


the Courier

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union

Refugees



Country reports
Bahamas
Guyana

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
(Federal Rep.)
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

France
(Territorial collectivities)
Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon
(Overseas territories)
New Caledonia and
dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and
Antarctic Territories
Wallis and
Futuna Islands

Netherlands
(Overseas countries)
Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao,
St Martin,
Saba, St Eustache)
Aruba

Denmark
(Country having special
relations with Denmark)
Greenland


United Kingdom
(Overseas countries and
territories)
Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands
and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

THE EUROPEAN UNION



THE 70 ACP STATES

Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent
and the Grenadines
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tuvalu
Uganda
Western Samoa
Vanuatu
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe



General Secretariat
of the ACP Group
of States
Avenue Georges Henri, 451
1200 Brussels
Belgium
Tel.: 733 96 00

This list does not prejudice
the status of these countries and territories
now or in the future.
The Courier uses maps from a variety
of sources. Their use does not imply
recognition of any particular boundaries
nor prejudice the status of any state
or territory.

Cover page:
Rwandese refugees waiting to cross
the Ruzizi bridge into Bukavu, Zaire
(UNHCR/H.J. Davies)

MEETING POINT**Sadako Ogata**

As High Commissioner responsible for the world's 23 million refugees, Sadako Ogata is faced with a daunting challenge. While the scale, scope and complexity of humanitarian crises are taxing the capacity of relief organisations, Mrs Ogata nonetheless thinks that viable solutions do exist. What is needed, she believes, is a better international legal structure that addresses the needs of uprooted people in a clear and accessible manner. For this to occur, the international community must take the political initiative and focus resources in such areas as prevention and setting minimum standards of treatment for asylum seekers.

Pages 3 to 4**ACP****Joint Assembly in Dakar**

The long-running saga of the Lomé IV mid-term review once again dominated the Joint Assembly's proceedings. Hopes that all the outstanding problems would be resolved by early this year proved optimistic, and members thus had another 'bite at the cherry' in their efforts to influence the negotiators. The Assembly also discussed the key subject of infrastructures and had its first opportunity to quiz Professor Pinheiro, the new Development Commissioner.

Pages 5 to 10**COUNTRY REPORTS****THE BAHAMAS**

Many people regard The Bahamas as a stamping ground for the rich — a semi-tropical tax haven where tourists flock to escape the winter chills of the

north. As The Courier discovered, there is a lot more to this island country which straddles the Caribbean/Atlantic divide. It has the problems of uneven development that are a feature of many archipelagic nations, and faces new competitive challenges in a rapidly changing region (and world). We look at what the Bahamians are doing to meet these challenges.

Pages 11 to 29**GUYANA**

The only English-speaking nation on the South American continent, Guyana is a country whose image among foreigners is somewhat out of focus. Its ecological obsessions — the constant threat of being swamped by the sea and the need to protect the tropical forest and sites of special natural interest — have raised barely a flicker of interest abroad. The same is true of the idiosyncrasies displayed in the exotic form of communism practised in former times, and the exemplary way in which Guyana has since resumed a democratic path. Yet this country, which the Spanish conquerors believed to be Eldorado, conceals an abundance of wealth and originality.

Pages 30 to 51**DOSSIER****Refugees**

The outlook for the world's refugees and displaced people does not look promising. The resources and personnel of the international agencies — not to mention the host countries — are increasingly coming under strain in the face of huge population movements. In the Dossier, we explore some of the issues surrounding the plight of refugees, with a focus on the different categories of refugee that exist and the struggle they face in trying to maintain a minimum quality of life. The European Union's response to those who seek asylum in Member States is also discussed together with some of the options and possible solutions for ameliorating refugee conditions.

Pages 52 to 88**editorial**

2. Transparency and communication

meeting point

3. Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees

acp

5. Joint Assembly in Dakar

country reports11. **THE BAHAMAS:** A haven in volatile times?

14. Interview with Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham

17. Keeping three million people happy is big business

20. Strengthening the economic linkages

22. Profile

23. Interview with Paul Adderley of the opposition PLP

26. 'The factors that make us Bahamian are very complex'

28. EU-Bahamas cooperation

30. **GUYANA:** Surface calm and strong undercurrents

35. Culture and change

37. Interview with President Cheddi Jagan

41. Interview with Desmond Hoyte, leader of the opposition

44. A day in Guyana

47. EU-Guyana cooperation

50. Strengthening the sea defences

dossier

52. Refugees

54. Refugee women

56. Development-induced displacement

58. Fleeing environmental devastation in the Sahel

60. Is there a refugee-specific education?

63. Refugee participation

66. Refugee assistance: A common approach

68. Defending humanitarianism at the end of the 20th century

70. Mozambican refugees and their brothers' keepers

71. The EU's asylum policy

74. Asylum procedures in the EU

76. A European response to the global refugee crisis

78. Refugees from the former Yugoslavia: The view from Germany

81. Developing early warning systems

83. Challenging the assumptions of repatriation

86. African hospitality takes the strain

87. International instruments concerning refugees

close-up

89. Fiji micro-pineapple project

developing world

92. SADC-EU Mining Forum in Lusaka

93. The challenge of pluralism, democracy, governance and development

96. World Employment Report 1995

culture and society

97. Health and human rights

cta bulletin

100. Gone fishing!

103. **THE COURIER'S MAILBAG**104. **PUBLICATIONS****NEWS ROUND-UP** (yellow pages)**CDI — Partnership****OPERATIONAL SUMMARY** (blue pages)

Transparency and communication

News from the Courier team

To plug the information gap, an essential step in improving democratic accountability, the European Commission has set in train a new information and communication policy. This is intended to provide transparent and user-friendly information which meets demands and is geared towards clearly defined target audiences.

Within the Directorate-General for Development, the unit responsible for communication, to which the 'Courier' belongs, has been given the task of applying this policy.


The approach is designed to make European public opinion more aware about the situation and problems of developing countries, and about the importance of international cooperation in this sphere.

As far as information is concerned, we must ensure that there is greater awareness of European cooperation with developing countries, and that such cooperation is seen as an integral part of the policies of the European Union.

Moreover, communication is taking its place among the tools and factors of development, and this means that development programmes must increasingly be examined from the standpoint of communication.

*This increase in the number of tasks has necessitated a redistribution of responsibilities among the Courier's editorial staff. **Dominique David**, the Editor, now becomes Director of Publications. **Simon Horner** takes over the job of Editor while **Roger De Backer** becomes Production Manager. **Lucien Pagni**, the current Deputy Editor, is leaving the editorial team to coordinate development information policy.*

The 'Courier' will, however, continue to be written by a multicultural team, which will avail itself of the services of a wide range of other writers in order to retain its objective and pluralist approach. It will also continue at all times to strive to increase awareness of the ACP countries and of cooperation with the EU, and to stimulate consideration of development problems, while keeping its topicality.



Simon Horner, the new editor of the Courier

Dominique David

Sadako Ogata

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

'Stretched to the limit'

Currently there are more than 23 million refugees worldwide and another 26 million internally displaced, with these figures increasing each year. As the scale and intricacy of humanitarian crises reaches unprecedented levels, international relief agencies are faced with more and more challenges. Resources and personnel have become stretched in the attempt to answer these ever-increasing distress calls. Yet despite the staggering number of refugees and the obstacles involved in helping them, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata believes solutions do exist for tackling the crises. In an interview with the Courier we began by asking Ms Ogata why the number of refugees in the world today is growing.

— The Cold War froze in place a vast number of ethnic conflicts that have since exploded around the world, creating humanitarian crises that seem to increase in number, magnitude and suffering every year. In 1994, the scale and geographical spread of such crises reached proportions that have few parallels in recent history. Suffering on such a scale inevitably creates mass movements of people. There are over 23 million refugees and others of concern to the UNHCR around the world, and an additional 26 million people displaced within their national borders. In other words, one out of every 115 people on Earth has been forced into flight. They may be the direct victims of conflict or they may be fleeing the effects of conflict — effects such as famine or the absence of adequate protection by their national state. The fact is that many of these people need the assistance and protection of an international body until the conditions in their country of origin change.

With the emergency in Rwanda and Burundi, 1994 was an acutely difficult year for UNHCR. Two million refugees fled that crisis, in conditions that at times have been appalling. I nonetheless remain convinced that there are opportunities to be seized, and that, given determination, humanitarian vision and political will, 1995 could yet be a year of solutions.

■ *Has UNHCR enough resources to do all the work facing it, or are you having to be*

selective about what you can do or the types of situations in which you can intervene?

— UNHCR is stretched to the limit. We have to be realistic in our requests to donor countries, and this sometimes means scaling down our assistance programmes or being selective in our involvement. For example, although we have increasingly become involved inside countries where we feel a potential refugee situation can be avoided, we cannot become involved with every internally displaced group. In some cases we can only encourage other, perhaps more suitable, organisations to take the lead.

Similarly, the return of refugees is often crucial to rebuilding and reconciling a devastated society. Economic reconstruction and progress is vital to their reintegration - while mass repatriation in the absence of economic reconstruction can create conflict to a degree that can at times derail what are often fragile peace agreements. But there is often a disturbing gap between refugees' return to their shattered countries and the onset of long-term development programmes to help rebuild war-damaged economies. We do institute small-scale development projects, called Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). We rebuild schools, roads, clinics and bridges, set up irrigation schemes and in general help people reintegrate their land. But these cannot hope to bridge fully the develop-



UNHCR/H. Sugano

ment gap. We need the partnership of other agencies and NGOs.

In Southern Africa, for example, UNHCR is in contact with other agencies to ensure that sustainable development programmes in Mozambique will continue after UNHCR phases out by mid-1996. Mozambique has seen 1.6 million people return home. It is Africa's success story, a beacon of hope not only for this agency but for the continent. We cannot let those people down.

■ *The various legal definitions of a refugee are now some years old. Do you think they are still adequate and what would be your ideal definition? Also, do policies on granting asylum need to be reviewed?*

— UNHCR exists to protect and assist refugees. Given the enormous increase in the numbers needing our help, material assistance is in itself an almost insuperable challenge. But legal and moral protection is at least as important to people who are fleeing not just hunger and thirst, but also persecution, violations of fundamental human rights, and often intolerable abuse. In terms of protection, our challenge this decade is to retain and strengthen existing asylum regimes. The key concepts remain asylum to people fleeing a well-founded fear of persecution; and *non-refoulement*, or the guarantee that such people will not be forced back against their will.

We need to bridge the gap between the narrow interpretations of the 1951 Convention that underlie our work in much of Europe, North America and Asia, and the more liberal refugee law promulgated by the OAU and the Cartagena Declaration in Latin America. We need to develop new legal structures that can act as a principled conceptual and operational base to protect civilians uprooted in conflict and post-conflict situations — not just people fleeing individual persecution, but all those who need the international protection of other states. The challenge includes issues such as the development of temporary protection, minimum standards of treatment for internally displaced people, and the need to combat statelessness. This last element is important in securing minority rights and preventing displacement.

The commitment to asylum must be preserved and strengthened, while every new opportunity for providing protection and seeking solutions is explored. It is deeply disturbing that, in many places, victims of war and human rights abuses must face legal and other obstacles in their search for sanctuary.

■ *How much freedom of action does the UNHCR have in helping refugees? Would you be more effective if you were more independent of the UN member states?*

— All the various humanitarian actors have a distinct role to play. NGOs and inter-governmental agencies such as the ICRC do work of fundamental importance, but their mandate is not identical to ours. UNHCR has been mandated by the international community to protect and assist refugees, and enjoys considerable independence. Though our status as a UN agency may sometimes appear cumbersome, it can also at times enhance our effectiveness and our authoritative stance.

■ *Should you have a right of 'humanitarian interference' which overrides national sovereignty and if so, under what circumstances?*

— There is an active debate in the international community on this issue, but in practical terms the sovereignty of states remains the basic building block of today's international system. It would be inconceivable for UNHCR to intervene in

any area without the cooperation of the authorities concerned.

The question of a 'right to remain', another interesting current theoretical debate, is perhaps more relevant to UNHCR. In an increasing number of conflicts the main aim seems to be the massive displacement of civilian populations. To what extent should people be helped to remain in their homes, in the country where they belong?

■ *When a situation that will lead to the displacement of people seems likely to occur, should the UN be empowered to prevent it? What form should preventive action take?*

— In recent years, UNHCR has increasingly taken on commitments aimed at preventing mass displacement. Conflict prevention should, of course, begin with basic institution building, economic development, and the encouragement of the fundamental elements of an inclusive and peaceful society. UNHCR usually becomes involved only after a first outbreak of conflict, to help prevent further conflict and further exodus. Our current programme for returnees in Tajikistan has been the focus of many projects to help improve stability and promote reconciliation in some of the most war-torn areas of the country. With the successful return of more than 90% of Tajikistan's former refugees and internally displaced people, we plan to phase out operations there by mid-1995. However, in neighbouring Afghanistan, we will be working to prevent further displacement. UNHCR is trying to foster prevention. But prevention cannot be the task of UNHCR alone. Above all, it requires serious, sustained initiatives at the political level.

■ *Particularly in Africa, what effects are refugee movements having on the economic, social and political life of host countries? Are such effects always negative?*

— Massive refugee movements can overwhelm host countries. Particularly in Africa, the generosity of countries of asylum is striking. We try to minimise the sudden social disruption, the conflicts over land, the ecological damage and the epidemics that huge, disorganised inflows of people can create. Still, it is vital to

recognise that many African countries have been very welcoming to the unfortunate who are forced to flee their homes — more so than many richer nations. As refugees become temporarily integrated into their host societies, they can have a positive impact, particularly in terms of new skills and economic development.

■ *How does UNHCR decide whether to integrate refugees into their host countries or repatriate them to their countries of origin? Where integration is chosen, how is it done?*

— The vast majority of refugees want to go home eventually; and where this is possible, repatriation, in safety and dignity, is almost always the best solution. If conditions in their countries of origin fail to improve enough to enable refugees to return, then in some cases we do encourage host countries to integrate them into their society, through mechanisms such as naturalisation. This is always a matter for the host country to decide. The third durable solution is resettlement in third countries, in cases where neither voluntary repatriation nor local integration in the country of first asylum is possible within an acceptable time-frame.

■ *Do you think the number of refugees is likely to go on rising? Will conditions for them improve or deteriorate?*

— Scanning the humanitarian horizon, you don't need to be a fortune teller to predict that UNHCR will be required to address new emergencies in 1995. In the short-term, at least, refugee numbers may well continue to rise. We need to remain prepared for them. The international community must reinforce its will to protect and assist people whose suffering has been so dramatic that they have been forced to leave their homes, often suddenly and in an atmosphere of intolerable pain. Refugees are not a threat. They are victims. It is a sobering thought, but any one of us, potentially, could one day be forced into flight. ■

Interview prepared by Robert Rowe and Jennifer Mitchell

The Joint Assembly in Dakar

The 20th session of the ACP/EU Joint Assembly was held in Dakar from 30 January to 3 February 1995. The meeting was particularly important, in political terms, being the last occasion on which the Assembly would convene under the first phase of the current Lomé Convention.

As expected, the subject of the mid-term review of that Convention gave rise to extensive discussion. The future of Lomé IV was the focus of debate at previous Joint Assemblies including the last one held in Gabon in October 1994. It goes without saying that the Assembly has a legitimate interest in the future form of the Lomé system. It owes its existence, after all, to Article 32 of the current Convention, which requires it to deliberate on all matters relating to ACP-EU cooperation.

Professor *João de Deus Pinheiro*, the new Development Commissioner, also had his first opportunity to address the Joint Assembly which was attended on this occasion by 34 MEPs (including a number of recently-elected members), 33 ACP parliamentarians and 16 ambassadors. In addition to the key issues relating to the Convention itself, the agenda of the meeting also covered a number of political aspects including relations with South Africa (which was present with observer status) and the situation in Haiti, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda and Burundi.

The meeting marked the farewell appearance of ACP Secretary General, *Behrane Ghebray* and *Paul Frix*, the outgoing Director of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI).

At the formal opening ceremony, the Assembly was addressed by three leading figures in Senegalese political life: President of the Republic *Abdou Diouf*, Sheikh *Abdou Khadre Cissokho* who is the President of the National Assembly and Mayor of Dakar, *Mamadou Diop*, who is a former Co-President of the Joint Assembly.

Tribute to Assembly's role

President Diouf paid tribute to the role of the Joint Assembly, noting that it was a persistent advocate of 'more equitable and balanced North-South relations, an environment geared to the well-being of nations, ACP debt reduction and respect for human rights.' He also noted its 'contribution to the destruction of apartheid and the advent of a non-racial South Africa.'

On the subject of the revision of Lomé IV, the President emphasised the importance of cooperation and regional integration. This, he argued, should not consist merely of theoretical concepts, nor should it originate only from governments. 'The public needs to feel that these huge regional entities are real', he insisted.

He also expressed pleasure at the fact that the democracy and human rights issues had not given rise to any differences of opinion in the course of the negotiations between the Union and the ACPs.

In connection with the renewal of the financial protocol, President Diouf said that the EU's enlargement, the accession of Eritrea to the ACP Group, the effects of inflation and the needs of the ACPs should all be taken into consideration. His conclusion was that 'the EDF needs to be substantially increased.'

The National Assembly President went on to touch on the significant events that had taken place since the Libreville meeting: the accession of three new countries to the Union, the decision by South Africa to apply to join the Lomé Convention, and the democratic changes in Haiti.

Drawing on human resources

The European Co-President of the Joint Assembly, *Lord Plumb* (EPP, UK) stressed in his address that development should be founded on human resources. He

reminded the meeting of the role of the informal and private sectors in promoting the emergence of an 'enterprise culture'. As regards debt, he stated that 'the measures taken by the Member States individually are valuable but insufficient; the problem of debt can only be resolved at an international level.' Referring to the uses to which aid is put, he also noted that women are a 'key factor' in development.

Following his visit to Rwanda and Burundi, Lord Plumb expressed the view that the Joint Assembly should offer its full support to the Prime Minister of Burundi whom he described as 'a man of integrity, acting in the best interests of the population.'

In a broader context, he emphasised the need to be able to prevent conflicts. As regards the Rwandan refugees, he pointed out that some of those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda, and some units of the former Rwandan government army, were regrouping in Tanzania and Zaire and deterring the refugees from returning to their home country.

Respecting rights and freedoms

ACP Co-President, Dr *Marcel-Eloi Chambrier Rahandi*, focused on the mid-term review proposal for a suspensive clause, based on human rights and democracy criteria, which places an emphasis on prior consultation between the EU and the ACP countries. He affirmed: 'It is up to us to respect the rights and freedoms of the citizens in states that are governed by equity and the rule of law — so that we have no need to invoke this clause.' On similar lines, he undertook to ensure 'that the Joint Assembly is a body of elected members.'

Dr Chambrier stressed the importance of the Assembly's independence in reaching decisions. These, he insisted, must not be compromised by positions taken in the European Parliament.

As regards specific development issues, he emphasised regional integration, the role of women, and the place of the young who make up more than half of the population of ACP countries.

Quotes of the week from Dakar

On South Africa

'This is the myth of a middle income country. We must attack economic and social apartheid'
Glenys Kinnock, PES, UK

On the Joint Assembly

'This is an assembly of elected members'
Dr Chambrier, ACP Co-President
'The Joint Assembly is mainly for decorative purposes, perhaps even more so than the British House of Lords.'
Zambian representative

On abortion

'Abortion is not a method of birth control'
Carlo Casini (EPP, I)

On trade

'If trade is compromised, let's provide more aid'
Terence Wynn, (PES, UK)

On competitiveness

'Competitiveness must take priority over preferences'
Professor Pinheiro, Development Commissioner

On coordination

'The coordination of European foreign policy will be ensured, thanks to the European Parliament'
Professor Pinheiro

On ACP debt

'A world conference needs to be organised on Third World debt'
Lord Plumb, European Co-President

On preventive diplomacy

'Strengthening the political partnership for preventive diplomacy'
Professor Pinheiro

On human rights

'Let us respect human rights so as not to invoke the suspensive clause. Let us make that clause ineffective'
Dr Chambrier
'The quicker they are to condemn, the slower they are to come to the assistance of countries which have embarked on the democratic process'
Zairean representative

On the Lomé Convention

'This is the last of the Conventions as we have come to know them'
Professor Pinheiro

On multilateral aid

'Multilateralism has now been compromised in favour of bilateralism'
Magda Aelvoet (Greens, B)

On partnership

'We must aim to be more effective in partnership, quickly, but without

dictatorship'

Professor Pinheiro

On outstanding Lomé balances

'Outstanding balances go to the countries which can absorb them'
Bernard Debré, French Minister for Cooperation

On Rwanda and Burundi

'A nine year-old refugee at Bukavu in Zaire — ashamed at having survived'
Glenys Kinnock
'We've got a fire and we're trying to invent the equipment to put it out instead of calling out the fire brigade'
Jan Bertens (ELDR, NL)

On civil society

'Development is based on people, not governments'
Professor Pinheiro

On Sudan

'Detention without trial in buildings inhabited by ghosts'
Rolf Berend (EPP, G)

Infrastructure development

In the Assembly's main debate (the 'general report' which this time, focused on infrastructures), *Johanna Maij-Weggen* (EPP, NL) who is the Rapporteur, observed in her introduction that interest in building and maintaining infrastructures appeared to have declined in recent decades. She stressed that answers should be sought at a regional rather than a sectoral level with a need for an overall 'cross-border' approach. She also recommended a long-term financing approach for the maintenance, administration and proper operation of infrastructures. She noted that, especially in Africa, rail transport and coastal navigation were less harmful to the environment than road transport.

In the debate which followed, a number of specific points were raised by various speakers. The representative of *Kenya* expressed approval for the regional approach but urged Europeans to open

their minds to local ideas. *James Moorhouse* (EPP, UK) believed that there was room for private financing of infrastructures alongside public funding. The speaker from *Barbados* chose to emphasise the need for improving maritime infrastructures while the *Fijian* representative expressed the hope that suitable weight would be given to the subject of telecommunications in the Report. He also stressed that there was a direct link between infrastructural development, tourism and the environment. The *Côte d'Ivoire* speaker stressed the importance both of the need for inter-regional routes and for free access to ports.

In his first appearance before the Joint Assembly, Professor Pinheiro, the Development Commissioner, began by referring to Mrs Maij-Weggen's report on infrastructures.

Between 1960 and 1975, some 40% of EU expenditure in ACP countries had been devoted to infrastructures. In the course of the first three Lomé Conventions,

the aid granted to projects of this kind had amounted to about 20% of the total. In the current Lomé IV Convention, the figure had risen to 25% of planned aid, and an integrated sectoral approach had been adopted. As far as administration was concerned, the Commissioner said that it was necessary to move away from the idea of government monopolies.

Lomé IV — the last Convention?

Infrastructures may have been billed as the main theme but in fact, the mid-term review discussions were always destined to figure prominently given that the negotiations were still under way. The Chairman of the Working Party on Lomé IV, Mr *Yoda* (Burkina Faso), began by welcoming the fact that, for the first time, Joint Assembly members had been able to attend the ministerial conference as observers.

The rapporteur, *John Corrie* (EPP, UK) then went on to summarise the

positive and negative aspect of the current negotiations. On the plus side, he echoed Mr Yoda's point about observer status for Assembly members and referred to the agreement on human rights and democracy, the establishment of political dialogue and the wider recognition of the role of the Joint Assembly. Negative aspects included the lack of progress on commercial matters and in financial and technical cooperation. As regards trade, he felt that the position of the Council was unacceptable: if all the quotas for agricultural products were reduced and if the factor for ACP exports to the Union were increased by 100, that would only equate to 1.3% of all exports to the Union.

On the thorny issue of the financial protocol, Mr Corrie observed that the French Presidency was endeavouring to obtain agreement on a figure of ECU 15 billion, whereas the total commitments by Member States at the time only amounted to ECU 8 billion. Mr Corrie deplored the attitude of the United Kingdom and Germany, both of which wanted to reduce contributions to the EDF 'in order to promote bilateral programmes'. He also criticised the attitude of southern European countries who wanted to reduce ACP access to the market in order to defend their national production.

The rapporteur went on to express the fear that Lomé IV, as amended, would be the last Convention, in the previously understood sense of the term. This fear was based on the attitude of certain EU Member States that appeared to be in favour of bilateral aid instead.

Suspensive clause — corrective, not punitive

The agreement that had been reached on democracy and human rights, according to Mr Corrie, would enable the ACP countries to reassert their commitment to respect for human rights — a key element in the Convention. As regards the clause which could be invoked to suspend cooperation when democracy or human rights were violated, he emphasised for the benefit of the EU side that this should not be viewed as a punitive measure but rather as a corrective one, designed to encourage ACP countries to continue their efforts.

Statements by Commissioner Pinheiro

Lomé IV

Referring to the Lomé IV negotiations, Professor Pinheiro, making his first appearance before the Joint Assembly, stressed that there had been agreement on a system of political dialogue to supplement the existing dialogue on development strategy within the Council of Ministers.

As regards aid, there was a need to become more efficient and to make optimum use of the resources, with systems which allowed room for swift decisions in conformity with established priorities. The selection of those priorities would, as in the past, be decided by dialogue. In general terms, of course, the Union's priorities were the same as those of the ACP countries, namely to improve their situation.

As far as trade was concerned, Professor Pinheiro thought it necessary to strengthen the Lomé system. The Commission would make proposals following the conclusions of the Uruguay Round. Favourable terms for access to the market were inadequate unless there was competitive export activity. It was necessary to structure and plan the aid machinery so as to encourage investment, and to promote the private sector and draw up a realistic plan for re-establishing competitiveness.

On the political level, the effectiveness of the partnership was being threatened by the disasters created by armed conflicts which were tearing some ACP States apart. There was a need to invest massively in preventing such conflicts, especially through the mean of preventive diplomacy. If conflicts were to be prevented, the principle of political partnership was paramount.

Replies to questions to the Commission

It was very rare for Union food aid and humanitarian aid not to reach its destination or to be used for other purposes. It was a matter of priority to set up a system of coordination and cooperation with the governments of the EU Member States.

As regards 'budgetising the EDF (ie integrating it into the overall EC budget), Mr Pinheiro felt that the Member States did not have a valid reason for refusing to do this, and he undertook to produce a proposal with this in mind.

With young people making up 50% of the population of the ACP countries, education was one of the major priorities for the second part of Lomé IV. Although there was no specific chapter in the Convention devoted to youth, Mr Pinheiro thought that this should not be an obstacle to drawing up programmes for the benefit of young people.

On several occasions, the Joint Assembly had expressed its concern about the Commission's intention to present a directive relating to the use of vegetable fats other than cocoa butter for the manufacture of chocolate. Mr Pinheiro thought that including fats other than cocoa butter would have serious consequences for a number of ACP countries.

Following the erosion of the preferences in favour of ACP countries, caused by the outcome of the GATT negotiations, the Lomé IV mid-term review provided an opportunity to find ways of making ACP exports more competitive. The Commission was awaiting the results of the study that it had commissioned on the effect of the Uruguay Round on ACP trade before making proposals to the Council and Parliament about ways of counteracting the adverse effects of GATT. However, the EU would not be able to grant ACP agricultural products unlimited access to the Union.

Following South Africa's request to enter into negotiations with a view to association with the Lomé Convention, the President of the ACP Council had confirmed that a working party had been set up to examine the request. The idea of applying the 'Namibia clause' to enable South Africa to enter the Lomé Convention needed to be studied.

Commissioner Pinheiro reported that, following the return of President Aristide to Haiti, a provisional programme involving ECU 120 million had been signed, and a rehabilitation programme for ECU 25 million had been approved.

Cooperation with Zaire would recommence when concrete results had been achieved.

In the case of Mozambique, the Commission had launched an emergency and refugee aid programme, and was finalising a programme on infrastructures. Projects relating to education and regional cooperation were planned. ■ D.D.



The Courier

On debt, he noted that ACP countries were currently devoting more than 50% of their foreign currency to debt repayment. The rapporteur approved Lord Plumb's suggestion that a world conference on Third World indebtedness should be convened bringing together the Union, its Member States, the Northern countries, the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions.

In the area of commercial cooperation, Mr Corrie observed that discussions had essentially focused on the development of the private sector, aid to non-traditional banana suppliers, STABEX and the reduction of import duties on beef and veal. He said that free access to the European market was essential for the ACP countries in order to help them develop trade and become more competitive.

GATT concerns

Taking up the trade issue in the debate which ensued, *Maartje Van Putten* (PES, NL) felt that the consequences of the latest GATT round for the ACP countries had not been sufficiently analysed. She deplored the fact that STABEX was meeting only 40%-50% of ACP requests and that only 8% of this was benefiting the poorest countries. She also criticised what she regarded as unnecessarily complex procedures claiming that before a project was approved, it had to be processed through 29 separate stages. The representative of *Malawi* called for a complete revision of Lomé IV with a view to making the Convention a 'genuine instrument of cooperation.' *Hervé Fabre-Aubrespy* (EN, F) recalled that he had urged the Union not to ratify the GATT agreements, and expressed the hope that measures would be taken to guarantee the preferential treatment accorded to the ACP countries under the Lomé Convention.

For his part, the speaker from *Zambia* made a presentation deploring the

The future of Lomé cooperation was a major talking point at the Dakar meeting

fact that the resolutions adopted by the Joint Assembly 'had not had any effect'. *Gunter Lüttge* (PES, G) called for a proposal to be put forward at the Copenhagen Summit on Social Development to the effect that debt should be converted into a 'fighting fund' against poverty. Fellow Socialist, *Michael McGowan* (UK) wanted the Council to be told unequivocally that Parliament would use its powers if the Council failed to respond to its demands in respect of the Lomé IV revision.

For the Commission, *Peter Pooley* restated the arguments of Commissioner *Pinheiro* that the full potential offered by the Lomé preferential system would not be realised until the ACP States had improved their competitiveness. He recalled that 95% of ACP exports entered the Union free of customs duties. As for the remaining 5%, the proposals made by the French Presidency would, for the first time, include concessions on these sensitive products.

Refugees

The Assembly also held debates on a range of other issues including the subject of refugees in ACP countries. The rapporteur, *Luciano Vecchi* (PES, I) introduced the discussion with a speech in which he drew attention to the fact that there were 24 million refugees and a further 26 million displaced persons in the world today. *Josep Pons Grau* (PES, S) paid tribute to the African countries which were taking in thousands of refugees. He pleaded for the establishment of a military intervention force to protect the lives of refugees and regretted the fact that the Union 'was incapable of formulating a genuine cooperation policy which would avoid conflicts.'

Jan Bertens (NL) of the Liberal Group said forcefully that prevention only

bore fruit when it went hand in hand with intervention. He referred to the problem of reintegrating refugees who often stayed for many years in the country which accepted them. The representatives of *Côte d'Ivoire*, *Senegal*, *Mauritania*, *Guinea* and *Guinea-Bissau* all spoke of the problems they were experiencing as a result of accepting refugees from neighbouring countries. The general message was that it was essential to create conditions that would allow refugees to return to their own countries, because their presence often destabilised the host nations.

As regards women, it was noted that the Fourth United Nations World Conference on Women would be held in September. Many speakers called for the Joint Assembly to send a delegation to the conference. The *Gambian* representative summarised the general climate of opinion, saying that the time had come to stop talking about the fate of women and start doing something about it. *Glenys Kinnock* (PES, UK) spoke of the 'feminisation of poverty' and pointed out that two thirds of those who were illiterate in the world were female.

On industrial development, the chair of the working party on this subject, *Konrad Schwaiger* (EPP, G) referred to the problems experienced by sub-Saharan Africa in attracting investment. The region only received 3% of the investment money spent in the developing countries. The Botswana rapporteur, Mr *Swartz*, noted that the fund earmarked for industrial development had fallen from 18.9% under Lomé II to just 7.7% under Lomé IV.

Lomé IV in West Africa

When the Joint Assembly is meeting in an ACP country, it has become traditional for members to discuss the application of the Lomé Convention in the region concerned. The Dakar meeting was no exception and the debate was introduced by *Magatte Thian* who is the Senegalese Minister for African Economic Integration. He considered, in the new world order that was taking shape, that it was essential to promote the integration of the developing countries into the world political and economic scene.

Statements by Minister Debré of the EU Council Presidency

Bernard Debré stated that the revision of Lomé IV had two objectives: adapting the Convention to reflect recent international political and economic

changes, and improving its effectiveness. He recalled the significant advances which had been achieved with regard to democratic principles, the strengthening of the rule of law and the proper administration of public affairs, respect for human rights, the promotion of political dialogue and the enhancement of the democratic character of the Joint Assembly through parliamentary representation of the ACP countries.

The Council President recognised that much remained to be done in the areas of trade and financial resources. However, an agreement had been reached on consultation of the ACP countries, the safeguard clause and the beef protocol, while progress had been achieved with regard to the use of STABEX. As regards cooperation for the financing of development, the questions relating to the cultural foundation and intra-regional cooperation had been settled.

On the subject of planning of Community aid, a major step forward had been made by taking account, in the dialogue with the ACP States, of the objectives and priorities of Community cooperation policy. Some matters remained to be settled but the principle of programming by tranches was established, as was the principle that unused funds should be reallocated to other countries.

A number of sensitive questions remained: access for ACP exports to the EU market, rules of origin, and financial and technical cooperation procedures. As

As regards structural adjustment, he pointed out that the heads of state of the seven franc zone countries in the sub-region had signed a treaty in August 1994 establishing the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The purposes of the Union were to make the Member States' economic and financial activities more competitive in the context of an open market based upon free competition, to set up a multilateral surveillance procedure to harmonise economic policies and performance, to create a common market, to work towards the coordination of national sectoral policies and to harmonise legislation.

The Commission representative, Peter Pooley, said that the situation was encouraging. In the past five years it had been possible to note a change for the better in this region, with the continuing development of the democratic process and the establishment of structural adjustment programmes, supported to the tune of ECU 300 million in 1993/94. As for the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc, he said that the problem had been overcome.

regards the erosion of preferences, the speaker recalled that the Convention made no provision for compensation for losses of preference, nor did it guarantee the preferential margins. But the French Presidency was prepared to invoke the Convention to support the competitive position of the ACP countries.

Finally, Mr Debré reminded his listeners that the EDF was funded by voluntary Member State contributions. The French Presidency, he said, would ensure that the 8th EDF budget reflected the importance it attached to maintaining privileged relations with the ACP countries.

Replies to questions to the Council

As regards Angola, the Minister recalled that the Union had welcomed the truce agreed between the Angolan authorities and Unita on 20 November 1994.

As far as Gambia was concerned, since no progress had been made, the Union had suspended all cooperation on 12 December and that suspension remained in force for the present. In the matter of recognition of the Rwandan government, he pointed out that recognition was an exclusive matter for Member States. Some EU countries, such as France, recognised states rather than governments. Since July, the Union had provided aid of ECU 150 million, and a further ECU 60 million had recently been approved. It was up to the Rwandan government to make every possible effort to achieve reconciliation for the Rwandan people.

On the issue of democracy, he regretted the setbacks that had occurred in Nigeria and Gambia and expressed the view that the latter was in no position to tell the Union how it should behave.

Francis Wurtz (EUL, F) reminded Mr Pooley that he had asked the Commission on several occasions to undertake a study into the specific effects on the population of SAPs and the devaluation of the CFA franc. Co-President Chambrier requested, in this context, that funds be made available to be spent effectively for the benefit of ACP people. He also said that the Commission should be bluntly told: 'It is your approach that is responsible for the present situation!'

In his reply, Peter Pooley pointed out that choices had been made by the ACP governments, not imposed by the Commission. He continued: 'It is quite wrong to say that the Commission is responsible for the mistakes that were made. The Lomé system is based on dialogue, and choices are made in a spirit of partnership.'

The Council, he reported, had set up a working party with a mandate to study South Africa's desire to establish appropriate relations with the countries which were signatories to the Lomé Convention. Mr Debré stressed that the Presidency would ensure the total allocation to the 8th EDF would be at an appropriate level reflecting the privileged nature of the relations maintained by the Union with the ACP countries. The latter had expressed a desire for an EDF of between ECU 16bn and ECU 18bn. The Commission was talking about a figure of ECU 15 billion. The French Presidency, he said, would do everything possible to achieve a satisfactory solution. It was opposed, however, to the inclusion of the EDF in the overall EC budget, on the grounds that this could lead to a reduction in its significance.

The alleviation or rescheduling of debt, he stated, was a matter for the Member States and not for the Union. This issue would have to be dealt with by the Bretton Woods institutions and the Club of Paris. The Minister pointed out that Community aid was made up of grants and concessional loans, the effect of which was that ACP debt to the Union was greatly reduced.

As for the banana issue, the settlement that had been reached was, said Mr Debré, transitional in nature. He reported that the USA would not oppose it until after the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), at which point, it would be necessary to comply with obligations entered into under the WTO agreement. ■

D.D.

In another debate, the Mauritian Agriculture Minister, *K.C. Ruhee* made a plea for ACP sugar producers to be permitted — under a specific preferential arrangement — to supply sugar at guaranteed prices so as to make good the Union's shortfall. The Union, he said, was suffering a genuine shortage of raw sugar for refining, and the situation, he believed, would get worse.

Country reports

Opening a debate on South Africa, *P.K. Dlamini* of Swaziland argued that this country's request to join the Lomé Convention should be supported. This view was echoed by Glenys Kinnock and Johanna Maij-Weggen, both of whom hoped that a decision on the inclusion of South Africa in the Lomé Convention would be taken as soon as possible. *Terence Wynn* (PES, UK) reinforced the argument with a call for the Joint Assembly to support the proposed accession. For the Commission, Peter Pooley felt that it was out of the question for South Africa

Resolutions adopted

Particular mention should be made of the the following resolutions:

- on the status of negotiations on the mid-term review of the Lomé Convention;
 - on the implementation of the Lomé Convention and on the specific problems of West Africa;
 - on Southern Africa;
 - on the results of the mission to Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire and on the situation in that region.
- The Joint Assembly also adopted resolutions relating to the current situation and developments in a number of ACP countries (Angola, Gambia, Haiti,

Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia) as well as in Western Sahara.

Various themes and sectors were the subject of resolutions including the forthcoming World Women's Conference in Beijing, the results of the Cairo International Conference on Population and Development, sugar and non-industrial fisheries.

Finally, there was a series of individual motions leading to the adoption of resolutions on a diverse range of topics. Examples of these included resolutions on primary products, social issues and debt, as well as on the situation in Congo, Equatorial Guinea and East Timor. ■ D.D.

to establish relations with the ACP countries outside the Lomé framework.

The situation in Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire was considered by the Assembly in some detail following a visit to these three countries made in January by Co-President Lord Plumb and Vice-Presidents *Bonge-Boma* (Gabon) and *Kinnock*. Lord Plumb emphasised how tense the situation still was in Burundi, with extremist minorities trying to destabilise the country, not to mention the presence close to the border of armed units, controlled by the former Rwandan government. The international community, he stated, should take preventive action and adopt a strategy to prevent loss of life.

He reported, however, that the situation in Rwanda had improved somewhat. The government seemed stable despite the problems it was having in setting up administrative structures. One serious problem area was the pressure being exerted by the former government to stop the return of the refugees.

Mrs *Kinnock* said that more than 70 people had been killed in Burundi in the past few days. 'If we want stability', she argued, 'then we must defend the current President and Prime Minister.' She also presented some shocking statistics. In Rwanda 300 000 children had been murdered, 80 000 more were still searching for their parents and a million people had been displaced. Kigali jail, designed to hold two hundred people, was currently packed with 6000 prisoners.

During the debate, the representative of *Burundi* called for the setting up of an international commission of inquiry, and for the Joint Assembly to bring pressure to bear to ensure that the

international community supported the existing institutions. *Monica Baldi* (FE, I) declared: 'We must not become silent accessories to disaster', while *Magda Aelvoet* (B) of the Green group also made a vigorous protest. 'It is not acceptable that the lives of Burundi's leaders should be put at risk simply because they are exercising the mandate given them by the people.' For his part, the speaker from *Rwanda* said that the former military rulers were gravitating to the refugee camps and surrounding areas. This was jeopardising the security which the government was seeking to re-establish, and the efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation which were being made.

Fisheries

Fishing, a subject close to the hearts of many in the host nation, was considered in some depth at the Assembly. *Nicole Pery* (PES, F) stressed the importance of this sector to Africa, pointing out that the contribution of non-industrial fish products as a percentage of animal protein intake was exceptionally high — more than 45% in eleven countries. She also observed that more than half of the productive 'manpower' in the deep sea and inshore fishing sectors was supplied by the female population.

She went on to draw a distinction between the fisheries agreements which the EU has with individual ACP countries, financed by the EU budget, and the cooperation linked to the Lomé Convention. The former allowed the European fishing fleet access to ACP waters in return for a financial contribution. Under the


latter, the EU undertook to assist ACP countries in developing their own fisheries potential. She argued that the policy conducted under the fisheries agreements was inadequate. Priority, she believed, should be given to non-industrial fishing. Mrs *Pery* pointed out that the compensation available under the individual agreements was much higher than the sums committed under the various European Development Funds. Because the short-term agreements were more lucrative, she claimed, some ACP countries were more interested in concluding them than in investing in development projects whose effects took longer to be felt.

Senegal's Fisheries Minister argued that there could be improved cooperation through a joint enterprise system. Although he argued that European industrial fishing was not taking place at the expense of non-industrial Senegalese fishermen under the current EU-Senegal fisheries agreement, EU-ACP relations in this sector should nevertheless be more strongly oriented towards development goals.

A representative of Senegal's National Fishermen's Collective, which has 8500 members, took the view, however, that non-industrial fishing was being marginalised. A sociologist acting as an expert consultant to the Senegal Fisheries Technology Research Centre argued that fisheries agreements could only be justified if they related to surplus resources which Senegal itself could not exploit. But, he claimed, the deep-sea and coastal resources of the country were insufficient to support both industrial and non-industrial fishing.

For the Commission, Peter Pooley stressed that the latest agreement concluded between the EU and Senegal was reducing the scope for access by European vessels to Senegalese waters. In addition, part of the contribution paid by the Union for access would be earmarked for the conservation of fisheries resources. The EU was willing to conclude second generation agreements, he stated, placing the emphasis on joint enterprises and technology transfer. It was necessary, he argued, to strike a fair balance between industrial and non-industrial fishing. ■ D.D.

THE BAHAMAS



A haven in volatile times?

'The world has witnessed dramatic changes in its economic, social and political landscapes in recent years. The Bahamas has not been spared the highlights, shocks and pressures of these volatile times. But the legendary resilience of the Bahamian people has manifested itself in a newly-developing culture of creativity, entrepreneurship, business orientation and political accountability. As a result, monumental leaps forward are being achieved in the country's economic development and investment opportunities.'

These are the words of Owen Bethel, the head of one of the country's numerous financial service companies, writing in the 1995 issue of *The Bahamas Handbook*. The *Courier* recently visited this scattered island nation off the south east coast of the United States to find out more about how The Bahamas is coping with the 'highlights, shocks and pressures' of the 1990s.

The Bahamas is, of course, an ACP country — one of the 15 grouped under the 'Caribbean' heading although it actually straddles the Caribbean/Atlantic divide. It also has the enviable position of being the richest ACP, if one chooses to measure wealth purely in terms of GDP *per capita*. Some Bahamians are ambivalent about references to the prosperity of the country. As a tourist destination and offshore finance centre, it has an interest in publicising its well-developed infrastructure, educated population and wide range

of modern facilities. At the same time, it is keen not to be excluded altogether from traditional development assistance. This is why local politicians tend to highlight the disparities which exist within the country, notably as between New Providence and Grand Bahama on the one hand, and the rest of the archipelago (the Family Islands) on the other.

The politicians have a point. Although the capital, Nassau, has its poorer quarters, the island of New Providence more generally presents a picture of reasonable prosperity. A visit to one of the Family Islands reveals a very different situation. People may not be starving there, but the residents have to grapple with many of the problems of under-development familiar to other ACPs — poor roads, lack of access to basic services such as electricity and reliable water, poor employment opportunities and so on. The main result of this economic divergence has been a continuous migration of Family Islanders to The Bahamas' two main centres of economic activity over a long period. The statistics are striking. New Providence, which has an area of 80 square miles, is home to two thirds of the country's inhabitants (170 000+) and has a population density of more than 2000 per square mile. The rest of the population (80 000+) divides almost equally between Grand Bahama (530 square miles) and all the other islands (4800 square miles) giving

a population density in the Family Islands of roughly nine per square mile. It is suggested that this discrepancy has arisen because of an undue emphasis in the past on the development of the tourist centres. Whether or not this is the case, the present government is committed to a policy of 'closing the gap'. Thus, for example, a programme is under way to extend mains electricity to all communities within the next few years and major investments are also taking place in roads and water supplies. (To be fair, some of this work was begun under the previous administration).

The history of the Bahamas has much in common with that of its Caribbean neighbours. Originally populated by Amerindians, they were visited by Columbus in 1492 who gave the name of San Salvador to the island where he landed. Permanent settlement came more than two centuries later when a group of pilgrims founded the first republic in the New World. By the end of the 17th century, the British presence was beginning to be felt although it was not until 1717 that formal control was established with the appointment of the first Royal Governor. Prior to that, The Bahamas had become infamous as a centre of pirate activity. The House of Assembly was established in 1729. During the American War of Independence, US forces made their first-ever overseas foray, capturing the main centre of the colony, Fort Nassau and six years later, it was the turn of

the Spanish to invade. The islands were restored to Britain by treaty the following year (1783).

Tourism develops early

During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a plantation economy developed worked by slaves brought over from West Africa. With the abolition of slavery in 1838, agriculture went into decline but the economic fortunes of the islands were restored a quarter of a century later when The Bahamas became a supply centre for the Confederacy during the American Civil War. It was at this early stage that tourism began with the building of the first 'resort hotel'. By the end of the 19th century, Nassau had become a fashionable winter holiday location. In the 1920s, events in the USA again brought economic opportunities, this time as a result of prohibition. The illicit rum-running trade proved lucrative and so did the legal tourist business as greater numbers of thirsty Americans chose to spend their holidays where alcohol was freely available.

Perhaps surprisingly, political reforms were slow in coming after the abolition of slavery. Politics were dominated for many years by a rich, white elite and universal suffrage took a further 124 years, finally being enacted in 1962. Thereafter, events on the constitutional front were to move quickly. Internal self-government was granted in 1964 and in 1967, the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) went on to gain power on a reformist, left-of-centre programme. In 1973, the Commonwealth of the Bahamas took its place in the community of world nations as a sovereign state.

The Bahamian population is mainly of African descent and in the past, there were undoubtedly racial tensions between the white minority who held political and economic power and the majority black community. The PLP, under Sir Lynden Pindling, which tended to be associated with the latter group, held power for 25 years, finally losing office in 1992. Today, the occasional racial undercurrent can still be detected but it would seem more reasonable to characterise the country's politics in terms of a conventional

left-right divide. The global tides have clearly been lapping at Bahamian shores in the political sense, with the election of a new, more market-oriented administration in the shape of the People's National Movement led by Hubert Ingraham. In fact, according to a PLP spokesman, the corruption issue was a key element in losing his party the last election. The view that they had held uninterrupted power for too long was indeed expressed by many of those whom The Courier spoke to, irrespective of their political views, but the changing global economic orthodoxy, with the state in retreat, and a new emphasis on the free enterprise, must also have played a part.

The system of government heavily reflects the British colonial past of the country, in both ceremonial and substantive aspects. The Queen remains Head of State, and there are no plans to change this, although it may become an issue in the future. The government is formed by the majority party in the elected lower house and the cabinet, chosen and presided over by the Prime Minister, is made up of parliamentarians.

As for the judicial branch of government, there is a system of local courts but a final appeal is still possible to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. This colonial throwback, which many other Commonwealth countries have abolished, has been criticised by some, particularly in the light of a recent Privy Council ruling preventing the execution of long-stay prisoners on 'death row'. Capital punishment is still on the statute book but no hangings have taken place recently although there is strong popular pressure for them to resume.

On the economic front, the tourist sector far exceeds all the others in scale. Some 50% of GDP is generated by the hotels, restaurants, transport operators and various businesses offering leisure pursuits (for more detail on this, see pages 17-19).

Offshore centre

The second most important area, responsible for about 8% of GDP, is the financial sector. The Bahamas is a long-standing 'tax haven' or offshore centre, to

use the term preferred locally. Political stability, which is a key element for investors, combined with a well-developed infrastructure, have made it an ideal location for investors seeking a secure place for their funds. There is no income tax, client confidentiality is guaranteed and the administrative framework — notably the 'one-stop shop' provided by the Bahamas Investment Authority — has been geared to attracting foreign funds. The result is that more than 400 banks and trust companies are now established and the sector is able to offer a wide range of financial services complete with the necessary professional expertise. In this area, as in tourism, however, the country faces stiff competition from neighbouring Caribbean territories who have entered the field more recently.

The absence of direct taxation has also attracted wealthy residents from overseas whose impact on the local economy is substantial. They build big houses (helping construction firms), employ staff and spend more than the average on consumer goods. Of course, the absence of income tax is not the sole reason for settling in The Bahamas. The congenial climate, scenic attractions and availability of up-market leisure pursuits such as yachting are also important elements. It should be noted that the wealthy residents have the effect of skewing the GDP *per capita* statistics. Although the amount currently stands at about \$11 600 *per annum*, the figure for the average Bahamian is likely to be significantly less.

In the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, production is very limited and mainly geared towards the domestic market. There is a view in the islands, probably justified, that The Bahamas cannot achieve the economies of scale necessary to compete effectively in export markets. Having said this, there is some concern that, in focusing so heavily on tourism, the government may be in danger of putting 'all of its eggs in one basket'. *Ishmael Lightbourne* of the Chamber of Commerce, who is the managing partner of an accountancy firm in Nassau pointed to a key difficulty in encouraging local productive activity, namely that 'the very success of tourism has provided an easier



Scene from a paper factory in Nassau
'Manufacturing is limited and mainly geared towards the domestic market'

career path for many potential entrepreneurs'.

Efforts to achieve import substitution, particularly in the area of foodstuffs, have only been partially successful. In addition to the usual domestic consumption, there is a huge hotel market to be tapped, but the proximity of Florida, with its high volume and quality production, makes it very difficult for local growers to compete, even with the partial protection of import duties.

Two items which are produced in relatively large quantities for export are crayfish, which go to the US market, and rum, which is destined mainly for Europe. *Francisco Carrera-Justiz*, who is President of Bacardi & Co. Ltd. explained how his operation (which is part of the much larger Bacardi Group) was able to make use of the Lomé IV Rum Protocol to export the bulk of its production to the European Union. The Bacardi factory provides jobs for 130 people (plus a further 35 indirectly) making it one of the largest manufacturing employers in the country. Mr Carrera-Justiz praised the 'healthy local business environment' but admitted he would like to see more export incentives. He was also concerned about the future of the EU's arrangements for rum imports which are important to the viability of the Bahamas operation.

One of the big global economic changes taking place, which is of particular concern to The Bahamas, is trade liberalisation. To date, the country has succeeded in 'opting out' of this process — it is not a member of the GATT — and for very good reasons. With a limited production base, it is not too concerned about the impact of other countries' protectionism. By contrast, it relies very heavily on customs duties and other border levies to fill the

government's coffers. This system has a certain protectionist element, in that it gives breathing space to small manufacturers and food producers who can sell locally, but it exists principally for revenue-raising purposes.

At the recent Summit of the Americas, the Prime Minister surprised some people by 'signing up', at least in principle, to the proposed 'Free Trade of the Americas'. Ministers insist that any developments in this direction will not take place for some time, but the implications of such a move could be profound. A free trade area would involve elimination of impediments to cross-border trade, including crucial revenue-raising duties. There is a lot of speculation as to whether this is feasible, and if so, what might replace them.

Another important question under discussion is whether exchange controls should be retained. In fact, these are not unduly burdensome at present, but there is pressure in some business quarters for them to be abolished altogether and the government appears committed to this in the longer term. Opponents argue that it could lead to a flight of domestic capital and the possibility that the present parity between the Bahamian and US dollars will become unsustainable leading to devaluation and inflation.

The government is committed to maintaining the parity, which is seen as vital for the tourist industry, and argues that the value of the currency is not sustained by exchange controls but by economic fundamentals. It remains to be seen whether The Bahamas will 'take the plunge'. If they do, and the government's analysis turns out to be wrong, it is difficult to see how the clock could be turned back.

In the social sphere, Bahamians are justifiably proud of the quality and scope of their educational system. Primary and secondary schooling is almost universal while higher education is available in four local institutions, including the College of the Bahamas which offers degree courses. A number of students travel abroad, mainly to the USA, to attend university. There is a problem in providing jobs for school leavers, however, with unemployment running officially at about 13%.

Concerns are focused on a disaffected segment of the youthful population whose activities are thought to be a major contributory factor in the crime rate. The government has just announced a pilot scheme for some 150 young people, which is aimed at developing self-esteem and the work ethic. There will be a focus on discipline and critics suggest that the plan amounts to a form of 'national service' but the government insists that it represents a positive effort to tackle the problems of school-leavers who have become alienated. The scheme includes plans for vocational training and sporting activities.

Despite concerns about the overall levels of crime, one area where there has been success has been in reducing the drugs trade. The Bahamas used to be a major 'jumping-off' point for smuggling narcotics into the USA and it is rumoured that more than a few of the islands' wealthier inhabitants have done well out of this pernicious trade. With hundreds of islands, the country is, of course, extremely difficult to police and there are no illusions about the fact that drug-smuggling still happens. But working in close cooperation with the US government, the authorities have succeeded in reducing the scale of the problem considerably.

It seems clear that, despite the external influences which impact heavily on The Bahamas, this is a country which has succeeded in carving out its own distinct niche. In the past, it provided a safe haven while America was at war and liquor when America was dry! Today it offers a haven of a different kind, welcoming vacationers looking for relaxation and investors seeking a secure place for their funds. Bahamians are fully aware that the outside world is changing and while Mr Bethel may have been exaggerating somewhat when he wrote of 'monumental leaps forward' but there is no doubt the people are ready to adapt where necessary while continuing to value and preserve the distinctive elements of their society. In that respect, at least, The Bahamas is certainly a 'developing' country. ■

Simon Horner

'Job creation is our biggest challenge' says Prime Minister Ingraham



It is often said that 'a new broom sweeps clean' and the people of The Bahamas are in the process of discovering whether this is true in respect of their government. In August 1992, after a long period of rule by the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP), the Bahamian electorate voted in a new administration led by Hubert Ingraham. His Free National Movement (FNM) came to power offering 'deliverance' for the country with a programme that included environmental measures, infrastructure investment, crime reduction and a strong dose of free market economics. In this interview with The Courier, Prime Minister Ingraham gives us a mid-term progress report. We began by asking him about the principal challenges facing his government in the economic sphere.

— The main challenge for The Bahamas is jobs, jobs and more jobs. We have not been creating sufficient employ-

ment to cater for all our school leavers, who number about 4000 every year. The downsizing in the tourism sector between 1990 and 1992 resulted in almost 2000 job losses and although financial services have done quite well, they haven't been able to make up the shortfall. It is also the case that linkages between agriculture and tourism have not been sufficiently strong.

■ *What you say seems to point to a need for diversification. In this respect, what areas of the economy do you see as offering the best prospects?*

— Diversification beyond the tourist sector is something for the longer term. In The Bahamas, the immediate opportunities still lie in tourism, not only in New Providence and Grand Bahama, which are the main centres, but also in the Family

Islands. One of our great advantages is that we have a number of islands that can be marketed as destinations in their own right. We are currently putting in the infrastructure that is needed to allow them to accommodate more tourist facilities. This year, we are building two new airports, capable of taking jet aircraft, on Marsh Island (Abaco) and San Salvador. New roads are being built in Abaco, Eleuthera, Exuma and Long Island — the last-mentioned funded by an EC grant — and we are extending the water and electricity networks. The locations we are talking about have excellent beaches and are even more beautiful than New Providence. They are particularly attractive for Europeans who tend to be long-stay, higher-spending visitors.

Apart from that we have been making good efforts in agriculture. Our exports to the United States, particularly of citrus and vegetables, are doing quite well, and we have helped to establish new farms in Abaco, Andros and Grand Bahama. Our fishing industry also has great potential. We are currently exporting more than ten million pounds of crayfish per year with, I believe, about 20% of that going to Europe. Finally, we will be looking for new opportunities in the financial services sector.

■ *Is it right to describe The Bahamas as a developing country? It is the richest country in the ACP Group.*

— We are a developing country and would be delighted to be treated as such. It is irksome from our point of view for people to take our so-called per capita income of \$12 000 per year and use that as a yardstick by which they measure our needs and requirements. That average is inflated substantially by the large number of non-Bahamians who are here in the financial services sector and who are making substantial sums of money. Additionally, it takes no account of the huge illegal immigrant population that we have. So it is inaccurate to use that number to say that The Bahamas is a rich country.

■ *How many illegal immigrants do you estimate you have here?*

— We have no accurate numbers although the usual figure given is thirty to

forty thousand. I think it may be somewhat less than that — perhaps nearer 20 000 — but it is still a very substantial figure relative to our overall population.

■ *Your administration is seen as being more market-oriented than the previous one — for example, when one looks at the privatisation policy you have instituted. In the longer term, how far would you wish to go in selling off public enterprises?*

— Only far enough to release the public from the hefty burden of past excursions into private enterprise. The state should concentrate on providing the services that it is best suited to provide — those that are needed by the population and where there is no profit in it for the private sector. To be specific, when we took office, we found a situation in which the state had become very involved in what were traditionally private sector enterprises. As well as the traditional public utilities, the government owned and operated a commercial bank, 20% of the hotel rooms in the country and a sand supply company. So we immediately began to work on disengaging the state. In the area of sand, which the government supplied for the construction industry, we put the company out to tender to the private sector and collected a royalty. There used to be long lines of trucks to get sand, but now the shortages have disappeared and the government's revenue is assured. As for the commercial bank, which we don't think the government ought to be involved in at all, we have now sold the first 20% of the shares to the public. The issue was oversubscribed. We offered two million shares and received bids for more than four million. A second issue will take place this year and the intention is that, over a three-year period, we will fully divest ourselves of the operation.

We have also turned our attention to the hotel sector. All but one of the government-owned hotels have been or are in the process of being privatised. We have sold a hotel in Eleuthera to an Italian group who are currently adding 100 rooms to it. It is scheduled to reopen in June and the plan is for weekly flights direct to the island from Milan. We have also agreed to sell two hotels on Andros, which are each

losing about \$20 000 a month, and a further two in Freeport. Taken together, the Freeport hotels have some 750 rooms, employ more than 1000 people and are costing the taxpayers \$14 million a year. Here in Nassau, we have sold a hotel to a Jamaican group which is now spending \$13 million on refurbishment. This is also scheduled to reopen in June. We will shortly be signing a contract to sell another hotel here in New Providence to a different Jamaican group. That will leave the government with just one hotel and we are entertaining discussions just now in connection with that.

The losses which the government has been sustaining in the operation of the hotels amount to about \$30 million a year. That is the taxpayers' money and it represents quite a significant proportion of our budget.

■ *What plans have you got for the public utilities including Bahamasair?*

— The condition of Bahamasair when we came to power, which it is still in, to some extent, doesn't make it a particularly attractive proposition for the private sector. But we are putting in new systems and people and have begun to improve the operation. Hopefully, we will turn it around sufficiently to make it attractive for a partner at the very least.

As regards the other utilities, the IDB is currently conducting a study into the feasibility of privatising the electricity company, BEC, while Bell Telephone of Canada have been looking at the telecommunications corporation, Batelco. We have not yet taken a decision about privatising the utilities, because we want first to complete the divestment of the other areas that I mentioned, where there is clearly no necessity for the government to be involved.

■ *Economic liberalisation is something that features high on the international agenda nowadays. There appears to be an inexorable trend, both regionally and globally, towards the elimination of trade barriers. Indeed, you yourself committed The Bahamas in principle to participation in the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, at the recent Miami summit. Given that this country gets the bulk of its state revenue from tariffs on imports and*



A road in the Family Islands gets a new surface. The government hopes that infrastructure improvements will encourage new tourism investment in less developed islands of the archipelago

exports, doesn't such an approach imply fundamental changes to your fiscal system?

— Absolutely. We are having a report prepared by the IMF in relation to our taxation structure. At present, we have more than 150 different tariff rates for different items. We have huge protectionism for a minority of businesses in the country. Take water, which is an essential of life. The operators of water companies are allowed to import all their equipment duty free into The Bahamas and pay no taxes on their sales. At the same time, the state levies a 100% protective tariff on imported water. As a result, a gallon of water purchased from a private company in The Bahamas costs just about as much as the pre-tax price of a gallon of gasoline. We are seeking, over a period of time, to reduce the number of tariffs to no more than five. We shall begin the implementation of the programme, on the basis of the IMF report, during 1995 and will hopefully complete it by 1996. That will ensure that the top tariff on goods coming to The Bahamas is no higher than 50% with exemptions for certain items such as basic foodstuffs. It takes a while to restructure a society but we are beginning the process.

The second thing which has been raised in the press has been the question of exchange control. We have begun liberalisation in this area. We have delegated substantial authority to the banks to deal with matters that used to be covered by exchange control and that has had a very beneficial effect. Consideration will be given to further delegation to the banking institutions and if we then consider it in our interests, we will abolish the controls altogether. At the moment we are a little hesitant to do so but in principle we support the concept.

■ *Given that 85% of your tourists come from the United States, you presumably have a particular interest in maintaining the parity with the US dollar.*

— We have an absolute interest in maintaining the parity and will take no steps whatsoever that will jeopardise that.

■ *There is obviously concern in the country about the crime rate — particularly violent crime. What are you trying to do to allay the fears of the people.*

— We have taken many steps. We have engaged extra police officers and provided additional equipment for them. We are reforming the judicial system and making it more expeditious in dealing with cases brought before the courts. People's concerns about rising crime rates are not necessarily borne out by the figures but there have been a couple of notable cases which have had a particular impact on public opinion. The rate of apprehension by the police has been fairly good but we would like to get it up even higher.

There are a number of underlying reasons for the growth in crime. The education system has not been able to

train a sufficient number of people for employment. There is also the breakdown in family life and other social causes which are not of the state's making. But the state, of course, has to try to find solutions. We think that we, and society more generally — including the churches — can have an impact on attitudes over time. I should point out that the tourist is safe in The Bahamas. Indeed, most people are safe because the crime is confined to particular areas and businesses and much of it is petty offences. Of course we do have the problem of weapons which I know are not so prevalent in Europe.

■ *The presence of guns is presumably linked to your proximity to the United States.*

— Yes, this is an imported phenomenon. We benefit from the US economy because of our geographical situation but I suspect that crime is one of the burdens we have inherited as a result of watching their television, coming into contact with them and picking up some of their habits. The Bahamas is an interesting country you know. The people who come here as visitors each year outnumber the inhabitants by about fifteen to one. But we think that it is fair to say that The Bahamas remains one of the safest countries in the world.

■ *You have a debate going on at the moment about whether the death penalty should be reactivated. Where do you stand on this issue?*

The Senate building in Nassau fronted by a statue of Queen Victoria. *'We are reasonably comfortable with the constitutional structures that we now have'*

— The society is very bloodthirsty and wants capital punishment. I think the majority of Members of Parliament want it. I have stated my personal abhorrence of the death penalty but I don't think I am able, and I don't propose to impose my own moral code and conscience on the society. We are currently awaiting a judgment from the Privy Council and the outcome of that may well trigger the death penalty for a number of persons. If that happens, the government will not stand in the way of the execution of the law, notwithstanding my personal opinion.

■ *Australia is seriously contemplating the possibility of establishing a republic by the year 2000. Is that something that is under consideration in The Bahamas?*

— Not at the moment but I suspect that the opposition will make it an issue at the next election. My party has not taken a position on the matter. We are reasonably comfortable with the constitutional structures that we now have and we don't propose to accelerate change in that regard.

■ *What is your view of the current relationship between The Bahamas and the European Union.*

— It is excellent. We are very grateful for all that the EU has done and is doing for The Bahamas. The relationship has had a beneficial effect on the lives of many of our citizens — whether it is in the field of electricity supply, public roads, medical projects or agriculture. Since we have been in office, we think that we have executed the projects to the satisfaction of our European partners. And now, we are in discussion with the European Investment Bank about funding for water supplies for many of our Family Island communities.

■ *What about the future of the relationship? Would you anticipate continuing to work together with other Caribbean countries in an ongoing treaty relationship with the EU after the year 2000?*

— That is our absolute hope and expectation and we shall certainly do all we can to have it continue. ■


Interview by S.H.



The Centre

Economy dominated by tourism

Keeping three and a half million people happy is big business



The Courier

What is the connection between the American space programme and tourism in The Bahamas? There is good chance that someone who has recently had a holiday there will be able to tell you, because the Skylab astronauts are cited constantly in the publicity put out by the tour operators. It is some years since the space station ceased operating but when it was in use, those manning it apparently waxed lyrical about the blue waters surrounding the Bahamas archipelago, as seen from space, and local entrepreneurs have been exploiting this fact ever since.

It isn't necessary to go into orbit to appreciate the beauty of the Bahamian waters. Even from ground level, the depth of the colour is striking. The sea in this area is clear and unpolluted, and offers a wide range of opportunities for swimming, sailing, snorkelling and scuba diving. Add to this, a selection of fine sandy beaches, a verdant shoreline and an agreeable climate (warm but not humid in the winter months) and one soon understands why some three and a half million pleasure-seekers come here every year.

Natural assets are, of course, only part of the story. To be attractive, the tourist 'product' also needs an infrastructure and this is where the Bahamians do

well. From the airport and cruise ship berths to the hotels, restaurants, shops and recreation sites, the country has built up an impressive array of facilities for the holidaymaker. Each day can be spent doing something different, with a strong emphasis on maritime activities. If money is no object, a powerboat, sailing ship or catamaran complete with trained crew — can be hired for a day trip, or longer, to one of the deserted cays. Those on more limited budgets can join organised sailing tours with 'free' drinks, beach barbecues and snorkelling thrown in. There is a special offshore marine centre close to Nassau which combines the pleasures of the beach with an opportunity to view the region's stunning sea life. There is even a submarine with windows, which allows people to look at the fish in their natural environment without getting wet!

Back on-shore, gamblers can try their hand at the casino while the compulsive shopper is well catered-for with a big variety of souvenir possibilities ranging from inexpensive straw goods (a local speciality) and gaudy tee-shirts (made in the Far-East!) to luxury Swiss watches and high quality jewellery. All of these items are ostensibly 'tax-free' although many imported items are actually subject to

Cruiseship in Nassau harbour

duties levied at varying rates. While the emphasis may appear to be on hedonism, those seeking the finer points of life are not entirely neglected either. Nassau boasts no fewer than 18 art galleries and museums where it is possible to learn about the history of the islands and appreciate the talents of local artists. There is also a special scheme called the 'People-to-People Programme' which is designed to bring Bahamians and visitors together for cultural exchanges.

Each year, during the festive season, the country has its own 'quintessential Afro-Bahamian celebration' known as 'Junkanoo'. The central feature is a colourful costume parade which is staged twice — on December 26 and New Year's day — and Bahamians spend much of the rest of the year preparing their outfits for the occasion. Although very much a 'local' event, large numbers of winter vacationers come to The Bahamas to join in the fun.

Remaining competitive

The association with tourism in The Bahamas goes back a long time. The islands were among the first in the

Caribbean region to recognise the potential of the holiday leisure business and nowadays, they offer one of most extensive tourist facilities in the world. Indeed, most of the economy is geared towards this single sector and this is reflected in the revenue, GDP and employment statistics. In economic terms, tourism is what might be termed a 'mature' product but as the professionals are all too aware, there is no room for complacency. The North American market is admittedly a huge one, with large numbers of people in Canada and the US (not to mention a growing number of Europeans) willing to spend money to escape the winter chill, but there is no shortage on the supply side either with dozens of possible destinations in the Caribbean. And the number is growing all the time as new hotel and infrastructure investments come on stream throughout the region.

From the standpoint of competition within the Caribbean tourist area, The Bahamas has numerous advantages, but one or two disadvantages as well. On the plus side, the country's long experience of tourism means that it is geared up to meet the needs and wishes of visitors. Hotel facilities are generally good, cruiseships are handled efficiently and catering standards are high. The country's geographical location, off the coast of Florida, makes it a

Bahamian children in costume at the annual Junkanoo festival




Ministry of Youth and Culture

popular destination for short-break visitors from this prosperous and populous American state. And because it is effectively within the dollar area, the problems and costs of currency exchange are minimised.

It is, however, a relatively high cost destination (the downside to the dollar parity), at least in comparison with some of the 'newer' Caribbean destinations such as the Dominican Republic. Tourism in neighbouring Cuba is in its very early stages but recent hotel investments there are likely to set alarm bells ringing in Nassau. It is virtually impossible for The Bahamas to compete with these countries on wage costs, which are a vital element in such a labour intensive sector, so a more 'upmarket' strategy is needed with a focus on marketing the islands' special characteristics. With tourism currently concentrated heavily on just two regions — New Providence and Grand Bahama — attention is also turning to the other undeveloped islands of the archipelago (the so-called 'Family Islands') with a view to developing differentiated products geared towards specific niche markets. As *Vincent Vanderpool-Wallace*, who is Director-General at the Ministry of Tourism, explained to *The Courier*, the strategy is to market The Bahamas, not as a single destination, but rather as a region offering a variety of possibilities to suit all tastes. In pursuit of this policy, strenuous efforts are being made to extend electricity, water and transport infrastructures in the Family Islands. In addition to providing the foundations for controlled tourism development, these investments are a catalyst for other types of economic activity. They also, of course, enhance the living standards of the local people.

As regards service quality, The Bahamas is clearly determined to keep up with changing tastes and the more exacting demands of contemporary holidaymakers. This is reflected in the work of the Bahamas Hotel Training College — one of only four higher educational institutions on the islands. Its purpose is to train present and future employees of hotels, tourism organisations and allied industries with a view to offering career development and to meet the varying needs of the sector. Its diploma programmes include courses in catering, book-keeping, front-desk skills, languages and management,



The Courier

'Strong emphasis on maritime activities'

and it operates on two campuses, in Nassau and Grand Bahama. Recently, the college has seen significant investment in new facilities at its Nassau site.

Hotels returned to the private sector

Since the election of the PNM government, there has also been a shift away from state intervention in tourism. At one point, the government actually owned and operated one fifth of the hotel rooms in the country and it is widely acknowledged that these were not as efficient as they could have been. A number of hotels have already been sold to private entrepreneurs and the ultimate aim is for the state to withdraw altogether from the accommodation sector. Union representatives are concerned that this will lead to increased unemployment but the government is banking on the creation of new jobs by the (mainly foreign) entrepreneurs who are being attracted to invest in the country. Recent purchasers of hotels have announced plans to spend considerable sums on upgrading facilities and expanding capacity, thereby lending support to the government's argument.

One tourist innovation for The Bahamas is the likely establishment of an 'all-inclusive' resort in the near future. Such resorts, which offer the tourist a complete package for transport, accommodation, food, leisure activities and entertainment — usually on a single, restricted-access site — are common in Jamaica and elsewhere but are so far unknown in The Bahamas. They are not universally popular, however. Opponents of the 'all-inclusive' concept argue that the local economy suffers because the visitor (and his cash) will rarely venture outside the resort. This analysis is

only partially correct because the resort itself creates a market for food, beverages and souvenirs which local suppliers ought to be able to tap. The visitors still have to eat and drink and indeed will presumably be inclined towards consuming more on the basis that 'they have already paid for it'. If the food and beverages are imported, then this reflects a structural problem in the local economy which has nothing to do with the package that is on offer. Having said this, one can understand why independent restaurateurs and taxi-drivers might take a dim view of this kind of venture.

All-inclusive arrangements may also be attractive to tourists who are worried about the security situation and it is no coincidence that they are more likely to be found in countries where there is an actual or perceived threat to visitors (who are seen as 'wealthy' in comparison with the local inhabitants). There is a crime problem in The Bahamas, and the proximity of the United States means that firearms are often involved, but there is no evidence that it is directed specifically towards tourists. Indeed, it is local inhabitants who are usually the victims and holidaymakers are probably in more danger in Miami. This is an area where perception is often more important than reality. As Mr Vanderpool Wallace was keen to stress, 'crime against visitors is virtually non-existent', but he acknowledged that one or two widely-publicised incidents could do a lot of damage.

The three million plus tourists who visit The Bahamas each year fall into two broad categories — 'stopovers' and cruise visitors. There is tendency to be rather dismissive of the cruiseship day-trippers whose time spent ashore is very limited but when you have an average of more than 5000 arriving daily, their economic impact is still likely to be significant. In fact, Nassau has the facilities to cope with several large vessels at one time and they berth only a stone's throw from Bay Street which is the town's main shopping thoroughfare. During the daytime, the street is usually crowded with these peripatetic holidaymakers and the local traders are certainly happy to see them. The cruiseship business is also lucrative for the government which levies a \$15 tax on each visitor (the 'departure tax'



Ministry of Tourism

which is paid by all travellers leaving the country). The most recent figures reveal a drop in sea arrivals reflecting a reduction, which the government hopes is only temporary, in calls by cruiseships to the Bahamas.

Staying longer

By contrast, the 'stopover' business has been buoyant. In 1993 just under 1.5 million visitors stayed in The Bahamas and the figures for the first ten months of 1994 pointed to an increase of about 3%. In financial terms, 'stopover' visitors are obviously a great deal more significant and one encouraging sign is that they appear to be staying longer. A 7% increase in the business was recorded up to the end of October 1994 and it was expected that the 1993 total of six million hotel nights would be surpassed by the end of the year. Almost 90% of 'stopovers' come from the USA or Canada compared with just 7% from Europe.

The Bahamas is keen to attract more European visitors who, not surprisingly, tend to come for longer periods, but in this regard, the proximity of the Islands to the USA may be something of a disadvantage. The hub airport in Miami is so close that it is difficult to make direct flights from Europe into a paying proposition. After a period with no direct air links to Europe, new services have recently been announced to Paris and London (with Milan also mooted) but it remains to be seen if these can be viable. The situation for the leisure traveller is not helped by the fact that the US authorities have only a rudimentary concept of international transit and passengers are required to stand in what are often long queues to clear customs and immigration even if they are only passing through. Caribbean governments, including The Bahamas, have lobbied without much success for the intro-

The statistics are impressive: 1.5 million 'stopovers' and more than six million hotel 'bednights' sold in 1993

duction of proper transit facilities at Miami, but in the absence of a competing hub within the region (outside the USA), there is no real incentive for the federal government in Washington to change the system. The Bahamas has, however, succeeded in persuading the US authorities to set up a system of customs and immigration pre-clearance at their own, more user-friendly international airport on New Providence and this has improved matters considerably for outgoing travellers.

'Bread and butter'

The importance of tourism to the Caribbean region is well known but The Bahamas is unusual in the degree to which this sector dominates the local economy. In this respect, it has something in common with many other ACP countries with economies based on a limited range of activities. The Islands are, of course, particularly vulnerable to events in their key North American market. As one of The Courier's interviewees put it, 'when the USA sneezes, The Bahamas catches cold'. Luckily for The Bahamians, fluctuations in the US economic cycle tend not to be too dramatic and long-term growth trends there should ensure an expanded leisure market with more people taking more holidays. With travellers prepared to venture further, there is also scope for increasing market share in Europe and elsewhere. The key point is to stay ahead of the existing and emerging competition. It is not surprising that those responsible for the tourism 'product' in The Bahamas recognise how crucial this is to the future of their business. Holidaymakers, after all, have been their 'bread and butter' for a long time, and they are anxious to make sure it stays that way. ■

S.H.

Strengthening the economic linkages

A discussion with William Allen, Minister of Finance and Planning

William Allen, who is Minister of Finance and Planning in the FNM Government, is a man with a formidable task. For while The Bahamas may be a small country, its unique geography poses special challenges for those responsible for the delivery of public services. Mr Allen, who is also the National Authorising Officer for the purpose of the Lomé Convention, described the government's strategy for economic development in a recent interview with *The Courier*.

He began by outlining the basic aim for the next five years, which he said was to achieve a 'deepening' of the Bahamian economy. Students of European integration will be familiar with the 'widening' versus 'deepening' debate in a somewhat different context, but as regards the future economic direction of The Bahamas, there appears to be little argument. The idea of 'widening', in the sense of diversifying away from the dominant tourism sector, finds few takers. The Minister did acknowledge that this might be a long-term aim but in the meantime, the focus must be on tourism — the one obvious field where the country has, in the economic jargon, a 'comparative ad-

vantage'. Mr Allen laid emphasis on strengthening linkages with the rest of the economy, something which implies increasing productive capacity in other areas, but the aims are necessarily modest. With the exception of a few niche markets, The Bahamas is too small to compete effectively in the increasingly global trading system and in stressing 'linkages', the idea is rather to achieve export substitution with more local products available for both residents and visitors.

Adding value to tourism

Mr Allen is also keen to see 'value added' to the tourism product with expansion 'that is less concerned with pushing numbers and more oriented towards higher quality'. This, it is hoped, will attract more visitors at the luxury end of the market. Tourism is currently concentrated in New Providence/Paradise Island and on Grand Bahama, and the Minister also foresees expansion in the largely undeveloped Family Islands. In this con-

A deserted stretch of beach on one of the Family Islands. The Minister foresees tourism expansion on the less-developed islands — but the emphasis is firmly on an 'up-market' product



The Courier

text, the emphasis on quality over numbers is significant. No-one wants to see the less-populated islands swamped by hordes of sun-seekers and the policy is therefore to encourage specialist holidays with each island offering something different. As the Minister put it, 'we want to develop the idea of 'Tourism Andros' or 'Tourism Abaco'. In other words, a product which takes advantage of the archipelagic geography of the country.'

As Finance Minister, Mr Allen naturally has an interest in matters relating to the Bahamian dollar which is currently fixed at parity with the US currency. Replying to a question about the possible abolition of exchange controls — an issue which is generating some heated debate at the moment — the Minister recognised that these were likely to go in the longer run. He acknowledged the controls were 'an artificial mechanism' but did not accept that abolition would necessarily lead to a drop in the value of the Bahamian currency. Although the market would be allowed to operate freely, he believed that The Bahamas would be able to manage its monetary system in a way which protected the balance of payments and ensured currency stability.



The Courier

Maintaining the parity

He also stressed that the existing controls were 'more apparent than real. 'There are indeed limits on outflows for investment purposes,' he said, 'but there are no restrictions — other than a reporting requirement — on profit repatriation.' He believed that it was not exchange control, but the fundamental economic situation that was responsible for maintaining the parity and insisted that the government's monetary and fiscal policy would be designed to ensure that this continued.

Turning to the crucial area of taxation, the Minister did not appear unduly worried by the prospect that state revenues might be eroded as a result of moves towards free trade. Almost half of the government's tax income currently comes from import and export duties but as the Minister pointed out, the creation of a 'Free Trade Area of the Americas' is not something that will happen speedily. Although The Bahamas has made an initial commitment to this ambitious project, 'we are long way from having to make a concession in respect of that', he states. While the authorities may have some breathing space before the difficult decisions must be taken, they are obviously looking at possible tax alternatives for the longer term. In the 1970s, the IMF recommended fiscal diversification in The Bahamas including the introduction of income tax. Reflecting what appears to be

The Bahamian economy — some key figures

The national budget

(projected figures in B\$m for August 1994 - July 1995)

Income:	636.5	
<i>of which tax revenue,</i>		543.7
<i>Import and export duties</i>		(286.5)
<i>Stamp tax (levied on 'duty-free'</i>		(102.9)
<i>products imported for resale</i>		
<i>Tourism tax</i>		(64.5)
<i>Other taxes</i>		(89.8)
Expenditure	681.8	
Deficit	45.3	

Balance of payments

Current account in goods and services
(provisional figures for 1993)

	Credit	Debit
Oil		122.4
Other merchandise	256.8	964.1
Travel	1279.0	194.5
Other	231.8	565.0

Other main indicators

GDP per capita	\$11 610
Unemployment rate	13.1% (1993)
Inflation rate	2.72% (April 1994)

a cross-party consensus on this issue, Mr Allen ruled out such a move. 'We are philosophically against income tax', he stressed. However, he recognised that some other form of indirect taxation such as VAT might be a possibility. Such a system would not mean a great deal of difference for retailers or consumers, he suggested, since the current price of goods

in The Bahamas includes any customs duties that have been levied. As he succinctly put it, 'we now call them customs duties — maybe someday we will call them something else.'

Economies of scale lacking

Finally, Mr Allen spoke about perceptions of The Bahamas and, in particular, whether it should be seen as a 'developing' country. In terms of per capita income, he acknowledged that 'we are regarded as middle-income, but when one looks at the structure of the economy, domestic production and the absence of linkages between tourism and other sectors, we must be very much a developing country.' He also stressed the unmeasured impact of the illegal immigrant population and the cost of service provision for a population spread over dozens of small islands. 'We have only 250 000 people', he said, 'but we can't even take advantage of the economies of scale of that small figure because of the scattered nature of our territory. Instead of a few large post offices, for example, we need to have dozens of small ones and that adds to our costs. It was difficult, he concluded, to get donors to recognise these factors. ■ S.H.

The entrance to the famous 'Straw Market' on Nassau's Bay Street. Traders will be keeping a close eye on the government's future plans for taxation





Profile

Geography

An archipelago of some 700 islands, and a further 2000 cays, islets and rocks occupying a sea-area of more than 100 000 square miles. Estimated land area, 5382 square miles.

Population

1990 census – 255 000, 1994 estimate – 274 000. *By island group: New Providence: 172 000; Grand Bahama: 41 000; Eleuthera, Harbour Island, Spanish Wells: 11 000; Abaco: 10 000; Andros: 8 000; All other islands: 13 000.*

Capital

Nassau (New Providence).

Political structure

Parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model. Queen Elizabeth II, the Head of State, is represented by a Governor-General (currently Sir Clifford Darling). The bicameral Parliament consists of a 16-member Senate (appointed) and a House of Assembly whose 49 members are elected from single member constituencies using the simple plurality voting system.

Party representation

House of Assembly (last election, August 1992): Free National Movement (FNM) 32, Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) 17.

Senate: FNM 10, PLP 5, Independent 1.

Government

The leader of the majority party in Parliament is invited to form a government. Following a ministerial reshuffle in January 1995, the Cabinet now has 13 members. The current Prime Minister is PNM leader, Hubert Ingraham. Sir Lynden Pindling is the leader of the opposition.

Economy

Tourism is dominant, generating about 50% of gross domestic product. The banking/financial sector accounts for a further 8%. The primary and manufacturing sectors are small and geared mainly towards local consumption. The main export products are shellfish and rum. The principal markets for Bahamian products are the United States (more than 50% of the total) and the European Union. The Bahamian dollar is fixed at par with the US dollar.

'Small countries must devise different economic techniques' says Paul Adderley of the opposition PLP

For an opposition viewpoint on current economic and political issues in The Bahamas, The Courier turned to Paul Adderley, one of 'elder statesmen' of the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP). Mr Adderley, a Cambridge-trained lawyer, has held a variety of ministerial posts over the past three decades including Attorney-General and Foreign Minister. He was Minister of Finance for the last two years of Sir Lynden Pindling's PLP administration. In this interview, he explains how his party's outlook differs from that of the government and gives his thoughts on some of the main issues currently facing The Bahamas.

■ *To what extent do your party's policies diverge from those of the FNM?*

— Until recently, there has been very little ideological difference between the political parties. There were some faint signs of it when the government announced their policy to divest themselves of the hotel corporation but even that wasn't entirely new. The PLP had already agreed to dispose of existing hotels. What we didn't intend to do was to dismantle the hotel corporation altogether. I have always thought that it was a useful catalyst for tourism development, the idea being that we shouldn't place ourselves at the mercy of foreign investment to determine whether or not hotels will be built. I was chairman of the hotel corporation for a few years and we had what I thought was an excellent plan for tourism development. This plan, which envisaged the provision of 14 000 new rooms, has been shelved and things are now being left entirely to the whims of private enterprise. I think this is a mistake. Small countries have got to devise different economic techniques from big ones. None of the economic theories which



come out of the books can sensibly be applied to a country of just 250 000 people which is what we have here.

■ *Free trade is an issue which looks likely to move higher up the political agenda. Indeed, the government has recently signed up, in principle, to the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. What is your view on this given that The Bahamas gets the bulk of its state revenues from customs duties?*

— The government signed up with everybody else at the recent summit in Miami. They did it without any forewarning that they intended to dismantle our current taxation system. We really have no idea what the government policy is on this. It wasn't in their election manifesto, and there has been very little said about it since the election. So here we are faced with a total economic transformation of the taxation base of The Bahamas and nobody is saying anything about it.

■ *Do you think it is feasible for such a transformation to take place.*

— No. It is absolutely unreasonable under existing circumstances. I certainly think we should have a review of the


country's tax policies because there are a great many disadvantages in the existing system but there are advantages as well; for example, the fact that the taxation is at source. So it ought not to be rushed into on a whim, as it were. We need to study the idea very carefully. Will we replace customs duties with an income tax? A bad idea I think. Or will we replace it with Value Added Tax, or some other kind of sales tax? Would we apply the tax to just goods or to goods and services? There are all kinds of variations to be looked at and I don't think we should rush into a decision.

We are already, in many respects, a suburb of Dade County (Miami) and that will become even more true if we abandon our sovereignty in this area. If we decide that's what we want, then fair enough, but if we want to maintain our sovereignty, it seems absolute nonsense to me to lock ourselves into a free trade area without, at least, the most careful examination.

There are certain elements in our economy which I think are inconsistent with the free trade concept. For example, developing local industry. There would be no such thing in a free trade zone. The Bahamas is a high labour cost country. This is related to the fact that we have universal secondary education. So the kind of the economy The Bahamas has developed is bound to be marginalised because investment capital in the world doesn't look for small places like this. You can earn a great deal more interest on investment money in places like Europe for example.

■ *Where do you stand on the question of abolishing exchange controls?*

— What this proposal amounts to is allowing the value of the Bahamian dollar to float. We fixed it at par with the American dollar, which is artificial of course, but it was done deliberately to accommodate the tourist industry and we still think it is a good idea. If you remove the controls, I am not quite sure what would happen to the value of the Bahamian dollar but it would probably have a tremendous effect on the economy because we import everything. If you consider that the Canadian dollar is only worth 80 US cents I find it difficult to see how the



A recently-built power station on one of the Family Islands

The Courier

Bahamian dollar could be maintained at parity. We support the exchange rate using Central Bank reserves and the controls enable us to maintain those reserves. The fixed deposits in our banks are currently about \$1.5 billion which is enormous for a country of this size. If we allow capital to move freely, huge chunks of this money will go to the US. Why shouldn't it? It would be a logical outcome. You can talk about sovereignty and independence as much as you like but when somebody has money they will try to put it where they can get the best return. And where are you going to make the most money? Obviously in the United States, in things like pension funds.

■ *In view of what you have been saying, about the economy, would it be right to say that there is now a left-right divide in the country's politics.*

— Yes, absolutely — over these very fundamental matters of how we tax the Bahamian people, where we look for money for investment and so on. What we are seeing emerging here is virtually nineteenth century laissez faire capitalism.

■ *Does that divide also extend to social issues. ?*

— Not to such a great extent. In the area of housing for example, both ourselves and the government believe in public housing. They have just announced plans to build 1500 new homes in New Providence, which is an enormous number. So they don't appear to support privatisation in this area. They do apparently support the idea of selling off the telecommunications and electricity industries, however, which seems like nonsense to me. The argument in favour of privatising these two utilities is that it will provide an opportunity for competition and will relieve the government of having to give subsidies. But the government isn't actually subsidising either of them at the moment. And the policy is not going to result in competition. Instead of state monopolies, you are going to have a private ones. This country is too small for two electricity or telecom corporations.

■ *So your argument is that the policy would not be economically efficient ?*

— That's right. It doesn't make sense. One of the strongest arguments in favour of privatisation is efficiency born of competition. But there isn't going to be any competition. The Bahamas is too small for that. Look at the United States. Even there, the smart boys will tell you that everything is likely to be reduced to fours. There will be four big banks, four big airlines, four big real estate companies and so on. That process is under way at the moment. So when you talk about competition in The Bahamas, it is nonsense. It can't happen.

■ *Unemployment is clearly one of the main problems that needs to be tackled here, as elsewhere. What measures would you propose, and do you think there is any link between unemployment and the crime rate ?*

— There is a significant link although there are other important factors as well. There is a certain kind of social offence committed by young men who are rebellious and disaffected. There are all kinds of social reasons for this. Illegitimacy is common here and many young people lack a father figure. I also think that the education system fails to provide any kind of substitute for that lack of parental authority. This is principally because most

primary school teachers are women and they often have a discipline problem with boys. There is no problem with girls you know. There is also an underlying problem at the level of the family. There are too many babies being born and too many fathers who are irresponsible. As I said, there isn't a father figure in many households. Having said this, a lot of crime is actually committed by employed people.

■ *What do you think is the reason for that ?*

— Materialism. We have got an extremely materialist society here. People's expectations are always well beyond their natural grasp or abilities. So white collar crime is relatively high. And then you have violent crime. Of course, this is a universal problem and I dare say that it is no worse here than it is in European cities.

We cannot escape the global social forces which are at work. There is one factor which is common to crime, however, which I would say is universal and that is American television. This can now be watched almost anywhere in the world. I can't help but think that there must be a link between violence on television and rising violent crime in the world in societies which have very little else in common. Look at Britain. Last year, the overall crime figures went down but the number of offences involving violence increased.

To return to your question about how to deal with unemployment, there is no easy answer. Anybody who tries to tell you that they have the solution is trying to fool you and probably deceiving himself as well. To be honest, we don't have the answer any more than anyone else has. You can focus on national service but that is not real employment and while it may have a tendency to contain problems — perhaps teach a little bit of self-discipline and personal responsibility, it doesn't tackle the root causes. One of the basic problems is that our economy is not able to provide a sufficient number of high quality jobs for those who finishing secondary education.

■ *Turning to constitutional issues, do you anticipate any debate in the future about The Bahamas becoming a republic ?*

— Yes, just like elsewhere in the Caribbean. There will be a debate at some time, but not just at the moment.

■ *One way in which the continuing constitutional link with London has provoked some controversy involves the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This has apparently made it less easy, for example, for capital punishment to be carried out in The Bahamas. What is your view on this issue?*

— I agree with the Privy Council on this one. When I was Attorney-General, I chaired the committee on the Prerogative of Mercy, and although I don't personally believe in capital punishment, I did what the law required of me.

The Privy Council has since said that you really ought not to hang anybody after they have been on death row for five years. In fact, nobody was hanged during my term of office for the simple reason that when the Governor-General signed the death warrants, the people who had been convicted appealed to the Privy Council.

They had a right to do so and their executions were stayed in the meantime. In all these cases, I think that more than five years have now elapsed.

■ *Is this situation likely to lead to pressure to abolish the right of appeal to the Privy Council?*

— Well this has certainly happened in other parts of the Caribbean but there isn't really any inclination in The Bahamas to change the system. Quite frankly, I don't think I would ever agree to abolish the appeal to the Privy Council which is currently the final arbiter. The country is too small for that. As long as we maintain a common law tradition, then I see nothing wrong with maintaining an association at the judicial level. I believe that there is an enormous commonality of decisions in England, Canada, Australia and the other common law jurisdictions. There is a kind of legal universality developing in the Commonwealth which wasn't there before, and that is a good thing. ■


Interview by S.H.

A manufacturer with a spring in his step

Entrepreneurs who don't dream of succeeding probably never will, but for the managing director of Scottdale, Scott Godet, it is the sweet dreams of others that are important. For beds are his business and the company he runs turns out between 40 and 50 mattress sets every week from its factory at the industrial park in New Providence. Mr Godet is the type of local entrepreneur that the government is keen to encourage. At just 32, he now employs between 12 and 17 people, depending on the state of the order book, and provides much-needed jobs on The Bahamas' most populous island. He also makes a contribution to the balance of payments by supplying a product which might otherwise be imported.

commercial properties including the industrial estate where the mattress plant is located and is thus able to offer factory sites at affordable rents for processing and manufacturing activities. The fabrics, springs and other materials that Scott Godet needs for his mattress business are all imported from the US and although, as a small businessman, he enjoys import duty exemptions, he still has to pay the stamp tax of 7% on the landed value of his inputs. 70% of his sales are to local retail outlets with the remainder going to institutions including hotels, hospitals and even the local prison!

When The Courier visited the mattress factory, Mr Godet reported that the business was doing well. He has a local competitor but does not have to worry



One of the employees of Scottdale putting the finishing touches to a mattress

It was while working in the family retail furniture business that he spotted the potential for moving into the manufacturing side. While friends doubted the viability of the project, pointing out that people do not buy new beds or mattresses that often, Mr Godet had the benefit of an insider's knowledge. He was regularly selling the product, after all, and knew roughly how much local demand there was. He also realised that most of the units he was retailing had been manufactured in the United States.

Mr Godet was assisted in his venture by the Bahamas Agriculture and Industry Corporation which has the job of facilitating business development in the country. The BAIC manages a number of

too much about cheap imports because of the government's tax policies. For Scott Godet, and others like him engaged in the small manufacturing sector, all the recent talk about free trade is bound to be a source of concern. There is no doubting his commitment to producing a high quality product as efficiently as possible. But whether he can hold on to the market niche he has captured — or indeed move into the export business — in any future American free trade area, remains to be seen. But if imagination and dynamism are to count for anything, his future should be secure. ■ S.H.

Cultural aspects

'The factors that make us Bahamian are very complex'

In examining cultural questions in The Bahamas, one must be careful not to offend people's sensibilities. Visitors are often struck by the American influence — from the Macdonalds restaurant in the centre of Nassau to the predominance of US networks on the television, with their daily diet of quiz shows, soap operas and situation comedies. The English that is spoken is heavily laced with American expressions and, of course, the mighty dollar oils the wheels of commerce.

The impact of the USA on many aspects of life in The Bahamas can hardly be denied but it is superficial to suggest, from a cultural standpoint, that the country is just an offshoot of its powerful neighbour. The Bahamas, in fact, has its own distinct and fascinating cultural traditions which reflect its particular history and the ethnic origins of its people. As *Algernon Allen*,

who is Minister of Youth and Culture, explained to *The Courier*, 'the factors that make us Bahamian are very complex — a mixture of political and historical experiences. There is the African diaspora, our British colonial past and the influence of our southern neighbours.' (The Bahamas plays host to a substantial Haitian population). Another important element, common to insular societies, is the attachment that people feel to a particular island with which they or their family have links, even if they have not lived there for many years. This is a situation which is common in the country, many people having moved in the past to New Providence or Grand Bahama from the less-developed Family Islands in search of work. Without seeking to undermine this sense of local identity, Mr Allen sees it as his task to organise events 'which bring together our archipelagic nation into a cohesive social unit'. The Junkanoo festival (see the article on tourism) is the main event in the Bahamian

cultural calendar but Mr Allen is also anxious to stress other aspects of his 'culture' remit. One of his objectives is properly to chronicle the traditions of communities in the Family Islands, some of which have a 'centuries-old lifestyle strongly based on the African experience.' He is also enthusiastic about the National Youth Choir's recent successful tour to the USA. As the Minister graphically put it, 'they wowed the audiences at the Smithsonian in Washington'.

For more information about this famous group, we turned to the Director of Culture, *Cleophas Adderley*. His interest is more than merely that of a civil servant with responsibility for the arts — for Mr Adderley is also the choirmaster. The National Youth Choir, as the picture

The song is entitled '*I hate Sat'days, I hate to bathe*', sung (and acted) here by the male section of the Bahamian National Youth Choir



indicates, is not just a choir in the conventional sense. The choristers are called upon to perform and move as well as sing, and the result is an exciting visual and musical display. The African influence is often heard in the beat and the story-telling quality of the lyrics, there is a hint of Caribbean rhythm and a touch of religious revivalism in some of the melodies, and the overall result is very definitely Bahamian.

Lack of confidence

Notwithstanding the success of the choir, Mr Adderley is worried about what he sees as a lack of local confidence in cultural matters. 'Too often, for anything local to succeed in the cultural sphere,' he says, 'the stamp of approval must come from abroad.' Like his professional counterparts in the arts in other countries, he also worries about the perennial problem of finance. It will always be difficult persuading governments to give substantial subsidies to artistic endeavours when there are so many other pressing needs, but the Director may have a point when he argues his case in the context of The Bahamas' all-important tourist sector. He suggests that many of the overseas visitors are actively looking for a different cultural experience and more investment in this area could result in profitable returns.

In addition to the focus on performing groups, there are a number of respected Bahamian artists whose works are displayed in various galleries. The islands offer rich scenic opportunities for

Vendue House, the building where the slave market used to be situated. Now it is the Museum of Slavery and Emancipation



The Courier



Changing the Guard at the Governor-General's residence

painters and, with so many tourists, there is always a good market for attractive landscapes.

For a historical perspective, one can visit a range of museums including the thought-provoking Pompey Museum of Slavery and Emancipation at Vendue House in Bay Street, Nassau. From the outside, it is difficult to imagine that this attractive building was the place where slaves were brought ashore from West Africa to be sold to the plantation owners.

Inside, however, one soon learns the uncomfortable truth about this aspect of the islands' past. Historical influences also play an important part in the public ceremonies which have a decidedly 'British' tinge.

With Queen Elizabeth remaining as head of state, and a Westminster-style parliamentary system, the country has retained many of the ritual aspects associated with the former metropolitan power. One of the more colourful of these is the 'Changing of the Guard' ceremony at the Governor-General's residence.

Finally, in common with many countries in the Caribbean region, religion still has a central role in Bahamian life. According to the Bahamas Handbook, the


country has more 'reverends' per capita than almost any other country in the world. 'If you like the Jesse Jackson, Martin Luther King and Adam Clayton-Powell style of preaching,' the Handbook claims, 'you will love the preachers here. They have a way with words, heaping praises on the Lord and firing the soul with nothing but their voice and the Bible.'

The lesson for visitors is clear. Don't be fooled by possible first impressions. It is hardly surprising that the islands have been subjected to American influences (positive as well as negative) given their proximity to the USA. But it doesn't take long to discover that the Bahamians also have a culture and set of traditions that are distinct and special. And there is no doubt that those with responsibility in this field intend to keep it that way. ■

S.H.

EU — Bahamas cooperation Helping balanced development

by James Moran*



Grand Bahama, which dominate tourism and which have benefited from the lion's share of investment over the years. They have also been a magnet for migration from the other islands, to the point where they now account for some three-quarters of the national population and where population pressures are placing serious strains on social and economic infrastructure. This is particularly true of the capital, Nassau.

When considering *per capita* figures, it should also be remembered that they can be a particularly poor indicator of the real level of prosperity in small island economies. The Bahamas suffers from the classic constraints of high unit costs of infrastructure and service development, a lack of breadth in necessary human resources (and thus the need for costly imports of skilled and professional labour), and high costs of living born of the dependence on imported goods. In short, the country has had difficulties in ensuring balanced development.

With this in mind, EDF assistance to The Bahamas under the national programmes, which began when the country signed the first Lomé Convention in 1976, has been concentrated on the less developed islands. A related objective has been to help The Bahamas reduce its heavy dependence on imports by developing local production capacity. Underlying these efforts have been the parallel aims of stemming migration and expanding tourism, still the mainspring of growth in The Bahamas and the best hope for sustained development of the poorer regions. Indeed, the government has made the diversification of the tourism product a priority in its current economic plans.

As shown in the table, total EDF grant assistance since 1976 now amounts to ECU 14.69 million. This includes ECU 3.29m in interest subsidies for two European Investment Bank 'own-resources' loans, which were made in the 1980s for water and sewerage development on New Providence (ECU 8.5m) and for improvement and expansion of electricity supplies in the Family Islands (ECU 9.1m).


Electricity was also a focus for the Lomé III EDF programme, which was largely used to co-finance, together with Government and the electricity corpor-

The Bahamas is, in many ways, an exception among ACP states. It is very dispersed geographically, being made up of about 1000 islands, and is strongly dependent in economic terms on trade with, and tourism from, its giant American neighbour, which lies within 100 km of its northern extremities. Indeed, it would be fair to say that when the US sneezes, The Bahamas invariably catches a cold, or worse.

Resurfacing part of the Queens Highway, Long Island. The work is being financed with Lomé IV funds

The country is, of course, also exceptionally well-endowed with natural beauty and, partly as a result, is wealthy relative to other ACPs. This is mainly thanks to the income generated by its well-established tourist industry. Nonetheless, the national per capita income figure conceals a heavily skewed distribution of wealth within the archipelago. Geography plays a major part in this: outlying areas such as the Family Islands are considerably less developed than New Providence or

* Head of the EC Delegation in Jamaica with responsibility also for The Bahamas, Belize, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Caymans.



A view of the Bahamas Hotel Training College in Nassau which has received help under the Lomé Caribbean regional programme

ation, rural energy development on one of the largest of the Families, Cat Island. The project is now almost complete and a number of small communities are receiving reliable power supplies for the first time. The balance of Lomé III funded the upgrading of the 34km Great Abaco Island Highway.

The first Lomé IV programme has concentrated on one project, the rehabilitation of the Queens Highway, which is the backbone of Long Island, a largely undiscovered jewel in the Family Island crown with considerable potential for tourist, agricultural and fisheries development. The project, which is in the process of upgrading the entire 110km stretch of road, is progressing well and is on schedule for opening later this year. And even as the bulldozers carry out their work, there is mounting evidence of the catalytic effect that this kind of development can have. Public and private investments have already begun to flow into the island, with new land sub-divisions and lateral road connections springing up, foreshadowing new construction; the appearance of a packing plant for local farming products,

The local contractor and an EC adviser discuss progress on the Long Island road project

new telephone and electricity lines going in and the development of health and school facilities.

Long Island thus seems destined for a new lease of economic life and it is perhaps unsurprising to hear those tour operators 'in the know' whispering the old adage — 'visit now before the masses arrive!'

Outside of infrastructure, previous EDFs have attempted to assist food production, notably through funding an animal feed pilot plant, a fruit crop nursery and a food technology laboratory. It has proved to be something of an uphill struggle: agricultural development has always been problematic in The Bahamas given the diffusion of the farming community across many islands, the difficulty of maintaining production incentives and the limited technical resources available. However, the objective of developing local production in those areas, such as horticulture, where it can compete with imports,

remains high on the list of priorities and lessons learned from these projects will be valuable for future policy.

The Bahamas has benefited from the substantial Caribbean regional programme, which has financed several actions in trade and tourism promotion. More particularly, the country has long been recognised as a regional centre of excellence for tourist industry training and is the site for the ECU 4.4m Caribbean regional hotel training programme, funded under Lomé III, which involved provision of technical assistance, training equipment and the construction of a student hostel at the Bahamas Hotel Training College in Nassau. Among other things, the project has established a HOST (Hospitality Occupation Standards for Training) programme for the region and introduced a hospitality trainer certificate which is, while based on sound international practice, a truly Caribbean qualification, adapted to the special needs of the regional industry.

In all, EDF cooperation with The Bahamas has helped the country to spur economic activity throughout the archipelago, particularly in the south, and has played its part in aiding the populations of the relatively neglected islands to gain access to development opportunities.

This will undoubtedly remain a domestic — and international — priority for some time to come, given the ever-present danger of social malaise and its regional handmaiden, illicit trade in narcotics. Indeed, The Bahamas' successful campaign in stamping out this activity during recent years has relied on both the 'stick' of enforcement and the 'carrot' of development. ■

J.M.

EDF Cooperation with The Bahamas since 1976

European Development Fund	Amount (ECUm)	Main projects
EDF 4 – Lomé I NIP	1.800	Line of credit to Bahamas Development Bank Food technology laboratory Technical assistance to BDB Economic development unit
EDF 5 – Lomé II NIP	2.100	Animal feed pilot plant Fruit crop nursery Technical assistance to the Central Purchasing Unit 3 health care centres Food and technology laboratory Great Abaco Highway Management training for CPU
EDF 6 – Lomé III NIP	4.000	Rural energy supplies Great Abaco Highway Queens Highway, Long Island
– subsidies for EIB loans	3.289	New Providence Water and Sewerage Family Islands electricity
EDF 7 – Lomé IV NIP	3.500	Queens Highway, Long Island
Total	14.689	

GUYANA

Surface calm and strong undercurrents

Guyana, the only English-speaking country on the South American continent, has a personality that foreigners find difficult to pin down. Neither its ecological nightmares — the fear of being engulfed by the sea, the protection of its tropical forests — nor its outstanding natural beauty arouse any great fervour. The same is true of the vagaries of its former exotic brand of communism, and the exemplary way in which it returned to the democratic fold. Yet this country, the land of Eldorado as the conquistadors believed, conceals a profusion of richness and originality.



The usual reaction, on hearing the name 'Guyana', is not to be transported into exotic daydreams of distant countries, but to ask 'Which one?' Countries which share their name with others are doomed to suffer an identity crisis, worse still, the clarification — 'Guyana, what used to be British Guiana' brings the automatic response, 'Oh yes, Jim Jones and the People's Temple ...' But disregarding this reference to a tragedy which was only

accidentally played out in Guyana and pressing on with 'the supposed site of the mythical Eldorado that obsessed the Spanish conquistadors' will bring a faraway look into the questioner's eyes.

That look will reflect the gleam of gold, the sparkle of the diamonds that still stud the country's soil, the crystal flash of countless cascades, dizzying waterfalls, rapids, mighty rivers lapping or lashing the shores of magnificent islands that divide

The Orinduik falls on the River Ireng
Guyana — surface calm and strong
undercurrents

the current, and the tropical forest, a vast region that is still *terra incognita*. Then there is the colonial architecture of Georgetown, like an artist's collection of wooden houses, perhaps the most beautiful in the world — reminiscent of a tropical Amsterdam from a bygone century with its canals, the lush green banks and the ornate

footbridges hanging above the water. And then, the faces of the people: Amerindians of many tribes, blacks, (Asian) Indians, Chinese, Creoles and half-castes with complexions in every golden shade the tropics can produce. And having said all this, swept away by your own enthusiasm, you would have to pause for breath and wonder why you had missed out so many inconvenient details. The wonders may be there, but there is no way of reaching them, short of hiring a plane and trusting your life to a pilot with the nerve to take off and land on landing-strips no more than a few yards long. The entire infrastructure of the country is in a catastrophic state, including the sea wall that protects the coastal area where most of the population live, a good proportion of which is below sea level. Not to mention the threats to the environment stamped upon the land by the caterpillar tracks of the destroyers of the Brazilian rainforests, planning to plough through Amazonia to the north coast, or hacked out by the picks of the gold prospectors, or spreading across the country in the form of the gigantic concessions to the multinationals. Then there are the claims of Venezuela and Suriname to almost three-quarters of Guyana's territory. and then again there is the threat that the country's society will implode under the pressure of racial tensions.


And so you have to start again at the beginning.

A country of six races

To the Indians who originally inhabited the vast area which today includes the territories of Guyana, French Guiana, Suriname (the former Dutch Guiana), Venezuela and a large part of northern Brazil, the whole region was known as 'Guiana' — the land of many rivers. For some unknown reason, when the Spaniards in the early sixteenth century began to turn their eyes from the Caribbean islands to the mainland of the continent, they overlooked the territory of Guiana — perhaps because its coastline was mired by the alluvial mud brought down by the Amazon, or because of the strip of mangrove swamps, dozens of miles wide, that cut off the dry land from the

sea. The Dutch, well accustomed to fighting and winning battles against the sea, took full advantage: in the late sixteenth

and early seventeenth centuries they explored the country by land and water, moving up the rivers until they reached the stretches above the tidewater, where they established trading posts. These were soon highly successful, bringing in cotton, precious woods like mahogany and logwood, coffee and sugar. The withdrawal of the Spanish presence from the West Indies had opened the way to French and English buccaneers and freebooters, by far the most famous of whom was the English explorer Walter Raleigh, who landed in what is now Guyana in 1595. Whereas the land of the Indians was swiftly shared out between the Portuguese in the north of Brazil, the Spaniards in Venezuela, the Dutch in Suriname and the French in Guiana, the future Guyana was long and hotly disputed. With the decline of Napoleon, France was forced to cede its territory in the region to Britain in 1814, and in 1831 this area — the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice — was united under the name of British Guiana. In the meantime, the 'sugar revolution' of the eighteenth century, which made the fortune of the island of Santo Domingo (now split between Haiti and the Dominican Republic), spread to South America, and more particularly Brazil and Guyana. Legions of slaves were brought in from Africa to replace the Amerindian popu-



Georgetown
Reminiscent of a tropical Amsterdam

lation, wiped out by force of arms and forced labour or decimated by diseases brought from the Old World.

With slavery abolished in British possessions in 1833, the Africans abandoned the plantations, which to them were the symbols of servitude. Labour was then brought in from Portugal, and especially from China and India. These three races were to play a major part in establishing the 'nation of six races', as Guyana is sometimes called by its citizens, alongside the British, the Africans and the Amerindians. Gradually, in what some people viewed as a campaign of colonial cynicism, the local population was converted to a minority by a massive influx of Indians. The same thing happened in Trinidad, and the present-day consequences there are similar.

In Guyana, this disruption of the ethnic balance, begun in the previous century, has escalated in recent decades with the accelerating decline of the birth rate among the urban population.

At the start of the second half of this century, this was not yet a problem: Indians and Africans, the two main elements in society, joined forces to demand independence. The future seemed rosy.

A wayward father

The country seemed to be a model of prosperity. Prices for sugar, coffee and above all bauxite, which had become the dominant export product, had soared on the commodities markets. On the political front, a parliamentary system had been set up, conforming to democratic traditions. This was also the period when Soviet ideology put down roots in the Third World, and from those roots grew the divided Left of today's Guyana: the People's Progressive Party (PPP) which is aligned with Marxism-Leninism, and the People's National Congress (PNC) which regards itself as socialist. The former enjoys more support among Indians and the latter among people of African descent, though there is no clear racial split. The struggle for independence entered its last round as the 1960s began. At that time it was the PPP that held the reins of power, the Prime Minister of the day being the present head of state, Dr Cheddi B. Jagan. With strong support from the most politicised strata of society, especially the unions, and a charismatic leader in the person of its founder, Lindon Forbes Sampson Burnham, the PNC took over in 1964 and presided over the birth of the new nation. At the same time, the party became more radical, to the extent of engendering a tropical pseudo-bolshevism, established in 1970 under the name of the cooperative Re-

public of Guyana, which took refuge in a policy of extolling non-alignment. The two major political parties then proceeded to perform a sort of impromptu *pas de deux*, with the social democratic PNC drifting towards communism while the Marxist-Leninists of the PPP became receptive to the dogmas of liberalism. Having come to power by the democratic process, Burnham — the 'Founder', the father of his country — gradually instilled the poison of dictatorship into what had become a repressive and nepotistic system.

For the country, it was a descent into purgatory. First, there was the economy. In the immediate aftermath of independence the high prices of sugar and many raw materials continued to rise, but things swiftly deteriorated. The profitability of the three main sources of income — bauxite, sugar and rice — collapsed, owing partly to falling prices but more to declining production, bad management and a failure to adapt to market requirements. Sugar production was nationalised, as was the mining industry. The state took charge of virtually all foreign trade, controlling 90% of imports and exports. With the importing of consumer goods prohibited, many products ran short, including basic food products such as flour,

An aircraft provides the only access to virtually the whole of Guyana's territory. And you have to hire it. *Two decades of infrastructural neglect*

salt and cooking oil. Guyana was even brought to the point of being short of sugar. The infrastructure — telephones, drinking water supply, road network, electricity — deteriorated. The life blood literally began to pour out of the country, as 500 000 people emigrated in fifteen years. This compares with a population of some 800 000 now living in the country. Guyana has still not fully recovered from the economic disaster of the Burnham era, and so the population drain has still not been completely checked. Salaries remain appallingly low, a government minister earning less than \$500. The only brake on the exodus today is the strictness of the United States Department of Immigration.

It was against this background of the Burnham era with its economic decline that there occurred, on 19 November 1979, the news story that was to be universally remembered, give rise to the wildest theories and fantasies, and reviving ancient hatreds: the mass suicide by poisoning of 912 members of the 'Reverend' Jim Jones's 'People's Temple' sect. It would have been no more than a nine-day wonder in the history of Guyana but for the repeated allegations about dark deeds of repression committed by the members of the sect on behalf of Burnham's political police.

The deterioration of the country's infrastructure was the catalyst which, in a sense, brought about the end of the dictator in 1985. Requiring a fairly minor surgical operation, and doubting that he could trust the loyalty of Guyana's doctors, he brought in a Cuban team. A power cut disabled the anaesthetic equipment, however, and he died in hospital. Burnham left behind him a country bled dry, politically isolated, rejected by the United States and on cool terms with its partners in CARICOM (the Caribbean common market), especially after the American invasion of Grenada in 1983 which the other CARICOM members supported or accepted. The matter of his successor was resolved as it would have been in Ancient Rome: by the party, with an information blackout that lasted for days, and the selection of an unexpected candidate.





Perestroika

The business quarter of Georgetown
Rapid growth in the last few years...

What surprises the visitor to Guyana is how little trauma the country seems to have suffered as a result of that period of political obscurantism. Could this be recognition for a man who, after all, made the independence of the country a reality? Or is it pragmatic and phlegmatic politicians trained in the British school who believe that a country's history has to bear the mark of its failures as well as its successes? Might it be complicity on the part of a restricted political caste, of whatever party, which had grown out of the same political movement, and every member of which had at some time or other been close to the former dictator? Whatever the reason, the fact is that there has been no move towards 'destalinisation'. Burnham's party is still one of the two dominating political life, and it has never unanimously distanced itself from the image of its founder, even arguing that his grand design for his country was only betrayed by inappropriate strategy and tactics. The PPP, which holds power today, and which had lived through the dictatorship, makes no display of virulent rejection of the past. Burnham's critics adopt a moderate tone. The mining town of Linden still bears Burnham's forename and

has never reverted to its former name (the surname of a Canadian geologist). And, on the anecdotal level, no politician shows any reluctance to make regular appearances at the Grand Hotel in the capital, where an engraved commemorative plaque bears the name of Burnham. This capacity for distancing oneself from events may, perhaps, be a safeguard against excessively violent social upheavals. In Guyana, there are those who will claim that this characteristic — together with a sense of hospitality — is the common denominator of all Guyanese, of whatever origin.

Desmond Hoyte, then, inherited Burnham's mantle of undivided power, together with a constitution tailored to suit the president, and a well-oiled machine for the rigging of elections. During the first two years there was little outward sign of change: the party apparatchiks still controlled the system. But, from the very outset, while proclaiming that Burnham, the 'Founder', had left the country a legacy of political stability, peace and sense of nationality, and that he would pursue his predecessor's objectives in terms of the building of the nation, Hoyte displayed a determination to use his own methods. At

any rate, from 1987 onwards he was to prove himself to be a Guyanese version of Gorbachev. He broke the state's stranglehold on the economy, and the equally fierce grip of the party on politics and of the Security Police on the population. On the economic front, Hoyte's government launched in 1988 a strict programme of structural adjustment which was essential if the country were to be rescued from its state of virtual bankruptcy: this included removal of all price controls, freely floating exchange rates and the ending of most trade restrictions. The beneficial effects of this programme began to be felt from 1990 onwards. Sugar production, for example, had been falling continuously, dropping from 300 000 tons in 1981 to a mere 130 000 in 1990, only just remaining above the level of the European Community import quota. But the management contract signed with a British company and the greater freedom of action allowed to the state sugar cooperative, Guysuico, paved the way for a spectacular recovery — over 240 000 tons a mere two years later, in 1992. Inflation fell from 100% in 1991 to 14% in 1992. The government imposed a programme of diversification on state-owned enterprises: Guysuico, responsible for sugar production, also branched out into other agricultural produce, aiming at self-sufficiency in food supplies — aquaculture, groundnuts, cassava and onions. And, above all, rice, the third mainstay of the national economy after sugar and bauxite, whose production is still encouraged by the present government, and which represents a jewel in the Guyanese economy and its visiting card. Over and above the need for internal food supplies, the rice option had proved its worth in terms of foreign trade and came to serve as a currency in Guyana's barter policy, especially in payment for manufactured goods from the Eastern countries or petroleum products from the neighbouring island of Trinidad. The government also reversed some of the nationalisations, so that the American bauxite company Reynolds, whose assets had been expropriated in 1975, was able to return to Guyana, a factor which helped give that industry some breathing space.

On the political front, Hoyte decided to organise elections in 1990.



Indian temple in Georgetown
*An essential need — preserving racial
 harmony*

Doubts about his sincerity, and the need to guarantee transparency and fairness, resulted in repeated postponements until 1992. Ultimately, the elections took place only because of the presence of observers. The role of former American President Jimmy Carter and his Center was critical, though there were still a great many irregularities. Supporters of the PPP, which was victorious in the elections together with the small Civic party, are still making allegations of electoral fraud against the PNC. The letter sent on 29 January 1993 by the Carter Center absolves the PNC of any suspicion.

It concluded that the main problems of the 1990-92 electoral process were *not* due to any manipulation or deliberate fraud by the government or the PNC. Their causes, it continued, could be found in administrative incompetence and a confused notion of authority.

According to the Carter Center, these problems still exist and will have to be resolved before the next elections, otherwise the confidence of the public, and of the PNC, in the government and democratic system in Guyana will be seriously undermined. The explanation for the violence that then occurred, say the Center's observers, was that control of the elections had escaped from the hands of the PNC's supporters, and they felt that the electoral machinery had passed into the hands of the PPP/Civic parties, whereas in fact the situation was one of complete anarchy.

Growth and tensions: the race against the clock

The success of the government which took office in October 1992 under President Cheddi Jagan can be quantified by a single figure: 16%. This represents the total growth of the economy during the government's first two years in power. The official architect of this excellent result, Finance Minister Asgar Ally, can also take pride in the rise in private sector investment — especially local investment, since the foreign currency variety has tended to dwindle. Sugar production in 1993 remained at the previous year's very good level, and the 1994 figures, due shortly, are expected to show a further rise. But Asgar Ally attaches even more importance to rice, production of which has been rocketing for several years and has now recorded an extraordinary rise of 20% in a single year. New investment has contributed heavily to this sector, and also to forestry production and semi-finished products (such as plywood) and mining, especially gold mining. These good figures are offset by falling incomes for the three main export products — sugar, rice and bauxite — as a result of low market prices. In addition, imports have increased more than exports, exacerbating the trade deficit.

Guyana has to bear the burden of the world's highest *per capita* foreign debt, a situation which has existed since the final years of the Burnham regime. Stern measures by successive governments have been unable to rid the country of this melancholy record. The latest published figures are in the region of \$2 billion. Servicing this debt consumes 70% of the foreign currency coming into the country. One structural adjustment programme follows another; the present government has had to turn the screw yet again. The state is tightening its belt, with public spending down by 10% of GNP in a single year. Although education and health are given a high priority, the cup is a bitter one for the poorest members of society. Studies show that more than 40% of the population lives below the poverty line, the figures being worse among the Amerindian communities, isolated in inaccessible parts of the country. In urban areas, the unemployed and those dependent on casual labour have borne the full brunt of the cutbacks in the social services budgets.

The government faces a serious dilemma: how to capitalise on its successes in terms of economic growth and business profits while at the same time explaining the rise in unemployment and the spread of poverty. The co-existence of these two situations is perceived as an injustice by the disinherited. And the rising tide of social protest goes hand in hand with racial tension: rightly or wrongly, the black community — more strongly represented in opposition ranks — accuses the government of manipulating economic and political power to the benefit of the Indians. Under the previous regime, it was the Indian community that protested against the monopolisation of political positions by the other side. As President Jagan's statements testify, his government is very concerned by this problem and bitterly attacks those who fan the flames. The real problem, according to the President, is the economic crisis and how to resolve it. He believes that his chosen path of encouraging growth is the right one. The second stage will be to redistribute the fruits of growth: an equation which amounts to a race against the clock. ■

Hégel Goutier

Culture and change

Guyana seems to be haunted by nostalgia, by regret for a time which has disappeared as though stolen, for a lost paradise, of a country in a state of relative prosperity, dreaming the opulent dreams of a nation on the verge of birth and enjoying all the wellbeing which good relations between the inhabitants of a country can bring. We asked two people who are well-placed in Guyanese society whether Guyana is suffering an identity crisis and whether Guyanese culture is becoming harsher.

The two are friends and colleagues who helped organise a local NGO for promoting the rights of women, called Red Threat Women, which has spread through the Caribbean, and they are members or supporters of a small political party, WPA (Working People Alliance) which derives support from intellectual circles. Their names are Jocelyne Dow and Wanda Radzik.

Jocelyne is an entrepreneur. She manages a company promoting and trading in furniture, craft products and works of art. Wanda works with her. Between them, they probably have in their genes all the ethnic elements which make up Guyana, from black to white and from East Indian to Amerindian. As intellectuals and artists who are in a state of gentle revolt and who are saddened to see their country at risk from internal conflict, depopulation and acculturation, they are making their voices heard within their own country and on international platforms. They are also very willing to give information to foreigners who wish to know more about their country. They surprise and charm those who come into contact with them by their generosity of spirit, which leads them to commit themselves, but without becoming biased, to criticise the rigidity of those in power, but without aggression and in particular to ask questions and to open up avenues through which their country can be experienced. They are both blessed with strong personalities and very individual ways of perceiving the world, but

when they talk about Guyana, they seem to be singing in a round, to use a musical metaphor. Our conversation with them revolved solely around the question as to whether Guyana has a single culture or several. They never replied directly, but their response was built up by a series of gentle strokes. They both gave the strong impression of thinking aloud and their responses were never cut-and-dried. And yet their doubt proved to be more informative than any number of assurances.

When they were asked what it is like to be a Guyanese today, Jocelyne was the first to answer, full of bitterness. Thirty years ago, it was possible to be truly Guyanese. Everything was possible then. And they went on to explain, starting from ground with which they are most familiar, the interface between art and history. Thirty years ago, Guyanese of every extraction were moved by the same will to create a nation. And those who were creative by profession or by inclination alone, that is to say painters, sculptors, musicians, etc., played an enormous part in this birth of a nation. The educational system was a model for the rest of the region. The cultural traditions were rich and the integration of different cultures manifested itself in a number of aspects of everyday life. Literacy was relatively high. The country was heading towards independence and enthusiasm abounded.

Phillip Moore: 'Many faces of Martin'
Melting-pot art



Wanda considers that the level of artistic activity and the education of the intellectually gifted have dropped off sharply since the time when they were the best, if not in the whole Caribbean, then at least in the English speaking Caribbean countries. One of the reasons for this is that, like specialists in other sectors, most of the best teachers have left the country. Moreover, the situation which has driven half of the population to go and live in other countries has helped to create a culture of departure. A significant proportion of the population spend their lives waiting for a visa and looking forward to the day when departure formalities have been completed, which means that they have no interest in the nation's future. Departure has gained a place in the Guyanese imagination.

Pluralism has always been a feature of popular culture. Each ethnic community has its own culture. Fortunately there are still places where these have retained their vitality, such as Etaka on the coast, which is a centre of African culture, or certain East Indian villages. But these cultures also mixed fairly well over time. It was frequently possible to see, next to the sea wall, Indians or black Africans coming to pay homage to their gods using similar rituals.

To understand the problem, we have to go back to the colonial system, which played on the divisions between the different communities. The plantations contained a patch for Indians and a patch for those of black African extraction, separated by a barrier. The colonial system of division was intended to prevent racial mixing. Few 'mixed' marriages took place here, in comparison with the number seen in Jamaica, for example. An antagonism therefore very quickly arose between the two communities, and this was manipulated. The competition between two groups of more or less the same size and with the same level of social development was extremely fierce. The recent political history of the country has exacerbated it. The two women therefore considered the problem to be more political than social or religious. Each of the three most important cultures of the country, Hindu, Muslim and black African, has its own festival, but many people celebrate all three. The Indian

The novel in Guyana

Guyanese writers have concentrated more on poetry than on the novel. There are, however, a number of big names in the latter field. First and foremost, one should mention Mittelholzer, especially in view of his great historical saga 'Keywana'. He describes Guyanese society, but not in the style of a painstaking X-ray picture, as provided by the Trinidadian Naipaul when he describes his country in 'Miguel Street'. Mittelholzer is rather a writer of a kind of Caribbean psychological novel. He currently lives in Trinidad.

Wilson Harris is another. He is a writer with a fertile imagination who has lived in England since the 1960s. All his novels are depictions of Guyana from the inside.

A young novelist and teacher who lives on the west coast, Harischandra Khemraj, was awarded the literary prize of Guyana for his first novel 'Cosmic dance'. Its title derives from the dances of Krishna in Indian mythology and it is interesting for several reasons. Taking a news item about the murder of an Indian girl in a village as a starting point, he explores the nuances of human relations and the social implications of a crime which could be termed commonplace, for relations between Indians and those of African extraction. This novel is published by Peepal Tree, Yorkshire, UK.

festival at Pagwa is an important one for many people of black African extraction. 'We are very respectful when it comes to our religious differences', emphasises Jocelyne. She considers that more progress should be made in the field of intimate relations, such as marriage.

Despite everything, a distinct Guyanese culture continues to be forged in everyday life. Guyanese music has been enriched by contributions from different races. Cricket is the national sport. Martin Carter is a true national poet. In the 1950s, his poems about resistance and the unity of thought crossed racial boundaries. Read by working people everywhere, they helped to raise everyone's awareness of colonial oppression. The 1950s were a period in which a true Guyanese culture flourished. They now seem to be the real time of paradise lost. Intellectuals were the motive force behind this movement. They took a lot of their inspiration from the culture of the first inhabitants of the country, the Amerindians. If one had to define a Guyanese culture which was common to all, one would point to the feeling of hospitality and also to a very Amerindian virtue, that of 'largeness'. And despite the fact that this element of Guyanese society continues to be pushed to one side, it is this sense of largeness both as regards the physical size of the country and an openness of spirit which guarantees its future. An awareness of place and self was what motivated all those creative people in the 1950s.

The new life shown by painting and sculpture has arisen as a result of this legacy. Traditional Amerindian sculpture

has always influenced Guyanese practitioners of the visual arts. Landscape interpreted in an Amerindian way is seen repeatedly in modern painting, even abstract painting. 'They have given so much to Guyana' said Wanda, 'starting with its name'.

Guyanese artists have fused together legends, myths and marvels from the Amerindian heritage and others. One element of popular culture is currently being taken up by an increasing number of people. Sitting somewhere between a ritual and a party game, it is the 'table link' used to invoke spirits of different origins, Dutch, African, East Indian, Chinese etc., creating in each case a setting and an atmosphere which are born of decorative and high art and mysticism. Each spirit is associated with the music of its origin, and so an African rhythm merges into a Hindu song. People even return specially from abroad to organise 'table links' as part of big village festivals. This is not connected with any particular religion. Another example might be the fact that Guyanese of all religions venerate and pay homage to the Indian goddess Kali. Many people of black African extraction practice 'Maipuja', which is a mélange of African, Amerindian and Indian beliefs or the 'Alleluia' religion, which is a mixture of Amerindian and African elements. Researchers now even talk about an Alleluia culture. The slaveholding system prohibited African religions, and they continued to be ostracised until the 1970s. They were forbidden by law. The arrival of the East Indians proved to be a life raft for African beliefs which were able to hide behind the religious

practices of the new arrivals, especially as there are a large number of similarities between Hindu and African rituals. But the influence was not just in one direction. There was a crossing over of beliefs, leading to cross fertilisation.

There was also a mixture of vocabulary. Many English words were subjected to Indian influence. Thus, for example, the word 'boy', has become closer to 'bhai'. But insufficient research has been conducted in this area to catalogue these linguistic features and to supply this information to the general public. Some typical Afro-Guyanese expressions have also passed into the common language. One Nigerian researcher at Georgetown University, Aldeola James, who married a Guyanese, has made some interesting discoveries regarding resemblances between similar traditions and social relations among Africans, East Indians and Amerindians in Guyana.

All these analyses, however, are tempered by the negative connotations of blackness in East Indian societies. The Indian goddess Kali is black. In other Caribbean societies, like that of Jamaica, where the separation between Indians and those of black African extraction was not as complete as in Guyana or Trinidad, there was very effective mixing, even in the sphere of intimate relations. The Jamaican revolutionary and thinker Marcus Garvey came from an Indian family. Ending denominational schools in Guyana in the 1970s encouraged the different elements to come closer together, and so the recent intention of supporters of the current government to reopen private schools can only be harmful.

Jocelyne insists, however, that economics and politics are of prime importance for the development of a national culture, which is not at present seen as a priority. The culture cannot exist, according to Wanda if there is no awareness of the need for it. She asserts her belief in the need for art, as it has a humanising effect on life. And the growth of a new barbarism should come as no surprise if art has been neglected. ■

H.G.

The Courier speaks to President Jagan

'Unless we correct deficiencies and constraints quickly, we won't be able to maintain democracy'

During his last visit to Brussels in September 1994, The Courier spoke to President Cheddi Jagan about Guyana's international relations. We interviewed him again in January 1995 in Georgetown and this time the focus was on other issues of importance to his country. Here, we present the results of these two interviews. Dr Jagan has already been in print a number of times, setting out his ideas about a 'New Global Human Order'. We began by asking him to explain what this would entail.

— We want to work out a strategy aimed at global cooperation between the North and the South. There are increasing demands from working people in the North, some of whom are losing their jobs and getting poorer. At the same time the Third World wants more aid, even if aid fatigue is setting in. With assistance, we can have faster growth thus giving us more access to industrial goods from the North. So, we think the time has come for new reforms; perhaps a new Lomé Convention which is better in terms of assistance and setting up institutions.

In Germany and France there are proposals to reduce the working week to four days but, it is said, with 10% loss of pay. The unions don't want pay cuts. Meanwhile, the welfare state is being dismantled. In the South, we need debt and poverty relief. In Guyana, for instance, we have a high growth rate but are not basically getting to the root of the poverty problem because of things like deregulation and the absence of monetary or trade controls. As a result, everything is imported into the country, our dollar is being devalued and the working class are feeling the effects.

We have a proposal, not just for the way the money should be used, but also where it could come from. It could be found by cutting arms expenditure by 3% a year. Demilitarisation along these lines would yield about \$460 billion over the next five years. There could be a dollar a barrel tax on oil, and then there is the idea put forward by a Nobel prize-winning

economist, for a half percent tax on global capital speculated on the stock exchange. This would give you \$1500 billion a year. So there are ways of getting the money, but unfortunately governments, particularly in the North, would have problems with this because big businesses — the oil monopolies, those who control the stock exchanges, the arms manufacturers and so on — do not like being taxed.

We think the time has come for new reforms, perhaps a new Lomé Convention...



■ *Unless and until these ideas are adopted, there is just the traditional form of aid...*

— Yes, and as long we are not industrialised, we have to buy from the developed countries and keep importing inflation. A programme of industrialisation is vital for us. We have some concessions for duty free entry for our products, in Europe, the USA and Canada but we need people to produce. A period of time must be given to help all countries to reorient their production to the new possibilities in the global market

■ *You have spoken about your desire for a new world order. What about your aspirations for your own country?*

— We want to be independent in the full sense of the word — politically, socially, economically and culturally; to have a country where the basic needs of the people are met and where they can enjoy to the full, the freedoms that are enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights and in the two UN Covenants. Our vision is also to have a society in which all the peoples — because we are called a land of six peoples — can live in peace and harmony, making a contribution towards the development of the country.

■ *Guyana went into a serious decline during the 1970s and 1980s. Do you think that the main problems are now over?*

— No, they are not over yet. We have inherited a legacy of problems that still need to be corrected — and as quickly as possible. Unless we correct those de-

iciencies and constraints quickly, we will not be able to maintain the democracy that we have attained. Nor will we be able to stop the continuing flow of Guyanese overseas. We also need to develop a sense of patriotism; a belief that this is the place to which the Guyanese belong, and this is the country which can meet all their needs and desires.

■ *Guyana's bad economic situation could presumably create a kind of disorientation among the population, especially among the young people in the different communities that make up the country?*

— We have to be careful about that because we can see turmoil in the world today that is largely a reflection of socio-economic conditions. Depressions offer fertile ground for demagogues, as with the rise of fascism in the 1930s. We now see a tendency towards nationalism, xenophobia and neo-fascism in a number of countries with the far-right gaining ground politically.

That democracy is under threat can be seen in many countries. In Venezuela, the last government was democratically elected but because of the socio-economic conditions in the country, in particular the fact that 60% of the people are living below the poverty line, there were two attempted military coups. There were disturbances last year in Mexico, in Chiapas Province, and now we see a new crisis with Mexico's involvement in NAFTA. Mexico was seen as a very stable country, which was making a lot of

progress but all of a sudden, everything has turned sour because the basic problems of the people have not been solved.

■ *Do you think the crisis at the Linden bauxite mine here in Guyana could be symbolic of a deeper problem in the country which could lead to an explosive situation? Would it be fair to say that there is particular dissatisfaction among a segment of the population, namely those of African origin?*

— Yes. We have to be careful about what happens at the Linden mine because that area is largely Afro-Guyanese. As you know, under colonialism, little islands developed in the economy: islands based on oil or bauxite or whatever, which were foreign-owned and rather more prosperous than the rest of the economy. As a result a lot of people drifted to these areas in search of work or higher pay. Especially under the last government, a lot of the public sector, both the civil service and the corporations, were 'padded' so to speak, as a way of solving the unemployment problem.

Now, as you know, the last government made an agreement with the World Bank that the industry should be rationalised and that nearly one-third of the work force should be dismissed. For their part, the Bank gave a loan of US\$15 million. Linden has to be privatised, but it

Debt servicing absorbs 40% of all foreign exchange receipts

can't be, because it is now clear that the company will lose nearly US\$15 million this year. This is money which the government cannot afford. I have set up a committee to study the problem. This involves not just the management and the board, but also for the first time, the two unions and the local regional and municipal councils which are dominated by the opposition PNC. So the PNC have been brought into the discussion.

Regarding the question of management, the last PNC government and the World Bank decided that foreign management would be necessary. I remember a meeting before we got into government, that was held at the union office, on the whole question of divestment and privatisation.

I heard the same leader, who is now representing one of the bauxite industry unions, say that black people cannot run anything, so let the white people come and take it over. And now he is agitating. They are making this into a racial question.

■ *You have given priority to education and health and have decided to cut the military budget. The financial power of this country tends to be in the hands of the Indian community, while the army is more African. Are you worried about the position of the army?*

— We have to be very careful to see that we have more jobs for everybody. When you have an unemployment problem, people jockey for jobs and this can lead to friction. So we have to be careful about that. In the first place, we have to give jobs on the basis of merit, not political patronage.

Secondly, we need to improve wages and salaries. We are aware that people working in government service are having problems because their salaries are very low. I am not worried about the racial question because things are not as simple as that. People talk about Indians owning everything but there are Indians who own small pieces of land and who are very poor just like the Afro-Guyanese workers in Guyana.

However, we understand that those Afro-Guyanese, who are not in-





involved in agriculture in the countryside, but who work for wages in the cities, and mainly in the government are paid rather low wages and salaries. Indeed, we have just increased the minimum wage from G\$4000 to G\$5500. But if divestment takes place, it will be mostly Afro-Guyanese who will be affected. People will be dismissed, creating unemployment and that can be a source of conflict as we are now seeing in the bauxite industry.

The PNC agreed to dismiss nearly one-third of the labour force and we did not want to do this as we felt the industry would become viable. The army and the police force understand these questions. So I do not think, looking at it mainly from a racial point of view, that it will create any problems here.

■ *You portray your regime as the one which has brought democracy back. What is your opinion on the arrest this week of two television journalists who were just doing their job, and on the rumours that a member of your government is putting pressure on the daily, Stabroek News,*

threatening it with cutting official advertisements indispensable for its survival, on the grounds that it is being too critical?

First of all the attack on the TV journalists was not made by the government but by the Georgetown municipality headed by the opposition, the PNC, who have their own constabulary. That distinction must be noted. We do not agree with it and our party issued a statement that it should not have been done.

Now, as regards the press, the press is free here. When the last government was in power, the Mirror newspaper company and others — the Catholic Standard, for example — could not import equipment, machinery or newsprint. Everything was disallowed. Even when a gift of newsprint was made by newspapers in the Caribbean, the last government refused to allow it to come into the country. Today, there are no such bans on anything. Anybody can set up a press and anybody can import the required materials.

'We have to be careful... if divestment takes place, it will be mostly Afro-Guyanese who will be affected.... That can be a source of conflict'

Similarly, anybody can set-up a TV station. This, in fact, is leading to poor production quality and this is something we have to be concerned about. We are not putting any controls on it though. And where we have a monopoly, we have opened up — so that, for example, in the state newspaper, you get all kinds of views expressed in the letters column. We had a monopoly over radio services but that is now open as well.

The radio station must bring in the government and opposition to discuss any matter which is pending in Parliament, or even before it goes to Parliament. So we not only have parliamentary democracy, having restored the sovereignty of Parliament, which was lacking under the last government, but have also brought democracy to the media.

Now as regards advertisements. This is not a question of press freedom, it has to do with expense. When we gained

power, we cut expenditure on the foreign service by half. And we cut the costs of my presidential secretariat.

My secretary did not have a computer until the latter part of last year. I have also told my ministers to restrict their official travel abroad so that we can save money.

Similarly, why should we advertise in three or four papers and in the radio and on the TV. Why advertise, for instance in both the Chronicle and the Stabroek News when the Chronicle has about one and a half times the circulation of the Stabroek News and they reach more or less the same kinds of people.


It is a waste of money. It has nothing to do with press freedom. We did not tell the Stabroek News that they would not get a licence to import newsprint and things like that.

They are publishing everything — and frequently attacking the government, and we have not closed them down. We have not told them they must stop publishing certain things or that we will censor what they are printing. It is quite false for them to say that we are denying the press their freedom. On this issue, let me state our position very clearly. We have been victims of press monopolies in the past.

In 1963, my government was destabilised not only because of CIA activities here in the country, but because of the privately owned media and its incitement of the people. When we were in opposition, we had a state monopoly in the media. But we believe in neither a private nor a state media monopoly. Wherever the state has control, we are allowing total freedom.

■ *To conclude, how do you see the future of relations between Guyana and the European Union?*

— We would like to maintain our strong links with Europe and the EU. In the course of the current mid-term review, we have been calling for an enhanced facility under the Lomé Convention and for a stronger collaborative relationship between our country and Europe.



As you are probably aware, in my talks at the Miami summit and elsewhere, I have been arguing that some of the concepts of the European Union should be applied in this hemisphere.

We should not only be talking about free trade, but also, as in Europe, about free movement of people and a development fund to help the lesser developed countries of the region. So that is what we have been proposing, using your model as an example of the kind of relationship which should be established in this hemisphere. ■

Interview by H.G.

Afro-Guyanese and Amerindian students in the countryside
'Our vision is to have a society in which all the people — because we are called a land of six peoples — can live in peace and harmony'

Desmond Hoyte


The Gorbachev of Guyana

Desmond Hoyte, who heads the Peoples' National Congress, is the leader of the opposition. In 1985, he took over the Presidency of the Republic and found himself with the unenviable task of restoring his nation's fortunes. His predecessor, Linden Forbes Burnham, had presided over a slump into depression and dictatorship and it was Hoyte who set Guyana back on the democratic track. He lost power at the election in 1992. His style in opposition is calm and courteous but, at the same time, meticulous and cutting.

■ *What is the main difference between you and the PPP?*

— The difference between the People's National Congress and the People's Progressive Party is basically one of ideology. Dr Jagan has made it quite clear that he is still committed to Marxism-Leninism — this is not just idle speculation on our part. He said so as late as last year at a press conference. He states that his party is Marxist-Leninist but his government is not. I find it difficult to understand this schizophrenia. I believe that many of the problems we are facing in terms of governance and the economy spring from the fact that there is this underlying ideological imperative which makes him and his party do, what I would consider, the wrong things in our circumstances. Our party, although originally a socialist one, has since 1985, when I assumed the Presidency, been committed to an open society and a market-oriented economy. This is the main difference. From 1985 on, we dismantled the old structures which marked the efforts to create a social society. We liberalised the economy and removed a number of the controls that had been in place. There were a great many of these. Perhaps the most difficult and important step that we took, in order to get the economy going, was the removal of currency regulations. It was these measures that caused the economy to turn around and put it on a firm road towards renewed growth and the possibility of prosperity.

■ *Yes, but given that Dr Jagan would say his programme is not Marxist-Leninist even if his party is, can you say that there is any real difference between the PPP and the PNC?*



— Well his programme is not Marxist-Leninist because he is constrained by the international financial agencies — the IMF and the World Bank. Once you have agreed programmes with them, there are certain things you are required to do. As a matter of fact, shortly before the 1992 elections, Dr Jagan went to Washington and assured the World Bank and IMF that he would pursue the policies I had set in place. Everybody looked forward to him fulfilling that promise but our contention is

Desmond Hoyte, the man close to the former dictator Burnham, who set Guyana back on a democratic track

that he has not been doing so. We were dismantling the extensive public enterprise sector. We were privatising because it was quite clear from our experience that by and large, public sector entities were a drag on the economy. But Dr Jagan has not pressed ahead with the divestment programme. Even though, as late as last year, he committed his government to the privatis-

ation of sugar, he has done nothing in that direction in practice. This is because he finds it ideologically unpalatable and also because that is where he sees his political base — among the sugar workers.

■ *Do you think it is the right time to privatise sugar? Is there not an argument that the government should improve the sector's performance first before selling it off to private interests?*

— That is what we did. The sugar sector was in very difficult circumstances for a multiplicity of reasons. One was, of course, the need for new investment to rehabilitate the industry. The amounts required were so large and there was no way the government could raise that kind of money. The initial funds were provided by the World Bank and Inter American Development Bank, on the basis that we were moving towards divesting the industry. We brought in management to run the industry and oversee with us the process leading to final divestment. In fact we had gone a long way along that road, reaching the point where, I think, the outstanding issue was the question of price. Sugar was vital to the success of our programme and it was absolutely necessary that we should maintain our quota under the Lomé Convention. We had in place a well-conceived project to restore the fortunes of the sugar industry — and it was a restored sugar industry that the PPP inherited.

For the first time in decades we began to attract serious investment in the country. We got the first major investment in bauxite by the Reynolds Company. One might have expected them to be the last people to come in because in 1975 we had nationalised the Reynolds holding and, as you know, the 'corporate memory' is a long one. Randolph Reynolds came and opened a new bauxite mine. He was able to get cover from the US federal agency that insures American investments overseas and that led to other investments. There was Omai, a Canadian group, which has a large investment in gold mining, the Barama Company in the forestry sector, which produces plywood for export, and many others. So investment started to flow. Since the current government assumed office, there has not been a single new major investment in this country.

■ *But isn't that part of a general international problem? There are many places where the rich countries prefer not to invest for various reasons and there is a lot of competition for international investment funds.*

No, I don't think that is the problem here. You can ask the business community. The government started out on the wrong foot by attacking all the companies which had invested here during our administration; making allegations and issuing threats. In fact, they behaved as if they were still in opposition, making remarks which alarmed the business and investment community. Up to a few months ago, the Minister of Finance was still calling business people 'blood-suckers' and 'parasites'.

Let me give you one outstanding example of a terribly bad signal. Just prior to our leaving office in October 1992, we were, as part of our divestment programme, selling a government-owned rice mill to a company called Kayman Sankar Limited. The project was being co-financed by the Caribbean Development Bank, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the Inter-American Finance Corporation, which is the private sector arm of the IDB. The government vetoed that project. When pressed for an explanation, the President said that they had a policy of not giving more than five hundred acres of land to anybody. This is nonsense, because in our country, land is not in short supply. It was an ideological decision based on a dislike of big companies.

We also had a regime of fiscal incentives which applied to both big and small investors. This government reduced these. The Guyana Investment Office, which is a government agency set up to promote investment, has been critical. They argue that it is a mistake to reduce the attractiveness of the country when the field is such a competitive one.

■ *But the government has succeeded in achieving economic growth. How do you explain that? And how do you account for the fact that lot of businesspeople here support the government?*

Economic growth is merely the consequence of investments made prior to October 1992. That is what is sustaining this economy. Our contention is that unless we get new investment, the growth will slow down. We achieved 6-7% growth in 1992.

You say that businesses support the government. Some do and some don't. A week does not pass without four or five business people coming here to meet and complain about what is happening to them. It depends on who you talk to. You have some big entrepreneurs who, for their own purposes, will say they support the government and that the government is doing nothing wrong.

■ *And after two to three years of this government, how would you rate its popularity?*

The popularity of the government is at a low ebb for several reasons. First, they made extravagant election promises to people in various parts of the country. I was recently in the Corentine, an area where the government has strong support, and the mood of the people there was, to say the least, foul. They complained about promises not being kept — as regards water and electricity supply, land distribution and housing. So there is a lot of disenchantment out there. Furthermore, the government said that it would bring down prices. Yet the fact of the matter is that the cost of living is skyrocketing every day. People are finding it extremely difficult to make ends meet. The government has not been able to control the exchange rate which keeps deteriorating. When we took office we had stabilised at somewhere between G\$100 and G\$125 to the US dollar. It is now pushing G\$150. It keeps sliding and this has an impact on the price of goods.

As regards structural adjustment, it was in 1987 that we entered the IMF programme having set our economic recovery programme in motion. We knew that once you get into an SAP, people with fixed incomes like pensioners, and those at the lower end of the wage scale, were going to have a pretty rough time. We negotiated with the Fund for a Social Impact Amelioration programme, which is popularly called SIMA in this country. Some

seed money was provided by the IDB, World Bank and the European Union. That programme is still in place and has attracted large amounts of money, but it seems to have lost its way. It has simply become an agency providing financial support to the government's capital programme.

■ *Looking at government policies, are there any policy areas in which there is a consensus between you and the government?*

We agree on a number of things but the problem is always in the implementation or the methodology. Most important of all is the question of consultation. That will always be a bone of contention

to look at border issues. As you know, we have some border problems with Venezuela and Suriname. In July of last year, we read in the newspapers that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had said he would set up this multi-party committee. On the same day, our General Secretary wrote to him expressing our disappointment that we should first learn about something like this from a newspaper report. There was no answer to that letter. Recently there was a motion in Parliament for the establishment of the select committee and we voted against it. The government says that they seek our support and cooperation, but there should have been some proper consultation.

most of those of Indian origin. In both of our parties, however, we have people who are not African or Indian descendants.

There is a problem of racism. Unfortunately we believe from the PNC point of view that the government has done things to encourage 'racial triumphalism' in this country; that it has taken action that can only reasonably be interpreted as being action against black people. We have seen a number of people being dismissed — more than 50 from the foreign service in one fell swoop. Now the minister is saying that he cannot find people to man the missions — after he has dismissed large numbers of competent, experienced officials. The PPP has taken the view that if you are black you are anti-PPP, anti-government and pro-PNC. But a truly professional person is not going to allow his duties to be affected by any political considerations. So you have what may seem to be a policy or programme of dismissing people of African descent, humiliating some of them and putting pressure on them. These are all matters that we will have to face. It is not something that you can sweep under the carpet.

Now what does the government do? We picked up a newspaper one day and read that the government intended to establish a race relations commission. Again no consultation with us. This was a unilateral government initiative. A little later we read in another newspaper that the government had appointed a chairman of this commission. No consultation with us as to whether he is acceptable. This so-called 'Race Relations Commission' is a non-starter. It is a waste of time and is not going to help with anything.

We feel that for the racial problems to be tackled successfully in this country, the government has, first of all, to set an example, through its policies and actions. People must believe that this government is acting with fairness and equity. Secondly, we need to talk frankly about it at a party to party, and a government to party level. Unilateral government action simply won't do. People hear the government rhetoric but they can also see all too clearly the actions which contradict that rhetoric. ■ Interview by H.G.



Street market in Georgetown
'... the cost of living is skyrocketing every day. People are finding it extremely difficult to make ends meet'

and it leads to a lack of harmony on many issues where we would otherwise have no difficulty cooperating.

Let me give you one recent example. Dr Jagan recently went to the Summit of the Americas in Miami. It was only on the day before he left that he sent me a letter setting out the issues he proposed to raise and asking our help in mobilising support for them?

Then there is the question of setting up a select committee in Parliament

■ *One final question. Is there a racial problem between the PPP and the PNC?*

No, there is not a racial problem as such between the People's National Congress and the People's Progressive Party. But let me be frank with you. It is a known historical fact that the support of the PNC is largely among people of African descent while the PPP draws the support of

A day in Guyana

As beaches of fine sand were for a long time considered essential for holidays, countries which did not possess such beaches failed to promote what they had to offer tourists. Guyana is an example of this. Other than having no beaches, the country of Eldorado can mould itself to the most unusual dreams of holidaymakers, and anyway, the islands in its interior, lapped by the waters of majestic rivers, are just as good for lazing around on. Political and economic decision-makers have realised this, and now consider this sector to be the future source of wealth of the country. And it is to be hoped that a day of escape and new impressions in the gentle moist heat of the Guyanese jungle will become more accessible, and not remain the prerogative of those able to hire an aircraft and the services of its crew, as today.

The day starts very early. The morning mists still cover the rectilinear layout of Georgetown's streets and canals. They have not yet cleared to reveal the bright fantastic show of rusty browns, greens, reds and silvers displayed by the roofs of corrugated iron which are never less than charming, even when they have aged somewhat, under their coats of paint of varying degrees of freshness. Those who do not much like taking risks start the day by feeling slightly apprehensive at the idea of setting off in an old crate of uncertain age and in an uncertain state of maintenance in search of makeshift airfields perched in the mountains or buried in narrow gorges. Oh, the beauty of Georgetown at the start of the day, how unassuming with an undertone of mischief. Why do its blocks of houses set at right angles seem to have so little in common with North American cities and create the impression of a town which is proliferated by a criss-cross network of passages,

odd little paths and alleyways? The scent of magnolia and bougainvillia at daybreak, the arabesques of the wrought iron fences, the turns taken by the outside staircases and the curves of the façades mirrored in the canals could be the reason for this interplay of illusions.

The little Islander aircraft has hardly come to life, yet, like a wading bird, it needs only a short run to become airborne. The hangar of the small aerodrome at Ogle is left behind and Georgetown is revealed in all its neatness like a set of dolls' houses which has been carefully arranged by an artist of the mannerist school. One hardly has time to pick out a few notable buildings from the patchwork: Saint George's Cathedral (which is thought to be the highest wooden building in the world), the High Court, Parliament, the Presidential Palace,

Georgetown
Pretty, unassuming, with a mischievous
undertone...



Georgetown
... and the interplay of illusions created
by arabesques and of façades mirrored
in the canals


the Grand International Hotel, a few big swimming pools — before the differences between large buildings and small houses, and between the homes of the rich and the modest dwellings of the poor fade away, as if in an impressionist roovescape. Very soon, attention turns towards the Demerara Bridge on the river of the same name, the mouth of which marks the eastern boundary of the town. How handsome it looks when seen from above and a long way off, this old bridge of great length which was built by the British Army. The intention was that it should be dismantled after a proper bridge had been built but this plan seems to have been forgotten. How fine it looks, and how silent. The clanking noises produced by the thick iron segments of this floating millipede, which fill the air when one crosses the bridge by car are not heard up here. Until he reaches the mouth of the huge Essequibo River, which is not far, the pilot does not hug the coast, which has no great surprises to offer. Instead, he veers slightly inland, over agricultural land. Fields of cane alternate with rice paddies intersected by long canals. These are the only link to the outside world for the small number of villages scattered along them. And yet this ordered model layout is interrupted here and there by a wood, forest or wilderness area. And then it all seems to be one big wilderness. After barely half an hour of flight, another country has been reached, that of 'the interior'.



How the Amazon changed its course

The mist has become even thicker and when one has been flying low over the Essequibo River for several breathtaking minutes, one notices that it is joined on the left by a number of tributaries, which are themselves a pretty impressive sight. One of them, the Mazaruni, meandering repeatedly, plays hide and seek with the Table Mountains, row upon row of massifs with flattened summits stretching mile after mile. These are the result of continental drift and of the collision which apparently occurred when Africa and South America met, a phenomenon which also caused the Amazon to reverse its course and stop flowing into the Pacific. The Table Mountains are subject to erosion, with the material transported a long way and sand deposited to depths of hundreds of metres. Instead of turning into desert, this sand supports luxuriant jungle vegetation. An even higher range of Table Mountains follows the first, and the pattern continues, each range having the appearance of a step in a giant staircase. And it is here, announces the pilot, that care must be taken. Peaks suddenly loom up as one approaches the border with Venezuela.

The first landing will be made after a good two hours; two hours of wandering through the air, climbing as one approaches peaks, overflying waterfalls and skirting round the most beautiful of them, like the theatrical Orinduik waterfalls on the Ireng river between Guyana and Brazil and the breathtaking Kaieteur Falls, as if to waylay them. At the first stop, the Amerindian village of Paramakatoi, one is already light years away from the life of the capital. It is a Saturday and the school is open, normally for adults but a large number of children are there as well. At first sight, the village is entirely made up of two school buildings (a primary school and a secondary one, both financed by the European Community), a health centre, an administrative building and a few dwellings for the teachers who are mainly young black women from Georgetown. In fact, residential buildings are scattered across an area of many square miles. The school is attended by five hundred children. On average, they live two hours away on foot. Some pupils even live two days'



journey away and are only able to visit their families occasionally. The head-teacher of the school, who is an Amerindian, explains that there is nothing out of the ordinary about this, as it is sometimes necessary to march for a fortnight. This was the case, for example, last year, when a regional workshop of Amerindian cultures

Arrival at Paramakatoi

The plane's crew kindly act as a link between the village and the central administration

The Courier



was held. She complains that after walking for two or three hours, the children are tired and not very receptive to teaching, especially as the school is unable to offer them a proper meal.

Paramakatoi's drinking water comes from four reservoirs each holding 300 gallons, and is transported by plane in two stages. The school is only linked to the national education system periodically by the crew of the plane. Today, as it happens, it is the pilot's wife who is the contact. She also acts as air hostess and guide for the small family eco-tourism business. Each time their aircraft is hired, she fills out a questionnaire on the functioning of the school of the place they are asked to visit, having questioned the head teacher. She performs the same service for other academic institutions. The school was fairly expensive to build, and it is expensive to maintain. Apart from the water reservoirs, it was necessary to transport cement in small aircraft capable of landing at Paramakatoi. Safety considerations prevent a two-engined, eight-seater, taking off with more than five

people on board, including the crew. Because of this, the pilot was forced to make two round trips between this Amerindian village and another one.

Satellite dish: an unexpected sight!

Our impromptu guide in Kato speaks Patamona and Makushi and looks and talks like a strolling player. His name is Georges Boldenwick. He was born in Suriname to a Dutch mother and French father. Now he has two wives and nine children: 'A real Guyanese', as he puts it. Retiring after 45 years of good and faithful service as an administrator and teacher, he is the head and social organiser of this village, a guide and a botanist in his spare time. Boldenwick is proud of two things: his friendship with a Guyanese botanist and mountaineer who has now disappeared and of his satellite dish for Kato's television set.

It is not very far from Kato to the next stop. There is hardly time to look at the jungle, which is so thick that one has the impression of flying over an enormous cauliflower, occasionally pierced by the arm of a river or a creek on which the boats of diamond prospectors can be seen. Many of them come from nearby Brazil. But Brazilian gold and diamond prospectors are mainly invading the extreme South East of the country, the virgin territory claimed by Suriname. As none of the

Kaieteur
One's breath is taken away by a vertical fall three times higher than Niagara



The Courier

citizens of the two parties to the dispute actually inhabit the area, the Brazilian adventurers are escaping with the booty while the protagonists argue just as in La Fontaine's fable of the two litigants and the goatskin.

The Orinduik Falls are like a foaming, transparent arc made up of four theatre curtains. Between them, the stone setting accentuates the majestic and fantastic impression made by the site. There is no sight quite like it.

But one only has to approach and skirt the Brazil or Guyanese Bank to find a number of small waterfalls to suit bathers. Whereas the Orinduik Falls are pretty, charming and induce a carefree attitude, the Kaieteur Fall is really rather formidable and takes one's breath away. It is a vertical fall which pours down into the abyss and is three times as high as the Niagara Falls. And people on the ground can only observe it by balancing themselves precariously on the craggy cliff, above this immense abyss. These lumps of rock are cracked, and one moves forward fearfully, on all fours, to catch a glimpse of the foaming mass at the bottom of the abyss. Kaieteur is a magnificent natural wonder, in a setting stage-managed solely by nature itself. The first explorer to discover it, 125 years ago, probably admired the same spectacle as the visitor does today, and felt the same degree of apprehension. Kaieteur also offers a magnificent walk through the jungle, from the landing strip to the falls. As well as having a perfect knowledge of the hazards of flying people for sightseeing purposes, the pilot, Malcolm Chan-A-Sue, a former KLM pilot, is an amateur botanist. The region enjoys a microclimate which has produced an unusual degree of biodiversity. The ground is made up of rock without soil, on which are found luxuriant vegetation and some very rare species; insectivorous plants, plants which produce their own pesticides, dozens of species of orchids and a flower which had been thought to be indigenous to Germany: in short, a rich riot of colours and scents. And, what is even more surprising in an equatorial zone, the long footpaths are carpeted by lichen, as in the Tundra, which is permanently covered in dew. The temperature and humidity of the Eastern side of the fall resemble that of a

temperate zone, whereas on the Western side, which is chosen for the walk back, you will find tropical vegetation and a temperature and atmosphere which are normal for the region. The fauna also displays a remarkable degree of biodiversity. The newcomer is struck first by the variety and beauty of the birds.

How to avoid killing the goose which lays the golden eggs

Just as Guyana is preparing to develop eco-tourism, Chan-A-Sue, who himself belongs to a pioneering company in this area of activity, gives a warning. He thinks that precautions should first be taken to avoid killing the goose which lays the golden eggs. Lichen, for example, will not survive if rigorous measures are not taken. There can be no question of bringing tourists by coach, and travel must continue to be by aircraft so as to make it possible to keep tabs on the number of visitors, which should not exceed two hundred per day. And he thinks it should be obligatory for visitors to be accompanied by guides. On the way back to Georgetown, the Islander lands on the tourist island of Kaow situated at the confluence of three rivers. A chalet is provided for tourists, who can travel there by boat. Kaow is opposite the town of Bartica which is considered to be the port of entry to 'the interior' of the country, i.e. the last point which is accessible by river or ground transport. Taking off from the green turf of Kaow Island, the waves of those inhabiting the chalet and the last frolics of children in the water in the late afternoon mark the end of a day spent in deepest Guyana a long way from the coastal strip. Then one arrives in Georgetown and the reflections of the old roofs in the weak light of the last rays of the setting sun do not excite one as much as they did in the morning.

Walkers had appeared unexpectedly during the walk near the Kaieteur Falls: they turned out to be gold prospectors with all their paraphernalia. They shouldn't be here, said our ecologically minded pilot indignantly. Exploiters of gold do not observe any rules. Let's hope that some rules will be placed on Guyanese eco-tourism. ■

H.G.

EU-Guyana cooperation

Helping to rebuild a shattered economy

by Alexander Baum*

Guyana went through difficult times when the economy slumped dramatically during the 1980s. An unprecedented drain of public resources following the contraction of national production and the accumulation of a burdensome external debt led to a deterioration of the infrastructure. The country has, since 1989, undergone painful structural adjustment and strong economic growth has been resumed. The European Union has supported Guyana in the effort to rehabilitate the infrastructure and rebuild the foundations of the economy.

Guyana's economic development over the last 30 years has been marked by a striking gap between theoretical potential and actual performance. Endowed with vast natural resources, available for the benefit of a small but highly educated population, all conditions seemed to be favourable for catching up with the developed world. After three decades, the natural resources are still largely untouched, but a large part of the population — about half a million people altogether — has left Guyana following an unparalleled economic decline between 1975 and 1990. Gross national income contracted at a rate of 4.9% annually between 1980 and 1988, leading to widespread impoverishment — second only to Haiti in the western hemisphere. During this period, the country accumulated a huge external debt which currently stands at \$2.1 billion — in per capita terms, almost five times the external debt of Brazil, the world's largest debtor. The nose-dive of the economy and the drain on public resources has left the country with the infrastructure in a shambles, deplorable health and education systems and a weakened production base.

The tragic decline was only halted after the launch of an Economic Recovery Programme which was announced in mid-1988. The basic direction of the reforms announced in the ERP has continued to be followed by the new government elected in independent Guyana's first democratic elections, which took place in 1992. The drastic policy reorientation has



The Courier

been characterised by a fundamental redefinition of the roles to be played by the private and public sectors and by a liberalisation of the economy. The far-reaching and successfully implemented structural adjustment process has led to the resumption of annual growth, which has been running at 7% in real terms since 1991. It has also, however, been accompanied by hardship for a substantial proportion of the population.

As a legacy of economic decline, migration and accumulation of insurmountable debt, Guyana is now caught between lack of capital and human resources on the one hand and the enormous requirements of rebuilding the economic foundations on the other. As the country continues with

Rehabilitation of the Demerara Harbour Bridge: one of the three main EU infrastructure projects

the process of structural adjustment, this very process limits the allocation of financial resources in many ways. In its efforts to rebuild the nation, Guyana finds itself forced to pursue conflicting objectives.

Cooperation: from crisis management to sustainable development

Financial and technical cooperation with the European Union has, since 1975, been a mirror of the fortunes of Guyana. Under the first Lomé Convention, assistance was extended in various sectors

* Economic adviser at the EC Delegation in Guyana.

such as fisheries, forestry and agriculture. A road along the east bank of the Berbice River was constructed to open up new agricultural land near the coast. GAIBANK, the state-owned development bank, received a line of credit for small loans. Beyond these main interventions, various studies and technical assistance projects, ranging from tourism development to industrial rehabilitation, were carried out. The European Investment Bank (EIB) supplemented the EDF-financed Upper Demerara Forestry project with a loan to Demerara Woods Ltd., a state-owned concessionaire of the Upper Demerara forests.



The Courier

Under Lomé II, the aforementioned projects in the forestry, fisheries and agricultural sectors were continued. The forestry project also received further funding while financing was provided for the construction of roads and culverts on the east bank of the Berbice River and a fish port and market in Georgetown. The rehabilitation of Georgetown's water supply and sewerage systems were the first projects to target the rapidly deteriorating infrastructure of the country. Within the framework of the infrastructure rehabilitation programme, Guyana received a Sysmin loan of ECU 31.5 million at the end of 1988. This supplemented an earlier Sysmin advance of ECU 3 million which was provided in 1985.

This project was aimed mainly at replacing and refurbishing the mining equipment of the bauxite mines run by the state-owned GUYMINE company around Linden and along the Berbice River. Continuing the Lomé I intervention, the EIB provided a first global loan to GAIBANK for on-lending to small and medium-sized manufacturing industries.

Lomé III saw a shift in emphasis with assistance being directed fully towards rehabilitating the dilapidated infrastructure. In a state of crisis, the country was having to respond to emergency needs on a day-by-day basis. A large

Tropical forest: a fragile heritage to be protected

Infrastructure Rehabilitation Programme (IRP) was launched under which 64 contracts were placed for a total amount of over ECU 17 million. Collapsed parts of the sea wall were repaired, leaking pontoons in the floating bridge over the Demerara were replaced and water supply systems were renewed. In a separate project, three river ferries were rehabilitated to maintain the crucial links between the road networks along the coast. In addition, a number of small technical assistance projects and studies covering the various sectors were financed. The EIB continued

its assistance to GAIBANK with a second line of credit.

When the malaria situation in large parts of Guyana worsened at the end of the 1980s, an emergency programme was undertaken by Médecins Sans Frontières, the European NGO. This was financed from non-programmable funds.

Under the first financial protocol of Lomé IV, the emphasis on infrastructure rehabilitation has continued unabated, albeit with a return to the traditional project approach. The three main projects — for the restoration of the sea defences, rehabilitation of the Demerara harbour bridge and completion of the New Amsterdam water supply system — are all continuations of assistance begun under the IRP project. In 1994, Guyana is also receiving an extra ECU 6 million under its national indicative programme which the government wishes to use to finance a further water supply system on the coast.

Cooperation outside the main focal area will include help for the private sector through two projects. A micro-credit programme, initiated and managed by an NGO, helps small and micro enterprises in developing their business. Technical assistance will also be provided to the Private Sector Commission, an umbrella organisation of local private sector associations, to set up a centre for providing business information, training and services to private companies.

In support of the structural adjustment programme, two general import programmes have been launched and the counterpart funds generated are being utilised to finance urgently-needed actions such as school and hospital rehabilitation. The programme management has been contracted out to a local consulting company and the communities concerned have been involved wherever possible.

In early 1993, the EIB financed the rehabilitation of the still ailing bauxite industry with a soft loan of ECU 5 million.


Benefiting from the Caribbean connection

Historically and culturally, Guyana is very much part of the Caribbean.

As a member of the Caribbean ACP group, CARIFORUM, it benefits directly and indirectly from the various regional programmes under the Lomé Conventions. Georgetown is the seat of the CARIFORUM Secretariat and it is here that the programming of Lomé IV regional programmes is coordinated. As the largest single contribution from which Guyana directly benefits, ECU 13.9 million was committed under Lomé II and Lomé III to support the establishment of a ferry link between Guyana and Suriname. After the completion of this project, Guyana's coastal belt will be accessible by road from a neighbouring country for the first time ever. The Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI) maintains a research outpost in Ebini, in the intermediate savannah area. Their programme, which is of special relevance for Guyana, is co-funded from Lomé III resources.

Although the full potential of the trade privileges provided under the Lomé Conventions has not been fully exploited, Guyana's exports of sugar, rum and rice benefit substantially from the respective protocols and provisions. The country holds the third largest sugar quota, which currently covers about two-thirds of the total production. After failing to fill the quota for four consecutive years, exports have been reaching their targets since 1992. Under the Rum Protocol, sales to the EU represent more than 70% of the total production and 90% of total exports. Rum earned more than \$10 million for the country in 1993. The rice sector, one of the most remarkable success stories of the recent economic recovery, has seen production almost triple over the last four years with good use being made of the favourable treatment under the Convention to tap the EU markets.

Guyana has also been supported by the EU in a variety of fields beyond the financial and technical provisions of the Lomé Conventions. Between 1985 and 1990, significant food aid was provided to relieve vulnerable and impoverished groups of the population. Part of the food aid was sold locally, generating counterpart funds which were then used to help start up the Social Impact Amelioration Programme. This was aimed at alleviating



The Courier

the social hardship ensuing from the structural adjustment process.

Under the EU's anti-AIDS programme, support has been provided to the tune of ECU 1 million since 1987 for the National Blood Transfusion Service.

Finally, Guyana receives financial assistance from the European Commission's special budget lines for the environment, tropical forests, human rights and democracy, mother and child health, and non-governmental organisations. An example of the Commission's commitment to support Guyana's efforts

School teacher in an isolated Amerindian village. Her school is supported by the EU Social Programme designed to alleviate the hardships of the structural adjustment process

in the environmental field is the environmental unit at the University of Guyana which is being established under a twinning arrangement with the University of Utrecht in The Netherlands. It will help the nation to build up the capacity to utilise its natural resources in a sustainable manner at a time when the pressure on these resources is growing rapidly. ■ A.B.

Strengthening the sea defences

by Markus Theobald*

Guyana's shoreline has a length of approximately 430 km but although culturally linked with the Caribbean, the country does not have the nice beaches that are common in other parts of the region. The waters off Guyana's coast are grey-brown in colour and do not attract recreation. The deposits which muddy the waters of most of this north-eastern coastline of South America are delivered by numerous large rivers — such as the Amazon, Corentyne, Essequibo and Orinoko.

Sea defences in Guyana...

One particular feature of Guyana is that its coastal plain, on average, lies between half a metre and a metre below the sea level at high tide. This means that it needs to be protected by a system of sea defences. Although the coastal plain, which is a narrow strip of between 3 km and 11 km, covers only 3% of the country's land surface, it is home to 90% of the population (and the source of 80% of Guyana's GDP). The sea defences have been dubbed Guyana's 'backbone' or 'spinal cord' and without them, the territory would long since have succumbed to the encroachments of the sea.

The importance of a strong system of sea defences has been recognised ever since the first settlements were established in the area. Such defences, which consist essentially of natural or man-made dams and walls, sluices, and canals, protect the coastline and extend up the rivers where they are under tidal influence. During the years that Guyana was under Dutch and British control, the system was gradually constructed and extended to a level where about half of the country's coast is shielded by man-made defences. The remainder is protected by natural earth embankments which, in turn gain




Photo Theobald

* Economic adviser at the EC Delegation in Guyana.



The Courier

protection from natural sandbanks or offshore mangrove forests.

From the time of Guyana's independence until recently, the sea defences were seriously neglected. There was little investment in construction, rehabilitation or even maintenance, and as the economic situation deteriorated, so too did the state of the defences. It has only been in the past few years that a re-consideration of the value of the sea-defence system has taken place — and this only after the sea has taken a heavy toll, with a number of breaches at different points and on different occasions resulting in serious asset and crop destruction.

It was in this context that the European Commission agreed with Guyana to make the rehabilitation of the defences a focal area in the National Indicative Programme under Lomé IV. Half of the NIP funds for the first five year period of the Convention were earmarked for this purpose.

Subsequently, other leading donor agencies (IDA, IDB and CDB) also pledged financing for sea-defence rehabilitation. The EC as the lead donor, organised several coordination meetings for what soon emerged as the major infrastructure rehabilitation programme in Guyana.

Institutional weaknesses within the administration turned out to be a major constraint in carrying out the

project, to which \$40m has been committed by the four main co-financiers. An enormous effort by both government and donors was needed to tackle this problem and a new, autonomous unit, entrusted with implementing the project (and satisfying the requirements of Guyana's partners in the venture) has now been established.

The initial setting up of the Project Execution Unit (PEU) had to be financed by the donors. The IDA provided funds for the Head of the Unit, equipment and vehicles, while the EC provided a technical assistance team of three experts. The salaries of counterparts, who are supposed to assume responsibility for the project after two years, following training from the technical assistance team, are subsidised from counterparts funds generated by the activities of other donor agencies.

The PEU has now been in place for a year and the EC-financed rehabilitation work has been contracted to an Italian consortium which began work in January 1995. Regarding work on sections of the defences due to be rehabilitated by the other donor agencies, the prequalification of contractors and tendering process is currently under way.

It is expected that by the end of 1995 several national and international contractors will be involved in rehabilitating Guyana's sea defences. The job is a vital

...fragile barrier after years of neglect

one. People need to feel secure that the sea will not encroach on their properties. This is a necessary incentive for greater efforts in the industrial and agricultural sectors.

The big question which remains, however, is whether Guyana will be able to ensure the proper maintenance of its coastal protection system in the future? A cost recovery study is presently being conducted and there are efforts in the pipeline to reorganise institutions and integrate the management of sea defences and other coastal issues into a wider long-term context. This has been given the title of the 'Guyana Shore Zone Management Programme'. Only time will tell whether this will lead to the evolution of an effective mechanism for sustaining investment in this most vital part of Guyana's basic infrastructure. ■

M.T.

Refugees and displaced people

The number of refugees in the world today is the largest it has ever been: 19 million people in all the continents have been forced out of their countries by persecution and violence, and the figures are still rising. At the same time, upwards of 24 million men, women and children have been displaced by man-made and natural disasters within their own countries.

The host countries to which refugees flee for safety and shelter are coming under more and more strain in trying to provide help. The difficulties are particularly severe in Africa, where the influx from civil wars in several regions has put intolerable pressure on neighbouring countries which are themselves suffering from poverty, overcrowding or underdevelopment. But in Europe, too, since the citizens of the formerly communist states won the freedom to travel, countries which were once safe havens for refugees from the eastern bloc — and other parts of the world — and used to welcome migrants from elsewhere as cheap labour, have been making it increasingly difficult for aliens to gain admission or, once they are in, to settle and find a home, education and work.

What is a refugee? The internationally agreed definition, on which all policies for dealing with the influx have to hinge, has been refined through a series of conventions and other accords (see the extracts from various international instruments which are reproduced at the end of this Dossier).

For some time it has been clear that policies towards refugees will have to change. Instead of merely coping with an influx when it arrives, the international community, especially the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, now argues that positive action must be taken to prevent the situations which provoke refugee flows developing in the first place. As a sign of the changing attitudes, in 1992 the High Commissioner



herself, Sadako Ogata, was invited to address the UN Security Council for the first time in her organisation's 42-year history, and pointed out that refugee issues had now become part of the global agenda for peace and security. In the Meeting Point at the beginning of this issue, Mrs Ogata discusses the role of prevention and peace settlements in stopping or reversing displacement and refugee movements.

Different categories of people experience displacement in different ways, and Patricia Smyke, an academic specialising in NGO work, looks at the effects on women of being uprooted from their familiar surroundings. The Director of CARE-Ethiopia, Robin Needham, explains how creating mechanisms through which refugees can participate in taking decisions which affect them helps to prevent feelings of frustration and apathy. Reasons for becoming a refugee vary too, as an account of environmental displacement by advancing desert in Africa shows. An article on a recent conference by Dr Chris McDowell of Oxford University argues that development itself can be a contributing factor.

When it comes to practical help, assistance for people in distress in Africa, Asia and Europe is a major activity of the European Community Humanitarian Office, which describes its emergency work

with refugees and displaced people in recent years. The International Committee of the Red Cross gives an account of its work in Africa, and we provide a round-up of the response which refugees encounter in host countries throughout the world.


From the Secretariat-General of the European Commission comes a discussion of new proposals for a three-pronged policy towards refugee movements and displacement, involving control, prevention and integration. From different viewpoints, the European Council for Refugees and Exiles and Johannes van der Klaauw of Amnesty International take a critical look at aspects of the asylum policies of the European Union and its Member States. Judith Kumin supplies a case study of UNHCR's work with refugees from the former Yugoslavia now sheltering in Germany. Looking towards policies for the future, Sharon Rusu of the UNHCR discusses the creation of an early warning system, and, Danielle Sepulveda of the Refugee Studies Programme in Britain considers whether, for refugees themselves, repatriation is the best solution. ■

Robert Rowe/Jennifer Mitchell ¹

¹ Jennifer Mitchell is a trainee with the Courier ACP-EU, and has also written a dissertation entitled 'Environmental Refugees of the Sahel' for The American University, Washington, D.C.

THE WORLD'S REFUGEES

Populations by Region on 1 January 1995



UNHCR IS TODAY RESPONSIBLE FOR MORE THAN
20 MILLION VICTIMS OF WAR AND
PERSECUTION, INCLUDING 19 MILLION REFUGEES.

Refugee women

by Patricia Smyke*

'With my husband, my parents and my home all gone, there were times when I just wanted to give up, just lie down and die. But I couldn't. What would happen to my children?... Later I found out that when I had to speak up, I could. When I had to learn new ways, I did. I made decisions. I'm stronger now than I ever dreamed I could be.'

Those are the words of a refugee woman preparing to return to Ethiopia with her children after several years in Somalia. Her testimony shows that there can be positive and negative aspects to any refugee's experience. At the very least, forced uprooting will mean *change*. Those of us concerned about development have a vital stake in making sure that the changes, insofar as possible, go in a positive direction.

This is especially true in regard to refugee women. With their dependents, they make up the majority of refugees and displaced persons, sometimes up to 80%. Refugee women have special needs which, if not met, can result in lifelong suffering for the women and their families and a great loss for their country. On the other hand, if their needs are met and they have some possibility for self-help, refugee women can make indispensable contributions to the refugee community and bring much-needed skills and experience to their country when they return home. ①

For most refugees and displaced persons, their forced uprooting is accompanied by violence, death, separation from family, and acute physical, emotional and economic hardship.

The impact of these experiences is different for men and women, for adults and children, for the elderly and disabled.

* Member of the International NGO Working Group on Refugee Women and a former faculty member of the Refugee Studies Program, Webster University in Geneva.

All these groups, because they have special needs, run special risks. Yet to label them 'vulnerable' is inadequate. It puts the emphasis on these refugees as victims. But they are also individuals with a variety of strengths, skills, experience and ideas that can be put to good use in their new situation.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has published *Guidelines on Refugee Women*. ② The International NGO Working Group on Refugee Women (IWGRW), has published *Working with Refugee Women: A Practical Guide*. ③ After several decades of sometimes sad experience, and after much consultation with refugee women... we know what needs to be done. The challenge is to get recommendations put into practice.

The development community should be familiar with the issues raised in the *Guidelines* and *Working with Refugee Women*. Many of them parallel the gender-related issues that come up in development activities. As repatriation of refugees goes forward in a number of countries, it is timely to review some of the issues here.

Refugee women need *physical protection* from violence, which may come from the police or soldiers of the host country, or from within the refugee community. In some refugee situations, especially those of long duration, people

lead lives of great frustration. Normal social restraints tend to break down, and the level of violence escalates. Women are often the victims.

Refugee women need protection from *sexual exploitation*, especially a woman who is the sole provider/protector for dependent children and older people. Her only means of guaranteeing the family food supply and safety may be complying with the demands for sexual favours made by guards, camp administrators or refugee men.

Women have special needs with regard to *legal protection* of their rights as refugees. Women often have difficulty gaining recognition as political refugees. And very few countries recognise gender-related persecution as grounds for granting refugee status (that is, when a woman is persecuted for an act that would not be punishable if committed by a man).

It is possible to provide refugee women with the physical and legal protection they need to ensure their basic human rights. It requires better training and discipline of border guards, police, administrators and the people processing requests for asylum. It requires more consultation with refugee women and men to identify protection problems and find solutions. In one case security was greatly improved after refugees pushed for some lighting in the camp at night.

Equal access

Refugee women are often at a disadvantage when it comes to getting

Ethiopian refugee women in Kenya. The majority of refugees in Africa are women and children



Mina

One of the Mozambicans preparing to return to her country has had a lot of experience in health and community action experience she got in a refugee settlement. She can show mothers how to use

ORT (oral rehydration therapy), or explain why babies need to be immunised. She knows how to help young refugee children who are disturbed by memories of the traumatic events in their past. She plays with them, listens to them, helps them express themselves in drawings. She knows about the dangers of land mines and can tell people how to avoid them. Does this sound like a returning refugee with an important contribution to make to the rebuilding of Mozambique? She is. Her name is Mina, and she recently

celebrated her 12th birthday. Mina is fortunate. She lived in a refugee settlement where people were determined to have their children's education continue. Ex-teachers and other volunteers set up classes under the trees shortly after they arrived. It was a settlement where the *Guidelines on Refugee Women* and the *Guidelines on Refugee Children* were well known and were followed. In addition, one of the NGOs working in the camp introduced the Child-to-Child approach to health education, which recognizes the potential of children to spread important ideas about health. Mina got the training and support she needed to do this work and is now a confident, well-informed young woman who will be an asset to her community and her country. ■

assistance for themselves and their families, whether it be food, housing, health care, education or opportunities for training and earning income.

Many 'access' problems can be avoided if refugee women are consulted in the planning and implementation of assistance programmes, *even in the stress of an emergency situation*. (Every influx of refugees is an emergency). If programmes are not planned from the beginning with the needs of refugee women and children in mind, there is little chance that they will be changed to meet those needs later. One can find plenty of examples of this in two areas of great importance to refugee women: health care and education/skills training.

Health care

Refugee women may miss out on needed health care for themselves and their family if clinics are staffed only by male health workers or doctors, if health posts are inconveniently located, or if a visit takes more time than women can spare from family duties.

A refugee camp or settlement presents health education possibilities that should not be missed but quite often are. We are all the losers when refugee women spend long years in a camp and do not learn about primary health care, preventive health measures, nutrition, family planning, AIDS, etc. Everyone gains when

refugee women are trained as clinic assistants, home visitors or community health workers.

Maternal and child health (MCH) needs are usually fairly well met in established camps and settlements. However, women have other specific health needs at *all* stages of their lives, and often these are not met. Young girl refugees are a case in point. There is often a gap in services for them. Once they are too old for the MCH clinic (at 5 or 6), they may not see the inside of a health facility again until they need pre-natal care themselves. But from age 7 to adolescence is a crucial time for a girl's health. Girls of this age need screening and treatment for anaemia and malaria before those two conditions endanger a first pregnancy. Girls (and boys too) urgently need to be informed about sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS. It can be done in ways that are culturally appropriate and acceptable to the refugee community.

Education and training

There can be little doubt about the benefits that an educated women brings to her family and community. Yet education programmes are the first to be cut when money for refugee assistance is scarce. This is short-sighted indeed from a development perspective, for a woman who has had even a few years of schooling is more likely to marry at a later age and

have a smaller, healthier family; get pre-natal care and have safe childbirth; have higher earning capacity; and have more confidence in herself.

Where refugee training programmes exist, women may not be included because men are presumed to be the wage earners who need it more, or because it is not customary for women to be active outside the home.

Again this is a great loss for women and their home country, because we know that it *is* possible to set up successful, culturally acceptable education and training programmes for refugee women.

The programmes work better, of course, if refugee women have a part in planning and running them. This has an added benefit: it is great training for participation in community development when women go back home.

Many refugee women in Central America got their first taste of community development activities while serving on refugee management committees in camps and settlements. They have gone home with formidable organising skills and a strong sense of solidarity.

In summary, returning refugee women can make a unique contribution to development *if* their needs have been met through 'people-oriented' planning and programming; *if* they have had a chance to 'speak up', take part, and not only cope with change, but help to plan and direct it; and *if* they have had the necessary support to overcome the hardships of forced uprooting and discover their own strengths. ■ P.S.

References

① Of all the refugees from developing countries who flee across national borders, the vast majority do eventually return to their home country. Some integrate into a neighbouring country. Only 3-5 % are resettled in industrialised countries.

② Available upon request from UNHCR, P.O. Box 2500, 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland. UNHCR has also published *Guidelines on Refugee Children*.

③ Available in English and Spanish from the IWGRW, c/o Webster University in Geneva, 1293 Bellevue, Switzerland.

Development-induced displacement

by Dr Chris McDowell*

In January, Oxford University's Refugee Studies Programme (RSP) hosted the first international conference devoted to the topic of development-induced displacement, expropriation and resettlement. Delegates drawn from 28 countries included developing world senior government officials, academics, NGOs and representatives of groups resisting displacement or campaigning for public awareness and improved resettlement practice and policy. The eviction of people because of national development and donor priorities is a major global issue and one that demands political and intellectual attention. Development-caused displacement, except for a few high-profile projects, has been largely hidden from international attention, and its true scale is unknown.

According to the World Bank's latest review of resettlement and development, between 90 and 100 million people have been involuntarily resettled over the past decade. In India alone some 23 million have been displaced since 1950. Hydroelectric dam projects, each year, lead to the involuntary relocation of between 1.2 and 2.1 million people. In Africa, dams on the Volta (Ghana), Aswan (Egypt), Zambezi (Zambia and Zimbabwe) and Bandama (Côte d'Ivoire) rivers have caused the forcible relocation of hundreds of thousands of people, mainly farmers and herders, but also townspeople. In China, water conservancy projects since the 1950s have created over 10 million displacees. But it is not just dams that create displacement. Unknown additional relocation continues as a result of forestry, mining and parks development, land-use conversion, the construction of transport corridors, urban growth, politically mandated relocation and resettlement caused by structural adjustment reforms. The scale of the phenomenon is enormous, the consequences for those displaced can be devastating and the expected advantages to the nation which are used to justify the displacement are not always realised.

Impoverishment

The most significant consequence of forced displacement for those im-

* Researcher at the Refugee Studies Programme, University of Oxford, UK, and author of a thesis on asylum migration for the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

mediately affected, and many more affected 'downstream', is impoverishment. At the Oxford conference three questions hung heavy in the air: why do impoverishment and social disintegration occur; how can impoverishment be prevented; and is displacement always necessary?

Nine consistently repeated forms of impoverishment are recognised: unemployment, landlessness, marginalisation, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, erosion of health status, social disarticulation and cultural stress. As papers presented at the conference graphically revealed, these forms of impoverishment tend to come as an inclusive package and with differing degrees of intensity.

Two speakers, A. Barabas and M. Bartolome, found that none of the groups relocated to make way for the Chinantecos and Cerro de Oro Dams in Mexico managed to have their basic demands fulfilled. The indemnification lands were of a very

inferior quality to those lost, and the credit system resulted in general indebtedness, until it was cancelled. The production projects, they argue, failed, and those relocated went back to growing maize for self-consumption, but with a lower yield, or migrated once more. Infrastructure works for the new towns were carried out after resettlement, and in such a temporary way that some of them (notably irrigation and drinking water) soon stopped working, or became inadequate or useless (as in the case of housing), while other facilities (such as electricity and latrines) were never installed. The intra-familial and intergenerational conflict which erupted over the possession of land 'destroyed the traditional joint residence, production and consumption patterns of domestic groups, and forced young people of both sexes to leave their familial and communal spheres, bringing about their uprooting and the loss of cultural and ethnic ties'.

In the Philippines 13 000 people were relocated when the town of Pantabangan was submerged to provide a reservoir for the Pantabangan Dam constructed in 1971. S. Tamondong described how relocation was undertaken prematurely to lands that were politically convenient but ill-suited for the purpose. Topsoil was removed and the apportioned land was inappropriate for cultivation, resulting in a shifting of the town's economy from farming to contract labour. This proved to be short-term and led to a

'Each year, hydro-electric dam projects lead to the involuntary relocation of between 1.2 and 2.1 million people'





VIVANT UNIVERS

sudden rise in unemployment, forcing people back onto the land, where environmentally unsustainable practices brought about a further decline in land quality. Twenty years on, Tamondong says, 'the mountains are almost bald from heavy deforestation... none of the project housing or personal loans have been repaid... none of the allocated farm lots are productive... [and] most of the people who remain are elderly... the younger, productive members of their families are elsewhere in the job market.'

In the absence of a clear national policy and of a political will to avoid or minimise displacement and mitigate impoverishment, governments bidding to generate sustainable social and economic development will be increasingly confronted with internal and international opposition. Governments which have not adequately dealt with the development of displaced people have failed to realise the full potential of their infrastructure projects to generate employment and promote social integration.

Solutions for the future

As the conference recognised, the goal for the future must be to turn this social process of impoverishment on its head, to anticipate the risks of displacement and counter them. Displacement-creating development is going to continue because developing societies, particularly those with a rapidly expanding population, have to balance benefits of safe water supplies, irrigation, effective transport systems, or urban growth with the costs and pains of resettlement. But rehabilitation and the re-establishment of livelihoods must follow displacement. Inadequate and ill-conceived planning and defective implementation of projects have been most marked where people's basic entitlements have been disregarded from the very inception of a project right

through to its completion. The effect of excluding those affected from the participation process, and ignoring the social, cultural, economic and political costs of displacement, has been to intensify social conflict and make the process of rehabilitation more difficult.

Social conflict and political struggle often turn around organised resistance to resettlement, and, in the absence of any legal avenues to defend interests, it is inevitable. But resistance struggles are not characterised by blind and deaf confrontation between the powerful and the powerless. Dialogues are emerging and project designers are recognising that affected people and NGOs representing their interests are extremely effective in contributing to resettlement planning. And recent resistance campaigns have succeeded in extracting major improvements in 'packages' given to resettlers. The World Bank has now proposed a series of policies to protect those displaced and ensure their entitlements. It is hoped that high standards of protection and entitlement enacted in a legal framework will be extended to all displacement-inducing projects.

To avoid conflict, and make the most of the gains of development, it is essential that donor organisations and donor governments, managing authorities (which will increasingly mean private companies and consortia) and developing world governments recognise the need for development initiatives that increase employment, reduce poverty and promote social integration. A top priority of national governments should be to find non-displacing alternatives to displacement-inducing and environmentally damaging projects. If displacement is unavoidable, action should be taken to ensure that affected people are not only fully compensated and able to purchase replacement land and other assets, but, at the very least, that they should be able to

A big industrial site in India. The land for this development was expropriated from the indigenous inhabitants and although compensation was paid, the owners were forced to relocate

regain their earlier living standard. This means that adequate financial resources must be built into the project budget, with flexibility in the management of that budget to ensure that money finds its way, in time, to those who need it.

Affected people, including potential host communities, should be informed and participate fully in the determination of their future. At the very least, national governments should incorporate the emerging international standards into national policies and domestic legislation for mitigating the negative impacts of involuntary displacement. The policy and legal framework must go beyond 'eminent domain' and protect the social, economic and cultural rights of people displaced and affected by development projects. It is essential that suitable training facilities are created to conduct research and train government employees and others responsible for population displacement. ■

C.McD.

References

Cernea, M. *'Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement: Reflections on the State of Knowledge'*, paper presented at DIDI Conference, Wadham College, Oxford, 3-7 January 1995.

Tamondong, S. *'State Power as a Medium of Impoverishment: The Case of Pantabangan Resettlement in the Philippines'*, paper presented at DIDI Conference.

Barabas, A. and Bartolome, M., *'Mediation or Self-Management: Large Dams, Social Movements and Ethnicity'*, paper presented at DIDI Conference.

Fleeing environmental devastation in the Sahel

A growing awareness, in both North and South, of the environment, and its implications for future generations, has found a place on international agendas, but the immediate effects of environmental deterioration on human migration patterns have been given scant attention. Most of the studies to date have emerged from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and a few from agencies within the United Nations. Most official and national government bodies, however, continue to treat those fleeing from insurmountable environmental problems as economic refugees. Preventive measures are usually geared to the macroeconomic policies of the country of origin, which often prompts governments to focus on industrial and agricultural growth at the further expense of those already living on marginal lands.

People the world over are seeking asylum from lands that have exceeded their capacity to support life, either through migration to other countries or through displacement within their own nations. Countries receiving these migrants in turn become host to a whole set of troubling issues, not the least of which is environmental degradation.

This unconventional class of refugees, increasingly referred to as 'environmental refugees', began receiving attention from the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) as far back as 1985. In a report published by UNEP, environmental refugees were introduced as 'those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardised their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.'

Environmental refugees generally fit into three broad categories: those who have been temporarily displaced because of environmental stress, such as earthquakes or cyclones, and who will be

able to return to their habitat; those who have been permanently displaced because of irreversible changes to their habitat, such as the establishment of dams and associated man-made lakes; and those who migrate temporarily or permanently in search of a better quality of life because their original habitat can no longer meet their basic needs. The majority of environmental refugees are located in the least developed countries, mainly sub-Saharan Africa. The bulk of these people are subsistence farmers or nomads forced to abandon their unsustainable lands.

In a current research programme, the Climate Institute of Washington DC has estimated that, in addition to the 18 million refugees who fall within the established (and restricted) definition of the term, there are at least 10 million others who can be classified as environmental refugees. And the Institute recognises that even this does not give the complete picture, owing to the lack of official recognition by governments. The true figure for this category of refugee, which the Washington researchers believe has grown more rapidly than any other in recent years, may be as high as 25 million. In other words, there are up to 15 million additional people who have been forced to migrate for environmental reasons not acknowledged by the authorities. This total is expected to rise as growing families and deepening impoverishment force many subsistence farmers into a vicious cycle of poverty, undermining the long-term productivity of their land in order to feed their families now.

Ecological distress in the Sahel

The Sahel region of Africa, stretching from Senegal to Chad, offers a startling landscape in which to explore the contributing factors leading to environmental migration. Scattered, unpredictable, torrential rainfall, coupled with very high daytime temperatures and almost

zero humidity (excluding coastal areas), are the forces which shape the Sahel's distinctive flora and fauna. The typical Sahelian landscape consists of wide, levelled plains of acacia shrub and tough grasses which, weather permitting, can sustain the pastoral livestock consisting of goats, camels, sheep, and cattle. During the dry season the land is often swept by hot, dust-filled winds, causing much hardship to the farmer and nomad. Every 1000 km or so, the great rivers of the Sahel, the Senegal and the Niger, bisect and nurture patches of irrigated agriculture which are linked by rail, road and market towns to the interior capitals.

To date, the most serious environmental refugee movement ever witnessed occurred after the Sahelian drought in the early 1980s. Over 250 000 people in Mauritania, 20% of the population, joined the destitute farmers in the country's urban areas. Currently, more than half the population of Nouakchott, Mauritania's capital, are refugees. In addition, nearly one million environmental refugees in Burkina Faso, a sixth of the nation's population, migrated to cities. In recent years, most environmental refugees have been moving towards the south and west to coastal West African nations. For instance, a large proportion of Sahelian refugees are concentrated in Côte d'Ivoire, making up one-fifth of the total population.

Environmental migration in the Sahel is the end result of several root causes. These include, though the list is by no means exhaustive: natural resource mismanagement, in which human activity has compounded or created natural disasters by pursuing unsustainable development methods (overcultivation, overgrazing, deforestation, and poor irrigation); demographic factors and carrying capacity (rising population places pressure for fuelwood, crop production, and water on an already finite environment, exacerbating soil erosion and desertification); and the political economy of Sahelian nations,

in which external pressures upon governments of developing countries lead to resource misallocation and inequity. Lastly, there is a root cause which encompasses all of the above in the shape of past and present unsustainable development practices, including current national development models. These are often conceived in response to crisis situations such as drought and famine, and are thus short-term prescriptions for solutions to long-term problems.

The influx of refugees into host countries has serious consequences, especially for sub-Saharan Africa, where it is

A new definition of 'refugees'?

While migration from one place to another is a centuries-old practice in the Sahel region, the rise of the modern nation state, and subsequent boundary demarcations, have enlarged the concept of who is a refugee. Some argue that the widely accepted view of refugees as being individuals who decide to seek asylum out of fear of political, racial, or religious persecution, or who leave their homes because of civil strife, must be expanded to include those people displaced because of environ-

usually viewed as economic migrants. Some maintain that this is appropriate as the term 'refugee' should be reserved for those fleeing political or human-induced factors. Following this line of reasoning are those who feel that broadening the refugee definition to include the environmentally displaced would detract from institutional responsibility in terms of prevention and response. While it is difficult in many cases to discriminate between those refugees forced to migrate because of environmental considerations and those driven out by economic factors, critics argue that it is imperative to recognise the close association between environmental degradation and population movements.

Whatever term one chooses to use to describe the environmentally displaced, it does not alter the challenges facing Sahelian governments and development organisations in halting the migration of environmental refugees. A good start would be to institutionalise measures that take natural resource depletion into account. To this end, local non-governmental organisations should work towards ensuring that a system of accountability is institutionalised by governments and aid agencies. Tapping indigenous knowledge also offers a wealth of possibilities for achieving alternatives to the current confusion and inefficiency surrounding environmental protection. By giving voice to the many who experience the harshness of poverty, those in the development field can become better educated and more actively involved in helping to formulate sustainable policies that work. ■ J. M.



Environmental devastation in the Sahel. As water resources shrink, Mauritanian farmers make a last-ditch effort to sow seeds in the parched land. Conditions like these have forced thousands into involuntary migration

estimated that migration makes up over half the high annual growth rate of urban populations. In addition, most urban centres have an economic base that is ill-prepared to provide employment, housing, clean water and services. Flows of refugees into already crowded urban areas, coupled with declining employment opportunities, have resulted in the stagnation of human capital and, in many cases, have reduced the host country's ability to direct or fuel its own development. Furthermore, most refugees settle in camps or settlements located in often environmentally fragile areas. As a result of these pre-existing conditions, in conjunction with the disproportionately high population density in refugee settlements, as well as the lack of incentives for refugees to maintain the environment, host countries fall victim to yet further environmental problems.

mental degradation. Redefining the concept of refugees to include environmental refugees would permit a realistic appraisal of the underlying causes and possible solutions which force people to flee degraded and unproductive lands. The sea of neglect surrounding the status of the environmental refugee has enormous significance for displaced individuals as their refugee status determines the amount of support and protection they receive, as well as having implications for a long-term resolution of their plight.

Lacking official recognition as environmental refugees, those individuals who flee unsupportable ecosystems are

Is there a refugee-specific education?

by Rosemary Preston*

In both industrially advanced and less developed countries, the education required by adults who are refugees relates to their past, present and expected social and economic experiences and not to their status as refugees. However, the condition of being a refugee affects the extent to which education is accessible and the quality of such provision. The experience of becoming and being a refugee may influence attitudes to education and capacities for learning.

Refugees: status and rights

The most important characteristics of refugees are their inability to repatriate due to continued fear of persecution in their homelands and the absence of permanent settlement opportunities in their country of asylum or elsewhere.

In theory, in the case of those seeking refuge from persecution, states are bound to respect the principles of territorial asylum, by providing protection of the person and refraining from forcible repatriation. In addition, if they are signatories to the Geneva Convention and Protocol, States accept, on humanitarian grounds, a commitment to make certain social and economic provisions in respect of those formally designated as refugees, so as to promote their integration in the country of asylum. Such States are required by the terms of the Convention to grant refugees, without discrimination, the most favourable treatment possible in this respect, if not the same treatment as the national population. The economic and social provisions listed by the Convention relate, among other things, to gainful employment and to education. Refugees

should have the same entitlement to wage-earning employment and primary education as the national population. Their entitlement to other forms of employment and education should be the same as that enjoyed by other aliens.

In practice, these intentions are not always fulfilled. States do repatriate refugee-seekers against their will. Although signatories to the Geneva Convention and Protocol, States nowadays are choosing not to confer refugees status on large numbers of those applying for asylum and instead grant more precarious residential status with inferior entitlements. In any case, signatories may reserve agreement to such clauses when signing the Convention and many do, on both economic and political grounds. These grounds include, among others, the inability to pay for such assistance, the fear of angering the local population, the need to discourage greater numbers of immigrants from seeking asylum and to minimise friction with the government of the country of origin.

The ascribing of refugee status differentiates groups of asylum-seekers and those so labelled from the local population, whether national or immigrant. It simultaneously creates a popular image of victims or circumstances where it is morally justifiable to give humanitarian assistance. By providing such assistance from sources and through channels other than those that would be used to bring equivalent services to local people, governments can avoid the accusation of giving to foreigners that which rightfully belongs to the national population. Since the status of refugee depoliticises and denationalises those so labelled, international agencies and governments can finance such aid on the grounds that it is not partisan. These processes are, in turn, allowed to produce the impression that refugees are unable to help themselves or to recognise the kind of assistance that they need and so have no contribution to make in providing for those needs.

Since this image of helplessness is patently not grounded in reality, it has to be assumed that such constructions have political purposes intended to maintain refugees without a voice in socially marginal positions. Several researchers have shown that refugee groups take many initiatives to help themselves. Typically, they are quick to identify a cluster of needs, the fulfilment of which will enable them to resume self-sufficiency as individuals, households or communities. In locations where subsistence production is not an option, the primary needs are an opportunity to generate income and a demand for training in skills that will enable them to do so, in ways that are appropriate to their present place of residence and expected long-term settlement. Only where refugees have been held for protracted periods of time in restricted settlements, without hope of a long-term alternative, does it seem that inertia undermines these initiatives.

Refugee futures

All education looks to the future, but not all people have certain futures. The often extended and changing uncertainty of refugee futures can make it particularly difficult to identify the most appropriate forms of education for refugee groups, whether children or adults. In Thailand and Pakistan, changes in both short and long-term settlement policies have resulted in major changes in the structure and content of educational assistance.

The influence of settlement characteristics on refugee educational and training needs is undisputed. Refugees are found in industrially advanced and less developed countries. They live in rural and urban areas, settled by private arrangement with local people or in accordance with government policy. They may live in individual households or in open or closed group settlements. These range from agricultural development schemes, such as those found in Zambia and Tanzania, to the closed, prison-like camps of Thailand and Hong Kong. When long-term settlement has been achieved, the refugee status lapses, administratively at least. Until then, refugees endeavour to prepare for as many options as they see before

* Department of Continuing Education, University of Warwick. Originally published in *Convergence*, Journal of the International Council for Adult Education, Toronto, Canada, Vol. XXIII, No.3, 1990.

them. These may include continued residence in places of temporary settlement, long-term residence in the same country, resettlement in a third country or, the internationally preferred solution, repatriation to their country of origin.

The decreasing opportunities for refugees from impoverished regions of the Third World to resettle in industrially advanced countries of North America, Europe and Australasia is discouraging poorer countries from offering initial asylum. These countries are also becoming less inclined to offer long-term settlement to those to whom they have given temporary asylum, sometimes for many years, while fruitless efforts have been made to ensure their safe repatriation.

The increasingly negative political climate surrounding refugees and asylum seekers explains in part the rhetoric of uncertainty that is used to inhibit decisive policy to enhance refugee futures. In industrially advanced countries, those given asylum without refugee status may be prevented from attending language and employment training that would be prerequisites for self-sufficiency. The failure of the second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) to establish ways to provide long-term development assistance to refugee-affected areas of the continent has meant that the transition from entitlement to emergency relief to development aid has advanced little and such provision as is made reaches only a minority of those who would benefit from it. The situation is similar in areas of Latin America and Asia which receive refugees.

The education of adult refugees

The study of the provision of education to adult refugees and asylum seekers and its effects on them should be explicitly located in the changing contextual fabric within which it is embedded.

In different parts of the world, many people devote large amounts of time and effort to helping refugees obtain education. In the face of what are sometimes enormous political, economic and logistical obstacles, their achievements are to be applauded. However, the proportion of refugee adults receiving education is



UNHCR/Ernst & Young

small and politically determined, with members of certain ethnic groups and nationalities being given preference over others. The costs *per capita*, in contrast, are high, distorted by the inclusion of the small number of refugees given scholarships to study outside their country of asylum.

Educational programmes for refugee adults seem to conform, with a few significant exceptions, to those provided for non-refugee groups of equivalent educational and social status. Whether initiated and administered by refugees, private voluntary agencies (PVOs) or governments, they include basic literacy and numeracy courses for those with no schooling, trade and craft skill training, post-primary levels of formal education and various professional and para-professional training courses. As with non-refugee groups, programmes may be directed at all members of the adult population or at selected sub-groups, differentiated by age, gender, ethnicity or nationality. Some programmes are devised to give selected refugees basic training to ensure immediate services for the refugee populations to which they belong. They include, for example, health worker and teacher training. This is in accordance with UNHCR policy, endorsed in many countries, that refugees should be responsible for services within the refugee community. Other programmes, taught and administered by refugees, are more concerned with engendering eventual self-sufficiency and longer-term opportunities. Among the exceptions to what are recognised as conventional forms of post-initial education are political socialisation and military training for refugees committed to the restructuring of government in their country of origin as a condition of their eventual repatriation. The provision of resources by international organisations (IOs) and donor governments to those who

Ethiopian refugees in Sudan. One of the greatest wishes of refugees is to have the chance of an education

administer such programmes, albeit for stated purposes such as the primary schooling of children, is seen at times as a breach of the non-political, humanitarian rhetoric that they use as a platform for their intervention. It includes UNHCR contributions to SWAPO, FRELIMO and the Angolan national liberation movements.

Thailand provides an illustration of the range of educational programmes for refugee-seeking adults of different national and ethnic groups (Hmong, Laotian, Vietnamese, Cambodian and now Burmese) with differing and changing expectations of long-term settlement. In the late 1970s, Vietnamese and Hmong refugees prepared themselves for resettlement in English-speaking countries; Laotians, until the early 1980s, expected to be able to remain indefinitely in Thailand, but now expect eventual repatriation along with the Cambodians. A small group of Vietnamese, rejected for resettlement, have no prospect of remaining in Thailand or of returning to Vietnam under its present regime. At Site 2 holding camp in Thailand, the largest Khmer settlement outside Pnomh Penh, educational programmes, funded by a series of IOs and PVOs, are administered by the Khmer Peoples' National Liberation Front (KPLNF) government within the camp. Adult programmes include three-month basic education courses attended by thousands of refugees, both men and women, who have never been to school, followed by the opportunity to continue primary schooling. Vocational training, for out-of-school youth or for adults of economically active age groups, is not available. Rehabilitation in craft and trade skills is provided for the handicapped, but restrictions are imposed on the kinds of tools and machinery that

can be brought into the camp for this purpose. Participants are nearly all young men who lost limbs fighting or in minefield accidents.

The Khmer Women's Association provides women with work in silk and cotton weaving and other dress-making activities, as well as some basic educational opportunities. Volunteers, usually expatriates employed by the different PVOs, are invited by the KPLNF government to train primary school teachers, literacy teacher trainers and community health workers. In the neighbouring camp at Khao-I-Dang, training is given in curriculum translation, design and materials production appropriate to the needs of the Khmer primary children. In Phanat Nikhom, a transit camp for those destined for resettlement in North America, Europe or Australasia, government orientation programmes are offered. Refugees also receive language training. The importance of military training in Khmer Rouge camps is well known, but little detail is available.

Listing and describing programmes in this way can read impressively, but little is known about the way in which the restrictions of the refugee environment affect the quality of these educational endeavours and reduce their scope for enhancing refugees' social and economic opportunities. With the exception of the resettlement orientation schemes which are mandatory, only a small proportion of the eligible population has the possibility of participating in these activities. This has clear implications for differentiation within the refugee population and in relation to the local population wherever long-term settlement occurs.

In the case of large refugee populations, in places of temporary settlement in less developed countries, the principal thrust of education is the primary education of children, who are likely to constitute more than half of the refugee-seeking population. In advanced industrial societies it is largely concerned with adults, as children are entitled to attend local schools. However, apart from studies evaluating government-sponsored reception programmes, little information is available about the extent, nature and effects of a plethora of educational initiatives.

Two conferences recently held in London reflected appreciation of the efforts of authorities and individuals to promote education for refugees, but also criticism of the increasing difficulties encountered in access even to rudimentary English classes, let alone pre-employment and production-oriented training. Particularly strong criticism came from people with professional qualifications which were not given equivalent status in Britain. The little research available substantiates these claims and, in the case of Britain, urges government to form a coherent policy.

The lack of research on education for refugees is not restricted to the United Kingdom. On the contrary, it is widespread and particularly acute in less developed countries. As has been argued elsewhere, most of the writing on refugee education, including that concerned with adults, displays humanitarian sympathy to refugees and assumes unquestioningly their right to education. Most of the research literature is in the form of project evaluations to governments and agencies, the purpose of which is to vindicate past, and justify future, expenditure. In places of initial asylum, the reports are biased towards project descriptions and sometimes to appraisals of project management and resource use. They are not as concerned with the educational, social or political implications of what is being achieved. The few previous attempts to draw inferences from case studies on refugee education are more committed to the justification of increased and improved provision than to an analysis of achievements. The few more critical appraisals include *Supote Prasertsi's* idea of sequential stages in the development of refugee education in Thailand and *Sarah Graham-Brown's* comparative study of Palestinian schooling.

Similar descriptive studies exist in places of long-term settlement. In addition, almost exclusively in industrially advanced countries, there are studies which analyse the extent to which the education and training given to adult refugees before and after arrival is enabling social and economic participation in the host society. Both the Canadian and American governments have initiated such research and some has been done by

members of the academic community. These studies approach their subjects as members of ethnic minority groups and do not identify determination of behaviour and assistance that are peculiar to them as refugees. Further, the latent interest in such research may be seen to be the extent to which education provided to such groups contributes to the well-being of the wider society, as much as to that of its recipients.

The superficiality of the limited number of studies on refugee education derives from host government and funding agency unwillingness to risk the adverse publicity that this might entail. Governments may fear the ulterior political motives of researchers and in any case do not wish international portrayal of parsimony in educational provision for refugees. Agencies need to paint positive pictures of their activities in terms of finite projects, so as not to deter funders. Nevertheless, there are many reasons why, for the sake of all interested parties, such research should be extended.

Justification and plans for increased and improved provision of education to adult refugees should depend on information about responses to the provision already made, in terms of participation and attainment. For the same reason, there is a case for analysing the effects of such education in terms of recipient well-being and the well-being of both refugee and local communities. At a higher level, there is little information on the ways in which educational assistance affects relationships between governments, agencies and refugees to test the validity of claims that the negative effects (refugee expectations of indefinite local settlement, refugee consumption of scarce local resources and employment opportunities) outweigh the positive (generation of employment, diversification of the economy). If it can be shown that educating refugees can be beneficial to the social and economic well-being of all, there is a case for detailed qualitative research on the extent to which refugee resourcefulness and initiative can be tapped to overcome the web of petty restrictions and ensure the quantity and quality of educational services. ■

R.P.

Refugee participation

by Robin Needham*

The world has acquired a fairly stereotyped impression of refugees. Unfortunately, as a professional in the refugee assistance field explains, these stereotypes also affect those who work with refugees and prevent participation by refugees in decisions that affect them and their future.

Firstly, refugees are assumed to be completely helpless and crying out for any assistance that can be given to them. A condition such as this is seen to require direct action and intervention, independent of the participation of, or consultation with, the refugees themselves.

Secondly, refugees are treated as statistics and numbers. The operation of working with them is regarded as a logistical exercise. Refugees are recipients for objects and items. Successful progress in a refugee operation is measured in terms of x houses built, y tons of food provided, z patients treated. There is little consideration of social factors or refugee values because the whole basis of so many refugee relief efforts rests on objects, not on people; on what is available, not on what is needed.

Thirdly, 'he who pays the piper calls the tune'. The donors are usually the ones calling the tune so the agencies serving refugees see themselves as being more accountable to the donors than to the beneficiaries. It is the donors who — to a great extent — dictate the nature of the response by consciously or subconsciously expecting their will to be done. Basic needs may be being met, but whose basic needs? Those of the donors, the assisting agencies or the recipients?

Fourthly, assisting agencies sometimes develop a highly specialised but

rather inflexible approach to the provision of that assistance. Specialisation and models developed in community health care, food distribution, camp layout and services, etc., in one refugee assistance programme become the blueprint for the work of that agency in any and all other refugee settings.

Fifthly, many agencies and donors provide high-tech, high-profile, capital-intensive, photogenic types of assistance such as sophisticated field hospitals, imported machinery and equipment, new technology and 'appropriate' housing and sanitation. Many of the appliances and applications are beyond the knowledge and experience of refugees and thus widen the cultural and social gap between the intervenor and the refugee.

Sixthly, the decision-making apparatus in many international organisations or voluntary agencies does not have the provision for a major local input. Overall policy and programming is decided in Geneva, London or Washington and directives are handed down in such a way that questioning them is often difficult or unwise. Policy formulated at these levels may commit an organisation to a course of action that can become outmoded or impractical in the light of subsequent developments.

Seventhly, many agencies have no history of real provision for a participatory approach within their own organisations: power sharing with or participation by those outside the agencies — such as beneficiaries — is consequently unthinkable.

Ultra-paternalistic

These various constraints on the participation of refugees have led refugee assistance programmes to be described as '... the last bastion of the ultra-paternalistic approach to aid and development. It is hard to think of another area where the blinkered nonsense of the "we know what

is best for them" approach survives so unchallenged' (Malloch Brown).^①

Aengus Finucane, the Executive Director of CONCERN, the Irish NGO, has said: 'Health services, food, shelter and education can be described as basic physical needs. But the basic human need of refugees is the restoration of dignity. Dignity is the vital ingredient missing when basic physical needs are delivered in a mechanistic and impersonal way. Respect for human dignity is too often the first casualty of emergency responses to assist refugees. A less sophisticated level of service may be the only thing that makes good sense. But there is no excuse for a 'frontiersman' approach which fails to respect the dignity of the refugee. Small technologies may be beautiful. But a small or lessened place for human dignity is always and everywhere inappropriate.'^②


The ultra-paternalistic approach described by Malloch Brown means that participatory mechanisms in refugee programmes and camp administrations are often overlooked by the intervenors, whatever their role.

Denying refugees the chance to participate deprives them of self-esteem and dignity, causing depression, anxiety and apathy.

A Vietnamese boat woman held in a refugee camp in Hong Kong, with no say over her own fate, contemplates a bleak future



* Director of CARE-Ethiopia. This paper is based on research undertaken by the Centre for Development Studies, Swansea, UK, and is reprinted from *Refugee Participation Network*, No 17, August 1994.



UNHCR/R. J. Davies

In truth, there are too many barriers, both physical and mental, within the system that preclude effective refugee participation. But the lack of participation by refugees in decisions that affect them and their livelihoods is a fatal error. Why? Because it deprives refugees of the use of their own coping mechanisms which are so important in helping them to re-establish identity, self-esteem and dignity. And what does this type of deprivation cause? Deep down there develops what Tyhurst calls 'social displacement syndrome'. ③

This manifests itself in a mixture of depression, anxiety, apathy and hypochondria, which in the early stages are often considered essentially benign in that they may be slight to the point of not exceeding any limits of normality. These stresses do not require treatment by powerful drugs but rather, as Tyhurst puts it, 'the best results are obtained by mobilising the patients socially and interpersonally'. Left unattended or neglected, these mild disorders can manifest themselves in much stronger psychoses and antisocial behaviour such as severe personality disorders, regression to infantile states and aggression.

Stresses and strains

It is vitally important for all who work with refugees to understand the mental health stresses and strains of being a refugee and take appropriate steps to address them. A refugee suffers from guilt, nostalgia and 'living in the past'. A refugee

is a survivor. However horrifying the pre-flight conditions and however traumatic the flight, by crossing a border and arriving in a camp, the refugee has survived when many of his or her family, relatives and friends and thousands of countrymen and women either did not survive or elected not to flee.

After the initial period of euphoria on reaching the safe haven has passed, refugees are often overcome by a sense of guilt that they have survived while others died, or guilt that they abandoned relatives and friends who were unwilling or unable to escape with them. A sense of grieving for home sets in: 'home' in the widest sense, meaning community, traditions and culture that have been left behind. This can lead to a nostalgia fixation and then to nervous depression and a failure to adapt, or a wilful resistance to adapting to new surroundings. In its severest form it can generate 'pronounced, strong withdrawal behaviour; decreased working efficiency or refusal to work'. ④

Adaptation difficulties and disorientation — frequent manifestations of being a refugee — are often unwittingly exacerbated by those who seek to help. Refugees are prevented from adapting adequately to new surroundings. The expectations of others — host governments, international organisations, relief officials, donors, the media — condition this adaptation. Prolonged residence in a refugee camp living like a refugee causes a refugee to adopt the role of a refugee. If a

Refugees suffer from problems of personal identity and inadequacy. Every aspect of life is contrived on a mass scale, and there is an almost total lack of privacy.

Rwandan refugees waiting to register on arrival at Hongo camp, Bukavu region, Zaire

refugee is perceived and expected by others to be poor, helpless, ignorant and dependent for long enough, then eventually the refugee will take on that role.

Refugees also suffer from problems of personal identity and inadequacy. The organisation and structure of camp life is authoritarian and impersonal. Every aspect of life is contrived on a mass scale, taking little notice of individual variations. There is an almost total lack of privacy. In this stage, with no clear idea about the future and no sense of social belonging, a refugee can easily lose awareness of himself or herself as a mature social being. People who were self-sufficient before flight now have no source of livelihood, no income, no power and no control over their lives. This hurt sense of pride caused by a sudden fall down the social ladder due to circumstances beyond one's control occurs individually or collectively. Previously independent, self-sufficient and proud people are now entirely dependent on others.

Living in such unnatural social conditions causes in some individuals an impairment of interpersonal and social skills. The failure to maintain social status is felt as a humiliation, giving rise to lack of self-esteem and a sense of shame. The inferiority complexes which arise from this

cause some refugees to appear arrogant and sullen, while others boast loudly of the old times when life was good. Relationships in often highly traditional and structured societies break down. Traditional coping mechanisms and methods of dealing with stress and anxiety are no longer effective. Traditional leaders and elders are discredited or powerless or have lost status. The effects of these various stresses are often manifested by the apathy shown by refugees towards attempts to involve them in activities such as public works.

Apathy is a behaviour pattern often found in refugees. The individual and the community become uninterested, passive and dull with a serious deterioration of motivation. Hope has been abandoned. The only motivation seems to be that of complaining to authorities about the physical living conditions within the camp, in particular singling out problems with food, water and shelter. In fact these physical complaints mask deeper psychological stresses which are, in the main, compounded by camp life. Refugees try to cope with these stresses by following what is essentially a conservative strategy.

There is 'a profound distrust of innovation, new forms of organising their lives, since these are challenges to the expressive meaning of both personality and structural traditions'.^⑤

What is 'participation'?

The best way to help overcome the mental health stresses of being a refugee is for all of us in the refugee assistance business to pay more than the cursory lip service to participation. In the refugee relief and development business, the term 'participation' is widely used but little understood.

What is 'participation'? I am not going to provide a prescriptive list of ideas. Each refugee situation demands its own response and raises its own challenges and opportunities for participation. David Drucker, in an article on community management, provides some interesting

Each refugee situation demands its own response and raises its own challenges and opportunities for participation.

Refugees exchange their ideas with a UNHCR official in Adobia settlement, Zaire

observations on the nature of participation. 'The fact is,' he says, 'that 'participation' is fundamentally an act of partnership. Partnership takes time and effort to establish and can only succeed where there is mutual trust. Trust is not too easy to come by: it has to be solicited, worked for, have exaggerated demands made upon it at first — thus testing its reality and solidarity — and it must be gradually earned and given life... True partnership is what is required, and this demands new directions, new skills, new activities and new roles if the age-old fixed expectations and patterns of interlocking behaviour are not to frustrate the new aspirations of development.'^⑥

At every stage and at every level of refugee assistance, there has to be a more comprehensive understanding of the refugee experience. Those of us who work with refugees simply have not had the kind of life experiences that refugees have been through. We have to gain a fuller understanding of the refugee experience in order to hope to answer the question: does what we are doing really meet the needs — all the needs — of refugees? Through paying greater attention to refugee participation, we may find that we can begin to answer this question and, at the same time, work towards providing a better quality of life for the many millions of refugees around the world whom, in one capacity or another, we all seek to serve. ■

R.N.

References

- ① Malloch Brown, Mark; 'Refugees: the African Dimension', paper given at a symposium on *Assistance to Refugees: Alternative Viewpoints*, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, UK, March 1984.
- ② Feldstein B, Frelick G and Frye E; 'Training International Refugee Health Workers', *Disasters*, Vol. 7 (1), pp. 26-28, 1983.
- ③ Tyhurst L; 'Psychosocial First Aid for Refugees', *Mental Health and Society*, Vol. 4, pp. 319-343, 1977.
- ④ Zwingmann C A; 'The Nostalgic Phenomenon and its Exploitation', *Uprooting and After*, Springer Verlag, New York, 1973.
- ⑤ DeVoe D M; 'Framing Refugees as Clients', *International Migration Review*, Vol. 15 (1), pp. 84-88, 1981.
- ⑥ Drucker D; 'Ask a Silly Question, Get a Silly Answer', *Community Management: Asian Experience and Perspectives*, David C. Korten, Kumarian Press, pp. 162-3, 1986.

Refugee assistance: a common approach

by Mikael Barfod*

The European Commission has decided to coordinate under one hat all its actions towards refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees in third countries and to work for a common strategy in this area.

In the 1990s, the world has faced an upsurge in humanitarian crises which has put more demands on an efficient and well-coordinated donor response. The Commission responded to the new challenge by creating the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in 1992. The mandate of the Humanitarian Office was to improve efficiency and visibility in the delivery of humanitarian aid by coordinating and concentrating resources. Nevertheless, the concentration of

* Assistant for policy coordination in ECHO, the European Community Humanitarian Office.

resources has not brought together all the services who have traditionally been handling aid to refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees.

The conventional wisdom within the European Commission has been that assistance towards refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees in developing or relatively poor third countries should be dealt with within a regional context by geographical desks largely responsible for development issues. (The one exception to this has been food aid, where a global approach is used which also extends to refugees.) This approach ensured a close relationship between refugee issues on the one hand and development and other regional issues on the other, not least when it came to protracted refugee crises.

However, in recent years, such long-standing refugee problems have been overshadowed by a large number of


humanitarian crises many of which have given rise to swelling numbers of new refugees. Obviously, the Commission must adapt itself to the increased multitude and magnitude of refugee crises by continuing the coordination efforts which started with the creation of ECHO.

The Community allocated an estimated total of ECU 455 million to more than 60 countries of the world in 1994. Since several Commission services are administering these diverse aid programmes,¹ the Commission is obliged to establish a common policy to avoid overlapping, 'black holes' (where no donor provides assistance) or other inefficiencies.

In spite of the diversity of refugee programmes funded by the Community, it is nevertheless important not to lose sight of the similarities. The large majority of actions in this field are implemented

¹ The services are: (1) ECHO, (2) the Directorate General for Development-DG VIII (Food aid Division, Unit 6 handling refugee assistance under the Lomé Conventions), (3) the Directorate-General for External Affairs/North-South Relations-DG I N/S (Directorate H (Mediterranean and Middle East), Directorate I (Latin America), and Directorate J (Asia)) (4) the Directorate-General for External Political Affairs-DG IA (Political External Relations) and the Secretariat General. In 1994 ECHO administered approximately 56 percent of all refugee programmes whereas DG VIII administered 24 per cent and DG I around 20 per cent.

Total Community Assistance to Refugees, Displaced Persons and Returnees by Region, 1994



through partners — often the same partners serving many Commission services — be they Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies or other international organisations. It is regarded as essential to have a common framework for dealing with these partners in a coherent manner. This is particularly important for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who received around 30% of all Community contracts towards refugees in 1994.

Aims of common approach

The first aim is to support the whole 'refugee continuum': relief, care

and maintenance, self-sufficiency, resettlement/repatriation, and rehabilitation/reconstruction. Since the orientation of the several Commission services in question emphasises different aspects of this continuum, it is all the more important to ensure, as far as possible, a consistent, well-planned and stable support to a given refugee crisis from the outset.

The second aim is to ensure that assistance to refugees, whenever possible, takes into consideration preventive action to avoid future refugee flows. Obviously, the issue of prevention is very complex, since it involves a wide range of policies (for example, targeted development aid; preventive diplomacy; or peace-making and peace-keeping) which fall outside the

scope of refugee coordination. Preventive action in the sense of permanent preparedness to furnish on the spot humanitarian assistance can, however, play a vital role. If, for example, there are safe havens created in a country in turmoil and internally displaced persons can find shelter in such areas within their own country, well planned humanitarian assistance can help provide the necessary life support for the displaced persons concerned. Thus, it supports UNHCR's declared policy of reception in the region of origin and prevents internally displaced persons from becoming refugees in the sense of the Geneva Convention.

The third aim is to forge a link between the external assistance toward refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees on the one hand and the Commission's wider suggestions on immigration and asylum policies. This new Commission policy maintains that the best way to come to terms with increasing migration pressures is to develop further a comprehensive approach with preventive elements.

The last but certainly not least important aim is to provide a one-stop mechanism where all discussions relating to assistance for refugees, including relevant strategic issues (political options, relations with partners, follow-up, prevention, etc.) as well as specific operational questions will take place. To this effect a Permanent Inter-Service Group (PISG) for assistance toward refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees has been created with effect from January 1995. The group is chaired by ECHO and includes participation from services mentioned above.

As soon as the Permanent Inter-Service Group has accumulated some experience and is able to draw on the lessons learned, work will begin to put together a common Community strategy which can be used in negotiations with implementing agencies, not least the UNHCR.

Since the global number of refugees in the world seems to be growing every day, there is unfortunately little chance that the new coordination mechanism will be idle in the foreseeable future. ■

M.B.

What is the 'Refugee Continuum'?

Relief. In the first part of a refugee crisis, refugees are often given urgent assistance to set up camps and means of survival.

Care and maintenance and self-sufficiency. The initial crisis often gets a high media profile but this is quickly followed by a more calm period where the relief resources available become more scarce and where the emphasis must be gradually shifted to care and maintenance and eventually towards self-sufficiency of the refugees or internally displaced persons. During this phase refugees should be given the possibility to grow their own food, to engage in income-generating activities or even to gain formal employment.

Repatriation/internal resettlement. However, the achievement of self-sufficiency among refugees must never obscure the long-term goal of voluntary repatriation/internal resettlement when the situation is sufficiently safe and stable for the refugees to go home.

Resettlement/reconstruction. Assistance may be necessary to arrange home transport and resettlement schemes including reconstruction of rural and urban infrastructure.



Demining operations in Cambodia

Demining/demobilisation. At the same time demining and demobilisation schemes may be necessary to ensure long-term safety of the refugees and internally displaced persons who have returned to their original home.

Economic integration. If after a protracted refugee crisis there appears no possibility of sending refugees and internally displaced persons home, it is sometimes advisable to arrange for long-term social and economic integration in the new home country/area through access to land, employment possibilities etc. This is obviously the last resort after all possibilities of returning have been exhausted.

Defending humanitarianism

by Peter Walker*

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies is an alliance of some 163 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies which was set up some 75 years ago. Together the Societies spend some 23 billion Swiss francs (ECU 14.4 billion) a year on programmes to assist the most vulnerable in their own countries. In 1994 they spent some SFR 430 million (ECU 270 million) on international humanitarian responses to those crises which overwhelmed the capacity of local organisations. Ten years ago, most of the Federation's operations used to close within a few months of starting up, but almost all the operations it mounted in 1994 will carry on into 1995, as will a great many started in 1993. Assistance is currently going to some 19.4 million people worldwide in international relief operations; 6.6 million of these are refugees or displaced persons. The number of emergencies requiring an international response has risen at an alarming rate through the 1990s, essentially for three reasons.

The types of disasters happening today have changed, and the Federation is having to respond to more mass movements of desperate people than it ever did before. Vast movements such as that of Rwandans into Goma, Zaire, are happening because of a range of pre-existing political, economic, ethnic and military factors that undermine individual security. Refugees and displaced people are obviously vulnerable and have experienced their own personal disasters or crises. Their pre-existing vulnerability may lead to their displacement and, once displaced, they become even more vulnerable.

The number of disasters has grown too, and they are affecting more people than ever before. Disaster now hits between 250 and 300 million people a

year, excluding those caught up in war. Although annual figures vary widely, the general trend is upward at a rate of around 10 million a year.

A greater proportion of people are unable to recover from disaster unaided. Population increase and urban expansion account for some of this rise. In addition, more people are vulnerable to disasters because they live in poverty, because they are forced to live in close proximity to hazards (on flood plains, on marginal land and in urban shanty towns) or because they are subjected to violence and intimidation, whether it is war, banditry, ethnic hostility or religious discrimination. Vulnerable people may remain in need of assistance for months or sometimes years.

Finally, an increasingly unbalanced equation complicates disasters. Available resources are not growing to meet the increasing needs of disaster victims, at either the national or the international level. The welfare safety net traditionally provided by government is being universally dismantled. Increasingly, the burden of looking after dispossessed and vulnerable people of our planet is being laid at the feet of the voluntary and private institutions and the UN.

The trend is well-illustrated by the growth in international humanitarian assistance (which excludes assistance for long-term development). There has been an alarming increase in relief spending in OECD countries, which provide the bulk of international disaster relief spending. This increase is even more alarming when compared with the figures for long-term development assistance. Total overseas development assistance (ODA) to developing countries remained stable between 1980 and 1990, at around \$53 billion per year. When population increases are taken into account, one sees that assistance actually fell from \$13.06 per capita to \$12.71. This leaves the International Feder-

ation and other aid agencies with an increasing load to carry.

Growing complexity

Two tragedies in Africa — Liberia and Rwanda — show very little prospect of a return to normality. These relief operations cannot be expected to close down in a few weeks. Caring and well-resourced welfare states with clear, respected and defensible boundaries are increasingly a thing of the past. Power, from the barrel of the cheap but effective automatic rifle, in the hands of the dispossessed and hungry, is the most potent factor shaping people's lives today. If one looks for causal factors for this change, rapid population growth and urbanisation stand out alongside environmental degradation and a shrinking of the natural resource base. Nationalism and ethnic conflict become a refuge


Sub-Saharan Africa Refugees by country of asylum

Country	Number of refugees
Angola	10 900
Benin	150 300
Botswana	500
Burkina Faso	6 100
Burundi	271 900
Cameroon	43 800
Central Africa	41 500
Congo	9 700
Côte d'Ivoire	223 900
Djibouti	32 000
Ethiopia	336 300
Gabon	400
Gambia	2 000
Ghana	45 100
Guinea	539 500
Guinea-Bissau	16 800
Kenya	352 800
Lesotho	100
Liberia	150 000
Malawi	650 000
Mali	13 100
Mozambique	300
Namibia	600
Niger	6 200
Nigeria	4 500
Rwanda	298 000
Senegal	74 000
Sierra Leone	6 300
Somalia	300
Sudan	722 100
Swaziland	57 100
Tanzania	592 000
Togo	3 300
Uganda	293 400
Zaire	1 476 000
Zambia	143 600
Zimbabwe	241 200
Others	407 400
Total	7,323 000

Source: UNHCR, November 1994.

* Director of Disaster and Refugee Policy, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, Switzerland.

REFUGEES IN AFRICA BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN IN %



into which frightened and disillusioned people retreat. These cultural differences will define the fault lines along which future conflict will occur.

The Band-Aid approach to relief cannot work in such cases as Rwanda or Liberia, yet our present alternative response of open-ended basic welfare support — thus moving from the Band-Aid to the life support machine — is no solution either.

Clearly humanitarian agencies have to change rapidly. Rwanda will prove to be a turning point. It has brought home to all involved the potential scale of the suffering in today's all-embracing disasters and the need to address root causes while, at the same time, running sustained, massive relief operations.

Nonetheless, we have to be careful to separate our analysis from our operation. Although most people now recognise that disasters are caused by a combination of natural, economic and often military factors, many aid agencies assume that disaster response must also be in three parts, combining humanitarian with military and economic intervention.

This is a fatal approach. Humanitarian assistance is able to operate in situations of violence because it is seen to be independent, impartial and neutral and provided with the consent of all parties. Whether we are engaging in search and rescue operations after earthquakes, airlifts to remote famine regions or shelter programmes to assist flood victims, the same principle holds true. Impartiality, neutrality and consent must be the guiding principles in aid delivery.

The need for standards

Liberia and Somalia have suffered devastating civil wars and refugee flows. Other African nations share the tensions that Rwanda unleashed. From Angola to Bosnia to the Caucasus, vast swathes of people face poverty and conflict. The speed and complexity of these emergencies has thrown into sharp focus four dilemmas confronting all who would offer humanitarian assistance amid conflict and chaos, while their sheer scale has exposed many of the practical problems that beset agencies in any disaster.

Political action or humanitarian action?

Despite the end of the Cold War, the international community as yet seems unable to take resolute collective action in the face of what are in essence political crises over peace and security, justice and resources. Instead, humanitarian action — frequently funded by governments directly or via the UN — becomes an alternative to or substitute for efforts to seek and find political solutions. How should agencies deal with this: get on with their job and keep quiet, protest and pull out until governments become active, or work on — perhaps refusing money from passive politicians — but press publicly for political action?

Human rights or humanitarianism?

The carnage in Rwanda was perpetrated by Rwandans, many of whom live among the millions asking for assistance. Are these people refugees, or criminals who have forfeited their right to aid? Keeping someone alive ensures their most basic human right, but should humanitarian agencies do more than feed the hungry? If aid workers police human rights, will this hamper their ability to work with all those in need?

Beneficiaries or agencies?

Which comes first: food for the hungry or a television team to generate donations to pay for the food? In Rwanda and Somalia, competition for coverage is intense. Have agencies lost sight of their first responsibility — to help those in greatest need — in the battle for exposure, resources and donations, or is agency-versus-agency competition inevitable?

To what standards should relief be provided?

To what standards should food or medical assistance be provided? What

standards are disaster victims entitled to expect? The standards of their home country, those of their country of asylum if they are refugees, or those of the country from which the relief team comes? These questions have never really been satisfactorily addressed, although recently the International Federation and seven of the world's major nongovernmental relief agencies created a common code of conduct for their relief workers, a code which has now been subscribed to by over 40 relief agencies.

If the last decade has brought exponential growth in relief work, increased complexity and a groping for common standards of assistance, what will the next bring? We believe that the need for humanitarian assistance will continue to grow, and that more disaster victims will be fleeing violence, becoming refugees or joining the swelling ranks of the internally displaced. Large-scale, long-term relief 'welfare' operations are here to stay. At the same time, the increased funding being put into relief is bound to be followed by an increase in the accountability required from relief agencies. If agencies do not start to set and agree on their own standards, then standards will be imposed on them by the donor community.

Ultimately, increased finance and standards of assistance cannot turn back the tide of growing humanitarian need. Relief aid for the most part addresses effects, not causes. Today this is not enough, and tomorrow it will be seen as irresponsible. If relief agencies are to be true to their humanitarian beliefs, they may soon find themselves with little choice but to start advocating and acting for states, north and south, placing poverty reduction, household food security and the non-violent resolution of conflict at the heart of their strategies. ■ P.W.

Mozambican refugees and their brothers' keepers*

The repatriation of Mozambican refugees is one of the great success stories of the UN High Commission for Refugees. Often overlooked, however, is the exemplary manner in which the host countries, notably Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland and Malawi, welcomed and sustained the refugees in their various ways for nearly 15 years and created the conditions for their orderly and successful repatriation.

Two important factors need, first of all, to be borne in mind. Southern Africa has a tradition of migrant labour, and hospitality to strangers is second nature to the people of that region. This explains why the emergency phase of the crisis was easily handled by international relief agencies. In Zimbabwe, for example, over 100 000 Mozambican refugees were initially allowed to settle spontaneously in farms throughout the country more or less as migrant labourers. Secondly, the nature of the conflict was such that two of the neighbouring countries most dedicated to freedom and independence in Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia, could not be indifferent. They lent support openly to the newly installed and beleaguered Frelimo government which had won independence from Portugal after a long and bitter liberation struggle. Indeed Zimbabwe, along with Tanzania, sent troops into Mozambique, not only to protect the vital Beira railway but also to reinforce the Mozambican army in its war against Renamo. The latter not surprisingly considered Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Zambia as parties to the conflict and retaliated by carrying out raids into Zimbabwe and Zambia. The attitude of both governments was therefore not just one of sympathy but also of responsibility.

* With special thanks to Mengesha Kebede of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees who provided most of the information for this article. He was a UNHCR field officer on Mozambican refugees during the crisis.

It should also be borne in mind that the UNHCR was quick to put into place the 'care and assistance' phase of its operation. This phase follows the emergency measures (basically life-saving operations) and involves the day to day management of camps — provision of water, health facilities and sanitation, clothing, cooking utensils, education, etc., with of course the support of governments and NGOs. The basic food, for example, is provided in most cases by the World Food Programme.

As the conflict in Mozambique intensified and the flow of refugees into Zimbabwe increased and the farms became saturated with them, the Zimbabwean Government instructed that new arrivals be taken from the border and settled in five designated centres run largely by the UNHCR. No land was provided for self-sustaining agriculture, although horticultural and other supplementary activities were allowed.

By contrast, agricultural land was provided for the refugees in the one camp set up in Zambia at Ukwimi. The land was developed, with technical assistance, into one of the best UNHCR camps on the African continent: the refugees produced enough food for themselves and for sale.

Swaziland followed more or less the same policy as Zimbabwe, but here refugee relations with the local population and the Swazi authorities were not altogether smooth. Two camps were designated for settlement, but soon they were overcrowded. Those who settled in the rural areas at times found themselves at loggerheads with farmers over land. No land was provided for the camps for self-sustaining agrarian activities, to avoid, the authorities said, creating an atmosphere of permanence and prevent the refugees from considering Swaziland as their home. This was understandable for a country which rations land among its own people.

The camps survived on food rations. In towns, where considerable numbers of highly skilled Mozambican refugees settled, residents saw them as threats to jobs. Relations deteriorated rapidly in 1990/91 when a wave of crimes, which hit Swaziland, was linked by the police to the refugees. Raids were carried out in Manzini and Mbabane, and over 300 Mozambicans (described as illegal immigrants) were rounded up and sent back in accordance with the extradition treaty signed with the Mozambican Government in 1990. That move was the direct result of immense pressure. It was a period when the number of refugees was put at 134 000 (almost a fifth of the total population) and up to 400 were arriving weekly. With all the will in the world to help, the strain on the tiny Kingdom was just too much.

Malawi presented a completely different picture. It was the most generous of the four countries. It threw its borders wide open and allowed the refugees to settle wherever they liked. The few camps that were set up were open: refugees came and went as they pleased. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of refugees fleeing Mozambique headed for Malawi. By 1991 there were an estimated one million. In such a densely populated country, where 90% of the people are agrarian, land was of course in short supply. Although some of the refugees, who settled along the border, wandered in and out of Mozambique and sometimes cultivated lands there, they generally shared the local resources with the local people — food, water, health care and schools. The UNHCR launched several remunerative activities involving large numbers in the Central and Southern regions. These were mainly 'compensatory environment projects' such as afforestation and borehole digging. The World Bank also had similar but bigger projects in the North where the refugees were also employed.

Peace came in the nick of time for Mozambique and for the whole of Southern Africa, for the refugee burden on the resources of the host countries was reaching an intolerable level following the severe drought of 1992. They had nevertheless amply demonstrated they were their brothers' keepers. ■ Augustin Oyowe

The European Union's asylum policy: control, prevention, integration

Asylum is defined as the right to remain in a foreign country because it would be dangerous for the applicant to return to his or her home country for political reasons, and is a right which the countries in the European Union have hitherto regulated under their own national legislation. Asylum policy first officially became a 'matter of common interest' to all the Member States when the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union came into force in November 1993 and defined asylum as one of the areas for joint, intergovernmental action in the field of justice and home affairs. As well as the legal innovation, the Treaty introduced an important institutional change, in that it raised the European Commission from the status of a mere observer in this context by giving it powers of legislative initiative.

Wasting no time, in February 1994 the Commission issued a Communication on immigration and asylum policies addressed to the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. This wide-ranging review of the present situation, combined with a set of proposals for future policy development, now serves within the EU institutions and the Member States as a seedbed of new ideas for tackling these ever more pressing issues.

Dennis De Jong works for the European Commission's Secretariat-General in Brussels on the coordination of immigration and asylum policies and had a hand in drafting the Communication. For him, the major message is that there should be a balanced, comprehensive approach which gives equal importance to control, prevention and integration. 'Very often, national governments concentrate on migration management and control measures,' he says. 'But if instead of only focusing on control you focused on what comes before and after admission — let's say, how does migration pressure come up, what are the underlying causes, can we

influence the causes, can we create alternatives to forced migration? — it would be far better for all concerned. A practical preventive policy should never imply that people are forced to stay in their country. I want to make that clear because sometimes you hear people saying: "First you have your control policies, and now your preventive policies to stop people from fleeing their country." Of course that is not our intention, it's just to take away the causes so that people do not have to flee. We would never say: "There's a need to flee but we won't let you." That's exactly the opposite of what we're saying.'

So the Communication calls for improvements in the collection of information on migratory flows into the Union and the causes of such flows and suggests setting up a permanent body to monitor migration pressures and movements. Making human rights policies more effective, it says, would in itself forestall forced migration by victims of human rights violations and persecution. And Mr De Jong points out that the document suggests an innovative way of achieving this. 'There is a recommendation to use, for our human rights policies, the information we get from asylum seekers. Mr X's personal file cannot be used directly with the name and everything, that is far too dangerous. There's the question of privacy and data protection too. But what you could do is use the material to describe tendencies. If you suddenly get a lot of people from Iran and they all say their religious or social group suffers from persecution, that is an important fact for our human rights policies.' A further innovation would be to create institutional linkages between Foreign Ministries on the one hand and Justice and Home Affairs Ministries on the other for the purpose of translating such information into practical foreign policy initiatives. No such links exist in any Member State at the moment. At the European

Union level, the Commission proposes to give more thought to how the effects of civil war and tension can be factored into policy decision-making. 'In some countries neighbouring on the European Union there is instability; there is growing political, ethnic and religious tension. Our Delegations or Embassies do report on these situations, but what is amazing is that immigration ministers, justice and home affairs ministers, never discuss them as a group until there is already mass-media interest. For example, we are going to face hundreds of thousands of Algerians fleeing their country. In France every month there are more than 1000 Algerians coming in needing intervention and protection. France has already set up a scheme for that, but we are not discussing it yet in our third pillar mechanism, justice and home affairs, because there is no interaction between it and the second pillar, foreign and security policy.' Here the Commission, as a single organisation, can act as a linking pin between ministries and a source of ideas on preventive diplomacy — though Mr De Jong acknowledges the limitations of that kind of diplomacy: 'It didn't solve the problems of former Yugoslavia, there's no guaranteed success here, but at least you could give it a try. And the sooner you know about growing conflicts the better it is.'

There is actually a heading in the European Union's general budget for setting up an early warning system on migration movements, and on a trial basis, the money has recently been used to run a project in the Ukraine, with the approval of that country's government. Locally recruited correspondents there have found that transit migration through the Ukraine from neighbouring, former Soviet-bloc countries is greater than migration by Ukrainian nationals and far greater than was previously suspected from informal reports. All the people concerned are

potential migrants to Western Europe, so the information is obviously of vital importance to policy makers in the Union. Doing the same kind of survey in ACP countries should theoretically be possible if the governments concerned give their consent. The problem in practice is that the countries where such an exercise might be useful tend to be those where tensions are already running so high that people collecting data and sending in reports could well risk their lives doing so.

When Member States are considering whether migrants have left their countries for political or merely economic reasons, there is some overlap in the sense that some economic migrants, when all other channels to admission have been closed, use the instrument of asylum as a last resort. Most migrants from the ACP countries, however, come to Europe simply for economic reasons. But might an early warning system produce information which would suggest economic policies development planners might adopt to halt migration from source countries? 'The traditional argument,' says Dennis De Jong, 'has always been that if you give more development aid, in the end you probably have less migration pressure, but

there is a short-term effect which increases migration pressure. First, people get the financial means to travel, and they will, probably travel in the beginning. Only after some time of stability will you be able to say that the migration pressure goes down. We would probably put it the other way round. At present, very often, the discussion is not so much about increasing development aid as about decreasing it, and it's probably far more powerful to say if you decrease development cooperation funds in certain areas you can be sure that you will pay for it another way, in terms of migration, illegal immigration most of it, or asylum. That's a useful basis for a general discussion, where the development community and those concerned with migration have shared interests.'

The Commission is already looking at the details of prevention, and has a programme under way in the Mediterranean area which involves examining exactly which parts of Morocco generate migration towards the European Union, so development aid can be targeted on those specific areas to create opportunities which will encourage people to stay there. Eurostat, the EU's Statistical Service, is investigating root causes in a number of

countries of origin. This activity, carried out in cooperation with other organisations, could be the nucleus of a wider network in the future. As Mr De Jong puts it: 'Any country is a potential refugee source. It should not become a political issue that we start to do some early warning in a certain country. If this became a very public, widely discussed political issue in a particular country, it might even destabilise the country and have a contrary effect. So it should be a rather broad network, and I think it would be better to have something which would be at least endorsed by UNHCR, which makes it far less political and far more a general activity that is deemed to be useful for the UN as a whole. We have direct contacts with the US State Department and the Canadian Government, which have the same sort of problems as we have, so perhaps what starts as a very small pilot project with a possible initiative in the form of a communication by the Commission might eventually evolve into some sort of a global early warning system, which everyone agrees we desperately need.'

The thorny question of defining who exactly is a refugee has traditionally been seen as the prerogative of the Member States. Work on a coordinated definition started a year ago. Any finally agreed version will certainly be in accordance with Article 1a of the Geneva Convention, which stipulates that a refugee is a person with a well-founded fear of persecution in his or her country of origin on a variety of stated grounds. At present Member States are liberal in regard to individuals seeking asylum to escape persecution. 'What they don't want,' Dennis De Jong says, '— and that's the major problem with the Yugoslav crisis, for example — is determination of eligibility by group. No Member State at this stage is ready to accept that the only thing you have to say is: "I belong to this group and so I'm a refugee." They always want individual examination.' Hence the new category of people who are allowed in under temporary protection instead of refugee status. 'Many Member States would now say civil war situations are generally not the situations that the Geneva Convention deals with. The Con-

DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES IN EUROPE, NOVEMBER 1994

Member States of the European Union are highlighted

Country	Number of refugees
Albania	3 000
Austria	18 000
Belgium	24 000
Bosnia-Herzegovina	2 740 000
Bulgaria	100
Croatia	800 000
Czech Republic	200
Denmark	42 000
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	629 100
Finland	9 000
France	183 000
F.Y.R of Macedonia	27 000
Germany	1 068 000
Greece	8 200
Hungary	3 000
Ireland	300
Iceland	200
Italy	12 400
Luxembourg	200
Malta	500
Netherlands	33 200
Norway	26 600
Poland	800
Portugal	600
Romania	1 200
Slovak Republic	1 500
Slovenia	45 000
Spain	13 200
Sweden	257 000
Switzerland	27 000
United Kingdom	79 400

Source: UNHCR Regional Office, Brussels.

vention deals with a government which persecutes a certain person, not with a country in turmoil. So almost all Member States have now developed new schemes for admission on a temporary basis of those who flee a civil war situation and cannot be sent back to the country of origin for that reason.' Member States do not always even officially admit that these schemes exist, for fear of attracting more people from the world's trouble spots. So there is no hope of harmonising them at the moment; but the Commission would at least like to see the Member States all agreeing to give temporary protection to certain vulnerable groups from certain

right has to be granted automatically in any particular country if a refugee has first passed through others where he has or might have sought protection. The Commission supports this interpretation, which is known as the third host country principle, but calls in its Communication for a mechanism to be set up to support projects by third transit countries which find themselves suddenly facing unfamiliar migration pressure. 'You see the situation in Poland, the Czech Republic and now the Ukraine,' says Mr De Jong. 'If we deny altogether that one way or another we are responsible for helping out the countries which are affected by these flows, we are

this matter last year, each national government wanted to incorporate the exceptions contained in its own law, with the result that 'on very important issues like the right of appeal and suspensive effect, whereby the person can stay in the country while his appeal is heard, we see that the document has been terribly weakened. What this leads up to is harmonisation at the lowest common denominator. You don't get harmonisation at the humanitarian level if you have to reflect the most restrictive national legislation.'

The Communication on immigration and asylum policies makes suggestions for preventing illegal immigration and dealing with illegal residents in the Union, focusing particularly on illegal employment and on establishing uniform schemes for the voluntary repatriation of illegal immigrants. When it comes to integrating third-country nationals legally residing in the Union, the Commission urges the Member States to harmonise their legal status so that they can acquire permanent residence entitlement, and to allow them freedom of movement. The right economic and socio-cultural conditions also need to be created if integration is to be successful. This should involve steps to combat unemployment among third-country nationals and proper monitoring of their working conditions, as well as developing special programmes of education and vocational training for them. And the European Union, says the Communication, should set up systems to monitor racial harassment and codify a ban on racial discrimination in employment.

Migration and asylum within the ACP group fall outside the scope of the Communication, but the Secretariat-General welcomes the direct link set up in the Lomé Convention between respect for human rights and the supply of development aid, in that encouraging human rights observance tends to discourage migration. The same applies to another aspect of the Commission's work in some troubled ACP States, as Mr De Jong concludes: 'It is in the Third World itself that you find most refugees, not here, and humanitarian relief is extremely important in preventing further destabilisation because of refugee movements in the Third World.'

R.R.

countries at the same time, rather than have some turn them back while others are letting them in. 'And temporary protection cannot last for ever: it should be followed either by return or by permanent settlement, and those are probably decisions for the Council to take rather than the Member States.'

Amnesty International has criticised the practice of some countries which refer, or even physically return, asylum-seekers to the last country they passed through since leaving their country of origin. People fleeing from Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia, for example, have been known to fly to Russia solely because that was the only country issuing immediate visas when they had to leave, then to apply for asylum in the European Union from Russia and to be told that they are Russia's responsibility. The Geneva Convention says that a person may flee his or her own country and is entitled to protection elsewhere — but it does not say that that

just dumping people on other countries. You can't have that.' Refugees in third host countries where reception facilities are inadequate to cope with the numbers arriving may end up destitute on the streets, and the ultimate danger is that an overburdened transit country, if no one helps share the burden, may simply send asylum-seekers back to their countries of origin. The European Parliament has proposed earmarking part of the general budget to set up a European Fund for Refugees specifically to pay for burden-sharing, both among EU Member States and with host countries outside the Union.

There has not so far been much progress in the European Union on harmonising minimum standards for fair and efficient asylum procedures, in other words making sure that the Member States treat asylum-seekers uniformly. When the Commission put out a working document on

A group of asylum-seekers in Italy waits to hear if they will be admitted



UNHCR/L. Boccardi

Asylum procedures in the EU: towards a lowest common denominator?

by Johannes van der Klaauw*

European Union governments continue to take steps towards harmonising their policies and practices in the field of asylum and immigration. With the nearing completion of the internal market and the lifting of controls at the internal borders, EU governments have made arrangements to control the external frontiers of Union territory more tightly and to stem the flow of what they presume to be illegal immigrants. Among these, however, are people seeking protection from persecution elsewhere.

EU governments have adopted resolutions, recommendations and policy statements in the recent past to respond jointly to increasing pressure on their asylum procedures, caused by growing numbers of asylum-seekers. Many of these measures have had an adverse effect on the protection of refugees who are increasingly being refused access to the territory and to asylum procedures in EU member states. As a result of these proposals, national policies and practices have been

* European Union Representative for Amnesty International, Brussels, Belgium.

adjusted to categorise a growing proportion of asylum claims as inadmissible or, for some other reason, as not meriting substantive examination. Among these claims are some from people who have travelled through a third country, which, according to certain criteria set by EU governments, are obliged to take the asylum-seeker back. When expelling asylum-seekers to such third countries, EU governments are not seeking assurances from these countries that they will carry out the substantive examination of the claim needed. Therefore the asylum-seeker is at risk of being sent back to his or her country of origin where he or she may become the victim of human rights violations.

EU governments have also adopted proposals by which a large number of asylum claims are being qualified as 'manifestly unfounded,' to be processed in an accelerated procedure, without proper consideration, resulting in the forcible return of the asylum-seeker to a third country or the country of origin, where he

An asylum-seeker in Austria. Minimum standards in the processing of applications for asylum should, in Amnesty International's view, include a full and fair hearing, a right of appeal and a right to remain in the host country while the appeal is heard

or she may be at risk of persecution. But the definition of such claims adopted by EU Member States is broader than that set out in international standards and includes cases which, in the view of Amnesty International, deserve individual and substantive consideration.

As long as there are serious deficiencies in national asylum procedures and practices in EU Member States, the detrimental effect of these joint policies, which do not take into account minimum standards of refugee protection, will only be exacerbated by the coming into force of the Schengen Supplementary Agreement and the Dublin Convention (determining the state responsible for considering an application for asylum). EU governments have recognised this since they have recently drawn up a set of minimum guarantees to be applied in asylum procedures in all Member States. However, their proposals — still under consideration — are legitimising existing deficiencies in Member States' asylum procedures rather than aiming at a common policy which matches up to the requirements of international standards.

Amnesty International has developed a comprehensive set of minimum standards for asylum procedures, which, if implemented as a whole, should provide a better guarantee that refugees would be protected against being forcibly sent back. The main characteristics of this proposal are: unfettered access for asylum-seekers in all cases to the asylum procedure, a fair and full hearing of his or her case, and an effective right to appeal against a negative decision — which means that the applicant is entitled to await the appeal decision before being expelled. Only the combination of these three main elements constitutes a solid basis for an asylum procedure with sufficient guarantees to provide refugees with the requisite protection. However, the latest EU proposals do



UNACR — J. Reson-Peterson

not respect all of these fundamental principles. Moreover, they leave the responsibility for decisions on asylum applications, in some cases, to immigration officials, including decisions whether to reject asylum-seekers at the border — whereas such a responsibility, in the view of Amnesty International, should rest exclusively with a special central authority.

The latest Council of Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs adopted a model agreement for the readmission by third countries of persons deemed not to be admissible to sojourn in EU Member States. Among those to be readmitted by non-EU states are people who have submitted asylum claims in an EU Member State but whose claims have been refused — without a proper examination. When implementing the current model agreement, EU Member States, not being obliged to ask for a proper examination of an asylum claim in an identified third state, may be accused of encouraging the successful return from one country to another of asylum-seekers ultimately ending up in a country where they are at risk of persecution.

EU Member States are, furthermore, in the process of harmonising the application of the definition of a 'refugee' as laid down in Article 1A of the 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees. They feel prompted to do so since they want, *inter alia*, to establish more or less similar recognition rates for refugees throughout the EU. They have chosen a step-by-step approach to reach agreement on common principles for assessing specific elements of this definition.

Amnesty International has urged EU governments on various occasions not to adopt principles falling short of already established international standards, since any initiative towards a new interpretation of elements of the definition will have consequences far beyond the borders of the EU. In this respect, any further proposals should follow the guidance of the 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status', published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The 'third host country' concept: a convenient alibi?

It would surely come as a surprise to most people if they were told that there are hundreds of African asylum-seekers in Japan. Saul Takahashi, a former refugee officer for Amnesty International in that country, writes that he was certainly taken aback to be faced with the numbers of Africans applying for recognition as political refugees. His experience suggests why some refugees are forced to apply for asylum in a country other than the first one in which they arrive from their country of origin. But they can still end up in a Limbo where nobody will take responsibility for them.

As a more or less racially homogeneous island nation in East Asia where in most towns black Africans still attract stares of wonder, and with her minute connections to the continent of Africa, Japan would not seem the obvious choice for a southern Sudanese or a Somali to seek refuge. Prepared mainly for Asians (Burmese, Chinese, Sri Lankans and others), I am ashamed to admit that at first I could not even point to Sudan on a map.

I learned fast. As a refugee officer, my job was to provide legal aid and advice in making an asylum claim to the Japanese Government. This was anything but an easy task: though signatory to the Geneva Convention, Japan's policy in reality is not to recognise any refugees at all. Her determination system is secretive and arbitrary, for all practical purposes resulting in refusal of recognition with no reason given. However, though almost never recognised and given official

asylum, the refugees are for the most part 'tolerated'; that is, the government does not (actively) send them back to their home country and turns a blind eye to their 'illegal' presence.

This is not necessarily the humane attitude the government would have one believe. The refugee lives in constant fear of deportation, and with no official permit to work (which would have come with official recognition), he is doomed to make do in the underground economy with no protection against the exploitation that is so rampant. On top of this, due to the colour of his skin, he must face extensive discrimination on a daily basis, from people avoiding sitting next to him on the train to cafeterias refusing him entry. With no hope of going anywhere else but the country from which he fled, the refugee is doomed to second-class citizen existence.

The simplest way of keeping out refugees in the first place is not to give tourist visas to nationals of 'refugee-producing' countries. When refugees are refused permission to enter by Western, including EU, countries, some of them come to Japan, which they assume quite wrongly to be not that bad — a rich, industrialised country, democratic, liberal and a signatory to the Convention. But when I left Japan in October 1994, I was already beginning to hear rumours from the Sudanese about the Japanese Embassy in Khartoum refusing more and more applications. As long as the refugees are shuffled from one 'third world' country to another and back, Japan and the West seem to be more than content. ■ S.T.

The current initiatives taken by EU Member States are affecting the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the first place, being quite often countries through which asylum-seekers have travelled before calling at the EU external borders, and often being considered 'safe' third countries by EU governments. However, many African refugees seek asylum in an EU country after passing through other African countries, and these Africans are therefore also affected by the increasingly restrictive EU measures. These countries are not formally party to discussions leading to the adoption of EU proposals — neither are the European Parliament, expert bodies in refugee matters or

interested non-governmental organisations. EU governments should act in a true spirit of international cooperation, while decisions adopted should be in line with international standards and reached in a transparent and democratically controllable process. Otherwise the current initiatives will not contribute to solving the present pressure on the refugee protection system in Europe, which, in fact, is less extensive than in many other — much poorer — parts of the world. ■ J. vdK.

A European response to the global refugee crisis

by Philip Rudge*

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) is deeply concerned with the complexities of the world refugee situation. The need for a broad range of measures to tackle its human and political dimensions is now evident. The challenge to develop a comprehensive approach to the moral and practical issues is urgent: for the millions of individuals concerned, the human suffering involved is intolerable; for the emerging international order, the political challenge is immense.

Over the past 50 years, states have worked on the national level and increasingly through international institutions to develop laws and practices with the explicit objective of tackling refugee situations in the interests both of the human beings concerned and of the community of states. The degree to which this has been successful reflects the reconciliation between the demands of humanitarian solidarity on the one hand and the interests of states on the other. This balance is delicate and continually changing; in the 1990s, the assertion of the principles of human solidarity has become imperative.

Until the 1980s, the protection and assistance of refugees in western Europe, while uneven and subject to foreign policy preferences of states, was not an issue which generally provoked great controversy, particularly when the number of asylum seekers was low and governments were able to count broadly upon the support of their electorates. Grave social and economic crises have come to dominate the political agenda throughout Europe, the number of asylum seekers has risen and sections of public opinion have become uncertain or hostile towards

refugees or foreigners in general. The result is enormous pressure on what have been considered well-established human rights standards and humanitarian principles, including those upon which refugee protection depends.

Such is the position in Europe in the 1990s. European states will continue to receive refugees, possibly in greater numbers than hitherto seen, who are forced to move because they are the victims of massive violations of human rights. It is a tragic fact that levels of persecution remain high and human rights violations are widespread throughout the world. Persecution of the individual or of entire groups of the population, armed conflict and civil war have, for decades, been the daily reality in many states. The consolidation process of many newly established states and the search for a national identity

Asylum seekers in France in the queue for refugee status
'European states will continue to receive refugees, possibly in greater numbers than hitherto seen'

continue to cause internal conflicts which often result in breaches of even the most fundamental human rights. Serious violations are also evident in states whose political processes have become dominated by the excesses of religious and ethnic fundamentalism.

As well as the intolerant and repressive states whose official actions strike at the heart of the civil and political rights of their citizens, there are numerous other states that, for a variety of reasons, are unable to ensure the economic, social and cultural rights of their populations. The social disorder that often arises from discontent with poverty, hunger and deprivation frequently provokes governmental responses, leading to a spiral of further protest and ultimately in suppression. The victims of this may be forced to seek a tolerable existence elsewhere, for example as *de facto* refugees, refugees with temporary protection status, and as refugees in the 'classic' sense of the word.

These situations are compounded further by other states which, for a combination of economic, political and military reasons, acquiesce in, or even promote, human rights violations, economic discrimination and civil strife. In the face of such conditions the victims, be they individuals or groups, often find that they have no alternative but to flee their communities in order to sustain their life and liberty.



UNICRIM, Vonappelsheim

* General Secretary of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).



UNHCR/L. Astrom

European resources will therefore continue to be called upon to contribute to the promotion of peaceful and sustainable development in all parts of the world, without which refugees will continue to flee. ECRE's aims must be seen in the light of this basic proposition: that in order for refugees to feel confident that they can obtain the protection they need and for states to feel assured that there is a genuine international sharing of responsibility, it is indispensable to devise a coherent and comprehensive refugee policy for Europe, based on respect for well established human rights standards and principles of solidarity.

Many of the Cold War political assumptions that have long underpinned refugee protection in Europe are now redundant and important new mechanisms of cooperation are evolving among states. Action on behalf of refugees is part of the UN Agenda for Peace; it affects, in the widest sense, the agenda of the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, of the Council of Europe and notably of the European Union. Within the European Commission and Parliament, asylum policy is subject to frequent and open discussion, whereas at the Justice and Home Affairs department of the Council, this subject is still being dealt with in an inter-governmental way, a process which has attracted widespread criticism for its lack of democratic transparency and judicial control.

The prevention of the conditions causing refugee movements demands from the international community a more vigorous implementation of transparent policies favouring global respect for human

rights and peaceful and sustainable development. The treatment of the immense human distress facing refugees requires a generous humanitarian response and a more equitable system of shared responsibility in which the institution of asylum remains an important element, but only one among many.

In the face of growing migratory pressures of all kinds, governments and inter-governmental organisations will need to develop a more strategic view, based on the highest quality research and information. Those persons and groups at risk must benefit from the full implementation of international standards and procedures relating to refugees; simultaneously a variety of migration policies will be needed to manage more effectively the movement of persons who leave their countries for non-refugee related reasons.

The growing non-governmental movement in Europe will play an increasingly important role in helping to devise, implement and explain the refugee policies of the future. NGOs are already creating

Young Vietnamese refugees in Sweden enjoy their first experience of snow
Many of the Cold War political assumptions that have long underpinned refugee protection in Europe are now redundant

new alliances with other parts of civil society, in particular in central and eastern Europe, to promote tolerance, the respect for the rights of minorities and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. New and more creative partnerships will be needed between NGOs, UNHCR and key inter-governmental bodies with a direct concern for human rights and refugee protection.

At the heart of this concern lies the need for a clear commitment by all states and civil society to the universality of human rights and the inviolability of the human person. Refugees themselves and the whole system which supports the international protection of refugees throughout the world requires that a European refugee policy be based on that fundamental position. ■ P.R.

The ECRE

The European Council on Refugees and Exiles is a forum for cooperation between some 60 non-governmental organisations in Europe concerned with refugees and the right of asylum. ECRE's objective is to promote through joint analysis, research and information exchange, a humane and liberal asylum policy in Europe. ECRE is concerned with the needs of individuals who seek asylum in Europe and the development of a coherent response to the global refugee problem. ECRE members include all the national refugees councils in Europe, lay and church-based assisting organisations, national branches of international networks, and organisations specialising in human rights issues. ECRE's activities depend on the ideas, priorities and active participation of its agencies. ECRE has consultative status with the Council of Europe. The Secretariat is based in London. ECRE also has a European Union Office, based in Brussels.

Refugees from the former Yugoslavia

The view from Germany

by Judith Kumin*

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia has generated Europe's biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War. Although statistics always have to be taken with a dose of caution, UNHCR estimates, conservatively, that three million persons, mostly women, children, and the elderly, have been driven from their homes by fighting and ethnic cleansing in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991.

Many displaced people have stayed within the former Yugoslav region. At the end of 1994, 380 000 refugees and displaced persons were being hosted in parts of Croatia under Croatian control, while a further 122 000 were living in the so-called UN Protected Areas of Croatia, which are under Serbian control. Serbia and Montenegro accommodate an additional 449 000 refugees, with 30,000 more in Slovenia and 15 000 in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The largest numbers are to be found within shattered Bosnia-Herzegovina itself, which has 1 327 000 displaced persons. About half of the population living in Sarajevo, in the besieged towns of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde in Eastern Bosnia, and in the Bihac pocket in the north-west of the country, have been displaced from other villages and towns, often only a stone's throw away.

Even without taking into consideration the 1.3 million others who have managed to remain in their homes in Bosnia-Herzegovina but who are dependent on international assistance, this is a shocking tally of the effect of the conflict on the civilian population.

Just how many refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have made their way to countries of Central and

Western Europe cannot be known with certainty, as many stay with friends and relatives and do not register with the authorities. There is no doubt, however, that the overwhelming majority of those who have left the former Yugoslav region have found temporary refuge in the Federal Republic of Germany (see table).

Although no complete registration has been effected in Germany of the 'war refugees' (to use the colloquial German term) from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Ministry of Interior estimated their number at the end of 1994 to be 350 000. Around 200 000 are Bosnians who are staying in Germany on the basis of a 'toleration permit' in line with the country-wide ban on deportations to Bosnia-Herzegovina which has been in effect since May 1992.

In addition, at least 40 000 refugees from Bosnia Herzegovina are staying in Germany thanks to a special arrangement whereby visitors' visas are issued to those who are able to secure a guarantee of support from an individual or group in Germany. By December 1994, a further 14 324 particularly vulnerable Bosnians had been admitted under a special quota for ex-detainees, victims of rape, persons in need of emergency medical treatment and other special cases. Finally, nearly 25 000 more Bosnians have applied formally for asylum in Germany, and await decisions on their requests once the current freeze on adjudication of Bosnian asylum cases is lifted.

Moreover, a substantial number of refugees from Croatia, perhaps as many as 70 000, are still staying in Germany, even though a formal decision has been taken by the German authorities to end temporary protection for this group. Those who came from territory currently under Croatian control were required to return home by the end of October 1994; those whose homes are in parts of Croatia currently under Serbian control are ex-

pected to leave Germany as of April 1995. They will not be able to return to their homes, but the German government expects Croatia to absorb them in other parts of the country. This will undoubtedly be a difficult task, as most accommodation available for refugees and displaced persons in Croatia is already occupied.

All in all, the estimate of more than 350 000 'war refugees' from the former Yugoslavia in Germany does not seem excessive. The number is all the more astounding when it is realised that it does not include the approximately 200 000 persons from Serbia and Montenegro (mostly ethnic Albanians from Kosovo) who have applied for asylum in Germany over the past three-and-a-half years.

The very fact that Germany has taken in such a large number of persons, in a relatively uncomplicated manner, is impressive, but it is important not to lose sight of the fact that behind the statistics are the disrupted lives of people who are waiting, often in a kind of legal limbo, to see what will happen in their home country, and what their own fate will be.

From the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, urged Governments to provide protection on at least a temporary basis to persons forced to flee from the area. She asked states to keep their borders open to new arrivals, and presented temporary protection as a practical tool to provide protection in cases of mass influx, while alleviating pressures on the reception capacity of the immediately affected neighbouring areas. Granting temporary protection in a flexible manner rather than requiring individuals formally to apply for asylum and to have their claims considered would also avoid imposing an undue load on the asylum procedures of receiving states.

When the High Commissioner formally called for temporary protection to

* The author is the UNHCR Representative in the Federal Republic of Germany. This article represents the opinion of its author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Protection for asylum seekers

In 1981 the Executive Committee of UNHCR adopted standards for the protection of asylum seekers in situations of large-scale influx. These provide for the protective measures set out below.

A. Admission and non-refoulement

1. In situations of large-scale influx, asylum seekers should be admitted to the State in which they first seek refuge and if that State is unable to admit them on a durable basis, it should always admit them at least on a temporary basis and provide them with protection according to the principles set out below. They should be admitted without any discrimination as to race, religion, political opinion, nationality, country of origin or physical incapacity.

2. In all cases the fundamental principle of *non-refoulement* — including non-rejection at the frontier — must be scrupulously observed.

B. Treatment of asylum seekers who have been temporarily admitted to a country pending arrangements for a durable solution

1. Article 31 of the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees contains provisions regarding the treatment of refugees who have entered a country without authorisation and whose situation in that country has not yet been regularised. The standards defined in this Article do not, however, cover all aspects of the treatment of asylum seekers in large-scale influx situations.

2. It is therefore essential that asylum seekers who have been temporarily admitted pending arrangements for a durable solution should be treated in accordance with the following minimum basic human standards:

(a) they should not be penalised or exposed to any unfavourable treatment solely on the ground that their presence in the country is considered unlawful; they should not be subjected to restrictions on their movements other than those which are necessary in the interest of public health and public order;

(b) they should enjoy the fundamental civil rights internationally recognised, in particular those set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(c) they should receive all necessary assistance and be provided with the basic necessities of life including food, shelter and basic sanitary and health facilities; in this respect the international community

should conform with the principles of international solidarity and burden-sharing;

(d) they should be treated as persons whose tragic plight requires special understanding and sympathy. They should not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;

(e) there should be no discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, political opinion, nationality, country of origin or physical incapacity;

(f) they are to be considered as persons before the law, enjoying free access to courts of law and other competent administrative authorities;

(g) the location of asylum seekers should be determined by their safety and well-being as well as by the security needs of the receiving State. Asylum seekers should, as far as possible, be located at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin. They should not become involved in subversive activities against their country of origin or any other State;

(h) family unity should be respected;

(i) all possible assistance should be given for the tracing of relatives;

(j) adequate provision should be made for the protection of minors and unaccompanied children;

(k) the sending and receiving of mail should be allowed;

(l) material assistance from friends or relatives should be permitted;

(m) appropriate arrangements should be made, where possible, for the registration of births, deaths and marriages;

(n) they should be granted all the necessary facilities to enable them to obtain a satisfactory durable solution;

(o) they should be permitted to transfer assets which they have brought into a territory to the country where the durable solution is obtained; and

(p) all steps should be taken to facilitate voluntary repatriation.

Co-operation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Asylum seekers shall be entitled to contact the Office of UNHCR. UNHCR shall be given access to asylum seekers. UNHCR shall also be given the possibility of exercising its functions of international protection and shall be allowed to supervise the well-being of persons entering reception or other refugee centres.

International solidarity, burden-sharing and duties of States

(1) A mass influx may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries; a satisfactory solution of a problem, international in scope and nature, cannot be achieved without international co-operation. States shall, within the framework of international solidarity and burden-sharing, take all necessary measures to assist, at their request, States which have admitted asylum seekers in large-scale influx situations.

(2) Such action should be taken bilaterally or multilaterally at the regional or global levels and in cooperation with UNHCR, as appropriate. Primary consideration should be given to the possibility of finding suitable solutions within the regional context.


(3) Action with a view to burden-sharing should be directed towards facilitating voluntary repatriation, promoting local settlement in the receiving country, providing resettlement possibilities in third countries, as appropriate.

(4) The measures to be taken within the context of such burden-sharing arrangements should be adapted to the particular situation. They should include, as necessary, emergency, financial and technical assistance, assistance in kind and advance pledging of further financial or other assistance beyond the emergency phase until durable solutions are found, and where voluntary repatriation or local settlement cannot be envisaged, the provision for asylum seekers of resettlement possibilities in a cultural environment appropriate for their well-being.

(5) Consideration should be given to the strengthening of existing mechanisms and, if appropriate, the setting up of new arrangements, if possible on a permanent basis, to ensure that the necessary funds and other material and technical assistance are immediately made available.

(6) In a spirit of international solidarity, Governments should also seek to ensure that the causes leading to large-scale influx of asylum seekers are as far as possible removed and, where such influxes have occurred, that conditions favourable to voluntary repatriation are established.

Thousands **Table: Refugees from the former Yugoslavia in the European Union**



be extended to persons from the former Yugoslavia in July 1992, there was no way of predicting how long the crisis would last. In the expectation that a negotiated settlement to the conflict would quickly be found, and that a rapid return home would be possible, the High Commissioner urged that they be granted treatment at least as favourable as that of asylum seekers, and recalled the standards outlined in Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) of her Executive Committee, concerning protection of asylum seekers in situations of large-scale influx.

Two and a half years later, at least 7% of Bosnia-Herzegovina's pre-war population has found temporary refuge in Germany. However, the tenuous status which temporary protection offers is a source of undeniable anxiety among the refugees.

The German authorities have been hesitant to accede to the High Commissioner's recommendation that the standard of treatment of those enjoying temporary protection should gradually be improved, the longer their stay in the country of refuge lasts. When arguing in favour of progressively improved treatment, UNHCR has pointed out that the need of this group of persons for international protection has been established, and many are undoubtedly qualified for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention. In reply the authorities argue that the instrument of

temporary protection will not be a credible one unless steps are taken to ensure that the stay of the persons concerned does not become permanent. Measures which would promote a degree of integration are therefore avoided.

The logic of this position is clear, but it does not offer much scope for coming to terms with the very real problems of the individuals concerned. In Germany, the majority of beneficiaries of temporary protection hold a 'Duldung', or toleration permit, which protects them from deportation for renewable periods of six months. As such, they do not enjoy freedom of movement (without special permission) outside their area of assigned residence, cannot collect children's allowances, and are not entitled to family reunification or government-sponsored training courses. Many have been living for years in collective centres, frequently together with asylum-seekers from other parts of the world. Although tolerable for short periods, it is virtually impossible over time to maintain a semblance of normal family life in the setting of a refugee camp, and this is doubly difficult for persons who have suffered severe trauma, such as those who were driven from their homes at gunpoint, raped or held in detention camps. Some need specialised psycho-social counselling which they cannot afford, or cannot find at their place of residence.

While most of the Bosnian refugees in Germany still hope that it will

one day be possible to return home, 25 000 have maintained their applications for asylum, an indication that they see little prospect of retracing their steps and are in search of a more durable solution than temporary protection can provide. Even though decision-making on asylum applications from Bosnians has been frozen in Germany since October 1993, new applications are recorded daily, reflecting the despair which many feel about the chances of going home.

The German experience with refugees from the former Yugoslavia has demonstrated the need for a Europe-wide approach to refugees from war situations, one which would both ensure protection for victims of conflict and take account of the legitimate concerns of states. A burden-sharing formula together with a harmonised approach to the content and duration of temporary protection are on the European agenda for the foreseeable future. Already in 1992 the European Community Ministers responsible for Immigration adopted a (non-binding) Conclusion on people displaced by the conflict in former Yugoslavia. During the German European Union Presidency in the second half of 1994, a draft document on burden-sharing was submitted for discussion. Agreement on these issues would be a giant step toward adapting the tools of refugee protection to the needs of today's refugees. ■

J.K.

Developing early warning systems

by Sharon Rusu*

To address complex humanitarian emergencies and to provide effective solutions to displacement as a result of war, internal conflict, human rights violations and dis-integrating economic and social structures are the major challenges for humanitarian organisations today. In the last six years, dramatic changes have taken place on a global scale. In order to meet present and future demands, traditional approaches must be reviewed in light of new strategies.

In a recent briefing note, UNHCR identified the protection challenge for the 1990s as the need to achieve a balance between the requirement 'to retain and strengthen the international protection regime... around the key concepts of asylum and non-refoulement, while also developing a new regime to provide a principled conceptual and operational base to protect civilians uprooted in conflict and post-conflict situations... This challenge involves such issues as the minimum standard of treatment of internally displaced persons; temporary protection; statelessness; and the gap between the narrow interpretations of the 1951 Convention and the more liberal OAU Refugee Convention and Cartagena Declaration concepts.' Clearly, the critical question for the Office is how to preserve and strengthen the commitment to asylum while addressing the new challenges posed by complex humanitarian emergencies.

Here, information systems are called for that support preparedness and response mechanisms. Information that addresses root causes is also critical for the prevention of flight and for ensuring solutions if and when movements and displacement occur. In addition, information for the resolution of pre-conflict and post-conflict situations is crucial to address-

* Chief, Centre for Documentation on Refugees, UNHCR, Geneva. The views expressed are the personal views of the author and are not necessarily shared by the United Nations or the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

ing long-term solutions and ensuring remedies for the legitimate rights of the dispossessed. Only information that is reliable and timely will provide the sufficient, solid base for informed decision-making. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of early warning.

Early warning and alert systems already exist within the UN system, alongside a number of systems, programmes and research at the academic and national levels. These systems include, for agriculture, the Global Information and Early Warning System on Food; for atomic radiation, the WMO/IAEA Convention of Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents; for the environment, the UN System-wide Earthwatch; for geophysical concerns, the International Tsunami Warning System and the Global Volcanism Network; for health, the Epidemiological Early Warning System; for humanitarian problems, the Humanitarian Early Warning Systems; for meteorological issues, the World Weather Watch Programme; for refugees and mass population movements, the Global Early Warning System for Displaced Persons. On the research side, two of the best known systems are PIOOM — Risk of Political and Humanitarian Crises; and CAS, an Econometric Model for Assessing Country Susceptibility to Conflict Escalation and Conflict Alert System.

Recognising the need for information systems that support preparedness and coordinated responses to emergencies, UNHCR currently participates in UN initiatives to establish an early warning system that will provide the humanitarian agencies with vital information regarding the potential for movements at the country level. These efforts are being coordinated by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), New York, whose Humanitarian Early Warning System is the subject of intense efforts to make it operational in the near future.

At the same time, an Inter-Agency Consultation on New Flows of

Refugees and Displaced Persons takes place monthly, chaired by the DHA, Geneva. These meetings have proven particularly effective in bringing together focal points from the major humanitarian agencies to review and discuss country situations, and to offer recommendations to the Secretary-General on new and emerging potential for population displacement. The UNHCR plays, and will continue to play, a lead role in these meetings as a result of its operational capacity and its information summaries on potential 'hot spots'.

At the NGO level, a new initiative, provisionally called RELIEFNET, has effectively brought together the US State Department, DHA and NGOs involved in humanitarian relief to address, *inter alia*, the need for an effective system of information, communication and exchange for the purposes of early warning. Whether this, along with existing systems, will result in the establishment of a global one that brings together the various actors concerned, in a combined and cooperative effort to avert new population displacements, by addressing root causes and preventing the escalation of conflicts through early intervention and mediation, is a question which has still to be answered. Among the other questions that continue to be asked are;

- what is early warning?;
- what is the nature and extent of the information necessary for an effective early warning system?;
- how can such information be used, in the context of prevention and preparedness, for coordinating humanitarian assistance?;
- who is it that is being warned, and;
- once identified, how can be sure that they are listening?

These are compound questions to complex issues but they reveal the frustrations that surround attempts to develop early warning models and corresponding practical information systems for their implementation. Responding to the implications raised by each of these questions is beyond the scope of this brief essay, which concentrates instead on UNHCR's experience with its own information programme.

In fulfilling its responsibility to provide international protection to re-

fugees, UNHCR needs to have credible and trustworthy information at its fingertips, particularly regarding conditions in countries which are the source of population displacements. Such information gives credibility to its decision- and policy-making processes, and ensures that the actions taken by the Office are both readily defensible and more likely to be oriented to effective solutions. This in turn lends authority to the recommendations or positions of principle adopted by UNHCR, for example, in its relations with States, other international organisations, and the public and NGO constituencies.

According to its Statute, UNHCR's work is to be humanitarian and social, but also non-political. Its *primary* responsibility is to provide international protection to refugees. UNHCR's information policy, therefore, must seek to maintain a balance between these objectives, particularly when they may be in tension. For these reasons, the information relating to conditions in specific countries that may be disseminated internally or externally will not reflect an opinion within UNHCR. Rather, it will represent the best available, authoritative evidence and will not pretend to be conclusive as to the existence of refugee-producing conditions.

With respect to *sources* of information, UNHCR is in principle committed to the use of publicly available material, subject to the integration of internal documentation at some future point. Publicly available information, provided it is gathered and used on the basis of coherent standards, has the advantage of being open to review and verification. Although the Office has regular internal reporting channels, it is not principally an information-gathering, reporting or monitoring agency.

UNHCR is concerned not only with collecting information from different sources, however, but also with its reliability. Its own standards, therefore, must reflect the practices of corroboration and multiple sourcing that are fast becoming standards in the field, although the general issue of criteria and authority of information would repay further debate in the near future.

Similarly, so far as UNHCR may also need to produce information for use in

determining refugee status in individual cases, it must be clear that such information is not itself determinative of the existence or non-existence of a well-founded fear of persecution. Decisions in this regard can only be made on the basis of all the circumstances, including the testimony of the individual claimant.

Finally, in developing its information strategy, UNHCR is conscious of the need to ensure that national and international standards for the protection of personal data are observed, and that individuals do not suffer loss of protection through prejudicial disclosure.

Tangible proof of the validity of the path taken by UNHCR in information lies in the UNHCR/Centre for Documentation on Refugees database now called REF WORLD. Started more than 10 years ago with the development of REFLIT, a refugee literature database, REF WORLD now comprises 15 databases containing country information and UN documentation in full text, as well over 20 000 bibliographic records, case law, instruments, legislation and an online thesaurus.

These databases are not an end in themselves, however. They are a tool that allows rapid access to verifiable information in the public domain, structured according to standard formats and index terms drawn from the *International Thesaurus for Refugee Terminology*. They offer a full range of analysis, law and comment on refugee issues and situations. They are the product of both the work of UNHCR researchers through collaboration with UNHCR field offices, (which, thanks to the efforts of UNHCR's Information and Communications System, are increasingly able to communicate worldwide via the latest communications technology), as well as the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada; the US Immigration and Naturalization Service Refugee Information Centre; a group of field consultants known collectively as WriteNet, and a network of NGOs under the umbrella of IRENE (the International Refugee Electronic Network). Every day new sources are being added as country situations are monitored in close cooperation with UNHCR's regional Bureaux, IRENE and the NGO network, and through direct communications with

UNHCR branch and field offices. Recently, the databases were shared with others during a six-month pilot project involving selected UNHCR field offices, intergovernmental organisations, governments and NGOs. The participants have completed a questionnaire on their experiences with access, and this is now being analysed. We are repeatedly reminded that how to make the databases universally accessible is a major and pressing challenge.

There is as yet no coherent international mechanism for information collection, verification and exchange. Some early warning and alert systems, such as that of the Food and Agriculture Organisation are already well-developed, while others are just beginning to develop in the less predictable and more political areas of migration, refugees, displaced persons, politics and human rights.

At present, UNHCR's initiative relates specifically to the needs of the Office, at headquarters and field level, in the light of its statutory obligations. In developing its information strategy, therefore, UNHCR is conscious of the need to avoid unnecessary duplication, ensure the integrity of the system of international protection, enhance programme design and implementation, and resolve responsibility issues between states and international organisations. It must also provide the essential basis for action in the United Nations, the UNHCR Executive Committee and other bodies involved in the development of coherent, multilateral responses to the protection of refugees and displaced persons and the prevention of refugee flows.

To view the multiple information needs of those who take decisions on how to address complex humanitarian emergencies as unimportant is rather like thinking earth tremors are unrelated to earthquakes. What we have learnt is that we must plan for tomorrow. Investing today in an accurate and current information system for the purpose both of preventing the necessity for flight and of preparing for emergent crises of displacement is truly an investment in the future. ■

S.R.

Challenging the assumptions of repatriation

by Danielle C. Sepulveda*



The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees designated 1992 as the beginning of the 'decade of voluntary repatriation.' From Afghanistan and Angola to Cambodia and South Africa, almost seven million forced migrants have returned home during this 'decade'. Sadako Ogata describes such mass repatriations, and the prospect of further large-scale returns in the near future, as 'immensely satisfying.' Since the end of the Cold War, UNHCR has been optimistic that conditions which caused exodus would improve, paving the way for thousands to return home in safety, honour and dignity. Indeed, it is a basic aim of the organisation to promote and facilitate repatriation whenever possible. Today, Ogata is concerned primarily with the problems which 'continue to plague countries of origin and that, if not contained, could undermine the impetus to return.' Although conceding that the foundations of voluntary repatriation are often fragile, UNHCR nonetheless hails repatriation as the most desirable of its three durable solutions.

Despite UNHCR's enthusiasm for repatriation, their position is not supported by research which would confirm or question the organisation's increasingly

assertive role in the repatriation of refugees. Conceptualisation of return and reintegration have only begun recently to attract the attention of the academic community. Of the three durable solutions, repatriation is clearly the least researched area, reflected in the dearth of substantive research papers and reports devoted to it. Rogge speculates that 'one likely reason for this relates to the widespread assumption that, because repatriation is the most desirable outcome of a refugee problem, it is also the least problematic and hence one not generating high research priorities.' As Crisp showed in his bibliographical survey of voluntary repatriation in developing countries, most studies to date have been concerned mainly with the international legal principles, the political motivations, and the logistics of repatriation.

Frustrated by the paucity of research into other significant dimensions, several scholars have attempted to remedy this conspicuous gap in knowledge. Allen and Morsink's recently published book *When Refugees Go Home*, for example, investigates the long term socio-economic consequences of repatriation movements in Africa. Another recent study, conducted

Voluntary repatriation to Namibia
Refugees boarding the plane in Angola
for the journey 'home'

by *Cuny and Stein*, explores situations in which refugees return to countries of origin which are plagued by unresolved security or political problems.

Questionable assumptions

Such studies undoubtedly elucidate dimensions of repatriation which have been persistently overlooked. But evaluating the conditions under which refugees return and investigating the consequences of repatriation movements does not advance our understanding of the concept of return itself. In large part, this is because the prevailing framework of repatriation is based upon certain questionable assumptions, such as 'all refugees want to go home' and 'the best place for refugees is home'. If these claims are accepted uncritically and taken as starting points for research and policy, then the problems posed by repatriation become ones of attempting to identify the most effective means of establishing conditions

conducive to return, of ensuring that refugees are informed of these conditions, of securing tripartite agreements, of protecting returning populations, and of providing material assistance upon return; in short, of strengthening the international practice of repatriation. Within this established paradigm, the question, 'Is repatriation the most desirable solution?' is not — indeed cannot — be asked. Until scholars challenge fundamental assumptions which underlie both the concept of repatriation itself and its generally accepted status as the preferred durable solution, studies of repatriation will fail to offer valid explanations of a highly complex phenomenon.

Discussions of repatriation necessarily occur within the wider context of forced migration. While typologies have been developed which discern and classify types of displacement, there has been no corresponding effort to delineate the varied contours of repatriation as a process falling within this wider context. The relevance of an elaborated theoretical understanding of the process of repatriation may contribute to the development of more effective social policies.

The idea that repatriation is an undifferentiated movement designating the return of forced migrants to their countries of origin requires critical examination. Repatriation denotes a varied and complex phenomenon whose permutations need to be circumscribed. The category 'returnee' may include different types of displaced person, e.g. refugees *per se*, returning internally displaced persons, labour migrants, and so-called 'ricochet' refugees/returnees. Similarly, the means by which people tend to return, and the meaning of return itself needs conceptual clarification. Repatriation in policy, practice, and research tends to be treated as a unified, monolithic experience. As such, it is unable to accommodate the complexities of actors, means, and ends — central components of any contemporary repatriation movement.

A comprehensive and balanced perspective of repatriation must take into account all relevant aspects of the problem, perhaps best achieved through a multi-disciplinary approach drawing on diverse bodies of literature. One such body

of literature is that which examines migration as a 'security' issue. Within this context, large numbers of asylum-seekers are often perceived as endangering public order and national security, and international peace and security.

Yet ironically, if one perceives mass entry into a country as a potential threat to security, while also recognising repatriation as a particular kind of population influx, then the reverse argument — that mass repatriation or 'remigration' of nationals constitutes a security risk to the country of origin — may also prove valid.

'Politics of exile'

A second body of literature which deserves review is that which explores the 'politics of exile.' As refugee situations become less of temporary emergencies and more of long-term, protracted crises which span years, even decades, nationals abroad may have a significant impact on politics at home. What happens, for instance, when the political intentions and expectations conceived and shaped abroad go unfulfilled or are challenged upon return? Clearly, such 'long distance nationalism' as *Anderson* calls it, has implications for the success of return movements and the mechanisms for re-integration.

Cases in which countries of asylum implement policies of mass naturalisation of refugees, such as the thousands of Rwandese who have been naturalised as Tanzanian nationals, suggest a different interpretation of return. *Gasarasi* argues that this policy, although implemented inadequately, was striking because of Tanzania's 'benevolent response' which resulted in the majority of those naturalised 'enjoying their new citizenship' and being 'reasonably well-adjusted.' Although *Gasarasi* states that 'the prospects for their post-naturalisation integration look bright,' he qualifies his optimism, recognising that 'the re-emerging international quest for the repatriation of Rwandese from their countries of asylum around the world' could undermine the success of post-naturalisation integration.' In such a context, repatriation may be rendered as national defection.

Those who argue that repatriation is today the most desirable durable

solution tend to overlook the long-term psycho-social consequences of 'going home.' Repatriation is portrayed as the culmination of a crisis, and thus the ideal solution. Evidence suggests, however, that return may be more traumatic than the experience of flight and exile itself. The imperative to survive has been shown to transform a refugee's social values and norms — what *Harrell-Bond* refers to as 'the oversocialised concept of man'. In the process of becoming refugees, many have developed coping mechanisms which have compelled them to assume new roles and identities; others, according to *Rogge*, 'have undergone major cultural and social transformations, such as becoming urbanised [or] joining insurgency movements'. With the passage of time, the conditions within the country of origin similarly change. To suggest that a change in status from that of 'refugee' to 'national citizen' will be smooth and unproblematic is to equate 'returning to one's country or origin' with 'going home,' two distinct ideas which are not necessarily coextensive.

A preliminary review of this diverse literature illustrates several ways in which various disciplines and perspectives might inform the complex phenomenon of repatriation. Accordingly, one possible hypothesis to be investigated empirically through field research is that repatriation — in both principle and in practice — may be politically destabilising to the country of origin.

In exploring this hypothesis, a valuable starting point may be to consider the policy of repatriation in relation to broader trends in refugee policy. This requires developing a historical framework, reviewing and classifying major phases of repatriation, and tracing the motives behind the international community's growing interest in it as the preferred durable solution. Given the prevailing climate of restrictionism, affluent states are increasingly unwilling to share the burdens of providing asylum. Host governments have an interest in reducing the number of refugees within their borders, while donors have an interest in reducing the costs of assistance. One must therefore ask, as *Harrell Bond*

has done, whose interests are being served by repatriation?

Challenging the concept of 'nation'

Of all the bodies of relevant literature, perhaps the one which has the greatest potential to illuminate current discourse on repatriation is that which attempts to understand the concepts of 'nation' and 'homeland.'

Challenging the nation as a natural and enduring unit of human organisation, modernist theorists of nationalism, most notably Gellner, have sought to demonstrate the historical contingency of nations and nationalism.

For them, the nation is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Moreover, as Anderson states, it is an 'imagined community,' an image constructed and anchored in the mind. Today, the modernist view in one form or another is accepted by scholars of nationalism, who generally consider it as possessing greater explanatory value than earlier interpretations.

It is, therefore, particularly perplexing that advances within this field have not informed our understanding of flight, exile, and return. Clearly, the conceptual foundations of repatriation have not been sufficiently scrutinised.

The very notion of repatriation is predicated on the assumption that a singular and immutable bond exists between a 'people' and particular 'space.'

As such, it reinstates the one-to-one correspondence between the two which the principle of nationalism proscribes, thus affirming the idea that people possess sedentary and static identities.

The underlying idea is that the experience of flight and exile constitutes a rupture in the symbolic representation of this bond which links a 'people' with a particular stretch of land, and repatriation is the sole means by which to heal this severed bond.

In this way, according to *Ranger*, 'refugees are seen as the product of crisis; their situation is abnormal; [and] repatri-

ation will resolve the crisis and restore normality'. By acknowledging the inextricable connection between nationalism as a phenomenon, and repatriation as a solution, we may recognise that the way in which we understand nationalism largely shapes the way we perceive repatriation.

Challenging the conventional wisdom that repatriation is the preferred durable solution will require a commitment to grasp the intellectually recalcitrant concepts of 'nation,' 'homeland' and 'return.'

Moreover, it will require a theoretical sophistication which has thus far not been demonstrated in the literature concerning repatriation. Subjecting the notion of repatriation to careful and critical analysis can no longer be viewed as optional.

In designating this the 'decade of voluntary repatriation,' UNHCR has determined return to be the necessary eventual solution to a number of major refugee problems still awaiting resolution. More than ever, a firm commitment to independent and impartial research which produces empirical and substantive data is needed. Questioning the assumptions which are uncritically relied upon may be seen as a valuable starting point in illuminating the complexities of contemporary repatriation and advancing a deeper, more instructive understanding of its varied contours. ■ D.S.

Sources

Allen, T. and Morsink, H. (1994) 'Introduction,' pp. 1-13 in Allen, T. and Morsink, H., eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, Geneva, UNRISD.

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso. (1992) 'The New World Disorder,' *New Left Review*, 8/1, pp.3-13.

Coles, G.J.L. (1981) 'Problems Arising from the Large Numbers of Asylum-Seekers: A Study of Protection Aspects,' Prepared for the Round Table on Problems Arising from the Large Numbers of Asylum-Seekers, International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, June 1981.

Cuny, F. and Stein, B. (1994) 'The Contemporary Practice of Voluntary Repatriation during Conflict; reintegration amidst devastation,' Report on 1992 International Study of Spontaneous Voluntary Repatriation.

Gasarasi, C. (1990) 'The mass naturalisation and further integration of Rwandese refugees in Tanzania: process, problems, and prospects,' *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 3/2, pp.88-100.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, Blackwell.

Harrell-Bond, B.E. (1986) *Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Kunz, E.F. (1973) 'The refugee in flight: Kinetic models and forms of displacement,' *International Migration Review*, 7, pp.125-146. (1981) 'Exile and resettlement: Refugee theory,' *International Migration Review*, 15, pp.42-51.

Loescher, G. (1992) 'Refugee Movements and International Security,' *International Institute for Strategic Studies*, Adelphi Paper No.268, pp.83.

Ogata, S. (1993) 'The Plight of Refugees: Issues and Problems Affecting Their Humanitarian Needs,' pp.293-298 in Cahill, K.M., ed., *A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters*, USA, Basic Books/Council on Foreign Relations.

Ranger, T. (1994) 'Studying repatriation as part of African social history,' pp.279-94 in Allen, T. and Morsink, H., eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, Geneva, UNRISD.

Richmond, A. (1993) 'Sociological Theories of International Migration: the case of refugees,' *Current Sociology*, 30/2, pp.7-25. (1993) 'Reactive Migration: Sociological Perspectives on Refugee Movements,' *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 6/1, pp.7-24.

Rogge, J.R. (1994) 'Repatriation of Refugees,' pp.14-49 in Allen, T. and Morsink, H., eds., *When Refugees Go Home*, Geneva, UNRISD.

UNHCR, (1987) 'Voluntary Repatriation: Principles and Guidelines for Action,' Inter-Offices Memorandum No.5, 10 February.

African hospitality takes the strain

by Emma Gough*

The Rwandan tragedy has had effects far beyond the country's borders. People fleeing the violence last April sought refuge in Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. Their arrival has turned the lives of local people upside down. Emma Gough of Gemini News Service reports from Kyabalisa refugee camp in Tanzania.

People in Tanzania's Karagwe district watch as aid workers screech past in their four-wheel drive vehicles on their way to tend to the needs of the Rwandan refugees who fled there after last year's killings. They have watched their farms being swallowed up to make way for refugees' huts, and they have watched once-abundant trees being stripped from the hillsides for firewood.

They have mixed feelings about the activities going on around them. Many accept that the refugees are in greater need than themselves, that they are human beings just like them. As *Johali Bitungwa*, chairperson of a Tanzanian women's group says, 'It's a tradition of Africa to help people.'

The Tanzanians were in the front line when the refugees first arrived, and they tell of how they looked after the refugees before the aid agencies geared up for action. *Adida* belongs to the same group as Bitungwa: She explains how they helped the refugees for two weeks before Caritas (the aid agency) came. 'We worked as a group and organised collections at the school. We collected food — cassava and plantains — and gave them cooking utensils.' The village councils even had to decide where the refugees could settle. If they had not made land available, it would have been acquired, just as water was channelled to the refugee camps, without regard for the needs of the local people.

* Gemini News Service, 9 White Lion Street, London, N1 9PD.

Tanzanians have also had to cope with threats to their lives and livelihoods: their crops have been stolen, and many live in fear of looters. It was only when conflict between the local people and refugees arose that they were noticed at all. In the rush to cope with the emergency, most agencies felt justified in ignoring them.

Candida Muhanika of the British aid charity, Oxfam, established a programme for women's development in Kyabalisa refugee camp. She included local Tanzanian women from the start. 'There was a rift between the refugees and the local population, which was not good', she reports. 'Sometimes, when the refugees were going to fetch water from the rivers, they were chased. The same thing happened when they were going to collect materials in the valley for making mats. Since they started working with Tanzanians, they go together and nobody chases them any more. So it has improved the relationship between the locals and the refugees a lot.'

There have been some advantages for the Tanzanians living nearby. In Kagenyi village, which is now a refugee camp, *Safura* explains: 'There was a water shortage here, but Oxfam has constructed

tap-stands and we now have clean water.' Other cite their access to medical services, and say that the refugees have opened up a whole new market for their produce.

Each benefit, however, is tempered by less positive effects. The new market, for instance, has come hand-in-hand with massive inflation. In Kandegesho, close to the Rwandan border, women struggle with prices up to ten times higher than in March 1994. A bunch of bananas, which used to cost 100 shillings can now cost up to 1000. Says *Florence Elisa*, in Kandegesho: 'We can now sell whatever we produce, but always have to pay very high prices when we buy, so there is no profit.'

One of the most devastating effects is on the environment. As *Safura* and her neighbours look at the bare hills around them, they are worried: 'The refugees have cut down all the trees. We don't have enough firewood and sometimes we can't cook. We have to walk six or seven kilometres to collect wood. It takes from early morning to three o'clock in the afternoon. Timber supplies are under pressure not only from people seeking fuel, but also from agencies gathering poles for construction. Wood is becoming harder to find, and increasing in price at an alarming rate.

Currently, the attitude of many people in the camps around Karagwe is one of tolerance, even generosity: some have given plots of land to refugees to cultivate. But as time goes on, and local resources become more scarce, further conflicts are certain to arise, unless the organisations working in the area take the Tanzanian people into consideration.

Adida is concerned about the future. A solution to the troubled existence that she and her neighbours are coping with must be found sooner rather than later. 'No-one has asked us what we think or want to happen, except Oxfam', she says. 'We'd like to talk to other organisations, but they are not interested. If the refugees stay here for long, we will run out of food and trees.'

E.G.

Rwandan refugees in Tanzania. Concern about the effect on the environment



International instruments concerning refugees*

Reference is made throughout the Dossier to the various international legal instruments relating to refugees. Below we reproduce some of the key provisions.

The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 14 December 1950.

Article 2: The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule to groups and categories of refugees.

The 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

The Convention was adopted by the UN Conference on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons held in Geneva from 2-25 July 1951 and entered into force on 22 April 1954. The Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and came into force on 4 October 1967.

The Convention and Protocol are the main international instruments that regulate the conduct of states in matters relating to the treatment of refugees. While the Convention does not create a right of asylum, it is important for the legal protection of refugees and the definition of their status. It attempts to establish an international code of rights for refugees on a general basis. It embodies principles that promote and safeguard their rights in the fields of employment, education, residence, freedom of movement, access to courts, naturalisation and above all the security against return to a country where they may risk persecution.

The Protocol extends the scope of the original Convention by removing

the dateline of 1 January 1951 contained in the definition of the term refugee at Article 1. It thus makes the Convention applicable to people who become refugees after that date. The Protocol also provides that it should be applied without any geographical limitation. However if states opted, when acceding to the 1951 Convention, to limit its application to events occurring in Europe, that limit also applies to the 1967 Protocol.

Article 1 A(2): Definition of the term 'Refugee'. (Any person who) owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to or, owing to fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence..., is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Article 33: Prohibition of expulsion or return ('refoulement'). (1) No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948.

Article 13(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

Article 13(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14(1) Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

Article 15(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

Article 15(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The United Nations has set international human rights standards in some 70 covenants, conventions and treaties. The most important of these are the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were adopted by the UN General Assembly and opened for signature in December 1966. Both Covenants entered into force in early 1976 and they impose legally binding obligations on state parties concerning the rights of people under their jurisdiction. Below are the provisions of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant which are of particular relevance to refugees.

Article 12(1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

Article 12(2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

Article 12(3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in the present Covenant.

Article 12(4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Approved by consensus by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1984 as Annex to GA resolution 39/46.

The Convention extends the principle of *non-refoulement* and non-extradition to any state.

* Source: The State of the World's Refugees 1993: The Challenge of Protection, UNHCR.

Article 3(1) No State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights

Adopted by the 18th Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 27 June 1981 in Nairobi.

Article 12(3) Every individual shall have the right, when persecuted, to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with the law of those countries and international conventions.

Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa

Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 6th Ordinary Session, Addis Adaba, 10 September 1969.

The OAU Convention adopts a broader definition of the term 'refugee' than the internationally accepted definition found in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. It does not include any temporal or geographical limitations, nor any reference to earlier categories of refugees. The OAU Convention also regulates the question of asylum. In addition, it unambiguously stipulates that repatriation must be a voluntary act.

Article I — Definition of the term 'Refugee'
 1. (As in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention)
 2. The term 'refugee' shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of the country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in

another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

Article II — Asylum

1. Member States of the OAU shall use their best endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality.

3. No person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraphs 1 and 2.

Article V — Voluntary Repatriation .

1. The essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against his will.

Article VIII — Co-operation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

1. Member States shall co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Cartagena Declaration on Refugees

Adopted at the 'Coloquio Sobre la Proteccion Internacional de los Refugiados en América Central, México y Panamá: Problemas Juridicos y Humanitarios' held from 19-22 November 1984 Cartagena, Colombia.

The Declaration broadens the definition of the term 'refugee' found in the 1951 Convention to include: '*...persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.*'

Although a non-binding instrument, the Declaration has been accepted and is being applied by the Latin American States to the degree that it has entered the domain of international law.

Convention Determining the State Responsibility for examining Applications for Asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities

Signed by the Member States of the European Communities in Dublin on 15 June 1990.

The treaty, known as the Dublin Convention, was signed as one of the collective measures taken by Member States towards the realisation of a single market and the elimination of controls at internal Community borders.

In the preamble, the signatories to the Convention express their determination to guarantee adequate protection to refugees in keeping with their common humanitarian tradition. The Convention also contains an expression of the signatories' awareness of the need to take measures to avoid leaving applicants for asylum in doubt for too long as regards the likely outcome of their applications. The signatories state their concern to provide all applicants for asylum with a guarantee that their application will be examined by one of the Member States and to ensure that applicants for asylum are not referred successively from one Member State to another.

In accordance with these objectives, the Dublin Convention sets rules for determining the state responsible for examining applications for asylum. It also elaborates the circumstances and conditions which govern the transfer or re-admission of applicants between Member States. It provides, moreover, for mutual exchange between Member States of general information and of information on individual cases. A number of safeguards are included concerning the protection of personal data.

In Article 2, Member States of the EC reaffirm their obligations under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, with no geographic restriction of the scope of these instruments, and restate their commitment to co-operate with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in applying them. ■

Micro-pineapple project

A success story in the Pacific

by Carlos Saavedra Rodriguez del Palacio*

Fiji is a country of more than 300 islands in the south-west Pacific. It has white, sandy beaches fringed with coconut palms, clear waters for diving, wonderful landscapes both on land and at sea, a variety of cuisines and a rich and interesting culture. The traditional lifestyle, which had been practised for centuries, was not surprisingly affected by the arrival of the Europeans (Abel Tasman sighted the islands in 1643 and Captain Cook landed for the first time in 1774). Sandalwood forests were discovered and these were immediately exploited by various companies who brought new colonists known as the 'beachcombers'. Living alongside the Fijians, they brought with them knives and firearms and some became mercenaries, playing a decisive part in the wars between local chieftains. Between 1820 and 1850, traders became less interested in sandalwood, turning instead to sea cucumbers, which are highly prized in Chinese cuisine. At the same time, groups of missionaries appeared on the scene introducing the Christian religion to the islands (and putting an end to the practice of cannibalism).

An event which was to have considerable influence on the subsequent development of Fiji's social structure was the arrival of Indians at the end of the 1800s. The British brought them to their new colony to cultivate sugar cane, usually under very harsh conditions. Since that time, the Indian community has grown in numbers, taking control of much of the country's commercial life and raising their standard of living in the process. Nowadays, the two-race structure of Fijian society (49% native Fijian, 46% Indian) is

the main cause of political and social instability. This was clearly illustrated in the military coup (albeit largely bloodless) which occurred following the victory of a coalition made up of the majority Indian party and the Labour Party, at the 1987 election. In economic terms, this event had serious negative repercussions. Subsequently, a new constitution was promulgated, based on a parliament in which the majority of seats were reserved for Fijians.

Sugar under pressure

The battered Fijian economy is not helped by the climate of instability and concerns about the nature of the new political system, although overseas aid and tourism have gradually been restored. The economic backbone of the country is still sugar cane, which is worked overwhelmingly by members of the Indian community. Before 1988, sugar represented 60% of total exports but this figure has fallen to 40% (as measured over the last three years). The liberalisation of world trade brought about by the GATT rep-

resents a serious threat to the country's economy since Fijian sugar would probably not be competitive without the preferences and support it currently enjoys.

Some years ago, a project to research into alternative crops to sugar cane was begun in a deprived region of Vanua Levu, the archipelago's second largest island. At the time, the main aim was to produce an acceptable amount of citrus fruits, but the project proved unsuccessful. It had a positive side, however, in that it demonstrated the adaptability of the pineapple crop to the region's dry climate. This was the origin of the micro-pineapple project (MPP) financed jointly by the Fijian Government and the European Union through the European Development Fund.

Marketing integrated into project

The MPP is being developed in Western Vanua Levu, a region which is short of resources and inhabited principally by Indian farmers. The greatest concentration is at Labasa, a dusty town reminiscent of the Wild West. The main sugar mill is here, together with branch offices of the Ministry of Primary Industries which is in permanent contact with the Segaga Research Station where the offices, cold rooms, nurseries and packing facilities are housed. Normally, agricultural projects

The Segaga nursery guarantees high-quality seedlings which are then distributed among farmers



* This is an edited version of an article submitted by Mr Rodriguez del Palacio, a former trainee at the European Commission, who is a freelance writer and photographer. The photographs accompanying the text were taken by the author.



are strongly geared to production. In order to reach targets, emphasis is usually placed on preliminary studies, good technical assistance, adequate infrastructure and short training courses for the rural population and others. In this case, the subsequent marketing stages are also the responsibility of those running the project — something which is less common with projects of this type. According to *Aad Van Santen*, a Dutch technical assistant who was also involved in the earlier citrus scheme, this is crucial for the project's success. 'There is', he says, 'direct communication between seller and producer, and in this type of market for fresh produce, a rapid reaction is extremely valuable'. Thus, for example, questions from the importer such as 'Can you tell me today if I can have 10 000 more pineapples for next week?' or 'At what temperature do I have to store the fruit from the last

shipment?' require a quick and specific response unencumbered by red tape. Direct management from Segaga means that, each week, New Zealand receives 5000 pineapples of excellent quality which last scarcely a day and a half in the supermarkets. Fruit which does not reach optimum export quality is sold locally, thus ensuring that the entire product is marketed.

From this description, it may seem that everything is clear-cut and simple. But, in fact, it has taken five years to achieve the first exports and not all the initial objectives have yet been accomplished. This is not to devalue the hard work undertaken by the expatriate officials and technical assistants involved. To complete an agricultural project which meets all of its targets is undoubtedly difficult, especially when it is an 'integration' project relying

Pineapples are harvested every week to maintain a constant supply

on the active participation of local workers and farmers. In Fiji, the pace is more relaxed. 'Here, things have a particular rhythm, two or three times slower than in Europe, but things do get done and they get done well', comments Naren Pandaram, manager of the Farmers' Cooperative which organises project management and which will continue to operate independently once the project is completed. 'If, for example, a distant relative dies', he continues, 'a worker will have to be away for up to a week in order to be present at the lengthy funeral ceremonies. He needs time to travel to his village, which might be on any one of the hundreds of islands in the archipelago.'

The Micro-Pineapple Project has a fairly simple structure. First, a number of

farmers prepared to devote part of their land to cultivating pineapples were chosen, these farmers having, in one way or another, already produced the crop on a minor scale for their own consumption. Short training courses and on-going technical assistance gave them an introduction to the use of suitable fertilisers and the necessary machinery. The nursery produces 500 000 seedlings each year and these are distributed among more than 100 farmers, according to a set weekly order, so that there is continuous production of pineapples throughout the year. Once the fruit has reached the required degree of maturity, it is harvested, selected, washed and classified according to size.

It is then placed in suitable packaging and kept in cold rooms for subsequent shipment to the New Zealand market. The infrastructure of roads, offices, cold room and packing plant is funded by the project's budget, but the actual farmers, working through the Cooperative, have to pay back the costs of fertilisers and seedlings once the fruit has been sold.

Challenge to increase production



There is no doubt that the MPP has been a success. For one thing, it has demonstrated the viability of pineapple cultivation in the area, something which many people and even some technical researchers were reluctant to believe. Moreover, private funds have begun to be invested in this sector and a South Korean businessman already has a considerable acreage turned over to pineapples. In addition, the fruit which is harvested each week and sent to New Zealand is of much

higher quality than pineapples from Australia or Hawaii, according to the actual sellers who are beginning to demand more 'Fiji pineapples', the name under which it is marketed. Actually meeting this considerable demand is the greatest challenge facing the cooperative in the coming years. Distributors in New Zealand require a constant supply estimated at approximately 50 000 fruits per week. This suggests considerable scope for improving market share among the Fijian growers. There has also been a study which suggests that a suitable promotion and marketing campaign could raise demand in New Zealand to 250 000 pineapples per week.

An increase in production with a view to achieving a sustainable level, will require further land to be put under cultivation and will involve most of the farmers in the cooperative, with the concomitant use of more fertilisers and the construction of new access roads and another monitoring office in the expansion zone. It will also be necessary to rely more on trained and experienced local workers.

So, when will it be possible to regard the project as completed? Although we accept that several objectives have been achieved, we must also realise that, at the moment, the project would not survive a hypothetical withdrawal of aid. At the present time, cooperative members are beginning to receive the first profits from sales. They are earning enough to feed themselves and their families and to cover household expenses, but not to put funds aside for expansion. Moreover, many applications from local farmers to join the cooperative have to be turned down simply because the group

Poster announcing the project



Careful transportation and packaging ensure optimum product quality on the market

does not have the capacity to supply the necessary seedlings. The logical step would appear to be expansion of the MPP. 'We must continue with this project up to the time when local workers are capable of working on a large scale in the post-harvest phase', believes Mr Van Santen. He adds, 'for many years, we have been telling the beneficiaries what to do and, unfortunately, many of them have become accustomed to this situation. We need a bit more time to teach them and to give them the confidence they need to take on responsibility and to make their own decisions'.

As things stand, a further five-year phase might therefore be merited although there is currently no formal proposal for this. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry in Fiji could seek not only to consolidate the successes of the first phase, but also to diversify into other species of tropical fruits, such as mangoes or papayas, for which the prospects on the Japanese, Australian, New Zealand or Canadian markets are formidable. These are questions for the future. Let us hope that, within a few years, it will be possible to publish a follow up to this article describing commercially viable pineapple production on Vanua Levu. ■

C.S.R.d.P

SADC-EU Mining Forum in Lusaka*

In the September 1994 issue of *The Courier*, the European mining industry was challenged to regain some of the ground lost in Southern Africa to investors from other regions. The call seems to have been heard loud and clear, judging by the spectacular turn-out at the first SADC-European Union Mining Forum held in Lusaka from 7 to 9 December. With almost 300 SADC and European mining operators and investors (50% above target) and over 20 major institutions present, the organisers were justly proud of their success.

The Forum was funded by EDF regional funds and placed under the dual sponsorship of the EU and SADC. Preparatory work, which began in 1992, involved various fact-finding missions and consultations in both the SADC region and Europe. No fewer than 21 consultants (14 from SADC), were involved in these activities which were coordinated by the EC Commission (DG VIII) and the SADC Mining Coordination Unit (MCU). They included identifying 185 mining projects at different stages of development, elaborating detailed and updated country files (covering mining policy, the environment and mineral potential) and promotional work.

Care was taken to choose applicants meeting strict selection criteria: they had to be bona fide investors with the necessary financial and technical capacity, and motivation. Since South Africa only joined SADC in August 1994, and because of its more advanced stage of industrial development, it was invited as an 'investor' country, on the same basis as the EU Member States. On the European side, invitations to participate were also made to mining investors from three countries which have since joined the Union (Austria, Finland and Sweden) as well as from Norway. A limited number of participants from third countries, selected by the World

Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, were also invited.

The Forum was threatened when, just a week before it was due to open, Zambia Airways collapsed. Disaster was averted by some last-minute flight rescheduling and the organisation of three special charters for SADC participants. A number of those attending made private arrangements with some driving several hundred miles to be present in Lusaka.

Participation alone is a major factor in the success of such an event and on this basis, there is cause for satisfaction, in both quantity and quality terms. 153 SADC mining promoters and licence holders, 110 European investors and financial institutions (including some of the largest 'players' in the mining world), 15 South African enterprises and 8 investors from third countries were present. There were also participants from leading development banks and finance corporations, as well as more than 100 public officials (mainly from SADC) and six ministers with mining portfolios.

After inaugural speeches by senior SADC and EC representatives, the Forum was formally opened by the Zambian Vice-President. The remainder of the first day was devoted to SADC country presentations. The core feature of the Forum, the individual promoter-investor meetings, were highly successful with 1500 taking place during the following day and a half. Throughout, there was a great deal of activity around the SADC country booths where promotional material, geological maps, background data and video presentations were available. The ACP-EU Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) demonstrated the manufacture and uses of compressed earth bricks and also played an active role in promoting the ornamental stone sector while the MCU arranged a gemstone exhibition and sale.

In parallel with the individual meetings, three workshops were held on mining finance, mining legislation (with the assistance of the Commonwealth Secretariat) and dimension stones (organised by CDI). Discussions in each work-

shop were led by a pre-arranged panel of high level professionals and institutions. Attendance and interest was high and the groups attracted a total of about 300 participants.

On-the-spot evaluation of the Forum confirmed the general impression that the formula was the right one, designed for the right people and held at the right time. The recent rise in mineral prices and the positive changes in South Africa played their part in the unexpectedly high turnout. Some 95% of participants found the Forum to have been worthwhile and more than 90% indicated they would attend another event of a similar kind. Interestingly, European participants were generally more satisfied than those from SADC, many of whom were primarily seeking concessionary funding for their projects. This augurs well for future investments in Southern Africa but points to the need for finer tuning of promoter identification.

By the closing day, at least ten promoters were reporting that their projects had attracted serious attention from one or several investors and that further developments had been planned. One project alone was being considered by 21 European companies. The CDI announced that of 45 projects presented at the Forum, 22 were the subject of specific business proposals. But this is just a beginning. A full-scale follow-up, including specific monitoring and evaluation activities, has already been planned. Since mining projects need time to mature, it will only be by the end of 1995 that it will be possible to assess the Forum's results in terms of actual mining investment and joint-venture agreements.

So much has been said about the unfavourable investment climate in Africa that the Forum's success should not be underestimated. Two immediate conclusions can be drawn from the experience. First, the African mining sector has growth potential and second, future ACP-EU fora could usefully refer to the formula used in terms of specialisation and approach. Above all, the event shows that Africa still has a future as a place for foreign investment. ■

* This article has been prepared by Unit B/4 (Industrial Cooperation, Private Investments and Enterprises) of the EC Commission's Development Directorate-General.

Africa in transition

The challenge of pluralism, democracy, governance and development

by Professor Adebayo Adedeji*

To my surprise and disappointment, public administration has not survived the decay and decadence that was the plight of sub-Saharan Africa throughout the 'lost decade' of the 1980s. Its effectiveness has become, in most countries, severely impaired. Over the years since independence in the 1960s, African countries generally have exhibited the characteristics of a 'soft' State as defined by Gunnar Myrdal in his 'Asian Drama'. These are the circumvention of laws and regulations by officials and the inconsistent application of policies and laws; the secret collusion between civil servants and politicians or between civil servants and the military, where it is the military that are in power, against the public interest; and, the use of corruption to secure objectives other than those officially sanctioned.

During this period, public administration and management in most of Africa has moved further away from Max Weber's definition of 'rational' bureaucracy, which had existed during the colonial era when government was generally limited in size and functions, and has conformed more closely and explicitly to Fred. W. Rigg's 'ecological' approach which focuses on the limitations inherent in the social and political environment of public administration.

It must be admitted that in the 1960s and 1970s we completely ignored the ecology of the bureaucracy approach. We down-played it in favour of development and social engineering through the various institutes and schools of public administration that had been established

after independence. We opted for a system and culture of development administration that could meet the challenges of rapidly expanding government operations and their growing involvement in the development process. It was our perception that such a development-oriented public service would also conform to the Weberian definition of rational bureaucracy — i.e. the application of the norms of professionalism, universalism, detachment and strict objectivity in policy analysis and decision-making with a hierarchical pattern of supervision and an information system which ensures continuity and certainty.

Hence, the main thrust of administrative reforms during the first two post-independence decades was on structure organisation and the internal administration values of the political system or opening that system to broader popular participation. Although we had perceived development administration as being capable of providing the catalyst for change in the developing, transitional societies of Africa, unfortunately most reform measures were more focused on the conventional administrative development aimed primarily at improving the instrumentalities of administration.

As it turned out, administrative reform became a main ingredient in

circumventing critical issues and in frustrating large political and socio-economic reform. Proceduralism and technicalities took precedence over objectives and reform became an aesthetic and rhetorical exercise, quite harmless to the *status quo*.

That is why, when the economic crisis assumed such a threatening proportion in the 1980s, the state bureaucracies were unable to meet the challenge it posed. The public services, weakened and ineffective as they had become, were burdened and dominated by the ever-growing concern and preoccupation with short-term crisis management almost to the exclusion of the pursuit of long-term objectives. Worse still, senior officials were shunted aside and marginalised as the role of foreign experts and managers, particularly officials of multilateral development institutions, in national economic decision-making and management became predominant. With this virtual taking over by foreigners, the scope for independent policy-making disappeared. As if this was not enough, the downsizing of these services, which was required by SAP, threw them into complete and total disarray and paralysis, and the devaluation of their labour through the devaluation of their national currencies gave overt encouragement to moonlighting and barefaced, shameless corruption, even in high places.

The David Anderson Africa Trust


The David Anderson Africa Trust was set up to commemorate the work of David Anderson in Africa. After over 25 years experience in the civil services of Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya, David Anderson became the first Delegate in the then EC Delegation for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in Maseru in 1976. He subsequently became

Managing Director of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation.

The Trust aims to contribute towards a more effective public administration in Africa through the funding of education and research and to promote the education and training of individuals who have been displaced from their own countries in Africa.

* This is an abridged version of the inaugural 'David Anderson Address' delivered by Professor Adebayo Adedeji at the 15th Round Table of the African Association for Public Administration and Management in Banjul, The Gambia, on 24 January 1994.

The complete text of the Address can be obtained from the David Anderson Africa Trust, Office B, Dales Brewery, Gwydir Street, Cambridge CB1 2LJ, United Kingdom.



Africa is becoming increasingly dependent on food aid and imports for the survival of its people

Thus, today, bureaucracies in Africa have lost their dynamism, resilience and commitment. Instead, they have become stagnant, dependent and largely unproductive. Good, humane governance has become a thing of the past in many countries. Those who exercise power are busy inflicting injury on their people because ethics and morality have disappeared from governance and indeed from public life.

Lack of real political and financial accountability is a major bane of Africa. It breeds irresponsibility among public officials and leads to resistance and cynicism among the citizenry. Since the weak are in no position to enforce accountability on their rulers, they naturally bend all their ingenuity to the evasion of power and inevitably to the evasion of law, if not its direct and open breach. Throughout all ages, this has proved to be the most devastating answer that the poor could give to the irresponsibility of their rulers.

Africa remains in transition

Since independence, our political process has been in transition. We experimented with the Westminster model of political system handed over to us at independence before replacing it with one-party political systems and presidential government. In many countries, the military have aborted the development of the political process through their intervention. The Nigerian experience is symptomatic — six successful coups d'état and nine military administrations since independence. Out of the 33 years of independence, the military have been in power for over 24 years. It is even worse in Togo and Zaire where the military have

been in power for an uninterrupted period of over 30 years.

Economically we have not fared better and in many respects there has been retrogression. In spite of more than a decade of SAP, the African economic condition has remained critical. *Per capita* income has continued to fall, the export sector is depressed and the burden of debt remains excruciating. Population growth is still very high and given the technological backwardness of the food and agricultural sector, Africa is becoming increasingly dependent on food aid and imports for the survival of its people.

At the root of Africa's economic malaise is the failure to pursue and achieve any fundamental transformation of the structure of the economy. The continent has yet to rid itself of its mono-culturalism and commodity export dependence. Efforts at economic diversification have been severely set back by SAP which, by requiring that the underdeveloped economies of Africa maintain an open door policy devoid of any protectionism, has spelt the doom of the nascent industrialisation process embarked upon in the 1960s.

To avoid any misunderstanding, let me repeat what I have said again and again about the need for adjustment. It is imperative for every country to adjust to changing circumstances — be they endogenous or exogenous. But such an adjustment must not be at the expense or to the detriment of long-term transformation and development. Any adjustment programme that puts on hold or deviates from the long term transformational path will keep the economies in a permanent state of disequilibrium and debilitating

paralysis. Unless and until the structure of the African economy is transformed and diversified, until factor inputs are primarily and overwhelmingly endogenous and the development paradigm is people-centred and holistic, sustainable development will remain out of the reach of Africa.

Such a transformation process will be aborted unless it is supported by a corresponding political process which assures human rights, political stability, political empowerment, public accountability, etc. The mistake which has been made for so long is to divorce our economic crisis from the political crisis and to deal with both separately and in isolation.

From transition to transformation: pluralism and democracy

Today, the word 'pluralism' is back in popular debate, albeit qualified by another word 'political'. But qualified or not, pluralism has, for centuries, been a way of life in Africa. Africa is a pluralistic society *par excellence*.

The multi-ethnic nature of sub-Saharan Africa is so complex and bewildering that because foreigners, particularly Europeans, had tremendous difficulties in comprehending it, they denigrated it. But many of the so-called tribes have populations larger than some of the European nations. For example, the Yoruba are about 20 million strong while the Hausa-Fulani number 25 million or more. Because of the colonial scramble for Africa and its partition by the colonial powers in a most reckless and inhuman manner, which paid no regard whatsoever to history, culture and ethnic homogeneity, virtually all the nation states of sub-Saharan Africa are multi-ethnic and multi-national.

During the colonial era, ethnic divisions were exploited by the colonial authorities to delay independence. Consequently, political pluralism has reflected and exacerbated ethnicism as ethnic-based, rather than genuine national, parties have tended to emerge. It was to arrest this development that a one-party system developed in a number of countries after independence. But all that was achieved was suppression of ethnicism rather than its eradication and the evolution of nationalism in its place.

In such circumstances, it is understandable that those who have been excluded from the decision-making process should opt for a more open system. Hence their commitment to pluralistic democracy. For them, pluralism essentially entails the transformation of the one-party regime into a multi-party political system. Indeed, external pressures have been mounted in favour of multi-party systems in Africa. This is now seen in the countries of the North as a basic condition that must be satisfied by a pro-democracy movement in Africa. So strong is the pressure from Western Europe and North America that political pluralism is widely becoming a new conditionality for Western aid. But the fundamental question of how liberal democratic pluralism can be achieved without exacerbating the tensions inherent in ethnic-cultural pluralism remains unanswered.

To build a truly democratic society and culture takes a long period of determination and purposefulness on the part of the people and their leaders. As I commented in May 1992 on the so-called Nigerian transition to democracy:

'Democracy cannot be decreed. Unlike instant coffee, there is no instant democracy. You cannot move from totalitarianism to democratic practice from one day to another. Democracy is more than just the ballot boxes, the political parties and all the institutional trappings. It is a way of life, a culture and a lifestyle at all levels of society and in all spheres of human endeavour.'

The tragedy of Africa was the failure of post-independence African leaders, as the inheritors of the colonial state, to put in place a policy and programme of restitution. African leaders failed to make any attempt at rediscovering, acknowledging and acting upon their continent's wealth of collective wisdom — whether in the form of social, economic and political organisation or in the form of knowledge or of ways of thinking. This failure largely accounts for the endemic crises that have confronted sub-Saharan Africa since independence.

Governance

It is not surprising — given the dismal state of its public service and of

public administration and management — that what generally prevails in Africa today as systems of governance cannot be described as good. The will to govern fairly and humanely seems to have disappeared in many countries. The restoration of good governance is therefore most urgently and badly needed as it is the foundation on which the politics of restitution must be built.

However, the capacity to govern has been severely hamstrung by SAP, one of whose fundamental tenets is that government should be rolled back so as to give way to the so-called market forces. Unfortunately, in the name of adjustment, governments in Africa pursued retrenchment policies through which they lost not only a large number of junior personnel but also a substantial number of high-level experienced people.

My own views about the folly of the policy of rolling back government in the name of marketisation in a typical African economy are too well known to need reiteration. Given the stage of development of the average African countries, what should be the role of government and what kind of reforms would this necessitate? Some foreign proponents have suggested that solutions to the unprecedented economic crisis and to the fast changing public expectations within each country are to be found in the creation of an efficient but tightly-focused machinery of government. This argument holds that government should stick strictly to the business of macroeconomic management and the ensuring of public service delivery. It should have nothing directly to do with those large areas of socio-economic transformation except for laying down and clarifying the rules of the game.

Yet these same proponents are not tired of reminding us of the success stories of East and South-East Asian countries in the achievement of rapid economic growth. They equally consistently fail to link the economic revolution in these countries with two basic phenomena: first that governments in these countries have seen intervention in the markets in any areas of social or economic life as perfectly acceptable requiring no more than one single basic test — does it work? and second that political pluralism

and democracy are virtually unknown in these countries which have, far more than African countries, put in place a politics of restitution. Unlike our leaders, the Asian leaders realised early, even when the struggle for independence was still raging, that a society which neglects the instructive value of its past for its present and future cannot be self-confident and self-reliant and will inevitably lack internally-generated dynamism and stability. Consequently, the Asians have resisted adopting the European model of pluralist democracy.

Democracy and development

All these boil down to the basic point that the surest way to make people accept restitution, development and transformation challenges is if the people perceive these challenges as their own and accept the goals as a summary of their priority aspirations. Conversely, if the people perceive such goals and challenges as unjust and elitist, if they feel alienated and marginalised, and if their major aspirations for a decent life are not central to public policy, they will neither identify with nor implement bureaucratic programmes drawn up for them. This is why the development process is not, and cannot succeed as a mere technical and administrative process. It must also be a political process involving open debate and decision-making over resource allocation, policy design and execution. This democratic setting is the best framework for realising the optimum utilisation of capital and other productive inputs that must be controlled and applied by the people.

This demands a new partnership; a new consensus between the government and the people. The people in their social groups, mass organisations and as individuals must be seen and accepted by African governments correctly as social partners in development. In these ways, the popular forces of society can be relied upon to mobilise the necessary resources for the effective launching of the transformation process for the Second Liberalisation of Africa. ■

A.A.

Worst jobless crisis since the 1930s says ILO

The world faces its worst employment crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s, according to the ILO in its report 'World Employment 1995'. In 1994, about 820 million people were either unemployed or underemployed throughout the world — a situation which ILO Director-General *Michel Hansenne* describes as 'both morally unacceptable and economically irrational'. It is creating, he says, 'an enormous waste of resources and deepening human suffering'. Hardest hit are the developing countries which account for 95% of the 820 million.

The report, prepared for the March World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen, warns that, except for a few countries, job-creation prospects remain gloomy throughout the world. Current growth trends will not 'be sufficient to cure Europe's endemic employment ills, reverse the decline in real incomes, halt the spread of poverty and underemployment in developing countries or prevent the marginalisation of Africa'. However, if appropriate economic policies are adopted both nationally and internationally, resulting in higher growth, joblessness in the industrialised countries (35m in 1994) could be halved in the next decade and the impact felt in the developing countries. Mr Hansenne argues for an international commitment to full employment, such as was made after World War II. This will provide the basis for international cooperation, without which, he says, the present crisis will not be resolved.

Four key steps need to be taken. The first concerns trade liberalisation for which the new Gatt agreement provides the framework. This treaty must be fully implemented if maximum benefits are to be derived from it. Tariff cuts will increase not only North-North trade flows in manufactured goods and job opportunities in the industrialised countries, but also North-South trade, which could fuel migration of low-skilled manufacturing jobs to the South. The agreement will liberalise, in

particular, northern textile and other manufactured goods markets for the developing countries. Although the South in this regard will present a challenge to the North, the situation will provide the latter with countless business opportunities enabling it to create 'the next generation of jobs'. The report calls on developing countries to abandon 'failed policies of import substitution' and end the practice of allocation of scarce capital resources which creates distortions.

The second step relates to increased international cooperation in respect of financial markets, balance of payments problems and long-term interest rates. The overall objective will be to channel more of the world's savings to productive real investments and to achieve lower interest rates which are vital for investment and job creation. Foreign direct investment (FDI), the report notes, can be a powerful spur to growth and employment. Unfortunately, the vast majority of developing nations have received little of this in recent years: although, as a whole, developing countries attracted \$70 billion in FDI in 1993, 70% of this went to just 10 advanced developing countries while the 47 least-developed received only a marginal and declining percentage. The need for LDC policies that favour FDI could not be greater. These policies must include 'economic and political stability, a favourable attitude towards private enterprise, and clear and transparent policies towards investors, especially multinational enterprises'. The report recognises that creating the right environment for investment promotion will involve extensive (and unavoidable) reforms for many countries, including labour market reforms.

The third step is the adoption of export-led development strategies, which have proved so successful in economic growth and employment in East Asia. However, the report warns developing countries to guard against 'artificial promotion or protection of activities which have no hope of becoming internationally competitive.' More open economic policies

should guide production and trade, but they should be in line with each country's comparative advantage.

The fourth concerns the labour market. The report rejects the argument that deregulation will resolve the unemployment and poverty afflicting most of the industrialised world. Proponents of deregulation, it says, point to various features of market regulation in Europe — including strong unions, stringent protection and generous welfare provision — as an explanation for high unemployment levels in comparison to those prevailing in the less-regulated USA.

This, it explains, overlooks the fact that labour market performance has deteriorated in all OECD countries since the first oil shock of 1974 'irrespective of differences in labour regulations'. The report also rejects the view that high wages in Europe are directly responsible for high unemployment. It admits, however, the need for positive adjustment measures to be taken to improve labour markets, including reduction of non-wage labour costs, retraining of workers and reforming unemployment benefit systems which, it acknowledges, have a link with the duration of unemployment. Generally speaking, 'a 10% increase in benefits leads to a 3% increase in the average duration of unemployment spells.' The appropriate response, in Michel Hansenne's opinion, is to 'make it more profitable for firms to hire the long-term unemployed.'

The report warns developing countries to be on their guard in seizing the opportunities presented by the new Gatt agreement. They need to adopt a balanced, two-pronged strategy aimed at generating more modern sector jobs, while upgrading the skills and living standards of the vast majority of the labour force in the low-productivity rural and urban sectors. 60% of urban workers in sub-Saharan Africa are engaged in unorganised activities in the informal sector. Most are vastly underemployed. Given the magnitude of poverty and underemployment in the developing countries, the report says that it 'is important that development policies should not be biased against them and that measures to reduce unemployment and poverty be given priority in government programmes.' ■ A.O.

Health and human rights

by Jonathan Mann*

For the first time in history, it is now possible to bring together — in an explicit and comprehensive manner — two great ideas of our time: health and human rights. For it is now clear that these two forms of discourse are languages with a common goal: promoting and protecting human well-being. Each represents a long process of seeking to describe the nature and forms of human suffering, and then of working to challenge the necessity of this suffering and to alleviate it.

Paradoxically, in the past, the activities and practice of health and of human rights were generally considered to be — or at least functioned as if they were — mutually conflictual, or even antagonistic. Within this context, health officials often perceived human rights activists as simply opposing necessary health measures, and creating barriers to their work; while human rights workers often considered health workers as professionals with a corporatist self-interest, lacking social responsibility. These attitudes blocked awareness of the great overarching commonality of interest between health and human rights which we can now see.

In recent years, an understanding of the wider complementary and even synergistic relationship between human rights and health has emerged through experience with the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The history of the health/human rights connection in AIDS has three distinct phases. The first period, early in the pandemic, was confrontational. Facing this new health threat, health officials and politicians often pressed for urgent measures. In a rather reflex manner, many simply reached back into the long traditions of communicable disease control, and proposed coercive approaches, including

mandatory testing, and even involuntary quarantine or isolation of HIV-infected people. Whether these strategies were actually effective in the past as health officials believed, such coercive approaches were hallowed by long use. However, largely because the initial recognition of AIDS was among gay men in the USA and other industrialised countries, and given the context of gay liberation and achievements within the women's health movement, the coercive measures, proposed as necessary to protect public health, were opposed as violating human rights and dignity. This confrontation expressed clearly the traditional operational antagonism of the human rights and health domains.

'Increased HIV vulnerability of marginalised groups reveals a fundamental connection between AIDS and human rights'

Rather quickly, practical experience with HIV-prevention led to a new phase in the relationship. For in cities and countries around the world, it became obvious that threats and coercion were counter-productive to public health. For when those at highest risk of HIV infection became afraid of the consequences of being found to have contracted the virus, they avoided participating in the public health programmes designed to help them. It became clear to health officials that the effectiveness of their prevention programmes was being undermined by coercive, traditional public health approaches.

This led to the formulation, by the World Health Organisation, of a so-called 'public health rationale' for prevent-

ing discrimination against HIV-infected people. In a radical break with the past, the need to prevent this discrimination was incorporated explicitly and directly into the strategies for preventing the spread of viral illness. Thus, this second phase recognised and responded to the practical and public health consequences of discrimination; at this stage, discrimination was understood as a tragic and counter-productive effect of the AIDS pandemic.

Yet, as the pandemic intensified and continued to spread inexorably around the world, and as the limits of the public health programmes to prevent HIV infection became more evident, a critical discovery was made which illuminated a much more fundamental connection between AIDS and human rights. Reviewing the evolution of the epidemic in different countries — industrialised and developing — a societal risk factor for HIV infection became evident. It became clear that to the extent that people belonged to marginalised, stigmatised and discriminated-against populations, their vulnerability to becoming HIV-infected was increased. For example, in the United States, the HIV epidemic had moved increasingly into the African-American and Latino communities, the inner cities and to women.

We have also seen that neglect and violation of women's rights and dignity create risk environments for women worldwide. Thus, in East Africa, women who are married and monogamous are increasingly becoming infected with HIV. They know about AIDS: condoms are available in the market place. Yet many, even if they know that their husband is HIV-infected, are not in a position to refuse unwanted or unprotected sexual intercourse — for fear of being beaten, without legal recourse, or divorced, which is equivalent to social and economic death. In short, their unequal rights, roles and status make them vulnerable to HIV and, for this reason, women's groups are seeking changes in laws governing divorce, marriage and inheritance — as anti-AIDS measures. These steps towards social and legal equality will be much more effective in HIV prevention than just putting out more, or more colourful, posters, or trying to flood

* Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Professor of Epidemiology and International Health, Harvard School of Public Health.

the country with condoms. It is in this context, considering not only AIDS, but also other sexually-transmitted diseases, reproductive health and sexual violence, that it is clear that male-dominated societies are a threat to public health.

Thus, the failure to realise human rights and respect human dignity has now been recognised as a major cause — actually as the root cause — of vulnerability to a global epidemic. This understanding resulted from concrete and practical experience, not from simply theoretical considerations; it was discovered in communities, not in governmental bureaucracies or universities. In this manner, field experience of global efforts against AIDS has led to a critical insight of importance beyond AIDS, for a careful analysis of the other major health problems of the world, including cancer, heart disease, injuries, individual and collective violence, and other infectious diseases, shows that they are all closely linked with the status of respect for human rights and dignity. Thus the struggle against a new global epidemic has led us to the threshold of a new understanding of health and society.

'Health is a state of physical, mental and social well-being'

The modern concept of health is expressed in the WHO's excellent definition: 'Health is a state of physical, mental and social well-being'. In the past, health tended to be considered just in terms of illness, disability and death, and generally only the physical dimension was taken into account. Thus, the WHO definition was revolutionary.

Next, public health was defined as 'ensuring the conditions in which people can be healthy', or, to take both definitions together, public health seeks to ensure the conditions in which people can achieve physical, mental and social well-being. Yet what are these essential conditions for health? While various classifications have been proposed, at least four dimensions must be considered: genetics, the physical environment, health care and the enormous range of issues generally covered by

the convenient term 'social factors'. In contrast to the prevailing myth, medical care accounts for only a small part of health. Medical care is not, and should never be considered, synonymous with 'health'; while its importance is unchallenged, by far the most important determinants of health status are the so-called 'social factors'.

The next obvious question involves the specific nature of these societal determinants of health. Socio-economic status has been the best-studied potential explanatory factor and indeed, throughout the world and over time, the rich and well-educated live longer and have less illness and disability than the poor. Yet the socio-economic status analysis has three major limitations. First, there is an increasing number of discordant observations. Why do married Canadian men and women live longer than their single fellow-citizens? Why does the health status of Mexican immigrants to Los Angeles decline as their socio-economic status rises? Why is the health of those Germans living in the former East Germany declining precipitously while their socio-economic status is improving? Why are obese women in the United States more likely to live in poverty and to have less education than non-obese women?

The second problem with the socio-economic explanation is related to the variables taken into account in the analysis. In most studies, socio-economic status is determined by considering a few simple issues; income, highest educational attainment, and job category. Yet the size of the gap between the rich and poor, the magnitude of societal inequality, is also relevant, and psychological characteristics such as hostility and depression are clearly important, as are other social features such as 'connectedness' and integration into the social fabric.

The third problem with the traditional socio-economic status argument is that it leads to paralysis and inaction. For once the health professionals have identified poverty and low socio-economic status as the critical determinants of health status, what concrete and practical steps can they take? The overwhelming nature of the problem leads to professional disempowerment, and to the common

situation in which health workers readily identify so-called 'social factors' as the most important determinants of health, yet their work does not directly address these root causes of ill-health, disability and premature death. Countless talks about health problems acknowledge the 'vital social, economic and other factors', yet these factors are rarely discussed!

The combination of this modern perspective of health as well-being, the modern appreciation for the overwhelming importance of the societal determinants of health status, and the insights generated by experience with HIV/AIDS prevention and care, have catalysed a new and broader approach to the connection between health and modern human rights thought and action.

For does not the human rights movement seek to describe, in its language, the underlying and essential preconditions for human well-being? Is not the vision of modern human rights based on the practical and concrete idea that well-being can be promoted and protected through specific measures addressing these underlying causes? Or, to put it negatively, in the absence of certain essential conditions — such as education, non-discrimination, personal security, freedom of thought and an adequate standard of living or respect for inherent dignity of the person — human well-being is constrained, restricted and violated.

'Three relationships'

This fundamental correspondence and complementarity of purpose — using different languages, strategies and methods, leads us to consider three relationships between health and human rights. Each relationship has specific and concrete implications for action and for research, and, at least as seen from the perspective of a public health professional, each raises important issues of professional roles and responsibility. Each is also the subject of current work at the Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights at the Harvard School of Public Health.

The first relationship involves the potential impacts of health policies, programmes and practices on human rights

and dignity. For while human rights recognises that public health protection may be an acceptable reason for restricting some rights, under some circumstances, it is also clear that health officials do not generally take human rights burdens explicitly into consideration as they develop their policies and programmes. In part, this failure is inadvertent — and due to simple ignorance of human rights concepts, norms or practices within the health professions; and in part it is related to the legacy of conflict between health and human rights. In contrast, we at the Center believe that modern public health professionals have, and can be expected to be held to, a dual standard: to protect public health and to protect human rights. To promote this process, we have developed an instrument — called the public health-human rights impact assessment — to help negotiate an optimal balance between public health goals and respect for human rights and dignity.

A second general relationship between human rights and health involves the health impacts of violations of human rights and dignity. This is an arena in which a great deal of work has already been done — by organisations such as Physicians for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Doctors of the World (Médecins du Monde) and Doctors without Borders (Médecins sans frontières) — as health workers have applied medical and, to a lesser extent, public-health skills to help document the existence and scope of human rights abuses. Most of this excellent work has focused on rights abuses in which the physical health dimension is immediately evident — as in cases of torture, or imprisonment under inhumane conditions. Yet the analysis must be developed further; we propose that violations of all human rights, as well as violations of dignity, have identifiable and measurable impacts on health. For example, when governments promote marketing of tobacco products or alcohol without information about their health dangers, is not the right to information violated? Or what about the health consequences of violating the right to association — found to be of such importance in discovering solutions to concrete health problems at the community level? Or the health impact of

violating the right to rest and leisure, or to safe and favourable conditions of work, or to information about reproductive health services?

The third relationship is the most profound. Based on reasons and experience already mentioned, we propose that the promotion and protection of health is inextricably linked with the promotion and protection of human rights. In other words, health promotion and protection require, and depend upon, the extent to which human rights are realised and dignity is respected. From this viewpoint, the human rights framework may provide a better one for analysis of health and for action to promote and protect health than the existing biomedical and pathology-based approaches which have been developed by the health professions. For the human rights framework addresses the requirements for physical, mental and social well-being, or, to put this in health language, it identifies and addresses the 'conditions in which people can be healthy.' This analysis does not minimise the value of biomedically-derived and traditional public health approaches, but it directly addresses the distinction between the societal root causes and the surface manifestations of ill-health, disability and premature death. Thus, when the World Bank states that increasing the educational attainment of women in developing countries would be a powerful and effective intervention for improving health status, they are not abandoning the need for medical services, or safe water, or prevention of epidemic disease. Rather, the analysis recognises that medical clinics, water pumps and immunisation programmes will ultimately be most successful in promoting and protecting health when women have the education — itself a human right — which is also such a critical precondition for realising other human rights.

'Linkage with human rights offers promise of revitalisation'

From the viewpoint of public health, the linkage with human rights offers the promise of revitalisation. For

public health has, in some ways, lost its bearings. While expanding enormously its scientific capacity to measure, public health has lost its clarity about why it is measuring, and to what purpose. By joining the expertise and knowledge of health to modern human rights thinking, we can learn how to attack simultaneously the root causes and the pathological expressions of these underlying societal conditions in terms of ill-health, disability and premature death. This could provide a strategic coherence to public health work which is currently lacking, and help discover ways to link, at a higher level of common interest, diverse health issues such as breast cancer, child abuse, violence, heart disease, sexually transmitted diseases, drug use and automobile injuries.


To human rights, the linkage with health expertise and methodology can be enriching and useful in practice. Health-based understandings of well-being may help broaden human rights thinking and practice. Documentation of the health impacts of rights abuses may expand the capacity for societal dialogue about these abuses and about their wider implications for society. This can be accomplished without seeking to justify human rights and dignity on health grounds, or indeed for any pragmatic purpose. In addition, the right to health can only be developed and made meaningful through dialogue between health and human rights disciplines.

Therefore, the challenge before us is to have the courage to transcend the disciplinary and historical walls which separate the domains of health and human rights. Ignorance hurts us all; human rights workers must become literate about health. We must also be bold, because we are engaged in, and urging forward, the great work and hope of our time for advancing human well-being in a sustainable world. Work in health and in human rights engages us in a profound challenge of personal and societal transformation — and one cannot proceed without the other. ■

J.M.

Gone fishing!

by Sarah Reynolds



With a hurricane lamp, a pulley and some string it is possible to attract night flying insects to a small fish pond and, if the lamp is in the middle of the pond and near the surface of the water, the fish will feed for free. The idea of producing high quality protein with very little work and next to no money seems too good to be true and yet small scale, subsistence level fish ponds seem to hold out that promise. Governments and NGOs have, with half an eye on the Asian experience, tried to stimulate fish farming enterprises in Africa. With a few exceptions the many different schemes in many different countries have failed to live up to their hopes and expectations. Many have wondered why, and what, if anything,

can be done to take advantage of a potential food source that is too badly needed to ignore.

Compared to other regions of the world, per capita consumption of fish in much of Africa is very low. In Ethiopia for example, the average is less than 100 grammes per person per year and the all-Africa average is less than 10 kg per head per year. Most of the fish consumed comes from the sea, from rivers and from lakes. The contribution from commercial fish farming enterprises is very low and, because of its cost, these fish end up on the dinner plates of affluent city dwellers. At subsistence farming level there are only three countries where fish farming production contributes on average more than 1 kg per year: Cameroon, Nigeria and Zambia.

As the population rises more fish will have to be caught, or farmed, if even the present low levels of consumption are to be maintained. And yet many marine and other natural fisheries are over-exploited and pollution adds its dirty contribution to depleting stocks. Although agricultural production is increasing it is not doing so fast enough to maintain present levels of food supply, which are in any case

inadequate. It is certainly not going to replace the need for fish. Many Africans, particularly women and children, could do with more protein in their diet, not less, so where are they to get it from? To grow their fish in their own backyard ponds has long seemed an obvious solution and yet fewer people are attempting fish farming than thirty years ago. In the Lake Victoria basin of Kenya, for example, there were over 25 000 ponds in 1964 but by 1993 the number had dropped to about 5 000.

Since, on the whole, people do not abandon a successful enterprise, the fish ponds have obviously not proved as useful to their owners as those who promoted their advantages had anticipated. The problems start with poor pond construction. Many are dug on poor sites, are too shallow or have inadequate water flow. Many pond owners do not regulate the supply of feed and fertiliser adequately and the fish fail to thrive. It can be difficult to get hold of fingerlings to stock the pond, especially if you are a pioneer in the area, and a further discouragement is that many of the young fry die when introduced to new surroundings. If they do survive and begin to grow, there is also a strong chance that other animals, for example otters, or birds or even human thieves will harvest the fish instead of the pond owner doing so. And the final yields may be low simply because the fully grown fish evade capture by burrowing in the pond bottom mud.

Fundamental problems

These are technical problems that extension advice could overcome but there may be more fundamental problems. Farmers may be disinclined to dig a pond if they do not have a guaranteed right to the land. Conversely, gaining access to land, or financial or development assistance, may be the initial incentive to dig a pond but once dug its further relevance to the farming system remains unrecognised. Farmers may be discouraged from continuing to transport feed and fertiliser to the pond if after all their work the fish are so small they are hardly worth eating. It is often women who first recognise the value of having a pond. While they are often prepared to take responsibility for main-



Technical centre for Agriculture and Rural cooperation (CTA),
"De Rietkampen",
Galvanistraat 9,
6716 AE Ede

Postal address
P.O.B. 380,
6700 AJ Wageningen,
The Netherlands

Tel. (0) 8380 60400 – Telex 30169

taining it, it is not always so easy to persuade a husband that a pond is worth the effort of digging. Furthermore, if a man or woman who digs a fish pond is going to be ostracised by the rest of the community for trying to advance him or herself beyond their defined role in society, there is little point in trying to promote fish farming within that community.

With technical knowledge and good husbandry many of these problems can be avoided or overcome provided that social factors are not the limiting constraint. There are many examples of farmers working their way around many difficulties to achieve what they want. Maize, for example, is a staple crop even in places where it does not want to grow. The reason for abandoned fish ponds must be the fact that farmers do not consider their return in fish, or potential return in fish, sufficient to justify the effort of digging, stocking and maintaining a pond. And yet fish need not be the only produce of a fish pond. Perhaps the mistake of its promoters in the past has been to concentrate too much on the yield of fish alone. The effect has been that following poor yields the farmer sees no reason for not abandoning the pond. But if the pond is abandoned, there is another loss. A source of fertile pond sludge dries up as does water for small scale irrigation. The farming community may be able to obtain their protein from beans instead of fish, but crops will not grow in infertile or dry soil and millions of African farmers are recognising the signs of the increasing infertility of their soil. They know they have to restore that fertility somehow and yet they also know that they cannot afford inorganic fertilisers. Integrating a fish pond into the farming system can go some way towards restoring soil fertility and moisture. A fish pond can yield much more than fish.

Brussels seminar

It was to discuss *The management of integrated freshwater agro-piscicultural ecosystems in tropical areas* that scientists from 18 African countries and several Asian and European countries met in Brussels from 16 to 19 May 1994 at a

seminar organised by CTA and the Royal Academy of Overseas Sciences, Belgium, with the cooperation of FAO. Participants from Asian countries were able to make important contributions to the seminar, outlining the experience of integrating fish farming into agricultural farming systems that in some countries has been practised for hundreds of years and, in the case of China for example, for nearly 2000 years.

By definition an integrated system makes use of available resources. Animal manure can be put directly into the pond to fertilise the water, much as it fertilises soil, stimulating the natural food supply. The fish can also be fed directly with crop residues and household waste. The water in the pond can be used to water vegetables and this will be especially valuable if it has been fertilised with animal manure. Once the fish have been harvested, the pond sludge can be dug out and put on the home garden or a crop can be grown directly in the pond mud while a second pond is brought into use for fish.

Work by ICLARM (International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management) suggests that integrating fish culture into existing farming systems improves the economic, nutritional and ecological sustainability of the farming system even if actual fish yields are low. Assessing ecological sustainability is difficult both in terms of cost and benefit to the farmer. Even more difficult to assess is the long-term cost of non-sustainable farming. What seems important is to encourage as many farmers as possible to make their own assessment of the value of adding a fish pond to their farming system, making equally clear the non-fish benefits. Research results on station have shown what can be achieved in terms of increased yield, both of fish and agricultural crops, and this has so excited the experts that they have failed to take proper account of all the other demands on a farmer's time and resources. Research results may be spectacular but they can also be irrelevant. This attitude has changed in recent years and much work is now being done under what is called the integrated resource management approach. The work of ICLARM suggests that the priority must be to introduce fish farming to as many

newcomers as possible, rather than concentrate on improving yields from existing ponds. A shoal of small fish ponds will bring benefits to many more farmers than a few isolated larger production units. Furthermore, a large fish farming enterprise is likely to discourage others in the region from digging their own ponds whereas many small ponds, each supplying no more than is sufficient for the owner's own family, may encourage others to start up, if only to match the status that goes with producing and eating fish.

Success in Madagascar

In Madagascar where rice is the staple food crop, fish farming is being successfully integrated with rice cultivation. In the Hautes Terres region there are some 13 500 hectares of irrigated rice paddies owned by nearly 80 000 farmers. They produce about 1100 tonnes per year of edible fish most of which they consume themselves. The constraint to further expansion is the availability of fry but a two-direction development strategy has been worked out to overcome the problem. In the vertical phase, independent, private producers of fingerlings have been encouraged under state supervision and in 1992/93 this sector produced two million fingerlings. In the horizontal phase, rice-fish farming has been promoted widely within the private sector and this has successfully created a demand for the fingerlings. If the present trend continues rice-fish farming has a promising future in Madagascar. And there may be other benefits within the system, for experience in China, India, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand has shown that rice grain yields improve if fish are grown in the rice fields.

They conserve nitrogen within the system, oxygenate the soil surface and release fixed nutrients to the floodwater, stimulating better rice growth. The fish may also reduce insect pests that attack rice and help to control weeds, snails and some rice diseases.

In Zambia, integrating ducks with fish is as old as the history of aquaculture, although this is not such a long history since aquaculture was first introduced in the 1950s. The first experiments were with Muscovy ducks which



refused to play their allotted role in the system because they preferred dry land to water. Peking ducks are much more obliging and disperse their droppings directly into the water helping to stimulate a fish production rate of five tonnes per hectare per year.

A pig can also make a useful contribution to a farming system which includes a fish pond since one pig produces enough manure for 100 sq m of fish pond and fish production can reach nearly 10 tonnes per hectare per year. Pig pens can be constructed so that the labour involved in moving manure is reduced to a minimum.

Another attractive farming system might be an example from Central Thailand in which rice, ducks, fish and vegetables are integrated. Fish are fed with rice bran and vegetable waste and their water is fertilised by the ducks. Water from the ponds is used for growing

vegetables and vegetable waste is also used for feeding ducks.

When rice stalks are strong, about a month after transplanting, ducks are driven into the paddy field and they help to eliminate weeds and pests. Ducks also forage on fallen paddy after rice harvesting and on small aquatic animals and plants in the fish pond, and they are also fed on fish feed waste thus reducing pollution in the pond.

Despite the apparent beauty and logic of a well integrated system there are still many constraints to the successful integration of fish culture to the farming system. There is a serious shortage of people able to give technical advice and because extension services are already under severe financial pressure they are unlikely to be able to expand their activities in future. Furthermore, fish culture is considered to be a specialist area and lack of integration in the advisory service is just one result of lack of govern-

The Courier

Rice irrigation in Madagascar where fish farming is being successfully integrated with rice cultivation

ment coordination between different sectors of agriculture.

However, the need to make the best use of land, the best and most efficient use of naturally available resources to feed a growing population and at the same time protect the environment, makes the successful integration of fish farming with agriculture a goal worth pursuing despite the difficulties and disappointments. ■

S.R.

Send us your views

The Courier welcomes letters from its readers on any topic covered by our magazine. You may wish to criticise (or praise) an item that we have published. You may feel strongly about something and feel that we haven't covered it sufficiently. Or you may simply have an opinion about a development issue or an experience 'in the field' that you would like to share with your fellow readers. Whichever it is, please feel free to drop us a line. We are reinstating the 'Mailbag' as a regular feature and look forward to hearing from you.

The Swazi sugar industry

The report on the sugar industry which appears in the Swaziland Country Report (issue 147) contains a number of inaccuracies which I believe should be brought to your attention.

Andy Colhoun is the General Manager of the Swaziland Sugar Association, not its President. The President is Dr J. Gosnell and the Chairman is Senator Obed Dlamini.

The claim that Swaziland's sugar crop, because it is grown under irrigation, is not affected by drought is not completely correct. The level of water in our reservoirs depends on the levels and flowing strengths of the rivers which, in turn, are dependent upon rain.

The 1991/92 drought may not have had as devastating an effect on the Swaziland sugar industry as it did in Zimbabwe and South Africa, but it did, nevertheless, have a major impact on the industry's production patterns.

The assertion that human labour is cheap — 'cheaper than mechanised cutting which is progressively being abandoned' — should perhaps have been better researched in view of its contentious nature.

Mechanised harvesting was abandoned in favour of manual cutting not only because it became increasingly expensive to replace plant parts, as a consequence of the fall in the value of the

SA rand (and hence the liLangeni as well) against international currencies, but also because of the very real need to maintain employment opportunities in the country.

The industry is not, as the report claims, 'run by expatriates'. The industry employs expatriate people just as it employs indigenous people.

It is a fact that most companies leave the day-to-day running of operations to a management team, each member of which is employed on a proven track record and, in the case of an expatriate, whose skills and expertise have been imported because they are not available locally. Management, in turn, reports to a Board of Directors.

The various organisations making up the industry in Swaziland are autonomous bodies owned independently, whereas the Council of the Swaziland Sugar Association is the regulating body set up under the Sugar Act of 1967.

The SSA does not own the industry, but merely regulates it and has responsibility for marketing the production.

The interests of every member of the industry are safeguarded through their Mill Group representation on the Council. Finally, the photograph in the Report is of Ubombo Mill, not Mhlume Mill.

*Brian Glasscock, Managing Director,
Mhlume (Swaziland) Sugar Company Ltd,
Mhlume, Swaziland*

Put pressure on opinion leaders

I always follow with keen interest the activities of the ACP group and the European Union. It must be recognised, however, that despite the benefits offered by the Union most African countries continue to suffer from poverty.

You will doubtless know the causes of our poor situation better than I. But when it comes to finding solutions, I think that more pressure needs to be put on our opinion leaders.

It is for them to address the problems so as to end the suffering on our continent. African countries should, at the very least, be able to produce their basic food requirements without having to depend on foreign aid.

David Buenortey, Accra, Ghana

Appreciation

We are writing from an agro-pastoral cooperative in Northern Togo to let you know how much, as a group, we appreciated your recent issue which covered the economic situation in Ghana, and the objectivity of your analyses of the issues affecting developing countries in general.

We think it is important to emphasise the importance of regional markets and links as well as 'local development' for export so that our economies go beyond their current subsistence level. We believe that this should be possible with goodwill and the necessary spirit of sacrifice. With best wishes in your future endeavours.

*Paul-Yempapou Sinandja (Coordinator),
for the Won-Manu Agro-Pastoral
Cooperative, Dapaong, Togo*

**Jacques Delors —
L'Unité d'un
homme**

Entretiens avec Dominique Wolton

(One man's unity: Conversations with Dominique Wolton)

Éditions Odile Jacob, 15 rue Soufflot, 75005 Paris — 397 pages — FF 140, 966 FB — 1994

This book is in the form of a dialogue between the former President of the European Commission and a sociologist, Dominique Wolton, a prolific author whose previous work includes two other dialogues, one with Raymond Aran and the other with Jean-Marie Lustiger. Dominique Wolton has certainly chosen his subjects carefully, all three of them being very strong and atypical personalities who stand out as eminent thinkers.

In a brief foreword Jacques Delors expresses the opinion that the politician's task is to mobilise society, and in just a few lines he summarises the essence of his beliefs and actions: 'In the modern world, marked by increasing interdependence and the rise of large groups, the construction of a politically united Europe is the most appropriate way for us to remain what we are, both ambitious and realistic, not only for France but also for liberty, solidarity and responsibility, which in close association represent the basis of the plan I have nurtured for the last 50 years'.

This series of interviews, however, is not a book of memoirs. It consists of five parts: social consensus, society, democracy and responsibility, European ambition, and the permanence of values. The reformist tone of the work bears witness to the former Christian trade-unionist who has not renounced his desire to be a 'social engineer'. This is a book of reflections on policy, and it is also marked by the pragmatic experience of the man who served under Chaban-Delmas and worked at the *Banque de France* before becoming France's Minister for the Economy and a European Commissioner.

This very rich anthology of questions and answers includes this succinct question: 'What is the greatest danger facing Europe?' The answer summarises virtually everything of concern to our common future: 'Lack of ambition and nostalgia for the past'. ■

Alain Lacroix

**Mémoires d'Exil:
Les réfugiés dans
le monde**

(Memoirs of Exile: Refugees throughout the world)

Educational file for secondary schools published by 'La Coopération par l'Éducation et la Culture', Rue Joseph II, 18, 1049 Brussels, Belgium (tel. 32 2 217 9071), in association with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees and with the support of the Commission of the European Communities and *Exil Belgium*.

The non-governmental organisation 'La Coopération par l'Éducation et la Culture' has recently published a series of articles on the problems of refugees throughout the world. This 'educational file' is a collection of writings and photographs by and about refugees, which explain the tortuous wanderings of those who set out in search of new sanctuaries far from their countries of origin, the uncertainty that increasingly surrounds their status and the causes of their expatriation. A refugee was defined by the United Nations in 1951 as 'someone who [for various reasons — political, racial etc.] justifiably fears persecution and who cannot or, because of this fear, does not wish to claim the protection of his country', while the introduction to these 'Memoirs of Exile' states that some 'confusion remains today about the different reasons that force people to flee their country of origin for a better life elsewhere'. As many as five categories of would-be exile are accordingly differentiated, particularly significant being the 'economic migrant' and the 'illegal alien', both of whom are 'economic refugees'.

Refugees, however, have not always played a negative role in the host country. Chapter 2 for example recalls that the refugee phenomenon is not unique to the twentieth century: 'There have been refugees since ancient times,' the authors say. Traditions of hospitality are also long-standing and are to some extent enshrined in most religions, and many refugees are actually famous (Dante, Freud, Einstein), while many others have contributed to the cultural, artistic, political and sporting heritage of the host countries.

Chapters 3 and 4 describe the international organisations that deal with refugees throughout

the world and their geographical distribution and number. Chapter 4 shows that most refugees are found in Asia and Africa (around 13 million), compared to just over a million in Europe and the United States respectively, with far fewer in Latin America and Oceania.

In addition to a compelling description of the activities of refugees who bravely struggle to rebuild a life for themselves and their children, this work also contains an interesting outline of the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on the organisation of the EU's external borders and the refugee problem in general which will be of particular interest to those who are not familiar with the internal workings of the EU.

The authors conclude by calling for thought to be given to ways of resolving this complex problem, the blame for which lies first and foremost, they say, in political structures, and only secondarily in economic difficulties. ■

L.P.

**Pour
les
Européens**

(For the Europeans)

GUIGOU Elisabeth — Editeur Flammarion — 245 pages, FF 110, Bfrs 759 — 1994

The author was a senior civil servant and adviser to the President of the French Republic, before becoming Minister for European Affairs from October 1990 to March 1993. During the referendum campaign on the Maastricht Treaty, the result of which was positive by a small majority, Elisabeth Guigou was one of the few prominent politicians to commit herself wholeheartedly to a campaign directed at the general public with clarity, perseverance and enthusiasm. She was therefore in a good position to appreciate the need for an explanation of a process of European integration which had become increasingly complex and confused.

It is clear that Maastricht tolled the knell of a 'Europe built on the sly, in smoke-filled rooms'. Indeed, 'the criticisms levelled by the anti-Maastricht lobby apply more to the Treaty of Rome, which dates back to 1957, and to the purely economic Europe of the 1985 Single Act. It was this which Maastricht sought to transform into a more socially conscious, more political and more democratic Europe, in short one

which is closer to the actual issues of concern to Europeans'.

To achieve this objective, Elisabeth Guigou comes out clearly in favour of a variable-geometry Europe which is already there in the Maastricht Treaty by virtue of the various exemptions from the social chapter or the monetary provisions requested by the United Kingdom and Denmark. This view also provides a new method for confronting the challenge of enlargement with the requisite flexibility. 'Variable geometry lets those who want a strongly structured Europe push ahead with their plans even if others are reluctant. But the door is not closed on the others.' There will therefore be a hard core of countries, those in favour of a single currency, common foreign and defence policy, and a common market open to all the countries of the continent capable of meeting the conditions for joining it.

In this hard core, there will be the six founder countries and 'those selected through their desire for integration and by the course of events'.

It will also be necessary to adapt the existing institutions, reduce the number of Commissioners, have a President of the European Council elected by Council of the Heads of State and Government itself for a period of five years, and so on. There is no shortage of suggestions, but they will doubtless lead to critical comments on these institutional questions from the smallest Member States.

In addition, no one can dispute that 'a variable-geometry Europe naturally makes European integration more complex. But what else can we do if we wish to see Europe growing into something more than just a huge free trade area?' ■

A.L.

PUBLICATIONS

RECEIVED

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION: GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

Ed. Lynn K. Mytelka, OECD Development Centre, F-Paris, 1994, 271 pp., ISBN 92-64-04033-1

This eight chapter study (seven in English, one in French) shows that in the current context of internationalisation, South-South cooperation can considerably improve the competitiveness of developing countries in international

Continued on inside back cover

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

Negotiations suspended in Lomé IV mid-term review

Negotiations for the mid-term review of the Lomé IV Convention were suspended abruptly in Brussels on 16 February at a very short session (barely one hour) of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, to the annoyance and disappointment of ACP ministers who had travelled from afar. This followed the Union's inability to come up with a figure for the 8th EDF — the second financial protocol of the Convention.

Whereas the ACP Group was asking for at least ECU 15.8 billion and the EU French Presidency, supported by the Commission, was proposing ECU 14.6 bn, the possibility of securing even ECU 12 bn appeared remote as ministers gathered for the doomed session. At an EU Council, convened a couple of days earlier to discuss the issue, some Member States, particularly the United Kingdom and Germany, indicated their intention to reduce their contri-

butions (purportedly in favour of bilateral cooperation). The President-in-office of the Council, French foreign minister *Alain Juppé*, calculated that he would have no more than ECU 11.8 bn to propose to the ACP States, a long way from the ECU 14.3 bn that the Commission considers necessary simply to maintain the value of the amount available under the 7th EDF. He was not willing to do so in 'a situation where 15 member states are unable to make the same effort, in real terms, as was made by 12' five years ago.

The position of the French Presidency and the Commission was supported by the President of the European Parliament, *Klaus Haensch*. In a letter to the EU General Affairs Council, Mr Haensch warned that the European Parliament was unlikely to ratify a second financial protocol which meant a reduction in Europe's commitment to the ACP States.

With ACP ministers unwilling to proceed with negotiations under these circumstances, and several EU delegations insisting that without a clear idea of the volume of the financial envelope they could not commit themselves to trade concessions, the adjournment of the ACP-EU Council was a foregone conclusion. Both *Alain Juppé* and his ACP counterpart, *Themba*

Masuku, Swaziland's Minister of Economic Planning and Development, accepted that 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed'. Mr Masuku told the Council that the ACPs cannot make a success of democracy and establish a market economy, as is being required of them, in 'an environment of poverty'. They were deeply disappointed given the flexibility they had shown, which had allowed agreement to be reached on political and institutional issues, and considerable progress to be made on trade and financial cooperation. They also pointed to the fact that EU aid to Eastern Europe and Mediterranean countries had actually increased in recent years.

At a joint press conference, however, *Alain Juppé* and *Themba Masuku* expressed the hope that the deadlock might be resolved and that the revised sections of Lomé IV, together with the financial protocol, might still be signed in Mauritius in May. They noted with gratitude the support of the European Parliament, the gradual softening of the German position and the one and half months available for consultations. The French foreign affairs' minister did not rule out the possibility of an extraordinary European Council to discuss the matter. ■

Augustin Oyowe

Haiti signs financial agreement


The 'fast track' approach provision of the Lomé Convention (article 300) is being invoked to spend ECU 25 million in Haiti within 24 months on various projects of an emergency nature. An agreement to this effect was signed in Brussels on 3 February between the Haitian minister of planning and external cooperation, *Jean-Marie Cherestal*, and Director-General for Development at the Commission, *Steffen Smidt*.

The amount is being drawn from Haiti's national indicative programme under Lomé IV (7th EDF), which was only signed in November 1994 following the restoration of country's legitimate President, *Jean-Bertrand Aristide*. It will be used to finance a wide range of infrastructure rehabilitation projects to make life bearable for the majority of the population: drinking-water supply (particularly to shanty towns around Port au Prince), reconstruction of dilapidated roads, footpaths and schools, food production, provision of agricultural inputs to farmers, training, etc.

NGOs will be used as much as possible to implement these projects and efforts will be made to ensure full participation of the beneficiaries at every stage. ■

A.O.

Steffen Smidt (left), Director-General for Development at the European Commission and *Jean-Marie Cherestal*, Haiti's Minister of Planning and External Cooperation signing the financial agreement



EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Following, where required, favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, the Commission has decided to provide grants and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to finance the following operations (grants unless otherwise stated). Major projects and programmes are highlighted:

Economic and social infrastructure

Central African Republic: ECU 1.75 million for the manual maintenance of rural tracks in the south-central region.

Central African Republic: ECU 1.987 million to support municipal development in Bambari.

Madagascar: ECU 1.97 million to maintain irrigated areas and for support to associations of water users.

Mauritius: ECU 660 000 to support the construction of a human resources centre at Rodriguez.

Senegal: ECU 1.8 million for the rebuilding of the Kermel market in Dakar.

Caribbean region: ECU 2 million to improve air communications in Guyana and Suriname.

Mayotte: ECU 6.7 million to improve the water supply system in the north east and north west of the island.

St Pierre et Miquelon: ECU 3.4 million towards work on St Pierre airport.

Trade promotion/ structural adjustment

Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe: ECU 2.297 million for the Europe-Africa Cooperation for Handicrafts (EACH) project aimed at developing trade in the artisanal sector.

ECOWAS: (The Economic Community of West African States): ECU 1.5 million to support the 1995 EU-West Africa agro-industrial forum to be held in Dakar.

ECOWAS: ECU 892 000 for the Ecowas trade fair.

Uganda: ECU 29.7 million for the second structural adjustment support programme.

Agriculture

Central African Republic: ECU 1.95 million to help improve the management of agropastoral resources in the field of livestock development.

Central African Republic: ECU 8.5 million to support agricultural production and activities aimed at allowing villages to undertake their own promotion work, in the central-southern region.

Mauritania: ECU 1.1 million to support the implementation of the land law in the middle and upper valleys of the Senegal River.

Swaziland: ECU 1.993 million towards phase two of a project aimed at improving rural irrigation (construction of small earthworks).

St Lucia: ECU 795 000 towards a rural development project in the Mabouya valley.

Enterprise

Guyana: ECU 700 000 to support the second phase of a credit initiative for small enterprises.

Health

Mozambique: ECU 1.925 million for continuing support to the health services in 27 rural districts.

Aruba: ECU 770 000 for the expansion of the Red Cross blood bank.

St Vincent & the Grenadines: ECU 850 000 for phase III of the Kingston Hospital development.

Environment

Fiji: ECU 1.15 million to reconstruct and equip a forestry centre.

Institutional support

SADC member states: ECU 2 million to support the SADC Secretariat with a view to improving coherence at a regional level in respect of trade and macro-economic policy.

Zambia: ECU 5 million to support the sustainable management of wildlife resources.

Burundi: ECU 1.57 million for a programme of support to the National Authorising Officer in the management of EDF projects.

Education

Guinea-Bissau: ECU 960 000 for a programme to support professional and technical training.

Caribbean region: ECU 2.5 million for a development programme for the Caribbean Examinations Council designed to achieve a suitable level for university entrance examinations.

Miscellaneous

Sierra Leone: ECU 1.223 million to support work designed to reintegrate child-soldiers into their original communities.

Caribbean region: ECU 22.2 million for an integrated regional development programme for the fisheries and agriculture sectors.

Barbados: ECU 1.547 million of which ECU 600 000 is in the form of a special loan, for the modernisation of fisheries installations in Consett Bay and Skeete's Bay.

Suriname: ECU 3.215 million towards for the reconstruction and operation of a rice research and production station.

All ACPs and OCTs: ECU 30 million to finance multiannual microproject programmes.

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK

Loans

Tanzania: ECU 23 million in risk capital for the construction of a hydro-electric power station on the Kihansi River designed to supply the energy needs of the productive sector.

Zambia: ECU 18 million in risk capital for the rehabilitation of the Tazama oil pipeline which links Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) with Ndola (Zambia) and supplies the Ndeni oil refinery.

Namibia: ECU 8.1 million for basic infrastructures — water supply lines, sanitation and electricity supplies — for the new residential areas of Windhoek where most the industrial and manufacturing activity is concentrated.

Kenya: ECU 5.5 million in risk capital for the rehabilitation of the oil pipeline between Mombasa and Nairobi which delivers refined petroleum products to the central and western regions of the country as well as supplying Uganda and other neighbouring countries.

EUROPEAN UNION

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Statements

Within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union has recently issued a number of statements, details of which are set out below:

Protest over Somali kidnapping

Statement of 20 January 1995

The EU strongly condemns the kidnapping of Mr Rudy Marcq who was working in Somalia for AICF, a humanitarian NGO. It demands his immediate and unconditional release. The EU will, when examining the United Nations' inter-agency consolidated appeal on Somalia, give serious consideration to the guarantees which can be obtained for the safety of those working for humanitarian organisations in Somalia.

Niger: democracy progresses

Statement of 7 February 1995

The EU congratulates the authorities and the people of Niger on the smooth holding of legislative elections on 12 January 1995. It is pleased to see the people of Niger through the free exercise of their suffrage, as witnessed by the observers present and confirmed by the Supreme Court, further consolidating the democratic process in the country. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Rumania and Slovakia associate themselves with this declaration.

Grave concern over events in Sierra Leone

Statement of 14 February 1995

The EU is deeply concerned at the ongoing crisis in Sierra Leone and at the increase in violent attacks on settlements and the country's economic assets. The EU deplores the consequent suffering and widespread displacement inflicted on the civilian population. The EU strongly condemns the abduction of 17 foreign citizens. These are wholly innocent victims of the conflict. They should be released.

The EU urges all those concerned to take advantage of the initiatives, in particular those of the UN Secretary General and the Commonwealth Secretary General together with the countries of the region aimed at bringing about a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Progress towards peace in Angola

Statement of 21 February 1995

The EU notes with satisfaction the progress towards peace and national reconciliation achieved in Angola, which has enabled the United Nations Security Council to launch UNAVEM III. It pays tribute to the action taken by the special representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr Blondin Beye, the observer countries in the peace process in Angola and the countries of the region, which made possible the conclusion of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 and the signature of a ceasefire now observed by all the parties.

The Union wishes to emphasise how very important it is that the ceasefire be total and observed to the letter over the entire territory, as the Security Council requests. It calls upon the parties concerned to give the UN their fullest cooperation, in particular by supplying all relevant military information, and emphasises the imperative need for the security of UNAVEM III personnel to be strictly respected.

In the Union's view, it is desirable that a meeting between President Dos Santos and Mr Savimbi — who have both expressed willingness in this respect — should take place as soon as possible. This would have an extremely beneficial effect on the peace process.

Wishing to lend its unreserved support to the movement towards peace now under way, the EU will, for its part, make a practical contribution to the consolidation of lasting peace in Angola, in order to ensure the necessary national reconciliation which must be achieved there, especially now that the whole of Southern Africa has committed itself to a course of stability and development. In this spirit, a number of Member States of the Union are preparing to take part in UNAVEM III, making substantial and varied means available to the UN.

In addition, in view of the extent of mine clearance needs, the EU will look favourably at the means requiring to be mobilised for effective participation in the efforts which the international community will be making in this area. It is therefore prepared to work with UNAVEM III and

will launch local initiatives to effect mine clearance operations linked to the implementation of rehabilitation projects. It will furthermore continue with the considerable humanitarian and food aid which it has previously granted to this devastated country. In this spirit, it is willing to contribute to the rehabilitation plan now being prepared by the Angolan Government in collaboration with the UNDP, while continuing with activities already undertaken.

To conclude, the EU will play its full part in the considerable efforts which will have to be made to support the Angolan Government's efforts to effect the reconstruction of the country and ensure its development. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Slovakia associate themselves with this declaration.

GENERAL INFORMATION

SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Africa: ECU 65 000 for a project to raise awareness about the situation of children in armed conflicts.

South Africa: ECU 54 000 for a regional seminar in Johannesburg on the principles of democracy and good governance.

Congo: ECU 85 000 for a press development project comprising a training element and the acquisition of printing materials.

Senegal: ECU 33 500 for a seminar in Dakar on the conditions for relaunching journalism training in Africa in the context of new forms of media.

India: ECU 33 600 for a programme to raise awareness about child labour with a view to eliminating this practice and looking at alternative solutions for employers.

Mediterranean: ECU 408 000 for phase two of a programme of training, evaluation and communication for NGOs in the Arab world.

Multiregional: ECU 100 000 for International Alert's 'Rapid Response' project designed to forestall outbreaks of violent conflict.

All developing countries: ECU 220 000 for an awareness-raising campaign on democracy and human rights, in the form of a system for distributing films on this subject.

HUMANITARIAN AID

Preventing disaster

Within the framework of its disaster prevention and preparation policy which falls within the wider humanitarian aid policy, the Commission has decided to support to the tune of ECU 402 000, a project by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs on the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) in international aid. The objectives of the DHA project are to:

- increase the volume and effectiveness of the international community's contribution to humanitarian actions;
- develop simplified procedures, and make them public, with a view to rapid implementation of emergency actions throughout the world;
- improve the effectiveness of the units concerned through training and operational exercises.

To achieve these objectives, the following five methods will be adopted:

- the creation, within the DHA, of a management unit responsible both for the co-ordination and strategic development of actions undertaken within the framework of MCDA, and for certain specific actions (an MCDA register of available resources, production of training support material and implementation of a global awareness-raising and training programme);
- production of information materials and training;
- the holding of exercises at an international level;
- awareness-raising and training measures at an international level for decision-makers and senior officials;
- training at the executive and national levels.

The EU's support, which is for a period of ten months, is intended to finance awareness-raising and training modules in Africa and Asia, as well as a contribution, covering 80 % of the total costs of the MCDA's annual exercise which will take place in Kenya. Also foreseen is the financing of an expert responsible for the 'air-bridge' operation.

The Commission believes that it is important for developing nations to take part in these training sessions in view of the greater need for disaster-preparedness in these countries.

Aid decisions

The Commission has recently taken the following decisions to provide humanitarian aid (including emergency and food aid):

ACP countries

East and Central Africa: ECU 1 million to continue the 'ECHO flight' network which provides for regular and interconnected transport of aid and humanitarian personnel within the region.

Djibouti: ECU 350 000 for flood victims.

Kenya: ECU 170 000 in assistance to Somali nomads in the Garissa region in the north-east of the country.

Niger: ECU 70 000 in medical assistance for the Tuareg people in the north of the country.

Rwanda/Burundi: ECU 45 million from the European Development Fund and ECU 5 million from the general Community budget to sustain for a further six months, the regional plan in favour of Rwandese and Burundians in Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda. ECU 5 million has also been earmarked for actions in favour of displaced people in Burundi.

Sierra Leone: ECU 700 000 for medical aid to displaced people living in the camps around Kenema.

Somalia: ECU 615 000 to support a permanent food programme targeted at children, and for the training of local personnel at the Merka hospital in the south of the country.

Somalia: ECU 1 million to help the people of Hargeisa in the north-west of the country and for the reactivation of three other projects.

St Lucia: ECU 125 000 to help victims of the tropical storm which struck the island last September.

Non-ACP countries

Peru: ECU 140 000 to extend for a further six months a basic medical project in Satipo province for the benefit, in particular, of Ashaninka Indians.

Peru: ECU 400 000 in favour of the suffering population of Loreto department.

El Salvador: ECU 340 000 for people affected by water pollution in the Tecoluca region and for refugees returning from Honduras.

Abkhazia: ECU 240 000 in favour of vulnerable groups of the population suffering as a result of economic sanctions and ethnic conflict.

Albania: ECU 450 000 for medical aid to the Peshkopje hospital, hospital and laboratory equipment, hygiene products and sanitation with a view to preventing epidemics.

Armenia: ECU 2.6 million for medical aid and support for the winter programme tar-

geted at the most vulnerable sections of the population.

Armenia: ECU 520 000 targeted at the most vulnerable sections of the population.

Azerbaijan: ECU 2.5 million in medical and food aid for the Azeri population.

Bulgaria: ECU 1 million in medical aid for specialist hospitals in the capital and for regional hospitals.

Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia): ECU 7.6 million for refugees and vulnerable sections of the populations.

Georgia: ECU 7.6 million for food aid and for the winter programme in favour of people displaced as a result of the civil war and ethnic conflict.

Russian Federation: ECU 5 million for victims of the fighting in Chechnya for food-stuffs, medical supplies and essential equipment.

Chechnya: ECU 310 000 to supply medicines to people remaining in the combat zone and basic essentials for refugees in surrounding areas.

Chechnya: ECU 5 million for the population affected by the conflict, in the form of food aid, medicines and essential equipment.

Ukraine: ECU 1.68 million for a vaccination programme, notably against diphtheria.

Algeria: ECU 350 000 in favour of the refugee Tuareg population in the south of the country.

Palestine: ECU 25 million, of which ECU 10 million will be made available immediately, for support to the education sector.

Afghanistan: ECU 620 000 in food aid for homeless people living in public areas of the capital.

Iraq: ECU 14 million for a global aid programme with a focus on medical assistance for people in the north and south of the country.

Egypt: ECU 130 000 in additional assistance to the victims of floods and fires in the Assiout region.

Cambodia: ECU 600 000 for victims of the renewed guerilla conflict involving the Khmer Rouge and government forces, in the form of medical aid to a hospital in the capital and essential products for displaced people.

Cambodia: ECU 295 000 for people displaced as a result of the recent Khmer Rouge offensives.

Mongolia: ECU 1 million for medicines, medical material and the transport of basic essentials with a view to restoring local production of pharmaceutical products.

Myanmar: ECU 240 000 for medical assistance to displaced people in the frontier region with Thailand. ■

PARTNERSHIP

Information Bulletin from the Centre



for the Development of Industry

Adapting the CDI to the Challenges of the Future

1994 was an excellent year for the CDI. We increased substantially our volume of activities, and witnessed the full implementation of our initial operating budget. We even felt it necessary to request an additional operating budget of ECU 1 million from the outstanding balance of Lomé III.

This overall success would not have been possible without the commitment of all those involved and the gradual increase in the Centre's human resource capacity in recent years.

In operational terms, we have pursued our policy of concentrating and decentralising our activities, in particular with the establishment of a second service company in Trinidad and Tobago, Caribbean Business Services Ltd (CBSL), which is to be run by the CDI.

Three service companies are due to be set up in 1995, in Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Zimbabwe, and studies will be launched in response to requests from Ethiopia and Guyana.

As regards the Interventions and EU Network Division, the European networks have continued to develop and growth in the volume of co-financing agreements has gathered speed, reaching a total of ECU 2,329,987 compared to 1,400,000 in 1993. In addition, professional meetings have again proved their increasing worth, and coordination with the European

Commission, particularly at the Mining Forum in Lusaka, has been strengthened. Progress has been made at the Administration Division on the computer systems for project monitoring and on improvements to the accounting system. Although we can be proud of the achievements of the various divisions, we should nevertheless bear in mind that the climate of industrial development in the ACP countries remains bleak. This is true in particular of Africa, where structural adjustment measures have so far had only a limited impact.

Facilitating development

Yet there are rays of hope and hopeful prospects to be seen: for several countries in West Africa and the Sahel, the recovery of international competitiveness following the devaluation of the CFA franc; and in particular the emergence of South Africa as a democratic multiracial society in 1994, coupled with its accession to the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the prospect of possible membership of the ACP Group of States in the future, to name just the essential new developments. The country looks set to become the engine of economic growth which Southern Africa and the rest of the continent so urgently need.

The CDI will, I hope, play a vital part in



Paul Frix, Director of the CDI

facilitating this process. For the first time, therefore, the stage is set for the CDI to play a major role in the development of South-South cooperation. We have therefore undertaken, in collaboration with the Secretariat-General of the SADC, an initial study into the desirability and feasibility of setting up a regional CDI structure for Southern Africa.

The CDI's forward-looking approach and determination to meet present and future challenges by adapting to changes in needs and opportunities in the various ACP regions is its guarantee of a useful role and a very bright future.

That future, I feel sure, will extend well beyond the year 2000, provided, of course, that the Centre can maintain absolute internal coherence, cultivate professionalism and guard against becoming too highly politicised. Another positive move would be for its status - established 18 years ago, in a context in which the private sector was not given priority - to be modernised, if possible, and its superstructures simplified at the mid-term renegotiation of the Lomé IV Convention.

*Paul Frix
Director of the CDI*

Contents

Editorial	1
Non-metallic minerals	2
Fisheries sector / Mauritania	4
Cashew nuts	6
CDI updates	8

Projects and Actions Resulting from the Professional Meetings

by Professor Jan Baeyens

Professor Jan Baeyens, associate expert with the CDI for the non-metallic minerals sector, reviews the many on-going developments in the sector in the Caribbean and new initiatives of interest to other ACP regions with mineral resources.


In the sector of non-metallic minerals and related building materials, it all started in May 1993 when the CDI organised its first professional meeting in Trinidad and Tobago: a three-day workshop bringing together 80 Caribbean producers and promoters and 20 European industrialists. The companies present covered a vast range of activities, from sand to abrasives and glass, from clay to bricks and tiles, and from aggregates to dimension stone.

The participants debated both general and specific topics, such as raw materials, production costs, investment incentives and constraints. Formal debates were frequently followed by informal discussions, especially during site visits. 12 projects emerged at the meeting as requiring EU assistance of a technical, commercial or managerial nature. Within a few months of the event, the CDI had granted assistance to eight projects.

These initial projects involved assistance of two kinds:

- Assessment of existing deposits and plants (a brick plant in Trinidad and a marble quarry and a limestone filler in Jamaica).
- Product or process expansion/upgrading programmes (paving stones, ceramic tiles, abrasives and selective quarrying in Trinidad; and glass in Suriname).

Assistance for several of the projects



Participants in the Professional meeting on ornamental stones organised by the CDI in early summer 1994, visiting the quarries of the Marmotech company in the Dominican Republic.

was continued in 1994 and other projects were added. Mr P. Keene, Deputy Head of Division at the CDI, recalls that the CDI notably delegated a quarry expert to one of the new projects, which required independent supervision for the restructuring of Trinidad's National Quarries Ltd - the largest national supplier of non-metallic minerals, with a number of corporate clients in the country. In addition, the CDI received a request for assistance from the foremost cement producer in Trinidad and Barbados, for the purpose of product diversification.

Clearly, the result has been a very posi-

tive contribution to project identification and development, leading to direct EU-ACP collaboration.

Specific needs and a specific challenge


From the first meeting, it was evident that there was a need for specific interests to be given specific treatment. Although much the same general principles can be applied to the various sub-sectors, each of them is confronted with particular problems which cannot be dealt with fully at a broad-based workshop. Ornamental (dimension) stone ac-

tivities, for example, emerged as a very distinct and promising sub-sector. The CDI met this challenge by organising a professional meeting for the ornamental stone sector in Santo Domingo (29 June - 2 July 1994), backed by the Euro-Dominican Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Dominicana de Inversiones y Exportaciones, SA.

The meeting brought together 22 EU companies and 40 Caribbean producers and promoters. The Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Suriname attracted a lot of interest from EU participants with a view to establishing joint technical or commercial development activities.

• In the Dominican Republic, the picture started to change soon after the workshop. First of all, promoters in that country, many of whom had not previously met, had a chance to meet and discuss the sector in the Dominican Republic and abroad. A consortium has already been established with a view to collaborating on the development of the sector, aside from existing dissensions and disagreements between some of the pro-

motors: the Dominican companies hold regular weekly meetings (at least 12 since the workshop) to define the most suitable strategies for both the development of the domestic market and the future of sensitive relations with a number of European partners. Furthermore, Dominican companies aroused strong interest among the European participants. Representatives of the firms Mármoles y Canteras, Tecnomin and Marmotech (who have already received CDI assistance) have maintained continuous contact with many European promoters. They have travelled to Italy, Spain and other European countries, visiting companies and exhibiting at the Verona Fair in September 1994. Mármoles y Canteras and Marmotech are currently developing cooperation agreements with Spanish and Italian companies.



Processing marble slabs at Marmotech.

- In Jamaica, Minex Ltd, which received CDI assistance for pre-feasibility work and the evaluation of mineral deposits, has established a partnership with Hellshire Marble, another Jamaican firm. CDI is monitoring this development closely, as it will enable Minex to have marble blocks processed at its competitor's existing processing plant, thus saving on initial investment.
- Surinamese granite was highly rated by all participants and two of the four companies present in Santo Domingo approached EU partners. A Surinamese and a Belgian company have signed a letter of intent concerning a joint venture and the CDI has accepted to co-finance the initial costs of project development.

Main data available on ornamental stone processing plants in the Caribbean

Companies	Current production M ² /year	Capacity M ² /year
Dominican Republic		
Mármoles y Canteras	43.200	86.400
Marmolería Nacional	36.000	144.000
Marmolart	7.000	14.500
Marmotech	40.000	70.000
Granitos auténticos	3.000	10.000
Tecnomin	38.000	80.000
Jamaica		
Hellshire	35.000	145.000
National Resources Industries	17.000	29.000
Marble Farms	5.000	12.000
Suriname		
Graniet	36.000	145.000

Further developments in other ACP regions

After the Caribbean, where follow-up action is programmed for 1995, the CDI turned its attention to Africa and took part in organising the mining forum in Lusaka (7-9 December 1994), where EU industrialists met their counterparts in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The forum - a European Commission-SADC initiative - covered the whole spectrum of the mining industry: >>>

153 SADC participants had more than 1,800 bilateral meetings with some of the 142 non-SADC participants and 136 representatives of institutions present.

Within the framework of its objectives in this vast sector, the CDI covered non-metallic minerals, the ornamental stone industry and the production of clay bricks (fired and compressed). The centre gave 22 EU companies, 45 ACP promoters and five ACP institutions direct financial support to enable them to take part.

Within these three sub-sectors, the CDI brokered some 150 bilateral meetings. On the basis of these discussions, 34 projects were selected for more detailed investigation, and 16 requests for assistance have so far been received, for projects concerning, inter alia, compressed earth blocks, fired clay bricks, ornamental stones and industrial non-metallic minerals.

It is too soon yet to announce results, since all applications are currently being completed and evaluated, but assistance is programmed for spring 1995.

Prospects for 1995

Supported by the success of these workshops in aiding project identification, development and EU-ACP collaboration, the CDI will actively pursue its promotion efforts through general and thematic workshops. 1995 activities will include co-sponsorship of a follow-up meeting in Trinidad (March), and an exhibition/workshop on ornamental stone at the Carrara fair in Italy (May).

Other needs and opportunities will emerge. With the know-how it has acquired in organising and conducting professional meetings, the CDI is well-placed to answer rapidly the needs of ACP/EU promoters.

CDI exhibition on compressed earth blocks

At the entrance to the mining forum in Lusaka, the CDI organised an exhibition prepared by Mr H. Houben, a CDI-selected consultant from C.R.A.TERRE.

The exhibition attracted considerable interest and allowed a number of SADC entrepreneurs to "discover" the potential of the technology involved.

The exhibition (in English) will be

used in other ACP countries with the assistance of the CDI's antennae.

During the forum, the CDI also promoted its latest Technology Profile, Compressed Earth Blocks. This book, containing 149 pages of technological data and information on ACP and European suppliers, is available from the CDI on written request.

Prospect

The professional meeting in Nouakchott industry and is still having very

Since the meeting, Mauritanian professionals have become aware of the attraction of and potential for developing their shipments of fish to Europe - not only in the form of deep-frozen products, but also fresh products. A great deal of conversion work is being undertaken at processing plants to bring the facilities into line with standards set by the European Union", says Mr. Miguel S. Peña. He is the Spanish consultant taken on by the CDI for a four month mission to help local exporters meet the challenge.

Traditionally, the Mauritanian fishing industry specialized in exporting octopus to Japan, where this product is much in demand. However, the species found in Mauritanian waters are some of the most sought after in many European markets, although this opportunity is still inadequately exploited. When it is sent to Europe the fish is almost always deep-frozen whole and marketed as second grade goods.

The reasons for this downgrading are found all along the line: from the fishing techniques used at sea on poorly maintained boats, whose crews have no notion of what is needed to enhance the value of the final product, and poor landing conditions to insufficient hygiene at processing plants on land and in packing for onward shipment.

As Mr. Miguel S. Peña observes, "quality is not just a matter of improving the facilities, but of changing mentality. At

ts for Exports to Europe are Looking Up

adhibou in December 1992, the first of its kind, created a new dynamic in the Mauritanian fishing positive effects.

every stage in the production line, each operator must be aware of the fact that proper handling of the fish is vital if the best price is to be obtained. This is far from being the case at the moment".

Since January 1995, Mr. Peña has been working with a selection of eight Mauritanian manufacturers. He is helping them to prepare and despatch samples of deep-frozen and fresh products which are to be tested and approved by a dozen Spanish and French importers. The mission will have two components:

- The first phase will involve an evaluation of "on-board" procedures on freez-

er long-liners or trawlers, as well as the boats of the small-scale fishermen who are the usual suppliers of the chosen export companies. This means assessing the selection of the catch, as well as how it is handled and stored in the hold.

- The mission will then look at facilities on land, where the expert will advise the companies in sorting the landed product. He will assist them with processing and refinement on the spot, in order to increase local added value. Particular attention will be paid to the presentation of the finished product to be sent to European importers for quality testing.



Mauritanian fish is of high quality and can be exported fresh, frozen or in processed form to European markets which are eager buyers.

The hygiene requirements of the European Market

European Union regulations specifying hygiene standards for the production and marketing of fishery products are laid down in EEC Directive 91/447 dated 21st July 1991. Very strict conditions apply to all forms of marketing the products of the industry, whether they come from member states of the Union or are imported: raw or prepared products, delivered fresh, deep-frozen or preserved by any other traditional method (salted, smoked, dried).

Moreover, all fishery products from third countries must have come from a preparation/processing/storage facility

approved and registered by the EU. This means that they must comply with rigorous hygiene rules applying to:

- Personnel, premises, installations and equipment
- Supervision of the cold chain
- The quality of the water used in processing and how liquid waste is handled
- The storage and disposal of waste
- Procedures for handling, preparing, processing and packing the products, etc.

The EEC Directive 91/493 1991 does, however, allow a transitional period, which expires on 31st December 1995, for the final application of the hygiene

standard requirement(1). This indicates the vital importance of the efforts made this year by Mauritanian companies wishing to pursue, develop or start exports of fish or other fishery products to Europe.

(1) We should note, however, that France, following serious discontent amongst her fishing communities, took a decision in 1994 to allow on to her territory products coming only from export establishments approved by an authority deemed to be competent in the country of origin. In Mauritania, at the suggestion of the Technology and Hygiene Control Service, eleven companies have received such approval.

Cashew Nuts: Potential in Africa

A CDI study conducted in Mozambique, Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau shows that these African countries are the third largest source of cashew nuts in the world, after India and Brazil. This product is the subject of growing demand at international level, not only in the United States and Europe, but also in other, emerging markets. If production, processing and marketing conditions can be restructured, relaunching this agricultural processing activity offers interesting prospects to these countries.

Cashew trees are cultivated in three major tropical basins: the Indian sub-continent, Brazil and in Africa, where nut production occurs mainly in the east (Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya), as well as in Guinea-Bissau. However, the position held by African producers has been radically challenged over the last two decades.

- India, itself a heavy consumer, is a powerful and relatively stable growing area. It has maintained a constant level of production of around 120,000 tons per annum on average of raw nuts, which has tended to expand in recent years.

- In Brazil, production has really boomed in 20 years: from 45,000 tons per annum in the mid 1970s, it is now approaching 200,000 tons. This country has thereby managed to "cream off" the major share of the American market, which alone accounts for almost 60% of world consumption.

- As far as Africa is concerned, the sector has virtually collapsed. In 1975/76, Mozambique recorded production of 120,000 tons of raw nuts, making it the leading world producer. The long civil war which ravaged the country in the 1980s caused a serious downturn. The cashew nut harvest fell to around 20,000 tons. Now that

peace has returned, the situation has, however, begun to recover and production has gone back up to 50,000 tons in the last few years.

The situation is barely less gloomy for the second largest African producer, Tanzania: from 85,000 tons 20 years ago, production is now around 15,000 tons. Estimates for Guinea-Bissau, which are lower in view of the size of the country, are vague.

A favourable context for redevelopment

Is it possible to revive the cashew nut sector in these African countries? There is genuine demand worldwide. Other outlets, in the Middle East, South East Asia, Japan or Australia, are emerging alongside the two major traditional centres of consumption in the developed countries - the United States followed by Europe.

What are the possibilities for rehabilitating their production? On this point, the in-depth study conducted by an expert in this sector in 1994, at the request of the CDI, reached some quite positive conclusions. "Each of these countries has a strong tradition of cashew nut growing and is in a favourable position to bring this agricul-

tural processing industry back to a level comparable to that reached in the 1970s". This constructive observation is based on a range of factors: the suitable nature of the soil and the potential for starting up plantations again and extending them; the quality of the product obtained; the knowhow of both the agricultural labour force and the operators of processing plants; and a lower production cost than Indian and Brazilian competitors.

A whole series of recommendations


However, in order to reach such an objective, the study suggests a series of recommendations to be implemented at all stages from growing to marketing:

- In terms of agronomy, much existing research into hybridization of varieties, eliminating diseases, etc - whose findings are inadequately disseminated in Africa - could help to improve cultivation techniques.

- At the processing stage, it is necessary to revise the old concept of excessively large plants, intended in principle to realise economies of scale, but which found themselves faced, especially in Mozambique, with

serious profitability problems. "The abundance of raw material should not result in inflated capacity, but rather in a more balanced geographical spread of small, efficient processing plants. New technology developed for the operation of these more modest plants does exist and should be introduced".

- Cashew nut processing also allows for the development of an important by-product, which can increase the added value of the activity. The liquid inside the shell actually represents 15% of its gross weight and has some attractive possible outlets, both for industrial and medical use (see box).



- Finally, with regard to marketing, African producers/processors must try to establish much more direct relationships with the European food industry which packs and markets cashew nuts (in grilled or salted form). At the moment, the world purchasing circuits are heavily dominated by middlemen - brokers and wholesalers - who control prices, quality requirements and the volumes sold. For both African manufacturers and end users, this screening process makes it difficult to achieve an appropriate match between supply and demand.

Multi-faceted production

The fruit of the cashew tree, or cashew nut, is grown for the particular flavour of its kernel which is eaten salted or grilled as an appetizer or in various culinary preparations.

- The kernel is contained in a shell, representing about 25% of its gross weight and surrounded by a liquid (technical name CNSL - Cashew Nut Shell Liquid). On an industrial scale, a hot oil bath process is used to extract the nut from the shell and then to peel off the skin around it. The challenge in this technological process is to produce the highest possible percentage of whole nuts, which are not damaged by the mechanical treatment they receive⁽¹⁾. Depending on the size and wholeness of the nuts obtained and sorted in this way - which vary greatly depending on the know-how of the operators - there is a scale of commercial qualities (and thus of prices) including 26 specific categories.

- CNSL, collected separately, is an interesting by-product.

- This is one of the few natural resins with the property of being highly heat-resistant. It is used in the automobile

industry in braking systems and paint manufacture. Furthermore, several other industrial applications have been developed in India (in particular as a termite-resistant coating).

- CNSL contains a substance known as "anacardium", which is used in medicine in treating dermatological disorders. In addition, recent research conducted in France and China has suggested a possible use in treating certain forms of cancer.

- The skin of the nut can be recovered and used in tanning hides, due to its high tannin content.

- Finally, the 'fruit' of the cashew tree, which surrounds the kernel, can be made into juice with a high vitamin C content, which can also be converted into a high-proof spirit.

(1) Two technological systems are available to shell the nuts, the British Sturtevant system and the Italian Oltremare system.

CDI support in restarting Mozambican production

Since peace was restored, Mozambique has launched into a programme of privatizing and rehabilitating several cashew nut processing plants which had previously been nationalized. In 1992, the CDI provided active support for the recovery of the SOCAJU processing plant, as part of a joint venture between Entrepasto and the Mozambican Government. To re-equip the facility,


the project received a loan of 3 million ECU from the European Investment Bank. The Centre helped the promoters to put together the funding application and provided technical assistance in starting up the new facilities and in training staff.

There are also two other applications relating to privatization/rehabilitation projects under consideration by the CDI.

■ **France.** The Caisse française de développement (CFD) and CDI signed a new agreement on 24th October 1994, designed to strengthen their co-operation and develop joint activities in promoting the private sector in the ACP countries. The aim of this agreement is to systematize joint prospecting for opportunities to assist, to simplify the procedures for dealing with co-funded projects and to increase the number of partnerships between French and ACP companies, in particular with the support of the French Regional Authorities.

■ **France.** The CDI took part in INTERCO 95, the Fifth Aquitaine Conference on Industrial Partnership, held in Bordeaux on 24th and 25th January, which brought together representatives of Caribbean, Central and South American countries. This annual meeting is designed to foster relationships between businessmen in Aquitaine - a region with a tradition of commercial open-mindedness and trade with the Americas - and their counterparts in developing countries. The debates highlighted the need for industrialists in Aquitaine to explore business opportunities in the Caribbean. Participants were also able to meet experts, including representatives from the Centre, able to guide and assist them in their projects.

During individual meetings with businessmen attending the conference, the CDI identified some potential projects, especially in the



■ **Jamaica.** Launched at the beginning of 1994 for a period of two years, the Target Europe programme is designed to promote exports from Jamaica to Europe and to attract European investors to the island's textile, food-processing and tourist sectors. The CDI is joining in the operation by providing technical assistance to participating companies. Target Europe is funded by Jamaica's National Indicative Programme (NIP) and falls within CDI's strategy of giving priority in resource allocation to countries which, within their NIPs, devote a significant part of EDF funds to the development of the industrial sector. Similar programmes are being formulated, in conjunction with the European Commission, for the Dominican Republic and Papua New Guinea (photo: Jamaican textiles could receive CDI support for marketing in Europe).

wood, fruit and vegetable and mechanics sectors. A seminar led by Mr. O. Perez Diaz, CDI country desk officer, as part of INTERCO, provided concrete examples from the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago of how the assistance provided by the Centre has fostered the realization of various projects.

■ **Ireland.** The Irish Trade Board (the Irish antenna of the Centre) and CDI will be undertaking a study during the first half of this year to identify proposals for industrial co-operation between Ireland and ACP countries. Funded by Ireland, the study will cover the dairy products and textile/clothing sectors. In particular, it should result

in the identification of Irish companies prepared to establish durable links or partnerships with ACP enterprises on a commercial, technical or financial basis.

■ **United Kingdom.** On 21st December 1994, a co-operation agreement was signed between CDI and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in the UK. It is designed to develop the complementary nature of their activities in supporting co-operation between British

companies and ACP countries. On the British side, the venture will include promoting the support available from the CDI amongst professional bodies and financial institutions in the UK; identifying technical resources and potential local partners; and assisting British companies in presenting applications to the CDI. An expert in industrial co-operation has been appointed within the DTI to put these aims into practice. For its part, the CDI will supply the DTI with all relevant information on potential projects and partners in ACP countries and on the co-funding sources available to British entrepreneurs; it will provide logistical support for seminars and business trips to ACP countries. It may also possibly offer financial assistance to such initiatives.

DIARY

■ **Professional meetings.** Forthcoming professional meetings organized by the CDI during the first half of 1995.

◆ *Valorisation of tropical fruits* (Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon): end May 95.

◆ *Valorisation of leather* (Southern Africa): June 95.

For more details, contact the CDI in Brussels or the Centre's local antennae in the ACP or EU countries.

Partnership is a publication of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), created under the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention.

- **Responsible Editor:** Mr. Paul Frix, Director of the CDI, Avenue Herrmann Debroux 52, B-1160 Brussels, Belgium. Tel.: + 32 2 679 18 11 • Fax: + 32 2 675 26 03
- **Coordination:** Mr. K. Mbay, CDI Communication and External Relations Officer
- **Editing and production:** European Service Network - Brussels Tel.: + 32 2 646 40 20

Operational Summary

No. 85 — March 1995

(position as at 10 March 1995)



EC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 December 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EC since 1976 and 1977;

— the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

- Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
TA: Technical assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr. Franco Cupini
Directorate-General for Development
Commission of the European Union
G 12 4-14
200, rue de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

A1	Planning and public administration	A5B	Industrial development banks
A1A	Administrative buildings	A5C	Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
A1B	Economic planning and policy	A5D	Export promotion
A1C	Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category	A5E	Trade, commerce and distribution
A1D	Police and fire protection	A5F	Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
A1E	Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation	A5G	Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
A1F	Economic surveys, pre-investment studies	A5H	Other insurance and banking
A1G	Cartography, mapping, aerial photography	A5I	Archaeological conservation, game reserves
A1H	Demography and manpower studies	A6	Education
A2	Development of public utilities	A6A	Primary and secondary education
A2A	Power production and distribution	A6B	University and higher technical institutes
A2Ai	Electricity	A6Bi	Medical
A2B	Water supply	A6C	Teacher training
A2C	Communications	A6Ci	Agricultural training
A2D	Transport and navigation	A6D	Vocational and technical training
A2E	Meteorology	A6E	Educational administration
A2F	Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)	A6F	Pure or general research
A3	Agriculture, fishing and forestry	A6G	Scientific documentation
A3A	Agricultural production	A6H	Research in the field of education or training
A3B	Service to agriculture	A6I	Subsidiary services
A3C	Forestry	A6J	Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
A3D	Fishing and hunting	A7	Health
A3E	Conservation and extension	A7A	Hospitals and clinics
A3F	Agricultural storage	A7B	Maternal and child care
A3G	Agricultural construction	A7C	Family planning and population-related research
A3H	Home economics and nutrition	A7D	Other medical and dental services
A3I	Land and soil surveys	A7E	Public health administration
A4	Industry, mining and construction	A7F	Medical insurance programmes
A4A	Extractive industries	A8	Social infrastructure and social welfare
A4Ai	Petroleum and natural gas	A8A	Housing, urban and rural
A4B	Manufacturing	A8B	Community development and facilities
A4C	Engineering and construction	A8C	Environmental sanitation
A4D	Cottage industry and handicraft	A8D	Labour
A4E	Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment	A8E	Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
A4F	Non-agricultural storage and warehousing	A8F	Environmental protection
A4G	Research in industrial technology	A8G	Flood control
A5	Trade, banking, tourism and other services	A8H	Land settlement
A5A	Agricultural development banks	A8I	Cultural activities
		A9	Multisector
		A9A	River development
		A9B	Regional development projects
		A10	Unspecified

Note

The information provided is subject to modification in line with the development and changes of the beneficiary country or with the conditions laid down by the authorities involved to take financial decisions. The EC is in no way bound by the summary which is for information purposes only.

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

Rehabilitation national roads in the South-West region: Namibe-Serra da Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. 18.5 mECU. Road rehabilitation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF ANG A2d

Health project «Post-emergency». 15 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, supply of medicines, health projects in Luanda, fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 7007 A7

Secondary industrial institute in Luanda. I.M.I.L. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 2.700 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Int. tender for supplies launched. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 6016(7) A6d

Artisanal fisheries in Namibe. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Fisheries. Estimate 10.400 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and boats, T.A., training, line of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 6032(7) A3d

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Livestock development. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a

Upgrading and expansion of Antigua Hotel Training Centre. Construction of and equipment for part new and part renovated and upgraded facilities. Estimated cost 2.200 mECU. Works, supplies, design and supervision, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 7001 A6d

BARBADOS

Upgrading of Fishing Facilities at Consett Bay and Skeete's Bay. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries. Total cost 1.789 mECU. EDF 1.546, local 0.243 mECU. Off-shore construction works (dredging, improvement of the existing jetty, anchorage, channel (markers) and on-shore works (improvement of the access road, construction of a terminal, a parking and paved area, electricity supply installation). Works by restr. tender after prequalification. Final design: short-list to be done. *Date financing February 95.* 6th and 7th EDF. EDF BAR 6007 A3d

BELIZE

Community Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEL 6002 A6b

BENIN

Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project

on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6009 A3d

Rehabilitation of the Cotonou-Hilacondji Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated cost 17 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 93 km. Works by int. tender. Supervision, geotechnical control, follow-up, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BEN 6017 A2d

BOTSWANA

Support for HIV/AIDS Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.800 mECU. Training, works and supplies. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BT 7005 A7b,c

BURKINA FASO

Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Modern earth-road. Supervision: short-list to be done. Estimated cost 13.5 m ECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF BK 7004 A2d

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 94-95. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 10.65 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7200/002 A1c

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Cereals. 6.100 mECU. Support for institutional reform, works, supply of equipment, T.A., lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7009 A3a

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Environment. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, soil management and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7010 A3a

Support project for fight against AIDS and STD's. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 1.350 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of equipment, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7013 A7b,c

BURUNDI

Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. Supervision and management. Works, supplies, T.A., training and awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 6029 A5i

Support project for micro-enterprises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare technical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 7004 A4, A5

Support programme for the National Authorising Officer. Resp. Auth.: Ordonnateur National. Estimated cost 1.570 mECU. Supply of equipment. T.A., training, evaluation, support mission. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF BU 7014 A1c

Health rehabilitation in the provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuzo. 5.500 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. and evaluation. *Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 95.* 7th EDF. EDF BU 7003 A7

CAMEROON

Integrated rural development programme in the North-East and North-West Benoué regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a

General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 7200/001 A1c

Local urban development (decentralised cooperation). 1.650 mECU. Investment Fund for micro-projects, training, T.A. and follow-up by G.R.E.T. (F). *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CM 7006 A8a,c

CAPE VERDE

Rural electrification — Praia. Resp. Auth.: Municipalité de Praia. Estimated cost 1.457 mECU. Works and supply of equipment for the electrification of 3 centres in 'rural Praia'. (Diesel power station and LT/MT distribution network). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7005 A2ai

Solar Regional Programme. 3rd part. Resp. Auth.: Cellule nationale de réalisation du P.R.S. Estimated cost 0.507 mECU. Construction, rehabilitation, equipment, support mission, awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7006 A2b, A3e

Improvement of living conditions in the centre of Praia. Resp. Auth.: Praia Municipality. 3.240 mECU. Rehabilitation works in block 16 by direct labour. Renovation of the Ponta Belem area. Work, by acc. tender. T.A. for Ponta Belem and for the Municipality. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF CV 7007 A8a

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Support for the Structural Adjustment. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 10 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. CA 7200 A1c

Support for the agricultural production and for rural centres self-promotion. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage. 8.500 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. evaluation, audit, training and follow-up. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF CA 6005/001 A3a

Support for Primary Health Cares in the Basse-Kotto region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé, Publique et de la Population. 1.900 mECU. Buildings, Wa-

rehouses, Healthcentres, medical equipment, vehicles, medicines, T.A. evaluation, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CA 7004 A7, A8

Rural roads maintenance in the Central-Southern region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports, des Travaux Publics, de l'Habitat et de l'Aménagement. 1.750 mECU. Rehabilitation of 240 km rural roads. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. evaluation. **★ Date financing February 95.** 7th EDF. EDF CA 6005/002 A2d

Support for the Agence Nationale de Développement de l'Élevage (ANDE) – Studies and Livestock system actions Units. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage. 1.950 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. **Date financing February 95.** 7th EDF. EDF CA 6001/001 A3a

COMOROS

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 93-95. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 6.600 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-up. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF COM 7200 A1c

Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement — Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for further investigations, tender dossier and works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d

Development of cultivation for export. Vanilla and Ylang Ylang. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dev. Rural. 1.900 mECU. Vanilla and improvement of quality (laboratory, management, marketing). Supply of non-wood ovens. Crop diversification. Equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 7004 A3a

CHAD

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. T.A. foreseen. 15.200 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF CD 7200/001 A1c

CONGO

Support for the forthcoming general elections. 0.200 mECU. Contribution for the printing of ballot papers. Imprimerie Nationale and Imprimerie des Armées. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COB 7004 A1c

Support for the Health Development National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction and rehabilitation works, T.A., training, supply of equipment and medicines. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF COB 7005 A7

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. G.I.P. 14.250 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import EC and ACP goods with negative list. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF COB 7200 A1c

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support programme for the 'pineapple market'. Estimated cost 7.780 mECU. EDF 6.100 mECU, O.C.A.B. (Organisation Centrale des Producteurs – Exportateurs d'Ananas et des Bananes), 1.680 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A., training, studies, line of credit. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 6016 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Phase III. 28.800 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF 7200/002 A1c

Coastal forests development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales (MINAGRA) and Société de Développement des Forêts (SODEFOR) 1.990 mECU. Studies, T.A., training, evaluation. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7011 A3a

Orumbo-Boka forest development. Resp. Auth.: MINAGRA and SODEFOR. 1.750 mECU. Studies, T.A., training, evaluation, follow-up, works and supplies. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 7006/001 A3a

Irrigated rice-growing areas in the Central and Northern Central regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 15.700 mECU. Infrastructure, organization, training. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A., studies, training. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing March 95.** 7th EDF. EDF IVC 5021/001 A3a

DJIBOUTI

Fight against desertification and development of livestock husbandry in Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, **★ T.A. Project suspended.** 7th EDF. EDF DI 6008 A3a

Health training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. T.A., **★ scholarships, seminars, training. Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF DI 7101/002 A7e

Construction of a laboratory for water and soil analysis. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dev. Rural. 0.115 mECU. Works and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF DI 7005 A3e,i

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Geological and mining development programme. 23 mECU. Studies, programmes managements, works, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e

Los Toros Hydroelectric project. Construction of a hydroelectric power station. Civil works, supply of electromechanical and hydromechanical equipment. Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7005 A2ai

Puerto Plata. Provincial development programme. Resp. Auth.: Oficina Técnica Provincial de Puerto Plata. 1.400 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, education, equipment. Project in execution. EDF DO 7013 A8b,c

Park conservation programme. Resp. Auth.: Direction National des Parcs (DNP). 0.750 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Equipment by direct agreement on local market. T.A. by AEI (Agence Espagnole de Coopération Internationale). **Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF DO 7014 A3

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF EG 0000 A1c

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classification and Use Master Plan — National System of Conservation Units — Forest Training and Research Centre. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i

Rural development programme in the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a

ERITREA

Rehabilitation Programme. 3.7 mECU. NGO projects for health, veterinary services, water supply and demobilization of soldiers. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ERY 7255 A7,A8

ETHIOPIA

Strengthening of water supply and sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. Supply of metering and control equipment. T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c

Rehabilitation of the Addis-Ababa – Modjo – Awasa Road. Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Road Authority. Estimated cost 40 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7005 A2d

Wildlife conservation in Southern Ethiopia. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, rehabilitation, equipment, T.A. and training. **★ Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF ET 7011 A3c,d,e

Social Rehabilitation Programme. EDF 6.868 mECU. Rehabilitation of health (including water and sanitation) services and of agri-pastoral activities. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7012 A3-A7-A8

Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, training, line of credit, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on ap-

praisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ET 7255/001

A8b,e

GABON

Mining development programme and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines, de l'Énergie et des Ressources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 mECU. Works by direct labour and int. tenders. Equipment by int. tender, T.A., follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF/SYS/GA 9999

A4a

Support for Structural Adjustment. 13.2 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF GA 7200

A1c

Rural water supply and micro-projects in 3 provinces. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau et de l'Énergie. 8.600 mECU. 300 new wells and rehabilitation of 210 existing water points. Drinking water for Haut-Ogooué, Ngounié and Woleu-Ntem provinces. Works, supply of equipment, T.A., training, follow-up. Project on appraisal.

★ **Date foreseen for financing March 95.** 7th EDF.

EDF GA 6015

A2b

GAMBIA

General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 1.400 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GM 7200/002

A1c

GHANA

Human resources development programme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipments. T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GH 7003

A6

Western Region Agricultural Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 15 mECU. T.A., buildings and training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GH

A3a

Lomé IV - Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 7 mECU. T.A., transport equipment, materials and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GH

A3a

Protected Area Development in South Western Ghana. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Forestry. 5 mECU. T.A., buildings, equipment and supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.

EDF GH 7005

A3a

Woodworking Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 4.5 mECU. Equipment, T.A., overseas training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GH

A3c

Transport Infrastructure Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Roads & Highways. 70 mECU. Works, supplies, supervision, training. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF.

EDF GH

A2d

General Import Programme III. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 32.2 mECU. T.A. for monitoring. ★ **Project in execution.** 7th EDF.

EDF GH

A1c

University Link. University of Ghana - Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.2 mECU. T.A., equipment scholarships, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GH 7101/001

A6b

GRENADA

Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, Community Development. 0.220 mECU. Water supply, road improvements, repairs and extension of schools, medical and community centre and sports grounds. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GRD 7102

Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Grenville Section of the Eastern Main Road - Grenville - Mama Cannes portion. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply of equipment for repairs. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 7th EDF.

EDF GRD 7002/001

A2d

GUINEA

Development of secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, roads, T.A. and training, management, work supervision, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GUI 7008

A8a,b

Information System for the National Programme to Support Food Security. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales. 1.600 mECU. Supply of equipment, permanent T.A. follow-up, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF QUI 7004

A3a

★ **General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment.** 13.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing March 95. 7th EDF.

EDF GUI 7200

A1c

GUINEA BISSAU

Support project to improve land resources. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.260 mECU. Technical actions to prepare the creation of a land registry. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF GUB 7012

A1f

João Landim bridge construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 23 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF GUB 7013

A2d

GUYANA

General Import Programme. Phase II. Hard currency allowance to the Bank of Guyana to import EC-ACP goods with negative list. 1.850 mECU. 0.150 mECU for T.A. follow-up and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 7th EDF.

EDF GUA 7200/001

A1c

Development of small business credit initiative. Phase II. 0.700 mECU. ★ **Date financing February 95.** 6th EDF.

EDF GUA 7001/001

A5

JAMAICA

Credit scheme for micro and small enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex Institution and Coordination and Monitoring Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 5th, 6th and 7th EDF.

EDF JM 5020

A4,A5

Institutional strengthening programme. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF JM 7005

A8a,b,c

Agricultural sector support programme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture - Rural and agriculture dev. Auth. (RADA). 5 mECU. More sustainable farming systems, soil conservation, reforestation and Community education. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF JM 7004

A3a

KENYA

Road sector. Preparatory phase. Studies. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Estimated cost 1.693 mECU. Studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF KE 7010

A2d

★ **Strengthening of STD and HIV/AIDS Programme in Nairobi and Mombasa.** Special Treatment Clinic (STC) in Nairobi and the Ganjoni clinic at Mombasa. 1.577 mECU. Works, supply of equipment by int. tender, T.A. training. **Project in execution.** 7th EDF.

EDF KE 08000

A7b,c

KIRIBATI

Seaweed development programme. Total cost estimated 1.280 mECU. EDF 1.100 mECU, local 0.180 mECU. Buildings, equipment, credit, T.A. to the general manager, monitoring evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF KI 7002

A3a

Training for Kiribati. Estimation 1.440 mECU. Human resources development. Supply of equipment, T.A. monitoring evaluation. ★ **Project in execution.** 7th EDF.

EDF KI 7004

A6

Airport development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. 1.100 mECU. Upgrading of airport operations and security in Tarawa, Kiritimati and Kanton atolls. Small scale building works and minor supplies with associated training and short-term expertise. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.

EDF KI 7005

A2d

LESOTHO

Structural Adjustment Programme. Phase II. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 8 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF.

EDF LSO 7200/001

A1c

LIBERIA

Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Monrovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water and power supply systems, restoration of

basic health and school facilities, distribution of seeds and tools, improved access to isolated regions, assisting the re-integration of ex-combatants and returning refugees. Implementation by local NGOs and European NGOs. Project in execution. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF LBR 7001 A1c

MADAGASCAR

Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6027 A2d

Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimate 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. Project on appraisal.
★ **Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95.** 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7004 A2d

Support programme to rehabilitate social and economic infrastructures. Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 17.500 mECU. Railways and road rehabilitation, small hydraulic works. Social infrastructure rehabilitation. Technical expertise study to be done for roads. Works, supplies, supervision and control, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7009 A2, A8

MALAWI

Limbe-Thyolo-Muloza Road. Works, construction by int. tender (conditional). 32.260 mECU. Works and supervision.
★ Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing March 95.** 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MAI 6021 A2d

MALI

Support to develop rural credit. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole. BNDA. EDF part 1.910 mECU. T.A. and line of credit, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a

Better use of surfacing waters in the 5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: Gouvernorat de Mopti. EDF 4.300 mECU. Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, T.A., follow-up and evaluation, training,
★ research. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95.** 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6005/002 A3a

Support for the programme for the rehabilitation and maintenance of priority roads. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement et de Transport. Estimated cost 43.4 mECU. Rehabilitation and strengthening of 380 kms of bitumenised roads (Ségou-Koutiala-Burkina Border-Ouan-Sévaré) and strengthening of 180 kms of the Diéma-Didiéni road. Supervision. **Project in execution.** 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7004 A2d

Support for the decentralisation programme. Estimated cost 0.600 mECU. T.A., studies, communication campaigns, equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7009 A1b

MAURITANIA

Second Road Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and

training. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF.

EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d

National measures to support the Solar Regional Programme. Estimated cost 2.520 mECU. Infrastructural works (tanks, wells, pipes) and awareness-raising, training and follow-up for the recipient communities, works and T.A. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95.** 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 6116/001 A2a,ai,b

Increased provision for treatment and prevention of AIDS and STD. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 0.350 mECU. Supply of equipment, training, management. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 7013 A7b,c

Aleg lake region economic development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de l'Environnement. Estimate 3 mECU. Irrigation in 2.000 ha. Works, studies, evaluation, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 7014 A3

Institutional and technical support for applying and implementing land and soil legislations and regulations in the medium and upper Senegal river valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural et de l'Environnement. 1.100 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. **Date financing February 95.** 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 6007/002 A8b

Support for farmers in Gorgol and Trarza regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural et de l'Environnement. 1 mECU. Equipment, T.A. evaluation, follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 7015 A3a

MAURITIUS

Human resources centre in Rodrigues. 0.660 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. **Date financing February 95.** 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 7101/002 A6e

Support for the Industrial and Vocational Training Board. IVTB. 2.500 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of equipments, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 6th EDF.
EDF MAS 6101/001 A6b,d

Cyclone Hollanda rehabilitation programme. 1.970 mECU. Rehabilitation of the telecommunication infrastructure for both national and international grid. Supply of equipment and alternative communication systems. Project on appraisal. 3rd and 5th EDF (remainder), 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 7003 A2c

National solid waste management project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Quality of Life. Estimate 8.650 mECU. EDF 7 mECU. Construction of a fully engineered landfill to cater for about 600 t of solid waste per day. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. for supervision and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 6017 A8b,c,f

AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.423 mECU. Prevention of sexual transmission, maintenance of safe blood supply, rationalisation of patient management. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 7004 A7b,c

MOZAMBIQUE

Training for railway staff. Phase II. T.A. for the regional school at Inhambane and the provincial railway training centres. 20 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ-REG 6409 A2d, A6d

Roads rehabilitation programme in Zambesia and Sofala provinces. 30 mECU. Roads and bridges rehabilitation. Works and supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF MOZ 7005/001 A2d

Beira-Inchope Road Rehabilitation. Estimation 25 mECU. Works over 111 Km. Supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ (REG) 7005/002 A2d

Institutional Support for the Ministry of Culture. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Establishment of a culture and development forum, improvement of the Documentation Centre, staff training, planning unit, equipment, and T.A. Training. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7016 A6

Social-economic reinsertion of young people. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7017 A8b

Supply of voting material. Estimated cost 13 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7004/001 A1c

Rehabilitation of the rural health system. Estimated cost 42 mECU. Rehabilitation and renovation of 7 rural hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of essential medicines and equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7018 A7a,e

Rehabilitation of the Cahora-Bassa/South Africa transmission line. Resp. Auth.: Hidroeléctrica de Cahora-Bassa. EDF part 20 mECU. Erection of towers, demining, bush clearing by int. tender (conditional) launched in September 94. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing March 95.** 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ(REG) 7019 A2ai

NAMIBIA

Support programme for the mining sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines and Energy. Day-to-day administration by the Industrial Development Corporation. 40 mECU. Mine development, expansion, drillings, tiling plant, small scale mining. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM SYS 9999 A4a

Institutional support for the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 1.3 mECU. T.A. for agricultural planning and marketing and production economics. **Project in execution.** 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7003 A1c

Namibia Integrated Health Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastructures, equipment, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95.** 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7007 A7

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for

educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, technical training and technical consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7005 A6i

Rural Development Support Programme for the Northern Communal Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural extension service, training of extension officers and establishment of a rural credit system. Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7011 A3a

Rural towns Sewerage schemes. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7015 A8c

NIGER

Vocational and technical training project (NIGETECH). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Finances et du Plan. 3.8 mECU. Seminars, scholarships, trainer training, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7101 A6d

Road infrastructures and telecommunications. Rehabilitation of Tillabery-Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-Tera and Say-Tapoa roads. For telecommunications: earth station in Arlit and administrative centre in Niamey. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95.* 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c

Integrated development programme in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, Tadress and Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage, de la Santé Publique et de l'Éducation Nationale. 18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, drilling, supply of equipment, T.A, training, evaluation and follow-up. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7012 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7200 A1c

NIGERIA

Borno region anti-poverty programme. Improvement of agricultural productivity and water management. Assistance to farmer's associations. 16,100 mECU. EDF 15,400 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supplies T.A. training, research, line of credit. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7009 A3a

Human resources development. Institutional support for community development and vocational training. Estimate 17 mECU. Supplies, T.A. training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7006 A6b,c,d

Management Support Unit. Technical and logistic support to the National Authorizing Officer — NAO's office in order to improve procurement monitoring and finan-

cial management of EDF programmes. 1.980 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7011 A1c

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of Education (NDOE) and Commission for Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: building renovation, university construction, rehabilitation works, works supervision, scholarships, training. Works for the university by int. tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b

Environmental Monitoring of Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. T.A. for 30 man/months and technical consultancies. Training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 7001 A4a

E.U. Programme Management Unit in support of the National Authorising Officer (NAO). Estimated cost 1.200 mECU. T.A., training and auditing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 6001 A1c

RWANDA

Drinking water supply in East Bugesera. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de Travaux Publics. 9.920 mECU. Pumps, treatment, tanks, renovation existing network. Works, supplies and supervision. Works: int. tender already launched. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF RW 6007 (7002) A2b

ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

Development of Social Infrastructure — Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and Ministry of Works, Communications and Public Utilities. 0.925 mECU. Construction and supply of furniture for primary schools, supply of equipment, T.A. for supervision of works. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF SCN 6001 A6a

SENEGAL

St-Louis regional development programme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E.'s, training, studies. Health centres, clinics, medical equipment and consumables, training, information. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, sanitation. Environmental protection with wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering scheme in Podor. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF. EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a

Support for the economic development of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 mECU. Line of credit for SME's and support for artisanal fisheries. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a

Priority programme to generate employment. P.P.G.E. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. 1.990 mECU. To alleviate the social impact

of the austerity measures and of the CFA Franc devaluation on the least-favoured urban populations. Line of credit, supplies. T.A., audit. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SE 7009 A8b

Support for market-gardening export sector. 1 mECU. Establishment of a Guarantee Fund, support and T.A. for professional organisations, air-freight programming. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SE 7008 A5d

SEYCHELLES

Marine and coastal centre. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Planning and Environment. Estimated total cost 0.675 mECU. EDF 0.325 mECU, local 0.350 mECU. Renovation and equipping of a centre for international, regional and local research. Works and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SEY 7003 A8f

Support for AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.139 mECU. Training, information, equipment. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SEY 7005 A7b,c

SIERRA LEONE

Agricultural Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 14.3 mECU. Construction of stores, rehabilitation of feeder roads, vehicles, agricultural inputs, materials, T.A. for project management, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SL 7001 A3a

Improvement of Freetown — Conakry road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SL 7004 A2d

Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 22.500 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's management capacity, to support its maintenance operations, to rehabilitate 160 km of road, to provide training and equipment to enable local private contractors to increase their role in road works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SL 7002 A2d

SOMALIA

Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SO 6029

SURINAME

Roads rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 19.700 mECU. Meerzorg-Albina and Wageningen-Nickerie roads. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 5th and 7th EDF. EDF SUR 7001 A2d

Rice research and breeding station. Resp. Auth.: Suriname National Rice Institute (SNRI). 3.215 mECU. Construction of research facility, laboratory, research, field equipment, office and transport equipment, T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. T.A. short-list done. Works by acc. tender, supplies by int. tender. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF SUR 60002 A3a

SWAZILAND

Technical Cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland (N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU. T.A. 12 person-years to selected agencies in the public and parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SW 7001 A1f

Science and Mathematics Advice and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. Auth.: The University of Swaziland - Training Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SW 6101/7 A6b

Rural dams rehabilitation and construction project (Phase II). EDF estimated part 1.993 mECU. Works, T.A. and supervision, training, surveys. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF SW 6012/001 A3a

TANZANIA

Support for Aids Control in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4 mECU. To strengthen health and other support services. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing March 95.* 7th EDF. EDF TA 08000/000 (7001) A7c

Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 35 mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 km of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 6021 A2d

Support for Ministry of Finance, Zanzibar. Estimated cost 1.300 mECU. Equipments and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7007 A1c

Support Unit for the N.A.O. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7008 A1c

Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. Works, pumping equipment, studies and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 5005(7) A2b

Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, treatment, storage and distribution. Works, equipment, design and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7009 A2

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Phase III. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Tanzania. 30 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7200/002 A1c

Assistance for the 1994-95 electoral process. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. Supply of voting material and equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7017 A1c

Support for Tanzanian students in Eastern Europe. Resp. Auth.: International Organisation for Migration (I.O.M.). 1.950 mECU. Provisions of monthly allowances to

the students to enable them to continue their studies and provision of tickets luggage allowance and some starting capital to facilitate reintegration in Tanzanian society. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7016 A1c

Ruvuma-Mbeya Environmental Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Development Authorities. Estimate 10 mECU. Improvement of forest conservation and use. Supplies, T.A., studies, training, management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TA 7018 A3c

Support to the Ministry of Works, Communication and Transport. 1.900 mECU. T.A., studies and training. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF TA 7019 A1c

TOGO

General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods. T.A. for management and implementation. 17 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF TO 7200 A1c

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to purchase EC and ACP goods with negative list. T.A. for six months for GIP implementation and the use of counterpart funds. 9.7 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF TR 7200 A1c

Small business development programme. Resp. Auth.: Small Business Dev. Corp. SBDC. 2 mECU. Supply of line of credit, training and supervision and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF TR 5016 A5e

Training project for young farmers (AYTRAP). Assistance for the young farmers to create rural enterprises. Estimated cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF TR 7002 A3a

UGANDA

Structural Adjustment Support Programme General Import Programme. Phase II. 29,700 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods. There is negative list of items not eligible (military-luxury items). Identification study: short list done. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF UG 7200/001 A1c

Smallholder Tea Development Programme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 mECU. Increase in the production and quality, management improvements, infrastructure development, institutional and financial sustainability, environment conservation and regional development. Works,

supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF. EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a

Support to the Uganda Investment Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UG 7005 A5e

Road maintenance programme in the South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 22 mECU. Works, supplies and supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF UG 7004 A2d

Animal water supply in Karamoja. To establish water retaining structures in selected strategical areas. 1.950 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UG 7008 A2b

ZAIRE

Temporary assistance programme for health care (P.A.T.S.). Rehabilitation programme. Estimated cost 18.500 mECU. To ensure that the health-care services that are still operating survive. Implementation by NGOs and local organizations. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ZR 6029 A7a,b

ZAMBIA

Social Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health, Education, Water Affairs and Local Government. 12 mECU. Rehabilitation works and health infrastructures, water supply, education. Supply of drugs and equipment, and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7003 A7,A8

Reorganisation and restructuring of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife services. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d

Rehabilitation of main runway at Lusaka International Airport. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG - ROR 7319 - ZA A2d

Structural Adjustment facility - Supplement to phase II. 11.800 mECU. General Import Programme. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7200/003 A1c

Feeder roads rehabilitation programme. 5 mECU. To rehabilitate rural feeder roads in the central and copperbelt provinces. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZA 6027 A2d

ZIMBABWE

OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe land use and health programme. Resp. Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the standard of living of rural populations. Conservation and improved utilisation of the wildlife resources, support to agriculture and improvement of social infrastructure. Road network, water, sanitation, building of a district hospital, equipment and supplies.

Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a

Structural Adjustment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development. 32 mECU. General Import Programme and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 7200/001 A1c

Support for the Faculty of Veterinary Science of the University of Zimbabwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Veterinary. 9.1 mECU. Supply of vehicles and equipment. T.A., University link, fellowships, scholarships. For Zimbabwe and SADC region. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b

Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. Increase of wildlife population, particularly of endangered species: black and white rhino — tourism development, works, supplies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f

Gokwe north and south rural water supply and sanitation project. 6.100 mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-points, new domestic water-points, latrines, maintenance, health education, T.A., training, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 7001 A2b

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Support for the Public Library in Curaçao. Resp. Auth.: Public Library Curaçao. Estimation 0.650 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NEA 7003 A6g

ARUBA

T.A. for managerial training. EDF 1.900 mECU. A training unit will train private and public executives and will advise companies on demand. Supplies T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ARU 6006 A6b

MAYOTTE

Water supply. North East and North West network interconnection. Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Agriculture et de la Forêt. 6.700 mECU. Row water, lines, water treatment, storage tanks. Works: int. tender (conditional) launched in September 94. Supervision and evaluation. appraisal. *Date financing February 95.* 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MY 7003 A2b

NEW CALEDONIA

Construction of a vocational training centre for apprentices. Estimated total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NC 7002 A6d

FRENCH PACIFIC OCTs

Interpretation equipment for the South Pacific Commission. Resp. Auth.: SPC. 0.100 mECU. Purchase and supply of 40 new table units, a new infra-red control/electronics system and 150 infra-red receive only head sets. Purchase by restr. tender.
★ *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7801 A1c

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

Water and sewerage in Providenciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 3.600 mECU. Water supply works and pipes. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TC 7001 A8b,c

ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON

St. Pierre airport building. Resp. Auth.: Préfecture de St. Pierre. Estimate 4.500 mECU. EDF 3.400 mECU. Collectivité Territoriale 1.100 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, supervision. *Date financing February 95.* 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF SPM 7001 A2d

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF WF 7001 A2d

Construction of territorial road n° 1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and rehabilitation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF WF 7003 A2d

Regional Projects

BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

Regional project for the management of the 'W' national park and adjoining game reserves. Estimated total cost 10 200 mECU. To establish three management units, 10 bridges and 20 observation posts with their equipment. Building and rehabilitation of administrative, technical and social buildings, tracks and bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on appraisal 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU. Widening of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b

PALOP COUNTRIES — ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE — GUINEA BISSAU — SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE — CAPE VERDE

Regional training for middle-ranking statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 middle-ranking statisticians in the five countries. Building-up a modular training system, training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7901-002 A6b,j

External trade and investment promotion. 2.600 mECU. Project in execution.

7th EDF.
EDF REG 7901/006 A5e

Technical support for the general cooperation of the PALOP programme. 1 mECU. T.A., supplies, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7901/007 A1c

Regional training centre for nursing administrators. 2.600 mECU. Trainers training, supply of equipment, T.A. and evaluation. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7901/005 A6c, d, A7

CENTRAL AFRICA

UCAC — Central Africa Catholic University. EDF 1.800 mECU. Support for the Ekounou Campus in Yaoundé. Road works and distribution networks, student house building. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7204 A6b

CIESPAC — Public Health Education Centre in Central Africa. 1.900 mECU. Student accommodation, equipment, scholarships, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7205 A6b

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF I.O.C. — INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION COMORES — MADAGASCAR — MAURITIUS — SEYCHELLES

Technical cooperation framework programme. 1.800 mECU. T.A., auditing and evaluation, equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7501 A1b

Regional programme for applied research: fruit-fly. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Planning and Development — Mauritius. 1.900 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., evaluation, training, follow-up — management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7502 A3a

Development of Exchanges Regional Integrated Promotion. (PRIDE). Resp. Auth.: I.O.C. Secrétariat. EDF 10.500 mECU. Equipment. T.A., training, management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7503 A5

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare-Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS

Guarantee Fund for Private Investments — Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO — Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to cover partially credit risks given by Banks to the private sector. Total estimated cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU — Others: France, Germany, E.I.B., Commercial Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7115 A5

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A.

Regional integration in East and Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. Estimated cost 1.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7316 A1b

PACIFIC ACP STATES

Pacific regional agricultural programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement and dissemination of selected crops, agricultural information and techniques to farmers. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6704/001 A3a

SADC

SADC Regional Customs Training Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland customs services. Training and equipment. 1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5412/7 A1b

SADC Language Training Programme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Languages in Maputo as Regional Project Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English language training and Portuguese language training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6

Regional training programme for food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci

S.I.M.S.E.C. - SADC Initiative for Mathematics and Science Education Cooperation. To establish a professional unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information exchange, teacher training curriculum development, staff development, research cooperation and support for teachers' organisations. Project on appraisal. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6428 A6b

Wildlife Management Training Project. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. Staff training, equipment and teaching materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f

SADC - MOZAMBIQUE

Beira port dredging contract. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 years, 4 million m³/year. Supervision and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7401 A2d

BENIN - COTE D'IVOIRE - GHANA - GUINEA - GUINEA BISSAU - TOGO

Regional programme to increase awareness in western coastal African countries of natural resources protec-

tion. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Priorities: fight against bush fires and deforestation and for soil protection. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6113 A3e

TANZANIA - KENYA - UGANDA - RWANDA - ZAMBIA - BURUNDI - ETHIOPIA - ERITREA - DJIBOUTI

Development and installation of the Advance Cargo Information System. ACIS. 8.500 mECU. Supply of computers software and T.A. Managed by UNCTAD. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7312 A2c, d

KENYA - UGANDA - TANZANIA

Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (Phase II). Project headquarter in Jinja-Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research Institute. EDF part 8.400 mECU. T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5316/001 A3d

CARIBBEAN REGION

Regional Tourism Sector Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 13 mECU. Marketing, Promotion, Education, Training, research and statistics product development and protection of cultural heritage. Works, equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7601/001 A5c

Regional Trade Sector Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 14 mECU. Access of Caribbean firms into identified market, strengthen the competitiveness of export oriented firms, improve the availability of trade information and support institutional development. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7601/002 A5d,e

Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) - Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Registrar of CXC in Barbados. 2.500 mECU. T.A., external consultancies, * equipment. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7603 A6a

University level programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at masters degree level in development economics, business administration, public administration, agricultural diversification, natural resources, management and architecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., scholarships. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7604 A6b

Caribbean Postal Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. and other action necessary for the creation of the Caribbean Postal Union. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605 A2c

Caribbean Telecommunication Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation on Telecommunication within the Cariforum member states. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605/001 A2c

Regional Airports Project. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 2 mECU. Upgrading

of equipment and improvement of training of staff. Improvement safety and air navigation standards in two airports in Suriname and one in Guyana. *Date financing March 95.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605/002 A2d

Caribbean Regional agriculture and fisheries development programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 22.2 mECU. Creation of an agricultural credit revolving fund, research and training activities to support commercial opportunities, establishment of an information network and sub-programmes in the fisheries, livestock and rice subsectors. Supply of equipment, T.A. and programme management short studies. * Credit Fund. *Date financing February 95.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7606 A3a

Education policy and dialogue. Resp. Auth.: Cariforum S.G.. 0.450 mECU. T.A. for regional common policies in three education areas: basic education, technical and vocational training, language teaching. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7607 A6a,d

Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 1.500 mECU. Promote cultural identity and foster mutual knowledge of the rich cultural panorama. Restoration of buildings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic fields and management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7610 A8i

ACP COUNTRIES

Support for the ACP cultural events in Europe - 94/95. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7000/016 A5g

Assistance to the ACP/EU organisations working on the improvement production and commercialisation of base agricultural products on foreign markets. Resp. Auth.: APROMA. 7.7 mECU. Training and information actions, coffee, cocoa and oil seeds. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6048/002 A5d

Technical support for the health system in ACP countries. 1.850 mECU. Studies, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 70012/012 A7e

Support to the Collaborative Masters Programme in Economics for anglophone Africa. Resp. Auth.: African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). EDF part 2 mECU. Participation of Departments of Economics in 17 universities. Equipment and teaching materials, scholarships, management, studies, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 70004/010 A6b

ACP COUNTRIES AND REGIONS

Programme of Community Support for Statistical Training (COMSTAT) 9.650 mECU. Production of reliable and up-to-date statistics by increasing the number of qualified statisticians working in national statistical systems. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 70.004/005 A1e, A6e

EACH - Europe Africa Cooperation for Handicrafts. Resp. Auth.: GTZ/PRO-TRADE (G) for German aid 1.164 mECU and for EDF 2.297 mECU. Beneficiary countries: Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

T.A. in the ACP producer countries and in target European countries (295 man/months) — promotional campaigns in Europe — ACP participation in specialized trade fairs. **Date financing February 95.** 7th EDF. EDF REG 7001/009 A5d,e

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Structural Adjustment Support Programme. Sectoral Import Programme for building materials to finish 100,000 social housing units. 70 mECU. hard currency allowance to cover CIF imports. Management by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.A.). Special accounts in the Central Bank. Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by a positive list (electrical equipment — spare parts). 1st int. tender launched. Project on appraisal. Project in execution. SEM AL 688-92 A1c

Support for the Algerian rural sector. 30 mECU. Project in execution. SEM AL A3a

EGYPT

Banking Sector Reform — Assistance for the Central Bank of Egypt. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Egypt. 9.9 mECU. Improvement the Central Bank capacity through training, provision of T.A. and equipment. Project in execution. SEM EGT 689/94 A1

St. Katherine Protectorate Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, EEAA. 6 mECU. Protection of critical habitats, ecosystems and cultural heritage sites, through zoning and a management plan. Works, supplies and T.A. and training. Major equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. SEM EGT 783/94 A3a

Support to population programme in Upper Egypt. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Population and Family Welfare (MPFW). 10 mECU. Service delivery, contraception, supply and distribution, family planning, management unit, T.A. evaluation and monitoring. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM EGT 867/94 A7c

Private Sector — Development Programme. PSDP. 25 mECU. Improvement of performances of private companies in domestic, regional and international markets. Business support programme. Information, T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM EGT 898/94 A5

Veterinary Services Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MDALR). 20 mECU. Line of credit training, T.A., equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM EGT 932/94 A3a

Upper Gulf of Agaba Oil Spill Contingency Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), Ministry of Environment for Israel and Agaba Ports Authority for Jordan with a representative from the EC. EC 2.900 mECU,

Egypt 0.200 mECU. Procurement of the equipment, development of local infrastructure, training and T.A. **Date financing February 95.** SEM EGT 1171/94 A8f

JORDAN

Support for Structural Adjustment. Phase II. Hard currency allowance with negative list. 30 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. SEM JO 414/94 A1c

MALTA

Strengthening educational and economic relations with the Community. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and traineeships, establishment of a Euro-Information Centre, integrated marketing programmes and tourism promotion. Different T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in execution. SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d

MOROCCO

Support to promote and development of remote sensing. Resp. Auth.: CRTS — Centre Royal de Télédétection spatiale. EC contribution 4 mECU. Action for soil vegetation, sea (surface temperature), forests control, identification and support to the management of aquaculture zones and macro-seaweed. Specialized T.A. training, supply of equipments by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. SEM MOR 486/94 A3a

Support for the Caissees Locales de Crédit Agricole. EC contribution 16 mECU. To strengthen local banks providing loans to small farmers. Allowance to the CNCA — Caisse Nationale de Crédit Agricole. T.A. foreseen for training, follow-up and parallel evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. SEM MOR 486/94 A3a

Support for the Agricultural Development Fund. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Mise en Valeur Agricole (NAMVA) — Caisse Nationale du Crédit Agricole (CNCA). 50 mECU. Line of credit and training, information, evaluation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM MOR 930/94 A3a, A5a

Support for Mother and Child Care. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 9 mECU. Works by int. tender, studies, T.A., evaluation. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM MOR 930/94 A7b

SYRIA

Electricity Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Electricité — Société Publique d'Electricité. SME. EC contribution 11 mECU. Project management unit, training, master plan, transmission and distribution, functioning and control, computerized management system, assistance to the supervision of works (5 sub-stations — funded by E.I.B.). T.A. experts, supply of equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. SEM SYR 415/94 A2a, i

Banking Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Syrian Central Bank (SCB) and the Commercial Bank of Syria (CB). 4.5 mECU. Supply of T.A., computer equipment, training monitoring and evaluation. Major equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM SYR 899/94 A1

Demographic sector programme in Syria. 2 mECU. Provision of quality Mother and Child Health/Family Planning services, population and housing census, strengthening civil registration system. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM SYR 890/94 A7c

Private Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Syrian-European Business Centre. 7 mECU. To improve the performance of indigenous business in local, regional and international markets. Establishment of the SEBC. T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. **Date financing February 95.** SEM SYR 1189/94 A5d,e

TUNISIA

Hill barrages and irrigation systems development. Resp. Auth.: Direction Générale des Etudes et des Travaux Hydrauliques. 3 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment, studies, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 94. SEM TUN 883/94 A3a

TURKEY

Vocational training programmes for tourism and mining. EC contribution 5.4 mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of equipment, studies. Project in execution. SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d

Programme to broaden relations between EC and Turkey. EC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the Universities of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in execution. SEM TU A6b

WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Rehabilitation programme for Palestinian ex-detainees. 10 mECU. To reintegrate into Palestinian economy and society 12,000 ex-detainees. Education, training, job counselling, vocational rehabilitation, medical assistance, business start-up training and follow-up, family support, wage subsidies. Project on appraisal. SEM OT 94/06 A6,7,8

Demographic indicators for the Occupied Territories. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (PBS). 1.400 mECU. Project in execution. SEM OT 94/06 A7c

Support for the electoral registration process: registration materials. 0.100 mECU. Supply of registration materials. Nationals Elections Office — Palestinian Commission for Local Government and Elections. **Date financing October 94.** SEM OT 94/07 A1c

EURO-MAGHREB COMMUNICATIONS S.A.R.L. PARIS

Euro-Maghreb training programme in communications. EC contribution 1.400 mECU. Seminars, scholarships for young professionals from Maghreb countries. Project on appraisal. SEM REG 687.92 A5g

A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Integrated development Ramon Lista. EC contribution 4.962 mECU. T.A. Support for indigenous populations. Project on appraisal Date foreseen for financing March 95. ALA ARG 94152 A3a

BANGLADESH

Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (CERP). EC contribution 15 mECU. Flood protection, forestry, agricultural development. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 94. ALA BD 9320 A3a

Bangladesh rural advancement Committee (BRAC). EC contribution 8.150 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA BD 9307 A3a

New Options for Pest Management (NOPEST). Resp. Auth.: CARE Bangladesh 6 mECU. To motivate and assist 32,000 farmers in rice growing areas of Mymensingh and Comilla districts. Training, equipment, T.A. by CARE, monitoring and evaluation. *Date financing December 94.* ALA BD 9431 A3a

BOLIVIA

Promotion and assistance for small private companies. EC contribution 8.795 mECU. T.A. and credit management. Short-list to be done. Project in execution. ALA BO 9373 A5e

Ministry of Development and Environment. T.A. to support the execution of programmes. 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA BO 94/42 A3a

Rural development in the Mitzque and Tiraque valleys. 13 mECU. Different, T.A. for bridges, canals, improvement of cultivated soils. Project on appraisal. ALA BO 94/49 A3a

Support for export promotion. 0.980 mECU. T.A. and training for 30 Bolivians trade representatives. Establishment of 2 trade promotion offices in Europe. Information data system. Project in execution. ALA BO 94/52 A5d

Support for artisanal fisheries and aquaculture. T.A. to improve know-how. 4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 95. ALA BO 94/53 A3a

Job promotion. 3 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA BO 9525 A5

BRAZIL

Support for unprivileged children in the urban environment. EC contribution 8 mECU. T.A. and micro-projects. Short-list to be done. Project in execution. ALA BRA 94107 A8e

Cooperation for the quality in the industrial sector. EC contribution 0.400 mECU. T.A. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA BRA 9465 A4g

CAMBODIA

Support for the agricultural sector and primary education. EC contribution 49.800 mECU. Supply of equipment, different T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. ALA CAM 94/14 A3a

CHILE

Study to create a technological Centre in Santiago. 0.500 mECU. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA CHI 94/172 A6b

Fruit prices control system. 0.420 mECU. T.A. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA CHI 94/180 A3a

CHINA (P.R.)

Development project to improve potato production in Qinghai. EC contribution 3.100 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. ALA CHN 9410 A3a

China-Europa International Trade School. EC contribution 14.85 mECU. Situated in Jinqiao Pudong region - Shanghai. Conception - supervision of construction equipment, teachers, non academic staff, training. Project in execution. ALA CHN 9408 A6b

COLOMBIA

Basic social services in Ciudad Bolivar. 8 mECU T.A. to the local services. Training. Project in execution. ALA CO94/101 A8b

ACTUAR Project - Family enterprises. 4 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 95. ALA CO 94/40 A5c

Support for the creation of basic technological enterprises. 0.900 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. ALA CO 94/41 A5c

ECUADOR

Rehabilitation of the Paute zone. Estimation 12 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. *Project in execution.* ALA EQ 94/44 A3a

Environmental impact of the oil exploitation in the Amazone region. 7.050 mECU. *Date financing December 94.* ALA EQ 94130 A8f

Ministry of External Relations Modernization. 0.400 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. ALA EQ 94/161 A1c

«La Huella» of Europe in Latin America. 0.300 mECU. T.A. *Project in execution.* ALA EQ 94/171 A5c

EL SALVADOR

Health and basic health programme in the western region. EC participation 10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health centres, infrastructures, training, T.A. Project in execution. ALA SAL 9391 A7c

Training in the geothermic energy sector. 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. ALA SAZ 94/36 A2a

Support for the Informal Sector. Phase II. EC contribution 7 mECU. Project in execution. ALA SAL 9483 A5e

Support for the library system of the University of Salvador. EC contribution 0.950 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA SAL 9467 A6b

Support for agricultural reform. 0.975 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA SAL 9506 A3a

GUATEMALA

Development aid to the indigenous populations in Central America. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. ALA GUA 9355 A3a

Programme to help street children in Guatemala City. EC contribution 2.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Short-list to be done. Project in execution. ALA GUA 94109 A8e

Support for the informal sector. 7.500 mECU. T.A. training, line of credit. Project in execution. ALA GUA 94/47 A5

Rural development programme in the Totonicapan Department. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA 9481 A3a

Rural Development in Baja Verapaz. EC contribution 8 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA 9489 A3a

Rural Development in Alta Verapaz. EC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA 9490 A3a

HONDURAS

Programme to help street children. EC contribution 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. ALA HO 94118 A8e

Programme de support SME's farmers in the Olancho area (PROLANCHO). Resp. Auth.: National Planning Ministry (SECPLAN). EC contribution 9.860 mECU. Supply of equipment by int. tender, T.A., monitoring. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA HO 94/124 A3a

INDIA

Transfer of Technologies for Sustainable Development (BAIF). Resp. Auth.: NABARD — National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development. Project management BAIF (Indian NGO) EC contribution 19.5 mECU. Wasteland development, Wadi programme, sericulture, cattle development, T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA IN 94/32 A3a

Saline Land Reclamation in Maharashtra. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation Department's Khar Lands Development Circle (KLDC) EC contribution 15.5 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA IN 94/27 A3a

INDONESIA

EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning — Ministry of Forestry. EC contribution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and monitoring, T.A. for detailed forest survey and mapping, training. Integrated Radio Communication Systems: T.A. for installation and training. Short-lists done. Project on appraisal.
ALA IND 9242 A3c

EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: Forest Fire Prevention and control in South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning Ministry of Forestry. EC contribution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 pilot projects for fire management units and equipment. Short-list done. Project on appraisal.
ALA IND 9212 A3c

Gunung Leuser development programme. Resp. Auth.: Indonesian Planning Ministry-BAPPENAS. EC contribution 32.5 mECU. Works, infrastructures, supply of equipment, T.A. training, monitoring and evaluation. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA IND 94/26 A3a

MERCO SUR

EC-Merco Sur cooperation programme and T.A. for the agricultural sector. EC participation 11.200 mECU. Institutional and technical support in the phyto-pharmaceutical and veterinary sectors. T.A., supplies, training and awareness raising. Project in execution.
ALA REG 93143 A3a

NICARAGUA

TROPISEC — Development of small rural production in the dry tropical zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution.
ALA NI 93144 A3a

Urban water supply and sewerage. Resp. Auth.: Instituto Nicaraguese de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (INAA). EC contribution 11 mECU. Three drinking water supply projects in Chichigalpa, Masatepe — two towns in the Pacific region and Camoapa. Two sewerage networks plus provisional basic drainage in the towns of El Viejo and Jinotepe. Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA NI 94/123 A2b

Roads and bridges rehabilitation. 2.6 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA NI 94145 A2d

Roads rehabilitation. 4 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA NI 94144 A2d

Support for unprivileged children. 0.857 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA NI 94167 A8c

PAKISTAN

Post-flood rehabilitation and protection project. 20.5 mECU. T.A., road works, dam construction. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94.
ALA PK 94/04 A8g

PANAMA

Support for rural SME's in the central region. 5 mECU. Supply of T.A. and line of credit. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA PAN 94137 A3a

PARAGUAY

Durable development of the Paraguayan Chaco (protection of the indigenous zones and ecosystem). EC contribution 14.800 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ALA PAR 93/40 A3a

PERU

Support for export promotion. EC contribution 3.774 mECU. T.A. Short-list done. Project in execution.
ALA PE 9357 A5d

Colca valley development programme. EC contribution 5 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing second quarter 95.**
ALA PE 9433 A3a

Women in rural situations. EC contribution 5 mECU. Piura and Ayacucho regions. Improvement of the women's conditions. Social services. Project in execution.
ALA PE 94/106 A3a

Vocational training programme. 9 mECU. T.A. training technical qualifications for non qualified young people. Project in execution.
ALA PE 94/55 A6d

Street children. 7 mECU. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA PE 94127 A8c

PHILIPPINES

Rural integrated development programme in the Aurore zone. EC contribution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal.
ALA PHI 9326 A3a

Tropical forest protection in Palawan. EC contribution 17 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution.
ALA PHI 9337 A3a

THAILAND

European Community Business Information Centre ECBC Phase I. 2.204 mECU. Supply of equipment, materials, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution.
ALA THA 93/761 A5e

URUGUAY

Integrated development programme for rural communities. 5.150 mECU. T.A. **Project in execution.**
ALA URU 94/39 A3a

VENEZUELA

Support for the establishment of the National Centre for Energy and Environment. EC contribution 1 mECU. T.A., local services, training, seminars. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal.
ALA VE 9415 A2a,A8f

Social Structural adjustment in Venezuela. Resp. Auth.: The Foundation set up to oversee the Experimental Vocational Training Centre. Estimated total cost 12.2 mECU. EC contribution 5.3 mECU, Provincial Government of Guipuzcoa (Spain) 0.959 mECU, local 5.941 mECU. EC contribution. Equipment and furniture by int. tender. T.A. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA VEN 94/112 A6d

PETARE PROTECT — Fight against drugs. 0.998 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA VE 94113 A8c

VIETNAM

T.A. programme for transition to market economy. EC contribution 16 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA VIE 9336 A1b

ASEAN

COGEN Programme EEC-ASEAN Phase II. Technology transfer for co-generation of energy from biomass. EC contribution 5 mECU. Execution: Institut Asiatique de Technologie (AIT) in Bangkok. T.A. and equipments. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94.
ALA/ASN/REG A2a

ASEAN-EC Energy Management Training and Research Centre — (AEEMTRC) phase II. Resp. Auth.: Project Steering Committee of AEEMTRC and EC Representatives. EC contribution 4 mECU. T.A. and training. **Date financing December 94.**
ALA/ASN/REG 94/33 A2a

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Cooperation programme with European Union towns, regions and local collectivities. 4 mECU. T.A., training. Project on appraisal. ALA REG 94/168 A5

Fight against cancer. 10 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA REG 9503 A7

ANDEAN PACT

Programme to eradicate foot and mouth disease. EC contribution 1.800 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA REG 9463 A3a

T.A. programme for customs. 5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 1995. ALA REG 94/163 A1b

DELEGATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

In ACP countries

Angola

Rua Rainha Jinga, 6
Luanda C.P. 2669
Tel. 393038 — 391277 — 391339
Telex 3397 DELCEE AN
Fax (244 2) 392531

Barbados

James Fort Building
Hincks Street, Bridgetown.
Tel. 427-4362/ 429-7103
Telex 2327 DELEGFED WB
BRIDGETOWN
Fax (1-809) 4278687

Benin

Avenue Roume, Bâtiment administratif
B.P. 910, Cotonou
Tel. 31 26 84/31 26 17
Telex 5257 DELEGFED — COTONOU
Fax (229) 315 328

Botswana

P.O. Box 1253 - 68 North Ring Road
Gaborone, Botswana
Tel. (267) 314 455/6/7
Telex BD 2403 DECEC
Fax (267) 313 626

Burkina Faso

B.P. 352
Ouagadougou
Tel. 307 385/307 386 - 308 650
Telex 5242 DELCOMEU — BF
Fax (226) 30 89 66

Burundi

Avenue du 13 Octobre
B.P. 103, Bujumbura
Tel. 3426/3892
Telex FED BDI 5031 — BUJUMBURA
Fax (257-22) 4612

Cameroon

QUARTIER BASTOS
B.P. 847, Yaoundé
Tel. (237) 20 13 87-20 33 67
Fax (237) 202149

Cape-Verde

Achada de Santo Antonio
C.P. 122-Praia
Tel. (238) 61 55 71/72/73
Telex 6071 DELCE CV
Fax (238) 61 55 70

Central African Republic

Rue de Flandre
B.P. 1298 Bangui
Tel. 61 30 53/61 01 13
Telex 5231 RC DELCOMEU — BANGUI
Fax (236) 616535

Chad

Concession Caisse Coton. Route da Farcha
B.P. 552, N'Djamena
Tel. 51 59 77/51 22 76
Telex 5245 KD
Fax (235) 51 21 05

Comoros

Boulevard de la Corniche.
B.P. 559 — Moroni
Tel. (269) 73 23 06 — 73 31 91
Telex 212 DELCEC KO
Fax (269) 73 24 94

Congo

Av. Lyautey
near Hotel Meridien
B.P. 2149, Brazzaville
Tel. 83 38 78/83 37 00
Telex DELEGFED 5257
Fax (242) 83 60 74

Côte d'Ivoire

Immeuble 'AZUR' Bd, Crozet, 18
B.P. 1821, Abidjan 01
Tel. 21 24 28 — 21 09 28
Telex 23729 DELCEE — ABIDJAN
Fax (225) 214089

Djibouti

Plateau du Serpent, Boulevard du Maréchal Joffre
B.P. 2477 Djibouti
Tel. 35 26 15
Telex 5894 DELCOM DJ
Fax (253) 350 036

Dominican Republic

Calle Rafael Augusto
Sanchez 21
Ensanche Naco
Santo Domingo
Tel. (809) 540 58 37-540 60 74
Fax (809) 567 58 51
Telex 4757 EUROCOM SD DR

Equatorial Guinea

Apartado 779 — Malabo
Tel. 2944
Telex DELFED 5402 EG

Ethiopia

Off Bole Road
P.O. Box 5570, Addis Ababa

Tel. 251-1-61 25 11
Telex 217 38 DELEGEUR — ET
Fax (251-1) 61 28 77

Gabon

Quartier Batterie IV
Lotissement des Cocotiers
B.P. 321, Libreville
Tel. 73 22 50
Telex DELEGFED 5511 GO — LIBREVILLE
Fax (241) 736554

Gambia

10 Cameron Street
P.O. Box 512, Banjul
Tel. 227777 — 228769 — 226860
Telex 2233 DELCOM GV — BANJUL
Fax (220) 226219

Ghana

The Round House — Cantonments Road,
K.I.A.-Accra
P.O. Box 9505
Tel. (233-21) 774 201/2-774 236-774 094
Telex 2069 DELCOM — GH
Fax (233-21) 774154

Guinea Bissau

Bairro da Penha, C.P. 359,
Bissau 1113
Tel. (245) 25 10 71/25 10 27/
251469/251471-72
Telex 264 DELCOM BI
Fax (245) 25 10 44

Guinea

Commission
Central Mail Department
(Diplomatic Bag Section — B 1/123)
Rue de la Loi 200, 1049 Bruxelles
Telex via Embassy Fed. Rep. of Germany 22479
Tel. (224) 41 49 42
Fax (224) 41874

Guyana

72 High Street, Kingston
P.O. Box 10847, Georgetown
Tel. 64 004-65 424-63 963
Telex 2258 DELEG GY — GEORGETOWN
Fax (592-2) 62615

Haiti

Delmas 60 - Impasse brave n. 1
(par Rue Mercier-Laham
B.P. 15.588 Petion-Ville
Port-au-Prince - Haiti - W.I.
Tel.: (509) 57-5485, 57-3491, 57-3575, 57-1644
Fax (509) 57-4244

Jamaica

8 Olivier Road, Kingston 8

P.O. Box 463 Constant Spring, Kingston 8
Tel. (1-809) 9246333-7
Telex 2391 DELEGEC JA
Fax (1-809) 9246339

Kenya

"Union Insurance House" 2nd and 3rd floors
Ragati Road
P.O. Box 45119, Nairobi
Tel. (254-2) 713020/21-712860-712905/06
Telex 22483 DELEUR — KE
Fax (254-2) 716481

Lesotho

P.O. Box MS 518
Maseru, 100, Lesotho
Tel. 313 726
Fax 266 — 310193

Liberia

34 Payne Avenue, Sinkor
P.O. Box 10 3049, Monrovia
Tel. 26 22 78
Telex 44358 DELGEGF LI — MONROVIA
Fax (231) 262266

Madagascar

Immeuble Ny Havana — 67 hectares,
B.P. 746, Antananarivo
Tel. 242 16
Telex 22327 DELFED MG — ANTANANARIVO
Fax (261-2) 32169

Malawi

Europa House
P.O. Box 30102, Capital City
Lilongwe 3
Tel. 78 31 99-78 31 24-78 27 43
Telex 44260 DELEGEUR MI — LILONGWE
Fax (265) 78 35 34

Mali

Rue Guégau — Badalabougou
B.P. 115 Bamako
Tel. 22 23 56/22 20 65
Telex 2526 DELEGFED — BAMAKO
Fax (223) 223670

Mauritania

Ilôt V, Lot 24
B.P. 213, Nouakchott
Tel. 527 24/527 32
Telex 5549 DELEG MTN — NOUAKCHOTT
Fax (222-2) 53524

Mauritius

61/63 route Florea Vacoas
P.O. Box 10 Vacoas
Tel. 686 50 61/686 50 62/686 50 63
Telex 4282 DELCEC IW VACOAS
Fax (230-686) 6318.

Mozambique

C.P. 1306 — MAPUTO
1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe — MAPUTO
Tel. 1-49 02 66 — 1-49 17 16 — 1-49 02 71
1-49 07 20
Telex 6-146 CCE MO
Fax (258-1) 491866

Namibia

Sanlam Building
4th floor
Independence Avenue, 154
Windhoek
Tel.: 264-61-220099
Fax 264-61 23 51 35
Telex 419 COMEU WK

Niger

B.P. 10388, Niamey
Tel. 73 23 60/73 27 73/73 48 32
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED — NIAMEY
Fax (227) 732322

Nigeria

4, Idowu Taylor St, Victoria Island
PM Bag 12767, Lagos
Tel. 61 78 52/61 08 57
Telex 21868 DELCOM NG LAGOS — NIGERIA
Fax (234-1) 617248

Abuja

Tel 09/5233144/46
Telex 0905/91484
Fax 09-5233147

Pacific (Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu)

Dominion House, 3rd Floor
Private Mail Bag, G.P.O. Suva, Fiji
Tel. 31 36 33
Telex 2311 DELECOM FJ — SUVA
Fax (679) 300 370

Papua New Guinea

The Lodge, 3rd floor, Bampton Street
P.O. Box 76
Port Moresby
Tel. (675) 21 35 44-21 35 04-21 37 18
Telex NE 22307 DELEUR — PORT MORESBY
Fax (675) 217 850

Rwanda

Avenue Député Kamuzinzi, 14
B.P. 515, Kigali
Tel. 755 86/755 89/725 36
Telex 22515 DECEC RWMCI
Fax 250 — 74313

Senegal

12, Avenue Albert Sarraut, Dakar
Tel. 23 13 34 - 23 47 77 -
23 79 75
Telex 21665 DELEGSE SG
Fax (221) 217885

Sierra Leone

Wesley House
4 George Street
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown
Tel. (232.22) 223 975-223 025
Telex 3203 DELFED SL — FREETOWN
Fax (232-22) 225212

Solomon Islands

2nd floor City Centre Building
Solomon Islands
P.O. Box 844 — Honiara
Tel. 22 765
Telex 66370 — DELECSI
Fax (677) 23318

Somalia

EC Somalia Unit
Union Insurance House — 1st floor
Ragati Road
P.O. Box 30475 Nairobi
Tel.: (254-2) 712830 — 713250/251
Fax (254-2) 710997

Sudan

3rd Floor — The Arab Authority for Agricultural
Investment and Development Building
Army Road, Khartoum
P.O. Box 2363
Tel. 75054-75148-75393
Telex 23096 DELSU SD

Suriname

Dr S. Redmondstraat 239
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo
Tel. 4993 22 — 499349 — 492185
Telex 192 DELEGFED SN
Fax (597)493076

Swaziland

Dhlan'ubeka Building, 3rd floor
Ch. Walker and Tin Streets
P.O. Box A.36
Mbabane, Swaziland
Tel. 42908/42018
Telex 2133 WD
DELEGFED MBABANE
Fax (268) 46729

Tanzania

Entelcoms House, 9th Floor
Samora Avenue
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam
Tel. 46459/60/61/62
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR —
DAR ES SALAAM
Fax (255-51) 46724

Togo

Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky
B.P. 1657, Lomé
Tel. 21 36 62/21 08 32
Telex 5267 DELFED-TG
Fax (228) 211300

Trinidad and Tobago

The Mutual Centre
16, Queen's Park West
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain
Trinidad W.I.
Tel. 62-2 6628/62-2 0591
Telex 22421 DELFED WG
Fax (809) 622-6355

Uganda

Uganda Commercial Bank Building,
Plot 12
Kampala Road, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 5244, Kampala
Tel. 233 303/ 233.304
Telex 61139 DELEUR — UG — KAMPALA
Fax (256-41) 233708

Zaire

71, Av des Trois Z
B.P 2000, Kinshasa
By satellite: tel. 00871 1546221
Telex 00 581 154.62.21
Fax 00871 1546221

Zambia

P.O.Box 34871
Plot 4899
Los Angeles Boulevard
Lusaka
Tel. 25 09 06-25 07 11 - 25 11 40

Telex 40440 DECEC ZA — LUSAKA
Fax (260-1) 250906

Zimbabwe

P.O. Box 4252
Construction House (6th floor)
110, Leopold Takawira Street
Harare
Tel. (263-4) 70 71 20/139 — 75 28 35 —
72 21 37 — 70 71 43
Telex 24811 Deleur ZW
Fax (263-4) 725360

In the OCT

Netherlands Antilles

Scharlooweg 37
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad
Curaçao
Tel. (599.9) 618488
Fax (599.9) 618423

Aruba

L.G. Smith Blvd. 50, (P.O. Box 409)
Oranjestad
Tel. 297-8-34131
Fax 297-9-34575

In the Mediterranean Countries

Algeria

36, Rue Arezki Abri
Hydra-16035 Alger
Tel. 59 08 22 — 59 09 25 — 59 09 42
Telex 66067 EURAL DZ — ALGERIE
Fax (213-2) 593947

Cyprus

Irish Tower Court, 8th Floor
242 Agapinor Street, Corner of Makarios Avenue, PO Box
3480
Nicosia 137, Cyprus
Tel. (357-2) 36 92 02
Telex (605) 4960 ECDELGY
Fax (357-2) 36 89 26

Egypt

6, Ibn Zanki St.-Zamalek
Tel. (20-2) 340 83 88 — 341 93 93 — 340 11 84 —
340 74 09
Telex 94258 EUROP UN ZAMALEK
Fax 3400388

Israel

The Tower, 3 Daniel Frisch St.,
TEL AVIV 64731
Tel. (972-3) 696.41.66
Telex 3421 08 DELEG — IL
Fax (972-3) 695 1983

Jordan

Al Jahez St. 15, Shmeisani, Amman
P.O. Box 926 794
Tel. 66 81 91/66 81 92 Amman
Telex 22 260 DELEUR JO AMMAN
JORDAN
Fax (962-6) 686 746

Lebanon

Immeuble Duraffourd, Avenue de Paris, Beirut
B.P. 11-4008, Beirut
Tel. 3630 30/31/32
Telex DELEUR 23307

Malta

Villa 'The Vines', 51
Ta'Xbiex Sea Front, Ta'Xbiex-Malta
Tel.: (356) 34 48 91-93-95, 345111
Telex: (356) 910 EC MLA
Fax (356) 34 48 97

Morocco

2 bis rue de Meknès-Rabat
B.P. 1302, Rabat
Tel. 7612 17/7612 46/7612 48
Telex 32620-(M)
Fax (212-7) 761156

Syria

Rue Chakib Arslan
P.O. Box 11269, Damascus
Tel. (963-11) 3327640/641
Telex 412919 DELCOM SY
Fax (963 11) 3320683

Tunisia

Avenue Jugurtha 21
B.P. 143, Cité el Mahrajene, 1082 Tunis
Tel. 78 86 00
Telex 14399 — TUNIS
Fax (216-1) 788201

In A.L.A. countries

Argentina

Plaza Hotel, Florida 1005, Buenos Aires
Tel.: (54-1) 312 60 01/09
Telex: 22488 PLAZA AR
Telefax: (54-1) 313 29 12

Bangladesh

Plot 7, Road 84
Gulshan — Dhaka
Tel. 88 47 30-31-32
Tel. 642501, CECO BJ
Fax (88.02) 88 31 18

Brazil

Q.I. 7 — Bloc A — Lago Sul — Brasilia (D.F.) Brasil
Tel.: (55.61) 248.31.22
Telex.: (038) 61.25.17/61.36.48 DCCE BRE
Fax.: (55-61) 248.07.00

Chile

Avenida Américo Vespucio SUR 1835, Casila 10093,
Santiago (9) Chile
Tel.: (56) 22.28.24.84
Telex: (034) 34.03.44 COMEUR CK
Fax (56) 22.28.25.71

China

15 Dong Zhi Men Wai Dajie
Sanlitun, 100600 Beijing
Tel.: (86-1) 532 44 43
Telex: (085) 222 690 ECDEL CN
Fax (86-1) 532 43 42

Colombia

Calle 97 n° 22-44
94046 — 14 Bogota 8
Tel. (57-1) 236 90 40/256 48 28/256 84 77
Fax (57-1) 610 00 59

Costa Rica (HQ of the Delegation for Central America)

Centro Calon — Apartado 836
1007 San José
Tel. 332755
Telex 3482 CCE AC
Fax (506) 210893

India (HQ of the Delegation in South Asia)

65 Golf Links
New Delhi 110003
Tel. 462 92 37/38
Telex 61315 EUR-IN
Fax 462 92 06

Indonesia (HQ of the Delegation for Brunei, Singapore and the ASEAN Secretariat)

Wisma Dharmala Sakti Building, 16th floor
J.L. Jendral Sudirman 32
P.O. Box 55 JKPDS Jakarta 10 220
Tel. 570 60 76/68
Telex 62 043 COMEUR IA
Fax (62-21) 570 6075

Korea

ICON Building
33-12 Changchoong-dong 1-ga
Choong-Ku
Seoul 100-691 - Korea

Mexico

Paseo de la Reforma 1675,
Lomas de Chapultepec C.P.
11000 Mexico D.F.
Tel. (52-5) 540.33.45 to 47 — 202.86.22
Telex: (022) 176.35.28 DCCEME
Fax (52-5) 540.65.64

Pakistan

No 9 Street n. 88
G-6/3, Islamabad
P.O. Box 1608
Tel. 82 18 28-82 24 15 - 82 30 26
Telex 54044 COMEU PK
Fax (92) 822604

Peru

B.P. 180 792, LIMA 18
Manuel Gonzales Olaechea 247
San Isidro, Lima 27
Tel. (5114) 41 58 27/32-403097
Telex 21085 PE-COMEU
Telefax (51-14) 41 80 17

Philippines

Salustiana D. Ty Tower,
7th Floor 104,
Paseo de Roxas corner
Perea Street — Legaspi Village — Makati
Metro Manila
Tel. (63-2) 8126421-30
Telex 22534 COMEUR PH
Fax (63-2) 812 66 86 - 812 66 87

Thailand (HQ of the Delegation in Indochina, Thailand, Malaysia)

Kian Gwan House 11 — 19th floor
140/1 Wireless Road
Bangkok 10 330
Tel. 255 91 00
Telex 82764 COMEUBK TH
Fax (66 2) 2559114

Uruguay

Boulevard Artigas 1257
CP 11200 Montevideo
Tel.: (598) 2.40 75 80
Telex: 23925 CCEUR UY
Fax (598) 2-41 20 08

Venezuela

Calle Orinoco — Las Mercedes
Apartado 768076, Las Americas 1061 A
Caracas
Tel. 91 51 33
Telex 27298 COMEU
Fax (582) 993 55 73

OFFICES OF THE COMMISSION

In ACP countries

Antigua & Barbuda

Alpha Building 2nd floor
Redcliffe Street
St. John's, Antigua W.I.,
P.O. Box 1392
Tel. and fax (1-809) 4622970

Bahamas

Frederick House, 2nd floor, Frederick St.
P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau
Tel. (32)55850
Telex DELEGEC NS 310

Belize

1 Eyre Street
P.O. Box 907
Belize City, Belize
Tel. (501-2) 72785 and fax
Telex 106 CEC BZ

Grenada

Archibald Avenue
P.O. Box 5, St George's, Grenada, West Indies
Tel. (1809) 440 4958 — 440 3561
Telex 3431 CWBUR GA
(Attn. EEC Delegation)
Fax (1809) 4404151

São Tomé & Príncipe

B.P. 132 — Sao Tomé
Tel. (239 12) 21780-21375
Telex 224 Delegfed ST
Fax (239-12) 22683

Seychelles

P.O. Box 530 — Victoria, Mahé
Tel. (248) 32 39 40
Fax (248) 323890

Tonga

Malle Taha
Taufa'ahau Road, private mailbag n° 5-CPO
Nuku Alofa
Tel. 23820
Telex 66207 (DELCEC TS)
Fax 23869

Vanuatu

Orient Investment Building, Ground Floor,
Kumul Highway
P.O. Box 422, Port-Vila
Tel. (678) 22501
Fax (678) 23282

Western Samoa

PO Box 3023,
Loane Viliamu Building, 4th floor, Apia
Fax (685)24622

Commission of the European Union Representation Office in Turkey

15, Kuleli Sokak
Gazi Osman Pasa, Ankara
Tel. 137 68 40-1-2-3
Telex 44320 ATBE TR
Fax (90-312) 437 79 40

Commission of the European Union Delegation in the South African Republic

2, Greenpark Estates
27, George Storer Drive Groenkloof, Pretoria
0181 South Africa
Tel.: (0027-12) 46 43 19
Fax (0027-12) 46 99 23

In the OCT

New Caledonia

21 Rue Anatole France
B.P. 1100 Noumea
Tel. (687) 27 70 02
Fax (687) 28 87 07

markets and suggests a break from traditional theory and practice to encourage this cooperation.

NUTRITION IN THE NINETIES

Eds. Margaret R. Biswas and Mamdouh Gabr, Oxford University Press, Walton Street, UK-London, 1994, 218 pp., ISBN 0-19-854863-X. In the 'Policy Issues' series.

The authors of this joint work, who include the two editors, are recognised experts in the area of nutrition and planning. It will be of interest to political decision-makers and project administrators alike and can be used as a reference work for university courses on nutrition in both developing countries and the industrialised world.

L'ECONOMIE URBAINE EN AFRIQUE — Le don et le recours (THE URBAN ECONOMY IN AFRICA — The gift and its use)

by Emmanuel Seyni Ndione, published by Karthala and Erda Graf Sahel, F-75013 Paris, 22-24, Boulevard Arago, 1994, 208 p., ISBN 2-86537-505-6

The author, in attempting a new appraisal of the economic functioning of a community that takes into account the 'performance' of the actors, their social logic and their strategies in handling constraints, throws an original light on one of the most crucial aspects of the economy in Africa — how does money circulate in an urban environment? As part of an urban research programme, a team followed the progress of money in a suburb of Dakar.

MALI

Published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate-General for Cooperation, NL-The Hague, 480 pp., ISBN 90 5146 043 7

An assessment of development cooperation policy between the Netherlands and Mali from 1975 to 1992.

LE BURKINA FASO CONTEMPORAIN — L'expérience d'un autodéveloppement

(CONTEMPORARY BURKINA FASO — The experience of self-development)

by Helmut Asche, published by L'Harmattan, 5-7, Rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique, F-75005 Paris, 287 pp., ISBN 2-7384-2148-2

The author was a technical consultant at the Ministry of Planning in Ouagadougou from 1986

to 1991. His socio-economic analysis of the country contrasts sharply with the prevailing Afro-pessimism. While pleading for more aid to provide access to health, education and drinking water he also expresses his hope for this country, where he believes self-sufficiency in food can be achieved politically, where corruption has not ravaged the administrative machine, where there is no shortage of entrepreneurs, where women enjoy a degree of economic independence and where soil erosion has not yet reached the point of no return.

SHORT CHANGED — Africa and World Trade

by Michael Barratt Brown and Pauline Tiffen, preface by Susan George, published by Pluto Press, 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA, UK, in association with Transnational Institute, 220 pp., ISBN 0-7453-0699-3

A detailed critique of the economic strategies imposed on African countries by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which tries to demonstrate that certain partners in the world economy are more equal than others.

ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, N.Y. 10016, 200 Madison Avenue, for the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ISBN 0-19-520994-X

This work is the second in the 'Policy Research Reports' series, the objective of which is to make the results of World Bank research into development policies available to a wider audience. It details the latest situation of 29 sub-Saharan countries in terms of the impact on poverty and growth of the structural adjustment to which they were subjected in the second half of the 1980s. This report acknowledges that, while structural adjustment might function in Africa, it cannot work miracles.

THE INTERNATIONAL COURSE ORGANISER'S HANDBOOK

by R. E. V. M. Schröder, published by Swets & Zeitlinger, Lisse (Netherlands), 245 pp., ISBN 90-265-1377-1

This guide is designed for organisers of training courses for foreign students, particularly those from developing countries. All re-

levant aspects are dealt with in chronological order: from the design of the course to preparing the student to return to his country of origin. Particular attention is given to the problems caused by the variety of nationalities and cultures.

FAO Publications (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization), Viale delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy

LE DEFI DE L'AMENAGEMENT DURABLE DES FORETS

(THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF FORESTS), 1994, ISBN 92-5-202370-X

PROGRAMME DE FONDS DE PRETS RENOUVELABLES ET DE CREDIT POUR LES COMMUNAUTES DE PECHEURS

(PROGRAMME OF RENEWABLE LOANS AND CREDIT FOR FISHING COMMUNITIES), 1994, ISBN 92-5-202880-3

INTRODUCTION A L'ERGONOMIE FORESTIERE DANS LES PAYS EN DEVELOPPEMENT

(INTRODUCTION TO FOREST ERGONOMICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES), 1994 ISBN 92-5-203177-4

EXAMEN DES POLITIQUES CEREALIERES 1992/1993

(EXAMINATION OF CEREAL POLICIES 1992/1993), 1994, ISBN 92-5-203485-4

The Courier
Africa –
Caribbean –
Pacific –
European Union

Address:

Postal address
(mail only)
'The ACP-EU Courier'
Commission of the
European Communities
200, rue de la Loi
1049 Brussels
Belgium

The Courier office address (visitors)

First floor
Astrid Building
1, rue de Genève
Evere - Brussels
Belgium

Publisher

Steffen Smidt
Commission of the
European Communities
200, rue de la Loi
1049 - BRUSSELS
(Belgium)
Tel. 00-32-2-299 11 11

Director of Publications
Dominique David

Editor

Simon Horner

Production Manager

Roger De Backer

Assistant editors

Augustin Oyowe
Robert Rowe
Jeanne Remade

Associate assistant editor

Hégel Goutier

Secretariat:

Carmela Peters
Fax: 299-30-02

Circulation:

Margriet Mahy-van der Werf
(299-30-12)

Back cover:

Tourists strolling in front of the
Governor-General's residence, Nassau,
The Bahamas
(Photo The Courier)

Bahamas

