

the Courier

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union



**Population
and
development**

**Country report
Ghana**

Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
(Federal Rep.)
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
United Kingdom

France
(Territorial collectivities)
Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon
(Overseas territories)
New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands


Netherlands
(Overseas countries)
Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustache)
Aruba

Denmark
(Country having special relations with Denmark)
Greenland



United Kingdom
(Overseas countries and territories)
Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

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THE EUROPEAN UNION



THE 70 ACP STATES



This list does not prejudice the status of these countries and territories now or in the future. The Courier uses maps from a variety of sources. Their use does not imply recognition of any particular boundaries nor prejudice the status of any state or territory.

Cover page:
A one-child family in Harare, Zimbabwe
(Photo John & Penny Hubley, EU)

Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
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Grenada
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
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Haiti
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Kenya
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Niger
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Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent
and the Grenadines
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tuvalu
Uganda
Western Samoa
Vanuatu
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

MEETING POINT

Peter Sutherland
GATT Director-General



Is GATT still a 'rich man's club'? Were the developing countries 'on the periphery' of the GATT negotiations? Is the Third World going to be a 'loser' as a result of the Uruguay Round?

These are some of the allegations that were made on GATT after it succeeded in concluding a new multilateral trade deal on 15 December 1993. The Courier asked GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland for his opinion.

Pages 2 to 4

ACP

Joint Assembly



With the negotiations for the Lomé IV mid-term review due to begin shortly, the most recent session of the Joint Assembly was, not surprisingly, dominated by discussions about the future of ACP-EU cooperation. While outside the Palais de l'Europe in Strasbourg, people were shivering in sub-zero temperatures, a lot of heat was being generated inside the chamber as representatives debated an interim report by Mrs Margaret Daly (above) on possible changes to the Convention, and a wide range of other issues.

Pages 5 to 9

COUNTRY REPORT

GHANA

More than ten years ago, facing a disastrous economic situation, the Government of Ghana embarked on an ambitious recovery programme. The old ideas of central planning and state control of the economy were replaced by a new emphasis on private enterprise. Chronic public deficits were reined in and the country was opened up to encourage investment, trade and competition from the outside world. We give a progress report on how Ghana has fared and also take a look at the new politics of this West African state following the restoration of democracy in 1992.

Pages 20 to 45



DOSSIER

Population and development

Whereas it took millions of years for the global population to reach the first million, it has taken less than fifteen to rise from 4bn to 5.4bn, and it is growing at an annual rate of 97m. The 1990s are the critical decade to stop the increase and avert catastrophe. As preparations get under way for the third International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in September, the Courier examines this great issue of our time.

Pages 50 to 94



meeting point

2. Peter Sutherland, GATT Director-General

a c p

- 5. Joint Assembly meets in Strasbourg
- 10. CFAF devalued
- 12. New ACP handbook from Eurostat
- 14. The development of bottomlands in the Sahel

country report

- 20. GHANA: Striving to keep up the momentum
- 25. Profile
- 26. Interview with Emma Mitchell, Minister for Trade and Industry
- 30. Fourth time lucky with democracy?
- 33. Interview with Justice Annan, Speaker of the Parliament
- 36. An opposition viewpoint: Professor Albert Adu Boahen
- 38. Emile Francis Short — guardian of human rights... and a great deal more
- 39. EC-Ghana cooperation
- 42. The Dawhenya Rice Project
- 44. Conversing about culture

e u r o p e

- 46. The 1994 European election — Gearing up for the campaign

d o s s i e r

- 50. Population and Development: the great issue of our time
- 52. Human impact on the Earth
- 55. Population growth, changes in age structure and implications for development
- 59. Population distribution and economic management
- 62. Birth control and family planning
- 65. From population policies to policies for people
- 68. Population growth and sustainable development
- 70. Population growth and economic development in Africa
- 72. Africa's population: the paradox of natural wealth and poverty
- 74. Mauritius: an orthodox population policy
- 77. Haiti in economic crisis: what population policy?
- 80. Our changing islands. The Pacific environment
- 83. Pleading the case for cities
- 86. ACP demographic and economic indicators

c l o s e - u p

- 95. Yam bean — An underexploited tuber crop with great potential

developing world

- 98. International Monetary Fund Report for 1993

culture and society

- 100. Cultural cooperation between the European Union and the ACP States

c t a - b u l l e t i n

- 103. Sustaining soil productivity in intensive African agriculture

BOOKS

NEWS ROUND-UP (yellow pages)

CDI — Partnership

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY (blue pages)

Peter Sutherland
GATT Director-General


'In the Uruguay Round everybody is a winner'

It was an obviously relieved Peter Sutherland who banged the gavel to conclude the final session of the Uruguay Round on 15 December 1993. Ever since the launching, in September 1986, of the so-called Punta del Este Declaration, this eighth round of multilateral trade negotiations had gone on, almost uninterrupted, for 2643 days! The 1986 Declaration covered the most complex and ambitious negotiating mandate Trade Ministers of the participating Governments had ever received. The talks were scheduled to be completed by the end of 1990, but deadlines were continuously postponed and many feared for the future of a liberal multilateral trade system.

While most of the 15 negotiating groups made slow yet steady and, above all, 'discreet' progress, some issues such as the debate on agricultural policy were fought out in the open. Such ongoing 'battles' between the EU, the USA and the Cairns group were in fact the main focus of media attention for a long time. These skirmishes also prompted some observers to conclude that the other negotiating partners, mostly from the developing world, were pushed to the 'periphery' of the negotiations. And, while the world at large welcomed with relief the final breakthrough, many Third World observers also felt that, in this game of winners and losers, the developing nations would again be on the wrong side. Based on computer projections, estimates showed a growth in the value of international trade, thanks to the Uruguay Round, ranging between US\$ 213 billion and US\$ 274 billion by 2002. While all the benefits of the new deal obviously cannot be quantified, most of those that have been calculated so far appear to accrue to the industrialised nations.

Is GATT therefore still a 'rich man's club'? 'No', was the vigorous response of GATT Director-General Peter Sutherland, when he spoke to *The Courier* recently. He strongly advocates the new trade deal, which, he says, will bring 'increased security and opportunity for all'.

As a former European Commissioner (1985-89), and therefore *au fait*



The Courier

with the Lomé Convention, he also seeks to ease the ACPs' worries about the possible erosion of their preferential trade access to the EU. (47 ACP States are currently GATT members).

Today, while working on the fine-tuning of the final text, which will be formally signed in Marrakesh by the 118 countries participating in the Uruguay Round (116 GATT members plus Algeria and Honduras) in April, the head of GATT puts the new trade deal into perspective.

■ *Mr Sutherland, what is your own overall assessment of the final outcome of the Uruguay Round as reached on 15 December 1993?*

— Well, I think it is massively beneficial to the world at large and I think it is also beneficial to all aspects of the world economy. In other words, it is not definable in terms of being positive for one group of countries as opposed to another. The opening of trade is the opening of opportunity and I believe that our internal assessments demonstrate quite clearly that everybody is a winner.

■ *Would you agree that, in the Third World press at least, there is a tendency to say that some of the poorest developing countries may be net losers in the end?*

— Well, there has been some reference to that but, equally, there have been contrary statements and opinions on

the same issue. I think that in general, one may say that the greatest resistance to the conclusion of this Round has often appeared to come from sectors or sections of the developed world rather than from the developing world, and, contrary to past experience, the greatest advocates of the multilateral system are increasingly perceived as being many of the developing countries. That, I think, makes absolute sense. If the weak and smaller countries in the world do not have the umbrella of a multilateral system providing security in terms of trade and trading conditions for the future, how can they attract employment-generating projects? How can they provide assurances in regard to their future development and sharing in world prosperity? So I think, it is a particular plus for the developing world.

■ *So you would not agree with the old adage about GATT being a 'rich man's club'?*

— Oh, I think it is quite the reverse. There used to be a theory which was widely accepted that an open world trading system worked to the advantage of the rich and to the disadvantage of the poor — but this theory has long since been rejected. As I pointed out, I think it is increasingly obvious that the vast majority of developing countries perceive it precisely in the opposite way today. The need for rules of the game is to avoid the law of the jungle taking over. This would inevitably mean the use of power by the strong against the weak and therefore it does not surprise me at all that developing countries are flocking to join the GATT and subsequently the World Trade Organisation. It is also the case that the developing states who are already GATT members have been strong advocates of the conclusion of the Round.

■ *The major bottlenecks or constraints during the years of negotiation stemmed mainly from disputes between certain blocs of developed countries. One could conclude from that — as some have done in the Third World — that the developing nations were on the periphery of the negotiations.*

— Well, I do not think that they were. It is very difficult to generalise about

this, and about 'justice' between developed and developing nations. It is also very difficult to make generalisations about developing or even least-developed countries in the world. These descriptions cover a wide spectrum of different situations. Some of the smaller, weaker countries were amongst the most active and persuasive during the course of the Uruguay Round.

■ *But within those weak countries, would you agree that it may not have been the very weakest — for example, those of sub-Saharan Africa — but rather those Third World Countries which have major interests in getting a new trade system going which were most active? I am thinking in particular here of those countries bordering the Pacific rim.*

— There are a number of sub-Saharan African countries that paid particular interest in the conclusion of the Round. Certainly, as far as we have been concerned within the GATT organisation, we have had a particular concern for this. Indeed, we have an internal group working on the interests of the least-developed countries, some of which are to be found in sub-Saharan Africa. I think that at the end of the day, the interests of those economies which are most likely otherwise to be marginalised are best secured by the multilateral system. So whatever one says about their level and degree of participation, the result has been to secure countries which are marginal in terms of their proportion of world trade within a system which gives them an assurance as to the future.

■ *What benefits do you believe the Third World in general can expect from the World Trade Organisation that will be established?*

— Oh, I think, very considerable benefits and most particularly that of knowing that there will be rules of the game which will be administered fairly and objectively. Let us assume that there had been no successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round; that a World Trade Organisation had not been agreed. What would we then be faced with? What would the least-developed countries in the

world be faced with? Quite simply with a world economy, in terms of trade, where bilateral and unilateral decision-making would ultimately determine who could sell what to whom. In those circumstances, what would the effects be on the least developed and the weaker nations in the world? I think they would be devastating. I think that they would lose all security in terms of inward investment and the prospect of attracting it from big industries. They would no doubt be the victims of the dumping of products from the developed world and of a whole series of illicit practices otherwise outlawed by the GATT.

■ *So it provides them with increased security. Is that the key point for you?*

— That is the key point: increased security and increased opportunity.

■ *On the other hand, the new trade deal looks as if it will also increase competition among the developing countries themselves. It seems that those with the weakest human resources and capabilities may lose out again. Will the GATT/WTO undertake specific measures to strengthen the trading and negotiating capacities of these countries?*

— Absolutely. We already do so but we will do it to an additional extent. I think that one of the primary functions of the World Trade Organisation will be to address the ongoing problems of the weaker members of the world trading community. At the moment, we have training courses and divisional resources placed at the disposal of the least developed countries — something which I think they greatly appreciate. At the end of the day, what one is talking about in terms of future perspectives for the World Trade Organisation is a body which I believe has a particular responsibility to the weaker elements of the trading system.

■ *What is the agenda now for the creation and setting up of the WTO?*

— The agenda is that, following the Marrakesh conference, there will be a tentatively agreed date subject to ratification for the commencement of the new

organisation. At the moment, I believe, that that date is most likely to be 1 January next year.

■ *So GATT will then become WTO?*

— Obviously GATT is an organisation which has its own existence but in effect over the coming period, the WTO will take over the areas of concern and the responsibilities of the GATT system.

■ *Given your own personal background as a former European Commissioner, you are of course very much aware of the specific relationship that the 70 ACP countries have with the European Union, which includes privileged access to the EU market. Within ACP circles, there is a commonly-held view that their preferential trade access under Lomé might be considerably eroded by this new trade deal. Do you agree with this or how would you seek to dispel such an argument?*

— I would dispel the argument very simply. Obviously, if a preference exists because a tariff level for the world at large is higher than that levied for those who have preferential access to a particular market, and if the higher tariff level is then reduced, clearly the difference between the two is also reduced. Now, under those circumstances, there are a number of points that have to be made. First, where the general tariff is reduced, it is important to point out that it has probably been reduced all over the world. So it is providing more opportunities for the exporters from the ACP countries to distribute their exporting capacity in a significant way over a wider area of the world. That doesn't impose constraints but quite the contrary, opens up enormous opportunities, and that is the most essential point. The second point is that the difference between binding tariff rates within the GATT system and what happens with the preferential rates that are offered by trading countries or blocs to poorer countries is that under the GATT you have permanence. The rates are binding; they can never go up again and they cannot be withdrawn. By contrast, the preferential rates granted by individual countries or trading blocs to poorer nations are less secure. They can be withdrawn. So, overall, I think there is no doubt that the general reduction of tariffs brought about by the

Uruguay Round is greatly to be desired by the poorer countries in the world. It provides across the board access for a whole range of products — and not merely those which are targeted by special preferential rates — and this means opportunities for the future. Even in those areas where there are targeted preferential rates, the world-wide lowering of tariffs provides greater opportunities.

■ *Looking at the mathematical models, whether from GATT, the World Bank or the OECD, that seek to quantify the profits from the new deal, it nevertheless seems to be the case that the rich countries stand to gain more than the poor ones.*

— I think that the assessment that you are making is based — if I may say so — on the wrong premise. Most of the assessments of the gainers and losers, and the ones that you are referring to in particular, are based upon the amount that is saved by the consumers in the societies in question as a result of the tariff reductions. That does not mean that the gainers are the rich and the losers the poor. It means that by reducing tariffs in the rich countries, where they are sometimes very high, the costs are reduced for their consumers. If that premise were to be taken to its logical conclusion, it would mean that free traders gain nothing by the Round whereas those with high tariffs gain everything. In fact, it is the opposite. So these figures, as with all figures, are misleading. They only show one side of the story. I believe that the big gainers in the Uruguay Round are those who have the capacity and will to produce. Those who have the greatest amount to offer in terms of the future trading system, and the greatest amount to gain in the long run — and indeed in the short term — are the developing countries.

■ *What about those who remain outside the system altogether?*

— Those who have remained outside, I believe, lack the security that the system provides and therefore lack the security of being able to attract investment. As I said earlier, the developing countries have a lot to gain but so also do the developed countries. I am not trying to

suggest that there are winners and losers in this 'ball game'. But, as I mentioned, I think that the weak make a particular gain in the sense of being provided with security for the future. Those who are entirely outside the system do not have that security and therefore will be dealt with on a bilateral basis by those with whom they wish to trade — that is an insecure future.

■ *Among those that are still outside, do you see an increasing tendency to join the multilateral trading system, now that they have seen that there has been a breakthrough?*

— I think it is a major incentive and that is perhaps why we have over 20 applications for membership of the system at the moment. These include both small and large countries. Russia and China are among the big applicant countries but there are many smaller ones as well. Altogether, there is a rash of countries that don't want to be excluded and that are now seeking to become part of the system.

■ *A lot has been covered in the new trade deal but many 'hot' issues of particular concern for the Third World remain outstanding: subjects such as social dumping, foreign investors' behaviour, international commodity prices, trade in labour-intensive services, environmental concerns and so on. Are they on any future agenda?*

— What GATT or its successor organisation will tackle in the future remains to be decided by the contracting parties. New issues will no doubt be looked at. One of these, that we already know for certain, is the issue of trade and the environment. I cannot say at this stage how that debate will develop, because ultimately it depends on getting the agreement of all the parties.

■ *Can one envisage a new round of negotiations along the lines of the one that has just been completed?*

— No, in my opinion that is very unlikely because it was too large and too interdependent to be duplicated. I think we will probably look at things issue by issue in the future, rather than in such a wide and interdependent way, but I may be proved wrong. ■

Interview by Roger De Backer

Joint Assembly meets in Strasbourg

Spotlight on Lomé IV mid-term review

To the uninitiated, the proceedings of parliamentary bodies are often mysterious and sometimes downright obscure. Governed, as they are, by frequently arcane procedures, they are inclined to be a constitutional lawyer's dream and a journalist's nightmare! To be fair to the ACP-EU Joint Assembly, which has just held its most recent session in Strasbourg, the discussions are not normally overburdened by procedural niceties and the documents to be debated are usually available, albeit at the last minute, to members and observers alike. But anyone who was trying to follow the vote on the 'Interim Motion for a Resolution on the Lomé IV Mid-Term Review', could be forgiven if they left the Palais de l'Europe without really having grasped what had just occurred.

To a large extent, the problem was one of timing, compounded by disagreements, which appeared principally to be on the European side, about substantive elements of the interim report and its accompanying resolution, drawn up by *Margaret Daly* on behalf of the Working Group on the Second Phase of Implementation of the Lomé IV Convention. Although the debate about the mid-term review began several months ago, the Joint Assembly is constrained by the fact that it only meets twice yearly. The subject was discussed at the last plenary meeting in Brussels in October, but at that time the opening of negotiations (scheduled for May 1994) seemed a long way off. When the Assembly reconvenes next October, the talks are likely to be well advanced, and could conceivably have been completed. The Strasbourg meeting was accordingly the only real 'window of opportunity' for the EU and ACP parliamentarians to put forward a common position with any hope of influencing the negotiation process.

That the Joint Assembly has a legitimate interest in the future shape of

the Lomé system is hardly in doubt. It owes its existence, after all, to Article 32 of the current Convention and its *raison d'être* includes an obligation to 'reflect upon all matters pertaining to ACP-EEC cooperation.' A look at the essential elements of the Community's agreed negotiating mandate, recently released into the public domain by the EU Council, reveals a further, more specific, interest. For, among the proposals to be tabled, there is one which would very significantly affect the composition and working of the Joint Assembly itself. To quote from the press release in question: 'The Union proposes that the Joint Assembly should be made up of parliamentarians coming from representative assemblies; it would meet *once a year* (italics added) and at other times when it appeared necessary.' In other words, the European side is apparently proposing to convert the existing *desideratum* that ACP representatives should be elected members of their

national legislatures into an obligation — in which case, ambassadors and other diplomatic staff would presumably be excluded. At the same time, it envisages reducing the frequency of the regular meetings by half.

In addition to institutional changes, the Council has agreed that the European negotiators should press for a number of more substantive amendments to Lomé IV (see box). In the circumstances, it was not surprising that the mid-term review should have featured so prominently in the Joint Assembly's discussions.

The President of the Working Group, Mr *Somda* of Burkina Faso, set the ball rolling in the debate with an introductory presentation in which he acknowledged the 'widespread feeling that our cooperation has not been achieving its objectives over the past few years'. He also



A view of the Palais de l'Europe, where the Joint Assembly met in February

The European Union lays out its stall

On 7 February, the EU Council unanimously adopted a negotiating mandate for the European side in the forthcoming negotiations under the Lomé IV mid-term review. One of the key points that the EU will be proposing is that there should be an affirmation of the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Alongside this would be a new clause allowing for the possibility of partial or total suspension of the Convention in the event of serious violation of these principles. (The so-called 'essential element' clause.)

As regards financing arrangements, it is envisaged that limited sums be set aside for specific actions covering institutional reform (democratisation), human resource development, the environment and the private sector.

In an attempt to deal with what they regard as the 'rigidity' of the current financing system, the Twelve are also proposing that, while an overall 'indicative' sum should be earmarked for each ACP State prior to the establishment of the National Indicative Programme (NIP), the funds would actually be delivered in two separate tranches, 'taking into account the execution and the nature of the projects, as well as the situation in each ACP State.' There is some uncertainty over what this exactly means but it is widely thought that it would introduce a 'performance-related' element into the system in the sense of

creating a link between the efficient use of funds at the early stages and subsequent allocations. Additional flexibility is also sought in the proposal to allow resources designated for development projects to be redirected towards humanitarian aid or rehabilitation, in situations where civil war has broken out or cooperation has been suspended.

The Community negotiators will also be seeking a reorganisation of 'certain competences in the area of financial and technical cooperation' with a view to improving efficiency 'while respecting the prerogatives of the ACP countries.' In concrete terms, this would involve the Commission establishing and managing study contracts although the terms of reference of such studies relating to the preparation, examination and evaluation of development projects and programmes would continue to be determined by the ACP State in question, in liaison with the Commission services.

The Twelve are furthermore proposing a reinforcement of the political dialogue between the two sides. This would extend to areas of general or common political concern outwith the areas currently dealt with in the Lomé Convention.

Finally, as mentioned in the main text, they will be arguing for new provisions affecting the composition and meeting cycle of the Joint Assembly.

argued, however, that it should not be a question of 'going back on the principles enunciated in Lomé' but rather of aiming to improve the procedures.

Mrs Daly was then given the floor to explain her report in more detail. She began by recognising the need to improve the effectiveness of ACP-EU cooperation and emphasised that the Working Party had set itself the task of 'identifying constructive proposals'. In this regard, she referred to a number of goals including improved flexibility in programming, a more efficient uptake of resources, extended political dialogue, continuing support for democratisation and the need to improve cumbersome procedures. All of these objectives, she argued, were accepted by both parties. The question, therefore, was not *what* needed to be addressed, but rather *how* the problems should be tackled.

Partnership

In the proposals which Mrs Daly went on to highlight, the theme of partnership featured heavily. Indeed, the underlying concern of the working group, which cropped up time and again in contributions from ACP representatives and MEPs, was that the mid-term review might lead to a shift in the existing balance of responsibilities in such a way as to undermine the partnership concept. Although he was unable to be present for the debate itself, Vice-President *Manuel Marin* had clearly anticipated this point. In his presentation to the Assembly earlier in the week on the Sotutu Report (see below), he noted the Joint Assembly's commitment to continuity and partnership and stressed that this was a vision that he entirely shared. But, he went on, 'the vitality of our cooperation de-

pends essentially on our capacity to come up with an adequate response to the challenges that we face'. The changes being proposed by the Community, he insisted, were designed with this in mind. He also stressed the fact that there was no question of *imposing* anything on the ACP countries. His arguments were echoed by *Peter Pooley*, Director General for Development at the Commission, who sought to reassure members that there was no conspiracy on the part of DG VIII 'to pull the duvet more over to our side of the bed'.


In her presentation, Mrs Daly also focused on a number of specific points of concern. She did not see a need for any fundamental change in the NIP concept, arguing instead for changes to the existing system that would improve the uptake of resources. She stressed the importance of capacity building and said that there was a need for an urgent review of Commission staffing levels. She spoke of a general need for greater transparency and a specific need for wider dissemination of information about opportunities under the Lomé Convention in the ACP countries. And she voiced concern over the procedures to be used in invoking the 'essential element' clause where human rights or democracy are threatened. Above all, she stressed the trade aspects — something which she reported would be a central element of the ACPs' negotiating mandate, although it

Margaret Daly, rapporteur on the Second Phase of Implementation of the Lomé IV Convention

'The question is not what needs to be addressed, but rather how the problems should be tackled'

The Courier





Commission Vice-President Manuel Marin, seen here with Director-General Peter Pooley, addresses the Joint Assembly
'The vitality of our cooperation depends... on our capacity to come up with an adequate response to the challenges that we face'

does not appear to feature strongly in the EU's agreed position. Mrs Daly argued that this subject, and in particular, the elimination of non-tariff trade barriers, should be given the highest priority.

The debate which followed was wide-ranging, with members focusing on different aspects of Lomé cooperation of particular concern to themselves or their regions. On the ACP side, a member of the *Papua New Guinea* legislature with experience in running a small horticultural business highlighted the difficulties faced by small entrepreneurs in raising capital. Echoing Mrs Daly, he urged that more information be made available locally about Lomé Convention risk capital facilities. The representative of *Cameroon* expressed concern about the dimension of the mid-term review, which he thought risked going beyond the bounds of 'a straightforward negotiation for a financial protocol'. In a 'maiden' speech, the speaker from the *Bahamas* also took up one of the rapporteur's themes in pointing out problems caused by different technical standards and rules of origin, which put a brake on trade. On the democracy/human rights question, the *Ugandan* representative noted that democracy was no longer a controversial subject in the conceptual sense but stressed that it should be seen as a means to an end, the end in question being a better way of life for the people

concerned. The speaker from *Barbados* also linked democracy with 'economic enfranchisement' and stressed that education was vital for the successful working of democratic systems. One of the most telling contributions came from a *Zambian* backbencher who proclaimed, to applause: 'The more pressure put on governments — any governments — to respect human rights, the better.'

Most of the heat generated in the debate came from the European side, where there was a clear divergence of view on the Daly Report. Interestingly, the division was not on 'party' lines. Thus, while Mrs Daly was opposed on several points by her fellow PPE member, *Maxime Verhagen*, she received strong support from *Janey Buchan*, who accused some of her fellow-Socialist Group members of 'shenanigans in the corridors, aimed at bad-mouthing Margaret Daly.'

The atmosphere among certain European members was undoubtedly less than cordial, although the sharpest comments were presumably reserved for the corridors to which Mrs Buchan referred. On the floor of the Assembly, critics of the Report focused on procedural and substantive objections. *Enrique Pons Grau* thought that the Joint Assembly was in danger of 'jumping the gun' and queried the procedural correctness of adopting an *interim* report (a view supported by Mrs *Belo*, who spoke later). He also felt that such 'serious work' should not be left in the hands of a single person, a reference presumably to the key role played by Mrs Daly in drawing up the report. On the subject of human rights conditionality, Mr Pons Grau said that what was being proposed did not discriminate against the ACPs, pointing out that such clauses appeared in many agreements concluded by the Community with third countries — often at the request of the latter! Mr *Arbeloa Mura* also made an impassioned speech in support of human rights.

Other speakers in the debate included *Maartje Van Putten*, who added her weight to calls for better information about Lomé Convention opportunities in ACP countries, *Christopher Jackson*, who thought there was a need to switch resources to primary health care, and

Brigitte Ernst de la Graete, who expressed the view that the 'choice' being offered to the ACPs in the mid-term review was of the 'take it or leave it' kind.

Voting muddle

And so to the vote. As stated earlier, the proceedings at this stage were very difficult to follow.

No fewer than 91 amendments had been tabled to the interim resolution and these were only made available in French and English at a very late stage. Indeed, the session had to be suspended for an hour in order to allow members the opportunity to read the texts. When voting finally began, Mrs *Cassagnagnago Cerretti*, the presiding Co-President, proceeded to work through the amendments at breakneck speed. Each time, as the rules require, the rapporteur was asked for her view (for or against) and on each occasion, her opinion appeared decisive, with the Assembly adopting amendments that she accepted and rejecting those that she opposed. Everything was going smoothly until amendment number 69 by Mr *Saby* which proposed the insertion of a new paragraph 50a. At this point it was discovered that there were two English texts of the resolution in circulation — and that the numbering of the paragraphs had diverged at paragraph 50. Thereafter, it was difficult to believe that everyone present actually *knew* what they were voting for (or against) since, for many, the remaining amendments could no longer be matched to the paragraphs in the draft resolution. Despite this apparently fundamental flaw, drawn to the attention of the chair by Mr Verhagen, Mrs Cassagnagnago Cerretti pressed ahead with the voting and the resolution, as amended, was finally agreed by 59 votes to five with seven abstentions.

The important question, of course, is what the Joint Assembly actually decided at the end of this confused session. The resolution is too long to reproduce here but some of the key emphases are worth summarising. These include:

— flexibility in managing NIP resources, without the need for a complete overhaul of the NIP concept;

— continuing partnership and co-management at all stages of the programming exercise;

— exploring new avenues for technical cooperation aimed, *inter alia*, at strengthening local capacities;

— establishment of a 'capacity-building fund';

— a statement 'welcoming the discussions on the possibility of introducing an essential element clause' in respect of human rights/democracy (this was an addendum successfully proposed by Mr *Romera i Alcazar*) but urging a careful examination of the implications of such a clause;

— clear and transparent provisions and procedures, to be set out in the Convention, to deal with cases where the Convention might be suspended because the 'essential element' clause has been breached;

— according the 'highest priority' to trade development and the use of the associated provisions of Lomé IV;

— examining the possibility of an increased legislative role for the Joint Assembly, rather than the purely advisory and often marginal role it presently has.

In general terms, it appears that the majority in the Assembly recognise the need for changes to tackle weaknesses in the Convention's implementation but are not wholly convinced about the *modalities* proposed by the Commission and the Council. All of those engaged in the debate are committed to the special partnership which exists between the European Union and the ACPs although there are differences about the substance of this partnership and about the direction it should take in future. Of course, the Joint Assembly's role in the process is purely advisory. But in pressing ahead with a resolution which sets out their distinctive position, prior to the commencement of negotiations, they must be hoping that they will be able to exercise some influence on the process.

Future relations

In contrast to the discussion on the mid-term review, the Joint Assembly's deliberations on other topics were characterised by the more

familiar consensus. The traditional 'keynote' debate was, in fact, on a report prepared by *Paula Sotutu* of Fiji. This was on the subject of 'future relations between ACP States and the European Union' and, not surprisingly, there was some overlap between this debate and the subsequent one on the Daly Report.

Presenting his report and resolution for the approval of the Assembly, Mr Sotutu began by affirming his belief that ACP-EU cooperation, based on mutual trust, has a future. He expressed a sentiment which was to be echoed by many other speakers during the session when he argued that relations should continue along the same lines as set out in Lomé IV for at least another decade, at which time, he believed, a full evaluation should be undertaken.

In seeking to analyse the reasons for the limited success of development efforts in certain areas, the rapporteur stressed the need to recognise the importance of cultural factors, and admitted frankly that these sometimes 'shackled progress towards democracy.'

Among his specific recommendations, Mr Sotutu concentrated on the need to tackle illiteracy, strengthen regional cooperation, promote ACP trade and encourage private enterprise. On this last point, he felt that not enough was being done on the part of ACP countries to bring the private sector into the nation-building process or, as he eloquently put it: 'Too often, they are left to paddle their own canoes.' He also addressed some remarks specifically to the European side, urging that they should not be 'too unbending' in applying conditionality in respect of human rights and democracy.

Mr Sotutu went on to speak of the importance of improving communication between the ACP States and the Commission, and of giving more responsibility to Commission delegates in the ACPs (who, he said, must be carefully chosen), with a view to improving implementation. Other issues he referred to included the ACP debt burden and the special needs of island and landlocked countries.

In the subsequent debate, Mr Sotutu was congratulated from all sides for the quality of his report. *Michael*

McGowan was concerned about the reported reluctance of some EU Member States to collaborate with the rapporteur when he was preparing his text, which he was nonetheless happy to commend. The representative of *Senegal* focused on the need to 'go to the grassroots', saying that development was for the people and there should be a greater readiness to place trust in them. Mrs *Schmidbauer* emphasised the need for closer coordination at the EU level, as is envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. She also called for debt-cancellation, urging Commissioner Marin 'to keep pressing the Member States' on this point.



The General Rapporteur, Senator Paula Sotutu of Fiji

'Bring the private sector into the nation-building process'

It was perhaps inevitable that the issue of the CFA franc devaluation should be raised, with the speakers from *Senegal* and *Côte d'Ivoire* both making heartfelt pleas on behalf of the 14 affected countries, all of which are ACPs. The *Côte d'Ivoire* representative conceded that the currency had previously been overvalued but condemned the 'brutal' way in which the devaluation had been carried out, and asked pointedly why the European Union 'had not lifted a finger'. Two French MEPs of opposite political persuasion, *François Guillaume* and *Henri Saby*, came together on this issue in urging an examination of the possibility that an 'ECU zone' be set up.

The GATT Uruguay Round outcome was another topic given an airing

during the debate. Most speakers took issue, in some form or another, with the widely-touted proposition that everyone would gain from this and the general view seemed to be that many of the least-developed countries were likely to lose out.

Terence Wynne referred to an issue which was not dealt with in the Sotutu Report, but which he felt should have been, namely the future of the Joint Assembly itself. While stressing the value of the meetings, he argued that consideration should be given to whether it was necessary to convene twice a year. He was particularly scathing about the low attendance on the European side. 'Had this meeting taken place in an ACP country', he said, 'I am sure that the attendance of Europeans would have been greater... the expenses are better.'

Other speakers in the debate included the representatives of *Jamaica*, *Botswana*, *Mali* and *Papua New Guinea* and MEPs *Hermans*, *Braun-Moser* and *Wurtz*. The Resolution drawn up by Mr Sotutu was adopted by the Assembly later in the week.

Commodities crisis

The early stages of the session also saw major contributions from the ACP Council (President in Office, Mr Brizon of Grenada), the EU Council (President in Office, Mr Baltas of Greece) and Vice-President Marin from the Commission. Mr Brizon devoted most of his speech to the question of commodity prices, highlighting the huge reductions in income suffered by many developing countries over the past two decades. He spoke of the need to concentrate on tackling the *causes* of this problem rather than merely seeking to alleviate its symptoms. As regards the GATT outcome, he doubted whether benefits would 'spread in any real sense to the ACPs' and was critical of the international community's failure to address the problems of the 'losers' in the Uruguay Round. He concluded by putting forward a series of 11 recommendations concerning, among other things, debt cancellation, Stabex re-

sources, unfair trading practices and structural adjustment support.

By contrast, Mr Baltas of the EU Council concentrated on the recently agreed European negotiating mandate for the mid-term review. He insisted that there was no question of calling the basic foundations of ACP-EU cooperation into question and said that what was being proposed was amendments to only a limited number of provisions. He also described the Community's actions in South Africa in advance of the election and outlined the Community's stance on Lesotho and Sudan.

Mr Marin also focused on the forthcoming Lomé IV talks (see above), prefacing his remarks with the encouraging news that project and programme implementation had been speeded up over the past two years. He expressed pleasure that the Council had 'taken on board' the bulk of the proposals presented by the Commission and reiterated the point that the objective was 'solely to update the Convention in order to make it more flexible and efficient'.

Other business conducted by the Joint Assembly during its Strasbourg session included the adoption of two major reports on sustainable development (rapporteur, Mr Verhagen) and on the implementation of the Lomé Convention (co-rapporteurs, Mr Kosgey (Kenya) and Mr Bertens) as well as a series of individual resolutions on a wide range of subjects. The situation in a number of individual countries was also debated, while 'question time' provided an opportunity to quiz the Commission and EU Council on various aspects of development policy.

This was the first Joint-Assembly at which the ACP's new co-President, Mr Chambrier (Gabon), presided. For the European side, Mrs Cassagnagnago Cerretti revealed that she would not be standing for re-election in June. This was, accordingly, her last session in the chair. The meeting was also marked by the presence, for the first time, of a representative from *Eritrea*, who was warmly welcomed by the members.

Too often, references to the 'end of an era' are nothing more than a journalistic conceit. The phrase crops up



The representative of Eritrea addresses the Joint Assembly for the first time

almost every time a famous politician, sports personality or literary giant departs the scene. Despite this, it was difficult to escape the conclusion that *something* was coming to an end when the Joint Assembly session wound up late on the Thursday afternoon with a series of laudatory speeches from both ACP and EP speakers.

With the European election scheduled for June, a number of European members have decided to call it a day. Statistically it is likely that others will fail the electoral test while some will return to the Parliament but not to the Joint Assembly. But it was difficult to resist the impression that more profound changes were also in the offing as the Lomé mid-term negotiations loom. Whether the Joint Assembly will emerge from the process strengthened, unaffected or truncated is not for us to say. All we can say is 'watch this space'.

Simon Homer

CFAF devalued 'Necessary' and predictable

It happened in mid-January. It had been expected for more than ten years, ever since the World Bank pointed to the 'increasingly urgent need to devalue African currencies' in its 1984 development report. It was heralded in mid-1993, when most of the European press announced, without further ado, that substantial devaluation (50%) of the CFAF was on the cards. And it was officialised after two days of open discussion in Dakar (Senegal) on 11 and 12 January. But news of the cut in the exchange rate of the CFA franc still came as a surprise in the 14 States in the zone. Was it a case of miracles dying hard, although there are no miracles in economic affairs? Or was it that devaluation, even long predictable, is always an unpopular move?

Technically speaking, the base rate of the CFAF to the reference currency (the French franc) was bound to be cut, and for many reasons. Historically speaking, the franc zone goes back a long way, having been in its present form since 1948, and there has been no change in the rate of the CFAF to the FF since, despite the fact that the reference currency has shifted on a number of occasions in relation to, say, the German mark and the American dollar. So, for 45 years, there has been no independent evaluation of the CFAF in the light of economic trends in the zone, whose trade, particularly with France, has maintained a structural deficit.

Other reasons for devaluation include those which might be called indigenous and have to do with the nature of the franc and the way it is used. Fundamentally, since 1960 at least, the CFAF has never been seen as a real instrument of development conforming to strict rules of monetary and financial management in a structured economy. In other words, the power of a currency is the


counterpart of actual production and this is not the case with the CFAF, whose fixed, guaranteed parity with the French franc has not so far been tied to any economic compensation by the 14 African States.

The swingeing cut in the CFAF is painful to all the countries concerned, of course, but, in the words of the principal architects of the adjustment, it was 'a necessity' if they were not to 'go to the wall'. The question now is to cushion the shocks (of inflation and declining income) which go with it and capitalise on an operation designed to get the economy off the ground again. So the IMF, the IBRD and, in particular, the European Union are getting substantial financial resources — back-up measures — moving to help the countries cope with the social consequences of devaluation and go some way towards creating optimum conditions for the revival of productive activity. There is special emphasis on farming, where inter-

nal inflation must be below the increase in the selling price of products to enable the peasants to get proper benefit from the nominal revenue hike which came with the change in the exchange rate.

One of the main back-up measures, involving writing off or reducing the debt, should in theory seal off the trap into which countries with heavy external debts fall, as they so often do in Africa, when States try to hang on to too large a percentage of the monetary benefits of devaluation.

Most commentators in Europe are careful about advancing the global advantages of this devaluation. But, one or two snipers apart (see box), the African press seems to see the difference in the exchange rate as a real lifeline to haul the drowning man out of the water. The



Bank clerk in Niger
Getting used to a lightweight CFA franc
and fewer imports



The Courier

exchange rate is not the main way to economic recovery, particularly in the African countries, including those in the franc zone, where the limited manufacturing sector usually finds it has to spend a lot on imported equipment when there are no industries upstream and a local network of sub-contractors.

The advantages of devaluation tend to be assessed in the light of the spurt they give to exports. In a forthcoming issue, *The Courier* will be asking economic and political operators for their views about what is happening in the field, to see what effect devaluation is really having on the economies of the countries concerned. Prompted by the move, a discussion of the way African economies work has already started, focusing on countries in the franc zone, which have a common currency but little or no common economic policy and abound with obstacles to trade and the free movement of people and goods.

It is by no means clear that devaluation will provide a strong and sustainable stimulus for these countries' exports or, most important, for their food output without a precise and objective

analysis of their strengths and their weaknesses beforehand. What will be the outcome and how good will the back-up measures be? Only the future can tell. ■

L.P.

The Senegalese rice-grower whom *The Courier* met recently complained that he was not earning much because of competition from imported rice. Will devaluation give him more incentive to produce and export?

Common currency

*This is taken from an article by J.J. Man Jusu in the 14 January 1994 issue of *Fraternité Matin*, an Abidjan daily which follows the government line fairly closely.*

'When the dust from the big bang of devaluation has settled, the members of the CFA zone will have to think deeply about the status of their common currency. Is devaluation the international financial institutions' way of urging the member countries to take themselves in hand, both monetarily and in many other fields?

Of course, we are told that it is only a change in the value of the CFA franc against the French franc, with FF1 now being worth CFAF 100 and not CFAF 50

as before, but this is the first devaluation to be made independently of the French franc, our reference currency, so does it not at least implicitly underline the independence (author's underlining) of the CFAF)?

So here we are, all by ourselves. We must shoulder our responsibilities and press on to the ultimate goal of monetary sovereignty. It means political sovereignty first, of course, and this, in the framework of African integration, is marking time. We have our backs to the wall. We must move fast to take our own future in hand.

So should we go for a common, independent African — regional or continent-wide — currency in the coming years? We think we should, and as soon as possible, never forgetting that we are no longer under France's wing.'


New ACP handbook from Eurostat

ACP BASIC STATISTICS — last published in 1988 — makes a welcome return this year, filling a gap in structured, tabulated information on ACP countries, a gap which has existed since the publication's last appearance six years ago. While the yearbook 'External Trade of the European Community with the ACP countries and the OCTs' continues to provide important ACP-EC trade flow statistics, there has been a serious dearth of information on the other relevant indicators. The new edition of **ACP BASIC STATISTICS** due to be launched in early 1994 is a more comprehensive and far-reaching publication than its predecessors. It is a valuable addition to Eurostat's output and, apart from being useful to the professional users of information, it will also act as a quick reference guide for readers seeking a detailed breakdown of statistics on African,¹ Caribbean and Pacific states.

The demand for coherent and timely data on ACP countries by information users is already well known and is not the subject for discussion here. Rather, this publication tries to respond to that demand inasmuch as that data is available. The inherent philosophy of the publication has been to put the emphasis on quality rather than quantity, and, hopefully future issues will fill some of the gaps *if the properly validated data becomes available*.

The publication regroups and synthesises data supplied by the major

¹ At the time of going to press, no information was available on the ACP's newest Member State — Eritrea — but efforts are being made to include them in future publications.



international organisations, and which is stored in the Eurostat database, on the short and long term macroeconomic indicators of each ACP country. An initial study of the best sources for each indicator in terms of coherence, validity and timeliness was undertaken by Eurostat. The resultant spread of data providers includes the IMF, the WORLD BANK, UNESCO, the OECD, the ILO, the FAO and of course EUROSTAT. Against a background of international coordination and activities aimed at systematising the identification, collection, storage, retrieval and dissemination of information on developing countries, this publication testifies to that spirit.

The publication offers a snapshot view of each ACP country, identifying some administrative information (main

cities, principal products, date of independence, etc.) as well as detailing the main demographic, social, economic, financial, trade and aid data pertaining to the country. The short term indicators cover the period 1987-1992 while the long term indicators covers the decades from 1960-1990 with projections for 2000 and 2025.


ACP BASIC STATISTICS is supported by data from the PVD (pays en voie de développement) domain of the Eurostat database, which houses over 100 000 annual time series from 1960 representing all the important macroeconomic indicators for 169 developing countries. The domain is currently undergoing its own important research and development work. The objective of this investment is to isolate a critical core of information on

developing countries (such as appears in the publication under review) and to make it easily accessible to the users via an interface with attendant facilities for desktop publishing.

The publication will appear separately in three languages — French, English and German — and will have an initial launch in March 1994 of 4000 issues. Copies of the publication can be requested at the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities while further information concerning the PVD database can be provided by unit A5 ('Relations with ACP and other developing countries') of Eurostat. ■

An example of the data provided on an ACP country in the new Eurostat handbook

Nigeria



Independence: 1963
Capital: Abuja

Area: 923 768 km²

Major cities (1991):

- Lagos (1 340 000)
- Ibadan (1 263 000)
- Ogbomosho (644 000)
- Kano (595 000)
- Ilorin (420 000)

Official language: English

Regional organizations: OAU, ECOWAS, OPEC

Currency: Naira

Productions:

- sorghum, millet, cocoa, rubber, cattle, sheep
- petroleum
- steel, refining, aluminium, food, textiles

Imports:

- machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured products, food

Exports:

- crude oil

Structural table						
	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Demographic indicators						
Population (1000 inhabitants)	42305	56581	78430	108542	147709	285823
Age rate of population growth (%)	2.5	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.1	2.7
Fertilization rate (%)	14.4	20.0	27.1	35.2	43.3	61.6
Life expectancy at birth	38.5	42.5	46.5	50.5	54.5	64.5
Mortality rate	6.82	6.90	6.90	6.90	5.94	3.54
Infant mortality (‰)	194	146	124	105	87	48
Social indicators						
Number of inhabitants per doctor	:	24667	10543	6424 ⁽¹⁾	:	:
Literacy rate (%)	:	:	34.0	50.7	:	:
Economic indicators						
GNP (Mio \$)	4173	12081	88610	32175	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	99	214	1130	296	:	:
Structure of GDP (%)						
Agriculture	:	41.3	27.4	36.2	:	:
Industry	:	13.8	40.3	38.4	:	:
Services	:	45.0	32.3	25.4	:	:
Per capita energy consumption (kg of oil equiv.)	:	34.6	114.6	138.3	:	:

Nigeria

Currency: Naira

Productions:


- sorghum, millet, cocoa, rubber, cattle, sheep
- petroleum
- steel, refining, aluminium, food, textiles

Imports:

- machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, manufactured products, food

Exports:

- crude oil



Economic table						
	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Foreign trade						
Exports (Mio \$)	7383	6875	8138	12912	12265	11886
Imports (Mio \$)	3918	3889	3419	4318	9031	8276
Trade balance (Mio \$)	3464	2986	4719	8593	3234	3611
Exports to the EC (Mio \$)	3468	3401	3825	5649	5665	5181
Imports from the EC (Mio \$)	2585	2562	2441	3183	3625	4400
Foreign debt burden						
Total foreign debt (Mio \$)	30893	31540	32769	36068	:	:
Debt towards the EC (Mio \$)	5604	9061	10047	11288	:	:
Foreign debt/GNP (%)	126.9	108.3	114.6	112.1	:	:
Debt servicing/exports (%)	13.0	28.5	19.7	21.3	:	:
Public development aid						
Total aid (Mio \$)	77.0	126.6	362.1	292.6	298.0	:
Bilateral aid from the EC (Mio \$)	34.0	40.6	135.1	66.9	132.0	:
Other bilateral aid (Mio \$)	23.5	61.9	190.4	147.0	73.4	:
Multilateral aid (Mio \$)	19.5	24.1	36.6	78.7	92.6	:
Economic indicators						
GNP growth rate (%)	-37.1	19.6	-1.8	12.6	-1.5	:
Demand structure (% of GDP):						
- Private-sector consumption	69.8	73.0	67.6	59.2	62.8	:
- Public-sector consumption	12.5	12.5	9.0	11.4	11.6	:
- Investment	13.7	13.5	13.9	14.6	16.9	:
- Net exports	3.9	1.0	9.5	14.8	8.7	:
Monetary and financial indicators						
Inflation rate (%)	11.3	54.5	50.5	7.4	13.0	44.6
Ecu exchange rate (ECU 1 =)	4.6	5.4	8.1	10.2	12.3	22.4
Dollar exchange rate (\$ 1 =)	4.0	4.5	7.4	8.0	9.9	17.3
General government deficit (Mio \$)	-2416	:	:	:	:	:
Direct investment from abroad (Mio \$)	603	377	1882	588	712	:
Gross international reserves (Mio \$)	4495	4954	2664	-1042	1523	:

Development of bottomlands in the Sahel

by Jean Albergel & Jean-Marie Lamachère (ORSTOM),
Bruno Lidon (CIRAD), François Gabelle (CIEH)
et al. (FSAGx, UAW, ISRA, IER, and INERA)

Drought, soil deterioration and an expanding population have forced farmers in the Sahel to look for new land to bring under crop and more and more use is being made of the bottomlands, low-lying seasonal wetlands where the chemical make-up of the soil is good and there is water available. They are a sound economic alternative for farmers, who can grow safety-net or cash crops (sorghum, maize and rice) there in the rainy season and graze their animals in the dry season, when there are also good opportunities for market gardening and growing off-season vegetables and fruit-trees.

Developing these lands for agriculture is one answer to the present crisis of traditional production systems, but going about it efficiently means having water engineering installations to provide flood protection and store and distribute the irrigation water. These facilities have to be technically reliable and manageable by the people who use them, for the bottomlands are fragile ecosystems which deteriorate easily.

Key to the abbreviations

CIEH: Comité Inter-africain d'Etudes Hydrologiques (Inter-African Committee for Hydrological Studies), Ouagadougou
CIRAD: Centre de Coopération Internationale de Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Centre for international cooperation on agricultural research for development), (France)
CORAF: Conférence des responsables de la Recherche Africains (Conference of African research leaders), (Dakar)
FSAGx: Faculté des Sciences Agronomiques de Gembloux (Gembloux Faculty of Science), Belgium

A CIEH-coordinated research programme designed to find out more about the natural functioning of bottomlands, look at problems encountered in developing them and test the installations and relevant techniques was carried out at five representative sites in the Sahel — in Yatenga and Comoë in Burkina Faso, in the Sikasso region of Mali and in the Siné-Saloum and Casamance regions of Senegal.

The research was carried out under the aegis of the CORAF R3S network¹ and various associates in North and South joined forces to develop the methods and tools of research. The water balance, high-water levels and water table of a number of catchment basins were analysed at each site and the chemical properties of the water, sediment transport, agricultural potential of the soil, land structures, production systems and the

¹ The programme has been supported by the second 'Science and Technology for Development' (STD2) programme run by Directorate-General XII of the European Commission.

IER: Institut d'Economie Rurale (Mali)
INERA: Institut d'Etudes et de Recherches Agricoles (Burkina Faso)
ISRA: Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles
ORSTOM: Institut français de recherche scientifique pour le développement en coopération (France)
R3S: Réseau de Recherche sur la Résistance à la Sécheresse
UAW: Université Agronomique de Wageningen (Pays-Bas)

technical methods which the farmers used were also investigated. Agricultural experiments both on station and on the farmers' plots were an opportunity to see how agricultural output in the bottomlands might be improved and diversified.


The research programme

Climatic problems combined with population growth and deteriorating land have completely altered traditional farming in the Sahel over the past two decades. With land less fertile and more and more mouths to feed, African farmers are coping by shortening the fallow periods, sometimes cutting them out altogether, and organic fertiliser is beginning to be in general use. They are countering the water shortage by cultivating new varieties of plants, using their land differently and planting their crops downstream of areas with drainage lines and runoff.

The bottomlands, chemically fertile tracts where surface water, drainage water and water tables meet (Raunct, 1985), are an increasingly attractive agricultural and economic proposition for Sahel farmers. In places where these sections of valley floor have always been used for crops, the demand for land has expanded and farming methods can no longer afford to be too extensive. In places where they were not worked in the past, individuals and groups are more and more likely to be making spontaneous attempts to develop them. Rainfall is unpredictable, but water engineering can improve supplies to the crops and regulate high-water levels and this goes a long way towards making agricultural production reliable

Figure 1

Pilot projects – Climate – Isohyets 1920-1970



and encouraging farmers to grow cash crops. Bottomlands were often developed in the Sahel without conducting any surveys or analytical comparisons to provide information which could be extrapolated for use throughout the region, but after the R3S Workshop in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) in 1987, research workers from various institutions in Africa and Europe realised what the problem was and mooted a combined research project on the Sahel bottomlands.

The project defined bottomlands as flat or concave valley floors and flat drainage paths (without definite, sizeable watercourses) which are submerged for part of the year by water which then recedes. The soil is colluvial. The drainage basins vary in area from 100 to 200 km² and the plots belong to a single village or a number of neighbouring villages. It takes a small or average amount of finance to install water regulation facilities and much of the work can be done by the peasant farmers themselves. The existing social organisation is compatible with management of the installations.

The project was carried out by various organisations in Europe (CIRAD, FSAGx, ORSTOM and UAW) and Africa (CIEH, IER, INERA and ISRA), with the help of the Commission of the European Communities, and the CIEH produced a summary of the results in January 1993 (Albergel, Lamachère et al., 1993).

This West African bottomland development programme confined its attentions to the climate zone in one rainy season between isohyets 600 mm and 1600 mm. Five pilot sites covering this zone were selected from two major geological areas — crystalline formations (granite, gneiss and migmatite) in the old West African shield, which is rarely above 500 m, and sedimentary marine formations in the Senegalese-Mauritanian basin, which is lower than 100 m.

Bottomlands in the West African countryside

The bottomlands cover only a small part of Africa — 5-10% of the areas


investigated by remote sensing — and the main features of them and their environment change, from north to south, with the climate zones.

North of the 600 mm isohyet, millet is the basic crop and is grown on the sandy, wind-blown soil which covers part of the slopes and the plains. Livestock, an important aspect of traditional production, are kept by nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes, which migrate with their herds during the periods of transhumance grazing. In this semi-arid environment, the bottomlands offer the advantage of collecting runoff during the rainy season. Their water tables are well replenished, sometimes with more than three times the amounts on the best-fed of slopes, although this may still not be enough for drinking water throughout the more than eight-month dry season (October to June). The current period of drought, which has been dogging West Africa for more than 20 years now, makes things in the more underprivileged areas worse and bottomlands in this climate zone, which used to be given over to livestock, are more and more likely to be under crop in the rainy season. Here, sorghum is the most popular crop in places where the soil is not over-saturated and where there is help from the water table at the end of the cycle. In the dry season, vegetables are grown behind brushwood fences in little gardens irrigated from seepage pits dug in the bottomland.

Between the 600 mm and 1000 mm isohyets, the main food crops are millet and sorghum, grown on fairly sandy soil. In the traditional system of agriculture,


Figure 2

Distribution of crops according to topography in the Sahel bottomlands (Yatenga)



livestock are present only in times of transhumance grazing in the dry season. The bottomlands in this region have virtually the same morphological and pedological properties as in the drier zones. The soil is sand and clay on colluvial/alluvial material upstream of the bottomlands and heavy in clay and hydromorphic to pseudogleic downstream. Rice is often grown in the middle of the bottomlands, although, with rainfall of less than 1000 mm, the crop is not reliable. Most of the outflow of the drainage paths is runoff, which makes for short, intermittent spurts which increase in violence with the percentage of the catchment basin which is under crop without any special soil protection. Maize is grown on the edge of the bottomlands, to supplement the rice, in the rainy season. Vegetables are grown near towns and villages in the dry season when there is enough surface or underground water.

Forest galleries develop along the main rivers between the 1000 mm and 1200 mm isohyets. Not so long ago, they were a breeding ground for the sandflies which transmit onchocerciasis (river blindness). The bottomlands here have sand, clay and alluvial soil upstream and clay-sand or sand downstream. Heterogeneity of texture is one of their main features. Chemically and organically speaking, they are more fertile than land on the valley slopes. They have an average calcium and magnesium content, but they are poor in




organic matter and nitrogen and very poor in sodium and potassium. Food crops — millet and sorghum — are grown on the slopes and rice occupies most of the bottomlands themselves, together with vegetables, fruit trees and maize. If the catchment basins are fairly large (more than 5 km²), the channels are fed as early in the year as August by underground flow-down slopes, producing seepage at the edge of the bottomlands when the water

tables level up. This lateral feeding of underground water into the bottomlands also produces a leaching of the soil in the bottomlands, where they get very sandy, hydromorphic and grey. Underground flow accounts for more than 40% of the water supply to the flood-prone areas over the year.

Above the 1200 mm isohyet, nature is very much as in the previous climate zone. We took a particular interest in this climate zone in areas near the Atlantic Ocean and bottomlands in tidal estuaries. The region we investigated, Casamance, was Senegal's rice bowl before the present period of drought. The plains and hillsides are covered with dry forest which the peasants tend to clear to grow sorghum, groundnuts and manioc. Rice is grown on low-salinity bottomlands. Tidal bottomlands have a specific kind of soil called mangrove soil, which deteriorated through emergence when the level of the water table dropped after the drought of the past 20 years. This is a regional disaster which has rendered infertile much of the bottomlands on which rice was once grown by very elaborate traditional methods.

Figure 4 Crop distribution by topography in Sudan-type multicrop bottomlands (Peniasso)



Advantages of West African bottomlands

The main advantage is that they concentrate surface and underground flow and can therefore be used to grow crops which demand more water (sorghum and rice) in places where there is less than 600 mm rainfall and longer-cycle, higher-yield strains in wetter areas. And with water tables near the surface of the bottomlands, trees and off-season vegetables can be produced with irrigation from shallow seepage pits. So, despite the very small areas in question, these marginal stretches of useful land are good places for the peasant farmers to innovate and experiment. They also have the advantage of relatively better soil than the valley slopes.

There is a clear distinction to be made between the area with more than 1000 mm rainfall p.a., where rice can be grown without any major risk, and the area with less, where it cannot. It is clearly reasonable to expect to step up rice growing in the former, but it could not be done without full-scale water control in the latter.

Natural constraints on the development of the bottomlands

In parts of the Sahel where the annual rainfall is below 1000 mm, high-water levels combined with fairly sharp slopes to the bottomlands — 2-5 m per km, say — give speeds of more than 0.6 m/s, uprooting rice sorghum shoots at the beginning of the rainy season and flattening them at the end.

In Sudan- and Guinea-type areas, with annual rainfall of 1000 mm, there are showers several days running, which can submerge crops in low-lying areas and cut off their air supply. Rice and sorghum stand up to submersion for up to three days, but the damage may be irreversible if it lasts longer. So too much water can be fatal to crops and too little can damage the harvests. At the beginning of the plant

cycle, shoots need very little water and the rainfall tends to be adequate.

When the plant starts throwing out suckers, it is very prone to hydrous stress, but since it does not need much water at this stage either and there is a good chance of rain, the risks are minimal. But at the end of the cycle, during flowering, fruiting and maturing, the plants need plenty of water and the risk of stress is considerable, particularly if the average annual rainfall is poor and the plant grown on the bottomlands comes from a damper climate.

In semi-arid zones, no rain means none of the high water which usually supplements the supply to bottomland crops. In Sudan-type areas, poor rainfall leads to early drying up of the drainage into the bottomlands and rapid dwindling of the water table, and the sandier the soil, the greater the damage.


We should say a special word about Casamance, where the main barrier to agricultural development is over-saline bottomland soil, which is now toxic due to very fast, very strong acidification as a result of West Africa's long period of drought conditions which have lasted for the past 20 years. Drought has depleted all the water tables in the region and caused

mangrove soil to emerge and become hyperacidified. It has made it easier for salt water to seep into the water tables in the tidal bottomlands and made the most exposed tracts of soil infertile.

Not only are there problems with water and soil. Another problem which occurs throughout Africa is the speed at which weeds grow on cultivated bottomlands. This is a major constraint on agricultural development, because it means more work for the farmers, who sometimes even have to abandon the most choked up areas. It takes an average of about six days to clear a 0.25 ha plot, but it can take one person from three to 13 days, and of course makes the labour costs on bottomlands larger than on higher ground.

Human constraints on the development of bottomlands

There are as many human constraints in turning bottomlands over to agriculture in West Africa as there are problems of the natural environment. For various reasons, bottomland farming is only a marginal activity in West African



agriculture (although a journey southwards shows that it is more common in areas with better rainfall than in the drier northern parts) and this is reflected in the high percentage of female labour on the bottomlands and the low percentage of land under crop in these parts. This is because of the West African peasant strategy of seeking to minimise risks and optimise human investment (reckoned in days of work). It takes 72 days to work a 0.25 ha rice plot in Yatenga, 50 days in Comoë and southern Mali and 92 in Casamance. By way of comparison, it takes only 30 days to work 0.25 ha of sorghum in Yatenga and it generally takes less than 40 to work 0.25 ha of rainfed crop. It is easy to see that, if the farmers are also able to grow cash crops (groundnuts in Senegal, for example, and cotton in Burkina Faso and Mali) on higher ground, they will see little point in planting winter crops on the bottomlands. However, bottomlands look more attractive when market gardening can be carried out and fruit trees grown on them.

The most striking case is that of bottomlands in southern Mali, where the peasants go so far as to cut tall rice if it is lagging behind and replace it with potatoes, which can be sold for a good profit. They have also devised a highly original method of planting potatoes, using the eyes to make the most of their small quantities of seed potatoes.

Another major problem in developing the bottomlands is land ownership. African peasants rarely own the land as we understand ownership in the West. They usually have the use of it, but major constraints go with it, since the users are at the end of the line of the successive loans which African peasants are wont to make to each other. In Yatenga, we found that land could be appropriated in three ways, by:

- antecedence;
- conquest;
- prolonged occupation.

The final user has to refer to the people who have charge of the land if he wishes to alter the way his plot is used, because it was granted to him for a specific purpose, without possibility of change.


Water-engineering — removing natural constraints

There have been many technical suggestions for removing the natural barriers to the development of the bottomlands, all of them involving more or less complete water control. The simplest installations, filter dikes in the Sahel and earth dikes in the Sudan and Guinea areas, offer only very basic security, since the crops still depend on local weather and soil conditions for their water.

Filter dikes do minimise the risk of the plants being torn up or flattened, however, and earth dikes retain enough water for enough time to feed rice when the soil does not filter too much and there is adequate rainfall.

whereby water levels can be controlled throughout the irrigated land, the installations maintained and their utilisation monitored.

The installations studied in the course of the Commission-financed programme belong to group one or two. The smallest facilities are not necessarily the cheapest in relation to the area served. The total cost of the filter dam at Bidi, in Yatenga, was assessed at CFAF 650 000 per ha and the cost of the semi-underground Kambo dam at CFAF 800 000 per ha. But they do have the enormous advantage of being able to be set up reasonably quickly with local labour, which accounts for 50% of the total cost. Bigger installations, such as Moadougou and the Gourga microdam, require very thorough preliminary studies, which should bring in the current



Slightly more elaborate facilities — semi-underground dams with spill dikes, micro-coffer-dams, installations with central collectors, distributor channels and an anti-salt dam — are a little more expensive, but provide a more reliable supply of water and better high-water protection. They require fairly serious prior study and sound engineering to control the water levels.

The most complex facilities involve more extensive water storage and a system of irrigation channels and high-water protection devices. They cost a great deal more per hectare and require very thorough studies, a proper grasp of water-engineering techniques on the part of the farmers and the sort of social set-up

(surface and underground) flow model and ground water model techniques to evaluate the degree of crop security, lay down rational management standards for the facilities and assess the real benefits.

Removing human constraints

There are various technical recipes and well-honed tools for removing the constraints of the natural environment, but there are very few for the constraints imposed by man himself. What we have is a fine mixture of chance, arbitrariness and



VOUANT LIMBERS

short-term economic considerations.

The growing techniques, which involve turning the earth, organic and mineral fertiliser, and herbicide to remove the weeds, are well known and have already proved their worth outside Africa. But there is an economic problem attached to using them inside Africa. They have been a success with commercial crops such as groundnuts and cotton and vegetables (potatoes, sweet potatoes and onions) and other things which bring in enough money. But the return on the sale of food crops is not currently such as to make herbicides and other inputs a possibility. World rice prices, which are artificially low, also preclude inputs and herbicide, although these things are vital to intensification and could offset the extra labour costs and help amortise the financial investments involved in water-engineering installations. But if inputs are to be used, there has to be greater security of production, which can only be provided by water-engineering facilities in the bottomlands.

Development aid is an opportunity to install systems which can be productive and paid off in the long term on certain conditions, the first of which is a

serious, honest study of both the natural constraints, which it would be wrong to minimise, and the human constraints in terms of finance and exploitation. Very few developments cater for the need for the peasants to hedge their bets by distributing their plots in the light of the risks. And very few are designed to meet the needs of the user. In most cases the idea is to keep construction costs down and very little thought is given to the constraints of actually using the installations.

Scientific achievements of the programme

Over and above a knowledge of the bottomlands and the way they work, the programme has produced:

- new measurement apparatus;
- bottomland development diagnosis systems;
- bottomland water management systems;
- a hydro-agricultural typology of bottomlands.

Three new pieces of equipment have been designed by the programme — a rain simulator, a hydrological recorder and a soil chemical parameter register.

The central areas of the bottomlands are often used for rice cultivation

There are four tools of diagnosis — a satellite data handling chain (developed at Gembloux), an expert system of assessing flow and high water in small bottomlands in lower Casamance, a bottomland soil water simulation method combining hydrological models and cultivated plant water models and an agriculture-oriented general typology of bottomlands of West Africa.

There are fewer water management tools, but they perform every bit as well as the tools of diagnosis, with which they can be combined. They include an anti-salt dam management system, which has worked well at the Djiguinoum site, and a dam water storage-release model, which is used to get the most out of the coffer at the Gourga micro-dam. ■

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GHANA

Striving to keep up the momentum

In the modern and somewhat cynical media age, bad news usually makes a better story than good news. This is a maxim which seems to apply particularly to stories coming out of Africa with the unfortunate result that people in the developed North know a lot more about the situation in Somalia, Sudan or Angola than about what is happening in Namibia, Uganda or Ghana. It also leaves an impression of the continent that is not wholly accurate. No one should underestimate the scale of the problems facing Africa, but a little more attention to the 'success stories' would at least allow one to have a more balanced picture.

In this Country Report, we attempt to redress the balance somewhat by featuring a nation which is widely perceived as being the 'success story' of West Africa over the past decade. Ghana was one of the first developing countries to bite the bullet of economic reform following the failure of policies based on central planning and state control. Tough structural adjustment measures have been implemented and a liberal economic framework has been put in place. And the evidence suggests that these policies have had a positive effect on the overall health of the economy, although, as is always the case when major reforms are introduced, there are both winners and losers.

At the outset, it is important to place Ghana's economic turnaround in its proper context. Most economies operate on a cyclical basis with alternating growth and stagnation (or recession). Government policies are usually aimed at minimising this 'roller-coaster' effect while at the same time ensuring that the long-term trend is upwards. Ghana would doubtless have liked to have followed this pattern but in fact, from 1973 until the early 1980s, there was a steady deterioration in the economic fundamentals culminating in a situation where ordinary consumer goods had all but disappeared from the markets and



The Courier

even basic foodstuffs were in short supply. The Government finances were in a desperate state, the local currency (the cedi) was grossly overvalued, foreign exchange was virtually unobtainable, the public sector was bloated and inefficient and allegations of corruption abounded. Translated into human terms this meant continuing misery for the long-term poor and rural population with little hope of rescue, and widespread impoverishment of the middle classes reflected in an exodus of skilled people to seek opportunities abroad.

Economically, the long climb back began in 1983 when significant growth was recorded for the first time in many years, although few would dispute that the *real* turning point came on the last day of 1981 when Jerry Rawlings seized power for the second time. (See the article later in this report entitled 'Fourth time lucky with democracy?')

'Economic turnaround'

Ten years ago, ordinary consumer goods had all but disappeared from the markets. Today, the picture is very different as this scene of street trading in Accra reveals

Despite a proclaimed adherence to socialist ideology, the new PNDC (People's National Defence Council) administration headed by Rawlings acted speedily in 1982 to stop the country's economy haemorrhaging further. Measures advocated by the IMF and the World Bank, which included a significant currency realignment, swingeing cuts in public expenditure, wholesale 'retrenchment' of civil servants and a new focus on private enterprise were adopted by the authorities. And although they meant pain for many ordinary people, Jerry Rawlings and his administration succeeded in convincing the country that they were vital for the restoration of the Ghanaian economy. From 1983 until 1990, economic growth

averaged more than 5% (comfortably above the rate of population increase which is high, at just over 3% per annum). Since 1990, the economy has slowed, but a real positive growth rate has been maintained. In practical terms, this has meant steadily rising *average* living standards, although there must be some doubt about the way this benefit has been distributed among Ghana's 16 million people.

Before turning to the current position, it is worth considering how the Rawlings government succeeded in 'keeping the lid on the situation' when implementing such a painful reform programme during the 1980s. To many people in Europe, slogans such as 'there is no alternative' or 'no gain without pain' are familiar ones coined by political leaders to justify public spending cuts or tax increases. But pain is a relative concept, and a body that has too much fat is much easier to restore to fitness than one that is suffering from emaciation. The answer appears to lie in Rawlings' unique political style which included a willingness to confront corruption and a ascetic lifestyle which accorded with the mood and reality of the time. Although he held the reins of power, he had a capacity — which must have frustrated his opponents — of sounding like an opposition leader, delivering trenchant speeches against oppression and conspicuous wealth. It is true that he took over when Ghana was at an economic nadir, and most Ghanaians, able to remember better times, recognised the need for painful medicine. Additionally, and this may be regarded as political heresy in some quarters, he did not, as leader of a military regime, have to worry about the polls. But his achievement in keeping the majority of Ghanaians 'on board' while steering the ship of state to calmer waters was still a remarkable one.

Since 1990, Ghana has succeeded in maintaining positive growth rates without quite matching the impressive performance recorded in the latter half of the 1980s. The figure for 1992 was 3.9% rising to an estimated 4.5% in 1993 with a further increase to 5.2% predicted for 1994.

It would be exaggerating to suggest that Ghana has had an 'economic miracle' over the past decade. GDP per head is still less than \$400, well behind

West African neighbours such as Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, and there are formidable economic challenges to be tackled. But what makes Ghana different is that it has succeeded in establishing a rising trend at a time when most other countries in the region are facing serious difficulties. The business environment has improved significantly and this offers hope for further development gains in the future.

Economic profile

The Ghanaian economy, in common with that of many African states, is strongly oriented towards primary production. Agriculture accounts for almost 50% of total GDP and provides employment for the majority of the working population. Industry accounts for a further 15% of GDP (compared with less than 7% in 1983) while services generate the remaining 35%.

The single most important crop is cocoa which is produced mainly by small farmers, and supplies the country with about one third of its export earnings. This proportion is substantially lower than in the recent past when the product represented between 40% and 60% of the country's exports by value. There are both positive and negative reasons for this decline in cocoa's export share. On the bright side, it reflects the relative success of other economic sectors which have increased their trade with third countries. But a large part of the drop has also been due to a severe slump in prices when expressed in hard currency terms. In 1987/88 the average price recorded by the International Cocoa Organisation (ICCO) was 77 US cents per pound. Five years later, this figure had fallen to 50 cents. The story of collapsing commodity prices is a sadly familiar one and in some senses, Ghana's cocoa sector is a microcosm of what has been happening to the key primary

products of developing countries throughout the world. On a more positive note, cocoa prices have surged recently with prices quoted for 1994 on the London futures market averaging 67 cents per pound.

It is worth pointing out that local producers were shielded to some extent from the effects of the earlier price drop by the sharp depreciation of the cedi. This resulted in higher prices in local currency terms, although, of course, it also meant general price inflation.

Cocoa production has fluctuated widely from one year to the next because of both economic and climatic factors. The forecast for 1992-93 was 280 000 tons (1964-65 — 557 000 tons, 1983-84 — 159 000 tons).

Despite the encouragement of higher prices, there are some fears in Ghana that the cocoa sector may be heading for more turbulence because of the recent devaluation of the CFA franc. Traditionally, Ghana has always vied with Côte d'Ivoire as the world's major producer. It lost its top place in the 1970s as domestic economic conditions slumped but since then it has clawed its way back, to a large extent because of Ghana's exchange rate policy which kept the cedi competitive while the CFA franc became progressively overvalued. In a single stroke, the latter currency has had its value reduced by half, and it is difficult to imagine this not having some adverse impact on Ghana's cocoa trade.

Another worry for Ghanaian (and other countries') cocoa has been the legal uncertainty which has arisen in the European Union over the content of chocolate. Three of the Member States allow vegetable oils to be added to the final product, thereby reducing the amount of cocoa fat that is required. The

Artisanal fishermen operating from the beach
'The economy is strongly oriented towards
primary production'



The Courier



Locally produced rice must compete with cheap imports

other nine forbid this. In the single market, where goods are allowed to circulate freely, this poses problems. Despite reassurances from the EU side, there are still worries in Ghana that there may be a 'downwards' harmonisation which will reduce overall demand for the raw material among the sweet-toothed Europeans.

Other food products grown in Ghana in relatively large quantities include rice, millet, sorghum, cassava and plantain. In common with other West African countries, local rice producers, often supported by development aid, are sometimes forced to compete with imports which are also part of an overseas assistance package and which are allegedly subsidised (notably from the United States). There are also cheap imports coming in from Asia. The issue is a complicated one with the desire to ensure plentiful food supplies for the urban population clashing with rural development objectives but some people question the wisdom of operating apparently conflicting policies in this area.

The forestry sector is a further important source of export earnings (\$133m in 1991) although concerns about sustainability have prompted the Government to impose severe restrictions in this area. It is estimated that Ghana lost 2% of its forest cover each year during the 1980s. The new strategy is to move towards more value-added production for export (processed wood, furniture etc).

As regards primary products, the most important growth area for Ghana is to be found in the mining sector. The country has traditionally produced a range of minerals including bauxite, manganese and gold. Production of all of these was badly hit during Ghana's long economic downturn but has recovered well since then although there are still big swings in production from year to year. Today, the bauxite industry is facing some difficulties due to world over-production but gold by contrast, is doing very well and in 1993, it

overtook cocoa as the largest single source of export earnings. This is an area which has seen heavy overseas investment and new exploration in recent times. One exception to the general upward trend in the mineral sector has been in the area of diamond production. Diamonds have been mined in Ghana for more than 70 years but since 1987, production has slumped. Recent new investment in this area, together with a reorganisation of the marketing arrangements, are expected to breath new life into this economic activity.

Despite Nkrumah's drive in the 1960s to create a modern and expanding manufacturing sector, industrial production continues to make only a modest contribution to the overall economy. Things have improved since the dark days of the early 1980s but this is one field where the Government's liberal economic policies have a definite 'downside'. In liberalising trade, the authorities have exposed Ghana's industrial enterprises to some very fierce competition and, as ministers and officials acknowledge, this has proved to be too much for a number of companies. Activities such as aluminium production, timber and cocoa processing and cement manufacturing have all suffered as a result. Economic purists argue that this is a necessary part of the adjustment process — industries that were inefficient and heavily protected should be allowed to go to the wall: in their place, new production will emerge in those areas where Ghana has the necessary comparative advantage. It is a fine theory for countries which are at a similar stage of development and which operate on the famous (and now somewhat clichéd) 'level playing field' but one wonders whether it can always be applied to the situation of


developing countries. It is true that Ghana can compete on wage costs, but in most other respects — capital requirements, managerial and technical expertise, marketing skills and so on — it has a lot of catching up to do. Despite this, the Government is committed to closing the gap and, within the broadly free market context, it is trying hard to identify and develop those areas where a comparative advantage can be exploited.

Government strategy

This is an appropriate point to turn our attention to the strategy adopted by the Government under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) which was launched in 1983. Key components of the programme have included a fundamental restructuring of institutions, a drive to achieve economic diversification, an effort to remove the imbalances in the state budget, liberalisation of both the currency and the trading system and attracting more private investment.

On restructuring, the basic aim has been to 'roll back the frontiers of the state' by slimming down the civil service, privatising a range of state-owned enterprises and reorganising those that remain in public hands. This has led to thousands of job losses in the public sector, but has had the positive effect of reducing pressure on the budget and of opening up possibilities for private entrepreneurship in areas previously thought to be the preserve of the Government. There is disappointment in some quarters (notably among external

*Imported tractors on the quay at Tema
'In a liberal trading environment, the balance
of payments figures take on an added
significance'*





'A nation of traders?'
This is an onion seller in
Accra's Makola Market

donors) about the rate of progress in divesting state-controlled companies but the authorities are probably moving as fast as is feasible given the vested interests involved and the necessity to allow at least some time for adaptation if many of the entities concerned are to have any prospect of surviving the chill winds of the free market. Interestingly, the Government is also criticised by some parts of the opposition for moving too quickly in this regard. In addition to the various ministries, institutions which have undergone radical restructuring have included the Cocoa Board (Cocobod) which has lost half of its employees, the Timber Marketing Board and the Electricity Corporation.

As regards diversification, a lot of attention has gone into expanding Ghana's non-traditional exports (see the interview with Mrs Emma Mitchell, the Trade and Industry Minister, which follows this article). In a liberal trading environment, the balance of payments figures take on an added significance, as the Government is acutely aware. If imports are flowing freely into the country, then it is vital to have healthy exports as well to ensure economic equilibrium. Unfortunately, Ghana continues to run a substantial trade deficit (\$470 million in 1992) and, because its exports are concentrated on a few primary products (notably cocoa, gold and timber), it is particularly vulnerable to events in these markets which are outside its control. Mr *Tawia Akyea*, who is Executive Secretary of the Ghana Export Promotion Council explained what his agency was doing to broaden the export base.

He emphasised that a 'scatter-gun' effect would not be effective. 'We do not have too many resources', he continued 'and we have therefore had to be selective, focusing on a small range of products in the agricultural, manufacturing and artisanal sectors.' The programme adopted by the Government has been successful up to a point, with the value of non-traditional exports rising from \$28 m in 1987 to \$68 m in 1992 but this still only represents a modest 7% of Ghana's total exports. New measures are being implementing with a view to increasing this figure to 15% by 1995.

One of the most remarkable signs of progress in Ghana's economic position is the improvement in the national finances. From a position of chronic deficits in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Government actually succeeded in recording a surplus from 1986 until 1991. Unfortunately, the country seems to have acquired one of democracy's bad habits which it is said, explains the imbalance in 1992 when there was a fiscal relaxation during the run-up to the presidential and parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the democratic habit of clawing funds back in post-election years also seems to have taken hold and Ghana has since had two tough budgets which saw significant tax increases (notably for petrol) and the reintroduction of greater discipline on the expenditure side.

On the related issues of currency and trade liberalisation, the Government took what many believe to have been a brave step in effectively floating the cedi and removing obstacles to imports. In the pre-Rawlings era, it was conventional political wisdom that currency devaluation was politically impossible but the administration succeeded in slaying this particular dragon in a series of carefully executed measures. The result was to improve the environment for exports after many years in which the currency was overvalued. The disadvantage is that there is increased uncertainty for businesses who are unable to rely on stable exchange rates and have to allow for the inflationary impact of a depreciating currency. In fact, the cedi has declined very steeply ever since liberalisation and this is one of the Government's main concerns at the present time.

The results of this, taken together with the measures to allow relatively free imports are to be seen today in the streets and shops of Accra where all kinds of imported products are freely available. This is clearly an improvement on ten years ago when virtually everything was in short supply but it does raise some worrying questions. All of The Courier's interlocutors agreed with the suggestion that Ghana is a 'nation of traders' but for the economy to prosper in the longer term, it must also hone its production skills to capture more of the home market and to expand exports.

This takes us neatly to the subject of investment. The Government is keen to attract domestically-generated and overseas money into new ventures and is offering a number of incentives with this in mind. Mr *N.T. Apotsi* of the Ghana Investments Centre told The Courier about the efforts being made in this area which included seminars and practical advice to putative entrepreneurs as well as targeted assistance to companies, notably in the above-mentioned sector of non-traditional exports. There had, he said, been a good international response to the reforms undertaken by Ghana, but he acknowledged that actual commitments were still running at a disappointingly low level. He blamed this principally on external factors and in particular, the strong level of global competition for limited investment resources.

Stability, of course, is a vital factor, in attracting investment from outside, and Mr Apotsi agreed that the perception of instability in the West Africa region created by the current situation in Togo and Nigeria and the uncertain political succession in Côte d'Ivoire were not helpful to Ghana. The unhappy events in Bimbala, 400 km north of Accra, when factional fighting left hundreds dead, did not take place until after The Courier's visit. Despite the high death toll, the general feeling is that this was a very specific and isolated incident which should not reflect on the wider achievements of Ghana in achieving progress and stability. But the fighting has certainly not helped the country as it seeks to attract investors in from other countries.

Mr Apotsi also spoke of the handicaps which limited the scope for domestic investment, and in particular, the related problems of access to loans and high interest rates. This was a theme taken up by entrepreneur *Kwame Nyantekyi-Owusu* who is the Managing Director of a local trading company with interests in agriculture, computing and consultancy. He identified the cost and availability of credit as one of the key problems that needed to be tackled and also saw a need for an improvement in the wider macro-economic climate. The continuing depreciation of the cedi made planning difficult, he argued, while local companies also faced difficulties in obtaining employees with appropriate qualifications.



Local entrepreneur, Kwame Nyantekyi-Owusu
'The depreciation of the cedi makes planning difficult'

Social challenges

So far, we have only dealt with the economic story in Ghana. Structural adjustment often comes in for criticism for being too oriented towards macro-economic aspects while ignoring the human element, so *The Courier* was particularly interested to learn how social programmes had fared under the Government's austerity programmes. To find out more, we turned to Commodore (retired) *Steve Obimpeh* and Mr *Harry Sawyerr*, respectively Ministers of Health and Education in the NDC Government, who were both happy to give a frank assessment of the challenges they were facing.

On health, Commodore Obimpeh made no secret of the fact that resources were very limited and that those that were available were 'inequitably



Minister of Health, Steve Obimpeh
'Tremendous improvements have been made in the provision of primary health care'

distributed' and sometimes inefficiently used. He also pointed out that only 65% of the Ghanaian population were within an hour's travelling distance of a permanent health facility and went on to acknowledge that 'every sector had had to shed some expenditure' as a result of structural adjustment. On a more optimistic note, however, he stressed that 'tremendous improvements' had been made in the provision of primary health care, pointing to a reduction in infant mortality and childhood diseases, wider immunisation programmes and extended family planning coverage. For Harry Sawyerr, the main tasks in the education sector included increasing access, improving the quality of tuition, making management of the system more effective and obtaining greater value for money. He spoke in particular of the emphasis that was being placed on tertiary education, pointing out that it was necessary 'to build up a reservoir of trained and specialised manpower in order to manage the various sectors of a modern economy.' While understanding the need to ensure the right macro-economic conditions, the Government also appears to recognise the importance of developing human potential. After all, what is the use of having a convertible currency, free trade, an investor-friendly environment and so on, if the properly qualified people are not there to manage and exploit the system for the advantage of the nation?

Both Mr Sawyerr and Commodore Obimpeh were keen to stress the important contribution of Ghana's development cooperation partners in their respective areas of responsibility. Ghana has received and continues to receive considerable assistance from the donor community. This is a reflection of international confidence in Ghana's policies but



Minister of Education, Harry Sawyerr
'Emphasis on tertiary education'

some suggest that it could leave the country unduly dependent on aid. This is something which the Government will doubtless have to address soon if it is to achieve its aim of greater self-reliance and 'promotion' in the medium term to the ranks of a middle-income country.

We started out in this article by saying that we would seek to redress the balance by looking at one of Africa's success stories. The reader might be forgiven for doubting whether the success is as great as is often claimed, from the description of the problems that exist and the views expressed by those whom *The Courier* interviewed. It is, therefore appropriate to conclude by re-emphasising the underlying context in which this report was prepared. All of the people interviewed by *The Courier*, from both government and the private sector, spoke freely — an encouraging indication of the prevailing political atmosphere. Their focus on current challenges does not detract from the very significant progress that has been achieved, which was acknowledged by everyone as the starting point for discussing what still needed to be done. It is evident that there is a real dynamism in Ghana today and a determination to keep up the momentum of reform in the face of formidable obstacles.

It is important to the international community that Ghana should succeed. They have invested a lot of hope (not to mention cash) in the country and the credibility of the much-maligned structural adjustment model is at stake here. Of course, success is even more important for the people of Ghana. For them, it is not a matter of proving or disproving a particular economic theory but something far more important — achieving a better quality of life. ■

Simon Horner

Profile

Area: 238 537 km²

Population: 16.5 million

Population growth rate: Between 2.5% and 3% per annum

Average life expectancy: 54 years

Literacy rate: 54%

Capital: Accra (more than one million inhabitants)

Other main towns: Kumasi, Tema, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, Bolgatanga

Official language: English

Other languages: Twi, Ga, Ewé, Nzima, Dagbani, Fante, Hausa

Political structure: Presidential system with a unicameral legislature of 200 members elected from single-member constituencies using the simple plurality (first past the post) voting system

Recent election results

Presidential election, November 1992 (3.99 million votes cast):

Jerry Rawlings	58.3%
(National Democratic Congress)	
Prof. Albert Adu Boahen	30.4%
(New Patriotic Party)	
Hilla Limann	6.7%
(People's National Convention)	
Kwabena Darko	2.8%
(National Independence Party)	
Emmanuel Erskine	1.7%
(People's Heritage Party)	

Legislative election, December 1992 (boycotted by the NPP and other opposition groupings):

National Democratic Congress:	189 seats
National Convention Party:	8 seats
Independents:	2 seats
EGLE Party:	1 seat

Currency: Cedi (1 ECU = 4975 in February 1994)

Inflation rate: (December 1993) 27.4%



GDP at market prices: (1992) 43009 billion (approx. \$6bn)

Real GDP growth:
 1992 - 3.9%
 1993 - 4.5% (estimated)
 1994 - 5.2% (forecast)

GDP per capita: (1992) \$400 (approx.)

Principal export products (1993 export figures): gold (\$468m), cocoa products (\$280m), timber (\$153m)

Main food crops: maize, cassava, plantain, sorghum, rice, millet

Other industrial crops: oil palm, cotton, sugar cane, rubber, tobacco

Other minerals: bauxite, manganese, diamonds

Trade balance: (1993 figures)

Exports:	\$1020m
Imports:	\$1663m
Deficit:	\$643m

The current account deficit for 1993, which includes non-factor services, private and official transfers etc., was \$545m

Public finances:	1993	1994 budgeted
Receipts	4673bn	41078bn
Expenditures	4791bn	41010bn
Deficit/surplus	-4118bn	68bn

The sources of the above information include recent Country Profiles of the Economic Intelligence Unit (40 Duke Street, London, UK) and the 1994 Budget Statement presented to Parliament by Finance Minister, Kwesi Botchwey on 14 January, 1994.

A strategy to broaden the export base

An interview with Emma Mitchell,
Minister for Trade and Industry

For many outside observers, Ghana, with its economic reform programme, offers an example for other countries to follow. Monetary and trade liberalisation has undoubtedly brought a new dynamism to trade in the country but it has also increased competitive pressures on local businesses and added urgency to the drive for export-oriented production. In this interview, Mrs Emma Mitchell, who is Ghana's Minister for Trade and Industry gives a frank assessment of the economic challenges and outlines the Government's strategy to tackle them.

■ *Ghana, like many developing countries, relies quite strongly on a limited range of products for the bulk of its export earnings. What success have you had in diversifying your export activities?*

— It is true that Ghana relies a lot on a limited number of export products, notably cocoa, timber and minerals, but we have achieved some success in diversifying our exports. Our main objective has been to promote non-traditional export products and to increase their contribution from 5% to about 15% of the overall total. To achieve this kind of increase, two main programmes have been adopted. The first one covered the period 1988-90 and entailed the adoption of a financial and technical support package to 70 selected enterprises, 30 each in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors and 10 in the area of handicrafts.

The result was an increase of more than 120% in non-traditional exports from almost \$28m in 1987 to more than \$62m in 1990, but despite this, the overall target was not reached. At present, non-traditional exports still only represent 6-7% of our total exports and 1% of GDP.

The second programme, which is currently under way, is what we have called the *Medium Term Plan for Non-*



The Courier

Traditional Exports. This was initiated by the Export Promotion Council as a follow-up to the previous plan and runs from 1991 to 1995. The aim is still to reach the 15% target, this time by 1995. To achieve this, however, we have realised that there are certain constraints that have to be tackled. These are associated mainly with our weak and inadequate competitive production base. Other problems have included the non-availability of finance, poor marketing arrangements, inadequate export incentives, inefficient management practices, poor pre-shipment handling, inadequate extension services and a weak infrastructure — things like ports, warehouses and telecommunications.

To be able to counteract these problems, we have adopted a number of strategies. For example, we have established 'export production villages'. This is where a group of farmers in a village come together in a kind of cooperative, to produce certain identified products that

we know are marketable. There is the provision of pre- and post-shipment financing through the Export Finance Company. We are also seeking to identify more exportable products — people don't always have a clear idea about what is likely to be marketable overseas. We are trying to raise overall quality, improve packaging and presentation, ensure the availability of good seed material and sharpen up our marketing strategies.

The Ghana Export Promotion Council has been doing a lot by way of training — short courses, seminars, workshops and so on — in all the regions of the country, including some of the production villages I mentioned, to teach the farmers the basics. These measures to help diversify the export base are aimed, obviously, at increasing export earnings, but also at protecting the economy from the price fluctuations which affect our still too limited range of primary export commodities.

■ *On the subject of availability of finance, is there not a problem, arising from the currency liberalisation, in that potential entrepreneurs are more inclined to put money into importing, where they can hope to get a quick return, rather than in manufacturing, where the dividends are obviously more long term.*

— Yes, that has been another factor. But there has still been the basic problem of having access to finance. Take the case of a manufacturer who needs a medium-term loan, to update machinery, for example. He has to face very high interest rates and the attendant problem of an unstable cedi, and this makes things very difficult indeed for him. And what about companies that are trying to start-up. In the past, all the banks had problems with loan recovery and, with that experience, they tend only to look favourably on customers that they already know. So people find that that even if they have a viable proposition, they often fail to get funding because they don't have the necessary track record.

■ *The figures I have seen for exports to the European Community also suggest a very heavy reliance on unprocessed goods — cocoa beans, unwrought aluminium,*

The Ghana Export Promotion Council has an imaginative approach to getting its message across. These are specially woven curtains at its headquarters in Accra



The Courier

wood in the rough and so on. Have you any measures in mind to increase the value-added component of Ghana's exports?

— Yes, we realise the importance of adding value to our traditional production. What we have done is to get the private sector very much involved in areas like the agro-based industries. Under the investment code which is presently before Parliament, and which we hope will soon be passed, we are giving various incentives for people to come and invest in the processing of products such as food, minerals and wood. In the timber sector, we are encouraging production of furniture and recently, the Government banned the export of logs. That is another way of encouraging value-added production.

Let me give you some more specific examples. Arrangements have been made to secure a joint venture to refine salt for export and assistance has been given to certain companies that are now successfully exporting fruit juice. We have also been promoting textile exports, in the form of finished garments, to the United States.

■ *The Lomé Convention was intended to be an agreement for trade as well as aid. Are you satisfied that Ghana is making full use of the Lomé trade provisions and what do you think are your prospects for expanding your markets in Europe?*

— The answer to the first part of your question is no. I am not fully satisfied

'We are trying to raise overall quality and improve packaging and presentation'
This is a display of some non-traditional export products currently being marketed by Ghanaian companies

with the use of the trade provisions of the Lomé Convention. It is true that the European Union gives preferential access to ACP countries in the form of zero tariffs on all semi-processed and processed goods, and on agricultural products not subject to the CAP. But there are other essential conditions that need to be fulfilled before this market access can be fully utilised. Some of these conditions are very stringent indeed and have been imposed merely to protect the EC market.

We have to acknowledge, however, that we also have some homegrown problems that prevent us taking full advantage of the Lomé trade provisions. These include our weak supply and production base which makes it difficult for us to be competitive, and difficulties in gaining acceptability for our products on the European market, because of either poor quality or unattractive presentation. There is also a problem of ineffective promotion.

On a more positive note, both ourselves and the EU have taken steps to tackle these difficulties. Our European partners have shifted the focus of their assistance to improving the industrial capabilities of ACPs. For our part, we have

recognised that we need to increase and diversify our exports to take advantage of the single European market and have taken a number of measures to remove the constraints I referred to. These are aimed, among other things, at improving the quality of our products and making packaging more attractive. We have also adopted intensive marketing strategies designed to penetrate new markets. We now have strong representation in major cities of the EU whose job it is to promote Ghanaian products and we participate in important trade fairs in Europe. As for our domestic environment, our policy is to have a realistic exchange rate for the currency which enhances our competitiveness. We are also striving to rehabilitate our infrastructure so as to remove some of the practical constraints at this end, and in our fiscal policy, we make sure that we don't tax exporters in a discriminatory fashion.

■ *Do you think that there is any scope for enhancing regional trade with neighbouring countries in West Africa?*

— Trading activity in the region goes back a long way, predating, in fact, the medieval kingdoms that existed here. The commerce was in products such as salt, cola, cattle, gold, spices and cowries.

Nowadays, we have ECOWAS which formalised the existing trade between the countries of the region. Its eventual objective is to bring about an economic union of the 16 West African States. The ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) is designed to reduce tariffs between Member States and, ultimately, to eliminate them altogether. Other strategies include adopting a common external tariff, removing non-tariff barriers, a scheme to compensate member states for tariff revenue losses, simplifying customs and immigration procedures to facilitate the movement of goods and people, reducing the number of checkpoints on the international highways linking the member states, introducing an ECOWAS travel certificate and the establishing of a monetary zone as a prelude to monetary union and a single currency. The situation at the moment is that more than 200 manufactured commodities originat-



Views of the docks at Tema. Trade should benefit from the ongoing rehabilitation of Ghana's port infrastructure

ing in the region enjoy preferential tariff treatment within the ECOWAS area.

As for enhancing regional trade further, there are a number of ways in which this can be achieved. In the first place, it would help if all the ECOWAS conventions and protocols were to be ratified by the Member States. At the end of June 1993, only Ghana had ratified all of the 28 instruments in question. Measures to open up the regional market for trade among ECOWAS countries are still needed and we need to establish banking relations between the member countries to facilitate currency transfers. We should also like to see the removal of quantitative restrictions on trade and payments.

■ *What difficulties do you face in trying to stimulate industrial development in your country?*

— The primary focus of the Ministry of Trade and Industry is the development of a more internationally competitive industrial sector with emphasis on local resource-based industries which have a capacity for export and efficient import substitution. In trying to stimulate such industries, a number of constraints have been identified, some of which relate to the implementation of the structural adjustment programme. Take the lack of credit, for example, which I mentioned earlier. Due to the implementation of tight monetary policies under the SAP, there has been inadequate credit to



help the private sector stimulate production. They have found it difficult to get working capital, or loans for rehabilitation and equipment. Where the credit is available, it is very costly, because the interest rates are high. It also happens that the Government 'crowds out' the private sector in the credit market. So while the thrust of the SAP is correct, there is an urgent need to overcome this particular problem in order to get the manufacturing sector working.

Another constraint relates to the continuous depreciation of the cedi. This has eroded the capital base of most industries, making business planning difficult and causing wider uncertainty in the economy.

Under our trade liberalisation policies, the tariff system has been rationalised. Rates have been reduced and the range between them narrowed in order to remove distortions. But the effect of this

policy has been to expose many weak industries to competition and a number of them have all but collapsed.

Given the structural weaknesses which I have already spoken about, Ghana's industries have not been able to take advantage of the liberalised trade regime and compete with imports. Consequently, the benefits of trade liberalisation are not being fully realised by the country.


Other difficulties relate to the general institutional and legal constraints that affect production, particularly for exports. But the Government has recognised these problems and has taken firm measures, notably in the most recent budget, to address them.

■ *What is your attitude to the so-called 'informal' sector of the economy? Is it a source of entrepreneurial dynamism or an impediment to real economic progress?*

— The informal sector is usually characterised as one where the operators are small, unrecognised and do not pay tax. In Ghana, it includes a series of unstructured economic activities that are largely labour-intensive, depending mainly on rudimentary technology and involving only marginal production. Informal operators can emerge in almost any economic field, as a response to unmet needs, and thriving on their own instincts for survival. The contribution of this sector to the Ghanaian economy has gained wide acceptance.

While in the rural areas, agriculture is still the main employer, informal economic activity is clearly a major potential source of jobs and income. To give you a specific example, of the 60 000 civil servants who have been redeployed, some 30% were absorbed by the informal sector.

So, to summarise, the informal sector is important to the Government for a variety of reasons: it is capable of generating a lot of employment, it is flexible in the use of inputs and technology, it has a low entry barrier because capital requirements are low, it provides an opportunity for entrepreneurial growth through the acquisition of basic business acumen, it provides training for apprentices in various areas and it is able to recycle



The Courier

industrial, household and agricultural waste.

One further area where it has played a significant role is on the financial side. The informal financial sector includes credit unions, rotating savings, local money lenders and various other non-bank operations.

So it is obvious that it offers a lot of potential in the economic development of Ghana. The problem is that its ability to contribute to the growth of the *formal* sector is seriously impaired, because there is no real link between the two. That is why we are drawing up programmes, with the support of the UNDP, to try to build a bridge between the sectors and coordinate their activities. In that way, we aim to bring benefits to the whole economy.

■ *In a recent feature on Ghana in the Financial Times, it was stated that, in order to catch up with the newly-industrialised countries of Asia, such as Thailand, you would need to see a big increase in private sector investment in export-oriented manufacturing industry. Is this a realistic aim and how does it square with the Government's insistence on placing small-scale agriculture at the heart of its economic policy?*

— It is true that we need to see a big increase in private sector investment in those industries that are geared towards exporting. Our manufacturing sector has a history of over-dependence on imported raw materials, low export potential and weak integration with agriculture.

The accelerated development programme introduced after independence placed a high premium on state-

Street trading in Accra.

'The informal sector provides an opportunity for entrepreneurial growth through the acquisition of basic business acumen'

owned import substitution industries. This policy involved imports of raw materials and machinery which created pressure on foreign exchange. The result was a disequilibrium in the external payments position of the country.

Prior to 1983, the small-scale private sector was undeveloped and strategic industries, which could have provided a springboard for the development of other industries and for job creation, were left unattended. Since then, we have privatised most of these enterprises which were in state hands, the consequence being that the private sector has come to be seen as the engine of growth. But it needs to see a number of improvements, including the infusion of modern technology, new managerial skills, private foreign investment (both direct, and in the form of joint ventures) and the development of the capital market.

Regarding your point about agriculture, I think it is imperative for us, in our situation, to concentrate on small-scale agriculture in order to achieve growth and we do not see any conflict here. As I said earlier, our investment strategy is designed to favour agro-based industries and we need to integrate the two sectors. Agro-based, export-oriented manufacturing using local raw materials represents the first step that we need to take. If we can succeed in this, we can then think about venturing into the more high-tech industries which need not necessarily depend on the agricultural sector. ■ Interview by S.H.

The politics of Ghana reviewed

Fourth time lucky with democracy?

Ghana's political history since independence in 1957 has been a chequered one. While the alternation of power between different political forces is generally seen as a positive aspect in established democracies, for Ghanaians it has meant periods of civilian rule punctuated by military regimes.

Kwame Nkrumah, whose Convention People's Party (CPP) first won an election in 1951, following the establishment of a Legislative Assembly with limited powers, led Ghana from the time of independence in 1957 until he was ousted by a military coup in 1966. Nkrumah was a staunch 'Pan-Africanist' and espoused socialist principles and self-reliance. His achievements included large-scale building and infrastructure projects, most notably the Akosombo hydro-electric project, but these schemes were implemented with little or no thought for the macroeconomic position of the country and Ghana rapidly accumulated unsustainable debts. By the mid-1960s, the population was suffering increasing hardship and the Government's position was increasingly undermined as the impact of the inevitable austerity measures was felt by ordinary Ghanaians. On the political front, Nkrumah had taken steps to suppress opposition to his rule, culminating in the establishment of a one-party state in 1964. In so doing, it is suggested that he may have sown the seeds of his own destruction — the government could now only be removed by military intervention and this duly happened while the President was visiting Vietnam on a peace-mission.


Few would deny that Nkrumah made mistakes while he was in office but he was still a towering figure in post-independence Africa and his place in the continent's history should not be underestimated.

From 1966 to 1969, Ghana's military leaders pursued an ostensibly pro-Western, anti-socialist line, but they failed to get to grips with the country's severe economic problems. The former ruling party (the CPP) was proscribed and many of its activists forbidden from taking part in politics.

When power was handed back to the civilians in 1969, the election was won by the Progress Party under *Dr K. Busia*, running on an anti-Nkrumahist platform with at least the tacit support of those who were relinquishing the reins of power. However, the Second Republic was not destined to last very long. The Busia administration fared no better in tackling the key economic problems and familiar accusations of corruption soon began to emerge. In 1972, the soldiers again seized power, and Colonel *Ignatius Kutu Acheampong* became Ghana's new leader at the head of the National Redemption Council, subsequently to be superseded by the Supreme Military Council (SMC).

If it was 'redemption' that the people of Ghana wanted, they were to be sorely disappointed. Under Acheampong, the country plumbed new economic depths, rampant corruption was alleged and there was a severe 'brain-drain' as thousands of qualified Ghanaians sought better lives for themselves and their families outside their native land. To be fair, Ghana's financial plight was not entirely the responsibility of those in government at the time. The first oil shock of 1973 plunged many oil-importing nations into economic crisis and, as a less developed state, Ghana was particularly vulnerable. But there is general agreement that mismanagement and a strong tendency to place personal financial wellbeing above the wider interests of the country, were hallmarks of this particular administration. In 1978, Acheampong was replaced as head of the SMC by Lieutenant-General *Fred Akuffo*. Shortly afterwards, civilians were brought into the govern-

Legacy of the Nkrumah era
The Akosombo Dam and hydro-electric scheme



ment, political parties were unbanned and planning for elections began, although there was no immediate improvement in the economic condition of the country.

A glimmer of light

If the story so far seems unremittingly depressing, some relief can be found in the course of events in Ghana since 1979. Political scientists enjoy debating the question of how far individuals influence the tide of history. Some take the view that they merely reflect wider trends and that if a person of apparent historical significance had not been born, their shoes would simply have been filled by someone else. From his public statements, one would not be surprised to discover that *Jerry Rawlings* was of this opinion. But there are many who would cite the Rawlings 'phenomenon' to support the opposite thesis, namely that the intervention of powerful (and sometimes idiosyncratic) characters can change the course of events, often dramatically.

The story of President Rawlings' rise to power would not look out of place in a 'Boys Own' adventure story-book. In 1979, disgusted by the endemic corruption and mismanagement of his superior officers (who were in power), the air-force flight lieutenant staged an uprising together with a small group of fellow junior officers. The lower ranks of the armed forces were apparently seething with discontent at the time over a number of specific grievances as well as the general state of the country. Rawlings insisted that the original purpose of the mutiny had been nothing more than to 'force a dialogue' with superior officers, so he must have been surprised at the events that followed. The uprising itself was clearly too small to oust the Government but when the 'conspirators' were arrested and put on public trial, Rawlings' eloquent defence of his motives tapped a well-spring of public resentment against the regime which propelled the flight-lieutenant (reluctantly it would appear) to the leadership of his country. Surprisingly, the authorities had allowed the trial to be reported in full and the response came quickly — a new and much larger uprising

in which Rawlings was 'sprung' from prison by other junior ranks and elevated to the rank of Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

While the impetus for the coup of June 4 1979 was provided by disgruntled military personnel, there was clearly a great deal of support for it among the civilian population. Rawlings found himself struggling to contain the deep anger of his military colleagues which could have led to a massacre of the ousted senior officers. At the same time, he made it clear that the objective was to return speedily to democratic rule, a promise which he was to honour in a matter of weeks when scheduled elections were allowed to go ahead. The elections were won by the People's National Party (PNP), and in September 1979 the Third Republic was inaugurated with *Dr Hilla Limann* taking office as President. During the short time between the coup and the installation of the new democratic government, a number of executions were in fact carried out, in two stages. Three former heads of state (including Acheampong and Akuffo) were among those who met their end by firing squad, and although these actions provoked condemnation abroad, there are those who believe that they were necessary, as it were, to 'lance the boil'. Feelings were running so high at the time that many feared a pogrom of all those associated with the *ancien régime* and a general breakdown of law and order. In fact Jerry Rawlings took what most acknowledge to have been a real risk when he subsequently called a halt to further executions in a political atmosphere that was still highly volatile.

The PNDC era

Many Ghanaians must have hoped that the dramatic events of 1979 would usher in a new era of clean and efficient government. In the event, the Third Republic was to be as short-lived as the previous attempt, a decade earlier, to make constitutional government work. The Limann administration, it must be said, was faced with a curious political situation. Jerry Rawlings, who had not himself stood for office, was widely popular among ordinary

Ghanaians. His trenchant criticisms of corruption had struck a chord with many people, and there must have been a sense that he was constantly 'looking over the shoulder of the elected politicians.' Notwithstanding this — or perhaps because of it — the authorities sought to distance themselves from their AFRC predecessors and, it is said, to undermine their achievements. People associated with the AFRC's brief period at the helm were marginalised and Rawlings himself was 'retired' from the Air Force. Accepting the questionable judgment behind this approach, it is nonetheless probably true to say that the Limann administration founded — like so many before it — on the rock of the economy. Government finances were in a very poor state and this was reflected in widespread disillusionment among public service workers. There were problems with the cocoa crop and worrying signs of a return to old, corrupt habits. Pressure built up, even from within the ruling party, and by the end of 1991 the scene was set for Rawlings' return.

The coup of 31 December 1991 was a 'civilised' affair by previous standards, with the army united in support of Rawlings' decision to take back power. The wild scenes of 1979 were not repeated but there is little doubt that the new leader also enjoyed the support of a substantial proportion of the civilian population. Power was vested in the Provisional National Defence Council whose name, in retrospect was something of a misnomer. In Ghanaian terms, the PNDC turned out to be one of the country's most enduring political institutions, disappearing only in 1992 when the Fourth Republic was established and Jerry Rawlings made the transition to 'democratically' elected President.

To the democratic purist, the 11 years of PNDC rule pose some awkward questions. It was clearly *not* elected yet during its time in office it succeeded more than any previous administration in coming to grips with both corruption and many of the country's chronic economic difficulties. It claimed to have a socialist philosophy but, in practice, it undertook a sweeping economic liberalisation programme. Painful decisions about state expenditure, which some argue would

have been impossible for elected politicians, were taken and implemented. The generally accepted view that to devalue the cedi would be political suicide was disproved, although the authorities had to resort to some clever presentation (eschewing the term 'devaluation') in the process. And, as a result, the Ghanaian economy finally began to turn around, with positive growth rates being recorded annually after the low point of 1983. The influence of the President himself in the recovery process must be recognised, together with the astute actions of Finance Minister *Kwesi Botchwey* (who still holds this portfolio). Jerry Rawlings is widely acknowledged to have a set a personal example in his own modest lifestyle. He rejected the cult of personality which often surrounds national leaders, whether in Africa, Europe or elsewhere, and took strong and well-publicised steps to root out corruption in his own government departments. He also seems to have had a Churchillian ability to engender a positive response from Ghanaians even when all that he could offer was the equivalent of 'blood, sweat, toil and tears'. It may be that he was simply there at the right time to capture the mood of a country grown weary of political instability and economic chaos, but most commentators believe that his unique brand of leadership has been a significant factor in Ghana's rehabilitation.

Back to democracy

In contrast with previous constitutional upheavals, the latest transition from military to civilian rule, which took place in 1992, proceeded relatively smoothly. Although the PNDC Government found favour with the international community for its economic measures, it could not ignore the winds of political change sweeping the world following the collapse of communism. Thus it was that in 1992 the Fourth Republic came into being, complete with a liberal constitution, an elected presidency and a re-constituted Parliament. Of course, the PNDC regime was not universally popular and there were always opposition forces who resented their lack of a role and believed that they could run things better.



The Courier

When Jerry Rawlings stood for the Presidency under the NDC (National Democratic Congress) label, he faced opposition candidates in a campaign which outside observers broadly pronounced to be free and fair. Rawlings' defeated opponents did not share this view, however, and decided, as a result, to boycott the subsequent Parliamentary poll. As a consequence, the 200-member house is dominated by the NDC and its allies while significant opposition parties have no representation. While it is not always easy to assess the claims of those who have won or lost elections about the fairness of the electoral process, the prevailing opinion is that the 1992 results reflected the wishes of the majority in Ghana although many regret the complete absence of opposition spokespersons in Parliament. The New Patriotic Party, while still protesting the outcome of the Presidential poll, has not succeeded in mobilising international opinion in favour of a rerun and now shows signs of wishing to 'come in from the cold'.

To an outside observer, even if the opposition claims are true, Ghana is clearly a pluralist country. There may be a government-run press, but private newspapers also circulate freely and it does not take long to discover those that do not support the Government. Indeed, some of the items they publish could never appear in the newspaper of many so-called 'mature' democracies for fear of provoking litigation. The opposition parties are also able to operate freely: staging press conferences, issuing pamphlets and campaigning actively on a wide range of issues.

Press diversity

'Private newspapers circulate freely... and it does not take long to discover those that do not support the Government'

And virtually everyone agrees that the highest judges in the land are able to deliberate without interference from the political establishment. In short, there appears to be a healthy democratic atmosphere, notwithstanding some concerns about the mechanics of the system.

As an illustration of this, *The Courier* publishes, in the articles which follow, the views of two politicians — one government and one opposition — on some of the key issues facing Ghana today. And to round off this section on Ghanaian politics, we also profile the head of one of the country's newest institutions, the Human Rights Commission, whose job is to protect ordinary citizens from arbitrary state action.

Three times in the past, Ghana has sought and failed to establish constitutional government based on democratic principles. Whether the latest attempt initiated in 1992 will prove any more successful remains to be seen. But most agree that the circumstances — both economic and political — are more propitious than on previous occasions and there seems a genuine commitment from both government and opposition to the goal of democratic stability as the best basis for tackling the economic and social challenges the country still faces. The majority of Ghanaians must also be hoping that this time will be 'fourth time lucky'. ■ S.H.

'Democracy is on course' says Speaker Annan

Mr Justice D.N. Annan, who is Speaker of Ghana's Parliament, is a key figure in his country's new pluralist political system. He presides over a single-chamber legislature of 200 members, which was first elected in 1992. In this interview with the *Courier*, he gives us his views about the progress of democracy in Ghana and makes a plea for all countries struggling to undertake political reforms in difficult economic circumstances. We began by asking Speaker Annan about the role of Parliament under the constitution of the Fourth Republic?

— The parliamentary system is not something that is new to Ghana. We have tried it before under the First, Second and Third Republics and basically, the functions of Parliament remain the same. Its best-known task is the legislative one. Parliament has the sole authority to make laws and these are usually proposed by the executive. Although a private member can put forward a measure, it doesn't stand much chance unless it is backed by the Government. This applies to all the areas in which the constitution requires that there should be legislation.

In addition, like other Parliaments, we have the sole authority to provide for taxation. The Government must come to Parliament whenever it needs to raise revenue, whether under the consolidated fund or from any other public source. So, for instance, the annual budget is now before Parliament and we are considering a range of tax measures presented by the executive.

Then, of course, under the Constitution, there is also our duty to scrutinise the performance of the ministries and the departments that operate under them. We look at the performance and monitor the actions of all public organisations and, where appropriate, follow that up with recommendations to Government. This is



done through the committee system which is a very important aspect of our parliamentary function. Committees have been set up which deal with virtually all the activities of government — foreign affairs, local government, justice, health, education, transport, communication and so on.

■ *Are ministers Members of Parliament?*

— Under the Constitution, the majority of ministers must be MPs. That rule does not apply to cabinet members but to the ministerial team as a whole. What we have in practice is a situation where most cabinet ministers — the most senior members of the government — are not members of the House but the majority of ministers overall must be MPs.

■ *And cabinet ministers are appointed by the President?*

— Yes, but they have to be approved by Parliament. Ministerial nomi-

nations, which are made by the President, must be submitted to an appointments committee of the Parliament for vetting. In other words, the President cannot appoint a minister — whether a cabinet member or a more junior minister — without the approval of the legislature.

■ *So, broadly speaking, it resembles the system in the USA?*

— Yes, it is closer to the American presidential system than to the Westminster model although, in one important respect which I have already mentioned, it is a hybrid of the two. This is the requirement that the majority of ministers be MPs. All ministers have to sit in Parliament under the Westminster system while in the USA, the approach is to keep the legislature and executive completely separate. Hopefully we can derive the advantages of both of these approaches in the hybrid system we have adopted.

■ *What about your own role as Speaker? Is that closer to the American or the British model?*

— This is a question I am trying to decide for myself! Here, we are trained mainly in the British tradition. Indeed, the book which guides me in matters of practice and procedure is *Erskine May* which is very well known to British legislators. But the role of the Speaker at Westminster is not quite the same as that of the Speaker in a presidential system. Of course, they do have certain things in common. Within the House, the Speaker has to maintain a balance between the various parties and in that particular context, he must be seen to be acting independently.

He must be fair to all the shades of opinion represented, especially the minority parties. Impartiality is important because there will be times when the Speaker has to make rulings on points of contention which divide the parties. But beyond that, the Speaker is likely to be more of an active politician in a presidential system than is usually the case under the Westminster model. If you look at the USA, you see that the Vice-President actually presides over the Senate while the Speaker of the House of Representatives may well be a close ally of the President. This is the approach we have here under the Fourth Republic.

Absence of opposition

■ *You mentioned the requirement for you to be impartial and fair in your dealings with all sections of opinion within the House. But various political groupings are not currently represented in the chamber and as a result, there is no significant parliamentary opposition. What effect, if any, does this have on the way Parliament and Government operate?*

— Well, in a certain sense, it makes it easier for me. The official opposition is not in Parliament for reasons which are well known. There are three parties represented in the House — the NDC, the NCP and the Egle Party but they are

essentially an alliance. However, given the absence of the opposition, I have noticed that the members are more independent in their attitudes, and they speak more freely. If the opposition were there, I think there would be a greater tendency on the part of government supporters to stick together.

■ *Given the situation you have just described, how would you assess the health of Ghanaian democracy?*

— Well, I certainly think that democracy is on course. We have a firmly entrenched multi-party system. It is unfortunate that the opposition parties are not in Parliament but they are very active outside. They hold rallies and issue statements, and there is no impediment whatsoever to their activity, which is good for democracy.

In addressing this problem of their absence from the House, what I have done in terms of Parliamentary activity, is to encourage them to use various possibilities that are open to them. For instance, while they cannot come to the floor of the House — that is forbidden because they are not Members of Parliament — they can come to the committees, and I have issued a general invitation to them to exploit this opportunity. The NPP, which is the main opposition grouping, has taken up the invitation, although the others have yet to do so.

Let me give you some examples of this. Last year, I invited them to submit their views to the finance committee. Not only did they present a memorandum but they actually came with a delegation. I facilitated their appearance before the committee and they then had a very intensive meeting at which they defended their paper, asked questions of the members and responded to questions from them. When the Finance Committee presented its report to Parliament, it took into account the views expressed by the opposition.

Similarly, when we were discussing the Serious Fraud Office Bill, which is a very important measure, we invited the opposition parties to present their position to Parliament. On this occasion, the NPP appeared before the legal committee and

the views that they presented were taken into account. As a result, the Act that was finally passed was different in certain material respects from the original bill which had been presented by Government to Parliament.

On another controversial issue, the divestiture of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, I received a delegation from the NPP. They presented a reasoned paper which was referred to the appropriate committee for consideration.

Finally, during the recent debate on the presentation of the budget, they came and were officially recognised and given a place to sit in the distinguished visitors' gallery.

So these are various instances of how we are trying to address the problem — and it *is* a problem — created by the absence of the opposition parties from Parliament. I should say that I am particularly disappointed that they are not in the House. When the problem first arose, I appealed to them several times to take part in the elections and come to Parliament. I did this because I knew that it would be healthier for democracy. I think — and this is a purely personal estimate — that they could have won about a third of the seats which would have meant having a formidable opposition bloc.

I also did this because I share a common tradition with them — the Danquah-Busia tradition¹ which, as you know, is now split between the NDC and the NPP. I chose to go with the NDC. The same is true of the Leader of the House and the Chief Whip. Others opted for the NPP. But even though we are now in different parties, I wanted them to be in the House to espouse the cause of that tradition — because it is one that is noted for its commitment to democracy. I think it is sad, therefore, that they chose not to fight the election.

¹ J.B. Danquah was a respected political figure and prominent critic of Nkrumah in the immediate post-independence period. He was detained without trial by the authorities on a number of occasions and died in custody in 1965. Dr Kofi A. Busia, was the leader of the parliamentary opposition who went into exile in 1959 and returned to Ghana when Nkrumah was ousted by the military in 1966. He was the first (and only) Prime Minister under the Second Republic, having led his Progress Party to electoral victory in 1969. He was removed by military coup in 1972.

'Fair and modern electoral machinery'

■ *Are you hopeful that the opposition will take part in the next election?*

— Oh definitely. Of course, there are certain issues that will need to be tackled. There is, for example, the question of the new voters' register. The President adverted to this in his sessional address when he stated clearly that there would be a new electoral roll and voting cards. He also said that the arrangements would be put in place long before 1996 when the next elections are due. So I am confident that these changes will be introduced.

On this particular issue, however, I should like to stress the importance of having sufficient assistance to enable fair and modern electoral machinery to be put in place. The policy originally was to introduce a personal identification card system as an important component of that machinery. Unfortunately, I am afraid that we have had to abandon that for reasons which are purely financial. So we are now going to have a new voters' register and although, as I mentioned, we will be issuing polling cards, it won't be a proper ID card system. Nobody wants this situation. We certainly don't in the Parliament or in the Government and none of the parties is happy about the decision. But we have simply not been able to raise suf-

ficient funds to be able to link the two. So now we are relying on what is virtually the old system where people go to vote without proper ID. We need something to take care of the difficulties which arise on polling day over identification of electors.

■ *What about the system the Indians use, which is to mark the voter's hand with an indelible ink once they have cast their ballot?*

— We already do that. In fact, the ink comes from India. But we need to supplement this with a card system which will put the issue of identity beyond dispute.

■ *Do you think that the emergence and consolidation of democracy in Ghana will have a positive effect on economic development? Is there a link between the two?*

— Yes, definitely. Those of us who came up through the PNDC have said for a long time that there is a clear causal connection between economic development and democracy. However, in our case, during the PNDC era, we thought that there was an element of prioritisation involved. Given the difficult circumstances

that faced us, we felt that we had to look to the economy first before tackling the political problem. We have been criticised for that but I still believe it was the right decision given the massive decline of the economy that had taken place.

It is my opinion that a programme of economic recovery and structural adjustment is bound to present certain difficulties and that we were lucky to be able to do it the way we did. Other countries have not been so fortunate. Look at Zambia, for instance, where the democratic system is having difficulty coping with the demands of structural adjustment.

I am concerned that newly emerging democracies should not be held back in their political development by economic problems. The industrialised countries need to recognise the extent of the economic problems that democratising countries face and to appreciate the importance of economic assistance in these circumstances. Otherwise, the whole process of democratisation will be imperilled. Structural adjustment is not easy for any country but it is particularly difficult for developing states which also face lower prices for their export products. It imposes certain hardships upon the people. These hardships must be recognised, and appropriate support given.

I am not convinced that the present systems of support adequately address this issue. The World Bank and the IMF support structural adjustment, which is good as far as it goes, but it doesn't go far enough. There are programmes which address the social dimension of adjustment and the negative impact that it has on vulnerable groups but I think the time has come for a Round Table to discuss how these different programmes of assistance can be institutionalised and made more responsive to the actual needs of the people.

In other words, I think there should be a more holistic approach in dealing with the assistance that is made available. Otherwise, democracy will be at risk, not from internal mismanagement, but from circumstances that are largely beyond the control of governments. This is something that is especially important for the ACP countries. ■ Interview by S.H.

Independence Arch in Accra commemorates Ghana's accession to statehood in 1957. But the road to freedom and justice is a rocky one for many developing countries and Speaker Annan fears that the harsh effects of structural adjustment could 'imperil' the democratisation process



An opposition viewpoint

The Courier speaks to Professor Albert Adu Boahen, leader of the New Patriotic Party

Professor Albert Adu Boahen, who leads Ghana's New Patriotic Party (NPP) is generally acknowledged to be 'leader of the opposition' despite the fact that the NPP is not currently represented in Parliament. He was the runner-up to Jerry Rawlings in the presidential election of November 1992, but his party decided to boycott the December 1992 Parliamentary election, alleging irregularities in the earlier poll. Since then, tension between the NPP and the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) has subsided to some extent and the two parties recently held exploratory talks on a variety of issues. But, as we discovered when we visited Professor Adu Boahen, the NPP is still unhappy about aspects of the new system of government and about the way it functions in practice. In this interview, we give him an opportunity to express his views about Ghana's political and economic system.

■ *What is your general assessment of democracy in Ghana at the present time?*

— On paper it appears as if everything is OK. We have had a transition from military to constitutional rule, Parliament is operating, most of the state institutions established by the Constitution are in place and the press — particularly the private press — is relatively free. But despite these things, there is still a lot to be desired. First, Parliament is effectively a one-party legislature. I admit that this is not directly the fault of the Government. It has come about because of the boycott staged by the main opposition parties, but we did this in protest against the rigging of the Presidential poll. It was done in the hope that the outside world would put pressure on the Government to restart the whole democratisation process.

Secondly, although the Government keeps repeating that it will observe the Constitution, it is not really doing so in practice. Indeed, the NPP has had occasion

to take the Government to the Supreme Court no fewer than four times to complain about clauses of the Constitution being breached. I think it is significant that we have won all four cases.

Moreover, although there is press independence in theory, the official media, including the radio and television, are clearly prejudiced against the opposition. So we don't yet have fair coverage of the opposition parties vis-à-vis the governing party and its allies.

There is also a general atmosphere of insecurity, particularly in the rural areas, because of the activities of various 'revolutionary' bodies set up during the time of the PNDC. There is still a sense of being in a military state rather than in a country whose basis is a constitution founded on the principles of respect for human rights and basic freedoms.

The only area where there has been a real improvement has been as regards the judiciary. There is definitely a fundamental change in the attitude and role of the judges — particularly those of the Supreme Court — and this is evident in the decisions that have been handed down. I am not saying this simply because these have gone in our favour but because they have been made in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the Fourth Republic Constitution. So this is one area where I think we can say that the democratic process is really on course.

■ *On the issue of upholding individual rights and preventing abuses of power, the newly-established Human Rights Commission has been given a very wide brief. How confident are you that it will be able to function effectively?*

— This is a question that is not just relevant to the Human Rights Commission. It also applies to the Electoral Commission, the Commission on Civic



Education and so on. These bodies will operate effectively only if their members and officials are appointed on the basis of their qualifications and expertise, and not their political affiliation or their membership of certain pro-Government institutions. Unfortunately we have reasons to doubt whether this is so with respect to the Electoral Commission and the Commission on Civic Education. So we have very serious concerns about how effective they will be. We are also concerned that Parliament is not acting as an objective, independent institution in the way it deals with Government proposals and measures. It is little more than a rubber stamp in reality.

■ *Can you tell us about the dialogue your party has been having with the Government? It was reported recently in a newspaper that this had come to an end. Is this true?*

— No, the dialogue is continuing. Our only concern is that it is going too slowly. So far, we have only had the opening meeting where it was decided that two technical committees should be set up to consider the two crucial issues: on the one hand, the question of the voters' register and electoral reforms, and on the other, the establishment of an 'enabling' political atmosphere and a genuine de-

mocracy in which the rule of law can prevail. This meeting took place about six weeks ago and the committees have not yet been convened. So the process is certainly very slow and we are beginning to wonder whether the Government is really serious about the dialogue. Many of our members are becoming increasingly impatient and I wonder whether in fact we should continue but officially, we have not called it off. We are still putting pressure on the Government to ensure that the committees meet as soon as possible and some of us are urging that a definite, structured timetable be drawn up.

■ *Turning to economic questions, the PNDC Government and its successors in the NDC administration have, in practice, adopted market-oriented policies despite their proclaimed commitment to socialist ideology. As a party which favours market solutions, have you not had the ground cut away from you, as it were, by the actions of the Government?*

— No, not at all. The whole country knows that we have always been strong advocates of free enterprise and the fact that the Government has switched over to our way of thinking is more a credit to us than a cutting of the ground from under our feet. But — and this is the difference between us — most of those in the Government don't really believe in the free market economy and they only agreed reluctantly to adopt free market policies. Indeed, I think that the whole system was imposed on them by the IMF and the World Bank. And therefore, they are not certain about it. They don't have the conviction, determination and consistency that they should have.

They have also not been implementing the programme very well because they have had the wrong priorities. So far, they have focused on improving the infrastructure and encouraging an increase in traditional exports such as cocoa, minerals and timber. We think that priority should have been given to agriculture; the production of food, first to feed us and then for processing and export. It is ridiculous that, after ten years, we still have to import fish and rice. We can produce all the rice and maize we need to feed ourselves and to export. It was done before, during the time of the Busia government between 1969 and 1972 and in the first two or three years of Acheampong's administration. But the present

Government is not paying any attention to agriculture and agricultural productivity.

Second, even though the Government says it believes in private enterprise, it has not really done anything in practice to encourage it. For the approach to succeed, the right atmosphere has to be created. The Government has to demonstrate its commitment to private entrepreneurship but instead, we have businessmen being oppressed, high taxation, high interest rates and a depreciating currency. In addition, we have seen very few investments from abroad. How can we expect interest from overseas when people's investments are not secure, when businesses have been confiscated and so on? The private sector is supposed to be the main prop of the structural adjustment programme, but it has failed to take off and as long as this situation continues, the problems of increasing productivity, diversifying exports and tackling unemployment can never be solved.

The third aspect of present policy that we find objectionable relates to the living standards of the average Ghanaian. The Government appears unconcerned about promoting employment or alleviating poverty. This is evident from the fact that almost all subsidies on things like health and education have been removed. The cost of these services has now become so prohibitive that many people cannot afford to go to hospital when they are sick, or find it difficult to send their children to school because of the fees, the cost of books and so on. We have also seen a resurgence of diseases like tuberculosis which we thought had been eradicated, because people are not able to feed themselves properly, and cannot afford the necessary treatment when illness strikes. So socially, the situation is desperate and we believe that this is because of the wrong emphasis that the Government has adopted in its structural adjustment and economic recovery programmes.

■ *Looking at the regional situation here in West Africa, there is currently a lot of instability in neighbouring countries. What is your party's view on the scope for economic expansion and do you think that Ghana suffers unjustly from a negative perception of the wider region?*

— There is certainly a great deal of instability in West Africa which is not true of Ghana and this is something which

may have influenced some of the policies and attitudes of certain developed countries. But I would not attach too much importance to this because I think that our country is sufficiently endowed with natural and human resources to deal with its economic problems despite the instability around us. This, of course, assumes that we have an effective, incorruptible system of government and a set of realistic policies that take into account the needs and conditions of the people.

There is one aspect of course which affects our economy and that is the problem of smuggling to neighbouring countries. This will probably get worse now that the CFA franc has been devalued and it is something that we certainly have to watch. But if we can get our internal economic programmes and priorities in order, I think we can cope with this particular phenomenon.

■ *With Eastern Europe providing a new focus of attention for many industrialised countries, and the tremendous growth that is taking place in Asia, there is a sense that somehow or other, Africa has been left behind. What needs to be done for Africa to re-establish itself on the world stage?*

— It is certainly true that the continent is very much marginalised. Nothing illustrates this better than the role that Africa was made to play — or rather not to play — during the recent GATT talks. Our interests were completely ignored and we will suffer considerably as a result. Added to this is the fact that the outside world has turned a deaf ear to our persistent demands for action to stop the decline in commodity prices. What is the answer to this problem? Well it is not easy, but I think firstly that we have to aim for political stability. We need to end the civil wars, the huge refugee problems and so on, which tend to drive away some of our supporters who would like to assist us.

But I think the more important thing is to try to form groupings to deal with our economic problems on a regional basis. If, for instance, we can get ECOWAS working effectively, then we can look more to tackling our own common problems and becoming more self-sufficient than we are at present. The answer lies in African countries cooperating, trading and working together so that we can finally reduce our reliance on the countries of the developed world. ■

Interview by S.H.

Emile Francis Short

Guardian of human rights... and a great deal more

When *Emile Francis Short*, Ghana's recently appointed Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative Justice, spoke to *The Courier*, he soon made it obvious to us that he is a man who relishes a challenge. This is not because human rights violations are widespread. On the contrary, the indicators suggest that the basic civil and political freedoms set out under the Constitution of the Fourth Republic are broadly respected. A pluralist atmosphere is reflected in the diversity of the press and in the readiness of people to criticise aspects of government policy without apparent fear of reprisal.

The challenge for Emile Short, in fact, stems from the scope of his powers of scrutiny and control. As the Commissioner's official title reveals, his brief extends well beyond the investigation of alleged human rights violations to include a whole series of 'ombudsman' functions encompassing almost all the state agencies from government ministries to the armed forces and the prison service. In addition, the Commission (whose membership of three includes two Deputy Commissioners) has been charged with the task of educating the public about human rights issues. And if all that were not enough, Mr Short also gave us details of various 'subsidiary' tasks which include investigating complaints relating to embezzlement of state property and conflict of interest situations involving public officers.

The legislation establishing the Commission¹ was only passed in 1993, so it is not surprising that the system is not yet fully functioning. Mr Short himself had been in post for just three months when *The Courier* spoke to him and it remains to be seen how effective the new body will be in monitoring the powerful and extensive state apparatus. But on paper, the signs are promising — the Act allows individuals the right to complain to the Commission, not just where they feel their fundamental rights have been infringed, but also when



they believe they are victims of maladministration. A further significant aspect of the new set-up is that the admissibility rules are very liberal.

Admittedly, there is a requirement that complaints must be signed by the complainant or his agent but this is in line with most domestic and international human rights systems, which preclude anonymous submissions. By contrast, although complaints would normally be expected to be in written form, they can be presented orally, with an obligation being placed on the receiving officer to put such complaints in writing immediately. This provision is intended to ensure that access to the procedure is available to the whole population including those who may have literacy problems. In similar vein, those in charge of institutions such as prisons or hospitals are required by law to forward, 'unopened and unaltered', any letters to the Commission written by inmates or patients.

When complaints which have been investigated are upheld, there is then a two-stage procedure. In the first instance, the Commission will issue a recommendation which is sent to both the complainant and the 'offending' institution. This is not legally binding on the parties but if, after three months have elapsed, it has not been complied with, the Commission has the power to institute court proceedings to have it enforced. As Mr Short explained, 'the basic approach is

to attempt conciliation, but if this fails, we will then seek a legal remedy.'

The Commissioner, who is himself a lawyer by profession, was upbeat about the prospects for the Commission and certainly appeared not to have any misgivings about its independence. Appointed by the President — in consultation with the 'bipartisan' Council of State — the Commission members have a status that is similar to that of judges. As the Commissioner put it: 'their appointment cannot be terminated except by an elaborate process in Parliament'. On the basis of the 'independence' recently displayed by members of the Supreme Court (see the interview with Professor Adu Boahen), there are good grounds for believing that the Commission will be able to establish itself above the political fray as the guardian of the rights of Ghanaians.

More problematic perhaps is the question of resources. Mr Short indicated that the full complement of staff (at all levels) would be approximately 800. This is a significant payroll which suggests a genuine commitment on the part of the Government to the success of the system. It is planned that there should be officials (and offices) throughout the country, again aimed at ensuring that people can have ready access to the process. But there must be some doubt as to how quickly the aim of nationwide coverage can be achieved in practice. Mr Short made no secret of the fact that appropriate local expertise was in short supply and expressed the hope that Ghana's partners in cooperation might be able to render some practical assistance in this area.

The Human Rights Commission has made a promising start, both as regards the responsibilities given to it by the Government and in the obvious enthusiasm of Emile Short to get to grips with the task. And although it is too early to gauge how influential it will be, it is clearly intended to be one of the key institutions in the development and consolidation of Ghana's fledgling democratic system. ■

S.H.

¹ The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act 1993.

EC – Ghana cooperation

Recent experience and future prospects

by Franco Conzato*

Cooperation between Ghana and the European Community has been marked over the last ten years by two major driving forces. The first was the launch in 1983, by the Ghana Government, of an Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), strengthened three years later by a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Both of these were aimed at achieving an economic 'turnaround' following a decade of decline. The second was a set of innovative principles embodied in the third and fourth Lomé Conventions. Lomé III, for example, introduced new areas of cooperation in the cultural and social fields. It also provided a framework for private investment and introduced the issue of human rights and respect for human dignity. Lomé IV strengthened these areas and included further innovations, notably as regards the development of the service sector. There was a new approach too on the financing side with a much greater emphasis on grants, and for the first time, explicit support for structural adjustment programmes.

Ghana was one of the few ACP countries that was able to take maximum advantage of such innovations, following its bold commitment in 1983 to embark upon wide-ranging economic and social reforms.

In this article, we look at the major operations financed by the European Community in the context outlined above, and seek to highlight areas of both concern and satisfaction regarding the pace of implementation of programmes financed under the two most recent Lomé Conventions.

An overview of past and recent experience

The principal sectors where Community resources have been allocated are

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transport infrastructure and agricultural/rural development. As regards transport, the main projects financed were the Axim-Elubo-Aboisso road and the rehabilitation of Takoradi port. Design and tender documents have also been prepared for two major trunk roads and contracting procedures are currently under way for the Tema port access road.

The total Community allocation for transport infrastructure is approximately ECU 130m of which ECU 40m has already been disbursed. Unfortunately, a dispute between the Government and a road contractor hampered the Commission's progress on EDF-funded projects and this resulted in significant delays.

In the agricultural sector, there have been major projects dealing with support for the production and marketing of palm oil, livestock and rice. Important works in these sectors have included irrigation systems, the supply of equipment and technical assistance. (One of these projects is described in more detail in the article which follows).

With Lomé III, the era of micro-projects began. By the end of 1993,

ECU 7m had been committed and almost all of this had been disbursed. Through the Microprojects Scheme some 420 projects, concentrated in two regions, were completed. They included the construction of clinics (village and district) and schools (primary and secondary) as well as works to improve sanitation and commercial premises. A further allocation of ECU 7m is foreseen for 1994.

Another area of cooperation worth mentioning is the GRATIS programme which is aimed at establishing Intermediate Technology Transfer Units (ITTUs) in each of the country's ten regions, to provide support to the private sector. At present, 8 regions are served by an ITTU. This intervention forms part of a wider package of support made available to the private sector by the European Community since the commencement of Lomé III.

In January, an SME Development Support Programme was unveiled at a workshop on post-structural adjustment strategies. This event, held in Accra was sponsored by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and by the Commission Delegation. The programme will make

Improving the transport infrastructure – a key element for the long-term success of the Government's Economic Recovery Programme



The Courier

some ECU 4m available, in the form of term loans, leasing and equity funds, for small and medium-scale enterprises in Ghana over a period of four years.

The major objective addressed by the project — which is to create employment by promoting SME growth — was an important topic of discussion during the workshop. In particular, the project aims to respond to the needs of small entrepreneurs by helping them to present acceptable financing proposals to local financial institutions so as to give them better access to investment and working capital.

Past experience with the financing of SMEs has not been wholly satisfactory. The main instrument used, lines of credit, proved to be too rigid in responding to the fast-changing conditions within the country.

The new programme seeks to overcome this problem by setting up a Fund which should operate on a competitive basis both on the side of the financial institutions involved and on the part of the ultimate beneficiaries (the borrowers).

Under the Stabex scheme, Ghana was allocated some ECU 23.2m for export losses incurred during the 1990-91 period. ECU 15m of this has already been disbursed. The funds have been directed towards sustaining the reform process currently under way in the cocoa sector. More specifically, the Community is helping the Ghana Cocoa Board to embark on a major reorganisation which involves re-trenchment and retraining programmes, as well to fight *Swollen Shoot Disease* which destroys the cocoa crop.


An important area of cooperation has been the Community's direct support for Ghana's structural adjustment process. It consists mainly of assistance for the country's balance of payments through the financing of imports from Europe of capital equipment, intermediate goods, petroleum products, fertilisers and other agricultural items. At least 70% of the local currency (cedi) proceeds of these imports is used to finance the recurrent expenditure of the Ministries of Health and Education, with a particular emphasis on primary health care and primary education. This forms part of the effort to mitigate the effects of the stabilisation measures on low-income families.

Other activities have included a multi-annual training programme under which finance was provided for a cooperative arrangement between the University of Kumasi and a European university. This scheme included the funding of several scholarships.

Since Lomé III, the Community has also financed Ghana's participation in trade fairs, under a regional project.

An important part of the overall cooperation relationship is the contribution of the European Investment Bank. The EIB has been active in Ghana since 1978, financing, among other things, the principal activity of the Volta River Authority which is energy production. At the

A view of one of the quays at the Port of Takoradi, prior to the completion of rehabilitation works. The Ghana Ports Rehabilitation Project has received substantial support from the European Community



This is the logo of the Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS), which is supported by the European Community and a range of other donor agencies. The 'OHEMA NYINKYIN' symbol used as the centrepiece, conveys the message; 'I must change myself and play many parts', a reference to the adaptability that is needed for the successful implementation of appropriate technology transfer programmes. The clamp and welder's torch, which appeared in the 1992 GRATIS Annual Review, signify respectively the consolidation and strengthening of the project during that year

end of December 1993, the Bank approved a new loan to the VRA of ECU 40m for the construction of a thermal plant in Takoradi.

Future trends

As stated at the outset, cooperation between the European Community and Ghana has, since 1983, been strongly influenced by the economic reform process undertaken by the Government. Over the same period, the Government has mapped out an accelerated growth strategy which is aimed at raising the country into the 'middle-income' category by the year 2007. More importantly, this strategy seeks to bring about significant improvements in poverty alleviation.

Among the crucial factors which have to be addressed are development of human resources and private sector promotion. The European Commission has

TABLE 1

Period	Breakdown of financing	Allocation (ECU m)
1975 Lomé I	National Indicative Programme (NIP)	50.0
	Stabex (timber)	5.1
	Emergency Aid	2.7
	Risk Capital	0.2
	Interest rate subsidies	1.8
	Regional projects	13.7
	European Investment Bank (own resources)	10.0
1980 Lomé II	National Indicative Programme	60.0
	Stabex (cocoa)	85.5
	Emergency aid	3.8
	Risk capital	16.0
	Regional projects	14.8
1985 Lomé III (NIP signed in February 1986)	National Indicative Programme	97.5
	Stabex (cocoa)	6.9
	Risk capital	23.0
	Interest rate subsidies	4.1
	European Investment Bank (own resources)	21.0
1990 Lomé IV (NIP signed in July 1991)	National Indicative Programme	114.0
	Stabex (cocoa)	16.4
	European Investment Bank (own resources)	20.0

paid close attention to these factors. In a recent financial agreement signed with the Ministry of Finance, it was decided to make the equivalent of ECU 29m available to the private sector for the second Structural Adjustment General Import Programme. In addition, the cedi income is, once again, to be used to provide finance for the health and education sectors which are key components in human resource development.

A new programme is also being prepared which aims at improving the local management of public funds in an attempt to ensure that financial resources made available by EC-funded programmes can be spent at both regional and district levels.

Besides the aforementioned SME Development Programme, two further projects aimed at the private sector are under preparation. One will establish an incentive scheme and provide technical assistance to the woodworking sector, with an emphasis on exploiting lesser-used timber species, while the other is designed to support investment in private plantations.

A new area of intervention is in the field of protecting natural resources. To this end, a Protected Area Development

Project is in the process of being identified. A commitment of approximately ECU 6m is envisaged here.

One area where the Commission has shown increasing interest is employment generation. A report on this subject, jointly sponsored by the Commission and the International Labour Office' was pre-

sented to the Government in December. The follow-up phase is still under way and it is anticipated that specific project proposals will be drawn up during 1994.


Conclusion

This brief outline summarises the present state of play in EC-Ghana cooperation in the light, both of the country's effort to sustain its economic recovery programme and the possibilities available to support this programme under the two most recent Lomé Conventions. It is clear that Community-funded activities are designed to fit in with the country's medium-term objectives with regard to accelerated growth and poverty alleviation. The Community fully recognises these objectives and this is reflected in the mix of programme and project development assistance which is provided. And although the pace of implementation has sometimes been erratic, the overall climate remains encouraging.

Finally, the process of democratisation and decentralisation, which has accelerated since the Constitution of the Fourth Republic gained popular approval in 1992, deserves a mention. This process presents new challenges and the Community, in accordance with the Lomé framework, is willing to help tackle these in order to help Ghana to achieve and sustain a higher stage of development within a democratic environment. ■

F.C.

Exam time in a Ghanaian secondary school. Cedi funds generated under the General Import Programme are used to support the activities of the Education Ministry



Ghana Ministry of Information

The Dawhenya Rice Project

by Bas van Helden*

Over the past ten years, Ghana has made considerable progress in its efforts to liberalise the economy and stimulate entrepreneurial activity. The effects of this policy are visible in the streets and markets with many Ghanaians actively engaged in trading and the provision of services. But while commerce is booming, the authorities recognise that productive activity in the country needs to increase as well. In this article, the author, who is the Rural Development Adviser at the EC Delegation in Accra, describes a rice project supported by the European Union, which aims at boosting the country's self-reliance in the agriculture sector.

The Dawhenya Smallholder Rice Irrigation Project is located some 40 kilometres east of Accra, close to the main road to Lomé in neighbouring Togo. The project has a history going back to the early 1960s when it was first conceived as a large-scale cooperative farm with irrigated rice cultivation and livestock development. For irrigation, it was to use low-cost earth dams, with a high ratio of water storage to earth moved. It was intended to serve as a blueprint for similar projects on the black clays of the surrounding Accra Plains and other suitable areas in Ghana.

In 1962, the State Farms Corporation began cultivation on about 60 hectares. Later in the same decade, the Ministry of Agriculture organised individual farmers from the Prampram and Dawhenya areas. The project was expanded with the help of hundreds of volunteers from schools and universities, joined by others from military camps and offices.

Some of the volunteers settled on the scheme. These were joined in 1979 by a number of Government staff and in 1983 by young Ghanaians returning from Nigeria. Around that time, it became clear that the scheme needed major improvements and studies were conducted with a view to undertaking its complete rehabilitation. The works were to cost an es-

timated ECU 3.2m of to which ECU 0.8m came from the Government of Ghana with the EDF providing the balance. The rehabilitation work was carried out in 1989-91.

The scheme is now fully operational with some 240 farmers cultivating nearly 200 ha of rice. The normal allocation is one hectare per farmer although some of those admitted to the scheme more recently are working an area of about half that size. Since the rehabilitation, the system has worked to the full satisfaction of the farmers. Water is pumped during the night from a large reservoir held by a dam to a storage reservoir at the highest point of the scheme. From there, it is distributed by gravity to the individual plots.


The project has built on the rice culture that has been practised at Dawhenya since the 1960s. An intensive, high input/high output rice production system has been introduced and the yields ob-

tained are the highest in Ghana. Average yields of 6.7 tonnes of paddy per hectare have been recorded, although a considerable number of scheme farmers produce substantially more. To date, the record, is 9.4 t per ha. The Secretary of the Dawhenya Farmers' Cooperative has, in fact, won a prestigious national prize for his performance.

Much of this success can be attributed to the timely supply of farm inputs and to good cultural practices. Fertiliser application is well planned and, at the early stages, emphasis was given to the selection of suitable rice varieties to replace the single variety which had been used on the project for 20 years without resupply of foundation seed. This seed had deteriorated, providing crops with low disease-resistance and low yields. On-site trials were established using seed obtained

'Water is pumped to a storage reservoir at the highest point of the scheme from where it is distributed by gravity to the individual plots'

These are the inlet pipes at the pumping station by the lower reservoir



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When *The Courier* visited Dawhenya, the harvest was in full swing. Here we see the crop being cut (top left), threshed (top right) and transported to the storage area



from the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria and from other sources. On the basis of site trial results on the scheme, five varieties were selected for multiplication and three of these were used during the last cropping season.

This is not to say that everything in the project has been plain sailing. During the second half of 1992 and the first half of 1993, planting could not take place as there was insufficient water in the reservoir. Rainfall had been lower than normal and this, combined with a relatively large rate of evaporation from the catchment area meant that the reservoir could not be adequately filled to meet the project's water requirements.

This, of course, caused considerable difficulty for the Dawhenya farmers who were forced to seek other sources of income. With few alternatives available locally, it was a relief when it became clear during June 1993 that the situation was returning to normal, and the farmers lost no time in returning to their plots to begin cultivation again.

It is also evident that the human factor has a role in the successful history of the project. The Dawhenya farmers have a high rate of literacy. This characteristic is reflected in their easy understanding, reception and adoption of cultivation practices. It also makes training easier and facilitates organisation of the farmers.

The project cannot be seen apart from its socio-cultural surroundings. A particular feature of significance to the project is the taboo against the use of agricultural implements — hoes, cutlasses, ploughs etc. on a Friday. On that day of the week, the only permissible farming activities are bird-scaring, hand picking and fertiliser or chemical application.

The people of Dawhenya bury their dead almost immediately but later collective funeral ceremonies are held in a nearby location. Dawhenya is a close-knit community with a high degree of face-to-face relationships. Consequently, for the whole period of the event (40 days), the community is engaged in ceremonies. As a result, farming activities are frequently disrupted during this time.

Produce marketing from the project is done by marketing women some of whom also have plots in the scheme. Farm gate prices offered by market women appear to be competitive, taking into account the occasional difficulties in selling local rice. However, payments are delayed until the rice is sold to the final consumer.

Imported rice, which is frequently preferred by local consumers because of its better grading and cleaner appearance, plays a primary role in price determination

on the local market. Since rice tends to be imported in large lots at certain times (mainly before Easter and Christmas, which are the times when Dawhenya is harvesting) there are short-term fluctuations in market prices. The obvious strategy to avoid low financial returns is to hold grain in store until the prices stabilise, but this can only be afforded by the wealthier farmers.

It is, however, not just an issue of price, says Mr *E.K. Anseré* who is co-manager of the project. His other concern is over the time it takes for the crop to be sold — it is slow during periods of heavy imports. Farmers, therefore, receive their money late and this makes it difficult for them to prepare for the next cropping season. Given the liberal trade regime that has been established under the Economic Recovery Programme, and the removal of guaranteed minimum prices, it is unlikely that the Government would consider import bans. However, current import duties of 20% provide considerable protection for local rice.

With the physical works completed and agronomic practices improved, the project is now looking to the future. The Government of Ghana is developing detailed plans to hand over the project to the beneficiaries. To date, it has been managed principally by a 20-strong team from the Irrigation Development Authority. The intention is to transfer most of the tasks to the Dawhenya Farmers Cooperative. It is for this reason that the management is now concentrating heavily on training the members of the Cooperative. ■

B.v.H.

Conversing about culture

As we all know, the concept of 'culture' is notoriously difficult to define. Most people would agree that it is (or should be) rooted in tradition, embracing elements such as language and religious belief, and finding visual and auditory expression in distinctive art, music, dance and architectural forms. It includes the way people dress, the way they organise their inter-relationships within the community and the ceremonies or rituals which punctuate their lives. As development economists have discovered, it can also influence the processes of production and distribution.

The problem of definition is not helped by the fact that culture is associated with creativity which means that it is always on the move. The metamorphosis may be less rapid in societies with only limited exposure to external influences — and there are few enough of these left in today's 'global village' — but change is

inevitable so long as humankind retains its vital capacity for inquiry and 'self-improvement'.

It is not surprising that countries such as Ghana, which were recently subject to colonial rule, should display a mixture of traditional and western cultural influences. To find out more about these influences, The Courier turned to Accra resident, Mrs Joyce Koranteng, who is active in a group bringing together women of all nationalities to learn about each other's cultures.

Looking firstly at religion, Mrs Koranteng explained that Ghana is a country of diverse faiths. Christians, of varying denominations make up the lar-

Agona (Ashanti) chief attending a durbar wearing a traditional hat made of feathers

gest single group but there is also a substantial Muslim population and almost a third of Ghanaians adhere to local ancestral religions. Nor are the distinctions between the different groups entirely clear-cut. Traditional Fetish priests still play an important role particularly in the performance of rites on festive occasions while Christmas has become a universal holiday — with a big emphasis on the children.


Of course Ghana, like many other African countries, is not ethnically homogenous itself and this is reflected in the very varied cultural traditions and practices in different parts of the country, as well as in the range of local languages spoken. The largest single ethnic group is the *Akan* which includes one of the most famous 'nations' of Africa, the *Ashanti*. Although they live mainly in the region around Ghana's second city, Kumasi, their language (Twi) is widely spoken throughout the country. Other important groups include the *Ewe*, in the east, the *Ga*, concentrated mainly around Accra and the *Gonja* and *Dagomba* in the north. Within each of these, there are many sub-groups and tribes contributing to a complex cultural mosaic.

One of the effects of this is that traditional political structures continue to operate side by side with the (largely western) state model headed by the President and Parliament. The paramount chiefs are important and respected figures who play a key part on ceremonial occasions such as during the famous annual 'durbars'. They also still enjoy considerable influence in other areas.

In the context of ceremonial events, Mrs Koranteng, who is herself from one of the royal families, explained the central significance of the drums. These are carved from special wood and come in varying shapes and sizes. They include the 'talking' drum which was used in olden times as a form of communication be-



Ghana Ministry of Information



Ghana Export Promotion Council

tween villages. People still learn the highly sophisticated drum language which may be used to convey complex messages — from the ceremonial invitation to the chief to begin dancing to the more prosaic request for something to drink!

The distinctive pattern of kente cloth



The Courier

Stools are among the most important items in a chief's regalia

Associated with the drums are the various dances which are also highly complex. Our interviewee pointed out that those taking part in the dancing had to be very careful in their movements because 'it could be very insulting if you get it wrong' — a salutary warning to any visitors invited to a durbar.

On the subject of artefacts, stools have an important role in local culture. These elaborately carved pieces of furniture are a symbol of high office and among the most important items in the regalia of the traditional chief. There is one in particular, the golden stool of the Ashanti King Osei Tutu, which is said to have descended from the heavens and no-one — not even the King himself — is allowed to sit on it. Indeed, it is not allowed to touch the ground and is only brought out on special occasions. There is, however, a replica on display in the museum in Kumasi which has an interesting story of its own. In an elaborate deception, this was presented as the 'genuine article' to the British Governor who, on discovering the significance of the King's stool for the Ashanti people, had demanded it for himself.

The Ashanti kingdom is also where the famous Kente cloth originates.

This thickly woven and brightly coloured material (usually cotton) is used in local dress as well as being a popular buy for tourists. Adinkra cloth, in which the motif is printed onto the woven cotton using hot dyes, is another distinctive material which is worn at funerals and on other ceremonial occasions.

Ceremonies marking the different phases of life, explained Mrs Koranteng, are very important to the people of Ghana. Traditionally, marriages were arranged and contracted by the families of the bride and groom with great care being taken to ensure that the match was suitable. Customary marriages are still recognised today (although they must be registered) but the external influences, including of course the Christian churches, have obviously had an impact. As Mrs Koranteng observed, without any visible sign of regret, 'Nowadays, people fall in love!'

Regarding the status of children, Ghana seems to be 'ahead' of western society in not recognising the concept of illegitimacy. This is something which has only recently ceased to have practical significance in many industrialised countries. It is normal in Ghana for the father to claim paternity and children who have been acknowledged will subsequently have a right to a share of the father's estate.

Finally, Mrs Koranteng described the traditional form of funeral service in which the family (i.e. blood relatives) have a key role. It is usual to have a 'lying in state' with relations and friends filing past to pay their last respects. Where the deceased comes from a royal household, special ceremonial drums will be used in the funeral service.

From our conversation, it was clear that Ghana has retained a rich set of cultural traditions which continue to play an important part in the lives of the ordinary people. Each of the country's ethnic groups has retained a strong sense of its own identity, but at the same time, Nkrumah's dream of giving Ghana its own national consciousness has also been largely fulfilled. Perhaps there is a lesson here for those Europeans who fear a loss of identity in the move towards 'ever closer union'. ■

S.H.

The 1994 European Election

Gearing up for the campaign

Across the European Union, the various political parties are beginning to step up their activity in anticipation of the European elections which are scheduled to take place on 9 and 12 June 1994. In this article, we take a look at some of the changes to the Parliament introduced since the last poll in 1989, discuss what are likely to be among the main issues of the campaign and consider the prospects for the main political groupings.

Changes

The most visible change to the European Parliament since the 1989 election stems from the unification of Germany. The effect of this event was to increase the population of the Community (now the Union) by some 16 million. Clearly, this 'enlargement' of one Member State by some 20% was bound to have implications on the overall composition of the Parliament. Although traditionally the smaller countries of the EC have always had EP representation weighted in their favour (relative to their share of the total population of the Community), since the first enlargement in 1973, the four most populous Member States (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the UK) have always enjoyed parity in the system. This approach, which has been reflected in the allocation of 'qualified' votes in the Council and in the numbers of MEPs, was easy to justify when each country had a population in the 50-60 million range. It ceased to be sustainable, however, when the Eastern Länder of Germany came into the picture. Since German unification, they have been represented in the Parliament by observers.

The increase in the number of European parliamentarians is not restricted to Germany. While their total representation rises from 81 to 99, the other three large EU countries also gain six extra seats each (to reach 87). Some of the less populous Member States are also given

additional places but the overall effect is to tilt the balance slightly back towards the big countries while retaining the weighted principle in favour of the smaller ones. Overall, the directly-elected membership of the Parliament will rise from 518 to 567.


At the time of writing, there was still a slight possibility that the increases agreed by the Council of Ministers would not go ahead. It was widely reported in the press that French ratification of the changes depended on a more cast-iron commitment to Strasbourg as the seat of the Parliament for plenary sessions. If the agreement is held up, in principle the old rules will still apply. Obviously, this would create significant administrative difficulties in all those countries that have introduced new electoral arrangements. The UK, with its single-member constituency system, would be particularly affected, having redrawn the boundaries to accommodate its six extra seats. It would also leave Germany significantly under-represented.

In terms of progress towards closer European Union, there are both

positive and negative aspects in the new arrangements which have been adopted. On the plus side, the Council has agreed to a Directive — which must be implemented speedily in all Member States — giving citizens of the European Union the right to vote and stand in the Member State where they reside. Each EU country has different eligibility rules in this area, but generally speaking the key concept has tended to be *nationality* with *residence* operating as a subsidiary requirement in some places. Certain countries had already taken steps to allow fellow-EU citizens the right to vote in EP elections but most 'expatriates' could only cast their ballot in their home state or through their embassy or consulate. Until recently, there were some who were disenfranchised altogether, falling between the two stools of a residence requirement which they failed to meet in their country of citizenship and a nationality rule which excluded political participation in their country of residence.

The new arrangements do not mean a complete harmonisation of electoral law as this will continue to be determined by national rather than EU

The chamber in the Council of Europe's building in Strasbourg, currently used for most of the European Parliament's plenary sessions



rules. But they do serve to ensure equality of treatment for other EU residents of a country vis-à-vis its nationals. In this respect, the European project is clearly moving forward but, for some, success in making the election a truly 'European' one will only come when the voters of one Member State elect someone who is a national of another EU country.

On the negative side, no progress has been made towards the establishment of a common electoral system. Thus, for the fourth directly-elected Parliament, each Member State will go its own way on this, despite a legal commitment to a single procedure which dates back to 1976. Eleven of the 12 EU countries currently have some form of proportional voting for the EP elections.

Perhaps the most important changes in the rules affecting the European Parliament are those which relate to its powers. For many years, the elected chamber has been decidedly the weakest in the three-tiered institutional structure of the EC, with the Council of Ministers taking most of the key decisions and the Commission wielding the most important powers of initiative. However, with the passage of time, the Parliament has gradually seen its status improve. Its authority over budgetary matters has steadily been extended and its capacity to take initiatives in wider policy fields has also grown. The Treaty on European Union took this process a stage further, although some who are worried about the democratic legitimacy of the Union's institutional set-up were disappointed with the Maastricht outcome. This concern notwithstanding, it is fair to say that the next Parliament is likely to have a more central role than any of its predecessors enjoyed. This is reflected in, among other areas, new powers of scrutiny in the appointment of Commissioners and additional areas of co-decision with the Council.

Issues

For strong supporters of European integration, one of the main regrets of the forthcoming campaign will almost certainly be the way in which so-called 'European' issues take second place to more local and national

concerns. This has always been a feature of the European elections, with national electorates more likely to register a protest against incumbent governments than to vote consciously for (or indeed, against) a particular Europe-wide platform. Oddly enough, had the poll taken place last year, when the debate over ratifying the Maastricht Treaty was in full swing in several EC countries, a much stronger 'European' dimension to the campaign would probably have emerged. The ripples of this debate will still affect the campaign in some countries — notably those where 'Euro-scepticism' continues to be expressed — but the raging controversy over competing visions of Europe has largely subsided. Instead, the key issue in all 12 countries is likely to be the economy. Recession across most of Europe has brought pain to many people, with unprecedented levels of unemployment being recorded and government budgets (particularly as regards social expenditure) under enormous pressure. There are some signs that economies are now beginning to pick up but the more fundamental debate about how to tackle 'jobless' growth will remain and looks likely to capture a high place on the political agenda. There is also the great issue of reconciling the disinclination (on the part of the prosperous) to pay taxes with the provision of a safety net for the poorest members of society which ensures that they are given the chance to escape from poverty. The EU is not excluded from this debate, of course, as Jacques Delors' recent White Paper shows, but the arguments are more likely to take place in a domestic context with the actions of national governments under much more scrutiny than those of the European institutions. And, ironically, when 'Europe' does come in for criticism, it will almost certainly be misdirected (as is now traditional) towards the Commission. The real centre of power — the Council of Ministers — will barely rate a mention.

At the 1989 elections, increased concern about the environment was reflected in the higher vote for Green parties in most Member States. Ecological problems have not gone away — and this is one area where people do see a link with the European Union. The message that pollution does not respect national borders is

widely understood and many voters look to 'Europe' as one of the key sources of policy and action. But while people are anxious about green issues, it needs to be recognised that these are likely to slip down the priority list with the economic recession. The conventional wisdom, backed by polling analysis from elections throughout the developed world, is that the economy almost always comes first in people's minds. This is particularly true when people feel that their economic security is under threat, as is currently the perception in much of the EU. According to the pundits, this tends to blunt voters' concerns in other areas, thereby making it more difficult to deliver an 'environmental' message.

It may be that foreign affairs will feature more strongly in the campaign this time, although electorates seem not to be exercised a great deal by events abroad when their jobs and wallets are threatened at home. The view that the events of the last two years in Bosnia represent a 'failure' in European foreign policy is debated in many respectable journals but it must be doubted whether it provokes much heated discussion in the corner shops and cafes. Europeans are disturbed by the horrors taking place beyond their borders but there seems no consensus either within or between countries as to how the EU should react. Politicians seem keen to keep their heads 'below the parapet' on an issue where moral repugnance and pragmatism point in opposite directions and, judging by the muted public reaction, they are doing no more than reflecting the ambivalence of those who put them in power. None of this suggests that it is a propitious time for a 'Great Debate' on the place of the EU in the world.

If foreign affairs in general seem unlikely to capture the European imagination in the coming campaign, what hope is there for those who would like to make development a key issue? The answer is, virtually none, but perhaps this is not as bad as people might imagine. Development policy has always tended to be a 'minority' interest which most European electorates rarely think about, even if they give to NGOs involved in the field. However, when they are confronted with it, they usually respond positively, supporting

the view that their governments should have policies to help tackle poverty in the developing world. In the present economic climate, to be brutally honest, it is difficult to imagine development policy 'hitting the headlines' except in a very negative way which could damage the quiet consensus that currently keeps it afloat. Indeed, the issue has recently made the front pages in one Member State precisely on this basis, with damaging allegations of links between ODA and arms contracts. If there are abuses, then the publicity will be valuable in preventing them happening again, but it could also undermine public support for the wider policy.

Party prospects

One does not have to be a renowned political analyst to realise that if the predominant issues in the campaign are economic and domestic then the results are unlikely to reveal any major 'Europe-wide' trends. Commentators agree that in several Member States governing parties are likely to receive a battering. The situation is most fluid in Italy, where much of the former political class has been discredited. In Germany and the UK, conservative administrations which have been in power for a long time are under pressure, while in France the cohabitation between a socialist President and a relatively new centre-right administration makes predictions difficult. (Which incumbent does one vent one's frustration upon?) Elsewhere, opposition parties are expected to make gains from those who have been in government for some time. In Denmark, where a spanner was first thrown into the Maastricht works, the future direction of the European Union may become an important talking point again; in Greece, the problem of 'The ex-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia', and wider concerns about instability in the Balkans seem inevitable. In the Netherlands and Italy voter fatigue may be a problem, with general elections scheduled in the preceding months. Local and regional elections will also distract attention in Germany and the UK.

One alarming phenomenon which many hope will be arrested in its tracks is the apparent rise, across Europe,

of extreme right-wing nationalist parties. Recent events in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the UK all suggest a backlash against the immigration populations of Europe. But one should not exaggerate the scale of this development. The vast majority of European voters appear to be committed to 'mainstream' parties — which support policies in favour of a tolerant, multicultural society.

What will be the verdict for Europe's political 'families' when the votes have all been added up in June? Will the Socialists retain their place as the largest single group in the Strasbourg hemicycle or

can the European Peoples Party (the Christian Democrats and their Conservative allies) overhaul them? Is the Liberal position as the pivotal third party secure or will they cede this to a resurgent Green movement? How will the extremes of left and right fare? The people of the European Union may not be electing a Government in June but, through their ballots, they are likely to settle quite a few issues about how they choose to be governed for the remainder of the decade. That is why the political commentators across the continent will be studying the results with such close attention. ■ S.H.

Parting shots

Two retiring Joint Assembly members speak to the Courier

When the ACP-EU Joint Assembly next meets in the autumn of 1994, there are sure to be some major 'personnel' changes on the European side. Most of the 70 Members of the European Parliament who currently sit in the Assembly have indicated that they will be seeking re-election in June, when voters in the EU go to the polls to choose a new Parliament. But while they must await the electorate's verdict, the names of some well-known political personalities who will *not* be sitting on the Joint Assembly's benches next time round are already known. These are the members who have announced they are not standing for re-election, either because they have chosen to retire, or because they are moving on to pastures new. Among the stalwarts of the Joint Assembly who have reportedly decided to call it a day are Mrs Cassanmagnago-Cerretti (the European co-President), Mrs Van Hemeldonck, Mrs Hermans, Mrs Buchan, Mr Verhagen and Mrs Simons. During the course of a busy week of debating and voting in Strasbourg, Mrs Simons and Mr Verhagen managed to find time to give *The Courier* some parting thoughts about EU development policy and about the work of the Joint Assembly.

Barbara Simons, who is retiring from the European Parliament in June, is a German member of the Socialist Group. She has seen lengthy service in the Assembly, first as an ordinary member and later as Vice-President, and is widely respected in development cooperation circles. Dutch MEP Maxime Verhagen (PPE) is not yet contemplating retiring from politics even if he is leaving the EP. He intends to pursue his political career at national level, having gained a high place on the Christian Democrat list for the coming general election in the Netherlands.

We asked our interviewees the same two questions: what did they think was the future for ACP-EU cooperation, and what were the best and worst aspects of the Joint Assembly?

For Mrs Simons, evidence that ACP-EU cooperation had a secure future was to be found in the series of votes which had just taken place inside the chamber on the 'mid-term review'. As the MEP stressed, 'this shows that we want the cooperation to continue and that we want to maintain its values'. She spoke in particular of the importance of partnership, political dialogue and respect for human rights and also underlined the need



Barbara Simons

for sufficient financial resources to be made available. In general, she was optimistic that the intelligent use of existing cooperation instruments would be kept going.

Mr Verhagen was also upbeat about the future although with a focus as much on change as on continuity. He took the view that recent debates, not just in the Joint Assembly, but also in the Parliament and the Council, had made at least one thing clear: 'that the principles of the special relationship between the European Union and ACP countries will still be in force after the mid-term review has been completed'. But, he continued, 'there will, of course, be changes'. He thought, in particular, that it would be necessary to alter some of the substantive 'content' of Lomé IV to take into account wider developments that had taken place in the meantime. Mr Verhagen pointed out that since the signing of the Convention in 1989, the East-West conflict had ended, communism had collapsed and there were new democratic imperatives that needed to be considered. All of these, he believed, would have an effect on the mid-term negotiations from a political standpoint. He also saw the need for changes from the economic or technical aspect, in recognition of the fact that, 'after more than 30 years of development cooperation, the situation in some African countries has actually got worse'. This, he thought, pointed to a need to improve the quality of the instruments, and where necessary,

create new ones, to enhance the impact of development cooperation. 'We should not forget,' he concluded, 'that in a time of economic crisis, European taxpayers increasingly want to be sure that their money is being well spent.'

Mrs Simons and Mr Verhagen (whom we interviewed separately) were in broad agreement when it came to what they thought were the 'best' aspects of the Joint Assembly. Both stressed the value of open and frank dialogue between ACP and EP members. Mrs Simons was particularly pleased about the trend towards greater parliamentary representation on the ACP side, venturing the view that this had made the 1994 Strasbourg meeting, 'one of the best I have ever attended'. She continued: 'Those on the ACP side don't just speak automatically for their governments but as politicians. There has been a definite change in many of the countries concerned, towards the protection of human rights and parliamentary democracy, and this is reflected in the greater freedom with which their delegates now speak. This is the case not just in the plenary but on the fringes of the meeting, and it means that a lot more can be achieved than was the case in the past.'

Mr Verhagen was keen to stress the uniqueness of the Joint Assembly, 'where ACP and European parliamentarians can meet and try to reach joint conclusions on development cooperation'. He thought that when it worked well, and consensus views on particular subjects were reached, the result could be to provide an impetus for projects and programmes to move forward. He particularly approved of the way the working group system could lead to accepted compromise positions — while acknowledging that things did not always go as smoothly as might be hoped in this regard.

This leads us neatly to the 'worst' aspects, as seen by our two retiring MEP's. For Mrs Simons, the most negative part of the Joint Assembly lies in its working conditions, or as she succinctly put it: 'Too many amendments and documents to be covered in too short a time'. Mrs Simons also put her finger on the thing that must strike so many outsiders learning about the Joint Assembly for the first time. This was



Maxime Verhagen

what she, perhaps euphemistically, described as 'a certain lack of influence'. She particularly regretted the fact that 'valuable agreements sometimes reached within the Joint Assembly have not gone on to have an impact with the Council of Ministers'. In addition, she was disappointed about the Assembly's failure to exert much influence on public opinion, something which presumably reflects its low media profile. For Mr Verhagen, 'too many amendments' was also a problem, related usually to a failure to achieve consensus at an earlier stage.

As Mrs Simons and Mr Verhagen approach the end of their mandate, it is clear that they both remain committed to the special cooperative relationship linking the ACP countries and the European Union. And, despite the occasional frustrations, they both see value in having a Joint Assembly which continues to bring together elected representatives from both sides to debate development policy and other issues.

The next time the Assembly meets, in October 1994, there will be a crop of fresh European faces to get to know. And with the Mid-Term Review negotiations scheduled to begin in May, there should also be a much clearer indication of what the future holds, both for this particular institution of the Lomé Convention and for the ACP-EU cooperation system more generally. ■

S.H.

POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT


The great issue of our time

The prediction is dire. The world is in the midst of a 'demographic explosion' and, unless the trend is arrested in this 'critical decade — the 1990s', is heading towards catastrophe. 'Why isn't everyone as scared as we are?'¹ ask two famous demographic researchers. 'Arresting global population growth should be second in importance only to avoiding war on humanity's agenda,' they claim.

However sceptical one may be about this 'doomsday scenario', we need to consider the facts. Whereas it took millions of years for the global population to reach the first billion, it has taken less than fifteen to rise from 4 bn to 5.4 bn, and it is growing at an annual rate of 97m (three births per second). Indeed, by the end of this decade, it will have grown by another one billion. Variant projections by the United Nations put the world's population by 2025 at between 7.6 bn and 9.4 bn. It is extremely unlikely that the Earth's resources can meet the demands of such a great number of people. Already at 5.3 billion, the demographic pressures on the Earth's resources are becoming unsustainable, as we have often warned in the pages of this magazine. Vast tracts of the tropical rain forests are disappearing at an alarming rate as farmlands and fresh water sources (including ground water) shrink. Pollution of the atmosphere and the seas is at its height, putting plant, animal and human lives at risk from the ozone layer depletion, noxious gas emissions and dumping of dangerous wastes.

It is, however, not only the size of the world's population that is giving cause for concern. Of far more importance, in the

¹ Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich in 'The Population Explosion'.



eyes of many demographers, is the fast rate of growth in the developing countries. They point to the fact that the global population growth rate has actually slowed down from a high of 2.1 % in the 1960s to 1.7 % at present, while the rates in the developing countries (Latin America excepted) are either constant or rising as in Africa. By contrast, the rates in the developed countries are declining.

The world, though, has not sat idly by over the demographic menace. It has acted vigorously over the past 30 years to reverse the trend. We have seen, among other measures, the creation in 1967 of UNFPA (the United Nations Fund for Population Activities) which has, for over two decades, been in the forefront of population issues. There have been two international conferences on population — one in Bucharest in 1974 and the other in Mexico City in 1984 — which produced recommendations that have inspired the formulation of policies on population at national and international levels. And then there was the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (or the Earth Summit) in Rio in 1992 which highlighted the impact of human activities on the natural environment. A third International Conference on Population and Development is scheduled for September this year in Cairo. It is expected to be heavily influenced by the environmental perspective.

Opinion is divided in the developing countries over the population issue. There are those who suspect a political motive with racial undertones, and others who see it purely as an economic issue. There is, however, a consensus that slower population growth is beneficial to economic development.

True to *the Courier's* tradition of dealing with the burning development issues of our time, this dossier on 'population and development' aims to contribute to the debate. We have a series of articles on population growth (policies, birth control and family planning), struc-

ture and distribution and their economic and environmental impacts. We also have case studies (regional and national). We believe that the dissemination of information and ideas is vital in the battle for population control. Experience has abundantly proved that.

Just as the 1974 Bucharest conference saw the emergence of the concept of birth control and family planning as the most effective means of curbing population growth, so the Earth Summit in Rio has opened our eyes to the fragility of our ecosystem and the need to intensify efforts to reduce population pressures on it.

Our understanding of the issue

Since 1974, the world's understanding of the population issue has deepened and evolved. The debate which, at first, was on whether economic development was a prerequisite for successful population policies or whether the reverse was the case, is now on how best to integrate, simultaneously, population and environmental strategies into development policies. We now know that all three are indissociably linked.

It is a happy coincidence that the Cairo conference is taking place in this, the United Nations Year of the Family. Both events are obviously connected and will be mutually reinforcing in terms of publicity.

The importance of the family in the control of growth and distribution of population need not be emphasised. The size of the family implies birth control and lately improvement in the status of women. For, although the State can employ direct and indirect means of control through such measures as an increase in the legal age of matrimony, a limit on the number of children and sanctions against offenders as in China, the choice to have a child or not remains that of the couple. Improvement in the status of women is increasingly being seen as one of the most powerful inducements to lower fertility. Migration, on the other hand, is often the decision of the family (families

will seek to diversify their sources of income in terms of location and kind of work if the environment in which they find themselves does not provide them with the security they need).

These realisations are part of the knowledge now in our possession with which to approach the population issue in the coming years in a more comprehensive, integrated and effective manner.

The absence of such an approach in the past has resulted in failure. For example, despite the fact that contraceptives are now widely used in the developing countries, the populations of Asia and Africa have continued to grow. Indeed it is estimated that 95 % of the global population growth in the coming decade will occur in the developing countries. No doubt the future size of world population will be determined by the extent to which fertility can be reduced in these countries.

Lack of serious political commitment and lack of communication between the leaders and the population at large are in part to blame for the ineffectiveness of family planning. But one important handicap has been lack of financial resources. The developing countries spend about US\$ 3.5 billion (some 0.5 % of budgets) and one billion dollars of international aid (1.5 % of total international aid) per annum on population programmes — grossly inadequate resources given the magnitude of the task. On the level of the individual, widespread abject poverty has meant widespread inability to respond to family planning campaigns.

Alleviation of poverty must be in the forefront of government thinking in the coming 30 years if the population disaster is to be avoided. It is expected that the Cairo conference will not only result in a consensus on full integration of population into the mainstream of government policy-making, but will also come up with a strategy to enhance the mobilisation of resources at both international and national levels for the realisation of the objective of slower population growth, economic progress and sustainable development. ■

Augustin Oyowe

Human impact on Earth*

It is a common misconception to think of population pressure as a matter of crowding: too many people in too little space. Like rate of growth, however, population density by itself is not the problem.

Japan, for example, with 320 people per square kilometre of land, is ranked first of 160 countries on the Human Development Index formulated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), while Mali, with only 6 people per square kilometre, is 156th. Where people live relative to the resources and resiliency of the ecosystem, the economy is more important than population size or density in determining sustainability. Even sparsely settled areas, including much of Africa and the Amazon rainforest, have difficulty supporting existing populations because habitable land is scarce and essential resources are degraded or lacking.

The number of people an area can support without compromising its ability to do so in the future is known as its *population carrying capacity*. 'Carrying capacity' is a broad concept involving many factors, from availability of fresh water and productivity of land to trade levels and amount of external debt. Far from a fixed measure, it shifts constantly with human activity.

'Human activity' is in itself a broad concept, varying widely with location, income and level of development. Essentially, however, the following interacting variables influence how population pressures impact on the environment in any given place:

- the absolute number of people using the resources;
- the level of consumption of environmentally sensitive goods, determined by lifestyle, income and socio-economic standards;

* From the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit in Focus N° 6).

- the practices used to harvest or protect resources;

- the type of technologies that draw on the resources, and the type and amount of wastes generated;

- the export levels of local resources;

- the role of social, economic and political institutions in resource management;

- the resiliency of nature.

To consider the relationship between population and resources for countries at different levels of development, Paul Ehrlich and Anne Ehrlich have suggested a formula, $I = PAT$, where I equals human impact on the environment, P stands for population factors (including size, growth rates and distribution), A equals per capita consumption, determined by income and lifestyle, and T stands for environmentally harmful technologies that supply A . There is a multiplier effect among the variables; their impacts compound one another.

The formula is intended to show how large populations in developing countries, despite limited economic and technological resources, can nonetheless impact heavily on the environment and conversely, how the relatively smaller populations in industrialised countries can have an impact as large or larger. 'Two groups in particular are responsible for a disproportionate share of environmental degradation: the world's top billion richest and bottom billion poorest,' states a report by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA).

Where human activities hurt most

At every level of development, human beings consume resources to meet basic needs for food, water, shelter and fuel. Human activities impinge on the environment most when consumption outpaces the ability of a resource to recover or renew.

In the developing world, the most pronounced effect of population pressures is on so-called 'renewable' resources: soil, water, forests. Three quarters of the people in the South live in ecologically fragile areas. Poverty forces them to exploit their limited stocks just to survive, leading to overcropping, overgrazing and overcutting at unsustainable rates. A vicious circle of human need, environmental damage and more poverty ensues.

By the year 2100, 65% of cropland in Asia, Africa and Latin America will be lost, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). In India alone, erosion, salinisation and waterlogging — by-products of the Green Revolution — have destroyed some 1.75 million square kilometres of land, an area about the size of Rwanda. Desertification now threatens one third of the world's land, affecting 850m people.

With growing populations, existing land must be subdivided into ever smaller plots. A study of 57 developing countries found that almost half the farms are now less than one hectare. Where plots are too small for even subsistence farming, as in parts of Nepal, farmers are forced onto ever more marginal lands, often destroying forest cover in the process. In



India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, more than 30m rural households have no land at all.

Rural development in a region that has almost turned into a desert in Cameroon
'Three quarters of the people in the South live in ecologically fragile areas'

The urban explosion

As population pressures break down fragile ecosystems, people are forced to move elsewhere to survive. Depleted resources are contributing to an urban explosion in developing countries, where city dwellers are expected to increase from 1.5 billion — 37% of the total population — in 1990 to 4.4bn, or 61%, in 2025. By the end of this decade, an estimated 75% of Latin America's population, 42% of Africa's and 37% of Asia's will be urbanised. Some 50 cities in the South will have over 4m people. Mexico City, the world's most populous metropolis, is expected to top 25m by the year 2000.

But promises of a better life for city dwellers are often elusive. In cities, as in rural regions, the poor are often forced to marginal areas: in this case, slums and shanty towns. Burgeoning populations not only tax infrastructures and generate waste and pollution but also increase pressures on outlying lands that supply food, water and fuel.

A curse of riches

Prosperity, too, can lead to environmental stress. Industrial development has been called 'a curse of riches'. Developed countries, with their level of economic wealth, are able to produce an abundance of goods. But supplying industry, agribusiness and — in many countries of the North — market-driven, high-consuming lifestyles place heavy demands on non-renewable energy and mineral resources. By-products of such consumption — including acid rain, ozone-depleting gases, toxic waste and accumulated rubbish — have grave and increasingly global consequences.

In industrialised societies, fewer people make a bigger environmental impact. With 25% of the world's population, the developed countries produce 50% of the world's greenhouse gases. One person in the North, according to UN figures, consumes 14 to 115 times more paper, 6 to 52 times more meat and 10 to 35 times more energy than a person in a developing country. The United States, the ultimate 'throw-away' society, generates

twice as much rubbish as any other country in the world. According to the US Environmental Protection Agency, the 1.1m tons of disposable plates and cups that Americans toss out each year would serve everyone on Earth six times over.

Newly emerging industrial societies in the South now face many of the same problems as industrialised areas in the North. At least 70% of the world's urban dwellers, most of them in developing countries, breathe polluted air, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO). Acid rain also poses threats: in China, there is growing concern that damage to rice stocks will cause widespread shortages.

Threatened resources

Unsustainable consumption of resources such as water and forests challenges both South and North. Freshwater stocks are especially vulnerable to population pressures. At least 1.7bn people — nearly one quarter of the world's population — lack enough drinking water, according to WHO estimates. Increased demands by agriculture and industry tax stocks from reservoirs, rivers and non-renewable aquifers. As use increases, so does pollution. In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Asia, freshwater demands may exceed reserves in 10 to 15 years — in some cases, even sooner. By 2025, it is predicted that more than one billion Africans — two thirds of the total population — are likely to face water shortages.

In industrialised countries, water resources are often taken for granted. But there, too, human activity — from farming and hydroelectric power-generating to lawn-sprinkling — takes a toll. Salinisation, which has lowered agricultural yields 24% worldwide, has decreased yields as much as 30% in the United States.

Conflicts over water resources are likely, experts fear. Already, there are disputes over shared waters of the Ganges, La Plata and Jordan Rivers. In the United States, communities are fighting 'water wars' in the courts.

Forest loss in both South and North is a prime example of uneasy efforts

to balance nature and human needs. By the year 2000, half the world's forest cover will be gone. Forests are a vital resource. The 'lungs of the planet', they transform atmospheric CO₂ into oxygen and thus play a role in stemming global warming. They are also the primary fuel source for 70% of families in the developing world. Slash-and-burn farming for subsistence has devastated forests from Thailand to Bolivia, eroding soils.

Tropical forests are home to between 50% and 80% of Earth's plant and animal species. Clearing them for cash-cropping, timber and cattle-grazing — mostly to supply markets in industrialised areas — threatens biodiversity. Half the world's pharmacopoeia originates in wild species. One species an hour, 10 000 a year, are disappearing, it is estimated. From New Zealand to the Pacific Northwest region of the United States, battles have erupted between loggers and conservationists trying to save wildlife habitats.

In industrialised countries, air pollution and acid rain are also killing woodlands. In the first study to quantify such effects, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis found that 75% of European forests were succumbing to high sulfur levels.


Quality of life

A 1982 FAO/UNFPA study found that, in theory, the developing countries (China excluded) could feed up to 33bn people on existing land. But speculating on how many people the Earth could support begs an obvious question: what kind of life could 33bn — or even 10bn — expect to have?

'It's beyond my comprehension,' Paul Ehrlich has said, 'that we should run an experiment to see how many people we can cram on the planet before all its systems collapse.'

Increasingly, talk of 'carrying capacity' is giving way to the notion of *social* carrying capacity. Emphasizing quality of life over sustenance of life, it underscores the idea that the goal of development is *human* development, or increasing people's choices.

'Income is one aspect of those choices, but it is not the sum-total of



VIVANT UNIVERS

Pollution: 'a curse of riches'

human existence,' states UNDP's *Human Development Report 1991*. 'Health, education, a good physical environment and freedom — to name a few other components of well-being — may be just as important,' adds the report, which includes natural resource stocks and contraceptive prevalence among a broad range of indicators.

Countries with rapid population growth rates and high fertility rank lower on various 'quality-of-life' indexes. Afghanistan, for example, with an average of 6.8 births per woman and one of the world's highest growth rates — 6.7%, as against 2.1% for developing countries as a whole — is 157th of the 160 countries on UNDP's Human Development Index, and is among the 30 countries in the 'extreme suffering' range on the International Human Suffering Index drawn up by the Population Crisis Committee.

It is common to divide the world between 'rich' developed countries of the North and 'poor' developing countries of the South. But in both South and North there is a growing gulf between rich and poor.

Poverty, population pressures and development are linked in myriad ways. For example, malnutrition and undernutrition — consequences of im-

poverished lifestyles — are associated with impaired physical growth and mental inadequacies. Children affected by pre-natal and prolonged malnutrition scored lower on intelligence tests in a number of countries, including China, India, Thailand, Kenya and Guatemala. Other studies show the effects of poor diet on attention span and school performance. In the Philippines, for instance, underfed children — measured by low weight-for-height — scored lower on mathematics tests than those who were adequately nourished.

Such deficiencies threaten not only individual but community development. Thus, the interrelationships between personal, environmental and economic health may hold keys to achieving sustainable societies.

'One of the clearest lessons of the last two decades of work in population,' says UNFPA Executive Director Nafis Sadik, 'is that investments in human-resource development — for example, improvements in women's status, access to education, health and the means of family planning — not only improve the quality of life but are also the best and quickest way to reduce population growth rates.'

Population growth, changes in age structure and implications for development

by Mohammed Nizamuddin *

Since 1950, significant changes have taken place in the world's demographic scene, affecting the size, composition and distribution of the population. This demographic trend is considered to have significant economic and social consequences, including effects on pensions, the labour force, medical care, services for the disabled, and family structure and residential patterns.

This article examines the demographic trends and population growth and identifies the major trends in age structures as observed in developed and developing countries of the world from 1950 to 1990 and as anticipated for the period 1990-2025. It also discusses the social and developmental implications of the changing age structure of population.

World demographic trends and population growth

One of the most significant advances of the twentieth century has been the dramatic increase in life expectancy all over the world, even among the poor in the least developed countries. Over the last 40 years, life expectancy in developed countries increased dramatically from 41 years to 62 years. Some countries and regions progressed much faster than others. For example, while life expectancy in China has increased by 30 years over the last four decades, life expectancy in Africa rose by only 15 years during the same period.

During the 1950s and early 1960s the dominant situation in the developing world was one of high fertility and declining mortality, which resulted in high rates of population growth. This translated

into an impressive growth in the size of the human population. Since then, population policies and programmes in an increasing number of countries have succeeded in reducing the population growth rate through increased accessibility and use of family planning services, coupled with social investments in health and education, particularly for girls. Between the early 1960s and late 1980s — in only 25 years — the total fertility rate

fell from 6.1 to 3.9 children per woman in the developing world.

Differences in fertility rates among countries and regions are much larger than the differences in mortality rates. While in East Asia fertility dropped by almost 60% to close to replacement level during the last 25 years, in sub-Saharan Africa fertility has remained at about the same level. Latin America has



* Deputy Director, technical division at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in New York.

seen a fertility reduction of 40%, and in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, fertility has fallen by about 26%.

In the more developed regions, change, although slower than in the developing world, has been taking place with more moderate increases in life expectancy and with fertility declining to slightly below replacement level.

Overall, even though the growth rate of the world's population has been slowly declining since the 1970s, its size is increasing in absolute numbers, faster than ever before. According to the medium variant of the 1992 revision of the United Nations population estimates and projections, the annual increment to the world population (which has gone from an average of 47 million between 1950 and 1955 to an average of 88m between 1985 and 1990) is expected to continue until it reaches a high of 98m between 1995 and 2000 and it is not expected to decline until after 2000. This is a matter of serious concern.

The total population of the world increased from 2.5 billion in 1950 to 5.6 billion in 1993. Of this total, about half are children and young people under the age of 20. The latest United Nations projections indicate a world population of 8.5 billion by the year 2025 and 10 billion by 2050. Annual additions to world population in the next decade will average 93m, the highest in history. Around 90% of this growth is taking place in the developing world, the countries least able to cope with the resources demand and environmental consequences of burgeoning populations, with their needs for housing, education, jobs, water, sanitation, health care and access to family planning services. Between now and the turn of the century, the population of industrialised countries will grow by only 56m or 5.2%, while that of developing countries will balloon by over 900m, or 24.6%.

Growth rates, however vary widely: in east Asia and in the Caribbean they are 1.3%, compared to 1.8% for Latin America, 2.2% for South Asia and over 3% in most parts of Africa.

Thus, in the context of the ongoing transition from high to low levels of fertility and mortality, important vari-

ations both exist at the regional and the sub-regional levels, reflecting the present situation of countries at their different stages of demographic transition. The majority of countries are converging to low rates of population growth but at different speeds of decline, thus yielding rates of growth that are increasingly diverse. In addition, a substantial number of countries are at a pre-transitional stage or at the very beginning of their transition.

Changes in the age structure

The demographic transition, which is a shift from high to low levels of fertility and mortality, changes the age structure of population from a young to an old-age distribution. Fertility decline reduces the proportion of children while mortality decline raises the likelihood of survival up to old age. The changing age

composition of a population in turn has important policy implications.

The figures in table 1 show the changes that took place during 1950-1990 and as forecast for the period 1990-2025 in the age composition of the world population and the more and less developed regions.

Young People

The population under the age of 15 in the world was estimated to be 1710m in 1990. According to the medium fertility variant, the number of young people under the age of 15 is projected to reach 2 billion a few years after the beginning of the next century and increase further to 2085m in 2025. The growth will be due to the increase of the child population in the less developed regions, from 1453m in 1990 to 1844m in 2025. In contrast, the population of the

TABLE 1

Trends in population growth, age distribution and dependency ratios for the world and the more and the less developed regions, medium variants, 1950-2025

Region	1950	1970	1990	2000	2025
	Population (in millions)				
World	2,516	3,697	5,295	6,228	8,472
More developed	832	1,049	1,211	1,278	1,403
Less developed	1,684	2,648	4,084	4,950	7,069
Under age 15					
World	870	1,386	1,710	1,934	2,085
More developed	203	279	257	251	241
Less developed	667	1,107	1,453	1,683	1,844
Age 15 to 24					
World	460	667	1,014	1,071	1,347
More developed	143	175	181	175	181
Less developed	317	492	833	896	1,166
Aged 65 and over					
World	128	199	318	424	828
More developed	60	101	130	172	268
Less developed	68	98	188	252	560
	Dependency ratios to total population				
Aged 15 to 64					
World	65.6	75.2	62.6	60.9	53.0
More developed	54.8	56.8	50.4	51.3	57.5
Less developed	71.6	83.7	66.7	63.6	52.2
Under age 15					
World	57.2	65.7	52.6	50.0	38.1
More developed	43.0	41.7	32.3	30.9	28.7
Less developed	65.0	76.9	59.3	55.3	39.9
Aged 65 and over					
World	8.4	9.5	10.1	11.0	14.9
More developed	11.8	15.1	18.1	20.4	28.8
Less developed	6.5	6.9	7.4	8.3	12.2

Source: World population prospects 1992 (United Nations Publication, Sales No E.93.XIII.7).

under-15 in the more developed regions is projected to decrease from 257m in 1990 to 241m in 2025. As a result of the differential growth, the composition of the world population under the age of 15 will change. The share of the more developed regions will fall from 15% in 1990 to 12% in 2025. The number of children under the age of 15 in the least developed countries will grow steeply, by 74% from 198m in 1950 to 345m in 2025. The share of the least developed countries of the world child population will rise from 12% in 1990 to 17% in 2025.

Due to declining mortality levels and the persistence of high fertility levels, a large number of developing countries continue to have substantial proportions of children and young people in their populations. Over the next 35 years, the global youth population will experience the fastest growth in history. The vast majority of this growth is expected to take place in Southern Asia and Africa, in countries considered among the least developed in the world. The population in the age group 15-24 in the world is estimated to be 1.01 billion in 1990. Under the medium variant projection, the UN estimates that by 2000 there would be 1.07 billion young people between the ages of 15 and 24. By 2025, the number would increase by 333m, nearly 30%. Interestingly, the number of young people between 15 and 24 in the more developed regions is projected to remain the same at 181m over the 35-year period. This will be in sharp contrast to the 333m projected for the developing countries. The current pattern of population growth and structure for most developing countries will continue well into the 21st century, thereby creating an ever increasing base of younger people.

The elderly

The world elderly population is considerably smaller than the size of the world child population. The projected speed of relative increase of the world's elderly population, however, is substantially faster than that of the world's child population. In 1950, there were 128m persons aged 65 and over in the world, constituting 5% of the global population.

By 2025, there will be a six and a half fold increase in the number: it is projected to grow to 828m in 2025, about 10% of the total. Thus, there have been notable increases both in numbers and in the proportions of elderly persons in the populations of most countries, a trend due to the decline in fertility levels, reinforced by continued declines in mortality levels among the elderly. The steady increase of older age groups in national populations has significant implications for both the developed and developing countries.

Within the elderly population itself, the older age groups show even faster growth, that is a seven fold increase in persons aged 80 and over between 1950 and 2025. The largest increase in absolute numbers of the elderly will occur in developing regions during the next several decades, as very large cohorts of the young survive till old age.

There is a growing tendency for the world's elderly to be concentrated in developing countries. This population was evenly distributed between developing and developed regions from 1950 to 1975. The discrepancy between them started to appear in the second half of the 1970s and the difference is projected to grow rapidly in the future. This results from the differential pace of growth. In the more developed regions, the annual increment is projected to decrease from about 3m at present to 1.6m in 2005-2010. In the following five-year period, the increment will more than double. Subsequently, it will continue to rise moderately to reach about 5m per annum in 2020-2025. The annual increment will grow substantially faster in the less developed regions, from about 6m per annum around 1990 to nearly 24m per year in 2020-2025. The process of ageing would be more rapid in the developing countries, because fertility decline is faster. By 2025, about 69% of the population aged 65 and over, about 560m people, will be living in developing countries.

From the above analysis, it is now clear that the age structure of the population of different countries and regions has been following, and is projected to follow, the course of the demographic transition. Thus, in the developed regions of the world, the transition has already taken place. They have reached very low



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levels of fertility and mortality. Their populations are considerably older than those in other parts of the world and are projected to become even older. In the developing regions, many countries in Asia and Latin America are now in the midst of the demographic transition. In the 1950s and 1960s, the age structure of the majority of these countries became younger. Then, in the early 1970s, a substantial fertility decline reversed the trend. Since then, these populations have been ageing rapidly, and are projected to become younger. In sub-Saharan Africa, most countries are still in the early stages of the demographic transition. Here, too, the pattern will be replicated, but it will come later. By the second decade of the next century, population ageing will be a significant problem.

Trends in the dependency ratio

One of the economic concerns raised by population ageing is that the numbers of people in the work force may decline in proportion to non-workers, mainly children and the elderly, who consume but do not produce much economically. Dependency ratios are a crude but useful non-economic indicator of this situation. These ratios aggregate both young and older dependents and express the total as a ratio of the working population. This total dependency ratio

can be disaggregated into its 'child' and 'aged' components.

The under-15 dependency ratio is declining and the aged 65 or over dependency ratio is rising, in both the more developed and the less developed regions. The trend in the total population dependency ratio is the result of the counter-acting trends of its two components. In the more developed regions, the upward trend of the aged 65 or over dependency ratio overrides the downward trend of the under-15 dependency ratio, thereby causing the total dependency ratio to rise. In the less developed regions, the downward trend of the under-15 dependency ratio overrides the upward trend of the aged 65 or over dependency ratio, thereby causing the total population dependency ratio to decline.

Developmental implications

The increase of population sizes and the declines of the vital rates have changed the age structure of the world population in a gradual and continuous manner. Changes in age distributions have shown various patterns and trends in different parts of the world. These variations in the age structure of a population can have far-reaching economic, social and developmental implications. In the following paragraphs, many of the important developmental implications of the changing demographic structure are highlighted.

In those developing countries which are still in the early stages of their demographic transition, stagnating economic development is responsible not only for high rates of total population growth, but also for producing an age structure which adversely affects economic growth.

The increasing number of young persons below 15 years of age is 'unfavorable' to economic development for at least two reasons. First, the relatively high proportion of young persons below working age tends to reduce labour input per capita and, all other things being equal, tends therefore to reduce income per capita. Second, the larger proportion of young persons in the population requires that a greater part of limited resources be allocated to 'social investment' rather than to 'economic investment'. That is, the

more youthful the population the greater is the proportion of total savings that must be devoted to the rearing of the young, and the smaller the proportion of total savings that is available for investment in agricultural or industrial projects designed to increase per capita production.

The massive growth in the number of young people in the developing countries has enormous implications for governments, economies and society as a whole. Among the most pressing problems related to children and youth today are: employment and migration trends, educational attainment rates, teenage births and violence and vandalism among youth (Financial Times, 1994). All of these problems are interrelated and represent a major challenge for both the present and the future. For example, if in the future more children are not in school and fewer young adults are able to secure jobs, there is an even greater likelihood that these young people will face hardship, migrate to new lands in search of opportunity or bear children before they have the economic and social support needed to raise healthy children (Financial Times, 1994).

In most developing countries, many young people tend to marry early and start childbearing too early. Adolescent childbearing has serious health, social, demographic and economic consequences. Pregnancy at too young an age places both mothers and their infants at much greater risks of death and illness. The rate of maternal death among women aged 15-19 is twice as high as it is among those aged 20-24. At the same time, babies born to adolescent mothers are less likely to survive than those born to mothers who are over 20.

Young people's lack of knowledge of reproductive health issues is another serious problem in many developing countries. Most of the time, the information they acquire from their peers or in the streets, or even from their families, is both misleading and unhelpful. Their curiosity and experimentation with sex and drugs place them at great risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases and HIV.

On the other side of the spectrum, developed countries as well as those developing countries which had an early

demographic transition or a rapid one, are increasingly facing complex issues associated with population ageing such as higher medical costs, pension, welfare and a shortage of young labour. Ageing of the population is usually associated with decreasing economic potential, in terms of such variables as increasing government expenditures for social security, heavier tax burdens on the working population, not increasing labour productivity, and increasing need for government support to the aged.

The developed countries which have already achieved the demographic transition, Japan, for example, anticipate that the labour force supply will be greatly constrained with the continued decrease in the working-age population beginning around 2000 owing to the impact of the lowering of birth rate in recent years. While the working age population will be decreasing, the elderly population will continue to increase up to about 2020. Thus, the burden of old age dependency is anticipated to increase 2.5 times during the coming 30 years.

Further, with improving life expectancy, the ageing process in those countries is increasing the proportions in the higher age groups (75 and over). With increasing numbers of elderly living to very old ages, the incidence of serious disability and extreme frailty is rising rapidly, resulting in an increasing economic burden to many governments of setting up nursing homes and other special institutions for the elderly.

The shifting ratios of child-aged dependents are also of importance, since the cost of providing for a dependent child is different from those of providing for an aged dependant.

With the success of the demographic transition and the consequent changes in population size and structure, the household and family structure have changed in both the developed and the developing countries. The substantial decrease in birth rate also means that the number of children who would be responsible for taking care of the elderly has declined dramatically. Consequently, this has pronounced effects, with serious implications, on the role of the elderly and their care and support in old age. ■ M.N.

Population distribution and economic management*

During the 1975-1985 period, net internal migration of all types (urban-to-rural, rural-to-urban, rural-to-rural and urban-to-urban) was estimated to have involved between 750 million and one billion persons. International migration, although involving a smaller number of persons, was also significant. Census data, referring mostly to the 1970s and early 1980s, indicated that some 77m persons lived outside their country of birth or citizenship, a figure that represented a lower limit for the stock of international migrants world wide. Given current unprecedented mass migrations, the figures for 1985-1995, when collated, will almost certainly be much higher than those quoted above.

The mass movement of populations the world is witnessing results from an accentuation of the motive factors, notably economic differentials, political instability, natural disasters, wars and conflicts, and states' disintegration and integration.

Over the past five years, the gap between the rich North and the poor South has widened considerably. There is hardly an economic datum in which the South (with a few exceptions) is not clearly seen as a net loser. This, coupled with the profound, uncertain and sometimes turbulent political and economic changes taking place in the developing countries, have made the North, more than ever before, extremely attractive to migrants from the South. Accordingly, the number of migrants from the South to the North has increased dramatically. And with the disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the collapse of its economies, the European Union, which has taken the opposite direction of integration, today faces immigration problems of huge proportions. South-South migration, on the other hand, has also increased, especially to the newly-industrialised countries of South-East Asia

(the oil-rich states of the Gulf remain attractive, although much less so than previously). If 1975-1985 was the decade of the Vietnamese boat people, the 1990s is proving to be that of the war refugee — a phenomenon not confined to the South. Conflicts in Liberia, Somalia, Angola, Bosnia, parts of the former Soviet Union, etc. continue to send waves of refugees across borders into neighbouring countries. Earthquakes and floods in India, Bangladesh, Iran and elsewhere have caused serious environmental damage and displaced large numbers of persons. The world has never before faced so many humanitarian problems with millions needing protection and assistance.

The implications of these population movements for both the host environments and places of origin cannot be underestimated. Countries with serious refugee problems, which may have to spend years caring for them, could be drained of valuable resources for develop-

ment, as most African countries have learned. More normal migrations could, for the host environment, spur or stifle economic growth depending on whether or not the right conditions are met, enrich the cultural fabric or place an unbearable economic burden and provoke social tension. They could, for the areas of origin, relieve unemployment, provide sources of income and, at the same time, deprive them of their most valuable manpower, for often it is the young and most talented segments of the population that have the facility to leave. Governments, not surprisingly, view population distribution as an important element in economic development planning. But how have the developing countries whose populations have grown enormously since the beginning of this century integrated this factor into national development plans?

Migrant workers in Namibia



* This article draws largely from a paper of the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on Population and Development scheduled for Cairo in September this year.



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Various strategies

Between 1930 and the early 1970s, one of the commonest strategies adopted by many developing countries to direct population redistribution involved substantial State intervention to promote industrialisation for import substitution. A strategy widely applied throughout Latin America, it led to unbalanced capital accumulation, which in turn gave rise to unbalanced population distribution by reinforcing, among other things, the primacy of the largest cities. To combat the inequitable effects of capital accumulation, governments then adopted territorial policies that sought to promote growth in peripheral regions, but these rarely had much impact because those regions were seldom given priority in the allocation of meagre national resources.

Moving capital to labour in pursuance of export-led economic development has not been entirely successful as a policy either as the experience of the newly-industrialised countries of South-East Asia has shown. During the 1970s and early 1980s, South Korea and Taiwan

adopted this policy, but they experienced significant migrant outflows, confirming that the process of development is itself destabilising in terms of population movement, i.e. likely to increase migration pressures, at least, in the short to medium term.

Generally, for a developing country with limited resources, population distribution can pose extremely complex problems: how, for example, to provide adequate social and infrastructural services to widely-scattered settlements to reduce emigration and boost agricultural production and, at the same time, respond to the growing needs of the ever-expanding cities. In the 1960s, a number of countries in Africa opted in favour of the rural areas — bringing marginal lands into production, sedentarising nomads, concentrating populations like in Ethiopia (the Awash valley) and in Tanzania (under the ujaama policy). Although there were many countries which attempted a simultaneous rural and urban approach, the scale, invariably, tipped in favour of the rural areas as planners sought to minimise rural exodus. School, access roads, health centres, electricity, etc. were provided to inevitably

A residential area in Bangui, Central African Republic
'Overcrowding, poverty, pressure on services such as water, housing, education, transportation and health facilities, environmental degradation and the spread of diseases are among factors militating against rapid urbanisation'

sparsely populated areas and these proved uneconomic, not only in terms of administrative and maintenance costs, but also in terms of impact on production. Other policy measures variously pursued included forced return of people to their places of origin, resettlement of populations in areas deemed less hostile environmentally to life and food production, expulsions of 'illegal immigrants' and constructions of new capitals. Despite these measures, economic progress remains elusive and population distribution uneven.

Lately, many developing countries have adopted a strategy which involves reducing the role of the state and ascribing a much greater role to market forces for production and population redistribution. While in the strategy pursued generally between 1930 and the

1970s, the combination of State support and national capital was seen as the main source of productive investment, in the new strategy, international investment has been sought and encouraged. The State, with a reduced role, has concentrated its efforts on maintaining fiscal austerity and balanced budgets. The key goal is the competitiveness incorporation of countries into the new international division of labour. This strategy has important spatial implications, since, within each national economy, rapid urbanisation tends to occur in those locations that serve as growth poles with respect to production, the transport of goods for export and associated services. Concomitantly, the centres where import substitution had been concentrated are beginning to decline in importance.

Urbanisation: part of the development process

Urbanisation has been a controversial issue in development for many years. In some developing countries efforts were made at limiting their growth either through coercion or through deliberate rural development programmes as mentioned above. Others policies sought to promote alternative medium towns if only to limit the size of some. Overcrowding, poverty, pressures on services such as water, housing, education, transportation and health facilities, environmental degradation and the spread of diseases are factors militating against rapid urbanisation.

It is now widely recognised that migration is a logical strategy of individuals or families seeking to enhance their opportunities or to ensure their survival,

and that economic growth entails both urbanisation and the movement of labour. Although in many countries governments are reducing their planning role, they nevertheless have to meet the needs and priorities of people and enterprises in the locations where they choose to establish themselves, usually urban centres. However, it is also recognised that while developed countries generally have the means of building adequate infrastructure while urbanising, developing countries, especially in Africa and Asia, have serious difficulties providing the infrastructural needs of such a process, hence the anti-urbanisation stance of many planners. The problem therefore is not so much rapid urbanisation as the inability of Governments to cope with the economic, social and demographic changes that accompany it.

Policywise, in the new climate of democracy and respect for human rights, it is politically undesirable and economically futile for governments to insist on stopping rural to urban migration. Rural and urban development are now seen as two sides of the same coin. Policies that emphasise one at the expense of the other are doomed to failure. Those that seek forward and backward linkages between the cities and the rural areas have greater chances of success.

A member of the urban poor is more often than not engaged in the informal sector. His plight can be improved by facilitating his access to credit, providing him with technical assistance to improve his housing and promoting the creation of partnerships between neighbourhood groups and nongovernmental organisations so that strategies to gain access to water, sanitation or rubbish collection can be devised. Such measures have greater probability of being successful if local or municipal authorities are strengthened by being allowed to collect taxes, granted greater responsibility for the welfare of local communities and at the same time made accountable to the governed.

In the coming years, as developing countries' economies become more export-oriented and integrated into the world economy, they will find that global forces will have greater influence in the spatial distribution of their population.

Augustin Oyowe

International migration in figures ¹

With 13m immigrants, or roughly 4% of their combined population in 1990, the countries of the European Community hit the top in the attractive destinations parade, according to a recent report

from the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA).

Eight million of these 13m are from outside the Community, 50% from North Africa, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia and more and more are coming in from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The biggest population shift recorded in the report is from North Africa to Western Europe. By 1989-1990, there were 2.1m Africans concentrated in eight countries of Europe.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe — Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, for example — are now sending contingents of emigrants too, and they themselves are playing host to thousands of people who have come in from the surrounding nations and the developing world to seek asylum.

Southern Europe, also a popular destination, now, attracts mainly emigrants from northern and western Africa and people with linguistic affinities (Argentineans of Italian origin and Latin Americans of Spanish or Portuguese origin).

The United States took in an estimated 7.3m emigrants in the 1980s, many of them from Mexico and Colombia.

According to UNFPA, the next big changes are expected to take place in Asia, particularly the recently industrialised South East, and Japan, the only country in the area with an advanced industrial economy. This country has been the focus of international migration to this part of the world since the mid-1980s, with the falling off of demand for foreign workers in the oil producing countries of the Gulf. Meanwhile, countries in Southern Asia (Korea and Singapore, for example) have seen improving economic growth in tandem with a slowly expanding labour force as well as higher wages and a shortage of workers in many sectors, which will probably be offset by emigrants from the Indian sub-continent, the Philippines and Malaysia, UNFPA maintains.

IPS

¹ Source: Dimension — (two-monthly journal of the information department of Belgium's General Administration of Development Cooperation).

Birth control and family planning

Empowering women to succeed

by Kapembe Nsingo *

According to the United Nations, the world experienced three phases of population growth between 1950 and 1990. The first period was 1950 to 1970, when the rate of growth rose from 1.8% to 2.1% mainly because of a rapid decline in mortality in all parts of the less developed regions. Although mortality decline slowed down in the second period, which was the 1970s, world population fell, because fertility declined fast in several Asian countries (particularly China) as well as, to a lesser extent, in Latin America. Since the late 1970s, the growth of world population has remained fairly constant at about 1.7% per annum.

The slow-down in growth, however, has not been translated into decline in absolute numbers: at 5.4 billion there has been an additional 1.8bn since 1970. This despite the recognition worldwide of birth control and family planning as the most effective means of arresting the dramatic increase following the first World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974. This proves that the global family planning campaign of the past 20 years has been ineffective, although it is arguable whether the situation would not have been worse without it.

As the figures quoted above show, the focus of population growth is on the developing countries. Indeed, fertility decline in the developed world has reached such levels that, for political and economic reasons, several industrialised countries are actually encouraging births. These countries have already achieved their demographic transitions and the use of contraceptives (a key element in the birth control campaign) is not only widespread but also dates back many years. All efforts at birth control are therefore concentrated in the developing countries, where 80%

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of the increase in the world population of recent years occurred — a figure, experts estimate, which will rise to 95% in the coming decade if present trends continue.

Birth control and family planning campaigns in the developing countries have been ineffective for several reasons. First of all, the campaigns are being conducted against a backdrop of widespread misery. Ninety-five per cent of the over one billion people who live in abject poverty, two billion without access to safe water and 900m illiterates¹ the World Bank says exist in the world are to be found in the developing countries.

The second factor is the availability of family planning services and contraceptives. According to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), 'Some 300m women of reproductive age lack access to family planning. Providing couples with the means to limit family size could mean 2.2m fewer births by year 2010.'

The third and perhaps the most important reason for the failure of the campaign is the regional factor. A glance at the United Nations data on population growth rates in the developing countries reveals a surprising regional variation which reflects the availability of family planning services and the use of contraceptives: population growth rate is on the decline in Latin America, constant in Asia and on the increase in Africa, where only 20% of women practise any kind of contraception (the figures are even lower at country level — 5% in Mali and 6% in Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, for example. Kenya and Togo, at 27% and 33% respectively, are among the very few which have had notable successes) and family planning services are either totally absent or are very small and ineffective.

Negative forces

There is no doubt that those 'negative' forces which traditionally determined the size of the family in societies such as Africa's are still very much at play: women have numerous

Recommendations on women

A group of experts preparing for the International Conference on Population and Development scheduled for Cairo in September has made a series of reasoned recommendations designed to help governments and policy planners tackle the problem of birth control and family planning. The focus is on improvement of the status of women. Sensitisation to gender issues, they say, should be given priority. Gender-based analysis should become an essential instrument in the design and implementation of all development activities and development policies and strategies should be assessed from the perspective of their impact on women's social, economic and health status. Below are highlights of their recommendations:

- women should be represented in much greater numbers in the policy-making arena and at all levels of planning, managing and executing population, development and environmental programmes, both for reasons of equity and to ensure the success of policies. Donors, governments and non-governmental organisations should seek culturally appropriate means for both the delivery of services and the integration of women in population and development initiatives. Any development, population and health programmes that sought the involvement of or attempted to deliver benefits to communities should be based on the direct participation of women: In particular, they should not assume that information exchanged with or resources delivered to men would necessarily reach women;

- given the important and far-reaching implication of women's education, governments and non-governmental organisations should make special efforts to promote the access of women and girls to both formal and non-formal education and devise innovative strategies to surmount the socio-economic and familiar constraints responsible for gender inequalities in school enrolment;

- in view of the interaction between extreme poverty and demographic trends, and recognising that increased economic productivity of women is vital both for their own interests and for national development, Governments should strengthen women's access to productive

employment, protect women from economic discrimination and remove all remaining legal and social barriers to their economic independence, including discrimination that restricts women's access to the benefits of social and health-care systems on the basis of marital status;

- governments should redouble efforts and encourage the active involvement of men in all areas of family responsibility, including family planning, child-rearing and housework. Children are entitled to material and emotional support of both fathers and mothers, who should provide for all their children of both sexes on an equitable basis;

- since reproductive choice is a basic right, women and men should be assured of confidential access to safe methods of fertility regulation within the framework of an adequate health system. In view of the rapid spread of the Aids disease, for which there is as yet no known cure, and HIV infections, governments and non-governmental organisations must promote safer sex, including the use of condoms, and must provide adequate medical services for sexually transmitted diseases. As unsafe sex is proving to be a major cause of maternal mortality, a woman wishing to terminate her pregnancy should have ready access to reliable information, sympathetic counselling and safe abortion services. Governments should also act vigorously to stop the practice of genital mutilation and protect the right of girls to be free from such unnecessary and dangerous procedures;

- governments should enforce laws pertaining to minimum age at marriage so as to ensure young women's right to health and the rights of young people of both sexes to education and employment. In addition, with a view to promoting and protecting adolescent reproductive health, governments should adopt such measures as the teaching of family life education with a realistic sex education component and provide appropriate counselling and services to girls and boys, drawing on the experience of non-governmental organisations in that area.

¹ Of the 900 million illiterates, 600m are women. Child mortality is also high: 14m die before the age of five.

children, because of the high child mortality rate — the more children they have the greater the chances of many surviving; children mean wealth — they provide labour to work the land and produce more wealth; children are seen as an old-age insurance for parents; children are a status symbol; women are required to have many children by the clan or by their husbands; a woman in search of a son because society (as in India) or her husband requires it of her may have to have many children to satisfy that demand; marriage with young girls of less than 15 years of age remains a traditional practice, while teenage pregnancy (married or single) is rampant. Thus the size of the family continues to be determined not so much by the woman as by societal value system or culture. A woman is more or less a biological object for reproduction on demand. Add to these polygamy, the influence of religion which holds that the 'pill' is but an artificial device which encourages a libertarian attitude to life and an affront and a challenge to God and the unhelpful stance of moralists who

condemn population control practices, as 'anti-human and nihilistic' and we have a measure of the magnitude of the problem.

The fourth factor is lack of political commitment by Governments, and the fifth is lack of financial resources.

There is no doubt that tackling the problems identified above is inevitable if birth control and family planning campaigns are to be effective. Experience over the years has taught demographers and policy planners alike that the key to birth control lies primarily in the improvement of the status of women. In fact those developing countries which have moved towards a greater empowerment of women have not only registered increased use of contraceptives, despite such factors as religion, but also a decline in population growth rates. A clear example is Mauritius, which has achieved both despite Hinduism. Catholic Italy has one of

the lowest fertility rates in the world — 1.4 births per woman, well below replacement level. By contrast, where the status of women is low, birth rates tend to be higher, as in western Asia and parts of Africa (which have an average rate of 6.5 births per woman).

But what does the empowerment of women entail and who does the empowerment? First of all, it must be accepted that while respect for and the maintenance of culture are vital in the existence of any society, cultural practices which deny human rights have to be abolished. Some of the practices we have identified above will fail any human rights test. But there is nothing as potent as empowering women to take control of their own lives. The most important aspect of the process involves the eradication of illiteracy, education which will automatically improve women's status in terms of access to information on their fertility and the chances of survival of their children and access to employment which will give them financial independence and alleviate family poverty. The second aspect of the process is the provision of health services, including contraceptives. These are gender issues the profound impacts of which the developing world is yet to grasp.

The role of governments in realising these objectives is crucial. Demographic issues, particularly those concerning women, have to be central in all development programmes and projects. In this regard, a group of experts preparing for the forthcoming International Conference on Population and Development has made a series of reasoned recommendations (see box). This calls not only for serious political will, but also for the establishment of civil order without which no demographic policy can work. The budgetary constraints which many governments (particularly African governments) face are a major handicap — a problem that has been amply dealt with in several articles in this dossier. But the empowering of women is not the responsibility of governments alone. In an era of structural adjustments and in the new economic climate of market forces, intergovernmental organisations, donors and the private sector will have to be more involved. ■

Teenage pregnancy is rampant in the developing countries



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From population policies to policies for people

by Christophe Vandeschrick*

Scientific literature abounds in definitions of the concept of demographic or population policy. For the purposes of this article, the notion of population policy covers a state's population objectives and its strategies for achieving them.

In other words, the object of a population policy is to affect the size and growth or structure (mainly by age or sex) or spatial distribution of a population by acting more or less directly on one of the three demographic phenomena which determine them, i.e. fertility, mortality or spatial mobility.

In fact, many policies have more or less direct, more or less deliberate demographic implications. A typical population policy is one which promotes the use of contraception to bring down fertility and population growth with it. A policy designed to bring down fertility by changing the marriageable age will also affect population growth, but indirectly this time, via the marriage rules. Lastly, a maternity-focused health policy will also have demographic implications — improving the health of mothers and children — without necessarily thinking of their effects on the population, which is what we call an implicit policy, in contrast to the first two, where the intentions are entirely explicit.

Direct policies, indirect policies, implicit policies, explicit policies — the possibilities are endless, but this article concentrates on explicit fertility control policies. The policies to discourage couples from having children which are increasingly popular in the South are one example while the policies to encourage childbearing pursued, possibly for longer, in some parts of the North, are another.

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But the many policies have not always had conclusive results. Far from it. Policy appraisal is a minefield and the conclusions are uncertain and, ultimately, always debatable. And some policies are designed in too narrow a conceptual framework, too far from the real situations they hope to affect, and of course hold the seeds of failure within them from the moment they are formulated.

Evaluating population policies

This means measuring how much of the change in a phenomenon can be put down to the policy — i.e. how much change would not have occurred without it. The whole point of the exercise, of course, is to help improve future policies.

As far as the theory is concerned, the job is an easy one, involving :

- identifying the aims of the programme ;
- translating the aims into indicators whereby achievement of the aims can be monitored ;
- collecting data on the indicators for people involved in the programme (and those not involved, but in the control group) ;
- comparing the data of those involved in the programme (and the control group) with the aims of the programme. ¹

But there is more than one step from theory to practice, as the two

following examples show. A recent study ² compared the family policies of France and the United Kingdom from the point of view of maternity leave, going back to work after pregnancy, parental leave to look after sick children, family allowances, family tax allowances and care of the children of working mothers. On all points, France emerged as having a resolutely pro-childbearing family policy, in contrast to the United Kingdom, where most considerations are social.

So the two countries, to say the least, have divergent policies, but very close fertility rates. In 1990, the fertility index was 1.80 children per woman in France and 1.85 in the United Kingdom! So, does that make France's policy of encouraging childbearing pointless? Deciding one way or the other means finding straight answers to two more questions, to take account of all the differences (other than those in family policy) between the populations of France and the UK, as follows.

— If France had exactly the same family policy as the UK, would it have fewer births?

— If the UK had exactly the same family policy as France, would it have more births?

If the answer to both was yes, it would be reasonable to conclude that France's family policy was efficient. If it was no, then the opposite would be the case. But the questions are impossible to answer. How could demographers experiment with (parts of) populations confined in laboratory conditions to find out how their fertility responded under variable

¹ Weiss C., Evaluation research. Methods of assessing program effectiveness, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1973, pp. 24-25, quoted by Bravo-Casas G., Considérations d'ordre général sur les politiques démographiques, in *Politiques de Population, Etudes et Documents*, volume III, number 3, August 1988, p. 113.

² Hantrais L., La fécondité en France et au Royaume Uni : les effets possibles de la politique familiale, in *Population*, volume 47, No 4, July-August 1992, pp. 987-1016. The comments which follow in the text do not seek to pass any final judgment on the effectiveness of France's natalist policy, but are simply intended to illustrate the difficulty of handling this type of issue.

family policies? It should come as no surprise — second example — to see different evaluations of the same policy coming up with different conclusions. When it comes to the success of Hungary's natalist policy (in *Politiques et Populations: Etudes et Documents*), for example, Andorka is more optimistic than Festy.

Lastly, it is also important to remember that evaluations are all too rarely carried out independently of the institutions which actually implement or suggest the policies. The studies which decide that policies are highly efficient may well be those closest to the competent authorities or the demography industry which oversees so many population policies in the South. The more independent studies regularly come up with (to put it mildly) less positive conclusions and ultimately cast doubt on most straightforward population policies as shapers of demographic trends. How can we decide between the triumphant attitudes of the people who run the policies (and probably the evaluations) and the doubts of those who snipe at them?

Despite the apparent simplicity of the exercise, population policy evaluation remains, not least, a delicate matter, although it is obviously one of the keys to improving the formulation and implementation of these policies. The situation is all the more regrettable because many policies, we believe, are hampered by poor formulation, which compromises their effectiveness from the start.

Policy formulation

In the South, policies of discouraging childbearing regularly involve the organisation of networks to distribute modern methods of contraception, possibly backed up by information campaigns.⁴ This type of programme is in fact based on the idea that there is a latent, unsatisfied demand for contraception among the people in question, which may

⁴ The information may be got across by persuasion and, in some cases, China for example, even by coercion.



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not necessarily be the case, despite the credence lent by some surveys.

There may well be no grounds for blindly assuming that women who want to space births by more than two years also want a modern form of contraception. It is a shift in meaning for which there is probably no justification, particularly if the people in question have traditionally gone in for long post-partum periods, of more than 20 months, say, during which conception is avoided without the use of modern contraceptive devices.

Many people in the South, especially sub-Saharan Africa (a bastion of high fertility and currently a focus for anti-childbearing policies remote-controlled by the demography industry) practise such

Mothers and children in a clinic in Cameroon
'A typical (direct and explicit) population policy is one which promotes the use of contraceptives to bring down fertility and population growth with it'

things as post-partum abstinence or long-term breast-feeding, which can be interpreted as a means of spacing or reducing births, i.e. of regulating fertility. Lastly, a woman anxious to keep births at least two years apart is only conforming to tradition and not necessarily expressing a demand for modern contraception. In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa she would be more likely to do the opposite because, for various reasons, high fertility is still prized.

If this were not the case, in fact, it is highly likely that fertility would decline,

with or without modern contraceptive programmes. Historically speaking, there was a substantial drop in fertility in the North before such modern methods were spread. Is there any reason to think that Chinese peasants would have been less inventive about birth control than, say, 19th-century French peasants, if they had been interested in lower fertility, Mr Demery wonders.

The theoretical framework of population policies ought to be more detailed than the one proposed previously (some policies have already made partial improvements). Demographic phenomena, and fertility especially, have many dimensions and policies designed to affect them have to cater for this.

But how can they reconcile the points of view of the psychologist (it is important to find emotional substitutes for motherhood), the sociologist (women's roles have to be diversified and institutions and values which encourage high fertility have to be changed), the microeconomist (the cost : benefit ratio of motherhood has to be altered and the cost of bringing up children increased) and so on ?

This approach, which is probably closer to the complexity of the phenomena involved, could also lead to contradictions and the policy has to handle them as best it can. When it comes to fertility, it is not unusual to see a desire for change in the individual clash with the expectations of the community and the whole art of politics is to juggle all the elements to achieve the desired effect.

Population phenomena are part of a whole network of relations — or interrelations — and so it would probably be better to abandon causal models for systemic ones. Instead of seeing population phenomena as the last link in a causal, linear chain, why not include them in a network of relations where they are cause and consequence in turn (see box). This conceptual effort may suggest fresh openings (there is still a great deal of investigation to be done here) in terms of planning, but it is important to realise that their effectiveness has yet to be properly demonstrated.

Integrating population and development

Population trends as such pose no problems. The difficulties arise when the organisation of society ⁵ is threatened by a predicted development. North and South alike are now worried that anticipated population trends will in fact undermine the future development of our societies — which may partly account for the success of the 'integrate population and development' phrase coined at the World Population Conference in Bucharest in 1974.

What determines what ?

When looking at the determining factors of fertility, demographers often stress economic variables, and rightly so. To take an extreme example, in Brazil, women are apparently sometimes only hired if they agree to be sterilised — a case of demographic behaviour being (very) heavily influenced by economic considerations. But is this always the way it works ? By no means. In the United Kingdom, for example, some employers open crèches in their firms to compensate for the State's failure to provide such facilities, which is the complete opposite, for this is economic behaviour adapting under the influence of demographic considerations. So relations between economy and population are not uniform. Does this mean that we should be preferring systemic models which make it easier to cater for this kind of situation ?

So far, the idea has often been reduced to the inclusion of population variables in socio-economic development planning — highly operational, but doing scant justice to the concept. Population is far more than just numbers, and development does not necessarily mean copying the North.

The pitfalls of this reduction can be avoided by moving firmly in another direction. Making a success of integrating population and development also, and perhaps most importantly, means making sure that the people are actually involved in the job of designing policies. This could start when the people's aims and the ways and means of achieving them were fixed, in the light of their culture in particular, and continue into the evaluation phase — which is to say that the people would stop being the passive implementers of directives from above and become operators in their own right.

If such population involvement worked, it could overturn many an ingrained habit. It could do away with purely sectoral policies, for example, to the benefit of a global plan for society. But what is actually happening to the population of the South ? To our mind, policies are still all too often confined to sectoral considerations. They are still all too often set up in response to what can be insistent demand from outside. And they are still all too often designed outside too and neither take notice of the specific features of the people in question nor arrange for them to be consulted. This is probably why they have not had any solid, demonstrable results.

But there is another way and that is to have more global social development policies which are also — and above all — designed by the people for whom they are intended, which would take us from population policies to policies for people. Will they really be more efficient ? Only the future will tell. ■ C.V.

⁵ Including environmental issues.

Population growth and sustainable development

by Jean-Marie Wautelet *

The interrelation between population variables and socio-economic variables often forms a 'U' curve, showing the whole ambiguity of the link between rising population figures and economic growth. Low-income countries, for example, may have a high or low population density and the same is true of high-income countries.

This ambiguity is now further complicated by the question mark hanging over the high level food balance (i.e. where both *per capita* income and productive employment in agriculture are high). Maintaining that balance is not only desirable for wellbeing but also appears to be the best way of achieving sustainable growth.¹ However, it now seems that the maintenance of this balance depends very much on its implementation having an effect on the reproductive capacity of the ecosystems.

Lastly, more recent thinking on the population issue tends to redefine development in terms not just of better access to material goods, but of the capacity of the people involved to make global economic, cultural and social plans for the societies in which they live.²

Since these two changes do not consider the population variable as internal or external to the growth process from the very beginning, they allow us to go beyond the dilemma embodied in the Malthus ver-

sus Boserup approaches³ and they form the basis of the discussion of the link between population explosion and development in Africa which we develop in this article.

Population growth and density

Most African nations have a paradoxical combination of high population growth and low population density and so when they spend on education, health, food, infrastructure and so on, they do not get the benefit of the economies of scale which go with high density.

The population growth-density gap is a particular problem in that the techniques used in the sectors just men-

³ In outline, Malthus says that economic growth cannot follow the rate of population growth (an internal variable), which leads to situations of extreme poverty, famine, epidemics, enforced migration etc., while Boserup's theory is that population growth (an external variable) enhances agricultural output by intensifying the factors of production

tioned tend to be imported and depend on economies of scale to make them work.

So a growing population comes up against high unit costs in terms of health, schooling etc. Sectoral policies pursued in isolation are 'of course' doomed to failure, given the high social and economic cost (in terms of technical and institutional innovation, dwindling income etc.) of policies which would stem the process.

Population growth and development

This dichotomy between growth and density refers us to the components of growth, which are at variance with the concept of development outlined above. A high growth rate is the result of both:

— an effect outside the population itself. When fitting Africa into the international division of labour, the colonial powers tackled the labour shortage by lowering the death rate with imported medical techniques;
— and an effect within the population. High fertility is linked to the need to maintain the social coherence of the



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¹ Mellor John W. and Johnston Bruce F., 'The World Food Equation: Interrelations among development, employment and food consumption', *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. XXII, June 1984, p. 533.

² Pecmans J. Ph. — From Modernisation to Neomodernisation: The Drift of the Dominant Development Paradigm in Bablewski Z. and Hettne B. (ed.), *Crisis in development*, UNU, EADI, 1989, p. 110.

extended family unit in an environment beset with insecurity.

So the nature of population growth clearly relates to the extent to which the people can control and steer structural change. We shall give three examples here to show how a one-dimensional population-development policy can engender phenomena which are at variance with the stated aims.

The first example is food security policies designed to boost national farm output by increasing the productivity of labour. It is easy to see that this growth of production *per capita* (Y/P) will be all the higher if the increase in the productivity of labour (Y/A) is not absorbed by a decline in the ratio of agricultural workers to total population (A/P). But measures designed to boost the productivity of labour (agri-industrial projects, intensification focused on the use of input etc.) are very often linked to a relative decline in the number of people working in agriculture and have the dual effect of encouraging the flight from the land and bringing too small an improvement in *per capita* production. The non-agricultural working population will then only grow viably if it can generate enough external revenue to import its basic consumer goods.

This example highlights the need to think of structural change in terms of internal social dynamics as well as of the external environment.

The next two examples point up the fact that the nature of these changes may be divergent and contradictory according to when and where they take place. Overlooking time differences may lead to cumulative recessive effects, as the relation between urbanisation and population change shows.

Demographically speaking, urbanisation may look positive in that it is supposed to hasten a decline in the birth rate. Ecologically speaking, the fear is that irreversible phenomena may occur with such things as access to drinking water and firewood before that decline has its effect on the volume of consumption of the urban masses.

The third example, which has to do with the notion of space, will bring us back to the concept of density. Some policies take an optimistic view, linked to Boserup's analyses and based on the idea that current population growth could help intensify these factors in production, making for an increase in farm output, 'without any external investment effort'. But the deterioration of the land and the depletion of the natural resources in some parts of Africa are due mainly to shifting cultivation practices in which work is the rare factor when, given the land squeeze and social changes, what is actually needed, according to Boserup, is a change in growing techniques.

However, rural-rural migration policies, as an alternative to intensification, also often bring short-term benefits and new long-term problems.

Thus rural-rural migration from areas of heavy density to 'virgin' rural areas, often encouraged by export crop schemes, opens up pioneering fronts which often do far more damage to soil fertility and anti-erosion practices than dense population did to the natural environment in the areas where it originated. The frantic drive to balance budgets in the short term turns out to be a powerful factor of soil deterioration here. It is also a mistake for these policies to consider growing population density as synonymous with population pressure when such pressure is in fact a question of the relation between the growing density and the social, economic and cultural environment of the people.

Population density and development

Most African countries have no really clear pattern of population density. Workers emigrate from high-density and low-density regions alike. In Cameroon, for example, there is heavy emigration from the densely populated western highlands and from some districts in the low-density Centre, while the Mandara Mountains (high density) and the South (low density) have low rates of emigration. Population pressure (i.e. a situation in which people are brought to

question their own methods of reproduction over a given territory) is not just relative to density, but to the way that density interacts with the standard of living, the agrarian system, the possibilities of non-agricultural employment, institutional and property structures and social cohesion within the territory⁴.

The fact that there are only a few (if any) studies of these interactions shows just how poor a job planners have made of replacing the quantitative approach to the relation between population and development with a qualitative approach which clarifies the complex relations between man and his environment.

Sustainability

The many scenarios of population pressure have something to do with the conditions of sustainable development. Development should no longer be seen from the point of view of economic growth alone, but in terms of the people's control over their living conditions in a given area.

There seem to be three major challenges in this quest for sustainable development. The first and most commonly highlighted is that of ensuring that women are recognised as being at the heart of the human reproduction-education-food production process. The second is the possibility of reorganising the social fabric so that the mobilisation and utilisation of resources can be controlled locally — which is where participatory democracy and institutional innovation must cater for a higher standard of living and the demands of the long-term reproduction of the ecosystem.

Third and last, it must be possible to recreate the Nation-State as a place where there is some consistency between the various decision-making areas and where the frontiers of socio-economic insecurity have been pushed back. The responses which those involved make to these three challenges will shape the way population and development are integrated in the future. ■

J.-P. W.

⁴ Bilsborrow R.E., Population pressure and agricultural development in developing countries: a conceptual framework and recent evidence, *World Development*, vol. 12, No 2, 1987, pp. 183-203.

Population growth and economic development in Africa

by Ahmed Bahri *

International organisations and the general public will have the opportunity to discuss this issue broadly again in 1994, with the holding of the International Conference on Population and Development, scheduled for Cairo in September this year, as was the case with previous Conferences in Bucharest in 1974 and Mexico City in 1984.

The subject is certainly not new. From the inescapable Malthus, to the striking demographic dynamics of the African nations and the so-called failure of three decades of development and international cooperation, by way of the European industrial revolution, the Asian green revolution and the emergence of new industrialised countries, the subject is still under discussion and people are still wondering, periodically, whether population growth or economic growth will gain the upper hand.

The aim of this article, which does not set out to provide either an in-depth or comprehensive investigation, or a full picture of the issue, is simply to trigger reflection on and enable the reader to ask himself questions about what is going on in Africa.

People like to say that Africa, a vast continent of something like 31 million km², is home to only 12% or 13% of the world's population, with a density of about 25 inhabitants per km², which is far lower than, say, Europe (about 100) or Asia (about 125). Some add that the continent is rich in resources of every kind. Yet it has serious problems.

What are the population problems? The difficulty for non-specialists and decision-makers, who may not know how

to perceive them properly and only suffer the consequences when reaction is long overdue, is that we all have a natural tendency to see the (somewhat abstract) population figure for a particular geographical area as an a-temporal piece of data, without either considering or grasping its dynamics and the constant changes it involves ... or reflecting that time, alas, does not wait.

Compare the changes in natural movements (birth and death), forced and spontaneous migration and rapid, uncontrolled urbanisation in Africa over the past 30 or 40 years — just one generation — with what has happened in Asia or Europe, and the conclusion that Africa has complex population problems is unavoidable.

Europe's demographic transition was a long-drawn-out affair which took more than one or two centuries. So, leaving historical accidents aside, the decline in the birth and death rates was very slow, giving time for the adjustments which resulted from it. When there were not enough resources to go round in the last century, surplus population was able to move elsewhere, in what were sometimes remarkable migrations, to the New World and other continents. Towns also developed fairly harmoniously around industry, communications or market and business centres, which all played their part in development, in symbiosis with the changing rural world and the modernisation of agriculture.

Asia did not experience the same course of events, but its demographic transition was faster and earlier than Africa's, so much so that the pressure on resources was diminished when the Asian countries embarked upon a phase of rapid

industrialisation. This was not of course a general trend, but there are plenty of specific cases.

What is happening in Africa? The spectacular decline in the death rate over the last 40 or 50 years was neither accompanied nor followed (far from it) by a similar decline in the rate of birth and fertility, such that, most African nations had to cope with increases of more than 3% per annum for a long period, with only one or two managing to get the figures down. The anticipated drop in population growth rates in various countries is not expected to result in a general demographic transition in Africa before the beginning of the next century, (between 2010 and 2020), because of the amazing spur to population dynamics imparted by the recent fertility trends we have just described.

How have the African economies reacted in the face of all these factors? Have they successfully picked up the demographic challenge and taken advantage of the fact that the population should be another development resource? Alas, they have not, particularly over the contemporary period. It could be that Africa's recent rapid population growth has become such a heavy burden that debt, that bane of almost every economy, pales into insignificance before it. This view is only acceptable, of course, if one is keen to broaden the horizons in the medium and the long term and take into account the needs of future generations. What is the point of having children if they have nothing but poverty and social evils in store for them?

Seen from this angle, Africa's population problem acquires a completely different dimension. But awareness of the consequences of excessive population growth came late in the day and the idea was slow to mature, although it was helped along by the force of recent violent events, from the bread riots to the

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'Fertility is too high and must drop and the best way of ensuring that it does is to improve the rate of contraception use from the current average of 10% to 20% by the year 2000'

vociferous discrediting of the established orders.

Obviously, African governments have had to cope with short-term problems, which in theory should have diverted their attention away from long-term issues, but their population policy statements and plans and all the measures they have introduced reveal that a great deal of commitment and effort is going into this field.

Few African countries had population policies before the Kilimanjaro Population and Development Action Programme (PAK) was adopted in Arusha in 1984. Arusha was a turning point, because it produced the first consensus on the need to moderate population growth and, at the same time, gave Africa an instrument of discussion which set population issues in the broader context of socio-economic development. It is a pity that the Programme did not get more attention and support for its implementation. The broad spectrum of issues which it tackled perhaps did not get the attention it deserved from the donors, who tended to lay emphasis on family planning — which, to be a success, needs a combination of factors and con-

ditions which the Programme indeed had the merit of highlighting.

And now, ten years later, African governments have once again pointed to the validity of the Action Programme, this time at the Dakar Conference, which was called to prepare the ground for the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in September 1994.

The Dakar/Ngor population declaration (DDN), which came out of that meeting, summed up what has been learnt over the past ten years, in the light of all kinds of events — the emergence of a civil society and democratisation, structural adjustment programmes, natural scourges and disasters, civil wars and disturbances, etc. and highlighted the importance of actually implementing the recommendations. With this in mind, it invited the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, in conjunction with bodies such as the Organisation of African Unity, the African Development Bank, the UN Fund for Population Activities and others, to form a Monitoring Committee of member countries to steer implementation of the recommendations of the Action Programme and the DDN. It also broke new ground by fixing the first quantitative objectives in the history of Africa.

The target is to get the population growth rate down from the current 3% to 2.5% by the year 2000 and 2% by the year 2010. The death rate (particularly among infants) should also decline with it, to below 50 per 1000, and the maternal death rate halved.

These figures have been called over-ambitious, of course. But there are encouraging signs, such as the tendencies noted in northern Africa, most of southern Africa and some parts of eastern Africa. And it is clear that some of the factors influencing population dynamics — those affecting maternal deaths, for example — are easy to control. Illegal abortions performed in dreadful conditions could well decline, if not stop altogether, if proper contraception programmes were implemented, information was provided and laws were passed. The newborn survival rate would improve too with proper health care, better-spaced births,

mothers being neither too young nor too old and so on.

Fertility is too high and must drop and the best way of ensuring that it does, as things stand, is to improve the rate of contraception use from the current average of 10% to 20% by the year 2000 and 40% by the year 2010. The targets for fertility can be achieved in exactly the same way as the targets for the maternal death rate. There is a potential demand for contraception, in fact, due to recent improvements in girls' school attendance, to clearer awareness by women of their unenviable social status, to the speed of information and so on.

The above remarks did not put enough emphasis on the effects of exaggerated population growth on economic and social matters in the various countries. Most economies are clearly unable to meet the additional demand for food, housing, school places, jobs, health services etc. which population growth generates, not to mention all the effort which has to go into improving those services, whose standards have often taken a tumble over the past ten or 20 years. In theory, a bigger population means that more people are available for work, it is true, and a larger potential market may be the result. But rare are the countries which have taken these opportunities of generating sustained development and setting society on a resolute path to progress and social justice.

No thought is given to the time it takes for a baby, which is one more mouth to feed, to become an adult, who can turn his hand to production, nor about the need to broaden and increase the basis of production to cater for the new needs which this population growth brings with it. It is for all the world as if every generation was building up its share of lack of production and handing it on to the next generation.

How can we escape from the endless spiral? That is what the leaders must be asked. And there must be an answer, because to give up hope would be an inconceivable outcome. The up-and-coming generations have to break with the old way of seeing things and adapt their culture to the demands of their time. ■

A.B.

Africa's population

The paradox of natural wealth and poverty¹

by Kapembe Nsingo*

Most African policy pronouncements have up until now treated demography as merely a tangential issue rather than a causal variable that could determine economic growth and development more decisively. It was always assumed that economic growth would provide the needs of any growing population, and, at independence, a certain overoptimism prevailed that growth would take care of the basic needs of the largely poor African populations. Even the donor community felt that a percentage contribution of their GDP would do the trick.

Ten years after political freedom, the shock waves of the 1973 oil price hikes, which devastated many economies, forced donors and recipients alike to rethink as the number of people to be fed, clothed and housed increased. At first, recycled oil money seemed to provide an answer: it was massively used to implement economic rehabilitation programmes, but this strategy not only failed, it plunged the continent into the heaviest debt-burden any region of the world has ever had to bear. Sub-Saharan Africa's external debt as a percentage of GDP in 1991 was 107.9% compared with that of South East Asia which was only 28.2%. This situation has been compounded by the dramatic decline in the prices of its primary commodities.

Natural resources

The net result for Africa has been a fall in living standards (to levels much lower than before independence) and an increase in the number of people living in abject poverty. Between 1980 and 1991, Africa's population grew by 3.1% while GDP grew by 2.1%. Income per capita was US\$ 350 during the same period, and is believed to have fallen further in 1992 and 1993. Yet there is this

paradox that 'Africa is a rich continent whose people are poor', as a Guinean representative at last year's Dakar African Conference on Population Planning put it.

The mineral and agricultural potential of Africa are well known. Some of her minerals are of extreme strategic importance, others are uncommon. Oil and gas have been discovered in a number of countries. Yet economic take-off remains elusive despite 30 years of development efforts and aid, and environmental degradation continues unabated: Africa's 660 million hectares of rain forest are disappearing at the rate of 3.2m hectares per annum, while large-scale desertification and erosion continue to deprive the continent of its agricultural lands. Africa holds a number of uneivable records: the highest rate of fertility in the world, the highest rate of mortality and the most people affected by the Aids epidemics.

There is a school of thought which believes that Africa's problems are now so numerous and so acute that any shift in natural, human and institutional resource balance would cause far-reaching damage to health and the environment and compromise its limited chances of survival. In other words, development in Africa is a lost cause. We do not share this pessimism. We believe that since development begins and ends with people, every development strategy should be viewed from that perspective.

The demographic factor in Africa's development is therefore a crucial one, not only because of the problem of pressure on resources and the effects on the environment, but also because people are the most important agents of development: it is their health, education and overall wellbeing which determine how much can be done and how. An unhealthy

person with inappropriate or inadequate education cannot work for socioeconomic transformation.

As already hinted, Africa, at the moment, has a population load factor that weighs too heavily on its limited financial resources to guarantee a meaningful quality of life for the vast majority of its people. Irrespective of the endogenous factors such as droughts and civil strife and exogenous ones such as debt and low commodity prices, which have contributed to Africa's economic woes, the situation calls into question the current development strategy of structural adjustment programmes which deny investment in the social sectors. Advocates of structural adjustment are seekers of immediate solutions, but there are no 'quick fixes' in economic development.

Demographic impacts

Given this background, how do Africa's demographic characteristics impact on its short- and long-term economic prospects?

It is important to note that the issue is not so much one of overpopulation or density or lack of space as of growth, structure and resource management. Africa's population may have trebled since the 1950s, but the continent is not overpopulated. With a vast area of about 31m square kilometres and a population put at over 612m, population density is only about 25 per square kilometre, although there are areas of high concentration like Nigeria, Burundi and Rwanda.

What is worrying is the gap between population growth rate and food production, as is shown by Africa's food deficit and the famine problem. Its per capita food production now is estimated to be 20% lower than it was in the 1960s. Should this not change by 2020, 'over a

¹ This is an abridged version of a paper submitted to 'The Courier'.

* Former Zambian ambassador to Belgium and the European Community.

quarter of all people in sub-Saharan Africa would still be facing food insecurity', according to the World Bank in a paper published last year. This per capita food availability picture is, however, distorted: a number of countries have already achieved significant levels of self-sufficiency in food, even becoming exporters to neighbouring countries. There is no doubt that, with the right kind of approach in dealing with drought, which has been occurring with worrying regularity in recent years, and with the right kind of technology in the method of cultivation, Africa can produce enough food to feed its growing population.

In 1993, the population of sub-Saharan Africa was estimated at 510m, of whom 46% were below the age of 15 and 5% over the age of 60. (The annual growth rate was put at 3%). There were more girls than boys in the under-15 age group. Teenage pregnancy is on the increase. With the huge unemployment problem, the dependency rate in Africa is extremely high. This has contributed, in no small measure, to the current phenomenon of rapid urbanisation. So, the overall picture is one of a continent with a largely young, poor and unevenly distributed population. The rural-urban development dilemma of the past 30 years is thus exacerbated.

A young population is in itself not a bad thing. In the medium term, it is an immense asset provided it is healthy and well educated.

Improve health and education

If the World Bank's 1993 World Development Report is anything to go by, household income 'is the major determinant' of the state of health of a given nation. We have mentioned Africa's widespread poverty and the lowness of income per capita. This has serious implications for health in the continent. Indeed, evidence of the effects of that poverty can be seen in health services, in malnutrition, high child and maternal mortality, high incidences of anaemia and the prevalence of common diseases. Where there has been an evident growth in income per capita, says the World Bank, children's lives have been saved and adult mortality rates, especially those of women, have gone down. This highlights the importance of public expenditure on health in Africa which, unfortunately remains inadequate and ineffective. Sub-Saharan Africa with 10% of the world population spends US\$ 12 billion on health, which is equivalent to 1% of the total world expenditure. Its health budget represents 4.5% of its GDP or a per capita expenditure of only US\$ 24.


Sub-Saharan Africa is in the midst of an educational crisis. This, at a time

'Sub-Saharan Africa is in the midst of an educational crisis... Seven out of ten children do not attend primary school. In some cases, three out of ten are without school places'

when over 65% of total population are illiterate. Seven out of ten children do not attend primary school. In some cases, three out of ten are without school places. Enrolment rates are lower for girls than for boys. Most schools are run down and need rehabilitation. With no new schools being built, the situation promises to be even worse in the coming years. The demand for school places is increasing at a pace far beyond the capacity of budgets. Where a child is lucky enough to have a place, he faces lack of learning aids and text books, inadequate furniture and a poorly paid, highly demoralised teaching staff. To make matters worse, Africa's expensively educated and able professionals continue to leave the continent in large numbers in search of better political and economic climates.

An increasing population, without the means to acquire a decent, relevant education, is on a slippery downward slope towards underdevelopment.

From the foregoing, Africa's economic prospects in the short and medium terms appear bleak, but this picture can be altered with the adoption of appropriate strategy and with the support of the international community. First of all, the wide gap between the population growth rate, GDP growth rate and food production would justify an intensification of the birth control and family planning campaign. This implies abandoning the lip-service, half-hearted Government approach of recent years for a realistic political commitment and the integration of population policies into development programmes and projects. In the absence of adequate financial resources, priority should be given to population-related issues, particularly social services (health and education) and improvement in the status of women (see article on birth control and family planning). But Africa will never be able to accomplish anything without a fundamental shift in the international situation in favour of the continent: this means, essentially, drastic reductions and cancellation of debts and improvements in the terms of trade to put an end to the current unjust situation where it is paid a pittance for its produce in the international market place. ■ K.N.



Mauritius

An orthodox population policy

by Gérard Cateaux (*)

Over the years, procreation and its corollary, population, have turned into a science and even a medicinal and moral policy. All peoples have a duty to procreate in the moral sense of the word, i.e. to marry, raise families and stake their claim to the future of mankind.

This was the thinking behind what happened in Mauritius, where the desire to improve Mauritian society dictated that population management should shape the future — a policy at total variance with the philosophy of Mao Tse Tung, who, in his time, wanted more Chinese, more people to work for China's development.

China's size gave free rein to the Chairman's ambition and Mao's was an expansionist vision. But we Mauritians, on our little island, could not follow the Great Helmsman's example. We had to contain and even control our people's enthusiasm with a family planning policy reflecting the make-up of our community and all the religions with which our people are involved in their everyday lives. It was not so easy.

Let us wind back the clock to just after World War II, when man had at last realised the value of the individual and the living being. Mauritius, like the rest of the world, had barely awakened from the nightmare of warfare on an international scale. It began to count its people. The birth rate was high, as it was the world over, and a typical family had five children, if not more.

Families, whatever their status and standard of living, wanted children. But it was underestimating the way the economy affected the family to imagine that when a child came into the world, a bowl of rice automatically came with it. But science and reason were getting the better of unreason. In 1953, the colonial Government set up an exploratory committee to look at the population in relation

to the country's economic resources and production potential and it pinpointed the need for birth control, suggesting that married couples stick to the standard pattern of mother, father and three children. So family planning emerged, in fact, because of a need for reasonably sized families and, within four years, the family planning concept and all its manifestations, from pills to natural methods, were part of the island's demographic scenery.

its fertility ahead, i.e. it must pave the way to a better future by being rigorously scientific and espousing a sense of duty to the community. This is why the right-minded opted for a responsible population policy aimed at uniting differences in a policy of planned, pragmatic parenthood which would regulate society.

What were the aims of the Family Planning Association? To promote the personal, material and sociological benefits of the family, first and foremost, and then open-mindedness and responsibility on the part of the islanders, to

TABLE 1

Region	Area (km ²)	M + F	M	F
Mauritius	1 865	1 022 456	510 676	511 780
Rodrigues	104	34 204	17 084	17 120
Agalega	70	167	91	76
St Brandon	1	—	—	—

The spectre of overpopulation

In February 1958, the Mauritius Family Planning Association saw the light of day. It was no easy birth, given the power of the Catholic clergy. But, in 1960, Titmus and Meade warned of the spectre of overpopulation looming and this prompted the Government of the day to restrict families to three children. Their report provoked a wave of opposition in the conservative press, the Catholic Church and the Mauritian community in general, but, consciously or unconsciously, the lay spirit guided the young nation, in the light of a higher reality, towards an ideal of generalised culture, with citizenship as a prelude to its happiness.

We learned that a people anxious to ensure its own survival has to plan

encourage a planned, scientific approach to solving marital problems, to help childless couples anxious to start a family, to help couples space births for the benefit of existing children, who were to contribute to the health and happiness of the family, to open centres and clinics providing advice, literature and statistical information on the wellbeing of the family and to set up the relevant contact with the various sister organisations fighting for the family cause.

But in our country, families were everybody's affair, with the State looking after the lay side and the Church there too, because of the preponderant part it played in the life of the nation, which had taken a close interest in population matters and therefore in the family. This led François and Michèle Guy, two real latter-day apostles, to take up an idea first mooted by

* Editor of the Mauritian 'Week End'.

TABLE 2

Population projection by selected age group and corresponding projected cost in terms of basic retirement pension

Year	1992	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030
Number of beneficiaries (by age group)									
60-74	71 248	75 144	79 206	85 743	104 059	134 081	166 752	196 742	208 670
75-89	19 012	18 632	26 013	27 860	27 931	30 279	33 916	42 105	55 018
90 and over	948	868	946	1 043	1 222	1 522	1 858	2 212	2 442
Total	91 208	94 644	106 165	114 646	133 212	165 882	202 526	241 059	266 130
Monthly pension (Rupees) assuming a 7.5% annual increase									
60-74	520	646	927	1 331	1 991	2 744	3 939	5 656	8 119
75-89	650	807	1 159	1 664	2 389	3 430	4 924	7 070	10 149
90 and over	3 100	3 851	5 529	7 937	11 395	16 359	23 485	33 716	48 404
Total monthly pension payments (Rupees m)									
60-74	37.05	48.54	73.42	114.12	198.86	367.92	656.84	1 112.77	1 694.19
75-89	12.36	15.04	26.67	44.70	66.73	103.86	167.00	297.68	558.38
90 and over	2.94	3.34	5.23	8.28	13.92	24.90	43.64	74.58	118.20
Total	52.35	66.92	105.32	167.10	279.51	496.68	867.48	1 485.03	2 370.77

The projection is, therefore, that the annual state pension bill will rise to R 30.8 bn (2.37 bn × 13) by 2030.

TABLE 3

The worker: pensioner ratio Current situation and future projections

Year	Workers ¹ : Pensioners ²
1992	7.5:1
1995	7.5:1
2000	7.4:1
2005	7.1:1
2010	6.3:1
2015	5.2:1
2020	4.2:1
2025	3.5:1
2030	3.2:1

¹ Workers = working population aged 18-60.
² Pensioners = aged 60 and over.

Monsignor (later Cardinal) Jean Margent and form an organisation of their own. It was called Family Action and it has stood the test of time. In 1963-1965, when the Guys were setting up the infrastructure to regulate births within the restrictive religious meaning of the phrase, it was impossible for the political (and lay) authorities of the nation to overlook the

importance of the Titmus and Meade report on the dangers of overpopulation and its basic equation: one family = three children.

A Hindu celebration in Port Louis
Despite the heavy influence of religion, 'we had to contain and even control our people's enthusiasm for children through family planning which reflected the make-up of our community and all the religions with which our people are involved in their everyday lives'



The result of the policy, brought in some 30 years ago, is that, with economic and scientific progress and a family planning policy, Mauritius is now the prisoner of its own success. According to the 1990 census, there are 1 022 456 people in Mauritius, but the island is still the same size it was in the 1960s, when half a million inhabitants were thought to represent overpopulation. And to think that, even with a population of a million plus, we still have to bring in foreign labour to meet the needs of the construction and textile industries.

As of the last census (1990), the population of Mauritius and its neighbouring islands are as shown in table 1.

Demography and an ageing population

Our success with family planning has brought its own problems. With all the progress being made worldwide, we cannot escape the problems of ageing and everything that goes with it. The figures speak for themselves. By the time we reach the third millennium, one Mauritian will be working to maintain three and the financial burden on social security will be astronomical — hence the campaign launched recently to get the age of retirement raised to, say, 65 instead of the current 60 (see table II).

This subject is discussed in an unofficial report on population ageing and

its consequences, which suggests that thought should be given to:

1. the socioeconomic consequences of an ageing population on the younger generation;
2. the worker: pensioner ratio, which is narrowing dangerously, and its economic effects in the medium and the long term;
3. the shortage of skilled labour and the future of professionals who retire at 60;
4. the situation of the elderly in the family;
5. relations between the generations — dialogue/absence of dialogue between young and old;
6. how to pass on values and traditions to the younger generation in a society in the throes of industrialisation.

These are the questions now and we hope that they will be answered soon — even if we only start with an answer to the thorny problem of an ageing population. The table makes the situation clear.

Demography is a matter of establishing findings, first and foremost, but what interests us here is what the future holds in terms of growth in the worst scenario of dramas, wars and family conquests and the exercise in survival which follows major disasters. Implosion is succeeded by population explosion as a resistance to fate — and as a creative, if not procreative force.

Safeguard our souls

The International Year of the Family is with us, serious thinking is the order of the day and we are happy to see that the Mauritian Government, which has a ministry concerned with the Rights of Women and the Family, is keen to make the family the focus of the union. Scheduled events are aimed at breathing fresh life into the family unit with a policy which will give the family its letters of nobility. Mankind, present and future, hinges on the family. All the dominant qualities which the family needs for its happiness gravitate around it. If the family does not exist, these dominant qualities stop having an influence on everyday life and on the ethical and cultural future of mankind as characterised by what Ivan Illitch called the convivial society.

All the questions raised by the population issue are linked to the problems

of society in general — in which, however, the family is still the focal point of any progress or decline. Rapid changes in outlook and habits, all-embracing industrialisation, human relations, new fashions and new behaviour seem to be rocking the Mauritian family's foundations, which are being undermined by the problems from elsewhere which accompany all industrial development.

This is why the authorities decided to start a campaign to make people

aware of the population issue and the problem of ageing in a context of rapid industrialisation. 'Let us stop for a moment — we don't need to stop the machine — and get our breath back, prepare for phase two of our industrialisation drive and, most important, join together to see how to safeguard our souls in the breakneck developments in this country of ours.' This could be the price which the people and their Government, together, have to pay for a better tomorrow. ■ G.C.

Why Mauritius' population policy worked¹

Two of the things which helped make the Mauritian population policy a success were the increase in the use of contraceptives, of course, and the economic revolution, which encouraged more women to go out to work. But there was also Family Action, an organisation which Monsignor (now Cardinal) Jean Margeot, Vicar-General of the Diocese, set up with a group of Mauritians in April 1963 to offer couples an educational system of information and fertility monitoring based on natural methods. The aims are unequivocal. Family Action preaches abstinence for parts of the month, reliably plotted on a temperature chart. It presents this less as a technique than as a code of behaviour, reflecting the three main facets of fertility — woman and her fertility, man and his responsibility and the child as a person from conception onwards — and becoming a full part of the couple. Here François and Michèle Guy, both doctors, discuss what has been learnt from the Family Action scheme, with the help of Gisèle Yop Tong and Richard Saint-Mart.

Millions of dollars have been spent on family planning over the past 30 years, in most cases without much in the way of results. In Africa, for example, which has had the largest number of birth control programmes, only 14% of women use any form of contraception. So how is it that Mauritius, which is so close to the continent, has made its policy work so well? The three word answer to this question is decision, clarification and unification.

Decision

Right from the start, the Mauritians themselves took stock of the problem and realised that the solution lay with themselves and, with financial support from international organisations, they set up their own campaign, motivated by a community genuinely anxious to get the population under control.

That community then moved into action to put the programme into practice, in a way unparalleled elsewhere, with everyone taking what he thought was the proper course and accepting the approaches of everyone else — which the Catholic Church was by no means the last to do. The authorities hailed this diversity and agreed to back all approaches. Mauritius has proved to be the fairly rare example of entirely peaceful coexistence between organisations with philosophies and activities as contrasting as those of

the Mauritian Family Planning Association and Family Action.

Clarification

In most cases, campaigns are based on the idea that controlling the population means having fewer children. Family Action's basic approach is to show that children are a good thing, something of value, not a nuisance, and to give priority to the couple, its guiding principle is that fertility is a form of power for the couple, not a disease to be treated with drugs.

The man and the woman start by learning to identify and understand the biological and psychological machinery of fertility and then decide on their own behaviour.

Unification

We have no wish to sanctify biology. Our aim is to teach the individual to understand the laws which lie within him and to use that understanding to adopt a way of life involving accepting that periods of fertility alternate with periods of infertility and recognising the many expressions of tenderness, conjugal communication and sexual contact. In this way, the unity of the individual and the couple is recreated through the convergent dimensions of human sexuality. In this way, achievement of the basic aspirations in the depths of the individual being can replace the clash between tenderness, pleasure and the gift of life which can so easily occur if contraception becomes all-important. Mauritius' Family Action has made it possible to go deeper into this issue, which raises so many questions.

¹ From an article in *Histoire du Développement*, No 23, October 1993.

HAITI IN ECONOMIC CRISIS

What population policy ?

by Jacques Hendry Rousseau*

The first world population conference in Bucharest in 1974 made some Third World leaders wake up to the vital importance of including the population variable when defining development strategies.

Closer to home, Mexico 1984 was the international consecration of population policies and programmes. So we moved on from principles to action programmes and designing population policies has become the top priority in most of the developing nations today. Does Haiti need a population policy? We shall answer this in the light of the socio-economic situation in this country, by:

- first, briefly outlining the population situation in Haiti ;
- second, outlining the economic situation ;
- third, relating population to the economy, i.e. setting out the main demographic and related economic problems observed in Haiti in recent years.

The population situation

The censuses of 1950, 1971 and 1982 provide us with useful information on Haiti's population trends. The resident population, which was 3 097 000 in 1950, went up to 4 330 000 in 1971 and 5 054 000 in 1982, so there were 66 000 new arrivals every year between the last two censuses, giving an average growth rate of 1.4%.

The average population projections worked out (provisionally) by the IHSI, Haiti's statistical institute, and CELADE, the Latin American Demography Centre, puts the country's total population at around 6 903 000 in 1993 and suggests that it will go past the 8 million-mark as the year 2000 approaches. The population

is expected to grow at 2% per annum, but with large-scale losses due to the crisis (a short-term rise in the death rate and in emigration), it could go a little more slowly.

Haiti is 27 750 km² and its population density, 249 inhabitants per km², is one of the heaviest in Latin America and the Caribbean in 1993. The even heavier density in relation to the arable land (844 km²) is a clear illustration of the pressure which the people exert on the land.

This is still a fairly young population. The population of under-15s is 40% of the total (including 15% of under-fives). More than half the population (55%) is of working age and the elderly (over 65) are poorly represented, accounting for only 4%.

There are more women than men (96 men for every 100 women) because of higher mortality and emigration among males.

Despite slight changes in the population spread, there is striking inequality. The largest contingent, slightly more than a third (34%) of the total population, lives in Ouest county, where the capital, Port-au-Prince, is situated. Then come Artibonite and Nord, with far smaller percentages of 14.2% and 10.7% respectively. The six other counties have less than 10% each, with figures varying from 3.5% in Nord-Est and 9.3% in Sud.

On the outskirts of Port-au-Prince where wood is offloaded for the making of charcoal 'Deforestation... is the cause of erosion and even desertification and infertile soil'



* Head of population analysis and research at the Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique (IHSI).

The degree of urbanisation nationwide, at 30%, is relatively low, but there is considerable disparity too. Ouest, which has 57.8% of the country's urban population, is still by far the most heavily urbanised part. Nord (25.7% urbanised), Nord-Est (24.6%) and Artibonite (21.5%) are in the middle of the scale and there are figures of around 13% in the other departments, other than for Sud-Ouest, which has the lowest rate of urbanisation (8%).

The rate of urbanisation has speeded up in all departments over the past few years and the proportion of the urban population is increasing. The main cities, Port-au-Prince especially, but Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, St Marc and Cayes too, are spreading as new shantytowns go up, in many cases to meet the housing demands of newcomers. But urbanisation is still going fastest in Ouest, where, in contrast to the other departments, the urban rate of population growth (4.6%) over the past five years has been higher than that of the country as a whole (4% p.a.). The figure is 3.9% in Artibonite, for example, and 3.2% in Nord.

Since virtually all commercial, economic and political activity takes place in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, the capital is still the main focus for the country's migrants and takes in upwards of 13 000 new arrivals every year, representing at least 70% of the flow from the nine departments. Most migrants are illiterate and unskilled and make a major contribution to mounting urban unemployment, the spread of shantytowns and the constant deterioration of the environment. The population of greater Port-au-Prince is growing at such a rate (4.8%) that it now represents 95% of the urban population of Ouest and 59% of that of the country as a whole and is thirteen times larger than that of the second city, Cap-Haïtien. So Haiti suffers from urban macrocephaly.

The present economic crisis has made external migration popular again and Haitians from every section of society are emigrating to other countries, looking for security and a better economic and social standard of living. Clandestine departures are still the most common, for

many are willing to risk their lives on simple little sailing boats to escape what are barely survival conditions.

However, more than 40 000 Haitians have been repatriated since the crisis began and, according to an IHSI sample survey, 90% of them are of working age and most are from Nord Ouest.

The economic situation

In the early 1980s, Haiti's economic situation was one of dwindling GDP. The GDP growth rate was negative (-0.2% per annum) between 1980 and 1990 and the economic crisis has brought growth further down to -8.9% per annum, since 1990. The decline in the rate of agricultural output -0.2% in the 1980s, has got far worse over the past couple of years (-5%). This decline in domestic output has of course had serious repercussions on trade. The trade deficit ran into hundreds of millions of dollars (about US\$ 165 million) every year during the second half of the 1980s and has got worse since, going past the \$200 million-mark in 1992.

Overall, the total volume of exports has declined considerably. The export index fell by an average 4% per annum in the 1980s and the volume of our exports fell steeply in 1990, with a relative decline of 85% from 1990 to 1993. As was to be expected, the galloping inflation generated by the socio-political situation gradually eroded the national currency and the average export value index therefore tended to go up.

On the import side, food products account for the bulk of the total value, with the 20% registered in the late 1980s going up to 28% in 1992. The country's domestic farm output is so poor that, even in the food sector, its dependence on the outside world is increasing gradually.

The cost of living has gone up a good deal, at a rate of 15.5% per annum, over the past two years. Housing and food loom large in the household budget and are very much to blame for the high cost of living, although their rate of expansion, at 10.5%, are well below the average of 14.6%.

Population and the economy

Although, with all the emigration to North America, the population is growing at a moderate pace; it far outstrips GDP (1.4% as against -0.2% per annum) and further outstrips agricultural GDP — hence a decline in the amount of food available *per capita*.

Declining farm output in the country has both encouraged migration and caused a massive rural exodus in which peasants have moved to the cities, particularly Port-au-Prince. The well-known negative effects of the rural exodus on planning and socio-economic affairs are:

- the abandoning of land in the rural areas which are to some extent the grain store of the towns;

- increasing deterioration of conditions in the urban environment, drainage particularly;

- worsening unemployment, housing crises, a rise in the urban cost of living and the spread of shantytowns.

The imbalance between needs and resources has made itself felt in all areas of the economy.

In health, for example, the infrastructure is unevenly spread across the country. The rural areas in which about three quarters of the total population live are extremely short of health centres and the whole situation is entirely unsatisfactory, with one doctor to about every 8000 people and one hospital bed for every 1400.

When it comes to employment, 56% of the total population are of working age, but the degree of labour absorption is relatively poor and 17% of the population are jobless. This is in fact an under-estimation, because many people do not bother to look for work because they do not expect to find any. Under-employment and disguised unemployed are still very common and, since the population is a very young one and there is chronic unemployment, the economic dependency index is very high, with 100 workers supporting an average of 150 non-workers.

In education, the infrastructure does not meet demand. Attendance is very poor, with only 38% of children of school

age actually attending school. With 63% of the over-10s (and 72% in rural areas) unable to read, the illiteracy rate is still high.

On the ecological front, deforestation brought about by the intensive use of charcoal is a particular problem. It is the cause of erosion and even desertification and infertile soil.

All this is why resources available do not match the needs of the population and the gap will of course get wider if the

State pursues a policy of non-intervention. The best answer would be to develop basic infrastructure to promote economic development and raise the standard of living, but since our country is going through a very acute economic crisis and its investment capacity is very low, it will not work in the short or medium-term. So we need a population policy which will adjust the population to the economy or control population growth to make it compatible with the country's socio-cultural and

economic potential. Population and economic development are linked, so economic action has to be taken alongside to raise the standard of living and make the population policy a success. And Haiti has already the right experience, for in 1989, CONAPO, the National Population Council, joined with a multi-sector committee to produce a paper on the formulation of an explicit population policy, which is waiting Government approval before moving onto the practical phase. ■

J.-H. R.

Population, political crisis and migration

Haiti's dizzy population growth slowed down slightly at the end of the 1980s. But it did not last and recent estimates suggest that it is surging upwards even faster than before. What caused this demographic two-step? It is still a matter of conjecture. Regular distribution of contraceptives and active promotion of birth control nudged the birthrate downwards. Emigration in the latter years of the Duvalier regime was very high, as hundreds of thousands of Haitians took refuge in the USA, Canada, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas and in the French departments of America.

With the present political crisis and the delicate situation which prevailed when Duvalier went and President Aristide was elected, there was much less in the way of health and contraception promotion — just as the negative effects of the pill, often administered without the appropriate medical control, were coming to light. Many women had their menstrual cycles upset, experiencing amenorrhoea, sometimes followed by periods of very heavy menstruation, and this went down badly with a population still unconvinced of the need for birth control and often very wary about chemical contraception. The American pill was partly developed in Haiti in the 1950s and 1960s and all the problems that come with test products administered in the wrong doses (miscarriage and sterility) have not been completely forgotten, particularly since the people on whom the drug was tested have been unable to benefit from the relatively expensive marketed product.

Political repression and embargoes are such that many of the NGO and health authority schemes which need the involvement of local people's organisations are currently handicapped — something which does not happen in periods of political enlightenment — and countless health operators and rural organisers are in prison or have gone underground or into exile.

Migration is another reason for the resurgence of population growth. One consequence of the relative political hope after 1986 and the arrival of Aristide in 1991 was the reversal of migratory trends when Haitians came home, voluntarily to begin with and then under duress. The USA, the Dominican Republic and the French administration of Guyana thought the time was right to send large numbers of illegal refugees back on the grounds that their life was no longer in danger and, since then, they have brought in particularly hard-line immigration policies, in some cases specifically directed at Haitians. American coastguards patrol the waters of the Caribbean, primarily to intercept Haitian boat people, although they pick up Cubans too and give them asylum. The poorest sections of society are fans of the new President, no longer yearn to be boat people and are keener on the idea of helping their country instead.

Despite the coup d'état of September 1991 and the terror which ensued, the Haitians' favourite countries of refuge failed to relax their policies. Bill Clinton, who had severely criticised the policy of George Bush, was forced, he claimed, to follow in his footsteps because of the huge risk of Florida's ports being invaded.

The repression of the *putchistes*, at a time when the Haitians had scant chance of finding a welcome abroad, led to unprecedented domestic migration. Between October 1991 and January 1992, international organisations estimate that 400 000 people, mainly from the shanty towns around the capital, fled to the provinces and the interior, pushing up the demand for land and affecting productivity in many places. But these domestic migrants gradually went back to Port-au-Prince, often to a different house in a different slum, because the political and economic situation in the country was no better and they felt that hiding anonymously in a big city was preferable. To a lesser extent, people migrated from one part of the rural world to another, leaving the most repressed areas, where the peasant organisations were the most deeply rooted — on the central plateaux, for example.

Another thing affecting population growth is the perennial reflex to have more children when times are hard (politically, economically and health-wise), particularly in rural areas. Political insecurity acting as a *de facto* reason for a curfew, economic lethargy created by the appalling rate of unemployment when most firms close down, constant power cuts, fuel shortages, the social paralysis which occurs when there are no forms of entertainment, whether cinemas, shows, television or outings, available: these are all prime ingredients of a mix which sets the birth rate soaring. It could not be expected to go on declining. ■

Hégel Goutier

Our Changing Islands

Pacific urban environments

by Jenny Bryant-Tokalau*

On the islands of the Pacific, which range from tiny atolls of less than a square kilometre, to the large, high islands of Papua New Guinea, there is a growing concentration of populations in urban areas which are, in some cases, microcosms of towns and cities in the higher population centres of Asia. Pacific populations are small but the speed at which some are growing, and population densities in relation to land area are of increasing significance. In such small and fragile environments, a major concern is the environmental degradation which accompanies urban growth. Pacific countries face similar problems to the majority of developing countries where around 35% of the population lacks access to adequate sanitation, and there is a lack of environmental infrastructure and services. Degradation of soil, fresh water, coastal and land-based food supplies and the deterioration of housing and other services is common. For example, in Kiribati only 44% of the population has access to safe water and in Papua New Guinea 43% lack access to adequate sanitation.

It is often stated in the Pacific that urban areas are growing rapidly and outstrip population growth rates. This contention is difficult to prove with any statistical accuracy since the latest census in some countries was taken more than a decade ago, but based on the data available, and surveys of particular cities and settlements, the indication is that urban areas are really growing at a faster rate than overall population (Table 1). Such a trend is not surprising given the nature of economic development in the

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last decade. Migration as a response to such development is an obvious component of the urban growth, but the towns as established centres, also grow as a function of natural increase. The 'town' for a growing number of Pacific islanders is home to a second, and even a third generation.

What is clear is that many Pacific islanders are no longer solely rural people, and the change is occurring very rapidly (Table 2). In the Melanesian and Micronesian countries in particular, the urban growth rate clearly outstrips population growth.

In small island countries such as Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, the proportion of the population urbanised is particularly significant, not only because of the limited land areas involved, but also because of the annual urban growth rate and the pressure on the physical and human environments.

The implications of these changes are complex. Pressure on land ownership and access, the breakdown and challenging of traditional patterns of behaviour and major political upheavals are occurring in the Pacific and are likely to continue, particularly with higher levels of education and the alienation of people from their land, overcrowding of housing, greater competition for education and health care, and a deterioration in basic service provision. The 'cure' for urban ills is most frequently sought by improvement in rural services (for example, Forum Secretariat, 1993), with a resistance on the part of Pacific leaders to also address the issues facing permanent urban dwellers and the social and environmental problems which are increasing in magnitude.

The state of Pacific urban environments

It is impossible to generalise about the current state of and future of the urban areas. Isolated, low lying, densely settled atolls with few natural resources, contrast with urban centres on large, high islands with many resources. Some areas are characterised by overcrowded, sub-standard and often informal housing, a concentration in diseases related to poor and unsanitary living conditions such as respiratory illnesses, tuberculosis, cholera and other gastro-intestinal complaints, polluted water supply and the ever-present difficulty of human waste disposal, particularly on low-lying atolls. Urban growth also has an impact on the availability of

TABLE 1
Population Growth Rate, Pacific Countries

Country	Population Growth Rate (p.a.)
American Samoa	1.7
Cook Island	1.0
Fiji	0.6 ¹
French Polynesia	3.0
Federated States of Micronesia	3.6
Guam	2.2
Kiribati	2.3
Marshall Islands	4.2
Nauru	1.6
New Caledonia	2.0
Nieu	-2.5
North Marianas	1.7
Palau	2.2
Papua New Guinea	2.3
Solomon Islands	3.5
Tonga	0.5
Tuvalu	1.7
Vanuatu	2.5
Western Samoa	0.2

Source: Booth and Muthiah, 1993.

¹ This figure seems too low and may reflect the high out-migration after the 1987 coups. Other commentators place the Fiji population growth rate at around 1.7% per annum (Cole, 1993).

Pacific Urbanisation

Country	Main Urban Centre	Total urbanised pop. (%)	Av. urb. growth rate p.a. (%)
American Samoa	Pago Pago	40	1.6
Cook Island	Avaura	59	2.1
Fiji	Suva	43.4	2.4
French Polynesia	Papeete	59	2.9
Federated States of Micronesia	Kolonia	26	2.6
Guam	Agana	91	2.1
Kiribati	South Tarawa	35.5	3.2
Marshall Islands	Majuro	67	5.7
Nauru	Nauru	100	1.4
New Caledonia	Noumea	80	4.1
Niue	Alofi	21	-0.7
North Marianas	Saipan	94	3.2
Palau	Koror	68	3.8
Papua New Guinea	Port Moresby	15.5	4.4
Solomon Islands	Honiara	20.3	5.3
Tonga	Nuku'alofa	30	2.1
Tuvalu	Funafuti	43	4.8
Vanuatu	Port Vila	22.7	4.5
Western Samoa	Apia	21	0.9

Sources: Bakker, 1990; Booth and Muthiah, 1993; Connell and Lea, 1993; King, 1992.

land for market gardening, the supply of fuelwood (where available at all) and the question of how and where to dispose of rubbish, both industrial and household.

The issue of traffic emissions in several cities, industrial effluents, and the impacts of construction activities on shorelines, and therefore upon lagoons, reefs, shellfish and water supplies are also increasing. These problems tend to affect poorer urban dwellers more than the wealthier groups, because of the location of their settlements, normally on marginal land close to industries or rubbish dumps.

Major areas of concern

Population and urban densities

Population densities in the small coastal areas that comprise most Pacific towns and cities, particularly in the atoll countries, are reaching levels generally considered to be unsustainable, and which are higher than almost anywhere in the world (Table 3).

In the Marshall Islands, for example, 66% of the country's population lives in the two urban centres of Majuro and Ebeye. The density of Ebeye is reputed to be one of the highest in the world at 59 437 persons per square mile (22 956 per square kilometre). In Majuro the urban density is 2025 per square kilometre, but in the Dalap-Uliga-Djarrit area it is over 11 000 persons per square kilometre. The pressures of life in such densities, even where the actual populations are small by world standards, have been well documented and include problems of communicable diseases, high infant mortality, increasing marginalisation of women, nutritional problems and severe unemployment.

With the high fertility exhibited in countries such as Kiribati and Marshall Islands, with few opportunities for outward migration, as well as the increasing urbanisation of the populations, severe environmental and health problems are likely to increase. Major problems include water supply and waste disposal.

Waste disposal and water supply

In Suva, Port Vila, Tarawa, and Fanga'uta (Tonga) lagoons, fecal coliform

levels have been found to be high everywhere and of concern to public health. In the Suva area the fact that 95% of mangrove oysters collected in eight sites exceed WHO limits for human consumption is cause for serious alarm. In Kiribati fecal contamination of shellfish as a result of inadequate sanitation in Tarawa is the cause of outbreaks of diarrhoeal diseases, hepatitis and sometimes cholera. Overcrowding is contributing to the contamination, not only from sewage, but also from the disposal of animal waste (especially pigs), household garbage, and the limited supply of freshwater.

The situation is widespread throughout the lagoons and urban areas of the Pacific. Indeed, it is said that 'only a minority of Pacific islanders have access to consistently safe water and sanitation'.

Solid and industrial waste disposal

The issues of solid and industrial waste disposal are of high priority in the Pacific. Incidents of dangerous and illegal pollutants being discharged into streams and oceans have increased, hand-in-hand with a growing manufacturing industry, especially in Fiji, as well as the problems of domestic garbage. There are very limited recycling and waste reduction programmes in the small countries and rubbish is generally burned or dumped into the sea, leading to inevitable health problems.

Other major urban environmental problems include coastal erosion, related to road and causeway construction, and deteriorating human settlements.

Human settlements, congestion and environmental problems

Pacific urban areas are facing increasing health problems related to urbanisation. Respiratory illnesses, gastrointestinal complaints, and child malnutrition are all increasing in Pacific cities.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands is one of the most frequently cited examples of overcrowded living conditions and the impacts for the population in Pacific urban areas. Sixty seven percent of the population is urban, with densities of more than 2000 persons per km² in Majuro.

Selected Urban Population Densities in the Pacific

Country	Population	Population Density (km ²)
Cook Islands (Rarotonga)	9 800	154
Fiji (Suva city)	141 273	3 418
Kiribati (South Tarawa)	30 000	1 610 ¹
Palau (Koror)	10 500	571
Papua New Guinea (NCD)	194 295	817
RMI (Republic of Marshall Islands) (Ebeye)	8 324	22 956 ²
(Urban Majuro)	15 000	2 025 ³
Solomon Islands (Honiara)	35 000	1 394
Tonga (Nuku'alofa)	30 000	3 308
Tuvalu (Funafuti)	3 000	1 071
Vanuatu (Port Vila)	19 311	762
Western Samoa	40 000	548

Sources: SPREP Reports to UNCED (Kiribati, Fiji, RMI); Connell and Lea, 1993.

¹ The SPREP report to UNCED claims a density figure for urban South Tarawa of 4167 persons per km².

² The SPREP report to UNCED claims a density of 59 457 persons per m² which translates to a density of 22 956 km².

³ The PHD report claims a density of 1510 in the DUD area. Clearly the discrepancy in density figures calls for more careful measurement of both land areas and populations.

The per capita health expenditure is high at US\$115, yet the fertility rate of 244 live births per 1000 per year is the highest in the Pacific. There is a total fertility rate of 7.23, a crude annual birth rate of 49.2 children per 1000, and an infant mortality rate of 63 per 1000 live births. Thirty percent of the urban population over 15 years has diabetes, and more than 11% of children are under weight. One third of all deaths in the Marshall Islands are of children under the age of 5, and these are largely due to respiratory infections, gastrointestinal illnesses and malnutrition.

While the Republic of the Marshall Islands is a dramatic case, it is not the only one. Health and service conditions throughout Pacific urban areas are worsening.

Options for Pacific cities

Population control

One approach to the growth of cities in the developing world is to advocate greater use of, and more effective birth control. However, the issue is far too complex to be dealt with by the standard definition of birth control. 'Birth control' in the Pacific context (and in the view of many countries in the 1990s) is an issue which depends upon gender equality, empowerment of women, and a recognition of the relationships between population, economic development and environmental considerations. All of these issues, when viewed along with the fact that there remain high maternal and infant mortality rates in the Pacific, high international migration from some countries, and a need for wider access to education and capacity-building in general illustrate that the response to urban development should be multi-faceted. Encouraging people to remain in rural areas may satisfy some for a time; education and economic development may stimulate urban growth, but for many there are few choices. Until Pacific countries recognise that urbanisation and urban living are an integral part of the total development of the countries, then little can be done to provide balanced development. Birth control alone will not address the issue of urban growth, but an improvement in economic, social and environmental conditions may have the effect of limiting family size.

Land reclamation

It has been suggested that land reclamation may be the only viable option for many Pacific urban areas. A number of countries have carried out reclamation for some years for industrial and institutional development (e.g. Fiji, Western Samoa), and in the atoll countries where land for housing is at a premium, reclamation is a normal activity. In some parts of Micronesia, families even build up coral blocks in the lagoons on which family dwellings are constructed. The impacts of reclamation, for example of mangroves, are well documented and they demonstrate the environmental uncertainty of large-scale reclamation, as well as the long-term impacts on the food sources and therefore diets and health of Pacific urban dwellers.

Land reclamation may nevertheless be the only option for countries such as the Marshall Islands and Kiribati where population densities are higher than almost anywhere in the world. Other choices are international and regional migration, where there is limited opportunity because of the migration laws of most countries, as well as the legacy of earlier such migrations. It may well be that if sea-level rise does occur, even at the lowest predicted level, that populations in atoll countries will have to migrate in any case, perhaps creating a new Pacific class of 'environmental refugees'.

Regional and community responses

The role of the inhabitants as participants in the urban environment and in trying to deal with the increasing stresses, is crucial to the future of the towns and cities of the Pacific.

The Pacific has a multiplicity of ways in which it can deal with the complex issues of urban environmental degradation. In some ways it is better placed than other regions because of the existence of several powerful regional bodies, such as the South Pacific Commission, the South Pacific Forum, the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme and the University of the South Pacific. These bodies can provide a source of strength and unified sharing of knowledge which can be devolved to the communities which are daily involved in managing urban areas.

Regional organisations however, are in much the same situation as international aid donors when dealing with

urban environmental issues. They can make suggestions and provide expertise and funding, but unless the local community feels that it has some say over its own local environment, little of note can be achieved. Strong local councils working with both the private sector and community groups representative of their electorate have been shown in many places to be the only effective way of dealing with local environmental issues.

There are many community-based organisations in the Pacific, ranging from environmental action, theatre and education groups, to church and women's organisations, and the more formal, business-associated community organisations. Many of these have recently become involved in environmental work, carrying out clean-up campaigns, providing volunteers to villages and overcrowded settlements to assist in improvement of the local environments by developing water, sanitation and housing projects as well as generating employment.

There is the danger, however, in depending too heavily on community based organisations to solve the problems of urban areas, particularly those problems which most affect the poor, or marginalised groups. It is a sad fact, but true, that 'in the absence of resources, most governments do not need convincing that they should do less; they will do less anyway'.

Conclusion

Although the above description of the present situation paints a highly negative picture of Pacific urban areas, demonstrating that they may quickly become unsustainable, it is also important to note that the human resources of Pacific countries, including in the urban areas, have an enormous capacity to work in a participatory manner to maintain the viability of their societies and their physical surroundings. The continuing strength of Pacific cultures, and the belief by most of the populations that they will find their own solutions to the burgeoning urban problems are a positive sign. It can only be hoped that governments and other institutions will work more closely with communities, and place urban issues high on the development agenda, before the cities grow out of control. ■ J.B.-T.

Pleading the case for cities

by Marie-Thérèse Manchotte *

The very strong urban growth in Africa today is merely the closing of the gap that exists between Africa and the other continents. It will take resources, imagination and confidence for this expansion to have positive effects on development and prevent it from degenerating into utter confusion.

The figures are worrying: sub-Saharan Africa has seen exceptional rates of urban expansion over the past decade, with figures rarely below 4.5%.¹ They were on average 6% per annum, reaching a peak of more than 10% in Mozambique and Tanzania.

With a growth rate of 10% per annum, the urban population doubles every seven years. With a growth rate of 6%, it doubles every 12. Currently 30% of the people in sub-Saharan Africa live in the towns and the continent's urban population is expected to increase by 120 million² between 1990 and the year 2000. Some countries already have more people living in the towns than in the country side.

Are these figures reliable? The definition of the city varies from one country to another, of course, and recent censuses have cast doubt on demographic projections which have been the working hypotheses for years, particularly in such countries as Nigeria³, which looms large in African statistics.

The figures cannot be used for scientific purposes, but they indicate and highlight major economic and cultural upheavals, showing that nowadays people live in towns, use money in trade and are changing their modes of social and cultural organisation. Neither do they reveal all

they might, namely that urban populations contain a higher percentage of workers, youngsters and women and that the towns are where an ability to innovate, a spirit of enterprise and the labour force are now to be found.

Are towns a brake or a boost to development?

Urbanisation may be a positive factor when it comes to slowing down population growth, ensuring that investments in health and education are efficient, changing methods of farm production and creating jobs.

However, if the towns sap people's energy because every member of the family has to work just to enable it to survive, if it takes hours to fetch and carry water and firewood and hours to travel about because public transport is inadequate or overcrowded, if children are left on the streets because they survive better there and their families have nothing for them and cannot bear to look them in the face, and if the deterioration of the environment is a serious threat to health, then the opportunities for productive activity are minimal and the creation of resources is a matter of chance.

Major cities which are sensitive and close to the source of power could see their social structures explode. The huge mix of people generated by very rapid population expansion may be a powerful factor for democratisation, but it may well cause instability too, for it is a time-bomb if nothing is done about it. Privileges may suffer, of course, but the potential of

nations today is in their adaptability and the youth of their population.

Lessons of past experience

In the 1960s, generations of urban projects were designed to meet a variety of aims. First of all, there were the big social welfare and middle-class housing programmes. One of the governments' first concerns was to provide urban housing, particularly for civil servants, but the accommodation on offer was either of too high a standard or culturally unsuitable, or the housing companies failed to recoup the building costs. This was followed by the urban and regional development master plans (with emphasis on planning), some of which still serve as yardsticks today. But, although financing was available for the plans themselves, it proved very difficult to mobilise the resources to put them into practice and the problem was not just a financial one either, for there were also legal and, above all, political stumbling blocks. Then, in the 1980s, sites were cleared and services provided for urban development in many places. But plots could not be laid out fast enough to keep pace with the expanding urban populations. The facilities did not always reach the people for whom they were originally intended either, and slippage towards the better-off classes occurred in many cases. Lastly, housing plot equipment programmes often proved impossible to reproduce.

For many reasons, results were sometimes poor and transparency was wanting and, over the past few years, donors have been forced to alter their urban development funding policies when:

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¹ World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1992.

² L'explosion urbaine dans le Tiers Monde, N. Massignon, The OECD Observer, No 182, June-July 1993.

³ Le recensement du Nigéria, Population & Sociétés, No 272, October 1992.



Kinshasa, capital of Zaire

1. investments deteriorated, forcing them to run projects focused on maintenance and management;

2. the difficulty attached to the spending of resources led to projects being simplified to ensure faster disbursement and to short- and medium-term projects being financed in preference to long-term ones;

3. contradictions between authorities who tended to centralise and the need for decentralised project management led to contractual relations with each project operator and a broadening of the partners' scope;

4. the average level of equipment per inhabitant declined and the pockets of poverty got worse, leading to the frequent inclusion in urban schemes of a component intended for the most underprivileged sections of the population.

In conclusion, what the major urban schemes taught us is that we cannot build other people's towns for them. The urban planners' pipe dreams have faded.

Over the past few years, there has been a clear revival of interest in urban matters, as the following factors show. In 1989, the Lille International Days held a discussion of towns and cities with the aim of making development aid sources more aware of the fact that towns are the driving forces of economic development in the Third World. In 1991, the World Bank brought out its publication on urban policy and economic development, suggesting an agenda for the 1990s, and, in 1992, the OECD Development Assistance Committee spent two days discussing urban development and the donors' roles and responsibilities; it plans a further meeting on the subject in another three years. It also defined urban development aid as all the policies, programmes and projects de-

signed to improve both urban management and infrastructure and the quality of life of people living in areas designated as urban by the recipient countries and possessing 20 000 or more inhabitants.

Although some people say that many urban projects have failed to live up to their promise, others are convinced that it is clear what has to be done between now and the end of the century.

The role of the World Bank

The World Bank is a leading light in urban matters not only because of its important Washington-based research team (30 or so experts, plus geographical and technical operatives), which has been investigating the urban sector for 25 years, but also because it capitalises on research workers with interesting ideas and is absolutely firm in its proposals and frank about the occasional error or failure. And of course the Bank is able to convince recipient governments, by exerting pressure (in the form of conditions) where necessary or through its determination to influence the donor and lender community.

The Bank has, accordingly, acquired a de facto leadership role in urban development. Its analysis of the urban challenge for the 1990s, highlights the following points:

— The IBRD and its partners should now broaden their view of urban issues to embrace more than housing and residential infrastructure and stress the productivity of the urban economy.

— Because poverty is worsening in the urban environment, schemes should be run

to raise the standard of living of people in towns by improving access to basic infrastructure and social services.

— The campaign to halt the deterioration of the urban environment should be stepped up.

— The cuts in research into urban matters in the 1980s has led to a lack of understanding of urban problems, and this needs to be tackled.

The Bank aims to lower the barriers to urban productivity through better management of the urban infrastructure by increasing the volume and composition of investments, reinforcing institutional running and maintenance capacity and seeking to ensure greater private sector involvement. It is also trying to improve both the rules and regulations (for market efficiency and to encourage private sector involvement in the building of houses and infrastructure) and the financial and technical resources and services of the municipal authorities.

But a lively debate is going on inside the Bank about its role — a debate which reveals the gap between theory and practice, which the operatives claim to know much better. Problems of communication within the institution are an encouragement to making general proposals on the basis of isolated examples. Lastly, clearly not enough attention is paid to the arrangements for actually implementing the schemes, so more thought will have to be given to the practicalities of action in the urban context. A firm statement that proper, sustainable strategies have been identified is no guarantee of success.

... and other donors

A great deal of bilateral cooperation⁴ is involved in the Urban Management Programme and the Municipal Development Programme being run by the World Bank and the UNDP.

Urban schemes come under three main headings, as follows:

— poverty alleviation — safety net-type aid targeted on the most vulnerable sections of society, i.e. children and single

⁴ Coopération et développement urbain, I. Milbert, Institut Universitaire d'Etudes du Développement, Geneva.

mothers. The economic and social aspects of poverty are also covered ;

— an increase in municipal authority powers as part of the government devolution and decentralisation ;

— improvement of infrastructure, equipment and urban retail services to lessen the adverse effects of urban dysfunction on the growth of urban productivity.

The dominant mode today

Realisation of the extent of urban expansion, with the economic, social and political consequences that go with it, public-sector withdrawal from traditional infrastructure investment and the need to locate private capital which can take over have brought to the fore the need for organised, responsible institutions at both central and local levels.

The resources available to help towns get the benefit of economic development tend to be inadequate, so

external aid has to try to improve coordination and find efficient intermediaries in the countries concerned.

If urban policies and a general framework for urban intervention are designed, funders who do not have vast research potential to call on here can see where they can make consistent, more efficient contributions.

Bilateral aid tends to involve studies, technical assistance, help with method, the organisation of special training and local authority information and structuring schemes. Major investment is less common.

Paths to follow

More and more is being done to make bilateral and multilateral cooperation agencies aware of urban development and a consensus is emerging on the need to focus on :

— the definition of national urban policies ;

— support for devolution and decentralisation ;

— institutional improvements and the development of local and municipal potential ;

— a broadening of the local authorities' tax basis ;

— better management of urban services (water and power supplies, rubbish collection and treatment and urban transport).

Conventional urban projects are still going on, clearly, but fewer of them are being started nowadays. Labour-intensive schemes are sometimes used for investments in urban areas.

Operations of this sort are run in towns of all sizes, although donors may have their preferences. The World Bank is more interested in the bigger towns, for example, and German cooperation in small ones — although demographic, geographical and geopolitical situations can easily be such that one-off solutions are the order of the day.

However, the important thing is for the towns to be in the hands of the people who use them and it is the job of the donors to set this process in motion.

For whatever the potential there is, it is human potential, and the creativity on which a positive response to the challenge of development hinges is to be found in the young people in the towns, the men and the women who have moved there. In all civilisations, after all, revolution starts in the town.

The European Community

The European Community has been giving priority to food security and rural development for more than 15 years now, but there has been some urban investment nonetheless, particularly in infrastructure and supply systems. Its current emphasis on health, education, the environment, poverty alleviation and women is extremely relevant to the towns.

This gives a completely new dimension to the debate on urban development.

M-T. M.

A street in Lagos, Nigeria



ACP demographic and economic indicators

Source: ACP Basic Statistics

1994 – Eurostat

Angola

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	4816	5588	6993	9194	13074	26619
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.5	1.5	2.3	2.8	3.6	2.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	10.4	15.0	21.0	28.3	36.2	55.6
Fertility rate	6.39	6.39	6.80	7.20	6.69	4.14
Infant mortality (‰)	215	186	160	137	112	59
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	41.8	42.8	44.6	47.1	47.3	40.8
— 15-64 years	55.4	54.3	52.5	49.9	49.9	56.1
— over 65 years	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.0
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	5295 ¹	10111	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	681 ¹	1100	:	:

¹ In 1984.

Barbados

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	231	239	249	257	268	305
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.5
Urbanisation rate (%)	35.4	37.1	40.1	44.7	51.1	67.7
Fertility rate	4.67	3.45	2.19	1.62	1.85	1.85
Infant mortality (‰)	87	46	27	12	9	6
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	37.9	37.4	29.7	24.2	22.5	17.8
— 15-64 years	55.6	54.6	59.8	64.1	66.3	66.3
— over 65 years	6.5	8.0	10.4	11.7	11.2	15.8
GNP (Mio \$)	88	181	837	1700	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	381	757	3361	6615	:	:

Antigua and Barbuda

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	55	66	61	65	70	87
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.8	1.8	-0.8	0.6	0.7	0.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	39.7	33.7	30.8	32.0	38.6	57.7
Fertility rate	:	:	2.10	1.90	1.90	1.90
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	32	19	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	35.4	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	:	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	5.1	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	26.3	45.8	111.0	338.1	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	478	695	1820	5202	:	:

Belize

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	91	120	146	189	229	290
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.1	2.8	2.0	2.6	1.9	0.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	54.0	51.0	49.4	50.5	55.2	70.6
Fertility rate	:	6.90	5.70	4.70	4.70	4.70
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	45	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	42.6	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	53.2	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	4.2	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	27.9	51.6	166.9	362.1	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	307	430	1143	1916	:	:

Bahamas

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	110	170	210	255	295	361
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.4	4.4	2.1	2.0	1.5	0.8
Urbanisation rate (%)	60.0	58.0	60.6	64.3	69.0	80.0
Fertility rate	3.74	3.30	2.62	2.17	1.85	1.85
Infant mortality (‰)	57	44	29	26	18	9
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.2	43.3	38.6	29.9	25.0	18.8
— 15-64 years	53.2	53.2	57.6	65.8	69.6	69.1
— over 65 years	4.6	3.5	3.8	4.3	5.4	12.1
GNP (Mio \$)	150	475	1222	2964	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	1360	2791	5818	11624	:	:

Benin

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	2237	2693	3459	4622	6269	12354
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.9	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.1	2.8
Urbanisation rate (%)	9.2	18.2	31.6	38.2	45.5	63.3
Fertility rate	6.88	7.00	7.08	7.10	6.60	4.10
Infant mortality (‰)	193	160	108	91	81	38
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	40.4	43.6	45.6	46.6	47.0	40.2
— 15-64 years	52.3	52.0	51.3	50.5	50.2	56.5
— over 65 years	7.2	4.4	3.1	2.9	2.8	3.2
GNP (Mio \$)	224	330	1402	1793	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	100.3	122.4	405.4	387.9	:	:

Botswana

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	481	623	902	1238	1650	2853
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.1	2.6	3.8	3.2	2.9	2.2
Urbanisation rate (%)	1.8	8.4	15.1	25.0	36.7	58.0
Fertility rate	6.70	6.90	7.00	5.50	4.65	2.52
Infant mortality (‰)	118	105	83	67	54	22
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	47.6	51.6	47.3	46.0	42.3	30.5
— 15-64 years	49.1	46.0	47.6	50.3	54.5	64.8
— over 65 years	3.3	2.4	5.1	3.6	3.2	4.6
GNP (Mio \$)	34	82	902	2928	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	71	131	1000	2365	:	:

Cape Verde

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	196	267	289	363	479	774
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.0	3.1	0.8	2.3	2.8	1.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	16.3	19.6	23.4	28.7	35.5	55.1
Fertility rate	6.90	7.00	6.70	4.83	3.86	2.23
Infant mortality (‰)	115	92	70	54	32	16
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	43.2	47.6	45.9	43.7	40.7	27.4
— 15-64 years	52.3	47.6	47.9	51.9	55.1	68.4
— over 65 years	4.6	4.9	6.2	4.4	4.2	4.1
GNP (Mio \$)	:	37.4	110.1	276.2	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	140.2	381.1	760.9	:	:

Burkina Faso

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	4452	5550	6957	8993	11833	22633
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.0	2.2	2.3	2.6	2.8	2.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	4.7	5.8	8.5	15.2	24.2	45.4
Fertility rate	6.35	6.39	6.50	6.50	6.06	3.86
Infant mortality (‰)	212	185	162	126	109	61
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.6	43.4	43.9	44.1	44.9	39.3
— 15-64 years	55.1	53.8	53.3	52.8	52.0	57.2
— over 65 years	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.5
GNP (Mio \$)	264	367	1479	2573	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	59.2	66.1	212.6	286.1	:	:

Central African Republic

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	1534	1849	2313	3008	3862	7046
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.6	1.9	2.3	2.7	2.5	2.4
Urbanisation rate (%)	22.7	30.4	38.3	46.7	54.6	70.2
Fertility rate	5.59	5.69	5.89	6.20	5.79	3.74
Infant mortality (‰)	182	150	122	109	100	56
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	38.6	40.1	41.7	44.3	45.0	39.1
— 15-64 years	57.3	56.0	54.4	51.7	51.3	57.6
— over 65 years	4.1	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.7	3.3
GNP (Mio \$)	111	179	799	1279	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	72.4	96.6	345.6	425.3	:	:

Burundi

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	2941	3514	4130	5492	7237	13392
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.8	1.8	1.6	2.9	2.8	2.5
Urbanisation rate (%)	2.0	2.4	4.3	5.3	7.0	16.7
Fertility rate	6.80	6.80	6.80	6.80	6.28	3.67
Infant mortality (‰)	157	140	127	112	98	50
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.0	44.5	44.8	45.5	45.8	37.7
— 15-64 years	53.0	52.2	51.8	51.3	51.5	58.7
— over 65 years	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.2	2.7	3.5
GNP (Mio \$)	194	235	913	1094	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	65.9	67.0	221.0	199.1	:	:

Chad

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3064	3652	4477	5553	7307	12907
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.4	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.8	2.3
Urbanisation rate (%)	6.8	11.8	20.5	31.6	41.8	60.4
Fertility rate	5.91	6.05	5.89	5.89	5.51	3.62
Infant mortality (‰)	200	179	154	132	112	69
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	39.6	41.4	41.9	43.3	42.9	36.8
— 15-64 years	56.8	55.0	54.5	53.1	53.5	59.2
— over 65 years	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.9
GNP (Mio \$)	216	329	723	1168	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	70.4	90.0	161.5	210.3	:	:

Cameroon

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	5296	6612	8655	11524	15293	29262
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.7	2.2	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	13.9	20.3	31.4	40.3	49.3	66.9
Fertility rate	5.68	6.10	6.45	6.10	5.30	3.30
Infant mortality (‰)	172	136	102	74	55	27
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	40.1	42.1	44.4	44.7	43.4	36.7
— 15-64 years	56.4	54.4	52.0	51.8	53.1	59.2
— over 65 years	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	4.1
GNP (Mio \$)	539	1111	6822	10631	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	101.7	168.0	788.3	922.5	:	:

Comoros

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	215	275	383	543	778	1646
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.2	2.5	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.0
Urbanisation rate (%)	9.8	19.4	23.2	27.8	34.1	53.5
Fertility rate	6.60	7.05	7.05	7.05	6.50	3.75
Infant mortality (‰)	170	147	120	99	79	37
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.2	46.0	48.0	48.2	48.3	39.4
— 15-64 years	52.6	51.5	49.3	49.4	49.4	57.8
— over 65 years	3.3	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.8
GNP (Mio \$)	11.2	24.7	120.9	248.2	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	52.3	89.8	315.8	457.1	:	:

Congo

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	988	1263	1669	2229	2976	5757
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.9	2.9	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	31.9	32.8	35.8	40.5	46.7	64.1
Fertility rate	5.79	6.19	6.29	6.29	5.87	3.78
Infant mortality (‰)	154	110	88	84	79	40
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	41.2	43.4	45.1	45.3	45.8	39.3
— 15-64 years	55.3	53.1	51.5	51.3	51.0	57.5
— over 65 years	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.2
GNP (Mio \$)	128	267	1542	2482	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	129	212	924	1114	:	:

Dominican Republic

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3231	4423	5697	7170	8621	11447
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.2	3.2	2.6	2.3	1.9	1.1
Urbanisation rate (%)	30.2	40.3	50.5	60.4	68.2	79.6
Fertility rate	7.40	6.68	4.70	3.75	3.00	2.19
Infant mortality (‰)	132	105	84	65	49	28
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	46.7	47.3	42.2	37.9	33.9	24.0
— 15-64 years	50.3	49.7	54.6	58.7	61.8	67.4
— over 65 years	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.4	4.3	8.6
GNP (Mio \$)	662	1476	6421	6731	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	205	334	1127	939	:	:

Côte d'Ivoire

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3799	5515	8194	11980	17065	37942
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.2	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.2
Urbanisation rate (%)	19.3	27.4	34.8	40.4	47.0	64.1
Fertility rate	7.10	7.41	7.41	7.41	6.88	4.22
Infant mortality (‰)	173	143	117	98	85	40
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.0	45.7	46.6	48.3	49.1	43.4
— 15-64 years	53.6	51.9	51.0	49.1	48.2	54.0
— over 65 years	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.7	2.6
GNP (Mio \$)	511	1369	9951	8767	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	135	248	1215	732	:	:

Equatorial Guinea

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	252	291	217	352	452	798
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.1	1.4	-2.9	5.0	2.5	2.3
Urbanisation rate (%)	25.5	26.7	27.4	28.7	32.9	51.9
Fertility rate	5.50	5.66	5.68	5.89	5.51	3.62
Infant mortality (‰)	193	173	149	127	107	65
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	37.2	39.0	40.6	42.5	43.2	37.0
— 15-64 years	57.7	56.5	54.8	53.8	53.0	58.9
— over 65 years	5.1	4.4	4.6	3.7	3.8	4.1
GNP (Mio \$)	:	66.9	104.4 ¹	145.3	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	229.8	470.6 ¹	412.7	:	:

¹ In 1977.

Djibouti

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	80	169	304	440	591	1159
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.9	7.8	6.0	3.8	3.0	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	49.6	62.0	73.7	80.7	84.3	89.7
Fertility rate	6.60	6.60	6.60	6.60	6.15	3.90
Infant mortality (‰)	193	166	143	122	103	61
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.5	42.0	44.2	45.0	45.5	39.8
— 15-64 years	55.0	55.6	53.8	52.5	51.6	56.6
— over 65 years	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.5	2.9	3.6
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	339.6 ¹	445.3	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	931 ¹	1012	:	:

¹ In 1984.

Ethiopia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	24191	30623	38749	49831	67173	130674
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.5	3.0	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	6.4	8.6	10.5	12.3	14.9	29.9
Fertility rate	6.70	6.70	7.00	7.00	6.51	4.06
Infant mortality (‰)	180	162	149	132	112	69
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.5	44.5	44.5	45.8	46.6	39.9
— 15-64 years	52.9	53.0	52.9	51.3	50.6	56.9
— over 65 years	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.8	3.2
GNP (Mio \$)	938	1776	4115	5934	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	38.8	58.0	106.2	119.1	:	:

Dominica

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	60	70	75	72	71	82
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.6	1.6	0.7	-0.4	-0.1	0.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	:	46.2	:	:	:	:
Fertility rate	:	:	3.90	2.80	2.80	2.80
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	13	16	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	33.2	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	58.1	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	8.7	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	12.0	20.1	58.7	159.7	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	200	288	783	2218	:	:

Fiji

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	394	520	634	726	800	974
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.1	2.8	2.0	1.4	1.0	0.8
Urbanisation rate (%)	29.7	34.8	37.8	39.3	42.7	59.6
Fertility rate	6.79	5.00	4.00	3.20	2.76	2.10
Infant mortality (‰)	75	55	37	27	20	8
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	48.0	43.5	39.1	38.0	31.6	23.0
— 15-64 years	49.5	54.0	58.1	58.7	63.8	66.9
— over 65 years	2.5	2.5	2.8	3.3	4.6	10.1
GNP (Mio \$)	108	211	1186	1375	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	275	405	1871	1894	:	:

Gabon

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	486	504	806	1159	1604	2869
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.4	0.4	4.8	3.7	3.3	2.4
Urbanisation rate (%)	17.4	25.6	35.8	45.7	53.8	69.6
Fertility rate	4.06	4.16	4.38	4.99	5.70	3.70
Infant mortality (‰)	179	147	122	103	85	47
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	32.3	32.3	32.8	33.0	40.0	36.8
— 15-64 years	61.5	61.7	61.4	61.1	54.4	59.0
— over 65 years	6.2	6.0	5.8	5.9	5.6	4.2
GNP (Mio \$)	126	306	3856	4535	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	259	607	4784	3913	:	:

Guinea

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3136	3900	4461	5755	7759	15088
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.1	2.2	1.4	2.6	3.0	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	9.9	13.9	19.0	25.8	33.6	53.3
Fertility rate	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.51	4.06
Infant mortality (‰)	208	187	167	145	124	79
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.4	45.1	45.8	46.7	46.9	40.3
— 15-64 years	53.1	52.3	51.6	50.7	50.5	56.7
— over 65 years	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	3.0
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	:	2557	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	:	444.3	:	:

Gambia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	352	464	641	861	1105	1875
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.8	2.8	3.3	3.0	2.5	2.1
Urbanisation rate (%)	12.4	15.0	18.2	22.6	28.9	48.6
Fertility rate	6.29	6.50	6.50	6.50	5.62	3.42
Infant mortality (‰)	219	193	167	143	122	77
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	39.7	41.8	42.5	44.1	43.2	35.9
— 15-64 years	57.2	55.2	54.7	53.0	53.5	60.1
— over 65 years	3.1	3.0	2.8	2.9	3.2	4.0
GNP (Mio \$)	25.5	53.7	222.5	318.6	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	72.5	115.7	347.1	370.0	:	:

Guinea Bissau

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	542	525	795	964	1192	1978
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.7	-0.3	4.2	1.9	2.1	2.0
Urbanisation rate (%)	13.6	15.1	16.8	19.9	25.2	44.6
Fertility rate	5.07	5.28	5.58	5.79	5.42	3.58
Infant mortality (‰)	204	189	176	151	129	83
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	36.9	37.4	39.0	40.9	41.4	36.6
— 15-64 years	60.0	59.0	57.0	54.9	54.5	59.2
— over 65 years	3.1	3.6	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.2
GNP (Mio \$)	:	78.7	104.8	184.5	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	150.0	131.8	191.4	:	:

Ghana

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	6774	8612	10736	15020	20172	37988
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.3	2.4	2.2	3.4	3.0	2.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	23.2	29.0	31.2	34.0	39.2	57.7
Fertility rate	6.90	6.80	6.50	6.39	5.53	3.38
Infant mortality (‰)	137	117	103	90	73	37
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.6	45.5	44.9	45.4	44.1	36.3
— 15-64 years	51.9	51.8	52.3	51.8	52.9	59.6
— over 65 years	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	3.0	4.1
GNP (Mio \$)	1203	2170	4426	5722	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	177.6	251.9	412.3	381.0	:	:

Guyana

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	569	709	759	796	883	1141
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.0	2.2	0.7	0.5	1.0	1.0
Urbanisation rate (%)	29.0	29.4	30.1	32.8	38.6	57.7
Fertility rate	6.76	6.11	3.94	2.77	2.32	2.10
Infant mortality (‰)	105	82	67	56	42	20
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	48.5	47.7	40.9	33.4	30.2	22.4
— 15-64 years	48.3	48.9	55.2	62.8	65.5	69.0
— over 65 years	3.2	3.4	3.9	3.8	4.3	8.7
GNP (Mio \$)	156.3	246.6	542.9	354.9	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	274.6	347.7	715.3	445.8	:	:

Grenada

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	90	94	89	91	94	113
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.7	0.4	-0.5	0.2	0.3	0.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	:	:	13.4	:	:	:
Fertility rate	:	4.60	3.80	3.10	3.10	3.10
Infant mortality (‰)	:	33	39	31	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	36.3	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	57.2	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	6.5	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	60.7	190.8	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	682	2097	:	:

Haiti

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3804	4520	5353	6486	7959	13128
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.0
Urbanisation rate (%)	15.6	19.8	23.7	28.6	34.9	53.9
Fertility rate	6.30	6.00	5.35	4.99	4.60	3.67
Infant mortality (‰)	193	150	121	97	77	43
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	39.4	41.0	40.7	40.2	39.9	35.6
— 15-64 years	55.5	54.4	54.8	55.7	56.3	59.9
— over 65 years	5.1	4.7	4.5	4.1	3.8	4.4
GNP (Mio \$)	267	391	1446	2418	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	70.1	86.5	270.1	372.8	:	:

Jamaica

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	1629	1869	2133	2420	2677	3509
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.0	1.1
Urbanisation rate (%)	33.8	41.5	46.8	52.3	58.5	72.8
Fertility rate	5.08	5.78	4.00	2.65	2.10	2.10
Infant mortality (‰)	71	45	26	17	12	6
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	41.7	47.0	40.2	33.2	28.5	21.6
— 15-64 years	54.0	47.5	53.1	60.1	65.0	68.7
— over 65 years	4.3	5.6	6.7	6.7	6.4	9.7
GNP (Mio \$)	689	1344	2431	3490	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	423	719	1140	1442	:	:

Liberia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	1039	1385	1876	2575	3565	7234
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.3	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.3	2.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	18.6	26.0	35.0	45.4	55.4	71.6
Fertility rate	6.50	6.80	6.80	6.80	6.33	3.98
Infant mortality (‰)	187	173	167	142	113	57
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	41.2	43.2	44.3	45.3	46.0	39.4
— 15-64 years	55.2	53.1	52.0	51.0	50.4	56.6
— over 65 years	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	4.0
GNP (Mio \$)	220	402	1093	1063 ¹	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	211.8	290.5	582.6	453.9 ¹	:	:

¹ In 1987.

Kenya

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	8332	11498	16632	23585	32818	63826
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.9	3.3	3.8	3.6	3.4	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	7.4	10.3	16.1	23.6	31.8	51.5
Fertility rate	7.82	8.12	8.12	6.80	5.76	3.14
Infant mortality (‰)	130	108	88	72	59	23
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.6	48.2	50.1	49.1	46.2	35.2
— 15-64 years	50.3	47.8	46.5	47.9	50.9	61.3
— over 65 years	4.1	4.0	3.4	3.0	2.9	3.5
GNP (Mio \$)	765	1545	7039	8277	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	91.8	134.3	423.2	350.9	:	:

Madagascar

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	5312	6745	8790	12010	16579	33746
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.3	2.4	2.7	3.2	3.3	2.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	10.6	14.1	18.3	23.8	30.8	50.5
Fertility rate	6.60	6.60	6.60	6.60	6.15	3.90
Infant mortality (‰)	228	195	150	120	102	48
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.0	43.4	44.2	45.2	45.5	39.0
— 15-64 years	55.2	53.8	52.9	51.9	51.7	57.7
— over 65 years	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.3
GNP (Mio \$)	651	1075	3996	2921	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	122.5	159.3	454.6	243.2	:	:

Kiribati

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	41	49	58	71	88	132
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.5	1.8	1.7	2.0	2.2	1.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	16.0	25.6	31.6	36.0	42.6	61.1
Fertility rate	:	:	4.60	4.20	4.20	4.20
Infant mortality (‰)	:	105	75	57	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	40.0	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	57.1	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	2.9	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	35.5 ¹	50.0	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	587.1 ¹	704.4	:	:

¹ In 1982.

Malawi

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3529	4518	6183	9582	12612	24923
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.0	2.5	3.2	4.5	2.8	2.8
Urbanisation rate (%)	4.4	6.0	9.1	11.8	15.6	31.7
Fertility rate	6.84	7.20	7.60	7.60	7.05	4.30
Infant mortality (‰)	209	197	177	149	132	81
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.7	46.7	47.5	48.5	48.7	40.8
— 15-64 years	51.7	51.0	50.2	48.9	48.7	56.4
— over 65 years	2.6	2.3	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.8
GNP (Mio \$)	161	283	1138	1801	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	45.5	62.7	184.0	187.9	:	:

Lesotho

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	870	1064	1339	1747	2233	3783
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.7	2.5	2.1
Urbanisation rate (%)	3.5	8.6	13.3	19.4	27.1	47.3
Fertility rate	5.86	5.71	5.74	5.00	4.42	2.97
Infant mortality (‰)	152	140	121	89	69	27
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	40.5	41.3	42.0	42.0	39.0	32.0
— 15-64 years	55.6	55.1	54.4	54.2	56.8	62.3
— over 65 years	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.8	4.2	5.7
GNP (Mio \$)	38	105	631	1007	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	43.8	98.4	471.1	576.7	:	:

Mali

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	4375	5484	6863	9214	12561	24580
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.2	2.3	2.3	3.0	3.1	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	11.1	14.3	18.5	23.8	30.4	50.0
Fertility rate	7.10	7.10	7.10	7.10	6.60	4.10
Infant mortality (‰)	211	206	191	169	149	98
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.6	45.7	46.8	46.9	47.2	40.0
— 15-64 years	53.0	51.8	50.7	50.5	50.2	57.1
— over 65 years	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.5	3.0
GNP (Mio \$)	:	333	1612	2465	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	60.7	234.9	267.5	:	:

Mauritania

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	991	1221	1551	2024	2680	4993
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.9	2.1	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.5
Urbanisation rate (%)	5.8	13.7	29.0	46.8	59.0	73.3
Fertility rate	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.06	3.85
Infant mortality (‰)	196	173	149	127	107	65
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.2	42.8	43.6	44.6	44.8	38.4
— 15-64 years	55.0	54.3	53.3	52.3	52.1	58.0
— over 65 years	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.6
GNP (Mio \$)	93.0	195.9	671.7	982.6	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	93.8	160.4	433.1	485.5	:	:

Niger

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3028	4165	5586	7731	10640	21287
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.4	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.2	2.8
Urbanisation rate (%)	5.8	8.5	13.2	19.5	26.8	46.4
Fertility rate	7.10	7.10	7.10	7.10	6.60	4.10
Infant mortality (‰)	197	176	157	135	114	71
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.3	46.1	46.8	47.7	47.8	40.5
— 15-64 years	52.4	51.5	50.8	49.8	49.8	56.6
— over 65 years	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.9
GNP (Mio \$)	448	638	2499	2471	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	147.9	153.1	447.4	319.6	:	:

Mauritius

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	660	826	966	1075	1183	1397
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.0	2.3	1.6	1.1	1.0	0.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	33.2	42.0	42.4	40.5	41.7	57.9
Fertility rate	5.98	4.25	3.07	2.10	1.90	1.85
Infant mortality (‰)	79	67	38	24	18	8
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	46.5	43.7	37.3	29.8	24.4	18.9
— 15-64 years	50.9	53.8	61.0	64.9	69.6	68.4
— over 65 years	2.6	2.5	1.8	5.3	6.0	12.7
GNP (Mio \$)	161	222	1124	2516	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	244	269	1163	2341	:	:

Nigeria

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	42305	56581	78430	108542	147709	285823
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.5	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.1	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	14.4	20.0	27.1	35.2	43.3	61.6
Fertility rate	6.82	6.90	6.90	6.90	5.94	3.54
Infant mortality (‰)	194	146	124	105	87	48
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.4	46.3	46.5	47.4	46.0	37.6
— 15-64 years	52.3	51.3	51.0	50.1	51.3	58.9
— over 65 years	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.7	3.5
GNP (Mio \$)	417.3	12081	88610	32175	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	99	214	1130	296	:	:

Mozambique

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	7461	9395	12095	14200	19436	36290
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.9	2.3	2.6	1.6	3.2	2.5
Urbanisation rate (%)	3.7	5.7	13.1	26.8	41.1	61.1
Fertility rate	6.29	6.50	6.50	6.50	6.06	3.86
Infant mortality (‰)	195	175	160	155	133	75
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	41.5	43.1	43.4	44.4	44.6	38.4
— 15-64 years	55.7	53.9	53.5	52.4	52.1	58.1
— over 65 years	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.5
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	2382	1229	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	197.0	86.5	:	:

Papua New Guinea

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	1920	2422	3086	3875	4867	7770
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.8	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.3	1.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	2.7	9.8	13.0	15.8	20.2	38.3
Fertility rate	6.26	6.21	5.87	5.25	4.46	2.49
Infant mortality (‰)	175	130	70	59	48	26
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	40.5	42.0	43.0	40.5	39.1	30.2
— 15-64 years	56.7	55.0	55.5	57.2	58.3	65.8
— over 65 years	2.9	3.0	1.6	2.4	2.5	4.0
GNP (Mio \$)	228	626	2488	3079	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	118.8	258.4	806.2	794.6	:	:

Namibia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	633	810	1066	1439	1964	3751
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.2	2.5	2.8	3.0	3.2	2.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	15.0	18.6	22.8	27.8	34.4	53.8
Fertility rate	6.00	6.00	6.00	6.00	5.57	3.40
Infant mortality (‰)	153	125	102	80	60	28
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.4	43.3	44.0	44.7	44.5	36.0
— 15-64 years	54.1	53.3	52.6	51.9	52.0	59.7
— over 65 years	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	4.3
GNP (Mio \$)	204	433	1845	2029	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	322	534	1731	1410	:	:

Rwanda

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	2742	3728	5163	7027	9766	20595
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.0
Urbanisation rate (%)	2.4	3.2	4.7	5.6	6.7	15.0
Fertility rate	7.38	7.99	8.49	8.49	7.78	4.23
Infant mortality (‰)	153	143	133	116	104	56
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.2	47.2	48.8	49.4	49.7	41.9
— 15-64 years	52.5	50.4	48.8	48.2	48.0	55.8
— over 65 years	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.3
GNP (Mio \$)	118	220	1164	2118	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	43.1	59.1	225.5	301.4	:	:

São Tomé and Príncipe

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	64	73	94	119	146	215
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.6	1.3	2.6	2.4	2.1	1.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	16.0	23.4	32.8	42.3	50.5	67.2
Fertility rate	:	:	:	5.10	5.10	5.10
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	83	69	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	41.0	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	53.8	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	5.2	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	19.7	45.8	46.3	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	269.3	486.7	389.2	:	:

Solomon Islands

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	118	161	227	320	444	844
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.7	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.3	2.6
Urbanisation rate (%)	8.6	8.9	10.5	14.6	20.0	38.3
Fertility rate	6.40	6.54	7.08	5.82	4.98	2.92
Infant mortality (‰)	131	80	47	32	23	10
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	45.6	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	51.6	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	2.8	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	27.7 ¹	107.9	207.3	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	160.5 ¹	475.1	647.9	:	:

¹ In 1972.

Senegal

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3187	4158	5538	7327	9581	17078
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.3
Urbanisation rate (%)	31.9	33.4	35.9	39.8	45.1	62.2
Fertility rate	6.90	7.00	7.00	6.50	5.62	3.47
Infant mortality (‰)	176	154	112	87	72	37
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	43.5	44.6	45.3	45.5	43.6	35.9
— 15-64 years	53.5	52.6	51.8	51.7	53.4	60.2
— over 65 years	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.8
GNP (Mio \$)	591	844	2917	5631	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	185.6	202.9	526.6	768.5	:	:

Somalia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3785	4791	6713	8677	11864	23401
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.1	2.4	3.4	2.6	3.2	2.8
Urbanisation rate (%)	17.3	20.4	22.2	24.2	27.8	45.9
Fertility rate	7.00	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.51	4.06
Infant mortality (‰)	180	162	149	132	112	69
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	43.6	44.8	46.0	47.0	47.3	39.8
— 15-64 years	53.5	52.2	51.0	50.2	50.1	57.2
— over 65 years	2.9	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.6	3.1
GNP (Mio \$)	180.2	322.9	602.7	835.0	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	47.6	67.4	89.8	96.2	:	:

Seychelles

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	42	53	62	71	77	84
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.1	2.4	1.6	1.4	0.8	0.3
Urbanisation rate (%)	25.4	26.0	42.8	59.3	69.2	80.1
Fertility rate	:	:	3.80	2.80	2.80	2.80
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	17	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	35.3	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	58.8	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	5.9	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	12.0	18.4	142.0	353.6	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	285	345	2291	4981	:	:

St Christopher and Nevis

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	51	47	44	42	41	47
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.5	-0.8	-0.7	-0.5	-0.2	0.5
Urbanisation rate (%)	27.9	34.3	41.3	48.9	56.3	71.4
Fertility rate	:	:	3.30	2.60	2.60	2.60
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	36	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	35.0	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	52.5	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	12.5	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	47.2	146.1	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	1072	3480	:	:

Sierra Leone

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	2241	2656	3263	4151	5395	9800
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.4	1.7	2.1	2.4	2.7	2.4
Urbanisation rate (%)	13.0	18.1	24.5	32.2	40.2	59.1
Fertility rate	6.19	6.39	6.50	6.50	6.06	3.86
Infant mortality (‰)	223	204	179	154	132	85
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	40.4	41.8	43.2	44.4	44.9	38.9
— 15-64 years	56.5	55.1	53.6	52.5	52.0	57.7
— over 65 years	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.4
GNP (Mio \$)	:	418	1069	863	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	157.4	327.5	208.0	:	:

St Lucia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	86	101	115	133	152	199
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.9	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.1
Urbanisation rate (%)	39.0	40.1	41.8	44.1	48.9	65.6
Fertility rate	:	5.70	4.40	4.40	4.40	4.40
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	19	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	40.0	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	54.7	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	5.3	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	100.0	347.5	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	869	2613	:	:

St Vincent

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	80	87	98	107	117	147
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.8	0.8	1.2	0.9	0.9	0.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	13.7	15.1	17.6	20.4	24.6	42.7
Fertility rate	: 5.40	: 3.60	: 2.60	: 2.60	: 2.60	: 2.60
Infant mortality (‰)	: :	: :	: 22	: :	: :	: :
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	: :	: :	: 35.5	: :	: :	: :
— 15-64 years	: :	: :	: 59.8	: :	: :	: :
— over 65 years	: :	: :	: 4.7	: :	: :	: :
GNP (Mio \$)	13.1	18.5	56.8	181.3	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	163	212	579	1694	: :	: :

Tanzania

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	10205	13694	18581	25993	35916	74172
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.6	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.3	2.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	4.7	6.7	14.8	20.8	28.2	48.2
Fertility rate	6.80	6.80	6.80	6.80	6.33	3.98
Infant mortality (‰)	150	135	125	108	94	49
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.8	46.8	47.6	47.2	47.9	40.6
— 15-64 years	51.9	50.9	50.1	50.3	49.6	56.6
— over 65 years	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.8
GNP (Mio \$)	587	1307	5125	2147	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	57.5	95.4	275.8	82.6	: :	: :

Sudan

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	11165	13859	18681	25203	33166	60602
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.0	2.2	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.4
Urbanisation rate (%)	10.3	16.4	20.0	22.5	27.3	46.4
Fertility rate	6.67	6.67	6.67	6.44	5.65	3.68
Infant mortality (‰)	175	156	131	108	90	51
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.3	44.4	44.9	45.2	43.5	36.5
— 15-64 years	52.7	52.9	52.4	52.0	53.5	59.5
— over 65 years	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.0	4.0
GNP (Mio \$)	1140	2162 ¹	6690	8731	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	102.1	151.3 ¹	358.1	346.4	: :	: :

¹ In 1971.

Togo

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	1514	2020	2615	3531	4818	9377
Average rate of population growth (%)	1.3	2.9	2.6	3.0	3.2	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	9.8	13.1	22.9	28.5	33.7	52.3
Fertility rate	6.58	6.58	6.58	6.58	6.08	3.59
Infant mortality (‰)	193	141	117	94	77	40
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	42.4	43.6	44.5	45.3	45.4	37.8
— 15-64 years	53.9	53.3	52.3	51.5	51.4	58.5
— over 65 years	3.6	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.8
GNP (Mio \$)	118	248	1097	1599	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	77.9	122.8	419.3	452.9	: :	: :

Surinam

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	290	372	352	422	500	668
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.0	2.5	-0.6	1.8	1.7	1.2
Urbanisation rate (%)	47.3	45.9	44.8	47.5	54.1	69.8
Fertility rate	6.56	5.94	4.20	2.97	2.39	2.10
Infant mortality (‰)	76	55	44	33	24	10
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	47.6	48.3	39.9	33.7	31.5	23.0
— 15-64 years	48.3	47.7	55.8	62.2	63.7	68.6
— over 65 years	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.0	4.8	8.5
GNP (Mio \$)	85	221	881	1597	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	292	595	2502	3785	: :	: :

Tonga

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	64	82	92	96	103	117
Average rate of population growth (%)	4.6	2.5	1.2	0.4	0.7	0.5
Urbanisation rate (%)	17.6	20.3	23.7	35.1	46.8	65.9
Fertility rate	: 6.50	: 4.80	: 4.00	: 4.00	: 4.00	: 4.00
Infant mortality (‰)	: 57	: 50	: 22	: :	: :	: :
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	: :	: :	: 37.4	: :	: :	: :
— 15-64 years	: :	: :	: 58.6	: :	: :	: :
— over 65 years	: :	: :	: 4.0	: :	: :	: :
GNP (Mio \$)	: :	: :	72.7 ¹	114.6	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	: :	: :	777 ¹	1193	: :	: :

¹ In 1984.

Swaziland

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	326	419	565	751	984	1739
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.1	2.5	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.3
Urbanisation rate (%)	3.9	9.7	17.8	26.4	36.1	56.6
Fertility rate	6.50	6.50	6.80	5.25	4.62	3.04
Infant mortality (‰)	158	147	108	83	63	29
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.0	45.5	46.4	44.7	40.7	33.1
— 15-64 years	53.2	51.9	50.8	52.2	55.9	62.2
— over 65 years	2.8	2.6	2.8	3.1	3.5	4.7
GNP (Mio \$)	33.6	111.2	540.3	801.4	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	103	265	956	1067	: :	: :

Trinidad and Tobago

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	843	971	1082	1236	1365	1779
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.9	1.4	1.1	1.3	1.0	1.1
Urbanisation rate (%)	64.5	63.0	63.0	64.8	68.8	79.8
Fertility rate	5.30	3.79	3.40	2.95	2.53	2.10
Infant mortality (‰)	64	46	38	24	16	8
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	43.0	42.1	34.3	34.4	31.1	23.4
— 15-64 years	53.0	53.5	60.2	60.0	63.2	66.7
— over 65 years	4.0	4.4	5.5	5.7	5.8	9.9
GNP (Mio \$)	484	757	5925	4569	: :	: :
Per capita GNP (\$)	574	779	5476	3697	: :	: :

Tuvalu

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	5	6	8	12	15	20
Average rate of population growth (%)	0.0	1.8	2.9	4.1	2.3	1.2
Urbanisation rate (%)	:	:	31.3 ¹	34.2 ²	:	:
Fertility rate	:	:	2.80 ³	3.10	3.10	3.10
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	33	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	33.8 ³	:	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	:	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	:	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	:	:	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	:	:	:	:

¹ In 1983. ² In 1985. ³ In 1979.

Zaire

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	15333	20270	27009	37391	50970	104530
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.3	2.8	2.9	3.3	3.1	2.9
Urbanisation rate (%)	22.3	30.3	28.7	28.1	31.0	49.8
Fertility rate	6.00	6.10	6.50	6.70	6.24	3.94
Infant mortality (‰)	166	133	115	102	85	43
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	44.0	44.3	46.0	47.3	47.8	40.7
— 15-64 years	53.0	52.9	51.1	49.8	49.4	56.4
— over 65 years	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.9
GNP (Mio \$)	3298	4721	14059	7176	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	215.1	232.9	520.5	191.9	:	:

Uganda

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	6562	9806	13120	17560	23401	45933
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.3	4.1	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	5.1	8.0	8.8	11.2	14.2	28.8
Fertility rate	6.90	6.90	6.90	7.30	6.72	3.83
Infant mortality (‰)	140	118	114	108	96	46
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	46.6	47.0	47.8	48.3	49.0	40.4
— 15-64 years	50.8	50.4	49.7	49.2	48.7	57.4
— over 65 years	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.2
GNP (Mio \$)	856	:	1262	2736	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	130.5	:	96.2	155.8	:	:

Zambia

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3141	4189	5738	8138	10672	20981
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.6	2.9	3.2	3.6	2.7	2.7
Urbanisation rate (%)	17.2	30.2	39.8	42.0	44.7	59.9
Fertility rate	6.60	6.65	7.20	6.75	5.90	3.79
Infant mortality (‰)	140	115	94	86	79	31
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	45.2	46.1	49.4	48.4	47.8	39.9
— 15-64 years	52.4	51.5	48.2	49.3	50.0	57.9
— over 65 years	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.1	2.2
GNP (Mio \$)	626	1742	3594	3386	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	199.4	415.8	626.4	416.1	:	:

Vanuatu

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	65	86	116	150	191	338
Average rate of population growth (%)	2.3	2.8	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.3
Urbanisation rate (%)	9.0	13.1	17.9	18.5	20.7	37.2
Fertility rate	:	6.50	6.10	5.60	5.60	5.60
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	69	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	44.4	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	53.6	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	2.0	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	95.8	164.6	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	826	1097	:	:

Zimbabwe

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	3812	5260	7126	9947	13194	22889
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.4	2.9	2.2
Urbanisation rate (%)	12.6	16.9	22.3	28.5	36.0	55.4
Fertility rate	7.50	7.50	6.60	5.79	4.87	2.56
Infant mortality (‰)	113	101	86	67	56	23
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	46.4	49.1	47.8	44.7	44.0	32.4
— 15-64 years	50.7	48.2	49.5	52.5	53.3	63.5
— over 65 years	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.8	4.1
GNP (Mio \$)	818	1481	5281	6577	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	214.5	281.6	741.1	661.2	:	:

Western Samoa

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2025
Total population (1000 inhabitants)	110	142	155	158	162	177
Average rate of population growth (%)	3.4	2.6	0.9	0.2	0.3	0.4
Urbanisation rate (%)	18.9	20.3	21.2	22.0	25.5	44.2
Fertility rate	:	6.70	5.60	4.60	4.60	4.60
Infant mortality (‰)	:	:	:	46	:	:
Age structure (%):						
— 0-14 years	:	:	:	39.4	:	:
— 15-64 years	:	:	:	56.4	:	:
— over 65 years	:	:	:	4.2	:	:
GNP (Mio \$)	:	:	95.2	155.5	:	:
Per capita GNP (\$)	:	:	613.9	984.4	:	:

Yam bean

An underexploited tuber crop with great potential

by Dr Marten Sørensen *

In the quest for new, sustainable and high-yielding crops which may help in improving the diet and self-sufficiency of Third World countries, the tuber-bearing legumes have recently come into focus.

These possess a number of attractive characteristics: they are highly nutritious and adaptable, impose few demands as regards soil quality and have good resistance to pests and diseases. In addition, being tubers, they will always produce a crop even if a sudden dry spell occurs.

Since 1985, scientists working on the Yam Bean Project, which is funded under the European Community's 'Science and Technology for Developing Countries' (STD) programmes,¹ have been examining the potential for this agricultural product, including methods of breeding and the scope for introducing it into areas where it is not presently grown.

The yam bean genus, whose scientific name is *Pachyrhizus*, is related to the common garden pea and consists of five different species. Like other members of the legume family, it has an efficient symbiosis with bacteria. These provide it with a source of nitrogen and, as a result, there is no requirement for an additional supply of nitrogen fertiliser. Another common generic characteristic is the presence of an insecticidal compound called *rotenone*. This ingredient is to be found in the mature seeds but not in toxic amounts in the tuber itself or in any other part of the plant.

History of cultivation

Of the five species of yam bean discovered to date, three are cultivated while the other two are exclusively wild. The first to be described

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¹ STD1, STD2 and STD3. These are specific programmes undertaken within the Framework Programme for Research and Development operated by Directorate General XII (Science, Research and Development) of the European Commission.

scientifically (by Linnaeus in 1753) was the Mexican species (*P. erosus*). Archeological evidence reveals that this bean was grown by the early civilisations of Mexico and Central America, such as the Aztecs and the Mayas. Today, this high-yielding species is the one which is most widely distributed. It was introduced to the Philippines by the Spaniards in the 16th century and, from there, cultivation spread to Indonesia and the rest of the Far East as well as into parts of the Pacific.

One interesting historical curiosity relates to its introduction into French Guyana. Believing it to be a Far-Eastern crop, the French botanist and explorer, Perrotet, took samples of the species from an island in Indonesia in 1821 and, travelling progressively eastwards, he introduced it to Mauritius and Reunion, French West Africa (Senegal) and finally to Cayenne (Guyana). In so doing, he came close to reintroducing the bean to its original distribution area.

Yam beans on sale in a market in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam



Another species, the Andean yam bean (*P. ahipa*), also has a long, documented history of cultivation. Several Andean cultures are known to have valued this refreshing, juicy crop and dried tubers have been found in the famous Peruvian 'mummy bundles'. The plant was also frequently depicted on the pottery and textiles of Andean civilisations that have been discovered.

The traditional distribution area of this species is in the Andean valleys of northern Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, although it is now rarely found outside Bolivia. The species has a number of distinct characteristics which are interesting from the perspective of an agronomist. These include its semi-erect bushy growth, its short growth period and, most importantly, the fact that it is photothermally neutral: in other words, it is unaffected by variations in daylight and temperature.

The Amazonian species, *P. tuberosus*, has a more obscure history of cultivation. This is doubtless due to the lack of remains from earlier civilisations in its distribution area. However, the fact that the crop is to be found in a number of Caribbean islands points to its introduction by Arawak or Carib Amerindians, and thus to a history of cultivation which predates Columbus.

Characteristics and uses

Although, with each of the three species, a single cultivar² may produce more than one tuber (the occurrence of this appears to be greatly influenced by the spacing in the field) the norm is one per plant. To be marketable,

² A plant type that was produced from a natural species and is maintained by cultivation.

the tuber should normally have a weight of somewhere between 500 g and 1 kg. In contrast to most other tuber crops, propagation of the yam bean is by seeding. In Mexico, the average number of plants grown per hectare is between 60 000 and 80 000. Traditionally, yam beans are intercropped with mays and common beans. The three are sown simultaneously, the timing varying according to altitude. Harvesting of the common bean takes place 85-90 days later, while the mays are ready for gathering after 110-120 days and the yam beans after 145-150 days. Yam beans are also cultivated as a monocrop and this is the method used in production for export.

Different methods of pruning are employed to increase tuber size. With the Mexican yam bean, reproductive pruning, which involves the removal of all fertile shoots, is usually carried out three or four times during the growing season. For the Amazonian species, in some areas half of the aerial parts are removed when flowering starts, but the most common cultivation practice does not involve (reproductive) pruning. Likewise, cultivation of the Andean yam bean does not involve any pruning. Yields vary according to the cultivation practices, plant density, the species involved and whether or not the field is irrigated, but the average in Mexico is 70-90 tonnes per hectare. These high yields are achieved in areas that have been continuously cropped with yam beans for 40-50 years!

The only other tropical tuber crop which can match this yield performance is cassava (*Manihot esculenta*), also known as manioc or tapioca. In other respects, however, yam beans have the edge. They produce a crop in less time (4-7 months according to species) and although they have a lower dry matter content, their protein content is four to five times greater. In concrete terms, this translates into more than seven tonnes of protein per hectare. Finally, yam beans retain their quality better once they have been harvested. In storage, the tuber can be kept for more than three months without significant loss.

As regards nutritional content, the Mexican yam bean consists of 80-90% water, 10-15% carbohydrates, 1.0-2.5%



Harvesting yam bean tubers in Mexico

protein and 0.1% lipids. Analyses carried out by Japanese scientists have shown that the starch (carbohydrate) content is of a highly digestible variety which is suitable for infant diets. The amino-acid (protein) content compares favourably with all other tuber crops and these qualities, combined with the low fat (lipid) content, explain why yam beans are regarded as a health food by American dieticians. The 'chop suey bean', which is the commercial name for the yam bean in American supermarkets, is currently the fastest growing speciality vegetable on the US market. Yam bean tubers are slightly sweet, with a mild pea-like flavour and a crunchy texture similar to apples. They can be cooked, deep fried or pickled with chili in vinegar and may also be eaten raw because, unlike cassava, they do not contain toxic compounds.

It is not only the tuber of the yam bean that is used as food. In Thailand, the young pods are eaten as a substitute for beans and are said to have a pleasant taste. Nutritionally, these pods can be compared with soya bean legumes or pods. Mature seeds contain a high amount of good quality vegetable oil (approx. 30% in *P. erosus*) but also too much rotenone to be edible (approx 0.5% pure rotenone and 0.5% rotenoids and saponins). If the insecticidal compounds are removed, however, the oil then has a composition which is almost identical to that of soya bean oil. This attractive possibility was identified by

Brazilian scientists working on the Amazonian yam bean and has been confirmed more recently in studies carried out at the University of Costa Rica into the rotenone content of different plants and species.

In addition to the use of tubers and young pods or beans for human or animal consumption, the dried hay which remains after harvest is a source of animal fodder in Mexico. The highly efficient natural way in which the plant absorbs nitrogen makes it an attractive alternative for cultivation on poorer soils.

Assuming the rotenone can be separated from the mature seeds, the oil is then fit for consumption and can be marketed as an alternative to soya bean oil. The rotenone itself may also be put to good use. It can be sold as a high value insecticide or, using simpler extraction methods, employed locally as a plant protective agent.

The project

The STD-funded project, which is now in its third phase, is an integrated effort involving nine different institutions from Mexico, Central America, Africa, Europe and the Pacific. A number of other institutions and private individuals have links with the project

through the 'Yam Bean Network'. In 1985, when the project was initiated, few seed samples and very little information about the yam bean were available from the world's various gene banks. Through various contacts some 20 samples of the Mexican yam bean and 2 samples of the Andean variety were procured but there were virtually no details as to the exact origin of this material, the cultivation practices involved or other relevant data. Thus, in order to make a comprehensive examination of the crop's potential, a thorough recording of the natural and cultivated distribution of the genus, based on information available from herbarium specimens, had to be undertaken. Subsequently, a number of field collections were carried out and today, approximately 200 sample groups, covering both wild and cultivated material, are available for the hybridisation and evaluation experiments currently in progress.

The breeding programme of the yam bean project involves carrying out hybridisation experiments with a view to developing new, high-yielding cultivars. All of the known varieties, other than some experimental ones resulting from radiation experiments carried out in India, are the result of selection without previous breeding.

Hybrids combining the growth characteristics and photothermal neut-

Yam bean field trials
under coconut palms in Tonga

rality of the Andean yam bean, the vigour of the Amazonian species and the high yielding capacity of the Mexican one would allow the cultivation of this crop under a wide range of climatic conditions. So far, the experiments have successfully hybridised four of the five species. Selections based on yield and adaptability experiments began in 1989 and the evaluation of fifth and sixth generation hybrids is currently under way. At present, some 600 hybrids are being tested at the various institutions linked together within the project.

Although the main emphasis is on the development of new hybrids, field trials have also taken place in Mexico, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Senegal, Benin, Thailand and Tonga, to examine the potential of existing strains. By way of example, two different types of the Mexican yam bean have yielded between 80 and 160 tonnes per hectare in trials carried out in Benin, Costa Rica, Mexico and Tonga. One Haitian cultivar of the Amazonian variety has produced a yield of 70 tonnes per hectare in Benin. Trials carried out in Portugal by the French partner in the project have demonstrated the astonishing potential of the Andean yam bean under Mediterranean conditions — yields of 54 tonnes per hectare with up to 24% dry matter were achieved. Recently collected material from Ecuadorian cultivars of the Amazonian yam bean sug-

gests a similarly encouraging yield potential.

The various trials have been carried out at different altitudes and cover a wide range of soil and climatic conditions. Both high rainfall and semi-arid regions are included.

When the crop was first introduced into Tonga, local consumers were reluctant to accept the new type of tuber presented to them. Although the traditional Tongan diet is based, in large part, on tuber and root crops, the crisp, juicy quality of the yam beans appeared to be too 'exotic'. It was also regarded as strange that it could be eaten fresh. However, with increased demand among the local Asian and European communities, and the attraction of easy cultivation, the Tongans are now growing, marketing and consuming yam beans in increasing numbers.

The news from Benin is similar, if not more encouraging. Thanks to local media coverage, a peculiar situation has arisen with several of the field trials subjected to 'unauthorised testing and sampling' at night, by local farmers! There, the biggest problem at the moment is the availability of seeds for local cultivation.

Although there are only five species of yam bean, the variations, both genetic and as to form and structure, are considerable, and this provides the basis for substantial improvements through breeding. The potential of the genus as a sustainable crop with a variety of uses, delivering high yields under a wide range of climatic and soil conditions, has clearly been demonstrated. Additionally, it has been shown to be readily accepted by consumers unfamiliar with the crop in two very different countries in Africa and the Pacific. Finally, looking at the crop's growing status in the United States, there is every reason to suppose that the untapped European market could also offer valuable export opportunities for yam bean growers. ■

M.S.



International Monetary Fund Report for 1993

Trade Liberalisation and regional integration

The IMF's end-of-year report is a tactfully worded presentation of the economic situation in 1993, showing considerable variation in trends from one part of the world to another. There was a slight (1.5%) improvement in growth rate in the industrialised countries, a further slowing of expansion in many African countries and a heavy production fall-off in the changing countries of central and eastern Europe, while more vigorous growth in the developing countries of Asia and the Middle East helped push the GDP of the developing country group up by 6% — a large general

increase, which is a statistical phenomenon covering a number of contrasting situations and fails to reflect the realities of the economies of the various countries involved (see table).

So neither low interest rates on external bonds quoted in dollars nor what was in some cases a considerable volume of capital inflow could even partly offset the effects of the commodity exporters' deteriorating terms of trade

and generally poor demand in the industrialised nations. Some developing countries achieved relatively good results with outward-looking economic strategies involving a sustained drive to stabilise and reform, the report maintained, but many others saw no change in an uneasy economic situation and the standard of

Salt being exported from Senegal.
The developing countries all run trade deficits: their volume of imports was higher than that of the industrialised countries in 1992 (10.2% as compared to 4%)



living worldwide continued to dip, as it had done in 1992, in the wake of a largely deflationist policy in this second category of developing countries and sub-potential demand in many regions.

When it came to capital and exchange markets, the report found that monetary conditions had relaxed further in 1993 and that exchange rates had dropped, overall, because of a decline in the pressure of inflation — both reflecting and encouraging a slackening of tension in the exchange rate machinery. The total debt of the developing countries (not including IMF credits) had contracted slightly as a percentage of export revenue, down from 124% to 116% in 1992. The failure to conclude the GATT agreements — the negotiations ultimately ended in December 1993 (after the publication of the IMF report) — apparently helped worsen the imbalance of trade, particularly between the big industrialised nations, and stepped up protectionist pressure. The trading performance of the developing countries in 1993 had still not shown any benefit from the liberalisation and macroeconomic restructuring efforts undertaken by some of them in Africa (Mali, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) and Latin America.

The countries of central and eastern Europe also continued the drive to liberalise their trade, but still had to impose temporary extra levies on imports to relieve the pressures of transition and help solve budget and balance-of-payment problems.

The move towards regional integration continued in 1993, particularly in the developing countries, with the completion of the European single market and the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the USA, Canada and Mexico. The single market is one of Europe's biggest contributions to the stimulation of trade and growth since the founding of the Community — or the European Union, as it has been since the end of 1993. The harmonised technical standards and controls and the market access which it brings spell strong competition for European firms, both within the Union and without, which should make them boost their efficiency and adapt more readily. So the single

TABLE

Overview of the world economy ¹
(Annual percentage of variation, unless otherwise stated)

	1989	1990	1991	1992
World production	3.3	2.0	0.6	1.8
Industrialised countries	3.2	2.1	0.2	1.5
USA	2.5	0.8	-1.2	2.1
Japan	4.7	4.8	4.0	1.3
Germany	3.4	5.1	1.0	2.0
France	4.1	2.2	1.1	1.8
Italy	2.9	2.1	1.3	0.9
United Kingdom	2.1	0.5	-2.2	-0.6
Canada	2.3	-0.5	-1.7	0.9
Total G7	3.1	2.0	0.2	1.6
Other industrialised countries	3.8	2.7	0.6	0.8
European Community	3.4	2.8	0.7	1.1
Western Germany	3.4	5.1	3.7	1.5
Developing countries	4.0	3.7	4.2	6.1
Africa	3.7	1.9	1.5	0.9
Asia	5.5	5.7	5.8	7.9
Middle East and Europe	2.9	3.9	2.1	9.9
Western hemisphere	1.7	0.4	3.1	2.3
Countries in transition	1.9	-3.6	-10.1	-15.5
Central and Eastern Europe ²	0.2	-7.4	-13.5	-7.5
Former USSR	2.5	-2.2	-9.0	-18.5
Volume of world trade	7.0	4.4	2.3	4.2
Volume of industrialised countries' imports	7.4	4.6	2.4	4.0
Volume of developing countries' imports	8.7	7.3	9.1	10.2
Price of commodities				
Price of petroleum ³	21.5	28.2	-17.0	-0.5
(in US dollars per barrel)	17.19	22.05	18.30	18.2
Rate of non-petroleum products ⁴	-0.5	-7.7	-4.5	-0.1
Consumer prices				
Industrialised countries	4.6	5.2	4.5	3.2
Developing countries	61.9	65.4	35.7	38.7
Countries in transition	27.6	32.4	100.5	776.2
Central and Eastern Europe	135.5	158.8	119.4	196.6
Former USSR	2.3	5.4	94.7	1,201.8
LIBOR six months (%) ⁵				
On deposits in US dollars	9.3	8.4	6.1	3.9
On deposits in yen	5.5	7.8	7.2	4.3
On deposits in German marks	7.2	8.8	9.4	9.4

¹ The composite production and inflation indices for the groups of countries are calculated in the light of estimates for the various countries, weighted to reflect the value of their GDP at constant prices.

² The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, plus Croatia, Slovenia and the other republics of the former Federative Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

³ Simple average of US dollar prices on the market of UK Brent, Dubai and Alaska North Slope crude.

⁴ In US dollars (+ world export weighting).

⁵ Interbank rate offered at London.

market reflects the crucial importance of free competition at international level, particularly between comparable economies, as a spur to trade and higher revenue. However, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) apart, the developing countries still have a long way to go with their regional integration, despite all the technical bodies and institutions dedicated to it. As the IMF report makes clear, Southern Africa's Preferential Trade Area (PTA), ECOWAS (West Africa) and UDEAC (Central Africa) are still looking at ways of tightening their integration.

Coming to the economic outlook, the report looks beyond the uncertainties of the moment and suggests that strict application of this growth strategy and a concerted, coordinated approach by the countries in the IMF could substantially improve world economic performances in the medium term. ■

Cultural cooperation between the European Union and the ACP States

by Pierfranco Alloa¹

'Cultural cooperation' had no legal force in the European Community (now the European Union) until 1986, when Lomé III took effect. This innovatory term was already being used in the Community institutions before that, in official statements and reports and as a practical way of referring to cultural schemes run on a more or less one-off basis, but, at that stage, the mention of cultural cooperation did not have the essentially binding legal status which came with the Lomé cultural provisions.

Interestingly, the legal concept was introduced on the external front before the Community officially enshrined it in the Treaties — which it did in February 1992, with the initialling of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. This introduced a new Article (128) providing for cultural cooperation both internally and in relations with third countries. Maastricht took effect on 1 November 1993, so, legally speaking, Lomé III led the way with the Community's cultural cooperation — a fact which is certainly worth emphasising.

As things stand, all EC cultural schemes for the ACP are carried out under Lomé IV, which contains a reinforced version of the provisions of Lomé III. Article 139 now sums up the aims of cultural cooperation, which should: 'contribute to the self-reliant development of the ACP States, a process centred on man himself and rooted in each people's culture... enhance their human resources, increase their own creative capacities,... foster participation by the population in the process of development,... promoting, in the interests of ... mutual enrichment ... a better understanding and greater (international) solidarity.'

Cultural cooperation should therefore be seen not as just one more aspect of cooperation with the ACP States,

but as the cornerstone of the whole edifice. Its vast potential brings into play both the concept of development itself and the way in which Community-financed schemes are designed and implemented. The two basics of cultural cooperation are catering for the cultural dimension in development (which includes involving the people) and financing cultural operations (which includes safeguarding the cultural heritage, the production and dissemination of cultural products, cultural events, information and communications). The Maastricht cultural clause, couched in more general terms and with a European focus, covers both of these.

Then, at the beginning of Lomé, there is a series of principles (directly or indirectly) related to culture and, at the end, five declarations on copyright, the audiovisual area, the return or restitution of cultural property, the Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation and the definition of 'appropriate technology' — a range of subjects which makes Lomé the broadest and most highly structured cultural agreement that the Community has reached with third countries so far.

Lomé's all-embracing view of culture covers man and his art (oral and written literature, monuments, music, audiovisual production etc.) and the way the Convention caters for the cultural dimension (Articles 142-145) reflects the meaning of the word culture as the system of values, the outlooks and the workings of a given society and the original solutions which that society attempts to find for its problems, whatever they may be. So culture, as a substratum common both to a society and to the way it functions, is the interaction of man with his environment, a way of coming to grips with reality and a

series of rules of different kinds enabling the individual to communicate with his ecosystem and establish the relations needed to match his socio-economic aims.

Culture has been seen in a less encompassing light in other agreements which the EC has signed since Lomé III, but it is the Lomé concept which seems to have set the trend and it would be unthinkable for the Community in its international relations ever entirely to depart from that ideal in the future. One thing, intercultural dialogue, comes up so regularly in the provisions on cultural cooperation that it would seem completely legitimate to see it as an essential part of the practicalities of that cooperation.

Lomé (Article 145) says: 'Intercultural dialogue shall be geared to more thorough knowledge and a better understanding of cultures. By clearing obstacles to intercultural communication, cooperation shall stimulate awareness of the interdependence of peoples of different cultures.' This:

- makes for a sharper sense of the relative nature of all culture;
- enables ACP inhabitants to say how they see western development models;
- leads to a reciprocal cultural contribution in which all that is positive and enriching for mankind in the ACP world is spread across Europe and *vice versa*.

So cultural cooperation between the Community and the ACP States is a genuinely historical breakthrough with a direct bearing on the collective memory of the colonial trauma and the rift between traditional and western culture. For years, the ACPs underwent not just political and economic, but cultural domination by the West and, in many ways, they are still doing so now. When the signatories to the Convention accepted the idea of cultural cooperation, they were agreeing (directly or indirectly) that, if the ACPs wanted self-

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sustaining development, they had to abandon cultural mimicry and shed western cultural models which turned out to be ill-adapted to local realities.

Catering for the cultural dimension

There is a literal meaning to this which Lomé makes more or less obvious. As we have seen, catering for culture gives the ACPs the opportunity to create the cultural conditions in which headway can be made with a form of development which is not copied from the West, but is indigenous and therefore right for local needs. Taking the cultural dimension into account means preserving and protecting the cultural and spiritual values of a given group of human beings and thus avoiding any irreversible upheavals which might undermine its social cohesiveness.

It should mean that traditional and modern can be combined without sacrificing one to the other and that two (European/western and 'ACP') value systems can act on each other to achieve optimum synergy.

According to Article 142 of Lomé IV: 'The design, appraisal, execution and evaluation of each project or programme shall be based on understanding of, and regard for, the cultural and social features of the milieu.'

Article 143 lists various specifically cultural and culture-dominated social aspects:

- adaptation to the cultural milieu and the implications for that milieu;
- integration and enhancement of the local cultural heritage, notably value systems, way of life, modes of thought and know-how, materials and styles;
- methods of information acquisition and dissemination;
- interaction between people and their environment and between population and natural resources;
- social and interpersonal relationships;
- structures, methods and forms of production and processing.'

The multidimensional nature of culture and the complexity of the develop-

ment process understandably forced the Commission to take an approach which encompassed the socio-economic and cultural element in an organic whole. So it has avoided an *ad hoc* approach and, in 1992, began gradually developing new general guidelines for project cycle management in the form of an integrated approach and a logical framework. The cultural dimension is included, as a non-economic, non-financial factor ensuring project viability, under the heading of socio-cultural and legal aspects and women in development. This is the cultural side of the integrated approach and should be taken into account at every stage of a project of which it is an integral part. So the Commission has to turn down any project which would interfere with ACP cultural values and this is difficult, because the essence of anything cultural is difficult to grasp and may be outside the field of vision. The facets of the cultural process vary from one country, one region and one moment in history to another and, because the situations are so different, any overall approach is bound to be incomplete.

So a culture analysis grid has been devised as a reference tool for use when processing a project, and the Commission has identified four types of factor for this purpose:

- cultural factors related to the social organisation of the population concerned;
- factors related to family organisation;
- cultural factors related to economic organisation;
- other cultural factors.

The grid, to be filled out by the Delegation, should make it possible to encourage the interplay of the positive factors of self-reliant development, by boosting them, and foster an understanding of and make allowances for the potential blockages and brakes. And, as a guide and an inspiration, it could be improved on in future, particularly with regard to the major cultural differences of and within geographical areas. UNESCO is currently tackling questions of this sort as part of its world decade for cultural development.

As yet little work has been done on evaluating what happens when cultural aspects are taken into account when implementing cooperation schemes. It is

objectively difficult, if not impossible, to quantify cultural factors or separate them from others. Other considerations apart, the success of a project is the best proof that proper account has been taken of the cultural dimension.



West African folk singer
Catering for the cultural dimension means
preserving and protecting cultural and
spiritual values

Financing cultural schemes

Lomé provides the possibility of financing a whole range of cultural schemes, mentioning the following areas specifically:

- the protection and promotion of the cultural heritage;
- the production and distribution of cultural goods and services;
- cultural events;
- information and communications;
- cultural research;
- human resource development schemes of a predominantly cultural nature (women in development, human rights etc.).

Cultural schemes are neither of minor importance nor ancillary, but are closely bound up with the identity of ACP communities. They must help the people root themselves deeper in their traditional culture and preserve and disseminate it — which should improve the self-confidence and creative potential which are funda-

mental to all artistic expression. No special resources were allocated to cultural schemes when the ACPs and the Community negotiated Lomé III, so the finance came from the national indicative programmes (about 45% of which identified the cultural sector as an area of cooperation), from the regional funds and from the All ACP funds in the case of more general operations, such as the Foundation for ACP-EEC Cultural Cooperation. Lomé III showed that it was very difficult to programme cultural operations, since they were often small affairs set up by NGOs or individual promoters with little to do with the State and were put forward by the governments on a one-off and fairly unpredictable basis. So far, more than 180 cultural projects (worth about ECU 46m) have been financed in virtually all possible sectors of intervention, making the EC the biggest patron of culture in Africa.

Conclusions

Although cultural cooperation is a major new principle, there are still obstacles across its path.

Inter-Community cultural policy is still a fairly limited field and it took Maastricht to provide a proper legal basis on which the Commission could embark on cultural action on any reasonable scale. With Maastricht, the European Community has become a political entity. But will it become a cultural one? Let us hope so! So far, perhaps because of the Community's only slight involvement in culture, there has sometimes been a tendency to see cultural cooperation with the ACP as an appendage grafted onto economic development, with the cultural dimension pushed into the background by immediate concerns. And, under the terms of Lomé, it is up to the ACPs themselves to devise the policies and measures needed for self-sustaining, self-reliant development. In practice, with all the pressures of an international economic environment worsening the burden of the national debt, natural disaster and domestic tension and conflict, these States do not always attach to the cultural dimension the importance which is recognised in the legal texts and reflected when political positions are

TABLE

ACP-EC cultural cooperation (Lomé III & Lomé IV)

	Number of schemes	Amount (in ECU)
I. Taking account of the cultural dimension in development	(18)	1 598 628
1. Research & surveys	3	35 510
2. Publications	2	44 000
3. Training	2	117 118
4. Symposia and seminars	11	702 000
II. Safeguarding and promoting the cultural heritage	(40)	9 860 452
1. General	2	29 000
2. Physical heritage	19	4 764 333
(a) restitution of cultural goods & archives	1	87 151
3. Traditional music	5	1 892 030
4. Oral tradition	1	80 000
5. Promotion of local languages	12	3 007 938
III. Production & distribution of cultural goods & services	(73)	7 615 836
1. Audiovisual sector	49	5 165 761
(a) film festivals	14	1 539 878
(b) film making	23	2 852 743
(c) film distribution	2	50 500
(d) training	1	150 000
(e) miscellaneous	9	572 640
2. Cultural publications	7	512 285
3. Literature	5	154 920
4. Performing arts (music, dance & drama)	9	777 870
5. Plastic art & exhibitions	3	1 005 000
IV. Information & communications	(15)	3 166 750
1. Mass media	7	2 752 000
2. Libraries	1	60 000
3. Intercultural communication	7	354 750
V. Cultural events	(20)	1 593 620
VI. Various schemes	(15)	22 831 267
1. Major programmes	3	10 250 000
2. Support for the Foundation for ACP-EC cultural cooperation	7	11 676 787
3. Miscellaneous	5	904 480
Total number of schemes	181	
Total amount		46 666 553

adopted. Lastly, it will take time and patience to cater seriously for culture. And time and patience seem to be in short supply at the end of the 20th century, particularly in the West.

Cultural cooperation is an innovation and such a complex one that it would be unrealistic to imagine that it has had time to get established. But ground has already been covered, as is evident from the Commission's way of taking the cultural dimension into consideration throughout the life of a project and the fact that a large number of schemes have already been financed. ACP-EC cultural cooperation is as vital as it was when Lomé III was signed — more vital even — and its potential should be exploited to the full. The cultural clause in Maastricht offers new prospects of cooperation and means

that the Community can now go beyond its merely economic dimension. A Europe focused on the internal market must now give way, both within the Community and without, to something more ambitious, to the vision of a multicultural society on the move, anxious to do more than safeguard its diversity and development and keen to become both a forum for intellectual exchange and a centre of cultural and artistic creativity.

All civilisations have to strike a balance between the material and the spiritual if they are to avoid going into decline. And with intolerance gaining ground, what cultural cooperation has to do is ensure that the different cultures of the world are known, appreciated and respected, just as we know, appreciate and respect our own cultures or those close to us. ■ P.A.

Sustaining soil productivity in intensive African agriculture

by Sarah Reynolds

Fly into any major city in the developing world and the chances are that the open land below you on the urban fringe is fit for nothing except the encroaching urban sprawl. Land that was once producing maize, bananas or other staples is exhausted and the town's markets are likely to be stocked with fruit and vegetables brought in from many miles away.

As populations go up, soil productivity goes down — a positive feedback system that ends in disaster unless the system is reversed. And however confident we may be in our ability to control the population growth rate in future, more immediately we all know there are going to be a great many more people to feed. We therefore have to reverse the accelerating trend towards ever lower soil productivity. This means improving fertility of the soil and, in particular, those soils that still have some potential for more intensive agriculture; soils that could produce food for the urban populations.

The challenge is to achieve greater productivity not only in the short term but on a continuing basis. There is no point producing higher yields today if those yields have the effect of mining the soil of the nutrients that will be needed tomorrow. We are already experiencing

the social, economic and environmental consequences of such practice in the past.

The answer to the challenge seems simple enough. Since nutrients are removed from the soil every time that a crop is harvested, those nutrients must be replaced in some form or another before the next crop can be grown. A proper nutrient balance must be maintained if the soil is to continue to produce worthwhile crops. While farmers may or may not understand the scientific basis of this balance, the fact is that their day-to-day farming practices are more likely to be influenced by government policy, which in turn may be influenced by external pressures, often from international agencies. For instance, during the 1970s and 1980s, farmers were encouraged to use fertilisers. Governments were, by and large, able to ensure that imported chemical fertilisers were available and cheap. But structural adjustment and other policies have meant the removal of subsidies on fertilisers and today you can see farmers in Tamale market, for example, in the north of Ghana, buying fertiliser by the cup or bowlful. Such small quantities will have insignificant benefits yet it is all they can afford.

ation of the soil, is no longer an option. If inorganic fertilisers are priced out of farmers' reach, replacing nutrients by the use of organic matter will become increasingly important. One alternative is to increase the use of readily available farm or household organic matter and another is to find new sources of organic matter, either from within a farming system or from some outside source such as industrial or agro-processing or even sewage waste. Final yields can be improved dramatically by such means as the use of high-yielding varieties, mechanisation, irrigation, pest and disease control and by reducing post-harvest losses. However all these strategies, as well as long-term hopes from biotechnology, depend upon soils which are sufficiently fertile to grow the crops in the first place. Sophisticated varieties require sophisticated, fertile soil.

A further alternative is to make better use of limited amounts of inorganic fertilisers, concentrating their use where it will have the greatest benefit. A farmer in the upper east region of Ghana applied four bags of compound fertiliser and two bags of sulphate of ammonia per hectare and was able to harvest 55 bags of paddy rice per hectare. Unable to afford that rate of application the next season, he used only two bags of compound fertiliser and one bag of sulphate of ammonia per hectare. His yield fell to only 20 bags of paddy rice — a 60% drop. And yet if he cannot afford to apply fertiliser at the correct rate, what is he to do? The answer could be to reduce the hectareage under intensive cultivation and apply inorganic fertilisers at the optimum rate to that limited hectareage. Thus a farmer could achieve more than double the yield on less than half the land and have the added bonus of a saving in labour costs. It sounds too good to be true but some soil scientists think that farmers should be discouraged from the view that simply trying to

Alternatives to chemical fertilisers

What are the alternatives to concentrated use of imported chemical fertilisers and are they likely to result in sustainable soil productivity? We have to bear in mind that just maintaining the present status of soil fertility is not good enough. Many soils in Africa are of low inherent fertility and furthermore, in many regions, shifting cultivation, which is the traditional route to natural regener-



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cultivate more land, however poorly, is the answer to their problems.

Soil structure and water retention

Inorganic fertilisers alone do nothing to improve the physical structure of the soil and in many regions of Africa it is the structure and therefore the water-retaining property of the soil that is the constraint on production. Erosion is widespread where soil structure is poor and in Zimbabwe, for example, the threat of erosion in the communal farming areas is such that it is believed that if the soil continues to deteriorate at its present rate most of the land will be unusable for agriculture in 100 years' time. As chemical fertilisers become more expensive, organic matter becomes more highly valued. Crop residues that were previously discarded or burnt need to be brought into use. One of the problems in areas that used to enjoy highly fertile soils is that farmers have never had any reason to doubt that their soil will continue to grow good crops. The result is neglect although the cause is lack of knowledge. A soil scientist living on the outskirts of Kampala has been able to demonstrate to his astonished neighbours that a good stand of bananas, in fact the best in a radius of 20 miles, can be grown on land now considered to be useless, though once fertile. He simply incorporates the trash that neighbouring farmers have discarded. He also incorporates ash from a nearby brickworks, he makes compost from fresh organic matter and adds a small amount of chemical fertiliser which helps control pests as well as boosting the nutrient level. However, he is a highly educated man and it is unfair to expect poor and, probably, illiterate farmers to adopt farm practices that are going to mean more work for a potential long-term benefit in which they have little reason to place much confidence.

The promotion of chemical fertilisers in the past has led to changes from the traditional farming system that may now be socially and economically difficult to return to. Any changes in farming systems promoted in order to increase the production and use of organic matter must have real, short-term benefits. Leguminous

green manures, for example, will fix atmospheric oxygen and may bring nutrients from deep within the soil layer nearer the surface and therefore within reach of next season's crop but it is desirable, even essential, that more immediately they produce some fodder for animals. Agroforestry systems should serve the same purposes, but they had better also produce fuelwood, or stakes for fencing or building. Complaints are frequently made against farmers for failing to adopt farming practices being promoted for their own good. But why should they when well-meaning advice in the past has left them no better off?

Making better use of on-farm organic matter, such as animal manure, crop residues, household waste, green manure and mulches of various sorts can all help to protect soil fertility to a certain degree or at least protect the soil surface from further depletion of nutrients. But farmers need to know how this material can be used most effectively. There may also be alternative sources of organic matter into which research to assess their potential could be beneficial. It is already known, for example, that both cocoa husk ash and oil palm branch ash contain high levels of potassium. Coffee pulp and rice husk can also contribute structure and nutrients to soil.

One of the challenges is to get organic matter to where it is needed. In Senegal, for example, much of the north of the country is unsuitable for arable agriculture but the pastoralists' animals are producing organic matter that is needed in the vegetable-growing areas to the south. The Soil Service of Senegal has already tried experimenting with producing a manageable compost of animal manure, with added phosphate, and transporting it from the north to where it is needed in the south.

It was at a seminar of soil scientists organised by CTA and the Soil Research Institute of Ghana that ideas such as this one from Senegal were put forward for discussion. The seminar, 'Sustaining Soil Productivity in Intensive African Agriculture', was held from 15-19 November 1993 in Accra. It provided a forum for leading African soil scientists and policy makers to identify the major constraints on the

intensification and sustainability of small-holder farming systems and to propose practical solutions to those constraints. Among the constraints identified was the lack of reliable data on land resources. Without such information sound land use and conservation policies are difficult to develop. There was a call for more information on resources and the management options of those resources which are available to farmers. Socioeconomic constraints were also discussed, in particular the problems associated with farmers' reluctance to adopt improved land management and conservation practices when they have no permanent title to the land. It was also felt that insufficient attention had been paid in the past to ensuring that women had the opportunity to avail themselves of improved technological packages. As far as policy is concerned, there is often a general lack of co-ordination of activities between various departments of ministries and land-use-related research institutions, NGOs and agencies. This leads to duplication of research effort. Furthermore, the dissemination of different technological packages on similar topics leads to confused messages reaching farmers.

The consensus of the seminar was that inorganic fertilisers, coupled with the effective management of organic matter, are critical for the intensification of traditional farming systems to meet immediate demand for food production. No alternative technologies were proposed which would adequately address the immediate requirements for increased food production. The application of existing knowledge on fertiliser use will be required to support increases in crop yields and soil fertility in the short term before new technologies can be developed. The majority of participants felt that this is not supported by the reduction of fertiliser subsidies by many African governments. However, some argued that the only sustainable way forward is for farmers to be able to realise sufficient profits from their increased production to allow the purchase of chemical fertilisers at competitive commercial rates, provided of course that those chemical fertilisers are used wisely. As one of the participants pointed out, 'Poor farmers transfer their poverty to the soil.' ■ s.r.

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

Mid-term review of Lomé IV

Below is the translation of a communiqué issued by the Commission on 7 February 1994.

On 7 February, the Council unanimously approved the negotiating directives for a partial review of the Lomé Convention.

Commission Vice-President Manuel Marin was extremely pleased to have the Member States' authorisation to propose to the ACP States that changes be made to the Convention, almost exactly along the lines set out in the Commission's proposal of September 1993. The essentials of the negotiating directives, under three main headings, are outlined below:

1. Promotion of human rights, democratic values, the rule of law and sound management of public affairs.

The Community and the Member States of the European Union will aim to ensure that the Convention enshrines the principles of democracy and the rule of law, alongside the existing references in Article 5. These will constitute the 'essential element' clause. The idea of sound management of public affairs should also figure as an aim of cooperation. Financial means can be earmarked to support schemes to advance democracy and strengthen the rule of law. There should also be incentives to promote the rule of law and decentralised cooperation (local initiatives designed to create the fabric of democracy at the grass-roots).

There must also be a clause explicitly providing for partial or total suspension of the Convention in cases of serious violation.

Parliamentary institutional machinery should both ensure greater consideration for democratic progress in the ACP States and make the Joint Assembly's work more efficient. The Union therefore proposes that the ACP-EU Joint Assembly be composed of MPs from the representative assemblies. It would meet once a year and additionally where it appeared necessary. Arrangements for possible direct cooperation between the European Parliament and the ACP legislatures will also be investigated.

2. Stepping up dialogue and developing the Community's cooperation strategy

The Union will ask for the aims and principles of cooperation currently set out in the Convention also to cater for the priorities of the

Community's cooperation policy as laid down, in particular, in Article 130u of the (Maas-tricht) Treaty, with due respect for the ACPs' sovereignty in the matter of choosing development strategies.

With this in mind, the financial protocol could include a limited amount for sectoral, priority schemes in various fields, namely, institutional reform (democratisation), human resources, the environment and the private sector.

The Twelve draw the ACP States' attention to the rigidity of the present system of programming which leads to resources — often in large amounts — not being utilised, and propose to adapt it as follows. Before its indicative programme is drawn up, the ACP States in question will be given some idea of the total amount likely to be made available to it over the duration of the financial protocol. This will be an indicative figure and should be considered as an aim to be achieved by both parties, but the total amount will be allocated, in two instalments, in the light of the implementation and nature of the schemes and of the situation in each ACP State.

If an ACP State is not in a position to sign or carry out its indicative programme because of civil war, or if cooperation has been suspended, the European Union could transform some funds earmarked for conventional development schemes into emergency or humanitarian aid, or perhaps into rehabilitation assistance in appropriate cases.

The Union proposes to step up political dialogue between the parties by taking the discussion beyond the strict problems of application of the Convention and looking at topics and policies of a general political nature and/or of common interest to a group of countries. This enlarged political dialogue could go beyond debates in the ACP-EU Council of Ministers and take place outside, and with a different geographical make-up.

3. Instruments and procedures of ACP-EU cooperation to be more consistent and more effective.

Here, the Union proposes to improve both instruments and procedures. It will do this firstly, by making Stabex more flexible and by extending rehabilitation operations and, secondly, by reorganising various financial and technical cooperation responsibilities to enhance the effectiveness of cooperation, with due respect for the prerogatives of the ACP States, which will continue to establish the terms of reference of project/programme preparation, appraisal and evaluation reports, in conjunction with the Commission. On this basis, the Commission will be invited to produce and manage the study contract in question, once the ACP State has given its agreement. The ACP State can then either approve

the completed study or ask to amend the results. A project management technical unit could be set up in some cases.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Following, where required, favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, the Commission has decided to provide grants and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to finance the following operations (grants unless otherwise stated):

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Vanuatu: ECU 3.6 million for the rehabilitation of rural primary schools.

Vanuatu: ECU 2.3 million towards a programme for the building and upgrading of rural access roads.

Liberia: ECU 25 million towards a general rehabilitation programme.

Angola, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe: ECU 11.7 million as a contribution to the third phase of a project aimed at facilitating the return and integration of qualified Africans.

Sierra Leone: ECU 12.5 million towards the rehabilitation of the electricity distribution system in the western region.

Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 12 million for the organisation of a wholesale market in the town of Bouake with a view to increasing the productivity of the food distribution system.

Guyana: ECU 8 million to rehabilitate the Demerara Harbour Bridge, a 1.8 km-long floating structure which links the capital with the rest of the coastal region.

Guyana: ECU 12 million towards the rehabilitation of coastal defences against salt water incursions.

Trinidad and Tobago: ECU 16 million, of which ECU 6 million is in the form of a special loan, towards work on the improvement of transport infrastructures (in particular, the road network, in order to bring about a reduction in the transport costs borne by both companies and individuals).

New Caledonia: ECU 3.95 million for the construction of the final section of the Koné-Tiwaka road linking the east and west coasts of the Northern province, in the context of the wider programme to upgrade the road network.

Mozambique: ECU 30 million in emergency assistance for the reopening and rehabilitation

of the road network, and of bridges destroyed during the war, in the Zambezi and Sofale provinces.

Cameroun: ECU 9 million towards a programme aimed at improving living conditions in the region of the Mandara mountains, with priority for water supplies.

Central African Republic: ECU 14.6 million to support Phase II of the development programme for the Northern Region.

Benin: ECU 1.95 million for a decentralised cooperation programme aimed at reinforcing the role of those representing civil society in Cotonou and in the département of Zou.

Ethiopia: ECU 1.99 million to improve the water distribution and sanitary systems in Addis Abeba.

Trinidad and Tobago: ECU 2 million for electrification schemes in 48 rural communities.

Wallis and Futuna: ECU 600 000 for the extension of the Wallis road network (creation of a second north-south route).

Wallis and Futuna: ECU 850 000 for resurfacing the Leave-Velè road on Futuna.

TRADE PROMOTION/ STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

Netherlands Antilles: ECU 4 million as a contribution to the second phase of the business development plan aimed at expanding the country's export capacities.

Malawi: ECU 30.6 million, of which ECU 20.6 million comes from the Structural Adjustment Facility, to support a general import programme.

AGRICULTURE

Namibia: ECU 7.7 million towards a programme for supporting rural development in the communal areas in the north of the country where 60% of the population lives.

Pacific ACP States and overseas territories: ECU 2.95 million towards a regional programme of support for the Pacific phytopharmaceutical service.

Guinea: ECU 15 million towards the 'Programme Guinea Maritime II' aimed at improving agricultural production and crop-growing (notably rice). This will also include direct support to groups of producers with a view to improving the commercialisation of such products.

EDUCATION

All ACPs and OCTs: ECU 2 million for a programme of information seminars and short-term traineeships for ACP/OCT students and officials.

Swaziland: ECU 720 000 to support a programme aimed at improving science education.

INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT

Eastern and Southern Africa: ECU 5 million for a regional project to provide institutional support to the EASTC (East African Statistical Training Centre) in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) for the training of statisticians.

MISCELLANEOUS

Dominican Republic: ECU 23 million towards a geology and mining development programme.

Pacific ACP States: ECU 4.65 million towards an integrated regional programme for the surveillance and management of fishery resources.

Zambia: ECU 1.2 million to help Angolan and Zairean refugees in the country.

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK

Appointment

Thomas Oursin, who replaces the recently retired Dieter Hartwich, has been appointed Secretary General of the European Investment Bank. Mr Oursin has been with the EIB since 1974 and was formerly head of the Bank's extra-Community financing operations.

1993 Report

The Report highlights another significant increase in loans during 1993 (ECU 19.6 billion as opposed to ECU 17 billion in 1992). The geographical breakdown of loans granted was as follows.

	ECU millions
In the European Union	17 724.2
Outside the European Union	1 887.2
(ACP States)	(225.7)
(Mediterranean States)	(680.5)
(Central and Eastern Europe)	(882.0)
(Latin America and Asia)	(99.0)

Loans

Ghana: ECU 40 million as a contribution to the building of a 200 MW electricity generating station near Takoradi (west of Accra), which is expected to come into service in 1996 and will help meet the increasing demand for power on both local and external (Togo, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire) markets. The loan has been granted to the Volta River Authority, a public company.

Botswana: ECU 7.4 million as a contribution to the financing of investments to ensure reliable, adequate water supplies, particularly in

the meat producing area which is vital to the country's export trade. This loan has been granted to the Water Utilities Corporation.

VISITS

President Chiluba of Zambia

On 3 February, President Chiluba was received by Jacques Delors and Manuel Marín, who reiterated the European Union's support for Zambia's political and economic transition.

The move to a multi-party democracy, which President Chiluba headed after the October 1991 election, was a major step forward hailed by the international community and in particular, by the European Union.

The talks touched on such areas as the need for economic reform to continue and even be speeded up in some areas (liberalisation of agriculture, privatisation of some parastatal bodies and more efficient tax collection) and on the importance of strengthening democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law.

Mr Delors and Mr Marín both confirmed that they supported President Chiluba in his determination to ensure good management and greater transparency in the running of public affairs. They assured him that the donors, particularly the European Union, supported the Zambian Government in its firm commitment to further political and economic reform.

Development cooperation between Zambia and the European Union, which began in 1974, has expanded considerably over the past few years, making the aid which the country receives under the Lomé Convention one of the EU's biggest programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. The Commission itself has played a major role by allocating to Zambia, ECU 202 million from Lomé IV resources to help the economic reforms that have accompanied the political changes. Much of this money has gone to the social sector — health and education — to help cushion the detrimental effects of economic reform on the most vulnerable sections of the population. The country also received food aid to the value of ECU 40 million in 1993 because of the drought which struck southern Africa the previous year and which did serious damage to the national economy.

Prime Minister Ravony of Madagascar

Vice-President Marin received Francisque Ravony, the Prime Minister of Madagascar, on 2 February.

On behalf of the Commission, Mr Marin welcomed Madagascar's progress with democracy and congratulated Mr Ravony, who is the island's first head of government to be elected by Parliament, which was itself formed after democratic elections in 1993.

The Prime Minister outlined the political and economic situation in his country, explaining that the delay in applying his government's programmes did not indicate any change in direction, but stemmed from compromises which were designed to head off a major political crisis.

Both parties were pleased at the degree of cooperation achieved between the European Union and Madagascar over many years. The Lomé IV indicative programme, worth ECU 130 million, came on top of ongoing schemes, Stabex measures and resources made available under structural adjustment programmes.

Mr Marin confirmed that the Commission was determined to step up its help, on the understanding that Madagascar would come up with a consistent, realistic, macro-economic plan for which this aid could provide effective support. He urged the Prime Minister to negotiate an agreement with the Bretton Woods institutions, since this would be a good way of ensuring Madagascar's credibility on the international scene.

Mr Ravony ended by expressing concern at the effects of the hurricane which had caused serious damage in Madagascar. Mr Marin indicated that the Commission would be prepared to send humanitarian aid if there was a need for this.

MISCELLANEOUS

Commission support for human rights and democracy in Malawi

Readers will remember that the Commission suspended aid to this country, because of human rights violations, in May 1992. Aid was resumed in July 1993 when the democratisation process began.

Radical political and legal changes have been implemented, heralding Malawi's first multi-

party elections since 1964. These are scheduled for 17 May.

A drive to support democratisation, begun during the period of the aid freeze, is still continuing and the results, so far, have been positive.

In less than a year, ECU 3 million from the human rights and democratisation budget line have been channelled into the following schemes:

- cofinancing of the Government's referendum budget;
- training for the referendum, by European NGOs, of monitors and voters;
- assistance in the organisation of an election team responsible for providing local authorities with technical and material support during the referendum and the election;
- help with the running costs of the National Consultative Council (NCC), the transitional body made up of members of all registered parties.

In 1994, schemes are planned to help prepare for the election and provide support, such as legal training, for the proper operation of institutions during the post-election period.

The results achieved in this new area of cooperation with Malawi are such that the Commission is looking at the possibility of re-orienting its work with this country to include giving priority to democratic development.

EUROPEAN UNION

EU election unit for South Africa

The European Commission has announced that Professor Jacob de Ruiter has been appointed to head the European Elections Unit which is being established in South Africa. Professor de Ruiter will head a team of experts in the electoral process, legal questions, the media, conflict resolution, security and logistics. The Unit, which will work closely with South Africa's Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), will be responsible for the coordination of the European Union's support for the election which has been scheduled for 27 April 1994. It will also oversee the deployment of some 312 EU observers.

This support is an essential element of the Joint Action decided by the European Union on 6 December 1993 to help underpin South Africa's transition to a democratic and multi-racial country.

The European Commission will provide advice, technical assistance and training, as well as continued support for non-partisan voter edu-

cation, as part of an overall international effort coordinated by the United Nations. In this context, the Commission has allocated more than ECU 12 million to assist the South African election. This does not include direct support by the Member States. Further financial support may be available for this initiative, if required.

Gateway to Japan

The European Commission has just launched its second campaign to boost European exports to the Land of the Rising Sun. It is called 'Gateway to Japan' and comes at exactly the right time, for, with the recent collapse of Japan-US trade talks and the American Government announcing its first retaliatory measures, Europe could well find itself paying for the concessions that one side is bound to make to the other.

The campaign is being directed by the Commission's Japan relations unit and is being run by a consortium combining the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambres) and a European consultancy in Tokyo. Only very specific sectors will benefit — medical equipment, mechanical maintenance, machine tools and furniture in the first year (1994-95), and maritime equipment, building equipment, waste disposal and packaging in the following year. These are all areas where European firms are highly competitive in international markets but have only a mediocre record in Japan.

The campaign will begin with information workshops on the market, barriers and opportunities in Japan. These will offer financial and logistical assistance (on top of any received from the Member States) to firms that are keen to take part in trade missions (a series of which are planned) or in selected trade fairs. 'Gateway to Japan' will receive ECU 7.1 million from the EXPROM budget (ECU 8 million in 1994) for the promotion of European exports. There will be a follow-up service for the firms involved.

The Commission is also continuing with its 14-year old Executive Training Programme, which enables teams from companies to spend three semesters in Japan — two of them on intensive Japanese language courses and the third on in-service training.

Hégel Goutier

Information highways

On 7 February, the Council of the European Union appointed the members of its 'High-Level Group on Information Society' (also known as the Bangemann Group after its chairman who is the Commissioner responsible for industrial policy and telecommunications). The group, consisting of some 20 members

representing the data processing and communications industry, its users and its consumers, has been asked to produce a report on the technologies in question. Technically speaking, this means looking at ways of giving practical shape to the Commission's recent proposal to establish a series of major worksites to encourage private investors who have suffered a loss of confidence during the recession. The plans include so-called 'information highways'; in other words, trans-European data processing and telecommunications networks.

Almost all of the members of the Group were present for the first meeting on 15 February, when they approved the Commission's move to 'kill two birds with one stone' by giving Europe the benefit of sophisticated communications networks and making EU firms (particularly SMEs with their scope for job creation) more competitive. This would also give an indirect boost to consumption. Setting up such networks, they maintained, meant removing the barriers and espousing the principles of deregulation, liberalisation and even privatisation if necessary. When it came to building major information/communications networks, there were practically no technical limits. European firms performed fairly well. Efficient networks meant interoperational and open ones, but intellectual property would, of course, have to be respected.

Two sub-groups were set up; one, under the chairmanship of Carlo De Benedetti of Olivetti (Italy) to look at the new markets, and the other, chaired by former EC Commissioner, Etienne Davignon of Société Générale de Banque (Belgium), to deal with standards, intellectual property and political aspects. Europe is not the only place to have discovered the virtues of information highways: the United States already has a working party investigating them. It has been agreed on both sides of the Atlantic that the dialogue should be maintained in order to prevent the networks from developing in isolation and to avoid compartmentalisation of the market. For clever use of subsidiaries allows the same firms to be everywhere. IBM Europe, for example, is connected to the American mother company and ICL (UK) is sustained by Japanese capital. This is one of the arguments that the Commission uses to fend off accusations about 'Fortress Europe', although it does admit that security-related information systems (such as the one developed under the Schengen Agreement) will be exceptions to this. The Group will shortly be meeting in the USA with its American counterpart.

A group of officials, headed by Commission Vice-President Henning Christophersen, will be looking into the possibilities of private and public (EU and Member State) financing. The

working sub-group chaired by Mr Benedetti will also be making proposals on this.

As for the fears that have been expressed about the inevitable job losses that would flow from the development of information highways, Mr Bangemann expressed his conviction that there would be far more gains than losses, as well as considerable economic and social advantages. The mayor of Barcelona, who is currently Vice-President of Polis (the association of European cities) pointed to the economic benefits of using electronic networks to ease the pressure on urban areas. The Commissioner and representatives of leading trade unions in the EU were to meet to discuss the projects being proposed and their likely effect on employment. The possibilities of electronic communications would probably make for shorter working hours, more people would work at home and pay would be calculated differently, no doubt with piece-work replacing a fixed wage.

The less well-off countries of the Union, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, feared initially that they would be submerged by far more powerful competitors, and had shown some reluctance towards the establishment of these open communication networks. But this concern had given way to another, that of being left on the sidelines of a technical revolution, and they had stopped opposing the idea of information highways.

The Bangemann Group will be submitting its report on new information technology and communications at the European Summit in June. One proposal already on the drawing board is to build communications networks linking up the scientific institutions of Europe and the dispensers of medical care — meaning not just hospitals, but also doctors. They will thus have access to data from centres at the forefront of medical science and will be able to share the experience of all their colleagues in the profession. It is not yet clear whether this will involve setting up new networks or linking up existing ones.

It is easy to see that information networks will lead to a rearrangement of the way work, schools, adult training, general education, social relations and even leisure activities, are organised. Will human beings spend their extra free time wallowing in data or will they use it to find themselves? In other words, will the next great technology leap be like all the others and free man from nature but not from himself? A philosophical question perhaps, but it is on the minds of those leading representatives of European enterprises, users and consumers who will be presenting the first fruits of their labours to the Council in June.

H.G.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The European Union has, within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), recently issued the following statements on events of international interest:

Statement on Congo 12 January 1994

The European Union is following with concern developments in the situation in Congo, particularly in the increasing frequency of confrontations in the capital and the weakening of the process established by the Libreville Agreement of 4 August 1993.

The European Union would remind the Congolese parties concerned that it was asked to participate in implementation of the Agreement, inter alia, by making magistrates available to Congo for the arbitration board. The board's careful and independent work cannot be called into question and the European Union would find it impossible to understand any contesting of its decisions. The European Union urges all Congolese political forces to respect the provisions of the Libreville Agreement and seek a political solution to the crisis through dialogue.

Statement on Lesotho 3 February 1994

The European Union has been deeply concerned about the fighting which has taken place in Maseru between elements of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force.

As the President of the Council of the European Union, Mr P. Pangalos, has declared in Gaborone, the Union unequivocally supports the democratically elected government of Lesotho and supports the mediation efforts undertaken by the international community to assist the Government of Lesotho in this difficult situation.

Any possible infringement of democracy in Lesotho could have unfavourable repercussions on future relations between that country and the European Union and might have serious consequences on the latter's development cooperation programme with Lesotho.

Statement on Burundi 14 February 1994

The European Union welcomes the democratic election of a new President of the Republic of Burundi, which was held on 13 January 1994, and his inauguration, which took place on 5 February. The events mark a return to the democratic institutions which were seriously

undermined by the attempted coup d'état of 21 October 1993 that plunged the country into a deep crisis.

The European Union takes particular note of the unanimous position adopted by the party in power and the opposition during this election. It hopes that this consensus will prove the starting point for the restoring of confidence in Burundi, which is a necessary condition for economic and social recovery in the country as well as for the return of those nationals of Burundi who took refuge in neighbouring countries after the events in question. It is convinced that the stability and democratic nature of Burundi will make it possible to continue fruitful cooperation with this country.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Public hearing on the right to humanitarian intervention

The public hearing held in Brussels on 25 January was opened by Enrique Baron Crespo, Chairman of the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, and Hans Van den Broek, the Commissioner responsible for external relations. Both speakers stressed that current events made this a very important meeting. Mr Baron Crespo traced the history of the right to humanitarian intervention to date while Mr Van den Broek pointed out that the philosophy of humanitarian aid was changing. With the end of the Cold War, he maintained, there were increasing demands on the UN Security Council and it was vital for the European Union to keep its credibility in this situation.

The first session, on the historical, political and legal context of the right to humanitarian intervention and the role of the UN in the new world order, included addresses by Mrs Haritimi Dipla of Athens University Faculty of Law and Economics, and General Philippe Morillon, defence adviser to the French Government. Both speakers emphasised the importance of humanitarian intervention and hoped that the errors of the past would serve to make future action more effective. Professor Dipla also hoped to see a code of intervention drawn up. Referring to his experience with the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, General Morillon said he regretted that their action had all too often depended on swings in public opinion, and called for the rights and obligations of both the victims and the people working for aid organisations in the field to

be defined more clearly before any international action was taken. Despite largely unfavourable public opinion, humanitarian action had saved 4.5 million human lives during the two winters of the fighting.

A second session (on 'limits and conditions of humanitarian intervention; the right of intervention and international law on humanitarian matters — towards a concept of national sovereignty') featured speeches by Yves Sandoz of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and José Maria Mendiluce, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' representative to the European Institutions and Benelux. Mr Mendiluce emphasised that there were limits to humanitarian action unless it was undertaken within a framework of prevention policy objectives. Both speakers felt that the current legal framework of humanitarian intervention was improving, but that it was still not adequate and did not provide enough protection for people working in the field.

The third part of the hearing was devoted to a debate on the future role of the UN, of regional organisations such as the European Union, the CSC and the WEU, and of the NGOs, in the implementation of the right to humanitarian intervention. Vice-President Manuel Marin of the Commission introduced the discussion and stated that one of the European Union's main aims in this area was to provide a European response to regional issues. The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) had been set up with this in mind, he said, and had distributed very substantial amounts in humanitarian aid during 1993. But there was more to it than granting aid, he added, for it had to be possible actually to distribute that aid to the victims — one aspect of humanitarian aid that required a great deal of effort. The UN had indeed decided to police the world, but it was still finding it difficult to get its decisions respected and the problem of the hiatus between political discourse and action in the field had to be tackled without further delay. Mr Marin also pleaded for a code of humanitarian intervention and suggested that the European Union should take the initiative on this. The speakers who followed, Professor de Waart (University of Amsterdam), Mr de Milliano (President of Médecins sans Frontières) and Bernard Kouchner (Chairman of the Association for Humanitarian Action) were concerned about the vagueness of the international law relating to the scope of action available to NGOs. They all agreed that, although the need to save victims was generally recognised, the importance of firm, rapid action was all-too-often underestimated.

Professor de Waart said that it was difficult to

take action under a provision of the UN Charter which prohibited aggression between states but which was silent on the subject of aggression between peoples and nations. Mr de Milliano pointed out that action by NGOs, which were neutral and impartial by definition, was sometimes compromised by that neutrality. He regretted that impartiality was used as a pretext for avoiding political decisions and insisted on the importance of preventive diplomacy and of states taking responsibility for ensuring that international law was properly observed.

Bernard Kouchner said that humanitarian action had made great strides over the past 25 years. It would be better, he thought, to stop talking about 'the right to humanitarian intervention' and use instead 'the right to intervene' in the sense of the right to prevent war. What was needed was a standing human rights army, 'not to intervene, but to have so as not to intervene'. This would be a kind of early warning system to head off crises and clarify the concept of the right to interfere, so that Third World and Eastern European countries would not see it as a return to imperialism. Although the hearing concentrated on the former Yugoslavia, Mr Kouchner did mention Somalia where, despite all the mistakes, between 300 000 and 450 000 children had been saved, whereas between one million and two million had died in Biafra 25 years ago.

The hearing was closed by Dutch MEP, Jan Willem Bertens, who will shortly be producing a report of the right to humanitarian intervention.

GENERAL INFORMATION

New DAC President

James Michael has just been elected to head the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Mr Michael, who has had various high-level posts in the US administration, notably in the field of development policy, took over from Alexander Love on 16 February.

Meeting on the needs of the coffee and cocoa sectors

Close to 100 participants from 15 African countries, the European Commission, the ACP Group, France, the Netherlands, the UK and Switzerland met in Nairobi in January to discuss the needs of the coffee and cocoa industries. Kenya, with a huge stake in coffee, was represented by 21 participants from the private and public sectors.

The three-day meeting, which was financed by the EC, was arranged by APROMA (Association des Produits à Marché).

A declaration was passed unanimously at the end of the event in which it was emphasised that each ACP coffee or cocoa-producing country should develop a professional association, or similar structure, on the initiative of its exporters, to implement the meeting's recommendations.

Among other things, these recommendations included a proposal that there should be a comparative study of actions in Eastern African countries, with emphasis on their possible defects and on improvements which could be made. This should include a review of liberalisation in the internal marketing system, payment systems for farmers, processing and appropriate financing.

The declaration also recommended a feasibility study for APROMA assistance to exporters, an in-depth study and dissemination through training seminars of sales techniques and a study of techniques allowing each country to obtain access to a national commodity insurance scheme. The participants called additionally for the implementation of training and information systems (such as Reuter's Trade Data), the supply of up-to-date information on market conditions, a study of new markets, promotion activities (particularly in Eastern and Central Europe, the CIS, China and Japan), and a study of the development of commodity exchanges.

It was further recommended that an appraisal be made of the current 'financing gap' resulting from the withdrawal of international banks from the sector and the resulting intensified local need for financing. This was seen to be of crucial importance and could be carried out in conjunction with a study of the creation of national or intra-ACP funds, with an initial appropriation from donor agencies, capable of satisfying these financial needs.

HUMANITARIAN AID

First Annual Report

On 16 February, the Commission approved the first annual report (for 1993) on humanitarian aid, from the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). This focused on the volume of the aid provided and on the diversity and complexity of the operations which took place in more than 50 countries.

In 1993 alone, the EU provided ECU 600 million (about \$700m) in humanitarian aid.

63.4% of this had gone to the former Yugoslavia, 0.1% to the countries of Eastern Europe, 16.1% to the ACPs, 8.2% to the republics of the former Soviet Union, 3.4% to Iraq, 3.2% to the countries of Asia, 2% to Latin America and 3.6% to North Africa. About 94% of EU aid is directed through other agencies with NGOs handling 44%, UN agencies (in particular, the UNHCR) 35% and other international organisations 11%. The remaining 6% is deployed in direct action by the Commission.

Aid decisions

The Commission has recently taken the following decisions to provide humanitarian aid (including emergency and food aid):

ACP countries

Central African Republic: ECU 200 000 in medical assistance and food aid for Chadian refugees who have fled from the oppression and massacres carried out in Eastern Logone since early 1993, and who are living in the Boubou camp.

Uganda: ECU 1 million for food and medical aid and for the distribution of basic essentials to refugees who have fled from southern Sudan.

Uganda: ECU 500 000 for additional food and medical assistance for Sudanese refugees.

Rwanda: ECU 8 million, in the form of food and medicines and for the provision of drink-

ing water, for people displaced by the civil war in the north of the country.

Angola: ECU 18 million for victims of the civil war. The aid will be used to help tackle the famine situation and widespread malnutrition in the country.

Madagascar: ECU 500 000 in the form of essential supplies for the victims of Hurricanes Geralda and Daisy.

Burundi: ECU 1 million in the form of food aid for people displaced in the troubles following the assassination of President Ndadaye.

Non-ACP countries

Russia: ECU 290 000 in additional aid for the provision of hot meals to disadvantaged groups, notably in Moscow.

Lebanon: ECU 400 000 in emergency aid for children suffering from thalassaemia (Mediterranean anaemia) and ECU 400 000 for children and adolescents suffering from chronic diabetes, which is on the increase.

Afghanistan: ECU 450 000 to help those fleeing from the continuing fighting, in the form of assistance for the Jamhuriat Hospital in Kabul and for a number of hospitals in Mazar-i-Sharif that are having to treat large numbers of wounded people.

Ex-Yugoslavia: ECU 275 000 to allow the work of the mobile hospital in the Banja Luka area of Bosnia Herzegovina to continue until the end of March.

FOOD AID

The Commission took decisions to finance food aid as set out in the chart which follows:

Country/ Organisation	Cereals	Milk powder	Vegetable Oil	Other Products
<i>(in tonnes)</i>				
Egypt	110 000		8 000	
Honduras		650		
WFP/IEFR	49 815	1 816	1 426	673
WFP/PRO	15 000	872	1 000	
FAO	10 890			
NGOs	200 000	7 000	12 500	
Ethiopia	50 000			
WFP/IEFR ¹	50 000	1 000	5 000	1 000
WFP/PRO	190 000		7 500	6 000
UNHCR	7 900	680	455	187
WFP/Normal	110 000	8 000	5 500	1 000
<i>(in ECU m)</i>				
Egypt		1.0		
Burkina Faso		1.5		
NGOs		7.5		
WFP/IEFR		3.0		
WFP/PRO		8.5		
UNHCR		2.9		
WFP/Normal		3.0		


¹ WFP - World Food Programme, IEFR - International Emergency Food Reserve.

CLOSE-UP ON FIJIAN INDUSTRY

In January this year, the CDI organised a two week "Promotion Attaché Programme" for Mr. Pradeep Kumar, officer in charge of the CDI Antenna within the Fiji Trade and Investment Board (FTIB). Partnership took the opportunity to interview him on some key aspects of Fijian industrial development and to focus on the main CDI interventions in this very active Pacific country.



The Fijian company Pacific Green has developed a unique process for utilising coconut palm timber to produce furniture. A CDI assistance is in the pipeline to support their development.



Partnership: What is the role of the FTIB in promoting the industrial development of the country and its role in supporting Fijian enterprises?

□ **Mr. Pradeep Kumar** : Established in the early 1980s, the FTIB is a statutory body of the Fiji Government responsible to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, and is therefore the Trade and Investment facilitating arm of the country. Apart from being the gateway for foreign investment into Fiji, as project approvals are given by FTIB, the Board under its "one stop shop" banner has successfully assisted companies to cut down project implementation time, increase

investment & trade promotions of targeted sectors to other countries and provide ongoing assistance to companies/projects facing difficulties. The FTIB also offers generous incentives to export-oriented companies under its Tax Free factory scheme. Some of these benefits include a 13 year Tax holiday, duty free concessions to import raw material and equipment and easy repatriation of profits. Non export-oriented companies are also given

concessions and incentives based on their project proponent.


As an institution deploying a large range of services to assist the private sector, the FTIB has been playing the role of CDI Antenna since 1983, so the CDI is therefore very well known to Fiji's private sector.

■ **For 2 years, you have been the "CDI man" in the FTIB. How do you manage to identify the companies which can be interested by a CDI support?**

□ We are proud to underline that Fiji is one of the most active of ACP states, in terms of the number of projects referred to CDI. To identify the opportunities of CDI assistance to Fijian companies, the FTIB organises local promotional seminars in targeted cities and towns which explains the functions of CDI along with other assistance organisations. Regular informative advertisements are also put in the local newspapers on the various assistance schemes available via FTIB, including the CDI's services. Last, investors inquiring with FTIB officers, who are aware

Contents

<i>Close Up on Fidji</i>	1
<i>Setting up of the First Local Service Company in an ACP Country</i>	3
<i>The European Market for Flowering Plants</i>	4
<i>CDI Priorities for 1994</i>	6
<i>FICAC '93</i>	6
<i>Two EIB loans in Cape Verde & Guinea Bissau</i>	7
<i>First International Industrial Forum in Madagascar</i>	7
<i>CDI in Brief</i>	8



of CDI's scope of assistance, are also explained various assistance schemes that could be tapped. Apart from informing the potential promoters the antenna also follows-up on the inquiries and assists in completing the CDI data sheets.

■ **What are the main needs of the Fijian companies that can be solved by partnerships with European industries?**

□ The open market economic policies have prescribed deregulation as the key to instigating efficiency by invoking competition. The local industries, which were very sheltered under the protective policies of the government, naturally faced problems competing on the international market. The Trade Agreements with the traditional markets of Australia and New Zealand, and even Japan and S.E. Asia, are becoming less attractive as they also seem to adopt a more open market approach.

CDI therefore fits in perfectly with this development stage of Fijian industries by exposing them to European partners. The Center has also been able to provide several companies with direct marketing assistance, training and exposure visits, equipment related assistance, direct technical assistance, and more.

■ **In conclusion of your stage at the CDI office - which is also your first visit to Europe - what are the fields where the cooperation between European and Fijian companies seems to be the most promising?**

□ In line with the Fiji's economic development policies - which defines the manufacturing sector as a priority for foreign investment promotions - several sectors have been and will continue to be targeted for CDI support. They are mainly:

● **Garments.** This is the largest of the manufacturing industries in Fiji and some companies are already exporting to Europe. CDI is currently assisting 8 Fijian companies to market their products to the EU.

● **Furniture.** Fiji has adequate tropical and plantation timber forests to be sustainably developed. In fact, Fiji has the largest plantation mahogany resource in the world, and its Caribbean pine plantations are also substantial. Coconut palm tree

wood has also been successfully developed in Fiji for manufacture of fine, stylish furniture and building lumber. CDI is currently assisting some of these companies by providing technical assistance.

● **Chemicals.** CDI has recently assisted diverse firms manufacturing plastic products and polyurethane foam; other projects like neoprene products, film packaging, etc., are also in the pipeline.

Furthermore, various other sectors hold the promises of new development with interesting opportunities for European cooperation, as for instance:

● **Non Metallic minerals.** Exploitable deposits of Non Metallic Minerals (clays, marble, limestone, etc.) have been found in Fiji.

● **Fisheries and food industry.** Being surrounded by the immense Pacific Ocean endows Fiji with substantial marine resources. The Fisheries sector therefore is well developed. There are some canning companies already involved in this sector. However, there is room for further development and cooperation. Other specific food production of tropical fruits are in development.

● **Last but not least,** in the geographical and economic context of the Fijian economy, another area of major interest of further development with European cooperation could be the, **manufacturing and assembly industries in advanced technological areas** (e.g. computer, motor vehicle parts assembly, etc.).

Key aspects of the Fiji's Economy

The "jewel" of the South Pacific. With a population of more than 750,000 inhabitants (end-1992 estimate) on 18,272 km², Fiji is the second most populated country of the eight ACP states of South Pacific (1), with a Gross Domestic Product per inhabitant of US\$ 1,757 in 1991.

Sectors. Agriculture, forestry and fishing represent 22% of GDP, with mining & quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas & water, and construction accounting for another 17%. Like all South Pacific countries - where people used to speak about the "tyranny of the distance" - transports and communication are a very important sector (14%). Tourism has also become a mainstay of the Fijian economy since its early development in the '60s and '70s. The gross receipts are estimated at US\$ 236 million in 1992, three times more than in 1980.

Foreign trade. Fiji's exports in 1991 represented 370 million US\$, of which sugar accounted for 40%. The newest trend in Fiji's foreign trade is the increasing part played by manufactured garments exports - 25% in 1991 - which have increased sharply since the industry took off under the stimulus of tax incentives offered since 1988. The largest export destination is the UK (26%). The balance of trade, however, is in continuous deficit for many years with the constant rise in imports of machinery (23% in 1991) and manufactures (26%), coming mainly from neighbors around the Pacific Rim (Australia, New Zealand, Japan).

Sources : The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1993-94.

(1) *The 7 others are: Papua-New Guinea (3,900 thousands inhabitants) Solomon Islands (320), Western Samoa (168), Vanuatu (158), Tonga (95), Kiribati (66) and Tuvalu (9).*

An Investor's Guide to Fiji


This guide is published by the FTIB. The 12 different sheets synthesise all the useful information about the incentives and facilities offered to the foreign investors: Tax Free Zone system, Investment incentive scheme, preferential trade agreements, labour regulations and employment standards, industrial consumables, communications, banking, exchange control, taxation, accounting, FTIB services, etc.

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● CDI - Mr. Peter Alling - Regional Officer for South Pacific.

FIRST LOCAL SERVICE COMPANY SET UP IN AN ACP COUNTRY

Inaugurated in Bujumbura, Burundi, on January 7th 1994, the CDIBU (Burundi Industrial Development Company) is the first of the local management advisory and technical service companies (MATS) that the CDI hopes to create in ACP States.



The Burundi Industrial Development Company (CDIBU) will enable the CDI and associated finance and development institutions to provide close support for local enterprises. Photos: silos at ALCOVIT, an animal feed company restructured with the help of the CDI, and the palm-oil processing plant of HBP (Huilerie de Palme du Burundi), which received start-up assistance from the Centre.

The Lomé IV Convention provides for decentralization of the Centre's activities so that it can make a more effective contribution towards the development of the industrial sector in ACP States", recalled Mr Paul Frix, Director of the CDI, on this occasion. "For the CDI, the creation of the CDIBU is the beginning of a major shift in its role and its operating methods. Burundi has clearly opted for a voluntarist policy to encourage the private sector. It is because of the favourable climate established in this way that it has been possible, with the active participation of the country's leading financial and economic institutions, to achieve this first concrete example of bringing the services offered by the Centre closer to the priority users."

A company under Burundi law, the CDIBU will be managed by the CDI, with four essential tasks :

- providing enterprises and promoters with better information on the financing resources that exist and the means of access to them;

- coordinating the preparation of project analyses;
- serving as an interface and helping enterprises or promoters in their negotiations with finance bodies, so as to facilitate their access to credit;
- coordinating the management, training and follow-up aspects for enterprises to be created, developed, rehabilitated or privatized.

The CDIBU was launched by six Burundi institutions which are the founder shareholders, namely the Banque Nationale de Développement (BNDE), Banque de Crédit de Bujumbura (BCB), Société Burundaise de Financement (SFB), Banque Commerciale du Burundi (BANCOBU), Banque Burundaise de Commerce et d'Industrie (BBCI) and Chambre de Commerce, d'Industrie, d'Artisanat et d'Agriculture du Burundi (CCIB).

From the very beginning, the CDIBU has demonstrated its desire to be a structure open to new national, bilateral or

multilateral financial backers wishing to provide additional contributions in the form of holdings or subsidies.

The CDIBU Board of Directors has decided to call upon the CDI to supervise the practical management of this new service and support structure.

The Centre is currently preparing to install the team of professionals who will work in close cooperation with the CDI to ensure independent and dynamic management of the CDIBU.

Apart from Burundi, local service companies are also in the pipeline in Trinidad and Tobago (Caribbean, see page 8) and Cameroon (Central Africa). For further information on this concept of MATS companies, see Partnership No. 10.

Contact :

At the CDI : Mr A.T. Adade-Helledy, Head of Section for Central Africa.

SAY IT WITH FLOWERS

by Mr. Bonarius of the Royal Tropical Institute (The Netherlands)

Cut flowers and plants are among the most promising products for export from ACP countries to the European Union (EU). In 1992, imports into the EU were valued at 604 million ECU, and market growth during the early nineties was 18.2%. During that same period, EU imports from Sub-Saharan Africa showed a staggering annual growth rate of over 30%, bringing the total annual value of imports from this region from a meagre 28 million ECU in 1980 to over 101 million ECU in 1992!

The Netherlands holds a central position in the EU floriculture market, being a major producer and international trader. Moreover, the Dutch are the trend-setters of the market. In Europe, their neighbour Germany provides by far the largest opportunity, with about one third of the trade, followed by France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The floriculture sector is very dynamic, but is also highly sensitive to the whims of the consumers.

The largest segment is the mass consumer market, the most influenced by fashion. At present, the trend in the Dutch market is toward bouquets made of various types of flowers and foliage. The preferred flowers are small, and - as their high per unit value suggests - flowers of the calyx type do very well. Strongly coloured flowers sell well, as do soft

tones and flowers combining two colours.

The traditional market for floral arrangements, including funerals and weddings, has other characteristics. Here the dominant colour is white, and a wider assortment of flowers with respect to size is acceptable. Flowers that presently do not sell very well in the trendy mass consumer market, for instance large-flowered carnations, sell well in this market.

Lastly, there is the speciality segment. This market is as yet not particularly well developed in Europe, but it is growing. It is largely made up of institutional buyers, i.e. luxury hotels, restaurants and business offices, who buy expensive flowers and combine them in beautiful arrangements.

The size of each of these general market segments varies per country and,

moreover, by ethnic group within the various countries.

What are the prospects for ACP producers ?

Knowing these market features, prospects for access to this market by producers from ACP countries are increasingly good. There are several reasons for this. Production costs in Europe are steadily going up. The cost of the energy required to provide the right climate for growing plants in greenhouses has always been high, and is expected to increase even further. Because of concern for the environment, producers must now install water purification equipment. In addition, productivity increases in the sector are marginal, whilst salary costs are following the overall economy.

Key production characteristics of flowers that sell well in the EU

Type of flowers	Optimum average night temp (°C)	Optimum average daytime temp (°C)	Humidity sensitive High/Low	Soil (ph)	Photo-sensitive
Roses	16	20	+	5.5-6.5	yes
Chrysanthemum	16	20	+	5.5-6.5	yes
Freesia	11	16	+	5.5-6.5	yes
Gerbara	16	25	+	5.5-6.5	no
Statice	16	25	+	5.5-6.5	no
Gladioli	16	20	+	5.5-6.5	yes
Cymbidium	11	25	+	*	no
Liatrix	16	20	+	5.5-6.5	yes
Anthurium And.	18	30	+	*	no
Zantedeschia	16	25	+	5.5-6.5	no
Heliconia	18	30	+	5-6	no
Strelitzia	18	30	+	5-6	no
Palm foliage	21	35	+	5-6	no

* Require well aerated soils enriched with specific nutrients

The figures in this table are relative to optimum days & night temperatures, humidity, soils, PH levels and photosensitivity. When these conditions are not met, there simply cannot be a comparative advantage for flower cultivation. When they are met, you have a starting point, but no more. Next, others factors - such as closeness to an international airport, investment climate, managerial and technical skill of local staff, etc. - need to be assessed to establish if the comparative advantage can be translated into a viable business.

Helping Gambian production enlarge its niche

Apart from these push factors, there are also pull factors. Sizeable investments in transport (international airports!) and communications have brought ACP producers closer to the EU market. Many popular species originated in the tropics or subtropics, where the appropriate climatic conditions are provided free by Mother Nature, or at least require less costly control measures. And labour is considerably cheaper.

Whilst macro-economic, infrastructural and climatic conditions may thus provide comparative advantages for production in a number of ACP countries, floriculture is relatively new to most of them. As a result, the needed crop technologies are still largely lacking, and market information, so pivotal for the dynamic floriculture market, still needs to be developed.

As a result, the floriculture sector is an ideal area for CDI assistance. Producers in the EU, who have the crop technology know-how and, more importantly, market intelligence, increasingly want to cooperate with potential producers in ACP countries. The case of Makumbaya Farm Ltd. in the Gambia (see box) is illustrative.



Floriculture at the Makumbaya Farm (Gambia), a pilot project supported by the CDI. The floriculture sector is very dynamic, but is also highly sensitive to the whims of the consumers.

The Dutch KIT expertise

The Royal Tropical Institute (KIT) is a Dutch organisation which, apart from research and training, provides consulting services in the field of agriculture, health, education and communication. Of its 500 staff members, some 150 are available for work in the tropics and subtropics. One of the fields in which services are rendered is the specialised "non traditional exports", such as floriculture. Experts of the KIT Enterprises Development department are available for short or long term assignments to assist entrepreneurs to develop projects in this field, in cooperation with other development agencies, such as the CDI in the case of Makumbaya farm.

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Makumbaya Farms Ltd., established in 1991, is a pilot project for the introduction of export-oriented floriculture in the Gambia. The strategy chosen was to supply chrysanthemums, with the support of a UK-based partner, to a specific niche of the market - the winter market in the UK.

The farm is located in the vicinity of the airport, has ample land, good soil and water supply, and a climate conducive to flower cultivation; so, on paper at least, its prospects were good. Despite this, the farm encountered major problems. Over-orientation to a single market niche, with only one flower and one trading partner, was risky. And although the large flowered chrysanthemums can be grown on this farm, the climate is not optimal, so there are relatively high energy and input costs. The farm also had problems with air freight and, not surprisingly in view of its pioneer status, with the limited capabilities and experience of its staff.

At this point CDI asked the Royal Tropical Institute (KIT), in the Netherlands, to assist Makumbaya in reviewing its business plan and assessing the need for further technical assistance. KIT confirmed the bright prospects of Makumbaya, but strongly emphasised the need to diversify both crops and markets. The introduction of such high value species as Calla, Zantedeschia aethiopia and Anthurium andrianum was proposed. In addition, KIT gave advice on the management structure, and recommended CDI support for training and technical assistance. The aim is an effective translation of the sizeable comparative advantages of Makumbaya into visible success.

CDI PRIORITIES IN 1994



Further action to support the development of specialised sectors such as dried fruit is one of the CDI's priorities for 1994 (photo: AGRIFA, a Senegalese company producing peanut paste which received CDI marketing assistance in 1993).

For some two years now, the CDI has been pursuing a strategy of sectoral and regional concentration of its interventions. This has led in particular to the organization and follow-up of "professional meetings" in the fields of fishing (Mauritania and the Indian Ocean),

approach, both in the form of follow-up and/or regional extension of the fields already covered by previous initiatives and in new sectors. Among the latter, particular mention should be made of leather (West, East and Southern Africa), tropical timber (Central Africa and the Pacific),

non-metal minerals (Caribbean) and animal feed (Central Africa). These meetings allow the Centre to meet more of the expectations of ACP and European operators in these sectors, to acquire increasingly detailed technical know-how and to develop an efficient network of contacts which can be of use to other ACP regions.

In the CDI's working programme for 1994, it is intended to give first priority to this type of

coconut-fibre based products (Pacific) and tropical fruit (West Africa).

The second priority is to study and prepare for new activities in different fields that have already been identified, such as packaging and some specialized agro-industrial sectors (sauces, flavourings, essential oils, dried fruit, etc.).

Furthermore, the Centre will continue to focus a substantial part of its efforts on developing synergies within the framework of initiatives taken by other institutions in the shape of forums or programmes (Dakar Forum sponsored by the EU, OECS fair and TARGET EUROPE programme in the Caribbean, extractive industries Forum in Zambia, ICEP privatization initiative in Mozambique, UNIDO Forum in Madagascar, etc.).

Finally, at the request of various ACP countries and other institutions, exploratory studies could also be carried out in several new fields (gold industry in Mali, forestry developments in Southern and East Africa, shellfish in the Caribbean, etc.).

Central Africa

LOOKING BACK ON FICAC '93

The 5th EEC-Central Africa Industrial Forum organized by the European Commission and the UDEAC (Central African Customs and Economic Union) took place in Yaoundé (Cameroon) in November 1993. It was attended by 332 participants, comprising 163 African heads of companies, 95 European heads of companies, 30 consultants and 44 representatives of various organizations.

The choice of African projects presented at the Forum was deliberately more selective than at the previous event in 1991, with a view to making the meetings more effective", underlines a consultant charged by the European Commission with the organization of the Forum. "Essentially, the projects chosen were those conceived within the framework of existing African companies. As usual, the CDI played a very active role in identifying and selecting the participants, through its antennae in Central Africa and its contacts in Europe". The CDI and the Commission cofinanced the travel costs of 70 heads of companies who were present in Yaoundé. The Centre also granted financial assistance

towards the travel costs of 39 of the European industrialists who agreed to make the trip to Cameroon.

All in all, it was a very full week of business contacts. On average, each industrialist attended in seven meetings, i.e. a total of 2,000 meetings, of which about a tenth represented contacts between African entrepreneurs wishing to cooperate. According to a survey conducted at the end of the Forum, 40% of the African participants considered that their presence at FIFAC had produced positive results, compared to 35% among the Europeans. The 90 or so letters of intent signed at the end of the Forum are also a pointer to the value of these contacts. Throughout the event, CDI representatives made themselves available to help businessmen requiring assistance in their negotiations.

Alongside these business contacts, at the request of numerous participants in the previous Forum in 1991 the European Commission also organized workshops/seminars on



The seminar on the purchase of second-hand industrial equipment, organised by the CDI within the framework of the FICAC, led by Mr. P. Keene and Mr. F. Matos-Rosa, respectively Deputy Head of the Intervention and EC Network Division and Official in charge of Institutional Relations in Europe at the CDI (3rd and 4th from left).

subjects concerning the development of the private sector in Central Africa, with the accent placed on SMEs in particular. These meetings, which brought together some 80 heads of companies and officials from various liaison bodies (chambers of commerce, trade organizations, etc.), provided the participants with a chance to express their views and put forward recommendations on three themes: the financing of SMEs, the role of liaison bodies and the ways and means of strengthening inter-regional trade. These seminars were based on two case studies and three working documents prepared from a survey conducted among forty enterprises, liaison bodies and financial

INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL FORUM

In 1985, Madagascar embarked upon a slow process of economic liberalization. A new investment code was introduced in 1989 and a free zone has been operational since 1990.

Despite the political uncertainties which marked the period from 1991 to mid 1993, Madagascar's transition to a liberal democratic regime, the dynamism of the private sector and the business potential of the "Grand île" have continued to progress. The free zone, which now contains around a hundred enterprises among which some of the pioneers have received assistance from the CDI, represents a total investment of 57 million ECU and some 23,000 jobs. One of Madagascar's major assets in this connection is without a doubt the dexterity of its labour force and the speed with which they can learn a trade. However, whilst Madagascar has a substantial development potential, there is still a long way to go in so far as the country's legal, administrative and commercial adaptation is concerned.

The CDI has mainly concentrated its aid in the agri-foodstuffs sectors and especially the textile industry, which has been develop-

ing apace thanks to the priority given to it by the Malagasy government and the development programme of this sector supported by the European Commission as from 1985.

In 1994, the great strides made by the private sector will be confirmed without any doubt and the First International Industrial Investment Forum in Madagascar from April 12th to 15th next in Antananarivo will give it a further boost. During a trip to seven European countries from January 27th to February 12th last, a Malagasy delegation led by Mr Herizo Razafimahaleo, Minister for Industrial Promotion and Tourism, presented the new economic and political climate to business circles in Europe, together with the investment and partnership opportunities which the country can now offer.

The CDI will be playing an active part in the Forum next April, organized under the aegis of UNIDO. In particular, the Centre



Mr Herizo Razafimahaleo, Minister for Industrial Promotion and Tourism, during his talks with Mr Frix, Director of the CDI. This Malagasy mission to Europe was geared towards promoting the forthcoming International Industrial Investment Forum to be held on the island from April 12th to 15th.

has selected a number of companies in the European Union which will be sending representatives to the Forum to look at the possibilities of setting up partnerships with local enterprises. The Malagasy companies selected by UNIDO to participate in the event represent numerous sectors: chemicals, pharmaceuticals, agro-industry, agri-foodstuffs sector, fishing, textiles and garments, and the building, mechanical engineering industries, wood, leather and skins.

Information: Mrs Mary-Jane Caudron, CDI Geographical Officer for Madagascar.

Cape Verde Islands and Guinea Bissau

TWO EIB LOANS

At the beginning of this year, the European Investment Bank (EIB) gave its agreement to the financing of two projects, one for an anchovy packing company in the Cape Verde Islands and the other for a leather goods and footwear factory in Guinea Bissau.

- FISHPACKERS OF CAPE VERDE S.A. is a project jointly presented by Spanish and Italian promoters. In effect, these two countries are the main producers and consumers of anchovies in Europe. This Cape Verde canning plant will pack quality products for export to Europe and North America, with conditions offering a good level of profitability, particularly due to advantageous labour costs. At least 170 new jobs will be created and the factory will also generate valuable spin-offs for the port of Mindelo (1), where it is to be established.

The dossier was presented to the EIB with the assistance of the CDI and the ICEX foreign trade institute - a public development body that the Centre has in Spain - which provided their technical support in the discussions with the EIB and will make a contribution towards the training activities. The Bank has granted a low-interest loan of 2 million ECU, i.e. the half the overall investment, with the balance coming from the promoters' own funds. Another interesting aspect of this financial package is the fact that part of the interest will be paid into the Cape Verde national

development fund which, with the agreement of the EIB, will use this money to finance investments of collective interest in Mindelo.

- YANDA FABRICA DE CALÇADO GUINEENSE is a project presented by the Portuguese firm CAVEX and partners in Guinea Bissau to construct a factory which will be the first production unit for leather articles and footwear in the region, using hides from the local tanning industry. Production will be mostly disposed of on the domestic and, above all, regional markets, but in the second stage leather footwear components will also be exported to Europe. The value added for a local resource provided by this project is therefore considerable, not to mention the creation of some 120 jobs.

The EIB has agreed to grant a loan of almost a million ECU - for a global investment of 1.3 MECU - via the Banco Totta e Açores in Bissau. The CDI and its partner in Portugal ICEP provided their aid in the feasibility studies, the negotiations with the banks and the on-site evaluation missions, together with legal assistance for the creation and constitution of the YANDA company. The Centre, again in cooperation with the ICEP, is also to help out in the start-up of the project and in staff training.

(1) The Mindelo port installations had already received financing from the EIB.

institutions in Cameroon, Gabon, Chad and the Central African Republic.

For its part, the CDI organized a seminar on the purchase of new and second-hand industrial equipment, at which a detailed analysis was made of each stage before, during and after the purchase operation. Representatives of Bivac International (Bureau Veritas Group) and of the Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) described the rules to be followed to an audience of around two hundred.

Various success stories were related by the companies Cavex (Portugal), Scandia (United Kingdom) and Ecamet (Cameroon), particularly with regard to second-hand equipment. The participants also received the new CDI publication on this subject, the "Guide to the purchase of industrial equipment" (1).

The next EEC-Africa Forum, focusing on West Africa, is to take place at the end of the year in Dakar, Senegal.

Industrialists(2) attending the Forum

- **African countries:** 178 participants from Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe.
- **European countries:** 111 participants from 10 EU countries.

(1) To obtain this guide, contact the CDI.

(2) Heads of companies and management consultants

■ **ETHIOPIA/ERITREA.** A group of 47 Italian investors led by Senator Mario Pedini, President of ASSAFRICA - the Italian employers' association that is a member of the "Group of Seven" (1) - visited Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 70th state to join the Lomé Convention, from January 16th to 23rd 1994 to meet the authorities and private economic circles and examine potential fields for joint investments. Delegates from the Italian Chamber of Commerce, the Italian Foreign Trade Institute (ICE) and SIMEST - a recently created Italian development finance institution - also accompanied the mission, which enabled these Italian businessmen to examine numerous questions on industrial cooperation with their local colleagues and to establish contacts with a view to setting up and developing partnership projects. The CDI, represented by Mr P. Baldan of the Division for relations with European Institutions, and Mr A. Shifferaw, from the CDI Antenna in Addis Ababa, jointly organized these business meetings with the ICE, the Centre's partner organization in Italy. The CDI and the ICE are currently preparing a joint programme for the financing of partnership projects between Italian, Ethiopian and Eritrean SMEs, which is due to be approved in the near future.



■ **FRANCE.** On January 24th last, Mr Pierre-Olivier Goineau of Entreprises Rhône-Alpes International - a French regional institution with which the Centre signed a cooperation agreement in September 1993 - paid a working visit to the CDI. He described the industrial structures of the Rhône-Alpes region, together with the internationalization possibilities for its companies. On this occasion, several cooperation proposals from local firms in the pharmaceutical and biological fertilizer sectors were submitted to the CDI.

■ **NETHERLANDS.** The CDI is preparing to set up an institutional network which will operate



TRINIDAD & TOBAGO.

Mr Hugh Henry-May, one of the officials responsible for the Caribbean region at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a subsidiary of the World Bank, paid a working visit to the CDI on January 28th last. On the agenda was the question of cooperation possibilities between the CDI and Enterprise Development Ltd (EDL) of Trinidad, a support company for local entrepreneurs. EDL's shareholders are financial institutions from Trinidad and the company is managed by the Business Advisory Service (BAS), which belongs to the IFC.

At present, EDL's interventions are limited to project studies and financial planning, and the CDI would be prepared to extend the scope of the EDL by making available its technical assistance, training and SME development services (on the photo: metal garden furniture produced by the Trinidadian company Williams Foundry Ltd., which has received technical assistance from the CDI).

more closely with Dutch industrialists, together with a steering committee for the Centre's actions in the Netherlands. Last January, the Director of the CDI, Mr Paul Frix, accompanied by Mr Fernando Matos Rosa, the Officer in charge of relations with European institutions, led a CDI round table on this subject with the main bodies representing the private sector in the Netherlands (NCW, the Federation of Christian Employers, VNO, the Federation for Industry, KNOV, the Royal Association of Entrepreneurs, NCH, the Trade Promotion Board, and VVK, the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry). During this visit, they also had working sessions with the financial institution for development and cooperation, FMO, and the directorate-general for international cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DGIS.

■ **GERMANY.** Two intensive contact days took place in Germany at the end of January 1994, on the occasion of a visit by Mr Hinzen and Mr Matos Rosa, CDI Officers for finance matters and relations with European institutions respectively.

● Seminar presenting the CDI to forty members of Africa-Verein, the German private sector organization forming part of the Group of Seven (1), with the participation of the AV President, Dr M. Kramer, and Mr Nuffer,

CDI national coordinator in Germany.

● Meeting of the members of the CDI action follow-up Committee in Germany, comprising the Development Bank DEG, the GTZ, PROTRADE, Africa-Verein and the CDI. In particular, the committee analysed the results of recent missions to Cameroon and Southern Africa and fixed the programme for 1994.

● Mission to Brussels by Mr von Hardenberg, Director of PROTRADE, a division of GTZ, the German technical cooperation body responsible for promoting imports from developing countries. Special attention was given to cooperation possibilities in the spices and essential oils sector in East Africa and the Caribbean.

■ **BELGIUM.** The Walloon Region (the first European region with which the CDI signed a cooperation agreement back in 1986) organized a meeting for some fifty industrialists last February, with a view to explaining to them the main facilities offered by the European Union for cooperation between their companies and non-member countries. Mr Frix, Director of the CDI, described the assistance provided by the Centre within the context of EU-ACP relations.

■ **PUBLIC DEBT OF THE ACP STATES.** Why not convert part of the public debt of ACP countries into financial resources to be made available to promotion and

support programmes for local industrial projects? This idea, put forward at the symposium on the future of Europe-ACP industrial relations organized by the CDI last November in Brussels, was followed by a discussion meeting at the CDI attended by officials from the European Commission and the Group of ACP countries and representatives of development cooperation bodies and institutions and French and Belgian employers' associations.

The participants heard an interesting report presented by Mr Guitard, Secretary General of the ACP Committee of CNPF-I (Conseil national du Patronat français - International). The CNPF proposes to turn part of the public debt into equity in public corporations ripe for privatization. These holdings could be acquired by active European partners prepared to become involved in relaunching these companies, whilst some of the shares created in this way could also be reserved for local investors as a first priority.

Following a debate in which the representative of the Caisse française de développement also took part, the meeting was concluded with the decision to continue exploring the various avenues opened up in this way, particularly through contacts with officials in other EU Member States.

■ **EUROPEAN UNION.** Following ratification of the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1993, the European Community is now officially known as the European Union (EU). This is the designation that our readers will therefore find from now on in Partnership.

(1) The Group of Seven is an association of national organizations of European entrepreneurs that are active in ACP countries.

Partnership is a publication by the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), created under the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention.

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Operational Summary

No. 79 — March 1994



(position as at 7 March 1994)

EEC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EEC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 December 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EEC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EEC since 1976 and 1977;

— the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EEC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

- Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
- Int. tender: International invitation to tender
- Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
- Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
- TA: Technical assistance
- EDF: European Development Fund
- mECU: Million European currency units

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Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

A1	Planning and public administration	A5B	Industrial development banks
A1A	Administrative buildings	A5C	Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
A1B	Economic planning and policy	A5D	Export promotion
A1C	Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category	A5E	Trade, commerce and distribution
A1D	Police and fire protection	A5F	Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
A1E	Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation	A5G	Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
A1F	Economic surveys, pre-investment studies	A5H	Other insurance and banking
A1G	Cartography, mapping, aerial photography	A5I	Archaeological conservation, game reserves
A1H	Demography and manpower studies		
A2	Development of public utilities	A6	Education
A2A	Power production and distribution	A6A	Primary and secondary education
A2Ai	Electricity	A6B	University and higher technical institutes
A2B	Water supply	A6Bi	Medical
A2C	Communications	A6C	Teacher training
A2D	Transport and navigation	A6Ci	Agricultural training
A2E	Meteorology	A6D	Vocational and technical training
A2F	Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)	A6E	Educational administration
A3	Agriculture, fishing and forestry	A6F	Pure or general research
A3A	Agricultural production	A6G	Scientific documentation
A3B	Service to agriculture	A6H	Research in the field of education or training
A3C	Forestry	A6I	Subsidiary services
A3D	Fishing and hunting	A6J	Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
A3E	Conservation and extension	A7	Health
A3F	Agricultural storage	A7A	Hospitals and clinics
A3G	Agricultural construction	A7B	Maternal and child care
A3H	Home economics and nutrition	A7C	Family planning and population-related research
A3I	Land and soil surveys	A7D	Other medical and dental services
A4	Industry, mining and construction	A7E	Public health administration
A4A	Extractive industries	A7F	Medical insurance programmes
A4Ai	Petroleum and natural gas	A8	Social infrastructure and social welfare
A4B	Manufacturing	A8A	Housing, urban and rural
A4C	Engineering and construction	A8B	Community development and facilities
A4D	Cottage industry and handicraft	A8C	Environmental sanitation
A4E	Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment	A8D	Labour
A4F	Non-agricultural storage and warehousing	A8E	Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
A4G	Research in industrial technology	A8F	Environmental protection
A5	Trade, banking, tourism and other services	A8G	Flood control
A5A	Agricultural development banks	A8H	Land settlement
		A8I	Cultural activities
		A9	Multisector
		A9A	River development
		A9B	Regional development projects
		A10	Unspecified

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development and progress of the beneficiary country or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EC is in no way bound by the summary which is for information only.

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

Rehabilitation national roads in the South-West region: Namibe-Serra da Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. 18.5 mECU. Road rehabilitation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF ANG A2d

Health project «After urgency». 15 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, supply of medicines, health projects in Luanda, fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* 93. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 7007 A7

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Livestock development. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a

BAHAMAS

Queens Highway, Long Island. Rehabilitation of the road. Estimated cost 4.800 mECU. EDF part 3.860 mECU. Works by acc. tender. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BM 7001 A2d

BELIZE

Community Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEL 6002 A6b

BENIN

Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6009 A3d

Structural Adjustment Programme — General Import Programme — II 1993-1994. 15.700 mECU. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BEN 7200 A1c

Construction works, Lot 1b Parakou-Djougou road. Km 65.000 — Km 136.634. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated cost 16 mECU. Works, supervision, geotechnical control, follow-up and evaluation. Works by int. tender. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BEN 7004 A2d

Beroubouay — Malanville road rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. 29 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BEN 6022/7001 A2d

Decentralized cooperation programme. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. To strengthen role, means of action and organization of the representative partners in the civil society. Support to the management of urban communal administrations in Zou and Cotonou, support to the associative sector.

★ **Date financing February 94.** 7th EDF EDF BEN 5018 (7) A8b

BOTSWANA

Wildlife Conservation in Northern Botswana. Resp. Auth.: Department of Wildlife and National Parks. (DWNP). 6.800 mECU. New tracks, construction of administrative office quarters and accommodation. Supply of equipment (earthmoving — tractors — 4x4 pick-ups). T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BT 6026 A3e, A5i

Wildlife conservation and utilization in Central and Southern Botswana. Resp. Auth.: DWNP. Estimated cost 6.4 mECU. Construction of buildings and staff houses, supply of equipments, T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BT 6001/7001 A3e, A5i

BURKINA FASO

Doua Plain development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 2.050 mECU. EDF 2 mECU, local 0.050 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 6005/7002 A3a

Electrification of 3 secondary urban centres. Resp. Auth.: SONABEL — Soc. Nat. d'Electr. 7.100 mECU. Power centre and distribution network in Diébougou, Kongussi, Nouna. Works, supplies and T.A. for supervision and control. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7001 A2ai

Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Modern earthroad. Supervision: short-list to be done. Estimated cost 18.5 m ECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF BK 7004 A2d

Support programme to S.M.E's. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce et des Mines. 10.500 mECU. Investments, agencies, T.A. and training. line of credit. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BK 7006 A4, A5

Support to the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 38 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-up. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF. EDF BK 7200 A1c

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Livestock. 9.6 mECU. Works for production, supply of equipments, T.A., training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BK 7008 A3a

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Cereals. Estimated cost 12.500 mECU. Support for institutional reform, works, supply of equipments, T.A., lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7009 A3a

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Environment. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, soil management and T.A. Project on ap-

praisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7010 A3a

Project to place solar equipments in the Provinces of Sourou, Yatenga and Passoré. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau. 2 mECU. Water supplies, works, wells, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BK 6001 A3a

Institutional Support to develop the Bagré region (610 ha). EDF part 2 mECU for T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BK 7011 A3a

Setting up cartographical schemes to manage the environment. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement et du Tourisme (MET). Direction Générale de l'Environnement (DGE). 1.950 mECU. This task will be carried out by local organisations. T.A. and evaluation by direct agreement after restr. tender. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BK 7010 A1g

Support project for fight against AIDS and STD's. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. Estimated cost 1.6mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of equipments, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7013 A7b,c

BURUNDI

Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. Supervision and management. Elimination of conflictual sources between the game and population. Make the game accessible to the tourism. Works, supplies, T.A., training and awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 6029 A5i

Support project for micro-entreprises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare technical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 7004 A4, A5

Global plan on urgent humanitarian aid to the burundese refugees in Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. 18.3 mECU *Project in execution.* 7th EDF EDF BU 7RPR 277 A8

CAMEROON

Support to the health services. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 8.5 mECU. Works, supplies of medicines by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender after pre-qualification. Project in execution. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF CM 6030 (7004) A7e

Road maintenance programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 22.5 mECU. Maintenance in 3 regions: Tikar plain, Ayos-Bertoua, Yaoundé. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6031 (7005) A2d

Integrated rural development programme in the North-East and North-West Benoué regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. Works, equipments, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a

Development of the Mandara Mountains region. Resp. Auth.: Mission de Développement Intégré des Monts Mandara (MIDIMA). 9 mECU. Works, supply of equipments, T.A. evaluation, studies. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CM 6026 A3a

'Bertoua-Garoua-Boulai' Rehabilitation Road - Feasibility study. 1.5 mECU. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CM 7002 A2d

CAPE VERDE

Development of an industrial zone in Praia. Resp. Auth.: Ministères des Infrastructures et transports. Estimated cost 1.290 mECU. Roads, electricity and telephone network and sanitation. Work supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7002 A2,A8

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

North Region development programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Economie, du Plan, des Statistiques et de la Coopération Internationale — Ministère des Eaux, Forêts, Chasse, Pêche et Tourisme (M.E.F.C.P.T.). 14.6 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender, T.A. by restr. tender after prequalification. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CA 6002/7002 A3a

COMOROS

Seed, support and market-garden development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. Total estimated cost 5.650 mECU. EDF 5.5 mECU, local 0.150 mECU. Production of improved vegetable material. Rural development actions, infrastructures, training teams. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 5002(7001) A3a

Line of credit for SMEs. Resp. Auth.: Banque de Développement des Comores, 1 mECU. Small loans for farmers. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF COM 7002 A5b

Micro-projects. Estimated total cost 3.4 mECU, EDF 2.5 mECU, local 0.4 mECU, local communities 0.5 mECU. Warehouses, rural hydraulic and electrification, health, education, works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 7102 A3a

Support to the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 5.500 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-up. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF. EDF COM 7200 A1c

Sea-access to the Moheli island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement — Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for further investigations, tender dossier and works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d

CHAD

Cotton rural roads maintenance. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7 mECU. Rehabilitation works and super-

vision. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CD 7004 A2d

Rural hydraulics programme in the concentration zone. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines, Énergie, Ressources en Eau. Estimated total cost 8.509 mECU. EDF part 8.300 mECU. Drillings, wells, hand-pumps, solar pump, T.A. Works, supplies and T.A., follow-up, works supervision. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CD 7003 A2b

CONGO

Support to the private sector and S.M.E.'s promotion. Resp. Auth.: National Authorizing officer, Ministère for SME, EEC delegation, Associations. 10 mECU. Lines of credit, development, promotion, viability of micro — small and medium entreprises. T.A., supplies and line of credit. Project in execution. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF COB 6005/7001 A4, A5

Support to the anticipated general elections. 0.200 mECU. Contribution for the printing of ballot papers. Imprimerie Nationale and Imprimerie des Armées. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COB 7004 A1c

Support to the Health Development National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction and rehabilitation works, T.A., training, supply of equipments and medicines. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF COB 7005 A7

COTE D'IVOIRE

Central Region food crops programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 40 mECU. Irrigation, agriculture modernization, young settlements. Food crops production marketing improvement. Works, soil improvement, supplies. T.A. studies, follow-up and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF IVC 6009 A3a

Health sector support programme. 11.2 mECU. Strengthening basic care, correcting balances between regions and support to decentralization. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 6011 (7001) A7

Support programme to coastal cities. 28.5 mECU. Social and economic infrastructure, planning and management of municipalities. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7002 A8a, b

Research — development programme for market gardening, agroforestry and fruit-trees sectors. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche Scientifique and IDESSA-IDEFOR/DFO and IDEFOR/DFA. Ministère de l'Agriculture. 8.760 mECU. Supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7003 A6f, A6c, i

Forest settlement programme in the Urumbo-Boka sector. Estimated cost 9 mECU. Rehabilitation and conservation of 7 forests. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7006 A3c, A8f

Wholesale market in Bouake. 10 mECU. Market construction and installation and starting. Works and T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF IVC 6009(7) A5c

Support to the Structural Adjustment Programme. Phase II. 18.5 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7200 A1c

Support to the Planning Directorate in the Ministère de l'Agriculture. 0.700 mECU. T.A., equipments, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7010 A3b

DJIBOUTI

Fight against desertification and development of livestock husbandry in Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF DI 6008 A3a

Health training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. T.A., scholar-ships, seminars, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF DI 7101/002 A7e

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Integrated rural development project in the NOROESTE (PROLINO). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. EDF 23.61 mECU. Building of earth-dams, infrastructure, supply of equipment, T.A. and lines of credit. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7006 A3a

Integrated programme to develop primary education at local level. Resp. Auth.: Secretaría de Estado de Educación, Bellas Artes y Cultos (SEEBAC). Total cost 8 mECU. EDF 7 mECU, local 1 mECU. Buildings, equipment, T.A. Works by direct labour or acc. proc., the equipment will be purchased locally. T.A.; short-list done. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7007 A6a

Integrated health programme in the south-east. Resp. Auth.: Secretaría de Estado de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social (SESPAS). Total cost 9.8 mECU. EDF 8.8 mECU, local 1 mECU. Physical health infrastructure by direct labour or acc. proc., health materials and equipment by int. tender, training, health education, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7008 A7a,b,c,e

Sectoral Import Programme for petroleum products. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Refinería Dominicana de Petróleo S.A. 9.500 mECU. Purchase of petroleum products, T.A. for follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7200/001 A4ai

Geological and mining development programme. 23 mECU. Studies, programmes managements, works, T.A. and evaluation. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e

Hydroelectric project «Los Toros». Construction of an hydroelectric power station. Civil works, supply of electromechanical and hydromechanical equipment. Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7005 A2ai

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency

allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF EG 0000 A1c

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classification and Use Master Plan — National System of Conservation Units — Forest Training and Research Centre. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i

Rural development programme in the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a

ERITREA

Small Scale irrigation in the Western Lowlands of Eritrea. Resp. Auth.: Department of Agriculture. Estimated cost 1.690 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of drinking water, agricultural inputs, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7255 A3a

ETHIOPIA

AFAR Rural Development. To improve living conditions. Human health facilities, better animal disease control programmes, microprojects programmes. T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7004 A3a

Structural Adjustment Support Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to the Central Bank. 75 mECU. T.A. for counterpart funds, social policy and G.I.P. follow-up. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF ET 7200 A1c

Strengthening of water supply and sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. Supply of metering and control equipment. T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 5006/7 A2b, A8c

FIJI

Construction of 2 bridges (Sigatoka, Ba). Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 10.6 mECU. EDF 10.240 mECU, local 0.360 mECU. Bridge reconstruction after cyclone Kina. Study to revise drawings: short-list done. *Date financing March 94.* 7th EDF. EDF FIJ 7001 A2d

Vunidawa and Korovou bridges construction. Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 1.135 mECU. Drawings and construction of Korovou bridge, deck construction for Vunidawa bridge. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF FIJ 7002 A2d

GABON

Support for rehabilitation of the national health system. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population. 11 mECU. Supply of equipments, essential medicines, T.A. and training, evaluation. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF GA 7002 A7

Mining development programme and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines, de l'Energie et des Ressources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 mECU. Works by direct labour and int. tenders, equipments by int. tender, T.A., follow-up and evaluation. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing April 94.* 7th EDF. EDF/SYS/GA 9999 A4a

GAMBIA

Rural Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. 14.5 mECU. Rehabilitation of water schemes, supply of road equipment and materials, T.A. and supervision. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GM 6004 A3a

Structural Adjustment Support Programme — General Import Programme 1993. 4.200 mECU. Hard currency allowance. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GM 7200/001 A1c

GHANA

Accra Plains Livestock Development Project (APLDP). Estimated total cost 4 mECU. EDF part 3 mECU, local 1 mECU. Provision of veterinary and animal husbandry extension services, including construction of cattle treatment centres, water points and other inputs. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6006 A3a

Twifo oil palm development. Maintenance aid 1988-1991. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (M.F.E.P.). Total estimated cost 12.6 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 7.6 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6007 A3a

Third microprojects programme. (Lomé III). EDF 18.500 mECU. Construction of schools, clinics, wells, sanitation facilities, markets. T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 6102 A6, A7, A8

Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 1993. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EEC goods. There is a negative list of items not eligible (military-luxury and environmentally hazardous products). 29 mECU. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF. EDF GH 7200 A1c

Human resources development programme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipments, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH 7003 A6

Small and Medium Enterprises Development Programme. Assistance in the preparation of business development plans. Financial contribution to the Ghana Venture Capital Fund. 4.8 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GH 7004 A5b, e

GRENADA

Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, Community Development. 0.220 mECU. Water supply, road improvements, repairs and extension of schools, medical and community centre and sports grounds.

Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GRD 7102

GUINEA

Agricultural Programme in «Guinée Maritime» (PAGM) II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales. 15 mECU. Infrastructural works, supply of agricultural inputs, equipments, T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF GUI 6001 (1) A3a

Development of the secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, roads, T.A. and training, management, work supervision, supply of equipments. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUI 7008 A8a, b

GUINEA BISSAU

Rural development programme. 23.8 mECU. Improvement of food and fisheries production, line of credit, micro-projects, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF GUB 6001 A3a

Project for the rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructures. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 11 mECU. Road rehabilitation, schools, health centres, urban roads, markets, water and sanitation. Construction of secondary bridges, access roads, supply of a ferry. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF GUB 6013 (PRI) A7, A8

Farim bridge construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 11 mECU. Bridge over Cacheu river. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7006 A2d

Cultural actions promotion programme. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Culture et à l'Information and EEC Delegation in Bissau. 1.650 mECU. Safeguard of the cultural heritage, training, manifestations, studies. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7008 A5g, i

General Import Programme. 8 mECU. Hard currency allowance. T.A. foreseen. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7200 A1c

GUYANA

Sea defence programme. Resp. Auth.: Hydraulic Division. 12 mECU. Rehabilitation of 11 km of sea defences, procurement of materials and equipment. T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF GUA 6003 (7001) A8g

Immediate action programme for the Demerara Harbour Bridge. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 8 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF GUA 6011 (7002) A2d

New Amsterdam water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 4.5 mECU. Construction of the ring main system, reservoir, supplies T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF GUA 6012 (7003) A2b

JAMAICA

Credit scheme for micro and small enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex Institution and Coordination and Monitoring Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 5th, 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF JM 5020 A4,A5

Water Supply, sewerage, institutional strengthening programme. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission (NWC). Estimated cost 18 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF JM 7005 A8a,b,c

KENYA

Revival and Development of the Swahili Culture. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Home Affairs and National Heritage. National Museums of Kenya (N.M.K.). 1.990 mECU. Safeguarding, acquisition and restoration, supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF KE 7004 A5i

LIBERIA

Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Monrovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water and power supply systems, restoration of basic health and school facilities, distribution of seeds and tools, improved access to isolated regions, assisting the re-integration of ex-combatants and returning refugees. Implementation by local NGOs and European NGOs. *Date financing February 94.* 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF LBR 7001 A1c

MADAGASCAR

Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6027 A2d

Renovation of provincial airports. Cofinancing with France. EDF 16.4 mECU. Works, equipment and supervision. *Date financing February 94.* 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6016 A2d

Improvement of the agriculture and fishing in the Far South. Resp. Auth.: Ministère d'Etat, du Développement Rural. Estimated cost 1.900 mECU. Works, supplies, study, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7003 A3a

Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimation 70.850 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7004 A2d

MALAWI

Aid for refugees. Resp. Auth.: Food Aid Coordination Unit in the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC). 5.224 mECU. The programme concerns basic needs for refugees from Mozambique. Roads, wells, drinking water, health, education. Management by UNHCR, Red Cross, MSF, Concern Universal. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAI 7255 A6, 7, 8

AIDS prevention programme Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.200 m ECU. Supply of information material, laboratory equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF MAI 7001 A7

Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) — General Import Programme. Resp. Auth.: Reserve Bank of Malawi. 30.6 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. for management and audit purposes. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MAI 7200 A1c

MALI

Health programme and population. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. Estimated cost 50 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, F.R. Germany and France 6.4, World Bank 21.6 mECU, local 3.5 mECU, USAID 8.2 mECU. Rehabilitation of health centres. T.A. for pharmaceutical sector, supply of medicines (with anticonceptionals and condoms). Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7002 A7

Fight against erosion around the road Bandiagara-Dourou. Dogon region. Estimated cost 0.900 mECU. Resp. Auth.: Commandant de Cercle de Bandiagara. Works by direct labour, T.A. by Association Française des Volontaires du Progrès (AFVP). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001/003/7 A3i

Support to develop rural credit. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole, BNDA. EDF part 1.910 mECU. T.A. and line of credit, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a

Fight against silting up and development of forest resources in the Northern regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement — Direction Nationale des Eaux et Forêts. 6.810 mECU. Infrastructural works, forest and trees, supplies, follow-up and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001/001 A3a

Strengthening of hydraulic village infrastructures in the Bankass and Koro Cercles in the 5th region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines, de l'Energie et de l'Hydraulique. Direction Nationale de l'Hydraulique et de l'Energie (DNHE). 1.989 mECU. Drilling works by acc. tender. Supply and installation of hand pumps. T.A. and follow up. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6005/001 A2b

Development of secondary towns in the 4th and 5th regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation. 5 mECU. Water supply in 3 towns, sewage works, markets, schools, waste collect systems in 6 towns. Works by acc. tenders. Supply of equipments and T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7008 A2b

Programme for the reception of 70 solar pumps. Resp. Auth.: DNHE. 2.9 mECU. Works by acc. tenders. Supply of equipments and T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7011 A2b

MAURITANIA

Support for the structural adjustment programmes. General Import

Programme. Hard currencies allowance to purchase EEC and ACP goods with negative list. 18 mECU. T.A. foreseen for implementation of the G.I.P. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 7200 A1c

Second Road Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and training. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d

Support to the management of the Kaedi Municipality. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Estimated cost 0.850 mECU. Works and T.A. by the NGO AFRICA 70. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 6007/001 A1c

MAURITIUS

West Coast Irrigation Project. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation Authority. 7 mECU. Improvement of the water intake structures at Magenta dam. Rehabilitation of the Magenta canal. Works and supply of equipments by int. tender. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 6013 A3c

Mauritius Institute of Public Administration and Management (MIPAM). Estimated cost 1.204 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 7101/001 A6e

Human resources Centre in Rodrigues. Estimated cost 0.800 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 7101/002 A6e

Support to the Industrial and Vocational Training Board. IVTB. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of equipments, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAS 6101/001 A6b,d

MOZAMBIQUE

Structural Adjustment Support Programme. General Import Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministères du Commerce et des Finances. 54.7 mECU. hard currency allowance to import ACP and EEC goods. There is a negative list of items not eligible (military-luxury and environmentally hazardous products). T.A. for management, follow up and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7200 A1c

Training for railway staff. Phase II. T.A. for the regional School at Inhambane and the provincial centres of railway training. 20 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ-REG 6409 A2d, A6d

Support for road rehabilitation and water supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Construction et de l'Eau. Direction Nationale des Routes et des Ponts (DNRP) and Direction Nationale de l'Eau (DNA). 10 m ECU. Works and supplies. T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF MOZ 7005 A2d

Reinstatement of displaced, refugee and demobilized people. 11 m ECU. For about 108,000 families. Supply of T.A., workshops, tools, building materials and equipments, 'Kits' for S.M.E's, agricultural

tools, seeds. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF MOZ 7006 A3a

Support to the students in eastern countries. Resp. Auth.: O.I.M. Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations. ★ 1.950 mECU. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7101/002 A6i

Rehabilitation project for the re-instatement of refugees and returned people in the rural sector. 12 mECU. ★ *Project in execution.* 7th EDF
EDF MOZ 7012 A3a

Roads rehabilitation programme in the Zambezia and Sofala provinces. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Construction et de l'Eau. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Roads and bridges rehabilitation. Works and supervision. ★ *Project in execution.* 7th EDF
EDF MOZ 7005/001 A2d

NAMIBIA

Support programme for the mining sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines and Energy. Day-to-day administration by the Industrial Development Corporation. 40 mECU. Mine development, expansion, drillings, tiling plant, recuperations, small scale mining. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM SYS 9999 A4a

Institutional support for the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 1.3 mECU. T.A. for agricultural planning and marketing and production economics. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7003 A1c

Namibia Integrated Health Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastructures, equipment, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7007 A7

Upgrading and rehabilitation of primary school physical facilities in rural areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and Culture. 1.800 mECU. Construction, equipments, T.A. for supervision, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7008 A6a

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipments, technical training and technical consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7005 A6i

Rural Development Support Programme for the Northern Communal Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural extension service, training of extension officers and establishment of a rural credit system. Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. ★ *Date financing January 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7011 A3a

NIGER

Sectoral Import Programme for medical supplies and inputs for the

productive system. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Finances et du Plan. 23 m ECU. Hard currency allowance to finance imports. T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF NIR 7002 A1c

Small-scale irrigation in the South Zinder. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 1.750 mECU. Works, supplies, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NIR 7009 A3c

Vocational and technical training project (NIGETECH). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Finances et du Plan. 3.8 mECU. Seminars, solar-ships, trainer training, T.A. ★ Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. *Date foreseen for financing March 94.*
EDF NIR 7101 A6d

Road infrastructures and telecommunications. *Rehabilitation of Tillabery-Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-Tera and Say-Tapoa roads. For telecommunications: hearth station in Arlit and administrative centre in Niamey. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal.* 7th EDF
EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c

Integrated development programme in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, Tadress and Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: *Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage, de la Santé Publique et de l'Education Nationale.* 18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, drillings, supply of equipment, T.A, training, evaluation and follow-up. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing April 94.* 7th EDF
EDF NIR 7012 A3a

NIGERIA

Export Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Export Promotion Council. 37 mECU. To transfer export know how to ± 250 Nigerian firms. Components: sectors, market, human resources and institutional development. Others: T.A. for management and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 6011 A5d

General Import Programme. 55 mECU, Hard currency facility to import goods and equipment not specifically excluded via a negative list. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 7200 A1c

Rubber Research Institute of Nigeria (RRIN). Resp. Auth.: R.R.I.N. 8 mECU. Works, infrastructures, rehabilitation of building, repair of roads, water supply. Supply of vehicles, tractors, laboratory and comp. equipment. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF UNI 6012 (7002) A3a

University Libraries Project. Resp. Auth.: National Universities Commission. 11.500 mECU. Small repair work, supply of book, and scientific journals, equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF UNI 7004 A6b

Katsina Arid Zone Programme. Resp. Auth.: Governor of Katsina State. 25 mECU. Soils and forests protection, livestock, increase agricultural productivity, irrigation, rural and social infrastructure, management and coordination, training. T.A.: restr. tender after prequalification. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF UNI 7005 A3a

Urgent assistance for the News Agency of Nigeria (N.A.N.) Resp. Auth.: N.A.N. 1.300 mECU. Repair-reconstruction of N.A.N. communication building, procurement — installation of new telecommunication equipments. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 7007 A5g

NITEL Maintenance training programme. Resp. Auth.: Nigerian Telecommunications. 10.5 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 7008 (6004) A2c

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Third Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 8.5 m ECU. Same as 2nd programme. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF PNG 7201 A1c

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of Education (NDOE) and Commission for Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: building renovation, university construction, rehabilitation works, works supervision, scholarships, training. Works for the university by int. tender. *Date financing February 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b

Ramu road improvement. Resp. Auth.: Department of works. Estimated cost 20 mECU. Upgrading of 73 Km of the Ramu highway (Pompuquato bridge to Usino junction) from the present gravel pavement to a bituminous sealed pavement and associated bridge works. Works and supervision. Design study: short-list done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing February 94. 6th EDF.
EDF PNG 6017 A2d

Environmental Monitoring of Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. T.A. for 30 man/months and technical consultancies. Training. *Date financing February 94.* 7th EDF
EDF PNG 7001 A4a

RWANDA

Drinking water supply in the Bugesera East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Travaux Publics. 9.920 mECU. Pumps, treatment, tanks, renovation existing network. Works, supplies and supervision. Works: int. tender already launched. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF RW 6007 (7002) A2b

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Development of Social Infrastructure - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Works, Communications and Public Utilities. 0.872 mECU. Construction and supply of furnitures for primary schools, supply of equipments, T.A. for supervision of works. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF SCN 6001 A6a

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE

Sectoral Import Programme for Structural Adjustment Support. Resp. auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat à la Coopération — Délégation de la Commission à Libreville et Antenne de la Commission à Sao Tomé.

1.5 mECU. Medical supplies, school equipment, foods and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF STP 7200 A1c

Improvement of the port. 0.450 mECU. Works and supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF STP-REG 6202/001 A2d

SENEGAL

St-Louis regional development programme. 22.5 mECU. Jobs creation, lines of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, studies. Health centres, clinics, medical equipments and consumables, training, information. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, sanitation. Environmental protection with wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering scheme in Podor. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF. EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a

Support to the national programme to fight AIDS. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Comité National de Lutte contre le sida. CNLS. 1.700 mECU. Works, rehabilitation, supply of equipment, T.A., management, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SE 7003 A7

Support to the economic development of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 mECU. Line of credit for SME's and support to the artisanal fishery. Supply of equipments, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a

SIERRA LEONE

Agricultural Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 14.3 mECU. Construction of stores, rehabilitation of feeder roads, vehicles, agricultural inputs, materials, T.A. for project management, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SL 7001 A3a

Electricity Sector rehabilitation project. Resp. Auth.: National Power Authority. Estimated total cost 52 mECU. EDF 12.5 mECU, E.I.B. 15.5 mECU, World Bank 17.5 mECU, local 3 mECU, Japan 6 mECU. EDF part: rehabilitation of the distribution network. Works, supply of equipments and T.A. for supervision. *Project in execution.* 6th EDF. EDF SL 6005 A2ai

Rural water supply and sanitation. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Wells rehabilitation, water points, equipments and T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF SL 5001/7 A2b, A8c

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Rural fishing enterprises project - Phase II. Total cost estimated 1.630 mECU. EDF 1.5 mECU, local 0.130 mECU. Construction works, fishing and office equipments and T.A. for project coordinator. *Date financing February 94.* 7th EDF. EDF SOL 6010/001 A3a

Cyclone Nina Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministres of Transport, Work, and utilities, Agriculture, National Resources and Education and Human Resources development and the EC delegation. 1 mECU. Rehabilitation of roads

and public schools. *Projet in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF SOL 7002 A8g

Malaita rural infrastructure programme. Resp. Auth.: Malaita Provincial Government (MPG). 6 mECU. Roads and wharves, supply of equipments and T.A. *Date financing March 94.* 7th EDF. EDF SOL 5013 (7) A2d

SOMALIA

Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. *Date financing - February 94.* 6th EDF. EDF SO 6029

SWAZILAND

Technical Cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland (N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU. T.A. 12 person-years to selected agencies in the public and parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SW 7001 A1f

VOCTIM - Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and VOCTIM. (Vocational and commercial Training Institute Matsapha). 1.100 mECU. Construction and equipment of buildings and staff houses. *Projet in execution.* - 7th EDF. EDF SW 5006/001 A6b

Science and Mathematics Advice and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. Auth.: The University of Swaziland - Training Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. *Project on appraisal.* 7th EDF. EDF SW 6101/7 A6b

TANZANIA

Port development, Zanzibar and Pemba ports, phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works, Zanzibar. Estimated total cost 13.4 mECU. EDF 10 mECU, Italy 3.4 mECU. Procurement and rehabilitation of cargo handling equipment. Rehabilitation of transit sheds, construction of passenger terminal with RO-RO facilities. Study: design of passenger terminal with RO-RO facilities for Zanzibar port. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 6009 A2d

Structural Adjustment Support Programme - General Import Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Tanzania. 55 mECU. Import of goods in the context of Tanzania's open general licence system, subject to a negative list. T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7200 A1c

Support for Aids Control in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 3 mECU. To strengthen health and other support services. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 08000/000 (7001) A7c

Serengeti Conservation and Development project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism, Nat. Resources and Envir. 9 mECU. Road and water supply rehabilitation, supply of equipments, studies and T.A. *Projet in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF TA 7002 A3a

Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 35 mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 Km of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study

ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 6021 A2d

Training and Training Institutions support project. Training materials, equipments, training, University Twinning. T.A. *Projet in execution.* 7.1 mECU. 7th EDF. EDF TA 6001 A6b

Support to Ministry of Finance, Zanzibar. Estimated cost 1.300 mECU. Equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7007 A1c

Support Unit to N.A.O. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7008 A1c

Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. Works, pumping equipments, studies and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 5005(7) A2b

Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of water, energy and minerals. Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, Treatment, storage and distribution. Works, equipments, design and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7009 A2

TOGO

General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and E.C. goods. T.A. for management and implementation. 17 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF TO 7200 A1c

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 2.130 mECU. Works. supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Support to the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to purchase EEC and ACP goods with negative list. T.A. for six months for GIP implementation and the use of counterpart funds. 9.7 mECU. *Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 6th and 7th EDF. EDF TR 7200 A1c

Rural Electrification. Resp. Auth.: Trinidad and Tobago Electricity Commission. 2 mECU. Connection of isolated rural communities to electricity supply network. Works, supply of equipments and T.A. *Date financing February 94.* 7th EDF. EDF TR 5014 A2ai

Road rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 16 mECU. Rehabilitation of several road segments in Western Trinidad. *Works by int. tender. Supervision. Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF TR 6003 A2d

Small business development programme. Resp. Auth.: Small Business Dev. Corp. SBDC. 2 mECU. Supply of line of credit, training and supervision and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TR 5016 A5e

UGANDA

Structural Adjustment Support Programme General Import Programme. Phase II. 30,250 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods. There is negative list of items not eligible (military-luxury items). Project on appraisal. Identification study: short list done. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7200 A1c

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Department. 12.8 mECU. Infrastructural rehabilitation, equipments, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7001 A6b, c, d

Smallholder Tea Development Programme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 mECU. Increase in the production and quality, management improvements, infrastructure development, institutional and financial sustainability, environment conservation and regional development. Works, supply of equipments, T.A. and training.
★ Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a

Uganda health project. Phase III of the Rural health Programme, West Nile Health Programme and the Uganda Blood Transfusion Service Project Phase II. Infrastructure rehabilitation equipment (vehicles, furnishings, offices), medical supplies and tests, in service training and T.A. and management. 20 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 6012/7003 A7

Institutional Support. Resp. Auth.: National Authorizing Officer. 1.5 mECU. Reinforce the capacity of the NAO office. T.A., training and supply of equipments.
★ *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF UG 6023/7004 A1c

Support to the Constituent Assembly elections. Resp. Auth.: Constitutional Commissioner. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipments with the exception of vehicles. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7003 A1c

Support to the Uganda Investment Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7005 A5e

Road maintenance programme in the South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 20 mECU. Works, supplies and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7004 A2d

VANUATU

Rural primary school rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 3.600 mECU. Rehabilitation of 36 schools and 5 maintenance workshops, Works, T.A., training and evaluation. *Date financing January 94.* 7th EDF
EDF VA 7005 A6a

Rural access roads project. Resp. Auth.: Public Work Department. EDF 2.305 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. for design and supervision and P.W.O. management. *Date financing January 94.* 7th EDF
EDF VA 6009/001 A2d

ZAMBIA

General Import Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 39 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC good. T.A. already financed on previous funds still on the spot. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7200 A1c

SYSMIN III - General import. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 60 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 9999 - SYS A1c

Zambian Centre for accountancy studies. Phase II. EDF 6.8 m ECU, T.A., supplies and Works. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 6001/7001 A6a

Social Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health, Education, Water Affairs and Local Governments. 12 mECU. Rehabilitation works and health infrastructures, water supply, education. Supply of drugs and equipments, and T.A.
★ Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7003 A7,A8

Reorganisation and restructuring of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife services. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d

Assistance to Angolan and Zairean Refugees. 1.2 mECU. *Date financing January 94.* 7th EDF
EDF ZA A8

ZIMBABWE

OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe land use and health programme. Resp. Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the standard of living of rural populations. Conservation and improved utilisation of the Wild Life resource, support to agriculture and improvement of social infrastructure. Road network, water, sanitation, building of a district hospital, equipment and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a

Structural Adjustment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. 28 mECU. General Import Programme and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 7200 A1c

Support to the Faculty of Veterinary Science of the University of Zimbabwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Veterinary. 9.1 mECU. Supply of vehicles and equipments. T.A., University link, fellow-scholarships. For Zimbabwe and SADC region.
★ Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing March 94.* 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b

Mashonoland East Fruit and Vegetable Project. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Agricultural Development Authority. 3.300 mECU. Provision of transport, construction of houses and assembly markets. Supply of equipments and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 5012/7003 A3a

Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. Increase of wildlife population, particularly

of endangered species: black and white rhino — tourism development, works, supplies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Curaçao - Business Development Scheme, phase 2. Estimated total cost 5.366 mECU. EDF 4 mECU. Development of international competitiveness in the export sector. Management training strategy. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NEA 6013/001 A5d,e

NEW CALEDONIA

Construction of a vocational training centre for apprentices. Estimated total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NC 7002 A6d

Construction of section 5 of the Koné-Tiwaka road. Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Aménagement de la Province Nord. EDF 3.950 mECU. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF
EDF NC 7002 A2d

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Pearl Oyster programme. Resp. Auth.: EVAAM. 1.150 mECU. Supply of research equipment and training. T.A. and researches. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF POF 6006 A3d

FRENCH SOUTHERN AND ANTARCTIC TERRITORIES

Rehabilitation of the «Vie commune» building in the Kerguelen Islands. Lasting improvement of the daily life quality for scientists, researchers, technicians, meteorologists on duty. Works, supplies. Estimated total cost 0.900 mECU. EDF 0.600 mECU, France 0.300 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF TAA/6001/001 A6f

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Holo-Fakatoj Road in Wallis (RT2). EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF WF 7001 A2d

Normalisation works in the territorial road n°1 (RT1) in Wallis. 1.125 mECU. Rehabilitation works. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF WF 7002 A2d

Construction of the territorial road n°1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and rehabilitations. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF WF 7003 A2d

Purchase of public works equipments. Resp. Auth.: Service des Travaux Publics du Territoire. 0.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF WF 7004 A2

Regional Projects

ACP COASTAL STATES OF WEST AFRICA

Improvement of the legal framework for fisheries cooperation, management and development. Resp. Auth.: F.A.O. 1.500 mECU. T.A., workshops, publications, evaluations. Project in execution. 7th EDF

EDF REG 710 A3a

MEMBERS COUNTRIES OF UMOA (UNION MONETAIRE OUEST AFRICAINE)

Assistance to the BOAD (Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement) for the support programme for promotion and financing the private sector in the member countries of UMOA. 0.512 mECU. Study, T.A. and training. Date financing February 94. 7th EDF

EDF REG 7106 A5

WEST AFRICA

Post harvest improvement study in West Africa. Resp. Auth.: I.S.R.A.: Institut Sénégalais de Recherche Agricole. 2.8 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

★ EDF REG 7111 A3a

BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

Regional project for the management of the 'W' national park and adjoining game reserves. Estimated total cost 10 200 mECU. To establish three management units and 10 bridges and 20 observation posts with their equipment. Building and rehabilitation of administrative, technical and social buildings, tracks and bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on appraisal 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f

CENTRAL AFRICA AND UDEAC

Regional Centre Bananas and Plantains (C.R.B.P.). Resp. Auth.: C.R.B.P. Strengthening of infrastructures and management. 2 mECU. In Nyombé. Project in execution. 7th EDF

★ EDF REG 6217 A3a

Inter-states transit in Central African Countries (T.I.P.A.C.): 5.5 mECU. To set up a regional scheme for transit transport. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

★ EDF REG 7202 A2d

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU. Widening of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.

EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b

Institutional support to Eastern and Southern Africa Management Institute (ESAMI). Resp. Auth.: ESAMI, Tanzania. 1.9 mECU. Extension of ESAMI installations plus provision of library, audio visual and printing equipment and improvement of kitchen and laundry facilities. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6311 A6b

Strengthening Economic and Policy Research in NARS in Eastern Africa (NARS: National Agricultural Systems). Technical and logistic support for building-up strong socio-economic programmes in NARS in Eastern Africa. Estimated cost 1.200 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 7306 A3c

PALOP COUNTRIES — ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE — GUINEA BISSAU — SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE — CAPE VERDE

Support to improve educational systems. 4.450 mECU. Trainers training, production of pedagogical equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 7901-001 A6b

Regional training for Middle Staff Statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 middle staff statisticians in the five countries. Building-up a modular training system, training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 7901-002 A6b,j

Regional Centre for Health Development. 3.480 mECU. Strengthening of public health systems in the 5 countries and better management of 385 sanitary districts. Training programmes, trainers training, T.A. for starting. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 7901-003 A6bi

Regional Training Centre for public administration and enterprise management. 7 mECU. Supply of equipments and T.A. Date financing January 94. 7th EDF

EDF REG 7901-004 A6b, e

COTE D'IVOIRE — ETHIOPIA — MALI

PAN African Rinder — Pest Campaign. Phase III. To improve financial autonomy of the livestock services, improving the vaccination programmes, supporting farmers associations and privatisation of certain profession in the livestock sectors. estimated cost 15.600 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 5007/003 A3a

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF C.O.I. — INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION COMORES — MADAGASCAR — MAURITIUS — SEYCHELLES

Support for environmental programmes in C.O.I. countries. Resp. Auth.: Mauritius Regional Authorising Officer. 11 mECU. T.A. for the regional coordinating unit — for national coordinating units — for surveys on the coastal area and on the protection of plant biodiversity. Supply of equipment by int. tender, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 6511/7 A8f

Regional programme to develop tourism in C.O.I. countries. Resp. Auth.: C.O.I. — Comité Permanent du Tourisme — C.P.T. 6.239 mECU. T.A. for setting-up the training programmes, sale, promotion and marketing, back-up operations to assist management, transfer of know-how and intra-regional solidarity, specific studies. Supplies and training. Project in execution. 6th and 7th EDF.

EDF REG 6944/7 A5c

Integral automatisisation of telecommunications in the Indian Ocean. Resp.

★ Auth.: C.O.I. 3.3 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF

EDF REG 5512 (7) A2c

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare-Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.

EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS

Improvement of postharvest utilisation of artisanal fish catches. Resp. Auth.: Sierra Leone National Authorizing Officer as Regional Auth. Off. Technical Secretariat in Abidjan. 8 mECU. Interventions in 16 countries. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 6126 (001) A3a

PACIFIC ACP STATES

Human resources development in energy sector. 4.400 mECU. T.A. to improve management, technical performance and regulation of conventional power supplies and petroleum import. Project in execution. 6th EDF.

EDF REG 5705/001 A2a,i

Pacific Tourism Development programme. Phase III. To assist Pacific ACP countries and OCT to develop their tourism sector. 11.530 mECU. Tourism marketing and promotion of the Pacific destination. Planning and policy capacities, research and statistics, manpower. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 7701 A5c

Senior Public Sector Management Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Institute of Social and Administrative Studies (ISAS) of the University of the South Pacific (USP). 1.855 mECU. Training programmes, seminars, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF

EDF REG 7703 A6j

Integrated Regional Programme for management and Control of Fishery. Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commission. 4.650 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution.

★ EDF REG 6709/001 A3a

South Pacific Regional Tuna resources assessment and monitoring project. Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commission 5 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., evaluation, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF REG 6709/002 A3a

Assistance to the Pacific Plant Protection Service. Resp. Auth.: South Pacific Commission. 2.950 mECU. Supply of equipments, T.A. and training. Date financing January 94. 6th EDF.

★ EDF REG 5719/6 A3a

ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE

Training in the port and maritime fields. Training by experts and consultants. T.A., training and equipment. 0.950 m ECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF

EDF REG 7403 A6b

SADC

SADC Regional Customs Training Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland customs services. Training and equipment. 1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5412/7 A1b

SADC Language Training Programme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Languages in Maputo as Regional Project Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English language training and Portuguese language training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6

Regional training programme for food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci

Southern African Foot and Mouth Disease Control Project. Resp. Auth.: Botswana as coordinator. 10 mECU. Works, supplies: vaccines, drugs, T.A. and training. ★ Line of credit. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 5406/001 A3a

S.I.M.S.E.C. - Sadc Initiative for Mathematics and Science Education Cooperation. To establish a professional unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information exchange, teacher training curriculum development, staff development, research cooperation and support for teachers' organisations. Project on appraisal. Estimated cost 5 mECU. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 6428 A6b

Development of the mining sector. Resp. Auth.: SADC Secretariat. 1.5 mECU. Preparation of the EEC-Southern Africa Mining forum (FOMIN). Preparation and promotion. T.A., monitoring and evaluation. ★ *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 6444(7) A4

Wildlife Management Training Project. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. Staff training, equipment and teaching materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing March 94.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f

SADC — MOZAMBIQUE

Beira port dredging contract. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 years, 4 million m³/year. Supervision and ★ training. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7401 A2d

BENIN — COTE D'IVOIRE — GHANA — GUINEA — GUINEA BISSAU — TOGO

Regional programme to increase awareness in western coastal African countries of natural resources protection. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Priorities: fight against bush fires and deforestation and for soil protection. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6113 A3e

OECS — TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO BARBADOS — GUYANA

Regional fruit and vegetable marketing programme. Resp. Auth.: Caribbean Food Corporation. 6.2 mECU. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6620 A5de

EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Support to the Eastern and Southern African Mineral Resources Development Centre (ESAMRDC). Resp. Auth.: ESAMRDC - Dar es Salaam - Tanzania. 4.950 mECU. T.A., consultancies - databases, training, supply of equipment. ★ *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7407 A4-A7

ANGOLA, CAPE VERDE, ETHIOPIA, GHANA, GUINEA BISSAU, KENYA, MOZAMBIQUE, SIERRA LEONE, UGANDA, ZAMBIA, ZIMBABWE

Return and Reintegration of qualified african nationals. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: I.O.M. Geneva. 11.700 mECU. *Date financing February 94.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 6018/001 A8d, e

ACP COUNTRIES

Programme for fighting AIDS. Funding of regional actions. 20 mECU. Support for regional structures, improvement of information, funding of research and training actions. Supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 8000 A7

Trade promotion. Trade development project. ACP-EC. To improve commercial performances. Estimated cost 7.200 mECU. T.A. actions, in twenty ACP countries on a preliminary period of two years. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 70001/010 A5d, e

ACP COUNTRIES AND REGIONS

Programme of Community Support for Statistical Training (COMSTAT) 9.650 mECU. *Production of reliable and up-to-date statistics by increasing the number of qualified statisticians working in national statistical systems. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 94.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 70.004/005 A1e, A6e

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Structural Adjustment Support Programme. Sectoral Import Programme for building materials to finish 100,000 social houses. 70 mECU. hard currency allowance to cover CIF imports. Management by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.A.). Special accounts in the Central Bank. Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by a positive list (electrical equipment - spare parts). Project on appraisal. ★ *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.* SEM AL 688-92 A1c

Support to the algerian rural sector. ★ 30 mECU. *Project in execution.* SEM AL A3a

CYPRUS

Mapping and property valuation. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Land and Surveys (DLS). 0.800 mECU. Supply of equipments and T.A. *Date financing January 94.* SEM CY 1309/93 A1g

EGYPT

Oil pollution combating emergency centre at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. 4.300 mECU. Project in execution. SEM EGT 771/91 A8f

Channel Maintenance Project (CMP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources (MPWR). 40 mECU. Integrated weed control, irrigation, biological control, institutional support, training, T.A. for general management, procurement and contracting, planning, monitoring and supervision, works, supplies and training. Project in execution. SEM EGT 881/92 A3c

Public Enterprise Reform and Privatisation Programme. Privatisations, restructuring operations, addressing policy and managerial issues (employment and labour issues, public sector indebtedness, financing of the restructuring operations, use of privatisation proceeds). Training action programme, Project Management. Estimated EEC contribution 43 mECU. Project in execution. SEM EGT 506/93 A1b

Nile Valley regional programme — Phase 2. 5 mECU. *Project in execution.* SEM EGT A3a

JORDAN

Ground water investigation in the Hammad and Sirhan basins. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water and Irrigation, Water Authority. 4 mECU. Initial studies, drilling exploration, surveys and analysis. Project on appraisal. SEM JO 589/90 A2a, A9a

Structural adjustment. Support programme. Hard currency allowance with negative list. 50 mECU. T.A. for follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution. SEM JO 440/92 A1e

Water sector intervention. 11.715 mECU. *Project in execution.* SEM JO A2a

Family Planning strengthening. ★ 1.100 mECU. *Project in execution.* SEM JO A1h

Improving Teacher Education. Resp. Auth.: Universities of Jordan and National Centre for Educational Research and Development (NCERD). EEC contribution 3.900 mECU. T.A., fellowship, and equipments. *Date financing February 94.* SEM JO 1283/93 A6b

LEBANON

T.A. to prepare reconstruction works. 3rd phase. Resp. Auth.: C.D.R. EEC Contribution 1.500 m ECU. Sectors: oil and gas, agriculture, industry and non financial services. Project in execution. SEM LEB A8a

MALTA

Protection of Malta's coastline against oil pollution. Resp. Auth.: Oil Pollution Executive 2.4 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, training and T.A. **★ Project in execution. Int. tender foreseen in March-April 94.**
SEM MAT A8f

Strengthening educational and economic relations with the Community. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and traineeships, establishment of a Euro-Information Centre, integrated marketing programmes and tourism promotion. Different T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d

MOROCCO

Structural Adjustment Programme Support. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to the Central Bank - Bank AL-Maghrib, to import EC goods. With negative list. 80 mECU. Project in execution.
SEM MOR 334/93 A1c

Rural development in the Central Haouz and Tassaut Aval. Resp. Auth.: Office régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole de Haouz. ORMVAH. EEC contribution 21.5 mECU. Irrigation works, tracks, T.A. and training. Works and supplies by int. tenders. **★ Project in execution.**
SEM MOR 1088/93 A3a

Drinking water supply and sanitation in the small center. 16 mECU. **★ Project in execution.**
SEM MOR A2b

TUNISIA

Date-palm trees in the Rejim-Maatoug region. Resp. Auth.: Office de Mise en Valeur de Rejim-Maatoug. EEC contribution 15 mECU. Italy 7 mECU. Drilling works by int. tender. Drilling equipment - Italy. Electrical equipment: Italy. Irrigation equipment: int. tender. T.A. Italy Project in execution.
SEM TUN A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance. T.A. for follow-up and evaluation. EEC contribution 40 mECU. Project in execution.
SEM TUN 000/92 A1v

Water and soil conservation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture - Direction de la Conservation des Eaux et des Sols. EEC contribution 45 mECU. Works by acc. tenders or direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A.: ORSTOM (F) funded by France. Project in execution.
SEM TUN 000/92 A3c

Building of two vocational centres. 8 mECU. **★ Project in execution.**
SEM TUN A6d

T.A. Programme to promote quality. Resp. Auth.: INNORPI - Institut National de Normalisation et du Régistre de le Propriété Industrielle. ECC contribution 5 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 94.
SEM TUN 1-94 A4e

Rural development project in Sèjnane. Phase II Resp. Auth.: ODESYPANO (Ministry of Agriculture's North-West Agro

forestry Development Board). EEC contribution 5 mECU. Work by direct labour, supply of equipments, T.A. and studies, training. Date financing February 94.
SEM TUN 1286/93 A3a

TURKEY

Vocational training programmes for tourism and mining. EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of equipment, studies. Project in execution.
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d

Programme to broaden relations between EEC and Turkey. EEC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the Universities of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in execution.
SEM TU A6b

WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Exceptional Aid for the benefit of the Palestinian population of the Occupied Territories. 60 mECU. To counteract the negative consequences of the Gulf war. Grants to extend credit and to create revolving funds, supplies of equipment and other materials and contributions to operating costs, technical assistance and training. Project in execution.
SEM OT 91 E A5e, A8a, b, c

Assistance to the Palestinian population of the West Bank of the Jordan and of the Gaza strip. EEC contribution 15 mECU. Health, education, production, environment, water, research and T.A. Project in execution.
SEM OT 93 A3, A6, A7, A8

Assistance to the Palestinian population of the West Bank of the Jordan and of the Gaza Strip. EEC Contribution 20 mECU. Assistance to the educational sector and T.A. **★ Project in execution.**
SEM OT 93/Ex A6b

Sanitation and drainage in Rafaj. 15 mECU. **★ Project in execution.**
SEM OT A8c

Assistance to the housing programme of the Palestinian Housing Council. 10 mECU. Works and T.A. Date financing February 94.
SEM DT 94/01 A8a

Assistance to private credit institutions. 8 mECU. Lines of credit to Economic Dev. Group (EDG), Arab Technical Dev. corp. (RDC), Agricultural Dev. and Credit Company (ADCC), United Agricultural Foundation (UAC) and T.A. Date financing February 94.
SEM OT 94/02 A5b

Construction and equipping schools and classrooms. Resp. Auth.: UNRWA. 10 mECU. Works by acc. tender and T.A. Date financing February 94.
SEM OT 94/03 A6a

Establishment of industrial park. 10 mECU. Construction and equipment of industrial parks. T.A. Date financing February 94.
SEM OT 94/04 A4

T.A. for the implementation of the development for the Occupied Territories. 5 mECU. Ad-hoc T.A. for different sectors. Date financing February 94.
SEM OT 94/05 A1b

EURO-MAGHREB COMMUNICATIONS S.A.R.L. PARIS

Euro-Maghreb training programme in communications. EEC contribution 1.400 mECU. Seminars, scholarships for young professionals from Maghreb countries. Project on appraisal.
SEM REG 687.92 A5g

A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

BANGLADESH

Jamuna-Dhaleswari Left Bank Studies (J.D.L.B.S.). Cofinancing with France. EEC contribution 4 mECU, France 4 mECU. Short-lists done. **★ Project in execution.**
ALA BD 9305 A8g

Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (CERP). EEC contribution 15 mECU. Flood protection, forestry, agricultural development. Works, supplies and T.A. **★ Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 94.**
ALA BD 9320 A3a

Bangladesh rural advancement Committee (BRAC). EEC contribution 8.150 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA BD 9307 A3a

BOLIVIA

Flood protection for the town of Montero. Resp. Auth.: CORDECRUZ and SEARPI. Total estimated cost 15.670 mECU. EEC contribution 12.500 mECU, SEARPI 0.674 mECU, CORDECRUZ 2.5 mECU. (SEARPI: personnel, logistics, ancillary services, maintenance of works - CORDECRUZ: works - direct labour, logistics, operating costs). Studies, monitoring, training programmes, defence works. Works by acc. proc. supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.
BO 9235 A8g

CHINA (P.R.)

Gansu provincial irrigation experiment and training centre. Resp. Auth.: Water and Electricity Bureau of Lanzhou Municipality. EEC contribution 1.700 mECU. Supply of sprinkler irrigation systems by int. tender. Specialized T.A.: agronomist and engineers, training specialists. Project in execution.
ALA CHN 9313 A3a

Quinghai livestock development project. EC contribution 3.200 mECU. T.A., equipments, vehicles, training. **★ Project in execution.**
ALA CHN 93 44 A3a

COLOMBIA

Fondo Amazonico. Cofinancing of project with private or public institutions in different sectors: mining, forestry, agricultural, environmental, institutional development, information, educational, health, tourism. T.A. line of credit: EEC contribution 5 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA CO 9213 A3a

Drinking water - Sanitation - Pacific Coast. 7.5 mECU. Water conduits and sewers in 57 villages. Supplies: int. tender to

be launched. Project in execution.
ALA CO 9239

A7c

COSTA RICA

Rural Integrated Development Programme in OSA-GOLFITO (Consolidation). EEC contribution 5.500 mECU. Supply of equipments, infrastructures, line of credit and T.A. Project in execution.
ALA COS 93/19

A3a

ECUADOR

Support to develop woman peasants and families in the Chimborazo Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de agricultura y ganadería (MAG). EEC contribution 3.562 mECU. T.A., supply of vehicles and office equipments training, studies, line of credit. Project in execution.
ALA EQ 9317

A3a

Relaunching the production and improving the quality of cocoa. EEC contribution 2.870 mECU. T.A. and equipment. Date financing February 94.
ALA EQ 93/50

A3a

EL SALVADOR

Health and basic health programme in the western region. EEC participation 10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health centres, infrastructures, training. T.A. Project in execution.
ALA SAL 9330

A7c

Sonsonate Hospital Rehabilitation. EEC participation 7 mECU. Infrastructures, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA SAL 9331

A7a

Job creation, training and line of credit for the informal sector. EEC participation 4 mECU. Training programmes (vocational) for wood, building, electricity, mechanics, taylor, secretary, T.A. and line of credit. Date financing January 94.
ALA SAL 93/5

A6d

GUATEMALA

Rural development programme in the Quiché Department. Resp. Auth.: Ministerio de Desarrollo (MINDES). 17.500 mECU. Support to the agricultural production and environment production. Support to the micro-industry. Works, supply of equipment, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution.
ALA GUA 9322

A3a

INDIA

Sector Support for Primary Education. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Human Resources Development. EEC contribution 150 mECU. Support to the sectoral programme and T.A. for follow-up and education. Project in execution.
ALA IN 9314

A6a

INDONESIA

Palawija Seed Production and Marketing. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General of Food Crops Agriculture. Ministry of Agriculture. EEC Contribution 9.7 mECU. Improvement of production and marketing of certified Palawije Seed Crops. Seed processing equipment by int. tender foreseen in 94. Project in execution.
ALA IND 8621

A3a

Development of Punggur Utaran Irrigation System Lampung. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General of Water Resources Development. (DGWRD). Ministry of Public Works. EEC contribution 29.3 mECU. Enlargement and upgrading of feeder, primary and secondary irrigation canals, construction of tertiary canals. T.A. for supervision of works and institutional strengthening for O&M and extension services. T.W.O.: int. tenders for feeder and primary canals, and restr. tender after prequalification by the end of 1993. Project in execution.
ALA IND 9019

A2b

Ground water irrigation and water supply in North Bali. Resp. Auth.: DGWRD. EEC contribution 10.300 mECU. T.A. construction of production wells, institutional strengthening of agriculture extension and water user association. T.A. contract awarded. Project in execution.
ALA IND 9119

A2b

EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning - Ministry of Forestry. EEC contribution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and monitoring. T.A. for detailed forest survey and mapping, training. Integrated Radio Communication Systems: T.A. for installation and training. Short-lists done. Project on appraisal.
ALA IND 9242

A3c

EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: Forest Fire Prevention and control in South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning Ministry of Forestry. EEC contribution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 pilot projects for fire management units and equipment. Short-list done. Project on appraisal.
ALA IND 9212

A3c

Satellite Assessment of Rice in Indonesia (SARI). EEC contribution 2.800 mECU T.A., supply of equipment and training. Date financing February 94
ALA IND 1319/93

A3a

LAOS

Thakek water supply project. Resp. Auth.: Nam Papa Lao (NPL). EC contribution 3.5 mECU. Buildings, equipment and T.A. for supervision. Project in execution.
ALA LA 9329

A2b

MERCO SUR

EC-Merco Sur cooperation programme and T.A. for the agricultural sector. EEC participation 11.200 mECU. Institutional and technical support in the phyto-pharmaceutical and veterinary sectors. T.A., supplies, training and popularisation. Project in execution.
ALA REG 9316

A3a

MEXICO

Multi annual programmes for business meetings. EEC-Mexico. EEC contribution 5.930 mECU. Business meetings in Europe and Fora in Mexico. T.A. and follow-up. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 94.
ALA MEX 94/02

A5d, e

MONGOLIA

Strengthening of the Veterinary Services. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Dept. of veterinary medicine. EEC contribution 2.3 mECU. Purchase of equipment by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA MNG 9209

A3a

NICARAGUA

TROPISEC — Development of small rural production in the dry tropical zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution.
ALA NI 9354

A3a

PAKISTAN

Rural roads in the Buner Area. Resp. Auth.: Provisional Government's Construction and Work Dept. (C & W) and District Council. 5 mECU. Construction of new sections of rural roads, upgrading of existing roads. Works by acc. tender. Supervision by European Consultant. Project on appraisal.
AIA PK 9106

A2d

Rural Electrification in Punjab. Resp. Auth.: WAPDA Project Management Unit. EEC contribution 21 mECU. Electrification of 540 villages. Equipment by int. tenders, T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA PK 9211

A2ai

Institute for Educational Development (IED). EEC contribution 5.4 mECU. Training and university cooperation. Management by Aga Khan Foundation-Karachi and Aga Khan University. Project in execution.
ALA PK 9208

A6a, b

PANAMA — COSTA RICA — NICARAGUA — HONDURAS — EL SALVADOR — GUATEMALA

Regional programme for the collection and treatment of the hospital waste. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Health in each country. EEC contribution 4.900 mECU. This programme covers the hospitals in the various capitals. Supply of equipment, incinerators, vehicles and tools. Training and European T.A. Supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal.
ALA REG 9133

A7a

Regional support programme for plant health. Resp. Auth.: O.I.R.S.A.-Organismo Internacional Regional de Sanidad Agropecuarias in San Salvador. EEC contribution 6.4 mECU. Supply of equipment, vehicles, tools by int. tender. Works by direct labour or acc. tender. T.A. long and short term. Training. T.A.: contract awarded. Project in execution.
ALA REG 9137

A3a

Regional programme for T.A. and development of the telecommunications sector in Central America. EEC contribution 13.800 mECU. T.A. to COM-TELCA and centro-americans operators. Rural telephone networks and improvement of transmissions capacities. T.A.: contract awarded. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution.
ALA REG 9123

A2c

PERU

Support for disadvantaged rural populations in the RENOM and INKA

regions. EEC contribution 10 mECU. Microprojects, reforestation, road infrastructure rehabilitation, improvement of production and marketing, educational and health programmes. T.A. and training. Project in execution. ALA PE 9244 A3a

Majes II Programme. Resp. Auth.: The Regional Government of the Arequipa Department. EEC contribution 11 mECU. Support for production (milk, fruit, vegetables), livestock, infrastructural works. T.A., line of credit. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project in execution. ALA PE 9302 A3a

PHILIPPINES

Western Samar - Agricultural Resources Development Programme (WS-ARDI). Resp. Auth.: Department of Agriculture (DA). Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). EEC contribution 15 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, agricultural inputs, vehicles, long term T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. ALA PHI 9215 A3a

Agricultural Support Services for Small Islands (ASSSI). EEC contribution 20 mECU. To support local community oriented micro-projects, in agriculture, fisheries, livestock, marketing, training, T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. ALA PHI 9232 A3a

Rural integrated development programme in the Aurore zone. EEC contribution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal. ALA PHI 9326 A3a

Tropical forests protection in Palawan. EEC contribution 17 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. *Project in execution.* ALA PHI 9337 A3a

COSTA RICA — HONDURAS — NICARAGUA

Action programme for adolescent women and young unmarried mothers.

4 mECU. T.A., coordination, management, follow-up. Supply of equipment. Project in execution. ALA REG 9246 A8e

VENEZUELA — EQUATOR — COLOMBIA — PERU

Fishing programme VECEP. EEC contribution 20 mECU. Artisanal fishing, resources evaluation and training. Project in execution. ALA REG 9243 A3a

SRI LANKA

Moneragala Irrigation and Community Development. Resp. Auth.: Project Management Unit (PMU) — Project Steering Committee (PSC) — Ministry of Agriculture. Total cost 7.03 mECU — EEC contribution 5.76 mECU, Government and local 1.27 mECU. Rehabilitation and improvement of 8 irrigation schemes, water management development, forestry, feeder roads, health services, small business, training, institutional support. T.A. transport and equipment. Supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. ALA SRL 9210 A3a

THAILAND

European Community Business Information Centre ECBIC Phase I. 2.204 mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 94. ALA THA 93/761 A5e

VENEZUELA

Rural development pilot project in the Cojedes State. EEC participation 5.275 mECU. Improvement of the agricultural products and farmer's organisations. T.A., supply of equipments, line of credits. *Project in execution.* ALA VE 9346 A3a

Biosphere reserve upper Orinoco-Casiquire. 6.396 mECU. Development plan, management, Cartography, inventory,

T.A. and equipment T.A.: short-list to be done. Project in execution. ALA VEN 93/09 A3a

VIETNAM

Reintegration programme for vietnamese refugees. EEC contribution 12.500 mECU. Project in execution. ALA VIE 9335 A1c

T.A. programme for transition to market economy. EC contribution 16 mECU. *Project in execution.* ALA VIE 9336 A1b

ASEAN

EC-ASEAN Radar Remote Sensing, ER S-1 Project. Resp. Auth.: European Space Agency (ESA). EEC contribution 3.9 mECU. To improve radar data acquisition for receiving stations. Supply of equipment by int. tender. T.A. for training and management. Project on appraisal. ALA/ASN/REG 9128 A1g, A8f

EG-ASEAN patents and trademarks programme. Resp. Auth.: EPO — European Patent Office. EEC contribution 6.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. ALA/ASN/REG 9223 A4g

AL-INVEST

Framework programme for industrial cooperation and investment promotion. To facilitate trade and the transfer of technology, know-how and european financing for the benefit of both sides. EEC contribution 9.100 mECU. Project in execution. ALA REG 9309 A1e,f,A5

AL-FA

AL-FA (Latin America - Academic Training). Community Latin America university exchange programme. EEC contribution 32 mECU. Post graduate exchanges, students exchanges and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 94. ALA 94/03 A6b

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Learning by performing arts: from indigenous to endogenous cultural development

Kees Epskamp – The Hague, CESO 1992 – ISBN 90-6443-110-8 – CESO Paperback no. 16 – Price: Dfl. 25,- US\$ 12.50

This book brings together essays on performing arts, paying special attention to those used to support education, training and instruction, with special reference to the Third World.

Attention is paid to the indigenous performing arts, to popular theatre as well as to theatre for development. In the field of learning and education the essays deal with indigenous and informal education, as well as with non-formal education as known to us from many adult education programmes. In the field of formal education, higher professional training in Art and Fine Art Education in Asia and Africa gets special attention, with an emphasis on the didactics of craft-industry training programmes, as for example the apprenticeship system, the pedagogical principle of learning by doing and the workshop method. Within this special sector of professional training the book explores ways of linking up examples from indigenous training systems in Africa south of the Sahara to endogenous developments in performing arts training at tertiary level in Eastern Asia. Considering the experience in a number of African and Asian countries, for the time being one may conclude that formalisation of performing arts training will increase in the near future, leaving little room for the life-long learning process which shaped this particular profession in the past.

While in the North Atlantic world the *avant garde* vanished during the eighties, when 'modernism' changed places with 'post-modernism', in the Third World there are still artists and intellectuals with a strong commitment to society and to redressing social inequality in particular.

Among them are performing artists, dancers, directors, actors, musicians, composers, puppeteers, storytellers and so forth who still have a vanguard function within the political and cultural development of their countries. Through

their art they fight for democracy and for the eradication of poverty. And they do this by using those forms of cultural expression which are authentic to the countries they live in.

However, side by side with these indigenous performing arts, these artists and intellectuals are realistic enough to consider cultural influences from beyond their countries' borders. There is no point in stopping the import of the exogenous culture brought in by the media, tourists, technology, development-support projects, etc. Therefore they are looking for an endogenous and sustainable form of cultural development which contributes to a strong cultural identity of their own.

The cultural dimension of development will continue to play a role in educational and developmental policies, practice and research. It is apparent that developing countries themselves are giving more and more weight to cultural aspects of development. This interest is also more visible in the policies of donor agencies. ■

Pour une nouvelle alliance Afrique-Europe

(For a new Africa-Europe alliance) – Futuribles – 55 rue de Varenne, 75341, Paris Cedex 04 – 125 pages – 1992

This, as *Futuribles* leader Hugues de Jouvenal explains in his preface, is the work of a high-powered group of nine people, headed by Edmond Jouven (who teaches at the University of Paris V and is a member of the Academie des Sciences d'Outremer), Maurice Lambiotte (head of research at the Centre national de la Recherche Scientifique) and Christian Etienne (who teaches at the University of Paris III and the Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques), who met over the period 1989-1991.

The idea behind their study of sub-Saharan Africa, black Africa in fact (it does not cover South Africa or the Maghreb), is that Europe cannot survive without Africa nor Africa without Europe. What do they see in this continent, with its *per capita* income dwindling from year to year, 28 of its countries on the least developed list and its trade accounting

for only about 1% of the world total?

It may be difficult to believe that development is possible in a part of the world which has not only the upheavals of Liberia, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Sudan and Ethiopia to contend with, to name only those, but seven big deficiencies — a devastated economy, a population explosion, major social handicaps (malnutrition, uncontrolled urban expansion, 30-90% illiteracy, physical debilitation caused particularly by malaria, sleeping sickness and AIDS, more and more refugees and growing numbers of street children), continual blighting of the environment, mismanagement, a widespread disregard for the law and much international uncertainty.

It is an apocalyptic finding and currently a well-founded one, but the authors, rightly, do not despair, for Africa 'has assets in its geographical situation, its raw materials, its energy resources, its agricultural potential, its manpower and its culture, which has already influenced choreography, music and painting in Europe.' True, but the situation has deteriorated over the past ten years. Commodity prices are lower, in many cases because the terms of trade are worse. In 1990, sub-Saharan Africa had a debt of \$118 billion, a modest sum alongside the \$1300 billion-worth of borrowings by the developing countries as a whole, but large in comparison with African GNPs.

The authors maintain that development should focus on methods of government and management, training, study and research potential, production, infrastructure and a new financing system involving the interesting proposal for a Euro-African Monetary Fund whereby the franc zone could ultimately develop into an ECU-type zone in which 'all the members gradually adopt stable but adjustable parities *vis-à-vis* the ECU.'

One of their remarks, about Africa's contribution to keeping the EEC supplied with metal, is over-optimistic, for there are many possibilities of supply across the world, but otherwise this (occasionally academic) book says a lot of pertinent things and comes up with some new ideas. But what sub-Saharan Africa, which is close to our hearts and in which we must not lose hope, needs most of all is peace, stringency and sound management. ■

Alain Lacroix

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(Photo The Courier)

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