


the Courier

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union



**Social
development**

**Country report
Suriname**

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
(Federal Rep.)
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom


France
(Territorial collectivities)
Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon
(Overseas territories)
New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

Netherlands
(Overseas countries)
Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustache)
Aruba


Denmark
(Country having special relations with Denmark)
Greenland

United Kingdom
(Overseas countries and territories)
Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

THE EUROPEAN UNION



THE 70 ACP STATES




Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent
and the Grenadines
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
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Togo
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Tuvalu
Uganda
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Vanuatu
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe

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or territory.

Cover page:
The battle against poverty,
unemployment and social
disintegration: key objectives for the
first global summit for Social
Development, held in Copenhagen in
March
(The Courier)

MEETING POINT**Riccardo Petrella**


In conjunction with our Dossier on Social Development, we interviewed Riccardo Petrella who is the founder of the 'Lisbon Group'. Under his direction, the Group has just published 'Limits to Competitiveness', a hard-hitting analysis of the globalisation of the world economy. A Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, Riccardo Petrella is also head of the social research division at the European Commission. This is an important role in an influential institution, but it does not appear to limit our interviewee who spoke to us frankly and freely about the key social development issues.

pages 2 to 5**DOSSIER****Social Development**

The UN's recent Social Summit in Copenhagen, which focused on the fight against poverty, was the first of its kind to be held. But the declarations which emanated from the conference hall ended up dealing more with principles than with any concrete proposals to help people or countries in distress. Was it, therefore, a waste of time? Oddly enough, most interested observers thought not. The Courier considers some of the views expressed at the Summit, assesses the results of the discussions and examines a number of aspects of the social development agenda in more detail.

Pages 45 to 74**CULTURE and SOCIETY****FESPACO**

The 14th FESPACO, the Pan-African Festival of Cinema and Television, which was held in Ouagadougou from 25 February to 4 March, beat all previous records in terms of the number of participants (both professional and public). It also saw the involvement of South Africa for the first time. The Festival 'fringe' included the staging of the seventh International Market of African Television and Cinema (MICA), two colloquia — on the hundredth anniversary of cinema, and the participation of women on the African continent — and the opening of the African Film Library. At the end of an exciting week, Malian producer Sheik Oumar Sissoko was declared winner of the FESPACO 'Grand Prix' for his film 'Guimba'. We publish an interview with the new laureate and report on proceedings at the Festival.

Pages 81 to 84**COUNTRY REPORTS****SURINAME**

During the 1980s, Suriname took a severe battering. A military coup at the beginning of the decade was followed by a steep decline in the country's economic fortunes. Large numbers of Surinamese emigrated in search of better prospects, taking their vital skills with them. The 1990s have seen a distinct improvement on the political front with the restoration of democracy to this multi-ethnic state on the northern coast of South America. However, despite a well-educated population and a natural resource base which most ACP countries would envy, Suriname still has serious economic problems. Structural adjustment has long been discussed but reaching agreement on what this should entail in practice has proved difficult. We report on the current state of play.

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- 13. Days of remembrance for Rwanda**
- 15. Assessment of and follow-up to medicines policy in the CFA area**

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
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Riccardo Petrella Founder of the 'Lisbon Group'

'Politics has abdicated in favour of private enterprise'



The Courier

Riccardo Petrella is a lecturer at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium), where he teaches 'Society, Science and Technology' in the Faculty of Economic and Political Science. He also lectures at the College of Europe in Bruges, is Vice-Chancellor of the European University of the Environment and holds honorary doctorates from several universities and 'Ecoles Supérieures'. On top of all this, he heads the European Commission's Social Research Division. Three years ago he founded the 'Lisbon Group' whose 18 members are intellectuals and researchers in Europe, North America and Japan. Under his direction, the Group recently published a work in several languages entitled 'Limits to Competitiveness — Towards a New Social Contract!'. The Group's opinion on the internationalisation of trade is clear from this title. What is more complicated is the profusion of economic, political, historical and cultural references which the Group's researchers find to support their analysis and make it more accessible. Although Mr Petrella belongs to an institution (the Commission) which has a significant involvement in the world's political and economic choices, this has not prevented him from speaking freely to The Courier. In this interview, he seeks to communicate and interpret the social upheavals which have occurred in the wake of the economic globalisation that is taking place now that market forces dominate. It is a subject which is close to Riccardo Petrella's heart and he talks about it with warmth and passion.

■ Can one say that the book 'Limits to Competitiveness', for which you were coordinating editor, is in tune with the recent Copenhagen Summit?

— I think that would be going too far. I don't really believe one can view the Copenhagen Summit, within the global institutional framework, as something which calls into question the significance of competitiveness. The document which was approved by the Heads of State, on the contrary, gives the impression that a competitive market economy should be developed as the most effective way of solving the problems of social development in the world. It regards the proper running of the market economy and of free trade as one of the instruments which

play a decisive role in creating world wealth and combating poverty, social exclusion and under-development. My impression, therefore, is that, in the wake of Copenhagen, we are still a long way from a strategy which might begin to question the relevance of the 'competitiveness' ideology.

■ Nevertheless, some discussion did take place in Copenhagen in this area. There was even the threat of making capital flows subject to taxation as well as implied criticism of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

— It is a pity that taxation of capital movements remains just a threat and that no concrete decision was taken in this area. All the interest groups argue that

these should be taxed, but the Summit document rejected this idea. From the outset, at the first preparatory meeting, the pressure groups and NGOs that took part demanded genuine, effective and concrete action — not just words. They called for intervention on a world scale to make it possible to direct and control movements of capital. At present, such movements are totally free. They are not subject to state control and their propriety is not questioned from a social or political standpoint.

The interest groups tried to get an acknowledgement of this but it was rejected in the final document. The only Head of State who spoke about taxing the movement of capital, when he referred to the proposals made by Tobin, the winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, was the French President, François Mitterrand. But the document had already been approved by then. Nevertheless, President Mitterrand tried to restart the debate. Given that this was his final appearance at a major world political summit, I think it is to his credit that he took this position. True, mention was made in the final document that the structural adjustment policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank since the 1980s have sometimes given rise to social problems and have aggravated the social situation, and I suppose that is better than nothing. In the end, the document toned down the eulogistic self-

¹ M.I.T. Press, Boston, 1995.

proclamation of excellence on the part of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in connection with structural adjustment policies. However, when the question arose of limiting what I regard as the considerable and pernicious influence of these two institutions, making them subject to some kind of international control — that is to say for their actions to be monitored by the UN and to conform, in particular, to the policies of the ILO, FAO and UNDP — this was not done. On the contrary, the total independence of the IMF and of the World Bank was reaffirmed and the only declaration made was that better forms of cooperation ought to be set up. What it boiled down to was an acknowledgement that there are still financial management institutions not subject to any political control by the United Nations. The statement simply served to reconfirm the absolute sovereignty of the financiers. This attitude fits in both with national policies and those of European and other institutions, whereby banks should henceforth be regarded as completely independent of politics. It is even said that politics should have no real influence over central banks. The latter are independent and organise their own affairs. They pursue new policies only as a function of maintaining monetary stability, although it isn't even that really, in the absence of a single currency and given the instability of exchange rates. The central banks and world financial institutions therefore organise themselves on the basis of maintaining the present system which clearly entails continuing internationalisation of the world economy. No, to be perfectly frank, and with the greatest will in the world, I cannot see how the Copenhagen Summit can be said to have introduced strategies which are different from those of market economics.

■ *In your opinion, therefore, apart from good intentions, Copenhagen was merely a talk show; a lot of 'hot air'?*

— It is a good thing that there was all this talk. It is worthwhile holding a high 'mass' like that because, in spite of everything, it does increase awareness and get things moving. Talk mobilises people. It also demonstrates that there are a huge number of interested parties and groups

who argue with one another, make decisions and who can provide solutions. No, I would not throw the baby out with the bath water. I think these kind of events are very important, but it should not be said that they automatically make significant advances possible — particularly if one examines them in any depth. The Summit again highlighted a general trend in cultural and conceptual thinking which I think is very dangerous: namely the view that social development is a matter for the individual. The English term for this is 'empowerment', a word which I heard used by virtually all the heads of state and government. Of the 130 world leaders who spoke, at least 100 of them referred to 'individual empowerment' or 'self-empowerment'. This is a very bad idea: to leave the solution to the individual and to see the task of the state and society as only that of 'empowering the people'. It may seem like sound ideology, but what it boils down to is seeing it as 'your' problem or 'my' problem — an issue for the individual, with no help from others to solve the actual social problem. From now on, we must not expect anything from the international community. Each person must achieve self-empowerment and become competitive at home in order to compete elsewhere. The nature of current European development policy urges us to help these people become competitive. I believe that culture and the sense of community have been totally forgotten. There was no reference to the empowerment of the community. Little by little, therefore, the role of the community — the state and society — is being diluted. That concept is being transformed. We are beginning to say that the state must be reduced and that salvation does not come from that direction. I am not advocating a dictatorial state, a centralised bureaucratic state or an anti-democratic state which is opposed to freedom, but a kind of state which, in French-speaking culture, would be called the 'republican' state, such as Germany, Sweden or the United States. I believe we must not lose sight of this concept of the state which is one of general interest and for the common good.

■ *So you think that the world leaders were effectively bidding farewell to the state?*

— Yes, that is true. But it is a highly ambiguous and dangerous exercise to bid farewell to the state if it is not replaced by some other form of structure and other concepts of politics: if the route to salvation is left solely to the individual, through the idea of empowerment. Some forms of state are now dead and buried, but in their bereavement, the leaders of certain countries should not dismiss the idea of the state as a political community involving public governorship and even a certain type of world governorship. Nor must we get rid of all that was positive in the constitution of the nation-states, even if some aspects of them were very destructive. The nation state has been highly centralising, rejected the reality of other cultures and other languages, and, at one time, generated fascist and totalitarian forms. However, it also established free schooling and welfare policy.

On the other hand, one of the significant advances achieved at the Summit is to be found in the references to civic society. All the heads of state and government highlighted its role. If this is meant to replace the state, then it would be harmful. If, on the other hand, it expands it, promoting the achievement of a political community, and the idea of the general interest which is then expressed by the state in political and administrative terms, the emphasis put on civic society will, in historical terms, represent a step forward to which the Copenhagen Summit has contributed.

■ *The Lisbon Group talks about a world civic society but isn't that just part of the globalisation which is so often prejudicial to civic societies within states?*

— Possibly. As far as we are concerned, the world civic society is a fact. It has been calculated that there are approximately 450 000 interest groups and non-governmental organisations throughout the world. A very large proportion of these already have what I would call a 'globalist', planetary and internationalist outlook. They represent between 600 and 800 million members and supporters, with approximately 5 to 6 million leaders. Let me give you one specific example. *Inter Wallonie Environnement* is part of this world civic society in my opinion. It is connected with a number of other insti-

tutions in other parts of the world that are concerned about the ecology. There are also associations which confine themselves to a national dimension, of course. For example the *Federation for the Defence of the Finnish Language*. One does not conflict with the other.

■ *In your study, you speak about abandonment of the weakest. Is this not also a matter for Third-World NGOs rather than their colleagues from the North? Out of the 2000 NGOs which went to Copenhagen, how many came from the South?*

— I will talk later about the constraints of this world civic society, but I would like first to describe what it actually is. Currently it is regarded as worldwide because these 450 000 organisations are virtually the only ones to give expression to a world moral conscience. It is not the churches, be they Catholic, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist or Shinto, who give expression to the world's moral conscience. It is all these associations who are fighting for what is good and just — friendship, respect for human rights, sharing, solidarity, love, kindness and human efficiency. If there is, in fact, a world moral conscience, it is these people who nowadays give expression to it. Fortunately, globalisation does not stop at the globalisation of capital. There is a whole series of organisations which have internalised and expressed this awareness, this planetary human condition, in explicit terms. As far as I am concerned, as an expression of the world moral conscience, this world civic society is, if you like, the visible manifestation of today's 'planetary' generation of which we are all a part. We are the first 'planetary' generation in history and this world civic society represents the vanguard of the movement. The second *raison d'être* of the global civic society is that it sees itself as the voice of world social demand. We all want a world which is more just and ecologically sustainable; one where there are no more wars and where disarmament is a fact, where people can travel freely, where there are no more refugees and where minorities are no longer slaughtered. Companies are not the ones who formulate this social demand. Nor are the military or the national bureaucracies. In addition, this world civic society is important because, in certain respects, it is a

vehicle for the expression of political demands. Examples might include the proposed ecotaxes and the monitoring and control of chemical dumps, demanded by the environmentalists. It could be the outlawing of certain types of trawling because we do not want to buy tuna if catching them has caused harm to dolphins. The people are not just making demands or taking to the streets. It was they who pushed for the Rio Conference and for the Summit in Copenhagen.

However, while we are in the process of achieving a certain level of organisation, the organisations that make up this world civic society do have weaknesses. They are highly diversified and scattered whereas multinational companies are very well organised and very efficient.

■ *But would you not agree that they also suffer from a lack of ideology? The world civic society seems to be afraid of ideologies in the wake of the overthrow of communism.*

— Yes, because it is currently too fragmented. For instance, there are developmentalists and ecologists. In Rio there were no developmentalists and in Copenhagen there were few ecologists. Fortunately, there were some though, and at least the preparatory documents did not talk of the ecology as if the subject had been exhausted in Rio. There is also fragmentation among the 'revolutionaries' and those who have 'sold out' to governments and to companies. There are many people of good will working in small organisations. But to compare these with other, much larger NGOs is like comparing Burkina Faso with Germany. Provided they organise and that some of their members, such as the trades unions, do not just drift along as is the case at the moment, the groups that make up civic society can become genuine negotiating partners of the private sector and exert a significant influence over the renaissance of politics in a world where politics has abdicated in favour of private enterprise.

■ *In practice, how can a politician rein in the ideology of competition?*

— It is not my task to tell the politician what he should do to regain his

position. I am a researcher and I observe. Obviously, an analyst is seen as a person who has values. There are those who, having done the same analysis as I have, see nothing wrong in political abdication. It would be best to ask the politicians how dignity can be restored to politics.

■ *How can the market be regulated to provide better social development for mankind? In your book you stated that the means are well known, it is just that no one quite knows how to grasp the nettle.*

— At present, it is true, there is no place in the nature of globalised, privatised, deregulated, liberalised and competitive market economics for the general interest. There is only room for competitors and, in part, for big predators. How should politicians prevent the predator acting with complete disregard for the rules? Well he must not liberalise everything. He must give new meaning to the development of market economics on a world scale and not leave the controls to the private sector. In principle, politicians do have the power: it is national parliaments which enact laws and, in theory, it is the state which defines the rules of the game, which does or does not deregulate and which does or does not privatise. If it were to be said that politicians were powerless, this would be an acknowledgement that politics are totally subservient to the private sector. That is absurd. The world is currently being transformed into an open space to be conquered. The imperative is to capture the telecommunications market, or the grain markets or the car markets. In the future, we are told, there can only be four car manufacturers instead of seven, for example. Eight major telecommunications companies instead of 12.

■ *At times, it has been said that politics was warfare by other means, but isn't economics just politics by other means?*

— I am aware of this expression, but it is incorrect. I am interested not in knowing how to wage war, whether I should use guns or conquer the market, but knowing how we will live together in 25 years, when there will be 8 billion people in the world. How can we organise all these people to allow them to meet their basic requirements and fundamental

aspirations. What interests me is knowing how to organise an economy. What should the 'house' rules be? The world economy sets out the rules of the world 'house' which are required to satisfy the needs of the members of our global family. We often hear the argument; 'if I don't conquer the market, someone else will'. In other words 'si vis pacem, para bellum'. I, myself, have never witnessed peace arising from a declaration of war. Sooner or later, a peace which is no more than an absence of war will lead to war. The prevailing view is that if you want to fulfil the needs of 8 billion souls, you must wage economic war. This might eliminate your rival and exterminate 100 000 people in the process because they are not competitive but it will allow you to say to people that you can supply water to them at the lowest price. But water is free — or at least it should be.

■ *Many people think that many heads of state and government attended the Copenhagen Summit because they fear the consequences of disparities of wealth in the world. You would draw attention to the fact that civilisations have disappeared owing to fear. Isn't that a very pessimistic view?*

— On the contrary, it is very encouraging. The Lisbon Group is saying that we have to build a society on a world scale whose objective is to pool the resources of science, technology, economics, transport, telecommunications, and so on, in order to fulfil the basic aspirations of the eight billion. Otherwise, there is the fear that four billion deprived people will go for the throats of the other four billion. History demonstrates that all the civilisations that have survived, in the sense that they have overcome difficulties, are those which have taken a positive and constructive attitude towards mankind and which set themselves goals. Eliminating fatalities, cataclysms or threats were no more than means to achieving these goals. The essential thing was the goal. If you join forces with someone only because you are afraid of someone else, it will be difficult later to build together. It is necessary to have a sense of belonging to a community and of having a choice. No good can come out of mere obligation.

■ *Many decent people in the 'triad', as you describe the Europe/Japan/United*



States bloc, do indeed wish to share with countries in the South, but convince themselves that aid has hitherto been a total failure and now wonder why they should give aid to the poor.

— You have put your finger on a major problem, there, because I do not think that the perpetuation of poverty or the exclusion of certain countries is due to the inefficiency of aid. True up to the early 1980s, aid was 'tied'. Remember that it was known as 'tied aid'; that is to say that if I give you aid, you have to buy my produce, my machines, and to call my engineers in to build your motorways. That aspect must be taken into account. On the one hand aid was given out but on the other something was taken back in return. It is not purely by chance that by the second half of the 1980s, net financial transfers from the South to the North favoured the latter. You will remember that, in 1992, there was a net transfer of \$50 billion from South to North. There was a whole series of mechanisms enabling the North to benefit from aid. It is true that the imbalances have not been entirely due to people in the developed countries. You also have to take account of certain groups in the developing countries — local purchasers, exploiters, dominant classes, clans, the military and, with a few exceptions, government officials, via whom all aid travels. Because of all of these, the so-called Southern countries therefore bear a great deal of responsibility for the failure of development policies because it is a well-known fact that most aid received is converted into arms or into prestige goods. I would conclude that those with the greatest wealth and those who have achieved the greatest level of development have to join forces with those who are least developed in order, together, to

'Civic Society... If this is meant to replace the state, it is harmful. If, on the other hand, it expands it..., the emphasis given to it will, in historical terms, represent a step forward to which the Summit has contributed'

attempt to satisfy the needs of eight billion people. We have to admit our mistakes, try not to repeat past errors and reorganise the world. We cannot be content with just standing by and observing patients who are seen as terminally ill. That would be quite absurd. A country should never be regarded as terminally ill — there are always people who aspire to something. It is currently said that Africa is terminally ill but on what basis dare we say that Africa is a lost continent?

Just because you don't have purchasing power doesn't make you any less a man, woman or child. One cannot always believe that salvation or rationality lies only in market solvency. Free services are also important. Free education was set up in our countries and that is why we were able to develop, not because there was a 'viable' education market. We set up public health services, installed public transport, built roads, public gardens and forums, and it is all free. The citizen only has to pay taxes which are minuscule in proportion to the cost of these amenities. I am convinced that these are positive, formidable and enriching things. It is the market economy which makes some politicians declare that there is no longer any poverty in Great Britain, that there are only people who do not respond to the system. That is cynicism of the most destructive kind. So it is not I who am pessimistic. It is the market economy which gives grounds for hope only to the strongest, and woe betide you if you are a loser. ■

Interview by Hégel Goutier

Southern Africa

'From confrontation to dialogue and peaceful development'

This was the title of an international conference which the Friedrich Ebert Foundation organised in Bonn, from 8-10 March, to coincide with its 70th anniversary celebration. The Foundation, which was set up in 1925 in honour of the German President, Friedrich Ebert, has long been associated with the struggles in Southern Africa for freedom and justice. Its commitment to the political education of the underprivileged and to democracy explain its choice of subject for the meeting — a region where, in the eyes of many, a fragile peace has taken hold. Behind the conference's title lay a certain anxiety for that peace - and hope that the democratic processes underway in South Africa, Namibia, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe could be consolidated and that economic development could begin unimpeded.

The conference was well attended, and at a very high level, by politicians, academics, trade unionists and journalists from across Southern Africa and the Federal Republic of Germany. Only the business sector was sadly absent. And female participation was badly affected by the Social Summit in Copenhagen where most of those invited preferred to go.

Angola conflict

In a week of heightened international concern about the situation in Angola, following serious violations of the ceasefire and of the Lusaka accord, participants were pleased to see a panel convened, in which both sides in the conflict were represented (Unita's secretary of foreign affairs, *Alcides Sakala Simoes*, and Angola's deputy minister of foreign affairs, *Georges Chikoti*), to discuss 'peace-making and reconciliation in Southern Africa'. Although not billed as a forum for negotiations, the conference was viewed as providing the protagonists with useful contacts.

With them on the podium were people with first-hand experience either with armed conflict or with the organisation of democratic elections after the cessation of hostilities: *Afonso Dhlakama*, president of Renamo, *Teodata Hunguana*, a high-ranking official of Frelimo and

member of the newly elected parliament in Mozambique, *Brazao Mazula*, head of the Election Commission in Mozambique and (in the chair) Professor *G. Toetmeyer*, director of elections in Namibia.

The combatants were given to understand by many speakers that the situation in Angola was not just the concern of Angolans, but also of Southern Africa, and indeed of the continent as a whole. The war is taking a tremendous toll in human lives and impeding the region's economic development. Mines have continued to kill and maim and the economic infrastructure is relentlessly being laid waste. Although the history of the war is well known, and both Sakala and Chikoti sought to recapitulate on the efforts they had made in the search for peace, it became clear at a certain point in the discussion that the word 'democracy' meant something quite different to Unita and Renamo. Mr Sakala for, example, justified Unita's continuation of the war as the need to ensure respect for human rights, press freedom and democracy in Angola and, somewhat contradictorily, reiterated his organisation's 'acceptance of the results of the 1992 elections'. The war is continuing, he said, because of the 'intransigence' of the Angolan Government over the sharing of responsibilities. This was denied by Mr Chikoti who pointed out that Unita's appointees to the portfolios reserved for the organisation by the Govern-

ment were still welcome to take up their posts. Mr Dhlakama also appeared to nurse a grievance that, despite Renamo's concessions, Frelimo had refused to share power in Mozambique after the recent elections. The idea of a government of national unity, though not expressed, was at the back of the everyone's mind as he spoke. It was left to SADC's executive secretary, Dr *Kaire Ubuende*, to explain briefly to both men that in a democracy, there is a separation of powers between the legislature and the executive.

Although South Africa has a Government of National Union, it cannot be cited as a model, according to the Reverend *Arnold Stofile* (the ANC's treasurer and chief whip in the national assembly). South Africa, he said, operates a system which was the product of negotiations between the ANC and the white minority government before the April 1994 election — an election in which the ANC won an overwhelming majority and could govern alone. Although the system has so far proved to be a good thing for South Africa, it cannot, he argued, be 'transposed'.

Beyond this debate on democracy, the general wish was to see Unita take a leaf from Renamo's book, and the audience was pleased to hear Mr Dhlakama speak (although somewhat tongue in cheek) of Mozambique's successful transition from war to peace as being based on 'the spirit of give and take and on patience'. While saying that it was not for him to advise Unita on the course of action it should take and regretting, at the same time, Frelimo's 'winner takes all' attitude, the Renamo president pointed out that at least democracy has brought respectability to his organisation (or political party). His participation in the conference was proof of that.

The situation in Angola did not by any means dominate discussions. Admittedly, it was invoked throughout the three-day conference, being the only 'black spot' in any general or sectoral discussion about the future of Southern Africa. But the real issues at the seminar were whether, in those countries where political domination, oppression and war had given way to democratic elections,

realistic national reconciliation was possible and what would be the 'peace dividends'.

Expectations

Contrary to the generally held belief, national reconciliation in Southern Africa is not easy because of the complexity of the factors, the conference was told. Among these factors, Professor Toetemeyer pointed out, are the 'lack of compelling integrative forces', the risk of class or tribal monopoly of power and the problems of integrating former liberation forces into civil societies. There is still a danger of ethnic or racial considerations leading to civil strife. However, the priority concern at the moment should be how the majority of the people's expectations for qualitative improvements to their lives can be met and how the rule of law and democracy can be consolidated. A panel consisting of Toetemeyer, Dhlakama, Mazula, Stofile, Justice Mrs A. Msossa (chairperson of Malawi's Electoral Commission and the only high-ranking woman from Southern Africa at the conference), Eric Silwamba (Zambia's deputy minister of information) and Nghidimondjila Shoombwe (deputy secretary to the minister of regional and local government in Namibia) were asked to examine these questions. There was a consensus that the people's expectations (or demands as many put it) are modest. They are no more than the right to the basic necessities of life — food and shelter. These expectations have to be met to avoid social explosion. And if, to achieve them, affirmative actions are necessary, then Governments are duty-bound to implement such policies. The electorate, the panel further agreed, expects transparency, accountability and representativeness (the issues of gender and group representation and minority rights having still to be fully addressed as is the developing resistance to the centralisation of authority).

Regional development

These expectations, however, cannot be met if economic growth is insufficient. The poor economic performance of Southern African countries in

recent years has been due in part to the disruptive and destructive policy pursued by the apartheid regime. The new South Africa, the conference was told, recognises the terrible price these countries have had to pay for their role in the fight against apartheid, and this more than anything, influences the policy of the South African Government. 'There is a sense of indebtedness towards these countries', Professor Pieter Le Roux of the University of Western Cape, said.

South Africa's emergence on the international scene has raised hopes that its economic strength will have a positive impact on economic growth in Southern Africa. The conference, not surprisingly, could not resist focusing at length on the Republic however much the organisers and the South African representatives tried to expand the discussions. When regional issues were dealt with, they hovered around South Africa as the potential economic locomotive.

Participants, however, recognised that the Republic is, at the moment, beset with problems. After many years of apartheid and economic subjugation of the black population, the government is facing an immense task meeting their expectations, however modest these are. There is not enough money in the kitty to implement the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which is precisely aimed at 'righting the wrongs of apartheid', providing the black majority with basic necessities: food, health care and housing. South Africa, therefore, is expected in the short term to be more inward than outward looking.

Despite the shortage of funds and the imperative nature of the RDP's social objectives, ANC treasurer Arnold Stofile said that the Government had pledged to adhere to 'sensible economic management'. Every available resource will be channelled to the RDP but the Government will resist the temptation to borrow from the IMF and the World Bank.

Professor Le Roux praised this policy and urged the Government to rely on internal resources to avoid falling into the kind of debt trap in which many developing countries currently find themselves. These debts, he said, resulted from World Bank and IMF willingness to lend to

corrupt, unelected and unaccountable governments and, in his opinion, they should be cancelled. The World Bank and the IMF should bear the consequences of their own decisions, he felt. The professor was also sceptical about development aid which, he thought, induced dependency.

The issues raised here were debated at length with several speakers from the floor disagreeing with Professor Le Roux. South Africa, they contended, required enormous amounts of foreign capital and development aid to achieve its objectives. This view also emerged clearly during a panel discussion on South Africa's relationship with the European Union, which was chaired by Dieter Frisch, former Director-General for Development at the European Commission. South Africa, the conference was told, already has an aid budget from the Union which is substantially higher than that of a large number of ACP States. This aid, which was previously implemented through non-governmental organisations and which had a considerable social impact on the black population during the apartheid years, has now been placed at the disposal of the South African Government.

Although minister of trade and industry Trevor Manuel referred briefly to this assistance in his intervention, he was more concerned about trade concessions from the European Union and South Africa's request for alignment with the Lomé Convention. These were necessary not only because of South Africa's membership of the various regional organisations to which ACP Southern African countries belonged, but also to prevent the concentration of industries in the Republic to their detriment.

Most speakers thought that the case for foreign injections of capital and development aid to the South African economy was overwhelming. South African journalist Alistair Sparks, who chaired the panel discussion on the RDP and regional cooperation, accepted this, but said 'there has to be a sense of caution.' He was supported by another speaker who pointed out that South Africa could avoid borrowing heavily by taking measures to repatriate all the indigenous capital that had fled the country during apartheid.

The apartheid years, when South Africa had abundant resources, were described by Professor Le Roux as a wasted opportunity. 'Instead of investing in people', he argued, 'the Government squandered the resources in defending a system which was based on division.' He pointed out, however, that successful implementation of the RDP in South Africa could provoke a wave of immigration on a scale never before witnessed and that this could wipe out all the gains made within a short time. With a population currently estimated at 41 million, which is likely to rise to 70m by 2020, South Africa cannot afford to be an island of prosperity in a sea of misery. This is why it must develop in tandem with the other countries in the region.

This concept of interdependence and common economic destiny was a constant theme throughout the discussions. It was in this context that Mr Manuel spoke of South Africa's wish for alignment with the Lomé Convention. As to the fear of South Africa's domination, only outsiders expressed it, according to Botswana's vice-president, *Festus Mogae*. 'South Africa will play a big role just as the United States plays a big role in the world economy', he said. Everybody will not benefit to the same tune. There will be competition. 'The most important consideration', he explained, 'is that a country inside the region is better at something than one outside of it.'

Mr Sparks believes that the best way forward in regional development cooperation should be on the basis of specialisation and complementarity. South Africa's role in this regard will be crucial. It has the industrial base, not only for regional reconstruction, but also for long term economic development. It could provide capital and agricultural machinery and inputs to other countries in the region. And one area where cooperation is obviously needed is agriculture. Mr Sparks pointed out that South Africa's soil is not very suitable for farming whereas the belt running from Angola to Zambia is ideally suited for it. This belt could easily become the breadbasket of Southern Africa.

Some participants found the number of regional organisations in Southern Africa disturbing. They felt there

was a proliferation which could result in increased bureaucracy and waste of precious resources. Mr Stofile disagreed. Organisations such as SADC, the PTA and SACU, he explained, represent different levels of integration and they function efficiently. Regional integration in Southern Africa has to be evolutionary, Mr Mogae added. It would be foolish, for instance, to include countries with interminable political problems like Burundi and Rwanda in a Southern African set-up.

Industrial relations

Neither South Africa nor the region as a whole will succeed economically without industrial peace. A big question at the conference was whether the trade unions, whose role has been critical in bringing about political change, would also move away from confrontation and opposition towards cooperation, as they seek the fulfilment of the people's expectation for an improvement in their standards of living.

South African trade unions have a difficult choice to make. The country already has wages that are comparable with, if not higher than those of many newly-industrialised countries in East Asia. The point was made by several speakers that the Republic risks becoming uncompetitive because of this and might even lose some of its industries to neighbouring countries.

To discuss this and other related issues, the Foundation brought two powerful regional trade union leaders to the conference: *John Gomomo*, President of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and *Fackson Shamenda*, President of the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions (Zatu). They were joined in a panel by Dr *Lloyd Michael Sachikonye* of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Zimbabwe, *Steven Friedman* of the Centre for Policy Studies in South Africa and Dr *Albert Schunck* of the German Metalworkers Union.

The union leaders were quick to make the point that, although their organisations had been in the forefront of the struggle for freedom and democracy, the battle for social justice was far from being waged let alone won. Mr Gomomo

spoke of the vast inequalities created by apartheid in South Africa which need redressing, the continuing resistance to change by large sections of the security forces and big business, and the large-scale privatisation and trade liberalisation which, he said, were destroying jobs. Although Cosatu will not engage in 'mindless militancy', the interests of their members will remain the unions' paramount consideration.

Mr Shamanda, for his part, emphasised the need for the entrenchment of democratic institutions which would guarantee a conducive environment for free bargaining. 'There is room for cooperation' he said, 'but the initiative must also come from the other side of the table'. If sacrifices were needed in the interests of business or of the country's economy, those sacrifices have to be made by everyone — workers, ministers and businesspeople alike. As to companies abandoning South Africa for neighbouring countries because of high wages, he warned that such companies will quickly find 'the same devil waiting for them' in their new locations. There would be close cooperation between trade unions in Southern Africa.

The absence of business voices at the conference was widely regretted, for it is generally accepted that tripartite dialogue involving the government, the trade unions and private enterprise is a *sine qua non* for industrial peace in the region. This, however, is unlikely to be achieved in many countries, according to Mr Friedman, first and foremost because a large section of the workforce is outside the organised labour market and employers themselves are not organised. In South Africa, tripartite bargaining can work because the unions are strong and are more established. Unfortunately, while employers accept the principle of the redistribution of income, he said, they do not have the 'mindset for negotiations with the unions'. Mr Friedman's pessimistic assessment was that he could see nothing ahead but conflict in industrial relations in South Africa. ■

Augustin Oyowe

King Baudouin Prize awarded to TASO

Tackling Aids as a development issue

TASO, the Aids Support Organisation of Uganda, has recently been awarded the bi-annual King Baudouin International Development Prize. The award was presented to TASO Director, Noerine Kaleeba by King Albert II of the Belgians, at a ceremony in Brussels on 22 March. In its statement explaining why TASO had been chosen from the 190 nominations received, the King Baudouin Foundation said that the organisation was 'an example of solidarity, and has been a driving force in the work of Aids prevention and in assisting Aids sufferers and their families in Uganda and throughout Africa. TASO,' it continued, 'is now internationally recognised as the leading African reference point for Aids assistance.'

Uganda has been particularly badly hit by Aids. The country's first victim was diagnosed in 1982 and it is estimated that to date, 1.5 million Ugandans have been infected by the virus. The support organisation was established in 1986-87 by a small group of Aids sufferers who came together at a time when those who had contracted the disease were still effectively being ostracised from society. Mrs Kaleeba's husband Chris was himself a victim of Aids, and after his death in 1987, she and fifteen others went on to establish TASO. Twelve of the original co-founders have since succumbed to the disease.

Although all the founder members were committed Christians, it was decided from the outset that the organisation must be a non-religious, non-political organisation. 'We wanted TASO to be open to all', said Mrs Kaleeba. The organisation's relationship with the Ugandan government was also clearly defined right from the beginning. TASO is a non-governmental organisation whose aim is to develop a constructive relationship with the authorities without coming to depend entirely upon them for finance. 'We were

fortunate', Mrs Kaleeba maintained, 'in that the Ugandan government very quickly recognised how serious the AIDS problem was in the country. Their national Aids programme is headed by capable and motivated people, who help us.'

Today, TASO provides counselling for some 25 000 'clients' in seven assistance centres, each of which is linked to a hospital. These centres are based in Kampala/Mulago, Masaka, Mbarara, Rororo, Jinja, Mbale and Entebbe. The organisation's work is carried out by a staff of 250 operating on an annual budget of \$2 million. A special feature of TASO's activities is the fact that it couples medical care with psychological and social assistance.

More than just an Aids support organisation

The organisation's work is not limited to helping Aids sufferers. It also extends support to family members and indeed, to anyone who approaches it for help. In September 1990, it launched a programme of direct assistance to village communities. The focus is on obtaining cooperation from village committees who are given help by 'TASO trainers'. With this assistance, the villagers then decide for themselves on initiatives which meet their particular needs. Only communities that are prepared to accept responsibility for themselves are eligible for help from the organisation. There are certain elements that are common to every initiative, however. For example, TASO always devotes a lot of attention to familiarising people with Aids prevention measures.

The organisation is working on ways to change attitudes so that villagers are persuaded not to exclude sick and infected individuals from their midst. Communities are this encouraged to




Noerine Kaleeba, founder member and current Director of TASO. She received the prize on behalf of the organisation from King Albert II at a recent ceremony in Brussels

become closely involved in patient care as well as in identifying sufferers.

Another important part of TASO's work is in helping to improve the economic conditions in which its members live. In concrete terms, this means launching initiatives which generate local income. For example, TASO has provided a loan to a poultry farm and has also given loans for the cultivation of maize and groundnuts. The impact of the work done by the organisation clearly goes beyond the provision of care and assistance for Aids patients. This was one of the key aspects stressed by the Chairman of the Prize's selection committee, Professor M. Lechat, when he explained why the Foundation had chosen to award an international *development* prize to an Aids support organisation.

TASO rarely refers to Aids 'victims' or Aids 'sufferers', preferring to use the term 'clients'. Words such as 'disaster', 'plague' and 'epidemic' are also avoided. The organisation is similarly averse to campaigns with slogans such as 'I say NO to Aids' or 'This person will die of Aids', arguing that it is obvious that nobody has ever said 'yes' to Aids. It is also obvious to



Michael Jensen

Children at Old Mulago Hospital Kampala, one of the biggest TASO centres in Uganda

TASO that people who have contracted the virus or are suffering from the actual disease can still live highly worthwhile lives. As one of the organisation's workers observes, 'sooner or later we're all going to die. Why should we single out a specific group of people and make out that it's their own fault. It doesn't matter whose fault it was. What matters is that we continue to think and live positively.'

Clients must be ready to give as well as receive

Clients of the organisation must be prepared not just to receive help but

also to work positively, becoming involved in the work of prevention, or even learning to become counsellors or trainers themselves. And they are given a say in the organisation's most important decisions. When the World Health Organisation asked for TASO's help in testing a new drug, the clients were asked for their views first. They agreed that TASO should participate in the experimental programme provided the drug would subsequently be made available to all Ugandans should it prove effective against Aids.

Similarly, when the organisation was considering ending the practice of giving free meals to people at consultation sessions — on the grounds that this made them into passive recipients of assistance — the proposal was presented to the members themselves. After several months of debate, a consensus was reached that this practice should no longer be automatic.

The key figure in Taso's work is the counsellor. This man or woman gathers information from the local community about the medical, social and financial status of the patient and his or her family. A dossier is then compiled on each individual, thereby enabling the provision of personalised assistance. The counsellor is also ideally placed to act as a link with the local community, which can discuss all its problems with him or her. The topics discussed can cover a wide range of subjects, from emotional problems to education, moral, religious and legal matters.

It is clear from the above that TASO fulfils a genuine role in the community. Aids is the point of departure that allows all those involved to join together to think about their living conditions and how to improve them. TASO thus confronts wider development problems, while working to foster a fundamental change in people's attitudes. From a modest initiative, launched by a handful of people, it now offers a model which is admired and imitated both within Uganda and beyond.

When asked at a press conference prior to the award ceremony what impact the King Baudouin Prize would have on TASO, Mrs Kaleeba emphasised the morale boost it would give to all those involved. 'It is important to feel good in your work', she maintained. The financial boost was also extremely welcome, of course, and Mrs Kaleeba indicated that the award money of BF 4 million (approx ECU 100 000) would be used to extend TASO's work in the more remote villages of Uganda. ■

ed S.H.

Grain market liberalisation and the small scale producer in sub-Saharan Africa

by Peter Tyler*

A feature of structural adjustment policies in sub-Saharan Africa is liberalisation of the grain market. The overall benefits anticipated at the macro-economic level are tending to overshadow immediate practical difficulties facing many small-scale grain producers who no longer find an assured market at harvest for surplus grain. Recognition and alleviation of the problems associated with the transition to a free market is vital if the process is to succeed. Specifically, this means addressing rural marketing and storage issues.

For several decades, the grain trade in sub-Saharan Africa has been dominated by grain marketing parastatals. Their objectives often included price stabilisation, pricing policies designed to raise cash to finance industrialisation targets and welfare goals including the provision of cheap staple food for urban consumers. Furthermore, policy-makers believed that strategic and household food security would be better served in areas of unpredictable production by maintaining government control of prices.

Traditional methods of grain storage and marketing were either lost or became subsumed into parallel systems supplying both national and regional markets. High yielding varieties of maize were promoted as a cash crop using subsidised inputs, even in areas where production was marginally profitable or quite uneconomic. Local grain purchasing depots were provided in remote areas

leading to high distribution costs. Pan-seasonal pricing encouraged marketing in the period immediately after harvest and central storage capacity increased. Research into methods of storing grains at the producer level was not considered of economic or strategic importance and was given low priority. Nevertheless, evaluation of the effects of recent droughts has shown that the tradition of holding a proportion of the grain harvest on-farm for household food security is not lost; it remains a valid and desirable objective.

Liberalisation of grain markets arose in response to the unsustainable costs of public sector marketing. The main elements that affect grain marketing are:

- removal of pan-seasonal and pan-territorial pricing and removal of taxes on imports for key commodities;
- anti-inflation policies, including high interest rates and limits on government borrowing;
- exchange rate policies designed to correct over-valuation;
- a reduced and more clearly defined role for grain marketing parastatals; and
- allowing the private sector to operate unimpeded.

West Africa has a long tradition of free markets systems. In Ghana, for example, the profusion of small operators involved with procurement, transport and marketing of grains and other food crops is impressive. To some extent, Tanzania has led the field in East and Southern Africa as a rapid reformer, and it now has a vigorous private grain trading sector. Zimbabwe and Malawi are implementing a slower, structural approach with the governments retaining a significant marketing function. In contrast, Zambia has moved quickly to remove controls but the private sector has been unable to cope with the opportunities created due to a shortage of trading

capital. South Africa and the neighbouring economically-dependent states have yet to liberalise fully, although in all countries there is abundant evidence that the free trading process has started and is gaining momentum.

Problems facing the small-scale producer

Recent appraisal of the liberalisation process by the Natural Resources Institute in six countries (Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe) has enabled a comparison to be made and general conclusions to be drawn. The key findings have been that:

- grain market liberalisation is leading to a reduction in the physical size of the grain stocks bought and held by the parastatals and a decline in their role as providers of food security;
- the private sector is emerging to participate in the grain trade but presently seeks a quick turnover rather than engaging in inter-seasonal storage;
- the producer now often has an enforced responsibility for storage, keeping more grain for longer, and therefore assumes a much higher risk of incurring losses than was the case previously.

Examination of the problems faced by the small-scale producer with surplus maize to offer has revealed several significant changes. In the past, it made good sense not to store maize, but to sell it immediately at the time of harvest at the fixed prices, buying it back later in the lean season (often at subsidised rates). Many years experience with guaranteed prices and a guaranteed outlet has not prepared producers for free market trading.

Surprisingly, the liberalisation of grain markets reveals a certain naivety amongst the small-scale farming com-

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munity, unfamiliar with the competitive elements of price negotiation. Some reorientation, to educate farmers in commercial marketing practices, and to instil confidence, is therefore a priority. There is fear of inflation and a conservatism that opposes the new and unproven. In many areas, this is also tempered by an appreciation that the preferred type of maize for home consumption can be stored without significant loss for many months. In contrast, improved high yield varieties grown as a cash crop are more susceptible to loss by insects during storage on the farm. Consequently, they are not considered suitable for home storage and so even the possibility of holding on to stocks of hybrid maize for several months, until a more satisfactory price can be expected, is viewed with disbelief.

On the positive side, the rapid growth in small village hammer mills is impressive. Some maize that previously left the production areas for commercial milling is now stored and milled locally as required. Small mills have also proliferated in urban areas where they operate in direct competition with, and to the detriment of, the commercial roller mills.

Technical options

There are a number of options that can be followed to support small-scale producers and help them to take advantage of the opportunities for adding value to their production. Advice is needed on how, where and when to sell. Seemingly simple problems such as obtaining a grain bag or arranging transport to a market prove very difficult to resolve when cash is required in advance and the producer has none.

For many rural producers, sale may not be possible or desirable immediately after harvest, and some additional provision for storage will be needed. The options for this are extending the capacity of traditional storage, or finding temporary storage, often inside the house. Use of either method for more than a few months will require treatment of the grain with insecticide. Safe and effective pesticides must be available locally.

The concept of communal or village buildings used as a means of

providing good storage is sometimes proposed as an option. Unfortunately, management procedures for pooling grain or retaining ownership in a shared store rarely work well.


One serious consideration for the small-scale maize producer located far from market outlets is to replace maize with an alternative cash crop, perhaps of higher value and lower bulk. Where there remains strong demand for maize, a longer term option is the adoption of a variety which combines some of the high-yielding advantages with improved storage characteristics.

Government actions

Part of the enabling process requires clear and implementable production, storage and marketing guidelines for producers. These should include delineation of the geographical areas from where it is clearly uneconomic to market maize, or marketing is impracticable due to lack of all-weather roads. Alternative crops to grow should be suggested. For those wishing to increase their storage of maize, advice on appropriate technologies should be available and access to inputs ensured.

A review of the capability of the agricultural extension services is important and a post-harvest training and extension initiative will be required. Technical issues such as the evaluation of storage methods, assuring grain quality and evaluation of alternative maize varieties and other cash crops will require adaptive research.

There are several ways in which donors can support the process of liberalisation. Governments have to accept that the required policy is one focused on encouraging the successful entrepreneur and that donor assistance must be appropriate to the needs expressed. Where storage infrastructure is requested, cost-effectiveness and management capability must be evaluated before any commitment is made. Too many grain stores, constructed in accordance with previous sector policies, are empty because they are inappropriate or not financially viable. Extension services are seriously underfunded and are rarely able to address post-harvest issues effectively. In the free market, extension workers assume a more



A typical traditional granary belonging to a small-scale maize producer in Zambia. Although suitable for conserving the family's food supply, it is inadequate when surplus maize, grown as a cash crop, has to be kept until a market is found

important role in post-harvest matters. They can directly help farmers to benefit financially from their efforts by providing information on local marketing opportunities and appropriate storage techniques. Avoidance of 'distress sales' at harvest, when prices are very low, and encouraging sale of grain later in the season, as prices rise, are key objectives for successful marketing systems.

There is much to learn about the liberalisation process, its ramifications, successes and failures. The process is dynamic but the methodology is incomplete. A workshop held in Harare in October 1994 brought together key players from 12 countries to discuss progress towards liberalisation of the grain markets of the region. The participants agreed unanimously to establish and maintain collaborative links through SADC to ensure that producers, entrepreneurs and consumers are all able to benefit from grain market reform. ■ P.T.

Days of remembrance for Rwanda

On 6 April 1994 in Kigali, two missiles fired by unidentified attackers brought down a jet whose passengers included the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. This attack was the signal for the unleashing of a wave of genocide and a series of political assassinations with exceptionally far-reaching consequences: the killing of approximately one million people, essentially civilians and mostly Tutsis but also Hutu opponents, and hundreds of innocent people of other nationalities, including Belgians. The Rwandan people, together with all mankind, was deeply affected by what happened in the spring of 1994 which will forever remain engraved on their memories.

One year later, leaders of Rwandan, Rwandan/Belgian and European associations decided to mark the first anniversary of the genocide committed in Rwanda by organising a series of activities. For three days, therefore, from 7 to 9 April 1995, there were events in various places in Brussels, all of which were characterised by the theme of 'IBUKA', or remembrance ('Ibuka' means 'remember' in Kinyarwanda).

The organisers of the Memorial Days had from the beginning to exclude any input of a political nature which might lead to polemics. The aim was quite different, since it was intended for this commemorative act to be above all an expression of remembrance and contemplation against a background of discretion and correctness imposed by respect for the victims and their families. Meditation also had a place in these events, hence the organisation at the Secretariat General of the ACP Countries (there could be no more judicious a choice) of some half dozen workshops devoted particularly to analysing the mechanisms behind the tragedy and ways of overcoming the consequences in the context of a new Rwanda. In addition to an exhibition of photographs and the showing of videos of the chilling images of the genocide, there was also a cultural and artistic dimension since, in the

Country of a Thousand Hills, culture has always been invoked as a potential factor in national unity, capable of playing a decisive role in reconciliation and perhaps even solidarity between ethnic groups.

The tone and general spirit of this Memorial Day were set at the outset, on 7 April at the Botanical Centre, at a night vigil which was both sombre and dignified, despite the emotion visible on people's faces. This took place in the purest African community tradition, and it involved a rite representing a kind of mystic link between the living and the dead: at the entrance to the Botanic Centre, a white cloth (representing a shroud) had printed on it a map of Rwanda and those attending the ceremonies placed a handful of earth or a spray of flowers on it. This symbolic gesture was also intended as a link with the state funerals organised in Kigali at the same time.

Memories of genocide: eye-witness accounts

This evening event, organised on the same day at the *Palais des Beaux-Arts* and attended by a thousand or so people, made up of Rwandan community representatives and all those who wanted to bear witness to the suffering of the victims of the Rwandan tragedy, was undoubtedly the most emotional part of the commemorative events. Gasana Ndobu from the CRDDR (Committee for the Respect of Human Rights and Democracy in Rwanda) who was the organiser of the Ibuka Days, and Pierre Galand from the CNCD (National Development Cooperation Centre) began by clarifying the structure and significance of the gathering: 'This evening', said Mr Ndobu, 'it is above all the thoughts of the victims which haunt us at this unusual commemoration... This is the first time we have shaken off the yoke of solitude so as to share our grief solemnly with others; only today, surrounded by all our friends throughout the world and in harmony with all the families affected by this tragedy in Rwanda, are we able to attempt to speak the unspeakable, to join

hands, to support each other and to allow our hearts to speak for us...' He then handed over to those who had physically experienced the tragedy and who have been able to overcome the horror of remembering in order to attempt to utter the unutterable and, with exemplary courage, give an account to the world. Who, that evening, was not deeply moved after listening to the words of Mathilde. This young Rwandan, having witnessed the murder of her entire family, was buried alive with them on 18 May 1994 in Kigali. On the brink of death, she was saved by the intervention of a neighbour.

As for Jean Baptiste, a former school teacher who also survived the massacres, his emotional account had the advantage of giving concrete expression to the experience of ethnic discrimination, humiliation and marginalisation suffered by members of the Tutsi minority over the last 30 years. However, the commemorative events were not intended only for the victims of the 1994 Rwandan tragedy to speak out. In fact, in solidarity with them were representatives from the Armenian and Jewish communities that have also suffered genocide in the past — acts which have marked the history of the 20th century. They attended as fellow witnesses, demonstrating the universal nature of the challenge summed up in the phrase 'Never again'.

The evening of remembrance was followed by a torch-light procession in the same serene and tranquil mould, without politicking, from the *Palais des Beaux-Arts* to the *Palais de Justice*. This was reminiscent of the marches towards death which preceded the massacres and underlined the fact that justice must be done.

Meditation workshops

The Days of Remembrance for Rwanda were, as mentioned, an occasion for meditation, within the context of workshops, on subjects such as 'The reconstruction of Rwanda: the role and responsibility of the NGOs', 'Intellectuals and the Media', 'Post-genocidal trauma', 'Justice', etc.

The 'Intellectuals and the Media' workshop was the occasion for a discussion involving journalists representing the Belgian, European and African press on the

one hand and specialists from Belgian, European, Rwandan and African academic circles on the other. This workshop generated both critical and forward-looking opinions. Particular topics for discussion were the state of isolation of the Rwandan press, the 'exclusion' of African intellectuals in TV debates concentrating on Africa, inter-university cooperation and the need to set up exchange structures which could contribute to the establishment of research centres in ACP countries.

Why does the European media virtually always call on researchers and specialists in the wake of catastrophes and not beforehand, at a time when their preventive role could have been of use? What have the sociologists been doing and where are the books describing the history of Rwanda over the last 30 years? How can we bridge the gulf which exists between the information received and the ability to react to it positively?... This type of question cropped up again and again in the debates and prompted the participants to make recommendations aimed at defining and rigorously applying a code of ethics and duty relating to the profession of journalist. In this field as in others, EU/ACP cooperation could certainly make a contribution.

What can the 'shrinks' do to help the survivors of the Rwandan tragedy? This was essentially the question which fired debate at the 'Post-genocidal trauma' workshop. In the face of the scale of the disaster (in psychological and psychiatric terms) after the genocide and given that the survivors had mostly been isolated from their individual communities (the torturer had broken into the psyche of the tortured), any therapeutic approach has to attempt to relocate the patient, that is to say the survivor, back in the dynamic current of his forebears and descendants in order to restore 'self-esteem'. Moreover, those involved (mental-health professionals, including two psychiatrists, a psychologist and a nurse) emphasised the need to set up the appropriate therapeutic techniques within the framework of the aid given to the survivors. These techniques should take into account the underlying cultural fabric of Rwanda including traditional methods of treatment which have proved their worth throughout Africa. A notable example comes from Senegal, where story-

telling and narrative techniques, supported by tom-toms, song and dance, enable the individual to rejoin his group, the aim being to set 'thoughts' in motion and to permit free discussion.

At this stage, 'group resources are of paramount importance given the burden of trauma and grief'. The participants unanimously acknowledged the importance of ongoing discussion groups as a therapeutic means enabling the survivor to recover and to resume his place with respect to the other members of the community. They also drew attention to the danger of doing 'anything rather than nothing' just because this is an emergency (thought here turns to some NGOs which are involved in Rwanda) without taking into account the fundamental rules of respect for human dignity, intrinsic human values and cultural and social organisation.

It was possible for a relevant and effective exchange of views to take place, with the audience made up, *inter alia*, of social communicators and mental-health professionals, most of whom had recent experience of work in Rwanda or who had been personally affected by the tragedy. Finally, the professionals meeting at the workshop paid tribute to the organisers of the Days of Remembrance for their initiatives which were in themselves very therapeutic. They went on to call for the organisation in the near future of a colloquium devoted to the huge subject of the traumatic after-effects of the genocide. This call was echoed by many of the participants of the other workshops when the whole group subsequently assembled in plenary to present their conclusions. This final session was attended by Berhane Ghebray, Secretary General of the ACP Group.

The evening of artistic events on 8 April made it possible, by means of the sombre but moving performances of a group of Rwandan artists working in Brussels (Amarabe, Cecile Kayirebwa, Imena, Imitali, Isamaza...), to appreciate the progressive inroads of the memory of the genocide into the content and form of contemporary Rwandan art. Appropriate songs and poems punctuated this cultural evening which gave young Rwandan art students, who had not had the opportunity to become acquainted with their country, the chance to pass on a message

of hope to the audience; hope for a rehabilitated and united Rwanda.

This message of hope and peace, which could be attributed to Rwandan youth everywhere, was shared by the Rwandan Ambassador, Mr Polisi, who also marked the date of 9 April symbolically in a moment of contemplation organised at the Embassy as a closing ceremony for the Memorial Days.

The lessons of IBUKA — An appeal to countries both North and South

In addition to the commemoration and what turned out to be a form of collective catharsis, it may be argued that the Days of Remembrance for Rwanda have sown seeds for the future. Whether they germinate and grow, however, will depend on both the Rwandans themselves and the international community. This is true particularly of the demand for justice that was implicit, but nonetheless clear, in every eye-witness account that was heard.

Clearly, the genocide and massacres in Rwanda are a challenge whose scale is of concern to all mankind. The fate of future generations will depend largely on the ability of countries in the South and the North effectively to prevent further human catastrophes on this scale. This challenge obviously requires both sides to listen to and acknowledge each other, this being the only way they will be able to understand the aspirations and deep-seated concerns of our respective peoples. There must also be active EU/ACP solidarity which is capable of being sustained during a crisis.

This presupposes commitment, and concrete acts of sympathy and courage on all sides whenever the integrity or dignity of any population, individual or group is directly under threat. This is perhaps the most important lesson to be learnt from these Days of Remembrance for Rwanda. ■

Massamba Mboup *

* Trainee with DG VIII (Development).

Devaluation one year on

Assessment of and follow-up to medicines policy in the CFA area

In Abidjan, in March 1994, the Health Ministers of the 14 countries making up the franc area adopted a new medicines policy to counteract the worrying effects of the devaluation of the CFA franc. One year later, the ministers met again in Brussels to discuss the initial results and to examine how they should follow up the measures implemented.

The scene is the Borschette Centre in Brussels. The afternoon is drawing to a close and the atmosphere is expectant. All are waiting: experts, advisers, sponsors, industrial representatives, members of professional associations and other journalists. In a room next door, *in camera*, the Health Ministers of the 14 countries of the franc area, together with six associated African countries¹, are, after considering the experts' report, agreeing the common provisions to be advocated in respect of medicines policy for the coming years. This meeting, supported by the European Commission, is the second of its type. The first was held last year in Côte d'Ivoire at the initiative of its Health and Social Affairs Minister, Maurice Kajou Guikahué.

It must be said that the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc which affected the 14 countries was a cause of great concern both for them and for the international community, in terms of its social consequences and particularly as regards the health of the various populations. In these countries, 90% of medicines come from abroad, mainly from the French pharmaceutical industry, and a 50% devaluation of the currency thus signified a doubling of the prices of medicines. The

fears will be all the better understood when one considers that medicines were not readily available to the great majority of the population even before devaluation.

Promoting generic medicines


At the Abidjan meeting, the ministers undertook to implement immediate short-term measures. The main one was a firm undertaking, as part of a policy resolutely aimed at procuring essential medicines, to limit imports to a small number of medicines with which 90% of illnesses can be treated. In this context, the promotion of generic medicines² was undeniably the best approach since such

² When a medicine has been invented, it is protected for 20 years. Once this period of time has passed, the product falls into the public domain and may be copied. This copy is known as the generic medicine

products are, on average, sold at a price three to four times lower than the original 'branded' product.

This measure would require two things: first, the development of qualitative control of the medicines (many of which are of doubtful quality) and, second, the systematic implementation of open or closed international tender procedures.

The promotion of generic medicines in the private sector would also be encouraged. Of course, such products have already been introduced in the private health field but they are not particularly widely used — a legacy of the link with France, where generic medicines account for only 3% of those marketed in the private sector. In order to reverse this trend, one of the key concerns was to encourage pharmacies by holding out the prospect of higher profit margins. As the margin tends to be proportional to the wholesale cost of the medicine, the lower



¹ Madagascar, Mauritania, Burundi, Guinea, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

prices of generic products work against the interests of pharmacists. The meeting agreed that this proportionality needed to be ended.

For the longer term, the 14 ministers recommended a policy of increasing public awareness and information about the use of generic medicines. Efforts were also to be made to develop competitive local production, particularly through lower import taxes on the raw materials required for manufacturing medicines. Finally, regional cooperation in the sphere of information (as to procurement sources, purchase prices, etc.) was to be implemented.


This new medicines policy received the financial and institutional backing of sponsors such as the European Union, the World Bank, WHO and UNICEF.

Avoiding the worst

In the year that has passed since the Abidjan meeting the main achievement has undoubtedly been to avoid the worst. Although situations vary from country to country, it can be confirmed that imports of medicines have fallen in value by about 30%, representing a reduction of approximately 22% in volume.

Many things have happened over the course of the year and numerous measures have been taken. However, it has primarily been the fixing of price scales and the promotion of generic medicines that has enabled the rise in medicine prices to be limited: to 70% for the private sector and to a relatively significant degree for the public sector (although a concrete figure is not currently available).

As regards fixing of price scales in the private sector, there have been three types of initiative. There was a reduction in wholesale and retail distribution margins for pharmaceutical specialities, reflected by an average drop in multiplying factors of between 10% and 15%. Temporary price-freezing or price-limiting measures were also brought in, offset by subsidies in three countries (Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal). Finally, margin figures in excess of



those authorised for pharmaceutical specialities were applied in respect of extremely rare generic medicines.

As for the public sector, only minimal measures have been taken relating to price scales. Only those countries where procurement centres were performing to a high level froze prices at 1993 levels.

The promotion of generic medicines was one of the key things to come out of the Abidjan meeting. The first priority was to alleviate the problem of regulation, since the countries in question have relatively weak legislative and regulatory structures. This was done and measures were effectively taken both to simplify registration procedures and to grant substitution permits to pharmacists. This was the case in most countries. Provisions regarding information intended for those using and prescribing medicines were also made more specific.

Generic medicines were certainly promoted, but they also had to be accepted. Public-sector results are by far the most significant given the ease of replacement of purchases by mutual agreement through greater recourse to the tender procedure. Against this background, a number of purchasing centres have been reorganised (for example, in Côte d'Ivoire), whilst others have been set up (Central African Republic and Burkina Faso). At the same time, those which were not operating were dismantled (Ca-

meroon). In the private sector, on the other hand, the tender procedure is still a rarity since only wholesalers from Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Togo and Senegal have given it a try. In addition, of all the countries, it is only in Niger, Mali and Equatorial Guinea that the market share of generic medicines in the private sector has reached even the modest level of 20%.

Local production is still a problem. No new units have been set up, except for a repackaging plant in Côte d'Ivoire and a small manufacturing plant in Chad. The few increases in production volumes which have been recorded (relatively small and highly variable as between countries) are in countries where there is a branch of a foreign pharmaceutical industry. As for domestic production, any improvement is marginal and it is not possible to say with certainty that true competition will result. A further issue of concern relates to the rules governing new entrants to the market. Other than in Niger and Mali, these remain poorly developed.

A need to maintain progress

Although the results mentioned above are encouraging, on the whole, it should nonetheless be recognised that the reduction in imports has meant reduced accessibility to and availability of medicines for the people of the CFA franc zone

countries. The new medicines policy must therefore be supported and its measures made more far-reaching. The priorities identified by the ministers at the end of the Brussels meeting go some way towards this.

The first priority is to increase monitoring of the quality of medicines. Although invitations to tender are well developed, particularly in the public sector, they do not always take into account product quality. This also entails better knowledge of the market.

A second priority is, naturally, to accelerate the introduction of essential generic medicines in the private sector. To this end, there must be a consolidation of distribution-margin systems in order to provide suitable incentives. Alternatively, generic medicines must be promoted as the primary element in the campaign against the parallel market for medicines. Their promotion and accessibility in the private sector are in fact essential to counter the marketing and use of sub-standard medicines.

A third priority concerns the evolution of medicine prescription and dispensing practices. The main recommendation in this respect is to set up a graded list of essential medicines and to inform and educate people about the dangers of medicine abuse.

A final priority relates to the promotion of domestic pharmaceutical production. It has been decided to make the year 2000 the target date by which the bulk of domestic requirements will be met from local production. The focus will be on highlighting the profitability and quality of such domestic manufacturing.

In order to achieve these objectives, the health ministers of the 14 countries and their counterparts in associated countries demonstrated a genuine desire to strengthen regional cooperation. The results one year after implementation of the new medicines policy are still uneven between the various countries and it is essential that measures be harmonised. It would also undoubtedly be desirable for this reform not to be limited only to medicines policy but generally to tackle the various facets of the

The viewpoint of French industry

Before devaluation, 90% of medicines in the franc area were imported. The French pharmaceutical industry had a virtual monopoly of this market. The situation has changed substantially and it is evident that recent competition offered by the promotion of generic medicines and related tender procedures will enable the market to develop further in the future. Mr B. Lemoine, Managing Director of the SNIP (National Association of Pharmaceutical Industries) gives us his opinion.

■ *Did devaluation of the CFA franc have knock-on effects for the French pharmaceutical industry?*

— The devaluation of the CFA franc undoubtedly had an effect on the French pharmaceutical industry which operates in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. The industry had approximately 80% of the pharmaceutical market in these countries, which was obviously a substantial figure, but this has been very significantly reduced, to approximately 15% to 20% in value terms. However, industries operating in this area have traditionally wanted and still are keen to develop partnerships with our friends in Africa which go well beyond simply supplying medicines.

So, yes, we were affected but we regard our role, as representatives of the French pharmaceutical industry in Africa, as being one of making available those medical treatments which are necessary to treat disease in those countries. We also see ourselves as working in partnership with public health authorities in the field of training, control mechanisms and diverse types of exchange.

■ *How do you see this role developing given the new policy implemented by*

these countries, particularly in the promotion of generic medicines?

— There are acute health problems in many regions of the world and particularly in Africa. The French pharmaceutical industry has a decisive role to play there and will continue to have such a role although it will adapt, as demonstrated over the last few months, particularly by lowering the prices of its medicines and adapting them to the new conditions brought about by devaluation. We are also developing a new policy in respect of generic medicines which meets the requirements of the people in these countries. The French pharmaceutical industry has therefore entered the market for generic medicines whilst continuing to develop up-to-the-minute treatments, medicines and pharmaceutical specialities as we have done in the past. This complements the partnership we would like to have with our friends in Africa.

■ *Do you have any fears concerning the new competition, particularly from countries in Asia and Eastern Europe?*

— Healthy competition, that is to say competition based on the same criteria, the same manufacturing standards, the same respect for people, health and the safety of medicines, is not something we see as a cause for concern. It is quite normal. On the other hand, if a type of competition were to develop which in some way eluded the strict procedures which make it possible to protect African populations against imports of medicines which are not controlled or insufficiently controlled, we would then naturally ask our African partners to put a stop to it and to be more vigilant in this respect.

health sector, such as education, access to pharmacies and water purification.


In this context, although some things were already happening before devaluation of the CFA franc, the latter did

act as an additional catalyst in accelerating restructuring of the public health sector. That can only be for the good. ■

T.G.

Suriname

A continuing saga of structural adjustment



The Courier

'Suriname is one of those places you only hear about when things go wrong.' This statement by an American on the plane to Paramaribo seemed jarring and perhaps a little unfair. But when one pauses to consider how this South American country has impinged on the consciousness of the average European (outside the Netherlands) over the last two and a half decades, it is clear that there is more than a grain of truth in this harsh observation. In the 1980s, Suriname cropped up from time to time on the main news bulletins and in the international pages of newspapers for

all the wrong reasons — a military coup in 1980, media censorship, the killing of 15 opposition leaders in 1982, a guerilla war which began in 1986 and a precipitous economic decline which saw tens of thousands of Surinamese emigrate in search of better opportunities. For most of the 1990s, the country's international profile has been much more low key, reflecting Suriname's new-found stability and a far less fertile environment for those seeking lurid headlines.

Suriname, of course, is not unique in only making the front pages when things go wrong. Indeed, such is the effect of the modern media that, arguably, humankind's knowledge of the political geography of small countries at any particular point in time is directly proportional to the misery being endured by the people of the territory concerned. Most of us would find it a lot easier to pinpoint Bosnia or Rwanda on a map than say Brunei or Costa Rica!

So while it may seem frustrating for those keen to extol the virtues of Suriname, the adage 'no news is good news' is more likely to be applicable at least when it comes to the attentions of the global media. The Courier, of course, is not driven by the same pressures which decree that war is a 'story' while peace is not (unless it has just broken out) or that a financial crisis is newsworthy while economic stability is uninteresting. In our Country Reports, we seek to offer readers an accurate snapshot of an ACP country at a specific moment in time, highlighting the positive aspects without neglecting the negative ones. And our investigation of Suriname reveals a mixture of the two. In that general respect, at least, it is no different from any other country, ACP or EU, that we report on.

Political equilibrium

On the positive side, the country appears to have achieved a reasonable political equilibrium after many years of turbulence and military rule. The army's coup in 1980 came as a rude shock to the citizens of this young republic (which had gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975) and although it was to be more than a decade before democracy would be fully restored, the Surinamese today seem determined to preserve and consolidate their rediscovered political pluralism. Evidence of a healthy democratic atmosphere was to be found in the openness of all those to whom The Courier spoke — government ministers, opposition leaders, business people, civil servants and union leaders.


The bad news is that the revival of Suriname's democratic fortunes has not yet been accompanied by a significant

improvement in economic performance. To an outsider, the scale of the country's economic difficulties is both perplexing and frustrating. Here is a nation which, unlike many of its ACP partners, is rich in natural resources. The population, though small at just over 400.000, is well educated. Paramaribo shows some signs of wear but was obviously a reasonably prosperous place in the recent past. So what has gone wrong and what can be done to restore the country's fortunes?

There is a widespread belief that most of Suriname's economic woes are attributable to macro-economic imbalances which are curable. In other words, the country has the potential but must take steps — some of which need to be radical and painful — to get back on track. The dreaded expression 'structural adjustment' rears its head in this context and in Suriname, one has to broach this subject with particular care. Perhaps the problem is that adjustment implies 'blaming' the authorities for past mistakes. It is generally deemed to be necessary because a government has been spending too much of the nation's wealth — and usually a lot more than it actually has access to, resulting in growing indebtedness. It may have allowed the civil service to become bloated so that state revenues end up being spent on salaries rather than on infrastructure and social investments. It may have sought in the past to control the 'commanding heights' of the economy through intervention and nationalisation only to discover that, without meaningful competition, the new state enterprises have turned into white elephants. National pride may have induced the authorities to defend an indefensible exchange rate to the detriment of exports.

Large-scale emigration

Elements of most of the above can be found in present-day Suriname although they are hardly the fault of those currently in power. The years of military rule had some profound negative effects on the economy which cannot easily be reversed. There was, for example, the loss of tens of thousands of citizens through emigration (mainly to the Netherlands). Many of these were people with import-



ant skills and the result has been a weakening of the human resource base of the country. Once a person has found a new life and career abroad, it is not easy to attract him or her back even if the prospects locally have dramatically improved. One side effect of the migration trend which might be seen as positive is the growth in remittances from Surinamese living overseas to their families back home. This has been an important source of income to the country in recent years.

A second damaging effect of the military dictatorship of the 1980s was on relations with other countries including traditional aid donors. At a time when most developing nations could rely on support from one or other side of the Iron Curtain, irrespective of the regime that was in power, Suriname does not seem to have benefited particularly from this. It

Paramaribo shows some signs of wear but was obviously a reasonably prosperous place in the recent past

may be that they were unlucky in having The Netherlands as their main partner in the North. The former metropolitan power, with its liberal policies and strong commitment to human rights, reacted strongly to events in Suriname, suspending the substantial aid programme that had been agreed at the time of independence and was still being implemented. The country's geographical position may also have had something to do with it. While the United States has an obvious interest in events within its own hemisphere, Suriname was not of particular strategic interest to either of the main Cold War protagonists. Today, it is probably true to say that all small developing countries have to contend with the possibility of losing



The Courier

Wide rivers and encroaching seas add up to high infrastructure costs

coastal area habitable and cultivable. This vital infrastructure is, needless to say, expensive to maintain.

While structural adjustment may not be a panacea for all the nation's ills, there is a general recognition that certain fundamental changes to the economy are needed to set Suriname back on the road to recovery. Government ministers acknowledge this fact as much as external advisers but find themselves seriously constrained when it comes to taking the key decisions. One of the most important constraints is to be found in the country's unique ethnic composition which is reflected in the political system.

Diverse population

For more information on the background to Suriname's heterogeneous population, we turned to renowned local historian Dr A. Loor. He explained how the country had experienced waves of settlement at different times during its colonial history. It began with European settlers and the forced migration of Africans brought over as slaves to work the plantations. Their descendants are known as Creoles. A number of these early slaves succeeded in escaping to the interior where they were able to re-establish a traditional village lifestyle. These people (the Bush Negroes) successfully concluded a peace treaty with the colonial authorities in 1760. In the mid-19th century a group of adherents to the Dutch Reformed Church arrived to cultivate the land (without slaves), escaping recession and starvation in Europe. Following the abolition of slavery, it was the turn of indentured labourers brought in from Hong Kong, Macao and 'British' India. Although on limited term contracts, usually for five years, many of these people stayed on to make Suriname their permanent home. The descendants of the last-mentioned group are known today as the 'Hindustanis'. Finally the years between 1890 and 1939 saw the arrival of some 30 000 immigrants from the Dutch East Indies (the Javanese). Add to all of this the indigenous inhabitants (the Amerindians), and the



The Courier

out financially if they stray from the path of democracy and human rights, but in the 1980s, Suriname was something of an exception in having such treatment meted out to it.

A third element is the weakness of certain infrastructures. This is related to the small size of Suriname's population and its associated weak tax base. It is all very well being rich in resources but you need people and cash to exploit these and in simple terms, there are not enough Surinamese to do this effectively. Despite the fact that the majority of the people are concentrated in the coastal strip, the country struggles even to maintain good east-west links centred on the capital. The coastal area is divided into segments by a number of very wide rivers several of which are too expensive to bridge. Goods tend to be transported by sea while people and vehicles have to rely on ferry services which are often erratic. During The Courier's visit, a crucial car ferry service linking the rice growing areas around Nickerie with Paramaribo was out of action although it was possible for foot passengers to make the crossing. Connections with neighbouring Guyana and French Guyana are constrained by similar problems and this presents some formidable challenges for entrepreneurs keen to develop intra-regional trade. The country also has an extensive system of dykes and polders designed to hold back the sea and keep the

result is one of the most ethnically diverse nations in the world.

Dr Loor insists that there is a distinct Surinamese identity (the local lingua franca, Sranang Tongo, is evidence of this), but he also acknowledges that each group has retained significant elements of its previous culture. Suriname, therefore, is not yet a genuine 'melting pot'. This is reflected in the party structures, which tend to be ethnically based, and this obviously has consequences in the field of policy making. While one should not exaggerate the fact that there are divisions — the current four-party governing coalition even presented a common list to the voters at the last election — the organisation of politics along ethnic lines means that those in power are not necessarily natural 'bedfellows' in ideological terms. As President Venetiaan himself acknowledged when he spoke to The Courier, the need for widespread consultation before agreement can be reached on proposals within government inevitably slows down the decision-making process. Measures likely to have an adverse effect on a particular ethnic group are especially difficult to push through and this causes real difficulties in a society where different groups have traditionally performed different economic roles. For example, the effect of any measures aimed at the important rice-growing sector will be felt mainly by the

Hindustani community. Action targeted at organised labour and the trade unions will tend to impinge most heavily on the Creoles.

The positive aspect of this is that Suriname has a broadly representative administration at present (even if it is doing badly in the opinion polls), which must be a good thing while memories of military rule and internal strife remain so fresh. It is surely better to fight one's battles round a negotiating table. This is perhaps an aspect which outsiders do not fully appreciate when they criticise Suriname for its apparent slow progress on the economic front.

The result, however, is that while the government has made a broad commitment to structural adjustment, it has not yet advanced very far down this particular road. The situation has been complicated by an extreme reluctance to bring in the IMF, the traditional 'overseer' of structural adjustment processes. Suriname is no different from other countries in being less than enthusiastic about 'inviting' the Fund to help with an SAP. Their judgments and prescriptions are often harsh and not everyone is convinced, on the basis of other countries' experience, that they offer the best 'cure'. What makes Suriname different, however, is the fact that they have held out much longer than most against IMF involvement. The story of structural adjustment in Suriname — which might more appropriately be termed a 'saga' — could fill several volumes. It began in the late 1980s after the first attempt to restore democracy which culminated in the 'telephone coup' of December 1990. The European Commission was closely involved at this stage in its novel role as proposed monitor of the structural adjustment process. The process was suspended during the brief spell of military rule in 1990/91 before being resumed following the election of the Venetiaan government. Unable to reach agreement with the authorities, the Commission subsequently withdrew from its intended role although it continued to play a part in Suriname's development through the regular Lomé Convention arrangements. At this stage, the government turned to the Warwick Research Institute



of the UK for help in drawing up and supervising the SAP.

When one considers the ideological background to structural adjustment (freeing up markets, privatising, reducing the state's involvement in the economy etc.) Suriname's decision to seek assistance from a 'private' source in the implementation of its programme has a rather satisfying logic. After all, if a key purpose of the exercise is to 'roll back the frontiers of the state' then why should the programme itself be exempt. IMF officials after all, are merely civil servants appointed to carry out the collective will of governments. The trouble is that in the real world, the Fund has the kind of influence that no private institute, however respected, is likely to be able to match. At a time when donor support is increasingly being linked to the implementation of fundamental changes in domestic economies, the 'cachet' of the IMF can be extremely important. In the case of Suriname, the Netherlands, which is the key donor, has made it clear that balance of payments support will only be resumed once a fully-fledged and convincing SAP is up and running.

Ready to talk to IMF

To be fair to the current government, progress towards structural adjustment has been speeded up, even if, to outsiders, it still appears frustratingly slow. R. Assen, who is the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation (and National Authorising Officer for Lomé Convention purposes) told The Courier of plans to 'strengthen the public service' in the process of which 'a lot of civil servants will be transferred to other productive

A bank in Paramaribo
Progress on the structural adjustment
front has speeded up but there is still a
long way to go

activities.' He also emphasised the government's commitment to privatisation. The most significant development is that the authorities are ready to talk to the IMF. Ministers appear to accept the need to have, at the very least, the Fund's seal of approval, even if it is not officially involved in drawing up structural adjustment measures.


In all of this, external advisers need to be conscious of the domestic political pressures in Suriname. Towards the end of 1994, the country saw a series of demonstrations and damaging strikes, illustrating the difficulties of implementing even modest reforms which have an adverse effect on certain sections of the population. Could it be that in order to consolidate democracy, there is a need to tread softly on economic restructuring? Conventional wisdom is that democracy and economic progress go hand in hand but there may be an argument against having too much economic upheaval while democracy remains fragile. On the other hand, economic instability is in itself a destabilising factor if it is not tackled speedily. It is an unenviable dilemma for the government and one which cannot be left unresolved for too much longer. ■

Simon Horner

President Ronald Venetiaan

'Economics difficulties are no reason to put democracy in the freezer'

Suriname has had a rough ride in recent times. Military coups in 1980 and again (briefly) in 1990 administered severe shocks to the body politic, while the country's economic performance has been less than impressive. The good news is that democracy is back. At elections in May 1991, civilian government was restored and Ronald Venetiaan took over the Presidency at the head of a four-party coalition. The bad news is that the economy is still struggling. In an interview with The Courier, President Venetiaan explained the difficulties facing his government as it seeks to restore Suriname's economic fortunes and consolidate the democratic system. We began by asking him about the economic challenges, and whether he could see 'light at the end of the tunnel'.



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— I think I may say, as a result of what we have been doing in recent years, that the business sector, and especially the part that is involved in production for export, has moved from a bad situation to more favourable conditions. Our main challenge is to ensure that we have enough export-oriented production to earn sufficient foreign currency and, of course, that the effects of these increased activities are felt in other areas such as the social sectors and those that are not direct foreign currency earners. Here in Suriname, we have some sectors which have been active in the export field for many years. We have the bauxite/alumina industry, rice production and bananas, although the last-mentioned does have some problems. We also have the forestry sector, where we are preparing to step up activities, and mining of both gold and natural stone, not to mention eco-tourism. So there are possibilities in production and exports and I think that, with these in mind, we may say that we can 'see the light'.

■ *On structural adjustment, which is evidently a sensitive issue here, what measures have been and should be taken with a view to adjusting the Suriname economy?*

— We have taken quite a number of measures already and I think we should recognise that there are still more to be taken, for example, in increasing the taxation base. We also have to look at taking people from the government service into the productive sector, and at the very important task of stabilising the exchange rate. According to the specialists, that is related to the amount of Surinamese money in circulation. So the issues before us, and what we have to do, are now clear but, of course, implementation is something else. That causes problems because the social costs are very high.

I think that our main target for the coming year must be to stabilise the exchange rate because until you do that,

you cannot come to grips with development. You think you are getting nearer to the goal then, all of a sudden, the posts move because the exchange rate tumbles. Keeping control on the amount of money in circulation is therefore important. Another priority for this year is to increase government income in terms of both foreign exchange and local currency through taxes.

■ *You mention the social costs of adjustment. Given that you are a democracy, does that not pose difficulties in that you have to have an eye to the next election.*

— The democratic system creates difficulties in two ways. First, as you point out, you have to keep an eye on the next election. Second, and perhaps more important, before you can begin implementing certain measures, you have to work through the whole democratic structure. For some countries trying to undertake

adjustment that may be an even greater problem. But let me say straight away that these difficulties are no reason for us to put democracy in the freezer. Some people say you should start with economic adjustment and then, once growth is achieved, bring back democracy. We have always said that for us, democracy is a precondition for development and a sound economy. We recognise the difficulties, but democracy is a high priority for us.

■ *Looking specifically at the forestry issue, which you mentioned earlier, Suriname is obviously hoping to earn significant amounts from timber export operations. You are currently negotiating with some Asian logging firms. Are you concerned about possible environmental effects, given what has happened in other parts of the world, and how would you propose to tackle this question?*

— We know that concern has been expressed. I would not say that we in the Government are concerned, but we certainly have to keep a watchful eye on the issue. There is always a danger of mishaps in the area of forestry activity. So it is very important for us to work with the companies in a way that convinces them of our commitment to sustainable exploitation. This doesn't just mean not cutting down all the trees; it also involves not killing the life that is in the forest, although of course, every tree you take away brings some changes. But remember that we have been involved in forestry activities for a long time and 95% of the Suriname forest is still there. This shows the sensible way Suriname has dealt with the issue up to now. So we believe that with what we have learned in the past and, eventually with a suitable level of support from international and regional organisations and friendly countries, we will be able to work with these logging companies in the right way.

Of course, it is not only forestry activity that can pose a threat to the ecology. There is also mining. You have to cut down trees to mine and there are other aspects as well such as the danger of chemical pollution at the processing stage. So in both forestry and in the mining of gold and bauxite, we are prepared, with support from abroad, to ensure that things are done properly.

■ *One issue which seems to be cropping up more and more, in both developing and developed countries, is privatisation. It doesn't seem to be a burning question here. Do you have any privatisation plans and if so, how far would you anticipate going?*

— As you know, every time there is a new administration, it presents a new programme setting out the policies of the governing coalition, and privatisation is in our programme. I believe that, together with new forms of tax, certain privatisation activities will have to be implemented.

■ *What sectors are you talking about here?*

— Well among the government-owned companies, there are some that are successful and others that have been having negative results. In the first place, we will be looking at those with negative results to see if the private sector can be brought in to run things better. Of course, it is not easy to push proposals through in this area. There is resistance from some quarters — the workers union and certain parts of the coalition will be upset. But we have had some interest, for example, in a state company in the forestry and wood processing sector.

We are also preparing to make government land available — for people who want to work it, not for speculators. Today, if a company wants to build a factory for production, they have to rent the land. So we plan to make it possible to sell government land. This measure is also seen as a way of taking money out of the system which is part of our currency stabilisation strategy.

■ *Moving on to political issues, are you happy that the democratic system is now well-founded after the problems in the last decade?*

— We had tremendous difficulties in the 1980s: a bad situation which I am sure you know all about, and I think that many people who were not particularly aware of the problems of dictatorships and military rule have now learned about them. Together we pooled our

efforts and worked to a point where we could restore democracy. We are very happy about that and particularly happy that it could be achieved without any major calamities. It was difficult and dangerous but we were fortunate that we got back to democracy without violence or intervention from outside.

Now we have the opportunity to democratise further. I think that alertness is very important here because, while today's problems are seen as being mainly economic ones, we need to keep a watchful eye on the danger that things deteriorate on the democracy front. I am not saying that democracy is weak here but we have to see that it becomes stronger and stronger. You have been here some days; you can see that we have a free press and Parliament. The opposition is free to criticise? You know these things are in place. The judges are also independent. If they rule against a government decision, there is no problem with that. As for the situation with our army, we have to work very hard on that point because the period of dictatorship has had an influence. We have said that we need to restructure and

Aluminium produced at the Suralco plant near Paramaribo
 'We have to look at taking people from the government service into the productive sector'



The Courier



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Logging operations
'We certainly have to keep a watchful eye'

transform the army to work with democracy and serve the needs of the people and the country. Because of lack of means, we haven't yet accomplished that restructuring.

In Suriname, of course, we have the same problems of banditry and crime that are developing elsewhere. Sometimes, crimes related to international activities are committed here.

■ *I presume you are referring to the drugs trade?*

— Yes. Drug-related crimes, for instance, create additional difficulties for the system: for democracy and for the economy. That means we have to work harder to preserve what we have achieved. It also means more work in restructuring the economy. There is, for example, a theory that because of drug-related money, it is more difficult to bring about a stabilisation of the exchange rate. There are amounts of money in the system and you can't explain where they come from or where they are going. This is not to say that drugs crimes are the number one issue in Suriname but the problem is there,

especially as we are on an important route between South America and Europe.

■ *Another political aspect which is interesting is the multi-party system that you have here. Eight parties are represented in Parliament. Do you think this is an advantage or a disadvantage in terms of constructing the necessary coalitions to proceed with policy initiatives?*

— I don't think there is any clear answer to that one way or the other. Our political system is there to provide for the representation of the people. And when you look at the population of Suriname, I think your conclusion should be that we have not yet reached the stage where we can work with a smaller number of parties. I think it is a good thing that the political system reflects the complicated situation in the population.

At the same time, of course, it is not so easy to work with. You have to keep an eye on what is going on in all the parts

of the coalition. Sometimes people say that the interests of one group or party are being promoted, and development is being blocked as a result. Some say that Suriname politics has an ethnic base. But if you look at politics in other countries, you see similarities. In the Netherlands, for example, they have a religious base. Having said this, we know that there are dangers when groups are organised along ethnic lines. The challenge is to move forward very cautiously, making sure that normal politics and interests do not become replaced by the race issues. But, in general, I think our political structure is a reflection of the situation in the population, and that is something that we have to work with.

■ *Finally, what do you think of Suriname's current relationship with the European Union and how do you see the relationship developing up to and beyond the year 2000?*

— I think Suriname is very close to the European Union at the moment. Of course we have very strong links with one EU country in particular — the Netherlands, and there also our bilateral relations with countries like Belgium, France and, to some extent, Germany and the UK. The Union is working towards closer political union and Suriname is aware of the fact that we should be integrating on this side of the Atlantic Ocean as well. I think that after the year 2000, it will be organisations of which Suriname is a member that will be dealing with Europe. Some may think that is a pity, because it is always more interesting to be in direct contact, but it is clear the way things are developing. It is important for Suriname to start working with this trend in mind. That is why we are looking to join Caricom. We are already a member of the Association of Caribbean States. And we are studying the consequences of the regional organisations emerging in South America. We are a Caribbean country, but we are also on the South American continent, so we have to look at all these developments and then make our choices. Already, we see a trend away from bilateral links with more dealings between one regional organisation and another. If that is the way our partners want to work, then we have to adapt to it. ■

Interview by S.H.

Rich in resources

Suriname, despite its economic difficulties, is a country which has a wealth of natural resources. It has a variety of mineral assets, notably bauxite, gold, natural stone and oil (featured separately in the article which follows). The fertile coastal plain offers good potential for agriculture, with rice and bananas currently the main products. The sea provides a potentially lucrative source of income from fishing activities. Finally, there are the trees — thousands of square kilometres of semi-tropical forest which could be exploited although such a suggestion inevitably gives rise to environmental concerns. The degree to which each of these resources is being tapped varies enormously. In this article, we examine what is currently happening in the different areas of primary production and look at how the sectors may develop in the future.

Bauxite is big business

The largest single economic activity in Suriname is bauxite mining and processing (into alumina and aluminium). In trade terms, this sector is responsible for between 50% and 60% of the country's total exports, by value, and it is therefore a crucial source of foreign exchange. Bauxite production began in the country as far back as 1916. Today, the main ore deposits being mined are around Moengo and Coeremotibo in the east and in the central region. Moengo, where production began in 1970, has only limited reserves remaining but more recent discoveries in the west of the country, with proven reserves of 90 million tonnes, should ensure continuing large-scale production for another 50 years. Bauxite, however, is expected to lose its dominant place in the economy within a decade.

The industry has not always had a smooth ride. As *Abdul Jainoel*, who is Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Natural Resources explained to *The Courier*, the state of the market is heavily

influenced by global economic trends. There was a downturn towards the end of the 1970s as the world price of the commodity slipped and the problems continued during the 1980s. The world economic situation was partly to blame for this but there was also the emergence of competition in the form of new plastics which provided alternatives to aluminium.

Currently, the situation in the bauxite sector is somewhat mixed. The price of processed aluminium has been rising but alumina prices remain depressed. The devaluation of the Suriname guilder has, at least, had the effect of making local production more competitive. Mr Jainoel predicts that the country will see increased investment in the sector with new mines opening.

The bauxite industry is largely in the hands of the private sector. The biggest enterprise is the Suriname Aluminium Company (Suralco) which is a subsidiary of a large American conglomerate. It employs almost 2200 people in mining the Moengo-Coeremotibo deposits and in processing at the huge Paranam plant situated some 20 km south of Paramaribo. It also has a minority stake in a mining joint venture with Billiton (a Shell subsidiary) which provides jobs for a further 600. The company produces some two million tonnes of bauxite annually. The bulk of its production is exported as alumina but the company also operates an aluminium smelter at Paranam which produces some 60 000 tonnes of the metal each year. To put these figures in context, approximately four tonnes of bauxite is needed to produce two tonnes of alumina which is then processed into one tonne of aluminium.

When *Arnold Soerohardjo*, a manager at Suralco, spoke to *The Courier*, he expressed optimism about the potential in the west of the country. A new mining joint venture had recently been approved and the aim was for full feasibility studies to be completed by the end of 1995. He



Part of Suralco's bauxite processing plant at Paranam near Paramaribo

was also concerned, however, about the instability caused by the country's high inflation, which made forward planning more difficult. As for the environmental impact of bauxite production, Mr Soerohardjo was keen to stress that although the local regulatory environment was 'not stringent', Suralco applied the more rigorous standards of its parent company in its mining operations and in dealing with waste products.

Another enterprise engaged in the exploration sector is the state-owned Grassalco, which prospects for gold and other minerals as well as bauxite. This company, which employs 123 people, reports promising prospects 'after several years of set-backs and stagnation'. It negotiates on behalf of the government with potential private sector partners and owns the concessions for the above-mentioned deposits in the western region.

Glittering prospects for gold — but government wants its share

While bauxite production falls entirely within the formal sector, the same cannot be said for Suriname's gold mining operations. Although a number of commercially exploitable ore bodies have been discovered, the bulk of the country's

current production, which takes place mainly in the eastern areas, is carried out by small-scale prospectors. Most of the gold is smuggled out of the country to neighbouring French Guyana where it can be sold for hard currency. Indeed, the government can only come up with a vague estimate of total production (somewhere between 5000 and 10 000 kilograms a year).

Recently, the authorities have tried to gain a firmer grip on the sector with a policy based on the 'carrot' rather than the 'stick'. Previously, the Central Bank would only buy gold from individual prospectors at the official — and quite unrealistic — exchange rate of SFL 1.80 to the US dollar, thereby ensuring that virtually no-one would sell to it. The Bank now offers a more attractive rate and the immediate result has been a surge of gold purchases with 800 kg being bought in a six-month period. This policy reflects the realities of the situation. It is simply not feasible for the government effectively to control the activities of the independent gold miners operating in the sparsely-populated hinterland: there are neither the personnel nor the infrastructure to monitor what is happening. Better, therefore, to gain some benefit by making it worthwhile for prospectors to sell 'their' gold to a local, official purchaser.

Suriname is also keen to attract foreign investment to exploit any larger-scale deposits that are identified. In June 1994, a joint venture agreement was concluded with a Canadian company in respect of a 10 000 hectare mining concession granted by the government. Another Canadian enterprise has an option to carry out exploration and development of the Gross Rosebel concession, and assuming that the feasibility study yields favourable results, it is hoped to bring production on stream by the middle of 1997. Permanent Secretary Jayinoel indicated that the country could eventually have as many as four commercial gold mines in operation.

Agriculture — strong reliance on EU markets

Turning to agricultural resources, Suriname's main speciality is rice which is cultivated in the western area of the fertile

coastal strip, mainly around the town of Wageningen. It is produced for local consumption but also in significant quantities for export. The main overseas market is the European Union. Up to a certain limit, the EU grants preferential access to ACP rice, with a 50% tariff reduction, but it is some time since Suriname has made use of this particular instrument. Financially, it is



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more rewarding to use the 'Antilles' route whereby the Suriname crop is sent to one of the Dutch islands in the region for further processing. The value that is added to the rice enables it to be sent on to Europe duty free (as a product of EU origin). In 1994, more than 75 000 tonnes of Suriname cargo rice were exported to Europe and the value of total rice sales to the Union exceeded ECU 25 million.

Rice is grown both by individual farmers and by a state enterprise which runs one of the largest, fully mechanised rice farms in the world at Wageningen. Significant research efforts (some supported by the EU) are undertaken to maintain and improve yields and prevent diseases. The sector, however, cannot be insulated altogether from the country's macro-economic problems and there is an awareness of the need to improve efficiency, particularly in the light of global trade liberalisation whose effects are beginning to be felt in the field of agriculture.

The move towards free trade in agricultural products poses a particular challenge to Suriname's second main export crop, bananas. These also benefit

from privileged access to the EU market, up to a level of 38 000 tonnes. In 1994, the country was able to make use of most of its preferential tariff quota, exporting almost 34 000 tonnes of the fruit, valued at ECU 8.5 million, to the Union. As *The Courier* has reported in several recent issues, traditional ACP banana production is under threat from the more efficient

Working in the rice paddies at an experimental station near Wageningen

'dollar' zone producers and to a large extent, it is being kept afloat by the special arrangements of the Lomé Convention. It is still not clear how long these arrangements can be maintained in the face of legal challenges under the GATT and the political impetus in favour of lowering trade barriers. However, it is generally recognised in Suriname, as elsewhere in the Caribbean, that the days of protected markets for bananas are numbered. *Richard Kalloe*, who is the Minister for Trade and Industry, acknowledged that the country's production, which is vested exclusively in a state-owned company (Surland), could not currently compete with dollar zone producers. Part of the solution, he thought, lay in diversifying into other crops, a process which he hoped would attract support from the EU. Suriname, of course, is fortunate in having greater scope for diversification than many of its Caribbean island neighbours, both in agriculture and in the wider primary production sector.

Mr Kalloe cited the example of Suriname's sugar sector, which had collapsed despite the benefits available to it

under the Lomé Sugar Protocol. He blamed this on a lack of investment but also concluded that 'there is no point focusing on a product whose viability is based on protectionism which cannot last'. The implicit message for Suriname seems to be 'adapt or go under'. This is not to say that there is no long term future for banana production in Suriname. Indeed, an assessment recently undertaken by external consultants suggests that the basic agronomic and climatic conditions in the country are favourable to banana growing and that what is needed are improvements to quality and efficiency. The European Commission is directly involved in efforts aimed at bringing about such improvements.

The country also produces a range of other fruits and vegetables, although at present, these are principally for local consumption. Mr Kalloe is keen to see new export markets develop and spoke of providing incentives in this area. One sub-sector which appears to offer considerable promise is fruit juices. To learn more about this, we turned to local entrepreneur *Ernst Bleijert*, who employs 28 people at his juice processing operation (Bleyco) in Paramaribo. Mr Bleijert is a former teacher who 'decided to go into business because of the economic situation'. On the face of it, this may seem a curious decision given the country's economic problems. However, when one considers the adverse effect of the crisis on the earning capacity of public servants, including teachers, the move may be more readily understood. In addition, Mr Bleijert was keen to stress that even a 'chaotic economic situation' can offer opportunities. 'It is not so difficult to go into business', he argued, 'and if you are well organised, it is possible to make a profit.' While currency stability was necessary for the long term, the current situation allowed Bleyco to produce 'an internationally marketable product at a highly competitive price.'

Bleyco's main production line is fruit juice sold in cartons although it also makes concentrated juices (syrops) and some jelly and jam. At the time of *The Courier's* visit, the company was still only supplying the home market but a number

of buyers in neighbouring countries, as well as in The Netherlands, had expressed interest in placing orders. Mr Bleijert felt that the regional export market (Guyana, French Guyana, Curaçao etc) offered the best prospects for the short term. As he frankly acknowledged, 'other markets may simply be too big for us.'

Mr Bleijert went on to describe the supply situation. Although all the fruit processed in his factory is grown in Suriname, there are some problems in ensuring regular supplies because of the undeveloped nature of the fruit farming



Ernst Bleijert in his fruit juice factory

sector. Citrus (oranges and grapefruit) is produced on plantations but the 'exotic' varieties such as passion fruit are generally grown by small farmers who cultivate just one or two acres. Bleyco has cooperated with two other entrepreneurs to set up the Foundation for Fruit Development in Suriname (SOFs) which aims to help small farmers expand their land use and thus ensure more secure supplies. Mr Bleijert also spoke of plans to provide a controlled irrigation system and of farmers and processors meeting together to agree prices and bring much-needed stability to the operation.

From the government side, Mr Bleijert does not look for a great deal of active assistance, being a firm believer in private enterprise. He would, however, be happy to see an easing of restrictions in the field of export licences. Delays in the granting of licences, he claimed, created a particular problems for those involved in trading perishable goods.


Fishing — shrimps dominate but expansion prospects lie elsewhere

Marine shrimps are an important source of export earnings and employment in Suriname. Three companies are engaged in this business, the largest being the state-owned Suriname American Industries Ltd (SAIL), which processes and packages the shrimps for export, and provides employment for 260 people. *Errol Mannes*, who is the company's managing director, briefed *The Courier* on how the shrimp business and the fishing sector more generally was currently faring. He began by pointing out that there was very little scope for expansion in shrimp production. The fishing is undertaken, mainly by licensed foreign vessels (from Korea) on an all-year round basis and, in 1994, more than 1.3 million kilos, valued at almost \$20m were exported. The biggest markets were Japan (1 million kilos) and Europe (330 000 kilos).

The problem is that the maximum sustainable catch of shrimps, which had remained stable at around 5000 tonnes for a number of years, is apparently now declining. With production costs going up, the result has been reduced revenues. SAIL, which is currently still in profit, is far from complacent about this and although shrimps will continue to be central to their operation (assuming the right measures are taken to stabilise the supply), they are actively looking at other possibilities, notably in the area of aquaculture.

Suriname appears to have considerable potential for aquaculture (fish farming) in areas around the Suriname and Commewijne Rivers and the Matapica Creek and Canal. A prefeasibility study, commissioned by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at the request of the government, revealed encouraging prospects for shrimp 'farming' in the brackish waters of the region. It is estimated that an area of between 30 000 and 40 000 hectares is suitable for this purpose and a tentative projection puts the possible financial return as high as \$300 million.

The focus is not all on shrimps either. There is also scope for exploiting other species both in deep sea operations and through aquaculture. Indeed SAIL has



The jetty in Paramaribo where shrimps are landed for processing by SAAL

its own experimental fish farm at its premises in Paramaribo and is hoping to be able to make this a commercial proposition. Suriname faces a problem as regards fishing for other species in its exclusive economic zone. At present, this is being done — often illegally — by foreign vessels. It is estimated that 50% of the snappers caught in the country's EEZ go straight to Venezuela. Mr Mannes spoke forcibly about this form of 'economic crime' which brings no benefits to the people of Suriname, arguing for punitive sanctions to deter potential offenders. Presumably, there is also a need to enhance the country's surveillance capabilities. Strong punishments are not enough to ensure effective deterrence — there must also be a reasonable prospect of getting caught.

Lumber limbers up

Finally there is one largely unexploited sector which would appear to offer significant prospects for economic development. 90% of Suriname is covered with trees and, in theory, the country could earn huge sums of money from timber. Until recently, commercial forestry activity was only carried out on a modest scale. Civil strife, including some guerilla activity in the hinterland, hampered prospects for foreign investment but now that peace has been restored, the way is open for new developments. An Indonesian company has already begun logging operations in its

150 000 hectare concession in western Suriname and the government has been negotiating big concessions with a number of other Asian logging companies. At the time *The Courier* visited the country, the contracts had been concluded and the only remaining hurdle was the need for parliamentary approval.

Given the precarious state of the Suriname economy, it is not surprising that the authorities should seek salvation in the country's biggest untapped natural resource. In the absence of sufficient domestic capital or expertise, it is no surprise either that they should look for foreign investors with experience in the forestry sector. But the policy raises some sensitive environmental questions. Suriname's trees form part of the wider South American rain forest which is often nowadays described as the 'lungs of the world'. Fears about unsustainable exploitation of the resource and the possible consequences for the global climate are increasingly being expressed, particularly in the North, where environmental movements have become more vocal (and politically powerful). It is easy to understand why some in the developing countries of the South might resent 'interference' in this area. Many regions of the industrialised world used to be covered in trees which were felled a long time ago in the interests of 'development'. Do societies that failed to sustain their own resources have a right to

lecture others on the virtues of sustainability? It is a valid question although the response could easily be that those who got it wrong in the past are quite well-placed to caution others against making the same mistakes. The concern is heightened when one looks at what has happened to other tropical forest zones in the world, notably in Asia and the Pacific, where the same logging companies operate.

In fact, the real issue is not about *whether* the forests should be exploited — the economic imperatives are probably too strong to leave them untouched — but rather over the *way* in which they are exploited. The government insists that sustainable methods must be employed and clauses to this effect feature in the contracts. The authorities are well aware of the permanent damage sustained by tropical forests elsewhere and argue that the same will not be allowed to happen in Suriname. The aim is, therefore, to ensure the forest can regenerate once the logging companies have taken the mature trees which are suitable for timber. The problem is that this is more expensive than traditional 'slash and burn' techniques and the concern must be that corners will be cut. To prevent this happening there has to be effective monitoring and control? Recognising that there is insufficient local expertise, the government is looking to traditional aid donors, including the EU, to help out. It seems likely that this request for assistance will be viewed sympathetically. Only time will tell, however, whether the safeguards prove to be adequate. ■ S.H.

Staatsolie

Rolling out the barrels

Oil production in Suriname is never likely to rival that of the Gulf states. Proven reserves are modest and it is not generally thought that new exploration will lead to the discovery of any huge new fields. Despite this, the oil wells of Suriname are playing an increasingly important part in the country's economy. Foreign exchange is in short supply and one of the few economic bright spots of recent years has been the growing production of crude oil to the point where the country now meets more than half of its consumption requirements (of roughly 13 000 barrels a day). The company responsible for this is Staatsolie, the state-owned oil business. In contrast to a number of other public enterprises, this company has established a reputation for efficiency and dynamism. The following article is an edited version of a text prepared by Staatsolie, which describes the growth and future prospects for petroleum exploitation in Suriname.

Petroleum was first discovered in Suriname in 1930 although systematic exploration, did not begin until the 1960s. In 1965, a potentially exploitable find at Calcutta in the Saramacca district was actually made by the Geological and Mining Service, while it was drilling for potable water. A year later, oil was detected in the same district at the village of Tambaredjo and in 1967, there was a further discovery at Weg-naar-Zee near Paramaribo. The peak of this exploration phase occurred in 1969-70 with the drilling of 20 exploration wells by Shell International at various onshore locations near the coast. However, none of the finds were considered potentially profitable at the time.

The 1970s saw a big change as the dramatic increase in oil prices led to a re-evaluation of the commercial value of Suriname's oil reserves. Indeed, the search

A pumpjack in the oilfield



Modern pumping equipment helps to keep the oil flowing

for oil became a national obligation — Suriname was spending more than a third of its foreign currency earnings on petroleum imports and domestic oil production offered an important opportunity for foreign exchange savings.

In May 1980, an oil commission was appointed by the government to formulate policies for petroleum exploration and production, and to negotiate contracts with foreign companies. After intensive preparations by the commission, the State Oil Company (Staatsolie Maatschappij Suriname NV) was officially founded under the commercial laws of Suriname. All but one of the shares are held by the state. The remaining share is held by the Stichting Planbureau Suriname, a public foundation for development and planning. As of the end of 1993, the company's equity stood at 273 million SFL.

Petroleum exploration and production activities are carried out under the Petroleum Law of 1990 and Staatsolie is granted exclusive exploration and production rights in most of Suriname's sedimentary basin. Other oil companies may participate in these activities under so-called production-sharing service contracts to be negotiated with Staatsolie. Such participation has, so far, been confined to the offshore area which has attracted several major oil companies in the past. In 1993, Staatsolie signed such a contract with Pecten Suriname Ltd (a subsidiary of Shell US), covering the total offshore basin.



The Courier



Staatsolie

Staatsolie storage and treatment facilities in Saramacca

The oil potential of this area remains unproven.

At the outset, Staatsolie operated as an agent for the state, overseeing the exploration activities of foreign oil companies operating in Suriname. However, it soon began onshore exploration in its own right. Initially, technical assistance was obtained from foreign oil companies operating in the country and with the passage of time, experience and knowledge was accumulated. Today, the company is run and staffed almost exclusively by Suriname nationals. At the end of 1994, the company was employing 455 people in a wide variety of tasks ranging from exploration and production to marketing and sales.

Staatsolie began its onshore exploration with the evaluation of a find of heavy crude in the Tambaredjo area about 55 km west of Paramaribo. A small petroleum deposit was located there, with promising test results, at a depth of 300 metres. In order to obtain better production data, a production pilot plant, complete with five wells, and treatment and storage facilities, was installed in 1982. This


investment was financed through commercial loans obtained from a consortium of local banks. The oil from this location is low in sulphur content and has been named Saramacca crude after the district. It is extracted using conventional pumping techniques and without any reservoir stimulation.

The commercial potential of the test production was established by selling the crude as a cheap burner fuel to local industries, replacing the more expensive refined fuel oils which had to be imported. It is transported to customers in tanker barges owned and operated by Staatsolie. The cash flow resulting from this, together with the experience and technology acquired, have allowed facilities to be expanded annually. By the end of 1994, production had reached 6600 barrels a day from 321 wells. In mid-1994, the total amount of oil in the Tambaredjo oil field was estimated to be 657 million barrels of which at least 20% can be extracted using conventional techniques. By 1994, 13.7 million barrels had been produced. In 1992, a 55 km pipeline was constructed to transport the crude from the treatment facilities in the field to the distribution

terminal located on the Suriname River near the capital. In 1994, about 40% of the crude was exported, mainly for refining in Trinidad, with the remaining 60% being sold to local industries, the largest proportion of which went to the bauxite/alumina sector. Plans for the future include expansion of onshore production to 10 000 barrels a day and the building of a refinery in order to process Saramacca crude locally (Suriname still has to import refined petroleum products). Production expansion is financed from the annual cash flow, together with short term bank loans. The plan is for the refinery to be funded by internally generated cash flow with initial capital coming from government funds and guarantees, and commercial bank-loans. The funding package was expected to be in place early in 1995. Construction of the refinery will take about 27 months. ■

ed. S.H.

Interview with Foreign Minister, Subhas Mungra



'You never cross the same river twice'

The Courier

This expression, borrowed from an Indian philosopher, sums up the attitude of Subhas Mungra who is Suriname's Minister of Foreign Affairs. He quoted it, in a wide-ranging interview with The Courier, to underline his message that the world is changing rapidly and that his country has to change with it. The tides of the global economy, like the waters of any river, are constantly on the move. For Mr Mungra, this should be viewed as a challenge rather than a threat. He also has strong views on the importance of new technologies and the free enterprise system. And he sees increasing regional integration as one of the keys to his country's future prosperity. The Minister began by explaining how Suriname's relations with other countries could be used to positive effect to improve the economic situation at home.

— We believe that, in order actively to reinforce our economic recovery programme, the strengthening of our foreign relations, on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, is of great importance. Nowadays, there is no such thing as a domestic economy. There is only one economy, the global one. Given the fact that no country can develop in isolation, there must be a push to strengthen and enhance relations with foreign countries. Normally in economic textbooks you have four factors of production — labour,

natural resources, knowledge and capital. In this global village, international economic relations should be seen as a fifth factor. That is our basic philosophy. Anyone who thinks you can still operate within closed economic boundaries is living in different world — and one that has already gone.

The globalisation of the economy has, of course, a lot to do with modern communications systems. It took our forefathers, who came from Asia and Africa by sailing ship, three to six months to reach Suriname. Today, I can board an aeroplane in the afternoon and start work next morning at eight o'clock in New Delhi. I can pick up the phone and do business with financial institutions in any country. I can take the fax and communicate with anyone on the globe. Once you are linked to the Internet, you have the world before you at the press of a button. If you buy the proper CD-Rom programmes, you have all information contained in every university at your fingertips. So modern communications systems have changed everything.

The trouble is that most people you talk to are still thinking within the framework of the old world, and this is the major challenge. Our philosophy is that you should not see the changes as a threat but rather as a challenge. We need to re-

invent company structures, labour unions and other functional groups within society. Look at what is happening in the USA. There is a corporate revolution going on at the moment; a completely new approach to management. The same goes for governments, of course, especially in developing countries. Governments which design their policies in the framework of a closed economy are living 10 if not 20 years behind the times.

■ *Would that need to reinvent government also include reducing its size?*

— Yes, it includes that. We also have to talk about specifics here. What do we mean by re-inventing government? The first thing one must recognise is that, because of modern communications, the political awareness of the population has increased dramatically. So participation at all levels of decision-making must come increasingly into the picture. It is not just a question of the government deciding. You need to get popular consensus and that means restructuring decision-making processes. This is especially true for developing countries.

Today, the whole world is talking about adjustment programmes. We have to adjust, not necessarily because we like it, but because it is a necessity. There was a famous Indian philosopher who said 'you

never cross the same river twice'. Just as the water in a river is constantly changing, so too is the world we are living in today and our policy must take account of that.

■ *You have talked about globalisation. Within that, and as we move towards it, there is also regionalisation taking place. Suriname in a sense, straddles two regions — the Caribbean one with which you have strong historical ties and the South American one. Where do you see Suriname being placed in a regional context.*

— Given that the whole world is being divided into mega-trade blocs — the EU, the Pacific Rim countries, the seven new tigers of Asia, Nafta, Mercosur and so on, Suriname has no choice other than to join in the process. Regional integration involves a series of stepping stones. Obviously, the group closest to us is Caricom. We have applied for full membership of this organisation and hope to be part of it by the middle of this year. This means we become part of a market of five million people with a GDP of \$500 million. At the same time, given that governments should be looking, not just at the next election but, also at the next generation, we agreed at the meeting in Colombia last year to sign the Charter of the Association of Caribbean States. This is a grouping of all the nations that border the Caribbean including the three big 'G3' nations; Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela. The market here is much bigger — 195 million people with a GDP of \$500 billion. Then there was the summit of the Americas in Miami recently, where we agreed to participate in the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas. This aims to create the biggest market in the world — 800 million people — by the year 2005. So as you can see, we have clear policy of intensifying regional cooperation.

Orienting ourselves more towards our own region means that our previous unilateral dependence on the former colonial power will necessarily be diverted. These steps are important if we are to achieve economies of scale and improve the efficiency of our production. In a bigger market, the most creative entrepreneurs will reap the richest rewards. And the message to the private sector is that you can no longer rely on monopolistic practices, tariff barriers or

other kinds of protection from the government. That is no longer possible.

■ *So the policy of state subsidies is no longer viable?*

— No it certainly is not. Of course, what I have just said begs the question as to whether wider economic spaces actually benefit small vulnerable economies like ours. This is a key question to which there is no easy answer. However, realistically, I think there has to be a transition period in which small vulnerable economies have some special arrangements, although I would hesitate to the use word 'protection' here. If this doesn't happen, whole industries may wither in the face of competition from the multinationals. They are able to afford price differentiation when they are penetrating new markets — temporarily offering prices that are lower than production costs so as to eliminate the opposition. So I think there must be some provision for small vulnerable economies while you are in the process of opening the markets. The important thing is that it should be temporary. President Clinton put the point well at the Miami summit. The only answer, he said, when you think your neighbour is beating you is to do even better yourself.

■ *You mentioned ending Suriname's dependence on the former colonial power. I have heard comments, both positive and negative, from Surinamese people about your relations with the Netherlands. How would you characterise the situation today? I would also be interested to hear what you think about your relationship with the European Union — which is not the same thing, of course.*

— I think one should be very realistic. The reality is that this over-orientation to the Netherlands has, one way or the other, to be changed. Once Suriname is forced to play its proper role in Caribbean regional integration, this will automatically divert attention away from the link with the Dutch. At the same time, we have to recognise that we have close family and historical ties and that we speak the same language. These ties will obviously continue.



Subhas Mungra
'A clear policy of intensifying regional integration

As for European Union link, that is a different story. Suriname is an ACP member and the EU is one of our major markets. I have talked about exploring and developing a wider economic space in this region, but our entrepreneurs are still oriented towards the European market. And I should say that we have a very good market for our rice and bananas. I think Europe will remain a very important trade partner for us in the coming decades and I see that as a good thing. There is no reason why trade blocs should not cooperate to enhance world trade. The thing that will change is that the blocs, in future, will be dealing with each other on a collective basis, not as individual countries.

So for Suriname, the EU will remain very important. I have focused on trade here, but there is also our close cooperation in development policy. I believe that the Lomé Conventions have helped to accelerate development in a number of sectors. Of course, there is a view that the decision-making process could be speeded up and red tape in Brussels could be reduced. We should look at whether the local delegation of the European Commission should not have more authority to decide on projects at the local level. These are just observations which one might make. But the agreement itself, between the EU and the ACP group, is still one which sets an example to the world in modern development cooperation and Suriname is very happy that we are part of it.

■ *Sticking with the Lomé Convention, one of the demands made by the ACP side is that they should have unrestricted access to the EU market for their agricultural products. Would that be helpful for Suriname?*

— It would be most helpful to Suriname and many other ACP countries who are primarily involved in agricultural production. Some Caribbean countries, notably the banana producers, are reliant on the European market for 80% of their exports. Fortunately, that is not the case for us, but free access to the EU would still be very welcome and would provide us with significant new opportunities.

■ *In the same context, new conditionalities are being suggested by your European partners. It looks as if, instead of EDF money all being earmarked to national programmes in one tranche, there will now be two stages, with access to the second being dependent on how well the first has been used. There has also been talk of extra political conditions. What is your view about this?*

— Like many ACP countries we are concerned about some aspects of these proposals. As you know, there is a project cycle — the preparatory stage, project analysis, the financing contract, implementation, disbursement and finally, evaluation. The degree to which we effectively use the Lomé funds depends, of course, on all these steps in the decision-making process. And as long as we don't know whether the delays have to do with red tape in Brussels, infrastructure problems or poor administration in the developing countries themselves, we should be wary of changes which might simply add to the delays. In particular, if they are due to red tape, you end up punishing the country for slow decision-making over which it has no control. So I don't think this is the way to do it. But I do think we should study new technologies for closer monitoring and better management of the complete project cycle. We need a better understanding of the obstacles for each country or region, and have try to find new measures to enhance the process. I think one possibility would be to have a project pipeline readily available the moment you sign the next Lomé Convention. You

shouldn't wait to prepare a project and there should be some funding for that. So you have always, so to speak, a selection of projects that are feasible and readily executable.

With regard to political constraints, we don't think there is any objection to the EU emphasising basic human rights, and of course protecting the environment. We all agree on these points. On human rights, I think it is the obligation of humankind, after 5000 years of civilisation, to force governments to tackle problems at the negotiating table and not by violence. Similarly, we should oblige governments to safeguard the environment for future generations.

■ *There seems to be general agreement that human rights and democracy conditionalities are acceptable — and indeed desirable. But what about a condition, for example, that a country must be committed to a free enterprise economic system? Is that an acceptable requirement to impose in a multilateral treaty like the Lomé Convention?*

— This is a very difficult question to answer because it presupposes we all agree on what is the most appropriate economic system for a country. We do know one thing: centrally-planned economies are out. It is clear that these don't work. No government can plan consumption behaviour, monetary behaviour, savings behaviour and investment behaviour for every person in the world. Even Deng Hsiao Ping admitted that a government that does everything for the people deprives them of their talents. So we mustn't interfere with the creativity of individuals. Let them be free to invest, consume and save whatever they like.

But having said this, we still haven't really identified the optimum economic development model in the world. All economies are mixed economies, but some have more central planning than others. In Sweden and the Netherlands, there is a lot of central planning. In the US, there is less, but even there, it exists. Everybody agrees that we should promote free markets in one form or another because it is better than having monopolies and closed economies, and contributes to general welfare, but the mix of

planning and free enterprise differs from country to country. So while we know that the market system should be promoted, I think that to make it a requirement in development cooperation instruments may be going a bit too far. It could lead to unnecessary interference in the sovereignty of a country.

■ *Is there, perhaps, a contradiction between a free market condition and the requirement that a country be democratic? If the idea that there is only one valid economic model is elevated to a fundamental principle, then surely your democratic choices are reduced to just one possibility?*

— Exactly, and that is why we have to be careful about free market requirements. Look at the problems that have arisen between the IMF and a number of countries. The IMF imposes conditionalities to secure monetary and balance of payments targets, but in the process, they restrict the governments' scope for developing their own monetary and fiscal policies. Of course, this is the only way you can do it, but the key point is that it is only temporary. It is designed to bring about stabilisation where things have got out of hand. Imposing the same conditions in the field of regular development cooperation policy is a very different matter.

■ *One final question. Is the IMF going to get involved in structural adjustment in Suriname?*

— Definitely. We recognise that Suriname should have closer cooperation with the Fund. The modalities have yet to be worked out but we are agreed that the IMF should assist Suriname to look into the viability of the programme that is being designed with our European consultant, the Warwick Research Institute. Once the programme is in place, we need the seal of approval and good advice from the IMF. This will help us in attracting the external support that we need and will also help to improve the investment climate. ■

Interview by S.H.

The opposition *Democratisch Alternatief '91*

Promoting young leadership

The election in 1991, which saw the re-establishment of democracy in Suriname, resulted in a clear parliamentary majority for the New Front coalition. The two main parties on the opposition benches are the NDP of former military ruler, Desi Bouterse, and *Democratisch Alternatief '91* (Democratic Alternative) which is led by Winston Jesserun. The latter grouping draws much of its support from the business community. The *Courier* met Dr Jesserun and one of his colleagues, praesidium member Ricardo van Ravenswaay to, get an opposition perspective on current affairs in Suriname.

In answer to a question about the differences between DA '91 and the government, Dr Jesserun was keen to stress the unitary nature of his party. The four parties of the governing coalition, he suggested, tended to pull in different directions making decision-making more difficult. There was also the linked issue of ethnicism. 'Each party in the coalition represents a different ethnic group,' he said. 'We, on the other hand, are a multiracial organisation, and that is a big advantage'. The youthful leadership of the party was suggested by Mr van Ravenswaay as another key difference. He said that DA '91 was committed to promoting young leadership and that this was in sharp contrast to other political groups, most of which, he stated 'are run by old leaders.'

Dr Jesserun went on to speak of policy differences between DA '91 and the government, notably as regards the economy. The latter, he maintained, had presided over a deterioration in economic conditions, 'without implementing any real policies for development.' In practical terms, DA '91 believes that a genuine political commitment to carrying out structural adjustment needs to be made. What was required, according to Mr van



Winston Jesserun, Leader of Democratisch Alternatief '91

Ravenswaay, was a comprehensive programme, accepted and supported by all the parties in government. The two key objectives, he thought, should be development designed to increase foreign exchange income, and expenditure reductions within the government itself.

Improve absorption capacity of private sector

Reducing government expenditure, of course, entails pain for public servants. Replying to a question as to whether DA '91 could realistically go into an election advocating big cuts (some people suggest that the civil service could be cut by half), Mr van Ravenswaay acknowledged that it was easier to say than to do. 'You can't just throw people on to the street without an income', he admitted, 'but what we need is policies to make sure this doesn't happen. We should simultaneously be developing the private sector so that their absorption capacity in terms of new employees matches the downsizing in the public service.' In addition, he suggested that a start could be made by removing some civil servants who, he alleged 'just sit there and don't

actually work', or who are making money from outside activities.

On the subject of privatising state concerns, our interviewees believed that this was 'a must', with an emphasis to begin with on the government-owned companies that make the biggest losses. Dr Jesserun was pessimistic, however, about the prospects for privatisation under the present administration. 'With this government,' he suggested, 'it is almost impossible because there is a difference of opinion between two of the main groups. The Creoles are afraid that everything will be bought by the Hindustanis.'

Turning to the broader problem of structural imbalances in the economy, the DA '91 spokesmen thought that the time had come to bring in the IMF on a more formal footing. While recognising that the work of the Warwick Research Institute in drawing up an SAP could be useful, they felt that the country had effectively exhausted its options, following the ending of EC involvement in this area. This is a highly sensitive subject in Suriname. The country has always resisted a classical SAP drawn up (and some would say imposed) by the IMF and Dr Jesserun thought that the main stumbling block now was a fear in government that it would 'lose face with the electorate.' Mr van Ravenswaay did not believe that any real progress would be made until after the next election. He recognised that the short term effects of structural adjustment are often painful while the benefits were more medium or long-term. 'I don't think it is possible for the government to embark on something which could hurt them at the next election. All they can do is bide their time and hope to cling on to power.'

With big forestry concessions due to be agreed with a number of Asian logging companies, the environment is a topical subject at the moment. In fact, in this area, there appears to be no funda-

mental disagreement between DA '91 and the government. As Mr van Ravenswaay was anxious to stress 'we are not against foreign investment.' He believed, however, that it was necessary to 'check the reputation of any company that is willing to invest in our country', and that the agreements in question needed to contain firm environmental safeguards. His main concern was whether Suriname was in a position to ensure that the environmental clauses in the contracts were respected. And like the government, he saw the solution to this problem in getting outside help from international organisations with the appropriate expertise. 'If that can be done, and you can give reassurances to the society, then we don't have any problem with this kind of investment.'

The Dutch connection

One aspect which clearly distinguishes DA '91 from the parties of the coalition government concerns relations with the Netherlands, the former metro-

politan power. The government, of course, wants an amicable relationship, but Dr Jesserun hinted strongly at something more than that. As he pointed out: 'We have a close relationship with the Netherlands. We have historical ties, we talk the same language and indeed, one third of our people actually live there.' He mentioned specifically, the importance of Dutch economic support. Quizzed as to what the relationship might entail, he did not argue for a return to some form of legal dependency, although that option has been mooted in some quarters in the past. There was no question of Suriname giving up its sovereignty, he insisted; 'What we are looking for is some form of Commonwealth'. He acknowledged that Suriname already had an association with the Netherlands but he wanted it to be given more substance. 'The Dutch refuse to do that at the moment', he observed ruefully.

DA '91 believes that placing the association with the Netherlands at the

heart of its external economic relations policy would be nothing more than a reflection of the practical realities. As Mr van Ravenswaay argued, 'we have to be honest and recognise that we need external assistance to consolidate our democracy and achieve economic growth.' The problem is that 'it takes two to tango' and the Netherlands does not seem convinced about the utility of releasing funds to support Suriname's development in the absence of significant progress in the field of structural adjustment. DA '91 believes that success for their party at the next election could be enough to induce their hesitant partner back on to the dance floor. Whether that is what the voters of Suriname (and the Netherlands!) want remains to be seen. ■ S.H.

A complex political mosaic

Suriname gained independence from the Netherlands in 1975. It was ruled democratically until 1980 when the elected government was overthrown in a coup staged by army officer, Colonel Desi Bouterse. In 1987, democracy was re-established and Colonel Bouterse's party was resoundingly defeated by a three-party coalition. There were continuing

tensions, however, between the civilian administration and the military, and in December 1990, the army again seized control. This was a bloodless affair involving a simple telephone call from the army leader to the President; hence the name, 'the telephone coup'. An interim military-backed administration took office but only for a short period, and in May 1991, further elections were held. These were won by a four-party coalition whose chosen candidate for President, Ronald

Venetiaan, holds office today. The next elections are due to take place in 1996.

The country has a unicameral legislature of 51 seats elected by a list system of proportional representation. The President is chosen by Parliament. Eight parties are currently represented in the chamber — reflecting the multi-ethnic composition of the country as well as a range of ideological positions. The party breakdown is set out in the chart.

Political parties in Suriname

| | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| Government | The <i>Nieuw Front</i> (which stood on a common list in 1991), consisting of: — <i>Nationale Partij Suriname</i> (mainly Creole — President Venetiaan's party) — <i>Verenigde Hervormings Partij</i> (mainly Hindustani) — <i>Kerukanan Tulodo Pranatan Ingil</i> (mainly Javanese) — <i>Socialistische Partij van de Arbeid</i> (Labour Party — mainly Creole) | 30 seats |
| Opposition | <i>Nationale Democratische Partij</i> (led by former military leader Bouterse) <i>Democratisch Alternatief '91</i> <i>Democratische Partij</i> (a splinter group of DA '91) <i>Pendawa Lima</i> (mainly Javanese) | 10 seats 7 seats 2 seats 2 seats |

Eco-tourism

'Getting away from it all' takes on a new meaning

For most people, Caribbean tourism conjures up images of sandy white beaches, scuba diving in clear blue waters and sipping daiquiris as the sun sets after another busy day of doing nothing in particular. Although on the South American mainland, Suriname can justifiably claim to be a Caribbean nation. Its population is heavily concentrated in the coastal strip, and there are few overland links with the rest of the continent. Having said this, there is not much point going there if you want a beach holiday in a luxurious all-inclusive resort.

Readers of our last issue will recall that we featured Guyana and it is not surprising to learn that the next door country, Suriname, displays similar geographical features. For the tourist, the coastal waters are muddy and unattractive, thanks to the major rivers which disgorge their contents (silt included) into the seas in this area. Beaches are few and far between and the climate tends to be rather too humid for the comfort of the average vacationer. The Surinamese recognise all this and have no ambitions to rival the Bahamas, Jamaica or St Maarten in the highly competitive mass tourism of the region. Instead, they have sensibly decided to target one particular market niche which exploits some very different attractions available in the country. With a huge area of underpopulated and often undisturbed tropical forest (whose few inhabitants have been largely isolated from the outside world), Suriname has a hinterland which is well-suited to eco-tourism, and the authorities are keen to expand this sector, currently in its infancy.

To some, the term 'eco-tourism' may be a contradiction in terms. Any

activity which introduces human beings to virgin territories, or brings so-called 'modern' cultures into contact with traditional ones, is bound to have an impact. The concerns of those who take this somewhat fundamentalist position can only be assuaged by having no activity at all, and this is almost certainly an unrealistic dream.

The case for eco-tourism is that it offers an opportunity to exploit resources — in this case the tropical forest — which might otherwise suffer the degradations of loggers, mining enterprises and road developers. If sufficient regular income can be derived from visitors who are interested in the flora and fauna, and the lifestyle of the forest inhabitants, then the temptation to seek a quick 'one-off' profit from those who would destroy the resource forever would be greatly reduced. This is an argument that is particularly powerful in countries encountering economic difficulties.

One problem is that there is no clear definition of what is meant by 'ecotourism'. The expression is used by an increasing number of tour operators anxious to tap into this growing market. Environmental awareness is increasing and so too is the desire for 'different' experiences in an increasingly homogenous world. Unfortunately, there must be a suspicion that some operators are simply 'jumping on the bandwagon' without any genuine commitment to preservation of the world's ecological assets. To be fair, this is not an accusation that can be levelled at those who run METS — the state-owned company responsible for the ecotourist product in Suriname.



'Anxiety and hope'

During the Courier's visit to Suriname, we took the opportunity to sample what METS had to offer. The destination is Awaradam on the Pikin Rio river — one of a small number of resorts (if such a term is appropriate), now up and running in the country's forested hinterland. The starting point is the quixotically-named 'Zorg en Hoop' airport in Paramaribo. This combination of 'anxiety' and 'hope' might have been specially devised to reflect the sentiment of the country at a time of economic crisis, but it also captures the feeling of the moment, as we accelerate along the multi-surfaced runway (rutted concrete, grass and compacted mud) in a tiny six seater aeroplane. There are very few roads in the interior and light aircraft, operating from clearings in the forest, offer the only real link between the hinterland villages and the capital. The route takes us over a flat landscape punctuated by houses and tracks. The huge Suralco bauxite and alumina facility is visible to the east but soon after the imprint of man fades to be replaced by a carpet of undulating green.


An hour later, we descend through broken cloud towards the treetops, and a surprisingly smooth landing on a grass airstrip. There we are met by Frans Dinge who is to be our host for the next two days. His 'local' name is *Jang Jan Man*, which means 'the man who loves food' although this is not immediately obvious from his physique. This is Bush Negro country and Frans is a 'local boy

made good' who worked for five years in French Guyana before returning to run the eco-tourist operation in his home area. Incidentally, the expression 'Bush Negro' has not acquired any pejorative overtones here. It is the name given to the descendants of former slaves who fled to the interior during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The term 'Maroon', presumably borrowed from Jamaica, is sometimes used instead. Although not indigenous to the area, the Bush Negro communities have established a distinctive and traditional lifestyle in their forest villages.

Our party then boards an open canoe-style boat - with an efficient out-board motor - for the twenty-minute journey up the Pekin Rio to Awaradam. We marvel at the skill of our navigator who deftly steers the vessel on a zig-zag route avoiding submerged rocks and skirting minor rapids. He has obviously done this many times before! Later, we would experience the same journey at night — accomplished at a much gentler pace with the additional help of nothing more than a powerful torch.

Awaradam itself is a custom-made 'village' of recent construction on an island in the middle of the river — the ideal place for those who want to learn the real meaning of the expression 'getting away from it all'. If your taste is for sumptuous accommodation with en-suite facilities, hot showers and room service just a phone call away, then you should, perhaps look elsewhere. Genuine eco-tourists, of course, are not looking for five-star luxury and, in

Frans Dingé — the 'man who loves food'



The Courier



The Courier

Above, a Suriname Airways plane carrying a party of eco-tourists lands on an airstrip carved out of the forest

Below, the boat trip up the Pekin Rio to Awaradam



The Courier

fact, the village is surprisingly comfortable. Great attention is paid to cleanliness, the toilet facilities are adequate and the huts which provide the sleeping accommodation are nicely designed. Wholesome hot meals are laid on (although the variety is limited) while coffee and tea (serve yourself) are 'on tap' throughout the day. There are also some nice individual touches — the hammocks set up on the balcony of each hut affording a view of the river, the reassuring mosquito nets above each bed and the hot coffee delivered in the morning.

Swimming with the piranhas!

The tour organisers lay on a number of different activities for the visitors. A walk in the forest gives us the

opportunity to learn how the people have adapted to living with their environment, without destroying it. It seems that every tree provides material for some aspect of daily life — construction materials for the houses, food and traditional medicines. A visit to some neighbouring Bush Negro villages allows us to find out more about the local lifestyle and traditions. Then there is 'shooting the rapids' without a boat — an exhilarating experience which is not as dangerous as it sounds. The news that we are sharing the waters with piranhas as we float downstream is alarming but it seems that the reputation of these 'killer-fish' is an unfair one — especially here, where they do not swim in shoals. Finally, we are treated to a spectacle of local culture one evening. The importance of the oral tradition is underlined in the songs which are replete with

important events, poignant stories and risqué tales (helpfully translated into English by the guide). The local children join in the dancing and audience participation is also expected!

The overall experience is a memorable one, and we leave Awaradam with a better understanding of how the Bush Negros live — and of the importance of preserving their natural environment if their lifestyle is to be maintained. There is a downside too. Awaradam welcomes a manageable number of tourists — roughly forty a month at present — but even this modest number is bound to have some impact. Visiting the villages is fascinating, and the people are welcoming, but one is slightly uncomfortable about the fact that, within a few days, another group of outsiders will pass through, and then another.... More tourists means more income but if the tourism is to be genuinely 'ecological', then it needs to be kept on a very limited scale.

METS offers similar tours to the areas inhabited by the original Indian inhabitants, whose customs and lifestyles are surprisingly different from those of their Bush Negro neighbours. Combined trips are also possible with modestly-priced accommodation available in Paramaribo. It

Sleeping accommodation at Awaradam: basic, but surprisingly comfortable



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must be said that the range of activities is somewhat limited and a more varied programme may be needed for those who plan to spend longer periods in the country. Another negative feature, which affects both tourists and businesspeople visiting the country, is the international airport. This can hardly be described as

A warm welcome from the children — but how long can their lifestyle be maintained?



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A cultural evening laid on for the tourists
'The importance of the oral tradition is underlined in the songs'

'user-friendly' and the arrival of big aircraft (particularly from Amsterdam), is usually accompanied by chaotic scenes. The bureaucratic formalities at the airport can be time-consuming and frustrating. The same goes for a visit to the bank which all visitors must fit in at some point during their stay, given the obligation to change a minimum sum of money into the local currency.

Despite these irritants, it is clear that Suriname is striving to provide a distinctive and attractive 'eco-tourism' product which exploits the country's natural assets without destroying them in the process. The hope must be that this approach will be maintained as the planned expansion of the sector takes place. ■

Profile

Location

Situated on the northern edge of the South American continent between French Guyana in the east, Guyana in the west and Brazil in the south.

Land area

163 820 square kilometres

Main geographical features

A low-lying fertile coastal strip, (where the bulk of the people live), protected from the encroachments of the sea by an extensive network of dykes. A heavily forested hinterland which is largely unpopulated.

Major rivers include the Suriname, the Nickerie, the Coppename, the Saramacca and the Commewijne. The Corantijn and Marowijne Rivers mark the boundaries with Guyana and French Guyana respectively.


Lake Brokopondo, formed by the damming of the Suriname River at Afobaka (where there is a large hydro-electric installation), is the country's only significant body of inland water.

Population

417 000 (1991 estimate)

Ethnic composition

Highly diverse. The ethnic groups are :
Hindustanus (37%), descended mainly from indentured labourers who came from the Indian sub-continent to work in the plantations after the abolition of slavery ;
 Creoles (31%), descended mainly from slaves brought to the country by early European settlers ;
Javanese (14%), whose origins are similar to that of the *Hindustanis* ;
Bush Negroes (8.5%), descendants of slaves who escaped in the 17th century and who re-established their traditional lifestyle in the hinterland ;



Europeans (3%), descendants of original colonists and of settlers who arrived after the abolition of slavery in 1863 to escape European famine ;

Chinese (3%), whose origins are similar to that of the *Hindustanis*

Amerindians (3%), the 'original' inhabitants, most of whom maintain a traditional village lifestyle in the interior.

Capital

Paramaribo (population — 192 000 approx.)

Political structure

Democracy restored in 1991 after eleven years of mainly military rule. There is a hybrid parliamentary/presidential system. The President, chosen by Parliament, is

both head of state and head of government.

The country is divided into ten local government districts.

Economy

Heavily focused on primary production, notably bauxite, gold, timber, fishing, rice and bananas.

Currency

The Suriname Guilder (1 ECU = 670 SRG — April 1995)

EU-Suriname cooperation

Supporting economic restoration

by Rolf Smit *

Suriname has been associated with the European Community since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Initially, the association was based on its status as a Dutch OCT but since 1975, when the country gained independence, Suriname has been a signatory to the Lomé Convention. In this capacity, it has participated actively in the different institutions set up under the Convention and has benefited both from the preferential trade advantages and from the aid instruments of the system. To date, financial allocations to Suriname under the four Lomé Conventions have amounted to ECU 87 million. Additional resources have been made available to the country under the regional programme.

Suriname has a good natural resource base with fertile coastal plains suitable for agricultural production, mineral wealth, extensive forests and rich fishing grounds. It also suffers, however, from the constraints of a small population, which means a limited domestic market and high *per capita* costs for infrastructure. The situation has been aggravated by massive emigration, often of educated and skilled people. This occurred especially after independence but continues today. Ambitious development programmes, high government spending and frequent changes in the country's leadership during the 1980s led to macro-economic imbalances, including high inflation and scarcity of foreign exchange. In 1989 the Government sought the assistance of the European Commission in addressing these problems. For the next three years, the Commission's role in Suriname was closely

associated with the discussions on the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP).

During 1990, a Programme for Recovery, Growth and Adjustment was elaborated by the EDF-financed consultants Coopers and Lybrand. This was submitted to the Suriname authorities but within a few days, the Government was toppled in what has become known as the 'telephone coup'. Discussions on the SAP resumed a year later following the installation of the democratically-elected President Venetiaan. With the approval of the Surinamese version of the adjustment programme by Parliament in November 1992, the Government invited the EC to take on the role of external monitor. Despite lengthy discussions between the Commission's services and the Government on the modalities for monitoring, it was not possible to reach agreement and in June 1993, it was decided that the Commission would not act as external monitor

of the SAP. Accordingly, any future involvement of the EC in the SAP will be in the framework of the Lomé Convention.

Democracy consolidated

In the political field the government has succeeded in recent years in pacifying the country and consolidating the democratisation process. The role of the army has been reduced and it has basically become a loyal instrument of the government. However, the reinforced democratic rule has not yet led to economic progress, and this remains the prime objective of the Government. With this in mind, they contracted with the Warwick Research Institute of the United Kingdom to assist in the preparation and monitoring of the structural adjustment programme. Discussions with the IMF, aimed at achieving closer collaboration, are also under way. The government's priorities and strategies are set out in the Multi-Annual Development Plan (MDP) for 1994-1998. This lists as the main objectives, the restoration of financial and monetary equilibrium, the growth of the export sectors, and the promotion of investment and employment.

EDF assistance under the first three Lomé Conventions was mainly directed towards the agricultural sector, infrastructure works, and activities in the field of education and training. Projects in

Suriname National Indicative Programmes, Lomé HV
(in thousands of Ecus)

| | Lomé 1 (EDF 4) | Lomé 2 (EDF 5) | Lomé 3 (EDF 6) | Lomé 4 (EDF 7) |
|---------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| — N.I.P. | 18 000 | 18 000 | 24 000 | 27 000 |
| — Transfers from previous EDFs | | 5 700 | 1 100 | 16 333 |
| Agriculture | 9 580 | 3 585 | 11 752 | 7968* |
| Social sectors | 1 876 | 1 323 | 135 | 3 152* |
| Infrastructure | 2 666 | 3 700 | 6 141 | 26 700* |
| Structural adjustment | | 1 700 | | |
| Others sectors | | | | |
| — Grants | 778 | 2 092 | 1 112 | 750* |
| — Loan (Development Bank) | 2 000 | | | |
| Reserve | | 4 260 | 4 763 | |
| Transfers to later EDFs | 1 100 | 13 000 | | |
| EIB loans | | 4 250 | 3 000 | |
| Total Community financial assistance | 16 900 | 14 950 | 28 100 | 43 333 |

(*): Includes amounts foreseen for commitments in the coming year. N.B. Financial data for Lomé 1 and 2 represent actual expenditure, while the data for Lomé 3 and 4 represent commitments.

* Rural Development Adviser at the EC Delegation in Paramaribo. Mr Smit was Acting Delegate at the time of The Courier's visit to Suriname.

the agricultural area included a sectoral import programme for the rice sector, a credit line for the Agricultural Development Bank, the rehabilitation of the Coronie Polder, the establishment of an artificial insemination facility and support for agricultural planning and rice research. In the fisheries sector, feasibility and market studies have been prepared and an artisanal fisheries centre has been established at New Nickerie. Also elaborated in recent years have been ambitious studies relating to the livestock sector and polder rehabilitation.


Infrastructure projects have included the rehabilitation of several sections of road and the repair of harbour facilities. These investments are designed to provide direct support for agricultural production and trade.

Measures in respect of education and training have included a secondary school project at New Nickerie, extension of the previously financed University of Suriname, and local and overseas training schemes. EDF contributions to the Structural Adjustment Programme, mentioned above, include substantial technical assistance, support studies and training.

Due to a temporary suspension of new activities after the 'telephone coup' of December 1990, and the SAP negotiations, the signing of the Lomé IV National Indicative Programme (NIP) was delayed until April 1994. In the meantime, however, preparation continued on several new projects and a number of these have subsequently been approved. The main activities currently being undertaken are described hereafter.

Enthusiastic response to micro-project programme

A micro-project programme has been approved and is being implemented. This scheme has been given an enthusiastic response from many people at the grassroots. As is the case in many other ACPs where such programmes are being carried out, the aim here is to improve the socio-economic position of lower income groups through the promotion of self-help and participation.



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The road project approved under Lomé IV is part of a wider programme to rehabilitate the whole of the 376 km-long coastal route. This road provides the only overland connection with the neighbouring countries of French Guyana and Guyana. It is also the backbone of Suriname's road infrastructure, serving 90% of the population and most of the agricultural production. The cost of the project is ECU 9.7 million.

Approval is expected shortly for an expenditure of ECU 3.2 million on a rice research and breeding station. This intervention is designed to increase the competitiveness of rice production and exports, through the supply of improved seed material and production technology. The sustainability of the project should be assured by the imposition a levy on rice exports, to be used to finance the operational and replacement costs of the station.


Currently the Government is negotiating large-scale forestry concessions with Asian companies for timber extraction and export. This offers the possibility of substantial returns but the potential risks to the forest are high, especially in the absence of a monitoring and control body. To make good this deficiency, the Government has sought EDF finance to prepare a project dossier with a view to setting up just such a body. The study will be carried out in the coming months. As regards the

Part of Suriname's main coastal road. The European Union has funded significant sections of this key transport artery

future management of the forest resources, a recently approved project with the University of Paramaribo, for a remote sensing facility, could play an important role. This project is financed from a special Commission budget line.

Other schemes currently being prepared include a tourism development programme, a training scheme for high level Surinamese staff involved in adjustment activities, an Aids prevention programme, and a drugs demand reduction programme.

Checking samples at the Rice Research Station



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The overall focus is very strongly on improving production and export capabilities, and thus foreign exchange earnings, as well as on creating employment and the conditions for a more stable economy and society.

Trade benefits

The main benefits for Suriname under the Lomé Convention are to be found in the trade field. All of the country's rice and banana exports go to the EU market under preferential access conditions. For rice the ACP countries benefit from a special quota of 125 000 tons of cargo rice and 20 000 tons of broken rice, with a 50% import tariff reduction. Since 1991, rice from Suriname has been going through the Dutch Antilles where value is added through processing. Thereafter, it receives 'EU origin' status which means that on export to Europe, it is exempted from import duties and quantitative restrictions.

This route is very attractive and accordingly, almost no use has been made by Surinamese exporters of the ACP quota in recent years. The financial advantage amounts to at least ECU 200 per ton. With an export volume of some 80 000 tons per year, this represents a total benefit of about ECU 16m. For bananas the advantage is ECU 75 per ton. With a quota of 38 000 tons, the additional earning potential amounts to almost ECU 3m.

These advantages are considerable, but the future for them is uncertain. They are contested by countries which are not eligible for the same treatment, including the United States, which has a special interest in both the banana and rice industries. It has publicly announced its opposition to the preferential trade relations under the Lomé Convention. It is therefore important that Suriname increase its efficiency in these sectors in order

to be able to confront the competition. The EU is helping in this through both the rice research and breeding station, and a support programme for the banana industry, financed from a special Commission budget line.


Under the regional programme, Suriname is implementing a ferry project with Guyana designed to improve the links between the two countries. There is also a regional airport improvement programme in the pipeline. Other ongoing and future regional programmes of benefit to Suriname cover sectors such as tourism, human resource development, agriculture, the environment and trade.

Recently it has been established that Suriname is eligible for support from the Sysmin fund under Lomé IV, and project dossiers in the energy and communication sectors are now being prepared.

Finally, through the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), Suriname has received additional technical and financial assistance, especially for developing its industrial base. Technical and market information is also made available to Surinamese entrepreneurs through the publications and activities of COLEACP and the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA).

Looked at as a whole, the projects, programmes and other interventions described above amount to a significant engagement by the EU in Suriname's efforts to achieve lasting development. ■

Inspecting EDF-funded polder works at Coronie



Schengen opens the way for free movement of people

Free movement of people is finally to become a reality, at least for seven of the nine countries which have signed the Schengen agreement. These countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, have three months to remove all frontier controls with other signatory states, starting from Sunday 26 March. Greece and Italy aim to implement the agreement at a later date. For David Williamson, the European Commission's Secretary General, this new freedom is not to be equated with insecurity. Quite the reverse in fact. He gives his reasons in an interview with '7 Jours Europe' (7 Days in Europe), the weekly organ of the Commission's representation in France. Below, we reproduce an abridged version of what he said:

■ *The Schengen agreement has just come into force between seven EU Member States. What concrete effects will this have on their citizens?*

— For the first time, it will be possible to cross certain internal frontiers within the Union without being subject to personal checks. This is important for both political and practical reasons. In a political context, it proves that the aim in the Single European Act to eliminate controls on the movement of people within the single market is realistic, as long as the political will exists among Member States. Schengen points the way forward for the whole Union and I am very pleased about that. As for the practical reasons, the first point is that everyone benefits from the new freedom. There will be no discrimination between citizens of the Union, depending on whether or not they are nationals of the 'Schengen states'. In concrete terms, free circulation will apply as much to a Frenchman as to an Italian or a citizen of the UK. Nor will there be any discrimination at the internal frontiers between Union citizens and those of other countries.

Nationals of non-EU countries who are normally resident in one of the seven 'Schengen states' may in future travel to any of the others without a visa. The residence permit will constitute exemption from the need to obtain a visa for stays of less than three months. Moreover, nationals of states not belonging to the EU who enter from outside will no longer have to have several visas to travel to the seven countries applying the Schengen agree-

ment. A visa issued by any one of them will be recognised by the others.

I should emphasise that 26 March marks a beginning rather than an end. Italy and Greece have also signed the agreement while Denmark has indicated its interest in not being left out of the area where people can move freely. Additionally, the new Member States, Austria¹, Finland and Sweden, have expressed their intention to show their citizens that they belong to the Union in this concrete form.

■ *What will happen at airports?*

— The elimination of controls applies whatever mode of transport is used. In the case of road and rail, this means eliminating controls which up to now have generally been implemented by simple spot checks. But the main innovation is at the airports. A special area reserved for passengers coming from other Schengen states is to be set aside in every major airport within the seven countries. Checks will no longer be made on people entering or leaving this area, who will be treated in exactly the same way as domestic ticket-holders — in other words, only subject to the security checks that apply to all flights, to ensure the safety of passengers.

■ *Is there not a danger that the new system will lead to more illegal immigration and greater freedom of action for terrorists and criminals?*

— Contrary to what some people believe, internal security is more effectively taken care of between countries which

have eliminated their frontiers with one another than between those which retain a number of non-systematic border controls. Indeed, controls within the 'Schengen area' were only eliminated because effective and modern ways of cooperating between police forces were ready to replace them. As for illegal immigration, by establishing stronger controls at the external frontier, the Schengen countries have provided themselves with effective ways of acting together to combat unauthorised frontier crossings. It should be emphasised that the arrangements for issuing a national visa must take account of the security needs of the other Member States. This will be a much more effective system than the present one, in which failure to obtain a visa in one Member State can be evaded by first passing through another in which the desired visa is issued.

Regarding migration within the Schengen area, it would be anomalous for a national from an outside country who is legally resident in one Member State to become an illegal immigrant in another. It should moreover be pointed out that the principle of readmission remains sacred: for example, an Uzbek who has entered France illegally via Germany must be readmitted by Germany, since that is the country through which he entered the Schengen area.

Development of terrorism and organised crime has unfortunately not waited for the elimination of internal frontiers. We must have the courage to recognise that current frontier controls between EU member states do not provide a barrier against this scourge. How many criminals have unfortunately succeeded in crossing internal frontiers despite such controls? New forms of cooperation between police forces will be much more effective, in particular thanks to the 'Schengen information system', which is a central database of wanted people and objects. This must be accompanied, in each country in question, by legislation to protect personal data. It means that a person wanted by the police will no longer be able to evade pursuit by crossing an internal frontier. The same applies to drug seizures which, incidentally are much more frequently the result of good police intelligence than of spot checks at frontiers. ■

Interview by F. de Fouchécour-Cozals

¹ Since this interview took place, Austria has signed the Schengen Agreement.

The turbot war

On 9 March, Canadian coastguards stopped and inspected the Spanish trawler Estai in international waters, over 200 miles off the coast of Newfoundland. On 13 March, the European Union decided to freeze relations with Canada. What very quickly came to be called 'The Turbot War' in the media was the direct consequence of a dispute over fishing between Canada and Europe which had been simmering for some time.

The most recent disagreement between Ottawa and the EU began at the beginning of February at a meeting of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO). This organisation, which groups together 15 countries and whose aim is to regulate fishing and to protect fish stocks, decided to reduce the 'total allowable catch' of turbot from 60 000 to 27 000 tonnes. This decision, which was intended to conserve turbot stocks, was not opposed by the Union. However, Brussels protested against the distribution of quotas among the interested countries. In fact, during voting, although the NAFO usually conducts its business on the basis of consensus, Canada succeeded in obtaining 60% of the quota of authorised catches compared with only 12.6% for European fishermen. The main parties involved in this case are Spain and Portugal which, in 1994, fished 80% of the 60 000 tonnes of what is also referred to as the Greenland halibut. After the vote, the EU asked the NAFO Member States not to ratify this distribution and unilaterally awarded itself a quota of 18 630 tonnes, i.e. almost 70% of the total. The Canadian riposte was not long in coming. They accused the Europeans of not accepting NAFO's majority decision unless it suited them. Ottawa also declared itself prepared to 'prevent the European Union laying waste the turbot stocks' in the same way as it had already 'devastated' the cod fisheries.

Canada has long accused Spanish and Portuguese trawlers of being the cause of turbot depletion. Although it is difficult to determine who is principally responsible, given that Canadian and American vessels also fish in the zone in question, there is, no doubt that stocks of turbot and of fish in general have fallen to critical levels. A study carried out by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reveals that 70% of fish stocks are, to a greater or lesser extent, close to depletion and that turbot has declined by over 60%.

Fish do not respect frontiers

In response to the threat to the North Atlantic fishing grounds, the Canadian authorities decided under national law, in 1994, to extend their jurisdiction beyond the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. The EU properly pointed out that this was contrary to the law of the sea. However, although from a legal standpoint the Canadian legislation is questionable, it is understandable from an ecological point of view. Greenland halibut, like other migrating fish, do not respect frontiers. It is therefore necessary to limit catches both inside and outside the EEZs if the 'overlapping' stocks of halibut are to be conserved adequately. In full stride, now, Canada, which has for many years been self-appointed 'defender' of fish stocks, proposed a sixty-day moratorium on halibut fishing. This proposal was rejected by the EU. Paying this rejection no heed, at the beginning of March, Ottawa gave the Spanish and Portuguese trawlers present on the Grand Banks off Newfoundland notice to leave the area. Having complied with this order for 24 hours, some 15 Spanish vessels returned to the zone. Ottawa was not slow to react. On 9 March, after a dramatic pursuit, Canadian coastguards detained the Spanish trawler Estai.

Although this action on the part of Canada seriously aggravated relations between Ottawa and Brussels, Canadians and, in particular, fishermen in coastal provinces were fully behind the government's decision. The boarding of the vessel unleashed an upsurge of nationalist feeling which was much to the satisfaction of the Federal Government. The independence referendum campaign in Quebec was in full swing and there is nothing like the nomination of a foreign 'enemy' to reinvigorate feelings of national solidarity. Finally, although the Canadian authorities are, first and foremost, stressing the ecological argument to justify their actions, there is no doubt that economic considerations also played a part. According to an EU spokesman, the Canadians are hoping, through their manoeuvring, to pick up a larger slice of the cake, ecology coming only second. However, regardless of the motives offered, in this case economic concerns and ecology are closely linked. In fact, if turbot stocks continue to decline at the current rate, all nations fishing for this species will suffer.

'Piracy' or ecological imperative?

The conflict, which saw a rapid deterioration of relations between the two sides, with Brussels accusing Ottawa of piracy and the Canadians accusing the Europeans of taking part in an ecological massacre, receded somewhat in the wake of the release of the Estai and its crew. The EU and Canada returned to the negotiating table and managed to reach a settlement after some long and hard talks, over the Easter weekend. This agreement may serve as a model for the UN sponsored negotiations on managing underwater stocks in the high seas which resumed in March 1995. In any event, the dispute has served to highlight the problem of too many fishermen chasing too few fish, and has concentrated the minds of those involved on the importance of sustainable practices and effective conservation. ■

Francis Caas *

* Trainee with the ACP-UE Courier.

Social development

This Dossier was organised by The Courier to mark the First World Summit on Social Development held in Copenhagen from 6-12 March. As is clear from the name, this international meeting was the first ever to focus exclusively on social issues and it was convened at an appropriate time, with most regions of the world, whether rich or poor, affected by some form of social malaise. The presence in Copenhagen of a record 130 world leaders demonstrated widespread concern about a possible 'social breakdown' as the present century draws to a close. The Courier analyses the Summit and its results, and expands on some of the key issues.

The Copenhagen Summit A hunger for food and justice

The Copenhagen conference was the first UN summit to deal with the 'little' people or, as an official put it, people with a hunger for food and justice. But there is many a slip twixt cup and lip. Interests diverged greatly and people were fearful of breaking the fragile compromises reached in the preparatory meetings. Everyone attending had come to make a declaration of faith. You got out what you put in, and those who wanted to be happy were happy, while those who expected to be disappointed had their expectations fulfilled. They were all, or nearly all, there. And very few went so far as to claim that the outcome wasn't worth the effort.

At first sight the Declaration of the heads of government and the Action Programme, the two official documents signed at the Summit, seek to tackle the social challenges facing the planet 'head-on'. The Declaration includes such resolutions as 'we commit ourselves to working towards eliminating poverty in the world', 'we commit ourselves to making it possible for everyone to earn a living... and to continue to move towards full employment'. The Action Programme aims to 'reduce poverty' and even refers at one point to its 'elimination'. It repeats the list of objectives of certain specialist agencies of the UN: 80% of children to complete primary education by 2005 (Unicef), 42 developing countries out of 95 having already achieved this aim; 35 mortalities for every thousand live births, the current annual average being 70 per thousand and a reduction by three quarters in serious cases of malnutrition among children less

than five years old (WHO); official development assistance at a level of 0.7% of the gross national product (GNP) of donor countries, 20% of such assistance being devoted to social needs. The programme has set 1996 as the deadline for cancellation of the bilateral debt of the least developed countries (LDCs). Following up these good intentions is no less important. Thus, the Summit texts talk of the need to reduce military expenditure and expenditure on armaments 'as far as possible' in order to increase the resources available for social and economic development.

A second reading of the official documents reveals that most commitments are fixed neither in terms of figures nor of implementation deadlines. The heads of government state that they 'intend to' take, or 'envisage' taking action. Phrases such as 'as far as possible' or 'as soon as possible' are used to qualify statements of intent.

Heated exchanges

Whereas some unexpected alliances were forged at the Cairo Population conference, in Copenhagen there was a clear divide on most topics between North and South. The only qualification to this is that some European countries, notably from Scandinavia, often supported the developing countries.

From the preparatory committee stage onwards, this 'divide' manifested itself in a variety of areas. The Group of 77 (developing countries plus China) wanted to set the year 2000 as the deadline for achievement of the 0.7% GNP target. Japan and the USA opposed this. Most

Northern countries rejected demands for debt cancellation. Nor did the USA and Canada wish to hear any talk of 'new and additional financial resources' for social development, a phrase which cropped up in an initial version of the preparatory document. The final document only spoke of envisaging ways of finally solving the problems posed by servicing debt. Another point of disagreement concerned immigration. The USA wanted a situation in which only legal residents would be permitted to benefit as migrants from the 'essential services' provided by states to the most needy.

For their part, developed countries pressed for the inclusion of undertakings on sustainable development. The G77 took the view that the conference was not about the environment and that if the rich countries insisted on returning to the 'Agenda 21' agreed at Rio, then they should also be ready to meet the financial commitments made in this connection.

The 'battle' of the parentheses

The documents were all but finalised during the preparatory stage and the seven days in Copenhagen were only to be concerned with 'the words in parentheses', i.e. the points on which no agreement had been reached. This did not make the discussions any the less heated and their vehemence increased as the day of arrival of the heads of government approached.

One of the final episodes in the 'battle' of the parentheses was a confrontation between the USA and Cuba, the

latter supported by the G77. Cuba defended the text put forward, according to which states would 'refrain from applying coercive unilateral measures in violation of international law which hinder economic and social development'. The last-minute compromise was that the signatories would 'avoid applying coercive measures which are not in accordance with international law and the UN Charter and which undermine commercial relations between states'.

The week was full of similar incidents, with the Action Programme provoking most of the disagreements. The final text of its first chapter, concerning encouragement for social development, demands that ODA be increased 'as soon as possible bearing in mind the economic circumstances and the assistance capabilities of countries...' The 'right to development' gave way to a commitment 'to take measures to ensure development'. Regarding finance, the wording 'such resources must be both adequate and predictable' became 'maximising their availability'. Instead of 'ensuring high-quality employment', it will be necessary to respect the ILO agreements relating to this issue.

Regarding the eradication of poverty (chapter 2), access to preventive health care is no longer guaranteed, the representatives calling for primary health care services to be 'free and affordable'. On the other hand, the G77 managed to 'ensure' that a social security network be included in structural adjustment programmes which would have to be designed so as to reduce their negative effects. The offer of 'basic health services' was also upgraded to the 'highest possible level of physical and mental health'. The text includes a number of other advances, following the addition of paragraphs on the advancement of women, education about HIV/AIDS, raising environmental awareness and recognition of the links between the labour market and education policies. This should probably be regarded as a success, attributable to NGO lobbying. Definition of the resources to be allocated to these education and health objectives remains elusive, as does everything regarding financing. The Action Programme talks of mobilising 'additional financial resources... both bilateral and private, including loans on concessionary terms'.

Once again, there was a failure to specify amounts and resources. The international fund for social development,

called for by the developing countries and NGOs, which would have given greater credibility to the decisions made at the Summit, was not established. A veto by most of the rich countries prevented inclusion in the final declaration of a tax on financial transactions. This has been proposed by James Tobin, the winner of the Nobel Economics Prize, and was advocated in Copenhagen by numerous leaders of developing countries, notably the Guyanese President Cheddi Jagan, as well as by President Mitterrand of France and the Danish Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen.

Measures to encourage expansion of productive employment and reduce unemployment were confined to a call for ILO standards to be respected. Regarding the burning issue of arms spending, a call for this to be reduced 'without necessarily compromising security' was toned down by the recognition of 'legitimate national defence requirements'. A new section was added on social integration and family responsibilities, calling for support for families, a sense of responsibility on the part of family members, mutual respect and equal partnership between men and women.

One disappointment for the developing countries was the absence of concrete provisions on the implementation of undertakings made at the Summit. The necessary resources will no longer be 'available' as envisaged in the initial text. There is now only a simple call for them to be 'adequate, predictable and mobilised in order to maximise their availability'. The undertaking for developed countries to commit 0.7% of their GNP to ODA before the year 2000, which was passed in Rio at the request of the European countries, has vanished into thin air. Regarding the problem of resources, the developing countries, with a few reservations, have nonetheless reacted positively to the 20/20 principle (20% of ODA from the developed countries and 20% of the national budgets of the developing countries to be allocated to basic social programmes).

Hopes raised over debt

The developing countries also reacted favourably to the invitation to the World Bank and IMF to adopt 'an innovative approach in order to assist low-income countries with significant multilateral debts in order to reduce the burden of debt'. The explicit reference to Africa's

bilateral debt disappeared, to the great displeasure of that continent. But hopes about debt cancellation were initially raised only to be dashed subsequently. This hope was fed by a gesture from Denmark, which announced at the outset that it would cancel the debt owed to it by developing countries to the tune of \$166 million. Denmark made an impassioned plea for others to display similar generosity. Information emanating from a number of developing country even encouraged the belief that their moderate stance in the debates was due to a desire not to upset Western leaders who were likely to follow Denmark's example.

But the widely-awaited effect of Denmark's announcement failed to materialise. Only Austria responded, writing off debt amounting to about \$100 million. There was a passionate plea from François Mitterrand, who expressed the view that his earlier decision to write off LDC debts owed to France was the most generous to be taken by a rich country. This is true in absolute if not relative terms (Denmark is a much smaller country). Prime Minister Rasmussen returned to the attack at the end of the Summit by urging his counterparts to display generosity in the next few months. But there must be some concern that his voice was submerged in the hubbub of a meeting drawing to its close.

The Bretton Woods institutions and numerous Western countries, under the leadership of the USA, sought to demonstrate that debt cancellation would have few positive effects, and might even be harmful to developing countries. It would be interesting to know if these arguments caused some people to waver in their conviction? Certainly, the Eritrean President, Iyasu Afewerki expressed the view that such a write-off would not help many African countries, arguing that their main problems lay elsewhere.

A policy almost without substance

The discussions on the Declaration were characterised by less North-South controversy than those on the Action Programme, with moral issues more to the fore. Immediately before the heads of government arrived, last minute pressure was exerted to bring about a modification of undertaking number 10 of the Declaration relating to education and health. Iran demanded that the text should give religious groups the status of partners

in the provision of education, and won its case despite Tunisia's opposition. On religious intolerance, the basic text called for 'the application where appropriate of laws and other regulations against racism, racial discrimination, religious intolerance, xenophobia and all forms of discrimination at all levels of society'. The words 'where appropriate' appeared in brackets. In diplomatic parlance, this term is used to imply that an obligation has priority over national legislation. Japan and the USA supported Iran against the European countries. Finally the term 'appropriate laws' was included instead and Iran succeeded in having religious intolerance qualified by 'in all its forms', which addition was supposed to diminish the strictness of the stipulation. As usual in this kind of international sparring match, the Vatican supported Iran, which also found a rather more unusual ally in Benin.

Despite the obvious concern of many to avoid overly political topics at the Summit, the discussion surrounding this tenth undertaking brought politics back onto the agenda. When, for example the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reiterated his conviction that a number of serious social problems found all over the planet should be dealt with in a global way, the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng fiercely defended the right of each country to determine its own social system, opposing what he perceived as a desire to interfere. And there was, of course, the ongoing confrontation between Cuba and the USA.

Behind the scenes, one issue which is now a recurring theme, was the increasing part played by the Vatican State in UN conferences, as self-appointed 'arbiter' in decisions where moral issues are involved. The desirability of giving priority to the Vatican over other religious faiths was once again questioned.

Summit of fear?

Another increasingly common situation at international conferences is the habit of a number of countries (often the same ones) of making reservations on everything relating to procreation and the family. On this occasion, the Holy See, Argentina, Ecuador, Sudan and Malta expressed reservations in this area. Iraq also made a reservation relating to its own particular circumstances, arguing that the

social consequences of trade sanctions had not been sufficiently emphasised.

Apart from this, the Declaration and Action Programme were signed by 120 leaders attending the Summit. However, despite the apparent unanimity, it was not possible to conceal the frustrations felt by participants. These came to the surface in the course of press conferences and post-Summit declarations, and sometimes found expression in outbreaks of humour. The contribution of the President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, who provided an improvisation on the theme of the selfishness of the rich who have gained their riches from the poor will not be forgotten. A similar memorable moment occurred when Gro Harlem Brundtland drew attention to the sign displaying the demands of the NGOs which was mounted at the entrance to the Summit meeting room. Ms Brundtland, the Prime Minister of Norway, had previously made scathing comments about her Northern counterparts who set off for Copenhagen with 'pockets full of air and mouths full of promises'. Before a panel of world leaders, she gave a parody of Martin Luther King, mocking the seven days of declarations made at the Bella Centre and claiming that any attempt to use them to pay bills would quite rightly be turned down by a bank with the words 'bounced cheque'. It is worth remembering that her country is part of a select group of just four countries (the others are Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) that have achieved the 0.7% GNP objective for ODA. The Swedish Prime Minister, in his turn, called on the West to avoid replacing the cold war with 'cold feet' isolationism.

Another member of the chorus of protestors, Cheddi Jagan of Guyana, made the following critical remark: 'We have come to the Summit and all we have heard about is free trade in one big integrated hemisphere'. He went on to cite, with irony, an example of the 'benefits' of free trade. The Caribbean Basin Initiative launched by President Reagan in the 1980s to assist the countries of the region had led to a doubling of US exports to the Basin between 1984 and 1993. US imports of Caribbean goods remained severely limited. The 'benefit', of course, is for the United States! The plea by President Mitterrand for a 'Tobin Tax', named after the aforementioned winner of the Nobel Economics Prize was very well received in Copenhagen. But the President of Guyana advocated this a long time ago,

in his analysis entitled 'Global Human Order'. He considers that a 'Tobin Tax' of just 0.1% would yield billions. The Netherlands, for their part, regretted that questions of poverty and exclusion in the Northern countries had not been broached.

Complete optimists were rare although US representatives were certainly 'upbeat'. They were keen to extol the provisions relating to the elimination of poverty, programmes of structural adjustment, advancement of women, workers' rights and the integration of the handicapped and other marginal groups. On the other hand, those who felt the Summit had achieved nothing were also thin on the ground. Most considered that though it did not yield tangible results, it will certainly act as a catalyst and a starting point for a new awareness of problems. Boutros Boutros-Ghali considered that the presence of so many heads of government was an encouraging sign, and could be taken as assurance that the Summit would bear fruit. This was especially true now that there is general acceptance of the view that today's serious social problems stem from a lack of security which affects the whole of humankind. While declaring support for the alternative NGO declaration, Juan Somavia, the Chilean diplomat who organised the conference, stated that the Summit had delivered a message of change and that it would enable the least regarded members of humanity to return to the stage. He thought that the commitment to eradicate poverty was of historical importance. In the name of G77, the Philippines representative, Cielito Habito stated that the meeting had been very worthwhile regarding debt, the possibility of new resources and the 20/20 arrangement.

Others saw the Summit as a success because heads of government had taken part out of fear that a social cataclysm affecting the whole world may follow on from the more limited catastrophes which have marred the new world order. This could be termed the 'Rwanda-Bosnia-Chechnya' effect. But, when all is said and done, is action motivated by fear the best basis on which to proceed? ■

Hégel Goutier

Delors behind the scenes at the Summit

'Saving Lomé is of great political importance, not only for those countries which are signatories to the Lomé Convention, but also for the political unity of Europe.'

Jacques Delors, the former President of the European Commission, whose opinion is sought by a large number of international bodies, (in this case by the organisers of the first UN Social Summit), was at Copenhagen as a matter of course. After the press conference given by the French President, which he attended, the *Courier* asked him briefly if he was keeping up-to-date with the position regarding the ACP countries, especially following the ups and downs of the ACP/EU negotiations on mid-term review of the Lomé Convention. We also thought it would be interesting to give Mr Delors' opinion on the Summit which he expressed in response to a question from another journalist.

Jacques Delors

I think that the idea of a social convention (defended by President Mitterrand at the press conference — ed.) is linked to a proposal which I put forward at a Council where we discussed the subject of economic security. This was to bring together all the international organisations and not to focus solely on monetary aspects or short term adjustment. What is needed in reality is to ensure lasting development in a healthy and stable economic climate and the 'take-off' of those countries which have not yet achieved this goal. It will, however, be impossible if each organisation works separately; especially if some of them, such as the International Labour Organisation, receive less of a hearing than others. My proposal is therefore that the full range of relevant international institutions should get together with all the national representatives and regional organisations to work out a global approach for the entire world. There is a lot of talk about globalisation but in reality, it is difficult to identify any concrete action so far.

The Courier

Don't you regret that there was no discussion of unemployment and poverty in Europe?

Jacques Delors

I told Mr. Somavia (the organiser of the Copenhagen conference — ed.) right from the start that we shouldn't attempt to cover everything. The inevitable result was a discussion between the rich Northern countries and the poor Southern ones. The other subjects need to be discussed in a separate conference. There is a lot to say about the causes of poverty in rich states, but much of it is specific to those countries. Trying to cover too much led to a failure to deal with everything on the agenda. When I met the organisers, I asked them what their theme was going to be. And when

they mentioned three subjects to me, I told them that that was two too many for maximum effect, not just to ensure an immediate impact on public opinion, but also effective follow-up.

The Courier

Do you, acting from the outside, have a part to play to save the Lomé Convention, which appears to be under threat?

Jacques Delors

Yes, yes, of course. I think that it is a problem of solidarity between countries. We cannot allow ourselves to fall back from the level the Community has achieved so far, which is worth maintaining. Our countries decided to grant some of their aid in a multilateral form and the end result of such aid is increasingly satisfactory. You know that, instead of



having large-scale general programmes, we are financing specific projects and that we have no desire to take the leaders of recipient countries by the hand and guide them through development. We want instead to finance specific projects and, you know, projects which are also supported as

part of bilateral cooperation between certain countries. It is therefore an effective approach and it is an extremely important political question, not just for the countries which are signatories to the Lomé Convention, but also in order to preserve the political unity of Europe.

The Courier

And can you influence the way in which events will develop?

Jacques Delors

We must work to persuade those who remain unconvinced. ■ Interview by H.G.

François Mitterrand

'Disagreement will continue if our partners insist on their desire to reduce aid to the ACP countries.'



From the long press conference given by President Mitterrand, which was one of the high points of the Copenhagen Summit, we are reproducing two of his answers of particular interest to the ACP countries, the second of which was made in response to a question from the Courier.

François Mitterrand (on the difficulties experienced in connection with the Lomé convention)

I personally think that it would be a very serious error for the European Union to abandon or reduce the ambitions which it set for itself when it raised the Lomé

resources to ECU 12 billion. This was done under conditions which were just as difficult as those of today. What's more, I remember the prognoses, as I myself was involved, when it was said: 'We'll never go beyond ECU 9 billion'. In fact, we decided on ECU 12 billion. Now we have come up against an obstacle because several countries think that their internal situations will not allow them to be generous with regard to other countries. I stress that this would be a serious error. The sums involved are not so large that they justify endangering the general policy of developed countries vis-a-vis developing ones. I am thinking of African

countries in particular, here, although they are not the only ones involved, of course. As long as I am responsible for it, and I am in agreement with the government on this, France's policy will be to reject any reduction. This means that the disagreement will continue if our partners insist on their desire to reduce aid to the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries.

The Courier

President Mitterrand, there is reason to believe that many African countries were expecting France to write off their debts, following Denmark's example. You, who they see as their defender, have not done so. Was your decision partly out of courtesy for your successor?

François Mitterrand

What more do you want? We have written off the public debts of 39 countries, almost all of which are in Africa. We have also taken specific measures to reduce the indebtedness of five or six countries classed as intermediate. No other country has made an effort like ours. Your question implies that we ought to decide to write off all debts without exception. I will tell you straightaway that this is not so far from my own personal view although such an approach would lead to numerous problems. Nevertheless, the effort made by France is the most significant one made so far anywhere in the world. It is therefore rather upsetting to be taken to task for not having done more. I agree that the problem of indebtedness should not be allowed to continue to spoil relations between developing countries and the richest ones. But unfortunately that is what is happening. ■

Interview by H.G.

The challenges of investing in human capital

by Armeane M. Choksi *

The World Summit on Social Development, attended by almost 100 heads of state, placed in high relief the issue of investments in human capital to alleviate the plight of the poor. Clearly, the challenge of economic progress in the developing world, in the broadest sense, is to improve the quality of life of the poor. Experience shows that this improvement results from moving simultaneously on two parallel tracks, namely *economic reforms*, to provide stability and an enabling environment for growth, and *investing in people* in the fields of education, health, nutrition and family planning. Successful countries have, in fact, moved on both these fronts to form a virtuous circle of development. There is — and can be — no delinking between economic reforms and effective investments in human capital.

The positive link between the overall economic system and investments in the human capital of the population can be seen from the cases of Pakistan and Korea. In 1960, the two countries had similar levels of income but, by 1985, Korea's GDP *per capita* was nearly three times that of Pakistan. What had Korea done differently from Pakistan? It had invested three times as much in its human capital, and it had done this in a very different and far more supportive overall economic policy environment than Pakistan. In 1960, fewer than a third of Pakistan's children were enrolled in primary school, while Korea had already achieved nearly universal enrolment in primary education. One defining characteristic of all East Asian countries is that they invested much more in human capital than most countries at similar stages of

development and had adopted more liberal and open economic policies than most developing countries. The so-called 'East Asia miracle' is really a misnomer. These countries achieved high growth by getting the basics right.

Investment in people in and of themselves will not be of high quality unless the overall economic policy framework within which these investments take place is conducive and supportive. This implies macroeconomic stability, a market-oriented economy, an open trade and investment regime, access to world markets, the right structure of incentives and the proper functioning of capital, financial and labour markets. These economic policies are needed to ensure that the investments in human capital are indeed of high quality. The quality of these investments is at least as important, if not more so, than the quantity.

Specifically, investing in *education* makes sound economic sense. Evidence across a wide variety of developing countries shows that investments in education — particularly at the primary level — boost productivity and economic growth. A better-educated person is also productive because he or she absorbs new information faster and applies unfamiliar inputs and new processes more effectively.

Education for girls

Investing in girls' education makes even more economic sense. This shows higher returns than investment in education for boys, which is not surprising. Many studies show that mothers channel more of their own incomes to expenditures on children than do fathers and, in virtually all societies, women are much more heavily involved in the immediate care of children


and in the critical decisions about food, sanitation, and general nurturing, all of which affect children's health and development. Better educated women have fewer and healthier children.

In Africa, one out of five children dies before the age of five if the mother has no education. The probability is more than halved for children whose mothers have seven years of education. In South Asia, women with no education have seven children on average. Those with seven or more years of education have fewer than four children. Women who receive education, and are then employed, also provide role models for young girls.

Investments in *health* increase people's alertness, capacity for learning, and ability to cope with and enjoy life. In addition, they bring benefits to the country's economy, because they release resources that can be used to achieve other development goals. Healthier workers are more productive and have longer working lives.

The direct economic impact of investments in health are very telling. One example is the effect of sickness on loss of

No schooling for these shanty town children in the Philippines
Investment in education doesn't just have social benefits — it also makes sound economic sense



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work time. Workers in Ghana, Indonesia and Peru report they are sick between three and five days a month on average — this is a lot of sickness! Worst of all, these days lost from work amount to a potential income loss of between 3% and 7% per month in these countries. These poorer countries and families can ill afford such losses.

And now, a recent study has shown that maternal nutritional deficiencies — specifically Vitamin A deficiency — can affect the transmission of HIV, the virus that causes AIDS.

A critical area that has long been neglected, and that provides a tremendous opportunity to reduce poverty and promote growth, is early childhood development. Currently, three million children die every year because of lack of clean water. Twelve million under the age of five die in the developing world, and 130 million do not have access to even primary education. More than a million children are blind because they do not get enough Vitamin A. An estimated 50 million are seriously impaired mentally and physically because their diets lack iodine.

Some of the most serious problems can now be prevented relatively easily and at low cost by immunisation and nutrition programmes. It would, for example, cost about \$15 per person to immunise children in low-income countries against seven of the most dangerous diseases.

Hard-headed economics

Clearly, investing in human capital is good economics. It leads to higher income and more economic growth — and to more education, and better health of this and the next generation. The rates of return on these investments are very high — much higher than the traditional sectors of infrastructure, agriculture and transport. For example, the rate of return to primary education in developing countries is 18%. It is not just the soft-hearted who should be concerned with improving health, education and other programmes. It is the hard-headed as well.

The past 50 years have witnessed the World Bank's evolution from an organisation originally created for the



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reconstruction of post-war Europe, into a modern institution seeking partnership with its clients in opening up markets and strengthening economies to improve living standards and expand prosperity for people everywhere. The early emphasis on infrastructure projects has been replaced by investment in human resources, with World Bank lending in this area increasing sharply from an average of about 5% of the total in 1980 to more than 17% in 1994.

The World Bank is now the single largest source of external finance for investment in education and health, particularly primary education and basic health, where the impact on economic growth and poverty reduction is the greatest.

The Bank's main objective in the area of human capital development is to help developing countries to reach the point where limits to investment in people (in education, health, nutrition and so on) no longer hold back growth or keep people in poverty. Its approach has been to:

- emphasise the importance of economic liberalisation and the integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
- increase its total lending devoted to investments in people;
- emphasise the basics, assisting countries to increase access to quality primary

Bottle feeding time at a Tanzanian orphanage
Early childhood development is a critical area that has long been neglected

schooling (particularly for girls), and to provide cost-effective basic health and clinical services, and take an integrated approach to population policy;

- give special attention and intensified emphasis to early childhood development, including immunisations, pre-school education programmes, and the provision of vitamins and other nutritional supplements;
- further increase operations designed to remove barriers to women's participation in economic development; and,
- work with all borrowers and partners in a joint effort to help attain — within the next generation — universal primary education of good quality, access to a minimum package of cost-effective health care, and the elimination of malnutrition. ■

A.M.C.

World Bank and IMF on trial

The Copenhagen 'hearing'

Those who drafted the source document for the Social Summit claimed at the preparatory committee stage that economic problems were not on the agenda at Copenhagen. They also introduced an article of 'liberal' faith in the first undertaking of the action programme when they claimed: 'We favour dynamic, open and competitive markets and guarantee everyone, and in particular the poorest and most disadvantaged, greater and more equitable access to such markets'. But such statements were of little avail. The two big international financial institutions — the World Bank and the IMF — still found themselves 'in the dock', accused by many of being 'antisocial'. And this was just one of a number of criticisms. The issue was encapsulated by officials from Mali who noted that prior to 1984, debt servicing was the second biggest item in their country's budget. Since structural adjustment, it had become the largest component, ahead of education and health.

Structural adjustment is always in the dock, but in this case it was the 'safety nets' provided in social programmes and intended to alleviate the impact of the adjustment which were under fire from NGOs, developing countries and their allies in Copenhagen. The links between the above-mentioned financial organisations and the United Nations itself were also criticised, with the claim being made that the latter is not in control, and therefore failing to live up to its founding principles. There were also mutterings about the profits of the World Bank, which are said to amount to a billion dollars per year, implying that the charity it prescribes really does begin at home. An internal World Bank report (the Wapenhans report) has, it must be acknowledged, added grist to the mill of its detractors, by accepting that the 'safety nets' are rather threadbare in places. There were 'serious problems' with

20% of the 1800 programmes of this type and the number of 'lame ducks' had considerably increased. It was also ascertained that some social programmes linked with adjustment, which were supposed to act as models, had not lived up to expectation. This, for example, was the case with Agetiip (the agency for carrying out public works to combat under-employment) in Senegal, according to the conclusions of a joint mission of the Bank and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).

One of the most aggressive 'prosecutors' in the case was Michel Chossudovsky, an economist at the University of Ottawa and a member of the Committee for cancelling Third World Debt. He accused the drafters of the Copenhagen document of duplicity: 'If a poverty threshold of 1 dollar per inhabitant per day is selected, as defined in the document, only 33% of the population of the Third World is defined as poor...The bank is fiddling the figures to make out that poor people are in a minority and to justify the concept of vulnerable groups on which campaigns should be targeted'. This means that, in order to keep prices realistic, social services, which are being extensively priv-



Malian children at school
Debt servicing has overtaken the budgets for education and health since the structural adjustment

atised throughout the South, must be paid for by those who are scarcely less impoverished than the recipients. Chossudovsky also pointed out that 'the United Nations document does not provide any analysis at all of the causes of the slump and dogmatically asserts that the neo-liberal model is the right one'. He quoted the official document: 'Internationalisation creates new opportunities for sus-

Tema Port in Ghana, a model country as far as structural adjustment is concerned. According to the UN, 'internationalisation opens up new opportunities for sustained economic growth... especially in developing countries'



tained economic growth and for development of the world economy, especially in developing countries.' He considered that the document expressed no reservations about excessive deregulation, the injustice of unequal trade and access to credit. He thought that many NGOs had fallen into the trap of criticising individual details rather than attacking the entire edifice.

The World Bank and the IMF kept their cool. They began to mount their defence, with some notable 'trumpet-blowing' at the preparatory committee stage. During the months preceding the Summit, they prepared a whole series of documents on their activities, as if seeking to forestall the inevitable attacks. In Copenhagen, they combined appeals to their audience with a pedagogical approach. The IMF, for example, invited the NGOs to a discussion of economic policies. Its representatives emphasised, to a packed meeting, the social concern underlying its five priorities for long-lasting developments: to take control of the monetary system, especially by reducing inflation which is really a source of indirect tax on the poorest members of society; progressively to eliminate all the barriers to a smoothly functioning market; to open up the economies of Member States to international trade and exchanges with the outside world; to institute active social policies to reduce poverty and unemployment and protect the less vulnerable sections of society; and to insist on proper management of public affairs — what the British term 'good governance'. The IMF went on to define the short term as being three years. Countries which have taken longer to introduce a policy of structural adjustment have failed to follow the prescriptions of the financial institutions.

When asked why it was refusing to write off or reduce the debts of less advanced countries, the IMF replied that this would be a bad signal, but that it was planning debt repayment facilities. 'Developing countries have every interest in giving pride of place to repayment of their debts to other countries,' according to the Fund. 'Otherwise they will lose all credibility with their financial backers'.

Those against structural adjustment maintained that African countries



The Courier

have been pressurised to such an extent that they are frequently no longer eligible for loans from the African Development Bank (AfDB). The institutional autonomy of that organisation, therefore, existed only in theory. They deplored the fact that the arrangements determined by the G-7 in Naples had done little to alleviate the burden of African debt. For example, it was only reduced by 3% in the case of Uganda. Ravi Kanbur, the World Bank's chief economist for Africa pleaded 'not guilty' to this charge. He considered that the budget deficit of the country was to blame, maintaining that multilateral institutions only hold a quarter of the claims on African countries, 60% of which result from bilateral debts. Another of the Bank's high-ranking officials thought that debt elimination would increase the cost of Bank loans. He believed that attention should be given to countries with extremely low incomes and even then, complete cancellation could not be considered. Complaints were also made about the World Bank encouraging agricultural over-production, which has led to a drop in world prices. The Bank saw its encouragement of production as going hand in hand with a reduction in regional taxes on products. Under such conditions, it argued, the increase in production has led to an increase in farmers' income, despite the fall in market prices.

The representatives of the World Bank and the IMF considered that the best form of defence was attack. They said that writing off the debt could lead to undesirable effects on developing countries. Rathan Bhatia, the IMF representative to the United Nations maintained at the meeting with the NGOs that, according to a study carried out by his organisation, the debts of middle-income countries were 'not too bad'. Only the debts of the poorest countries gave cause for concern. He thought that cancelling the debt of a developing country would only result in economic growth of about 0.5 %, achieved at the high price of a lack of faith on the

Groundnuts in Senegal
Complaints about World Bank
encouragement of agricultural over-
production... which leads to lower
prices on world markets

part of potential investors. The critics were unfair and out of date, he argued. Structural adjustment was a life raft for countries facing problems, whether developed or developing. When it was suggested that the structural adjustment programmes which have been implemented in Africa for many years now have proved futile, Rathan Bhatia admitted that African countries did have special problems, but claimed that these were due to their instability, which discourages investors, and also to the limited scale and therefore lack of attractiveness of their economies.

The defence and counter-attack were followed by a burst of magnanimity. The World Bank announced that it had prepared programmes which will enable the poorest countries to wipe out debt amounting to 1 billion dollars in the short term, with another 3 billion in the offing.

After the discussions, the official texts adopted in Copenhagen called on the World Bank and the IMF 'to adopt an innovative approach in order to help low-income countries with large multilateral debts'. Against the odds, the developing countries managed to ensure that 'a social security net' is attached to structural adjustment programmes. It was also decided that the UN would keep a closer watch on certain working committees of the two Bretton Woods institutions. The latter maintained that this is no innovation and that the 'exhortations' of the Summit are already current practice as far as they are concerned. Nonetheless, the events at Copenhagen seemed very much like a shot across their bows, and their efforts to justify themselves perhaps mean that the point has been taken. ■

H.G.

Copenhagen

The no-frills report of a European public servant

by Pierre Defraigne*

This text was not intended for publication. It is an open report, free from diplomatic circumlocutions, written on-the-spot by a public servant on assignment, to record his impressions of a pivotal international forum. The *Courier* is pleased to be able to offer it to you for two reasons: firstly because its analysis of the results of the Copenhagen Summit is clear-sighted, and, secondly, because it offers an unusual insight into one aspect of the work of the European Commission.

The major outlines of what was achieved in Copenhagen are gradually becoming clearer after hundreds of hours of negotiations, conducted in parallel at several levels in a less enthusiastic frame of mind than was the case in Rio (Conference on the Environment) and less fervently than in Cairo (Conference on Population and Development).

The sole fact of having brought together the biggest meeting of Heads of State and Government ever convened on a topic both as neglected and as controversial as social progress is a major event in itself. The price to be paid in return for attendance by the world's leaders at the highest level was to avoid radical debate of the world economic system itself, the counterpart of its efficiency being increased inequality between countries and within countries, or of the political systems which still prevail in many countries in the South and which ignore human rights and development. On the other hand, this was a propitious opportunity to rouse the international conscience and it was indeed seized. This Summit did not therefore result in any spectacular advance, but it did mark progress in several fields which, taken

together, give new direction to development policies.

The positive side

Positive elements resulting from the Summit were as follows:

Firstly, a multidimensional, global, common approach to development is gradually emerging as an alternative to North/South confrontation. The idea that the quality of internal development policies and access to international markets are more effective than external public aid is gaining ground everywhere. Copenhagen introduced the idea that greater emphasis ought to be given to human development both for economic reasons (gains in productivity) and for social reasons (justice and stability). Human development and sustained development appear henceforth to be inseparable; the eradication of extreme poverty, a reduction in inequality and the place accorded civil society and education contribute to protecting the environment.

Although the superior efficiency of the market has now been recognised, its shortfalls (flaws in competition, external influences and short-sightedness) and limitations (unequal distribution of income) are also better perceived and, consequently, the need for corrective political actions, particularly to ensure a more equitable distribution of productive resources and of the fruits of growth, and more prudent management of natural resources, is the subject of a growing consensus.

Complementarity of national policies and international action is more evident than ever, owing to interdependence. This interdependence is no longer limited to the economic and financial sphere, where it continues to be consolidated. Since Rio, it is also recognised at an ecological level. Copenhagen also

clearly reveals that interdependence profoundly affects the social sector: voluntary or forced migrations are only the most obvious manifestation of this, and, from now on, it is at the very heart of our societies that the process of globalisation is destabilising social structures, forcing people to move and adjust, generating new divisions between winners and losers in the internationalisation of commercial and financial markets.

Consequently, the international context of social development must be strengthened. Despite reluctance on the part of some developing countries, it was confirmed for the first time by the United Nations that human rights were part and parcel of the whole development problem. The idea that human rights and fundamental liberties are universal values and that State sovereignty cannot be used as a pretext for ignoring or restricting them, is gaining ground. In this respect, Copenhagen confirmed what was accomplished in Vienna. Moreover, it is now accepted that human rights include the right to (individual) development and that it is therefore impossible to say that the entitlement to (collective) development and human rights are in opposition. Finally, the theory of equal rights for men and women is gaining ever greater ground over the notion of fairness, a concept put forward by some countries.

The progressive generalisation of ILO conventions in relation to fundamental workers' rights is essential if freedom of trade is to lead to more equitable wealth distribution in developing countries. It is also needed to ensure fair competition in order to prevent protectionism. The explicit and priority need to integrate the social dimension into IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes is accepted.

More effective use of development aid and its rechanneling towards the social sector is illustrated by the approach of the 20/20 bilateral agreements: 20% of official development assistance devoted to basic social programmes as against 20% of national public resources allocated to the same objectives. The burden of official debt will be lightened within this framework.

The proposal to organise a meeting devoted to social development, on the eve of each Development Committee meeting of the World Bank, between the

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UN Secretary General and the Directors General of the IMF and World Bank and, from now on, the ILO, has been approved.

The other side of the coin

Cultural and religious differences are being reinforced and becoming increasingly noticeable. They have been revealed, particularly, in the undertaking concerning health and education but, above all, in relation to human rights. Some Muslim countries fiercely resist the formulation of rights for women, more liberal customs and religious pluralism, and for a large number of developing countries democracy, human rights and the role of civil society are still controversial or even radically contested subjects. Some successful countries, notably in Asia, justify their reluctance to provide such rights on the grounds that they might interfere with the 'right to development'. They are also rejected by countries with authoritarian regimes or reactionary oligarchies that have no real concern for development.

These divisions, which were already present in Cairo, persisted in Copenhagen and were behind most of the difficulties encountered during negotiation. In contrast, it will be noted that Asian countries (such as India) and countries in Latin America (such as Chile, Mexico and Brazil) support evolution towards universal values on the subjects of human rights, fundamental liberties and equality between men and women, even within the Group of 77.

On the subject of resources, aid fatigue is gaining ground: the 0.7% objective is a distant goal. Partly for good reason and partly for the sake of change, more and more emphasis is being placed on the quality of official development assistance and on the contribution of the private sector, including in the social fields. Too much aid is still being distributed on the basis of strategic and commercial interests and its effectiveness will improve only slowly.

The international financial markets are contributing increasingly significant resources to developing countries, but the problems they pose are still left out of the debate. On the one hand, the problem of the amplification, by the international money market, of the external shocks to

which the fragile economies of developing countries and countries in transition and engaged in reforms are exposed, is not being studied seriously. Any serious debate on this topic within the United Nations is prevented by the fear on the part of industrialised countries of seeing the free movement of capital by the developing countries once again called into question. On the other hand, little attention is given to certain serious dysfunctional aspects of the financial markets: expatriation of capital linked to corruption or to fraud and tax evasion; money laundering. These problems have dimensions which are at once economic (and, owing to their breadth, their impact can sometimes be macroeconomic), ethical and political, which interfere with development. Once again these questions are evoked without being properly discussed.

Monitoring a summit such as this is essential, since it marks the point of departure of new policies on the part of states and international organisations. Results and methods should therefore be evaluated regularly and at a significant political level. This monitoring and follow-up system remains to be drawn up by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). There is a risk that industrialised countries will encounter great difficulty in setting up a technically effective and politically credible monitoring system because they will be accused of interference by developing countries.

The EU's image

As regards internal coordination, we can feel satisfied that the common positions have generally been presented by France fairly and convincingly. European Union positions often appeared to the participants as being constructive and reasonable: the EU demonstrated both its cohesion and strength to make proposals. Internal coordination revealed the wealth of expertise and diversity of positions of Member States. On the one hand, we had at our disposal an exceptional pool of technical and political knowledge and, on the other, by making a continuous effort to be succinct, we proposed well-balanced common positions capable of serving as a sound basis for a more general consensus within the UN.

However, although our work is recognised by the participants at the Conference, awareness of it outside that forum is low because we have an image problem (institutional complexity and difficulty in defining the role of the EU with respect to the Member States) and a communication problem. The United Nations always beat us in this area!

With more specific reference to the Commission, the speech given by President Santer to the Heads of State and Government was refreshing and innovative and it was perceived as such since this privilege has not been extended to any other leader of an international organisation or institution, however impressive. Copenhagen thus signified the crossing of an institutional threshold for the Commission, a result both of full-participant status and of the support of the Secretary General of the UN, sensitive to the active involvement of the Commission in preparing for the Summit. The President's speech preceded that of Mr Mandela and he spoke to a packed auditorium which was very receptive to his message.

Mr Flynn's speech in the ministerial session gave a very convincing picture of a social Europe which is being built with difficulty, but with ambition and generosity.

The Commission's services gave a very solid and dynamic contribution to the internal coordination process, both in the field of basic guidelines and strategy and of specific compromise formulations which were very warmly welcomed by our Member States.

The conviction and expertise of the French Presidency were of considerable help to the Commission which necessarily has a difficult and hybrid role (providing expertise and 'overseeing' events) at a UN conference.

The Commission's delegation included MEPs (Mrs Gyldenkilde, Mr Chantierie and Mr Skinner) and representatives from the EU's Economic and Social Committee. ■

Copenhagen, 12 March 1995
P.D.

From Rio to Beijing

The long march of civil society

The 1990s have seen the UN return to the social issues outlined at the 1990 World Summit on Children. The change was really first seen at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro where 'civil society', represented above all by NGOs, played a prominent role. This was followed by the World Human Rights Conference in Vienna in 1993, where the debate turned out not to be as passionate as expected, given the subject matter. There

was, however, no lack of passion in Cairo at the Conference on Population and Development which was held in September 1994. In Rio, the participants 'discovered' the planet Earth and were given a jolt in the process. In Cairo, it was women's issues that came to the fore. Women's organisations played a central part once again in Copenhagen and in September, they will occupy centre stage at the World Conference on Women which will take place in Beijing. Although 'civil society' has succeeded in making its mark at recent UN conferences, the organisations involved have had to fight hard to arrive at this point. To use appropriate Chinese imagery, the route from Rio to Beijing has indeed been a 'long march'.

The UN has just set itself a goal at the first Social Summit in Copenhagen — to reduce poverty. One may well ask what is new. After all, the UN Charter of 1945 includes the objective of eradicating poverty. And it is not lacking in detail when it comes to social objectives. Article 55, for example, aims at achieving better living conditions, full employment, and economic and social development. It was to have been the task of the UN's specialised institutions to meet these objectives. However, the Cold War meant that the hopes and values that flowered briefly at the end of the Second World War soon receded. The world divided into camps set apart by wealth, ideology and mutual suspicion, and social concerns were swiftly relegated. It was necessary to await the fall

of the Berlin Wall and rising disillusionment with the new world order before they could regain a place high on the list of global priorities. It took hordes of the newly impoverished, the dreaded emergence of what some see as a new type of barbarism and, above all, anguish on one's own doorstep (misery having become established in even the richest countries) for the UN to think again about the need to make nations cooperate in the quest for individual welfare.

The UN's 'return' to social issues has been an agonising process. Despite the impetus given by the two most recent Secretaries General, bureaucracy, paralysis, national self-centredness, the requirements of domestic politics and reluctance to adopt the language of ordinary people have all combined to hinder the process. The new ambiguous relationship between states and the groups within them that constitute 'civil society', have forced the latter to fight to avoid rejection, but also to prevent themselves becoming part of the 'establishment'. The relationships between official conferences and parallel NGO conferences are a good illustration of this. Copenhagen was symptomatic: the NGO forum was relegated to Holmen, some kilometres from the actual Summit but a number of officials, ranging from the Chairman of the Conference to Mrs Hillary Clinton, made the trip to speak to the NGOs. NGO representatives also acted as advisers and sometimes even as full members of certain national delegations.

Rio: a torrent of 'inadequate' promises

The ambiguities in the UN's renewed approach to social matters are demonstrated particularly if one looks at the time taken in following up undertakings made in Rio. Many NGOs see the circumlocutions of politicians as evidence of a lack of will pointing to a need for greater

determination on their part to continue the struggle. Yet as far as the diplomats are concerned, the lapse of 'just' three years between the Rio Conference and the first follow-up session, which took place recently in Berlin, represents a record. It is this kind of thing which disconcerts the man in the street. Another disconcerting aspect is that, in Berlin, a decision was made not to make a decision about anything. The undertakings of the Earth Summit were effectively put 'on hold'. In Rio, the developed countries agreed to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Angela Merkel, the German Environment Minister who chaired the conference said in her address that this was the only genuinely important point on the agenda. It was vital, she felt, to adapt the Rio undertakings in order 'to prevent any dangerous disturbance of the climatic system'. But this is too expensive, insisted a number of OECD countries. It would jeopardise economic revival and standards of living, without any scientific certainty that reduced consumption of fossil fuels would have a positive influence on the greenhouse effect. 30 or so countries from the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, which risk being submerged if global warming increases, believed that the mere existence of the danger should be enough to justify action. It is worth noting that some nations who see themselves as 'representatives' of the Third World, such as China, India and Brazil, are also major polluting countries. Oil-producing states do not support ecological measures either. The surface temperature of the earth has increased by 0.5° in 50 years, according to the experts, and a further increase of 1.5° to 4.5° over the next 1000 years is predicted, with a rise in sea level of between 30 and 60 centimetres by the year 2050. There is also doubt as to the precise role of aerosols and other pollutants. Some of the major polluters in the North therefore think it would be better to invest in climatology with a view to obtaining more concrete information.

The Rio undertakings are in the form of conventions on biodiversity and climatic change and the so-called 'Agenda 21' of measures to be applied during the 21st century. The US is unwilling to pay for ecological progress in developing countries and the latter, for their part, do not intend to wager their development in order to

respond to the latest ecological concerns of the rich nations. The Group of 77 reject the requests of certain rich countries for the financial burden to be shared with developing countries. In Berlin, delegates preferred not to discuss resources, owing to a lack of common ground. The US, Britain and other developed countries wanted 'joint implementation', a strategy which would enable them, in exchange for investment in environmental programmes in the South, to reduce the ecological demands placed on their own territory. In other words, it would enable them to carry on polluting at home whilst cleaning up elsewhere. Industrialised countries were to submit a report on their programme for the reduction of toxic gases, and the results obtained, to the Berlin meeting. Only 15 did so, including five who stated that they were committed to achieving the set target. Paradoxically, participants in Berlin agreed on one thing: reductions in gases must be even greater than the targets set in Rio.

Not much in fact came out of the Berlin gathering. The compromise text, voted through by consensus, merely acknowledged that the Rio undertakings were 'inadequate' and gave a 'negotiating mandate' for the conference scheduled to take place in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997. There is thus still no protocol for actually applying the framework agreement on the reduction of greenhouse gases. It is intended that the Kyoto meeting should ratify an agreement on carbon-dioxide emissions after the year 2000. But the US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand remain unhappy at the prospect of fixing threshold levels for a reduction in toxic gases within two years. The oil lobby is, of course, very powerful in the US. Both Europeans and Americans wanted negotiations to ensure that ecological measures do not impede competition and Southern countries saw in this a threat of customs barriers being set up against them. There was even fear of a blockade. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia expressed their reservations and the proposal for 'joint implementation' for an experimental period of five years did not succeed. Finally, the US obtained an agreement on 'trapping', i.e. the planting of trees to reduce carbon-dioxide levels. Southern countries were successful in that the 1997 protocol 'does not introduce any new undertaking' for them. They will have only

'to comply with undertakings already made'. The text from Aosis (Association of Small Island States) was not accepted and will be looked at later. The NGOs were disappointed. Germany, however, was pleased that it was chosen to host the Secretariat of the Convention on Climate Change. Michel Barnier, the French Environment Minister, praised the Berlin conference on behalf of the EU, saying that it had given 'new life to the spirit of Rio'. This appears to be a somewhat optimistic assessment.

Cairo: the big surprise

The recent Cairo Conference turned out to be the 'jewel in the crown' for the UN in its programme of meetings on social issues. Even before sufficient time has elapsed to allow a balanced assessment of its results, observers believe that its resolutions represent an outstanding success for the UN, particularly since a revival of moral conservatism did not augur well for significant progress. There was success regarding human rights, which were supplemented by a new one: the right to reproductive health. Never before had an official meeting tackled so many sensitive issues. Meeting in order to discuss the dangers of overpopulation, the world's nations ended up by outlining a new world moral code to protect the individual against the excesses of his country, culture or religion. They were virtually forced into this by the mobilisation of global 'civil society' - not just the NGOs but also groups representing the people of various countries, trades unions, intellectuals, local politicians and so on. As for the NGOs, who had their fingers burned by the Rio experience, where they arrived *en masse* but without a strategy, they prepared for Cairo down to the last detail. According to the Liaison Committee of the Development NGOs of the EU, they lobbied governments and Community authorities for months prior to the conference. The focus was on one central issue, namely that any population control must be set in the context of rights and reproductive health and that efforts must be concentrated, as a priority, on development and equality between men and women. The emphasis should not, they believed, be on the issue of population, *per se*, the current situation being a consequence of unequal develop-

ment in political, economic and human terms between North and South, rich and poor, men and women. The result was that European countries spearheaded these ideas. Reproductive rights were proclaimed: abortion is no longer taboo, even if acknowledged only 'in the event of distress to the woman... in those countries where it is permitted' and not as a means of birth control. Moreover, 'health and reproductive rights' imply that 'people can have a satisfying and risk-free sex life', that adolescents have a 'right... to confidentiality', even if, in parallel, 'the right, duty and responsibility of parents to guide adolescents in matters of sexuality and reproduction' is acknowledged. As for another matter directly affecting millions of individuals, namely immigration, the bringing together of families, although not accorded the status of a right, is nevertheless stated as a vital principle with which nations are required to comply and which they must include in their domestic legislation.

Above all, the meeting quickly became a forum on the place of women in preparing for the future. The official declaration acknowledges that it is impossible to manage the world population if women are not active players in change, given that they influence their surroundings more than men do. The declaration demands equality in terms of education (all must have access to primary education by 2015 at the latest), individual control over the number of children wanted and spacing of offspring. Violence against women and children, particularly genital mutilation, child prostitution, infanticide and the selection of foetuses to the detriment of girls were all condemned.

Despite initial criticism of the lack of time allocated to sustainable development or of the weakness of the UN in agreeing too quickly to make concessions to 'moral' nations, the NGOs still regard Cairo as having been a positive step, while they continue to mobilise themselves particularly as regards monitoring the system for financing rights and reproductive health.

Railing against the modern state

One in five of the earth's inhabitants is poor and 70% of the poorest are

women. This statistic provides the link between the conferences in Cairo and Copenhagen. With International Women's Day, on 8 March, falling in the middle of the conference, this was a dream occasion for women's groups to increase awareness. The Swedish Prime Minister, Ingvar Carlsson, probably summed up their work best. 'We have talked of the feminisation of poverty, but we must feminise the struggle against it! Enlightened men should learn from the feminist agenda. Shared power and shared responsibilities are not a cost. They are an investment'.

However, the 'poverty clock', which was set running on 3 March by the UNDP administrator, a few days before the conference started, made no gender distinction. After 11 days, when debate came to an end, it indicated the figure 598 072, this being the number of children born into poverty since the talks had started. The clock will be started again in Beijing. Everyone, including civil society organisations who, in Copenhagen, concentrated their efforts on development topics, is aware that most of these children were born in developing countries. The hunger strike at the entrance to the official Summit, by women (mostly from the South) calling for cancellation of debt had some impact. A number of NGOs from the South set themselves up as a General Assembly, thereby realising a project born at the Cairo conference. They had the opportunity to structure their project during the preparations for Copenhagen and Beijing on the basis of two observations, namely Southern countries' lack of influence at the United Nations, which is seen as being controlled by a single superpower, and the impression that the South is in the minority in international fora, whereas the reverse is actually true. This Assembly has taken on the responsibility for passing on the viewpoints of countries in the South. Razia Ismail, the Indian co-founder stresses that this is being done without any animosity towards Western nations. The sole desire, she says, is that such nations should understand that there are other ways of thinking and developing than those they adhere to themselves. She believes that Southern NGOs, in particular, must develop their ability to become true partners because, currently, they and their sisters in the North

are only tolerated at the United Nations, not fully accepted.

Trade unions were also prominent in Copenhagen. Indeed, in several cases, the so-called social partners (from employers associations and trade unions) were represented in the official delegations. Hundreds of trade unionists took part in a forum convened by the ILO on 8 March. They stated that they were satisfied with the Summit which represents a 'sign that the international community is aware of the need to act with great urgency in order to combat flagrant and increasing injustice in the world' and which 'took into account the recommendations of the ILO'. Another reason for satisfaction on their part was the Summit's decision to breathe new life into the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The third Copenhagen summit, besides the official one and the NGO forum, was that involving a number of intellectuals at the University of Copenhagen. Invited to debate the struggle against poverty and inequality, they enhanced their standing. One debate concerned the modern state: a concept generally agreed to be of recent invention. Even in Europe, the empires and kingdoms of the past were not states, emphasised Eric Hobsbawm from Britain, since the attributes of the modern state — territorial and administrative integration, and equal rights for citizens involving redistribution of resources, were not inherent to them. Moreover, current distortions between states were held to make this system of world organisation practically unviable. The paradoxes include the concept of overpopulation: 'overpopulated' countries, it was claimed, are, in fact, underpopulated. Only 25 of the world's 220 countries have more than 50 million inhabitants (1993 figures), and just three of these are in Africa. During the course of debate, the 'nebulousness' of African countries was featured. Mapped out by a small number of colonial strategists, with no thought for logic, they owed their existence solely to official declarations. These countries, it was said, are incapable of meeting intrinsic state obligations as regards the security and welfare of the citizens. This situation was condemned by Wole Soyinka, the Nigerian winner of the Nobel Literature Prize, who added that the frontiers of a country remain precarious so

long as they divide people who want to live together. According to the intellectuals, Africa is not the only case in point, the former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union offering further instructive examples. Soyinka therefore requested that men and women be placed centre stage, and assisted in finding their identity. It was the frantic search for such an identity which was at the root of many of the recent disasters involving humankind (civil wars, Muslim fundamentalism, community fanaticism). He also urged that priority no longer be given solely to abstract figures attributed to countries, such as increases in GNP.

A programme for Beijing: bread and roses

The results of Copenhagen and the importance placed on them have been assessed in various ways by the representatives of civil society, yet all state that they are prepared to defend the Summit's achievements. They also hope for further progress in Beijing in various areas, ranging from undertakings on sustainable development and employment protection, the definition of NGO status at the UN to the promotion of skills and technology in developing countries.

Gertrude Mongella, Secretary General of the Beijing conference, wants this to be the starting point for implementation of the recommendations of the UN's 'social' conferences. She launched a 180-day campaign which aims to bring about a 180-degree turn in the world order so that half of mankind can assume its rightful position. On 8 March she presented a woven cloth from Cambodia which she circulated amongst the audience. It bore the inscription 'together, women will weave the world as far as Beijing'. Nafis Sadik, the Secretary-General of the Cairo Conference, ended her list of aspirations for Beijing with a simple statement: 'We want bread and roses'. The UN's new found attention to social issues is therefore very welcome. ■

Hégel Goutier

Poverty

Culture as a response

by Daniel Duranleau*

Heads of state and of government, NGO representatives and journalists have all left now and life in Copenhagen has resumed the tranquil course typical of this Nordic capital. It would be easy to say that life goes on exactly as it did before these solemn declarations of war on poverty, which were heard at the Belta Center, but this World Summit on Social Development which has just ended has, in our opinion, made it possible to make considerable advances which must now be methodically consolidated. Naturally, aspirations of seeing the adoption of an integrated, global policy to combat extreme poverty and exclusion have not all been fulfilled, but Copenhagen is a landmark in the improved understanding of extreme poverty and of the way in which its elimination may be tackled.

Poverty: a question of responsibility and rights

The Summit's final Declaration states 'We have been meeting here in order to make a commitment to work for social development throughout the world so that all men and women, particularly those living in poverty, will be able to *exercise their rights, utilise resources and share responsibilities* enabling them... to make a contribution to the well-being of their family, their community and humanity as a whole'.

This statement is a clear recognition of the fact that poverty is a condition which makes it impossible for those burdened by it to exercise their rights and take on their responsibilities, a situation which leads to exclusion. The Declaration reinstates poor families and

peoples in their rights by recalling that they are not to blame for this situation but, on the contrary, are constantly striving to combat poverty.

This approach to poverty, linking rights and responsibilities, echoes what the international ATD Quart Monde Movement, at the initiative of its founder, Father Joseph Wresinski, has been defending for the last 37 years. In 1987, in his report to the French Economic and Social Committee ('Extreme poverty and economic and social instability'), Father Joseph put forward a modern definition of poverty which applied to all countries regardless of their level or type of development.

'Instability is a situation where those factors which give a sense of security, particularly employment, are absent. Without these factors, peoples and families are unable to assume their professional, family and social obligations, or enjoy their basic rights. The resulting sense of insecurity may be more or less far-reaching and have more or less serious and definitive consequences. It leads to extreme poverty when it affects several areas of their existence, when it becomes persistent, and when it compromises the opportunity to take on one's responsibilities again and reinstate oneself in one's rights in the foreseeable future'.

This definition describes extreme poverty and the various forms of instability which can lead to it if they are ongoing. It also offers clear-cut lines of action, namely to concentrate attention, both in analysis and in implementation of solutions, on the urban or rural population burdened over time by multiple factors of instability and thereby sidelined by the policies that are put in place. It also points to the priority which must be given to the most disadvantaged populations.

The Action Programme adopted in Copenhagen requires nations, over the next few years and particularly in 1996 (International Year for the Elimination of Poverty), to work to establish national objectives for the elimination of poverty and to define what poverty actually is. In this context, the definition proposed by Father Joseph is still relevant.

The multidimensional nature of poverty


This definition also stresses the multidimensional nature of poverty, something the Copenhagen undertakings clearly recognise. Of course, some countries were reluctant to use the term 'multidimensional', but all agreed on the need for an integrated, global approach to combat poverty. Poverty is undoubtedly an economic and social phenomenon, but it also has cultural, spiritual and political aspects. It is not possible to tackle one aspect of instability in isolation whilst ignoring the interdependent nature of the various aspects of life for the most underprivileged peoples.

In point of fact, however, this is too often what the anti-poverty measures put in place actually do. If all the partners in this struggle had understood the need to make an integrated attack on poverty, Copenhagen would truly have signified an advance at this level.

The need for human investment

The discussions which took place, particularly during the third preparatory session, on the need to reconstruct social links, to enable everyone to take part in community and cultural life, demonstrate the need for human investment to overcome misery. These discussions revealed that the fight against poverty could not be solely a matter of equipment or programmes, but that it was also necessary to create places where feelings of solidarity could be expressed, that it was necessary for men and women to join together with disadvantaged populations in order to build confidence and take action to combat misery. Far from being a secondary aspect, this human investment is, on the

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Daniel Guin, ex. ATD Quart Monde

contrary, a quite integral part of any effective policy - without it, the partnership cannot last.

It is important, however, not to confuse participation and partnership. It is one thing to propose that a population participate in development programmes devised, designed, implemented and assessed by others with the best of intentions, but it is quite another to be guided by the populations in question, to enable them to explain what their plans are, to conceive them, to implement them and to

Let men and women join together with the most disadvantaged populations in order to build confidence

assess them together. Any fight against misery requires partnership.

In partnership with the most deprived populations

The texts published after the World Summit confirmed time and again that the fight against poverty and exclu-

sion could not take place without a partnership with the peoples and families living in poverty and the organisations representing them. We should rejoice at such an approach. Our Movement is convinced that it is only by closely associating those who are the foremost participants in the fight against the poverty with which they are burdened that it will be possible to progress towards this objective of elimination. We must also remain vigilant.

We are aware that partnership with the world's poorest peoples is a difficult exercise. It requires the implementation of new ways of enabling deprived peoples to be partners and a strong desire on everyone's part for such a partnership to succeed. It also requires time, as no partnership can be improvised. Misery crushes those in its grasp to such an extent that it would be illusory to assume that this partnership would be automatic and that it would be sufficient to publicise one's intention to set it up for it actually to take place.

Partnership with the poorest peoples is all the more essential since the value of the Copenhagen Summit will be revealed by monitoring of the undertakings made by our leaders. Yet, who will be a partner in assessing the measures announced? Who will join in considering the programmes to be consolidated because they have been deemed effective and the remedies to be applied to others? If underprivileged peoples and their organisations are not closely associated with this monitoring process, what will have been the significance of the declarations on partnership made in Copenhagen and throughout the preparatory process? The priority for our Movement and for the small NGOs and individuals meeting in the 'Permanent Forum on Extreme Poverty in the World' will be to fight constantly for the full involvement of the most underprivileged peoples actually to be given concrete expression both at national and international level. (The Permanent Forum is a network of correspondents in approximately 100 countries set up by Father Joseph Wresinski and grouping together small NGOs and individuals engaged in the fight against poverty.)

Partnership: a question of sharing know-how and culture

What, however, is the essential condition for a partnership to end the exclusion of the world's poorest people? Father Joseph alerted us to this as early as the 1960s. In order to become full partners, the poorest people must, naturally, have equal opportunities of access to work. But this must not consist merely of 'invented' occupations, or jobs offering neither prestige nor the opportunity for a professional career in the future — which are likely to be poorly paid and accompanied at best by only limited training.

In order to become partners with equal opportunities, excluded workers must have access to culture. They must have the means to utilise their own know-how, to enrich it through access to other knowledge, to share in the cultural wealth of the world around them and to become creators, together with their more privileged fellow citizens, of the culture of tomorrow. Without sharing in cultural creativity, it is futile, thought Father Joseph, to speak of sharing in economic creativity. The poorest people show us in their daily lives that cultural development, social development and economic development are inseparably linked.

Rethinking human activity

It is in this context that our Movement considered the need to rethink the whole question of human activity and produced, as a contribution to the World Summit, a document entitled 'To combat poverty and exclusion, we must rethink human activity' (Alwine de Vos van Steenwijk, January 1995).

The world's poor have the same aspirations as everyone else: to be free and useful, and to be freely useful. The 'social processing' of unemployment is not, on its own, a response which fulfils their ambitions. Man's creativity does not extend only to trading activities and its most widespread manifestation, namely productive employment. It also develops on a social, cultural, spiritual and political level. Those populations which are excluded from the productive employment sector



Daniel Gingras, ATD Quart Monde

and from trading activities are also excluded from the fields of culture, artistic creativity and from social, spiritual and political participation. Therefore, work sharing as well as sharing of all effort to make people's lives dynamic, creative and full of the promise of change are called for. In the absence of this, work-sharing will constitute only an internal redistribution amongst those who already have a place within our societies, and the gulf between these people and the world's poor will grow ever wider.

The change which is before us is a project in civilisation, a project in whose context nations ought simultaneously to undertake to fight so that everyone can have a job which confers dignity, and can thus be regarded as a worker of quality. Human activity overall must be reconsidered, introducing throughout one's working life periods where a time of economic productivity and a time of human, cultural and social productivity alternate.

In conclusion, in this great effort to promote social development, the ATD Quart Monde Movement, in the footsteps

In order to become partners... excluded workers must have access to culture

of Father Joseph, will therefore conduct a three-fold campaign in respect of this question of human activity:

- a campaign for the right of everyone to have access to the employment market, and to play a useful part under dignified conditions and in the long term;
- a campaign for the right of everyone to be creative and useful during those periods when they are not active on the employment market; and
- a campaign for an equitable distribution, in everyone's working life, of periods spent both in and out of the employment market in a market economy.

In this context, we welcome the progress made by the World Summit on Social Development. It is now a matter for our leaders to match words with actions so that those people experiencing extreme poverty can effectively 'exercise their rights, utilise resources and share responsibilities' which enable them to contribute to the wellbeing of humanity. ■

D.D.

Representation of the very poor throughout history

by Jean Tonglet*

We do not intend, here, to go back beyond the time of the French Revolution (1789) interesting though it might be. For present purposes we can start with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, made at the time of the Revolution. It was then that the idea of citizens' participation in the affairs of State first emerged, along with the associated concept of representation. Even today, however, 'representation' is by no means a universal idea. To be able to exercise full rights as a citizen, many requirements have to be met; you must have a certain amount of money, a fixed place of abode, pay taxes, be on the electoral roll and so on. All these conditions have prevented the poorest people from being represented.

Because this sector of the population has not been properly represented, intermediaries have usually taken over, in place of the parties concerned. Throughout the history of the West, it has often been the Church which has acted as mediator. It has been a constant presence among the poorest sections of society, represented by parish priests, religious congregations, and charities. Affected by the misery around them, philanthropic organisations of all kinds, both religious and lay, have striven to meet the most urgent needs of the poor, taking on in the process the role of mediator. This 'humanitarian' world has thus brought about certain changes and has contributed to the acquisition of respect for certain rights. With the State assuming responsibility in this area in many countries, through a wide range of social services, social workers have also become a point of contact for the

poorest groups. All these interlocutors may claim a certain legitimacy owing to their proximity, presence, the aid they contribute and their role as defenders of the rights of the world's poorest people.

Direct forms of representation also exist. People come together, usually on the basis of a territory or a specific objective, to form community organisations (such as tenants' committees) or campaigning groups for the right to housing or other specific rights. But even here, the phenomenon of 'internal exclusion' is sometimes seen. Thus, for example, tenants' committees in a poor district often turn against their poorest members (the 'bad tenants', the 'bad payers') and sometimes even demand their expulsion? Those within the group arguing for this form of exclusion point out that, in their relations with the authorities, their case is weakened by these 'bad' people because they contribute to the poor 'name' of the district, or provide a useful pretext for intermediaries seeking to justify a lack of action in the sphere of maintenance or renovation.

A more extensive kind of representation, however, was advocated as far back as the French Revolution, notably by the Paris city engineer, Dufourney de Villiers. Through his work, he experienced at first hand the wretchedness of the population. In a 'List of Grievances', dated 25 April 1789, de Villiers urged the 'Fourth Estate, the Fourth Order, the Order of Vagabonds, Invalids, Beggars, Day Labourers, the Sacred Order of the Unfortunate' to draw up lists of their grievances and thus to participate in the system of consultation within the framework of the States General.

A clear distinction must be made between the various forms of representation referred to above. On one side, there are the mediators, for whom the poorest people might be regarded as clients, with all that that implies in terms of mutual dependence. On the other, there are the mechanisms which provide for the poorest to represent themselves.

Some mediators certainly achieve a degree of understanding of what poverty really entails, owing to their proximity to the very poor and the ways in which they have made themselves more aware of their aspirations. However, there are also many contrary examples in which mediators use their own ideas and judgments about the needs of their 'customers' as a basis for their actions.

This explains, for example, the policy implemented up until the 1950s, whereby children were sent from orphanages in Liverpool to Australia and elsewhere without their relations ever being informed. Similarly, across Europe, children find themselves placed in the poorest circumstances with little hope of 'escape'. It also explains how outside involvement in the family life of people receiving social benefit develops, with the imposition of certain views on the education of the children, family life, relationships between spouses (for example, pressure on the couple to separate), family planning and the spending of money. In the context of research into the guaranteed income in Europe, a Dutch recipient of social benefit told us, seething with anger, how his social worker had demanded he give up paying into a small funeral-insurance plan he had 'treated' himself to. The social worker regarded this as a pointless expense for a recipient of State benefit. For the man himself, it was, on the contrary, of paramount importance to his concept of human dignity. Some years earlier, he had seen his partner buried without ceremony in a common grave for the destitute.

Finally, some mediators sometimes prevent the poor from expressing their own opinions, because their views are deemed worthless or even damaging to the proper running of the system. We experienced this phenomenon ourselves in the course of the survey mentioned above, carried out by ATD Quart Monde at the request of the European Commission. When we were seeking the opinions of the poorest populations on the guaranteed income systems, some social services departments, who could have introduced us to extremely poor families, refused to cooperate. Officials took the view that their departments were doing all within their power and that there was no point in asking questions of people who were the source of so many problems. ■ J.T.

* This text is taken from the document entitled 'Démocratie et grande pauvreté' presented by Jean Tonglet, ATD Quart Monde representative at the International Meeting on 'Democracy and Development' organised by the 'Forum de Delphes' in Greece (30 October to 2 November 1994). Information on the Forum can be obtained from: 21 ter, rue Voltaire, 75011 Paris France.

Trade aspects unacknowledged at the Social Summit

by Myriam Vander Stichele*

Global trade liberalisation has been embraced by many as a solution to a large number of the world's economic ills. Trade is expected to increase as barriers are removed and the result should be stronger growth and — it is assumed — greater prosperity. This should, in turn, lead to fewer social problems, better educational opportunities, enhanced health facilities and so on. Not everyone accepts all the elements of this analysis, however, particularly when it comes to looking at the plight of the world's poorest people. The author of this article, who is the Trade Programme Coordinator at the International Coalition for Development Action, reviews a report on trade launched by the ICDA during the Social Summit and takes issue with some of the conclusions (and omissions) in the texts that were agreed by the politicians in Copenhagen.

One of the reasons stated for convening the World Summit for Social Development in March 1995 was the fact that the world economy is becoming globalised. This phenomenon is 'profoundly changing the parameters of social development' and is being 'accompanied by intensified poverty'. The final text of the Social Summit recognises that greatly increased trade is one of the factors contributing to globalisation and that this, in itself, opens up new opportunities for sustained economic growth in developing countries.

During the debate and in the negotiations on the various texts adopted at the summit, however, there was little discussion about the impact of international trade and trade liberalisation on

social development and particularly on poverty eradication, productive employment and social integration. Indeed, this complex relationship is not widely understood and is seldom analysed. The limited economic criteria used in official reports on international trade are unable to provide a sufficient assessment of the impact of trade on the social development of people in Third World countries. Yet trade generates 19 times more income than aid in these countries. In 1992, the developing countries' export revenues amounted to \$1167 bn compared with \$60.4 bn from aid and \$51.5 bn from investment.

The International Coalition for Development Action (ICDA) launched an *Alternative Report on Trade* (ART) at the UN Social Summit with a view to clarifying the issues relating to the impact of trade on the lives of people in the Third World and the role of multinationals in world trade. ICDA is a network of development NGOs which has been working mainly on the effects of international trade policies (such as the Uruguay Round) on sustainable development and people in developing countries.

The ART contains a series of concrete case studies prepared by civil associations in developing nations, as well as campaign materials from non-governmental development organisations in European countries, which are aimed at offering an assessment of trade's impact at the social and micro-economic levels. It also gives an analysis of the main trends in international commerce and developments in international trade policy, looking at some of the realities of trade that are frequently ignored: the main agents, the politics, the lobbying, and so on.

Contradictory findings

A number of the conclusions in the *Alternative Report on Trade* contradict the recommendations of the Social Summit. For instance the Summit's Programme of Action on a favourable national and international economic environment, as a basis for social development, talks of 'implementing fully and as scheduled' the multilateral trade agreement reached in the Uruguay Round. However, a careful analysis of Brazil's agricultural sector, and of the impact of trade liberalisation, reveals negative consequences on poverty eradication, employment and social integration:

In Brazil, the liberalisation of trade in agricultural products under the Uruguay Round is taking place in a context where 73% of the 38 million people living in rural areas have an income below the official minimum wage and where concentrated land-ownership means that 80% of those owning land occupy just 13% of the total cultivable area. The great majority of small farmers are not in a position to intensify or modernise their production in line with the needs of industry because of competition from products imported with lower tariffs. This leads to further marginalisation and threatens the very existence of five million farms operated by poor families (representing 56% of the rural working population). The import liberalisation that has already taken place has undermined food security without leading to lower food prices. From being self-sufficient in wheat, Brazil is now a net importer. In the wheat and cotton sectors alone, 350 000 jobs have been lost. Poverty and hunger are a consequence, not so much of high prices, as of a lack of

* Readers wishing to obtain a copy of the *Alternative Report on Trade* discussed in this article should contact the ICDA Secretariat, rue Stevin 115, B-1040 Brussels, tel 32-2-2300430, fax 32-2-2300348.



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A subsistence farmer in Brazil
Competition from imports threatens
the very existence of five million small
farms

purchasing power experienced by more than 30 million poor Brazilians.

Estimates as to the likely gains from the Uruguay Round suggest very modest increases in the export volumes of Brazil's main products (between 1% and 3%). Only a limited group of 'competitive' products (such as poultry, orange juice and tobacco), produced by large agri-businesses, are expected to do better, increasing their exports by more than 10% above current volumes.

The foregoing analysis also reveals a contradiction between the provision supporting immediate implementation of the Uruguay Round and other elements in the Programme of Action that was agreed. The latter includes a commitment to promote open markets and a multilateral rule-based trade system which is open and equitable for all people, 'particularly those living in poverty', and support for sustainable development of the agricultural sector, including improved food production and access to food for poor people.

The kind of support for agricultural production allowed under the Uruguay Round agreement will certainly not be enough to implement effective domestic policies for sustainable agricul-

ture, food security and the fight against poverty. As a result, some 4.5 million Brazilian families will be faced with a total lack of alternatives in their struggle for survival.

Studies undertaken by UNCTAD, FAO and others, show that sub-Saharan Africa, for example, will be a loser in the latest GATT process. The Social Summit texts, however, fail to acknowledge fully these negative effects. In essence, the Summit only recommended policies designed to enable developing countries to take the opportunities created by the new trade agreement. It called for assistance to be given to countries, particularly in Africa, that 'are not currently in a position to benefit fully from the liberalisation of the world economy'. However, it recommends action to help counter the negative effects on agriculture in the net food-importing and least developed countries, as decided in the Uruguay Round. The big question is: when will the Northern countries 'give full consideration to requests for technical and financial assistance to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure'?

On the subject of poverty eradication, a case study in the Alternative Report on Trade shows that family, farm-based banana production for export contributes significantly to this goal in the Caribbean Windward Islands. However,

the protection afforded to that production is inconsistent with the Uruguay Round. The Social Summit Programme of Action requires fair competition and ethical conduct on the one hand, so as to improve the functioning of the market and mitigate negative impacts resulting from market forces. On the other hand, it requires the dismantling of protectionist measures in line with the provisions of the Uruguay Round. If the new free trade rules were to be fully applied, Caribbean banana exports would plummet because of competition from bananas produced by transnational corporations in Latin America under often unacceptable conditions. People in the Windward Islands would suffer because no other export alternatives are likely to be available offering the same widespread benefits for the population. The European Union has so far stood firm on the Lomé banana protocol that gives preferential access to traditional ACP banana producers. But there are imperfections in implementing the regime, and the EU is under attack from Latin American producing countries and the United States.

Further case studies dealing with the actors in international trade and the

Bananas being loaded in St Vincent for shipping to Europe.
Production for export contributes significantly to poverty eradication in the Windward Islands

The Courier



people affected in Chiapas, Mexico, and with the situation in the cocoa and medicines sectors, are set out in the ART. These describe the complex links between trade on the one hand and poverty, employment and marginalisation on the other — issues that are not acknowledged in the proposals in the Social Summit texts. The latter place emphasis on the national level and national governments with often little mention of multilateral trade agreements. The relationship between the UN (including the Social Summit) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is not examined. Indeed, the WTO is not even mentioned, presumably because it was created outside the UN framework. Trade liberalisation and better market access are nevertheless seen as beneficial ways to obtain the Summit's goals. Case studies in the Alternative Report indicate that where these could have positive effects on developing countries, the recommendations have not always been followed in the past by the industrialised countries. For instance, the first phase to implement new rules on textiles and clothing has only liberalised 0.1% of the EU textiles and clothing market. Once more, opportunities for alleviating poverty through job creation, such as was seen in Bangladesh where there was a boom in employment for women in the textiles and clothing export industries, are being lost.

Many inequalities

The Alternative Report on Trade puts the case studies in perspective through an analysis of recent trends in North-South trade and of important events at both the economic and political levels. The information is supplemented with appropriate graphics and tables. These reveal the inequalities in terms of the share of global trade enjoyed by the countries of the Third World. As a whole, these countries were exporting 25% of the world's traded goods in 1992 but there was a sharp contrast between the least developed countries (just 0.3%) and those of South and South East Asia (13%).

The ART also reveals the cost of arms imports in developing countries (\$12.4 bn in 1993). This sum is not far short of the amount of \$15 bn which is needed

to provide primary health for all, including the elimination of severe malnutrition.

Throughout the Social Summit texts, diversification of commodities is called for. At the end of the ART section on recent trends in commodity trade, one of ICDA's member organisations, INZET, calls for consideration of other solutions for Africa such as supply management and commodity agreements.

Highlighting the important role of multinationals


The Social Summit documents also imply that economic growth will lead to more employment. The same prediction has been made as regards the expected effects of the Uruguay Round. The ART takes a less optimistic view, pointing out that trade is driven by competition and that rationalisation of production is destroying jobs rather than creating them. In this area, the strategies of transnational corporations (TNCs) play an important role. Between 1985 and 1992, the number of foreign affiliates of such companies tripled while employment in the TNCs themselves only increased by 12%.

In the various sections of the Alternative Report on Trade, the overriding role of transnational corporations in international trade becomes evident. Yet TNCs are largely absent from the texts and conclusions of the World Social Summit. These corporations have been and are lobbying for rules which are of special benefit to them but which ignore the impact on people in the developing countries. This is the case, for example with regard to intellectual property rights (TRIPs) which could increase the price of medicines, reducing the access of poor people to health care. Similarly, it is TNCs who are keen to see the adoption of new EU rules on chocolate which could have a negative impact on cocoa producers in the Third World.

TNCs control a large part of world production through their investment strategies, specialisation, strategic alliances and sub-contracting. The economic power of the biggest multinationals is as great as, if not bigger than, the GDP of many developing countries. For instance,

the sales of the world's four biggest corporations (General Motors, Ford, Exxon and Shell) amounted to \$435 bn in 1993, which was more than the gross domestic product of all of Africa!

Governments signing-up to the Social Summit declarations promise only to encourage transnational corporations 'to operate in a framework of respect for the environment' and 'with proper consideration for the social and cultural impact of their activities'. They agree to promote 'fair competition and ethical responsibility in business activities'. If the Summit is to have any real impact on world poverty and unemployment, the role of transnational corporations will need to be better addressed.



A drug dispensary in the Horn of Africa. Transnational corporations are lobbying for rules on intellectual property rights (TRIPs) which could increase the price of medicines, reducing the access of poor people to health care

It is true that the Social Summit text calls for further analysis and monitoring of global changes and trade liberalisation. The Alternative Report, however, tries to provide a critical analysis that reveals the risks of trade liberalisation, the complex reality of the links between trade and social development, and the major actors. There is a need for further debate, more case studies and a global analysis from different countries and levels of society (civil associations, university, business, governments, the EU) to enhance the understanding as a basis for sound policies and international agreements that aim at sustainable development. ■ M.V.S.

NGO Forum

The alternative Copenhagen conference

by Thibault Grégoire*

The aim of the Heads of State and of Government, meeting at the Bella Centre in Copenhagen, was to launch a programme for development in the service of mankind. In parallel, a few kilometres away, in Holmen, nearly three thousand NGOs were meeting as a reminder that more has to be on offer than just the perennial promises.

Although recent world summits in Rio, Vienna and Cairo have demonstrated the need to implement a common action programme aimed at long-lasting and sustainable development, they also bore witness to the limits — some would readily speak of a lack of will — of their applicability. Was the Copenhagen Summit on social development to flounder as a result of the same shortcomings? There were many who foresaw dark clouds hanging over the result and, amongst the NGOs, there was a general feeling of scepticism.

The economy in the service of mankind

A lack of genuine debate concerning the structural roots of poverty, under-employment and social exclusion, the three main subjects of the Summit, was undeniably what the NGOs feared most. Although Copenhagen was to concentrate on a tragic social situation which has to be tackled, it was nevertheless necessary to avoid the customary conciliatory gestures. Social development would quite simply remain illusory if, by dealing with only the symptoms, an attack were not made on the causes of the social crisis.

The United Nations' Summit could not produce what Christian Com-

élieu called 'an ambulance sent to help the victims of the economic war'.¹

Economics: the key concept of the much-heralded campaign. As far as the NGOs were concerned, the *leitmotiv* of social development ought to be the institution of an 'economy in the service of mankind'. The single line of thought, modern dogmatics², should be relegated to the dungeons. Neo-liberal orthodoxy has proved itself to be incompetent by placing growth above all aspects of human welfare. The world economic system, idealising competition as sacrosanct, has only widened the gulf separating rich and poor, affluent and excluded, countries in the North and countries in the South. The usual incantations no longer apply, since the current situation in industrialised countries implacably bears witness to the fact that growth does not necessarily go hand in hand with employment, quite the contrary. It is therefore now time to reverse the trend. Since internationalisation of the economy is inevitable, it should be given a new role, namely that of serving mankind. To this end, the social dimension can no longer be isolated from financial, commercial or political diktats. Harmonisation of objectives must take over the predominant position given to economics.

The need to reflect on the crux of the problem was to serve as a backdrop to the Summit. The major powers had no other choice and the NGOs hung like the sword of Damocles over Copenhagen. Such was the role that was announced. *'If there is no strong movement of public opinion in both North and South, persistent and consistent action on the part of the NGOs, popular and community organisations and*

*trades unions, one can be sure that this Summit will see, yet again, a display of pious wishes'*³. Only concrete and whole-hearted participation on their part, that is to say taking account of civil society, would make it possible to draw up just solutions. To bring this task to a successful conclusion, the 3000 or so NGOs had to forget their varied backgrounds. Despite their great diversity, the various NGOs, both from North and South, were sometimes in harmony. Genuine alliances between groups of researchers, associations and other social movements were formed during preparation for the Summit, thereby building up pressure and a will to succeed which was international. Through the medium of newspapers, magazines and numerous lectures or within the framework of national platforms, they did, for the most part, demonstrate solidarity in their proposals. For the most part, that is.

Proposals for an alternative vision of development

Inspired, on occasion, with a certain idealism, the NGOs attempted to nudge open a few doors on the future by recommending specific measures, without falling into the simple trap of merely imposing another universal model. Even at the preparatory stage (PrepCom), they had set up a code of behaviour for managing equitable development ('12 points for saving social development'). These priorities, which, it is claimed, are the framework for the future action programme, were to come up throughout the Summit, each NGO emphasising one aspect or another, according to what type of organisation it was. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the major guidelines, could, however, be easily discerned.

The fundamental priority, the initial foundation for authentic social development, was, for these NGOs, undoubtedly recognition of and respect for human rights, more particularly those termed indivisible and universal economic, social and cultural rights. Without doubt, this concept presupposes that there will be an end to any form of discrimination, be

¹ Christian Comélieu, in *Les cahiers d'Environnement sans frontières*, p. 21.

² Ignacio Ramonet, in *le Monde Diplomatique*, January 1995, p. 1.

³ Plate-forme Copenhague des associations francophones belges, CNCD, p. 1.

this on the basis of race, sex, religion or culture. The same applies to the right for all to receive education.

Although some NGOs insist on certain specific rights such as, for example, the right to nourishment⁴ or those of autochthonous peoples, all were in agreement in giving special attention to the condition of women. In fact, in the opinion of the NGOs, the Summit, particularly in the draft Declaration, did not place enough emphasis either on the effective measures to be taken to end the discrimination of which women are too often the victims (despite the UN Convention) or on their role in future social and economic development. Each player in development, that is to say household, community, government or social movement, is thus required to set up suitable policies.

This obligation to respect human rights is inevitably reflected in commercial policies, whether of the private sector or those defined by the WTO (World Trade Organisation). There is a need to develop fairer commercial exchanges and to monitor the flow of capital on an international scale and to make this and financial speculation subject to the requirements of social development for all. Intrinsically, these measures must be accompanied by a code of behaviour in this field: the famous social clauses. Protectionism in the North, the South's categorical rejection of social clauses, the attitude of the United States, and applying the rules long advocated by the International Labour Organisation were all subjects which promised to give rise to impassioned debate. The NGOs were persistently in favour of the clauses being applied firstly to major transnational companies whose size must, moreover, be reduced. In addition, the NGOs proposed that the WTO be made answerable to and thus be monitored by the United Nations.

The same treatment was proposed for Bretton Woods institutions, a radical modification of World Bank and International Monetary Fund policies having long been the battle cry of a

⁴ Advocated particularly by the FIAN (Food First Information and Action Network), referring to the fact that this right is enshrined in Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

number of NGOs. Debate principally concerned structural adjustment programmes. In order to put an end to the widely discredited negative social effects of the economic conditions imposed by these institutions, the NGOs advocated total remodelling of these programmes on the basis of preliminary social-impact studies (under the auspices of the UN). Another of their concerns was debt which is responsible for diverting resources from their rightful destination (for example, health or education). The solution put forward by the NGOs was, of course, a radical one, since it required no less than complete debt cancellation.

Still on the subject of aid to developing countries, but this time with reference to bilateral policies, the NGOs reminded OECD countries of the promise made a long time ago to devote 0.7 % of their GNP to official development assistance (this reminder was naturally not directed at Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, who are the only ones to fulfil their obligations). Also, according to Rio, a new timetable had been established, for the year 2000, but current figures revealed that the situation for the majority of them was quite the opposite. The NGOs were also relatively in favour of the concept of the 20/20 pact proposed by the United Nations⁵.

The fight against environmental degradation is also a topic the NGOs hold very dear. Long-term social development which takes this factor into account is an effective way of combating poverty and unemployment and thereby of recalling, once again after the fashion of Rio, the fact that economic and ecological interests must complement each other. Since the topics dealt with were population growth, the renewal of resources and energy-related pollution, the NGOs, supported by many scientists, proposed concrete solutions in this sphere also. Hence, for example, plans to integrate the unemployed into work renovating buildings or plans to use solar energy.

The final favourite subject was disarmament. Any social development is

⁵ The 20/20 pact means that the poorest countries devote 20% of their national budget and donor countries devote 20% of their aid to fundamental problems of human development.



Women undoubtedly have a major role to play in future social development

impossible while conflicts persist, and the NGOs called for world peace. In addition, although the end of the Cold War is a historic opportunity to make progress in terms of nuclear disarmament, one fact that should not be neglected is that conventional arms today claim many victims. Particular reference was made to the notorious anti-personnel mines with which many countries in the South abound.

The NGOs insisted that all these measures would be possible only within a context of active consideration of social movements. This was the absolute basic requirement. The NGOs advocated that all governmental, international or community decisions must be based on participation by civil society in the various stages of the development process. This was the logical follow-up to their task in Copenhagen. To this end, *'the Summit must incite nations to suppress structures and policies which hamper access to decision-making on the part of populations and impede organisation in everything relating to their living*

conditions' ⁶. The groups most often targeted are naturally women and also trades unions, and the NGOs endeavoured to remind certain governments to take these into account when formulating long-term employment programmes. Particular mention was also made of autochthonous peoples: in order to preserve their culture, any policy which affects the welfare of these communities must be implemented under their control.

'A Summit for nothing...' — but who is at fault?

Have all the discussions about moving towards a fundamental modification of development resulted in anything? This question could well be asked in the light of the NGOs' 'Alternative Declaration'. The latter was, in fact, a counter-declaration, a mirror-image of the parallel Summit, which simply emphasised the ideas close to the hearts of the organisations in question.

There are genuine grounds for disappointment. For example, the heads of government signed only non-binding undertakings, the subject-matter of the social clauses was skilfully eluded and proposals concerning structural adjustment programmes were vague, to say the least. However, all the NGOs did not express the same opinion. Some of them, like OXFAM, stated that they were relatively satisfied with the Copenhagen Summit because it could henceforth serve as a basis for future action or, alternatively, because it gave rise to a solemn undertaking to attempt to eradicate poverty. These NGOs will perhaps celebrate the fact that Denmark and Austria have both cancelled the debts of developing countries (US-\$166 million and US \$100 million, respectively).

In any case, no one was naive enough to believe that, under the influence of the representatives of civil society, a magic wand would be waved at the end of the Summit, bringing an end to social deprivation.

Incidentally, what exactly is this civil society that was supposedly represented by the NGOs? Is it that of the



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outcasts, the excluded, the deprived, the down-and-outs and others trying to live in a system which, for them, has been discredited. Or has the claim to represent 'civil society' been hijacked by organisations who, in reality, lack any real influence? Of course, many NGOs have thousands of people behind them. But where were the associations for the unemployed? Mostly absent. Where were the organisations which defend the cause of the homeless hiding? For they were also absent. How many NGOs came from the South? Very few. Too few. It costs a great deal to travel to the Danish capital and, in fact, if one looks closer, the priorities referred to above are, first and foremost, instructions directed at states and international institutions. Did the NGOs therefore have the wrong idea of their mission, or does this criticism apply to at least some of them? Many observers, as well as other NGOs, reproach them for restricting themselves to the customary activity of lobbying, contenting themselves with speaking about ideology and idealism without digging deeper for solutions based on the fruits of their own experiences. In addition,

Putting an end to child labour: an obligation which is not yet universally recognised

the Alternative Declaration did not obtain the desired 1000 signatures (only 600). The reasons for its rejection were of two types: there were those NGOs who felt that the declaration had nothing to do with them, their mission in Holmen being only 'to attend' and there were those who disagreed with the proposals. This was the case, in particular, with many Spanish NGOs, including Médicos del Mundo: '*It is not a matter of reiterating battle orders or of claiming utopian rights but, rather, of succeeding in adopting concrete measures which are valid from day to day and, above all, implementing methods for eradicating corruption*' ⁷.

Finally, the mistake on the part of NGOs undoubtedly lay in the fact that they did not take advantage of having been in the background. Rather than exchanging experiences in Holmen, they preferred to use their time peering at the Bella Centre. ■

T.G.

⁷ El Mundo, 10 March 1995, p. 57.

Social development

A universal priority

The World Summit on Social Development which was held in March 1995 in Copenhagen provided an opportunity to take stock of the social situation over the past few decades and to devise a social agenda for the 21st century. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) was intensively involved in preparations for the summit.

UNRISD, which was set up in 1963 on the initiative of the Dutch government, devotes itself exclusively to research into social development. Although it is part of the United Nations system, the Institute is entirely financed by voluntary contributions and enjoys a large amount of autonomy. UNRISD is completely free *'to define the questions into which it will conduct research, decide on the methods to be applied, select researchers, draw conclusions and publish the results'*.

In anticipation of the Social Summit, the Institute stepped up its activity and mobilised its network of researchers throughout the world. Intense pre-Summit activity has been brought to a successful conclusion. The Institute has issued a number of publications containing a whole range of proposals made by researchers, academics, economists and other organisations. It has also drawn up a kind of action programme of what could be achieved in the field of social development. The aim was to prepare the ground for those taking part. In fact, social development encompasses a number of fields which are very different, although related, ranging from the social and political effects of the economic crisis on the Third World to the impact of environmental deterioration on the female condition and the problems of refugees. Bearing in mind the diversity and complexity of the world today, the Institute has attempted to clarify and highlight the

main social problems facing us as we approach the end of the century.

A changing world

Everyone agrees that the world today is moving forward at a frantic pace. Technological innovation, advances in information technology and speedier, more powerful means of communication, mean that for a number of years now, mankind has been moving at a rate which is faster than its 'normal' cruising speed.

Whereas it took Europe more or less a century to achieve its industrial revolution, now each day sees a new batch of technological revolutions. Their scope means that the changes affect everyone on the planet, from Vietnamese farmers to New York brokers. And it is no longer just a question of technological upheaval. Society as a whole, from a political, social and economic viewpoint, has entered a phase of rapid and frantic change. The process termed globalisation by many has become one of the great issues. While we may congratulate ourselves for some of the changes wrought by this process, others have had devastating results on individuals, populations and countries. The very nature of the process means that everyone is affected. It remains, however, the case that the effect on those who do not take part in this development and who suffer instead of profiting from it are frequently disastrous.

Taken as a whole, the international community has often been taken by surprise by the speed at which the changes have occurred. Sometimes it has simply decided to ignore them. Many have believed that a *laissez-faire* economic approach would ultimately provide all the solutions — and that social problems would be eradicated through the establishment of a healthy market economy. With this in mind, a number of governments have pared down or dismantled

their social institutions. Such measures have had dramatic effects on the poorest and most disadvantaged sections of society and all those who have not been swept along by the dynamism of the free market.

Studies published by UNRISD clearly highlight the way in which decision-making powers have, over the past few years, been passed over to institutions which, whether they be private or public, political or financial, have systematically ignored the social implications of their actions. This has been particularly true of the structural adjustment policies advocated by the IMF and the World Bank in Third World countries. These policies were intended in theory to permit developing countries to put their shaky economies back on their feet. In practice, however, they have almost always failed to take account of the realities in the countries to which they have been applied, tending to destabilise an already precarious social and economic situation. This has meant that even though the North and South are now intimately linked, the connection has tended to work in favour of the former for the simple reason that it operates the controls of the new world order in which the free market is 'king'. There is, however, a growing realisation that economic development and social development go hand in hand. Indeed, economic globalisation has led in its turn to a globalisation of social problems. This means that if account is not taken very soon of the social aspects of development, there is a danger that the economic engine will begin to falter. As Boutros Boutros-Ghali has written, it is now necessary *'to elevate the social question to the level of a universal priority'*.

A dangerous imbalance

In order to tackle poverty, it is necessary to institute social measures to forestall or compensate for the dysfunctions resulting from the market economy, which have continuously widened the gap between rich and poor. Today, almost a third of the population of the Third World lives in conditions of absolute poverty. Inequalities have deepened even in the industrial countries. In Europe, almost 15% of the population lives below the poverty line. The tension resulting from this situation means that the search for a solution is



Shanty town in the Philippines
*Even though there is less danger of
 nuclear Armageddon, millions of
 human beings still live in a climate of
 permanent insecurity*

not just a moral question, but also one of international security. UNRISD and other organisations have proposed a whole range of measures intended to combat poverty and exclusion, create jobs, curb crime and drug trafficking, take action to correct the inequalities between poor and rich countries, fight starvation and promote education for everyone; in short, to create a fairer world.

To achieve this, we must first strive to eliminate the flagrant imbalances which currently exist. Even though, since the Second World War, mankind has developed at an unprecedented rate, such development is indisputably of a selective nature. Development and wealth always exist in conjunction with the most unspeakable destitution. The existence of wealth and poverty alongside one another and the resulting contrasts are disturbing. A large number of children continue to die of hunger while huge quantities of food are wasted each day. World wealth has increased sevenfold over the past 50 years, but the billion richest individuals receive 60 times more than the billion poorest. And military expenditure is now equal to the total annual income of half the human race. In view of the pressures which could result from these imbalances and the dangers lying in wait for mankind as a whole if the situation deteriorates or even continues as it is at present, it is essential that thought be given to a new social contract, which must be implemented on a global scale.

A new social contract

UNRISD and other United Nations organisations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have published a large number of reports, especially in the run-up to the Copenhagen Summit, putting forward suggestions as to how social development can be restarted.

Now that the cold war has ended, there is much less danger of a nuclear Armageddon. However, even though fear of a worldwide cataclysm is no longer the order of the day, millions of

human beings still live in a climate of permanent insecurity. This insecurity is due among other things to the dangers of famine, civil war and the illnesses with which the Third World is afflicted. In the industrial countries, it is mainly crime, drug addiction and the precarious nature of employment which cause insecurity. Long term aid for developing countries is essential in order to permit their reintegration into the international economy. At the moment, the low-income countries have been left holding a poor 'hand'. They lack the means necessary to face the industrial countries on equal terms in the race for competitiveness and profitability. There is a need, therefore, for more constructive relations between rich and poor countries. The survival of both depends on it. We only have to consider the problem of indebtedness to see how the relations are governed by interdependence. Although the poor countries are compelled to borrow to enable them to function at all, the rich countries are, for their part, obliged to lend to keep the economic machinery running and to enable the debtor countries to pay the interest on their debts. For example, when Mexico became insolvent in December 1994, a rescue plan was negotiated as a matter of urgency between the main creditors to enable it to continue to service its debt.

In order to increase the pace of social and economic development in less advanced countries, in Africa in particular, it has been proposed that donor countries divert 0.7% of their GNPs to development aid. This aim, which has been frequently reiterated, is currently only achieved by four countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. A great deal has also been said about a new '20-20' deal for human development. Based on the sharing of responsibilities between donor and developing countries, the idea is that the former would devote 20% of their

official development assistance (ODA) to social programmes, while the latter would allocate 20% of their total budgets for the same purpose.

Another way of making money available for development would be to 'harvest the peace dividend'. Since 1987, military expenditure has fallen by 3.6% per year on average. The amounts released in this way amount to \$935 billion, 3/4 of which is 'savings' made in the industrial countries. However, this reduction in military expenditure has not automatically led to an increase in amounts spent on development aid. On the other hand, the poorest regions of the world, and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, have not reduced their military expenditure at all. By the same token, the arms-producing countries have taken a short-term commercial view of matters and have continued their export trade. At present, 86% of arms deliveries are made by the five permanent members of the Security Council. Buyers and sellers must act together to reverse this trend. Exporting countries would first of all have to stop subsidising their arms exports. In addition, the amount of development aid granted to the poorest countries should be increased. This would give them the resources to reduce social and economic disparities. These are frequently the cause of the instability which governments cite to justify their 'need' for weapons. In short, the relative security afforded by armaments must be replaced by the security of a social and economic environment which is more equitable and stable. A reduction in military budgets amounting to 3% per year between 1995 and 2000 would release \$460 billion. This could be used to accelerate social development and to finance conversion of the arms industry into manufacturing for civil purposes.

Another major source of financing on an international scale might be provided by the imposition of a tax on speculative international capital transactions (suggested by James Tobin, Winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics), and an international levy on polluting materials. Imposition of a rate of 0.05% on speculative transactions would yield a sum of \$150 billion per year. A tax of \$1 per barrel of petrol or its equivalent for coal would release \$66 billion per year. These amounts could be spent on social development and protecting the environment.

To achieve these objectives, individual countries and international institutions will have to show goodwill. The role of the UN in particular will have to be strengthened in order to promote better cooperation. Finally, it is essential that monitoring organisations, especially for checking on arms sales and observance of the 20-20 pact, be set up. There must also be a possibility of imposing restrictive measures where the rules are not followed, if the proposals are to be effective.

An interdependent world

Human security is currently threatened in numerous ways. Some of these threats, such as starvation or civil war, are restricted to particular regions of the planet, but others are not limited by political or geographical boundaries. These include the AIDS pandemic and environmental deterioration. Whatever the threat, however, the solutions are mostly to be found at the international level. And the reasons for the emergence of such threats must be placed in a more international context.

For example, stopping drug trafficking will only be possible if we tackle the reasons for drug-taking in industrial countries and if alternative ways of earning a living are provided for drug producing countries, such as Bolivia, which earns 20% of its total GNP from the cocaine industry.

Crime and violence, not to mention terrorism, have also taken on a multinational character. These have developed exponentially in our societies, mainly because of an undesirable social and economic environment, which is itself due to deep-rooted international imbalances. Crime does not develop in a vacuum and it may have an impact on areas with which it is not directly connected, such as investment. A large number of foreign investors hesitated for a long time before establishing themselves in South Africa — a very violent society where someone is murdered every 20 minutes.

Famines provide another example. Although limited to particular regions and caused by natural factors such as droughts, these are frequently due to maladjusted agricultural policies and inadequate environmental management.

Solutions to all these problems are, nowadays, rarely found at a national

level alone and so an international view must be taken. New structures will have to be established or old ones reinforced if we wish effectively to fight crime, drug cartels, environmental problems or the exploitation of women and child labour.

During its preparatory work, UNRISD adopted a number of proposals. A key one was the creation of an Economic Security Council within the UN. Its task would be to analyse the main economic problems, determine their impact on social development and define the action necessary to put them right. It is necessary for nations to be represented at the international level, perhaps, for example, through a 'People's Assembly' within the United Nations. Such an institution would tighten the links between the various peoples inhabiting our planet. For a number of years, we have been witnessing the resurgence of nationalism. In order to prevent nations from turning inwards in this way, it will be crucial in future to redefine common aspirations and common goals for the entire human race.

Finally, the Institute feels that the possibility of setting up a Central World Bank should also be considered, to replace or coexist with the IMF and the World Bank, which are often rightly or wrongly accused of only representing the interests of the industrial countries. Although these proposals are currently vague, their very existence should be welcomed, as they point to a way in international collaboration can be redefined and reinforced.

Towards a new concept of citizenship

Since the end of the Second World War, we have witnessed true integration, both at an international and a regional level. The best example of this is perhaps the European Union, which now encompasses 15 countries. Other regions of the world have also followed this path, with greater or lesser degrees of success. However, although links have been tightened at a political and economic level, very little has been done from a social viewpoint. In Third World countries, social action is all too frequently still at an embryonic stage, while in the industrial countries, there has been a clear reduction in the commitment of organisations to social development.

There must therefore be a re-think. Social development must be injected with a new dynamism which will allow everyone on the planet to become a fully fledged world citizen. The proposals adopted by UNRISD are intended to help achieve this. According to the Institute, true and active citizenship is based on three pillars: respect for human rights and individual liberties; political participation via universal suffrage and involvement in public life; and finally a certain level of socio-economic well-being. There are not many countries in which these three pillars co-exist harmoniously, if they exist at all. To implement the third element, it is essential for new life to be breathed into international solidarity.

This is a question of effective and constructive solidarity, not charity. There is a need for redistribution along more equitable and humane lines both within countries and between them. The current trend for an increasing number of responsibilities to be transferred from political institutions to multinational economic and financial corporations must be reversed or at least moderated. The role of state institutions and international forums must be reaffirmed and reinforced.

One of the main roles of the Copenhagen Summit was precisely to remind the world and its leaders that, despite the indisputable progress which has been achieved over the past half century, there are still serious imbalances. The work of UNRISD clearly shows that a solution to these imbalances must be found as a matter of urgency and that social development is a universal priority. However, the final declaration made at Copenhagen did not dictate anything to anyone. The task of drawing up concrete measures and proposals therefore remains. ■ F.C.

The Nordic countries: a society for all

The Summit held in Copenhagen mobilised international opinion. Just as in 1981 in Cancun, governments and politicians were asked to concentrate their minds. This they did. The Summit laid particular stress on the importance of human beings (the people-centred approach) and on the way in which people should interact to tackle their own problems and those of their physical environment.

It was no coincidence that the Conference should be staged in Northern Europe. The eminent position afforded social issues by the state in the democracies of Scandinavia countries is well known. It is at once a factor and a unit of measurement of global progress. The 'Swedish model', in effect an embodiment of the entire Scandinavian system, inspired politicians further south in continental Europe, particularly in France, where President Pompidou wanted to achieve it 'plus sunshine'. At the Summit, Finland's President Ahtisaari stressed that his country had always defended the principle of people-centred development: 'the result of contemplation about our democracy and our individual traditions, linked to a highly advanced sense of social responsibility', he commented. The welfare state has long been cited as the 'answer' to various socio-economic challenges but current economic problems have brought its viability into question. 'Perhaps the model needs a few far-reaching modifications', stated President Ahtisaari, who reaffirmed his conviction that 'the foundations of the welfare-state system remain healthy — a society for all regard-

less of the wealth and status of each individual in that society'.

The welfare state has many supporters and arouses much admiration but it also provokes controversy about its economic basis and its potential effects on individual liberties. It is usually the benefits rather than the concerns which are uppermost in people's minds. Much more than a simple historical reference, the 'Nordic' model arouses great practical interest and has a certain intellectual attraction. Being centred on people and their social welfare, it bases the progress of the individual on reforms and ongoing improvements to his physical and cultural environment. Environmental investment and the development of resources are the cornerstones of this system. One of the most noteworthy results for the Scandinavian countries is the very high level of economic and technological development that has been achieved despite the sparseness of the populations. But what are the foundations of the Nordic model?


The 'ideology' of social welfare in Scandinavia is based on the principle that all strata of society must have decent living conditions and certain fundamental rights in respect of unemployment, illness and old age. The principal elements of these rights lie in their universality, and public measures are seen as the best way of guaranteeing them. Thus, virtually all social benefits are financed by direct or indirect taxation. These account for approximately 31% of Denmark's GDP as against an average of 27% in the EU as a whole. It is noteworthy that social expenditure in Denmark represents no less than 50% of all public spending. The system involves social trans-

fers to ensure a better redistribution of income. By international standards, the result is impressive — only 4% of the population in Scandinavian countries live below the OECD-defined poverty line. It is estimated that 80% of the transfers in question go to those who would, otherwise, be classified below that line. The graph gives more information about social expenditure in Denmark, (comparable with that of the other Nordic states), and the average for the same expenditure in the EU as a whole. In family matters, for example, in all Scandinavian countries there are well-established measures for compensating women should their income drop when they become pregnant, have a child or adopt a child. Similarly, allowances are granted to families with children, while housing is allocated on the basis of the requirements of the family, elderly persons or the needy. The state also steps in to take the place of bad payers of maintenance in the event of divorce. Health allowances are allocated either through the state or directly via one's employer. There is a right to an early pension for those who are unable to work on health or social grounds.

Thus, the 'Nordic way of life' is special in terms of the priority it affords social issues and the equality of opportunity it provides from a very early age. It includes an education system which avoids means-testing and places great emphasis on public-sector involvement in managing virtually all the social services. The Scandinavian societies have gained the necessary knowledge and developed high-quality technologies in the field of social institutions and services. Elements of these approaches have been copied worldwide, ensuring for the Nordic model an internationally renowned reputation. However, the success of the socio-economic system in Scandinavian countries has only been achieved through the commitment of the people of these countries to build 'a society for all'. This is perhaps the key lesson for anyone seeking to emulate the Nordic model. ■

Lucien Pagni

Total social expenditure by source of financing



A novel experience

The planter-cheque operation in Cameroon

by Véronique Alary and Georges Courade*

Confronted by a worldwide crisis in coffee and cocoa prices, the Cameroon Government, supported by the European Union, has for several years been attempting to make the change from a price-regulation system under State control to a complete opening-up of the sector. One of the key phases in this restructuring plan was the repayment of debts owed to the planters. The authors present an assessment of this operation and a number of conclusions drawn from their work.

At the beginning of the 1990s, after an initial stage during which costs came down owing to a reduction in export tariffs and intermediary margins, the Cameroon Government set itself the task of remodelling its marketing policy, hitherto dominated by the all powerful National Basic Products Marketing Office (ONCPB). In financial crisis, the Office was faced with a situation of having to suspend price support payments to producers. The ONCPB was abolished to make way for the more lightweight ONCC (National Cocoa and Coffee Office), which permitted greater commercial freedom while maintaining a degree of annual stabilisation. Abolishing such a body was not without problems, a case in point being how to balance the ONCPB's debts arising from cocoa and coffee shipments via intermediate structures and incurred by way of price stabilisation? The ONCPB was in a situation where it had to suspend payments although it was imperative that the thousands of planters be reimbursed. Within this context, the European Commission, using STABEX funds, made a significant contribution to financing the operation (to the tune of CFAF 44.5 billion).

* Véronique Alary, doctoral student at Paris I and researcher at ORSTOM. Georges Courade, geographer at ORSTOM and lecturer at IEDES.



Cocoa is one of Cameroon's main crops

Avoiding pitfalls

To ensure that the operation ran smoothly, a STABEX cell was set up in Cameroon whose mission was to coordinate and verify the amounts of the intermediate structures' debts after they had provided a breakdown of their financial situation (production, approach costs, finance costs) together with a list of payments made to their planters. This was an operation fraught with difficulties, since some of the debtors sent their production directly to independent processing plants, with these manufacturers shipping on to exporters. Therefore, to avoid any imbalance amongst the local inhabitants when arrears were paid, it was decided that these private operators should also receive assistance in honouring their debts. A further problem was encountered when drawing up lists of eligible recipients and debts when it came to updating these debts with respect to the initial payments made. These lists were prepared using the intermediaries' accounting records and were from then on also drawn up on the basis of receipts issued by the planters.

After comparing lists provided by the intermediaries with audits conducted at the former ONCPB, the amounts were set in proportion to the index derived from 'amount of ONCPB-intermediate debt/total intermediate-planter debt'. Any balance remaining after payment to the planters was allocated to the intermediate structure. A cheque system was set up to ensure efficient reimbursement: after signature of a discharge, individual, non-endorsable cheques are handed over to the intermediaries at public ceremonies at which the government and the European Delegation are represented (the latter is responsible for explaining the origin of and reason behind the funds). It was then up to the intermediaries, once they had the cheques in their possession, to ensure that they were distributed to the planters who had been informed earlier by radio and the press and also by representatives from the authorities, the message being relayed via the classic 'word-of-mouth' method. At the same time, this contact with the planters enabled the intermediaries to bolster their confidence, given the context



A Cameroon woman in her small coffee plantation

of freedom in purchasing which had, meanwhile, been set up by the Cameroon State. The cash was then paid out at bank branches in an operation which, in the more inaccessible regions, was facilitated by the setting-up of 'mobile cashpoints' by the *Crédit Agricole du Cameroun*, which was the commercial bank associated with the operation.

This operation enabled more than 50 000 planters from five different provinces to be reimbursed, an achievement which invites a number of comments in the light of a study that was made of it.

Understanding and use of the funds

Initial comment relates to the planters' perception of the operation. In effect, being too distant from those who devised it both in cultural and geographical terms, the recipients appear to have had some difficulty in understanding the machinery of the operation in real time as well as in working out exactly who was behind the scheme. This problem in appreciating the situation was, naturally, exacerbated by the random nature of the way in which they had been informed and also owing to the election campaign going on at the time. Many planters associate the presidential elections (held in 1992) with vague promises and they are a source of scepticism and mistrust. Moreover, the

official intermediaries or those in the sector did not always rush to pass on the information, as they had only a very sketchy knowledge of STABEX. The result of this was that only a very small proportion of planters were aware of the origin of the funds.

A second comment relates to satisfaction on the part of the planters. Easy access to bank branches (above all for the elderly) and the virtual absence of approach expenses or commission fees when the arrears were cashed in certainly received a warm welcome from the recipients. In fact, three out of four planters stated that they received the total amount of the cheque. The study also demonstrates that the vast majority of planters actually turned up in person at the bank to cash their cheque (in other cases, a family member or someone from the cooperative was delegated to attend), and there was none of the customary wrangling to prove their identity.

There is, finally, a third comment arising from the study which relates to the use of the funds received. The amounts averaged CFAF 94 000, and one-quarter of the planters received in excess of CFAF 200 000, yet most of the planters had spent their money within three months. There were various reasons for this, the planters' spending being subject to the

constraints of urgent needs and requirements which were themselves conditioned by an inherent scale of priorities. In this connection, it should be noted that the planter was not always the only one to decide the fate of the sums received since, in many cases, other people benefited from the recipient's generosity — these were people of varying degrees of closeness to the planters, for instance spouses, unemployed family members, agricultural workers, etc. In any case, the money was spent principally in three specific areas: the first was to pay off loans, most of which had been taken out for the children's education, for funerals or to repay another loan (under the so-called 'rotating' system). The second priority when allocating the money was education and health, clothing, farming (particularly purchasing equipment) and investing in business and stock breeding. Of marginal importance and of lowest priority was saving, with tontines remaining the principal destination of the funds, followed by banks, friends and family.

An encouraging experience

This complex and risky operation which, given the context, was an outstanding success, enabled the European Commission to demonstrate that it could guarantee effective direct payment to the planters. In doing so, it also strengthened the intermediaries, enabling them to find healthier accounts and renewed credibility in the eyes of their supporters or clients, a very necessary quality given the recent opening-up of the sector. However, it is a pity that the origin of the funds should remain a mystery for many planters. Having said this, although misappropriation was reported here and there, the intermediaries were generally imaginative in responding to the planters' wishes and requirements. Finally, the Cameroon Government was able to support intermediaries forced to adapt to the market. Above all, it regained legitimacy as an economic regulator, a function which was being increasingly called into question.

The final stage of restructuring is currently in progress — the complete opening-up of the sector and the freeing of prices together with the abolition of the ONCC. ■

V.A. & C.G.

The increasing informality of African economies

by Odoardo Como *

'The informal economy is the people's spontaneous and creative response to the State's incapacity to satisfy the basic needs of the impoverished masses'

(Mario Vargas Llosa)

Structural adjustment continues to be a constant in the economic policies of many developing countries. This is certainly the case for the African economies, still in serious crisis after the terrible decade of the 1980s. The signs are there for all to see. Growth is half what it was in the 1970s, having fallen to an annual average of 2.1% for the period 1980-91 (as against a 3.3% average for developing countries as a whole and 2.9% for OECD countries). Investment fell in real terms by 53% between 1980 and 1989. During the same decade, the real price of certain primary products, notably cocoa, coffee, cotton and tea, fell by half. The debt ratio (foreign debt/GNP) exceeded 109% in 1991, the highest level in the world. Human capital investment is still insufficient to increase significantly the indicators relating to the development of human resources.

Among other things, structural adjustment programmes are leading to drastic reductions in the public sector. There have been redundancies in the civil service, or at the very least recruitment has been suspended. Civil service salaries have been cut or frozen, and public enterprises have been privatised with the inevitable result: the dismissal of surplus labour.

The job situation has been deteriorating, both as a consequence of the economic crisis, and in some cases as an immediate effect of the measures imposed

by SAPs. Unemployment has increased from 10% in the mid-1970s to 18% now, and in some countries it has touched 30%. About half the population lives in poverty. Prospects remain bleak, given the continuing trend towards growth without employment, which was recently identified in the UNDP's Human Development Report for 1993. In the 1990s too, according to ILO estimates, the number of manufacturing jobs in Africa will not keep pace with demographic trends, increasing by just 2.4% *per annum*, while manpower increases at the rate of 3.3%.

Increasing exclusion

The area of exclusion is therefore increasing: exclusion from growth, exclusion from employment, and exclusion from basic services. The inability of the state to satisfy the expectations of its population seems ever greater. Conversely, forms of adaptation are on the increase and the informal economy is a typical manifestation of this. Although definitions may differ somewhat, the informal sector can be said to cover all those forms of productive activity, both of goods and especially services, carried out on a small scale, while totally or partially evading institutional, fiscal or insurance obligations. A certain degree of informality is inevitable in any type of economy. It can, in fact, constitute one of the means by which new

needs begin to be satisfied when they originate in traditional societies, thus generating spontaneous development. It may also be a way of circumventing the high degree of institutionalisation in societies. However, it is also true that the current growth of the informal sector is mainly due to other explanations. Indeed, given the general failure to promote informal activities effectively so as to make them useful to overall socio-economic development, the growth of this sector nowadays appears more to respond to the pure logic of survival than to demonstrate the validity of the *laissez-faire* approach.

Today a strange social trend seems to be at work. Societies, including African ones, are becoming increasingly institutionalised. Even though the state is disengaging from productive sectors, it is attempting to strengthen its role as the arbiter and guarantor of the rules of the game. The result is somewhat paradoxical with the state endeavouring to institutionalise its presence and formalise rules at a time when private initiatives are hindered by a difficult economic situation. An example of this is to be found in the field of taxation. States are attempting to structure fiscal systems better by introducing western-style VAT, or by seeking to tax the informal sector. The logical consequence of this is that the informal sector has itself begun to change in order to adapt to the social and institutional context.

Different components of the informal sector

When we speak of the increasing informality of African economies, we are referring not just to the general growth in the informal sector, but also to its internal dynamics. It should not be seen as a uniform whole but rather as divided into segments. One component is made up of people who are not really part of the labour market at all, such as prostitutes or 'car-minders' and 'shoe-shines' in large African cities. There is no sense in talking of institutionally and formally identifiable supply and demand in relation to such categories of work which are not recognised and are sometimes even illegal.

* This is an edited version of a text submitted by the author who works at the *Università degli studi di Napoli 'Federico II'*.



An example of 'intermediate' informal activity :
a motorcycle repair shop in Bamako, Mali

There is also an informal sector *within* the market, which can in turn be divided into three categories. The first is what may be termed *low profile* informal activity. This includes many small trades plied by a self-employed workforce which is completely lacking in training and has no fixed workplace. The focus here, not unnaturally, is on the provision of services. The sale of pre-cooked foods, light and non-organised transport on rickshaws, hawking and domestic service come to mind. The second category could be defined as *intermediate* informal activity. In this case, there is a low level of skill and the use of (a little) employed labour. A small amount of starting capital is required for equipment. This category would include small carpentry or cycle-repair businesses, the small-scale transport of goods and persons, and retailing. The third category is made up of *high-profile* activity. Here we find manufacturing, the existence of a sound basic professional training, perhaps acquired in the modern sector, the hiring of staff, and sufficient capital assets to cover start-up costs. It includes large-scale commercial activities such as motorcycle and car repairs, manufacturing using wood and metal to a reasonable standard, and the production of other manufactured goods. The difference between this informal category and the others is the existence of a start-up barrier (mainly in relation to skills and the required initial capital). The distinction between this field and the formal private sector is to be found in the partial evasion

of some institutional factors, the relationship between employer and employee, and the lack of availability of loan finance (always problematic for the informal sector, as banks are reluctant to lend to anyone who is unable to provide suitable guarantees).

Mopping up on the margins

When we talk about the informalisation of African economies, we are mainly referring to the process which has swelled the marginal categories of the informal economy, that is to say those outside the market, and the first two categories (low profile and intermediate) operating within the market. This has been described by one author (Milton Santos in *L'espace partagé*) as 'the lower circuit of the economy. In a period of dramatic decline in economic activity, it is precisely the poor segment of the economy which is swelled with the persons expelled from the civil service and the privatised enterprises. What appears to be significant is that the overall reduction in the level of economic activity has led to lower labour demand from both the formal private sector and the high-profile informal sector. The consequence of all this has been more unemployment (which in Africa has increased by 6% in five years, and is still increasing) and growth in the intermediate and low-

profile informal sectors. The ILO has estimated that at least 70% of new jobs created are currently in the informal sector. As mentioned earlier, this is the least dynamic part of the informal sector, characterised by the absence of barriers to entry. Today, this sector has taken on the role of mopping up on the margins of the labour market. This leads to an increase in the business carried out in defiance of the regulations, and clearly damages formal activities. Increasing marginalisation is also caused by the fact that as urban employment and salaries fall, there is a knock-on effect on the rural areas. This is because the remittances sent back by those who previously left the countryside to take jobs in the cities have dried up. Thus, while it is true that the fall in employment is essentially an urban phenomenon, it also means that the countryside has become poorer.

Accepting the thesis that the poorest part of the informal economy has gained in importance as the socio-economic fabric of Africa is progressively dismantled, it is difficult to see how this informal activity is capable of providing the basis on which to construct the new model of development advocated by Latouche in his work *'The Planet of Castaways'*. This model, which rejects the ideal of a just society — the *better society* advocated by Popper — is supposed to originate from the spontaneous forces of the castaways of development. Our view is that the existence and increasing growth of the informal sector is simply the economic manifestation of exclusion, revealing the inadequacy of the view that modernisation is an uninterrupted and in some way inevitable process. Exclusion might only be a cost which has to be paid in the short term, but it must teach us to perceive development processes in a new way, and to pay more attention to the complexity and multiplicity of forms which development processes can assume. We must be ready to take advantage of those elements which prove to be particularly useful in different contexts. We also need to assess how states and international organisations can play a role in providing concrete support for those trends which, like the high-profile informal sector, can stimulate development and help it to spread. ■

O.C.

Can aid promote good government?

by Mick Moore and Mark Robinson*

The promotion of 'good government' has become an explicit objective of most aid donors. This has raised suspicions in developing countries, particularly when the threat of withholding aid has been used to force multi-party elections. But experience is showing that the good government agenda is less threatening than it first appeared, and provides opportunities for improving the quality of aid. Good government principles are here to stay and — if applied consistently, openly and intelligently — can bring benefits for both recipients and donors.

What is meant by 'good government'?

The term 'good government' entered the aid vocabulary in the early 1990s. Definitions of what it means vary. For most donors, the main ingredients are democracy (particularly multi-party democracy), respect for human rights and the rule of law, and efficiency, accountability and transparency in government and public administration. For some, good government also embraces popular participation, equity and poverty concerns and a commitment to market-oriented economic policies.

Disagreement among donors on the content of the good government agenda means they have pursued distinct, sometimes contradictory policies, and have failed to give clear signals to recipients about what they are trying to achieve. This has confused the picture and diluted the impact of good government initiatives.

* The authors are fellows of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. This is a reprint of a policy briefing published recently by the IDS (drawn up by John Madeley and edited by Geoff Barnard). The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of IDS or its funders.

Views from the South

'Human rights begin with breakfast'. African delegate to a United Nations conference

'The individual cannot really be a human being if his or her basic needs are not met, and those basic needs include security, subsistence, health and education'.

Pierre Sané, Senegal (Secretary-General, Amnesty International)

Caution is needed before, 'we twist arms to force democracy and all the other noble ideas and concepts down everyone's throats'... 'the Commonwealth should not just go along with the World Bank' in putting new conditionalities on aid.

Dr Mohathir Mohamad, Malaysia's Prime Minister, at the 1991 meeting of Commonwealth Finance Ministers

'Economic linkages are the most important instrument we have'.

Nigerian civil rights lawyer arguing in favour of tying aid to human rights.

What's new — and why now?

There is nothing new in many of the aims of good government policies, or in the approaches used to pursue them. What is new is that donors are putting more emphasis on using aid to promote good government, and are devoting more resources to it. There are several reasons for this.

In the first instance, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism undermined the case for giving aid to repressive and undemocratic governments simply because they were anti-Communist. Democracy could be promoted as an objective in its own right. There was also a

growing belief that 'bad government' had been undermining development. Corruption, poor control of public funds, lack of accountability, human rights abuses and excessive military expenditure, have all been blamed for holding back development, particularly in Africa. Finally, there is the conviction among donors that aid will be more acceptable to taxpayers if it is seen to promote democracy and human rights.

The end of the Cold War was the trigger that allowed these concerns to be packaged together under the single 'good government' heading.

The punitive approach

Aid donors are implementing good government policies through a range of measures. These can be broadly divided into two sets: positive (the carrot) and punitive (the stick). With the punitive approach, aid is made conditional on the recipient government adhering to political conditions set by the donors. Failure to do so can result in aid being reduced, suspended, and in extreme circumstances, terminated. The key objective is to promote political reform, usually in the form of multi-party democracy, together with progress on human rights.

In practice, the punitive approach has been used sparingly, and often only as the last resort when conventional diplomatic pressures have failed. Where it has been applied, it has not always had the desired effect. In 1992, donors publicly presented the Kenyan government with a virtual ultimatum — hold free, multi-party elections or aid will be severely cut. This caused a stir, partly because Kenya had previously been seen as a close ally of Western donors. Donors achieved their objective in the sense that multi-party elections were held, in December 1992. However, the outcome was that the existing government was able to take advantage of its influence over the electoral process to split the opposition, and gain re-election on the basis of a small share of the votes polled. Ethnic tensions were heavily exploited in campaigning, leaving Kenyan society in a weakened state, and undermining its development prospects.

Punitive measures have also been taken against Haiti, Malawi, Somalia, Sudan and Zaire, but again with mixed results. All this has convinced some donors to downplay the punitive approach. Canada, for example, has abandoned it as a mechanism for furthering good government. France has diluted its commitment to democracy promotion as a key policy objective. And in May 1994, the Clinton administration reversed its policy of linking preferential trade benefits to China to an improvement in human rights. However, the United States has not discarded the punitive approach completely, and in some cases has been willing to back aid sanctions with military force to restore democracy — Haiti being the most recent example.

Most donors will no doubt continue to use aid as a bargaining counter to affect the composition and behaviour of governments. The difference is that now they are doing this quietly rather than overtly.

The positive approach

Donors also employ a wide array of positive aid measures — mostly involving institution-building — to encourage good government. They fall into two main categories. The first of these is public sector reforms, advocated by the World Bank in particular. These include promoting better management of the public sector, encouraging civil service reforms, pushing for greater accountability and transparency in government, strengthening the legal system and training the police.

The second category is political reforms. This covers such areas as training journalists, promoting a free press, supporting human rights groups and other civic and non-governmental organisations, providing election monitoring, encouraging constitutional reform and assisting new political parties.

The positive approach has been less controversial than the punitive and has, on the whole, been more successful. But it is not without its problems. Institution-building projects tend to be small-scale and long-term. They require patience and flexibility on the part of donors, and are difficult to manage and appraise.

Donors have found it hard to spend money in this area. Providing too much money to organisations, too quickly, runs the risk of undermining their effectiveness and legitimacy.

Is national sovereignty threatened?

Good government policies *are* intended to be a threat to Third World governments who abuse human rights, or are corrupt and undemocratic. Using aid to counter these tendencies may threaten

Do donors practise what they preach?

Aid agencies have been justly criticised for failing to apply good government principles to their own operations. For example:

- failing to consult properly with recipients;
- being less than 'transparent' in their own dealings with recipients;
- advocating good government on the one hand, while at the same time funding dubious aid projects, such as dam schemes that leave thousands displaced without proper compensation.

The World Bank, which pioneered the notion of connecting aid with good government, very quickly found the tables being turned against it. The fact that it has recently opened its operations to greater public scrutiny is due in part to creative use of good government arguments by its critics.

governments, but can help those who suffer under them — donors argue. However, even those who favour democracy and respect for human rights are wary of donor intentions. Donors are promoting a particular type of government — multi-party democracy. What right have they to interfere in the internal politics of countries by prescribing this form of government? If positive rather than punitive measures become the norm in future, then recipients may feel less

threatened. But critics remain suspicious that donors are using good government arguments as a convenient excuse to cut aid budgets.

One of the clear benefits of good government pressures is that they are helping to shift the debate within Third World countries. People are hearing terms such as accountability, transparency and anti-corruption, and are beginning to use them themselves to raise questions. Are government organisations doing their job? Do we get value from large, parastatal foodgrain corporations that fail to provide cheap and reliable food supplies and run enormous deficits? Why is the press not able to investigate allegations of high level corruption? People feel more confident about raising these kinds of questions when their governments are also under international pressure to take these issues seriously.

Contradictions

At present, the good government agenda is full of contradictions. Apart from donors defining it in different ways, there are glaring inconsistencies in the way it is applied. The following are among some of the most obvious:

— the fact that donors continue to provide substantial aid and trading privileges to some powerful and influential countries such as China and Indonesia, despite clear evidence of human rights abuses.

— The fact that some of the donor nations most active in promoting good government have themselves been among the largest suppliers of military equipment to the Third World. Recent reductions in sales to some parts of the Third World are not due to any change in policy. They are because Western suppliers are being priced out by tight budgets and competition from other low-cost suppliers, like China.

— inconsistent responses to events, such as when General Sani Abacha seized power from a caretaker government in Nigeria in late 1993, reversing the country's planned return to democracy. He was condemned by (among others) the British Government. But Britain continued to supply arms to Nigeria.

These examples show the conflict between good intentions and political



A historical snapshot of a military parade in Zaire.
'An open attack on military spending has yet to become a recognised dimension of the good government agenda'

realities. They may be inevitable, but they do not strengthen Third World confidence that good government policies are being applied consistently or fairly.

Other problems stem from conflicts between different elements in the good government agenda. In July 1994, for example, the elected government of Gambia was forced out of office. Coup leaders alleged that the previous government, which had held power for 29 years, was corrupt. The dilemma for donors was which was more important: supporting democracy, or rooting out corruption? In cases such as these, donors are forced to make difficult choices. The USA announced it would cut off aid. Britain opted for a middle course, saying that existing aid commitments would be honoured but that no new ones would be made.

And what if recipient governments change their policies and satisfy good government criteria? The German government has recently increased aid to countries that have complied with good government criteria, and cut funding for others. But most donors have stopped short of making hard and fast commitments.

The way forward

The good government agenda has moved on since it was first put forward. The positive approach has gained ground,

and use of aid as an explicit and public means of forcing political change is being downplayed. It has proved to be a crude and unreliable tool. Instead, donors are resorting to the more traditional approach of applying pressure behind the scenes. In early 1994, action of this kind led to the sacking from an African government of three Ministers against whom donors had collected direct evidence of large-scale corruption. This more covert approach has the advantage of being more flexible, and more likely to be effective — although it can be criticised for not being transparent, and therefore breaking one of the basic rules of good government.

Looking ahead, the good government agenda is clearly here to stay. Aid donors have become attached to the principle, and have in many cases reorganised themselves so they have an office or division dealing explicitly with these issues.

The 'good government' label may be too broad and diffuse, and may eventually fall out of use. But the principles behind it — that giving and receiving aid are political processes, and that political issues should be taken into account — are likely to be embedded in aid programmes for the foreseeable future.

There are a number of lessons to be learned, however, if the potential benefits of good government policies are to be reaped. For recipient countries, the good government agenda has turned out to be less threatening than it originally appeared. It is better for countries to grasp the agenda and turn it to their advantage, than fight it. Demonstrating progress in improving government performance and addressing human rights issues should also provide useful leverage in negotiating better aid packages — although there are no guarantees. Recipient countries should, in addition, be putting pressure on donors to consult more, stop 'moving the goalposts', and practise what they preach.

For donor countries, greater clarity and consistency are crucial if good government policies are to work. Donors should coordinate their actions and seek to develop a more coherent approach. Additionally, the good government agenda needs to be broadened to embrace the economic dimension of human rights. It is

About IDS

The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) is one of Europe's leading centres for research and teaching on development issues. Established in 1966, it is situated on the campus of the University of Sussex, near Brighton, UK.

The good government agenda is just one of the subjects that IDS research focuses on. Other key areas include investment and enterprise, human development, gender, food security, poverty, and the environment.

The Institute's teaching programme has two parts. Its post-graduate degree courses attract students from all over the world. It also offers a range of short courses designed for senior administrators and development practitioners. Several of these are run in collaboration with partner institutions in the Third World.

Also based at IDS is the British Library for Development Studies. This has one of the most extensive collections of material on Third World development.

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not tenable to argue for political freedoms while at the same time promoting policies that make the poor worse off. A third point is that an open attack on military spending has yet to become a recognised dimension of the good government agenda. Until it does, this glaring inconsistency will undermine the moral argument behind good government policies. Finally, if donors are serious about attacking Third World corruption, they should start by following the United States' lead and make the payment of overseas bribes by their citizens a criminal offence. ■

M.M. and M.R.

Wind-up radio

The idea is a simple one, but as always, someone had to think of it first. Trevor Bayliss, a British researcher, can claim the credit in this case. While watching a BBC documentary on the AIDS epidemic in Africa, Mr Bayliss realised that one of the main obstacles to the dissemination of information in Third World countries was the high cost of batteries and the fact that they were not readily available. A market study carried out by 'BBC International Broadcast and Audience Research' (IBAR) showed that there are currently over 100 million working radios in Africa. In fact, the radio is the main mass medium of communication throughout the continent. However, a number of users are unable to listen to the radio for longer than a few minutes a day because of the high price and scarcity of batteries. The solution to this problem is therefore to develop a radio which does not need batteries.

An inventor and a businessman

Trevor Bayliss's invention works a little bit like old-fashioned watches which have to be wound up at regular intervals. A handle situated on the back of the radio is turned for a minute in order to tighten a spring inside the set. As it is released, this spring supplies energy to a generator which enables the radio to operate for

almost an hour. Then, all one has to do is wind up the radio again to prepare it for another 60 minutes. The generator has a life of 7000 listening hours, i.e. three to five years of normal use. It is easy to replace, has a good sound quality and can be used to receive FM, AM and short waves. Another advantage of the wind-up radio is that it only costs \$25. And of course, as it does not use batteries, Mr Bayliss's radio is environmentally friendly.

Rory Stear, a South African businessman, took over where the inventor left off and ensured that the project was a success from a financial viewpoint. Mr Stear very quickly realised the potential and importance of this radio for the dissemination of information in developing countries. Having met Trevor Bayliss, he contacted the British Overseas Development Administration which provided the money needed for technical development of the Bayliss generator. The next stage was to find the funds which would enable radio sets to be produced. It was here that Kagiso Trust Investments (KTI) and the Liberty Life Foundation entered the story. KTI is the leading non-governmental organisation in South Africa. It mainly occupies itself with providing development aid and Archbishop Desmond Tutu is one of its members. The Liberty Life Foundation also devotes itself to social development and is part of the Liberty Life Association of Africa, South Africa's lead-

ing insurance company. The funds obtained by these two groups made it possible to set up the BayGen Power Company¹ and an assembly plant in a Cape Town suburb. The radio sets will be produced by about 150 workers, most of whom are handicapped. South Africa's six main organisations for the handicapped have also invested in the company set up by Rory Stear. If everything goes according to plan, the first radio sets should leave the works during June. Almost 60 000 have already been ordered by the British Crown Agents agency for dispatch to Rwanda.

All the advantages without the disadvantages

The wind-up radio project is interesting and promising for many reasons. In South Africa, it will create jobs for the disadvantaged and some of the profits made will be used to finance social projects under the auspices of the organisations backing the BayGen Power Company. In Third World countries, the wind-up radio will increase access to all kinds of information, such as AIDS prevention campaigns, weather reports or adult education programmes. A study made by the John Hopkins University in Washington has shown that the radio is now the most effective way of disseminating information among the inhabitants of developing countries. It has a crucial part to play and important needs to satisfy. Uganda's Ministry of Information estimates that almost three million wind-up radios will be required in that country alone.

Its affordable price makes this radio particularly suitable for NGOs. Its robustness and compactness make it ideal for the use which will be made of it by NGOs in the field. The wind-up radio is therefore the perfect tool. It is environmentally friendly, offers high-quality reception and enables its users to listen without worrying about the batteries. ■

F.C.



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FESPACO 95

Africa likes its films

'Unlike words, images are accessible to everyone, in all languages, without the need for prior training or expertise... But once the screen grows dark, there is the question of access to the inner vision which governs each visible universe. Only language and symbolic translations can control this access... «the eye listens»'

Régis Debray (French essayist)

The 14th Pan-African Film and Television Festival was held in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) from 25 February to 4 March 1995. This event was devoted to 'Cinema and history' and was welcomed as a celebration both of 100 years of cinema and 25 years of Fespaco. There was a record attendance: 66 countries were represented, there were 228 foreign journalists, 187 directors, 174 producers, purchasers, distributors and operators, 65 actors and actresses and 130 films.

The panel of judges for the feature-film competition was chaired by *Ousmane Sembene*, a Senegalese novelist and film-maker, born in 1923, a pioneer of African cinema who, in 1966, was the originator of the first African feature film, 'la Noire de...'.

Competition was between 20 feature films, 23 shorts and documentaries, six feature films submitted from the African 'diaspora' and eight 'diaspora' shorts. There were also a number of other films and TV productions, eight of which concerned South Africa.

Taking place on the fringes of the actual festival was the VIIth MICA (International African Television and Film Fair), marking ten years of experience. At the last MICA in 1993, 317 products (film and video) were presented and there were 879 sessions with two thirds of the productions actually screened.

Two colloquia also took place on the fringe, one relating to the centenary of the cinema and the other concerning 'the outlook and voice of women on the African continent'. The African Film Centre

was also inaugurated. In addition, the 14th Fespaco was marked by the notable entry of South Africa onto the stage.

Perhaps more than usual, Fespaco was both a professional and popular event. Its popular appeal was demonstrated at the opening and closing ceremonies, attended by more than 50 000 people and by the audience sizes in the cinemas. These included open-air venues, most notably, the giant screen set up in the Place de la Révolution to accommodate more than 5000 film-goers. We should not forget either the animated crowds that thronged Ouagadougou's streets for over a week. During that period, the city was vibrant with the rhythm of African films. All the cinemas were in use — taken almost by storm by the many film enthusiasts who were pleased to have such a wide choice. Most of the cinemas offered three 'sittings' (18.30, 20.30 and 22.30) and some of the indoor ones were even showing films in the morning. The opportunity offered by Fespaco saw the revitalisation of a number of districts on the outskirts where there are popular cinemas.

Throughout the event, the same themes kept cropping up :

- the possibility of breaking free from traditional story-telling and the 'folklore' genre,
- the desire to record the values of a threatened way of life,
- artistic demands,
- the desire to entertain an audience unfamiliar with quality cinema,
- aspirations of reaching the international market,
- making films in local languages.

Even more striking was the pre-occupation with the distribution and screening of films. In Burkina Faso, most cinemas are part of a state structure and 15% of the ticket price is ploughed back into production. Moreover, any film of African origin has been exempt from tax since 1993. Unfortunately, this is a very rare — and perhaps even a unique — situation in Africa.

A weekly publication in Burkina Faso (*Journal du Jeudi*) wrote: 'We can no longer revel throughout the festival in the exceptional quality of our film-making. We now have to break even, and this is the sole requirement for cinema in the future'. From this standpoint, Africa, just like the United States or Europe, also has to contend with competition from foreign television, foreign video and foreign satellite channels.

But why are African films not profitable? The main reason lies in the fact that they suffer from a poor distribution system. But the idea that the African public does not like its own cinema is clearly one that is no longer sustainable. To quote only the example of Burkina Faso (a specific case, admittedly) many film enthusiasts in Ouagadougou go to the cinema every evening and sometimes they see two or three performances. There are 15 cinemas in the capital and many more in the regions. The average price of a seat is CFAF 200. Could it be that the audiences in Burkina enjoy films as much as ever but that African films are too scarce to fill the cinemas on a regular basis?

This appears to be the conclusion of a 'spot' survey of people coming out of



Banner in Ouagadougou
'Stay young by going to the cinema'

Africa and the centenary of the cinema

Speaking about the ethnographic and documentary films shown during Fespaco, the Chairman of the panel of judges, the Senegalese film-maker *Ousmane Sembene*, declared: 'We will be seeing films which have been made in Africa, films for which Africa has been the backdrop, with blacks appearing as extras, like shadows'.

It is true to say that prior to 1950, Africa was excluded from cinematographic production. Then the first pioneers appeared on the scene - people like *Albert Mongita* in the Congo, *Mamadou Touré* in Guinea and *Paulin Soumanou Vieyra* in Senegal.

Before then, the African continent had been little more than a film set for European film-makers. At the time when African countries were gaining their independence, African cinema was to come into being against a pre-existing cinematographic background where films were not made by African directors, distribution and showing of films was controlled by the former colonial powers and a pre-determined cinematographic culture was conferred on audiences.

On the occasion of the centenary of the cinema, the Pan-African film-makers' federation published a work* bringing together many varied contributions, which we summarise below.

At the outset, *Gaston Kabore* asserts: 'If Africa does not acquire a genuine capability to forge its own viewpoint, so as to come to terms with its own image, it will lose sight of its point of view and its awareness'.

Two principal subjects deserve mention: the functions of cinema and the perennial problem of distribution. Should cinema be militant (at the risk of being conformist), is it useful in social terms or is it a free art? Naturally, opinion varies on this subject:

For *Clément Tapsoba*: '...black and particularly African cinema cannot be perceived simply as an interpretation of

beauty. A work of art's interpretation of beauty is, in my opinion, a matter for dogmatic criticism, which is commonplace in the West'. Similarly, there may be a risk of African directors losing their air of authenticity and their originality because they have to respond to external market demand.

On the other hand, *Idrissa Ouedraogo* has a totally opposite viewpoint: 'Africa has for too long regarded films in terms of their cultural or educational aspects, and has neglected production requirements... African directors have in mind more a declaration of claims than simply film-making. For me, Yeelen, Bal Poussière and Ti-lai are proof that a major obstacle has been overcome... Samba Traoré is an act of rebellion against the ghetto into which everyone else is trying to push us. I want my films to be seen in Africa and elsewhere in the world, and my ambition is that audiences choose to see them because they are films and not because they are 'African' films... Cinema is above all technique and, today, this technique is universal. Sensitivity and creativity have neither colour nor race'.

As for distribution, *Tahar Cheriaa* points out that 'whoever controls distribution controls the cinema'. However, there are others who comment that, today, a film depends more on its TV or video distribution rights than on cinema ticket sales. This situation also applies to Africa, with the additional handicap that the continent as a whole depends principally on the West both in terms of equipment and programmes.

This leads us to the idea of launching a MEDIA programme aimed at creating a single market for film and television, encouraging all aspects of this particular sector, namely finance, production, distribution and training.

* L'Afrique et le centenaire du cinéma, Paris, Présence Africaine, 1995 (French/English bilingual publication)

any more, though I would support a fresh look at the subjects dealt with in the films and a much stricter official film-selection procedure'.

Ouedraogo: 'The linear nature of the action is generally unsatisfactory'.

Oumarou: 'I like African films because they enable us to assert ourselves, but they are not produced like American or European films. I often go to the cinema to see karate, Indian and adventure films'.

Boureima often goes to the cinema, particularly to see action films (Rambo) and also karate films.

Orokia is very keen on Malian films, but says 'I would like to know why Africans don't make as many films as white film-makers. It's such a pity because I'm fed up with karate films and all the others, although I do like going to the cinema'.

Sophie states, apropos of a Tunisian film, that she quite likes African films which are not based on fiction and that she identifies with the actors because the subjects dealt with are closer to real life. She does not go to the cinema on a regular basis and feels Fespaco offers her the opportunity to forget her 'weariness at the end of a long day'.

The results of this survey can be summarised as follows: Firstly, Fespaco is a real festival, not only in terms of its films but also for the atmosphere it generates. Secondly, the majority of film enthusiasts are quite keen on African films but deplore the fact that they are unable to see them in the two years between festivals. On the contrary, they are 'compelled to acquire a taste for the American, karate and Indian films which are regularly shown'.

Dominique David

the cinemas, that was arranged by The Courier. We gave the job to two young experts from Burkina Faso, *Tahirou Tasséré Ouedraogo* and *Assane Ouedraogo*. In order to reproduce the spontaneity of the replies, a few unedited examples are given below for our readers.

A more comprehensive assessment of the survey's results is also being prepared.

Souleymane: 'I just wish that we could go on seeing African films in the cinemas after Fespaco. What is the point of it though, if we have to wait two years before we can see another African film?'.

Harouna, with a more critical point of view: 'Fespaco is no longer innovative. It deals with the same topics every time. I am not really very interested

An interview with the Malian director, Sheik Oumar Sissoko

'Guimba': denouncing the Africa of the tyrants

Lying somewhere between traditional and modern, the film 'Guimba' by the Malian director Sheik Oumar Sissoko, received 'L'étalon du Yennenga', the grand prix of the fourteenth Panafrican Film Festival (Fespaco), in Ouagadougou. It is the successor to 'Au nom du Christ' by Roger Gnan M'Bala, from Côte d'Ivoire, which won the award in 1993. The winner also received the European Union award, the prize for best costume and scenery as well as a number of other special awards.

'Guimba' is a parable on democracy and it denounces the Africa of the tyrants. King Sitakilli reigns in Mandingo¹ territory as a tyrant over his people in the company of his dwarf son who is as fond of women as is his father. The tyrant's opponents intend to exploit this weakness to bring about his downfall.

This is the third time that Mali has received the highest Fespaco award, making it the country to have received the greatest number of prizes in the history of the Festival. The Courier had the opportunity to interview Sheik Oumar Sissoko during the proceedings in Ouagadougou. We began by asking him whether 'Guimba' is a genuinely African film.

— I have been wanting to make an African film with Africans since 1980 and that is why I set up an association which then became an Economic Interest Grouping called Kora Films. Its aim is to make co-productions with other African countries and it was Kora Films, supported by Idrissa Ouedraogo (a director from Burkina Faso) which made 'Guimba'. Post-production on my second film was in

¹ The Mandingo Kingdom covered all or part of the current territory of Mali, Guinea and Senegal.

Burkina Faso and pre-editing on 'Guimba' was also in Burkina Faso. Apart from final editing in Paris, my film was produced, directed and edited by Africans.

■ *For a film which many are comparing to Bertolucci's 'The Last Emperor', don't you think that your budget is exceptionally low?*

— My film's budget is approximately FF 6 million and this level of financing was made possible by using local equipment and technicians who were paid at a preferential rate. Funds came from the EIG Kora Films (Mali), the French Ministry of Cooperation, the National Cinematographic Centre (France), the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency (French-speaking communities), the CBPC (Mali) and DIPOCI (Burkina Faso).

■ *Filming took place at Djéné, a traditional Malian town. I overheard a young Malian spectator say that he no longer recognised his own town. What do you say to that?*

— All I did was to touch up a few buildings here and there for the modest sum of FF 15 000. All the work was done by local people.

'Death before dishonour!'

■ *There are several themes in 'Guimba', including the denunciation of arbitrary power, but also certain concepts based in Mandingo culture: the relationship of humour and its logical succession, i.e. the tyrant's suicide! You yourself are a Malian,*

so surely people are going to think of recent events in your country?

— That's how things are: 'Death before dishonour!'. This is a trait in Mandingo culture: tolerance is not vengeance. It was our cultural heritage which was trampled underfoot by tyrannical governments. Contrary to what you might think, this is about the virtues of our cultures, the birth of initiatives and participation. There can be no modern democracy without traditional democracy; there has to be tolerance and respect, and the 'relationship of humour' is the best example of this. Even when the relationship happens to be a distant one, certain links mean that murder is out of the question but that acting in collusion can lead to the saying I mentioned earlier 'Death before dishonour!'. Hence the noose placed around the neck of the tyrant and his descendants!


■ *What are your feelings about the way the film was received by African audiences?*

— It would be wrong these days to say that Africans are unaware of African films. In the last five years, Africans have both witnessed and been players in the rejection of tyrannical governments, so my film will not pass them by since it is a kind of testimony to this rejection. African audiences are extremely tolerant, respectful and they stand together. They are also acquiring a taste for the lowering of taboos!

■ *How does 'Guimba' fit in with your other films?*

— I initially studied mathematics. I was a committed African student, always wondering how I could express myself, and it was not long before I found that film had to be my means of expression, in the language of my country. I continued my studies in history and sociology and then I did a course at the Louis Lumière National Cinematographic College.

I started out by making topical films. In 1982, my first film dealt with the problem of education in Mali and in 1983 I looked into rural libraries and the effects of drought in rural areas. I made 'Nyamanton' (The lesson in filth), in 1986, and this was



'L'étalon du Yennenga': The Grand Prix of the Panafrican Film Festival. According to the award winner, Omar Sissoko: 'It can no longer be said that Africans are unaware of African films'

my first feature-length film, about child labour. After that, I made 'Finzan' which was dedicated to the condition of women oppressed by tradition and society. I have also made several documentaries.

■ *What do you expect from critics both in the West and in Africa?*

— What I would like above all is for them to take a fresh look at culture which is closer to self-sufficiency in food than might be thought. Everyone knows that culture is, first and foremost, food for the spirit and only this approach will make it possible to understand development problems before trying to solve them!

'Petty nationalism is harmful'

Cultural activities also have an economic function since culture is an industry which creates jobs. As far as cinema in Africa is concerned, there are sufficient regional structures (Burkina Faso, Mali, Tunisia, Algeria, Zimbabwe) but, unfortunately, there is petty nationalism which is harmful. In addition, culture must not be confused with the advancing tide of communication because communication always sweeps away culture.

■ *The perennial problem of cinema in Africa is one of distribution. How do you see this affecting 'Guimba'?*

— The problem of distribution is all the more complicated because even TV stations have insufficient funds and we know that subsidies cannot go on for ever. In the case of 'Guimba', Kora Films will be organising distribution and release in Africa and Europe. We expect the film to be dubbed into English so we can reach the US market, and we also intend to be at the Cannes Festival. However, the main obstacle is still distribution of the film in Africa. African directors must become more involved in releasing films. The real problem is that we do not have any credible distributors in Africa. At the moment, to set up an effective distribution structure in Africa necessarily implies further State subsidies. Despite this, there is a need for it to be managed independently.

■ *Do you believe that there is such a thing as 'African' cinema?*

— To make a film specifically 'African' is, to a certain extent, to marginalise it. Cinema is a universal art characterised by a script, and the cinema in Africa is diverse and multi-faceted. We must not let it be side-lined. Fespaco is attempting to bring in stricter rules regarding the selection of films, but there is still a kind of African ghetto. Nevertheless, I still think that the 'Fespaco label' is important for a film coming out of Africa. As for the Europeans, they would do better to help us finance the distribution of our films in Europe rather than organising myriad festivals. ■

Interview by Dominique David

Radio as a development tool

A project undertaken by *Echos Communication*, an association which has chosen to deal with development through communication, could very briefly be summarised thus: three years of work; five continents covered; twelve hours of broadcasts and twelve subjects. All this was aimed at offering another view of development and to enable the South to take the floor.

In co-production with CRPLF (the Association of French-Language Public Radio Stations) and with the aid of five journalists, *François Milis*, executive secretary of *Echos Communication*, and *Jean-Pol Hecq*, a journalist and producer at RTBF, produced a series of radio reports¹ in countries as diverse as Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Bangladesh and Switzerland. The topics they covered were also wide-ranging: savings and credit, women, resource management and transport. However, all these subjects were treated as integral parts of one and the same problem, namely development.

The series of broadcasts entitled 'Democracy, environment and development: the intercultural dialogue for safeguarding the planet' was aimed principally at making audiences in French-speaking countries in the North and South aware of the interdependence between the self-determination of peoples and preservation of the global environment. These populations are still too often perceived as recipients of aid and as 'incompetents' who know no other language than that of grievances. *Echos Communication* wanted to give them the floor to express what *François Milis* calls their 'citizenship': 'There is a great desire to participate which is felt by a whole range of players. We wanted to show how these people are taking charge of their environment and their development'. Participation is un-

deniably the key word in the various broadcasts: participation with a cultural foundation; the preservation of culture in order to achieve improved development: 'too many structures have a vertical approach. If a project is based solely on the technical understanding of things, there is every chance of it not succeeding, because cultures and concepts are different. Projects must therefore incorporate a global view of culture'.

Interdependence

Each broadcast demonstrates this need for a cultural approach to development, but such approaches and experience, however specific and different they may be, cannot be isolated from one another. In fact, everyone, today, recognises the interdependence linking all the driving forces of development, in the South and in the North. 'Democracy, Environment and Development therefore wishes to identify certain characteristics which are similar in the North and in the South'. This is why each topic studied, without claiming to be exhaustive, mixes accounts from both hemispheres. 'The approach will be multi-faceted: the North/South twinning of subject-matter will reflect debate'.

By way of example, the broadcast devoted to health is very revealing. It is divided into four parts, each peppered with musical passages. The first part deals with efforts made by a Bolivian association to draw up a suitable policy which takes into account the causes rather than the symptoms of the health problems of the majority Indian population. The second is devoted to possible responses to the question of dealing with problems of access to medicine encountered in Senegal by those living in the bush. Such difficulties are heightened by the reduction in buying power since the devaluation of the CFA franc last year. Next, it is the turn of Bangladesh: a field hospital has been working for over 20 years to train medical

auxiliaries and surgeons recruited from a rural community whose members are for the most part illiterate. Very encouraging results have been achieved. Finally, they hand over to the Quebec government Health Minister who gives his opinion on public health worldwide.

When listening to these four accounts which come from four very different parts of the world, certain converging aspects very rapidly come to the fore, despite often original solutions: promotion of a national health policy which takes the people's primary needs into account, the need for a global approach which incorporates other elements, such as education or access to drinking water, the problems of dealing with what is at stake in terms of trade, etc. These are all aspects which bear witness to this multi-faceted approach and the need for a global approach to problems linked to development.

This division is important, explains *François Milis*, because it permits two levels of appreciation: 'There is an experimental level, that is to say a more concrete level, which is the result of people's perception of the problems they encounter; but there is also a more synthetic level made possible by a more global view of the same problems by those in charge of projects, by researchers or experts'. The same applies to the other 11 topics studied. Of course, some are addressed in a more intellectual or conceptual manner, there are those which are composed only of factual accounts and still others which are dealt with much more critically.

Communicating these innovations and local knowledge via radio enables them to be appreciated, and accessible to a greater number of people and communities. This is why, in addition to programming on the French, Belgian, Swiss and Canadian public airwaves, *Echos Communication* now envisages broadcasting on national and local radio in the South². ■

T.G.

¹ This project is financed by the AGCD, the DDA and DG VIII.

² The first broadcast will be on Sunday 11 June at 1315 on RTBF Channel 1. For further information, contact: *Echos Communication*, 28 rue Coleau, B-1410 Waterloo (tel: 02-384 94 06).

Information: food for thought

by Sarah Reynolds

Agriculture feeds nations, but unless agriculture is nourished by information agricultural production is likely to remain inadequate. This is the case throughout the world, but it is particularly true in Africa. As with food, the quality and availability of information is not equitably shared among nations. Consumers in the developed world have access to almost all the information they could possibly want, all highly processed for quick and easy digestion. Consumers in developing countries often have to go without sufficient information, or are presented with a poor quality product that they find impossible to assimilate or digest. How can agricultural information systems better serve the appetite for knowledge of those who are at present information-undernourished?

While much is being done to facilitate the flow of information from north to south, the Fourth Lomé Convention, like its predecessor, lays emphasis on the need to encourage the development by ACP countries of their own capacities for the production, acquisition, processing and dissemination of information for agricultural and rural development. CTA has held a series of four regional work-

shops in Africa to give representatives from the region the opportunity to discuss how such information services could best be developed. The fourth workshop, for Southern Africa, was held in Windhoek on 14-18 November 1994 and was attended by participants from nine countries within the region and by representatives of regional and international organisations. The workshop was sponsored by the CTA and organised jointly by the CTA, the Southern Africa Centre for Cooperation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR) and the Ministry of Agriculture of Namibia, the host country. CTA intended that the workshop should give participating countries the opportunity to consider a regional approach to handling technical information on agriculture, by pooling existing resources and developing common services on a regional basis. Such a policy makes more efficient use of limited resources within the countries concerned and this, in the longer term, will lead to the self-sufficiency that the Lomé Convention seeks to stimulate. In the shorter term, regionalisation is attractive to potential donors whose own sources of funding are also limited.

Effective regional cooperation in agricultural information systems is likely to depend on the strength of national institutions. Libraries and documentation centres are too often in competition for

Christopher Lungu of SACCAR presents newsletter to the Namibian Minister of Agriculture, Nangolo Mbumba at the Windhoek workshop



recognition and resources and, although library staff are often cooperating with each other on an informal basis, there may be little or no cooperation at an official level. Furthermore, information services are often undervalued by policy-makers who fail to appreciate that information is an essential tool of development without which their policies cannot be effectively implemented. So in what ways can agriculture information services be better managed and upon whom does the responsibility lie for achieving that improvement?

Although there is obviously a degree of overlap, there are three principal categories of people who have some power to implement change: the policy-makers themselves, users of information services including researchers and extensionists, and the information specialists who staff the libraries and documentation centres.

Some countries have yet to formulate an agricultural information policy and in others, the policy is weak and ineffective. Proper recognition of the relationship between agricultural information and agricultural development is an area of responsibility that can only be undertaken by policy-makers who have to find, or allocate, resources to fund the service. This means not only adequate buildings and equipment but also a well-trained and adequately paid staff who can look forward to opportunities for advancement within their chosen career. A point which is often overlooked by those responsible for funding documentation centres, perhaps because they do not use the service themselves, is that the staff are there to serve the needs of, among others, highly trained scientists. To be able to do their job properly, documentalists must be able to understand the needs of such users and if they cannot do so the results may, indirectly, be very costly. Agricultural information may not appear to be as valuable as agricultural research, but research which has not been based on an accurate assessment of current needs, and a review of other such work being undertaken, is likely to be either inappropriate or a duplication of effort. And what are extensionists to extend if not accurate, reliable and up-to-date information?



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In these days of increased environmental awareness, agriculture, fisheries and forestry information is inter-related and very much in demand, and yet few of the countries in the region have an effective national agricultural information network. Among the many causes are a lack of awareness of the need for networking, lack of communications media to keep the network alive (such as telephones, e-mail, newsletters, etc) and lack of money for transport, subsistence, training and equipment such as computers and photocopiers to develop products in support of the network.

Information — on time

Just as policy makers have a responsibility to provide good information services, users of those services have a responsibility to insist upon it. No politician is going to be able to justify funding a service that no-one demands. And users should draw upon and respect the talents of the library staff, a number of whom have been trained to degree standard and above. One of the most frequently voiced disappointments of library staff is that they are informed too late, or not at all, of forthcoming programmes. It can take weeks to obtain relevant literature from distant sources and it is frustrating for both librarian and user to have to wait when more forethought could have avoided the delay. If researchers, extensionists and other users take librarians into their confidence from the outset, more information, information of better quality and information from sources that might otherwise have remained unexplored, will be available to help when making decisions.

Malawi has found an innovative solution to the frequent problem of marginalisation of the information/documentation sector from the decision-making process. Research within the Department of Agriculture is organised into commodity and service groups. For example, there is a maize commodity group and a crop storage service group. Information is also a service group. At the project meetings when plans are drawn up, and constraints and results are discussed, the librarian is automatically included as leader of a service group. This can benefit in two

ways: it markets the information service to the key players and it keeps the Information Service Group informed of upcoming programmes in time to have the information resources available to support the programme.

Just as users of library services must respect the professional nature of library staff, the staff must accord the same respect and courtesy to the users of their service. An attitude of indifference or superiority may discourage the shy, young researcher who needs all the help he can get at the start of his career but who may rise to a position of influence in later years. While it is true that many libraries and documentation centres are short of books, journals, computers and staff time, librarians and documentalists can nevertheless do much to influence those who have the power to improve the situation by making the best of what they have rather than sitting back and lamenting what they lack. Shortage of qualified staff is a recurring problem. In Mozambique, junior staff educated to Grade 6 or 7 are trained to undertake specific tasks as one part of the whole job or process. Each learns a specific routine and then hands the work on to the next person for them to carry out the next stage of the process. Although there are initially many mistakes, these can be corrected and everyone learns how to do better. The encouragement that is given, and the resulting job satisfaction at all levels, boosts staff morale and attracts support for the library.

So policy makers, users of documentation centres and the information specialists themselves all have some power to improve agricultural information services, but what specific services need to be addressed? One of the problems that faces many libraries is the shortage of foreign exchange for the purchase of periodicals. A further cause for concern is the late appearance and high mortality rate of national and regional scientific journals. Although the 'Zimbabwe Journal of Agricultural Research' is designated as the SACCAR regional journal, there are many problems, not the least of which are the lack of paper and printing materials and a backlog of articles waiting to be printed. These are problems that affect not only those working in agricultural research but

also those working in the extension services. Like their colleagues in research, they cannot afford to subscribe individually to international journals. They may also find it difficult to gain access to scientific literature coming into the country which is usually channelled to established libraries.

Custodians of the future

Extensionists face a further challenge. There is a growing realisation that traditional risk reduction and survival strategies are being lost as young people ignore the wisdom of their elders, preferring to leave the rural areas and head for the bright lights of town. They see no relevance to their lives of knowing what wild plants can be taken from the bush for food when rains fail and there are no crops. In the CFA franc zone of West Africa, western drugs have more than doubled in price since devaluation of the currency and, throughout Africa, foreign exchange for importing costly drugs is scarce. Knowledge of the medicinal and healing properties of indigenous plants must not be lost, because if the knowledge is lost so too are the plants, for no-one will ensure their survival. The droughts in recent years have highlighted the danger of losing this knowledge and information specialists are being asked to work with extensionists and researchers to find ways of documenting it for use by present and future generations.

Information specialists are usually kept fully occupied in collecting, cataloguing and storing information. As electronic communication becomes more widely available, the amount of information within reach could well become overwhelming. Will information specialists be given the support they need from their managers, departments heads and, ultimately, the politicians? Information is valueless unless it is properly handled and used to support the knowledge system. It is knowledge that must be communicated. There is a big difference between 'I know' and 'I am informed that...'. Given the resources to do their job properly, information specialists are key players in the knowledge system. They are, after all, the custodians of our future. ■

S.R.

ISLAM D'EUROPE- Intégration ou insertion communautaire ?

(ISLAM IN EUROPE — *Integration or insertion into the community?*)

Under the direction of Robert Bistolfi and François Zabbal. Editions de l'Aube, La Tour d'Aigues, Collection Monde en cours, 1995, 383 pp.

A significant proportion of the population of the European Union is of foreign origin. Recent immigration, during the last 30 or 40 years, has increased the Islamic component and Islam is often the second religion. In socio-cultural terms, eight to 13 million people, perhaps more, are involved.

Is there one type of Islam or many? There is no obvious uniform concept of Islam, the range being very wide from traditional Islam exhibiting cultural entrenchment varying over time and in space, to concepts confirmed by different politico-religious movements.

In the face of this complex Islamic reality, two approaches clash from the outset: briefly, one aims to assimilate and the other to integrate but, today, the debate cannot be reduced to this simple choice of alternatives. The way in which Islam finds its niche will obviously have repercussions on the cultural and political future of the host countries as well as on overall cohesion of the European Community. By confirming its secular position, this form of Islam could develop a more egalitarian dialogue with Islam in the Arab-Islamic world, and this element will also shape relations between Europe and the Mediterranean.

Islams d'Europe studies the context of integration in a number of European countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Italy and Greece). The specific nature of the experience of each country is examined, together with current questions. The aim was to address shifting socio-cultural and socio-political realities, to compare concurrent approaches and possible points of convergence. The authors invited sociologists, legal experts, political analysts, people in the field (from the community movement), analysts from politico-religious publications, theologians, etc. to examine the dynamics at work.

There are many factors which, taken together, form the structure which receives the newcomers. Some are legal, others are institutional or symbolic and

are reflected in the different approaches to immigration and alien status, the notion of nationality and citizenship (with the predominance, here, of *right of residence* and *right of descent*), Church/State relationships, etc. Drawing on national history, the success of integration therefore depends on a movement towards, and the conditions of, acceptance. In this context, societies must examine themselves and the background to the obligations they impose as the price for acceptance.

Extreme 'models' have had to evolve. The French model *par excellence*, that of assimilation, has had to be established in an *ad-hoc* manner with cultural diversity. Conversely, with the various models of integration, there has been alarm at the erosion of common values linked with a dogmatic respect for cultural differences.

Yet, is there a 'European integration model'? This is still unclear from the convergence of concerns in Europe. Do the thoughts and sometimes the self-critique developed in this work nevertheless make it possible to define future prospects? One might think that this model ought simultaneously to take into account two requirements — firstly and as a matter of priority it would monitor preservation and enrichment of the common 'basis' of individual values against all Community-oriented machinations. However, on the other hand, whilst still avoiding division into groups, it would include recognition of the collective entrenchment of any current membership of a cultural group. If it has to exist, this European model must be confirmed in a context of conflict between these requirements. Given the evolution in progress, it appears that the French approach to integration is not the least well equipped to reconcile all sides. ■ Robert Bistolfi

L'Europe à géométrie variable — Transition vers l'intégration

(Variable-geometry Europe — *transition towards integration*)

Pierre Maillet and Dario Velo — *European Perspectives Collection*, publishers: Harmattan, 5-7 rue de l'Ecole polytechnique, 75005, Paris — 262 pp., 1994.

This work is published under the direction of Pierre Maillet, Emeritus Professor at the University of Lille I (France), Honorary Director General at the Commission of the European Communities, General Secretary of the Confederation of

European Associations of Economists, and by Dario Velo, lecturer at the University of Pavia (Italy) and Chairman of the Centro Studi Sulle Comunità Europee. They have been assisted by a multinational editorial committee consisting of eight people from the Member States. If one adds that the European Perspectives Collection, under the direction of Pierre Maillet, is part of the European Community's Jean Monnet Action and that it is the result of joint work by the holders of European 'Jean Monnet' economics chairs, it will be understood that this book is a serious work advocating consolidation of Europe's structure.

The Maastricht Treaty undoubtedly pointed the way but it is set in the context of the Treaty of Rome, all the partners making the same undertaking. However, in point of fact, there is something slightly unrealistic about a process which, for example, enables the United Kingdom to take advantage of opt-out clauses. Thought must be given to the diverse characteristics which would be further enhanced given the future prospects for expansion towards Eastern Europe. The 1996 intergovernmental conference will probably be the forum for these adjustments.

We are familiar with 'Europe à la carte' and 'Two-speed Europe', but it is preferable to speak of a variable-geometry Europe with each state contributing to the effort towards the common goal but at its own pace and in accordance with its capabilities and particular wishes. The book's subtitle clearly indicates the aim — 'transition towards integration' — and only the transitional formula of an enlarged Europe operating on the basis of variable geometry, but organised so as to guarantee consistency in all actions undertaken, makes it possible to take optimal advantage of the potential and wishes of each country. This is the required response to today's economic and political challenges preparing us for tomorrow's more complete integration. Without lingering on the road, progress must be made while still taking account of the actual situation and sometimes, as has been said, giving time time. ■ Alain Lacroix

PUBLICATIONS

RECEIVED

THE HEALTH IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

By Dr M.H. Birley. Publishers: HMSO Publications Centre (P.O. Box 276, London SW8 5DT, UK).

1995, 241 pp., £22, ISBN 0-11-580262-2.

Although governments and international agencies donate considerable sums to development projects in various sectors (agriculture, energy, industry, etc.), while taking into account the effect of these projects on the environment, many health professionals agree that the health aspect is too often neglected.

Intended for the layman, this work addresses students of development and environmental sciences, engineers, consultants and managers concerned with development actions. It offers a wide-ranging examination of the possible health risks of these projects and proposes a simple procedure for assessing and managing them.

PROTECTION DES CULTURES ALIMENTAIRES EN AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST ET CENTRALE — Guide pratique des produits phyto- pharmaceutiques dans les pays de savane et forêt humide (FOOD-CROP PROTECTION IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA — a practical guide to phytophar- maceutical products in the coun- tries of the savanna and rain forest)

By Jean-Gilbert Theissen and Roland Pierrot of the Mission de coopération phytosanitaire of the French Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, directed by the Ministry of Cooperation (20, rue Monsieur, F-75007 Paris). Distributor: AGRIDOC (27, rue Louis-Vicat, F-75738 Paris). 1994, 525 pp., 140 FF. ISBN 2-11-088564-5.

This practical manual on protecting food crops aims to help monitoring authorities and producers take advantage of phytopharmaceutical products whilst reducing the risks these pose in use. It also aims to protect users, consumers and the environment against toxic hazards constituted by certain active substances, by making it possible to distinguish between reliable products and dangerous or non-effective preparations, clearly indicating the reliable producers and distributors.

PLANTES PARASITES DES CULTURES ET DES ESSENCES FORESTIERES AU SAHEL (PARASITIC PLANTS OF CROPS AND FOREST SPECIES IN THE SAHEL REGION)

By B. Dembélé, A. Raynal-Roques, G. Sallé and C. Tuquet. Publishers: John Libbey Eurotexte (6, rue Blanche, F-92120 Montrouge) for the Sahel Institute. Distributor: AGRIDOC (27, rue Louis-Vicat, F-75738 Paris). 1994, 43 pp., 80 FF. ISBN 2-7420-0048-8.

Continued on inside back cover

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

EU-South Africa relations The Commission sets out its stall

On 29 May, the European Commission adopted a proposal from Commissioner Pinheiro for a Council decision authorising the negotiation of a new framework for relations between the EU and South Africa. Below we reprint an abridged version of the press statement issued by the Spokesman's Service of the Commission.

The Commission is aiming for a twin-track approach: on the one hand, a protocol to the Lomé Convention covering the terms and conditions of South Africa's accession to the Convention and, on the other, a trade and co-operation agreement between the European Community and the Republic, which could lead to the establishment of a Free Trade Area. In close connection with these two instruments, the Commission is willing to endorse South Africa's request to continue to benefit from the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD) which is financed by a special Community budget line. The Commission proposes allocating ECU 500 million for this programme for the period 1996-1999 (The figure for 1995 was ECU 125 million).

'This is an ambitious approach which confirms our determination to strengthen our links with South Africa', said Professor Pinheiro after the approval of his proposals. 'I believe South Africa is a special case that deserves a special effort from our side. It merits the best possible arrangement we can offer for future relations', he added.

The Commission's twin-track approach takes into consideration the specific economic, social and political conditions in South Africa, the issue of regional integration, and the wishes expressed by the South African government. South Africa has asked to open negotiations 'with a view to establishing the closest possible relationship with the Lomé Convention', as well as an

agreement with the European Union 'on specific elements that might more appropriately be accommodated outside the Lomé Convention, to the benefit of the existing Lomé members and South Africa itself'.

The proposal is designed to contribute to sustainable social and economic development in South Africa by providing easier access to the Union's market and a gradual and smooth integration into the world economy. It would also enable South Africa to play a role as the 'powerhouse' for economic development and regional cooperation in Southern Africa to the benefit of ACP countries in that region and beyond. These objectives will be pursued without risking negative consequences for ACP countries that could arise from South Africa's full membership of the Lomé Convention, given its relatively strong economic performance (South Africa's exports to the EU are the equivalent of more than 50% of the exports of all 70 ACP countries combined).

Protocol on accession to the Lomé Convention

The Commission is proposing that the Protocol should describe the terms and conditions of South Africa's admission to Lomé IV. A decision in favour of the Protocol will be required from the joint EU/ACP Council of Ministers. As a member of the ACP Group, South Africa would participate in the institutions of the Convention and in all areas of ACP-EU cooperation, as set out in Part Two of the Convention. The economic structure and production of South Africa is, to a considerable extent, comparable with those of the ACP countries. However, given the strength of certain sectors of the country's economy the parties would agree to limit South Africa's eligibility under certain articles of the Convention. The situ-

ation would be reviewed in the framework of negotiations on future new arrangements between the EU and the ACP countries. A special article on South Africa's accession to the Convention, referring to such a Protocol, could be included in the final text emerging from the current Lomé IV mid-term review.

The bilateral agreement

The Commission envisages a very ambitious trade and cooperation agreement covering the possibility, if South Africa so desires, of establishing a Free Trade Area. The Agreement would govern all economic and trade relations between the Community and South Africa (insofar as they are not addressed by the Protocol to the Lomé Convention). It would provide for cooperation in the financial, technical and economic spheres, as well in a wide range of other areas of mutual interest. Plans for a political dialogue, together with institutional arrangements, are also envisaged and the Agreement would contain a strong focus on the promotion of regional cooperation and integration. A clause stating that relations between the Community and South Africa should be based on respect for human rights and democratic principles, is viewed by the Commission as an essential element of the agreement.

Within the framework of a possible Free Trade Area, the Commission proposal envisages an asymmetric time frame. This would allow South Africa, at an early stage, to gain improved access to the EU market without initially having to grant reciprocal treatment to the Union's exports. South African industry would thereby gain a breathing space to restructure and enhance its competitiveness, and to prepare itself for a situation of decreased protection against EU exports. For certain sensitive products longer transitional periods may be necessary for both parties.

Development co-operation — a special budget line

In principle South Africa will be eligible to benefit from the financial cooperation provisions in the Lomé Convention. However, the parties could agree that, for a certain period, this eligibility would be suspended (except as regards regional projects and emergency assistance), in favour of a special financial facility in support of the development process in South Africa. This fa-

cility, the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development (EPRD), aims to contribute to the improvement of the living standards of South Africans, with particular emphasis on the poorest sections of the population, during the initial period of transition. The facility would also provide financial resources for South Africa's participation in regional cooperation under the Lomé Convention.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Following, where required, favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, the Commission has decided to provide grants and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to finance the following operations (grants unless otherwise stated). Major projects and programmes are highlighted.

Economic and social infrastructure

Gabon: ECU 8.6 million for a village water supply programme and for microprojects designed to improve the marketing of agricultural products in three provinces

Djibouti: ECU 115 000 to build a laboratory for the analysis and control of water and ground salinity and for monitoring aquifers

Malawi and Mozambique: ECU 36.26 million for the rehabilitation of the road between Limbe and the Mozambique frontier

Mozambique: ECU 5 million towards the restoration of the Cahora Bassa high tension electricity link with South Africa. This grant supplements an EIB special loan of ECU 15 million for this project

Haiti: ECU 16 million for a rehabilitation programme in the energy sector

Trade promotion/structural adjustment

Guinea: ECU 13.5 million under the Structural Adjustment Facility for a general import programme

Agriculture

Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 15.7 million for an irrigated rice development project in the central and north-central regions

Health

Burundi: ECU 5.5 million for a health sector reconstruction and rehabilitation programme in the provinces of Bubanza, Ciboitoke, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuso

Tanzania: ECU 4 million to support the programme against HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases

Education

Cameroun, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Chad: ECU 1.8 million towards the construction in Yaoundé of a second campus for the Catholic University of Central Africa, with a view to supporting the training of managers

Institutional support

Guinea-Bissau: ECU 473 000 for technical assistance to the EDF national authorising officer

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK

Loans

Cameroun: ECU 20.5 million for the extension and strengthening of Douala's transport and electricity distribution systems. ECU 12.5 million is in the form of risk capital made available to the government of Cameroun while the remaining ECU 8 million is a loan from the EIB's own resources for the national electricity company

Dominican Republic: ECU 8 million for ADEMI (Asociación para el Desarrollo de Microempresas) to support future investments by small and medium-sized enterprises in a variety of sectors

VISIT

Vice-President Mbeki of South Africa

The Vice-President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, paid a visit to the Commission on 24-25 February. He met with President Santer, Vice-President Brittan and Commissioners Pinheiro and Bangemann.

In a meeting with Mr Santer and Mr Pinheiro, Mr Mbeki discussed relations between South Africa and the European Union with a focus on three main areas: the 1995 aid programme, the framework for future bilateral relations and the proposed alignment of South Africa with the Lomé Convention.

The two sides agreed to speed up the discussions on the 1995 aid programme with a view to signing the agreement before the end of the spring. ECU 125 million would be provided immediately for operations in support of South Africa's reconstruction process within the framework of the European Programme for Reconstruction and Development.

As regards a new bilateral agreement, Mr Pinheiro indicated the Commission's intention to present a proposed negotiating mandate to the Council in the coming weeks (see page 1 of this News Round-Up). The aim would be to reach the final negotiating phase during the summer. In the course of the joint press conference held by Mr Mbeki and Mr Pinheiro, the latter stated that it would be an 'ambitious agreement covering economic and financial cooperation and a political dialogue' with a particular focus on regional cooperation in Southern Africa. Both sides expressed the hope that an agreement could be concluded before the end of the year.

As for the alignment of South Africa with the Lomé Convention, Mr Pinheiro indicated that the specific nature of South Africa's situation would need to be taken into account so as to avoid any disruption of the Lomé mechanisms.

Mr Mbeki went on to stress his country's 'ambitious vision' as regards regional cooperation. This, he believed, should include not just the political and economic aspects but also the wider issue of security and stability in Southern Africa. It needed to be a global system of cooperation, he insisted. Mr Pinheiro lent strong support to

this vision promising the full support of the Commission.

Mr Mbeki and Mr Pinheiro also exchanged views on current political and regional issues involving Lesotho, Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi.

In his meeting with Commissioner Bangemann, Vice-President Mbeki received assurances about the Union's firm commitment to the participation of developing countries in the emerging 'information society'.

MISCELLANEOUS

Togo: progressive resumption of aid

The European Union is to resume progressively its assistance to Togo. Aid was frozen in 1992 because of attempts by the authorities to hinder democratic change in the country.

The EU will begin by unblocking funds for rural development, education and the fight against AIDS.

The Commission hopes, by this action, to encourage Togo's efforts in the field of democratisation. A resumption of European aid, even if only partial, should help to provide a respite for the economy of the country which has suffered very seriously as a result of protest strikes organised by the supporters of democracy.

EUROPEAN UNION

COUNCIL

Racism and xenophobia

The General Affairs Council of 6 March discussed the interim report of Mr Kahn, President of the Consultative Committee on Racism and Xenophobia. The Council shared the concerns expressed in this report about recent attacks of a racist and xenophobic nature which have been carried out

in several Member States. It also underlined the importance it attaches to a global strategy in the fight against racism and xenophobia, in advance of the European Council which will be held in Cannes (France) in June.

In an oral presentation of his interim report, Mr Kahn spoke of the concerns of the members of the Consultative Committee about increasing displays of intolerance. He made the point that racism was a reality which disfigured the construction of Europe and threatened its underlying principles.

Indicating that the Committee over which he presided would submit its final report to the Council during its May session, Mr Kahn nevertheless wished to apprise members at this stage of certain proposals that would be contained in the report: the creation of a European 'observatory' for racism and xenophobia, a European programme targeted at 'problem' neighbourhoods and the prolongation of the Committee's own mandate.

As regards the first proposal, Mr Kahn said that an observatory would be particularly useful given the scale of the problem to be tackled and its 'transfrontier' nature. The observatory would be able to study the problems and put forward concrete measures to remedy them. As for the Consultative Committee's mandate, the speaker drew the Council's attention to the fact that six months was too short a period to address all the issues in a comprehensive manner and propose solutions. This was why he felt the mandate should be extended, assuming the Council was satisfied with the Committee's work to date.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

In the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union has recently issued a number of statements, details of which are set out below:

Burundi

Statement of 19 March 1995

The European Union's objectives and priorities regarding Burundi are to consolidate the process of national reconciliation

and a return to normal democratic life, in particular by restoring the rule of law, and to promote the economic and social recovery of the country.

Following the appointment, by the President of the Republic of Burundi, of Mr Nduwayo as Prime Minister and the forming of a new Government, the European Union wishes them both every success in their task.

The EU is however still concerned at the way the political situation is developing and the worsening of security conditions in Burundi. That concern prompted it to send a mission to Bujumbura on 10 and 11 February 1995.

The EU is determined to give strong backing to the 'Government Convention' concluded on 10 September 1994 with provisions forming the institutional framework for necessary national reconciliation, and would urge all political parties, military forces and sectors of civilian society to respect and implement it in a spirit of dialogue, moderation and compromise.

The EU supports the action being taken in Burundi by the international community, and in particular by the United Nations Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity, and is resolved to step up the efforts which it is already making to help strengthen stability in Burundi.

The European Union is therefore prepared to:

- assist the Burundi Government in organising a 'national debate' of the kind provided for by the 'Government Convention' with the participation of all sectors of the Burundi nation in order to consolidate national reconciliation and reconstruct democracy,
- help strengthen the action already being taken by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *inter alia*, by support for the sending of experts as provided for in Resolution 1995/90 adopted on 8 March 1995 by the UN Commission for Human Rights,
- contribute to restoring the rule of law and strengthening the Burundi legal system, *inter alia*, by giving help in the training of magistrates,

In view of the role which could be played by an international Commission of Enquiry into the attempted coup in 1993 and the massacres which followed, the European

Union hopes that the United Nations will be able to adopt a position quickly on the request submitted to it by the Burundi Authorities.

It also pays tribute to the action taken by the OAU, which it hopes will be extended further and is prepared to support.

The EU is convinced that the economic and social recovery of Burundi will facilitate a return to stability and its consolidation for the future, and it would like a round table of donors to be organised swiftly with the participation of international institutions and all countries which are friends of Burundi.

The EU is also prepared to help implement and follow up the action plan adopted by the regional conference on assistance to refugees, returnees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes region, held in Bujumbura from 15 to 17 February 1995.

By way of support for the Burundi nation in its search for peaceful and democratic solutions, the EU would encourage all partners to take any measures they deem necessary against extremist elements in Burundi in order to prevent them travelling abroad and receiving assistance.

The European Union is aware of the close links which exist between the various humanitarian and political problems facing the region and the considerable danger of destabilisation which persists, calls for the organisation of the conference on peace, security and stability desired by the United Nations Security Council and reiterates its strongest support for all forces in Burundi which are working towards peace, dialogue and national reconciliation.

Burundi: common position adopted

Written procedure of 24 March 1995

1. The European Union will pursue, with regard to Burundi, the objectives set out in its Declaration of 19 March 1995 defining its overall priorities.

2. The Ministerial Troika will visit Burundi on 24 March 1995 in order to demonstrate the European Union's support for national reconciliation as provided for in the Government Convention of 10 September 1994.

3. The European Union is prepared to assist the Burundi Government in organising a national debate with the participation of all sections of the Burundi nation in order

to consolidate national reconciliation and reconstruct democracy. The Presidency, acting under the conditions set out in Article J.5(3) of the Treaty, will contact the Burundi authorities with a view to submitting an assessment of requirements to the Council as soon as possible.

4. The Presidency and the Commission, acting within the scope of their respective competences, will establish the contacts necessary for implementing this common position and will together make the envisaged representations to third parties.

4.1. The European Union is prepared to lend its support at an early date to sending human rights experts within the framework put in place by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

— The necessary contacts will be established with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in order to define the conditions for the European Union's participation;

— the Commission intends to propose that the European Community contribute as soon as possible to the funding of this operation an approximate amount of ECU 3 million, to be reassessed by the Commission in the light of the results of the Troika's visit and ongoing contacts.

4.2. The European Union is prepared to assist in restoring the rule of law and strengthening Burundi's judicial system, *inter alia*, by giving help with the training of magistrates.

The necessary contacts will be established with the Burundi authorities in order to enable the Council to adopt a programme of assistance to the judiciary system as soon as possible.

4.3. The European Union supports the rapid convening of a round table of donors with the participation of international institutions, in particular international financial institutions, and all countries friendly with Burundi.

The necessary representations will be made in order to secure the broadest possible support for this proposal.

4.4. The European Union is prepared to help implement for Burundi, and to follow up, the action plan adopted by the Regional Conference on assistance to refugees, displaced persons and returnees in the Great Lakes region, held in Bujumbura from 15 to 17 February 1995.

The necessary representations will be made to encourage third States to support the action plan.

4.5. The European Union is prepared to support the action taken by the OAU.

5. All the other European Union objectives and priorities as defined in the declaration adopted in Carcassonne on 19 March 1995 will be pursued as soon as possible and will be covered, if appropriate, by a supplementary common position.

6. This common position will be followed up by the relevant Council working parties, to which the Presidency and the Commission will regularly report.

7. This common position shall be published in the Official Journal.

Gambia: EU concerns about military government

Statement of 21 March 1995

The European Union has noted the report by the National Consultative Committee and the statement made on 3 February by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council.

Whilst noting with satisfaction that the period for transition towards a civil government has been reduced, the EU remains concerned that a military government will remain in place until July 1996. It greatly regrets that the opportunity has not been availed of to hand over to an interim civilian government and that effective control of the government consequently remains in the hands of the military.

The EU would ask the AFPRC to take practical steps without delay to restore constitutional government, thereby enabling the Union to resume its cooperation with the Gambia gradually and in the light of developments.

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia associate themselves with this declaration.

Nigeria: appeal for reinstatement of a constitutional regime

Statement of 22 March 1995

The fresh arrests carried out by the Nigerian authorities in recent days, in particular those of General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Head of State, and General Yar Adua, the former Vice-President of the Federation, causes the European Union serious concern.

These arrests of prominent figures demonstrate the impasse in which the military authorities in Nigeria have placed themselves. They confirm the EU's belief that the re-establishment of a constitutional regime and public liberties is essential for civil peace in Nigeria. The EU, in particular, calls upon the Nigerian authorities to release the political prisoners, to restore freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary and to guarantee the safety of all persons who remain imprisoned. The imprisonment for nine months now of Mr Abiola prompts continuing disquiet.

The EU is convinced that the stability and prosperity of a major country like Nigeria cannot come about through increased repression, nor the prolongation of military rule. It calls on the Nigerian authorities to establish a democratic constitutional regime as soon as possible.

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia associate themselves with this declaration.

GENERAL INFORMATION

SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Rwanda: European human rights observers

Professor Pinheiro, the European Commissioner with responsibility for relations with ACP countries and South Africa has signed an administrative agreement with Ambassador Ayama Lasso, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, regarding the sending of a contingent of EU observers to Rwanda in support of the UN's observer mission.

Under the agreement, the EU will provide 40 observers from its 15 Member States, for a maximum period of five months.

The European contingent will be integrated into the UN mission but will retain sufficient autonomy to ensure the EU's visibility in its own right. The agreement fore-

sees the sending of the first group in the middle of March, to be followed shortly thereafter by two further teams of observers.

The agreement has been hailed by High Commissioner Lasso and by the European Commission as an important step forward in international cooperation offering a precedent for future cooperation in the area of safeguarding and encouraging respect for human rights.

Decisions

ACP countries

Burkina Faso: ECU 91 600 for the Mouvement burkinabe des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples (Burkina movement for human and people's rights) to finance information and awareness-raising actions focusing on human rights and help to victims of human rights violations

Guinea Bissau: ECU 137 000 to help strengthen the Guinea Bissau League of Human Rights by supporting its programmes in the fields of civic rights education and penal reform

Malawi: ECU 248 000 to support the professionalisation of and greater autonomy for the recently-established independent press. This project will serve as a pilot for actions in other countries

Tanzania: ECU 207 000 for a training project for local councillors and to help familiarise municipal authorities with democratic procedures in a multi-party context

Non-ACP countries

Central America: ECU 247 000 to finance a study into the human rights situation, democratisation procedures and associated needs in this part of the world

Central America: ECU 80 000 to run an awareness-raising course for teachers and demonstrators working in the human rights field

Latin America: ECU 225 000 to finance the participation of 50 representatives from NGOs and women's groups from Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Conference on Women, to be held in Beijing in September 1995

Chile: ECU 356 700 towards a training programme aimed at consolidating the institutional network

Costa Rica: ECU 200 000 to finance the annual report of Conare (The national council of rectors) on the state of the nation with a view to strengthening the involvement of the people in arriving at a national consensus

Colombia: ECU 200 000 for a project designed to encourage a culture of tolerance, notably among displaced people

Colombia: ECU 70 000 to establish a co-ordinated national mechanism aimed at preventing forced displacement of people, and to help those who have been affected by such displacements to adapt

Mexico: ECU 112 500 for the production and distribution of printed and audiovisual material regarding the promotion of a democratic culture: press and media freedom, election procedures etc

Mexico: ECU 34 500 for a project to train animators working on the ground in the promotion and defence of human rights

Panama: ECU 25 000 towards a human rights awareness-raising programme in secondary schools

Algeria: ECU 170 000 for the production and distribution of a weekly TV 'magazine' programme on political, social and religious issues in the country

West Bank and Gaza: ECU 860 000 to finance a computerised electoral register being set up by the Palestinian authorities for local councils

Gaza and Jericho: ECU 80 200 for a media 'monitoring' project aimed at assessing how independent the media is, the quality of its election coverage and whether the state media offers equitable access to the various political parties

'Multiregional' projects

ECU 394 586 for a project aimed at developing a capacity for conflict resolution, rapid 'early-warning' and preventive diplomacy among organisations and regional 'actors', so as to prevent disputes from turning into violent conflicts.

ECU 31 475 towards the organisation in The Netherlands of a human rights seminar for trainers from the Third World.

ECU 310 900 for a project designed to help women's organisations and NGOs to prepare for and participate in the UN Conference on Women to be held in Beijing in September 1995.

HUMANITARIAN AID

Aid decisions

The Commission has recently taken the following decisions to provide humanitarian aid (including emergency and food aid):

ACP countries

Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 550 000 towards food and hygiene assistance for Liberian refugees and the host population in the region of Tabou Grabo

Liberia: ECU 845 000 for an urgent health programme for displaced people seeking refuge in and around the capital

Nigeria: ECU 400 000 to create a place of refuge for 1000 Ogoni families displaced as a result of the internal conflict between Ogonis and Adonis in the south east of the country

Rwanda and Burundi: ECU 12 million for a food programme for refugees and displaced people in the two countries as well as in Zaire, Uganda and Tanzania

Somalia: ECU 700 000 towards works designed to re-establish water supplies in Mogadishu

Somalia and Southern Sudan: ECU 2.9 million to extend, for a further three months, the ECHO-flight system operating out of Kenya. This system, which supports humanitarian NGOs working in the region, provides transport for both people and merchandise

Non-ACP countries

Peru: ECU 200 000 towards the fight against a cholera epidemic in Lima

Bolivia: ECU 1.15 million to help the victims of natural catastrophes

Bosnia-Herzegovina: ECU 5.8 million to distribute seeds, fertilisers and gardening equipment to a million displaced people with a view to reducing their dependence on humanitarian assistance

Armenia: ECU 6.41 million for a health programme and for assistance in the energy sector for people still suffering as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan and the 1988 earthquake

Armenia and Azerbaijan: ECU 7.65 million for emergency food aid (ECU 3.85 million for the Armenian population and ECU 3.8 Million for the Azeris)

Azerbaijan: ECU 6 million to provide essential materials (shelter, fuel, clothing), and aid in the health field (vaccinations, medicines) for some 70 000 displaced people

Georgia: ECU 11.2 million for food aid for displaced people and for basic water and electricity provision in the hospitals

Russia: ECU 1 million for homeless people in Moscow and St Petersburg with a particular focus on children and elderly people. The money will be used to provide basic health care and social assistance

Tadjikistan and Kirghizistan: ECU 8 million for emergency food aid to the people of the two countries (ECU 5 million for the former, ECU 3 million for the latter). A further ECU 150 000 is provided to pay for special communications and transport

equipment needed for the implementation of aid programmes

Tadjikistan: ECU 280 000 to supply basic essentials to displaced people in the area around the capital, Duchambe

Iraq: ECU 510 000 for people in the north of the country for a programme against Sunna plague

Bhutan, India and Nepal: ECU 600 000 to provide food aid for Tibetan schools established in the three countries following the huge exodus from Tibet, which occurred in 1959, of people fleeing the Chinese occupation

Cambodia: ECU 2.34 million targeted at the most vulnerable sections of the population, notably displaced people

FOOD AID

Decisions

The Commission has recently taken a number of decisions to finance food aid as set out in the chart which follows:

| Country/ Organisation | Cereals (tonnes) | Milk powder (tonnes) | Sugar (tonnes) | Vegetable oil (tonnes) | Beans (tonnes) |
|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|-------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|
| Ethiopia | 75 000 | | | | |
| Mozambique | 1 810 | 674 | 177 | 149 | |
| Rwanda/ Burundi | 20 000 | | | 1 000 | 9 000 |

1995 Food Aid Convention: reduction in the USA's contribution

Declaration of 22 March 1995

The Community notes with regret the United States Government's decision to cut its minimum annual contribution in wheat equivalent under the Food Aid Convention from 4.47 million tonnes to 2.5 million tonnes, a reduction of almost 45%.

The Community regrets this step when, throughout the renegotiation of the Convention, the United States indicated that it would maintain its contribution at previous levels.

The Community considers the scale of the cut to be particularly damaging in the context of the current campaign to combat poverty and when no decrease in world food aid requirements is to be expected. The Community, for its part, intends to

continue its action in this area and will maintain the level of its commitments under the new Food Aid Convention at 1 755 000 tonnes, as announced in December.

PARTNERSHIP

Information Bulletin from the Centre



for the Development of Industry

CDI Projets 1994: When ACP companies bank on innovation

Giving priority to ACP companies whose projects are established on sound bases. Encouraging entrepreneurs who innovate, develop local resources, meet the concrete needs of their regional markets or aim at well-targeted export "niches". Diversifying the concrete forms of assistance which the CDI can provide to enable them to team up with European partners and which traditional cooperation channels are often not in a position to offer.

These are some of the pragmatic lines of action developed by the CDI during the course of the IVth Lomé Convention. The results achieved by the Centre last year illustrate the value added of this strategy. A statistical summary of the projects assisted and the interventions undertaken in 1994 is given on page 7.

Before this, a few examples. This edition begins with a description of some interesting initiatives by ACP companies supported by various customised assistance formulas provided by the CDI.

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Gathering roses in glasshouses in Florissa, Tanzania

Upmarket crops

Quality products are not only made in the developed countries. In the agri-foodstuffs field, there are some market niches which can be a source of substantial value added for developing regions, with a considerable knock-on effect for rural areas. The CDI supports such innovative projects through original made-to-measure interventions. Three examples serve to demonstrate this: early vegetables in Cameroon, roses in Tanzania and exotic fruit processing in the Dominican Republic.

C a m e r o o n

PROLEG Project: "Garden" beans

In Western Cameroon, the land is very fertile. But it is also underdeveloped due to the fact that it is a landlocked region far from the coast. Victor Fotso, a local industrialist specialising in leather processing (Sitacuir), realised that this was an opportunity to diversify his activities. He opted for agro-industry - growing high-quality extra-fine green beans for export - and founded the PROLEG company in 1992, in which 2.5 million ECU has been invested. This African group has largely used its own funds, topped up by financing from Proparco and the AEF (Africa Enterprise Fund of the IFC) (670,000 ECU). Initially, the CDI's contribution consisted in cofinancing feasibility studies on this type of crop and providing assistance - especially through the presence of experts on the spot - as regards technology, training and management.

During the first year, Proleg collaborated with small farmers working traditional village-style plots of land. A pyramidal structure of responsibilities was established, with a European head of farming supervising five large sectors each run by a manager; within these sectors there are regional heads who in turn are in charge of a number of farming assistants. This technical staff provides its support in

planting, irrigation, fertilisers and health-care treatment. Daily harvesting is carried out by rural workers, along with sorting and packing. Part of production is intended for European markets in fresh products, whilst another part is earmarked for quick-freezing.

"The essential thing first of all was to instill a sense of quality into the staff in a job that calls for motivation and dedication. Growing green beans is easy. Growing traditional "garden" beans which have a much superior taste and cannot now be found in Europe is something else", explains Olivier Draulette, sales manager of CIS (Compagnie Industrielle de Services), a French company holding shares in Proleg and in charge of the distribution of its products in Europe.

A refined vegetable (very different from the varieties produced by cloning which can be harvested mechanically in 24 hours), this garden bean must be hand-picked in the cool of the morning within two hours. Maximum delivery time is 48 hours. The products are therefore packed immediately and then transported by night in lorries (Proleg now has a fleet of some 200 vehicles) to the airport: a seven-hour journey over 300 km of tracks. A fine example of just-in-time.

haricots verts
extra-fins
cueillis et éboutés main



Packaging of quick-frozen beans by Proleg in Cameroon, sold in French supermarkets under the brand name "le Bandjounais"

Whilst this process works perfectly in the rainy season, production runs up against climatic constraints during the dry season from November to May, when demand in Europe is very high. The first harvest (1992-93) led to production of 214 tonnes and the second to some 300 tonnes, of which 200 tonnes were frozen. "In the beginning we froze more than planned but we have since adjusted to meet the demand for fresh products more closely and to deal more effectively with the dry season. Fotso has invested in the acquisition and clearing of land, irrigation processes, agricultural equipment and cold chains." In fact, the group has acquired a hundred hectares in the Bandjoun Foubott Bafousam region. Proleg employs 430 people full-time and 850 part-time, and also provides a living for some 1,500 self-employed farmers in the region.

T a n z a n i a

FLORISSA Project: Top-quality roses

Omari Issa, Manager of Florissa

At the moment, Proleg exports mostly to France. Its fresh products are distributed on the markets of Rungis, Toulouse and Lyons. Quick-frozen production (which should rise from 800 tonnes in 93-94 to 1,400 tonnes in 94-95) is being marketed initially by large French distribution companies such as Auchan, Carrigel and Pomona. This approach is far from uninteresting when we realise that the "quick-frozen" formula accounts for 54.7% of sales of vegetables in this country and that demand in this field is increasing by 5.5% a year there.

CDI intervention.

Keen to develop this approach, Proleg is conducting systematic research into new quick-frozen markets. What better way to influence decision-makers than to show them on the spot the quality of the products and the processing method? In 1994, the CDI provided this project with an original kind of support. A number of potential customers were invited to visit the installations in Cameroon and see the harvesting techniques for themselves. A competition (cofinanced by the CFD) was also organised for salesmen in existing distribution channels, with the prize-winners being offered a similar trip to Africa after a promotional period.

These different interventions by the CDI illustrate its desire to give priority to initiatives involving projects with a significant impact in rural areas.

To tie everything up, it now remains to convince the European clientele. "Last year, we showed the decision-makers who we were. We must now demonstrate to the consumer the superior quality of this traditionally grown, hand-picked product. In a way, it is a return to the old days. The consumer realises that this is a different taste. That it the aspect that we must now develop in our marketing campaigns in Europe."

Another African country: Tanzania. In the Kilimanjaro region there are now two hectares of glasshouses in which roses of exceptional quality are grown. The climatic conditions allow them to be cultivated 365 days a year. This project is the brainchild of a Moshi entrepreneur, Omari Issa, who trained in management at a development finance institution and set up the FLORISSA company in 1992. Considerable investments have been made (ECU 1 million): soil analysis, glasshouse construction, high-performance irrigation system, purchase of plants suitable for local conditions, installation of a refrigerated packing room, studies on the best packaging for this refined product, etc. Clientele targeted as a priority: the major cut-flower markets in Europe.

CDI intervention.

A dual partnership agreement was signed, firstly with the Moerheim

flower-growing companies (Netherlands) for technical assistance, and secondly with Universal Plants (France) which supplied plants patented by the French firm Meilland. The CDI's intervention consisted in financing the cooperation of Eric Vellinga, a Dutch expert (Moerheim) who helped Florissa in horticultural techniques and the management of the project. In 1994, he supervised soil preparation, irrigation and the construction of glasshouses. The latter, of French manufacture, were erected first of all under the direction of one of the company's technicians from whom the Africans quickly acquired sufficient know-how to carry out subsequent installation themselves. Jean Dyens (Universal Plants) was also involved from the beginning in selecting the site, preparing the soil, planting the flowers and - in collaboration with Eric Vellinga - training the personnel. In effect, Tanzania has no tradition of its own in this field.

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At the moment, there are four glass-houses (covering two hectares) in which different varieties of roses are grown. More extensive work to lay on water and electricity has proved necessary than initially anticipated. Three African executives have been recruited and Florissa now employs some fifty staff for an annual production capac-



Florissa: new rosebushes

ity of 3 to 3.5 million cut flowers.

Exports, which began last November, have been very favourably received in Holland, the main export market, but also at local level (Moshi, Arusha, Dar-Es-Salaam). A third partnership agreement has just been signed with the Dutch marketing company AA Flor.

"I am sure that there is a substantial clientele for high-quality roses of this kind, even if the marketing always proves more difficult when products from faraway countries are concerned," concludes Mrs Meilland, sales administration manager at Universal Plants. "Florissa's exports are also faced with the problem of the lack of flights. Flowers must be transported very quickly, which is possible to London, Paris and Amsterdam. If air freight to Japan existed, I am certain that an entire market could be developed there too."

D o m i n i c a n R e p u b l i c

ESQUIZ DOMINICANA Projet : Tropical flavours

A consultant can become an entrepreneur, as demonstrated by Belgian Paul Vlamincq, Chairman of ESQUIZ DOMINICANA, a marketing company which he has founded with four Dominican SMEs. This marketing man - he has worked for Proctor & Gamble in particular - specialises in the field of beverages based on fruit juices. During a mission to the Dominican Republic in 1994 on behalf of the CDI, he saw for himself the quality of the region's tropical fruit, the development potentials for derived products (drinks, purees, syrups, etc.) and the dynamism of some SMEs: "I met industrial partners who filled me with such enthusiasm that I decided to launch a company to market their current products and new products that we could create together."

These four Dominican companies, operating in different fields, have valuable complementary qualities allowing them to work in synergy to meet other needs. BON produce fruit-based preparations, Ilguiflod specialise in coconuts, which are frozen by Tropigugos, and Latin Fruit manufacture exotic purees.

In October 1994, the CDI supported these different companies by financing their attendance at the famous SIAL (Paris), where they were able to present their products, establish contacts with potential clients and propose studies on new developments on request. More than sixty clients expressed an interest. The sales arising from these contacts are estimated at some \$ 800,000 a year - not to mention the potential as regards products yet to be created.

"Some of the products already being marketed do not suit European tastes because they are too sweet, but it is not really difficult to change", says Paul Vlamincq. "On the other hand, there is an enormous demand for new products based on tropical fruit. Given the general curb on drinking and driving, people need light, tasty drinks, and tropical fruit is the ideal solution. Consequently, there is a whole market to be explored and satisfied."

Examples: original "cocktails" of banana and passion fruit juice or nectars of tamarind, cocoa and guava. These fresh products, manufactured in the Dominican Republic, will henceforth meet increasingly strict European standard as regards quality and hygiene (ISO 9000, Hazard Analysis, Quality Management, etc.).

More and more is expected of another potential product: pieces of fruit frozen by the AQF method (-40°C to -50°C). The advantage of this presentation is that it offers quality products to rival fresh fruit. "These pieces of fruit can be used at the rate of 100%, whereas if you buy a fresh pineapple you may have to throw some of it away... It is a field that we intend to develop, which will be of particular interest to hotels, airline catering services, etc."

"Competition already exists", concludes Paul Vlamincq, "especially from other Latin American countries and India. But I think that the know-how of these Dominican companies, the quality of the basic products and the creativity that they have demonstrated in meeting demand bode well for the future ..."

GROWELA / CAPE VERDE ISLANDS

Three Portuguese companies set up in Africa

With its considerable experience in Africa, Portuguese industry ranks alongside Belgium as the European Union partner where the CDI finds the largest number of companies prepared to invest in projects on this continent.

GROWELA-Cap-Vert is a footwear manufacturing company created by three Portuguese companies - GROWELA-Portugal, Selco and SET - which have invested 1.7 million ECU in specifically export-oriented production. The factory started up in March 1994 and the first objectives of the feasibility study were attained during the second half of the year, when the footwear line was running at 1,850 pairs a day (December 1994) with a productivity level barely 5% to 10% lower than that of the parent company and a reject rate of around 5%. When full output is achieved, the factory will produce 442,000 pairs a year. GROWELA-Cap-Vert intends to treat the hides itself: start-up of a unit with a capacity of 743,000 hides a year is planned for 1995.

CDI intervention.

In the beginning, the CDI helped the Portuguese industrialists to present their project to the two finance institutions which agreed to back it - the BFE (Banco de Fomento e Exterior) in Portugal and the AEF (World Bank Group). For the 1994 start-up, the Centre and its institutional partners ICEP (Investimentos, Comercio e Turismo-Portugal and FCE (Fundo para a Cooperacao Economica) contributed towards the establishment of a training programme in Portugal for 3 senior managers and 18 middle managers and

skilled workers. At the same time, 45 people received basic training in the Cape Verde Islands in cutting, stitching and assembly techniques.



Growela footwear production line

SEDIMA / SENEGAL

Poultry-farming: a model of steady growth

Recent developments at Sedima in Senegal constitute a perfect example of phased growth by an agro-industrial enterprise adapted to the needs of the Western Sahel region.

Since the creation of its first modest chicken farm in 1976, this private company has continued to grow over the years by adding new activities, on a small-scale to begin with and then gradually developed: production of compound feedstuffs (from 250 kg/hour to 5 tonnes/hour today); importing day-old chicks (19,000 chicks a week); installation of a hatchery (30,000 to 60,000 chicks a week).

CDI intervention.

Following the professional meeting on "compound feedstuffs" organised by the Centre in Saly (Senegal, end of 1993), an additional stage was achieved, upstream with the start-up of an industrial abattoir

with a capacity of 700 chickens per hour and downstream with a breeding unit for egg-layers (3,400 head). The CDI provided its assistance in organising a marketing campaign to launch products from the abattoir under the "Mister Poulet" label. Along with media activities, this operation also comprised a promotion campaign through tie-in sales and a merchandising action.

SEDIMA is continuing its integrated development, still with the Centre's support. Eggs for consumption are laid by 20,000 battery hens in two ultramodern buildings. Three other units now under construction will allow 50,000 layers to be housed by the end of 1995. Other pro-

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jects in the pipeline concern:

- expansion of the egg-laying and broiler breeding units (24,000 head);
- increase in the production of broiler chickens to 6,000 a week;
- doubling of feedstuff production to 10 tonnes an hour with integrated automation of production;
- a second hatchery to bring short-term

production up to 50,000 chicks a week by 1996.

SEDIMA's rapid development is the result of a vigorous management policy and a careful investment strategy pursued by the company management. Until 1994, they managed to achieve this growth solely through funds generated by the company's activities. It was in this way that the

firm found it possible to obtain loans for the substantial investments currently in the pipeline.

SEDIMA now has a turnover of 2,000 million FCFA. It employs a hundred people and generates a large number of indirect jobs among poultry-farmers and distributors.

FLORYCHANTE / MAURITUS

Ceramics: from craft to industry

Florychante Ltd is an illustration of the support provided by the CDI to an SME faced with expansion and modernisation problems.



Shot of the workshop at Florychante

Set up some ten years ago, Florychante Ltd was initially a ceramics workshop whose hand-made products were intended for the local tourist industry. The company has slowly developed since then, but only with a limited technical and production capacity. This gradual expansion

therefore ran up against numerous production problems.

Not available locally, essential raw materials such as clay and varnish, together with moulds, had to be imported from South Africa. The company's development problems were reflected in the quality of the finished product, whilst attempts to enlarge its commercial base remained very limited. Faced with competition from imports from South Africa and China, Florychante can meet only a very small percentage of demand from local consumers for quality products.

CDI intervention.

In October 1993, a CDI mission conducted an in-depth examination of the company's technical and manufacturing problems and made a series of recommendations to the management. Further support was then provided by the Centre to enable the general manager of Florychante to go to the United Kingdom to visit several firms in the Stoke-on-Trent region specialising in a wide range of equipment for the ceramics

sector. During this trip, he ordered basic equipment representing an overall investment of 500,000 ECU, with the machines being delivered to Mauritius in August 1994.

The following month, a further mission was organised, financed by the CDI, to supervise the commissioning of the new unit and to train the staff in all the technical and practical aspects of the new production tools. Great importance was also placed on improving product quality and the production methods used so far. Florychante Ltd now produces 60 tonnes of earthenware articles a year, with a turnover of 400,000 ECU, and employs a staff of 29. Imports of materials from South Africa have been reduced in volume by over 80%. Current production meets international standards as regards quality and durability. And the company now has a sufficiently strong base to consider subsequent expansion on a large scale with real prospects of soon being able to export a wide range of products to South Africa and neighbouring markets. ■

CDI 1994 in brief

In 1994, the CDI's capacity to support ACP enterprises was significantly increased compared to the previous year. The number of projects supported by the Centre rose by 25%, whilst the number of interventions was up by 20%. A detailed breakdown of this development is given in the tables below.

To carry out this task of supporting ACP industrial projects, the CDI has continued to strengthen the two networks established in these countries and in the European Union.

When it comes to financing, the CDI also has close synergies with a network of a dozen national or international finance institutions. The latter contributed towards the financing of over 20% of the projects supported by the Centre in 1994.

Finally, the CDI's activities are not limited to individual support for projects. To encourage new partnerships between EU and ACP entrepreneurs, it also makes a major effort to promote industrial growth sectors in the ACP countries. Two lines of action have been given special priority to this effect:

- The organisation of three new Europe-ACP professional meetings focused on fishing (Namibia), ornamental stone (Dominican Republic) and 2nd- and 3rd-stage timber processing (Cameroon). The Centre also contributed towards the Mining Forum in Lusaka (Zambia), organised by the European Commission, and was one of the linchpins in the Conference on the industrial integration of South Africa held in Athens on the initiative of the Greek government when it held the Presidency of the European Council.


- The CDI developed its publications catalogue with 8 technical and thematic guides (6 others are in course of preparation).

All this information - and much more - will be available in the CDI's Annual Report for 1994, which is to be published sometime in June.

Summary of projects supported by the CDI


| | 1993 | 1994 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Total number of projects supported (having benefited from at least one intervention) | 154 | 192 |
| <i>Type of development</i> | | |
| New companies and pilot projects | 40% | 35% |
| Existing companies undergoing development (expansion or diversification) | 27% | 34% |
| Existing companies undergoing rehabilitation or consolidation | 33% | 31% |
| <i>Type of company</i> | | |
| Private companies | 84% | 85% |
| Mixed companies | 10% | 9% |
| State-run companies | 6% | 6% |

Sectoral breakdown of projects in 1994



| | |
|--------------------------|-----|
| Agro-industries | 34% |
| Wood-Metal-Construction | 31% |
| Clothing-leather-textile | 15% |
| Other | 20% |

Geographical breakdown of projects in 1994



| | |
|-----------------|-----|
| West Africa | 23% |
| Central Africa | 7% |
| Southern Africa | 21% |
| East Africa | 24% |
| Caribbean | 19% |
| Pacific | 6% |

Summary of CDI interventions

| | 1993 | 1994 |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Total number of interventions | 190 | 229 |
| <i>Of which</i> | | |
| Feasibility studies, expertise & diagnosis, assistance in negotiations | 48% | 44% |
| Direct interventions, technical assistance, training | 52% | 56% |

Timetable of CDI sectoral activities in 1995

Open to all interested companies in the European Union and ACP countries concerned
(information available from the CDI)

| Sector | Date | Activity | Place | ACP countries concerned |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| Cut flowers | February | Meeting for professionals in the cut flowers sector on the occasion of the International Horticultural Fair . | Netherlands - Amsterdam | East Africa, Southern Africa |
| Wood | February | Training workshop in maintenance. | Tonga | Tonga |
| Ornamental stone | May | Meeting for professionals in the ornamental stone sector (marble and granite) on the occasion of the Carrara International Fair . | Italy - Carrara | Caribbean, Southern Africa, West Africa |
| Fishing and wood | June | Participation in the UNIDO Forum for the wood and fishing sectors. | Ghana - Accra | Ghana |
| Tropical Fruit | June | CDI sectoral meeting: developing tropical fruit. | Côte-d'Ivoire - Abidjan | West Africa |
| Leather | June | CDI sectoral meeting: developing local leather and leather components for footwear. | Botswana | Southern Africa |
| Various key sectors | June | Meeting for the promotion of investments. | Zimbabwe | Zimbabwe |
| Animal feed | July | CDI professional meeting: developing raw materials for animal feed. | Senegal - Dakar | Sahelian West Africa |
| Leather | September | Meeting for professionals in the sector on the occasion of the INTERSIC Leather Fair. | France - Paris | All |
| Wood | September | CDI sectoral meeting: developing local timber and 2nd- and 3rd-stage processing products. | Caribbean | Caribbean |
| Building materials | October | Participation in MAT CONSTRUCT at the ACP-EU Forum organised by the European Commission. | Gabon - Libreville | Central Africa (CEEAC/ECOCAS) |
| Sea products | October | Meeting for professionals in the sea products sector on the occasion of the International Fishing Exhibition . | Senegal - Dakar | All |
| Lake fishing | October | CDI sectoral meeting: developing lake fishing. | Lake Victoria or Europe | Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania |
| Essential oils & spices | October | Meeting for professionals in the essential oils and spices sector on the occasion of the ANUGA Fair. | Germany - Cologne | Caribbean |
| Agri-foodstuffs | October | Meeting for professionals in the processed vegetables sector on the occasion of the ANUGA Fair. | Germany - Cologne | Southern African, East Africa |
| Various key sectors | October | Meeting for the promotion of investments. | Namibia | Namibia |
| Wood | November | Workshop presenting wood dryers. | East Africa | East Africa |
| Agro-industry | December | Participation in the European Commission's Forum on the agro-industry and agri-foodstuffs sector. | Senegal - Dakar | West Africa (ECOWAS) |

Partnership is a publication of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), created under the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention.

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Operational Summary

No. 86 — May 1995



(position as at 7 May 1995)

EC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 December 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EC since 1976 and 1977;

— the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
TA: Technical assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
mECU: Million European currency units

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Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

| | | | |
|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| A1 | Planning and public administration | A5B | Industrial development banks |
| A1A | Administrative buildings | A5C | Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities |
| A1B | Economic planning and policy | A5D | Export promotion |
| A1C | Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category | A5E | Trade, commerce and distribution |
| A1D | Police and fire protection | A5F | Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing) |
| A1E | Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation | A5G | Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography |
| A1F | Economic surveys, pre-investment studies | A5H | Other insurance and banking |
| A1G | Cartography, mapping, aerial photography | A5I | Archaeological conservation, game reserves |
| A1H | Demography and manpower studies | | |
| A2 | Development of public utilities | A6 | Education |
| A2A | Power production and distribution | A6A | Primary and secondary education |
| A2Ai | Electricity | A6B | University and higher technical institutes |
| A2B | Water supply | A6Bi | Medical |
| A2C | Communications | A6C | Teacher training |
| A2D | Transport and navigation | A6Ci | Agricultural training |
| A2E | Meteorology | A6D | Vocational and technical training |
| A2F | Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power) | A6E | Educational administration |
| | | A6F | Pure or general research |
| | | A6G | Scientific documentation |
| | | A6H | Research in the field of education or training |
| | | A6I | Subsidiary services |
| | | A6J | Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc. |
| A3 | Agriculture, fishing and forestry | A7 | Health |
| A3A | Agricultural production | A7A | Hospitals and clinics |
| A3B | Service to agriculture | A7B | Maternal and child care |
| A3C | Forestry | A7C | Family planning and population-related research |
| A3D | Fishing and hunting | A7D | Other medical and dental services |
| A3E | Conservation and extension | A7E | Public health administration |
| A3F | Agricultural storage | A7F | Medical insurance programmes |
| A3G | Agricultural construction | | |
| A3H | Home economics and nutrition | A8 | Social infrastructure and social welfare |
| A3I | Land and soil surveys | A8A | Housing, urban and rural |
| A4 | Industry, mining and construction | A8B | Community development and facilities |
| A4A | Extractive industries | A8C | Environmental sanitation |
| A4Ai | Petroleum and natural gas | A8D | Labour |
| A4B | Manufacturing | A8E | Social welfare, social security and other social schemes |
| A4C | Engineering and construction | A8F | Environmental protection |
| A4D | Cottage industry and handicraft | A8G | Flood control |
| A4E | Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment | A8H | Land settlement |
| A4F | Non-agricultural storage and warehousing | A8I | Cultural activities |
| A4G | Research in industrial technology | A9 | Multisector |
| A5 | Trade, banking, tourism and other services | A9A | River development |
| A5A | Agricultural development banks | A9B | Regional development projects |
| | | A10 | Unspecified |

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EC is in no way bound by the summary which is for information only.

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

Rehabilitation national roads in the South-West region: Namibe-Serra da Leba section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. 18.5 mECU. Road rehabilitation by int. tender (conditional). Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF ANG A2d

Health project «Post-emergency». 15 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, supply of medicines, health projects in Luanda, fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 7007 A7

Artisanal fisheries in Namibe. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Fisheries. Estimate 10.400 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and boats, T.A., training, line of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 6032(7) A3d

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Livestock development. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a

Upgrading and expansion of Antigua Hotel Training Centre. Construction of and equipment for part new and part renovated and upgraded facilities. Estimated cost 2.200 mECU. Works, supplies, design and supervision, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 7001 A6d

BARBADOS

Upgrading of Fishing Facilities at Consett Bay and Skeete's Bay. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries. Total cost 1.789 mECU. EDF 1.546, local 0.243 mECU. Off-shore construction works (dredging, improvement of the existing jetty, anchorage, channel (markers) and on-shore works (improvement of the access road, construction of a terminal, a parking and paved area, electricity supply installation). Works by restr. tender after prequalification. Final design: short-list to be done. 6th and 7th EDF. *Project in execution.* EDF BAR 6007 A3d

BELIZE

Community Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Social Services. 0.150 mECU. Project preparation study. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEL 6002 A6b

BENIN

Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6009 A3d

Rehabilitation of the Cotonou-Hilacondji Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated cost 17 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 93

km. Works by int. tender. Supervision, geotechnical control, follow-up, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BEN 6017 A2d

Rural structuration programme in the Mono Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de la Restructuration Economique. 6.500 mECU. Work construction, rehabilitation of water systems, roads, schools, markets, warehouses. Works by acc. tender, supplies by local manufacturers. T.A., evaluation. Participation NGO AFVP (F). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th EDF. EDF BEN/6003/001 A3a

BOTSWANA

Support for HIV/AIDS Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.800 mECU. Training, works and supplies. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BT 7005 A7b,c

BURKINA FASO

Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Modern earth-road. Supervision: short-list done. Estimated cost 13.5 m ECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF BK 7004 A2d

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 95-96. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 25 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7200/002 A1c

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Cereals. 6.100 mECU. Support for institutional reform, works, supply of equipment, T.A., lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7009 A3a

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Environment. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, soil management and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7010 A3a

Support project for fight against AIDS and STD's. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 1.350mECU. Rehabilitation works, supply of equipment, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7013 A7b,c

BURUNDI

Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. Supervision and management. Works, supplies, T.A., training and awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 6029 A5i

Support project for micro-enterprises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare technical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 7004 A4, A5

Support programme for the National Authorising Officer. Resp. Auth.: Ordon-

nateur National. Estimated cost 1.570 mECU. Supply of equipment. T.A., training, evaluation, support mission. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF BU 7014 A1c

Health rehabilitation in the provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuzo. 5.500 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. and evaluation. Date financing March 95. 7th EDF. EDF BU 7003 A7

CAMEROON

Integrated rural development programme in the North-East and North-West Benoué regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a

General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 7200/001 A1c

Lagdo fishing project. Resp. Auth.: MINEPIA. Estimated cost 3.500 mECU. Preservation and improvement of the social-economic situation around the Lagdo Lake. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6002/002 A3a

Protection and sanitation of the Kousseri town. Kousseri road network. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 4 mECU. Dyke rehabilitation works along the Logoni river, road works and rain water drainage. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6022 A8g, A9a

Access road to the Tikar Plain. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 14.232 mECU. Road works over the Kakar-Sabongari-Atta-Sonkolong road. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6037 A2d

CAPE VERDE

Rural electrification — Praia. Resp. Auth.: Municipalité de Praia. Estimated cost 1.457 mECU. Works and supply of equipment for the electrification of 3 centres in 'rural Praia'. (Diesel power station and LT/MT distribution network). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7005 A2ai

Solar Regional Programme. 3rd part. Resp. Auth.: Cellule nationale de réalisation du P.R.S. Estimated cost 0.507 mECU. Construction, rehabilitation, equipment, support mission, awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7006 A2b, A3e

Improvement of living conditions in the centre of Praia. Resp. Auth.: Praia Municipality. 3.240 mECU. Rehabilitation works in block 16 by direct labour. Renovation of the Ponta Belem area. Work, by acc. tender. T.A. for Ponta Belem and for the Municipality. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7007 A8a

Road infrastructure improvement in the Santiago, São Nicolau and Maio islands. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Infrastructures et des Transports - Direction Générale des Infrastructures. 3.090 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Work supervision short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April-May 95. 7th EDF. A2d
EDF CV 7003

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Support for the Structural Adjustment. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 10 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. CA 7200 A1c

Support for the agricultural production and for rural centres self-promotion. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 8.500 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. evaluation, audit, training and follow-up. **★ Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF CA 6005/001 A3a

Support for Primary Health Cares in the Basse-Kotto region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé, Publique et de la Population. 1.900 mECU. Buildings, warehouses, Healthcentres, medical equipment, vehicles, medicines, T.A. evaluation, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CA 7004 A7, A8

Rural roads maintenance in the Central-Southern region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports, des Travaux Publics, de l'Habitat et de l'Aménagement. 1.750 mECU. Rehabilitation of 240 km rural roads. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. evaluation. **★ Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF CA 6005/002 A2d

Support for the Agence Nationale de Développement de l'Elevage (ANDE) - Studies and Livestock system actions Units. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage. 1.950 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. **★ Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF CA 6001/001 A3a

Support for the transport sectoral programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 50 mECU. Road rehabilitation. Works, supervision, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CA 6008 A2d

COMOROS

Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement - Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for further investigations, tender dossier and works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d

Development of cultivation for export. Vanilla and Ylang Ylang. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dev. Rural. 1.900 mECU. Vanilla and improvement of quality (laboratory, management, marketing). Supply of non-wood ovens. Crop diversification. Equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF COM 7004 A3a

CHAD

Re-launch of the fishing sector. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral study: short list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CD 7011 A3a

CONGO

Support for the Health Development National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction and rehabilitation works, T.A., training, supply of equipment and medicines. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF COB 7005 A7

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support programme for the 'pineapple market'. Estimated cost 7.780 mECU. EDF 6.100 mECU, O.C.A.B. (Organisation Centrale des Producteurs - Exportateurs d'Ananas et des Bananes), 1.680 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A., training, studies, line of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 6016 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Phase III. 28.800 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF 7200/002 A1c

Irrigated rice-growing areas in the Central and Northern Central regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 15.700 mECU. Infrastructure, organization, training. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A., studies, training. Date financing April 95. 7th EDF. EDF IVC 5021/001 A3a

DJIBOUTI

Fight against desertification and development of livestock husbandry in Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, T.A. Project suspended. 7th EDF. EDF DI 6008 A3a

Health training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. T.A., scholarships, seminars, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DI 7101/002 A7e

Construction of a laboratory for water and soil analysis. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dev. Rural. 0.115 mECU. Works and supply of equipment. Date financing March 95. 7th EDF. EDF DI 7005 A3e,i

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Geological and mining development programme. 23 mECU. Studies, programmes managements, works, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e

Los Toros Hydroelectric project. Construction of a hydroelectric power station. Civil works, supply of electromechanical and hydromechanical equipment. Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7005 A2ai

Puerto Plata. Provincial development programme. Resp. Auth.: Oficina Técnica Provincial de Puerto Plata. 1.400 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, education, equipment. Project in execution. EDF DO 7013 A8b,c

Park conservation programme. Resp. Auth.: Direction National des Parcs (DNP). 0.750 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Equipment by direct agreement on local market. T.A. by AEI (Agence Espagnole de Coopération Internationale). Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF DO 7014 A3

Support programme for the private sector. Estimated total cost 7 mECU. EDF 4.2 mECU, local 0.950 mECU, local private sector and SME'S 1.4 mECU, C.D.I. 0.450 mECU. EDF part: line of credit and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th EDF.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF. EDF EG 0000 A1c

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classification and Use Master Plan - National System of Conservation Units - Forest Training and Research Centre. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i

Rural development programme in the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a

ERITREA

Rehabilitation Programme. 3.7 mECU. NGO projects for health, veterinary services, water supply and demobilization of soldiers. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ERY 7255 A7,A8

ETHIOPIA

Strengthening of water supply and sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. Supply of metering and control equipment. T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c

Rehabilitation of the Addis-Ababa - Modjo - Awasa Road. Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Road Authority. Estimated cost 40 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7005 A2d

Wildlife conservation in Southern Ethiopia. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, rehabilitation, equipment, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7011 A3c,d,e

Social Rehabilitation Programme. EDF 6.868 mECU. Rehabilitation of health (including water and sanitation) services and of agri-pastoral activities. Works, sup-

plies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7012 A3-A7-A8

Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, training, line of credit, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7255/001 A8b,e

SME'S development programme. Estimated total cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ET 7003 A5

GABON

Mining development programme and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines, de l'Énergie et des Ressources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 mECU. Works by direct labour and int. tenders. Equipment by int. tender, T.A., follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF/SYS/GA 9999 A4a

Rural water supply and micro-projects in 3 provinces. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau et de l'Énergie. 8.600 mECU. 300 new wells and rehabilitation of 210 existing water points. Drinking water for Haut-Ogooué, Ngounié and Woleu-Ntem provinces. Works, supply of equipment, T.A., training, follow-up. **Date financing March 95.** 7th EDF. EDF GA 6015 A2b

GAMBIA

General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 1.400 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GM 7200/002 A1c

GHANA

Human resources development programme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipments. T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH 7003 A6

Western Region Agricultural Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 15 mECU. T.A., buildings and training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH A3a

Lomé IV - Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 7 mECU. T.A., transport equipment, materials and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH A3a

Protected Area Development in South Western Ghana. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Forestry. 5 mECU. T.A., buildings, equipment and supplies. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF GH 7005 A3a

Woodworking Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 4.5 mECU. Equipment, T.A., overseas training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH A3c

Transport Infrastructure Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Roads & Highways. 70 mECU. Works, supplies, supervision, training. Project on

appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF GH A2d

General Import Programme III. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 32.2 mECU. T.A. for monitoring. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GH A1c

University Link. University of Ghana - Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.2 mECU. T.A., equipment scholarships, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH 7101/001 A6b

GRENADA

Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, Community Development. 0.220 mECU. Water supply, road improvements, repairs and extension of schools, medical and community centre and sports grounds. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GRD 7102 A4a

Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Grenville Section of the Eastern Main Road - Grenville - Mama Cannes portion. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply of equipment for repairs. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GRD 7002/001 A2d

GUINEA

Development of secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, roads, T.A. and training, management, work supervision, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b

Information System for the National Programme to Support Food Security. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et des Ressources Animales. 1.600 mECU. Supply of equipment, permanent T.A. follow-up, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF QUI 7004 A3a

General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment. 19 mECU. **Date financing April 95.** 7th EDF. EDF GUI 7200 A1c

GUINEA BISSAU

Support project to improve land resources. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.260 mECU. Technical actions to prepare the creation of a land registry. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7012 A1f

João Landim bridge construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 23 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7013 A2d

Livestock development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 1.200 mECU. Zootechnical actions, privatisation, veterinary profession. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 5007/003 A3a

T.A. to the National Authorising Officer's Cabinet. Resp. Auth.: NAO 0.473 mECU. T.A. and training. **Date financing March 95.** 7th EDF. FED GUB 7001/001 A1c

GUYANA

Development of small business credit initiative. Phase II. 0.700 mECU. **Project in execution.** 6th EDF. EDF GUA 7001/001 A5

Pouderoyen water supply system. Resp. Auth.: Guyana Water Authority (GUYWA). 6 mECU. Raw water supply, treatment process, storage reservoirs, site work, transmission main, distribution main, T.A., supervision, evaluation. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing May 95.** 7th EDF. EDF GUA 7003 A2b

HAITI

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Finances. 23 mECU. General Import Programme with negative list. Different T.A. with individual experts. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing May 95.** 7th EDF. EDF HA 7200 A1c

JAMAICA

Credit scheme for micro and small enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex Institution and Coordination and Monitoring Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 5th, 6th and 7th EDF. EDF JM 5020 A4,A5

Institutional strengthening programme. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF JM 7005 A8a,b,c

Agricultural sector support programme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture - Rural and agriculture dev. Auth. (RADA). 5 mECU. More sustainable farming systems, soil conservation, reafforestation and Community education. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF JM 7004 A3a

KENYA

Road sector. Preparatory phase. Studies. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Estimated cost 1.693 mECU. Studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF KE 7010 A2d

Strengthening of STD and HIV/AIDS Programme in Nairobi and Mombasa. Special Treatment Clinic (STC) in Nairobi and the Ganjoni clinic at Mombasa. 1.577 mECU. Works, supply of equipment by int. tender, T.A. training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF KE 08000 A7b,c

Farming in tsetse infested areas. Estimated total cost 14.600 mECU. Refine the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and develop better technologies to prevent infections. Monitor the environmental impact of the techniques. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF KE 7011 A3a

KIRIBATI

Airport development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. 1.200 mECU. Upgrading of airport operations and security in Tarawa, Kiritimati and Kanton atolls. Small scale building works and minor supplies with associated training and short-term expertise. Date financing April 95. 7th EDF. EDF KI 7005 A2d

LIBERIA

Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Monrovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water and power supply systems, restoration of basic health and school facilities, distribution of seeds and tools, improved access to isolated regions, assisting the re-integration of ex-combatants and returning refugees. Implementation by local NGOs and European NGOs. Project in execution. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF LBR 7001 A1c

MADAGASCAR

Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF MAG 6027 A2d

Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimate 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF MAG 7004 A2d

Support programme to rehabilitate social and economic infrastructures. Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 17.500 mECU. Railways and road rehabilitation, small hydraulic works. Social infrastructure rehabilitation. Technical expertise study to be done for roads. Works, supplies, supervision and control, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF MAG 7009 A2, A8

Bemaraha Project. 2nd phase. Resp. Auth.: Ministère d'Etat au Dév. Rural. 0.700 mECU. Training and awareness-raising for the protection of cultural and environmental wealth of the 'Tsingy de Bemaraha' region. Classified world property site by Unesco. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April-May 95. 7th EDF. EDF MAG 7020 A3a

MALAWI

Limbe-Thyolo-Muloza Road. Works, construction by int. tender (conditional). 36.260 mECU. Works and supervision. Date financing March 95. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF MAI 6021 A2d

Poverty alleviation programme-Pilot project Agroforestry. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development MOALD. 1 mECU. Sustainable land utilisation on catchment area level achieved and water supply and sanitation at household and village level improved. Equipment and T.A. T.A.: short-list done. Date financing May 95. 7th EDF. EDF MAI 5001/001 A3a

Poverty Alleviation Programme-Agroforestry component. Resp. Auth.: MOALD. Estimated total cost 47 mECU. EDF 22 mECU, local 2 mECU, counterpart funds from food aid 94 23 mECU. Water supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAI 5001/002 A3a

Structural Adjustment Programme 1995. Estimated cost 25.700 mECU. General Import programme. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAI 7200 A1c

Information, education and communication population programme. Resp. Auth.: NAO-Ministry for Women and children Affairs, Community and Social Services - Ministry of information and Broadcasting. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Increase awareness and promote behaviour change as regards reproductive health, including disease prevention. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAI 6009/001 A7b,c

MALI

Support to develop rural credit. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole. BNDA. EDF part 1.910 mECU. T.A. and line of credit, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 6001/002 A5a

Better use of surfacing waters in the 5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: Gouvernorat de Mopti. EDF 4.300 mECU. Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, T.A., follow-up and evaluation, training, research. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 6005/002 A3a

Support for the programme for the rehabilitation and maintenance of priority roads. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement et de Transport. Estimated cost 43.4 mECU. Rehabilitation and strengthening of 380 kms of bitumenised roads (Ségou-Koutiala-Burkina Border-Ouan-Sévaré) and strengthening of 180 kms of the Diéma-Didiéni road. Supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 7004 A2d

Support for the decentralisation programme. Estimated cost 0.600 mECU. T.A., studies, communication campaigns, equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 7009 A1b

Support for 'Crédit Initiative - S.A.' Resp. Auth.: Crédit Initiative S.A. under control of Ministère des Finances. Estimated cost 3 mECU. Credit to SME's, management, project studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 6001/006 A4d,c-A5

Support for the Ministry of External Affairs. Resp. Auth.: Ordonnateur National. 0.300 mECU. Support for the ACP/EC cooperation unit and for the delegation for african integration. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 6007/001 A1c

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme 95-96. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Finances et du Commerce. Estimated cost 25 mECU. General Import Programme with negative list. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MLI 7200 A1c

MAURITANIA

Second Road Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350

mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAU 6004-7004 A2d

National measures to support the Solar Regional Programme. Estimated cost 2.520 mECU. Infrastructural works (tanks, wells, pipes) and awareness-raising, training and follow-up for the recipient communities, works and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAU 6116/001 A2a,ai,b

Increased provision for treatment and prevention of AIDS and STD. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 0.350 mECU. Supply of equipment, training, management. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF MAU 7013 A7b,c

Aleg lake region economic development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de l'Environnement. Estimate 3 mECU. Irrigation in 2.000 ha. Works, studies, evaluation, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. Date foreseen for financing April-May 95. EDF MAU 7014 A3

Institutional and technical support for applying and implementing land and soil legislations and regulations in the medium and upper Senegal river valley. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural et de l'Environnement. 1.100 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF MAU 6007/002 A8b

Support for farmers in Gorgol and Trarza regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural et de l'Environnement. 1 mECU. Equipment, T.A. evaluation, follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAU 7015 A3a

Coordination Unit for programme financed by the European Union. Resp. Auth.: Ordonnateur National and Head of the Delegation of the E.U. 0.500 mECU. Date financing April 95. 7th EDF. EDF MAU 6007/003 A1c

S.N.I.M. rehabilitation and rationalisation. Resp. Auth.: SNIM - Soc. Nat. Industr. et Minière. Estimated total cost 54.500 mECU. Nouadhibou port dredging, supply of specialized equipment for mining. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAU-SYSMIN 7018 A4a

MAURITIUS

National solid waste management project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Quality of Life. Estimate 8.650 mECU. EDF 7 mECU. Construction of a fully engineered landfill to cater for about 600 t of solid waste per day. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. for supervision and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF MAS 6017 A8b,c,f

AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.423 mECU. Prevention of sexual transmission, maintenance of safe blood supply, rationalisation of patient management. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF MAS 7004 A7b,c

MOZAMBIQUE

Social-economic reinsertion of young people. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF MOZ 7017 A8b

Supply of voting material. Estimated cost 13 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7004/001 A1c

Rehabilitation of the rural health system. Estimated cost 42 mECU. Rehabilitation and renovation of 7 rural hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of essential medicines and equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7018 A7a,e

Rehabilitation of the Cahora-Bassa/South Africa transmission line. Resp. Auth.: Hidroeléctrica de Cahora-Bassa. EDF part 20 mECU. Erection of towers, demining, bush clearing by int. tender (conditional) launched in September 94. Date financing March 95. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ(REG) 7019 A2ai

NAMIBIA

Namibia Integrated Health Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastructures, equipment, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7007 A7

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, technical training and technical consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7005 A6i

Rural Development Support Programme for the Northern Communal Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural extension service, training of extension officers and establishment of a rural credit system. Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7011 A3a

Rural towns Sewerage schemes. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7015 A8c

NIGER

Road infrastructures and telecommunications. 40 mECU. Rehabilitation of Tillabery-Ayorou (Tender launched), Farie-Tera and Say-Tapoa roads. For telecommunications: earth station in Arlit and administrative centre in Niamey. Works and supervision. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF
EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c

Integrated development programme in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, Tadress and Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: Ministères de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage, de la Santé Publique et de l'Éducation Nationale. 18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, drilling, supply of equipment, T.A. training, evaluation and follow-up. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF NIR 7012 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF NIR 7200 A1c

Decentralized cooperation programme. Rural development and creation of private companies. Estimated total cost 1.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NIR 7013 A3,A5

Fishery development in the southern Zinder zone. Resp. Auth.: NGO under control of Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Professional sector structuration, strengthening of fishery marketing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NIR 7014 A3a

Environmental protection programme in the lower Tarka Valley. Estimated total cost 10 mECU. To stop ecological and economical destruction of the zone. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF NIR 6002/002 A3a

NIGERIA

Human resources development. Institutional support for community development and vocational training. Estimate 17 mECU. Supplies, T.A. training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 7006 A6b,c,d

Management Support Unit. Technical and logistic support to the National Authorizing Officer — NAO's office in order to improve procurement monitoring and financial management of EDF programmes. 1.980 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF UNI 7011 A1c

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of Education (NDOE) and Commission for Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: building renovation, university construction, rehabilitation works, works supervision, scholarships, training. Works for the university by int. tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b

Environmental Monitoring of Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. T.A. for 30 man/months and technical consultancies. Training. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF PNG 7001 A4a

E.U. Programme Management Unit in support of the National Authorising Officer (NAO). Estimated cost 1.200 mECU. T.A., training and auditing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF PNG 6001 A1c

SENEGAL

St-Louis regional development programme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, studies. Health centres, clinics, medical equipment and consumables, training, information. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor.

Drainage network, sanitation. Environmental protection with wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering scheme in Podor. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a

Support for the economic development of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 mECU. Line of credit for SME's and support for artisanal fisheries. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a

Priority programme to generate employment. P.P.G.E. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et du Plan. 1.990 mECU. To alleviate the social impact of the austerity measures and of the CFA Franc devaluation on the least-favoured urban populations. Line of credit, supplies. T.A., audit. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF SE 7009 A8b

Support for market-gardening export sector. 1 mECU. Establishment of a Guarantee Fund, support and T.A. for professional organisations, air-freight programming. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF SE 7008 A5d

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme with negative list. Estimated total cost 20.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF SE 7200/002 A1c

SEYCHELLES

Marine and coastal centre. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Planning and Environment. Estimated total cost 0.675 mECU. EDF 0.325 mECU, local 0.350 mECU. Renovation and equipping of a centre for international, regional and local research. Works and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF SEY 7003 A8f

Support for AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.139 mECU. Training, information, equipment. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF SEY 7005 A7b,c

SIERRA LEONE

Improvement of Freetown - Conakry road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF SL 7004 A2d

Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 22.500 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's management capacity, to support its maintenance operations, to rehabilitate 160 km of road, to provide training and equipment to enable local private contractors to increase their role in road works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF SL 7002 A2d

SOMALIA

Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF
EDF SO 6029

SURINAME

Roads rehabilitation programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. 19.700 mECU. Meerzorg-Albina and Wageningen-Nickerie roads. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal, 5th and 7th EDF. EDF SUR 7001 A2d

Rice research and breeding station. Resp. Auth.: Suriname National Rice Institute (SNRI). 3.215 mECU. Construction of research facility, laboratory, research, field equipment, office and transport equipment, T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. T.A. short-list done. Works by acc. tender, supplies by int. tender. **Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF SUR 60002 A3a

Tourism development programme. Resp. Auth.: Suriname Tourism Foundation. Estimated total cost 0.745 mECU. Institutional strengthening, statistics and research, product upgrading and development, Tourism awareness programme, marketing and promotion, human resource development. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF SUR 7003 A5c

SWAZILAND

Technical Cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland (N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU. T.A. 12 person-years to selected agencies in the public and parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF SW 7001 A1f

Science and Mathematics Advice and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. Auth.: The University of Swaziland - Training Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF SW 6101/7 A6b

Rural dams rehabilitation and construction project (Phase II). EDF estimated part 1.993 mECU. Works, T.A. and supervision, training, surveys. **Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF SW 6012/001 A3a

TANZANIA

Support for Aids Control in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4 mECU. To strengthen health and other support services. Supply of equipment and T.A. Date financing March 95. 7th EDF. EDF TA 08000/000 (7001) A7c

Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 35 mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 km of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study ongoing. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 6021 A2d

Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. Works, pumping equipment, studies and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 5005(7) A2b

Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, treatment, storage and distribution. Works, equipment, design and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7009 A2

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Phase III. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Tanzania. 30 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7200/002 A1c

Assistance for the 1994-95 electoral process. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. Supply of voting material and equipment. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7017 A1c

Support for Tanzanian students in Eastern Europe. Resp. Auth.: International Organisation for Migration (I.O.M.). 1.950 mECU. Provisions of monthly allowances to the students to enable them to continue their studies and provision of tickets luggage allowance and some starting capital to facilitate reintegration in Tanzanian society. Project in execution, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7016 A1c

Ruvuma-Mbeya Environmental Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Development Authorities. Estimate 10 mECU. Improvement of forest conservation and use. Supplies, T.A., studies, training, management. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7018 A3c

Support to the Ministry of Works, Communication and Transport. 1.900 mECU. T.A., studies and training. Project in execution, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7019 A1c

Support for coffee research. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 3.325 mECU. EDF 2.125 mECU, local 1.200 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment for the research centres, training. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 6001/002 A3a

Road rehabilitation and maintenance (Ruvuma and Iringa Regions). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated total cost 15 mECU. EDF 12 mECU, local 3 mECU. Road rehabilitation, support to regional and district engineers' offices, training of local contractors. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TA 7011 A2d

TOGO

Educational project AIDS/STD. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 0.625 mECU. Training, pedagogical equipment, supplies audit, T.A. Date financing April 95. 7th EDF. EDF TO 7003 A7b,c

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal, 5th and 6th EDF. EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Training project for young farmers (AYTRAP). Assistance for the young farmers to create rural enterprises. Estimated cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. Project on appraisal, 6th and 7th EDF. EDF TR 7002 A3a

TUVALU

Outer Island Primary School Rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 0.300 mECU. To improve the physical state of the primary school facilitating on the outer islands, Nukufetau and Vaitupu. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF TV 7004 A6a

UGANDA

Smallholder Tea Development Programme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 mECU. Increase in the production and quality, management improvements, infrastructure development, institutional and financial sustainability, environment conservation and regional development. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a

Support to the Uganda Investment Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF UG 7005 A5e

Road maintenance programme in the South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 22 mECU. Works, supplies and supervision. Project in execution, 7th EDF. EDF UG 7004 A2d

Animal water supply in Karamoja. To establish water retaining structures in selected strategical areas. 1.950 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF UG 7008 A2b

ZAIRE

Temporary assistance programme for health care (P.A.T.S.). Rehabilitation programme. Estimated cost 18.500 mECU. To ensure that the health-care services that are still operating survive. Implementation by NGOs and local organizations. Project in execution, 7th EDF. EDF ZR 6029 A7a,b

ZAMBIA

Reorganisation and restructuring of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife services. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. **Project in execution.** 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d

Rehabilitation of main runway at Lusaka International Airport. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF REG - ROR 7319 - ZA A2d

Feeder roads rehabilitation programme. 5 mECU. To rehabilitate rural feeder roads in the central and copperbelt provinces. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF ZA 6027 A2d

Editing and printing of geological maps. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines. Estimated total cost 1 mECU. To produce 20 geological maps and 10 structural maps. To assist with training the zambian geological survey department. T.A.: a full-time cartographer for 2 years and a geological map editor for 1 year. Project on appraisal, 7th EDF. EDF ZA 5029 A1g

Support to the development of the crafts sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Community Development and social services. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Training for technical skills and management provision of grants and loans for tools, materials, transport. Supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7004 A4d

Management training for the ministries of health and education. Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health and Education. Estimated total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF 1 mECU, local 0,200 mECU. T.A. multi-sectoral: management/administration, planning, accounting-training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7003/001 A6/A7

Forestry management for sustainable woodfuel production in Zambia (along the line of rail). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Training, supply of equipment, studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZA 7009 A3c

ZIMBABWE

OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe land use and health programme. Resp. Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the standard of living of rural populations. Conservation and improved utilisation of the wildlife resources, support to agriculture and improvement of social infrastructure. Road network, water, sanitation, building of a district hospital, equipment and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a

Support for the Faculty of Veterinary Science of the University of Zimbabwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Veterinary. 9.1 mECU. Supply of vehicles and equipment. T.A., University link, fellowships, scholarships. For Zimbabwe and SADC region. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b

Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. Increase of wildlife population, particularly of endangered species: black and white rhino — tourism development, works, supplies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f

Gokwe north and south rural water supply and sanitation project. 6.100 mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-points, new domestic water-points, latrines, maintenance, health education, T.A., training, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ZIM 7001 A2b

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Support for the Public Library in Curaçao. Resp. Auth.: Public Library Curaçao. Estimation 0.650 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NEA 7003 A6g

ARUBA

T.A. for managerial training. EDF 1.900 mECU. A training unit will train private and public executives and will advise companies on demand. Supplies T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ARU 6006 A6b

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES — ARUBA

Tourism development programme. Estimated total cost 6-6.5 mECU. EDF 4-5 mECU, local 0.100 mECU, local private sector 1.400 mECU. Training, T.A., marketing in Europe. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7835 A5c

NEW CALEDONIA

Construction of a vocational training centre for apprentices. Estimated total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 mECU. Works by acc. tender. **Date financing April 95. 7th EDF.** EDF NC 7002 A6d

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

Water and sewerage in Providenciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 3.600 mECU. Water supply works and pipes. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF TC 7001 A8b,c

ST. HELENA

Wharf improvement project. Resp. Auth.: Public Works + Service. Department. Estimated total cost 1.743 mECU. To increase the safety and efficiency of Jamestown Port by upgrading wharf facilities for passenger and cargo handling. Works, supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SH 7001 A2d

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF WF 7001 A2d

Construction of territorial road n° 1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and rehabilitation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF WF 7003 A2d

Regional Projects

BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

Regional project for the management of the 'W' national park and adjoining game reserves. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. To establish three management units, 10 bridges and 20 observation posts with their equipment. Building and rehabilitation of administrative, technical and social buildings, tracks and bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU. Widening of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF. EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b

PALOP COUNTRIES — ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE — GUINEA BISSAU — SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE — CAPE VERDE

Regional training for middle-ranking statisticians. 3.5 mECU. Training of 900 middle-ranking statisticians in the five countries. Building-up a modular training system, training for trainees, workshops-newsletter. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7901-002 A6b,j

Technical support for the general cooperation of the PALOP programme. 1 mECU. T.A., supplies, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7901/007 A1c

Regional training centre for nursing administrators. 2.600 mECU. Trainers training, supply of equipment, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7901/005 A6c, d, A7

Bibliographic Fund. Resp. Auth.: Bibliographic Fund-Maputo. 2.500 mECU. Development of human resources. Editing, circulation, reading promotion. T.A. and evaluation. **Date financing April 95. 7th EDF.** EDF REG 7901/008 A6g,i

CENTRAL AFRICA

UCAC — Central Africa Catholic University. EDF 1.800 mECU. Support for the Ekounou Campus in Yaoundé. Road works and distribution networks, student house building. **Date financing March 95. 7th EDF.** EDF REG 7204 A6b

CIESPAC — Public Health Education Centre in Central Africa. 1.900 mECU. Student accommodation, equipment, scholarships, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7205 A6b

ECOFAC II - Forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. République du Congo. Estimated total cost 12.500 mECU. To develop national and regional capacities for a good management of forest resources. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6203/001 A3c

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF I.O.C. — INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION — COMORES — MADAGASCAR — MAURITIUS — SEYCHELLES

Technical cooperation framework programme. 1.800 mECU. T.A., auditing and evaluation, equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7501 A1b

Development of Exchanges Regional Integrated Promotion. (PRIDE). Resp. Auth.: I.O.C. Secrétariat. EDF 10.500 mECU. Equipment. T.A., training, management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7503 A5

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare-Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS

Guarantee Fund for Private Investments - Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO - Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to cover partially credit risks given by Banks to the private sector. Total estimated cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU - Others: France, Germany, E.I.B., Commercial Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7115 A5

BURKINA FASO - CAPE VERDE - GAMBIA - MALI - MAURITANIA - NIGER - SENEGAL - CHAD

Regional environmental training and information programme. Resp. Auth.: Institut du Sahel à Bamako. 16 mECU. T.A. training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing April 95. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6147/001 A6/A8

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A.

Regional integration in East and Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. Estimated cost 1.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7316 A1b

PACIFIC ACP STATES

Pacific regional agricultural programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement and dissemination of selected crops, agricultural information and techniques to farmers. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6704/001 A3a

SADC

SADC Regional Customs Training Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland customs services. Training and equipment. 1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5412/7 A1b

SADC Language Training Programme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Languages in Maputo as Regional Project Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English language training and Portuguese language training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6

Regional training programme for food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci

S.I.M.S.E.C. - SADC Initiative for Mathematics and Science Education Cooperation. To establish a professional unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information exchange, teacher training curriculum development, staff development, research cooperation and support for teachers' organisations. Project on appraisal. 5 mECU. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6428 A6b

Wildlife Management Training Project. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. Staff training, equipment and teaching materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f

SADC - MOZAMBIQUE

Beira port dredging contract. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 years. 4 million m³/year. Supervision and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7401 A2d

BENIN - COTE D'IVOIRE - GHANA - GUINEA - GUINEA BISSAU - TOGO

Regional programme to increase awareness in western coastal African countries of natural resources protection. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Priorities: fight against bush fires and deforestation and for soil protection. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6113 A3e

KENYA - UGANDA - TANZANIA

Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (Phase II). Project headquarter in Jinja-Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research Institute. EDF part 8.400 mECU. T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5316/001 A3d

CARIBBEAN REGION

Regional Tourism Sector Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 12.8 mECU. Marketing, Promotion, Education, Training, research and statistics product development and protection of cultural heritage. Works, equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th EDF.* EDF REG 7601/001 A5c

Regional Trade Sector Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 14 mECU. Access of Caribbean firms into identified market, strengthen the competitiveness of export oriented firms, improve the availability of trade information and support institutional development. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. *Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th EDF.* EDF REG 7601/002 A5d,e

Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) - Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Registrar of CXC in Barbados. 2.500 mECU. T.A., external consultancies, equipment. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7603 A6a

University level programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at masters degree level in development economics, business administration, public administration, agricultural diversification, natural resources, management and architecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., scholarships. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7604 A6b

Caribbean Postal Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. and other action necessary for the creation of the Caribbean Postal Union. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605 A2c

Caribbean Telecommunication Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation on Telecommunication within the Cariforum member states. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605/001 A2c

Regional Airports Project. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 2 mECU. Upgrading of equipment and improvement of training of staff. Improvement safety and air navigation standards in two airports in Suriname and one in Guyana. *Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605/002 A2d

Caribbean Regional agriculture and fisheries development programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 22.2 mECU. Creation of an agricultural credit revolving fund, research and training activities to support commercial opportunities, establishment of an information network and sub-programmes in the fisheries, livestock and rice subsectors. Supply of equipment, T.A. and programme management short studies. *Credit Fund. Project in execution.* 7th EDF. EDF REG 7606 A3a

Education policy and dialogue. Resp. Auth.: Cariforum S.G.. 0.450 mECU. T.A. for regional common policies in three education areas: basic education, technical and vocational training, language teaching. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7607 A6a,d

Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 1.500 mECU. Promote cultural identity and foster mutual knowledge of the rich cultural panorama. Restoration of buildings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic fields and management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7610 A8i

Tertiary level programme. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level education and teacher training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6628/001 A6b

MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

ALGERIA

Structural Adjustment Support Programme for building materials to finish 100,000 social housing units. 70 mECU. hard currency allowance to cover CIF imports. Management by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.A.). Special accounts in the Central Bank. Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by a positive list (electrical equipment - spare parts). 1st int. tender launched. Project on appraisal. *Project in execution.* SEM AL 688-92 A1c

Support for the Algerian rural sector. 30 mECU. Project in execution.
SEM AL A3a

EGYPT

Banking Sector Reform - Assistance for the Central Bank of Egypt. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Egypt. 9.9 mECU. Improvement the Central Bank capacity through training, provision of T.A. and equipment. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 689/94 A1

St. Katherine Protectorate Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency, EEAA. 6 mECU. Protection of critical habitats, ecosystems and cultural heritage sites, through zoning and a management plan. Works, supplies and T.A. and training. Major equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 783/94 A3a

Support to population programme in Upper Egypt. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Population and Family Welfare (MPFW). 10 mECU. Service delivery, contraception, supply and distribution, family planning, management unit, T.A. evaluation and monitoring. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 867/94 A7c

Private Sector - Development Programme. PSDP. 25 mECU. Improvement of performances of private companies in domestic, regional and international markets. Business support programme. Information, T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 898/94 A5

Veterinary Services Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MDALR). 20 mECU. Line of credit training, T.A., equipment. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 932/94 A3a

Upper Gulf of Agaba Oil Spill Contingency Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), Ministry of Environment for Israel and Agaba Ports Authority for Jordan with a representative from the EC. EC 2.900 mECU, Egypt 0.200 mECU. Procurement of the equipment, development of local infrastructure, training and T.A. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 1171/94 A8f

JORDAN

Support for Structural Adjustment. Phase III. Hard currency allowance with negative list. 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM JO 279/95 A1c

MALTA

Strengthening educational and economic relations with the Community. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and traineeships, establishment of a Euro-Information Centre, integrated marketing programmes and tourism promotion. Different T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d

MOROCCO

Support to promote and development of remote sensing. Resp. Auth.: CRTS - Centre Royal de Télédetection

spatial. EC contribution 4 mECU. Action for soil vegetation, sea (surface temperature), forests control, identification and support to the management of aquaculture zones and macro-seaweed. Specialized T.A. training, supply of equipments by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM MOR 486/94 A3a

Support for the Agricultural Development Fund. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de la Mise en Valeur Agricole (NAMVA) - Caisse Nationale du Crédit Agricole (CNCA). 50 mECU. Line of credit and training, information, evaluation. Project in execution.
SEM MOR 930/94 A3a, A5a

Support for Mother and Child Care. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 9 mECU. Works by int. tender, studies, T.A., evaluation. Supply of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM MOR 930/94 A7b

Private sector development programme. 30 mECU. Provision of consultancy and training services to private enterprises delivered through a business centre in Casablanca 'Euro-Maroc Enterprise' staffed by expatriate and local consultants. A small office will also be established in Tangiers. Credit line for small enterprise creation in north Morocco. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th EDF.
SEM MOR 299/95 A4/A5

SYRIA

Electricity Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Electricité - Société Publique d'Electricité. SME. EC contribution 11 mECU. Project management unit, training, master plan, transmission and distribution, functioning and control, computerized management system, assistance to the supervision of works (5 sub-stations - funded by E.I.B.). T.A. experts, supply of equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 415/94 A2a, i

Banking Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Syrian Central Bank (SCB) and the Commercial Bank of Syria (CB). 4.5 mECU. Supply of T.A., computer equipment, training monitoring and evaluation. Major equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 899/94 A1

Demographic sector programme in Syria. 2 mECU. Provision of quality Mother and Child Health/Family Planning services, population and housing census, strengthening civil registration system. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 890/94 A7c

Private Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Syrian-European Business Centre. 7 mECU. To improve the performance of indigenous business in local, regional and international markets. Establishment of the SEBC. T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 1189/94 A5d,e

TURKEY

Vocational training programmes for tourism and mining. EC contribution 5.4 mECU. Seminars, staff, trainers, supply of equipment, studies. Project in execution.
SEM TU A5c, A4a, A6d

Programme to broaden relations between EC and Turkey. EC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the Universities of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in execution.
SEM TU A6b

WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Rehabilitation programme for Palestinian ex-detainees. 10 mECU. To reintegrate into Palestinian economy and society 12,000 ex-detainees. Education, training, job counselling, vocational rehabilitation, medical assistance, business start-up training and follow-up, family support, wage subsidies. Project in execution.
SEM OT 94/06 A6,7,8

Support for the electoral registration process: registration materials. 0.100 mECU. Supply of registration materials. Nationals Elections Office - Palestinian Commission for Local Government and Elections. Project in execution.
SEM OT 94/07 A1c

Gaza City solid waste disposal - completion. Resp. Auth.: Municipality of Gaza City. EC contribution 5 mECU. Provision of technical services and supply of rolling stock and equipment. T.A. and training. Date financing May 95.
SEM OT/95/02 A8b,c,f

Programme of institutional capacity-building for the Palestinian Authority. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Authority with the European Commission Representative to the Occupied Territories and the European Commission T.A. Office. EC contribution 2.500 mECU. Provision of assistance to seven Ministries. T.A., supply of equipment training. Date financing May 95.
SEM OT/95/03 A1c

Municipal Support Programme, Gaza and West Bank. EC Contribution 25 mECU (Budget 95: 10 mECU - Budget 96: 15 mECU) Municipal infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion within the road, water supply, building and sewage sectors. Supply of equipment for infrastructure maintenance and solid waste management. Municipalities: Rafah, Khan Younis, Gaza, Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin. T.A. will include full-time secondment in 95/96 and half time in 97 of municipal engineers with a project manager and short-term specialist input. Works by acc. tender. T.A.: short lists to be done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM OT 95/96 - 300/95 A1c

Gaza Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. To meet the final completion date of January 96, further financing is urgently required. This financing will cover the execution of the utility connections, the remaining construction works, the provisions of the main medical equipment and T.A. for the initial operation. Operation initially by UNRWA. Expatriate T.A.: short list to be done. Medical equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM OT 302/95 A7a

Private Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Business Services Centre (PBSC) in Ramallah. EC contribution 6 mECU (1995 Budget 3 mECU - 1996 Budget 3 mECU). Programme of consulting information and training services. Consulting services by EC consultants. T.A.: short lists to be done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95. SEM OT 95/96-342/95 A4,A5

EGYPT - PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL

Middle East Peace Projects. 33 mECU (Budget 95: 13 mECU, Budget 96: 20 mECU). Planning and consulting support measures for major regional investments: water infrastructure projects on the Jordan and Yarmouk, development of Gulf of Agaba area, transport infrastructure and the inter-connection of electricity grids, integrated economic development of Gaza, Sinai and parts of Israel. Regional veterinary cooperation and the establishment of an integrated water data system. Feasibility studies, detailed plans, engineering designs. T.A. by restricted tender or direct agreement. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95. SEM REG 95-96/298-95 A9a,b

A.L.A. developing countries ASIA and LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Integrated development Ramon Lista. EC contribution 5.500 mECU. T.A. Support for indigenous populations. Project on appraisal Date foreseen for financing April 95. ALA ARG B7-3010/152/94 A3a

BANGLADESH

New Options for Pest Management (NOPEST). Resp. Auth.: CARE Bangladesh 6 mECU. To motivate and assist 32,000 farmers in rice growing areas of Mymensingh and Comilla districts. Training, equipment, T.A. by CARE, monitoring and evaluation. **Project in execution.** ALA BD 9431 A3a

BOLIVIA

Promotion and assistance for small private companies. EC contribution 8.795 mECU. T.A. and credit management. Short-list to be done. Project in execution. ALA BOL B7-3010/93/173 A5e

Ministry of Development and Environment. T.A. to support the execution of programmes. 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA BOL B7-3010/94/42 A3a

Rural development in the Mitzque and Tiraque valleys. 16.410 mECU. Different, T.A. for bridges, canals, improvement of cultivated soils. Project on appraisal. **Date foreseen for financing April 95.** ALA BOL B7-3010/94/49 A3a

Support for export promotion. 0.980 mECU. T.A. and training for 30 Bolivians trade representatives. Establishment of 2 trade promotion offices in Europe. Information data system. Project in execution. ALA BOL B7-3010/94/52 A5d

Support for artisanal fisheries and aquaculture. T.A. to improve know-how. 4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing quarter 95. ALA BOL B7-3010-94/53 A3a

Job promotion. 3 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA BOL B7-3010/95/25 A5

Seeds integrated development project. 5 mECU. Increase of the national productivity by improvement of the seed quality. Project on appraisal. ALA BOL B7-3010/95/070 A3a

BRAZIL

Cooperation for the quality in the industrial sector. EC contribution 0.400 mECU. T.A. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA BRA B7-3011-94/65 A4g

CAMBODIA

Support for the agricultural sector and primary education. EC contribution 49.800 mECU. Supply of equipment, different T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. ALA CAM 94/14 A3a

CHILE

Study to create a technological Centre in Santiago. 0.500 mECU. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA CHI B7-3011-94/172 A6b

Fruit prices control system. 0.420 mECU. T.A. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA CHI B7-3011/94/180 A3a

COLOMBIA

Basic social services in Ciudad Bolivar. 8 mECU T.A. to the local services. Training. Project in execution. ALA COL B7-3010/94/101 A8b

Support for the creation of basic technological enterprises. 0.900 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. ALA COL B7-3011/94/41 A5c

ECUADOR

Rehabilitation of the Paute zone. 12 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. Project in execution. ALA ECU B7-3010/94/44 A3a

Environmental impact of the oil exploitation in the Amazon region. 7.313 mECU. **Project in execution.** ALA ECU B7-3010/94/130 A8f

Ministry of External Relations Modernization. 0.400 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. ALA ECU B7-3011/94/161 A1c

Improvement of crop production and use of phytogenetics products. 0.995 mECU. Project in execution. ALA ECU B7-3010/94/103 A3a

EL SALVADOR

Health and basic health programme in the western region. EC participation 10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health centres, infrastructures, training, T.A. Project in execution. ALA ELS B7-3010/93/91 A7c

Training in the geothermic energy sector. 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. ELS B7-3011/94/36 A2a

Support for the Informal Sector. Phase II. EC contribution 7 mECU. Project in execution. ALA ELS B7-3010/94/83 A5e

Support for agricultural reform. 0.975 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA ELS B7-3010/95/06 A3a

Institutional support for the national academy of public security. 0.950 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. Short-list to be done. ALA ELS B7-5076/94/194 A1c

GUATEMALA

Development aid to the indigenous populations in Central America. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. ALA GUA 9355 A3a

Programme to help street children in Guatemala City. EC contribution 2.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Short-list to be done. Project in execution. ALA GUA B7-3010/94/109 A8e

Support for the informal sector. 7.500 mECU. T.A. training, line of credit. Project in execution. ALA GUA B7-3010/94/47 A5

Rural development programme in the Totonicapan Department. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA B7-3010/94/81 A3a

Rural Development in Baja Verapaz. EC contribution 8 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA B7-3010/94/89 A3a

Rural Development in Alta Verapaz. EC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA B7-3010/94/90 A3a

Export strengthening towards European Union. 0.500 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. ALA GUA B7-3011/94/01 A5d,e

Episcopal Conference and Broadcasting Institute. 0.890 mECU. Training and T.A. Project in execution. ALA GUA B7-3010/94/95 A5g,A6

HONDURAS

Programme to help street children. EC contribution 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. ALA HON B7-3010/94/118 A8e

Programme de support SME's farmers in the Olancho area (PROLANCHO). Resp. Auth.: National Planning Ministry (SECPAN). EC contribution 9.860 mECU. Supply of equipment by int. tender, T.A., monitoring. **Project in execution.** ALA HON B7-3010/94/124 A3a

INDIA

Transfer of Technologies for Sustainable Development (BAIF). Resp. Auth.: NABARD — National Bank for Agricultural and rural Development. Project management BAIF (Indian NGO) EC contribution 19.5 mECU. Wasteland development, Wadi programme, sericulture, cattle development, T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. **Project in execution.** ALA IN 94/32 A3a

Saline Land Reclamation in Maharashtra. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation Department's Khar Lands Development Circle (KLDC) EC contribution 15.5 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. **Project in execution.** ALA IN 94/27 A3a

INDONESIA

EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning — Ministry of Forestry. EC contribution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and monitoring, T.A. for detailed forest survey and mapping, training. Integrated Radio Communication Systems: T.A. for installation and training. Short-lists done. Project in execution. ALA IND 9242 A3c

EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: Forest Fire Prevention and control in South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning Ministry of Forestry. EC contribution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 pilot projects for fire management units and equipment. Short-list done. Project in execution. ALA IND 9212 A3c

Gunung Leuser development programme. Resp. Auth.: Indonesian Planning Ministry-BAPPENAS. EC contribution 32.5 mECU. Works, infrastructures, supply of equipment, T.A. training, monitoring evaluation. **Project in execution.** ALA IND 94/26 A3a

MEXICO

Life improvement for children and young people. 0.800 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. ALA MEX B7-3010/95/23 A8c

NICARAGUA

TROPISec — Development of small rural production in the dry tropical zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-3010/93/144 A3a

Urban water supply and sewerage. Resp. Auth.: Instituto Nicaragüense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (INAA). EC contribution 11 mECU. Three drinking water supply projects in Chichigalpa, Masatepe — two towns in the Pacific region and Camoapa. Two sewerage networks plus provisional basic drainage in the towns of El Viejo and Jinotepe. Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. **Project in execution.** ALA NIC B7-3010/94/123 A2b

Roads and bridges rehabilitation. 2.6 mECU. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-3010/94/123 A2d

Roads rehabilitation. 4 mECU. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-5076/94/144 A2d

Support for unprivileged children. 0.857 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA NIC B7-3010/94/167 A8c

PAKISTAN

Post-flood rehabilitation and protection project. 20.5 mECU. T.A., road works, dam construction. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. ALA PK 94/04 A8g

PANAMA

Support for rural SME's in the central region. 5 mECU. Supply of T.A. and line of credit. **Project in execution.** ALA PAN B7-3010/94/137 A3a

PARAGUAY

Durable development of the Paraguayan Chaco (protection of the indigenous zones and ecosystem). EC contribution 14.800 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. ALA PAR 93/40 A3a

PERU

Support for export promotion. EC contribution 3.774 mECU. T.A. Short-list done. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/93/175 A5d

Colca valley development programme. EC contribution 5 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA PER B7-3010/94/33 A3a

Women in rural situations. EC contribution 5 mECU. Piura and Ayacucho regions. Improvement of the women's conditions. Social services. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/94/106 A3a

Vocational training programme. 9 mECU. T.A. training technical qualifications for non qualified young people. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/94/55 A6d

Street children. 7 mECU. **Project in execution.** ALA PER B7-3010/94/127 A8c

PHILIPPINES

Rural integrated development programme in the Aurore zone. EC contribution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. ALA PHI 9326 A3a

Tropical forest protection in Palawan. EC contribution 17 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. ALA PHI 9337 A3a

URUGUAY

Integrated development programme for rural communities. 5.150 mECU. T.A. and housing construction for poor families. Project in execution. ALA URU B7-3010/94/39 A3a

VENEZUELA

Support for the establishment of the National Centre for Energy and Environment. EC contribution 1 mECU. T.A., local services, training, seminars. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA VEN B7-3011/94/15 A2a,A8f

Social Structural adjustment in Venezuela. Resp. Auth.: The Foundation set up to oversee the Experimental Vocational Training Centre. Estimated total cost 12.2 mECU. EC contribution 5.3 mECU, Provincial Government of Guipuzcoa (Spain) 0.959 mECU, local 5.941 mECU. EC contribution. Equipment and furniture by int. tender. T.A. **Project in execution.** ALA VEN B7-3011/94/112 A6d

PETARE PROJECT — Fight against drugs. 0.998 mECU. Project in execution. ALA VEN B7-5080/94/113 A8c

B.I.C. Barquisimeto. 0.500 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. ALA VEN B7-3011/94/99 A5d

VIETNAM

T.A. programme for transition to market economy. EC contribution 16 mECU. Project in execution. ALA VIE 9336 A1b

ASEAN

COGEN Programme EEC-ASEAN Phase II. Technology transfer for co-generation of energy from biomass. EC contribution 5 mECU. Execution: Institut Asiatique de Technologie (AIT) in Bangkok. T.A. and equipments. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 94. ALA/ASN/REG 94/15 A2a

ASEAN-EC Energy Management Training and Research Centre — (AEEMTRC) phase II. Resp. Auth.: Project Steering Committee of AEEMTRC and EC Representatives. EC contribution 4 mECU. T.A. and training. **Project in execution.** ALA/ASN/REG 94/33 A2a

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Cooperation programme with European Union towns, regions and local collectivities. 4 mECU. T.A., training. Project on appraisal. ALA AML B7-3010/94/168 A5

Fight against cancer. 10 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALR B7-3010/95/03 A7

ANDEAN PACT

Programme to eradicate foot and mouth disease. EC contribution 1.800 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA PAN B7-3010/94/63 A3a

T.A. programme for customs. 5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 1995.
ALA-AND B7-3011/94/63 A1b

Support for the Tribunal A. de Cartagena. 0.617 mECU T.A. Project in execution.
ALA REG AAN B7-3011/94/51 A8b

CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES

EUROTRACE. 0.500 mECU. Computerized system and data bank for external trade and commerce. Project in execution.
ALA REG AMC B7-3011/94/151 A5c

Sustainable development programme in rural border zone. 11.160 mECU. Regional programme to exchange experiences in sustainable development, project promotion. T.A. monitoring supply of equipment. Project on appraisal.
ALA REG AMC B7-5041/1/94/117 A3a

SOUTHERN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Pilcomayo River. 0.850 mECU. Study. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal.
ALA REG AMS B7-3010/94/147 A2d

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This leaflet is intended particularly for agronomists and those conducting surveys in countries in the Sahel region who may have to deal with the problem of parasitic plants. It will enable weed researchers rapidly to identify the pathogenic species and help them in deciding which agronomic approach to recommend.

DES MANUELS SCOLAIRES SUR MESURE — Guide pratique à l'intention des auteurs de manuels scolaires pour le primaire dans les pays en développement (MADE-TO-MEASURE SCHOOL MANUALS — a practical guide for authors of primary school manuals in developing countries)

By Marie Chatry-Komarek. Publishers: L'Harmattan (5-7, rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique, F-75005 Paris). 1994, 239 pp., 140 FF. ISBN 2-7384-2874-6.

The author, who has worked in Africa and Latin America for over 15 years, in the field of primary-education school manuals in national languages, summarises, in this volume, a German-Madagascan educational project, supported by bilateral German aid, whose objective was to equip pupils and their teachers with manuals in the local language of Madagascar. This is a guide which demonstrates the feasibility of the work it describes.

DITS DE LA NUIT — Anthologie de contes et de légendes d'Afrique centrale (TALES OF THE NIGHT — an anthology of stories and legends from Central Africa)

Choice of texts by Véronique Jago-Antoine and Antoine Tshitungu Kongolo. Publishers: Labor. 1994, 298 pp. ISBN 2-8040-1013-9.

An anthology of stories, humorous or satirical bestiaries and legends which will enchant with the universal appeal of its topics and the unusually free spirit of its traditions. This book makes it possible to renew one's acquaintance with African history, which has long remained separate from written civilizations, offering the original, strong flavour of the tales.

LES ENTREPRISES INFORMELLES DANS LE MONDE (INFORMAL ENTERPRISES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD)

Under the direction of Rolando Arellano, Yvon Gasse and Gérard Verna. Publishers: Laval University Press (Cité universitaire, Sainte Foy (Quebec), Canada G1K 7P4). 1994, 484 pp. ISBN 2-7637-7361-3.

The informal sector has been the subject of numerous research projects for nearly twenty years and is now recognised as a major

phenomenon in the world economy. Specialists from America, Africa, Asia and Europe met to debate the subject at an international colloquium and the proceedings are collected in this volume.

They are variously termed underground, parallel or subsistence, but informal enterprises have in common the fact that they evade state control. They exist everywhere — in the Third World as a means of survival or in Western countries as a reaction to increasingly burdensome charges and rules.

By dealing with a number of aspects of the informal sector (emergence strategy, state of the situation worldwide, nature and formal or informal environmental links), the book is intended for those interested in the concept and the extent of the phenomenon.

LA ZONE FRANC — La dynamique de l'intégration monétaire et ses contraintes, Tome 2 (THE FRANC AREA — The dynamics of monetary integration and its constraints, Volume 2)

By Hubert Gérardin. Publishers: L'Harmattan (5-7, rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique — F-75005 Paris). 1994, 477 pp. 250 FF. ISBN 2-7384-2953X.

In Volume 1, 'La zone franc, histoire et institutions'. ['The franc zone, its history and institutions'], the author gave a precise description of the history and operating mechanisms of the franc area which today still consists of a group of 14 African countries using a currency linked to the French franc.

In Volume 2, he retraces economic, monetary and financial developments which have occurred in the franc area since the various countries gained their independence. Through a number of statistical tables and graphs, this work offers material permitting long-term analysis and provides a status report on the countries for evaluating what is at stake in current debates (CFA parity, capital flow, choice of monetary policy, European and African integration).

MADAGASCAR: DEMOCRAZIA IN CAMMINO (MADAGASCAR: THE ROAD TO DEMOCRACY)

Under the direction of A. Tosolini, H. Rakotonratsima, M. Bigi and R. Zanoli. Publishers: Alfabeta (C.P. 475, I-43100 Parma). 1994, 144 pp., Lit. 18).

At a time when Africa's appearance in the media signals yet another catastrophe, RTM (Reggio Tiers Monde), an international voluntary agency, and

the journal ALFAZETA have decided to describe the current state of democracy in Madagascar, emphasising the prospects for a country which, through its own strength of character, has been able to rid itself of a dictatorship without recourse to violence and to take the first steps on the road to democracy.

LES CREOLES (THE CREOLES)

By Robert Chaudenson. Publishers: Presses Universitaires de France. 'Que sais-je?'. Encyclopaedic Collection. (108, boulevard Saint-Germain, F-75006 Paris). 1995, 127 pp. ISBN 2-13-047009-2.

The author is a specialist in Creole cultures and particularly Creole dialects which are a variety of languages found in certain former European colonies and which, while being obviously an evolution of the colonists' languages, are also special and independent systems. The approach, here, is socio-historical and sociolinguistic and concludes in favour of the exceptional interest of studying these dialects for the purposes of language-science research. In addition to actual scientific aspects, it argues that the emergence of the Creole cultures and dialects illustrates Man's remarkable abilities to create new systems out of slavery. ■

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A street scene in Paramaribo, capital of Suriname. Democracy is being consolidated but serious economic problems have still to be tackled (Photo The Courier)

Suriname

