingdom	Migrants	43	7.7	54	9.7	97	17.4	462	82.6	559	100.0
	Nationals	26	13.4	1	0.5	27	13.9	167	86.1	194	100.0

TABLE 19: DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO WHETHER THEY ARE SINGLE/UNACCOMPANIED OR ACCOMPANIED AND ACCORDING TO REGION OF ORIGIN (1975)

Host country	Workers	Single/un-accompanied		Accompanied		Total respondents	
		number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	Comm.	30	15.5	164	84.5	194	100.0
	Eur.	10	5.1	186	94.9	196	100.0
	Non-Eur.	17	8.5	182	91.5	199	100.0
Belgium	Com.	15	10.6	126	89.4	141	100.0
	Eur.	23	7.8	272	92.2	295	100.0
	Non-Eur.	86	33.7	169	66.3	255	100.0
Denmark	Com.	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Eur.	64	27.4	170	72.6	234	100.0
	Non-Eur.	118	33.0	239	67.0	357	100.0
France	Com.	17	24.6	52	75.4	69	100.0
	Eur.	97	33.3	194	66.7	291	100.0
	Non-Eur.	116	61.4	136	38.6	352	100.0
Luxembourg	Com.	4	1.3	294	98.7	298	100.0
	Eur.	17	4.2	385	95.8	402	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	100.0
Netherlands	Com.	23	50.0	23	50.0	46	100.0
	Eur.	57	45.6	60	54.4	125	100.0
	Non-Eur.	278	70.2	117	29.8	392	100.0
United Kingdom	Com.	9	14.3	54	85.7	63	100.0
	Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	88	17.8	408	82.2	496	100.0

Table 19 shows that the percentage of single/unaccompanied migrants in the German, Belgian and Dutch samples is higher among workers from the Community and outside Europe than it is among workers from non-EEC countries of Europe, whereas the general tendency in the other countries is for the percentage of unaccompanied/single men to go up as the place of origin is more distant.

Tables 20 and 21 provide more precise comparisons between the number of dependants of nationals and migrant respondents, by country.

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TABLE 20: NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS OF MIGRANT AND NATIONAL RESPONDENTS (1975)

Country	Workers	Number of dependants								Total	
		0		1		2		3 +			
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	Migrants	8	1.6	88	18.4	127	26.5	255	53.5	478	100.0
	Nationals	2	1.1	42	23.7	56	31.6	77	43.6	177	100.0
Belgium	Migrants	67	11.7	88	15.3	126	22.0	292	51.0	573	100.0
	Nationals	14	19.0	18	24.3	18	24.3	24	32.4	74	100.0
Denmark	Migrants	76	12.5	122	20.2	159	26.4	247	40.9	604	100.0
	Nationals	12	6.2	51	26.4	39	20.2	91	47.2	193	100.0
France	Migrants	327	45.7	90	12.6	170	23.7	129	18.0	716	100.0
	Nationals	19	17.4	30	27.5	41	37.6	19	17.5	109	100.0
Luxembourg	Migrants	135	19.3	85	12.1	155	22.1	325	46.5	700	100.0
	Nationals	14	14.0	25	25.0	30	30.0	31	31.0	100	100.0
Netherlands	Migrants	355	62.9	27	4.8	38	6.7	144	25.6	564	100.0
	Nationals	30	13.2	61	26.9	48	21.1	88	38.8	227	100.0
United Kingdom	Migrants	107	18.6	56	9.7	89	15.5	323	56.2	575	100.0
	Nationals	39	19.2	57	28.1	39	19.2	68	33.5	203	100.0

TABLE 21: NUMBER OF DEPENDANTS OF MIGRANTS FROM THE VARIOUS AREAS OF ORIGIN (1975)

Country	Workers	Number of dependants								Total	
		0		1		2		3 and more			
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	Comm.	6	4.2	22	15.8	44	31.4	68	48.6	140	100.0
	Eur.	2	1.1	63	36.2	58	33.3	51	29.4	174	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	3	1.8	25	15.2	136	83.0	164	100.0
Belgium	Comm.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	Comm.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Eur.	24	10.0	51	21.2	70	29.2	95	39.6	240	100.0
	Non-Eur.	52	14.2	71	19.5	89	24.5	152	41.7	364	100.0
France	Comm.	15	21.7	14	20.3	32	46.4	8	11.6	69	100.0
	Eur.	97	33.2	54	18.5	94	32.2	47	16.1	292	100.0
	Non-Eur.	215	60.6	22	6.2	44	12.4	74	20.8	355	100.0
Luxembourg	Comm.	32	10.7	39	13.0	67	22.5	160	58.3	298	100.0
	Eur.	103	25.6	46	11.4	88	21.9	165	41.1	402	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	Comm.	23	50.0	-	-	-	-	23	50.0	46	100.0
	Eur.	332	58.8	-	-	-	-	232	41.2	564	100.0
	Non-Eur.										
United Kingdom	Comm.	12	17.6	12	17.6	11	16.2	33	48.6	68	100.0
	Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	95	18.7	44	8.7	78	15.4	290	57.2	507	100.0

Tables 20 and 21 give somewhat different results from tables 18 and 19 as regards dependants. The only plausible explanation is that the migrant workers had a different understanding of the questions on which tables 18 and 19 are based. The questions on living alone or with others are interpreted differently according to the actual situation the migrant worker is in. Generally speaking, moreover the results in tables 20 and 21 are more reliable. The number of single unaccompanied migrants in the country is usually higher than those who actually state they are not accompanied by their wife and family. Many of the migrants living in single accommodation did not see themselves as living alone.

These tables show that in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, more immigrants than nationals have three or more dependants. In the other three countries — France, Denmark and the Netherlands — the proportion of single men and small families is higher. These differences appear to be due to deliberate choices in selecting the samples. More respondents in France and the Netherlands were single or living in hostels.

Overall, the reports make it clear that, when migrant families are united, their households are generally larger than national households, usually because they tend to have more children and also because they often support other relatives as well. Migrants often complain that low-priced housing in Community countries is designed for smaller families than theirs. The effect of size of family will be analyzed later in the section on density of occupation of housing.

From the point of view of housing policy, it is worth noting that, among migrant workers, single people and childless couples tend to move more often than whole families. However, proof can only be furnished by further statistics — and, in spite of the substantial amount of migration in the countries of the Community today, the phenomenon is an inadequately documented one.

TABLE A 1: Number of persons of national origin and from other Community countries and third countries (European and non-European) interviewed in the survey carried out from April to September 1975.

	Ch. 1	%	%
GERMANY			
Total migrants	591	74.6	100.0
of which: EEC	196	24.7	33.2
Non-EEC	395	49.9	66.8
Eur.	198	25.0	33.5
Non-Eur.	197	24.8	33.3
Nationals	201	25.3	-
Grand Total	792	100.0	-
BELGIUM			
Total migrants	723	87.1	100.0
of which: EEC	143	17.3	19.8
Non-EEC	580	69.9	80.2
Eur.	305	36.7	42.2
Non-Eur.	275	33.1	38.0
Nationals	107	12.9	-
Grand Total	830	100.0	-
DENMARK			
Total migrants	605	75.6	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-
Non-EEC	605	75.6	100.0
Eur.	241	30.1	39.8
Non-Eur.	364	45.5	60.2
Nationals	195	24.4	-
Grand Total	800	100.0	-
FRANCE			
Total migrants	716	86.8	100.0
of which: EEC	69	8.4	9.6
Non-EEC	647	78.4	90.4
Eur.	292	35.4	40.8
Non-Eur.	355	43.0	49.6
Nationals	109	13.2	-
Grand Total	825	100.0	-
LUXEMBOURG			
Total migrants	700	87.5	100.0
of which: EEC	298	37.2	42.6
Non-EEC	402	50.3	57.4
Eur.	402	50.3	57.4
Non-Eur.	-	-	-
Nationals	100	12.5	-
Grand Total	800	100.0	-

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TABLE A 1

NETHERLANDS			
Total migrants	564	75.8	100.0
of which: EEC	47	6.3	8.3
Non-EEC	517	69.5	91.7
Eur.	125	16.8	22.2
Non-Eur.	392	52.7	69.5
Nationals	180	24.2	-
Grand Total	744	100.0	-
UNITED KINGDOM			
Total migrants	582	74.1	100.0
of which: EEC	68	8.7	11.7
Non-EEC	514	65.4	88.3
Eur.	-	-	-
Non-Eur.	514	65.5	88.3
Nationals	203	25.9	-
Grand Total	785	100.0	-

TABLE A 2: Distribution of persons interviewed by age group (1975 situation)

Host country	0 - 24		25 - 34		35 - 44		45 & +		TOTAL		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
GERMANY											
Total migrants	36	6.1	214	36.2	229	38.8	111	18.9	590	100.0	
of which: EEC	21	10.6	67	34.0	54	27.4	55	28.0	197	100.0	
Non-EEC	15	3.8	147	38.4	170	43.2	56	14.6	393	100.0	
Eur.	6	3.0	58	29.9	85	43.8	45	23.3	194	100.0	
Non-Eur.	9	4.5	89	44.7	90	45.2	11	5.6	199	100.0	
Nationals	8	4.0	52	25.9	61	30.3	80	39.8	201	100.0	
Grand Total	44	5.5	266	33.6	290	36.6	191	24.3	791	100.0	
BELGIUM											
Total migrants	49	7.0	180	25.5	290	41.0	187	26.5	706	100.0	
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	7	7.4	22	23.1	32	33.7	34	35.8	95	100.0	
Grand Total	56	7.0	202	25.2	322	40.2	221	27.6	801	100.0	
DENMARK											
Total migrants	56	9.4	306	51.0	179	29.9	58	9.7	599	100.0	6
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	56	9.4	306	51.0	179	29.9	58	9.7	599	100.0	6
Eur.	17	7.0	101	42.0	88	36.6	34	14.4	240	100.0	1
Non-Eur.	39	10.8	205	57.1	91	25.4	24	6.6	359	100.0	5
Nationals	11	5.7	53	27.4	34	17.6	95	49.3	193	100.0	2
Grand Total	67	8.4	359	45.3	213	26.9	153	19.4	792	100.0	8

V/448/76-E

FRANCE										
Total migrants	58	8.1	309	43.1	223	31.1	126	17.7	716	100.0
of which: EEC	5	7.2	17	24.6	17	24.6	30	43.6	69	100.0
Non-EEC	53	8.2	292	45.1	206	31.8	96	14.9	647	100.0
Eur.	24	8.2	106	26.3	108	37.0	54	18.5	292	100.0
Non-Eur.	29	8.1	186	52.4	98	27.6	42	11.9	355	100.0
Nationals	14	12.8	44	40.3	24	22.0	27	24.9	109	100.0
Grand Total	72	9.9	353	48.7	147	20.3	153	21.1	725	100.0
LUXEMBOURG										
Total migrants	26	3.7	226	32.2	262	37.4	186	26.7	700	100.0
of which: EEC	5	1.7	35	11.7	132	44.3	126	42.3	298	100.0
Non-EEC	21	5.2	191	47.5	130	32.3	60	15.0	402	100.0
Eur.	21	5.2	191	47.5	130	32.3	60	15.0	402	100.0
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nationals	24	24.0	27	27.0	21	21.0	28	28.0	100	100.0
Grand Total	50	6.2	253	31.6	283	35.4	214	26.8	800	100.0
NETHERLANDS										
Total migrants	27	4.8	162	28.8	284	50.4	90	16.0	563	100.0
of which: EEC	10	21.7	11	23.9	18	39.1	7	15.3	46	100.0
Non-EEC	17	3.3	151	29.2	266	51.5	83	16.0	517	100.0
Eur.	9	7.2	44	35.2	49	39.2	23	18.4	125	100.0
Non-Eur.	8	2.0	107	27.3	217	55.4	60	15.3	392	100.0
Nationals	4	1.8	56	24.7	51	22.4	140	51.1	227	100.0
Grand Total	31	3.9	248	27.6	335	42.4	206	26.1	790	100.0
UNITED KINGDOM										
Total migrants	40	6.9	144	24.8	225	38.8	171	29.5	580	100.0
of which: EEC	2	2.9	12	17.6	19	27.9	35	51.5	68	100.0
Non-EEC	38	7.4	132	25.8	206	40.2	136	26.6	512	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Eur.	38	7.4	132	25.8	206	40.2	136	26.6	512	100.0
Nationals	15	7.4	47	23.1	43	21.2	98	48.3	203	100.0
Grand Total	55	7.0	191	24.4	268	34.2	269	34.4	783	100.0

TABLE A 3: Persons interviewed classified according to length of stay (1975 situation)

Host country	1965		1965 - 1969		1970 - 1974		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
GERMANY								
Total migrants	222	37.6	208	35.2	161	27.2	591	100.0
of which: EEC	81	41.3	70	35.7	45	23.0	196	100.0
Non-EEC	141	25.7	138	34.9	116	29.4	395	100.0
Eur.	99	50.3	60	30.4	38	19.3	197	100.0
Non-Eur.	42	21.2	78	39.4	78	39.4	198	100.0
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BELGIUM								
Total migrants	164	23.9	412	60.2	109	15.9	685	100.0
of which: EEC	70	53.0	41	31.1	21	15.9	132	100.0
Non-EEC	94	17.0	371	67.1	88	15.9	553	100.0
Eur.	84	28.6	181	61.6	29	9.8	294	100.0
Non-Eur.	10	3.8	190	73.4	59	22.8	259	100.0
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DENMARK								
Total migrants	-	-	160	26.4	445	73.6	605	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	-	-	160	26.4	445	73.6	605	100.0
Eur.	-	-	121	50.2	120	49.8	241	100.0
Non-Eur.	-	-	39	10.7	325	89.3	364	100.0
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE A 3:

FRANCE									
Total migrants	227	31.9	281	39.5	203	28.6	711	100.0	5
of which: EEC	55	82.1	9	13.4	3	4.5	67	100.0	2
Non-EEC	172	26.7	272	42.2	200	31.1	644	100.0	3
Eur.	56	19.3	133	45.9	101	34.8	290	100.0	2
Non-Eur.	116	32.7	139	39.3	99	28.0	354	100.0	1
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
LUXEMBOURG									
Total migrants	282	40.3	133	19.0	285	40.7	700	100.0	
of which: EEC	239	80.2	43	14.4	16	5.4	298	100.0	
Non-EEC	43	10.7	90	22.4	269	66.9	402	100.0	
Eur.	43	10.7	90	22.4	269	66.9	402	100.0	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
NETHERLANDS									
Total migrants	103	18.3	289	51.2	172	30.5	564	100.0	
of which: EEC	15	32.6	14	30.4	17	37.0	46	100.0	
Non-EEC	74	14.6	275	54.5	155	30.9	504	100.0	
Eur.	43	34.6	35	28.2	46	37.2	124	100.0	
Non-Eur.	31	8.1	240	63.1	109	28.8	380	100.0	
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
UNITED KINGDOM									
Total migrants	485	83.4	83	14.2	13	2.4	581	100.0	
of which: EEC	59	86.8	7	10.2	2	3.0	68	100.0	
Non-EEC	426	83.0	76	14.8	11	2.2	513	100.0	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	426	83.0	76	14.8	11	2.2	513	100.0	
Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

TABLE A 4: Distribution of persons interviewed according to wether accompanied by wife and/or children (1975 situation)

Host country							TOTAL		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
GERMANY									
Total migrants	55	9.3	2	0.4	532	90.3	589	100.0	
of which: EEC	29	15.0	1	0.5	164	84.5	194	100.0	
Non-EEC	26	6.6	1	0.2	368	93.2	395	100.0	
Eur.	9	4.6	1	0.5	186	94.9	146	100.0	
Non-Eur.	17	8.5	-	-	182	91.5	199	100.0	
Nationals	30	16.1	-	-	156	83.9	186	100.0	
Grand Total	85	11.0	2	0.2	688	88.8	775	100.0	
BELGIUM									
Total migrants	65	9.4	59	8.5	567	82.1	691	100.0	
of which: EEC	10	7.1	5	3.5	126	89.4	141	100.0	
Non-EEC	55	10.0	54	9.8	441	80.2	550	100.0	
Eur.	17	5.8	6	2.0	272	92.2	295	100.0	
Non-Eur.	38	14.9	48	18.8	169	66.3	255	100.0	
Nationals	13	13.8	3	3.2	78	83.0	94	100.0	
Grand Total	78	9.9	62	7.8	645	82.3	785	100.0	
DENMARK									
Total migrants	64	10.8	118	20.0	409	69.2	591	100.0	14
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	64	10.8	118	20.0	409	69.2	591	100.0	14
Eur.	21	9.0	43	18.7	170	72.6	234	100.0	7
Non-Eur.	43	12.0	75	21.0	239	67.0	357	100.0	7
Nationals	22	11.5	-	-	170	88.5	192	100.0	3
Grand Total	86	11.0	118	15.0	579	74.0	783	100.0	17

TABLE A 4:

FRANCE									
Total migrants	132	18.5	198	27.8	382	53.7	712	100.0	4
of which: EEC	11	15.9	6	8.7	52	75.4	69	100.0	1
Non-EEC	121	18.8	192	29.9	330	51.3	643	100.0	4
Eur.	42	14.4	55	18.9	194	66.7	291	100.0	1
Non-Eur.	79	22.5	137	38.9	136	38.6	352	100.0	3
Nationals	21	19.6	1	1.0	85	79.4	107	100.0	2
Grand Total	153	18.7	199	24.3	467	57.0	819	100.0	6
LUXEMBOURG									
Total migrants	21	3.0	-	-	679	97.0	700	100.0	
of which: EEC	4	1.3	-	-	294	98.7	298	100.0	
Non-EEC	17	4.2	-	-	385	95.8	402	100.0	
Eur.	17	4.2	-	-	395	95.8	402	100.0	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	21	21.0	5	5.0	74	74.0	100	100.0	
Grand Total	42	5.3	5	0.6	753	94.1	800	100.0	
NETHERLANDS									
Total migrants	66	11.8	287	51.2	208	37.0	561	100.0	
of which: EEC	23	50.0	-	-	23	50.0	46	100.0	
Non-EEC	43	8.4	287	55.7	185	35.9	515	100.0	
Eur.	39	31.2	18	14.4	68	55.4	125	100.0	
Non-Eur.	4	1.0	271	69.2	117	29.8	392	100.0	
Nationals	9	4.0	12	5.3	206	90.7	227	100.0	
Grand Total	75	10.6	288	39.4	425	50.0	788	100.0	
UNITED KINGDOM									
Total migrants	43	7.7	54	9.7	462	82.6	559	100.0	
of which: EEC	8	12.7	1	1.6	54	85.7	63	100.0	
Non-EEC	35	7.1	53	10.7	408	82.2	496	100.0	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	35	7.1	53	10.7	408	82.2	496	100.0	
Nationals	26	13.4	1	0.5	167	86.1	194	100.0	
Grand Total	69	9.2	55	7.3	629	83.6	753	100.0	

TABLE A 5: Number of persons living alone or with others (1975 situation)

Host country					TOTAL		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
GERMANY							
Total migrants	66	11.0	528	89.0	594	100.0	
of which: EEC	21	10.6	176	89.4	197	100.0	
Non-EEC	45	11.4	352	88.6	397	100.0	
Eur.	9	4.5	189	95.5	198	100.0	
Non-Eur.	36	18.1	163	81.9	199	100.0	
Nationals	29	14.4	172	85.6	201	100.0	
Grand Total	95	11.9	702	99.9	795	100.0	
BELGIUM							
Total migrants	213	29.6	506	70.4	719	100.0	
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	22	21.0	83	79.0	105	100.0	
Grand Total	235	28.5	589	71.5	804	100.0	
DENMARK							
Total migrants	77	13.1	512	86.9	589	100.0	16
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	77	13.1	512	86.9	589	100.0	
Eur.	23	9.0	210	90.1	233	100.0	8
Non-Eur.	54	15.2	302	84.8	356	100.0	8
Nationals	11	5.6	184	94.4	195	100.0	-
Grand Total	88	11.2	696	88.8	784	100.0	16

TABLE A 5:

FRANCE							
Total migrants	330	46.4	382	53.6	711	100.0	
of which: EEC	17	24.6	52	75.4	69	100.0	
Non-EEC	313	48.7	330	51.3	642	100.0	
Eur.	97	33.4	194	66.6	290	100.0	1
Non-Eur.	216	61.3	136	38.7	352	100.0	3
Nationals	22	20.5	85	79.5	107	100.0	2
Grand Total	352	43.0	467	57.0	818	100.0	6
LUXEMBOURG							
Total migrants	135	19.2	565	80.8	700	100.0	
of which: EEC	32	10.7	266	89.3	298	100.0	
Non-EEC	103	25.6	299	74.4	402	100.0	
Eur.	103	25.6	299	74.4	402	100.0	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	14	14.0	86	86.0	100	100.0	
Grand Total	149	18.6	651	81.4	800	100.0	
NETHERLANDS							
Total migrants	142	25.1	422	74.9	564	100.0	
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	11	4.8	216	95.2	227	100.0	
Grand Total	153	19.3	638	80.7	791	100.0	
UNITED KINGDOM							
Total migrants	36	6.2	545	93.8	581	100.0	
of which: EEC	9	13.2	59	86.8	68	100.0	
Non-EEC	27	5.2	486	94.8	513	100.0	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	27	5.2	486	94.8	513	100.0	
Nationals	3	1.4	200	98.6	203	100.0	
Grand Total	39	4.9	745	95.1	784	100.0	

TABLE A 6: Number of dependents in the country of origin (1975 situation)

Host country	0		1		2		3		4 & +		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
GERMANY												
Total migrants	8	1.6	88	18.4	127	26.5	81	17.0	174	36.5	478	100.0
of which: EEC	6	4.2	22	15.8	44	31.4	27	19.2	41	29.4	140	100.0
Non-EEC	2	0.5	66	19.5	83	24.8	54	16.0	133	39.4	338	100.0
Eur.	2	1.1	63	36.2	58	33.3	30	17.2	21	12.2	174	100.0
Non-Eur.	-	-	3	1.8	25	15.2	24	14.6	112	68.4	164	100.0
Nationals	2	1.1	42	23.7	56	31.6	44	24.8	33	18.8	177	100.0
Grand Total	10	1.5	130	19.8	183	27.9	125	19.0	207	31.8	655	100.0
BELGIUM												
Total migrants	67	11.7	88	15.3	126	22.0	124	21.6	168	29.4	573	100.0
of which: EEC												
Non-EEC												
Eur.												
Non-Eur.												
Nationals	14	19.0	18	24.3	18	24.3	13	17.5	11	14.9	74	100.0
Grand Total	81	12.5	106	16.4	144	22.2	137	21.2	179	27.7	674	100.0
DENMARK												
Total migrants	76	12.5	122	20.2	159	26.4	114	18.8	133	22.1	604	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	76	12.5	122	20.2	159	26.4	114	18.8	133	22.1	604	100.0
Eur.	24	10.0	51	21.2	70	29.2	56	23.4	39	16.2	240	100.0
Non-Eur.	52	14.2	71	19.5	89	24.5	58	15.0	94	25.8	364	100.0
Nationals	12	6.2	51	26.4	39	20.2	57	29.5	34	17.7	193	100.0
Grand Total	88	11.0	173	21.7	198	24.8	171	21.5	167	21.0	797	100.0

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FRANCE												
Total migrants	327	45.7	90	12.7	170	23.7	129	18.0			716	100.0
of which: EEC	15	21.7	14	20.3	32	46.4	8	11.6			69	100.0
Non-EEC	312	48.2	76	11.7	138	21.3	121	18.8			647	100.0
Eur.	97	33.2	54	18.5	94	32.2	47	16.1			292	100.0
Non-Eur.	215	60.6	22	6.2	44	12.4	74	20.8			355	100.0
Nationals	19	17.4	30	27.5	41	37.6	19	17.5			109	100.0
Grand Total	346	41.9	120	14.5	211	25.6	148	18.0			825	100.0
LUXEMBOURG												
Total migrants	135	19.3	85	12.1	155	22.1	190	27.1	135	19.4	700	100.0
of which: EEC	32	10.7	39	13.0	67	22.5	104	34.9	56	18.9	298	100.0
Non-EEC	103	25.6	46	11.4	88	21.9	86	21.4	79	19.7	402	100.0
Eur.	103	25.6	46	11.4	88	21.9	86	21.4	79	19.7	402	100.0
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nationals	14	14.0	25	25.0	30	30.0	17	17.0	14	14.0	100	100.0
Grand Total	149	18.6	110	13.7	185	23.1	207	25.9	149	18.7	800	100.0
NETHERLANDS							3 & +					
Total migrants	355	62.4	27	4.8	38	6.7	144	25.6			564	100.0
of which: EEC	23	50.0	-	-	-	-	23	50.0			46	100.0
Non-EEC	332	58.8	-	-	-	-	121	41.2			521	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nationals	30	13.2	61	26.9	48	21.1	38	38.8	-	-	227	100.0
Grand Total	385	48.7	88	11.1	86	10.9	232	29.3	-	-	791	100.0
UNITED KINGDOM												
Total migrants	107	18.6	56	9.7	89	15.5	83	14.4	240	41.8	575	100.0
of which: EEC	12	17.6	12	17.6	11	16.2	13	19.1	20	29.5	68	100.0
Non-EEC	95	18.7	44	8.7	78	15.4	70	13.8	220	43.4	507	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Eur.	95	18.7	44	8.7	78	15.4	70	13.8	220	43.4	507	100.0
Nationals	39	19.2	57	28.1	39	19.2	39	19.2	29	14.3	203	100.0
Grand Total	146	18.8	113	14.5	128	16.4	122	15.7	269	34.6	778	100.0

CHAPTER 3 - FACTORS DETERMINING THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS

The place assigned to migrant workers in western economies determines their level of income and, consequently, the range of goods and services and housing available to them.

Similarly, the sectoral and geographical breakdown of jobs occupied by migrant workers determines whether they are spread out over the territory or concentrated in specific areas, thus dictating the type and cost of their housing and the range of communal facilities (both public and private) to which they have access. Today, an increasing proportion of manual work is in the tertiary sector, largely concentrated in the major built-up areas, as is construction work at which a large number of migrant workers is employed. On the other hand, jobs in industry are more dispersed and trends in employment in this sector are less encouraging.

We shall first comment on the way migrants are distributed throughout the various occupations and sectors. This varies according to nationality or country of origin and, of course, according to sex. Finally, we shall examination the spatial distribution of migrant workers.

1. Distribution of migrants by sector

Although there is a vast amount of economic and social literature on migrants, there are still no proper analyses of changes in the distribution of migrants among the various sectors and occupations, nor of the "diaspora" from the geographical point of view.

There are not enough statistics on the integration of migrant workers into our economic and social systems; for instance, there are no figures on annual trends in the distribution of migrants by sector and by skill level. However, in recent years, the EEC has been recording data on the number of recruits per year and per sector.

The occupational and sectoral distribution of migrant workers cannot, however, be omitted. The following tables attempt to give an overall picture of the situation in the major sectors - the primary sector (agriculture and mining), the secondary sector (industry) and construction and the tertiary sector (services).

1.1. Distribution among primary, secondary and tertiary sectors

A number of comments may be made on table 22.

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France has the highest number of migrants in the primary sector, followed by Belgium and Luxembourg. All these countries, in fact, employ a considerable proportion of their migrant workers in the coal and iron mines.

In all countries, the majority of migrants work in industry. Germany, with 78.2%, has the greatest percentage of migrants in the secondary sector and it is followed by Denmark, with 74.7%, and France, with 66.1%. However, if account is taken of migrant workers as a percentage of the total work force, Luxembourg is in the lead — 24% of its work force in the secondary sector are foreign workers. In Germany, in spite of the heavy concentration of migrants in industry, they account for only 16% of the total work force in this sector.

In Germany and France, more than 22% of the total work force in construction is migrant labour — i.e. one worker out of five is foreign.

The greatest differences between the countries are in the tertiary sector. In the United Kingdom, 42% of migrants work in the tertiary sector, as against 37.1% in Belgium and 38.6% in Luxembourg.

France is the only country to have a fairly large number of migrant workers in the transport sector (12.4%).

The distribution by sector is, obviously, determined by a number of factors: by the regulations and administrative procedures involved in obtaining work and residence permits; by the fear of unfavourable reactions on the part of consumers, users and clients if migrants are employed in certain types of services, particularly if the ethnic difference is marked; and by the restrictions that workers and their unions place on the hiring of foreign labour. For example, the distribution of migrant workers in the various branches of the automobile industry in the United Kingdom is not determined by economic considerations alone — although little is generally made of any analysis of the other factors bearing on the issue.

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TABLE 22 - COMPARISON BY COUNTRY OF DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS OVER THE THREE MAIN SECTORS, PLUS MIGRANT LABOUR AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL WORK FORCE

Host country	Year	SECTOR											
		Primary		Secondary		of which construction		Tertiary		inc. transport		Grand total	
		% mig.	Mig. total	% mig.	Mig. total	% mig.	Mig. total	% mig.	Mig. total	% mig.	Mig. total	% mig.	Mig. total
Germany	1972	2.4	7.1	73.2	15.3	17.9	22.3	19.4	4.9	1.0	1.6	100.0	10.8
Belgium	1971	8.4	9.7	54.5	3.6	(-)	(-)	37.1	5.2	(-)	(-)	100.0	7.5
Denmark	1974	1.4	(-)	74.7	(-)	2.9	(-)	23.9	(-)	1.0	(-)	100.0	(-)
France	1963	9.8	13.1	66.1	11.4	61.4	12.3	24.1	3.8	2.2	2.3	100.0	7.7
Luxembourg	1966	4.1	7.0	57.3	24.3	(-)	(-)	38.6	16.7	12.4	11.2	100.0	19.0
Netherlands	1976	2.4	(-)	72.3	(-)	4.2	(-)	22.8	(-)	4.6	(-)	100.0	(-)
United Kingdom	1966	1.6	(-)	56.0	(-)	(-)	(-)	42.6	(-)	(-)	(-)	100.0	(-)

Source: Table based on general information supplied in national reports.

(-) Figures not available

1.2. Women workers

It should be possible to analyse the sectoral distribution further by dividing workers according to sex, since both the range of jobs offered and personal preference and skill levels differ according to sex.

Two tables illustrate the importance of such an analysis.

First, table 23 shows the percentage of the foreign labour force (male) according to nationality and region. These figures are, unfortunately, only available for the United Kingdom. Then, table 24 shows the distribution and trends in the foreign labour force by sex, these figures only being available for Belgium.

TABLE 23 - MALE LABOUR FORCE AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE (United Kingdom, 1966)

Male workers Total workers	United Kingdom 64	West-Midlands 63	Greater London 61
Foreign male workers Total foreign workers from Commonwealth	70	79	65
Male workers from Caribbean Total workers from Caribbean	61	64	59
Male workers from India Total workers from India	75	90	69
Male workers from Pakistan Total workers from Pakistan	95	99	88

Source: English report

Table 23 shows what a very small percentage of the total work force from Pakistan is made up of women. Many more Indian and, above all, Caribbean women, go out to work.

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It also emerges that there are major differences in the type of jobs held by women, according to type of region or town. There are many more jobs for women in big cities like London.

These differences in women's share of the labour market are due to a number of things: how the pattern of jobs specifically for women varies according to the place or region where migrants are concentrated; the number of women of a given nationality in the host country; variations in size of family according to nationality or ethnic group; different views on emancipation and women's work and the fact that a large percentage of women's work is black market.

Table 24 shows the difference in distribution of migrant employment of sector and gives the trends in this distribution (Belgium only).

TABLE 24 - TRENDS BY SEX IN JOBS OCCUPIED BY THE FOREIGN LABOUR FORCE AND THE PERCENTAGE OF MALE WORKERS (BELGIUM 1947, 1961 & 1970)

Sectors	Year	M	F	Total	M/Total	F/Total
Agriculture	1947	2.077	115	2.192	94,8	5,2
	1961	886	34	920	96,3	3,7
	1970	509	40	549	93,0	7,0
Mining & quarrying	1947	67.570	299	67.869	99,6	0,4
	1961	50.567	212	50.779	99,6	0,4
	1970	18.492	144	18.636	99,2	0,8
Manufacturing industry Total	1947	36.905	9.119	46.024	80,2	19,8
	1961	37.645	9.385	47.030	80.0	20.0
	1970	68.998	19.621	88.619	77.9	22.1
of which Metallurgy	1970	43.091	5.522	48.613	88.6	11,4
Chemicals	1970	7.352	2.349	9.701	75,8	24,2
Non ferrous metals/ minerals	1970	7.040	1.607	8.647	81,4	18,6
Food & drink Tobacco	1970	3.911	2.052	5.963	65,6	34,4
Textiles	1970	3.227	2.544	5.771	55,9	44,1
Clothing & leather	1970	1.583	5.101	6.684	23,7	76,3
Other	1970	2.734	446	3.240	86,2	13,8
Construction	1947	6.662	18	6.680	99,7	0,3
	1961	8.178	34	8.212	99,6	0,4
	1970	21.390	201	21.591	99,1	0,9
Transport	1947	3.252	50	3.302	98,5	1,5
	1961	2.845	125	2.970	95,8	4,2
	1970	4.777	267	5.044	94,7	5,3
Commerce & Services	1947	4.400	7.903	12.303	35,8	64,2
	1961	7.123	8.140	15.263	46,7	53,3
	1970	21.796	15.277	37.073	58,8	41,2
Total workers	1947	120.866	17.504	138.370	87,3	12,7
	1961	97.244	17.930	115.174	84,4	15,6
	1970	135.962	35.550	171.512	79,3	20,7

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Table 24 (Belgium) calls for a number of comments.

Between 1961 and 1970, the number of migrant workers in mining dropped by 32.000. These people seem to have gone over to the manufacturing industries and to construction and services. Over the same period, the number of migrant workers has increased in most, if not all, manual jobs in the secondary and tertiary sectors.

It also emerges that the percentage of women in the total migrant labour force went up from 12.7% in 1947, to 15.6% in 1961, to reach 20.7% in 1970 and that the number of foreign women workers doubled between 1961 and 1970 in Committee and services as well as in industry.

Women workers from abroad are spread over the sectors in which women are traditionally employed. There are practically none in mining, construction or transport and the highest percentages are in industry (76.3%), textiles (44.1%) and commerce and services (41.2%).

Since 1961, more men have been employed in commerce and services and numbers of men employed in this sector are rising more quickly than numbers of women.

1.3. Distribution of nationalities by sector

As Pierre George has stressed, the high turnover in migrant workers is also accompanied by a succession of different nationalities (20). It is as if resources of labour were running out -- at least, the reserves of cheap, docile labour that the countries of Europe can obtain from the areas inside concentric circles around Europe's two major importers of labour — Germany and France. The United Kingdom recruits its foreign labour from elsewhere - the new Commonwealth.

Immediately after the Second World War, Italy was the prime source and the principal supplier of labour to the other countries of Europe. But after 1960, it was faced with competition both from within Europe and further field. This was the peak period of American investments, following

(20) P. GEORGE, Les Migrations internationales, P.V.F. Paris, 1976, p. 150.

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the setting-up of the Common Market. Then Spain began competing with Italy as a supplier of workers to Germany and France and Greece also entered the field, sending most of its workers to Germany (21).

For a certain period, it was as if the two major importers of labour had shared out the reserves of the various recruitment zones (22).

In 1963, Turkey and Yugoslavia emerged as major suppliers of workers for Germany, and Portugal and North Africa appeared as suppliers for France.

Since 1968, official recruitment has continued in the various countries, but alongside this have emerged a number of parallel, unofficial flows of migrants and the neat divisions of the previous years are becoming blurred.

The other countries of Europe tend to recruit their migrant labour from one or other of the old zones — Denmark and the Netherlands do much the same as Germany, and Luxembourg hires most of its foreign workers from the Latin countries. Belgium tends to follow France, which, like the United Kingdom, recruits a considerable number of workers from its ex-colonies.

This hotch-potch of recruitment of workers from many States — following the signing and implementation of a large number of agreements and bilateral treaties -- does not mean that there is any comparison between the way in which the various nationalities are shared out among the various sectors.

No statistics are available, but it is clear that each successive wave of migrants spread out differently over the various sectors. This is mainly because migrant labour tended to go to whatever sector was short of workers at the time and also because the earlier arrivals gradually moved into those sections of the labour market that were partly or completely abandoned by the national work force.

The information we have at our disposal reveals that each successive wave of migrants only partly replaced the previous one — since the points at which they entered and became integrated into first industrial and then occupational structures were different. The earliest migrants are normally the most widely dispersed. But the speed at which the migrants spread also depends on the general attitude of the population and on the whole series of regulations and agreements which determine the status of the various nationalities. To all this must be added a great deal of discrimination, which ranges from the subtle to the obvious according to the degree of ethnic difference of the migrants in question.

(21) A. Drettakis, quoted by P. George, op. cit. p. 165
(22) B. BELLON, le Volant de main-d'oeuvre, Ed. du Seuil, Paris 1975, p. 132.

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Table 25 shows the interplay of these mechanisms governing the way in which the migrants are distributed among the various sectors.

TABLE 25 - DISTRIBUTION OF MALE FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE WEST MIDLANDS (UK) in 1966

National category	Manufacturing	Construction	Services	Total
Total working population (male)	60.0	10.0	30.0	100.0
Workers from				
Commonwealth	77,0	5,0	18,0	100.0
Caribbean	72,0	8,0	20,0	100.0
India	78,0	6,0	16,0	100.0
Pakistan	89,0	1,5	9,5	100.0

Source: 1966 Sample Census - Commonwealth Tables - Extract from the English report.

This table shows that West Indians, Indians and Pakistanis — three successive waves of immigrants - have spread over the various sectors in very different ways. We shall see below how the same tendencies appear in the distribution by occupation.

Table 26 gives details of migrants of certain nationalities in France.

TABLE 26 - DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR OF MIGRANTS FROM CERTAIN COUNTRIES WORKING IN FRANCE (1973)

Nationality	S E C T O R			
	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	Total
Portuguese	-	87	13	100
Moroccan	3	90	7	100
Algerian	3	80	17	100

The difference between nationalities is usually less marked, but the preponderance of the secondary or industrial sector is greater in France than in the United Kingdom, where migrants have a greater tendency to go into the tertiary sector.

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1.4. Distribution by sector of national and migrant respondents in the national surveys (23)

An analysis of the distribution by sector of respondents in the various countries of the Community is set out in table 27. The distribution is, of necessity, influenced by the place the sample was taken from and the methods used to select it. The table confirms the impression that there are a great many foreign workers in the metal industries, representing between 63% and 76% of the total in Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the United Kingdom. However, construction workers are preponderant in Luxembourg (66.9%) and France (46.5%). This high figure for France can be partly explained by the fact that the sample was taken from a new town. A considerable percentage of migrants were reported as working in transport in the United Kingdom (34.1%) but this arises because of the method of sampling and 16.8% in France. Their share in other sectors of industry and services is considerable in the Netherlands (63%) and in Germany (17.1%).

Overall, the composition of the control group taken from the national work force in the same or neighbouring areas as the migrant workers interviewed is much the same as for the migrant samples (24). Only in the case of Luxembourg are there any real differences.

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(23) A more detailed analysis of the sectoral distribution of migrant respondents can be found in Annex Table A.7.

(24) In the United Kingdom, the control group and the migrant sample were established on the basis of firms'lists of staff.
The same goes for the Danish control group chosen in Copenhagen.

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1.5. Distribution by sector of new arrivals

Although migrant labour is mainly concentrated in the industrial sector, an analysis of the distribution of total and foreign work force (table 29) and the distribution of new arrivals (tables 30 and 31) show that, in all host countries except the Netherlands and Luxembourg, migrants are entering the tertiary sector, in larger numbers. Table 30 confirms this.

This is because our economies are becoming more service-oriented. It is also because the attempts to keep down prices of services and the increasing wages being paid in the tertiary sector have led to the substitution of migrants for nationals, especially in unskilled labouring jobs. The SOPEMI suggests that the increase in employment in services encourages the recruitment of EEC nationals.

In 1974, there was also more recruitment in the primary sector. As the same SOPEMI report points out, this increase in recruitment was due to plans to relaunch the coal industry.

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TABLE 27 - Distribution by sector of nationals and migrant respondents (1975)

Host Country	Workers	SECTORS								Total	
		Metal industry		Construction		Transport		Other industry & services			
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	migrants	375	63.9	72	12.3	10	1.7	130	22.1	587	100.0
	nationals	84	42,8	27	13,8	18	9.2	67	34.2	196	100.0
Belgium	migrants	348	69.0	157	31.0	-	-	-	-	505	100.0
	nationals	43	69.4	19	30.6	-	-	-	-	62	100.0
Denmark	migrants	450(x)	76.1	19	3.2	21	3.6	101	17.1	591	100.0
	nationals	117	60.3	36	18.6	10	5.2	31	15.9	194	100.0
France	migrants	203	31.2	303	46.5	109	16.8	36	5.5	651	100.0
	nationals	45	43.7	18	17.5	38	36.9	2	1.9	103	100.0
Luxem-bourg	migrants	167	23.9	468	66.9	31	4.4	34	4.8	700	100.0
	nationals	60	60.0	9	9.0	15	15.0	16	16.0	100	100.0
Nether-lands	migrants	153	27.2	26	4.6	29	5.1	355	63.0	563	100.0
	nationals	28	15.6	43	23.9	21	11.7	88	48.8	180	100.0
United Kingdom	migrants	378	64.9	-	-	204	35.1	-	-	582	100.0
	nationals	122	59.8	-	-	-	36.3	1	0.5	204	100.0

(x): This includes a certain number of workers from elsewhere in the industrial sector.

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TABLE 28 - DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR OF MIGRANT RESPONDENTS (Percentages, 1975)

Host Country	Workers	SECTOR								Total	
		Industry		Construction		Transport		Other			
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	EEC	95	49.0	21	10.8	9	4.6	69	35.6	194	100.0
	Eur.	133	68.2	22	11.3	-	-	40	20.5	195	100.0
	Non-Eur.	147	74.2	29	14.6	1	0.6	21	10.6	198	100.0
Belgium	EEC	84	82.4	18	17.6	-	-	-	-	102	100.0
	Eur.	126	64.3	70	35.7	-	-	-	-	196	100.0
	Non-Eur.	138	66.7	69	33.3	-	-	-	-	207	100.0
Denmark	EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Eur.	209	86.7	8	3.3	1	0.4	23	9.6	241	100.0
	Non-Eur.	241	68.9	11	3.1	20	5.7	78	22.3	350	100.0
France	EEC	14	21.5	40	61.6	10	15.4	1	1.5	65	100.0
	Eur.	51	21.1	162	67.0	28	11.5	1	0.4	242	100.0
	Non-Eur.	138	40.1	101	29.4	71	20.6	34	9.9	344	100.0
Luxem-bourg	EEC	85	28.5	189	63.4	17	5.7	7	2.4	298	100.0
	Eur.	82	20.4	279	69.4	14	3.5	27	6.7	402	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	- -	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nether-lands	EEC	31	67.4	34	6.5	4	8.7	8	17.4	46	100.0
	Eur.	104	83.2	1	0.8	7	5.6	13	10.4	125	100.0
	Non-Eur.	324	32.4	22	5.6	1	4.6	29	7.4	393	100.0
United Kingdom	EEC	38	55.9	-	-	30	44.1	-	-	68	100.0
	Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	339	66.0	-	-	174	34.0	-	-	513	100.0

TABLE 29 - DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL AND MIGRANT LABOUR FORCE
(thousands & percentages)

Country	SECTOR							
	Primary		Secondary		Tertiary		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany, 1972								
Foreigners	54.9	2.4	1840	78.2	458	19.4	2352	100.0
Total	772.0	3.5	11671	53.5	9368	43.0	21811	100.0
Foreigners as % of total	7.1		15.8		4.9		10.8	
Belgium, 1972								
Foreign males	20.3	10.91	111.2	59.58	55.1	29.51	186.7	100.0
Belgian males	161.2	7.03	1137.5	49.62	993.7	43.35	2292.3	100.0
Foreign fema.	0.4	0.63	23.2	38.69	36.4	60.88	60.0	100.0
Belgian fema.	29.5	2.99	288.3	29.26	667.6	67.75	985.5	100.0
Total foreign.	20.7	8.4	134.5	54.5	91.5	37.1	246.7	100.0
Total Belgians	190.7	5.8	1425.8	43.5	1661.3	50.7	3277.8	100.0
Total	211.4	5.9	1560.3	44.3	1752.8	49.7	3524	100.0
Foreigners as % of total	9.7		8.6		5.2		7.5	
Denmark, 1974								
Foreigners	-	1.4	-	74.8	-	23.9	-	100.0
Turks	-	2.9	-	85.2	-	12.9	-	100.0
Yugoslavs	-	0.3	-	85.2	-	14.6	-	100.0
Pakistanis	-	0.4	-	79.5	-	20.2	-	100.0
France, 1962								
Foreigners	138	14.18	573	61.1	226	24.1	938	100.0
Total	1155	8.6	6219	46.4	6026	45.0	13400	100.0
Foreigners as % of total	12.0		9.2		3.8		7.0	
1968								
Foreigners	114	9.8	766	66.1	279	24.1	1158	100.0
Total	868	5.8	6731	44.9	7397	49.3	14996	100.0
Foreigners as % of total	13.1		11.4		3.8		7.7	
Luxembourg, 1960								
Foreigners	1.4	7.2	10.9	54.4	7.7	38.4	20.0	100.0
Total	19.3	15.0	56.6	44.1	52.5	40.9	128.5	100.0
Foreigners as % of total	7.5		19.2		14.6		15.6	
1966								
Foreigners	1.0	4.1	14.3	57.3	9.6	38.6	24.9	100.0
Total	14.6	11.1	58.7	44.9	57.4	43.9	130.7	100.0
Foreigners as % of total	7.0		24.3		16.7		19.0	
United Kingdom 1966								
Total males	-	8.0	-	48.0	-	43.0	-	100.0
Commonwealth m.	-	1.0	-	56.0	-	42.0	-	100.0
Irish males	-	1.7	-	63.2	-	32.5	-	100.0
Total males in West Midlands	-	0.4	-	69.0	-	30.0	-	100.0
Commonwealth m. in West Midlands	-	0.2	-	81.0	-	17.0	-	100.0
of which West Indians	-	-	-	79.0	-	20.0	-	100.0
Indians	-	-	-	82.0	-	15.0	-	100.0
Pakistanis	-	-	-	89.5	-	9.0	-	100.0

TABLE 30 - COMPARISON BETWEEN DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT WORKERS AND DISTRIBUTION OF NEW ARRIVALS, BY THREE MAIN SECTORS

Host Country	Year	SECTOR			Total
		Primary	Secondary	Tertiary	
Germany	Total 1972	2.4	78.2	19.4	100.0
	New arrivals				
	1973	-	60.3	39.7	100.0
	1974	-	38.0	62.0	100.0
Belgium	Total 1971	8.4	54.5	37.1	100.0
	New arrivals				
	1973	4.6	44.4	51.0	100.0
	(EEC alone)				
	1974	5.6	50.5	43.9	100.0
Denmark	Total 1974	1.4	74.7	23.9	100.0
	New arrivals				
	1973	-	-	-	-
	1974	-	-	-	-
France	Total 1968	9.8	66.1	24.1	100.0
	New arrivals				
	1973	12.8	59.9	27.3	100.0
	1974	15.8	52.6	31.6	100.0
Luxembourg	Total 1966	4.1	57.3	38.6	100.0
	New arrivals				
	1973	18.3	56.1	25.6	100.0
	1974	20.6	56.9	22.5	100.0
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-
	New arrivals				
	1973	2.2	65.5	32.3	100.0
	1974	1.6	67.0	31.4	100.0
United Kingdom	Total 1966	1.0	56.0	42.0	100.0
	New arrivals				
	1973	3.5	10.5	86.0	100.0
	1974	4.6	11.5	83.9	100.0

Source: Document EEC V/51/75-F Emploi des travailleurs étrangers, Directorate for living and working conditions.

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TABLE 31 - PLACEMENT OF MIGRANT WORKERS OVER THE PERIOD 1973 - 1974

Host Country	SECTORS							
	Primary		Secondary		Tertiary		Total	
	number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Belgium 1973 EEC	-		-		-		-	
Non-Comm.	273	4.6	2.613	44.4	3.006	51.0	5.892	100
Total								
1974 EEC	-		-		-		-	
Non-Comm.	346	5.6	3.092	50.5	2.692	43.9	6.130	100
Total								
Germany 1973 EEC	-		-		-		-	
Non-Comm.	-	-	192.294	60.3	126.778	39.7	319.072	100
Total								
EEC	-	-	976		463		1.439	100
Non-Comm.	-	-	17.181		29.142		46.323	100
Total	-	-	18.157	38.0	29.605	62.0	47.762	100
France 1973 EEC	225		4.072		5.642		9.939	100
permanent workers Non-Comm.	16.688		75.051		30.377		122.116	100
Total	16.913	12.8	79.123	59.9	36.019	27.3	132.055	100
1974 EEC	298		4.683		6.045		11.026	100
Non-Comm.	9.886		29.242		14.307		53.435	100
Total	10.184	15.8	33.925	52.6	20.352	31.6	64.461	100
Luxembourg 1973								
EEC	1.030		1.375		817		3.222	100
Non-Comm.	196		2.389		901		3.486	100
Total	1.226	18.3	3.764	56.1	1.718	25.6	6.708	100
1974								
EEC	1.157		522		375		2.054	100
Non-Comm.	240		3.333		1.146		4.719	100
Total	1.397	20.6	3.855	56.9	1.521	22.5	6.773	100
Netherlands 1973								
EEC	-		-		-		6.655	100
Non-Comm.	339	2.2	10.025	65.5	4.937	32.3	15.301	100
Total								
1974								
EEC	-		-		-		7.010	100
Non-Comm.	249	1.6	10.658	67.0	4.996	31.4	15.903	100
Total								
United Kingdom 1973								
EEC	494		1.443		4.465		6.402	100
Non-Comm.	875		2.661		29.303		32.839	100
Total	1.369	3.5	4.104	10.5	33.768	86.0	39.241	100
1974 EEC	391		1.276		4.102		5.769	100
Non-Comm.	1.389		3.198		28.458		33.045	100
Total	1.780	4.6	4.474	11.5	32.560	83.9	38.814	100

Source : EEC Document V/51/75 op. cit.

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2. Distribution by occupation

Although it is true that the extent and speed of changes in the distribution of migrants over the various sectors depends on nationality (since there is a hierarchy here) and on sex (because of the nature of the work), migrants are also distributed differently according to occupation.

All available statistical data suggest that they are concentrated in the unskilled worker category, particularly in those branches where little or no skill or qualifications are required and which, given prevailing working conditions and pay, are shunned by national workers.

The vast majority of migrant workers are at the bottom of the occupation and hierarchical pyramid.

TABLE 32 - DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING POPULATION IN BELGIUM BY SEX AND OCCUPATIONAL STATUS (percentages, 1971)

Occupational status	Men		Women	
	Belgian	Foreign	Belgian	Foreign
Employers & self-employed	16,98	7,21	12,65	6,81
White collar	34,46	18,93	46,05	30,00
Workers, assistants & others	48,56	73,86	41,30	63,19
Total	100,00	100,00	100,00	100,00

TABLE 33 - COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF FRENCH AND FOREIGN WORKERS BY PROFESSIONAL SUB-CATEGORY (percentages, 1971)

Sub-category	Men		Women	
	French	Foreign	French	Foreign
Foremen & skilled workers	54,9	39,5	25,4	15,7
Semi-skilled, unskilled, apprentices & others	45,1	60,5	74,6	84,3
Total	100,00	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: INSEE, quoted in the French report.

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TABLE 34 - PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS BY NATIONALITY IN FRANCE (1973)

Nationality	Qualification			Total
	Unskilled & semi-skilled	Skilled	White collar, technicians, management etc.	
Italian	51,4	41,1	7,5	100,0
Spanish	62,6	31,5	5,9	100,0
Portuguese	70,0	28,8	1,2	100,0
Tunisian	70,3	16,1	13,6	100,0
Yugoslav	70,8	23,9	5,3	100,0
Moroccan	81,4	14,9	3,7	100,0
Algerian	87,2	11,5	1,3	100,0

Source: INSEE, op, cit.

These tables confirm that migrants tend to be semi-skilled or unskilled workers.

Table 34 shows that this tendency is more marked in the case of certain nationalities. In all countries but the United Kingdom, the preponderance of semi-skilled and unskilled workers is borne out by the level of qualification of migrant workers in manual jobs who were interviewed in the national surveys on housing conditions.

Table 35 gives percentages of unskilled/semi-skilled and skilled workers among migrant and national respondents.

Table 36 compares the distribution (percentages) by major category of respondents — Community workers, Europeans, nationals from non-EEC countries of Europe and nationals from other third countries (25).

(25) Further details of the distribution by qualification can be obtained from table 8 in annex to this chapter.

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TABLE 53 - DISTRIBUTION (ABSOLUTE NUMBERS AND PERCENTAGES) OF MIGRANT AND NATIONAL RESPONDENTS, BY LEVEL OF QUALIFICATION (1975)

Host Country	Workers	Professional qualifications						Total respondents	
		Apprentices, Semi-skilled & unskilled		Skilled		Foremen & technicians			
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	migrants	508	88,2	59	10,2	9	1,6	576	100,0
	Nationals	106	54,3	71	36,4	18	9,3	195	100,0
Belgium	migrants	588	84,2	110	15,8	---	-	698	100,0
	nationals	68	64,1	38	35,9	-	-	106	100,0
Denmark	migrants	479	81,8	84	14,3	22	3,9	585	100,0
	nationals	117	61,0	53	27,6	22	11,4	192	100,0
France	migrants	456	67,2	195	28,8	27	4,0	678	100,0
	nationals	54	55,7	31	32,0	12	12,3	97	100,0
Luxembourg	migrants	521	74,4	157	22,4	22	3,2	700	100,0
	nationals	75	75,0	18	18,0	7	7,0	100	100,0
Nether-and	migrants	457	81,6	100	17,8	3	0,6	560	100,0
lands	nationals	123	68,3	50	27,8	7	3,9	180	100,0
United	migrants	222	38,2	340	58,5	19	3,3	581	100,0
Kingdom	nationals	60	29,7	121	60,0	21	10,3	202	100,0

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TABLE 36 - DISTRIBUTION OF MIGRANT RESPONDENTS BY AREA OF ORIGIN AND LEVEL OF QUALIFICATION (1975)

Host Country	Workers	Professional qualifications						Total respondents	
		Apprentices, semi-skilled & unskilled		Skilled		Foremen, technicians & others			
		number	%	number	%	number	%	number	%
Germany	EEC	156	83.0	24	12.7	8	4.3	188	100.0
	Eur.	187	98.0	4	2.0	-	-	191	100.0
	Non-Eur.	165	83.8	31	15.8	1	0.4	197	100.0
Belgium	EEC	119	83.2	24	16.8	-	-	143	100.0
	Eur.	245	81.6	55	18.4	-	-	300	100.0
	Non-Eur.	224	87.8	31	12.2	-	-	255	100.0
Denmark	EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Eur.	176	74.0	55	13.1	7	2.9	238	100.0
	Non-Eur.	303	87.3	29	8.3	15	4.4	347	100.0
France	EEC	27	42.1	29	45.3	8	12.6	64	100.0
	Eur.	178	63.8	89	32.0	12	4.2	279	100.0
	Non-Eur.	251	75.0	77	23.0	7	2.0	335	100.0
Luxembourg	EEC	219	72.3	70	23.1	14	4.6	303	100.0
	Eur.	302	76.1	87	22.0	8	1.9	397	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	EEC	24	52.2	22	47.8	-	-	46	100.0
	Eur.	94	75.8	29	23.4	1	0.8	124	100.0
	Non-Eur.	339	87.0	49	12.6	2	0.4	390	100.0
United Kingdom	EEC	22	32.3	46	67.7	-	-	68	100.0
	Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	200	39.0	294	57.3	19	3.7	513	100.0

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These tables only require brief comments.

Most respondents in the United Kingdom — both migrants and nationals — were skilled workers. In the other countries, the percentage of unskilled and semi-skilled varied between 54% and 88%.

In all countries except Luxembourg, migrants are more often unskilled and semi-skilled workers than are nationals.

Except in Germany and Belgium, percentages of unskilled and semi-skilled workers are higher in the case of nationals from countries outside Europe. Behind them come Europeans from outside the Community and then people from the Community itself — who are, judging from the sample, proportionately more often skilled. In Germany, Turks are more often skilled than migrant workers from Community countries and, in Belgium, Europeans from outside the Community are the most highly skilled.

3. Geographical distribution of migrant workers

Migrant workers who have settled in host countries within the European Community tend to congregate in industrial and urban areas — i.e. they are concentrated in the main mining and industrial areas and the major urban centres of western Europe.

This geographical distribution corresponds quite closely to the location of centres of employment and places of work. The jobs and sectors in which migrants work, the level of income that goes with them, partially explain the way the migrants are spread over the territory (26).

In the primary sector, migrant workers usually find jobs in coal and iron mining areas. Jobs in manufacturing are more common in the major industrial areas — which may or may not correspond to the mining zones. Finally, services are heavily concentrated in the main towns and more particularly, in the metropolitan districts. These districts are the location of various secondary activities which, like the building trade, are heavily concentrated in urban areas. This concentration increases with the rate of growth of the towns themselves. Changes in distribution by sector and by occupation-particularly in the distribution of migrant workers among the various sectors and jobs — have also meant changes in the residential pattern.

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(26) In Germany, two thirds of foreign workers live in 7% of the country. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit: Ausländische Arbeitnehmer, 1972-73, Nuremberg 1974, quoted by Günter Schiller in la régulation des migrations, Aperçu de quelques politiques notamment en République Fédérale d'Allemagne dans : "Revue Internationale du travail", Vol. 111, n°4, avril 1975, p. 365.

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Over the last few years, the tertiarization of our economies and the changes and rationalization of mining, particularly in the coal and iron sector, have reinforced the tendency of migrant labour to settle in the towns. However, the workers who settle in the towns are not necessarily the same ones who have moved away from the primary to the other sectors.

3.1. Degree of urban concentration

A statistical analysis shows that the majority of migrants today are concentrated in metropolitan districts and major industrial zones.

In Germany, the majority of the country's 2 350 000 migrant workers are in the Rhine valley, particularly in North Rhine Westphalia (679.000) and Baden-Würtemburg (570 000).

In Belgium, 69 000 of the 1974 total of 230 000 migrant workers — i.e. 30% — were in Brabant. (27).

In Denmark, a large proportion of the 36 000 migrant workers live in or around Copenhagen.

In France, 694 000 — i.e. 36.5% — of the 1 900 000 migrant workers registered in 1974 were in the Paris area.

In Luxembourg, most migrant workers are in the capital, although there is a fair concentration near Esch, the capital of the iron industry. However, overall, they are fairly widely distributed over the country as a whole.

In the Netherlands, migrants are localized in the south west (Randstadt Holland). There are a number of very large towns in this area, which means that migrants are encouraged to spread — 29 000 of the 132 000 migrant workers are in the Amsterdam area (North Holland), 36 000 are around Rotterdam and the Hague and 10 000 in the region around Utrecht.

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(27) S. PANCIERA, M. PLEVOETS, V. CAMPANELLI et J. DELCOURT, Les travailleurs immigrés dans l'Agglomération bruxelloise, Agglomération de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1976.

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In the United Kingdom, more than 55% of migrants — i.e. 927 000 of the total 1 665 000 migrant workers in 1971 — live and work in the Greater London area.

To sum up then, the majority of migrant workers — whose arrival en masse was, in fact, never planned by any of the countries of Europe — are concentrated in the thriving and most populous areas of the Community. They came into the areas of heaviest demand for housing where everything was ripe for overcrowding; to the fringe areas where houses were oldest and most unhealthy; and to quarters due for demolition that lent themselves to land speculation and re-development.

On housing markets of this type, much the same thing will happen as is happening on the labour market, as W.R. Böhning as pointed out. This is to say that the foreigners will move into areas and housing that the national population has abandoned (28) and that they will tend to form colonies, ensuring themselves a sufficiently wide network of primary relations (29). The French report has clearly shown that an old urban complex is most suitable for the formation of this type of social relations network — in spite of the unhealthy conditions of much of the housing. None of which is a reason for the unhealthy conditions..

Migrant workers enter the economy at the point where there is the greatest shortage of labour and thus go to areas where the housing market is already tight.

Large numbers are attracted to jobs demanding no or few qualifications and are concentrated in the biggest and densest industrial and urban centres. Housing here is already a problem and this obviously has a bearing on the standard of the residential area and type of accommodation available to the migrants — and to similar categories of national workers.

The tertiarization of our economies, which helps push up the number of women migrants, in all probability encourages families to re-unit and leads to migrant waters and their families remaining in certain parts of the towns. This, in addition of other factors — which are analyzed in the following chapters — makes the housing market even more difficult

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(28) W.R. BÖHNING et D. MAILLAT, Les effets de l'emploi des travailleurs migrants, Organisation de Coopération au Développement Economique, Paris 1974, p. 37.

(29) J. REX et R. MOORE, Race Community and Conflict, A study of Sparbook, Oxford Univ. Press, London 1967, pp. 8-9.

(30) Rapport français, pp. 233-252.

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TABLE A 7: Distribution of persons by occupational sector

Host country							Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
GERMANY									
Total migrants	508	88.2	59	10.2	9	1.6	576	100.0	
of which: EEC	156	83.0	24	12.7	8	4.3	188	100.0	
Non-EEC	352	90.8	35	9.0	1	0.2	388	100.0	
Eur.	187	98.0	4	2.0	-	-	191	100.0	
Non-Eur.	165	83.0	31	15.8	1	0.4	197	100.0	
Nationals	106	54.3	71	36.4	18	9.3	195	100.0	
Grand Total	614	79.6	130	16.8	27	3.6	771	100.0	
BELGIUM									
Total migrants	588	84.8	110	15.8	-	-	698	100.0	
of which: EEC	119	83.2	24	16.8	-	-	143	100.0	
Non-EEC	469	84.5	86	15.5	-	-	555	100.0	
Eur.	245	81.6	55	18.4	-	-	300	100.0	
Non-Eur.	224	87.8	31	12.2	-	-	255	100.0	
Nationals	68	64.1	38	35.9	-	-	106	100.0	
Grand Total	656	81.7	148	18.3	-	-	804	100.0	
DENMARK									
Total migrants	479	81.8	84	14.3	22	3.9	585	100.0	
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-EEC	479	81.8	84	14.3	22	3.9	585	100.0	
Eur.	176	74.0	55	23.1	7	2.9	238	100.0	3
Non-Eur.	303	87.3	29	8.3	15	4.4	347	100.0	17
Nationals	117	61.0	53	27.6	22	11.4	192	100.0	3
Grand Total	596	76.7	137	17.6	44	5.7	777	100.0	23
FRANCE									
Total migrants	456	67.2	195	28.8	27	4.0	678	100.0	
of which: EEC	27	42.1	29	45.3	8	12.6	64	100.0	
Non-EEC	429	70.0	166	27.0	19	3.0	614	100.0	
Eur.	178	63.8	89	32.0	12	4.2	279	100.0	
Non-Eur.	251	75.0	77	23.0	7	2.0	335	100.0	
Nationals	54	55.7	31	32.0	12	12.3	97	100.0	
Grand Total	510	65.8	226	29.1	39	5.1	775	100.0	
LUXEMBOURG									
Total migrants	521	74.4	157	22.4	22	3.2	700	100.0	
of which: EEC	219	72.3	70	23.1	14	4.6	303	100.0	
Non-EEC	302	76.1	87	22.0	8	1.9	397	100.0	
Eur.	302	76.1	87	22.0	8	1.9	397	100.0	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	75	75.0	18	18.0	7	7.0	100	100.0	
Grand Total	596	74.5	175	21.9	29	3.6	800	100.0	
NETHERLANDS									
Total migrants	457	81.6	100	17.8	3	0.6	560	100.0	
of which: EEC	24	52.2	22	47.8	-	-	46	100.0	
Non-EEC	433	84.2	78	15.2	3	0.6	514	100.0	
Eur.	94	75.8	29	23.4	1	0.8	124	100.0	
Non-Eur.	339	87.0	49	12.6	2	0.4	390	100.0	
Nationals	123	68.3	50	27.8	7	3.9	180	100.0	
Grand Total	580	78.4	150	20.3	10	1.3	740	100.0	
UNITED KINGDOM									
Total migrants	222	38.2	340	58.5	19	3.3	[illegible]	100.0	
of which: EEC	22	32.3	46	67.7	-	-	[illegible]	100.0	
Non-EEC	200	39.0	294	57.3	19	3.7	513	100.0	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	200	39.0	294	57.3	19	3.7	513	100.0	
Nationals	60	29.7	121	60.0	21	10.3	202	100.0	
Grand Total	282	36.0	461	59.0	40	5.0	782	100.0	

TABLE A 5: Distribution of persons by level of skills (1975 situation)

Host country									Total		
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
GERMANY											
Total migrants	72	12.3	375	63.9	10	1.7	130	22.1	587	100.0	
of which: EEC	21	10.8	95	49.0	9	4.6	69	35.6	194	100.0	
Non-EEC	51	12.9	280	71.2	1	0.2	61	15.7	393	100.0	
Eur.	22	11.3	133	68.2	-	-	40	20.5	195	100.0	
Non-EEC	29	14.6	147	74.2	1	0.6	21	10.6	198	100.0	
Nationals	27	13.8	84	42.8	18	9.2	67	34.2	196	100.0	
Grand Total	99	12.6	459	58.5	28	3.6	197	25.1	783	100.0	
BELGIUM											
Total migrants	157	31.0	348	69.0	-	-	-	-	505	100.0	
of which: EEC	18	17.6	84	82.4	-	-	-	-	102	100.0	
Non-EEC	139	34.5	264	65.5	-	-	-	-	403	100.0	
Eur.	70	35.7	126	64.3	-	-	-	-	196	100.0	
Non-Eur.	69	23.3	138	66.7	-	-	-	-	207	100.0	
Nationals	19	30.6	43	69.4	-	-	-	-	62	100.0	
Grand Total	176	31.0	391	69.0	-	-	-	-	567	100.0	
DENMARK											
Total migrants	19	3.2	450	76.1	21	3.6	101	17.1	591	100.0	
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-EEC	19	3.2	450	76.1	21	3.6	101	17.1	591	100.0	
Eur.	8	3.3	209	86.7	1	0.4	23	9.6	241	100.0	
Non-Eur.	11	3.1	241	68.9	20	5.7	78	22.3	350	100.0	14
Nationals	36	18.6	117	60.3	10	5.2	31	15.9	194	100.0	1
Grand Total	55	7.0	567	72.2	31	3.9	132	16.9	785	100.0	15
FRANCE											
Total migrants	303	46.5	203	31.2	109	16.8	36	5.5	651	100.0	
of which: EEC	40	61.6	14	21.5	10	15.4	1	1.5	65	100.0	
Non-EEC	263	44.9	189	32.2	99	16.9	35	6.0	586	100.0	
Eur.	162	67.0	51	21.1	28	11.5	1	0.4	242	100.0	
Non-Eur.	101	29.4	138	40.1	71	20.6	34	9.9	344	100.0	
Nationals	18	17.5	45	43.7	38	36.9	2	1.9	103	100.0	
Grand Total	321	42.5	248	32.9	147	19.5	38	5.1	754	100.0	
LUXEMBOURG											
Total migrants	468	66.9	167	23.9	31	4.4	34	4.8	700	100.0	
of which: EEC	189	63.4	85	28.5	17	5.7	7	2.4	298	100.0	
Non-EEC	279	69.4	82	20.4	14	3.5	27	6.7	402	100.0	
Eur.	279	69.4	82	20.4	14	3.5	27	6.7	402	100.0	
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Nationals	9	9.0	60	60.0	15	15.0	16	16.0	100	100.0	
Grand Total	477	59.6	227	28.4	46	5.8	50	6.2	800	100.0	
NETHERLANDS											
Total migrants	26	5.0	153	27.0	29	5.0	355	63.0	563	100.0	
of which: EEC	3	7.0	12	26.0	4	9.0	27	59.0	46	100.0	
Non-EEC	23	5.0	141	27.0	25	5.0	328	63.0	517	100.0	
Eur.	1	1.0	25	20.0	7	6.0	92	73.0	125	100.0	
Non-Eur.	22	6.0	116	29.0	18	5.0	230	59.0	392	100.0	
Nationals	43	24.0	28	16.0	21	12.0	88	48.0	180	100.0	
Grand Total	69	9.0	181	24.0	50	7.0	443	60.0	743	100.0	
UNITED KINGDOM											
Total migrants	-	-	378	64.9	204	35.1	-	-	582	100.0	
of which: EEC	-	-	38	55.9	30	44.1	-	-	68	100.0	
Non-EEC	-	-	339	66.0	174	34.0	-	-	513	100.0	
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-Eur.	-	-	339	66.0	174	34.0	-	-	513	100.0	
Nationals	-	-	122	59.8	81	39.7	1	0.5	204	100.0	
Grand Total	-	-	499	63.6	285	36.3	1	0.1	785	100.0	

CHAPTER 4 - ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN THE GROWING VOLUME OF MIGRANT MANPOWER AND ITS UTILISATION

1. Limitations of statistical analysis

In itself, an analysis of the growth in the number of migrant workers in the European Community, of their various social characteristics, of their occupational distribution of whence they came and whither they have gone will tell us nothing about why jobs are given to an ever-increasing number of them, how it is possible to recruit them in such numbers, by what procedures jobs are found for them nor how or why their distribution in different industries, occupations and regions has changed over the years.

Irrespective of the amount of detail involved, statistical analysis of the distribution of these workers, gives us no help in identifying the tasks assigned to them, nor the cost-benefit ratios or the social and economic effects of using their labour. Data analysis by itself gives us no guidance about the succession of functions the migrant workers have fulfilled in our economic development and in the various phases of rationalisation which economic growth implies. Nor yet does it tell us whether the growing diversity of jobs in which these workers are employed, and their gradual transition from mining and manufacturing into tertiary or service occupations, is really an indication that compartmentalisation of the market for foreign labour is breaking down, nor how the growth in numbers and movement between sectors are influencing the housing facilities and conditions.

The statistical approach will indeed provide an indication of the importance of the migrants and the part they play, prompting enquiry into the effect of controls and restrictions, an appraisal of the effects of day-to-day policies operated by officials, both on the emigration and on the immigration side; but it cannot by itself elucidate the multiplicity of causes and responsibilities involved in the massive numbers of migrants who arrive. There are many other factors and phenomena for which it can offer no explanation. These include the changes, both gradual and sudden, in bringing this manpower into use; the reasons why migrants are sometimes encouraged to settle permanently and sometimes encouraged to move back and forth between the host country and the country of origin. Nor can it explain inhibiting forces such as the drastic prohibition of arrivals since the end of 1973; and the setting of a strict control over the flow of migrants "while avoiding wholesale dismissals such as those which occurred in the 1966-67 recession". It is as though the EEC countries "having put an end to the importation of labour, were now seeking to protect, and make better use of, the stock of foreign workers they already have. No other explanation seems to fit the measures authorising the reunion of family groups and the aid for the establishment and integration of migrant workers, the housing policies and the measures aimed at involving foreigners in local or regional administration" (31)

A closer understanding of the factors determining the flow of migrants is needed, if we are to arrive at a valid outline of a housing policy for the workers involved. It calls not only for an estimate of the number of

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(31) SOPEMI, 1975 Report opp. p. 6

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migrants in future years, but also some knowledge of the factors which bring them into the economic system or keep them outside it, which determine how they establish themselves locally, whether their settlement is temporary or permanent in character, and whether they migrate as single units or bring their families with them.

Quite apart from the shortcomings in the housing policies of the EEC countries, the way the migrant workers are housed depends partly on how they are placed in the labour market and partly on the type and extent of the facilities developed in the urban centres where most of them are located. The layout and construction of these centres are determined as much by the workings of the property market as by the occupations and social groups coming successively into prominence there.

In this chapter it is proposed to analyse primarily the economic developments and the resulting changes in the labour market which explain the growing utilisation of migrant manpower. There is no general and overall plan determining this utilisation which has continued as a direct reaction to the different phases of economic development and the various changes involved.

They are inherent difficulties in any attempt to describe the course of economic development in such a way as to account for the growth in migration. Each of the countries concerned has an economic and industrial policy of its own; each has its own immigration policy, its social policy and its housing policy; and we should thus be driven to regard each country as a special case. Moreover, our analysis is made more difficult by the fact that different types of explanation can be advanced for the same facts, and there are correspondingly different views as to what ought to be done about them.

Explanations must cover the migratory flow itself, the use of which this manpower is put and the wages paid for it. The two main categories of explanation are the "factor" class and the "actor" class. The former offers an explanation in terms of the economic and other factors operating at any specific time. The latter refers to explanations based on the outlooks of the individuals, departments and institutions involved in deciding upon emigration and immigration policies.

There would not be any serious problem in combining these two approaches, were it not that the "actor-factor" dichotomy is complicated by two types of economic explanation. The normal liberal explanation makes a study of the growth in the numbers of migrants, and explains it by the influence of economic forces and restrictions on the labour market. The second approach, which may be dubbed the "critical" one, analyses migration as the resultant of a relationship between different forces and an exchange on unequal terms between the highly industrialised countries of the centre and the less industrial periphery. This approach also

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examines the influence of migration in the development of class relationships inside the two sets of countries.

The reasoning in favour of the former thesis starts from the relative abundance manpower characteristic of the manpower-exporting countries, compared with the manpower-importing countries. An alternative starting place is the discrepancy in wages and the aspirations raised by the high wages paid in the highly industrial countries. The analysis also extends to the political and administrativ machinery, which consists essentially of the decision making system through which the supply of, and demand for, labour are matched.

In the "critical" argument, the migratory flux is explained by a relationship of economic domination and dependence inherent in the operation of the capitalist economic system. According to Bertrand BELLON, for example, "the international exploitation of labour can take two forms — the export of capital to the places of origin of the underdeveloped labour force, and the importation of this same labour force to the places where the product is made. Both these stem from the same logical approach and are aimed to produce more at lower cost".(32).

Incidentally the two methods of development described here are substitutes for one another. In the words of Gérard LYON-CAEN, "one is the transfer of capital to wherever manpower is abundant and cheap and is to be found anywhere from Taïwan to Singapore from Mexico to Spain. The other is the transfer to the industrial centres of the manpower available from densely populated countries in which capital is lacking. One day it will be recognised that both approaches stem from the same phenomenon — the decline in the sovereignty of States and the emergence of a single market in which the power of international capital can have free and limitless rein" (33).

Viewed from this standpoint the export of labour becomes a matter of bargaining between the countries which dominate and the bourgeois classes in the dominated countries. It helps to mask local under-employment and to maintain advantages secured by part of the native middle-class" (34).

This explanation, too, contains an economic argument — an analysis of the exploitation of surplus value — and a political one — an analysis of the convergent interests of the governing classes in the economic and

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(32) B. BELLON, op. cit., pp 125 et seq.
(33) LYON-CAEN, Les travailleurs étrangers, étude comparative, Droit social, No. 1, p. 2, January 1875
(34) BELLON, op. cit., p. 129

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political fields and the balance of power within the class system of the countries concerned.

It is no part of the purpose of an international report, and still less of the following paragraphs, to make a choice between different standpoints or analyses. Its objective is rather to attempt the most objective summary possible of the facts put forward by both sides, calling attention to differences of interpretation and various specific sets of circumstances.

In what follows we shall consider the various types of explanation as mutually complementary, but shall also attempt to indicate their relative importance.

In first type of explanation for migratory flows lies, of course, in the regulations and institutions set up to manage, increase and control them; and in the interests of the groups and individuals taking part in the development of these regulations and institutions.

A second type of explanation sorts out the economic and social forces in the emigration countries, especially the Mediterranean countries. This explanation ignores, at least hartly, the question of the growth of migration into the United Kingdom.

The third type of explanation is that which starts from the economic development requirements of EEC countries and the various advantages to be had from using migrant manpower.

These types of explanation must be considered in the light of the primary purpose of this chapter, which is to show that the following are necessary in order to arrive at a housing policy for migrant workers: (i) the laying down of a migration policy and (ii) the existence of basic agreements between the parties concerned in each country of the EEC and between the countries from which the workers come and those to which they go.

2. Explanation based on institutions and regulations

Some people regard the increased flow of migrants and the changes in the distribution of the migrant workers among different industries as being caused not only by the influence of economic forces on the labour market, but also by the influence of regulations and institutional machinery. This applies particularly to migrants from outside the European Community, who do not enjoy the right of free movement.

2.1. Arrangements for placing the workers

Except for migrant workers from the EEC countries themselves, the jobs available to foreigners are strictly limited, both by official regulation and by various social requirements gouverning the recruitment of manpower and its allocation to specific jobs, at any rate at the time

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of the migrant worker's entry into the country. As noted by D. MAILLAT (35) the Community countries have always made the recruitment and lawful employment of foreign workers conditional on the non-availability of national (and now of Community) workers suitable for the jobs available.

In most of the EEC countries, regulations and sundry social constraints limit the use of workers from outside countries to specific occupations, industries, or sometimes to an individual employer or to a specified region. As described by LYON-CAEN, a definite link is laid down between the admission of the migrant and his recruitment at least in the case of authorised entries. Admission is usually made conditional, on the worker being already in possession of a valid employment contract.

In all countries except the United Kingdom, a large part of the recruitment is arranged by means of bilateral treaties, and only after checking that it is not practicable to fill the job by national recruitment. This is the rule of priority of access to the national employment market.(36) In most Community countries three conditions are laid down for the recruitment of a migrant worker from a non-Community country:

- the prospective employer must send the candidate for immigration an employment contract valid for at least a specified period;

- suitable housing must be kept available;

- the immigrant must conform to specific health standards.

These three rules no longer exist for migrants coming from Community countries. In the United Kingdom, too, they are not applied to immigrants described as "patrials". (37)

In most cases the resident's permit is conditional on the possession of a work permit. In general there is a distinction between three types of work permit and residence permit:

- temporary residence permits, a residence permits of duration equivalent to that of the employment contract, but not specifying the industry concerned;

- work permits of limited duration for specific jobs and limited either to a single employer or a specified branch of industry;

- residence and work permits of unlimited duration.

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(35) W.R. BOHNING and D. MAILLAT, op. cit., p. 17
(36) LYON-CAEN, op. cit., p. 6
(37) LYON-CAEN, ibid.

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The first two types of work and residence permits make it possible for the migrant to be expelled at short notice, as in a recession period. They are also used when workers are intended for jobs of limited duration in firms which are closing down, or in the process of being reorganised as a result of mechanisation; or when workers are needed for infra-structure contracts or other work of limited duration.

Besides the link between admission and recruitment, there have been statements of principle, aimed at guaranteeing the migrant equal treatment to that of nationals. These principles seek to provide equality of treatment and of union rights, and of access to social security benefits.

This set of protective measures does not apply to workers who came into the country as tourists, though the large number of such cases in most of the countries has led to the setting up of offices for sorting out such situations.

Up to the present, however, except for the Irish entering the United Kingdom, most of the migrants have no political rights, nor the freedoms normally enjoyed by citizens. This applies to migrants from countries which are members of the EEC, as it does to those from non-member countries.

This absence of political rights is a direct limitation on the migrant's rights of expression and organisation. It is thus understandably difficult for such workers to take part in conflicts outside working hours, and especially in conflicts aimed at improving their housing conditions or the facilities in the neighbourhoods where they live.

The same lack of political rights also has repercussions on the level of trade union participation and the exercise of union rights. The migrant worker can be escorted to the frontier at any time if his activities are regarded as being prejudicial to the national economy. This is the case, for example, in Belgium where expulsion measures can be taken on the ground that "the foreigner is regarded as injurious to public order, public security or the economy of the country". We shall return to this point in a later chapter.

Conditions are made unstable and insecure for the migrant worker by: the restriction on the jobs or industries accessible to him; by his lack of social or legal status (or differences in regard to it) arising from the manifold bilateral treaties; and by the absence of any political status applicable without distinction to all migrant workers. This lower-grade of citizenship and the absence of political rights are both an expression and a fundamental cause of the condition of migrant worker.

Moreover, the restriction on jobs and industries accessible to the migrant, and the mutual dependence between his job and his residence permit, are prejudicial not only to his status, his social stability and his feeling of security, but they also act indirectly to limit the area in which he can live and work, and thus they circumscribe the housing and housing conditions within his reach. This, however, does not prevent there being, with the passage of time, a considerable broadening in the range of jobs held by migrant workers.

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This, arises firstly because favourable economic conditions lead to the recruitment of both individuals and groups of migrants. A second reason is that the continuing presence of migrant workers in the economies of the West contributes to the self-perpetuation of migration flows.

2.2. Effect of the business cycle on admissions, expulsions and re-entries

It is usual to explain the absence of long-term immigration policies by the fact that recourse to migrant manpower reserves depends on upward and downward swings in general business conditions. However, all the national reports take the view that the reserve of migrant labour is a permanent feature of our economies since the need for it is structural rather than transient, even though the level of recruitment may rise or fall in conformity with business fluctuations. In general, rising trends in business lead to the labour market becoming international.

Even if the distribution of migrant manpower in the economic system is the answer to a structural problem — the chronic shortage of semi-skilled and unskilled workers — recruitment may nevertheless proceed in parallel with economic fluctuations (38). In any case, the fact that foreign workers are admitted or brought into the western countries in periods of business booms does not mean that their jobs are temporary ones or that their function in the general economic system is no more than "cyclicae shock-absorber" or an instrument for breaking open production bottlenecks caused by a lack of national manpower.

Moreover, the part played by foreign workers is of permanent and crucial importance even though they are most heavily concentrated in those industries which are least protected from the effects of boom and recession, and are indeed to be found in the industries most exposed to the risk of closure because they are out of favour with national workers. It is this which explains the extent of cyclical unemployment among migrant workers which is only imperfectly reflected in the unemployment statistics.

In table 37, the level of unemployment among migrant workers is compared with that among native workers in 1974. Unemployment among foreigners is highest in Germany, Belgium and Denmark. The proportion of foreigners in the total number unemployed is higher in every country than the proportion of migrant workers in the total number of wage-earners. In other words, foreigners have a higher unemployment rate than the national average. The rates of unemployment, however, are not an exact reflexion of the true proportion of foreign workers discharged because of the crisis.

(38) Dutch report, p. 2-12-22

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Table 37: Employment and unemployment of migrants and others in EEC countries 1974 (June or December)

	Wage-earners, total (th) (1)	Unemployed, total (th) (2)	Unemployed (%) (3)	Foreign wage-earners (th) (4)	Foreign unemployed (th) (5)	Foreign unemployed (%) (6)	EEC-foreign wage-earners (th) (7)	EEC unemployed (th) (8)	EEC unemployed (%) (9)	Foreign wage-earners as % of total (cols 4:1) (10)	Unemployed foreigners as % of total (cols 5:3) (11)	EEC wage-earners as % of foreign (cols 7:4)	EEC unemployed as % of foreign (cols 8:5 (13)
Germany	21.623	945,9	4,37	2.350	134,7	5,73	527	30,7	5,83	11,33	14,20	22,43	22,8
Belgium	3.019	140,1	4,64	217	19,6	9,03	121	12,9	10,66	7,19	13,99	55,76	65,8
Denmark xx	1.925	101,5	5,27	36	7,0	19,44	8	-	-	1,87	6,90	22,22	-
France	16.800	723,4	4,31	1.900	67,6	3,56	300	7,3	2,43	11,31	9,34	15,79	10,8
Luxembourg	125	0,14	0,11	45	-	-	29	-	-	36,00	-	64,44	-
Netherlands	3.940	180,8	4,59	119	4,4	3,69	51	0,5	0,98	3,02	2,43	42,86	11,36
United Kingdom	22.424	742,0	3,28	1.665	27,5	1,65	653	-	-	7,32	3,71	39,22	-
EEC total	84.095	3.011,6	3,58	6.379	255,6	4,01	1.703	-	-		8,49	20,70	-

x 1975

xx Estimates of unemployment by Danish experts.

Source: Doc. CEE V/53/75-F

This table does not include: illegal or "irregular" workers; workers who have decided to return home; those whose work and residence permits have expired and who have not secured their renewal; or workers not reporting their unemployment for fear of losing their permits (39).

On the other hand it is not because migrant workers are most drastically affected by the business swings, that their presence is to be interpreted in terms of the business cycle. In the fastdeveloping countries of the West, migrant manpower was employed on a growing scale until 1973, because these workers were ready to accept the transfers of jobs and all the other mobility requirements implied in rapid economic change. In this way migrant workers brought into the economic structure an important flexibility factor for dealing with the adjustment processes.

2.3. Economic fluctuations as influences on the recruitment and dismissal of the migrant manpower reserve.

Though the recruitment of migrant manpower tends to follow the swings of the business cycle, these fluctuations are not in themselves the sole explanation of changes in the rate of recruitment. A change for the better in business conditions tends to upset the balance of forces between employers and workers and thus tends to bring foreign manpower into employment. In the same way, when economic conditions are bad migrant workers are more easily regarded as competitors by native workers in the host country, so that there is a tendency for migration to dwindle and for some workers to return home. This is the period when trade unions begin to express all their reservations about importing foreign labour.

The fact is, that when times are bad, the comparatively high unemployment rate for native workers suffices to block recourse to migrant labour, even if there are still shortages of manpower in the specific trades and industries which mainly employ foreign workers. Despite unemployment, native workers seldom return to experiencing labour shortages, for they retain their dislike of taking jobs normally regarded as "for foreigners only" (40).

It thus looks as though the apparent correlation between business swings and entries and departures of foreign manpower can be attributed to the fact that the various phases of the trade cycle give a greater or less influence to the various pressure groups which have a say in the decisions affecting migration and to changes in public opinion about immigration policy.

Despite the overt hostility to uncontrolled immigration among the major trade union organisations in Europe, it is difficult for them when business is booming to put up any effective resistance to the recruitment of new contingents of migrant workers, which is manifestly in the interest

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(39) S. PANCIERA & B. DUCOLI, Crise et immigration en Belgique, in "Contradictions", No. 9, 1976, pp. 109-128

(40) S.O.P.E.M.I. opp. report 1975, p. 8

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of the government and the employers'organisation. (41) Moreover, when labour shortages are a proven fact and might indeed act as a check on economic stability and growth effective opposition to migration is practically impossible.

Since immigration cannot be blocked altogether, the trade unions are resolutely in favour of its being controlled. They are opposed to it because of the potential competition between the migrants and their own members and because they fear that an abundance of labour used lead to cleavages among workers and to a weakening of their bargaining power and their scope for action. The workers'unions, indeed, usually favour the recruitment of foreign manpower being a strict state monopoly; and they have everywhere supported the resumption by the State of the immigration control, so substantially relaxed in Europe since 1968.

Though the unions are against immigration in principle, they are nevertheless on the side of the immigrants in their opposition to any discrimination between the foreign and the national workers.

Once the migrant workers have entered a country and established themselves there, the local trade unions do their best to act as their spokesmen. This is sometimes intended as a way of preventing the claims of foreign workers going beyond their own, and sometimes as a way of preventing these migrants putting up an unfair competition against national (and nowadays community) workers. In the latter case the unions press for the foreign workers to be given all the social, economic and political rights to which national workers are entitled.

There is, however, a basic contradiction in the fact that the unions, with the backing of public opinion, are in favour of migrants being subject to the principle of non-competition after they arrive, but that they also favour the differentiation of work (and therefore of residence) permits. These are the instruments by which migrants are allocated to jobs; and it is through them that the market for foreign manpower is compartmentalized which constitutes a fundamental pre-condition for all potential discrimination in working conditions, wages, way of life and thus of housing.

3. An inadequate explanation: self-perpetuation of migration from countries of origin and the strategy of the migrant workers.

3.1. Migration and underdevelopment

Underdevelopment is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of migration.

(41) This point is illustrated in an unpublished analysis by M. VERBRUGGE of replies given in Belgium to the tripartite committee on foreign manpower. These showed that in case where unions regarded the recruitment of foreign workers as inopportune, successive labour ministers (irrespective of party) always came in the end to decisions in favour of the requests made by employers.

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One of the explanations of the rapid increase in migration up to 1973 is based on the accelerated development of the western economies, the resulting changes in the number and range of jobs to be filled, and the consequent shortage of labourers. Another explanation is based on an analysis of the causes and mechanisms of dismissal and expatriation which result from underemployment and from the cumulative effect of underdevelopment and delayed expansion, more especially in the Mediterranean basin, whence the main flow of migrant workers originates, except for those proceeding to the United Kingdom.

This fundamental imbalance in the development process brings about migratory flows and leads to the creation of official machinery to organise develop, direct and control there flows. Such machinery is set up both in the emigration countries and in those of immigration and employment, and in theory it is for the benefit of the people concerned.

It is thus telling only part of the story to say the recruitment of migrants and their admission into western Europe resulted from an expansion in the demand for labour and the inadequacy of available supplies of manpower. As a counterpart there had to be other countries in which there was unemployment, underdevelopment and pauperisation.

If there is to be migration, there must be a potential supply of labour, comprising readily available reserves of workers who are ready and willing to go abroad for a time or even for good; and there must also be governments willing to send this labour to the countries which use it.

A survey of the basic causes of migration, which are in operation in the emigration countries shows that some of the factors are demographic, some economic and technical, others psycho-sociological and some political. All these are closely interwoven in practice.

Among the factors which set the flow in motion, Pierre Georges mentions, in order of importance, a number of factors of which the first is over-population. This is essentially due to the fact the population has been increasing faster than economic growth. The next factor is the breakdown of geographical or class barriers "which may proceed from a centrifugal movement setting up a positive explosion locally, and which may in fact have taken its first impulse from population pressures. But emigration may also result from a request by the local government which amounts in fact to a requisition". Another factor is the lack of land (which is common to all emigration from the Maghreb) and it may even come, paradoxically enough, from the country's own economic take off "simply because it breaks down the old immobility of populations — in short, because "industrialisation is not going ahead fast enough". (42)

The primary causes of migration, when all is said, are poverty and unemployment. To a very large extent these two variables are the expression of the pauperisation of the peasantry. This in itself results from many factors, including colonialism, two world wars and the liberation struggles which slowly converted the peasantry into a proletariat. All this was instrumental in many peasants being violently expropriated, in

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(42) P. GEORGE, op. cit., pp. 80-84

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small producers being separated from their means of production and subsistence, in the creation of a landless peasantry who, in some circumstances, become ready candidates for emigration.

The impoverishment in question flows also from the imbalance between the growth in population and the growth in its subsistence needs. In most cases societies from which emigration occurs are predominantly rural. The pressure of population itself may differ in intensity from country to country; but in every case there is the problem of maintaining a family economy, the needs of which increase as the families get larger and larger. Despite ethical and cultural variations, this demographic pattern is to be found in countries and regions, such as Kabylia, Andalousia, Greece and Yugoslavia.

"The starting point is the recognition by the group or the individual of the impossibility of providing full maintenance, in its traditional place of residence, for a population which is growing faster than its means of subsistence, or which sees and recognises the possibility of improving its living conditions by participating, through some of its members, in the income distribution of a more developed economy. In other words, emigration is regarded as a corrective for the poverty of the individual and the group". (43)

Among the other factors which favour emigration, mention should be made of the after-effects of colonial warfare in countries such as Algeria and Portugal; and the increasingly noticeable effects of a technological and economic revolution within countries such as Yugoslavia and Turkey.

These workers finding they must give up their traditional occupations, seek to find their way into the modern economic circuit and travel to areas where growth is occurring. Many are those who drift into the towns of their own countries, but once there discover that it is impossible to secure productive employment. The massive drift towards the towns of active population thrust out from their rural surroundings, creates unemployment and the first to suffer are the young. International migration thus appears as an extension of the migration which began at home.

Even so, the expropriation of land and property, unemployment and ensuing poverty are not in themselves sufficient to incite people to abandon their family, their home and their country. Other determining factors are their feeling that their poverty has become unbearable and the bright colours in which a happy and secure existence are painted in advertising and other cultural extensions of the capitalist systems. Migration is increasingly a desired break from an economic and social background which the individual has come to regard as ineffective and oppressive.

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(43) P. GEORGE, op. cit. p. 26

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It is at this late stage of the process that the zest for departure becomes contagious. There develops an atmosphere of departure which spreads from neighbour to neighbour and reaches populations hitherto unconscious of it. The psychological mechanisms set in motion by material factors will then begin to effect the outward flow of emigrants to an extent which will be greater or less, depending on the population of each region, its nearness to the means of communication and the cohesiveness of individual social groups. At this stage an awareness that poverty has become unbearable is linked with economic calculations about migration which is now envisaged as a source of wealth; and side by side these factors build up the determination to seek voluntary exile.

3.2. Bridgeheads to feed the migration flow

Those who prefer the "voluntarist" explanation point out that once a current of migration has been created, it tends to feed upon itself and grow in volume. Foreign workers, once they have got their footing, act as bridgeheads for the coming of their women-folk; and this is made all the easier by the fact that the aspirations of women in the host countries are rising as are those of their men folk. Working women in community countries eschew employment in domestic and servile jobs in preference for service occupations in which a greater number of openings has become available. There is thus room at the bottom of the ladder for the woman immigrants to tackle the "womens'work".

Penetration on these lines ultimately leads to the admission of other dependants in younger or older age-groups, and sets up conditions in which the foreign population begins a period of natural growth. This is true, even when the earlier immigrants were originally brought into the host country as part of a migrant manpower reserve designed to act as a economic shock absorber.

Migration is also subject to the economic forces which make for self-development. This is noted by BÖHNING & MAILLAT when they say: "the foreigners need goods for their own consumption and which sets up a demend for additional labour. Thus the employment of each foreign worker may induce a demand for another", (44) Conversely, when any of these workers stop working or leave the country they increase the risk of a collapse in effective demand.

A stronger flow of immigrants may come from the fact that once migrants are allowed into jobs in industries and occupations on which the workers of the host country are turning their backs, this very fact tends to sharpen the dislike of the national workers for the jobs concerned and increase their tendency to seek other employment. This process of departure, succession and replacement in the labour market follows a pattern not unlike Gresham's law for monetary systems with two currencies enjoying different degrees of esteem. The coming of the migrants tends to induce in the national workers a certain "snob effect" which may indeed be accentuated by xenophobia or race-consciousness.

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(44) R.W. BOHNING & D. MAILLAT, op. cit., p. 12 ./.

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Thus, once the pump has been primed there is a tendency for migration to develop on its own steam, especially since strict controls call for a good deal of administrative machinery and may prove costly. Such control is, indeed, not really operative except when its enforcement is strengthened by economic conditions (e.g. the 1974 recession) or when public opinion calls for the stemming, or even the stopping, of immigration as was the case in the United Kingdom in 1962.

An analysis of quasi automatic social forces shows us how, at any given moment, the flow of migrants may escape the control of those by whom it was originally organised. On the other hand, it cannot disguise the importance of, or the administrative responsibility for, the systems of decision and control set up to guide the currents of migration, to reduce or increase them or even to create new flows as required by the countries and economies concerned, especially the host countries. In the first instance, migration results from bilateral agreements, the operation of official or semi-official recruitment offices, and from the machinery for regulating the entry, controlling the employment and supervising the places where the migrants and their families settle.

In the absence of any supervision of migration, conditions make for the deterioration of the migrant worker's status and position. Reception and housing conditions are left increasingly to chance; and it is because of this that migrants from EEC countries are not always or automatically better treated than nationals of outside countries migrating under a bilateral agreement in which decent housing conditions are specifically stipulated.

4. Explanations in terms of the economic growth process

The increased recourse to migrant manpower in the economies of the West is not merely the consequence of new and higher aspirations among the workers in the host country and among the migrants themselves.

The growth in the number of foreign workers employed, at any rate up to the end of 1973, is not just the result of diminished vigilance or overwork among officials and others responsible for handling the migration flows, whether in countries of origin or in host countries.

A more fundamental explanation of the growing migration of workers and their families seems to lie not only in economic growth and in the manpower requirements resulting from the non-availability of national workers at any rate at prevailing wages and under going working conditions; but also in the stronger and stronger wage pressures, and in the direct and indirect advantages obtained by employing migrant workers in place of national manpower.

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Even at present, with the recession in progress, people are preparing estimates of social costs and long-term costs which may result from using foreign labour.

In any case, the phenomenal growth in international migration in the Community since the war, and more especially since 1968, was only possible because it provided support for the accelerated economic growth; and because the migrants were coming in response to calls not only from traditional immigration industries (iron and coal mines, metal-working and manufacture and civil engineering) but also to those of the tertiary sector. In the big cities of Western Europe, the census results show a growing number of migrant workers in small and medium-sized firms (45) in the larger urban agglomerations.

4.1. The shortage of labourers and the semi-skilled

The need for importing manpower is primarily due to the chronic shortage of semi-skilled labourers in most of the west european economies since the end of the second world war. Even after 1973, and despite the depth of the recession, this shortage was still being felt in various sectors of the labour market.

After the second world war, the use of prisoners of war, and very soon afterwards the recourse to immigrant manpower, found a justification in reconstruction requirements and the need for energy and basic products (e.g. iron and coal). Later came the expansion in the basic industries, promoted by the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community. It laid down plans for expansion in these industries; and since the future prosperity of Europe seemed to depend on them , recourse to external manpower was all the better justified. Until 1955, western Germany was the only country not calling for foreign workers; but in the 1945-55 period it was dealing with an influx of nearly 12 million repatriates and refugees from central and eastern Europe (46).

After this period the manpower shortage was attributed to the small size of the active population, and the slowness in its growth. This was due partly to the raising of school-leaving age and the lowering of pensionable age; and other factors were the slow population growth, due to changing mentalities and backgrounds, and to the low birthrates of 1935-47 which were now being reflected in the adult age-groups.

During this post-war period the slow growth in the active population went hand-in-hand with the higher aspirations and improved vocational training of the national working populations. This contributed to their distaste for heavy and dangerous industries which, in some of the countries,

(45) S. PANCIERA, M. PLEVOETS, V. CAMPANELLI & J. DELCOURT op. cit., pp. 11-28
(46) GEORGE, op. cit., p. 163

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were themselves facing a period of reconstruction, decline and re-conversion. There were whole sectors of industry, including the mines and steel mills, whose employees had long been an aristocracy among workers and the spearhead of the working classes; and now these sectors faced increased competition from substitutes for coal and steel, and stiffer rivalry in the new Common Market for these products. Not only was competition increasingly intense, but it was a time for reconstruction and rationalised production processes, which speeded up the departure — if not the positive flight — of the national workers who are usually more exacting than the immigrants.

Moreover, though there were by now considerably more women going out to work, their levels of skill were comparatively low and they were no solution to the shortage of labourers and semi-skilled workers now becoming apparent in a whole range of heavy, dangerous and unhealthy jobs, and others with long or irregular hours, weekend or night work, in such industries as building and civil engineering.

Finally, the higher educational levels were an incentive both for men and for women to get away from monotonous jobs, from the unduly piecemeal or repetitive, from cleaning and maintenance work, from the servile and domestic, all of which were in most cases among the worst paid.

However, this rise in aspirations and growing disinclination for manual and unskilled occupations was only possible because there was at the same time a great expansion in the number of tertiary jobs, including thosein banks, insurance offices and shopkeeping; and there were plenty of skilled jobs to be had in the new growth industries (such as the chemical and petrochemical industries, gas, electricity, electronics, the making of electrical and medical instruments and equipment, telecommunications, data-processing, high-speed transport by land or sea and the aerospace industries).

"The easiest course", says R.W. BOHNING", one which allows the social, productive and employment structures to be kept substantially intact, was the "temporary" immigration of foreign workers. This would also make it possible to deal with swings in the economic cycle. This is more true for the fact that the foreign workers are ready and willing to take the jobs which call for no real vocational training, nor any knowledge of the national language". (47)

The call for migrant workers enabled the national labour force to be more mobile and more adaptable than was inherent in the economic and job structures. With the coming of the migrants the workers in western countries were able to abandon a whole range of jobs and industries, even before completion of the reorganisations implied in their departure. Men

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(47) R.W. BOHNING & D. MAILLAT, op. cit., p. 11 ./.

and women workers, even the youngest of them, were able to proceed to the more desirable jobs which were now open to them.

This is why the call for migrant manpower, during the period between the end of the war and about 1960, can only be understood in the light of two related facts. One is the drift of national manpower seeking to avoid the human and social cost of heavy or dangerous work, and also the degree of reorganisation and rationalisation which was to be expected; and the second was the high cost of mechanising and automating the jobs which the national workers were leaving.

4.2. Direct and indirect advantages of employing migrants

After 1960, and more especially since 1968, the scale of the migration phenomenon is not wholly accounted for by inelasticities in the system and the growing shortage of unskilled labour. The migration boom which has been in progress since 1968 actually continued until the beginning of 1974, despite the rise in unemployment during the period. This is shown in table 38 below.

Table 38: Unemployment in EEC countries (1970 = 100)

Countries	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Germany	120	100	124	165	183	391
Belgium	116	100	97	122	126	136
Denmark	153	100	159	135	124	524
France	96	100	125	138	126	141
Ireland	86	100	100	109	102	98
Italy	108	100	100	114	110	92
Luxembourg	-	100	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	118	100	123	205	209	255
United Kingdom	93	100	130	145	104	98

Source: Basic Community statistics 1975-76, p.20

(47) R.W. BOHNING & D. MAILLAT, op. cit. p. 11

Until about 1960, recourse to migrant manpower was limited to a few basic industrial sectors. After this date, with the formation of the Common Market and the arrival in Europe of oil at competitive prices, there began a new phase of accelerated economic expansion, and intensified competition between nations, implying complete overhaul and reorganisation of the productive machine.

For these purposes, the migrant labour force seemed to be the most adaptable one. As early as 1962, M. MASSENET, who was then delegate in the French Prime Minister's office for social questions relating to foreign workers, saw the foreign manpower as "support in the form of young workers who are not "rigidified" by unduly long service in any occupation, or sentimentally attached to their customary dwelling places, but able to give added fluidity to an economy suffering from "stickiness" in every field, and especially in the manpower structure"... (48)

Apart from the greater adaptability of the migrant labour force, the growing volume of migration can be explained by the wage levels, both for skilled and unskilled work, which migrants can be forced to accept.

Between 1960 and 1974, there was a major increase in wages in all European countries. Galloping inflation was at hand.

Table 39: Wages per person employed at current prices and exchange rates (for indices 1960 = 100)

Countries	1960	1969	Indice	1974	Indice
Germany	1.674	3.513	210	7.689	459
Belgium	2.002	3.862	193	7.359	367
Denmark	1.757	3.866	220	6.582	375
France	1.912	4.169	218	6.328	331
Ireland	1.262	2.357	187	3.864	306
Italy	1.182	2.861	242	4.659	394
Luxembourg	2.442	4.186	171	7.849	321
Netherlands	1.589	4.060	256	8.389	528
United Kingdom	1.891	2.822	149	4.209	222
Community	-	-	198	-	348

Source: S.O.E.C., National accounts, 1/1975

(48) M. MASSENET, L'apport de la main-d'oeuvre d'origine algérienne au développement économique français, in "Bulletin SEDEIS", No. 850 (supplement Feb. 1962). Quotation taken from French export, op. cit., p. 15

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For both employers and governments the coming of migrant workers lowers the cost of part of the labour force, reduces the operating costs of various activities, and is makes it possible to keep down the labour costs as a whole.

Studies which are now available show sizeable gaps between the wages paid to national and to migrant workers. In the Paris region, for example, the discrepancy is as much as 18.4% for unskilled workers and the biggest gap is in the skilled category.

Table 40: Differences between wages paid to French and foreign workers in the Paris region (49)

Category	Paris area
Foremen	11.0 %
Skilled workers	9.4 %
Semi-skilled workers	6.9 %
Unskilled workers	5.9 %
All workers (av)	18.4 %

Similar discrepancies were recorded in an investigation in the Brussels area in 1972 (50).

(49) B. JOUSSELIN & M. TALLARD, op. cit., p. 10
(50) J. HAEX, A. MARTENS & S. WOLF, Arbeidsmarkt - discriminatie, gastarbeid, Sociologisch Orderzoekinstituut, (Louvain University) 1976, p. 123

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Table 41: Average gross wage per hour of Belgian workers and comparative wage rate for foreign male workers (both males and females) according to skill classification (at 31.12.72)

Classification	average hourly wage male Belgian worker	Comparative wage scale: male foreign worker	Comparative wage scale female Belgian worker	Comparative wage scale female foreign worker
Unskilled	85.56 F	0.89	0.76	0.68
Semi-skilled	102.77 F	0.92	0.80	0.63
Skilled	106.05 F	0.89	0.73	0.68
Building workers	92.80 F	0.93	-	-

The migrant workers are thus accepting wage rates below those of the national workers, though higher than what they could get in their own countries if they could find jobs. They are thus reducing companies' costs. Indirectly, but proportionately, they are cutting down the subsidies paid by the government to industries in difficulties, and the expenditure required for setting up various forms of infrastructure which they help to complete in a shorter time than would otherwise be taken. They also diminish proportionately some of the running costs of public administrative bodies which are buyers of services (e.g. maintenance, repairs and cleaning).

Even if the foreign manpower were paid at the same rates as its counterpart in the host country, the use of such manpower helps to avoid some of the logistic cost of the labour force. The migrant does not get to the host country till he is grown-up and able to work, so that the country which employs him does not have to shoulder the cost of rearing and educating him.

Moreover, though the migrants pay social security contributions comparable with their local counterparts, the benefits they receive are, in some industries, smaller and sometimes non-existent. Under the unemployment insurance arrangements, for example, some of the migrants are packed off home if they experience a spell of unemployment which outlasts the remaining validity of their work (and corresponding residence) permits. Again family allowances are at times paid on a smaller scale when the family remains in its country of origin; and in various other cases the migrants lose benefits because of conditions regarding the number of contributions or the length of residence; or because the systems are

territorially separate, as is the case with sickness and accidents (51).

Moreover there are many migrants who are bachelors or unaccompanied, and who are more willing to accept minimal standards of housing. Their calls on social and collective facilities are also small.

Finally, the work of the migrants helps to eliminate production bottlenecks and promotes the growth of the national income, and therefore the assessment basis for taxation and social security.

The reports from the enquiries in France, Belgium and Germany also emphasise the political and social advantages arising through employing the migrants. The number who are trade unionists is usually much smaller than for the national workers; and even though they enjoy full union rights in many countries, including the right to strike, the law generally recognises a discrimination when it comes to the assumption of union responsibilities.

As has been emphasised elsewhere in this report, the scale of the foreign manpower recruitment proportionately diminishes the political and electoral importance of the working class, and also their ideological solidarity (52).

4.3. Part played by migrant workers in building and production of capital goods

The migration boom we have had since 1968, on the other hand, did not stem from overworked control offices or the opening of labour markets for foreign labour. It was on a massive scale and its explanation lies in a number of immediate advantages offered to employers in various industries, and to companies of all sizes, by the employment of migrant workers. The most pertinent explanation of the large increase in the migration of men and youths lies, of course, in the phase of expedited and uncontrolled growth which came upon us after 1968. From that time onwards the countries of the West were in a state of "economic overheating" and there was galloping inflation. In sobre fact, this was a phase of over-investment which has been followed, in the usual way, by a phase of rationalisation. The requirements set up by this expansion explain how many of the migrants had found their way into the building industry and others connected with fixed capital formation.

(51) LYON-CAEN, op. cit., p. 12
(52) A. GORZ in "Les temps modernes", 1970; quoted by CEDETIM, Les immigrés, Stock, 1975.

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In France and Germany more than 20% of the migrants were engaged in building and civil engineering. The French report shows how there has, since 1953, been an almost perfect correlation between the new entries of permanent workers and the production index for the building industry. Even in the crisis conditions of 1974 the construction industries still account for a large share of the foreign workers recruited, despite the setback in the total number of migrants who have arrived.

Table 42: Total placings and placings in the building and construction industries of foreign workers in EEC countries 1973-74

Host country	Placings of foreign workers		
		1973	1974
Germany	Building Total	74.701 319.072	4.828 46.323
Belgium (excl. EEC nationals	Building Total	518 5.892	610 6.129
France	Building Total	41.733 132.055	18.718 64.461
Luxembourg	Building Total	2.157 6.708	3.013 6.773
Netherlands	Building Total	324 15.301	504 15.903
United Kingdom	Building Total	638 39.241	764 38.814

Source: EEC, Doc. V/51/75 - F, pp. 10-27

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During this 1968-73 period, a great number of infrastructure items were built, renewed or enlarged. A whole host of industrial estates were laid out and there was an enormous invasion of American and other foreign companies. The latter was facilitated by the building of new factories on a massive scale, the laying out and enlargement of seaports and airports, automated communications, expanded telecommunications, more and more motorways, underground transport, pipelines for oil and gas, dams and power stations and any number of public buildings for collective use — hospitals, homes, schools and new universities. In the cities, this was the period of administrative skyscrapers and offices, of car parks and enormous open spaces, of the development of new towns and the setting up of prestige headquarters in the business areas of the big cities.

Industrially, it is a triumphal period for the growth industries, for chemicals, petrochemicals, electronics, aeronautics and nuclear energy. At the same time the development centres were coming closer to the sea.

It was during this phase of "super-growth" that immigration went through the biggest boom it has ever known. Manpower reserves were being sought everywhere and the countries of the Mediterranean seabord were being systematically prospected.

This was the time when migration was unplanned and uncontrolled, when more and more people forced into the host countries as "tourists". Little by little governments were losing the monopoly for recruiting migrants; all manner of "regularisation" systems with retrospective powers were being brought into being; for after all, the migrant workers cannot be blamed for evading laws about which they knew nothing. It was the time of stupendous growth in the service sectors, the "tertiary economy", the call for an army of maintenance workers and cleaners, both inside and outside the new buildings.

4.4. The time of recession — a new appraisal of the social cost of migration

Quite a number of commentators, who have long been assessing the benefits of employing migrant workers, felt the impact of the deep economic recession, in 1973 and since then have been considering the possible negative effects of the inflow of labour and recalculating the social costs of immigration.

The best summary of the literature relating to these effects and costs as recently disclosed — doubtless as a result of the recession, but perhaps also because of the emphatic claims for equality of treatment, rightly put forward by the workers themselves and the governments of the countries from which they come — is from the pen of the German commentator, Günter SCHILLER:

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The following is a brief summary of the negative effects in the SCHILLER analysis:

- The existence of a reserve of mobile manpower might speed up the concentration of population, and industry. In short, it might accentuate the imbalance between the different regions, since the migrants would have been brought into the existing industrial and urban concentrations;

- The unlimited supply of unskilled labour would limit technical progress and stand in the way of necessary changes in economic structures;

- The large-scale arrival of young foreign workers might oblige specific social categories (e.g. workers in the older age-groups) to withdraw altogether from the market;

- The massive immigration of workers'families might lead to increasing expenditure on social services and collective facilities (53).

To these social costs must be added the demands — justifiably increasing — of the countries from which the migrants have come. The recent treaty between France and Turkey, for example, requires France to provide bigger benefits than were specified in the treaty between Germany and Turkey, so as to attract into France manpower which was then no longer immigrating thither (54).

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter has been concerned with conditions in the market for foreign labour, and it may be useful to conclude by emphasising the correlation between the economic development problems of Western Europe after the last war and the expansion in the migration of manpower. The parallel between them serves to demonstrate the extent to which migrant workers, because of their mobility and adjustability, helped us in overcoming the successive problems of continued growth. In practice, the reasons for recourse to migrant manpower vary with the different phases of reconstruction, development and rationalisation of the means of production.

In this post-war period there seem to have been four successive phases.

In the period 1948-58, we were in the reconstruction phase. The migration of Italian workers helped towards this reconstruction, at any rate in some of the west European countries. This was the time when migrants were pouring into the coal mines and the iron and steel industries, which the new ECSC was integrating. The housing shortage which prevailed at this time was considered by many as being reason enough for not allowing the migrants to bring their families. In most cases the migrants were recruited in groups.

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(53) G. SCHILLER, La régulation des migrations. Aperçu de quelques politiques, notamment en République fédérale d'Allemagne; "Revue internationale du travail", vol. III-nº4 April 1975, p. 365.
K. HOFFNER, Ekonomische Alternativen zur Ausländerbeschäftigung, Göttingen, 1975 (Kommission für wirtschaftlichten und socialen Wandel.

(54) G. LYON-CAEN, op. cit. p. 2 ./.

The next ten years, 1958-68, were the phase of modernisation. The period followed directly on the formation of the Common Market, which was the signal for an expansion phase. It was also a period of intensive competition, which necessitated industrial reconversion and complete reorganisation. There was a boom in mergers and industrial concentration; and the period was also marked by the ascendancy of oil which, at the prices at which it was then available, was a strong competitor with other types of energy, and the death-blow to the expansion plans for coal-mining.

In some countries the long-term plans for the coal-mining industry, as was the case in Belgium, were plans for closing the mines. This resulted in quite a number of the migrants having to be moved into the urban centres where other jobs were available; and it also brought them within the scope of the urban improvement plans.

In 1968, after two years in which the boom had been somewhat hesitant, the growth began afresh and gathered an added momentum. Public and private investment expanded in parallel; and it was a time when the process of growth was believed (at any rate until the end of 1973) to have no limit. It was a time, too, of social turbulence.

This interlinked succession of phases accounted not only for the swift growth in the number of migrants, but also for the fact that they spread into the jobs left vacant in various industrial and service occupations; and this in turn explains the employment of many more migrant women workers during the final period.

Conditions were now ripening for a deterioration in housing. Not only were there more migrants than could be handled adequately by the harrassed and overworked immigration and reception departments, but on top of this came the almost unbelieveable rise in the cost of house building (55) due to the unprecedented expansion in other branches of the building and construction trade. Chapters 5 and 6 below will give an account of this worsening in the housing picture.

Then at the end of 1973, there came the time for drastic rationalisation of a production machine, which had been subjected to revere strain first by the currency crisis and then by the oil crisis. Economic growth file abruptly and at the same time migration was brought to a halt. Soon afterwards the migration resumed, but under strict control, for the reserve of migrant manpower is an absolute necessity for current tasks in the operation of the economic system, as well as in its expansion. The process of spontaneous migration from countries outside the Community was brought to a complete stop; and governments are instead re-asserting their monopoly in this field, but the rectification of existing irregularities is preferred to wholesale expulsions.

The migration boom and the deep recession which has ensued should be an occasion for more fundamental consideration of immigration problems and, more specifically, of how to organise the way of life and working conditions of these displaced persons who constitute the manpower reserve.

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(55) The Luxembourg report is more explicit about this. It is a useful example, for Luxembourg is one of the countries in which the housing shortage is least noticeable and in which the residential property market is under the smallest strain. vol 1 pp. 129-139.

CHAPTER 5: HOUSING CONDITIONS OF MIGRANT WORKERS

In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyse the housing conditions of migrant workers, as revealed by the surveys carried out simultaneously in the seven EEC countries which employ migrants (i.e. all except Ireland and Italy).

It is important to lay down from the outset the limits of permissible comparisons, having regard to the various methods of sampling and the way the surveys were conducted. Even though the following tables present data from all seven countries, it is not permissible to make comparisons between the different national results.

The limitations of the resources available precluded any attempt to use the survey to provide a representative account of the housing situation for migrant workers, or even to list the differences between one country or another or between different areas in the same country. The aim was rather to note the significant differences in housing conditions for migrants as compared with those of national workers living in the same districts, or employed by the same companies; and secondly, to note the differences between the categories of migrants according to whether their countries of origin were EEC countries, other European countries or non- uropean countries.

1. Selection of districts and methods of sampling

As indicated in earlier chapters, it was by jobs requiring little or no skill that large numbers of migrant workers were attracted. They were concentrated into the biggest and most densely populated urban industrial areas where the strain on available housing was most marked. This naturally affected the quality of the housing available to them, as it also affected the housing of workers from the host country.

Substantial differences are, however, to be noted between one country and another and within each national territory, depending on the areas in which the migrants are settled.

Having regard to these differences, the ideal solution would have been for the national surveys to have covered all the groups of migrants, irrespective of the degree of industrialisation and/or urbanisation of the regions in which they lived.

The practicable number of interviews, however, could only be 800 per country, including at least 100 national workers. This was not enough to provide a sample which would be representative of either residential district or by countries of origin.

The set of districts chosen, nevertheless, provided good coverage of typical situations affecting the migrant workers in EEC countries. The size and location of the various centres covered by the survey were known.

Moreover, the data available in each country for purposes of sampling were found to be very variable, so that each of the national teams had to be given a certain freedom of action in selecting its sample. In every country, however, the sampling method was designed so that the sample itself should be as random and as subject to probability criteria as possible, so as to avoid any systematic bias on the part of the researcher. This means that they provide knowledge of the situations and problems encountered by migrant workers in the specific regions in which the survey was made.

The best evidence of this lies in an analysis of how the districts were chosen and the method of sampling in each country.

Germany. The sample was taken in the Rhineland area, the city chosen being Mannheim in Baden-Wurtemberg on the frontier of the Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate areas. The sample related to three districts, the E-K. Quadrate, Neckerstadt and Sandhoven, lying respectively at increasing distances from the city centre. Selection of interviewees was made from registers kept by the local authorities.

Belgium. The three regions in which Belgium is divided led to the choice of three sampling areas, all of which were urban — Brussels-capital, Charleroi and Antwerp — each of which has quite a different degree of strain on its housing facilities. The two former districts are the biggest concentrations of foreign population in the country; but Antwerp, though metropolitan, has only a very small contingent of migrant workers. Inside these three centres, the respondents were selected by systematically sampling a list of areas and districts heavily populated by foreigners.

Denmark. The number of migrant workers is not high, amounting only to 36 000. The sample was taken in Copenhagen, the capital, and in two neighbouring suburban towns — Albertslund and Ishøj — and in an industrial town in northern Denmark — Frederiksvaerk. In Copenhagen, the list of control group members was compiled from the employee lists of manufacturing firms.

France. The sample was selected from the Paris area, which has the biggest concentration of foreigners in the country. Three places were chosen for the survey:

- the XIXe and XXe arrondissements, old working class neighbourhoods in which the traditional industrial activity is gradually disappearing and major urban development schemes are in progress;

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- the commune of Vitry in the Marne valley, which is a city of workers with a big immigrant population;

- the new town of Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines (Trappes) in the Yvelines, a department in the area around Paris.

The sample was taken from the registers of the communes in the three areas concerned.

Luxembourg. Migrants in the Grand Duchy are not densely concentrated in any area, except for some parts of the capital city itself (Grund and Pfaffenthal), in the area around Esch, the capital of the steel industry, and at Dudelange. The main part of the sample was chosen in these regions, using the national population register.

The Netherlands. A typical urban area was chosen along with two small industrial towns. Utrecht is not the biggest of cities, but it is a good example of a polycentric region, Randstad, as described above (chapter 4). Seven districts in Utrecht were chosen for the sample, these being the parts of the town where the density of migrant population is greatest. The actual selection of the sample was again made from the registers of the local authorities.

Also included in the sample were two small industrial towns in the Twente region, in the rural country of the eastern Netherlands.

The United Kingdom. It was decided not to carry out the survey in the London area, though it has the heavie t concentration of migrant workers. So many studies have been made of the London area that it seemed preferable to tackle the area which is second in size — the West Midlands — which is listed as having had 183 600 migrant workers in 1971.

Birmingham and its surrounding districts were chosen for the sample, which was selected from lists of employees of a number of companies. The control group was selected in the same way. The sample thus covers all the districts inhabited by the migrants in and around Birmingham.

Thus the countries choosing a large part of their sample in and around their capital cities were Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark and France. These chose the most densely populated area where the strains on the residential housing market is usually at its greatest.

The other countries — Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom — did not choose the first-ranking and biggest population centres, and it follows that the strain on housing facilities may not be at its strongest in these areas. However, all the surveys adequately cover the range

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of district types where migrant workers are to be found.

2. Contents of the questionnaire

The structure of the questionnaire was laid down by a group of experts from the nine Community countries. It had necessarily to contain a number of common questions and others designed to take account of national peculiarities and special considerations raised by the individual experts.

It must be emphasised from the start that it is difficult to compile an international questionnaire dealing both with housing and with the social integration of the migrants, when each of the countries under consideration has its own housing conditions and immigration regulations. Questions which are useful and significant in one country often appear meaningless in one or more of the others.

Moreover, the questionnaire had to be so drafted as to yield useful answers, not only from the migrants, but also from the national workers. Obviously the whole range of questions put to the migrants could not be used for the interviews with the national workers, for whom the questionnaire had to be less elaborate.

Another point worthy of passing mention was the enormous problem of translating such questionnaires, owing to the great number of languages used both by migrants and by the local workers.

A great many tests and checks of the questionnaires were therefore necessary.

The common content of the questionnaire was as follows:

1) The introductory section covers personal particulars of those occupying the housing visited — age, nationality, year of arrival in the country, marital status, composition of the household. These variables were analysed in chapter 2.

2) On housing, the questions covered:

- terms of tenure and occupation;
- description, amenities, deficiencies;
- problems of access;
- housing expenditure;
- current difficulties in regard to housing;
- changes of lodgings and residence.

3) On the question of finding a job, the questionnaires covered:

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- occupational status and employing industries (analysed in chap. 3);
- training and occupation in country of origin;
- training received in host country;
- working conditions and facilities;
- past and future occupational mobility.

4) A series of questions related to the social integration of the migrants:

- relations with workers of own nationality, other nationalities, the local nationality (questions for drafting locally);
- knowledge of the language;
- leisure pursuits (for drafting locally)
- facilities available.

5) Questions on legal status, especially work and residence permits in the host country.

3. Presentation of the results

The complete results are presented in each of the national reports (56). For purposes of the international report, it is not possible to present a full and detailed analysis. Choices have to be made as to what can be summarised and what set out; and these choices are necessarily somewhat arbitrary.

Below are a number of tables comparing the housing position for local nationals and the various classes of migrant. The addition of more such tables would only serve to confirm the facts and tendencies which these tables exemplify.

In order to analyse the differences revealed between the classes concerned, we present two tables relating to each aspect. The first will compare the position for workers of the local nationality with that of all migrant workers. The second will show the difference between the migrant categories distinguished in the enquiry — i.e. EEC nationals, other Europeans and non-Europeans.

Though the groups of national workers appear on the whole to be better housed than the migrants, all the information in the national reports suggests that the national control group in this study was housed below

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(56) See the list of authors and titles and references at the beginning of this report.

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national average standards. These averages were derived from decennial censuses of from special enquiries, into the housing position in the various countries or in the regions covered by national surveys which were carried out during the first half of 1975.

There are a number of distressing cases which are not brought into account in the description of housing conditions for the migrants in the areas selected. The sampling arrangements and the places where the enquiry took place were in general such as to exclude the recording of certain specific housing conditions and categories of migrant workers. It is, for example, only rarely that the enquiry extends to "shanty" housing, the existence of which is not usually recorded in the official lists. Moreover, the greater part of the sample covered housing in urban areas; and mobile dwellings, such as one finds on building sites, were left out of consideration. There was one exception to this, however. This was in the French sample, in which the choice of Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelinnes, the new town in the Trappes which is still being built, made it possible to interview some people from this fringe of the population who were living on a caravan site.

There is also a definite under-representation of unmarried or unaccompanied migrants living in homes or hostels. In Federal Germany, for example, the sample excludes workers living in huts. The same under-representation also exists in the samples taken in the United Kingdom and in Belgium, where this form of accommodation is less typical than, for example, in France, Luxembourg or the Netherlands.

Migrants of doubtful legal status were difficult to locate for purposes of the sample, because they were not included in the lists. Even in the Belgian sample, which was intentionally made on a street-by-street basis from a list of house numbers, comparatively few "irregulars" were found. However, a high proportion of dwellers in basements and top floors failed to reply or refused to be interviewed.

These factors suggest a need for special caution in assessing the data recorded. Any interpretation must take into account the systematic bias which inevitably finds its way into all sample surveys, irrespective of the efforts of the research worker.

It should be understood, too, that the choice of densely populated districts where the migrant population is often more than 10% entirely omits the upper fringe of migrant workers, usually of longer standing, whose residences are less old and dilapidated and who are to be found almost anywhere in the urban areas. In this case, however, the bias is not a dangerous one, since the aim of the enquiry was primarily to provide an analysis of conditions and problems which need to be taken into account in formulating a housing policy on social lines for the benefit of the migrant worker.

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4. Forms of tenure

Before a start is made on the analysis of the tables of housing tenure, it should be mentioned that the ownership of a dwelling, does not necessarily mean that it is better in quality or comfort than a rented one.

Indeed, the Belgian enquiry mentions that the quality and comfort of owner-occupied dwellings are usually the better; but a different conclusion emerges from the Dutch and United Kingdom reports, where the owner-occupier percentage is shown as being higher for migrants than for nationals. Both these reports emphasise that owner occupied dwellings are in many cases old and uncomfortable and have been abandoned by the local workers in favour of more expensive housing provided by local authorities on a rented basis. They also show, that the dwellings owned by migrants often date from 1949 or earlier, and there are serious difficulties about buying them, since they are not regarded as sufficient security for mortgage loans. This obliges migrants to secure finance at very high rates of interest, or to make interfamily arrangements about the money and leads to overcrowding of the accommodation.

Nevertheless home ownership strengthens the position of a migrant and renders him, his family and friends immune from expulsion. Insofar as the premises he owns are covered by urban improvement schemes, the migrant comes within the local authority's re-housing obligation. Ownership also gives access to the credit facilities made available for home renovation; and in this case the owner automatically secures the benefit of the increment in value.

House ownership seems, in general to be achieved by migrants of longer standing. In Luxembourg, for example, most of the house-owning migrants came into the Grand Duchy before 1965. Ownership is often an indication of continuing residence.

Owenrship status, however, is infrequent as is shown by the results of the country enquiry in tables 43 and 44 (57) Table 43 shows that it is sometimes non-existent, as in the German sample. In the French sample, ownership is almost as rare among French workers as among the migrants. This is due to the areas sampled and the methods of sampling used. Preference was given to renters, especially those in "social" low-cost housing and this was particularly true in Trappes, one of the three sampling areas.

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(57) For more detailed information, see table A9 annexed to chapter 5.

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Comparison of the ownership rate among national workers and migrants shows a considerable balance against the migrants in Luxembourg and Belgium, while in the Netherlands and Denmark the difference is less marked. In the United Kingdom the opposite is true, as has already been emphasised.

Table 43 also shows that migrant workers are more frequently sub-tenants than are the national workers. Sub-tenancies are most frequent in Denmark and the Netherlands, which are also countries showing quite high figures of house ownership by migrants.

In table 44, the migrant workers are divided into EEC nationals, other Europeans and non-Europeans, and the table shows that home ownership is proportionately highest among the EEC nationals, while the proportions for the other classes of country are smaller in the above order. This is largely due to differences in the length of settlement, and to the age structure in the individual groups.

In those countries where immigration from the EEC is small, of recent inception or non-existent (i.e. Denmark and the United Kingdom), the migrant group with the highest proportion of home-owners is that from non-European countries.

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TABLE 45: Tenure of dwellings by national and foreign workers (1975 survey)

Host country		Owners		Tenants		Sub-tenants		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany	Migrants	-	-	591	100.0	-	-	591	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	201	100.0	-		201	100.0
Belgium	Migrants	75	10.7	602	85.7	25	3.6	702	100.0
	Nationals	38	36.5	65	62.5	1	1.0	104	100.0
Denmark	Migrants	141	22.3	308	50.8	157	25.9(1)	606	100.0
	Nationals	73	37.8	114	59.1	6	3.1	193	100.0
France	Migrants	48	6.9	638	91.5	11	1.6	697	100.0
	Nationals	9	8.4	98	91.6	-	-	107	100.0
Luxembourg	Migrants	103	14.7	568	81.1	29	4.2	700	100.0
	Nationals	54	55.1	43	43.9	1	1.0	98	100.0
Netherlands	Migrants	91	16.2	420	74.7	51	9.1	562	100.0
	Nationals	48	21.4	174	77.7	2	0.9	224	100.0
United Kingdom									
	Migrants	343	67.8	183	36.2	-	-	506	100.0
	Nationals	73	34.5	112	60.5	-	-	185	100.0

(1) This high percentage may be due to the fact that the migrants had a different understanding of the term "sub-tenant".

TABLE 44: Tenure of dwellings by migrant workers, distinguishing those of EEC and other origin. (1975 survey)

Host country	Owners		Tenants		Sub-tenants		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany EEC	-	-	196	100.0	-	-	196	100.0
Other Eur.	-	-	198	100.0	-	-	198	100.0
Other	-	-	197	100.0	-	-	197	100.0
Belgium EEC	61	41.9	77	54.2	4	2.9	142	100.0
Other Eur.	7	2.3	283	94.0	11	3.7	301	100.0
Other	7	2.7	242	93.4	10	3.9	259	100.0
Denmark EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Eur.	29	12.1	158	65.8	53	22.1(1)	240	100.0
Other	112	30.6	150	40.9	104	28.5	366	100.0
France EEC	13	19.1	50	73.5	5	7.4	68	100.0
Other Eur.	24	8.4	260	91.0	2	0.6	286	100.0
Other	11	3.2	328	95.6	4	1.2	343	100.0
Luxembourg EEC	84	28.2	212	71.1	2	0.7	298	100.0
Other Eur.	19	4.7	356	88.6	27	6.7	402	100.0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands EEC	15	32.6	24	52.2	7	15.2	46	100.0
Other Eur.	27	21.6	95	76.0	3	2.4	125	100.0
Other	49	12.5	301	77.0	41	10.5	391	100.0
United Kingdom EEC	29	44.0	37.	56.0	-	-	66	100.0
Other Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	314	68.3	146	31.7	-	-	460	100.0

(1) This high percentage may be due to the fact that the migrants had a different understanding of the term "sub-tenant".

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Sub-tenancies are in most cases more frequent among the non-European migrants.

These tables do not show whether the dwellings occupied by their owners are of comparable age and quality. On this the Luxembourg report, for example, states that, "on the basis of the 1970 census, 63% of the foreign households occupied dwellings built before 1945" (58).

It is to be noted, too, that the cases of ownership are less numerous in the more metropolitant areas where the housing markets are tighter. In these areas leases and sub-leases are more frequent, as will be shown in section 4. In France, however, ownership percentages are higher in Paris and in Vitry than in the new town of Trappe (Saint.Quentin en Yvelinnes).

In the Netherlands, too, the percentage is higher in Utrecht than in the industrial towns around Twente.

In Belgium it is at Jumet, in the Charleroi sampling district, that the number of owners is highest.

5. Types of dwelling

It will be seen from tables 45 and 46 that there are particular types of dwelling habitually used by immigrants. These are homes, hostels and makeshift accommodation. These occur frequently in the Dutch, French and Danish samples, but they arise in the samples from all the other countries except only Belgium, where they are not mentioned at all, though this does not mean they do not exist (59).

In countries such as Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, where the overwhelming majority of dwellings are single family ones, practically none of the migrants was in housed in homes, hostels or on a makeshift basis.

Comparing the position of migrants and national workers (table 45), it can be seen that the former are much the more often housed in flats. This is particularly the case in Germany, Denmark and Belgium.

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(58) Luxembourg Report, p. 243

(59) For further information for each country, see table A.10 annexed to this chapter.

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In the French sample, however, flat-living is more frequent among the nationals, which is a partial explanation of the small proportion of owner-occupiers shown in table 43. The areas chosen for sampling also contributed.

In the countries where access to property ownership is most frequent, the proportion of migrants in single-family houses is highest, except in the case of Denmark.

A country-by-country comparison of the migrants of different national origin shows that single-family dwellings are more usual among community nationals, among whom ownership is the more usual. This can be seen in Belgium, the Netherlands, France and also in Germany, though the sample in the two latter cases showed comparatively few single-family dwellings.

A comparison between the non-community European workers and the non-europeans, shows percentage differences which are in many cases to the advantage of non-Europeans (e.g. Denmark, U.K., Belgium and Germany).

These differences are probably accounted for, at least in part, by the length of time the various migrant categories have been settled; for in all cases except the United Kingdom, the non-Europeans are, on the average, the most recent immigrants. To a greater extent than other migrants, the non-Europeans are to be found in homes, hostels and make-shift accommodation. They are also more frequently bachelors or unaccompagnied. For these groups, housing conditions are the worst; for housing of this type has only a limited market among the nationals of the host country.

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TABLE 45: Types of dwellings occupied by national and migrant workers interviewed (1975 survey)

Host country	Single-family houses		Flats and apartments		Homes and hostels		Other makeshift		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany										
Migrants	19	3.3	492	85.4	52	9.0	13	2.3	576	100.0
Nationals	55	29.3	128	68.1	-	-	5	2.6	188	100.0
Belgium										
Migrants	288	39.2	447	60.8	-	-	-	-	735	100.0
Nationals	67	65.7	35	34.3	-	-	-	-	102	100.0
Denmark										
Migrants	89	14.7	422	69.7	86	14.2	9	1.4	605	100.0
Nationals	79	40.9	109	56.5	4	2.1	1	0.5	193	100.0
France										
Migrants	38	5.4	478	67.6	134	19.0	57	8.0	707	100.0
Nationals	2	1.8	103	94.5	1	0.9	3	2.8	109	100.0
Luxembourg										
Migrants	429	61.3	239	34.1	4	0.6	28	4.0	700	100.0
Nationals	70	70.0	27	27.0	3	3.0	-	-	100	100.0
Netherlands										
Migrants	240	42.7	43	7.7	235	41.8	44	7.8	562	100.0
Nationals	157	69.8	65	28.9	-	-	3	1.3	225	100.0
United Kingdom										
Migrants	491	84.4	39	6.7	45	7.7	7	1.2	582	100.0
Nationals	173	85.2	24	11.8	3	1.5	3	1.5	203	100.0

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TABLE 46: Types of dwelling occupied by different classes of migrant (1975 survey)

Host Country	Single family houses		Flats and apartments		Homes and hostels		Other makeshift		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany										
EEC	8	4.0	158	80.2	26	13.2	5	2.5	197	100.0
Other Eur.	4	2.2	155	84.7	23	12.6	1	0.6	183	100.0
Other	7	3.6	179	91.3	3	1.5	7	3.6	196	100.0
Belgium										
EEC	86	60.6	56	39.4	-	-	-	-	142	100.0
Other Eur.	43	14.4	255	85.6	-	-	-	-	298	100.0
Other	159	53.5	136	46.1	-	-	-	-	295	100.0
Denmark										
EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Eur.	60	25.1	135	56.5	44	18.4	-	-	239	100.0
Other	29	7.9	287	78.4	42	11.5	8	2 2	366	100.0
France										
EEC	14	20.3	54	78.3	-	-	1	1.4	69	100.0
Other Eur.	14	4.9	185	64.2	56	19.4	33	11.5	288	100.0
Other	10	2.8	239	68.3	78	22.3	23	6.6	350	100.0
Luxembourg										
EEC	185	62.1	102	34.2	-	-	11	3.7	298	100.0
Other Eur.	244	60.7	137	34.1	4	1.0	17	4.2	402	100.0
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands										
EEC	24	52.2	8	17.4	9	19.5	5	10.9	46	100.0
Other Eur.	62	49.6	9	7.2	21	16.8	33	26.4	125	100.0
Other	154	39.4	26	6.7	205	52.4	6	1.5	391	100.0
United Kingdom										
EEC	51	75.0	7	10.3	8	11.7	2	3.0	68	100.0
Other Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other	440	85.6	32	6.2	37	7.2	5	1.0	514	100.0

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6. Density of home-occupation

Except in Belgium, the density of occupation is higher for migrants than for nationals. The biggest differences are in Germany, Denmark and France. In the other countries -- Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom -- the density is habitually lower both for the migrants and for the nationals. This is clear from table 47, which summarises the data given in tables 48 and 49 (60).

It should be remembered, too, that makeshift accommodation, hostels and homes often consist of one-room dwellings with a single occupant living alone; but sometimes, too, these dwellings contain whole families or a number of room-mates if they are not officially regulated and supervised. The apparently good position in Belgium may be due to the fact that no houses of this type were returned in the sample.

All the reports consider the density of occupation to be above the national average in the different countries. This is true both for national workers and for migrants; and the average density recorded is higher than that of the enquiry areas themselves.

(60) Further information is contained in table A 11 annexed to this chapter.

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TABLE 47: Density of occupation — proportion of dwellings with more than 1.5 people per room (1975 survey)

Host country	Percentage with 1.5 and over people per room			
Germany	Nationals	13.5		
	Migrants	76.1 of which:	EEC	83.3
			Other Eur.	85.3
			Non-Eur.	69.4
Belgium	Nationals	39.7		
	Migrants	21.3 of which:	EEC	19.1
			Other Eur.	38.6
			Non-Eur.	27.5
Denmark	Nationals	5.2		
	Migrants	50.0 of which:	EEC	-
			Other Eur.	54.8
			Non-Eur.	46.9
France	Nationals	43.0		
	Migrants	63.2 of which:	EEC	53.6
			Other Eur.	58.6
			Non-Eur.	69.1
Luxembourg	Nationals	24.0		
	Migrants	39.6 of which:	EEC	38.6
			Other Eur.	78.9
			Non-Eur.	-
Netherlands	Nationals	9.3		
	Migrants	16.4 of which:	EEC	8.7
			Other Eur.	21.5
			Non-Eur.	13.8
United Kingdom	Nationals	8.4		
	Migrants	22.5 of which:	EEC	14.7
			Other Eur.	-
			Non-Eur.	23.6

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TABLE 48: Density of occupation — national and migrant workers classified by number housed per room (1975 survey)

Host country	Density of occupation (per room)								Total	
	- to 1.50		1.50 - 1.99		2.00 - 4.99		5.00 & +			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany										
Migrants	123	23.9	147	28.5	136	26.4	109	21.2	515	100.0
Nationals	174	86.5	18	9.0	7	3.5	2	1.0	201	100.0
Belgium										
Migrants	425	78.5	43	8.0	50	9.2	22	4.1	540	100.0
Nationals	35	60.3	9	15.5	12	20.7	2	3.5	58	100.0
Denmark										
Migrants	301	50.0	130	21.6	161	26.7	10	1.7	602	100.0
Nationals	183	94.8	5	2.6	5	2.6	-	-	193	100.0
France										
Migrants	260	36.8	75	10.6	334	47.3	38	5.3	706	100.0
Nationals	61	57.0	13	12.2	33	30.8	-	-	107	100.0
Luxembourg										
Migrants	423	60.4	110	15.7	153	21.9	14	2.0	700	100.0
Nationals	76	76.0	9	9.0	15	15.0	-	-	100	100.0
Netherlands										
Migrants	471	83.6	23	4.1	36	6.4	33	5.9	563	100.0
Nationals	204	90.7	18	8.0	3	1.3	-	-	225	100.0
United Kingdom										
Migrants	450	77.5	92	15.8	39	6.7	-	-	581	100.0
Nationals	186	91.6	14	6.9	3	1.5	-	-	203	100.0

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TABLE 49: Density of occupation — migrant workers classified by origin and number of persons per room (1975 survey)

Host country	Density of occupation (per room)								Total	
	1 - 1.50		1.50 - 1.99		2.00 - 4.99		5.00 & +			
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany EEC										
EEC	33	16.7	36	18.3	49	24.9	79	40.1	197	100.0
Other Eur.	29	14.7	46	23.2	47	23.7	76	38.4	198	100.0
Non-Eur.	61	30.6	65	32.7	40	20.1	33	16.6	199	100.0
Belgium										
EEC	106	80.9	10	7.7	13	9.9	2	1.5	131	100.0
Other Eur.	227	80.5	25	8.9	23	8.1	7	2.5	282	100.0
Non-Eur.	92	72.5	8	6.3	14	11.0	13	10.2	127	100.0
Denmark										
EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other Eur.	108	45.2	47	19.7	78	32.6	6	2.5	239	100.0
Non-Eur.	193	53.1	83	22.9	83	22.9	4	1.1	363	100.0
France										
EEC	32	46.4	9	13.0	28	40.6	-	-	69	100.0
Other Eur.	121	41.4	37	12.7	130	44.5	4	1.4	292	100.0
Non-Eur.	107	30.9	29	8.4	176	50.9	34	9.8	346	100.0
Luxembourg										
EEC	183	61.4	59	19.8	52	17.5	4	1.3	298	100.0
Other Eur.	240	59.7	51	12.7	101	25.1	10	2.5	402	100.0
Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands										
EEC	42	91.3	1	2.2	2	4.3	1	2.2	46	100.0
Other Eur.	91	72.8	6	4.8	20	1.6	8	6.4	125	100.0
Non-Eur.	338	84.2	16	4.1	14	3.6	24	6.1	392	100.0
United Kingdom										
EEC	58	85.3	6	8.8	4	5.9	-	-	68	100.0
Other Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-Eur.	392	76.4	86	16.8	35	6.8	-	-	513	100.0

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7. Standard of comfort

The comfort of a dwelling is measured by its basic facilities. A great number of indices of comfort can be constructed, but a systematic presentation of these would be superfluous.

Table 50 below is the best presentation of the position. It shows only the percentages of national and community workers whose dwellings have a bathroom and/or central heating. This is a rough and ready indicator, but a most significant one. The detail of table 50 is shown in Nos. 51 and 52 (61).

The conclusion is much the same as in the preceding sections. Migrants from the EEC countries, even when they are the longest settled, enjoy a level of home comfort which is still materially below that of national workers. In comparison with the other migrant groups, nevertheless, they are in a privileged position.

When comparison is made between the migrant groups from outside the EEC — European and non-European — the position does not emerge as being uniformly to the advantage of the Europeans (e.g. in Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands).

In this instance some of the data regarding the Netherlands are lacking because of the different method of calculation adopted there. Analysis of the information available indicates, nevertheless, that the results of the survey are on the same lines.

(61) Table A 12 annexed to this chapter gives various further particulars.

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TABLE 50: Home comforts — percentage of dwellings with bathroom and/or central heating (1975 survey)

Host country	Percent with bathroom and/or central heating			
		%		%
Germany	Nationals	83.8		
	Migrants	38.4	of which: EEC	46.3
			Other Eur.	31.5
			Non-Eur.	37.7
Belgium	Nationals	61.0		
	Migrants	37.6	of which: EEC	47.1
			Other Eur.	39.9
			Non-Eur.	29.5
Denmark	Nationals	90.1		
	Migrants	56.5	of which: EEC	-
			Other Eur.	49.4
			Non-Eur.	61.2
France	Nationals	53.3		
	Migrants	33.8	of which: EEC	43.5
			Other Eur.	31.9
			Non-Eur.	33.5
Luxembourg	Nationals	91.5		
	Migrants	59.4	of which: EEC	65.5
			Other Eur.	49.6
			Non-Eur.	-
Netherlands	Nationals	91.5		
	Migrants	19.6	of which: EEC	-
			Other Eur.	-
			Non-Eur.	-
United Kingdom	Nationals	98.0		
	Migrants	88.6	of which: EEC	100.0
			Other Eur.	-
			Non-Eur.	87.1

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TABLE 51: Facilities available in dwellings: comparison between migrant and national workers (1975 situation)

Host country		Without water		Outdoor lavatory		Indoor lavatory		Bathroom		Central heating		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany	Migrants	-	-	137	25.3	197	36.3	137	25.3	71	13.1	542	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	5	2.6	26	13.6	121	63.0	40	20.8	192	100.0
Belgium	Migrants	-	-	191	27.8	237	34.6	188	27.4	70	10.2	626	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	21	20.0	20	19.0	53	50.5	11	10.5	105	100.0
Denmark	Migrants	1	0.2	10	1.7	252	41.6	32	5.3	310	51.2	605	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	-	-	19	9.9	12	6.2	162	83.9	193	100.0
France	Migrants	-	-	427	59.6	47	6.6	95	13.3	147	20.5	716	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	44	40.4	8	7.3	17	15.6	40	36.7	109	100.0
Luxembourg	Migrants	1	0.1	109	16.8	154	23.8	194	29.9	190	29.5	648	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	-	-	1	1,0	37	37.0	62	62.0	100	100.0
Netherlands	Migrants	3	0.8	4	1.0	95	24.8	137	35.8	144	39.5	368	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	3	1.4	9	4.1	184	84.4	22	10.1	219	100.0
United Kingdom	Migrants	-	-	53	9.2	13	2.2	392	67.7	121	20.9	579	100.0
	Nationals	-	-	3	1.5	1	0.5	132	65.0	67	33.0	203	100.0

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TABLE 52: Facilities available in dwellings: comparison between different categories of migrant workers (1975 situation)

Host country		Without water		Outdoor lavatory		Indoor lavatory		Bathroom		Central Heating		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany	EEC	-	-	38	21.7	56	32.0	41	23.4	40	22.9	175	100.0
	Other Eur.	-	-	52	28.3	74	40.2	46	25.0	12	6.5	184	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	47	25.7	67	36.6	50	27.3	19	10.4	183	100.0
Belgium	EEC	-	-	36	25.7	38	27.2	49	35.0	17	12.1	140	100.0
	Other Eur.	-	-	84	28.2	95	31.9	88	29.5	31	10.4	298	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	71	28.6	104	41.9	51	20.6	22	8.9	248	100.0
Denmark	EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Other Eur.	-	-	6	2.5	115	48.1	13	5.4	105	44.0	239	100.0
	Non Eur.	1	0.3	4	1.1	137	37.4	19	5.2	205	56.0	366	100.0
France	EEC	-	-	29	42.0	10	14.5	10	14.5	20	29.0	69	100.0
	Other Eur.	-	-	189	64.7	10	3.4	48	16.5	45	15.4	292	100.0
	Non Eur.	-	-	209	58.4	27	7.6	37	10.4	82	23.1	355	100.0
Luxembourg	EEC	-	-	36	12.9	60	21.6	84	30.2	98	35.3	278	100.0
	Other Eur.	1	0.3	73	19.7	94	25.4	110	24.7	92	24.9	370	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	EEC												
	Other Eur.												
	Non-Eur.												
United Kingdom	EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	46	68.7	21	31.3	67	100.0
	Other Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	-	-	53	10.4	13	2.5	346	67.6	100	19.5	512	100.0

8. Defects disclosed

It would be an unduly laborious task to give a detailed analysis of the defects discovered in the national surveys; and this would be redundant in an international report aimed to give a general picture rather than a detailed analysis.

The faults and defects recorded indicate the state of repair of a dwelling and determine how far it is habitable. The questionnaire took note of such points as bad ventilation, insufficient natural light, signs of damp, dilapidated wall coverings, defective staircases, old and dangerous electrical apparatus, defective roofs, cracked or unstable walls, antiquated sanitation, bad insulation against rain and cold, broken window-panes, badly fitting windows, defective sound-proofing and similar defects.

Table 53 shows the proportion of dwellings in which five or more such lacunae were noted. A more detailed picture is given in tables 54 and 55 (62).

The conclusions to be drawn from these tables is to the same effect as in the previous sections of this chapter. The assessment of defects, however, is always subjective; and differences of understanding or judgement which may arise either on the part of members of the survey staff or members of the migrant population may lead to considerable differences in the descriptions of facts which are really quite comparable.

(62) Table A 13 annexed to this chapter gives additionnal information.

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TABLE 53: Percentage of dwellings with at least 5 defects (1975 survey)

Host country	%		difference		%
Germany	Nationals	5.7	+ 6.0	EEC	8.3
	Migrants	11.7		Other Eur.	17.6
				Non-Eur.	9.1
Belgium	Nationals	50.7	+ 10.9	EEC	43.7
	Migrants	61.4		Other Eur.	48.1
				Non-Eur.	84.5
Denmark	Nationals	0.0	+ 4.5	EEC	-
	Migrants	4.5		Other Eur.	0.4
				Non-Eur.	7.5
France	Nationals	44.3	+ 9.6	EEC	19.6
	Migrants	53.9		Other Eur.	61.9
				Non-Eur.	53.8
Luxembourg	Nationals	2.0	+ 15.3	EEC	7.7
	Migrants	17.3		Other Eur.	24.4
				Non-Eur.	-
Netherlands	Nationals	26.2	+ 3.9	EEC	28.3
	Migrants	30.1		Other Eur.	28.8
				Non-Eur.	30.7
United Kingdom	Nationals	9.4	- 0.8	EEC	8.8
	Migrants	8.6		Other Eur.	-
				Non-Eur.	8.4

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TABLE 54: Classification of dwellings by number of defects recorded: comparison between migrant and national workers (1975 survey)

Host country		1-4 defects		5 and more defects		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany	Migrants	339	88.3	45	11.7	384	100.0
	Nationals	132	94.3	8	5.7	140	100.0
Belgium	Migrants	263	38.6	418	61.4	681	100.0
	Nationals	46	49.5	47	50.5	93	100.0
Denmark	Migrants	546	95.5	26	4.5	572	100.0
	Nationals	193	100.0	-	-	193	100.0
France	Migrants	237	46.1	277	53.9	514	100.0
	Nationals	54	55.7	43	44.3	97	100.0
Luxembourg	Migrants	579	82.7	121	17.3	700	100.0
	Nationals	98	98.0	2	2.0	100	100.0
Netherlands	Migrants	393	69.9	169	30.1	562	100.0
	Nationals	166	73.8	59	26.2	225	100.0
United Kingdom							
	Migrants	529	91.4	50	8.6	579	100.0
	Nationals	184	90.6	19	9.4	203	100.0

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TABLE 55: Classification of dwellings by number of defects recorded: comparison between the various categories of migrant workers (1975 survey)

Host country		1 - 4 defects		5 and more defects		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany	EEC	100	91.7	9	8.3	109	100.0
	Other Eur.	108	82.4	23	17.6	131	100.0
	Non-Eur.	131	90.9	13	9.1	144	100.0
Belgium	EEC	71	56.3	55	43.7	126	100.0
	Other Eur.	151	51.9	140	48.1	291	100.0
	Non-Eur.	41	15.5	223	84.5	264	100.0
Denmark	EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Other Eur.	239	99.6	1	0.4	234	100.0
	Non-Eur.	307	92.5	25	7.5	332	100.0
France	EEC	41	80.4	10	19.6	51	100.0
	Other Eur.	85	38.1	138	61.9	223	100.0
	Non-Eur.	111	46.2	129	53.8	240	100.0
Luxembourg	EEC	275	92.3	23	7.7	298	100.0
	Other Eur.	304	75.6	98	24.4	402	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	EEC	33	71.7	13	23.3	46	100.0
	Other Eur.	89	71.2	36	28.8	125	100.0
	Non-Eur.	271	69.3	120	30.7	391	100.0
United Kingdom							
	EEC	62	91.2	6	8.8	68	100.0
	Other Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	467	91.4	44	8.4	511	100.0

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9. Rents and house charges

Public opinion in EEC countries, though perhaps less generally in the U.K., regards migrants and their families as transient residents who have settled there for the minimum time needed to amass the resources they need to set themselves up more comfortably in their own countries. This is indeed the typical answer given spontaneously by a large number of the migrants when asked about their expectations for the future. Most of them express the wish to go back to their own countries, either because of the hardships they are enduring in their work and housing conditions, or because the uncertainties of their position and their occupational future makes it impossible for them to think in other terms. It is also true that the return home is not necessarily by choice. Apart from statistics on the causes of the return, it seems that quite a number of migrants go home because they have lost their jobs because their health has deteriorated or because of the poor quality of the dwelling assigned to them in virtue of their job contracts. This is borne out in the Italian and Irish reports. The point will be discussed further in another chapter.

The man in the street is still apt to think that migrants accept uncomfortable housing either because they don't want anything better, or because what they are getting in the host country is in any case better than they would have at home. On the other hand the German report, which went more deeply into this question, notes that the aspirations of the immigrants are not materially different from those of the nationals, though the former have not the funds to get what they want.

Remittances home are the third reason mentioned to account for the inferior housing conditions of the migrants, especially in the case of bachelors and married men not accompanied by their wives.

Table 56 shows that in every country except Luxembourg, a majority of the migrant workers sent money back to their own countries. The proportions are particularly high in the countries which, like Germany and the Netherlands, seek to encourage the immigration of unaccompanied males. On the other hand, remittances are also sent by a substantial majority of the migrants both in France and in Denmark.

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TABLE 56: Migrant workers classified in terms of remission or non-remission of money to country of origin

Host country		Send remittances		Do not send remittances		Total	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Germany	All migrants	575	96.8	19	3.2	594	100.0
of which:	EEC	191	97.0	6	3.0	197	100.0
	Other Eur.	186	93.9	12	6.1	198	100.0
	Non-Eur.	198	99.5	1	0.5	199	100.0
Belgium	All migrants	233	54.5	195	45.5	428	100.0
of which:	EEC	4	7.0	53	93.0	57	100.0
	Other Eur.	81	44.5	101	55.5	182	100.0
	Non-Eur.	148	78.2	41	21.7	189	100.0
Denmark	All migrants	526	87.1	77	12.8	603	100.0
of which:	EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Other Eur.	198	82.9	41	17.1	239	100.0
	Non-Eur.	328	90.1	36	9.9	364	100.0
France	All migrants	422	89.0	52	11.0	474	100.0
of which:	EEC	7	100.0	-	-	7	100.0
	Other Eur.	160	76.6	49	23.4	209	100.0
	Non-Eur.	255	98.8	3	1.2	258	100.0
Luxembourg	All migrants	181	25.9	519	74.1	700	100.0
of which:	EEC	15	5.0	283	95.0	298	100.0
	Other Eur.	166	41.3	236	58.7	402	100.0
	Non-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	All migrants	424	77.7	122	22.3	546	100.0
	EEC	17	37.8	28	62.2	45	100.0
	Other Eur.	90	75.0	30	25.0	120	100.0
	Non-Eur.	317	83.2	64	16.8	381	100.0
United Kingdom	All migrants	248	58.4	177	41.6	425	100.0
	EEC	10	15.4	55	84.6	65	100.0
	Other Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Non-Eur.	238	66.1	122	33.9	360	100.0

Remittances are least frequently paid from migrants originating in EEC countries. The proportion sending them is higher among the Europeans and among the non-Europeans it is very high.

The national reports emphasise that the remittances home are sent mainly made by unmarried men, and still more, by married men unaccompanied by their families. These are also the immigrants who are worst housed; and they are the category for whom residential mobility is highest.

These popular explanations of the low housing standards are, however, rather disingenuous.

Several of the national reports note that the proportion of income and wages set aside for housing by the migrants is far from small. It ranges between 10% and 25 or even 30% of household incomes; and the 10% figure often occures in households earning two or more sets of wages.

The national reports note, too, that the proportion spent on housing by the migrants is usually higher than that spent by national workers covered in the surveys, because the nationals are more often the owners of their homes; or because they are more often lodged by relations; or because rents are liable to be lower for longer-term occupants, and long tenure is more frequent among the nationals.

The German and Danish reports, in particular, give calculations of the rent of dwellings per sq. m. The prices calculated are, in general, higher for migrants than for nationals.

The difference in the price per sq. m. is shown in table 57, which is taken from the German report.

TABLE 57: Rentals charges (1975) for dwellings of various qualities for tenancy by Germany and other nationals.
(DM per sq. m.).

Equipment	for Germans	for foreigners	foreigners as % of Germans
Good	4.44	4.17	93.9
Medium	3.30	3.68	111.5
Modest	2.67	3.84	143.8
Poor	3.93	5.42	137.9

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Though foreigners pay less than Germans for a dwelling of good quality, this position is reversed for all the other categories.

For poor quality dwellings, in which 75% of the immigrant workers are housed, foreigners are paying an average of 39% more than German tenants.

Moreover, it seems that quality is not the main determinant of the rent, and high rentals do not automatically mean good housing conditions.

In practice the worst quality attracts the highest rents on a sq. m. basis; and comparisons made in Germany between 1968 and 1973 showed that the tendency to pay more for the lower-quality was becoming more and more marked.

This discriminatory tendency is also found when the migrants are subdivided by nationalities of origin. It appears that difficulty in finding a dwelling and the ability to choose between alternative dwellings (63) are matters which depend on nationality of origin. It all happens as though the market were compartmentalised according to nationality. Moreover, quite apart from the compartmentalising of the market, the dwelling itself may be segregative in character. Lodging in hostels which is a form adopted in many of the host countries, is the most segregative of all, comfortable but expensive.

The regulations of the hostel play the same part as the regulations of the workshop floor, and it offers the most extensive opportunities for keeping the migrants under control and doing what they are told (64).

Thus, the foreign workers depend on a segmented property market which offers them a limited number of potential homes of poor quality at high prices, or the alternative of better dwelling places in tenement blocks or in hostels on financial and social terms which to most of the migrants find unacceptable. This is why they prefer an old building, a furnished room or a hostel whose cost is relatively low.

In general, the housing available to the migrant workers whether offered by private landlords or local authorities, is now becoming less plentiful. This permits private owners to make profits out of proportion to the quality of the dwellings which they let.

A variety of mechanisms is involved whose existence and operation must now be described.

(63) German report, op. cit., p. 89
(64) French report, op. cit., p. 211

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The poor housing conditions, which are usually explained by the desire of the migrants to go home, are in fact the result of their economic position, their political status and the social status conferred on them by various groups in the host country.

To a lower-grade legal and social standing, which guarantees the migrants will be kept in their place, there corresponds an environment and a set of housing conditions which ensure that migrants do not lose the required characteristics.(65)

From observation of the housing market, it appears that migrants' do not choose their housing conditions, but that there are the manifest consequence of the way in which the whole political, economic and social system operates.

These migrant workers are compartmentalised in the labour market, and also in the housing market. In both cases, what they get are the places left vacant by the nationals by reason of the latter's better economic and social conditions. To find housing, migrant workers crowd into the places whence the nationals have fled, because they are antiquated, polluted, noisy and under the threat of urban renewal, schemes, property development operations and other forms of property speculation. As though by chance, these migrant workers help, for a time, to maintain the value of capital which is already depreciated.

These migrants are discriminated against in their capacity as workers; and in fact, if not openly in law, they suffer from a like discrimination in social and housing policies.

Indeed, the particular characteristics of the houses these workers occupy — their bad location, the high rents for homes with bearly tolerable sanitation, or their remoteness from national population groups or from collective facilities and services - have an effect on the workers'feelings about their situation. The poor housing conditions create a growing feeling of being shut in and shut off, they reproduce and accentuate in the housing situation the manifold discriminations of which these migrants are victims in other areas, and limit or neutralise any effort they make to organise themselves.

The housing set aside for foreigners, or rather the housing which their marginal position in our social system constrains them to occupy, are thus part of the machinery of social confinement and control, of making life insecure, and thus inhibiting or eliminating any demands which might be made. The importance of such demands cannot be underestimated if we want to work for better conditions with any chance of success.

It appears from all that has been said that housing conditions not only reflect the specific features and conditions of migrant manpower, but actually maintain them.

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(65) French report, op. cit. p. 49

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TABLE A9: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS BY TYPE OF HOUSE TENURE

Host country	Owners		Tenants		Sub-Tenants		T o t a l	
GERMANY	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
. All migrants	-	-	591	100.0	-	-	591	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	196	100.0	-	-	196	100.0
Non-EEC	-	-	395	100.0	-	-	395	100.0
Eur.	-	-	198	100.0	-	-	198	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	197	100.0	-	-	197	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	201	100.0	-	-	201	100.0
Grand Total	-	-	794	100.0	-	-	794	100.0
BELGIUM								
. All migrants	75	10.7	602	85.7	25	3.6	702	100.0
of which: EEC	61	42.9	77	54.2	4	2.9	142	100.0
Non-EEC	14	2.5	525	93.7	21	3.8	560	100.0
Eur.	7	2.3	283	94.0	11	3.7	301	100.0
N-Eur.	7	2.7	242	93.4	10	3.9	259	100.0
. Nationals	38	36.5	65	62.5	1	1.0	104	100.0
Grand Total	113	14.0	667	82.8	26	3.2	806	100.0
DENMARK								
. All migrants	141	23.3	308	50.8	157	25.9	606	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	141	23.3	308	50.8	157	25.9	606	100.0
Eur.	29	12.1	158	65.8	53	22.1	240	100.0
N-Eur.	112	30.6	150	40.9	104	28.5	366	100.0
. Nationals	73	37.8	114	59.1	6	3.1	193	100.0
Grand Total	214	26.8	422	52.8	163	20.4	799	100.0
FRANCE								
. All migrants	48	6.9	638	91.5	11	1.6	697	100.0
of which: EEC	13	19.1	50	73.5	5	7.4	68	100.0
Non-EEC	35	5.6	588	93.5	6	0.9	629	100.0
Eur.	24	8.4	260	91.0	2	0.6	286	100.0
N-Eur.	11	3.2	328	95.6	4	1.2	343	100.0
. Nationals	9	8.4	98	91.6	-	-	107	100.0
Grand Total	57	7.1	736	91.5	11	1.4	804	100.0
LUXEMBOURG								
. All migrants	103	14.7	568	81.1	29	4.2	700	100.0
of which: EEC	84	28.2	212	71.1	2	0.7	298	100.0
Non-EEC	19	4.7	356	88.6	27	6.7	402	100.0
Eur	19	4.7	356	88.6	27	6.7	402	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
. Nationals	54	55.1	43	43.9	1	1.0	98	100.0
Grand Total	157	19.7	611	76.6	30	3.7	798	100.0
NETHERLANDS								
. All migrants	91	16.2	420	74.7	51	9.1	562	100.0
of which: EEC	15	32.6	24	52.2	7	15.2	46	100.0
Non-EEC	76	14.7	396	76.8	44	8.5	516	100.0
Eur.	27	21.6	95	76.0	3	2.4	125	100.0
N-Eur.	49	12.5	301	77.0	41	10.5	391	100.0
. Nationals	43	24.0	135	75.4	1	0.6	179	100.0
Grand Total	134	18.1	555	74.9	52	7.0	741	100.0
UNITED KINGDOM								
. All migrants	343	67.8	183	36.2	-	-	506	100.0
of which: EEC	29	44.0	37	56.0	-	-	66	100.0
Non-EEC	314	68.3	146	31.7	-	-	460	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N-Eur.	314	68.3	146	31.7	-	-	460	100.0
. Nationals	73	34.5	112	60.5	-	-	185	100.0
Grand Total	416	58.5	295	41.5	-	-	711	100.0

TABLE A10: DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS BY TYPE OF HOUSE OCCUPIED

Host country	Single-family house		Appartment				Other makeshift		Total	
GERMANY	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
. All migrants	19	3.3	492	85.4	52	9.0	13	2.3	576	100.0
of which: EEC	8	4.0	158	80.2	26	13.2	5	2.5	197	100.0
Non-EEC	11	2.9	334	88.1	26	6.9	8	2.1	379	100.0
Eur.	4	2.2	155	84.7	23	12.6	1	0.6	183	100.0
N-Eur.	7	3.6	179	91.3	3	1.5	7	3.6	196	100.0
. Nationals	55	29.3	128	68.1	-	-	5	2.6	188	100.0
Grand Total	74	9.7	620	81.2	52	6.8	18	2.3	764	100.0
BELGIUM										
. All migrants	288	39.2	447	60.8	-	-	-	-	735	100.0
of which: EEC	86	60.6	56	39.4	-	-	-	-	142	100.0
Non-EEC	202	34.1	391	63.9	-	-	-	-	593	100.0
Eur.	43	14.4	255	85.6	-	-	-	-	298	100.0
N-Eur.	159	53.5	136	46.1	-	-	-	-	295	100.0
. Nationals	67	65.7	35	34.3	-	-	-	-	102	100.0
Grand Total	355	48.2	382	51.8	-	-	-	-	737	100.0
DENMARK										
. All migrants	89	14.7	422	69.7	86	14.2	9	1.4	605	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	89	14.7	422	69.7	86	14.2	9	1.4	605	100.0
Eur.	60	25.1	135	56.5	44	18.4	-	-	239	100.0
N-Eur.	29	7.9	287	78.4	42	11.5	8	2.2	366	100.0
. Nationals	79	40.9	109	56.5	4	2.1	1	0.5	193	100.0
Grand Total	168	21.1	531	66.5	90	11.3	9	1.1	798	100.0
FRANCE										
. All migrants	38	5.4	478	67.6	134	19.0	57	8.0	707	100.0
of which: EEC	14	20.3	54	78.3	-	-	1	1.4	69	100.0
Non-EEC	24	3.8	424	66.4	134	21.0	56	8.8	638	100.0
Eur.	14	4.9	185	64.2	56	19.4	33	11.5	288	100.0
N-Eur.	10	2.8	239	68.3	78	22.3	23	6.6	350	100.0
. Nationals	2	1.8	103	94.5	1	0.9	3	2.8	109	100.0
Grand Total	40	4.9	581	71.2	135	16.5	60	7.4	816	100.0
LUXEMBOURG										
. All migrants	429	61.3	239	34.1	4	0.6	28	4.0	700	100.0
of which: EEC	185	62.1	102	34.2	-	-	11	3.7	298	100.0
Non-EEC	244	60.7	137	34.1	4	1.0	17	4.2	402	100.0
Eur.	244	60.7	137	34.1	4	1.0	17	4.2	402	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
. Nationals	70	70.0	27	27.0	3	3.0	-	-	100	100.0
Grand Total	499	62.4	266	33.2	7	0.9	28	3.5	800	100.0
NETHERLANDS										
. All migrants	240	42.7	43	7.7	235	41.8	44	7.8	562	100.0
of which: EEC	24	52.2	8	17.4	9	19.5	5	10.9	46	100.0
Non-EEC	216	41.9	35	6.8	226	32.8	39	7.5	516	100.0
Eur.	62	49.6	9	7.2	21	16.8	33	26.4	125	100.0
N-Eur.	154	39.4	26	6.7	205	52.4	6	1.5	391	100.0
. Nationals	132	73.3	46	25.6	-	-	2	1.1	180	100.0
Grand Total	372	50.1	89	12.0	235	31.8	46	6.2	742	100.0
UNITED KINGDOM										
. All migrants	491	84.4	39	6.7	45	7.7	7	1.2	582	100.0
of which: EEC	51	75.0	7	10.3	8	11.7	2	3.0	68	100.0
Non-EEC	440	85.6	32	6.2	37	7.2	5	1.0	514	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N-Eur.	440	85.6	32	6.2	37	7.2	5	1.0	514	100.0
. Nationals	173	85.2	24	11.8	3	1.5	3	1.5	203	100.0
Grand Total	664	84.6	63	8.0	48	6.1	10	1.3	785	100.0

TABLE A11: Density of occupation (number of persons per room available)

Host country	- 1.49		1.50 - 1.99		2.00 - 4.99		5.00 & +		Total SS	
GERMANY	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
. All migrants	123	23.9	147	28.5	136	26.4	109	21.2	515	100.0
of which: EEC	33	16.7	36	18.3	49	24.9	79	40.1	197	100.0
Non-EEC	90	22.7	111	28.0	87	21.9	109	27.4	397	100.0
Eur.	29	14.7	46	23.2	47	23.7	76	38.4	198	100.0
N-Eur.	61	30.6	65	32.7	40	20.1	33	16.6	199	100.0
. Nationals	174	86.5	18	9.0	7	3.5	2	1.0	201	100.0
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BELGIUM										
. All migrants	425	78.7	43	8.0	50	9.2	22	4.1	540	100.0
of which: EEC	106	80.9	10	7.7	13	9.9	2	1.5	131	100.0
Non-EEC	319	78.0	33	8.1	37	9.0	20	4.9	409	100.0
Eur.	227	80.5	25	8.9	23	8.1	7	2.5	282	100.0
N-Eur.	92	72.5	8	6.3	14	11.0	13	10.2	127	100.0
. Nationals	35	60.3	9	15.5	12	20.7	2	3.5	58	100.0
Grand Total	460	76.9	52	8.7	62	10.4	24	4.0	598	100.0
DENMARK										
. All migrants	301	50.0	130	21.6	161	26.7	10	1.7	602	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	301	50.0	130	21.6	161	26.7	10	1.7	602	100.0
Eur.	108	45.2	47	19.7	78	32.6	6	2.5	239	100.0
N-Eur.	193	53.1	83	22.9	83	22.9	4	1.1	363	100.0
. Nationals	183	94.8	5	2.6	5	2.6	-	-	193	100.0
Grand Total	484	60.9	135	17.0	166	20.9	10	1.2	795	100.0
FRANCE										
. All migrants	260	36.8	75	10.6	334	47.3	38	5.3	706	100.0
of which: EEC	32	46.4	9	13.0	28	40.6	-	-	69	100.0
Non-EEC	228	35.7	66	10.3	306	48.0	38	6.0	638	100.0
Eur.	121	41.4	37	12.7	130	44.5	4	1.4	292	100.0
N-Eur.	107	30.9	29	8.4	176	50.9	34	9.8	346	100.0
. Nationals	61	57.0	13	12.2	33	30.8	-	-	107	100.0
Grand Total	321	39.4	88	10.8	367	45.1	38	4.7	814	100.0
LUXEMBOURG										
. All migrants	423	60.4	110	15.7	153	21.9	14	2.0	700	100.0
of which: EEC	183	61.4	59	19.8	52	17.5	4	1.3	298	100.0
Non-EEC	240	59.7	51	12.7	101	25.1	10	2.5	402	100.0
Eur.	240	59.7	51	12.7	101	25.1	10	2.5	402	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
. Nationals	76	76.0	9	9.0	15	15.0	-	-	100	100.0
Grand Total	499	62.4	119	14.9	168	21.0	14	1.7	800	100.0
NETHERLANDS										
. All migrants	352	62.4	120	21.3	43	7.6	49	8.7	564	100.0
of which: EEC	40	87.0	2	4.3	2	4.3	2	4.3	46	100.0
Non-EEC	312	60.2	118	22.8	41	7.9	47	9.1	518	100.0
Eur.	85	68.0	8	6.4	24	19.2	8	6.4	125	100.0
N-Eur.	227	57.8	110	27.9	17	4.3	39	10.0	393	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UNITED KINGDOM										
. All migrants	450	77.5	92	15.8	39	6.7	-	-	581	100.0
of which: EEC	58	85.3	6	8.8	4	5.9	-	-	68	100.0
Non-EEC	392	76.4	86	16.8	35	6.8	-	-	513	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N-Eur.	392	76.4	86	16.8	35	6.8	-	-	513	100.0
. Nationals	186	91.6	14	6.9	3	1.5	-	-	203	100.0
Grand Total	636	81.1	106	13.5	-	5.4	-	-	784	100.0

TABLE A12: LEVEL OF ANNUITY IN DWELLING - EXPRESSED BY SEVERAL INDICATION

Host country	Without water		Outdoor lavatory		Indoor lavatory		Bathroom		Central heating		T o t a l	
GERMANY	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
. All migrants	-	-	137	25.3	197	36.3	137	25.3	71	13.1	542	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	38	21.7	56	32.0	41	23.4	40	22.9	175	100.0
Non-EEC	-	-	99	27.0	141	38.4	96	26.2	31	8.4	367	100.0
Eur.	-	-	52	28.3	74	40.2	46	25.0	12	6.5	184	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	47	25.7	67	36.6	50	27.3	19	10.4	183	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	5	2.6	26	13.6	121	63.0	40	20.8	192	100.0
Grand Total	-	-	142	19.4	223	30.4	258	35.1	111	15.1	734	100.0
BELGIUM												
. All migrants	-	-	191	27.8	237	34.6	188	27.4	70	10.2	686	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	36	25.7	38	27.2	49	35.0	17	12.1	140	100.0
Non-EEC	-	-	155	28.4	199	36.4	139	25.5	53	9.7	546	100.0
Eur.	-	-	84	28.2	95	31.9	88	29.5	31	10.4	298	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	71	28.6	104	41.9	51	20.6	22	8.9	248	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	21	20.0	20	19.0	53	50.5	11	10.5	105	100.0
Grand Total	-	-	212	26.8	257	32.5	241	30.5	81	10.2	791	100.0
DENMARK												
. All migrants	1	0.2	10	1.7	252	41.6	32	5.3	310	51.2	605	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Non-EEC	1	0.2	10	1.7	252	41.6	32	5.3	310	51.2	605	100.0
Eur.	-	-	6	2.5	115	48.1	13	5.4	105	44.0	239	100.0
N-Eur.	1	0.3	4	1.1	137	37.4	19	5.2	205	56.0	366	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	-	-	19	9.9	12	6.2	162	83.9	193	100.0
Grand Total	1	0.1	10	1.3	271	34.0	44	5.5	472	59.1	798	100.0
FRANCE												
. All migrants	-	-	427	59.6	47	6.6	95	13.3	147	20.5	716	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	29	42.0	10	14.5	10	14.5	20	29.0	69	100.0
Non-EEC	-	-	398	61.5	37	5.7	85	13.1	127	19.7	647	100.0
Eur.	-	-	189	64.7	10	3.4	48	16.5	45	15.4	292	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	209	58.9	27	7.6	37	10.4	82	23.1	355	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	44	40.4	8	7.3	17	15.6	40	36.7	109	100.0
Grand Total	-	-	471	57.1	55	6.7	112	13.6	187	22.6	825	100.0
LUXEMBOURG												
. All migrants	1	0.1	109	16.8	154	23.8	194	29.9	190	29.4	648	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	36	12.9	60	21.6	84	30.2	98	35.3	278	100.0
Non-EEC	1	0.3	73	19.7	94	25.4	110	29.7	92	24.9	370	100.0
Eur.	1	0.3	73	19.7	94	25.4	110	29.7	92	24.9	370	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
. Nationals	-	-	-	-	1	1.0	37	37.0	62	62.0	100	100.0
Grand Total	1		109	14.6	155	20.7	231	30.9	483	64.6	748	100.0
NETHERLANDS												
. All migrants	3	0.5	241	42.7	-	-	243	43.1	77	13.7	564	100.0
of which: EEC	3	6.5	4	8.7	-	-	35	76.1	4	8.7	46	100.0
Non-EEC	-	-	237	45.8	-	-	208	40.2	73	14.0	518	100.0
Eur.	-	-	20	16.0	-	-	105	84.0	-	-	125	100.0
N-Eur.	-	-	217	55.2	-	-	103	26.2	73	18.6	393	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	10	5.5	-	-	153	85.0	17	9.5	180	100.0
Grand Total	3	0.4	251	33.7	-	-	396	53.2	94	12.7	744	100.0
UNITED KINGDOM												
. All migrants	-	-	53	9.2	13	2.2	392	67.7	181	20.9	579	100.0
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	46	68.7	21	31.3	67	100.0
Non-EEC	-	-	53	10.4	13	2.5	346	67.6	100	19.5	512	100.0
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
N-Eur.	-	-	53	10.4	13	2.5	346	67.6	100	19.5	512	100.0
. Nationals	-	-	3	1.5	1	0.5	132	65.0	67	33.0	203	100.0
Grand Total	-	-	56	7.2	14	1.8	524	67.0	188	24.0	782	100.0

TABLE A 13: Classification of dwellings according to number of defects noted (1975 situation)

Host country	1 - 4		5 & +		Total			
GERMANY	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
. All migrants	339	88.3	45	11.7	384	100.0		
of which: EEC	100	91.7	9	8.3	109	100.0		
Non-EEC	239	86.9	36	13.1	275	100.0		
Eur.	108	82.4	23	17.6	131	100.0		
N-Eur.	131	90.9	13	9.1	144	100.0		
. Nationals	132	94.3	8	5.7	140	100.0		
Grand Total	471	89.9	53	10.1	524	100.0		
BELGIUM								
. All migrants	263	38.6	418	61.4	681	100.0		
of which: EEC	71	56.3	55	43.7	126	100.0		
Non-EEC	192	34.6	363	65.4	555	100.0		
Eur.	151	51.9	140	48.1	291	100.0		
N-Eur.	41	15.5	223	84.5	264	100.0		
. Nationals	46	49.5	47	50.5	93	100.0		
Grand Total	309	39.9	465	60.1	774	100.0		
DENMARK								
. All migrants	546	95.6	26	4.4	572	100.0	33	
of which: EEC	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Non-EEC	546	95.6	26	4.4	572	100.0	33	
Eur.	230	99.6	1	0.4	240	100.0	1	
N-Eur.	307	92.5	25	6.9	332	100.0	32	
. Nationals	193	100.0	-	-	193	100.0	2	
Grand Total	739	96.6	26	3.3	765	100.0	35	
FRANCE								
. All migrants	237	46.1	277	53.9	514	100.0	202	
of which: EEC	41	80.4	10	19.6	51	100.0	18	
Non-EEC	196	42.3	267	57.7	463	100.0	184	
Eur.	85	38.1	138	61.9	223	100.0	69	
N-Eur.	111	46.2	129	53.8	240	100.0	115	
. Nationals	54	55.7	43	44.3	97	100.0	12	
Grand Total	291	47.6	320	52.4	611	100.0	214	
LUXEMBOURG								
. All migrants	579	82.7	121	17.3	700	100.0		
of which: EEC	275	92.3	23	7.7	298	100.0		
Non-EEC	304	75.6	98	24.4	402	100.0		
Eur.	304	75.6	98	24.4	402	100.0		
N-Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-		
. Nationals	98	98.0	2	2.0	100	100.0		
Grand Total	677	84.6	123	15.4	800	100.0		
NETHERLANDS								
. All migrants	393	69.9	169	30.1	562	100.0		
of which: EEC	33	71.7	13	28.3	46	100.0		
Non-EEC	360	69.7	156	30.3	516	100.0		
Eur.	89	71.2	36	28.8	125	100.0		
N-Eur.	271	69.3	120	30.7	391	100.0	2	
. Nationals	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Grand Total	-	-	-	-	-	-		
UNITED KINGDOM								
. All migrants	529	91.4	50	8.6	579	100.0		
of which: EEC	62	91.2	6	8.8	68	100.0		
Non-EEC	467	91.4	44	8.4	511	100.0		
Eur.	-	-	-	-	-	-		
N-Eur.	467	91.4	44	8.4	511	100.0		
. Nationals	184	90.6	19	9.4	203	100.0		
Grand Total	713	91.2	69	8.8	782	100.0		

CHAPTER 6 - MECHANISMS AND EFFECTS OF THE PROPERTY MARKET

1. General conditions for migrants in the housing market

With the exception of some migrant workers, mostly from EEC countries, and of immigrants who have been settled some time, or were admitted in virtue of some special craft or skill, most of the migrants have to remain in homes on the dilapidated fringes of the housing market. These dwellings lie in areas which are shabby and old, in a state of deterioration matched by a low quality environment, and are characterized by a lack of open spaces and the antiquated state of the social and collective facilities (66).

The areas where immigrant labour is usually housed are all the more likely to be of this type since the migrants are concentrated in the most highly industrialised and most densely populated districts such as the metropolitan areas of Paris, London or Brussels. Under the combined effect of various constraints — economic, social, political and ideological — most of them do not get the benefit of subsidised housing, and they are thus driven into a fringe of the housing market where almost all of the dwellings are privately owned and in a state of decay. In this way, they are shut off from the local communities; and, since their level of political organisation is low, they are more likely to be affected by urban renewal schemes, population transfers and removals from one area to another, given the paucity and segregative character of the space available. It is clear that the influx of migrant workers into any area takes place as part of a process in which they replace local populations who have taken flight because the area is going downhill and often, too, because of the threat of property operations in the transition areas on the edge of big administrative and office blocks in flourishing business areas. Thus it is that the immigrants' rents and personal investments help to maintain the value of dilapidated housing, until it can be renovated. Such renovation is facilitated by the fact that any attempt to resist eviction-rehousing orders will be impeded by both the institutional feebleness of the migrants and that of nearby communities of local nationality.

2. Accessibility to housing of various types

2.1. Subsidised housing

Insofar as subsidised housing schemes are being developed locally, they tend to be in more salubrious areas than those occupied by the

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(66) S. PANCIERA, M. PLEVOETS and V. CAMPANELLI, op. cit.

migrants and are often constructed for the benefit of those with higher incomes and smaller families than the migrants. The latter are therefore not able to secure ownership (67) or to rent these subsidised houses and it is even more rare for a migrant to get possession of a new house. Several of the national reports show how various procedures contribute to the allocation of council and other subsidised houses to better off social categories; and they underline the smallness of the number of migrants who find their way into such housing. Migrants' prospects of acquiring such housing are further diminished by the fact that the number of such dwellings actually built is far below the need as assessed on any objective basis. When migrants are found at all in subsidised housing, it is usually in very old housing, unless it be that they have been compulsorily re-housed or are lucky to have income enough to buy a new subsidised house, despite the big increase in the prices of such houses in recent years.

For the most part, migrant workers occupy these dwellings on a rental basis, because they are too costly to purchase and mortgage rates are too high. It is also true that migrants often have bigger families than their local counterparts, so that they have to live in more crowded conditions. It is, of course, for local populations that the national housing policies are made and operated; and it is seldom enough that they correspond with the desires of migrant workers or the real needs of foreign families who have no voice or representation in this field as in so many others.

Other administrative regulations, official and unofficial, restrict access to subsidised dwellings, by implying that the families of migrants should adjust their behaviour to conform with the expectations of the locals — in other words, that there should be a thorough assimilation of the foreigners into the local way of life.

These subsidised dwellings are built under the encouragement or to the order of national or local authorities; and access to them is governed by a number of criteria, including length of residence, prices, the solvency of the applicant and the availability of such accommodation. All of these stipulations play their part to the detriment of the weaker sections of the population including the migrant workers. Another factor which also comes into operation is the resentment and retaliation of the locals when faced by the invasion of their potential housing by migrant workers.

Thus, despite the efforts made in different countries of the Community to deal with the housing problem, the migrants have access to only a small fringe of subsidised housing; and always and everywhere, this fringe is smaller than the proportion of migrant workers in the total population, whether this be counted on a district basis or for individual industries, or for big metropolitan areas.

2.2. Privately-owned dwellings

The national reports make it clear that the migrants are housed in areas which have been evacuated by the nationals, because the houses are dilapidated and overcrowded. Migrant workers who go into the market as

(67) In Germany and in Denmark, nobody can obtain ownership of a subsidised home.

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potential buyers of a privately-owned house, are only too often negotiating for a very old building, often dating from 1920 or earlier; and the mortgage companies are chary about granting a loan on their houses. When it comes to renting a privately-owned house, the migrants usually pay dearer than the locals for the same quality range, and the prices per sq. m. are so high, that they accept tiny dwellings. Even for housing of similar price and quality, migrants'housing is usually more densely occupied since their families are usually larger.

In very many cases, it is the size of the family which determines the type of dwelling, its cost and the segment of the housing market in which the migrant will seek his accommodation. It is the private landlord whose terms are most discriminatory, since they can take advantage of the lack of political or administrative weight behind these groups of workers from foreign countries, who are in the market for only a short time and whose presence in the country at all may well be illegal. This apparent preference for accommodation which is privately-owned, dilapidated and infra-social (for it does not come up to the standards of the "social" or subsidised dwelling) is primarily due to the insufficient number of dwellings and to the fact that the space available and the prices asked are out of line with the means and the requirements of the families of migrant workers.

In all EEC countries the funds available fall short of what is needed for building subsidised houses or renovating them. At their current levels these funds do not suffice to check the deterioration, or even the comparative deterioration, of a big section of the available housing.

Moreover, the migrant workers get only a meagre share of the credits which are given for house improvements. This is because they are only seldom the owners of their houses; and as tenants they can only take action with their landlord's consent. This is a field in which there are a number of other mechanisms which operate against the migrant tenant. It is not only a question of the conditions on which he can secure the various grants; but there is a further question of the size of the grant and thus the question of how much is left for him to pay for out of his own pocket and how the expenses are to be divided between landlord and tenant. Added to this is the difficulty — the virtual impossibility — of realising the value added to the dwelling if he should move out. In most cases, too, these tenants cannot avoid having to pay higher rents resulting from improvements carried out by their landlords.

Lastly, regulations are such that repairs to property can only be subsidised in areas for which there are not any outstanding plans for urban renewal involving compulsory purchase since these plans would justify the owners of the property in refusing to undertake further investment.

3. Residential concentration

3.1. Forced concentration

Anybody who takes a look at these fringes of tumbledown housing will be struck by the fact that they are concentrated in specific parts

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of the town, and thus contribute to keeping the different social strata apart. These areas of shabby old houses are usually close to big industrial plants, or to some centre of pollution or waste disposal. Sometimes they are sandwiched between stations and railway yards, bus stations or airports or other important social facilities of an infrastructural character; and again they may be on the edge of administrative or business areas which are being actively developed and have become what ecologists call "transition areas". In such areas there is so much property speculation in progress that both public spending on infrastructure and private investment will have fallen to zero. They are districts from which there is a rapid outflow of the local population due to the age of the buildings, the noise, the unhealthy surroundings, rickety and dangerous structures, overcrowding, heavy traffic and the general dilapidation of the houses. The better off residents move to other dwellings in green belts, and to comfortable homes in the suburbs. They are thus making space available for their replacements, i.e. those whose incomes constrain them to be content with poor housing.

Among the latter is the immigrant population. It is indeed a replacement; for not only are its working members filling jobs and operating industrial sectors which have lost their attractiveness for the local population, but their families are pouring into the houses and areas for which the locals have demonstrated their dislike.

All these conditions keep the foreign working population out of the "normal" circuit of the housing market. They confine it to marginal housing which does not conform to the needs of the foreign working population, but from which the social housing policies of the host countries seem, in current circumstances, unable to extricate them. These houses are totally insufficient compared with the enormous number which would be required to halt the general deterioration — absolute as well as comparative — of the housing stock. This is particularly the case in the big industrial centres, where the population is most dense, the growth in the range of jobs is fastest and where, in consequence, a large majority of the migrants have settled.

This interplay of general factors, however, does not by itself give an adequate explanation of the ecological grouping of the migrant workers. Open and concealed methods of discrimination, repulsion and exclusion are employed by the owners of private property around the edge of the migrants' areas in order to segregate them from the areas where the nationals live. The racist behaviour of these property owners is encouraged by the fears so freely expressed among the national populations in the immediate neighbourhood of the immigrants' areas.

This confinement of the immigrants into specific types of area tends to promote overcrowding and sets up conditions in which high prices can be charged for housing units of low quality. Moreover, it makes for speculation by the owners of houses in areas which are in decline.

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For present purposes, the phrase "comparative deterioration" is used to describe what happens when the total stock of houses is increasing and a marginal part of them improved, so that older and less comfortable houses lose their value. Thus comparative deterioration arises from the fact that improvements are taking place elsewhere.

By comparison, "absolute deterioration" occurs when there is gradual physical deterioration in the housing stock and a decay of residential areas because of lack of public or private investment, or because the investment made is designed to increase the density of occupation.

Usually, too, a lack of maintenance outlay on buildings follows the absence or inadequacy of public investment in the infrastructure and in the collective and social facilities of districts earmarked for reconstruction. The usual effect is to speed up the physical decay so that it becomes absolute.

Even if the current economic crisis were to continue, inducing delays in the redevelopment plans which would have been expected given the rize of immigrant population, the fact remains that the foreign workers are the last opportunity for making a profit in the period preceding expropriation and redevelopment of the areas concerned. They are the last opportunity for small property owners to speculate on these operations — about which decisions may have been made sometime in advance — by spending the very minimum on maintenance and repairs and seeing how much they can squeeze out of their tenants, though this will vary with the nationality of the migrant, his probable length of stay and his occupational status.

Increased overcrowding arises partly from the size of migrant families and the ways in which they cohabit, but partly, also, from the quest for maximum profit by the owners of these dilapidated dwellings. It is they who carry out or authorise the sub-division of dwellings; for by putting partitions across rooms, or sub-dividing the floors of the house, they may double the number of separate apartments, so that they can lodge several families instead of one or two, or a larger number of unaccompanied bachelors.

Such overcrowding causes the dwellings in these areas to deteriorate more quickly and tends to create real ghettos of foreign inhabitants wherever the indigenous population falls below 30%.

The degree of over-crowding in the dwellings varies with the social distance between successive contingents of different nationalities and races brought into the area; and the same is true of over-exploitation with increasingly high prices being asked for smaller dwellings of worse and worse quality. Each host society and each employing country gradually gets used to a certain type of foreigner. To some extent the larger established nationalities are, after a time, more or less "adopted", whereas there is a tendency to be doubtful, even hostile, about the new arrivals, especially if their skin colour is different, and the cultural gap wider, as is the case with Africans or Asiatics for example.

This sequence of events is at least a partial explanation of the ecological distribution of national groups of immigrants and the tendency for specific districts to "specialise" in particular nationalities. In

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Brussels, for example, there are Moroccan and Turkish quarters, in Paris there are Algerian areas and in Copenhagen Pakistani districts.

There are various other factors which accentuate this grouping by nationality or race. In Federal Germany, for example, there are several big firms trading in particular cities or regions which make a practice of recruiting manpower of a specific nationality. Thus, there are specially large numbers of Turks at Gelsenkirchen, of Yugoslavs at Stuttgart and of Italians at Ludwigshaven. This compartmentalisation of the labour market is often matched by a compartmentalisation of residential districts, the one phenomenon leading naturally to the other.

3.2. The tendency to live in groups

It is of course true that the ghetto form of settlement in some of the foreign colonies, cannot be always and solely explained by the compartmentalisation of the labour market, or by discrimination against the migrants or by his political status or the forced departures some of the immigrants and their families have experienced.

It is also perfectly natural that people of the same nationality should live together; and the arrangement may well perform important functions, not only for the receiving societies, but also for the foreign colonies entering the country. The national reports, make it clear also that none of the nationalities, except for some of the Italians and the Irish, has really taken root in the employing country. In other words, none of them has really succeeded in weaving itself into a web of social relationships with the locals. The gap is wider for groups of different racial origins, which are sometimes reinforced by long histories of antagonism, as with the Algerians in France.

The marginalisation of migrants is often a cumulative process and is accelerated by the type of urban area where the foreign groups are concentrated. In these areas, they often meet only one another.

In this kind of conglomeration, conditions may be insanitary, comfort standards may be low, the housing may be dilapidated; but the shops, cafés and many other meeting places serve to create a network of social relationships;

However, this type of group living also gives rise to some form of social organisation stimulated by various intermediaries, such as those who provide work (legal or illegal), unscrupulous lodging house keepers, fellow countrymen of longer settlement and "the dispensers of meagre compensation for isolation and hard work" (68).

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(68) P. GEORGE, op. cit., -.66 ./.

The ghetto, or colony of foreigners, is both the normal channel for the immigrant and the virtually compulsory means for entering the employing country. It is also either the place where his integration begins or else his place of withdrawal or even rejection. It is a place of withdrawal when racial prejudice comes to the surface, and recoils on a whole racial linguistic and cultural group; the immigrant cannot escape from the stigma of the group to which he belongs. It is a place of rejection, insofar as the formation of the ghetto reflects the enormous obstacles to the integration of the worker into the employing country.

These concentrations of migrant workers which are to be found in all Community countries are partly forced upon them by outside influences, for they are in fact the logical accompaniment to the compartmentalisation of the labour market. On the other hand, many migrants desire and prefer them for reasons of sentiment, culture, social life and economics. They are an index of the distance and the degree to which their workers are segregated and out off from the world outside.

Thus, group living is desired by the migrant workers, but it is also dangerous in that their insularity may result in their problems being ignored, laying them open to the deterioration of their housing and to expropriation and uprooting if this should seem to fit in with the economic logic and the redevelopment policy of the big towns.

4. How the deterioration happens

Though the migrant workers make profitable the special fringe of housing in which they are hived off, this housing is subject to the same influences as the rest of the built-up area and the property market as a whole.

In every Community country, with the possible exception of Luxembourg, deterioration, both relative and absolute, has occurred in most of the dwellings to which the migrant workers are confined. Private residential construction continues at its normal pace, but the building of "social" or subsidised dwellings has slackened off since the beginning of 1974 because of economic conditions. The new housing policy is based on new laws designed to make the old houses healthier and put them in a better state of repair. Yet, even the combined effects of the renovation policy and the building of new subsidised housing are not enough to prevent the deterioration, both relative and absolute, of the housing kept for the migrant workers.

In modern social systems, as CASTELLS emphasises, the housing question is primarily a crisis question. Uncomfortable and insanitary dwellings, and the slow expansion in the number of houses, are the inevitable result of the mal-functioning of the housing market in a capitalist economy (69).

Yet it is not entirely a problem of the number of houses. The housing question is much more a question of price and quality. It boils

(69) M. CASTELLS, La question urbaine, Maspero, Paris, 1975 pp. 190-217.

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down to the problem of ascertaining how suitable dwellings can be produced without inducing a big rise in labour costs; for the houses produced in the private market, and even these built by the State, are still out of reach for most of the population with which we are now concerned. In Germany, and some of the other countries, there is relative deterioration in the housing occupied by the migrants and part of the local population, and at the same time there is a continued surplus of good quality housing at prices 25 or 30% above anything these workers (especially those covered by the survey) are able or willing to pay.

In every country, these excessive prices, (even including the prices of "social" housing) result from a disproportionate increase in the price of land, construction costs and the comforts of life in the bigger and more densely populated urban and industrial areas. Private home-building, as well as social house-building comes into competition with other forms of property investment, such as business or administrative offices, shops and parking lots, all of which require site clearances and the destruction of a great many hectares of property which has already grown dilapidated and unprofitable, and where the migrants and their families have the best chances of finding their homes. Moreover, redevelopment of city centres is usually accompanied by enormous infrastructure works, such as urban motorways, more and larger railway stations and bus termini.

Thus the increase in the number of migrants since 1968 is not the only reason for the scarcity of housing. This has arisen largely because of the demolition of whole areas, in which migrants and their families had taken refuge, and which were scheduled for improvement and redevelopment.

The migrant population has its own important part to play in these development and redevelopment schemes, since it is so largely employed in building and civil engineering. It is thus its fate to be caught in the meshes of the very web it is helping to weave.

5. The notice to quit as an instrument of urban development

5.1. Redevelopment

The concentration of economic development and population growth into and around big urban and industrial centres, and in metropolitan areas, promotes property speculation, housing development, rebuilding plans for the central and suburban areas, and redevelopment of the modes of communication between the centre and the suburbs.

The extension of office areas and the setting up of new zones of luxury housing are events which go together in the development of the property market, even though yield and profit rates may vary.

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With the enlargement of the city centre the surrounding girdle at once comes under the threat of invasion by administrative buildings, extended shopping areas, parking facilities and service installations, new blocks of luxury flats (which are sources of the highest profits) and new roads into the heart of the town. It is this threat of a complete change in the way an area is used which tends to make the local inhabitants take flight; and this is made the easier because their place is taken by the incoming population of migrants and their families.

In this connexion, BOHNING emphasises that "the improved living standard of the local population leads it to abandon altogether the older living quarters in the inner city, seeking new homes in the suburbs, and leaving behind them the old and infirm and also some available space which the immigrants are only too happy to take for themselves. What is happening in the property market is thus the same type of takeover of vacancies which is going on in the labour market" (70).

Moreover, the weaknesses in the institutions and political standing of the migrant workers is a strong card in the hands of the planners and helps in carrying out redevelopment schemes designed to change the function of the area and bring it on to a higher social level. In both cases there is an enlargement of the tax base, so that the local authorities also stand to benefit. In this transformation of urban areas, the districts where the migrants are living appear to be as "a target which is economically justified".

These redevelopment processes are, however, slow and complex. There are manifold ways of going about them, the actors are many and the stakes are high. The first people who play a part in it are the property owners — private individuals, firms and public authorities — within whose responsibility the area falls. The departure of part of the local population leads the owners, public or private, to minimise their spendings on embellishment, repairs and maintenance and to avoid any new expenditure. The living quarters thus grow increasingly dilapidated with age, and a reduction occurs in the value of the area for which the property speculators and promoters had already made their plans. Simple calculations are by now all that is needed to demonstrate the irrational use which is being made of the area just outside the city centre, and to dazzle the public authorities — local, regional and national — with the image of prospective advantages to be got by compulsory purchase, by measures to clear the area, demolish the buildings and set up administrative skyscrapers, shopping and service areas and high-rise apartment blocks.

These operations have many consequences. They solve the problem of housing the expanding public services; they contribute to enlarging the range and volume of the fiscal and other receipts; they encourage private initiative and employment, for it soon becomes possible to realize the increases in value, particularly if the operations which have been authorised are on a large enough scale. Even so, the costs are high and there is a possibility of political repercussions, so that public authorities are often in favour of tackling the operations stage-by-stage; but they come up against the problem that this costs more and attracts many fewer private property developers.

(70) W.R. BOHNING and D. MAILLAT, op. cit., p. 113 ./.

This policy of the "small parcel" was tried out for a short time in France; but it failed, largely because the higher investment cost has to be spread over a longer period. The initial aim was to build a substantial amount of low-cost housing; but after a trial period the objectives changed and it was handed over to private property developers. They were only able to cover their costs and financial charges by "balancing operations", which meant the building of luxury accommodation whose profitability was assured.

Other things being equal, when conditions are right in the finance, property and housing markets large-scale operations are quite often a necessity as rescue operations for local authorities responsible for the transition areas. These local bodies may well be feeling the pinch because they have been bled of part of their traditional population, and they therefore have their eyes open for construction projects and programmes which will bring the areas back to life.

Often they may find they must sell their reserves of land, instead of buying more and keeping it as a reserve. In their weak and impoverished state, they are increasingly vulnerable to pressure from the property promoters, and readily accept the development plans laid before them instead of steadfastly carrying out an improvement policy of their own for the benefit of all the inhabitants.

In actual fact it is not only the local authorities, the financiers, the mortgage and property companies and the property developers who are interested in the redevelopment operations. These do not result solely from plans hatched in the local framework, but they also attract the attention of the national authorities.

Indeed, the national authorities determine the use to be made of land through their general development plans; and there are usually many public works operations which have to be carried out before or with the building and land development ventures by private undertakers. The plans and layout for the buildings, too, have to be approved beforehand by national authorities. The interest of the central government in all these operations is heightened by the fact that it is usually direct beneficiary, partly through the generation of incomes for tax and partly through the taxes incorporated in the prices of a new houses and buildings.

Furthermore, these macro-projects of property development involve many administrative departments, institutions and groups; and their many decisions, interventions and pressures have to be coordinated and kept in line. This leads to the setting up of facilities for consultation, even inclusion in various forms of ad hoc structure which Maurice DUVERGER calls "administrative real estate complexes".

Thus the actual position of these urban and industrial conglomerations is really the result of a town-planning policy arising from connivance between property owners, housing capitalists, the government and local authorities. It is at least partly the result of the weakness of public bodies, at whatever level, when faced with the power of money, property speculators, building companies and housing promoters. In any

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case it is not possible to ignore the links which are built up at many levels between politicians and senior officials on the one hand, and representatives of private economic interests on the other.

Indeed, it often happens that the politicians or officials are unofficial representatives of firms, finance houses or pressure groups, which are active in the property business.

On the other hand, decisions in property matters are not always conspiracies. Many property projects owe their inception and development to votecatching or even, more simply, to ignorance of the mechanisms which underlie degradation in living conditions.

There is no other way to explain how and why, in the big industrial areas and towns at the present time, speculators and property developers are able to pick the cream of the sites and trigger a galloping inflation in land prices, both in the town and in its suburbs. Over 12 years, the increase in land prices in Paris has averaged 37% and in Copenhagen the 20-year increase has been 300%. For the areas around the centre of Brussels there was an increase of nearly 1 000% in land prices between the periods 1948-58 and 1968-70.

This unbridled rise in land prices, while it raises the sectors concerned in the social scale, ultimately distorts housing policy. Property owners in the area around the city centres, who speculate about expropriation of their buildings for demolition, are well aware that the prices they will obtain will not depend on the value of the buildings on the site, but on the value of the site itself. They therefore refuse any major repair jobs or improvements suggested by their tenants.

The property speculators and developers, by acting in their own financial interest are induced to build for the highest possible profit on sites which have become the more valuable for their scarcity. The profitable use of this land calls for taller and taller buildings, and more and more opulent constructions for public departments and, for private services (such as banks, insurance offices, head offices of big firms or advertising agencies and the like); or for strata in the population who can afford the luxury of apartments in the centres of towns or villas in the green belt around it. The struggle of land speculators for excess profits thus becomes the essential motive force in channelling property investment into one project on another and therefore in determining the forms which urban development takes.

Policy in property matters is not the only thing which is disturbed by the excessive rise in site values. It also encourages segregation, both by area and on the social plane, creating boundaries by putting homes in separate strata determined by quality, size and price, so reenforcing the barriers already existing in the labour market.

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Besides, these high prices are of value to others as well as private speculators. National and local governments, when they find it possible, base the prices of their own developed land improvements on prevailing land values and thus they, too, make something from the general rise.

In this world of urban and land development, the acts and policies of public authorities are always ambiguous because, however good were their initial intentions, they are rapidly caught in the trap of a free market for land and houses despite all the intervention powers vested in them. There are a number of spheres in which the initiative lies with them; but it is not easy for them to combine respect for the free play of democratic forces with a fundamentally concerned attitude towards these operations of redevelopment and renewal.

In such large-scale operations, it is not possible to control or run counter to the power of financial interests. This is, in the first instance, because national legislation on territorial improvement tends to embody only embryonic democratic procedures.

Secondly, the legislation in many countries, though it is designed to protect the citizen, his health and the integrity of his property, can be used in practice to eliminate such pockets of resistance as may remain to property development operations, and may even be used to accelerate a change in the use to which land is put.

In Belgium, for example, it is sufficient to own half the sites in any redevelopment area to be able to claim compulsory purchase rights for the rest.

The same applies in carrying out sector plans, and in determining the use to be made of specific areas or sites; but in some circumstances exceptions may be made which frustrate the main social objectives. In the same way the sanitation and anti-slum laws, and those which govern expropriation for purposes of public utility, and the measures to encourage renovation of residential areas and the repair of houses and dwellings, may be used to add fuel to property speculation, provided there is the certainty that once the improvement project is completed, the rents will rise out of reach of the people actually lodged on the spot, and thus favour the eviction of the sitting tenants.

There are various other legal means of encouraging the inhabitants to leave. These include; relocation indemnities, rehousing clauses and rent subsidies. Although all of these measures are socially indispensable and should, indeed, be given wider scope, they do not fundamentally affect the uninhibited way land speculation and property development is carried out in some of the European Community countries.

As a rule, large scale land speculations and property deals have enormous social consequences for the people who live in the areas concerned. Yet there is no real danger in their reactions, even though they be virulent. This is particularly true of migrant workers, because they are not and cannot be well organised and thus have no political striking force, as we shall have occasion to show in another chapter. Besides,

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these migrant workers do not form an adequate tax base for the local authorities who are carrying out major projects. Thus it was that in Brussels almost 10 000 people were moved out within a few years, under the Manhattan project for redeveloping the area round the Gare du Nord.

Migrants are very often the main victims in these operations, even though they have, over quite a period, contributed to the profitability of dilapidated areas destined in fact and in law for ultimate compulsory sale. It can easily be understood why these foreign populations have lately been clubbing together with the surviving local nationals in the same areas, in an effort to resist renewed uprooting and the dismantling of the communities they have formed.

5.2. The victims and their rehousing problems

With no real choice as to where to go next, the migrants are in the way, even though they are making certain types of property profitable. For this reason they are often the first and most numerous victims of any property speculation. This is especially emphasised, in the Belgian and French reports.

A succession of decisions has to be made in the course of an urban development or improvement plan; and in these the migrants and any other marginal population are regarded as a target which is economically and politically justified. The migrants are the more exposed to the effects of property speculation, and the more vulnerable to it, for the fact that they are the most isolated, cut off as they are from the local nationals and their organisations. They are less organised, and indeed less capable of organising, to defend themselves against public bodies they had no voice in appointing, and who wield against them instruments of dissuasion and reprisal, well suited to suppress any opponents. It often happens that migrant workers and their families, after several years of residence and settlement difficulties, find themselves yet again under the threat of being uprooted and having their communities dispersed.

Families living in dwellings which are insanitary or on the point of being listed as such, thus become victims of urban growth under a double heading. They are constrained to live in these ill-maintained dwellings and in districts scarcely fit for habitation; and because they live there, they are thrown out when all the renovation plans come to fruition. The expension and dispersal of the migrants reproduces the whole process of the decay inasmuch as the urban renewal programme may be carried out without any accompanying policy of relocalisation or rehousing of the displaced persons. In the absence of such a policy, and sometimes even in spite of it, the people thrown out find whatever new quarters they can.

Most of these property operations end by splitting the displaced inhabitants into two groups. The one consists of people who can afford higher rents, and will now emigrate to subsidised housing if this is offered at acceptable prices, or prices which have become acceptable through removal allowances and rent subsidies, or when the law requires

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the rehousing of the former occupants. The latter is in fact legally required in several countries when buildings are classified as insanitary, or expropriated and demolished under an improvement scheme. It is often a condition, too, that the new housing proposed should not throw the migrants and their families out to the very edge of the town area, to creating a new forms of social and spatial segregation.

The other, often the more numerous, part of the dispossessed tend to cluster together as near as they can to the place whence they have been driven, housed in interstitial spaces in dwellings of low standing, the shortage of which has recently been exacerbated and will become all the more marked for the fact that not enough subsidised houses are being built to meet social need (especially for unaccompanied immigrants and those with very big families). Building proceeds very slowly, so that the gap between supply and demand is forever widening. From the standpoint of the migrant workers, this practice of looking for somewhere to live close to where they lived before, is a logical attempt to preserve or reconstruct their former systems of social relationships.

This accentuated shortage of available infra-social dwellings raises rents and leads the landlords in the affected areas to divide and subdivide the dwellings. The process thus begins again; and with the invasion and the overcrowding, dislike for the area among the less impoverished local nationals is renewed, and there sets in the process of dilapidation and deterioration which, in the long run, will bring more speculators and yet another set of renewal and improvement plans.

6. Conclusion

We thus have a cumulative and recurrent process, by which people are kept on the move and socially segregated, in a state of marginal citizenship. Those subject to this process are a certain fringe of the national population and a large part of the immigrant workers in the big towns and industrial areas in the countries of the European Community. If it is to be brought to an end, there will have to be totally new property policies, much bolder encouragement for the building of subsidised dwellings and new criteria for access to them. Side-by-side with this there will have to be a policy aimed not only at the refurbishing of houses, but also at the renewal of collective property and infrastructure improvement. In short, the policy must be aimed at improving the environment on which the quality of life vitally depends.

Nevertheless, the ultimate factor is property policy, the method of appropriating land and determining its use and purpose; and it is this which sets in motion all the processes described. It is the potentiality for property speculation which puts up land prices; and these increased prices extend the range of buildings needed and the scale of the road and railway investment. They also determine profit differentials on the basis of the different uses made of land and fundamentally regulate the extent to which people and their activities are kept socially and spatially segregated.

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These patterns of land ownership and land speculation also determine the development of the property promotion system, which Ch. TOPALOV calls "the whole production -- circulation system of the commodity, housing". These same patterns explain the activities of the different agents, the way they behave, the way they choose their sites, conceive and carry out their building programmes fix sale prices, rents and leaves; and how they organize financing operations aimed at creating real estate investment and its acquisition by public or private bodies.

The retarded rate at which subsidised housing is being built is explained by these processes of property speculation and development. We must also lay at their door the tendency noted in various EEC countries to hand this branch of the building trade back to private enterprise and to concentrate increasingly on the improvement of existing houses, so as to mitigate the impact on the cost of housing of the rise in site values construction costs and interest rates. This tendency is a strong one despite the fact that repayment periods have been considerably lengthened. These are in fact the very processes which explain the importance of the reserve of migrant manpower for the building and civil engineering industries.

On the one hand, therefore, we have the economic organisation of land use, the reach for profit in the property sector, the big rise in site values and in the cost of building and credit. On the other, we have an increase in our labour force at the smallest possible cost. In practice, if local authority housing were made equally available to all, it would result in a considerable rise in the cost of maintaining, and therefore of using, this labour force, at any rate so long as building costs stay at their present level and the types of construction remain unchanged. In any case, the liquidation or repair of inferior dwellings is bound to be costly, unless drastic measures be taken to rationalise and control construction and bring greater flexibility into the systems of land use and the adaptation of dwellings, depending on the size of the successive occupying families.

It is worth asking whether the time is politically and socially ripe to tilt the scales between the underlying forces. It is this which must be analysed in the next chapter.

We should, however, note from the outset that the continued expulsion and dispersal of the weakest groups in the urban population creates a recurrent disequilibrium in society because it reduces the organizational capacity of those first affected by the social conditions in which urban redevelopment plans are designed and carried out. The capacity of migrant workers to organise themselves is further diminished by the refusal to add to their moral and social weight by giving them political representation.

CHAPTER 7. - FACTORS INHIBITING MIGRANTS'ORGANISATION CAPACITY

There are today various indications of a militant attitude among the migrant workers in the countries of the European Community. Such attitudes are to be seen in industrial firms as protests about working conditions; and in the hostels, residential districts and urban settlements, as opposition to the housing and conditions of life they have to accept in the first instance.

They are forced to accept such conditions by measures taken by the reception societies and their machinery of social control. This machinery has still to be brought under examination, as have the conditions which might encourage what several national reports call the "self-organisation" of the migrants.

1. The many systems of immigration

In each and every EEC country, there are many systems which serve to manage immigration, as has been emphasised by G. LYON-CAEN (71). However, the classification of migrants in this or that system and the granting of this or that type of residence and work permit, are direct determinants of the type of problem the migrants will have to face. This applies, especially, to their housing.

There are three or four systems operating at the same time, depending on the country:

- For nationals of the EEC member countries, there is now free circulation. This implies not only the right to enter the country and to stay there, with or without a family; but also the right to carry on the occupation of ones choice , whether as an employed or a self-employed person. In Denmark, the same applies to nationals of the Scandinavian countries.

- In some countries, such as France and Great Britain, preference is given to nationals of countries which were formerly part of the colonial empire. Citizens from these countries are, in general, entitled to enter the metropolitan territory without restriction. They are not, however, authorised to work unless they hold a work permit.

  In the United Kingdom the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1968, as amended by the Immigration Act of 1971, reduces the right of free entry into the country, largely by drawing a clear distinction between entrants who are "patrial" and "non-patrial" and by making illegal entry an offence.

  Free circulation under the first two systems does not automatically imply a lessening in discrimination or better treatment of the migrants, especially as regards housing. Nor does the granting of better legal status, or even of political rights, provide any automatic solution (or a better solution) to the problems of EEC immigrants or former colonials. Since they enjoy better protection, employers may be reluctant to engage them. It is also possible that employers prefer workers from specific regions. In Luxembourg, for example, among a

(71) G. LYON-CAEN, op. cit., p. 5-6

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number of possible sources of labour, preference is given to male workers from northern Italy rather than those from the south — from the Friuli and Veneto rather than from Sicily or Calabria.

In matters of settlement and housing, the EEC nationals and sometimes the former colonials are free to set themselves up wherever they wish. In practice, nevertheless, their choice is limited by property market conditions, and the wage and working conditions they can obtain. Other factors to be considered are racial prejudices and feelings of xenophobia among the inhabitants, even for migrants from the EEC.

Free circulation, and the exercices of political rights, are thus necessary stages in securing equality of treatment, but they are not by themselves sufficient.

-The third system is that of common law. It is applied to migrant workers from non-community countries and those not originating from former colonial territories. In some cases the common law system is applied through bilateral immigration and labour treaties.

It should be borne in mind that under this system it is possible to issue different types of residence and work permit, depending in most cases on the nature of the work and the duration of the employment contract. Thus, there are three or four types of work or residence permit granted in different EEC countries. There are those of unlimited duration, those for a limited period, with or without specification of the employing industry. In some cases, too, the permit specifies the place of employment or the place of residence.

Usually the granting of a residence permit and its duration are contingent on obtaining a work permit; and for this the grant and the duration are determined partly by the nationality of the migrant, and partly by the application to employ him filed in proper form by the prospective employer. The residence and work permits are, in most cases, granted, renewed, refused or withdrawn at the same time. Thus, if the working contract expires or is interrupted by unemployment or any other cause, the migrant may be deprived at the discretion of the authorities of the renewal of his work permit which will mean his loss of a residence permit. There is now, however, a tendency in national legislations to give the migrants permanent residence and work permits if they have been four of five years in the country. Even this, however, is not automatic. It is not a right, and the authorities may refuse it for a variety of reasons.

-The last system is concerned with migrant workers who entered the countries concerned as tourists, or in some underground manner, who, having stayed in the country more than three weeks, were recruited into work without a permit. These are the "clandestine workers" or the "irregular residents".

As has been noted above, all the Community countries now have an official procedure for regularising the position of these workers. Since 1974 control of irregularities has been strengthened, and stronger sanctions authorised against intermediaries, against employers who illegally engage a foreigner who lacks a work permit, and against landlords and "doss house" keepers, who house migrant workers on terms which are often scandalously costly.

Administrative measures could also be taken against local and municipal authorities who do not put up an effective fight against slum conditions, dilapidated housing, shanty-towns, over-crowded hostels, unequipped

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camping sites, hutments, attics and cellar-kitchens which are the usual refuge of illegze workers and those whose work permits have expired. Measures such as these, however, would amount to getting rid of the symptoms without dealing with the ultimate causes of the disease. The latter must be found in the variety of systems by which the immigration is regulated depending on the countries from which the migrants have come.

National administrations and migrant assistance officers find difficulty in keeping abreast of and in applying there regulations which vary some much depending on the countries of origin of the migrant. Furthermore, these regulations give an official character to the inequalities of treatment and induce some migrants to compare their situation with that of others and hence to feel discriminated against. Fundamentally, of course, there is discrimination against all of them, through the refusal of all political rights (even to EEC nationals), through restrictions on their public civil liberties and through the political impotence which is imposed on them, in fact, if not actually in law. This absence of political rights has direct repercussions on the capacity of the migrant workers to exert any pressure, individually or collectively on all or part of the system in which they are located.

2. When rights are refused: social inferiority

The refusal to the migrants of their various civil, political and social rights and the withholding of their civil liberties puts them into a state of inferiority when they have to deal with officials and private individuals in responsible positions.

The absence of political rights especially all national or local voting rights, makes it a duty not to be concerned with political matters and to adopt a neutral attitude on pain of expulsion from the country. This is a major handicap to the migrants. It obstructs them in acting in their own interests, it handicaps them in spreading information, in organising meetings and in all ways they can bring their attitudes and objections to the notice of the authorities. It prevents their seeking a hearing on decisions being made and measures being contemplated by public authorities, be they national or local, especially in matters of housing, land improvement and the reconstruction of urban districts. Some writers, such as Manuel CASTELLS in France, do not hesitate to state baldly that the economic and social conditions in which the migrants live and work are accepted only because of the political vacuum into which they are thrust. In other words, the absence of any political status is a guarantee that their resistance will be weak. Not only do they have no political rights, but they are always liable to have their political involvement investigated and to be expelled from the country if they should do anything wrong. The possibility of summary expulsion means that any movement can lose its leadership at any time. There is no lack of cases in which steps have been taken to turn out foreign nationals declared to be injurious to public order and security, or to the economic system, on the ground that they took part in political propaganda and activities, or in action such as strikes, which can be interpreted as injurious to the country's economy.

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Lack of political rights, continued control and threat of expulsion impose limitations not only on the migrant's rights of expression and organisations outside his working life, but they also have a direct impact on the nature of his trade union involvement. Only too often in practice they put a brake on the exercise of his trade union freedom, the enjoyment of which he is, in theory, guaranteed. It is indeed true that trade union action sometimes comes very close to the frontiers of public order; and even if the migrants are free to join the unions, appoint their delegates and take part in union action, they usually have to do it "without letting their claws show", to use an expression in one of the reports of the Belgian Senate Labour and Social Security Committee.

The low-grade political position of the migrant workers thus has repercussions on their union membership and on the firms where they work. It makes them less combative, though the effect is certainly less marked in their working lives than in life outside work. Even when they are the official elected representatives of their fellows — e.g. in the consultative councils for migrants which were set up in a number of communes in Belgium and elsewhere-they never have the protection of the types of clause which cover migrant trade unionists elected to membership of a union delegation or a works council.

Since they have no political rights, the migrant workers consider any involvement in campaigns for raising the quality of life, protecting the community or improving housing conditions to be more dangerous than trade union activity. They are thus peculiarly ill-equipped when confronted with the great property speculation and development projects, or improvement, redevelopment and reconstruction plans which, in many cases, have the approval of national populations, though without any consultation with representatives from the other nationalities who live in the threatened area.

Despite the difficult position in which they find themselves, it should not be concluded,however, that these migrant workers, with or without their families are necessarily going to let themselves be victimised. There is no lack of example of campaigns carried out by the immigrants in district committees, tenants'committees, unions of inhabitants and urban social movements. They have campaigned against cases of expulsion, rent increases, demolition plans, reconstruction schemes, rehousing, the occupation of abandoned or unoccupied dwellings or for access to local authority housing.

On the other hand, there is an element of danger in taking part in this kind of action. We have only to recall how such attempts — including, for example, the revolt in the French hostels — have been snuffed out, to understand that these immigrants have do not really much choice. It is hardly necessary to recall how, after the events in France in May 1968, a large number of migrant workers were expelled.

The migrants can, if they wish, play their part in forming an advance guard with political intent and radical leanings — in which case they have every chance of being shepherded to the frontier — or they must take refuge in patient expectation, and end up by denying themselves any active part in campaigns and struggles undertaken on their behalf, either by other migrants or by the national unions and the working class.

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As regards problems outside their work, the migrants are still more at a disadvantage because of the evident reluctance of national trade unions to take any action in matters affecting the maintenance of the labour force. For the most part the official bodies representing the unions do not espouse the causes of particular groups, especially when their concern is with housing or with the maintenance of the labour force rather than with the way it is treated by the employers. The battle is outside the ordinary field of union affairs, and it is concerned with migrants who have no political rights, nor any claim to help from national political organisations, which tend to ignore the problems of these voteless people, except when their activities set up reactions and controversy among those entitled to vote.

In the political field, it is a paradox that migrants should be treated as taxpayers in just the same way as the local nationals, and that nobody sees any anomaly in this. They pay their taxes and contribute through their work to the nation's well-being; but their opinions and any action they take are ranked as unwarranted interference.

In practice, the taxes they pay are helping to finance the policy of building local authority housing, besides the construction of hospitals, schools and a number of other facilities; but though all this is vital for themselves and their families, they are refused any way of saving what they would like or what they need.

Yet is should not be difficult to give the migrants at least a modicum of rights. It could include, in the first instance, voting rights at the municipal level, where many of the decisions taken have a direct impact on the life of the migrants and their families. (72) There could also be rights in the social, cultural and legal fields, (73) such as improvement of the areas where they live; health; schooling and other matters connected with housing. It should be laid down that the migrants have a right to the national culture; and when it comes to the courts of law, they should be provided with interpreters free of charge because of the inevitable feeling of inferiority which besets anybody putting forward his arguments in a language other than his own.

The limitation of the migrants'political rights results from a unilateral decision taken by the host country; but the control and supervision of his political utterances while he is there may also have been induced by pressure from the government of his own country, or its diplomatic representatives. Some of these restrictive measures for the supervision of individual migrants were taken by the German authorities as result of pressures and requests for strict control over these immigrants from the governments of their countries (e.g. Greece, Yugoslavia and Iran).

Sometimes, too, there is further insidious interference by the migrant's country of origin. In some cases in which the migrants are given the right of expression in municipal affairs, it has come to the surface that the consulates of the emigration countries have been trying to influence the opinions and activity of the immigrants.(74).

(72) Cattaneo PETRINI and W. ENDERS, L'intégration des migrants dans la société des pays d'accueil, in Revue Française des Affaires Sociales jan-march 1974, No. 1, pp. 207-209.
(73) G. LYON-CAEN, op. cit., p.
(74) C. PETRINI and W. ENDERS, op. cit., p. 207 ./.

In fact, political rights are withheld from the migrants not because they could not use their rights; but because their exercise could be dangerous to the migrants' countries of origin, as well as to the countries into which they have come. For the countries of origin outside the EEC, the danger lies in the possibility that the migrants, in exercising political rights, might intensify internal political conflict from the security of a platform provided for them by the country of immigration. For the latter, the danger lies in the immigrants becoming aware of local or national political problems, so that in districts where they accounted for a large part of the population (often 30% or 40% and sometimes even more) they might put the existing political forces out of balance without there being any possibility of forecasting in which direction the balance would tilt or whom it would favour.

The exercise of political rights, however, is not the whole question. Events in the United Kingdom, where both Irish and Commonwealth citizens have voting rights, do not suggest that the exercise of such rights is an automatic corrective of discriminatory practice. The same applied, not long ago, to the Algerians in France. The lack of automatic correction is a simple demonstration of the strength contained in the variety of other processes of social control. This is what remains to be examined.

3. The legend of temporary migration (75)

Everything indicates that the migration movement is an answer to a structural necessity and that the need for workers is a permanent requirement; but the countries of the European Community organise migration as though it were no more than an answer to swings in the business cycle, and the view the problems of the migrants themselves as though they were no more than temporary residents. Statistics concerning the rate of arrival and departure of migrants also help to perpetuate the notion that the migrations are temporary in character, especially when statistics concerning length of settlement are not equally available. Many look for support for this view of migration in the statments of migrants themselves about their intention to return to their country after a time and point to the makeshift arrangements accepted by the migrants in the receiving country, as further proof of their thesis.

In the light of established fact, this interpretation is most deceptive. It leaves the migrant to make his home in temporary quarters and induces him to accept social, legal and political inequalities as normal (76).

This concept of temporary immigration is only an illusion, but it is still shared by the parties concerned. It is also shared by those responsible for emigration in the countries from which the workers come. They find in it a way of using manpower which is "immediately available"; and they see in it the possibility of imparting skill to workers which their national industry will be able to put to profitable use when they return. In general, the migration movement is represented as a trafic roundabout, into which the migrants enter for the sake of acquiring skill and vocational experience, in the expectation of economic development in their own country and their own region, to which they will be able to make a better contribution when they come home.

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(75) B. KAYSER, Mythes et réalitees de l'émigration, in Espaces et sociétés, No. 4, Dec. 1971; M. MOROKVASIC, Des migrants temporaires: les Yugoslavs, and N. ABADAN, Le non-retour à l'industrie, trait dominant de la châîne migratoire turque, in Sociologie du travail, No. 3, July-September 1972, pp. 260-277 and pp. 278-293; A. BASTENIER and F. DASSETO, Les travailleurs migrants: marginalisés et rentabilisés, in Revue Nouvelle, No. 7-8, July-August 1976, pp. 22-23, Italian Report.

(76) Albert BASTENIERS and Felice DASSETO, op. cit., p. 22-23

In reality there is only comparative truth, as has been shown in earlier chapters, in the suggestion that the migrations are temporary. Admittedly the age structure of the foreign population, and especially of the foreign workers, discloses a population which is young compared with the local nationals; but the few statistical pointers we have show that the length of residence and the age of the immigrant workers are both on the increase. The tendency is also growing for families to join the original immigrant and for the unit of migration to be the married couple. Various figures show that, though considerable numbers of migrants move in and out each year, a far from negligible proportion end by setting up a settled establishment abroad, if not a permanent one.

A number of studies have shown that emigration and the length of stay are not really a matter of choice. Most of the workers concerned, have been reduced to migration by unemployment perhaps because of prolonged poverty, perhaps because local production is too small and local wages too low, or perhaps because local communities have been disorganised in the country's modernisation process, or because of factors of a political character. Confirming survey on Yugoslavia and Turkey, for example, the Italian report has shown that the outward movement of individuals is only, a makeshift and a last resort; and that it does not in itself induce regional prosperity, but is more likely to aggravate underdevelopment and decline.

If emigration there be, its primary motive is not the fulfilment of, or the escape from, obligations to family or community. It is because emigration is organised by governments through bilateral agreements, usually for no better reason than the immediate convenience of the two countries at either end of the movement. The emigration countries find a useful outlet for the available manpower, and will be hoping to secure in exchange investments and productive equipment, or at least foreign currency which will restore their external balance. They organise emigration by propaganda about the potential benefits, the jobs offered, the level of education and skill required. As first steps towards the emigrant life, language lessons are provided and together with information about the manners and customs of the country of destination. None of this of course, supercedes such information as has already been obtained less formally, from previous emigrants. On the other hand, little is said about the prospects of the emigrant when he comes home. There is a simple assertion that the migration will make the worker better equipped to contribute to the development of his country, even though the chances of doing so effectively are small. There are exceptions in a few cooperative experiments, comprising plans for the collective employment of the returning workers. These exemplary projects, however, are few.

By contrast, as M. CASTELLS emphasises, the employing countries receive, through their immigration programme, a supply of workers without ever having had to bear the cost of producing them and bringing them to adulthood. The host countries also escape a number of social obligations, and they split their labour force in two, thus vitiating the solidarity of the workers. Immigration enables them to open up the bottlenecks which were inhibiting production and impeding their development. Moreover, the migrant workers can be given jobs in exporting industries and thus help to keep prices competitive; or they can work in industries making goods for, or supplying services to, the indigenous labour force and thus help to mitigate the rise in its

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cost. (77)

If, on the other hand, a large number of migrants return home reasonably soon, or cut short their period abroad, this does not necessarily imply that they have chosen to do so, nor does it mean that there are jobs waiting for them when they return. Both the Irish and the Italian reports make it clear that it is the return of the workers does not coincide often enough with the provision of new job opportunities. In most cases the return of the workers is motivated by family obligations, by difficulties of adaptation to industrial life or by the loss of a job and resulting unemployment; and the industrial countries, too, may be seeking to inflict upon their migrant workers the ill effects of the economic crises and structural changes through which they have passed. Other explanations for the return homeward are events such as the withdrawal of the resident's permit or an expulsion order.

According to the Italian report, 10 to 15% of the migrants use their savings to open a shop, a café or a restaurant in their own country, or to exercise an independent trade or become the working boss of a bus or trucking firm, or head of a little mechanical workshop or farm. Many a migrant has long dreamed of returning thus; but rare are those whose home coming is made possible by a chance of using the skills he has acquired abroad in similar factories and under similar conditions, except indeed in the case of workers in the building and civil engineering industries.

For the great majority of migrants, the improvement in their position resulting from their period abroad lies in the use they can make of their savings. They usually do this in their own villages by buying a piece of land or by building, enlarging or improving their house. The Italians, it seems, do this more frequently than the Irish, according to the reports from the two countries. Another of their aims is to buy and instal a whole battery of durable consumer goods, bringing themselves up to western standards of comfort. This is specially noted among migrants of the younger age-groups, whose attitudes have been profoundly affected by the desire to consume.

In short, therefore, it is rare for jobs to be waiting for the returning wanderers, and the way they spend their savings is conditioned by the economic and financial structure of the regions from which they came. The chances of finding a productive use for the savings — as opposed to one involving simply acquisition or increased consumption — necessarily depends on whether the migrant was by origin from a rural, industrial or urban background, and on whether he is indeed seeking to come back into a community close to the point from which he started out.

In these conditions, it is cultivating a sheer deception to persist in claiming that migration helps the migrant's vocational career, to perpetuate the idea that the migrants are short-term departures and to organise their movement as though it were just an excursion and a phase in the great cycle of development. All this, nevertheless, seems to go down quite well with those who are its targets — the migrants themselves — as well as with the countries which export and import the manpower. In reality, the portrayal of migration as a temporary affair, has a number of effects, most of which are, from the migrant's own standpoint, counter-productive.

(77) Manuel CASTELLS, Travailleurs émigrés et lutte des classes, in Politique aujourd'hui, March-April 1975, pp. 5-7. ./.

Nevertheless: "in accordance with their original project, but in contradiction of all the evidence of fact, these immigrant workers continue to think of themselves as staying only provisionally in the country to which they have come". (78)

This legendary and often illusory home-coming leads the migrant workers to make enormous sacrifices. Their first care is to make money; and to do this by using such skill as they possess, they will have to accept heavy and dangerous work, irregular working hours, frequent overtime. All this brings them into conflict with the national trade union organisations, which are specially anxious to keep working hours and timetables at normal levels.

Many of the workers are determined to send money home; and to this end they set themselves up in the host country, deliberately and for an indefinite period, in the poorest conditions. In doing this, they are more inclined to seek conditions akin to those of the working class in their own country, rather than the amenities enjoyed by their local colleagues. They care little about the lessons offered them in the language of the country, even though it is made clear that they will improve their capacity to stand up for themselves, and to get on in his career. They neglect the possibility of making friends with some of the nationals or with workers from other countries living nearby. They are disinclined to participate in trade union agitation and make common cause with the workers of the employing country. The proportion of migrant worker workers who are members of trade unions, or who play any part in them, is sometimes appreciably smaller than among workers of the local nationality.

The Italian report states that the migrants work and save with feverish intensity; and if they are unexacting about the housing they get in the employing country, it is because they hope to be able, through migration, to improve the homes and housing of their family at home and provide it with elementary domestic comfort.

Those who think of their return in this light are not specially particular about the roominess or quality of their housing in the country they work. They insist but little on support from national trade unions to get them better housing conditions, and it is rare that they join forces with the nationals to press for a social housing policy. They are not setting out to acquire house property in the country to which they have emigrated.

Though it is in this light that the migrants see their eventual return, the fact remains that large amounts of savings and remittances are send without much effect, and practically without any cumulative effect on the development of the home region. This is because the money is eaten into by the inflation, by fluctuating rates of exchange and, still more, because the investment stays in the village, usually to improve the house and its facilities.

In Italy, these remittances create a certain amount of property speculation in the villages. They stimulate sales of building materials and domestic equipment, but they do not enlarge the production circuits or lead to the making of new ones.

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(78) A. BASTENIERS and F. DASSETO, art. cit., p. 22 ./.

This savings/housing cycle depends in various ways on local and family circumstances, especially on the wife wanting to stay where she is. This may be because the children are too young, or because they are already at school; it may be because she has got to help her aged parents, or because there is a chance of cultivating a patch of ground, or raising a few beasts. With the passage of time, nevertheless, a change is coming over the mentalities of the women and it is occurring to some of them that there could be advantages in getting away from the costs and shackles of the family and of village life. However this may be, the planned home-coming and the savings/housing cycle play their part in making the migrants think first and foremost about securing enough money rather than about how they could use and reproduce their working capacity locally or improve their own legal or political status.

Finally, the labour-importing countries as a whole consider the "migrants' aspiration" a reasonable justification for not granting foreigners comparable rights to those of their own nationals. All the machinery of social and political control to which the migrants are subjected (residence permit, work permit, lack of political and even of trade-union rights) are regarded by most people as quite normal, whereas any such regime applied to the nationals of the country would be condemned as totalitarian. But after all, say some of the commentators, "these people have come to our country only provisionally and for a limited time. How then can they pretend to the same degree of social and political influence as our own nationals?"

4. Social mechanism inhibiting recognition of common interests

There are still a great number of factors obstructing the formation among the migrants of a collective consciousness, a common front among themselves and effective solidarity with the working class among the indigenous population. These factors are still preventing the migrants from acquiring the political strength which they need for correcting their social position, the discrimination from which they suffer, their bad housing conditions, their vulnerability in the face of slum clearance and other changes in the urban layout.

Quite a number of the national reports, especially those from Germany, Belgium, France and Italy, mention the need for developing a collective conscience for setting up joint institutions and for bringing the migrant workers into joint campaigns to improve their housing conditions. These factors inhibiting the recognition of common interests will be dealt with below ambiguity in position and aspirations, stratification and turnover and impairment of social contacts.

4.1. Ambiguity in position and aspirations

The migrant worker is ambiguously placed. Even when he is a colonial or ex-colonial and has certain legal and other advantages (as in France and in the United Kingdom) his way of life is that of a foreigner. This applies even to EEC nationals. The very fact of migration puts the migrant workers at the margin of two social systems — that of the country of origin and that of the country of employment.

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When the migrants leave their own country, however temporarily, they are moving into new conditions, very different value systems, especially for those of them who come from rural surroundings. They are right outside the control of society as they know it. Caught in the wheels of an industrial economy, influenced by advertising and less inhibited by family norms, the migrants change and aspire to comfort and amenities.

The foreign migrant must change everything at once, his mode of life, his way of living, the climate he lives in, the nature and speed of his work, his relationship with society and the way he looks at the world. Though he may still be interested in the life, development and politics of his own country, he can now play no active part in them, and there is no way by which he can take an active interest in the politics of the country where he is employed. Moreover, this would be a prohibited act; and for most of the migrants, participation in local politics is thus subject to a two-fold interdiction. Some indeed may be opening their eyes — all at once or in stages — to the conditions which govern underdevelopment and development, and to their mutual interdependence and may therefore be led to form considered political views rather than remaining passive.

The ambiguous element in migrants'plans also arises from their unstable position, their precarious legal standing, their vulnerability to the accidents of life to structural changes and to the resulting forced changes in home and job.

All this tends to make migrants concentrate on economic objectives and enhances their desire to keep their jobs as individuals, if not collectively. For a great number of them, these factors, allied with the absence of political rights and enforced political neutrality, easily breed apathy and social resignation.

4.2. Stratification and turnover

The immigrant population is not a homogeneous entity. Even if the total number of migrants is steady or rising, the number of arrivals and departures is considerable and the composition of the migrant population is very prone to change.

Apart from EEC nationality or ex-colonial origin, there is a diversity of economic, social and political backgrounds in the countries of origin which may make it specially hard or specially easy to settle in any particular employing country; and arising from this, there may be noteworthy differences in living and working conditions for specific groups of migrant workers.

In all the Community countries immigration has occurred in waves; and over a period there has been a tendency to find greater advantage in recruiting migrants from further and further away from the employing country. Moreover, some of the nationalities were, on the average, recruited earlier or later than the others, which leads to a big difference in methods of settlement and organisation. The foreign population is accordingly growing more diverse, with some of the national groups becoming less numerous and others more. Among themselves they form their own social hierarchy, depending on nationality, country or region of origin and the length of time since they arrived.

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The longer it has been since the first migrants came from any particular country, the more it will facilitate the settlement of new arricals. The difficulties will be greater for the first recruits of a new nationality; but it often happens that the year of arrival sets up less discrimination than the racial factor.

Moreover, even in a group of workers of the same nationality, there are considerable differences in settlement and adaptation capacity. All the recruits from any given nationality do not necessarily have the same outlook and the same reactions.

Sociologically, nationality is a composite variable, embracing quite a number of different factors, such as the reasons for emigrating, the language and region of origin, skill and qualifications, proposed length of stay, whether a work permit has been obtained and whether all or part of the family has accompanied the migrant.

Despite the big differences within the national groups, it is found on analysis that race, language and nationality are still very important lines of division. Moreover, they often reflect differences in skills, jobs and wage-levels. They lead eventually to the setting up of separate communities, a more or less isolated country within a country. This tendency to club together on a racial, linguistic or religious basis, is all the stronger for the fact that settlement in the employing country is regarded as a temporary affair. The new settler therefore makes less effort to acclimatize himself; and this sets up defensive actions, including the racial conflicts and xenophobia now encountered in some measure throughout Europe (79). But these reactions do not originate solely from the origins and native characteristics of the migrants. They are just as much due to the work they undertake and the dwelling quarters in which the reception societies have a way of confining them — admittely to the advantage of all or part of the employing country and its governing classes, for this apparatus of social exclusion is forever producing and reproducing a reserve of unskilled and mobile labour.

The first available studies of the migrant's vocational and social mobility indicate that the second generation tends to remain at the level of labourers with only a slight degree of skill. This is less true in comparable groups from the host country (80).

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(79) A. BOUDHIBA, Migrations internationales et changements sociaux, in: Prospectives, No. 3, July 1974, p. 120-121.

(80) A. MARTENS, quoted by A. BASTENIERS and F. DASSETO, op. cit., p. 19. Immigration et occupation des étrangers: contradictions et aspects insolites, in: Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, No. 1, 1974, pp. 43-57.

Thus, whenever a large number of migrant workers settle or are settled together in badly equipped lodging houses and deteriorating slums, the various mechanisms of social stratification and exclusion look as though their object was to keep down the cost of maintaining the migrant labour force, both in the elementary sense of providing housing and environment and in the wider sense of giving education and training.

The rate at which the migrant population rotates also has similar effects to those of the environmental barriers. It has already been emphasised that rotation saves the employing country the costs which are implied in any lasting settlement. Moreover, it keeps down the pressures, because the newly arrived migrants take some time to find their feet and become aware of their problems and the ways of solving them. This comes only through familiarity with the surroundings. It is a noteworthy fact, too, that membership of a trade union seldom comes till the migrant has been some time in the host country.

Indeed, length of stay, has a big influence on the migrants'behavisme. After a certain time they acquire some "inside knowledge" of the associations and interest groups which influence the economic and social life of the employing country — such as employers'associations, trade unions, political parties and the various bodies engaged in negotiation and decision making.

4.3. The impairment of social contacts

The extent to which the migrant population lives in isolation from their local counterparts is brought out in the French and Luxembourg surveys, which give considerable space to the analysis of their participation in local activities. In the French survey, it was established that segregation and isolation of the migrants still existed in the town of Trappes (Saint Quentin-en-Yvelines), despite the good quality of the housing and the special efforts made in constructing the town to avoid site encampment, and to house the migrants in decent independent conditions. This led to a breakdown in social integration, through the absence of any neighbourly relations with the French, accompanied by attitudes of rejection. There is a stronger network of social relations between the migrants and the French in the old quarters of Paris than in Trappes.

As the foreign working population increases and becomes more diverse, the foreigners and the locals necessarily come more in contact with one another. There is a growth in the number of areas where competition and tension arise; for the migrants, low in status though they be, continue growing in numbers to a point that they are considered a threat. The cessation of admissions and the fundamental change in immigration policies since the end of 1973, were due as much to fears of intractable future conflicts as to the economic crisis which, from this standpoint, ranks as

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an opportunity for a change in policy rather than as the cause (81).

In the analysis of social contacts and relationships, it is important to distinguish between contact at work and contact elsewhere.

4.3.1. Local activities

Migrants of the different nationalities and races maintain contact with their local counterparts in a variety of ways. The native people do not proclaim themselves to be racialist or anti-foreigner, but some of them are less ready than others to welcome what they regard as a foreign invasion; and their reaction is often the worse for the fact that the wider is the racial, language and cultural gap, the more dense is the local population of immigrants.

This is at least a partial explanation for the development in the bigger cities of positive ghettos of migrant workers, usually grouped by nationality of origin. You thus come upon an Italian quarter, a Spanish quarter and others dominated by Turks or North Africans.

The writer, Albert MEISTER, distinguishes between two forms of racism: that based on contact and that based on distance. Contact racism is the usual one in the population strata which are in contact with the immigrant workers. For there, the presence of the foreigners disrapts their daily life, and also districts their dream; for the presence of the immigrant puts paid to their hope of attaining pleasant surroundings in a comfortable area. Distance racism is the type found in the fashionable districts.(82)

Reactions such as these, of course, inhibit any campaign for improving the lot of the immigrants.

Moreover, though the local authorities are obliged to make reception arrangements for the migrants, it is easy to see that the specific interests of these workers and their families do not enter into local politics, even when they represent a majority of an urban population — although this might well be a basic precondition for the migrants being politically and socially mobilised.

On the other hand, though local politics are not directly framed to protect the interests of the migrants, this does not mean they are unaffected by them. The migrants are small taxpayers. In Brussels in 1972, an analysis of the fiscal statistics shows the communes with the highest density of foreign population as accounting for 61.8% of the

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(81) S O P E M I Report 75, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
(82) A. MEISTER, L'inflation créatrice, Essai sur les fonctions socio-politiques de l'inflation, P.U.F., Paris, 1975, - 276.

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number of returns, but only 55.7% of the net taxable income. This explains the fact that the communes with high densities of immigrant populations are generally those in which the taxation rates are heaviest. It is in these communes, too, that ordinary and extraordinary expenditure per head is highest. The biggest components of the ordinary budget are education, administration and public assistance, while expenditure on the police force is also a major item. Though it is in these communes that the extraordinary budgets are heaviest, a detailed analysis of how the money was spent shows that it was not to serve the immigrant population, but for enormous infrastructure and urban improvement operations, in which these communes are implicated (83).

4.3.2. At work and in the firm

There are also a great many contradictions and ambiguities in the relations between the local and the migrant manpower, because they are sometimes in competition, and sometimes support one another. On the one hand the foreign workers come into the labour market as a competitive additional supply and when they replace the local nationals, they are a source of downward pressure on wage-levels. They are thus regarded as contrary to the interests of local workers, especially in periods of economic difficulty.

On the other hand, the foreign workers are at the lower end of the social structure, and thus ensure that the nationals are promoted in their jobs and achieve a certain degree of social ascendancy.

Whichever interpretation be chosen, there is clearly great ambivalence in the part which migrants play in the structure which determines relations and attitudes at work and in the housing conditions.

Between the two branches of the labour force, there is thus a certain distance or absence of permeation which sets a limit on the possibilities of alliance and collective action in trade unions and political parties. It also stands in the way of the consciousness of common interest between the migrants and the locals, and prevents the migrants from realizing the full extent of the benefits derived from migration by the countries and economic systems concerned.

According to Maryse TRIPIER, the distance between migrants and locals is now determined at one and the same time by:

- increasing substitution in labour-intensive industries and regions, no longer in declining sectors, but in the expanding ones;

- increases in the size and diversity of social and cultural differences, and also by the growing isolation of the migrants vis-à-vis the local communities.

Substitution and isolation make it difficult to work together. They are more apt to create division and new segregation, which have repercussions on the attitudes of both migrants and locals. Even if the divergence between the two groups is not felt at work, it subsists

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(83) S. PANCIERA, Martine PLEVOETS, Vittorio CAMPANELLI, op. cit., pp. 167-213.

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in the mentalities of both groups of workers and has become one of the major worries for the trade unions (84).

According to Stephen CASTLES and Godula KOSACK, "the presence of immigrant workers is one of the chief contributory factors to the lack of class consciousness among big sections of the working-class. The existence of an immigrant stratum at the bottom changes the native worker's conception of his own place in society. There are now many workers who have lost the sense of social dichotomy -- in which the great working masses confronted a small capitalist class at the top -- and now see themselves as an intermediate stratum superior to the immigrant workers with their lack of skill. Such a view is evidence of a hierarchical view of society which embodies advancement by competition and individual achievement instead of by solidarity and collective action" (85).

National labour is thus becoming bourgeois, considering itself a workers'aristocracy whose wages can be raised, owing to the beneficial effect of immigration on the speed of capital formation and thus on productivity. As the migrant workers park into the old buildings and thus give them a use, the housing conditions of national workers can be improved.

Usually, too, the migrant workers are affected by the language handicap, both in communicating with migrants from other nationalities and with the locals and their organisations. Under the impression that their settlement is temporary and provisional, most of them are willing, indeed anxious, to work overtime; and they agree to shift work and irregular hours, which the national trade unions are seeking to combat. Moreover, quite a number of the migrants, conscious of their lack of political rights, of their precarious tenure of their job, of the continuous supervision by administrators and policemen, are chary of trade union commitments and tend to avoid anything that might be regarded as a venture into politics.

Many of these migrants are from local areas and all are from countries where there is not much industry. They suffer the strain of having been uprooted and are apt to feel homesick; and they remember how, in non-industrial countries, trade unions are heavily dominated by the apparatus of government and politics. This is the explanation for the suspicious attitude of the migrants towards trade union organisations.

All these obstacles are mentioned in the national reports, but the importance attached to them varies according to the nationalities of origin of the migrants, the cultural distance, the special conditions in which they are employed, the regions and industries where they are

(84) M. TRIPIER, Concurrence et différence: les problèmes posés au syndicalisme ouvrier par les travailleurs immigrés, in Revue française de Sociologie du Travail, 14th year, 3/72, July-September, p. 337.

(85) S. CASTLES and G. KOSACK, La fonction de l'immigration ouvrière dans l'Europe de l'Ouest capitaliste, in Critiques de l'économie politique January-March 1973, p. 48.

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put and the degree to which local policy tend to group the different immigrant nationalities together or keep them apart. All these factors affect the relative case with which pressure groups may be formed, controlled and coordinated in the individual firm.

5. Effects on organisation potential for migrants

The idea that migration is temporary is reflected in the varying legal status granted to the nationals of different countries, the diversity of work and residence permits depending on the job or industry and the general absence of political rights.

All these factors tend to promote the isolation of migrant groups from one another, and from the workers and population in the countries where they are employed. They put the migrants in a position of weakness within the social system, and set up an imbalance between the migrants and the host society. The sense of weakness is the greater in that the migrant, comes into our countries with no special skill, no knowledge of the language, no appreciation of the complexity of the interlocking bodies, machinery and mechanisms which are part and parcel of life for individuals and groups in industrial countries. Moreover, he has no experience of the rules and regulations governing the contacts he may make in his working life and out of it; he has no understanding of the migratory streams in one of which he is embroiled, nor of their implications and consequences for the countries from which workers come and those to which they go; he has no experience of industrial life, of the organisation of firms, of the way of life or of the operation of local bodies and local activities in the country where he is to work.

5.1. Forms of organisation

All these factors contribute to an understanding of why joint action and social conflict by the migrant workers are so intermittent, so localised in time and place and are usually concerned with specific problems or immediate threats, such as those resulting from particular plans and decisions, or from delays by the many functionaries concerned in firms and local bodies. Even when decisions of this type are not expressly aimed at migrant workers and their families, the latter may nevertheless be able to perceive the effects upon themselves, their neighbours, their friends, their leaders, or some other part of their settlement or working community.

This explains how and why conflicts with migrant workers are today developing in many fields, including housing.

In the first instance, there are conflicts inside individual firms, in relations between the migrants and the employers, foremen and union delegates, who may have ignored the interests and problems of the migrants. For instance, they are sometimes discriminated against by being threatened with redundancy or non-renewal of a work permit, which, incidentally, may involve deprivation of housing accommodation provided by the firm. Another instance is when the firm runs hostels which the migrants try to take under their own direct management, supervising the sanitation,

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allocating rooms and places, laying down the internal regulations, with or without the cooperation of boards or committees appointed by the firm.

On the housing side, too, conflicts sometimes arise when the migrants stage a rent strike, resist expulsion or contest disciplinary regulations in privately-owned hostels or homes. They may also put up resistance when attempts are made by land lords to put up the rents, or to evict some specific family, or when foreigners are refused as tenants or when buildings are left unoccupied or repairs and improvements are neglected.

Other instances occur as reactions to discriminatory or segregative attitudes or behaviour on the part of the local population or some of the shopkeepers, on grounds of race or nationality. It has sometimes happened in this connexion that conflicts are sharpened rather than soothed, when the migrants live in close association with the locals, or migrants of different origins live together.

In other instances pressures are applied against the activities of land speculators and property developers when their projects are a direct threat to the migrants and to their families.

Protests are also organised against decisions by local or national authorities which involve evicting families with or without provision for re-housing. An example of this is when dwellings are declared unfit for habitation; or when buildings are expropriated or demolished in virtue of renovation or improvement schemes, or the building of new infrastructure; or when families are turned out of slum dwellings, shanty towns, cellars or attics without suitable re-housing arrangements beforehand; or when public authorities ignore requests from migrant's consultative committees or refuse to provide playgrounds or make requested adjustments in public services and facilities; when the responsible authorities prohibit the occupation of available empty premises or buildings; when new dwellings offered for re-housing are unreasonably priced or located outside the urban area or away from the area of community life.

Other instances relate to opposition to police supervision and control, or to measures which use public order and security as a pretext to persecute the collective organisation and the cultural and social life of the migrants, by expelling their leaders and thus denying them the right to the independent expression of their interests.

On this basis it would be a mistake to underestimate the capacity of the migrant workers to develop their collective awareness, to organise their action and engage in campaigns to defend their interests and vindicate their individual and collective rights.

5.2. The right to independent collective representation

The migrant workers as a whole are deeply desirous of collective independent representation of their interests (86).

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(86) Léon GANI, Syndicata et travailleurs immigrés, Ed. sociales, Paris, 1972.

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In this connexion the German report emphasises the importance attached by the migrants of whatever nationality to organised representation. For almost every nationality, too, there are cultural and leisure groups and social organisations under the patronage of their countries of origin. Many of these groups and organisations are run by the churches, trade unions, political parties or workers'movements in their countries of origin and others by consulates or consular associations which are anxious to provide for the religious, social and political well-being of workers from their countries. Some of the countries which export their manpower have indeed provided, through their consulates, assistance in the form of guardianship to their migrants by financing associations and supplying interpreters, priests, national newspapers and at times providing accommodation. Most of these associations and bodies, however, are local and do not appear in public.

Side by side with these associations, there are others of a semi-political character. The German report emphasises their activities in bringing the claims and complaints of the migrant workers and their families to the notice of the competent authorities. They tackle this for lack of other representation; for the claims to be considered are often those which the trade union organisations in the host country are reluctant to support partly on the ground that unions are concerned mainly with the work place, but partly because there claims are not the concern of collective bargaining groups and political movement which act mainly in the interests of the local workers.

This, incidentally, explains the "marginal" character of a great number of the campaigns and actions of the migrant workers, for the latter not only lack political rights, but they do not find any sufficient echo to their complaints in organisations which are not sufficiently interested, constituted or equipped to defend their claims.

These campaigns and pressures come to the surface intermittently and at the local level, but they are often virulent because of the contrived weakness of the migrants as a body, because of the suspicion cast upon any attempts by them to organise, and because of the way in which they are supervised and repressed. They fall between the two stools of workers' organisations in their own countries and in the employing country, and they are at sea in the tangle of procedure, decision-making bodies, participation and negotiation, in which the migrant workers seldom have direct representation.

These campaigns, marginal but often bitter, give rise to sharp reactions among politicians and those concerned with keeping order. They bring measures of repression, which include the beheading of movements by the expulsion or arrest of the leaders; severe controls over individuals and the life of communities; and, in the longer term, measures aimed at stifling, splitting up or altogether dismantling their organisations. It would be perfectly possible to deal with such matters otherwise, through discussions with delegates from the different national communities and thus setting up a dialogue which might find expression in the formation of local consultative councils.

Nevertheless, if the complaints of the migrant workers are to be dealt with, dialogue is not enough. The opinions expressed must be heeded, and the communities must be provided with methods of contact between elected

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representatives and their base, and between the different national communities. Moreover, these groups must be given facilities for training their delegates, helping them in their work and coordinating their action in defending and promoting the interests concerned.

These arrangements for organising the migrants on an independent footing and often on a nationality basis, do not mean any rejection of general solidarity. They do not necessarily foreshadow any breach in the overall solidarity of the working class, nor is there a suggestion at any point of setting up new workers'organisations separated from those which are most representative. These forms of independence and self-organisation by migrant workers may perhaps be the path of transition to new solidarities in the same way as were, and are, the craft unions.

In the same way, the formation of consultative councils on a local basis can only be regarded as a step towards the right to vote and to free political expression, initially on a local and communal basis, but, in the longer-term on a national and community footing, in common with all settled foreign residents.

CHAPTER 8. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

1. How the migrant workers are housed

Since the end of 1973, the countries of the European Community have called a halt to the migration into their territories of workers from non-member countries, the movement within their territory being free. This has stopped the extremely rapid growth in the number of migrants recorded in the 1968/73 period. Nevertheless, the large numbers entering in these earlier years has raised problems which still require solutions.

This is partly because the growth was only possible by recruiting from a great variety of sources, so that the migrant population comprises a number of different nationalities.

This increase in the migrant population and the number of migrant workers has been accompanied by a growth in the proportion of women, partly due to the general rise in female employment and partly to the desire of breadwinners to be joined by their families, which desire is increasing due to the breakdown of communities in the country of origin. A connected factor is the attainment of working age by a second generation of migrants, whose presence in the EEC countries dates back a number of years.

The increase in the number of migrant workers has not induced any basic difference in the nature of the jobs in which they are engaged. The proportion occupied in service occupations is indeed higher than in the past, and this helps to explain the larger proportion of women; and the fact that the migrant population is often concentrated in the bigger urban and industrial areas, where the housing market is most apt to be under strain and the dwellers in which are most exposed to disturbance by property speculation, building operations and changes in the urban layout.

The spectacular growth in the number of migrant workers, with or without their families, has been the result of immigration being regulated ad hoc, without long-term forecasts and recruitment planning, without social provision for problems directly or indirectly engendered by the arrival of vast numbers of these workers, and without any thought as to what would happen if there should be a critical economic setback.

From every point of view the stage is set for the housing conditions of the migrants to deteriorate, both absolutely and by comparison with local workers. The only exceptions are the United Kingdom, where migration has been stopped since 1962; and Luxembourg, where the government is pursuing an active policy for housing the migrants and their families.

It appears from the various national enquiries, that there are only slight differences in housing conditions between immigrants and local nationals living in the same districts, but that this is due to the population categories questioned being in marginal areas and social strata well below the national averages. The differences nevertheless are many, and they tell systematically against the immigrant groups.

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The immigrants are much less frequently owners of their homes than are the local nationals. In cases in which a comparatively large proportion succeed in overcoming this difficulty (e.g. in the United Kingdom sample) their purchases are usually old-fashioned and bought from private owners. Access to ownership of a new dwelling, or to new subsidised housing, is extremely rare. This is primarily because purchase prices are too high and also because mortgages are expensive, and because workers in insecure employment and with only weak legal status are seldom regarded as credit worthy. It appears, nevertheless, that home ownership can be a major security factor for migrant workers and their families.

Even when the migrants are only tenants, the proportion lodged in subsidised housing is smaller in all cases than the proportion they represent of the total labour force. In practice, even for the local natives, the working class does not secure any large proportion of the allocations of subsidised dwellings.

In cases in which migrants succeed in securing subsidised housing on a rental basis, it is either one of older dwellings, sub-standard in comfort and accessibility, or is made available because the migrants were displaced in virtue of an urban redevelopment scheme which included a re-housing clause. The under-representation of migrant workers arises only partially from subsidised dwellings being offered at prices they cannot pay; it can also be attributed to conditions of access which are less easy to satisfy for immigrant workers than for local nationals. Another cause is a certain lack of knowledge about available social benefits and schemes, and to discrimination against them which is sometimes unconscious and sometimes deliberate.

It is noted that the migrant workers, since they cannot buy their dwellings nor secure subsidised housing, usually have to pay more than the locals for accommodation of like size and quality; The housing they occupy is usually much more overcrowded, less comfortable and containing more defects than accommodation of the same size occupied by local nationals; Apart from the districts assigned to the migrants, and the fraction of the housing market to which they have access, their range of choice is limited to what is offered by private landlords.

There are, nevertheless, various factors telling in favour of better housing within the migrant group. These include:

- comparatively long residence in the country;

- the fact of being married and accompanied by wife and children, doubtless because the worker is anxious to house his family better than he would expect to do for himself alone. It has in fact been seen that unmarried or unaccompanied workpeople are the worst housed. Moreover, they are the most willing to commit themselves to site jobs which require mobility, such as those on building and civil engineering sites. Unless they go into homes and hostels, in which there are, unfortunately, disciplinary rules which supplement the irritations of factory or workshop; these workers are most often to be found in doss houses and other primitive forms of accommodation.

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There are no marked differences between workers of different nationalities on different social-political or legal backgrounds such as between nationals of an EEC country and others. It sometimes happens, indeed, that groups from outside the EEC (e.g. Portuguese and Spaniards) are housed in better conditions than immigrants from the Community countries. This was especially noted, in France, Belgium and the United Kingdom; and in the latter case it will be remembered that Commonwealth nationals have long enjoyed a privileged status.

Nationality, and through it the political and legal status of the workers, does not seem to give rise to big differences, and rather surprisingly better status does not seem to give rise to big differences, and rather surprisingly better status does not necessarily lead to better housing. Indeed, when racial considerations come into play, the legally privileged may be the less well off in practice. This is the case in the United Kingdom with the immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and from West Indies.

The explanation of these discrepancies is rather complicated. Among the Italian nationals, for example, it is noted that most of the migrants are the unskilled and the jobless, their country of origin being in an advanced state of development. For the Spaniards and Portuguese, on the other hand, some part of the emigration is or was of political origin; and this makes it appreciably easier to find among them a stratum of greater skill or qualification.

Apart from nationality, differences of race and colour play an important part in explaning observed differences and levels of discrimination, quite apart from the legal or political status of the migrants concerned. This does not mean that a better political or legal status has no influence at all; for it is indeed a fundamental condition for securing a certain position in the social system. Once this has been secured, however, other changes are by no means automatic.

The national surveys make it clear that differences in housing conditions (apart from first arrivals who are bachelors or unaccompanied by their families) cannot be traced to lower levels of aspiration, or to simple cultural differences. The explanation for the housing conditions in which the migrants live is to be found in the palce assigned to them in the general economic and social system and, resulting from this, in their geographical distribution. These conditions are the direct result of the tight housing situation in all the Community countries, and most of all in the big urban and industrial centres into which most of the migrant workers are drawn.

2. Probable future strains in the housing markets

The housing conditions of migrants and their families are partly due to their concentration in big urban and industrial centres where the housing markets are under more than normal strain. Such country-by-country comparisons as it was possible to make in the course of the enquiry, between groups of migrants in places suffering from different degrees of market strain, show that the actual housing conditions are definitely at

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their best wherever the state of strain is least. It is, accordingly, impossible to ascribe everything to differences of culture and aspiration.

With this in view, it may be suggested that the Commission, in working out its programme for the housing of migrant workers, should take into account this persistent tension in the housing markets in cities and urban areas. However severe the economic crisis, even the total blocking of the immigration flow, or measures to make it much more selective, could not mitigate the prevailing tension in these markets. Part of the need for migrant labour is a structural feature; and some at least of the migrant manpower is likely to settle permanently. With new manpower recruitment limited by the prohibition of immigration, but a corresponding lengthening in the residence of the migrant population, the greater is the desire migrants' to reunite their families. In France, for example, the stoppage of worker immigration has been accompanied by further individual entries resulting from reuniting families. In other Community countries the problem is similar.

Thus, the cessation or diminution of the immigrant flow does not lead to an automatic reduction in the absolute number of people requiring to be housed, which might reduce the pressure in the housing market. The economic crisis, and the restrictions on immigration which become its normal accompaniment through the convergence of economic and social forces, does not bring any relief to the housing problem.

Even if future recruitments were to be rigidly confined to bachelors or unaccompanied males, there would be no automatic reduction in the housing problems set up in providing housing for the migrants who have already arrived.

Moreover, the crisis has not alleviated the problems of the migrants in general, nor their housing problems in particular, because it does not lead to any change in their position in the overall system. Its effect on their the housing problems is in fact rather negative. In the economic system as we know it, the tendency is for housing construction to be passed over increasingly to private enterprise. The private share of residential construction thus tends to grow, because its natural associate is a reduction in the building programmes of local authority or subsidised housing. The credit finance available tends to shrink and this exercises a downward pressure on the demand for new houses and subsidised dwellings. This demand, is specially liable to rise or fall with the prospects for incomes and employment; and the appreciable rise in building costs puts an increasingly large fringe of the population on the very edge of the market for new housing, if not outside it altogether.

Before the crisis, when the economy was still experiencing a boom, there was an enormous rise in site values, construction costs, rents and mortgage rates, so that the building of subsidised housing remained far below its programmed level and below the rate of depreciation of the existing stock of dwellings. There is no other way of explaining the tendency to renovate old dwellings which, in our different countries, has been running in parallel with the cutbacks in the building of new ones. Renovation, however, does not eliminate the widening fringe of

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uninhabitable housing, at any rate if it be judged on current standards of health and hygiene. This applies most of all in the urban areas, which is where most of the migrant workers are concentrated.

3. How to intervene?

Much earlier research has been put into describing the measures taken in different Community countries to promote housing development and develop housing policies. Our own research sought to go beyond the mere description of the housing position of migrant workers from Community countries and elsewhere; and, the mere catologuing of recent trends in housing policy; we sought to identify possible lines of action.

The experts'attention was focussed in the first instance on two problems. These were: Methods of non-discriminatory intervention. In some of the countries there appeared to be difficulties in carrying out a housing improvement and development policy, framed specifically for the migrant workers. If this is indeed the limiting factor, what can be done to correct the position?

What resources should be available to the Community for securing an adequate and fundamental change in a situation of manifest and increasing gravity?

In the discussion of the first problem, most of the experts took the view that migrant workers could not be the target for a specific policy. They constitute, the experts said, a group similar to other marginal groups or categories, all of which should be taken together as the target for a dynamic social policy for housing improvement and development. From this standpoint the experts considered various fundamental criteria, under which the migrant workers and groups of native workers similarly placed, could both be given aid in such a way as to eliminate discrimination in favour of either.

Consideration was thereupon given to a number of measures by which the Commission might improve housing conditions for social groups suffering from discrimination or "marginal" treatment. These proposals are based on experiments launched and initiatives already taken in various countries; and thus without being altogether original, they have the advantage of being, or having been, tested and of being operated in more than one country.

Even if full account is taken of these experiments, however, the measures to be taken and the criteria for their application will necessarily need exact definition at a later stage, as also will the conditions for their effectiveness.

Moreover, the parties to a programme for improving housing conditions should not be solely guided by the problems raised by the present state of housing for migrants in the Community. They will also need to take into consideration the place we hope ultimately to give them in the social structure of this European Community, and in its political organ-

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isation — for the Commission can hardly avoid considering the rights of migrant populations, whether or not they be Community nationals — in the context of the Community elections scheduled for 1978.

3.1. First principle: non-discrimination or equality of treatment at Community level

Ideally, any negative discrimination should be matched by a positive one. This is the well-defined attitude taken by Luxembourg; but except for Luxembourg's code of good housing for the migrants, and France — which provides funds and specific allocations to provide housing both for unaccompanied migrants and for those with families — most of the other countries base the aid they give to migrants schemes aimed at particular social groups.

It appears difficult to propose a thorough revision of this attitude, even though the experts were convinced, after studying the enquiry reports, that the housing of migrants is generally lower in quality than that of the local natives. The number of dwellings which are old and dilapidated or even unhygienic, is much higher for the migrants than for the locals; and fewer migrants than locals enjoy the various benefits granted by governments in regard to housing and access to house ownership.

In further discussions, however, the expert group found it difficult to propose any positive forms of discrimination designed to give the migrants advantages which would be more than offset the disadvantages and discrimination to which they are now subject.

As a first stage it would be possible to review the criteria for, and the conditions of access to, the various housing aids, so as to eliminate any stipulations which function in such a way as to exclude most of the migrants. Such extensions of the aid available, however, would not go far towards any radical improvement in the migrants' housing conditions, as described in the enquiry. It often happens that national governments or local authorities require specified periods of residence and lay down criteria for good household administration before they will consider a candidate for subsidised housing. These criteria are often quite foreign to the way the migrants live. Most of the residence stipulations operate against the provision of benefits to most of the migrant workers, even if there is no exclusion on grounds of nationality.

This actual discrimination in housing needs to be considered in parallel with many other types of discrimination — if not in social security, the benefits of which are acquired through work and workers' contributions — at least in all the social welfare schemes and minimum income guarantees. In most cases these benefits accrue only to the local nationals.

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The expert group, however, found it difficult to put forward measures of positive discrimination in favour of the migrants, so as to offset the various types of discrimination to which they (unlike the locals) are subject. This cautions attitude was partly due to concern about the feasibility of such measures. Most of the countries would have refused any effective discussion of such measures.

And the group accordingly attempted to define methods of intervention applicable to a number of specific social categories, which would include all or part of the migrant group (Common Market nationals or others); and thus they sought to avoid any future necessity for setting up first-zone, second-zone and third-zone categories of migrants, with distinction between Community nationals, workers from former colonial territories and migrants of other origins. Against this background differences of treatment depending on length of residence would be better justified than those based on nationality, race or colour.

In any case it would seem a matter for regret that the proposed differences of treatment might lead to new types of migrant being sought — those types which cost least, towards whom the national governments are least committed, and who, in the fullness of time, would be substituted for the categories which are more costly because they are better protected.

At all costs the host countries must not be allowed to have recourse to any special category of migrant workers because of differences in the cost, or of the weakness of their legal and political status.

There must, too, be absolutely no question of migrants being forced to accept lower wages which would help them in poor housing conditions, which in turn would induce them to accept lower salaries.

Though it was difficult to make any headway in suggesting methods of positive discrimination, it should ultimately be made impossible for negative differences to be maintained, either between migrants and local nationals or between different categories of migrants.

This possibility of discrimination between migrants, based on their countries of origin, has its principal source in the bilateral agreements between the countries which are importers and those which are exporters of manpower. It would be desirable for all future recruitment agreements to contain the most-favoured-nation clause. This is the only alternative to fixing a Community-wide definition of a migrant worker and his status. This should make it possible to avoid any discrimination or difference of treatment based on national origin, or on whether a migrant's recruitment and method of entry into the employing country was as part of a contingent (and thus under responsible sponsorship) or as a "tourist" with subsequent regularisation of his position. This regularisation procedure, it should be stated at once, has various advantages both for the migrant worker (who does not have to have a preliminary medical examination) and for the employer (who is saved the cost of recruitment abroad and does not have to give the worker a written contract of approved duration which has to be for a year or more). These, however, are advantages only on the short term.

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As we have already demonstrated, new laws do not automatically abolish discrimination, but they provide us with weapons to avoid them in the future. This same theme of equal treatment underlay the declarations set out in the Community social programme in 1974, and the conventions and recommendations of the International Labour Office. Hitherto, however, none of these texts has made claims for equality of treatment in regard to housing.

Progress towards such equality can, in the long run, be attained only through a migration policy adopted and operated, at least in part, at Community level.

3.2. Other lines of action — defining target categories for the social housing policy.

The results of the Community survey show that access to sponsored or subsidised housing is extremely limited, not only for migrant workers (EEC nationals or other); but also for quite a number of marginal population categories in the country itself. New measures of a general character in regard to subsidized housing would therefore have only a very small immediate effect for these groups.

In all the countries, too, the current economic crisis has materially reduced the momentum of subsidised building programmes. The crisis itself, and the galloping inflation in construction costs which was its forerunner, are factors which preclude any reliance on a quick solution to the problem of adequate housing — whether in quantity or in quality — for migrant workers in the EEC.

Keeping in mind these general considerations, the expert group sought to define criteria which would put the migrants on the same footing as local workers whose needs are similar, and measures providing equality of treatment for both classes, especially in relation to housing.

Moreover, our survey data show that there was hardly any major difference in any of the countries between the migrants and the control group, which was selected from the same areas. Moreover, if the comparison be amended to exclude the sub-group who own their own homes (a very small sub-group in the case of most migrant groups) the difference is very small indeed. The locals and the foreigners living in the same districts have similarly modest incomes and their housing conditions are below the national or regional average.

This aspect is important because it enables the migrant workers to be dealt with by reference to areas or categories which also include national workers. This is a necessary condition if one is limited to measures which favour whole social groups who have been discriminated against whom victimisation by the social-economic and politico-legal systems for different reasons.

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Measures in this class can be devised in a number of ways. In the first instance they can apply to specific geographical or ecological areas. The second approach would define the social classes to be aided by reference to their needs, the extent of discrimination, against them or their institutional weakness.

These two approaches, and also those mentioned below, can be combined insofar as the social strata are to be found in conglomerate form, as a result of the very handicaps, discrimination or institutional weaknesses to which the migrants are subject.

By defining certain groups on the basis of social demographic criteria, aid of various kinds can be given to both migrant workers and local nationals. In many cases the migrants are bachelors or unaccompanied; and when they have their families with them there are often more children than is locally usual. It would therefore be possible to frame a housing policy to cope particularly both with bachelors and with big families.

Since migrants are, to a greater extent than nationals, concentrated in old and dilapidated buildings and areas scheduled for clearance and redevelopment, the age and condition of the buildings occupied could be a non-discriminatory condition of eligibility for aid.

It is upon such lines as these that conditions of eligibility should be fixed which will bring more than proportionate aid to the migrants without setting up any positive discrimination against the local nationals.

4. Criteria for definition of needy areas

The districts inhabited by the weaker social categories, or victims of discrimination, are quite easy to demarcate. Ecological science is indeed studying the laws which govern the way space is shared in the social system. It shows that there is a tendency for specific areas to be delimited into which are crowded growing numbers of those inhabitants who are, for whatever personal or social reason, denied access to other parts of the territory and other forms of habitation.

The country-by-country analysis made it clear that most of the migrants tend to settle in districts characterised by high population density, by the age and dilapidation of residential accommodation, by the lack of facilities of various kinds and the low level of the state investment. Priority areas might thus be selected, not by reference to the proportion of migrants, but rather by the density of population and the deterioration or dilapidation of the housing. Other criteria could include the dilapidation of the environment, the state of the roads, the drainage or lack of it, or the absence of infrastructure which is so often the cause of decrepit housing facilities. Indeed, these decisions by public authorities to invest or disinvest have a way of colouring the outlook of local inhabitants about the future of their area and the wisdom private investment in it.

These criteria for the demarcation of areas, even though if they were quite elaborate, would still raise the usual problems of fixing "thresholds", which would clearly define the boundaries. The levels fixed and the criteria laid down will determine the size of the areas, and whether the benefits provided are to be concentrated or scattered. In the

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first instance, it will only be possible to cover a limited number of experimental areas, as it happening at present in Belgium where five or six districts in Wallony are being intensively renovated.

Though the demarcation problem can be dealt with, this intervention procedure raises objections in the sense that the delimitation of the zone boundaries may encourage the migrants to re-deploy themselves within the zones, making ghettos in which they will be easily identified as migrants and marginal members of the economic and social system. This segregation might well make discrimination more widespread and more definite in the longer run.

5. Preference for social-demographic criteria in defining target categories

Housing policy,(whether it acts separately from, or as an accessory to, the scheduling of priority areas requiring urgent action), would only be capable of alleviating the more serious cases and the most unhealthy conditions, if the conditions of eligibility were made more numerous, so that the aid could be awarded only in specific circumstances or to special social categories.

Any analysis of the migrant populations, including workers and their families, discloses a wide conformity to a demographic pattern. It is a young population (below 45 years of age), consisting of people who are either bachelors or unaccompanied, or in families which are on the large side. They are engaged in certain characteristic jobs, often those which are heavy, dangerous, unhealthy, dirty, with irregular hours of work and often of the most repetitive kind. In short, their jobs are those from which many of the locals are seeking to escape; and these migrants live in the oldest of the houses and are very seldom their owners.

Among all these criteria, there are quite a number which are all the more suitable as eligibility standards for aid, since they define categories which seldom consist exclusively of migrants. Some of them would extend to a big fringe of the local nationals, and aid would not be regarded as discrimination in favour of migrants. The use of such criteria would be preferable to classifying the migrants in a single group with the aged or socially handicapped.

In this connexion, though it is true the locals might react against any positive discrimination in favour of the migrant workers, it is worth remembering that migrant workers themselves might object to being grouped with the handicapped and other marginal groups.

Experts from several delegations took a strong line against any such assimilation of the migrants. The discrimination from which these people suffer, it was argued, is not due to any natural weakness of their own, but to weaknesses deliberately produced by the social, legal, economic and political status inflicted on them by our governments and our countries. The migrant workers and their families differ from the other marginal groups, in that they are an active force in the service of our nations

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and, by their hard work and consumption expenditure, greatly assist our economic growth. These men and these families cannot be thrust into assimilation with groups which are so often seen as temporary or permanent national liabilities. They are people of working age, and their families are no mere debit item in the economic accounts, but are young enough to be contributing in many cases more than they receive. This is in fact the case in all branches of social security. Moreover, by recruiting them at an adult age, we have not had to bear the cost of rearing them and educating them. By the taxes they pay and the work they do, they contribute to erecting our infrastructure, to building our schools, hospitals, roads, to financing our universities and our old people's homes.

Thus if the migrant class are weak in status, it is through no fault in their stature as producers and taxpayers. They are a fringe of population for whom a suitable housing policy would be no more than a just reward for the contribution they make.

By making tests of need and eligibility criteria less opprobrious, one could avoid offence to the locals and aim specifically at providing better housing, both for the bachelors and for large families. We shall deal below with these very different types and their very different requirements, putting special emphasis on the problems of the unmarried or unaccompanied.

Before we come to this, however, it behoves us to show how the growth in the foreign population, which is partly made up of migrant workers (whether they be bachelors, unaccompanied or with their families), is closely dependent on national migration policies, which themselves follow the fluctuating requirements in different phases of the economic cycle.

6. Impact of migration policy on the nature and volume of housing requirements

The number of migrants coming into a country, and whether they come by themselves, bring their families with them or have those families admitted at a later stage, depends very largely on the migration policy the employing country chooses to pursue.

In all countries, immigration policy and the way it is regulated, have been framed — in our view, mistakenly — on a basic assumption as to whether the immigration is necessarily temporary or of longer duration and as to the type of work which the migrants are expected to perform.

In Federal Germany, for example, the official choice has been frankly in favour of allowing the immigration of bachelors and only for short periods. Such a policy, combined with high wages, makes it possible to avoid big infrastructure expenditure, as well as enabling the migrants to save money and send it back to their own countries.

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Policies aimed mainly at securing the immigration of unaccompanied workers are those which are most closely connected with the employment situation and employment policy. The immigration of unaccompanied males, without family charges, is the policy most in line with the immediate satisfaction of the demand, from companies and public authorities, for relatively unskilled labour. In view of the short stay of the migrant worker, little training and skill are required. Such a policy ensures that the lowest possible costs fall directly on the company concerned and that further costs, relating to the improvement and maintenance of the labour force, are also minimised.

On the other hand, if the immigration is rigidly confined to bachelors, it results in considerable coming and going of manpower, and the political effect for the country is essentially different from that in countries which allow the families to be reunited, as is the case in Luxembourg and Belgium. Both these countries, though in some districts more than in others, are afflicted with growing population deficits, especially in working age-groups. It is for this reason that foreign workers are given a chance of coming into the country with their families, or having them follow later. The serious character of the current economic crisis and its long duration, are presently being used as arguments in favour of an immigration policy strictly confined to short-term manpower requirements.

The restriction of immigration, imposed almost simultaneously in all the countries on account of the crisis, might thus have brought us back to a policy of immigration centered on short-term objectives, the best way of dealing with which is to confine immigration to bachelors. Such objectives might have come into the ascendant the more easily for the fact that, even before the crisis, the desire to promote the reunion of families was losing ground because of the difficulties of social integration or simply of living together. These difficulties were the greater because the manpower recruited, whether of individuals or in contingents, came from more and more distant countries, which resulted in an increasing cultural gap. There can be no denying that the concentrations of migrant workers we see nowadays in the different Community countries, have a tendency to create strains between national and foreign populations, especially when the latter represent large proportions of the population in parts of the big urban and industrial centres. The economic crisis enhances the rivalry of the migrants, and exacerbates the discrimination to which they are subject. These factors set up strains between the different national communities, more especially since the various categories in the national and foreign work force are unequally affected by crisis conditions.

Up to the present, however, and despite the crisis, there is no noticeable trend towards a policy directed to securing the immigration of bachelors and unaccompanied males, or to put a stop to the immigration of families.

6.1. Modifications of immigration policies

The change in progress are directed more towards modification of the two policies which should in fact be pursued together if the aim is to give the worker more freedom of choice in deciding whether to migrate by himself

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or with his family. The modification and the combination of the two policies is mainly due to the distinction between the different requirements of the economic system.

In Federal Germany the primary aim of policy find unaccompanied workers, preferably bachelors. This is the official strategy, but the various political parties have divergent views. The official policy is defended by the C D U; but the S P D favours the reunification of families which, incidentally, tends to happen of its own accord as soon as immigration becomes more permanent and the average length of stay in the country increases. The survey shows that a considerable number of families have already been reunited, and still more are anxious to do so. The movement is helped by the increasing proportion of women among the migrants.

In Belgium and Luxembourg, policy openly favours family reunification; but the assistance made available for this purpose is less generous in Belgium than in Luxembourg. As in most of the countries, work permits are conditional on there being suitable housing accommodation, so that theoretically there should be no serious housing problem, either for bachelors or for families. In Belgium, however, — as opposed to Luxembourg and France — there is very little encouragement for the building and equipment of hostels for bachelors. This is a shortcoming which has raised a number of problems in recent years, for the hostels have in some cases been unduly exploited by those who keep them, while in other cases there have been conflicts with the managements of companies responsible for them.

In France, two migration policies are operated side-by-side, because it is admitted that there exists both a structural need for manpower and a less permanent need arising from current economic conditions. The settlement in France of a certain number of migrant families is permitted and encouraged; but care is taken at the same time to secure a reserve of bachelor manpower. Central organisations have been given the task of promoting the policy of building and operating hostels for bachelors and unaccompanied workers; but this policy now seems to be leading to a dead end. We shall return to this point later.

In Denmark, the policy has been similar to that in Federal Germany; but there is a chronic and growing shortage of workers for some industries and with some qualifications; and this is leading towards the development of conditions, and a policy, more favourable to the reunification of families.

In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, reunited families are still the primary objective of the social policy on migrant workers. There is no apparent trend towards a policy to promote unaccompanied immigration, though the government has indeed raised the subsidies provided for employers and local authorities to build hostels for bachelor workers. From the start the practice has been to build hostels of a comparatively small size, none of them housing more than 50 workers. This is in line with the effort to secure industrial dispersion over the territory of the Grand Duchy.

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In the Netherlands, immigration policy used to be frankly in favour of the unmarried and the unaccompanied, but the tendency is now towards greater facilities for the entry and establishment of families. This is connected with the fact that various groups of migrants have been some time in the country, which has created a certain demand for permanent installation facilities. Efforts are being made to disperse these family dwellings throughout the areas surrounding the cities, which would in general be better for family and group life. At the same time various new measures have been taken to promote the financing and construction of housing for single individuals close to the town centres. These measures are not specifically for migrants; but it has been found that there are special advantages in housing unaccompanied people close to the shopping areas and leisure facilities of the town centre — in other words close to all the facilities needed for their maintenance and relaxation. Through these measures, the aim is not the creation of big residential complexes, but rather to secure units of single-family dimensions. Special credits are provided in the Netherlands for seeing that each group is housed with due regard to ecological requirements. The lodging of bachelors close to the town centres puts them both close of the various kinds of facilities they require, and also close to the transport systems which carries them to their places of work. It is thus unnecessary for them to live in the immediate neighbourhood of their factories and under the shadow of their employer.

In the United Kingdom, the position is similar to that in Belgium, in the sense that there is no official provision for the reception of bachelors or unaccompanied workers except, of course, for the provision made for the elderly.

Since 1970, however, the laws on immigration have been made more restrictive and it is becoming increasingly difficult for residents to bring their dependants into the country. Not only does this give rise to political resentments among migrants who desire to have their families with them, but it also raises new social problems through the impossibility of bringing families together. This is yet another discrimination to be endured by menfolk who are, in many cases, deprived of a number of their rights and privilege.

Most of the manpower-importing countries in the EEC now appear to be following a mixed policy. Leaders in this have been France and Luxembourg, both of which are already implementing policies calculated to find housing both for the unaccompanied migrants and for the families.

6.2. Causes of this modification

It may be asked in these circumstances whether it is really necessary to make a choice between the two migration and housing policies. In both cases the changes seem called for, in virtue of a more flexible definition of the migrant manpower requirements of our economies.

It is probable in fact that there will be some changes in the way immigration is conducted under the constraint of changing business conditions and the resulting manpower requirements in the employing countries. The economic crisis is making us think more closely about the

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causes of migration and the need for it, by forcing us to better identify and access our requirements and to define the types of migrant which can best be admitted or promoted.

It seems that the countries which import manpower draw distinctions between two or three different classes of migrant workers, defined by reference to their own standpoints and interests; and the way they treat their migrants varies according to the nature of their own requirements. The personal plans of the workers inside these categories may well differ on the same lines as the requirements of the employing countries.

The first category is made up of workers possessing skills which are indispensable to the smooth working of the employing country's economy and who come from countries with a sufficiently small cultural and social gap to enable their natives to find their place with minimum difficulty in the employing country. This is a manpower reserve for the settlement of which suitable conditions are provided for installation and integration.

The second category consists of workers who are willing to stay abroad for some time, but without raising the question of real integration.

The third category includes workers who are willing to face very quick rotation, or who are prepared to undertake occasional work. On further consideration, however, it is for the migrants themselves and not for the host countries to make this choice. In fact, whatever initial assumptions each country may have made regarding the temporary or permanent character of the migration and the contribution of the migrants to the country's economy and population, there is always pressure in favour of the alternative policy. This is because the choice between a recruitment policy for single men or for united families is not one for the host country, but rather for the migrants and their families.

For the sake of respecting this choice, the host countries must pursue a flexible policy and be able to deal with the housing problems, both of the single man and of the family. There are a number of factors which favour this freedom of choice. In the first place two types of objective are to be found among the migrants themselves: the objective of migrating alone, which is inevitably the pattern with bachelors; but also applies to some married men and to some who have children in their care; and the objective of accompanied migration. The preference for unaccompanied migration seems the more logical when recruitment is from a distant country, and the cultural gap is big. It is a preference particularly marked in countries where the emancipation of women is least advanced.

The most explicit report on this subject is that of the United Kingdom. It brings out the point that various classes of migrant desire to protect their wives and daughters from the permissive conditions affecting women in our countries. Moreover, a long absence may appear more or less acceptable, both for the man and for the woman, depending on the country or region of origin. In some parts of Kashmir, for example, long absences for army service or for work in the towns have become quite customary.

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The United Kingdom report also indicates that when the women have accompanied their men, the number who go to work varies with the nationality of origin and the degree of emancipation enjoyed by women in the countries from which they came. For a definite confirmation of this, however, we need statistics which include length of sojourn and the number and age of the children; for the mothers of large families inevitably have their hands thoroughly full with tasks other than those of job. These facts confirm the belief that all nationalities of worker do not have the same desire for or interest in reuniting their families, or for staying permanently in Europe.

Clear as it is that the practice of cohabitation and the desire for a reunited family may differ from one nationality to another, it is nevertheless a remarkable fact that in all the host countries the number of family establishments grows with the length of time the migrant has been there. The case of the Italians — the longest established migrant workers in most of the Community countries — is typical. It is also the case of the West Indians in the United Kingdom who arrived earlier and in greated numbers than the Indians and Pakistanis. For these early arrivals the tendency to bring in the family is most clearly marked.

Thus the various national groups of immigrants, whatever may be our own preferences, our own requirements and the bases of our own policies, behave in substantially different ways. The demographic features of the different groups, especially the age and sex distribution, are clear indications of their preferences and also of the constraints we habitually put upon their choice.

It often happens that apparent preferences conceal or obscure the constraints imposed by the host country. In Federal Germany, for instance, there is no subsidy to cover the removal costs. Even in countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg, where a removal indemnity is paid for the family, there is a ceiling on what each family may receive, and the indemnity is payable only in respect of three people per family. In practice, discourages the immigration of whole families particularly the bigger ones.

The migrants'preference for re-uniting families meets further obstacles when the state of the housing market is specially strained, or when the terms and conditions offered to the families of migrants — which are often large, sometimes very large by local standards — are specially deplorable. The surveys in the different countries show that the families which find it most difficult to secure suitable accommodation at a reasonable price are the big families with three or more children.

Ideally, the countries to which the migrants come should avoid circumscribing their choice and refrain from penalising the wish of the married migrant to have his family with him, even if his responsibilities are large. The policy must be, to provide for such reunions more especially since the immigration is tending, at any rate in many of the countries, to lose its temporary character.

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6.3. Possible approaches

Looking at matters from this standpoint, the Community countries ought to be induced to adopt an open policy, leaving it to the migrant to decide for himself whether he wants to bring his family with him and, if he did not do so in the first place, whether to decide at a later date to have them join him.

Of course this open door policy implies very different scales of cost in the short compared with the long term. The policy of seeking bachelor immigrants saves the employing country a good deal of expenditure, whatever it may cost the families and ultimately the employing firms; for manpower thus recruited is the least stable, and calls for permanent recruiting offices if a stable work force is to be maintained. In the longer run, too, this policy raises social costs for the local population through the strains liable to be set up by the presence of big and growing bachelor communities.

Moreover, unaccompanied men have to be protected from drug-pedalling landlords, from camouflaged slum housing, from permanent caravan dwellings (87) and from undue domination by the employer through the possible link between the employment contract and the leasehold contract. Similar conditions prevail when it comes to housing for families, and it is as well to avoid the combined rôle of employer-landlord. Institutional housing with management on a joint basis, is much to be preferred.

Accommodation in hostels is also to be considered, especially very small ones such as those found in Luxembourg, where units of 30 residents are preferred to bigger ones, despite the potential economies of size.

Another worthwhile proposal is the Dutch one for setting up migrant hostels in town centres, where a wide range of amenities are available.

Also for consideration is the concept of hostels under joint management, or managed by the migrant themselves; for this would avoid many problems and internal stresses.

(87) This formula applies only during the working week, but it tends to become the permanent way of life for workers on construction sites, especially when they only come into the country on a seasonal basis. In any case, non-temporary accommodation should be provided at the week-ends.

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Such policies, however, do not deal with the problems of migrants who come in as tourists and take up clandestine residence in our countries. These people are the most exposed to drug pedlars and slum landlords. These are special problems which cannot really be solved, except by measures of another type. The social services, if only they were more fully subsidised, could help in promoting better solutions to problems whose extent is considerable, but whose impact can be assessed only indirectly. We think, for example, that our own survey, despite all efforts to the contrary, did not get down to the real fringe of migrant workers whose position is on the furthest edge of all legislative protection.

With this in view, it would be as well to take a leaf out of the French book, and impose more severe penalties on unscrupulous employers who work with black market foreign labour, and on drug pedlars and landlords who abuse the irregularities of clandestine and other migrant workers to impose rentals and tenancy terms which are very costly and often scandalous.

7. Housing problems for bachelors and unaccompanied migrants

For purposes of housing unaccompanied people, it is perfectly possible to have a policy with no specific reference to migrant workers, whether or not they are native of EEC countries. Many of the problems facing unaccompanied migrants are equally common among other people who live alone, whether they be foreigners or nationals of the country concerned.

For the most part, the people living alone, whether or not they be bachelors, are the worst housed. This is fully confirmed in the national surveys. The conditions in which these people live are the worse for the fact that there are a great many of them, and the supply of housing for them is insufficient in quantity and inadequate in quality.

Moreover, even when their housing is physically good, and many amenities provided, (for example in the French hostels both their construction and management conform to approved standards of hygiene and safety) the unaccompanied migrants are not without their social problems, stemming, for the most part, from having to live with a large number of people who did not choose to live together. These housing problems for migrants who arrived unaccompanied, will not be solved by the mere passage of time. Migrants of longest standing who are still by themselves have just the same problems.

The explanation may be that the immigrants living by themselves usually stend least on housekeeping and household equipment and improvements, either because they are bachelors or because they are contributing substantially to costs and charges incurred elsewhere, for it is indeed the unaccompanied migrants who send home the biggest remittances. Yet these explanations, based on personal circumstances and obligations, are not in themselves sufficient. It is undeniable that suitable quarters for bachelor living are very frequently unavailable, not only for migrants, but equally for students and senior citizens. The deficiency is specially inconvenient for the migrant since he is a long way from his family.

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Another explanation may be the attitude of local populations, who are often unenthusiastic about letting a room and sharing their meals with one or more lodgers of nationalities other than their own.

There is in fact great difficulty in finding quarters for bachelors in private houses, simply because of the prejudice against the bachelor migrant as a non-permanent lodger and often because of his way of life and his leisure habits. A contributory factor, too, is the absence of any official policy for promoting this type of housing, which is of a very risky nature. Even countries which have deliberately chosen to seek unaccompanied immigrants rather than families, because their manpower requirements and their necessary installations for migrants are no more than temporary, have made no effective contribution to solving the housing problems inevitably induced by their selective immigration policies.

Moreover, those countries which have made a special effort to provide good housing for unaccompanied immigrants, as has been the case with France, have not been particularly successful in doing so, because of the complexity of the problem. For example, the building of hostels which was the policy pursued in France, came to a dead end. The accommodation was clean and of good quality, but the satisfaction derived from healthy living on these lines was mitigated by the many social problems arising through the concentration in collective homes of migrants in this category.

It is quite reasonable to regard community living as the logical answer to the solitude of these immigrants, as well as a safeguard for local populations which are reluctant to provide lodging and care in their own homes. Yet after a certain time, the mere fact of concentration begins to feel as though it were a compulsory residence, and comes to be regarded as barrack life, from which many migrants seek to escape. When the number of migrants living in a hostel gets at all big, the system is apt to turn into a form of confinement, a system of moral and social control which obscures the genuine effort to provide good quality accommodation. For the migrants, too, the constraints arising from the hostel regulations and discipline are the central factor for conflict. It is hard to see any other explanation for the fact that even though hostel conditions are good, a large number of the inmates leave them after a certain time to seek the freedom which the hostel does not seem to have given them. These departures occur, despite the amenities and amusements, the educational activities and the encouragement of literacy provided by the more enlightened hostel administrators. In France, where public authorities and employers have cooperated in giving the hostel formula its biggest encouragement, rent strikes and protests against restrictive regulations have been very frequent and are now giving rise to demands by the immigrants to manage the hostels for themselves. These claims gain in emphasis from the fact that the availability of room in a hostel is often linked with the migrant's job, so that if he loses his job he may find himself homeless and perhaps even lose his residence permit.

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There can thus be no doubting the importance or the awkwardness of the problem inherent in housing the bachelors or unaccompanied workers the EEC countries have set out to attract, though often without full consideration of the policies needed for coping with the long-term and short-term situations they were creating.

Yet the help needed for single people is not solely concerned with migrants. The latter can be put on the same footing as is done in the Netherlands with a number of other categories of people living alone. From the policy standpoint, too, there would be advantages in making no distinction between the various categories of lonely people, even though it may not always be a good plan to put them physically together.

The experts take the view that this problem should be dealt with as a whole rather than share out the housing policy responsibilities among a host of different organisations dealing with individual categories and social groups.

In these conditions the policy for housing single people would not need to be considered simply as part of the immigration policy, even though the fundamentals of immigration policy have, as has been shown above, done much to induce or accentuate the intrinsic problems of finding quarters for single people or families.

8. Policies of renovating houses and rehousing operations following urban redevelopment

Much research, including our own, has shown how migrants tend to swarm into the cities and concentrate in certain areas.

In general, the immigrant population appears as a replacement in particular industries, jobs, regions and dwellings which have ceased to be attractive enough for a large part of the native population.

The migrants are thus to be found in specific types of area. These include those where the housing is old and dilapidated; areas adjacent to industrial or waste-processing sources of pollution; in places surrounded by railway stations, bus depôts and other service infrastructure; noisy or transition districts, such as the fringe of business areas for example, where private property investments or public infrastructure work have fallen to nothing, perhaps for a long time, because of property speculations in progress.

The migrants are more liable than any other category to be affected by eviction and rehousing operations associated with urban development, the extension of business areas, shopping facilities and parking lots, and the accompanying layout and improvement of access roads.

The fact that migrant populations tend to conglomerate in particular types of area and in old and tumble-down dwellings, is due in general to the uncertainties of their outlook, resulting from the fragil tenure of

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their jobs and the fact that they may not be able to survive a period of unemployment. Moreover, their solvency does not always stand up to local rents and still less to the cost of buying new houses; and their position as desirable tenants is sometimes questioned because, when they move into any district or any particular building, it is often a signal for the local nationals to begin moving out. The jobs held by most of them and the places where they live are those considered least desirable for national workers; and for this very reason they are in danger of undesirable promiscuity. Demonstrations of the most race-conscious type often occur on the fringe of these districts where their coming and their penetration is most dreaded. Most of the migrants are driven into the very fringes of the job market, and in the same way they are thrust out to the very edge of the market for decent housing.

This explains the growing density of occupation in the areas where the migrants have taken root, and the very small proportion of them in the new districts and new houses which have grown so much more expensive. Moreover, there could be no generalised access to new housing, unless rents ceased to reflect building costs and were kept down to a certain level of income per head, including an allowance for those for whom the head of the household is legally and financially responsible.

On the other hand there are, among the general measures, some which operate quite systematically to the advantage of migrant workers. These include all the measures aimed at the refurbishing of dwellings and areas, and also those designed for the rehousing of those who have been living in districts which are changing their character.

In the short term, these are the policies which would be most advantageous to the migrant workers. It is necessary, all the same, that these refurbishment policies should not become simple substitutes for the policy of building new dwellings, and allowed to operate merely as a transfer of funds from the building of new houses to the repairing of the old.

Financing the repair policies can, of course, mitigate the degree of decrepitude and the rate at which the old houses are falling to pieces; but it is a great pity that this policy should be carried out, at least in part, by funds got from skimping expenditure on new housing. The transition from construction to repair policies is to be seen in all the EEC countries and the building of subsidised dwellings is still below the critical depreciation rate at which certain dwellings are becoming or are being made uninhabitable each year.

8.1. Renovation policy

Renovation policy is desirable. The migrants would be all the better helped if the income maxima for eligibility could be lowered, and if the public contribution to the cost could be raised to 70 or even 90%. The Community might be prepared to consider grants up to 90% in some of the work of rehabilitation and improvement; but this does not mean the consideration would extend to all the internal improvements. In the first phase, at any rate, the expenditure covered would have to be limited to what was needed for comfort and sanitation. Moreover appropriate standards would have to be laid down and also a definition of the state of repair beyond which living accommodation would no longer be regarded as capable of improvement grants.

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The list of improvements to be considered might follow the luxembourg model, including works for reducing dampness, ensuring water supplies, drainage, ventilation, lighting, sanitation and the building of such new rooms as are necessary, the enlargement of existing rooms and the installation of central heating. The subsidy provided is 25% up to Flux 80 000 and 10% for further sums up to Flux 230 000.

The policy of renovation has an advantage over a policy aimed solely at building subsidised dwellings, in that it avoids area demolition, or the removal of the inhabitants elsewhere, which almost always means the splitting up or disappearance of the communities concerned. The destruction of the social fabric, with all its tissue of relationships and connexions, is thus avoided. Moreover, since the operations in question are handled one at a time, there is an additional assurance that the social fabric will not be disturbed.

At the same time, too, these operations have a partial effect in curbing property speculation. In the areas in which they are carried out, they check the process of dilapidation and thus slacken the inducement to property speculation and major conversion and redevelopment works. Moreover, the residential rehabilitation policy is in direct conflict with the policy of economic and social up-valuation in city centres, so that it has little chance in the long run of securing adoption on a large scale.

These renovation operations also raise conflicts with the mortgage and credit institutions. In cases where the potential lender is a private individual or company, the chances of mortgage or other credits are often very slim; and in some countries the credit institutions already refuse outright to make loans on property more than a specific time after it was built. In most cases the rule specifically excludes dwellings dating from before 1919. To deal with this problem the Community might help in developing a mortgage system specifically for lending on dwellings considered as suitable for improvement, irrespective of the construction date.

There are still other obstacles to be cleared out of the way, if it is really hoped to give renovation policy its real social importance. The effect on the migrants of a policy of this kind, as was the case with the policy of housing construction, may be little or nothing if the policy is not accompanied by a number of clauses or ancilliary measures. In some countries indeed, renovation is being carried out on a luxury scale for rehabilitating dwellings in old parts of the town. The costs incurred are necessarily enormous and they are inevitably reflected in higher rents. There is a serious risk that rent increases following renovation or restoration may have the same effect of exclusion, as is now implied in the policy of new sponsored housing. Its avoidance requires either a rent-freeze or the fixing of specified rates of increase regarded as acceptable.

In addition, obstacles to renovation programmes should be avoided by drafting proforma contracts between landlords and tenants, laying down

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the rules for sharing the cost and the profit. At all costs, landlords must be prevented from turning out their tenants after the latter have carried out renovations or penalising them by raising their rents or some of the connected charges. There should be special security clauses to cover tenants who put in hand improvements in the accommodation they rent.

There are various formulae by which the tenant may become co-owner of that part of the value corresponding to the renovation cost; but all of them tend to induce the landlord to refuse any application by tenants to renew or improve the property. If renovation policy is not to become a mere voluntary procedure and a face-saver without any major effect on putting things right, there must be definite rules defining the right of the tenant to take action in opposition to the landlord's wishes.

With these various points in mind, it appears that the purchase and renovation of properties by the institutions responsible for subsidised housing, would be a better method than any other for fixing and maintaining balanced systems of rental after the renewal operations.

To encourage renovation of housing and make the policy really effective in providing quick solutions to housing problems, a factor to be borne in mind is the possible disproportion between the necessary outlay and the value increment which can be secured in the market, either by the owner or by the tenant or by both together.

The impossibility of matching the investment by a corresponding realisable increment in value, will occur in districts in which property speculation has given over to land speculation, the motive force in which is the demolition of existing buildings and total or partial reconstruction.

This can be summarised by saying that, above and beyond all the necessary precautions the renovation subsidy will only have an impact in cases in which owner and/or tenant is/are certain of being able to secure reward for effort and expenditure either in the rent or in the selling price of the building. Measures could be brought forward to enable the migrant to secure easy recovery of the invested capital, if he decides to return to his country of origin. A measure on the same lines, incidentally, should be laid down to cover the other settlement costs required of the migrant for his proper installation in the host country.

The commentaries were intended merely to show that renovation policy can only be successful for purposes of the migrant workers, in cases in which the future of the immediate neighbourhood is guaranteed; and in cases which do not exclude the immediate profitability of the operation in the form of more rent for the landlord and guaranteed occupation for the tenant. On the other hand, when there is no system of compensation, these interests and requirements are contradictory.

Finally, renovation policy must not exclude construction policy. It is not really possible to substitute either of these policies for the other; but both must be run in double harness.

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8.2. Keeping land speculation within bounds

Because of the places where the migrants settle and because they tend to upset people, they are often among the most numerous victims of land speculation and property development. This is mentioned in all the survey reports; but the most detailed analyses are those contained in the French and Belgian studies.

Both of these emphasise how far and how fast site values have risen in the big urban and industrial centres, where most of the migrants are concentrated. This rise, which stems from land speculation and property development, acts in various ways to destroy policies to encourage the building of subsidised housing and the rehabilitation of housing intended for the social groups in obviously greatest need, among whom are the migrant workers.

As a result of land speculation, the old buildings scheduled for demolition lose the whole of their value. The only thing that matters to the owner is the market value of the ground where they stand. Moreover, expensive ground calls for expensive buildings; and as site values rise, there is a growing inducement to use them more and more for spulent buildings intended for private and public institutions which can afford to occupy them, or for the upper crust of population who can pay for luxury flats. Thus the extension of office areas, shopping streets, services and parking lots goes hand in hand with luxury dwellings and reduced programmes for subsidised housing. The speculation in land, and the size and purpose of the buildings erected, lead to a process of eviction of the most vulnerable groups in the population, among which of course are the migrant workers. The families living in the speculation areas are two-fold victims of the urban growth. They are obliged to live in ill-maintained dwellings, and they are the most exposed to the impact of redevelopment plans which, when carried into effect, reduce the supply of such accommodation as would be socially and financially within their compass. There is no other possible explanation of the very high rents these families have to pay by comparison with the size and quality of their dwellings.

Thus it is, that a marginal fringe of the national population and a big proportion of the migrant workers are made into quasi-permanent wanderers. Escape from this state of things would require a different land policy, encouraging refurbishment schemes and requiring a bigger proportion of "social" housing in each of the schemes, coupled with a review of the terms of access. Apart from keeping land speculation within reasonable limits, there must also be a policy aimed at rehabilitating older accommodation, renewing collective equipment and facilities and improving the infrastructure.

When family evictions are necessary because living accommodation is beyond repair, the work must be undertaken in such a way as to dovetail with the available housing capacity. Moreover, for these one-at-a-time schemes the social costs are smaller than for other types, even though the financial cost may be higher. In any case no scheme should be put in hand without the assurance of rehousing.

It would also be necessary to provide for indemnities and bonuses to cover the costs of moving.

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9. Social and cooperative housing services

Among the host of problems concerned with housing, migrants have little or no information to guide them, and are not in a position to cope with them single-handed.

9.1. Setting up a housing service

If the housing position of the migrant workers is to be put right, it will imply that specific people or organisations will be given an explicit mandate to watch the housing position for the migrants and the way it is developing, especially in areas where the number of the migrant population is biggest.

The task of this service would include:

- contact with public administration to see that individual files are in order and to correct individual or collective housing situations involving migrant workers;

- giving and obtaining opinions on any new housing legislation, or contemplated regulation, and indicating the probable effect on migrants and their families;

- supplying all possible information to the population of migrants, in such a way that it knows its rights and gets the benefit of such advantages as it may lawfully claim;

- helping in any approaches to the administration required in building, buying or leasing of a house, or the obtaining of mortgage loans and similar credit;

- securing an adequate spread of the migrant population, which is often forced into too small a space, raising the risk that it will operate as a positive ghetto;

- seeing that landlords conform to the elementary rules of hygiene and sanitation in the accommodation they offer for letting;

- inspecting accommodation for the benefit of migrant workers and helping them in obtaining and signing leases and in subsquent disputes with landlords;

- encouraging migrants to take an active part in groups and movements for solving their housing problems;

- contributing to the success of any initiative taken by migrants in housing matters, especially in setting up and operating oooperatives of tenants and/or landlords.

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9.2. Tenants'unions or cooperatives

The development of housing cooperatives depends mainly on voluntary action by groups of migrant workers who contribute by subscription and working together and supply buildings on a rental basis to the other members.

Technical and financial assistance could be given to the development of cooperatives of this kind. Some of them are now operating in various urban centres. Their procedure is to inspect buildings and separate apartments offered for rental, whether offered by private or public landlords. They contact the owners and propose a lease to their members. To avoid any direct conflict between the migrant worker and the landlord, the cooperatives not only sign the lease and pay the rent, but also put up the guarantees and ensure the tenancy risks. There is a compensation system between high rents and low. If there is a dispute with the landlord, the cooperatives defend the tenant's ahead of time, such as when the migrant has to go back to his country or to face some other unexpected event. There is nothing to stop these cooperatives reconstructing or buying buildings and re-selling them to migrants who want to own their homes.

A certain amount of expenditure is required to set up and run a cooperative, but it is a help in organising pressure regarding the level of rent, checking the supplements and charges added to the rent, discussing the arrangements for sliding-scale rent and obtaining the right to do up the premises. In the law courts and social tribunals it can defend the migrant tenants, or brief counsel and cover the costs.

Associations of this type also, help to secure a fair allocation of space to individual families, taking into account their size and their resources — i.e. fixing the rent by reference to the income available, as well as to the cost of leasing, renovating or purchasing the dwelling.

Cooperatives or associations of this kind do not necessarily have to be matters of private initiative. At Rotterdam, for example, the city itself has formed an organisation which takes in hand the purchase of houses, their renovation and their letting.

On these lines it might be desirable for the Community to finance various services and some of the cooperatives. It would thus be able to evaluate the experiments and test their contribution to correcting the housing condition of migrant workers and their families. It could also make sure that these associations could secure the best advice from legal and financial experts.

Services and associations such as these, must not be unduly large if they are to be run by the workers themselves, and if they are to avoid all forms of internal exploitation. In any case effective participation by those concerned — the members or cooperators — must be encouraged.

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Provision of finance for these bodies would be in line with recommendations made in the German survey report, which favoured promoting and supporting migrants'pressure groups in matters connected with housing.

10. Possible lines of Community action

At present the Community has only slight powers to intervene in regard to housing conditions and the chief mechanisms by which they are determined.

In fact these powers are virtually non-existent, apart from financial intervention for building and residential improvement promoted by the Social Fund, and the financing of research work. There are no special powers in regard to housing or the various mechanisms which condition the development of dwellings, from land speculation or territorial improvement to the setting up of collective facilities, and still less in matters concerning mortgage and credit terms.

Nevertheless, an objective analysis of the way migrant workers in our various countries are housed makes rather a bad showing in regard both to the amount of accommodation available and to its quality.

This is the most general of the comments emerging from the comparative study of the housing for local nationals and migrants, which we have carried out in all the employing countries in the Community. The latter be given new powers enabling it to correct the housing position of the migrants. These should operate on two fronts, powers to follow a policy of promoting new buildings and, wherever possible, the rehabilitation of existing housing; consideration of measures for correcting the legal-political standing of the migrant workers which, as it now exists, makes them liable to discrimination in fact, if not always by legal provision or deliberate action.

In what follows we propose examining some of the measures the Community might put in hand to correct the housing position. We shall then come to an analysis of the possible effects on the migrants'housing position of an improvement in their legal-political status. They ought to be in a position take collective action in such matters, which implies that they should enjoy the same rights as citizens of our own countries. This change in status should apply both to migrants from Community countries and those from outside countries.

Among the measures which the Community could take to improve the housing position for the migrants, there are two different approaches:

The first covers the provision of suitable housing for the migrants in the host countries. Such measures cannot fail to have a good effect, also, on the housing conditions of workers of local nationality, especially since they would lessen the strains on the housing market;

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The second is concerned with the savings of the migrants and the opportunities for putting them to profitable use, immediately and in the longer term. This must include measures to encourage the sending of money home to their own countries, and the productive use of such funds when they get there. This would involve supervision of the machinery used, primarily in financial and banking institutions, but also in the help given to the migrants in their investment decisions when they get back to the country. The money repatriated is often earmarked for home building or domestic improvements.

10.1. Community intervention and measures in regard to housing

It seems that the idea of the setting up of a special fund by the European Community to promote better housing for the migrant workers, has raised anxiety in some of the delegations, lest in amount to discrimination in favour of the migrants.

Yet the experts of a number of countries think that, without a fund, it would be impossible for the Community to implement a generous policy to provide suitable housing for social categories with specific needs or characteristics. Such a fund will need to be a substantial one if the Community is to make a success of a genuine policy based on the many proposals and intervention criteria which have been discussed and approved. The extent of need is in itself justification for raising these considerable funds. The italian delegation suggests that the receipts coming specifically from the application of the Common External Tariff should be used to provide a source for this finance. Other sources are possible, however, including the French plan, which provides for a 1% levy on wages and salaries.

It goes without saying, too, that the formation and management of such a fund should conform to the individual rights of each State, implying contacts with the governments of the countries from which the migrants came, and an association with both sides of industry.

The fund thus formed would be capable of being utilised in several ways at the same time. In the first instance, it would serve as a guarantee fund, making it possible to release considerable sums of money by providing performance guarantees, as was proposed by the Luxembourg delegation. By entering into association with the governments to provide guarantees for part of the advances to be made to promotors by private institutions, the Community would be entering into the pre-financing of the construction without usurping the initiative of the countries themselves, or impinging on funds already set aside for house building.

Guarantees on the same lines could also be given in respect of campaigns for the rehabilitation of old dwellings and also for the setting up or renewal of infrastructure and collective facilities in areas where the need is recognised.

Such a guarantee, nevertheless, though it encourages building and the rehabilitation of dwellings, is in itself quite insufficient, because the development firms are not going to launch into construction programmes in the midst of an economic crisis, on the basis of a simple performance guarantee given by Community governments. What they want is a guarantee that the dwellings will be bought or let, and it is this which should be given to them. Home building and the problems of access to new housing

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depend ultimately on the solvency of the buyer and the amount of the loan or subsidy to be put at his disposal.

Some of the experts believe that the access of migrants to sponsored or subsidised housing, whether as purchasers or as tenants, could only be promoted by fixing allocation quotas for the sponsored dwellings, proportionate to the number of migrants in the commune, area or region concerned. This quota fixing, some of the experts argue, would have a two-fold advantage:

- it would ensure definite representation of the migrants and perhaps of a number of nationalities in newly built districts;

- it would spread the migrants and their homes more evenly over the towns, thus setting a limit on racial and nationalistic disturbances.

There are some, however, who doubt whether the quota formula could be effective in application, because it is not discrimination or rejection which has led to the absence or under-representation of the migrants in new subsidised housing schemes and to their confinement in specific residential districts. These conditions, it is argued, result from the inaccessibility of this housing, because of the high rents and motgage repayments. The view taken by these critics is that there is no real solution, except by a drastic rise in wages or the provision of special advantages on acquisition or occupation of a sponsored dwelling.

In addition, the inaccessibility of new or renovated housing and the slender opportunities for the migrant workers to secure it result very largely from insecurity of their jobs, and for many of them from the precarious nature of their sojourn in the host country, and also from the poor financial situation of this part of the population.

In this connexion, the German survey showed that the rents of subsidised dwellings are 25 or 30% above what the migrants are able or willing to pay. At the present time, both rents and mortgage repayments are materially higher than what current rates of remuneration enable the migrants to pay; whether for purchase or for a tenancy. This is a field in which the Community might intervene by encouraging interest-rate subsidies or proposals for extending mortgage repayments up to, perhaps, 40 years and/or for the amount lent to be increased up to 90 or 95% of the value.

Other proposals raised for consideration include the delivery of new dwellings at various stages of completion. The buyer would take delivery of an unfinished job and round it off as he wished, and within the limits of his own skill and resources. This has been successfully tried in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and would clearly be specially suitable for workers in the building trade.

On the other hand, it is probable that the improvement of the housing conditions of a large number of migrants can only be made possible by big non-repayable subsidies. It is in Luxembourg that such subsidies are at their highest, the amounts varying with the size of the family concerned, but running up to 50% of the building cost. In some cases the subsidy has

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amounted to Flux 1.3 million, if you include the value the site made available by local authorities to encourage building development.

The remedy for unduly high rentals, the experts suggest, must be the extension of rent subsidies without which many migrants cannot secure recently built or recently renovated homes. It might be possible for the European Community to guarantee repayment of the subsidy, or that there should be suspension clauses coupled with guarantees of ultimate repayment. This would give the migrant worker a feeling of security through the various vicissitudes of life, and make it possible for him to abandon without undue cost the idea of permanent settlement which, for any reason, had become less attractive. The EEC intervention should be so arranged as to give the migrant worker not only security of existence, but also an adequate flexibility in his plans for returning to his own country, or settling in the country where he works.

The ultimate obstacle to the securing of subsidised dwellings by migrant workers, is undoubtedly the insecure and unstable status in which we classify them. The determinant factors, as the current crisis has abundantly proved, is the lack of any guaranteed duration for their sojourn in the country and for their jobs. In Luxembourg it is clear that the access of many migrants to home ownership is the result not only of the substantial advantages granted them in housing matters, but also to their possession of genuine residence and employment guarantees which are indispensable in planning a long-term settlement.

10.2. Repatriation and profitable use of migrants'savings

The Italian and Irish reports were particularly concerned about the repatriation of migrants'savings and the use made of them in the countries of origin and on their return there.

A policy aimed at the profitable use of migrants'savings is, however, difficult to define. Any such policy would have both to encourage the formation of savings and facilitate their effective use; and there is ambiguity in the objectives of such a policy. Having encouraged the savings formation, it is possible to promote their utilisation in the country of employment, or to advocate their transfer to the migrants'home countries and put them to the most profitable use when they get there. Given the uncertainty of migrants'plans it should be possible for both objectives to be pursued, either as alternatives to one another or one after the other.

It should also be possible to encourage individual savings and promote at the same time their collective and cooperative utilisation; but the structures and machinery at present available are not particularly suitable for cooperative ventures, either in the countries which import the manpower or in those which export it. Hitherto, the savings of the migrant workers have not been used for purposes of economic development in the countries or regions from which they came. The savings which are sent home have mainly been used for the purchase or improvement of a house, or for the acquisition of successive pieces of equipment or consumer durables. They have not done anything to promote economic development of the region or the local collective organisations, and they have had no material effect in creating better paid jobs there.

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A genuine policy should not only promote the formation of savings and the conservation of their value, but also supervise the conditions under which the money is sent home and put to use. It should encourage both the personal and collective use of the savings. From this standpoint the money saved by the migrants should be one of the instruments of cooperative economic initiative towards the development of the migrants'countries of origin.

In addition, any policy for promoting savings and their productive investment should be thought out in terms of the alternative uses open to the migrants themselves. Thus a migrant worker should be able to invest his savings in improving his dwelling in the country where he works; but consideration should be given to parallel measures which will enable him to realise his investments and recover his savings, if and when circumstances should occasion a change in his general plans, such as a return to his home country.

11. Importance of equal status in the emancipation of migrants

Equality of legal and political status for the migrants, irrespective of their national or racial origin, does not by itself make everybody equal; but it is an indispensable, though insufficient, condition for the struggle against the various forms of discrimination and the arbitrary measures to which migrant workers are subject.

11.1. Possible effects of equality of status

It is not only the migrant worker who is affected by factual discrimination in housing matters; other social categories are also subject to them. On the other hand, some of the discriminations encountered by the migrant workers are directly linked with the legal and political status assigned to them. This has its influence both on their place in the machinery of production and in the housing they can hope to occupy.

Their institutional weakness, which is created by the different systems of admission and settlement, is at least partly responsible for the profit and advantage accruing to companies and the State from the use of migrant workers. It follows that equality of status would eliminate a large part of the advantage we secure by employing the migrants. On the other hand, the equalisation of legal and political status would not automatically provide us with a solution for the problem of the migrants, whether they come from EEC countries or from elsewhere. In other words it is not enough to recognise that there is interdependence and relationship of cause and effect between the legal-political status, the economic vocational status and the position in regard to housing; and a reform in the first link of the chain will not automatically induce corrections at other points. The experts regard equality of legal and political status as a condition sine qua non of self-promoted organisation among the migrant workers and through this to the conquest of factual equality in other fields. The granting of equal legal and political rights, as has been shown above, does not by itself improve the migrant's lot in regard to his

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Nevertheless, the granting of political rights and the withdrawal of restriction on those individual liberties which are the perquisite of every citizen in a normal democratic state, sould be a help to migrant workers of whatever geographical or racial origin in making progress, in taking up the challenges and in overcoming the handicaps — institutional, economic and cultural — imposed upon them.

A first step towards giving the migrants a voice and a participation in politics lies in the formation of consultative councils on a local basis. This, on the other hand, is not a real step towards bringing the migrants effectively into the political systems of the host country and of the European Community. Ultimately it must be made possible to confer national voting rights and Community voting rights on adults resident and working in Community countries for five years or more. An occasion for this step to be taken might be the EEC elections scheduled for 1978.

The consultative committees would in fact be instruments of dialogue on a local basis; but their creation is not enough in itself. There must also be machinery for taking into account the opinions they express, and securing means of communication between migrants and the elected representatives, more especially since these would have to bridge a substantial social gap.

In the same way, effective participation and a place in the system would require a number of social, cultural and legal rights for the migrant workers. They should be in a position to give free expression to their views on matters arising from their housing and on projects for urban or territorial improvement which affect them. They should have a right to their own national culture and various rights in the law courts, including the availability of an interpreter without charge. These measures would partly correct the social inferiority felt by the migrants, including that which everybody is likely to feel in being obliged to express himself in a language other than his own.

Besides and beyond these rights, a capacity for collective expression presupposes for the migrants the setting up of organisations in various forms.

11.2. Conditions for independent organisation and the full exercise of trade union rights

Among the actions needed to secure the emancipation of the migrants are the items connected gheir capacity for self-organisation.

This is a priority matter. The only genuine guarantee that their rights will be respected lies in a series of measures to support cultural and political groups, and particularly those engaged in the struggle for improved housing for migrant workers.

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In this connexion the foreign fractions must be allowed the full exercise of their trade union rights, beginning inside the unions. This is because the unions are still the best intermediary for specific political requests by the migrants.

According to the experts, nevertheless, it is the migrants themselves who should find their way out of the blind alley by looking after their own interests, and setting up union and political organisations side-by-side with the workers in the host country. Fascinating as this sounds, it is far from being really operational, for it is not within the scope and capacity of the migrant workers themselves to set up organisations and become collectively aware of the social situation in which they are put. Such developments have been impeded by the characteristics of the migrants themselves and of the groupings which they form, and they have been especially hindered by implied dissuasion and the removal of all appropriate means of action as a result of their exclusion from political rights, the continuous supervision of all political and trade union activities and the relentless elimination of the leaders of their movements whenever their actions go beyond what the national governments regard as "acceptable".

In any attempt to carry action beyond mere analysis and see what really would make it possible to improve the migrants'lot, the problem of getting him organised is undoubtedly the most complex obstacle. Everybody is his own best defender; but one cannot defend oneself without selfconsciousness, a knowledge of ones position and condition, and the structural limits by which one is hemmed in. In our belief, whenever and wherever the migrant population is subject to frequent movement to and from the host country, the chances of developing a collective consciousness are slim.

Other limiting factors for any chance of mobilising the migrants include the diversity of their nationalities and the hierarchy which is springing up among them. Buttressing this diversity is the better status provided for migrants from EEC countries, who are free to circulate at will and take up residence wherever they wish with or without their families, though this freedom is not always a winning card, as it pointed out both in the Italian and Irish survey reports. The same hierarchy is to be found in employment for migrant workers of different origins do not secure jobs in the same sectors. There is thus a certain social stratification between migrants of different nationalities, reflecting the division of labour and reflecting the cultural gaps between them.

Another limiting factor results from the rate of movement from job to job and in the places where the migrants settle. The industrial reconversions and the urban redevelopment programmes in which they are caught are disruptive of many types of partial solidarity, which can only be reconstituted later by primary groups of associates who have been through the upheaval.

In formal terms foreigners as such are a single category; but differences of nationality may engender separate groupings. Foreigners in the wider sense can only become a group if the surrounding circumstances lead to some degree of political consciousness; for otherwise their political and economic status will block any such tendency.

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It is, incidentally, a possibility in present circumstances that some such political consciousness might come into being — but as a reaction against flagrant discrimination and racial incidents among the national populations, rather than through any joint sense of political awareness among the workers as such.

It may be that the ultimate strength of the system lies in its capacity to bring the spirit of race into the ascendant against the spirit of class.

11.3. Ambiguity of plans and arrangements for independent organisation

The lack of uniformity in the plans of migrant workers may also work against union among them and the development of a common consciousness. This is not only because the migrants believe their settlement is no more than temporary, but also because they do not always know just where they stand in relation to the working class in the host country. Can they and will they put their faith in the belief that their interests are indeed common; or will they find they are very different from the local working classes?

Added to these differences is the bourgeois character which the national working class in the different countries is now acquiring because of the migrant workers. The workers in these countries are developing a middle-class disdain for the jobs the migrants perform, and this is leading on to a disdain for the migrant workers themselves. This applies especially in times of economic crisis, because it is only too easy to regard the migrants as competitors. Xenophobia is by no means rare; and as various French examples have shown, it is not always at the points where foreign workers are most plentiful and most concentrated that it finds its way to the surface.

This xenophobia is a strong influence against any union between national and migrant workers. Moreover, the social rift in the working class in capitalist countries is a trump card for the employers who have found in their foreign manpower an instrument of competition by which they can limit the demands of the national working classes. These factors taken together are an undoubted obstacle to the emancipation of the migrant worker groups.

A still more forceful hindrance, on the other hand, lies in the legislative obstructionism which stands in the way of full civil and political rights for the migrants.

At the outset this obstructionism seems to be the work of the political machine which, under the pretext of national security, seeks to keep the foreigners (including of course the migrant workers) in a state of institutional and organisational weakness. In practice it weakens them so much and so soon after their arrival in the country, that it forces them to accept lower-grade work than is given to national workers, or which they would consider unacceptable because of the bad working conditions.

In actual fact, the justifications given for obstructing political and legal emancipation appear to be primarily economic; to avoid the cost which would result from strengthening the position of the migrant section of the working class. It has an undeniable effect in mitigating strain on the labour market. It weakens the combat strength of the workers and thus

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the negotiating powers of the unions. These effects are secured in conjunction with arrangements to secure satisfactory growthrates in total production.

Thus, though the idea of self-organisation by the migrants is in itself attractive, it raises difficulties which must not be underestimated, because it inevitably runs counter to vested economic and political interests. It is worth wondering whether self-organisation by the migrant workers and their accession to status equivalent on all points to that of the nationals would not, in the last resort, eliminate immigration altogether.