




The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Published every two months

N° 128 - JULY - AUGUST 1991



**Human Rights - Democracy -
Development**

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

BELGIUM
DENMARK
FRANCE
GERMANY
 (Federal Rep.)
GREECE
IRELAND
ITALY
LUXEMBOURG
NETHERLANDS
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
UNITED KINGDOM

General Secretariat
 of the ACP Group
 of States


Avenue Georges Henri, 451
 1200 Brussels
 Belgium
 Tel.: 733 96 00

THE 69 ACP STATES

ANGOLA
ANTIGUA & BARBUDA
BAHAMAS
BARBADOS
BELIZE
BENIN
BOTSWANA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMEROON
CAPE VERDE
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
CHAD
COMOROS
CONGO
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
DJIBOUTI
DOMINICA
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
ETHIOPIA
FIJI
GABON

GAMBIA
GHANA
GUINEA
GUINEA BISSAU
GUYANA
HAITI
JAMAICA
KENYA
KIRIBATI
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALI
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MOZAMBIQUE
NAMIBIA
NIGER
NIGERIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
RWANDA
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

ST. LUCIA
ST. VINCENT AND
THE GRENADINES
SAO TOME & PRINCIPE
SENEGAL
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SOLOMON ISLANDS
SOMALIA
SUDAN
SURINAME
SWAZILAND
TANZANIA
TOGO
TONGA
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
TUVALU
UGANDA
WESTERN SAMOA
VANUATU
ZAIRE
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE



FRANCE

(Territorial collectivities)

Mayotte
 St Pierre and Miquelon

(Overseas territories)

New Caledonia and dependencies
 French Polynesia
 French Southern and Antarctic Territories
 Wallis and Futuna Islands

NETHERLANDS

(Overseas countries)

Netherlands Antilles
 (Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin,
 Saba, St Eustache)
 Aruba

DENMARK

(Country having special relations with Denmark)

Greenland

UNITED KINGDOM

(Overseas countries and territories)

Anguilla
 British Antarctic Territory
 British Indian Ocean Territory
 British Virgin Islands
 Cayman Islands
 Falkland Islands
 Southern Sandwich Islands and
 dependencies
 Montserrat
 Pitcairn Island
 St Helena and dependencies
 Turks and Caicos Islands

This list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future.

The *Courier* uses maps from a variety of sources. Their use does not imply recognition of any particular boundaries nor prejudice the status of any state or territory.

MEETING POINT: Chief Emeka Anyaoku



'A Commonwealth realistic and imaginative enough to be guided by the knowledge that our constituencies are not only of the present generation, but also the future unborn of this world'. This was the goal which Chief Emeka Anyaoku of Nigeria pledged to work for when he took office as Secretary General of the Commonwealth in July 1990. In an interview with *The Courier*, Chief Anyaoku explains his vision of the Commonwealth's role and expresses his views on a number of current international issues. **Pages 3 to 5.**

ACP-EEC — Council of Ministers

The ACP-EEC Council of Ministers met in Brussels in May. Included on the agenda were the implementation of Lomé IV, problems relating to raw materials and relations between Community and ACP States as the Single Market of 1993 approaches. The discussions were an opportunity for the ACPs to restate their fear of being 'marginalised' in favour of Eastern Europe, and for the Community to reassure its partners of its intention to continue with and intensify cooperation under the Lomé Convention. **Pages 6 to 7.**

COUNTRY REPORTS

BENIN: As the first country to hold a national conference aimed at arranging the transition towards a democratic regime, Benin is now very much a test case, both for other African states and for donor countries. The former are seeking inspiration from the measures taken to solve the economic and institutional crisis while the latter are looking to draw conclusions from Benin's experience in order better to adapt their aid policy. **Pages 18 to 28.**



WESTERN SAMOA: The last couple of years have been quite 'stormy' for Western Samoa. Both in 1989 and 1990, cyclones hit this Pacific paradise, and Ofa in particular struck hard in February 1990, causing about US\$ 140 million damage. Yet another issue has given even more cause for heated debate: the introduction of universal suffrage. Approved by plebiscite in October 1990, last April's elections were 'historic', as the first ever in the country to be held under universal franchise. **Pages 29 to 42.**



DOSSIER: Human rights, democracy and development

A political subject whose economic consequences are debated but real. Are human rights universal? In addition to formal democracy, what are the minimum conditions for pluralism? What is the connection between democracy and development? A difficult question, but given that policy choices influence development, they should be exercised democratically. In the Dossier, we look — in as objective a manner as possible — at possible answers to these questions. **Pages 48 to 84.**

The Courier

AFRICA-CARIBBEAN-PACIFIC — EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

No 128 — JULY-AUGUST 1991

CONTENTS

2. Editorial

MEETING POINT

3. Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Secretary General of the Commonwealth

ACP-EEC

6. ACP-EEC Council of Ministers meeting in Brussels
8. Programming Lomé IV
11. ACP-EEC industrial fora

ACP

15. Manufacturing parastatals — not so dismal after all

COUNTRY REPORTS

18. **BENIN:** The democratic point of reference
21. An interview with Monsignor de Souza
23. An interview with State Minister Désiré Vieyra
25. The budgetary nightmare
27. Unique context for EEC-Benin cooperation
29. **WESTERN SAMOA:** Universal suffrage at last
37. An interview with Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana
41. EEC-Western Samoa cooperation

ACP-Regional Cooperation

43. Remote sensing and rural development — a better grasp of the phenomena of desertification

EUROPE

45. Community-NGO cooperation
47. Eurostat — ACP country reports

DOSSIER: Human rights, democracy and development

48. Human rights, democracy and development
50. 'Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside'
52. An interview with Dr Erskine Simmonds, Vice-President of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly
56. An interview with Henri Saby, President of the Development Committee of the European Parliament
61. Amnesty International — The international conscience for 30 years
65. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
68. Human rights in Africa: the decisive steps
69. Building democracy with tribalism
73. Democracy in the English-speaking Caribbean
77. Democracy and development
79. Development and the African political heritage
82. Some thoughts on governance and democratisation
84. Transition to democracy: is there a model?

CLOSE-UP

85. Travellers' rights
86. Children in the Sahel learn to protect their environment

CULTURE AND THE ARTS

88. Freedom and the film industry in Africa

CTA-BULLETIN

92. Animal health and production in the developing world
94. **THE COURIER'S MAILBAG**
96. **BOOKS**
NEWS ROUND-UP (yellow pages)
CDI — Industrial opportunities
OPERATIONAL SUMMARY (blue pages)

Jacques Delors in Dakar: interdependence and solidarity

Commission President Jacques Delors and Vice-President Manuel Marin made an official visit to Senegal from 30 April to 3 May 1991 at the invitation of Abdou Diouf, the President of the Republic. The visit, Jacques Delors' first to an ACP country since taking up his post, was particularly important bearing in mind the way the political and economic situation in Africa is developing.

On 2 May, he made a major speech on interdependence and solidarity to members of the Senegalese parliament, Government and diplomatic corps.

'We must first get the measure of this interdependence', he said, for only then 'will we have a better idea of the source of the new development awareness emerging in Africa and elsewhere — which must also be the basis for a completely renewed partnership between Europe and Africa'.

A changing world means adaptation and solidarity

For Mr Delors, adaptation is an imperative and it demands solidarity.

'It is impossible to stay on the sidelines in a changing world. There is no frontier, no protection and no specific model to dispense us from the effort involved in the internationalisation of trade'.

Solidarity has first to emerge on the economic front, where stability is threatened by 'incoherent decisions taken piecemeal in the name of monetary order, liberalisation of trade and redistribution of financial resources' and by the failure of the organisations responsible for regulating the commodity markets, where supervision, transparency and cooperation should be the order of the day.

The European Community is responding to interdependence by getting organised. 'I am not setting this up as an example in itself', Jacques Delors said. 'I am giving it as an example of a far wider trend which goes well beyond it'.

The Single Market of 1992 began as a desire for collective adaptation, dictated by the need to boost competitiveness to cope with the internationalisation of technology, financing and markets.

The Single European Act, ratified in 1987, was the institutional reflexion of this need and it triggered cooperation, solidarity and openness.

Economic and monetary union and political union should be interpreted in the light of these 'dialectics of opening and solidarity... The Community is open of necessity and its solidarity is both a tradition and an ideal... By means of this dual movement, it is in fact preparing to make a better job of its part in world interdependence'.

New development awareness is born

This, first of all, Jacques Delors said, breaks with the past in two ways, by:

- rejecting 'romantic visions which inspire over-voluntarist policies and are based mainly on the determination of the central authorities';
- denouncing 'exclusive recourse to assistance, which prevents the people from taking responsibility for their own development'.

The structural challenges are simultaneously global and more particular to Africa. The global ones include the trends in commodity prices and the debt ('Africa's debt is equal to its GDP — the highest percentage in the world') and there are others related to Africa, demography and the environment ('in Africa, cooperation with the whole world has to be used urgently to break through the vicious circle of poverty and the destruction of the natural environment').

But there is no point in tackling structural problems unless democracy is seen as vital — although it must be clear that 'democratisation is not a process forced upon us by events in Eastern Europe or new political conditions from outside'. Democracy is needed primarily because 'counterweights are required to prevent structural reform from leading to other sorts of arbitrariness and new frustrations. Everyone has to be involved, from political leaders to the man in the street'.

None of this will be possible without some practical organisation of interdependence, which naturally includes the responsibility of the countries of the North, but also a further world cooperation drive, particularly at regional level.

Africa and the European Community — the basis for a new partnership

Mr Delors maintains that, together, ACPs and Europeans have a joint vision and the means of achieving it — hence we can also set ourselves a target.

The Lomé Convention, a 'model of cooperation based on contracts, mutual respect and duration' which is constantly being adapted, suggests encouraging initiatives with the help of our new partnership and making human rights and man himself the ultimate foundation of our process of cooperation. 'Now, clearly, the furthering of democracy and economic and social development are inseparable'.

Jacques Delors ended his speech by defending the need for 'solidarity in development' as something which would 'link all initiatives, draw them together into a common philosophy and strongly question the developed countries, starting with the European Community'.

Dominique David
Editor

Chief Emeka ANYAOKU

Commonwealth Secretary-General

'Democracy — a guiding principle of the Commonwealth'

Chief Emeka Anyaoku of Nigeria is a man with long experience of international relations. In 1959, he joined the Commonwealth Development Corporation and he went on to work for the Nigerian diplomatic service in 1962. In 1977, after 11 years in the Commonwealth Secretariat, he was appointed Deputy Secretary-General responsible for international affairs and administration. He has also served briefly as his country's Foreign Minister. On 1 July 1990, Chief Anyaoku took over from Sir Shridath (Sonny) Ramphal as Commonwealth Secretary-General having been chosen for the top post the previous October by the Heads of Government, meeting in Kuala Lumpur.


In his acceptance speech, Chief Anyaoku pledged to work towards 'A Commonwealth realistic and imaginative enough to be guided... by the knowledge that our constituencies are not only of the present generation, but also the future unborn of this world'.

► *How would you characterise the current role of the Commonwealth and what do you think the future holds? Will the Commonwealth still be here in 50 years time?*

— The Commonwealth has a unique capacity to bridge racial, ideological and economic divides and inequalities, assisted by its common language, common professional and institutional heritage, and cooperative spirit. It is a capacity of increasing value in a world that is seeing a resurgence in ethnic and racial loyalties and new nationalisms which are beginning to threaten the stability and cohesion of established nation states. With its diversity of cultures and communities, the Commonwealth could be a catalyst for new forms of consensual cooperation and bridge-building among nations and

between communities within nations. It could also play a significant role in promoting conflict resolution.

Looking ahead, I am convinced that the Commonwealth will continue to have a distinctive and enlarging scope. In deciding on its future roles, it will concentrate on issues which can be tackled by drawing on recognised Commonwealth strengths and characteristics. For example, it will maintain its commitment to assisting its developing member countries in a variety of practical ways, bilaterally and multilaterally through the Commonwealth Secretariat and its technical cooperation agency. It will also assist member countries in their reform efforts by providing policy advice and other practical support in the form of technical assistance for development projects.



In this interview with The Courier, Chief Anyaoku gives his own vision of the Commonwealth's future role and discusses some of the current development issues facing his organisation and the world in general.

You asked me about the position in 50 years time. I would say that as long as the world needs instruments for promoting true multilateralism, there will continue to be a role for the Commonwealth. If it is not there in 50 years it will only be because the UN has fully succeeded in becoming the instrument of genuine global consensus, in which the collective interests of countries and peoples, both large and small, and irrespective of geography, form the basis for global action.

► *How important is the UK now within the Commonwealth given its tendency to be isolated on a number of issues in recent years? Has there been any noticeable change since John Major became Prime Minister?*

— I don't believe that this question reflects an accurate reading of Britain's standing in, and relations with, the Commonwealth. In relation to South Africa, it is not sufficiently recognised that Britain has been unwavering in its support for the Commonwealth objective of the abolition of apartheid. There is of course, disagreement on means but Britain is by no means alone in disagreeing about the means of achieving certain Commonwealth objectives. The British Government and people have, over the years, continued to give important support to Commonwealth initiatives. For example, we now have on the table, far-reaching proposals to address the indebtedness problems of many low-income countries — the Trinidad and Tobago Terms. These resulted from an initiative taken by John Major in September 1990, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, under the premiership of his predecessor. I began my term of office last year as Secretary General with very good relations with Margaret Thatcher and look forward to excellent relations with John Major.

► *Although the Trinidad Terms are more liberal than previous schemes to ease indebtedness, some would argue that they are still unrealistic in that they will require an increasing level of repayments in the future. For some of the poorest countries it is difficult to imagine this being feasible.*

— I think we should be quite clear on one thing — it is certainly not an ideal solution. But on the basis that half a loaf is better than none, it is undoubtedly an improvement. If you look at the details, it proposes doubling the write-off element from one third to two thirds, lengthening the period of repayment from 14 to 25 years and an initial five year period when interest will be capitalised. These are definite improvements on what we had in Toronto. Having said this, I would agree that we need a lot more if the debt problem is to be tackled as successfully as we all wish.

► *Last year, the Commonwealth launched an Equity Fund of \$56m for the purpose of investing in Commonwealth developing countries. Can you explain how the fund works?*

— This is an initiative which, in a modest way, can make a direct contri-

bution to capital flows to developing countries. Its aim is to channel private portfolio equity investment from long term investors in industrial countries to emerging capital markets of Commonwealth developing countries. Comparable country equity funds already exist and most of them are doing well. The particular twist the CEF seeks to add is to give investors a much wider range of investment opportunities by including some of the smaller markets and countries where current difficulties conceal great long term potential. The Fund must channel its resources to countries only on a commercial basis. It has already begun to invest in places such as Malaysia and India and other countries which should benefit include Kenya, Nigeria and Pakistan — places where there are either existing or emerging stock markets. There is also a plan to extend the investment activities of the Fund to smaller countries of the Commonwealth which often get neglected in terms of foreign investment.

► *The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation is one of the better known facilities established by the organisation. How effective has it been given that the resources are limited? Does the fact that it is replenished by voluntary contributions cause any problems?*

— When you have voluntary contributions, you need to go fund raising from time to time but a measure of its success can be seen in the growth of the fund itself. When it was first launched in 1971, its budget was £400,000. This year, the planned expenditure is £30 million. The demand for its services has been on the increase for some time.

The CFTC is now established as a leading international technical assistance agency in the transfer of technology from one developing country to another. Because it operates flexibly and very cost effectively, it is able to provide wide-ranging technical assistance directed to the development priorities of governments. It is something which operates very much on a mutual assistance basis.

► *The Commonwealth has a good reputation for its work in facilitating student exchanges. In recent years, however, concern has been expressed over the impact of hugely increased fees in the traditional host countries. Has the Commonwealth been able to do anything to alleviate this problem?*

— Student mobility within the Commonwealth has certainly fallen in the last decade, at a time when internationally, it has been rising and this is clearly a matter of concern. A Standing Committee on Student Mobility was established in 1981 and it has issued a number of reports, detailing possible measures to remedy the effects of fee increases for overseas students.

There are now more scholarships being given on a multilateral basis. The Commonwealth Fellowship and Scholarship Programme is expanding, there are more bilateral awards by some donor countries and we have begun the 'Commonwealth of Learning' initiative which is intended to use distance education techniques to help bridge the gap. Notwithstanding these measures, the concern still exists. In the end, it is important that Commonwealth students should be able to move freely about the Commonwealth in the same way as in Europe. The EC, as you know, has the Erasmus Programme and we are very keen to explore ways in which a similar programme could be introduced in the Commonwealth at some date in the future.

► *Have you had any feedback on such an idea from countries such as the UK, Canada or Australia?*

— They remain in sympathy with the objectives that I have talked about but we have yet to see a change in the laws and policies that make foreign students pay much more than home students — and I think that is the crux of the matter.

► *What was the object of your recent meeting at the World Bank?*

— Apart from addressing the International Development Conference, I called on Barber Conable of the World Bank and Michel Camdessus of the IMF. We have good relations with both bodies and work closely in many areas of mutual interest. I used my visit as an opportunity to strengthen these relations and to discuss issues of ongoing concern to Commonwealth countries. These included the development crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, debt relief particularly in connection with the proposed Trinidad and Tobago Terms, adjustment programmes, foreign investment policies and promotion, and environmental issues.

I was particularly keen also, to discuss the work of the Commonwealth Expert Group on Global Economic and Political Change and its Impact on the Development Process, in which the Bank and the Fund are participating. It is the first time we have worked together with them on a major study. Both the Bank and the Fund are important institutions to us. Their roles are constantly discussed and reviewed at meetings of Commonwealth finance ministers and it is therefore, quite useful for us to have close working relations with them.

► *Your predecessor, in his 1989 Report, spoke of democracy as 'a Commonwealth ethic at the very heart of Commonwealth reality'. Do you think that the current upsurge of democratic sentiment in Africa is likely to be permanent? Do you see a link between democracy and sustainable economic development?*

— The late 1980s have seen a reassertion of democracy in many parts of the world including Africa. There is now a deep awareness worldwide of the faults and limitations of non-democratic political and economic systems. And it is increasingly recognised that development will prove to be neither sustainable nor equitable, unless citizens are secure in their economic and political rights and are able to participate fully in the development process. In Africa, this is leading to the abandonment of the command in favour of the free market economic system and movement to political pluralism in a number of hitherto single party states. I believe that this trend stands a good chance of becoming permanent especially if the development and economic targets of the countries concerned are significantly realised. It may be different if, having embraced these democratic trends, there is then no noticeable improvement in economic and development performance.

I do see a link between democracy and sustainable development. Indeed, as the South Commission observed in its recent report, the state is best able to perform its functions when there is a national consensus on the goals and purposes of development, and on the apportionment of the costs as well as the benefits. Democratic institutions which allow full participation and through which such a consensus can be reached are therefore, not only an objective of people-oriented

development, but its very means as well. An autocratic-ruled country can, for a period, attain high growth but in the long run this becomes threatened by political instability.

Democracy is indeed, one of the guiding principles of the Commonwealth, as enshrined in the 1971 Singapore Declaration. We have in the last seven months been able to work in ways aimed at strengthening the democratic process in a number of Commonwealth countries. At their request, we have sent teams of observers, for instance, to Malaysia and Bangladesh to observe their national elections. Recently, we sent an advance team to Guyana to observe their election preparations. We are doing all this in the belief that the electoral process which is crucial to the sustenance of democratic institutions needs to be strengthened and the presence of observers from the Commonwealth has been shown to be very helpful in doing this.

► *What is your view about the relaxation of sanctions against South Africa at the present time?*

— Sanctions were introduced as a means of bringing about an end to the inhuman apartheid system. They were designed to bring the South African Government to the negotiating table and to keep it there until fundamental and irreversible change in South Africa had been secured.

The Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers which met recently to review the situation, welcomed the steps taken so far by President De Klerk but stressed that sanctions should begin to be relaxed, only after the South African Government has implemented the undertakings it has made to remove the obstacles to negotiation with the true representatives of the African majority population. These include the release of all political prisoners, the return of the exiles, the actual repeal of the legislative pillars of apartheid and a review of the repressive security laws. It is a fact that these obstacles have still not been effectively removed. Hence, the position of the Commonwealth — minus Britain of course — is that it would be premature to relax sanctions now.

► *Would you anticipate a democratic South Africa reapplying to join the Commonwealth?*

— South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth until 1961 when it had to leave because of its apartheid policy. I would expect a non-racial, democratic South Africa to be warmly welcomed back to the Commonwealth.

► *A number of African countries are, once again, suffering from severe famine exacerbated by internal conflicts. How optimistic are you about an adequate response from the developed nations? Do you think that there is a place for un-requested humanitarian intervention, even where it raises issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity?*

— The response to the grave situation in some parts of Africa is far from satisfactory. There seems sometimes to be too much of a political element in the response of donor governments to situations requiring a humanitarian response. However, at the level of the people, I am glad to say that the response has been better. We saw in London recently, the Wembley concert to raise funds for the Kurds and what a success it seems to have been. Among governments, a hopeful element is the recognition that more needs to be done for Africa.

I would be happy to see the day when the practice of global multilateralism would mean that the international response to natural disasters and humanitarian needs cannot be inhibited by issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. But we must admit that until we have a practice of genuine multilateralism that is, international policies that take full account of the views of smaller and disadvantaged countries — these issues will continue to be raised.

► *What do you think about the possibility of a global, humanitarian 'strike force', perhaps under UN auspices, which would have the capacity to respond immediately to crises?*

— I would hope that we can get there and that the United Nations will, in time, develop the capacity to react quickly to cases that call for massive humanitarian assistance from abroad. But we cannot afford to have such interventions decided simply by the more powerful states or some other groups of countries. It must be on the basis of genuine international consensus.○

Interview by Simon HORNER



ACP-EEC Council of Ministers in Brussels discusses start-up of Lomé IV and cooperation for 1993

The ACP-EEC Council of Ministers held its 16th meeting in Brussels on 6 and 7 May under the co-chairmanship of Luxembourg's Agriculture Minister René Steichen on the Community side and Rwandan Planning Minister Augustin Ngirabatware for the ACPs.

On the agenda of this Council meeting were the big issues of ACP-EEC cooperation — entry into force of Lomé IV, commodities, the ACP debt, Southern Africa and other international issues.

Lomé IV — sticking to the deadlines

Previous Lomé Conventions have not always taken effect within the legal time limits and transitional measures have had to be extended as a result. But the serious economic problems facing the ACPs and a desire to avoid having more than one EDF going at the same time makes Lomé IV implementation an urgent matter for all concerned in the Group and the Community alike.

The ratification procedures whereby the agreement can come into force were well under way on the ACP side in May, as 47 of the 69 countries had completed the formalities, although the Community had only scored five out of 12 at the time. All the Member States and at least two thirds of the ACPs have to ratify and deposit their instruments of ratification before the agreement can be implemented. The ACPs had already done this by May and the Community was anxious to assure them that the Member States would have done likewise by 1 July, when the transitional measures expired and the new Convention was scheduled to take effect ⁽¹⁾.

What the Community was aiming at, Commission Development Director-General Dieter Frisch explained, was to stick to the dates laid down for implementation of the Convention — particularly, as Manuel Marin pointed out, now that

Community aid programming was already well ahead in most ACP States (bar the new ones and those in which the political situation was such as to preclude indicative programmes).

Mr Frisch also announced that Stabex operations, a sensitive subject as far as the ACPs were concerned, should not have the ups and downs of previous Conventions, given the way payments were developing.

Commodities

There was broad discussion here, with the Community stressing that studies would be a good way of investigating the PMDT (processing, marketing, distribution and transport) side of the ACP products laid down in Lomé IV — ie cotton, wood, tea, iron, cocoa and bauxite (for which an economic study was also thought to be helpful).

The Community deplored the fact that two large countries, the USA and Malaysia, one a consumer and the other a producer of cocoa, had not yet joined the International Cocoa Agreement. It also thought, however, that no further cocoa agreement should see the light of day until the attendant financial problems had been solved.

The Council again said how important it thought the International Coffee Agreement was. In a declaration to this effect, it regretted that negotiations for a new Agreement containing economic clauses had not yet begun and called upon all members of the Agreement to do their utmost to see that this happened soon so that a fresh Agreement could be concluded at the ordinary session of the International Coffee Council in London in September 1992.

Sugar and bananas

The Member States were unable to agree to the ACP request for compensation for the Community's dwindling sugar beet prices. This drop was reflected in a decline in the price offered for ACP cane sugar, the guaranteed price for which was fixed according to Article 5(4) of the Sugar Protocol, which said that it should be 'negotiated annually, within the price range obtaining in the Community...'.¹

The ACP sugar spokesman, Mauritian Minister Dulloo, said that exporters wanted ECU 30 million-worth of compensation from the Community. Mr Steichen pointed out that there was no direct tie-up between the Community's price policy and compensation for any losses and that the Community was in fact encouraging people to look for a global solution to the problems of ACP export sugar costs. Freight alone represented 10% of the price the ACPs were being offered, Mr Dulloo said.

The Community repeated that it would respect its commitments *vis-à-vis* the ACPs, particularly when it came to preference and access to the Portuguese market in the case of a common agricultural policy reform or a GATT agreement.

The ACPs were still worried about the banana trade and their position on the Community market being compromised in 1993 if traditional, guaranteed outlets in some of the Member States disappeared as a result of the single market.

The Community had not yet adopted a common position on this rather delicate subject given the economic implications, but the President of the EEC Council said that the Community noted the ACPs' explanations and concern.

Debt

Discussions of the ACP debt to the Community have reached stalemate. The ACPs still want the Twelve simply to write off their borrowings, but the Community has to think of its position on the international scene, where it goes for a case-by-case approach in conjunction with the other international organisations. The ACPs' debt to the Community is smaller than their domestic and other debts, the President of the EEC Council said and Europe was trying to lighten the Group's burden by having 92% of Lomé IV financing in the form of grants, instead of the 75% of previous Conventions.

The international situation — South Africa and adjustment — was also on the agenda. The Community again made it clear that cooperation with Eastern Europe and Latin America and Asia

⁽¹⁾ At the time of publication, only one Member State had not been able to complete its ratification, due to a more complicated process.



The ACP Council of Ministers meeting shortly before the joint Council

Photo MAPEZ

would not be developed to the detriment of the ACPs. When it came to trends in South Africa, it said, positive measures were an important sign of encouragement for the Government's drive to abolish all the apartheid legislation and it was interested to see that there was a possibility of direct negotiation between South Africa and Namibia on Walvis Bay and the islands off the Namibian coast.

One programme of reform

Manuel Marin pointed to one or two misunderstandings on structural adjustment, particularly over eligibility, EEC relations with the IBRD and the IMF and the Commission contribution to SPA (the special programme of assistance for Africa). In the programming process, he said, the Commission had concentrated on the 35 or so countries defined under the Convention as automatically eligible-countries, ie those already getting financial or other support for adjustment from the principal funders. The eligibility of other countries embarking on 'autonomous' processes of adjustment depended upon a joint assessment demonstrating that the criteria laid down in the Convention actually were being met.

As far as the other misunderstandings (relations with the other institutions and SPA) were concerned, Mr Marin said the Community could not embark on adjustment operations without coordinating closely with the other donors, particularly those whose job it was to back up the process.

There could only be one programme of reform in any given country — 'your programme. Our job is to stand alongside you and make sure that this programme — the contents of which you will have negotiated with the World Bank and the IMF — really does include the essential things laid down in the Convention'.

'It is coordination with these institutions very early on in the process which will enable us to ensure this coherence and to defuse any problems'.

'We want neither to align ourselves on the positions of these institutions nor to subject our financing to decisions in which we have not been involved', the Commissioner said. As in the past, the Community would be actively involved in the IBRD-coordinated programme and the Commission felt that it would be able to mobilise about ECU 1 billion in Lomé

IV resources to support adjustment in countries eligible for this programme.

At the ACP Council of Ministers

ACP Ministers met to discuss internal matters — and, of course, items on the agenda of the joint Council — a few days before the ACP-EEC meeting and, once again, spent a lot of time on the operation and finances of their Secretariat General in Brussels.

They looked at the reorganisation and staff problems of the Secretariat, both of which are closely related to the financial situation, which is critical and showing no improvement over previous years — a serious matter which forced them to consider a variety of solutions, ranging from a solemn appeal for the States to pay their contributions to a quest for external financing to cover at least 90% of the budget.

ACP Ministers also looked at the entry into force of Lomé IV, expressing satisfaction at the speed with which so many countries had completed the ratification formalities.

Jamaica offered to host the next ACP and ACP-EEC Council of Ministers in Kingston in May 1992.○

LUCIEN PAGNI

Programming Lomé IV

by Michael LAIDLER (*)

Once again, the period of programming has been in full swing. With the signature of Lomé IV in December 1989, the way was cleared for that all-important exercise in consultation between the Community and the ACP States as to how the Convention will be applied individually to them over the five year period covered by the 1st Protocol to the Convention. Since mid 1990, intense activity has been taking place between the Commission (in consultation with Community Member States) and the ACP capitals to draw up the strategic planning documents known as 'National Indicative Programmes'. As the operation draws towards its close, this short article seeks to answer some simple questions about the process which, although at the heart of EEC/ACP cooperation, has sometimes given rise in the past to uncertainties and even misunderstandings. It will also try briefly to give a view as to why programming is such an essential step in the life of the Convention, how it has evolved to its present stage, what is new under Lomé IV, what and who is involved, and the results of the current exercise so far.

Why do we have programming?

At the heart of the programming philosophy lies the notion that each ACP state is entitled to clear and early indication as to the amount and type of Community assistance it can count on under each Convention. This is not just to simplify the bookkeeping or budgetary process; but to ensure that Community support is geared to the country's own priorities and to the optimal use of internal resources and external financial assistance. As you can imagine, this is no simple affair in today's climate of social and economic reform. The process often requires extremely complex discussions covering macro-economic strategies, sectoral policies, government commitments and undertakings in numerous fields. And all this must be coordinated both within the ACP state and with other donors, notably the Bretton Woods institutions in cases where structural adjustment is in process. But the effort required by this dialogue on strategies

and policies is worthwhile, even essential; since, when completed satisfactorily, it establishes a very clear statement of how Community assistance will best be directed. This will take into account past performance, new priorities, economic and social considerations, other sources of support etc. This statement also defines clearly the respective responsibilities of both parties in ensuring the success of the programmes. On the Community side this commitment generally takes the shape of a guarantee to provide financial and technical inputs. On the ACP side the commitments cover undertakings at both macro-economic and sectoral level. Most programmes include specific references to human rights development, environmental questions and a commitment to realise the full potential of women in the development process.

It is important to bear in mind that programming is not intended primarily to establish a list of projects for financing. Rather, it sets out agreement on the priority sectors and defines jointly the objectives and conditions, including a timetable, to ensure the strongest and most effective management of the pro-

grammes. This agreement is only reached after lengthy discussions between the delegates in the ACP countries and their ACP counterparts. Programming is not a one-off exercise. It is the natural climax to the ongoing exchange of policy views, which is the hallmark of a relationship between partners who, for the most part, have been working together now for almost two decades.

How does programming work and who decided it should work that way?

Formally, the programming process is of course laid down by the Convention itself. Articles 281 to 284 lay down the ground rules. In brief they are:

— Each ACP state has from the Community a clear indication of the total amount of programmable resources⁽¹⁾ from which it will benefit under the Convention, including the first allocation of structural adjustment support where this applies. This information was communicated to all ACP States early in 1990.

— The ACP state is responsible for drawing up its own draft indicative programme which is then submitted to the Community and discussed between the two parties bearing in mind the sovereign right of the ACP states to determine their own policies.

— The draft indicative programme has to contain information about the development priorities of the ACP state concerned, define the focal sector or sectors for Community assistance, set out the most appropriate means for meeting the objectives of those focal sectors and, if possible earmark national projects or programmes, (especially if these follow up on on-going programmes already being financed from Community sources).

— After being discussed, the indicative programme, which is signed by both parties, has to specify the agreed focal sector (or sectors), the agreed measures, a timetable for implementation, the framework and conditions for structural adjustment support (where this applies) and

⁽¹⁾ Programmable resources are those which can be planned in advance and, for obvious reasons, exclude Stabex, Sysmin and Emergency aid which by their nature respond to given circumstances which are impossible to predict.

(*) Head of Division, West Africa Coastal States in the Directorate General for Development.

information about the ACP state's priorities in terms of regional cooperation.

— The indicative programme has to be kept flexible to take account of changes in the situation and shifts in priority.

These basic, short and fairly self-evident formal requirements are in fact the distillation of many years of debate, experience, evaluation and not a little political controversy. Under the first two Lomé Conventions programming was a relatively straightforward attempt to establish priorities on the basis of the most expedient projects. The choice was often dictated by such criteria as the degree of readiness of the project, the need to balance political pressure for funds, a 'spread of sectoral coverage' and sometimes just plain luck! With the greater significance of resources available from the EDF, it became increasingly necessary to target that assistance in such a way as to focus its impact and to ensure a long term partnership in specified areas of support. That is why under Lomé III it was decided that the lion's share of Community assistance should be concentrated on a small number of sectors (even just one), which can also mean geographical sectors; and also that both sides would have to agree between them how best to achieve their objectives in that sector, and set their agreement out clearly in the indicative programme.

Moreover, it was agreed that the ACP states and the Community stood a better chance of success if proper coordination was ensured with other funders interested in the sector. All this required a much increased level of frankness and completeness in discussion. This gave rise to the famous expression 'policy dialogue' which was the subject of much controversy at the time; but which has now become a routine part of our cooperation and which is better described as a 'dialogue on policies'.

It is very important to realise that this concept of sectoral or focal concentration remains central to today's programming process. None of the innovations under Lomé IV Convention (cf. below) have in any way diluted the three principles of

- dialogue
- focalisation
- coordination.

And all this has been decided by common accord between the ACP as a whole and the Community. Sometimes



Photo TANZANIA INFO

Mr Giovanni Livi, Director Eastern and Southern Africa shaking hands with Professor Simon Mbilinyi, Principal Secretary at the Ministry of Finance, immediately after the signing of Tanzania's Lomé IV indicative programme

the comment is heard that the 'Commission's rules are complicated'. Well, they may sound complicated because of the complexity of the development challenge; but, first, they are not 'the Commission's rules' (but those laid down by the negotiations) and secondly, is it really so complicated to agree together how best to use scarce resources?

Structural Adjustment

Much has been written about this aspect of the new Convention and this is not the place to enter into the theory and practice of macro-economic and sectoral reform policies. Nevertheless, Lomé IV provides, for the first time, for specific resources to be earmarked from the EDF in support of ACP states who are undertaking programmes of structural adjustment. And the first allocations of those resources are made for eligible states at the beginning of the Convention period. It follows therefore that this important aspect of cooperation has to be dealt with in depth as part of the programming process. At first sight, this may seem to add unmanageable dimensions to what was already a complicated scenario.

In practice this is not so. The nature of the Lomé III type of programming, concentrating as it did on sectoral priorities, dialogue and mutual commitment, has lent itself naturally to a logical extension into the macro-economic sphere. Indeed, without specifically saying so, Lomé III had already involved

the Community in many cases in those questions (Remember that general and sectoral import programmes were already a prominent feature of Lomé III). Under the new Convention the dialogue, extended to cover macro-economic considerations, notably debt, public expenditure, money management, and the social consequences of adjustment (where the Community's grant resources can play a particularly useful role) has considerably enriched the nature of the relationship, not only between Commission and ACP states but also with Member States and the Bretton Woods institutions.

This has certainly not been without difficulties for the Commission which, with its limited manpower resources, has had to participate fully in this enlarged debate which imposes disciplined and well informed monitoring of changing and complex issues. Although the Commission has organised itself to set up a small group of adjustment specialists to help with this work, the additional work load for all the services involved in Lomé IV has been significant. (as it has also been, of course, in the ACP states themselves).

It is worth emphasising that, in their approach to the structural adjustment aspects of Lomé IV, the programmers have made conscious efforts to ensure that these are seen as part of an integrated approach. Structural reform is not an add-on, or a separate development tool. Adjustment is an essential part of the

development process, designed to remove short- and medium-term barriers to growth. As such, it is important to relate it to the medium and longer term sectoral strategies defined in programming and *vice versa*. They are part and parcel of the same overall series of objectives. Looked at in this light, programming becomes a global exercise, coherent both in terms of its components and of the activities and inputs of the government and their development partners, internal as well as external.

Decentralised cooperation

In contrast, seemingly, to the macro-economic aspects of Lomé cooperation, it is interesting to note that the Lomé negotiations were concerned at the same time to extend the scope of the Convention so that assistance could be used for the benefit of the maximum number of people. In the jargon, this has been dubbed decentralised cooperation, and is covered by articles 20-22 of the Convention. The aim is to widen participation in the activities of the Convention to include decentralised authorities, rural and village groupings, cooperatives, NGOs and any local organisation with useful ideas and schemes. It also aims to increase the scope for participation from within the Community by involving European partners such as NGOs and other groups and associations, such as towns, in this

process of decentralised cooperation. The detailed implementation of this new aspect of the Convention will require empirical experimentation, but the principle of this kind of approach has been reinforced during the programming process. Aside from the obvious intrinsic importance of this departure, it is particularly significant at a time when many ACP states are in a period of social and political change and when the role of such organisations is frequently at the heart of such change.

Political and social change

The decentralisation concept adds an undeniable new political flavour to the life of the Convention. Indeed, the whole process of programming has taken place against the backdrop of the remarkable process of political evolution, notably in Eastern Europe and in Africa and the great importance attached to these issues by European Community public opinion. This has inevitably been present in the minds of all concerned with programming, not least Commissioner Marin and the senior officials who have, over the last few months, been involved in the process of signing indicative programmes in the ACP capitals. (A process which is frequently staged in a very political context). Clearly the Community has a vocation to promote human rights and support political change which reflects the legitimate aspirations of the people. Lomé is the expression of a political

attitude and we cannot pretend that politics do not have a role to play in its implementation. The mutual concerns of the partners have been frankly discussed in that context during programming.

Results of Lomé IV programming

The 'complexity' of all this has not stood in the way of an extremely successful programming process. The ACP states, recognising the benefits of sectoral concentration have responded quickly and effectively in carrying out their responsibility to agree draft indicative programmes in discussion with the EC Delegates. It is very significant that the sectoral approach of Lomé III has been confirmed under Lomé IV and rural development (involving important social and environmental components), roads, socio-economic infrastructure and the development of human resources once again form the backbone of cooperation under the Lomé system.

The Commission has, on the basis of those discussions, been able to coordinate with the Member States both on a bilateral basis (often in the European capitals) and in the EDF Committee, on the outlines of the proposed programming approach in the large majority of ACP states. Consultations with other donors, notably the World Bank and IMF have been intense. Nearly 50 indicative programmes were signed in time for the ACP/EEC Council meeting in May 1991 and the very demanding deadlines set by Development Commissioner Marin for the early completion of the process will in essence have been met without losing sight of the need to maintain quality. Given the complex issues involved, political and economic uncertainties within some ACP states and the staffing shortfalls imposed on all concerned, this is a remarkable achievement. The men and women involved in the ACP states, in the Member States and within the Commission services have made special efforts to reach this stage. That they have done so is a tribute to the fact that the programming system has been accepted by all as a tool which respects the mutual rights of all the parties, provides the most realistic chance of success in an uncertain world, but which most of all reflects the sometimes forgotten uniqueness of the Lomé system. ○

M.L.



PHOTO WATERPUMP

*Bringing the benefits of the Convention to the people is a principal aim.
Above a cooperative in Burundi*

Contact between firms easier thanks to ACP-EEC industrial fora

by Martin MINGUELLA (*)

The EEC-West Africa industrial forum has been held in Dakar every two years since 1974. This event, run under the aegis of ECOWAS and the Commission of the European Communities and almost entirely financed by the EEC, has become a tradition in the region. The 10th forum, marking almost 20 years of existence, is in 1992, which is something for the Community and ECOWAS to be proud of, as few African events have been as regular as this.

Central Africa is also host to a two-yearly, UDEAC-EEC industrial forum for members and observers of the Economic Community of Central African States. This event, first run in 1985, has been held in Libreville twice and Yaoundé once and will be returning to Libreville again in December of this year.

The original idea was just to promote foreign investments in the ACP States, but these industrial meetings have adapted to trends in the international economic environment and the ACPs and the most recent ones have not only focused on investment promotion, but, above all, on encouraging a whole range of technical, financial and commercial techniques which companies can use to cooperate.

The investors' forum of the 1970s has gradually become an industrial forum in which partnership takes precedence over investment.

Aims and design

The industrial fora were created to enhance industrial promotion and ACP-EEC company cooperation.

Article 83 of Lomé IV says: 'The Community shall contribute in a spirit of mutual interest to the development of ACP-EEC and intra-ACP enterprises by

way of information and industrial promotion activities. The aim of such activities shall be to... organise the contacts required in the industrial sphere between policy-makers, promoters and economic operators from the Community and the ACP States...'

The aims of fora, a deliberately broad definition, are to 'foster... industrial cooperation between enterprises in the Member States of the Community and in the ACP States', by providing an organised framework to facilitate contact and negotiations between African project promoters and potential European partners, as well as between African businessmen in the region. This cooperation may be technical, financial or commercial.

An ACP-EEC industrial forum, which lasts four days, is the culmination of a year's hard work in an average of 25 countries (the 12 Member States of the EEC plus the 16 members of ECOWAS or the 11 members and observers of ECCAS) and followed up for about 12 months afterwards.

Organisation

More than 20 different organisations are directly involved here, including:

— institutions which support the ACP-EEC fora, i.e. UDEAC in the case of Central Africa, ECOWAS in the case of



Photo CDI

A forum is an organised framework to facilitate contact and negotiations between African project promoters and potential European partners

(*) Principal administrator at the Commission of the European Communities.



Photo CDI

The Europe-West African Industrial Forum is run at the Dakar international trade fair site

West Africa and the Commission of the European Communities in all cases. The Commission also takes care of the general organisation and coordination of the operation;

— institutions which help, i.e. the CDI and UNIDO;

— consultancies employed by the Commission, in particular to identify promoters and projects in the ACP region and promote the forum in the EEC.

There are three stages to a forum — preparation, the forum itself and follow-up.

Preparation involves, basically:

— identifying ACP project promoters and promoting the forum in the ACP region in question, a task usually performed by industrial promotion bodies in the ACP States involved, with the help of consultants;

— promoting the forum in the Member States of the EEC and identifying potential European partners for ACP promoters already identified, usually done by the consultants, together with the European promotion bodies. The crucial thing in the running of the event itself is to have the material organisation taken care of by a promotion unit from the host country.

There are two important elements here:

— bilateral meetings between ACP project promoters and potential European partners, a job normally organised on

computer, given that there are something like 200 projects and 1500-2000 meetings. Getting participants together in an organised framework to discuss pre-identified cooperation projects is the fundamental point of the event;

— a partnership day organised jointly by the Commission and the CDI (see box).

The main phases of monitoring are:

— a first appraisal directly the event is over to look at the organisation and results via a survey (run by the consultants hired to help with the organisation) of the businessmen who took part;

— a second such appraisal by the same consultants in the three months after the event, with a view to a progress report of each project at the end of the following March (fora usually take place in December);

— an in-depth appraisal which the Commission entrusts to the CDI. The aim here is to produce a precise report to enable the CDI to take stock of negotiations between African promoters and potential European partners and then help them put their cooperation operations into practice, which may involve the provision of technical assistance, training schemes or assistance with preparing bankable dossiers.

Partnership days

The formula used for these sessions was very popular with forum participants, mainly for two reasons.

First of all, the presentation of successful partnerships by the businessmen who have negotiated them enables participants to take a proper, pragmatic look at the problems which have to be tackled before a cooperation operation can be a success. It is also an opportunity for them to learn from the technical, financial and commercial solutions which the partners have found for these problems.

An African journalist and various CDI officers run the case presentation session and ensure that the talks with the businessmen are flexible and spontaneous.

Secondly, the examples highlight the need to take a wide range of partnership formulae into account. The case analyses use the same terms as the speakers at the seminar, thereby showing that, in partnership operations, there is a distinction to be made between 'engaged' and 'married' and that it is as well, if not essential, to have the 'engagement' before the 'marriage'.

One important thing to be learned from these meetings is that there is a whole range of technical, financial and commercial possibilities, involving different degrees of commitment, for inter-firm cooperation.

Results

An independent consultant's recent evaluation of the fora shows that results are very satisfactory when it comes to ACP-EEC firms participating and getting into contact, to participants exchanging information and to obtaining know-how about negotiating agreements between firms and creating a culture and a spirit of enterprise in the recipient ACP States.

There were more than 500 participants (250 Europeans and 250 ACPs) at DAKAR-90, the 9th EEC-West Africa Industrial Forum, for example, and there were about 2000 officially organised meetings to enable them to discuss the 250 or so projects put forward at the event.

The results in terms of practical cooperation operations triggered by the fora are, however, very modest, in particular because of a crisis-ridden economic environment which is not very conducive to cooperation between firms. Financing difficulties are the commonest

obstacle to seeing this sort of operation through.

However, it must be remembered that it takes time to see the practical outcome of cooperation between firms in the EEC and the developing countries, ACPs especially, and it is too early to draw any firm conclusions at this stage.

Outlook

The Commission has looked at the outcome of the assessment of the industrial fora and is planning to look into the idea of extending these events, at the request of the competent regional authorities, along three main lines:

— geographically, by organising forum-type industrial promotion activities in other regions;

— sectorally, by focusing some schemes in more specific areas (agro-food, mining, timber and export industries).

Fora as a contribution to industrialisation in the ACP States

It is worth pointing out that an industrial forum is an instrument of industrial promotion bringing ACP and European businessmen together and its main virtue is to provide an organised framework to make this job easier.

We mention this again here to underline that these events do not claim to solve all the ACPs' industrialisation problems. The aims and the nature of the fora are not such as to have a direct influence on other essential aspects of the ACP industrialisation process. It is also worth remembering that businessmen and organisations have in many cases expected more of these operations than they can actually offer.

Industrial fora should be promotion operations run as part of the programmes of ACP-EEC industrial cooperation and support for the ACP private sector for which Lomé IV offers a range of possibilities.

A look at one or two basics of an ACP company support policy, highlighting the possibilities offered by the Convention, is perhaps useful here.

PROJECT — rehabilitation of a margarine plant in Senegal

Type of partnership

A licensing, long-term technical assistance and marketing agreement between a Senegalese firm, SONACOS, and the Portuguese SNS.

Profile of the partnership

ACP: SONACOS

SONACOS has a margarine production plant 140 km outside Dakar able to turn out 4500 tonnes p.a. It has 20 years' experience in margarine manufacture, based on a contract with a multinational group and this came to an end in 1988, at which time production stopped.

EEC: SNS (Sociedade Nacional de Saboos)

SNS, which is based in Lisbon, produces and markets a wide range of products, including soaps, table oil, margarine, polish and varnish, glycerine, hygienic preparations, conservation and cleansing products, supplies for baking and pastry-making and for the paint industry, resin, glue and paper and PVC (for mineral water bottles).

It also provides a wide range of services — economic studies, market surveys, technical and management assistance, assistance with marketing etc.

Others involved

ICEP (the Portuguese external trade institute), Portugal's equivalent to the CDI.

This first financed a diagnosis of the Senegalese firm and then covered the costs of starting up the plant again.

CDI

This identified the Portuguese partner with the help of the ICEP, cofinanced the diagnosis and collaborated in the negotiations to finalise agreements between the two parties. It then cofinanced the costs of starting up the plant again.

Project summary

Relaunching margarine production in Senegal with the help of a European firm.

The two partners met at the EEC-West Africa Industrial Forum in December 1988 and were invited to a working meeting at the CDI.

The Senegalese and the Portuguese companies signed a letter of intent and an ICEP-CDI cofinanced diagnosis mission went out to Dakar, following which the European partner made specific proposals about starting the plant up again. These were as follows:

— technical: formulation and quality of the margarine (and the raw materials), rehabilitation and start-up programme, long-term technical assistance;

— commercial: testing the market, packaging, advertising, distribution, brand etc.

In May 1990, negotiations were held with CDI and ICEP support in Portugal to come up with a licence agreement involving long-term technical assistance and help with marketing.

In June 1990, the European partner began test producing margarine in Europe to try out on the market. The programme to rehabilitate and start-up the Senegalese plant then began with cofinancing from the CDI and the ICEP.

SNS and SONACOS also signed two other agreements:

— an agreement on sub-contracting production for export to third countries;

— a letter of intent on setting up a joint venture to manufacture other products.

Features of the partnership

The agreement between the two partners, which is more than an ordinary licence contract, is in three parts:

— preparation and re-start of the Senegalese production unit;

— transfer of know-how in all (technical, commercial, management etc) areas in the medium term (four years), paid for from royalties based on the turnover of the Senegalese plant;

— possibility of one-off activities by SNS, at SONACOS' request, for developments planned later.

Financially speaking, this new agreement costs the Senegalese company less and is more flexible to apply.

The first area to look at is the ACPs' legal and institutional environment.

This is very important, because involving the private sector in the development drive, particularly the SME promotion side of it, means providing a climate conducive to national and foreign investment and to the creation and development of firms.


So improvements to the economic, legal and tax environment, and to the institutional framework, will often be called for to ensure that the firms have favourable conditions to work in, with SMEs and big firms on an equal footing. This is a key area for the Community to back up ACP effort.

Indeed, in Article 111 of Title VIII of the Convention (Enterprise development), the Community and the ACP States recognise the need for technical assistance with improving the legal and tax framework in which firms have to operate.

The second point has to do with SME financing.

SME access to finance (risk capital and medium- and long-term credit) has to be improved as a basic means of offering encouragement to firms.

New methods of encouraging joint ventures and of spreading firms' technological, industrial and commercial risks have to be found (risk capital comes in here) and it is important to try to adapt medium- and long-term financing (work-



Official flag of the Dakar Fair

ing capital included) and guarantee systems to the special needs of the SME.

Lomé IV puts particular emphasis on aid for the mobilisation of national savings, the development of financial intermediaries and technical assistance with the reorganisation and reform of financial institutions.

When new SME financing instruments are set up and additional resources channelled through the financial intermediaries, training and technical assistance programmes will be needed to improve the latter's operational skills.

A third important subject in any private sector support policy is to develop

businessmen's skills and make ACP firms more competitive on both local and export markets. It is vital to encourage chambers of commerce and professional bodies to do more in the company development process and this is covered by Article 111 of the Convention mentioned earlier.

Two key factors, management and technology, are worthy of particular mention here.

An effort should be made to identify the management problems and specific solutions of ACP firms in the various areas of company strategy, human resources, marketing, financing and production.

Lomé IV (Article 111 (d)) provides for technical assistance with setting up specific programmes to train and develop the skills of heads of firms, particularly in small firms and the informal sectors.

As regards technology, which is the other factor of competitiveness, an increase in the technological autonomy of the ACP firms is fundamental. This means not only supporting the transfer of appropriate technology, but making a sustained effort to absorb and adapt it and, above all, to develop and distribute local technology.

So schemes are needed to help firms to identify and set up adapted technology and local technological institutions to develop appropriate processes for both local and export markets. ○ M.M.



Manufacturing parastatals — not so dismal after all

by Barbara GROSH (*)

As the wave of privatisation sweeps across Africa under various structural adjustment programmes, the debate has also come to the fore as to whether public or private enterprises make greater economic sense. In this article, which is admittedly technical, Barbara Grosh analyses a study of manufacturing in Kenya and comes down firmly in favour of government participation, albeit mostly in joint ventures.

Many believe that government ownership of commercial firms leads to inefficiency, protection and politicisation. Some believe that African economies will only improve when many parastatals (firms owned by the government) are privatised.

A recent data set for Kenya shows a more positive role for government participation. Within the same industry, public firms and joint ventures were generally more efficient and less protected than private firms.

There is little reason to expect either greater efficiency or greater profitability from selling government shares in joint ventures, or from totally divesting purely public firms. Taking private partners in purely public firms may lead to better performance.

The data

During 1985 the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry directed a study of the manufacturing sector in Kenya. The survey covered 77 manufacturing firms during 1984. Managers were interviewed and each firm completed a 17-page questionnaire with information on revenue, costs and capacity utilisation. We use those data here to analyse the impact of private versus public ownership.

The sample covered about 33% of net manufacturing output and 28% of manufacturing employment, with firms in 10 manufacturing industries. Between 20% and 45% of the employees were covered in all but two industries. For these two —

wood and furniture, and electrical and transport equipment — the coverage was only 5% and 7%, respectively.

The firms in the sample fell into three groups. Twelve were purely private, some owned by multinationals and some by Kenyan entrepreneurs. The government owned the rest of the firms either partly or wholly via one or more of Kenya's parastatal Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, the Industrial Development Bank, or the Development Finance Company of Kenya. The President of Kenya appoints the top managers of firms owned wholly by DFIs. Managers of joint ventures are appointed by their Boards of Directors, which include DFI staff and representatives of the private partner.

Table 1: Average measures of performance, by industry and ownership

Industry	ERP* (%)	DRC*	ROR* (%)	N*
1. Paper & packaging				
Joint venture	-30.4	1.54	2.7	2
Private	-13.8	1.71	3.5	3
2. Wood & furniture				
Joint venture	-13.6	0.97	8.3	1
Private	-29.6	0.94	missing	1
3. Food Processing				
Public	-2.7	0.28	121.8	1
Joint venture	4.1	0.91	19.1	3
Private	-2.1	1.51	5.5	9
4. Beverages & tobacco				
Public	-4.1	0.81	20.2	1
Private	17.2	1.18	13.3	3
5. Chemicals				
Public	38.1	0.82	32.1	2
Joint venture	49.0	1.08	24.5	3
Private	-9.4	0.99	9.8	10
6. Textiles				
Public	94.4	2.31	9.9	4
Joint venture	-17.9	1.16	2.1	2
Private	616.8	16.56	0.6	1
7. Clothing, footwear, other textile & leather products				
Public	-38.2	2.68	-4.5	1
Private	51.0	1.00	35.7	7
8. Metal & metal products				
Public	-61.6	1.53	-1.9	1
Joint venture	34.0	1.78	6.3	4
Private	169.0	5.20	3.7	6
9. Non-metallic minerals				
Public	-11.7	1.30	2.5	1
Private	104.8	2.05	12.8	1
10. Electrical & transport equipment & misc. manufactures				
Public	425.1	3.02	52.8	1
Joint venture	50.3	1.66	29.2	3
Private	521.4	4.16	33.7	2

Notes: Averages are means, weighted by value added.

* See over for explanations.

(*) The author is Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Senior Research Associate, Metropolitan Studies Program, Syracuse University. A longer version of this article appeared in the *Development Policy Review*, Vol. 8, (1990), 43-58. For information on parastatals in other sectors in Kenya, see the author's book *Public Enterprises in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't and Why*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1991.

Analysis

We make three sets of comparisons: public versus private firms, joint ventures versus private firms and public firms versus joint ventures. We compare the firms in terms of protection, efficiency and profitability. We compare firms within industries. The data reporting these comparisons are shown in Table 1.

Public versus private

Public firms were generally less protected and more profitable and efficient than private firms in the same sector. There were public firms in eight of the ten industries. In all except the chemical industry, the public firms showed a lower average rate of effective protection than did the private firms. In five industries public firms suffered negative effective protection.

The effective rate of protection (ERP) shows the degree to which trade restrictions encourage manufacture in Kenya. The ERP measures by how much factor costs (labour, rent, interest) for the stage of production done in Kenya could exceed costs for that same stage of production elsewhere, while the locally produced goods remain competitive on the local market because of tariffs. A positive ERP indicates local costs can be higher, while a negative ERP means that local firms must have lower cost margins to remain competitive in their home market.

Efficiency can be measured using the domestic resource cost ratio (DRC). The DRC ratio compares the value of resources consumed in domestic production with value added, both in social prices. The term 'social prices' refers here to world prices for traded goods or to shadow prices for non-traded inputs. A DRC less than one means that value added is greater than the international value of resources consumed. Such a firm uses resources efficiently by world standards. A DRC greater than one means that the value of resources consumed to produce locally was more than the value added. In such cases, local production drains the economy more than would import.

Public firms were more efficient on average than private firms in all but one industry—clothing, footwear, and other textile and leather products. In three of the eight industries public firms performed efficiently by world standards

Table 2: Distribution of capital stock by industry grouping and ownership classification (percentage of capital)

	Public	Joint ven.	Private
INDUSTRIES WITH NO EFFECTIVE PROTECTION^a			
Paper & packaging	2.1	68.2	35.6
Wood & furniture			
Food processing			
INDUSTRIES WITH MODERATE EFFECTIVE PROTECTION^b			
Beverages & tobacco	85.8	19.9	27.7
Chemicals			
Textiles			
HIGHLY PROTECTED INDUSTRIES^c			
Clothing, footwear, etc.	12.5	11.9	36.7
Metal & metal products			
Non-metallic minerals			
Elec. & transport equip.			
<i>Total portfolio</i>	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total investment (KSH M)	1,306.9	6,690.5	5,409.8
Number of firms	12	18	43
Average investment per firm	108.9	352.1	128.8
<p>^a Average ERP ranged from -27% to 2%. ^b Average ERP ranged from 14% to 35%. ^c Average ERP ranged from 50% to 112%.</p>			

(DRC was less than one). In the other five industries, the public firms were inefficient by world standards, but (in all but one) were more efficient than their private competitors.

In five of the eight industries, public firms were more profitable on average than their private counterparts. Their rates of return (ROR) are shown in the fourth column of Table 1. The public firms were less profitable in three as a result of lower protection. Only in the clothing industry did public firms have lower profits which could be ascribed to lower levels of efficiency. There, negative effective protection compounded the public firm's lower profits, while private firms enjoyed positive protection. Profitability was measured using the total return to capital, including interest costs and profits, divided by the replacement cost of capital.


Joint ventures versus private firms

Joint ventures were more efficient than private firms in five out of seven industries. They were also generally less

protected, but because of their greater efficiency, joint ventures always achieved rates of return which approximated or exceeded those of private firms. There were joint ventures in seven industries. In four of these, the joint ventures experienced nil or negative effective protection. The joint ventures had average rates of effective protection which were both positive and greater than those of the private firms in only one industry, chemicals. Thus privatising the public portion of joint ventures would probably not increase efficiency or profitability.

Public versus joint venture

In five industries there are both public firms and joint ventures. In two of those — textiles, and electrical and transport equipment and miscellaneous manufactures — the joint ventures had much lower effective protection. They were also much more efficient than the public firms, suggesting an argument for partial privatisation. The joint ventures reported lower average profit rates than did the public firms, so partial privatisation would probably not increase profits.



'There is evidence that joint ventures perform better than purely public firms'

**Table 3: Quantity index of manufacturing production
(1976 = 100)**

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Industries with no effective protection					
Index	132.7	140.2	145.9	160.8	175.7
% change		5.7	4.0	10.2	9.3
Industries with moderate effective protection					
Index	155.5	176.4	186.2	203.4	222.7
% change		13.4	5.6	9.2	9.5
Highly protected industries					
Index	353.7	316.3	293.0	277.5	270.6
% change		-10.6	-7.4	-5.3	-2.5
TOTAL MANUFACTURING					
Index	163.6	170.3	178.2	188.7	199.4
% change		4.1	4.6	5.9	5.7

Source: Statistical Abstract, 1988.

Capacity utilisation — key to efficiency

Public and private firms are less efficient than joint ventures mainly because of lower capacity utilisation. On average, joint ventures had 92% capacity utilisation, and their average DRC of .96 showed them to be efficient by international standards. In contrast, public firms averaged only 68% capacity utilisation and their DRC of 1.41 showed inefficiency. Had their capacity utilisation risen to 100%, their DRC would

have fallen to 1.05, i.e., they would almost have been efficient. Private firms had the lowest average capacity utilisation, 61%, and the highest average DRC, 1.46. Had they been able to operate at full capacity their DRC would have fallen to .96, i.e., they would have been efficient.

One reason capacity utilisation was low was cyclical. In 1984 Kenya experienced the worst drought in its history, with depressing effects on demand in many sectors, especially durable goods

sectors. Since 1984 public firms have probably improved their capacity utilisation, while private firms have probably had theirs fall. This conclusion stems from evidence in Tables 2 and 3. Public firms had 85% of their capital invested in sectors with moderate protection. Those same sectors have had rapid output growth since 1984, so capacity utilisation is probably up. Private firms had 36% of their capital invested in highly protected industries. Those industries have shown declining output since 1984, undoubtedly causing falling capacity utilisation.

Conclusion

The parastatal DFIs seem to have played a positive role in Kenya. They seem to have been especially effective in their joint ventures with private firms. These joint ventures have been efficient in most sectors, and never much less efficient than the private sector. They have also functioned with near zero average rates of protection, and made modest profits. In contrast the private sector has invested a substantial part of its portfolio in highly protected industries, shown low levels of capacity utilisation and inefficiency. It may be that government partnership has served as a form of reassurance to private partners, inducing them to invest in sectors where the payoff period is longer. The private partners may feel more confident that the regulatory environment will be consistent when the state has a stake than when it has none. When private firms are nervous about the investment climate they look for higher protection and shorter payoff periods.

There is evidence that joint ventures perform better than purely public firms. Joint ventures have the bulk of their investments in unprotected industries while public firms have the bulk of their investment in industries with moderate protection. However, even within the same sector, the joint ventures performed better than the public firms in two of the five industries. This may well be because of the way managers are appointed. Public firms' managers are appointed politically and may be either less qualified technically or simply more subject to various political pressures which negatively affect the efficiency of their firm. Private partners may push for technically qualified managers and resist political pressure. Enlisting their aid may be a good strategy for parastatal DFIs. ○

B.G.

BENIN

The democratic model



The Courier

Democratic rebirth — as this resolutely modernistic work displays

February 1990. Months of striking have brought the State to its knees. The Government takes the unprecedented step of calling a national conference ranging across the political spectrum in an attempt to handle the crisis. The conference, which has very broad powers, opts for a democratic approach based on human rights and a multiparty system and lays down new democratic guidelines. A new constitution enshrining the new democratic principles is adopted during the year that follows and municipal, legislative and presidential elections are organised. Nicéphore Soglo, the Prime Minister of the transitional period, becomes President, but ill health forces him to go to France for treatment as soon as he is sworn in. While convalescing, he appoints Désiré Vieyra Minister of State for Defence and for the Coordination of Government Action.

'Benin is an experimental laboratory both for the financial backers and the other countries of Africa'. The speaker, who has followed the democratic process closely, knows exactly what he is talking about, because his country is financing a major development programme in Benin. And indeed the Beninois experiment, universally agreed to be an outstanding example of its kind, has become 'a model for all those wanting their countries to avoid murderous upheavals of the sort

which have led to interminable bloodshed in Liberia and Somalia'.

The idea of a national conference as a way of freeing the bottlenecks caused by single-party dictatorship and autocratic management left Cotonou and spread all over the continent. Every opponent from Yaoundé to Conakry and N'Djamena to Lomé is now anxious for these exercises in collective exorcism, a mixture of vehement denunciation and contrite self-criticism against a background of socio-economic autopsies leading up to a general consensus on how to get out of the impasse. Some countries — Gabon and Congo, for example — have already had their conferences and have taken their emulation of Benin to the extent of having a man of the church in charge. Others — Niger, Mali and the CAR — are in the midst of their preparations, with a trip to Cotonou more or less a must. The Gabonese were in fact the first to go on an official trip and they were followed by the Malians, while the Congolese have been unofficially and those from Niger were expected in Benin at the time of writing.

The common concern of all these visitors is, of course, to get Benin's infallible recipe, not just for organising and running a National Conference of the Live Forces of the Nation (which is what

these sessions are officially called), but for scrupulously implementing the decisions the meeting takes — i.e. drafting and adopting a new constitution based on a multi-party system, legislative and presidential elections and respect for human rights.

Constraints of democracy

Benin's peaceful transition, ruffled only by clashes of political ambition in the Government (sometimes impeding State action), the occasional failure to stick to the agreed election timetable and one or two (in some cases violent) controversies at the polls, was thanks to the maturity of the country's political class. And everyone agrees on the particular effort made by the trio at the top during the transitional period — President Mathieu Kérékou, who was courageous and clear-sighted enough to lay his power open to question to avoid the sort of carnage which occurred elsewhere (he was rewarded with amnesty for all his deeds during his 17 years in power), Nicéphore Soglo, the former PM, who, as Head of Government, had to put the decisions of the national conference into practice and start up the state apparatus again (his compatriots showed their appreciation by electing him President of the Republic), and Monsignor Isidore De Souza, whose moral au-

thority, negotiating skills and innate sense of State worked wonders at the crucial time of the conference and then at the head of the High Council of the Republic, the legislative body of the transitional period.

Will all African countries seeking inspiration from the Beninois model find men such as these when the time comes? Let us hope so. But they are not the only ones to be watching what is going on in Benin. The funders too, of both bilateral and multilateral aid, are monitoring the situation closely, for others will be able to use the answers Benin finds to the problems of those hypertrophic civil services, unemployed graduates, bankrupt state firms and ill-adapted education systems which dog all the countries of Africa to one extent or another. What was sometimes brutal economic reorganisation has been wrought in Africa in the recent past, of course, but in most cases it has been imposed from the top by authoritarian regimes little concerned with the state of mind of the general public.

But things are quite different in Benin now. People do not hesitate to go out into the street and make their claims, trade unions are properly organised and regularly say what they think and the political parties — 14 of them stood in the elections — are active once more. So how can austerity measures be applied, even if everyone agrees, or claims to, that they are unavoidable? How can they be applied when they will, perforce, involve an even greater deterioration in the standard of living of already very poorly paid people? Democracy has its own constraints, as we know, especially the need for negotiation with employers and workers (with all the imponderables this entails), who may not always agree that certain issues are urgent.

Rumour or reality?

The Government may well have hesitated to take certain steps when elections were on the horizon, which is perfectly understandable, but now that the voting is over and the men and the institutions are there, the time of big decisions is upon it. So it is unfortunate that, just at this moment, a cog in the well-oiled machinery of Benin's move to democracy should go awry. The new President, Nicéphore Soglo, has been sick and was hospitalised in France, according to official sources with typhoid fever and a bout of sciatica, and it could not have

been worse timed. It has meant that the state of grace normally following presidential elections was not used for the most delicate reorganisational measures involving pruning the civil service to release money for investment. State revenue is just enough to cover the civil servants' pay at the moment, but only just. There is nothing left, not even for a drop of petrol or a ream of paper. The situation is obviously unbearable.

The most extraordinary rumours have been circulating about the President's illness. Nicéphore Soglo, they say, is under a spell cast by his political opponents (this is not Africa for nothing), or suffering from poison taken at an election meeting and afflicted with a strange malady which disappears as soon as he goes abroad but is doubly severe when he puts his foot back on Beninois soil, thus preventing him from doing his job. In May, well-informed people in Cotonou were giving details of an imminent



President Nicéphore Soglo visiting Brussels in January

announcement of a vacant presidency, without so much as a blush when they were told that the constitution did not allow for such a procedure in case of temporary incapacity of the President.

House of intellectuals

But all these rumours, which Mr Soglo's brief television appearances did nothing to dispel, ultimately created an unhealthy climate in Benin in the early winter and the new national assembly did nothing to help the situation by dragging out the discussion of its rules of procedure and delaying setting up its com-

mittees. Many people, including Monsignor De Souza, saw the MPs' shillyshallying as an attempt at buying time until the President came back to negotiate possible seats in the Government — a far more attractive prospect than heading a parliamentary committee. Such dilatory manoeuvring was child's play for a House that the Beninois with a mixture of pride and embarrassment, called the most intellectual parliament in the world. Almost all the 62 MPs are graduates, which, Robert Dossou, MP, told me, is because of a voting system whereby the heads of lists, who are always chosen from among the intellectual élite, are always elected.

The MPs are not the last to complain about this imbalance in national representation. Albert Tevodjéré, for example, the former deputy director general of the ILO and the leader of the Our Common Cause party, has no hesitation in saying that an extra House is called for, a sort of senate, for all those 'who do not necessarily speak French, because all the other institutions, the executive, the legislative and the constitutional bodies are for the privileged'.

Although the majority of these MPs support government action (48 of them have voted for Nicéphore Soglo at one time or another), the rest hesitate to come down frankly on the side of the opposition — if what State Minister Désiré Vieyra says is anything to go by. Is this because the programmes of the different parties are all based on the same crisis and propose very similar solutions? Or do people believe that the state of the economy is such that there has to be a consensus on the difficult measures that need taking? Some people, like Monsignor De Souza, are calling for a government of national unity or at least a common programme and it would be paradoxical if Benin's political class, which rightly fought the single party system, indirectly resuscitated it by being united. At all events, it is 'easy to be an opponent today', as Robert Dossou points out, 'because the problems facing us have built up over the past 30 years and they will not be sorted out overnight'... which means that there will be plenty of room for discontent which can be used to change people's opinions for some time to come.

Surrealistic debate

But with or without an opposition, there is one problem that the new Government has to tackle as a matter of

urgency and that is the student problem. For some time now, the university in Benin has been in a state of upheaval and has even been closed on a number of occasions. The students' main complaint is delay in the payment of their grants and university assistance — there are four months outstanding this year (two made available recently), nine for 1989 (the famous 'blank' year) and, most curiously, one for 1985 (May, the month of the strike). The Minister of Education, Paulin Houtoundji, says this last claim is 'ridiculous', because only 40 of the 250 potential beneficiaries are still following courses, the rest having been working or looking for work for years.

The grants debate takes an occasional totally surrealistic turn. An award of CFAF 25 000 (and slightly more for some professional establishments) per month goes to 2490 of the 9000 students enrolled in higher education. CFAF 100 000 per year goes to a further 1500 students if they are aged no more than 24 on 31 December in the first year of enrolment and have a mark of 11.5 out of 20 in the end of year examinations. The students fought hard for an age limit of 39, and then 35, before resigning themselves to the idea of accepting this lower figure — whereas 24-year old baccalaureate-holders in most other countries of Africa have no chance of this sort of state help and are sometimes not even allowed to enrol at all because places are so short.

The Beninois students who were the spearhead of the dispute which forced President Kérékou to agree to the idea of a national conference feel they have been

forgotten in all the changes. The workers, they say, have been paid for the month's strike. The Government is apparently not against paying some of the arrears, but, with structural adjustment, it only has CFAF 900 million for its home students. However, the Minister of Education was keen to point out that 'grants are not wages, contrary to what the students think. They are not a right, any more than the university is a parking lot for people to sit about while looking for something better'.

The only worthwhile suggestion, as he sees it, is to transform Benin's school system in accordance with the wishes of the education authorities, putting greater emphasis on vocational training and the standard of teaching. Education as designed to train civil servants at the beginning of the century is no longer what is needed now the civil service has reached saturation point. Here, as in many African countries, the diagnosis is correct, but the difficulty is breaking with a system which has created the problem but is still popular because of its successes in the past.

Educational reform is a necessity nonetheless. There are already 4000 young graduates looking for work and their ranks are swelling all the time, although the economy cannot find the welders or plumbers or electricians or modern farmers it needs.

First dividends

The schooling problem is undeniably one of the most difficult to solve. Fortunately for the Government, other, apparently equally difficult things — the



**Paulin Houtoundji,
Minister of Education**

banks, for example — are moving along the right lines. New private institutions have in fact sprung up on the ruins of the three national banks which were liquidated because 75% of their portfolios were irrecoverable (there were more than CFAF 124 billion-worth of doubtful claims). With democracy, the savers' confidence, damaged by having their deposits frozen when the state banks collapsed, has returned too. Four new banks have taken in upwards of CFAF 50 billion (almost half of it for the Bank of Africa, in which Beninois are majority shareholders) in a year. The fact that savers are beginning to switch home funds long in the hands of Togolese bankers to help their own country's development is encouraging, of that there is no doubt, and if the movement were to gather momentum, Benin would be cashing the first dividends of its new regime of freedom.

It has already had spinoff in the shape of more sollicitousness amongst the funders (the famous 'most democratic' of them) during the process of creating the new institutions. But their political interest will not last forever, particularly since Benin no longer has a monopoly on the move over to democracy, and the central issue — too much state spending — now has to be tackled as a matter of urgency.

It would be a drama for the future of democracy in Benin if political complications, even triggered by perfectly natural causes, caused any further delay in the settling of this problem. ○ AT.



Savers have more and more confidence in the new banks

Monsignor de Souza: 'People are too selfish and they do not show enough love for their country'

Everyone in Benin is convinced that much of the success of the National Conference was due to Monsignor Isidore de Souza, that rotund, good-natured, mischievous and highly moral man who masterminded the debates, and it came as no surprise when he was made President of the High Council of the Republic, the nation's legislative body for the transitional period, after the meeting — which he had in fact attended by chance when he stepped into the breach as an eleventh-hour replacement for the bishops' representative. Believers may well see this as the hand of destiny.



In this interview, Monsignor de Souza talks about the main economic problems the transitional government has had to tackle.

► *Monsignor, did the national conference perhaps neglect the economy a little bit...?*

— There were two crises. First of all, there was the economic crisis — the worst, the biggest and the hardest to do anything about. On top of that essentially economic and therefore social crisis, there was a political crisis and everyone in Benin believed the two were linked — bar the Head of State, who spent a lot of time in one of his speeches saying that he had not called the National Conference to go in for pointless political discussions, but because there was an economic crisis he wanted to find answers to. The crisis, to his mind, was essentially an economic one. I told him that there was a political crisis on top of it, as must have been obvious from the fact that the students and civil servants were unwilling to call off their strike until the political system had been changed. This political crisis was the star of the show and I have to say that the National Conference paid a lot more attention to the star than to the economic backdrop, although not without making some hints — but only hints — as to how the basic crisis might be handled. It called for the civil service to be reformed, for example.

► *Do you mean pruned?*

— Indeed I do, because one of the main reasons for our crisis is that every bit of Benin's State revenue goes into paying the civil servants, although they and their families only make up 10% of the nation and we have 90% of the population paying the taxes which make up the State

budget and only 10% getting the benefit. That's not right. There are the services which that 10% render to the nation and the economic and social effects of their wages, obviously, but it would have been better to have the State's income doing more. The civil service is enormous and it is easy to see why, because the State in fact thought it had to recruit everyone who had been to university into the civil service. It systematically took on all new graduates, without any idea of planning requirements or possibilities. You can't do that. There is no country in the world that can systematically give jobs to all its graduates.

► *I think the message has got across now and the students understand...*

— No, they don't. Not all of them. And there are people who have got into the civil service with forged diplomas or no qualifications at all. If we check on diplomas strictly, I think, we can cut out at least a third of the civil service, or at least reduce the staff who have only got the certificate of primary education instead of the baccalaureate they claim. They are classified in the light of their diplomas, after all.

► *But why hasn't this been done over the past year?*

— The executive should have set up a commission to do it, but it had to tackle the immediate problem of finding wages.

► *And there were the elections, weren't there, because if you lay off a third of the civil service, you have that many more dissatisfied people, don't you?*

— It is a complicated problem, I have to say. We Beninois are very complicated, as our present President of the Republic so often says. We want one thing and we want the opposite at the same time. We want to rationalise the civil service without laying anyone off and it can't be done. Yet we are very good at opposing Government action. I realise that we shall find that we haven't done anything like that which the National Conference asked when we take stock of this transitional period. As an economic measure too there was the privatisation of our State firms, but that has been done.

► *These were healthier firms, were they?*

— There are some privatisations which I don't personally agree with at all and the privatisation of the BCB, the Banque Commerciale du Benin, is one of them. I am neither a banker nor an economist, but I still think that we were stupid to liquidate the BCB. It wasn't even privatised. More privatisation is on the cards — the La Béninoise brewery, for example. Privatising that would be a lesser evil, but liquidating it would be another mistake. When companies of that sort go broke in a country where a lot of beer is drunk, it has to be due to bad management. If it were run properly, it would make a profit.

► *That looks as if you've developed a taste for political action*

— I was already talking like that before I started in this business.

► *Yes, but it probably didn't get you anywhere at the time...*

— It doesn't even now, because I'm not on the executive. I tried to oppose BCB liquidation as much as I could, but I failed.

► *They say the election campaign had much more to do with people than with ideas or programmes...*

— What I am about to say doesn't apply just to Benin. It applies to nearly all of Africa. For the moment, we are electing men, not choosing programmes. This is a dominant feature of Africa. Some of our parties proposed programmes, but they looked so much alike that, if you read one, you'd read the lot, as they were all based on the same economic, social and political analysis. And the candidates themselves didn't insist much on their programmes either. Even the President elect never mentioned his. He hasn't got one.

► *Is this structural adjustment?*

— By no means. Structural adjustment isn't a programme. It's now that the programme has to be designed and I hope it will be drawn up not just by him and the one or two parties which back him. I hope it will emerge from a national consensus.

► *You are for a government of national unity?*

— I'm talking about programmes, not governments. If I were President of the Republic, I wouldn't try and form a government right away. I'd start by trying to get some national consensus on a government programme and I'd call a mini-conference of about 60 people for this purpose; economists, experts and leading figures who hold the traditional power and are far stronger than the President in some fields, the leaders of all the parties represented in the National Assembly. And once the programme was ready, I'd ask them how many ministers they thought we needed to supervise implementation, insisting on the need to keep the numbers down on the grounds of austerity — to 10, perhaps, but certainly not 20 or even 17. Only afterwards would I tell them to leave my hands free to form my government to do all the things we had planned together. This Conference will be always kept in mind in all the draft decrees, so everyone will have the impression that it is his particular programme which is being implemented.

► *Who knows? People may well listen to you, but doesn't the North-South polarisation which appeared in this latest election campaign go against this kind of consensus?*

— Apparently, intellectually, yes. But psychologically and tactically, no. On the contrary, it may provide a solution for North-South polarisation. The fact of getting the people in North and South alike to say what they think, to meet and to discuss together, on the other hand, is going to foster cohesion.

► *Would you then put the moral authority which you enjoy in this country at the service of a government to explain that the State cannot do it all?*

— I haven't waited to do so. I met the students again last week ⁽¹⁾ and told them, *inter alia*, that there was no point in asking for the arrears for 1990, the year in which they did no studying, because the Government did not have the means to pay them. One of the things I called for was a social truce, with the trade unions dropping their claims and all of us trying to build the country together — the only way to get what they want. Even if they overturned the Government, the change wouldn't bring an immediate, automatic, magic answer to their claims. We have to stop the country going from government to government. We mustn't start on another series of *coups d'état* every three or four months.

► *Do you think there could be another coup d'état in Benin after all you've been through?*

— I have no illusions. There might not be another military coup, but there is nothing to say there won't be a civilian one. When you overturn one government after another, you may make people want more, army included — although we have practical evidence that this is no answer. Until we have decided to make an effort and make sacrifices and get resolutely down to work, there will be no answer.

► *Does that mean people have not yet got down to work again?*

— Frankly, I have to say that I have seen nothing serious or permanent designed to build the country so far. People are not disinterested enough, nor do they love their country enough. We aren't nationalists. We are individualists and egoists. We have to congratulate the transitional Government and its head,

the present President of the Republic, for setting people to work — but they are not yet working as they ought and they never will until every Beninois is convinced that his State is no welfare State. The State is there to try and give everyone the best living conditions, in cohesion, in peace and in tranquillity. But no-one is convinced of this yet. People — students, civil servants and peasants — expect the State to do everything for them. But it can't. Where would it get the money?

► *The fact that the President is sick and absent is creating a void at the moment...*

— It would be wrong for the period we are currently living through to last too long. This is why I personally am praying and asking people to pray to the Lord to make the President of the Republic better and restore him to full health soon, so that everyone can focus on him in the building of our country. Why are the MPs marking time in their discussions on the rules of procedure? I think — and I mean think, not assert — that one of the reasons for this is the fact that the new President isn't there and hasn't yet formed his Government. People cannot hold two posts — you can either be an MP or a minister — so there is every point in letting things hang fire, because, if they choose now they may well be biting their fingers tomorrow. So they are waiting and, to my mind, waiting is not in the country's interests. We are putting our personal interests before the State's interests and I am free to say so because I am not fishing for anything. I have not got my eye on any jobs or any material advantages and that is my strength.

► *To hear you talk, you could almost forget that you are one of the heads of the church in Benin. Is the church in your country finding recruitment difficult at the moment?*

— No. Quite the contrary. Under the previous régime, we lost our schools and they wanted to confine us to the vestry and the church and this was highly beneficial to the church. The less freedom we had, the more the ranks of the faithful swelled and now we are forced to push out the walls a little bit so everyone can get in. It's not just the Catholic church either. It's the same for the Protestants, for the sects and for the Moslems. Saying that there was no God in our country was enough to make everyone say that He was there. ◯

(1) The interview was on 6 May.

State Minister Désiré Vieyra: 'Aid will not be misappropriated'

Nicéphore Soglo felt the draught, as they say in Cotonou, when several of his Ministers angled for the presidency, and he wanted to have government action coordinated by someone in whom he had entire confidence. He could not have done better. For Désiré Vieyra is his brother-in-law

and, having been head of mission to the Prime Minister during the transitional period, he has a solid grasp of the priority issues in the country. In this interview in Cotonou in May, when President Soglo was still convalescing in France, Désiré Vieyra answered The Courier's questions.

► *The political transition went very smoothly indeed, but we have not seen any economic results yet. Why is this?*

— We are at the end of the transitional period and we have achieved all we set out to do. We have had elections and the institutions are there. We have got it almost completely right. But you don't get economic results until the medium term at least. It takes more than 12 months to get over 17 or 18 years of muddling and silting up and militaro-Marxism and corruption and confusion — one legislature at least.

► *You are going to have to force austerity measures on a population which has already been through a lot and wants something better?*

— Were I cynical, I should say that you have to amputate a gangrenous leg if you want to save the patient. There were 9000 people in the civil service when Mr Kérékou came to power and, 17 years later, there are 47 000. And I am not counting the State companies, where there are another 8000 ex-civil servants who will want integrating, or the army, which has swollen from 2000 to 12 000. What can we do? The World Bank has us on life support and it is forcing us to perform a number of clearly defined tasks, including pruning the civil service. If the drastic measures of the structural adjustment programme are to be applied, something has to go. The social side of structural adjustment has not escaped us and we have been trying to cushion the effects as far as possible with the World Bank and the IMF. We got these institutions to take decisions they declined to take before by making them realise that they had to help



us keep the social problems down if they wanted us to make a success of the move to democracy. They are asking us to liberalise, to reorganise the State companies or to close some of them down and none of it is easy. But it has to be done. As we have always said, if you are ill, you don't blame the doctor. And if he gives you something to make you better, you take it, even if it does taste nasty.

► *Will the President have the parliamentary support he needs to carry through these reforms?*

— We have got everyone who ever supported Nicéphore Soglo's application for the presidency together and checked on this and I don't think there will be any problems. Better still, I have talked to lots of MPs and found that the difficult thing today, paradoxically enough, is to locate someone willing to be in the opposition.

► *You are going to find yourself back in a single party situation...*

— And we can't have that... although I have talked with some very sound people and they are wondering why I am anxious to see them in the opposition. 'For the time being', they say, 'the President-elect hasn't done anything we object to. You can't force us. We shall join the opposition if we want to'. The argument stands up intellectually, of course, but my answer is that there has to be an opposition nonetheless, otherwise we shall be back in a single party system. But I repeat that the problem today is not finding a parliamentary majority. It's finding an opposition.

► *That is perhaps because all the parties are forced to have one and the same programme — structural adjustment.*

— Perhaps it is. But they don't all agree on the programme. It came under a lot of attack during the election campaign. A great deal of ink flowed over the idea of targeted departures, for example.

► *The unions are not keen on the redundancies either, are they...?*

— No they aren't, but you have to realise that the whole value and originality of the new régime is its transparency. We are putting our cards on the table. 'There they are. Look. Is that a good enough hand to win all the bids? Reasonably speaking, no. So choose your priorities'. That is how we stand with the unions and let me assure you that it works, it really does. That is all there is to it. Democracy. You tell the truth, you discuss things and you say, 'we are all in the same boat. What shall we do?'

► *And they say, 'yes, but you've got to redeploy those who are leaving'...*

— It isn't easy. We are getting something done. The country was in complete disorder, as you know, and the whole system of control was overthrown for reasons you can guess and we are now putting it back together. And what do we find? That the civil service is full of ghosts. But once we have audited, I am sure we will get back on our feet again.

► *Like many other African countries, Benin is short on own resources, isn't it, particularly with the costs of running a modern State, and this undermines any attempt at development planning...*

— That is absolutely right, because we are forced to rely on the outside world, on the funders. That is the way it is for the time being. Our only hope is that, if we boost our income and are stringent about spending, we can release something for investment within the decade. We shall manage if we can return the lost virtues of hard work, staying power, ingenuity and initiative to the Beninois nation, to which I am proud to belong. We can do so, we believe, by liberalising, but above all by governing transparently.

► *And by setting an example?*

— Yes. I was telling the German Deputy Foreign Minister recently that he could rest assured that any aid we received would be used to the best possible effect and that not a penny of it would find its way into a foreign bank account. If any member of the Government did that, he would not only lose his job immediately. He would be thrown into prison. The President would tell you the same thing if he was there. We are unyielding on this.

► *What about the funds which have already disappeared?*

— We are trying to get them back. We realise that the people are impatient, but this money is sitting in foreign banks which see no point in releasing it and will do all they can to hang on to it. If we want to get it back, our applications have to be

absolutely watertight, which is why we are taking our time in drawing them up.

► *Is there any idea how much is involved?*

— No, but it's a huge amount.

► *Ten billion or so?*

— We're talking of tens of billions. No Government ever had so much money as the one that preceded us. In this very room, before my very eyes, the Libyan Ambassador told Nicéphore Soglo just how much his country had given Benin — and it was CFAF 45 billion — before asking where it had gone. But we should have been asking him, because we weren't there at the time and we didn't know what the money was for, or where it went or to whom... and there are plenty more cases like it, you can be sure of that. We can perhaps only get a small amount of it back, but when we have finished getting our case together, everyone who has pocketed funds will be paying the price one way or another, because it would be immoral to let people going on swindling the nation.

► *Some people say that the democratic process will be threatened unless you get rapid results on the economic front. Is that true?*

— It could be. The people are impatient and not unreasonably so. They have had 17 years of deprivation and shortage and they want everything — and they want it now. The Government has to make them realise that economic recovery takes time and they have to be patient. But patience is unknown in our countries, as you know. When life expectancy is short, people are impatient, apparently, because they have no idea what the future has in store. But we are going to try and teach the people patience and hard work and patriotism.

► *Is that the latest motto?*

— No, it isn't. I put it like that, hard work and patriotism, because I have travelled all over Africa and found that patriotism is something we Africans lack. We do not love our countries — apart from the Ethiopians, who go on dreaming of home even when they have become refugees.

► *Is it a good thing or a bad thing, overall, to have Nigeria the giant next door?*

— Both. We cannot do without it, even if we are having enormous problems for the time being. Once upon a time it was a good thing, because the Naira was so strong that the Nigerians came here to do their shopping. That was when the previous Government earned all that money. And what did it do with it? God only knows. Now we have the other extreme. The Naira has been devalued and we go and do our shopping over there. Just wander about the streets of Cotonou and you see black market petrol on sale everywhere. We are doing our best, but we have not managed to put an end to it and I really wonder whether there is any point in trying to do so drastically when so many people with no other form of income live off illegal trading. That is the problem with the giant Nigeria. We have to live with it.

► *Then there are all those attempts at industrial development which will be stifled by competition from similar contraband goods from Nigeria...*

— It all depends. Nigeria may well have plenty of possibilities, but it does have a problem too, as it cannot meet the needs of its own population. If you produce goods of a high standard, Nigeria will buy them whatever the price because it does not currently turn out enough for its 110 million people. Even with all its breweries, it still buys beer from us, because it doesn't produce enough itself. We have to make the most of this by setting up the proper structures. Nigeria is still a big market, which is why I say it is both a good thing and a bad thing.

► *Will you be leaving politics after this interim period, or moving up?*

— I have always said that you cannot serve the people in every job. I was head of mission for a year and very few people even knew I existed. Now I am coordinating government action and if the President came back tomorrow and said I ought to go somewhere else, I should feel neither frustrated nor diminished. If I have to go back into the cabinet, I shall go back into the cabinet. The essential thing is to have the country's interests at heart. ◻ Interview by A.T.

The budgetary nightmare

Admitting today what could not be admitted yesterday changes nothing. 'Benin is on life support from its funders'. These are the words of Désiré Vieyra, the State Minister who coordinates government affairs, and indeed the country can no longer afford even the basics. Petrol for official cars for the foreign observers who oversaw the elections was unbelievably, beyond it and only recently it had to look for CFAF 700 million every month to top up the civil service wage bill. That is a thing of the past now it has just (and only just, the World Bank says) enough resources of its own to pay staff, although all other operating expenditure — office supplies and 'phone calls, for example, and the investment programmes of course — has to be financed, directly or indirectly, by external aid. This hurts the nation's pride and cannot therefore be expected to last, particularly since there is no guarantee that the donors' political interest in Benin's young democracy will not wane.

The Government can only hope to escape from this impossible situation by spending less or earning more. It has in

fact decided to do both, but in a crisis situation of this magnitude, it will not be easy. Any pruning of the already poor civil service pay is politically out of the question and cutting back on the wage bill therefore means cutting back on staff.

There were only 9000 civil servants 19 years ago, but there are 47 000 now, plus 12 000 soldiers (as against only 2000 in 1972) and 4550 students, who look upon their study awards and educational assistance as virtual salaries. The target for 1994 is 8000 departures from the civil service. Similar reductions are foreseen on the military side, with a French-financed plan for a cut of 800 personnel due to begin soon.

With State company reorganisation triggering acute unemployment and 4000-6000 graduates in search of jobs, the Government has taken infinite care with the squeeze that is the main component of its structural adjustment programme. There have even been terminological precautions. It began by talking about 'voluntary departure' from the civil

service and produced a plan to trim staff numbers by 2500, but the CFAF 3.9 billion available to fund it (CFAF 3.7 billion from the Community and the rest from Germany) only covered 1590 personnel. Paul Dossou, Minister for Planning and Economic and Financial Affairs, said that some funders were unwilling to help with this first batch of redundancies because they thought the average cost of CFAF 2.7 million was excessive. And the State had lost many of its expensively trained university professors, engineers, statisticians and other staff, for whom retirement was a real gold mine, with some of them getting more than CFAF 10 million.

The Government learnt its lesson from this and launched the idea of 'targeted departures', from which cadres who are vital to the proper functioning of the administration are excluded, but this was attacked from all sides and did not survive the election campaign, so now the message is "reinforced voluntary departures". But whatever the term, the aim is still to cut the State wage bill by some CFAF 1200 billion, this being one of the commitments the Government has made to the Bretton Woods institutions.

The unions will not hear of anything other than voluntary departures either. The first conversions of former civil servants were not a great success, they maintain, and their suggestion is a series of measures ranging from the laying off of all contract staff to cutting back on State



Two ways of combatting unemployment — black-market petrol sales in the informal sector and labour-intensive road improvements

spending, checking on civil servants' paper qualifications and dismissing all the 'economic thieves'. One point on which Paul Dossou agrees with them is the need to check on diplomas — and make sure that they are being used by the right people. 'A check through the files in the Ministry of Labour and Finance has revealed that 300 people were being paid in error and we are probably still paying 1900 deceased and departed officials' — roughly this year's departure target... so other solutions will have to be found for 1992.

Firmer control

Boosting State revenue is not easy. How can cash-strapped firms pay tax? Customs and excise are expected to be the best proposition here, for Benin has traditionally had a flourishing re-export trade with Sahel countries in the interior and neighbouring Nigeria especially. Fraud-control measures — exemption restriction and control, faster customs and documentation procedures, better technical assistance structures, computer management of customs operations and checks on imports in foreign ports of origin with predetermined duties and levies — are on the drawing board or already being implemented.

This should go hand in hand with firmer controls on Benin's land frontiers. They have been wide open so far and a whole range of goods, electrical apparatus, electronic equipment, beverages, clothing, detergent and so on, regularly crosses the border, especially the one with Nigeria. The busiest trade, however, is in petroleum products. The streets of Cotonou and the road to Porto Novo are lined with petrol stations, most of them with only a few litre bottles on a rickety table by a drum, with the indispensable funnel of course, and all supplied by this particularly lucrative black market. SONACOP, the official national oil marketing company, sells petrol at CFAF 165 per litre, but it only costs CFAF 100 from these new-style garages and the nearer they are to the frontier, the more the price drops, going down to as little as CFAF 60 or even CFAF 45 in Nigeria on the other side. Many Beninois fill their cars up abroad. One banker I heard of says he goes twice a week and pays CFAF 2500 for 50 litres every time instead of the CFAF 8250 it would have cost if his sense of civic duty had won the day over the family budget.



Paul Dossou, Minister of Planning and Economic and Financial Affairs

Two thirds of Benin's petroleum supplies are black market imports. The other third comes from SONACOP, which virtually has nothing but embassies and other official departments on its books now and is losing an estimated CFAF 5 billion a year because of it. But what the State loses in tax revenue, it gains in social peace, because this trade provides a living for thousands of Beninois with no other form of income.

This is why the Government has not put a sudden end to it, as Minister Désiré Vieyra readily admits, although it is trying to contain it by making the occasional example of big-time black marketeers. It is also trying to regulate the different components of this informal sector, which has expanded in such a remarkable manner. Without this host of small activities, from fast food by the roadside to car repairs and hawkers of every kind, the Beninois would find life much more difficult.

The informal sector does not just offer plenty of work in a country where jobs are short. It also offers good money. Drivers of those latter-day rickshaws, the Zemidjan ('take me quick') motorcycles, which reign supreme in the Cotonou taxi shortage, can earn as much as CFAF 4000 per day if they own their own machines. So it is easy to see why the State wants a special tax system to get what it can from the informal economy. But will it keep its dynamism...?

The CFAF-Naira tandem

Many people see the flourishing self-employed sector as one of the most promising answers to the unemployment crisis. But its expansion, like the future of the whole Beninois economy, is irrevocably bound up with what goes on in neighbouring Nigeria, for the economic situation in that vast market of 110 million consumers has a direct effect on economic activity in Benin. In the early 1970s when Nigeria had its oil boom, for example, the Naira was at its peak, the re-export trade prospered as never before and the country 'had never earned so much money', as Désiré Vieyra put it. But there was a complete slump when the frontier was closed in the mid-1980s. Trade between the two countries is currently hampered by the exaggerated disparity between the CFAF and the Naira since the large-scale devaluation of the latter — which has made Nigerian goods particularly cheap to Beninois buyers but has pushed up the price of Benin's exports to the Nigerian market. This, and the permeability of the frontier, means that 'very few industrial units make a profit', as Lucien Glèlè, the treasurer of Benin's employers' association who is in charge of SME-SMI promotion, told me, 'because they are the victims of competition from a weak Naira and Nigerian products which have the benefit of economies of scale. So agriculture is the only opening for the SMEs, because Nigeria will always have to import food'.

Although only half its arable land is under crop, in fact, Benin is self-sufficient food-wise and it could, apparently, become a food exporter fairly easily if the farmers had the right incentives. One of the rare successes recently has been in the agricultural sector, with the spectacular recovery of cotton production, which had slumped to around 20 000 t only a few years ago, and was up at 180 000 t this year.

But it is the entrepôt trade (Burkina Faso has just built vast storage facilities in the port of Cotonou) and the services sector which are expected to do the most for the 4.5 million Beninois in their little 113 000 km² country whose highly educated cadres once earned it the title of the Latin Quarter of Africa. The democracy Benin has undertaken, so originally, to create cannot but help it along the way. But first it has to solve its budgetary nightmare. ◯

A.T.

Unique context for EEC-Benin cooperation

by Michel PERETTI (*)

The climax of Benin's move to democracy came on 4 April with the investiture of the President of the Republic, who had been elected by universal suffrage.

It followed an economic, social and political crisis which culminated in 1989 in the collapse of the banks, a civil service wage stoppage and a general strike which brought the country to its knees.

This made a special context for development cooperation and, as far as the recent past at least is concerned, a unique one from the democratisation point of view too. Now however, with many countries in the same boat, it would be as well to see how the Lomé instruments were used to support and back up the changes in Benin.

(*) The author is the Commission Delegate to Benin.

Working towards democracy

Social peace again

There was a general strike in December 1989. The claims were financial — the workers wanted their wages and back pay — and political too, as there was a call for amnesty, for separation of the trade unions and the single party and of the party and the State and for official business to be run along more moral lines.

The priority of Government, industry, workers and cooperation partners was to revive social peace and get the country back to work.

The Commission of the European Communities had already decided to back up the international community's drive to help the Government (with about CFAF 9 billion), but since it was keen to see a return to political and social peace in Benin, it also indicated it was willing to

make an extra effort and, once the decisions involved in bringing back social peace had been taken and the Government and civil service representatives negotiated an agreement to bring the situation back to normal, an almost CFAF 1.4 billion was released in addition, to help pay the wage bill.

So the Commission made an entirely exceptional contribution to recurrent State spending in a crisis situation with a donation from the structural adjustment facility and reallocation of part of the national indicative programme funds to a rural development programme.

The fact that civil service wages were paid, political claims met with the High Council of the Republic and a transitional Government set up put things back to normal, which was the basis for the next step in the democratic process, the elections.

Free elections

Election results must be watertight if they are to have any meaning. The authorities of the transitional period — the High Council of the Republic and the Government, that is — therefore asked for observers from parliaments and other institutions in friendly countries to help and the European Parliament responded by sending Henri Saby, Chairman of the Committee on Development, to check on conditions during the legislative elections.

Righting the situation

With society at peace once more, the vital and urgent thing was to get the new reforms going so the books could gradually be balanced again. Basically, the idea was to reduce the public spending deficit, much of which was due to the fact that the wage bill was in no way compatible with State revenue.

The first step in the civil service reorganisation scheme, and one which brought the annual wage bill down by 4%, was the Commission's channelling of resources from the Lomé III national indicative programme into a CFAF 3.7 billion voluntary departure operation under which 1500 permanent staff left their jobs with an average of CFAF 2 480 000 in their pockets.

Traditional cooperation

It is important to realise that implementation of the national indicative



Michel Peretti (left) with Monsignor de Souza

12 million-worth of risk capital and an ECU 13 million contribution from the structural adjustment facility.

The idea is to make a further effort to right the nation's major economic and financial balance by helping with the structural adjustment programme and consolidating road infrastructure, health and agriculture operations financed previously.

Structural adjustment

Support for structural adjustment will be provided via import programmes. These should make for the speedy mobilisation of counterpart funds which can be used to reorganise the civil service, finance labour-intensive job creation to mop up unemployment in the towns and cover health, education and other spending in the social sector.

Decentralised cooperation

Now that Benin has its democratic institutions, it is important to encourage the people to take part in developing the economy so as to give full expression to democracy. Decentralised cooperation will be the order of the day in all sectors other, of course, than the major infrastructure.

Where there is a demand for it, participatory development will involve a wide range of local partners (decentralised authorities, firms, trade unions, teaching centres, research centres and rural and village associations) acting on their own initiative or in conjunction with European NGOs.

Benin's changes and new democratic framework have triggered hopes and expectations at home and abroad. What the country has to do now — with the help of its cooperation partners, amongst whom the Community and the Member States play a leading financial part — is show that democracy works.

This means that the rights and obligations which democracy confers must be understood, that social peace must be assured and that the various sections of the population must be encouraged to take an active part in the development process. It also means having a democratic process whereby the public will accept the difficult decisions involved in balancing the nation's books and reorganising the economy. ○ M.P.

	(CFAF million)
CONTRIBUTION TO STATE BUDGET	3 375
— start of school year 89-90	600
— study awards	200
— pension arrears	1 200
— wages for permanent civil servants (May & August 1990)	1 375
REORGANISATION OF THE BANKS	1 370
— standard reimbursement of deposits in excess of CFAF 50,000 (CFAF 50,000 per saver)	1 000
— unfreezing of Benin Social Security Office claims	300
— bank's social fund	70
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE PROGRAMME	3 740
— allowances for 750 staff	1 910
— allowances for 750 staff	1 830



The Courier

programme, focused on social and infrastructure schemes, continued during this time in spite of all the problems. In a period of economic crisis, of course, it is the most underprivileged sections of the population which are the hardest hit, but the health operation, covering the whole of the health service in the two coastal provinces where 33% of the population live, was to maintain basic treatment and ultimately guarantee care at a price everyone could afford.

Benin is traditionally a transit point for the Sahel countries and Nigeria, with import dues making up almost 30% of State revenue, so it is vital for the economy to keep up its transport infrastructure. The Community has continued to finance highway rehabilitation with this in mind, by paying 50% of the costs of the network of asphalted roads.


Cooperation in the new context

The Lomé IV national indicative programme, signed in February, combines ECU 83 million-worth of grants, ECU

During Lomé II and III, a considerable amount of Community finance went to the public health sector

COMMUNITY AID UNDER LOME		(ECU million)
Lomé II		66
— rural development		31%
— road infrastructure		35%
— health		16%
— miscellaneous		13%
Lomé III		117.11
— rural development		21%
— road infrastructure		35%
— health		4%
— structural adjustment		40%

WESTERN SAMOA



The Fale Fono or Parliament House

The Courier

Universal suffrage at last

To say that the past few years have been 'stormy' in Western Samoa, is probably putting it mildly. Cyclone Cina which hit the Polynesian island state in early 1989, is usually referred to as having been of only 'mild force', certainly when compared to cyclone Ofa which struck this Pacific paradise in February 1990. Although loss of life was fortunately limited, the damage was widespread — estimated by the authorities at US\$140 million, compared with a 1989 GDP of only about US\$110 million.

While the aftermath of Ofa is still very noticeable, there was another issue which was even more on the minds of the heavily politicised Samoans: universal suffrage. Long before independence, which Western Samoa achieved as the first Polynesian State in 1962,

this had been a subject of sometimes heated debate. Time and again, there had been attempts to change the electoral system, whereby only matai or titled family heads were allowed to vote, into one of universal suffrage. Time and again such a change had been fought off out of some undue fear that it would attack the core itself of the faa-Samoa or Samoan way of life.

At last, in October 1990 it became the issue of a plebiscite, the results of which led to a change in the Electoral Act: all Western Samoans of twenty-one years or more would now be able to cast their vote, every three years, for one of the 47 Members of their national Fono or Parliament. And so they did, on Friday 5 April 1991, in elections which are now being labelled as 'historic'.

'A simple and sunny heaven'?

Those were the words of the world famous writer Robert Louis Stevenson, when referring to the place where he spent the last few years of his life. Author of such classics as 'Treasure Island' and 'Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde', he was buried in 1894 on a hilltop near the capital Apia. Both his former house, now the residence of Western Samoa's Head of State Malietoa Tanumafili II and his grave now

figure high on many a tourist's agenda as a sort of literary pilgrimage.

Western Samoa is certainly a sunny place, occupying an almost central position in the South Pacific, lying just east of the international dateline (GMT-11), some 2900 km north-east of New Zealand and 4200 km south-west of Hawaii. Fiji is 1270 km to the west and Pago Pago, American Samoa only 130 km to the east. Samoa is in fact, the larger, westerly portion of the Samoa archipelago, the

eastern part being nowadays, the only US territory south of the Equator, sharing the same culture and language as their western brethren.

The country covers a total surface of 2841 km² which is mainly accounted for by the two largest islands, Savaii (1708 km²) and Upolu (1118 km²). The remainder is made up of 7 smaller islands of which only two are inhabited. The main islands, of volcanic origin, are mountainous with rugged forested interiors, frin-

WESTERN SAMOA

ged by coral reefs and crystal clear waters. 'It is sheer beauty, so pure it is difficult to breathe in it', wrote the somewhat lyrical poet Rupert Brooke.

A quarter of the total population of about 161 000, lives on Savaii, while most others (70%) live on Upolu, where they are heavily concentrated around Apia. Due to large net emigration flows, the natural population growth has had virtually no effect on total population which remained stable throughout the last decade. An estimated 100 000 Samoans live abroad, mainly in New Zealand, Australia and the USA and many Samoans still receive secondary and tertiary education in New Zealand. According to some, there are more Samoans living in Auckland than in their own capital Apia...

All in all, it may well not be such a 'simple' heaven — Western Samoa is said to have the highest suicide rate in the world, a quite surprising feature for a society where Christianity is deeply entrenched. Churches of such inspiration are to be found everywhere and the sheer numbers speak for themselves: there is one church per 167 inhabitants. And yet, half the children are said to be born outside marriage. The latter does not mean that the country shares the views of such anthropologists as Margaret Mead. Quite the contrary as is revealed in the following quotation which appeared in the 14 May issue of the Government published SAVALI news bulletin 'Like



The Courier


The old house of the writer Robert Louis Stevenson ("Treasure Island"), now the residence of Western Samoa's Head of State Malietoa Tanumafili II

when Margaret Mead came to Samoa looking for a panacea for adolescent problems in her country, and returned to America with 'Growing Up in Samoa' and falsely reported that there was free love and sex under every coconut tree here and the American people went all 'coconut' with sex while the Samoans continued with their taboo on free sex, and a desire to see proof of virginity on the night of the marriage'.

The ancient history of the Samoan islands may be difficult to retrace, yet the

Samoa language goes down as being the oldest existent form of Polynesian speech, which may be one reason to call this the 'cradle of Polynesia'. Most local myths and legends contain references to Fijian influence. In the middle of the fifth century, legends mention the powerful ruler Pili, whose sons, after his death, entered into a not-so-brotherly quarrel for power. Around 950 A.D., the Tui Tonga conquered Samoa and ruled over it for over 300 years, until Samoans finally united their forces and threw them out. One can only wonder whether today's underlying rivalry, sometimes expressed in a friendly way through a good game of rugby, at times less friendly through outright clashes between young Tongans and Samoans in Auckland, goes back to these early stages?

The islands were first visited by Europeans in the early 18th century and most sources refer to Dutch explorer Jacob Roggeveen as the 'discoverer' in 1722. Later in that century, French navigators such as de Bougainville called in on the archipelago. It was not until 1830 that missionaries from the London Missionary Society settled to propagate their message and values. By the mid-19th century, German planters and traders were beginning to make their way to these parts of the world, making Apia their main centre of Pacific interests. Other Western nations, the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, showed an increasing interest. Each one



manœuvred to establish its influence by exploiting the divisions between the traditional Samoan factions that were squabbling for power and control. The three powers involved, the USA, the UK and Germany finally ended up, at the turn of the century, making a deal which split the archipelago into two parts: the Eastern part went to the USA and Western Samoa came under German administration. Samoans, even nowadays, may regret the split, but they had no say in the 'deal' as they were weakened then by their internal divisions. At the outbreak of World War I, New Zealand occupied Western Samoa and in 1918 they were granted a mandate over the territory by the League of Nations. After World War II, the United Nations Trusteeship Council made it a UN Trust Territory administered again by New Zealand. As of 1954, internal self-government was progressively introduced and by October 1960, an independence Constitution was adopted. Thus, Western Samoa became the first independent Polynesian State on 1 January 1962. At that particular moment in history, Western Samoa had two joint Heads of State, being two of the four paramount chiefs: when Tupua Tamasese Meaole died in April 1963, Malietoa Tanumafili II became the sole Head of State, with functions analogous to those of a constitutional monarch. He will hold the office for life; thereafter the Head of State will be elected by the Legislative Assembly for a five-year term.

Universal suffrage and the dignity of the matai

What precedes is clear proof that in Western Samoa, modern government is intricately intertwined with custom and tradition. The '*faa-Samoa*' or Samoan way of life stands quite apart from all other societies in the Pacific by its distinctive system of chieftainships. There is a pyramidal hierarchy of graded titles of mainly two kinds: titular and orator chiefs, and traditional authority is vested in so-called *matai*, the heads of extended families or *aiga*. Each extended family appoints by consensus, at least one *matai*, who in turn is assisted by one or two orators who serve him in numerous tasks and duties in the village. At family level, there is a sort of built-in social security system whereby the *matai* looks after the well-being of all his *aiga*-members. The notion of consensus is important as unlike in other Pacific



The Courier

The main islands, of volcanic origin, are mountainous with rugged forested interiors

States, there is no segregation here: every Samoan can be elected to be a chief by his family; he is not born to it, nor does he automatically inherit the title. Yet the role of a *matai* is not to be underestimated: the holder of such a title has nearly complete authority over the use of customary land, and their responsibilities in economic, social and political affairs is widespread. Each of the 362 villages has its own *fono* or council where *matai* meet and exercise legal powers vis-à-vis village rules. All untitled men, young and old, belong to the *faa-taulelea*, a village organisation which not only serves their own families but also the village as a whole.



The Courier

'It is sheer beauty, so pure it is difficult to breathe in it' — a lyrical description by the poet, Rupert Brooke

Politically speaking, until the last elections, it was really a question of 'to be or not to be... a *matai*'. Voting was in fact restricted to the *matai*: they elected, every three years, 45 out of the 47 members of the Fono or National Parliament, the remaining two being elected by the universal suffrage of some 2000 voters on the individual voters' roll, citizens mostly part-Samoan or of other origins.

Yet the main strength of the *matai* system, as the lynchpin of Samoan society over the years became, in political terms, its major weakness as, through a dramatic multiplication of titles, it began to undermine itself. Whereas before the 1962 Independence, few young men were given a *matai* title, normally having to wait their turn until the old *matai* died, over the years more and more titles were created. By doing so, some felt they could, as it were, buy the allegiance of a series of new voters. The figures rose quite dramatically: there were only about 13 000 *matai* in the mid-1980s, but by the time of the October 1990 plebiscite on universal suffrage, the number of *matai* registered at the Land and Titles Court was over 20 000, and a few thousands more were still unregistered as they were being disputed or challenged. Says 'The Savali Bulletin' on this issue: '... people have been sick of all the corruption arising out of some candidates' selfish pursuit of power for personal gain and prestige. They saw the creation of *matai* titles as the sign of nothing else but pure greed, and they demanded solutions. Some members of Parliament who fell to the same temptation of creating more *matai* to gain more votes in elections, have genuinely regretted their mistakes. They did not know at the time that they had opened a Pandora's box of viruses which would affect the body of Samoan culture and customs, let alone politics, for many years after'.

It is against this background that the long battle to achieve universal suffrage (see also the Prime Minister's interview which follows), and the positive outcome of the October 1990 plebiscite has to be seen. It is really not for lack of trying that it took so long to bring about universal suffrage. There was uncertainty in the minds of many people, mostly stemming from fear of the unknown. There were also hardliners who strongly opposed the whole idea and succeeded in fighting it off



The Courier

Each of the 362 villages has its own fono or council where matai meet and exercise legal powers vis-à-vis village rules

for many years. According to The Savali 'they believed that universal suffrage would erode the dignity and authority of the *matai*, because they believed that when the *taulelea*; untitled men, and women were entitled to vote, it was the same as giving them the right to sit and speak in the council of chiefs and orators, 90% of whom are men. This, to them, is like controlling the affairs of the villages, from under the breadfruit and coconut trees and not from within the house of the council of chiefs. Where then is the *faa-Samoa*, the hardliners asked'.

The fear for erosion of the dignity of the *matai* from within through unduly multiplying titles, obviously put more weight in the balance as was shown in the

October 1990 Plebiscite. Of the two questions put to the people, the one on the opportunity of introducing a bicameral system was rejected, yet when asked to grant everyone 21 years of age and over the right to vote, there was a majority in favour. Changes to the Electoral Act thus allowed an historic step towards full democratisation, raising the number of voters from 20 000 *matai* only to about 56 000 — '21 plussers'. Though some tried to cast doubts until the last minute, evoking the possibility of violence on election day, the 5 April polling process witnessed nothing of that kind; a further proof of what Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana calls 'the political maturity of the country'.



The Courier

Women and young people have been the main beneficiaries of the adoption of universal suffrage

That is not to say there were no surprises. On the contrary. The Leader of the outgoing Opposition for instance, who holds one of Samoa's four paramount titles, lost his seat to a newcomer. Under the '*matai* only' voting system, *matai* loyalty would probably have been strong enough to carry him through. Under universal suffrage, neglect of one's own constituency — as he admitted himself — is an error rarely forgiven to any politician.

Universal suffrage could definitely give a further boost to a more solidly entrenched 'party' system. Indeed, until well into the 1980s one could not really talk of political parties but rather of like-minded factions of *matai* representatives. Within 45 days of the three-yearly elections — a system which certainly keeps politics lively — a majority in the Fono, elects, by secret ballot, both the Speaker and Prime Minister, the latter having then the task of selecting the other eight Cabinet Ministers. Loyalties to the two main parties, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) — the winner again last time round — and the Samoa National Development Party (SNDP) usually called the Coalition, have been known to shift relatively easily, and members or whole factions 'crossing the floor' have often added spice to the political debate. It is not surprising therefore that for the second time, candidates had to sign a contract 'binding' them to their party and providing for very stiff penalties in the event of desertion. Of course, every contract has its weak points and some might say they are much too one-sided...

Back to business

Now that most of the political dust has settled, the new HRPP Government will have to get on with what Prime Minister Tofilau Evi Alesana calls 'the tasks of nation building'. As he declared in his speech at the swearing-in ceremony of his new Cabinet on 14 May, apart from a major reconstruction programme, tackling the damaging effects on infrastructure of cyclone Ofa, as well as efforts to be undertaken in the productive and social sectors, 'the greatest emphasis possible will be placed on the development of the private sector'. 'My own experience has shown too often that our country's economic growth and the generation of



Total damage caused by cyclone Ofa in February 1990 was estimated at US\$140 million

new jobs for our young people leaving school, can only be expedited if we are to create a more favourable investment climate for our entrepreneurs generally', he argued.

That might be easier said than done as there are a number of major constraints to any development. Without being exhaustive, there are the problems caused by geography and climate, such as the distance from overseas markets, the rugged interior, the occasional droughts and of course the exposure to cyclones; the natural resource base essentially limits potential to agriculture, including forestry, fisheries and tourism. The economy is still largely dominated by agriculture which represents about half of GDP. Mostly still at subsistence level, and marked by low productivity, it nevertheless provides well over 80% of the country's export earnings. However, it falls short of providing enough employment opportunities, pushing some of the most skilled and enterprising manpower to emigrate, causing shortages of labour here and there. Most of the major crops, dominant both in terms of domestic consumption and exports, have been hampered by adverse conditions, be it coconuts, cocoa or bananas, and in effect, only taro stood out as a winner over the past few years.

Finance Minister Tuilaepa Sailele could not agree more that there have been and still are problems in the agricultural sector: 'We have obviously not yet fully recovered from cyclone Ofa which not only damaged a lot of infrastructure, but also affected very badly most of the tree crops. But it wasn't just Ofa; since the

latter half of 1985 we have had to face persistent low international prices, which by no means provide an incentive to our producers. Only coconut cream and taro export receipts grew significantly, yet even for the latter, market outlets, mainly in New Zealand, Australia and the USA, are limited and one must beware of oversupplying and possible price drops'.

Ofa really could not have done more to expose the vulnerability of this small island economy. Not allowing for the cost of lost agricultural production — difficult to estimate at the time — the total bill

came to some US\$140 million. Whole villages were flattened, thousands were made homeless, schools and hospitals were destroyed, power and water supplies were cut off, an inter-island ferry was grounded, port facilities were smashed and those parts of the roads that were left, became a nightmare for brakes and suspension. Repair works to roads in particular will still require massive investment and the Prime Minister bluntly admits in an interview (which follows), that 'had the state of infrastructure been the issue of the last elections, we wouldn't have won...'

Economic performance, with a GDP growth rate already floating between -1% and 1% in the latter part of the 1980s, obviously suffered much from Ofa's devastating effects. Together with deteriorating terms of trade, Ofa sharply widened deficits in both last year's merchandise trade account as well as the current account of the balance of payments. Export earnings dropped by 30% to only 21 million Tala or Western Samoan dollars (1), while imports rose by 9% to an all-time high of WSS186 million. Quite surprisingly, however, the overall balance of payments showed a surplus of WSS38 million, up 15% over the previous year. Not only did external assistance rise sharply; Samoans abroad were also moved by the devastation caused by Ofa and their remittances reached almost WSS92 million allowing their families to undertake necessary rehabilitation works. Their combined



The Courier

**Tuilaepa Sailele,
Minister of Finance**

'... it wasn't just Ofa; since the latter half of 1985, we have had to face persistent low international prices...'

(1) 1 Tala or Western Samoan dollar = ECU 0.35 (June 91).



The Courier

Coconuts, like most other crops except taro, are facing low productivity

efforts put Western Samoa in the comfortable position of having enough foreign reserves (WSS\$161 million) to cover over nine months of imports of goods and services.

Though some outside observers fear remittances may drop as links with overseas Samoans risk becoming weaker, Finance Minister Tuilaepa Sailele remains confident: 'Our cultural ties will always be strongly maintained through both family ties and church communities. Wherever our people go, they will never forget those who stayed behind. There have been recessions before in New Zealand, Australia and the USA, but remittances will for a very long time continue to remain very strong'. 'Of course, what happens out there can only be a further incentive for us to try and create more jobs over here, for instance in small scale manufacturing and tourist facilities even if that may be a tall order', he felt. Yet it can be feasible, as is illustrated by the pending opening of a plant for the production of car wiring systems, which will create some 300 jobs. Also the success of neighbouring countries such as Fiji with the development of a garment industry have further pushed government to renew as a positive measure, investment laws and incentives.

Trying to boost agriculture

The new Agriculture Minister Jack Netzler is really an 'old hand', not only in the sense that he held the portfolio in the

early 1980s, but also because he, together with Tuilaepa Sailele (the financial 'Wizard') are the only two Ministers who were also in the PM's previous eight-man team. Jack Netzler is also one of the two MPs elected by the 2097 individual voters of non-indigenous origin. He has the reputation of a 'doer' and has a no-nonsense approach to his new job (before, he was in charge of Public Works) based on experience drawn from



The Courier

Jack Netzler,
Minister of Agriculture

'There has been too much talk about diversification and not enough doing'

his own farm. His mind seems set this time on one target: 'To get agriculture really on the move'.

There have been a number of structural changes already, for instance with the privatisation of the Marketing Board which, for lack of proper management ran into a lot of problems. Of course, private operators who took over the job still have to establish and consolidate their contacts with overseas buyers. The huge WSTEC operation is also in the process of being privatised with the exception of one farm on each main island. The government-owned Western Samoa Trust Estates Corporation — old German plantations seized after WWI — previously controlled some 30 000 acres and used to be the main commercial farm supplier in the export sector, but its performance never lived up to expectation. 'The Lands Corporation is now subdividing former WSTEC land for leasing it out to farmers, but we will have to monitor this operation closely so that the level of future leases still make it worth the farmer's while', says Minister Netzler. In fact he feels that most of this sector should be deregulated and privatised, including his own Department: 'We should really only stick to extension services and our very strong research branch'.

Most of the traditional crops have suffered major setbacks for a variety of reasons, and Ofa is not just to blame. Bananas have virtually disappeared from the market as they no longer measure up to New Zealand import standards. Cocoa has ceased to offer a reasonable income to planters and rehabilitation of old plants has been too slow. Coconut oil not only faced a sharp drop in world prices but also the effects of a campaign against 'tropical oil' given — according to some — its high cholesterol content.

'There has been too much talk of agricultural diversification but not enough doing' feels the Minister newly in charge. Besides attempting to rejuvenate certain crops like cocoa or modernising the coconut oil mill, both in terms of processing and putting out new end products, the Minister is looking for crops which would rapidly turn into good foreign exchange earners. Apart from vanilla — which would take longer to establish and be more labour intensive — the Minister is thinking of spices, in particular ginger, which could quickly

produce good export results, as is already proven by Fiji's success in this area. Forestry and fisheries too have potential for development; some local timber types could fetch high value but resources have to be monitored carefully. The same goes for fishing where, because of the lack of the old village controls, fishing in the lagoons increasingly depletes resources. Further out, species like red snapper could be profitably exploited. The Minister also feels that there will be a need for 'some changes in the social way of life'. 'What good is it for instance to look theoretically at livestock development, when resources are often severely depleted to provide ceremonial and social functions in the villages?' he wonders.

Tourism: a more clear-cut approach

Some used to feel government had a somewhat half-hearted approach to tourism development, thinking it refrained from pushing ahead with it for fear of exposing the *faa-Samoa* to too much foreign influence, yet Finance Minister Sailele does not agree: 'We just had a lot of constraints to overcome. Look for instance at the upgrading of the airport we had to carry out, in order to make long distance flights land here instead of just overflying us. It was quite a struggle convincing major airlines to come here, but you are always in a chicken and egg situation. If the potential hotel investor holds off for lack of air capacity, the carriers can hold off for lack of hotel infrastructure'. Jack Netzler who has a particular interest in civil aviation and therefore combines it with his farming portfolio, could not agree more: 'Red tape makes flying in this particular region of the world a difficult business and it is very hard to talk about anything regional in this area for everybody has his own way of doing things'. Not surprisingly therefore Air Pacific, once a regional carrier, lost its regional shareholders and became only Fiji's national carrier.

Vensel Margraff, Director of the Western Samoa Visitors' Bureau keeps a worried eye on current downward economic trends in his major tourism markets, mainly New Zealand, Australia and the USA, as they may adversely affect his sector. Besides the classic tourist assets, he feels additional attractions can be provided to improve his product: more sightseeing, archeological and historical sites, tracks for wanderers from all over



The Courier

The Vava'u regional tourism project, still under construction, could become 'a stepping stone to village participation in tourism projects'

the world, nature reserves. Some conservationist societies from Sweden and the USA are already active in this field, but more are welcome.

Mr Margraff is 'thankful to the EEC's longstanding record of assistance to this sector and in particular to the varied and all-encompassing help supplied by the EEC-backed Tourism Council of the South Pacific, which is now in the process of elaborating a Tourism Development Master Plan'.




The Courier

Vensel Margraff, Director of the Western Samoa Visitors' Bureau
'Tourism should not interfere with day-to-day life in the villages'

Although the *faa-Samoa* and culture are major assets, he strongly feels that 'tourism should not interfere with the day-to-day life in the villages', though it clearly can have an impact on the village dominated land tenure system. He continues, 'applications of investors should be processed in a more proper way, as it is frankly often the cause of many problems'. Such was the case for instance with the Vava'u tourism project, a TCSP regional project still under construction which suffered a lot of setbacks originally due to the land tenure system. Yet the originality of the concept — the promoter being the local village council — will make this in his view 'a stepping stone to village participation in tourism projects'.

Challenges ahead

The land tenure system may in some cases be a hindrance to quick economic development. In the view of Education and Labour Minister Fiame Naomi, 'it still constitutes a basic security, which is not guaranteed in many other places'. Fiame Naomi, a daughter of Western Samoa's first Prime Minister, and member of the World Executive Committee of the Young Women's Christian Association, is one of two women MPs and the first woman ever to join the Cabinet. 'I stood for the third time in these last elections, and must be con-



The Courier

Youth are Samoa's future: how will they be affected in the long term by the transition to a universal franchise-based democracy?

sidered by now to have been long enough in politics, which does not mean women could not handle this job before'.

Apart from furthering the debate on the introduction of compulsory education, she will obviously stick to her party's manifesto as far as her objectives are concerned. This would involve bringing about a number of projects such as, for instance, the upgrading of the Technical Institute to full Polytechnic level, the relocation of Samoa's National University, and increased attention to the training of and infrastructures for teachers. She certainly faces a number of bottlenecks which form a challenge of their own: 'I am in the difficult situation of having to match overcrowded classes in the cities, due to urban migration, with a shortage of teachers'. The urban drift is indeed on the rise and leaves many rural schools empty or under-utilised while making city classrooms overflow with pupils. 'We will have to prioritise our education capital investment accordingly', she feels.

When asked about possible changes to the *faa-Samoa* due to the pressures of modern life, she gives a very well-balanced answer: 'In the long term, our resources, limited as they are, will always have an impact on our culture: our model is based on the sharing and equitable

redistribution of common resources within the extended family. Of course, part of this is typically Samoan but we do share a good deal of our culture with other more universal values, so really I don't see the need for a sort of cultural struggle to fight off influences from the *palangi's* (whites). Let us not be hypocritical about the advantages it has brought to us and not forget there are

deeper issues to culture than just performing arts. As long as there are Samoans, there will be a Samoan culture with its own community-based social fabric. Yet the more I travel, the more I see that people are really the same everywhere, and workable social units exist everywhere, though in different forms and in different degrees of intensity'.



The Courier

**Fiaame Naomi,
Minister of Education**

'... as long as there are Samoans, there will be a Samoan culture with its own community-based social fabric'

The biggest change so far, the introduction of universal suffrage, has not really altered much in her view, at least not yet: 'The irony of it all is probably that most new voters, mainly women and young people — of the previously 20 000 *matai*, only 300 to 500 are women — still followed the old *matai* criteria of family allegiances, kinship ties or church affiliations. The real change will come about in the minds of the politicians and decision-makers. They will have to start wondering what those new groups of voters, women and young people, will think of certain issues, as people in power must always read what lives among their electorate'. The real transition from the former *matai*-only village consensus model to modern universal franchise-based democracy will indeed only start now, after the 'historic' elections. ○

Roger DE BACKER

'The country has reached political maturity'

declares Prime Minister Tofilau Efi Alesana



Le Courrier

On Tuesday 7 May, Tofilau Efi Alesana, now 67, became Prime Minister of Western Samoa for the fourth time. As leader of the Human Rights Protection Party, he had won 30 of the 47 seats in Western Samoa's Fono or Parliament in what are now already referred to as the 'historic' elections of 5 April 1991. They were indeed the first ever to be held under universal franchise in the country. A week later he presented his new Cabinet to the Fono, surprising more than one observer as he kept only two of the previous eight Ministers on his new team. Though planning to increase the number of Cabinet Ministers — which would need a change

to the Constitution, and a 2/3 majority — this move may not be without political risk: after his 1985 election win, he made the same move — keeping in fact only the same two Ministers on his team as today — but within a few months the snubbed Ministers defected and made his government collapse. Yet in Western Samoa's ever so lively politics, Prime Minister Tofilau seemed more confident than ever when he met with *The Courier* magazine, highlighting above all, the long and difficult path to universal suffrage and the importance it has for the faa-Samoa or Samoan way of life.

► Prime Minister, you have just won another electoral victory, somewhat different from the previous ones because it was the first on the basis of universal suffrage. What in your view were the reasons of your success this time?

— First of all, I do not regard this victory as a direct result of my political management. It was rather the result of the fact that the country has reached political maturity. Political maturity was the key this time, because I feel that if Western Samoa had still been under its former traditional way of philosophy, we could not have won the election. It is only because of the modern trend of political thinking in the country that support came to my party.

As you know my party is the Human Rights Protection Party and the people know that I am desirous — as are my party's supporters and parliamentarians — that the rights of the people are not only protected but exercised as well. This was illustrated by the Introduction of the Bill for universal suffrage.

This notion of adopting the modern trend of democracy through universal

franchise and the right of all people to cast their votes, had been on our books for quite some time. It was already mentioned in our first Constitutional Convention in 1954 by one of our great leaders, Mataafa, who also became our first Prime Minister. He strongly presented his case in the House, which was based on granting the right to non-titled persons to have a vote and have a say in their government.

► Why did it take so long before the idea came to fruition?

— As I said, it took time for the country to become politically mature. Remember, it was mentioned again in the Constitutional Convention of 1960; there was a motion in the House moved by one of the well-known matai, Paitomaleifi, to grant universal suffrage for the election of members of the Parliament. It was rejected then by the majority but there were some matai who voted for the motion. Again, in 1968, an MP moved another motion to grant to those who have attained the age of 21 the right to vote. That motion was also lost, but six members of Parliament voted for the

motion, including the current leader of the opposition.

When Tupua Tamasese Efi came into power — the former leader of the opposition, who fell from power as a result of the recent elections — he appointed a commission to investigate the importance of electoral franchise and whether the country still favoured the system of matai franchise, dually with the individual voters' roll which concerned only about half a percent of the population. That commission was chaired by our former Prime Minister Tupua Tamasese Lealofiaana IV. His recommendation to the House was to change to universal suffrage and that was again rejected by the House.

In 1984, a further motion was submitted by a Parliamentarian in the House but with a wording different from the previous ones. She wanted the voting right to be given to those who had attained the age of 25 upward, not 21 upward. That motion was seconded by Tupua Tamasese Efi who was then leader of the opposition and I was the Prime Minister at the time. So I appealed to the proposer of the motion saying I didn't think it was

the right time — motions of this sort had been put to the House before and were heavily defeated, because the majority of the members were matai. I suggested that she withdrew her motion until after the general elections in 1985, pledging that if my party, the HRPP, was returned to power, I would introduce a general referendum on universal suffrage so that the people might express their views. The then leader of the opposition, Tupua Tamasese Efi also pledged that should his party be returned to power, he would introduce a plebiscite, which he did not do when we were ousted from power shortly thereafter.

I won that election, obtaining 31 seats, but after only three months, a motion of no-confidence, engineered by some members of my own HRPP party, was moved against me. Some of them were not reappointed to Cabinet by myself, so they turned around and formed a faction and that faction moved the motion, which ousted us from power. So that is the history of this key issue.

My honest reply to the question is that I think our victory was very much due to political maturity within the country. If people had wished to express themselves this time on such issues as the improvement of infrastructure, we would not have had a chance to come back to power, because you have seen the state of the roads and of the water and electricity supply. They are all in a pretty bad shape.

People did not consider that. That is why I am sure it is the political maturity that accounted for our breakthrough.

They felt they had a unique chance to express themselves for the first time under universal suffrage. Maybe, if after the current term we can't prove to them that we can do some work on infrastructure, then they can decide otherwise because the majority of them are now non-matai of the age of 21 or over.

► *To what extent could this change the Samoan way of life, because it is quite a change by Samoan standards?*

— My personal feeling, and it has been proven during the course of the last election campaign, is that the last election was the smoothest ever experienced in this country because people were happy with the opportunity. So I anticipate no marked change to our cultural system. Take the case of American Samoa where they have adopted and practised this system of universal suffrage for some 20 years now, yet their matai system is still well under control and is still the best showpiece of the Samoan way of life.

► *Much more so than here?*

— Much more than here, because they still stick to one matai, to one title per family. Here, there was a multiplication of matai, I think, so that one family reached the number of 70 or 80 titled people and this meant a ruination of our matai system.

That was exactly one of the reasons why I strongly advocated the change in our voting system, because matai who were candidates in an election could easily turn around and establish matai and have them registered. If I registered about 100 matai, that means I had

already 100 strong voters supporting me. That happened, I think for the first time in 1967. Such undue multiplication of matai titles started the ruination of the matai system. So I no longer worry about any future diminishing of the dignity of our system or of our culture, as augmenting the number of matai no longer has electoral consequences.

► *You have just constituted a new government — taking a political risk because you drastically changed its composition. What do you want to achieve with this new government?*

— Firstly, there is the continuation of programmes that we have already started. As I mentioned earlier, our road system is still in bad shape, as a result of cyclone Ofa. Now we have financing facilities lined up for those road works from a number of donors. These will assure the continuity of ongoing programmes.

Then there are some new programmes that I have in mind and these are aimed at further opening-up Western Samoa to the outside world. Number one is a deep sea harbour that will go along with a small airstrip to cope with the inter-island air traffic. Those are really uppermost in my mind. Any additional amount of boats that can be brought into the harbour — you still see a lot of boats waiting outside the reef because of shortage of berthing capacity — will, I believe, help to open up the country even more.

The other important novelty we want to introduce shortly, is the setting up of a commission or a committee to enhance and encourage investment to the country. You know, we have some assets here. A major one is political stability and I can vouch for that asset. That will attract those with investment ability and funding because they know this is a safe place for them to be and our matai system contributes to the protection of that stability. In this matter, I really would like to work hand in hand with the authority of the Alii ma faipule, that is, the Council of Chiefs in each village and district. Remember that historically, both the New Zealand regime and the German regime tried to overstep the authority of these Councils of Chiefs, but we learnt from their mistakes.

► *Confronting the slump of the early 1980s, you proved not to be afraid of taking very drastic austerity measures. Now again, in the aftermath of cyclone Ofa, the country still needs to be restored to its*



The current Head of State, Malietoa Tanumafili II, holds the office for life; his successor will be elected for a 5-year term

previous levels. How optimistic are you that you can enhance further sustained growth?

— The last part of your question is very hard to reply to. I am not too optimistic. I believe that if I do not have support, I can think of anything, but those philosophies of mine have to be convincing to others. For example, some might think my economic and development philosophy is too ambitious. But anyway, you are quite right to say that with my party I managed to have our economy recovering from its woes which lasted until 1983.


When I came into power in 1983, our economic situation was in a real shambles so we had to introduce very austere measures. I appealed to Parliament: 'Please, this is a time for us to make sacrifices. We can't expect foreign people to come and assist us if they find our people just lying back and doing nothing, so please stand up'. We devalued the currency by almost 33% and we boosted industry. The amount of our foreign exchange reserves at one time covered only three weeks of imports.

Oil supply ships, when they came, first cabled to see whether the banks had sufficient money to pay for their oil, or else they would go back. The locked-in oil payments yet to be made at that time were about US\$6 million and the total amount of locked-in funds for foreign payments was about US\$13.9 million. We managed to pay that back within 9 months and now we are maintaining and ensuring the stability of our foreign reserve funds at about US\$150-160 million.

► *One of the priorities you had in those days and which is still valid, was to increase agricultural productivity, but this has not really come about.*

— There have been big efforts to increase agricultural products but you should understand that we have been set back not only by Ofa, but also by hurricane Cina at the beginning of 1989 and although its velocity did not reach the same speed as Ofa, it was still very strong and it damaged a lot of our plantations under our incentives system.

The other reasons behind the declining figures for agricultural exports are, on the one hand, the drop in world prices and on the other, the adverse publicity in the United States against the consumption of what they call 'tropical oil', which is really coconut oil. You should go to the outer



The whole village gathers for the funeral of a matai, the head of an extended family or aiga

villages and see the amount of copra just dropping down and lying there... We are still trying to find a way out of this situation and yet our oil mill could not get the volume of copra they wanted in order for them to have a viable milling operation, as people are reluctant to cut the copra. The reason, of course is the low price.

We have made a major change in this field to the extent that we introduced a Bill which cuts off all subsidies for copra and coca. This may rebound on us, because the opposition did not take the same stand and made very bad publicity for the government. They said: 'now that you are taking away this money, what about the poor people?'. So the people's response was not to cut any more copra. Also, the opposition promised to reintroduce incentives if they came back to power. Now, as they are not coming back, I think we will be alright because we will not introduce any copra incentive prices anymore. How could we be expected to do that as we get Stabex funds from overseas to compensate for our losses in export earnings?

► *To what extent are you concerned by the recession in Australia and New Zealand? Do you fear the effects of adverse economic trends there?*

— They have certain policies that I really do not support and I did not have much to say before the elections but I think I will have some negotiations with them. They put, for instance, certain restrictions on our exports of agricultural commodities to them. Some measures are very stringent especially those on our

bananas, yet bugs in bananas can be there because no one can detect everything. Of course we fumigate them before they are exported but they always seem to find something.

I do not think things should continue this way. We, the leaders of the smaller nations of the South Pacific, should put pressure on these two major governments within the region. After all, they are our main trading partners — far more so than the United States and Europe, so if they want to help stabilise our balance of trade, I think they should take heed far more of our desires. I will talk to them strongly.

► *What about the labour market; on the one hand there is still a high rate of emigration which has a positive effect given the high level of remittances of Samoans abroad, yet those labour markets are slowing down and perhaps, the cultural ties of generations of Samoans abroad will weaken and so will remittances; on the other hand, locally there may be a labour shortage?*

— That is exactly one of the points I have in mind when I say we need to encourage investment in Samoa. In New Zealand, they have a surplus now of factory hands who are out of jobs. Should there be investors in manufacturing here in Samoa, the Samoans there could return home. I really would like to see my people return home because people are very important.

Don't forget, in the beginning, the reason why they were enticed to go over there was not because of the wish of the Samoans to leave their country. No, they

were asked to. The first were even offered the fares to come to work in New Zealand in the period after the Second World War. A lot of them are now out of a job, so remittances from there to here will be declining substantially.

As a matter of fact, I was speaking this morning with some returnees from New Zealand and I said: 'Are you here to stay?' 'Yes' was the answer so I said: 'Well why don't you try to convince all your family to come back? We have a potential here'. Indeed there is a land mass that is yet to be developed and markets to be tapped, such as for taro. Incidentally, the booming taro market is one of the reasons why a lot of people are not going into cutting copra because it requires a lot of labour but fetches a bad price, whereas for taro the price is very good and the amount of consumers around the world is growing all the time.

So quite a number of Samoans are now thinking of returning. Those who are out of a job over there, still have to pay their rent, their fees for electricity and water, etc. And then there is also the reduction of unemployment benefits they used to receive, but which are now nearly halved.

► *What is your view on the benefits of regional cooperation?*

— Within the region, I don't think we have experienced any immediate increase in benefit. I don't mean to say that there will be no benefit; there will be, but it might take a long time, so the various countries — I can of course only speak for Samoa itself — must look seriously to their own future.

Of course, we appreciate very much the regional programmes that are also of benefit to Western Samoa; programmes covering such areas as telecommunications and perhaps eventually satellite television. You may remember that I included in my manifesto that we will encourage private television companies to come here and invest, so maybe regionalisation of television programmes is another issue we can look into.

► *Looking at tourism, is there still that somewhat half-hearted approach to it. On the one hand it is a foreign exchange earner while on the other, there is a certain reticence, in view of what it could do to the attitude the youngsters will develop about their future and what it could do to the*

Samoan way of life and culture. Is there a more clear-cut approach now?

— I usually reply to overseas correspondents, when they ask this question, that I think the reason why some cultures are being spoiled by the tourist industry is very much due to the governments of the countries concerned. It all goes back to their response and motivations, and to them passing legislation to cope with it. For example, I have pledged that we will introduce legislation for compulsory education and that will automatically prevent children from trying to sell things



Prime Minister Tofilou Efi Alesana
'I no longer worry about any future diminishing of the dignity of our matai-system or of our culture, as augmenting the number of matai no longer has electoral consequences'

to tourists during daytime. That is the role of government; preventing unnecessary commercialisation via the indigenous people, which would not only spoil the country but also the tourists. Some tourists will come here with a notion in mind 'this is paradise'. So they expect to get that because of the books they have read, for example, Margaret Mead's book that she wrote about 'The coming of age in Western Samoa'.

► *What do you think of that?*

— It's wrong! It is totally wrong. She probably had an affair with a Samoan man so she wrote that way, but she was totally wrong. Maybe if a tourist has read that book and comes over here, he will try to experience the same as she did. So who is to blame? Is it the country or the writer? It is an amazing situation and it has to be looked into, not only within the

country but also in those places where the tourists come from and in the travel offices overseas. We should say: 'When you go to Samoa this is what you should look into. You can go to a Samoan family and establish a good relationship. They will care for you, look after you and even feed you, with no money asked for. At the end of his stay, the palangi⁽¹⁾ might present them with a gift or not, but that is not the essence of it all.

► *After so many years experience of cooperation with the EEC, how do you regard the EEC as a partner?*

— I highly regard the relationship between my country and the EEC. First of all it reflects to the Samoan people an understanding that they never had before. There are discussions with visitors from overseas, the grants of aid to projects assisted by the EEC, they all contribute to people starting to open their minds. Remember those days when the Germans were here, they used to take Samoans as dancing groups to Germany, and don't forget we still have people here who are named Europa, as they were born during that period, but that era is finished. Yet, now this connection of the European Community with Western Samoa is very important again.

I think however that the current evolution of Europe and whatever outcome it may have for the social way of life of the people over there, will not have the same effects here. The reason is because you based your social system at some point, and in some way or another, on your economic system. They go hand in hand, whereas here they are two different things: economic development does not spring naturally from our culture. Here culture thrives all the same and our social system is entrenched in it. That is why I make mention of the Alii ma faipule, because their influence is very strong. If the government introduces new ways and means and new programmes to be implemented and spares no effort in explaining the programme to them, then the Council of Chiefs can sell the idea to others and people will move accordingly. Even if they have no money they can do the work on the strength of this cultural ability and influence of the Alii ma faipule; so our approach is different. ◯

Interview by R.D.B.

(1) 'White man'.

EEC — Western Samoa cooperation

by Hubert MARTINETZ (*)

Western Samoa, the most populous Polynesian island state in the Pacific and independent since 1962, has been associated with the European Community since Lomé I.

The contribution of the Community to the socio-economic development of the country has risen consistently with each successive Lomé Convention:

- ECU 4.6 million under Lomé I – National Indicative Programme
- ECU 6.2 million under Lomé II – NIP
- ECU 9 million under Lomé III – NIP

In addition, Western Samoa has received Stabex transfers totalling ECU 20.4m, emergency aid of ECU 360 900, and loans from the European Investment Bank of ECU 8.4m. At the end of the Lomé III Convention, the European Community had allocated to Western Samoa a total of ECU 48.3m. Under Lomé IV, the National Indicative Programme amounts to ECU 9m in the form of grant aid and ECU 1.5m as the minimum contribution foreseen in the form of loans managed by the EIB.

Lomé I and Lomé II

Agriculture is the most important sector of the economy of Western Samoa.

Close to 90% of exports are either directly or indirectly based on agriculture. The economy therefore depends almost entirely on outside factors such as world market prices, over which the country itself has no control. But the prices of Samoa's main export commodities, i.e. coconut oil, copra and cocoa beans have fallen drastically, while at the same time, the prices of imports, notably oil, have increased.

The development plans of Western Samoa reflect these problems, in putting emphasis on:

- increased agricultural production;
- a rural development programme;
- industrial development;
- efforts to reduce dependence on imported fuel.

The National Indicative Programmes under Lomé I and II reflected these objectives. The bulk of financing from the EDF and from the EIB, has been used to develop the substantial hydro-electric potential and to reduce dependence on imported oil for electricity generation.

For geological reasons, water storage capabilities are limited in Western Samoa. Consequently, full use cannot be made of hydro-power during the dry season. Therefore, all three hydro-power plants constructed during this period were so-called river schemes. These are:

- Samasoni (installed capacity of 1.8 MW)
- Fale-ole-Fe'e (1.6 MW)
- Sauniatu (3.5 MW).

Under Lomé I and II, 60% and 85% of the respective National Indicative Programmes and an additional ECU 3m loan from the EIB were allocated to the development of hydro-power potential. The proportion of total electricity generation reliant on imported diesel fuel fell from 80% in 1980 to 20% in 1985.

Lomé III

Lomé III saw continuity in the development of hydro-power potential, but, also an important step forward in the technology which had been adopted. The Afulilo hydro-power project, under construction since September 1990, will be the first storage hydro-electric power scheme in Western Samoa. At the first stage, the plant will be equipped with two turbines of a total capacity of 4 MW. Further extension by a third turbine is foreseen as well as the possibility of integrating the neighbouring Vaipu basin. The link between the two reservoirs will increase the potential by using the surplus electricity during the night to pump the water from the Vaipu basin to the higher Afulilo basin.

Although the project had already been identified in the early 1980s, technical design and feasibility studies took several years until finally the financial package of ECU 21m came together and the financing was decided in July 1990. The breakdown is as follows:


- European Community (EDF and EIB) 51.69%
- Asian Development Bank (ADB) 20.9%
- International Development Agency (IDA) 11.33%
- Western Samoa Government and the Electric Power Corporation (EPC) 15.31%
- Australian International Development Assistance Bureau 0.77%

With support for the Afulilo hydro-electric project of ECU 8.85m from the EDF, the Lomé III National Indicative Programme was fully committed. The EIB committed itself to a minimum of ECU 1m but by the end of the Lomé III Convention, their commitment had risen significantly with a further ECU 2.6m for the Afulilo project and a further ECU

Community aid for Western Samoa from Lomé I to Lomé IV
(in '000 ECU) programmable & non-programmable aid without regional cooperation

Convention	NIP	STABEX*	Emergency Aid	EIB LOANS	TOTAL
Lomé I	3 817	2 837	—	890	7 544
Lomé II	6 153	6 489	146	3 321	16 109
Lomé III	9 000	11 122	215	4 200	24 537
Lomé IV	9 000	—	—	1 500	10 500
Lomé I – IV	27 970	20 448	361	9 911	58 690

* Western Samoa is exempt from the reconstitution of STABEX funds.



The Afu'ulilo hydro-power project — under construction (above) since September 1990 — will be the first storage hydro-electric power scheme in Western Samoa

1.6m for the Development Bank of Western Samoa.

Lomé IV

At the beginning of the 1990s, Western Samoa once again faces considerable uncertainty in the light of the recent slowdown in the growth of output in industrial countries and doubtful prospects for the future.

In addition, cyclone Ofa caused serious damage on the islands of Savaii and Upolu in February 1990. Despite increased inflows of private remittances and foreign aid, the national economy is only slowly recovering from the devastation. Furthermore, the trade deficit will worsen as a result of declining export receipts and of increased imports following the cyclone.

Having completed the temporary repairs to allow basic access to the country's infrastructure, Western Samoa has now focused its efforts on urgent medium-term reconstruction. The Government appealed for foreign aid in order to begin a large-scale rehabilitation programme in infrastructure, especially road construction, telecommunications, energy and water supply. Given the substantial capital investments in this sector, the Government will ensure that maintenance costs will be recovered from user fees.

The European Community took into account the reorientation of the national

development plan during its programming mission for Lomé IV. Following this dialogue between the Government and the Commission, the National Indicative Programme for Western Samoa was signed on 11 March 1991.

The 'economic and social infrastructure in the rural areas' has been identified as the sector of concentration for the Community support. Approximately 85% of resources will be allocated here. The European Investment Bank also considers the provision of finance in this focal sector to be in accordance with Article 236 of the Fourth Lomé Convention.

The identification of an integrated programme of action for water management on both inhabited islands is currently under way. The viability and feasibility of the programme has to be confirmed by a water development plan study and a corresponding national water policy. The study will begin as soon as the required number of states have ratified the Convention, allowing it to enter into force.

The remaining 15% of the financial resources managed by the Commission allows a flexible approach for activities which do not necessarily fall within the focal area, but emphasis may be given to the development of human resources and follow-up measures for projects financed under previous Lomé Conventions. The follow-up measures include technical assistance and training and institutional

strengthening, in order to improve running and maintenance of the facilities and to measure the long-term viability of the projects.

Regional cooperation

Western Samoa has drawn considerable benefit from the allocation of regional cooperation funds. This trend should continue under Lomé IV, where ECU 35m is allocated to the eight associated Pacific States. Western Samoa suffers from isolation as much as any other island country in the South Pacific. The accent has therefore been, and will continue to be, placed on telecommunications, regional transport and tourism, as well as on research on resources in the agricultural sector and in fisheries.

The multiannual Pacific Regional Agricultural Programme financed by Lomé III funds is currently under way. The Western Samoa component is implemented by researchers of IRETA, an institute of the University of the South Pacific. In addition, the infrastructure of the campus will be improved by the construction of housing for the students.

In the sector of communications, the 13-year-old earth satellite station will be replaced in 1990/91 by a modern digital station with additional capacity, placing communications between Western Samoa and overseas on a more modern and efficient level. ○ H.M.



Remote sensing and rural development — a better grasp of the phenomena of desertification

by Robert GREGOIRE (*)

On 27 and 28 November, Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso, hosted a meeting marking the end of phase one of a number of studies in which remote sensing was used to highlight the dynamics of desertification on the southern periphery of the Sahara. These studies were part of the Community drought and desertification control programme and, as such, were paid for by the Commission budget. More specifically, the idea is to help the governments in this part of the world to combat the decline in the natural factors of production by giving them a better grasp of the dynamics of the principal phenomena of desertification.

The aim of the work, run on behalf of the Commission's Directorate-General for Development (this time with the scientific backing of the Joint Research Centre at Ispra) by seven European research bodies in Ireland, the UK, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, France and Italy, was to perfect methods of remote sensing that would give a clearer idea of the dynamics of desertification. It began in 1984 and involved:

- estimation of rainfall from satellite data;
- continuous monitoring of wind erosion;
- quantitative and qualitative estimation of the ligneous biomass used mainly for firewood;
- continuous monitoring of the Sahel grazing land;
- prospecting for underground water near the surface in the Sahara and Sahel;
- production of a hydrological model of the upper Senegal basin;
- studies of energy and water in various plants grown in the Sudano-Sahel area;
- development of a cheap satellite data processing system suitable for West Africa.

A meeting to summarise these data at the Joint Research Centre

in Ispra in June 1990 revealed that a number of the subjects of research could, on certain conditions, be transferred to potential regional and national users as they stood. One or two years' further investigation and experimentation were called for to validate methods in other cases, however, but this was something which could be done by mixed African and European research teams, with the existing local structures leading the way and European teams providing any back-up.

A proper transfer of technology would thus be possible in both cases.

The idea of the Ouagadougou meeting, on the threshold of phase two, was to provide an interface between part of the study strongly dominated by European money and men and a further, African-dominated stage with financing partly from Lomé IV regional funds and possibly national sources too.

At the meeting were 13 nations from West Africa (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal), two from the Maghreb (Algeria and Tunisia), five regional organisations (the CILSS, the CRTO, AGHRYMET, the IGAAD and UNPE/UNSO), the Sahara-Sahel Observatory, the seven European co-investigators and a large delegation of staff from the Commission, DG VIII and the Ispra Joint Research Centre and Delegation advisers.

Discussions about the transfer of technology, which focused on what to transfer, how to transfer it and to whom, were along two main lines.

1. Telling national and regional leaders how remote sensing can help make a better job of managing the natural factors of production (water, soil, vegetation and the West African microclimate), but pointing out the limitations too. The basis for this was:

- a) the seven European research centres' results, which representatives put over in such a way as to be understandable to non-specialists;
- b) the programme monitoring team's (French and English) report on remote sensing in the Sahel environment, summarising the results of the seven co-investigators, together with similar work carried out elsewhere in the world and some thoughts on the ways of transferring technology, which has since been very widely distributed by our Delegations in West Africa and by the CTA.

2. Discussing the design of a transfer system for study activity — the bulk of which has so far been run by European research units — with the African partners.

The wide ranging origins of the Ouagadougou participants (25 people from Ministries of Planning, Finance, Agriculture, the



PHOTO GREGOIRE

The underground water resources revealed by remote sensing can help transform dry regions

(*) Principal administrator — DG VIII.

Environment etc. 25 remote sensing experts and 10 Commission staff) show that the aim of informing rural development decision-makers was partly achieved.

The following recommendations on transferring research activities to African partners were made and participants passed them on to the governments and decision-makers.

Recommendations

1. Subject of activity

Diagnosis of the environmental conditions required for better management of the natural factors of production (water, soil, vegetation and the micro-climate).

2. Practical proposals for partnership in transfer activities (North-South, South-North and South-South)

A protocol enshrining data exchange and the joint running of activities.

— This would mean that the countries of the South could help devise technology and thus make a bigger contribution to decision making.

Running activities means adapting the results of existing but as yet not fully operational methods and diagnoses to local conditions and developing a new methodology. It does, of course, involve training technical cadres locally and elsewhere. The meeting stressed the importance of training — to be provided, in particular, by existing national and regional organisations here.

The arrangements for all this are to be laid down in partnership agreements. Proposals can be made at both regional and national levels.

3. Gradual adjustment of the transfer to local conditions

This means implementing projects over a four- or five-year period.

The adjustments will be made gradually, with regular evaluations geared to inserting the results of applied development research into the programmes of activities.

4. Priority applications

The West African geographical area has to be described as a whole. Teams of partners and a steering group have to be set up downstream to:

- foster contact between the partners;
- make the partnership activity dynamic;

— ensure cohesion between activities and programmes.

5. Lomé IV financing

It is highly desirable for these programmes to be financed under Lomé IV regional financing agreements — and over a period of four or five years if they are to be effective. They will be assessed in the usual Lomé way.

The recommendations show that the participants are anxious to:

1) carry on with the study programme, but this time through partnerships involving both African and European study teams, with the African teams taking the lead. These partnerships, grouped into a network in the sub-region covered by the invitation to tender, will be run and coordinated by a permanent European expert living in Africa. Where need be, he will be backed up in particular areas by *ad hoc* working parties comprising people from the partnership teams and one or two highly qualified experts;

2) strengthen the weak link in the remote sensing utilisation chain — i.e. the national remote sensing unit in each country concerned, which is connected to the other units in the West African sub-region.

Each of these units, as interface for the final user, will:

- pass on questions and requests from the grass roots;
- disseminate information from outside and adapt it to the local situation;
- coordinate remote sensing programmes at national level;
- capitalise on the knowledge of specialists trained elsewhere by fitting them into a system where their technical skills can be used and perhaps improved.

The infrastructure, equipment, staff training and operating costs will have to be underwritten by external aid for years to come, as is the case with the Las Palomas satellite receiver station in the Canaries and regional units such as Agrymet in Niamey.

The bulk of the Community financing will come from the Lomé IV regional programme for West Africa, with an additional amount from the Commission budget.

Examples of partnership studies involving getting a national remote sensing unit off the ground are:

Cape Verde

Inclusion of relief in the evaluation of natural ground resources by remote sensing.

Spatial distribution of water resources in relation to vegetation and soil runoff potential.

Quantitative diagnosis of agricultural output.

All spatial data (on rainfall, runoff potential and vegetation) to be integrated into a geographically and administratively defined geographical information system. Duration — three years.

Partnership — Cape Verde: INIA

— Europe: IRAT/CIRAD.

Guinea

(with possible extension to Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana)

Monitoring of brush fires by remote sensing.

Three aspects to be studied:

- the fire calendar;
- the geographical area affected by fires at any given time;
- the effect of a fire season on the plant cover (various types of environment and cover).

All data to be integrated into a geographically and administratively limited geographical information system to make it easier for users to work in the field. Duration — four years.

Partnership — Guinea: Map study unit of the Directorate-General for Forestry
— Europe: University of Geography of Copenhagen (CHIPS software) and the Joint Research Centre at Ispra.

A partner, as yet to be located, to prepare pictures in the early stages.

In conclusion, it is worth pointing out that the new phase of study and action discussed at the Ouagadougou meeting has substituted 'management of the natural factors of production' for the more restrictive 'desertification' and that the programme impact zone is now the whole of West Africa rather than just the Sahel.

The realities of the terrain thus confirm, if indeed any confirmation were needed, the Lomé IV authors' desire to make the management of the natural factors of production in all countries and all climates one of the essential aims of the Convention. ○ R.G.



Community — NGO cooperation

by Laure DE CENIVAL (*)



17th General Assembly in Brussels in April

The 17th General Assembly of Europe's development NGOs (non-governmental organisations — DNGOs) was held in Brussels on 9-11 April when representatives from the 700 organisations in the Liaison Committee of Development NGOs of the European Community and their partners in the Commission took stock of their cooperation and discussed prospects for NGO action in the coming years.

(*) The author is a trainee legal expert in DG VIII at the Commission of the European Communities.

Since 1976, cooperation between the NGOs and the EEC has been practical proof that the Community shares the solidarity of the people of Europe with the poorest populations of the Third World. The focus has been on cofinancing development schemes (microprojects) in the developing countries, on campaigns to put public opinion in Europe in the picture, on food aid and emergency aid and on helping the NGOs coordinate to make them more effective. The NGOs and their local partners are highly motivated and committed and

their independence, relatively small size and autonomy and attendant flexible management all contribute to their success. These positive factors tend to combine to bring greater efficiency, speed and flexibility to the design and implementation of projects in the developing world, making NGO action a vital complement to intergovernmental and Community cooperation programmes.

Manuel Marin, Commission Vice-President, Nicole Péry, Vice-President of the European Parliament and member of its Development Committee as well as of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly, and Devaki Jain, the Head of the New Delhi Institute of Social Studies, spoke at the opening session of the meeting to a large number of representatives of Community institutions, ACP nations and NGOs.

Manuel Marin's subject was human rights and development, an area in which he has taken the initiative of suggesting a new, innovatory Community policy tying development cooperation to the promotion of human rights and democracy. The Commission indeed intends going in for positive encouragement measures in the shape of large amounts of aid for countries — such as Haïti and Benin which are making a special effort. Although negative measures (sanctions) have not been ruled out, there is no question of imposing conditionality or, even less, a model for democracy. Proper development means respect for human rights and authentic democratic participation, and the development NGOs therefore see these areas as vitally important.

The opening session also saw the official prize-giving of the DNGO 2001, the annual award set up by Europe's development NGOs in 1988 and given to a group or individual involved in an outstanding initiative to do with North-South relations. This year it went to the International Collective in Support of Fish Workers (ICFSW), the North-South network of basic groups, NGOs, trade unions and fishermen from all over the



Photo EEC

Anne-Marie Beulink, Chairman of the NGO-EC Liaison Committee, presents the NGO 2001 award to Aliou Sali, the President of ICSFW

world, which was founded in 1986 to improve the situation of people who depend on fishing and on the processing and distribution of fish and fish products for their livelihood. The original idea was to help artisanal fishermen in the Third World, but the organisation now takes care of fisheries workers everywhere and is a fine example of an NGO in which North and South are in partnership and adapting to the NGOs' new role in a changing world — the central theme of the 1991 meeting.

The world in which the NGOs work has changed over the past few years. There have been major upheavals on the international scene, bringing progress for democracy and an end to confrontation between East and West and taking Europe's attention away from the problems of the developing world. The new international economic order currently emerging puts less emphasis on the poor and focuses development on mankind. But the advance of democracy in many Third World countries is leading the populations of the South to want greater involvement and greater control over their own lives — which is why one of the essential aims of the General Assembly was to see how development agencies in the North and NGOs and grass roots groups in the South can cooperate more efficiently and achieve a democratic development model based on what the people need. Four workshops therefore looked at specific aspects of the main topic — NGOs from the South and their external relations, European development NGOs and their external relations, the influence of DNGOs and the challenges of a changing world and the techniques of lobbying and coordination.

So the DNGOs devoted most of the three days to themselves and the world they work in. The meeting was an opportunity to look at the various contexts in which development NGOs from North and South operate and to discuss the initiatives they hope to promote and how to implement them. It also gave the European organisations a chance to redefine their relations with their partners in the South and, most important, when it comes to achieving greater solidarity in the world, their strategies vis-à-vis the authorities in North and South. ○

L.D.C.

ACP country reports

by Jenny BEMBELLO (*)

Länderberichte, the statistical monographs in the German Statistical Office's foreign series, cover something like 150 countries at the rate of 30 per year, clearly setting out recent figures from all available national and international sources and providing concise comments, graphs and subject maps in addition.

Lay-out and content are designed to show the State structure, government, geography and population of the country in question and, most important, to give a close analysis of the different sectors of the economy. So there are details of agriculture, industry (mining and energy included) and external trade, plus more specific economic information on such things as employment, price and wage trends and finance as well. Figures on the national economy and the balance of payments highlight general economic trends and social aspects are covered in special chapters on health and education.

Since relations between the ACP and EEC countries are intensifying and improving all the time — the Lomé Conventions have something to do with this — but that the general public in the EEC is ill-informed about it, the European Community Statistical Office in Luxembourg (Eurostat) and the Federal German Statistical Office in Wiesbaden (StBA) signed a statistical agreement, in October 1988, whereby Eurostat undertook to bring out French and English versions (with one or two

amendments) of the original German reports on the ACP countries. Four of the 22 chapters containing details of bilateral and international aspects are in fact changed to suit the international readership, with the analyses (of external trade, official development assistance, external investments and debt) seen from a Community rather than a bilateral angle.

Zimbabwe was the test country selected to start the Community series, a choice dictated by the importance the EEC attaches to this country and its potential role in the Southern African development process and by Zimbabwe's own drive to improve its socio-economic performance with a structural adjustment programme. The Zimbabwe report was published in June 1990 and presented to the press in Harare in July.

With the signing of Lomé IV (due to be ratified in 1991), Eurostat and the StBA naturally went for Togo for the first regular report in the Community series which is to involve two 120-page issues every year.

Togo found development difficult in the 1970s and early 1980s, when unfavourable international economic conditions and breakneck industrialisation triggered a profound structural crisis in the nation's economy. Things began to pick up gradually in the mid-1980s, although this country, like many others in Africa, is the victim of recurrent variations in the price of its main export products (phosphates, coffee, cocoa and cotton) on the international market. But its importance

as a European Community trading partner and a goods transit point for the neighbouring countries is increasing.

A functional banking organisation, a highly developed transport infrastructure and a liberal trading system presage further economic improvements, particularly in agriculture, where about 70% of the population earn their living.

The structural adjustment programme in operation since 1983 has brought vast reforms in its wake and been of particular importance in recent economic developments, while the privatisation of unprofitable public and semi-public firms, a general farm price reform, a new investment law and the setting up of a free trade zone have created the conditions for lasting economic growth. All this could make Togo more attractive as both an investment proposition and a trading partner for the Community countries.

As well as setting out general economic and socio-economic trends, the report gives details of the volume and destination of trade flows and of economic cooperation between the European Community and Togo.


The main sectors covered — external trade, the external debt, foreign investments and official development assistance — will be dealt with in chapters focusing on relations with the European Community. The German Development Institute (DIE, Berlin) was asked to produce these four chapters and the general economic table and the chapters on sectoral economic trends, employment, trends in prices and wages and the social situation are the work of the foreign statistics department at the Federal Statistical Office in Berlin.

The Togo 1991 report is not just a reliable source of information for investors in the European Community and elsewhere. It is a work of reference for students looking for sound resource material and tourists interested in having a better idea of the importance and specific nature of the country they are visiting.

The next reports will be on Namibia and Cameroon. ◯ J.B.

(*) CESD-Communautaire (European training Centre for statisticians, economists of developing countries).

Human rights, democracy and development



In this dossier, *The Courier* tackles a political issue — human rights and the transition to democracy — and its relationship with development, the economic implications of which are being widely discussed today.

We print the opinions of European and ACP authors, as usual, with a view to respecting contradictions without hiding disagreement and to criticising without facile intolerance or easy sectarianism or taking refuge in dogma. Far be it from us to be didactic; we are merely thinking aloud and taking a critical approach to the matter. Far be it from us to explain; we are merely trying to understand and to look less to the causes than to the meaning of events.

Aware, as we are, that there are no ready-made solutions in politics, we have aimed as far as possible to avoid any form of ethnocentrism — hence the point of going beyond official state policy and looking at local ways of going about things. Hence also the need to take account not just of political power, but also of symbolic power, that which, in the words of Pierre Bourdieu, 'is only wielded when misinterpreted as arbitrary'.

The human rights debate long turned on the primacy of economic and social rights over civil and political rights, but there now seems to be a consensus on the idea of human rights as more or less universal and a democratic minimum everywhere. As Albert Camus said at the Labour Exchange in Saint-Etienne on 10 May 1953, 'they said we ought to have justice first and see about freedom later, as if slaves could ever get justice'.

In this issue, Manuel Marin outlines the Commission's view as recently presented to the Council of Community Development Ministers.

Dr Simmonds gives an ACP point of view and Henri Saby says where the European Parliament stands, while human rights in both ACP and EC countries are covered in the Amnesty International report. Germain N'Gom, President of the African Lawyers, and a British NGO describe operations run by Africans in Africa.

Democracy is currently attractive because of its economic implications — which is both its strength and its weakness — but it would be as well to wonder whether it should not be sought for its own sake rather than just for what it means in terms of development.

In any case, it would be wise to avoid any preconceived ideas about democracy being alien to Africa and to shun the tendency to impose existing models from outside. Democracy may be universal, but it is contingent on many other things at the same time. The situations in the (particularly African) ACPs are very different from those in the EC. The only obvious similarity is that many

regimes are now seriously short on legitimacy, although local conditions tend to lead to specific differences from then on. Most Africans, for example, think and talk politics in the vernacular and symbols usually win the day over instrumentality (Dominique Darbon). The patrimonial nature of the African State turns a political struggle into a struggle for access to state resources as well as for political position (J.F. Médard) and, lastly, nations were built before democracy in Western Europe.

It would also be wrong to overestimate the new call for democracy. The first aim is to contest the authority of power, so the first thing at stake is power and the fight to control it (in some cases) or consolidate it (in others). In some cases one may ask, perhaps if the real issue is not political change for its own sake. Hence some governments react merely by trying to limit the damage by being 'democrats for convenience' as contrasted with 'democrats by conviction'. Defending legality has also sometimes been used as an alibi for safeguarding vested interests previously established without benefit of the law.

Looking beyond its institutions, democracy is a political system in which the people have formal and/or informal ways of keeping tabs on the governments which they have chosen (Comi M. Toulabor).

So a democratic society is one in which there is a public arena in which to discuss the ways and means of organising society and where no power is aimed at ideological hegemony (Alain Ricard).

Seen from this angle, the link between democracy and development is an obvious one and the sort of democracy which has a range of targets is a political choice which must be exercised democratically.

In this context *The Courier* opens its columns to a personal opinion on the relationship between tribalism, democracy and party, and also to an analysis of the democratic tradition in most countries of the Caribbean and the Pacific as well to a reflection on the tie-up between democracy and development. A member of the EIB staff has contributed his thoughts on the relationship between development and the African political heritage; lastly, there is an analysis of recent outstanding switches to democracy and a point of view about the terms of proper governance.

Whether the aim be merely to smooth over political contestation or genuinely to convert to democracy, the important thing is to provide a response to the many expectations of the overwhelming majority of the people of Africa and elsewhere...○

Dominique DAVID

'Democracy cannot be imposed from the outside'

by Manuel Marin

Vice-President of the European Commission

The human rights debate has broadened considerably of late. Growth models can no longer be designed along purely economic lines but must be linked to models of society too.

Although in the past, human rights infringements were quite often raised as issues of principle (in Lomé II and III, for example) or when particularly serious breaches had occurred, the international community always preferred (whether from self-interest or hypocrisy) to avoid placing matters such as regimes and political structures on the agenda. Nowadays, as I have stated before, even the most neutral of international organisations openly discuss these issues, under pressure from two sources:


— First and most obviously, people are gradually waking up to the fact that economic reforms are heavily dependent for their success on certain social structures, democratic ones especially, existing at the same time. Individuals cannot be expected to be productive unless they actually have the possibility of guiding and controlling the way the benefits of their work are used; that much is obvious, and the collapse of the regimes of Eastern Europe is there to prove it.

— Second, and to my mind much more importantly, the demand for democracy did not just emerge from the hallowed precincts where the funders hold their technocratic meetings. It came in fact from the developing countries themselves, from the peoples who are now, with greater or lesser degrees of urgency, calling for a complete reform of their political structures.

The movements may be violent, they may be confused and they may be hesitant, but their demands are much the same everywhere — representation of the people, freedom of expression, more efficient management and the rule of law.

Failing to understand and provide support for this wave, which is a clear sign of our partners' increasing political maturity, would be to ignore the very foundations of our commitment to development linked not only to growth but also inspired by a concept which focuses on man as operator and principal beneficiary, in which human rights are recognised as one of the basics of genuine development — as Article 5 of Lomé IV makes clear.

These new considerations were behind the communication on human rights, democracy and development cooperation policy which the Commission made to the Council and the European Parliament in March this year.



The idea was to trigger thinking and come up with coherent, general lines of conduct for the relationships to be established between development cooperation policies, respecting and promoting human rights and supporting the democratisation process in the developing countries.

This is why the two main aims for development cooperation in the Commission's political union proposals are to:

- ensure economic and social development and meet the basic needs of the populations of the developing countries;
- ensure development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

The processes for taking decisions on human rights and democracy in relation to development cooperation can be designed, with a view to greater effectiveness and consistency, in the light of whatever guidelines are laid down at the intergovernmental conference on political union.

So it is as well to ask how the human rights-democracy issue can be reflected more clearly in the cooperation policy guidelines.

If the Community's initiatives are to be politically credible, they must be seen to be free of particular politico-economic interests or preferences. Equally important is for the attitudes of the Community and the Member States to be more consistent.

The Commission's thinking on this is based on the indissoluble links between human rights and democracy on the one hand and the right to development on the other.

Article 5 of the Lomé IV Convention

1. Cooperation shall be directed towards development centred on man, the main protagonist and beneficiary of development, which thus entails respect for and promotion of all human rights. Cooperation operations shall thus be conceived in accordance with the positive approach, where respect for human rights is recognised as a basic factor of real development and where cooperation is conceived as a contribution to the promotion of these rights.

In this context development policy and cooperation are closely linked with the respect for and enjoyment of fundamental human rights. The role and potential of initiatives taken by individuals and groups shall also be recognised and fostered in order to achieve in practice real participation of the population in the development process in accordance with Article 13.

Hence the Parties reiterate their deep attachment to human dignity and human rights, which are legitimate aspirations of individuals and peoples. The rights in question are all human rights, the various categories thereof being indivisible and inter-related, each having its own legitimacy: non-discriminatory treatment; fundamental human rights; civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights.

Every individual shall have the right, in his own country or in a host country, to respect for his dignity and protection by the law.

ACP-EEC cooperation shall help abolish the obstacles preventing individuals and peoples from actually enjoying to the full their economic, social and cultural rights and this must be achieved through the development which is essential to their dignity, their well-being and their self-fulfilment. To this end, the Parties shall strive, jointly or each in its own sphere of

responsibility, to help eliminate the causes of situations of misery unworthy of the human condition and of deep-rooted economic and social inequalities.

The Contracting Parties hereby reaffirm their existing obligations and commitment in international law to strive to eliminate all forms of discrimination based on ethnic group, origin, race, nationality, colour, sex, language, religion or any other situation. This commitment applies more particularly to any situation in the ACP States or in the Community that may adversely affect the pursuit of the objectives of the Convention, and to the system of apartheid, having regard also to its destabilising effects on the outside. The Member States (and/or, where appropriate, the Community itself) and the ACP States will continue to ensure, through the legal or administrative measures which they have or will have adopted, that migrant workers, students and other foreign nationals legally within their territory are not subjected to discrimination on the basis of racial, religious, cultural or social differences, notably in respect of housing, education, health care, other social services and employment.

3. At the request of the ACP States, financial resources may be allocated, in accordance with the rules governing development finance cooperation, to the promotion of human rights in the ACP States through specific schemes, public or private, that would be decided, particularly in the legal sphere, in consultation with bodies of internationally recognised competence in the field. Resources may also be given to support the establishment of structures to promote human rights. Priority shall be given to schemes of regional scope.

Human rights and democratic principles are not just an aim in themselves. To my way of thinking, they are a *sine qua non* of the balanced, effective development which is designed to meet the basic needs of the people.

There can be no question of imposing institutional models on our partners in development. What we have to do is emphasise the fact that the battle for human rights is a universal battle and that human rights are entirely independent of whatever the form of society may be. Now that South Africa is on its way to becoming a multi-party, multi-racial democracy, I do not see how the rest of Africa can dissociate itself from what has become a universal phenomenon.

Switching to democracy means respecting fundamental rights, opening a political dialogue and running free elections to guarantee a pluralist society. And if democratic systems are to be set up in the developing countries, it must be primarily as a result of internal initiatives, for democracy cannot be imposed from the outside.

So the Community must go along with the move to democracy and freedom at the pace which the history of each country dictates and in the light of the historical and cultural characteristics of each — provided that progress actually occurs.

The essential thing, to my mind, is to lay the foundations for profound and lasting democracy. Our immediate priority must

be to promote what might be called economic democracy in which every section of the population has fair access to economic resources and a larger part to play in development.

The Community's cooperation policy should help establish genuine democracy in the developing world and make these countries work more transparently, more openly and more efficiently. This pursuit of the principle of good governance demands proper domestic control of the way development funds are used.

In the context I have just outlined, the Commission feels that Community action should concentrate on positive support and promotion as far as possible. A frank and open dialogue has to be established with the developing countries if this sort of approach is to work. The need for negative reaction measures may be to some extent a sign of failure, but they may be necessary in extreme cases of violation of human rights. If this happens, reaction has to be graded according to the degree of seriousness and due care must be taken to avoid harming the interests of the most underprivileged sections of the population.

The debate on the link between human rights, democracy and development is extremely important, for it could, I am convinced, shape North-South relations in the 1990s.

I hope that a frank and open exchange of views by all the parties concerned will clarify the various viewpoints and make for a consistent, global approach. ○

M.M.

Early dialogue necessary with violators of human rights

An interview with Dr Erskine Simmonds, Vice-President of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly

Dr Erskine Simmonds is Vice-President in-office of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly. A member of the Barbados Lower House of Parliament from 1986 to 1991 and now a senator, he was a member of a Joint Assembly team sent to investigate the human rights situation in Sudan and Suriname. The EEC Delegate in Barbados, Philippe Darmuzey, met him in Bridgetown on behalf of 'the Courier' and had the following interview with him.



► *You are a national of a country often described as a true democracy, a fact not very common in the developing world. How do you account for this enviable situation?*

— I think that Barbados takes its democracy from the system bequeathed to us by the British. You are quite aware, of course, that our parliament is 350 years old and with a tradition like that, the people themselves are the keepers of democracy. They set the standards and any politician in Barbados who tries to step out of line with that tradition would sooner or later be dealt with very severely by the people. So, I think it is a matter of the long educational process of the people to the merits of democracy.

► *As a member of the Joint ACP-EEC Assembly, you have taken part in a number of missions to Africa, and also in this region, to Suriname. What lessons have you drawn from these missions with regard to human rights?*

— I would like to say that human rights violations are not unique to any one

country. Human rights violations occur in all countries in the world. It is a matter of degree, and I say to people in third world countries that I visit that there is a certain point beyond which one cannot go. We view it as a kind of spectrum moving, say, from green to red. When you have passed the green mark, moving towards the red, you begin to border on the dangerous and what we would say to you is that you should bring those violations to an end.

Now, you asked about my visits to Africa. You have to understand that there are some countries not only in Africa but also all over the world where the system of government is quite different from the systems we might be familiar with and their norms are different. We have to understand that we are, at times, judging them by our own standards, using our value judgments to evaluate their human rights violations. I say that because there are several countries where civil wars have been going on for years. It is difficult to expect in a

country which has got a civil war not to have people in prison, people who oppose governments. I think what happens in a lot of countries is that after a length of time, the authorities seem to forget the people they have incarcerated and one needs to remind them that there are channels through which charges should be brought against them. Very often, I have found that when you sit down and discuss with those responsible for the incarceration, they have overlooked the fact that some of the people they have in jail no longer constitute threats to the community. I say that because, if you incarcerate someone for ten years, the political climate invariably changes during that period: ten years after, the kind of people who supported the imprisoned would have left the scene. So, you see, at times when you are in the forest you cannot see the trees and it takes someone else to come in with a new eye to remind you and have you reappraise the situation. We were able during our missions to get some of the political prisoners released. I think this was

because we were able to point out to officials that it was detrimental to the image of the presiding government to hold political prisoners.

► *On this issue of human rights, are there norms that have to be accepted by everyone?*

— Yes, I think we have to have norms. In this world we must have laws. If we do not have laws then the world becomes a jungle. We have to say to people that if you arrest someone; if you take him into custody, then it is accepted practice to let that individual know why you have taken him into custody. Secondly, once you have informed him, there is a limited length of time within which you must have brought charges against him. No individual should be held indefinitely without charges. I think this is a basic human courtesy that must be extended in all countries. You cannot take away any individual's right to live in freedom. If you think that someone has violated the laws of a country, he or she must be told of the violations and he or she must be given the mechanisms to defend himself or herself. I think this is a fundamental right on which we cannot compromise and to which every country should adhere.

► *Are there any mechanisms whereby outside pressure can be exerted on any country to make sure that it respects these fundamental rules on human rights?*

— This is a very interesting question. I am one who believes that dialogue can do a lot and my belief has been reinforced by the missions that I have made. I went with a team to Sudan in December, and following our mission, some 55 political prisoners were released. When we got there initially we felt a certain resistance from the Government. We did have a few problems but after dialogue we noticed a general mellowing of the authorities. Let me say here, I think one of the things that disturbs me is the lack of a follow-up. When a country frees some prisoners, we should not rest on our laurels. Once it has been possible to establish dialogue with the country and get them to move, we should have a follow-up. It is very, very important. In my short time in the Joint Assembly (and I am not accusing the Joint Assembly) I have not seen enough of the follow-ups. You see, the freeing of

political prisoners, the triumph of human rights, is a credit to the country involved and, indeed, to the entire ACP family and the Lomé concept. We should not wait for a situation to get out of hand and talk about intervention, which causes a lot of dislocation and human suffering. If and when we recognise that problems are incipient, as part of a body that works together, we should initiate dialogue as quickly as possible. This dialogue should not be a one-off dialogue because in the long run, it would cost the individual country, the region and the Joint Assembly much more effort and money to correct a problem that could have been solved by simple persuasion. So, I think that what we need to do, once we recognise infringements of human rights in any particular country, is to start dialogue early. We need to maintain that dialogue and as soon as we realise that they are responding positively, to make sure they stay on the right path, with the right mechanisms, in the interest not only of the country or region but also of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly.

► *Dialogue is also a key word in development cooperation. It is even an important aspect of the Lomé Convention. Can external aid, particularly that provided by the European Community, play a role in the promotion of democracy?*


— There is no doubt in my mind, looking at the philosophy that is shaping our world today, that we are moving towards two things: privatisation and democratisation. This is quite evident looking at the changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe and in other parts of the world. It is therefore incumbent upon third world countries, looking for aid, to understand that the world is no longer one of confrontation with nuclear bombs. The confrontation now is about the rights of human beings to live in peace and to express themselves fully within a society. It is a fact that aid is being linked more and more to democratisation. I think this is a reality which we have to face. My point is that those countries which have no proper democratic systems have to recognise that financial aid for development will be difficult to attract if the whole issue of democratisation is not addressed and addressed urgently. I see nothing basically wrong with this philosophy. I feel that in many countries where there are

human rights violations, where there are standing armies and where there are civil wars, these are impediments to progress. So, if any country wants seriously to make progress then they must avoid civil wars. I know this is not easy but I think we need to enter into dialogue. Let me add though that many of the conflicts within countries are fuelled by outside interests. Historical, economic and social factors, at times, fuel civil wars within some countries and so in addressing the whole area of human rights and democratisation, one also has to take into consideration external factors that contribute to these problems. So, although I have said that we need to talk to the political leaders within the country, sometimes it will be necessary to talk to agents beyond the boundaries of the countries who may in some way be fuelling turmoil. At times, we may have to say to those external forces that we think that certain interests should not be pursued at the expense of tranquillity within a given country.

What I am saying is not new. It is a fact that we have to face. One may argue theoretically that it is in the interest of people who produce arms to see civil wars all over the world so that they can sell their arms. This is a very simplistic way of looking at it, but we are talking also of the financial dimension to a problem that we have to address.

► *In general terms how is the connection between democracy and development reflected at the moment within the ACP Group?*

— The only isolated case I know of is Sudan where the European Community has cut off aid because of its human rights records. I know that this has caused a lot of concern within the ACP Group, especially among countries which have been accused of serious human rights violations. This is understandable because in the countries in question, viable and far-reaching projects are funded by the European Community. A cut-off of aid puts any country at a disadvantage. I would like, however, to comment on this. We have to understand that when we cut off aid to a developing country because of human rights violations, it is not the political leaders that suffer most, it is the masses of the people who suffer. So, what happens, in effect, is that in trying to



ACP-EEC Joint Assembly in session in Kampala, Uganda last February

'The freeing of political prisoners, the triumph of human rights, is a credit to the country involved and, indeed, to the entire ACP family and the Lomé concept'

penalise the people who violate human rights, it is the very people whose human rights are being violated who are penalised. So, we need to have a more holistic view of the situation before acting or before donors cut off aid.

► *Is there a general consensus in the ACP Group on this holistic approach you mentioned and on how to make progress on this issue?*

— The ACP is made up of 69 countries from different parts of the world (the Pacific, the Caribbean and Africa). It is difficult to expect 69 countries; people from varying backgrounds, to come to a specific agreement on any issue. However, even the countries that are accused of human rights violations will agree (as members of the United Nations, and the Lomé Convention, which have their own provisions on human rights) that violations are an infringement of law. So, in a sense, yes, there is that agreement. But, some would say that what the outsider may see as a human rights violation at times is not a violation at all. Human rights violation is a matter of degree. An individual, because he is the leader of his political party, may think and act in the interest, first, of his political party and then of his country. His vision may be blurred, seeing his political party as the country: anything that is in the interest of his political party is also automatically in the interest of the country. We, as politicians, are, at times, guilty of that, because we think that our political party is the only one that has the total interest of the country at heart. Sometimes it takes someone from the outside to say to you that you are not representing the country but only your political party. You know when our vision is impaired it is only the eye specialist who can fit us with a pair of appropriate glasses to see properly. The Joint Assembly should be like the eye specialist when our vision is blurred as regards respect for human rights.

► *Dr Simmonds, beyond democracy, are there, in your opinion, minimal conditions for pluralism?*

— That is a very interesting question. My observation of the African continent is that it cannot be compared to the Caribbean where you have almost homo-

genous societies and where it is very easy to have a democratic system with opposition parties existing. However, in some African countries, you have the ethnic problem. History has shown, with the first multi-party systems they had, that these systems have accentuated ethnic problems. One has to ask the question whether other systems should not be tried. I am told, for example, that in Uganda the leader of the opposition is also the Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Cabinet⁽¹⁾. Now, that would be unthinkable in our system. Using the simple democratic process, it is inconceivable that an opposition member can sit in the Cabinet and make decisions for our country and, what is more, he is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is a very key Ministry. I think one needs to look at that kind of system and see what advantages it has, because what that system does is bring together differing groups of people, whether they are along ethnic lines or not, and they can make meaningful contributions to the development of the country. What I am saying is, that in most developing countries we have to understand that poverty is the enemy, not necessarily the other political party. How do you fight poverty? You fight poverty by avoiding civil wars. You fight poverty by bringing the masses together, whether or not they are from different ethnic groups or political backgrounds. We must recognise what the common enemy is. Civil war is an enemy. Poverty is an enemy. Desertification is an enemy. The creation of refugees is an enemy. If we can get people to see that these are common enemies and if they can develop a political system — call it democracy, pluralism, or whatever you will — to fight those common enemies then I think we would have achieved our objective. So what needs to be done in special circumstances like these is for people to sit down and rationally analyse which political system can benefit their country. I do not think that there is any one political system that can work for the whole world because people come from different social backgrounds, different cultures, and have different experiences. Once we recognise

⁽¹⁾ Reference to the government of the National Resistance Movement, a grand coalition of all the political parties in Uganda aimed at providing a united and effective government after several years of political instability. Although it is provisional and experimental, it is not unlikely that this new political system would be incorporated into the new Constitution currently being drafted.

the causes of failure, there is nothing wrong in looking at them and experimenting with systems that will solve those problems, including all the problems of human rights.

► *Now let us look at the question of the economic cost of the transition to democracy. Is it possible to pursue a policy of democratic adjustment at the same time as an economic structural adjustment? Given the support to structural adjustment foreseen under Lomé IV, is there any potential to use this support to advance the democratic process?*

— This is a very important question because when we talk about structural adjustments, for us in the ACP, it means the ones presented by the Bretton Woods Institutions and our experience here has been very bad. The results, if I look at the Caribbean, for example, in places like Guyana and Jamaica where the IMF have gone in, there has been great social dislocation. You find people from those potentially rich countries (compared to Barbados) actually fleeing, migrating to other countries because the standard of living in their countries has fallen tremendously. I therefore would like to see the Lomé Convention looking at ways of helping ACP countries reconstruct their economies. Now, I know there will have to be some social consequences, but while the economy is being reconstructed, these consequences should be made less painful. And, let me say that in the countries that are democratic, such structural adjustment can pose a serious threat to the democratic institutions with the threat of military dictatorship around the corner. It would give ammunition to those opposed to the government; an opportunity to mobilise frustrated people to create political and social turmoil. I think this is an aspect that escapes the Bretton Woods Institutions when they consider structural adjustment programmes. I understand that in a way because I think they deal primarily with the economic factors of countries but economic factors are not the only ones which determine, the peace, stability, progress or success of a country. You have to have people who are content. You must have people who are prepared to work within that country to uplift it. One of the problems with structural adjustment is that when the pill becomes too bitter to

swallow, it is the intellectuals who leave the country first, so that even when structural adjustment begins to be effective, the people needed for the implementation of the programme are gone. Skilled people do not stay around. The other factor is that when structural adjustments are implemented in a particular country, within that region, it causes dislocations in neighbouring countries. This is because that country's commodities are cheaper as a result of devaluation and businessmen in neighbouring countries, not involved in structural adjustment, find it more profitable to buy their products from the country where the adjustment is taking place rather than produce at home. All of these factors have to be taken into account when we are talking of structural adjustment and democratisation. Structural adjustment administered in a vacuum can at times be a disincentive and an enemy to the process of democratisation.

► *So then, do you see any way there can be perhaps a transitional period for a country involved in reconstructing its democracy, for example, a kind of external support?*

— I personally think that any institution; any international institution that is seriously interested in the democratisation process of any country has to look not only at the economic factors, but also at the social and political factors. These are linked, because in the final analysis the politician in a democracy has to go to the people to ask for a vote. Now, people are not going to vote for a party in a democracy when they perceive that party as having made their fathers and mothers lose jobs and as having been engaged in closing schools so their children cannot be educated and have a brighter future. After all, the world has become a small place where you can turn on the television and see people in all parts of the world and how they live. People all over the world aspire to higher standards of living. That is normal in any society. So, once the standard of living drops with structural adjustment, it would have negative effects on the political system, especially if that political system is democratic. So, structural adjustment programmes have to include social measures and, at times, an initial, substantial injection of funds. ○

Interview by
Philippe DARMUZEY

'Human dignity is a universal value'

A talk with Henri Saby, Chairman of the Development Committee of the European Parliament

Henri Saby's personal conviction is that human dignity is a universal value. There is an international consensus on the links between human rights, democracy and development, although it is wise to be wary of systems that look like democracies but mask unbearable dictatorships. The criteria for and arbiters of human rights can be defined and the job of external aid is to back up measures which make a positive contribution to developing political democracy and population involvement and encouraging opportunities for democratic adjustment.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT



World consensus on the links between human rights, democracy and development

► *Mr Saby, you are Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee on Development. Is there a common position on the relationship between human rights, democracy and development?*

— I cannot say that there is officially a common position because we are in the middle of discussing Manuel Marin's report. But over the past few years, I have noticed a large majority on the concept of the close and indissociable link between human rights, democracy and development — an urgent and vital subject which has been discussed at world level, in the UN and in various other places.

So the European Parliament does not have an official position, but we will have one and we are going to be discussing it in

the Development Committee and in the plenary session. I have noticed that the subject has been cause for considerable concern over the past two or three years — on the agenda in the UN and in think-tanks elsewhere. Only the day before yesterday, we ourselves on the bureau of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly put it on the agenda of the Amsterdam meeting in September, for example. It really is a very topical issue.

'Canada Dry' democracies

► *When people talk about democracy at the moment, they are thinking mainly of Africa — which is not to say that other ACPs are unaffected. I know that you, in your capacity as President of the Development Committee, have been on a number of field missions on the delicate subject of human rights. What have you learnt from them?*

— A number of things. First of all, when we began tackling these problems seven or eight years ago, it was a dialogue of the deaf. It was not opposition perhaps, but a psychological block, a political block. The missions we have had to Africa, I have to say, have been real successes. We got results first with Mr Bersani with this human rights approach and now we are getting them with Mr Tindemans. The results are extraordinary. I cannot tell you exactly how many people have been released from or had their lives changed thanks to our joint ACP-EEC action, but it must be tens of thousands.

It's not just the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly; it's the whole Community machine, the Council of Ministers — we put the matter before them — and the Ambassadors, the Governments and the joint action of the Joint Assembly. Now if you like I shall explain the criteria and the various stages of action.

There is something else I should like to say. The Committee on Development covers 130 countries. I have been to South East Asia and Latin America in my capacity as President and I have come to a conclusion which is both interesting and worrying. It is interesting because I am delighted to see that there are no more dictatorships in the world today. The last ones, be they ideological or economic or monetary or military, have fallen.

But what we are seeing emerge now are just as big a cause for concern, because they are far more subtle. I call them 'Canada Dry' democracies — they have the name of democracy and the flavour of democracy, but nothing to do with democracy at all.

A typical example is Guatemala, where to all intents and purposes we have republican institutions and elections, although no people has in fact ever suffered so many assassinations and so much victimisation. I have been on missions to El Salvador, where it was awful, and I went on missions to Chile a few years ago, before the new institutions were set up, but I have never seen anything like what I saw in Guatemala.

So we are seeing the emergence of a number of so-called democracies which in fact mask unbearable dictatorships and systematic killings. Yet — and this seems to me to be fundamental — there can be no development or economic take-off in these countries unless there is democracy and there can be no democracy without respect for human rights. So when we tackle these problems, reactions differ.

There is another way, I think, beyond the right to interference, as some people so disagreeably call it. The idea is that no-one forces a sovereign state to sign an international treaty (the UN Declaration of Human Rights, for example, or the OAU Charter, the Charter against the torture of children and so on), so, once it has signed it, it is reasonable for the international community, the conscience of the nations, to question the government in cases of clear violation. That is the principle we are recommending.

We have no model to help. We believe there is a universal scale of values about human dignity and that it therefore has nothing to do with culture or religion. It is

the sum of reasoning and a political will for dignity which has emerged from all civilisations and all cultures. But today, a universal conscience of the people is emerging through the UN. It must be expressed much more strongly through this principle of recognition of international law and a universal scale of values belonging to no-one but being part of the collective memory of mankind.

This means we have both the right and the duty to question and collect information from the authorities in countries which have signed these international contracts. Infringements, and sometimes cases of serious violation, are common.

Criteria and arbiters

► *Suppose there is a consensus now on human rights being more or less universal — can we have criteria and universally recognised arbiters to exercise what you don't like calling the right to interference — the right to check, let us say?*

— I should answer that by saying that the basic criteria need adding to. I have already mentioned the universal scale of values and there is a second term democracy. What is a democracy? In other words, what is a State of law? We well know that human rights are usually violated when the State of law disappears and State terrorism starts. It's the eternal link between a State of terrorism and the terrorism of the State. We have seen State terrorism in Chile, we have it in Guatemala and El Salvador, we have it in our countries and we have seen it elsewhere. So what means does a State of law have, what is democracy actually founded on? Some criteria crop up often, regardless of religion and culture.

A democracy is a State of law where political parties alternate in elections by secret ballot. Political pluralism is the first criterion. The second, a fundamental one to my mind, is that justice must be independent of the executive power and the military. A third criterion is that a legal environment must be created in the State of law whereby each individual can flourish and his freedom thrive in a concept of responsibility with rights and duties. Those are the three terms which give the best idea of what a State of law needs for its democratic development.

That is the second concept of the universal conscience which is beginning to emerge.

The third is equally important. Clearly, although we recognise the people's right to self-determination and independence, decades of experience have shown us that a nation which does this will still fail if it is economically and monetarily strapped. So the third concept is the economic right of peoples and that is the crux of the matter. The economic right of the people is the right to produce and trade in the world on fair terms and it is a right which brings basic contradictions in practice.

Is it, for example, compatible with GATT, that veritable world market racket, the biggest cloak of hypocrisy I have ever seen, which has ultimately cornered the world market for one or two of the wealthiest and virtually banned all the others from joining the club? GATT too, paradoxically, blocks free economies, for the system is founded on the law of supply and demand with a regulator called the market and, once there are dominant positions, the market — the regulator — silts up.

So, here we are in a system which to all appearances is liberal, but which is in fact an economic dictatorship of the worst kind. The last parameter of this third point is an unstable international monetary system and international institutions which no longer reflect this concept of human rights, democracy and development.

As soon as the Bretton Woods institutions inveigle a country which is strapped by debt into accepting a 'Chicago School' programme, the situation gets even worse. The World Bank and the IMF have constantly strangled the economy — and thus democracy and human rights — in most countries.

The last is the most difficult one, for although states and international bodies are willing to accept the idea of the first and the second, they are reluctant to have anything to do with the third.

That is the fundamental thing that has to change at international level. Let me give you a practical example. The Community is making a big effort for the least developed nations. Over the past 10 years

it has almost kept to the international agreement to channel 0.7 % of GDP into them. And look at what our richest partners have done during this time — the USA has given 0.15% and Japan 0.32%. We have been consistent.

But how can we get the European Community, the Council of Ministers and the 12 Member States to make a big effort with the budget? Twelve and three make fifteen, and we could get to 20 billion easily if we added bilateral aid to Community aid in making use of Lomé IV to promote the human dimension of development cooperation issues. But at the same time, the Twelve's representatives at the World Bank only see the Chicago School criteria. But it can't go on.

This is a key issue, a point of friction which calls for the strongest international pressure, including a reform or a change of GATT, which is no longer in line with the realities of today or tomorrow. It is an increasing brake and it is blocking up the system itself. So, there you have two or three basic criteria which define the approach at international level. Who then should step in if stepping in has to be done? I am with those who believe that the countries and peoples of the world will never accept just one policeman, be it the USA, France, England, the USSR or anyone else. And that they will be less and less inclined to accept just one banker laying down the rules.

So this call to planetary conscience has to be made in an institution like the UN and in institutions like the European Community or in the international bodies which are there to guarantee these rights and the implicit involvement of the States when they sign these agreements.

An arbitration body?

► *If I may interrupt you here... do you think that one of the various joint ACP-EEC institutions might turn into an arbitration body one day?*

— We must be pragmatic about this. An arbitration body means universally accepted criteria. The first criterion, the concept of individual dignity, is not a problem. Respecting oneself and respecting other people is something which will get across. The second, the means of a

real State of law, is something which is going to happen in accordance with the will of the peoples. There is no imposed model. But I should say that there are references and universal values which are undeniable and less and less under discussion.

It is the third criterion which will be the problem, for which is the body which will tell GATT to be careful? Which body will say 'it's all over, you are ruining or strangling a country or making it go hungry?' Which body will tell Bretton Woods that it's all over and we have to have structural adjustments that take notice of the human dimension and stop going in for short-term management with the plain lucrative aim of making more?

I think there is the UN. I think the UN has an important part to play here. It can give its opinions on appeals, not as of right, but assessing values. And there are other ways. In the contractual relations between the 12 and the 69 ACPs, for example, we are fully able to say, publicly — and we have a graduated scale for this — that a particular State has violated human rights.

Diplomatic pressures heavily applied give results. We have, for example, asked the Commission to block aid to Sudan, Israel, Syria, Turkey and so on. So things have developed, because a Community which involved inter-governmental cooperation and a commercial side without conscience has, over the years, given birth to a political conscience of the people of Europe. There are means of applying pressure there.

Strictly speaking, one can have courts at various levels, according to the points at issue — 'a world court', the court at the Hague, the European Court of Justice, why not? There is a whole approach here, but if we can get a written process recognising the unbreakable link between human rights, democracy and development, we shall have made an extraordinary step forward.

The role of external aid

► *Is there a role for external aid in promoting democracy, not just preventing abuse but actually promoting it to encourage development?*

— I had to ask the Commission about this and I think we agreed on positive, practical measures. I went to represent Parliament at the elections in Benin, for example. I went to represent it at the elections in Haïti and at the proceedings at Windhoek in Namibia. Sometimes we are dealing with states which have done nothing, which have no experience and sometimes not even the money to build polling booths or print voting slips.

So I asked the Commission for aid in the democratic process as we had for Asia and Latin America, but it cannot be done because there is nothing in the Lomé agreements. So we are convinced that the 1992 budget should contain a line on backing up the democratic process. We should, if necessary, be able to send a delegation to ask the Commission to help train the officers who will be checking on the voting, printing the slips, ensuring that the count is properly done and so on. That, I think, is a positive contribution which is absolutely vital today.

When it comes to Mr Marin's document, I believe that all positive aid arrangements should be backed up here. Lastly, we see people making a considerable effort in extraordinarily difficult conditions and helping them is just as important as building a motorway. I am also candid enough to say that the community of peoples, in their fiscal solidarity, can no longer accept the idea of development funds being misappropriated. Excuse me for saying so, but the days of building gold mosques and gold cathedrals in countries where most people die of hunger are over. It must be advertised.

A country whose head of state has transferred development funds to a Swiss bank account or anywhere else is no longer acceptable. I cannot see me and my colleagues telling the voters, 320 million Europeans, that they are being asked for an extra bit of solidarity and partnership with the people in the developing world and then find that 40% of the funds have been misappropriated, that the system is corrupt. It can no longer be accepted.

And there, the Commission has a very important job to do on the spot, in conjunction with the diplomatic representations. We must state clearly that

we are willing to do more to ensure that nations flourish and not increase the burdens which crush and imprison them'.

Democracy from the bottom up

► *In all the positive work the Commission does in the field, there are the problems of democracy from the bottom — i.e. people participation. I should like to know what you think about what can be done to get the (often emergent) civil society to be aware of itself before projecting it, possibly too fast, into the somewhat sophisticated machinery of formal democracy.*

— There is a popular saying which goes 'empty stomachs have no ears'. In conditions of this sort, it is obvious that it is pretty much of a Utopia to talk about the concepts we have just discussed. So a fundamental part of the cooperation, development and international solidarity process is giving people the means of existence. Some extremely interesting things have been done here. People dying of hunger in the country must be prevented from coming to die of hunger in the town and learning the most dangerous things our civilisation has ever produced, be it drugs or the exploitation of women and children.

I should like to mention an IFAD scheme here in which five women working in a village were given the opportunity to take turns at getting loans to buy seed and a few basic tools and get organised. The rate of coverage of these loans is 98%, while the figure for the rich is 46%, which is something for the bankers of this world to think about. Obviously there is no question of democracy unless women can play a decisive role in these countries. Not only do they have to provide the daily bread. They are also responsible for bringing up the children and organising the micro-society. So there will be no proper democratic process and no real respect for human values unless practical action is taken, speedily and as a matter of urgency, on the weakest link in the chain.

It is clear that the NGOs have a fundamental part to play in this process, although it must be clear that the Community's or the world's development policy cannot be entrusted to them. We are boosting their means and we want to



EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

'... once a sovereign state has signed an international treaty, it is reasonable for the international community, the conscience of the nations, to question the government in cases of clear violation'

go on doing so more and more, but we maintain that we have to have coordination, at all costs, at the same time, including with bilateral aid. And although it may well shock some Governments, I am clear in saying that bilateral

cooperation will disappear in time if we are serious.

The Community's development cooperation policy has logically to steal a march on this process from the recent

past of former colonies, on whatever is negative and positive. At the moment, efficiency dictates that the general development policy has to come from the Community. There has to be complementarity and at least concertation upstream — which is not always the case today. There is a new approach that a special session of the European Parliament is going to attempt to define through the concept of a new world partnership.

Towards democratic adjustment

► *Returning to more macro-economic problems, do you think that it is a good idea to promote structural adjustment? What is your position on the need for such structural adjustment and what forms it might take?*

— That touches on the intellectual aberration of the 'mondiocrats'. Going on with a structural adjustment policy along Bretton Woods lines is a monumental heresy featuring technical and scientific incompetence or patent bad faith. Who can define the contrary of reality? Take stock of structural adjustment over the past 10 years and the consequences are dramatic in most cases. It hasn't been a success anywhere — at least as far as the people are concerned.

There are cases where the temperature was prevented from mounting any further, but there are none where it was an actual success. Why? The statistics show that the past 10 years have been a time of constant transfer of capital from poor to rich countries.

I don't want to be difficult with my economist colleagues and friends, but it has to be admitted that economics is not a science. It is a technique. And like any technique, it is not the user but the inventor who defines the programme. It is reasonable to support the idea that structural adjustment has to continue along the present stringent lines.

I think the Bretton Woods structural adjustment criteria are perfect for Sweden but a dead loss for places like Zambia or Mozambique and I said so in public at the Joint Assembly in Kampala. 'Stop the massacre', I said. Today's structural adjustment criteria fail to take account of the human dimension in the medium term. It is for all the world as

though they were pointing a jet of water at a fire and putting jerrycans of petrol ready to burst into flames all round it. It's a blunder.

They are always saying: 'It's not true. It will work. Look at South East Asia', but I've spent four or five years getting to grips with this issue and let me tell you that if a tenth of the billions of dollars invested in that part of the world had gone to Africa, things would be quite different. So let us be serious about it. Let us be like the Community and turn on the pressure. With Lomé IV, the Community is bringing pressure to bear to get Bretton Woods criteria altered along the structural adjustment lines we have laid down to revive the human realities and ensure proper chances of rationalisation and development for the people in these countries.

I love intellectual formulae. I have a lot of fun with the civilisation technicians, as the economists are sometimes called. They aren't serious. Reality proves them wrong. You find the same analysis in every sector, in every country and in the international bodies. Even the World Bank and IMF staff are clear about it, but as long as there is no chance of changing the rules of these institutions and there are many more blockages, nothing will be achieved — hence the major consequence of a new world economic order, a new and more stable international monetary system and another currency alongside the dollar. If the dollar is unwilling to cater for the human dimension, the Ecu can guarantee a different development policy from that of the Chicago School, ultimately backed up by a European Development Bank. Why not?

Migrants' rights

► *Our ACP partners are worried about what effect the Single Market of 1992 will have on human rights how it will affect the particular problem of the status of migrant workers and students and particularly the new procedures the Community is bringing in for refugees and the right of asylum. Where do you, as a Euro-MP, stand on this?*

— This is very important and it is something we dealt with in the Committee — especially during a very successful seminar. I think we have to open our eyes and take our heads out of the sand. Most Community countries have immigration problems and I think there are two sides to them. I have always maintained that the answer to immigration is to boost income, because, if someone can earn a decent living at home, no one would feel he has to uproot himself or herself and go abroad.

However, there is another side to reality and that is the people from all over the world who have already settled in our countries, which is something for the European Community. There are two approaches to this. First of all, a common legal basis for the whole definition of refugees and migrant workers — we need a minimum of legal coordination in the Community on this one if political theory is to be consistent with political will and reality.

That perhaps means defining what an immigrant is. You have political immigrants and you have economic immigrants and you have people who want to flee the law in their countries. What the Community has to do, I think, is harmonise its legislation. An immigrant who is properly registered and has completed the universally accepted formalities has to have the same rights and duties whether he is in Patras or Amsterdam or Hamburg or Toulouse or anywhere else.

This last point has to do with the rights and duties of immigration. I, as a Community national, am willing for immigrants to have the fullest rights the Community can endow, but on one condition — the countries of origin must reciprocate. The immigration side of the rights of peoples must recognise the individual's right to thrive in a consensus of reciprocity. If that demand had always been there, we would have far fewer problems today. So that is roughly what I personally think about this issue and I believe a majority in Parliament agrees with me.○

Interview by
Dominique DAVID

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (*)

The international conscience for 30 years

You cannot get away with killing or torturing prisoners of conscience so easily any more, says Peter Dufy, the young lawyer who now heads the international organisation, because Amnesty International is everywhere.

Thirty years ago, another lawyer, Peter Benenson, heard that President Salazar had given two Portuguese students seven-year jail sentences for toasting freedom in a restaurant and decided to launch an international campaign for political prisoners.

Amnesty International, the humanitarian association, was born, with the helping hand of Sean McBride, the Irish lawyer and diplomat, on 28 May 1961. It has saved 42 000 prisoners and now has a million members in 150 countries.

How it works

Amnesty International handles violations of the basic human rights defined in its mandate with a view to:

- freeing all prisoners of conscience who are detained for their beliefs, colour, sex, ethnic origin, language or religion and who have not used or advocated violence;
- getting fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners;

(*) Taken from official Amnesty International publications.

— opposing the torture and execution of all prisoners.

It starts with a thorough investigation, drawing on a variety of sources of information and missions in the field. The only objective boundary is that 'the information (still) has to be plausible in the light of all we know', says Malcolm Smart, the Head of Research at the International Secretariat. Amnesty receives more than 1100 papers, periodicals, government bulletins and transcriptions of radio broadcasts for this purpose.

Amnesty's work was originally based on Articles 18 and 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In 1975, it started a movement to get the death penalty abolished. The first approach employed was lobbying by sending letters direct to government authorities. It then focused on bringing abuses to the notice not only of government authorities but also of the public at large.

The death penalty is the only subject on which Amnesty International's members may make direct approaches to their Governments. They have to remain impartial and therefore never campaign against other human rights abuses in their own countries.

Amnesty both campaigns for human rights and provides material assistance

for victims. It helps pay lawyers who defend prisoners of conscience and contributes to the costs of *habeas corpus* or other legal procedures aimed at contesting detention or restrictions. It also assists prisoners on release.


Is Amnesty impartial?

As Malcolm Smart says, 'I'd be delighted if governments could prove all our reports wrong, if that meant human rights aren't being violated...'

Although Amnesty works in highly political fields, it is a strictly non-partisan, independent and impartial organisation, which never takes sides in conflicts between governments or opposing groups and favours no political or religious ideology. It is financed by donations from members and receives nothing from any government.

One criticism noted by Richard Roach, head of press and publications, is that in some parts of the world people think that Amnesty International does nothing in Western Europe or North America. This is wrong, for there are plenty of campaigns in the West, particularly against the detention of conscientious objectors and police action against some of the nationalist movements.

A.I.-Folton



DOSSIER

Amnesty International in Africa

The human rights movement in sub-Saharan Africa has developed fast. Governments have been known to say that the protection of civil and political rights is a luxury and that priority has to go to the economy and social matters, but Amnesty International has always maintained that this is no justification for abuse such as torture or illegal executions. Human rights are indivisible.

The organisation now has national branches in six countries of Africa and groups in four more, most of them set up over the past decade.

There were AI national branches in just Ghana and Nigeria in 1978, but branches opened in Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire in 1979 and the first African meeting of AI members was held in 1980. Regional meetings of this sort, now annual events run in a different country each time, are an opportunity for members to discuss a regional view of the policy put forward by the International Council. They also mean that African members have more to do with decision-making at every level of the international movement.

In 1982, Amnesty International was extended to East Africa and notably, to Kenya, Mauritius and Tanzania.

In 1984, the Tanzanian groups hosted a regional conference during the world campaign for the abolition of torture. At the time of this meeting, attended by 70 people from 26 countries, including 17 African ones, there were 41 local groups on the continent.

***Tyranny exists regardless of colour.
It is no less reprehensible for
being perpetrated by one of us. (1)***

Recruitment of Zimbabwe members began in 1989.

The difficulties are objective ones — poor transport, rudimentary communications and general poverty, posing a real challenge to the development of an independent human rights movement in Africa. In some countries a stamp on a letter for a prisoner is the same price as a meal.

(1) A reference to a speech by Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda, at the OAU Summit in 1986.

African prisoners of conscience adopted by Amnesty International include Agostinho Neto, the first President of independent Angola, Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, President and Minister in Zimbabwe, and Diallo Telli, former Secretary-General of the OAU, who was starved to death.

Human rights violation in Africa

Religious groups and lawyers in the front line of the struggle are particularly subject to abuse. Journalists too have an important part to play in spreading news of abuse and drawing attention to repression.

Individual rights in Africa often used to be seen in terms of economic development rather than civil and political freedom.


In the 1960s, AI made appeals for Africans jailed for opposition to the

colonial regime or to systems imposed by the whites in general.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Amnesty faced an emergency situation with the killing of thousands of prisoners by various states.

One of the atrocities revealed by the organisation was the massacre of dozens of schoolchildren in the Central African Republic in 1979. Subsequently, Bokassa was condemned to death... and an AI observer at the court appealed against his execution. Human rights are indivisible no matter who is involved!

The military regimes and single-party systems gradually set up summary procedures, particularly for political cases. Then came lightning, unfair court cases and forced confessions, often broadcast on the radio. People accused in a case in 1986, for example, never appeared in court and never knew they had been



A.I.-Folton

'I'd be delighted if governments could prove all our reports wrong, if that meant human rights aren't being violated'

AI describes the present situation

Africa in 1990

Human rights abuse continues despite signs of reform in one or two countries. Among the most tragic cases in the 1990 report is that of a 38-year old university teacher who died after torture during a week's 'unofficial' imprisonment for his political opinions.

But positive changes are occurring with political reform allowing for opposition parties in former single-party states, the abolition of the death penalty in three countries and better human rights protection in others.

Benin, for example, has freed political prisoners and made important changes on the human rights front since it brought in its political reforms.

The death penalty has been abolished in Sao Tome & Principe where new political parties have also been authorised and 39 political prisoners have been released.

Zambia has freed 10 political prisoners serving long-term sentences and has legalised the opposition parties.

South Africa has raised the ban on opposition movements, Nelson Mandela is free and the state of emergency is over — although opponents to the regime are still in prison awaiting charges and trial.

Seven other countries now allow new political parties to set up, but are still arresting people on political grounds, if not massacring students and political prisoners during power switches. Torture continues in about 18 African countries at least, illegal executions in 10 and irregular procedures in two.

Mozambique, Namibia and Sao Tome & Principe have abolished the death penalty and Rwanda has commuted many of its death sentences. Recourse to capital punishment has declined in South Africa, but is on the increase in five other countries.

Europe in 1990 (1)

The political upheavals in Eastern Europe in 1989 are still making themselves felt in reforms aimed at greater freedom of expression, movement and association, in the freeing of political detainees and prisoners of conscience and in the election of two former prisoners of conscience as President, in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

But human rights are still being flouted in Europe, particularly in the context of ethnic conflict or nationalist troubles.

Bad police treatment persists in 12 countries of Europe and seven of them are in the EC. Conscientious objectors still get sent to prison in nine countries of Europe, three of which are in the EC.

Czechoslovakia and Ireland have abolished the death penalty, the Belgian Government has produced a bill to do away with it in peace time, Bulgaria has decided to place a moratorium on it and Albania is using it less.

European external policy and human rights — Amnesty International's view —

AI believes that the protection and promotion of human rights are essential to the Community's external policy (development aid policy included) and must be an integral part of any overall structural approach to human rights.

Such an approach should involve positive measures and systematic, practical steps whenever human rights are violated, in accordance with Article 5 of Lomé IV (ACP States).

AI hopes that the idea of human rights clauses as adopted in the recent cooperation agreements with countries in Central and Latin America and Eastern Europe will be extended systematically to all the Community's future agreements with third countries. This will show the care the Community takes over human rights, objectively and not subjectively, without limiting itself to the developing countries or those moving over to democracy.

The organisation also feels that the Community could usefully support national human rights protection-promotion schemes in the developing countries.

The Community could also help national NGOs defend the rights of local communities and interest groups and help victims of abuse and their families.

Free elections and multi-party systems, Amnesty International maintains, cannot guarantee human rights on their own. ○

D.D.

(1) The geographical region of Europe, including Eastern Europe.

judged. Some of them were not in a position to know as they had already been executed.

Serious human rights abuses occurred in the 1980s in countries long at war, where there was respect for neither

human rights nor the laws of war — massacre, torture and arbitrary detention were common currency. AI both campaigned against abuse by Governments and drew attention to abuse by the armed forces of the opposition in these places.

Over the past five years, AI has been to all but 12 of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It has been forced to suspend its appeals for individual prisoners of conscience in some places because of the potential threat to their lives.

Towards the universal abolition of the death penalty


Amnesty International began this campaign in 1975. It has had international backing from UN Economic and Social Committee decisions (1984), the sixth Protocol of the European Human Rights Convention (1985), the African Human Rights Charter (1986), the optional protocols to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (December 1989) and the American Human Rights Convention (1990).

There have been no executions in the EEC since 1977 and the trend in Africa is encouraging too. Cape Verde has been abolitionist since independence in 1975. No-one has been condemned to death in Comoros since 1975 or Djibouti since 1972 and Madagascar, Seychelles, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire have commuted all the death penalties imposed over the past decade at least — which could be seen as *de facto* abolition. Comoros, Djibouti, Niger and Togo can reasonably be considered as abolitionist in practice. However, some countries on the continent are still resolutely in favour of capital punishment and one of them executed more than 120 people in 1990, a sad record, even bearing in mind the size of the population.

In the Caribbean, the Dominican Republic abolished the death penalty for all crimes in 1966 and Haïti did likewise in 1987. A commission of enquiry is looking into abolition in Trinidad & Tobago, while Barbados brought in legislation in 1989 to prevent the death penalty being pronounced on under-18s.

The Pacific States have a long abolitionist tradition. Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu no longer have the death penalty for any crime, Fiji and PNG have abolished it for ordinary crimes and Western Samoa is abolitionist in practice.

The European Parliament called the death penalty a violation of human rights and appealed to the 'common civilisation' of the Member States to get it abolished. It has made many appeals for clemency, as have the EEC Foreign Ministers as part of European political cooperation, and the Co-Presidents of the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly have also intervened in a large number of cases.



The death penalty continues to be used in 92 countries

Late 1990 — the trend is towards abolition

Half the countries on the planet have done away with capital punishment on either a *de jure* or *de facto* basis. The death penalty has been abolished for all crimes in 44 countries, for common law crimes in 17 and there has been no capital punishment for at least 10 years in 25. However, 92 still have the death penalty — and use it.

AI particularly concerned with harmonising policy on the right to asylum in Europe

One of the things the Member States are doing as part of the 1992 single market programme is to provide for systematic cooperation whereby nationals of many non-Community countries have to have visas and sanctions can be taken against carriers who

transport asylum-seekers without the relevant visas and travel documents.

Amnesty International is concerned that such measures might deny potential prisoners of conscience and people who might face torture, 'disappearance' or execution, access to the status of refugee.

The Member States are also working on cooperation provisions for the policies and practices governing the entry of asylum-seekers to their territories and these people's access to the refugee status determination procedure. The new provisions suggest that people fleeing human rights abuse and seeking protection in a Community country will only be able to apply for asylum in one Member State.

Amnesty International has found that the criteria used to determine the status of refugee vary from one Member State to the next and that an asylum-seeker may well be recognised as a refugee in one country and have his application refused in another. ○ D.D.

The African Charter on Human and People's Rights

by Nuala MOLE (*) and Hezekiah LAITAGO AWASEB (**)

The wind of change is once again sweeping across Africa. Only this time, it is with a difference. The call is no longer for national independence, but the protection of fundamental human rights. The link between human rights and development has now been expressly recognised in Article 5 of Lomé IV. Since 1981, Africa has had its own regional human rights treaty — the African Charter on Human and People's Rights which has been ratified by 40 countries (see box). An independent Human Rights Commission based in the Gambian capital, Banjul, has been set up under the Charter to oversee its implementation. The Charter, the Commission and the national courts all need support in their work of protecting human rights.

The provisions of the Charter draw on the philosophy and wording of the other international instruments which preceded it — the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants and the European and American Conventions. But it has adapted their provisions to meet some of the situations which are of particular importance to Africa. The Charter not only protects the rights of both individuals and groups, but also lays down corresponding duties, including duties of the state towards the individuals and groups whose lives it governs.

The Charter protects the rights of individuals to equal treatment before the law, a fair trial and freedom from both torture and inhuman and degrading treatment. It protects the rights of groups as well as individuals, to freedom of speech, association, movement and assembly. Individuals have duties towards their families, society, the state and the international community. States have a duty to assist the family, to eliminate discrimination against women and to protect the disabled. The Charter contains some provisions not always found in



The headquarters in Banjul, of the African Commission on Human Rights

other regional treaties — the right to social and economic development, to self-determination and to assistance in liberation from foreign domination.

The Commission

The functions and powers of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights relate to the protection of the rights laid down in the Charter. The Commission can undertake research studies, organise meetings to discuss issues and problems, disseminate information, encourage other human rights institutions and give its views or make recommendations to the governments.

More importantly, under Article 45 of the Charter, the state parties have entrusted the Commission with the task of interpreting it. The Commission has 11 members under the current Presidency of Professor Umozurike of Nigeria. Each member is elected for a six-year period and there may only be one national of any particular state serving on the Commission at a given time. The Commission members are chosen for their high repu-

tation for integrity and their relevant expertise in the field of law.

It has always been stressed that in carrying out its functions, the Commission's primary objective is the amicable settlement of disputes. Its role is conciliatory, striving to mediate between the parties to secure a friendly resolution.

The Commission can examine allegations made by one state about another. Where one state has good reason to believe that another has violated the provisions of the Charter, it may refer the matter to the Commission by communication to its Chairman, to the Secretary-General of the OAU and to the state concerned. There then follows a three month period during which the issue can be resolved through bilateral negotiation or by any other peaceful procedure. If this fails, either state may submit the matter to the Commission through the Chairman, notifying the other state or states involved to that effect.

The individual

Anyone who feels that a violation of the Charter has occurred can com-

(*) Executive Director, Interights.

(**) PhD student, University College, London.

municate this to the Commission, which will examine the complaint if a simple majority of the members agrees to do so.

The communication must, however, meet a stringent series of criteria which are clearly stipulated in Article 56 of the Charter and which include the following:

- communications must be compatible with the Charter of the OAU and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights;
- they must not be written in disparaging or insulting language directed against the state concerned or its institutions, or against the OAU;
- they must not be based exclusively on reports disseminated through the news media;
- every effort must first have been made to resolve the problem through the national courts and the complaint must be made within a reasonable time of this having been done.

The Commission cannot deal with cases already settled by states in accordance with various international instruments, ie the principles of the UN Charter, the OAU Charter or the African Human Rights Charter itself.

While the Commission mandate has been established since 1986, its procedures are not yet fully operative. At the Eighth Ordinary session in Banjul in October 1990, two submissions were communicated by non-governmental organisations under Articles 55 and 56, and their outcome is awaited with interest.

The African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies

Access by individuals, lawyers and national governments to the facilities of a regional commission of this kind is a new experience for Africa. It inevitably requires the development of specialist expertise and resources.

The work of the African Commission is complemented by the African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies which is based in the Gambia. Under its director, Raymond Sock, the Centre strives to advance greater respect for human and people's rights in Africa. It collaborates closely with African and international organisations working in the field. The Centre has six interrelated

programmes for the 1991-92 period. These are:

- Human Rights Procedures: to increase awareness in Africa of international human rights procedures, with the aim of increasing the flow of information between African human rights groups and the international machinery;
- Research: to conduct, commission and publish reliable and objective research about human rights in Africa;
- Documentation: to build a human rights library and documentation resource, available to anyone interested in human rights in Africa;
- Publication: to publish a regular newsletter and series of occasional papers on African human rights issues;
- Training and education: to organise two training seminars, conduct a review of human rights education in Africa and prepare for an annual human rights course starting in 1992-93;
- African Human Rights Internship Programme: to enable African and other interns to learn from and contribute to the work of the African Centre.

The Banjul judges meeting

To deepen the understanding of international human rights law by the African judiciary, a judges meeting or 'Judicial Colloquium' was held in Banjul from 7-9 November 1990 on the theme of the 'Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms'. The importance attached to the national application of international human rights norms is evident in the fact that this was the third such meeting. The first was in Bangalore, India in 1988 and the second in Harare, Zimbabwe in 1989.

Out of the first meeting came the so-called 'Bangalore Principles'. They referred, *inter alia*, to the growing tendency for national courts to look to international law for the purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law, be it constitutional, statute or common law, is uncertain or incomplete. The Bangalore Principles concluded by stating:

'These views are expressed in recognition of the fact that judges and lawyers have a special contribution to

Interights

Interights, the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights has observer status at the African Commission and is currently actively involved in the advisory, promotional and educational process pertaining to international human rights norms in Africa. Among the members of its Advisory Council are two notable African experts, Justice Enoch Dumbutshena, former Chief Justice of Zimbabwe and Adama Dieng from Senegal. The organisation's base is in London and it works in Europe, Africa and the Caribbean.

JAN BRYCHTA



Interights' activities include the provision of the following:

- free specialist advice and information in international human rights law (it is currently assisting lawyers in several countries in Africa and the Caribbean);
- direct legal representation in selected cases before tribunals such as the European Commission of Human Rights, the United Nations Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission;
- assistance to lawyers and non-governmental organisations in the preparation of cases before international and regional tribunals;
- practical assistance and advice to local civil liberties organisations and lawyers on international and comparative human rights law;
- amicus curiae briefs in cases raising important issues concerning the interpretation of fundamental rights (an amicus curiae brief is a document which is put before a commission or court by someone who is not a party to the dispute but who has specialist knowledge of the law or facts which may assist the tribunal to reach a more informed conclusion).

make in the administration of justice in fostering universal respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms'.

The follow-up to the Bangalore meeting was convened in Harare in April 1989 by Chief Justice Enoch Dumbutshena of Zimbabwe and was opened by President Mugabe. The 'Harare Declaration' reiterated the Bangalore principles and added:

'But fine statements in domestic laws or international and regional instruments are not enough. Rather, it is essential to develop a culture of respect for internationally stated human rights norms which see these norms applied in the domestic laws of all nations and given full effect...'

It is against this significant backdrop of both Bangalore and Harare that the Banjul meeting took shape. It was well-attended by senior judges from the West African region, by visiting judges from Zimbabwe, India, Australia and the United Kingdom and by Mr Adama Dieng, the new Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists.

The meeting was hosted by the Chief Justice of the Gambia, in conjunction with the Commonwealth Secretariat and Interights, with assistance from the Ford Foundation, the Danish International Development Agency and the British Overseas Development Agency.

The discussion centred on papers presented by the participants which covered a wide range of subjects. The concluding statement of the proceedings, known as the 'Banjul Affirmation' called for human rights to be included in legal education, in formal professional teaching and in other activities. It also called for wide and popular dissemination of information about human rights and freedoms. To this effect, judges, lawyers, litigants and others should be made familiar with applicable human rights norms as stated in international instruments and national constitutions and laws.

The 'Banjul Affirmation' also called on the African Commission on Human and People's Rights to consider establishing local associations in each member state for the purpose of facilitating the process of education and training, and the dissemination of human rights information.



Participants at the Banjul Judges meeting

It proposed the establishment of closer links and cooperation across national frontiers by the judiciary on the interpretation and application of human rights law, and the making of effective arrangements for the publication and exchange of judgements, articles and other information and, where appropriate, the use of special expertise.

It also suggested that adequate resources by way of library stocks and other materials be urgently made available for all judges for their information and assistance and to disseminate and teach international human rights law. Furthermore, it stressed the importance of complete judicial independence as well as complete independence of the judicial profession. Underlining the importance of real and effective access to the ordinary courts for the determination of criminal charges and civil rights and obligations by due process of law, it stated that these safeguards were necessary if the rule of law was to be meaningful and if the law was to be of practical value to ordinary men and women. It also recognised the need for a generous approach to the matter of legal standing in public law cases, suggesting that courts be assisted by well-focused *amicus curiae* submissions from independent, non-governmental organisations such as Interights in cases where international and comparative law and practice might be relevant. The Banjul Affirmation also suggested

that national courts enable non-governmental organisations and expert advocates to provide specialist legal advice, assistance and representation in important cases of public interest.

It called for the exceptions and derogations contained in the African Charter to be construed strictly and for the law to be interpreted in such a manner as to reject arbitrary or unreasonable laws. 'Otherwise, these exceptions and derogations would destroy the very principles guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms'.

Call for an African Court of Human Rights

However, the single most significant and constructive development of the Banjul Colloquium is the recognition by the participants of the pressing need for an independent African Court of Human Rights similar to the European Court, whose decisions would be binding. Currently, the only enforcement organ is the Commission whose decisions cannot bind the states.

As a result of the Banjul meeting, a further judges meeting in Nigeria is set for December 1991 which will again be attended by the senior West African judiciary. A judge from the European Court of Human Rights has also been invited to share the experiences of that institution with the meeting.○

N.M. & H.L.A.

Human Rights in Africa: the decisive steps

by Benoît NGOM (*)

Africa, 'the continent human rights have forgotten', was soon to surprise many observers with its protection of human rights and freedoms when, during the second decade of independences, the idea of non-interference was held up to question in no uncertain manner.

Paradoxically, African political leaders were among the first in the world to claim the right to criticise a state if it violated human rights and thus the idea became part of the continent's human rights practices.

The first public manifestation of this was in 1975, when Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere severely criticised the President of Uganda, where that year's OAU Summit was due to be held.

Dr Nyerere, with the backing of the Heads of State of Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, objected to the host country being one where human rights were flouted so openly. They thought it was wrong to criticise South Africa for violating human rights and yet not speak out when other African countries were guilty of the same thing and, although the recommendation to move the summit came to nothing, it was a precedent and it left its mark.

This was the background against which the process culminating in the removal of Bokassa was set in motion. The Emperor, accused of allowing the massacre of primary and high school children, agreed to the commission of enquiry suggested by the heads of French-speaking states. They met in Kigali in May 1979 and decided to set up an African legal commission — it comprised lawyers from Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo and Liberia — and this ultimately pronounced Bokassa responsible for atrocities committed on the children of Bangui.

At the Monrovia Summit in June 1979, Godfrey Binaisa, ignoring diplomatic niceties, launched into a violent attack on dictators such as Nguéma and Bokassa.

So it was the crimes of African Heads of State — Idi Amin, Macias Nguéma and Jean Bedel Bokassa — which triggered the first indignant reactions of the continent's leaders. The denunciation of the conspiracy of silence around the violation of the rights and freedoms of the citizen heralded the subsequent adoption of the African Charter of Human and People's Rights.

Thus it was that, with one voice, the states of the continent agreed to the principle of setting up an African Charter of Human and People's Rights. The Monrovia resolution ultimately took practical shape when the Heads of State and Government unanimously adopted it at the 18th OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Summit in June 1981.

A year after Monrovia, in June 1980, Banjul (Gambia) hosted a first meeting, an interministerial conference which adopted the draft African Charter of Human and People's Rights on the basis of a text which experts had come up with at an earlier session in Dakar.

The Charter is a fundamental contribution to the development of regional law in Africa and, as such, fills one of the many gaps in the protection of individual and collective rights and freedoms. It seems to embody a median line of conduct involving two concepts of human rights — the concept of civil and political rights found in the West and the concept of social and cultural rights found in the socialist countries, which both are applicable to and can be demanded of the states of Africa.

So, clearly, there was more to it than just signing a human rights charter without reference to the vague notion of people.

A Commission of Human and People's Rights was set up to ensure that the Charter was applied. The members were elected by secret ballot by the Conference of Heads of State and Government.

In carrying out their duties, the Charter says, the members of the Commission enjoy the diplomatic privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Organisation of African Unity. Their prerogatives are broad, since they may use whatever method of investigation seems appropriate and, in particular, hear the Secretary-General of the OAU and indeed anyone likely to enlighten them.

The wind of freedom is blowing across Africa, bearing hope with it, and people are surprised to find themselves dreaming of new democratic constitutions involving several parties taking their turn at governing.

In only a few months, countries such as Namibia, Benin, Cape Verde and Sao Tome & Principe have tried out multiparty systems and tasted the delights of alternance.

But is this really the end of dictatorship and the coming of democratic political regimes? Time alone will tell but the democrats are still getting ready for a society of equality and justice.

The African Jurists' Association brought its expertise and reputation to bear on the consolidation of the primacy of law in Africa, attending seminars with UNESCO and many NGOs to get the African Charter of Human and People's Rights adopted and ratified.

We have also been involved in the democratisation of Africa's political system, having contributed to the process in Namibia, at the OAU's request, and attended the Benin National Conference and joined the OAU in supervising the first democratic elections in Cape Verde, at the invitation of the parties concerned. ○

B.N.

(*) President of the African Jurists' Association. Author of 'Les droits de l'homme et l'Afrique' (Silex - Paris - 1984), 'La cour suprême du Sénégal' (Présence africaine - Paris - 1990).

A personal view

Building democracy with tribalism

Although corruption is often cited, tribalism is probably the commonest motivation of most military coups in Africa—those violent reactions of resentment by one or several groups against domination by others. Note that, invariably, no sooner are the accusers in office than they are themselves accused of the same misdeed. If they are not, in turn, overthrown a state of permanent tribal tension would reign. More tragic, of course, are the civil wars with ethnic overtones — led by war-lords in search of political power — which have been and are being savagely waged with tremendous loss of lives and property, immense human suffering and famine. The picture Africa projects is, accordingly, one of absolute chaos, of barbarism and economic decay.

Perceived inevitably as a factor of instability, an evil which would distort and ultimately destroy any political system no matter what its merits, tribalism is justifiably in the forefront of the debate on democracy in Africa as one regime after another bows to popular pressure for political pluralism. But is tribalism really evil? Is it truly inimical to democracy and party politics?

For over three decades, advocates of the one-party state or military rule have advanced the need to overcome tribalism and promote national unity to justify the monopoly of power by a restricted group of people. This has led, in some cases, to the installation of dictatorship and a reign of terror. These one-party or military-rule enthusiasts erroneously assumed that, either by persuasion or coercion, tribalism could be smothered and a nation of subservient peoples moulded. They failed miserably.

Surprisingly, proponents of a multi-party system of government appear to make a similar assumption in claiming that party ideals, freedom and justice, respect for human rights, and other principles embodied in democracy are so cherishable and attractive that tribalism can easily be traded for them. They often cite examples in Western Europe where pluralism has flourished amid ethnic tensions and nationalism. Africa, they point out, has not the monopoly of tribalism. Its leaders should create the conditions favourable for its defeat. These 'democrats' aspire to the creation of homogeneous African societies, without which, they claim, multi-party democracy would be in jeopardy, as if homogeneity can be achieved within a time frame of twenty or thirty or fifty years, and as if it does not require as a minimum condition a common language.

Such reasoning betrays a lack of understanding of the psychology, indeed

of the true nature, of African tribalism. We are not dealing here with minorities resentful of decades or centuries of oppression seeking redress or secession (such agitations are, as already pointed out, also taking place in Africa), but with what is, in essence, the primitive impulse of the African's heart, his being.

Defined as the sentiment of belonging to a group of clans which claim a common ancestry, tribalism is, as we know from the works of Sigmund Freud, linked to totemism, a necessary and universal phase of human development. This definition differs considerably from the popular negative understanding of it as meaning 'hatred of, or discrimination against, people of other tribes' — a notion reinforced by the political situation in Africa just described, which is repulsive to many people around the world. Tribalism that involves hatred and domination of others is a sentiment with which many Africans are ashamed to be associated, even if by nature they are tribalists.

The African tribalist

Let us then undertake briefly a psychoanalysis of the African tribalist. We must start by recognising as valid the freudian assertion that in this our twentieth century, there are societies which have retained, more than others, that sense of oneness with nature with which

humanity in primitive times was imbued and that that sense exercises tremendous influence in the organisation of life, manifesting more often in animism, and in the worship of the ancestors. Such are African societies, still overwhelmingly rural, which are characterised mostly by the worship of the ancestors, a traditional religion of which absolute loyalty not only to the family but also to the clan or the tribe is the basic tenet. In Western societies, that primaeval sense has been forced back deep into the subconscious, although traces can be found in certain gestures, superstitions and rituals. Although there is a certain re-awakening of the sense of the 'tribe' among minorities, spurred by political and economic reasons, the family as a unit in the West, generally, has given way to the individual and society has become a collection of individuals in contrast to Africa where society is made up of families and of tribes. The African attachment to his family or his adherence to the extended family system is too well-known to warrant emphasis.

Loyalty to the clan, as demanded by the traditional religion, together with fear and mistrust of other tribes acquired through ages of inter-tribal wars, raids and slavery, have created in the African psyche a sense of 'insecurity outside the group'. Evidence of this can be found in schools, universities and cities across the continent where different tribal associations come into being for the purpose of providing their own tribes-men and -women with the support they need in unfamiliar surroundings, keep them in touch with their own culture and promote tribal interests. It is not uncommon to find such associations in places as far away as London and New York.

We should note, looking back at history, that almost all the tribes brought under one 'nation' for the administrative and economic convenience of the colonial master resented the unnatural union. It should therefore not come as a surprise to realise that the African, accordingly, owes greater allegiance to his tribe than to his so-called country. Indeed his order of priorities are instinctively his family, his tribe and his country, caring much less about the latter, except in the context of international relationships.

These then were the people to whom the colonial masters granted independence. Not long exposed to democratic



A Nigerian newspaper vendor in the 1960s bearing news of the political strife that was to lead to a chain of catastrophic events. At the root of it all was tribal tension

practices, and amid poverty, is it any wonder that the democratic models bequeathed to Africa collapsed almost everywhere in the first decade of independence, as many regimes were overthrown in military coups and many others confiscated power by means of one-party states?

The case of Nigeria

It is perhaps in order at this juncture to undertake a case-study of Nigeria where the tribal problem posed to democracy is more acute and more complex than in any other African country. Nigeria, according to some estimates, has well over 70 ethnic groups. It was created in 1914 through the amalgamation of the British Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria.

A glance at the records of the three-day debate on the 'Motion for Independence' in the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives in January 1960 reveals certain incontrovertible facts: 1) The House was a caricature of the House of Commons, Members knew very little about parliamentary ethics and procedures; 2) Debates lacked substance, being dominated by ethnic squabbles.

For example: Soon after the Prime Minister had introduced the motion and the leader of the opposition had replied, the first Member to speak expressed fears about exchanging what he called 'white imperialism for black imperialism'. 'I love independence', he said, 'I fought for it and its attainment is a credit to us, but nevertheless there are some doubts and sad experiences arising from the insincere, undemocratic,

oppressive, vindictive and tribalism attitude of some of our leaders..... I have to mention that I come from a tribe which is deemed to be the fourth largest and the oldest in the country. Now we are attaining independence we want to be independent in that tribe, to rebuild and reopen in such an administrative way that all the Ijaw-speaking elements are united to form their own Province or State in an independent Nigeria'. He did not want his people to be under the Government of the Western Region. Another Member did not want his either to be under the Government of the Eastern Region. 'I feel Mr Speaker Sir' he said, 'that we are not safe in the hands of 'Ajingba' Government of the Eastern Region. Certainly you know that with Dr Okpara presiding we people in the Calabar Province are in hell.'

It should be noted that the colonial administration had created three regions, based on the three main tribes, in 1947 in response to tension between the three groups. The political parties which emerged during this period, though supposedly national, were each dominated by one tribe. They were: the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC)-Hausa-dominated; the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC)-Ibo-dominated; and the Action Group (AG)-Yoruba-dominated. Politicians from the minority tribes allied themselves with one or the other party in accordance with whichever they felt would serve their best interest. They were often disappointed, and because they usually felt uncomfortable within the formations, were more often inclined to agitate for the creation of their own region or province.

In the House of the Representatives we referred to, the NPC and NCNC were in coalition. They were opposed by the AG. It was thought that the alliance between the Hausas and Ibos augured well for peace and democracy in the country in terms of promoting tribal understanding and harmony. It increased, on the contrary, the suspicion of the Yorubas of an Hausa/Ibo conspiracy to dominate. Equally it was thought that the realignment of the political landscape which occurred in 1963 was a step in the right direction: a split had occurred in the AG with a faction forming the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) and going into an alliance with the NPC. The NCNC and AG, on the other hand, came together. Unfortunately, the bitterness caused among the Yorubas by the split in the AG was to precipitate serious political disturbances in the Western Region and lead to a chain of catastrophic events: the first military coup in 1966, the massacre of the Ibos in the Northern Region, the secession of the Eastern Region ('Biafra') and the Nigerian civil war.

Mindful of these experiences, the 1979 Constitution of the Second Republic, which saw the return to democratic government that year, required political parties to be truly national, i.e. present on the ground in the then 19 States of the Federation, and the President of the Republic to win election in at least two-thirds of the number of states. That Constitution failed. The political formations which emerged were a virtual resurrection of the three post-independen-

dence parties, still as ethnically dominated as ever, and with the same personalities. With another return to democratic rule planned for 1992, a number of measures have already been taken aimed at avoiding a repetition. Will they succeed? It should be noted that, in order to reduce tribal tension, the tradition of devolution of power begun in 1947 by the colonial regime has been maintained with exercises in the creation of states. Each exercise has always succeeded in reducing ethnic tension in the country.

Admittedly not all the African countries have had the same experience as Nigeria, but we can draw a number of general conclusions, valid for all, from our psychoanalysis of the African tribalist and our case-study of Nigeria: the first is that tribalism is a natural sentiment that cannot be stifled. It relates to the personality, indeed to the true identity of the African; the second is that African countries had at independence little or no experience in the operation of democracy based on western models, and still have considerable difficulties grappling with their mechanics; and the third is that politics in Africa cannot avoid being affected by tribal sentiments. Consider the results of the March 1991 election in Benin Republic where, despite the general feeling of a widespread desire for change after more than two decades of government by Mr Kerekou, the latter's share of the votes was almost exclusively based on the support of his northern tribesmen. The winner, President Soglo, failed to win substantial votes among them. This, on the threshold of what is supposed to be a new era for democracy in Africa.

Let it be said outright that democracy has, since the days of the Greek city-states, proved its superiority over all other political systems. It is a system that has triumphed over totalitarianism in Eastern Europe and which is increasingly being adopted in the Third World in general. Poverty is not a constraint. After all, the biggest democracy in the world, India, is a poor country. The future peace and prosperity of Africa, no doubt, depends on democracy taking root on the continent.

The trouble is that Africans have never realistically attempted to build democracy with the institutions available to them. They have indulged and are continuing to indulge in mimicry. None of the great democracies of today copied

wholesale the political system of the other. Whatever system they have is both a reflection of their national character and of their history: the United Kingdom, a constitutional monarchy since William and Mary in 1689; France, a unitary presidential system since 1958 after a long period of government instability and search for a more durable system — since the 1789 revolution in fact!; the United States, a federal presidential system since 1789 when the Constitution of the United States came into effect. The founding fathers of that Constitution had examined all the political systems known to mankind — monarchy, oligarchy and democracy and rejected each as dangerous, preferring instead to infuse all three into a system of checks and balances, refined it is true by various Amendments. A great document which suits the American temperament and which has stood the test of time.

Condemned to living together in modern states, Africans ought to find a formula for peace. Tribalism, as defined in this article, should not be seen as a factor of division but as a natural institution (in-built pluralism or natural constituencies if you will) with which democracy ought to be constructed. Language, they say, is a vision of life. Tribes which speak different languages see the world in different manners, and such visions should find expression in democracy, much more so in societies where ideology plays little or no part in the formation of political parties.

Reconciling democracy with tribalism: a possibility

The question inevitably is: how can tribalism, in practice, be reconciled with democracy? This must, of course, start with a Constitution which emphasises the basic, entrenched principles of democracy; i.e. respect of human rights, respect for the rights of minorities, freedom of speech and of the press, an independent legislature, an independent judiciary, fair distribution of the nation's wealth, social services and amenities, education for all and an obligation for government to govern constitutionally.

Although situations vary from country to country (some have a greater number of tribes than others and thus have greater ethnic problems as already pointed out), the Constitution should organ-

DOSSIER

ise political life with a guaranteed role for every tribe. For those with numerous ethnic groups, political life could, for example, be organised thus: Each component part of society, ie tribe, should have at least a guaranteed representation in the Legislature, the number of representations, of course, reflecting its numerical strength. Each tribe should elect its representative on the basis of a contest, initially at least, exclusively between tribally-based political parties. The virtue of such a system is that it would reduce thuggery, ballot rigging, resentment often felt by many at the sight of a member of one tribe campaigning in another or the thought of being represented by him, increase popular participation in political life, and give a double mandate to the elected person: ie representative not only of his local party's interests but also those of his tribe.

Let us not forget that in the Athenian city-state where democracy was first practised in the ancient world, the Council of the Five Hundred, which constituted the steering committee of the Assembly, was composed of 50 members drawn from each of the 10 tribes and that the board of magistrates comprising 10 members was also chosen on a tribal basis. Although women, slaves and foreign residents were excluded from participation in politics, the city-state system functioned for its citizens very well, ensuring peace and stability from 508 BC to 338 BC when Athens was conquered by the Macedonians.

Readers may well ask how under such a system a national government can be formed with the multiplicity of tribally-based political parties. The answer is simple. The system will induce the emergence at national level of political parties formed through the coalition of the tribally-based parties. This inevitably implies not only a process of negotiation but also a bottom-up approach to the establishment of national parties rather than what currently obtains which is of parties formed at the national level (but dominated in most cases by a single tribe as has been the case in Nigeria) and imposed on the rest of the country. It will be the local parties willingly going into alliances whose structure, policies and constitutions they will help shape rather than individuals without voice and without influence joining parties whose policies and structures had been determined elsewhere. It will give the tribe, however

minor, a sense of importance and of participation in national affairs, especially if the Constitution demands a high level of support in the Legislature for the formation of a government and the enactment of certain kinds of legislation, support high enough to preclude domination by one or a small group of tribes however populous.

Let us note here that, in contrast to most European parties which are based

A system as suggested in this article necessarily means reduced powers for whoever is chosen by whatever means as Head of State. It means greater powers for the Government and the Legislature. It will induce the establishment of local government more on the tribal level (which, in any case, will be a return to one akin to what Africa had before colonialism), than on the level of district or province, the boundary of which was often arbitrarily drawn. The establish-



A Kenyan politician in suit and in traditional regalia during an election rally in his constituency. The message is clear: tribal sentiment is a powerful factor. Better marry it with democracy rather than fight against it

on mass membership of branches, the two main parties in the United States, the Democratic and Republican parties, had their roots in a variety of militant groups across the country supporting one or the other of the two strands of political opinions which emerged between 1789 and 1801. The Democrats were mainly adherents of the federalist principles enunciated by Alexander Hamilton while the Republicans were mainly followers of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, opponents of federalism and supporters of greater powers to the states. The American party system thus came into existence as a bottom-up movement, the national parties serving as umbrella organisations for different interest groups which happened to have common interests at the national level.

ment of local government on the tribal level will not only contribute towards the channelling of those energies presently expended at the national level on dispute back into tribal cultural and social welfare; it will also facilitate rural development.

This system can only function effectively if there is a commitment to respect those entrenched democratic principles which we have already outlined here, particularly those regarding the respect of the rights of minorities and the obligation to govern constitutionally. To ignore, deplore or attempt to smoulder tribalism in order to build a strong democracy is, in the opinion of this writer, day-dreaming. ◻

Augustine OYOWE

Democracy in the English speaking Caribbean

The upsurge in democratic sentiment which has transformed the world's political landscape over the last five years has certainly been dramatic. Some political scientists are tempted to characterise this as a sea-change which represents the final triumph of democracy and its attendant liberal economic philosophy, over authoritarianism and central planning. While such a conclusion may be premature — with many infant democracies facing formidable challenges which could threaten the whole process — the prevailing wind continues to favour political pluralism. Within the ACPs, the main impact of this sudden democratic renaissance is being seen in Africa. Elsewhere, and notably in the Caribbean, democracy has followed a more evolutionary course and, at the beginning of the 1990s, the pluralistic tradition is already well established.

In this article, we focus on the democratic systems in the English-speaking Caribbean, with a view to identifying their principal characteristics and to assessing their effectiveness. As more and more developing states experiment with the democratic alternative, in the hope of finding solutions to their current political and economic difficulties, the experiences of existing democracies in the developing world may offer some useful lessons.

Similarities

In general terms, the 12 anglophone ACP countries of the Caribbean region display a considerable degree of homogeneity. Ten of them are island states (the exceptions being Guyana and Belize). Their populations range from small to very small (Jamaica is the largest with 2.4 million inhabitants). There are notable economic similarities, with heavy reliance on a limited range of cash crops and a particular emphasis on tourism. In most of the countries, the general level of education is good, and a high proportion of the population is literate. On the negative side, they are all vulnerable to the tropical cyclones which strike with such devastating force in the region.

From a constitutional standpoint, the common heritage of the English-speaking Caribbean is largely reflected in the systems of Government which have emerged. In the decolonisation period, following the Second World War, it was generally believed that statehood was not a viable option for territories below a certain population and size. The British solution to this problem in the Caribbean was to set up a West Indies Federation which, it was intended, would proceed to independence in due course, as a single sovereign entity. The scheme foundered as a result of inter-island rivalries and because the British simultaneously pursued a policy of internal self-government

on an island by island basis. The latter approach effectively undermined the efforts to forge a West Indian identity (although this exists on the cricket field) under the umbrella of the Federation.

At the same time, international perceptions about the minimum requirements for statehood in terms of both population and territory were rapidly changing. Economic advances in a number of the larger Caribbean territories contributed to the view that these, at least, could 'go it alone' and this led to the independence, between 1962 and 1966 of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana. Despite a further attempt by Britain to draw together most of its remaining Caribbean islands — principally in the Lesser Antilles — under the ill-fated 'Associated States', the majority of these moved to independence during the 1970s.

Westminster model

In stark contrast to the position in Africa, the basic constitutional frameworks bequeathed by the colonial power have survived largely unscathed in the English-speaking Caribbean. Accordingly, government structures continue to resemble in many ways the Westminster system upon which they were modelled. Guyana is the only real exception to this, having inaugurated a new constitution in 1980 which replaced the system es-

tablished at the time of independence and which incorporated socialist principles into the basic law.

One clear distinction between the countries under discussion and the erstwhile metropolitan power is the fact that the former have written constitutions. It is perhaps ironic that Britain, whose antipathy towards enshrining its own basic norms and conventions in a single constitutional document is well known, should have played such a prominent part in the writing of other peoples' constitutions, but it is difficult to imagine how the independence process could have proceeded otherwise.

In all of the states concerned except Guyana, the legal form of the Constitution is still the original 'Order in Council' signed by the monarch at the time independence was granted. Each contains a series of human rights provisions as well as the basic rules governing the exercise of executive, legislative and judicial authority.

Human rights guaranteed

Broadly speaking, the provisions relating to fundamental rights guarantee the following to the citizen (taken from the Antigua and Barbuda Constitution Order, 1981):

- life, liberty, security of the person, the enjoyment of property and the protection of the law;
- freedom of conscience, of expression (including freedom of the press), and of peaceful assembly and association;
- protection of family life, of personal privacy, of the privacy of the home and other property, and from deprivation of property without fair compensation.

It is perhaps significant that these entrenched rights usually precede the clauses relating to the structure of government.

A set of similar rights is also enumerated in the Guyana Constitution, although this document cites as 'the principal objective of the political system', the extension of 'socialist democracy by providing increasing opportunities for the participation of citizens in the management and decision-making processes of the state'. Article 18 goes on to lay down, in almost biblical fashion, the precept that 'land is for social use and must go to the tiller', while the existence of privately owned economic enterprises is also recognised (Article 17).

On the institutional side, in the other 11 states, the British parliamentary system of government has been reproduced with variations which are more of form than substance. This is true even of the two countries which decided against constitutional monarchy with the Queen as head of state (Trinidad and Tobago, and Dominica). In both of these, the President performs a role which is analogous to that of the Crown, and real political power is in the hands of the directly elected politicians. In the others, the Queen remains head of state, and is represented by a Governor-General who assents to bills which have been passed by the Parliament. In the normal course of affairs, the Governor-General has a formal and ceremonial role but, as events in Grenada in the early 1980s revealed, he assumes a position of considerable importance when the system itself is under threat.

The bicameralism of the British system, with an unelected upper house, is also reflected to a large extent in the Caribbean democracies. In most cases, the Parliament consists of two chambers — the elected House of Assembly (or House of Representatives) and the appointed Senate, although in a few of the smaller jurisdictions, representatives and senators sit together in a single chamber. The standard pattern is for representatives to be elected by single member constituencies using the simple majority voting system while Senators are appointed by the Head of State 'on the advice of...' the Prime Minister or the Leader of the Opposition. Students of the British constitution will recognise the formulation as a euphemism which according to convention, effectively binds the monarch.

Two-party emphasis

From the democratic standpoint, it is interesting to note the extent to which *two-party* as opposed to *multi-party* politics are protected by the various constitutions. There is no rule against third parties standing, but the use of 'first past the post' in single member constituencies — an arrangement which is constitutionally entrenched in several of the jurisdictions — clearly tends to favour two-party politics. More significant in this regard is the method of appointment of senators. In most cases, the Prime Minister chooses the majority of senate

members while the opposition is guaranteed a minority bloc by virtue of their leader's right of nomination. Thus for example, in Trinidad and Tobago, 18 of the 31 Senators are chosen by the government and six by the opposition.

The extent to which Guyana departed from the 'British' model is particularly reflected in its voting arrangements. It is the only English-speaking Caribbean nation whose constitution requires proportional voting, with 53 of the 65 National Assembly members elected under a list system.

Clearly, the health or effectiveness of democratic structures cannot be judged solely by reference to the systems which exist on paper. There are numerous examples of countries with ostensibly democratic constitutions where the essential characteristics of democracy such as free speech or fair election processes are manifestly absent. The importance of having the right system should not be underestimated but arguably, the existence of a genuinely democratic atmosphere is even more vital.

Importance of education

In this respect, most of the Caribbean islands have been fortunate. There is a well-established tradition of democratic debate and of tolerance of opposing views. The relationship between these circumstances and the generally high level of education — which includes wide understanding about the principles and mechanics of democracy — is one which should not be overlooked. It should also be underlined that the practice of representative government in the area has a longer pedigree than the relatively recent independence dates would seem to suggest. Many of the islands enjoyed extensive internal self-government prior to the final cutting of constitutional ties with the UK, and in fact the Parliament of Barbados, which was established in 1639, is one of the oldest in the Commonwealth.

The process of democratic evolution in the Caribbean, which contrasts sharply with the more rapid transition experienced by other states in the decolonisation process may also help to explain the relative stability of political systems in the region. Although a number of countries have, at different times, experienced turmoil which appeared to threaten

established political structures — for example in Jamaica in 1980 — the system has normally been able to absorb this and to act as a vehicle for peaceful political change. Grenada in 1983 was, of course, a notable exception in experiencing the kind of revolutionary upheaval more commonly associated with the African continent. The fact that speedy intervention from outside resulted in the restoration of the *status quo ante* means that we can only speculate about whether this would have occurred in other circumstances, but it certainly is not inconceivable.

The tradition of democracy may be an important foundation, but there is some debate as to whether the Westminster model is the most suitable basis for the genuine and democratic expression of the will of the various English-speaking Caribbean peoples. While acknowledging that the existing systems have provided West Indian societies 'with regular, usually honest and basically reliable mechanisms for elite recruitment and circulation', the author Anthony Maingot clearly has some doubts. (1)

Doubts over voting method

He accepts that the intrinsic legitimacy of the current government structures in the West Indies 'has allowed them to survive some dramatic challenges', which is clearly a testament in their favour, but he also suggests that the *electoral method* may have a corrosive effect in the longer term. In particular, he is critical of the 'winner takes all' voting system which tends to translate modest movements of votes into much larger swings of seats, to the detriment of minority groupings. He also believes that the system encourages polarisation of opinions and induces partisanship which might tend to undermine fundamental national unity. There is some evidence to suggest that simple plurality voting is less suitable for countries which do not have homogenous electorates, and where fair representation of different ethnic, religious or other groups is desirable. In the Caribbean

(1) Author of the chapter entitled 'Citizenship and Parliamentary Politics in the English-Speaking Caribbean', which appears in 'Dual Legacies in the Contemporary Caribbean: Continuing Aspects of British and French Dominion', edited by Paul Sutton. Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., London, 1986.


context, Maingot's critique may, therefore, have greater relevance to a country such as Trinidad and Tobago while being less pertinent, for example, to the Bahamas or St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

However, the essential fact remains that governments in the English-speaking Caribbean can be, and regularly are replaced by a peaceful electoral process in which everyone is free to participate. To an adherent of democracy in a country where no such freedom exists, the exact form of the system would certainly be a secondary consideration.

The issue of minority representation, indirectly referred to above, also arises in the somewhat different context of the rivalries which exist between various Caribbean islands brought together in a single sovereign entity. The territorial instincts and loyalties of island inhabitants are a well-established sociological phenomenon. These instincts tend to be expressed in nationalistic or 'quasi-nationalistic' sentiments, the concomitant of which is likely to be a suspicion of larger neighbours. Europe has a number of well-known examples of this, and in the Caribbean it has affected the constitutional situation of a number of countries.

The problem arose because, notwithstanding the much reduced population criteria which came to be accepted in assessing the viability of statehood, there are numerous Caribbean islands which are almost certainly still too small to operate meaningfully on the international stage. Geographical logic would suggest that where possible, these should have been joined with larger neighbouring islands, and this was done in a number of cases, by a UK government which appeared anxious finally to cast off its colonial mantle. Thus Tobago was 'partnered' with Trinidad, Barbuda with Antigua and the islands of Anguilla and Nevis with St Kitts. The trouble is that geographical logic and political reality do not always coincide. Early disturbances in Anguilla, where local people were vehemently opposed to the proposed link with St Kitts, resulted in its reversion to the status of a UK dependency. The remaining partnerships have survived although not always without difficulties.

From a constitutional standpoint, it is interesting to note that each of the smaller islands enjoys some form of internal self-



*Is the Westminster model the most suitable basis for Caribbean democracy?
This is the Parliament building in Grenada*

government. The aim here has been to satisfy concerns about the possible domination of larger neighbours by allowing some diversity in the governmental system, without undermining the wider unity of the state. Thus, for example, the constitution of 'The Federation of St Christopher and Nevis' specifically guarantees the rights of the smaller island.

This kind of solution has not been possible throughout the Caribbean, however, and as a result, the region now contains most of the world's remaining dependent territories — small islands where the leeway which comes from being

a 'remnant of empire', thousands of miles distant from a largely disinterested metropolitan power, is preferred to any of the alternatives.

Personality politics

A further aspect of politics in the Caribbean area which deserves a brief mention is the importance of individual political personalities. Although, as in the UK, party systems are well-entrenched, the political dynamics of small jurisdictions are such that much greater weight tends to be attached to the leading personalities. Clearly, in the smallest

The Pacific – distinctive cultures and traditions

At first sight, one might expect the governmental systems of the eight Pacific states in the ACP group to have quite a lot in common with those of the English-speaking Caribbean. The countries, after all, have certain important similarities — small populations, economies founded largely on primary commodities and a history of strong links with the British Crown.

However, despite the similarities, an examination of the political structures of the Pacific countries reveals important differences which are rooted in the distinctive cultures and traditions of the region. Each of the island nations has its own characteristics and these are reflected in the way their societies are currently organised. It is evident, for example, that Papua-New Guinea, with its four million inhabitants and its multitude of different tribes and languages, mainly of Melanesian origin, will be organised along different lines from Polynesian Tuvalu, which has fewer than 10 000 people living on eight tiny islands just to the west of the international date line. The unique pre-independence status of Vanuatu as a Franco-British 'condominium', had a particular effect on the way government evolved in that archipelago while the fact that Tonga was never a colony (it was a British protectorate) clearly influenced the system more in favour of local norms and institutions. Fiji, with its two main ethnic groups, is something of a special case. Problems over the relationship between, and role of the Fijian and Indian communities respectively, have influenced the country's constitutional development in a very specific way in recent years.

Despite the divergences within the region, the essential factor which differentiates it from the anglophone Caribbean is the strength of the pre-existing indigenous societies. The local populations (Polynesian, Melanesian and Micronesian) had their own institutions based on tribal or family groupings long before the European powers became involved in the

Pacific and the current political systems, therefore, represent a synthesis of these traditions with imported political concepts which are mainly of British origin.

The most obvious manifestation of western-style democracy is the fact that all of the states concerned now have universal adult franchise. However, the relationship between this and the actual wielding of political power varies from country to country depending on the role played by traditional institutions, hierarchies and ethnic groups in the process. In Tonga, for example, only nine of the 31 members of Parliament are elected and the role of traditional chiefs and of course, the King as head of state, is still very significant. In PNG and the Solomon Islands, the fact that the village (wontok) is the basic unit of society, is seen as an important buttress of the democratic system. In Tuvalu, all twelve members of the Parliament are elected by their local (island) communities and the Prime Minister is chosen from among them. In Fiji, voters are registered on four separate rolls (Fijians, Indians, Rotumans and others) and 37 of the 70 members of the House of Representatives are elected by those registered on the first of these.

In some of the Pacific states, parliamentary bodies are, themselves, somewhat alien transplants, representing as they do, the unity and expression of the modern nation state in a region where the family, the village or the island is likely to prove a far more important focus. What is interesting is that parliamentary politics, complete with local adaptations, have endured in most of the states concerned. Transfers of power are generally peaceful and opposition groupings can normally function freely. Unlike Africa, where the marriage between local political concepts and the Westminster model, proved an unhappy one, the fusion of two different political cultures in the Pacific has met with much less difficulty.

states such as Dominica and St Kitts/Nevis, with populations of less than 100 000, the relationship between a politician and his or her voters is likely to be particularly strong, but even in the larger Caribbean countries, an elected representative would find it difficult (and would be ill-advised) to distance himself too much from the voters. The constituency system further reinforces the link between the local member and the particular group of voters upon whom he depends for his political career.

From a democratic standpoint, this is obviously a good thing. The continuing legitimacy of representative democratic systems requires that they should remain

accountable and accessible. There is a tendency on occasion, for politicians operating in larger jurisdictions to lose sight of these imperatives. On the other hand, there is the risk that too much emphasis on personalities and on maintaining the support of one's own power base could affect the coherence of national political and economic objectives. Additionally, the apparatus which is designed to provide checks and balances against excessive or corrupt behaviour may function less effectively in a small state where a charismatic political leader plays a dominant role.

In the final analysis, the success or failure of any country's political system

can be gauged by its results in terms of economic performance and social well-being. The results from the English-speaking Caribbean are not uniform and it must be recognised that a number of them continue to face problems of development and poverty. However, the conclusion must be that the record of recent decades is largely positive.

In most of the countries which are the subject of this article, democracy has worked, and in a world with an ever-growing number of new democracies whose systems are currently 'on trial', this fact alone should be a source of encouragement. ○

Simon HORNER

Democracy and development

by Yves GAZZO (*)

Is democracy the culmination of the development process? If so, is it earned? Does it hold back development? If so, is it a luxury? Is it mixed with a particular cultural heritage? If so, is it racialist?

A start is made on answering these questions below. It emerges that, if no analyses are run or conditions laid down prior to democracy, then the appearance of a democratic environment generally, but not always, makes economic development easier. However, different sorts of state systems (constitutional monarchies, parliamentary systems etc) have usually achieved this sort of development and dirigism (not to be confused with authoritarianism) has helped speed up economic progress. And the later the economic take-off, the stronger the degree of state intervention (as in Germany, the Latin countries of Europe and South America, in contrast with Northern Europe, Britain etc, where the state hand was much lighter).

Lastly, and especially, there is no need to be rich to be democratic. An aptitude for democracy is not a cultural privilege.

Democratic but not necessarily rich

The emergence of a democratic system is not the ultimate prize of societies whose development has flourished. Although extremely poor societies have priorities and preferences other than democracy or the defence of the right to live, the formal and quantified systematisation of democratic conditionality is contestable, as is the democratic income threshold put at \$1000 per capita just recently. The finding that there are more democracies amongst the rich is simply an image of the existing situation and an analysis of the dynamics, and causes of it in no way includes any economic considerations.

Democracy in Europe also emerged at a time of underdevelopment.

Britain was under-developed in this sense then, because people were hungry, child mortality was high, farm workers were virtual slaves to the big landowners, corruption was rife and so on.

(*) Mr Gazzo is a principal administrator with the Directorate-General for Development at the Commission of the European Communities.

Prosperous Argentina, on the other hand, failed to ensure democracy until very recently, while Colombia is sticking to constitutional civil arrangements in spite of outbreaks of violence. Lastly, India's democracy seems to be the fruit of a happy marriage of complex tradition and relatively successful decolonisation.

Democracy and cultural privilege

Democracy is born of an awareness of the limits of dictatorship. Authoritarianism (in South America, for example) indeed now seems to mean inevitable uncertainty and democracy moderate certainty.

Such awareness always occurs in periods of sudden change, when social balance ceases to appear as the zero-sum game which gets the despots accepted.

And the discovery is, in fact, that of the idea of development and the 'citizen' is born with it.

However, although people are not fated to authoritarianism, they are not fated to democracy either.

Democracy does not have to be a carbon copy of the European model, furthermore, and not because the Third World is more community-spirited than the First, or that it is totalitarian either. In African societies, be they Moslem or oriental, the concept of the individual is different, usually involving greater religious subjugation and powerful community constraints whereby the individual only exists as one of the group of very similar members to which he or she happens to belong. In Europe, 16th century Protestantism produced Calvin's stiflingly totalitarian Geneva, yet 17th and 18th century Calvinism became one of the main springboards for our modern western society.

Questions

Is democracy earned?

Authoritarianism may well look like an extremely good way of getting through the brutal stage of economic take-off and

there are many examples which seem to back up the idea, including:

- the Second Empire in 19th century France;
- the Franco regime in Spain, which changed into a speedy development promoter in its last stages, but still contained negation in the shape of the unsuitable dictatorship it had created;
- the Brazilian military and its galloping inflation.

However, there are just as many examples of the opposite, including:

- the decline of democracy in Japan, South America, Germany etc in the 1930s;
- the development hold-up (in Salazar's Portugal and Vargas' Brazil in 1932-54 and in Ethiopia, Cuba, Tanzania, Madagascar etc today).

Is democracy a luxury?

It may certainly seem so, since the world map is still dominated by authoritarian regimes of many kinds, ranging from the wretchedly poor Bangladesh and Somalia to the industrialised nations of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore etc.

It is also true that authoritarianism is sometimes seen as an accessory to development.

Some people say that the societies of the South need a sound dose of authoritarianism to overcome their inertia and bad habits — and to withstand perverse seduction from us.

Although political stability is vital, it would be wrong to confuse authoritarianism and political dirigism.

The institutional nature of regimes seems to have had little influence over development in the past.

However (as already mentioned), the later the economic take-off, the greater the state intervention. The early industrial revolutions of northern Europe took place outside the state, while those (re)launched later on in Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Spain and Brazil took place with it. In cases of this kind, the state is still very much in evidence as overseer, regardless of how far the countries may be from the democratic ideal, as in the Third World, for example, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali show.

The form a government takes is no indication of its ability to succeed economically. Brazil planned its development without regard for the country's (more authoritarian or more democratic) political phases and democratic India has ensured the progress of its farming and industry with far more determination than the military governments of Pakistan and Indonesia.

In Europe and other places, democracy has often, but by no means exclusively, been a forerunner of development. Although Britain's economic upheaval happened in the predemocratic framework of a stable parliamentary system in the 18th century, Germany's industrialisation occurred mainly under the authoritarian hand of the Bismarck regime.

Trends in Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland (and the USA and Canada) were along the same lines as those in Britain, although somewhat later.

After the revolution, economic expansion in France took off again with the same élan under the monarchical, property-dominated, authoritarian Second Empire and the parliamentary Third Republic and the same went for Italy, with a corrupt parliamentary system, the Mussolini dictatorship and the Republic after 1946. Japan modernised during the first 30 years of the century under the aegis of a regime that was parliamentary in appearance and then under successive authoritarian governments until 1945.

Is democracy racialist?

When the Peruvian novelist Maria Vargas Llosa says 'we should stop despising ourselves', he is referring to our lamentations about the purported democratic inability of the countries of the South. Our political modernisation has often been the outcome of some fairly unlovely comings and goings sandwiched between both more democratic and more dictatorial episodes.

If we accept the idea of non-democracy in the developing world easily, it is by legitimating it in the name of tolerance.

What we used to call primitive (different traditions and cultures and poor material conditions) is now respect for other people's identity. The process of democratisation which recently got under way in various countries in fact calls for all our care and understanding.

Africa, or the difficulty of building a nation-state

There are fairly few possibilities for an African State. As G. Hyden put it, it is 'hanging in the air' and for several reasons:

- the relatively new concept of the nation-state in Africa;
- the limitations of the unanimist idea;
- the fact that the real economy develops independently of the state.

The nation-state — a new concept

African states are very heterogeneous and the frontiers fail to follow either major geographical features or rivers. Contrary to what is usually thought, the African borders were not drawn at the Berlin Conference in 1886. They are the result of a series of negotiations in the field, as exploration happened, military expeditions went out and commercial interests were secured.

However, states organised in the pre-colonial era were genuine multi-ethnic federations.

Yet when they left, the colonial powers declined to play the federation card to the benefit of these territories, aided by one or two countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon. This militated in favour of the dismantling of FWA and FEA, the collapse of the East African Federation and so on.

What changed in comparison with the pre-colonial period was the way the states were administered. The functions of multi-ethnic states were limited to the central power, ensuring security and collecting taxes, without interfering in the social relations of the groups, which kept their own languages, laws and customs.

The modern states, on the other hand, were designed along European lines and tried to define and impose legislation that was supposed to represent what the whole community wanted.

The limitations of the unanimist approach

The drive to build national unity where none existed and develop the countries

contrived to avoid the scattered effects of western-style democracy, so efforts could be focused better — hence the unanimist approach in most countries, with single parties etc. And when the military replaced politicians who were deemed to be unacceptable, they kept the same language in the interests of 'national salvation'.

With embryonic trade unionism and the traditional aristocrats in many cases broken by colonisation, most African governments applied policies that tended to favour people in the towns.

The modern African states are the fruit of a foreign tradition, not the interplay of the various social groups, and they are to a very large extent foreign bodies in their societies.

Despite this, some countries have made real progress with national unity (although other countries, Chad and Sudan for example, are still on the brink of explosion) and with building a modern economy (exports), although, with famine and unsuitable policies, things are less encouraging on the food production front.

Lastly, an increasingly large section of the African economies is developing free of state action, which illustrates the way African societies are responding to changing values and economic conditions. So the nation-state should Africanise and be less 'hanging in the air'.

Although it is difficult to draw conclusions on a subject which has been under discussion for two thousand years, the ideas outlined above should add to our thinking and the way we react to the questions we get from, *inter alia*, the ACPs.

There is no doubt that their development drive will not succeed without an improvement in their mastery of the art of governance — which does not necessarily mean western-style democracy.

Responsible leaders, transparent use of public funds, the involvement of the people at every stage of economic, social and political activity and the possibility of them organising their own mutual assistance and voicing their opinions on development decisions which concern them are among the principles of the development charter which has still to be established. ○ Y.G.

Development and the African political heritage

by Stephen McCARTHY (*)

Since the end of the Second World War, most peoples of the world have experienced an improvement in human well being. Economic and social progress has come to be taken for granted. Until ten years ago, the 450 million people of sub-Saharan Africa could have been comfortably accommodated in this generalisation. Africa was regarded as the least developed of all the continents, if not necessarily as poor as the Indian sub-continent. But with its plentiful resources, its unexploited geography, and supported by financial and technical assistance from wealthier countries, it was certainly moving in the right direction.

These hopes have all been dashed. Observers now view Africa with deeper and deeper pessimism, socially, economically and politically. The rest of the world appears to be pulling away leaving that vast continent standing at the starting gate and increasingly handicapped by the growing weight of its own problems.

Explanations for sub-Saharan Africa's performance being so much worse than that of other parts of the world fall into two groups. Some have blamed external circumstances, including the colonial past and the structure of international trade relations; others emphasise internal factors.

African apologists have tended to opt for the external causes. The notion of nation states with precisely fixed geographical boundaries, each theoretically being in equal relationship with all the others, is, they would say, not part of African cultural and historical tradition, with its more organic structures of groups and tribes. The colonial powers' division of Africa completely ignored such traditions. They used geographical features, rivers and hills and lines of latitude and longitude, to divide a continent. In so doing they disregarded the lessons from their own European history, which showed that what makes a nation is a complex web of common cultural, social and economic interests among people leading to a sense that what they share in common is greater than their regional, tribal or other differences. Without such commonality of interests, genuine representational government would be very hard to achieve.

The costs of nation-building

As a result, although independent Africa adopted the European notion of

(*) Head of Division, European Investment Bank. These are edited extracts from a longer and more wide-ranging paper published in the EIB paper n° 15, December 1990 entitled 'Development stalled, the crisis in Africa: A personal view'. They reflect solely the views of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EIB.

the nation state and of fixed geographical boundaries, an enormous and economically costly nation-building effort has been required to hold these nations together. These costs initially included the essential trappings of a modern sovereign state — legislatures, government machinery, foreign representation, independent currencies, armies — which the national economies, often no bigger than a European municipality, could ill afford. Later they included the abandonment of political pluralism and the emergence of powerful over-centralised systems of government.

Outsiders are more inclined to argue that the roots of Africa's problems are largely internal. Many Africans themselves would accept this but without accepting that this is a simple explanation amenable to simple solutions. Poor government is both a cause of underdevelopment and a symptom of it. It is partly caused by the lack of human capital, the weak sense of nationhood discussed above, fluctuating foreign earnings, inappropriate political philosophies and so on. In reality there is a whole web of interrelated factors which combine into inter-locking vicious circles (see Figure 1).

But there are a number of patterns and policies which are found throughout the continent. These have their origins in the historical circumstances leading up to independence, in the prevailing rather socialist and dirigiste ideologies at the time, and in a general opinion, shared by both African governments and their advisers, as to what was necessary to cause and sustain 'development'.

At the time that most African nations were being created, theorists generally believed that industrialisation was the key to economic development. This was partly based on the view that raw material prices were in long term decline. This implied that the situation of developing countries was getting steadily worse. They were dependent on a limited range of export commodities, which were sold at fluctuating prices on world markets open to distortion by the actions of richer countries.


National planning of capital investment was also essential. In poor countries, capital was self evidently in short supply. And African countries needed a great deal of basic infrastructure. There was no choice but to coordinate such decisions and to plan the allocation of capital at a national level. Much of the resources for investment would have to come from outside the country often through external aid programmes. This again required coordination. Finally, since skilled manpower was short it seemed better to concentrate it in small efficient units operating at the national level.

The highly centralised institutions and structures which were created acquired a momentum and political power of their own which has survived ever since. They were essentially urban, modern sector institutions and were favoured at the expense of the rural agricultural sector where, typically, three quarters or more of the population were still to be found. The urban population insisted on 'modern standards' and was able, by virtue of its geographical concentration, to exert far more political pressure on the government than the more dispersed rural dwellers. So urban wages and salary levels rose, prompting in turn an accelerated drift of people to the towns. This happened throughout the continent.

Opportunities for corruption

In fact the urban modern sector turned out to be inefficient and corrupt. With few market constraints on the parastatals, and governments increasingly unrepresentative of the people, the centralised structures became bloated and rich sources of patronage. Centralised regulation of so many aspects of economic life offered many opportunities for corruption.

Higher urban living standards were effectively paid for by greater taxation of



The Courier

Checks and balances are needed

the rural sector, often achieved by the monopsonistic marketing boards not paying agricultural smallholders a fair price for their products. Real exchange rates were also allowed to appreciate, thereby shifting the internal terms of trade between the rural sector which provided most of the export earnings, except in the few mineral economies, and the urban sector which consumed most of the imports. Smallholders had little choice but to accept this situation. They could sometimes smuggle exports into a neighbouring country, if the economic environment there was more favourable, and such informal inter-country trade continues on an enormous scale. They could also opt out of the monetary economy and revert to subsistence production. Many rural people appear to have done so especially when national foreign exchange shortages became so acute that basic commodities were simply unavailable in the rural areas.

The political system offered rural dwellers no countervailing political control. Although the majority of African states had been set up with democratic constitutions on European lines, in few cases did the democratic element survive more than a few years.

A number of forces contributed to this constitutional disintegration. Traditional structures had not necessarily been undemocratic. But the idea, which is important in a western democracy, of a 'loyal opposition', loyal to the state and the constitution but not to the government in power, was not easily grafted onto this tradition. Further, as noted earlier, the new African nations were usually artificial creations bearing little relation to previous African geo-political structures, with their intermingling and sometimes interdependent tribal groups. As a result, in most countries government and opposition parties quickly divided

along tribal or regional lines. Those who genuinely wanted to promote the new nation state, and no doubt many did, did not see how this could be achieved when the political parties merely seemed to legitimise old traditional and tribal differences. Thus the one party state emerged, attempting to internalise and balance these ancient political forces within a single structure. With a few exceptions, pluralist democracy was discarded on the continent.

Checks and balances undermined

In most countries the process rapidly went further. Either the single political party became the personal fief of a dictatorial President who then changed or corrupted the constitution to ensure his own survival, or the military took over. Moreover, once the basic checks and balances of the original constitution were undermined other safeguards quickly fell away. Human rights were eroded, freedom of speech was abandoned and political dissenters were

imprisoned. Legislative assemblies became rubber-stamping bodies. Judiciaries lost their independence and stopped dispensing justice — at least where affairs of state were concerned.

Meanwhile the traditional rural leaders had either been emasculated in the new national order or had been absorbed into its elite. The generally low standards of rural literacy and education combined with poor internal communications made it difficult for new rural leaders to emerge. The exclusion of the rural poor from the political and economic mainstream — except in so far as they can continue to be induced to grow export crops — has meant that few resources have been allocated to human development of a basic kind — literacy, primary education, preventive and basic medical care, and nutrition. In the long term this perpetuates the low skill level in the population and more indirectly the high population growth rate.

In short, the human dimension affects the economic outlook for Africa in a number of ways. First, the population explosion makes it necessary, like Alice, to run in order just to stay in the same place. Second, the low level of skill and relatively poor health of African people limits their productivity, their income and thus the rate of growth of the economy as a whole. This in turn means that fewer resources are available for improving health or educational standards. Finally, an ill educated population has been more easily manipulated by small groups seeking power for themselves and effectively further denying resources for the rural poor.



The Courier

'Rural poor excluded from political and economic mainstream'

The African political establishment has been traumatised by recent calls for political change. Throughout the continent there has been an upswell of popular discontent, with demands for the abandonment of the one party state, the holding of free elections and the restoration of basic human rights and freedoms.


Politicians have responded in different ways. Those with least to fear appear to have acquiesced and agreed to consti-

imprisonment without trial, restore freedom of speech and so on.

A pattern for peaceful political change, albeit perhaps utopian, might be on the following lines. The centre, whose importance has often been reinforced by inflows of external aid, would weaken. Power would flow more to small groups and intra-country regions whose natural influence and historical importance has been suppressed for a long time. Such groups and localities are likely to draw

incomplete African statistics would suggest. People may not yet have found technical, social or economic solutions to the problems which confront them each day, but they are undoubtedly more aware of the outside world and more open to external influences than they would have been even a generation ago. These then are reasons for optimism, even though political paralysis may, in the short term, slow the pace of economic reform.

Figure 1: Vicious circles — the political, historical and human factors



tutional reform and free elections. Others have set themselves against change, making as few concessions as they can. They may succeed in digging in for a while without making any political adjustment. But they will be more politically isolated, both domestically and internationally, than hitherto.

Raised expectations

Although one cannot see the outcome of these events, something fundamental has clearly changed. Expectations have suddenly been raised, or expressed, and it will not be easy to put the genie back in the bottle. The calls for reform certainly go beyond just multi-party elections, indeed it may prove inappropriate simply to go back to Westminster style democracy. There will also be demands to reform the judicial system, abandon

strength from their own traditions. The overlay of western institutions and values might begin to be discarded and replaced by increasingly confident African solutions for African problems, not necessarily less representative than what went before.

The earlier analysis suggested that decentralisation of power and democratic advancement in some form or another can be expected to encourage economic and social progress over the medium term. A return to a more organic local and tribal political structure should encourage local economic decision making, more likely to reflect the needs and interests of rural people.

There are indeed signs and hints that rural communities and economies are much more alive than unreliable and

The alternative to peaceful political change and economic reform is much more sombre. Civil war, such as has now been continuing in the Horn of Africa for many years, but can also be found on a smaller scale throughout the continent, may lead to national disintegration in a number of countries followed by economic and political anarchy.

So far as the rest of the world is concerned, the failure of aid to raise living standards is widely, if still quietly, acknowledged. Western countries, particularly European ones, will view present developments in Africa with some trepidation. The continent, having once been brought into the ambit of the global economy and polity, initially through colonisation, cannot now simply be ignored. ○ S.M.

Some thoughts on governance and democratisation

by F.J. van HOEK (*)

'Governance' is now widely recognised, by all concerned with achieving sustainable development, as an important issue that can no longer be neglected. Recent shifts within the international political arena, notably, the changes in Eastern Europe, as well as political changes in various ACP countries (the cold war finally receding from Africa, the movement towards, and demands for, multi-party systems in various ACP States), have reinforced discussion on this topic. However, it is not only the political context which has contributed to the emergence of this debate on governance. The recognition that sustainable development and a more equitable distribution of income have not occurred in most ACP States has also played a part. The crisis in governance is, therefore, now considered to have been one of the main impediments to sustainable development and as a result figures high on the development agenda.

The debate on governance has been characterised at first by a political connotation. It is now generally recognised that in many developing countries, particularly — but not exclusively — in Africa, factors such as extensive personalisation of power and widespread corruption resulted in a situation where government and its organs have only served the interests of a few, while fundamental freedoms and human rights were denied to many. Hence, the crisis can, in part at least, be attributed to the lack of a countervailing power and the pervasive lack of institutions of democracy. Discussions about political reform have stressed the need to bridge the gap between state and civil society; to create the necessary social and political space for popular participation in the development process; to nurture 'institutional pluralism' in government and civil society. This in turn

explains the recent internal and external pressures for the introduction of the processes of democratisation.

Beyond the political context within which the crisis of governance can be explained, lie the very fragile systems of governance. Historically, alien models of governance were introduced during and after independence and these resulted in institutions managing the development process which were more often not originally designed for this function and thus were ill-adapted to local political, social and cultural conditions. Moreover, external factors such as donor interventions, have also had their effects on the performance of these institutions e.g. through the setting-up of project-related parallel administrations, the introduction of new institutions and organisations that operate either within or outside the realm of government, and the traditional approach to technical assistance favouring, as it did, full-time long term assignment of expatriate personnel in executive positions.

The issue of governance is complex; definitions vary widely and one cannot easily disaggregate the various notions. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to distinguish between what could be called 'politico-administrative' aspects of governance and the economic aspects although in practice they are intertwined. As Richard Joseph indicates in his article on 'African Governance in the 1990s', economic governance embraces the practices of decision-making and implementation in the economic realm, i.e. matters that affect directly public investment and expenditure as well as the use of available resources in both the private and the public sectors. Hence, economic governance embraces such issues as price, fiscal and exchange rate policies, protectionism, subsidies, market liberalisation, the role of the state as an economic agent and as facilitator for the blossoming of an efficient and competitive private sector

etc. The political dimension of governance refers to the prevailing political system, the structure of government, general constitutional provisions (including those referring to an independent judiciary), the nature of the electoral system, the relation between state and civil society (including the question of human rights as well as what is now commonly called 'participatory government').

The seminar on Governance and Institutional Development in sub-Saharan Africa⁽¹⁾, organised by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in March 1990, identified several issues as being of critical importance to governance, such as: the level of political stability; the role of the state in development and how this role can be operationalised; the endogenous institutional capacity for policy formulation and implementation and the 'checks and balances' necessary to ensure transparency of policy formulation and implementation as well as accountability at both political and administrative levels.

For the purpose of achieving its mandate, ECDPM has formulated the following outline of what governance connotes: Governance is taken to refer to political and institutional aspects of the capacity of a government to ensure law and order, formulate and implement policy, and create an enabling environment for development. This capacity comprises the organisational structures, human resources and management systems, which constitute the machinery of government, and is influenced by societal norms. Governance is associated with transparency and accountability of public management and embraces the totality of institutions related to governing a modern state.

The greater part of ECDPM's present work-programme is of direct relevance to the enhancement of governance capacity as described above. This holds true for programmes like the Sous-Espace Céréalière in the Sahel, which aims at improved cereals marketing systems at national level and policy harmonisation at regional level; the issue of how to ensure more efficient policy formulation and implementation through improved mechanisms dealing with sectoral inter-

(1) Ref. 'Governance and Institutional Development', J. Corkerey and J. Bossuyt, (Eds.), European Centre for Development Policy Management, Occasional paper, Maastricht 1990.

(*) Director General, European Centre for Development Policy Management (Maastricht, Netherlands). The opinions he expresses in this paper are entirely his own and not those of the Centre.

linkages in the OECS region; and the various issues dealt with under the programmes 'Public Sector Management/Private Sector Development' and 'New Avenues for Technical Cooperation'. Thus, ECDPM is clearly involved in a range of aspects of governance. Because of its mandate, its primary focus is on the institutional aspects of administrative and politico-administrative governance.

In this period where democratisation forms a major subject of discussion in many ACP countries, a new area that could be explored in the area of governance could be that of ways and means to improve the process of interaction between the several organisations that might be regarded as stakeholders in the policy process. In this context it would be useful to explore the interplay between the state and representative professional and other occupational organisations; the institutional arrangements needed for effective interplay in policy-making, implementation and monitoring.

An analysis of this kind could focus on the kinds of institutions and processes that can lead to a genuine policy dialogue. It may help identify a framework within which organisations such as universities, trade unions, women's organisations, chambers of commerce and cooperatives, an independent judiciary, the press and other media would actively participate in improving development policy formulation and implementation. Such a dialogue would be part of a systematic effort to build a pluralistic institutional infrastructure. This, in turn, would contribute to improved governance, by encouraging greater transparency and accountability through more intensive popular participation. Transparency in the policy process and accountability within a government system can be the result of the checks and balances that stem from a participatory system. A central issue in development and governance, this synergy can only be achieved if both are supported by the appropriate institutions which, in turn, require the political will to make them work.

The analysis would have to take stock of the existing relevant organisations in order to know how they operate, what their institutional and human capacity is and how they exercise their influence vis-à-vis the central government.

What is central in this analysis is the **channels** through which these organis-



Market women in the Republic of Benin

'Discussions about political reform have stressed the need to bridge the gap between state and civil society; to create the necessary social and political space for popular participation in the development process'.

ations interact, and the ways in which they can improve the process of policy-making and implementation. The power-base of these organisations and the way in which they can operate and contribute to an effective management of the economy evidently constitute parameters for 'governance'.

As has been said, democratisation is one of the main topics of discussion in relation to developing countries. It features in discussions within these countries as well as between them and the donor community. Its advancement is often an element of conditionality. Most, if not all, of the discussion centres on the political aspects of systems of government. These can be both sensitive issues for the countries concerned and difficult areas in which to effect real change in the short term.

Any system to foster and give effect to popular participation in the process of government will need to take account of the characteristics of the local socio-cultural environment. Many developing countries need to be able to accommodate within their boundaries ethnic, religious and other groups which may differ widely and deeply from each other. Today, however, most of the developing countries have models of government that have their origin in the industrialised

world. There the environment, with its generally more educated populations and greater and more widespread systems of checks and balances, is so different as to raise questions concerning the relevance of the models. In addition, the continued effectiveness of some of these models is, today, under scrutiny in some industrialised countries. Consideration of the question of democratisation from the perspective of the right and power of the governed to participate in and influence the formulation of policy would be less sensitive. A focus on the institutional rather than the political dimensions of democratisation could lead to the production of more effective mechanisms for consultation and communication between the central government and the several sectors and interest groups in the population. It would thus facilitate the achievement of a policy articulation and formulation process which would be perceived to be more equitable whatever the political system.

Understanding of what the elements of a system to achieve popular participation in this context are, would be a contribution to the evolution of a genuinely indigenous structure of government and a governance system to complement it. ○

F.J. van H.

Transition to democracy — is there a model?

A few years ago, Milton Friedman, the well-known American economist, used to justify his contact with General Pinochet's Chile by saying he still hoped to see a right-wing dictatorship veer towards democracy — something his critics, regular visitors to the Eastern bloc, could not, he maintained, legitimately entertain, such was the entrenched nature of the Communist regimes. But since Gorbachev and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, things have changed and no authoritarian regime is likely to survive the fever of democracy that has taken hold of the people.

Black Africa, long deprived of democratic debate, is no exception. Countries from one end of the continent to the other are following each other down the path to change — and, curiously enough, the French-speaking and Portuguese-speaking nations seem more affected than the English-speakers. (Could it be because the latter's freedom was less constrained?)

But how does a switch from a military or single-party system to a democratic, multi-party system based on freedom of the press and economic liberalism happen? Political events in recent months suggest that there are two main scenarios, with variations — a gentle move Benin-style with a national conference or Côte d'Ivoire-style without one, or violent change, with a bloodbath, as in Mali.

But there is an exception to every rule and, in this case, it is the Cape Verdean model which does not really fit into either category. This really is a peaceful democratisation process and, in contrast with almost all others, not the result of pressure from the street. In February 1990, with neither strike nor demonstration to prompt it, the Cape Verdean Government looked at Eastern Europe and decided to go for political pluralism. It intended this to take the opposition by storm, it is true, but, contrary to all predictions, the newly created People's Democratic Movement (MPD) got twice as many seats in the January 1991 elections as the former single party, the

African Independence Party of Cape Verde (PAICV).

A month later, it was the turn of outgoing President Aristide Pereira, former leader of the PAICV, who was beaten by pro-change Antonio Mascarenhas Monteiro. The nation, deprived of free elections since independence in 1975, calmly demonstrated that there was nothing incongruous about democracy in Africa. And it was soon to be followed by another Portuguese-speaking nation — Sao Tome & Principe, where things were even more conducive to change since the outgoing President decided not to stand again.

A national conference

These two Portuguese-speaking nations are not typical, however, for democracy in their case came about when the 'prince' was suddenly converted, unprompted and certainly without any economic triggering, to the virtues of pluralism. The Cape Verdean economy, which had developed consistently since independence, was far from being a disaster.

Benin, on the other hand, is more typical of what happened in Africa — which is no doubt why its particular model so quickly became the one to copy at any price. With the economy in ruins after 17 years of a 'Laxist-Beninist' system (a reference to the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine) and the country paralysed by a civil service strike, President Kérékou decided to find a solution by calling representatives from across the political spectrum to a meeting — the famous national conference, which African oppositions across the continent were to call for in their own countries and which laid down the various stages of, and guidelines, for the democratisation process and appointed people to run the country during the transitional period (see report on Benin elsewhere in this issue).

After Benin, Gabon and Congo ran national conferences, Niger, Togo, Mali and Zaire are preparing theirs and more

and more people in Cameroon, Chad and Madagascar are calling for one in their countries too.

Côte d'Ivoire managed to move over from a single party to complete pluralism without one. After months of student-worker agitation against a background of economic crisis, President Houphouët-Boigny decided to disregard his much-advertised antipathy for multi-party systems, authorise all parties which wanted to become legal and hold free elections — without any change to the constitution, which had in fact always catered for such an eventuality.

Democracy and development

However, his opposite number in Mali, Moussa Traoré, could not bring himself to free the country's political life from the monopoly of his own party, the Democratic Union of the Malian People, and turned a deaf ear to the opposition's oft-repeated requests. He had no compunction about opening fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing hundreds and wounding nearly a thousand more, until a group of soldiers joined the civil opposition, removed him and immediately started the move to democracy.

This is the only example of bloodshed in the democratisation process so far if you do not take into account countries such as Ethiopia where there was an armed struggle. There has been loss of life during demonstrations in some places (Cameroon and Togo spring to mind), but Mali is the only country where so many victims have fallen to democracy — but is it really democracy yet?

It is early days. What is clear is that there are promising beginnings all over the continent. The void has been replaced by a surfeit of political parties, with the international press reporting new titles every day, and the trade unions, long-muzzled, are able to function as they should. But the economic crisis is there, cramping the style of the new regimes in their drive to meet the aspirations of an increasingly impatient people.

Ultimately, the future of the democratic process depends on the success of economic recovery programmes. For, as former French Cooperation Minister Jacques Pelletier used to say: 'there may be no development without democracy, but there is no democracy without development either'. ○ A.T.

Travellers' rights

by Gilles FONTAINE (*)

There are overloaded lorries all along the roads and tracks, of course, but I remember being truly amazed one day at a wood truck with only one shock absorber, if that, and its rear end practically scraping along the ground.

My travelling companion felt that a short lecture on micro-economics was in order: 'Overloaded? But, my good man, that's the African profit margin' more pith than truth, perhaps, but a snappy little formula which I have heard trotted out many times since.

Sorry. Is anything the matter? Yes, I did know this edition of *The Courier* was supposed to be on human rights and not road transport... which is why we are going to replace the wood with people.

And with people, the overloading-equals-operator's-profit is still there, but instead of dead wood, we now have lack of comfort, loss of time and, most important, loss of life. Anyone who has witnessed a bush taxi accident knows just what I mean and that snappy little formula we used just now soon has a bitter taste to it.

Are we really all that way from Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights? (**)

Let us briefly return to the shock absorbers.

There are those sensitive souls — and they easily come to terms with rudimentary bush taxis because they never have to go in one — who can be moved to tears by ageing suspension and worn out motors kept going by amazing little craftsmen. But infinitely rarer are those who are moved (to tears or not) by the roads, although roads are the main victims of all this overloading.

When you ask the uninitiated why nice tarred roads (often financed by the EDF) which are supposed to last 20 years have to be redone at least every 10, they tend to think it is poor maintenance — which is where they are wrong. Overloading is the biggest cause of speedy deterioration of

tarred roads and this way of making a profit has put half the roads in sub-Saharan Africa out of commission and meant a quarter need urgent maintenance to head off rapid decline.

A quick look at the figures shows that this would take enormous investments... but who will find the money if there is every likelihood of it going up in smoke again? And what sort of future is there for the whole road network anyway when there are hardly any funds for upkeep?

This transport non-policy is leading straight up a blind alley. Everyone knows how important roads are — as a local chief once told me so elegantly, without roads, the wilds will return to the wilds.

So it is economically and technically vital to stop operators overloading their vehicles, otherwise towns will not get their supplies, imports will go up and exports will be further penalised. The immediate question, of course, is how. And the immediate answer is by controlling axle weight.

At this stage in the proceedings, it would be as well to take a break for some exercise, just long enough for lots of



Bush taxi in Madagascar
The effects of overloading always occur to road-users and drivers later on. Many people see checks on it as police harassment rather than a useful precaution

people to raise their arms to the skies, drop them with long, fatalistic sighs and say: 'Don't you realise that's never worked in Africa?' — meaning that it never will work either.

But let us leave the perpetual cry of 'that's Africa' to those who despair of everything and listen instead to those who believe that protecting the roads, that dying species, is a major challenge that has to be picked up.

Dream a bit, of course, and you soon come to the idea that turning the roads into a controlled area, one of law and therefore of freedom, could be an even more exciting challenge than might be imagined.

Just think. Given all the necessary financing there could be a body of properly paid officials running proper controls instead of today's systematically illegal levies on the way in and out of the villages. And just suppose that overloading declined as a result. Where would the profit margin be if fares were not put up?

Therein lies the big risk of failure. So we have to create this area of law and do away with all the predators holding operators and passengers to ransom along the way. What a saving in time and money that would be! Perhaps fares would not need to go up after all.

Am I dreaming? Of course I am and so is everyone else interested in human rights.

I should like to end with something I saw during the great drought of 1985 when there was a terrible shortage of trucks to unblock the ports where food aid was being unloaded.

The first reflex was to ask for international aid to provide a fleet of extra trucks, a request it would obviously have taken months to meet. But a miracle happened, because the number of trucks available to shift goods out of the port of Lomé doubled in just a few days. All it took was a cut in the transport time to the coast by doing away with all the pointless pseudo-controls and speeding up the customs formalities. It was no dream and it really could not have been called expensive.

So what is wrong with high-speed bush taxis — HSBT — and, say, Air-Ziguinchor or Air-Bonkoukou doing direct flights with none of those pointless stopovers?○ G.F.

(*) Principal Administrator, Directorate General for Development, EEC, 200, rue de la Loi, B-1049 Brussels.

(**) Every individual has the right to life, liberty and safety.

Children in the Sahel learn to protect the environment

We know why the desert is advancing in the Sahel. We have known for years. One of the reasons is the hazards of climate or, to put it more simply, the successive periods of drought over the past 15 years. But it is not the only one. The main reason, perhaps, is the destruction of the natural environment by man himself, for whenever a tree is burned as firewood, 90% of the heat generated is lost and whenever the edge of a well is neglected and whenever a bucket of water is wasted, the desert takes over a few more square metres of land.

The problem is that it takes time for cause to have effect and there is no obvious link at all between man's act of predation and the damage which this actually wreaks on the environment. So environmental protection is very much a matter of awareness and education and, some say, of creating a proper ecological reflex in man, something which has to be done in childhood, before bad and environmentally harmful habits become ingrained.

This finally brings one to the school-children of the Sahel, who are both to

benefit from and be involved in an environmental training and information programme which the European Community is running in the nine member states of the CILSS (the Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel), i.e. in Senegal, Mauritania, Gambia, Cape Verde, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Guinea Bissau and Chad.

Sixty schools in these countries have been chosen to teach their pupils a new way of living in their natural environment and a new way of life that is in harmony with the world around them.

In the following interview, Bartolomé Amat, head of the training schemes technical group at the European Commission, explains the background to the scheme and how it will work.

► *Mr Amat, can you tell us first what is behind the project?*

— The nine members of CILSS first called for an environmental training and information programme at the Lomé III regional fund programming meeting in Cape Verde, when they made combatting

of desertification their main aim. It was to be achieved in three ways — by providing training in environmental matters and environmental protection, by using gas instead of firewood and by bringing in solar water pumps. It was our job to investigate the first of these and come up with a training programme and, after discussion and reflexion, we began defining targets and subjects. We decided to start with an in-depth scheme for schools, although we knew that many youngsters did not attend and that we could not reach the population as a whole through the children alone. Target number one was to change the children's outlook, attitudes and behaviour towards the environment and the surroundings in which they lived.

► *But is understanding the environment really something you can teach from books like other subjects in the classroom?*


— We are going to concentrate on just a few schools and ask the children and the teachers there to go out and look at what is around them. We are going to get them to look at the changes that have taken place and get them to use their observations to think about why the natural environment is deteriorating. Inductive teaching, we call it. It goes from the particular to the general. The Freinet method which has spread over France and produced excellent results there, is the inspiration behind it, but it is not very well known in Africa. Teachers haven't been trained to use it and it takes a lot of effort to put into practice.

► *So the first thing is to train the teachers, is it?*


— That's right. Train the teachers, change their outlook as well and ask them to do more, because there is more to it than dishing out work in class. They have to go outside the classroom and cope with children asking questions they can't answer. They will have to do research of their own to give pupils answers to any questions which they haven't studied themselves and which aren't covered by the ordinary textbooks.

► *So you are going to run seminars and courses for teachers...?*


— That's right. In each of the countries, we have set up an institutional apparatus around a project leader, who is assisted by national teaching teams and people from universities and institutions who can also help with the teaching. Then



'... a new way of living in their natural environment and a new way of life that is in harmony with the world around them'



FAO - J. van ACKER



VIVANT UNIVERS

'... whenever a tree is burned as firewood, 90% of the heat generated is lost and whenever the edge of a well is neglected and whenever a bucket of water is wasted, the desert takes over a few more square metres of land'

there is a national steering committee of representatives from the various ministries — of Education and Agriculture and the Environment, if there is one — to guide the training programmes, while the project leader runs teacher training seminars, with the help of local teaching teams.

► *The programme only gets to the children, doesn't it? But it is usually adults, the parents, who are responsible for the deterioration of the environment. Do the designers of the project expect the children to tell people around them, especially their families, what they have learnt?*

— This is indeed what we hope will happen, because, in Africa, teaching schoolchildren cannot be dissociated from informing parents. Parents associations in these countries of the Sahel are very active. They are very involved in the life of the school and you cannot bring in a new subject or an extra-curricular activity without the parents being told about it. So they are bound to keep tabs on what their children learn. The idea of African children teaching their parents obviously does not come into it.

► *Your programme will only reach children who go to school, something which by no means all African youngsters do. The project has been given ECU 10 million, CFAF 3.5 billion that is to say, for nine*

countries to share over a number of years, which is really very little, bearing in mind the targets, and only a few thousand children at most will be able to benefit. Will that be more than a drop of water in the Sahara?

— We could go for a national information campaign, but we would lose out on intensity. The other option was an in-depth scheme for a restricted number of schools and that is what we decided on. We think that, afterwards, the idea can be spread by osmosis and that it will catch on. Above all, we set a lot of store by exchanges between schools and by visits to demonstrate what particular schools have done and others can be persuaded to do.

► *So it will start with a few schools and then these schools will teach others, is that right?*

— That is correct. Don't forget that by starting small, with 20 schools in each country, we shall have reached at least 65 000 children by the end of three years. That really isn't bad. It's quite a large number, in fact, and it is bound to have an influence on the social environment in which they live.

► *How far are you with the actual implementation of the project?*

— The project began in 1990 with the installation of the project leader and the whole institutional set-up. Now, a year on, we have the first teacher training

sessions and we hope to start practical activities in the schools during 1991. This means for the moment discovery, analysis and reflexion for the children. Practical soil protection and nursery creating activities will come later. This year, we will be showing the children that the environment has changed, but that the important thing to change is man's behaviour.

► *But active teaching methods mean using knowledge and putting what you have learnt into practice...*

— That's right! So we are asking each school to devise small schemes and they will have small, autonomous budgets of their own to run so they can buy equipment or spend what they need to carry out the activities they themselves have devised.

► *The project is a three year one, isn't it? Is that enough?*

— By no means. Educationally speaking, three years is a very short time. The project set-up year was time lost as far as teaching is concerned. We opted for three years because the funds available under Lomé III were limited, but we are already preparing an application for the meeting of ministers in Bamako soon for new schemes to be programmed under Lomé IV so that we can extend the programme to five years. ○

Interview by Jean TANGUY
free lance journalist

Freedom and the film industry in Africa

by William N'DIAYE (*)

The idea of freedom in African societies differs with the tribal group and its socio-economic activity, the various phases in the group's history and the degree of intercultural relations experienced with the French, English or Portuguese colonials.

One thing is constant in this compartmentalised world, however, and that is that the individual does not exist outside the group. The life of the community is organised in such a way as to create social cohesion and respecting custom and usage means bowing to a whole series of obligations with the abiding principle that the group must adhere to the general consensus. So the view of freedom is a common one and in no way an evil for the group. The ability to know and be able to do things are linked and in the hands of the holders of knowledge.

The influence of Islam and Christianity created a new system of constraints alongside the traditional one still thriving in the area between savannah and forest.

Colonisation brought Africa a network of towns and the towns, a new phenomenon, drew in the rural populations, cutting them off from their villages, their traditions and their culture. This exodus, a favourite subject with the African cinema, was already a kind of journey of initiation in search of greater independence and liberty, for there was no demanding village patriarch in the town and it had an air of freedom as a result.

But it was pseudo-freedom and, when other constraints of a modern kind, of the consumer society where everything had to be paid for, made themselves felt, it very soon emerged as relative. Financial alienation was a leitmotif of African films and economic freedom was seen as synonymous with freedom itself.

Independence brought upheavals, with the new states managing their freedom in such a way as to create social, cultural, economic and political upheaval.

(*) Senegalese in-service trainee with the unit 'Europe in the world: development' DG X (Information) of the European Commission.

The psychological shock of traditional culture meeting modern culture reflected a series of criteria which are hard to identify with the notion of freedom, varying as they do from one period to the next, and this conflict was reflected by the African cinema, which saw itself as a means of political awareness and socio-cultural liberation.

Africa-sur-Seine film-makers

In the collective imagination of young Africans, the West in general and Paris in particular stand for freedom in all its forms — a Mecca where life is full. African filmmakers were among the first to fall victim to this dream and there is nothing surprising about the fact that the first Africa-sur-Seine film — the title says it all — was made in Paris by a group of young Senegalese under the direction of Paulin Vieyra. It was the beginning of a fantastic adventure for the African film trade...

Instead of the freedom they so much desired, they found incomprehension, lack of communication and rejection. The extent of the ensuing disappointment is reflected in the many films on the subject — J.P. Ngassa's 'Aventure en France' in 1962, T.M. Manga's 'Mon stage à Paris' in 1968 and D. Ecaré's 'A nous deux France' in 1970, to name but a few.

The problem of first choosing between and then balancing tradition and modernity troubled most film-makers and was a constant feature of their works from then on.

Back to 'the roots'

Most of them went home to Africa and threw themselves into the cinema of truth and discovery (Bachy), aware of the role which film could play in societies of oral tradition seeking freedom in their lives.

Helped by what they had lived through, they looked around and gained inspiration from experience of the complexities of the conflict between tradition, with its strength and its (often highly repressive) archaism, and modernity, with its extraversion and its progressiveness. Where freedom stood in the conflict

between neocolonialism and autonomous development was also to be a concern of these African film-makers, who were inspired by Jean Rouch and went for the cinema of truth from the outset.

The establishment of military or single-party regimes in the new states led to the emergence of an elite company of rich, intellectual leaders who were quick to dissociate themselves from the poor and mostly illiterate masses who knew nothing about either modern legislation or their rights — clear social inequality which left its mark on the cinema.

The African cinema saw its aim as primarily social. Film-makers, like folk-singers, had to be the people's conscience. In a changing world, films were a means of building a picture of African culture and identity and a mirror constantly reflecting the society of which they were an expression. They were also a way of making people aware of things through illustration and by freeing men, women and children from alienating or repressive forces of an endogenous or exogenous, traditional or modern kind.

The African film-maker as medium

Ferid Boughédir, the Tunisian critic and film-maker, who created the outstanding 'Halfaouine', sees five great trends reflecting the different motivations of film-makers in the Negro-African cinema. These trends are political, cultural, moralistic, navel-contemplating and commercial — and they sometimes intermingle.

Every film-maker has an innate sense of vision and sees reality with greater depth and acuity because of it. He is free to choose how to transmit his perception of African realities to the public — or his people, as he prefers to call his audience — and say where he stands vis-à-vis the movements of his society. His main aim is to make the spectator aware of his socio-cultural environment and to sharpen his emergent political maturity so he can reclaim the freedom taken from him and better his condition.

The prime aim of the film-maker here is to decondition the audience whose freedom has been taken away by a flood of images from elsewhere. African films, long neglected by the countries of their continent and, thanks to the big European and American multinationals, absent from African screens, have long



Scenes from the film 'Finye' by Souleymane Cissé

been in the trough of the wave, tossed about amidst jetsam from the West — all those American 'B' films and Indian melodramas and karate films. And, often unable to take the vital step backwards from this screened reality, they live at second-hand the imaginary reality inspired by the hero, who thereby becomes a symbol, a link of projection and identification for the audience in the reality of the story which is foreign to him. This absence of freedom of choice is full of import when it comes to shaping the spectators' taste and reactions. So the viewer of African films must get used to this through quality pictures which are both instructive and based on an African language and African aesthetics which are accessible to the masses and yet offer them the pleasure of viewing. This is vital if viewers are to be won over and educated and their loyalty ensured.

So the viewer has to be culturally freed and held up to question in a new social and economic context.

English-speaking and Portuguese-speaking African films are different. In Nigeria, the cinema is more or less bound to the Yoruba tradition and is therefore entertainment for the unthinking who want an easy time of it (V. Bachy). Ola Balogun alone makes committed pictures. And, given the civil war, all films in Mozambique and Angola are nationalistic broadsheets of a sort.

A kind of awakening

The first wave of western films described above — navel-contemplating, perhaps, in that they are the work of people who are anxious to free themselves from existential anguish related to their sense of being uprooted and who, most importantly, have an account to settle

with the West — was followed by rapid denunciation of colonial and neo-colonial oppression, economic poverty, social inequality and cultural alienation. This kind of — in a way — subversion launched by some film-makers hit home with the African masses and certainly had something to do with the general wave of contestation throughout Africa today aimed at obtaining greater freedom and democracy.

The first important film made in Africa, Ousmane Sembène's 'Borom Saret' (1962), denounces social inequality in African towns where the centre is reserved for the local bourgeoisie and the

masses are relegated to the suburbs, uses the folk-singer to speak out against social parasitism and invites the viewer to a revision of this alienating custom. The antagonism between different social classes with diverging interests is a feature of almost all Sembène's films. In 'Xoala', for example, he plainly criticises the 'class of politico-businessmen and their under-hand dealings with the people in power', to use his own words, and screenings of the picture in Senegal have involved cutting all the sequences deemed compromising for the authorities.

Madagascar's Benoît Ramampy used 'Accident' as a way of speaking out against his country's marked social inequality and the alienating role of money.

'Baara', the work of Malian Souleymane Cissé, was the first African film to show the condition of the worker, his exploitation by the bourgeoisie and the perverse effect of money.

The wind of change

Some film-makers encourage the spectator to be aware of the struggle required to change the existing powers and institutions.

Souleymane Cissé's 'Finyè' was in some way a premonition here. Designed in complete freedom, the picture is a profound reflexion on temporal and spiritual power, in which Cissé contrasts political power and traditional values. In it, an old man, the incarnation of Africa's spiritual heritage, fights the military government's repression of the students. When his spiritual power fails, he burns his sacred garment, thereby symbolically freeing himself from tradition, and joins the student demonstration shouting: 'You are the future'. This picture does not



In his film 'Finye', Souleymane Cissé opposes the political establishment and traditional values

have the didactic quality of so many films dealing with the contrast between old and new and the viewer is free to draw his own conclusions from what he sees.

Less than 10 years after 'Finyè' (it means 'the wind') came out, a student demonstration which claimed freedom so far ungranted won the support of both a people aspiring to democracy and the regular army, which led to the overthrow of Moussa Traoré's dictatorial régime. So perhaps the picture helped speed up the people's awakening.

Okioh's 'Ironu', is a virulent denunciation of the corruption and misbehaviour of the political regime in his country (Benin), although the picture is set in an imaginary country, where the hero prefers torture and death to compromise and loss of dignity.

'Lettre paysanne', the work of Senegal's Safi Faye, an ethnologist by training and the only African to film fiction, is in the same vein. This is a peasant/government controversy over a single groundnut crop which is grown for export (without any economic benefit to the peasants) and hampers the development of the millet crop which is of more benefit to the grower. The subversive nature of the shots and the story-line have resulted in this film being banned in Senegal. Films and freedom are not always compatible in Africa.

The cinema not only complained about the absence of political freedom. It also denounced attacks on human rights by stigmatising the bad treatment meted out to 'rebels' who fight for their rights and glorify anti-colonial resistance.

Sembène's 'Camp de Thiaroye' is a denunciation of French troops' massacre of Senegalese soldiers claiming the same rights as their French counterparts and it was banned in France, as was Barabé of Niger's 'Si les cavaliers...'. 'Un ano de independencia', the work of the Mozambican pioneer Fernando Silva, points an accusing finger at the deeds and misdeeds of Portugal in its former colonies of Africa. Ruy Guerra's 'Mueda, souvenir et massacre' (1979) is a similar denunciation of the Portuguese army's massacre of 600 freedom-seeking peasants.

Sembène's 'Ceddo' hits out at the cultural traumatism of the people and the political implications of the sudden introduction of Islam to Senegal, praises the resistance of the ceddo, who are free men, and suggests revolt through the heroine,

who kills the Great Imam, the Head of State, at the end of the picture.

'Sarraounia', the work of Med Hondo (Mauritius), along similar lines, invites the audience to identify and project onto the queen, the symbol of anti-colonial resistance and reunification of the peoples of Africa.

In Ola Balogun's 'Cry Freedom', it is the British colonials who are at loggerheads with the guerillas (led by men keen on freedom and independence).

Evolutionary freedom

The evolutionary aspect of freedom and tradition is apparent in a number of pictures whose producers have decided to bring the audience a debate on civilisation. They seem concerned with location-conflict and how to handle it and the audience is invited to reflect on this.

Far be it from them to recommend a blind return to source, for theirs is an objective view of tradition, which capitalises on the positive aspects and complains about the retrograde and oppressive sides.

'Tilai' deals with the problem of freedom in traditional society. In it, a young man goes back to his village, after several years away, in the hope of finding and marrying his fiancée, but, to his great surprise, he finds that his father has married her instead, against her will, as traditionally he was entitled to do. Should the young couple resign themselves to this as tradition demands? Possibly, but they free themselves from their shackles and go against the oppressive custom and the audience is left to draw its own conclusions.

'Muna moto', by Dikongue Pipa (Cameroon) is an original script looking at how to reconcile freedom and respect for tradition.

Both 'Kodou' by A.Samb (Senegal) and 'Médecin de Gafiré' by M. Diop (Niger) discuss the meeting between traditional and western medicine, emphasising the limitations of each, but without suggesting any answers, so the audience is free to draw its own conclusions. The freedom of the film-maker and the audience also means mutual respect for free will.

Keeping a promise made according to tradition is the subject of the last film of O. Ganda, the pioneer of Niger, who suggested that today's politicians might get inspiration from 'L'exilé' (1980).

The ban on marriages between high-caste nobles and lowcast folksingers is presented as an aberration by a number of film-makers, especially Ivorian K.L. Fadika in his 'Djelli'. In 'Julu', King-Ampaw, the Ghanaian, sets a young technician against his father, a traditional dignitary, who refuses to allow a well to be sunk although it would have been beneficial to the whole village and, most important, would have removed the need for women to walk several kilometers a day to fetch water.

D. Diop Mambetty, the Senegalese film-maker, portrays the distress and anguish of young Africans caught between two cultures in 'Tsuki Bouki', in which various levels clash violently to reflect the mental image of the protagonists. Theirs is an existentialist dilemma. They hesitate between staying in the town, that place of both freedom and perversion, going back to their villages, where they can revive their cultural resources but be deprived of freedom, and going to France, that symbol of total freedom where everything is good. They opt for the middle way — staying in town.

Women's lib

Polygamy, emancipation, culture shock and a clash of values are at the very heart of the women's liberation issue in the African cinema and there are plenty of films to illustrate the aberrations of marriage and the dowry system. D. Kamea (Cameroon) uses farcical and comic techniques, those genuinely African approaches, to get across this message in the manner of the traditional folksinger in 'Pousse Pousse' and 'Notre fille'. Sarah Maldow gives a vehement glorification of the Angolan liberation movement through the heroine of 'Sambizanga' and Safi Faye has a vitriolic portrait of the harsh conditions in which women are forced to live in traditional society in the 'Lettre paysanne - Fadjal - Moi, ta mère' trilogy.

Souleymane Cissé complains about the alienation of women in 'Den Muso', in which he has his heroine in very eloquent non-communication about the social isolation of women in Africa in general. Many Malian women deprived of freedom by tradition and religion identified with the heroine — hence the picture's great success.

Bigamy and sexual freedom are also dealt with, very dramatically, in D. Malga's 'L'étoile noire' and D. Ecaré's



Scene from the film 'Yeelen' by Souleymane Cissé

'Visages de femmes' mixes extrovert eroticism, incest and adultery in an over-long love scene in its overturning of traditional sexual taboos, thereby posing the problem of the limits of freedom of expression.

However, other 'city' films — V. N'Dabian's 'Le cri du Muezzin' and H. Duparc's 'Bal poussière' — have women portraying perverse and ill-assimilated westernism.

'Visages de femmes', again, gives us a new social category which has emerged in Abidjan — businesswomen, who run their own affairs and have nothing to envy men.

The rights of the child

It was not until 1990 that the Charter of the Rights of the Child was signed and brought in line with the UN's 40 fundamental freedoms. Children are in fact as badly off as women in Africa, where they suffer from ills as varied as illiteracy, juvenile delinquency and being forced to work at too young an age, to name but a few.

Yet many African films, particularly short and medium-length ones (80% of output), denounce the deprivations and injustice meted out to children. C.O. Cissoko (Mali) takes a lively approach to children's right to education in 'Nyamanthon', a short film which has won many awards while in 'Njangaan', M. Traoré (Senegal) in turn decries the idea of children being exploited in the name of religion and points up the usefulness of modern education.

Senegalese Moussa Bathily's 'Tiyabu biru' (circumcision) rejects children's western education, which it sees as a loss of identity and dignity.

'Falato' (the orphan), the work of Mali's Mohamadou Cissé, takes an optimistic approach to childhood. In this picture, an African child who has lost his father is not allowed to be brought up by his mother and has to go to his uncle instead. But his uncle treats him very badly and he ultimately runs away, finds his fortune in the city and ends up governor.

All these films are rooted in the mental and imaginary universe of tradition, which fails to become myth in spite of it, and they help shape a new culture in which the city dimension is of increasing importance.

Yet the African cinema is changing. It is seeking a wider public by creating its own language and aesthetics based on living language, gesture and visual expression, thereby expanding the possibilities of understanding and freeing itself from worn-out international clichés.

Conclusion

The intellectual adventure couched in terms of a discussion of civilisation and culture which African films bring to their audiences is a window on man himself and on to a better understanding of self and the other. The importance of the individual's image of himself and his own identity makes for greater freedom of thought and control over the future.

The recent wave of debate which has swept across Africa in the quest for greater freedom, justice and democracy is eloquent proof that socio-political maturity, that prerogative of the intellectual élite which has been in power for so long, is now the prerogative of the masses in Africa too. And films of course have something to do with it. The espousal of the idea of a multi-party system in so many African states is a step towards democracy and points the way to a further area of freedom for the people, something of which the cinema is aware — and responsible for.

Film-makers who wish to be involved must, in turn, respect the freedom of the spectators, ie they must take their respective expectations into account, know how they appreciate different kinds of films, evaluate their new aspirations and understand any reluctance.

The cinema itself has to get rid of a number of obstacles, such things as poor production and distribution policies for local films, narrow national markets, the shortage of decent regulations and all the political and linguistic barriers. Burkina Faso alone seems to have grasped the importance of all this. As well as running the two-yearly Pan-African Film Festival in Ougadougou (FESPACO), where there are more and more entries, the country helps its film industry and even coproduces foreign pictures (such as 'Sarraounia' by Mauritian Med Hondo), for, as President Sankara said, 'the cinema is a battlefield'. Gaston Kaboré, the creator of 'Wend Kuuni') and Secretary-General of the Pan-African Film Federation, deplors this and is working for closer collaboration between television and the cinema.

However, young African film-makers presented four films at Cannes in May this year, a sign that the industry's horizons are broadening. And in May again, professionals at RECIDAK 91, Dakar's film meeting, tabled a motion to ensure that freedom of expression is actually ensured and never held up to question again.

What the Africans have to do now is go deep into the immense store of adventures, epics, myths and legends (G. Hennebelle) and say what they think in another way, untrammelled, so they can play a full part in Africa's economic, social and cultural development — in its freedom, that is to say. ○ N. N'D.



Animal health and production in the developing world

by Micheline NIELSEN and Jacques HARDOUIN (*)

More and more thought is being given to closing the gap between progress in the developing countries' livestock sector and the means actually invested in it. Animal production and health researchers realise that they need inter-regional and international collaboration and must design strategies and multidisciplinary research. They must also ensure that the right sort of training is available for young research applicants from the developing countries, but, despite frequent statements and suggestions to this effect, institutional brakes have largely held back any practical change.

The networks

Research networks have been set up to foster inter-regional and international collaboration, in order to forge and facilitate closer links between researchers in given fields so as to make for better use of infrastructure, disseminate information and possibly train research workers and devise joint research strategies. More efficient data distribution should mean that duplication of effort in time and space can be avoided and research better geared to requirements. Although there is no point in discussing the relative merits of theoretical versus applied research, in the developing world, where there are vital needs to be met (Hardouin, 1989), actually identifying those needs is still a problem, and for several reasons.

Multidisciplinary

This, a fairly common feature of development projects but much more of a rarity in research projects, is absolutely vital when it comes to identifying needs and analysing the feasibility of using the results of research in the field.

Multidisciplinary identification of needs is sometimes carried out by teams working on development schemes, but rarely by the researchers themselves. However, experience shows that development and research tend to be separate, leading to the ludicrous and all-too-often passively accepted situation in which the

needs are known only by people who have no access to research. It would be wiser to admit that development teams do applied research and that all too often the research workers do pure research. — which is why the idea of multidisciplinary absolutely has to include the skills of both developer and researcher if research is not to be purely academic. Research networks have their part to play here by combining researchers and developers and making the researchers shoulder their responsibilities and answer the developers' questions rather than embark upon further research into what may well be of only secondary interest.

Strategies and training

Research topics which never yield the ultimate answer (crossing, for example) and over-specific, over-repetitive subjects should no longer make up the majority of proposals (Fielding, 1987). By altering species, type, place, proportions in the ration etc, the food value of any given agricultural by-product can be tested *ad infinitum* and this is an example of the sort of research which involves major investments in terms of skill and equipment and should, in all but exceptional cases, be stopped. Technicians in the field should use existing data to find the best answer, calling on the advice of research staff if need be. Indeed, it is often better to come to terms with some imprecision (as to rates, yield and so on) but have workable answers to the real (sociological, economic etc) constraints.

In the case of trypanosomiasis, genuine progress in combating the vector will

probably not solve the problem in the short or medium term; vaccination is probably a dream and chemical control is often difficult to manage (Demey, 1987). A product may be tested over and over again and shown to be effective, but these results will not be of any use if the product is in short supply in the field or the user cannot afford it. The main criterion for selection and crossing in the industrialised world is productivity and the developing countries have tended to follow suit here, all too often overlooking factors such as trypanosomiasis tolerance or the advantage of small size for high yield. Research comes into its own in investigations of the trypanosomiasis tolerance type, which meets a need (10 million km² and 200-220 million people in Africa are affected), and the point of the work done on laboratory animals is proven in the actual herds. The desired results, i.e. the selection of trypanosomiasis-tolerant animals in the light of genuinely objective criteria, should have a rapid, long-term effect in the field. There are more examples — spontaneous resistance to ticks thus reducing the use of acaricides and slowing down the appearance of resistance on the part of the ticks (de Castro, 1990) and resistance to worms rather than worm resistance to anthelmintics etc. Results obtained in Australia show the well-foundedness of research of this kind. The crossing of bulls and zebu has produced animals with stronger resistance to ticks and satisfactory productivity and selection has led to a sheep population 80% more worm resistant than the original population — something which meant accepting new selection criteria.

However, even with what seems like the right research topic, the techniques and general approach are often misguided and generate results that are unacceptable outside the research stations — which if they are in the developing countries, tend to be a very long way from the realities of the terrain. So feasibility controls of the results in the ecological, sociological and economic conditions of the field should be an integral part of the research when full-scale application is out of the question.

Training is fundamental here and it is reasonable to ask about the point of

(*) Dr Nielsen and Professor Hardouin are with the Department of Tropical Animal Production at the Prince Léopold Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium.

training future researchers in the industrialised world when they are going to have to cope with conditions in the developing countries. What is the point of a Visna-Maedi specialist who knows nothing about contagious ecthyma? What is the point of a specialist who studies productivity in the light of rations of concentrate, that are anyway unobtainable on the market, but knows nothing about molasses and urea? What is the point of a specialist who goes for double and treble lambs at all costs without realising that they will often have little chance of survival in a traditional village environment? Triangular cooperation is obviously useful to research training (Hardouin, 1989), with, say, institute A in the developing world sending a research trainee to be supervised at institute B in the industrialised world and the student then continuing his or her training with a research project at institute C in the developing world, free from the routine and constraints of the original institute A.

Researchers should think more in terms of development and remember some of the questions raised (and mentioned by Fielding, 1987) in the context of the work on small ruminants. Would there be any consequences, for example, if research into small ruminants stopped? Would the owners of sheep and goats see a difference? Research integrated into the environment which is supposed to benefit from it should be part of the training of future researchers. When designing experimental protocols in national and regional strategies, students should learn to put priority on the objective outcome of their work in the field and on real future needs. Indeed, developers faced with problems do not have time to wait for answers and they have to cope with a degree of imprecision which increases when they look at the future. But researchers rarely have the 'futuristic' vision which would enable them to look at the long and the medium term. Very few of them were working on sheep and goats in the late 1970s, when research into this particular category of animals was deemed to be pointless, and the same was true of research into the farming of game animals, long considered utopic, while the use of draft animals was thought to be outmoded. This failure to look ahead should be handled by proper training in institutes with real science policies that

Bibliography

de Castro J. (1990) *Resistance to Ixodid ticks in cattle with an assessment of its role in tick control in Africa. International symposium on breeding for disease resistance in farm animals. University of Wales, Bangor, 13-14 September 1990.*

Demey F. (1987) *Contribution à l'étude des paramètres pour l'identification et la sélection d'animaux trypanotolérants. PhD en production animale tropicale. Institute de Médecine Tropicale Prince Léopold.*

Fielding D. (1987) *Research relevancy in small ruminant systems in Africa. Goat production in the humid tropics. Proceedings of a workshop at the University of Ife, Ile Ife, Nigeria, 20-24 July 1987.*

Hardouin J. (1989) *Collaboration triangulaire pour la formation des chercheurs. African small ruminant research and development. Proceedings of a conference held at Bamenda, Cameroon, 18-25 January 1989. African small ruminant network, ILCA, March 1989.*

Nielsen M.-Hardouin J. (1982) *Petits ruminants dans le nord-ouest du Cameroun. Proceedings of the international colloquium 'Tropical Animal Production for the Benefit of Man', Prince Léopold Institute of Tropical Medicine, Antwerp, Belgium, 17-18 December 1982.*



Fences on a research station. Practical innovation tends to be the work of developers rather than researchers

are open both to the future and to practical realities in the field. Practical innovations are usually the work of developers, not researchers, as researchers are rarely under pressure to solve problems immediately. They, alas, have other pressures, as they have to publish when they start their careers, with promotion depending on the number of articles they produce, and the point of research becomes publication rather than results, research topics being chosen in haste and not for their pertinence. The potential number of publications and, therefore, the speed with which 'results' i.e. column inches in research journals, can be obtained are major criteria when it comes to choosing topics and the quality of the results is now only of secondary importance. So the responsibility of the authorities in charge of promoting research staff in the industrialised and developing world alike is enormous, because an assessment of scientific worth must be more than a mere page count.

Conclusions

Research should no longer be allowed to continue if similar work has already been done elsewhere, if the results are of a predictable order or if there is no clear idea of the effect in the field.

Priority must be given to topics which combine economic, sociological and ecological factors and aim to produce global, long-term solutions.

The results of applications in the field should be an integral part of any publication. Research stations should be an additional tool of research in the field and no longer just institutions geared ultimately to nothing more than self-perpetuation.

None of this can be achieved unless research is seen as a service for developers and breeders — which means that developers and researchers have to collaborate closely at every level, identifying problems, organising experimental protocols, analysing results in the field and identifying strategies together. It would also be wise to envisage the possibility of research staff sharing their time between the research stations and the producers, as this would keep them close to the grass roots and enable them to do extension work, run full-scale applications of results obtained on station and make observation a part of everyday practice (Nielsen, 1982). ◯



Down with science?

I have just received No 125 of *The Courier* (January-February 1991) and was very interested in what it had to say. I am writing to you about two of the articles in particular — *Scientific publishing in Africa* (page 48) and *The European integration process: lessons for Africa* (page 50).

On the first of these, scientific publishing, it is worth pointing out that although Africa has sound intellectual potential after 30 years of socio-political independence, there are various impediments to its scientific and technical development. They include the passiveness and inability of African scientists, who all too often forget science once they embark on politics, a lack of will and, most important, governments' tendency to stifle initiative with dictatorial policies, so, even where scientific publications exist, they represent practically nothing. Scientists and students therefore have to wake up to the part they have to play in the intellectual development of Africa... and they have to start by triggering the Africans' scientific initiative.

On the second subject, African integration, I should like to say that Africa is the continent where national economies develop in the greatest isolation. There are many reasons for this, both inside and outside the continent. For example, governments have not yet realised — or indeed refuse to realise — that it will take EEC-style economic integration to secure for Africa a sound economic future. Official sub-regional bodies (such as UDEAC and ECOWAS) are not as effective as they might be. Yet unofficial trading takes place between people living along all the frontiers of Africa, and if governments wanted to make a start on integration, all they need to do is make this official. Economic integration should ultimately also have political aims, because free political movement and the unification of legal systems must go hand in hand with the free movement of capital, goods and individuals. All this seems out of reach in Africa, where everyone who takes power justifies it for his tribe or family.

Isidore Ondoki, Kiev, USSR

Demography and development

In issue No 123, I read an article on demography containing one or two alarming statistics. This has prompted me to write to you with some observations about this science.

Two indicators are always quoted for economic and social development — rate of economic growth and rate of

population growth — but the most important measure of economic and social development to my mind is per capita GDP. The majority of the developing countries have had negative economic growth rates over the past few years, while their populations have gone on expanding and this does not add up to proper economic and social development. The two rates need at least to match each other if the well-being of the people is to be assured.


More striking is the fact that all the financing is focused on maintaining economic growth — but without tackling the population explosion alongside. This is a big mistake for developing nations and donors alike, because all the material and financial means channelled into economic growth will bring nothing but failure unless some of them go into slowing down demographic growth.

Here are one or two examples.

1. Where can the developing countries find the means of creating 38 million jobs by the year 2025 when some of them have the threat of famine to cope with?
2. Can the developing countries provide housing for an urban population expanding at the rate of 3.6% p.a. — four times faster than in the developed world and 60% faster than in the rural areas?
3. Can Africa feed a population which will expand from the present 648 million to 1581 million without also trying to stop it going that far, because grain production has declined in 25 of the 43 countries of Africa for which the FAO has figures for the period 1979-81 and 1986-87?
4. How can sub-Saharan Africa reduce poverty with GDP growing at a projected rate of 3.7% annually in the 1990s, while its demographic growth is 3-4% p.a.?

If the donors want to help the developing countries achieve sound economic and social development, they have to see that these countries can improve their economic and social growth rates and bring down their rate of population expansion.

Djibo Bahoba, Niamey, Niger



Sight Savers

The interesting article by Chris McIvor in your November-December issue entitled 'A new approach to the disabled in Africa' describes what is not such a new approach, as far as Sight Savers (The Royal Commonwealth Society for the Blind) is concerned.

For many years, this organisation has supported projects which take treatment to where it is needed, particularly in rural areas. Mobile eye units, of which there are several in Zimbabwe, undertake primary eye care and refer more complex cases to clinics. A programme supporting itinerant teachers in Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi — jointly funded by the EEC — enables blind children to be taught in their local schools instead of being segregated in an institution. Permanently blind people are trained to redevelop their skills or acquire new ones so that they can live fuller, more productive lives within their own communities. This includes 'rehabilitation assistants' as described by Mr McIvor.

This is not to criticise what he wrote. Indeed, Sight Savers fully support the opinion he quotes: 'Our final aim throughout the globe is to allow the disabled and handicapped to become a part of the community rather than a section outside it'. It is just that this has been this organisation's philosophy for quite a long time.

Andrew Walker, Haywards Heath, West Sussex, UK

Environmental issues neglected

It is with great interest and high regard that I usually read 'The Courier'. I find it indispensable for anybody who is involved in official development assistance, and have recommended it to many offices here in the Philippines.

I was, however, disappointed with your latest Dossier on Roads (Issue no. 125). I found the topic to have been treated in a rather old-fashioned way. I am missing, specifically, the following points:

— Could it be that the EC is unaware of the huge amounts of taxpayers' money wasted on useless roads. Your editing simply assumes that roads and trade are good (sometimes gods!) in their own right. A considerable amount of recent research does not prove this positivistic viewpoint.

— Increasingly, roads and other infrastructure projects have resulted in greater rural militarisation. This aspect alone, which often limits public acceptance, deserves closer scrutiny. Also lacking in the Dossier is the question of public participation in the road planning process.

— As an environmental consultant, I am especially concerned about the non-treatment of the environmental effects of road construction. In other issues of 'The Courier', and in other publications, the EC is highly vocal about environmental questions. Roads have long been recognised as a major contributor to problems in this area.

Given the large amount of EC assistance flowing into this sector, one wonders why the Courier has come up with such a shallow treatment?

Dr Stefan Cramer, Calbayog City, Philippines

Cornish now extinct

The article entitled 'Europe's regional or minority languages' (The Courier no. 122) was of great interest. I note it mentions that 'Cornish is spoken in Cornwall'. However, I believe that it is more accurate to say that the language is now extinct. Although a few words of Cornish origin are still used in local English, Cornish as a spoken tongue died out in the eighteenth century.

Richard Roberts-Miller, Dorking, Surrey

Why no Nigeria?

I have been a regular reader of the Courier since I first subscribed in February 1988 (Issue no. 108). As a student of Educational Management/Economics at the University of Ibadan, I have found a number of your dossiers particularly useful. Your Country Reports are also fascinating and educational enabling us to learn about lesser known countries on the globe. Please keep it up.

But why have you failed to cover Nigeria, the giant of Africa, in your Country Reports? Since I became a regular reader of the magazine, Nigeria has not been featured.

Olu Adesola Famade, Abeokuta, Nigeria

Ed. We endeavour to organise our Country Reports so as to ensure coverage of as many ACP States as possible, in what may be loosely described as a 'rolling programme'. There may of course be special circumstances which justify our covering a country at a particular time or which prevent us from preparing a report which would otherwise be due.

With six issues of the Courier a year, and 69 ACP States, there is normally a gap of some five to six years between our reports on a particular country. Nigeria was the subject of a Country Report in issue no. 106 (November-December 1987) and it is probable, therefore, that we will be featuring the 'giant of Africa' once again in the relatively near future.

Thierry de MONTBRIAL ed. — **RAMSES 91** Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), 6, rue Ferrus, 75014 Paris — Published by Dunod — 424 pages Bfrs 1122 — 1990

The latest RAMSES (the Annual World Report on the Economic System and Strategies) is, like previous editions, a topic-by-topic summary of the main international events, although, having been written in August of last year, it does not of course cover the consequences of what has been happening in the Gulf.

Thierry de Montbrial's introduction starts with a maxim which Louis XIV included in his memoirs for the enlightenment of the dauphin: 'The whole art of politics is making the most of short-term situations', and then cites two outstanding personalities whose contribution to recent history has been immense and whose influence is still to be felt — Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl. Part one of the book, 'Europe again', comments on the spectacular and far-reaching changes of the past 18 months and part two, 'European competitiveness — nations and companies' develops a particular aspect of this. Part three, 'The international economy — Europe's turn', looks at Europe and its place in the world and part four discusses the environment.

We are given a lucid analysis of the economic and political collapse of communism, the reunification of Germany and the upheavals in the Soviet empire. There is little about the Third World this time, other than some emphasis on the persistence of regional conflicts, nonetheless some of which seem to be calming down. 'Both Soviets and Americans are pulling out from Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan and together they are recommending negotiated answers to fighting which they have themselves often kindled in the past'. The handling of trends in southern Africa and of the Gulf crisis of August 1990 is useful and there are some pertinent remarks on other Third World issues, in particular in a section on development and international cooperation in part three — the developing countries' total debt by the end of 1990, for example, was expected to reach \$1 320 billion, in spite of improvements in its financial management. The author quite rightly points out that the common term 'Third World' is less and less suitable for a very varied reality, where there are Asian nations, for example, especially the 'four dragons', with quite remarkable development alongside African nations 'which have gone on declining and are in a genuinely tragic situation'.

Lastly, the reader aware of the 1990s being a 'green' decade will be fascinated by part four, which deals with the environment, the fruits of industrialisation, urbanisation, the negligence of mankind and demography — 'There were a billion people on earth in 1800. There were 2 billion by 1925, 5 billion by 1987 and there will probably be more than 10 billion by 2010'. And the reader seeking a synthesis of current international events will be drawn to the statistical annexe. Indeed, for anyone interested in developments on the international scene, RAMSES, as usual, is a must.

Alain LACROIX

○○○

Edited by Jan JOOST TEUNISSEN — **Europe and Third World Debt Reduction: the role of the Netherlands** — FONDAD Policy Research Centre, Noordeinde 107a, 2514 GE The Hague, Netherlands — 58 pages — \$5 — 1991

This publication is the outcome of a Seminar organised in collaboration with the Interchurch Action for Latin America 'Solidaridad' and the Catholic Organisation for Joint Financing of Development Programmes (Cebemo).

The participants whose contributions are presented here are Jan P. Pronk, H. Johannes Witteveen, Percy S. Mistry, Stephany Griffith-Jones and Javier Iguiniz.

'After eight years of debt crisis management, what results have actually been achieved?' This is one of the critical questions raised by Percy S. Mistry, a former high official of the World Bank. In his contribution, Mistry discusses the escalating burden of official debt, i.e. debt owed to governments and multilateral institutions like the World Bank.

Jan P. Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands expresses grave concern about the 'political inertia' that has prevented solutions to the debt problem. 'Despite the Brady Plan, despite recent proposals to adopt an international strategy combining debt relief with investment and trade policies, international policy making in this field is paralysed'.

H. Johannes Witteveen, former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, argues that current debt reductions under the so-called Brady Plan are not sufficient to restore growth and the creditworthiness of developing countries. He finds it 'a somewhat anomalous situation' that most European

banks now have loan-loss provisions worth over 50% of their Third World loans, 'while in the Brady Plan, debt reductions of much smaller percentages are being proposed'.

If developing countries cannot obtain adequate levels of debt reduction, international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank should accept 'that the debtor unilaterally imposes a maximum level of debt service, jointly defined by the IFIs and the debtor government', says international financial expert Stephany Griffith-Jones.

'The apparent unsustainability of current development models promoted by the IMF and the World Bank gives reason to evaluate and seriously rethink development philosophies and strategies', states Javier Iguiniz, Professor of Economics at the Catholic University of Lima.

In the concluding debate, a banker says: 'Banks, certainly those in Europe, have provisioned sufficiently large amounts to allow a very sizeable debt reduction. The question is how we can get things moving. I think that pressure on the banks will be much more effective if it is complemented by initiatives of governments to do something more substantial on the side of official debt reduction. It would be up to Europe to do something...'

○○○

Albert SASSON: **Feeding tomorrow's world**, UNESCO/CTA 1990, Sextant series no. 3, 805 pp. ISBN 92-3-102083-8. Published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 7 Place de Fontenay, 75700 Paris.

The title 'Sextant' was chosen for the UNESCO series of publications which includes this book because, by analogy with the navigational instrument, the essential purpose is 'to enable the reader to find his bearings in an ocean of sometimes complicated and often confusing information'.

'Feeding tomorrow's world' should help to achieve this purpose. Essentially, it is a 'mini-encyclopaedia' which provides a wealth of information about food-related issues. It is divided into three sections entitled 'Human Nutrition', 'Production and Trade in Agricultural Foodstuffs' and 'Achievements and Potential International Cooperation and Prospects'. There can be little doubt about the utility of the book as a reference volume for people working in the field. The 'Human Nutrition' section, for

Continued on inside back cover

President Delors visits Senegal

In his first official trip to an ACP country since assuming office, the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors visited Senegal from 30 April to 3 May.

The purpose of the visit, on which he was accompanied by Vice-President and Commissioner for Development, Mr Manuel Marin, was to affirm European solidarity with an African continent facing difficult political and economic circumstances, in particular at a time when many in Africa are worried that the Community might be concentrating more of its aid effort on countries of Eastern Europe.

President Delors was welcomed at Dakar-Yoff by the Senegalese Prime Minister, Habib Thiam, senior members of the Government and diplomatic representatives of the Member States.

Mr Delors, Mr Marin and a number of their officials later had an audience with President Abdou Diouf, with a number of Senegalese ministers in attendance. The discussions were continued at a dinner offered by the Head of State.

The following day, President Delors and Vice-President Marin, accompanied by the Prime Minister, went to Podor in the north of the country. This is the site of a major rural development programme financed by the European Community.

Atmosphere of warmth

In an atmosphere of warmth, the President met village heads and representatives of women who are beneficiaries of the programme. This gave him the opportunity, not only to learn about the situation 'on the ground', but also to ascertain the utility of the project and to assess the problems still to be tackled in order to ensure a regular flow of production.



Presidents Delors and Diouf in conversation

On 2 May, Mr Delors and Mr Marin had a working meeting with the Prime Minister and ministers with responsibility for issues involving cooperation with the Community. The talks focused largely on the situation in Senegal, Africa and Europe.

Visit to Gorée

The President subsequently visited the island of Gorée where, in the presence of

the Mayor of Dakar, members of the Government and representatives of the Member States, he inaugurated the 'Place de l'Europe'. He then went on to the Senegalese National Assembly where he delivered a keynote speech on the themes of interdependence and solidarity (see the editorial at the beginning of this issue).

On 3 May, President Delors was received at the 'Hôtel de Ville' of Dakar where the mayor presented him with the keys to the city.

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

SPECIAL PROGRAMME AGAINST FAMINE IN AFRICA

Recognising the seriousness of the food crisis which threatens many parts of Africa, the Commission has adopted a special programme aimed at supplying, as speedily as possible, the cereal equivalent of 400 000 tonnes of food aid to the

affected areas. Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Malawi, Angola, Mozambique, Mauritania and Niger will receive supplies under this programme. The estimated overall cost is ECU 140 million.

Also in the yellow pages

- II European Development Fund
- III. Visits
- IV. General Information
- V. European Community

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

The Commission has recently decided to finance the following projects, after a favourable opinion from the European Development Fund Committee.

19 March 1991

Kenya and Ethiopia (regional project): 6th EDF — ECU 1.75 million (grant). Isiola-Moyale road study

Cameroun: 6th EDF — ECU 10.3 million (grant). Rural development axes: Saa — Ntui — Sangmelima — Bafut.

27 March 1991

Uganda: 6th EDF — ECU 685 000 (grant). Energy supply project for the Hima cement works.

Cameroun: 6th EDF — ECU 12 million (grant). Construction of the Yaoundé-Ayos road.

23 April 1991

Trinidad and Tobago: 6th EDF — ECU 1 million (grant). Phase II of the tourism development programme.

Solomon Islands: 6th EDF — ECU 2 million (special loan). Honiara urban development project.

Member States of the Preferential Trade Area (PTA): 5th and 6th EDF — ECU 6.7 million [5th EDF — ECU 2.2 million (grant), 6th EDF — ECU 4.5 million (grant)]. Computerisation of PTA customs and trade statistics.

Tanzania and Malawi (regional project): 6th EDF — ECU 9.1 million

[Tanzania National Indicative Programme — ECU 3.5 million (grant), Regional Cooperation — ECU 5.6 million (grant)]. Ibanda-Uyole Road.

Malawi: 6th EDF — ECU 3.262 million (grant). Aid to refugees.

2 May 1991

Papua-New Guinea: 5th and 6th EDF — ECU 21.52 million [6th EDF (Sysmin) — ECU 18 million (special loan), 5th EDF — ECU 1.043 million (special loan), 5th EDF — ECU 2.477 million (grant)]. Programme of road and bridge repairs.

Sierra Leone: 6th EDF — ECU 16.8 million (grant). Reconstruction of the Waterloo-Masiaka Road and repair of the Makeni-Fadugu section.

Benin, Burkina Faso and Niger (regional project): 6th EDF — ECU 18.5 million (special loan). Rehabilitation of the Godomey-Bohicon road (119 km).

Rwanda: 6th EDF — ECU 8 million (grant). The Kigali-Butari and Butari-Burundi roads.

30 May 1991

Ghana: 6th EDF — ECU 20 million (grant). Phase II of port rehabilitation.

Kiribati: 6th EDF — 5.7 million (grant). Telecommunications programme.

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK

Madagascar: ECU 180 000. The European Investment Bank has acquired a minority holding, on behalf of the European Community, in Financière d'Investissement ARO (FIARO), a Madagascan venture capital company established in 1988. The operation, involving ECU 180 000, has been funded from risk capital resources provided for under Lomé III. The purpose of FIARO, which is majority-owned by the State insurance company (ARO), is to take up minority equity participations in private companies.

Senegal: ECU 1.5 million. The European Investment Bank is providing a loan

of ECU 1.5 million for improving cargo handling at the port of Dakar, Senegal. The investments comprise a forklift, trailers, data processing equipment, office space modernisation and local transport facilities.

The funds from risk capital resources provided for under the Third Lomé Convention and managed by the EIB, are advanced in the form of a conditional loan for 10 years at 5% to Credit Lyonnais Sénégal which will on-lend the proceeds of the loan to Delmas Sénégal SA, a limited company incorporated in Senegal.

ACP EMBASSIES

Three new ACP Ambassadors, representing Gabon, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, have presented their credentials to the President of the Commission of the European Communities.

GABON

Marcel Eugene Ibinga Magwangu (47), who is the new Ambassador of Gabon, has a degree in economics from the University of Caen (France). In his early career, he worked at UNESCO before returning to Gabon where he held a number of posts of responsibility in educational and government circles. During the 1980s he served a term of office as Director General of the Agency for the Safety of Aerial Navigation in Africa and Madagascar (ASECNA) based in Dakar (Senegal). On his return to Gabon, he was appointed Personal Representative of the Prime Minister and in May, 1990, he became adviser to the Prime Minister with responsibility for missions.



Mr Marcel Eugene Ibinga Magwangu, the new Ambassador of Gabon

GUINEA-BISSAU

Mr Fali Embalo (35), who is the new ambassador of Guinea-Bissau is a law

graduate of the University of Reims (France). He also holds a master's degree in public law from the same institution. Prior to undertaking his tertiary studies, Mr Embalo was a school teacher, first in his own country and then in Vietnam.

In 1983, he was appointed Head of the Secretariat of the Guinea-Bissau Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The following year, he became Head of Cabinet to the Foreign Minister and Permanent Secretary with responsibility for cooperation with the five Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa.

He has worked at the Guinea-Bissau Embassy in Brussels since 1986, initially as First Secretary and subsequently as Legal Affairs Adviser.



Mr Fali Embalo, the new Ambassador of Guinea-Bissau

MAURITANIA

Mr Taki Ould Sidi (46), who is the new Mauritanian Ambassador, went to school in his native country before studying at the Institut des Hautes Etudes d'Outre-Mer in Paris. He has long experience of diplomatic posts in both Europe and Africa. His first ambassadorial position was in Bonn (Germany) in 1976, where he was also accredited to Denmark and Sweden. He subsequently served as his country's ambassador in Dakar, Madrid and Beijing as well as in Brussels for a short time.

During the 1980s, Mr Sidi held ministerial office in the Mauritanian Government, first as Minister of Economic and Physical Planning and subsequently as Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources.



Mr Taki Ould Sidi, the new Ambassador of Mauritania

During discussions, the evolution of the political situation in Mali following the events in March was mentioned. President Delors and Vice-President Marin welcomed the progress already made by Mali on the way to democracy.

Both the President and the Vice-President of the Commission underlined that the European Community, which is one of the principal partners of that country as regards external aid and trade flows, is ready to help Mali during this delicate period in its history. At the beginning of the events in March, the EEC rapidly supplied emergency aid intended to improve medical care for the wounded. More recently it has financed, using counterpart funds, a study to identify the damage sustained by the administration and public enterprises. It is in the same positive spirit, they said, that the Commission intended to participate in the meeting of the Friends of Mali scheduled to take place in Paris on 3 July.

King Mswati III of Swaziland at the Commission

His Majesty, King Mswati III of Swaziland visited the Commission on 30 May and was received by Vice-President Marin. The King, who is currently the Chairman of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States (PTA) was accompanied by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism of Swaziland, and by the Secretary General of the PTA.

The objective of the visit was to discuss cooperation between the EC and the PTA and to take a general look at regional cooperation between the EC and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) member states and the prospects for the implementation of Lomé IV. The talks also provided an opportunity to discuss the bilateral relations between the EC and the Kingdom of Swaziland in the framework of the Lomé Convention.

During the King's visit, Swaziland's national dance troupe was also in Belgium. In the framework of cultural cooperation, the troupe gave demonstrations in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, of Sibhaca dancing, a colourful mixture of powerful rhythmic movement and humour.

VISITS

Prime Minister Sacko of Mali in Brussels

Mr Soumana Sacko, Prime Minister and Head of Government of the Republic of Mali, visited the Commission on 25 June 1991. He was accompanied by Squadron-leader Souleymane Sidibe, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Mr Amadou Mody Diall, Minister Delegate to the Prime Minister and Head of Mission, and also by Mr Mamadou Ouattara, Minister of Justice. He was received by Mr Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, and by Mr Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the Commission responsible for development cooperation and for fisheries.

Mr Marin visits Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles

Mr Manuel Marin, Commission Vice-President with special responsibility for development and fisheries paid official visits to the three island ACP States of the Indian Ocean, at the end of April. The purpose of Mr Marin's trip was to join with the authorities of Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles respectively in reviewing progress in cooperation between these countries and the EC, and in assessing future prospects.

Mr Marin had talks with, among others, President Ratsiraka and Prime Minister Ramahatra of Madagascar, Prime Minister Jugnauth of Mauritius and President René of the Seychelles.

The Commissioner was able to sign, in each of the countries concerned, the indicative programmes which had been drawn up covering the first five years of the Lomé IV Convention, the ceremonies having been timed to coincide with his visit.



Commission Vice-President Manuel Marin greeting His Majesty, King Mswati III of Swaziland during his visit to the Commission in Brussels

GENERAL INFORMATION

EMERGENCY AID

The Commission has recently taken the following emergency aid decisions. These include a number involving EDF funding for ACP States:

All ACPs: ECU 650 000 (27 March 1991 — grant).

Immediate emergency aid for prompt action in ACP countries.

Malawi: ECU 650 000 (27 March 1991 — grant).

Immediate emergency aid for the victims of floods and landslides.

Liberia: ECU 630 000 (25 April 1991, 6th EDF — grant).

The aid is intended for the 500 000 people who are still suffering the consequences of the conflict. It will be implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross and International Action Against Hunger and will finance health and medical programmes.

Somalia: ECU 3 million (24 April 1991, 6th EDF — grant).

According to available information, millions of victims are suffering the effects of the civil war which has resulted in the destruction of a large part of the country's infrastructure, the abandonment of health services, a serious shortage

of food and drinking water and the migration of a large number of people from the major towns and cities. The aid will be deployed by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the NGO, 'Hermann Gmeiner Fonds Deutschland' in the form of medical assistance programmes as well as the organisation of transport for emergency and food aid in the areas affected. The Commission had already decided on similar emergency aid and food aid to the tune of ECU 5.8 million, which is being channelled through various NGOs. With this latest decision, the total aid committed to date, by the Community and its Member States in favour of the victims of the conflict in Somalia, has risen to approximately ECU 11 million.

Ethiopia: ECU 650 000.

The aid, which will be deployed by 'Médecins Sans Frontières' (Belgium) will consist of medical assistance programmes and emergency supplies.

Sudanese refugees in Zaïre: ECU 300 000.

The aid is designed to help the 15 000 Sudanese refugees who have arrived, in particularly difficult conditions, in Zaïre since March. The influx is continuing at between 300 and 500 a day. The aid will be deployed by the French and Belgian organisations of 'Médecines sans Frontières' in the form of a medical and sanitation programme and temporary shelter facilities.

Somalian refugees in Kenya: ECU 435 000 (22 May 1991, grant).

The aid will be undertaken by the Red Cross League, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the NGO 'CARE', and will provide basic needs.

Bangladesh: ECU 10 million.

This emergency humanitarian aid has been provided for the victims of the cyclone and floods in Bangladesh. Community aid will be allocated as follows: — ECU 2 million in emergency aid to cover the cost of distributing tents, blankets and other emergency equipment through the Red Crescent Society of Bangladesh, a number of non-governmental organisations and the Commission Delegation in Dacca; — ECU 8 million in food aid for the distribution of 45 000 tonnes of wheat and 1500 tonnes of vegetable oil. These products will be mobilised largely on the spot, so that they can be made available quickly to the sectors of the population most seriously affected.

Myanmar (formerly Burma): ECU 70 000.

The aid will cover a League of Red

Cross and Red Crescent Societies relief programme for 25 000 people left homeless and destitute by a fire in the town of Mektilla.

Cambodia: ECU 500 000.

The aid, which will be undertaken by the French and Belgian organisations of Médecins sans Frontières, is directed towards those people in Cambodia who are particularly affected by the intensification of the conflict. It is aimed at financing medical/sanitary programmes.

FISHERIES

Namibia: The European Commission decided in April temporarily to suspend negotiations for the conclusion of a fisheries agreement between the Community and Namibia, notably in order to bring about the ending of illegal fishing in Namibian waters, and to encourage the EC Member State concerned to take the measures required to attain this objective.

The Commission considers that the situation is, at present, clarified, and thus proposes to reopen negotiations with the Namibian authorities. The Commission has received assurances from the association of shipowners concerned that its members will henceforth respect Namibia's sovereignty over its territorial waters, and avoid all action that might endanger this sovereignty.

Furthermore, the Member State concerned has informed the Commission that it has adopted the necessary measures to discourage any further illegal fishing.

The Commission hopes that the negotiations will continue henceforth in a harmonious atmosphere, and that a fisheries agreement between the EC and Namibia will be concluded taking into account the interests of both parties.

maintain the territorial integrity and unity of the country and underline the urgent necessity of a peaceful solution to the internal conflict, which is the only guarantee for cohesion and national stability.

The Community and its Member States urge all the parties concerned to participate as rapidly as possible in talks which should deal in particular with political reconciliation, institutional reorganisation and the reconstruction of the country. They note with interest all regional and international efforts to this end and reaffirm their willingness actively to support the search for a negotiated settlement acceptable to all the parties concerned.

The Community and its Member States also reaffirm their commitment to pursue efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the populations affected by famine. They call upon all the parties concerned to do everything in their power to guarantee the efficient delivery of aid directed to the civilian populations.

Ethiopia

The Community and its Member States welcome the joint communiqué issued in London on 28 May and the commitments subscribed to on this occasion. They reiterate their conviction that only a negotiated, political solution acceptable to all the parties will guarantee peace, stability, and the economic and social development of Ethiopia.

The Community and its Member States appeal to all the parties to exercise restraint so as to allow a smooth transition to a democratic system. They support the convening of a Conference open to all political groups, with the participation of international observers, with a view to establishing a national government of transition. They hope that an undertaking will be given on this occasion to hold free elections, duly scrutinised, on the future organisation of the country and its institutions.

The Community and its Member States recall the commitments to which they have subscribed in the framework of the Lomé Convention and consider that the economic aid to Ethiopia would be all the more effective if democratic institutions were rapidly established. To this end, they look to the provisional administration to respect its commitments regarding human rights and the progressive democratisation of the country.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

European Political Cooperation

The following public statements have been made recently in the framework of European Political Cooperation

Somalia

The Community and its Member States are following with concern, the

development of the situation in Somalia. In view of the separatist tendencies of recent days, they reiterate their urgent appeal to all the parties concerned to

The Community and its Member States recall their readiness to support any appropriate process of political negotiation and electoral consultation which will be organised. They also confirm their commitments to meet the humanitarian needs while stressing again the necessity to ensure free access to the populations benefiting from assistance.

Western Sahara

The Community and its Member States welcome the adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 690 approving the report of the UN Secretary General on the referendum to be held concerning the self-determination of the Saharan people. They believe this represents an important step towards a just and lasting settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara.

They also confirm their firm support for the Secretary General's efforts to implement the final stages of his plan.

Code of conduct for Community companies with subsidiaries in South Africa

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs approved the tenth synthesis report on the application of the Code of Conduct for companies from the EC with subsidiaries, branches or representation in South Africa. They decided to forward it to the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community.

The report covers the period from 1 July 1988 to 30 June 1989 and analyses reports on the activities of 244 companies with more than 91 000 black employees. It also takes into account the annual report by representatives of the Twelve in Pretoria on the implementation of the Code.

The Community and its Member States noted with satisfaction:

- that a very large majority of European companies have resolutely adopted a policy of allowing their workforces to choose freely their representatives;
- that objective, non-racial criteria are employed by all companies in determining wages and filling vacancies;
- that the majority of companies have achieved total desegregation;
- that in line with the objective of encouraging black businesses, an increasing number of companies are members of, or support, local organisations established to promote black entrepreneurs.

The Community and its Member States are convinced that the measures taken by European companies to abolish segregation at the working place have substantially contributed to furthering their policy aimed at achieving the elimination of apartheid by peaceful means. In the expectation of the foreshadowed profound changes of the South African society, they reaffirm their commitment to promote the full implementation of the Code of Conduct.

COMMUNITY CITIZENS SUPPORT DEEPER AND WIDER UNION

Eurobarometer poll

In the opinion of the majority of EC citizens, Europe in the year 2000 will have a single currency, more member states and a common military force. These are some of the results of the latest EUROBAROMETER poll, which was carried out in March 1991.

A variety of issues currently being debated at the Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union and Economic and Monetary Union receive a favourable reception from the general public.

The establishment of a European citizenship, proposed by Spain, is considered 'a good thing' by 60% of EC citizens, with a particularly warm welcome from Spaniards (78%), Greeks and Italians (73%). Denmark is the only

country with a majority not in favour of the idea.

A majority of Europeans (62%) favours the Community being responsible for a common policy in matters of security and defence.

60% of EC citizens (and 54% of British) are supporters of a single currency replacing the different currencies of the Member States in five or six years' time. 64% think that this will be a reality by the year 2000.

57% think that the Community should be responsible for a common foreign policy — a seven point increase since the last poll.

The idea of creating a common European Central Bank, with the heads of national central banks on its Board of Directors, is accepted by 56%.

STUDENT MOBILITY IN THE EC

In 1991/92, the Commission is to finance 1645 Interuniversity Cooperation Programmes involving around 1200 higher education institutions and 59 000 students. Thus, the continuity of Community assistance to an increasingly strong network of institutions will be maintained and, with significant support at Member State level, nearly 4% of all EC students will be eligible for a period of study in another Member State under the ERASMUS programme.

SINGLE CURRENCY

On 27 June, Commission Vice-President Christopherson presided at the prize-giving ceremony of the first European Ecu Essay contest, organised by the Ecu Banking Association.

In his speech the Vice-President declared that it would be vital for Europe in the future world, to have a single currency. Only this, could bring the full benefits of the Single Market and of Economic and Monetary Union. A single currency, he averred, would be essential for the identity of Europe vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and only the Ecu could fulfil this role.

Mr Christopherson emphasised that the Ecu was now a strong and stable currency. Its attractiveness was such that Norway, Sweden and Finland had decided to peg their currencies to it. He argued that it must be reinforced, not by a new definition but by the reinforcement of convergence. The Commission therefore favours a freezing of the basket definition so that there will be no further modification of the currency amounts defining the Ecu. This will allow the Ecu to strengthen naturally as the appreciating currencies within it account for an ever-increasing share.

The Vice-President stressed, however, that the strengthening of the Ecu required clear political commitment to its status as the future single currency within a reasonable timespan. He added that progress made so far in the Intergovernmental Conference on European Monetary Union was encouraging and expressed confidence that the Treaty amendments would be in place before the end of the year, paving the way for the Ecu as Europe's single currency before the end of the millenium.



INDUSTRIAL OPPORTUNITIES

PUBLISHED EVERY TWO MONTHS

No.79 : JULY - AUGUST 1991

GUYANESE MILL NEARLY TREBLES SHINGLE PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT

Nagasaw Sawh Ltd., has been producing shingles since 1978 and is the only Guyanese sawmill to do so. By 1989 production had risen to 2,700 bundles of shingles per month, mainly absorbed by the domestic market. (A bundle is equivalent to approximately 2.3 square metres of shingles.) The company, which employs 200 people, then decided to expand their shingle production by 5,000 bundles a month and to exploit export opportunities to the Caribbean Region and to North America.

In 1990 they purchased four second-hand mills from Canada, financed by Gaibank and the International Development Bank. They requested technical assistance from CDI in the areas of shingles plant layout and production system

planning. CDI paid for a Canadian expert to make three visits of three weeks to Guyana.

The construction of the new plant went smoothly. During the expert's first visit, which took place in June 1990, drawings were produced to make assembly easier and reduce possible errors. The interior layout of the mill was established with the goal of eliminating slow spots in the production line. Production flow problems in the old mill were identified.

During the second visit in September adjustments were made to the speed of the conveyors to create an optimal flow for productivity before final start-up took place. In December all remaining machinery was put in place, shingle machines were given a test run and a main-

tenance programme was suggested by the expert. He also suggested the creation of a middle tier of management in order to free senior management to lead the growing company and recommended the appointment of a mill foreman to ensure smooth running of the machinery and systematic maintenance to minimize downtime.

Annual production at Nagasaw Sawh Ltd., is estimated to rise from its present value of Ecu 0.65 million to a value of approximately Ecu 1.5 million in the second year and approximately Ecu 1.8 million in the third year after expansion. 90% of the additional production will be easily absorbed by the Caribbean Region and North American markets. 70 new jobs should be created. ♦

The infeed conveyor and the splitter at the new plant.

Cooperation with CDI extremely useful, say Portuguese.

Since the Portuguese Institute of Foreign Trade (ICEP) signed a cooperation agreement with CDI in June 1987 no less than 70 projects have been jointly assisted by the two organizations. More than 90% of the projects are in Africa, with the emphasis on Portuguese-speaking countries, while the remainder are divided equally between the Caribbean and Pacific ACP regions.


The industrial sectors with the largest number of assisted projects have been, in order of magnitude, agro-industry, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, metal fabrication, footwear and clothing. Many other industries are represented with fewer projects. The main types of assistance have been feasibility studies 31%, training 22% and technical assistance 21%. Assistance has also been provided in the areas of company evaluation, rehabilitation, diagnostic missions, start-up assistance and licensing agreements.

THE BENEFITS

The cooperation agreement has shown itself to be an extremely useful instrument for Portuguese companies, according to a status report prepared in January 1991 by Cristina de Almeida, who is CDI's liaison person in ICEP. In listing the benefits the report cites eleven actual project case histories as evidence.

By encouraging investment in the ACP countries the agreement enables Portuguese companies to regard industrial cooperation as a new way of transferring labour-intensive production to the ACP countries and making their products competitive. It permits them to promote their technology which, generally speaking, is not ultra-sophisticated and is extremely well-adapted to the state of development of ACP countries.

Continued on page 2



Continued from page 1

Equipment which needs to be replaced due to its low productivity by European market standards can be transferred as a form of participation in joint ventures in ACP countries, where it can still be used to manufacture competitive products.

Portuguese companies can benefit from fiscal and financial incentives, specifically tax exemptions when products manufactured in ACP countries are exported. In some cases they are able to gain access to new sources of raw materials. In other cases they are able to enter protected markets from which they have previously been excluded or which have been uneconomical as export destinations due to transportation costs over great distances.

Increased exports can also be a benefit through the expansion of existing business or through contacts with their new trading partners. Taking seven concrete examples, ICEP shows that an investment on their part of approximately Ecu 83,000 produced estimated exports of about Ecu 6 million in the form of equipment, raw materials, components or end products. From its point of view ICEP finds such figures encouraging.

A final benefit for Portuguese companies is the assistance provided by ICEP and CDI in seeking finance. The relationship between CDI and the European Investment Bank (EIB), becoming closer under the fourth Lomé Convention, should also facilitate Portuguese firms in obtaining the financing they seek, says ICEP. And they are mindful that CDI also has cooperation agreements with other financial institutions: the Danish Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU), the French Promotion and Equity Company for Economic Development (PROPARCO), the Geneva-based International Finance Company for Investments and Development in Africa (SIFIDA) and the German Finance Company for Investment in Developing Countries (DEG).

CONTINUING INVESTMENT IN AFRICA

In view of the benefits accruing to Portuguese companies from the assistance given to industrial cooperation under the agreement, ICEP believes in continuing activity in Africa. The Institute has plans in Africa and believes it should be left to competing countries to take their chances in the recently opened up markets of Eastern Europe.

At a time when there is so much talk of foreign investment in Portugal, ICEP believes it is important to realize the



Cristina de Almeida, CDI's liaison person at ICEP.

capacity of Portuguese firms for dynamic expansion in foreign countries. It also believes that the assistance that it provides jointly with CDI is essential to small and medium-sized companies and may well have a still greater multiplier effect on Portuguese exports of goods and services, thus achieving the Institute's ultimate objective.

FUTURE STRATEGY

A study of the "death rate" of projects co-financed with CDI leads ICEP to conclude that difficulties in obtaining financing have been the chief obstacle to their coming to fruition. Without any doubt, the most constructive form of cooperation is the establishment of joint ventures. The Institute believes that results so far achieved could be considerably improved upon with the development of

an appropriate strategy, particularly now that CDI's role has been slightly modified under Lomé IV.

To develop its strategy ICEP sees a need clearly to define its priorities. Priority markets will be:

1) Africa, primarily the Portuguese-speaking countries plus ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) and the member States of SADCC (Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference);

2) the Caribbean and the Pacific Regions on a case by case basis.

The priority sectors of industry, based on the results to date and the demand from Portuguese firms, will be agro-industry, metal fabrication, leather goods and footwear. In addition, priority will be given to strategic industries for priority countries and industries for which equipment is available for transfer to ACP countries as equity participation.

Regarding the priority activities, feasibility and financing studies are to be reinforced, technical assistance will be provided when export expansion and/or an advantageous use of technology is involved. Less emphasis will be placed on professional training which can be carried out by other agencies.

Priority will be given to larger projects of optimum feasibility. ICEP's level of co-financing will be maintained. It will make full use of CDI's assistance for smaller projects. It will also seek out other sources of financing and develop close, painstaking collaboration with other agencies involved in cooperation, banks, venture capital companies, et cetera. ♦

PROMOTING COOPERATION IN PORTUGAL

SEMINARS ON LOMÉ IV

More than 50 industrialists attended each of two seminars organized by the Portuguese Association for Economic Development and Cooperation (ELO) in Oporto on the 4th of April and in Lisbon on the 5th of May. The subject of the seminars was financing possibilities under Lomé IV. This attracted a great deal of attention, given the high level of interest displayed by Portuguese industry in investment in ACP States. (See article above.)

Participants from Brussels were J-M Anacoreta Correia, Head of Division for Industrial Cooperation, Investment and Enterprise in the Directorate General for Development at the EC Commission, Martin Curwen, Head of Coordination Division, at the European Investment Bank (EIB) and Fernando Matos Rosa, respon-

sible for liaison with CDI's partner organizations in the EC.

COOPERATION WEEK IN LISBON

Cooperation Week was organized by the Technical University of Lisbon during the second week of May. The event focussed on the PALOP group of lusophone African States which use Portuguese as an official language. Portuguese universities work together with industry on technologies adapted to cooperation.

The event was attended by a number of government ministers from Portugal and the African lusophone States. CDI's Fernando Matos Rosa, together with chief executives and directors of several companies, took part in a panel to discuss the experiences of Portuguese firms involved in ventures in African lusophone States. ♦

EAST AFRICA ANTENNAE HELP PLAN AND PROGRESS INTERVENTIONS

"Involving antennae in project promotion in Europe adds another dimension to their knowledge of projects and the requirements of European investors. It gives them greater expertise in selecting well-prepared projects that have better prospects of implementation."

Ashenafi Shifferaw, CDI Antenna in Ethiopia

CDI's antennae in Ethiopia and Sudan visited Brussels in April to review and select projects in their countries with CDI staff and to promote and progress them with EC firms and institutions in collaboration with CDI's industrial sector experts.

17 ETHIOPIAN PROJECTS PROGRAMMED

Seventeen out of a total of twenty-four projects reviewed were selected for inclusion in the 1991 programme of interventions in Ethiopia. Of these, five are in the food sector, ten in the manufacturing and processing, one in the construction and one in the agricultural industries. Ten projects involve joint ventures, three training, three diagnostic and other studies and one travel assistance. CDI antenna Ashenafi Shifferaw was able to contribute to progressing 13 of the projects during his visit.

The unique climate of Ethiopia makes it very suitable for the cultivation of various plants for essential oils. In furthering a joint venture essential oil mill project, Ashenafi Shifferaw visited a French pilot plant operated by the National Polytechnic Institute of Toulouse. He also investigated a low-tech straw board manufacturing process in the United Kingdom.

SUDANESE PROGRAMME PUTS EMPHASIS ON FOOD AND EXPORT INDUSTRIES

Salah H. A/Mageed, in charge of CDI affairs at the Sudan Development Corporation, our antenna organization, reporting at the end of his visit, writes:

"Five of the twelve proposed interventions fall within the food sector, a top priority in the government programme. Four projects are in the mining and building materials sector. The input to GDP of the long-neglected mining sector could be very great indeed. Mining projects, though demanding very big investments, have a great added value, are export oriented and could be very attractive to EC partners.

"Sudan is rich in animal resources and a leather-board tannery joint venture project also has good export potential.

"The proposed programme includes rehabilitation of an asbestos factory, important since it could be the main supplier of asbestos pressure pipes and sheets for the local market. Another import-substitution project is a plastic moulding company for fridges and water coolers."

Types of assistance requested include three searches for joint-venture partners, a search for financing and six evaluation and market studies. Technical assistance is programmed for three projects and installation and start-up assistance for one other. ♦

Sudanese marble being processed in Belgium, a joint venture between Sudanese and Belgian firms. From left to right: Victor Brancalonei, the Belgian joint venture partner; Omer Mohamed Abdelsalam, Economic Counsellor, Sudan Embassy, Brussels; Ashenafi Shifferaw, CDI Antenna in Ethiopia; Salah H. A/Mageed, CDI Antenna in Sudan; J-M. Delchambre, Head of Interventions and EC Resources Division, CDI; Imad Eldin Hassan of the Sudanese Imtco Mining & Trading Co.



New act encourages investment in Sudan

Government of Sudan policy is to use the resources of the country, especially in agriculture, to obtain self-reliance in food production, to free prices, solve the problems of existing industries and encourage investment. In June 1990 it approved a new investment act which is meant to achieve greater harmony and to be more effective and practical in the treatment of the problems facing new investments in Sudan.

The act's salient features are:

1. Equitable treatment for investors irrespective of whether they are nationals or expatriates or whether the project is private or public.
2. Greater encouragement is, however, given to those investments that tend to utilize domestic materials, raise export capabilities, achieve food security, promote rural development and support equitable distribution of income.
3. Arbitrary nationalization or confiscation is forbidden.
4. Projects shall have the following privileges:
 - exemption from business profits tax for a period, not less than five years;
 - partial or total exemption from duty on machinery, equipment, land, apparatus, prefabricated buildings, generators, means of transport, spare parts, initial and intermediate production inputs;
 - allocation of land necessary for projects;
 - duty concessions;
 - granting of a higher credit ceiling for project financing;
5. Projects shall be granted the following facilities:
 - transfer of profits and the cost of financing resulting from foreign capital or loans, in the currency in which the capital or loan was imported;
 - setting aside of the necessary percentage of export returns to meet the cost of foreign production inputs and other financial obligations;
 - repatriation of the savings of foreign investors in accordance with the prevailing regulations.

Wire from local copper in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe possesses copper which is mined and locally processed into semi-finished products. A Zimbabwean company producing galvanized steel wire products since 1972 with an annual turnover of Ecu 900,000 decided to diversify into copper wire for the domestic market and subsequently for export to the region. In order to give the project a solid basis, the promoter arranged supply agreements with local customers.

CDI provided technical assistance in the following areas: selection of equip-

ment, advice on the design of a strander to be built by the promoter and factory layout. The promoter paid for the local costs of the visiting expert while CDI covered the foreign exchange costs.

Based on the expert's advice the promoter ordered equipment. Further CDI assistance for start-up and training is envisaged.

This diversification project requires an additional investment of Ecu 250,000 and will produce an additional annual turnover of Ecu 350,000. ♦

Milling local maize in Madagascar

Flour mills are normally large scale operations. Local African cereal growers are rarely able to supply grain in sufficient quantity to supply such mills and accordingly imported grain tends to be used, consuming scarce foreign currency and providing no benefit to local agriculture.

Probo is a Malagasy company involved in cassava and coffee processing and other food-oriented products. It was set up and is run by a private entrepreneur and is situated in a maize-growing area. With the help of the African Project Development Facility (ADPF), a subsidiary of the World Bank, the entrepreneur developed a project for milling the local maize, of which there is an adequate supply. To mill the relatively small planned capacity of 20 tons per 24 hours he planned to use well-adapted equipment which is simple to operate and maintain. It also consumes little energy.

The Agricultural Development Bank of Madagascar agreed to finance the

project in principle but required that various elements of the feasibility study be confirmed or elaborated. Cooperating with ADPF, CDI identified an appropriate expert and co-financed the additional study. The study confirmed that a sufficient quantity of maize was available of acceptable quality and price, that there was an adequate market for the mill's products among bakers and brewers and that the choice of equipment was indeed suitable.

The study enabled BTM to grant the financing and the project is now underway. 26 people will be employed at the mill and the project will stimulate maize production and benefit the local farming community. Adding value to local cereals falls into the area of CDI's priorities and we are now assisting the training of a Malagasy technician in Europe. CDI will also assist start-up of the mill over a period of two months. ♦

The mill under construction.



Developing scarce tropical fruit products for export in Suriname

Suriname produces large quantities of tropical fruit but at relatively high cost, so that adding value by producing fruit pulp and juices is not economically feasible.

Since 1987 Consolidated Industries Corporation (CIC), a Surinamese detergent manufacturer, has been developing a project to diversify into dried and candied fruits for export as a means of earning foreign currency. The company set up a fruit farming subsidiary and a small experimental processing facility and test-marketed the resulting products successfully in local shops.

CDI financed a pre-feasibility study to investigate European marketing opportunities and the development of a candied and desiccated fruits production unit. The study confirmed that opportunities existed, especially for the scarcer tropical fruits such as star fruit and Malaysian apples, which could be marketed at a premium and had already been grown and processed successfully by the promoter. The study also defined the technical and quality control requirements for a pilot plant.

Following the pre-feasibility study the promoter has decided to set up the pilot plant, which can produce enough dried and candied fruit for test marketing in Europe. Further assistance has been approved by CDI to investigate distribution, packaging, price structures and profitability and, according to the results, a bankable project for a full scale operation. ♦

Adapted technology and technical partnership for fruit processor in Cameroon.

A problem of fruit processing in many parts of Africa is that fruit is not farmed in sufficiently large quantities to ensure an adequate continuous supply. Often the only supply is simply the surplus produce of kitchen gardens which exist primarily to feed their owners' families.

Conserves M'Banga is a small Cameroonian enterprise which supplies

THE NEED TO CHANGE ATTITUDES TO INDUSTRY

by Jean-Pierre Zounon

Jean-Pierre Zounon is responsible for CDI affairs at the Central Projects Bureau of the Ministry of Planning and Statistics, our antenna organization in Benin. In this article he describes some obstacles to industrial growth that the governments of developing countries should take into account. The obstacles essentially relate to the concept that governments have of development, of the educational system and of the nature of industry itself.

It is hard to understand today how governments of developing countries used to believe that agriculture alone would suffice to ensure the economic take-off of their countries. Often campaigns were organized on a large scale to inculcate the idea among the people that the only solution to their problems was to be found in agriculture. Certain administrations even went so far as to take anti-economic and anti-social measures to apply their programmes based on this nutritional concept of development.

Today the international crisis, from which the developing countries are the heaviest losers, should make us think. Our ideas and actions have got to evolve not only towards democracy but towards the whole area of development.

No economic model constitutes a panacea but the history of the evolution of the rich countries shows that the pace of development of a country depends to a large extent on the rate of industrialization of its economy. It is imperative for the poor countries to begin by encouraging initiative and creativity in the indus-

trial field if they really want to develop.

The educational system in developing countries also constitutes a bottleneck to industrialization. Many criticisms have been voiced against a system inherited from the colonial period which is devoted to training administrators, that is to say employees and not employers. Private promoters come to create their own businesses more by accident than by vocation. The educational system in the countries of the third world should be rethought and reoriented towards the training of men and women capable of creating jobs, not only for themselves but also for others.

Some obstacles to industrialization have to do with the nature of industry itself. The activity is often thought of as difficult, and for good reason. Industrial projects demand more resources and dedication from the promoter. If he wants to succeed, an entrepreneur is obliged to invest all that he possesses, all his time, his whole body and soul. And most enterprises do not produce real profits until after years of operation. The entrepreneur has to arm himself with with forti-

artisanally produced, high quality, pasteurized fruit juices to hotels, restaurants, supermarkets and other outlets. The entrepreneur planned to expand and to produce about a million litres a year of passion fruit, guava and pineapple juices with equipment specially developed in collaboration with the French Citrus Fruit Research Institute (IRFA).

The simple, low capacity equipment can process different types of fruit and is therefore well-adapted for local conditions of supply where no single fruit may be continuously available.

CDI assisted in the drawing up of a contract in which the equipment supplier became the technical partner of the

entrepreneur. This involves short-term start-up assistance followed by two years of production assistance, during which there will be continuous communication between the partners and four visits of inspection by the equipment supplier.

This two year programme has the full financial support of CDI and the French Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique. Longer term production assistance is also planned.

It is CDI's policy to encourage this type of partnership, which ensures the ongoing commitment of a European supplier in the satisfactory performance of his equipment without necessarily involving him in a financial joint venture. ♦



tude and patience. Whatever the reliability of studies carried out beforehand, the success of a project finally depends on the character and the determination of the entrepreneur.

All this means that people seeking to earn a living often prefer occupations such as, for example, trading or operating taxis. They do not create added value but they can bring substantial short-term profits to the operators. It is necessary, therefore, to convince such entrepreneurs that industry may also be profitable as well as a more satisfying, creative and challenging activity for them personally in the longer term.

It is undeniable that the lack of material and financial means annihilates the spirit of enterprise. But sometimes the refusal to undertake something is the result of underestimating the means at one's disposal. This is proved by the fact that those who have accumulated money by so called "parallel" activities, often do not think of investing the money in an industrial enterprise.

This situation challenges the conscience of developing country governments, which must begin to create the genuine bases for developing private initiative in the industrial field. People must be helped materially and psychologically to understand that industry contains no more risk than other kinds of activity.

Today's educational system is inadequate to train people to meet the challenge facing countries and it must be improved. To do this, the planners and decision makers must reappraise their nutritional concept of development. CDI can play a useful role in this process of changing attitudes and behaviour.

CDI welcomes contributions on themes relevant to industrial development in ACP countries. Views expressed in such contributions belong to their authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CDI. ♦

Practical body whose assistance goes right to the factory floor

Industrial Opportunities is mainly devoted to providing a bi-monthly chronicle of CDI's activities. This descriptive article on CDI, its mission, and how it works summarizes the framework for these activities and the way it is adapting to the priorities set by the Fourth Lomé Convention.

Keen to encourage the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, the European Community and the ACP States set up the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) in 1977 under Lomé I, the first ACP-EC Convention.

Although CDI is an international institution it is also a practical operational instrument for creating new industries in ACP States and improving the operations of existing ones. It subsidizes technical assistance and facilitates contacts between ACP and EC companies wishing to form long-term partnerships.

CDI's contributions reduce the burden of pre-investment and implementation costs for ACP industrial projects and may significantly reduce risk and enhance the early profitability of the more marginal ones.

FACILITATING AND LOCATING PROJECT FINANCE

CDI is a facilitator. It does not itself provide equity or loan finance, but assists ACP enterprises in choosing appropriate EC partners and in locating sources of finance. It has received Ecu 60 million for the first five years of Lomé IV to carry out a wide range of free services aimed at the identification, promotion and implementation of projects, with a special emphasis on SMEs. It puts together ACP entrepreneurs and European suppliers of technology, know-how and finance. It helps to render feasibility studies bankable and to identify sources of project finance.

CDI taps additional funds through agreements with its partner organizations in EC countries and its complementarity with the two main institutions of the Lomé Convention, namely the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Commission.

CDI is increasingly positioning itself as a service organization which can speedily and flexibly complement the assistance given to industrial enterprises at local,

regional or international level. It is also ready to act as an executive agency for funds earmarked for industry (as technical assistance) under the bilateral aid programmes of EC countries.

CDI sees itself as a dynamic link between two decentralized complementary networks. The European network consists of industrial firms that have registered with CDI and regional, national or private institutions that collaborate with it. It also incorporates financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank and national development banks.

The ACP network consists of CDI's antennae and correspondents in all ACP countries. Typically these are development banks, chambers of commerce and industry, government ministries, industrial promotion agencies or private consultants.

EMPHASIS ON SMEs

The Lomé IV Convention stresses the need to create and develop small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) because of "the essential role that these enterprises play in the modern and informal sectors in building up a diversified economic fabric and in the general development of the ACP countries".

Attention is drawn to the advantages SMEs offer for the acquisition of skills by ACP countries, the use of local manpower as well as other local resources and the transfer of appropriate technology.

This is why the Convention requires CDI to give priority to SMEs.

INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIPS

CDI is especially committed to promoting long-term cooperation between ACP and EC enterprises through various types of partnership, notably joint ventures, management contracts, marketing agreements, licensing, franchising and sub-contracting. The EC partner also contributes to all pre-investment studies and accompanying measures.

For an ACP entrepreneur there can be many advantages to such partnerships, including the sharing of risk, long-term access to know-how and technology, possible entry to the EC partner's markets and his sources of finance.

EC firms may be able to benefit from entry to new markets which might otherwise be closed to them, access to local sources of raw materials, and additional finance plus fiscal and other incentives, through an ACP partner. They may be able to sub-assemble in ACP countries and export from them at competitive cost. They may also be able to make profitable use of know-how and equipment appropriate to ACP countries, even if possibly obsolescent in Europe by, for example, contributing good second-hand equipment as their share of the overall investment in a joint venture with an ACP partner.

CDI encourages EC firms to come forward with their own proposals for setting up production in ACP countries. It will promote such proposals to experienced ACP entrepreneurs who might make suitable partners.

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

Some projects are identified through missions to ACP countries and through ACP field representatives or antennae which make up CDI's network of contacts in each ACP country. Other projects are presented to CDI directly by ACP entrepreneurs, or may be introduced by EC firms or by CDI's partner organizations in EC or ACP countries.

Whichever way a project is introduced to CDI, an actual request for assistance must be made by an ACP promoter on special application forms.

If a project does not already have an EC partner, CDI will attempt to match it, where appropriate, with an EC firm which has expressed interest in establishing industrial partnerships in ACP countries.

CDI naturally finds it more cost efficient to assist enterprises in countries which have planned adequate technical

CDI'S ASSISTANCE AND SERVICES

The following are some of the main features of the free assistance available from CDI:

- assessment of initial requests (ACP projects, EC firms' proposals);
- searches for EC or ACP partners;
- sponsorship of business trips to allow potential partners to meet;
- diagnostic studies for the rehabilitation, diversification, privatization or expansion of existing ACP enterprises;
- assistance with negotiations
- provision of model legal texts for business partnerships;
- presentation of projects to financial institutions;
- technical advice on plant selection
- provision of technical expertise, notably for start-up;
- assistance with training;
- evaluation of second-hand equipment;
- help with the export of ACP manufactures (product upgrading, market surveys, trade fairs, publicity material and so on);
- provision of industrial information (technology, markets etc.) in response to enquiries.

CDI subsidizes the foreign exchange costs of its interventions along with enterprises and partner organizations in EC countries.

and financial support for industry under the European Development Fund (EDF) indicative programmes for Lomé IV. Plainly speaking, CDI will stop spreading its net too wide and will focus its limited resources on promising branches of industry and on countries where there is coherent support for industrialization and a manifest will to succeed. ♦

Renewed agreement aimed at intensifying Greek cooperation

A new agreement aimed at increasing and intensifying cooperation between ACP and Greek companies during Lomé IV was signed by Mr. N. Anastassakis, President of the Hellenic Organization of Small and Medium-sized Industries and Handicrafts (EOMMEX), and CDI Director Paul Frix on the 7th of June. It will build on the cooperation already achieved under the previous agreement between the two organizations during Lomé III.

Together with CDI, EOMMEX will assist pre-investment and implementation costs of Greek firms involved in industrial projects in ACP countries as well as the search for finance for these projects. At the signing ceremony, Mr. Anastassakis said that the Greek sectors of industry which offer most promise for cooperation with ACP countries are agro-food, wood, leather tanning and processing, solar and wind energy, paper, construction materials, ceramics and textiles.

Other meetings were held in Athens at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with

officers in charge of cooperation matters in the Minister's cabinet and at an operational level, with the Minister of Industry and the Secretary General of his ministry, with the Greek member of the Committee on Industrial Cooperation (CIC) as well as with the Federation of Greek Industries, the Hellenic Bank for Industrial Development, the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Hellenic Export Organization and individual entrepreneurs and consultants.

Accompanying Paul Frix from CDI were Fernando Matos-Rosa, Manager of the EC Cooperation Agreements Unit and Vana Catsica-Diamantopoulos of the EC Resources Division. ♦



CLOSE ENCOUNTERS IN OUAGADOUGOU

As part of a policy of getting closer to ACP States on the ground, CDI's Executive Board Meeting in April took place in Ouagadougou, capital of Burkina Faso and home of one of its members, Zama Banhoro, who is Director of Industrial Development at the Ministry of Economic Promotion.

Meeting in an ACP country gave the six Board members a chance to observe the realities of the development situation at first hand and to make contacts with local institutions.

Another Board meeting took place in June in Luxembourg where the members had an opportunity to become acquainted with local development cooperation bodies and with the European Investment Bank (EIB). An Autumn meeting will be held in Kenya at a date coinciding with the CDI Antennae Meeting of the East Africa Region.

Antennae meetings are regular bi-annual events which give Brussels staff and antennae the opportunity to improve effectiveness by reviewing and cementing their working relationship and resolving problems. At the same time

antennae are able to pool ideas and foster links for regional cooperation among themselves. The Board's presence in Ouagadougou coincided with the West Africa Region antennae meeting.

In Ouagadougou the antennae agreed unanimously on a number of recommendations for the future. They recommended that the frequency of regional meetings be increased to once a year. They suggested that more use should be made of them as consultants, in addition to the preparation work they already carry out for the West Africa Industrial Forum, held every two years. Some missions, they said, do not necessarily have to be carried out by expatriates.

As for the West Africa Industrial Forum, they suggested that its venue should rotate among the countries of the Region so that the economic benefits that accrue to the host country be shared.

Flexibility in applying the minimum investment threshold of Ecu 200,000 to projects was requested, given the economic conditions in some countries of the region. ♦

VACANCIES

CDI (see description on pages 6 and 7) invites applications for the following vacancies in two Divisions.

◆ RESOURCES, INTERVENTIONS AND EEC NETWORK DIVISION

The Resources, Interventions and EC Network Division plans and implements CDI interventions by using resources of know-how, technology, financial engineering, etc., in the EC, in particular among industrial companies.

CDI is currently looking for specialists for this division, capable of fulfilling the following specific tasks:

Tasks

Evaluation of industrial projects to be created or rehabilitated in ACP countries; implementation and follow-up of assistance operations decided by CDI; relations with industrial, professional and institutional operators in the field of industrial cooperation and development.

Assignments

Successful candidates will be assigned to the following departments in accordance with their qualifications:

- Department of technological resources, industrial interventions, documentation and marketing;
- Department of feasibility studies and financial engineering;
- Department of partnership agreements and legal services;
- Department of cooperation agreements and EC network.

◆ PROJECTS AND ACP NETWORK DIVISION

The main task of the Projects and ACP Network Division is to develop a thorough knowledge of ACP countries and necessary contacts with these countries to ensure that CDI can identify viable projects and companies and provide them with appropriate assistance.

For this Division, CDI would welcome applications for the posts of country officers from candidates meeting the appropriate criteria.

Country officer job description

- Build up and manage a network of contacts in a group of ACP countries to maintain a good knowledge of the country's industrial possibilities and requirements;
- Train and motivate local officers representing CDI within the network;
- Draw up a list of priority industrial sectors in need of CDI's assistance and, on the basis of pre-established criteria, identify, evaluate and select the companies or projects to receive assistance from CDI;
- Ensure that timely and appropriate assistance is provided by using outside resources under CDI's supervision or by using CDI's own resources;
- Monitor the follow-up and overall implementation of assistance provided to the group of countries for which he/she is in charge and draw up the relevant progress reports;
- Report to the regional Department Head;
- Although the place of assignment for the above positions is Brussels, the successful candidates will have to travel to the countries in question.

◆ QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS FOR CANDIDATES

Education and training

University level or equivalent, with degree in industrial economics, engineering, economics, finance, management or commerce.

Professional Experience

Minimum of 5 years experience in an industrial enterprise, consultancy firm, development bank, development institution, professional association, etc., preferably acquired in both EC and ACP member States. We refer to experience:

- either in technical and marketing aspects in an industrial sector (preferably agro-industry, building materials or textiles);
- or in the preparation, evaluation of studies, financial engineering or the negotiation of partnership agreements;
- or in relations with organizations for industrial cooperation or promotion.

General terms and conditions

- Be a national of one of the signatory States of the Lomé Convention (ACP-EC);
- Contracts with possible renewal for the duration of the first part of the Lomé IV Convention, ending 28 February 1995. Frequent missions to EC and ACP countries;
- Salaries and other benefits will be comparable to those offered by similar international organizations;
- Place of assignment: Brussels;
- Desired maximum age: 35;
- Languages: thorough command of English and French as working languages;
- Application deadline: 2nd September 1991, to be sent to the following address:

The Director of CDI,
rue de l'Industrie 28, B-1040 Brussels
Tel.: (32 2) 513 41 00 Fax (32 2) 511 75 93

The application file can be in either English or French and should include:

- A complete curriculum vitae;
- Names of at least 3 people who can testify to the candidate's qualities;
- A letter from the applicant explaining his/her reasons for applying;
- Copies of degrees and certificates of employment for all professional experience indicated in the CV;
- A recent photograph plus a photocopy of a valid passport or identity card.

Acceptability of applications

A duly filled in, clearly legible and signed application must be submitted within the specified deadline.

Interviews with preselected candidates will be conducted in Brussels over a period of two days at most. CDI will cover the relevant travel and accommodation expenses.

CDI is an equal opportunities employer, and does not discriminate on the basis of race, creed or sex.

Operational Summary

No. 63 — July 1991

(position as at 28th June 1991)



EEC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979) and Lomé III (8 December 1984), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC in 1976 and 1977;

— the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

- Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
- Int. tender: International invitation to tender
- Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
- Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
- TA: Technical assistance
- EDF: European Development Fund
- mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr. Franco Cupini
Directorate-General for Development
Commission of the European Communities
Berl. 6-86
200, rue de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

A1	Planning and public administration	A5B	Industrial development banks
A1A	Administrative buildings	A5C	Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
A1B	Economic planning and policy	A5D	Export promotion
A1C	Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category	A5E	Trade, commerce and distribution
A1D	Police and fire protection	A5F	Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
A1E	Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation	A5G	Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
A1F	Economic surveys, pre-investment studies	A5H	Other insurance and banking
A1G	Cartography, mapping, aerial photography	A5I	Archaeological conservation, game reserves
A1H	Demography and manpower studies		
A2	Development of public utilities	A6	Education
A2A	Power production and distribution	A6A	Primary and secondary education
A2Ai	Electricity	A6B	University and higher technical institutes
A2B	Water supply	A6Bi	Medical
A2C	Communications	A6C	Teacher training
A2D	Transport and navigation	A6Ci	Agricultural training
A2E	Meteorology	A6D	Vocational and technical training
A2F	Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)	A6E	Educational administration
		A6F	Pure or general research
		A6G	Scientific documentation
		A6H	Research in the field of education or training
		A6I	Subsidiary services
		A6J	Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
A3	Agriculture, fishing and forestry	A7	Health
A3A	Agricultural production	A7A	Hospitals and clinics
A3B	Service to agriculture	A7B	Maternal and child care
A3C	Forestry	A7C	Family planning and population-related research
A3D	Fishing and hunting	A7D	Other medical and dental services
A3E	Conservation and extension	A7E	Public health administration
A3F	Agricultural storage	A7F	Medical insurance programmes
A3G	Agricultural construction		
A3H	Home economics and nutrition	A8	Social infrastructure and social welfare
A3I	Land and soil surveys	A8A	Housing, urban and rural
A4	Industry, mining and construction	A8B	Community development and facilities
A4A	Extractive industries	A8C	Environmental sanitation
A4Ai	Petroleum and natural gas	A8D	Labour
A4B	Manufacturing	A8E	Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
A4C	Engineering and construction	A8F	Environmental protection
A4D	Cottage industry and handicraft	A8G	Flood control
A4E	Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment	A8H	Land settlement
A4F	Non-agricultural storage and warehousing	A8I	Cultural activities
A4G	Research in industrial technology		
A5	Trade, banking, tourism and other services	A9	Multisector
A5A	Agricultural development banks	A9A	River development
		A9B	Regional development projects
		A10	Unspecified



ATTENTION: The PABLI Service is temporarily suspended for technical reasons. The reactivation of the Pabli Service will be indicated in due course.

PABLI — Blue page informatics

Direct access to the blue pages via on-line terminal or telex

The blue pages are on computer and available either directly via a terminal or micro-computer. Selected extracts of the blue pages may be obtained.

The cost of these two services has been fixed and are applied from 1989.

To obtain any information concerning PABLI please write, specifying the option chosen (terminal or telex) to:

ECHO Customer Service
177, Route d'Esch
L-1471 LUXEMBOURG
Tél.: 352/48.80.41
Télex: 2181

ECHO is in charge only for PABLI. For general correspondence see page I.

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

Namibe-Lubango-Makala road rehabilitation sections 3+4 (Serra da Leba-Lubanga, PK 41.1). Resp. Auth.: Ministério do Plano. Estimated total cost 17 mECU. EDF 16 mECU, local 1 mECU (Counterpart Funds). Rehabilitation and strengthening of 74 km. Project on appraisal. **★ Int. tender no 3293 for works (conditional), launched in April 91. Opening 15.8.91.** 6th EDF. EDF ANG 6011 A2b

BARBADOS

Hospitality Studies Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and Culture. Total estimated cost 2.5 mECU. EDF 1.6 mECU, local 0.900 mECU. Construction of Tourism Training Centre — cum-Hotel. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BAR 6006 A5c

BELIZE

Belize City Hospital. Phase I. 8.6 mECU. Work constructions and supply of equipment. 4th, 5th, and 6th EDF. Works: in. **★ tender foreseen 2nd half 91.** Project in execution. EDF BEL 6004 A7a

Community Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEL 6002 A6b

BENIN

Mono rural development programme. Development of the rural production. Cofinancing with BAD. EDF 16.5 mECU, BAD 14.4 mECU, local 4.9 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: SCET-AGRI (F) EDF BEN 6003 A3a

Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6009 A3d

BOTSWANA

Support programme to Botswana copper-nickel mining industry. Resp. Auth.: BCL Ltd (Bamangwato Concessions Ltd). 21.650 mECU. Works, exploration drillings, supply of mining equipment by int. tender. Replacements parts by direct agreement T.A. to prepare int. tender dossier, evaluation and follow-up of the tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BT SYS 6019 A4a

Livestock marketing development project. Resp. Auth.: Botswana Cooperative Union. 2.4 mECU. Provision of infrastructures, transports, T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6014 A3a

Water development programme. Resp. Auth.: Department of Water Affairs. 2 mECU. Serowe waste water sanitation and

T.A. to the Department of water affairs. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6023 A2b, A8c

Wildlife Conservation in Northern Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of Wildlife and National Park. (DWNP). 6.800 mECU. New tracks, construction of administrative office quarters and accommodation. Supply of equipments (earthmoving — tractors — 4 x 4 pick-ups). T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 91. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i

BURKINA FASO

Rehabilitation of the road Koupéla — Togo border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement, Supervision: Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. Estimated total cost 20.35mECU. 152 km rehabilitation (R.N. 16). Works by int. tender and supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing **2nd half 91. Int. tender no 3344 (conditional) launched in March 91. Opening 1.8.91.** 5th, 6th and 7th EDF. EDF BK 6019 A2d

BURUNDI

Socio-economic development of the natural region of Mugamba. Resp. Auth.: CVHA project, OTB, Ministère du Dév. Rural, Direction Générale des Routes. 32 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. Int. tender for works launched in November 89. Int. tender **★ for supplies launched in July 90. 2nd int. tender no 3379 for vehicles launched in June 91. Opening 30.7.91.** 6th EDF. EDF BU 6018 A3a

CAMEROON

Rural development programme in the Bénoué basin. Resp. Auth.: Mission d'études pour l'aménagement de la vallée supérieure de la Bénoué (MEAVSB). Total estimated cost 30 mECU, EDF part 25 mECU. Roads network, schools, health centres, rural water supply. Support to crop production and fishery. Irrigated agricultural areas, fight against soil and surface vegetation degradation. Works, supplies, T.A. and training Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CM 6002 A3a

Rural development programme in the Logone and Chari. Resp. Auth.: Semry. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Consolidation and extension of existing actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF CM 6013 A3a

Rural development poles: Saa-ntui, Sang melima, Bafut. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Total estimated cost 14.625 mECU. EDF 10.300 mECU, local 4.325 mECU. Strengthening of the monitoring structures, improvement and extension of basic socio-economic infrastructures, training, education, popularization of rural development, health. Works: **★ tracks, buildings; supplies for civil works,**

vehicles, crop inputs, rural equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing **2nd half 91.** 6th EDF. EDF CM 6012 A3a

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Conservation programme for the ecosystem in the North. National game and natural reserves. Supervision for protected areas. Monitoring, management. Supply of infrastructures. EDF 25 mECU. Supplies: first int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CA 6002 A3a

Development programme of the Central and Southern region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. 20.3 mECU. To strengthen coffee plantations in the villages and the infrastructure, diversifications in ex cotton zones; rural health and human hydraulics, T.A., studies, following and evaluation. Short-lists already drawn up. Project in execution. **Int. tender for supplies no 3440 launched in June 91. Opening 11.9.91.** 6th EDF. EDF CA 6005 A3a

CHAD

Rural development priority programme in the concentration zone. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de Dév. Rural. 15 mECU. Hydro-agricultural works, infrastructure, education, health. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CD 6002 A3e

Strengthening of the health sector in the Sahelian prefectures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 12 mECU. Supply of essential medicines, training programme and T.A. Int. tender for vehicles launched in July 90. Project in execution 6th EDF. EDF CD 6003 A7e

Rural development programme: Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Office National de Dév. Rural (ONDR). 28 mECU. Works, feeder roads, scholar buildings, agricultural equipment, pumps, T.A., follow up and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF CD 6005 A3a

COMOROS

Rural integrated development programme in the north region of Anjouan Island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production agricole, 1 1.3 mECU. Improvement of crop production, infrastructure, works by int. tender (conditional) launched end June 89. Supply of equipments, materials and vehicles. T.A., training, evaluation, audit. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF COM 6002 A3a

Artisanal fishery. Second Phase. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Agricole. 2 mECU. Purchase of equipment, T.A. and training. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF COM 5017 A3d

CONGO

FEDAR (EDF regional action for the Pool and Cuvette). Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 36 mECU. Roads, wells, rural infrastructure, supervision of works, line of credit, monitoring. Road: int. tender launched in August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF COB 6002 A3a

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support to the livestock development. Continuation and completion of the Marahoué Ranch (T.A., investment, training) and support to 'Centre National d'Élevage Ovin'. 11 mECU. Project in execution. First int. tender for supply launched in December 89. T.A.: Jules Van Lancker (B) — GFA (BRD)-INFORMES Y PROYECTOS (E) 6th EDF. EDF IVC 6003 A3a

Centre food crops programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture modernization, young settlements. Food crops production marketing improvement. Works, soil improvement, supplies. T.A. studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. EDF IVC 6009 A3a

DJIBOUTI

Training programme. 2.2 mECU. New vocational training actions for adults. T.A. for training centres. Training, scholar-ships and training courses. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF DI 6101 A6d

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Présidence de la République. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF EG 0000 A1c

Support to the agricultural development of the Bata district. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.7 mECU Rehabilitation or buildings extension. Supply of equipments. T.A. by Association Française des Volontaires. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF EG 6004 A3a

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classification and Use Master Plan — National System of Conservation Units — Forest Training and Research Centre. T.A. and supply of equipments. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 91. 6th EDF. EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i

ETHIOPIA

North Shewa rural reclamation and development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Total cost 28.5 mECU. EDF 24 mECU, local 4.5 mECU. Soil and water conservation, reafforestation,

rural infrastructure development and feeder roads. Works, supply of equipment, vehicles, T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6001 A3a

Central Shewa peasant agriculture development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 53.4 mECU. Buildings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, consumer goods, equipments, T.A., studies, credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6002 A3a

South Shewa conservation-based rural development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 26.2 mECU. Buildings, roads, rural infrastructure, agricultural inputs, consumer goods, training, T.A., micro-projects, credit line. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6005 A3a

Coffee improvement programme III. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Coffee and Tea Development. 38.1 mECU. Construction and civil works, supply of equipments, vehicles and agric. inputs, aerial photography, training and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF 6003 A3a

Lake fisheries project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Fishery Dept. 7.5 mECU. Provision of inputs to fishermen, development of cooperatives, establishment of marketing organisation and infrastructure, training, research and fingerling production centers. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6008 A3d

Aid for refugees. Contribution to the UNHCR and to MSF. Transport sector, water sector, health sector. Project on appraisal. 8.1 mECU. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6104 A8

Sectoral import programme. III. Resp. Auth.: S.I.P. Steering Committee. 17 mECU. Supply of fertilizers and raw materials. Spare parts. Public sector industrial inputs and private sector. T.A. and monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. Int. tender no 3408 launched in April 91. Opening 31.7.91. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6017 A3a

Foreign trade development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT). 1.5 mECU. T.A.: two-years marketing expert, a team of marketing specialists (short-term consultancy services in Ethiopia). Market researches, training on international marketing and international trade, technical seminars. Equipments and supporting services Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ET 6010 A5de

FIJI

Investment and export development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Commerce (MTC) and Fiji Trade and Investment Board. 7.2 mECU. Land purchase for the Tax Free Zone, works, supply of equipments, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF FIJ 6007 A5d

Social infrastructure, schools and bridges. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Infrastructure and Public Utilities and Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport 2.626 mECU EDF 2.350 mECU, local 0.276 mECU. Construction of 11 bridges and 49 new classrooms and 45 teachers quarters. Supply

of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF FIJ 6009 A6a, 8a

Electrification of the Lakeba, Gau and Koro islands. Estimated cost 2.762 mECU. Supply and installation of diesel power stations, electrical distribution and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF FIJ 6004 A2ai

GAMBIA

Rural Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of Water schemes, supply of road equipments and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. EDF GM 6004-7004 A3a

Import Programme for Petroleum Products. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. Estimated cost 4 mECU. Purchase of fuel products. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GM 6008-7001 A1c

GHANA

Accra Plains Livestock Development Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. Provision of veterinary and animal husbandry extension services, including construction of cattle treatment centres, water points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6006 A3a

Twifo oil palm development. Maintenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (M.F.E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6007 A3a

Ghana Ports rehabilitation project. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority. Total estimated cost 22.6 mECU, EDF 20 mECU, Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority 2.6 mECU. Further rehabilitation of Takoradi, dredging of Takoradi and Tema Ports, reconstruction of the Tema access road. 5th EDF. Date financing May 91. EDF GH 5028 A2d

GRENADA

Levera National Park project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism. 0.925 mECU. Works and services comprising Park infrastructure, access roads, attractions development, management programmes, T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GRD 6005 A5i

GUINEA

T.A. and supplementary equipment for the 'Ecole Nationale des Arts et Métiers' (ENAM), Conakry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale. 5.5 mECU. Renovation works by acc. tender. Equipments by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. Supplies: Int. tender launched in April 91. 6th EDF. EDF GUI 6006 A6b

GUINEA BISSAU

Rural development programme. 23.8 mECU. Improvement of the food and

fishery production, line of credit, micro-projects, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6001 A3a

General import programme. Resp. Auth.: Unité de Gestion de Balance de Paiement auprès de la Banque Nationale. 6 mECU. Hard currencies allowance programme. Italy: 2 mECU to supply fuel and lubricants to the Bissau Power Plant during 1 year. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6005 A1c

Project for the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 8 mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health centres urban roads, markets, water and sanitation. Construction of secondary bridges, access roads, supply of a ferry. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF GUB 6010 A7, A8

JAMAICA

Rural water supplies. Phase I. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission. 6.7 mECU. Extension, upgrading of five existing water supply schemes: South Manchester, Elderslie/Niagara, Castleton, South Chapelton. Works and supplies. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF JM 6003 A2b

Montego Bay airport. Charter terminal. Resp. Auth.: Airports Authority of Jamaica. 7.1 mECU. Works and supply of equipments. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF JM 6004 A2d

Negril and Ocho Rios sewerage schemes. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission. 25 mECU. Negril: 17 km of trunk sewers, 13 pump stations and 2 treatment plants. Ocho Rios: 5 km of sewers, 6 pump stations, 1 treatment plant and deep sea outfall. T.A. for supervision. Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF JM A8bc

KENYA

Agricultural research programme. 20 mECU. Soil and water management research. Soil fertility and plant nutrition. Civil works and libraries. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6003 A3e

Cereal sector reform programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Agriculture and Supplies and Marketing and NCPB. National Cereals and Produce Board. 65 mECU. T.A., studies, training. Storage and rolling stock, sectoral import programme purchase of agricultural inputs, short and longterm T.A., cooperatives and reserve funds. Studies, T.A. and training: short-lists already drawn-up. Works by int. tender and acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6008 A3a

ASAL livestock development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Livestock Development. 9 mECU. Works by restr. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6009 A3a

Special debt programme. Resp. Auth.: Director of External Resources with representative from Ministry of Finance, Commerce, Central Bank of Kenya, the Delegate of the Commission. 2nd phase of the Agricultural Sector Import Programme (ASIP). 7 mECU Supply of agricultural inputs by int. tender. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6019 A3a

Strengthening of research resources of the national museums of Kenya. Resp. Auth.: NMK Directorate 3 mECU. Construction, transport, equipment, T.A., training and research links with national, regional and international organizations. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE A6f

Strathmore post secondary educational college. Resp. Auth.: Strathmore college. EDF 3.100 mECU, Italy 1.310 mECU. Construction of teaching and administrative buildings, library, canteen, accomodation and catering department. Supply of equipment and T.A. Works by acc. tender. T.A. and supplies by Italy. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF KE 6005 A6b

KIRIBATI

Telecommunications programme. Resp. Auth.: Telecom-Kiribati. 5.7 mECU. Supply and works relating to 2 telephone exchanges, a transmitting station and equipment for air and sea rescue services. Works, supplies and T.A. 6th EDF. Int. Tender (conditional) launched in November 90.
★ **Date financing May 91.**
EDF KI 6003 A2c

LESOTHO

Manpower development project to support Lesotho's natural resources sector. Resp. Auth.: National Manpower Development Secretariat (NMDS). Ministry of Planning Economic and Manpower Development 7.7 mECU. Construction of schools, class-rooms, laboratories, supply of T.A., scholar-ships and training. Project in execution. Int. tender no 3428 for supplies launched in June 91. Opening 12.8.91. 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6007 A6b

Queen Elizabeth II Hospital: improvement and upgrading. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Works. 4.9 mECU. Works by acc. lender. Supply by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 4th and 6th EDF.
EDF LSO 6012 A7a

'Lesotho Highlands Water Project' - Muela Hydropower Project (MHP). Estimated cost 44 mECU. Engineering supervision and part of the civil works. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 91. 7th EDF.
★ EDF LSO 6001-7001 A2ai

LIBERIA

Bong Mining Company. Rehabilitation project. Resp. Auth.: Government and BMC. 49.3 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, shovels, conveyor belts, dumpers, locomotives, spare parts. 2 int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF LBR/SYS 0000 A4a

South-East development programme. Estimated cost 27 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LBR 6002 A3a

Rural water supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs. 2.900 mECU. Drilling works by acc. tender. Supply of hand pumps and spare parts. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF LBR 6011 A2b

MADAGASCAR

Maize development programme in the Middle West. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Production Agricole. 9.5 mECU. Building of a nursery and farmers training. Works, supplies, T.A. evaluation and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: CONSULT-IBERICA (E)
EDF MAG 6006 A3a

Bridge Rehabilitation of the Fanambana river. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 2.3 mECU. Works and T.A. Date financing June 91. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 5034 A2d

Local handicraft, improvement Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie de l'Energie et des Mines. To improve production and marketing. T.A., training and line of credit. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing Septembre 91. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6022 A5d, e

MALAWI

Strategic fuel reserve. Resp. Auth.: Office of the President and Cabinet. Contingency Planning Unit. 4.2 mECU. Construction of tanks for diesel, petrol, ethanol. Associated infrastructure and equipment. T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF MAI 5020 A2a

Rural health programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Ministry of Community Services (MOH and MOCS). 9.3 mECU. Construction of an hospital, two health centres supply of equipments, T.A. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A.: short-list drawn up. 2 int. tenders for supplies launched in August 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6009 A7a, e

Programme for industrial products imports. 12.5 mECU. Supply of industrial equipment, raw materials and spare parts. Project in execution 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6019 A1c

Aid for Refugees. Contribution to the UNHCR and the Malawi Red Cross. 3.262 mECU. Actions for access roads, health facilities, boreholes-wells. **Date financing April 91.** 6th EDF.
EDF MAI 6104 A8

Limbe - Thyolo - Muloza Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Asphaltting of 104 km. Works by int. tender (conditional). Project on appraisal.
★ **Works: int. tender (conditional) no 3407 launched in May 91. Opening 13.9.91.** 7th EDF.
EDF MAI A2d

MALI

Rice-growing intensification programme in the large irrigated areas of

'Office du Niger' and 'Opération Riz Segou'. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 65 mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, roads. Supply of equipment for maintenance and for agriculture, study, T.A., training and experimentation. Study: short-list done. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.

EDF MLI 6004 A3a

Food security programme in the 5th region. Resp. Auth.: Gouverneur de la région. 24 mECU. Soil and ground water resources, rehabilitation of Bamako. Mopti road. Works, supplies, supervision, study, T.A. training. Supplies: int. tender launched in July 89. Works: int. tender launched in March 90. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.

EDF MLI 6005 A2b, d

Support to the Structural Adjustment Programme. Estimated cost 31 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 91. 7th ADF.

EDF MLI 7001 A3a

MAURITANIA

Aioun El Atrouss hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 1.050 mECU. Renovation and supply of equipment for 3 buildings. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

EDF MAU 5012 A7a

Rehabilitation of Nouakchott National Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 4 mECU. Renovation and upgrading for building, supply of medical-technical and surgical equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. STUDIES: STUDIO BICHARA (I)

EDF MAU 6003 A7a

Support programme for the development of the Gorgol region (PDRG). Estimated cost 35 mECU. Improvement of the irrigated areas, support to the traditional crop, regeneration of the natural habitats, rural infrastructure, sanitation of Kaedi. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF MAU 6007 A3a

General import programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances. Banque Centrale de Mauritanie (BCM). 7 mECU. Hard currency allowance for essential goods imports. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.

EDF MAU 6008 A1c

MAURITIUS

Programme to diversify productive sectors (2nd part: agriculture). Resp. Auth.: to purchase equipments: Ministère des Finances. Tender board. 8 mECU. Works, rural development, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. Int. tender launched in November 89. 6th EDF.

EDF MAS 6006 A3a

MOZAMBIQUE

Second import programme. Resp. Auth.: UCPI (Unité de Coordination des Programmes d'Importation et Délégation de la Commission. 30 mECU. Sectors: rural, fishery, transports and industry. Supply of seeds, equipments, row materials, lorries, spare parts, T.A. audit and valuation. 4 int. tenders launched from August 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF MOZ 6025 A1c

Rural telecommunications. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 11 mECU. Supply of radio and telephone equipment. Project on appraisal. Int. tender (conditional) no 3383 launched in May 91. Opening 20.8.91. Date foreseen for financing Septembre 91. 6th EDF.

EDF MOZ 6021 A2c

Integrated development programme of Cabodelgado. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce. AGRICOM. 8 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 3 mECU. Support to ± 50 000 people in the districts of Mocimboa, Praia and Mueda. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF MOZ 6022 A3a

NIGER

Rice-growing in the river valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 63.6 mECU. Cultivation of 1,800 ha, electrification, feeder roads. T.A. for management. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF NIR 6001 A3a

Small irrigation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 21.560 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Tarka down valley, irrigation, boreholes and wells. Feeder roads, environmental protection, T.A. Works and supplies. First tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF NIR 6002 A3a

Mining research: gold and coal. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines et de l'Énergie. 12.450 mECU. Gold: photogeological and photomorphological study on existing aerial photos. Revision of all available data. Strategic prospecting. Site exploration and pilot plant. Coal: study and building of a washing plant. Study on the coal field of Anou ArarenSolomi. T.A. and training. Drillings by int. tender. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. First tender launched in July 90. 6th EDF.

EDF-SYS-NIR 6011 A4a

Training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Éducation, Commerce, Culture, Plan, Agriculture. 4,366 mECU. Three priority sectors: rural development, business development, cultural development. Supply of equipments T.A. and scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF NIR 6101 A6b, c, i

General Import Programme. Support to the structural adjustment. Estimated cost 27 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 7th EDF.

EDF NIR 7001 A3a

Niamey Say Road Construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement — Direction des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Construction of 56 km by int. tender (conditional) launched in May 91 with number 3406. Opening 27.8.91. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 91. 6th or 7th EDF.

EDF NIR 6022-7001 A2d

NIGERIA

Oil Palm Belt Rural Development Programme (OPBP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water Resources and Rural Development. 68.840 mECU. Flood protection and drainage works in the Niger Delta — 20 000 ha. Rural infrastructures, micro-projects, T.A. training, research, supervision of works, management. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: SOCFIN Con-

* sultant Services (B). Int. tender no 3438 launched in June 91. Opening 20.8.91. EDF UNI 6001 A3a

North East Arid Zone development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 35 mECU. Increase of rural production, livestock development, afforestation and environment control, rural infrastructure development (health, education), commercial services (inputs, credit and marketing system), manpower development, training and research. Works: irrigation, drainage, buildings, supply of seeds, chemicals, fertilizers, dozers, drilling rigs, T.A., training, research. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: DANAGRO (DK)

EDF UNI 6002 A3a

Research and Training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development Training Support Unit (TSU). 30 mECU. Scholarships, seminars, T.A. Teacher training, cooperation between Nigerian Training Institutions and European Training Institutions, exchanges between Nigerian and European research institutions. Purchase of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF UNI 6004 A6a, b, c, d, e, f

Desertification control and environmental protection programme in Sokoto. Resp. Auth.: Sokoto Environmental Programme (SEP). Direct responsibility of the Office of the Governor. 30.6 mECU. Community awareness, mobilisation and development campaign. Afforestation actions, improvement of range management and livestock development. Rehabilitation of a smallscale irrigation, training and applied research. Works: buildings, nurseries, water points, irrigation networks. Supply of vehicles, motorcycles, generators, media equipments, T.A. Works by acc. tenders. Supplies by int. tenders. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: SIR MAC DONALD & PARTNERS (UK) — I.N.C. — IL NUOVO CASTORO (I)

EDF UNI 6003 A3a

Sectoral import programme. 10 mECU. Supply of pumps, agricultural inputs, spare parts for tractors and metal frame for warehouses. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: CROWN AGENTS (UK)

EDF UNI 6008 A3a

'Middle belt' programme. Resp. Auth.: States of Kwara and Niger, Executive Committees. Estimated total cost 38.662 mECU. EDF 33 mECU, local 5.662 mECU. Education, health, social infrastructure. Renovation works, rehabilitation, supply of equipments, T.A., training and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: B.M.B. (NL) — TRANSCON LTD. (UNI)

EDF UNI 6007 Aabe

Mambilla Tea Integrated Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Nig. Beverages Production Company Ltd. 28 mECU. Civil works: dam, roads, buildings utilities. Supply of vehicles, factory and irrigation equipment. T.A. for management and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF UNI 7001 A3a

Export Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Export Promotion Council. 35 mECU. To transfer export know how to ±250 Nigerian firms. Components: sectors, market, human resources and institutional development. Others: T.A. for management and supervision. Project on ap-

praisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 7002 A5d

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Road and Bridge Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Parallel cofinancing with World Bank. EDF, part estimated 21.520 mECU. Works and supervision. **Date financing May 91.** 6th EDF.
EDF PNG 6014 A2d

RWANDA

Food strategy support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. 51 mECU. Development of the rural activity, monitoring, training, maintaining of natural environment stability. Infrastructures, supply of agricultural inputs, vehicles, T.A. studies and training. 2nd int. tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF RW 6001 A3a

Special Import Programme. Resp. Auth.: Gouvernement du Rwanda and Banque Nationale Rwandaise (BNR) 12mECU (6 mECU) for petroleum products by int. tender. (6 mECU) hard currencies allowance to import essential products (malt, oil, sugar, salt, gypse, pharmaceutical products, fertilizers, pesticides). T.A. (procurement agent) to promote, coordinate and follow up of operations. **Date financing June 91.** 6th EDF.
EDF RW 6009 A3a

SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE

Riberia Peixe rural development. Resp. auth.: Ministère de la Coopération. Development of agricultural output (palm oil) and industrial exploitation. 6.79 mECU as follows: EDF 4,00 mECU, EIB 2,00 mECU and local 0.791 mECU. T.A., works, training and supplies. T.A.: ULG Consultants (UK). Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF STP 6001 A3a

SENEGAL

Consolidation of the livestock development programme. Resp. Auth.: SODESP. Estimated cost 1,6 mECU. Study under way by Bessel Ass. (UK). Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF SE A3a

Support programme for repatriation from Mauritania. Resp. Auth.: DIRE (Délégation à l'Insertion, à la Réinsertion et à l'Emploi). EDF 2.1 mECU. Line of credits, for existing SME and new SME. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SE 6104 A8b

Support programme for the phosphate sector. Sysmin. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Industriel. 15 mECU. Research for methods to eliminate cadmium from rock and/or from phosphoric acid. Investments in 2 processing plants. Research actions, studies, new humid storage (central conveyor, adjustable stocker, rail scraper, longitudinal conveyor), mining equipment, 3 dumpers, 1 bull-dozer, 2 loaders, 1 hydraulic shovel. **Project in execution 6th EDF.**
EDF SYS SE 17 A4af

SEYCHELLES

Consolidation of the development of the craft industry. Resp. Auth.: Department of Industry and CODEVAR. 1 mECU. T.A. on policy in the sector and specialized

for wood, ceramics, textiles and others (to be decided). Training and evaluation. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing July 91.** 7th EDF.
EDF SEY 6003-7001 A5d, e

Tuna quay rehabilitation. Resp. auth.: S.F.A. 1.200 mECU. Supply of equipment and works. **Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.**
EDF SEY 6008 A2d

SIERRA LEONE

North Western artisanal fisheries and community development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Agriculture and Natural Resources (Fisheries Division). 6 mECU. Infrastructures, supply of equipments, line of credit. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6004 A3d

Rehabilitation of the Telecommunications network. Phase 2. 7.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: BRITISH TELCONSULT (UK)
EDF SL 6006 A2c

Tourism development programme. Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Tourism and supply of equipment. **Project stage: identification. 5th EDF.**
EDF SL 5026 A5c

Sectoral Import Programme. Agriculture. Resp. Auth.: SIP Steering Committee; Nat. Auth. Off. (NAO), EEC Delegation and the Ministry of Agriculture and National Resources. 6 mECU. Supply of agricultural inputs, machinery, spares, for agricultural processing, fishing equipment, T.A. (procurement agent); management and evaluation. Short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6002 A3a

Construction of the Waterloo-Maziaka road and repairing of the Makeni-Fadugu Section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 16.8 mECU. Road reconstruction with bitumen layer of 50 mm T.A. for supervision. **Int. tender no 3429 launched in May 91. Opening 22.8.91. Date financing May 91.** 6th EDF.
EDF SL 6007 A2d

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Development of human resources in the rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Planning. 4 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: D.H.V. (NL)
EDF SOL 6003 A3a

Rural health project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Medical Service. 3 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SOL 6007 A7a

Honiara Urban Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Housing and Government Services (MHGS). Home Finance Corporation (HFC). 2m ECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Works partly by direct labour, partly by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A.: short-list done. **Date financing April 91.** 6th EDF
EDF SOL 6013 A8a

SOMALIA

Bardheera Dam. Resp. Auth.: Bardheera Dam Authority (BDA). 600 mECU.

(Estimated) Dam Project 500 mECU. Powerline to Mogadishu 100 mECU. Funding: EDF, Italy, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Abu-Dhabi, Kuwait Funds, FADES, Isl. Dev. Bank. Local Power and river regulation for agricultural development. Construction of a concrete gravity dam with hydro-power station, associated infrastructure and electrical transmission lines. The dam will provide water, flood protection and power for up to 223000 ha of irrigated agriculture in the Juba Valley, and energy to Mogadishu. Civil works: first into tender launched in 1984. Transmission lines int. tender in 1992. Equipment: powerhouse main equipment and auxiliary equipment, int. tenders in 1992. Gates, valves, intake equipment, int. tender in 1992. Int. tender with prequalification launched in February 86 for hydraulic tests. Project in execution. 5th EDF.
EDF SO 5003 A2a

Old Mogadishu port rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Somali Port Authority (SPA). 14.5 mECU. Works by int. tender. T.A. and supervision. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91.** 6th EDF.
EDF SO 6005 A2d

National Museum Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Somali Engineering Agency. Dept. of the Ministry of Works and Housing. Total estimated cost 0.650 mECU. EDF 0.500 mECU, Germany 0.040 mECU, local 0.110 mECU. Restoration of the former Sultan Ben Ahmed Palace built in 1872. Works by restricted tendering procedures addressed to preselected and well qualified companies. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91.** 6th EDF.
EDF SO 6015 A8i

SUDAN

Sudan Railways Support Programme (SRSP). Resp. Auth.: Sudan Railways Corporation. 19 mECU. Reconstruction of five major and 18 minor bridges and 7 culverts in the line Kosti-Babanaoussa. Supply of materials, tools and replacement part, for the most immediate repairs and maintenance of the track Khartoum-Port Sudan and those required for a direct improvement of telecommunications. Works and supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF SU 6011 A2d

Post Flood Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Programme (PFRP). Resp. Auth.: agricultural part: Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Transport infrastructure: Roads and Bridge Public Corporation (RBPC) and Sudan Railways Corporation. 15 mECU. Agricultural sector: supply of spare parts for repair and replacement of 2500 pumps. Int. tender and direct agreement. Supply of maintenance parts for 100 trucks (6t): by int. tender. Supply of 100 pumps by int. tender. T.A. for repair, control and credit allowances. Transport sector: bridge construction (5 x 25 m) at Geneina, repair and work supervision. Bridge by acc. tender. Supplies for railways, gabions, pipes by int. tender. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF SU 6020 A2d

Dubeibat-Dilling road. Resp. Auth.: Roads and Bridges Public Corporation. 16.5 mECU. Reconstruction and widening over 60 km including construction of bridges and culverts. Works by int. tender. T.A. for supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF SU 6006 A2d

SWAZILAND

Rural water supplies programme. Ministry of Natural Resources. 2.6 mECU. Works and supply of equipment for village drinking water supply scheme. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6008 A3a

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 8 mECU. Works and supply of educational equipment, T.A. and training. Int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6010 A6a, b

Rural dam rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4mECU. Works and supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SW 6012 A3a

Upgrading of the Manzini-Matsapha Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Communications. Estimated 10 mECU. 8 Km dual carriageway. The existing 2-lane road is to be upgraded to a 4-lane highway. Works by int. tender foreseen 2nd half 91. Short-list to be done for supervision. Project on appraisal. 5th and 7th EDF. EDF SW 5016 A2d

TANZANIA

Agricultural sector support programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Planning. 94 mECU. Measures to improve food security, support for coffee production and processing, assistance to cooperative unions, repair and maintenance of vehicles and tractors, feeder road maintenance and assistance to institutions implementing the programme. Supplies by int. tender/restr. tender or direct agreement. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6001 A3a

Secondary roads improvement project. 16 mECU. Repair and rehabilitation works on Songea-Mbinga and Iboma-Mlangali-Madaba secondary roads to improve transport of agricultural produce. Roads and bridges. 2 int. tenders (conditional) launched in August 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TA 6007 A2d

Conservation of historical buildings. 0.690 mECU Restoration works. Forts Bagamoyo and Zanzibar. *Project in execution.* 6th EDF. EDF TA 6015 A5i

Livestock service development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Dept. Estimated total cost 4.2 mECU. EDF 3.7 mECU, local 0.500 mECU. Construction of low-cost houses, vaccination campaign, credit lines, T.A. Project in execution. 5th EDF. EDF TA 5020 A3a

TOGO

Rural development programme in Bassar. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. EDF 10.3 mECU. Rural intensification and diversification, soil protection, improvement of infrastructure, support to the small-farmer association, marketing improvement. Works, studies, research, evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: S.A. AGRER (B) EDF TO 6006 A3a

Support programme to the phosphate mining industry. Resp. Auth.: Office Togolais des Phosphates (OTP). 15.7 mECU. Research actions on cadmium problems. Purchase of drying machines and shovels. Project in execution. 6th EDF. Pilot Trials: DUETAG (F). EDF TO-SYS 6015 A4a

Rural hydraulics in the Savanes and Kara regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. 2.475 mECU. Wels and sources assessment. Supply and installation of 200 pumps. Supervision of works. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: CINAM (F) SOC. GRENOBLOISE D'ÉTUDES (F) EDF TO 6010 A3a

Rural Hydraulics in the Savanes and Kava regions. II Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement. Estimated cost 11.750 mECU, EDF 11.2 mECU, local 0.550 mECU. Execution of 600 drillings (positifs) and hydraulic fracturation, supply of 600 pumps supervision of works. Works by int. tender (conditional) no 3452, launched in July 91. Opening 9.10.91. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TO 6010-7001 A3a

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation. 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

VAVAU development programme. Resp. Auth.: Vava'u Committee. 5 mECU. Construction of new market, road improvement and maintenance, education and health facilities, training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TG 6002 A8b

Lupepau'u airport upgrading. Rest. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation. Ministry of Works 2.385 mECU. Works, supplies and supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TG 6003 A2d

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Sectoral import programme: industry. 12 mECU Allocation of currencies to import raw materials and intermediate products. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF TR 6002 A4b

Tourism Development Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Tourism Development Authority. 1 mECU. To enhance day-visitor attractions, training and tourism education, supplies and T.A. *Date financing April 91.* 5th EDF EDF TR 5011 A5c

ZAIRE

Kivu programme. 40 mECU. Action for crops (coffee, corn, palm-tree, rice) environment (Parc de la Virunga), lines of credit. 1st int tender launched in April 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6002 A3a

Kinshasa hinterland programme. APEK 25 mECU. To improve crop production. 1st int. tender launched in July 89. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6003 A3a

Rehabilitation programme of SNCZ. 7.5 mECU. Supply of raw materials and spares to replace railways system. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: TRANSURB CONSULT (B) EDF ZR 6017 A4a

Apek Programme, roads section. Resp. Auth.: Office des Routes. 35 mECU. Rehabilitation of 111 Km of surfaced road on the Kinshasa-Kikwit route with works supervision — upgrading of 384 Km of major earth roads managed by Office des Routes. Rehabilitation of 496 Km of country earth roads managed by local authorities. Bridges repairs, additional technical and economic studies, training programme. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 91. 6th EDF. EDF ZR 6006 A2d

ZAMBIA

Smallholder development in copper belt province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12 mECU. Basic infrastructure by acc. tender. Supply of vehicles and materials by int. tender T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6004 A3a

Smallholder development in central province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and water development. 12.35 mECU. Basic infrastructure and social facilities. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZA 6005 A3a

Lusaka-Kabwe road. Resp. Auth.: Roads Dept. Road rehabilitation 134 km. Estimated cost 36 mECU. *Int. tender for works (conditional) launched in June 91 no 3416 — Opening 18.10.91.* Project on appraisal 6th and 7th EDF. EDF ZA 6014 A2d

ZIMBABWE

Small scale irrigation programme. Resp. Auth.: Agritex Irrigation Division. 14 mECU. Irrigation works over 700 ha. Supply of vehicles and equipments. T.A., training, studies Int. tender launched in July 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6010 A3e

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of National Scholarships. 3.4 mECU. T.A. and scholarships, awards, seminars. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF ZIM 6020 A6

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Tourism development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Development Cooperation. 19.15 mECU. Programme for 5 islands. Optimal use of tourism potential. T.A., training, promotion and investments in tourism infrastructures. Works, supplies, T.A., training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF NEA 6007 A5c

Business development scheme. 1.5 mECU. T.A. for marketing, management, product, company and strategy development. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF NEA 6013 A5c

ARUBA

Airport extension. Extension of airport facilities. Apron, taxiway, new arrival building, car park, access roads, platform buses, fencing, security peripheral road, technical studies. Estimated cost 14.5 mECU. EDF 6.3 mECU, The Netherlands ± 8.2 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. (final design, tender dossier, supervision). Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF ARU 6003 A2d

NEW CALEDONIA

Norcal study. Estimated total cost 1.440 mECU. EDF 0.800 mECU, Territoire 0.440 mECU, COFREMMI (local) 0.200 mECU. Reupdating of an existing study about nickel production. This study will be executed by the former consultant in charge with the previous study. Impact study on environment financed by EDF: short-list done. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF NC 6005 A4a

Improvement of the Magenta Airport. Resp. Auth.: Administration Territoriale. 1.2 mECU. Works by acc. tender (conditional). Date financing June 91. 6th EDF. EDF NC 6006 A2d

ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

Equipping of the St. Pierre port. Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Équipement. Estimated total cost 5.5 mECU. EDF 2.6 mECU, France and territorial collectivities 2.9 mECU. EDF part: works. Quay and platform. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing September 91.* 6th EDF. EDF SPM 6001 A2d

MONTSERRAT

Port Rehabilitation Project. Resp. Auth.: Montserrat Port Authority. Estimated total cost 11.350 mECU. EDF 2.240 mECU, EIB. 2 mECU, local 2.390 mECU, C.D.B. 4.570 mECU, C.I.D.A. (Canadian Int. Development Agency) 0.150 mECU. Construction of a jetty (80 × 15m) and an approach bridge (95 × 9m). Work, by int. tender. T.A. and training. Date financing June 91. *Pre-qualification no 3417 launched in May 91 — Opening 19.7.91.* 5th and 6th EDF. EDF MON 6001 A21

ST. HELENA

Sea defences. Resp. Auth.: Public Works and Services Dept. 3 mECU. 2.5 mECU EDF, 0.500 mECU UK. To protect shore facilities at James and Rupert's Bay. Rehabilitation and reinforcement of existing sea walls. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF SH 5001 A8g

Regional Projects

GUINEA — GUINEA BISSAU — SENEGAL — MAURITANIA — NIGER — MALI

Soil development of the versant basin type in Guinea: Fouta Djallon and Niger Upper Basin. Resp. Auth.: Ministère Guinéen de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (MARA), Direction Générale des Forêts. Estimated total cost 37.5 mECU. EDF 31.5 mECU, Italy 6 mECU. Anti-erosion works, technical and social infrastructure with local NGO's and population. Preparatory studies for programme extension, aerial survey and mapping. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6137 A3a

BURKINA — NIGER

Timber development in the future reservoir of the Komienga Dam. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement du Burkina. EDF 5.9 mECU. Timber trees recuperation and processing to obtain building and service timber, fuel-wood, charcoal for their commercialisation. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. T.A.: ANERCO GMBH (BRD) EDF REG 6102 A3c

BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

Regional road Godomey Bohicon. 18 mECU. Maintenance for Cotonou to Niamey and Ouagadougou on the Godamey Bohicon 119 Km. Supervision of works. short-list done. *Date financing May 91.* 6th EDF. EDF REG 6158 A2d

Regional project for the management of the 'W' national park and adjoining game reserves. Estimated total cost 10 200 mECU. To establish 3 management units and 10 bridges and 20 observation posts with their equipment. Building and rehabilitation of administrative, technical and social buildings, tracks and bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on appraisal 6th EDF. EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f

INDIAN OCEAN ACP COUNTRIES

Assistance to the cardiology regional centres. Resp. Auth.: COI and Ministry of Health in Mauritius. 1 mECU. To purchase by int. tender medical equipment. Project on appraisal Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6509 A7a

Regional programme of meteorological cooperation concerning tropical hurricanes. Resp. Auth.: Madagascar as Regional Authorizing Officer. 5 mECU. Purchase of specialised equipment by int. tender. T.A. and training Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6508 A2e

Development and management of the tuna resources. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Commission de l'Océan Indien C.O.I. Estimated cost 5.450 mECU. EDF 4.9 mECU, C.O.I. 0.550 mECU. Institutional

Aspects for management and regulations — regional programme on applied research — collecting, exchange and analyse of fishing statistical data-training. Supply of equipment T.A. training and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 91. 6th EDF. EDF REG 5504 A3a

PACIFIC ACP COUNTRIES

Regional tourism development programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: SPEC and TCSP. Development of tourism and tourism related sectors of the Pacific ACP States and OCTs. 7.4 mECU. Works: implementation of programme components, supply of films, promotion and teaching materials, T.A., support for TCSP and project. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6027 A5c

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CILSS

Regional programme for soil protection and reafforestation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de la Pêche du Cap Vert. 4.250 mECU. Works, training, supply of equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6145 A3e

Information and training programme on environment. Resp. Auth.: CILSS Secretariat. 10 mECU. Supply of pedagogical equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6147 A8f

CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ANGOLA — ZAMBIA — RWANDA — COMOROS

Development of the regional cultural cooperation in the Bantu world. Resp. Auth.: CICIBA (Gabon). 5.6 mECU. Actions to collect and use knowledge and know-how, cooperation pilot projects with cultural specialists, support actions to artists and shows. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6079 A8i

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 2.0. mECU. Widening of the capacity. Construction of classrooms, offices and housing. Project stage: identification. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5311 A6b

Institutional support to Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, Tanzania. Estimated cost 4.5 mECU. Extension of ESAMI installations plus provision of library, audio visual and printing equipment and improvement of kitchen and laundry facilities. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6311 A6b

P.T.A. COUNTRIES (Preferential Trade Area)

Computerisation programme for customs and external trade statistics. Resp. Auth.: P.T.A. Secretariat. 6.7 mECU. *Date financing April 91.* 6th EDF. EDF REG 6922 A1b

IGADD COUNTRIES

T.A. for a fight against desertification strategy. Resp. Auth.: IGADD. Supply of specialised T.A. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5361 A3a

BURUNDI — RWANDA — ZAIRE

Institutional support to the: 'Institut de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique (IRAZ) at Gitega, Burundi. Resp. Auth.: IRAZ and Ministère des Travaux Publics, Burundi. EDF part 2.430 mECU. Building of administrative and research complex. Works by int. tender foreseen in 91. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6318 A1a

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS AND CEAO

Automatic processing of trade statistics and customs data. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat Exécutif de la CEDEAO. Directeur général du Fonds de la CEDEAO. 5 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6163 A1bcef

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

Block trains (Tanzania Railways Corporation, TRG). Resp. Auth.: TRC. 36 mECU. Provision of main line and shunting locomotives and wagons. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6313 (TA....) A2d

Northern corridor alternative. Kericho-Isebania road Kenya. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communication, Kenya. 9 mECU. Rehabilitation of bitumized road of 170 km in the Victoria lake region. 6th EDF. Date financing June 91. EDF REG 6315 (KE) A2d

Improvement of Burundi access to the central corridor. Resp. Auth.: National Authority Officer, Burundi. 10 mECU. Road construction. First part: 27 km. Muyinga-Tanzania border. Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6317 A2d

Musoma — Sirari Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works — Tanzania — Estimated cost 22 mECU. Upgrading to bitumen standard of existing road. Works, equipments and supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 0000 (TA 6005) A2d

KENYA — ETHIOPIA

Isiolo-Moyale road. Preparatory studies. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works, Kenya. Estimated cost 1.750 mECU. Separate economic feasibility and engineering studies. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6324 A2d

TANZANIA — MALAWI

Ibanda-Uyole road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Communications and Works, Dar Es Salaam. EDF 9.1 mECU. Rehabilitation works of existing bitumen road. 6th EDF. Date financing April 91. EDF REG 6402 (TA) A2d

CAMEROON — CONGO — GABON — CENTR. AFR. REP. — EQUAT. GUINEA — SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE — ZAIRE

Conservation and rational utilization of the forest ecosystems in Central Africa. 24 mECU. Buildings, tracks, bridges, supply of equipment, T.A. and training Prequalification launched in October 90. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6203 A3a

SADCC

Maseru Container Terminal. Resp. Auth.: Government of Lesotho and SADCC. 1.350 mECU. Construction of container terminal and supply of containers, handling equipment. Study required: detailed design of works. Short-list already drawn up. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5421 A2d

Mananga: agricultural management training. Resp. Auth.: Mananga Agricultural Management Centre (MAMC). 1.6 mECU. Supply of T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6425 A6ci

Regional Wildlife Training Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry Natural Resources. Tanzania 5.353 mECU. Supply of field training and office equipment, teacher training, rehabilitation of college buildings. T.A.: Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6408 A5i

SADCC — ANGOLA

T.A. for the Office of the Lobito Corridor (Project Coordination Unit). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et Communications. 2.400 mECU. T.A. in 2 phases. Supply of equipment. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6423 A2d

SADCC — MOZAMBIQUE

Limpopo line rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Mozambique Ministry of Transport. EDF part estimated 15 mECU. Community contribution to an overall rehabilitation programme for the Limpopo railway line. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 91. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6421 A2d

Beira port contract dredging. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. Estimated cost 9 mECU. Dredging for two years of the access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 years, 4 million m³/year. Supervision and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6401 A2d

CAMEROON — CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. — CHAD — CONGO — GABON — GHANA — NIGER — NIGERIA

Aeronautical satellite Telecommunications. Project for Central and Western Africa. Estimated cost 22 mECU. Improvement of air traffic safety. The project will provide high quality voice and low speed data links between. The Air Traffic Control Centres in 8 countries. Project on appraisal. Int. tender (conditional) no 3442 launched in June 91 — Opening 31.10.91. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6038 A2d

ASECNA

Regional air safety training schools at Douala and Niamey. Resp. Auth.: ASECNA. 7 mECU. Building and equipping of schools in Douala and Niamey. Works and equipments by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6057 A6d

BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA BISSAU — TOGO

Regional programme to grow Western coastal african countries awareness of natural resources protection. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Priorities: fight against bush fire and deforestation and for Soil protection. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6113 A3e

CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES AND MONTserrat

CARDI (Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute). Technology transfer and applied research programme. Resp. Auth.: CARDI. EDF 5.3 mECU. Works supplies, training, T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6632 A3a

OECS — TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO BARBADOS — GUYANA

Regional fruit and vegetable marketing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6620 A5de

OECS AND MONTserrat

Tertiary education. Resp. Auth.: OECS Secretariat. 7.2 mECU. Construction, supply of equipments, training, trainers training, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6628 A6bcj

CARICOM AND UK OCT

Regional hotel training programme. Resp. Auth.: Bahamas Hotel Training College (BHTC). 4.4 mECU. Construction region training facility, supply of equipment, scholarships. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6614 A5c

Student accomodation for Caribbean regional educational institutions. Resp. Auth.: UWI, CAST and CTC. 16 mECU. Construction of residential hostels with a total of 1080 beds and daytime accomodation in six campus concerned in Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Contracts for architectural design will be awarded following a design competition. Works by restricted tender after prequalification. Equipments and furnishings by int. tender. Project in execution. 5th and 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6630 A6b

CARIBBEAN ACP COUNTRIES AND OCT'S

Caribbean Tourism Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO), Barbados. Estimated cost 9 mECU. Market development in Europe, product development in the Caribbean, statistics and research, tourism education and training, linkages development. T.A. after prequalification. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6917 A5c

ALL ACP COUNTRIES

Support programme to take social dimension of the structural adjustment into account. 1.500 mECU. Studies, statistics, reports, T.A. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6076 A1b

ACP AND OCT COUNTRIES

ACP and OCT countries participation in trade development actions and services. Resp. Auth.: Programme coordination by Trade Devpt. Unit in DG VIII-Brussels and geographical units in DG VIII-Brussels and EEC delegations. 6.193 mECU for ACP's and 0.375 mECU for OCT's. Trade fairs and tourism, seminars, conferences, workshops and symposia. T.A. to prepare programmes and actions and for training. Commercial missions (regional), publication of brochures and documentation. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6916 A5e

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Integrated training programme on forestry. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hydraulique, de l'Environnement et des Forêts. 2.5 mECU. T.A. long-term and short-term, equipments, scholarships. Project in execution.

SEM AL A3a

Integrated programme to improve seed production for large scale farming. EEC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. **2nd int. tender no 3441 launched in June 91 — Opening 22.9.91.**

SEM AL A3a

Centre to Develop Pesticides (CDP). Resp. Auth.: CERHYD (Centre de Recherche pour la Valorisation des Hydrocarbures et leurs Dérivés) 1.9 mECU. T.A. and training, supply of equipment. Project in execution.

SEM AL A3a

Support programme to the hydraulic sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement Direction de Développement des Aménagements Hydrauliques (DDAH) and Agence Nationale des Ressources Hydrauliques (ANRH). 8 mECU. T.A. for National Water Plan, supervision and monitoring for dams, studies, waste water treatment stations. Supply of equipments. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91.

SEM AL 183/90 A2b

Pilot project to develop artisanal fishery in Western Algeria. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche. 9.770 mECU. Supply of line of credit and specialized T.A. Training and scholarships. Evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91.

SEM AL A3a

Financing of artisanal enterprises from 'Société Nationale de l'Électricité et du Gaz (SONELGAZ)'. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat and SONELGAZ. 9.060 mECU. Supply of line of credit for artisanal enterprises, supply of pedagogical equipment, T.A. for bank-office in charge for credits. Project in execution.

SEM AL A4d

EGYPT

Egyptian Renewable Energy Development Organization. EREDO. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Government. EEC contribution 7.7 mECU. Construction and equipment for the centre. Works and supplies: int. tender with prequalification foreseen in 2nd half 88. **Int. tender for supplies no 3423 launched in June 91 — Opening 12.8.91.**

SEM EGT 1002 A2a

IUD production. Resp. Auth.: National Population Council (NPC). EEC 2.100 mECU. T.A., equipments, raw material for local production of IUD. T.A. by Organon (NL) Equipments by int. tender. Project in execution.

SEM EGT A7c

Food Sector Development Programme (FSDP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation, National Oil Crop Council, Livestock Production Council, Animal Production Cooperatives (APC). 55 mECU Animal food improvement. Milk marketing. Artificial insemination (AI) and animal health improvements, edible oil, line of credit. T.A. Project in execution. **Int. tender no 3432 for supplies launched in June 91 — Opening 30.7.91.**

SEM EGT A3a

Bardawil Lagoon development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MOALR) and the General Authority for Fish Resources Development (GAFRD). 3 mECU. Protection of natural resources by controlling and improving the water salinity of the Lagoon. Improvement of the marketing of fish and reduction of losses. Construction of an additional landing place with basic marketing facilities and improvement of the existing one. Installation of a cool chain including an ice-making machine. Improvement of the Lagoon's fishing methods by introducing more careful fishing techniques and better management. T.A. for the development and implementation of training and extension

programmes. Purchase of equipment and vehicles by int. tender. Project in execution. SEM EGT 510/90 Aai

Credit line for small-scale industries. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry, Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI). 8.5 mECU. Credit line and T.A. Project in execution. SEM EGT 509/90 A4b

Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Egypt. 175 mECU. Hard currencies allowance for private and public companies and public authorities, to cover import prices (CIF) for eligible goods. Importers have to deposit in advance in local currency the equivalent amount of the CIF prices into a special account for counterpart funds. Project in execution.

JORDAN

Study on underground water-level in the Azraq basin. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Hydrology and Irrigation. 3 mECU. To collect and exploit all data concerning water region of Azraq basin. T.A. supply of equipment and drilling works. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution.

SEM JO A2a

Project for a national soil map and land utilization. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 4 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution.

SEM JO A1g

Education Improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.8 mECU. T.A. by ten experts and one project director. Scholarships. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91.

SEM JO 261/90 A6a, A6b

Improvement of agricultural productivity in arid and semi-arid zones. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and the University of Jordan. T.A. by a European research institution competent in the development of arid zones. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.

SEM JO 570/90 A3a

Ground water investigation in the Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, drilling explorations, surveys and analysis. Project on appraisal.

SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a

Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Jordan. 150 mECU. Hard currencies allowance for private and public companies and public authorities, to cover import prices (CIF) for eligible goods. Importers have to deposit in advance in local currency, the equivalent amount of the CIF prices into a special account for counterpart funds. Project in execution.

MALTA

Improvement of infrastructure. 3.1 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipments. Management of natural water resources, long term development plan for 'Telemalta Corporation' Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.

SEM MAT 88 A9b

Protection of Malta's coastline against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of

specialized equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution. SEM MAT A8f

Upgrading of standards laboratories. Resp. Auth.: Maltese Government. 2.2 mECU. Identification by European T.A. of the present situation for standard laboratories. Training and organizational matters, purchase of equipments. Restructuring of different laboratories. Supply of analytical equipment, microbiological equipment and calibration equipment. Project on appraisal. ★ Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. SEM MAT 1912/90 A1c

MOROCCO

Support to strengthen technologic and scientific education structures. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Education Nationale. EEC 40 mECU Achievement of Beni Mellal and Settat faculties. Construction of Errachidian and Mohammedian faculties and CPRT of Settat. Supply of equipments for faculties and CPRT, studies, T.A. and supervision. Works and equipments by int. tenders. Project in execution. SEM MOR A6b

Rehabilitation and protection of the disaster areas in Ouarzazate and La Moulouya. Resp. Auth.: Office Rég. de Mise en Valeur Agricole de Ouarzazate (ORMVAO) and La Moulouya (ORMVAM). Works by direct labour. Supply of equipment by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. SEM MOR 236/90 A3a

Support to strengthen training structures in the textile and leather sectors. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics, de l'Équipement de la Formation Professionnelle et de la Formation des Cadres and the OFPPT. EEC contribution 28.075 mECU EEC part; construction of 3 centres. Equipements for 6 centres trainers training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 91. SEM MOR 264/90 A6c, A6d

TUNISIA

Date-palm trees in the Rejim-Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equipments— Italy. Electric equipment: Italy. Irrigation equipments: int. tender. T.A. Italy Project in execution. SEM TUN A3a

Credits for S.M.E. rural sector. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale Agricole (B.N.A.) 12 mECU. 1st phase purchase of 60 000 or 70 000 t of wheat: hard and/or soft, by 'Office des Céréales'. Counterpart funds will be distributed for credit operations. Purchase by int. tender. Project in execution. SEM TUN 3aA

Financial and technical support to the 8th Social and Economic Development Plan. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de Développement Régional. Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale (DGCI). EEC contribution 0.500 mECU. T.A. ★ and purchase of equipment. Project in execution. SEM TUN A1b

Mobilization of water resources in the Kasserine Governorat. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et du Développement. Commissariat Régional de Développement Agricole de Kasserine. EEC Contribution 7 mECU. Water schemes, dams, drillings. ★ Works by acc. tender. Date financing May 91. SEM TUN 254/91 A3c, A9b

TURKEY

Geothermal energy in Western Anatolia. Resp. Auth.: MTA — Institut de Prospection et Recherches Minérales EEC contribution 8 mECU. Supply by int. tender of specialized equipment for wells, boreholes and for laboratory analyses. T.A. and training. Project in execution. Int. tender foreseen in July 91. SEM TU A4a

Improvement of health services. EEC contribution 5.8 mECU. Master plan, specialized medical equipments, scanner, vehicles. T.A. and supplies. Project in execution. SEM TU A7ac

Fight against environmental pollution. Resp. Auth.: Prime Minister's Office. Directorate General of the Environment. EEC contribution 2.8 mECU. Purchase of mobile system to measure, control, water, air, surface and soil pollution. Supply of laboratory equipment, T.A. Project in execution. SEM TU A8f

Vocational training programme for tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of equipment, studies. Project in execution. SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d

Programme to deepen association relations between EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the University of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in execution. SEM TU A6b

Regional centre for training and development for the 'Union Internationale des villes (UIV)' for eastern Mediterranean countries and Middle-East in Istanbul. EEC contribution 1.4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. SEM TU A1c

Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Turkey. 175 mECU. Hard currencies allowance for private and public companies and public authorities to cover import prices (C.I.F.) for eligible goods. Importers have to deposit in advance, in local currency the equivalent amount of the C.I.F. prices into a special account for counter part funds. Project in execution.

WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Assistance to the Palestinian population in the occupied territories. EEC contribution 10 mECU. Various projects, lines of credit supply of equipment, T.A. and ★ training. Date financing May 91. SEM OT 91 A8a, b, e

A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

BANGLADESH

National Minor Irrigation Development Project (NMIDP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 131 mECU. EEC contribution 26.399 mECU. IDA/World Bank and local 66 mECU. Works and supplies. T.A. for environment, training. Project in execution. ALA BD 9013 A3a

River survey project. Resp. Auth.: See ALA BD 9003 project. EEC contribution 12.6 mECU. T.A. to collect reliable data on discharge, water levels, river velocities and sediment transport, provide reliable hydrographic charts of key areas. Training, special equipment and instruments and SPOT imageries. Project in execution.. ALA BD 9004 A9a

BHUTAN

Strengthening of veterinary services for livestock disease control. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 4 mECU Building works by acc. tender. T.A. by restr. tender after short-list. Short-list done. Equipment and materials by Specialised Procurement Agent appointed by the CEC in agreement with the R.G.O.B. Vehicles and vaccine, by int. tender. Project in execution. ALA BHU 9008 A3a

BOLIVIA

Protection of La Paz, Trinidad, Santa Ana, Villa Montes against floods. Resp. Auth.: CORDEBENI, CORDETAR and A.M. LA PAZ. EEC contribution 11.700 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and supervision. Studies. Project in execution. ALA BD 9023 A9a

COLOMBIA

Microprojects in the Pacific Coast zone. Phase 2. Resp. Auth.: Corporación Regional Autónoma del Valle del Cauca (CVC). EEC contribution 11.200 mECU. T.A., works, equipments and line of credit. ★ Training. Project in execution. Int. tender for supplies no 3425 launched in May 91 — Opening 23.7.91. ALA CO 9020 A3a

INDIA

Doon Valley integrated watershed management project. EEC contribution 22.5 mECU. Rehabilitation and reafforestation, soil conservation, minor irrigation, energy conservation, community participation, agriculture. Works by direct labour, supply by int. tender or acc. tender. T.A. Project in execution. ALA IN 9014 A3a

Kerala Horticulture Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: GOK Chief Secretary and Steering Committee. 28.7

mECU. Supply of fertilizer, equipments (seeds and industry) works and T.A. (short-term and long-term). *Date financing May 91.*

ALA IN 9103

A3a

INDONESIA

Rural electrification project (hydro-electric micro-power stations). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy and Mines. Electricity and new energy Dept. EEC contribution 18.9 mECU. Works, supply of turbines, generators, adjusters of 10 KW, 25 KW and 100 KW, vehicles and other equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA IND 8719

A2a

Punggur Utara irrigation project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works, Directorate General of Water Resources Development (DGWRD) EEC contribution 29.3 mECU. Civil works: main system, secondary and tertiary canals. Works by int. tender and acc. tender. T.A. for preparation tender dossiers, supervision and monitoring. Project in execution.

ALA IND 9019

A3a

IRAN

Rebuilding of the Manjil and Abbar Tarum Hospitals. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Medical Education. 13 mECU T.A. for architectural and technical studies and work supervision. Building and equipments by int. tender. *Date financing May 91.*

ALA IR

A7a

LAOS

NAM NGUM water, pumping irrigation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture, Forêts, Irrigation and Coopératives Nationales (MAFIC). EEC 5.5 mECU. Building of 4 irrigation networks and drainage. Studies, construction of 4 pumping stations, supply of equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal.

ALA LA 8802

A3a

NICARAGUA

Reintegration of qualified persons for economic reconstruction and development. Resp. Auth.: Organisation Internationale pour la Migration (OIM), Genève 5.1 mECU. Project in execution.

ALA NI 9005

A1b

PAKISTAN

Support to the rural population of the Chitrai region. Resp. Auth.: Aga Khan Foundation, Pakistan, Karachi. EEC contribution 8 mECU. Rural development, health, education. Project in execution.

ALA PK 9018

A3a

PANAMA

Rehabilitation of Santo Tomás Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de Salud. EEC contribution 4 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. for maintenance, training and management. Project in execution.

ALA PAN 9017

A7a

PANAMA — COSTA RICA — NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA

Regional development programme for agricultural research on cereals in Central-America. EEC contribution 10.8

mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8823

A3a

Regional support programme for fishery development in the Central American isthmus. Resp. Auth.: OLDE-PESCA. EEC contribution 13.4 mECU. T.A., works, supply of equipments, line of credit, training, studies. Project in execution.

ALA REG 9009

A3a

PARAGUAY

Rural settlement. San Pedro and Caaguazu. Resp. Auth.: Instituto de Bienestar Rural. 10.4 mECU. Settlement of 4 000 families. Basic infrastructures, equipments, training and T.A. *Date financing May 91.*

ALA PAR 90/24

A3a

BCIE (BANCO CENTROAMERICANO DE INTEGRACION ECONOMICA)

Support to the SME in Central America (PAPIC). Phase II. Resp. Auth.: BCIE. EEC 6 mECU, Italy 1 mECU, Sweden 3.8 mECU, BCIE 3.8 mECU. Hard currencies funds. T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8909

A5b

IDB (INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK)

Special fund for T.A. 2 mECU. Short-term consultancies with European experts, or European consultings. Studies, T.A., training. *Date financing May 91.*

ALA REG 91

A9b

Special fund to finance small productive projects. Resp. Auth.: IDB. 8 mECU. *Date financing May 91.*

ALA REG 91

A5a

EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — HONDURAS

Trifinio region development pilot project. Resp. Auth.: Ministros de Recursos Naturales. Comité de Dirección. EEC contribution: 7.170 mECU. Reforestation works, feeder roads, warehouses, supply of equipments and T.A. Feeder roads, irrigation, warehouses and supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8814

A3a

PERU

Rural micro-projects programme (Pampa-Puno II). Resp. Auth.: COR-PUNO. EEC contribution 21.4 mECU. T.A.: ten expatriates. Supply of trucks, vehicles, equipments, training. Project in execution.

ALA PE 8817

A3a

Irrigation project in Tumbès. Resp. Auth.: Comisión mixta Puyango-Tumbes. Sub-comisión peruviiana. EEC contribution 21.4 mECU. Purchase of equipment and materials. Credit line. T.A. and training and research. Project in execution.

ALA PE 9012

A3a

PERU — ECUADOR — COLOMBIA (PEC)

Regional programme: fishing technical cooperation EEC/PEC. Estimated

EEC contribution 6 mECU. T.A., supply of equipments and training. Project on appraisal.

ALA REG 8721

A3a

COCESNA — COSTA RICA — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA — HONDURAS — NICARAGUA

Radar control for civil air traffic in Central America. EURO MAYA project. Resp. Auth.: COCESNA (Corporación Centroamericana de Servicios de Navegación Aérea) and co-director EEC. EEC contribution 18.5 mECU, Italy 9.5 mECU. Civil works, supplies, 4 radars and equipments, communication systems. Extension of the Tegucigalpa control centre. T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA REG 8819

A2d

PHILIPPINES

Agricultural education programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). EEC contribution 10.4 mECU. Parallel cofinancing with ADB. Supply of equipments and agricultural inputs. Pedagogical equipment, furnitures, laboratory equipments and audio-visuals, books, chemicals, tools, vehicle, T.A. and training. Project in execution.

ALA PHI 8824

A6ci

Earthquake Reconstruction Programme (ERP) (July 90). Resp. Auth.: Department of Agriculture, CECAP (Central Cordillera Agricultural Programme). Project Office. EEC contribution 20 mECU. Agricultural rehabilitation, works, supplies and T.A. Hospital rehabilitation: works for 2 hospitals, supply of equipment and supervision. Studies: 1) Alternative transport strategy study. 2) Urban planning studies for the cities of Bagnio and Dagupan. Project in execution.

ALA PNI

A8a

SRI LANKA

Pilot project for agricultural productivity villages under the poverty alleviation programme. Resp. Auth.: Project Implementing Unit. 2.5 mECU. T.A. training and supply of equipment. Project in execution.

ALA SRL 9002

A3a

Minor and medium size irrigation systems in the North-Western province. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Ministry of Agriculture. EEC contribution 6.3 mECU. Work, by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. T.A.. Project in execution.

ALA SRL 9016

A3a

National Irrigation Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Project Coordination Committee. Total estimated cost 41.5 mECU. EEC 3.34 mECU, World Bank 24.67 mECU, counterpart funds from EEC Food Aid 7.59 mECU, local 5.9 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing July 91.*

ALA SRL 9107

A3a

THAILAND

Development and extension of fruit and vegetable production in Northern Thailand. EEC contribution 9.45 mECU. Long-term T.A., supply of equipments, line of credit, training, research and follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution.

ALA TH 8812

A3a

DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

In ACP countries

Angola

Rua Rainha Jinga, 6
Luanda C.P. 2669
Tel. 393038 — 39 12 77 — 39 13 39
Telex 3397 PROQUIM AN

Barbados

Sunjet House, Fairchild Street
P.O. Box 654 C, Bridgetown.
Tel. 427-4362/429-7103
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB
BRIDGETOWN
Telex (1-809) 4278687

Benin

Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif
B.P. 910, Cotonou
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU
Telex (229) 315 328

Botswana

P.O. Box 1253
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7
Telex BD 2403 DECEC
Telex (267) 313 626

Burkina Faso

B.P. 352
Ouagadougou
Tel. 307 385/307 386-308 650
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — OUAGADOUGOU

Burundi

Avenue du 13 Octobre
B.P. 103, Bujumbura
Tel. 234 26/238 92
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA
Telex (257-22) 4612

Cameroon

QUARTIER BASTOS
B.P. 847, Yaoundé
Tél. 22 13 87/22 33 67/22 21 49
Telex DELEGFED 8298 KN
YAOUNDE — CAMEROON
Telex (237) 20.21.49

Cape-Verde

Achada de Santo Antonio
C.P. 122-Praia
Tel. 61 37 50-61.32.25-61.33.23
Telex 6071 DELCE CV

Central African Republic

Rue de Flandre
B.P. 1298 Bangui
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI

Chad

Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha
B.P. 552, N'Djamena
Tel. 51 59 77-51 22 76
Telex DELEGFED 5245 KD
N'DJAMENA — CHAD
Telex (19-235) 51 21 05

Comoros

B.P. 559 — Moroni
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91
Telex 212 DELCEC KO

Congo

Av. Lyautey
near Hotel Meridien
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00 — Ville
Telex (242) 83.60 74

Côte d'Ivoire

Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, CROZET, 18
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01
Tel. 32 24 28 — 33 29 28
Telex 3729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN
Telex (225) 324089

Djibouti

Plateau du Serpent Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre
B.P. 2477 Djibouti
Tel. 35 26 15
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ
Telex (253) 350 036

Dominican Republic

Avenida George Washington 505
Edificio Torremar

Apartado 302
Santo Domingo
Tel. (1-809) 687 22 02
Telefax (1-809) 687 26 29
Telex 3264757 EUROCOM SD

Equatorial Guinea

Apartado 779 — Malabo
Tel. 2944
Telex DELFED 5402 EG

Ethiopia

Tedla Desta Building
Africa Avenue (Bole Road) 1st Floor
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa
Tel. 51 01 29/51 25 11/51 01 80/51 01 89/ 51 26 72
Telex 21135 DELEGEUR — ET
Telex (251-1) 51 41 19

Gabon

Quartier Batterie IV
Lotissement des Cocotiers
B.P. 321, Libreville
Tel. 73 22 60
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE
Telex (241) 732228

Gambia

10 Cameron Street
P.O. Box 512, Banjul
Tel. 777 — 87 69
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL
Telex (220) 26219

Ghana

The Round House — Cantonments Road,
K.I.A.-Accra
P.O. Box 9505
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH
Telex (233-21) 774154

Guinea-Bissau

Rua Eduardo Mondlane 29
Caixa Postal 359, Bissau
Tel. 21 33 60/21 28 78
Telex 264 DELCOM BI

Guinea

Commission
Central Mail Department
(Diplomatic Bag Section — B 1/123)
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479
Telex (224) 441874

Guyana

72 High Street, Kingston
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN
Telex (592-2) 62615

Haiti

B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville
Port-au-Prince
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644
Telex (203) 20018 DELCCEN HN
Telex (509) 57-4244

Jamaica

8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8
P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7
Telex 2391 DELEGEK KINGSTON 5
Telex (1-809) 9246339

Kenya

National Bank Building
Harambee Avenue
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi
Tel. 33 35 92
Telex 22302 DELEUR — KE
Telex (254-2) 215925

Lesotho

P.O. Box MS 518
Maseru, 100, Lesotho
Tel. 313 726
Telex 4351 LO DELEGEUR — MASERU
Telex (266) — 310193

Liberia

34 Payne Avenue Sinkor
P.O. Box 3049, Monrovia
Tel. 26 22 78
Telex 44358 DELEGFED LI — MONROVIA
Telex (231) 262266

Madagascar

Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares
B.P. 746, Antananarivo
Tel. 242 16
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO
Telefax (261-2) 32169

Malawi

Lingadzi House
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City
Lilongwe 3
Tel. 73 02 55/73 01 73/73 06 93
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR MI — LILONGWE
Telefax (265-7) 30593

Mali

Rue Guégué — Badalabougou
B.P. 115 Bamako
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO
Telex (223) 223670

Mauritania

Ilôt V, Lot 24
B.P. 213, Nouakchott
Tel. 527 24/527 32
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN — NOUAKCHOTT
Telex (222-2) 53524

Mauritius

61/63 route Florea Vacoas
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas
Tel. 686 50 61/686 50 62/686 50 63
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS
Telex (230-686) 6318.

Mozambique

C.P. 1306 — MAPUTO
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — MAPUTO
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-49 17 16 — 1-49 02 71
1-49 07 20
Telex 6-146 CCE MO
Telex (258-1) 491866

Namibia

Saniam Building
4th floor
Independence Avenue
Windhoek
Tel.: 264-61-220099
Telex 35135
Telex 419 COMEU WK

Niger

B.P. 10388, Niamey
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY
Telex (227) 732322

Nigeria

4, Idowu Taylor Str Victoria Island
PM Bag 12767, Lagos
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA
Telex (234-1) 617248

Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu)

Dominion House, 3rd Floor
Private Mail Bag, GPO, Suva, Fidji
Tel. 31 36 33
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA
Telex (679) 300 370

Papua New Guinea

The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street
P.O. Box 76
Port Moresby
Tel. 675-21 35 44-21 35 04-21 37 18
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY
Telex (675) 217 850

Rwanda

Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14
B.P. 515, Kigali
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36
Telex 22515 DECE RWMIC
Telex 25U — 74313

Senegal

Avenue Pompidou 57 (2^e étage)
B.P. 3345, Dakar
Tel. 21 13 24/2157 77
Telex 21665 DELEGESE — DAKAR
Telex (675) 217885

Sierra Leone

Leone Wesley House
44 George Street
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN
Telex (232-22) 225212

Solomon Islands

2nd floor City Centre Building
Solomon Islands
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara
Tel. 22 765
Telex 66370 — DELEGI
Telefax (677) 23318

Somalia

Via Makka Al Mukarram, n° Z-A6/17
P.O. Box 943, Mogadiscio
Tel. 21 118/21 049/811 18
Telex 628 EURCOM — SO
Telefax 252 — 21118 — 21049 — 81118

Sudan

3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural
Investment and Development Building
Army Road Khartoum
P.O. Box 2363
Tel. 75054-75148-75393
Telex 23096 DELSU SD

Suriname

Dr S. Redmondstraat 239
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo
Tel. 993 22 — 99349
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN
Telefax 93076

Swaziland

Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor
Cr. Walker and Streets
P.O. Box A.36
Mbabane, Swaziland
Tel. 42908/42018
Telex 2133 WD
DELEGFED MBABANE
Telefax (268) 46729

Tanzania

Extelcoms House, 9th Floor
Samora Avenue
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 311 51/311 52
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR —
DAR ES SALAAM
Telefax (255-51) 38575

Togo

Rue de Calais 22
B.P. 1657, Lomé
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32
Telex 5267 DELEFEDTO-LOME
Telefax (228) 211300

Trinidad and Tobago

2, Champs Elysées
Long Circular, Maraval
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain
Trinidad W.I.
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591
Telex 22421 DELFED WG
Telefax (809) 622-6355

Uganda

Uganda Commercial Bank Building,
Plot 12
Kampala Road, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UGA — KAMPALA
Telefax (256-41) 233708

Zaire

71, Av des Trois Z
B.P. 2000, Kinshasa
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221
Telex 00 581 154.62.21
Telefax 00871 1546221

Zambia

P.O. Box 34871
Plot 4899
Brentwood Drive
Lusaka
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 -25 11 40
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA
Telefax (260-1) 250906

Zimbabwe

P.O. Box 4252
NCR House (10th Floor)
65 Samora Machel Ave.
Harare
Tel. 470.7 1.20/39/40/43

Telex 4.811 ZW HARARE — ZIMBABWE
Telefax (263-4) 725360

In the OCT**Netherlands Antilles**

Scharloeweg 37
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad
Curaçao
Tel. (599.9) 618488
Telefax (599.9) 618423

Aruba

Paardenbaastraat 12, (P.O. Box 409)
Oranjestad

In the Mediterranean Countries**Algeria**

36, Rue Arezki Abri
Hydra-16300 Alger
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42
Telex 52246 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE
Telefax (213-2) 593947

Cyprus

Iris Tower, 8th Floor
2 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue PoBox 3480
Nicosia 137, Cyprus
TEL. (357-2) 36 92 02
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELVC
Telefax (357-2) 36 89 26

Egypt

6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek
Tel. 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 11 84
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK
Telefax 3400385

Israel

2 rehov ibn gvirol, Eliahu House
10th floor TEL AVIV
Tel. 03-26 62 12/26 62 13
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL
Telefax 251983

Jordan

Shmeisani Wadi Sagra Circle, Amman
P.O. Box 926 794
Tel. 66 81 91/66 81 92 Amman
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN
JORDAN
Telefax (262-6) 686 746

Lebanon

Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beyrouth
B.P. 11-4008, Beyrouth
Tel. 3630 30/31/32
Telex DELEUR 23307 LE BEYROUTH

Morocco

2 bis rue de Meknés-Rabat
B.P. 1302, Rabat
Tel. 612 17/612 46/612 48
Telex 32620-(M)
Telefax (212-7) 61156

Syria

73 rue Rachid
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus
Tel. 24 76 40-24 76 41
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY

Tunisia

Avenue Jugurtha 21
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis
Tel. 78 86 00
Telex 14399 — TUNIS
Telefax (216-1) 788201

In A.L.A. countries**Bangladesh**

House CES (E) 19
Road 128, Gulshan — Dhaka — 12
Tel. 60 70 16
Telex 642501, CECO BJ
Telefax (88.02) 88 31 18

Bresil

Q.I. 7 — Bloc A — Lago Sul — Brasília (D.F.) Bresil
Telex: (55.61) 248.31.22
Telex: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE
Telefax: (55-61) 248.07.00

Chili

Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835
Santiago (9) Chili
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK
Telefax: (56) 22.28.25.71

Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America)

Centro Calon — Apartado 836
1007 San José
Tel. 332755
Telex 3482 CCE AC
Telefax (506) 210893

India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia)

YMCA Building 5th floor, Jaisingh Road
New Delhi 110001
Tel. 344 222 — 350 430
Telex 31/61315 EURO-IN
Telefax (91) 352706

Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapur and ASEAN) Secretariat

Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor
J.L Jend Sudirman 32
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220
Tel. 578 0081/578 0181/578 01 59
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA
Telefax (62-21) 5780072

Mexique

Paseo de la Reforma 1675,
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P.
11000 Mexico D.F.
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME
Telefax: (52-5) 540.65.44

Pakistan

House n° 8, Margalla Road, F 6/3, Islamabad
P.O. Box 1608
Tél. 82 18 28-8146 36/8146 86
Telex 54044 COMEU PK
Telefax (92) 822604

Philippines

c/o Executive Power Center, Inc. 12th Floor
Hong Kong Shangai Bldg. 6780
Ayala Av. Makati Metro Manila
Tel. (632) 810.44.76
Telex: 14915. EPC PS
Telefax: (63-2) 818.27.56

Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, Malaysia)

Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor
140/1 Wireless Road
Bangkok 10 330
Tel. 255 91 00
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH
Telefax 2559114

Uruguay

Edificio Artigas (1° Piso) — Calle Rinçon 487 — Primer
Piso — Montevideo
Tel.: (598) 2.96.37.44/96.37.45/96.31.66/96.31.80
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY
Telefax: (598) 2-95.36.53

Venezuela

Calle Orinoco — Las Mercedes
Apartado 67076, Las Americas 1061 A
Caracas
Tel. 91 51 33
Telex 27298 COMEU
Telefax 918876

OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION

In ACP countries

Antigua & Barbuda
Alpha Building 2nd floor
Redcliffe Street
St. John's, Antigua W.I.,
P.O. Box 1392
Tel. and telefax (1-809) 4622970

Bahamas
Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick Str.
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau
Tel. (32)55850
Telefax DELEGEC NS 310

Belize
1 Eyre Street
P.O. Box 907
Belize City, Belize
Tel. (501-2) 72785 and telefax
Telefax 106 CEC BZ-

Grenada
Old Fort
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies
Tel. (809) 440 4958 — 440 3561
Telefax 3431 CWBUR GA
(Attn. EEC Delegation)
Telefax (809) 4404151 (Attn. EEC Delegation)

São Tomé & Príncipe
B.P. 132 — Sao Tomé
Tel. (239) 12 21780
Telex (0967) 224
Telefax: (239-12) 22683

Seychelles
P.O. Box 530 — Victoria Mahé
Tel. 23 940
Telex 2213 DELCAM SZ
Telefax (248) 23890

Tonga
MAILE TAHA
Taufa'ahu Road
Nuhu Alofa
Tel. 21820
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS)
Telefax 23869

Vanuatu
Orient Investment Building Ground Floor,
Kumul Highway
P.O. Box 442, Port-Vila
Tel. (678) 22501
Telex 1093 DELCOM NH
Telefax (678) 23282

Western Samoa
c/o Private Mail Bag
Chief Post Office, Apia
Telex 204 CECOF SX
Telefax 24622

In the OCT

New Caledonia
21 Rue Anatole France
B.P. 1100 Noumea
Tel. (687) 27 70 02
Telefax (687) 28 87 07

Commission of the European Communities Representation Office in Turkey

15, Kuleli Sokak
Gazi Osman Pasa, Ankara
Tel. 37 68 40-1-2-3
Telex 44320 ATBE TR
Telefax 1377940

example, contains a comprehensive treatment of many important areas including protein deficiency and malnutrition, children's diet, more general dietary patterns and wider health issues. Similarly, the section dealing with production and trade provides a great deal of information concerning the agricultural output and potential of different countries and regions as well as about climatic and other factors affecting food production.

A work of this nature must inevitably contain technical terminology but, in keeping with UNESCO's aim of reaching a broad target readership (teachers, researchers, academics, technicians and decision-makers), it has been written in a very readable style, without in any sense detracting from the intellectual quality. It also contains many useful charts and diagrams.

○○○

'Industry and environment' — Verlag Dr. Grüb Nachf., Ölbergweg 8, D-7801 Bollschweil — Telephone 07633/7025, Fax 07633/82129, Telex 772 730 brosd

Environmental technology is a technology of success. All engineers and all those involved in industrial development, never mind which country they find themselves in, are today concerned with solutions within the context of environmental technology or will soon have to seek them.

If these questions are to be solved successfully then information on the current state of development is necessary.

The range of information included in a new and comprehensive reference book brought out by UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organisation) is in line with the latest state of knowledge and relates to the areas of interest and the relevant industrial sectors in practically all the countries in the world.

This reference work is made more valuable as a result of its inclusion of information from the WFEO (Committee of Engineering Information in Paris) which is concerned with criteria for research and systematic ways of solving problems, e.g.:

- the demonstration of methodical ways of analysing a practical project;
- the identification of partners and sources able to provide additional information on technological solutions.

This new reference work sets out to provide development engineers with guidelines in their search for information, e.g. by means of simple and reliable ways of analysing the situations facing them and identifying rapidly the necessary sources of information.

This new book, 'Industry and environment', enables an engineer to compare his projects with other tasks which have already been solved.

In this connection, a particular advantage is offered by the inclusion of hundreds of addresses of various institutions, public authorities, investors and bodies which are concerned with questions of industry and the environment. This information is divided up in a user-friendly way, both according to subjects and according to countries.

The book is useful for development engineers but also for every specialist concerned with this new and promising technology. The book will appear on 15 August 1991. It is available from Verlag Dr. Grüb nachf., Ölbergweg 8, D-7801 Bollschweil. The book will be officially launched in October at the UNO Environmental Conference in Copenhagen.

○○○

Pascal FONTAINE and Henri MALAFOSSE — **The European Institutions** ('Les institutions européennes'): The Alphabetical Metz series — Les éditions Metz, 1 rue du Départ, 75014 Paris — 144 pp. — 57 FF. — 1991

The basic idea of this little book is excellent because it presents, in alphabetical form, that is to say very usable and condensed, the institutions, the history, the achievements, the problems and the hopes of the European Community. It covers from A as in 'Act, Single European' to Y as in 'YES', a youth exchange scheme for Europeans between 15 and 25 years of age.

A great success can be predicted for this work which has been written by two authors very familiar with this Europe whose construction should accelerate with the two intergovernmental conferences, the one on economic and monetary union, the other on political cooperation which should also cover diplomacy and defence.

Both writers periodically publish pieces on the European Community and one may recall that Pascal Fontaine who is now, notably, a professor at the Institute of Political Studies (IEP) in Paris, was the erstwhile last assistant of Jean Monnet.

Finally, one must add that this volume, which is in pocket-book form, includes a list of useful addresses and a chronological listing of steps in the construction of Europe from 1946 to 1990 A.L.

Address:

Correspondence should be sent to:

'The ACP-EEC Courier'
Berlaymont 5/2
Commission of the European Communities
200, rue de la Loi
1049 Brussels
Belgium

Visitors are always welcome to call at our office (Monday to Friday, from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m.)

THE COURIER

AFRICA - CARIBBEAN - PACIFIC
 - EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

PUBLISHER

Dieter Frisch

Commission
 of the European Communities

200, rue de la Loi
 1049 - BRUSSELS
 (Belgium)

Tel. 235-11-11 (switchboard)
 Telex COMEURBRU 21877

EDITOR

Mr Dominique David

DEPUTY EDITOR

Lucien Pagni

ASSISTANT EDITORS

Roger De Backer
 Amadou Traoré
 Augustine Oyowe
 Simon Horner

SECRETARIAT:

Viviane Jacquet (235-27-19)
 Susan Carlier (235-72-30)

CIRCULATION

Margriet Mahy-van der Werf (235-76-39)



Western Samoa