




# The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

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**National  
languages**







# Lomé IV has been signed

## NEWS ROUND-UP

**Lomé IV has been signed!** — After a good deal of to-ing and fro-ing, the new ACP-EEC Convention was signed in Lomé on 15 December. *The Courier* will be publishing the complete text in its next issue. There are a good many innovations in "Lomé IV": new ACP States, a 10-year duration, help with structural adjustment, the abolition of special loans and the improvement of Lomé III texts on a number of subjects, particularly trade and Stabex. ECU 12 billion are on the table for the first five years of the new ACP-EEC agreement. **Page 1**

## MEETING POINT: Domingo L. Siazon, Jr.

At a time when Third World economies are suffering a heavy debt burden and undergoing major structural adjustment, industrial development may seem less of a priority than hitherto. Yet in the view of UNIDO (the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation), "there can be no meaningful economic growth unless one pays attention to industrial development". UNIDO's Director-General Domingo M. Siazon, Jr. explains. **Pages 2 to 5**



## COUNTRY REPORT

**THE GAMBIA:** The small West African nation of The Gambia, which has been for over two decades a bastion of democracy and respect for human rights in the African continent, has adopted an economic policy that most experts have described as ultra-liberal. **Pages 13 to 27**



## DOSSIER: National languages

The language problem, which gives rise to such passion and controversy, is closely linked to development. Whether it concerns the political management of the State, rural administration, education, the media or culture, the choice of language to be used is a basic one. Our dossier offers some considerations at a general level as well as the analysis of some actual solutions adopted in a number of countries. **Pages 44 to 81**

# Best Wishes for 1990!

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**Domingo L. SIAZON, Jr.**

*Director-General  
of UNIDO*

### **Towards a second Industrial Development Decade for Africa**



The Courier

*In late November last year, the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation held its third bi-annual General Conference in Vienna, the Austrian capital. The Conference adopted UNIDO's medium-term plan for 1990-95—the main priority areas of which are set out below—as well as the Organisation's programme and budgets for the next two years.*

*Created by the UN General Assembly in 1966 as a technical body within the UN Secretariat to promote and accelerate industrialisation in developing countries, it became a UN specialised agency in 1986. The first Director-General of UNIDO as it was being converted to its new status was Domingo L. Siazon, Jr. Born in the Philippines, Mr Siazon, now 50, has now been reappointed for another four-year term. A firm believer in the role the private sector*

*has to play in industrial development—"and which doesn't work for charity"—he has a down-to-earth approach to most problems.*

*He therefore insists on the need for developing countries to understand "realpolitik", for instance when facing the new East-West context ("change can be used to your benefit, don't be afraid of it") or when commenting on the debt burden ("debt is not a financial problem, but a political one"). In the following interview, he comments on the outcome of the General Conference, tones down the possibility of reaching the so-called Lima target (developing countries' industrial production should reach 25% of world production by the year 2000) and puts into "real" perspective the first Industrial Development Decade for Africa while leaving hope for IDDA II.*

► *Mr Siazon, we're just witnessing the end of the General Conference. Perhaps you could make a general comment on the key decisions that were taken during the last week?*

— The key decisions relate to the approval of the medium-term plan of UNIDO which in fact suggests a plan for UNIDO for the next five years, with a concentration on five areas, which would include rehabilitation, human resource development, transfer of technology, small and medium scale industries, environment and energy. At the same time, we would be looking at three horizontal topics, which are: integration of women in industrial development, economic cooperation among developing countries and mobilisation of financial resources. The other important issue relates to the second Industrial Development Decade for Africa, which was

included in our programme and budget for 1990/91. We hope that the second decade will be a better one. It certainly will be better prepared because we have a calendar of events that would require the Ministers of Industry to submit their national industrial development plans for the next 10 years to a group of experts for analysis, and then later on, to have a meeting of the Ministers of Industry, to ensure that they are all committed to the national programmes as well as any regional programmes they may have for the next decade. And, of course, the third one is a new programme for environment for UNIDO which would have four elements: the first one being the strengthening of the internal capacity of the organisation to deal with environmental aspects in the industrial sector. And at the same time, to better sensitise our colleagues in the (UN) Secretariat

to the importance of environment in the industrial sector. The second element relates to the strengthening of UNIDO's capacity to provide advice to countries on legislation and policies related to the environment in the industrial sector. The third element is strengthening UNIDO's capacity to provide technical advice on the alternative processes related to industrial sectors, in particular clean technologies, etc... And the last element would be to be able to finance, through UNIDO programmes, technical assistance projects related to the industrial sector but with particular emphasis on environment.

► *You just mentioned the first IDDA. One can gather from a number of statements from African Ministers that, in fact, this has made very little progress and that they are fairly disappointed by the results near the end of*



*this first IDDA. What is the global assessment of IDDA I?*

— Well, you see, first of all, to say that there was a first IDDA is, in fact, a misnomer. The first money that came was in 1985. We had US\$ 1 m towards the end of that year. In 1986 and 1987, we had US\$ 8.6 m, of which only about three was made available because UNIDO had a financial problem. Then in 1988, we had a full IDDA programme, but governments decided to evaluate the first IDDA towards the end of that year. So what was being evaluated was: 1985, in which US\$ 1 million was given, towards the end of the year; 1986 and 1987 in which only a third of the money was given, and 1988. Now to call that a decade, and then to expect that that particular answer would have the impact of a ten-year programme is not really realistic. But unfortunately, Member States decided to evaluate the programme as a decade, although in fact, it effectively operated only for two years before the evaluation: '85 and '88. '86 and '87 were ineffective because of the financial problem.

► *Do you call it, then, a problem of putting your money where your mouth is?*

— That is one, and two is a problem of start-up, because you see all the talk of the decade in the '80s, like the Lagos Plan of Action, the UN General Assembly Special Session on Africa, all this process takes about five years. We have a declaration, and then the real action starts only three or four years later. In 1985, it was just US\$ 1 m for the whole of Africa. Most of that was spent just to get the people to think that there was an advantage in looking at the industrial sector in terms of economic growth. So the biggest lesson from the first IDDA is a clear recognition by the African states that, one, there can be no meaningful economic growth unless they pay attention to industrial development. And two, there can be no industrial development unless they themselves have national plans for industrial development, national programmes, and strategies, that this development process cannot be done by multilateral organisations like UNIDO, without major participation from national governments. And the

most important, three, is that they are now looking more and more at sub-regional and regional integration of markets, in terms of commercial transactions, but also of industrial co-operation. We have a gap with this, of course, between recognition and practice. But at least with this as a basis, we feel, in UNIDO, that if we are able to manage this preparatory part, the first two years, properly, with the cooperation of ECA (which is now having problems securing some money from the UN to pay for its participation in this whole exercise) then I think we will have a very good programme.

► *How optimistic are you that this 25% target, the one from Lima will ever be achieved. Is it just a figure in the air?*

— The Lima target is a target, but we know that it will not be achieved because, today, let's say in '89, we only hit 13.8%. So we will never hit 25% for the year 2000.

► *Developing countries are facing two factors which are major brakes on economic progress. One, they have a very substantial debt burden, and two, people tell them that they have to structurally adjust. Where does that leave industrial development?*

— The structural adjustment has to be well-managed, in such a way that you don't have an over-concentration on agriculture. I think we have to learn from experience. In many of the structural adjustment programmes designed for Africa, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, there was, correctly, an emphasis on agriculture, but to the extent of leaving out any new investments for the industrial sector. In the end, what has happened is that because the programmes of assistance by donor countries and multilateral organisations were not well coordinated, what was intended to be a good structural programme, did not work out in the end. For example, many sub-Saharan developing countries were asked to put all their investments in agriculture, free the markets, devalue the currency, fine. But at the same time, you had food aid programmes from the Community, PL 480 from the USA, from the World Food Programme, and these shipments of food came generally at a

very bad time—during harvest season. Often the cost-free agricultural products came into the markets of the developing countries at the time when the investors—the national farmers—were supposed to make some profit, but, through dumping on the market at that time, they actually did not benefit from their investments, with the result that you will now have a hard time convincing these farmers to put their money again into agriculture.

My point two is, you have a problem when in the beginning you have, for example, cement plants, or fertiliser plants in developing countries, and these are abandoned all of a sudden because they cannot get any foreign currency to pay for spare parts. As a result, you now have many of these countries with cement plants not operating, and they are importing cement from abroad, or they are importing even the small spare parts they need to fix agricultural machinery, because they have, for the last three or four years of restructuring, not assigned any foreign currency to keep up the operations of these small industrial companies. So again, this has to be looked at very seriously.

The third element is, it's always very easy to say you must restructure, you must do this or that, but look at the developed countries, for example. How much has US industry restructured? It's still the biggest debtor country in the world. How has the German economy restructured? Not in industry but in other sectors. Is it really that free? Are there really no subsidies? How are the Community countries doing? Have we looked at the subsidised portion of all these economies? But we are saying: "All right, we in the industrialised world are doing this. It's all right for us, but you developing countries, in order to borrow more money from the IMF, should do this, or that, in a very short period of time". What I'm saying is, I'm all for restructuring: there should be restructuring. But one should also take into account the level of human pain that this restructuring will bring about. Because in the end, the most expensive exercise in government is when you have a freely-elected government overthrown by force and you have rioting, because the measures



you were trying to introduce—economic measures—could no longer be sustained in terms of social costs. If you look at many of the sub-Saharan countries, you must also look at the social impact of many of these restructuring programmes, in terms of education, nutrition, health. Perhaps in the short-run you will not see this, but in the long-run you certainly will, when you look at the competitiveness of these economies, because they will have a population which has been malnourished which would have a permanent impact on the ability of the children to grow and to think and to get properly educated. This is too high a price to pay. So, we are for restructuring, UNIDO has always taken that position. We are for liberalisation, but then all these aspects have to be taken into account. External assistance must be well-coordinated, because I have seen so many times where, because of national policies, donor countries give food aid at the wrong time and kill the poor farmer. That has happened to the Philippines before. I was part of a team negotiating a World Bank loan, and one of the conditions was to release the price control on rice and corn. But all of a sudden, the United States wanted to lend the Philippines US\$ 40 million of PL 480 food aid although we didn't need it and the wheat and the corn came during harvest season and prices collapsed. Now, when you are talking of devaluing your currency so you can export, fine. In a classical system that would work, but most of these countries have nothing to export—except agricultural products. Even when you devalue the currency, they can, of course, export agricultural products, but in fact the problem is they don't have enough to eat themselves. In agriculture, when you are successful and you double your production, you get half the price. So in terms of influencing the economy, it has not changed, it has only made your imports more expensive, in terms of the factor inputs. This is an issue that has to be really looked at more seriously.

► *According to a number of commentators there is an immediate correlation between rising debt and attempts at industrialisation, for instance, in*

*Latin America. So is that going to increase the debt burden?*

— The correlation is wrong. The reason why you have a lot of problems in Latin America was that they had made bad investments. It's not industry *per se* that creates the external debt. When you invest correctly in an industry, what happens is you get a NIC<sup>(1)</sup>, you get a Singapore, you get a South Korea, you get a Malaysia, you get a Thailand, this is the lesson. You have to use the money you borrow, not for consumption, but for industrial production so that you can sell, and for industrial restructuring so you are competitive. So the argument that industry creates debt is right, but industry also allows you to pay debt.

► *How come one doesn't see NICs in sub-Saharan Africa?*

— Well, one is, you have to understand the conditions in which they were left. Second is, the human resource development base was not there for many of these countries. I guess that three is that not enough has been done in a co-ordinated manner.

► *Many of these countries seem to have completed a rather sad and sour circle to the extent that they were exporters of agricultural produce, made an attempt at industrialisation, but now seem mostly to have fallen back to just being exporters of agricultural items.*

— Yes, but I have visited a lot of African countries and if you look at the plants there that are not working, I think you would have to also say that the problem was that their business partners were really without conscience. I have seen plants there that did not work from the beginning and it takes two to create a system like that. The foreign partners, a lot of them were from Western Europe and the United States, and the local businessmen, were corrupt. I would say that there is something to be said about the moral or business ethics in these cases of many of the companies that participated in these industrial plants. I have seen them and I just

(1) NIC: Newly industrialising country.

can't believe it. You know, you have an "integrated" textile mill and one part is about 100 kilometres away from the other. Or, let's say, a garbage incinerator in Lagos and you've got the wrong voltage. It means that the Western European company that did it, did it in very bad faith from the beginning, and of course, the local partner and those who were checking it probably didn't have the technical capacity to do so. We have seen industrial projects proposed to some developing countries in Africa where there are so many processes which are not needed. In one project, we sent somebody to look at it and remove one process and the country saved a couple of million dollars. But they don't know any better, so many of them, about these technical processes and this is the problem. Now, of course, they should not have been encouraged to go into very large, very complicated industrial processes which they did not understand. They just depended on expatriates all the time, and this is wrong. We should actually concentrate on a national capacity and therefore we need human resource development. For UNIDO, this is a priority area. We must have the necessary human resources.

► *The fear over the last few months, which is steeply rising among developing countries, is this major political breakthrough in Eastern Europe. East-West relations may open a totally new perspective in terms of industrial cooperation, East-West, rather than North-South.*

— Yes, but that doesn't bother me. You see, I think that if you have more cooperation in Europe, more political stability in Europe and fewer military blocs, then you would create a dynamic Europe in terms of economy. It means, also, that when the economy grows, demand grows, which means you will have a bigger market for developing country products. I always look at it that way, and a unified Europe, a strong Europe economically and politically, will also be able, later on, to concentrate on the needs of the developing countries. I don't see that as a negative aspect. In the short-term there might be some negative aspects, but I always invest long-term.



► *There's also an increased claim from developing countries, particularly in Africa, that they want more and more to be capable of transforming their own agricultural produce before exporting it. How do you see this demand?*

— I think that in Africa, there should be a very good look taken at the agro-industry sector. What is needed is to increase the manufacturing added value to whatever they are in: exporting or producing. I think a major round for the Africans will be the negotiations within the ACP context. Here, the view in UNIDO, if you look at its global report for 1989/90, is that maybe the ACPs' hurdle in terms of Europe's requirements on manufacturing value-added to qualify for favourable treatment is probably too high—higher than what was experienced by, let's say, Hong Kong, or Korea when they were starting their industrial development. There, we have observed that initially Hong Kong and Korea's manufacturing value-added was less than 20%. So if you really wish to give a chance to many of the sub-Saharan, or least—developed countries, maybe you should be looking at a more flexible hurdle for the ACP countries next time round. And of course, another element is that more technical assistance will be required for these countries.

► *An increasingly contentious item is also the linkage between environment and industrial development. What is UNIDO's thinking on this?*

— You see, I always believe that preventive medicine is better than curative, if you can avoid it from the beginning, in terms of knowing the processes and the technology and affording the economic price. Now, of course, in many developing countries the cost of money is so high that if they go ahead they always think that the environment can wait a little. They are tempted very much to make low investments and go to the more polluting processes, but I think that right now, in many developing countries, the people have become more conscious of the environment: clean air, clean water, clean soil. So UNIDO would be pursuing a policy wherein we would make suggestions

saying, you've got alternatives: this is what it could do to your environment, this is what it costs to avoid damage to the environment. And, of course, we will try to demonstrate to them that in the long run, maybe after a period of five or ten years, it will be cheaper, in fact, to opt for the more expensive solution.

► *So, a cost/benefit analysis of environmental impact. But has one sufficient experience to do that?*

— In fact, I am hoping that the World Bank will develop this, because, right now we don't have an established methodology in the UN system for trading off, for example, 10% less sulphur dioxide in the air, with a 10% increase in capital costs. How would I trade them off, as an economist or as a decision-maker? Is the World Bank prepared to give me only a 6% loan, if I put a scrubber on a coal-fired plant, when the cost of this scrubber puts my cost of energy 40% up, even though it would reduce my sulphur dioxide and arsenic emissions, and I will have to pay the same interest rate? No. The issue is, if the World Bank is trying to encourage cleaner technology then it should try to subsidise or give an incentive for this. I would have a problem if the World Bank says: "Now, since you are not putting a scrubber in your coal-fired plant, I am not going to lend you any money." because that makes life very difficult for developing countries. Look at China. The Chinese are going to increase their power production next year; about 70% of that will be coal-fired plants—and no scrubbers. Now what do you do in a situation like that? This is something which would require a lot of thinking and a lot of multilateral cooperation because if you are Chinese and you need energy, and you say: "But I can't afford it," the world community will tell you: "But you are going to pollute the whole world." Then the Chinese will say: "Will you help me?" And what do you say? "Yes, I'll help you, I'll lend to you but only if you put in a scrubber." That's no help.

► *You seem to be personally attached to the development of human resources. Are you succeeding in creating what you might call an industrial*

*network? What can you really bring about there?*

— I think that in terms of human resource development, UNIDO alone will not be able to do that. We have to start from the basis—from scratch, and this is where I think UNESCO has an important role to play. Unless we can adopt a system whereby we are able to improve the curriculum in education systems in many developing countries, they have very little chance of competing in industry. You see, if you look at the successful economies, Germany, Korea, Singapore, Japan and look at their literacy rate, it's 99%. If you look at the number of years they have to go to school, especially in the Asian countries, before going out of high school, and if you look at the subjects they take, in terms of sciences and maths, then it becomes quite evident that a strong educational system is an advantage and it's something that we can build on later. UNIDO does not deal with vocational programmes. We deal with in-plant programmes, industrial training. So we need that base to build on. Now even up to now, there are a lot of bilateral programmes between developing countries and developed countries where developing country nationals have access to universities in developed countries. The only problem, of course, is they tend to stay there. They don't want to come back and this is the case in many countries in Africa. It's a vicious circle. It's like the chicken and the egg. And I don't really know the solution, except that I have observed it in the case of Korea. A lot of Koreans now are going back, after years in the United States, because now the country is developing. So I guess for the first few years, the governments really have to encourage and develop an incentive system of pay scales for those who are better trained, especially those in the technical sector. And, that political connections and maybe personal relationships pay less of a role in determining who is to occupy an important position. It should be what you know, and not who you know. Again, this is part of a cultural and political change. ○

Interview by  
Roger DE BACKER



## Training and commodities: development priorities for the social partners

*Representatives of ACP and EEC economic and social interest groups gathered in Brussels in mid-November for their 13th Annual Meeting. The purpose of such meetings is to bring members of employers' and workers' organisations from both the ACP and the EEC Member States in contact with representatives of the EEC institutions, and joint ACP-EEC institutions, to express their views on how best their interests could be served, or safeguarded, in the context of the Lomé Convention. This year's meeting centred on two major themes: firstly, vocational training (with special reference to farmers' training) and secondly, the deterioration in the terms of trade which has been the fate of most of the ACP States throughout the 1980s.*

The meeting took place at a time when, in the words of Edwin Carrington, the Secretary-General of the ACP Group, the negotiations for the new cooperation agreement, Lomé IV, were "nearly finished but far from complete". So that, despite his implication that much was still missing in the agreement, the new Lomé die was virtually cast, and it was not so much a question of the "grass roots" representatives hoping to influence the content of the Convention as of hoping that its content would be given substantiation.

### **Two themes: vocational training...**

This was, for example, the wish of Sheela Flather, the Rapporteur on the discussion paper on vocational training drawn up by an ad hoc group of the Economic and Social Committee, who rejoiced in the proposed article in Lomé IV on the training of women,

in particular, but emphasised that it would be meaningless unless followed by action.

The purpose of the paper, which served as the basis for debate, was both to "highlight the importance of vocational training for the development and growth of the ACPs" and to encourage the stepping up of vocational training, not only as an integral part of development programmes and projects, but as a fit subject of such projects and programmes in its own right. On the purpose of vocational training, as defined in the paper, there was consensus: its overall objective should be to "provide individuals with the necessary skills and knowledge which will contribute to the economic growth of both organisations and countries". It was a vital activity, and funds for it were equally vital. "The Community", argued Mr Sada Diallo, a member of the National Employers' Federation of Mali, "should make available massive aid for training". It could also give assistance to its own Member States. One participant, from Ireland, called for help to his country, where a number of training colleges were having to be closed for lack of funds. Mr



*Mrs Sheela Flather, Rapporteur for the paper on vocational training. "From the long-term point of view, investment in human resources is the key to independent development"*

Fayese, the Secretary-General of the Nigerian Cooperatives' Federation, was among several to stress the importance of audio-visual aids, especially of radio which, he said, was "a much-neglected medium".

Others emphasised the importance of *appropriate* vocational training, i.e. in fields where there were jobs to be found. Bakary Karambe, of the Mali Trades Union, pointed to the situation in his country where many who were highly educated (graduates, lawyers) were needing to be re-trained as farmers, because other avenues offered them no hope of earning their living. Gabriella Nimbona, representing a cooperative group in Kigali, Rwanda, expressed hope that the resolution to be adopted at the close of the meeting would become reality, particularly as regarded the education of women in rural society. "It is well known", she said, "that if you educate a woman, you educate a family", adding that development projects which had invested in men had not had the same impact as those which had invested in women. She was among many calling for funds for vocational training in the ACP States to be channelled through NGOs. "Vocational training", said Mohamed Ali, of Mauritania, "is not a monopoly of the State". Local NGOs, who knew and understood the social and cultural context of training could speak the language of those trained, were at great advantage.

The participants' final declaration on this theme, affirming that "a focus on training... would contribute considerably to the development of the ACP countries", called, inter alia, for greater regional cooperation in training, and in particular for the creation of more regional and sub-regional training centres. The basic training of those involved in farming and non-farming rural activities, it continued, "will tend to be the teaching of literacy; but it should consist, too, of training in the techniques of crop production and livestock rearing, elementary mechanics, the handling of water, carpentry, environmental protection and the like". This declaration will now, as is customary, be forwarded to the European Parliament's Joint Assembly, to the Council, the Commission and to all those participating actively in the Convention in





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*Participants being briefed on the latest progress in the negotiations. Left, Ambassador Jean Vidal, France's Permanent Representative to the EEC, centre, Mr Edwin Carrington, Secretary-General of the ACP Group and right, Mr Lluís Riera, Deputy Head of the Private Office of Commissioner Marin*

one way or another, in the hope that its various recommendations will be followed up. This, Carlo Casini (Vice-President of the Joint Assembly) admitted in his opening address, had not always been the case in the past, or not adequately. But there had at least been recognition of one fundamental principle dear to the economic and social interest groups—namely that of genuine polycentric cooperation, i.e. cooperation which functioned through a wide variety of public and private bodies and which kept as close to its beneficiaries as possible, which was becoming a reality in the implementation of the present Convention.

### ... and commodities prices

The second theme of the Meeting, that of the deterioration of the terms of trade, was highly apposite, since it had been the inadequacy of the trade concessions that, to a great extent, had caused the most recent round of Lomé IV negotiations to falter a few days earlier.

Summarising the discussion paper for the assembly, Marc Cortois, of the Belgian Confederation of Christian Trades Unions, recalled the trend in commodity prices over the past two decades, a trend which, in the 1980s had been characterised by three main facets: instability in world market prices, deterioration in the terms of trade of countries heavily dependent on commodity exports and a particularly sharp fall in commodity prices between 1980-86, a period when a number of factors heightened the problem of indebtedness. The trend had not been uniform in respect of all commodities, and the paper naturally concentrated on those of greatest importance for the ACPs—oil, coffee, copper, cocoa, wood and sugar.

In a nutshell, the situation was as follows: sub-Saharan Africa as a whole had seen export earnings fall by some 30% in the years 1981-87. For the oil-exporting developing countries the fall had been the sharpest (some 50%), but food-crop exporters had also suffered badly. The trend in import prices (including oil) had also been downward, but never by more than 10%, so that the terms of trade had deteriorated, overall, very considerably over the decade.

### Two options: stabilisation or compensation

Mr Cortois went on to analyse briefly some of the mechanisms for offsetting price instability—stabilising commodity prices or stabilising export earnings—commenting on the initiatives that had been taken hitherto on price stabilisation and on their relative failure. As to the two export earnings stabilisation schemes now in operation, the IMF's Compensatory Financing Facility and the Lomé Convention's STABEX mechanism, he pointed to a number of measures which could heighten their effectiveness, including, in the case of STABEX, an increase in the level of resources. As to how to approach the problem of the deterioration of the terms of trade in future, the group recommended more attention to the diversification of production and greater encouragement to more processing in the ACP countries of the commodities they produce. "Such an approach" the discussion paper concludes, "can only produce results in the long term. But to achieve these results, both bottlenecks with which the developing countries are confronted today, viz. the burden of indebtedness and the deteriorating terms of trade, will have to be eased

in the short term. Otherwise there will be no scope for the necessary structural approach".

These sentiments were widely echoed in the discussion that followed. P.A. Thompson of the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce welcomed the "long and brutally frank debate" on the issue, "a debate which had lost none of its daunting complexity in finding a solution". Some arrangement for better prices and/or better compensation must be found, he said, while the medium- and long-term problems such as product diversification were being addressed. The ACPs had a part to play, it was true, in the form of fiscal and budgetary policy, but the EEC—as the richer of the two partners—bore the greater responsibility and "should seize it in the interests of world peace".

Before concluding their discussions, participants were able to hear of the latest progress in the Lomé IV negotiations from representatives of the ACP Group (Mr Carrington), of the ACP Council (Ambassador Tavola), the EEC Council (Ambassador Vidal) and of the Commission (Mr Riera). (An account of the final developments in the negotiations is given in the News Round-up.) Not all were entirely satisfied with the manner in which matters were progressing—and the overall financial package was, of course, still an unknown factor. But one thing was certain, and participants at this meeting could take particular comfort from it: not only were economic and social interest groups becoming increasingly involved in the Lomé negotiations, but there was also ever-wider consensus on the need for them to participate in development projects and programmes themselves. ○

Myfanwy VAN DE VELDE



# Cooperation between ACP and EEC institutions and universities

by Jean-Pierre DUBOIS (\*)

Inter-university cooperation has been the main type of inter-institutional cooperation in the Community's relations with the developing world. Both are aimed at institutional support and at getting European and Third World establishments to exchange their experiences in training and research. Both the support and the exchange may be in the form of European technical assistance with local training and research, exchanges of students and staff, study grants and the publication and dissemination of information, with the delivery of teaching materials and equipment.

On the Community side, it was 1987 before ERASMUS, the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students, was launched. It covers student exchanges, although of course staff exchanges and the joint designing of syllabuses with a view to the mutual recognition of diplomas are extremely important for European integration too. As things stand, the advantages of ERASMUS cannot be offered to students or teachers in third countries (Third World included).

The Community introduced inter-institutional cooperation with the Third World only recently, although bilateral cooperation by former colonial powers was started, with schemes to suit the demands of universities in the Third World, as soon as independence came. The Community has altered its basic regulations and relaxed its procedures in relations with the ACPs to take account of requests both from Third World establishments wanting to improve their teaching and research potential, better their management or give a more practical turn to their activities and from European establishments seeking new programmes, study grants for foreign students and subsidies now that higher education budgets in the Community countries are being slowly cut back, particularly in the United Kingdom.

The instruments which the Community has for cooperation of this sort are vast and geared to their objectives in various ways.

The Community has also begun to provide indirect support for inter-institutional

and inter-university cooperation with the countries of Latin America and Asia recently as part of its implementation of heading 9 340 of the Community budget (training schemes for nationals of the developing countries of Latin America and Asia).

Budget heading 930 (financial and technical cooperation with the countries of Latin America and Asia) has already enabled the Community to finance a considerable amount of institutional support and training schemes in agriculture, cooperative development, and cooperation in industry and technology, in some cases in the form of inter-institutional cooperation.

And, with budget heading 947 (support for European training institutions for the benefit of developing country nationals) the Commission is trying to offer increasing support with transferring courses taught in Europe to the developing nations and forge links between institutions in the Community and the Third World. This budget heading got ECU 1 100 000 in 1988.

Science and Technology for Development, the Community's research drive aimed at helping the developing world, has been the opportunity for two sub-programmes (on tropical agriculture and medicine, health and nutrition) to be run since 1983, with a view to backing up research in institutes in Europe and the developing countries. Some of this had been inter-institutional cooperation (see article by T. Wollersen in n° 118).

Lastly, many training schemes have been financed under the Community's bilateral cooperation agreements with the countries south and east of the Mediterranean. This had included coop-

eration on industrial technology and agricultural and medical research between research institutes and universities in Europe and in such countries as Egypt, Jordan and Syria.

All these instruments are, generally speaking, well suited to the aims of the cooperation which they are intended to pursue.

## Lomé I and II

As far as the ACPs are concerned, it is the successive Lomé Conventions which provide the general framework for inter-institutional cooperation.

The Community has always financed training schemes in the ACPs. It began mainly with infrastructure and equipment, but the trend has shifted over the past years and there is a noticeable and sustained increase in technical assistance and study grants.

The pattern of recent years also shows the Community financing fewer and fewer education and training projects in relation to all other projects. At the same time, higher, technical and university education in the ACPs is getting more support.

All this exactly matches the aid policy trends of other funders, as the World Bank pointed out in its recent (January 1988) report on education in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is particularly true of German, British and French cooperation and it also reflects the policy of the ACPs, especially the African ones, which have concentrated on higher education in recent years and cut the percentage of their budgets earmarked for education.

There were no special provisions on cooperation between institutions or universities in Lomé I (1975-80). Nonetheless, the biggest beneficiaries of the regional funds at this stage were three members of the Association of Commonwealth Universities — the University of Botswana and Swaziland (as it was then called), the University of the South Pacific (Fiji) and the University of the West Indies (Caribbean). And it was not by chance that they were all English-speaking universities with regional status either. Lomé I also saw several universities in Nigeria get financing for agreements with European universities from the national funds.

This higher educational support was not seen as cooperation. The main idea was to improve the buildings and sup-

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ply equipment, study grants and technical assistance without trying out any real cooperation with European institutions or going for institutional improvement — in spite of the fact that there were already a large number of bilateral cooperation schemes going on with institutions in the Community countries at that time.

It was Lomé II (1980-85) which contained the first provision (Article 141) on collaboration between training and research establishments and universities in the Member States and the corresponding institutions in the ACPs.

Several ACP countries financed inter-university cooperation, usually as part of the national indicative programmes (multi-annual training programmes) under Lomé II — Nigeria (rural development and the environment), for example, Papua New Guinea (education and medical research) and Zimbabwe (science teacher's training and the faculty of veterinary medicine). A programme worth several million ECU was also run from regional funds for the University of the West Indies (ECU 8 million) and support provided for the University of the South Pacific (Fiji) at this time. Support programmes at the frontiers of inter-university cooperation were also run in Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Under Lomé II, Community support for higher education began to go mainly to the countries of southern Africa. And the overwhelming majority (70-80%) of these cooperation schemes were run by Dutch-speaking and British universities on the European side working with universities in exclusively English-speaking ACPs.

The real breakthrough of inter-institutional cooperation into the text of the Convention was in Lomé III, in particular with Articles 68 and 113 and, most importantly, Articles 119 and 208, which set it in the context of the development of human resources in the ACPs and the increase in their capacity for innovation.

At the same time, the principle of concentrating aid in major programmes and making training schemes an integral part of them provided a new framework for inter-institutional cooperation by forcing the Community and the ACP States concerned to put the bulk of their support behind operations in the focal sectors of aid — essentially, the devel-

opment of rural areas, food and agriculture. This principle did not, of course, exclude large-scale integrated training projects involving such things as staff improvement programmes.

So all the instruments of Lomé III can be used to improve and increase the number of these cooperation schemes — which is indeed what happens in reality. Most of the schemes have yet to be implemented as most of them have progressed no further than the identification stage.

Nigeria is undeniably the ACP country which has made the greatest use of this instrument in training and research, not just with its ECU 30 m training programme, but with three major development programmes financed under the indicative programme by the Community. There is nothing surprising about this, given the impressive degree of development of the country's system of higher, technical and university education.

Other potential inter-institutional cooperation schemes include the Free University of Brussels and the University of Kisangani (Zaire), the Conakry School of Public Health (Guinea) and the University of Liège, the Universities of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique (Eduardo Mondlane), Zimbabwe (further support for the veterinary faculty), several countries of

Southern Africa (maths and science training primarily with the Free University of Amsterdam) etc.

And then there is a series of support schemes to help regional training institutes in the ACP Group, which are not inter-institutional cooperation but could (in some cases, partly) be. They include ESAMI, Mananga in southern Africa, air safety in West Africa, a support programme for the University of the West Indies, regional training institutions in Central Africa (to be determined) etc.

An estimated ECU 20 m is being channelled into helping inter-university cooperation under Lomé III, with schemes worth between ECU 300 000 and ECU 2 m.

### Problems of implementation

The bilateral cooperation institutions in countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and France, which are specialised in inter-university cooperation, take a very flexible approach to the running of schemes, based on years of experience. They have direct discussions with the local universities, produce joint cooperation agreements with the ACP institutions concerned, ensure far faster financing and take more account of the features of the individual countries.

### *University of Zimbabwe — Veterinary Faculty of Utrecht*

*Cooperation between the University of Zimbabwe and the Veterinary Faculty of Utrecht is a good example of cooperation that has worked in spite of the varying expectations each partner had of the other.*

*There had been no contact prior to this. The subject of cooperation in this case was training in veterinary science, teaching by Utrecht staff to improve and expand the syllabuses at Zimbabwe, and the supply of teaching materials. The sum of ECU 500 000 was earmarked for this under Lomé II.*

*The programme catered for a lack of staff training in Zimbabwe and, in view of the regional role which the University of Zimbabwe plays in this field, success was vital.*

*The partners were entirely free to define the content of their cooperation and both proved to be very involved in the programme.*

*Among the reasons for success were no doubt the very high technical level and the sound state of the infrastructure at Zimbabwe, the very high standard of the support from Utrecht and the fact that Zimbabwe was open to cooperation with a modern institution.*

*The outcome of the programme was higher quality teaching and the introduction of new teaching methods, together with extended, permanent contacts making for the maintenance and improvement of knowledge. Utrecht also said it had gained a great deal from the cooperation.*

*Two problems remain. The contribution to the replacement of foreign technical assistance officers by nationals, which is limited, and the diploma-holders' ability to find employment in the region, which is also limited.*

*The project is being continued under Lomé III — which reflects the need for the partners' long-term involvement.*



## *KUL*<sup>(1)</sup> – *University of Nsukka*

*Cooperation between the Catholic University of Louvain (KUL) and Nsukka was more difficult to get going.*

*The linkage agreement, signed in 1985, provided for:*

- *greater teaching potential at the Nsukka Faculty of Agriculture;*
- *creation of an irrigation system at Nsukka to make crop-production experiments possible throughout the year;*
- *stimulation of research projects involving all aspects of irrigated agriculture.*

*The programme included the sending out of academic staff to Nsukka, exchanges of academic staff from both universities, training in Europe for teachers and technicians from Nsukka, the supply of laboratory and irrigation equipment, plus the attendant materials, and provision for logistics and running costs — ECU 1 200 000 in all.*

*It was decided not to stick blindly to the programme come what may, but to advance in phases so that changes could be made if necessary and regular evaluations run. This approach, which follows a gradual change in both outlook and achievements, obviously takes longer than implementation alone would do.*

*The project was supposed to take four years, but two and a half years after the letter of agreement was signed (September 1985), the partners completed the preparatory phase, originally scheduled to take a year, and envisaged finishing the programme in 1991. There were a number of reasons for the delay, including a lack of familiarity with EEC procedures, the problems of recruiting a hydrologist on a long-term contract, internal difficulties at the University of Nsukka, government and university red tape and lengthy tender procedures. Various changes were also made to the plan of operation during phase one to take account of new situations and new insights. This brief outline highlights two important characteristics of the inter-university cooperation formula — the implementation is flexible and the design non-commercial. The formula also provides both partners with an opportunity to make the inter-cultural contacts, to understand the various contexts in which the partner institution operates, joint planning, the administrative and financial procedures of the EEC and so on.*

*Obviously, the Nsukka-Louvain linkage is based on clearly defined needs and aspirations on both sides and on individual motivation in the two faculties — important when it comes to cementing relations of this type. So far, the aim of cooperation has been to cater for Nsukka's needs, but the balance will be redressed once the joint research starts. There is no doubt as to the opportunities for long-term exchanges here.*

*The KUL contribution is not to technology and science alone. Input on the management staff side has led to important changes in the University of Nsukka and these changes—which, inter alia, foster a spirit of cooperation between departments and make for the establishment of a tradition of maintaining the equipment—are in fact seen by the parties involved as the scheme's greatest achievement.*

*The construction of the bore-hole on the campus at Nsukka was time-consuming, monopolised many people for a long period and generated some frustration — which led people to question the wisdom of including infrastructural work in the terms of reference of inter-institutional cooperation.*

*Administering and running the linkage takes both the partners and the Commission Delegation a considerable amount of time. Experience has shown that the Delegation cannot confine itself to planning and monitoring the cooperation and it also has to advise the partners on organisational matters and help them with the administration, to make the linkage easier. On both sides, the linkages between programme organisation and administration are in the hands of the academic staff, which tries to combine this work with other university duties — which is in fact difficult and certainly does not improve the efficiency of the programme.*

*The procedure which led to the linkage is by no means an example of spontaneous initiative of interest to two partners. It was more of an "arranged marriage", suggested, facilitated and decided by the EEC and the fact that the University of Nsukka agreed to it instead of demanding the right to choose its own partner perhaps has something to do with African marriage traditions...*

(1) Catholic University of Louvain (Dutch-speaking).

For countries like the UK and the Netherlands, this cooperation is one of the essential aspects of aid in the education sector.

Germany, too, is seeking to foster inter-university cooperation in the form of linkages, in particular in conjunction with its higher technical schools (Fachhochschulen), where teaching is heavily job-related, through the Carl-Duisberg Gesellschaft (CDG). The Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Entwicklung (DSIE) and the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) are also involved in these cooperation schemes.

HEDCO deals with this in Ireland and the ICU in Italy, while Belgium has universities such as the Free Universities of Brussels (both Dutch- and French-speaking), the Universities of Liège, of Louvain, of Ghent, the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Antwerp, the Faculties of Agriculture at Gembloux and so on with many links with universities in Africa and Latin America, sometimes with and sometimes without the support of official Belgian cooperation.

The machinery of ACP-EEC cooperation is not so well geared at present to the rapid identification and implementation of cooperation schemes.

It is the general financial and technical cooperation machinery of Lomé III which has to be used for inter-institutional cooperation. Working through the National Authorising Officer, an essential feature of the ACP-EEC system, can impede the precise identification of the fields and institutions of cooperation and reduce the necessary flexibility in implementation. And the system of restricted invitations to tender for technical cooperation contracts is not necessarily compatible with the demands of cooperation schemes destined to take several years (10-15 at least) even between European and ACP partners who are gradually improving their reciprocal support capacities.

These obstacles partly restrict the Community's potential for initiative when it comes to establishing worthwhile cooperation schemes by putting it most often in a position to finance partnerships that have already been set up between European and ACP institutions but which have failed to attract adequate bilateral funding. There is nothing wrong with this role of "pure



## Cooperation between universities under Lomé III

Country	Institutions	Sector	Amount (ECU)
Guinea-Conakry	University of Liège – University of Conakry	Health	400 000
Zaire	Free University of Brussels (French-speaking) – University of Kisangani	Research Health Agriculture	300 000
Zimbabwe	University of Zimbabwe – University of Amsterdam	Geology	300 000
Swaziland	University of Swaziland – Free University of Amsterdam	Science-Maths	± 1 500 000
Botswana	University of Botswana – Free University of Amsterdam	Science-Maths	1 500 000
Lesotho	National University of Lesotho – Free University of Amsterdam	Science-Maths	625 000
Nigeria	RVB (NL) and University of Ibadan	Management	850 000
Nigeria	Stuttgart – Surrey and Obafemi Awolowo Ile-Ife	Environmental monitoring and assessment	2 000 000
Nigeria	Institut für Kernenergie und Energie Systeme, Stuttgart and Obafemi Awolowo Ile-Ife	Energy masterplan for rural development	600 000
Nigeria	KUL – University of Nigeria, Nsukka	Equipment maintenance for universities	1 000 000
Nigeria	University of Maiduguri – Centre for Arid Zones Studies and European Research Centre (to be named)	Training research in arid zones	1 000 000
Nigeria	Amahdu Bello University, Zaria and Hedeselskabet (DK), Phase 2	Training, research in pedology, soil and water resources management and conservation	500 000
Nigeria	Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Faculty of Agriculture, Sokoto – partner to be determined	Range management and related disciplines	to be determined
Nigeria	Ondo State University, Ado Ekiti – University of Aalborg	Training programme for small-scale agro-based industry	to be determined
Nigeria	University of Calabar, Institute of Oceanography – African Regional Agriculture Center (P.A.) – Nigeria Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research – University of Göttingen – Institute of Husbandry and Genetics	Applied research for the innovation of a pond culture scheme with freshwater in the Oil Palm Belt	to be determined



financier", quite the contrary, provided these cooperation schemes are indeed worthwhile. And this is normal, since this is a field in which the Community acts as a relay between European and ACP institutions.

And the Community's experience in this field will expand and no doubt help improve its capacity for initiative.

**The basic problems**

It was with a view to improving the nature of these schemes that, in 1982, '83 and '84, DG VIII ran meetings for all European organisations in the Member States concerned with inter-university cooperation with the Third World, for major ACP universities (chancellors and vice-chancellors), the Association of Commonwealth Universities, the National Universities Commission of Nigeria and the Association of African Universities.

These meetings provided an opportunity for the Community to say just what the purpose of this cooperation was:

- the design of training and research programmes closely geared to the ACPs' development aims, to their indicative programmes and to practical results;
- liaison with existing regional and national institutes;
- a continuous process, flexible enough for changes of direction to be made, making for exchanges involving both parties;
- a personal and financial commitment and interest by the institutes involved on both sides (not just the ACP institutions);
- clear definition of the needs and responsibilities of each side;
- the implementation of programmes, preferably involving a faculty or research unit and, within these programmes, the mobilisation of the whole

series of staff concerned (from librarians, technicians, administrative staff and teachers);

- the implementation of packages containing study grants, staff exchange programmes, equipment, teaching materials, publication aids and training programmes (including management), provided these elements make a specific contribution to improving the project;
- coherence of the research, training and practical results.

The aim of all these cooperation activities is not necessarily a productive project, but an improvement in the ACP institutions, with a view to increasing their capacities *vis-à-vis* external expertise in their priority areas of development.

Such areas—agricultural and rural development, health, science, agri-food and energy—are priorities.

**Evaluating inter-university cooperation**

Before preparing a further meeting with the appropriate European and ACP organisations, the Commission decided to assess some of the cooperation schemes it had financed previously. It did this in 1988, with Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Egypt as the target countries.

The evaluation covered both the nature of the schemes and the administrative difficulties encountered during implementation on both sides.

It illustrated the problems of this sort of cooperation and, in particular, the absence of any clear objectives or clear-cut division of responsibility between the partners, the complications attached to a complex institutional framework (especially in Nigeria), the very slow speed at which cooperation schemes started up (especially Nigeria again), the complexity of payment procedures, some schemes' lack of practical effect

and the cumbersome nature of the Community's implementation (commitment and payment) procedures.

It stressed that all the cooperation schemes did not combine to make a programme. The Community was supporting them by chance almost, and this was good as it reflected requests which the ACP countries themselves made within the contractual framework.

It pointed to the fact that the most conclusive results were obtained when the cooperation was of an academic nature, that schemes did not put emphasis on developing the curriculum or dealing with management issues, and that the areas of cooperation tended to be arrived at pragmatically without any form of programming — which was not to say that there was no justification for the choices.

In spite of all these difficulties, inter-university cooperation is a fruitful method of cooperation in view of the opportunity it offers for the sort of partnership from which each partner derives proper benefit for his or her own institution.

**And the conclusion?**

Inter-institutional cooperation is no panacea. It is an instrument which has to respond to specific needs. It must not just provide support for European institutions in search of financing to balance their books or take their own research further — or just meet ACP training institutions' wish for financing for schemes that will do nothing for their development at a time when the value of higher education, especially in Africa, is in doubt (because of the cost, the limited outlets and the failure to provide some courses) or pay for long courses of study to get ACP nationals the diploma that will get them promotion when they go home.

And nor should it be a substitute for conventional technical assistance, the spirit and particularly the implementation of which are certainly different from inter-institutional cooperation.

South-South inter-institutional cooperation remains a target for the ACPs. Regional groupings do exist, of course, in French- and English-speaking Africa, in the Caribbean and the Pacific, but the Community cannot provide support until the ACP universities have taken the initiative into their own hands. ○

J.-P.D.

ACP or SEM (*) state	Universities-Institutions linkage		Subject
	ACP-SEM Univ.	EEC Univ.	
1. Nigeria	Jos	Durham (UK)	environment, management farming systems architecture & environment soil erosion soil sciences electron microscopy veterinary science
2. Nigeria	Nsukka	Louvain (B)	
3. Nigeria	Ife	Trieste (It)	
4. Nigeria	Zaria	Hedeselskabet (DK)	
5. Egypt	Cairo	Ghent (B)	
6. Egypt	Cairo	Lyons (F)	
7. Zimbabwe	Harare	Utrecht (NL)	

(\*) Southern and Eastern Mediterranean.



## THE GAMBIA

### Market forces rule, OK.

Presenting the 1989/90 budget to Parliament last June, the Gambian Minister of Finance and Trade, Mr Saihou Sulayman Sabally painted the picture of a robust economy. "The Gambian economy", he said, "is now in its third year of growth, exceeding 5% per annum. This has resulted in the first sustained increase in overall real incomes for more than a decade... The private sector activity has increased sharply and business confi-


continuing low standard of living and widespread unemployment, for example) and when only weeks after Senegal tightened border controls, hotels in The Gambia were rapidly running out of cooking gas, sowing panic among hoteliers at the beginning of the tourist season.

The Gambian reaction may be based on a feeling that the economy has taken a course which has "built-in self-defence" mechanisms that will

the optimal utilisation of all productive resources in the economy".

There is no doubt that this policy, coupled with such factors as foreign goodwill and patronage have produced, within a short time, spectacular results in stabilising an economy that was deeply in trouble in 1985 with roaring inflation, irregular supplies of essential commodities such as rice and fuel, arrears in the service of external debt, huge budget deficits, a weak reserve position, an acute shortage of foreign exchange and widespread loss of confidence and lack of new investment in the country.

A combination of internal and external factors led to the crisis which actually began as far back as 1980.



dence is high. The country's current foreign obligations are being met, foreign arrears are being reduced and The Gambia's international financial standing has improved dramatically".

Mr Sabally's transparent elation was reflected so much among officials in Banjul that news of the sudden collapse of the Senegambian Confederation—a structure upon which observers have for years placed considerable hope for the future of The Gambia—was received not only with the characteristic calm of The Gambia but with a certain air of confidence in the resilience of the Gambian economy to such an external shock.

For a country of only 11 000 sq km, almost surrounded by Senegal and heavily dependent on one crop, groundnuts, this was surprising, particularly when nothing on the ground bears out the official optimism (the


ultimately defeat the kind of measures being taken by Senegal. The fact is that The Gambia, which has always had a liberal economy by African standards, has adopted in recent years a new non-interventionist policy which most economists have described as ultra-liberal.

Mr Sabally ascribes the new policy to the lessons that have been learned in the past four years or so of IMF-inspired structural adjustment which were, among other things, that "in tandem with political freedoms, economic operations at all levels must be given the freedom to take economic decisions", and that "the pace of economic growth cannot be forced through Government intervention that results in budget deficits, excessive credit creation or rapid increase in foreign debt". It is the duty of the Government, he said, to create a consistent set of incentives "to encourage

They include notably, the fall in the output and world prices of groundnuts, increased costs of food and fuel imports and increased public expenditure. Indeed the situation became so bad that The Gambia had to abandon its Second Development Plan to adopt a Public Investment Plan (PIP) for which funds were sought from donors at a conference in London in 1985. The PIP was soon, though, to be integrated into a Structural Adjustment Programme when the IMF and the World Bank came in demanding changes.

The Government adopted a recovery programme which, first, concentrated mainly on the removal of the disparities in exchange rates and prices, the stabilisation of the balance of payments and the reforming of the public sector. A floating regime for the Dalasi, the national currency, was introduced and the foreign exchange





**The GPMB oil milling factory.**

*For decades the groundnut industry was dominated by the Board*

market was liberalised ending the Central Bank's monopoly. In September 1986 the IMF provided The Gambia with an approximately SDR 10.9 million adjustment facility.

Inflation was brought down from 70% in 1985 to 10.9% in 1987 through the removal of subsidies in such areas as health and transport and through the judicious issue of treasury bills and strict limits to bank credits by the Central Bank. Between 1988 and 1989 alone, banks sold some 804 million Dalasi worth of foreign exchange to the public, a 55% rise on the period 1987-88. Although the value of the Dalasi has fallen significantly, the gap between the official and parallel markets has almost disappeared. The civil service was pruned and brought down to a manageable size and a number of parastatals have been slated for sale.

By the end of 1987 The Gambia had registered sufficient positive results for the authorities to be convinced that the way ahead resided in a market-oriented economy — where the growth of the productive sectors, agriculture, manufacturing, fisheries and tourism—are determined by the level of private initiatives and investment.

Impressed by the results and The Gambia's economic orientation, the IMF, late in 1988, provided a three-year credit equivalent to SDR 20.5 million under what it called Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The World Bank, the African Development Bank and The Netherlands government, on the other hand, also agreed to provide a loan totalling US\$ 34 million towards the programme. The IDA has indeed already provided SDR 17 m to The Gambia. This was ratified by Parliament last June. Understandably, the loan will be used mainly for balance of payments support.

These developments no doubt provide the basis for official optimism for the 1990s but they mask the factors that could negate all the efforts: the mixed fortunes of the various sectors of The Gambian economy — their strengths and weaknesses, the fact that The Gambia remains heavily dependent on foreign aid, most of which is in the form of outright grants for capital projects and, to some extent, budgetary support, and the debt burden which currently amounts to \$ 355 million.

With no mineral resources, and only its people, the River Gambia, its limited land space, beaches and coas-

tal waters as assets, the task of development would appear daunting. Openness and friendliness towards foreigners, it is true, have so far paid The Gambia rich dividends in foreign assistance, and in tourism. This may or may not continue. The River Gambia's vital role in agriculture in a naturally dry country is limited by saline intrusion. The country's forest resources have been depleted. There is therefore not much for a country to sing and dance about.

## **Agriculture: emphasis on food production**


Agriculture, accounts for about 55% of GDP. It has, since the birth of The Gambia as a nation, been dominated by one crop, groundnuts. In the early '60s groundnuts played a pivotal role in the development of the country: production rose steadily from an average 94 000 metric tonnes between 1961 and '65 to a high 131 000 mt in 1966, earning a reasonable income for The Gambia. The industry was, and still is, managed by the Gambian Produce Marketing board (GPMB), a non-profit organisation which was set up not only to maximise farm-gate prices for farmers but to ensure adequate revenue from groundnuts for the government — responsibilities the Board discharged fairly adequately.

The GPMB, however, was to spread its tentacles into the Gambian economy, becoming involved in everything closely or remotely connected with groundnuts, from transportation through storage and processing to export. It was to take responsibility for cotton when the latter became the focus of efforts at diversification of exports.

Sixty percent of groundnut sales to the Board is accounted for by the Gambia Cooperative Union and the remainder by operators licensed to buy from the farmers. Alternatively the farmers sold groundnuts directly to dealers across the border in Senegal, attracted not only by the convertible CFA franc, which for many years was more stable than the Dalasi, but also by the ease with which they disposed of them (transportation across the border was sometimes easier than across The Gambia). This trade which elsewhere is known as



**Production of principal crops in the Gambia 1978-1988**



Source: FAO.

smuggling is described in The Gambia as the centuries-old practice of "cross-border trade". Figures on The Gambia's annual groundnut production are therefore unreliable. The FAO estimates show output of 126 000 mt in the 1967/68 season, 130 000 mt in the 1977/78, 150 000 mt in 1982/83 and 110 000 mt in 1986/87. Sales to the GPMB, however, do provide some bases upon which the strength of the groundnut industry has been measured over the years. Purchases by the Board between 1973 and 1977 averaged 132 000 metric tons. They plunged dramatically to 78 000 mt between 1978 and 1982 due mainly to bad weather and pest inva-

sion. The GPMB purchase figures as disclosed to *The Courier* reveal not enough quantities reaching the Board in recent years. In the 1987/88 season, for example, the GPMB purchased 63 000 mt and only 24 000 mt by September 1989 (see table below).

The slump in the tonnage purchased by the GPMB in a decade when world prices of groundnuts have fallen badly meant huge reductions in foreign exchange earnings from the product. This partly explains the profound crisis that has shaken the GPMB and the groundnut industry as a whole: the Board, anxious to encourage farmers, has had to buy groundnuts

at prices far above the world market prices and the Government has had for several years now to subsidise the parastatal, including paying off its debts with the Central Bank. The GPMB which had been a source of income for the Government thus became a drain on its resources, making the Board an inevitable target in the Government's overall structural adjustment exercise. It will no longer receive subsidies from the Government. Its ancillary activities, particularly in transport, are to be privatised, and it has to compete henceforth, at the buying level from farmers, with operators who no longer require to be licensed.

Although there is widespread fear that the GPMB will sink under competition, at the Board's headquarters in Banjul the future is viewed with that same air of confidence that is noticeable among officials about the direction of the economy as a whole. The entire Board, which *The Courier* had the good fortune to interview at one of its regular sessions, feels there has been too much unnecessary worry about the GPMB's survival. They point to their "impressive" achievement of the 1988/89 performance contract which saw the GPMB reduce its operating loss from 28 200 000 dalasi in 1987/88 to 5 300 000 dalasi. But this was due almost entirely to "tighter control over operating costs and lower interest charges" on loans paid to the Central Bank. The Board has still to prove its commercial viability. A factor in its favour is that it remains the only export outlet for all groundnuts and groundnut products. What the reforms have done in essence is to relieve the GPMB of the responsibility of guaranteeing prices to the farmers. The extent to which competition at the buying level will rationalise the groundnut industry, improve output and farmers' income is yet to be seen. What is clear is that the GPMB is banking on farmers continuing to sell their groundnuts to their cooperative unions or societies which are under contract to sell to the Board and on their preference for the "cash on the spot" policy which operates in The Gambia to the "chit system" in Senegal where operators buy now and pay later. "The price has to be substantially attractive for any farmer to sell across the border",

**All figures in metric tons**

**1987/88**

Undecorticated groundnuts purchased	63 327
Exports:	
shelled groundnuts	16 463
crude groundnut oil	8 393
expellers cake	12 167

**1988/89**

Undecorticated groundnuts purchased	24 769
Exports:	
shelled groundnuts	9 321
crude groundnut oil	3 166
expellers cake (as at 30/9/89)	3 453
estimated for export in Oct. '89	3 000
total to be exported	6 453

Source: GPMB



says the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mr Amadou Taal, who estimates that in the short run there are bound to be price differentials but in the long run "both countries will have to be influenced by world market forces". The virtue of the exercise, in the opinion of the Permanent Secretary, is that "from now on farmers will not be expecting a fixed price for the year". They could sell to the GPMB or to the private operator depending on the highest bidder. Meanwhile, GPMB's Managing Director Mr Saihou Drammeh and his Board are figuring out how to operate in this "slightly modified environment", feeling they would take "adequate measures" to "operate on a commercial basis".

If the GPMB found groundnuts tough to crack in recent years it has found it easy going with cotton. Introduced as far back as 1965 as part of The Gambia's diversification attempts with a project financed by the African Development Bank in the Upper River Division (URD), production rose to 1 175 tonnes in 1978 fell to 99 t in 1979 before rising steadily and reaching 2 500 t in 1985. Although output has fluctuated ever since because of adverse weather conditions, it has nevertheless remained close the 2 000 tonnes mark (1 847 t in fact in 1988/89 with the area under cotton cultivation rising from 1 166 hectares in the 1987/88 season to 2 698 ha in 1988/89). All cotton production is exported.

The Gambia's diversification thrust, however, has been not so much toward cash crops as towards the production of foodcrops given the escalating costs of food imports — a major factor that contributed to the country's recent economic difficulties. It remains a heavy burden. In 1988, for example, food accounted for nearly 30% of total imports. Emphasis has been on the production of coarse grains—maize, millet and sorghum—and production increased consistently until in the 1988/89 season when it fell from 72 000 tonnes in 1987/88 to 70 680 t. In support of this grain policy, a number of OECD countries have donated milling machines which have been installed in the rural areas to lighten the task of women who traditionally grew and processed these crops.


It should be noted that the policy of improving the condition of women and making their contributions to development more effective is being taken seriously in The Gambia. A large number of agricultural projects specifically directed at them are being set up all over the country by donors, including the European Economic Community. The EEC has, among others, a women's vegetable gardens project in Pirang and an integrated rural agricultural development project in the Upper River Division involving women. Mr Taal, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture expects the EEC to concentrate on the production of coarse grain in the URD, for while it is true that there have been increases in foodgrain production in recent years, he says, it is important that the rate of increase in output should outstrip the population growth rate, which is estimated to

Project has been launched. This aims at improving literacy among rural women, teaching them basic skills and helping them engage in income-generating activities, particularly in handicrafts and agriculture. To this end, the Gambian Women's Finance Company has been set up with a loan from the World Bank to provide credits, not normally obtained through the formal banking system, to rural women.

Overall, farmers have the opportunity of meeting face-to-face with President Jawara annually. The latter, has, over the past five years, established the practice of touring the country every year to discuss the farmers' problems with them.

If there is an area in which The Gambia's drive at self-sufficiency is producing handsome results it is in the production of rice. Both swamp

*Swamp and irrigated rice cultivation are practised in The Gambia — a naturally dry country. Production has risen significantly over the years. Women are in the forefront of agricultural development, with a number of organisations coming into being and specifically directed at them, politically, economically and socially*



be 3.4% annually, if The Gambia is to achieve self-sufficiency in food and bring an end to the scourge of heavy food import bills.

Women, on the other hand, are organising themselves into potent forces for development. With the establishment recently of their political forum, the National Women's Council and Bureau, things are moving fast. A Women's Development

and irrigated rice are being developed. Output has been rising since the early 1980s. Last season, for example, paddy rice production increased from 20 340 tonnes in the 1987/88 season to 23 520 tonnes.

Considerable hope is being placed on the Jahally Patcharr scheme which involves a large number of smallholders using imported rice strains on an irrigated area of 1 500 hectares.



Reportedly producing the highest rice yields per hectare of any farm in the world, the scheme accounted in 1984 for at least one-quarter of The Gambia's total production. It has continued to perform well. Plans are now afoot to complement it with another scheme — a tidal irrigation rice project at the MacCarthy Island Division which will bring 5 000 hectares under cultivation and involve 10 000 farmers.

Simple farming tools are now being produced locally thanks to the SEGAMCO factory, a Gambian/Senegalese joint venture which was set up recently. With a soil conservation programme at Demba Kunda and the Good Seed Programme multiplication scheme at Marembe, The Gambian government obviously takes agriculture very seriously. The results are not only seen in the output of coarse grains and rice but in the production of fruits and vegetables as well. Output of those are up, with export earnings in 1988 reaching 543 000 dalasi, 60% up on the 1987 figure.

Although the smallness of The Gambian economy and low world market prices affect agriculture, there is no doubt that pests and diseases and the weather are the greatest constraints. Ricefields and farms are often invaded by weaver birds and locusts. With the international help, The Gambia has been able to contain the threats though not without considerable losses. Geographically, The Gambia is located in the Sahel where rainfall is scanty and droughts are regular occurrences. This makes irrigated farming extremely important. This, however, is realistically possible only up to a point along the River Gambia because of saline intrusion from the sea. Pump irrigation is widely practiced in the country but its impact is limited. For years a project to build a barrage/bridge at Balingho on the River Gambia to control saline intrusion and thus protect investment in the existing and future irrigation projects has been planned. Nothing has come of it. According to the Minister of Economic Planning and Industrial Development, Mr Demba Jatta, there have been various studies on the project. Some of them were favourable, others were negative because of environmental concerns.



The Courier

*Women at work at the EEC-financed vegetable garden project at Pirang*

But the project has not been abandoned as some officials in Banjul seem to suggest. "What is being done presently", he says, "is mobilising the resources for its realisation". The project is not only important for agriculture, it is vital to The Gambia's future energy needs, heavily dependent, as it is, on fuel imports and no prospects of oil discovery in the country. Informed sources indicate that the issue is not so much the absence of resources (a number of donors have indicated their willingness to participate in the financing of the project) as the caution that Senegambian politics demand (see the article

on "The demise of the Senegambian Confederation").

As far as the livestock industry is concerned, The Gambia is making good progress. Except for the year, 1984, when drought affected herds, the production of meat, eggs, chicken, milk, etc, has increased substantially and so also have the allied products of hides and skins. These performances are largely due to good and efficient veterinary services and the use of improved strains. For example, the use of the trypano-resistant N'Dama breed in cattle rearing.

The fisheries sector has also come on strong in the past three years. As



The Courier

**Off-loading of merchandise at Banjul port**

*The balance of trade deficits are minimised by a booming re-export trade*



well as growing private interest in industrial fishing, two artisanal fisheries projects have resulted in an increasing number of Gambians and foreigners (mostly Senegalese and Ghanaans) taking up fishing as a full-time occupation and in the doubling of the catch. One of the projects, funded by the Italians, involved the provision of facilities to fishermen in the Kiang West area. Completed in January 1989, the catch rate per fishing unit of the project has already attained the 98.9 kilos per day deemed necessary to make the scheme viable, so much so that the authorities now want to extend it to five villages in the North Bank and Lower River Divisions. The

## Expanding manufacturing and the private sector


Because of the very narrow agricultural base and limited domestic market, The Gambia's manufacturing sector is very small, accounting for 8.9% of GDP. There are set-ups in beverages, palm oil, and salted, dried and smoked fish. (Investments are being sought in fruit and vegetable processing, exploration of tataniferous sands, the manufacture of glass products and biscuits, pharmaceuticals, groundnut butter and confectionery). Otherwise the industrial and commercial sectors are dominated by parastatals: the GPMB (groundnuts and

Company are slated for divestment. If successful, it will broaden the commercial sector.

The Gambia's overall industrial policy, as seen, aims at the transformation of what resources are available locally. It also aims at the assembly of goods for which The Gambia has comparative advantage in the sub-region, as Mr Alieu N'Gum, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development told *The Courier*. But it raises not only the question of the attractiveness of The Gambia to foreign investors but also the issue of foreign control of the economy. Although there are schemes like the Private Enterprise Development Project and investment promotion bodies like the National Investment Board, which aim at encouraging Gambians to go into business by providing advice and credits, it is clear that whether in pursuing the privatisation policy or in setting up manufacturing units, The Gambia needs foreign investors and foreign skills. On the latter, although Gambia's education policy is geared towards the development of indigenous skills, the country relies a good deal on other West African countries for its vital personnel needs. They tend, in this regard, to see a West Africa without frontiers, once more, an illustration of Gambian open-mindedness. Furthermore, there are a large number of technical assistants from a variety of other sources. As far as foreign investments are concerned, they see the fact that there are no constraints whatsoever on foreign investors, which is in tune with their liberal policy, as a big incentive. The Development Act was revised recently to make it possible for an investor to have all the approval he needs to go into business within 90 days of application and provide him with all necessary information.

## A booming re-export trade

If the smallness of the manufacturing sector has not been felt in recent years, it is because of the rapid growth of the re-export trade. The Gambia's traditional exports are, of course, groundnuts and groundnut products, fish and fish products and fruits and vegetables. The last two have become, particularly in the past



The Courier

*The beach becomes a hive of activity at the landing hours of fishermen involved in the EEC-funded fisheries project along the South Atlantic coast*

second project, which is being funded by the EEC, is focussing on six villages along the South Atlantic coast. The project started in 1988. It involves the training of fishermen and the provision of fishing equipment and essential infrastructure for storage, drying, smoking and marketing. With the Gambian coast believed to be rich, particularly in such high-value varieties as shrimps and lobsters, the future of the fishing industry looks bright. A visit to any of the coastal villages involved in the EEC project at the landing hours of the fishermen is enough to convince one of that bright future at the sight not only of the quantity of fish being brought ashore, but the large number of people involved in the industry.

groundnut products), the Gambian Utilities Corporation (electricity and water supply mainly), the Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (finance), GAMTEL (The Gambia telecommunications company), the Gambia National Insurance Corporation and the Livestock Marketing Board. But the Government is set to change that with its divestment policy. Already it had sold the Nyambu timber sawmill and is offering for sale a number of public enterprises, including the National Trading Corporation (which was converted into a limited liability company in June 1988), Seagull Coldstores, the Banjul Breweries and Africa Hotels Ltd. Others like Ferry Services, the Dockyard and the Gambia River Transport



few years, important sources of foreign exchange: Gambian horticultural produce as well as shrimps and lobsters are increasingly being exported to neighbouring countries and Europe. But it is the re-export trade that has seen a spectacular growth. Commodities such as rice, flour, sugar, tea and textiles are imported for re-export to Senegal, Guinea Bissau, the Republic of Guinea, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali and even as far as to Sierra Leone. Inevitably the computing of The Gambia's balance of trade is a complicated affair. What is certain, however, is that the country's trade deficits are minimised by the strength of the re-export trade which has become the second fastest growing sector of the economy after tourism.

The boom in this trade is due mainly to The Gambia's low import duties and liberal import policy, made even more liberal since the start of the structural adjustment programme. As the Comptroller of Customs, Mr Sarian Ceesay told *The Courier*: "There is no restriction on imports and exports, no restriction on the movement of capital, no price approvals. Unlike in some neighbouring countries where customs formalities are cumbersome, where importers have to deal with agents who deal with customs officials, here in The Gambia, importers have direct access to customs officials. They can sort out their problems with the customs within a short time".

The collapse of the Senegambian Confederation has resulted in Senegal tightening controls on exports and on transit goods from The Gambia at all



The Courier

*Tourists on one of The Gambia's fine beaches. The Gambia is an increasingly popular destination for European tourists*

border crossings with the latter. Not surprisingly there were fears that this move would strangle the re-export trade and create enormous problems for the Gambian economy.

While The Gambia reacted calmly to the situation and adopted a "wait and see" attitude, Mr Ceesay believes in what he calls the "invisible hands of the laws of economics", that is, that if one tries to "use artificial means to restrict certain things the law of economics will take its own course".

The truth is that the Gambian re-export trade is based on demand by importers in the neighbouring countries and not necessarily on The Gambia's drive to sell imported goods to them. The problem of transit is therefore much more the affair of the importers than of The Gambia. Experts estimate that even with all the problems that will arise from the new situation (delays and higher costs) importers would still find it cheaper

to import through The Gambia than through elsewhere.

This aside, The Gambians see the re-export trade as having become so much of mutual benefit to them and to some powerful communities in Senegal that the latter are expected to exert pressure on their government for a relaxation of the controls. A new regulatory bilateral agreement on goods in transit or on exports from The Gambia to Senegal cannot be ruled out. It should be noted that it is in the area of customs cooperation that the Gambians estimate that much progress had been made under the Senegambian Confederation.

## Tourism: the sky is the limit

The extent to which the collapse of the Confederation will affect tourism is yet to be seen. Some of the facilities used by hotels in The Gambia are imported from Senegal. In August/September when relations worsened between the two countries hotels began rapidly to run out of cooking gas as Senegal tightened controls, creating panic among hoteliers, and forcing some to look frantically for alternative sources of supply. Tourism has become the fastest-growing sector of The Gambia economy. It contributes as much as 10% of the GDP and now employs some 7 000 people directly and indirectly. Tourist arrivals have increased from 86 000 in 1986/87 to 112 800 in 1988/89. This figure is set to rise further in the 1989/90 season. A number of factors explain the increasing attractiveness of The Gambia as a favoured destination. Apart from the friendliness of



*Banjul Breweries, one of the government-owned enterprises up for sale to the private sector*



the people, the country is peaceful and stable. It is only 5½ hours flight from Europe and provides almost all the facilities that other, further-off, destinations can boast of: fine "unspoilt" beaches as the Gambians like to describe their coastline, good sunshine and warm temperature. For lovers of nature, there are over 4 000 species of birds to watch and there is the Abuko nature reserve where the Gambian authorities have created a mini-park for some lions, crocodiles and other familiar African wildlife.

Fifty-five percent of visitors to The Gambia are British, 15% Scandinavian mostly Swedish, 14% French, and 4% Germans. Promotional campaigns are continuing throughout Europe and the Gambians are so impressed by the response of visitors that they plan to make tourism an all-year-industry and not just a seasonal one that takes place between the months of October and April. They also plan to extend the Tourist Development Area (TDA), which currently covers the area between the Atlantic Hotel in Banjul along the coast to the newly-established Senegambia Hotel, to Brufut. There are at the moment about 14 tourist hotels providing altogether 4 000 beds. More hotels are being planned, for as far as the Gambians are concerned the sky is the limit in tourism. They do not see a point where the number of arrivals will become unacceptable. "As long as The Gambia is a favoured destination we will accommodate tourists", says the Minister of Information and Tourism, Dr Lamin Saho.

The extent to which The Gambia is benefitting from tourism, however, remains the subject of criticisms by development experts. True enough, they say, the industry earns foreign exchange, provides employment and has down-stream effects on agriculture and the handicraft industry. But the majority of tourists, they point out, come with package tours which have been paid for abroad, leaving the country with little gain. The Gambia loses out in another way. Dr Saho admits that there are very few Gambians actively involved in the industry, in terms of investment. There are one or two who own hotels or cafés, the rest are just employees. The industry is overwhelmingly in the hands of foreigners.

## Low standard of living

In a way this discrepancy in tourism (an industry that is booming with very little benefit for the people) reflects more or less the dichotomy in the economy as a whole: macro-economic indicators showing rapid economic recovery but no visible improvement in the standard of living of the Gambians. The structural adjustment exercise meant the removal of subsidies and retrenchment of public employees. Although President Al-Haji Sir Dawda Jawara indicates in his interview with *The Courier*, that measures have been taken and will be taken to alleviate the effects, unemployment is still widespread, purchasing power is still very low despite the fall in inflation. There have been price increases in such basic items as sugar (36%), rice (16%), groundnut oil (15%), fruits and vegetables, meat, fish and eggs. Not only have subsidies been removed on transport, there are not enough buses for city commuters. Indeed transport in Banjul is a nightmare; irrespective of the payment of transport allowances to workers, the roads are almost impracticable with nearly all the streets dug up in projects that are advancing at a snail's pace to provide the capital with a sewerage system and improved telephone, water and electricity services. Even works on the approaches to Banjul (the Second Highway Maintenance Project and the Banjul/Serrekunda Highway Project, which once came to a standstill after the original contractor ran off with nearly 80% of the funds allocated to it) are proceeding painfully slowly. These and many other projects throughout The Gambia depend on foreign finance.

Considering its size and population, its dependence on one crop, groundnuts and on a narrow range of other activities, its heavy dependence on external finance for capital projects and its heavy debt burden (indeed for the foreseeable future the country will continue to face heavy debt-servicing despite generous rescheduling<sup>(1)</sup> and some write-offs) the Gambian government's ability to influence the pace of the country's economic development

(1) There has been a build-up of reserves amounting to SDR 20 million (equivalent to 2½ months of imports, which is designed to meet debt-servicing commitments in the 1990s).

## Yundum: no economic spin offs from the shuttle

When the National Aeronautic Space Agency (NASA) indicated early in 1989 that the Gambian international airport, Yundum, would be its first choice in an emergency landing, of its shuttle spacecraft, there were hopes that the decision would bring considerable economic spin-offs for the Gambia. It was assumed that it would mean the upgrading of Yundum to meet the shuttle requirements: lengthening the 4000-metre runway, for example, by an extra 300 meters at either end and having some 60 or so staff on the ground.

US sources in Banjul, while confirming NASA's choice have revealed to *The Courier* that nothing practically is planned for Yundum. The airport, as it is, they say, can receive the shuttle which will automatically deploy its safety catchnets on hitting the tarmac.

It should be noted that the choice of Yundum by NASA was based purely on technical grounds. NASA has already alternative emergency landing sites in Morocco and Spain, but Yundum, unlike those two sites, lies directly below the shuttle's southern trajectory, which will make it easy for the spacecraft, in the event of engine failure on take-off, to simply glide down onto the Gambian airport. The Moroccan and Spanish bases suffer from not being on the path of the shuttle which, in an emergency, would require at least that some of its engines are working for the spacecraft to be manoeuvred for a landing. ○ A. O.

in the coming years is obviously limited. Its option for a market-oriented economy—to rely on market forces to determine exchange rates, the interest rates as well as the allocation of resources to the productive sectors of the economy—would therefore appear logical. It would be interesting to watch whether The Gambia which has been in the forefront of democratic practices in West Africa is blazing the trail in economic liberalism.

○ Augustine OYOWE



# “We have adopted quite a radical approach...”

— An interview with Sir Dawda Jawara —

*Al-Haji Sir Dawda Kairaba Jawara has been President of the Gambia since 1970. He had earlier been Prime Minister for five years. His leadership has been described as “unusual” in Africa by the Chairman of the US Senate African Affairs sub-committee, Mr Paul Simon. For almost 24 years, Sir Dawda Jawara and his party, The People’s Progressive Party, have allowed democracy and the respect of human rights to flourish in the small West African state. His government has now adopted a liberal economic policy that has begun to yield interesting results. The Courier spoke to him.*

► *Mr President, what is it in the nature of The Gambia that the principles of human rights and democracy took hold early on, for a long time, in a continent where they are not fashionable?*

— It is difficult to answer this question precisely. Certainly one cannot divorce it from the nature of The Gambia and from our history. The fact is that our Party, the PPP, has, right from its inception in 1959, drawn up a constitution which emphasises democracy and human rights, and even though these had not been fashionable in Africa, particularly from the time most African countries were achieving their independence (Ghana in the late '50s and many others in the '60s), we steadfastly tried to adhere to these principles. It has not been easy, but we have, as you have said, maintained them up to the present day. Of course we have every reason to believe now that this is the correct path and we will continue along it.

► *The OAU Commission on Human Rights has its headquarters here in Banjul. Do you consider this as an honour, a recognition of The Gambia’s respect of human rights? How will it operate?*

— The Commission has been opened. We of course consider it a great honour to this country. As to how it will operate, there are nine Commissioners elected by the OAU, and of these, one is a Gambian. They have a chairman who is Gabonese <sup>(1)</sup>.

(1) This interview was conducted at the beginning of October 1989. Since then, the Gabonese president of the OAU Commission on Human Rights has been replaced by a Nigerian.



The Courier

The Commission is quite independent of any government. Each Commissioner has been elected in his personal capacity. I’m sure they have already started functioning, receiving complaints from groups of citizens who have something to complain against their governments in the area of human rights. Of course, a Member State can also bring complaints against another Member State.

► *But are Member States prepared to adhere to the findings and rulings of the Commission on complaints?*

— There is a set procedure for the Commission to process complaints and then bring them to the OAU. This has yet to be done. As you know it’s a new Commission. The headquarters have only recently been inaugurated. I have a feeling that soon we will be seeing the results of its work.

Already we have seen some benefits in terms of a changed attitude towards human rights among the Member States.

► *These are interesting times in international relations. The tension between the East and the West has reduced considerably and we are beginning to witness the salutary effects on Southern Africa. How do you see the situation in South Africa itself evolving?*

— Yes, indeed, we are seeing tremendous changes, almost a revolution in attitudes, especially between the superpowers which, of course, is having salutary effects on the approach to

regional conflicts around the world, and Southern Africa is no exception. We have seen definite changes, which I’m sure are partly due to this general détente in international affairs. We have seen the change from Botha to De Klerk in South Africa who, of course, sounds much more conciliatory, much more open in his approach to the South African problem, the problem of apartheid and the democratic rights of all South African citizens. We have, of course, not seen any tangible results yet in President De Klerk being in charge, but we welcome the change in attitude. But I think the evolution of this process would be welcome if, for example, the Zimbabwean model is adopted in South Africa, so that a formula could be found whereby the black majority are given their rights—a majority government is established—and whereby



## THE GAMBIA

the rights of the minorities are protected. I think the Zimbabwean model can be very useful in the case of South Africa.

► *You have been the Chairman of ECOWAS. The Organisation's achievements have not been much. What do you think has stalled progress?*

— I ceased to be Chairman in June, at the 12th Summit of ECOWAS, which was held in Ouagadougou. I handed over the Chairmanship to President Compaore of Burkina Faso. Of course, the next summit of ECOWAS, the 13th Summit, will be held here in Banjul. Preparations are going on satisfactorily and we hope to host that summit in May 1990. I agree with you, progress in ECOWAS has been quite minimal. There have been tremendous setbacks in implementing the protocol on the free movement of persons, goods and services; trade liberalisation has been very slow, and monetary union is yet to be implemented. The first two are really the life and soul of any community of this type: trade and movement of persons, goods and services. The difficulty, I think, has many sources. First of all, as far as trade is concerned, we still have the colonial legacy whereby the trade of the colonies was really an appendage of those of the colonial masters. This has not changed to any great extent: ECOWAS trade is far more between ECOWAS countries and the metropolitan countries in Europe than it is among Member States. We reckon that inter-ECOWAS trade is well below 10% of trade in the region. This is a big setback to the setting up of our economic community. We have also witnessed setbacks in the free movement of persons, in particular. All is not lost, though. As far as monetary integration is concerned, ECOWAS is actively studying a report which has been commissioned to find out whether the region or the sub-region can have a single currency. This is actively being considered and it is a thing that is quite feasible.

► *The Senegambian Confederation has more or less been frozen or suspended. How do you see the future of relationship between The Gambia and Senegal?*

— Well, the Confederation has



*The newly-opened headquarters of the OAU Commission on Human Rights in the Gambian capital, Banjul*

come rather abruptly to an end, to our great surprise, because we do feel here that it was achieving some of its purposes. As far as the future relations between us and Senegal are concerned, both Senegal and The Gambia stress the special relationship which has always existed between the two countries, even before the Confederation, and I hope that this will continue. It is likely that soon after the winding up of the Confederation has been completed the two Governments, maybe the two Heads of State, will come together and see what can be put in the place of the Confederation, how we can in fact implement this special relationship between the two countries.

► *Does this mean the suspension of on-going projects; for example, the project to improve road and telephone links between the Gambian town of Basse and the Senegalese town of Villengara?*

— Well, suspension is the wrong term to use; actually, the Confederation has not been suspended, it has been dissolved—completely dissolved along with everything that relates to it. It is even stated in the agreement dissolving the Confederation that all contracts have come to an end so that, even if there was any contract going on (which as far as the road is concerned there has been

none, just a project under study), that contract would have come to an end, and matters would have to be resolved with the contractors. The dissolution of the Confederation has been so total that really anything that we do now will have to be based on a new initiative on a bilateral basis.

► *The Gambia owes a great deal of its continuing economic recovery to increased flows of external aid, some of which are outright grants. To what extent is the country moving towards a greater self-reliance in budgetary matters?*

— As far as the budget is concerned, there is a subsidy to the extent of 5.6% of GDP. In the context of our Economic Recovery Programme, it is envisaged that external dependence of the recurrent budget on subsidies will be reduced to 5% next year, and gradually from there on. The subsidy on the development budget is much heavier because about 60% of the project costs are financed by external loans and 27.5% by grants. Nevertheless, we still hold fast to the philosophy of self-reliance—our slogan is *tesito* which means belt-tightening—or much more than that. The reality is that we could only be self-reliant if our efforts at sustainable growth yield the desired results in the short and the longterm. But, as you know, there are certain handicaps—



internal as well as external. The internal handicaps are: a weak economic base, limited savings and a low level of investment. The external constraints, of course, are tremendous. The one that easily comes to mind is the debt-burden which weighs heavily on our economies. Of course, The Gambia is by no means alone in this predicament.

► *The Gambia relies heavily on a single crop, groundnuts. You have made efforts to diversify, but how optimistic are you about achieving a broader-based economy?*

— It is true we rely mainly on groundnuts as a main export crop, but for many years now we've been trying to diversify our economic base, both in the agricultural field and in other areas. Cotton has been a crop which we chose, particularly in the eastern part of the country, URD (Upper River Division), and parts of MRD (Middle River Division). Sesame has recently come in as another crop which could supplement groundnuts as an export cash crop. It is quite promising and I understand there are markets available for it. It's a good crop to bring in for diversification because even without an export outlet it provides a good oil seed for domestic use and it has been very useful in that regard. Horticulture is coming on as a way of diversifying our agricultural export produce. Livestock is another area which we are working on. The ITC is a research institute which is doing good work on livestock. Tourism is of course another area which is developing, helping us to diversify our economic base. Our focus here is the TDA (the Tourism Development Area), which has been set aside for the development of tourism to supplement up-country tourism. This industry will act as a stimulus to artisanal industries. Fisheries is another area which can diversify our economic base, and this too we are working on. (Fisheries is an area in which we are cooperating with the EEC.) In diversifying we do not overlook the need for the rational and more efficient use of our resources. Last but not least, we are encouraging private investment. The response has been considerable. There is a great deal of interest in private investment.

► *You have established this unique practice of touring the country to see the farmers face-to-face. What effects has this had on you, personally, in the governance of The Gambia, and what has the response of the farmers themselves been?*

— The "Meet the farmers" tours, which is the name the media has given them, have been extremely useful to the Government, because they enable me and my entourage (which includes ministers and high officials, non-governmental organisations and members of the diplomatic corps) to meet the people in their own areas, in their own fields and swamps and so on. I think there's no better way actually of getting the feel of what the people really want, what their aspirations are, and what their successes and limitations are. We discuss problems frankly. This enables us to understand the nature of these problems and how best to approach them. So I think it is useful both to the Government and to the farmers.

► *Your successful IMF-inspired structural adjustment programme has not been without social costs. What measures has your Government taken to alleviate the hardship?*

— We had to address what has now come to be called social dimension of adjustment. When we embarked on implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme, we had to take some very painful decisions, for example, retrenchment of a certain number of employees in the civil service, reducing subsidies and in some instances stopping them completely, implementing cost recovery, for example in the health sector—charging patients so that there is some recovery or partial recovery of costs of services and medicines and so on. All these, of course, have their negative impact on particularly vulnerable groups. We recognised this and have decided, along with the UNDP and UNICEF, to carry out some research, so that we can approach this problem more intelligently.

We have, however, early on in the Programme—which of course started in 1985—tried to help those civil servants who were retrenched by making some resources available to IBAS (the

Indigenous Business Advisory Service) which works with the Ministry of Economic Planning and Industrial Development, to help them to use their retirement benefits, supplemented by IBAS, to set up businesses in horticulture, poultry, or whatever. This has been extremely effective. It is our intention to increase the resources available for this. We have also, in the cost-recovery exercise in the health area, made exceptions for groups which are considered vulnerable, like children, pregnant mothers, those suffering from communicable diseases, etc. These are the initial measures we are taking on the social dimension of adjustment. As I have said, we are now carrying out specific research into this in conjunction with UNDP, UNICEF and others and when this is completed, we hope that we will mobilise resources which would be directed at these vulnerable groups to help them counter the negative effects of the adjustment programme.

► *Is the Government prepared to see the Gambian Produce Marketing Board, GPMB, go to the wall if it finds competition too tough in your overall liberal policy?*

— Yes, and this applies to all our parastatals, really. We have to reform or modify them considerably. Those parastatals, or parts of parastatals, which we think should continue are actually being made the subject of a performance contract. The GPMB is one of them. We have hived off some of its activities which are not quite commercial in nature and we have signed a performance contract with it on what remains. If the GPMB can make it commercially, that's well and good, but if it cannot, of course, it can go to the wall. The Government used to subsidise GPMB heavily to enable it to pay a certain price to the producer for groundnuts, rice and cotton, but these subsidies have now been removed completely: they were reduced gradually over the last two or three years. The GPMB is now asked to purchase the country's groundnuts at prices determined by market forces.

► *The EEC has made substantial contributions to the development of*



*The Gambia. What are your expectations from Lomé IV?*

— The EEC is one of our main partners in development. Their assistance has been welcome in the areas of agriculture, fisheries, education, health and communications. And recently we have seen a new approach in which EEC assistance on a multi-sectoral basis is concentrated on a chosen geographical area, in this case the Upper River Division, one of our administrative regions, where an integrated programme has been set up. Given this extent of our cooperation with the EEC, we are naturally interested in the outcome of the Lomé IV negotiations. As developing countries, the focus of our interest really lies in trade and development finance, especially at a time when commodity prices have fallen badly and are still falling. Most of our trade with the EEC is in primary commodities and prices have been falling in real terms, and there has been no real increase in the quantum of EDF resources in the previous Conventions. It is my view that Stabex has been one of the most imaginative and popular innovations of the Lomé Conventions. Nevertheless we are aware that there are areas of disagreement between the ACP Group and the EEC: the ACP Group wants to expand the coverage of Stabex to include more processed products and the EEC wants to restrict it as an agricultural instrument. Similarly, the disbursement of EDF resources is also constrained by complicated and time-consuming procedures, which we hope Lomé IV will further rationalise and simplify. I remember saying exactly the same thing when we were negotiating Lomé III. We have further noted that there has been agreement between the EEC and the ACP relative to the principles of equality, respect for sovereignty and non-reciprocity in trade and in the application of the outcome of Lomé IV negotiations — with the exception of the control of natural resources, especially in the fisheries sector. Of course, we look forward to working out a balanced agreement that will address all remaining contentious issues such as non-discrimination in trade and the dumping of toxic wastes. ○ Interview by A.O.

## The demise of the Senegambian Confederation

The end came suddenly for the Senegambian Confederation last August. According to sources in Banjul, a Gambian suggestion that the presidency of the Confederation should rotate between the Heads of State of Senegal and The Gambia rather than held permanently by the President of Senegal, as it had been since 1982, annoyed the Senegalese. Within 24 hours the Senegalese army and police units in The Gambia—the most visible symbols of the union between the two countries—had been withdrawn and President Dawda Jawara had accepted, not the proposal for a “freeze”, but the complete pulling down of the Confederation. He asked his foreign minister, Mr Omar Sey, to begin negotiations immediately for the dismantling with his Senegalese counterpart. So came to an end the latest (if not the final) chapter in the saga of voluntary union between the two countries which goes as far back as the 19th century.

The Gambia is surrounded by Senegal on three sides, dividing the latter almost into two. In terms of area, Senegal is 20 times the size of The Gambia. Culturally, both countries share the same ethnic groups and languages (Mandinka, Fula, Wolof, Jola and Serahuli). Islam and Christianity are the dominant religions in both countries.

It has always been believed that it was a matter of time before Senegal swallowed up The Gambia since both countries were carved up in the Versailles Treaty of 1783. But for one reason or another, The Gambia has remained separate. In the 1870s the French proposed to exchange The Gambia with territories elsewhere. This proposal seemed at one time to be finding favour in London, but it was successfully scuttled by lobbyists of Bathurst-based English merchants. The British were again prepared, before independence, to see The Gambia absorbed by Senegal, a position strengthened by a UN report which favoured federation. This idea was vigorously opposed not only by

the emerging political party in the territory, the PPP (the Protectorate People's Party which was to become the People's Progressive Party) but also by some Senegalese politicians, particularly Doudou Thiam who, it is believed, had an eye on the vice-presidency of Senegal—a position which was being proposed for The Gambia.

A physical inconvenience for Senegal, the independence of The Gambia was received in Dakar not without a feeling of disappointment. But in the Senghor years that followed, both countries learned to accommodate each other, moving closer step by step after initial difficulties.

In 1964, the FAO proposed a customs union between the two countries but nothing came of it. Three years later, however, they signed a loose Treaty of Association and joined other West African countries in 1975 in signing the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) treaty—a treaty which has among its medium-term objectives a customs union throughout the region.

In 1978, both countries set up The Gambia River Development Organisation which has among its development targets the building of a bridge/barrage across the River Gambia. The bridge/barrage, it is hoped, will provide energy and irrigation possibilities for The Gambia and the fastest and easiest link between the northern and southern parts of Senegal, vital for Senegal not only economically but also from the point of view of security. The project has still not got off the ground for a variety of reasons, the most important being the considerable reluctance on the part of The Gambia, which, informed sources believe, is not really convinced that the economic benefits that will flow from such a bridge will overshadow the implications as far as The Gambia's sovereignty is concerned.

The Gambia, however, contrary to most forecasts, has proved economically viable despite its geography. Although The Gambia shares the



common principle of plural democracy with Senegal, this small country has an entirely different economic system, which seems to work. Gambians continue to guard jealously the independence and sovereignty of the country. They have never made a secret of the fact that The Gambia's sovereignty is non-negotiable in its relationship with Senegal.

## An abortive coup

The abortive coup d'état in The Gambia in 1981, put down with the help of Senegalese army, forced the authorities to reappraise The Gambia's relationship with Senegal. It strengthened the ties between the two countries. This culminated in an Agreement which set up the Senegambia Confederation — a union that came into force in February 1982. As well as consolidating the cooperation already existing between the two countries, the Agreement provided, among other things, for joint independent institutions: a parliament, an executive and an army with the President of Senegal as President of the Confederation and the President of The Gambia as the Vice-President (Both countries retained their full sovereignty and official languages); harmonisation of foreign policy; strengthening of cultural and technical cooperation and eventual economic integration.

The Confederation's budget was being financed two-thirds by Senegal and one-third by The Gambia. For the Senegalese, the Confederation represented a step along the road to political union between the two countries. For The Gambia it was a forum for cooperation and eventual economic union, no more, no less. It was this difference in conception of what the Confederation actually meant that was beneath the unspoken disagreement between the two countries and the slow progress towards economic integration.

When the eighth anniversary of The Senegambian Confederation was celebrated in Dakar in February 1989, it was all pomp (military march past) and nothing to show for it. At least 80% of the Confederation's budget went on defence and security.

In the eyes of The Gambians, however, progress was being made. Trade

between the two countries was on the increase and the re-export trade was booming. Agreement had been reached on the Protocols to establish a Free Trade Area and negotiations were continuing on monetary and customs union between the two countries before the sudden collapse of the Confederation.

The Senegalese reaction, according to Gambian sources, was to tighten border control on goods coming into, or in transit through, Senegal from The Gambia as the text of a telex widely circulated in Banjul, from the Senegalese authorities to all customs

posts along the border with The Gambia, made clear. The Gambians have, meanwhile, reacted calmly to the situation with some feeling that, despite the collapse of the Confederation, Senegal would respect other agreements on international trade to which both countries are signatories like the UN Convention on transit and ECOWAS treaty. At the time of writing there has been no major development in the relations between the two countries. It is only left to be seen the extent to which The Gambia's re-export trade and economy as a whole will be affected. ○ A.O.

## Basic facts about the Gambia

**Area:** 11 295 sq km along the River Gambia.

**Brief history:** The Gambia's first contact with Europe goes as far back as 1456 when Portuguese navigators, Luis de Cadamosto and Antoniotto Usidimare sailed up The Gambia and landed at an island they named St Andrew, after one of their sailors called Andrew, who died of fever and was buried there. For 200 years the Portuguese enjoyed a quiet monopoly of trade with the hinterland until the mid-17th century when they were challenged by other European powers. First by the Baltic Germans of the Duke of Courland, who occupied and built a fort on St Andrew's Island in 1651. Ten years later, the British captured it and named it James Island after the heir to their throne who was to become King James II.

Then there ensued a long period of rivalry between the British and French as the American and Caribbean colonies expanded, demanding more slaves. The British held on to territories along the bank of the River Gambia and up north to St Louis on the Bank of Senegal River. In 1766 they established the Province of Senegambia with headquarters in St Louis which was placed under the responsibility of the Royal Charter Companies. James Island, on the other hand, was placed under a Lieutenant Governor.

Taking advantage of British engagement in the American war of independence, the French in 1779 attacked and captured James Island destroying the fort. The island was, however, returned to the British a couple of years later, under the Versailles Treaty in 1783, when the present-day boundary lines of The Gambia were drawn.

The British acquired the capital, Banjul (formerly Bathurst) in 1816 and administered both The Gambia and Sierra Leone from there until 1888 when they were separated. Apart from trade, the British had little interest in the tiny colony and were willing to part with it in exchange for French colonies elsewhere. Despite French initiatives in this direction, this somehow never happened. As mentioned in the Senegambia article, even at independence, the British were in favour of The Gambia being absorbed by Senegal, a position strengthened by a United Nations report which recommended

union. The People's Progressive Party (PPP) won the elections of 1962 which paved the way to self-government with Dawda Jawara as prime minister. In February 1965, The Gambia became independent and in April 1970 a Republic, with Al-Haji Sir Dawda Jawara as its first president. The latter has held the post ever since having successively been re-elected in a country which embraced plural democracy from the moment of self-government.

**Population:** 695 886 (1983 official estimate) annual rate of growth 3.4%; density 61.5 per sq km. Ethnic groups: Mandinka, Wolof, Fula, Jola and Serahuli. Eighty percent are Moslem and the rest are mostly Christians.

**Political parties:** The PPP (People's Progressive Party in power since 1962); NCP (the National Convention Party), and the United Party.

**Capital:** Banjul (pop. approx. 45 000: 1985 estimate).

**Currency:** Dalasi. D13 = £1 (Sept. 1989); D8.6 = ECU 1 (Nov. 1989).

**Gross Domestic Product (1988/89 estimate):** D 513.4 million: Agriculture 29.9%; Industry 8.9%; Services 49.9%.

**GDP per capita:** US\$ 250.

**International trade (1988/89):** exports D 311.4 m; imports D 940 m; deficit D 628 m. Goods exported: groundnuts and derivatives, cotton, fish and fish products, fruits and vegetables.

Principal imports: food, drink and tobacco, machinery and equipment, manufactured goods, minerals and fuel. Goods re-exported; mostly rice, flour, sugar, China green tea and textiles.

**Principal trading partners:** United Kingdom, France, U.S.A., Belgium and Luxembourg, Thailand, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Switzerland.

**Destination of re-exports:** Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso.

**Reserves (1988/89):** D 184.9 m (SDR 20 m).

**Foreign debt (1989):** US\$ 355 m.



# The Gambia-EEC Cooperation

In 1990, cooperation between The Gambia and the European Economic Community will have been in existence for 15 years, under the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Lomé Conventions. 1990 will also see the initiation of the Lomé IV Convention, which, unlike its predecessors, will last for 10 years instead of five. Since the beginning of Lomé I in 1975, cooperation between the EEC and The Gambia has steadily grown, intensified and matured and is expected to grow further under Lomé IV.

It would be instructive to examine first what has happened in the past before reviewing the prospects for the future.

Programmes have now reached 86%. Disbursement under the Lomé III Indicative Programme started slowly due to a slow rate of commitment, but now stands at over 36%.

Table 2 provides an indication of the allocation of funds by category of activity. Lomé I and II were characterised by a relatively wide range of activities. Under the category "rural development", emphasis was given to the construction of rural feeder roads. The largest single project under Lomé I was the construction and equipping of Gambia College, at Brikama, amounting to almost ECU 4.1 m. Gambia College is the highest educational and train-

Artisanal fisheries development has received attention under all three Conventions, starting in 1977. Initially emphasis was given to access for fishing villages to beach sites and markets, together with a revolving loan fund for fishermen and vendors to acquire improved gear and equipment. In addition, an ice plant was constructed at Brikama, and a fish landing site was completed at Gunjur, in Western Division, in 1983. The objective of the two first phases of the programme was to encourage more Gambians to become fishermen by enhancing the economic environment for greater commercialisation. Under Lomé III, five beach landing sites have been developed by the construction of smoking huts, market and cleaning facilities, fishermen's lockers, repair workshops, offices for fishermen and smokers, associations, and fisheries department extension staff, together with a new ice making plant and a landing jetty in Tanji.

The revolving loan fund will be enlarged to allow for the provision of improved vessels, engines and marketing equipment for traders. The construction phase is almost complete, and the work of mobilising fishermen to take advantage of new opportunities has been initiated. The current phase has benefited from the previous eight years' experience, in that the villages and villagers, both men and women, have been drawn into the design and construction of the project from the start. It is anticipated that the pace of economic activity in the participating villages will be significantly increased as the quantity of fish landed increases, with increased quantities of fresh and processed fish being marketed and consumed both in The Gambia and in neighbouring countries.

Training and education has also figured under the first two Conventions, with the provision of some 212 student years training overseas, in addition to in-country training. Lecturers have been funded to carry out in-country and in-service training at the Management Development Institute in the fields of Financial Management and Accountancy.

### Lomé III : sectoral concentration

The Lomé III Convention, beginning in 1985, saw a shift of emphasis from a relatively large number of interventions

**Table 1: The Gambia: Allocations, commitments and disbursements, 1975 to 1990  
National Indicative Programmes**

	Lomé I (mECU)	Lomé II (mECU)	Lomé III (mECU)
<b>1. Indicative allocations</b>			
Grants	11.30	12.5	21.0
Risk Capital, Special loans	—	1.5	2.0
<b>2. Commitments</b>			
Grants	11.25	12.5	20.0
Risk Capital, Special loans	2.36	1.5	5.7
<b>3. Disbursements</b>			
Grants	10.70	9.8	7.6
Risk Capital	2.36	0.0	0.0

### Lomé I, II and III Indicative Programmes

Over the three Conventions, the total volume of grants allocated to The Gambia amounted to ECU 44.8 m, of which ECU 43.75 m has been committed, and ECU 28.1 m has been disbursed (See Table 1 above). The allocation of Special Loans or risk capital under Lomé II and III amounted to ECU 3.5 m, although ECU 9.56 m has been committed, the additional ECU 6.06 m being "non-programmable".

At the end of Lomé III (1989) commitments under all three Conventions stood at a respectable 98%, the last two years of the Lomé III period witnessing a surge of commitments for various projects and programmes. Disbursements under Lomé I and II Indicative

ing institution in the country, covering the training of teachers, nurses, and agricultural extension staff. The College was officially opened by the President on 18 February 1983—the anniversary of The Gambia's independence.

The largest project under Lomé II is the Banjul Sewerage and Drainage Project, for which grant finance of ECU 3.5 m was made available; the design studies were financed under Lomé I. The project aims at improved rainwater drainage, the provision of water-borne sewerage facilities in the capital Banjul, thus improving public health facilities in a low-lying area with a high water table. The overall project, which is not yet completed, also aims at providing public conveniences and home connections.



towards a policy of both locational and sectoral concentration, with a view to making aid funds more effective. In the case of The Gambia the period of policy dialogue was somewhat protracted as these new objectives were translated into appropriate projects and programmes. At the same time the European Community developed a new policy of directly helping heavily-indebted sub-Saharan countries undergoing structural adjustment programmes, through the financing of special import programmes designed to lead to the creation of counterpart funds.

It was mutually agreed that the sector to receive concentrated attention would be rural development and the environment. Within this framework, the largest Financing Agreement is for the Upper River Division Integrated Programme (URDIP) with a funding of ECU 7 m, comprising five principal elements: agriculture and forestry, primary schools, health, feeder roads and river transport (two ferries at Basse and Fatoto), and credit for agriculture.

Supporting this sectoral concentration was the third Artisanal Fisheries Development Project, already mentioned above, and a Women's Gardens Programme, both in Western Division.

The Gambia also received in 1988 one of the first Special Import Programmes to be funded by the EEC, comprising the ECU 5 m funding of diesel and motor spirit needs of The Gambia for a period of one year. The fuel had been successfully delivered by the end of 1989 and the counterpart funds (40 million dalasis) from the programme will be applied to development activities from 1990 onwards, the bulk of them being used in the Upper River Division Integrated Programme (ECU 3.6 m equivalent).

The final significant project to be financed in 1989, a project which derives its funding from the balances of all three Conventions, as well as 10 million dalasis from the Fuel Import Programme, is the Four Provincial Centres Water Supply Programme. Its total estimated cost is ECU 5 m. This programme is linked to a major project for the improvement of water supplies in the Greater Banjul Area to which the European Investment Bank is contributing ECU 5.7 m.

**Table 2: Percentage allocations by category under Lomé I, II and III**

	Lomé I	Lomé II	Lomé III
Rural Development, including highway maintenance, feeder roads, microprojects	39%	25%	45%
Fisheries	14%	13%	15%
Social infrastructure, including water supply	38%	40%	5%
Education, training	7%	18%	5%
TA, miscellaneous	2%	4%	2%
Fuel Import Programme	—	—	24%
	100%	100%	96%

*N.B.:* The balance of 4% under Lomé III remains to be allocated.

### Stabex

As a country heavily dependent for foreign exchange and general economic health on the production, processing and export of a single crop—groundnuts—The Gambia has benefited considerably from the European Community's instrument of Stabilisation of Export Earnings (Stabex). Over the period 1978-1989, when world prices have fluctuated markedly and declined significantly, and when weather conditions in Sahel countries have been unfavourable, The Gambia has received a total of ECU 47.65 m in the form of Stabex grant transfer payments, which is as much as all national indicative programme allocations under the three Conventions. Stabex transfers are applied to price support measures, input provision, and agricultural diversification.

### Regional cooperation

Regional cooperation is assigned an important role under the Lomé Conventions. Under Lomé I and II, funding was provided for in the evaluation and related studies of a bridge-barrage across the River Gambia, for the design and construction of various sections of the Banjul-Bissau Highway, for a telecommunications improvement programme for various ECOWAS countries, and for support to the International Trypanotolerance Centre based in The Gambia and Senegal, through ILCA and ILRAD for research on N'Dama cattle.

Under Lomé III, most regional projects benefiting The Gambia will be derived from its membership of CILSS (Comité Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel).

### Cooperation outside the Lomé Conventions

The Gambia has benefited from food aid, both direct and through Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), emergency aid for locust control, co-financing with NGOs in small rural development projects and family planning, and a small environmental project to protect the diminishing number of hippopotami in the River Gambia.

Mention should also be made of the Fisheries Agreement between the EEC and The Gambia under which European Member State vessels may fish in Gambian waters, with licensing arrangements, and upper limits for total catch. The Agreement allows for an annual payment of ECU 1.1 m to The Gambia, together with funds for training and research. This Agreement is due for renegotiation in 1990.

### Prospects for the future

With the signing of the Lomé IV Convention the resources available for cooperation between the European Community and the ACP for the next five years have increased overall by more than 40%. This increase will hold true also at the national level. The programmes likely to be funded in the future will follow the pattern of the past, particularly with the experience gained during the implementation of Lomé III. Consequently we may expect a similar concentration of effort either sectorally or geographically, with possible appropriate support in the structural adjustment process, which The Gambia is currently implementing effectively. ○

Alan WADDAMS  
EEC Delegate to The Gambia





# STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

*More and more ACPs are running structural adjustment programmes. This article contains analyses of such programmes in two very different economies—those of Niger and Trinidad and Tobago.*

## **NIGER: reforms under the first structural adjustment programme**

by **Kiari LIMAN TINGUIRI** (\*)

Niger, like most of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, has embarked upon a process of economic reform (it began in 1983), with the help of the IMF and the World Bank, plus bilateral assistance from a number of donor countries (the USA through USAID and France through the CCCE). The aim, as always, is to reduce the external and public deficits, reorganise the system of production and create the right conditions for healthier, less vulnerable growth.

This article sets out to list and analyse all the reforms which Niger has adopted in the course of its structural adjustment drive. However, there are one or two prior considerations. Although the structural adjustment programmes adopted in the different countries are all aimed at righting the balance in the major sectors of the economy, each one is geared to a precise diagnosis of the situation in the country concerned. And it is this which dictates the measures chosen for the reform and gives the programme its coherence.

Firstly, then, it would be as well to look at the analysis of Niger's economy, which lies behind the structural adjustment programme, before going into details of the main reforms carried out there, but after setting the programme in its historical context—i.e. the growth of the national economy over the past 10 years. The main constraints and trends in Niger's economy over the past decade, the programme of economic reform on which the Government has embarked, and the results it has produced are all examined.

### **Niger in the '80s: adjustment of the economy**

Niger's economic growth prospects are restricted mainly by the fact that the country is landlocked, by the shortage of arable land in a country where 90% of the population lives off resources derived from the rural sector (40% of GDP), by the decline in land availability due to desertification, by strong demographic expansion and by the poor quantity and quality of the productive apparatus. So the factors of

production are inadequate from the word go. And the economic policy, too, is limited in its effect, for two reasons. First, Niger belongs to the West African Monetary Union (WAMU) and economic policy is nothing more than budgetary policy, as the monetary policy is supranational. Second, Niger is wide open to foreign trade, and the informal sector of it, with Nigeria, no doubt accounts for the greatest volume. So the nation's economy is affected by the economic (and especially monetary) policies applied in Nigeria, without being able to respond in the same way (by, say, devaluation).

It is within the area shaped by these constraints that the growth of Niger's economy over the past decade should

be seen if it is hoped to produce a rigorous analysis of the reasons for, and aims of, the structural adjustment programme. Niger's GDP went from CFAF 443.2 billion to CFAF 649.8 billion (current rates) between 1979 and 1987, largely thanks to the rural sector and the extent of world demand for uranium.

One of the outstanding aspects of the decade of growth of this country's economy (1978-88) is of course the spectacular development of public firms. The government used its uranium earnings to increase its hold over the productive sectors and to supply essential goods and services at low prices, while developing employment. In 1985, the public firms sector was contributing 7% of GDP (21% of the value added in the modern sector) and employing 11 500 staff. The financial results were mediocre, largely because of unsound investment decisions, wrong pricing and marketing policy, state interference, a lack of financial discipline and a shortage of qualified staff.

From 1981-82 onwards, world demand for uranium dropped, the rural sector was hit by successive years of drought, the public firms sector failed to improve its performance (quite the contrary) and Nigeria closed its frontiers (1983-84). All this combined to upset the balances (or make the imbalances untenable) and the structural adjustment programme proposed righting them to set the scene for further growth. This meant:

— the balance of payments, trends in which can be summed up as follows: the classic trade deficit went from CFAF 30.5 billion in 1979 to CFAF 17.7 billion in 1987, having soared to CFAF 72.1 billion in 1982. Thus the current accounts deficit was only able to be lowered in 1986-87 by cutting back on imports and doubling transfers without counterparts;

— public finances: the overall deficit was 12% of GDP in 1980-81 and represented 8% of GDP in 1986-87 after dropping to 4.5% of GDP in 1983-84;

— the outstanding external debt: CFAF 356 billion on 31 December 1987 (51% of GDP), as against the 53.1 billion (12% of GDP) of 1979.

So, even a rapid analysis of Niger's economy in the '80s clearly reveals the

(\*) The author, who holds a doctorate in economics, is head of the Economics Department at the Faculty of Economic and Legal Science at the University of Niamey. A bibliography on structural adjustment in Niger, which gives more detail than the footnotes in this text but which could not be printed here, can be obtained from the author.



**Table I: Agricultural output (million tonnes)**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Millet	1 255.0	1 364.0	1 314.0	1 292.0	1 325.0	779.0	1 449.0	1 389.0	997.0
Sorghum	351.0	368.0	322.0	357.0	362.0	240.0	329.0	360.0	366.0
Cowpeas	304.0	266.0	275.0	270.0	269.0	195.0	115.0	297.0	209.0
Groundnuts in the shell	89.0	126.0	102.0	87.0	74.0	31.0	9.0	55.0	40.0
Paddy rice	23.8	30.7	39.6	42.0	45.3	51.4	56.1	75.3	49.0
Cottonseed	3.0	2.9	1.8	2.0	4.0	3.9	4.8	7.3	

Source: Ministry of Agriculture.

**Table II: Uranium in the national economy**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Production (tonnes)	3 616.0	4 132.0	4 354.0	4 256.0	3 423.0	3 273.0	3 181.0	3 109.0	2 950.0
Price (CFAF per kg)	24 500.0	24 500.0	24 000.0	20 000.0	27 500.0	29 250.0	30 000.0	30 000.0	29 300.0
Exports (CFAF billion)	83.6	97.2	98.0	90.8	110.0	98.8	95.3	88.5	86.7
Employment	2 083.0	3 239.0	3 397.0	3 409.0	3 451.0	3 364.0	3 555.0	3 549.0	

Source: Ministry of Mining and BCEAO for exports.

**Table III: Public finance situation (CFAF billion)**

	1980/81	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	1984/85	1985/86	1986/87
Total deficit (commitments)	-64.0	-45.1	-48.6	-31.1	-53.7	-66.3	-61.6
Adjustment			1.9	0.8	-1.8	1.8	-0.1
Arrears	2.8	14.4	-1.7	-12.4	-3.4	0.0	0.0
Reimbursement of revolving debt					0.0	0.0	-4.7
Amortisation of public debt (*)	2.9	6.0	7.6	14.3	18.7	18.6	20.0
Total deficit (paid out)	-64.1	-36.7	-56.0	-57.0	-77.6	-83.1	-86.3
Internal financing	20.8	10.4	6.1	8.2	14.2	4.0	-0.3
- non-banking	9.4	-1.0	1.7	2.5	7.0	5.7	11.9
- banking	11.4	11.4	4.4	5.7	7.2	-1.7	-12.2
External financing	43.3	26.3	49.9	48.8	63.4	79.1	86.6
- drafts	43.3	26.3	49.9	32.9	48.4	65.1	71.1
- rescheduling (*)				15.9	15.0	14.0	15.5

(\*) Amortisation = before rescheduling. The DAEP is responsible for the estimates for amortisation and rescheduling in 1986-87.

Source: DAEP, Ministry of Planning.

**Table IV: Debt indicators**

	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Liabilities	53.1	89.8	173.6	205.1	276.4	322.0	326.5	340.2	356.0
Growth rate of liabilities		69.1%	93.3%	18.1%	34.8%	16.5%	1.4%	4.2%	4.6%
Debt as % of GDP	12.0%	16.8%	29.0%	31.2%	40.0%	51.4%	47.9%	46.3%	50.8%

Source: Ministry of Finance.

causes of its present problems as being repeated droughts, the vicissitudes of its relations with Nigeria and the sharp drop in the world demand for uranium. The origins of the imbalances which made the adjustment policy inevitable—the balance of payments and public finance deficit and an untenable external debt—are also apparent.

### The programme of economic reforms

#### The diagnosis and the logic of the programme

All the reforms in the structural adjustment programme, be they macro-economic or sectoral, were aimed at speeding up the growth of the nation's economy and maintaining the external and budgetary imbalances at desirable levels. The measures were designed to solve a number of structural problems which both directly caused these imbalances and impeded the growth of the economy. There were five such structural problems.

(1) The inefficiency of public resource management because the public sector was dominant and ineffectual in what it did in the economy.

(2) A vast, inefficient semi-public sector whose poor performance was largely due to the regulations governing prices, contracts and employment.

(3) A modern private sector whose development was held back by the lack of raw materials and which was not expanding as it should have done because of a system of incentives which encouraged investment for its own sake rather than the economic viability of projects—so the comparative advantage of the country was not taken into account.

(4) A small revenue base and rapid demographic growth in a landlocked economy, with agriculture, which depends on the hazards of climate, as the main sector. Agricultural policies have not encouraged products with a good cost-effectiveness ratio.

(5) Minimal capitalisation on human resources.

We shall not discuss the well-foundedness of this diagnosis here. The important thing to remember is that it provides the internal coherence of the SAP as a whole and that the reforms which the programme has brought in are only pertinent as a response to the problems posed by that diagnosis.



## Macro-economic reforms

We shall list the aims before outlining the instruments used to achieve them.

### *The aims*

The various economic policy measures taken as part of the programme can be divided into categories, according to the main aim of each, as follows:

The stabilisation measures are macro-economic reforms intended to reduce domestic demands (or absorption). The tax measures (increases in the rates, taxable amounts and the return on duties and taxes), a cut in public spending and a restrictive monetary policy reflected in the limitation of domestic credit make a direct contribution to contracting absorption (and therefore to the absorption of domestic and external imbalances).

The measures aimed at stabilising the economy include greater supply (production) through better use of the factors of production, the elimination of price distortion (grants and regulated fixing) and the withdrawal of tax disincentives and monopolies. These reforms are clearly liberal in inspiration and attempt to create (or re-establish) the right conditions for proper competition, the only thing likely to bring about optimum allocation of resources.

Then there are measures to create or restore the international competitiveness of national output. The most classic of these, devaluation, is, however, not available to Niger because of its membership of WAMU.

Measures to get growth off the ground again include increasing the supply of goods and services by expanding the production base. What is aimed at here is an increase in the supply of factors of production, with new investments and measures to channel national savings into investment as a first step. The measures to discipline the institutions, which are aimed at ensuring that the results of the various reforms are lasting ones, involve administrative reform, to create management control structures.

### *The instruments*

The main objective is more stringent management of public finances to

make public investments more effective (aim B) and broaden the basis of the economy (aim D). A distinction should be made between the reform of domestic public finances and those geared to improving the management of the external debt.

The domestic financial reforms include expenditure reorganisation measures and resource mobilisation schemes. Current expenditure was restricted by making changes at three levels:

- larger operating funds, together with the transfer of costs (of small irrigation works, teaching establishments etc) to the users;
- a staff cost freeze in real terms through a restriction on civil service recruitment;
- a reduction in transfers to consumers by a cut in direct grants and the recovery of the costs of public utilities.

In investment expenditure, now covered by a rolling three-year programme, there are three trends. The emphasis on investment in directly productive sectors has been increased again (from 38% to 45% of investment expenditure in 1985 to 1987), there is to be a human resource development programme and the existing infrastructure is to be updated.

An attempt will be made to mobilise resources through cost recovery measures to make the public services more efficient (reducing the budget appropriation for grants, hospital dues, irrigation fees, school supplies, drinking water and drainage). VAT is to be introduced, the tax on petroleum products revised and the possibility of exemptions from customs duty limited, all of which should help make the tax system more efficient and increase its yield.

New standards are to be introduced for decisions on, and the management of, the external debt, both to restrict liabilities and achieve the sort of debt servicing that is compatible with the nation's financial resources. There were two measures here—no further loans on non-soft terms were to be entered into in 1986-88 and a search was to be made for financial aid on soft terms, calling on external grants and concessional credits.

Economic and State intervention policies were reviewed with the twofold

aim of making for greater efficiency (aim B) and cutting the costs to public finances (aim A). This resulted in a public firms reform programme and a change in the private sector incentive system.

### *(a) reforms in the semi-public sector*

The vast programme of reform of the public firms, begun in 1985, included measures of three main kinds—changes to incentive policies, improvements to the legal and institutional framework in which the semi-State bodies operated, and programmes of rationalisation, privatisation and liquidation of certain firms. The price and marketing policy reforms mentioned hereafter were intended to standardise the structure of incentives for both public and private firms. They did away with some of the public firms' privileges which discouraged private initiative and they paved the way for better competitiveness for the firms which remained in the public sector. These institutional and legal reforms took place in 1986.

### *(b) Reform of price and marketing policies*

In 1984, the Government began taking steps to reduce official price controls and make the system set up in 1974 more flexible. The aim was to make resource allocation more effective and improve the system of incentives by making price-fixing more dependent on market forces. In October 1984, the cowpea export monopoly held by SONARA, a mixed company, was abolished and, in October 1985, all monopolies and quasi-monopolies were done away with and millet and sorghum imports liberalised. In September 1985, the number of goods and services covered by the approval system was brought down from 27 to seven and then five, now only covering what were deemed to be staples. The price approval system for all local industrial products covered by the Investment Code was replaced by a more flexible system of price formation in which Ministry of Trade authorisation was no longer needed for price rises of up to 7% p.a. A liberal cereals marketing system was set up in November 1985. In October 1986, the list of imports subjects to luxury tax was simplified and separate margins for



each product were replaced by pre-established margins of 35-50%. All other imports were entirely deregulated.

Before the reforms, Niger's marketing system was dominated by COPRO-NIGER, the State trading board, and the OPVN (the cereal marketing board). COPRO-NIGER's job was to stabilise the prices of some imported consumer goods, on which it had an import monopoly and sold at prices fixed by the administration in its own sales outlets. The OPVN's job was to stabilise consumer grain prices by means of buffer stocks. The government also intervened on the produce market by granting food and cattle import and export licences to private operators on a selective basis. The work of the two boards was considerably reduced when the above-mentioned price reforms were introduced and the import monopolies and quasi-monopolies were withdrawn. They also lost their price stabilisation functions and all COPRO-NIGER's sales outlets were closed. In October 1987, the OPVN was supposed to have brought its stocks down to a maximum of 80 000 tonnes, which were to be its buffer stocks. Its role in marketing will now be simply to replace a third of the buffer stock every year through a system of invitations to tender for its sales and purchases.

### Sectoral reforms

#### *Tariff policy, regulation of external trade and more flexible economic procedures*

These measures were outside the adjustment programme proper, although they were planned and/or adopted within its framework. They were suggested at the round table on the private sector (March 1988) with a view to encouraging greater openness to external markets and include the withdrawal of duty on all exported products, a considerable reduction in the duty on imported raw materials that do not exist locally, standard duties on all products for local consumption or in transit, the early adoption of the draft texts on temporary import arrangements and the actual implementation and widespread application of economic customs arrangements. The Minister of Trade's authorisation, previously required before nationals could set up companies, was



*"The first SAP was the opportunity for a complete overhaul of agricultural policy"*

also done away with, so that those interested can now apply direct to their lawyers to draw up the rules and make the required announcements. And activity licences, which had lasted two years, were now good for five years for commercial and industrial firms, thus making for securer investment.

#### *Reform of agricultural policy*

The first structural adjustment programme was the opportunity for a complete overhaul of agricultural policy and it led to revision of all the instruments (and, indeed, the very philosophy) of state intervention in this sector. The new agricultural policy brought in reforms in four areas.

##### (a) *Cereals policy*

The State embarked on a programme to liberalise the marketing of agricultural products in 1984-85. This was done and marketing opened both to official bodies and to cooperatives and private traders. As far as prices are concerned, the principle is for millet and sorghum prices not to be fixed and for there to be indicative prices for groundnuts and cowpeas and floor prices for rice and cotton.

##### (b) *Agricultural input grants*

Grants for agricultural inputs other than fertiliser were withdrawn. This,

combined with the decline in the producers' income following the price slump and the liberalisation of agricultural product marketing, led to an immediate and continuing decline in the consumption of agricultural products.

##### (c) *Agricultural credit*

The CNCA (the National Agricultural Credit Fund) suspended its credit distribution in 1985 and concentrated on recovering the amounts it was owed. This absence of credit was a cause of concern in the rural world. However, in spite of this, the Government decided to close down the CNCA and set up a new system of agricultural credit.

##### (d) *Agricultural research*

This has been geared to subjects likely to respond to the most urgent needs of the peasants—whose technical skills should be improved by better extension methods and better coordination of the various services involved in the field.

### **The social sectors—health and education**

Not all the projected reforms here were fully implemented during the first structural adjustment programme and we shall simply confine ourselves here to the spirit of them and their anticipated effects.



Structural adjustment in the health sector is intended to strike a fresh balance between the aims and the priorities as they emerge from the way resources are allocated to the various health schemes. A balance is called for between curative and preventive medicine, treatment in urban and in rural areas, and resources allocated to staff and to equipment (and tend towards a decline in the equipment: staff ratio).

The reforms to right these balances involve improving the way the available human resources and infrastructure are used in the health sector, but it is those aimed at better financial management which are likely to have the effect on access to treatment.

Niger has a dual imbalance in its education system between, on the one hand, present development trends and the country's long-term training requirements and, on the other, the aims of the education system and the country's economic and financial realities. It is heightened as time passes by the high unit costs of training at all levels and by the inefficient way in which available resources are distributed.

A package of nine reforms was planned to cut the cost of school infrastructure (by the general use of local materials), restrict the grants and allowances paid to students and get part of the operating costs (school supplies) paid by the users. The reforms were not applied fully in this sector either, in some cases because they were politically and socially inopportune and in others because they were progressive.

### **Institutional reforms**

The idea here was to create or improve the potential of the structures which prepared decisions and controlled the economic and financial management. The Inspectorate of Finances and the Directorate of Studies and Forecasts were set up in the Ministry of Finance, the Organisation and Method Bureau was set up in the Office of the Prime Minister and the Directorate of Economic Analysis was set up at the Ministry of Planning. Other departments had their duties increased or redefined, their functions specified and their intervention procedures improved. This is what happened at the Directorate-General for Customs and the Directorate-General for

Taxation at the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate of Project Assessment and Programming at the Ministry of Planning. But it was of course the creation of the Ministry to be responsible for public establishments, the state companies and mixed companies (in August 1984) which was the most important of the institutional reforms, as it started the public firms' sectoral adjustment programme—which focused on the definition of a new institutional framework for relations between the state and the semi-public sector. These reforms also involved setting up a system to improve economic and financial management, including a three-year sliding scale of public investment planning, better project cycle management procedures and the programming of public investments. Lastly, the reform of the price system and the doing-away with the monopolies held by the the state companies involved in marketing completed the the state's withdrawal with a view to a liberal economic environment.

### **Results of the first structural adjustment programme on the eve of the second**

In addition to the general constraints hampering Niger's growth (a long-term trend towards desertification and limited input availability), there are a number of specific constraints affecting the success of any macro-economic reform programme. They are, briefly, as follows:

The reforms in the programme have of course improved the environment, in particular because the State has withdrawn what was never really very effective intervention. However, there is nothing to suggest that the economic operators, particularly those in the rural sector, will be able to make the most of this. They are, in fact, still very dependent on weather conditions, because the liberalisation of the economy of natural factors of production, that long-standing and recurrent aim of development plans, has still not been achieved. And Niger's rural communities, like the other sectors of the economy, are short of businessmen. Lastly, the fact that the rural sector is poorly integrated into the modern sector means that reforms are not transmitted efficiently.

The absence of businessmen is not just a problem for the rural world. The plentiful supply of traders (the Aihazai) masks the shortage of industrialists and it is by no means clear that a dynamic private sector can compensate for the reduction of the public sector.

The importance of the informal sector, the branches of which (farming included) supplied an average of two thirds of the country's GDP in 1980-83, is both decisive and increasing. But because of its flexibility, this sector can always adjust its numbers and what it pays them to suit demand and it leaves the modern sector alone to cope with the level of taxation that organised structural adjustment requires.

Lastly—and this is most important—there is Nigeria, whose presence restricts the impact of the measures Niger has taken and whose economic policy influences its economy.

When it comes to results, various attempts at evaluating the situation have shown that, "so far, the stabilisation policy has had a greater impact than the structural adjustment policy" (P. & S. Guillaumont). The stabilisation itself has been achieved by "a reduction in real terms of current expenditure, by clearing State arrears, ensuring reimbursement of the revolving debts of the offices, the State and the mixed companies, reducing debt in the banking system and improving the management and financial results of the public firms" (Evaluation report by the Ministry of Planning, April 1988).

At the same time, "there has been less tax revenue than anticipated because economic activity has slowed down and there have been problems in the mining sector".

On the supply side, "the structural adjustment programme cannot, strictly speaking, be thanked for the good results of the 1986 and 1988 agricultural years, any more it can be blamed for the cereal shortfall of 1987 (De Coninck, Liman Tinguiri and Keita Michel in an ODI (London) report for IFAD—preliminary draft), but a number of reforms pose problems and seem to run counter to the desired effect.

Last but not least, these results, which are partial at best, have been obtained at a social cost which the Ministry of Planning deems high. It is



fourfold—a decline in numbers in the private (modern) and semi-State sectors of an estimated 5% in 1986; a continuing drop in real civil service wages (which were frozen in 1982-88), a decline in the money income of the rural population and stagnation, if not decline, of the average income of the “informal businessman” between 1982 and 1987, alongside a rapid increase in the number of establishments.

### Constant constraints

The aim of the different programmes run with IMF and World Bank support was financial rationalisation and the laying of foundations for the future growth of Niger's economy. But in 1988, the economy has still not had its second wind after the uranium boom of the later '70s. The rationalisation and adjustment measures run since 1983 have of course made it possible to avoid rapid deterioration of the external accounts and public finances by stabilising financing requirements. But in spite of this substantial achievement, Niger's economy is still vulnerable to outside factors and suffers from major structural distortion. The main constraints on the country's economy—the limited and decreasing amount of arable land, the vulnerability of farming and herding to weather conditions, rapid demographic growth, a weak world uranium market, and heavy external debt—make their presence felt. And, in spite of all the progress, the reasons for adjustment, the excessive imbalance of payments and the exaggerated external debt, remain.

### Prospects

The Government sees continuation of these reforms in the shape of a second structural adjustment programme not as a choice, but as an unavoidable necessity. The question is whether structural adjustment should be taken further—i.e. should it be fully and completely applied or should the reforms be extended to sectors and institutions as yet unaffected by the programme? In fact, the two are more complementary than mutually exclusive. Although the reform should be taken further if the short-term aims of the structural adjustment programme are to be met—and incomplete or only partially applied reforms would not do—enlargement is the only thing

which will guarantee the long-term success of adjustment, for coexistence in the same political and economic space of an “adjusted sector” (running according to the standards laid down by the structural adjustment programme) and an unreformed sector (evolving along former lines) would compromise the efficiency of the country's whole economy and administrative system in the long run.

If the groundwork for the second programme (already under way) is anything to go by, the reforms should be continued and taken further in the following fields:

In public finances, “the policies will aim to increase the basis for taxation by better control of the informal sector and better administration, to improve the structure of current expenditure by increasing the allocations for maintenance and equipment with a view to increasing the efficiency of State intervention, to improve the investment selection potential and make for better implementation of the investment programmes. The budget deficit will continue gradually to be reduced, being financed by external resources, with no recourse to the domestic banking system. The monetary and credit policy will continue to be cautious, aiming to reduce inflation and ensure proper resources for the expansion of the productive sectors” (1).

In the State firms sector, reform of the legal and institutional framework will be completed by bringing the statutes into line with the new framework, actually applying the new system of remuneration and signing programme contracts. At the same time, the rehabilitation of the strategic firms maintained in the public sector and the privatisation of others will be continued and finalised. And lastly, the public sector debt rationalisation programme should be completed.

Improvements to the economic environment will be sought through liberalisation measures (price and marketing system) and a revision of private sector incentives (the Investment Code).

The civil service will be reformed, with stricter control of staff numbers,

(1) Medium-term economic and financial policy outline document.

from the point of view of both quality (recruitment by competitive examination) and quantity (strictly in accordance with needs), and a revision of the staff plans.

The credit absorption capacity should be increased with the setting up of structures which can design projects, particularly ones eligible for external financing.

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A final judgement on Niger's structural adjustment policy would be premature, because the process is not yet complete and there are a number of external factors affecting its outcome. Two general remarks may be made, however, on structural adjustment programmes as an economic policy measure which is both viable in a developing country in spite of the international economic crisis and promises economic growth (and if possible development, too).

First, the design (and negotiation) of structural adjustment programmes is a daunting and a salutary exercise for the authorities and the administration of the developing countries.

It is daunting because defining precise targets in terms of dates, quantities and so on is running the risk of being weighed in the balance and found wanting on measurable performances and, where appropriate, sanctioned for it (this is the role of conditionality).

It is salutary because, although the structural adjustment programmes do not solve every problem, they have the merit of posing the “real questions” and, above all, of highlighting the fact that political choices always have a cost and that real arbitration often means deciding which section of society has to bear that cost.

Repetition of structural adjustment programmes could, without due care, turn them into routine operations. The danger is that the “development policy letters” (the reference documents for the structural adjustment programme) would become surrealistic texts, like the economic and social development plans before them, whose main worth was not their connection with what was real and realisable, but in their power of attraction. ○ K. L. T.



## TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: the issues and the evidence

by Ronald RAMKISSOON (\*)

Trinidad and Tobago can be characterised as an open petroleum economy, in which the petroleum sector is the engine of growth. This is not to say, however, that this sector is firmly integrated with the rest of the economy: on the contrary, it is a virtual enclave. It is government's taxation of the sector and its expenditure in the rest of the so-called non-oil economy that has effectively driven the economy for several decades.

In some sense the current dilemma which the economy now faces originated with the first oil shock of 1974 and, less so, the second in 1980. The dramatic rise in international oil prices in 1974 and after, along with the increase in domestic oil production, meant corresponding increases in government's revenue and expenditure, with the first big deficit on overall government operations occurring in 1982 (\$2 346.6 million). A relatively small deficit of \$131.6 million was recorded in 1979 and was indicative of the underlying imbalance in government operations.

### The boom years, 1974-1982

Sustained high levels of government expenditure, both capital and current, stimulated much growth in the non-oil economy, contributing to the 6% average annual growth in real output in the whole economy over the period 1974-1983. Government expenditure on wages and salaries at the start of the boom represented just over 50% of total current expenditure in both 1973 and 1974. Despite some arguments to the contrary, the share of wages and salaries in total current expenditure declined soon after, averaging under 45% since then, but reaching 49% in 1986.

It was government's subsidies and transfers to the population, which was intended to cushion the effects of inflation as well as to "spread the wealth around", which tripled over the decade from 14.3% of total expenditure in 1973 to 48.2% in 1983.

In the context of a booming economy, unemployment fell from 15.4% in 1973 to 9.9% in 1980. The rate really began to push upward from 1983, when it measured 11.1%. The increase in unemployment during the boom did not result from a falling wage rate, for both real and nominal

wages grew by substantial amounts. The index of average weekly earnings of production workers registered an average annual increase of 20.6% over the decade 1974-1983. The corresponding average rate of inflation was 14.2%.

The rate of inflation grew rapidly over the boom period, reaching 17.5% in 1980, and remained in double figures until 1985 when it fell to 7.7%, partly because of a contraction in aggregate demand. The average unit value of imports rose by almost 200% between 1974 and 1980. Increase in the broad money supply averaged 28% between 1974 and 1982. The rate of inflation was not, however, exorbitant by developing countries' standards, partly due to the high level of imports, consistent with rapid economic growth in an open economy, coupled with a presumably overvalued exchange rate of TT \$ 1.00 = US \$ 0.42.

For once the country appeared to have broken the foreign exchange stranglehold which has crippled the development effort of so many Caribbean and Latin American countries. The balance of payments recorded surpluses for eight successive years, beginning in 1974, and the country's foreign exchange balance reached record levels. The current account balance, which is of major concern in

adjustment programmes, registered surpluses in seven consecutive years, except in 1979 when a small deficit of \$ 80.5 million was recorded.

Monetary policy over the period of the boom sought to cushion the economy against the full impact of the expansionary fiscal policy as well as to channel a greater proportion of loanable funds into priority sectors. The growth in the money supply was still high, however, with the broad money supply growing by an average 28% annually over the period 1974 to 1982.

### 1982: the oil boom ends

The following situation characterised the economy in the final year of the oil boom. The balance of payments account recorded its first deficit in nine years in 1982, with the value of imports peaking in the same year and the current account balance showing a big deficit of \$ 2 095.8 million. The country's terms of trade were worsening, while inflation was high compared to the country's major trading partners. Foreign reserves, which peaked in 1981, were still high but declining. The unemployment rate was at its lowest level in decades and the standard of living high. Fiscal policy was expansionary, with government expenditure high and rising and revenue falling. The public debt was not prohibitive, but it was high, and rising rapidly, while capacity to repay the debt was being weakened. Between 1981 and 1983 the total public debt grew by some 46% and the external debt service ratio was just 2.4%.

An important question is, did the structure of output change over the period of the boom and, if so, how? Basically, while the contribution of the services sector, including construction, transport and finance rose substantially, that of agriculture, petroleum and manufacturing declined over the boom period. This pattern largely reflected the high level of government expenditure, high income levels and a liberal import regime.

### The period of adjustment: 1983-1988

It is true to say that the need for adjustment was recognised quite early

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by the then government. Evidence of this includes the appointment of the Committee to Review Government Expenditure (The Bobb Committee) in 1978 and the appointment of the Multi-Sectoral Planning Task Force in 1982. The adjustment process in some sense really began in 1983. However, the Budget Speech of January 1982, in particular, set the tone for what was to follow when the then Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and Planning stated "the fête is over and the country must go back

public sector grew by 94% between the period 1983 and 1987 compared to private sector credit which grew by 21% over the similar period. Further, loans by the Central Bank to the public sector rose from just \$29.9 million in 1983 to \$1 004.4 million in 1987. It appears, therefore, that Trinidad and Tobago made one of the classic mistakes of many developing countries — it borrowed to finance expenditure in the context of a contracting economy.

The contraction in the money sup-

ply former fell by an average 26.3%, between 1983 and 1986, the latter declined by only 2%.

While the problem in cutting recurrent expenditure is never easy, as the experience of other countries has shown, the substantial cutback in capital expenditure was most unfortunate and is not unrelated to the persistent decline in economic growth over these years.

But how was the high level of expenditure maintained? This was

### Selected indicators (Trinidad and Tobago)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
1. GDP (Constant Price, Factor Cost) \$ M	2 991.4	3 005.2	2 914.1	2 662.1	2 504.4	2 462.4	2 377.9
2. GDP (Current Price, Factor Cost) \$ M	17 560.7	20 153.0	19 712.2	19 194.9	18 399.4	17 241.9	16 332.5
3. Petroleum Price (US \$ per barrel)	31.4	29.0	26.4	25.4	24.5	13.14	14.0
4. Government Revenue (% change)	8.8	0.8	- 7.8	1.0	2.2	- 0.8	- 1.4
5. Government Expenditure (% change)	21.8	42.5	- 7.3	- 6.0	- 7.0	- 15.0	0.0
6. Recurrent Expenditure (% change)	13.2	70.1	3.3	0.1	- 4.0	- 7.0	- 4.0
7. Capital Expenditure (% change)	33.5	10.9	- 26.0	- 21.0	- 18.0	- 40.0	36.0
8. Overall Balance on Fiscal Operations (\$ M)	426.5	- 2 346.6	- 2 216.0	- 1 655.7	- 917.4	- 1 012.0	- 1 214.7
9. Overall Balance of Payments (\$ M)	1 350.5	- 527.1	- 2 161.6	- 1 749.5	- 261.5	- 2 413.8	- 899.0
10. Current Account Balance (\$ M)	758.1	- 2 095.8	- 2 354.7	- 1 382.7	- 256.6	- 2 173.7	- 901.5
11. Foreign Reserves (\$ M)	7 687.2	7 160.1	4 998.4	2 850.0	3 579.9	1 190.6	292.0
12. Broad Money Supply (% change)	20.7	36.7	7.0	4.8	0.7	- 3.5	2.5
13. Unemployment Rate (%)	10.4	9.9	11.1	13.4	15.7	17.0	22.3
14. Inflation Rate (%)	14.3	11.4	15.2	13.2	7.7	7.7	10.3
15. Net Terms of Trade—average Unit Value (1974=100)	121.1	102.5	101.8	100.9	93.6	81.0	71.0
16. External Debt Service Ratio	2.1	2.4	6.8	5.5	6.4	11.3	21.6

Sources: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago, National Planning Commission, Central Statistical Office.

to work". In that Budget Speech, as well as in those which followed, particular emphasis was placed on the need for greater productivity and efficiency in the economy. The inefficiencies in the plethora of state enterprises were attacked and the critical need for growth in the export and non-oil sectors of the economy were emphasised.

### Monetary and fiscal policy

Over the adjustment period 1983 to 1987 monetary policy was, by and large, contractionary, with growth in the broad money supply averaging 2.3%. There was an average annual decline in the narrow money supply of about 6%. Growth in bank credit, however was relatively buoyant, averaging 7.4% and only declined in 1985 to rise again in the following two years. Commercial bank credit to the

ply was achieved partly on account of the still-high foreign exchange outflows. However, this had a deleterious effect on the country's balance of payments account. A judicious use of the policy instrument of reserve requirement in particular also helped in limiting money supply growth.

Fiscal policy was still relatively expansionary. While the net injection of funds by the Central Government into the economy declined over the period — from \$4 038.2 million in 1983 to \$1 749.0 million in 1987 — it was still high. Total government expenditure declined over the period by an average 7% between 1983 and 1987 but GDP (current prices) fell by 17% over the same period.

Very importantly, however, the curtailment of total expenditure was largely at the expense of capital, not recurrent, expenditure, for while the

done partly through high taxation but also by borrowing — domestic and foreign. The critical external debt service ratio jumped from 2.4% in 1982 to 6.3% in 1983 and reached 21.6% in 1987 — a pattern of quickly spending windfalls and borrowing to meet high expenditure typical of many developing countries.

### Inflation and unemployment

Import prices declined until 1985 and consequently helped in constraining the growth in domestic prices, but, with the devaluation in 1988 (TT \$1.00 to US \$0.24), prices are expected to rise. Increases need not be exorbitant, though, given a relatively contractionary monetary policy.

Rising unemployment has accompanied the increase in prices and stems directly from the contraction of the government sector, in particular



the curtailment of government's capital expenditure. The rate of unemployment rose steadily from 11.1% in 1983 to 22.3% in 1987, and constitutes one of the greatest costs of the adjustment strategy.

### Devaluation and the balance of payments

Devaluation of the domestic currency plays a major role in most adjustment programs. Indeed, it is a major ingredient of most orthodox packages since it is argued that a major cause of balance of payments problems in developing countries is an overvalued exchange rate. The structuralists, on the other hand (i.e. those who eschew a monetarist, short-term approach to the problems of developing countries) by and large discourage the use of devaluation as an instrument of adjustment because of what they claim are weak export and import elasticities in developing countries. Moreover, devaluation is likely to be inflationary and, coupled with contractionary demand, induces stagflation.

The Trinidad and Tobago dollar was devalued in December 1985. From that time most goods were traded at the new rate, but "essentials", mainly food and medicine, remained pegged to the previous exchange rate of TT\$ 1.00 = US\$ 0.42 until January 1987. What was the effect of the devaluation? The value of merchandise imports in nominal terms, which was declining steadily since 1983, rose by 43% in Trinidad and Tobago dollar terms in 1986, but fell by 21.8% in the following year. On the export side, total export value, which was increasing since 1983, fell by 4.5% in 1986 but rose by 2.3% in 1987. The current account balance worsened dramatically in 1986. The poor export performance in 1986 was primarily due to the price of oil, which fell dramatically from an average US\$ 24.50 in 1985 to US\$ 13.14 in 1986. Indeed, it would appear that had it not been for this fall in petroleum prices the balance of payments account may have been much better, since the export value of most other categories of exports including food and manufactured goods, increased in 1986. The unexpectedly large drop in oil prices

lends credence to the view that the success of an adjustment strategy may also depend, quite simply, on luck.

Further research on the impact of the devaluation is certainly necessary, but one may tentatively conclude that the devaluation was helpful in contracting aggregate demand. It is only capital goods imports which appear to be relatively price-inelastic. Mineral fuels accounted for some 70% of the average value of Trinidad and Tobago's exports between 1986 and 1987, and, because of the structure of the petroleum industry, a price incentive brought about by a devaluation of the Trinidad and Tobago dollar is unlikely to lead to any significant increase in output. Over time, however, price incentives are likely to contribute to export growth in the non-oil sector of the economy.

### The supply side

There is no doubt that the government of the day recognised that the problem of growth and transformation needed to be addressed in conjunction with that of stabilisation. It was recognised, firstly, that short-run adjustment (stabilisation) necessitated a fall in consumption; secondly, that the economic base must become more diversified and thirdly, that export growth was crucial for long-term survival.

Moreover, the authorities clearly saw both that the long-run health of the economy depended on enhanced productivity and strategic investments and that the tax regime needed to be revamped to encourage production.

What appears to have been the case, however, is that the recognition of the problems was not translated into timely and effective action to deal with them.

### Issues of the adjustment period

This brief analysis of Trinidad and Tobago's attempt at stabilisation/adjustment allow some tentative observations to be made. The first relates to the debate on the degree of emphasis that ought to be placed on a demand management strategy as opposed to supply expansion. The evidence indicates that, in the case of Trinidad and Tobago, greater empha-

sis and success has been associated with the short-term demand management strategy. The failure to generate an expansion in supply is due to several factors, not the least of which the fact that structural weaknesses in the economy take years to be corrected. For example, it takes several years, especially in developing countries, before productive factors are reallocated within the tradable goods sectors and from the non-tradable goods sectors of the economy.

While it appears that, in the short term, aggregate demand must of necessity contract, supply expansion cannot be long in coming if the stabilisation/adjustment strategy is to succeed. While orthodox demand management policies appear to "spill over" into some amount of output contraction, some argue that "expansionary stabilisation" is possible. It is doubtful whether Trinidad and Tobago explored these alternatives sufficiently in addressing the supply side.

Another issue which arises relates to the cause of the problem in the first place. While one can argue that the immediate balance of payments problem was due to the fall in the price of oil in 1982 and more so in 1986—an external factor—the underlying structural weakness of the economy and the nature of the response to falling oil prices is very much an internal matter. Developing countries will always be subject to the vagaries of the international market place. It is really our response to the external shocks, favourable and adverse, which will determine the viability of our economies in the medium to long run.

The success or failure of an adjustment strategy depends very importantly on the share of consumption and investment in domestic expenditure as well as on the strength of the national savings effort. In Trinidad and Tobago, consumption appeared to have increased while capital formation declined over the period of adjustment. Consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP (market prices) is estimated to have risen from an average 81.2% in the period 1983-1985 to 86.5% in 1986, while investment fell from 21.3% of GDP in the former period to 15.4% in 1987.



Moreover, the fall in capital formation in 1987 of almost 30% was more than three times the decline of 9% in consumption expenditure. While the data are estimates and consequently subject to error, it appears that sufficient emphasis has not been placed on investment in the adjustment period, which explains the continuing decline in economic growth.

National savings have also declined from the levels reached in the 1970s. With the deterioration in fiscal operations the government has moved from being the major contributor to savings to a dis-saver over the last few years. The private sector has now moved to become the major contributor.

### “Soft landing”

The evidence seems to indicate that the policy-makers opted for a gradual approach to adjustment rather than shock treatment. Indeed the term “soft landing” was very much in vogue during the period. From the standpoint of adjustment strategy one finds that the “gradual” approach can be too drawn out and possibly so much so as to be ineffective. On the other hand, shock treatment may result in convulsions and social disorder. What might be more important however, is timing. Action taken for example, soon after a landslide election victory can be tremendously effective compared with the same action taken several months later.

Here, then, is the political dimension of the adjustment strategy. There were two points in time, in the author's view, at which it was opportune for the political directorate of the day to take unpopular but apparently warranted decisions including expenditure restraint in the context of a stabilisation/adjustment strategy. The first was in 1981 the year in which the People's National Movement won a landslide victory. The second opportunity was in 1986 when a new party, the National Alliance for Reconstruction replaced the People's National Movement which had been in power for approximately 30 years. This party benefitted from several studies, including the Demas Report of 1983 which pointed to the serious economic problems which faced the country and to the direction in which

solutions should be sought. One may with some justification, however, argue that the present government is still “new” and further, that measures have been taken to reduce expenditure among other things.

After about five years of stabilisation/adjustment where does Trinidad and Tobago stand? Real output declined by a further 3.4% in 1987. In 1987, deficits were recorded on the balance of payments account and on the current and capital accounts as well. The balance of payments deficit in 1987 (\$ 899 million) was, however, much smaller than that of 1986 (\$ 2 413.8 million) and may indicate a shift towards equilibrium. The country's stock of foreign reserves, however, reached one of its lowest levels since the early 1970s (\$ 292 million) in 1987. It is now virtually exhausted.

The country's total public sector debt stood at \$ 10 173.7 million (US \$ 2 826.0 million) at the end of 1987 with external obligations representing 65% of the total or US \$ 1 836.9 million. The public sector's external debt service ratio stood at 26.1%. Unemployment is approximately 22% and rising, while the rate of inflation is not exorbitant. The government is finding it difficult to meet its financial obligations and the international financial market is almost inaccessible at this time.

### What chance of success?

What does the evidence indicate about the likelihood of success of Trinidad and Tobago's strictly *internal* efforts to correct the various economic disequilibria?

The economy benefitted tremendously from the dramatic upsurge in oil prices in 1974 and 1979/80. Through government expenditure in the non-oil economy, employment grew and the standard of living of the population rose. The balance of payments account showed healthy surpluses and the country prospered. With the fall in oil prices the economy stagnated, unemployment increased, the balance of payments account went into repeated deficits, the debt burden grew and government found it difficult to reduce recurrent expenditure substantially. The non-oil export sector failed to fill the vacuum left by the

decline in the export value of petroleum.

Clearly, over the period of the boom the economy had not been put on a path of self-sustained growth. Two administrations, since the downturn began in 1983, have sought to deal with the classical twin problems of stabilisation and growth.

Firstly, the government was much more successful in the orthodox technique of demand management than it was in addressing the structuralist concerns of supply expansion. The reasons for this relate to the fact that it seems easier to contract the economy than it is to free supply bottlenecks. As well, it seems to be the case that economic contraction was viewed as the major challenge in the adjustment period.

Secondly, while one can argue that external events triggered the need for adjustment, the domestic response appeared not to be flexible enough to deal with a rapid change in the international price of the major export commodity and the consequence of that price fall on national income.

Thirdly, certain aspects of the stabilisation/adjustment strategy as, for example, the cut in expenditure which occurred was at the expense of capital investment, appeared to be disastrous. The implementation and administration of the two-tier devaluation of December 1985 appeared also to have limited the optimal potential of the measure.

Fourthly, the two regimes which spanned the adjustment period allowed the two opportunities of major election victories to pass them by. This has been most unfortunate when one considers that virtually all schools of thought agree that the political dimension of a stabilisation/adjustment programme is the single most difficult aspect and consequently opportunities cannot be allowed to be lost.

The country's stock of foreign reserves in 1988 was virtually exhausted and, while there are signs that certain macroeconomic imbalances are tending towards equilibrium, serious social and other problems remain. Consequently, Trinidad and Tobago may not be far off from the second stage of the adjustment scenario which characterises so many developing countries. ○ R.R.



# Controlling erosion in south-eastern Nigeria

by Th. M. BOERS (\*)



*One of the deep gullies caused by erosion in south-eastern Nigeria*

The problem of soil erosion in Nigeria has been compared, in its extent and seriousness, to the problem of desert encroachment. Annual soil loss is estimated at 30 million tons, of which 50% occurs in the Eastern States. It is important to note that there is a direct relationship between population density and soil erosion, because of the need for living space and farmland, both of which are obtained through the clearing of forest. Population density

in the states of Imo and Anambra is of the same order as that of the north-western countries of the EEC, estimated at about 600 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.

Why are the South-eastern states of Nigeria so seriously affected? What is being done and what can be done about it? South-eastern Nigeria lies in the tropical rain forest which has a rainfall of between 2 000 and 2 500 mm per annum. The rainy season extends from April to October. Traditionally the local population practices shifting cultivation, but this has become a problem because of the population pressure on the land. The shortage of land forces some farmers to return to the same plot after two

years, while others cultivate one plot continuously.

## Gully erosion

Cutting down trees for cultivation has deprived the region of the dense forest canopy which protected it against torrential rainfall and the erosive powers of water: fast runoff from metal roofs, roads and footpaths removes topsoils and creates deep gullies in the land. In the Agulu-Nanka region (Anambra State) an area of about 1 100 km<sup>2</sup> is affected by gully erosion, — a process which may have started as far back as 1850 at the rate of an estimated 20-50 m per year. In Imo State some gullies measure 3 km long, 2 km wide and 120 m deep. The Amucha gully for example has grown from 6 m deep in 1970 to 48 m deep now, and it is fed by a watershed of nearly 3,000 ha.

A survey conducted during the 1970s in a very densely populated area of 6 000 km<sup>2</sup> affected by gully erosion found that of the 70 independent gully units identified 52 were still increasing in diameter. A total area of 3,400 km<sup>2</sup> was classified as highly exposed to erosion.

## Surface erosion

Surface erosion as against gully erosion is the removal of topsoil by rainfall and overland flow. Although it is less spectacular than gully erosion it affects larger areas. Surface erosion is a creeping process, which slowly but surely reduces agricultural output. On bare soil, surface erosion can remove one or more centimetres of topsoil every year. This causes sharp reductions in agricultural yields, indeed yields can fall to zero in some cases.

The soils under the tropical rain forest are of poor structure and have low fertility. Once the land has been cleared and farmed on for a year or two, fertility falls. The raindrop impact on soils as bare as these can easily destroy their structure, forming crusts all over. Crusts reduce absorption of rain water and they facilitate surface runoff, which removes topsoils as well as the nutrients and organic matter that are

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present in them. What is left behind is scarred, infertile land.

Where runoff from areas of a few hectares concentrates, small streams are formed. These streams converge into larger ones, increasing their erosive power. The streams cut into the land at accelerating speed. If this process is not stopped, then gullies are formed.

Erosion is further aggravated by fast runoff from houses, roads and civil engineering works. Many gullies start to develop on weak points of engineering design, such as uncovered side slopes of roads or unprotected slopes downstream of culverts. While surface erosion lowers agricultural production by reducing soil fertility, gully erosion aggravates the problem by reducing the area of farmland and destroying roads, buildings and structures.

When searching for a solution to a problem of this magnitude, it is natural to look at the experiences of countries which have had similar problems. Unfortunately it is not easy to find an example of a large-scale reclamation and erosion control programme, which has been successfully completed. One reason is that rapid soil erosion of the type that causes the loss of about 10 million hectares of arable land every year, is a new problem in the world today. Many countries are still trying to find an answer to it. There has, however, been one example of a huge erosion control operation. That was in the USA some 50 years ago.

During the 1930s when drought struck the Great Plains of the Southern USA and dramatic wind erosion occurred, the area became known as the Dust Bowl. Natural grasslands had been brought under cultivation and this was one of the causes of the calamity. It was estimated that on one day (11 May 1934 to be precise) some 300 million tons of soil was blown away. This is about 10 times the estimated annual soil loss in Nigeria today. The US Government took important steps to solve the problem: the Land Grazing Act was enacted. This ushered in the rational use of land for animal husbandry. By the end of 1950s the Dust Bowl had been halted.

### Awareness of the threat

In Nigeria a survey carried out in 1987 among 100 farmers in Imo State showed population awareness of the threat of erosion and of the urgent need to combat it. The farmers saw declining yields and the destruction of farmland and houses as very serious problems. However, they lacked the technical knowledge to solve them. Although individual farmers take whatever measures they see as necessary they also see government action as vital if the erosion menace is to be removed.

The Nigerian Government on the other hand has recognised the seriousness of the situation and the need for research. In the mid-1970s the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development commissioned a pre-feasibility study, followed by a detailed study on erosion control. The reports were completed in 1979. These presented a comprehensive plan of action for Imo and Anambra States. Execution of the entire plan would take 30 years. It envisages not only erosion control but also mod-

ernisation of agriculture. The present economic difficulties of Nigeria are now a serious constraint on the execution of this project, which is a large one.

At the Imo State Government level, however, the Agricultural Development Project (ADP) has regional offices where extension agents advise farmers on erosion control measures, such as planting crops on contour ridges and planting cover crops to protect the soil against raindrop impact. At present the World Bank is supporting the ADP.

### Two requirements: technical know-how and capital

The immediate effect of these government initiatives is that the awareness of the erosion menace has increased, both among government officials and the local population. Relations between human activities and soil erosion have become clearer. So also is the urgent need for solutions. There are two important



*One of the methods being used to control erosion, applying the results of research*



requirements for erosion control: technical know-how and capital in which the role of the government is essential.

The technical knowledge is not readily available, but should be developed through applied research. In this process, experience from other countries can be useful, although they cannot be applied directly (what worked in the US 50 years ago may not work in Nigeria today). The applied research should involve hydrological, geological, as well as socio-economic, surveys. Also, specific data is necessary on surface runoff and soil loss while suitable cropping patterns for soil protection are developed.

Such a research programme can only be carried out and properly coordinated through government initiatives: the capital required to conduct research and execute projects of land reclamation and land conservation can only be provided by government. The phase of planning, design and execution of such projects, which should follow the research, would of course involve private consultants, but government has to take the lead by providing the proper framework for all the activities.

### **Research approaches: suggestions**

For the applied research programme, two parallel approaches may be used: a) a trial and error approach by farmers themselves in villages and b) applied research by engineers and other scientists in experimental fields.

The first approach will aim at fast results in the short run for specific conditions in a village area. Extension agents can help the farmers to set up small plots to try out erosion control measures such as planting on ridges instead of on mounds to prevent overland flow and selecting cropping patterns which will provide good soil production throughout the rainy season. The results of such trials are site-specific and cannot be directly applied to other areas with different conditions.

The second approach will aim at results for the medium and long run,

which have more general validity, are not site-specific, but applicable under varying conditions. For this more basic approach, erosion parameters and processes have to be studied on experimental fields, such as the erosive power of rainfall, surface crusting and infiltration, overland flow and sediment transport and soil resistance to erosion. This approach will provide data for prediction of soil erosion in other areas and reduction of soil erosion there by control measures.

For both approaches it is important to understand one essential concept: any erosion control scheme should be "catchment-based". Isolated erosion control measures by individuals are too limited for a problem of these dimensions. The following example may illustrate this point.

Suppose that community X, located in a certain catchment area, wants to stop erosion of its own farmlands and tries to do so by a cooperative effort of all its farmers. If community Y is located in a higher upstream section of the same catchment area, surface runoff from Y can erode farmland of X. Community Y may not even be aware of the fact that they are causing an erosion problem for X. And even if they realise this, they may not be too inclined to stop it, because they live on high and dry lands. The conclusion from this example is that the struggle can only succeed if there is a concerted effort by all farmers in the communities of one catchment area towards the same goal. The way to do this is through government action.

### **The EEC's contribution: the Erosion Studies Centre/ESC**

Since 1985 the EEC has financed the Erosion Research Project, in which the Federal University of Technology, Owerri (FUTO) is cooperating with two European universities: Delft University of Technology and Wageningen Agricultural University, both in The Netherlands. An erosion experimental field and a meteorological station have been established on FUTO campus in Owerri and various surveys have

been carried out in Imo State to collect data on hydrology, meteorology, geology, and the socio-economic impact of erosion.

During Phase 1 of the project, three European lecturers have cooperated with Nigerian lecturers at FUTO. Delft seconded an engineer and a geologist while Wageningen sent one engineer. In 1988 Phase 1 of the project, which was financed from Lomé II funds, was concluded with the International Symposium on Soil Erosion in South-eastern Nigeria held at FUTO.

The project is executed under the direction of the EEC Delegation in Lagos. Phase 1 was considered as a University Linkage Programme. Phase 2, started in 1989, is being financed from Lomé III funds and the project is integrated into the large "Palm Oil Belt Development Programme" for Nigeria. In Phase 2 of the project the Erosion Studies Centre (ESC) at FUTO will develop.

Delft and Wageningen will send two experts to help establish this Erosion Studies Centre. ESC will continue with applied research on experimental fields and will also start trials in village areas. The emphasis on practical application of research results in village areas will be increased. Economic aspects of erosion, reclamation and control measures will also be studied. ESC will cooperate with government services, extension agents, research institutions and universities involved in erosion control.

There is no easy solution to the erosion problem in South-eastern Nigeria. Financing will be needed to develop and spread technical know-how. Erosion control can only be achieved if agriculture is also properly developed. Time will be required to instruct farmers on proper cultivation and cropping methods and to mobilise the rural population so that a concerted effort becomes possible. The EEC can play a constructive role here by providing financial and technical assistance. Cooperation between Nigeria and the EEC can result in real progress towards complete erosion control in South-eastern Nigeria. ◊ Th. B.





## European Civil Protection: responding to disasters

Disasters do not just happen to other people. Europeans are fully aware of the fact that while they watch on their TV screens the unfolding of great disasters overseas—whether Armenia, Bangladesh, the Caribbean or Sudan—there are plenty of major disasters very much closer to home. There have, in the past decade, been earthquakes in Italy, a disastrous chemical spill on the Rhine, the Chernobyl explosion, the flooding of Nîmes, the Lockerbie air crash, and a host of others. Behind the scenes of these natural disasters there is a new European sentiment—that although each country is best placed to deal with its own calamities, there is a strong argument for knowing more about what your neighbours are doing and can do.

Jean-Pierre Lerat



*Europe 89: a helicopter flies in to an advanced medical post*

That European solidarity exists, and has done for some time, is not in dispute: from 1977 to 1987 the Community budget disbursed more than ECU 95 m in grants to help with earthquakes, floods, snowstorms, cyclones and severe cold spells. But the existence of a budget line and the will to engage funds are only the start of the story. In 1987, a real programme of Community civil protection began when, on 25 May, the Council adopted a resolution which embodied Commission proposals whose objective is to have, in time, a real strategy at continental European level which will include all resources for fighting disasters: a strategy that goes beyond merely responding to emergencies and involves forecasting, prevention and early warning as well as rescue operations, aid and medium- and long-term reconstruction.

### A diversity of traditions

It must, however, not be thought that the European dimension of civil protection is a simple matter of money or even organisation. By tradition, the responsibility for helping with disasters is the province of each

Member State's Home Affairs Ministry (with two exceptions; in Ireland this task is carried out by the Environment Department, and in Italy there is a Ministry of Civil Protection) but the actual work is carried out by military, para-military or quasi-military forces. The uniforms, traditions and mentality of these latter make them, perhaps, less susceptible to concepts of "harmonisation" than other elements in society. Furthermore, quite apart from traditions of the countries involved, there is also a divergence in the history of types of national disaster. In the Mediterranean countries, there is a long history of natural disasters—earthquakes, volcanoes, forest fires, droughts, dam bursts and floods. In the northern countries, there are few natural hazards but a greater concentration on environmental issues—industrial and chemical accidents, for example. In between, the Benelux countries, France and Germany, hold a position midway between the two extremes, and tend to be generous and cooperative but at an unofficial level. All this makes it difficult to envisage the same interest in Greece as in Denmark for expertise in chemical clean-ups, or in Den-

mark as in Greece for forest fire detection and control.

What European Civil Protection must aim to do is to create the optimum conditions for getting the thinking of national bodies concerned with civil protection aligned on similar lines, creating economies of scale and intensifying personal contacts. Given the difference in national traditions and the nature of natural disasters from country to country, there is a political aspect to all this: reinforcing European-wide predictive and reactive capability makes it easier for the European "man in the street" to see that "Europe" is working for him. Just as the European flag now flies alongside national flags in various countries, a European Civil Protection logo alongside the well-known symbols of national civil disaster squads will reinforce the feeling that European solidarity is real and that it has practical effects.

### Community involvement

The Community has now a budget line for cooperation on civil protection, small as yet, but an earnest of





Jean-Pierre Lerat

*Expensive simulation: even a wrecked aircraft was provided and put in the remote 'crash site'*

its desire to forge ahead. A series of preliminary actions has already been singled out. This includes the compilation of a guide to civil protection, the establishment of a permanent network of liaison officers, more effective use of data banks and the holding of joint simulation exercises. The guide to civil protection is a practical manual intended for use by those responsible for civil protection and by the national authorities involved in planning disaster relief. The text, more than 300 pages supplemented by annexes, describes the current situation in member countries, indexes disasters and their characteristics, lists the multilateral and bilateral agreements signed on the subject between Member States, catalogues the disaster relief plans established at national, regional and local levels and lists the resources which could be made available to

by satellite and to develop a secure communications network, not only for reference but for operational use. Much of the work now being undertaken is thus on the information side—between professionals themselves and between professionals and the public at large. But there comes a point when cooperation must pass from words—even electronic words—to deeds, which is where “Europe 89” comes in.

### **Europe 89: a simulated disaster**

On the afternoon of 17 October 1989, a twin-jet medium-haul airliner took off from Orly Airport, Paris, on a charter flight to Spain, with 170 passengers and 5 crew on board. As it crossed the Gaillac navigation beacon, the pilot notified the Area Control Centre at Aix-en-Provence of

Community countries. The permanent network of civil servants responsible for civil protection and disaster relief has been in operation since 1 July 1987, and its establishment has allowed for a rapid exchange of information on the requirements and available resources in the Community for coping with natural or man-made disasters. There are now plans afoot to upgrade the network using electronic mail and a data transmission system to make it operationally viable. Existing data banks on the subject are being evaluated and inventoried with a view to establishing the feasibility of their interconnection.

Studies are being undertaken to develop the evaluation of natural risks

pressurisation problems on board the aircraft and requested permission to descend to level 100 and continue the flight to Barcelona. A few minutes later, while trying to hand the aircraft over to the Spanish air traffic control, the ACC realised that it had lost contact with the aircraft. The Search and Rescue Coordination Centre at Lyon Mont-Verdun was immediately requested to initiate an aeronautical investigation. Within five minutes the Centre contacted the Gendarmerie in the three départements closest to the flight path and last known position of the aircraft, with a yes/no request for information on sighting.

Fifteen minutes later, there was the first indication that something was wrong. While the Gendarmerie reported negatively, the French SARSAT satellite picked up a radio distress signal in the Pyrénées Orientales region. At the same time, Perpignan airport contacted the Area Control Centre with the information that an aircraft leaving Perpignan on a scheduled flight had picked up a signal from a radio distress beacon. Ten minutes later, the Search and Rescue Centre put two SAR (Search and Rescue) helicopters, one each from Aix and Perpignan on standby, alerted the Palma, Majorca Search and Rescue Centre (asking for a Spanish aircraft to be put on standby) and issued its second request for information to the prefect of Pyrénées Orientales.

The rescue plan was now set in motion: a prearranged series of telephone calls was made requesting information from local authorities and the general public about the missing aircraft. The following groups became involved at this stage: the radio hams' association, Gendarmerie, Border Police, Customs and Excise, State Security Police, the Forestry Department, local fire and rescue services, town halls, the National Electricity Corporation, the local authority equipment suppliers and the Post Office. Mobile patrols were gathered and sent out by all these bodies. Fifteen minutes later, the first information on the possible location of the aircraft came in from a Border Guard patrol, and the Search and Rescue Centre



ordered its aircraft aloft to conduct visual and electronic searches, whilst requesting the Spanish aircraft to do the same. Five minutes later there was confirmation that a jet aircraft with one engine trailing smoke was heading into the area already being searched.

An hour and 20 minutes after contact with the aircraft was lost, a French helicopter's homing device narrowed the crash area down to a radius of 2 kms in the mountains. Air searches were called off and patrols ordered to concentrate their efforts on this sector. Rescue services were put on standby, as were emergency medical teams, ambulances and hospitals where treatment might be required. An hour and ten minutes later, the first search parties located the crashed aircraft, sealed off the area and proceeded to give first aid, while the operational HQ of the rescue operation was transferred to the crash site. The aircraft had come down, out of control, in a medium mountain area, with 50 dead, 30 seriously injured, 90 people suffering from multiple trauma and five missing. A tragedy—but only on paper.

In fact, "Europe 89" was an ambitious simulation exercise, carried out by the French and Spanish authorities under the aegis of the Commission's Directorate-General for Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection. Everything but the dead and injured was present on site, including a mock-up of a crashed airliner. Aircraft, helicopters, rescue vehicles (250 of them!) and the command and control network functioned perfectly. 450 operational personnel, from mountain rescue teams to medical staff, took part, as did 150 national experts from EEC and EFTA countries, 200 observers, 100 journalists and 200 logistics and traffic control staff, a total of 1087 people over three days, without an accident, without an incident. It was an expensive exercise, but a number of consequences will ensure that it was money well spent.

Firstly, the exercise showed that cooperation was possible: "Europe 89" promises a revival of interest in exchanges of information and personal exchanges. This will help with



Jean-Pierre Lerat

*European cooperation: above, the operations HQ with communications link. Below, a Spanish helicopter unloads 'casualties' while a French medical unit stands by to whisk them to hospital*



Jean-Pierre Lerat


the formulation and planning of disaster control and relief strategies in the future, each partner selecting what is best to come up with coherent and harmonious plans. The same is true of equipment: during the "Europe 89" exercise, it was discovered that no less than eight different types of stretcher were being used! If nothing else, a reduction in this sort of diversity would be welcome. Most of all, though, the exercise showed that cooperation in the face of a disaster was possible, that national programmes, though excellent, could always be improved, and that the cooperation was useful and should serve as a model for others contemplating a simulation exercise.

It is no easy matter to make European integration come alive for the man in the street: politicians and economists can make their pronouncements, academics and civil servants produce the paper. But the concept of European Civil Protection is easy to understand. Thanks to Community funding and the stimulation of links and networks, disaster prevention and relief has been, and is being, improved. And the next time a disaster strikes, the victims will be grateful that equipment has been modified and reaction times reduced. A stitch in time saves nine, they say. European Civil Protection wants to do more and save Twelve! ○

T.G.



## National languages



Vivant Univers

*Respect for cultural identity is seen in the right of every individual to use his own language. Here, a young couple from Central Africa reading the Bible in Sango*

*“There is something very surprising about the failure of virtually all development thinking to refer to language issues”*

**(R. Chaudenson)**

Now, at the end of the 20th century, something like 4 000 languages are spoken by the roughly 5 billion-strong population of the earth. Some of them are well-known and others virtually unheard-of outside the small circle of people who use them. Some have gained ground, and others are dying. Although the language issue triggers real passion—take the outcry in France when the Institut Pasteur decided to publish its famous *Annals* only in English recently—very little thought is given to its connection with development, as Professor Chaudenson, Head of the Institute of Creole and Franco-phone studies at the University of Provence, says in this epigraph to the *Dossier*.

Yet there are many links between national lan-

guages and development and the most obvious and the longest-standing one may well be political, as the story of the Tower of Babel, as Judeo-Christian tradition has it, goes to show. In the beginning, says the Book of Genesis, “the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech... And they said, Go to, let us build a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven... And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language... and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. Go to, let us go down, and there confound their languages, that they may not understand one another’s speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth and they ceased building the city”. The



moral is clear. A single language is an incomparable instrument of power. This traditional Hebrew response to the question of the origin of languages has been taken up by modern thinkers who believe that there was once one, original language, of which bits survive here and there, especially in some African tribes. This is what some of the work of Cheick Anta Diop (Senegal), Théophile Obenga (Congo), Tshitendji Nzembele (Zaire) and Jean-Marie Habig (Belgium) says and what von de Velde (Germany) said 100 years ago. However, the "language-power" equation is there, with another equation, "language-human right", as a corollary. This is more ambiguous. While respect for cultural identity is apparent, in particular, in the individual's right to speak his own language, everyone also has the right to be taught to speak a language which is a means of communication and an opening onto the outside world — and communication is increasingly important in the modern world. So, since there are so many languages and so few of them are international (or, relatively speaking, national means of communication), many people will be forced to be bilingual if they want to enjoy this twofold right.

Obviously, many other factors come into the choices which the governments of developing countries have to make. Should they have one or more national languages? Should they maintain or suppress the language of the colonials, for example? There are political factors (quest for national unity, ease of administration etc.), economic factors (rural development, trade promotion etc.) and socio-cultural factors (the best local language to use in education and health, the cost of teacher training or of producing textbooks, etc.). L.J. Calvet dates the emergence of the language question in three countries in the light of the problems they had to tackle.

	China and India: before the birth of the State	Guinea Conakry: after the birth of the State
<b>Practical problems</b>	How to address the people, spread propaganda and militate for independence	How to run politics, education and collective promotion, consolidate the power of the State
<b>Symbolic problems</b>	How to assert national existence and oppose colonialism	How to strengthen national unity and mark the frontiers
<i>Source: La guerre des langues (The language war), Payot, Paris 1987.</i>		

The *Dossier* comments on these various aspects of the problem and gives examples (Nigeria, Seychelles, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Niger, Kenya and Papua New Guinea), beginning with an article by J.L. Doneux and F.N. Gasana, taking stock of the language and development issue. A description of the language

### Some of the commonest languages in the world

Language	People for whom it is the mother tongue (million)
Chinese	1 000
English	350
Spanish	250
Hindi	200
Arabic	150
Bengali	150
Russian	150
Portuguese	135
Japanese	120
German	100
French	70
Punjabi	70
Javanese	65
Bihari	65
Italian	60
Korean	60
Telugu	55
Tamil	55
Maratha	50
Vietnamese	50

*Source: The New Internationalist, No 151, January 1989.*

situation in Africa follows, for information and to show the dimensions of the problem, and the situation in teaching, agricultural extension work, the media and literature is then discussed.

But this is not just a government problem. It is every bit as important to the individual too. As L.J. Calvet also says, "There is no such thing as a monolingual country and it is man's destiny to be confronted by languages rather than a language". And confrontation often starts very early, at school, for example, for people lucky enough to have a place. School is where many children come into contact with another language — and not just in the developing countries, either. Europe, too, has its regional and its minority languages and even little European schoolboys and -girls who speak the same language at home and in the classroom soon learn, to their amusement, that, although cocks may go "cocorico" in France, they go "quiquiriqui" in Spain and "cock-a-doodle-doo" in England. But it is not just a question of translating words and phrases. Concepts may be a problem too, when an equivalent cannot be found in another language. The biggest problem is, of course, literary creation. Ngugi wa Thiong'o explains how he had to transform the creative approach he used in English when he wanted to write in Gikuyu. So individuals are responsible for making a decisive choice—that of which language to use in their private lives, especially in the home—and the article by O. Nekitel on the case of Papua New Guinea points out how important this choice is, because for the language in question it really is a matter of life and death. ○

M.-H. BIRINDELLI



# National languages and development

by Jean Léonce DONEUX (\*) and François Ndoaba GASANA (\*\*)

Anyone attempting to investigate the part national languages play in development must first look the languages and development.

Let us start with languages. They exist long before they are deemed to be national or not, and they exist in two ways. They may be native languages, used daily, starting in the womb (showing the significance of the term "mother tongue" so often used to describe the first system of symbols within which every child grows up) or they may be learned languages, acquired later on to meet the needs of the geographical, sociological, political or even educational environment. Most of the time, of course, languages which are superimposed on the native tongue are other people's native tongues too — unless, like Latin or Ancient Greek or Sanskrit, they are learned for historical or religious reasons, without being part of everyday linguistic exchange.

(\*) Recent publications by the author, a linguist, include: J.-L. Doneux and J. L. Rouge — *En apprenant le créole à Bissau ou Ziguinchor*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1988. Aram Diop-Fall, J. L. Doneux and R. Santos, *Dictionnaire Wolof-Français-Wolof*, Paris, Karthala, 1989.

(\*\*) Researcher in African literature, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium.

Now let us look at development. This has been adequately defined elsewhere and all we need mention here is what directly relates to language:

— If development is an accumulation of knowledge and know-how, then languages are directly involved, because they are the vehicle for it all, from our most time-honoured products, like axes, down to the computers of today. It is important, for example, to learn, because you are told, that the *blade* of the axe is *blunt*, but the *handle* is perfectly sound. And when it comes to the computer, a decent set of instructions or an intelligent users' guide will avoid the need to open it up and look inside.

— But we can go further than this and confidently state that human languages are not just tools of development or vital pre-conditions for its achievement. They are *one of the components* of development. After all, what are radio, TV and newspapers and rock concerts and social evenings and children's rhymes if not so many opportunities for people *to express themselves*, because they need to express themselves as much as they need to say "I know about this" or "I have revised my second degree equations".

## The choices — from native tongues to recognised national languages and languages at school

There is not just one language. There are thousands. So can they be left out of politics or development policies, for example?

They could be. It would be not wanting to burn one's fingers pointlessly by going too near the flame in man's very soul. Even a member of a small language group of 300 people — and there are such things — gets upset if his language is not taken seriously, because it is the language of his mother and his childhood and his entry into adult life. And what about bigger groups which know that their language is spoken over a large area and has to compete with other languages that are every bit as important?

Yet when states became independent, this was rarely the approach they took. In most cases, they acted on a kind of implicit understanding that if you do nothing about your languages then they are likely to do something about you.

The reason for this is that, in the modern world, the formal and institutional uses of languages are probably more important than the informal, everyday use. In this day and age, what State has not created its radio — and more recently television — and been confronted with the choice of what languages to use for broadcasting? And what State does not have to run a whole educational system and decide which language(s) to use for instruction?

The response to the need to give at least some shape to what might be called a language policy has varied, partly at least, with the colonial attitude to the languages spoken in the colonies. Roughly, the picture is as follows:

— When the colonisers, for reasons of their own, had some respect for the languages of the colonies and used them in contact with the locals, in administration and the schools, these countries continued the practice once independent. They did not have to. They could have stopped, claiming

### Reading the "Kibaru" (it means "news" in Bambara) together in the shade of the baobab in Mali

*"These decrees (on national languages) have paved the way for literacy campaigns in many parts of the world"*





that, if the colonials did it, it must have been detrimental to development and aimed at cutting off international contact and access to modern science and technology. But in all but rare cases, they did not. Instead, most of them were anxious to increase and standardise the use of one or more local languages, particularly in the classroom. And this policy was not incompatible with another, concurrent, one of ensuring that many nationals also spoke a foreign language of international standing.

— Some colonising countries not only paid no attention to the local languages, but even tried to prevent their use, particularly in schools. In Africa, for example, middle-aged adults still remember the “marker”, the stick passed round to children unfortunate enough to say something in their native language in the classroom, in the playground or at lunch and subjecting the one caught with it at home-time to the punishment of exercises in the language of the coloniser — and the school. These were the countries, it seems, which were very quick off the mark with a national language (and usually languages) on independence.

In fact, countries with languages in institutional use during the colonial era needed no special justification to carry on as before. But most of the countries which went in for language policies which differed from those of the colonisers felt that a symbolic break was essential — and these are the very countries which have laws and decrees to make national languages a reality.

### Scope and content of the national language decrees

It is worth looking at the profile of these, very similar decrees.

— They tend to sort out the country's languages, giving national status only to some of them, in the light of statistical considerations, so that minority languages are left out.

— They also tend to be careful to refuse to establish any hierarchy of national languages, even when one is obviously dominant.

— They are accompanied by an alphabet showing how the new national languages are to be written,

giving word division on a language-by-language basis. Sounds which are common to several languages are written in the same way, as far as possible, and, in some parts of Africa, there is a drive to obtain an inter-State consensus on a common regional alphabet.

What part have these decrees, most of which were enacted in the '60s, played?

First of all, they undoubtedly made the people realise that their languages *could be written down* and, since writing and modernism are connected (although not as closely as some people imagine), this was a symbolic act which, *per se*, had something to do with development.

In many countries, the decrees did not remain a dead letter either. They paved the way for literacy campaigns in many parts of the world and drew attention to the fact that the countries' own languages could benefit from musical and dramatic expression and be used on radio and TV too.

But now we are better placed to see that they have their limitations and we may well wonder whether now, a quarter of a century later, some of them ought not to be revised — if not textually (not always necessary) perhaps, then in their practical application. This brings us to the two areas at which they are aimed:

— “minority languages”. These were often excluded, as we have already said. But even in underprivileged developing countries, there are radio broadcasts in the regions and provinces which could certainly give the minority language speakers a few hours a week for themselves. And, going beyond the bounds of their decrees, this is something some countries have indeed introduced.

— The national language. We said that the decrees were very careful about not laying down any hierarchy of national languages, even where one was dominant. There again, time has passed and there are countries where there would be little objection to one language taking over more now, even if only as a second language which people are more or less forced to master if they want to get about and make themselves understood everywhere. At least one country has made it possible for such a language to be

used in its parliament — something not included in the decree, but apparently a natural development nonetheless.

### Why stop at the school gates?

Let us go back for a moment and see exactly what the present situation is. Most countries where the colonials used one or more of the regional languages in the classroom have kept to, and built on, the idea. But what about the others, which resorted to decrees to give the national languages their “letters patent”.

There is a relatively simple answer here, but it provides food for thought. The vast majority of these countries in fact stopped their national language drives at the school gate and any of them which tried to go further were forced to retreat. Why?

Why is the scholastic use of a national language universally accepted in one country but unable to gain currency in another?

We should perhaps put this more dynamically. Why has it been impossible to do this *so far* (and may therefore be possible to do it in the future)?

The (provisional) answers are in fact to be found above. First of all, the countries where the colonials had forced their own language on the school system were no doubt wary about throwing out the baby with the bathwater when they became independent. Then, being careful about politics, they were understandably unwilling to decree *one* language a national one.

But things change and will go on changing. Ideas about schools, and the development aims the country may wish them to have, are changing. And the ideas every individual has about his language, the languages around him and the major international “working” languages, are changing too.

So, from the mother tongue (of even a tiny group) to the languages which are (ultimately) national, or even common to a number of States, it is not too hard to predict that the “language factor” will remain at the centre of our thinking on development over the coming years. ◊

J.L.D. and F.N.G.



## The languages of Africa: an annotated map<sup>(\*)</sup>

An introduction to the languages of Africa has to start by setting aside errors and prejudices.


A dialect is a regional variation of a language, so there can be no dialects without languages and the common claim that "Africa has no languages, only dialects", is an empty one devoid of all meaning. Most of the world's languages are subdivided into dialects across their territories and, if one such dialect takes over as the general means of communication, then it becomes a common language and relegates the other dialects to the rank of *patois*. The Paris dialect became a common language called French and, in Belgium, the dialects of Picardy, Wallonia and Lorraine have become *patois*. Common languages, although not unknown, are rarities in Africa, because the unifying social forces of history have rarely had large-scale effects, so most African languages are scattered dialects.

African languages are said to be simple. *A priori*, cultures with elementary levels of technology are thought to have elementary languages, but in fact there is no link between the technical level of a population and the structure of its languages. The grammar of the languages of classical antiquity, Greek and Latin, as well as modern Russian, is in fact far more complex than the grammar of modern English or French, and Central Africa, near the equator, has some of the simplest languages in the world, such as Ngbaka, and some of the most complex, such as Rwanda. Another reason for this mistaken idea is that Europeans who learn an African language usually learn a pidgin (which, by definition, is greatly simplified) instead of a traditional language. And a third reason is that most African languages are tonal, a feature unknown in Europe and not catered for in the writing which the Europeans have introduced into Africa. And as tones—which do not appear in the writing—are often what distinguish main and subordinate clauses, people tend to think, say, that African languages have no subordinate clauses and build up their sentences just by juxtaposing main ones.

They also claim that African languages have no abstract or generic terms, although there are in fact plenty of them and they are used even in cases where our languages have more concrete terms.

In many Bantu languages, for example, "being better looking than X" is expressed as "being superior to X in looks". What African languages tend to lack is not

(\*) Source: A. Coupez, Head of the African Linguistics Section, Royal Central African Museum, Tervueren (Belgium).





with Ngombe, Mbala and Kete. Without any precise geographical details (meridian, parallel or village, district or province), it is often impossible to identify a language by its name, which is why the exact number of African languages is not known. And then there are reference problems in publications, particularly the indexes, where dozens of forms can be used for proper nouns with variable initial prefixes. In Rwanda-Rundi-Ha, for example, the population of Burundi and everything to do with it, language included—Burundi, for example, Uburundi, Murundi, Umurundi, Kirundi, Ikirundi, Ndundi, Indundi and so on are all to be found—so linguists and ethnologists tend to replace the names of languages and populations by invariable code names such as Rundi.

There is no internationally recognised way of producing a typology of languages. Languages belonging to the same historical family may be very different structurally.

Here are the traditional African languages spoken by about five million people or more on their own territory.

**Peul** (Fulbe) – enclaves of speakers from Senegal to Sudan. **Igbo** – Nigeria.

**Yoruba** – Nigeria and Benin.

**Bantu group**

**Rwanda-Rundi-Ha** – Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaïre.

**Sotho-Pedi-Tswana** – Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa.

**Nguni** (including **Zulu**, **Xhosa** or **Cafre** and **Swazi**), South Africa and Zimbabwe.

**Amharic** – Ethiopia.

**Tigrinya** – Ethiopia.

**Galla** – Ethiopia and Kenya.

**Somali** – Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.

**Hausa** – Nigeria and Niger.

Widespread traditional languages tend to be used as vehicular languages outside their own territories. The 40 or so commonest of these include:

**III E Hausa**, with more than 20 million speakers outside the countries of origin (Niger and Nigeria) is spoken particularly in Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cameroon and Chad.

**I A 2 Mandekan** (or **Dyula**), covering the traditional languages **Bambara**, **Malinke** and **Dyula** – outside the countries of origin (Mali, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea Bissau) is also spoken particularly in Liberia, Burkina Faso and Ghana.

**I A 4 Agni-baule** – Côte d'Ivoire.

**I A 6 Sango**, related to the traditional **Ngbandi** – Central African Republic, Chad and Zaïre.

**I A 5 D Bantu C 36 Ngala** (**Lingala**, **Bangala**, **Mangala**, **Lusengo** etc.) is not exactly a traditional language, but a group of languages spoken along the River Zaïre – Zaïre, Congo and the Central African Republic.

**I A 5 D Bantu G 42 Swahili** (**Kiswahili** and locally in Zaïre, **Kingwana**) – outside the countries of origin (Kenya and Tanzania) is spoken particularly in Uganda, Rwanda, eastern Zaïre, Burundi and Zambia.

**I A 5 D Bantu H 16 Kongo** (**Kikongo**, **Fiote**, **Ikeleve**, **Kituba**, **Monokotuba**) – Congo, Cabinda, Zaïre and Angola.

**I A 5 D Bantu S 40 Fanagalo** (or **Kitchen Kaffir**), based on **Xhosa** – South Africa.

## Classification

### Congo-Kordofan (or Niger-Kordofan)

This family, which includes the majority of the African languages and covers half the continent, is divided into two branches: Niger-Congo (I A) and Kordofanian (I B). The second branch contains only a few small languages spoken in Sudan.

#### I A 1 West-Atlantic

This branch is divided into two groups, a northern and a southern group, the latter being nearer to the rest of Niger-Congo. **Northern group: Fulani (Fulbe, Fula and Peul)**, with enclaves of speakers between Senegal and Sudan, and **Wolof** in Senegal.

**Southern group: Serer** in Senegal and **Temne** in Sierra Leone.

#### I A 2 Mandé.

It is still not clear exactly how this subgroup hangs together. The main languages, in decreasing order of number of speakers, are:

**Bambara** – Mali, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal.

**Malinke** – Mali, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Guinea Bissau.

**Mende** – Sierra Leone and Liberia.

**Soninke** – Mali, Guinea, Senegal, Mauritania and Guinea Bissau.

**Susu** – Sierra Leone and Guinea.

#### I A 3 Voltaic

The Voltaic branch is made up of a central group, which includes **Môôre**, the profile of which has been properly established, and various groups.

**Senúfo** – Mali, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana.

#### I A 4 Kwa

The groups of languages in this subgroup are given from west to east. The last four are designated by their principal language.

**Kru: Bassa** – Liberia.

**Western group: Akan (Fante and Twi)** – Ghana  
**Ewe** – Togo and Benin.

**Yoruba group** – Benin and Nigeria.

**Nupe** – Nigeria.

**Bini group: Edo** – Nigeria.

**Igbo group: Ibo** – Nigeria.

#### I A 5 Benue-Congo.

This branch is a crucial position as far as the classification of African languages is concerned, because of both the number of languages it covers and the extraordinary extension constituted by the Bantu group in the extreme south east. It is divided into four groups:

**I A 5 A Plateau** – Nigeria.

**I A 5 B Jukunoid** – Nigeria.

**I A 5 C Cross River: Efik-Ibibio** – Nigeria.

**I A 5 D Bantu-type** – Nigeria and Cameroon.

In the northern part of this group are languages which are a relatively long way from Bantu, particularly **Tiv**, spoken in Nigeria. Further



south, in the savannah areas of western Cameroon, are two groups more closely linked to Bantu: the Western Savannah group and the Mbam-Nkan group, which includes **Bamileke**. The Bantu group is at the extreme south-east of the Bantu-type group.

### *Details of the Bantu group*

**Fang-Bulu-Ewondo** – Cameroon.  
**Myene, Mpongwe and Galwa** – Gabon.  
**Mongo** – Zaïre. **Tetela** – Zaïre.  
**Lega** – Zaïre. **Nyanga** – Zaïre.  
**Nyamwezi-Sukuma** – Tanzania.  
**Swahili** – Kenya and Tanzania.  
**Kongo** – Congo, Cabinda, Zaïre and Angola.  
**Northern Mbundu (Kimbundu)** – Angola.  
**Toro-Nyoro-Kiga-Nkore** – Uganda.  
**Ganda** – Uganda. **Luyia** – Uganda and Kenya.  
**Rwanda-Rundi-Ha** – Rwanda, Zaïre, Burundi, Tanzania.  
**Cokwe** – Zaïre, Angola and Zambia.  
**Luba-Kasayi (Ciluba)** – Zaïre. **Luba-Shaba (Kiluba)** – Zaïre.  
**Bemba** – Zaïre and Zambia.  
**Nyanja** – Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique.  
**Yao** – Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique.  
**Southern Mbundu (Umbundu)** – Angola.  
**Shona** – Zimbabwe and Mozambique.  
**Suthu-Pedi-Tswana** – Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa.  
**Nguni (Zulu, Xhosa or Cafre and Swazi)**; South Africa and Zimbabwe.  
**Ronga-Tsonga-Tswa** – Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

### I A 6 Adamawa-Ubangi

This branch is divided into two groups:  
**Adamawa group** – Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.  
**Ubangi group** – Zaïre, Sudan and Central African Republic.

### II Nilo-Saharan

This family, scattered across the northern part of Africa, is the most heterogeneous. It includes a majority of isolated enclaves in the desert and in the middle of other language groups. We only give some of the branches and some of the subgroups here.

#### II A Songhai

Most Songhai languages are spoken along the Niger where the River forms a loop (Mali and Niger). The main ones are **Songhai** and **Zarma**.

#### II B Saharan

These languages are spoken mainly in central and northern Chad. The main ones are **Teda** (or **Tubu**), spoken in the Tibesti, and the **Kanuri** group, which comprises **Kanuri** and **Kanembu**, spoken in Bornu.

#### II E Chari-Nile

These languages are scattered over an area from the northern Sahara down to Tanzania.

#### II E 1 Eastern Sudanic

**Nubian** – Sudan.

The Nilotic group: **Dinka** – Sudan.

**Acholi-Luo** – Uganda.

**Nandi** – Kenya.

**Masai** – Kenya and Tanzania.

#### II E 2 Central Sudanic

These languages, none of which are widespread, are divided into two groups: a western group (spoken in Chad, the Central African Republic and Sudan) containing, in particular, **Sara**, **Bongo** and **Bagirmi**, and an eastern group (Zaïre, Sudan and Uganda), containing, in particular, **Logo** and **Mangbetu**.

#### II E 3 Berta

#### II E 4 Kunama

#### II F Koman

### III Afro-Asiatic

This family has six very distantly related branches.

#### III A Semitic

The Semitic languages, which include Arabic and Hebrew, are centred on the Middle East, although several of them are scattered over Ethiopia, among the Cushitic languages, primarily **Amharic**, the official language of Ethiopia, and **Tigrinya**. The expansion of **Arabic** in Africa, linked to the expansion of Islam, has occurred above all in the regions of the Sahara and the east coast.

#### III B Egyptian

**Ancient Egyptian** has left no descendants other than **Coptic**, the liturgical language of the Christians of Egypt.

#### III C Berber

These languages, which are centred on the Maghreb, also occupy the central Sahara. **Tamasheq** is spoken in northern Mali and Niger.

#### III D Chad

These languages are spoken in northern Nigeria and northern Cameroon and in eastern and western Chad. The main one is **Hausa** (Nigeria and Niger).

#### III E Cushitic

The internal classification of this branch is complex. The main languages are:

**Galla** – Ethiopia and Kenya.

**Somali** – Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia.

#### III F Omotic

This branch, spoken in western Ethiopia, does not contain any widespread language.

### IV Khoisan

These languages are spoken mainly by the Bushmen and Hottentots in the desert regions of southern Africa, but there are also enclaves of speakers in Tanzania. Few studies have been made of them and their historical relations are by no means clear. They differ from other languages in having clicks as regular consonants. ◦



# National languages in teaching

by Joseph POTH(\*)

*Since the Third World States have taken over responsibility for their own future, the language of the coloniser has tended to remain the main vehicle for educational activity and French, English, Spanish and Portuguese classes are still very much to the fore in the syllabuses for children and adolescents in these countries.*

*However, local languages have been carried along on the wave of new ideas and flourished to such an unexpected extent over the past 20 years that they are by no means succumbing to the slow death to which some of them seemed doomed. Faced with an encroaching, universal and alienating modernism, men and women in the developing nations are feeling it absolutely essential to go back to their traditional forms of expression. And their mother tongues, full of life and reason, are a guarantee of their identity and mean that everyone has an effective antidote to the levelling-out of personality.*

*For cultural, political and economic reasons, major international organisations such as UNESCO, the UNDP, the World Bank and the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation have long been backing the Third World nations' local language drive and their support is increasing, as the UNESCO plan for African languages in the year 2000 (The UNESCO Horizon 2000 Project Relating to the Promotion of African Languages) shows. The partisans of monolingual European schools, themselves long reserved on the issue, are now being increasingly insistent about the promotion of European languages in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific—and everywhere else in the world—and respect and consideration for the local languages. Everyone now agrees that the coexistence of two languages in the same education system may be a source of balance and development rather than confrontation.*

## Importance of the mother tongue to the harmonious development of the child

It is now certain that early learning until formal education begins is normally done through the mother tongue and that forgetting that this is so is one of the reasons why children are falling behind and dropping out of school in many of the Third World's education systems. It is indeed the mother tongue which guarantees that the child will get off to a good start at school and which provides the fundamental balance which prevents stultification. And it is the mother tongue which enables him to verbalise his thinking and fit it harmoniously into the world around him. Yes, the child is as comfortable in his mother tongue as in his mother's arms and by refusing to allow him to use the fam-

iliar linguistic support which responds to his fundamental need for expression and creativity, the school will make him fall behind. The facts confirm the soundness of this analysis. In spite of the arguments which are still sometimes triggered by bringing local languages into the classroom, there is no doubt that there has been constant, tangible progress in this field. There are very few African language or Creole-speaking countries which have not yet addressed the 'language of education' issue and it would be easy to list the (even firmly multilingual) states whose desire is to guarantee the national languages pride of place in the institutional activities of the school.

The latest statistics show that, for example, 37 out of 47 African countries are committed to using one or

more of their national languages in the curriculum and four others have embarked upon a study phase prior to doing so. So 41 States have given, or are about to give, full teaching status to national languages in their educational systems, although in 1976, a mere 13 years ago, the figure was less than 16. So, strikingly, history has accelerated rapidly and a great deal of ground has been covered. Those are the facts. There is no doubt that the use of national languages will be at the heart of all the major educational reforms expected all over the ACP Group and elsewhere in the coming years.

Furthermore, the use of these languages is not to the detriment of national or international tongues. The school systems of the Third World are moving towards institutional bilingualism. When a people is a major one, it has been said, bilingualism no longer looks like a weakness. It is a higher rung on the ladder of cultural values. Most political leaders now seem convinced of this, as can be seen from the official pattern set for the syllabuses in the various States undergoing language reform.

It would be reasonable to say that what is good for the promotion of the mother tongue is good for second or foreign languages, too. Psychologists have clearly shown that repressing a child's mother tongue is extremely harmful to the development of his cognitive activity, as it impairs the subsequent development of his faculties of expression in the non-mother

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1. Guide méthodologique à l'usage des instituts de formation (Guide to method for training institutes), 1979.

2. Dossiers pour l'information des cadres de l'enseignement (Information dossiers for educational managers), 1984.

3. Dossiers pour la formation pratique des agents de la réforme linguistique (Dossiers for the practical training of reform operators), 1987, in the *Etudes et documents d'éducation* series (Nos 32, 47 & 54), published by UNESCO.


J. Poth is also the author of "L'enseignement des langues maternelles africaines à l'école... Comment? Guide opérationnel à l'usage des responsables techniques et des formateurs pour la mise en œuvre d'une réforme linguistique". (The teaching of African mother tongues at school... How? An operational guide to the implementation of language reform for technical officers and teachers)—UNESCO, Regional education office for Africa, Dakar, Senegal—1988.



tongue he has to learn later. But if parental tongues are encouraged in the classroom, then the child always has the opportunity—a factor of equilibrium—to talk about his interests, his needs and his thoughts—which become clearer, more refined and deeper as a result. The child gradually “decentralises”. His curiosity in his surroundings awakens and he shapes and forms his personality. And this is the background against which the need for new means of expression and investigation linked to the increasingly specialised content of the curriculum soon makes itself felt. English, French and Spanish classes are timely additions and, because they are essential, the motivation to follow them is powerful, speeding up and ensuring the learning process. However, full use of the mother tongue in the classroom, in Europe, Africa or anywhere else, is justified—over and above any considerations related to learning a second (national or international) language. The right to the mother tongue is as inalienable as the right to education, health and life and it is curious that the International Convention on the Rights of the Child fails to mention it.

### Possibilities and constraints of the teaching of national languages

Although a consensus has gradually emerged over the past few years as to the properly thought-out use of national languages in the classroom, the major problems of actually applying the idea are still as acute in a large number of countries which have already embarked, or are about to embark, upon language reform. This is because many experiments in the field are relatively recent, particularly in the French-speaking countries—other than countries such as Zaïre, Burundi, Rwanda or Togo. They took root in the period of political independence and took practical shape later on and those who want to promote operations of this sort in their own countries do not have the hindsight needed to analyse them as a whole or, most important, to assess them. The shortage of human and financial resources, and of suitable structures, also means that information travels slowly from one State to



At school in Tanzania. “Kufundisha” is the Swahili for “to learn”  
*“... in many countries, primarily English-speaking ones, the national languages have long had the right to be used in the classroom”*

another. Even when the exchange networks actually function, statistics are few and far between and evaluation reports virtually non-existent.

Of course, in some countries, mainly English-speaking ones (Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania etc), the national languages have long had the right to be used in the classroom. But during the colonial era, the demands of language, language teaching and educational psychology were not what they are today and the experience of these countries, whose quantitative achievements are remarkable, can hardly be used as models for the language reforms currently being launched by the States—which automatically go for quality and usually do so by subordinating the generalisation of national languages to an experimental procedure based on the prior analysis, evaluation and validation of the basic assumptions on method. We cannot but approve of this approach because, in language reform more than any other field, it is important not to fall into the trap of purely quantitative ambitions. An extension of language reform which is not geared to intensification of the concern with method could well bring disillusion or even retrogression. The

unhappy example of various defunct and moribund language reforms is a reminder of this...

Bilingual and plurilingual approaches in schools have of course been the subject of outstanding studies in a number of countries of Europe and America—in spite of the fact that the focus has been on purely linguistic interactions to the detriment of the learner. But these studies are of limited usefulness in Third World countries, because the introduction of a bilingual system would in most cases be an obvious paradox. While the idea in the industrialised nations is to move on, when the time is right, from mother tongue to foreign language, as follows:

MT → FL,

the historical conditions in which the education systems of almost all the French-speaking countries of Africa, for example, have developed have generated the emergence of institutional bilingualism in the schools, along the following lines:

FL → MT.

The second language is already on the curriculum and it is the mother tongue which is the new term by



which the bilingual situation is created. So the natural order of application is reversed. The problem is obviously how to return to a healthier situation in which the mother tongue is used for learning in the early years of school. However, it is easy to understand that a bilingual system in these countries cannot be based on successful experiments elsewhere if the basic situations are not similar—and may even be radically different.

Not all the countries faced with this difficult situation have chosen the same way out. Each strategy for using national languages in the classroom has its own special features which have as much to do with the number of languages spoken in the country as their social, economic, religious, historical or numerical importance. The language policy cannot be copied from neighbours and the diversity of approaches is clear proof that educational leaders refuse to take over seemingly similar foreign models lock, stock and barrel. Everyone wishes to decide on his approach in the light of his particular needs and the characteristics of the national situation—and rightly so.

So for some States, the best approach to national languages in the primary school is *to use methods highlighted by adult literacy campaigns*. Certainly literacy centres can point to

valuable experience in the use of the languages spoken by the people around them, but this is not enough and it could, from many points of view, be dangerous if it were applied systematically. The biggest objection to using adult literacy material in schools has to do with educational psychology: what is right for adults may well not be right for school children. A child is not the miniature adult that the adults' unhappy tendency to see everything in terms of their own criteria has long had us believe. Children have their own way of looking at life and they are often rich and intuitive. And adults have theirs, developed and sometimes, paradoxically, reduced or limited by habit and experience.


Almost all reading primers for adults, for example, go in for the spelling lists which best suit their particular category of users. But modern children's primers take a more natural approach, based on analysis before synthesis. The same goes for numbers and ways of learning arithmetic. The child's approach, shaped by a specific process of development, is nothing like the adult approach, which is why the progressions used by writers of literacy primers cannot be used in school books. At all events, experience has shown that direct, systematic use in the primary school of the

method and content of literacy centres ultimately saves neither time nor money.

In many countries, *it is the university which leads the way* in bringing the national languages into the schools. Everyone is aware of all the work the university language institutes have done to improve our knowledge of the local languages and the rigorous descriptions which they have come up with are a vital precursor of any educational application. What we have to do now is assess this approach prudently and take care when it is implemented. Most of the descriptive work available is attached to written theses and couched in a language that tends not to be accessible to the primary school teacher working in the field. Obviously, any detail relating to the technical field of language, to be precise, has to be translated in terms of a specialised lexicon. Nonetheless, communication between the university and the primary school practitioner is difficult, particularly when the aims of the researcher rarely coincide with those of the schoolmaster. The ultimate aim of the researcher is a rigorous description of the language, and linguistic criteria alone are pertinent. But the schoolmaster wants the harmonious development of the child and subordinates the facts of language to it and takes psychological and educational criteria into consideration and sometimes intuition, that fruit of vocational training and experience in the field, too.

So the academic and the schoolmaster are on two very different planes. Leaving the former to coordinate the introduction of national languages in the classroom would amount to asking him to agree to the primacy, or at least the prevalence, of psycho-pedagogic criteria over purely linguistic ones. But is that what he was trained for? In fact, the introduction of national languages in the primary school is a global problem and, as such, cannot be reduced to the purely disciplinary considerations which all too often characterise the traditional specialist.

Thought about one or two cases of failure and stagnation, the objective data accruing from the evaluation of current operations and the specific



FAP - F. Botis

#### Eager pupils in Swaziland

*Every approach to using national languages in the classroom has its own special features which have as much to do with the number of languages spoken in the country as their social, economic, religious, historical and numerical importance*



circumstances are leading more and more countries to take a third approach—that of putting the job of coordinating the renovation of language in the primary school in the hands of the Institutes of Education and educational leaders. In this case it is the educational specialists who bring together the talents needed to organise training situations and research situations and ensure that all activities are constantly focused on the psycho-pedagogic aspects of the language problem. What could be better than to get the educational specialists to solve the problems of schooling? If this happens, the psycho-pedagogic approach becomes a genuine priority, with the individual and social development of the child the main aim, and the languages of the classroom no longer anything more than a means of speeding it up and consolidating it within the main educational options selected by the competent authorities.

## What experience shows

Experience tends to show that the immediate problems (which vary in acuteness from one country to another) facing the national leaders responsible for drawing up, applying or improving a language policy based on using national languages in the classroom are reflected in a number of actions which have to be taken and which the Institutes of Education have to have under proper technical coordination and control. Here are the main lines of an operational and flexible piece of programming setting out the precise tasks which have to be carried out as soon as the ball appears in the technicians' court.

### 1. *Designing and drawing up a master plan*

Language reform is not just a matter of goodwill. It has its technical side too. It is not a dangerous or uncontrollable operation because it has its conditions, its assumptions and its protocol and they are realised through a (usually experimental) master plan which is the scientific support for the operation and an ideal tool with which to manage the reform (diagnosis, forecasting, decision-making, budgeting and linguistic, educational, administrative, legal and financial assessment). The design and

drafting of an operational master plan are vital to make the language reform plan a national undertaking and provide the unifying method reference framework which is all too often missing. Furthermore, the explicit existence of such a support makes it possible for the system to self-regulate and provides the proof of efficiency and yield needed for continuation of the operation. This is a powerful addition when it comes to getting the moral, political and financial support which every language reform requires at home and abroad.

### 2. *Campaigning to make parents, teachers and educational managers aware of the use of national languages*



*The absence of teaching materials, and particularly of the right sort of textbooks, is all too often a major handicap when it comes to teaching national languages*

Experience has made it clear that no language reform, however justified its aims and however coherent its operational programming, has a chance of success unless the people running it believe in it and espouse the aims of the change and agree with the dynamics of the movement they have to help create. This demand, which looks like a prerequisite of innovation from many points of view, is undoubtedly one of the priority tasks of the person in charge of running the plan of execution. Experience has also shown that any educational project, whatever the aim, will only be

viable if the whole national community is behind it. The lessons of the past show that successful awareness campaigns tend to be based on teachers and populations being informed, interested and directly involved in the process of reform.

### 3. *Setting up permanent training for language reform staff*

Training programmes are linked to the socio-linguistic situations of each country, to the educational aims and to the general policies the nation has chosen. However, whatever the intrinsic value of the educational aims of innovation and regardless of the importance of the technical and financial means allocated to it, the success of the teaching of national languages is something to do with the people, above all—which is why the training of convinced, available and competent officers is a priority everywhere. This training will essentially involve language, teaching method, educational psychology and culture. Special attention will be paid to an introduction to converging psycho-pedagogic approaches which are coordinated and make it possible to move smoothly on from the first to the second language.

### 4. *Setting up structures to design, produce and disseminate teaching materials (handbooks and guides for the teacher in particular) for the teaching of national languages*

The absence of teaching materials and, more particularly, of suitable textbooks, is all too often a major handicap for the teaching of national languages. Experience has clearly shown that this lack is behind one of the main claims made by teachers in the field. There is no doubt that giving teachers and pupils enough of the right sort of teaching materials is one of the basic guarantees of success because it rationalises learning and heightens motivation. This is why handbooks and textbooks will have to follow strict guidelines laid down in the educational and technical specifications which will have to be devised.

### 5. *Setting up an institutional framework to ensure the status of national language teaching*

This will be both a legal and an administrative, technical and financial framework. Experience has indeed



shown that too many language reforms are run in the field without any explicit institutional framework. This gap has to be rapidly bridged because it costs the reform all its credibility. The existence of a specific institutional framework makes it easier to get a national consensus in favour of the reform because everyone involved—parent, teacher and pupil—is able to see that the operation has gone past the provisional stage and become a permanent feature of the national education system.

These, then, are one or two elements of a strategy for introducing national languages into the classroom, which concerns, *mutatis mutandis*, most of the States involved in such a process. This is no theoretical approach. It is based on research, backed up by an analysis of the process observed in the field, and is part of the experience obtained from direct involvement in the various language adaptation operations.

It is probably necessary to add that not all these reforms aimed at using national languages as vehicles for

teaching in their own right are in a particularly dynamic phase of their history at the moment. However, if, in all good faith, an analysis is made of the root cause of the failures and "postponements" recorded here and there, in most cases—part, of course, from those due to the political upsets which mark the life of nations—what emerges is the non-respect or plain absence of a national consensus and a credible master plan. There is no doubt as to the suitability of mother tongues as both vehicles and subjects of education. ○ J. P.

## The language of instruction: some statistics concerning sub-Saharan Africa

The diversity of linguistic backgrounds in sub-Saharan Africa greatly complicates teaching. Linguists identify over 1 250 languages in use today in the region, and only nine of these are spoken as a first or second language by as many as 10 million people. The African educator's response to this challenge has reflected in part colonial precedents and in part a healthy pragmatism. Although literacy in one or more African languages is an explicit goal of the education system in some countries and not in others, the combination of the colonial heritage and the relative absence of published materials in these vernaculars has led most African countries to adopt the language of the former colonial government (the metropolitan language) as the national language and to introduce it as the medium of instruction at some level in the formal education system.

Differences in school language policy have to do with when and how fast the transition to the national language takes place. The colonial powers in Africa pursued different policies with respect to media of instruction in schools, and African nations have often kept these traditions after independence. Eleven of 15 former French colonies and all three former Portuguese colonies officially begin instruction in the national language from the first day of primary school. In contrast, 13 of 15 former British colonies begin instruction in one or more African languages and teach English at

first as a subject; only later is English introduced as the medium of instruction.

Although the decision to use or not to use an African language for instructional purposes often echoes the colonial past, the feasible choices also depend on the number of speakers of the language in the nation. An examination of current school language policies among African countries suggests convincingly that the size factor has influenced policy-makers. In 21 countries that utilise one or more African languages for instructing new primary pupils, the most widely spoken African language is the first or second language of more than 5 million people in the median case. In 16 countries in which a European language is used as the medium of instruction, the number of speakers of the most widely spoken language is only about 2.5 million. (These figures are derived from Table 1).

### Note

The number of languages refers to the estimated number of indigenous languages spoken in each country. The figures shown are not exact and are intended only to differentiate, in a general way, between linguistically heterogeneous and homogeneous countries.

Principal languages include indigenous languages spoken by at least 10% of a country's population and any other language that serves as an

official language, *lingua franca*, or medium of instruction in the country's education system. Several names are sometimes used for the same language. The percentage of the population speaking a language is the sum of the percentages that speak it as a mother tongue and as a second language.

The official language (or languages) is the language recognised and promoted for use in official domains such as law courts, national speeches, and public documents and is often the language of instruction. The percentage of speakers of the official language is estimated only roughly, if at all, and is usually directly related to the percentage of the population that completes several years of formal education. A *lingua franca* is a common language used as a means of communication among groups of people whose mother tongues differ.

A language is defined as a medium of instruction when it is used to teach a variety of subjects in the curriculum; it is not considered a medium of instruction when it is taught only as a subject. Instruction is here divided into three levels: lower primary, upper primary, and postprimary. Lower primary refers to the first three or four years of primary education, upper primary to the last half of primary instruction, and postprimary to secondary schools and to universities, colleges, and other postsecondary schools.



Table 1: Languages of sub-Saharan Africa

	Number of languages		Principal languages <sup>(1)</sup>	Percentage of population speaking language as:		Language used as:				
	Total	Principal		Mother tongue	Second language	Official language	Lingua franca	Medium of instruction in:		
								Lower primary	Upper primary	Post-primary
<b>Low-income economies</b>										
1 Mali	10	4	Bambara Fulfulde Arabic French	31 20 low	20	x x	x x	x x	x x	x x
2 Burkina Faso	10 <sup>(2)</sup>	5	Mossi French	50 low		x x	x	x x	x x	x x
3 Niger	7 <sup>(2)</sup>	7	Hausa Songhai French	46 low	24 19	x	x	x	x	x
4 Gambia	8	5	Manding Wolof Fulfulde English	41 13 14 low	19	x	x x	x	x	x
5 Somalia	4 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Somali Arabic English Italian	95	2	x x x x		x x	x x	x x
6 Chad	15 <sup>(2)</sup>	3	Arabic Sara French	13 19 low	40 10 13	x	x x	x x x	x x	x
7 Ethiopia	70	4	Amharic Tigrinya Galla English	31 14 35 low	40	x	x x	x	x	x
8 Zaïre	300	5	Swahili Lingala Luba Kongo French	36 28 17 12 low	13 41 18	x	x x x x	x x x	x	x
9 Malawi	15 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Nyanja Lomwe Yao English	50 15 14	10 5	x	x	x	x	x
10 Guinea Bissau	NA	5	Crioulo Portuguese	low		x x		x	x	x
11 Tanzania	120	3	Sukuma Swahili English	13 .6 low	90 15	x	x	x	x	x x
12 Burundi	3	3	Rundi Swahili French	99 low	10	x x		x	x	x
13 Uganda	30 <sup>(2)</sup>	7	Runyankore Luganda Luo Swahili Lugbara Ateso/ Akarimo-jong English	20 18 12 low	20 35	x x x	x		x	x
14 Togo	15 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Ewe Kabiye Hausa French	44 low	6 20	x	x x	x x	x	x
15 Central African Republic	10 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Banda Gaya Sango French	31 29 25 low		x	x	x	x	x
16 Madagascar	NA	2	Malagasy French	low		x	x	x	x	x
17 Benin	10 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Fon-Ewe Yoruba Bariba French	60 13 12 low		x		x	x	x
18 Rwanda	3 <sup>(2)</sup>	3	Kinyarwanda Swahili French	90 10 low	8	x x	x	x x	x x	x
19 Kenya	50	7	Swahili Kikuyu Luhya Luo Kamba English	5 25 low	60	x x x x x	x	x x	x x	x
20 Sierra Leone	18	4	Mende Temne Krio English	31 25 low	5 45	x	x	x	x	x
21 Guinea	15 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Malinke Fulfulde SouSou French	30 28 16	18 5	x	x	x	x	x



22 Ghana	54	9	Dagbani Ewe Akan Hausa Adangme Nzema Ga Dagaari English	16 12 40     low	60	x x  x x x x x	x x	x	x	x
23 Sudan	100	13	Arabic Shilluk Bari Latuka Zande Kreish Ndogo Moru English	50       low	10	x x x x x x x x	x	x	x	x
24 Senegal	10 <sup>(2)</sup>	8	Wolof Fula Serer Diola Malinke Soninke Arabic French	42 19 15 7 6 3  low	40 5    high	x x x x x x x	x x	x	x	x
25 Mozambique	20	8	Portuguese	low		x	x	x	x	x
<b>Middle-income oil importers</b>										
26 Mauritania	5	6	Arabic Fulfulde Wolof French	80   low	7 13	x x x	x	x	x	x
27 Liberia	28	4	Bassa Kpelle Krio English	14 20 40 low	23 40 50	x x x	x	x	x	x
28 Zambia	73	8	Bemba Nyanja Tonga Kaonde Lunda Luvale English	31 11 11   low	25 42	x x x x x	x x	x	x	x
29 Lesotho	2	2	Sotho English	95 low	4	x	x	x	x	x
30 Côte d'Ivoire	60	5	Akan Dyula Anyi-Baoule Senoufo French	25 16 20 12 low	50  35	x x x x	x	x	x	x
31 Zimbabwe	20 <sup>(2)</sup>	3	Shona Ndebele English	75 16 low		x x x	x x	x	x	x
32 Swaziland	NA	3	Swati English	90 low		x	x	x	x	x
33 Botswana	3	2	Tswana English	90 low	9	x x	x	x	x	x
34 Mauritius	NA	8	French English	low low		x x				
35 Nigeria	350 <sup>(2)</sup>	11	Hausa Yoruba Ibo Fulfulde Pidgin English Kanuri Edo Ijo Efik Idoma English	30 20 10    low	20	x x x x x x x x x	x x	x	x	x
36 Cameroon	200	9	Bamileke Fang Ewondo Fulfulde French English	27 18  low low		x x x	x	x	x	x
37 Congo, People's Republic	15 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Kongo Teke Lingala French	52 25  low		x x x	x	x	x	x
38 Gabon	15 <sup>(2)</sup>	4	Fang Eshira Pidgin English French	30 20  low	20	x x	x	x	x	x
39 Angola	20	4	Kongo Kimbundu Umbundu Portuguese	15 23 30 low	20 35	x	x	x	x	x

(1) Only those languages for which data were available are shown. See the technical notes for other principal languages.

(2) Estimates may understate the actual number.

Source: World Bank Education in Sub-Saharan Africa (1988).



## Is a lingua franca possible in Nigeria?

by A. Babs FAFUNWA (\*)

*It is the fundamental right of every child to be educated in his own mother tongue. It is universally agreed that the mother tongue is the best medium for doing so. Yet, of all the continents and peoples of the world, it is only in Africa and perhaps in a few other ex-colonial countries that formal education is offered in a language that is foreign to the child. In Europe, North America, the USSR, China and in all other leading countries of the world, the child goes through his primary, secondary and university education in his own mother tongue. In such countries, activities related to trade, commerce, education, civics, cultural and social activities are conducted in the mother tongue, whereas in Africa south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo, we educate our children almost exclusively in a foreign tongue from primary to university level. While some of the native speakers of English or French have problems in understanding their own language, as dramatised in a popular book entitled: "Why Johnny Can't Read", the African child has all of Johnny's linguistic problems, plus his own, thus suffering from double jeopardy.*

The African child is in an ambivalent position. Between the ages of 0 and 5, African children are invariably brought up in the traditional African environment, but when they reach the age of 6, one-third to one-tenth of these children (depending on the country) enter another educational system almost completely different from the one they were accustomed to; that is, they grow up with a certain cognitive style and suddenly find themselves in another environment with an entirely different approach.

### Language: the key to high dropout rates?

This phenomenon has not been given the attention it deserves by African educators and psychologists. We tend to assume that the African child takes this dramatic change in his stride and we expect him to respond to this new situation as an average English, American or German child would. The fact of the matter is that the child's cogni-

tive equilibrium has been disturbed and this abnormal situation (the deep gulf between the traditional, non-formal African system of education and the formal, Western-oriented system of education) tends to retard the cognitive process in terms of the anticipated outcomes of the Western form of education. More than 50% of children who enter primary schools drop out before the end of the course. A number of studies carried out on "Primary School Dropouts" in Nigeria and elsewhere attribute the dropout phenomenon (which ranges from 40% to 60% in some countries) to premature introduction of English as the language of instruction at the primary school, poorly trained teachers, and inadequate teaching facilities.

But the major contributing factor was the foreign medium of instruction.

There is little or no continuity between the African child's home experience and his school experience—a situation that does not arise in the Western countries where, in most cases, the child's school experience is a continuation of his home experience and expo-

sure. Several observations and studies regarding the Nigerian educational system and language problems have been made over a period of time and reported in a number of documents from many sources.

### Is a lingua franca possible in Nigeria?

Before we delve into this issue we have to assume the following:

- that no other factor can enhance or guarantee an effective development of the African personality (self-reliance, self-confidence, resourcefulness and innovativeness) better than the Africans' own language, culture and education;

- that the first 12 years is the most formative period in any child's life;

- that it is the inalienable right of every child to be taught in its mother tongue at least for the first 12 years of his/her life if he is to develop a solid foundation for his future growth as a man/woman with pride in things African and an appreciation for his cultural heritage;

- that the African can be considered on an equal basis (with Europeans, Americans and others) only if he has something of his own to contribute to world civilisation.

Therefore, all African languages—major, medium and minor, should be recognised and developed as national languages as a matter of national policy by all African States, and each language be made the medium of education at least for the first six years of the child's formal education and for mass literacy programmes for adults.

It is proposed that one of the more widely used African languages in a given country be developed as the official national language of the country with English, French or Portuguese (as the case may be) as an "associate" national language.

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Similar models obtain in the USSR, Spain (Catalonia), Yugoslavia, India, China and some other countries of the world.

The University of Ife Six-Year Primary in Yoruba, which was launched in January 1970 with a pupil population of 1 500 and which has now been adopted as a pilot project by the Oyo State Government of Nigeria involving 85 000 pupils, has proved conclusively that the child lost nothing and indeed gained more cognitively, linguistically, and emotionally by his exposure to six years of primary education through the Yoruba medium; that the child's exposure to Yoruba as medium of education and English as a second language for the first six years did not in any way adversely affect his secondary and tertiary education; that the child understood mathematics and science concepts better when instructed first in the mother-tongue and later in English; that the child's exposure to English as a second language placed him at an advantage as compared with the peers who learned English as a first language; that the child developed self-confidence and self-reliance traits earlier than his cohorts; and that the results was the same in urban and rural environments.

### Hausa: a potential common language

The Hausa language has the potential of becoming a *lingua franca* not only in Nigeria but eventually in West Africa for the following reasons. First, it is more widely spoken than any other language (African or foreign) in Nigeria and West Africa as a whole. Second, it has standard orthography. Third, it has a dictionary and many books have been published in this medium. Yoruba and Igbo, the two other major languages in Nigeria, are not as widely spoken as Hausa in Nigeria even though the Yoruba language has standard orthography, a Yoruba dictionary and many publications.

However before the introduction of Hausa as a *lingua franca*, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

— All the major and medium Nigerian languages must be recognised and developed as national languages. India recognised 13 and it is not too much for Nigeria to recognise 10. These languages and other smaller ones will be used as media of education at primary and, possibly, at the junior secondary level. *Unless people are made to feel that their own mother-tongue is as important as the lingua franca, they will be hostile to the official language.*

social and cultural studies, agriculture, introductory technology etc.

Assuming that all conditions stated above are met, the following are proposed:

*Official Language: Hausa*

As a medium of education from primary to university level.

*Major National Language: Yoruba and Igbo*

As a medium of education from primary through secondary and as

	Primary 1 - 6	Secondary 1 - 3	Secondary 4 - 6	Tertiary 1 - 4
As a medium of education	<b>Mother tongue</b> Yoruba Igbo Nupe Kanuri Edo Efik Fulfulde etc.	Hausa	Hausa	Hausa
As a subject	Hausa English	Mother tongue and English	One Nigerian language and English	One Nigerian language and English

— Indigenous Hausa speakers must compulsorily learn one of the two major languages, Igbo or Yoruba, just as all other speakers will compulsorily learn Hausa—thus balancing the sacrifice and removing all forms of superiority or inferiority complexes.

— It must be made abundantly clear that the adoption of Hausa as the *lingua franca* does not confer permanent leadership of Nigeria on Hausas. Every true Nigerian citizen has a right to aspire to leadership of this great nation.

In countries where a national language was introduced without due consideration as enumerated above, the *lingua franca* was "suspect" and speakers of other neglected languages were openly hostile and felt betrayed. From our experience at Ife, it should be possible to develop within a short period of two to three years, text materials up to primary Six and beyond in 20 of the Nigerian languages and in such subject areas as science, mathematics,

language of study for higher degrees. Also for adult literacy programmes.

*Other National Languages: Edo, Efik, Ijaw, Kanuri, Nupe, Tiv, Fulfulde, Ibibio etc.* As a medium of education up to end of primary school and for adult literacy programmes.

*English* will be an "associated" official language and will be studied as a second language from primary to secondary level.

Finally, to introduce the above proposal into the formal school curriculum, the following is proposed as shown in the table below:

As we have said elsewhere, this issue will continue to generate considerable debate for some time to come.

It we are to fully develop and promote the Nigerian personality, no other language can do the job as effectively as that of our own native land. ○

A. B. F.



## SEYCHELLES

Using Creole (Seselwa) in schools:  
a cultural challenge

by Giovanni LIVI(\*)

**Kout manche't man dio  
pa gen mak***(a proverb meaning "Chop the water  
with an axe and it will not show")*

*Lomé III already does a great deal to see that ACP-EEC cooperation takes social and cultural aspects into account and Lomé IV will do more. The Creole<sup>(1)</sup> spoken widely in the Caribbean (particularly in Haiti), Cape Verde and the islands of the Indian Ocean, is worthy of special attention here. Seychelles is the only country in the world where Creole has legal status and occupies a proper place in the nation's development projects. A brief historical outline will explain this.*

**Ethnic and linguistic  
diversity**

Since 1979, Seychelles has been running an original language experiment whereby teaching in schools is done in Seselwa—the word used in preference to "Creole" for the people's mother tongue<sup>(2)</sup>—following a political decision motivated by the history and structure of Seychelles society which has been stamped by the ethnic diversity of its original formation.

Most of the population of Seychelles are descended from Europeans (particularly the French, who

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(1) "Creole" languages in the USA (Louisiana) and the Caribbean are those spoken by the descendants of the colonists, mostly French but also Blacks, descended from African slaves brought over from the Senegambian region protected by the 'Code Noir' of 1724, or of those in Haiti after the revolution of Toussaint L'Ouverture. The 'French Creole' spoken in Louisiana is very similar to Haitian Creole and much used in Zydeco music.

(2) The suggestion to use "Seselwa" instead of "Creole" came from the Institut Kréol, which was set up in 1986 to rehabilitate the language and do away with the feeling of disdain that sometimes went with it because it had emerged from an historical phenomenon and its well-known consequences—slavery and colonisation.

were the first to explore the islands, with Lazard Picault, in 1742 and actually took them over in 1756, naming them after Louis XV's comptroller-general of finance, Jean Moreau des Seychelles). The Africans arrived at the same period. The other two main sections of the population, the Chinese and the Indians, who came later, in smaller numbers, have not had any significant effect on the nation's culture.

The 105 islands—including Mahé, the home of 86% of the population, and Praslin and la Digue, with about 11% (1988 estimates) originally belonged to France. Then the British took over when the Treaty of Paris gave them the archipelago, along with Mauritius, in 1814. The islands became independent in June 1976.

When the European population expanded, life on the plantations was French-dominated and some French colonials and African slaves already spoke Kréol when they arrived. The British did not hold back Creole culture—which is thus "firmly rooted in France and Africa. The symbiosis of all these races shaped a single culture, Kréol, over two centuries of life together. Unlike Mauritius and other Kréol islands, Seychelles forms only



*Facsimile of the cover of an arithmetic book used in the third year primary of Seychelles schools*

one people and everyone sees this culture and this one language as his or her own", says M.P. Choppy, the Head of the Institut Kréol.

Seychelles' standard of living, one of the highest in the ACP Group, has enabled President France-Albert René (re-elected in June 1984) and his Government to bring in some quite remarkable welfare and social services—including free education.

**Seselwa, the official  
language**

In 1981, the Seychelles People's Progressive Front (SPPF) decided to make Seselwa the country's first official language, followed by English and French to reflect the make-up of the population and the traditional links with Europe, Africa and Asia, which had been strengthened by technical development (see Seychelles report in *The Courier* No 112 — November-December 1988).

The importance of the educational reform of 1982 can be gauged from the fact that, prior to 1979, Kréol had no legal status and was not used in the schools. French was widely spoken in teaching, much of which was provided by Catholic mission schools, and, as the British had set up



an official education system, English gained ground too, becoming the official language of education in 1944, with French as one of the subjects on the curriculum. In 1970, French was withdrawn from the first three years of the primary. Then came a fairly muddled period of linguistic shuffling, with a two-line system of education—a fee-paying grammar school lane for children from the better-off sections of society, and a free parish school lane for most of the country's youngsters, whose opportunities there were very limited, very few of them being able to go on beyond year three of the secondary school.

As official reports show, the academic results were not very good and the failure rate was very high.

### Trilingual pupils

In 1980-81, the Government went in for a policy of balanced bilingualism which was aimed at making everyone in Seychelles bilingual in French and English but cut Kréol out. But in 1988 Seselwa came to the fore in the nation's education policy as the first official language, with English and French behind it, and the policy of promoting Seselwa language and culture is now both enshrined in the legislation and being put into practical effect.

With the 1982 reform, the language was able to get over a huge barrier and come into direct contact with national education, culture, training and the development of the younger generations.

"For years the Seychellois had been told that Kréol was no use as a vehicle for advanced ideas, science, technology and so on. All it was good for, its detractors maintained, was domestic communication", as M. P. Choppy emphasised. The Sector Plan of 1982, she pointed out, said that "general education as a whole used to attach little importance to improving the standard of living or the knowledge and use of the environment or to preparing for a job—i.e. the schools expected pupils to learn things which had nothing to do with the needs of economic development or the protection of the cultural identity of the nation".

The introduction of Seselwa in the

*His brother says :  
"Come and sing with us"  
But Tenten isn't interested  
Eating is more important.*

**Son frer ti dir li,  
"Vin sante, avek nou."  
Me Tenten pa ti enteresse.  
Manze ti pli enportan pour li.**

*Son frère lui dit  
« Viens chanter avec nous. »  
Mais Tintin n'est pas très intéressé.  
Manger est plus important pour lui.*

*Extract from a Seselwa primer.*

classroom is not just justified from the point of view of educational psychology. As the Plan says, "the development of many aspects of intelligence and the development of lan-

guage are closely related. If the three Rs are to be assimilated as well as the child's state of development will allow, then teaching has to be based directly on things the child has

### Creole in Cape Verde

A former Euro-MP, Willy Kuijpers, (ARC-Belgium) put the following question to the Commission of the European Communities :

*"Creole has been the vernacular in Cape Verde for over 300 years and, although schools still use only Portuguese, according to the party newspaper 80% of pupils in the second class of the grammar school fail the end of year exam in Portuguese which would entitle them to move up to the next class. The Cape Verde poet and philosopher Tomé Varela da Sila has therefore suggested that education in the vernacular might produce better results. The town of Boston (USA) provides an example where the education authorities give immigrant children from Cape Verde lessons in Creole as well as in English.*

*Can the Commission state whether a project for education in Creole in Cape Verde is being considered under Title VIII of the Third Lomé Convention (or similar future provisions under Lomé IV) with regard to cultural and social cooperation?"*

Vice-President Manuel Marin replied on behalf of the Commission :

*"The Cape Verdean authorities are very conscious of the importance of Creole as part of the nation's cultural identity.*

*The Government has commissioned a group of linguists to analyse Creole scientifically in order to create a basis for its effective and rational use as, for example, a medium of instruction. At the same time, the Government is eager to establish a new method of teaching Portuguese, using the methodology of foreign language teaching. Once the research has been completed, the problem of teacher training will arise.*

*The Commission, which is currently providing aid for the training of primary and secondary schoolteachers, will probably have occasion to support this development".*



actually experienced. This means it has to be provided in a language which the child understands properly—in this case Creole”.

And the development of culture and the media has put Seselwa in the limelight, too. As Thomas and Ravel have said, “the development of Creole literature, drama and song, the setting up of the anthropology department to study Creole culture and collect examples of the oral tradition, the extension of the language in the press and the media, the Seychellisation of programmes and the Creolisation of education are all practical achievements of this aim”.

At the same time, it was decided that there would be an educational reform whereby Seselwa, which had never been taught before, would take its place alongside English and French. This was because running the far-reaching educational reform attendant on the new language policy applied from early 1982 onwards meant that a syllabus reform Committee had to be set up to bring Seselwa in as both *a subject* and *the language of instruction*.

**Seselwa in the classroom**

In an article on the use of Seselwa in the classroom, Laureana Barhé, of the National Institute of Education said that “a syllabus reform committee had to be set up to cater for implementation of the language policy in education at the very beginning of 1982. The committee’s first job was to take whatever steps were needed to bring in Seselwa as both a subject and the language of instruction, starting by studying the spelling and syntax and listing the vocabulary. Dictionaries, grammars and readers of the language had to be produced and printed and audio-visual aids and training for existing teachers were also required. The National Institute of Education was also set up in January 1981 to facilitate implementation of the teaching side of the educational policy, to help formulate the aims of education by providing details to make the political decision-making easier, to translate the aims of education laid down at political level into aims and then specific targets, and to suggest syllabuses and educational directives on ways and means”.

**The Creole Festival of 1989**

*The link between the popular traditions and the life of the islands was highlighted by the “Creole Festival” of 1989, which brought artists, poets, bands and tourist leaders from the islands of the Indian Ocean together in Seychelles from 25 October to 21 November. The President of the Festival, Danielle de St Jorre, the Minister of Planning and External Relations, talked of the success of this event, which had given other Governments—the Mauritian one, for example—the idea of organising a Creole day.*

*Mme. de St Jorre visited various ACP States in the Caribbean, and had contact with people from Haiti, and intends inviting them to the “Creole Festival” of 1990.*

*Réunion is also putting Creole to the fore.*

*The Festival, run by the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) with financial assistance from the Commission of the European Communities, is, D. de St Jorre said, “en festival pour tou pep kreolofonn” (a festival for all Creole-speaking people).*

L. Barhé’s study analyses the role of Seselwa in relation to the other two official languages, English and French, in the kindergarten and the primary school and assesses what has been done since the 1982 reform.

It is worth noting that i) in the first four years of the primary school (P1-P4), Seselwa is the language in which all subjects (mathematics, sciences, humanities, family life, etc.) are taught; ii) it (reading, oral and written expression) is one of the subjects on the curriculum throughout the nine-year primary course; iii) it is also the language in which some subjects (art, family life, political education and extra-mural activities) are taught from year five (P5) onwards. Seselwa is taught for 6 hours and 40 minutes per week in the first term of the primary school and 6 hours in the second and third terms, working down to one hour and 20 minutes in the seventh year. The weekly Seselwa timetable so far has been as follows:

Year	P1 (*)	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	P7	P8	P9
Hours of Seselwa	6 h 40 6 h	5 h 20	5 h 20	2 h 20	2 h	2 h	1 h 20	—	—

(\*) 6 h 40 in term one and 6 h in terms two and three.

The idea of the educational reform was to fit the three official languages (Seselwa, English and French) into the teaching system so children would learn all three and be able to express themselves and go on to do advanced studies.

“English, the second official lan-

guage, the Sector Plan said, will be brought in as soon as the children can read and write Creole—i.e. in the second year primary. English will become the main language of teaching as soon as possible. French is the compulsory third language and it will be studied in the primary school as soon as the children have an adequate grasp of English (to a level to be fixed later)”.

Oral English has been started in term two of P1 since 1988 and French language classes begin in term one of P4 (year three of the primary).

Assessments run in 1984 and 1987 showed that the results were positive and even encouraging, in spite of material difficulties, as Laureana Barhé says. “It takes a lot of determination and effort to ensure that the basic work which has already been done can bear fruit in the very near future”.

But there is no doubt that Seselwa has revolutionised education in the

Seychelles and that today’s pupils get more from their schooling than did their predecessors. Teaching in Seselwa is in complete symbiosis with the underlying Seselwa society. School and home are no longer cut off from each other. ○

G. L.



# Functional literacy, agricultural extension work and local languages

by Bernard DUMONT (\*)

*For years, people have been saying and writing that population involvement is vital to development, economically, politically and educationally and from many other points of view too.*

*But if there is one sector where the idea has been slow to take root it is that of the modernisation of the peasant classes—when almost everyone in the rural world is a herdsman or farmer, is illiterate and normally speaks one or more languages that are different from the official language used in schools and in administration and public life. This is no imaginary situation, for it is that of the majority of people in many of the ACP countries.*

For years, most rural development projects were based on extension methods involving a network of basic extension workers (one for every three to seven villages), divided into sectors and zones (groups of sectors), whose job was to get those peasants deemed most receptive to grasp technical ideas—the use of farming timetables, for example, seed selection, organic and chemical fertiliser, draught animals and drill sowing—selected and ordered by the agricultural engineers at the head of operations.

The engineers work in the official language and, since the peasants only speak one or maybe two local language(s), ideas and demonstrations have to be translated somewhere down the extension hierarchy, at a level which depends on whether the extension workers (usually educated in the official language and trained to a fairly advanced level) are natives of the region or not.

But “translators can be traitors”, as the Italians say, and there is no guarantee that the message will not get distorted. Nor is it easy for the engineer to know what the peasant has actually got from it. Although some projects have made for noticeable improvements in farming methods and output, there is no secret about the fact that the results of

others have been less convincing and that costly innovations barely survive the running down and departure of the extension teams and supervisors.

The progress made with transcribing African languages for the masses over the past 20 years and their use in literacy campaigns, teaching and the rural press have improved the situation considerably in three distinct but complementary areas—in the under-



*Once they could write their languages, the peasants could express their opinions and knowledge: the readers' letters in Mandinka in a paper like Kibaru in Mali was proof of that*

standing of the ideas passed on by the extension workers, in the continuity and retention of the information and in the interaction of knowledge.

Once people begin to write a local language, its status changes and its speakers with it. First of all, it is more likely to be called a “national language”. And although living conditions in the villages are such as to virtually rule out access to written communication in the official language (as it takes years simultaneously to acquire a foreign language barely spoken in the immediate environment and master its writing), it only takes a few weeks for young adults to learn the three Rs in their own language by functional literacy methods.

As soon as one or two people can read and write the language of the village, it is fairly natural for them to start helping the extension workers. And the extension organisation is more likely to communicate in writing, particularly on notice boards and posters which specify and help conceptualise recommended practices demonstrated in the field and in printed leaflets and notes to make the handing over and use of the various inputs more objective and reliable.

What is even more obvious is the ability which the rural communities acquire by writing their own common language and memorising and assimilating information which the extension workers bring in from outside. Although they usually listen to the extension worker when he is there, they do not always understand or accept what he has to say, but they read out the illustrated brochures and cards (subtitled in the local language) which he leaves behind and comment on and discuss them when he has gone. And if the village also gets copies of a rural newspaper in the local language, bringing the written word into everyday use and dealing with the same or similar subjects as the extension operation, then the new ideas from the outside world clearly have a far better chance of being properly assimilated.

But it is above all the village communities' new ability to contribute to the development of agricultural methods that is the greatest innovation wrought by the spread of national

(\*) The author is a specialist in functional literacy, working mainly in Bambara.



**Traitor translator...**

*The problems which African languages pose to foreigners have not just to do with form, but with meaning. The people of Europe's common fund of culture often gives the illusion that, when you move from one language to another, translating is simply a matter of switching forms while meaning stands unchanged. This illusion fades when you change your cultural universe. Semantic differences crop up everywhere, including in sectors where you would expect a universal consensus.*

*In English, the response to a question is "yes" or "no" according to whether the answer is positive or negative:*

- 1. Is your name Peter? = Yes  
— My name is Peter
- 2. Is your name Peter? = No  
— My name is **not** Peter
- 3. Isn't your name Peter? = Yes  
— My name is Peter
- 4. Isn't your name Peter? = No  
— My name is **not** Peter

*But in most African languages, the choice of "yes" or "no" is made in the light of whether the question and answer are both negative, the response will be "yes" and, if they are not, it will be "no". The response for the above four questions therefore are:*

- 1. Affirmative question + affirmative answer = Yes
- 2. Affirmative question + negative answer = No
- 3. Negative question + affirmative answer = No
- 4. Negative question + negative answer = Yes


*Source: Royal Central African Museum, Tervuren, Brussels.*

language writing. Until this happened, illiterate peasants were all too often considered to be ignorant and some of them all but thought so themselves, as their knowledge did not get the benefit of the prestige attendant on the written word and agricultural extension work always looked like a contribution from outside.

Once they could write their languages, the peasants could express their opinions and knowledge. The readers' letters in Mandinka in a newspaper like *Kibaru* in Mali and the topics discussed in Niger in the many village newspapers in Zerma and Hausa are adequate proof of the peasants having plenty to say. The empirical but coherent knowledge of pedology, botany, human and animal health, climatology, hydrology and so on which they have built up over centuries of experience in the fight for survival is considerable and no drive for authentic improvements to their living conditions should allow itself to overlook it. Better still, they gain confidence in themselves and their ability to judge and act when they can see what they think and know written down and in print—and in their own language, with no risk of involuntary distortion. This self-confidence is vital if people are to shoulder real responsibility instead of waiting for the extension worker to make the innovations and if they are to be able to recognise and benefit from their mistakes—if, in a word, they are to be fully involved in the management of their farms and the progress of their villages.

This is not of course to say that functional literacy is all-sufficient to solve the problem of improving the living and working conditions of the peasants. It would be wrong to hide the fact that it indeed generates fresh ones—the availability of resources to print things in several languages, for example, new jobs for women in production and decision-making, the administrative status of national languages which cannot be kept out of public life, how to teach the official language through written knowledge of the local language and so on.

It is not sufficient, of course, but it is still necessary to proper involvement in development. ○ B.D.



FAO - Clark

**Bananas being produced in Western Samoa**

*"They gain confidence in themselves and in their ability to judge... when they can see what they think and know written down in print"*



# Language and authenticity: the case of Zaïre

by Mwatha Nusanji NGALASSO (\*)

*Zaïre is a real linguistic chequerboard. It has more than 200 languages – 221, to be precise, according to a recent count, a very high figure for a population of about 30 million, giving an average of 150 000 speakers per language. But averages are misleading. Some of the vehicular languages—Lingala, for example, Kikongo, Kiswahili and Ciluba—are spoken by several million people and some of the “tribal languages” by only a few thousand or even a few hundred. But the majority of these languages (186 out of 221), spoken by more than 85% of the population of Zaïre, belong to the Bantu group—hence the similarities of vocabulary and grammar. A large number of them have never been written down or described scientifically, which makes standardisation difficult. In addition to these native tongues, there is French, a legacy of the Belgian colonial period and proclaimed “the official language” of the nation when Zaïre became independent in June 1960, making the chequerboard even more complicated.*

*Since 1967<sup>(1)</sup>, Zaïre has adopted its so-called authenticity policy, preaching mental disalienation and a rooting in authentically Zaïrean and African cultural values. It was a daring challenge, hailed with militant enthusiasm at the time by all Zaïreans and followed with keen attention by other Africans, and it made Zaïre a pioneer and a model that some countries (Togo and Chad, for example) were quick to follow. Of necessity, the idea meant promoting national languages as a way of achieving integral, integrated development, involving the entire population, and it called for an original approach to the management of plurilingualism.*

*What has happened to Zaïre's experiment after 25 years of existence? What can it tell us about, say, the status of languages? What part do languages play, practically speaking, in education and in national development programmes? These are just some of the questions which we should like to answer here, in the light of the facts as observed.*

## Authenticity and the language issue<sup>(2)</sup>

The ideology of authenticity is in line with the already long-standing doctrines whereby African man should be emancipated through a clear awareness of the importance of his own culture and through a firm desire to use this culture in every field of activity. These doctrines are variously known as *negritude*, *negroism*, *self-awareness*, *personalism*, *socialism* or *nationalism*, and the profound link between them is this desire to forge a third way, firmly based on national cultures, between the politico-economic ideologies of Eastern and Western Europe. What is original about the Zaïrean ideology is, essentially, its stated intention of being above all pragmatic. In the name of authenticity, it says, let us promote

deed rather than word and let us affect and guide everyday behaviour rather than abstract thinking. One of the basic slogans is: “In the beginning was the deed and the deed led to progress”.

But it is the word, the discursive level that is to say, which seemed to be important in putting this action programme into practice. A large-scale campaign was organised across the whole country and beyond the frontiers. Toponymy (the name of the country itself and of the main towns) and hydronymy (the names of the rivers and major lakes) were changed and anthroponymy (a ban on foreign forenames), too. The names of public facilities (hospitals, schools and institutes) and publications (newspapers, journals and gazettes) were “Zaïreanised” and forms of address altered (with “citizen” and “mamma” replacing “Mr”, “Mrs” and “Miss”). The terminology of politics and the administration changed and members of the cabinet, ministers, MPs, governors and mayors are now all (political, State, people's, regional, area etc.) *commissioners*. All these exercises in naming, un-naming and renaming are a fine illustration of the fact that “taking political power is also taking linguistic power”. The

only major, strictly non-linguistic change was a clothing restriction (a ban on the wearing of jackets and ties for men and on the wearing of trousers, dresses, wigs and hairpieces for women), leading to a kind of standardisation in the garb of both sexes, with men wearing the *abacos*, a light, Mao-style suit, and women wearing Dutch wax *pagnes*.

One of the most remarkable results of the authenticity policy of the '70s was that it triggered the debate about the official language and the status of the national languages whereby the monopoly of French was seriously threatened. But it was not the first time, nor the last, and the final solution is still only on the drawing board.

## The official language problem

Zaïre's language problem is one which crops up with unbelievable regularity and it is always couched in terms of choosing one or several national tongues as the official language to replace, or compete with, French. The debate, a long-standing one, dates back to the colonial era. Opinions, obviously, are divergent and contradictory and divide into four, or maybe five categories — one, the unilingualists who want French

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(1) The year in which the MPR (Popular Revolutionary Movement) was created. The year, also, of the publication of “Mabika Kalanda, La remise en question, base de la décolonisation mentale” (Brussels).

(2) See also articles “Authenticity and the problem of languages in Zaïre”, *Jiwe* 2: 35-45 (Lubumbashi, 1973) and the State of Languages and the Languages of the State of Zaïre, *African Politics*, 23: 6-27 (Paris, 1986).





*“The only major, strictly non-linguistic change was a clothing restriction... leading to a kind of standardisation in the garb of both sexes”*

and nothing else; two, the unilingualists who want one Zaïrean vehicular language or vernacular; three, the French-Zaïrean bilingualists (French plus a Zaïrean vehicular language); four, the plurilingualists who want four main Zaïrean languages with or five, without, French.

People tend to be unanimously against one, two and five. One is deemed to be too costly in terms of the national cultural identity and so it is, on the face of it, incompatible with the aims of the official authenticity policy, while the other two look unrealistic in the modern international context. That leaves three and four, which focus all the divergent opinions. None has any clear statement to make about the projected status of the languages or the respective functions to be fulfilled, nationally and internationally, by French and the chosen Zaïrean language(s) or about the strategic means to be used to ensure that the population actually assimilates the languages.

The ideal solution is far from simple. All the political, cultural, economic and financial implications of the various choices have to be considered and a proper strategy has to be devised to achieve the stated aim. But such consideration has not been the subject of any profound thought so far—which at least partly explains the lack of headway with the national language. Is the will there? And, above all, are the means of implementing the policy there?

The two (technical and political) sides of the problem are not always clearly perceived.

Technically speaking, from the point of view of the linguist, you could almost say that there is no objective reason for any one choice (or, rather, that it would be theoretically possible to choose any of the national languages because, in absolute terms, all of them are equal in dignity and legitimacy) and that any of them could, if chosen and supported by the institutions, be standardised and brought into line terminologically to meet all the new needs and thus prove perfectly able to fulfil any function, including official ones. “All it would take” is the means—money, staff and equipment. This egalitarian view, which favours absolute liberalism or risky choices and, ultimately, non-State interventionism in languages, is idealistic, of that there is no doubt. It makes no political sense. For it is not possible to govern a modern State efficiently with an excessively large number of languages. So a choice, but not any choice, is one of the demands of the act of government.

Politically speaking, the problem is primarily one of creating a clear awareness of belonging to the same nation and culture, of promoting a means of communication which makes for mutual understanding in the community at the lowest cost and of avoiding the development of the micronationalism that could well compromise the unity of the State. This kind of aim is easily achieved by officially adopting one language rather than using many. The monolingual solution is the one used by most States with centralised régimes. But linguistic unity is not the only workable model which history provides, even in the European States so often held up as references. There are plurilingual, federalist-type solutions of the kind used in Switzerland, Belgium, the USSR, Canada and elsewhere and they are not failures. It all depends on the sociolinguistic situation. At all events, the best solution, politically speaking, is the one whose most tangible result has to be maximum (political, economic and social) profit, and minimum (financial as well as cultural) costs.

Zaïre’s language problem has not always been posed objectively. Monolingual solutions have often been put forward as if they went without say-

ing and pluralist solutions have been deemed to lead inevitably to ethnic conflict and therefore to deal a fatal blow to national unity. But nothing is less sure. It has to be admitted that, since the colonial era, it is the pluralist solution, pragmatically, which has prevailed—an argument which could well demonstrate the opposite—and it seems to be the common sense political solution in view of the language situation in Zaïre. This vast country (four times the size of France and 80 times the size of Belgium), of great ethnic, and therefore cultural, diversity, would find it very difficult to cope with just one language, unless that language had an exceptional and universally acknowledged power as a symbol.

This specific solution is undeniably the reason why the Belgians adopted the pluralist solution for the colony during the colonial era, with two official languages (French and Dutch) and no exclusion of the main local languages—which was in fact in line with the language policy used in their own country. The remarkable thing is that, ever since 1960, no monolingual solution—except the one involving using a foreign language of international standing, French—has ever been accepted by everyone. But many people feel that this can only be a provisional answer in an independent State, a useful stepping stone before the introduction of official plurilingualism in which national languages are used as instruments of domestic development and an international language (probably French) for external communication, diplomacy and the teaching of some subjects at higher and university level.

### **The status and function of languages**

One of the essential jobs of language policy is to give a clear status to the languages. This is one of the best ways for a State to manage plurilingualism on its territory and real success depends on thorough work on the languages themselves and on a proper strategy being planned to achieve the stated political, economic and cultural aims at an excellent cost-benefit ratio.

To put it bluntly, the Zaïrean language area has never been planned in





Vivant Univers

*“Lingala, the language of the capital, the army, modern music and the party, stands out”*

such a way as to make the explicit choices of language and the taking of the appropriate strategic steps necessary. The “national language” status has always been a purely administrative concept and never the subject of any legal provisions. Only French is mentioned in an article of one of the first constitutions in which it is proclaimed to be “the official language”. Does this mean that Zaïre has no language policy? Most certainly not. What State could claim not to have one? Even no policy is a policy. And Zaïre’s policy is the extension of a long-standing practice inherited from the Belgian colonists — pro-French without totally excluding the dominant local languages. This *de facto* situation is often justified by arguments such as the will to do away with tribalism and the forces which divide the nation, the desire to establish a strong, efficient central power and the wish to move faster towards modernisation. The prestige of the language, its practical usefulness as a means of social improvement, the citizens’ desire for something cultural which was previously denied them and popular enthusiasm do the rest.

This French language hegemony is most apparent in the classroom, in spite of the fact that the place of the national languages, which was accepted in the colonial era, is still recognised in the primary school. The striking thing is that the situation is totally immobile. Nothing is being done either to develop the use of these

languages in public life or to extend the teaching/learning of them to other levels of schooling. It is as if these languages were utterly unfit to be the subject and means of learning other than in the early years of the primary school, a lack of daring with incalculable consequences on people’s outlook, stultifying imagination and perpetuating the feeling that Africa’s national languages are subordinate and will remain so for some time to come.

The failure to develop these languages in schools has had repercussions on other sectors of the life of the nation (administration, justice, the press, etc.), too, distorting the workings of the State institutions and greatly compromising the success of the projected economic development programmes because there is no direct means of communication between the decision-makers, the experts and the people themselves. French, spoken by a tiny minority, cannot currently play this part.

The relations between the languages in Zaïre form a strong hierarchy and it is this which amounts to a (supplementary) job distribution, and makes it possible to define the country’s linguistic framework as diglot. As it happens, it is unbalanced or ill-balanced bilingualism because all the important functions in public life (administration, education, the media and so on) have an official language, a foreign one, in the eyes of the law and the national languages are

excluded, even from those sectors where they would be better than French.

\* \* \*

The Zaïreans set great store by their authenticity policy, but the results have not lived up to expectations. However, it has to be admitted that it has been a particularly good opportunity to take the thinking on the official language and the status of national languages further. There is an apparent contradiction between word and deed which cannot be put down just to the lack of faith in the ability of the national languages to serve development effectively. The success of French derives from its legal status, which favours it, and to a large extent from the socio-economic advantages attached to using it.

One major feature of the language situation in Zaïre is its extreme dynamism — something which is also typical of the relations between the local languages themselves and between them and the official language, French. Although the ethnic languages have been passed over by the law, under which they have no status, they continue to thrive, although the number of speakers is declining constantly, in proportion, as a consequence of the enormous rural exodus to the big cities — where French and the main vehicular languages have a hold. There is no reason to think that they will die out in the near future. For most people, particularly in the country, they are still the easiest and the commonest way of communicating.

But the greatest beneficiaries of the present dynamic process are the vehicular languages, which are eroding the positions of the ethnic languages and increasingly becoming the vernacular of the towns, undermining French by taking over some of the jobs which the only official language used to do (in, say, administrative work, communication in the political sector and the party and so on). Lingala, the language of the capital, the army, modern music and the party, stands out. But French is still a *sine qua non* of access to modern knowledge and international communication. ○

M. M. N.







When *Kwayedza* was first published, it was not accorded the kind of respectability its English sister-papers received from elite readers. Our first hurdle, therefore, was to create and maintain a good measure of respectability, and to create an image that distinguished the paper from the established English newspapers. We had to produce a paper whose stories would be repeated in homes, at schools, at workplaces and everywhere — stories that readers would remember long after reading them.

### An accent on everyday problems

*Kwayedza* went for stories and social problems which affected people in their day-to-day life. The paper went for stories which exposed retrogressive beliefs and what people did as a result of those beliefs — beliefs in avenging spirits, for example, are a case in point. If a man causes the death of another he may be charged with murder, culpable homicide or manslaughter and may be sent to jail, and that should be the end of the story. But in Zimbabwe, while the man who killed another is in police custody, his family will probably be in more serious trouble. The family of the deceased will refuse to bury him, and will leave his body on the doorstep of the man who killed him. The family of the murder suspect will have to negotiate for the body to be returned to its rightful home.

*Kwayedza* has exposed stories of this kind in which the families of the deceased accepted back the body for burial only after ten or more head of cattle, and one to two thousand dollars, have been paid for compensation, and in addition to that, a young girl is also given to the family of the deceased for the purpose of bearing children for the family of the deceased when she grows up.

Legislation against this kind of practice may not succeed because the families that offer little girls for compensation do believe in, and are genuinely afraid of, the avenging spirit of the deceased.

*Kwayedza* has exposed this kind of story, has written editorial comments on such stories and has set people

talking so that even Parliament could not ignore their significance.

### A soaring readership

The elite who would not read *Kwayedza* at the beginning began to buy it, wrap it inside their usual daily paper, *The Herald*, and take it to their offices where they would read it.

Now they no longer hide the paper, but buy it openly, and our circulation has been going from strength to strength. We started with a circulation of 17 000 but this has now grown to 80 000 and according to market research, *Kwayedza* has a readership of 11.4 readers per copy.

The second hurdle was getting sufficient advertising. Although our circulation was growing fast, the financial executives who control advertising budgets are not Shona-speaking and therefore have no idea of the editorial content of *Kwayedza*, and the paper probably means very little to them.

*Kwayedza* commands a big readership both in the cities and out in the countryside, with many readers, because of their low educational level, preferring *Kwayedza* to English newspapers, and there has been an improvement in the amount of advertising that we are now getting. *Kwayedza* is usually 16 pages, but from time to time we are forced to go to 20 pages in order to accommodate available advertising for that week.

### Stringers for nationwide coverage

The newspaper has a small full-time staff consisting of two reporters, one sub-editor, a secretary, an assistant editor and an editor. It is distributed throughout the whole country, though obviously it would be physically impossible for two reporters to cover the whole country. If *Kwayedza* is to be interesting to readers throughout Zimbabwe, however, it has got to publish news from every corner of the country. The result is that we have had to recruit and train stringers, who send us news on a more or less regular basis and who get paid for published contributions. This participation by the people in the writing of

their own paper has in fact helped the paper to spread far and wide.

When a story sent in by a stringer is published, the stringer will not fold the paper and put it away after reading. It is only natural that he would like his family, his friends and other people to read the story and as it will be a local story in his area, many other people would like to see it in print. It is possible and easier for stringers to collect and send stories to *Kwayedza*, because they do it in their own language. And with the facts provided, the small staff of *Kwayedza* is able to write interesting stories from throughout Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has been fortunate in the sense that it has two main languages: Shona, which is spoken by the majority of the people in Zimbabwe and Ndebele, which is spoken by the people of Matabeleland. Many people who work in Bulawayo in Matabeleland are bilingual, speaking both Shona and Ndebele.

What is *Kwayedza*'s mission? There is a serious campaign both by the government of Zimbabwe and by a non-governmental organisation called the Adult Literacy Organisation of Zimbabwe (ALoz) to make all adults who were unable to go to school for one reason or another when they were young, functionally literate.

There are thousands of Zimbabweans who were able to receive primary education, only, before Independence, and those whose education was disturbed by the war of liberation. There are not enough books to go round even if these new literates could afford to buy them.

*Kwayedza* does what their appetite for reading cheaply. A copy of *Kwayedza* will help new literates to acquire a reading habit. The paper keeps the people informed of what is going on in their own country, provides instructional material in health, mother and child care, simple farming, self-reliance, and, of course, to help Zimbabweans rediscover themselves and to take pride in their own culture — starting with pride in their own language.

But most of all, *Kwayedza* should help prevent new literates from falling back into illiteracy. ○ P.C.



# National languages on La Voix du Sahel

by Adamou MAHAMAN<sup>(\*)</sup>

All of us in the developing countries today know that development is impossible unless the people actually take part in bringing it about. But before they take part, they have to be put in the picture and educated so that they can be mobilised and feel totally involved in the development process.

How this can be done in a vast country such as Niger, with its 1 287 000 km<sup>2</sup>, is a question which the authorities, well aware of the vital need for population involvement in development, are answering through radio broadcasts, with their enormous scope for spreading information.

But is broadcasting all it takes to put a country with an 80% illiteracy rate in the picture?

This brings us to what Niger sees as being the all-important issue of language. The national authorities' interest in the national languages is clear from their constant drive for cultural promotion, aimed particularly at using our languages and educating the masses in their own tongues — because if the various sections of society are to be mobilised and made aware of what is going on, then both their languages and their cultures have to be taken into account. A huge effort has been made with linguistic research, primary education (in experimental schools), functional literacy, political discussion (gradually integrating our languages), communica-

(\*) The author is head of La Voix du Sahel broadcasting in Niamey, Niger.

tion in our languages in the media and so on.

But in a country such as Niger, where there are eight national languages (Hausa, Zerma, Fulfulde, Tamashek, Kanuri, Gourmantche, Toubou and Arabic) side by side, how can broadcasting be organised to reach "the whole nation", particularly when the coexistence of different languages very often poses problems of regional balance in Africa? Although choices have had to be made in some countries where hundreds of languages are spoken, no such selection of dominant ones has been made in Niger and all our languages are used and have broadcasting time on La Voix du Sahel.

Since Niger's development is based mainly on farming and herding, the main occupation of 80% of the population, La Voix du Sahel stresses development and the various factors of it in its news, education, information and entertainment programmes.

Between the start of broadcasting in October 1958 and independence in 1960, most of the programmes were prepared in Paris and finished in Niamey.

La Voix du Sahel currently broadcasts for 119 hours, as follows:

- in the national languages — 4 600 minutes, or 64.43% of total time;
- in French — 2 420 minutes, or 33.89% of total time;
- in English — 15 minutes, or 0.21% of total time;

**Table 1: Types of programmes broadcast**

Area	Total time	French	National languages	English	% of total broadcasting time
Education and information	2475'	450'	2025'	—	34,66
Culture	735'	270'	465'	—	10,30
Entertainment	1400'	630'	770'	—	19,61
News	2425'	1070'	1340'	15'	33,96
Miscellaneous	105'	—	—	—	1,47

## LA VOIX DU SAHEL



Office de Radiodiffusion  
Télévision du Niger

B.P. 361 NIAMEY  
TEL. 72.22.72 - 72.32.72  
TELEX 5229 NI

— announcements and changes of frequency — 105 minutes or 1.47% of total time.

So the national languages are well represented on La Voix du Sahel, whose main aim is to pass on information and messages about development, register feedback and educate the people and make them aware of what is going on so as to achieve our development aims. The programmes are as in Table 1.

Education and information broadcasts deal with such questions as food crops, product preservation, animal health, desertification, reafforestation, combating endemic diseases, food hygiene, cooperatives, the use of contraceptives, women in development, private enterprise, national unity and more.

Cultural broadcasts cover religion and the history of Niger and introduce our people to the social and cultural sides of our towns and villages and bring them the works of our artists (singers, travelling musicians, painters, writers and so on).

News programmes provide coverage of national, African and international events and the very varied entertainment programmes include traditional and modern music from Niger, music from Africa, the international hit parade and record requests.

A.M.



## Common language, different cultures

by Seydina Oumar SY<sup>(\*)</sup>

The French-speaking world is made up of peoples with different cultures but a common language, French.

I should like to start by mentioning these cultural differences and stress the need to respect everyone's individuality and culture. This is the basis for solidarity in a spirit of partnership. But as well as these divergences, we have a common bond—that language which we, certainly even more than the countries of the North, want to see influential. We have different cultures and every day we use languages which are often only spoken in one or two countries.

Our international means of communication is French and we, even more than the French, do not want French to die. It is not by chance that it was Africans, the former President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, and the former President of Niger, Hamani Diori, who were the first to launch the idea of this French-speaking community and the need to organise it. We see in it many advantages and a possibility of communication, but we must also see in it a means of developing our intellectual faculties and our situation and making them flourish. That is to say that, if the French-speaking community is to be a sound one, it must be willing to listen to what each of its components has to say. In the lexicon, in France, people talk about the "arbre à palabre" (a not wholly complimentary term for the tree beneath which discussions are held) rather patronisingly, as if everything said there was clap-trap, rather as the Anglo-Saxons think that we French-speakers are masters of the spoken word and very eloquent and can make long, brilliant speeches. Well, we must take up this

challenge and show that, in these times, the French language, a language of culture, can also be a modern language. This is particularly true now that technology has taken us into the satellite era, where the media are to be extremely important—and it has to be realised here that, although the French-speaking community may not be lagging behind as far as discoveries are concerned, it is behind when it comes to communicating and



A young Peul girl, in Senegal

*"We have no intention of being Frenchmen... the Senegalese need to be Senegalese"*

transmitting them. So many of the expressions we use have been borrowed from the Anglo-Saxons. So we have to make an effort, not just to modernise the language and maintain it, but to make it a useful tool. And here, I believe, the French-speaking community also provides an opportunity for cooperation between the countries of the North and the countries of the South.

**"We do not want to be black Frenchmen"**

Our prime concern here in the countries of the South, in the Third World, afflicted as we are with economic problems and with debt, is survival and we will stick to the country which can help us tackle these problems and take up these challenges, whatever its language. In this

act of solidarity, however, the best placed, sentimentally speaking, are of course those who speak the same language as we do—although they have to realise the fact and come try and solve the problems with us. I think that we in Senegal will try to show what the problems of the South are. We will try to get the French-speaking community to cooperate, in the etymological meaning of the term, and to work together, because we believe it is in the interests of us all. But we still want to say that this cooperation, this quest for solidarity, should not be translated into a policy of assimilation. We start with different cultures, but we have no intention of being black Frenchmen or black Canadians or black Belgians. The Vietnamese need to be Vietnamese, the Senegalese Senegalese and the Zaïreans Zaïrean, but they can still derive the means of developing or nurturing their own faculties from someone else. In other words, if the French-speaking community is to work, it must be a community of solidarity and cooperation...

And what can we in the South do for the organisation of this French-speaking area? First of all, as I said at the beginning, our contribution is dictated by necessity. We need French more than the French do because it is our language of international communication and, until recently, we were better proponents of the French-speaking community than the French people themselves. But, leaving this necessity aside, we think we can contribute a certain way of looking at things. We think we have to help get the cultures of the French-speaking community known the world over, because, as Léopold Sédar Senghor would say, the universal civilisation which will be the civilisation of tomorrow is an act of giving and receiving. And if there is no contribution we in the South are able to make, then we have to agree to be the perpetually assisted—a situation unworthy of the countries of the South and an attitude which would prevent us from building a society with the values we espouse. ○ S.O.S.

(\*) The author, Senegal's Trade Minister, delivered this paper at a study day in Nice in December 1987, when he was Ambassador to the EEC. The conference was run by the Institut de la Paix et du Développement (Director, Professor Maurice Torelli) at the University of Nice and the proceedings were published by the Presses Universitaires de France in its "Travaux et Recherches de l'Institut du Droit de la Paix et du Développement" collection under the title of: "L'après-Québec: quelle stratégie pour la francophonie?"



# I write in Gikuyu

by Ngugi wa THIONG'O<sup>(\*)</sup>

*The choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a people's definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in relation to the entire universe. Hence language has always been at the heart of the two contending social forces in the Africa of the twentieth century.*

*The contention started a hundred years ago when in 1884 the capitalist powers of Europe sat in Berlin and carved an entire continent with a multiplicity of peoples, cultures, and languages into different colonies. The Berlin-drawn division under which Africa is still living was obviously economic and political, but it was also cultural. Berlin in 1884 saw the division of Africa into the different languages of the European powers. African countries came to be defined and to define themselves in terms of the languages of Europe: English-speaking, French-speaking or Portuguese-speaking African countries.*

*Unfortunately, writers who should have been mapping paths out of that linguistic encirclement of their continent also came to be defined and to define themselves in terms of the languages of imperialist imposition. Even at their most radical and pro-African position, in their sentiments and articulation of problems they still took it as axiomatic that the renaissance of African cultures lay in the language of Europe.*

## The language of African literature

In 1962 I was invited to that historic meeting of African writers at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda. The list of participants contained most of the names which have now become the subject of scholarly dissertations in universities all over the world.

The title, "A Conference of African Writers of English Expression", automatically excluded those who wrote in African languages. The discussions on the novel, the short story, poetry, and drama were based on extracts from works in English and hence they excluded the main body of work in Swahili, Zulu, Yoruba, Arabic, Amharic and other African languages. Yet, despite this exclusion of writers and literature in African languages, no sooner were the introductory preliminaries over than this Conference of "African Writers of English Expression" sat

down to the first item on the agenda: "What is African Literature?"

The debate which followed was animated: Was it literature about Africa or about the African experience? Was it literature written by Africans? What about a non-African who wrote about Africa: did his work qualify as African literature? What if an African set his work in Greenland: did that qualify as African literature? Or were African languages the criteria? OK: what about Arabic, was it not foreign to Africa? What about French and English, which had become African languages? What if an European wrote about Europe in an African language? If... if... if... this or that, except the issue; the domination of our languages and cultures by those of imperialist Europe: in any case there was no Fagunwa or Shabaan Robert or any writer in African languages to bring the conference down from the realms of evasive abstractions. The question was never seriously asked: did what we wrote qualify as African literature? The whole area of literature and

audience, and hence of language as a determinant of both the national and class audience, did not really figure: the debate was more about the subject matter and the racial origins and geographical habitation of the writer.

English, like French and Portuguese, was assumed to be the natural language of literary and even political mediation between African people in the same nation and between nations in Africa and other continents. In some instances these European languages were seen as having a capacity to unite African peoples against divisive tendencies inherent in the multiplicity of African languages within the same geographic state. English, French and Portuguese had come to our rescue and we accepted the unsolicited gift with gratitude. Thus in 1964, Chinua Achebe, in a speech entitled "The African Writer and the English Language", said:

"Is it right that a man should abandon his mother tongue for someone else's? It looks like a dreadful betrayal and produces a guilty feeling. But for me there is no other choice. I have been given the language and I intend to use it".

## An Afro-European tradition

The fact is that all of us who opted for European languages—the conference participants and the generation that followed them—accepted that fatalistic logic to a greater or lesser degree. We were guided by it and the only question which preoccupied us was how best to make the borrowed tongues carry the weight of our African experience by, for instance, making them "prey" on African proverbs and other peculiarities of African speech and folklore.

What African writers have produced, despite any claims to the contrary, is not African literature. The editors of the Pelican Guides to English literature in their latest volume were right to include a discussion of this literature as part of twentieth-century English literature, just as the French Academy was right to honour Senghor for his genuine and talented contribution to French literature and language. What we have

(\*) Excerpts from "Decolonising the Mind — the politics of language in African literature". Ngugi wa Thiong'o is one of Kenya's best known authors.



created is another hybrid tradition, a tradition in transition, a minority tradition that can only be termed as Afro-European literature; that is, the literature written by Africans in European languages. It has produced many writers and works of genuine talent: Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Ayi Kwei Armah, Sembene Ousmane, Agostino Neto, Sédar Senghor and many others. Who can deny their talent? The light in the products of their fertile imaginations has certainly illuminated important aspects of the African being in its continuous struggle against the political and economic consequences of Berlin and after. However we cannot have our cake and eat it! Their work belongs to an Afro-European literary tradition.

But some are coming round to the inescapable conclusion articulated by Obi Wali with such polemical vigour 20 years ago: African literature can only be written in African languages, that is, the languages of the African peasantry and working class, the major alliance of classes in each of our nationalities and the agency for the coming inevitable revolutionary break with neo-colonialism.


**“Gikuyu is my mother tongue!”**

I started writing in the Gikuyu language in 1977 after 17 years of involvement in Afro-European literature, in my case Afro-English literature. It was then that I collaborated with Ngugi wa Miril in the drafting of the playscript *Ngaahika Ndeenda* (the English translation was *I Will Marry When I Want*). I have since published a novel in Gikuyu, *Caitani Mutharabaini* (English translation: *Devil on the Cross*) and completed a musical drama, *Maitu Njugira* (English translation: *Mother Sing for Me*); three books for children, *Njamba Nene na Mbaathi i Mathagu*, *Bathitoora ya Njamba Nene*, *Njamba Nene na Cibu King'ang'i*, as well as another novel manuscript: *Matigari Ma Njiruungi*. Wherever I have gone, particularly in Europe, I have been confronted with the question: why are you now writing in Gikuyu? Why do you now write in an African language? In some academic quarters I have been

# NGUGI WA THIONG'O

## *Decolonising the Mind*

THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE  
IN AFRICAN LITERATURE



*Ngugi wa Thiong'o's latest book, dedicated "to all those who write in African languages, and to all those who over the years have maintained the dignity of the literature, culture, philosophy, and other treasures carried by African languages"*

confronted with the rebuke, "Why have you abandoned us?" It was almost as if, in choosing to write in Gikuyu, I was doing something abnormal. But Gikuyu is my mother tongue! The very fact that what

common sense dictates in the literary practice of other cultures is being questioned in an African writer is a measure of how far imperialism has distorted the view of African realities. It has turned reality upside



down: the abnormal is viewed as normal and the normal is viewed as abnormal. Africa actually enriches Europe: but Africa is made to believe that it needs Europe to rescue it from poverty. Africa's natural and human resources continue to develop Europe and America: but Africa is made to feel grateful for aid from the same quarters that still sit on the back of the continent. Africa even produces intellectuals who now rationalise this upside-down way of looking at Africa.

I believe that my writing in Gikuyu language, a Kenyan language, an African language, is part and parcel of the anti-imperialist struggles of Kenyan and African peoples. In schools and universities our Kenyan languages—that is the languages of the many nationalities which make up Kenya—were associated with negative qualities of backwardness, underdevelopment, humiliation and punishment.

So I would like to contribute towards the restoration of the harmony between all the aspects and divisions of language so as to restore the Kenyan child to his environment, understand it fully so as to be in a position to change it for his collective good. I would like to see Kenya peoples' mother-tongues (our national languages!) carry a literature reflecting not only the rhythms of a child's spoken expression, but also his struggle with nature and his social nature. With that harmony between himself, his language and his environment as his starting point, he can learn other languages and even enjoy the positive humanistic, democratic and revolutionary elements in other people's literatures and cultures without any complexes about his own language, his own self, his environment.

**“... do for our languages what Shakespeare did for English”**

We African writers are bound by our calling to do for our languages what Spenser, Milton and Shakespeare did for English; what Pushkin and Tolstoy did for Russian; indeed what all writers in world history have done for their languages by

meeting the challenge of creating a literature in them, which process later opens the languages for philosophy, science, technology and all the other areas of human creative endeavours.

**“Increasingly uneasy about the English language”**

I grew up speaking Gikuyu. My first encounter with stories and oral narratives was through Gikuyu.

The most creative of those Kenyans then writing in Gikuyu was Gakaara wa Wanjau who had even established his own Gakaara Book Service for publishing and book distribution. He had an impressive list of novelettes, political essays, songs and poems and sheer agitational material, all urging people to higher resolves in their pursuit of land, freedom and the redemption of their culture. Unfortunately all his books were banned and he himself arrested and detained for ten years from 1952 to 1962.

The English language opened the door to a wide range of fiction and it was this that eventually led me to the English Department at Makerere in 1959 and hence to the kind of writing which climaxed in *Petals of Blood* which was published in July 1977. But I was becoming increasingly uneasy about the English language. After I had written *A Grain of Wheat* I underwent a crisis. I knew whom I was writing about but whom was I writing for? The peasants whose struggles fed the novel never read it. In 1977 I called upon Kenyan writers to return to their roots in the languages and cultures of all our nationalities. Still the question nagged me. I had been able to cope with the problem of language in theatre. What about a novel? Would I be able to overcome the problems?

**No tradition of novels in Gikuyu**

Gikuyu language did not have a significant tradition of novel or fiction writing. Gakaara wa Wanjau had tried to create the beginnings of such a tradition. But his books had been banned in the fifties. I was also confronted with basic questions of

tense, even those of the changing visual impression of words on paper. Words and tenses were even more slippery because of the unsatisfactory Gikuyu orthography. Gikuyu language had been reduced to writing by non-native speakers such as European missionaries and they could not always identify the various lengths of vowels. The distinction between the short and the long vowel is very important in Gikuyu prose and poetry. But the prevailing orthography often left the reader to guess whether to prolong or shorten the vowel sound. I tried to solve the problem by using double vowels where I wanted to indicate the long vowel. But it took several pages before I could get used to it. And even then it was never finally satisfactory for what it called for was a new letter or a new market for the long vowel. Gikuyu is also a tonal language but the prevailing orthography did not indicate tonal variations.

So for all these reasons, I would write a paragraph in the evening sure of how it read, only later to find that it could be read in a different way which completely altered the meaning. I could only solve the problem by severely controlling the context of words in a sentence, and that of sentences in a paragraph, and that of the paragraph within the entire situation of the occurrence of the action in time and space. Yes, words did slip and slide under my own eye. They would not stay in place. They would not stay still. And this was often a matter of great frustration.

**Finding the appropriate “fiction language”**

But the biggest problem then, and what I still think is the biggest problem facing the growth and the development of the African novel, is finding the appropriate “fiction language”, that is, with fiction itself taken as a form of language, with which to effectively communicate with one's targeted audience: that is, in my case, the people I left behind.

There were two interrelated problems of “fiction language” vis-à-vis a writer's chosen audience: his rela-



relationship to the form, to the genre itself; and his relationship to his material, that is, to the reality before him. How would he handle the form? How would he handle the material before him?

The first question has to do with how the novel as a form has developed. The Afro-European novel itself had produced a whole range of approaches: from the linear plot development in Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* to Wole Soyinka's *The Interpreters* which almost dispenses with plot. Could I write for an audience that had never read a novel in the same way as I would write for an audience that had read, or was aware of, James Joyce, Joseph Conrad, Wole Soyinka or Ayi Kwei Armah?

In the Afro-European novel of my previous practice I had gone through different phases of "technical" growth. *The River Between* and *Weep Not, Child* have a linear plot. Event leads to event in a relay in a field of continuous time. The point of view is largely that of the central character. The one narrative voice is that of the omniscient narrator/author. But by the time *Weep Not, Child* came out in 1964 I was already dissatisfied with that approach.

The narrative form of *A Grain of Wheat* with its stories within stories in a series of flashbacks was a product of that reappraisal. *Petals of Blood* had taken a stage further the techniques of flashbacks, multiple narrative voices, movement in time and space and parallel biographies and stories. The technique allowed me to move freely in time and space through the centuries and through all the important landmarks in Kenya's history from the early times and back to the 12 days' duration of the present of the novel.

But all this assumed a reader acquainted with the convention of reading novels, and particularly the modern novel in European languages. Would similar techniques carry the kind of reader who had been to see Ngaahika Ndeenda (*I will marry when I want*)? And yet how would I return to the linear plot? I was, in other words, much more conscious of my new audience.

Or maybe it was a matter of languages. Would my use of Gikuyu language dictate a different kind of novel?

Whatever the case, I wanted to go for a simpler plot, a simpler or clearer narrative line, a stronger story element (the element of what happens next!) without looking down upon or patronising the intended worker/peasant readership.

I tried to solve the problem in three ways. I went for a fairly simple structure, that of a simple journey. Caitani Mutharabaini (*Devil on the Cross*) rests on two main journeys over virtually the same ground. War-iinga moves in a matatu taxi from the capital city Nairobi to Ilmorog, a fictional rural outpost. Then War-iinga makes a second journey in a car from Nairobi to Ilmorog to Nakuru. A gap of two years separates the two journeys. There are a number of flashbacks. The journey, the means of transport and the actual places mentioned in Nairobi and Nakuru would be familiar to many ordinary Kenyans. I also borrowed heavily from forms of oral narrative, particularly the conversational tone, the fable, proverbs, songs and the whole tradition of poetic self-praise or praise of others. I also incorporated a biblical element—the parable—because many literates would have read the Bible. People would be familiar with these features and I hoped that these would help root the novel within a known tradition.

Language, plot, realism of social and physical detail, features of oral narratives, all these were elements of form and I knew that form by itself, no matter how familiar and interesting, could never hold the attention of my new kind of reader for long. They have more important things to do than indulge in pretty rearrangements of familiar features of orature or of the urban and rural landscape. Content with which the people could identify or which would force them to take sides was necessary. Content is ultimately the arbiter of form. A proper marriage of content and form would decide the reception accorded the novel. So the most important thing was to go for a subject matter, for a content, which had the weight

and the complexity and the challenge of their everyday struggles.

But what happens when reality is stranger than fiction? How does a novelist capture and hold the interest of the reader when the reality confronting the reader is stranger and more captivating than fiction?

Then one day I got it. Why not tell the story of men who had sold their souls and that of the nation to the foreign devil of imperialism? Why not tell the story of evil that takes pride in evil? Why not tell the story of robbers who take pride in robbing the masses? That was how I came to write the novel *Caitani Mutharabaini (Devil on the Cross)* in Gikuyu language.

### How the Gikuyu novel was received

The reception of a given work of art is part of the work itself or rather, the reception (or consumption) of the work completes the whole creative process involving that particular artistic object. So now I want to tell you briefly how the novel *Caitani Mutharabaini* was received. It was read in families. A family would get together every evening and one of their literate members would read it for them. Workers would also gather in groups, particularly during the lunchbreak, and they would get one of them to read the book. It was read in buses; it was read in taxis; it was read in public bars.

One amusing aspect of all this was the development of "professional readers" — but in bars. These were people who would read the book aloud to the other drinking but attentive customers. When the reader reached an interesting episode and he discovered that his glass was empty, he would put the book down. "Give him another bottle of beer!" some of the listeners would shout to the proprietor. So our reader would resume and go on until his glass was empty. He would put the book down and the whole drama would be repeated, night after night, until the end of the novel.

The process I'm describing is really the appropriation of the novel into the oral tradition. *Caitani*



Mutharabaini was received into the age old tradition of storytelling around the fireside; and the tradition of group reception of art than enhances the aesthetic pleasure and provokes interpretation, comments and discussions. Remnants of this—what used to be the norm, that is the group reception of art—are still to be found in theatre and, to a limited extent, in the cinema.

### The difficulties of distribution

The distribution of the novel (and of the play *Ngaahika Ndeenda* which was published at the same time) was a challenge to the publishers. It soon became clear that the structure of bookshops, libraries and other information centres was geared to serve the urban English-educated sectors. The urban poor and the rural areas had really no access to luxuries in between hard covers. They are presumed to be illiterate—which they normally are—and poor — which they mostly are. How does one overcome the isolation imposed by poverty and illiteracy? Do these not severely limit the reception of, let's say, a novel? All this is probably true: poverty and illiteracy do severely limit access to knowledge and information. But after some time institutions are built around this uneven and unequal development. The lack of bookshops and library facilities in the rural areas where the majority live is a case in point. They are poor and illiterate; therefore they cannot buy or read books; therefore there is no need for bookshops or libraries. But because no bookshops or libraries are available, people are denied the very means of knowledge and information which might help in their attempt to organise and break the circle of illiteracy. Rural schools are denied what is freely available to the wealthy sections of the urban centres. The habit of borrowing a book from a library or buying a book for reading for pleasure and for instruction outside the formal classroom is hardly developed. How do you sell novels to such areas?

There was no real solution to the problem. The publishers often used their vans as a mobile bookshop. They experimented in various ways: like leaving several copies at some

shops or stalls on a sale-or-return basis. But some enthusiastic readers would buy the books from the publishers in bulks of five, ten or 20 and on their own initiative would take the copies to rural areas and plantations. There were some surprises. One such seller, Ngigi wa Wachiira, on returning to a plantation where a month before he had sold two or three copies, was treated with gifts. So out there were such good books. Would he please keep on bringing new titles to them? They could always pool their resources and buy a few copies, and so Ngigi had become a hero for making *Caitani Mutharabaini*, a novel, available to them!

Despite the difficulties, the novel sold fairly well — certainly to the commercial satisfaction of the “daring” publisher. The publishers had initially printed only 5 000 copies, hoping to sell them over a period of three to five years. In other words they would have been satisfied with an annual sale of over a thousand copies. But within a month of publication they had reprinted another 5 000 and within the same year they had to reprint 5 000 more. The novel came out in April 1980. By December, 1980, they had had three printings bringing the total to 15 000 copies. Not even for a novel in English had they ever done so well in Kenya in the same length of time. The publishers tell me now the novel has settled to an annual sale of about 1 000 copies which compares favourably with their best-selling titles in English or Kiswahili in Kenya.

### Translation from one African language to another

The novel has now been translated into English, Swedish, Norwegian and German. There are possibilities of Russian and Japanese editions. But more important has been the translation of the novel into Kiswahili under the title *Shetani Msalabani*, a direct communication between Gikuyu and Swahili languages.

Indeed I see this kind of communication between African languages as forming the real foundation of a genuinely African novel. A novel

originally written in Ibo could find itself translated into Yoruba and vice-versa. A novel written in Dholuo or Maasai could find itself translated into two or three or more Kenyan languages or into African languages outside Kenya. There would thus be a real dialogue between the literatures, languages and cultures of the different nationalities within any one country — forming the foundations of a truly national literature and culture, a truly national sensibility! Within Africa as a whole there would be the foundation of a truly African sensibility in the written arts. This will also have the added effect of enhancing the art of translation which would be studied in schools and colleges (another career open to graduates!) and this necessarily would mean more rigorous and committed study of African languages.

The future of the African novel is then dependent on a willing writer (ready to invest time and talent in an African language); a willing translator (ready to invest time and talent in the art of translating from one African language into another); a willing publisher (ready to invest time and money) or a progressive state which would overhaul the current neo-colonial linguistic policies and tackle the national question in a democratic manner; and finally, and most important, a willing and widening readership.

But of all these other factors, it is only the writer who is best placed to break through the vicious circle and create fiction in African languages. The writer of fiction can be and must be the pathfinder. It has happened in history, in other countries such as Russia and Finland. Then the other factors will follow.

When that day comes, when the African writer will naturally turn to African languages for his creative imagination, the African novel will truly come into its own, incorporating into itself all the features developed in the different parts of Africa from the different cultures of African peoples as well as the best progressive features of the novel or fiction developed in Asia, Latin America, Europe, America, the world. ○

N.w.T.



# Languages in danger of disappearance: the case of Papua New Guinea

by Otto Manganau NEKITEL (\*)

*Vernaculars, that is languages other than pidgins and the metropolitan ones, play an important role in the life of Pacific peoples. They serve not only as mediums of communication but also as symbols of group identity and collective solidarity. Vernaculars enable different groups of people to identify who they are and to what ethnic and linguistic entities they belong. Thus vernaculars are often said to assume a special social status in the linguistic communities in which they serve as mediums of communication. Vernaculars are also instrumental in our perceptions of reality. They influence the way we perceive things*

*found in our immediate environment, the way we think, the way we act and speak the languages, as well as the way we behave when interacting with fellow human beings in any given social context. Consequently it is important to nurture and guard against the disappearance or potential disappearance of vernaculars, for they are the surest ways for Pacific peoples to safeguard or recover the authentic cultures inherited from our undefiled ancestors, as well as to hand them on to future generations yet unborn. The vitality and continuity of vernaculars must be safeguarded from unnecessary external linguistic interference and replacement.*

When thinking about vernaculars, in Papua New Guinea or any Pacific country, there is a common problem that we all face: mental dependence. It seems that not only do Pacific peoples rely on metropolitan powers for their string-tied monetary hand-outs, technical knowhow, and other so-called expertise, but also we are largely dependent on metropolitan experts who instil into our minds what *they* think is best for us or what *they* think we should do to achieve rapid and effective westernisation or modernisation. What, for instance, is the meaning of such labels as: *Pasifiki Toana*, the Pacific Way, the Melanesian Way, *Fa'a Samoa*, the Hawaiian Renaissance? To an aspiring specialist of language all those labels, or alternative tags, have a common message: beware Pacific people, of the external forces which, if not watched very carefully, will denude our vernaculars, our cultures, and other social fabric of our societies.

## Cultural and language identity

Given the broad expanse of the Pacific and the widespread nature of its human settlements, an exhaustive study of what is happening to vernaculars is beyond the scope of this

paper. Nonetheless a fair number of Pacific vernaculars have experienced "linguistic genocide". The aboriginal language of Tasmania, as well as some 400 aboriginal vernaculars of mainland Australia, have disappeared and to a large extent so has the Hawaiian language of the American state of the same name. Within Papua New Guinea, Dutton has reported that three vernaculars in southeast Papua (Ouma, Yoba and Bina) are spoken by less than four people and thus face extinction when the last speaker dies. This general issue is addressed here with respect to the declining status of Abu', which is my mother tongue. Abu' is spoken by about 320 people who live in Womsis village located in the central Sepik region of Papua New Guinea. It is a member of the Arapesh Language Family.

## Linguistic map of Papua New Guinea

To provide a context for the discussion of Abu', we must understand some features of the linguistic landscape of Papua New Guinea: the number and variety of local vernaculars, the position of *lingua francas* (Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu), and the use and status of English. At least 750 distinct vernaculars, along with innumerable dialects, are spoken within the mainland and insular areas of Papua New Guinea. None has a large number of speakers by world

standards. In terms of speakers, Enga is the largest (with 180 000), and spoken in the province bearing the same name, located in the mid-western highlands region. Four other vernaculars are relatively sizeable: Kuanua with 80 000 speakers, located around the Rabaul area in East New Britain province; Melpa, with 75 999 speakers, located in the Western Highlands; Kuman, with 70 000 in the Simbu Province; and Huli, with 65 000 speakers, spoken by the Tari of the Southern Highlands. Many vernaculars are small, some with no more than 100 speakers.

The basic linguistic division of Papua New Guinea vernaculars is between those belonging to the Austronesian (A) Family and those others that, for linguistic convenience, have been collectively referred to as Papuan (P: also known as non-Austronesian). The term Papuan is a classificatory residual, despite the fact that many more people speak them. Austronesian vernaculars (A) show some evidence of lexical similarities, which in turn suggests a genetic relationship. They are found mostly along the coastal, near-coastal, and insular areas of the country. Each has approximately three hundred members and is spoken by small communities, apart from Kuanua (also known as Tolai, around the Rabaul area of New Britain) and Motu (more than 10 000 speakers in the villages of the Port Moresby area). The total number of Papua New Guineans who

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## DOSSIER

speak Austronesian vernaculars constitute a small fraction of the total indigenous population.

Papuan (P), or non-Austronesian vernaculars, constitute the remainder. A very few have, by Papua New Guinea standards, a great number of speakers (Enga, Melpa, Kuman, Huli) but most are small. Some are intermediate in size and the Arapesh language family, to which Abu' belongs, has approximately 20 000 speakers. Papuan vernaculars differ quite considerably and belong to a number of unrelated linguistic groups. They are spoken in the interior or highlands of New Guinea: Gulf and Western provinces, most of West New Britain, some pockets along the East and West Sepik coasts, and some parts of the North Solomons province. In total, they account for an overwhelming majority of the indigenous population, perhaps more than two million persons.

There are, in addition to these 750 vernaculars, one official language—English—and two unofficial national *lingua francas* (Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu) in Papua New Guinea. Hiri Motu, the *lingua franca* spoken in the southern and south-eastern part of the country, owes its origin to contact

situations between expatriates and indigenous people. It was found initially in and around the Central province and spread from there as the British and subsequently the Australian colonial administration expanded its influence to other areas with in the former colony of Papua. It is now spoken by about 20 000 Papua New Guineans.

Tok Pisin, found in the highlands, northern, and insular provinces, originated with plantation activities in the 1880s. Recruitment of men from the New Guinea islands especially from the Duke of York island, New Ireland and New Britain, to go to Samoa and work as indentured labourers on commercial plantations resulted in the acquisition of the code. On return to New Guinea, many became overseers and passed on their knowledge of Tok Pisin to labourers newly recruited from other parts of the former Trust Territory, who transferred it to their village communities when returning at the end of the work contract. Tok Pisin was and is an unofficial language, but its importance in crossing linguistic boundaries was recognised by both the colonial government and the Catholic mission. Both institutions used it to communicate with the indigenous people and thus indirectly

encouraged its spread. Today Tok Pisin is the principal *lingua franca* of Papua New Guinea and the main language of communication in most speech situations.

English occupies a special position, being officially sanctioned as the language of formal education, government, commerce, and of international contact. It is, however, spoken by a small fraction of the population, mostly the Papua New Guinea intelligentsia and educated elite along with the overseas community in the country. Any of the three national languages may be used in any given speech situation. Since only some Papua New Guineans have acquired passable skills in all three, the choice of which is determined extemporaneously by the interlinguistic context, the topic of discourse, and the language known by the participants. For example, bilingual speakers in Hiri Motu and English may switch codes between these two when addressing bilinguals in the same languages.

### Current position of Abu'

Abu', the symbol of ethnic and cultural uniqueness and hence of Womsis consciousness, is dwindling in varying degrees. The acquisition of Abu' as a first language, by children born of Abu'-speaking parents, is no longer as common as it was a decade ago. Children are generally left to learn what they encounter as the medium of communication among peer groups. Since Tok Pisin is the predominant language of communication in the village, and especially among children and the younger generation of Womsis parents, naturally it is becoming the first language among children. Subsequently the process of creolisation, when a pidgin gains its own native speakers, begins right in the village.

Nowadays Tok Pisin is used in most speech situations, for perhaps 60-70% of the time. That is, about 60-70% of any discourse is conducted in Tok Pisin either throughout its entire length or interspersed with Abu'. A switch from Abu' to Tok Pisin for specific lexical or phrasal loans is more frequent, but the converse is not as common. Most meetings of the local government council or school board of governors, among



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*"At least 750 distinct vernaculars, along with innumerable dialects, are spoken within the mainland and insular areas of Papua New Guinea"*



parents, or about land disputes are conducted in Tok Pisin. Church services and religious instruction always were and still are in Tok Pisin.

With this degree of language switching in support of Tok Pisin, there is a real danger of Abu' being replaced or dying out. The survival or continuity of this vernacular is rather bleak unless Abu' speakers realise what is happening and begin to encourage children to acquire Abu', most preferably as their first language. There are several likely reasons for this state of affairs.

### Colonial attitudes towards Abu'

Expatriates who visit Womsis have never shown any interest in learning Abu' because their communicative needs are well served by Tok Pisin. Pidgin was and is the language of communication between the villagers and expatriates, and also with visitors from other communities. The parish priest, the *kiaps* (patrol officers), the medical officers, and numerous other-government or mission representatives always used some kind of Tok Pisin, especially the *Tokmasta* variety. Those Abu' speakers who did not know Tok Pisin were often called *bun kanaka*, *manabus*, or *daluh*: literally, a person from the interior or "bush" but used derogatorily to mean "idiot" or "stupid kanaka". Thus certain social attitudes emphasised the prestige of Tok Pisin to a point where it was seen as the language of those in power or in positions of influence. When a language is regarded as part of the culture of the colonising power, be it pidgin or a metropolitan language, the people who are being colonised can be led to think that their vernaculars are inferior. Consequently they make efforts to use the external language to achieve upward social mobility within, or for reasons of social identification with, the dominant culture. Thus prevailing social attitudes increasingly encourage the uses of Tok Pisin at the expense of Abu' in Womsis village, where once Abu' was the only language known and spoken.

### Interethnic marriages and Abu' continuity

Interethnic marriages are now more common than in the past and a num-



WHO - Abcede

*"The best language teachers are the parents. If parents fail to teach vernaculars to their children it is not always possible for other people to do so"*

ber of Abu'-speaking adults have spouses from other ethnic or linguistic groups. Exogamous marriage should be encouraged to allow people the liberty to choose their own partners, and also because they foster a sense of national unity and/or ethnolinguistic integration. Nonetheless, they can hinder the continuity and vitality of vernacular languages.

General observation seems to suggest many parents of interethnic marriages leave their children to acquire whatever happens to be either the language of wider communication or the functional language of the given locality. In most areas of Papua New Guinea these are either Tok Pisin or Hiri Motu, which often become the mother tongues of many children. This is particularly true when the partners of an interethnic marriage reside in towns, cities, and on plantations, where ethno-linguistic integration often occurs and can be actively encouraged. In certain cases, the mothers of interethnic marriages teach children their own vernaculars, especially if they do not have a paid

job or, more importantly, are concerned about the future social, cultural and linguistic identity of their children. Male partners seem generally less concerned about what vernaculars their children acquire as long as they speak the language of the fathers. Interethnic marriages may also lead to bi- or multi-lingualism.

In general, children born of Abu' and non-Abu' parents reflect the situation for the country as a whole. Three of my first cousins by marriage have non-Abu'-speaking wives and their children have learnt Tok Pisin and some English but hardly speak the language of either their fathers (Abu') or their mothers. Tok Pisin, Hiri Motu, and English often become the mediums through which interethnic communication takes place and hence generally become the spoken languages of children of interethnic marriages. Initially, such children tend to be monolingual but later progress to become bilingual, trilingual, or even multilingual, especially if sociolinguistic conditions necessi-



tate and favour such linguistic diversity.

**Abu' members living outside their own environment**

Those who leave Womsis to attend schools or get jobs elsewhere in the country either lose command of Abu' or else retain to a varying extent a passive knowledge, provided that some degree of communicative competence in the vernacular had been acquired prior to departure from the village. Some *Wantoks* (fellow Abu'ans) who have or who are currently studying at university have virtually abandoned Abu'. One reason is that either they are not competent to speak Abu', for they had never fully developed lasting skills in the vernacular, or else they feel uneasy and perhaps even ashamed to use it lest they become objects of ridicule for not knowing their language or for speaking it with a strange accent. Many Abu' in town or at university use Tok Pisin or English simply because these are the languages with which they feel comfortable or that are spoken within these ethnically mixed contexts.

When they return to Womsis village for holidays, they find it more convenient to use Tok Pisin. When some begin to verbalise in Abu', those claiming to be local authorities make fun of them for speaking it with a foreign accent. Given such attitudes, the only option for those unable to accept linguistic intolerance is to use the language with which they feel comfortable and which does not invite social stigmatisation. Many of us long absent from Womsis have little or no opportunity actively to reinforce our knowledge of the vernacular. On return, we find it difficult to express ourselves in Abu' and thus communicate through Tok Pisin, which only serves to give greater support to an introduced pidgin at the expense of the local language. In general, there is a decrease in the knowledge of Abu' with increasing distance from the area where it is spoken.

**Easier to use Tok Pisin**

Speakers of a vernacular may resort to the use of another language for reasons of economy and ease of articulation.

This reflects the universal tendency for those communicating in a language with a complex phonological system and syntactic structure to turn to that vernacular or language whose phonological and syntactic systems are less complex. It is often said that Tok Pisin is an easy language to learn and perhaps this is one of the main reasons why the Abu' prefer to use it. From the linguistic point of view, this is a rather unorthodox position, since all fully-fledged languages are either equally difficult or else equally simple. The notion of one language being simple or more complex than another very often reflects the naiveté, personal biases, or value judgments of a particular individual or group.

Let us accept, however, that some languages may fall under the rubric of "easy" and that Tok Pisin is one of them. Which linguistic features make Abu' a little difficult to learn or perhaps more difficult than Tok Pisin? Are there any aspects of the vernacular that appear awkward to master and may discourage children from learning it?

The first phonological problem with Abu' has to do with the unpredictable occurrence of the glottal stop represented by an apostrophe in written form. Preliminary observations suggest that the glottal stop was awkward to master by a number of Abu' children. Although Tok Pisin and Abu' have a similar grammatical order in both being subject-verb-object languages, Abu' possesses a very complex structure. We give one example in each language:

Example of Abu'

**Aleman ubahineri alialineri nubulawa nahe'kani aulaf enini.**

*Man big-man dark-man he-ran he-went to house his-of.*

Example Tok Pisin

**Bikpela blakpela man i ranigo long haus bilong em.**

*A very big dark man ran to his house.*

Beyond the difficulty of learning Abu', Womsis is a changing society and thus its language is accepting newly introduced lexical items that have become available from Tok Pisin and English. Generally, when nouns are borrowed from Tok Pisin, they

retain their singular form but take on the Abu' plural ending. Some examples are:

Tok Pisin	Abu'	Gloss
(singular form)	(plural form)	
pater sista tisa	paterimi siteiwa tisaimi	priest sister/nun male teacher

The main point is that Abu' is borrowing heavily from Tok Pisin and if such changes are not guided by linguistic principles, then Abu' may become so heavily pidginised as to lose its identity as a vernacular.

**Consideration for others**

In Womsis society, certain linguistic norms forbid people from using a language not understood by visitors unless one wishes to swear at them. To ensure that relationships between visitors, guests, and hosts occur without feelings of suspicion, Abu' speakers try to avoid using their own vernacular but will communicate quite freely in Tok Pisin. This action indirectly supports the rising dominance of a pidgin over Abu', especially when speakers of Abu' use Tok Pisin if they are within hearing of the visitor's locus.

**Parents' failure to foster Abu'**

Finally, parents themselves are largely responsible for the apparent decline in the status of Abu', since it appears that they are not genuinely concerned about their children acquiring it. It was a common sight to see and hear parents speaking to their children in Tok Pisin. I told a number of Womsis parents, including my sisters and female relatives by marriage, that Abu' was in danger of dying out if they did not teach it to their children. Even more, when they die, Abu' would go with them and their children would no longer have a vernacular or a culture with which to identify. It is hoped that further education on the importance of maintaining Abu' can be initiated soon to make parents more aware of the importance of keeping Abu' alive and to ensure the ethnolinguistic continuity of their society.



## The position of vernaculars in Papua New Guinea

What can be done to ensure that Abu' and other Papua New Guinea or Pacific vernaculars remain alive and vital?

On numerous occasions in Papua New Guinea, leaders express concern on the importance of preserving our rich and diverse cultural heritage. However, neither speeches nor documents recognise or emphasise the vital role that vernaculars play. The single exception is contained in the Report of the Information Review Committee, that was formed in 1979 under the chairmanship of Mr. Leo R. Morgan, then of the Public Services Commission.

Among the committee's recommendations were two that recognised the importance of not only the three official languages (English, Tok Pisin, Hiri Motu), but also the many vernaculars, for the process of nation-building and unification. Government and non-government agencies were urged to promote the official languages "through literacy, literature development, language planning, translation, and interpretation services", and the committee considered that a national department should coordinate such activities. In its eighth recommendation, the committee urged that "government and non-government agencies utilise to the greatest practical extent the nation's vernacular language resources".

The government acted to implement some of these points by establishing the Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies (IPNGS), which organises an annual literature competition to encourage expression in the three official languages. No language planning occurs at governmental level and no appropriate body exists to undertake the recommended or comparable activities.

The Department of Extension Studies and the Faculty of Education of the University of Papua New Guinea, in collaboration with the provincial government of the North Solomons, has initiated a pilot project in vernacular education, from which favourable reports have been received and which might serve as a model for other provincial governments.

## Conclusion

Given a lack of language planning in Papua New Guinea, the specific recommendations that follow aim to ensure that our many vernaculars remain alive:

- The best language teachers are the parents. If parents fail to teach vernaculars to their children it is not always possible for other people to do so. Parents should ensure that their children learn the tongues of their mothers or fathers at an early stage of their lives, for if this does not occur, their children will not pass on the vernacular to their own offspring.



Air Nugini

*"On numerous occasions in Papua New Guinea, leaders express concern on the importance of preserving a rich and diverse cultural heritage. However, neither speeches nor documents recognise or emphasise the vital role that vernaculars play"*

- The Education Department should mount a nationwide programme in vernacular education, for at least the first few years of elementary schooling, as is now being tested in the North Solomons province. This can be done by teaching the vernacular of the given area, initially as a subject and later as a medium of instruction once written materials become available. The fifth recom-

mendation is an important first step to achieve this.

- Papua New Guinea ought to mount literacy programmes in vernaculars nationwide. If the government cannot undertake such a responsibility, then it should make funds available to certain organisations, such as the Summer Institute of Linguistics, to expand and intensify what has already begun in some areas of the country.

- The network of national and provincial radio stations should be involved in language and cultural programmes. Once these are devised, vernacular and cultural experts from different language groups could be asked to present traditional stories, singings (folk dances), and other aspects of local culture. These programmes could also be translated into Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu for the wider audience and thus help people recognise the overall value and richness of vernaculars.

- Government must assist professional linguists and knowledgeable persons to develop orthographies or spelling systems, for unwritten vernacular languages and to encourage the production of a literature in them to demonstrate their importance and enhance their continuity. In this way, the ethnolinguistic consciousness of the people would be safeguarded.

If vernaculars are being threatened or interfered with by external linguistic systems, as is occurring to Abu' from Tok Pisin, then the onus is on the adults in such communities to ensure that the local vernacular is taught to their offspring. Such is the rapid pace of social change in Pacific Island societies today that members of various speech communities may not be able to spend the time needed to reinforce their knowledge of vernaculars. In this situation, literate members of different speech communities need to use whatever talents gained from western-oriented education and any technological means available to research, document, and produce literature in their rich vernaculars. Such poems, stories, folk dances and tales would represent a visible token of appreciation at being a speaker in a specific local language and therefore, a member of a particular and special group of people. ○ O. M. N.



## The National Sheep Rearing Centre, Béoumi

*Small ruminants – a potential source of animal protein for Côte d'Ivoire*

by Roger DISSET (\*)

Although there is no pastoral tradition in Côte d'Ivoire, Ivoirians have always had small ruminants in their villages, the sheep and goats they keep for traditional purposes such as sacrifices, gifts, family festivities and much-appreciated meat.

Although small ruminants are not seen here as the savings and objects of barter that they are in many other African countries, they are just as hard to come by, as all the females are kept for reproduction to replace those which die of disease or old age.

Côte d'Ivoire has 1 780 000 sheep and goats, but in spite of a very considerable increase in stock over the past decade, there is still a long way to go before the country is self-sufficient in sheep and goat meat. Ivorian producers only account for 43 % of the annual consumption. The Government's livestock development policy has very sensibly chosen the Centre as the place to extend sheep and goat rearing because of the vast

stretches of savannah which are right for this purpose. With more than 40 % of the national herd, this region has opened the way for improved support for sheep and goat rearing activity and it now has considerable regional and national infrastructure.

At the outset, the extension system which Côte d'Ivoire set up was intended both to increase the productivity of the existing herds and to create a new class of herdsmen who knew how to apply the new techniques. Improving and developing sheep and goat production means that there must be the people and the healthy, productive animals of the right quantity and quality to do it. And that the range of techniques involved is known.

After running the system for a year or two, it also became clear that extension staff had to be retrained and steps taken to provide both the new and experienced rearers with high-performance rams and sound young potential ewes.

It was against this background of expanding sheep rearing in Côte d'Ivoire that the Ministry of Animal Production set up the National Sheep-rearing Centre (CNO) in 1976, with half the financing from the special investment and equipment budget (BSIE) and half from the European Development Fund. The Centre actually opened in 1978 after the 4th EDF agreement (No 2.119/CI) was signed by the EEC and Côte d'Ivoire.

The financing agreement laid down the aims of the CNO, in line with what the Government wanted, at the outset. They were to produce better breeding stock, try out pasture management systems, the various feeding methods and the technical equipment specific to conditions in Côte d'Ivoire and open a vocational training centre offering basic and advanced courses to herdsmen and extension workers.

The Centre, which is between the town of Béoumi and the Kossou reservoir on the Bandama, is a 500 hectare area, of which about 160 ha have been cleared for allocation or planting as artificial grazing land.

There is also some major infrastructure, some of it dating back to the time the Centre was set up and some added as needs arose.

### Developing livestock methods

From the word go, the livestock sector and the Centre had technical difficulties to cope with. They began with an epidemic of sheep pox (fortunately soon under control) and an outbreak of a hitherto virtually unknown disease called "nervous syndrome". Very little is known about this disease even now, but the

(\*) Mr Disset, a small ruminants expert, is with the Ministry of Animal Production in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire.



*Djallonké rams at the CNO in Béoumi*

CNO





*A flock of gestating ewes on the Panicum pasture during the dry season*

woody *Brachiaria ruzizensis* at Béoumi the single food-based complement, the distribution of non-diversified mineral complements and so on had their part to play in this pathological upset. However, the disease has disappeared since early March 1983, thanks to general improvements in livestock techniques.

Forage crops have also had their ups and downs and problems with seeds, gathering, planting and choice of type and association have had to be overcome, usually during the course of developing the livestock techniques. The standard of the grazing land today is proof of the ability which has been developed in this field.

The development of various types of enclosure has also been a source of some difficulty. In the present economic conditions, the cheapest and safest method has proved to be a specific number of shepherds for a specific number of sheep. Modular enclosures are only used for ewes which are in-lamb or suckling. The lambs are zero-grazed, more to facilitate monitoring and testing than for economic reasons — which would have militated against this approach.

Lastly, people are now well aware of what farm tools are needed to create and maintain artificial grazing land, but the cost of buying and maintaining the machinery and the users' lack of qualifications rule out this modern method for the time being.

As things stand, the sound health of the livestock, the production of breeding stock, proper organisation of the work of both shepherds and assistant shepherds, the maintenance of herding and so on mean that the Centre really has the national character its name suggests.

Overall, the main technical choices made when sheep-rearing began at the CNO involved intensifying Djalónké rearing and introducing forage crops, which were planted and maintained with a full set of agricultural equipment ranging from cutters to pick-up balers.

As with most intensified herding, the rate of reproduction is three lambings every two years or mating every eight months (a rate of 1.5).

After some trial and error with forage crops in enclosures, the choice of herding systems has now been fixed. They involve:

- rearing adults (gestation, mating and a possible rest period), tended by shepherds, on natural savannah with a (three or four ingredient) food complement;

- rearing ewes which are in-lamb and suckling on intensified forage crops in moveable enclosures, shifted daily, with a food complement as above;

- rearing permanently stabled animals for slaughter with the provision of green forage, zero-grazing and the same food complement as above.

At the outset, *Brachiaria r.* and *Stylosanthes* (non-associated) were chosen as forage crops, but they caused problems—the former had a bad effect on sheep and the latter caused attacks of anthracosis—and were dropped in favour of various types of *Panicum* (which was planted to begin with but is now produced entirely from cuttings) in association with *Centrosema* (which is broadcast).

Now there are plenty of plots planted with a variety of *Panicum* and only very few where *Panicum* and *Centrosema* are still grown side by side. However, there are one or two plots where, astonishingly, *Panicum* is



grown in association with *Centrosema-Brachiaria*, models of their kind which are properly worked. Surplus forage is harvested as hay, in principle, during the short dry seasons or at the end of the rainy season.

The disease prevention plan takes account of both climate, livestock cycles and major pathological risks. It includes preventive treatment against internal parasites (including *Haemonchus* and *Moniezia*, which dominate), which are more common during the rainy season, and against external parasites (dominated by ticks and scabs). A very successful model delousing tank has been built and is currently being used for the disease prevention programme.

Lastly, the animals are vaccinated against small ruminant fever and sheep pox, which are endemic in the Ivorian flock.

The standard sheep fold comprises a small enclosure, with a footbath on the way out and a 185 m<sup>2</sup> area, all within a 600 m<sup>2</sup> plot fenced with wire netting on teak posts. This type of fold is ideal, but could be improved even further if an extra enclosure were added inside so that animals could be isolated if need be. It is perfectly designed and easy to maintain. Each one now also has a 20 m<sup>3</sup> sealed rainwater tank making for proper supplies almost all the year round.

The comparative results of 1979-80, 1984-85 and 1985-88 in the table show that:

1. Data collection since 1985 has made it possible to establish all the zootechnic parameters relating to the technical management of a herding operation which is a model for all sheep-rearing projects.

2. The zootechnic results of the last agricultural year are excellent.

The productivity of 1.41 lambs available per ewe has further improved by almost 20% on the previous year's figure and death rates are declining — a total death rate of 5.4% for a herd of the size of the CNO's is a real achievement.

3. The rate of exploitation is 43% in spite of a 30% net natural increase — which would have meant more than 60% with a growth of a few percentage points.

4. A comparison of these results with the results for 1979-80 (when sheep

Trends in zootechnic parameters, 1980-86				
Parameters	1979-1980	1984	1985	1986
Total number	1 222	2 060	2 634	3 895
Total ewes (*)	650	1 100	1 496	1 899
Local sales	—	—	1 025	1 308
Rate of exploitation			43,4 %	40 %
Net natural increase			30,9 %	47,9 %
Fertility			90,7 %	89,7 %
Fecundity	111 %	144 %	151 %	154 %
Prolificity			150 %	176 %
Numerical productivity	0,96 %	1,20 %	1,30 %	1,38 %
Deaths of young animals under their mothers	45,5 %	14,4 %	6,8 %	9,2 %
Adult mortality	11,6 %		1 %	1,1 %
Total deaths	33,3 %	9,4 %	5,4 %	6,7 %
Length of cycle (months)	9,5	9,5	9,5	9,5

(\*) The figure for normal operation (2000 ewes) was reached in 1987.

pox and nervous syndrome were rife) is sound indication of better herd management.

The CNO has 7 214 m<sup>2</sup> of enclosures and 2 422 m<sup>2</sup> of covered area. This gives 3.6 m<sup>2</sup> of enclosure and 1.2 m<sup>2</sup> of covered area to each breeding ewe — so needs are easily covered, since the suggested standards are 2.4 m<sup>2</sup> of enclosure and 0.60 m<sup>2</sup> of shelter per breeding ewe.

Other facilities include the delousing bath and the rainwater collection tanks — models which would be well worth popularising.

The original idea of the National Centre was to produce strain improvers (rams) and female lambs for rearing, but it handed over ram production to the National Sheep Selection Programme (PNSO). However, it is still contributing to production because all Centre mating, and the special coupling geared to producing young male strain improvers, is carried out with high-quality PNSO rams. Artificial insemination breeding tests are also being run.

The female production has been well beyond the forecasts for two years now. More than 500 female lambs are sold for rearing every year.

### Vocational training

The National Centre is now also the country's specialist sheep-rearing vocational training centre.

Since opening, it has turned out young sheep breeders, helped train students from schools of herding and provide retraining for sheep technicians. The number of trainees has also increased to more than 50 p.a., with an intake of more than 200 in 1984-88. Herdsmen and agricultural engineers at the Institute of Agriculture in Bouaké account for 70% and 25% respectively of intake.

The Centre has now called on all the country's extension projects to be more involved in the training process, to ensure that trainees can settle into the sheep industry once they leave the Centre and to run technical and economic monitoring of their herding activity.

So the National Centre has carried out to perfection the tasks with which the promoters entrusted it. It is still playing a dominant role in developing sheep-rearing throughout the country, but particularly in the Central Region of Côte d'Ivoire.

The Centre's herding unit extension project, set up in 1976, is providing backing for an increasing number of people. Although it is aimed at all kinds of animal, sheep are so predominant in this region that it is helping an increasingly large number of Djalonké sheep farmers. Almost 550 sheep and goat farmers are reached by the extension services.

But there are still no sheep farmers for whom the activity is the main form of income.



In spite of a slight decline in productivity caused by the farmers having to pay for all the medicines themselves over the past year, the zootechnic results are satisfactory, as the table shows.

The other structures installed to help develop herding are performing their intended tasks efficiently.

The Bouaké diagnostic laboratory identifies any diseases and suggests ways of curing and avoiding them. The Central Laboratory which is over it is now responsible for a nationwide project to study small ruminant pathology, in which the CNO is also involved.

The National Sheep Production Centre—or Tonodi sheep station, after the name of the place where it is situated—can handle 3 500 breeding ewes, and is also responsible for developing techniques and producing breeding stock as well as helping develop the sheep industry and organising production and marketing so as to supply the consumer with good quality meat. From 1990 onwards, it will be involved in the Centre Region's development drive.

The National Sheep Selection Programme (PNSO), mentioned earlier, is based in the centre of Côte d'Ivoire for geographical reasons and because of the sheep-rearing tradition of this region and the advance it has over the other parts of the country in this respect. Its main aims are to:

- improve the profile and commercial weight of the Djalonké sheep without sacrificing its hardy nature;
- provide breeders with strain improving rams.

The PNSO was set up in 1983, with



*Three to six month-old Djalonké female lambs feeding*

joint financing from the FAC and the EDF and an Ivorian counterpart from the Special Investment and Equipment Budget.

The last national body involved in the sheep industry is the National Artificial Insemination Centre, which has adapted methods of preserving and inseminating with Djalonké sperm to the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and is continuing to develop these techniques and performing some insemination with best ram stock for both national needs and West African requirements.

All these structures are there to make a success of the development of sheep rearing. However, care must be taken to see they are efficient, that

they are kept up to date and properly coordinated. If, over the next 15 years, self-sufficiency in sheepmeat is to be achieved as well, then the productivity of existing stations will have to be improved and new stations set up. Priority measures here include training and the creation of new, modern stations.

This is why the Ivorian authorities have opted for support for the rearing of small ruminants, particularly at the CNO, in the technical and financial cooperation programme between the Republic and the EEC.

This cooperation, which is upstream of the extension projects, is fully in line with the CNO's general programme of rural development in the broadest meaning of the term, the main aims of which are to get young herdsmen settled and achieve self-sufficiency in food.

This is an extra opportunity for the Central Region to lead the way in the development of sheep rearing. The success of the programme depends mainly on choosing the right people to rear the sheep — a job in which the CNO managers and teachers have a major part to play.

The investments needed to promote sheep rearing were the subject of a Commission decision worth ECU 3.5 million (6th EDF) on 18 May 1989. ○ R.D.

### Zootechnical results, 1987

Annual fecundity		123.00 %
Deaths of young animals		12.90 %
Adult deaths		3.80 %
Production :		
Sales	22.7 %	
Consumed by the farmer	8.4 %	
Losses (lost or stolen)	3.1 %	
Exploitation		33.00 %
Net natural increase		0.23 %
Index of productivity per breeding ewe or number of animals available per breeding ewe for sale, consumption by the farmer or herd expansion		0.75 units



## Agbassa: a model for population transfer

by Kossivi GBODUI (\*)

In the past, the people of Agbassa were from different tribes, the Kabye, the Losso and others, but now they are one, bound by the same interests or, better, the same future — survival through the wager they have made on agriculture, a challenge they took up 14 years ago. They have already all but won the first round and so far 20 000 of them have been settled on 5 000 hectares of land on which most of them had never set foot before.

The miracle—and this is no exaggeration—has been wrought by the unfailingly fruitful cooperation between the EEC and Togo. The story of the project began in 1972 when the EEC's Development Commissioner stopped off in Lomé (Togo) on an African tour and heard that the local authorities wanted to develop the Kara Valley in northern Togo. The aim was to relieve the pressure on the Kara massif, an unwelcoming area with unproductive soil which the rural exodus had robbed of almost 22% of its working population, by

replacing these emigrants by migrants from elsewhere in the region and offering better land to the peasants who had stayed there — although for how long? The part of the Kara Valley between the River Kara and the old Lomé-Ouagadougou highway in west Binah province was chosen because it had some of the best land in the region.

Today, the EDF-Kara scheme, usually called the Agbassa Project, is a reality. A visit to the site, preferably during the growing seasons, shows what ECU 6 million can do. Food crops and cotton grow along newly-made ridges where peasants, alone or in groups, sow seed. This is Agbassa for much of the year, green, with the smell of the countryside forever pervading the five main townships. For not only does the EDF-Kara Project involve the people of Agbassa, but those of Broukou (the project centre where the administrative block is sited), Bidjande, Misseouta and Agounde too, and each of them has its own dispensary, pharmaceutical

depots and community buildings to complete the fine rural infrastructure of 135 km of tracks, 63 water points (30 wells and 33 boreholes, one with a solar pump), a central store with a mechanical workshop, 45 storage sheds and 279 units of housing for the peasant farmers and 44 for the supervisors, schoolteachers and nursing staff.

But the most obvious signs of success are the two markets whose reputation as regional providers of grain none would now dispute.

### The peasants prepare for self-management

Agbassa became an agricultural agency in December 1986, which means that, for three years now, this EDF project has been in the post-financing stage during which the locals take over the facilities. The supervisors now only offer training and advice, above all to the producer groupings, the final stage in the peasants' shouldering of responsibility for their own future.

There were 10 producer groupings to begin with, but there are 33 now, forming five large self-managed groups which supply their members with inputs and collect and store the food products, the idea being only to put goods on the market when the prices are highest.

Members can get marketing credit to meet their needs at the beginning of the agricultural year. One of the main activities of the groupings is selling cash crops such as cotton and food products and, in 1988-89, they marketed 373 082 kg of cotton seed. But far from sitting on their laurels, they have carried on organising to speed up their self-sufficiency. They have, for example, brought in a voluntary subscription of one sack of maize or sorghum per farmer per year. This is worth CFAF 5 000 in monetary terms and there is the revenue from sales on top of this — assets which go to make up a solidarity fund with which the peasants pay for their maintenance and repairs to small items of infrastructure. The bigger




*One of the Kara Project's 63 water points with pumps*

(\*) The author is with Radiodiffusion Télévision Togolaise, BP 21, Kara, Togo.



## Map of the EDF - Kara Project



items have been entrusted to the public services, so as to ensure that the project achievements last, but the bee-keeping centre and the project forge have been privatised to make for better returns.

The Togolese authorities are pleased to have taken the initiative for an operation which has made it possible for most peasants to raise their standard of living. Over the 1987-89 period, farmers in Agbassa had an average income of slightly more than

CFAF 560 000 p.a. and the figure in 1982 was already an estimated CFAF 335 600 and CFAF 464 000 in 1986, with a net money income of CFAF 30 000-95 000 as against the CFAF 10 000 of the Kabye peasants who stayed put.

### The European taxpayer reassured

In a few years' time, the farmers of Agbassa will have extra income from

other farming-related activities — tree-planting, for example, bee-keeping, market gardening and herding. Complete success has not yet been achieved here, but making people aware of the situation will do the rest. In the tree-planting sector, schemes have already maintained 910.5 ha (1977) and 711 ha (1988) and reafforested 225 ha and 20 ha respectively in those years. Cattle, sheep, goat and poultry deaths have dropped considerably, to around 1%. The peasants are open-minded and willing, as was clear when draught methods were introduced. Although the Kabye peasants are not traditional rearers of large animals, they have converted to the idea nonetheless. The results were slow to appear, of course, because there was psychological resistance to overcome, but with the acquisition of 300 pairs of oxen, considerable progress has been made with this technique.

And what about the future, both immediate and long-term? Everyone here in Agbassa realises that the transfer and settlement of peasants, currently 98.54% controlled, could well no longer reach the same level in five or 10 years' time, for the youngsters coming to Agbassa now are more demanding and there are plans soon to provide better reception structures and improve the existing facilities to make them more attractive.

The EEC Commission Delegate in Togo, Gaspard Dünkelsbühler, who visited the EDF-Kara Project site recently at the head of a delegation of EEC diplomats to Togo, said that, going beyond the immediate results, the important thing was that Agbassa should survive after Community financing came to an end. He also said he hoped that, with the dynamic approach of the population here, the operation would be a reassuring example for the European taxpayer — who would see it as an encouragement to support other similar projects elsewhere. For the time being, this goodwill is symbolised by a bridge, 148.4 metres long and 8 metres wide, the second of its kind in Togo, which links the old Kara region with Bassar region, the site of another similar project on which work has only just begun. ○ K.G.



## Gabon: producing fertilisers locally

by Alan DEMPSTER (\*)

*Gabon has put top priority on developing the crop output of its traditional peasant smallholdings and agro-industry, on promoting small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and on diversifying mining, in which national operators are to play a bigger part.*

*All three aims came together in a 12-month pilot project to evaluate and demonstrate the working of occurrences of lime and phosphate in the Gabonese Republic, a project which was funded partly by the European Development Fund (ECU 500 000) and partly by the Gabonese Government (CFAF 50 million, or about ECU 142 000).*

The original idea came from the Directorate-General for Mining and Geology (DGMG) at the Ministry of Mining, Industry and Trade, which brought up the possibility of a Lomé-assisted mining scheme in 1985. Various DGMG proposals were discussed with the Commissariat for Planning, Development and Economic Affairs and the EEC Delegation. With agricultural development now the top priority of Lomé, they were looking for a mining project related to that sector and, since Gabon was known to have potash and phosphates, it was decided to look into the possibility of developing the raw materials for fertilisers there.

The study was put out to tender (by restricted invitation) and carried out by geological consultants Crowe Schaffalitzky and Associates Ltd (CSA) of Dublin, Ireland, who spent a month assessing Gabon's fertiliser requirements and the feasibility of local prospection. The country uses relatively little fertiliser—the average for 1985-87 was about 6 000 tonnes p.a.—but its estimated annual requirements are 30 000 tonnes, 25 000 tonnes of it lime and phosphate soil conditioner. As the need for nitrogen and potash fertiliser, particularly of chemical origin, is small (only 2 900 tonnes of urea and complete fertilisers etc. being used in 1987), there was no point in looking for or evaluating the raw materials for these products, because local processing would require enormous investment and not therefore be a paying proposition. It was suggested that it would be better for the Government

(\*) The author is a geological consultant.



*The Lébamba unit. R. to L., the generator, the crusher, with a conveyor belt going straight to the hopper which feeds the grinder, which has its own conveyor belt to the (covered) storage hopper, beneath which is a semi-automatic bagging machine*

to start by concentrating on raw materials which could be developed cheaply to meet national requirements.

Both the Gabonese authorities and the Community liked the idea and, after a second mission to Gabon, an invitation to tender was drawn up. The CSA's suggestion was to move on to a pilot lime, dolomite and phosphate soil conditioner scheme to produce test batches for agricultural projects and agro-industry. The Government wanted practical results for the farm sector as soon as possible and so it selected three known sites near the following agricultural areas:

- Fernan Vaz (Ogooué Maritime): phosphates, lime and dolomite;
- Ndendé-Lébamba (Ngounié): lime and dolomite;

— Lastoursville-Franceville (Ogooué-Lolo and Haut-Ogooué): dolomite.

These are the three Integrated Operations Zones (OZI) where the existing agricultural operations (farming and farming-herding development projects and large-scale agricultural undertakings) can try out the fertilisers and get them into general use later on.

A private contract for the project was signed with CSA, with a view to getting the benefit of the firm's experience, bearing in mind the relatively small amount involved. The total

budget was ECU 642 000 and 44% of it was used to purchase equipment (mostly the basic hardware needed to quarry, crush and powder hard rock and bag it for distribution to the farmers). A four-wheel drive vehicle with a trailer and outboard motor and a few items of camping, prospection, geological, laboratory and drawing equipment completed the purchases. The contractor chose all the new items (all of them from the EEC) after restricted consultation, with an eye to the value for money offered by the tenderers.

The orders were placed and work began in the field in June 1988. The reserves and the quality of the occurrences in the three project zones were evaluated during a preliminary phase. The timing of the field work was



partly influenced by the seasons, the prospection and evaluation of phosphate, lime and dolomite in the area south of Ndougou (Fernan Vaz), for example, being carried out in the not-so-rainy months of August and September. This region, geologically part of the sedimentary coastal basin, is low-lying and therefore has plenty of lakes, rivers and swamps and the team (of two expatriates and eight Gabonese) often travelled by boat in the course of their investigations. Pitting and drilling techniques were used for the geological study and evaluation of the occurrences and rock samples were analysed for their phosphorous and carbonate content, solubility and neutralising value (NV) in laboratories in Gabon and Ireland.

None of the Fernan Vaz occurrences turned out to be worth exploiting for soil conditioner, so the team moved on to Lébamba to start test working a deposit of magnesian limestone which was suitable (Ca: 30%, MgO: 18%, NV: 95-100). This (Early Precambrian) limestone is very hard and has to be blasted out.

Once the site had been stripped, a quarry face five metres high, in two benches, was developed with a front-end loader and holes 2.50 m deep drilled (at 1.10 m x 1.20 m) for explosives with a pneumatic hammer-drill powered by a portable compressor. The large rocks thus dislodged were reduced to small pieces by blasting or by a rock-crusher (the scoop on the front-end loader being used for this). For reasons of economy, the rock was pulverised in only two stages. A crusher with a grab and a hammer-grinder were mounted on trailers so they could be towed from site to site. Each unit had electric motors and controls, a feeder and a conveyor belt which could be folded away for travelling. Power came from a wheeled 95 kva generator powerful enough to work all the machines at once. The crushers were placed end to end so that conveyor belt could tip the rock straight into the hopper of the grinder. The jaws of the grab on the crusher were fixed at the minimum distance so as to feed finely crushed rock into the grinder — which then tipped the powder into a large (4 m<sup>3</sup>) storage hopper at the bottom of which there was a semi-automatic



*The bagger is regulated to weigh out 50 kg at a time and the flow is stopped automatically as soon as the desired weight is reached*

bagger regulated to turn out 50 kg packs.

With this equipment, a team of 12 turned out 1-2 tonnes per hour of a standard agricultural lime product (100% finer than 3.5 mm and 35% less than 150 microns) and packed into 50 kg plastic bags, sealed with a wire tie. As the fastening could be undone easily, the bags were not damaged and the customer could use them again — a considerable advantage to the small grower.

Most of the output was sold to an agricultural extension project for distribution to the local growers and broken rock was also bought in bulk by local constructors.

Field tests using varying amounts of lime on a variety of crops (groundnuts, maize and cassava) were also run by the agricultural project under an arrangement drawn up by the contractor. Gabon's soil tends to be very acid and have fairly low fertility as far as agriculture is concerned, but a lime conditioner neutralises the acidity, encouraging microbial activity and releasing oligoelements, thus improving the structure of the soil, which is more fertile as a result and yields bigger crops. Testing of the soil conditioner produced by the Lébamba project will continue over a number

of years, but the results already confirm its usefulness to the farmers.

The original idea for the unit to travel from site to site, moving on whenever the annual requirements of a particular area were met, which was why all the major equipment for the project was portable or on trailers. But this has proved impracticable, for the moment at least, and it has been decided to leave the unit at Lébamba, where it is working well, and to look for a promoter willing to take on the existing pilot project as a commercial enterprise. The project-trained team is continuing production at Lébamba until such a promoter is found.

However, the project leaders produced an evaluation report for the Gabonese administration when the project contract came to an end, recommending support for initiatives likely to lead to similar pilot schemes being set up in Lastoursville and N'Toum (near Libreville). Calculations based on the Lébamba scheme suggest that such ventures could well be paying propositions — provided, of course, that there are enough customers. They would be cost-effective if they sold about 1 700 tonnes of conditioner p.a. at the fertiliser project's suggested price of about ECU 140 per tonne (ECU 7 per 50 kg bag). This is much lower than the price of the same imported product and affordable by not only the agro-industrial companies and development and agricultural extension schemes which are currently Gabon's biggest users of fertiliser, but also by small growers, who are only just beginning to use soil conditioner.

Gabon's short (12 month), low-budget (ECU 642 000), fertiliser project has succeeded in demonstrating that soil conditioner can be produced from local raw materials at low cost and that a small firm could make it a paying proposition. It has also encouraged other small conditioner producers to set up and shown the quality of the local product by demonstrating that it is cheaper than and just as efficient as a similar imported product.

Practical, low-cost pilot projects of this sort are absolutely right for the developing countries where phosphorous and carbonate rocks occur. ○

A.D.



# Cadmium: menace or myth?


There can be little doubt that, by and large, Europe needs no excuses for environmental preoccupations. Our planet is an increasingly fragile one, polluted, overpopulated and overexploited. In such areas as reforestation, pollution control, recycling and help for population control, the EEC and its Member States have an enviable record of research and legislative action. It is leading the fight against the dumping of toxic waste and the release of harmful elements into the atmosphere. It is helping its partners in the ACP Group to tackle some of the problems of overpopulation. But it is also true that European preoccupation with "green" issues—a relatively recent phenomenon—is sometimes one which threatens to do a lot of harm to ACP economies which have been encouraged to concentrate on certain exports to maintain and increase their economic viability. This is the case with cadmium.

### What is cadmium?

Cadmium is a metal, which looks rather like tin and which has many of the properties of zinc. It does not exist in nature in its pure form and is fairly rare although a ubiquitous element in the environment, being found in the soil, in water and in the atmosphere. It is mainly found in zinc ores, phosphate rocks and copper and lead ores. Cadmium was discovered in 1817 and industrial production began in 1852, although it only achieved significant proportions since about 1907. Current world production and consumption are of the order of 17 000 tons.

### What is cadmium used for?

Cadmium is mainly obtained from zinc ores, and its production is thus closely linked to zinc refining. Its major industrial use today is linked to two of its main properties: it resists alkaline corrosion (and corrosion by



*Our planet is an increasingly fragile one, polluted, overpopulated and overexploited*

humid atmospheres and sea water) and it makes excellent electrical contacts. It is much in demand as a coating for other metals (steel, iron, copper and brass) in brake linings, mining equipment, electronics, aerospace, shipbuilding and household equipment (notably washing machines). Cadmium salts have striking colours, ranging from yellow through orange and red to brown, and are used as colouring for plastics. Cadmium is stable when heated to as much as 600 °C and is therefore ideal for colouring plastics that are moulded at high temperatures. Since cadmium is resistant to atmospheric effects it is also useful as a stabiliser for plastics (PVCs) which tend to deteriorate when exposed to atmosphere, heat or light for any length of time. Nickel/cadmium batteries are considered to be among the most robust and economic (they are rechargeable) and they can be found

powering anything from military equipment to pocket calculators. Unlike other industrial uses of cadmium, in which the metal is used only in small quantities, nickel/cadmium batteries use substantial amounts of the metal. For example, approximately 5 g of cadmium are used in a rechargeable battery for a pocket calculator.

Since there are no deposits of cadmium in the world, the metal we use comes as a by-product of zinc refining and thus the supply of cadmium is wholly dependent upon the demand for zinc. Moreover, since cadmium is a fairly expensive raw material it has only been used where unavoidable, and this tendency has been reinforced by the surge of environmental concern in recent years. In addition, some 60% of the cadmium used in batteries is recycled, while zinc has been substituted in some areas (coating, notably).



## What harm does cadmium do?

Because, like lead and mercury, cadmium is a heavy metal, there is considerable unease about allowing concentrations to build up in the human body. Cadmium, in minute quantities is present in earth, air and water, but over the past few decades, human ingestion has increased. Humans can ingest cadmium either through the lungs or the digestive tract. In the case of the former, 50% of the cadmium is retained, in the latter, 5%. That is to say, humans run the risk of increasing their cadmium intake by breathing, by smoking and by eating and drinking. Since animals, as well as humans, excrete 95% of their cadmium intake, the most concentrated source of cadmium outside the actual cadmium industry is probably animal fertiliser and sewage sludge.

The cadmium that is ingested by humans can lead, in cases of severe "overdosage" to kidney and liver malfunctions and to weakening of the bones, osteomalacia. In cases of workers in the cadmium industry, the lungs may also be affected. But it has to be said that despite 131 documented studies on the subject since 1959, only scant evidence exists that exposure to cadmium by people not actually in the cadmium industry does lead to significant increases in morbidity or mortality. The most famous case in which cadmium poisoning figured was in the Fuchu area of the Zintzu River basin in Japan in the years after World War II. There, a factory mining zinc discharged its wastes into the river system, which irrigated ricefields, which retained cadmium and passed it through the plants to the local people. A disease of the bones called Itai-Itai (Ow!-Ow!) broke out. The disease affected only women over 40 who had given birth to many children, had lived in the area for over 30 years and who suffered from calcium and phosphorus deficiency, due to an insufficient diet during the wartime years. It must also be remembered that certain foods retain cadmium far more than others. These include liver, kidneys, oysters, shellfish, mushrooms and lettuce. In addition to the very specific preconditions for those who suffered from Itai-Itai disease we must add the fact

that the Japanese diet is based on proteins from seafood and on a variety of mushrooms. On the other hand, a study carried out in the UK on a village situated on the site of an abandoned mine (where cadmium concentration in the soil was 100 times greater than in surrounding villages) "failed to find evidence in... residents of any health effect which could be attributed to the contamination of the soil by cadmium". Thus, though there is evidence of cadmium poisoning, it is confined in large measure to very specific cases and to those who work in the cadmium extraction industry, where prolonged and intense exposure is the norm.

Of the three forms of cadmium contamination, that through the soil is by far the most common. Soil contamination depends, to a very large extent, on the nature of the soil (acid or alkaline) and on the nature of the crops grown. Bearing this in mind, the most common form of soil contamination is largely held to be from natural products used as fertiliser—sewage sludge, composts made from household and agro-industrial wastes, or animal dung. According to various studies, these make up 50%-70% of cadmium entering the soil. A certain amount, much harder to pin down, enters the soil through contaminated water or precipitation (from the air as dirty rain or dust) and the amount

brought in by fertiliser containing cadmium has been estimated at anywhere between 10% and 25%. The most recent study carried out on behalf of the EEC has given fertilisers an overall value of 15%. In real terms, this means that, in the EEC, agricultural land receives about 6.5 grams per hectare per year and is, according to a recent report "a very small proportion of the cadmium content of the soil (around 1 500 g per hectare) and small also in relation to atmospheric pollution". Of the 5 000 tons entering the ecosystem each year, only 270 can be traced to fertilisers. Current EEC Legislation (Directive 86/278 of 12.6.86) allows an input of 150 g of cadmium per hectare per year on a 10-year mean basis by means of sludge spreading. This legislation now in force compares with the (weighted) average 6.5 grams that enter through use of fertiliser for which legislation is planned.

## Cadmium and fertiliser

The environmental preoccupations of Europeans are the result of living in a highly-industrial society which has had a profound and frequently negative effect on the quality of life. Europeans now feel themselves wealthy enough to forego certain advantages in order to safeguard their environment. Until fairly recently, Euro-



*European ecological worries mean that governments now stress environmental purity and not production*

BELGA



pean agriculture, for example, was intensive, and was given every encouragement to be so. Public concern over intensive farming methods, however, has brought a spate of legislation, as have the budgetary and political problems consequent upon running up and storing large surpluses. The EEC has noted the public's changing concerns and has discouraged the creation of surpluses, whilst at the same time enacting legislation to restore some semblance of "natural" farming—prohibiting the use of growth hormones in cattle-rearing and providing "set-aside" grants for land restored to the wild. Over the past few years, there has been discouragement of the use of phosphates in cattle feed<sup>(1)</sup> and even, due to lower farm prices, a downward shift in fertiliser use.

All this has meant a reduction in phosphate imports, and, particularly, a move to seek out phosphates low in cadmium. No limits for the cadmium content in fertilisers have yet been set, but, along with limits for sewage sludge and atmospheric emissions by industry, it is conceivable that such limits will be imposed. Thus, not only has the general economic situation led to a drop in phosphate imports, but the likelihood of legislative action will stimulate two things—a search for low-cadmium sources of phosphates and a further drop in phosphate consumption. In 1985, EEC imports were 16.7 m tons of rock phosphate, in 1987 they had fallen to 14.8 m tons.

Currently, Senegal and Togo provide about 10% of the EEC's rock phosphate imports (the vast bulk of which are used in fertiliser manufacture) and their phosphates have the highest cadmium contents (apart from Nauru's), of between 172 and 234 mg per kilo of rock phosphate. The USA and Morocco currently supply nearly 70% of the EEC's requirements, while Israel and Tunisia supply nearly 17% together. Thus Togo and Senegal will be the first to suffer from either a decision to enforce maximum cadmium levels or a search for new suppliers. (These exist: the USSR and South Africa have deposits of low-cadmium phosphates which are being exploited and Finland has deposits



*The phosphate workings at Kpeme, Togo. Will Sysmin alone keep Togo's exports buoyant?*

which could be exploited). Togo depends on phosphate exports which provided around 20% of central government revenue in the 1983-86 period and represent around 7% of GDP. Over the past few years, thanks to dynamic management, the OTP, Togo's government phosphates corporation, has found new buyers, like North America and Indonesia, and the EEC's share of phosphate exports has dropped to around 30%. Were a maximum level of 200 mg of cadmium/kg of rock phosphates (P2 O5) imposed by the EEC, Senegal would be disbarred as an exporter; were a maximum level of 150 mg imposed, both Senegal and Togo would be barred. This would constitute another barrier to the trade which ACP countries are so keen to develop. What is the Commission's response?

### Sysmin: a response?

The Togolese government has made a Sysmin application to enable the industry to face up to the possibility of enforced cadmium content maxima. The response has been a loan of ECU 15.7 m (40 years, ten-year grace period, 0.5% interest) with the two-fold aim of improving productivity by investing in capital equipment, and of improving the quality of the phosphates by research into methods of de-cadmiation. Several approaches are possible in this latter area: calcination, acidification and fluid-bed combustion. Although the research approach is the most logical one, a recent report has stated that "there is no general industrial solution for the cadmium problem at the moment nor any single global solution for the fore-

seeable future" and that the phosphoric acid solution<sup>(2)</sup> will involve "high supplementary investments". Other recent reports show that while research is continuing, many approaches are not even at the pilot-plant stage and the technology is relatively untested. The Sysmin solution thus offers hope, but it is a distant hope and one which rests on injections of capital which may not always be available.

In summary, then, the case of cadmium is not untypical of the new comprehension gap which threatens to divide North from South. Twenty years ago, the division was based purely and simply on disparities of wealth, which it was hoped could be narrowed by injections of capital and the creation of export industries. Today, the gap consists of disparities of goals. In the North, environmental awareness has overtaken the push for growth and, in some cases, is working against that growth, while in the South material and social advance still depend on making and selling more. In the specific case of cadmium, European regulations on fertiliser promise a benefit of doubtful value to Europeans since contamination by cadmium in fertilisers is so very marginal. But they are a very real threat to the exports of countries which still depend on Europe as a customer. Sysmin may be the answer for the moment, but it does not mask the fact that, for many ACP countries Europe's environmental preoccupations are the death sentence for growth. ○ Tom GLASER

(1) Cadmium levels fixed by Council Directive 87/2238 of 25.1.88.

(2) This approach, for Togo, looks the most promising.



## Towards a Pan-African Association for African oral tradition and heritage

by Fortunatus DAWODU (\*)

On 22 June 1989, two years to the day after an international conference on oral culture and oral history in Lagos, people from Nigerian universities met again to make their contribution to the creation of a Pan-African association of African oral heritage and tradition, along the lines suggested in Lagos.

The concern of intellectuals determined to trigger a continent-wide movement for the creation of a repertory and for the study, protection, preservation and creative utilisation of the African oral tradition had already been expressed at a similar conference run by the CAEH, the Centre Algérien des Etudes Historiques, in Algiers in March, when the upshot of the four-day discussion by the 50 or so participants was the unwelcome finding that Africa's oral literature was in danger of extinction unless practical steps were taken at once.

The speakers were unanimous in wanting the States to take proper responsibility for this oral literature through teaching and contemporary audio-visual techniques. But they, and Aghali Zakaria (Niger) especially, still thought that the media were tending gradually to marginalise the African languages, those prime vehicles of African oral culture, by systematically favouring the dominant languages.

The meeting was also an opportunity for critical reflection on the oral tradition and the beginning of a break away from various kinds of analysis borrowed here and there. By setting up its association—officially launched by the Minister of Information and Culture—Nigeria had highlighted the serious threat to cultural values.

(\*) Mr Dawodu, a journalist, is press attaché to the EEC Delegation in Lagos (Nigeria).

### NAOHT: a forum for reflection and action

The idea of the Nigerian Association for Oral History and Tradition (NAOHT), stressed Professor E.J. Allagoa of the University of Calabar in south-eastern Nigeria, was to create a forum—not just for reflection, but above all for action, a focus for intellectuals from various fields dealing with every aspect of oral tradition, oral history, oral art and oral communication. But Allagoa did not think that the formation of the Association meant that the fight for the oral tradition had been won. The state of neglect of our oral heritage was deplorable, he said, as was apparent from the fact that our radio and TV stations were forced to erase tapes and videos of our precious heritage because they had nothing else on which to record other programmes.

The NAOHT was a late arrival, bearing in mind the very long oral tradition, one of the most important sources of information in the drive to reconstruct what happened before writing was invented. And even after the merchants and explorers introduced writing, they were more interested in commerce and concentrated on trading centres, leaving other sectors to their own devices, and salvation came in the shape of the oral heritage, folklore and tradition.

There is of course a risk attached to drawing conclusions about historical fact from oral tradition. But what could be more credible? What other emanation of authentic African history is there, presented in a genuinely African perspective?

One of the things which the NAOHT is already working on is a book called "Oral tradition and oral history in Africa and the diaspora:

theory and practice", to be published by the Nigerian Centre for Negro-African Art by the end of the year—a project to which UNESCO has already given its support. It is also planning a cultural newsletter.

### "Ancient voices"

In her talk entitled "Hearken to the ancient voices", Professor Bolanle Awe, Head of the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ibadan, looked at three specific oral genres—traditions, proverbs and tales—currently existing in Nigeria, where the situation is difficult, as it is in most African countries, having to cope with structural adjustment, cutbacks and austerity. Moral virtue counts for little in the battle for survival, she said.

What are these "ancient voices" if not the voices of our ancestors, still present in our everyday life in these three genres today?

Our ancestors, Bolanle Awe said, had a totally dignified human being at the centre of all their preoccupations. Do not the Yoruba (one of the biggest tribes of south-western Nigeria) in fact say that only a bastard neglects his father's line ("Oma ale lonfi owo j'uwe ile baba re")?

Oral culture covers virtually every other aspect of our life, not just enlivening memory, but protecting us from an unknown future. But the break with our traditional past which colonialism brought about has led us to ignore the meaning and pertinence of these traditions in our lives. So, Professor Awe said, it is vitally important for us to listen to the past, to what our customs and traditions have to say to see whether they can provide an answer to our present difficulties.

Tradition is vitally important in most of our illiterate societies. It recounts ancient history, for example, telling how the societies got there and describing their relations with the people's traditions. And, above all, they bring out the salient features of the societies. The Bayajida legend of the Hausa tribe of northern Nigeria, for example, tells how a hero from the east killed a mighty snake which was wiping out the people of the Kingdom of Queen Daura. Queen Daura was



pleased, offered him her hand in marriage and gave him all the powers of the Kingdom. And they had a son, Bawo, who in turn had six children of his own, who founded the six great Hausa states.

Professor Awe mentioned the outstanding women in Nigeria's history, harking back to the position Djamila Armane had taken in her speech at the Algiers meeting in March on the importance of women in society. And as Djamila Armane had discussed Algerian women and the Algerian war of liberation, showing women's contribution to the armed struggle and the numbers of those who had gone underground, Bolanle Awe described the cases of Moremi of Ife and Princess Inkpi of the Igala, presenting women as the saviours of the societies in which they lived.

Proverbs fall into two distinct categories—those which directly reinforce ideas with traditional wisdom in support of a particular statement and those which comment on particular behaviour by praising or condemning it. Proverbs in this latter category are often indirect, the audience not necessarily being in the sights and the proverb acting as a plane used to polish up the angles of communication. A mastery of proverbs is, ultimately, an art and those who have it always attract more respect.

A Yoruba proverb says that a badly behaved, incorrigible child will learn to live away from home—showing that parents are morally obliged to bring their children up properly. In other words, Professor Awe says, they have publicly to admit when they have fallen short. And she quoted another proverb—that a child's hand is too small to get a calabash down from a shelf and an adult's hand too big to get into a gourd—to illustrate the sense of collective responsibility of everyone in society and the reciprocal nature of relations.

We must listen to the past. As yet another Yoruba proverb points out, only the dog which ignores his master's whistle will get lost in the deep forest. And an Igbo (another major Nigerian tribe) proverb adds that if the ear will not hear, when the head is cut off, the ear will go with it. ○


F.D.

## Makondé art, traditional and modern

The people of Southern and Eastern Africa have never been seen, particularly, as having a tradition of sculpture: it has been the West Africans, rather, that have been associated with the genre. But there is one area, at least, along the Ruvuma river that separates Mozambique from Tanzania, which can boast not only a tradition of wood carving, but also a thriving *modern* school of sculpture. The ethnic group in question are the Makondé, a people who, even in the arrangement of their villages, display a sense of aesthetic consideration, and it was to Makondé art, and to wood-carving in particular that a major exhibition was devoted recently at the Museum of African and Oceanian Arts in Paris.

The Makondés' tradition of carving wood is probably as old as the people themselves: the tribe, legend had it, had grown from the union of a man who had carved a female figure, which in the night had "awakened" and become flesh and blood. Their first child, born near the river, had been stillborn; they moved across the plateau stretching from the river to the Mbemkuru Valley and a second child had been born, but died, too. It was only after moving back to the plateau, to a thick forest area, some way from the water, that a third child was born who survived. Thereafter, the Makondé kept to the dry, and healthy, plateau region, far—at least an hour's walk—from the water, but far, too, from the disease that the water engendered.

Their sculpture was linked, particularly until colonisation (the era of




*A mapico helm mask, as worn by the Makondé during initiation dances. The bearer looked not through the eyes, but through the mouth and apertures in the nose*



“traditional” carving) with the cult of the ancestors. Household items (cooking utensils, pipes, spoons or pieces of furniture) were decorated, too, but it was particularly in the creation of the mask used in initiation rites that the Makondé excelled. Exhibiting this type of artefact is of course, unsatisfactory in many ways: a mask is only part of a whole, and a moving whole at that. So that the whole significance of the context is lost, and all that can be admired is the actual artistry in the mask itself.

Here it was the *mapico* helm mask in particular that was well represented, *mapico* being a kind of dance performed by the Makondé in both female and male initiation rites. The mask would be sculpted by an initiated male from a light wood (sometimes kapok) to which would be applied reddish, yellow, black or brown dyes. Real (human or animal) hair would be added, and facial markings might be applied to the surface in wax, or carved in the wood. Masks for girls would bear more intricate, less fearsome markings, and beads or earrings were common features. Labrets—upper lip ornaments which in reality would have been in shell or bone—are a feature of both male and female masks. The faces are tilted upwards, because it was in fact through the gaps in the mouth or the holes of the nostrils that the bearer of the mask could see—not through the eyes, which are without openings. None of the sculptors of the masks in the exhibition are known, nor are the dates of the sculptures clear: many come from museums of the former colonial powers—Germany, Portugal and Britain, and the earliest registering of a mask in this exhibition dates from 1905.

Traditional Makondé art such as the *mapico* masks remained almost wholly unaffected by outside influences until around 1914, when a road was built across the plateau. Thereafter, from 1920-50 or so, the interests of missionaries, of local authorities and of traders began to make themselves felt in the sculptures—not only in their subject matter (witness the overweight, gruff colonial officer in his pith helmet), but even in the type of material used, with heavy, highly-polished dark woods taking



*The Colonial Administrator, dating from the period (1920-50) when outside influences were brought to bear on the Makondé sculptors' work.*

over from painted white woods. Later still, as of the late 1950s, a modern school appears, practised almost exclusively by the Makondé on the Mozambican side of the border. Typically, their carvings are vertical arrangements of long, thin figures, representing scenes from folk tales, both ancient and modern.

### Contemporary Makondé art

This “modern” style began to evolve in 1950 or so, and the opening of the Nampula Museum (from where many of the exhibits originate) did



*An ujamaa (tree of life) carving, by an unknown sculptor, shows the considerable technical virtuosity of the Makondé woodcarvers*



much to stimulate creative production. The art was encouraged—as indeed it had been in the colonial era, when wood-carvers had been exempted from certain taxes—and the core of 30 or so sculptors experimenting in the mid-1950s has now swollen to a “population” of several hundreds. The works themselves have grown in height, as well as in volume, over the years, and a number of different styles have emerged—not all, by any means, universally admired. Indeed much has been dismissed as derivative and banal “airport art”.

One of the most striking styles to have developed is that of the tree of life, a style known as *dimongo*, a name referring to the tasks which a family carries out together. Because of this, it is a style frequently referred to, also, as *ujamaa*. These tree of life sculptures are tall, round carvings, tree-like, literally, showing a mass of small human figures going about their daily household duties. Often the centre for the trunk from which the sculpture is shaped is carved out, “so that the figures appear to be moving freely around a column of air” (1) The fine example, by an unknown sculptor on page 95 is over a metre and a half high, and is a work of considerable technical as well as artistic virtuosity.

Another trend to emerge was that known as *Shetani*—a style first developed by a sculptor by the name of Samaki, in which supernatural beings—demons and spirits—pile on top of each other, sinuous legs and arms intertwined, in portraits of human tragedies old or new. Samaki’s own work, in the 1950s and 1960s, with its tall, slender figures, with looping limbs and bulging eyes, set the tone of the new movement. Of those who followed, some were more abstract, some more grotesque. Some are recognisable portrayals of folk tales; in others the human forms are so distended and misshapen as to require interpretation. *Shetanis Ntchunge* and *Namande* (above, far right), is a case in point. Nor are the *shetanis* always centred on legend: *Shetani Candonga*, represents “dishonest traders being pursued by the Economic Rehabilitation Pro-



gramme”, and *Shetani Aids* portrays the horror and tragedy of a couple infected with the AIDS virus.

With the growing renown of modern Makondé sculpture, artistic standards, some say, are dropping. In Mozambique, as in Tanzania, sculptors



Two examples of the *Shetani* style. Above, the more abstract *Shetanis Ntchunge* and *Namande*, where the folk tale recounted is difficult to discern. Left, *Shetani Cualuca cheating on Lipilile with Ntangodi*

now work in cooperative groupings, with the responsibility for the sale of their work assumed by the cooperative. Good works are expensive, and buyers are not always forthcoming, and too many sculptors, in Dar es Salaam in particular, are working on cheap carvings, trinkets for tourists. Makondé art has a great tradition, and an undeniable pool of able sculptors, and it would be a pity indeed if its originality was lost entirely, sacrificed on the altar of market forces. ○

Myfanwy VAN DE VELDE

(1) Catalogue to the exhibition.





# From paper to computers: IRETA information services in the South Pacific

by Wesley WARD (\*)

The Institute for Research Extension and Training in Agriculture (IRETA) plays a major role in disseminating agricultural information throughout the South Pacific region. It serves the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. It is based at the University of the South Pacific, Alafua Campus, in Western Samoa, and publishes a wide range of periodicals and books. It also uses databases and data banks for providing specific answers to agricultural problems through its AIN (agricultural information network) centre.

IRETA was established in 1980 to provide an "outreach" arm to the South Pacific region for the USP School of Agriculture. It is fully integrated into the school, as all academic staff are also fellows of IRETA, and so are involved in its regional efforts in research, extension and training.

## IRETA publications

The South Pacific Agricultural News (circulation: 1150, 11 issues per year) is a current affairs and general agricultural newsletter. It is aimed at all areas of the agricultural sector; extension officers, researchers, agriculture teachers, farm managers, private industry, NGOs, students and anyone interested in agriculture and rural development. Each monthly issue contains articles developed around a major theme, other news and articles, and a number of regular features.

A more formal publication is the Alafua Agricultural Bulletin (circulation: 800, three issues per year). The main target audiences are researchers

and extension workers. Some papers deal specifically with scientific research; others are less technical and are aimed at extension staff, with some of this material also suitable for agriculture teachers. It has a worldwide distribution to agricultural libraries, as well as to researchers and extension officers throughout the region.

A less formal attempt to link research and extension is made through the Agricultural Research in the South Pacific Newsletter (circulation: 550, four issues per year). Sponsored by the Commonwealth Consultative Group for Agriculture (CGA), its primary purpose is to link researchers and extension officers to current research being carried out in the region. News from researchers, and regional and donor organisations, is also disseminated by this means.

High-school agriculture teachers are the primary targets for the South Pacific Agriculture Teacher (circulation: 400, four issues per year). However, it is used by extension officers. It is primarily a collection of teaching units on specific topics, produced by

students of the Advanced Certificate for Teaching Agriculture (ACTA) programme based at USP Alafua. Its larger print size, ample graphics and wider spacing give it immediate use as teaching notes. Information can also be adapted and repackaged for use by extension officers. It also contains information from Alafua researchers and supporting organisations for teachers.

Irregular publications are produced, with funds coming from IRETA, workshops, aid donors or from direct purchase by researchers in developed countries. These include:

- a) the Agrofacts series, a set of extension pamphlets on specific topics. These are produced by IRETA research and extension staff, and School of Agriculture students. They are referenced using the "Agdex" number filing system, which is modified for the South Pacific. Agrofacts is used by extension officers, teachers, students, English-literate farmers, and NGOs and similar organisations;
- b) workshop proceedings and notes that are published as required. These contain research, extension, informa-



*The entrance to IRETA headquarters in Western Samoa*

(\*) IRETA information officer and CTA Pacific region branch officer, University of the South Pacific, Alafua Campus, Private Mail Bag, Apia, Western Samoa.



tion, policy and other papers. Libraries and national ministries and departments of agriculture are major receivers of these books.

### CTA publications

The Pacific regional branch office (RBO) of the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Co-operation (CTA) is also based at USP Alafua campus. The Pacific Office has an expanding catalogue of EEC-printed materials, though there is a move towards more "localised" productions, to be funded through the RBO. These publications are available through the CTA headquarters to other ACP regions. Publications include extension manuals, workshop proceedings, posters, technical manuals, Spore and the Technical Memoirs series.

### Publication distribution

Distribution is based on IRETA's agricultural liaison officer (ALO) network, with an ALO based in each USP country. All ACP countries are fully served by this system in addition to other nations in the Pacific.

Boxes of publications are sent regularly via air mail to ALOs. This delivery cost represents an additional 100-200% of printing costs, so that hand carriage back to the various USP countries by visitors who attend workshops and meetings at Alafua is also used to cut costs. The use of desktop publishing and the resulting smaller, more readable print is critical in lowering printing and distribution costs (by as much as 20-30%). Publications either become smaller (meaning fewer pages and so less weight), or more information is packed into the same weight. As a result, there is more effective and economic dissemination of information.

### Developments

The IRETA South Pacific Agricultural News commenced in November, 1983, with an initial run of 350 copies. It has been the pioneer publication for much new publishing technology used at IRETA, including desktop publishing. It has moved from traditional typewriter/cut-and-paste methods, to use of computer word proc-

essing. This is now combined with a desktop publishing programme, with the printed output coming from a laser printer. It is hoped soon to include a desktop scanner and graphics programme to allow more control over the final camera-ready output.

There are both advantages and disadvantages to this system, apart from the usual arguments for and against computers, (especially in the tropics!). These advantages include:

- a) as noted above, smaller, more readable typefaces, mean either less paper used or more information packed into the publication. This is important where mailing costs are high;
- b) publications are more professional looking for less editing and layout time. They also achieve more impact, especially with proper use of the graphics features in programmes.

Disadvantages include:

- a) desktop publishing requires larger, faster computer hardware to effectively handle the bigger files. Hence, initial capital costs are greater;
- b) more equipment and programmes can go wrong. Computer backup and maintenance services are poor in most LDCs. So a small stock of spare parts is needed to limit "down time", which increases initial costs;
- c) the time and training needed to learn new programmes.

### Data banks and databases

IRETA's initial experience in this area was through the formation of the agricultural information network (AIN) in 1983. This is based on ALOs receiving information requests on specific subjects. Where ALOs are unable to complete a request through their own national information sources, the request is passed on to USP Alafua. Initially, the person responsible for information searching at Alafua was the Information Officer, but the AIN now has its own small centre based in USP Alafua library, with two full-time staff. Feedback on the disseminated information is provided through the ALO by personal contact with the client. The use of this system by the region has exploded in the past year with the establishment of the centre.

The earliest computer database produced by USP Alafua was the library's book catalogue. It has been developed for use by library and teaching staff, students and anyone interested locally.

A selected index of South Pacific agricultural journals was also produced in a printed format, but it was limited in the number of journals it indexed, and in its effect on information searching in the region.

The AIN centre is the South Pacific's focal point for FAO's current agricultural research information service (CARIS). The ALOs are important links in collecting this information on a regular basis to update the regional database maintained at Alafua. New input to the regional data also appears in the Agricultural Research in the South Pacific Newsletter. A printed version of the regional CARIS database will be released soon.

A CTA-sponsored regional meeting in October, 1988, set the stage for a vast improvement in co-operation and understanding between major sources of agricultural information in the Pacific. These were the University of Guam, the University of Technology (Papua New Guinea), the South Pacific Commission (SPC) library (New Caledonia), SPC plant protection service (Fiji), and University of the South Pacific (Alafua Campus). Here, practical solutions were sought to problems in linking these information sources. A huge, but not insurmountable, problem was the different software and computer systems being used by the various institutions. From this meeting a number of databases are being prepared in compatible formats for use by the participants:

- a) PIAJ: Pacific index of agricultural journals, covering the eight major scientific and extension journals of the Pacific area, from the first issues forward;
- b) RULAS: regional union listing of agricultural serials, listing the Pacific locations for selected agricultural journal titles;
- c) regional personnel directory: This exists in fragmented form, but it is intended to join these pieces with CARIS data.

Through the meeting, access to catalogue data banks of the various



institutions was improved: access through electronic data transfer (by disc) is becoming a possibility. To oversee all these activities, the standing committee for agriculture information networking in the Pacific (SCAINIP) was formed, with representation from all the institutions involved. An interesting feature of this is the number of regional groupings and political boundaries that are enclosed by the group, and so the number of potential users has greatly expanded through other institutions. A "round-robin" newsletter keeps everyone in touch with relevant activities of their counterparts elsewhere in the Pacific.

It was also agreed that information searches done for clients within the Pacific region by the SCAINIP members would be free. For searches from outside the region, costs would be on actual costs, or exchange, basis.

A new development in information retrieval is by computer data that is transmitted through satellite via packet-radio. This sends small "packets" of radio signals, e.g. computer files, from one computer, through satellite link, to another computer. So, computer files can be rapidly transmitted over vast distances. This is still in its experimental stages, and Alafua is among the terminals in the

Pacific on the US PEACESAT satellite network, testing this technology. This system uses two satellites to link stations from Guam to Tonga, Texas to the Caribbean. It aims to improve education opportunities for all the countries involved.

USP Alafua is currently on voice link through PEACESAT to many Pacific countries and on the USPNET system to the other USP member countries. It is by this last link that ALO can communicate with Alafua staff and other ALOs during a weekly, scheduled "meeting".

The meeting is most important in exchanging current news, research and making requests for publications and the AIN centre. All of these activities are aimed at administrators, researchers, extension workers, teachers and trainers, students, NGOs, private enterprises, agribusiness and farmers (where possible).

#### Impact and role for the future

The IRETA South Pacific Agricultural News is currently being surveyed for effectiveness, and impact. Early responses are positive and favourable, generally endorsing its quality. It is criticised for not discussing particular agricultural topics.

If its ever-expanding distribution is any indication, the IRETA News appears to fulfil its role in disseminating current agricultural news and issues across the South Pacific, and elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, insufficient emphasis is placed on more "popular" writing by researchers, so much news is obtained by reading it in a scientific journal or annual report rather than straight from the researcher. More emphasis must be placed on extension efforts by researchers, world-wide.

This is often a problem of training, as researchers feel ill-equipped to write in a simpler style. This could be initially overcome by training, and in the longer term by practice and incentives. Where English is a second (or third) language, this problem is particularly prevalent, as it also becomes a question of confidence of expression, and pride. Time and experience can hopefully overcome some of these problems.

One exception to this, in IRETA publishing efforts, is research destined for the Alafua Agricultural Bulletin. This is a refereed journal, which is an outlet for the "publish or perish" researchers. So, some research does have an assumed objective of being published in the AAB.

The Alafua Agricultural Bulletin (and other Regional agricultural journals) will be reviewed in a study to be carried out by IRETA, CTA and ACIAR (with the help of other groups if possible). This results from concerns expressed by delegates at a regional meeting on the dissemination and utilisation of agricultural research results in the South Pacific, held in Suva, Fiji, in May 1989. Its recommendations were endorsed by regional meetings of heads of extension and secretaries/directors of agriculture for the USP South Pacific region.

At the Fiji conference, criticisms were levelled at the Agricultural Research in the South Pacific as repeating information from other newsletters. It was pointed out that it dealt with current research, not yet published in many cases, and that it was aimed at research and extension personnel rather than the more general agricultural public.



*Palm tree plantation in Papua New Guinea. The Agricultural Research in the South Pacific Newsletter attempts to link research and extension works.*





A plant nursery in Fiji

*The IRETA News appears to fulfil its role in disseminating current agricultural news*

IRETA does not produce publications at the farmer level (unless the farmer is English-literate), for good reason. It is felt that this is the role of national departments and ministries of agriculture. IRETA can give advice and aid when called upon, but will not impose itself on the region. The Institute has been criticised in some quarters for this, but it is the policy of IRETA as set by USP member countries through the regional advisory board (RAB).

Publications are usually the last thought for researchers, and indeed even for extension officers, in the Pacific. Of course, we are not alone in this problem. Publications should be integrated into the communications/extension objectives of any research project. Unfortunately, this is quite often not the case, or it is only a last-minute thought.

Facts and figures could be presented to show the growth of IRETA's AIN system. However, a few anecdotes would show the effectiveness and impact of this system far better:

— crispy chips now contrast nicely with tender chicken for the Sunday lunch in Funafuti, Tuvalu. A family enjoying these foods, which are now produced locally, is unaware that

IRETA's information system had a hand in their production;

— the August, 1988 issue of the IRETA News, described a pig and poultry-raising scheme used in Kiribati. This became the model for a similar scheme to be carried out by the Tuvalu Division of Agriculture which is to start soon;

— in September, 1988, a desperate plea was made for information during a normal satellite meeting. The ALO from Tuvalu had a question from the manager of a farmer's co-operative from an outer island on how to make and keep his sweet potato chips crisp. This was passed on to USP Alafua, with the limit of six days to find the answer. With the use of satellite, telex, fax and two computer databases in three countries, the answer was returned to the manager with hours to spare before he left for his remote outer island home. And his chips have improved, being sent to the "main" island of Funafuti to substitute for expensive imports.

No formal study has been done to study the impact of information delivered through the AIN system. It is doubtful that one could be designed to accurately measure this impact. Yet the impact is felt by:

— the family eating their Sunday meal;

— the farmers using publications to get more yam and sweet potato planting materials; and,

— the policy-makers in the RAB who continue to allot significant quantities of scarce resources to information gathering, handling and, especially, dissemination activities.

Printed materials, electronic databases, audio-visual materials and others are all information: all are making their impact, small but growing, as the "information age" moves into the Pacific, to help sustain the traditional Pacific way into the twenty-first century.

Systems must be used that are cost-effective and sustainable in the long term. Some initial costs may be seen as extravagant, but if thought through carefully in the planning stages, they will be recouped in saved costs later. Planning for back-up and maintenance is crucial where high technology is used, especially in the economic and institutional situation of developing countries. But perhaps most importantly, we need to look at structures, organisations and expertise that are already in place locally: it is far easier to modify something that already exists than to impose major changes from above. ○ W. W.





### Tribute to the late Lorenzo Natali

*I have read with deepest regret of the death of Lorenzo Natali.*

*As a regular subscriber to The Courier since 1979, I have read so much of the late Lorenzo Natali's activities and have developed personal friendship for him as regards his dedicated and effective love for Africans and developing countries.*

*I therefore wish to express in my small way, sincere condolences to the bereaved family, and also to the ACP-EEC Group in general.*

**Samuel Kwamena Amuah,**  
*Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire*

### Nurture Nature

*In The Courier n° 117 of September-October 1989, General Eyadéma, Président of Togo, makes some striking environmental observations about phosphates and cadmium.*

*"Some European countries are indeed blaming phosphates for the flora choking the rivers, lakes and seas—and quite wrongly so. They also object because their impurities include cadmium, which they claim, without a scrap of scientific proof, is dangerous to man."*

*The bombastic style is somewhat ameliorated by following paragraphs which reveal serious on-going scientific research into the the apparently groundless claims of the Greens.*

*Nevertheless the caption to an accompanying photograph showing open-cast mining reinforces the contemptuous dismissal of the real or potential pollution.*

*How do scientists, Green or otherwise, really see the threat? Is it malicious fantasy or grim eco-disaster?*

*I have extracted the relevant section of Amadou Traoré's interview and sent it to the Editor of the British magazine 'Resurgence'.*

*While raising the subject of Green issues, may I suggest that, in sympathy with the natural world and Man's nurture of it, The Courier changes the blue framework of its cover to a green colour. The particular depth of shade is up to you.*

*May I close by quoting the motto of Namasagali College Wildlife Club (NCWC):*

*'Nurture Nature  
and Nature will nurture you —,  
If not Gaia will get you.*

**S.C. Downie, Kampala, Uganda**

### A welcome step

*Let me take this opportunity to observe that the venture you took in inviting creative writers to contribute to The Courier, of which I am a regular reader, is a very welcome step, particularly to me. Whereas I do not have very high hopes of winning the competition, I still think that you might give me the chance to break into print later when you compile the best stories into a literary anthology. I have on my shelves two or three manuscripts of novels, most of which were written during my student days, that I have failed to convince any publishers to take on, and as I near my thirties, I feel my steam running out; given a chance of breaking into print, I would revive my spirits.*

**A.G. Musamali, Kampala, Uganda**

### Seeds and forestry

*I would like to add several ideas to the CTA article on the importance of healthy seeds in your issue No. 114.*

*The article concentrated on the importance of healthy vegetable seeds without touching on ligneous species. If we take agriculture in the broadest sense, we will realise that it covers silviculture as well, and it is obvious that information about high-quality seeds will be of just as much use to forestry as to agriculture in general.*

*Apart from agroforestry, which is vital for developing countries, trees provide many food products in themselves, and forage for animals which then furnish their milk and meat to the people. Trees further produce the energy for cooking the food and are the principal green energy source in the Third World.*

*All this, plus the fact that trees represent renewable energy sources, means that studies on the lines of those for food crops should be launched as a matter of urgency.*

**Mamadou Goudiaby, Dakar, Senegal**

### A terrible world?

*I thought that No 116 of The Courier, which I have here at the moment, was worthy of particular encouragement. Having Dunkel and Auclert speak as they did is an opportunity for people who are not really in the picture to understand—and therefore appreciate—more what is going on.*

*We live in a terrible world, an increasingly terrible world, but no one seems to be very interested in the achievements (and they are exceptional achievements in the history of mankind) of the successive Lomé Conventions.*

*I have lived in Africa and I still have a lot to do with several of the negotiators mentioned in your columns. Your ACP and EEC countries merit everyone being made to realise what has been done and what is still to do for the general good.*

**RP Guy Dominique Sixdenier, Paris, France**



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**MOBUTU: Dignité pour l'Afrique** (Dignity for Africa) — Talks with Jean-Louis Romilleux — Editions Albin Michel, Paris — 1989 — 210 pages

One thing is certain — Zaïre's President, Mobutu Sese Seko, leaves no one indifferent. He attracts both the esteem and the annoyance of the international press in the many commentaries on him and his country, so his book should not be short of readers.

The title is a fair reflection of one of the most important sides of African life. "Dignity" was indeed the main reason for the fight for independence and it is the essential foundation of the claims of the blacks in South Africa and the *raison d'être* of economic and social development in every country of the continent.

The President has plenty to say about his family background in this five-part work. As a child in a large family in the river region, he was soon aware of the economic and social development problems of his country, then a Belgian colony, and, most important, of the difficult task of building a nation in such a vast and varied territory as Zaïre. Young Mobutu was already talking about his country's political problems in "Actualités Africaines" back in 1956. "I was already pointing out the dangers of tribalism and I even listed the Congolese leaders likely to play a part in politics", he writes. Mobutu the journalist also had ideas as to how tribalism could be avoided. And, in the army, his analyses of political problems were a great help when, in 1964, he became President of the Republic and had to cope with all the old political issues. This section (Chapters One and Two) sheds clear light on the approach of the man who has run Zaïre for the past 25 years and his account, scattered with anecdotes about family and army, is a source of information and an aid to the understanding of certain facts.

But Mobutu is a political animal. In Chapter Three (on power, democracy and authenticity), he explains and defends his single party policy. "The degree of democracy is not gauged by the number of political parties", he maintains, wondering, by

way of illustration, "whether Belgium with eight parties for 12 million people is any more democratic than the USA with two... Democracy does not necessarily mean a multi-party system... (which is why) as soon as I came to power, I did the opposite and created a unitary constitution, a single national party of unity and integration, a single federative union". And Mobutu aimed for harmony between the nation's political institutions and its culture by getting Zaïrians "to seek their own identity, their own soul and their own authenticity in their forenames, in dress, in the arts and in traditions compatible with modernity". This was the policy of authenticity, which provoked a great deal of controversy in its time, although it has had reasonable results in some major areas of the life of the nation today.

The President admits that there have been economic errors, but they were caused by the fact that the country did not have enough trained people in 1960. The recent events between Belgium and Zaïre may bear out the Zaïrian idea of the difficulty of running a coherent economic policy in an economy which was based on mining throughout the colonial period. The development of the economy, and particularly the agricultural side of it, is one of the nation's challenges.

Mobutu also discusses debt in Zaïre and Africa in general. "We are not refusing to pay our debts", he maintains, although he does refuse to entertain programmes geared to stabilisation and negative net capital transfers to developed countries without economic growth.

AIDS is also on the agenda, with Mobutu regretting that this scourge is presented as an African phenomenon when "there are very few of the main carriers—the drug-addicts and the homosexuals—over Black Africa". If AIDS is gaining ground faster in Africa, he adds, it is because of the poor state of development of the health services.

These conversations with Mobutu and the delightful touches the photographs bring to the text make a lively and highly instructive book on the man and his politics.

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Michèle DELAT and Tristan MERCIER: **Etudiants d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique dans la Communauté Européenne** (ACP students in the EEC) — Editions Karthala, 22-24 bdv Arago, 75013 Paris — 239 pages — BF 656 — 1989

This study, carried out by Delat and Mercier, was initiated mainly at the instigation of the Young People's Christian Union (UCJG) in France and the Foreign Students' Solidarity Movement (SEE) in Belgium. The first information we are given is an essential figure—there are currently 50 000 ACP students in the 12 countries of the Community. France has the biggest contingent, with almost 30 000, or 61% of the total number. In second place is the United Kingdom, with more than 9 000 (19%), and then come Belgium (6.5%), Federal Germany (5%), Italy (3.5%) and Portugal (3%), while the six other Member States have smaller percentages. It is also interesting to see that 12 African countries have more than 1 000 students in Europe, or 72% of the whole ACP contingent. They are, in decreasing order, Cameroon, Nigeria, Zaïre, Madagascar, Côte d'Ivoire, Congo, Senegal, Mauritius, Togo, Benin, Kenya and Ethiopia.

In the preface, Raymond Chasle, Mauritian Ambassador, President of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors and Secretary-General of the ACP-EEC Foundation for Cultural Cooperation, does an excellent job of summing up the contents of this original piece of work. "It covers the method used for the study and gives estimates of the ACP students in Europe (in figures), the results of the survey and an introduction to the current legislation in the main host countries. It sets out the terms on which ACP students can enter and stay in Europe, the courses they take and their standard of living in two of the Member States, France and Belgium."

So, we learn, more than a third of the ACP students in France have less than FF 1800 per month to live on, 40% have between FF 1800 and FF 2500 and barely a quarter more than FF 2500. Although 61% of them have grants, 13% have them only to supplement the larger



# THE CONVENTION AT WORK

## Lomé IV signed!

After many ups and downs, the new ACP-EEC Convention was signed in Lomé on 15 December. The full text will appear in the next edition of *The Courier*.

Ministers have had to meet twice since the negotiations began again in September 1989 to achieve this. The Council of Ministers of 27-29 October was supposed to conclude the negotiations, but completion then was impossible as agreement had still not been reached on most of the subjects of discussion, in spite of the fact that the meeting had started with the Vice-President of the Commission insisting on the need to wind up the talks and stick to the timetable. But Commissioner Marin's appeal failed to unblock the negotiations and there was still considerable ground to cover. And of course it was up to the Member States and the ACPs to react, not just the Commission and the ACP negotiators in Brussels. Of all the areas under discussion, only the duration of the Convention (10 years), the admission of three new States (the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Namibia) and the more technical issues (rum, the CDI and toxic waste) were in fact settled when the time came.

The crucial subjects at the heart of the negotiations—structural adjustment, the rules of origin, Stabex, debt, investment and risk capital and possible funding for the LDLICs—had still to be debated. And there was a total impasse on financial and technical cooperation, particularly as regarded the volume of financial aid in Lomé IV.

The ACPs had put forward their figure (ECU 15.5 billion for five years) in Luxembourg, but the Community was still in the throes of a difficult internal discussion in which one side recommended a substantial increase in the EDF and the other suggested a limited fund and better trade provisions.

So the Ministers had to meet again in Brussels from 25-27 November. This time, however, it was a restricted

meeting, with 12 ACP Ministers led by Mr Sefali (Lesotho) and the three Luxembourg spokesmen, Ministers Nzé (Gabon), Greaves (Barbados) and Dulloo (Mauritius), and, on the Community side, Ministers Dumas and Pelletier (France), Presidents, assisted by three spokesmen, Mrs Adam-Schwätzer (Germany), Mrs Chalker (United Kingdom) and Mr Dankert (The Netherlands). Three other European Ministers attended all or part of the talks and top Commission representatives Manuel Marin, the Vice-President responsible for Development and Fisheries, and Dieter Frisch, the Director-General for Development, were present throughout. Most of the sessions were very restricted, so it is not possible to report on what was said, but it is known that there were several bones of contention right up to the last minute in the discussions on political matters (the future accession of three new members), technical matters (maritime transport), the institutions (the status of the ACP-EEC Cultural Foundation) and, most important, finance (the volume and breakdown of financial resources under Lomé IV).

The ACP spokesmen had made their position clear at a press conference in ACP House on 21 November. On the last point, they said, in particular, that the ACPs were embarking on the last phase of the negotiations with an open mind, but the question of the volume of finance would be decisive. They thought their suggested figure of ECU 15.5 billion was reasonable in comparison with the effort the EEC was making for Eastern Europe.

The EEC had asked the ACPs for a positive reaction on the texts still under discussion, to get the talks on the volume of financial aid going again. A difficult discussion followed, with the ACPs believing they had reacted as requested and some Europeans maintaining that they had not done so clearly enough. It took no less than 48 hours of hard discussion for the ACPs to get the EEC to

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suggest figures (no breakdown) — which they then found inadequate. However, as the vital compromises had been reached on all other points and an extra effort on the EEC side had got the volume increased to the fateful ECU 12 billion (ECU 10.8 billion of EDF resources and ECU 1.2 billion of EIB own resources), the ACPs finally announced their agreement with the figure on 3 December. The texts were then tidied up and a final version will probably be available in the various languages during the course of January 1990.

The special Lomé IV edition of *The Courier* will include an analysis of the main innovations of the Convention.

At a press conference on 6 December, Commissioner Marin summed up the main innovations as being the 10-year period, making for more stable cooperation (with the present ECU 12 billion for the first five years being updated at the end of that time), the three new States (Haiti and the Dominican Republic now and Namibia after the projected vote on the constitution in the spring of 1990), the support for structural adjustment, discontinuation of mandatory reimbursement of Stabex transfers and other major improvements to the system, the addition of gold and uranium to the Sysmin lists, the inclusion of a text on debt, the abolition of special loans, better trade provisions (rules of origin, access etc.), the double ban on imports and exports of dangerous waste, the inclusion of a chapter on human rights and a text on the Cultural Foundation.

M.-H.B. and L.P.



## EDF

The Commission, having received the favourable opinion of the EDF Committee, is to finance the following projects:

### St. Vincent and the Grenadines

#### Bequia airport

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 18 500 000

The project involves the construction of a small airport in Bequia, the largest of the Grenadines, which, together with St. Vincent, form a single country. The chief objective is to establish air links between Bequia and international airports so as to develop the obvious tourist potential of the island and to increase the standard of living of its inhabitants, for whom tourism represents the main economic activity. Other important objectives include the development of regional transit tourism, the improvement of operating conditions for airlines and regional charter operators, the development of regional trade and of Bequia's economic infrastructure to meet tourist demand. The planned airport is supplementary to a comprehensive programme for the expansion and improvement of the country's infrastructure and the services offered to the public. The programme is financed, for the most part, by foreign aid.

### Togo

#### SYSMIN — Phosphate mining industry

Sixth EDF

Loan: ECU 15 700 000

In its SYSMIN application, approved by a decision in July 1988, Togo requested an ECU 15.7 m loan to enable the Togolese Phosphate Board, its phosphate exploitation firm, to handle the problems attendant on the heavy cadmium content of Togolese phosphates.

The project, aimed at providing a proper answer to the cadmium problem, is in two parts. Part one is research geared to pilot industrial testing of various processes and exploitation of the low-cadmium carbonate stratum — elimination of cadmium via phosphoric acid. Part two is

investments in equipment (dryers and mobile scoops) to improve productivity of operation and enable the Board to contribute to any further investments required for the removal of cadmium.

### Eastern Caribbean States

(Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines)

#### Higher education

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 7 200 000

The Eastern Caribbean States have to improve their human resources if they are to reach their growth and development targets. All these small islands need better training and the Treaty establishing the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) makes higher education, and training particularly, one of the aims of regional cooperation.

The rudimentary higher education infrastructure of each island, the shortage of qualified teaching staff and the high cost of studying abroad, even in the region, all hold back the development of the Organisation's human resources.

The project will improve the potential of higher education in the region by supplying the national colleges with new facilities (laboratories, classrooms, libraries and learning centres), offering better teacher training, starting up new courses and setting up a regional education planning unit in the Secretariat of the Organisation.

### Countries of West Africa

#### Better use of artisanal fisheries products

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 895 000

This priority action programme is the first stage of a major regional project aimed at improving the use of artisanal fisheries products. More than half a million people depend on artisanal fishing and they produce about 70% of all the fish which goes for human consumption. Losses amount to more than an estimated 100 000 tonnes p.a. (about 10% of the catch) and the aim of the programme is to inform and train the fish processors and dealers to reduce this major loss of protein and income.

### Uganda

#### Infrastructure at Kampala

Fourth, fifth and sixth EDFs

Grant: ECU 25 000 000

This is part of the support provided for the Kampala section of the Uganda infrastructure project which the Government has incorporated in the current four-year investment programme. It is a continuation of the two previous projects (EDF financing) to supply water to, and lay urban roads in, Kampala.

The main accent is on improving Kampala water supplies by stepping up the production capacity to meet demand now and into the 21st century. The main components of the project are civil engineering works, as a new water processing plant able to handle 82 000 m<sup>3</sup> per day and a main sewer and a reservoir to control the flow are to be built.

### Kenya

#### Nature protection campaign in the Mara zone

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 350 000

The basic idea here is to encourage the protection of the natural resources of the Mara ecosystem and get the local population to play a full part in creating and sharing the revenue and other assets of the Mara zone. The general strategy will be to improve the management and infrastructure of the Mara reserve so as to preserve and increase the attractions for tourists and provide the necessary incentives and education for the herdsmen who live there. The project will also encourage regional cooperation with the administration of the Serengeti National Park with a view to joint action in those areas of management where a broader regional approach is called for.

### Zimbabwe

#### Tourist development

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 3 600 000

This programme aims to make Zimbabwe one of the tourist attractions of Southern Africa.

An integrated programme has been designed, the main components of which are to improve the institutions, develop the labour force by running a



training programme for the whole industrial sector and to promote Zimbabwe with a tourist marketing programme.

#### **Development of human resources**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 4 500 000

The purpose of this programme is to back up the development of human resources in Zimbabwe, in particular, but not exclusively, in the rural sector, the focal area of the country's national indicative programme. It is in two parts—general aid for the institutions and aid for specific sectors which are the subject of projects and programmes being run at the moment or to be run with EEC aid—and uses study grants, traineeships of up to a year (in Zimbabwe and the SADCC region and abroad) and technical assistance to try and increase the potential of some public and private institutions which play a key role in the sector, with a view to all the aspects of the activities covered by the projects and programmes.

#### **Small scale irrigation programme**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 6 000 000

Special loan: ECU 8 000 000

Small-scale irrigation development has remained below its potential in Zimbabwe. After independence, most efforts went into the rehabilitation of damaged schemes and there is not enough current capacity to plan and develop new smallholder schemes. Overall irrigation planning needs to be improved and better coordinated.

The purpose of the programme is to strengthen the government body responsible for small-scale irrigation and to simultaneously implement a new scheme in Manicaland so as to improve communal farmers' living conditions in terms of income and food security.

#### **Papua New Guinea**

##### **Training programme**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 850 000

This is backing for the national training programme over the period 1989-91.

It includes training at home and abroad and concentrates mainly on

the priority national sectors of agriculture, livestock and energy. Public services at both national and provincial level are involved.

#### **Nigeria**

##### **Sectoral import programme (SIP)**

Sixth EDF

Loan: ECU 10 000 000

This is to support the Government's process of reform and help cater for a financing shortfall of about US\$ 0.6 billion for 1989. Other donors, including Japan, the United Kingdom, the USA and the World Bank, will be covering the foreign exchange deficit for that year. The programme has also been approved by the IMF. An agreement providing a standby credit to be granted for 1989 was signed at the beginning of the year.

This SIP will make it possible to obtain spare parts for tractors, agricultural equipment, cattle-feed and palm oil production facilities and new equipment.

##### **Middle Belt programme**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU: 6 900 000

Special loan: ECU 26 100 000

This programme covers Kwara and Niger States in the Middle Belt. The region is primarily an agricultural one. The states are amongst the less developed states of Nigeria, with serious health and sanitation problems, extensive contamination of rural water supplies as well as rural water supply shortages, and rapidly increasing rural populations. As a result, the incidence of waterborne diseases is high, as is the incidence of numerous preventable diseases. Furthermore, the high population growth rate (3.4% per annum) is causing social and economic hardship within the rural communities.

The programme will finance a small number of carefully selected and well integrated development activities in the fields of primary health care, population services, functional adult literacy and urgently needed rural social infrastructures. The programme will give high priority to the role of rural women. It will be implemented on a decentralised basis through existing state and local government institutions, which will be strengthened by

means of training programmes and logistical support, as well as through maximum community involvement at village, farm and household level. Self-help initiatives will be actively encouraged.

#### **New Caledonia**

##### **Development of human resources**

Fifth and sixth EDFs

Grant: ECU 1 715 000

This project is part of the territory's training programme for the coming years. It is mainly for people in the interior of the islands and particularly the Melanesian population whose needs in this sphere are considerable.

The projected training schemes will take care of the priorities which the Territorial Committee on Vocational Training has laid down, i.e. farming and herding, construction and the tourist trade, plus short training courses in economic organisation.

#### **All ACP States and OCTs**

##### **Regional cooperation with trade promotion**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 4 932 000

The idea here is to provide effective assistance to the ACP States with support for their trade in the difficult situation on the world market. It is also to ensure, as part of trade cooperation, effective financial and technical assistance with organising their attendance at about 30 international trade fairs and three EEC-ACP seminars to be run on the occasion of some of them.

#### **Senegal**

##### **Rehabilitation of the St Louis Hospital**

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 4 000 000

This is one of the priorities of the national health plan, which is part of the Three-year Public Investment Programme. The programme was revised in accordance with the guidelines of the medium- and long-term adjustment programme which recommends rehabilitating the existing facilities and restricting new construction with a view to keeping down the outlay on equipment and operation.



The modernisation and renovation of the hospital, of which there have already been two other EDF-financed phases, provides for:

— rehabilitation works:

- demolition and erection of the building to be used for emergency and general medicine;

- renovation of four buildings;

— a programme of support for maintenance, training and organisation of the maintenance team.

## Burundi, Rwanda, Zaïre

**Support to IRAZ (Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique) Gitega, Burundi**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 430 000

The purpose of this project is to provide IRAZ (Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique), an institute of the CEPGL (Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs, consisting of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaïre) with its own administrative building, three laboratories and a maintenance workshop in Gitega, Burundi.

These provisions will enable IRAZ to fulfill the objectives for which it was created by the member states of CEPGL, namely, to contribute to the food self-sufficiency of the sub-region through research into agriculture and animal husbandry. At the time of IRAZ's inception the Government of Burundi supplied the Institute with temporary accommodation at Gitega.

## Mozambique

**Displaced persons assistance programme**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 12 743 800

The civil war in Mozambique has resulted in the movement of some 2.5 million people from their homes. Of these, some 1.5 m are crowded about the towns, main roads and the coast in Mozambique. Displaced people are particularly vulnerable for they are cut off from their traditional means of support. Insecurity and the near-total dependence on outside assistance compound the fragility of their situation.

The objective of the programme is to help displaced people in Mozambique both to survive and to resist total dependence on outside help. The

themes selected for support are therefore institutional reinforcement to better cope with acute emergency situations; basic health service provision with the reinforcement of a domestic health service capability; water supplies for areas with a concentration of displaced persons; and agricultural support, once more targeted on the displaced.

## Botswana

**Livestock marketing development**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 400 000

The Livestock Marketing Development Project is one of a number of actions directed at the central theme of developing and conserving natural resources as identified in Botswana's National Indicative Programme. The objectives of this project support those of the Botswana National Development Plan VI, of sustained growth and economic independence.

The project aims to increase the livestock off-take rate by increasing the marketing service offered to small-scale herdsmen and primary cooperative societies in all areas of Botswana, which in turn should reduce localised overgrazing.

## French Polynesia

**Development of Tahiti's HE system**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 825 000

Special loan: ECU 825 000

French Polynesia is keen to become more self-sufficient in energy. There are plans for the construction of up to 40 hydroelectric power stations in the mountains of Tahiti, which will account for some 30% of electricity production by the year 2010.

To cope with the increase in supply the island's transmission grid is to be upgraded, with a 14.4 km underground high-tension line linking the Punaruu transformer substation on the west coast to the urban area of Papeete (TEP 2 HT line). This the line to be financed by this project.

## New Caledonia

**Rural development programme**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 1 778 000

Special loan: ECU 300 000

The programme, entitled a "rural development programme", forms part of the sectoral and geographical priorities identified by New Caledonia in its tenth Five-Year Plan (1989-93). It is geared mainly to improving the infrastructure required for health protection and the improvement of living conditions in New Caledonia, and forms part of the efforts to develop economic activity and employment in rural areas.

The programme has three components:

- harnessing of water resources,
- aquaculture,
- artisanal fishing.

## Zaïre, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania

**Improvements to Kalemie harbour**

Fifth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 000 000

Special loan: ECU 8 000 000

The port of Kalemie, on the west shore of Lake Tanganyika, is the terminus of the Kamina-Kalemie railway. The port is an important link in the central corridor linking Shaba with the port of Dar es Salaam and in regular trade between Zaïre, Burundi and Rwanda.

The purpose of the project is to safeguard and restore the existing facilities and maintain a capacity compatible with the estimated capacity of the central corridor following the improvements undertaken and in progress at Kigoma, on the Kigoma-Dar es Salaam railway and at the port of Dar es Salaam.

## St. Kitts and Nevis

**Development of social infrastructure**

Sixth EDF

Grant: ECU 2 750 000

The programme involves two projects within the social infrastructure sector:

### Primary school construction

The overall objective is to improve the standard of basic education provided at the primary level. The aim of the project is to finance the construction of three new primary schools, which will provide purpose-built facilities for teaching approximately 1000 girls and boys of between five and 12 years old.



**North Nevis water development**

The project is the final phase of a programme to improve the water supply system serving some 3 000 people living in the northern half of Nevis.

**Ethiopia****Aid for refugees**

Sixth EDF  
Grant: ECU 8 100 000

Ethiopia and Somalia are two of the states in sub-Saharan Africa that have for a long time given refuge to hundreds of thousands of refugees.

The situation in Ethiopia is particularly chronic at present with increasing numbers of refugees fleeing the wars in Sudan and Somalia. These refugees arrive in the country destitute, suffering from malnutrition and often have been the victims of attacks and rape by combatants.

The camps in Ethiopia where the refugees have found protection are located in areas where the provision of the basic necessities of survival have presented enormous problems. Shortages of food and water have too frequently occurred.

The Commission, together with the Ethiopian government, has been examining ways through which extra assistance could be provided. The situation is particularly serious this year in the light of the shortfall in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) funding requirements.

The Government of Ethiopia is anxious to ensure that certain key elements of the UNHCR's programmes will be maintained, despite the shortage of funds. After discussions between the Government, the EEC and UNHCR, the Commission has decided to support the following aspects of the UNHCR's programme so as to guarantee its uninterrupted continuation:

	<i>MECU</i>
— transport of food for Sudanese and Somali refugees:	3.5
— supply of water for Somali refugees in the Eastern Region:	2.5
— development of a permanent water supply for Somali refugees:	1.0
— provision of health care for Sudanese and Somali refugees:	1.1
total:	8.1

**EIB****Benin: ECU 7 m for improved telecommunications**

The Bank is lending ECU 7 m for the improvement and extension of the telecommunications network in Benin.

The funds, from risk capital resources provided for under the Third Lomé Convention and managed by the EIB, are advanced to the Government of Benin in form of a conditional loan for 25 years at 1%, to finance its participation in the increase of the capital of Office des Postes et Télécommunications du Bénin (OPTB).

The project, totalling ECU 40.6 m, and co-financed by the International Development Association (World Bank Group), by the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique, Paris, and the African Development Bank, comprises the rehabilitation of the telephone system in the country's capital, Cotonou, and the addition of 9 500 exchange lines, four digital exchanges to replace and expand switching equipment, parts of the national transmission networks including the modernisation of radio relay links to Togo and Nigeria, as well as technical and managerial assistance.

**Burundi: ECU 2.5 m for tea production**

The EIB is lending ECU 2.5 m for increasing tea processing capacity with a view to increasing smallholder tea production in Burundi.

The funds are provided in form of a conditional loan to the Republic of Burundi at 2%, for 20 years, from risk capital resources.

The Government will onlend the funds to the Office du Thé du Burundi (OTB) to finance factories and storage facilities.

These investments will help improve the efficiency of the tea industry in Burundi and thereby raise the quantity and quality of output.

They are part of a larger scheme costed at ECU 15.5 m, covering technical assistance, plantations, quarters for pickers, and vehicles as well as training.

**Chad: ECU 6 m for water supply**

The Bank is providing ECU 6 m to finance the rehabilitation of water supply facilities in Chad.

The funds, from risk capital resources, are being advanced in the form of a conditional loan, for 20 years at 1%. The borrower is the State, which will pass on the proceeds to Société Tchadienne d'Eau et d'Electricité (STEE).

This project constitutes part of a larger scheme also encompassing rehabilitation of power supply facilities.

The total cost of both the water and power components is estimated at ECU 20.4 m, with the funding from the EIB covering the water infrastructure.

**Guinea: ECU 6 m for water supply**

The Bank is providing ECU 6 m to finance the extension and modernisation of water supply facilities in Conakry, the capital of Guinea.

The funds, from risk capital resources, are being advanced in form of a conditional loan, for 20 years at 2%.

The borrower is the State, which will pass on the proceeds to the Société Nationale des Eaux de Guinée (SONEG).

The project will improve water supplies in Conakry and provide access to drinking water for an additional 500 000 consumers by the doubling of raw and treated water-mains capacity, construction of a second treatment plant and two reservoirs, the installation of distribution mains and 15 000 connections, as well as the rehabilitation of the existing distribution network.

Total costs for the scheme, which is to be implemented between 1990 and 1994, are estimated at ECU 77 m.

Financing is also expected to come from the African Development Bank, France's Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (CCCE), the International Development Association (World Bank Group) and SONEG's own funds.



### Guinea Bissau: ECU 3.5 m for industrial fishing and fish-processing

The EIB is granting a loan of ECU 3.5 m to part-finance four fishing trawlers and the rehabilitation of a fish-processing plant at Bissau, in Guinea Bissau. The funds, from risk capital resources, are advanced in form of a conditional loan to the Republic of Guinea Bissau.

The Government will use ECU 900 000 for taking shares in the ship-owning company and ECU 720 000 in a separate company which will be set up to operate and manage the project. The balance of ECU 1 880 000 m will be on-lent to the ship-owning company. To the extent that the loan is used for acquiring capital it will be made for 25 years at 2% per annum, and the balance for 15 years at 2.5%.

### Lesotho: ECU 3 m for industrial buildings

The EIB is lending ECU 3 m for the construction of factory buildings totalling 24 000 m<sup>2</sup> in the town of Maputsoe in northern Lesotho.

The funds, from risk capital resources, are granted in the form of a conditional loan to Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) for 15 years at 5%. LNDC is the country's major institution for long-term financing.

The new factories will be located in an industrial estate of 23 hectares, serviced with access roads, water, sewerage, power and telecom installations. The total investment cost is estimated at ECU 7.4 m; Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Germany) is financing infrastructure and some factory buildings in parallel with the EIB.

### Somalia: ECU 2.4 m for a sesame oilmill

The EIB is helping to finance an industrial joint venture being established by the Somali government and a Belgian commercial company to rehabilitate and operate a sesame oilmill near the capital Mogadishu.

The total financing of ECU 2.4 m will be made available to fund contributions to the joint venture company's share capital by the Govern-

ment and SIPEF and as direct loan to the joint venture company to finance fixed assets. The loan to SIPEF will be the Bank's first ever to a European company under special provisions of the Third Lomé Convention which enables the EIB to assist both European and ACP parties to a joint venture promoting industrial activities.

The funds, drawn from risk capital resources managed by the Bank, are in the form of three conditional loans at very concessional rates:

- ECU 100 000 to the Somali Democratic Republic towards its subscription in cash to shares in the company;
- ECU 300 000 to SIPEF for half of its subscription to the shares and;
- ECU 2 m to the joint venture company for plant, equipment and related investment.

### Swaziland: ECU 4 m for a spinning mill

The Bank is lending ECU 4 m for the construction of a cotton/polyester spinning mill with an annual capacity of 2 820 tons of high-quality yarn, near Manzini, in central Swaziland.

The funds from the Bank's own resources, (essentially, its borrowing on the capital markets), will be made available to Spintex Ltd. for 10 years at 5.65% after deduction of an interest rate subsidy drawn from the resources of the European Development Fund in accordance with the provisions of the Third Lomé Convention.

Spintex is a private company whose equity is held by a Swazi investor, International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group), Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden (FMO) of The Netherlands, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Beteiligungen in Entwicklungsländern (DEG) of Germany.

Total project costs are estimated at ECU 22.5 m. The project will be financed by equity, the EIB loan and by preference shares held by the three foreign equity shareholders.

### Tonga: ECU 2.3 m for strengthening the industrial base

The Bank is providing a global loan of ECU 2 m from its own

resources for 12 years at 5.05% to Tonga Development Bank (TDB) for part-financing small and medium-sized industrial, agro-industrial, tourism and transport projects.

Simultaneously the EIB is providing ECU 300 000 in the form of a conditional loan from risk capital drawn from European Development Fund (EDF) resources to finance part of the Kingdom of Tonga's contribution to forthcoming increases in TDB's share capital.

TDB was established in 1977 and is the country's only bank providing medium and long-term finance to the productive sectors. ○

## EMERGENCY AID

### Ethiopia

The Commission has decided to send a first consignment of emergency food aid of 30 000 tonnes of cereals and 500 tonnes of milkpowder to Ethiopia as part of the food aid programme for 1989.

This aid, worth an estimated ECU 7.6 m, is a response to an international appeal from the United Nations and the Ethiopian authorities.

Two regions in northern Ethiopia, Eritrea and Tigre, are facing a drought and a risk of serious food shortages, or even famine, for more than two million people.

The food shortfall which the food aid is intended to cover has been put at about 225 000 t of cereals in Eritrea alone and a similar figure has been suggested for Tigre.

In view of this situation—which has just been confirmed by the Ethiopian authorities (the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission) in an appeal to all donors—an aid plan, coordinated by the UN, was produced in October to meet the needs of the people as soon as possible and various donors (the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic in particular, together with the USA) have already responded.

Local coordinators have brought in the European Community, because of the importance of the role it has always played in humanitarian operations in Ethiopia, to make as rapid a response (15 000 tonnes per month) as possible to food requirements until



late 1989 - early 1990, bearing in mind the logistical problems and the lack of stocks on the spot.

A second consignment of emergency aid could be envisaged in the same context once the FAO has confirmed the situation in November and the requested delivery timetable.

### Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia

The Commission has granted emergency aid of ECU 380 000 for Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia. The 60 000 refugees already in the Fugnido camp in western Ethiopia are being joined by around 3 500 new refugees every month. The aid will be implemented by Médecins sans Frontières (Netherlands and Belgium) and will be used to dispatch staff, medical equipment, medicines and essential goods.

### Angola

The Commission has granted emergency aid of ECU 650 000 for those affected by fighting and drought in central and southern Angola.

The aid will be implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross and will be used to finance the immediate dispatch by plane of foodstuffs.

### Refugees in Malawi and Burundi

The Commission has granted a total of ECU 2 239 000 in aid for Mozambican refugees in Malawi. The aid will go towards the following projects:

- repair and maintenance of access roads to the refugees camps at Dedza, Ntchen and Nsanje (650 000 refugees): ECU 739 000;
- repairs to the embankments at Chiromo and the Bangula-Marka road: ECU 670 000;
- programme of medical assistance and education for around 80 000 refugees (Dedza West): ECU 519 700;
- infrastructure support for medical establishments in the refugee reception areas: ECU 401 000.

The Commission has also granted aid of ECU 750 000 in support of the repatriation and reintegration of refugees from the Ntega district of Burundi, coming from Rwanda. The money will be used chiefly to improve living conditions and country roads.

Article 204 of the Lomé Convention lays down that aid may be

granted to ACP States taking in refugees or returnees to meet acute needs not covered by emergency aid, and to implement, in the longer term, projects and action programmes aimed at the self-sufficiency and integration or reintegration of such people. ○

## ACP EMBASSIES

The new Ambassadors of Antigua and Barbuda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Togo have just presented their credentials to the Presidents of the Council and the Commission of the European Communities.

### Antigua and Barbuda




James Thomas, a 60-year-old Oxford economist, has spent most of his working life with the West Indies Oil Company, where he has held various posts of responsibility.

### Djibouti




Hassan Idris Ahmed is a schoolmaster turned diplomat who was Head of the International Organisations Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation before coming to Brussels. He is 40 years old.

### Ethiopia



Hailu Wolde Amanuel Negatu, who is 53, is a geography graduate from the Universities of Addis Ababa and Wisconsin. His work experience has included running his country's Land Reform Programme, a job he held until being appointed Head of the Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities, with the rank of Minister, in 1987.


### Somalia





The new Ambassador, 42-year-old Ali Hassan Ali, is a commerce graduate from the University of Boston. This is by no means his first stay in Brussels, as he was Commercial Counsellor at the Somali Embassy there in 1973-80 and Economic and Commercial Counsellor in 1981-85.

## Togo



Assiongbon Agbenon, who is 52, qualified at the International Institute of Public Administration in Paris. He has been an Ambassador since 1976, with posts in both Bonn and London.

## Zaire



Kimbulu Moyansa wa Lokwa, a qualified linguist, now returns to Brussels, where he was educated and has held posts as Adviser and then Minister-Adviser at the Zairean Embassy before being appointed Ambassador to the Swiss Confederation. The new Ambassador is 39. ○

## ACP GROUP

### Ghebray Berhane, new Secretary-General of the ACP Group

The Ethiopian, Ghebray Berhane, is to succeed Edwin Carrington (Trinidad and Tobago) as Secretary-General of the ACP Group. Dr Berhane, who was elected to the post last October by the ACP Council of Ministers, is well versed in matters pertaining to



ACP-EEC cooperation, in which he has taken a very active part during the past 10 years. As Ethiopia's ambassador to the EEC from 1979 to 1988, he participated in the Lomé II and Lomé III negotiations, co-chairing the Article 193 Committee on the implementation of financial and technical cooperation. After he left Brussels, he was elected to the Co-Presidency of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, a post he retained until last September. Dr Berhane will take up his new post in March 1990. ○

## VISITS

### The Prime Minister of Mozambique visits the Commission

On 14 November Mr Mário Fernandes da Graça Machungo, Prime Minister of Mozambique, accompanied by Mr Daniel Filipe Gabriel Tembe, the Minister of Trade, met Mr Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the Commission with special responsibility for development policy.

The visit provided an opportunity to discuss the principal international topics of the moment. Mr Machungo

and Mr Marin looked at three subjects of particular mutual interest: bilateral relations between the Community and Mozambique and the peace process; the situation in Southern Africa; the social aspects of structural adjustment in Mozambique within the framework of the Economic Rehabilitation Programme currently under way in that country.

### EC-Mozambique relations and the peace process

The two delegations were satisfied with the state of bilateral relations and confirmed their cordial links. Both sides also noted the satisfactory progress made in implementing Mozambique's national indicative programme under Lomé III and the efficient mobilisation of the other cooperation instruments. That same day, the EDF Committee approved a Commission proposal on aid for displaced persons in Mozambique (ECU 12.75 m) following an appeal made by Mozambique in the face of an emergency situation.

Looking at developments in the peace process, Mr Marin reiterated the Community's solidarity with, and support for, the Mozambican Government in its efforts to bring peace to the country.

Mr Machungo explained Mozambique's active policy to find solutions to the war being forced upon the country from outside; this included diplomatic initiatives, an internal policy of bringing peace and recovery, and efforts towards reintegration, notably through the current amnesty.

Mr Marin suggested that he might visit Mozambique at the beginning of next year. Mr Machungo readily agreed to the suggestion, which demonstrated the good relations between the two sides.

### The situation in Southern Africa

Both sides were satisfied with the progress of the elections in Namibia: the Namibian people had been consulted in accordance with United Nations Resolution 435.

With regard to South Africa, both sides noted the moderate elements which had appeared since last September's election and reiterated the need for further efforts to abolish apartheid. Mr Marin affirmed that



the Commission wished to continue its support for the countries of Southern Africa being subjected to destabilisation and to maintain its presence in the process to settle the regional conflict.

### The Economic Rehabilitation Programme and structural adjustment

Mr Machungo informed Mr Marin of the progress made in the Economic Rehabilitation Programme and of the difficulties encountered in implementing it, owing in particular to fighting and destabilisation within the country.

Mr Marin said he was well aware of the efforts made by the Mozambican Government: the programme's results over the last three years proved that Mozambique was capable of improving its economic situation in spite of the extremely adverse situation in which the country found itself. He stressed that he was resolutely in favour of the social dimension of structural adjustment being taken fully into account in Mozambique; in the Commission's view adjustment should aim at growth but should also be even-handed. ○

### SADCC mission

A SADCC mission, led by Simba Makoni, the Executive Secretary, visited the Commission and met Vice-President Manuel Marin on 16 November 1989.

The object of the mission's visit was to present the Commission and the Member States with the subject of SADCC's annual consultative conference for 1990: SADCC — The next decade: Investment, skills and productivity. The meeting will take place in Lusaka (Zambia) from 31 January to 2 February 1990.

It will mark SADCC's first decade and should therefore take stock of what has been achieved. But, above all, it will be the opportunity to establish the organisation's strategy for the '90s, in particular in the light of the way the peace process is developing in Southern Africa. SADCC's institutional workings and priorities will have to be reviewed over the coming years to reflect new challenges in the region.

Vice-President Manuel Marin confirmed that he would be representing the Commission at the conference —

which will probably be the first major regional meeting to take place after the signing of Lomé IV.

In his talks with Mr Makoni, Mr Marin stressed two things in particular:

— the importance of regional cooperation for political progress and economic development in Southern Africa. The countries in this region should be increasingly united by links in their trade and investments and in the coordination of their economic policies. This is particularly important if there is to be a fair share of the benefits derived from the current peace process in Southern Africa.

— the Community's commitment to development in the region. As far as Lomé is concerned, Southern Africa is an area which, in spite of its enormous economic problems and state of destabilisation, manages to get the biggest rate of commitment of regional cooperation funds, which is proof of the viability and effectiveness of SADCC schemes. The drive to increase regional cooperation which should come under Lomé IV must take this reality into account. The Commission hopes that relations between the countries of Southern Africa will switch from conflict to cooperation after Namibia's independence and the democratisation of South Africa.

The SADCC delegation stressed that it had been invited to look to the integration of Namibia once it was independent and said it was preparing its own institutions and gearing its priorities to cater for the arrival of its 10th member.

Manuel Marin confirmed that the Commission was already paving the

way for Namibia to join Lomé IV as soon as it was officially independent. ○

## FISHERIES

### Application of the EEC-Guinea Bissau agreement

Following negotiations held in Brussels on 7, 8 and 9 June 1989, a new Protocol between the European Economic Community and the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau was initialled on 9 June 1989. The Council has just decided upon the provisional application of the new Protocol that lays down the following fishing rights for the period from 16 June 1989 to 15 June 1991:

- (1a) Freezer shrimp trawlers: 10 000 grt a month, annual average.
- (1b) Freezer fin fish and cephalopod trawlers: 5 000 grt a month, annual average.
- (2) Freezer tuna seiners: 45 vessels.
- (3) Pole-and-line tuna vessels: 15 vessels.
- (4) Surface longliners: 35 vessels.

The Community will pay ECU 10 830 000 m in financial compensation during the life of the Protocol, and will also contribute ECU 550 000 to help finance a Guinea Bissau scientific or technical programme.

In addition, ECU 550 000 will be provided in awards for study and practical training.

New fees to be paid by shipowners have also been fixed. ○

## GENERAL INFORMATION

### Southern Africa: the EEC Troika meets the ACP

On 28 November a meeting was held in Brussels between the EEC Troika and a delegation of ACP countries. Mr Jacques Pelletier the French Minister for Cooperation and Development led the delegation of the Member States accompanied by Gerard Collins the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pedro Solbes, Spanish Secretary of State for European Affairs and Manuel Marin, Vice-Pres-

ident of the Commission. The ACP delegation was led by Mr Sefali, Lesotho's Planning Minister.

The meeting examined the recent events in Namibia and in South Africa. The two parties expressed their satisfaction at the way the elections were conducted in Namibia, monitored by international observers, and the attitude of all the parties involved. They reiterated their full



support for the action of the UN Secretary-General and his special representative and UNTAG for the successful completion of the next stages of the independence process in Namibia.

The Troika recalled EEC support to Namibia. Community aid to this country will increase in 1990 pending its accession to the Convention after its independence. Concerning South Africa, the Troika stressed the positive measures the EEC has taken in favour of anti-apartheid organisations.

The Troika and the ACP delegation reviewed the latest events in South Africa. The Troika was handed the declaration of the *ad hoc* committee on Southern Africa adopted on 21 August 1989 in Harare and promised to pass this document to the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Community. The two delegations clearly stated that they were in favour of a quick and complete eradication of the system of apartheid in South Africa. The ACP delegation requested regular contacts with the Twelve on this subject. ○

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## GATT

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### EEC hails focus on real issues

The following statement was issued by Mr Frans Andriessen, Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for External Relations and Trade Policy after the conclusion of the informal Ministerial meeting of the Uruguay Round held in Tokyo 16/17 November:

“The Commission is very satisfied with the discussions which have just concluded because they were more centred on what can be done together in order to reach a positive conclusion of the Uruguay Round than on what divides the different delegations”.

The discussions concentrated on the main issues which are on the negotiating table in Geneva:

- how to open markets;
- which rules and disciplines should regulate international trade;
- how new sectors of international exchange should be integrated with the multilateral trade system. The

Commission is particularly happy at the prospect of integrating services and intellectual property rights into the GATT system.

The Commission had occasion to explain in detail what its priorities are in these negotiations:

- to establish a well-functioning multilateral trade system based on reliable, transparent rules and acceptable procedures for the settlement of disputes applicable to all countries;
- the Community is convinced that unilateralism and bilateral deals do not fit this concept of a multilateral world trade system. It is moreover convinced that a satisfactory outcome to these negotiations is the only way to enhance economic growth and job creation in both developed and developing countries.

The Commission's delegation was pleased that all participants in the meeting stressed the need to intensify their work in Geneva in order to reach a balanced result in good time. All participants should contribute to this process without excluding any subject.

The Community itself will complete its proposals by the end of the year, notably on agriculture and subsidies. ○

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## EASTERN EUROPE

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### Economic assistance to Poland and Hungary

The third meeting of the Group of 24 took place in Brussels at the end of November at senior official level in the presence of representatives of international economic and financial institutions. The 24 reviewed the coordination of their programmes to assist economic reform in Poland and Hungary, taking into account information recently provided by the Polish and Hungarian authorities. They welcomed the reaffirmation of support for this reform expressed by the members of the European Council in Paris on 18 November.

The 24 noted that:

- more than one third of the ECU 336 m (\$ 370 m) pledged for food assistance has been supplied and that the remaining two-thirds will be delivered shortly, mostly before the end of the year, in accordance with Polish needs and absorption capacities;

— the Community has decided to increase the financial means for economic cooperation with Poland and Hungary in 1990 to ECU 300 m and that the European Investment Bank is preparing to finance investments of up to ECU 1 bn with a three year horizon;

— most members of the 24 including the Community have decided, or are planning, to improve access to their markets for Polish and Hungarian exports notably through an extension of the generalised system of preferences;

— the identification of projects in the four priority areas defined by the 24, agriculture, training, environment and investment, is well under way in close cooperation with the Polish and Hungarian authorities;

— the coordination of these projects and other actions has been pursued in the working groups, each of which has met at least twice since the last Group of 24 meeting; the agricultural group has coordinated food supplies to avoid bottlenecks; the training group is examining programmes for local administrators, banking and financial staff and language teachers; the environment group is working on joint actions concerning air and water pollution, and waste management; the investment group is analysing the legal, fiscal and guarantee conditions favouring private investment and identifying sectors for foreign investment in close cooperation with the Polish and Hungarian authorities.

The 24 stressed that continuing mutual information regarding new initiatives and concrete proposals is essential to the process of coordination. Intensive coordination and definition of priorities is all the more important now that the phase of identifying and implementing projects has begun. Such coordination should take place in full cooperation with the multilateral economic and financial institutions, in particular the IMF and the IBRD.

The 24 welcomed the new initiatives taken by their members since the last meeting. Further assistance to restructure the agricultural sector and to improve the environment is forthcoming; wide-ranging training programmes are being developed; new investment credits and export credit facilities are being made available.

Some members of the 24 have earmarked considerable amounts for the



establishment of a stabilisation fund of \$ 1 billion for Poland. It was anticipated that members of the 24 will prepare to announce at the 13 December ministerial meeting, specific commitments to capitalise such a stabilisation fund, so that the fund will be ready to operate in accordance with an IMF agreement. A balance of payment support programme for Hungary has also been discussed. The 24 reiterated the importance of an early conclusion of the negotiations between Poland and Hungary and the IMF.

The meeting was informed by the Commission of the new initiatives discussed by the members of the European Council regarding the creation of a development and modernisation bank for Eastern Europe, a foundation for staff training and study exchange programmes for the young.

The EEC Commission conveyed its opinion that further food supplies for Poland were needed. The Community is already examining a second food supply programme in order to overcome shortages during the winter and invited other members of the 24 to consider similar action.

The 24 welcomed the Commission's invitation to a ministerial meeting in Brussels on 13 December to reconfirm their willingness to support the political and economic reform process and to give new impetus to their coordination efforts for economic assistance. The Polish and Hungarian governments were invited to this meeting at a high political level to present their economic policy reforms and assistance needs. ○

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## UNESCO

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### Four new books on general African history

The Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, launched four volumes of a General History of Africa at UNESCO's headquarters in Paris on 31 October. They were Volume VI (the 19th century until the 1880s), the abridged English version of Volume I (Methodology and African Prehistory) and two volumes in two African languages — Volume I in Kiswahili and Volume II (Ancient Africa) in Hausa.

Kiswahili is spoken by about 50 million people in a dozen countries

of Africa, mainly Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zaïre, Zambia, Rwanda and Burundi, and Hausa is used in Niger and Nigeria, where there are almost 40 million speakers.

So far, Volumes I, II, IV and VII have appeared in French and Volumes I, II, III, IV, VI and VII have appeared in English. Volume III will appear in French in early 1990 and Volume VIII in English in 1991. Some volumes are also available in Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Korean and Italian.

The project to prepare and edit the General History of Africa in eight volumes, under the auspices of UNESCO, was agreed by the General Conference in 1964, but it was 1971 before anything came of it and a 39-member scientific committee (two thirds African and a third non-African) was appointed by the Director-General of the Organisation. This committee, which includes Professor Ki-Zerbo (Burkina Faso), Professor Théophile Obenga (Congo), Professor Mohammed El Fasi (Morocco), Professor Devisse (France), Professor Ogot (Kenya) and Monsignor Tschibangu (Zaïre), has the intellectual and scientific responsibility for the work: UNESCO in no way influences its content. The History is, above all, a history of ideas, civilisations, societies and institutions. ○

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## CENTRAL AMERICA

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### Community support for a major programme to increase trade and regional integration

The Commission has approved a grant of ECU 43.5 m for the five countries which are members of the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

This covers the first stage of a programme to increase trade between the countries of the region, involving a Community contribution of ECU 120 m over three years and planned to produce an annual increase in trade of 25% and a 1% annual increase in the region's GDP.

Presenting the decision, Mr Abel Matutes, Member of the Commission

with special responsibility for relations with the countries of Latin America, underlined the innovative nature of the programme. "This is a qualitative leap in our cooperation with Latin America, and Central America in particular", he said. "It is the first scheme which will have a real macro-economic impact, by its very character and by the amount of funding it receives". Mr Matutes said that the Community's initiative sprang from "the wish to provide effective support for the efforts towards peace, democracy and development in Central America".

The Commission decision, which was approved unanimously by the Member States, followed a request made by the countries of Central America at the latest meeting in the EEC-Central America dialogue, held in San Pedro Sula in February ("San José V"). It is a response also to the efforts of the countries of the region to reach a political consensus which will enable them to find a democratic solution to the current troubles and create the right conditions for economic development.

The Community funding will be used to increase intra-regional trade — a prerequisite for the development of industry and agriculture in the five countries. This will go hand-in-hand with the gradual dismantling of obstacles to regional trade, while cooperation is stepped up between the governments and central banks of the region, with a view to greater commercial liberalisation and economic integration.

Trade between the five countries of Central America, which at the beginning of the 1980s stood at US\$ 1.2 billion, is now less than US\$ 500 million.

The main factor in this decline is the lack of continuity and security in the settlement of commercial transactions. This situation is due chiefly to foreign exchange shortages, the non-convertibility of most of the local currencies and the absence of a multi-lateral payments system. In these conditions, trade is carried out via bilateral agreements, or in strong currencies or by barter, all of which restricts its growth. A further problem is the large number of restrictions on trade which the countries of the region have introduced because of their balance of payments problems.



The Community aid will be used to support a programme to liberalise regional trade, together with the setting-up of a Regional Payments System modelled on the European Payments Union, which functioned successfully in post-war Europe in similar conditions (non-convertible currencies, shortage of foreign exchange), allowing a remarkable growth in trade in Europe and a return to convertibility for the currencies of the countries participating. ○

## LATIN AMERICA

### Financing for an Andean Pact development programme

The Commission has decided to finance the Junta del Acuerdo del Cartagena (JUNAC) of the Andean Pact (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela) Consolidation programme for agriculture and industry, worth ECU 7 500 000.

This regional programme consists of a package of preinvestment measures (services of experts, studies, analyses and recommendations) and training measures aimed at contributing to the process of regional integration in a number of subsectors. The Junta of the Cartagena Agreement (JUNAC), the techno-administrative arm of the Andean Pact, has been a recipient since 1977 of Community assistance in the form of financial and technical cooperation.

The programme will last for three years (1990-93) and will centre on:

- agriculture and food security: harmonisation of policies, logistical and structural support, assistance for training and research in connection with the production, marketing and export of agro-industrial crop and livestock products;
- industry: harmonisation of policies and the implementation of programmes in the following areas: the capital goods industry; SMEs; agro-industry; industrial technical assistance; standardisation, quality control and metrology.

Two complementary lines of activity are also planned:

- harmonisation in the areas of consumer protection legislation, rules of competition and the elimination of unfair competition;

- structural support in the form of the services of a Community adviser to the director of the industry department. ○

## INDIA

### ECU 23.2 m for an agricultural project

The Commission has just decided to finance an ECU 23 200 000 agricultural project in India.

The idea is to protect the environment by reconstituting the plant cover on the communal land in villages in the Aravalli Mountains in Haryana and, at the same time, to give the villagers the firewood, timber and forage they need in an ecologically acceptable way.

The natural vegetation of 33 000 ha of semi-arid land will be reconstituted, the fertility of the soil and the water resources protected, the hydrological balance re-established and soil

erosion reduced. In particular, denuded hillsides will be replanted, land development works will be carried out and protective vegetation reconstituted. Small trees (for timber) and fruit trees will also be planted.

The aid from the European Community will be used to finance the land development works and supply machinery, equipment, vehicles, housing, training services and technical assistance. The Indian Government will be providing the resources for the administrative infrastructure, the staff, wages and running costs and the upkeep and protection of the work.

The total cost is an estimated ECU 28.8 m of which ECU 23.2 m is to come from the European Community.

The project will not only protect the environment, but should also ensure the production of an annual 47 000 tonnes of firewood, 23 000 t of woody forage, 13 000 t of small timber and 4 000 t of fruit. It will be of benefit to 293 village communities comprising an average of 1 592 people. ○

## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

### AIDS and desertification on the agenda of the Development Council

In November the Development Council met in Brussels under the chairmanship of Jacques Pelletier, French Cooperation Minister. It discussed the implementation of the programme to combat AIDS in the developing countries, approved in May 1987, and noted that the phenomenon remained particularly serious, despite the efforts made, and that the alarming spread of the disease justified long-term measures in this field.

Noting that all the measures which could be implemented on the basis of the programme adopted in 1987 would soon have been initiated, the Council stressed the need to continue efforts to support the measures taken by the developing countries to combat AIDS and asked the Commission to take steps to that end using the quickest procedures available.

With this in mind, the Council stressed:

- the need to act in conjunction with

the States concerned, taking account of the regional dimension of the problem;

- the importance of involving the population and public and private bodies operating locally;

- the advisability of continuing and stepping up existing co-ordination with the WHO in its special programme on AIDS and with Member States in the context of their research and health programmes. In this context, special attention would also be given to programmes for combating sexually transmitted diseases;

- the value of collaborating with the WHO in monitoring the pandemic and evaluating measures taken;

- the priority which should continue to be given to prevention and information.

In this connection, the Council paid tribute to Marina Baraldini, in charge of the programme to combat AIDS, who died recently in the UTA air disaster in Africa while on active duty.



## Countering desertification

The Council also discussed the implementation of the programme to counter desertification, launched in 1986. It was particularly pleased to see that the number of Community-financed projects to counter desertification had increased greatly and that, overall, a sum in the region of ECU 1 billion had been invested either directly or indirectly in Africa to this end over the past three years.

It noted with interest that the variety of measures taken had enabled a broader strategic approach to desertification to be adopted, aimed at safeguarding balances as a whole and at tying in the measures concerned in closely with development problems. The Council emphasised the advantages of projects to combat desertification by a global approach the aim of which is also to increase income, improve resource management and monitor migratory movements.

Despite an improvement due to higher rainfall in some regions over the past two years, the Council observed that desertification remained a worrying problem warranting further long-term efforts by the Community and its Member States.

The Council therefore stressed the importance of the Community and the Member States continuing to support efforts in this area by the developing countries and particularly by the ACPs. This support should take the form, in general, of paying systematic attention to the problem of desertification when drawing up development projects and, more specifically, of implementing projects aimed directly at countering desertification.

In this context, the Council stressed the need to create in the partner countries the general conditions enabling an appreciable improvement in the management of natural resources to be achieved; these would in particular involve:

- stepping up co-ordination efforts so that projects were carried out through a global approach in which socio-economic development went hand in hand with respect for the environment;
- helping people in the rural areas concerned to take a greater part in cultivating village lands in a way that took the natural factors of production into account;
- helping to increase national means of ensuring that projects were suitable with regard to natural resources and the environment.

The Council pointed out that its Resolution of 1986 highlighted the importance of co-ordination, in particular to ensure sufficient concentration of aid, and stressed the need for more progress in this area. In this connection the Council restated the importance which it attached to regular meetings between those responsible in this field in the Member States and the Commission.

The Council pointed out that it would be desirable, in due course, to make an assessment of the measures taken by the Commission and the Member States to combat desertification. The assessment should concentrate in particular on the question of the involvement of the population concerned and should provide information on experience with the global approach and the general conditions for improving resource management. ○

## POLLUTION

### The shipment of radioactive waste

The Commission has just adopted a proposal for a directive laying down a system of authorisation, notification and control for the shipment of radioactive waste in, and on entry to and exit from, the Community. The idea is to step up the administrative control of movements of radioactive waste which had proved inadequate to cope with the events investigated by the European Parliament's commission of enquiry into the handling and transport of nuclear waste in 1988.

The proposal was produced on the initiative of Mr Ripa di Meana, who emphasised the fact that "the provisions prevent the recurrence of the disturbing episodes such as the Transnuclear/Mol affair. All operations involving radioactive and nuclear waste should be carried out with the utmost stringency and under the strict control of the authorities".

In the Community, activities involving a risk resulting from ionising radiation are covered by the provisions of the Council Directive of 15 July 1980. The proposal for a directive which has been adopted adds shipments of radioactive waste to the activities in respect of which prior authorisation has to be obtained, pursuant to the directive, by the competent authorities in the Mem-

ber States. It also gives details of application of the system.

The projected system is based on the system established by the Council Directive of 6 December 1984 on the supervision and control within the Community of transfrontier shipments of hazardous waste. It also contains various items from the Basle Convention on the control of transfrontier movements and elimination of hazardous waste (22 March 1989), which was signed on that day by the Commission on the Community's behalf.

The proposed system, essentially, is as follows:

— The competent authority of the Member State which is to receive the radioactive waste is to be notified of every transfer of such waste. If the radioactive waste is to be exported to a third country, the competent authorities in the Member State of shipment must be notified. In this case, the notification must clearly indicate the agreement of the third country which is to receive the waste <sup>(1)</sup>.

— A shipment may not be effected before the competent authorities have acknowledged receipt of the notification authorising it.

— The competent authorities may only authorise a shipment where there is sufficient evidence that the recipient of the radioactive waste is able to manage the waste in an appropriate manner. In the case of shipment to a third country, prior written consent from the country of destination is required.

— A general notification procedure may replace specific notifications and be used for such shipments of radioactive waste as present the same characteristics and are transported in the same conditions. The general notification procedure may be applied, in particular, to transfers of radioactive waste from medical practices.

— A standard covering document must be issued for every step provided for in the system.

(1) During the Lomé IV negotiations, the Community and the ACP States undertook to do their utmost to see that international shipments of dangerous and radioactive waste were properly controlled.

Lomé IV says that the Community bans all direct or indirect exports of such waste to the ACP States and, at the same time, that the ACP States ban the direct or indirect importation onto their territories of such waste from the Community or any other country, without prejudice to any specific international commitments to which the contracting parties already subscribe or may subscribe in the future in these two fields in the relevant international fora.



The proposal will now go before the Economic and Social Committee before submission to the Council and the

European Parliament in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty. ○

## EUROPEAN SUMMIT

### Nearer to Monetary Union

The Summit of Community Heads of State and Government in Strasbourg on 8 and 9 December managed to achieve all it set out to do. Here are the official conclusions on the main items on the agenda.

#### Economic and Monetary Union

The European Council discussed convening an intergovernmental conference to amend the Treaty with a view to the final stages of EMU and, as there was a majority in favour of this, the meeting will be organised, by the Italian authorities, before the end of 1990.

The Council also noted that the Commission would be presenting a general document on all the aspects of Economic and Monetary Union, taking all the various analyses and contributions into account, before 1 April.

#### The European Social Charter

The Heads of State and Government of 11 of the Member States adopted the Community Social Charter, which enshrines the fundamental social rights of workers. It expresses their profound attachment to a model of social relations based on common traditions and practices which will be a reference when it comes to taking social considerations into account in the future development of the Community.

The European Council noted that the Commission had produced an action

programme for the application of the Charter and had invited the Council to discuss its proposals in the light of the social dimension of the internal market, respecting the competence of both the individual nations and the Community.

#### Central and Eastern Europe

The Community will do all it can to encourage the appropriate economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and continue to look into the best ways of associating with countries which were embarking upon economic and social reform.

The following were just some of the practical points discussed:

- as soon as possible, the Council will be inviting the Commission to negotiate a trade and cooperation agreement (to be concluded during the first half of 1990) with the GDR;

- the European Council called on the Council to take the appropriate decisions about nationals of Central and Eastern European States taking part in some education and training programmes along the lines of Community programmes;

- the European Council called on the Council to take the decisions, in early 1990, whereby a European vocational training foundation could be set up, in the light of proposals to be made by the Commission;

- the European Council approved of the setting up of a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The

aim would be to promote productive and competitive investments in the States of Central and Eastern Europe in consultation with the IMF and the World Bank, to facilitate the transition to a more market-oriented economy and to speed up the necessary structural adjustments. The European Council asked for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to be set up as soon as possible and for the requisite steps to be taken for negotiations for this to start in January 1990.


The meeting ended with the European Council President, François Mitterrand, saying: "Rarely have we had to deal with such serious issues as those facing us here today. We have made an internal response (on the Social Charter and the EMU) and we have made external responses (on the Bank and East-West cooperation)".

European integration and German unity, President Mitterrand said, were two movements which were part of Europe's future, "but not at any time or anyhow. First let us speed up the integration of the Community and the movement of the peoples will be harmonised around this and the German question will be part of it".

In an interview with *Libération* on 11 December, President Jacques Delors brought up the possibility of a "contract of association with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the GDR — not one designed as an antechamber to accession, but a permanent agreement, which is valid in itself and gives these countries the opportunity to benefit from the Community's dynamism".

Since the Social Charter had been adopted as an official declaration, Jacques Delors stressed, the Commission would be making proposals and the countries saying where they stood, in the light of the Treaty, on each one. ○

*The Heads of State and Government together with their Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the President of the European Commission*







# INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES

PUBLISHED EVERY TWO MONTHS

No.71 : JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1990

## AN IMPORTANT FIRST IN INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIP

THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK  
GRANTS FIRST EVER LOANS TO BOTH EEC AND ACP PARTNERS  
IN SOMALI OIL MILL PRIVATIZATION.

**O**n its role of encouraging joint ventures between EEC and ACP industrial partners, CDI brought together a Belgian agro-industrial concern and the government of Somalia in order to rehabilitate an edible oil mill. CDI also provided vital support to both parties for the establishment of a Somali joint venture company which the European Investment Bank (EIB) subsequently assisted, together with the two partners, through a total financing of Ecu 2.4 million.

Built in 1975 near to the capital city of Mogadishu, Somalia's state-owned Edible Oil Mill had virtually ceased production by 1984 due to shortages of spare parts and raw materials. In 1987, in implementation of the Somali government's liberalizing economic policy, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce offered the mill for sale to the private sector and asked CDI to seek a technical and financial partner.

CDI identified SIPEF, a Belgian company which specializes in agro-industries in developing countries, and brought it together with a Somali delegation at CDI's Brussels headquarters. Soon after, SIPEF carried out a diagnostic study of the plant and the availability of raw materials, co-financed by CDI.

This was followed in 1988 by a feasibility study which CDI both assisted and co-financed. CDI also provided its expertise for the financial engineering of the project and preparation for its presenta-

"The rehabilitation of the Mogadishu oil mill has only been made possible because, from the day CDI brought the Somali promoters and the European investment candidate together until Somagrind Ltd. was formed, SIPEF benefitted from the Centre's assistance in the form of feasibility study evaluation, preparation of contracts, assistance during negotiations with the Somalis and with a lawyer in Somalia as well as the co-financing of studies and missions.

"This advisory role enabled SIPEF to prepare a project report for consideration by EIB and, ultimately, to obtain credits on very concessional terms as provided for in the Lomé Convention."

"The ACP countries are full of potential in our sector. The know-how and the capital are available in Europe. CDI brings the elements together. In this way it plays an essential and decisive role in the industrial development of the ACP countries."

*J. Misson, Project Manager,  
SIPEF Engineering.*

tion to EIB. Several follow-up missions to Somalia ensued, accompanied and actively assisted by EIB. SIPEF's mission costs were co-financed by CDI, who also assisted in the drawing up of the joint venture agreement and the legal incorporation of the new company, Somagrind Ltd., through Somali lawyers.

### LOANS AT CONCESSIONAL RATES

The Ecu 2.4 million, drawn from risk capital resources managed by EIB, are in

the form of three conditional loans at very concessional rates. They consist of Ecu 100,000 to the Somali Democratic Republic towards its subscription in cash to shares in the company, Ecu 300,000 to SIPEF for half of its subscription to the shares and Ecu 2 million to the joint venture company for plant, equipment and related investment.

The oil mill will produce unrefined sesame oil mainly for local consumption and, as a by-product, sesame cake cattle feed for export. SIPEF, which has a 54% stake in the company, will provide management and technical assistance to the mill and handle the export of sesame cake. Works to renovate and modernize the mill include repairs to existing buildings, restoration of production line equipment and new installations such as silos, presses, a packaging unit, boilers and electricity generating equipment.

### GOOD PROSPECTS

The mill has good prospects and will make a significant contribution to the local economy. The growing demand for edible oil has been met by imports and will now be partly replaced by oil produced by Somagrind. Furthermore, the proceeds of the sesame cake exported to the EEC will largely cover the foreign exchange requirements of the project. The mill will also provide a reliable outlet for sesame seeds, an important Somali raw material, giving an impetus to the agricultural sector. A survey of the potential for increasing the production of sesame seeds, financed by the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in Mogadishu, was an appreciable contribution to the project. ■



# REVIEWING CDI'S PRESENCE IN ACP COUNTRIES

by Jens Mosgard, Deputy Director of CDI.

**A** mission was recently undertaken to Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire by Jens Mosgard and Sebastiao Ditutala, area officer for West Africa. The main objective of the mission was to look into problems related to CDI's antennae (or "field representatives") and to follow up CDI-assisted projects, inspecting some of them. The difficulties encountered with our antenna arrangements in Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire raise general questions about how CDI could improve on the work of its antennae.

## WHAT ARE CDI'S ANTENNAE?

CDI's antennae are most often parastatal institutions such as investment promotion centres, development banks, industrial development corporations etc. A dozen private consultants and chambers of commerce also act as antennae. In some countries a government will insist that a ministry should act as CDI's antenna.

The general functions of the antennae are to identify local projects and promoters suitable for CDI's assistance, with a view to creating industrial ventures together with European industrialists or rehabilitating, diversifying or expanding existing operations. The follow-up of CDI-assisted projects already underway, together with support to potential investors arriving from Europe, are also important assignments for antennae.

To encourage and facilitate project creation, antennae can be remunerated and reimbursed for specific costs.

In general, however, it is assumed that antennae should have an interest in industrial promotion similar to that of CDI. Private antennae, naturally, have to be paid a retainer fee to take such an interest.

## GENERAL ANTENNAE PROBLEMS

When acting as antennae, governmental institutions and parastatal bodies are often handicapped by bureaucratic procedures and by understaffing. Moreover, private entrepreneurs are not always happy in approaching a governmental institution to obtain CDI's assis-

tance in solving their project problems. This is partly due to private entrepreneurs' general reluctance to approach governmental institutions and partly due to a frequent suspicion that their ideas may be exposed to competitors who have industrial and personal links with government. They also fear the delays that governmental institutions can introduce.

On the other hand, the more independent institutions and private antennae create other fears. The fear, for instance, that a private antenna who may himself be a businessman, could be faced with a conflict of interests while attempting to obtain CDI's assistance.

For these reasons, CDI always allows individual entrepreneurs to approach it directly. However, it is a great disadvantage for CDI that it does not have its own locally-based personnel for the purpose of evaluating a promoter and his project's potential.

## CAPE VERDE AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE

ACP countries vary considerably in size and economic potential. During our mission, however, we were impressed by how fertile the ground is for the development of private enterprise in Cape Verde and by the facilities available there. The Central Bank, for instance, is able to provide financial support. Also, a number of Cape Verdian promoters return from abroad with foreign exchange earmarked for investment. Unfortunately such positive factors are not available in many African countries today, Côte d'Ivoire included.

Paradoxically, Cape Verde had a reasonably good private antenna arrangement up to June 1989, but the government now wishes to take over this role for well-defined reasons. In Côte d'Ivoire, CDI's antenna is a governmental institution, whose performance is somewhat impaired because it addresses itself only to smaller industries. CDI therefore suggested that a more independent correspondent should be identified to supplement the work of the present antenna.

In Cape Verde the Government suggested that a private antenna can only have a limited impact in view of the priority it now wishes to give to private industry supported by a new governmental unit.

Côte d'Ivoire, on the other hand, is

prepared to help remedy the problems being experienced with the existing antenna organization, but would prefer more governmental institutions to be involved in any solution, while allowing direct cooperation with the Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

In both countries, therefore, CDI will now be obliged to rely mainly on government-controlled units for antenna operations.

Even with the weaknesses mentioned above, such arrangements may still work. But they can work only if these institutions are freed from the bureaucracy which traditionally characterizes governmental bodies and if one key person in each institution is given CDI-related work as his or her main responsibility. This person would have to be permitted to act as an intermediary between ACP entrepreneurs and CDI without having to obtain hierarchical approval every step of the way.

CDI's work is very complex: it is not easy for outsiders to understand it in detail. CDI therefore trains key persons from its antenna organizations. Where such persons remain in their posts for some time as CDI's extended arm, CDI usually gets good service. Regrettably, in governmental institutions, it happens too frequently that these key persons are moved to other posts after CDI has trained them.

## REINFORCING CDI'S PRESENCE

CDI regional experts based in the more industrially oriented parts of the ACP world, combined with CDI experts travelling from headquarters to cover other states, would provide a much more efficient representation system than exists today. The objectives of such a system would be to

- support and assist new and existing antennae in their work;
- assure a rigorous local follow-up of all projects and assist in negotiations for ACP-EEC industrial ventures;
- facilitate the identification of local sources of finance for projects;
- provide better diagnosis and stronger follow-up of projects (with more industrial expertise contributed by CDI expert staff);
- Pursue complementarity in the development of specific enterprises in ACP regions and thus promote intra-regional trade in manufactured goods.




# WORKING TOGETHER WITH DENMARK

**D**enmark's relatively small economy and the lack of historical links with ACP countries have proved to be no barrier to the vitality of Danish manufacturers in several sectors or to institutions in the field of industrial development. CDI has played a modest but positive complementary role in channelling Danish energies towards development projects in the food, wood-working, metal and mechanical engineering industries.

Cooperation agreements signed in 1987 with Denmark's IFU (Industrialization Fund for Developing Countries) and the Federation of Danish Industry have made it possible to bring to bear interventions by Danish manufacturing companies in ACP countries. The recent annual report published by IFU indicates that it committed itself to three new ACP projects in 1988, of which one (Victoria Pumps, Uganda) is CDI-assisted. Furthermore, another ACP project in which IFU has reinforced its financial commitment (a Nigerian flour mill) was also assisted by CDI in 1988. Of the 36 projects in IFU's African portfolio, 9 have also received CDI's assistance.

The Federation of Danish Industry has focussed on promoting the production of milk and milk products as well as honey in the Caribbean and a foundry project in Ghana.



The table shows interventions by Danish companies in ACP projects between 1985 and 1989, some of which are of particular interest. The extension and diversification of a recently privatized company manufacturing metal structural products in Togo was accomplished with the help of a Danish company, while a mini-brewery in Cape Verde, A Danish/Cape Verdian partnership, was started up recently. In both cases CDI played an important role in negotiations, studies and start-up.

Finally, CDI has involved Danish consultants and industrial companies in research in Denmark with a view to forming partnerships, in particular sectors, in certain ACP countries or regions. The sectors chosen were fruit and vegetable

*Danish (and Dutch) investors are involved in this CDI-assisted Togolese firm which manufactures plastic pipes.*

processing and milk products and wood-working.

One such research operation begun in 1988 in the wood-working sector was pursued in 1989 in the field. Now four Danish companies, after a mission to Tanzania, are negotiating agreements with their Tanzanian partners.

Although no projects could be co-financed by CDI and IFU or the Federation of Danish Industry in 1988, the large number of projects which the two Danish institutions were involved in and in which CDI has also assisted, clearly shows real complementarity between the activities of all three bodies. ■

INTERVENTIONS IN ACP PROJECTS BY DANISH COMPANIES IN LIAISON WITH CDI FROM 1985 TO 1989

COUNTRY	PROJECT	A	B	C
Bahamas	Poultry slaughterhouse	●		
Cameroon	Wood workshop		●	
Cape Verde	Brewery		●	
Gambia	Soft drinks		●	
Ghana	Pre-fabricated houses		●	
Ghana	Soft drinks			●
Nigeria	Pre-fabricated houses		●	
Nigeria	Rubber hoses		●	
Nigeria	Maize and sorghum flour mill		●	
Nigeria	Rice mill		●	
Rwanda	Brewery	●		
Senegal	Fishing and fish processing		●	
Sudan	Milk products			●
Togo	Plastic pipes	●		
Togo	Metal pylons	●		
Trinidad and Tobago	Forestry		●	
Western Samoa	Passion fruit processing	●		

Key: A = Feasibility study  
B = Technical or start-up assistance  
C = Diagnostic, rehabilitation, diversification or expansion study.

*Continued from page 2*

However, CDI now needs to be allocated enough money to increase its workforce (and therefore its presence in ACP countries), and to give it the financial capacity to assist marginal projects through long-term, in-depth assistance, in particular for training and initial management. Such costs are often too great for smaller industries and are an obstacle to profitability. Increased assistance to such projects would make them attractive for ACP and EEC investors alike.

With a stronger presence on the ground in ACP countries and increased funds for interventions, CDI would be able to make a greater impact on projects and be in a better position to assess the effects of the assistance it has provided. ■




# NEWS IN BRIEF

## SIX TRINIDADIAN TOOLMAKERS AT U.K. TOOL AND DIE SHOP

MIC (Metal Industries Company) is a joint venture between the government and the private sector to service light manufacturing firms in Trinidad and Tobago by providing tool and die and precision engineering facilities. Recently CDI co-sponsored with MIC a one month training visit for two groups of three senior toolmakers to A.E. Harris & Co., a highly reputed metal forming, machining and engineering company in the United Kingdom.

MIC Managing Director Dave Bhajan recently told CDI that the trainees now appear to have the confidence to design and manufacture more sophisticated press tools and plastic moulds to a higher level of precision.

In the picture the Managing Director of A.E. Harris (left) shows MIC trainees an instrument panel made by his company for Rolls Royce. Also present is Trinidad & Tobago's High Commissioner to the U.K., Mervyn Assam (second from right).



## LONG TERM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR SURINAME SALT WORKS

**C**DI and ICEP (Portuguese Institute of External Trade) are financing long term technical assistance for the rehabilitation of Suriname Salt Works (SSW). The assistance is being carried out by technicians from the Portuguese company VITASAL.

*Roberto Sewbalak, Chairman of SSW, on site.*



SSW is a joint venture between Mr. Sewbalak of Suriname and Mr. Gerritse of the Netherlands and its objective is to produce 3,000 tons of salt a year for the local and regional markets. The pilot phase of the project was officially inaugurated in October. With a commercial production of approximately 400 tons a year, it will allow the promoters to trim production costs in order to submit a feasibility study to the financial authorities for the full-scale project and to obtain the loans needed to carry it out.

## ASSISTANCE FOR CAMEROON PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORY

**L**es Laboratoires du Docteur Nguewa (LDN) is a Cameroonian-owned company producing medicines. Dr. Nguewa, whose Cosmafric division has been producing cosmetics since 1980, requested CDI's assistance for the start up of the pharmaceutical laboratory. During a three months period, a chemist identified by LDN's French technical partners supervised the installation of supplementary equipment and trained eight young qualified employees. The areas covered included the preparation of manuals of procedure, stock control, computerizing documentation, good housekeeping, optimization of the use of equipment and advice on the acquisition of future equipment.

For the moment LDN is concentrating production on inexpensive medicines described as essential by the World Health Organization (WHO). These include medicines against malaria, pain, coughs, asthma and skin ailments, all in liquid form. Later, Dr. Nguewa hopes to diversify into other products "selected



according to national health priorities", and to exploit local medicinal plants which are currently exported as raw material. Such locally sourced import substitution will contribute positively to the country's balance of payments. ■

## CDI'S REPRESENTATIVES FROM THREE WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES VISIT BRUSSELS

Employees in charge of the CDI dossier at three of its West African antenna organizations spent the month of October familiarizing themselves with all aspects of CDI's work, visiting EEC organizations and enterprises active in their countries and following up current projects.

Ibrahima Cissé, an economist with CDI's Senegal antenna organization and author of the article below, spoke of several new projects under consideration for CDI's assistance; a fruit juice processing plant, an ice-making plant, a paving concern and a paint factory.


Senegal, he added, has a pool of well-educated labour as well as many skilled and experienced emigrants returning from the EEC. A governmental agency has been set up to assist their integration into the economy.

Mme. Gakou Salamata Fofano of Mali's CEPI (Centre for Industrial Studies and Promotion), who is one of the nation's first three women to graduate in civil engineering, said that her visit had been very useful in filling gaps in her knowledge of CDI and in helping her to assess the viability of projects.

Current CDI-assisted projects that she followed up during her visit included joint venture partner identification for a dairy, a diagnostic study of the bakery industry and the search for a partner for the rehabilitation of a brick works.

Mamadou Touré is Manager of Studies at UBDM (Union of Development Banks of Mauritania), which provides a one-stop shop for foreign investors. It identifies bankable projects, grants credits and searches for funding for SMEs. He spoke of the new Mauritanian foreign investment code that came into force in 1988 and includes guaranteed repatriation of profits, fiscal incentives, a two to four year tax break on profits and the granting of free land to decentralized enterprises.

Current projects that he followed up during his visit include a fish processing plant for which CDI financed the feasibility study. A joint venture partner has now



been identified and financing is under discussion. A wholly Mauritanian-owned hand-made carpet manufacturer was assisted by CDI to attend the Milan Fair and to produce a prospectus. For the first time the company is starting to export systematically. A match factory has been assisted in a rehabilitation pro-

*West African antennae in Brussels. From left to right: Mamadou Touré (Mauritania), Ibrahima Cissé (Senegal) and Gakou Salamata Fofano (Mali).*

gramme by a visit to a similar factory in Zaire and a garment manufacturer and blanket maker have both received technical assistance and are negotiating for further help. ■

## THE NEW INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN SENEGAL

*by Ibrahima Cissé, Economist in charge of CDI affairs at SONEPI (National Industrial Studies and Promotion Company), CDI's antenna.*

For several years Senegal has been involved in adjusting to the broad lines of its economic and social development plans. The objectives of the New Industrial Policy are to pursue the disengagement of the state in direct investment, share holdings or guarantees and to improve the competitiveness of enterprises in home and export markets.

The general objective of improving competitiveness has several aspects:

- increasing industrial productivity
- encouraging exports
- increasing the added value of locally made products
- knitting together the industrial fabric by developing SMEs, especially in the regions, by a firmer policy of decentralization

In this context Senegal has taken certain measures in favour of SMEs among which are:

- improvements in water and electricity supplies and transportation
- reform of the banking structure
- a new investment code providing more incentives to SMEs
- a "one-stop shop" to simplify the formalities involved in setting up an enterprise
- reorganization and strengthening of SONEPI so that it can play a full part in promoting industry.

SONEPI's principal objective is to promote SMEs. Its activities include centralizing and distributing information on industrial projects and carrying out feasibility and market studies, making requests for funding from international institutions, financial and economic forecasting etc.

SONEPI studies state participation and the use of foreign credits in industry. It

*continued on page 6*



provides consultation and assistance on organization, management, production and the improvement of techniques and working methods. In cooperation with specialized organizations it facilitates entrepreneur training by arranging seminars, courses, study travel etc. In collaboration with CDI, SONEPI encourages joint ventures with foreign partners and offers the whole range of CDI's assistance.

Over the past four years some dozen Senegalese projects have benefitted from CDI's assistance. Joint venture partners were identified for an electrical control panel assembly shop. An energy collector company and chicken feed manufacturing project received travel assistance. An organic fertilizer project, a fishing project and a fish drying and processing unit were assisted with feasibility studies. An agricultural equipment company and a sandal manufacturer received training. An egg tray-making unit and a metal sponge-making company received technical assistance. A rehabilitation study for a quarry was financed. ■

## ACP EXPORTERS AT PARIS LEATHER FAIR

**L**a Semaine du Cuir, held in Paris in September, was the first fair at which the assistance of the EEC Commission and CDI were coordinated. The Commission covered the cost of stands and their decoration for nine ACP countries, while CDI assisted by paying the travel costs of two manufacturers.

The two CDI-assisted manufacturers were Pilane Leathers (Pty) Ltd., of Botswana, who exhibited raw hides and skins, semi-finished and finished leather, leather articles and shoes, and Dire Tannery of Ethiopia.

Mr. Bhjoani of Pilane Leather reported that they had obtained substantial business but added that the design and workmanship of the company's leather articles and shoes needed improvement. He was confident that they could be competitive. Dire Tannery, who also acquired new business, considered the



CDI financed an expert to prepare promotional material for a wide range of goods made by the Ethiopian Leather Corporation, including these bags.

exposure they received at the fair of great significance and plan to attend regularly. Attendance had brought them up to date with markets and competition and given them confidence to make decisions about their plant's expansion scheme. ■

## WHAT KINDS OF ACP PROJECTS INTEREST EEC INVESTORS?

by Drs J.W. Steketee, Divisional Coordinator, Intervention Programmes Division

**W**hile it is true that CDI is very much in favour of ACP-EEC joint ventures, it is also true that the smaller the project is, the less interested potential investors are. Return on a small investment is also small. For example: for a project with a total investment of Ecu 200,000 total share capital is usually somewhere between Ecu 60,000 and Ecu 80,000 to which the foreign contribution should be somewhere between Ecu 12,000 and Ecu 30,000. Thus, even a reasonably profitable small project would give too little return on the foreign share capital to interest a potential EEC partner.

It is difficult to say at what investment level potential investors become interested, but CDI has learned from experience that the success rate in promoting projects with an investment level below Ecu 1 million is so low that it cannot afford to handle them.

Other factors also play a role. Projects that produce (mainly) for the domestic market and do not generate foreign exchange earnings, do not easily attract foreign investors, especially if part of the raw materials has to be imported. In the latter case the project will depend on the allocation of foreign currency for the



purchase of raw materials, which depends in many ACP countries on priorities set by the government.

Clearly no foreign loan can be found for projects of this type, which also makes them unattractive for foreign investors, regardless of their size. The solution is to have them fully financed from credit lines available to local development institutions.

Another important aspect is the availability of local share capital. Generally speaking *total share capital must*

*be 30%-40% of the total investment.*

As in the majority of cases a foreign investor will not (or is not allowed to) take more than 20% to 40% of share capital, *the local promoter must provide* the remaining 80% to 60% which would correspond to about 20% to 30% of the total investment.

**It is therefore strongly recommended that an ACP promoter who intends to submit a project to CDI for promotion, first discusses it with his bank and investigates whether he has the financial capability to sponsor the project, whether it has any potential interest for a foreign investor, whether it can be locally financed, the prospects for obtaining foreign exchange allocations if raw materials have to be imported and regulations concerning foreign loans if the project is important enough to justify it.**

If his conclusions are positive, the ACP promoter should then submit a request to CDI to promote his project, supported by the justification and necessary evidence. CDI's antennae in ACP countries will help promoters with the preparation and transmission of such requests. ■



# MARKETING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME FOR ACP MANUFACTURES

by Berhanu Kidane, Marketing Adviser, CDI.

*The provision of marketing assistance for ACP manufactured products was added to the functions of CDI under the Third Lomé Convention, as an integral part of the ACP industrial development process.*

*CDI's assistance is intended to supplement the efforts of ACP manufacturers to enter viable export markets. It is flexible and wide-ranging and includes the promotion of manufactures and their adaptation for export. The assistance so far provided to companies has had a significant impact on their exporting capability.*

*Because the markets for manufactured products are highly competitive, ACP countries need to develop effective export strategies. Moreover, adequate incentives and support services both at home and in the main export markets are of paramount importance if ACP exporters are to succeed.*

## PROBLEMS OF ACP MANUFACTURERS

Some of the problems which ACP manufactures face in export markets are low product quality, inadequate design, unattractive packaging and presentation. Low production capacities can lead to irregularity of supply and affect price competitiveness.


ACP manufacturers are accustomed to catering to captive markets with little or no competition. If they can sell all they can produce they have no incentive to take the extra risks of exporting, which is more demanding in terms of time and cost and may not initially be as profitable as the home market.

Lack of exposure to competitive products and competitive markets does not encourage manufacturers to improve the standard of their products.

## DISCOURAGING CONDITIONS

In some ACP countries business conditions discourage manufacturers from venturing into export marketing.

Most ACP countries do not give adequate support and incentives to their exporters. They should adopt the initiatives of other developing countries whose manufacturers have succeeded in penetrating competitive export markets with



the help of positive policies as well as adequate governmental supports and incentives.

Nonetheless, it is heartening to note that some ACP manufacturers have succeeded in penetrating export markets, including those of the EEC, where they are competing successfully. Other manufacturers with potentially exportable products are encouraged to take advantage of CDI's assistance to help them achieve similar results.

## PREPARING TO EXPORT

ACP manufacturers must recognize that export markets are different from local markets, that there are many variables and unknown factors.

Exporting can also be expensive. It requires preparation and study, well-laid plans and strategies. First of all the potential exporter should be able to reply affirmatively to some basic questions:

- Have his products competed successfully against imported products in his home market?
- How do his products compare with the products already on sale in his target markets?
- Are his products packaged acceptably?
- Can he offer competitive prices in the sector he wants to enter?
- Can he ensure regular supply?
- Can he afford the initial investment needed to go into export marketing (e.g. for travel and other promotional expenses, introductory prices, inventory etc)?
- Is he committed and can he establish the organizational set-up needed for a sustained export business?

CDI recommends that initial market entry be made through established importers.

## HOW CDI CAN HELP

CDI's marketing assistance scheme is designed to supplement the ACP manufacturer's efforts. ACP regional markets and the EEC are the main targets, but assistance can extend to other markets where necessary.

In general, CDI's assistance is geared to respond to practical problems in practical ways. Interventions are intended to help make potentially exportable products more competitive and to help promote them in export markets. They also extend to market surveys and other activities such as:

- improvements to the design, quality and presentation of viable products to adapt them for export markets
- identification of market niches and importers
- travel assistance for market assessment and negotiations
- sales promotion, including designing promotional materials and participation in fairs.

The marketing assistance scheme is flexible and requests for other types of assistance can be considered.

## APPLYING FOR MARKETING ASSISTANCE

Manufacturers with potentially exportable products may apply for assistance by completing the special CDI forms and submitting them along with supporting financial statements. Manufacturers have to show evidence that they have sufficient production capacity and the necessary organizational back-up for export. CDI's antennae are available for consultation and assistance in completing the forms.

## WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED SO FAR?

Fifty-seven requests for marketing assistance costing over Ecu 380,000 were handled from 1986 up to June 1989. As a result, many manufacturers discovered new markets, established durable contracts and built up export business, at the same time providing a source of foreign currency for their countries.

*Continued on page 8*





## INDUSTRIAL PROPOSALS FROM EEC FIRMS ACP ENTREPRENEURS, PLEASE REPLY

The proposals outlined below have been put forward by EEC firms interested in setting up production in ACP countries under joint venture, franchising, licencing, sub-contracting, marketing, management or other agreements with local businessmen.

ACP entrepreneurs interested in any proposal are invited to write to CDI quoting the reference number. However, CDI will not be in a position to act upon letters received unless ACP entrepreneurs provide all the information requested at the bottom of the page.

Where a joint venture is proposed, the EEC companies are willing to consider contributing (depending on the country and the project) some 20% of the equity investment. For other proposals, the companies are committed to entering into long-term agreements for the creation of profitable ventures.

Where second hand equipment is suggested, CDI may sponsor an evaluation by an independent expert of the quality, cost, suitability and condition of such equipment.

All equipment costs are quoted in Ecu (European currency units). The value of the Ecu may easily be ascertained from its relationship to other European currencies. Thus, on 4 December 1989: 1 Ecu = £ 0.73, or FF 6.955, or DM 2.035.

Please ALWAYS mention the CDI reference numbers when reproducing these proposals.

### 89/94 FO BELGIUM

A Belgian company has developed a small containerized and transportable palm oil mill, with an independent power generation facility. It seeks ACP partners.

#### SMALL PALM OIL MILL

**Minimum capacity:** 240,000 litres of oil a year for an investment of Ecu 150,000

**Cooperation proposed:** joint venture partnership, industrial franchising or licensing agreement, transfer of know-how, technical and training assistance.

### 89/95 EX U.K.

A large well established UK manufacturer of ceramic wall and floor tiles is prepared to consider cooperation with ACP companies.

#### CERAMIC WALL & FLOOR TILES

**Minimum capacity:** 10,000 m<sup>2</sup> per week for an investment of Ecu 1.4 million.

**Cooperation proposed:** equity participation, licensing agreement, transfer of know-how, training and management contract.

### Information required of ACP entrepreneurs when replying

- Show why it would be worth-while to manufacture the products in question in your country, e.g. give market data, indicate that raw materials are available locally, etc.
- Describe your present activities plus your industrial and/or commercial experience, enclosing any available information such as your latest balance sheet.
- State how much capital you yourself could contribute.
- State the maximum portion of the equity your country legally allows to an EEC partner.
- Can you obtain finance and if so from where?
- If you need a foreign loan or supplier's credit, can you obtain a local guarantee?
- Is your project a national priority?
- Outline the incentives your country offers to foreign investors.

Continued from page 7

On the other hand, not all CDI's interventions could be said to be successful. Many products needed improvements before they could be successfully exported.

#### GUIDE TO OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE LOMÉ CONVENTION

CDI has published a Guide to the Trade Provisions for the Third Lomé Convention which highlights the favourable conditions and the preferential opportunities

for ACP enterprises. ACP economic operators and industrialists can use the Guide to take better advantage of the trade terms and privileges offered by the Convention.

#### COOPERATION WITH OTHER EXPORT PROMOTING INSTITUTIONS

CDI cooperates with other institutions that promote exports from developing countries. The Development Directorate of the Commission of the European

Communities, for example, has a programme for sponsoring ACP participants at trade fairs. CDI finances some of the expenses not covered by the Commission's subsidies.

Cooperation is also being developed with the Centre for the Promotion of Exports (CBI) of the Netherlands and the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) to complement the assistance we provide for improving the exporting capability of ACP industries. ■



# OPERATIONAL SUMMARY

No. 55 — January 1990

(position as at 11th December 1989)



## EEC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

### Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

- the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979) and Lomé III (8 December 1984), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;
- the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC in 1976 and 1977;
- the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

### Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

### Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

### Main abbreviations

- Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
- Int. tender: International invitation to tender
- Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
- Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
- TA: Technical assistance
- EDF: European Development Fund
- mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr. Franco Cupini  
Directorate-General for Development  
Commission of the European Communities  
Berl. 6-86  
200, rue de la Loi  
B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.



## DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

<b>A1</b>	<b>Planning and public administration</b>	<b>A5B</b>	Industrial development banks
A1A	Administrative buildings	A5C	Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
A1B	Economic planning and policy	A5D	Export promotion
A1C	Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category	A5E	Trade, commerce and distribution
A1D	Police and fire protection	A5F	Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
A1E	Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation	A5G	Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
A1F	Economic surveys, pre-investment studies	A5H	Other insurance and banking
A1G	Cartography, mapping, aerial photography	A5I	Archaeological conservation, game reserves
A1H	Demography and manpower studies		
<b>A2</b>	<b>Development of public utilities</b>	<b>A6</b>	<b>Education</b>
A2A	Power production and distribution	A6A	Primary and secondary education
A2Ai	Electricity	A6B	University and higher technical institutes
A2B	Water supply	A6Bi	Medical
A2C	Communications	A6C	Teacher training
A2D	Transport and navigation	A6Ci	Agricultural training
A2E	Meteorology	A6D	Vocational and technical training
A2F	Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)	A6E	Educational administration
		A6F	Pure or general research
<b>A3</b>	<b>Agriculture, fishing and forestry</b>	A6G	Scientific documentation
A3A	Agricultural production	A6H	Research in the field of education or training
A3B	Service to agriculture	A6I	Subsidiary services
A3C	Forestry	A6J	Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
A3D	Fishing and hunting		
A3E	Conservation and extension	<b>A7</b>	<b>Health</b>
A3F	Agricultural storage	A7A	Hospitals and clinics
A3G	Agricultural construction	A7B	Maternal and child care
A3H	Home economics and nutrition	A7C	Family planning and population-related research
A3I	Land and soil surveys	A7D	Other medical and dental services
		A7E	Public health administration
<b>A4</b>	<b>Industry, mining and construction</b>	A7F	Medical insurance programmes
A4A	Extractive industries	<b>A8</b>	<b>Social infrastructure and social welfare</b>
A4Ai	Petroleum and natural gas	A8A	Housing, urban and rural
A4B	Manufacturing	A8B	Community development and facilities
A4C	Engineering and construction	A8C	Environmental sanitation
A4D	Cottage industry and handicraft	A8D	Labour
A4E	Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment	A8E	Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
A4F	Non-agricultural storage and warehousing	A8F	Environmental protection
A4G	Research in industrial technology	A8G	Flood control
<b>A5</b>	<b>Trade, banking, tourism and other services</b>	A8H	Land settlement
A5A	Agricultural development banks	A8I	Cultural activities
		<b>A9</b>	<b>Multisector</b>
		A9A	River development
		A9B	Regional development projects
		<b>A10</b>	<b>Unspecified</b>

\*\* From January 1990 PABLI will be updated twice monthly.



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# ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

## ANGOLA

**Rehabilitation of the Americo Boavida Hospital.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Estimated total cost ±25 mECU. EDF 19.5 mECU. Italy 5.5 mECU. Works, supply of medical-technical equipment. T.A. for installation, maintenance and training. Works: int. tender (conditional) launched in October 88. Supplies: int. tender only for Italian companies foreseen in *December 89*. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ANG 6004 A7a

## BARBADOS

**Barbados export development.** Resp. Auth.: Barbados Export Promotion Corporation (BEPC). 1.3 mECU. T.A., training, studies, for marketing exports of rum and to develop new rum-based exports. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BAR 6002 A5d

## BELIZE

**Belize City Hospital. Phase I.** Estimated cost 8.6 mECU. Work constructions and supply of equipment. 4th, 5th, and 6th EDF. Project in execution. EDF BEL 6004 A7a

**Community Development Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEL 6002 A6b

## BENIN

**Mono rural development programme.** Development of the rural production. Cofinancing with BAD. EDF 16.5 mECU, BAD 14.4 mECU, local 4.9 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6003 A3a

**Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions.** Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6009 A3d

**Sectoral import programme: industry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministre du Plan. 16 mECU. Supply of industrial inputs, spare parts, raw materials. Direct agreement and int. tenders. \*T.A. Project in execution. *4 Int. tenders launched in October 89*. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6013 A4b

## BOTSWANA

**Manpower development for sustainable resource utilisation.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and University of Botswana. 4.4 mECU. T.A. and training for basic science, ground water exploration and management, environmental resource and sustainable agriculture. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6003 A6

**Support programme to Botswana copper-nickel mining industry.** Resp. Auth.: BCL Ltd (Bamangwato Concessions Ltd). 21.650 mECU. Works, exploration drillings, supply of mining equipment by int. tender. Replacements parts by direct agreement. T.A. to prepare int. tender dossier, evaluation and follow-up of the tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BT SYS 6019 A4a

**Livestock marketing development project.** Resp. Auth.: Botswana Cooperative Union. 2.4 mECU. Provision of infrastructures, transports, T.A. *Date financing November 89*. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6014 A3a

**Water development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Department of Water Affairs. 2 mECU. Serowé waste water sanitation and T.A. to the Department of water affairs. *Project in execution*. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6023 A2b, A8c

## BURUNDI

**Rehabilitation of the R.N. 1-Bujumbura-Rwanda border.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 33 mECU. Rehabilitation works plus the town section up the port of Bujumbura. *Int. tender (conditional) launched in August 89*. *Date financing December 89*. 6th EDF. EDF BU-REG 6305-6317 A2d

**Socio-economic development of the natural region of Mugamba.** Resp. Auth.: CVHA project, OTB, Ministère du Développement Rural, Direction Générale des Routes. 32 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. *Int. tender for works launched in November 89*. 6th EDF. EDF BU 6018 A3a

**Export support service (SAE).** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie, Agence de Promotion des Echanges Extérieurs (SAE). 0.500 mECU. Execution by direct labour. T.A. by COLEACP. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing January 90*. 6th EDF. EDF BU 6023 A5d

## BURKINA FASO

**Hydro-agricultural development in the Douna plain. (Intermediate phase).** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau. 2.1 mECU. Improvement of 400 ha. Construction of quaternary canals, training and monitoring. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BK 6005 A3a

**Rural development programme in the Sissili province.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau, Ministère de l'Agriculture et Elevage, Ministère de la Santé Rurale, Ministère de l'Education nationale. 31.5 mECU. Same programme: see BK 6001. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BK 6004 A3a

**Training programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération, Ministère du Travail, de la Sécurité Social et de la Fonction Publique (pour les CNPAR), Ministère de l'Environnement et du Tourisme, Ministère de la Santé et de l'Action Sociale, le Secrétariat d'Etat à la Culture. 2.770 mECU. Training on rural development, training to support structures for conception, control and execution of development programmes, training for movies directors and promotion of cultural industry. Support, follow-up and evaluation of training programmes. *Project in execution*. 6th EDF. EDF BK 6007 A6c, ci, d

**Strengthening of the Yako-Ouahigouya road.** Estimated cost 15.5 mECU. Works on 70 km. Technical and administrative supervision. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing December or January 90*. 6th EDF. EDF BK 6008 A3a

**90. Int. tender conditional launched in september 89.** 6th EDF. EDF BK 6006 A2d

## BURUNDI

**Socio-economic development of the natural region of Mugamba.** Resp. Auth.: CVHA project, OTB, Ministère du Développement Rural, Direction Générale des Routes. 32 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. *Int. tender for works launched in November 89*. 6th EDF. EDF BU 6018 A3a

**Export support service (SAE).** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Commerce et de l'Industrie, Agence de Promotion des Echanges Extérieurs (SAE). 0.500 mECU. Execution by direct labour. T.A. by COLEACP. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing January 90*. 6th EDF. EDF BU 6023 A5d

**Rural development programme in the Bénoué basin.** Resp. Auth.: Mission d'études pour l'aménagement de la vallée supérieure de la Bénoué (MEAVSB). Total estimated cost 30 mECU, EDF part 25 mECU. Roads network, schools, health centres, rural water supply. Support to crop production and fishery. Irrigated agricultural areas, fight against soil and surface vegetation degradation. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. *Project in execution*. 6th EDF. EDF CM 6002 A3a

**Rural development programme in the Logone and Chari.** Resp. Auth.: Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolidation and extension of existing actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF CM 6013 A3a

## CAMEROON

**Rural development programme in the Logone and Chari.** Resp. Auth.: Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolidation and extension of existing actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF CM 6013 A3a

**Sectoral Import Programme for building materials and equipments.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et Entreprise Publique d'Approvisionnement (E.M.P.A.). 4 mECU. To purchase cement, iron, medical equipment and pavings. 1st int. tender launched end June 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CV 6002 A4c

**Sectoral Import Programme for building materials and equipments.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et Entreprise Publique d'Approvisionnement (E.M.P.A.). 4 mECU. To purchase cement, iron, medical equipment and pavings. 1st int. tender launched end June 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CV 6002 A4c

**Sectoral Import Programme for building materials and equipments.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et Entreprise Publique d'Approvisionnement (E.M.P.A.). 4 mECU. To purchase cement, iron, medical equipment and pavings. 1st int. tender launched end June 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CV 6002 A4c



**CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

**Conservation programme for the ecosystem in the North.** National game and natural reserves. Supervision for protected areas. Monitoring, management. Supply of infrastructures. EDF 25 mECU. Supplies: int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF CA 6002 A3a

**Development programme of the Central and Southern region.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. 20.3 mECU. To strengthen coffee plantations in the villages and the infrastructure, diversifications in ex-cotton zones; rural health and human hydraulics, T.A., studies, following and evaluation. Short-lists already drawn up. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF CA 6005 A3a

**CHAD**

**Rural development priority programme in the concentration zone.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Dév. Rural. 15 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works, infrastructure, education, health. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF CD 6002 A3e

**Strengthening of the health sector in the Sahelian prefectures.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 12 mECU. Supply of essential medicines, training programme and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF CD 6003 A7e

**Rural development programme. Phase 2.** Resp. Auth.: Office National de Dév. Rural (ONDR). 28 mECU. Works, feeder roads, scholar buildings, agricultural equipment, pumps, T.A., follow up and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF CD 6005 A3a

**Strengthening of the operational services for vegetables defence. Fight against locust.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Direction Protection des Végétaux. 0.900 mECU. Supply of equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF.  
EDF CD 5026 A3a

**Development of basic infrastructure.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 3 mECU. N'Djamena. Rehabilitation of 5 administrative buildings. Strengthening of the Chagoua bridge and of Chari river banks in Farcha. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. **Project in execution.** 4th and 5th EDF.  
EDF CD 5017 A1a, A2d

**COMOROS**

**Rural integrated development programme in the north region of Anjouan Island.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production agricole. 11.3 mECU. Improvement of crop production, infrastructure, works by int. tender (conditional) launched end June 89. Supply of equipments, materials and vehicles. T.A., training, evaluation, audit. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF COM 6002 A3a

**CONGO**

**FEDAR (EDF regional action for the Pool and Cuvette).** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 36 mECU. Roads, wells, rural infrastructure, supervision of works, line of credit, monitoring. Road: int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF COB 6002 A3a

**COTE D'IVOIRE**

**Rural oil palm plantations for the 2nd palm plan.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 20.850 mECU. 22,945 ha in rural areas. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF IVC 6001 A3a

**Support to the livestock development.** Continuation and completion of the Marahoué Ranch (T.A., investment, training) and support to "Centre National d'Elevage Ovin". **★11 mECU. Project in execution. Int. tender for supply launched in December 89.** 6th EDF.  
EDF IVC 6003 A3a

**Centre food crops programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture modernization, young settlements. Food crops production marketing improvement. Works, soil improvement, supplies, T.A. studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen **★for financing 1st half 90.** 6th EDF.  
EDF IVC 6009 A3a

**DJIBOUTI**

**Urban development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Urbanisme et du Logement et Ministère de l'Intérieur. 4 mECU. Rehabilitation, construction of waste water controlled network, works and supplies, road assessments to improve **★rain waters. Project in execution.** 6th EDF.  
EDF DI 6002 A2d

**Training programme.** 2.2 mECU. New vocational training actions for adults. T.A. for training centres. Training, scholar-ships and training courses. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF DI 6101 A6d

**EQUATORIAL GUINEA**

**Forestry support programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Eaux et Forêts. 7.3 mECU. Assessment of the forest feeder roads network. Support to the definition and application of governmental measures to preserve forest patrimony. Support to improve timber export control. Project on appraisal. **★Date foreseen for financing February 90.** 6th EDF.  
EDF EG 6001 A3c

**Essential goods import programme.** Resp. Auth.: Présidence de la République.

Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF.  
EDF EG 0000 A1c

**Support to the agricultural development of the Bata district. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.7mECU. Rehabilitation or buildings extension. Supply of equipments. T.A. by Association Française **★des Volontaires. Project in execution.** 6th EDF.  
EDF EG 6004 A3a

**ETHIOPIA**

**North Shewa rural reclamation and development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Total cost 28.5 mECU. EDF 24 mECU, local 4.5 mECU. Soil and water conservation, reforestation, rural infrastructure development and feeder roads. Works, supply of equipment, vehicles, T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF ET 6001 A3a

**Central Shewa peasant agriculture development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost 53.4 mECU. Buildings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, consumer goods, equipments, T.A., studies, credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF ET 6002 A3a

**South Shewa conservation-based rural development.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated cost 26.2 mECU. Buildings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, consumer goods, training, T.A., micro-projects, credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF ET 6005 A3a

**Coffee improvement programme III.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development. 38.1 mECU. Construction and civil works, supply of equipments, vehicles and agric. inputs, aerial photography, training and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF 6003 A3a

**Lake fisheries project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery Dept. 7.5 mECU. Provision of inputs to fishermen, development of cooperatives, establishment of marketing organisation and infrastructure, training, research and fingerling production centers. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.  
EDF ET 6008 A3d

**Aid for refugees. Contribution to the UNHCR and to MSF. Transport sector, water sector, health sector. Project on appraisal.** 8.1 mECU. 6th EDF.  
EDF ET 6104 A8

**Sectoral import programme for the agricultural sector. Phase II. Provision of agricultural inputs (fertilizer and machinery), steel, works and T.A. Spares, chemicals, raw materials for the industrial sectors.** 24 mECU. 2 int. tenders launched in November 89 (conditional). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing January 90. 6th EDF.  
EDF ET 6009 A3a



**FIJI**

**Coconut rehabilitation and improvement programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Primary Industries. Estimated total cost 1.350 mECU. EDF 0.900 mECU, local 0.450 mECU. Clearing of 300 ha of land, establishing of a hybrid seed garden (150 ha) develop a research centre. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF 6005 A3a

**GAMBIA**

**Development support for the "Upper River Division".** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. 7 mECU. Rehabilitation and improvement of feeder roads, rebuilding and equipment of 6 health centres, rehabilitation of 18 primary schools and 2 vocational training craft centres, rehabilitation of 20 new wells. Credit lines. Works by acc. tenders, supplies by int. tenders. T.A. Int. tender for two ferries launched in July 89. Project in execution. **3rd int. tender launched in November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF GM 6004 A3a

**GHANA**

**Accra Plains Livestock Development Project (APLDP).** Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. Provision of veterinary and animal husbandry extension services, including construction of cattle treatment centres, water points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6006 A3a

**Twifo oil palm development. Maintenance aid 1988-1991.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (M.F.E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6007 A3a

**Sectoral import programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP). 20.5 mECU. 1st phase: supply of 25 000 t of fertilizers and vehicles. 1st int. tender (conditional) launched in August 88. 2nd int. tender for 30 000 t fertilizers **launched in August 89.** Hard currency allowance (11.5 mECU) for import. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6010 A3a

**GUINEA**

**Rural development programme in Upper-Guinea.** Resp. Auth.: Coordination team composed by representation from: Ministère du Plan et de la Coopération internationale, Ministère des Finances, Secrétariat d'Etat à la Décentralisation, Ministère du Dév. Rural, 30 mECU. To modernise agricultural systems and to improve the way of living. Development of the crop production, infrastructure (roads, social, rural hydraulics), micro-projects, lines of credit, T.A. and training. Supplies: int. tender launched in February

88 and July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GUI 6002 A3a

**Rural development programme in Maritime-Guinea.** Resp. Auth.: Coordination team (see EDF GUI 6002). 40 mECU. Crop production and fishery, road network, social infrastructure, rural hydraulics, micro-projects, lines of credit, research actions, vulgarisation, T.A. and training. Supplies: 2 int. tenders launched in March 88. Int. tender for wells and pumps launched in October 88. 1 int. tender for equipment and vehicles launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. FED GUI 6001 A3a

**General import programme.** Resp. Auth.: Banque Centrale de la République de Guinée (B.C.R.G.). 12.5 mECU. Hard currency prices CIF covered by the project. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GUI 6009 A1c

**Friguia alumina plant rehabilitation project.** Resp. Auth.: Société Friguia. EDF 35 mECU, EIB 13 mECU, Friguia 30.4 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, feeder road construction. T.A. for S.M.E. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GUI-SYS 6010 A4a

**T.A. and supplementary equipment for the "Ecole Nationale des Arts et Métiers" (ENAM), Conakry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. 5.5 mECU. Renovation works by acc. tender. Equipements by int. tender. T.A. and training. **Date financing December 89.** 6th EDF. EDF GUI 6006 A6b

**GUINEA BISSAU**

**Minor bridges.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement Social. Estimated total cost 3.7 mECU. Construction of 4 bridges to open four agricultural regions. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF GUB 5011 A2d

**Rural development programme.** 23.8 mECU. Improvement of the food and fishery production, line of credit, micro-projects, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GUB 6001 A3a

**General import programme.** Resp. Auth.: Unité de Gestion de Balance de Paiement auprès de la Banque Nationale. 6 mECU. Hard currencies allowance programme. Italy: 2 mECU to supply fuel and lubricants to the Bissau Power Plant during 1 year. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF GUB 6005 A1c

**GUYANA**

**Economic infrastructure sector support programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 15 mECU. Rehabilitation of sea defences, quarries, transport, water supplies. Supply of equipment, training. 28 int. tenders

for supplies launched in February and April 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GUA 6003 A2b, d

**Sysmin-Rehabilitation of the Bauxite Industry.** Resp. Auth.: Guymine. EDF part 31.5 mECU. Supply of equipments, spare parts, T.A. at Linden and Kwakani. Project in execution. **3 int. tenders launched in October 89.** 5th EDF. EDF SYS GUA 5024 A4a

**JAMAICA**

**Rural water supplies. Phase I.** Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission. 6.7 mECU. Extension, upgrading of five existing water supply schemes: South Manchester, Elderslie/Niagara, Castleton, South Chapleton. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF JM 6003 A2b

**Montego Bay airport. Charter terminal.** Resp. Auth.: Airports Authority of Jamaica. 7.1 mECU. Works and supply of equipments. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF JM 6004 A2d

**Negril and Ocho Rios sewerage schemes.** Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission. 25 mECU. Negril: 17 km of trunk sewers, 13 pump stations and 2 treatment plants. Ocho Rios: 5 km of sewers, 6 pump stations, 1 treatment plant and deep sea out-fall. T.A. for supervision. Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF JM A8bc

**KENYA**

**Minor roads rehabilitation and maintenance programme.** Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works by direct labour. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF. EDF KE 6002 A2d

**Agricultural research programme.** 20 mECU. Soil and water management research. Soil fertility and plant nutrition. Civil works and libraries. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF KE 6003 A3e

**Development of commerce and industry.** Estimated cost 5 mECU. Export promotion and marketing, trade development promotion and support to informal sector and small scale industries. Studies, short-lists already drawn up. Project stage: identification. 6th EDF. EDF KE 6004 A5de

**Cereal sector reform programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Agriculture and Supplies and Marketing and NCPB. National Cereals and Produce Board. 65 mECU. T.A., studies, training. Storage and rolling stock, sectoral import programme purchase of agricultural inputs, short and long-term T.A., cooperatives and reserve funds. Studies, T.A. and training: short-lists already drawn-up. Works by int. tender and acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF KE 6008 A3a



**ASAL livestock development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Livestock Development. 9 mECU. Works by restr. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF KE 6009 A3a

**Mara Conservation Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. 1.35 mECU. EDF part. Strengthening of the management and infrastructure of the Mara reserve. Education and training. **Date financing October 89.** 6th EDF. EDF KE 6015 A5i

**Special debt programme.** Resp. Auth.: Director of External Resources with representative from Ministry of Finance, Commerce, Central Bank of Kenya, the Delegate of the Commission. 2nd phase of the Agricultural Sector Import Programme (ASIP). 7 mECU. Supply of agricultural inputs by int. tender. \*T.A. and evaluation. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF KE 6019 A3a

**Strengthening of research resources of the national museums of Kenya.** Resp. Auth.: NMK Directorate. 3 mECU. Construction, transport, equipment, T.A., training and research links with national, regional and \*international organizations. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF KE 6021 A6f

**LESOTHO**

**Manpower development project to support Lesotho's natural resources sector.** Resp. Auth.: National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS). Ministry of Planning Economic and Manpower Development. 7.7 mECU. Construction of schools, class-rooms, laboratories, supply of T.A., scholar-ships and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF LSO 6007 A6b

**Queen Elizabeth II Hospital: improvement and upgrading.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works. 4.9 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supply by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 4th and 6th EDF. EDF LSO 6012 A7a

**LIBERIA**

**Bong Mining Company. Rehabilitation project.** Resp. Auth.: Government and BMC. 49.3 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, shovels, conveyor belts, dumpers, locomotives, spare parts. 2 int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF LBR/SYS 0000 A4a

**South-East development programme.** Estimated cost 27 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF LBR 6002 A3a

**Rural water supply. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs. 2.900 mECU. Drilling works by acc. tender. Supply of hand pumps and spare \*parts. T.A. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF LBR 6011 A2b

**MADAGASCAR**

**Maize development programme in the Middle West.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Agricole. 9.5 mECU. Building of a nursery and farmers training. Works, supplies, T.A. evaluation and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MAG 6006 A3a

**Housing and health assistance for urban population.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé et Travaux Publics. 5.5 mECU. Supply of medicines and platforms for housing. Supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MAG 6009 A7, A8a

**MALAWI**

**Strategic fuel reserve.** Resp. Auth.: Office of the President and Cabinet. Contingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU. Construction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. Associated infrastructure and equipment. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF MAI 5020 A2a

**Rural health programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Community Services (MOH and MOCS). 9.3 mECU. Construction of an hospital, two health centres supply of equipments, T.A. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A.: short-list drawn up. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MAI 6009 A7a, e

**Programme for industrial products imports.** 12.5 mECU. Supply of industrial equipment, raw materials and spare parts. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MAI 6019 A1c

**Nkhata Bay-Dwangwa road.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Road construction. Estimated cost 31.110 mECU. EDF part 15.965 mECU, Germany (KFW) 15.145 mECU. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF MAI 6024 A2d

**Fertiliser buffer stock expansion.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 13.950 mECU. Purchase of 20 000 mt of fertilizer by int. tender. Extension of existing T.A. **Date for financing December 89.** 6th EDF. EDF MAI 6005 A3a

**MALI**

**Rice-growing intensification programme in the large irrigated areas of "Office du Niger" and "Opération Riz Segou".** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 65 mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, roads. Supply of equipment for maintenance and for agriculture, study, T.A., training and experimentation. Study: short-list done. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF MLI 6004 A3a

**Food security programme in the 5th region.** Resp. Auth.: Gouverneur de la région. 24 mECU. Soil and ground water resources, rehabilitation of Bamako. Mopti road. Works, supplies, supervision, study, T.A.

training. Supplies: int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF MLI 6005 A2b, d

**MAURITANIA**

**Aioun El Atrouss hospital.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.050 mECU. Renovation and supply of equipment for 3 buildings. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF MAU 5012 A7a

**Rehabilitation of Nouakchott National Hospital.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 4 mECU. Renovation and upgrading for building, supply of medical-technical and surgical equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF MAU 6003 A7a

**Support programme for the development of the Gorgol region (PDRG).** Estimated cost 35 mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, support to the traditional crop, regeneration of the natural habitats, rural infrastructure, sanitation of Kaedi. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MAU 6007 A3a

**General import programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances. Banque Centrale de Mauritanie (BCM). 7 mECU. Hard currency allowance for essential goods imports. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF MAU 6008 A1c

**Drinking water supply of Aioun El Atrouss.** Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Hydraulique. 2.6 mECU. Production and water distribution. Managers training. Works, T.A. and \*training. Project on appraisal. **Works: int. tender launched in October 89.** **Date foreseen for financing February 90.** 5th EDF. EDF MAU 5022 A2b

**MAURITIUS**

**Programme to diversify productive sectors to improve, employment prospects (1st part: industry).** 10 mECU. Actions to strengthen export and industry promotion institutions, actions to incite development of small enterprises. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MAS 6002 A5e

**Programme to diversify productive sectors (2nd part: agriculture).** Resp. Auth.: to purchase equipments: Ministère des Finances. Tender board. 8 mECU. Works, rural development, supplies, T.A. and training. \*Project in execution. **Int. tender launched in November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF MAS 6006 A3a

**MOZAMBIQUE**

**Rural rehabilitation in the Inhambane Province.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Direction Nationale du Développe-



ment Rural (DNDR). 4.5 mECU. Dry and irrigated agriculture, marketing for rural inputs and crop production, rural hydraulics, training and education. Works, supply of agricultural equipments, T.A. Works: acc. tender or direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MOZ 6019 A3a

**Second import programme.** Resp. Auth.: UCPI (Unité de Coordination des Programmes d'Importation et Délégation de la Commission. 30 mECU. Sectors: rural, fishery, transports and industry. Supply of seeds, equipments, row materials, lorries, spare parts, T.A. audit and valuation. Int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MOZ 6025 A1c

**Rural telecommunications.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transports and Communications. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Supply of radio and telephone equipment. Technical study for project appraisal to be done: short list drawn up. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF MOZ 6021 A2c

**Integrated development programme of Cabodelgado.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce. AGRICOM. 8 mECU. EDF. 5 mECU, local 3 mECU. Support to ±50 000 people in the districts of Mocimboa, Praia and Mueda. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF MOZ 6022 A3a

**Displaced persons. Assistance programme.** Contribution to different NGO's for institutional support, health activities, water supplies agriculture. UNDRP, CARE, MSF (H, F, B), Marins SF, Eduardo Mondlane Stichting Zambesia, Oxfam Belgique, World Vision Zambesia, Cooperation and Development. 12.743 mECU. Date financing November 89. 6th EDF. EDF MOZ 6104 A8

## NIGER

**Rice-growing in the river valley.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 63.6 mECU. Cultivation of 1,800 ha, electrification, feeder roads, T.A. for management. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDR NIR 6001 A3a

**Small irrigation programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 21.560 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Tarka down valley, irrigation, boreholes and wells. Feeder roads, environmental protection, T.A. Works and supplies. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF NIR 6002 A3a

**Mining research: gold and coal.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines et de l'Energie. 12.450 mECU. Gold: photogeological and photomorphological study on existing aerial photos. Revision of all available data. Strategic prospecting. Site exploration and pilot plant. Coal: study and building of a washing plant. Study on the coal field of Anou Araren-Solomi. T.A. and training. Drillings by int. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF-SYS-NIR 6011 A4a

**Training programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministères de l'Education, Commerce, Culture, Plan, Agriculture. 4.366 mECU. Three priority sectors: rural development, business development, cultural development. Supply of equipments, T.A. and scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF NIR 6101 A6b, c, i

## NIGERIA

**Oil Palm Belt Rural Development Programme (OPBP).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Rural Development. 68.840 mECU. Flood protection and drainage works in the Niger Delta. — 20 000 ha. Rural infrastructures, micro-projects, T.A., training, research, supervision of works, management. **Project in execution.** **Works: int. tender launched in October 89.** 6th EDF. EDF UNI 6001 A3a

**North East Arid Zone development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 35 mECU. Increase of rural production, livestock development, afforestation and environment control, rural infrastructure development (health, education), commercial services (inputs, credit and marketing system), manpower development, training and research. Works: irrigation, drainage, buildings, supply of seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, dozers, drilling rigs, T.A., training, research. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF UNI 6002 A3a

**Research and Training programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Training Support Unit (TSU). 30 mECU. Scholarships, seminars, T.A. Teacher training, cooperation between Nigerian Training Institutions and European Training Institutions, exchanges between nigerian and european research institutions. Purchase of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF UNI 6004 A6a, b, c, d, e, f

**Rural health facilities project.** Resp. Auth.: Federal Ministry of Health. 6.100 mECU. Construction of premises and upgrading existing ones. Building and furnishing of maintenance workshops. Supply of equipments, management, supervision and training. Works by acc. tenders. Supplies by int. tenders. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF UNI 5018 A7a

**Desertification control and environmental protection programme in Sokoto.** Resp. Auth.: Sokoto Environmental Programme (SEP). Direct responsibility of the Office of the Governor. 30.6 mECU. Community awareness, mobilisation and development campaign. Afforestation actions, improvement of range management and livestock development. Rehabilitation of a small-scale irrigation, training and applied research. Works: buildings, nurseries, water points, irrigation networks. Supply of vehicles, motorcycles, generators, media equipments, T.A. Works by acc. tenders. Supplies by int. tenders. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF UNI 6003 A3a

**Sectoral import programme.** 10 mECU. Supply of pumps, agricultural inputs, spare parts for tractors and metal frame for warehouses. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF UNI 6008 A3a

**"Middle belt" programme.** Resp. Auth.: States of Kwara and Niger, Executive Committees. Estimated total cost 38.662 mECU. EDF 33 mECU, local 5,662 mECU. Education, health, social infrastructure. Renovation works, rehabilitation, supply of equipments, T.A., training and evaluation. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF UNI 6007 Aabe

## PAPUA NEW GUINEA

**Smallholder Cocoa and Coconut Rehabilitation Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Dept. for Agriculture and Livestock. 4.7 mECU. Feeder roads, housing, supply of vehicles, boats, motorcycles, equipments, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF PNG 6005 A3a

**Human resources development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Department of Personnel Management. 1.850 mECU. Training programmes all levels in the country and abroad. Sectors: rural development and agriculture, harbours, mineral resources, management. **Date financing October 89.** 6th EDF. EDF PNG 6008 A6bd

## RWANDA

**Food strategy support programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 51 mECU. Development of the rural activity, monitoring, training, maintaining of natural environment stability. Infrastructures, supply of agricultural inputs, vehicles, T.A. studies and training. **Int. tender launched in September 89.** Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF RW 6001 A3a

## ST. CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS

**Development of social infrastructure.** Resp. Auth.: Departments of Public Works, Nevis Water Department. 2.750 mECU. Construction of 3 new primary schools, supply of equipment, improvement of the water supply system in the northern half of Nevis. Int. tender for supplies launched in September 89. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF SCN 6001 A6a, A2b

## ST. LUCIA

**Rural development. Social Infrastructure.** Resp. Auth.: Central Planning Unit. 3.645 mECU. Works and supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SLU 6002 A3a



## SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE

**Riberia Peixe rural development.** Resp. auth.: Ministère de la Coopération. Development of agricultural output (palm oil) and industrial exploitation. Estimated total cost: 6.79 mECU as follows: EDF 4.00 mECU, EIB 2.00 mECU and local 0.791 mECU. T.A., works, training and supplies. T.A.: Short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF STP 6001 A3a

## SENEGAL

**Consolidation of the livestock development programme.** Resp. Auth.: SOD-ESP. Estimated cost 1.6 mECU. Study under way by Bessel Ass. (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF SE A3a

## SEYCHELLES

**Rural development project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Nat. Dev. 2.922 mECU. Support to small farms, research, soil improvement. Cofinancing with Italy. Works, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SEY 6004 A3a

## SIERRA LEONE

**North Western artisanal fisheries and community development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Agriculture and Natural Resources (Fisheries Division). 6 mECU. Infrastructures, supply of equipments, line of credit. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SL 6004 A3d

**Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications network. Phase 2.** 7.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SL 6006 A2c

**Tourism development programme.** Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Tourism and supply of equipment. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF SL 5026 A5c

## SOLOMON ISLANDS

**Development of human resources in the rural sector.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SOL 6003 A3a

**Rural transport project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport, Works and Utilities (MTWU). 1.5 mECU. Works and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 90. 6th EDF. EDF SOL 6008 A2d

## SOMALIA

**Bardheera Dam.** Resp. Auth.: Bardheera Dam Authority (BDA). 600 mECU. (Esti-

mated) Dam Project 500 mECU. Powerline to Mogadishu 100 mECU. Funding: EDF, Italy, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Abu-Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, Isl. Dev. Bank. Local. Power and river regulation for agricultural development. Construction of a concrete gravity dam with hydro-power station, associated infrastructure and electrical transmission lines. The dam will provide water, flood protection and power for up to 223 000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Civil works: first int. tender launched in 1984. Transmission lines int. tender in 1989. Equipment: powerhouse main equipment and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 1989. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int. tender in 1989. Int. tender with prequalification launched in February 86 for hydraulic tests. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SO 5003 A2a

**Satellite telecommunication links with Europe and the Gulf States.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. 5 mECU. Int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SO 6003 A2c

**Sectoral Import Programme (SIP).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 15 mECU. Provision of a hard currency facility to the public and private sectors for imports: agriculture, livestock, fisheries, industry and transport. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SO 6006 A1c

**Sectoral import programme: petroleum products.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 16 mECU. Supply of refined oil products and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SO 6009 A4ai

**Old Mogadishu port rehabilitation.** Resp. Auth.: Somali Port Authority (SPA). 14.5 mECU. Works by int. tender. T.A. and supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 89. 6th EDF. EDF SO 6005 A2d

## SUDAN

**Sudan Railways Support Programme (SRSP).** Resp. Auth.: Sudan Railways Corporation. 19 mECU. Reconstruction of five major and 18 minor bridges and 7 culverts in the line Kosti-Babanaousa. Supply of materials, tools and replacement part, for the most immediate repairs and maintenance of the track Khartoum-Port Sudan and those required for a direct improvement of telecommunications. Works and supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF SU 6011 A2d

**Post Flood Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme (PFRRP).** Resp. Auth.: agricultural part: Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Transport infrastructure: Roads and Bridge Public Corporation (RBPC) and Sudan Railways Corporation. 15 mECU. Agricultural sector: supply of spare parts for repair and replacement of 2 500 pumps. Int. tender and direct agreement. Supply of maintenance parts for 100 trucks (6 t): by int. tender. Supply of 100 pumps by int. tender. T.A. for

repair, control and credit allowances. Transport sector: bridge construction (5x25 m) at Geneina, repair and work supervision. Bridge by acc. tender. Supplies for railways, gabions, pipes by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SU 6020 A2d

## SURINAME

**New Nickerie Secondary School.** Estimated cost 1.4 mECU. Construction and supply of equipment. Int. tender for works (conditional) foreseen in the 2nd half 89. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF SUR 5014 A6a

**3rd line of credit to the Agricultural Development Bank.** Resp. Auth.: Landbouwbank. 10.550 mECU. To finance development oriented loans for capital investments in small and medium sized enterprises. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF SUR A5a

## SWAZILAND

**Rural water supplies programme.** Ministry of Natural Resources. 2.6 mECU. Works and supply of equipment for village drinking water supply scheme. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6008 A3a

**Human resources development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 8 mECU. Works and supply of educational equipment, T.A. and training. Int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6010 A6a, b

**Rural dam rehabilitation programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4mECU. Works and supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6012 A3a

## TANZANIA

**Agricultural sector support programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Plan-ning. 94 mECU. Measures to improve food security, support for coffee production and processing, assistance to co-operative unions, repair and maintenance of vehicles and tractors, feeder road maintenance and assistance to institutions implementing the programme. Supplies by int. tender/restr. \*tender or direct agreement. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6001 A3a

**Incentive goods production programme.** 6 mECU. Provision of imported raw materials and other inputs, spare parts, bicycles. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6003 A4b

**Sectoral Import Programme.** Resp. Auth.: Government of Tanzania. 24.5 mECU. Allocation of currencies to import raw materials and spareparts for agriculture, transport and the production of basic consumer goods.



Purchase of trucks spareparts for the transport sector. Int. tender launched in April 89. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TA 6010 A1c

**Secondary roads improvement project.** Estimated cost 20 mECU. Repair and rehabilitation works on Songea-Mbinga and Iboma-Mlangali-Madaba secondary roads to improve transport of agricultural produce. Roads and bridges. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6007 A2d

**Conservation of historical buildings.** 0.700 mECU Restoration works. Forts Bagamoyo and Zanzibar. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6015 A5i

## TOGO

**Support to the draught animals cultivation.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. EDF 5.47 mECU. Extension of the Adélé ranch, introduction of new techniques, line of credit. Works: feeder roads, bridges, wells, housing. Supply of vehicles, equipments, veterinary products, T.A. and training, research. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TO 6005 A3a

**Rural development programme in Bassar.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural. EDF 10.3 mECU. Rural intensification and diversification, soil protection, improvement of infrastructure, support to the small-farmer association, marketing improvement. Works, studies, research, evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TO 6006 A3a

**Support programme to the phosphate mining industry.** Resp. Auth.: Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP). 15.7 mECU. Research actions on cadmium problems. Purchase of drying machines and shovels. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF TO-SYS 6015 A4a

## TONGA

**Vava'u Airport Development Project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation. 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

**Integrated regional development study for Vava'u.** Short-list done. Project stage identification. EDF TG A3a

## TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

**Sectoral import programme: industry.** 12 mECU. Allocation of currencies to import raw materials and intermediate products. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF TR 6002 A4b

## UGANDA

**Special programme debt.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning. Bank of Uganda. Delegation of the Commission. 15 mECU. Provision of hard currency to import agricultural inputs, spare parts, vehicles, printing equipment, building materials. Supplies by acc. tenders and int. tenders. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF UG 6016 A1c

**Farming systems support programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 13 mECU. Purchase of farming inputs, and vehicles, machinery and research equipment. Training and T.A. including management support, studies and mid-term evaluation. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing January 90. 6th EDF. EDF UG 6007 A3a

## WESTERN SAMOA

**Afulilo hydro power project.** Estimated total cost 18 mECU. EDF part 7.5 mECU. Construction of a dam, reservoir, penstock, 4 MW power station, 40 km transmission lines, T.A. and training. Cofinancing under discussion with EIB, IDA and Asian Dev. Bank. Int. tender launched in March 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF WSO 6001 A2a

## ZAIRE

**Kivu programme.** 40 mECU. Action for crops (coffee, corn, palm-tree, rice) environment (Parc de la Virunga), lines of credit. 1st int. tender launched in April 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6002 A3a

**Kinshasa hinterland programme.** APEK 25 mECU. To improve crop production. 1st int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6003 A3a

**Sectoral import programme.** Resp. Auth.: Banque du Zaïre. Estimated cost 30 mECU. To import spare parts, raw materials and intermediary inputs for industry and agroindustry sectors. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6016 A1c

**Rehabilitation programme of SNCZ.** 7.5 mECU. Supply of raw materials, and spares to replace railways system. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6017 A4a

## ZAMBIA

**Rehabilitation of 3 grain silos.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. NAMBOARD. 9.6 mECU. Works, supplies and work supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 89. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6007 A3f

**ZAMSTEP. Zambia Mathematics and Science Education Project.** 3.5 mECU. Supplies, training and management. T.A.: Short-list done for restr. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6002 A6a

**Smallholder development in copper belt province.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12 mECU. Basic infrastructure by acc. tender. Supply of vehicles and materials by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6004 A3a

**Smallholder development in central province.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12.35 mECU. Basic infrastructure and social facilities. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6005 A3a

**Import programme and special debt programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Bank of Zambia, Export Board, EEC Delegation. 20 mECU. Purchase of inputs, raw materials, spare parts and equipments for productive sectors, agriculture, health and transports. T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6016 A1c

## ZIMBABWE

**Land Use Project for Kanyati and Gatshe-Gatshe Communal Lands.** 3 mECU. Cultivation and development and proper utilisation of wildlife potential. Works, supply of vehicles and rural equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6004 A3a

**Small scale irrigation programme.** Resp. Auth.: Agritex Irrigation Division. 14 mECU. Irrigation works over 700 ha. Supply of vehicles and equipments. T.A., training, studies. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6010 A3e

**Tourism development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. 3.6 mECU. EDF part. T.A. studies, marketing. **Date financing October 89.** 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6008 A5c

**Human resources development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of National Scholarships. 3.4 mECU. T.A. and scholarships, awards, seminars. **Date financing October 89.** 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6020 A6

## Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

### ANGUILLA

**Anguilla road improvement.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Communication, Works and Public Utilities. Estimated total cost 2.710 mECU. EDF 2.440 mECU, local 0.270 mECU.



Improvement of 11 road sections. 7.9 km. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF AG 6001 A2d

#### NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

**Tourism development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Development Cooperation. 18.100 mECU. Programme for 5 islands. Optimal use of tourism potential. T.A., training, promotion and investments in tourism infrastructures. Works, supplies, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF NEA 6007 A5c

**Business development scheme.** 1.5 mECU. T.A. for marketing, management, product, company and strategy development. ★T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing February 90.* 6th EDF. EDF NEA 6013 A5c

#### FRENCH POLYNESIA

**HV transmission lines. TEP 2.** Resp. Auth.: TEP (Société de Transport). 1.650 mECU. Erection of a HV transmission line 90 KV. Supply of cables and electrical equipment. ★*Date financing November 89.* 6th EDF. EDF POF 6001 A2ai

**Deep-sea fishing fleet.** EDF part 1.420 mECU. Purchase of 3 fishing boat for tuna. 24 m. Training and T.A. Purchase by int. tender. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing January 90.* 6th EDF. EDF POF 6002 A3d

#### NEW CALEDONIA

**Rural development programme.** Resp. Auth.: Administration Territoriale. 2.078 mECU. Poupou and Ouégoa water supply. Aquaculture, sea-shrimps, artisanal fishery. ★Works and supplies. *Date financing November 89.* 6th EDF. EDF NC 6004 A2b, A3d

**Human resources development.** Resp. Auth.: Administration Territoriale. 1.715 mECU. Stock-farming training, T.A. for artisanal fishery, training, management, T.A. *Date financing October 89.* EDF NV 6101 A6ci

#### WALLIS AND FUTUNA

**Electrification of Futuna.** Resp. Auth.: Administration Supérieure de Wallis et Futuna. 1.1 mECU. Supply of cables and pylons for L.T. and M.T. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF WF 6001 A2a

#### BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

**Improvement and extension of the water supply system.** Resp. Auth.: Water

and Sewerage Department. EDF 2 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supply of transmission and distribution mains, reservoirs and infiltration trenches with pumps. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF VI 6002 A2b

#### CAYMAN ISLANDS

**Community college.** Works and supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CI 6001 A6d

#### ST. HELENA

**Sea defences.** Resp. Auth.: Public Works and Services Dept. 3 mECU. 2.5 mECU EDF, 0.500 mECU UK. To protect shore facilities at James and Rupert's Bay. Rehabilitation and reinforcement of existing sea walls. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF SH A8g

## Regional Projects

#### GUINEA — GUINEA BISSAU — SENEGAL — MAURITANIA — NIGER — MALI

**Soil development of the versant basin type in Guinea: Fouta Djallon and Niger Upper Basin.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère Guinéen de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (MARA), Direction Générale des Forêts. Estimated total cost 37.5 mECU. EDF 31.5 mECU, Italy 6 mECU. Anti-erosion works, technical and social infrastructure with local NGO's and population. Preparatory studies for programme extension, aerial survey and mapping. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6137 A3a

#### BURKINA — NIGER

**Timber development in the future reservoir of the Komienga Dam.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement du Burkina. EDF 5.9 mECU. Timber trees recuperation and processing to obtain building and service timber, fuel-wood, charcoal for their commercialisation. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6102 A3c

#### BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

**Regional road Godomey Bohicon.** 15 mECU. Maintenance for Cotonou to Niamey and Ouagadougou on the Godomey Bohicon part. Supervision of works: short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6158 A2d

#### INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES

**Foreign trade statistics.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances-Comores. 2.200 mECU. Setting up of a computerized system. Supply of equipments, T.A. ★training and evaluation. *Project in execution.* 6th EDF. EDF REG 6506 A5e

**Assistance to training, research and T.A.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Finances, Mauritius. 1.100 mECU. Training, seminars, studies. T.A. to the C.O.I. (Commission Océan Indien). *Project in execution.* 6th EDF. EDF REG 6507 A6cfhj

**Assistance to the cardiology regional centres.** Resp. Auth.: COI and Ministry of Health in Mauritius. 1 mECU. To purchase by int. tender medical equipment. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing February 90.* 6th EDF. EDF REG A7a

**Regional programme of meteorological cooperation concerning tropical hurricanes.** Resp. Auth.: Madagascar as Regional Authorizing Officer. 5 mECU. Purchase of specialised equipment by int. tender. T.A. and training. *Date financing December 89.* 6th EDF. EDF REG 6508 A2e

#### PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES

**Regional agriculture development programme.** 6.8 mECU. Ten pilot project. T.A. works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6704 A3a

**Regional telecommunications.** Resp. Auth.: SPEC. 5.550 mECU. Coastal radio stations, earth satellite stations, T.A., training. Equipments by int. tender. Works by int. tender and direct agreement. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6705 A2c

**Regional tourism development programme. Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: SPEC and TCSP. Development of tourism and tourism related sectors of the Pacific ACP States and OCTs. Estimated total cost 7.4 mECU. Works: implementation of programme components, supply of films, promotion and teaching materials, T.A., support for TCSP and project. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6027 A5c

#### MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CILSS

**Regional programme to promote the use of butane gas.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS 8.260 mECU. To substitute wood and charcoal. Actions to inform, to make aware, to promote LPG (Liquid Petrol Gas). Financial aid to reduce costs. Stocks for gas cylinders (3 and 6 kg). Gas fund in each country. Support to improve ovens and supporting plates, purchase of rail tanks, T.A. Rail tanks by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6106 A3a

**Regional programme for soil protection and reforestation.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de la Pêche du Cap Vert. 4.250 mECU. Works, training, supply of



equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6145 A3e

**Information and training programme on environment.** Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secrétariat. 10 mECU. Supply of pedagogical equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6147 A8f

#### MEMBER COUNTRIES OF U.A.P.T.

**Satellite telecommunications project.** Resp. Auth.: U.A.P.T. Secretariat in Brazzaville, R.P.C. Parametric study under way by national organisations of I, UK, F and D. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5307 A2c

#### CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ANGOLA — ZAMBIA — RWANDA — COMOROS

**Development of the regional cultural cooperation in the Bantu world.** Resp. Auth.: CICIBA (Gabon). 5.6 mECU. Actions to collect and use knowledge and know-how, cooperation pilot projects with cultural specialists, support actions to artists and shows. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6079 A8i

#### EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

**Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania.** Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 2.0 mECU. Widening of the capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5311 A6b

**Institutional support to Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI).** Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, Tanzania. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Extension of ESAMI installations plus provision of library, audio visual and printing equipment and improvement of kitchen and laundry facilities. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6311 A6b

#### IGADD COUNTRIES

**T.A. for a fight against desertification strategy.** Resp. Auth.: IGADD. Supply of specialised T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5361 A3a

#### BURUNDI — RWANDA — ZAIRE

**Institutional support to the: "Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique (IRAZ) at Gitega, Burundi.** Resp. Auth.: IRAZ and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Burundi. EDF part 2.430 mECU. Building of administrative and research complex. \*Works by int. tender foreseen end 89. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. EDF REG 6318 A1a

#### BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

**Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare Burundi border.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

**Central Corridor-Tanzania-Bukombe-Isaka road.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 35 mECU. Asphalt covering of -130 km. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6309 (TA....) A2d

**Block trains (Tanzania Railways Corporation, TRG).** Resp. Auth.: TRC. 28 mECU. Provision of main line and shunting locomotives and wagons. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing January 90.** 6th EDF. EDF REG 6313 (TA....) A2d

**Northern corridor alternative. Kericho-Isebania road Kenya.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communication, Kenya. 13 mECU. Rehabilitation of bitumized road of 170 km in the Victoria lake region. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6315 (KE) A2d

**Improvement of Burundi access to the central corridor.** Resp. Auth.: National Authority Officer, Burundi. 10 mECU. Road construction. First part: 27 km. Muyinga-Tanzania border. Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG A6317

#### SOMALIA — DJIBOUTI

**Djibouti-Zeila (Somalia) road.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère and Ministry of Public Works. Estimated cost 28 mECU. Construction of a road between Djibouti town and Zeila town in Somalia. Int. tender (conditional) launched in May 89. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing December 89.** 6th EDF. EDF REG 6301 A2d

#### WEST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

**Priority action programme to improve postharvest utilization of artisanal fish production.** Resp. Auth.: National Authorising Officer from Sierra Leone as Regional Authority Officer. 0.895 mECU. Grass-root activities involving fish processors of several countries and region, studies on marketing and credit and training and experimental work for fish quality improvement. T.A. by CEASM \* (NGO-F). **Date financing October 89.** 6th EDF. EDF REG 6126 A3g

**Pan African Rinderpest Campaign (PARC). Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: IBAR. 7.500 mECU. Vaccination campaigns provisions of drugs and vaccine support to the management, marketing and increase animal production. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing January 90.** 6th EDF. EDF REG 5007 A3a

#### SADCC

**Maseru Container Terminal.** Resp. Auth.: Government of Lesotho and SADCC. 1.350 mECU. Construction of container terminal and supply of containers, handling equipment. Study required: detailed design of works. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5421 A2d

**Mananga: agricultural management training.** Resp. Auth.: Mananga Agricultural Management Centre (MAMC). 1.6 mECU. Supply of T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6425 A6ci

#### ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE — SADCC

**Training of railways staff.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce. Estimated cost 7.3 mECU. Training of Inhambane school and in the Northern regional centres, Southern and Central. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6409 A6d

#### SADCC — MOZAMBIQUE

**Beira-Machipande road.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. Maputo 5 mECU. Repair works. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6413 (MOZ....) A2d

**Limpopo line rehabilitation.** Resp. Auth.: Mozambique Ministry of Transport. EDF part estimated 15 mECU. Community contribution to an overall rehabilitation programme for the Limpopo railway line. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6421 A2d

#### ASECNA

**Regional air safety training schools at Douala and Niamey.** Resp. Auth.: ASECNA. 7 mECU. Building and equipping of schools in Douala and Niamey. Works and equipments by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6057 A6d

#### CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES AND MONTSERRAT

**West Indies university.** Resp. Auth.: UWI and National Authorising Officers. 6.2 mECU. Renovation and rehabilitation works, supply of technical and scientific equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6601 A6b

**Bequia airport.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Planning. St. Vincent and Grenadines. 18.5 mECU. Airport construction. Works and supply of equipment. T.A.: Kocks Consult (D). Works: prequalification \* launched in April 89. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF REG 6625 A2d



**CARDI** (Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute). **Technology transfer and applied research programme.** Resp. Auth.: CARDI. EDF 5.3 mECU. Works supplies, training. T.A. Date foreseen for financing December 89. 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6632** A3a

**ORGANISATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) AND BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS**

**Eastern Caribbean States Export Development Agency (ECSEDA) and Automatic System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA).** Resp. Auth.: OECS secretariat in Castries, St. Lucia, ECSEDA headquarter in Roseau, Dominica. 4.430 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment and computers. Project in execution. 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6610** A5d

**OECS integrated tourism programme.** Resp. Auth.: OECS secretariat. Estimated cost 3 mECU. Cooperative marketing in Europe, T.A. and tourism training. Project on appraisal.

★ **Date foreseen for financing February 90.** 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6613** A5c

**OECS — TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO — BARBADOS — GUYANA**

**Regional fruit and vegetable marketing programme.** Resp. Auth.: Caribbean Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6620** A5de

**OECS AND MONTserrat**

**Tertiary education.** Resp. Auth.: OECS Secretariat. 7.2 mECU. Construction, supply of equipments, training, trainers training, T.A. and evaluation. **Date financing November 89.** 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6628** A6bcj

**CARICOM AND UK OCT**

**Regional hotel training programme.** Resp. Auth.: Bahamas Hotel Training College (BHTC). 4.4 mECU. Construction region training facility, supply of equipment, scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6614** A5c

★ **Student accomodation for Caribbean regional educational institutions.** Resp. Auth.: UWI, CAST and CTC. 16 mECU. Construction of residential hostels with a total of 1 080 beds and daytime accomodation in six campus concerned in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Contracts for architectural design will be awarded following a design competition. Works by restricted tender after prequalification. Equipments and furnishings by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 90. 5th and 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6630** A6b

**ALL ACP COUNTRIES**

★ **Support programme to take social dimension of the structural adjustment into account.** 1.500 mECU. Studies, statistics, reports, T.A. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. **EDF REG 6076** A1b

**MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES**

**ALGERIA**

★ **Integrated training programme on forestry.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hydraulique, de l'Environnement et des Forêts. 2.5 mECU. T.A. long-term and short-term, equipments, scholar-ships. Project in execution. **SEM AL** A3a

★ **Integrated programme to improve seed production for large scale farming.** EEC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. **SEM AL** A3a

**EGYPT**

★ **Egyptian Renewable Energy Development Organization. EREDO.** Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Government. EEC contribution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equipment for the centre. Works and supplies: int. tender with prequalification foreseen in 2nd half 88. T.A.: GET/KFA (D). Int. tender dossier: Phoebus (I). **SEM EGT 1002** A2a

★ **IUD production.** Resp. Auth.: National Population Council (NPC). EEC 2.100 mECU. T.A., equipments, row material for local production of IUD. T.A. by Organon (NL). Equipments by int. tender. **Date financing September 89.** **SEM EGT** A7c

**JORDAN**

★ **Study on underground water-level in the Azraq basin.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Hydrology and Irrigation. 3 mECU. To collect and exploit all data concerning water region of Azraq basin. T.A. supply of equipment and drilling works. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution. **SEM TO** A2a

★ **Project for a national soil map and land utilization.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. **SEM TO** A1g

**MALTA**

★ **Tourism industry modernisation.** 2.4 mECU. Tourism development plan, promo-

tion, institut for hotel management and tourism, restauration of the St. Jean Cathedral. T.A. and works. T.A.: short-list not yet drawn up. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution. **SEM MAT** A5c

★ **Improvement of infrastructure.** 3.1 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipments. Management of natural water resources, long term development plan for "Telemalta Corporation", Marsaxlokk port project and "Malta Dev. Corporation". T.A.: short-list not yet drawn up. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. **SEM MAT** A9b

★ **Protection of Malta's coastline against oil pollution.** Resp. Auth.: Oil Pollution Executive. 2.4 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing January 90. **SEM MAT** A8f

**MOROCCO**

★ **Drinking water supply for small centres.** Resp. Auth.: Office National de l'Eau Potable (ONEP). 11.888 mECU. Pipes, equipments civil works, transmission lines, access roads and fencing, studies and supervision. Works by int. tender. Project in execution. **SEM MOR** A2b

★ **Support to the anti-locust programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EEC contribution 6 mECU. Purchase of 4 bi-turbo props aircrafts by restr. tender. Project in execution. **SEM MOR** A3a

★ **Tessaut-Aval hydro-agricultural region. Construction and equipment of the T2 water-main.** Resp. Auth.: Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole du Haouz (ORMVAH). EEC contribution 34.150 mECU. EEC part: construction of 19 km of the water-main and 2 syphons. Int. tender launched end of June 89. Project in execution. **SEM MOR** A3a

★ **Support to strengthen technologic and scientific education structures.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. EEC 40 mECU. Achievement of Beni Mellal and Seltat faculties. Construction of Errachidian and Mohammedian faculties and CPRT of Settat. Supply of equipments for faculties and CPRT, studies, T.A. and supervision. Works and equipments by int. tenders. **Date financing September 89.** **SEM MOR** A6b

**TUNISIA**

★ **Rural development project for the South-West of Kef.** Resp. Auth.: Office de mise en valeur du Kef. Ministère de l'Agriculture. EEC contribution 10 mECU. Purchase of 3 bulldozers, 2 motograders, 5 tractors with 5 t trailers, 5 tanks (3 000 litres each) 2 4x4 vehicles by int. tender launched in November 88. Works by direct labour. Project in execution. **SEM TUN** A3a



# A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

**Date-palm trees in the Rejim-Maoutoug region.** Resp. Auth.: Office de Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maoutoug. EEC contribution 15 mECU. Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equipments: Italy. Electric equipment: Italy. Irrigation equipments: int. tender. T.A.: Italy. Project in execution. SEM TUN A3a

## TURKEY

**Geothermal energy in Western Anatolia.** Resp. Auth.: MTA — Institut de Prospection et Recherches Minérales. EEC contribution 8 mECU. Supply by int. tender of specialized equipment for wells, boreholes and for laboratory analyses. T.A. and training. Project in execution. SEM TU A4a

**Improvement of health studies.** EEC contribution 5.8 mECU. Master plan, specialized medical equipments, scanner, vehicles. T.A. and supplies. Project in execution. SEM TU A7ac

**Fight against environmental pollution.** Resp. Auth.: Prime Minister's Office. Directorate General of the Environment. EEC contribution 2.8 mECU. Purchase of mobile system to measure, control, water, air, surface and soil pollution. Supply of laboratory equipment. T.A. Project in execution. SEM TU A8f

**Vocational training programme for tourism and mining.** EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of equipment, studies. Project in execution. SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d

**Programme to deepen association relations between EEC and Turkey.** EEC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the University of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish "Business Council". Project in execution. SEM TU A6b

**Regional centre for training and development for the "Union Internationale des villes (UIV)" for eastern mediterranean countries and Middle-East in Istanbul.** EEC contribution 1.4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. SEM TU A1c

## WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

**Assistance to the Palestinian population in the occupied territories.** EEC contribution 2.971 mECU. Various projects, lines of credit, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. Third int. tender for the rehabilitation of ADS diary in Jericho launched in July 89. SEM OT A8a, b, e

## BANGLADESH

**Improvement of food grain storage depots (LSD's).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Food, Dept. of Food (MOF/DOF). 15 mECU. Rehabilitation and improvement of 130 LSD's. Works and supply of T.A. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution. ALA BD 8816 A3a

**Thikana project.** Resp. Auth.: Thikana Village Development Fund (TVDF), Committee and Promotion, Planning and Management Unit. EEC contribution 9.5 mECU. Establishment of the Village Fund, and T.A. Project in execution. ALA BD 8815 A3a

## BHUTAN

**Development of agricultural support activities.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 3.4 mECU. Building of regional centres, soil analyses laboratory, supply of equipments and vehicles, T.A. and training. Project in execution. ALA BHU 8809 A3a

## CHINA (PEOPLE'S REP.)

**China-EC centre for agricultural technology.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and Fisheries (MAAF) and EEC Commission. EEC contribution 5.9 mECU. Chine will construct the centre. EEC part: supply of equipment, documentation, training, european staff, T.A. and works supervision. Project in execution. ALA CHN 8821 A3, A6

**Maize and sunflower research development project in the Jilin province.** Resp. Auth.: Jilin Province Commission for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (JPCFERT). EEC contribution 2.7 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment by int. tender on direct agreement. Training, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. ALA CHN 8813 A3a

## ECUADOR

**Reconstruction Programme. (After March 87 earthquake).** Resp. Auth.: Banco Ecuatoriano de la Vivienda (BEV). EEC contribution 3.5 mECU. Housing and T.A. Project in execution. ALA EC 8810 A8a

## EL SALVADOR

**Programme for the Development of Handicrafts in deprived areas.** Resp. Auth.: Interministry Committee with the leadership of the Ministry of Culture and Communication. EEC 6 mECU. T.A., studies and supply of equipment and vehicles. Project in execution. ALA ES 8710 A4d

**Construction of a hospital in Zacamil.** Construction and equipping of a 200 beds hospital. 12 mECU. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. for supervision and management. Works: int. tender launched in September 89. Project in execution. ALA ES 8712 A7a

## GUATEMALA

**Programme for sustainable development of the Lake Atitlan Basin.** Resp. Auth.: Ministerio Desarrollo Urbano e Rural (MDUR). Pilot programme of microprojects. EEC contribution 3.5 mECU. Works and infrastructures. Supply of equipment, line of credit, T.A. and studies. Int. tender launched end of April 89. Project in execution. ALA GU 8822 A3a

## HONDURAS

**Water supply, health in the rural sector.** Resp. Auth.: Consejo Directivo de Saneamiento (CODISA), and Ministerio de Salud Publica. EEC contribution 14.5 mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, vehicles, T.A. and training. Int. tender launched end of April 89. Project in execution. ALA HO 8620 A8bc

## INDIA

**Inland Fisheries Development.** Resp. Auth.: National Cooperative Dev. Corp. (NCDC) with Dept. of Fisheries (DOF). EEC contribution 22.1 mECU. Works, T.A. and supply of equipments. Project in execution. ALA IN 8804 A3a

**Tank Irrigation System, Tamil Nadu, Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Agriculture. EEC Contribution 24.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. ALA IN 8811 A3a

**Agricultural markets in Kerala.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 18.4 mECU. Construction of three larger regional markets and three smaller markets along the east-west trade routes. Site development, shops and storage facilities, roads and parking areas. T.A. and training. Project financed through counterpart funding from sale of - 260 000 T of muriate of potash (MOP). Purchase by Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (MMTC) Int. tender in 89. Project in execution. ALA IN 8818 A3a

**South Bhagirath: II. Integrated watershed management.** 8.4 mECU. Reafforestation, soil protection, T.A. Project financed through counterpart funding from sale of 115 000 t of muriate of potash by MMTC in 89. Int. tender: see ALA IN 8818. Project in execution. ALA 8820 A3a



## INDONESIA

**Rural electrification project (hydroelectric micro-power stations).** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy and Mines. Electricity and new energy Dept. EEC contribution 18.9 mECU. Works, supply of turbines, generators, adjusters of 10 KW, 25 KW and 100 KW, vehicles and other equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA IND 8719 A2a

## LAOS

**NAM NGUM water, pumping irrigation.** Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, Forêts, Irrigation and Coopératives Nationales (MAFIC). EEC 5.5 mECU. Building of 4 irrigation networks and drainage. Studies, construction of 4 pumping stations, supply of equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal.

ALA LA 8802 A3a

## PACTO ANDINO MEMBER COUNTRIES

**Regional programme for technical cooperation: APIR (Accelerate Process on Regional Integration).** Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. EEC participation 7.3 mECU. T.A. for studies, training and advising. Supply of small equipment. Project in execution.

ALA JUN 8806 A1b

**Satellite Telecommunications Andean System (SATS) Preparation - Phase 2.** Resp. Auth.: JUNAC. 2.2 mECU. Project in execution.

ALA JUN 8803 A2c

## PAKISTAN

**Primary education in rural areas.** Cofinancing with CIDA and IDA. EEC contribution 15 mECU for works, T.A. and scholarships. Project in execution.

ALA PK 8716 A6a

**Baluchistan agricultural college.** Resp. Auth.: Baluchistan Department of Agriculture. Directorate of Agricultural Education Services. Estimated total cost 28 mECU. EEC contribution 18.4 mECU.

tion 18 mECU. Design and construction of the college. Supply of pedagogical equipment and vehicles. T.A. to prepare tender dossiers for works and supplies. T.A. for supervision of works. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.

ALA PK 8807 A6ci

## PANAMA — COSTA RICA — NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA

**Regional development programme for agricultural research on cereals in Central-America.** EEC contribution 10.8 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8823 A3a

## BCIE (BANCO CENTROAMERICANO DE INTEGRACION ECONOMICA)

**Support to the SME in Central America (PAPIC). Phase II.** Resp. Auth.: BCIE. EEC 6 mECU, Italy 1 mECU, Sweden 3.8 mECU, BCIE 3.8 mECU. Hard currencies ★ funds. T.A. and training. *Date financing September 89.*

ALA REG 8909 A5b

## EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — HONDURAS

**Trifinio region development pilot project.** Resp. Auth.: Ministros de Recursos Naturales. Comité de Dirección. EEC contribution: 7.170 mECU. Reforestation works, feeder roads, warehouses, supply of equipments and T.A. Feeder roads, irrigation, warehouses and supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8814 A3a

## PERU

**Rural micro-projects programme (Pampa- Puno II).** Resp. Auth.: CORPUNO. EEC contribution 21.4 mECU. T.A.: ten ex-

triated. Supply of trucks, vehicles, equipments, training. Project in execution.

ALA PE 8817 A3a

## PERU — ECUADOR — COLOMBIA (PEC)

**Regional programme: fishing technical cooperation EEC/PEC.** Estimated EEC contribution 6 mECU. T.A., supply of equipments and training. Project on appraisal.

ALA REG 8721 A3a

## COCESNA — COSTA RICA — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — HONDURAS — NICARAGUA

**Radars control for civil air traffic in Central America. EURO MAYA project.** Resp. Auth.: COCESNA (Corporación Centroamericana de Servicios de Navegación Aérea) and co-director EEC. EEC contribution 18.5 mECU, Italy 9.5 mECU. Civil works, supplies, 4 radars and equipments, communication systems. Extension of the Tegucigalpa control centre. T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8819 A2d

## PHILIPPINES

**Agricultural education programme.** Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). EEC contribution 10.4 mECU. Parallel cofinancing with ADB. Supply of equipments and agricultural inputs. Pedagogical equipment, furnitures, laboratory equipments and audio-visuals, books, chemicals, tools, vehicle, T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA PHI 8824 A6ci

## THAILAND

**Development and extension of fruit and vegetable production in Northern Thailand.** EEC contribution 9.45 mECU. Long-term T.A., supply of equipments, line of credit, training, research and follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution.

ALA TH 8812 A3a

## INQUIRY

If you have suggestions for improving the presentation, format and print used in the "blue pages" operational summary, please send them to:

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N.B.: If you are happy with the present layout, please also let us know at the same address.



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amounts provided by their parents. Or they go out to work.

To the best of my knowledge, this is the first book of its kind. It is clearly a useful piece of work and, as such, should help generate greater understanding about the conditions in which the ACP students come and stay in the European Community. This is in everyone's interest, for, as Raymond Chasle says, European students have an opportunity "to spend some of the decisive years of their lives meeting people from a range of cultural horizons". And are not many people hoping to see the ACP-EEC Convention generate a real inter-cultural dialogue? ○ALAIN LACROIX

○○○

Francis MELI: **South Africa belongs to us: a History of the ANC.** James Currey Publishers, London 1989

Outlining the different strategies pursued by the African National Congress in its resistance to apartheid whilst remaining committed to its ultimate goal, a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa, this new book is the first history to be published of South Africa's oldest political party.

Meli's message to the reader is that despite banning and harassment by the South African government, the ANC remains central to the future of South Africa and that it is not possible to have a settlement in South Africa which does not include the African National Congress.

○○○

Elsa ASSIDON: **Le commerce captif** (Captive trade) — L'Harmattan, 7, rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique, 75005, Paris, France — 180 pages — 1989

Elsa Assidon's book is about three French trading giants of Black Africa—the CFAO (Compagnie Française de l'Afrique Occidentale), the SCOA (formerly Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Africain) and Optorg. Hitherto, these trading or import-export companies as they are called have been mainly of interest to historians and specialists on sub-Saharan Africa but to a lesser extent to economists, who tend to look upon them as relics of a bygone age.

How did they change from simple traders to the importers and exporters they are today, distributing computers, glassware, textiles, cars and food on their traditional markets? Does their keenness on investing in France in recent times signify a kind of repatriation of once-colonial capital? Can they become ordinary external trading companies by setting up in other countries too? The continued crisis of the African economies, the latest financial upheavals and the coming of Europe's Single Market in 1993 mean these countries have to take major decisions—which are, on investigation, limited—for their future.

This work goes beyond a mere history of these firms and supplies information about a particular commercial domination. The structure of the markets and the method of monetarisation in trading economies reveal an association between trading and monetary domination going back to before the creation of the franc zone. The origins of this monetary integration and the fact that it has been maintained since political independence may well be the result of captive trade, over and above the traditionally highlighted institutional factors. The investigation and analysis in this book shed fresh light on the colonial heritage of Black Africa.

○○○

**La dette extérieure, le développement et la coopération internationale** (External debt, development and international cooperation) — Final report of the NGO Conference in Lima (Peru) in January 1988 — Editions l'Harmattan, 5-7, rue de l'Ecole Polytech-

nique, 75005, Paris, France — 251 pages — 1988

The external debt of the Third World countries, which weighs so heavily on the poorest of them and mortgages many a development scheme, is no longer the province of the international experts, having become a rallying point both for the peoples and the organisations that represent them and for the development NGOs.


The close correlation between debt, development and democracy is an idea which is making its presence felt. It was behind the work of the Conference on Debt, Development and International Cooperation which was run by European and Peruvian development NGOs in Lima in January of last year under the banner of "not paying the unpayable" and "we have already paid the price" and ended with a decision to promote various debt campaigns and to bring out a report on its work.

The Conference, attended by Latin Americans, Europeans, Americans, Canadians and Asians, was held with financial contributions from a number of NGOs and the production and distribution of the final report were made possible by the Commission of the European Communities as part of a campaign to make the European public aware of the debt issue.

This book, which looks at the economic, social and political repercussions of the debt crisis and investigates development alternatives for the people concerned, is a worthwhile contribution to a subject under frequent discussion.

<p><b>THE COURIER</b> AFRICA - CARIBBEAN - PACIFIC — EUROPEAN COMMUNITY</p> <p>PUBLISHER <b>Dieter Frisch</b></p> <p>Commission of the European Communities</p> <p>200, rue de la Loi 1049-BRUSSELS (Belgium)</p> <p>Tel. 235 11 11 (switchboard) Telex COMEURBRU 21877</p>	<p>EDITOR <b>Marie-Hélène Birindelli</b></p> <p>DEPUTY EDITOR <b>Lucien Pagni</b></p> <p>ASSISTANT EDITORS Roger De Backer Amadou Traoré Augustine Oyowe Myfanwy van de Velde Tom Glaser</p> <p>SECRETARIAT: Mary Beatty (235 75 87) Viviane Jacquet (235 27 19)</p> <p>CIRCULATION Margriet Mahy-van der Werf (235 76 39)</p>
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