

the Courier

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union



**Southern
Africa**

**Country reports
Djibouti
Namibia**

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
(Federal Rep.)
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

France

(Territorial collectivities)
Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon
(Overseas territories)
New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

Netherlands

(Overseas countries)
Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustache)
Aruba


Denmark

(Country having special relations with Denmark)
Greenland

United Kingdom



(Overseas countries and territories)
Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

THE EUROPEAN UNION



THE 70 ACP STATES

Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent
and the Grenadines
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tuvalu
Uganda
Western Samoa
Vanuatu
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe



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the status of these countries and territories
now or in the future.
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of sources. Their use does not imply
recognition of any particular boundaries
nor prejudice the status of any state
or territory.

Cover page:
The advent of multiracial democracy
in South Africa finally seems to have
brought winds of change for the whole
of Southern Africa and its 120 million
inhabitants
(Photo The Courier)

MEETING POINT**Judge Richard Goldstone**

Judge Richard Goldstone is a man who could hardly be accused of shirking a challenge. Appointed to head a Commission of Inquiry into the behaviour of the security forces in his native South Africa, during the run up to the first democratic elections, he gained international prominence with a hard-hitting report which revealed widespread abuses. Now a judge in the South African Supreme Court, he is currently on secondment having taken on the job of United Nations Prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. His task is to bring to justice the perpetrators of genocide in these two countries. In an exclusive interview with *The Courier* during a recent visit to Brussels, he explained how he was going about this. From a legal standpoint, Judge Goldstone is operating in almost virgin territory and in this wide-ranging interview, he tells us more about the principles which underpin his work and about some of the practical hurdles which he faces.

pages 2 to 5

COUNTRY REPORTS**DJIBOUTI**

After three years of civil war, peace has finally returned to Djibouti. This country, in more than one sense, is one of the hot spots of the planet: a lunar 'cauldron' of uncommon beauty, where ethnic checks and balances are of prime importance. Today it is having to pay the price of peace. Its service economy is in dire straits and

urgently in need of radical reform. Formally a democracy — although the opposition is not represented in parliament — Djibouti recently saw the leaders of the former FRUD rebel movement joining the government and, in the process, putting the seal on the pacification process. In order to examine how to restore financial equilibrium and reduce state control of the economy, a Round Table with the principal donors is foreseen for this autumn. President Hassan Gouled Aptidon, who has held office since independence in 1977, comments on his country's recent political and economic evolution.

Pages 14 to 31**NAMIBIA**

Five years ago Namibia gained its independence after a long and bitter struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. The mood at the time was characterised by a remarkable spirit of reconciliation but few underestimated the challenges that lay ahead. In economic terms, Namibia was effectively two separate countries with great extremes of poverty and wealth. Among the majority black population, there were high expectations that the government they had elected would deliver improved living standards and a more secure future. The *Courier* recently visited Namibia to 'take the temperature' and assess how far the country has progressed in its efforts to meet these expectations.

Pages 32 to 46**DOSSIER****Southern Africa**

Southern Africa will have to grapple with many challenges over the coming years, but at least hope seems finally to have been restored after decades of division, civil war and racial strife. Although the ending of apartheid and the flowering of democracy may only be the first steps on the road to renewal, the region appears better equipped than ever before to face the uncertainties of the new millennium. We examine some of the key political, economic and social issues facing Southern Africa at the end of a turbulent 20th century.

Pages 47 to 78**meeting point**

2. Judge Richard Goldstone, UN Prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

a c p

6. Lomé IV : agreement clinched at eleventh hour
9. Belize — the arrival of the culture of Nature
12. Burundi's media of hatred

country reports

14. **DJIBOUTI:** Paying the price of peace
20. Interview with President Hassan Gouled Aptidon
24. Interview with Prime Minister Barkat Gourad Hamadou
25. Interview with FRUD Secretary General, Ogouré Kifé Ahmed
27. Round Table : the long and winding road to structural adjustment
29. EU-Djibouti cooperation
32. **NAMIBIA:** Status quo and national reconciliation
34. Interview with President Sam Nujoma
37. Controlling and managing national resources
40. Improving living conditions : problems and prospects
44. Profile
45. Namibia-EU cooperation

dossier

47. Southern Africa — The state of democracy
53. The prospects for consolidating the peace in Angola
56. Interview with Frances Rodrigues, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Mozambique
59. South Africa and Southern Africa
63. In search of common security
66. Securing Southern Africa
68. Interview with Kaire Mbuende, SADC Executive Secretary
71. The prospects for Southern Africa in the international economy
73. The information Highway : South Africa — the link between rich and poor
75. A region of migration... and refugees
76. From Cape Town to Dar-es-Salaam
78. 'Unity in diversity' bid for the tourist dollar

close-up

79. The Caribbean Tourism Development Programme
81. ECHO Flight : an airline with a difference

developing world

84. OECD report on aid in 1994
85. Environmental management in Cameroon — A participatory approach

culture and society

87. Brussels African Film Festival — The rise of the critical age
88. A chat with the actress France Zobda, from Martinique
91. **ÆTHIOPIA** and the Ethiops

c t a - b u l l e t i n

92. The push for biosafety regulations

THE COURIER'S MAILBAG**PUBLICATIONS****NEWS ROUND-UP** (yellow pages)**CDI — Partnership****OPERATIONAL SUMMARY** (blue pages)**Issue 151 Front Cover**

On the front cover of issue 151 of *The Courier*, we published a photograph featuring a man holding an infant child to illustrate our Dossier on Social Development. The caption on the inside referred to 'the battle against poverty, unemployment and social disintegration' as key objectives for the Copenhagen Summit. We should like to make clear that there was no intention of suggesting that those featured in the photograph were victims of 'poverty, unemployment and social disintegration.' Indeed, the choice of picture was determined by a desire to portray the subject in a positive manner. *The Courier* regrets any offence which may have been caused.

Judge Richard Goldstone

UN Prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda

'Exposing the truth'

It is not often that members of the judiciary are to be found in the international limelight. As a general rule, judges — even those responsible for 'landmark' decisions — rarely become household names outside their own countries. Those who choose an international legal career may gain a global reputation, but because they operate in an area that seldom attracts the attention of the wider public, this is likely to be restricted to specialists in the field.

Judge Richard Goldstone has, perhaps involuntarily, succeeded in breaking both of the above 'rules' during his distinguished career. Working in the 'domestic' setting of his native South Africa, he hit the global headlines with a hard-hitting official report which revealed illegal and unauthorised activities by sections of the apartheid regime's security forces. In so doing, he helped to neutralise one of more serious threats to the process of democratic transition in that country. Today, he holds the high profile position of United Nations Prosecutor, charged with bringing to justice the perpetrators of genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Traditionally, criminal jurisdiction has been a matter of domestic rather than international law and although there is the precedent of the Nuremberg hearings fifty years ago, the UN Security Council's decisions establishing international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda effectively break new ground. When Judge Goldstone visited Brussels in June, we had an opportunity to find out more from him about how the tribunals operate and his role as Prosecutor. We began, however, by asking him about his work heading the Commission of Inquiry in South Africa during the transitional period, and about the difficulties he had faced.

— Leading up to the elections, there was a tremendous fear that violence would derail the whole process. The Commission I headed had a three-year term of office and the interesting aspect was that we had our own investigation units — police officers working for us. In terms of the legislation under which we operated, I was given unlimited powers of search and seizure. This enabled us to send in our own investigators to raid military intelligence and other site offices — which was quite dramatic at the time. This led to the uncovering of illegal activity, carried out without the consent of the government, by right wing factions within the security forces.

In my view, however, the single most important achievement of the Commission was our investigation into behaviour at mass demonstrations and rallies. I set up an international team of experts, sitting with South African experts, to try and find a politically acceptable arrange-

ment for the mass action. This had become very much a feature of South African politics and it had tremendous potential for death and injury. For political reasons, the liberation organisations refused to give notice under South African legislation of marches and mass meetings involving tens of thousands of people. The police, on the other hand, didn't know where people would be marching, how many would be involved, what route they would take or when it would happen. The marchers didn't know whether they would be stopped physically by the police or allowed to march. So there was this tremendous uncertainty which was extremely dangerous. Indeed, it resulted in some very unfortunate clashes in 1990 leading to death and injury. One of results of the investigation was that the liberation organisations — particularly the ANC — and the South African police, sat down with us and listened to the expert opinions. At the end of it, there was an agreement



brokered where the liberation organisations agreed to give notice — not in terms of the legislation but under the new agreement. In turn, the police acknowledged that they had a duty not just to facilitate demonstrations but also to protect demonstrators and not stop them. Under that agreement, thousands of marches and mass meetings were held without incident. It was in that context that the EU, UN and Commonwealth monitors came to South Africa and played a very major role in ensuring that the peace was kept at such events. That was obviously of vital importance in the run-up to the first democratic election. People were able to exercise their right of assembly, in a fairly peaceful atmosphere.

■ *Given that your report focused directly on misbehaviour in the security forces, did you come under any pressure, or were you able to operate freely?*

— Well I certainly had no pressure from the political leadership. President De Klerk's government obviously didn't like the truth but it encouraged me nonetheless and gave me the resources and facilities to continue the investigation. I couldn't have done it but for that. In the area of witness protection alone, millions of rands were spent on getting witnesses out of the country. That couldn't have been done without additional resources being obtained from the government. There was no question of any pressure to

desist. And obviously, Mr Mandela was more than delighted that the investigation was taking place so there was no political pressure there. There was certainly pressure from the right wing who, obviously, for political reasons, hated the fact that this was being done.

■ *Do you think that what you did in South Africa could provide a model for countries that are seeking to establish the rule of law.*

— Well, it is really a question of exposing the truth. It was for that reason that I was and still am a supporter of the Truth Commission which is now, happily, going forward in South Africa. If the truth hadn't emerged as a result of the Commission's investigation, the election may well have been made impossible because the people causing the violence would have been able to continue acting unlawfully without detection. The fact that their activities came to light put them on the defensive and made it difficult, if not impossible for those activities to continue.

■ *Can we turn to your role as prosecutor in two very different situations — although they have certain common features — Ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The idea that there can be international control of criminal behaviour within a country is something which is very new, Nuremburg notwithstanding. Do you see this as a sign for the future development of international criminal norms?*

— Well I have no doubt that it is the way international humanitarian law should go. It is not the best solution to have *ad hoc* tribunals appointed by the Security Council. It is a great deal better than nothing, of course, but it is discriminatory in the sense that it only applies to some countries and not to others. To have a really fair and just system of enforcement, one would want a permanent court which would have jurisdiction over all countries. That can't be done via this route. It is generally accepted that there would need to be a treaty and countries would have to agree or be persuaded to join in. This is really the difficulty. In order to create such a court, nations would have to give up their sovereignty to the extent that they would allow an international court to have jurisdiction over their citizens.

■ *So you would not see the new tribunals as an embryonic international humanitarian court?*

— I see it more as an experiment which, if it succeeds, will provide very important arguments to support the permanent court about which I was talking. To the extent that it is deemed to fail, it will be an argument against such a court.

'To have a really fair and just system of enforcement, one would want a permanent court which would have jurisdiction over all countries'

■ *What sort of resources have you got at your disposal for carrying out your task?*

— For the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, we put in a budget for 1995 to the United Nations of just over \$28 million. From every practical point of view, that has been accepted. I say practical because the technical position is that there is still a dispute in the General Assembly as to whether the money should come from the regular UN budget or the peacekeeping one. Until that has been settled, the budget cannot formally be approved. This is not having a practical significance because, while they are arguing, every three months they are giving us a quarter of what we have requested. Added to that is our authority to enter into 12-month contracts. That is the same position we would be in if the budget had been approved in the first place.

■ *And how does that translate into personnel?*

— We have now in my office — that is, the office of the Prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia — about 125 people, of

whom about 50 are investigators. The others are legal people, administrators, analysts, interpreters and so on.

■ *And what is the situation with regard to Rwanda?*

— Rwanda is still very much in the start-up phase. There has been a tremendous shortage of funds because of the UN's financial situation but, fortunately, a number of interested countries have come forward. They are organising contributions of investigators and other staff, as well as money for the trust fund which was created by the Secretary General.¹ At the moment, we have nine people in the office of the Prosecutor in Kigali and five who are working jointly on Yugoslavia and Rwanda at my office in The Hague. But the number in Kigali will at least double over the next few weeks. We are also going to have extra staff in The Hague because a lot of the investigations need to be done in Europe. We will be setting up the actual court in Arusha, Tanzania, but a lot of building needs to be done before that is up and running.

■ *Can I ask about the legal basis for your actions. I understand your authority stems from UN Security Council resolutions?*

— Yes, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which is binding on all member states.

■ *What legal system are you applying for the actual prosecutions?*

— What has happened is that we have six trial judges for each tribunal and a further five appeal judges who are common to both. That makes 17 judges in all. The Yugoslavia tribunal was set up first and the 11 judges involved in that formulated the rules of procedure and evidence. It is more or less what one would understand by a trial in the common law countries. They agreed on an adversarial system. The rules of evidence, however, were purposefully, and in my view, sensibly, left very vague. Within my office and among the judges there is a common feeling that what we are doing is creating a new international jurisprudence and procedure. We feel very free to look at civil

¹ Judge Goldstone's visit to Brussels included a meeting with Commissioner Pinheiro who indicated that the Commission was willing to provide funding to support the tribunal.

law, common law and other systems to decide what aspects, procedures and rules of evidence are the fairest.

■ *If and when somebody is found guilty, what sanctions can you impose?*

— The maximum penalty is life imprisonment. It can obviously be shorter than that. There can also be monetary fines and, in appropriate circumstances, confiscation orders applying to property or funds.

■ *Looking at the actual work of the investigators, how easy have these people found it to gather the evidence for the cases?*

— In the former Yugoslavia, the major difficulty is the mass of information and evidence that there is to sort through. There are huge numbers of potential witnesses - hundreds of thousands of refugees in various European countries and each one a potential witness. There are over 300 000 in Germany alone. We have documents coming in by the thousand every week. Most are in Serbo-Croat and have to be translated. The bulk of the witnesses need to be interviewed through interpreters. Taken together that amounts to a huge mass of work. The problems is obviously exacerbated by the fact that a lot of investigations need to be carried out in the former Yugoslavia — particularly in Bosnia. With a war going on that is difficult and often hazardous. In October last year, we had to pull out two teams because it was too dangerous and in any event, because of the hostilities, it was physically

impossible for them to do the work. We look at Nuremburg with a certain amount of envy. The prosecutors were appointed by nations that had complete control over the relevant territory and they had a very efficient paper trail which made life a lot easier. We don't have that luxury.

'In Rwanda, the former leaders made no secret about what they were doing — so one can go, as it were, for the jugular'

■ *In view of what you have just said and given the resources that you have, isn't there a danger that you will end up by just scratching the surface?*

— We decided at the outset that we could only really target the main offenders who are the leaders. These are the people responsible for implementing the policy which led to such terrible atrocities. Our limiting factor is that we only have two trial chambers, so we can put on very few trials.

A ruined village in the former Yugoslavia
Carrying out investigations while a war is going on is 'difficult and hazardous'

■ *So the idea is to make an example of those who were in charge?*

— That is really the point. We can't waste a scarce resource on people who didn't play a major role. In fact, it is easier in Rwanda to investigate and implement this policy because the leaders of the former government that was in power when the genocide was committed in April and May 1994 made no secret about what they were doing. They used the radio and other forms of propaganda and really did it quite openly. Even since fleeing Rwanda to the camps where they are now, there are some who have made no secret of what went on. So one can go, as it were, for the jugular and investigate the leaders.

■ *In practice, how can you apprehend the people in the camps?*

— That's a matter for the future and obviously there may be some difficulty. In terms of the statute, however, it will be the obligation of the state where those people are to execute arrest warrants if indictments are issued. If any country doesn't comply, it will be reported to the Security Council. I hope that it would take appropriate action against any member state flouting one of its resolutions.

■ *Surely there is a practical difficulty in the case of Rwanda, given that a lot of the suspects are apparently in Zaire. Even if the 'spirit' of the authorities is willing, the 'flesh' may be weak in that they simply are not capable of complying?*

— That may well be the case, but I think we are going to have to cross that bridge when we come to it. There are many scenarios that one could think of. If we don't get the people, and this is obviously happening in the case of a few people we have already indicted in areas controlled by the Bosnian Serbs, then we have no option but to follow what we call the Rule 61 procedure. This involves presenting the evidence on which the indictment is based to a trial chamber of three judges. Witnesses can be led so that the historical record begins to be created, an international warrant of arrest is issued and the information is made public. It is not a trial *in absentia* — there is no question of issuing a verdict against the accused. But



UNHCR/A. HOJMAN

that person, in effect, becomes an international fugitive, which is not a very pleasant situation to be in.

■ *Do you think there is any practical hope of establishing the rule of law in somewhere like Rwanda at the moment?*

— Yes I do. I have visited Rwanda twice, meeting with the authorities on both occasions and having detailed discussion with the leaders. What impresses me is the importance that they attach to justice in the process of reconciliation. I have been left in no doubt that it is their first priority. It is the reason, after all, that Rwanda

that those suspected of having been responsible for the misery should be brought to court in Rwanda itself. We have no jurisdiction over that — nor should we have. It is really the coming together of national and international justice that we are aiming for: on the one hand, the restoration of effective local justice and on the other, an international tribunal to try the relevant people in leadership positions who are not within the jurisdiction of the Rwandan courts. The latter is something the Rwandan government cannot do and no other state is likely to attempt even if their local rules on jurisdiction allow it..

■ *Are there any arrangements envisaged for the defence of the accused?*

— Absolutely. There is a tremendous concern, both within the Prosecutor's office and among Tribunal members, to ensure that the system is as fair as any system can be to the accused. We are acutely conscious of the fact that this is international justice and that what we do must be exemplary. No doubt for that reason, the Security Council decided that defence counsel should be provided, at the UN's expense, for impecunious defendants. The only trial pending at the moment, which relates to events in the former Yugoslavia, is that against Mr Tadic who was arrested in Germany. His lead counsel is a Dutch lawyer who is being paid for by the tribunal. He is assisted by three other lawyers who have been provided by the Serbian government.

There is also a victim protection unit which is gearing up now to deal with witnesses whom, we anticipate, will need protection as well as medical and psychological assistance. So we are going out of our way to ensure that the system is beyond reproach. ■

Interview by Simon Horner



requested the establishment of the international tribunal. I don't think there is any doubt that without such a request, it wouldn't have happened.

I should add that on its own, the international tribunal cannot succeed in re-establishing the rule of law. A vital element is for Rwanda to be assisted in restoring its own criminal justice system. Obviously, it will be highly significant if we succeed in trying leaders who, according to the evidence we collect, were guilty of organising the genocide. That will clearly have an important healing effect. But at the local level, there are many people currently in Rwandan prisons who should either be tried or released. From the point of view of people in local areas, it is very important

A problem in apprehending suspects
*Many of those who organised the
genocide in Rwanda are living in
refugee camps such as this one in Zaire*

■ *How were the judges who sit on the two tribunals chosen?*

— All the judges were chosen in a joint exercise involving the Security Council and the General Assembly. In the case of the 11 for Yugoslavia, 22 names were put forward by the Security Council and the General Assembly chose 11 of these. In the case of Rwanda, the six trial judges were chosen by the General Assembly from 12 Security Council nominees. The judges come from 17 different countries covering all the continents.

Successful conclusion to the Lomé IV mid-term review

Agreement clinched at eleventh hour

by Debra Percival*

It took the Summit meeting of EU heads of government in Cannes, France on June 26-27 for agreement finally to be reached on funding for the Lomé IV second financial protocol covering the next five years. A wrangle over the level of funding, traditionally pooled from the pockets of the EU Member States, had held up talks on other improvements to the Convention such as access to the EU market for ACP farm produce. Under pressure from the French Presidency, Member States finally agreed on the sum of ECU 13.307 billion for the next five years. This includes a 1.28% share for the 20 Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).

After a round of late-night bargaining among Member States — and agreement by the European Commission to scrape the bottom of its own 'barrel' with ECU 292 million of 'unallocated Lomé resources' — the leaders of the European Union succeeded in reaching the French Presidency's 'bare minimum' of ECU 13.3bn. This takes account of inflation within the Union over the past five years (21.5%), but means no 'real' increase for the 70 ACP countries this time round, despite the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the EU since Lomé IV came into operation.

The final deal was reached after the French agreed to increase their national contribution by another ECU 100 million with Germany finally consenting to give more than last time despite originally seeking a nominal decrease. Britain, which said it wanted to shift more of its overseas development contributions to its bilateral budget, also put more into the 'kitty' than

it had originally envisaged. One result is that France now replaces Germany as the number one contributor to the EDF. All other EU states except Britain are providing more, in nominal terms, this time round (see Table 1).

The deal was done in part thanks to decisions on EU development assistance packages for other 'developing' regions — six Eastern and Central European nations in line for EU membership and 12 Mediterranean nations with whom the EU has ambitions of creating a giant Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone. In a typical piece of EU bartering, the German government agreed to put a little more into the Lomé pool following agreement on an ECU 6.7bn package for Central and Eastern Europe over the period 1995-2000. Meanwhile, some of the EU's Mediterranean nations (notably Spain and Italy) — content with an ECU 4.7bn aid deal covering the same period for their Mediterranean basin neighbours — were able to agree to the ACP figure with some last-minute adjustments.

ACP nations, who had sought a package of ECU 15.8 bn, notably to improve processing, marketing, transformation and distribution of produce to hold their own in an ever more competitive EU market, expressed initial disappointment. 'This is natural when one receives less than one requested,' Papua New Guinea's information minister, *John Moms*, told journalists.

But the financial deal swiftly led to a special one-day meeting of EU and ACP ministers on June 30 to tackle the outstanding matters in the mid-term review: more open access to the EU market, tariff concessions, a declaration on

the protection of tropical forests, another on the alleviation of ACP debt, a compromise on methods of allocating development funds and finally, a breakdown of the financial package for the next five years among the different instruments of the Convention (see Table 2).

Some trade concessions

Under the new arrangements, there will be better access to the EU market for ACP farm products although it is less than the ACP group had hoped for. For numerous products which currently do not qualify for any preference, customs duties and levies are reduced by 16% across the board. Excluded from this are highly sensitive items such as olives, olive products, wine and lemons. The ACPs originally sought 36% tariff cuts.

A 50% reduction of the current levy on 15 000 tonnes of cereals and 500 tonnes of pork meat has been agreed.

Better access for ACP farm products but less than the ACPs had hoped for. This is Ghanaian cocoa being loaded for shipment to Europe



* Journalist specialising in issues of EU development policy. The full text of the revised Lomé Convention will be reprinted in a forthcoming issue of *The Courier*.

There are also numerous concessions for products currently subject to quotas and reference quantities. The tariff quotas on fresh figs, sorghum and millet are transformed into less restrictive 'ceilings', tariff quotas on sheep meat, poultry meat, milk products, pears and meat preparations are doubled and the quota for strawberries rises from 1500 to 1600 tonnes.

Import duties on rice are reduced by 15% within existing quotas and 'reference quantities' are abolished for all products except oranges and mandarins. There is also some liberalisation in respect

of a number of items that can only be exported to the EU at certain times of the year. Finally, the export quotas for canned tuna and tuna loins are increased to 4000 and 500 tonnes respectively.

More cumulation for regional growth

One innovation over the next five years is to allow other developing countries to benefit from Lomé's 'cumulation clauses'. Thus, in the interests of

more growth in regional markets, 15% of the content of an ACP product can be 'cumulated' in a neighbouring nation, yet still benefit from ACP preference. Some sensitive items including canned tuna, rice, and certain textile products such as sweat-shirts, are excluded from this arrangement.

EU and ACP ministers agreed at the 30 June meeting on a compromise list of countries that will benefit from this system. In the Caribbean and Pacific areas, these are Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela and Nauru. In Africa, cumulation is extended to Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, together with South Africa on an *ad hoc* basis pending the outcome of talks on its possible 'qualified membership' of Lomé IV. In this regard, the ministers also agreed that South Africa will have automatic entry to the Convention — on whatever terms are finally agreed — once the negotiations have been completed, thereby avoiding the lengthy Lomé ratification process.

Two tranche method

With France keen to end its six-month period in the EU driving seat on a high note, eleventh hour debate at the meeting on June 30, the final day of the French Presidency, also resulted in compromise over the way in which funds are to be allocated under the 8th EDF. The novelty is that 70% of the total will be distributed in an initial three-year tranche with the remainder earmarked only after an assessment of how the first allocation has been spent.

Development Commissioner, Professor *João de Deus Pinheiro*, said that this method was in keeping with the new Lomé motto of 'efficiency and effectiveness' in promoting aid: He added that the 'coordination and coherence' of aid with other donors and with Member State bilateral programmes would also be watchwords for the coming five years. He told journalists: 'The two-tranche procedure will give more to those who absorb money well. There will be no more sterile funds in the Convention.'

Table 1: Where the money comes from (in ECU millions)

	7th EDF (1990-1995)	8th EDF (1995-2000)
Belgium	433	503
Denmark	227	275
Germany	2 840	3 000
Greece	134	160
Spain	645	750
France	2 666	3 120
Ireland	60	80
Italy	1 418	1 610
Luxembourg	21	37
Netherlands	609	670
Portugal	96	125
United Kingdom	1 791	1 630
Austria		340
Finland		190
Sweden		350
Unutilised previous EDF funds		292
Extra humanitarian aid for ACPs from EC budget		160
Transformation of special loans into grants		15
Sub-total	10 940	13 307
+ EIB own resource funds for lending	1 200	1 658
Total	12 140*	14 965*

* The global figures in the respective financial protocols are ECU 12bn and ECU 14.625bn. The discrepancy is accounted for by the fact that the above figures include the contribution for overseas countries and territories and (in the second column), a sum for food aid. These are not, strictly speaking, part of the EDF.

Table 2: Where the money goes to (in ECU millions)

	7th EDF (1990-1995)	8th EDF (1995-2000)
Grants	7 995	9 592
(of which structural adjustment facility)	(1 150)	(1 400)
Risk capital	825	1 000
Stabex	1 500	1 800
Sysmin	480	575
Sub-total (EDF)	10 800	12 967
+ OCT funds and food aid	140*	340
Sub-total	10 940	13 307
+ EIB own resources for lending	1 200	1 658
Total	12 140	14 965

* OCT figure only

Debt, forestry and banana declarations

ACP states will be able to draw encouragement from a new declaration on debt in Lomé IV. There is, however, no formal commitment from the EU side to cancel debt. The text reads: 'The Community reaffirms its willingness to contribute constructively and actively to the alleviation of the debt burden of ACP States. In this context, it agrees to transform into grants all the special loans of the previous Conventions which have not yet been committed. The Community also

Tropical forest in Gabon
The 'Protocol on Sustainable
Management of Forest Resources' is
one of the innovations to emerge from
the mid-term review



The Courier

confirms its determination to pursue the discussion of these questions in the appropriate fora, taking account of the specific difficulties of the ACP States.'

Likewise, a general declaration on the protection of tropical forests will be inserted in the Convention, but without the extra funds attached for their preservation which ACP countries had requested at the outset. The new 'Protocol on Sustainable Management of Forest Resources' refers to the use of 'relevant resources available under the Community budget', alongside funds from the national and regional indicative programmes, to halt desertification and preserve forests.

The protocol contains plenty of ideas of how funds can be used: conservation of endangered forests shaped to the need of local populations, and 'buffer zones' to be set up to assist the conservation, regeneration and sustainable development of tropical forests. Re-forestation, forestry management and the restoration of degraded forests could all attract funding. So too can 'institution building', including training schemes for local people, forest managers and researchers and support for organisations in the forestry sector.

Most major ACP-EU meetings nowadays find it difficult to avoid discussion of the thorny banana issue and the gathering on 30 June was no exception. Although no additional funds were specifically set aside to improve the industry in the ACPs (notably in the Caribbean) the ministers did agree a declaration on the subject. This stated that special attention would be granted, 'when determining the volume of programmable assistance to ACP banana suppliers to the EU, where external circumstances beyond their control have led to the need for restructuring.'

Human rights suspension clause

One of the most significant political changes was the introduction of a human rights 'suspension clause' in Article 366 of the Convention. This states that if any of the essential human rights appearing in Article 5 are violated, the partial or total suspension of development aid can follow. This can only happen, however,

after prior consultation with ACP nations and the abusing party, other than in particular 'emergency circumstances' which are defined in a separate declaration.

The two sides also agreed that the ACP-EU political dialogue in the spheres of foreign and security policy needed to be strengthened. Over the next five years, it is planned that this should happen either with each of the three distinct Lomé 'regions' or on a thematic basis.

Finally, mention should be made of the proposals concerning the Joint Assembly. There was agreement that every effort should be made to have ACP countries represented by parliamentarians — or at least by people designated by national parliaments — at the Assembly's biannual meetings in order to emphasise the democratic nature of the institution. Failing that, the participation of an ACP representative will have to meet with the prior approval of the Assembly.

The final stage in the 15-month-long 'mid-term review' will take place with the formal signature of the amended Convention. Mauritius has offered to host the ceremony, which will take place later this year. ■

D.P.

Belize — the growth of a 'culture' of nature*

Culture and nature in Belize appear to be inseparable. It is rare for Third World countries, bogged down in insoluble problems, to show such concern for nature conservation and to closely associate this devotion with their concept of culture. One could almost speak of a culture of nature. On a more light-hearted note, one could say that this Belizean culture/nature is the adopted daughter of Baron Bliss and Coca Cola. The latter company has given a great deal of sponsorship money to 'Programme for Belize' (PFB), a private company operating as a foundation which is involved at the very crossroads of ecology and ancient architectural heritage, dealing with environmental protection in the widest sense over a vast territory containing dozens of Maya sites. The American company has of course made use of the operation that it is sponsoring in its marketing. The programme entailed the purchase of several hundreds of thousands of acres, an act which provoked some unease among a number of Belizeans. Baron Bliss, however, was a true patron — a 'benefactor' to use the term usually applied to him in Belize. His earlier legacy enabled the country to set up and run an arts centre which has been operating for several decades. Although modest, it is certainly worthy of the name.


In the minds of many Belizeans, the nationality, the size of the bequest and the links which Baron Bliss had with their country are sometimes ill-defined. Some think he was Portuguese, others that he long ago 'adopted' this small Central American territory, and yet others that he left an immense fortune. No matter! The benefactor has the status approaching that of a cult figure throughout the country, and particularly in Belize City. Baron Henry Edward Earnest Victor Bliss is referred to locally simply as Baron Bliss, even if his striking name gives rise to all kinds of embellishment. The true story is that he

* See also 'Surprising Belize', Belize Country Report, The Courier, No. 152, pp 12-32.

moored off Belize during a voyage, but never actually disembarked from his vessel. This British — indeed, quintessentially English — nobleman arrived at the port of Belize City in 1926. Suffering from food poisoning contracted in Trinidad, he was unable to come ashore and he spent his time fishing. His health never recovered during the months spent offshore, but he was befriended by the city's citizens who would come to visit him, caring for him and bringing food. When he died, he left two million dollars to the country. As a kind of funeral monument, Belize City erected a lighthouse at the entrance to the port. This structure linking land and sea, is at the site where the Baron spent his last months. It is obviously very useful but, at least as far as art lovers are concerned, the most productive part of the Baron's legacy is the Bliss Institute, home to a number of cultural and artistic institutions run with money from the same fund. These institutions include the National Library and the Belize Arts Council. The Institute is home to a permanent exhibition of Maya art. Belize even has a national holiday (9 March) dedicated to Baron Bliss.

Defying the laws of probability


A lot of the Baron's two million must presumably have been spent if the precarious existence of the Belize Arts Council is anything to go by. It has no permanent store of exhibits, apart from a few Maya works. However, this cultural institution manages to keep a range of activities going. Every year, it organises some 20 exhibitions, combining art and crafts. In addition, there are plans to build a 'proper' museum in Belmopan, the capital. Some exhibitions are staged within the framework of exchange arrangements with other countries, particularly Mexico which is the only foreign country to have a Cultural Centre in Belize. The centre is proud to present the works of any Mexican



The Xunantunich Maya site under restoration
Culture and nature together

who has succeeded abroad, but its limited means prevent it from doing so as often as it would like. The next event, according to Mrs *Beverly Smith-Lopez*, Director of the Belize Arts Council, which will be in November 1995, is an exhibition of the work of *Pen Cayetano* who lives in Germany. In the plastic arts, the local 'stars' are *Terry Gordon*, whose works were on show during our visit, *Benjamin Nicolas*, another painter, *Louis Belisle* and, above all, the sculptor *Georges Gable*. The last-mentioned, who is also a poet, has his own gallery and is akin to an 'official' artist under contract to the government. His works are often to be found adorning prestigious government offices.

Most of the sculptures produced owe more to crafts than to art. The source is family workshops producing mahogany pieces amongst which an art lover's trained eye can sometimes pick out something which is obviously finer than the stereotype of mass-produced work. A dance company is also part of the Council, having a modern and a folklore section. It sometimes tours abroad, particularly in



Pen Cayetano 'Alagurahtina Fang',
1991

*Pride in presenting citizens who have
succeeded abroad*

Mexico and neighbouring Caribbean countries. The laws of probability being what they are, one would not expect a country of 200 000 inhabitants to produce hundreds of great artists. But despite the limitations, the Belize Arts Council manages to struggle on with its limited means. The dance company is responsible for giving courses in state schools and, by promoting a National Children's Art Festival, the Council hopes to stimulate young talent. In 1994, the Festival brought together 4000 children from the Belize City district. This year, children from other districts will be invited to the economic capital, in anticipation of next year when each district will organise its own festival. The stage after that will be to coordinate a national festival scheduled for the year 2000.

Solving the Maya mystery

The Programme for Belize began with the purchase of 110 000 acres (50 000 hectares) of land, supplemented by 92 000 acres donated by Coca Cola and a further 10 000 acres in the area where the borders of Belize, Guatemala and Mexico meet. Those in charge aim to make this combined

area part of a park spanning all three countries. The initial fund of \$6 million has come from outside donors. Some of this amount has been raised through an ingenious subscription scheme involving the 'adoption' of an acre of tropical forest. Foreigners, particularly from the USA and Europe, are encouraged to subscribe. A significant sum provided by USAID enabled the organisation to clear its debts in 1993. Other donors include the European Union which supports archeological research work at the La Milpa site.


The area managed by the programme contains about 60 known Maya sites. Research being carried out at La Milpa is concentrating on the reasons behind the collapse of the Maya civilisation. This site is broadly typical of Maya cities as a whole and is one of the three largest in the country which, overall, has hundreds of such sites. High up, the ceremonial temple made up of 85 structures separated by 24 inner courtyards is the dominant feature. The immense 'great' palace is flanked by four pyramid-shaped temples and it was here that the sacred ball game took place. Dignitaries used to live within the first perimeter. At the very bottom of the slope were the living quarters of the masses and, between the two, the residences of the middle class. Four years of work at La Milpa have resulted in the deciphering of a number of the epigraphs on the steles. Researchers have also reached certain conclusions based on the study of the vegetation

which has invaded the ruins. One of these is that one should be cautious in referring to 'the Maya civilisation' or 'its' decline, since there were a number of stages involved. It is probable that settlements evolved completely independently of each other and without coordination. They also collapsed at different times although, clearly, they all faced a series of similar crises.

Construction at La Milpa began in approximately 400 BC and continued for about 1000 years. After a long decline, there was a short-lived revival in about the eighth century and then the site was completely abandoned. However, it must have been inhabited later by peoples other than the Mayas because the foundations of a ninth-century house, in a completely different style, have been found. It was frequented on and off at least up to the 17th century, offerings deposited at that time having been found. The site was rediscovered in 1938 by a *chiclero* (a peasant farmer collecting sap to make chewing gum) who told a British specialist about his find. Unfortunately, more recently, at the beginning of the 1970s, La Milpa was also the target of looters who completely devastated it.

The greatest Maya centre in Belize was probably Caracol, a city-state extending over 100 square miles and which, at its height, had 200 000 inhabitants — as many as the entire country

Mahogany carver in Belize City



today. At the time, the population of the current territory of Belize is thought to have been about 750 000 although some researchers speak of figures as high as two million. What is increasingly certain is that this land was the centre of the Maya civilisation during the classical period (250 to 900 AD). Caracol was discovered in 1938 and was partially excavated in 1950. It was suspected that this site was more than just a great religious centre, but it was only in 1986 that the deciphering of an epigraph on an altar stone enabled the archeologists to say for sure that Caracol had conquered the city of Tincal (Guatemala), hitherto regarded as the most powerful Maya metropolis. This discovery filled a gap of nearly a century and a half in Maya history and enabled Caracol's supremacy to be given due recognition.

We were unable to visit Caracol which is difficult to reach, not being served by a major road. However, it is not so difficult to admire Altún Ha and Xunantunich, both magnificent sites which have already been restored to a considerable degree. Work is still going on at Xunantunich. Like Caracol, this is close to the border with Guatemala, a few kilometres to the south of the superb town of San Antonio.

This impressive place exudes mystery and magic, with the giant face of the Sun God at the centre of the newly renovated façade of El Castillo (The Castle) which is the central structure. This is a cathedral of stone, earth and vegetation, heaped in that order. Viewing the sequence of structures from the heights of El Castillo, the sight of blue tarpaulins protecting the parts under restoration adds to rather than detracts from the sense of mystery. The edifice takes on the appearance of an 'operating theatre' for a vast surgical operation! In order to reach Xunantunich, one has to put one's vehicle on a tiny boat and cross a small shaded river which seems to act as the link between our century and the Maya world. It is possible to visit this site and the one at Altún Ha at night if one exchanges a few pleasantries with the guards. The evening light and the solitude add a special chemistry to the mystery of these Maya ceremonial places.

Belize has been selected as the HQ for 'Mundo Maya', an organisation



The Courier

promoting tourism along the Maya Route. This is tourism at a high cultural level, grouping together the efforts of the five regions in question: Yucatán, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, in addition to the host country.

The tortoise's reproach

Archeological research is only one aspect of the work of the Programme for Belize. The protection of animal and plant species and environmental conservation are in fact, the main elements. Indeed, it is the ecologically orientated exploitation of the forest and the highly controlled development of ecotourism which ultimately will enable the Programme to finance itself. The PFB also acts as an educator with a mission which includes teaching young people about the ecology. It both receives students and goes out to speak to them in schools and educational centres. Young American and European university graduates also come to make their knowledge available to the centre and to complete their training under the direction of, among others, *Roger Wilson*, who is Technical Coordinator of the Programme. He came to Belize with a wealth of nature conservation experience gained in the Seychelles, Guinea and Rwanda.

Although the PFB is the most important environmental protection scheme in Belize's cultural programme, it is far from being the only one. Among the many others, the Blue Hole National Park deserves a particular mention. This is sponsored by the Belize Audubon Society, a local branch of the US foundation (which also helps finance the PFB), the Belize government, the Worldwide Fund for Nature and the MacArthur Foundation. The park extends over an area of nearly 600 acres of essentially rocky terrain with

Restored façade at Xunantunich
Impressive beauty, mystery and magic

lakes, underground rivers and caves. Its main attractions are the 'Blue Hole', a 100-foot-deep hole which is 300 feet in diameter and from which an underground river emerges, and St. Herman's Cave. The park is home to many rare species of fauna including jaguar, ocelot, jaguarundi, tapir, opossum and the howler monkey, a species related to the baboon. Added to this are many reptiles, including the boa constrictor and the iguana, and an infinite variety of birds. Other institutions devoted to defending the ecology include the Cockscomb Basin Wildlife Sanctuary, Guanacaste National Park and the Crooked Tree Wildlife Sanctuary.

One park particularly dear to the inhabitants of Belize is the Community Baboon Sanctuary inhabited by many thousands of monkeys (in fact, black howler monkeys rather than true baboons). Its management structure is highly original, being based on voluntary help from eight village communities, with aid from institutional sponsors. Each proprietor undertakes to respect a strict code of conduct which includes protection of the forest along the riverbanks, maintaining fruit trees during felling, and maintaining a forest corridor between individual farms. The advantage for the farmer is that these techniques protect his land against erosion and prevent the silting-up of waterways which are essential to him. It also enables him to avoid the tortoise's reproach.

In Belize, a widely appreciated West African legend relates that an old tortoise saved some men from a huge flood by advising them to plant palm trees to hold down the sand. That is why, when captured by man, the tortoise beats her breast for not having anticipated man's ingratitude. ■

Hégel Goutier

Burundi's media of hatred

Tackling the worst excesses

by Manuela Varrasso*

'To be Hutu or Tutsi in Burundi is to remember who killed someone close to you, 15 years ago, or to wonder who is going to kill your child ten years hence. Each time there is a different reply. This is not a fear without substance. For 30 years, it has been invoked in this region of Africa to increase awareness of one's own ethnic history — and the victimisation that goes with it — and as a means of denouncing others.' This quotation comes from a 1988 text published by 'Reporters Sans Frontières' (RSF), the international organisation for the defence of press freedom¹.

As a follow-up to the above, RSF has recently published an in-depth study, with support from the European Commission, entitled 'Burundi, the poison of hatred — a study of extremist media'². The aim is to alert international opinion to the 'interethnic confrontation' being played out in this small central African country with the full participation of much of the media.

The authors, *Barnabé Ndarishikanye*, assistant at the Faculty of Economic Sciences in Bujumbura, and *Jean-François Dupaquier*, a journalist, conducted their survey from July to October 1994. In their report, they make a series of accusations against the 'media of hatred' that exists in the country. They also draw attention to the non-application of ethical principles throughout the so-called 'democratic' or 'independent' press. In Burundi, it appears,

the media is democratic and independent in name only!

Avoiding the ravages of 'ethnisation'

The so-called inescapable 'logic' of ethnic confrontation, which resulted in genocide in neighbouring Rwanda, was central to the propaganda broadcast by the infamous *Radio Télévision des Mille Collines* (Thousand Hills Radio and Television). This study does not attempt to explain the crisis in Burundi by simplistic analogy with Rwanda, but rather to identify — and denounce — the political 'manipulation' of ethnicity which is actively supported by elements in the extremist Burundi media. There is an awareness in Burundi of the dangers the country faces and this awareness could help ensure that the worst fears are not realised. 'In its misery, Burundi needs clear-cut media coverage... Only in denouncing death-dealing proposals and projects can we stop the infernal yet resistible spiral of manipulation on ethnic grounds'. These are the words of historian, *Jean-Pierre Chrétien*, in his introduction to the work. He continues: 'Hatred between Hutus and Tutsis has become a feature of society in Burundi nowadays. Is it that we are being forced to watch the emergence of a reality which has remained concealed for too long? Or are we entitled to express surprise at a phenomenon, portrayed as being perfectly natural, which was all but invisible in the culture of the old Burundi...? The ethnic conflict which inspires such dread would, in fact, appear to be quite a recent development. It is thus essential to examine the contemporary situation, looking beyond the over-simplifications which imply that Hutus and Tutsis will be tearing each other apart until the end of time'.

Independent press isolated

With this in mind the authors observe that it is rare for the media to engage in proper research leading to the publication of the truth. Of the 29 publications covered by the study, only five appeared to meet strict ethical criteria. Three were private sector publications: *La Semaine* (neutral, ceased publication in September 1994), *Panafrica* (a satirical journal) and *Le Phare* (a neutral bi-monthly). The other two are the government dailies, *Le Renouveau* and *Ubumwe*. These provide the kind of national and international news which other journals ignore, the latter focusing heavily on partisan disputes. So the overall score is one publication in six, which is pretty poor!

Prohibiting extremist publications

Reporters Sans Frontières argues in favour of banning those media operations that are being used as the tools of both Tutsi and Hutu extremism. (Tutsi — *la Nation, le Carrefour des Idées, l'Etoile: Hutu — le Miroir, le Témoin, l'Eclairer* and *Radio Rutomoringo*, which is the Burundi equivalent of Rwanda's *Radio Télévision des Mille Collines*.)

RSF's objective, in the current emergency situation, is to point the finger of blame at a number of malevolent publications which have fanned the flames. One might cite here, the following text from *Le Carrefour des Idées*, a journal which has not hesitated to use the language of cannibalism to convey its message of hatred: 'After killing him, they cut out his heart and killed his ox. Then they mixed the two meats to make kebabs'.

The excesses are so great as to seem almost caricatures. Incitements to hatred, whether on social, political or religious grounds, abound.

Encouraging the 'moderates'

It is not enough to ban extremist publications of course. One must also

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¹ The organisation publishes a quarterly entitled: *La lettre de Reporters Sans Frontières* and an annual report (*Le rapport sur la liberté de la presse dans le monde*). These can be obtained, together with other specific studies from RSF at 5, rue Geoffroy-Marie, 75009 Paris, France. Tel: 33 1 44 83 84 84 Fax: 33 1 45 23 11 51.

BURUNDI LE VENIN DE LA HAINES



Etude sur les médias extrémistes

avec l'appui de la Commission Européenne

tradition of conviviality (much admired by visitors) which leads to spontaneous exchanges of information. As far as journalists are concerned, according to the authors, this needs to be backed up with more professionalism and a genuine investigative spirit.

The assistance being provided by RSF is targeted at both the independent media and the above-mentioned publications linked to the authorities. With European Commission assistance, the organisation supports journals which reject the division of the press along tribal lines and which undertake to respect professional ethics. Any Burundi publication can approach RSF to request reimbursement of a portion of its printing costs, provided it signs the 'Ethical Charter' negotiated beforehand between the RSF and the Burundi press. Local RSF correspondents in Bujumbura are responsible for checking adherence to the Charter. Non-compliance leads to the withdrawal of aid from the journal in question. In addition, every month, a panel of professional representatives from the Burundi press awards a modest prize to encourage the authors of the best articles which have appeared in the country's media. ■ M.V.

encourage 'moderate' newspapers to treat journalistic ethics with respect. Although not all journals indulge in the excesses described above, many are seen as deliberately manipulating opinion: Thus, for example, according to the radical Tutsi publication *Le Patriote*; 'It is out of the question that the next Head of State should come from the Frodebu' (10 May 1994).

In general terms, the authors of the study deplore the 'imbalance of information' that exists in Burundi. This is reflected in the one-sided presentation of 'facts' and in partisan editorialising, which

make it easy to identify the political or ethnic backing behind the publication in question. This is without even investigating their sources of finance, which would require a more in-depth enquiry.

Gossip and rumour

The study also highlights the use of 'gossip and rumour' as a key element in disinformation. 'Facts' presented are neither verified nor confirmed. Often they are reproduced straight from conversations heard at the bar. This country has an oral cultural background and a Central Africa

DJIBOUTI

Paying the price of peace

The Courier

A civil war fought against a background of economic recession is a mixture which would threaten to bring down any economy, however strong it might be. Yet, this is what Djibouti recently 'treated' itself to. In the same cynical vein, one might make the observation that this is nothing out of the ordinary in this part of the world. Who can forget the fratricidal struggle which gripped Ethiopia/Eritrea for so many decades? Not to mention the latest in a long line of conflicts that erupted just a few months ago pitting the brothers of North and South Yemen against each other. There must be few who are unaware of the internal struggle and continued disintegration of Somalia. And from time to time, one is offered a reminder, generally through shocking images of civilian populations in distress, that the North and South of Sudan seem more incompatible than ever. In fact, the situation in the Horn of Africa has more than a passing resemblance to that of another 'hot spot' that continues to confront us — the Balkans.

Given the regional context, the fact that Djibouti also finally succumbed to what many see as the overriding ethnic factor is not entirely surprising. All of the countries in question, insofar as they genuinely 'exist', rely on calculated doses and precarious balances between ethnic groups, clans and subclans. Almost all have found themselves embroiled in a cyclical pattern of civil wars. These vary in intensity but the stakes are always the same: gaining power. Could it be that the infernal heat which sometimes descends

on the countries bordering the Red Sea lead to a form of spiritual 'overheating'?

Djibouti has the unenviable reputation of being one of the world's hottest spots. On the political front, however, things have gone off the boil in the wake of direct negotiations between the warring parties. After three years of fighting, the country has succeeded in reestablishing peace through an agreement that was signed on 26 December 1994. Less than six months later (on 8 June 1995), the new power-sharing arrangement was consolidated as members of the former rebel movement, the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), took up posts in the government. The FRUD now looks more like a conventional political party once again. However, while political equilibrium may have been restored, the economic situation is more unbalanced than ever. In almost every respect the country has to get back on the rails in order to restart the engine of economic growth.

To do this, stabilising measures followed by far-reaching economic reforms are required. This will have to be done in close collaboration with foreign partners. Radical structural adjustment is due to be discussed in detail at a Round Table scheduled for this autumn (having been postponed several times already). It will bring together all interested parties and its main aim will be to ensure Djibouti's long-term development, something which is viewed as a prerequisite for achieving a lasting peace. Reducing state control over the economy while making the govern-

ment apparatus more efficient, will entail sacrifices for everyone. Indeed, relaunching growth and creating sufficient jobs for the growing mass of young people may, in the longer term, prove just as challenging as the task of reconciling a divided people who, after all is said and done, must live together.

Uncommon beauty

Despite the torrid sun which beats down on its 23 000 square kilometres from May to October, Djibouti is engraved on the memory of most visitors on account of its uncommon beauty. One of the slogans used for attracting tourists is 'land of extremes' and the country really does deserve this description. It has a desert landscape which often resembles the surface of the moon. The earth's crust at this point is very thin, barely five kilometres in depth, as against several tens of kilometres normally, and for this reason, geologists and volcanologists flock there. Djibouti continually experiences earthquakes although fortunately, these are of low magnitude.

In 1978, the Ardoukoba volcano near Lake Assal erupted. At 155 metres below sea level, Lake Assal is the lowest point in Africa and one does not need to be a geophysicist to appreciate the grandiose beauty of this place — an expanse of salt almost 10 kilometres in length, contrasting with the deep blue, highly salinated water and the even deeper azure of the sky. This remote spot exudes desolation but one

should not forget that it was from here that innumerable caravans set off to carry precious salt into the African interior. This happened well before the *toubabs* became interested in Djibouti for more obvious geostrategic reasons.

Situated near the Gulf of Aden and the entrance to the Red Sea, Lake Assal, together with its neighbour, the *Goubet-Al-Kharab* (Demons' Gulley) and its *Ile du Diable* (Devil's Island) form the end of the Great Rift Valley which runs south across most of the continent. Nearby are the distinctive signs of the fault where the continents are drifting apart. The result will be a new Eritrean Ocean which is expected to appear gradually over the next few million years.

Further into the interior of the country, which reaches a height of 2000 metres near the northern border with Ethiopia, other equally spectacular wonders await the courageous visitor. In addition to the primal forest of Day, there are a number of extensive plains such as Hanlé, the biggest one, and the Petit and Grand Barra, not forgetting the 350-square-kilometre doom-laden expanse of Lake Abbé, with its unmistakable smell of sulphur. Although the landscape of Djibouti might appear harsh and sometimes hostile, the sea bed along its 370 kilometres of coastline is renowned amongst divers as one of the most beautiful. It is particularly rich in marine life although the large number of sharks might make it seem rather uninviting.

Precarious balance

Although the neighbouring waters are teeming with fish, the population is little inclined to take advantage of the bounty of the sea, being largely nomadic in origin. Most of the 520 000 inhabitants of Djibouti in fact share a nomadic culture and pastoral tradition dating from time immemorial, but more than half have in the meantime settled in Djibouti City, the capital. Their dignity and pride, however, remain undiminished, as does their propensity towards belligerence when they consider their interests have been harmed or the balances has been upset. The two largest communities which provide the most important counterweights in this political balancing act are (in alphabetical order), the Afars and Issas. In fact, even in colonial times, this order had a certain symbolism. French colonists first arrived here in 1862, shortly after construc-

tion began on De Lessep's great dream, the Suez Canal. This strategic colony was known initially as the French Somali Coast (the Issas are part of the wider Somali 'family'). It then became the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, and it was not until independence on 27 June 1977 that the name was changed to the Republic of Djibouti.

Roughly speaking, the Afars originate mainly in the North and West while the Issas are from the South, but seeking to define 'ethnic territory' or indeed to estimate the proportions represented by the two main groups (there are those who believe the figures are 'manipulated' for political purposes) is a risky exercise. Indeed, it was this which was at the root of the conflict which engulfed the country between 1991 to 1994. It suffices to say that the overstaffed civil service (an obvious target for any adjustment measures) has a key role in the redistribution of resources. With this in mind, administrative positions are filled in the manner of an 'apothecary's account' with great attention being paid to ethnic balance including membership of clans, sub-clans and so on. It should be mentioned in passing that most of the people belonging to the two main ethnic groups actually live outside Djibouti's national frontiers.

The other components of the population are by no means insignificant in numerical terms and each group has a specific role to play in the national economy. In addition to some tens of thousands of Yemenis, (Arabs), there are also the Issaqs and the Gadaboursi, both of which are Somali clans. The first two are active in commerce whilst the last-mentioned are often to be found in the executive and clerical levels of the civil service.

The presence of almost 11 000 French citizens, including 4000 troops (the



result of agreements made at the time of independence and due for review in 1997) has a very significant impact on the country's economy. Some even say that the French input represents up to 40% of the GDP. The anticipated withdrawal of between 450 and 500 soldiers between now and the end of 1996, and the suggestion that married soldiers with their families may be replaced by unmarried newcomers, is causing some concern in business circles. This is a French-speaking 'island' in an area which is otherwise Anglo-Arab. One effect of the Gulf crisis has been to raise the issue of Djibouti's usefulness in military terms. While this is not perhaps yet being called into question, attention at least has been drawn to the issue. With France (the main overseas funder) also taking a close interest in the structural adjustment process, and much local debate over whether the country is going to follow the strict IMF guidelines, there are clearly good reasons to keep a watchful eye on the policy statements and intentions of the former colonial power — and its new President.

The government's decision at the beginning of this year to close more than 80 'bars' (often supplying 'services' other

A country where the ethnic balance is precarious and there is massive unemployment





The Courier

than mere alcohol, which is still sold in hotels and restaurants) has caused some concern in French army circles and among the wider expatriot community. No-one has seriously suggested that this move is a manifestation of emerging Muslim fundamentalism or an attempt to reach a rapprochement with nearby Arab countries. Although Djibouti is a predominantly Muslim country (a member of the Arab League and of the Islamic Conference), the government's stated reasons for taking the action are decidedly more prosaic. It was, in simple terms, a measure designed to combat the proliferation of alcohol and drug abuse, 'immoral' behaviour and the AIDS problem. Many of the bars were run by Ethiopians using Ethiopian employees working without a permit and it goes without saying that this community is unhappy with the decision. Elsewhere in the society, however, the questions are more about where the surplus 'energy' which still exists can be channelled now that this outlet has been closed off.

Djibouti also has a serious refugee problem — scarcely surprising in a region of endemic conflict. Estimated at 120 000, the refugees have had a considerable effect on the country's economic activity and on its administration and infrastructure. In fact, in combination with the high population growth rate for actual Djibouti citizens (about 3%), the result has been significantly increased pressure on all services and structures. It is not really surprising, therefore, to find that the government's traditional line of welcoming displaced people has hardened somewhat. On top of the *ad-hoc* return of refugees and refusals to admit new arrivals, large-scale repatriation operations have been launched, such as the one begun last July to send 15 000 Ethiopians home.


War, peace and democratisation

From the standpoint of internal politics, the incoming tide of refugees has

Djibouti's economy is based essentially on services, and it has an excellent telecommunications network

inevitably had an impact, particularly in the context of the ethnic balance. While Issas have been arriving from Somalia, the fall of the Mengistu regime also caused the flight of Afars, many of whom belong to militias, from the Ethiopian side. We should also mention here the solidarity of the Issas with their 'brothers' in Somaliland (the north west of Somalia) which has declared its independence. Some argue that the origins of the Afar insurrection in Djibouti in 1991 are to be found in the proliferation of weapons and experienced fighters who found their way into the country as a result of conflict elsewhere in the region. This is disputed by the leaders of the rising. Whether true or not, it was at that time that the FRUD took up arms in its quest for a larger slice of the national 'cake'. Since independence, Djibouti has been governed by its veteran leader President Hassan Gouled Aptidon (who is interviewed later in this report). The Afars who rebelled took the view that their legitimate interests had been damaged, and were critical of the

Said Ibrahim Badoul, President of the National Assembly
'We are still in the learning stage of democracy... but there is true freedom of expression'



The Courier

regime for what they regarded as its political immobility and its alleged rejection of genuine democratic power-sharing. There is a very Djiboutian concept which incidentally is linked to this: that of the *bras cassés* (broken arms). This term is applied to civil servants, critical of the current system, who are often well-trained but, because they are from the 'wrong' ethnic group, feel marginalised and on a path to nowhere.

With the spread of fighting in the hinterland, the first steps towards political reform, designed to bring about a multi-party democracy were taken in the capital. In September 1992, a new pluralist constitution was adopted. However, during the first new-style elections in November of the same year, the *Rassemblement Populaire du Progrès* (People's Progress Party), of President Aptidon swept the board winning all 65 seats. The victors had a number of factors to their advantage — the fact that the voting system was the British model of 'first past the post', the importance of Djibouti City itself (with 37 seats) and, not least, the opposition boycott. In fact only one party contested the election against the RPP. In the Presidential poll of May 1993, President Aptidon prevailed against two opposition candidates to win a fourth term of office. It is worth noting, however, that in both polls, the abstention rate was approximately 50%.

Mohamed Djama Elabe, who was a minister between 1986 and 1991 and now leads the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD) which is one of the two main opposition groupings (the other is the National Democratic Party — NDP), said that 'the elections perpetuated the old one-party system' in the current parliamentary set-up. He believes 'that the old tribal structures that are so ingrained in people's minds must be abandoned.' Tribalism could, he thinks, be turned into a positive factor. Given the current economic situation, he is concerned that the future could be even more harsh. 'In extremis', he argues, 'we could go the way of Somalia. It is the very credibility of our ruling class which is at stake'.

For Said Ibrahim Badoul, President of the National Assembly, Djibouti is still in the learning phase of democracy. Although it is true that the former single party won all the seats in the first multi-

party elections, he says, this does not preclude it from entertaining a range of different ideas and ensuring genuine freedom of expression. As he also points out, the peace accord entails the FRUD becoming a political party — the fourth one in the country. The opposition, he observes, is expanding and becoming more active in view of the forthcoming democratic elections'. President Badoul also emphasises the role of 'traditional' democracy — the system of consultation with the forces within society such as the former sultanates, for example, designed to reach honourable compromises through dialogue. He says that this was an important element in achieving the peace agreement. As an Afar who belongs to the national reconciliation committee, he saw the conflict first and foremost as 'a clash of generations against a tribal background'.

Mercifully for the country, and somewhat unusually, the warring parties entered into direct negotiations. Conducted largely in secret, these lasted almost a year, and finally led to the peace accord which was signed on 26 December 1994. This ended a bloody struggle which had had disastrous effects on the socio-economic fabric of the country, but the ground was now prepared for reconciliation. The salient points of the peace accord included the FRUD's acceptance of the new constitution (which they had previously rejected), a review of the electoral rolls and of procedures for granting citizenship (subject to a policy of ethnic balance), a ministerial reshuffle which would bring FRUD representatives into government, integration of some of the rebels into the regular army, decentralisation of powers and the transformation of the FRUD into a genuine political party.

Although, during the early months of this year, implementation of the terms of the accord seemed slow, various aspects of it were progressively applied, the most notable being the government reshuffle of 8 June 1995. Two FRUD representatives were given ministerial posts — *Ali Mohamed Daoud* the President of the FRUD, was allocated the Health and Social Affairs portfolio, and *Ogouré Kiflé Ahmed*, the General Secretary (interviewed later in this Report) became Minister of Agriculture (an unrewarding task in a country with such hostile natural conditions) and Water (a key sector in a predominantly pastoral country where rainfall is scarce and there are no permanent surface water courses).

Economy in distress

War in general does not pay — at least not for those who wage it. The costs to the participants are generally very high and this harsh reality is something that Djibouti cannot sidestep. On the other hand, some observers take the view, perhaps cynically, that the country has actually benefited from recent external crises such as the Gulf War and the conflicts in Yemen, Rwanda and Somalia. Djibouti's strategic situation and its service economy have made it a centre for the supply of humanitarian aid, the transit of aid workers and the passage of evacuees. Some have even suggested that it was the 'positive' effect of the Iraq/Kuwait conflict that enabled the government to mobilise 8000 troops very quickly at the beginning of its own struggle. One result was that Djibouti acquired an unenviable reputation



Mohamed Ali Mohamed, Finance and Economics Minister and the driving force behind the Round Table
'The state must find ways of reducing its expenditure without cutting the social sectors'

— of having one of the highest ratios of troops and police to inhabitants in the world! Nothing is without a price and now that peace has returned, the demobilisation of several thousand men poses its own particular problems. This is not counting the personnel reductions implied in one of the provisions of the peace accord which foresees the incorporation of between 800 and 900 former FRUD rebels into the army. The war effort was very costly, placing a great deal of stress on the budget. In combination with other factors, both internal and external, it helped plunge the economy into a serious structural crisis.

From an economic standpoint, Djibouti enjoys a number of distinct advantages. These include its strategic position, its very liberal economic system and its highly developed service infrastruc-

tures. The problem is that the economy is completely out of balance, with services representing almost three-quarters of GDP. Djibouti is also highly dependent on the outside world. The port, which is the lifeblood of the economy, and the railway, which is the vital artery with Ethiopia, are kept alive by others and have both experienced a marked drop in activity over the last few years. Djibouti produces very little itself and has very limited natural resources, an extremely restricted local market, high production factor costs and massive unemployment, estimated at more than 40%. Most of the jobless are unskilled young people. The country's service sector includes a high concentration of productive public enterprises (PPEs). Some of these appear to be overequipped while others are poorly maintained, often inefficient or overstaffed, and hence barely viable. Overall, the public sector's share of the economy is regarded as disproportionate. Djibouti also has its own currency, the Djibouti franc, which has been tied to the American dollar since 1949. (\$1 = FD 178). For a country which imports virtually everything, any depreciation of the greenback *vis-à-vis* the main European currencies (France being the most important trade partner) is keenly felt.

Both internal and external financial balances are out of step and the deficits have reached such a level that, for Finance Minister *Mohamed Ali Mohamed*, (previously responsible for trade and the economy), 'the fate of the country is now at stake.' He stresses the need for in-depth reforms to restore the viability of the economy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the budget deficit, expressed as a percentage of GDP, has almost tripled and it has become increasingly difficult to finance. By the end of last year, Djibouti had run up a total external debt (including sums owed by its PPEs) of \$267.5 million — this at a time of internal conflict when conventional budgetary aid was dwindling. 'The priority is therefore to get public finances moving again and this cannot be done without sacrifices. The state must find ways of reducing its expenditure without cutting the social sectors, explained former Finance Minister, *Ahmed Aden Youssouf*.

It is in this context that a first series of austerity measures totalling almost FD 800 million have already been elaborated. Together with proposals to boost revenue. An ambitious reform programme has been proposed to meet the demands of the IMF and other donors, and



The Courier



The Courier

this will be the subject of in-depth discussions at the Round Table in the autumn (see article later in this report). The date has finally been fixed after two postponements. Although most politicians declare their conviction that Djibouti must 'reach a settlement' with the IMF and accommodate itself to their requirements, it is no secret that the prospect of having to slim down the state holds little attraction for those in power. They find themselves unhappily caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Both the slow and complicated initial implementation of the peace accord and political change at the highest level in France generated a degree of hesitation. Today, however, the psychological block appears to have lifted. Indeed, some, such as *Djama Mohamed Haid*, the Governor of the National Bank, are beginning to express guarded confidence in the future: 'Admittedly, the economic picture is alarming, he says, but, because of adjustment, there won't be a catastrophe.

Less state, more private sector

Trimming the size of the state is undoubtedly one of the watchwords of the adjustment process. This extends not only to tackling overstaffing but also and, indeed perhaps more significantly, to examining the very role of the state as an economic operator.

The now widely-accepted concept of 'good governance', in this context, goes well beyond the declared intention of tackling corruption, nepotism and bad management. It also implies that the state abandon its entrepreneurial functions to become mere facilitator of an environment favouring private enterprise, with a role in the promotion of job creation. To this end, a new equation must be found linking the employment market and training, which is deficient in many respects. Again, a change to structures and attitudes appears necessary if the future is to be guaranteed. There

Djibouti is experiencing increased competition from other ports in the region but it continues to modernise

are complaints in the private sector about the lack of suitable training and a belief that the education system fails to match local requirements and concepts. Complaints of this kind are not unique to Djibouti of course, but it would certainly appear that illiteracy levels are high and standards of schooling unsatisfactory in a country with more than 200 000 youngsters of school age. One telling indicator is the staffing situation at the Djibouti *Lycée*. Of the school's 85 teachers, no fewer than 59 are (expatriate) technical assistants as against only 20 Djibouti citizens. The rest come from other African countries. There is also the thorny ethnic issue. Many members of the younger generation dare to hope that in the future, merit and competence will prevail over the need to maintain a strict ethnic balance, but this, too, is something that will take time.

The current mood in the private sector is far from buoyant and there is talk of business slackening off. Those involved in the various aspects of the transit trade, who are the heaviest users of services in an economy which revolves round the transit of goods and people, face a range of difficulties. The state is reducing expenditure, fiscal pressures are growing, costs are increasing, and there is increasing competition from neighbouring countries. There is some good business being done in the banking sector (Djibouti aspires to a reputation as a 'financial centre') but it is suggested that much more is possible. *Mohamed Aden*, who is Vice-Chairman and Managing Director of the Bank for Commerce and Industry of the Red Sea (a subsidiary of the BNP), emphasises the advantages of 'our very liberal economic system, a fully convertible currency, and the complete absence of both exchange control and income tax. Taken in combi-

The railway linking the port to Addis Ababa urgently needs renewal of equipment and management restructuring

nation with our high-performance communications network', he says, 'these could turn us into a little Switzerland'.

Inflated lung, blocked artery

The key barometers of economic activity in Djibouti are the port and the railway. Unfortunately, while recognising that the patient is on the mend, any diagnosis based on an examination of these two vital organs would suggest that recovery still has a long way to go. Of course we should recognise that the 'illness' brought on by the internal conflict was a long and debilitating one.

The competitiveness and efficiency of this transport corridor have been sorely tested by increased regional competition. The port employs some 650 people and is relatively well equipped, but some think that it is oversized. Despite this, a renewal and modernisation programme for the petroleum facilities is currently under way. Operators are concerned at the port's reputation for being expensive and there is no doubt that competition from Berbeira in neighbouring Somaliland and Assab in Eritrea is being felt increasingly. An effort is under way to breath new life into the crucial landward link in the corridor which leads to Ethiopia. This suffers from customs procedures which are regarded, at the very least, as 'painful' by business people who use the route because of the delays and added costs that they entail. Add to this the shortcomings of the railway itself, and one soon discovers that this is the weakest link in the chain. This vital artery, with its reputation of imperial elegance, (having been started by the Ethiopian Emperor Ménelik II at the end of the last century), is 781 kilometres long. The Djibouti section is 100.6 km. No-

wadays, it has lost much of its former glory. A lack of maintenance in the past means that most of the equipment and infrastructure is in need of major overhaul. Engines and rolling stock are prone to breakdown and there have been more serious problems resulting from the poor condition and unevenness of the permanent way. A major programme is anticipated to remedy the situation. The initial phase will be implemented by the French Development Fund, and the plan is for this to be followed by Community intervention.

In any discussion about the railway, it is clear that the human factor — whether at operational or management level — should not be neglected. It is an enterprise run jointly by Djibouti and Ethiopia, and governed by a statute which implements the terms of a treaty concluded in 1981. This foresees a sharing of responsibilities. At management level, a major initial step forward has been the creation of a joint administration council (as against two councils in former times). In the opinion of the former Minister of Transport, *Ahmed Waberi Guedi*, this is likely to accelerate the decision-making process to the obvious benefit of the railway in terms of improving its viability. Co-management, however, is not always easy. This was demonstrated in the (relatively minor) divergence of view that occurred between the parties over the acceptability or otherwise of 'second hand', although entirely serviced, locomotives for the first phase of the overhaul. The Ethiopian side was somewhat unenthusiastic about this proposal. As for staffing levels, the railway has 390 employees in Djibouti (where their 'railway workers' club' evokes a certain nostalgia) as against 2200 in Addis Ababa. The overmanning at the Ethiopian end has been attributed by some to the 15-year reign of the Mengistu regime. Given possible future privatisation and a reduction in state control, a reduction in staff numbers, together with better targeted training would appear to be required. Put briefly, a degree of discipline has to be rediscovered.


Even if there is no water, there is always *khat*

In such a hostile environment, with water in short supply and where age-old nomadic traditions mitigate against permanent settlement, it is difficult to make the agricultural sector flourish. It is therefore largely restricted to the produc-

tion of market-garden crops in the zone around Djibouti City, together with a few small cooperative farms in the interior. Nomadic stock-breeding is obviously heavily dependent on access to water supplies. Although some cattle ranching is being developed, this sector continues largely to be managed in the traditional way, with owners viewing their livestock as walking capital'. Fishing has some potential but again, a number of measures are needed if the traditional fisheries sector is to achieve a qualitative step forward.

The above-mentioned sectors, where modest progress has already been made, could make an important contribution to solving the country's enormous unemployment problem. There are also more limited possibilities in other areas such as, for example, the craft industry or tourism. These are sectors where the European Community is, or has been, active in its cooperation. Although the craft industry has become increasingly organised and structured, with greater emphasis on training workers in a range of skills, tourism was 'killed off', so to speak, by the civil war. Tourism was not particularly common even prior to the conflict, the country's image being based on geological or historical themes (such as the salt caravans) which are of interest only to a small and specialised market. As a result of the fighting, most of the necessary infrastructure has been destroyed and access to the interior of the country was all but impossible. 'We are looking forward to a new, more favourable atmosphere', stresses *Ali Mohamed Abdallah*, the Director of the National Office of Tourism and Craft Industries, who also highlights Djibouti's reputation as a top destination for diving.

In fact, some of the strains of unemployment are moderated, in a manner of speaking by *khat*, the green leaves of a bush which many people in Djibouti chew from early afternoon. This is said to generate feelings of euphoria. Attempts to ban the 'drug' since independence have come to nothing. Indeed, it is in such widespread use throughout the region, that nowadays it has virtually been legalised. A levy is charged on each bundle of leaves, which are sold as soon as possible after they have been picked in Ethiopia. Despite this, *khat* is regarded as a curse with many negative consequences from



Sale of fresh *khat*, the local 'drug' that is widely used. This is the only 'sector' of the economy which does not appear to be in crisis

the socio-economic standpoint. Narcotic effects aside, the fact that the leaves are imported, with 12 to 14 tonnes transported by air every day, represents a haemorrhage in foreign exchange. One tonne costs approximately DF 1 million and, it is said, the *khat* must get through, at any cost. In the current economic crisis, it would appear that the *khat* traders are the only ones who are coining it in! ■

Roger De Backer

'Now is the time for reconstruction'

An interview with President Hassan Gouled Aptidon

For someone who is said to have been born in 1916, but who is probably six to eight years older, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon is surprisingly nimble and quick-witted. Little appears to escape him, and when he returned his written replies to our preliminary questionnaire he was perfectly willing to answer a few additional questions on the spot. The result was an exchange of ideas and opinions almost as rapid as a tennis ball skimming over the net. He has held the reins of power in Djibouti for a very long time. He became interested in politics after the Second World War, and very rapidly stood out as one of the principal leaders of the Issa community. After a long political career, which has had its ups and downs, he finally led the country to independence on 27 June 1977 and became the first and, to date, only president Djibouti has known. Little happens in his country without him knowing about it or without his approval. Combining the post of Head of State with that of Head of Government, this astute politician uses all his skills and experience to achieve a political balance and ethnic equilibrium. The task has proved far from easy, as witnessed unfortunately in the three years of civil war the country has recently suffered. Having succeeded in restoring peace, he is now issuing an appeal for reconstruction, both to the citizens of Djibouti themselves who will have to grow accustomed to a period of austerity and to external donors who will be called upon to support domestic efforts at stabilisation and economic reform.

■ *After years of fratricidal struggle, the Government of Djibouti has signed a peace accord with FRUD representatives. What is the significance of this accord?*


— For three years, our country was the theatre for violent armed confrontation between the FRUD and government troops. This conflict had severe con-

sequences both on the economy and the people of our country.

It is rare in the history of conflict throughout the world to be able to enter into direct peace negotiations between opposing warring parties, but we were stimulated by the desire to spare our people and our nation the fate of some of our unfortunate brothers in Africa. We thus demonstrated our desire to keep a tight rein on our passions. Now is the time for reconstruction. The government has to do all it can to pick up the pieces and restart development projects which were halted or suspended because of the conflict. New projects must also be drawn up on the basis of new requirements. We now have to win the development war together and the efforts we will be called upon to make will not be enough if we do not receive support in the form of aid from the international community.

■ *The fact that the entire FRUD has not signed the peace accord and that part of it is still bent on continuing the armed struggle, might compromise peace and national reconciliation. Do you envisage initiatives to bring everyone to the negotiating table?*

— We signed the peace accord on 26th December 1994 with an organisation which is both political and military. If dissent exists within this organisation there is nothing we can do unfortunately except take note of the fact. However, it is apparent to everyone that virtually all the members of the FRUD have joined in the peace process and are today returning to Djibouti. Finally, since the accord was signed, no incident has been recorded anywhere in the country. That is the best illustration one can have of the fact that the vast majority of politicians and soldiers in the FRUD support the long-awaited



peace agreement that was signed with my government.

I should, nevertheless, point out that we have never excluded anyone from the process. Today, negotiations are complete and peace has become a reality. Djibouti needs all its sons and I, for my part, will never close the door to those who would now like to return to take part in the reconstruction efforts we have before us. Our task is immense and I praise God for having guided us throughout with wisdom and reason.

■ *The internal conflict the country has experienced over the last three years has led to a financial crisis which is so profound that a structural adjustment programme has now become essential. It appears that the government is reluctant to sign such an agreement with the IMF although other donors have made this a precondition for their assistance. Why is that?*

— We have no hesitation in committing ourselves to a reform policy and there is no question of our circumventing a structural adjustment programme. My government is currently working on the measures advocated by the IMF. The Council of Ministers on 23 April 1995 was also devoted to studying the recent report by the International Monetary


Fund. The cuts of 798 million Djibouti francs, due to take effect on 1 July 1995, are among the first measures intended to achieve a drastic reduction in state spending. The Geneva Round Table, which has been postponed until October, should finalise our undertakings. These may well include painful measures but they are necessary to bring about a more stable future for our country. We expect a great deal from this meeting in terms of development and it is my personal wish that the donor community take an active part in it. We aim to achieve a positive result which will make it possible to relaunch our economy and our image as 'a land of exchange and encounter'. The objective is to restart the construction of a nation that wants to offer a better life for all and a future for its children.

I expect a great deal from the French President, Jacques Chirac, and his government in the implementation of a new partnership with our continent. I hope they will continue to speak on our behalf within the international community and its institutions, particularly the IMF.

■ *You, Mr. President, are the region's elder statesman and recently you have met a number of leaders from factions in Somalia. In the wake of the failure of the United Nations operation in that country, will we soon see an initiative from neighbouring countries in an attempt to find a solution to the Somali crisis?*

— You are quite right to use the term 'crisis' to describe what is happening in Somalia. Our human, historical and economic links with that country ensure that we cannot remain indifferent to what is happening there. For me, Somalia is an example of a country where state authority has succumbed to tribal antagonisms, and this has been the cause of its downfall.

I was in favour of United Nations intervention in Somalia. Djibouti has also always demonstrated its support for UN resolutions. We made our ports and airports available to the United States and France and to other countries taking part in UNOSOM operations. It must be acknowledged, however, that the UNOSOM intervention was a failure. So too were the mediation attempts conducted within the



The Courier

framework of the OAU, the Arab League, IGADD and the Islamic Conference Organisation.

I also regret the fact that the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, which we organised in July 1991 and which brought together virtually all factions in Somalia, was not sufficiently supported at the time by international organisations, because we were so close to a joint solution. I am now convinced that, today, the only solution to the Somali problem is to be found within the country itself. Somalia's fate is in the hands of its own people and the solution has to be a political one. It is regrettable that the Somali leaders, whoever they are, continue to fight each other so fiercely. They pay no heed to the misery and pain of their children and I cannot but regret this attitude.

■ *Your country has always been a place of asylum for refugees from Somalia and Ethiopia who are attracted by the stability and relative prosperity of Djibouti. Yet, recently, round-ups and expulsions across the border appear to have increased. Is your policy of accepting refugees changing?*

— Firstly, you must allow me to take issue with the words 'round-ups and expulsions' because I cannot accept them, although neither implies any breach of the rules. I think it is necessary, firstly, to distinguish between genuine candidates

Road sign, near Lake Assal, riddled with bullets — testimony to three years of civil war

'It is rare in the history of conflict throughout the world to be able to enter into direct peace negotiations between opposing warring parties, but we were stimulated by the desire to spare our people and our nation the fate of some of our unfortunate brothers in Africa'

for asylum as defined by the Geneva Convention — a convention we have signed and respect — and clandestine economic immigrants coming principally from Ethiopia and North West Somalia. One should also note the arrival in recent years of immigrants from West and Central Africa.

Let us be realistic. The Republic of Djibouti cannot nowadays support such a flood of irregular immigrants. We have a floating population which, over the years, has come to exceed 120 000 people, and this is a burden we cannot sustain. The very survival of our country is now threatened. I would be surprised if you could tell me of a single country which now shelters as many foreigners — nearly 20% of our population!

Every day we are faced with increasing problems of security in Djibouti City and our health, housing and planning infrastructures have become hopelessly inadequate to meet the needs of this population. Let me give you just one example: in the anti-TB Centre in Djibouti, eight out of ten beds are occupied by foreigners.

President Aptidon 'live'

■ *Mr President, would it be right to say that Djibouti is now having to pay the price of peace?*

— To summarise my reply, I would say that in order to have stability you must have a strong economy. That applies to all countries throughout the world.

■ *Is it Djibouti's aim to become an even better service economy in the future?*

— Of course. We have to overhaul the services and ensure they operate normally, regardless of the regional situation which is in crisis. But that is not the fault of this country!

■ *As elder statesman in this region...*

— I'll stop you there, if I may! I may be the 'elder statesman', as you say, but each country is free to organise itself and follow its destiny. My regret is that, in Somalia for example, conditions are not yet right for reconciliation. Djibouti does not intend to go down that road again. As for the Somalis, they have requested that they be left in peace to settle their problems themselves, which they are now doing.

■ *You know virtually all the people involved — do you see your role as one of conciliator?*

— You would have to ask the Somalis that question! The situation in Somalia is regrettable and in fact is little more than a struggle for power.

■ *Djibouti's future appears to be linked, to a considerable extent, to that of its large neighbour, Ethiopia. How do you see your relations with Ethiopia developing?*

— Djibouti has experienced many wars but what holds us together is the railway which was finished at the end of the last century. This railway has never been repaired despite the

damage caused by the various conflicts around it. Emphasis must be placed on repair.

■ *Despite multi-party elections here, the opposition is not represented in Parliament. What do you have to say about this?*

— Firstly, what does 'democracy' mean? The democracy you speak of is based on universal suffrage. Elections are held and you win or you lose. It is not a war. So if you lose you have to wait your turn to be represented and if you are elected, well, good for you!

■ *Is the fact that the opposition is not represented in part due to the voting system which has been kept non-proportional?*

— That is a matter for Djibouti! You must not attempt to impose on us ideas which are not or cannot be applicable to certain African countries. Africans must be left to define their own type of democracy. After all, the Europeans themselves have had many years over which to develop their own systems.

■ *Yesterday¹, we saw a democratic change of power for one of your principal partners with the inauguration of President Chirac in France. Do you expect to see a change in France's attitude towards Djibouti?*

— What primarily interests us is that France should come to our aid on a bilateral level and that it should also play an active role at the Round Table talks. We now have to approach President Chirac and draw his attention to our situation in a region which is continually shifting and where there is no peace and a great many refugees.

■ *Within the same context of democratic transition, and I refer, here,*

to other instances in Africa, for example Senegal, have you any thoughts about your successor, given your advanced age, and taking into account the delicate balance between ethnic groups and clans in your country?

— It is something we think about continually but it is obviously a problem for Djibouti to solve.

■ *Does Djibouti have anything to fear from the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism? In this context, some people might think of the recent closure of the bars, for example.*

— Our country is too small for such a movement to develop unnoticed. If they try anything, we will know immediately.

■ *Would you agree that Djibouti reflects Africa more broadly in the sense that it has nonsensical colonial frontiers. The majority of the major ethnic groups which make up your population live outside your borders?*

— We were not the ones who fixed the borders! And, despite our small size, we do not intend to give land away to bigger countries! We will take care of the problems in our small patch of 23 000 square kilometres! ■

¹ This interview took place on 18 May 1995.

Djibouti has acted and will continue to act as a regional humanitarian centre but we are bitter about the fact that the international community is losing interest in *our* country and *our* refugees after all we have done to assist our neighbours. Would Belgium accept a quarter of its own population as immigrants, mostly illegal?

International organisations, brother countries and friends must help in containing populations within the subregion by guaranteeing food supplies to their country of origin. This was my message at Addis Ababa on 18 April 1995 at the extraordinary IGADD Summit. I also expressed my regret, on that occasion, that many African countries, including Djibouti, have seen donors turn away, in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in order to come to the aid of Eastern Europe. Encouragement is no longer sufficient. We need a genuine undertaking from our partners.

■ *IGADD's performance to date has been rather modest, although you and your fellow leaders in the region have just expanded its field of competence further. How do you imagine it will be able to take on these new tasks?*

— In Addis Ababa, at the most recent extraordinary IGADD Summit, I believe I pointed out that the organisation, which is there to achieve development for our populations, was becoming increasingly a reality and an undeniable necessity. This opinion was shared by the other heads of state at the meeting.

Subregional cooperation at all levels is a prerequisite for economic and social development. It contributes to political stability and consequently to the security of our country's populations.

North West Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea are experiencing a period of peace. We must, therefore, act to keep the peoples of the subregion in their own countries, with the aid of international organisations, by guaranteeing their food supplies.

In the past, the IGADD was more a tool permitting political

settlement of disputes between member countries or enabling some of them to renew dialogue. However, the recent example of the GATT has shown us that it is difficult to reconcile the sometimes different interests of countries which are much more structured than ours. If, in the context of a calmer future, with the noise of weapons silenced, the countries in the Horn of Africa were to group together, they would have considerable economic potential. The West would then view our countries and our people differently — they would not have the image they so often do of emaciated bodies ravaged by famine.

This is why, nowadays, the burden of recent conflict must give way to the reinforcement of institutions born of the desire for development, trade and regional cooperation. Both the IGADD and the PTA must fulfil their role. The survival of our economies depends on it. The role of the international organisations and the more important role of the EU is to come to our aid in reinforcing these institutions because, since Addis Ababa, member states have demonstrated a genuine will to construct. I therefore have confidence in the future of the IGADD.

■ *The presence of French troops on Djibouti soil generates significant income. Although the withdrawal of these troops is not currently on the agenda, has your government thought of alternative solutions? How do you view your country's long-term future?*

— As you say, the withdrawal of French troops is not on the agenda. I can only confirm this and say it is not something we desire.

We have to be realistic. Most of our working population is employed in the service sector — banking, commerce and administration — which is closely linked to the French presence and largely to the French military presence. This is also a balancing factor acknowledged by all countries in the Horn of Africa. French forces have, in particular, supported humanitarian operations throughout this part of Africa, in Somalia, Rwanda and even, more recently, in Yemen. The presence of French forces stationed in

Djibouti must be seen in the context of agreements concluded between our two countries. We have enjoyed a long and friendly relationship with France and cooperation has been fruitful. Its history is closely linked with our country.

For this reason I would draw your attention to the fact that, although the military presence is important, there is another aspect of this very close relationship between France and the Republic of Djibouti, namely French cooperation. It can be seen particularly in the priority areas of education and health and has long helped our country in more efficiently managing our human resources. France is often also the intermediary for other support coming



'You must not attempt to impose on us ideas which are not or cannot be applicable to certain African countries'

from the EU. This has contributed to major town-planning operations in Djibouti City, water supplies, support for sports development and the relaunching of cooperative action in the field of agriculture. ■

Interview by R.D.B.

'We have to make a real effort'

An interview with Prime Minister Barkat Gourad Hamadou

He says he was born in 1930 (but is probably older). Barkat Gourad Hamadou is a self-taught man who has worked both in the port and in the railway sectors. By 1958, he had already begun his political career during which he was to hold a number of responsible positions, notably those of Minister of Education and, later, Minister of Health. In September 1978, he was appointed Prime Minister, then responsible for the port — a charge again entrusted to him, as an interim measure, prior to the most recent ministerial reshuffle on 8 June 1995 when his field of responsibility was widened to include planning. Prime Minister of Afar origin, he is not head of the government. This post is held by President Hassan Gouled Aptidon himself. On 15 May 1995, the Prime Minister granted us a brief interview at the Port Director's office.

■ *Prime Minister, you are currently acting Ports Minister, a post which you have occupied before. Is this a return to your 'first love'?*

— Yes, I am currently acting Ports Minister having previously held this post. It is a very important task because the port, together with the airport, are the real lifeblood of Djibouti. Despite the keen competition we face from Assab in Eritrea and, to a lesser degree, Aden in the Yemen and Berbera in Somaliland, port activities are going pretty well. New facilities are currently being built, particularly with Japanese aid, and we are eager to start the work at the Fontainebleau wharf which France has promised us. We expect to begin this by the end of the year.

■ *Is the port really in such good shape? There has been a drop in activity and some companies have been wound up.*

— Admittedly, at the beginning of this year, there was a drop in activity,


but there has now been an upturn. A number of ships are *en route* to our port and others will follow. For example, we will soon be trans-shipping 45 000 head of cattle. This is because of the highly competitive conditions we are able to offer, and we are ready to agree just as competitive tariffs for other vessels. With assistance from French technicians, we are also currently studying our tariff structures so that we will be able to maintain our competitive edge in the future. Thousands of tons of goods could transit through here, particularly aid intended for Ethiopia. Our Port Director has held discussions with a number of aid agencies, notably in Rome, and we are prepared to offer favourable tariffs, especially for aid intended for neighbouring countries. We must, after all, do our bit. However, I cannot conceal the fact that there are problems with the railway which carries a certain amount of freight.

■ *Nevertheless, for a service economy, your production factor costs are relatively high.*

— We are aware of this and are attempting to bring them down.

■ *On a more political note, as one of the highest placed Afar representatives in a country where there is a very delicate balance between different communities, how do you see this balance evolving in the future?*

— For my part, I can assure you that everything is perfectly in balance. After three years of war against the FRUD, we have succeeded in achieving peace and we are now beginning to reestablish the equilibrium we had in the past.



■ *How should one interpret the recent closure of the bars? Does this herald an emergence of Muslim fundamentalism?*

— No, far from it! In Islamic terms, here in Djibouti we are very tolerant. What happened was that it came to our notice that these bars had become meeting places for people with bad reputations — prostitutes, drug addicts and so on. In the evenings, some parts of the capital city looked like Pigalle! We have not banned alcohol as such — you can still find it in restaurants and hotels — but we wanted to do away with these places of ill repute which are a threat to our young people. You should therefore not interpret this as greater influence on the part of Arab countries or as the expression of increased religious feeling.

■ *There have been a number of incidents along the border with Somalia. Does this make you apprehensive?*

— It does indeed pose a problem for us because they don't have a government with whom we can discuss such incidents. There have, for example, been instances of Djibouti fishing vessels being attacked by pirates. In general, we have always had good relations with Somalia, but at present we have no contacts with whom we can have a meaningful discussion.

■ *Djibouti also seems to be sending increasingly large numbers of refugees back to their own countries. Does this signify the end of your traditional policy of welcoming the needy?*

— Yes, we have been sending back a lot of Ethiopian refugees, but Ethiopia is happy to take them back. We also have a large number of refugees from Somalia and a number of sponsors are ready to help us send them back, but the Somalis are refusing to accept them. We just have to pray that there will soon be a government with which we can negotiate.

■ *Domestically, you have a problem with respect to the large numbers of young people entering the job market every year, where they simply increase the already very high level of unemployment. Is there a solution to this problem?*

— *Inch' Allah...* Currently, Djibouti does not have any big companies which could absorb them but we are doing all we can, although I frankly cannot tell you how we are going to solve this problem.

■ *Would it be true to say that Djibouti is just 'surviving and no more' at the moment?*

— Admittedly, we face very serious economic problems. We are hoping to solve them and are placing a great deal of faith in the Round Table which is to take place in the autumn. We ourselves have to make serious efforts to balance the budget, and our outside partners will help us to do this. We have already implemented a number of austerity measures which the citizens of Djibouti will not like, but these measures have to be taken. ■

Interview by R. D. B.



Djibouti Port
'We are attempting to bring down production factor costs'

DJIBOUTI

'We have to achieve a change in mentality'

An interview with the General Secretary of the FRUD, Ogouré Kiflé Ahmed

Ogouré Kiflé Ahmed was born in 1955 and, after finishing his education, began a career in what was then the 'colonial' army, joining the police force in 1977, after independence. He is a founder and the current General Secretary of the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD) and, between autumn 1991 and 26 December 1994, led an armed rebellion of mainly Afar supporters. A peace accord ended the fratricidal conflict. In the interview which follows, which took place on 18 May 1995 (before he became Minister for Agriculture and Hydraulics), he gives his thoughts on the implementation of the peace accord and his country's future.

■ *How many members does the FRUD have? Some would say that you only represent a faction inside the country which signed the peace accord in December 1994, while those on the outside oppose the terms of this agreement.*

— First and foremost, I would like to state categorically that there is only one FRUD, not several! When the FRUD began the peace process with the Djibouti government, there were personality clashes but not an actual split.

■ *Given the age difference between you and those who are or were in power, was there a 'generation' problem?*

— Not really. There was no conflict between the generations within the FRUD. The issue was clearly a political one and there were divergent points of view, but these divergences immediately attracted widespread coverage. Some of the press began to talk of a split or a break-up and the disagreement led to a highly publicised polemic conducted through press communiqués broadcast on the national and international airwaves. So, you see, the FRUD I represent is the only authentic FRUD, the one which signed the peace



accord with the Aptidon government on 26 December 1994.

■ *How do you explain the fact that a country which usually favours dialogue went through three years of civil war before going back to talking?*

— It is true that we had a war that was waged for political reasons. Finally, we saw a renewed desire to open up a dialogue and reach a negotiated solution to the crisis — something the French had been advocating since 1992. In the beginning, the process did not go very well, although, on the FRUD side, there was always a wish to settle the dispute by peaceful means. Then, at the end of 1993, it became possible for direct contact to be initiated with the government.

■ *Six months after the signing of the peace accord, how do you assess the way in which it has been implemented?*

— The peace accord has its own timetable, objectives and mode of application. Up to the present time, it has been respected. That we cannot deny, although there are objective difficulties in particular relating to the financial crisis. Generally, we have to achieve a change in mentality because it is not enough just to conclude a peace agreement or attempt reconciliation. There also has to be a real political change and a new approach allowing everyone to start again. In this way, we will achieve the reconstruction, rehabilitation and consolidation of our country and return to being a state run along normal lines. Obviously, there are a number of procedures to be followed and conditions to be fulfilled. In order that change could take place, first and foremost, the FRUD had to end the rebellion. This is in the process of happening. After this stage, the President of the Republic will be able to bring in the next part of the programme which involves, for example, the formation of a new government¹ to include FRUD representatives.

¹ This interview took place on 18 May 1995. Since then, a new government which includes FRUD representatives has been formed (presidential decree of 8 June 1995)

■ *As a political movement, what changes do you advocate to promote your country's development?*

— Primarily, we would recommend a policy of decentralisation, that is to say a transfer of competence and resources towards organisations throughout the entire country. We need, in particular, to give greater responsibility to the various components making up our nation. We then have to clean up the administration and management of our state system, with far-reaching reforms at a number of levels.

■ *One of the principal terms of the peace accord was integration of some of the rebels into the regular army.*

— Between 750 and 800 of our troops have already been incorporated as part of the first phase of FRUD withdrawal from the rebel movement. Future stages will involve the reintegration of some members of our community who fled, were captured or who lost certain rights.

■ *Is it not ironic that, although democratic elections have taken place, the biggest opposition movement, the FRUD, is not represented in parliament?*

— The problem is there are a great number of factions which have been unable to present a united front and thereby constitute an opposition force capable of confronting those in power. In the FRUD, we opted for armed rebellion to defend our interests, but the opposition in the wider sense has no national or regional policy. In point of fact, it is not enough to make promises or statements — you have to have an impact on events and constitute a united force which the people can trust and support. We are faced with a very complex situation, with a very varied opposition and often highly divergent personal ambitions. This is the cause of our isolation. We intend to transform our rebel movement into a political party as envisaged in the peace accord. We will become the country's fourth political party. I am convinced that the formation of a coalition government will be a major step forward in efforts to get Djibouti back on its feet and will also provide evidence for foreign donors of our political will to join forces and emerge from the current crisis.

■ *If the FRUD is transformed into a political party, how will you be able to prevent it becoming a mouthpiece of the Afars?*

— The FRUD does not just represent the Afars. Although Afars are in the majority within the FRUD, we also have Arab and Somali support. Admittedly, our demands have reflected the wishes of a particular community, but tribalism was not the sole *raison d'être* for our rebellion. If it had been, we would not be enjoying peace now. Our job at the moment is to transform our movement into a political party representing the whole nation.

■ *One criticism of the FRUD has been that it is made up of 'foreigners' from Eritrea and Ethiopia.*

— In times of war, many things are insinuated, but it was nevertheless with the FRUD that the peace agreement was duly concluded. The facts themselves therefore refute these allegations.

■ *To conclude, are you optimistic about Djibouti's future?*

— Yes, I am, because things are evolving and changing all the time. We will be able to start again and I am truly optimistic although I do realise that there are problems involved in the essential change in outlook that people must adopt. Djibouti's citizens must realise that their country does not produce anything and that it is in their interests that they themselves should take initiatives to demonstrate to the international community how they want their country to evolve. ■

Interview by R.D.B.

Round Table: the long and winding road to structural adjustment

by Amadou Traoré*

The Round Table on 'reform and development of the economy of the Republic of Djibouti' should take place, finally, in October 1995, in Geneva, as recently decided by the Djibouti authorities. Or, at least, it is to be hoped it will take place because absolutely everything in Djibouti seems to be on hold pending this meeting which has already been postponed twice. It was scheduled originally for April 1995 and was put back to May, which would have coincided with the French presidential elections. The official reasons given for

these successive postponements are firstly the need to put further finishing touches to preparations for the Round Table, by making the maximum number of contacts in advance and refining sectoral diagnoses and, secondly, the need to allow the new regime in France (the principal partner) time to familiarise itself with Djibouti's case. Both are plausible and valid reasons, but there may be a third reason linked to fears based on the possible social consequences of the proposed reforms.

But, now, things are becoming really urgent. The Geneva meeting must take place without delay so that a solution can finally be found to the very grave financial crisis the country is in, because the more time passes the worse the public finance situation will become and the greater will be the costs of adjustment (even if one is reluctant to mention this word). This will, nevertheless, not be the first time such a policy has been proposed in Djibouti.

In fact, the first attempt to implement a structural adjustment programme in this small country in the Horn of Africa dates back to 1991, just before the start of the armed rebellion in the North and South-West of the country. It was a relatively limited exercise within the framework of Lomé IV and its structural adjustment fund. Djibouti's small size, the relatively simple nature of its economy and

its problems at the time meant that Europe alone was in a position to finance the programme. Everyone, including the IMF whose financial involvement was not sought, was in agreement for Djibouti to be an example of adjustment 'after the European fashion'. The Commission had never before implemented an adjustment programme without the support of the Bretton Woods institutions, who are the 'experts' in this field.

The economic reforms proposed at the time entailed the continuation of a three-point financial stabilisation programme concluded between France and the Djibouti government. This encompassed:

- decreasing budgetary aid from France;
- the repayment of arrears accumulated by the state of Djibouti;
- the setting-up by the latter of a reserve fund to enable it to deal with unforeseen expenses.

The letter sent to the Finance Minister, who was the national authorising

officer for the European Development Fund, concerning implementation of the adjustment programme was not answered. In fact, initial signs were beginning to emerge at this stage of the conflict that was to come. This fratricidal struggle was to plunge the country into mourning for more than two years and cause a terrible drain on its finances.

Today, more than three years later, the country's financial position is at such a low level that the task of restoring it far outstrips the capabilities of a single donor. This, at least, was the view of Philippe Soubestre, Deputy Director General for Development at the European Commission, when he spoke to a top-level Djibouti delegation that visited the Commission in March to discuss implementation of the reform programme. Suspicious of IMF remedies, which have been so discredited in some circles, Djibouti had been

*The easy times have passed
Djibouti has resolutely to follow the
path of austerity, endeavour and good
management*



The Courier

* Economic adviser at the EC delegation in Djibouti.



Djibouti airport — a productive public enterprise
An important aspect of the reform programme relates to the restructuring of such enterprises

tempted to dispense with the participation of this institution. It was fearful of violent demonstrations similar to those experienced in a number of other developing countries. At the same time, it was keen to obtain World Bank aid in areas such as the health sector. This was a vain hope. The Bank was very quick to peg any assistance it gave to a proper programme run with the IMF. This was also the position of France, the country's principal partner, and, more subtly, that of Europe, whose contribution was, in this case, more limited and more difficult to implement.

The government had, in fact, implicitly accepted the need for adjustment measures for some time by then. This is the only way of interpreting its decision to prepare the 'Report on the reform and development of the economy of the Republic of Djibouti', which the authorities describe as 'going beyond an adjustment programme'. This was adopted in Cabinet and, over a period of several months, the government came to accept that the Round Table, originally intended to deal only with health policy, should be expanded to cover all sectors where the economy was at a standstill. This shift took place quite naturally towards the end of last year, from the moment it became obvious that health problems could not be dealt with outside a wider institutional and economic context. It was anticipated that sectoral meetings on health, education and transport matters would have to be organised subsequently.

The months to come will be crucial in fine-tuning the reforms, drawing up a timetable for achieving them, agreeing monitoring structures and formally negotiating the package with the Bretton Woods institutions. IMF and World Bank delegations are expected to arrive in Djibouti this summer. The European Union has promised to help the country in these delicate negotiations and later to support it through the various instruments provided in the Lomé Convention. In addition to the funding available under the Djibouti national indicative programme, the Commission may use financing from the Convention's structural adjustment fund. Djibouti will have automatic access to this once it has signed an agreement with the IMF.

Despite these different sources for financing its reform programme, which is aimed at correcting the imbalances which have accumulated over a number of years, the country will not exactly be faced with an embarrassment of riches. Its budget deficit continues to grow — in one year this has increased from DF 2.9 billion (approximately ECU 12.6 million) to DF 7 billion, according to the latest World Bank estimates. The state can no longer finance the deficit, having exhausted all the resources at its disposal, including the assets of public enterprises that it has

drawn upon. Internal payment arrears are put at DF 18 billion and there is an increasing balance of payments deficit.

As the principal cause of these imbalances is the military spending connected with the mobilisation of some 8000 troops to put down the FRUD (Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy) rebellion, the core of public finance stabilisation policy consists in demobilising this additional manpower rendered useless by the conclusion of the peace accord with the FRUD. This will be a tricky operation to carry out, because there is likely to be considerable discontent on the part of the military. The operation is, however, essential.

Another important aspect of the reform programme relates to the restructuring of the EPPs (productive public enterprises) which, in 1993, represented 16% of Djibouti's GDP and employed 2500 of the 16 000 workers in the modern sector. Such enterprises included the autonomous international port of Djibouti, the airport, Djibouti Power, the Djibouti National Water Authority and the Office of Posts and Telecommunications. It is proposed to strengthen and guarantee their autonomy vis-à-vis the authorities by means of an undertaking on the part of the latter not to interfere in their management, particularly in staff policy matters.

For other companies, it will quite simply be a matter of privatisation or receivership. However, in all cases, there may be negative repercussions on employment levels which are already depressed. This will be the principal problem of this exercise which will be undertaken in parallel with an attempt to reduce the number of public-sector workers by 10% (by encouraging voluntary early retirement). For Djibouti, the easy times have undoubtedly passed. The country must now resolutely follow the path of austerity, endeavour and good management.

The hope must be that this route will allow Djibouti to emerge from its current crisis and that it will be shorter and less tortuous than the road which led it to adopt the reforms in the first place. ■

A.T.

EU-Djibouti cooperation

by Frans Baan*

Cooperation between Djibouti and the European Commission began in 1959, well before the Republic's independence in 1977, and when the territory was still known as French Somaliland. With the current Lomé Convention (Lomé IV), which came into force at the beginning of 1990 and which is the basis for cooperation up to 2000, the various cooperation arrangements will soon have covered a period of 40 years.

Under the terms of the different instruments of the Conventions as well as of the Commission's budget, the Republic of Djibouti has received approximately ECU 80 million at current rates. This figure does not take into account involvement in regional programmes, valued at approximately ECU 35 million, from which Djibouti has also benefited.

In financial terms, cooperation has increased considerably in the course of the more recent Lomé Conventions. This followed from Djibouti's independence and the decision to set up a properly autonomous Commission delegation in the country. Over 90% of the aid has been in the form of grants, the remainder being loans on concessional terms managed by the European Investment Bank.

In these circumstances, and given the long-standing nature of the relationship, it has been possible to integrate European cooperation into Djibouti's social and economic policy. The focal areas for cooperation, moreover, have not changed markedly over the years. When the relationship began, the key sectors were much as they are today: urban and rural drinking water supplies, housing and drainage, health and education. The relationships developed in these areas are therefore well-founded reflecting the outcome of an ongoing dialogue.

The *drinking water* sector is an excellent example of EU/Djibouti cooperation. The 'fight against thirst', as

Djibouti's President has dubbed it, has been a vital subject from the outset. Initially, the emphasis was more on urban areas and, in particular, water supplies to Djibouti City with backing for the construction of water towers, and pipelines from bores in the Loyada coastal plain. The focus then gradually shifted to the countryside, with the sinking of wells and boreholes, and other works. An ambitious programme aimed at setting up 61 water supply points throughout Djibouti was begun in 1991. Unfortunately, it has only been possible to complete part of this programme up to the present time, owing to the country's internal problems which began at the end of 1991.

These achievements, and in particular the works to exploit surface water have, nevertheless, been a success. On the Grand Barra (a plain where there is very little height variation), the excavations have been filled with water several times since they were dug, providing some 10 000 m³ per excavation!


Urban sanitation is the other major field of involvement. An ambitious 'Programme for the Urban Development of Djibouti City' (PDUD) aims to clean up the old quarters and develop expansion of

the city towards the adjacent heights of Balbala. The Commission is involved in this programme together with bodies such as the French Cooperation Ministry, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. European finance is being channelled towards drainage provision in District 4 (under Lomé III) and Districts 1 and 2 (under Lomé IV) of the old town. The project aims to remove waste water and rainwater. Given the site of the old town and its height above sea level, this removal problem is particularly acute.

For other reasons and, in particular, owing to the difficulty of achieving alignment of building façades in the older districts (a prerequisite for the installation of pipelines), the programme has suffered delays. It now appears, however, that the problems have been overcome and work is shortly due to recommence.

A major *training/employment* programme has also been instituted. This involves support for a range of training institutions as well as direct actions to help Djibouti's craft businesses. It has been decided to concentrate efforts mainly in this latter area. The first phase of this ambitious programme, which began in 1993, aimed at assisting the National Office of Tourism and Crafts (ONTA) and providing technical and financial support for Djibouti's micro-businesses. The overall

Water installation on the Grand Barra plain



The Courier

* Head of the European Commission Delegation in Djibouti.



Drainage in Djibouti City

objective of the programme is to provide work for Djibouti's young people who make up the majority of the population and who currently have limited prospects. Micro-businesses in such varied fields as woodworking, metalworking, engineering, artistic crafts, leatherwork, and so on, offer genuine and tangible opportunities to improve the chances of finding a job. The Djibouti Chamber of Commerce (CICID) is also playing an increasingly dynamic role in this context, taking on responsibility for supporting a previously neglected sector by encouraging the training of groups of craftsmen in their respective trades.

The field of *public health* has been supported by three types of intervention. First, medicines and medical equipment have been supplied to help the country deal with the influx of refugees and displaced persons. Second, a number of dispensaries have been or are due to be established in the interior of the country. Third, a decision has been made to concentrate on training in the field of health. This approach has resulted in the construction of the Health Personnel

Training Centre in Djibouti and in a major ongoing training programme. *Animal health* has also received considerable assistance both nationally and regionally within the context of combating rinderpest. At a national level, Community aid has been spent on the construction of cattle enclosures and other buildings and on amenities for veterinary stations.

The regeneration of plant cover, and through this, the production of fodder for the *stock-breeding sector* has been started up on the basis of a pilot project in the west of the country, on the broad Yoboki plains. The results are promising and major structures have been planned. Although the execution of these plans was interrupted by recent events, they will shortly be restarted.

In the area of non-programmable aid, support for Djibouti has included assistance in combating the scourge of cholera, and in financing medicine imports to help the country deal with the problem of displaced persons and refugees. In addition, emergency assistance was provided to combat serious flooding at the end of 1994. Djibouti has also received considerable food aid, particularly in the form of wheat flour. This has allowed for

the manufacture and sale of bread at a price the population can afford.

At a *regional* level, EU aid to the republic has always been substantial. Firstly, mention should be made of the *fight against rinderpest*. Djibouti has received assistance in the context of the pan-African campaign to combat the disease in the form of assistance for vaccination campaigns, the construction and equipping of veterinary stations, training for technical staff and so on.

The Djibouti-Ethiopia Railway has also benefited from substantial aid in the past. This has covered major rehabilitation works, training, the supply of tools, and even the provision of rails. The line running from Djibouti through Dire-Dawa to Addis Ababa is of crucial importance for Djibouti's economy. The transport 'chain' to the hinterland consisting of the port, the railway and the feeder roads can only function at the speed of its weakest link — and this has often been the railway owing to disturbances in regions through which the line runs.

In terms of institutional relationships, major emphasis has been placed on

Cattle enclosure





The Courier

deepening cooperation with IGADD, the inter-governmental authority for combating drought and desertification. Aid in this context has included support for cereal-marketing programmes, remote sensing, domestic power supplies and artisanal fishing. The member countries of IGADD are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Somalia.

A programme to create a *Regional Telematic Server Centre* is also being consolidated and is aimed at providing access to international databases, and the exchange of information and documents to support and stimulate trade.

A regional *radio link* programme connecting the region's principal capitals, including Djibouti City, is currently being set up with help from the European Investment Bank.

The future of EU/Djibouti cooperation looks promising after the difficult period the country has just experienced.

The second Lomé IV protocol will help the Republic deal with problems in stimulating the economy so that it can face

its future development with confidence. This involves promoting Djibouti as a major commercial port centre in the region. Special attention also needs to be given to the problem of the poorest members of society, providing assistance for them and ensuring that basic social welfare provision remains intact.

At regional level, further involvement in overhauling the railway is envisaged. This will involve a large-scale reconstruction programme which will include the railway in the Djibouti port area. The Commission's contribution to this effort is part of the Lomé IV regional programme.

It is therefore fair to say that EU/Djibouti cooperation is operating satisfactorily despite the recent slowdown.

Trade relations between Djibouti and Europe are, however, still very one-sided. In 1993, 40% of Djibouti's imports came from Europe but the latter was the destination for only about 2% of the country's exports.

Opportunities available to Djibouti in the commercial area are thus

The development of the craft field will create jobs

not yet being exploited to the full, 18 years after the country became independent. Djibouti, however, has plans to make greater use of the trade opportunities offered by Lomé IV. It has in mind, in particular, the construction of an industrial free zone with a view to exploiting its advantageous regional location. ■ F.B.

Namibia

Status quo and national reconciliation



The Courier

Traditionally, newly independent African countries mark their transition to a new era by obliterating colonial symbols and replacing them with ones of national significance. In these exercises, the streets of the capital are usually the first 'casualties'. Despite the emotions this subject evokes in the last African country to be decolonised, Namibia has gone against the grain. All but a few of the streets of the capital, Windhoek, have retained their colonial names, even those that evoked bitter memories like Goering and General Lothar von Trotha. To critics, this symbolises the *status quo*. To others it demonstrates the Government's commitment to national reconciliation.

It has been five years since Namibia became independent following the UN-supervised elections of November 1989. These brought SWAPO to power after 23 years of armed struggle against South Africa's illegal administration of the territory. As in South Africa following the ANC's electoral triumph in April 1994, SWAPO's victory raised high expectations among Namibians for social justice and improvements in living conditions. Their principal expectations were a radical land redistribution, access to better education and jobs, better wages and a narrowing of the gap in the standard of living between the white community and the black

The Windhoek 'suburb' of Katutura. Still a place where misery abounds.

population. Although independence has brought priceless freedoms — freedom of expression and freedom to live and work anywhere and with whoever one wishes, today those aspirations are far from being fulfilled. Despite having, on paper, one of the highest incomes *per capita* in Africa, abject poverty is widespread in Namibia. Indeed there is a growing army of child street beggars these days in Windhoek.

A first-time visitor to the Namibian capital can hardly fail to notice the inheritance of apartheid during the morning rush hour when Africans are bused in for work from the overcrowded township of Katutura. This 'suburb' of Windhoek, with few amenities, came into being in 1959 when blacks were dumped there having been moved from the Old Location in Windhoek. Although Katutura has been accepted by the black population, many of whom have begun to put up better houses, and the Government has, over the past five years, been carrying out a programme of renovations and rehousing, water provision, electrification and road construction, it is still a place where misery abounds. Large numbers of people arrive

there daily from the countryside looking for non-existent jobs, putting a tremendous strain on the township's meagre facilities and creating an atmosphere of insecurity. The coloured people, meanwhile, continue to live in Khomasdal which is a better-planned town with more facilities, while the whites live in the garden-city that is Windhoek itself. In this situation, there is a palpable sense of resentment and bitterness which must surely be undermining the government's policy of national reconciliation.

This policy has been something of a one-way street, with SWAPO reaching out to the white community, so far unsuccessfully, to pull together and tackle Namibia's pressing problems of inequality, unemployment and poverty. Whether this lack of response is due to resentment over loss of political power or fear of losing economic dominance is difficult to ascertain. White entrepreneurs have shown a distinct lack of interest in investing in job-creating enterprises or in human resources. And matters are not helped by the provocative actions of some people. In August last year, there was a celebration by a group of rightwingers of the birthday of Adolf Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess. Some continue to hanker for a 'whites-only' homeland, while the white population of Walvis Bay has resisted the effective political and economic reintegration of the former enclave into Namibia.

Unemployment crisis

This obvious lack of cooperation has meant that, despite the government's dedication to job creation since coming to power five years ago, unemployment has reached crisis proportions. Indeed last May, unemployed former SWAPO guerrillas took to the streets in protest. It took the charisma and reassuring skills of President *Sam Nujoma* himself to calm their anger.

Despite these economic problems and SWAPO's perceived lack of radicalism, Namibians gave a vote of confidence to the organisation by returning it to office with an increased majority in December last year. This suggests that that they do not lay the blame at the government's doorstep. In the elections, SWAPO won 53 of

the 72 seats in Parliament — 11 more than in 1989. President Nujoma performed even better, securing 76.3% of the votes cast in what was the first direct presidential election.

SWAPO's victory at the polls stunned the main opposition party, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) which won only 15 seats. Its presidential candidate attracted only 22% of the votes. The DTA, it should be recalled, has a colonial background; it was considered almost as a creation of South Africa. Perceived often wrongly as a whites-only party, it began in fact as a coalition of all the ethnic groups that took part in the constitutional conference called by South Africa in 1975 to discuss the future of Namibia. It contested the 1978 election organised by South Africa within the framework of its internal peace plan, an election which SWAPO boycotted and which the DTA, not surprisingly, went on to win decisively. The alliance was involved in the territory's administration until 1985 when a transitional government was formed under the UN.

No longer financed by South Africa, the DTA has tried to broaden its appeal with policies that are not dissimilar to those of SWAPO in such areas as national reconciliation, affirmative action and environmental protection. However, as last December's elections showed, these policies failed to attract support. The DTA, in fact, may be in terminal decline. The fact that it is getting weaker is something that *Hans Erik Staby*, its financial spokesman, frankly admits. SWAPO, Mr Staby told *The Courier*, has no serious rival. 'Only when the movement is seen no longer as liberator from the colonial yoke but as purveyor of misery,' he argued, would the 'roles of government and opposition be interchangeable.' Considering the depth of misery into which apartheid plunged the Namibian people, and the fact that the situation can only improve, not worsen, as one SWAPO official pointed out, it does indeed look as though the DTA faces a long time in political limbo.

Inevitably this situation has given rise to concerns in certain quarters over the future of democracy in Namibia, especially when SWAPO has the majority it needs to change the Constitution if it desires. Such

concerns, however, are not shared by western diplomats. Indeed the German ambassador has been quoted as saying that 'even if a one-party state develops, the democratic foundation of Namibia will remain unchanged.'

That optimism is based on SWAPO's track record, since independence, of respect for the rule of law and regard for the Constitution. Nowhere has this been more evident than on the question of land which, it is generally agreed, is at the root of the poverty of the black majority and of the inequalities in Namibian society. As in South Africa, colonialism and apartheid deprived Namibians of most of their viable farm land. Two thirds of such land, made up largely of commercial ranches, was and still is owned by whites, half of whom live abroad. About 4500 white farmers work on these ranches. For years, Namibians were confined to animal husbandry on communal lands: effectively providing reserves of cheap labour from where manpower could be drawn for the commercial ranches and mines. Only 5% of the entire country is suitable for crop cultivation. This is located in the far north where about 120 000 families eke out a living. Virtually nothing was done to improve production in the communal lands during the colonial regime. As long as the commercial ranches produced for domestic consumption and for export, and the mines earned foreign exchange, everything could be (and was) imported from South Africa. Over the decades, the gap in incomes between indigenous Namibians and white people widened to such an extent that by 1990, it was estimated that whites earned an average of 20 times more than blacks.

Land reform

At independence, SWAPO was expected, as a matter of top priority, to carry out a radical land redistribution in order to redress the situation. However, the Land Reform Act, which was passed by Parliament in October 1994, was anything but radical, and government officials, in the face of growing criticism, appear understandably uneasy when the issue is broached. Prime Minister *Hage Geingob* explains the situation in terms of legality

and justice. 'Unless you have won a war, your enemies have raised their arms in surrender and you seize their land', he told *The Courier*, 'you just cannot ignore other people's rights. We are saying that existing property rights will be respected. Of course we live in a new era with new morals, but it is all part and parcel of the government's national reconciliation drive which makes sound economic sense.'

An issue of such economic importance for the future of Namibia requires caution and above all consensus among the major players. Indeed in 1991 a national conference on land was convened. Although the conference accepted the principle of reform, it rejected expropriation as a solution, recommending instead a ban on foreign ownership of agricultural land and on the purchase of large tracts by individuals. The Reform Act took these recommendations on board. Foreigners who wish to acquire land in Namibia must prove beyond doubt that they intend to develop it and must receive the approval of the Minister of Lands. The Act limits to 5000 hectares the size of holding an individual can have and foresees taxes on unutilised large pieces of land. Although it prohibits expropriation, it nevertheless provides a mechanism to enable the Government to acquire land. Anyone wishing to sell his or her land must give the Government the first option and the Government is not obliged to accept the price quoted. 'That is the catch,' says Prime Minister Geingob, but he went on to point out that 'unfortunately we will be buying back our own land.'

The sum of N\$20 million was set aside in the last budget to enable the Government to start a buying programme. As and when the land becomes available, it will be bought and distributed to those who can develop it, according to Agriculture Minister *Mbumba*, although it is not certain at what pace the land will become available. However, new jobs depend not so much on the availability of agricultural land as on the various measures which the Government has taken over the past five years to produce growth in fisheries, agriculture and tourism. With the return of Walvis Bay to Namibia the prospects for foreign investment in manufacturing are good. ■

Augustin Oyowe

Struggling for the 'economic empowerment' of Namibians

An interview with President Sam Nujoma

For 23 years Sam Nujoma led the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) in a bitter armed struggle against apartheid South Africa for the independence of Namibia. South Africa had held on to the territory illegally despite the termination of its mandate in 1966 by the United Nations. Following a UN-brokered peace, Mr Nujoma returned from exile in September 1989 to lead SWAPO in pre-independence elections which the Organisation won by securing 42 seats in the 72-seat Constituent Assembly. In February 1990 Sam Nujoma was elected President by the Assembly and last year, in the first direct presidential election, he was returned to office by a huge majority winning 76.2% of the votes cast.

Combative as ever for justice and equality, President Nujoma agreed to be interviewed by The Courier. Among other things, we discussed democracy, national reconciliation, and transparency and accountability in government.

■ *Mr President, you and SWAPO were returned to office by an overwhelming majority last December. However, the increasing weakness of the opposition has created a certain uneasiness about the future of democracy here with fears that Namibia may slowly drift into a de facto one-party state. Do you understand this uneasiness?*

— In the first place, democracy, freedom and justice were brought about by SWAPO and SWAPO is committed to maintaining them through the involvement of the people. Namibians must participate in the affairs of the State and be involved in the decision-making process and that is precisely what we are encouraging. Good governance demands that. For example, we believe in the equality of the sexes. In the 1992 regional and local government elections, SWAPO reserved a certain number of consti-



The Courier

ties for women to contest — which they won. That is clearly seen today in towns like Tsumeb, Grootfontein and Mariental where women are mayors. Windhoek also had a woman mayor for a while. This was the decision of the SWAPO party alone. It was not proposed to us or imposed on us by anybody and nobody had to preach to us about democracy. It stems from the fact that over 55% of our population are women and we could not tolerate a situation where men, who are in a minority, took all the decisions affecting the majority. It was obvious to us that women had to be brought along and encouraged to participate if we wanted to create a strong foundation of democratic culture in this country. This policy of involving people in the day-to-day decision-making that affects their lives was adopted when SWAPO was fighting for the liberation of Namibia.

■ *It is very heartening to hear about SWAPO's success in establishing social justice but I was referring to the ineffectiveness of the opposition party and the possibility of a de facto one-party state. Will SWAPO, in the light of that weakness, be relying more on open internal debate?*

— We have democracy within SWAPO. Leaders are elected by the congress whether at a regional, district or branch level. So what is all this about democracy? Members of SWAPO have travelled all over the world — in the Americas, in Africa, in the former communist countries — and have seen different systems. We make our own decisions based on what is in the best interests of Namibians. So you are being unduly concerned about whether there will be or not a one-party state here.

■ *SWAPO has the necessary majority to change the Constitution and, if I am not mistaken, you have indicated that it needs changing. Will you be doing that?*

— Please don't put words in my mouth. We have here in Namibia, a Constitution which is a basic document guiding our nation, and it is respected. If there is a need for us to amend any clause we will call a referendum and invite the people to decide. If it is carried then that will be the wish of the majority of Namibians. SWAPO so far has not decided to change any clause, but if it becomes necessary it will be done. Constitutions are not binding forever; they can be amended in the interests of the people.

■ *Devolution of powers to the regions was once at the forefront of political debate here. Somehow the issue seems to have disappeared. What is the government's position on this?*

— We have regional governors and local councillors, and we also have an upper house called the National Council, which is made up of representatives from all the regions in the Republic. All the institutions are functioning very well. I don't understand what you are talking about. Why don't you go to the regions and find out what is happening?

■ *How is national reconciliation going?*

— We adopted the policy of national reconciliation while we were in exile. We fought a war that was imposed on us, a racial war against a minority of white settlers who came from Europe, occupied our territory and deprived us of land, freedom, justice and equality. We had no choice but to take up arms and fight. We fought for 23 years and defeated them. We, however, decided to offer to those who wanted to become Namibian nationals our hand of friendship through a policy of national reconciliation based on equality before the law. That policy, which has been accepted by the majority of our people, is flourishing in Namibia.

We still have neo-Nazi elements here who celebrate Hitler's birthday and who sometimes cause trouble. But they are an insignificant minority and we have the capacity to deal with them.

We also have racist Boers who want to divide our country. Some are even claiming territories stretching from the southern part of Windhoek, which they want to incorporate into a Boerland — a white South African homeland where the black man will never set foot. Certainly it will never happen. It is a dream that will not come true, but it is an insult to the integrity of the African people. We also have the capacity to deal with them.

**'A policy
of national
reconciliation based
on equality
before the law'**

■ *You mentioned land. The Land Reform Act has been enacted but critics say it does not address the disproportionate distribution of land between commercial farmers and communal farmers?*

— Land reform is one of the most difficult issues we have had to face. I think our decision was taken in the interests of all concerned. We are dealing with it the Namibian way, with the aim of ensuring that every Namibian has access to land. The process will be long, because we have only just started. Even countries which achieved independence long before us have still not resolved the land problem, but we are determined to resolve ours in the interest of all Namibians.

■ *Respect for human rights, transparency and accountability are now the yardsticks used by donors to determine a country's eligibility for assistance. How committed is your government to these principles?*

— We do not want to be subjected to this kind of thing by foreigners who want to impose their way of life on us. We fought for the liberation of our country and we know precisely what we want and how to get it.

What we are advocating is trade and cooperation. We are not asking for assistance. Those who do not want to give us aid don't need to. We have resources

which we want to sell to those who can buy them, and we can also make purchases from them. We welcome humanitarian assistance — and also give such assistance where we can, for example, to Rwanda when this was necessary. If we have a drought, and donors want to help those affected, we will accept the offers as genuine. But for them to impose their foreign policy because of aid is deplorable. We totally reject that in Namibia.


■ *Are you applying a policy of affirmative action?*

— Yes we are. The majority of Namibians were denied education and even employment for a long time. There were also whites who were denied rights, either because they were members of SWAPO or because they were sympathisers who stood for the principles of equality and human rights. They were subjected to all kinds of mistreatment, their children could not go to school, they had no jobs and no money. So we employ them: I have ministers who are whites in my government and even some who are not members of SWAPO.

■ *The creation of jobs has been government priority since independence. It is still a very serious problem. How confident are you of being able to overcome it?*

— The problem is very acute in the sense that we inherited one and a half million of our own citizens who are uneducated, untrained and unskilled. We have vast resources — uranium, gold, copper, zinc and so on, and we are unable to exploit them for the benefit of our people because we do not have the necessary educated and trained workforce. We did not even have skilled workers like bricklayers, plumbers or electricians, because every profession was reserved for whites.

We consider that having won the first phase of our struggle, for political emancipation, we are now in the second phase. This is the struggle for the economic empowerment of the indigenous people. We have the weapons but not the ammunition as yet. That ammunition is the education of our children as agriculturalists, veterinarians, geologists, marine biologists and so on. So we have been investing in and paying particular atten-



The Courier

tion to education at all levels — primary, secondary and university. We established a university two years ago (although it has not yet got all the faculties), and we have created several technical institutions. Others are being created at regional level. We set up the Development Brigade Corporation, a parastatal, specifically to provide vocational training for electricians, mechanics, carpenters, bricklayers and so on. It is even helping to train people who are illiterate — and we are already beginning to see the results. Some of the graduates have gone on to set up their own small businesses. Of course, it will take at least ten years to train the real professionals. We are not sitting down with our arms crossed. We have a programme in this area which we will certainly carry out.

■ *Mr President, no country can develop in isolation. There has to be some form of regional cooperation and integration. Relations between Namibia and South Africa have historically been very close. The end of apartheid and the assumption of office by the ANC have opened a completely new chapter in that relationship. Do you see integration with South Africa going faster than overall regional integration?*

'The problem of unemployment is very acute'
This is Katutura, a sprawling suburb of Windhoek and home to many Namibians who cannot find jobs

— Politically we in Namibia believe in the unity of Africa. First, we are striving to implement the Abuja Treaty of 1991 which established the Economic Community of Africa. That is our top priority as far as our foreign and national policies are concerned. We also attach great importance to the regional economic groupings like SADC and COMESA in which we are involved and we want to work together with other African economic groupings like Ecowas in West Africa and the Arab-Maghreb Union in North Africa. We see these as the ladders we need to climb and finally end up implementing the Abuja Treaty. That is our main objective in this area.

As to our relationship with South Africa, we are already together in the SADC family and we also have bilateral relations. As you say correctly, no country can live in isolation. South Africa is our closest neighbour and we have close economic ties. Much of our trade — over 70% — is with that country, and this will

probably continue to increase given the fact it has a larger population. For example, we would like to increase our beef, mutton and fish supplies to South Africa, and buy some of the things we need from there. Trade cooperation with South Africa will certainly be promoted by my government.

■ *Relations between the European Union and Namibia have strengthened since Namibia became independent five years ago. How do you see this relationship developing in future?*

— Cooperation between Namibia and the European Union since our independence has certainly been beneficial to Namibia. We sell our beef and other products to the EU and we receive substantial humanitarian assistance. I would like to stress this excellent relationship for which we are grateful. ■


Interview by A.O

Controlling and managing national resources

One of the most shameful aspects of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia was the inordinate exploitation, for decades, of the country's natural resources by all comers. Even as recently as 1986, a commission of enquiry under South African High Court Judge, Pieter Thirion, reported that mining companies were, among other malpractices, rapidly depleting Namibia's mineral resources. In the country's waters, which contain one of the richest fishing grounds in the world, fleets from several nations plundered the stocks. The greatest challenge facing SWAPO, on coming to power, was to put an end to this 'pillaging', take control of the country's natural resource base, particularly its minerals and fish stocks (which, together with livestock, make up the backbone of the economy) and get to grips with economic management.

Namibia is effectively a minerals 'paradise', coming high in the world rankings in a variety of products. It is the leading producer of gem-diamonds (accounting for around 30% of the world's total output), has the largest uranium mine and some of the biggest known reserves of tin and lithium. It is also the world's second largest producer of lead, third in cadmium production and fourth in zinc and copper. Other important minerals include tungsten, silver, gold, vanadium and salt. Mining accounts for 28% of the Gross Domestic Product and over 70% of export earnings. Three big foreign companies linked to South Africa dominate the sector — Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM), owned by De Beers, in diamond mining, Rössing, part of the Rio Tinto-Zinc (RTZ) group, in uranium and The Tsumeb Corporation in base-metals.

Of all the new arrangements which the government has made with the mining companies, none is as interesting as the one with CDM. It has taken a 50% equity share alongside CDM in a new company called NAMDEB Corporation which began operation in November last year. The Government not only expects higher revenues from this arrangement, but also hopes, above all, to gain a better knowledge of how the diamond industry operates. 'We want to know what goes on, how much is produced and actually sold and eventually have a say as to where the diamonds go', says Trade and Industry Minister, *Hidipo Hamutenya*. He con-



tinues; 'We will also learn how diamonds are cut and polished. It would be very irresponsible of us not to do this as a diamond producing country. India, which has no diamond deposits, has a huge industry cutting and polishing our diamonds — which are then brought back here and sold to us. They only add value and we pay exorbitant prices. We can actually establish our own cutting and polishing industry.'

CDM has shown pragmatism in coming to this type of arrangement in Southern Africa: it has a similar one with Botswana, for example. Although Namibia provides less than 5% of the De Beers group's overall diamond production, it is

responsible for no less than 98% of the conglomerate's gemstone output. In 1989, CDM transferred its sorting and valuation activities from South Africa to its gleaming, high-rise offices on Independence Avenue in Windhoek, bringing in the process, a number of jobs for Namibians.


Fishing

As already mentioned, Namibia has one of the richest fishing grounds in the world. At one time, the sector was second only in importance to mining. However, it was dominated by foreign interests. Inshore fishing for pilchards, rock lobsters and anchovies was controlled by

Ore crusher at the Rössing uranium mine
Namibia is effectively a minerals 'paradise'

South African companies based in Walvis Bay and Lüderitz while offshore fishing was the exclusive domain of foreign (particularly Spanish) distant water fleets, who took their catches to their home ports for processing.

The Government now appears to have established full control of the sector and has transformed fishing into a truly Namibian industry. It has done this mainly by stipulating that foreign fishing companies operating in the country's waters must be in joint-ventures with Namibians. Although Namibians themselves are free



The Courier

A scene from five years ago: a foreign trawler lies idle in Lüderitz harbour after being arrested for illegal fishing in Namibian waters
Pirate fishing is no longer a serious problem thanks to effective surveillance and enforcement

to establish their own companies, they are also being urged to go into partnership with foreign operators. The response has been encouraging: there are now a good number of local fishing companies, encouraged no doubt by a further stipulation that a certain portion of the fishing quota must be reserved for newcomers to the industry. Investment capital may be a problem for the indigenous entrepreneur, but the special quota allocation is designed to give them a strong bargaining chip. 'Once you have that piece of paper allocating you a quota, you can negotiate easily with a foreign partner, because you have the fish and they have the boats', says Agriculture Minister, *Nagola Mbumba*. 'We have also tried as much as possible to ensure that fish processing is carried out onshore in Namibia, so that jobs can be created. That has helped to make it even more a Namibian industry.' In fact, fish processing offers great potential for job creation. The development of Walvis Bay, especially the Export Processing Zone, will present opportunities that should enable the country to realise its full potential in terms of both employment and foreign earnings.

The government has been aware of the danger of overfishing since Namibia's independence and conservation has been a top priority. It has established an annual catch quota system for certain varieties, especially sardines which are known to move up and down the coast.

The result this year has been some unrest among fishermen because the quota was filled too early. Quotas are based on the results of scientific surveys. Although the 1994/95 quota of 50 000 metric tonnes, distributed among 50 companies, has been adjusted upwards, it is still smaller than that of 1992/93 season. Having received scientific advice that the stocks are moving towards Angola, the government has refused to increase the allowable catch any further, illustrating in the process its commitment to conservation.

The government is also in full control as far as the policing of Namibia's 200-mile exclusive economic zone is concerned. This is especially true, now that Walvis Bay has been transferred to Namibian sovereignty. South Africa's continued occupation of the enclave had been a hindrance. Some 25 foreign deep-sea trawlers are licensed to fish within the EEZ. 'We have taken action against those who challenged our 200-mile limit: we have arrested them and impounded their boats', says Mr Mbumba. 'It is well established that, for the past two years, no one has tried to fish illegally in our waters and we have had no trouble with anyone. We have been lucky enough to get powerful patrol boats from Norway and a

helicopter from Japan. And now that we have friendly neighbours to the South and to the North, we are coordinating surveillance and would catch anyone who tries any tricks.'

The environment and wildlife

Control has also been extended to the environment, which was considerably damaged by the effects of the old apartheid regime, as well as to another precious resource — the country's wildlife. Namibia's fragile ecology suffered in the past from the fact that indigenous people were obliged to live in the communal areas under apartheid and the result was overcrowding and deforestation. By contrast, the commercial farmlands, with just 4500 farms, were thinly populated. The effects of the policy are vividly revealed in Ovambo which is the most densely populated region. In addition, under the colonial regime, farmers received neither training nor advice in the crucial area of environmental protection. Namibia's livestock industry is the country's second largest foreign earner and this is reflected in the animal 'population' figures - more than 2 million cattle, 2 million goats and 3 million sheep. Overgrazing is a very serious problem, especially given that there are no possibilities of farming for fodder. Namibia's annual rainfall, which ranges from as little as 50mm in the south to 700mm in the north, renders this type of cultivation impossible.

In areas with some forest cover, deforestation is continuing due to demand for firewood. The government is taking measures to limit the damage. It provides agricultural advice services in communal areas and is encouraging small-scale tree planting and the use of alternative fuels such as biogas in Ovambo and elsewhere. Two years ago it began to encourage communal farmers to move to areas which provide better farming conditions and, in this regard, set up a loan scheme to enable them to buy the land.

As part of a tourism development programme which was drawn up with the assistance of the European Union, Namibia's wildlife resources are to be better managed. The aims are conserva-

tion and the development of eco-tourism, particularly in the communal areas. The plan being drawn up by the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism, which will be presented to Parliament for approval, involves giving responsibility for resource management to the communal farmers. Currently all animals in the communal areas belong to the state. Under the plan, which has already been approved by the cabinet, game on any farm will belong to the farmer in question. It will be his responsibility to protect and utilise the game. 'This will not only provide communal farmers with additional income but also help promote our policy of conservation,' says Minister of Wildlife and Tourism, *Gert Hanekom*.

This move is no doubt in recognition of the fact that game has always been an important source of food and income for Namibian farmers. Indeed, in the mid-1970s, when venison production reached its peak, a processing plant was set up in Windhoek with the assistance of the EU and a certain quantity was even exported to the European market. There are hopes that the industry can be revived, bearing in mind that, as a matter of policy, culling is undertaken to maintain the country's ecological balance.

Tourism: a major future player

It should be noted that Namibia's tourist industry grew remarkably in the period immediately after independence. The interest generated by this event brought a wave of curious visitors. Al-

though numbers have fallen somewhat in the past two years, Namibia has tasted the fruits of tourism and is serious about reversing this trend. Its objective is to attract more visitors and make the industry a major player in the country's economy. 'We have a lot to offer,' Mr Hanekom told *The Courier*. 'We are one of a handful of countries that have balanced and widespread attractions — desert, sea, game hunting, wildlife and so on. I feel sure that with the proper promotion, and expanded and improved services, we could attract more visitors.' Currently Namibia welcomes about 280 000 visitors a year. In Mr Hanekom's opinion, this figure could easily rise to 630 000 by 2002 in view of all the developments that are taking place.

Tourism is one of the areas that investors have shown considerable interest in over the past five years, and the government is counting on the private sector to expand the sector further. 'We intend to create a parastatal, a sort of Tourism Board, which will be controlled by the private sector and will be responsible for promoting, marketing and grading of hotels. It will take over all government resources — resorts, camps, game lodges, nature reserve parks and so on, and if possible, privatise them,' says the Minister.

As the government takes effective control of Namibia's resources and manages them rationally, revenues are beginning to come in. The country is not as cash-strapped as it was two or three years ago. That, in itself, has required the

government to exercise prudent economic management — an important factor in Namibia's good credit rating. It has borrowed moderately and kept its international debts low.

Although Namibia has introduced its own currency, the Namibian dollar, this is kept at parity with the rand and the latter is still legal tender in the country. Being in the Rand Monetary Area has, of course, restricted the scope for an independent economic policy. Inflation is currently running at 12% *per annum*. However, the government has prevented it rising faster through the operation of a tight monetary policy. It has resisted the temptation to print more money in times of difficulty or to increase spending now that revenues have increased. 'We observe international standards because we do not live in isolation,' says Deputy Finance Minister, *B. Kukuri*. 'Even when we have deficits, we finance them in a way that does not endanger our future development. We have been able to keep the deficits down to around 5% of GDP which is the internationally accepted level.'

These five years of independence have been a period of establishment and consolidation. Despite the difficulties, the verdict appears to be that SWAPO has accomplished a great deal and is poised to realise its major goals of creating jobs and improving the standards of living of the majority black population. ■ A.O.

*Aiming to attract the tourist dollar
Namibia hopes to more than double
the number of visitors by 2002*



Improving living conditions: problems and prospects

In 1990, when SWAPO came to power, it promised to improve living conditions and fight poverty and ignorance through job creation and education — a tall order for an organisation which had been fighting in the bush for over 23 years. Namibia has a narrowly based economy and its population is largely uneducated, untrained and unskilled. Although it has a relatively high GDP *per capita* of around US \$1500, income distribution is highly distorted in favour of the white minority.

Ask any Namibian minister what the achievements of the government have been during these five years of independence and he will almost certainly refer, first and foremost, to the establishment of peace and harmony in the country — 'rare commodities in the world today and a prerequisite for whatever will follow,' says Prime Minister *Hage Geingob*. What has been achieved in terms of improved living conditions and better education may seem modest when measured against the magnitude of the problems. Yet SWAPO's performance has been magnificent given the meagreness of the resources at its disposal.

Projects such as the renovation and rehousing scheme in Katutura, construction of better highways and rural roads, new schools, clinics and so on are visible evidence of the efforts that are being made. Measures have been taken that are quietly relieving the harsh living conditions and laying the foundations for sustained economic development.

Land distribution

The question of land distribution, which is at the root of the imbalance in income distribution, has been dealt with elsewhere in this Report. A Land Act has been passed which aims, in the long term, at giving indigenous Namibians greater access to land. In the meantime, the focus

has been on boosting the agricultural production of the 980 000 Namibians who live on just 23% of the viable communal land. About a quarter of these (some 250 000) are livestock producers in the north. For many years, these small-scale farmers were effectively denied participation in the mainstream cash economy thanks to a veterinary cordon fence that was erected to prevent their cattle moving southward where white commercial farmers produce for export. Livestock in Namibia graze on free range.

Beef production is the most important agricultural activity, accounting for 90% of commercial output. 80% of the beef produced is exported to South Africa and the European Union, both of which impose strict health requirements. The amount of smallholder production reaching South Africa is less than 1% of total exports, the rest being sold domestically either live or as carcasses.

The veterinary cordon fence is designed to keep out foot and mouth disease to which northern Namibia is exposed from neighbouring countries. The purpose is to retain the country's international classification as a disease-free area and thus maintain its access for beef to the EU market where it has a quota and enjoys preferential prices. When the Government assumed office, it was faced with the

dilemma of either removing the fence and risk ruining a vital industry, or tolerating the continuing injustice against communal farmers by taking no action. It came up instead with a creative scheme which involves intensive vaccination of smallholder stocks. With the help of the EU, it has also been setting up new quarantine areas where farmers wishing to sell their animals can have them properly checked and declared fit before being sold to a farmers' meat processing company which the Ministry of Agriculture has helped set up. The company has processing plants in Windhoek, Okahandja, Oshakati and elsewhere. 'We are pleased that with this scheme, our farmers now have access to the market which they did not have previously,' says Minister of Agriculture, *Nagola Mbumba*. 'If they want to sell their cattle, they can do so and get better prices. We are also providing a certain amount of subsidy to those whose animals are underweight.'

Although Namibia is self-sufficient in beef, it imports 90% of its other food requirements. This is a result of both history and geography. The colonial government did nothing to encourage cultivation of food crops which were easily

Free range grazing
The government faced a dilemma over
the veterinary cordon fence

The Courier



imported from South Africa. Furthermore, most of the country is only suitable for livestock. Just 5% of the land is arable, and this is situated in the far north where rainfall reaches 700mm *per annum*. Here, 50% of Namibia's population is engaged in subsistence farming, producing mainly maize, millet and sorghum. There are also a few large-scale arable farms around Tsumeb. It has recently been discovered that grain could be grown in the south on the border with South Africa, along the Orange river basin where some farmers already produce grapes for export. The possibility of crop farming under irrigation exists on the Okavango and Zambezi rivers in the north. Despite this potential, it is generally agreed that Namibia will never produce enough grain to meet its needs. However, measures have been taken to help farmers increase output. These include the establishment of rural and agricultural development centres where they can buy seeds, fertilisers and cheap equipment and the provision of credit facilities. The aim, according to Mr Mbumba, is to ensure that domestic production covers at least 50% of requirements. Each farmer is being encouraged to produce more of what he or she is best at. These measures are already producing positive results: last year, Namibia, produced enough food to meet 60% of its domestic consumption, well above the target, but it is not known whether this is sustainable. However, the Government is going ahead with plans for greater monetisation of the sector. A scheme is now in place whereby surplus production is being bought from farmers. According to the Agriculture Minister, 'we have, for the first time, introduced a milling system for millet and have been able, as a result, to put millet meals on the supermarket shelves where they are selling well.'

It should be noted that in both livestock and crop production, the tendency is towards further processing. This fits neatly into the Government's plans for industry and the private sector as a whole and has played a significant role in creating a number of new employment opportunities.

Government resources

These development activities have been strongly supported by donors who have taken a keen interest in Namibia over the past five years. International assistance to the country has doubled during the period to \$140 million, according to a UNDP source. However, inadequate resources have placed severe limitations on the scale and number of projects, and the lack of access to concessionary loans has not helped. Namibia's high income *per capita* disqualifies it from such loans, an unjust situation given the huge income distortions in the country. The living conditions of the black majority are as bad as those in many of the least developed countries.

Fortunately, the outlook for government finances is good. Studies have shown that there is considerable scope for expansion of the tax base and for increased revenues from the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) which Namibia joined at independence. The SACU currently provides one-third of all income (about one billion rand annually), but experts think that Namibia could earn considerably more. Since establishing its Customs and Exercise Department two years ago, the country has gained a better idea of what it is worth under the arrangements and it believes it is currently losing out. In support of this, Namibians cite the fact that there are bigger volumes of imports and exports passing through their country than through Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho — witness the heavy daily traffic of goods, particularly copper, from Zaire and Zambia, heading towards Walvis Bay for transshipment. Although Namibia expects to be compensated adequately when the review of SACU currently under way is completed, it has also commissioned a study from a British firm to determine how much customs revenues it could earn annually if it left the system.

Job creation

As large numbers of Namibians leave the rural areas daily for the cities, unemployment has become an extremely serious and even dangerous problem. Indeed had the government not been

fortunate enough to have the civil service absorb the pressure, the situation would almost certainly have resulted in civil disorder. Through its policy of affirmative action aimed at correcting past injustices, the government has recruited massively, mainly from among SWAPO members and supporters. These were people who were barred from the civil service for nearly three decades for political reasons. Yet there are still quite a large number who could not be accommodated, as illustrated when former SWAPO guerillas took to the streets last May in protest against unemployment. This is partly due, of course, to the fact that the authorities, in pursuit of their policy of national reconciliation, had to retain all the 48 000 civil servants already in post. The result is a public service that is clearly overmanned for a population of only 1.5 million.

Namibia, unlike most other African countries, does not have to account to the IMF. It is neither heavily in debt nor subject to any structural adjustment programme. It owes less than US\$150 million and has agreed with the new South African government that it is the latter's responsibility to settle Namibia's modest colonial debt. But the country needs all the money it can get on the revenue side if it is to cope with public capital investment and wage bills without having to resort to large-scale borrowing.

If unemployment is acute today, it is because the private sector in general has failed to create as many jobs as were hoped for at independence five years ago. Namibia's largely uneducated and untrained labour force has been a major factor in this situation. Not only has it represented a disincentive for possible investors: those enterprises already in the country have also had tremendous difficulties filling vacant positions, even for such skills as secretaries. According to *Ryno Ritter*, deputy general manager of Ohlthaver and List, Namibia's largest brewery, 'a qualified secretary today can be sure of being snapped up immediately with a good salary.' But this is the legacy of apartheid about which the government can do little in the short to medium term. On the other hand, the tremendous efforts it has put into vocational training for self-employment are happily beginning to



The Courier

produce results as evidenced in the strong growth of the informal sector over the past three years. Additionally, the government is investing heavily in education, not just to provide a longer term solution to the unemployment crisis, but also to create what Deputy Minister of Finance, *B. Kukuri* describes as 'the enabling environment for future economic development.'

Political calculations

Aside from the skills shortage, calculations about political developments in both Namibia and South Africa have influenced the actions of possible employers. Shortly before independence, there was a flight of capital to South Africa reflecting the wariness of some investors about SWAPO's political orientation. On the other hand, a good number of foreign investors began, at the same time, to express interest in the country. Not all of the latter's plans materialised, however, on account of the changes taking place in South Africa. They had the idea of establishing in Namibia to tap into the South African market, but decided instead to bide their time. As Prime Minister Geingob frankly put it, 'with the end of apartheid in sight, why go for the second best. South Africa is more attractive.'

To attract Namibian capital back to the country, the Ministry of Finance has introduced a regulation requiring financial institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds to invest at least 25% of their portfolios locally. Thanks to the Namibian Stock Exchange, which was set up over a year ago, investors have been able to comply by repatriating funds from South Africa to purchase shares in Namibia. Currently the problem is not so much a shortage of capital as the absence of viable areas for investment.

As SWAPO begins its second term in office the overall outlook for the private sector is bright. Namibia has succeeded in diversifying its markets with preferential access, for example, to the European Union through the Lomé Convention. Meanwhile, the prospects for diversifying in the traditional livestock, food crops and fisheries sectors have never looked brighter. Last year's transfer of Walvis Bay to Namibian sovereignty, and the construction of the Trans-Caprivi and Trans-Kalahari highways, which are due to be completed next year, should give the country comparative advantages and a competitive position which is much stronger than at the time of independence. Suddenly the smallness of Namibia's domestic market seem less relevant as the

Exiles who returned to Namibia at the time of independence hoped for a brighter future. The government has done a lot to fulfil their hopes, on very limited resources, but the job queues are still too long

country moves resolutely in an export-oriented direction. It now has the regional (SADC), continental and European markets within easy reach. 'We see ourselves as ideally located in Southern Africa', explains Trade and Industry Minister *Hidipo Hamutenya*. 'We have a common border with Angola, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana, And we have up-to-date infrastructures which are among the best on the African continent, whether in terms of roads, telecommunications, banks, hotels, schools or medical facilities. Investors, who locate in Namibia, can send their goods across the border into the huge Angolan market which is emerging. We do not see any reason, for example, why a garment manufacturer cannot do as well here as in India, Malaysia or Hong Kong. We are also linked to Zaire via the Trans-Caprivi highway.'

Walvis Bay offers key to greater prosperity

Walvis Bay lies at the heart of Namibia's integrated national industrial



Windhoek Railway Station
*'We have up-to-date infrastructures
 which are among the best on the
 African continent'*

strategy. The only deep-water port in the region, it currently deals with two million tons of cargo annually. This is largely thanks to the new bulk terminal, completed early this year, which handles export products such as manganese and fluorspar and imports of coal and grain. The plan is to increase capacity to 4.5m by dredging, building more berths and increasing warehouse and cold storage facilities, thus making it even more attractive *vis-a-vis* Cape Town or Durban. US\$ 11 million is understood already to have been provided by the German Government for the work, which Mr Hamutenya expects to begin early next year.

Allied to this project is the establishment of an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Walvis Bay. This idea, which has been greeted enthusiastically in Namibia, includes the creation of linkages with industries elsewhere in the country. The Walvis Bay municipality has, on its own account, already earmarked a site and begun work on infrastructures. 'All the key elements are now in place,' says Mr Hamutenya. An 'Offshore Development Company', in which the Government currently has a 15% holding, has been set up under the EPZ Act to encourage would-be operators. It will act as 'an umbrella service for all enterprises registered to

operate in Namibia as offshore enterprises, including export processing zone enterprises and financial concerns.'

The Government expects most of EPZ's infrastructures — factory shells, roads, water, sewerage and workers' housing — to be provided by private entrepreneurs. Several, understandably, have expressed an interest. In May, a meeting organised by the Trade and Industry Minister attracted a good attendance of business executives from South Africa, Europe and North America, as well as officials from the International Finance Corporation and other funding agencies. The participants exchanged views on the government's business plans for the EPZ. Although no immediate concrete results emerged, the authorities are confident of a good response to its call for investments. It is offering a variety of incentives, notably full exemption from customs duties and taxes, inexpensive labour and a peaceful industrial climate. As regards the last-mentioned, the government has enacted a statute exempting the EPZ from the application of certain aspects of Namibia's Industrial Relations Act. This move has infuriated trade union leaders who interpret it as a licence to exploit workers. But as Mr Hamutenya stressed to *The Courier*, 'just as the labour movement feels that

workers will be exploited, there is a feeling that too much application of the labour laws can lead to instability. Investors do not want to invest their money in a place which is riddled with strikes and unrest.' Namibia is wagering on the success of Walvis Bay's EPZ — and if they win the bet, the result could be many more jobs and better living standards for many Namibian citizens. ■

A.O

Profile

Natural features

Namibia has a total land area of 824 000 square kilometres and borders five countries — Angola, Botswana, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is semi-arid and has erratic rainfall ranging from an annual average of 50mm in the south to 700mm in the Caprivi Strip in the north-east. Only half of the land area is suitable for farming. The Namib desert runs along the whole of the Atlantic seaboard (a distance of about

1600 km) with a width ranging between 65 km and 160 km. The country is 16% desert, 20% woodland and 64% savannah, the last-mentioned being characterised by grassland with some trees and shrubs.

Population

There are about 1.4 million Namibians from 11 different ethnic groups. Just under 4% of the population is white. 75% of those living in the country depend on livestock and agriculture for their livelihood.

Main population centres


Windhoek (the capital), Tsumeb, Lüderitz, Oranjemund, Walvis Bay, On-dangwa, Keetmanshoop.

Political system


Multi-party democracy consisting of a directly-elected executive President (who is also Head of State) and a unicameral Parliament elected by proportional representation. The current President is Sam Nujoma.

Economy

Namibia's economy is based on agriculture (10% of GDP), mining (29%) and fisheries (14%). The main agriculture commodity is livestock. Mineral deposits currently being exploited include diamonds, uranium, tin, lithium, cadmium, copper, zinc, lead, gold and silver. Manufacturing accounts for just 7% of GDP.



Source - UN



Namibia-EU cooperation

Helping to redress the imbalances

by Roger Leenders*

The Republic of Namibia gained its independence in March 1990 and its constitution is considered to be one of the most democratic in the history of Africa south of the Sahara. The country became, in December of the same year, the 69th ACP State when it signed the Lomé Convention. Namibia has a very low population density — its estimated 1.5 million inhabitants are scattered across a vast territory of 825 000 square kilometres, of which only 42% is usable for agricultural purposes.

When one looks at the *per capita* income figures, Namibia does not appear to be a particularly poor country. From recent data, GNP per head is estimated at between US\$1300 and US\$1500. However, the distribution of income and wealth is extremely uneven. The population of certain parts of the country ranks among the poorest on the continent while a small percentage of the inhabitants can be classified among the richest in the world.

Since independence, the Government has adopted a policy of reconciliation and affirmative action. This entails attempting, on the one hand, to favour the previously disadvantaged sections of the population while, on the other, seeking to create a more harmonious multi-racial society. By and large, the approach has been pragmatic, building on good things from the past and making development benefits available to a larger part of the population.

The economic base of Namibia is somewhat limited. Mining, although in decline, remains an important source of revenue while fishing has gained in importance in the five years since independence. Tourism is also a sector now recognised as having good potential for development, especially in the field of job creation. The

private sector is relatively strong — certainly in comparison to most other African countries.

Namibia's external debt amounts only to about US\$130 million and it is Government policy to maintain the debt — and hence the servicing commitment — at a very low level.

EC support in the early days

Prior to independence, Namibia received assistance from the European Commission through various budget lines, with most of the aid being channelled through non-governmental organisations. The United Nations Institute for Namibia (UNIN), located in Lusaka, Zambia, also received substantial financial support.

Although the country joined the Lomé system in December 1990, the first National Indicative Programme was not signed until March 1992. In order to assist Namibia before the financial resources allocated under Lomé IV could be utilised, the European Commission, exceptionally, made some ECU 33.5 million available under separate budget lines, during 1991 and 1992. These funds were mobilised in support of 53 different projects.

Lomé IV

Under the first financial protocol of the Convention, ECU 50m has been made available to Namibia for programmable assistance in the form of grants (the *National Indicative Programme*). Agreement was subsequently reached between the Government and the Commission to concentrate this funding on three focal sectors: agriculture and rural development (40% of the total), health (30%) and education/human resources (20%). The

remaining 10% was to be made available for activities outwith these sectors.

By May 1995, ECU 30.9m of the NIP had been allocated to projects while new financing proposals to the tune of ECU 16.8m had been submitted to the Commission. This means that, by the end of the year, it is anticipated that 95% of Namibia's financial envelope will have been committed.

The country has also received various forms of non-programmable aid. In March 1993, the Commission approved a grant of ECU 40m under the *Sysmin* facility. The programme financed with these funds, which consists of a portfolio of 12 projects, aims at reversing the unfavourable trends experienced by the mining sector in recent years. It will contribute to:

- safeguarding production and the earning capacity of the sector;
- broadening the production base, through diversification and integration of the mining sector into the wider economy;
- improving the geological and mineral data base, and;
- expanding training facilities

By May 1995, 44% of the allocation had been committed.

Within the framework of *regional cooperation* between the European Community and the SADC member states, Namibia benefits from support in a number of areas, including the development of trade and services, the establishment of sea fisheries inspectorates, the creation of a regional marine data base and customs training. In the field of transport, Namibia also has a particular interest in the regional support provided for the Trans-Caprivi Highway.

Another significant element of non-programmable assistance under Lomé IV is to be found in the *Beef Protocol*. When Namibia joined the Convention, it was granted a quota for export to the EU market of 60 000t of deboned beef over the period 1991-1995. In 1994, the country exported almost 11 000t to the Union, valued at some N\$216m, under this arrangement. Since 1994, Namibia has also had access to an import quota for *seedless grapes*. For the period December 1994-January 1995 the Commission granted a duty-free concession of 400 tonnes and a

* Head of the European Commission Delegation in Namibia

further reference quantity of 100 tonnes was provided for February-March 1995.

Cooperation outside the Convention

The Lomé Convention is not the only source of financial and other support made available to Namibia by the European Community. The country has been the recipient of *food aid* in the shape of 15 000 tonnes of cereals, 427 tonnes of beans and 267 tonnes of dried fish. The counterpart funds generated from the domestic sale of two thirds of the cereals supplied amounted to N\$4.4m. By May 1995, 82% of these funds had been spent on 20 projects at the request of the National Authorising Officer.

In the area of support for *non-governmental organisations*, the Commission has co-financed more than 40 projects since independence with a financial commitment of ECU 3.6m. Support and technical assistance have also been provided to the Ministry of Health and Social Services in the context of the Community's *AIDS/STD Control Programme*. In 1993, *emergency aid* was supplied in the shape of financial support for the drilling of 20 boreholes in the former Namaland region. This region



The Courier

was badly affected by the drought of 1992-93. A total of ECU 1.9m has been spent on a range of projects under other European Community budget lines covering *nature conservation, human rights and democracy and rehabilitation in Southern Africa*.

Finally, the European Investment Bank has approved four loans at preferential interest rates for investments in

Uranium mining
A programme funded under Sysmin aims at reversing the unfavourable trends experienced by the mining sector in recent years

Namibia. The total sum involved here is ECU 22.5m of which ECU 17m comes from the bank's own resources (with an interest bonus of ECU 3.2m financed by the EDF). The remaining ECU 5.5m has been provided as risk capital, supplied by the EDF and managed by the EIB. ■ R.L.

European Community financial support to Namibia

	ECU (thousands)
EC budget	
Various budget lines (mainly predating Namibia's accession to Lomé IV)	33 581
Emergency aid	180
Aids control programme	755
Food aid	4 470
NGO co-financing	3 636
<i>(Sub total)</i>	<i>42 622</i>
Lomé IV	
National Indicative Programme	50 000
Sysmin	40 000
EIB funding from EDF resources	8 735
<i>(Sub total)</i>	<i>98 735</i>
Total	141 357



SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa, a region covering nearly 7 million square kilometres with a population of more than 120 million has had more than its fair share of political, social and economic upheaval. Unlike other parts of Africa, decolonisation was long in coming and, for some, colonialism only finally ended in April 1994 with the first multiracial elections in South Africa. There are few areas of the world where racial criteria have, over time, acquired such significance and where the fight against racial discrimination has left in its wake so much suffering and displacement of peoples. Today, on the threshold of the 21st century, Southern Africa faces the same challenges as the rest of the planet but it appears to be more united and resolute than ever in confronting the problems it must solve. The winds of change — and hope — finally seem to be blowing over this end of the continent.


The state of democracy

The 11 member states of the SADC (Southern African Development Community) have, for some years, been undergoing far-reaching socio-economic and political transformations. Countries which, in the wake of independence, had opted for Marxist-Leninist-inspired economic models, referred to by some as 'Afromarxism', have today turned towards economic liberalism and are implementing structural adjustment programmes. In parallel with this economic liberalisation, the world is also witnessing major political reforms. The authoritarian regimes established after independence have, with only a few exceptions, given way to democratically elected regimes. In the 1960s, Botswana was the democratic exception in the region. Today, it is only in Angola and Swaziland that fully-fledged multi-party systems have not taken

root. The most important milestone in this wave of democratisation was undoubtedly the ending of apartheid in South Africa. The advent of democracy in that country put an end to several years of destabilisation and warfare orchestrated by the racist Pretoria regime. The arrival as Head of State of Frederick de Klerk, less of a warmonger and more pragmatic than his predecessor, has had a direct influence on the destiny of neighbouring countries. Namibia, which was under South African occupation, finally became independent in 1990. In Mozambique, peace was restored in 1992 — an event at least partly due to the withdrawal of financial and military aid previously supplied by Pretoria to the Renamo rebels. Recent political changes in South Africa have obviously left a deep impression on the region, but it should be

recognised that the decisive factor affecting the political and economic destiny of the region — and above all, that of South Africa itself — has been the fall of communism and the ending of the Cold War.

In order better to understand the changes which have affected the member countries of SADC, The Courier offers here a review of the political, economic and social situation currently prevailing in seven member states of this organisation. Angola, Mozambique and South Africa are not included because they are dealt with individually in other articles in the Dossier. Namibia, is dealt with in greater depth in a Country Report in this issue.



The Courier

Zambia: still awaiting economic upturn

Zambian copper mine
Even today, over 80% of Zambia's export income comes from copper

Since independence in 1964, Zambia has had only two presidents: Kenneth Kaunda and Frederick Chiluba, and it was not until October 1991, after democratic elections, that the former finally took over the reins from the latter. This somewhat forced handover of powers occurred under the influence of combined pressure from international donors and a population weary of 27 years of 'monopoly' power, which had been disastrous both economically and socially.

At the time of independence, the mood was more one of euphoria. Not only had Northern Rhodesia, now Zambia, shaken itself free of British rule, but the country also had enormous mineral resources, particularly copper, which enabled it to look to the future with some confidence. The government of Kenneth Kaunda and the party he led, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) therefore set about an ambitious modernisation programme. The positive effects were rapidly felt and, by the end of the 1960s, the average income of Zambians was one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.

When, at the beginning of the 1970s, the price of copper began to fall on international markets, a rapid decline set in. The country in fact depended absolutely

on this mineral. Even today, over 80% of Zambia's export income comes from copper mining. The government, which was not far-sighted enough to diversify the economy, sought to blame its difficulties on the outside world. At the time, the government of Ian Smith in Rhodesia, together with South Africa and the Portuguese authorities still in power in Angola and Mozambique, were overtly hostile to the Lusaka regime. However, this alone is not enough to explain the deterioration of the Zambian economy. In the early 1980s, when two of these destabilising factors had disappeared (Mozambique and Angola had been independent since 1975 and Rhodesia became Zimbabwe in 1980), the living conditions of the Zambian people continued to decline and economic crisis followed in its wake.

In 1983, the Zambian government approached the IMF and implemented a series of strict policies. The withdrawal of subsidies for maize flour, the staple foodstuff of the majority of Zambians, together with an increase in the price of fuel unleashed a general outcry from the population. Strikes and demonstrations took place throughout the country. Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s, President Kaunda, having progressively concentrated all power in his hands, was

obliged to let go and he authorised the holding of multi-party elections which took place on 31 October 1991. The MMD (Movement for Multi-Party Democracy) took 125 of the 150 seats in the National Assembly. Its leader, Frederick Chiluba, a former trade union leader, became the country's new President, winning 76% of the vote. It is worth noting that the turnout was only 45.4%, a figure explained not only by material and technical deficiencies at the time of the elections but also by the profound lassitude and disillusionment of many Zambians vis-à-vis their political class. The choice offered to the population on the eve of the elections was not one to engender strong loyalties. The outgoing regime may have been almost moribund but the MMD campaign focused relentlessly on criticism of the Kaunda government's record with few solutions or ideas for solving the crisis. In addition, many politicians, seeing how the wind was blowing, left the UNIP to join the MMD. In general, those electors who cast a ballot did so to register a protest against the UNIP. They voted for change but not, it appears, to express any overwhelming enthusiasm for the MMD.

Today, more than three years after the election, most observers agree that the changes introduced by the new regime have been slow and not particularly radical. The economic and financial situation has barely improved and Zambia still has one of the biggest debts *per capita* in the African continent (totalling \$6.2 billion). Moreover, its dependence on copper is as great as ever and the population has seen no improvement in living conditions. The people have had to bear the brunt of the adjustment policy implemented by the government, at the energetic instigation of the international financial institutions. This policy, combined with an inflation rate of 60% in 1994, has had a damaging effect on Zambian society. The social costs of measures designed to relaunch the economy have seen the tolerance threshold of ordinary Zambians sorely tested. Criminality and delinquency are on the increase in major towns and cities and budget cuts have affected health and education in particular. Rural dwellers, already hit by the 1992 drought, are finding it increasingly difficult to make ends meet. Finally, according to at least some observers, favouritism, embezzlement and corruption remain in the system, allegedly to be found at all levels of society.

The current leaders are finding it increasingly difficult to justify the sacrifices they impose on the population in the name of economic revival and a more prosperous future and, although Zambia is today a democracy, the Zambians need to feel the benefits of it very rapidly if the democratic system is to take root in the longer term.

Malawi: the *ancien régime* finally crumbles

This small state at the centre of Southern Africa has also seen the advent of democracy after several decades of an authoritarian monopoly on power. For nearly 30 years, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, self-proclaimed president-for-life, and his party, the MCP (Malawi Congress Party) governed the country with an iron fist under the benevolent gaze of the West and of South Africa. At the height of the Cold War, President Banda's virulent anticommunism was welcomed and a

election were the United Democratic Front (UDF) headed by Bakili Muluzi, the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) with Chafukwa Chihana as leader, and the MCP of Kamuzu Banda. In the presidential poll, Muluzi won 47% of the votes against 33% for Banda and 19.5% for Chihana. The outcome was similar in the legislative elections. Of the 177 seats in parliament, the UDF took 85, the MCP took 56 and the AFORD 36. A more detailed analysis of the results reveals a sharp regional and ethnic divide. The North voted overwhelmingly for the AFORD, the centre (President Banda's homeland) not surprisingly stayed mainly with the MCP, while the South, where 50% of the population is concentrated, voted for the UDF.

If President Muluzi is to avoid ethnic conflict and regional imbalances in the future, he will have to implement a more harmonious and egalitarian policy than his predecessor. The latter, when in power, outrageously favoured the centre

before falling out of favour. These people appear to have been ousted because they were seen as a threat to the dictator rather than on account of their reforming ideas.

President Muluzi himself was a minister and then General Secretary of the MCP until his exclusion in 1982. This has prompted some local journalists to suggest that there has been more of a facelift than a real change. However, the very fact that it is possible overtly to express this kind of criticism reveals that something fundamental has changed in Malawi.

The former dictatorship is now just a bad memory and democracy, with all it implies (freedom of association, freedom of expression, etc.), has become a reality. Moreover, the citizens of Malawi no longer refrain from expressing their criticism and their disappointments, which are many. The promises made on the eve of the elections are taking time to materialise and the people are still waiting for the anti-poverty programme, officially launched by the government, to bear fruit.

In economic terms, Malawi is still on a dripfeed. It depends heavily on external aid, a fact which prompts real questions about the extent of its independence vis-à-vis the outside. In this, however, its situation is no different from that of many other developing countries. Like the majority of African states, it is having to implement an austerity plan strongly 'recommended' to it by international donors while, at the same time, striving to meet the needs of its citizens, over 50% of whom live below the poverty line.

To this, one might add rapid population growth, chronic malnutrition, a serious AIDS problem, a barely productive agricultural sector and the challenge of keeping corruption at bay. The depressing legacy of the Banda era is that Malawi is one of the world's poorest countries. On the other hand, the days of the government doing exactly what it wanted, without being answerable to anyone, are well and truly over. The hope must be that now democracy is in place, the dynamic forces of the country and its people will come to the fore allowing them to take proper control of their own destiny and to become genuinely involved in running their own country.



Picking tea in Malawi
The population is waiting for the anti-poverty programme, launched by the government, to bear fruit

blind eye was turned to the countless exactions and violations of human rights committed by his regime. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the near-disappearance of communism, Malawi became less attractive to Western powers. Suddenly, more circumspect on matters of human rights, they finally suspended the economic aid Malawi depended on for its survival. Faced with international repudiation and an increasingly explosive internal social situation, the regime had little choice. In 1993, President Banda announced a referendum on setting up a multi-party system. With 63% of votes in favour, the regime's opponents won their first victory over the nonagenarian dictator. The breach thus opened could not be resealed and President Banda was compelled to promise early free and democratic elections. They took place on 17 May 1994. The three main parties in then

and, notably, made his mother tongue (Chichewa) Malawi's official language, although it was spoken by only a minority of the people. In order to avoid increased regional fragmentation, the UDF needs to acquire a national dimension. After the elections, Muluzi's party allied itself with the AFORD, enabling them to have an absolute majority in parliament and to be more representative nationally. The two groups, however, have little in common. AFORD is seen by neutral commentators as a party untarnished by links with the *ancien régime*. The UDF, on the other hand, includes a number who were involved, to a greater or lesser extent, with the government of former President Banda

Tanzania: multi-party system in the pipeline

Unlike most African countries which have changed over from a single-party regime to a multi-party system in a rapid and often disorderly fashion, Tanzania is making its transition to democracy both prudently and slowly — too slowly, according to some foreign donors. Once again, it is the latter who are exerting pressure on the Tanzanian regime to become more liberal. Interestingly, one of the earliest and most trenchant critics of the government is former President Julius Nyerere, who led the country from independence in 1961 until 1985, when he voluntarily left office. Nyerere is not slow to denounce what he sees as the faults and failings of the CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi), the single party currently in power. He has been openly critical of the alleged slowness of the authorities, corruption, apathy and the government's apparent inability to take account of the population's opinions and needs. These unflattering comments, together with a stagnant economy, have helped to influence the government of his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, in the direction of political and economic liberalisation. Opposition parties have been authorised, an independent press has developed and an electoral commission has been set up to organise and monitor the electoral process which should result in democratic general elections in October 1995. Since the Tanzanian parliament authorised the creation of new political formations in May 1992, 12 opposition parties have sprung up. However, if supporters of these parties wish to avoid what happened in Kenya, where the outgoing party won in the face of a divided opposition, it will have to form alliances and present a more united front. Such a move has already been made by four parties which have rallied round a single candidate (a former CCM minister). There is little doubt that in the run-up to the October election, Tanzanian politics will be dominated by the inevitable jostling for position as parties seek to come up with candidates capable of winning the presidential poll.

With liberalisation, however, a whole series of latent problems has re-

surfaced. Religious and racial tensions have multiplied, particularly in Zanzibar where claims for autonomy are becoming increasingly vehement. Some are calling into question the 1964 union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar (the current Tanzania) and claim that a form of federation or confederation may be necessary. The new government to be elected in October will have to deal with this thorny problem very quickly. The advent of democracy could also spring a few nasty surprises on the new leaders. The freedom thus created will not, as was possible in the past, allow the 'evils' of Tanzanian society to be covered up. In this multi-denominational and multi-ethnic society, there is a great risk of seeing prejudices and rancour resurfacing, particularly if economic and social problems are exacerbated. In the long term, the territorial integrity of Tanzania may be threatened, particularly if the economic situation deteriorates any further.

Zimbabwe: election result a foregone conclusion


Political life in Zimbabwe holds very few surprises. For 15 years, Robert Mugabe has been Head of State and for 15 years his party, ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front) has run the country. The incumbent party's victory in the legislative elections on 8 and 9 April 1995 once again confirmed the President's firm grip on power.

ZANU-PF's victory is not difficult to explain. Of the 150 seats in parliament, 30 are nominated directly by the President. The government also controls the bulk of

the media which gives it a distinct advantage in election campaigns. In addition, ZANU-PF is the only political group to receive government financing as the country's constitution states that a party must have at least 15 seats in parliament to receive campaign funds. Finally, there are divisions among the opposition — the parties involved lack credibility at times and their manifestos do not appear to offer a genuine alternative. The result of all this is that of the 120 directly elected MPs, only two are opponents of the ruling party. Democratic debate is accordingly skewed with the field clear for ZANU-PF to have its mandate automatically renewed every five years. This is not to say that the people have had the wool pulled over their eyes as election turnouts (which have never exceeded 60%) would seem to testify. Nevertheless, the stakes are high. Over the last five years, the country has experienced serious economic difficulties, the rate of unemployment having quadrupled since independence in 1980. Today, almost 45% of the population is out of work. The inflation rate is around 25% and the country has to devote more than 20% of its budget to servicing its external debt. Finally, and as one would expect, Zimbabweans too are paying the costs of the adjustment policies advocated by the Bretton Woods institutions.

Although the President still attracts support because of the role he played during the war of independence, he and his party must take care to avoid

Most rural dwellers in Zimbabwe are still waiting for the promises of redistribution of land in their favour, made in the wake of independence, to be realised



John and Penny Hubley

complacency. Without signs of political and economic recovery, they will have to deal with the growing exasperation felt by Zimbabweans many of whom are still awaiting the concrete outcome of promises made in the wake of independence. This is particularly true of rural smallholders who, for many years, have been tempted by the offer of a redistribution of land in their favour. Currently, 4000 white farmers own 11.2 million hectares compared with 1 million black families eking out a living on barely 16.3 million hectares.

The government is reluctant to expropriate white farmers' land, particularly if they have to be compensated, as promised. Firstly, the government does not have the funds. Secondly, there would be a risk of negative repercussions on agricultural production and foreign investors who would look unfavourably on a government operating in this way.

Zimbabwe, long regarded as an example of stability in the region, must today come to terms with a stagnant economic and financial situation, together with increasingly frequent social upheaval. The ZANU-PF government, unlike its neighbours, can scarcely blame its predecessors. After 15 years in power, Robert Mugabe's government must accept most of the responsibility for the prevailing situation. New solutions have to be found. Some observers argue that a renewal of the political class is needed before anything can change in Zimbabwe. For the time being, however, those within the governing party who recommend a more dynamic democracy have an uphill struggle. As for the opposition, with its current divisions and inconsistencies, it is not in a position to change anything.

Botswana: democracy on trial

Botswana has always been seen as a model of stability and democracy in an Africa dominated until recently by single party and authoritarian regimes. Since independence in 1966, the country has regularly experienced free and democratic elections. Just as regularly, the BDP (Botswana Democratic Party) has won these



View of Gaborone
An increasing number of Botswanans
are migrating to urban centres

elections. This regularity and stability can be explained largely by the national consensus which has been established since independence between the political class, the big stock-breeders, the rural population, traditional chiefs and members of the authorities. However, over the last two years, divisions have appeared within the leading team and society as a whole has been disrupted by growing tensions. Several corruption cases have come to light, affecting some members of the BDP. The opposition took advantage of this to gain ground at the most recent legislative elections (October 1994) where the BDP had its worst result since 1966. The electoral decline of the governing party is due principally to the economic recession which has been affecting the country for some time. With growing unemployment and few professional opportunities for the younger generations, many Botswanans are beginning to question the policies of President Ketumile Masire and his party. This mood change is particularly evident in towns and cities, where the population is younger, better educated and more politically aware. The most striking evidence of this is to be found in the capital, Gaborone, which voted decisively for the main opposition party, the Botswanan National Front (BNF) in 1994. If the BNF continues to gain popular support at the same rate, the next election in October 1999 could well spell the end of the BDP's monopoly. In fact, the successive BDP victories of the past 30 years have been based essentially on support from rural voters and traditional chiefs. The latter maintain a patron/client relationship with their 'subjects', enabling them to 'indicate' the way they wish people to vote without too much difficulty. This is particularly the case when rural populations are unaware of or not up-to-date with political decisions taken in Gaborone. There is a tendency to follow the lead of the traditional chiefs who are their 'political intermediaries'. This system, which has

helped the BDP to win absolute majorities in the past may not persist, however. Growing numbers of people are migrating to urban centres where they are exposed to more diverse political influences than in the rural environment. This new, more educated generation is also more demanding and is seeking change. There are those who believe that the government must respond to the expectations of this emerging constituency if it is to avoid defeat at the next election.

Of course, if the BDP does lose power next time round, this does not signify the end of democracy. On the contrary, alternation in politics is seen by many as one of the key components of a healthy and long-lasting democratic system. It seems fair to assume that the possibility of defeat at the polls will influence the BDP in a positive way. Far from resting on its laurels, one can assume that it will be actively seeking solutions to the political and economic unrest currently affecting Botswana.

Lesotho: return of the King

A small mountainous state entirely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa, Lesotho has since its independence in 1966 been prey to chronic political instability. Between 1970 and 1988, the country had a single-party system under the firm rule of the Basutoland National Party (BNP) and its leader Leabua Jonathan. He fell victim to a military coup fomented by General Justin Lekhanya who proceeded to take control of the country. A power struggle between the general and King Moshoeshoe II resulted in the latter being deposed and sent into exile. He was replaced by his son Letsie III in 1990. A year later, it was the turn of General

Lekhanya to be stripped of power — this time by disillusioned soldiers. Shortly afterwards, violent riots broke out in Maseru, the capital. More than 30 people died and nearly 100 were injured. By this time, the people had grown weary of the ever-worsening political and economic situation. In May 1991, the government authorised the formation of opposition parties and proposed elections for June 1992. These were delayed and finally took place in March 1993. The victors were the Basuto Congress Party (BCP), which won nearly 75% of votes cast. Nevertheless, political and dynastic upheaval was still to come. In August 1994, King Letsie III dismissed the Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle, and insisted his father be reinstated as monarch. By virtue of the mediating role played by South Africa, Zimbabwe and Botswana, this happened in January 1995, Moshoeshe II became King once again, Letsie III abdicated and Mokhehle came back as Head of Government. For the time being, therefore, the political situation in the kingdom looks distinctly more promising.

Lesotho has become a constitutional monarchy and has revived democracy but, once again, only one party has virtually all power vested in it, albeit through the legitimate expression of the voters. This time, the King and the government will have to work together to restore the confidence of a people left with few illusions or aspirations after successive coups and palace revolutions.

Swaziland: a kingdom at the crossroads

In Swaziland, the authorities and, in particular King Mswati III, are convinced that the multi-party system is a source of division and trouble. They take the view

that the Tinkhundla system (see issue no 147 of *The Courier*) is best suited to the needs of Swazi society. The complex voting procedure involves three stages. Candidates for each jurisdiction are nominated (only 15 electors are required for each nomination). Primary elections are then held to choose a candidate for each jurisdiction. These are followed by secondary elections at Tinkhundla level, grouping together several jurisdictions, to appoint the representative to the Lower Chamber. Although based on elections, this system does not conform to the concept of democracy as one would normally understand it in the western sense. Opposition parties are not authorised. In addition, the King is responsible for nominating 10 of the 55 members of the lower house and 20 of the 30 Senators.

It is not at all clear whether Swaziland can maintain this form of political system in the longer term. There are signs of an increasingly strident opposition and the country has been affected by a number of strikes and demonstrations in recent years.

There is also the likely impact of democratic changes in the neighbouring countries of South Africa and Mozambique. Swaziland has many assets, including a relatively dynamic economy compared with other developing countries, and a homogenous population, but if it chooses not to introduce political reforms, it will find itself out on a limb in a region where multi-party democracy is now the norm.

Furniture factory in Swaziland
A dynamic economy compared with other developing countries



Building a fairer and more balanced world

Southern Africa has certainly been experiencing upheavals in the last few years but at least the changes have been more positive than negative overall. Political regimes have been liberalised, democracy is slowly beginning to take root and, with the exception of Angola, the guns are silent. However, if one looks more closely, the advent of multi-party systems and democracy have scarcely changed the day-to-day life of the majority of the region's inhabitants. Indeed, for many of them, the situation has dramatically deteriorated.

In the eyes of the rest of the world, Southern Africa is also suffering from the effects of the world recession and from what some would regard as the 'new world disorder'. However, unlike the developed countries, Southern Africa and the Third World in general no longer seem to have control over their own destiny. Some countries, like Mozambique or Zambia, are literally at the mercy of Western donors. Although living conditions for most of the region's inhabitants need specially adapted social programmes and greater commitment on the part of the state, it is the opposite that is happening. The state is withdrawing on a massive scale and aid and subsidies are being drastically reduced. International financial bodies justify the suffering and sacrifices thereby engendered in terms of macroeconomic equilibrium and a more prosperous future but it is becoming increasingly evident that a rapid improvement in living conditions is urgently required if a generalised social explosion is to be avoided. In some countries, food riots, strikes, peasant revolts, the resurgence of ethnic conflict and rising criminality are already heralding this.

Although political democracy is in itself an important and considerable step forward, it is not enough on its own. It must provoke a positive spillover in the social and economic spheres. The disparities that are growing must be halted and reversed. This requires a genuine will to build a fairer and more balanced society. The lesson is one not just for Southern Africa but for the world as a whole. ■

The prospects for consolidating the peace in Angola

by P. Pierson-Mathy*

The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 and the Security Council's decision of February 1995 to undertake a new peace-keeping operation in Angola (UNAVEM III — United Nations Angola Verification Mission) are the starting points for a long process of re-establishing and consolidating peace after the unprecedented trauma and devastation caused by two years of war which followed the first multi-party elections organised under international supervision in September 1992.

The UN mission will have a maximum of 7000 armed men, 350 unarmed military observers and 260 police observers. These 7610 personnel, drawn for the most part from UNAVEM II (the previous mission) will be supplemented by an appropriate number of civilians recruited locally and internationally. The cost of UNAVEM III has been estimated at \$1261 million, \$65 million of which is to be provided by the Angolan government. The latter, of course, also faces the enormous cost of national reconstruction. UNAVEM III has thus been designed as a wide-ranging operation which is radically different in both size and nature from the two earlier United Nations operations in Angola.

In order to appreciate the scope of the mandate of UNAVEM III and to assess its likelihood of success, we think it essential firstly to recall the circumstances, objectives and mandate of the two previous operations, particularly UNAVEM II, which was linked to the disaster into which Angola sank and which was the predecessor of the current mission.

UNAVEM I

The first operation in Angola resulted from the international settlement of the conflict in South West Africa leading to the independence of the territory as Namibia. This conflict had been fuelled by the political aggression of South Africa's apartheid regime which opposed both the independence of Namibia and the consolidation of MPLA rule in Angola. The Angolan government had opted for a People's Republic and had pledged solidarity in the fight for national liberation in Southern Africa. This solidarity, also expressed by the other 'Front Line States' in the region posed a threat to the interests of the Pretoria regime which linked its own survival to the preservation, if necessary by force, of the *status quo* elsewhere in the sub-continent.

South Africa was not wholly isolated in its hostility. Up until 1988, the year the first peace accords on Angola were concluded, Western nations, led by the United States, tolerated this aggression and rejected any proposal for sanctions against South Africa on account of its policy. The USA was also hostile to the Cuban presence in Angola. Since 1975, they had, on this pretext, been refusing to establish diplomatic relations with the Angolan government. From 1981, they linked Namibian independence to the departure of Cuban troops from Angola — a position of doubtful international legality — and in 1985 they agreed to give direct military aid to UNITA, which was already armed and supported in the field by South Africa. The irreversible crisis of the apartheid regime at the end of the 1980s, coinciding with the weakening of the role of the USSR in international politics, provided the catalysts for the USA to intervene to speed up the conclusion of accords which would help to preserve certain geostrategic interests of the United States and its allies in Southern Africa.

UNAVEM I was the product of the first peace accords signed on 22 December 1988 between South Africa on the one hand and Angola and Cuba on the other. The mediator for this was not the United Nations but the United States, then effectively a party to the conflict. These accords linked the end of South African aggression against Angola and the independence of Namibia — hitherto prevented by Pretoria — to the subsequent withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Cuban forces had arrived in 1975 to assist the new Angolan state in confronting South African aggression. Angola and Cuba accepted this withdrawal and agreed to apply for support from the Security Council for this to take place under the supervision of the United Nations. UNAVEM I was the result, with the Security Council authorising a mission whose mandate was limited to observing the withdrawal and departure of Cuban troops. This proved successful, with the Cuban and Angolan parties respecting their undertakings.

The 1988 accords effectively ended South African aggression but did not put an end to the war in Angola nor to the intervention of the United States in the conflict. While forcing Pretoria to stop all military aid to UNITA, the agreements did not oblige the USA — which was not a party to them — to do likewise. American aid continued to flow via Zaire. Despite the departure of the Cuban troops, Washington persisted in its refusal to establish diplomatic relations with Angola. It now made the normalisation of relations with the country dependent on the ending of the single-party system and the legalisation of UNITA. Angola had, in the meantime, abandoned its socialist stance.

The 1991 accords and UNAVEM II

The Angola Peace Accords, signed on 31 May 1991 between the

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Angolan Government and UNITA, were negotiated in Lisbon under the auspices of Portugal. The United States and the USSR were party to the negotiations, although the former did not halt aid to UNITA while they were going on. The peace they envisaged was based on a cease-fire and the disarming and demobilisation both of the government army and of UNITA's forces. The United Nations was called upon to intervene in the process. The peace was to be consolidated by multi-party legislative and presidential elections to be organised in 17 months, under international supervision.

In exchange for UNITA's recognition of the Angolan state and of its institutions up to the elections, the government was obliged to deal with this organisation, after the signing of the accords and before it had been disarmed and demobilised, as if it were a political party free to move and operate over the entire country. There were major risks inherent in relying on the sudden transformation of UNITA, a totalitarian and militaristic organisation whose leader demanded power as a 'right', into a democratic party. However, the intervention of the United Nations and of the three states which had taken part in the negotiations reassured the government and population of Angola. In fact, the UN's role, as defined in the accords, was severely circumscribed. The UN was not nominated in the accords to supervise the elections. It was nevertheless invited to act as principal observer by the government, acting in consultation with UNITA, although without the composition of UNAVEM II being significantly increased. Thus UNAVEM II consisted of just 450 unarmed soldiers, police and civilians supplemented at the height of its mission in March 1993, by 400 additional personnel.

In fact, UNITA was able to take advantage of the 1991 accords, whose implementation was to be supervised by UNAVEM II under the authority of the Security Council, and with the backing of the guarantor states. Against the background of the installation of a multi-party system and of democracy in Angola, it was able legally to set itself up in strategic centres and towns throughout the country — while fraudulently retaining its charac-

ter as an essentially armed movement whose objective was to take power either through the ballot box or by force of arms. No preventive measures were envisaged by the Security Council in the event of UNITA losing the election, although it was well known that, unlike the government forces, Jonas Savimbi's movement was only partially disarmed and demilitarised. Some countries were convinced that the MPLA, worn out by years in power, would be abandoned by a population tired of the horrors of war. This analysis proved false. So tragically, did the 'hopes' expressed by the three observer states and the UN in their diplomatic initiatives, after the elections. These were aimed at persuading UNITA, already on a war footing, to accept the results and assume the main opposition role. The polls were deemed free and fair by the UN.

The Lusaka Protocol and UNAVEM III

The MPLA won the legislative elections with 53.8 % of the vote as against UNITA's 34.1 %. In the Presidential race, President Dos Santos received 49.5 % (just short of the required absolute majority) with 40.7 % going to Jonas Savimbi. Rather than face the likely outcome of a second round in the presidential election and ignoring the legitimacy of the vote, UNITA reverted to military means in an attempt to take power. The United Nations and the guarantor states were slow to condemn UNITA's actions. By ignoring the democratic choice of the Angolan people, UNITA forced the country back into a disastrous war.

Condemned by the Security Council for recommencing hostilities, UNITA was asked on 15 July 1993 to withdraw its armed forces from all territories occupied since the election. Its refusal to do so led the Council, on 15 September 1993, to adopt a military and oil embargo against the rebels. Meanwhile, the Angolan institutions established as a result of the elections saw themselves endowed with new legitimacy.

The Lusaka Protocol was preceded by several attempts at negotiation, led by UNAVEM II and assisted by the three guarantor states. Such attempts, however,

were doomed to failure as long as the military balance favoured UNITA and international pressure on the latter remained limited. Among the failed efforts were the so-called 'Namibe ceasefire' (26 November 1992), the Addis Ababa negotiations (January/February 1993) and the Abidjan talks (April/May 1993). In Abidjan, the United States sought to induce UNITA to accept the cease-fire in exchange for political gains. Through the mediation of the United Nations, they obtained major concessions from the government which was then in a poor position militarily speaking. In the interests of 'national reconciliation', UNITA was assured that it could take part in government at all levels. However, after 40 days of talking, UNITA withdrew from the process and again took up its offensive against provincial capitals. This intransigence was finally to lead to a reversal of the USA's attitude. Following the failure of the Abidjan negotiations and 20 years of diplomatic 'boycott', Washington normalised its relations with Luanda in May 1993. Obstacles to the acquisition of military equipment by the Angolan government were removed and American objections to limited but obligatory sanctions against UNITA were lifted. Meanwhile, the government re-formed the national army.

Negotiations began again in November 1993, this time in Lusaka. UNITA had had to make a formal preliminary undertaking to accept the principle of the withdrawal of its forces from all territories occupied after the elections. Conducted under the auspices of the new representative of the Secretary General, *A.B. Beye*, the negotiations were to last a full year. The UN played a major role in the process, alongside the observer states. The Lusaka Protocol was finally signed on 20 November 1994, despite the absence of Jonas Savimbi. This was mainly because the military situation now decisively favoured the government which was coming under strong pressure from the United States and the Security Council not to 'humiliate' Mr Savimbi. UNITA had, in the meantime, lost most of the provincial capitals it had seized and no longer had access to most of the diamond-mining areas it had exploited to finance the war. Finally, the regional context had also changed with the ANC's

election victory in 1994 and Nelson Mandela's accession as President of South Africa.

Main provisions

The Lusaka Protocol set out the principles and conditions of the ceasefire and of national reconciliation. It established the role of the bodies responsible for monitoring application of these provisions, namely the joint commission, the three observer states and the UN.

The cessation of hostilities firstly implied the limited disengagement, under the supervision of the United Nations, of the fighting forces. At the same time, there was to be free movement of people and goods. The second phase entailed the quartering and disarming of UNITA forces under UN supervision.

A third set of actions was to involve completing the training of the FAA (Angolan Armed Forces), with the incorporation of UNITA personnel at all levels into this body. Implementation of these provisions has been extremely slow coming up against numerous obstacles, including hundreds of cease-fire violations perpetrated, for the most part, by UNITA. The situation did not ease until April 1995.

The subsequent Lusaka meeting on 6 May between President Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi improved matters further. Despite this, by July 1995, the process was five months behind schedule. No quartering or disarming of UNITA had commenced by that date.

The provisions relating to 'national reconciliation' formed the other pillar of the peace process. These provisions set the number and the nature of the posts to be allocated to UNITA, both within the government and in provincial and local authorities, which were now to be decentralised.

A post of Vice-President was offered to Jonas Savimbi by the Angolan government after the Lusaka meeting. The appropriate amendments were made to the constitution but the UNITA leader was slow to agree. The participation of UNITA members in government and administrative structures was made subject to the disarming of this organisation's forces. It should be noted that an amnesty had been

agreed by Parliament before the protocol was signed.

Role of the United Nations

The specific nature of the peace process lies particularly in the importance of the tasks allocated to the United Nations. This time, the UN presided over the joint commission, the body responsible for monitoring application of all the political, administrative and military aspects of the 1991 peace accords which had still not been applied and all the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. The other members of the joint commission are the government, UNITA and the three observer states, with decisions being taken on the basis of consensus.

In the context of national reconciliation, the UN has been invited, after the departure of UNITA forces from occupied areas, to monitor compliance with the security conditions required for normalisation of state administration.

It is also to be involved in the electoral process which was begun in September 1992 and which was due to be concluded in a second round of presidential elections. It is the UN which, in consultation with the joint commission, has the task of declaring at the appropriate time that the political and material conditions set out in the protocol have been achieved.

Deployment of UNAVEM III and future prospects

Despite being afforded the basic means to control implementation of the protocol, UNAVEM III has taken a long time to be deployed. At the time of writing, seven months after the cease-fire came into effect, it was still far from complete. On 7 February, the Security Council authorised the deployment of advance elements of UNAVEM III to prepare for the arrival of infantry units and the subsequent arrival of the personnel needed for setting up the areas where UNITA forces would be billeted.

However, various conditions needed to be met for the deployment of the 7000 armed men to go ahead. Some of these depend on the cooperation of the

government and UNITA in complying with their respective obligations and others are linked to material obstacles resulting from the devastating effects of war. The UN has a very big task but it must be seen through if the ceasefire and the overall peace process is to be consolidated. In this context, the delays encountered are bound to be a cause for concern.

There can be no guarantee of long-lasting peace while UNITA retains its weapons and has not been integrated into the military and institutional processes of the Angolan state. UNAVEM III has a major role to play in this respect. Everything humanly and materially possible should therefore be done to accelerate its deployment. After UNAVEM II, which was a dramatic failure for Angola, its peace process and the credibility of the United Nations, the Angolans have legitimate reason to expect more from the international community this time. ■ P.P.-M.

Frances Rodrigues, Deputy Foreign Minister of Mozambique

'Every day, you have to work for democracy'

October 1994 saw the first democratic elections in Mozambique and, since then, the country has, at it were, become 'normal' once again. Well, almost. It is still one of the world's poorest countries and depends for the most part on international aid. Frelimo, which now holds the reins of power, has the hard task of setting the country

back on the road to economic growth and of inspiring hope in the millions of Mozambique citizens tested by several decades of war. Frances Rodrigues, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, knows that the years to come will be decisive in terms of her country's future. In an interview in the capital, Maputo, she gave us her views about the future of Mozambique.

■ *Do you think that democracy will be maintained in Mozambique and is it possible to speak of true democracy?*

— We naturally want democracy to be maintained and consolidated but, as this is a continuous process and not a static one, we have to work for it and do more every day. Even in Western countries, nothing guarantees that democracy will be maintained, and the same applies to Mozambique.

In any case, the government and institutions are doing everything necessary for democracy to be maintained. A constructive dialogue has started between *Frelimo*, which won the elections, and the other parties, particularly *Renamo*. The first session of Parliament went well, the government's programme and budget have been approved and it can now begin its work. The conditions are in place for it to be able to pursue its democratisation policy and to encourage other state institutions to do likewise.

■ *What is the status of these institutions, particularly the Parliament and the new judicial bodies?*

— These institutions are quite new. They have only just been set up and have not yet acquired the status one might wish them to have. However, we have already established a relationship with similar institutions in other countries with a view to promoting cooperation. We have also asked our foreign partners to provide specific aid in this area. Such cooperation should make it possible to consolidate and stabilise Mozambican institutions.

■ *Is it your wish that the European Union should assist you in this area?*

It is not only *our* wish but also that of the EU. This type of cooperation was raised in debates at the Joint Assembly in Dakar as well as in the more general context of strengthening the political dialogue between the ACP countries and the Union.

■ *Why hasn't Mozambique followed South Africa's example and set up a government of national unity based on Frelimo and Renamo? Don't you think that failure to do this might have a destabilising effect in the future?*

— In South Africa, the parties involved decided before the elections to share power and set up a government of national unity. This was not the case in Mozambique where *Frelimo* won the elections, formed the government and is now in power. Mozambique's experience is no different from that of other democracies such as Sweden, Denmark or more recently, France. I have never come across anything in the history of democracy where a party winning the elections asks its

opponents if they would like to take part in government.

■ *You gave the example of Sweden, but that country has not had to fight an adversary like Renamo, which has a very violent and controversial past. Do you think that Renamo is prepared to respect the democratic rules?*

— We can only hope. In any case, for the time being, Mr Dhlakama's party is supporting democracy. The government, for its part, is doing all it can for the democratically agreed programme to be implemented and for all institutions to work together in harmony.

■ *At present, Mozambique depends almost entirely on outside aid. How can you speak about true independence?*

— Mozambique is not the only country to be heavily dependent on outside aid. You also have to take into consideration the fact that we have only been independent for about 20 years and

Mrs Rodrigues accompanied by Commissioner Pinheiro during the latter's visit to Mozambique



Mozambique: peace at last

The first democratic elections in Mozambique's history took place on 27-29 October 1994. These were organised under the auspices of the United Nations and were declared free and fair by international observers. After several decades of war, Mozambique is finally savouring peace and has set out resolutely on the path to democracy.

Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975, after an 11-year war of liberation which set the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)* against Portugal, the colonial power. As soon as it became independent, Mozambique found itself faced with a deplorable socio-economic legacy. Few Mozambicans had been to university and 93% of the population was illiterate. Overall, the country sorely lacked qualified personnel, health services were virtually nonexistent and, as they fled the country, the Portuguese settlers destroyed much of the agricultural and industrial infrastructure. The government set up by *Frelimo* has therefore, from the outset, been confronted with an extremely difficult situation. On top of all this, they found themselves fighting a war against the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo)*, supported by Rhodesia and South Africa. The conflict lasted almost 16 years and had a disastrous effect on the Mozambican population and economy. Finally, *Frelimo's* increasingly autocratic Marxist-Leninist politics caused serious disorganisation in the agricultural sector, the country's principal source of revenue, leading to a net fall in investment. Towards the end of the 1980s, the country was on its knees. The war had killed a million people, displaced over 5 million Mozambicans and forced almost 2 million others to take refuge in neighbouring countries. In economic terms, the cost of the conflict has been estimated at \$15 billion. At the beginning of the 1990s, the average *per capita* income was barely 80 dollars a year. However, from 1989 onwards, the winds of change began to blow in Mozambique and the wider region. With the end of the Cold War and the arrival in power of President De Klerk, a less bellicose leader than his predecessor, both the *Frelimo* government and *Renamo* saw their traditional allies melt away. Pressure from international aid agencies combined with exhaustion on the part of the combatants forced the opposing parties to enter into negotiations and, finally, to sign a peace agreement on 4 October 1992. Elections were held two years later and, according to all observers, they were a model of calm and organisation. Even the announcement by *Renamo* leader Afonso Dhlakama, a few hours before the polling stations opened, that his party was withdrawing from the elections on the

grounds of fraud, failed to disrupt the process. The Mozambican people had waited for this day for too long to let the opportunity slip. Dhlakama consulted the South African Vice-President, Thabo Mbeki, President Mugabe and other international leaders who all urged him to take part in the elections. On 28 October, he announced that his party was once again a competitor in the race for power.

A paradoxical result

The population's enthusiasm for these first democratic elections was demonstrated in a very high turnout. Almost 90% of the possible electorate cast a ballot. In the Presidential poll, the outgoing candidate, Joachim Chissano, won 53.3% of the votes as against 33.7% for Afonso Dhlakama. In the legislative elections, *Frelimo* won 44.3% and *Renamo* 37.8%. The latter party won the majority of votes in the five central provinces (Nampula, Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala). The relatively high vote in favour of *Renamo* may have come as a surprise to some since the organisation had been viewed by many as South Africa's puppet, infamous throughout the region for atrocities committed against the civilian population. In fact, the explanation for *Renamo's* good result is probably to be found in the increasing disillusionment felt by a significant section of the population over the policies of *Frelimo*. This discontent was particularly strong among the peasants who had suffered considerably as a result of the government's collectivisation measures. Allegations of increasing corruption within the ruling party and a perceived drift towards more authoritarian policies also prompted some of the electorate to vote for the opposition. *Renamo's* victory in the centre of the country was explained by the fact that the population in these regions saw *Frelimo* as being dominated by the *Shangaans*, an ethnic group from Southern Mozambique. Finally, according to one observer, generalised 'moral amnesia' had taken hold of the population, leading it to forget both the demands exacted by *Renamo* and the positive changes achieved by *Frelimo* in the days after independence. By the eve of the elections, there was little to choose between the two parties in the minds of the electorate.

Some journalists covering the events also commented that many Mozambicans had voted for *Renamo* through fear of seeing it taking up the armed struggle again if it lost the elections. The spectre of a situation similar to that in Angola was constantly hovering over Mozambique. However, the situation in these two

countries is very different in many respects. *Renamo*, for example, does not have access to the kind of resources available to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (diamonds and oil), which would have been needed to restart the war. Moreover, *Renamo's* leader who is, in the final analysis, a tactician, is well aware that time is on his side. In the 1999 elections, he could well become the next President of Mozambique, particularly if the present government does not meet the pressing needs of the population.

Relaunching the economy and consolidating democracy

Mozambique's transition to democracy has thus been a success, but the hardest part is still to come. The country is confronted by a host of major problems. There is an urgent need to reintegrate millions of refugees and displaced people, not to mention large numbers of demobilised soldiers, into Mozambican society. This is going to be difficult given the very high unemployment and limited work opportunities. As regards the economy, Mozambique is in rough waters and it will have to deal with socio-economic imperatives which are difficult to reconcile. The country is having to implement a very strict recovery policy imposed by the international financial authorities while, at the same time, seeking to improve the everyday life of millions of Mozambicans who live in very precarious conditions. Finally, despite a growth rate of 5.4% in 1994, the country is a long way from overcoming the economic crisis into which it was plunged by years of conflict and drought. If one adds to this an external debt of over \$5 billion and a rate of inflation which, last year, exceeded 70%, the next few years are bound to be painful, particularly for the underprivileged.

To get the country back on its feet, the government must overhaul industrial and agricultural infrastructures which are in a lamentable state, improve and repair land communications and port facilities (which has already been done in the case of the port of Beira), inspire new confidence in foreign investors, promote its unexploited natural resources and continue to attract essential international aid. The country today has considerable assets to help it achieve these objectives. It is at peace and the regional environment is stable at last. The people know all about the ruinous effects of war and are therefore determined to ensure that their efforts bear fruit this time. Perhaps most importantly, while Mozambique may be one of the world's poorest countries, hope for a better future seems, once again, to have become part of the fabric of everyday life. ■

F.C.

these have been very troubled years. Shortly after independence, we had to deal with *Renamo's* attempts at destabilisation orchestrated by the former Rhodesia. From the outset, Mozambique had to fight to preserve its territorial integrity.

It also had to make a considerable effort in helping Zimbabwe finally to achieve independence and democratic government. Mozambique then suffered a great deal because of the apartheid regime in South Africa. Lastly, a very long and very painful war has just come to an end and all



The Courier

A well-equipped orphanage in Maputo
Hope for a better future seems to have
become part of the fabric of everyday
life

this has meant that we are currently one of the world's poorest countries. Our essential tasks at the moment are to relaunch the economy, restore the social fabric, consolidate democracy and enable Mozambique to develop as a nation in its own right.

■ *You put a lot of emphasis on the negative role played by South Africa, Rhodesia and Renamo, but don't you think that Frelimo's management is also partly responsible for the country's economic and social decline?*

— If you weigh everything up, it is undoubtedly the war which has had the most pernicious and disastrous effects. *Frelimo* has had to deal with an extremely difficult situation and has tried to run the country as best it can.

■ *Frelimo's politics and ideology appear to have undergone a complete U-turn in recent years. Nowadays it advocates market economics whereas, before, the ideology was Marxist-Leninist. How do you explain this?*

— *Frelimo* has adjusted its politics to the current world situation. We have had to adapt to the new world order, but we have tried to do this gradually. Our ultimate objective must be to get the country back on its feet both in economic and social terms. Young people make up 40% of the population and we have to inspire hope in them as well as in the millions of displaced people and refugees in neighbouring countries. We also need to integrate large numbers of demobilised soldiers back into society.

■ *What is Mozambique's role within Southern Africa and particularly SADC, and what is its relationship with its powerful neighbour, South Africa?*

— We are totally committed to strengthening our relationship with all SADC countries. Within that organisation, Mozambique coordinates a vital sector for regional integration, namely transport and communications. South Africa is now a member of SADC and the South African government has made a commitment to support cooperation. Of course, there are very different levels of development, not only between South Africa and Mozambique, but also between South Africa and other SADC countries.

Our objective is to reduce this huge discrepancy and to create synergies between the countries in the region. Although South Africa has a higher level of development, other SADC countries also have assets which South Africa needs in order to go on developing, and we will therefore try to use everyone's assets as harmoniously as possible. You see a similar situation within the EU where there are considerable differences in development between Member States. We in Southern Africa hope to be able to follow Europe's

example and help one another. The Union is an example we could copy.

■ *Your government has been very bold in the undertakings it has made to the IMF and the World Bank. Do you think you will be able to stand by these undertakings?*

— We intend to make every effort to keep our word. We had our Consultative Group Meeting last March and the results of this were positive. Up to the present time, things seem to be on the right track, but Mozambicans will, of course, have to accept the many sacrifices these undertakings will require to get the country back on its feet.

■ *Are Mozambique's citizens prepared to make additional sacrifices?*

— Do they have any choice? You know as well as I that the conditions are difficult and there is no other option. ■

Interview by F.C.

South Africa and Southern Africa

by Dr Greg Mills*

Now that South Africa has enjoyed over a year of democratic government since the elections in April 1994, the 'rainbow nation' is expected to focus its attention, not only on the priority of internal nation-building, but on efforts at rebuilding the Southern African region. It is anticipated that South Africa will play a role in this by increased regional economic cooperation and closer integration through a variety of regional institutions. This involvement is expected to have a positive impact on the living conditions of the mass of the population in Southern Africa.

In this new era, away from the confines of the Cold War and the destabilising effects of apartheid, regional relations are now defined on the basis of an interdependent, mutually beneficial and non-hegemonic philosophy. Areas of common interest, whether in the economic or security domains, are seen as the catalyst for the states of Southern Africa to draw closer together and become collectively stronger. The non-hegemonic philosophy is in line with the ANC's position on foreign policy presented in their working document prior to the 1994 elections. This provided an insight into the future commitments and direction of the Government of National Unity. The document placed great emphasis on South Africa's role in the region and the African continent as a whole. In particular, it identified 'a special relationship with the peoples of Southern Africa all of whom have suffered under apartheid'. The focus was to be on balanced regional economic development aimed at transforming the 'exploitative and socially undesirable features of the existing regional economy'.

* This is an abridged version of an article submitted by the author, who is Director of Studies at the South Africa Institute of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg. Some of the issues raised in the article are expanded on in Dr Mills' edited volume on South Africa in the Global Economy, published by the Institute earlier this year. He writes in a personal capacity.

According to President Mandela, South Africa will, in this quest, have to exercise self-restraint and sensitivity in achieving the necessary balance between giving assistance to the region and regional domination. As Table 1 reveals, South Africa is clearly the most powerful state in Southern Africa. As such it has a strong international voice and will exert a decisive influence on the destiny of the region. Trade with African countries can now take place freely and openly. However, there are still both political and economic factors which inhibit regional prosperity. These include the marginalisation of Africa from the international mainstream, limits on the expansion of intra-African trade (due, among other things, to credit and infra-structural conditions), the continuing military and social insecurity in the region and, most importantly, the problems of transition that face South Africa as the dominant regional actor.

South Africa's development challenges

Although a giant on the continent and in Southern Africa — where with under 40% of the population, it produces 80% of the region's economic product — South Africa is still a relatively small player in world terms. It ranks at the lower end of the 'upper-middle-income' countries, below Mauritius, Brazil, Mexico,

Gabon, Greece and Portugal. If one takes the figures for economic growth per capita — generally seen as a leading indicator for stable political development — the picture for South and Southern Africa is not at all rosy. As Table 2 indicates, growth in sub-Saharan Africa has lagged well behind that of other regions, both developed and developing. And between 1980 and 1992, South Africa managed only 60% of the growth rate achieved by sub-Saharan countries as a whole.

The low growth rate of sub-Saharan Africa is undoubtedly linked to demographic trends. The population of the region has more than doubled from 294 million in 1970 to nearly 600 million in 1994. It is projected that the figure will rise to 940 million by 2010 and 1.36 billion by 2025. Southern Africa accounts for a consistent 25% of these totals. As for South Africa itself, the population rose from 22.5 million in 1970 to around 41 million in 1994. The projections for 2010 and 2025 are 58.4 million and 73 million respectively. Although mankind's adaptability, combined with new technologies in areas such as plant breeding and fertilisers, have kept the means of subsistence ahead of population growth in South Africa, there is justification for a Malthusian pessimism about its chances of staying ahead.

Given the decline in the availability of natural resources *per capita* as a result of this increase in population, some radical changes are necessary if the socio-economic situation is to be stabilised. Assuming the formula of the Asian countries and other 'success stories' is adopted, this should rely on export-driven growth. Technological skills are, of course, required

Southern Africa: population and GNP (1992)

Country	Population (thousands)	GNP total (US\$)	GNP per capita (US\$)
Angola	9 732	6 000	620*
Botswana	1 360	3 797	2 790
Lesotho	1 860	1 090	590
Malawi	9 085	1 896	210
Mozambique	16 565	1 034	60
Namibia	1 529	2 502	1 610
South Africa	39 763	106 019	2 670
Swaziland	860	930	1 080
Tanzania	25 965	2 561	110
Zambia	8 589	2 580	290
Zimbabwe	10 352	5 896	570

* 1989 figures

Source Esterhuysen, P. (ed), *South Africa in Sub-Equatorial Africa: Economic Interaction*. Institute of South Africa, Pretoria, 1994 pp 3, 14.

Performance indicators in the world economy

Group and region	Real GDP growth (%)		Growth in exports (%)		Growth in gross domestic investment (%)	
	1970-80	1980-92	1970-80	1980-92	1970-80	1980-92
Industrial countries	3.3	2.9	5.4	4.9	2.0	4.0
Less developed countries	4.5	6.0	3.9	4.4	7.0	7.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.6	1.8	2.8	2.4	5.1	-3.0
East Asia & Pacific	6.6	7.7	9.5	10.5	9.7	10.1
South Asia	3.5	5.2	3.6	6.8	4.6	5.0
Middle East, North Africa etc.	5.2	2.2	3.9	0.8	n/a	n/a
Latin America & the Caribbean	5.4	1.8	-0.1	2.9	6.8	-0.5
South Africa	3.0	1.1	11.1	0.7	2.5	-4.4

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1994, New York, Oxford University Press

for this to happen. Yet South Africa has a deplorable lack of technically skilled, educated workers. This is a debilitating legacy of apartheid and of Bantu Education in particular. Although, in the past, the government spent a relatively large amount on schooling by global standards (the 1992-93 figure was 5.4% of GDP), this has been racially biased. In 1992, spending on whites was 3.5 times that on blacks. And the prospects of achieving expenditure parity at the higher level are slight. In South Africa in 1993, an estimated 12.5 million people were defined as illiterate.

Education is related both to skewed income distribution patterns and low productivity ratios in South Africa. While the standard of living indicators for the white, coloured and Asian sectors of the population compare favourably with those of developed countries, the figures for black South Africans (around 75% of the total) are among the worst in the world. Around half of the black population is below the age of 20, living in an environment where there are high expectations but a lack of economic development, and hence of opportunities. In 1990, some 16 million South Africans lived below the breadline figure of R600 (ECU 125) per family per month. Most of these people were living in rural areas.

It is estimated that an annual growth rate of less than 4.0% will not create sufficient jobs to keep pace with the population increase. Around 400 000 people are entering the labour market each year, yet between 1985 and 1989, only 31 000 jobs were created annually. 95% of these were in the formal sector. By

contrast, a shortfall of 920 000 skilled workers is forecast by the year 2005, although there will be a surplus of 11.5 million unskilled or semi-skilled workers. South Africa's unemployment rate for 1994 was 32.6%, according to the first-ever official figures issued in March. Unofficial estimates (including from Government sources such as the Foreign Ministry) have put the figure at 45-50%. According to the official statistics, about 1.5 million people were employed in the informal economy while some 4.7 million people indicated they were unemployed.

Productivity is an indirect function of skills, technology, capital and labour, taken in combination. Against such a poor educational backdrop, it is not surprising to find that labour productivity has improved only slowly in South Africa — at an average of about 0.4% and 0.5% in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. Wage increases have been much higher — around 10% *per annum* in the 1970s and 16% during the 1980s. The result, despite abundant labour reserves, was that South Africa became increasingly capital intensive and labour-saving from the 1970s onwards, and unemployment went up. This is an important factor for the South African government as it seeks to encourage investment in areas that ideally should create jobs and simultaneously generate export-driven wealth.

The African burden

South Africa's future ties with the international global economy, which are crucial in seeking to surmount the above-

mentioned structural difficulties, are inescapably linked to international perceptions of the region. The question that investors ask is — 'are these stable and profitable places in which to invest.' In this context, Nelson Mandela has observed that 'South Africa cannot escape its African destiny'. The country does, however, benefit from an increasing trading relationship within the continent. According to *Raymond Suttner*, who chairs the South Africa Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs, South African exports to the rest of Africa amounted to 31.7% of the country's total exports in 1993. During the first half of 1994 there was a 30% increase in such trade to a projected R5 billion. But this positive situation is still offset to a large extent by South Africa's geographic location and perceptions of the continent as a whole. Africa has been described by some as 'The Third World's Third World' - regarded as marginal in the international economy and incapable of solving its own difficulties. Unfortunately South Africa, if only by dint of geography, is part of that mindset.

Together, South and Southern Africa represent a contradiction of frustration and hope. A prosperous Southern Africa would obviously benefit South Africa as it seeks to expand trading links, partners and profits. Yet as Angola and Mozambique struggle to get back into their independence starting blocks, that vision is some way off. Table 3 gives some indication of the problems facing the region in its efforts to get to grips with life after apartheid.

Without wider regional prosperity, the gains for South Africa are likely to be small, and the extra burdens high. By way of example, the cost of dealing with illegal immigrants to South Africa from the region was estimated at more than R200m in 1994. In the same year, it was projected that these costs would rise to R1bn by the year 2000. This figure has since been revised upwards to an estimated R4bn. This is measured in terms of the costs of clothing, housing, feeding and educating the migrants. Add to this the costs related to smuggling, whether of drugs, vehicles, weapons or general contraband (which alone represents an annual loss of around R1bn in uncollected customs revenue) and

South Africa and its neighbours: the socio-economic picture

Country	Real GDP growth (%)	Inflation (%)	Population growth (%)	External debt (US\$ billions)
<i>South Africa</i>	2.0 (1994)	9.7 (1994)	2.5	1.7 (1993)
Angola	-22.6 (1993)	1840 (1993)	2.0	10.9 (1993)
Botswana	-0.7 (1993)	14.3 (1993)	3.5	0.545 (1992)
Lesotho	2.5 (1993)	13.9 (1993)	2.6	0.472 (1994)
Malawi	-9.4 (1994)	40.5 (1994)	3.0	1.82 (1994)
Mozambique	5.8 (1993)	50.0 (1994)	2.7	5.3 (1993)
Namibia	-2.2 (1993)	8.6 (1993)	3.0	0.350 (1993)
Swaziland	1.0 (1993)	12.9 (1993)	2.2	0.240 (1993)
Tanzania	1.6 (1992)	0.4 (1993)	2.8	6.7 (1992)
Zaire	5.0 (1994)	11 000 (1994)	3.0	11.28 (1993)
Zambia	-5.4 (1994)	55.0 (1994)	3.7	6.79 (1993)
Zimbabwe	3.5 (1994)	22.5 (1994)	3.2	4.2 (1993)

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit and various press reports.

it is clear that South Africa cannot afford to ignore the plight of the wider region. The number of official refugees in South Africa is only around 10 000, but illegal migration from neighbouring states rose from 45 000 in 1988 to nearly 100 000 in 1993. Estimates of the total number of such migrants in the country vary widely — from 2 million to 9 million (mainly Mozambicans) - but the South African Police Service believes that the latter is the more accurate figure.

This influx has predictably, provoked xenophobic reactions among some

South Africans, and this is likely to have political implications for the ANC. In developing a policy response, the government obviously has to be mindful of the impact on their constituencies. They may react to the crisis by strengthening immigration controls, by addressing the root

*Contrasting images of South Africa
The standard of living indicators for white, coloured and Asian people compare favourably with those of developed countries, but the figures for black South Africans are among the worst in the world*

causes or perhaps a combination of the two. In any event, they are likely to favour the cheapest option. It could be that, far being a politically incorrect solution, the idea of a 'fortress South Africa' will become something of a socio-economic necessity. Many initiatives have been put forward by South Africans, neighbouring states and the international community to address some of the insecurities present in the region. These include:

— The so-called 'British' initiative mooted by John Major during his visit last September when he called for new mechanisms to head off conflicts before they become unstoppable;

— The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, formally established at the Tunis Summit in 1994, which focuses on preventive diplomacy and crisis management;


— The Association of Southern African States established as part of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) grouping.

— The Inter-State Defence and Security Conference;

— The SADC sector on Political Cooperation, Democracy, Peace and Security.



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All these so-called security mechanisms are designed to work in tandem with the development thrust of regional organisations such as SADC. As the new South African National Defence Force reorganises itself and strives to create a new image externally and domestically, it is likely that this arm of the government will become involved outside the Republic's borders: in peace support missions, disaster relief, training missions, and inevitably, in joint military operations.

The RDP

It is clear that something extraordinary is needed for South Africa to break out of the straightjacket. The government's chosen solution is the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which sets out to transform South Africa and make amends for the years of apartheid. This will be done through the building of some 1 million houses, the electrification of 2.5 million dwellings, the provision of free and

compulsory education for all children, the creation of 2.5 million jobs, and the redistribution of 30% of all arable land — all within the next five years.

The management of the RDP is going to be crucial, as South Africa strives to meet short-term demands through consumption while seeking to portray an image of financial rectitude. If one has to borrow heavily, then one must spend wisely and ensure transparency and accountability every step of the way. This will be difficult for a government now largely representative of the very poor, among whom high expectations have created a culture of entitlement.


Given the insecurity affecting both South and Southern Africa, which is largely based on economic problems, the impact of the RDP across South Africa's borders will be central in creating conditions of sustainable economic development in the region. Integration through SADC, the Southern Africa Customs Union, the proposed Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa), and a variety of special bilateral trade relationships could assist in this process. Of course,

while South Africa's economic dominance will inevitably shape the region's fortunes, the neighbouring states also have a key role in determining their own future. They are not passive spectators in an international game involving South Africa and the global community. They should be actively seeking to turn their economies into viable trading entities that are attractive to outside investors.

It is clear that South Africa has overcome some big challenges but in many respects, the most difficult ones still lie ahead. It must capitalise on both the domestic and external goodwill generated by the success of its transition, in confronting its own difficulties. In this endeavour, the fortunes of South Africa and the Southern African region are closely intertwined. ■

G.M.

*A school in Mozambique
South Africa's neighbours are not just
passive spectators — they have a key
role in determining their own future*



The Courier

In search of a common security

by Fernando Gonçalves

The Foreign Ministers of the 11-nation Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) recently took a decision to transform the Frontline Group of States (FLS) into an Association of Southern African States (ASAS), as a security, conflict resolution and defence arm of SADC. In this article, the author, who is Senior Editor of the 'Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly' (SAPEM) analyses some of the general aspects of setting up common security systems and looks at the specific issues facing Southern Africa in this context. This is an abridged version of an article first published in Volume 8 No. 7 of SAPEM in April 1995.

At conferences throughout the world, politicians, diplomats, academics and intellectuals ponder the issues of conflict resolution, and common defence and security, particularly for countries sharing the same geographical space. But just how such mechanisms are to be implemented continues to be the subject of heated debate. At their annual summit in Tunis last year, OAU leaders endorsed a decision to set up a continental conflict resolution mechanism. This reflected a political desire to deal with conflicts but very little seems to be happening on the ground. This is partly due to the financial paralysis affecting the OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, but more seriously, reflects differences among the member states on the mechanics of implementing the plan. Similarly, in November last year, at a Francophone summit in Biarritz, African leaders found it difficult to endorse a French proposal to set up a continental peacekeeping force, despite widespread agreement among them that such a mechanism would help prevent the recurrence of Rwanda-type situations. Nor does the issue of collective security always lead to consensus outside Africa. Last year in Budapest, Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton were unable to hide their disagreements over America's desire to incorporate the former Warsaw Pact members into the NATO.

These failed attempts illustrate the point that the issue of collective security, whether regional, continental or international, is more complex than might initially appear. The complexity has

become even more pronounced since the end of the Cold War. Previously, capitalist states were motivated to group together against what they perceived as the threat from communism, and vice versa.

National sovereignty and pride

At the heart of the problem, are the issues of national sovereignty and pride, together with the desire of states to take care of their own security affairs rather than placing them in the hands of a supranational structure, which most fear they will be unable to control. In Southern Africa, although the need for coordination on matters of regional security has been recognised, it is apparent that SADC will not, at least in the foreseeable future, move beyond the level of rhetoric. The controversy that surrounds the question of regional security is heightened because conventionally, it is viewed by people solely in military and police terms, rather than in a wider context encompassing aspects of economic and social development.

The collective use of force for the purpose of preserving international peace and security is permissible under the UN Charter, which also allows for the use of force at a regional level, after authorisation by the Security Council. But smaller and weaker countries may have a legitimate concern that, in establishing regional systems of collective security, they lay themselves open to possible bullying tactics by their stronger neighbours. A good example is the political crisis that

affected Lesotho last year. According to sources in the Kingdom, this was partially caused by a confidential letter sent by the Prime Minister to the leaders of Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, in which he sought military intervention to protect his government from a faction of the army that had sided with the King.

Some students of international relations have also challenged the validity of the regional security concept, citing the fact of unequal economic and social development both within and between states. Where such imbalances within a country lead to internal strife, intervention by outside forces is likely to be viewed as interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. Where there is unequal development between nations — even if they are in the same geographical region — this is likely to result in their having different foreign policy perceptions and goals. And if the goals differ, so too will the means to achieve them. Finally, there is an argument linked to the fact it is more difficult to intervene in conflicts that occur in larger and stronger nations. Smaller and weaker states are, therefore, unlikely to receive equal treatment.

Groups of nations seek collective security because they have common values and interests that need to be preserved. It may be an ideology that they are seeking to protect — or perhaps their accumulated wealth. NATO was set up to protect Western democracies against a perceived communist threat, while the Warsaw Pact came into being as a security belt for the former Soviet Union, designed to ensure that satellite nations could not be used to stage attacks against it.

Regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa has mainly been seen in terms of infrastructure development and economic coordination. It has also provided a common platform for soliciting aid from the North. To date, however, it has excluded one of the most important integrationist elements, namely the human being. The 100 million or so inhabitants of the SADC area remain alienated from the 'integration' process, as evidenced recently, when the organisation decided to give its bureaucrats visa facilities to travel throughout the region. The business community, which is supposed to

be the engine of growth in any process of economic integration, received no such concession.

Previous attempts

Southern Africa has seen previous attempts at common regional security. Indeed, the former colonial powers regularly consulted each other on how best to combat the liberation movements, in the period prior to independence. The role played by the Frontline States in the decolonisation of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe was also essentially a recognition of the need for an integrated approach to political and security issues in the region. It was in the same context that Tanzania and Zimbabwe committed troops to help the Mozambican government fight Renamo, then regarded as an instrument of South African destabilisation against Mozambique. Even the idea floated by South Africa in the 1980s for a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), may be viewed in this light although it is quite clear that what was envisaged was South African dominance rather than cooperation with its neighbours.

With the coming of independence in South Africa, peace in Mozambique and the prospect of an end to the conflict in Angola, the notion of regional security now needs some redefinition. Previously, almost 100 million people (including 30 million black South Africans), faced a common enemy with the military and economic capability to destabilise the entire region. But although South Africa has now joined the regional fraternity, its role will still have to be defined by reference to its own national interests as a regional 'superpower'. The smaller and weaker countries have adopted a cautious policy: one which does not give South Africa the right — even under the guise of regional security — to undermine their national sovereignty. President Mandela is very much aware of this and, in the first year of his presidency, has acted judiciously to allay such fears.

Thus South Africa has been discreet and responsible when the question of playing the role of regional policeman has arisen. During the Lesotho crisis, it joined

Botswana and Zimbabwe in the mediation effort, but opted for a total blockade to put pressure on the landlocked nation, rather than the military intervention contemplated by its partners. Similarly, when Renamo pulled out of the Mozambique election in October 1994, South Africa speedily intervened at the highest diplomatic level to prevent a crisis. But when requested to send 1000 peacekeepers to Angola, it refused. The reason it gave was that it was still reforming the defence forces, which were dominated by elements of the past regime. Technical explanations of this kind are a convenient cover for concealing considerations of a more political nature. They could have sent a small contingent of former Mks, the ANC's guerilla wing, who have been integrated into the new South African National Defence Forces. This would have been a powerful signal that Pretoria is willing to cooperate in regional peacekeeping efforts.

An important point here is that South Africa cannot play the leading role which many expect of it because it does not currently have the financial capacity to do so. The authorities are under increasing internal pressure to redistribute wealth, and the ANC cannot turn a blind eye to this if it wants to retain its position as the main political force in South Africa in the longer term.

Possible first steps

João Honwana, of the Cape Town-based Centre for Conflict Resolution, who was formerly a commander in the Mozambique Air Force, says that in the short term, any attempt to set up a formal collective security mechanism in Southern Africa could be counter-productive. 'It would be a cooperation between institutionally fragile states both in terms of human and financial resources,' he argues. Honwana, who is the co-author of a study on the feasibility of establishing a SADC Sector for Political and Security Cooperation, believes that a first step should be to reinforce diplomatic cooperation in the region. Military commanders could, in the meantime, start by training small specialised units with the participation of all the SADC countries. 'Security cooperation

could also take the form of information exchanges and participation in joint military manoeuvres', he suggests.

Given the many possible pitfalls in the process of bringing about a formal common security arrangement, it is hard to see how the system could work. But there must be a starting point. It would be possible, for example, to create a common defence force based on contributions of human and material resources from the member states. This would not be an intervention force, but one that could function as a deterrent and that could be called on to assist in non-military operations such as rescue operations in cases of natural disaster. A regional security mechanism that is not based entirely on a fighting component could also encompass research with the long term objective of reducing the region's dependence on the northern hemisphere for the supply of defence equipment.

Some in the region are not just calling for non-military means of conflict resolution, but even contemplate the possibility of abolishing national armies altogether. This was a suggestion put forward by a church leader at a recent meeting on regional security in Malawi. He argued that the resources could be redirected towards improving the economic and social conditions of the people. 'Real security,' said a speaker at the meeting, 'comes in the form of economic and social development of the masses.' There can be little doubt that national security and stability, which are key elements in achieving regional security, largely depend on the ability of states to meet their people's economic and social needs. They also need to observe human rights and give all their citizens the chance to participate in their nations' decision-making processes.

Those who believe in the scrapping of armies in Southern Africa argue that their role is to safeguard their countries against external aggression. In the absence of such threats in present-day Southern Africa, they insist, the role of maintaining law and order within a country should be vested in the police force, not the military. It would be a hard task, however, to convince the soldiers that they no longer have a role. Some military experts stress that a potential for

conflict remains, citing the Namibia-Botswana border dispute over Sidudu island, and the disagreement between Zambia and Zimbabwe over the Kariba Dam and the ownership of a small island on the Zambezi River. On the other hand, there is a fear that maintaining large military contingents in a time of relative peace could result in the soldiers themselves becoming a source of instability as they increasingly seek ways of interfering in the political process.

High military spending

Over the years, most African countries have increased military spending at the expense of the socio-economic sectors, either because of legitimate concerns about defence and internal security, or out of a desire for 'prestige'. According to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACTA), between 1985 and 1989, sub-Saharan Africa imported nearly \$15 billion-worth of arms, a sum that is equivalent to the combined GDPs of Chad, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Somalia and Tanzania. Indeed, real spending may be much

higher taking into account the subsidies granted to African military establishments and the military-related expenditure that is not classified as such.

The Washington-based Global Coalition for Africa estimates that 'if African governments were to reduce their military budgets by 50% between 1993 and 2000, they would have an additional \$7 billion to devote to poverty alleviation, improving health and education, and supporting productive investments.'

Given this scenario, it is also necessary to conceive of regional security in terms of diplomacy coordination, joint mechanisms for preventing and combating crime, exchange of information on drug trafficking, immigration matters, exchange of intelligence information, and most importantly, eliminating the root causes leading to conflict. Improved social and economic conditions, promotion of human rights and the equal participation of all ethnic groups in the decision-making process can greatly reduce the potential for conflict in any society. Greater cooperation among the countries of the region in these areas is essential as a confidence-building measure in the context of promoting regional cooperation and developing collective security mechanisms. In the same vein, governments in Southern Africa may need to set up a durable mechanism to deal with minor border disputes that might arise in future, as well as establish a credible system that can allow them to mediate in conflicts within and between the countries of the region.

As regards the calls for massive disarmament and demilitarisation, most governments are likely to be wary of the prospect of demobilising tens of thousands of soldiers who may find themselves deprived of any means of subsistence. But by all accounts, the price of offering attractive demobilisation packages to these soldiers over a certain period of time — say five to ten years — to allow them a gradual return to productive civilian life, is much less in the longer term than having to keep them idle in the barracks.

There have also been calls for the formation of a regional military contingent under a regional command. While such a contingent would be desirable only as a deterrent factor and would be used to

respond to emergency situations, including natural calamities, its practical operational aspects would need some further careful thought. This should include consideration of mechanisms designed to strengthen control of it by civilian institutions.

Security, be it regional or national, cannot be viewed merely in terms of the political and military dimensions, nor should it be confined to issues of crime and other forms of civil violence. It should be seen in a broader context so as to include important aspects of the people's economic and social development.

Identifying common interests

At another level, and as in the field of economic cooperation, SADC members states need to identify and articulate clearly their interests where regional security cooperation is concerned. On the basis of that, they must then be able to strike a balance between the costs and benefits of such cooperation. One immediate task will be that of setting targets and timetables, before embarking on the path of formal collective security mechanisms. In this regard, it is essential that all countries hold a common belief in, and are committed to, systems that allow for popular participation in major political decision-making, transparency and public accountability.

There can be no collective security where those who are supposed to participate and benefit from it pursue different systems and values. In such circumstances, regional security can easily turn into insecurity, with each individual member state seeking regional endorsement of its own policies, which may include repression of internal dissent. ■ F.G.

Pointing to a future without national armies?
It would be a hard task to convince the soldiers that they no longer have a role



Agency for International Development, Washington

Securing Southern Africa

by Peter Vale*

For all its promise of peace and security, Southern Africa remains an enigma. Poorly served by its infrastructure, the region boasts world class highways. Bounded by water on three sides, its land is permanently parched. Rich in agricultural resources, it can no longer feed its people. Committed to blurring ethnic differences, these are apparent at almost every corner. And, although more secure than ever, the region's strongest state has electric fences on its borders. What will determine Southern Africa's security concerns in the 21st century? Will it turn into another global powder-keg? Or can the lessons of political change in the region inspire fresh approaches to the challenge of security?

Colonialism bequeathed Southern Africa a cruel legacy. European powers left behind them division, destitution and desperately poor states. As a result, when colonialism ended, it was not so much a moment of creation as a false dawn. Free at last, the states of the sub-continent were drawn not towards democracy but to authoritarianism. Post-independence governments used coercion and corruption to meld disparate forces within uncomfortable borders. The analytical point is as simple as it is brutal — strong methods were used to build weak states. Because South Africa's historical trajectory is so pointedly different from that of its neighbours, it is important to note that apartheid's cruel madness produced much the same result.

Since the mid-1980s, state-building processes in the region have faced new pressures in the form of externally driven measures to reconstruct their economies. The results have been uneven but the instruments used have further weakened Southern African states. Certainly, mainly wasteful economic programmes were shed but the human price — in countries without a recognisable social net — has been high. The secondary implications have also been serious: political legitimacy has weakened and the state's coercive capacity increased. Additionally, conflict over scarce resources has engendered debilitating tertiary effects. Thus, ethnicity

has been sharpened and irredentism encouraged.

Paralleling economic adjustment, Southern African governments have been driven towards 'good governance' under 'external conditionalities'. Again, the outcome has been uneven. Weak states invariably lack the plural culture necessary for healthy democracy. In some countries a democratic purpose has been rekindled but sustaining it is proving very difficult. The predatory ambitions of weak state bureaucracies drain the leadership upon which effective civil society grows.

If external pressure forced change upon the states of Southern Africa, the most significant pressure on the region itself has come from within. The ending of apartheid and the emergence of a 'new' South Africa have completely changed people's understanding of the region's future. Assumptions of permanent conflict have given way to a moment of profound rediscovery and exploration. As it searches for new points to build stability, Southern Africa is having to balance the pathologies of weak states and failing polities against the increasing self-assurance of post-apartheid South Africa. Not only is South Africa the world's 'darling', it is also in the throes of a potent nation-building project which has seen the country draw together in both celebration and economic reconstruction. In its exuberance, its sheer size and its military and economic power, the 'new' South Africa promises to distort, not balance, the equation for regional security. The lure of South Africa, for example, is fast changing the region's demographics. Armed with their understandings of the past and anticipating a

better future, Southern Africa's people are marching on South Africa. As elsewhere, migration is at the root of a series of 'new' security concerns, narcotics and illegal weapons being the most visible.

Migration

Can South Africa carry the burden? Estimates suggest that there are anywhere between 2 million and 9 million migrants in the country. Statistics — it is said — reveal everything and the variance in this particular one may point to disaster. A hard, but certain lesson of contemporary public policy is that states which cannot collect reliable statistics are unlikely to be able to deliver to their citizens let alone to the millions who live deeper in the shadows. This influx has also revealed the unacceptable face of nationalism in a region which — certainly formally — is intent on forging a unity of purpose. The portrayal of migrants in the 'new' South Africa has been very negative. Opposing illegal migration has become a powerful unifying force in South Africa's search for common national values.

But however powerful South Africa may be, its efforts to halt the flow of migrants in search of material well-being will fail. The people of Southern Africa are caught in a fundamental paradox: although divided into a dozen countries, Southern Africa revolves round a common source of wealth. This is why prospects for work in places as far apart as Ladybrand, Lüderitz, Luanda and Lusaka, are influenced by prices on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Does the movement of Southern Africa's people threaten the region's stability in the 21st century? The answer lies in how carefully the people of the region are prepared to understand the lessons of their collective past. Threats to the security of states in Southern Africa were traditionally met with force, which explains why war has been such a permanent feature of life in the region. And the legacy they have left is harsh. Even after the formal end to hostilities, the aftermath of war is to be found everywhere. The ICRC estimates that there are nine million landmines in Angola waiting to maim and kill civilians. On the other seaboard, in Mozambique, slow progress is

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being made in the clearance of two million landmines. Both these countries, like much of the rest of the region, were devastated by the destabilisation measures of apartheid carried out for the 'security' of its ruling minority.

Meeting security threats with force invariably produces unhappy results. If the region wants to fashion political outcomes commensurate with the prosperity its people deserve, individual states can no longer avoid the challenge posed by demilitarisation. This will not be easy, however. Encrypted in colonialism was the understanding that armies are synonymous with 'the state'. In Southern Africa, this idea has been used with devastating effect. The military have dispossessed ordinary people and empowered entrenched elites. Their claims on budgets have helped curtail development, directing limited state resources to an unproductive sector. The entrenched power of the military explains two immediate strands of insecurity in contemporary Southern Africa. First, the region's economic disparities are reinforced by a military imbalance. Second, the region's strongest military force — that of South Africa — is still almost entirely geared to fighting the Cold War, a war which polarised the region's people.

This situation has to change if Southern Africa is to be secure in the 21st century. But can it change? The key lies in the link between security, accountability and the democratic process. Because weak states are invariably intolerant, state institutions in Southern Africa have proved to be malleable. The simple goal of control leads to rupture — in other words, efforts to establish and sustain order often generate deep disorder. The lesson is clear. Lasting security is to be found in the hopes of the people not in the control offered by institutions.

What does this mean for Southern Africa? Experts know that to understand security, there are some preliminary 'tests' that need to be run. For all its current success, Southern Africa is not exempt from these. Take the test of geography. How will the region feed and water its people? The very heart of the region's economy, South Africa's economically productive Gauteng Province (where

Johannesburg is situated) faces an unprecedented water shortage. In mid-winter 1995, its water authority launched an appeal asking the public to save water, noting that reserves had fallen to the 'uncomfortably low level of 33% of total capacity'. This plea came after a rainy season in which the spectre of drought haunted all of Southern Africa. An estimated 10 million people faced hunger and deepening poverty. In some countries, up to 90% of the crops grown by small farmers failed. Urbanisation provides another 'test'. Contrary to accepted orthodoxy, the region's population is no longer rural. Deepening social crises have forced millions off the land. Paralleling global trends, by the year 2025, more than 60% of the region's people will be concentrated in its cities. Demographic projections suggest that the greater number of them will be living in South Africa. Meeting the security challenges posed by both geography and urbanisation in Southern Africa is not possible by military means. So what can be done?

Reuniting the region

The search for future security must begin by reuniting the region around its single economy. The key lies with the region's borders. Throughout the world, the maps which both comforted and excited the Cold Warriors are changing. In some places — the old Czechoslovakia for instance — fragmentation has been painless. In others — such as former Yugoslavia — it has been horrific. But the process of change seems unstoppable. In Southern Africa, the cues for reknitting the region together have been provided by the ease with which Walvis Bay was restored to Namibia and by Nelson Mandela's offer to consider Lesotho's desire for access to the sea.

In Southern Africa, the integration — through a mechanism still to be determined — of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and South Africa into a common political entity will speed security not by enhancing the power of the last-mentioned but by protecting the most vulnerable. This initial step should be followed by others under the principle which dilutes state power and enhances the authority

and transparency of local democratic institutions. Of course the militaries will resist this approach, but globalisation has destroyed their arguments. Lasting security in Southern Africa is linked to widening the distributive capacity of its single source of wealth. The way to do this is to change the way in which the present political units are linked to it; to sharing the region's wealth without destroying its growth potential.

The embryonic forces of civil society well understand the importance of this for Southern Africa's security. In quiet ways, the trade unions have assiduously worked to enhance the power of their regional 'personality'. Women's groups are reaching both far and near in the cause of greater empowerment. Businesses are discovering the profitability of previously unexploitable Southern African markets. In remarkable ways, states are no longer in the lead. It is the people of the region who are showing the way.

For five years, the world has been in the throes of a dramatic unravelling. Southern Africa has not been exempt; indeed it has been at the forefront of change. Multiracial Zimbabwe, independent Namibia and post-apartheid South Africa all attest to the possibility of tolerance in a part of the world where race was, for centuries, the single most determining factor in human life. Although the process has been painful, these successes have relied on challenging the very foundations of much that was thought to be immutable.

Securing Southern Africa in the next century will require great courage; it will entail more 'unlearning' than learning; more questions than answers. Analysts, policy makers and politicians will have to show that they have the foresight to change the region rather than simply reform it. Outsiders — like the EU and the ACP Group — can help in limited ways but the moment of discovery in the search for lasting security lies ultimately with the region's own remarkable people. ■ P.V.

The Courier talks to Dr Kaire Mbuende, Executive Secretary of SADC

SADC's new role — development through economic integration

Many regions of the world have seen dramatic changes during the last five years and none more so than Southern Africa. Namibia has thrown off the colonial yoke, the civil war in Mozambique has ended, democracy has been restored to Malawi and there are hopeful signs for an end to Angola's seemingly interminable conflict. Above all, South Africa's apartheid system has been consigned to history. Throughout the region, democracy and the rule of law are taking root and politicians are, in many cases for the first time, able to focus their main efforts on tackling the development challenges facing their countries.

Dr Kaire Mbuende has been no mere witness to these events. A native of Namibia, he joined SWAPO at the age of 18. He spent many years in exile, working at the SWAPO headquarters in Lusaka and studying and lecturing in Scandinavia. Throughout this time, he was active in the cause of Namibian independence, seeking to mobilise international opinion. In 1989, with nationhood finally in sight, he was able to return to his country where he became head one of SWAPO's regional election directorates. He went on to win a seat in the Constituent Assembly which subsequently became the country's Parliament, joining the government as Deputy Agriculture Minister. In January 1994, he was appointed Executive Secretary of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the successor to the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

SADC may only have lost one initial but it has nonetheless undergone a metamorphosis. The old SADCC was a grouping which brought the 'Front-Line States' together in a cooperative effort designed to provide a counterbalance

against apartheid South Africa. The new SADC has South Africa as a full and active member. In this interview, we sought Dr Mbuende's views on the prospects for the region and for the organisation that he heads. We began by asking him about SADC's current objectives now that South Africa has become a member

— It is important to bear in mind that South Africa joined SADC at a time when the organisation was being re-constituted. The old SADCC had the objective of reducing the member states' economic dependence on South Africa in particular. This was done through a variety of projects which were economic but, at the same time, political. The idea was that you could not effectively support the struggle against apartheid when you were, at the same time, dependent on the apartheid regime. Thus, for example, there were transport and communication projects designed to create alternative trade routes: instead of being dependent on South African ports, exports from Zimbabwe were rerouted through Mozambique, while Zambian products went via Tanzania.

Now, of course, South Africa is part of SADC. When it was clear that democracy was imminent there, it was necessary to consider what the future might hold for the organisation. Meeting in Maputo in 1992, the Council of Ministers decided that the cooperation had been beneficial to its members and that it should be deepened, not abandoned. Today, the objective is to have closer cooperation and integration in various fields. We are looking at the organisation as a vehicle for development through the economic integration of the countries in the region.

■ *South Africa is very much the 'giant' of the region. Isn't there a danger that the*

other SADC members might be swamped politically and economically by such a powerful neighbour?

— I should say first that we believe in the sovereign equality of nations. That is the basis upon which we conduct business in the organisation. So formally, South Africa has no more say than Lesotho in the running of SADC. Obviously, at the economic level, it is a different ball game. Market forces work independently and not necessarily in line with politicians' intentions. But even here we don't see the threat of the smaller economies being swamped. Of course, we are linked together in terms of infrastructure, transport and communications, financial institutions and so. But we believe that mutually beneficial trading relations can be developed. South Africa may be powerful but there is room for manoeuvre in the smaller countries provided that the playing field is level. If we can achieve market liberalisation for example, we will see South African products going to neighbouring countries but also the reverse happening. It won't be a matter of competing with the big South African corporations but of exploiting market niches. This can bring substantial benefits to the region's smaller economies. And it is clear that South African politicians are committed to equitable regional development.

■ *In the EU, member states that are less economically advanced receive extra regional funds. Is there any mechanism of this kind existing or foreseen under SADC?*

— I think the question of regional funds will become relevant once we reach a higher level of integration. We haven't got to that stage yet. We also need to try and avoid the kind of situation that has developed under the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) where there are simply fiscal transfers from the resources of the customs union — in practice, from South Africa — to the other members. These have done nothing to address the imbalances. There have been 30 years of financial transfers under SACU and the imbalances in industrial development are still there. What we need is mechanisms that can serve as corrective measures. We are at a preliminary stage in our thinking,

but there is, for example, the notion of differential application of rules of origin depending on the size of the economy, the level of industrial development and so on. This type of measure would favour the smaller economies. The next stage is to look at developing financial institutions for funding infrastructure projects, providing credits for economic activities — industrial development especially — in the least developed countries. It might not be the same kind of fund that the EU has but I think there are various possibilities in this area. We can of course look at providing financial compensation but it should be tied to the stimulation of economic activity. If transfers are used simply to subsidise budget deficits, then that doesn't solve the problem.

■ *Despite the efforts of SADC since it was set up in 1980, most member states are no better off today. How do you explain this and what do you think can be done to improve the situation?*

— The main explanation was the political instability in the region, although there were other factors such as falling commodity prices and global recession. But it is clear that a stable environment is absolutely crucial, whether it be overall political stability, an atmosphere of peace and security or stable macro-economic policies.

In terms of maintaining political stability we have created a conflict resolution mechanism. Through that we are able to intervene in conflicts such as those that occurred in Lesotho and Mozambique. We are also monitoring the situation in Angola closely. A committee has been set up to work with the UN and help the process in that country. So that is one level at which we are working.

We also think that now that the political and security considerations are less dominant we can seriously address the question of development. There is a related issue here to do with spending priorities. In a number of our countries, large amounts have been spent on defence, and that now needs to be looked at in the context of the new Southern Africa. Do we actually need such large and expensive

armies now that South Africa is democratic and we have mechanisms in place for conflict resolution and political cooperation? We hope that resources will be diverted from military spending to development and social objectives.

Another important aspect that I mentioned is having a stable macro-economic framework. We are currently instituting a new SADC 'sector' on finance and investment, to be coordinated by South Africa. This will look at questions of harmonising macro-economic policy, monetary policy and so on. The whole political environment has changed and the conditions are much better so we now want to move forward and create a larger regional market. This implies trade liberalisation — enhancing competition within the region so as to improve the efficiency and productivity of industries. The creation of a regional market of 120 million people should also help to attract foreign direct investment.

■ *On this subject, given that sanctions have been lifted, are you concerned that South Africa might draw foreign investment away from the smaller SADC countries?*

Canning plant in Swaziland
The smaller economies in the region may initially have difficulty competing with South Africa for foreign investment but Dr Mbuende believes that they will benefit in the longer term

There has clearly been a lot of interest in South Africa as a new and emerging country. I don't think, however, that the funds that would have gone to Zimbabwe say, will now be diverted to South Africa. Traditionally, foreign direct investment in the region has largely been resource-based — in primary industries such as mining and agriculture and we foresee this continuing as investors take advantage of the resources that are available. What we want to see now is a different kind of investment focusing on secondary industries where value is added. Competition for funds here is bound to be fierce. And that is something that is very important for the smaller economies, like Lesotho's for example, that have few natural resources. There will be manufacturing investment in South Africa and it may initially be to the detriment of other countries in the region, but the more investment that comes to South Africa, the more competitive the environment becomes. I think the result will be greater mobility of South African capital within the region. So we do not really fear that the opening up of South Africa will be damaging to the wider region. By attracting investment to South Africa initially, we are setting in motion a whole new process. South African investors, and indeed foreign investors who start out there, will soon discover the comparative advantages available in the neighbouring countries.

■ *Turning to the question of regional organisations, are you concerned about*



The Courier

the possibility of rivalry between SADC and other regional structures such as Comesa (the former PTA) and SACU? Is there room for more than one organisation?

— Talking first about the old PTA, as its title indicates, it was originally conceived as a preferential trade area and it co-existed fairly well with SADCC. The transformation of the PTA into Comesa and of SADCC into SADC, have changed the situation, however. The two organisations have the same objectives and an overlapping membership, and that is a contradiction in terms. It is difficult to see how it can work in the long run and there is a need for a re-examination.

■ *How do you see that inconsistency resolving itself?*

— Two ideas have been put forward. The PTA, as it was at the time, proposed merging with SADCC to form Comesa. That would have eliminated any duplication. There were two elements, however, that had to be considered, one economic and the other political.

In the context of trade liberalisation, a merger might have been possible involving such a large geographical area. But the pace of liberalisation would have been affected. Practical experience shows that you can progress much more quickly in a smaller area. So while the idea might have worked at the market level, we would have needed to apply a principle of variable geometry allowing some regions to move faster than others. There is also the point that in macro-economic policy terms, it is difficult to talk about harmonisation when the levels of development of the countries involved are so different.

■ *There are echoes here of the 'widening versus deepening' debate in the EU.*

— That is correct. When you go on to talk about political cooperation on the basis of shared value systems, you have a further problem. In Southern Africa, we now have democracy, political pluralism and multi-party systems as the basis of our political stability. If SADC had been merged into the larger Comesa area, which includes countries like Somalia and Sudan, there would have been difficulties. We think that those values, which are dear to us, might have had to be sacrificed, and we were unwilling to do that. So SADC felt

that the merger idea was not a solution because the area involved was too large.

The second proposition was one put forward by the SADC leaders. They suggested that the best solution was to have organisations working for integration at a regional level — East Africa, Southern Africa and so on — not as an end in itself but as stepping stones towards the ultimate objective of integrating the whole African continent as set out in the Abuja Treaty. The idea is that you need to strengthen these units as a first step and create a mechanism for trade relations and other links between them. Given the present level of development of our societies, we think that would be a much more reasonable way of proceeding.

Turning to the Customs Union, the situation is quite different. Unlike SADC, SACU does not have central coordination in areas like infrastructure, mining, human resource development and so on. It focuses on operating a trade regime among its members. On the other hand, it represents a more advanced form of integration in that particular field, with its system of revenue-sharing derived from the common external tariff. I don't think it would be right to sacrifice that in the interests of a larger unit. Once we reach a higher level of integration within SADC, the existence of SACU may be open to question but at present there isn't really any rivalry or contradiction. SACU is effectively a more advanced 'sub-set' in the region. What is of interest to us is expanding the free movement of goods and services between the SACU market and the broader SADC one.

■ *The Lomé IV mid-term review has finally been concluded. How satisfied are you with the outcome?*

— Thinking specifically of the Southern Africa regional programme, we certainly were hoping for more resources — for the simple reason that the situation here has changed and we now are poised for take-off. Stability has been restored and programmes that were not previously possible can now be undertaken. For instance, roads and railways that were not built because of the security situation can now go ahead. This points to a need for more resources, which would be used to

good effect, but unfortunately, it doesn't look as if there will be an increase. We cannot say we are satisfied, but we have to be realistic. What the experience brings home to us is that we should not base our development strategy on development assistance. If you do that, you are vulnerable to fluctuations in resource flows from the developed nations. That is why we attach great importance to trade and investment. SADC has also been working on a strategy to involve the private sector more in infrastructure development. Up to now, such programmes have been the exclusive domain of governments.

■ *It seems ironic that when South Africa had apartheid and the region had a high political profile, donors felt the need to make a strong commitment to the Front Line States. Now that the political situation has stabilised and, as you point out, new investment opportunities have arisen, the imperative to provide support seems to have receded?*

— There is definitely some truth in that. Of course, the democratisation of South Africa coincided also with big developments in Eastern Europe. I don't think we are talking about donor fatigue as such. What we see is a diversion of resources from Africa into other areas. In terms of aid volumes, there may even have been an overall increase, but our share is declining and that is unfortunate.

We have to accept that the significance of Southern Africa on the global political scene is declining. With the end of the Cold War, the region has lost its strategic significance. The importance of Southern Africa as a front against the inhuman system of apartheid has also gone. We are saying that the region needs assistance today for different and more positive reasons. The potential for success is greater than ever before. If you come to the aid of Southern Africa now you can be sure that you are helping a qualitatively different process with a real prospect of economic take-off. That is why there is a need for a 'final push'. The alternative is for us to remain in a situation of perpetual dependency. I should say, despite this, that there is still a lot of interest in Southern Africa. The problem is that it is not commensurate with our current needs. ■

Interview by S.H.

The prospects for Southern Africa in the international economy

by Rashad Cassim*

The economic prospects for Southern Africa have never received as much attention as today, partly at least, as a result of diminishing war and conflict in the region. Previously, this overshadowed any debate about the region's economic future.

The experience of Southern Africa in the last decade leaves much to be desired. Most countries have experienced negative real economic growth, balance of payments problems and high unemployment rates. In 1994, Africa's manufacturing exports amounted to around 2.6% of all developing country exports. Clearly, SADC countries only contributed a proportion of this very low figure. South Africa's share of total world trade has also been in decline since the 1960s.

By contrast, developing countries as a group have increased their share of world trade enormously in recent years. They now account for an estimated 25% of the total, double the level of a decade ago. Moreover, in the aftermath of the international debt crisis in the 1980s, a large amount of capital and foreign direct investment began flowing into the developing economies. But Southern Africa has been unable to attract even a small proportion of these flows. Manufactured products constitute only around 10% of Southern Africa's total exports and most of these are low value consumer items and other light manufactures. In most Southern African countries, excluding South Africa and Zimbabwe, between one and three commodities account for the bulk of exports. Moreover, the region's share in primary commodities has been declining.

Despite such a discouraging scenario, the prospects for the region over the next ten years — while they may not be fantastic — appear far better. According

to the World Bank, growth between 1994 and 2003 is projected to average 4.8% *per annum* for all developing countries, with East and Southern Asia expanding most rapidly at 7.6% annually. Annual GDP growth in Africa is projected to grow at 3.9% *per annum*. Although this seems low compared to the projections for developing countries generally, it would represent an improvement on previous years.

Another important point is that Southern Africa has experienced differential growth rates in the last decade. Botswana saw growth averaging almost 10% between 1980 and 1992 but the figure for Mozambique was actually negative (-1.1%). The prospects for growth also vary considerably for individual countries within the region. In Botswana, it is slowing down while in South Africa, the rate is expected to pick up during the next few years.

Enhancing the prospects for industrialisation

Economists have long argued that the engine for economic growth and development in the region is the industrial sector. Policy makers in Southern Africa are currently exploring different avenues to enhance the prospects for industrialisation. Industry in the SADC area exemplifies the structural problems endemic to Africa as a whole. The sector is underdeveloped and dependent on imports from industrialised countries. Only three countries have significant manufacturing capabilities — South Africa, Zimbabwe and (to a lesser extent) Zambia. South Africa's manufacturing sector, in value-added terms, is more than five times larger than the combined total for the rest of the SADC region. It is also nearly 15 times greater than that of the second largest manufacturer, Zimbabwe. South Africa accounts for more than three-quarters of the GNP of Southern Africa.

In most SADC countries, manufacturing constitutes a very small part of total economic activity. As the table

shows, this sector's share of total GDP averages 14% with Angola recording the lowest figure (4%), and Zimbabwe and South Africa sharing the top position (26%). While the figure of 14% is not abnormally low it could be misleading. Most economies in the region are small and a 15% contribution to GDP in the case of Lesotho, for example, does not mean that this country has a substantial manufacturing sector.

Clearly, if countries in Southern Africa have any comparative advantage in international markets, it is in resource-intensive and labour-intensive products, and not in sectors like capital goods. The region's immediate priority is not to attempt to improve its comparative advantage in the international markets for capital goods. SADC countries are not endowed with the skills or human resources and lack the capital that is a necessary precondition to compete in this field. Instead, the aim is to minimise the cost that capital goods impose on the industrialisation process in SADC.

The question of comparative advantage has to be seriously revisited by policy makers in Southern Africa. The biggest challenge is to create a responsible system of macro-economic management that is sensitive to the growth prospects of

The manufacturing sector's contribution to overall GDP in the SADC countries

Country	% share of GDP from manufacturing
Angola	4
Botswana	5
Lesotho	15
Malawi	14
Mozambique	n/a
Namibia	6
South Africa	26
Swaziland	18
Tanzania	6
Zambia	20
Zimbabwe	26
Average	14

* Development Policy Research Unit, University of Cape Town.

all sectors of the economy, but particularly agriculture and industry.

Economic integration

A much-debated issue nowadays is how economic integration might alter the prospects of Southern Africa. It is vital to understand that deeper forms of such integration would not be a panacea for the region's economic ills. The prospects for increasing intra-regional trade in the short to medium term are limited and the success of individual SADC countries will continue to depend, to a large extent, on national economic policies. Regional cooperation, however, could act as an important impetus to stimulate economic growth in the longer term while economic integration might play an important role in attracting much needed foreign direct investment to the region.

Although attempts to increase intra-regional trade could play a very positive role in enhancing the growth prospects of Southern African countries, they must not be seen as a substitute for expanding extra-regional exports. In the short to medium term, the most significant export growth is likely to come in external markets, notably the EU and other industrialised countries.

South Africa's accession to SADC could also provide new momentum for regional integration by virtue of the fact that it may have resources, albeit limited, to facilitate industrial linkages in the region. However, a critical question is posed by the asymmetry that exists between South Africa and the rest of the region. In relative terms, the former may have a more sophisticated infrastructure and broader industrial capabilities, but by international standards, South Africa is lacking significantly in all the fundamentals that make up a successful industrial economy. In particular, it has a limited skills base and productivity is poor. This offers a sober message to the country's regional partners. South Africa could doubtless be the locomotive for regional growth but there are gross inequalities within the country that need addressing. These could seriously undermine the positive economic

spin-offs that high growth in South Africa might otherwise yield for the region.

The problem with disparate levels of development is that industrial capabilities in the respective SADC countries differ considerably. In Mozambique and Angola, where manufacturing capacity is severely limited, some import substitution activities may be required. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, the urgent need is to rationalise highly diversified industrial structures. The key question is how to harmonise the needs of different countries through a regional programme.

Future prospects

Regional economic growth will depend on the ability of Southern Africa to attract capital inflows (particularly in the light of the fact that the savings rate is below 10%), expand the range of exports and increase levels of private investment.

While most policymakers agree that diversification is a fundamental challenge facing the regional economy, there is no similar consensus as to how this can be achieved. The much maligned structural adjustment programmes in many Southern African countries have, by and large, been unsuccessful — characterised by basic disagreements about the sequencing and pace of economic liberalisation. Economists do agree, however, on the need to achieve macro-economic stability in order to prevent large fiscal deficits and on the importance of expanding exports to minimise balance of payments constraints. Macro-economic instability is often a consequence of falling foreign reserves, net negative resource flows and lack of investment.

This implies that Southern African countries need to go beyond macro-economic policy to resuscitate the regional economy. More imaginative policies on the part of governments are needed to facilitate growth and development. On the issue of diversification, for example, much can be learnt from the experience of the recently successful resource-rich East Asian countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia. With resource endowments not unlike those of Southern Africa, these countries

continued to invest in the primary sectors of the economy.

Indeed, their exports of primary commodities played an important role in financing industrial development. In Southern Africa, more vision is also needed in looking at other growth sectors such as tourism which is often less vulnerable to fluctuations than primary commodities. Finally, the countries in question should look at market as well as product diversification. International evidence shows that market diversification can often boost efforts at diversifying one's product base. It is this kind of innovative idea that could usher the Southern African region into a new era of economic growth. ■ R.C.

The Information Highway

South Africa — the link between rich and poor

'Over half of mankind has never dialled a telephone number. There are more telephone lines in Manhattan than in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.' These words were spoken by South African Vice-President, *Thabo Mbeki*, at a G-7 meeting in Brussels in February. It is difficult to imagine a better way of alerting the leaders of the world's most powerful nations to the danger facing the developing countries in a world which is on the threshold of a new information age. The danger, quite simply, is that these countries risk being disconnected. It was an appropriate moment to make the point as the G7 had on their agenda, the definition of future world communications networks.

Mbeki's call appears to have been heeded. The proposals offered by this notable guest at the gathering of the world's seven richest countries and of the European Commission have been taken into consideration. Even better, they have been followed up quite quickly, at least by the Commission which has relayed the demands of its South African partner to the G7. The position of Nelson Mandela's South Africa as a pole of attraction and a driving force for development in the Southern African region is in step with the Commission's development policy, which has long favoured regional intervention. It is also in keeping with the options taken up by the EU, in the context of various Councils of Ministers, to make telecommunications the focus of Community development and an important element of its policy of cooperation with the developing countries.

Many politicians in these countries, not to mention some European specialists, see information and communications technologies as superfluous — or at least as a luxury rather than a priority. What they fail to take into account is that the world economic context, with its

emphasis on liberalisation, privatisation and the globalisation of commerce, leaves little choice but to participate in new methods of communication. The alternative would be economically disastrous. Nor do they mention in their analyses the example of the South East Asian nations, which are growing apace, now that the telephone has been made available to their people.

The experience of the EU may be of particular interest to developing countries. It has had to tackle a number of issues on a regional scale — issues such as liberalisation versus monopoly, the balance between public and private sector participation, providing services to rural areas, modernising networks and so on. Generally speaking, the EU encourages regional integration among its developing country partners and this aspect is seen as an important factor in development. Telecommunications are in the vanguard of this support for regional integration. SADC, for example, which recently welcomed South Africa as a full member, is receiving more than ECU 120 million in Community aid for the period 1990-1995, the first item being the Transport & Communications sector.

In the field of communications technology, there is obviously a great disparity between the developing and the industrialised nations. 'Teledensity' (the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants) stands at 44 in the European Union, with relatively significant variations — from 32 in Portugal to 57 in Denmark. The figure is above 30 in all industrialised countries but averages less than 5 in African states. There is also an astonishing disparity between developing countries as well as within them - notably as between urban and rural areas. For example, teledensity in Argentina is 11 as against 2 in

Botswana, while 90% of the telephone lines in India are in urban areas.

EU aid to developing countries in the field of telecommunications is covered by the Commission's own budget and by the European Development Fund (EDF), with possible injections of cash from the European Investment Bank (EIB). The Commission budget relates more specifically to association and cooperation agreements with third countries, while ACP states are eligible for resources under the Lomé Convention. These come in the form of grants from the EDF (paid into by EU Member States) which are managed by the Commission, and loans from the EIB, either from its own resources or from risk capital provided under the Convention. For the period 1990-95, the Lomé Convention funds amounted to ECU 12 billion. The breakdown was ECU 10.8bn in the EDF which includes risk capital (ECU 825m) and interest rebates (ECU 280m) and ECU 1.2bn from the EIB's own resources. The recently concluded mid-term review of Lomé IV, which has still to be ratified, sets aside ECU 12.6bn for the EDF (including risk capital of ECU 1bn and interest rebates of ECU 370m) and ECU 1.6bn under the EIB's own resources.

In ACP countries and more particularly in Africa, the Commission has promoted the development of rural telecommunications services and equipment for satellite transmissions. There have been major EDF-financed projects for rural areas in Mozambique (ECU 13m) and Tanzania (ECU 25m). In the field of satellite communications, ECU 38m has been spent on a project for civil aviation safety in West and Central Africa, while there have been four projects aimed at solving the specific problems of small island countries in the Pacific. The latter include funding for Intelstat B land stations for satellite telecommunications serving Western Samoa, Papua New Guinea and Kiribati. The EIB has contributed to projects in Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe, as well as to regional schemes. Between 1975 and 1993, the total amount allocated for Commission and EIB telecommunications projects in the ACPs and overseas territories was ECU 418m. This represents almost half the total funds provided for this sector under the EU's cooperation

policy covering the developing countries and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe.

The 'lead' department for the Commission's telecom projects in ACP countries is DG VIII (the Development Directorate General) and the focus here is mainly on providing infrastructures. Programmes implemented in other developing countries are the responsibility of either DG I (External Economic Relations) or DG XIII (Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation of Research). DG I deals with projects in the context of economic cooperation and generally operates in liaison with DG XIII. The latter also acts alone in areas relating to research and development or the diffusion of innovative technologies. One programme worth a mention is the support being provided for the organisation and management of various operators, currently in progress in

strengthen links which already exist in these fields.

South Africa: the ideal intermediary

The evolution of relations between the EU and South Africa, which will probably result in total or partial participation by the latter in the Lomé Convention, seems to herald a change in cooperation activities in the field of telecommunications between the EU and the whole of Southern Africa. This previously segregated country is like the missing link between developing countries in Africa and the industrialised countries, in the sense that it is made up of a patchwork of areas which are lagging far behind and others which have full telecommunications facilities, with the same standards as the developed world. This was a dichotomy made possible by decades of apartheid. Another dilemma lies in the nature of town/country relationships. These are atypical, because the rural properties of large-scale farmers are far more technically advanced than the township urban areas. If 'telepenetration' is taken as a criterion, the national average is 8.9, which approaches the figure for the most advanced developing countries in Latin America. But in the townships and black rural areas the figure drops to just 2. In white districts of Durban, the figure is as high as 75, a level comparable to the Manhattan or Tokyo business districts.

South Africa has the potential to play a leading role in regional cooperation. The country has already joined the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and will soon be taking an active part in the Pan-African Telecommunications Union (PATU) and in the Southern Africa Transport and Telecommunications Community (SATTCC). Its initiatives at the Brussels G-7 meeting are a good illustration of its potential. Firstly, it announced its intention to organise a conference in 1996 on the information society and developing countries. For this purpose, it has requested assistance from the European Commission — which has already responded positively. In addition to G-7 members and representatives from other developed countries, this event will bring

together a selection of developing countries. It is planned for the end of the first quarter of 1996, in conjunction with two major meetings. The first, 'European Health Telematics' (18-20 April 1996), is a seminar organised by the Commission and financed by the DG XIII Telematic Programme (independently of the Community's 1995 commitment of ECU 125 million destined for the Programme for the Development and Reconstruction of South Africa). It will present the results of European research and an exhibition featuring some 15 projects. The South African government asked for it to be an illustration of the Community's AIM programme. The other meeting, 'Health Informatics in Africa' (15-17 April 1996), is a pan-African conference organised by South Africa's Medical Research Council. Further major meetings are planned.

At the Brussels G-7 meeting, Vice-President Mbeki emphasised that developing countries are eager to acquire sophisticated technologies but that they refuse to become mere importers and consumers. This was one of the 'five principles' that he formulated. The other four relate to the dynamic role which the TICs have to play in reconstruction and development, the need for a major initiative for the Southern African region, the need for a global approach and the essential involvement of the developing countries in the creation, production and formulation of options in international cooperation. The opening up of 11 G-7 pilot projects to external partners is a good sign. From the very start of the conference, South Africa put itself forward as a candidate to take part in most of them.

South African officials say that they rely strongly on the European Union as their contact with the other developed countries. In a letter to Mr Mbeki, Commission President Jacques Santer undertook to work with the South African government to promote the success of the 'five principles'. A G7 meeting to prepare the ground for the Halifax summit was held shortly after the Brussels meeting and the Commission succeeded here in gaining official support for the South African conference on the information society and the developing countries. This was reflected in the final resolution adopted in Halifax. ■

Hégel Goutier



Developing countries are eager to acquire sophisticated technologies but refuse to become mere importers and consumers

the six countries of the Central American isthmus. This is being financed by the Commission to the tune of almost ECU 14m and actions successfully undertaken have included a telecommunications dialogue, structuring of the sector, regulation, universal access and standardisation, on both a bilateral and a regional level. Finally, in the context of research, telecommunications will henceforth be part of 'Action 2' of the IVth Framework Programme for international cooperation with the developing countries. This new situation should make it possible to develop joint R&D actions with new partners and to

A region of migration... and refugees

This article is a summary of a study of the causes and effects of migration in Southern Africa, by Hussein Solomon, a researcher at the Centre for African Studies at the University of the Western Cape. Details were first published in 'Africa Insight'. The author begins by making a distinction between true emigration and temporary migration, the latter being a frequent phenomenon in the region and one which is not taken into account here.

The civil wars which have ravaged Mozambique and Angola have 'officially' ended and repatriation is now being organised under the aegis of the UNHCR — with some considerable success in the case of the former. Thousands of refugees are quitting their host countries (principally Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia) and returning to their places of origin. Also returning are those who fled a violent situation brought about by external influences. Instability in countries bordering South Africa owing to the latter's support for groups such as *Super-Zapu* in Zimbabwe or the *Mashala Gang* in Zambia during the 1980s are the best examples of this. They are joined by yet others, forced by past events to leave their region under threat from a repressive political regime.

Although these refugees from conflict and oppression have mostly been well received in their country of asylum, this does not always apply to other categories of migrant. Indeed, the phenomenon of migration in Southern Africa has not halted now that peace has been restored. In fact, the return of 'war' refugees to their home country may help to mask a new type of migration, which takes place for other reasons and to other destinations.

The millions of people arriving in Johannesburg and elsewhere in South Africa from other countries in region — and also, increasingly, from Central Africa — are often 'illegals', hoping to achieve refugee status, find employment and see

an improvement in their living conditions. South Africa alone hosts an estimated five million people in this category.

The principal driving force behind these new movements can be summed up precisely — the future. In their home countries, the future is synonymous with poverty. Their home lands have been devastated by war. Ecological conditions are also unfavourable, due to events such as the serious drought which struck the region in 1992. Populations are also growing by between 2.5% and 3.5% each year. The phenomenon of migration has been exacerbated by drastic economic reforms imposed by the North — the structural adjustment programmes set up by the World Bank and the IMF to tackle the economic crisis that has struck most of Southern Africa. Other factors include, galloping inflation, tens of thousands of job losses in both the public and private sectors and a general impoverishment of the population

Brain drain

Not all refugees are illegal immigrants, however. Recent years have seen a stream of doctors, engineers, teachers and other intellectuals leaving their countries of origin for South Africa and its immediate neighbours which have more robust economies (Botswana, Swaziland and Namibia). Others have left for the West. Such people are frequently received with open arms in their country of asylum. This represents a 'brain drain' with serious consequences for those states whose intellectuals are leaving. On the other hand, some countries are happy to 'export' their excess unskilled manpower. In the case of Lesotho, for example, this ensures an influx of foreign currency from nationals working in the mines or on the farms of South Africa who send money to their families back home.

Although a boon for an employer, who sees the new arrivals as cheap labour, free from trade union interference, the arrival *en masse* of refugees can be a source of serious tension in the destination

country. There are economic tensions in Malawi for example, where 8000 arrive every month to swell the population, 10% of which is already made up of refugees. Services such as water supplies and sanitation are under threat and hundreds of hectares of forest are being destroyed for housing, leading to soil erosion and agricultural decline. Socio-cultural tensions include fear within the local labour force of unemployment, and this can lead to an increase in nationalism and xenophobic feelings. This has been seen in South Africa which has approximately 250 000 Mozambican refugees. There are also political tensions, both within states and between them. A past example of this was where South Africa used Mozambican refugees to reinforce *Renamo*. Indeed, Mozambican refugees have been poorly treated by Pretoria, having been refused refugee status which is vital for them to be able to receive the necessary assistance. This action was criticised by the international community.

How, then, can migration be halted? Solomon suggests two possible approaches. The first entails deterring immigrants by forced repatriation, better patrolling of frontiers or the use of electric fences — there are many different methods available and a number of them have already been used, particularly in South Africa. The problem is that although these measures are effective in limiting 'legal' migration, they have virtually no impact on illegal movements. The second approach is more interesting. It involves tackling the underlying causes of migration in order to render it pointless and thereby to encourage a return to the home country. This is, of course, a long-term process since states need to build up the capacity to grant meaningful rights linked to social and economic development. To this end, the author emphasises the need for Southern Africa to encourage regional integration, but he stresses that this will only be possible if there is a restructuring of North/South international relations. This too is a long-term process whose anticipated results will take some years, perhaps decades, to become apparent. But Solomon believes that it is a process that cannot be avoided. Southern Africa, he points out, has millions of people who are 'potential migrants'. ■

T.G.

From Cape Town to Dar es Salaam

A journey of discovery

by Lance Greyling

Having lived all his life at the 'bottom' of Africa, Lance Greyling — who is a young South African journalist — has always felt the need to venture north and discover what life is really like in the rest of the continent. During the apartheid years, the information available about countries to the north was very one-sided, focusing on accounts of political and economic devastation. Far from contributing to his understanding, these reports, he says 'merely served to enhance my existing view of Africa as a complete enigma.' On completion of a Postgraduate Diploma in African Studies, Greyling decided to undertake a journey of discovery which took him from Cape Town through Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The following is an account of some of his experiences and observations as he travelled from Cape Town to Dar-es-Salaam.

Throughout our journey, our policy was to travel only on local transport. As well as being the cheapest mode available, this allowed us an opportunity to converse with the people and discover the realities of the country from their perspective. Nowhere did this prove more fruitful than in Zimbabwe where we became embroiled in a political discussion on the train from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls. This

discussion made me aware of a truth that would constantly resonate throughout our travels in Africa, namely that people necessarily have a greater understanding of politics in situations where the political environment permeates every aspect of their daily lives. I found the most common lament of Zimbabweans to be that of the hardships which the World Bank's structural adjustment programme (ESAP) had wrought on the population. This reaction was understandable when one considered that after four years of structural adjustment, the economy had still not managed to reduce its inflation rate, which was running at about 25%. Coupled with the rising cost of living was the fact that under the ESAP, the government had been forced to withdraw subsidies on many essential goods and services. Structural adjustment also meant that local businesses were forced to become more internationally competitive, which necessarily translates into job losses. Government figures released in November 1994 revealed that, since 1990, the unemployment rate had risen from 37% to 45% with an accompanying retrenchment of around 25 000 workers. In my view, the most

The railway bridge between Zambia and Zimbabwe at the Victoria Falls

disheartening reflection of this situation was among the university graduates to whom we spoke, who did not hold out much hope of acquiring a job in the near future.

Legacy of drought

To be fair, however, one cannot lay all the blame on the ESAP. The crippling drought of 1992 clearly played some part in Zimbabwe's current economic malaise. I also found it slightly ironic that amidst all the talk about the need to curb public spending, one could still witness the rather bizarre sight of traffic officers driving around in the latest model Mercedes Benz. To my mind, this was a manifestation of another great lament voiced by Zimbabweans, namely the lack of government accountability. The problem, as it was related to me, lay in the big divisions among the opposition parties, and the concomitant fact that there was no force in Zimbabwean politics strong enough to present any real challenge to the power of the ruling ZANU party.

Zambia was the next country that we travelled through and unfortunately, I became aware of an even greater spirit of disillusionment than that which pervaded Zimbabwe. This was a reflection of the dismal state of the economy and the severe lack of employment opportunities in the formal sector. Although Zambia's new government under President Chiluba had managed to bring about macro-economic stability by bringing down inflation and interest rates, this still needed to be translated into improved living standards for the majority of the population. Unfortunately, one deleterious effect of the economic reforms has been deindustrialisation. More than 100 businesses had been forced to close in the previous few years as a result of stiff international competition. Besides the obvious loss of jobs that this entailed (more than 55 000 altogether), it also meant that Zambia's manufacturing and textile sector was greatly diminished. As one trader, who we met on the bus between Lusaka and Lilongwe, affirmed, Zambia had been reduced to a state where it was no longer able to manufacture its own goods. The trader in question was taking this bus trip



The Courier

— a journey of 11 hours — twice a week, just so he could buy goods from Malawi to sell on Zambia's informal markets. The huge informal economy of Zambia was another reflection of that country's high unemployment. We met recently retrenched workers and university graduates selling cigarettes and other assorted items at Lusaka bus station.

One graduate whom we encountered related to us how he used to see the ANC's Chris Hani, when he was in exile, jogging on the streets of Lusaka every morning. This reminded us of Zambia's former role as a 'front-line state'. It was not just the ANC that depended on the help of Zambia during its liberation war: ZAPU (Zimbabwe) and SWAPO (Namibia) also benefited. The support which Kenneth Kaunda offered to these organisations often led to violent reprisals from the regimes in the countries in question. There was, for example, the air attack on Lusaka by the South African Defence Force in May 1985. Such acts of reprisal were very costly for the Zambian population in human and material terms and, in my view, underline the great debt which the region, and South Africa in particular, owes them for the part they played in the liberation process.

Consolidating democracy

Malawi was a country which I was particularly interested in visiting, as I often recall tales from my schooldays of the 'benevolent' dictator Hastings Banda, who had 'wisely' chosen to align himself with South Africa and, in the process, secure a prosperous future for his country. The reality of the situation was very different. When Banda's rule came to an end in 1994, he left a bitter legacy with which the present government now has to contend. One aspect of this is Malawi's present lack of both a strong civil society and a tradition of competitive politics, two essential cornerstones of political democracy. The task of consolidating democracy in a country where repression was the order of the day for 30 years will certainly not be easy. The feeling that I got from speaking to Malawians was that they were certainly happy with the changes, but still felt some trepidation over whether the new order would be able to deal with the country's

host of economic problems. The economic strategy which Banda adopted involved exploiting its land and labour endowments. This entailed incomes, migration and manpower policies which reinforced the cheap labour supply syndrome. As regards wages, the government initially set minimum rates that were to remain constant for lengthy periods despite inflation. In the early years, these might more aptly have been described as maximum wages, as permission was required if the pay was to exceed the prescribed levels. Union leaders also used to be appointed by Banda himself, which meant that workers had very little recourse in terms of fighting for higher wages. The scale of the problem was illustrated to me by a schoolteacher who informed me that his present monthly wage was the equivalent of US \$30.

It was also in Malawi that I was made more acutely aware of an issue that has a marked effect on the entire African continent, namely the problem of endemic diseases. Sitting around a campfire one evening, one of the locals quite casually remarked to me that he thought he had just contracted malaria. This is a malady that can be fatal but the tone in which he spoke seemed to indicate that he had caught nothing more than the equivalent of a common cold. A doctor working in the field of AIDS education in Uganda later told me about the difficulties she faced in her work, including the fatalistic attitude of people when informed about the new disease that kills people indiscriminately and on a large scale. Their response is simply that there are already many diseases in Africa that have been doing that for years.

Tanzania was the last SADC state that we passed through. Although I was only there for a short time, one aspect I noticed was the extent to which former President Julius Nyerere still plays a role in that country's politics. As is customary in all African countries, the photograph of the President can be seen hanging in banks and government offices. The difference in Tanzania is that Nyerere's photograph is invariably hung alongside it. Although he left office in 1985, I still sensed a great deal of respect for him among the population. Indeed, his influence is so great that many people believe the person he endorses in




VIVANT UNIVERS

A second-hand clothes market in Malawi
Democracy has been restored but the country still faces a host of economic problems

the forthcoming elections will ultimately become President.

Throughout my travels in East and Southern Africa, I became aware of one common feature that all the countries seem to possess. This is the resilience of the people and their ability to survive times of extreme economic and political adversity. The ordinary people of the continent are truly its greatest resource. But it remains to be seen whether their talents can be harnessed in a way which will allow them to emerge from their present condition. ■

L.G.



'Unity in diversity' bid for the tourist dollar

by Elias Nyakutemba*

After years of talk, countries in East and Southern Africa are taking the first steps towards cooperation in tourism — despite fears that South Africa will get the lion's share of the benefits.

'We have held several high level *Indabas* (meetings), all very fruitful and cordial,' says Zambian Tourism Minister General *Criston Tembo*. From Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, the resolve is that we need, not just want, a single regional tourism body now, to coordinate and promote tourism. We have no doubt that it will work and help our economies to grow.'

After the first meeting of the Regional Tourism Council for East and Southern Africa, in Swaziland, the new organisation's executive will formulate a policy and make recommendations. Tembo is confident. 'I am sure that won't be a problem considering so much ground has already been covered.'

Buoyed by tourism success in South Africa, Kenya and Zimbabwe, and confident that the era of liberation struggles and civil wars is over, governments and tourist operators believe the time is ripe for a new approach. *Mike Matola*, Malawi's chief tourism officer, says that 'we are all weak and fragmented economies', but, 'by putting our tourism act

together', it will be possible to build up regional activities.

Leading Malawi businessman *Andrea Bizzaro* says that 'since the idea began to filter down there has been tremendous activity on the ground and as a matter of fact, we already have the blueprint — regional packages will mean tourists will travel on a single cheaper ticket from the Cape to Mombasa. What we need is to harmonise standards, swallow national pride and create a single regional airline and so on, so that we can compete favourably.'

Harmonisation will not be easy. Regional development initiatives do not have a history of success in Africa. Even the two groupings which have come together to form the Tourism Council — the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) — have a patchy record.

Mike Harvey, Zambian chairman of the Tours and Lodges Association admits: 'Our major worry is how to get all the nations to agree on policy issues, to reduce taxes, harmonise tariffs, remove visa restrictions and divorce the industry from politics.'

In addition, many countries will find it difficult to raise money for the estimated \$10 billion needed to renovate run-down infrastructure to international standards. 'The private sector is the only hope,' says a Tanzanian economist, but in countries with particularly weak econ-

The Victoria Falls
Some fear that South Africa will capture the lion's share of any benefits from the current tourism initiative but other countries in the region have many attractions to offer visitors

omies — such as Tanzania — even the private sector is crippled by high taxes, import duties and interest rates.

Nevertheless, commercial operators are particularly pleased by the intention of the governments concerned, in the words of *Ian Jones*, chairman of the Malawi Hotel and Catering Association, 'to involve the private sector at every stage of planning. In the last six months,' he says, 'we already have in Malawi fresh tourism investment of up to \$1.3 million. There are more applications to put worn-out facilities right and get new projects going. We can't go wrong.'

In Zambia, 33 new lodges are being built by private investment at a cost of more than \$2 million. Another \$1m will be spent by the government this year on refurbishing infrastructure.

Some critics warn that the winner will be South Africa's well-oiled \$2 bn a year tourism industry, with the rest of the region left to share the crumbs. Zambian hotelier *Herman Streidl* dismisses such fears: 'South Africa is not the big issue. They will naturally get a lion's share, but tourists want to see the Great Lakes, the Victoria Falls and other attractions which are not in South Africa. So we have our share of the cake.' ■

E.N.

* Zambian freelance journalist. Article from Gemini News Service, 9 White Lion Street, GB — London, N1 9PD

The Caribbean Tourism Development Programme

by Paul Needham*

The Caribbean has become one of the most popular tourist destinations in the world in recent years thanks to a positive general image, favourable dollar exchange rates and low airline prices. Many Caribbean states and territories are increasingly looking to tourism as the provider of long-term economic growth and employment at a time of uncertain future prospects in other industries such as the fruit trade. However, the region's tourism industry still suffers from structural weaknesses such as over-dependence on the North American market, an unbalanced level of destination awareness in Europe, and insufficient training and research data within the Caribbean. In particular, smaller destinations have yet to fulfil their tourism potential.

In Lomé IV, the European Union committed itself to four main areas of assistance: human resources and institutional development, product development, market development, and research and information. *Philippe Darmuzey*, head of the European Commission delegation in Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean, says the fundamental objective is to assist the Caribbean to establish a sustainable tourism industry based on public-private partnerships, and to help small destinations with little opportunity for economic diversification to develop a tourism sector.

Stimulating market demand

In an initial series of tourism development programmes from 1983-87, ECU 9.2 million was spent, partly on the European market with the establishment of a Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO) office in London and associated marketing activities, and partly on research and smaller projects in the Caribbean. In 1993, the EU launched a more ambitious three-year ECU 9 million Caribbean Tourism

Development Programme (CTDP) covering 24 beneficiary states and territories. The objectives were to achieve long-term growth in tourism earnings and visitor arrivals from Europe, improve tourism products to match European market needs, and promote smaller destinations. A vital element was to aim for project self-sustainability beyond the lifetime of the programme. At present, Caribbean destinations welcome just 17-18% of their visitors from Europe, although these account for at least 40% of room nights since European tourists generally stay longer and spend slightly more than their American counterparts.

Steigenberger Consulting, a German tourism consultancy, was commissioned to oversee the programme, with the CTO in charge of day-to-day administration. Well over half of the funding was for investment in Europe rather than the Caribbean but Steigenberger's managing director, Dr *Peter Agel*, insists this is absolutely vital for tourism development. 'With tourism, we help more if we invest money in Europe because tourists are generated for the region and then they spend their money there,' he points out. However, 'this was very difficult for the EU, and particularly for its development aims, because the general understanding of aid is that the money should be spent in the developing region.'

There was a switch away from the so-called 'hard-sell' approach under which tour operators had been subsidised to include particular destinations in their holiday brochures, but which generated relatively few extra sales. Only a small number of specialist tour operators have been given support under the current programme. Instead, it has targeted demand by concentrating on travel agents. As Dr Agel explains: 'Travel agents are the point of sale and that is where the decisions are made today. We must have influence at the point of sale.'

The largest project was a correspondence seminar on the Caribbean which will have been completed by about 6000 travel agents from eight European countries by the end of the programme next February. Programme-funded CTO Chapters (national branches) were successfully formed by tour operators, hotels and other travel organisations in Germany and Italy in addition to the existing UK Chapter, but the French operation folded due to lack of trade support. A multimedia CD database of Caribbean destinations and hotels was also initiated during the programme and successfully transferred to private sector partners for further development.

Other projects out of the 83 in Europe have included study and work placements for some 30 Caribbean travel industry professionals in Britain and the Netherlands, a voucher programme for small hotels, marketing back-up for travel trade fairs and roadshows, and press and travel agents' destination trips.

Training for Caribbean professionals

In the Caribbean, about 1500 participants have been trained in over 50 workshops in subjects such as tourism information services, professional guiding, customer relations for customs officials and even passenger friendliness and service for taxi drivers. Reports completed under short-term consultancies include a series of visitors' surveys, tourism development policies for Bonaire, Guyana, Montserrat, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia and Suriname, and studies in regional airline cooperation, the impact of tourism on the marine environment, tourism sector taxation and visitor harassment.

CTO Marketing Director for Europe, *David Barber*, says: 'The biggest success of the programme was the correspondence seminar which really raised the profile of the CTO in Europe. The development of the German chapter was another major achievement. In the Caribbean, we had the visitors' survey and the training of Caribbean private and public sector professionals. This is the first time the CTO has had the resources to carry this

* Freelance journalist based in Germany.

Correspondence seminar for European travel agents

The seminar targeted travel agents whose advice to consumers is often decisive in the choice of a holiday destination. Up to 6000 travel agents from eight countries, include 1800 in Germany, 1300 in the Netherlands, 900 in the UK and 800 in Italy, studied brochures and completed questionnaires on 32 Caribbean destinations in courses lasting eight months. All successful participants gained certificates as 'Caribbean tourism experts'. A tombola competition generated 15 000 additional Caribbean bookings in German-speaking countries alone. Although the seminar costs amounted to ECU 2 million, the CEO is delighted at the travel trade's reaction and says participation numbers were generally above expectation apart from in France.

out.' Philippe Darmuzey adds: 'Broadly speaking, the programme has been satisfactory. It has certainly been successful in all areas of training, and the correspondence seminar in particular has done much to increase understanding of the region's characteristics by the European travel trade.'

The visitor survey system is likely to be continued in several Caribbean countries and the creation of European CTO chapters offers the prospect of sustainable private sector partnership, but continuation of the 'pump-priming' tour operator financial support scheme is more open to question, he adds.

On specific objectives, the CTDP has easily achieved its target of an annual rise of 60 000-90 000 European visitors. Some 2.6 million European tourists visited the Caribbean in 1994, a rise of 13% (300 000) on the previous year. The 1993 figures were themselves, 10% higher than in 1992. The target of boosting the Caribbean's gross tourism earnings by US \$65m will also be substantially exceeded. German visitor spending alone rose by about \$50m to some \$800m last year.

Whereas in the Caribbean, projects could be targeted fairly easily at the 24 beneficiary states and OCTs, a more broad-brush regional approach was necessary at the European end. As Dr Agel explains: 'The execution of the programme has always borne in mind that we have to concentrate on the beneficiaries and not the Caribbean in general. In terms of marketing in Europe, however, you cannot tell a tour operator the difference between beneficiaries and non-bene-

ficiaries. In the correspondence seminar, it would have been impossible to omit the non-beneficiaries because people at the point of sale view the Caribbean as a whole.'

An ECU 11m three-year successor programme is now being planned. This will concentrate on human resource development in the Caribbean to consolidate the achievements of the 1993-96 programme. Particular assistance will be given to new ACP states Haiti and the Dominican Republic, as well as Suriname, whose tourism industry is under-developed. Philippe Darmuzey explains: 'This new programme will continue certain marketing activities but will shift strongly in emphasis towards the strengthening of regional capacity to deliver education and training and to monitor sector developments.' Activities will include in-service and institutional tourism training, product diversification to cover ecological, heritage and special interest tourism, establishment of a regional CTO research unit, and a possible management information system.

Still a long haul for smaller islands

While clear progress is being made in the development of the region's tourism industry and in the growth of European markets, substantial challenges remain as the Caribbean competes in the long-haul tourism market with fast-growing Asian destinations. Awareness of smaller islands remains low in Europe and

will require long-term marketing support to transform a public perception that holidays in the Caribbean mean mass tourism to cheap destinations such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Jamaica.

In addition, Peter Agel claims that many Caribbean hoteliers and the Caribbean Hotel Association (CHA) still do not see Europe as a 'serious market' compared to the 'bread-and-butter' North American business on the doorstep, and thus give the continent a low marketing priority. David Barber accepts that in the long-term, the European market share is not likely to rise much above 20% or 25% at the very most, but stresses the European length of stay, which is double that of Americans. As Philippe Darmuzey points out, achievement of the EU's long-term goals of a sustainable Caribbean tourism industry requires an integrated approach covering assistance for both product and market development. Beneficiary states and OCTs in the Caribbean still face a long haul before their tourism future is secured. ■

P.N.

The humanitarian wings of the European Commission

ECHO Flight: an 'airline' with a difference

When the 'ECHO Flight' system began operation last year, some people wondered whether it was appropriate for the European Commission to set up what appeared, in effect, to be an airline. This apprehension has been offset by the many instances of praise from beneficiaries of the service, the NGOs operating under difficult field conditions in Somalia, Rwanda and Sudan. The forceful stance of the new European Commissioner for humanitarian matters, Emma Bonino, and her declared wish for ECHO (the European Community Humanitarian Office) to have a higher profile, have probably helped in allaying any concerns.

It is unlikely that you will come across an aircraft bearing the ECHO emblem at a major commercial airport. The nine planes that display the Humanitarian Office's logo together with the EU flag, usually take off from and land on mud runways or austere airports in quite unfavourable conditions. Their bases are Lokichoggio, Maldera, Djibouti and Mogadishu, the nerve centre being Nairobi. The luggage carried consists of equipment for NGOs and food aid, while the passengers are humanitarian workers rather than tourists. An exception to this is where ECHO organises a special flight in the context of one of its public relations operations aimed at making citizens in donor countries more aware of what happens to their money. It was an event of this kind which allowed a group of about 30 children, surrounded by a mass of journalists, to experience the thrill (and discomfort!) of a flight in a noisy, unpresurised C130 Hercules of the Belgian Air Force. Summer had arrived early for these latitudes and the atmosphere on the tarmac of the Brussels airfield was torrid as the group assembled one afternoon in June. They will probably remember for a

long time the striking images of their country as seen from the strange 'balcony' of an aircraft flying at low altitude. The stern of the plane was opened — left gaping like the mouth of a shark — so that the passengers could understand how aid packages are dropped over areas where it is not possible to make a landing. This flight was the children's reward for having won a drawing competition on the theme of humanitarian flights. It was also an opportunity for the partners in the operation — the Humanitarian Office and the Belgian Air Force — to explain to the press what they were doing.


Link man

A key person in the ECHO Flight team is the service's technical coordinator in Brussels. *Poly Stevens* is a tall man — perhaps two metres — and as he passed back and forth between the cockpit and the passenger section his head touched the ceiling of the compartment. Mr Stevens acts as the link between 'officialdom' and the military. Himself a former military pilot, he was a logical choice for the European Commission when it was seeking to recruit someone to carry out this important liaison task. The Commission's aim was to improve the efficiency of its support in the transport field offered to NGOs involved in regions of Africa afflicted by conflict and famine. Since the beginning of 1994, Mr Stevens has been based at ECHO's HQ in Brussels, and, working with ECHO officials, he has helped to define the basis for the operation of this 'free' airline which made its first flight in May 1994. Prior to that time, each NGO received a transport budget and duplication of tasks was unavoidable. In the absence of coordination, it was often the case that two half-empty aircraft, chartered by two different



Reward for young 'artists' in a drawing competition featuring humanitarian aid. The thrill (and discomfort) of a flight in a military plane

organisations, were flying between the same places at virtually the same time. It was essential to achieve better cost efficiency in the use of European aid. To begin with, requirements had to be identified — a difficult task given the essentially random nature of emergency situations. An efficient coordinating structure between the NGOs and the service providers also had to be defined. The specifications included a safety guarantee at least as good as that for private airlines, since the Commission's image could suffer badly should any instances of negligence arise. According to Poly Stevens, 'We had to fulfil a mission which was not clearly defined and for which flexibility is still the primary characteristic. At the same time we had to offer maximum safety standards.' It was relatively easy to lease small aircraft capable of operating out of makeshift aerodromes, but for large transporters, capable of providing the link with Europe and conveying large quantities to difficult areas, the issue was more complex. It was here that Poly Stevens' links with former air force colleagues proved particularly useful. He acted as 'matchmaker',



Southern Sudan — a major operation with a low profile

Currently, the largest theatre of operations for ECHO Flight is Southern Sudan, where a particularly vicious war has been taking place, largely out of the public eye, for more than 10 years. The army of the Islamic Khartoum regime aims to 'normalise' this zone which harbours a number of guerrilla groups. In 1988 alone, Southern Sudan recorded 200 000 deaths — mostly civilians — in the conflict. Together with the specialised UN agencies such as Unicef and the World Food Programme (WFP) and the ICRC, ECHO is involved in Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), which was launched at the end of the 1980s. This is a purely humanitarian operation, although one of uncommon scope. This year alone, the OLS has a budget of \$100 million. Its headquarters are in Nairobi, Kenya, which is also home to the ECHO Flight coordination centre. The actual operational base is at Lokichoggio in north west Kenya, close to the border with Sudan. The village has been transformed in recent years with its airport, installations for managing food stockpiles (running to thousands of tonnes), seeds and farm implements, not to mention the Red Cross hospital. Lokichoggio airport is the departure point for the Belgian Air Force's big transporter and also the place of arrival for medical flights bringing the wounded from Southern Sudan. Although the NGOs receive ECHO's services free of charge, the transport of supplies for the WFP has to be paid for. Last year, the latter used ECHO Flight to transport some 10 000 tonnes of food to Sudan.

In order to be able to deploy its aircraft over Sudan, ECHO Flight, and the OLS as a whole, have had to keep a low profile. ECHO adheres to a policy of strict political neutrality, and northern areas of the country receive aid in the same way as southern areas affected by the catastrophe. This is a government requirement. The relevant authorisations have to come not only from the latter but also from the guerrilla factions controlling the region — a situation which inevitably gives rise to difficulties, with both parties having to be reconciled. At the beginning of this year, flights by the Belgian C130 were sus-

convincing the Air Force of the image-boosting advantages of supporting humanitarian work. Belgian officials were quick to agree.

The Belgian military came up not only with the equipment — a C130 Hercules replaced every five weeks for maintenance, and the benefit of their long experience of providing succour in humanitarian crises. They were also able to offer their revolutionary system of precision jettisoning without a parachute (Very Low Altitude Gravity Extraction System). The system is simple in essence but also highly accurate with a 99.5 % success rate. This surpasses any other methods used hitherto. The keys to achieving such an impressive result are the very low flight altitude, the low speed and the packaging of the parcels. The goods are packed in a double nylon bag and loaded on pallets which may carry up to two tonnes. When approaching the jettisoning point, the aircraft's speed is considerably reduced, landing gear and flaps are put down, the big ramp at the stern is lowered and the nose is lifted by between eight and ten degrees. The pallets, which have been held only by straps then slide until the straps break. The bags separate and hit the ground individually with a low kinetic energy in comparison with that of a homogeneous packet. The outer bag tears but inner one remains intact. Even the wooden pallets can be recovered and used

A Belgian Air Force C130 Hercules, in the service of ECHO Flight
Remarkable precision in dropping food aid

by NGOs or local people. ECHO Flight began its work at a time when serious questions were being asked about similar operations carried out with questionable efficiency by the US Air Force. In these, the parcels were often damaged or landed outside the target area in 'hostile' territory.

Another plane used by ECHO Flight is the Cessna Caravan, which is also employed to transport food aid, although in smaller quantities. This is a single engine turbine aircraft with higher performance levels than a conventional piston twin-engine aircraft. More importantly, it is safer, owing to the use of a fuel which is less inflammable than petroleum spirit, something which can be important in certain countries where it may be difficult to guarantee fuel quality. There are also two Beechcraft King Air 200s which have a greater range than the Cessnas. The one based in Djibouti, for example, is able to cover Northern Somalia. Lastly, there is a small, fast jet aircraft.

ECHO Flight's other function is to bring NGO workers out of difficult situations. About 50 such evacuations have taken place on safety grounds during the last year and these have given a considerable boost to the Humanitarian Office's profile.

pended on the pretext that it had dropped 40 tonnes of weapons for the rebels. According to Poly Stevens, this is technically impossible. 'It was a misunderstanding', he told us in measured tones, 'which we have fortunately now resolved. The payload of a C130 is only 20 tonnes, 16 when jettisoning, not 40. Moreover, the weapons would have been damaged unless we used parachutes, which are not part of the aircraft's equipment.' He went on to stress; 'What ECHO Flight cannot afford is for a case of negligence, a misunderstanding or a lack of effort to cause a breakdown in the agreement and for the aircraft to be prohibited to enter the relevant airspace. Sudan is a country which has rights and these rights are respected'.

The other centres for the ECHO Flight network are Mogadishu (Somalia) serving the south of that country and Djibouti covering Northern Somalia. However, ECHO Flight's terms of reference are fairly wide and it is flexible enough to be able to intervene in other areas where humanitarian aid is required. Initially, the machine took some time to run smoothly, not least because of the human and cultural aspects of working in multinational groups and the administrative difficulties arising from the fact that the teams were based in one country whilst the services were provided to another. Nowadays, it appears to operate faultlessly.

The ECHO Flight people say they are delighted with the results achieved in the first year. Aircraft loadings vary between 60% and 80% of capacity which is very high for this type of flight. There is close coordination with the NGOs, who are regulated by a set of strict procedures. These include penalties on passengers who fail to turn up for check-in. Such passengers lose their priority in the reservation list for a certain period. The effect is that the proportion of 'no-shows', which generally run at about 25% for flights of this nature, has fallen to just 7%. The cost of transporting passengers or freight, calculated on the basis of weight per unit of distance, has also been reduced by 36%. Although there are still no precise figures available, it is thought that substantial savings have been achieved. The evidence for this is that



ECHO Flight manages, with four aircraft, to do what 10 NGOs subsidised by the Office used to achieve with 10. And as for any criticism about the possible waste of resources entailed in having certain aircraft immobilised on the ground for too long, Poly Stevens offers a categorical rebuttal. Firstly, he points out that great care was taken in anticipating the needs when the small fleet was set up. In addition, the fact that an aircraft is on the ground does not necessarily mean that it is not in use. Given the particular constraints of humanitarian operations, the time is employed profitably in extensive servicing. He also observes that the aircraft have permanently to be on standby to deal with any problem situations that arise.

ECHO Flight in Maridi (Southern Sudan)
A large scale deployment but a low profile. Account has to be taken of all the factions in this terrible conflict

Another very important gain is in the area of safety. Up to the present time, ECHO Flight has had no accidents, whereas, in the past, the inexperience of crew members, mechanical failures in aircraft that were inspected in a somewhat random fashion, overloading and non-compliance with security requirements gave rise to one or two — which of course is one or two too many. ■ Hégel Goutier

OECD report on aid in 1994

Official development assistance from the North to the South is still declining but not as fast as before. This was the conclusion reached by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), when it published provisional figures in June showing the flows of development aid in 1994 from the members of its Development Assistance Committee (DAC).

In nominal terms, the amount of assistance provided by the 21 member countries rose by \$1.4 billion to a total of \$57.8bn. Allowing for inflation, this represented a decrease of 1.8% which compares with a 5% fall in the previous year. Taken as a whole, the European Union is the major provider of development aid to the Third World. However, the DAC figures show Japan

consolidating its position as the largest individual donor in absolute terms. The amounts paid into the European Community's development cooperation policy by each Member State are added to 'their' totals although nowadays, the OECD provides additional information in the form of a 'composite' EU figure. All EU countries except Greece participate in the DAC.

In its communiqué, the OECD notes sharp falls in the amount of development aid provided by Belgium, Italy and Finland, attributing this to overall public expenditure reductions in these countries. It also observes that four states — three of which are EU members — continued to exceed the UN 0.7% GDP target (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and The Netherlands). However, the overall percentage of GDP

allocated for development assistance by DAC countries fell to just 0.29% — a 21-year low. To be fair, it should be recognised that a number of contributing states nowadays have significant aid commitments to countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union which are not formally regarded as 'developing' but nonetheless face major economic challenges. The OECD recognises this and seeks to provide a more balanced picture by also publishing the amount of official aid given by DAC members to these so-called 'Part II' countries (See Table II).

Although ODA to developing countries declined, there was better news in the area of private capital flows. These rose for the fourth successive year to reach \$97bn. ■

S.H.

Table 1 - ODA from DAC countries

Country	ODA as % of GDP		ODA in \$bn	
	1993	1994	1993	1994
<i>EU</i>				
Denmark	1.03	1.03	1.34	1.45
Sweden	0.99	0.90	1.77	1.70
Netherlands	0.82	0.76	2.53	2.53
France	0.63	0.64	7.92	8.45
Luxembourg	0.35	0.40	0.05	0.06
Germany	0.36	0.33	6.95	6.75
Finland	0.45	0.31	0.36	0.29
Belgium	0.39	0.30	0.81	0.68
United Kingdom	0.31	0.30	2.92	3.09
Austria	0.30	0.29	0.54	0.56
Portugal	0.29	0.28*	0.25	0.25*
Spain	0.25	0.26	1.21	1.25
Ireland	0.20	0.24	0.08	0.10
Italy	0.31	0.20	3.04	1.97
<i>EU average/total</i>	<i>0.45</i>	<i>0.43</i>	<i>29.77</i>	<i>29.12</i>
<i>Non-EU</i>				
Norway	1.16	1.05	1.01	1.14
Canada	0.45	0.42	2.37	2.23
Australia	0.35	0.38	0.95	1.09
Switzerland	0.33	0.36	0.79	0.98
Japan	0.27	0.29	11.26	13.24
New Zealand	0.25	0.24	0.10	0.11
United States	0.16	0.15	10.15	9.85
Total DAC	0.31	0.29	56.40	57.75

* estimate

Table 2: Official aid to 'Part II' countries in 1994* (in \$bn)

Germany	2.30
United States	2.25
France	0.65
United Kingdom	0.28
Netherlands	0.27
Japan	0.25
Switzerland	0.24
Austria	0.23
Denmark	0.20
Italy	0.16
Spain	0.09
Belgium	0.08
Sweden	0.08
Canada	0.06
Finland	0.06
Norway	0.04
Portugal	0.01
Ireland	0.01
Total	7.25

* Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic and Ukraine)

Environmental management in Cameroon

A participatory approach

by Asit K. Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada*

During the past decade, many developing countries have embarked on the preparation of national environmental management plans (NEMPs), primarily with the assistance of the UNDP, the World Bank and certain bilateral aid agencies. When analysed only on a technical basis, these plans — as to be expected — are of varying quality. When considered in terms of their implementation, however, the vast majority have been paper exercises with very limited impact on national policies and programmes. Only in a few selected countries have NEMPs had a discernable impact. One of these is Cameroon. Cameroon's success has been somewhat unexpected since the country is a relative newcomer to the environmental field. In this article we examine the process leading to the preparation of the Cameroon NEMP, since the process has been largely instrumental in the success of the plan to date.

Prior to 1992, Cameroon did not have a national environmental management policy. Environmental protection was a part of various sectoral policies and, not surprisingly, the different sectors and ministries responsible for managing them, placed varying degrees of emphasis on the relevant environmental factors. Consequently, at the normative level, a variety of legislative and regulatory policies were adopted, which tended to focus primarily on the exploitation rather than on the holistic management of the ecosystem.

Cameroon's environmental legislation comprised various rules and regulations, reflecting the above-mentioned

sectoral fragmentation, and the complexity of the legal system in general. The legal system is notable in that traditional customary rules and modern laws exists side by side. This is especially the case as regards forest and wildlife management.

Integral approach

One of the most important factors leading to the preparation of the NEMP was the Cameroon government's realisation that it was essential to take an integrated overview of the environmental management process, on a long-term basis, for the sustainable development of the country's extensive natural resources. The authorities also recognised that such an approach was needed to prevent the environmental degradation currently taking place. A new institutional structure was thought necessary offering a comprehensive approach to environmental management in place of the fragmented, dispersed and sometimes even contradictory efforts made prior to 1992, the results of which had been somewhat limited.

The need for both a new institutional structure and the preparation of a holistic national plan for the environmental management of the country was accepted at a very high level — by the President himself. In April 1992, a Presidential decree was issued which revised the administrative structure of the Government. It created a new Ministry of the Environment and Forests (MINEF), with a specific mandate to develop a comprehensive national strategic action plan which would protect the environment and manage the currently abundant natural resources of the country in a sustainable manner for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. Cameroon has, after Zaire,

the second largest area of tropical forest in Africa.

The preparation of the national plan was facilitated by the Resident Representative of the UNDP in Cameroon through policy dialogues with the Government and the donor community. With the converging interests of the Government of Cameroon and the UNDP, discussions were initiated by both sides on how best a national environmental management policy could be formulated and implemented.

Since environmental issues affect all sectors, a *Groupe de réflexion* (Reflection Group) was established which included various UN agencies active in Cameroon in the environmental field. The primary objective of the *Groupe* was to assist the government in identifying and managing priority environmental issues. It was later expanded, under continuing UNDP chairmanship, to include other interested bilateral donors. The aim was to exchange views and ideas on a regular basis and thus facilitate the environmental management process in Cameroon. In retrospect, it can be seen that the *Groupe* made a very substantial contribution to achieving effective donor coordination — something which is often a challenge in many developing countries.

The *Groupe* and a national inter-ministerial working group on the environment jointly formulated the terms of reference for a major multidisciplinary and multi-institutional mission on the environment. This mission took place in September-October 1992 following six months of preparatory work. It was headed by one of the co-authors of this article (Professor Biswas) on behalf of the UNDP with *Mesack Tchana*, Inspector-General of MINEF, as the National Coordinator. Among the other UN agencies taking part were UNSO, FAP, UNESCO and

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Road-building through the Cameroon tropical forest
The government recognised the need for an integrated and long-term approach to environmental management, for the sustainable development of the country's extensive natural resources

UNIDO. Bilateral donors who fully participated in the mission included Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States while the World Bank was also actively involved in the discussions.

The mission included both national and international experts. Teams were set up to cover all the priority areas identified by the Mission, each consisting of one expert from the UN or a bilateral agency and at least one national counterpart. The final report was drafted by the mission leader based on the analyses and recommendations prepared by the individual mini-teams, which were given specific assignments within an overall agreed framework. The report included the following chapters :

- Environment in the prevailing economic context ;
- Analysis of critical environmental issues ;
- Industry and environment ;
- Health and environment ;
- Legal and institutional framework ;
- Socio-anthropological framework ;

- Environmental training, education, research and communications ;
- Women, environment and development.

From the outset, the aim of the mission was to prepare an operational and implementable report, which would result in significant numbers of follow-up activities. In fact, the Report did not end with a series of recommendations but rather with a set of national and international actions necessary to implement the recommendations in terms of substantive and extensive follow-up activities.

Ensuring continuity of the process

Bearing in mind that the NEMP should be prepared by Cameroonian experts for the Cameroonian people, the mission suggested that the process should entail a 'bottom-up' rather than a 'top-down' approach and that foreign experts should be used only when absolutely essential. To date, the process has involved 60 national consultants and the number will increase to 100 by the end of the year. Following the preparation of the programme support document for the NEMP process, a team of national and international experts was quickly assembled to formulate the plan, ensuring continuity of the process and follow-up actions.

To define the general orientation, planning methodology and work programme for formulating the NEMP, the project organised a national consultation, followed by a target-oriented planning workshop which was held in Garoua in July 1993. Following the preparation of the work programme, nine regional studies were conducted, each culminating in an intensive regional consultation (with the participation of about 3500 people) and planning exercise. The consultative process has now been completed, and the results are currently being synthesised.

The important aspect of the regional consultation process was the overwhelming emphasis placed on the views of local people, provincial and divisional services, universities and research institutions, and environmental NGOs. These local participants outlined the critical environmental issues for their regions and

recommended priority actions for identified ecological zones. Concurrent with the regional consultations, the following sectoral studies were initiated :

- Biodiversity and forest resources ;
- Geology and mineral resources ;
- Industrialisation and its environmental impacts ;
- Urban and institutional issues ;
- Harmonisation of sectoral environmental policies ;
- Land use ;
- Research programme.

In addition, three support activities are in progress. These deal with 'sensitisation' of the population and decision-makers to environmental issues, the development of an environmental information system and the implementation of micro-projects identified during the regional consultations. All these activities are designed to provide the policy framework and strategies for environmental management.

The idea of implementing micro-projects during the NEMP process is an approach that is being tried for the first time. These were considered essential to ensure a continuing high level of interest from local people — who are being consulted throughout the entire process. Equally, the donors supporting the NEMP are keen to see some development activities. The effect of linking the 'sensitisation' programme to the implementation of micro-projects, and of providing funds to NGOs to execute these, is that various parties have now become 'stakeholders' in the exercise.

This is the first time such a genuinely consultative process has been organised to develop a national plan for any sector in Cameroon, and the results so far indicate that it has been an extraordinary success. Many developing countries are now embarking on the preparation of NEMPs, generally with the assistance of bilateral or multilateral aid agencies, and those involved might benefit from a closer study of the Cameroon experience. ■

A.K.B. & C.T.

Brussels African Film Festival

The rise of the critical age

Cinema is 100 years old in 1995. The Brussels African Film Festival is just two years old, but this small event is sure to grow in the future if the success achieved in film's centenary year can be sustained. 16 films, including 10 feature-length offerings, were screened in the week of 16 to 23 June, at the prestigious Palais des Beaux Arts in Brussels. Those attending included all the directors, a number of the actors and various other protagonists of African cinema — the term being taken in the widest sense because, like last year, Caribbean cinema was also represented, not to mention a presence from the Pacific. The festival, which is supported by the ACP Committee of Ambassadors (linked to the EU through the Lomé Convention), receives the bulk of its financial support under the cultural cooperation provided for in the Convention. As well as eclectic programming and high quality standards, the Brussels Festival is distinguished by its conviviality, far removed from the protocol and fuss surrounding most film festivals.

Although cinema is in relatively poor health almost everywhere, absorbed from within by 'popular' films, a term often used to conceal its mediocrity, or parasitised by television, film festivals are on the increase. New ones are born every year, at least in Europe and America, and they are always greeted by a frustrated 'And here's another one'. However, as regards African work, the story is truly one of austerity and parsimony. It is possible to count on the fingers of one hand the number of African film festivals worthy of the name. An African film festival in Brussels, a city which played a pioneering role in the creation of cinema and the first foreign city where the Lumière brothers presented their new invention, is symbolic of the organisers' desire to show that Africa made a very early contribution to the great adventure of cinema. The first

time round, the event was favourably received. But this was perhaps something of a *pro forma* welcome — an attraction based on novelty and on this occasion, therefore, it faced a more decisive test which could determine whether it will survive. 'The results', confided *Pape Mbaye Sene*, ('Pape' to his film-maker friends), who was President of the organising committee, 'have been beyond all expectations. The Festival began under favourable auspices. It opened on the evening of a public holiday, but we were unsure whether audience numbers could be maintained throughout the week. In fact, the afternoon screenings proved almost as successful as the evening ones. The public just kept on coming'. On the last day, a mock-up of the poster for the 1996 Festival, whose dates have already been fixed, was distributed.

It would be difficult to comment on all the films on offer at the Palais des Beaux-Arts, but the selection did have a central theme, the same as that chosen by the first Pan-African Film Festival in Ouagadougou (Fespaco 95), namely 'cinema and history'. On the opening night, the curtain-raiser was *Guimba* by Sheik Oumar Cissoko of Mali. This is a kind of X-ray of a tinpot dictatorship; a study of the appropriation of power in a village. It describes the gloom weighing down on the community, and by analogy on entire countries or continents, and presents an alarming portrayal of the permanent nature of the threat. Positive changes in terms of freedom of speech which have occurred in Africa in recent years are too precious to be taken for granted, and to safeguard them requires patient and ongoing commitment. Rest assured, the director makes use of many more images. His film is, first and foremost, a serenade to Africa and its beauty, the feeling of wonder and the story of the thousand and one days leading to the birth of freedom.

The event and the artists who attended it were well matched. The 'star'

participant was probably *Idrissa Ouedraogo*, the Burkinabé director whose successes have included, in order of appearance, *Yaaba, Tilai* (the Grand Prix winner at Cannes in 1990), and *Samba Traoré*, which was awarded the Silver Bear in Berlin in 1993. In *Le cri du cœur*, screened in Brussels, he gives a portrayal of a character who is fairly unusual in African films and opts for an original treatment of the plot. He describes the joys and disappointments of a fairly well-off African family living in Lyons, who would be perfectly happy were it not for the fact that Africa was indelibly marked on the skin of their child. He is a disturbed character who, in his mind, repeatedly encounters a hyena in the streets of Lyons. This causes despair for his parents for whom a foreigner has to adopt a 'low profile' if he wants to go unnoticed. Can a black child afford psychological problems, those diversions reserved for whites? The parents are obliged to put their child into the care of a psychiatrist, but it turns out to be in vain. Only the understanding of a French neighbour, an artist who is himself somewhat ostracised by society, offers a psychological refuge and last hope for the child. In one fell swoop, he sweeps away many of the common prejudices. The film is an opportunity for the director to make an incursion into French society. There is no ethnographic affectation, and the result is a perspective on Europe — something which sadly is rarely attempted by African film-makers. This approach prompted concerns which were voiced during the post-screening debates. There is a certain 'Africanist' audience, which may be African or European, which sees Ouedraogo's open-mindedness almost as a kind of betrayal or a desertion from some undefined struggle. Such an attitude tends to put film-makers in a creative straitjacket.

Another Festival success was *Keita de bouche à oreille* by Dani Kouyaté (Burkina Faso). Burkina has certainly made film-making one of the raw materials of its development. This is a superb story which begins with 'Pay attention and listen carefully. Everything began with the trials and tribulations of a poor antelope. One day, the antelope was having trouble finding a source of water to quench its thirst, when it came across a great hunter

and fortune-teller'. With this introduction, you enter into the mysterious world of a *griot* (witch-doctor cum minstrel) and his family. The viewer is captivated right up to the end (or non-end!) of a story which transcends time and eternity.

Another film which might, on account of its original approach, be compared with *Cri du cœur* is *Jit* by the Zimbabwean film-maker Michael Raeburn, who relies on comedy. It would be wrong to describe this as a film without pretension, but its pretension is unusual in seeking to offer amusement. This is something which is frequently lacking in African cinema which has become so involved in the tribulations of the continent that it

sometimes forgets the overriding joviality and absence of morosity that prevails, despite all the problems. The film was presented as a musical story. The music is quite good and the story very good but ultimately, it is not a musical story.

It is widely believed that artists are attracted to festivals because of the prizes. Brussels does not hand out awards. Pape Sene is against their introduction because he believes that competition would encourage superficial courtesy between professionals and would detract from the convivial nature of the event. To be fair to the artists, many of those who were in Brussels came because they enjoy the rare opportunity to meet one another

in such an easy-going atmosphere. This explains why the organisers invite some directors and actors even when their films are not on the bill. Contacts are important of course. In Brussels, Bamba Bacary, the male lead in *Bal Poussière* (by the Ivorian film-maker Henry Duparc), met with Idrissa Ouédraogo who promptly hired him for *La traversée du jour* to be made in Southern Africa.

This was just one of the 'successes' cited by Pape Sene, the driving force behind the festival. As he looks forward to future developments, the only 'problem' we hope he might encounter is having to deal with an influx of film professionals hoping to land contracts in Brussels. ■

H.G.

A meeting with actress France Zobda, from Martinique

France Zobda, the Martiniquan actress, has enjoyed an international career in Europe, the United States and Latin America. With 'L'exil de Béhanzin', by Guy Deslauriers — a milestone in West Indian cinema — she returns to the cinema of her own country. Previously, she says, her involvement in the film sector of her region had been limited to stereotype roles as a pretty mulatto girl. She was mentioned in the 1992 Guinness Book of Records, after being featured on French TV, on account of the many shades of colour in her eyes — seven in the left and four in the right.

This publicity obviously did little to lessen the superficial image of her as a sex symbol. In 'L'exil de Béhanzin', the role of the female lead could have been specially written for her. She portrays a multi-faceted character and is Martinique in essence — the long-forgotten or ungrateful daughter of Africa whom historical chance has brought face-to-face with her past, personified in the Dahomean king, Béhanzin, who was exiled in the Caribbean at the end of the last century. The small island encounters its 'Alma Mater' when the distracted gaze of the King meets the pale eyes of a beautiful washerwoman.

We took advantage of the screening of the film at the Brussels Festival to find out more, together with France Zobda,



about the cinema in Martinique and Guadeloupe. It is currently in the doldrums even if production is substantially increasing. Could the relative successes of the

region's four major exponents of film — Euzhan Palcy, Julius Amédé Laou, Christian Lara and Guy Deslauriers — be obscuring a host of less publicised problems?

— We are aware of the problems that a West Indian encounters in this business. We are just happy, when there are films like *Béhanzin* and *Rue Case Nègre*, and others that people have liked, to be able to say that there are some films which make headway and enjoy a degree of success at festivals or in cinemas.

■ *What are the current main strengths and weaknesses of West Indian cinema?*

— Well, you could say that a film is made now every three to four years instead of every 10 years, which was the case in the Lara era. This means that we have more productions and more directors. We do have a problem with the National Film Centre (CNC) relating to advances on ticket sales and subsidies. The French West Indies do not have access to Cooperation Ministries nor do we really enjoy the same advantages as French film makers. Compared with the cinema in Africa or Quebec for example, you will see that we have very specific problems which are related to the legislation that applies. As long as the situation remains unresolved, we will not make any great leaps forward. All that we can do is stumble along.

■ *There was a law passed recently which expanded the scope of application of the TSA — the supplementary tax which forms the basis for aid to the cinema — to the Antilles. Am I right in thinking that you are sceptical about this?*

— We wanted this law to be applied so that we could be incorporated into the CNC's cinematographic circuit. But the tax paid by the Antilles will not go back to them. It will go to support French cinema managed from Paris. Once again we will find ourselves financing films by Berry or Miller because they direct bigger films, with better known actors, and takings are expected to be higher than ours. The money will not be allocated to films like *Béhanzin* or *Siméon*.

The person in charge of the Elizé circuit, the only film distributor in the West Indies, French Guyana (and Haiti), opposed the tax. He thought it was better to help the local film industry with direct financial contributions. But now that he has to pay the tax, he is not going to provide any more funds. This means that, under the current situation, the film sector in the Antilles loses out both ways.

Another problem in the Antilles cinema is that we are criticised for being inward-looking despite the very small size

of our audience. A film which is a major success may attract 60 000 cinema-goers across the three French departments in the Americas. There is some merit in this criticism. We need to be more outward-looking.

■ *Could the production of films with very low budgets, perhaps even videos — enabling you to build up your audience — be one possible solution?*

— That would be very difficult, in my opinion. You are right in saying that television is something completely different. It is the future, it is affordable, popular and is quick to bring you fame, but, as I see it, you need the big screen to enable people to dream. There is also the fact that the kind of budget savings possible in Africa cannot be achieved in Martinique. You cannot pay a skilled technician a pittance. Whether we like it or not, we are involved in an arena corrupted by money. *Béhanzin* cost only 20 million French francs, and that was a historical portrait. What's that compared with *Germinal*? We could, I suppose, work in Betacam, as many of the Jamaicans do, but you have to remember that Jamaica places its video productions in the United States. People in the English-speaking world are more supportive, in this sense.

'I do not want to be held back by a country, culture or language'

■ *You yourself do not appear to have gone through very lean times. Do you think you have had the right breaks?*

— Yes, I have been lucky. It all began, thanks to Christian Lara, with *Adieu Foulard*. I started off in this film with just a minor role but ended up being billed alongside Gregg Germain. I was then able to set up a dramatic arts school and started working with the director of *The Towering Inferno* and *Death on the Nile* on a film called *Shina, Reine de la Jungle*, in which I played one of the principal roles. The next step was to work in theatre, television and French cinema, filming with Carole Laure, Sammy Frey and Jeanne Moreau in *Sauvetoi Lola*. After that, I had a part in a Canadian series which lasted three years,

called *Cogne et Gagne*, about a Haitian doctor. This was followed by an American series filmed in Italy which lasted eight months before I returned to the West Indies for *Béhanzin*. In between times, I have done a lot of TV work in Italy, Spain and Germany. This experience has strengthened my sense of being a citizen of the world. I do not regard myself as French. I speak and work in French, English, Italian and Creole and, if I have to, I will work in other languages and will study them. I do not want to be held back by a country, culture or language. In the West Indies, we have the advantage of being of mixed race so I have been able to play Puerto Ricans, Brazilians, Ethiopians, and so on. If I am lucky enough to portray a West Indian, so much the better, but I won't be typecast. Work for me has no colour, flavour or smell — it is just me offering my personality, individuality and my West Indian character in my roles, in my films and in other countries.

■ *There is an impression that artistes in films in the South are sometimes hostages to their audiences, be they home-grown or foreign, who want to impose creative models on them.*

— That is absolutely true. But as I have always said, I will reject what people want to make of me whether it is a colour, a stereotype or an archetype. This has happened to so many actresses who have allowed themselves to be swallowed up without ever seeking to open the door to their wider talents.

■ *Yet, in 'Béhanzin', you couldn't be more West Indian, could you?*

— Having been able to achieve my independence in the face of pressure from West Indian audiences, I was happy enough to take on a totally West Indian role in *Béhanzin*. At that time I came back with a greater desire to show people what I have done but I am first and foremost what I am and I can find myself whenever I want to. In other words, I can portray various roles, but I am aware of who I am and I never lose sight of that. That's the most important thing for an actress, particularly one who has to carry the flag as we do, like ambassadors for our countries. We work under close surveillance and there is always the West Indian public judging you and watching you — more than French audiences would judge their actors. We have a kind of torch to pass on and, when interpreting a role, we are necessarily forced to think about West

Indian audiences and how they will react. I have just finished a slightly *risqué* film — compared with what I have done up to now — and my greatest joy but also my greatest fear at the moment is to find out how the West Indian public will react to it. The saying 'no one is a prophet in his own country' is particularly apposite to the Antilles.

■ *In playing Régina in 'Béhanzin', you appeared to give your all to your West Indian character. Would you say that it was your finest role?*

— It really is a good role. In this profession, you spend a lot of time 'superficialising' yourself, so to speak — building yourself up to be an all-purpose actress, to be manipulable in the physical sense of the word. Then when you get a role like this, where you have to divest yourself of any artifice and be completely authentic — to be a real person — you wonder whether you will be able to do it. I have spent so many years getting rid of my accent and walking with a rolling gait as required by so many typecast roles. I have had to acquire a 'cheap' side over the years. You are always being told to 'watch your accent', 'remember to speak in a slightly sing-song way', 'pay attention to your movements' and so on. Then, suddenly you have to forget all this, walk normally and find yourself again, because you are being asked to offer freshness, truth and splendour. It's good if you can do it because then you feel that there is a purpose to life. You tell yourself 'I am in this profession, and although I may have lost myself I can find myself again'. You are happy that you can get this across fully to the public and, in a role like Régina, let the audience know that you are there to remember things about yourself which you might one day forget.

■ *'L'exil de Béhanzin' is an encounter between Africa and Martinique by means of a fine love story between two people who should not have met. Is this juxtaposition of Martinique and Africa a climactic relationship; one of attraction and repulsion?*

— Yes and rightly so. When we were at school, Africa had a flavour and image of savagery. It had negative connotations, conjuring up everything that shouldn't happen and everything that was different. I remember, as a child, being addressed as a 'Congo black'. As a student, I had my first opportunity to discover Africa, thanks to my African colleagues. In



being able to portray Régina, where love triggers a collision between two worlds, and where a page of history that had been torn out is replaced, I regarded it as a stroke of luck. For many years I had told my compatriots 'you don't know Africa at all. Go there and discover what Africans are really like. They are our brothers. You will see where our true roots lie and realise that 'the savage' is not what you think'. I was confronted with this character who tells an African black that Africa is not home and is not me and, at the same time, falls in love with this Africa which is so complex and so close, such a mixture of myself. The character reminds you of all the old clichés about Africa handed down from the last century. At the same time, the film criticises the fact that, at that time, we were prevented from really knowing who this exiled King was and why he was in Martinique. The shock of the arrival of King Béhanzin was suppressed. So the film is there to remind us that nowadays we are Creoles more than Africans, West Indians or blacks: Creoles, according to Chamoiseau, with our own identity, which is a mixture of several cultures. We have to accept all those who have come back and who have lived off our cultures. We have to incorporate this collision between different worlds.

■ *Briefly, what will be your next appearance on screen?*

— I have just finished filming *Les caprices d'un fleuve* for Bernard Giraudaux. The film is also about the colonial period, this time in Dakar. It deals with both the scorn and fascination evoked by Africa in the white man arriving there. We cover

revolts by the Moors and the tribulations of the Gorée slaves, but it's also the story of mulatto women in Saint-Louis who manipulated the whole scene: colonists and rebels, whites and blacks. They did this by using the weapons at their disposal, namely their beauty and their knowledge of the two worlds. They employ both the dignity of black women and the 'magnificence of white women'. That's the kind of character I play, which is the opposite of Régina. When all is said and done, the woman featured in this role is only an agent, the intermediary who enables the colonist to learn about life before falling in love with a slave girl who will enable him to realise his dreams.

■ *It would appear that you are also involved in the perfume business?*

— Yes. Two months ago in Martinique I opened a flower fragrance shop, where we use the remedies our grandmothers used to treat disease. We make use of what we have to hand locally. I have been studying plants for a year now, organising courses and giving lectures. The good thing about this is that it gives me the opportunity to think about other people rather than myself, which is what happens in my career as an actress.

■ *This work as a businesswoman is not going to interfere with your career as an actress, then?*

— Film work leaves you with lots of spare time. I wanted to share it and to give some of it to Martinique and the West Indies. I create dreams through film, but I wanted to offer something specific. People have a great need to be listened to. But rest assured, I don't think of myself as a businesswoman. This activity will not make my fortune, only give me inner happiness. ■

Interview by Hégel Goutier

ÆTHIOPIA and the Ethiops

The peoples of the Horn of Africa

by Xavier Van der Stappen*

The 'Cultures and Communications' Association will be presenting a major exhibition, lasting six months, on the Horn of Africa at the Royal African Museum in Belgium. A large number of European museums are participating in this event which is intended to reflect the cultures of the many ethnic groups inhabiting this part of Africa.

While it is true that Ethiopia, Southern Sudan, Eritrea and, most recently, Djibouti have experienced a certain amount of unrest, it is also the case that media reports about these countries often focus exclusively on negative images, leading to a pronounced bias in the view that the European public may have of these countries. The exhibition's aim will, therefore, be to reveal the diversity and cultural richness of this region. Some may say that it is wrong to talk about culture under the current circumstances, but how can we understand the hopes and aspirations of peoples who are so far away, if we do not take account of their identity and of their most enduring possession: their culture? After all, it is cultural differences and more particularly their historical, social, physical, economic and religious elements which produce both ties and conflicts.

The cultures of the Horn of Africa are amazingly diverse and are a good illustration of the interdependence of economics and culture. Most of the ethnic groups in question are highly specialised in their production of goods although the overall effect is variety. They are thus able to preserve their independence while remaining open to other groups through trade. At the markets, where most of the trade takes place, one soon discovers that while external appearance is determined by the religion to which one belongs, it is also a function of the economic activity of the group. The finery, hairstyles, scarifi-

cation, body painting and tattoos are all signs which indicate membership of an ethnic group. The burgeoning industrialisation of East Africa has not yet eradicated the very varied craft activity of this area. To make light of this truth is to display a lack of awareness.

The name 'ÆTHIOPIA', the Latin term for Ethiopia, was given by Mediterranean visitors to the Christian Empire of Africa. In ancient documents, this term was used to cover what was later called Negricia, or 'the country of black people'. This was a region which had poorly defined borders but which aroused particular curiosity as it was shrouded in enduring myths and legends. The use of the term 'the Ethiops' in the title is intended to illustrate the diversity and poetry of the peoples inhabiting this part of the world.

For those with a fascination for the past and for an empire long gone, or who want to see beyond the tragic media images, a visit to the exhibition will be a time of discovery. As they pass through the various sections, visitors will go back in time to discover a rich past which will help them to gain a better understanding of the present: extraordinary geological formations, the distant beginnings of the first

A diversity of peoples



hominids, thousands of stelae which have not been published before and the forgotten kingdom of the legendary Queen of Sheba. The story then goes on to show the adventure of Judaism. On the high plateaus, Christianity succeeded in shaping the isolated descendants of King Solomon; then Islam appeared and allied itself with Christianity to overcome the pagan tribes. A succession of kings tried, with varying degrees of success, to dominate the Horn of Africa politically during a period of over 4000 years. Then the first Europeans arrived, determined to penetrate the mysteries of a world both close in faith and distant in its rites.

A plough, some teff, sesame and neuk plants, a grindstone and a collection of ceramic articles reveal the everyday life of the millions who have cultivated the high plateaus. Opposite, a richly decorated Afar tent emphasises the pastoral side of Ethiopian life. The decorated surfaces of everyday objects speak volumes about these men and women who worked every day just to survive. Thousands of varied and surprising objects bear witness to an existence characterised by know-how, skill and ingenuity, but also to the differences from our own lives.

Previously unseen collections are brought together for the first time in Europe, at a prestigious location with an international reputation. It took a team of specialists two years to go through this vast region and collect all the evidence of cultural richness, which was previously not known to exist. Pottery, personal adornments, weapons, neckrests and seats, wickerwork and weaving, clothes and examples of the goldsmith's and silver-smith's art breathe life into a section organised according to subject. A street in Addis Ababa and a gallery of modern and contemporary art enables the artists of the towns to express themselves. Craftsmanship from churches, bibles, manuscripts, processional crosses and polychrome paintings from the thirteenth Century tell of centuries of Christianity in isolation. Concluding with a lavish collection of photographs to place the various sections of the population back in context, the exhibition will be a comprehensive source of information about the Horn of Africa and the many and varied communities which inhabit it. ■

X.V.d.S.

* Organiser of the 'ÆTHIOPIA and the Ethiops: the peoples of the Horn of Africa' exhibition.

The push for biosafety regulations

by Ivar Virgin and Robert J. Frederick*

As we approach the year 2000, an environmentally-conscious world greets technological developments with mixed emotions. Excitement and fascination are tempered with large measures of scepticism, uncertainty and fear. People are sceptical about claims that new is better; uncertain that benefits will be shared equally and not enjoyed by only a few; and afraid that a new technology brings with it unacceptable adverse impacts.

Such reactions have, at least in part, put pressure on national governments and international organisations to monitor and regulate new technology applications. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of modern biotechnology. In the following article we attempt to illustrate this by briefly discussing some of the current thinking on biotechnology regulation and its implications for the African, Caribbean and Pacific states.

We must start with at least a basic understanding of biotechnology. Simply put, it is the use of biological materials (organisms or parts of organisms) to achieve some purpose. Like many technologies, it is not new, but it is constantly changing. The majority of these

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changes are incremental: for example, a more productive series of antibiotic producing microbes is developed that increases yield by 10%, then 20% and so on. These changes occur generally unnoticed except by those directly involved. Other changes, however, can be much more dramatic, even revolutionary in form and scope. Such was the discovery of recombinant DNA techniques in the early 1970s. Suddenly, it seemed, powerful genetic modification tools became available to every laboratory in the world and with them, the capacity to produce 'new combinations' of genetic information. The techniques allowed genes to be transferred across species barriers and these genetically modified organisms (GMOs) attracted everyone's attention. The potential was very great — modern biotechnology would find applications in areas as diverse as medicine, agriculture, food processing, chemical production and environmental improvement. Concentrating only on the potential, however, was not enough. In order to derive the most benefits for the most people, it had to be developed and applied judiciously. Policies and procedures were created to ensure environmentally safe application of biotechnology and with them, the concept of 'biosafety' was defined.

In developed countries, biotechnology regulations, and how they are used to evaluate biosafety or — put another way — to make risk/benefit analyses, have been evolving over the last eight years. As regulators have become more comfortable with answers to 'old' issues, 'new' ones seem to keep arising. One of these emerged when biotechnology was highlighted in the Convention on Biological Diversity. This was signed in parallel with Agenda 21 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in January 1992. It couples access to genetic resources with scientific cooperation and transfer of technology from

developed to developing countries. Its objective is to stimulate the conservation and ecologically sound use of biological resources. Jeffrey McNeely recently described the issues in this way: 'The new biotechnologies may increase the value of the world's biodiversity if they allow increased use of the genetic diversity of both wild and domestic species, thereby increasing their economic importance. But biotechnology also poses significant ecological and economic risks that could ultimately undermine its potential contribution to the conservation of biodiversity. The introduction of any new organism poses a risk to the environment and many of the world's known extinctions have been caused primarily by the introduction of exotic species. The release of genetically engineered organisms into the environment thus deserves the most careful oversight and monitoring.'¹

In articles 8(g) and 19 of the Convention, developing country concerns for biotechnology were clearly expressed and the call for regulations clearly stated. The former requires the establishment or maintenance of biosafety regulations by each contracting party. The latter includes a call to examine the need for an international protocol. Just exactly what form such a protocol would take is still not decided. The issue was discussed at the first conference of parties to the Convention last December, but was referred to an intergovernmental meeting of experts for further consideration. After the experts met in Madrid in July of this year, the recommendations drafted to the next conference of parties included strong support for a protocol. This would address all activities related to organisms resulting from modern biotechnology, their transboundary movement and use in centres of origin and the issue of genetic diversity. Among the suggested items for consideration were procedures for advanced informed agreement, facilitation of information exchange and national regulations for risk assessment and risk management.

¹ McNeely, J.A. 1994. Critical Issues in the Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. pp 7-10. In *Widening Perspectives on Biodiversity* (Krattiger, A.F., et al. Eds.) IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and International Academy of the Environment, Geneva, Switzerland.

How important are biosafety regulations for a country's biotechnology development? It has been argued that the absence of established biosafety procedures is a major constraint to the development of biotechnology in developing countries. Generally, most research scientists will not transfer GMOs to countries that lack such regulations. Without regulations, an important part of the development process such as field testing is blocked. Biotechnology industry and research institutes therefore are reluctant or refuse to develop transgenic plants without government sanction or regulatory reviews.

What is the level of activity of biotechnology and what is the status of biosafety regulations in the ACP countries? In most, research and development in this area has been concentrated in the agricultural sector. There is no doubt that agricultural biotechnology has an important role to play in ACP countries' development. In many African states, for example, traditional agriculture and plant breeding can be and is being supplemented by agricultural biotechnology. This includes tissue culture and micropropagation techniques producing disease-free seedlings, development of live animal vaccines and, more recently, the development of transgenic plants. So far, most of the research in Africa has taken place in national agricultural research facilities or universities with very little being carried out in the private sector.

In a recent article by *Ahl Goy* and *Duesing*², the authors list more than 1025 field trials with genetically modified plants between 1986 and 1993 in a total of 32 countries. The majority of these trials were carried out in the United States and Europe. None, however, was conducted in an ACP country. Elsewhere in Africa, Egypt and South Africa have run field trials on transgenic plants. Kenya, Zimbabwe and Nigeria seem poised to follow this year.

Recognising the potential of biotechnology on the one hand and the need to proceed using a precautionary ap-



Micropropagation of coffee plants at the Kawanda Agricultural Research Institute, Uganda

proach, ACP countries are searching for national regulatory mechanisms appropriate to their needs. Since 1993, a series of meetings related to biosafety has taken place in Africa (See Table). The interest in biosafety regulation mechanisms is expressed in conference statements such as: 'Participants wish to urge the Governments of Southern and Eastern Africa to facilitate and give priority to biotechnology policies including safety mechanisms... including guidelines and/or regulations, as well as biosafety committees at the national and institutional level...' ³ and '...without biosafety guidelines, countries are being denied the opportunity to access the full potential that the application of biotechnology offers through public and private sector research, development and implementation...' ⁴ A prime objective for some of these workshops has been to build institutional and human capacity in risk assessment and management by sharing industrialised countries' experience in biosafety regulations and field releases of GMOs. In other meetings, scientists, policy makers and special interest groups have gathered to discuss common frameworks

that can be developed to serve particular national needs.

Despite the growing number of such efforts, fewer than 10% of developing countries worldwide have biosafety regulations in place. There are, of course, agricultural regulations, such as animal health acts and plant quarantine rules, in ACP countries, but these do not deal with GMOs. Among the ACPs, only Nigeria has biosafety guidelines signed by the national ministry. Zimbabwe, however, has a text awaiting approval while Kenya has an early draft of guidelines prepared. Uganda has set up a biosafety committee with responsibility to develop national biosafety guidelines and Zambia is reviewing existing regulations to determine if these can be adapted.

In response to this lack of guidelines, a Regional Focal Point for Safety in Biotechnology has recently been established in Harare, Zimbabwe. Its members are Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The principal objective of the focal point is to coordinate the implementation of regional safety measures in the conduct of biotechnology. It is presently involved in the process of collecting information on

³ From the *Conference Statement of the African Regional Conference for International Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology*, October 1993, Harare, Zimbabwe

⁴ From the *Conference Resolution of: Biotechnology and Biosafety: Benefit and Risk Assessment in an African Perspective*, May 1995, Nairobi, Kenya

² Ahl Goy, P. and Duesing, J.H. 1995. Pots to Plots: Recombinant Plants on Trial, *Biotechnology*, 13, 454-458.

Recent regional meetings and workshops on biosafety that have included ACP countries

Meeting	Date
African Regional Conference for International Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology (Harare, Zimbabwe)	October 1993
AGERI/ABSP/UNIDO Regional Biosafety Workshop (Cairo, Egypt)	January 1994
BAC/IITA Biosafety Training Workshop (Ibadan, Nigeria)	January 1995
Benefit and Risk Assessment in an African Perspective (ISAAA) (Nairobi, Kenya)	February 1995
Biodiversity and Harmonisation of Biosafety in Central America and the Dominican Republic (IICA) (San Jose, Costa Rica)	February 1995
Turning Priorities into Feasible Programs : Regional Seminar on Planning, Priorities and Policies for Agricultural Biotechnology (South Africa)	April 1995
African Regional Focal Point for Safety in Biotechnology : First Steering Committee Meeting (Harare, Zimbabwe)	May 1995

Persley: 'Biotechnology regulation in Africa is an opportunity or a constraint. It is an opportunity to develop and implement scientifically based guidelines in individual countries which will accelerate the development and access to new biotechnologies... However, it may be a constraint where the absence of a regulatory framework, or the adoption of a costly bureaucratic, or inflexible biosafety system will delay the use of biotechnology in Africa.'⁵ In other words, there must be a balance between protection against possible risks and allowing biotechnology to develop to its fullest potential. It is up to ACP countries individually to determine how they meet the challenge. ■ I.V. & R.J.F.

biosafety from international organisations to establish an information network and library that it will make available to national focal points. This information will help the individual nations to formulate, develop and implement their own biosafety guidelines and regulations.

Consistent with the precautionary approach mentioned above, it is clear that in and of themselves, biosafety regulations will not facilitate the development of a technology nor ensure its safety. They must be viewed, instead, as an integral part of national biotechnology policies and strategies. They should apply to both locally developed biotechnology techniques and those acquired from other countries, be implemented with consistency, and be based on sound scientific principles. As with any new technology, the rate of transfer and the level of success is dependent not only on human capacity building but also on the ability to create a supporting infrastructure and an 'accepting' environment. Efficient technology transfer requires interaction between various national sectors including private research organisations and academic institutions, and public sector bodies including ministries and other agencies.

For ACP countries to benefit fully from their genetic resources and from the

rapid development of modern biotechnology, science policies must include safety mechanisms such as biosafety guidelines and/or regulations. To assist the process of establishing these, there are many activities ongoing at the regional and global level that ACP countries can take advantage of. Regional meetings and biosafety workshops in Africa have already been mentioned. There are also a number of 'general principles' documents which take the form of position papers or consensus reports. These help to focus international discussions and provide individual countries with a framework for biosafety regulations. The UNIDO/UNEP/WHO/FAO Code of Conduct and the International Technical Guidelines for Safety in Biotechnology are good examples. The latter was originally developed by a joint effort of the UK Department of the Environment and the Netherlands Environment Ministry and is nowadays refined at regional meetings sponsored by UNEP. Finally, many international bodies such as the Biotechnology Advisory Commission, ISNAR, UNIDO and ISAAA are directly or indirectly providing independent advice and assisting in information.

As a final note, we would like to sum up with the words of *Gabrielle*

⁵ In: *Proceedings of the African Regional Conference for International Cooperation on Safety in Biotechnology*, 1993, Harare, Zimbabwe.

Tax incentives and foreign investment

Policies to attract foreign private investment have been the focus of attention in many developing countries. Most aspire to create an attractive investment climate and the incentives necessary for attracting foreign capital. In Nigeria for example, generous concessions to investors include tax holidays for periods of three to seven years, accelerated capital depreciation and import duty exemptions. In my view, much of the current concern with incentives is misplaced. Properly designed, they can play an important role in stimulating investment and increasing capital inflows, thus creating employment, promoting risk-sharing and enhancing technology transfers. But insufficient attention is often paid to the consistency of the incentives with the stated policy objectives. As a result, the cost effectiveness of such measures escapes public scrutiny.

Recent studies show that it is shortage of resources and not inadequate incentives which limit the pace of economic development in developing countries. It is obvious that tax incentives alone cannot be effective in attracting foreign investment. In most cases, they result in revenue losses for the government, and create inequities and distortions in economic operations. Abuses are widespread because the authorities seldom monitor their use by investors. Many goods claiming exemptions or reduced tax rates have been used for purposes other than those for which they were qualified to receive preferential tax treatment.

The importance of public revenue for enhancing development cannot be overstated. Irrespective of the political colour of its government, the economic and cultural development of a country requires the efficient and steadily expanding provision of a host of non-revenue-yielding services such as communications systems, education and health. These must be publicly financed and without them, foreign investment cannot hope to be successful. With mounting external debts,

developing countries are increasingly required to finance expenditure through internal resources. And with a reduced tax base resulting from excessive tax concessions, they often resort to inflationary measures to do this — thus worsening the investment climate.

It could be argued that a country gains from foreign capital inflows even if they are untaxed in the sense that income is generated locally and export earnings increase. But the amount of money investors are ready to commit depends on a much broader view of the market possibilities. It is unlikely that special concessions will have an appreciable effect on total foreign investment flows. In short, investment is much more responsive to political stability, the availability of infrastructures and the stability of investment laws than to tax concessions. The provision of fiscal incentives alone simply reduces revenue and hence the amounts available for vital infrastructures.

In recognition of this, many experts, including from the IMF, have suggested limiting tax holidays to the initial stages of the investment, avoiding open-ended customs reliefs and restricting the tax exemption on export-related profits to five years. There are also calls for closer monitoring of the exemptions that are granted. I support these proposals and would put forward another — that there should be better control of financial transfers. Many foreign companies use these to evade tax and, in the process, deprive developing countries of much-needed revenue.

Bashir Obasekola, Friendship University, Moscow, Russia.

Putting the record straight

We greatly appreciate *The Courier* and always look forward to receiving it. It keeps us well informed about the progress of ACP-EU projects. May we just point out an error in the front cover caption of issue 149 (French version). The town of Djenné in Mali has not been built using baked clay but natural clay (using the 'adobe' technique involving a clay coating).

Philippe Garnier, Architect, Coordinator of the Building Advisory Service and Information Network (BASIN), Villefontaine, France.

Safe landing in Guyana

I read with great interest your report on Guyana published in issue 150. As the manufacturer of the 'Islander' aircraft, we were pleased that you survived the short take offs and landings. Luckily, that is what it was designed for. The picture on page 32 clearly shows the shabby state in which some of the aircraft are flown. They have usually been purchased sixth hand! Since air transport is an important factor in the economic development of Guyana I shall be writing to the Commission office in Georgetown to see if we could discuss ways of upgrading these aircraft.

Walter M. Stark, Sales and Marketing Director, Pilatus Britten Norman, Aircraft Manufacturers, Isle of Wight, United Kingdom

Working to avoid future human tragedies

I found issue no. 151 of *The Courier*, which focuses on social development, to be rich in both discussion and analysis. In the 'ACP' section, I read with great interest the excellent article on the 'Rwanda Memorial Days' written by one of your stagiaires, Massamba Mboup. This describes the events in question in a manner that is both relevant and engaging. The authors pleads, in his conclusion, for the countries of North and South to help in the reconstruction of Rwanda and to find ways of preventing similar human tragedies occurring in the future. This gives real food for thought to all of us who work tirelessly in the field of EU-ACP development cooperation.

Bernard Kouchner, President of the Committee on Development and Cooperation, European Parliament.

**Ramsès 95 —
Rapport Annuel
Mondial sur le
Système
Economique et les
Stratégies**

(Annual World Report on the Economic System and Economic Strategies)

Under the direction of Thierry de Montbrial and Pierre Jacquet — published by Dunod for the Institut français de relations internationales — 411 pp. — 159 FF, 1081 BF — 1994.

As in past years, this report, which is the fourteenth in the series, contains a number of essays by various authors on major topics of current interest. This annual summary of world events is a reflection based on well-presented documentation offered in the form of inserts, tables, graphs, maps and bibliographies.

The volume was finished in mid-July 1994 and, as usual, is inevitably slightly out of date. It is divided into three parts: 'fragments of a third post-war period', 'growth and competition (economies in a time of globalisation)' and 'the United Kingdom, Europe's laboratory?' This well-documented third part presents a good illustration of the need for and difficulties involved in regional integration as well as the problems involved in reconciling tradition and modernity.

Although this thematic third part can stand independently and represents a choice made this year by the authors, the other two parts, on the other hand, are complementary. In the wake of the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the USSR as an entity, they describe the new divisions arising between developed areas and poorer regions. The former enjoy peace in a context of relatively stable political regimes. The latter are prey to all kinds of crises. These observations must, admittedly, be qualified by emphasising the often remarkable development of some countries in Asia, the still fragile recovery of Latin America and the major structural difficulties still encountered throughout Africa.

According to the authors, 'the consolidation of a truly multilateral international economic framework is still, as at the end of the Second World War, the best way to ensure international economic and political harmony.

It can no longer, however, be limited to trade between the United States, Europe and Japan'. In the context of monitoring economic revival, managing competition and reducing unemployment significantly, this would appear to be an accurate observation. ■ Alain Lacroix

**L'Europe et
l'Afrique — siècle
d'échanges
économiques**

(Europe and Africa — a century of economic exchanges)

By Hélène d'Almeida-Topor and Monique Lakroum. Publisher: Armand Colin, 103 boulevard Saint Michel, 75240 Paris Cedex 05 — 235 pp. — 902 BF — 1994

The authors are highly qualified teachers. Hélène d'Almeida Topor is a lecturer in African history at the University of Paris I and Monique Lakroum is a lecturer in Contemporary History at the University of Reims. Topor, notably, has published among other things, a work entitled 'L'Afrique au XXème siècle' (Africa in the XX century) while Lakroum is author of 'Les transports en Afrique' (Transport in Africa). They therefore know Africa very well and their qualifications reflect both the interest of their joint work and its limits.

The book has six chapters: compartmented economic areas, fragmentation of infrastructures and networks, the end of the empires (1890-1955), Africa in the face of world trade (1956-1973), imbalance in economic exchange (1973-1993), and marginalised Africa.

The reader will benefit from studying the more directly historical parts which are clearly written and didactic. Those chapters dealing with trade and the economy are a less easy read. Essential topics are described in terms of unequal exchange which is not, however, all 'one-way'.

It is true, as the authors say, that Africa no longer holds the same interest for Europe in terms of control over raw materials or rare products, although it is seen as a potential outlet for products manufactured in Europe. Africa is having to tackle head on, the competition from Asia with its large pool of available manpower. Perhaps this work might have been more satisfying if it had placed greater emphasis on the renewed hope which is emer-

ging in a number of countries south of the Sahara. ■ A.L.

**Le capital,
suite et fin**

(Capital: a follow-up)

By Guy Sorman — Librairie Arthème Fayard — 566 pages — FF 150, Bfrs 1040 — 1994

There is no denying that Mr Sorman, a journalist and writer, has a lively style, an enquiring mind, a vast political and economic culture and a feeling for a good formula — many of our readers have already had the opportunity of appreciating it in 'La nouvelle richesse des nations' and 'Sortir du socialisme' — and considerably more time for the virtues of private enterprise than those of Marxist and totalitarian ideologies. At the age of 50, he has completed a series begun in 1983 and his latest book, a partisan and impassioned work, is a vast fresco of economic policy in the world today.

No effort has been spared in this most recent work, the result of two years of meetings and enquiries taking in 20 countries and five continents; an itinerary starting at Lenin's now little-visited house in Ulyanorsk and Andrei Sakharov's home in Nizhni Novgorod (Gorki until 1992), working its way through Africa and ending in Amazonia.

Mr Sorman deals with Africa (unthinkable capitalism) in Chapter 6. One of his ideas is that Europeans introduced four things — hygiene, schooling, consumption and the State — which did not exist there before and that hygiene was one of the causes of the population growth absorbing the continent's savings and preventing the accumulation of capital. One could also mention the role of the extended family or the consumer habits of the colonials which persisted after independence and created such expense for the African economies, or that exports are ill-adapted to the needs of the international market, despite the efforts of the IMF, which has headquarters in Washington, the new financial capital of Africa. What this writer thinks, in fact, is that although capitalism is an experiment of the past and a wager on the future, Africans live mainly in the past and the present and private property, which is decisive in a capitalist system, is a rarity in Africa. And ultimately, he is fairly pessimistic, for Africa will never have capitalism to combine the

essential individualism of the businessman with tribal solidarity.

The Sorman philosophy can be summed up thus: Capitalism puts down roots in every culture. The seed first germinated in Calvinistic soil and became acclimatised in Catholic Spain, Moslem Turkey and Taoist China. It does not just produce goods. It also shapes new kinds of behaviour, without which its strength would fade. A passion for consumption, non-violence, adherence to contracts and personal responsibility may not be features of the original society, but, when capitalism comes, they thrive and thus the machine produces its own fuel. But it also produces its own toxins in the shape of amorality and competition between hedonism and the work ethic. These may well kill capitalism, although it is far from dead yet. ■ A.L.

**Other
publications
received**

La République de l'île Maurice — Dans le sillage de la délocalisation

The Republic of Mauritius — in the wake of relocation

(By Rajendra Paratian. Editions L'Harmattan, 5-7, rue de l'Ecole Polytechnique — F — 75005 Paris. 1994, 333 p. 180 FF. ISBN 2-7384-2903-3.)

In this book we are told about Mauritius, the homeland of the author, who has specialised in sociology and development economics. Sugar cane was introduced there over 350 years ago, but Mauritius has been able to modify the burden inherited from the colonial period and constitutes something of an exception. Whereas most Third World countries are just managing to keep ticking over, Mauritius has engineered a spectacular change of direction by ridding itself of its monoculture and making manufacturing the main growth sector since 1986. But the author also describes the impact of this transition on the social and cultural life of the island, which has overturned the old ties based on the 'sugar civilisation'.

Continued on inside back cover

THE CONVENTION AT WORK

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Following, where required, favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, the Commission has decided to provide grants and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to finance the following operations (grants unless otherwise stated). Major projects and programmes are highlighted:

Economic and social infrastructure

Kenya: ECU 1.966 million for urgent rehabilitation work on the Nairobi-Mombasa road.

Madagascar: ECU 1.9 million for the first decentralised cooperation programme covering, notably, the health field.

Mauritania: ECU 58 million for the rehabilitation and rationalisation of the national industrial and mining company (SNIM).

St Kitts & Nevis: ECU 4.5 million for airport extension works.

Trade promotion/structural adjustment

Burkina Faso: ECU 25 million to support the 1995-96 structural adjustment programme.

Comores: ECU 300 000 for a project designed to strengthen the organisation and functioning of the CNAC (National Artisanal Centre of the Comores).

Côte d'Ivoire: ECU 20.5 million to support the structural adjustment programme.

Malawi: ECU 26.1 million in support of structural adjustment (ECU 8.8 million from the Structural Adjustment Facility, ECU 4.9 million from the Transfrontier Initiative Fund, ECU 3.2 million from the 7th EDF and ECU 9.2 million as a loan under the 6th EDF).

Mali: ECU 25 million to support the 1995-96 structural adjustment programme (ECU 12.9 from the Structural Adjustment Facility and ECU 12.1 million from programmable resources).

Namibia: ECU 1.882 million for the implementation of the tourism development programme.

Senegal: ECU 20.1 million to support the structural adjustment programme (ECU 8.7 million from the Structural Adjustment Facility and ECU 11.4 million from programmable resources).

Indian Ocean countries (Madagascar, Comores, Seychelles, Mauritius and Réunion): ECU 9.3 million for the integrated regional trade development programme (PRIDE).

Dominica: ECU 500 000 for the development of eco-tourism at the Emerald Pool and Trafalgar Falls sites.

Papua-New Guinea: ECU 2 million to finance priority infrastructures in East New Britain in favour of students and academic staff, displaced as a result of volcanic eruptions which devastated Rabaul, the province's main town.

Agriculture

Tanzania: ECU 1.98 million to support research in the coffee sector, in particular at the Lyamungu station.

Health

Burkina Faso: ECU 1.6 million for a project to support reform of the pharmaceutical sector.

Central African Republic: ECU 1.8 million for a project designed to improve the health of the people in the Basse-Kotto prefecture, within the framework of a global anti-poverty programme.

Mali: ECU 1.41 million for a programme to support safe blood transfusion and for education into sexually transmittable diseases and Aids, in village areas.

Central Africa (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Chad): ECU 1.98 million for a training programme for health service managers in the form of support for CIESPAC (the Central Africa Inter-State Centre for Higher Education in Public Health).

Education

Netherlands Antilles: ECU 650 000 to support the Curaçao public library, notably through the purchase of a mobile library vehicle.

Environment

Ghana: ECU 4.6 million for a programme to develop and improve the two national parks in the western part of the country with the aim of preserving the biodiversity of the tropical forest zone.

Guinea Bissau: ECU 1.35 million for the conservation and rational use of fragile ecosystems, in particular through the creation of the Centre for Protected Areas in Buba and the Lagoas Park at Cufada

Guinea Bissau: ECU 550 000 to support the drawing up of environmental legislation.

Institutional support

Congo: ECU 500 000 to support the population and habitat census.

Mauritania: ECU 700 000 in institutional support for the economic and agricultural development of the Tagant region.

Uganda: ECU 1.95 million to support the parliamentary and presidential elections.

East Africa, Southern Africa, Indian Ocean (Burundi, Comores, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe): ECU 2 million to support technical working groups and for the implementation of policies under the CBI (Cross-Border Initiative) designed to facilitate cross-border trade and financial exchanges among the countries concerned.

Miscellaneous

Niger: ECU 1.5 million for a decentralised cooperation programme aimed at financing about 100 projects. The projects, which will include significant local financing, will be undertaken by craftsmen and others.

UEOMA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) countries: ECU 1.62 million for a project designed to produce reliable and standardised monthly figures for consumer price movements in the seven countries of the Union (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo)

Zambia: ECU 950 000 for the printing and publishing of geological maps.

Pacific (ACP countries and OCTs): ECU 1.95 million to improve the alert system for cyclones in the region.

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK

Loan

Namibia: ECU 12.7 million to Telecom Namibia to finance the modernisation of essential elements of the telephone system and, in particular, for the establishment of fibre optic links between Windhoek and the coastal areas including Walvis Bay.

VISIT

The national authorising officers of the PALOP (Portuguese-speaking) ACP countries.

On 8 June, Commissioner Pinheiro had a meeting with the ministers from the five PALOP countries — Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cap Verde, São Tomé & Príncipe — who have responsibility for dealing with EU aid (the national authorising officers). This meeting, which was the first of its kind, came at the end of two days of discussions on the current state of play in the first (non-geographical) PALOP regional programme and on preparations for implementing the second. They included talks among the ministers themselves and meetings with the relevant Commission services.

Together with Professor Pinheiro, the ministers reviewed the implementation of the first PALOP programme. This was launched in 1992, with ECU 25 million being provided for seven different projects. While recognising the positive aspects of the programme's operation, they also looked at the implementation difficulties stemming from the geographical dispersion of the five beneficiary countries, the need for training and motivation of national administrations, and the importance of coherence and complementarity in respect of both the national indicative programmes and the activities of other donors.

It is foreseen that the second programme will seek to optimise the objectives set out in the

current programme, focusing on only a limited number of new sectors. Significant additional resources are hoped for in the framework of the programming of the 8th EDF.

In conclusion, the PALOP Ministers confirmed their political commitment to maintaining traditional regional cooperation as set out in the Lomé Convention.

MISCELLANEOUS

Resumption of aid to Rwanda

Following a proposal by Professor Pinheiro, the Commission has decided to lift the partial suspension on aid to the Government of Rwanda in force since 26 April and to resume fully all areas of cooperation with a view to assisting in the process of national reconciliation and the economic and social rehabilitation of that country.

The Commission has taken this decision in the light of the positive response of the Government of Rwanda to the report of the International Commission of Inquiry into the killings in Kibeho on 22-24 April, and on the basis of an exchange of letters agreed between the Commission and the Government following a high-level mission to Kigali on 3-4 July. In this exchange of letters, the Government has restated its commitment to the pursuit of national reconciliation, including the intensification of dialogue with opposition groups committed to that objective, and has undertaken to implement concrete measures to enable the return of refugees, the processing of cases against those currently in detention, the release of children from prison and the establishment of a climate of greater confidence and cooperation with international non-governmental organisations operating in Rwanda.

The resumption of full cooperation will allow the Commission to pursue its programme of rehabilitation for Rwanda agreed in December 1994 for a total of ECU 67m and to envisage further assistance in order to enable the Government to fulfil the commitments it has undertaken in the areas already outlined. Finally, in order to strengthen its support for the consolidation of respect for human rights and the rule of law, the Commission is also considering making a contribution of up to ECU 1.5m in the very near future towards the operation of the International tribunal for Rwanda.

EUROPEAN UNION

PARLIAMENT

The Holocaust: a day of commemoration

During its June session, the European Parliament adopted a joint resolution (supported by all groups apart from members from the far right) seeking the designation of a European 'Day' to commemorate the Holocaust in all the countries of the EU.

On the designated day, a variety of activities and events would be staged aimed at reminding people about the Second World War and the Holocaust and explaining, to young people above all, the dangers of totalitarian and racist ideologies.

The Parliament has asked the Commission to prepare a pilot project and has invited the Member States of the Council of Europe to participate in the initiative.

COMMISSION

Death of former President

Sicco Mansholt, the former Commission President, died on 30 June at the age of 86. Mr Mansholt held the post of Minister of Agriculture in the Netherlands from 1945 to 1957, and became the European Commissioner for Agriculture in 1958. He held this post for 15 years during which time he was highly influential in developing the Community's Common Agricultural Policy.

Mr Mansholt held the Presidency of the Commission from 1972 to 1974, succeeding Mr Malfatti.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union

has recently issued a number of statements, details of which are set out below :

South Africa: abolition of the death penalty

Declaration of 16 June 1995

The European Union has taken note of the verdict of 6 June 1995 by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa, judging the death penalty to be incompatible with the new constitution of the country. Such a decision gives concrete and visible expression to South Africa's commitment to the rule of law.

Burundi: support for efforts to restore confidence

Declaration of 23 June 1995

Three months after setting out its objectives and priorities with regard to Burundi (Carcassonne statement of 19 March and common position of 24 March 1995), the European Union commends the efforts being made by the leaders of the country — in particular the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister — to restore confidence, as well as the resolute action by the special representatives of the UN and OAU Secretaries-General.

It is nevertheless increasingly concerned at the proliferation of acts of violence and the destabilising activities of extremists on all sides. It vigorously condemns such acts and deplores the excessive number of victims. It condemns the behaviour of certain military units during disarmament operations in areas of Bujumbura and points, in this connection, to the Burundi Government's responsibility for the proper conduct of such operations.

It reaffirms that the situation can return to normal only if there is respect, and support from all sections of the population, for the government convention of 10 September 1994 establishing the conditions for power-sharing, as pointed out by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister in their joint statement of 30 March 1995.

In this connection, it takes note of the special measures announced by the President on 18 June, which show the authorities' resolve to restore order, while hoping that they will be implemented in strict compliance with human rights.

The unreserved commitment of all the Burundi people and of the international com-

munity is needed if this serious crisis is to be overcome.

The EU remains determined to give its resolute support to the efforts of the Burundi authorities to restore peace and their actions against all trouble-makers. It reaffirms its opposition to extremists.

The decisions taken by the EU in support of the process of national reconciliation are being implemented :

- Support is being provided for increasing the staff of the OAU observer mission.
- Assistance for the dispatch of human rights experts by the UN High Commissioner is being prepared.
- The aid requirements for rebuilding the legal system have been identified.
- The action plan for assistance to refugees, displaced and repatriated persons, adopted in Bujumbura, can be implemented with the assistance of the EU.

— The principle of a round table of providers of funds has been the subject of a protocol of agreement, complete with time limits, between the UNDP and the Burundi government. It is now for the government to draw up a clear programme of economic and social recovery to be placed before the fund providers.

— Measures banning travel by extremists to the Member States are being applied.

The EU considers that the states in the region have a particular responsibility and it urges them, together with all states in the international community, to support the stabilisation efforts being made by the Burundi authorities and to take the measures required to prevent the arming and movement of extremists.

The EU reaffirms the need for a well-prepared regional conference as soon as possible, under the aegis of the United Nations, on peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region, since a conference of this kind is the only means of reducing the deep-seated causes of instability in the region.

Haiti: hopes expressed for a successful second-round ballot

Declaration of 30 June 1995

The European Union welcomes the good conduct of the ballot on 25 June, which constitutes an important step along the road to democracy and the consolidation of the rule of law in Haiti. It nevertheless deplores that the elections became the scene of acts of violence,

and in particular, the assassination of a former officer of the armed forces and of an election candidate.

It notes that the proper conduct of the electoral campaign and of the ballot has clearly demonstrated the population's wish to express itself freely and responsibly.

The EU, which supported the organisation of those elections, in particular by preparing the elections and by dispatching observers, notes that international solidarity has helped to ensure that the ballot has gone smoothly.

It hopes that the administrative and logistical shortcomings noted on 25 June can be corrected in the second-round ballot on 23 July, and in the presidential elections at the end of the year, both of which constitute decisive steps for Haiti.

Nigeria: Appeal for political prisoners to be freed

Declaration of 30 June 1995

The European Union points out that it is now more than two years since the Nigerian presidential elections of 12 June 1993 were annulled despite the fact that observers both at home and abroad had judged them to be free and fair.

Since that time, Nigeria has increasingly failed to honour its commitments on human rights, commitments freely entered into by Nigeria as a party to a number of international instruments. Continual and widespread recourse to detention without trial is a cause for grave concern, as are restrictions on freedom of expression and association. The EU strongly condemns the recent arrests of civilian politicians. It is also concerned at the prolonged detention of eminent persons and by the recourse to procedures which are illegal or lacking in any legal basis. The EU calls on the Nigerian authorities to make sure that all detainees are treated humanely and receive a proper trial, which includes the right to appeal to a higher court.

As it has underlined in its declaration of 22 March 1995, the EU is of the firm conviction that Nigeria's current difficulties stem from a lack of political progress. On taking office in November 1993, President Abacha proclaimed his intention of restoring civilian, democratic rule. While it has taken note of the announcement of 27 June on the lifting of the ban on political activities, the EU regrets that the announcement of a timetable for a return to constitutional rule has once again been defer-

red and that political prisoners have not been released.

The EU will continue to keep a careful watch on the situation in Nigeria to assess any further decisions which might be necessary to face up to developments in the political situation and in the human rights situation.

Zaire: concern about operation of Constitutional Act

Declaration of 7 July 1995

Since the agreement between parties in Zaire on the Constitutional Act, which laid down the powers of Zairean state institutions so that transition to the Third Republic could be managed in a spirit of cooperation, the European Union has been closely following the attitudes of parties in this process of transition. It continues to be concerned at the fact that both the spirit and the letter of the Constitutional Act are frequently violated.

The EU notes that the question of the Presidency of the HCR-PT at its sitting on 1 July 1995 has created confusion, particularly as regards the regularity of the procedures followed. The EU wishes to make known its deep concern at this situation and the resulting uncertainty. It would again stress the enormous importance which it attaches to respect for the principles of a state of law without which democracy cannot be established. In this context, it would strongly urge each of the transitional institutions to ensure that any ambivalence is removed and the act of transition applied in its entirety.

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia associate themselves with this declaration.

Gabon: Referendum successfully staged

Declaration of 31 July 1995

The European Union, which is an observer with regard to the Paris agreements, welcomes the successful completion of the constitutional referendum held in Gabon on 23 July 1995 with a view to making possible full application of those Agreements.

It is pleased with the result and hopes that the process of dialogue and consultation between Gabon's political forces will continue, in order to consolidate the achievements of democratisation, which are a fundamental con-

dition for the economic and social development of the country.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the Union align themselves with this declaration.

GENERAL INFORMATION

Long term cooperation between South Africa and the EU

On 30 June, Commissioner Pinheiro, South African Minister Trevor Manuel and Minister Jacques Godfrain (representing the French Presidency), formally opened negotiations between the EU and South Africa. The meeting took place in Brussels in the presence of representatives from the EU Member States, ACP countries, the European Investment Bank and the European Parliament. In a cordial atmosphere, the two sides declared their political commitment to take part in the negotiations with a view to establishing a long-term relationship. Following the Council's decision of 19 June, Professor Pinheiro was able to present his negotiating proposals on behalf of the Commission. These envisage a two-pronged approach consisting of a Protocol to the Lomé Convention setting out the conditions and modalities for South African accession, and a bilateral agreement on trade and cooperation between South Africa and the European Community. Mr Manuel, who is South Africa's Minister of Trade and Industry, indicated his agreement with the broad thrust of what the Commission was proposing. He also underlined the importance he attached to obtaining the EU's acceptance of a special agreement which should help his country to reintegrate into the global economy. He went on to stress the need for support for rehabilitation and development in South Africa, something which he said would have benefits for the wider Southern African region. Echoing Professor Pinheiro, Mr Manuel spoke of his interest in the ACP countries and gave an assurance that they would be consulted throughout the negotiations.

The talks are expected to last several months. Professor Pinheiro and Mr Manuel will meet again before the end of the year to take

stock of progress in the work of their negotiators. The Commission's negotiator will be Steffen Smidt, Director-General for Development.

Conference on new EU-Southern Africa relations: the role of enterprises

The first Club de Bruxelles conference on EU-Southern Africa relations, held in October 1993, brought together 360 participants and 32 speakers including Manuel Marin and several ministers and leading figures from the Southern African region. Two years later, the Club is preparing to stage a second conference taking into account the numerous changes that have occurred in the region. Less 'political' than its predecessor, this gathering will mainly be directed towards aspects of concrete cooperation between Europe and Southern Africa — in particular, underlining the role that EU and SADC companies can play in the development of the region.

The event will take place in Brussels on 19 and 20 October 1995, benefiting from the support of the new Commissioner in charge of the dossier, Professor Pinheiro. Some 40 high level speakers representing the private sector in Southern Africa and Europe, governments and other institutions, will take the floor. It is expected that 300-400 people will participate in the conference. To coincide with the event, the Club de Bruxelles will also be publishing a 100-page study in English and French which will be distributed to all participants.

The following draft programme gives a preliminary indication of the areas that will be emphasised at the conference. The aim is to interest European companies in collaborating with enterprises and authorities in the Southern Africa region, in particular in sectors where the development of infrastructure will be a driving force for economic development (energy, transport and communications, information technology etc.)

Thursday 19 October

First session: Overview of the new relations between the EU and Southern Africa and prospects for European companies.

Second session: Regional cooperation between the Southern African countries focusing especially on health, agriculture, food security, trade and industry (in particular within the mining sector).

Third session: Relations between the EU and the RSA (the bilateral Trade and Cooperation

Agreement; accession, with special status, to the Lomé Convention; European support programmes etc.)

Fourth session: EU aid programmes for the Southern African region and the role of enterprises.

Special evening session: Transport and tourism in Southern Africa.

Friday 20 October

Fifth session: Direct investment in Southern Africa: conditions, priority sectors, government support, deregulation, privatisation etc.

Sixth session: Cooperation between European and Southern African companies, transfer of technology, the role of SMEs, European industrial cooperation support programmes.

Seventh session: First case study — energy. Electricity, hydro-electric power, coal, nuclear power, oil and renewable energies (solar and wind power). The role that European companies can play.

Eighth session: Second case study — the role of information technology and telecommunications. The potential impact of the information society on Southern Africa, networks, telematics services to be installed, Euro-African cooperation within the framework of European programmes, the role that companies can play in this sector in the region.

Further information about the conference can be obtained from the Club de Bruxelles, 10 rue du Collège St. Michel, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium. Tel: (322) 771 98 90, Fax: (322) 770 66 71.

UNHCR plans boycott of mine producers

Calling for bold international action to rid the world of anti-personnel mines, the UNHCR announced on 6 July that it would henceforth refuse to do business with companies involved in the sale or manufacture of such weapons. In a speech to the International Meeting on Mine Clearance, in Geneva, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, said that 'the scourge of land mines' posed a serious obstacle to the return of millions of refugees and displaced people around the world. Mines indiscriminately kill and maim tens of thousands of civilians annually. Mrs Ogata believes that their production and sale must be stopped. 'For my part,' she stated, 'I see little difference between those who use them and those who produce them.'

Although banning mines requires action by governments, Mrs Ogata said that the UNHCR

could still play its part by refusing to deal with manufacturers. 'With respect to UNHCR, we shall not knowingly purchase the products of companies that sell or manufacture anti-personnel mines or their components,' she asserted. 'Whatever the present legality of manufacturing such weapons, the toll they take on innocent civilians amounts to a crime against mankind. Those who make, sell and export them bear a direct and heavy responsibility which has to be recognised and dealt with by the international community.'

Somalia: from emergency aid to rehabilitation

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organised a meeting in Brussels on 6 July, the purpose of which was to inform participants about the current situation in Somalia. Chaired by *Erling Dessau*, of the UN co-ordination team for Somalia (UNCT) — which has been based in Nairobi (for security reasons) since October 1994 — the meeting brought together representatives of a variety of organisations including UN agencies, European institutions, universities and NGOs.

'We are working on the transition between emergency aid and rehabilitation in Somalia,' declared Mr Dessau in his address. He added that the United Nations had not suspended its activities in the country following the departure of UNOSOM forces last March. Operation *Restore Hope* had undoubtedly been controversial but, he stressed, 'it cannot be denied that it nonetheless saved the lives of many people.' Now, he said, was the time for 'rule rehabilitation'.

The UNDP is the lead agency, working alongside other UN bodies, NGOs and local actors to restore the situation in Somalia. The work involves a series of targeted actions in the fields of nutrition, health and education, and in the reintegration of refugees and displaced people.

But the priority is clearly to strengthen the local authorities and to support various movements bringing together women, intellectuals and religious groups, in the project of rebuilding the country.

In this context, one thing is certain, according to Mr Dessau, namely that 'the people want no more war.' This was confirmed by *Mr Illing*, the EU representative in Somalia. According to him, living conditions in the country are getting back to normal. 'It is our belief that the work we (in the international community) have undertaken is beginning to

have an impact,' he asserted. 'We will continue to do our work. I may not know yet how we are going to proceed but I do know that there is a great deal more that we could do in both the humanitarian and development fields.'

This view was shared by *Waba Leba*, the OAU's director in Brussels. He stressed that 'Africa must be the first to invest in itself. Following this meeting, one can only hope that the nine UN agencies and 30 or so NGOs still present in Somalia will be able to help meet the Somali people's aspirations for peace.'

HUMANITARIAN AID

ACP countries

Central and East Africa: ECU 3.5 million for the extension, until February 1996, of the ECHO Flight operation designed to transport personnel and supplies within this region.

Cape Verde: ECU 100 000 for the victims of the Fogo volcanic eruption which occurred at the beginning of April.

Cape Verde: ECU 20 000 for a project to train local personnel in surveillance techniques in respect of the Fogo volcano, whose activity threatens the population of the island.

Kenya: ECU 820 000 for preventive action aimed at stopping the spread of cholera

Kenya: ECU 329 000 for essential equipment and health assistance to Somali refugees who have fled from their country.

Liberia: ECU 300 000 for basic essentials (such as shelters and drinking water) and medical/nutritional assistance to displaced people in Harbel and Buchanan.

Sierra Leone: ECU 750 000 to support the medical services in the cities of Freetown and Bo.

Sierra Leone: ECU 700 000 to provide food aid for impoverished, displaced people in the capital.

Rwanda/Burundi: ECU 25 million to provide food aid for the next three months to displaced people in these two countries and in neighbouring states.

Sudan: ECU 950 000 for medical aid destined, in particular, for war-wounded patients in the south of the country.

Sudan/Uganda: ECU 9 million for a six-month global aid plan in favour of Sudanese people affected by the conflict in their country.

Non-ACP countries

Cuba: ECU 15 million to support the sanitation system through improvements to drinking water and food quality, and the provision of medical supplies and hygiene products.

Guatemala: ECU 415 000 to help displaced people living in the capital achieve self-sufficiency.

Mexico: ECU 600 000 to help Guatemalan refugees in the country achieve self-sufficiency.

Mexico: ECU 435 000 for food and medical assistance and the provision of basic products to civilians who have fled the fighting in the Chiapas region.

Nicaragua: ECU 780 000 to help people who have been uprooted achieve self-sufficiency, for a project to reintegrate demobilised soldiers, for livestock and agricultural support and for a project to rehabilitate small-scale health facilities.

Peru: ECU 750 000 for medical aid in the form of vaccination against rabies. This is being spread by bats and poses a threat to some 30 000 people.

El Salvador: ECU 370 000 for a project to improve the health of displaced people living in the Marazan region in the north of the country, which was previously a combat zone.

Former USSR: ECU 2.6 million for a diphtheria vaccination campaign. An epidemic of this disease began in 1991 and the aim is to prevent its further spread.

Former USSR: ECU 630 000 to purchase equipment for the children's hospital in Minsk for victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.

Bangladesh: ECU 1.4 million to help victims of the recent floods which have affected 60% of the country's territory and rendered more than 15 million people homeless.

Nepal: ECU 350 000 to provide basic essentials and ambulance services for eight camps in the south of the country occupied by refugees of Nepalese origin from Bhutan who have fled their homes since the adoption, in 1989, of a policy of 'national consolidation' by the Bhutan government.

Cambodia: ECU 155 000 to improve the health care of people who have fled from the conflict zone.

Philippines: ECU 120 000 for a year-long training programme aimed at preparing for national disasters.

Sri Lanka: ECU 305 000 for medical and pharmaceutical assistance, covering a six-month period, for patients at the university hospital in Jaffna.


FOOD AID
New regulation

The Commission has adopted a proposal for a new Council Regulation on food aid policy and food aid management and special operations in support of food security.

The Commission proposal represents a response to the new challenges facing EU food aid. Rapid population growth, difficulties with the development of the agricultural sector in several third world countries, the continuation and escalation of conflicts or economic and political instability and the new requirements caused by the break-up of the former Soviet Union necessarily entail the revision of legal instruments in order to make them more effective. The overall objective of combating poverty, confirmed on several occasions by the Union, and the specific role of food aid in this area, are the final factors which ensure that revision of the legislation is a necessity.

The new Regulation has three main themes:

(1) Food aid as a key component of long-term food security strategy. Priority in this respect is to be given to instruments such as structural

food aid, local purchasing and triangular operations with the aim of contributing to the development of agriculture, food security, the promotion of local trade and the inter-regional economy in the developing countries.

In addition to the allocation of staple foodstuffs, the aid can also be used to supply seeds, fertilisers, tools and other inputs or raw materials, to build up reserves and conduct public information and training campaigns.

(2) Amending the list of potential recipients of Community aid. To take account of the recent changes in the world geopolitical map, especially those resulting from the break-up of the former Soviet Union, the new Regulation adds considerably to the list of countries eligible for EU food aid. It will now include over 120 countries.

(3) Bringing together all the existing legal instruments on food aid in a single body of rules.

Decisions

The Commission has recently taken a decision to finance food aid as set out in the chart which follows:

Country Organisation	Cereals (tonnes)	Milk powder (tonnes)	Sugar (tonnes)	Vegetable oil (tonnes)	Butteroil (tonnes)	Beans (tonnes)	Others (ECUm)
WFP normal	120 000	5 000		8 000	500		4.0
WFP P.R.O.	61 236		1 900	2 600			1.5
WFP I.E.F.R.	52 000		1 000	5 000			2.0
Mozambique	22 000			2 500			
Malawi	60 000						1.5
Lesotho	20 000					3 000	
Cambodia	15 000						
Niger							
NGOs 2nd tranche	50 000	800	2 000	6 250		15 000	5.0
UNWRA	1 162	1 122	1 684	1 080		583	3.36
Total	401 398	6 922	6 584	25 430	500	18 583	17.36

PARTNERSHIP

Information Bulletin from the Centre



for the Development of Industry

Poultry farming in West Africa

CDI supporting integration of "South-South" trade

Poultry farming represents a strategic source of animal protein for the people of West Africa. This sector, which has developed substantially over recent years, depends upstream on a regular supply of high-quality feedingstuffs at competitive prices. The CDI organised an initial "ACP-EU Industrial Partnership Meeting" in this field in Saly-Portudal (Senegal) in 1993. Since then, several projects involving the poultry farming sector have been assisted and monitored by the Centre. Another meeting was also arranged there by the CDI on August 1st and 2nd 1995. Bringing together several players from the region's "poultry feed" branch, the meeting studied ways and means of solving the major procurement problems faced by local feed suppliers.

In the new circumstances that have been prevailing for almost two years now following devaluation of the CFA franc (which occurred just after the first Saly-Portudal meeting), West African poultry farming has been going through a turbulent time, especially as a result of the substantial fall in purchasing power, spiralling inflation and growing price instability. On the

other hand, the change in monetary parity has made traditional imports of eggs for hatching much dearer, which has encouraged the domestic rearing of breeding hens. Downstream, the industrial slaughterhouse of Senegal is being consolidated to meet growing demand on the market. But the take-off of this growth sector has now run up against a critical problem: the procurement difficulties of feed suppliers throughout the West Sahel area. It was this diagnosis that persuaded the CDI to organise its seminar on this subject in Saly-Portudal at the beginning of August 1995, attended by representatives from Burkina-Faso, the Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and France. For two days, professionals concerned with the problems of this sector - feed suppliers, farmers, middlemen, trans-



SEDIMA battery hens (Senegal)

port operators, etc. - examined the current problems affecting the market and tried to find ways and means of remedying this situation on a regional level.

The main maize producing and consuming country is Senegal, which accounts for 80% of the industrial poultry farms in the West Sahel region. The major problem facing feed suppliers

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Contents

• Wood/Leather: ACP/EU Partnership Meetings	3
• MAT-CONSTRUCT '95 : EU/Central Africa Forum	3
• Mauritius/Garment industry: Spotlight on design	4
European Network: Strengthening of France/CDI cooperation	5
Dredgers: Successful transfer of technology	7
News in brief	7
CDI Director in Mauritania, Guinea and Mali	8



SEMINAIRE ACP - UE

APPROVISIONNEMENT EN MATIERES PREMIERES
DES PROVEDIERS EN ZONE OUEST SAHELIEUNE

SALY - 1 au 2 Août 1995



Presentation by a participant during the working sessions at the Saly-Portudal seminar

concerns the acquisition of maize and fish meal, which they cannot find in suitable quantities and qualities and at competitive prices compared to maize imported from outside the Economic Community of West African States.

A field study carried out at the request of the CDI prior to the seminar, by Mr El Hadji Diao, the Centre's sectoral correspondent in Senegal, underlined the main obstacles that exist at present to making full use of the region's maize supply: weakness of agricultural production and marketing structures, price distortions, lack of professional cooperation among the players in the sector, expensive and difficult transportation, high taxation and heavy customs duties.

Following this analysis, broadly shared by the professionals present in Saly-Portudal, the debates allowed some concrete strategic options to be determined. In effect, it would seem that the maize shortage, particularly critical in Senegal, could be eased by supplies available in Mali and Burkina-Faso. This presupposes the grouping of orders at the beginning of the marketing year, organisation of transport by rail and road, and an effort to reduce the customs and fiscal obstacles erected by the authorities. Similarly, Mauritania could prove to be a useful source of fish meal, provided that appropriate trading channels are established.

The participants also drew up a list of short-term objectives: the need to en-

courage the creation of maize storage units, which are essential for the regular procurement of supplies; the establishment of seasonal credit facilities in close cooperation between storage operators, buyers and capital providers; the collection and distribution of statistical information (quantities, prices, origins, etc). To this effect, a permanent database, constantly updated by the professionals themselves, could be developed with the help of the CDI.

In the medium term, the participants would like some major incentives (support measures, dissemination of information, seasonal loans, organisation of collection) for the regional development of maize production. They favour the creation of a pilot production and storage plant on an industrial scale, with the financial participation of feed suppliers and other players in the sector. The Centre could also contribute towards getting this sort of initiative off the ground.

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CDI projects in the poultry farming sector in West Africa

Since the first Industrial Partnership Meeting in Saly-Portudal at the end of 1993, the CDI has been involved in eight project assistance operations in the poultry feed sector for the West African region. Seven projects are currently in the pre-assistance stage.

Country	Projects in progress	Projects in pré-assistance stage
Burkina-Faso	1	2
Côte-d'Ivoire	1	1
Mali	1	1
Mauritania	1	-
Senegal	4	3

Furthermore, the Centre has also been increasing its interventions in favour of projects directly linked with poultry farming. In particular, we could mention: assistance in the creation of hatcheries in Senegal and the Côte d'Ivoire; aid for development of the commercial strategy of the first poultry abattoir designed to supply the regional market constructed in Senegal; creation of meat cutting and marketing centres in Burkina-Faso and the Côte d'Ivoire; the imminent opening of a private pilot centre for raw materials analysis.

CDI guide to industrial poultry farming

In the "Technologies" series in the collection of CDI guides, this 51-page publication presents information and advice collected from both African and European professionals. More than a conventional poultry farming manual, this guide aims to help the professional poultry farmer or project leader in this field to avoid a number of mistakes by providing a series of analytical and decision-making tools: diagrams, advice, technological profile of the sector, recommendations for the development of projects such as the creation of hatcheries, abattoirs, feedingstuff production units, etc.

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Next ACP/EU Industrial Meetings

WOOD INDUSTRIES IN THE CARIBBEAN

**Paramaribo, Surinam
November 6th-10th 1995**

For three years now, in the four main countries of the Caribbean which have forestry resources (Belize, Guyana, Surinam and Trinidad & Tobago), the CDI has been pursuing a policy of giving sectoral priority to the wood industries. Thanks to this support, several companies in the region have been able to establish export contacts with European partners. The knowledge acquired in the field has allowed this meeting in Paramaribo to be organised in order to consolidate and develop the progress achieved in this sector. Face-to-face meetings will be arranged between:

- entrepreneurs selected on the spot - capable of meeting quality requirements on their own regional markets and in Europe;
 - firms from Europe interested in this type of product and possessing high-level commercial and technological know-how.
- These contacts will be aimed in particular at promoting two kinds of outlets: articles with a high value added for joiners (windows, doors, floors, etc.) and furniture manufacturers, together with equipment for the very important hotel industry that is rapidly developing in the region (a market dominated until now by suppliers in the USA and Asia).

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FOOTWEAR MANUFACTURE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

**Botswana
October 15th-20th 1995**

The leather and hide sector represents a very important resource in the African countries of the ACP Group, especially in Southern Africa (Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe). So far, this potential has been regarded by the industrialised countries as a reservoir of raw materials or semi-finished products. Today, however, with the new policies adopted by their governments for restructuring and promoting the private sector, a growing number of local companies in Southern Africa are embarking upon the manufacture of leather articles such as footwear and clothing (particular-

ly in the field of exotic leathers, which are much sought after on the international market). Consequently, there are now real possibilities of obtaining supplies in this subregion, of either complete footwear or uppers, or establishing partnership links (commercial, technical, financial, etc.) with local companies with a view to meeting the growing demand on domestic markets. It is in the light of these developments that this meeting has been organised by the CDI, to bring together EU operators in the footwear industry and their counterparts in the five above-mentioned countries of Southern Africa.

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MAT-CONSTRUCT '95; EU/CENTRAL AFRICA FORUM BUILDING MATERIALS AND THE CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORKS SECTOR

Libreville - Gabon - October 24th-27th 1995



The countries of Central Africa have substantial needs as regards the development of infrastructures (roads, bridges, ports, urban amenities, etc.), collective facilities (schools, hospitals, administrative buildings, etc.) and housing. In this last-mentioned field, population growth and rapid urbanisation are generating a very high level of demand for building work. The construction and public works market is therefore an important outlet for a wide range of building and finishing materials.

On the basis of this observation, the European Commission decided >>>

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to focus its biennial EU/Central Africa Industrial Forum on this particular sector. This business get-together for industrialists from 11 African countries (Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Príncipe and Zaire) and the 15 countries of the European Union will offer the participating companies a unique opportunity to obtain information and establish commercial, industrial and financial contacts in the field of building materials and in the construction and public works sector, through the organisation of bilateral meetings between company heads.

The CDI has cooperated extensively with the European Commission in preparing and organising this Forum: identification of potential participants; preparatory study on the situation in the industry - which will serve as a basis for the debates; financial contribution towards the travel expenses of numerous African and European participants. In Libreville itself, the Centre will be holding an exhibition on the technologies for manufacturing compressed earth blocks and cement tiles and organising an information seminar on the know-how connected with these materials⁽¹⁾. The CDI will also be offering its assistance to any participating companies which may request it and will be following up the Forum in conjunction with the European Commission.

(1) The CDI has published a guide on compressed earth blocks, available on request.

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Spotlight on design and creation

The first Trend Forum was organised in Mauritius from August 22nd to 24th last for the country's extremely important garment industry - the biggest employer on the island, providing some 100,000 jobs. This event, supported by the CDI, reflected the determination of local industrialists to meet the new GATT era with the focus on design and creation.



Sweat Sun clothing workshops in Mauritius

For the last two decades, the strategy followed by the Mauritian government to promote the clothing industry has been a resounding success. Thanks to the rules of preference set out under the previous GATT arrangements and to the comparative advantage of low production costs in a free zone, many companies have recorded increases of around 100% in personnel, productivity and output. But the new rules of the World Trade Organisation have thrown the textile and clothing markets wide open. They will radically change the conditions of competition on which Mauritius has been able to construct the development of this sector. Over the next ten years, the island is going to be confronted with a major challenge which the EPZDA (Export Processing Zones Development Authority) intends to take up in every way, recognising the need for a substantial improvement in product quality. Today, faced with keener international competition, performances in terms of design and creativity are an essential precondition for winning market shares.

Over the last three years, there have been various EPZDA initiatives, jointly supported by the Mauritian government, the Eu-

ropean Commission and the CDI, with a view to stepping up the value added of Mauritian products. In this context, the training programmes to improve productivity and quality entrusted to FIELDEN HOUSE by the CDI and EPZDA in 1993 and 1994 were aimed at improving the export performances of 20 to 25 companies.

Organised at the end of August, this very first 1995 Trend Forum constituted a new event open to local and regional companies and to experts, specialised institutions and buyers in the European textile industry. The aim of the meeting, which comprised workshops, fashion parades and individual business contacts, was to identify new trends and to explore the conditions for market access, particularly in Europe. Trend Forum '95 also served as a testing ground for Mauritian industrialists, allowing them to prepare for their active participation in the MITEX fair next October in Milan.

Contact at the CDI:

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Strengthening of France/CDI cooperation

During the first seven months of 1995, a third of the CDI's European cofinancing was carried out with the Caisse française de Développement.

The CDI's European Network aims to enable the Centre to mobilise the technical and financial resources available in the EU for industrial projects in the ACP countries and to find European companies to become involved as partners. To this end, the CDI has signed agreements with around thirty European institutions - some of them coupled with a financial package. This close cooperation allows the Centre to tie in with European industrial circles and to organise joint interventions with these partners in favour of ACP projects.

Seven agreements have been signed with the following French institutions: Ministère de la Coopération et du Développement • Caisse française de Développement (CFD) • Assemblée des Chambres françaises de Commerce et d'Industrie (ACFCI) • Association de la Région Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur (PACA) pour le Développement et la Coopération Industrielle (ADECI) • INTERCO-Aquitaine • Institut régional de Développement de Champagne-Ardenne (IRCOD) • Entreprise Rhône-Alpes International (ERAI).

The CDI also collaborates with other national and regional bodies in France, without such cooperation being formalised by a written agreement.

Since 1986, the agreement signed with the CFD has been the only one in France to be coupled with a financial package through which the CDI and the CFD jointly finance different interventions. The two bodies have therefore developed a long working experience together in providing



At the CDI headquarters, a working meeting between a team from the Centre and representatives of all the member organisations of the French institutional network (CFD and regional industrial cooperation agencies)

companies with their assistance. Renewed in October 1994, this agreement has been strengthened by a more systematic approach to seeking out partnership opportunities in the ACP countries with the help of the French regions and by simplified processing of joint projects. This has made the CFD the Centre's special associate on French territory.

■ In mid-August 1995, the CFD approved the sum of 459,000 ECU for six interventions to be carried out with the CDI (see inset opposite), i.e. a third of the cofi-


nancing arrangements reached by the Centre throughout its European network. Four other requests representing CFD cofinancing of 208,000 ECU are also being examined. By way of a comparison, during the whole of 1994 the CFD approved cofinancing operations with the Centre totalling 486,000 ECU.

■ Twelve CDI interventions for the present year involve French companies: seven of them have established partnerships with ACP firms and the other five are playing a part as suppliers of services.

CFD/CDI cofinancing arrangements over the first seven months of 1995

Country	Nature of project
Guinea	Fishing
Mauritania	Manufacture of polystyrene crates
Congo	Milk processing
Côte d'Ivoire	Milk
Gabon	Technical assistance and training
Sub-Saharan Africa	"Trade-guild" support programme in six countries (see inset on the following page)





SITACUIR (footwear manufacturers) - Cameroon: a project that has benefited from an intensive training programme jointly provided by the CDI and the CFD

100 industrial "trade-guild" support projects

In July this year, the French association "Entreprise et Développement", a network of decentralised initiatives for "North-South" industrial partnerships, launched the programme "100 projets pour l'Afrique et la Méditerranée". This mobilising exercise is aimed at promoting the creation of Franco-African "industrial couples" based on cooperation between companies working within the same "trade". The partnerships may be of different types: commercial, technological, financial, etc. Thanks to personalised individual support going beyond a strict customer-supplier relationship, they should enable SMEs in the South to attain greater control over their production tool, their operating methods and their market access. They are also aimed at involving French companies in an alliance strategy with their partners which could possibly lead to co-investment operations favouring their development. The sub-Saharan African countries to which priority is being given in this initiative are Benin, Burkina-Faso, the Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Senegal and Togo.

Led by "Entreprise et Développement", this industrial support pro-

gramme, the first stage of which is planned for two years hence, has the financial backing of a steering committee bringing together the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, Industrial Affairs, Foreign Trade, Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as the CFD and the CDI, which are also providing technical support. To back up the incipient "industrial couples", the programme is funding evaluation and consultancy missions by the entrepreneurs themselves or by executives of the partner companies and providing the necessary follow-up to give tangible shape to "diagnosis-proposals", especially in the form of feasibility studies and the search for financing.

Contacts:

- *CFD: Mr Michel Oudin - Paris.*
Tel.: (33-1) 4006 3131. Fax: 4006 3826
- *Réseau Entreprise et Développement*
Mr Jean-Claude Sitbon - Marseilles
Tel.: (33) 9114 4228 - Fax: 9191 8537
- *CDI: Mr Paolo Baldan,*
Officer responsible for the European Network - TD.
Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 32. Fax: 675 26 03

Euramide : African managers return home

The CDI is supporting an original training experiment in France launched by the Institut français de Logistique, d'Audit et de Formation (ILAF). This organisation has developed a retraining programme for unemployed African executives living in France. Carefully selected for their skills, the participants in this course receive theoretical and practical training in company creation and management and prepare a pre-feasibility study on a project of their choice, with a two-month spell at a French company in the sector concerned. In particular, the CDI makes a financial contribution towards an "opportunity identification" trip to Africa for the originators of the best projects. To mount the project, the would-be managers can call upon the services of the local CDI antennae. If they prove to be sufficiently interesting, the projects could also receive joint financial support from the CDI and the CFD, which also has local agencies.

Contacts:

- *CDI: Dr Hamed Sow,*
Geographical Officer for West Africa.
Tel.: (32-2) 679 18 24. Fax: 675 26 03
- *ILAF: Mr Pierre Schal.*
Tel.: (33) 2647 2071. Fax: 2649 0326

Dredgers: Successful transfer of technology

The article published in Partnership No. 10 in November 1993 concerning our project to transfer dredger construction technology to the ACP countries was a great success. This project, initially limited to Nigeria, consisted in partly constructing light dredgers on the spot - in partnership with a local entrepreneur - specially designed for the conditions encountered in ACP countries. The operation received technical and marketing assistance from the CDI. Following this article, over 30 companies from all four corners of the world, interested in this technology developed by Daniel Doyen TOYO (Belgium), got in touch with us. The excellent contacts established have led to a number of concrete results:

- NIGERIA: production and sales of dredgers are continuing at a sustained level;
- BENIN: SIBEAU has already produced four dredgers (the company received a loan from UNIDO for this);
- CAMEROON: negotiations are in course with SOCODES, a company that is prepared to manufacture the equipment;
- SENEGAL: a project for the construction of a demonstration dredger is well under way, again with the support of the CDI. It should be pointed out that West Africa is faced with a serious problem of beach erosion and sand extraction is no longer allowed. One solution, therefore, is to extract river sand using simple, light, reliable and transportable equipment, which is the case with the

dredgers in question;

- ANGOLA, ZAMBIA and ZAIRE: cooperation agreements are about to be signed for the local manufacture of dredgers. Here it is a question of extracting diamonds from deep rivers. But there have been reactions to Partnership from well beyond the ACP countries: contracts have also been signed - following this publication - with companies in the MIDDLE EAST and the FAR EAST for excavation work for pipelines. The biggest successes so far, however, have been in EGYPT and MOROCCO, for large dredging units, and in ALGERIA with a project for the local construction of 39 dredgers. The objectives in these three countries have been, respectively, to dig the foundations for a bridge over the Nile, dredging for the construction of a marina and the cleaning-out of dams.

The lesson that we have learnt from this experience is that the concept of equipment adapted to suit local conditions and partial manufacture on the spot can guarantee success: the problems connected with payments in hard currency are greatly reduced and local maintenance of equipment in proper conditions is ensured.

(1) This text was transmitted to us by Mr Edouard de Grand Ry, Sales Manager of DANIEL DOYEN TOYO (Belgium).

ACP NETWORK

■ **Mozambique: CDI participation in the first conference on development of the private sector in Mozambique.**

This meeting was organised at the beginning of July 1995 in Maputo by the Mozambique government, with the support of the World Bank, the European Commission and the Italian government. Mr Matos Rosa, Deputy Director of the CDI, was invited to describe the role of the CDI and the assistance possibilities offered by the Centre. A special programme is being prepared at the moment. The conference brought together representatives of the governmental authorities, the private sector and the banking sector, to study the handicaps holding back the growth and development of the private sector in Mozambique and to reach a consensus on a series of concrete actions to be brought into effect. During this mission, Mr Matos Rosa also visited two Mozambique companies receiving assistance from the CDI, namely:

- RIPLEX, an SME with a staff of 15, manufacturing plastic articles (household goods, bottles, bags, etc.), whose products have been meeting with growing success on the market. RIPLEX has received training and production start-up assistance.
- "Lusalite du Mozambique", whose two plants in Maputo and Dondo manufacture sheets and accessories of asbestos cement. This company has been helped in the commissioning of new equipment.

EU NETWORK

■ **New Greek expert on secondment to the CDI.** On May 1st 1995, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a Greek expert, Miss Dimitra Douma, available to the Technical Services Division (TD) of the European Network. Miss Dimitra Douma had been working in Athens since 1988 at the Development Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she was in charge of dossiers connected with the Lomé Convention.

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■ **Agreement between the CDI and the Comité belge du Forum franco-phon des Affaires (FFA).** The FFA, whose task is to promote partnerships between firms in the French-speaking regions of Belgium and companies in the developing countries, has signed a cooperation agreement with the CDI. The FFA will place its own network of contacts and correspondents in French-speaking Belgium at the disposal of the Centre for the dissemination of information on its activities and for the search for partners and appropriate technologies. The decentralised network of the CDI will be used to promote proposals for partnerships and technological transfers from the FFA. The two bodies will endeavour to set up the possible cofinancing of projects via the funds that can be mobilised through the Agence générale de la Coopération au Développement (AGCD), the Belgian finance institution with which the Centre also has an agreement.

Contacts:

- **FFA:** Mrs Lucile Lambert - Ministry of the Walloon Region. Tel.: (32-2) 211 56 39. Fax: 211 55 37
- **CDI:** Mr Paolo Baldan, Officer responsible for the European Network, Tel.: (32-2) 679 19 32. Fax: 675 26 03

CALENDAR

■ **October 15-20 1995**

Botswana

Industrial Partnership Meeting on Footwear Manufacture in Southern Africa (see pages 3)

■ **October 24-27 1995**

Libreville - Gabon

MAT-CONSTRUCT '95 - Building Materials and the Construction and Public Works Sector (see pages 3)

■ **November 6-10 1995**

Paramaribo - Surinam

Industrial Partnership Meeting on the Wood Industries in the Caribbean (see pages 3-4)

■ **November 21-24 1995**

Dakar - Senegal

AGRO-IND '95 - EUI/ACP Industrial Forum on Agro-industries

The CDI annual report has just been published. A precious source of information on the whole range of actions carried out by the Centre. In particular, the report contains a detailed description of the 20 projects supported by the Centre in 1994.

Contact:

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Partnership is a publication of the Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI), created under the ACP-EEC Lomé Convention.

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- **Coordination:** Mr. K. Mbay, CDI Communication and External Relations Officer Tel. : (32-2) 679 19 61 • Fax : (32-2) 675 26 03
- **Editing and production:** European Service Network - Brussels

CDI Director on working mission to Mauritania, Guinea Conakry and Mali



The Director, Mr Surendra Sharma, discussing aspects of a lime crushing/ceramic tile manufacturing enterprise assisted by CDI in Mali.

In early July, the Director, Mr Surendra Sharma, made an intensive week-long working visit to Mauritania, Guinea Conakry and Mali as well as a quick stop-over visit to Côte d'Ivoire, visiting several CDI-assisted projects, to assess the impact of assistance provided by the Centre.

Mr Sharma held discussions with industrial project promoters for possible future assistance, as well as with executive representatives of industry and manufacturers associations, for priority industry sector needs for CDI to focus upon. The Director also held discussions with Ministers of Industry and Planning, senior officials in these Ministries and National Authorising officers, both to obtain an indication of the priority needs for CDI interventions, as well as to sensitise at government level the importance of allocating some tangible support to private sector development via the National Indicative Programme Funds, should ACP countries wish to continue receiving CDI's assistance to industry when the Second Financial Protocol becomes effective from 1996 onwards. A further aspect of Mr Sharma's visit was to engage in frank discussions with executives of CDI's antenna institutions in the countries visited as well as with correspondents of CDI. The Director also agreed, in principle, for CDI to sponsor direct assistance to small and medium scale enterprises through the use of local experts and consultants to be channelled via OPIP in Guinea Conakry and CAPES in Mali, both well respected CDI antenna institutions in their respective countries.

The Director also held meetings with EU Delegations in each of the countries visited both to solicit support for CDI actions and activities as well as to offer CDI's support to EU private sector development programmes conducted by the EU Delegation under the Lomé Convention.

Operational Summary

No. 88 — September 1995

(position as at 12 August 1995)



EC-financed development schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of EC development schemes prior to their implementation. It is set out as follows:

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups of countries, corresponding to the main aspects of Community development policy:

— the ACP countries (Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific), which signed the multilateral conventions of Lomé I (28 February 1975), Lomé II (31 October 1979), Lomé III (8 December 1984) and Lomé IV (15 December 1989), plus the OCT (overseas countries and territories) of certain member states of the EC, which get the same type of aid as the ACP countries;

— the Mediterranean countries (Maghreb and Mashraq), which signed cooperation agreements with the EC since 1976 and 1977;

— the ALA developing countries of Asia and Latin America, beneficiaries since 1976 of annual aid programmes.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Note

As the information provided is subject to modification in line with the development aims and priorities of the beneficiary country, or with the conditions laid down by the authorities empowered to take financial decisions, the EC is in no way bound by this summary, which is for information only.

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
TA: Technical assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
mECU: Million European currency units

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

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B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

A1 Planning and public administration

- A1A Administrative buildings
- A1B Economic planning and policy
- A1C Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category
- A1D Police and fire protection
- A1E Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation
- A1F Economic surveys, pre-investment studies
- A1G Cartography, mapping, aerial photography
- A1H Demography and manpower studies

A2 Development of public utilities

- A2A Power production and distribution
 - A2Ai Electricity
- A2B Water supply
- A2C Communications
- A2D Transport and navigation
- A2E Meteorology
- A2F Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)

A3 Agriculture, fishing and forestry

- A3A Agricultural production
- A3B Service to agriculture
- A3C Forestry
- A3D Fishing and hunting
- A3E Conservation and extension
- A3F Agricultural storage
- A3G Agricultural construction
- A3H Home economics and nutrition
- A3I Land and soil surveys

A4 Industry, mining and construction

- A4A Extractive industries
 - A4Ai Petroleum and natural gas
- A4B Manufacturing
- A4C Engineering and construction
- A4D Cottage industry and handicraft
- A4E Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment
- A4F Non-agricultural storage and warehousing
- A4G Research in industrial technology

A5 Trade, banking, tourism and other services

- A5A Agricultural development banks

- A5B Industrial development banks
- A5C Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
- A5D Export promotion
- A5E Trade, commerce and distribution
- A5F Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
- A5G Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
- A5H Other insurance and banking
- A5I Archaeological conservation, game reserves

A6 Education

- A6A Primary and secondary education
- A6B University and higher technical institutes
 - A6Bi Medical
- A6C Teacher training
 - A6Ci Agricultural training
- A6D Vocational and technical training
- A6E Educational administration
- A6F Pure or general research
- A6G Scientific documentation
- A6H Research in the field of education or training
- A6I Subsidiary services
- A6J Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.

A7 Health

- A7A Hospitals and clinics
- A7B Maternal and child care
- A7C Family planning and population-related research
- A7D Other medical and dental services
- A7E Public health administration
- A7F Medical insurance programmes

A8 Social infrastructure and social welfare

- A8A Housing, urban and rural
- A8B Community development and facilities
- A8C Environmental sanitation
- A8D Labour
- A8E Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
- A8F Environmental protection
- A8G Flood control
- A8H Land settlement
- A8I Cultural activities

A9 Multisector

- A9A River development
- A9B Regional development projects

A10 Unspecified

ACP STATES

New projects are printed in italics and offset by a bar in margin at left

Projects under way are marked with an asterisk and with words or phrases in italics

ANGOLA

Health project 'Post-emergency'. 15 mECU. T.A. to the Ministry of Health, supply of medicines, health projects in Luanda, fight against AIDS. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 7007 A7

Artisanal fisheries in Namibe. Resp. Auth.: Ministry for Fisheries. Estimate 10.400 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and boats, T.A., training, line of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 6032(7) A3d

Rehabilitation of the Tchivinguiri Institute. Estimated total cost 9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF ANG 7014 A6b

Reconstruction support programme. *Estimated total cost 58 mECU. Relaunch of economic and social activities. Improvement of basic social services and living conditions, poverty alleviation, increase of production and of basic communication possibilities, amelioration of basic infrastructures, participation in mine-clearing operations, support for demobilisation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.* EDF ANG 6036 A7,A8

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Livestock development. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 5003 (7001) A3a

Upgrading and expansion of Antigua Hotel Training Centre. Construction of and equipment for part new and part renovated and upgraded facilities. Estimated cost 2.200 mECU. Works, supplies, design and supervision, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF AB 7001 A6d

BENIN

Fish breeding. Applied research and popularization actions. Resp. Auth.: MDRAC. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF BEN 6009 A3d

Rehabilitation of the Cotonou-Hilacondji Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. Estimated cost 17 mECU. Rehabilitation works over 93 km. Works by int. tender. Supervision, geotechnical control, follow-up, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BEN 6017 A2d

Rural structures programme in Mono Province. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de la Restructuration Economique. 6.500 mECU. Work construction, rehabilitation of water systems, roads, schools, markets, warehouses, Works by acc. tender, supplies by local manufacturers. T.A., evaluation. Participation NGO AFVP (F). Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. EDF BEN/6003/001 A3a

BURKINA FASO

Tougan — Ouahigouya — Mali border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Modern earth-road. Super-

vision: short-list done. Estimated cost 13.5 m ECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 95. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF BK 7004 A2d

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 95-96. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 25 mECU. T.A. for starting and follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7200/002 A1c

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Cereals. 6.100 mECU. Support for institutional reform, works, supply of equipment, T.A., lines of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7009 A3a

Sectoral Adjustment Programme — Agricultural — Environment. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, soil management and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 7010 A3a

Periodical maintenance programme. Ouagadougou-Ghana, Bobo-Côte d'Ivoire, and Bobo-Mali. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated total cost 30 mECU. Works, supervision, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BK 6017 A2d

Support project for the reform of the pharmaceutical sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé — Direction des Services Pharmaceutiques (DSPH) and CAMEG. 1.6 mECU. Line of credit, works, equipment and T.A. Date financing June 95. 8th EDF. EDF BK 7017 A7c

Geological cartography. Resp. Auth.: *Ministère de l'Energie et des Mines. Estimated total cost 15 mECU. Aerial geophysical survey for the middle west, creation of a national geophysical data bank, geological mapping 1/200.000. Works, equipment, T.A. Tender dossiers preparation: short-lists to be done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.* EDF BK SYS 9999 A1g, A4

BURUNDI

Ruvubu Game Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement, du Tourisme et de l'Environnement. 4 mECU. Supervision and management. Works, supplies, T.A., training and awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 6029 A5i

Support project for micro-enterprises. 10 m ECU. Support to prepare technical dossiers, management follow-up. T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF BU 7004 A4, A5

Health rehabilitation in the provinces of Bubanza, Cibitoke, Rutana, Ruyigi and Cankuzo. 5.500 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF BU 7003 A7

CAMEROON

Integrated rural development programme in the North-East and North-West Benoué regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du

Territoire. Estimated cost 13.350 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6002/7001 A3a

General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 7200/001 A1c

Lagdo fishing project. Resp. Auth.: MINEPIA. Estimated cost 3.500 mECU. Preservation and improvement of the social-economic situation around Lake Lagdo. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6002/002 A3a

Protection and sanitation for Kousseri town. Kousseri road network. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 4 mECU. Dyke rehabilitation works along the Logoni river, road works and rain water drainage. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6022 A8g, A9a

Access road to the Tikar Plain. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 14.232 mECU. Road works over the Kakar-Sabongari-Atta-Sonkolong road. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6037 A2d

Tikar Plain development. Resp. Auth.: MINAT. Estimated total cost 8 mECU. Social-economic improvement. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CM 6004 A3a

CAPE VERDE

Rural electrification — Praia. Resp. Auth.: Municipalité de Praia. Estimated cost 1.457 mECU. Works and supply of equipment for the electrification of 3 centres in 'rural Praia'. (Diesel power station and LT/MT distribution network). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7005 A2ai

Solar Regional Programme. 3rd part. Resp. Auth.: Cellule nationale de réalisation du P.R.S. Estimated cost 0.507 mECU. Construction, rehabilitation, equipment, support mission, awareness-raising. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7006 A2b, A3e

Road infrastructure improvement in the Santiago, São Nicolau and Maio islands. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Infrastructures et des Transports - Direction Générale des Infrastructures. 3.090 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Work supervision short-list done. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. EDF CV 7003 A2d

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Support for Structural Adjustment. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 10 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. CA 7200 A1c

Support for agricultural production and for rural centres self-promotion. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage. 8.500 mECU. Works by direct labour. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. evaluation, audit, training and follow-up. Project

in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF CA 6005/001

A3a

Support for Primary Health Care in the Basse-Kotto region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé, Publique et de la Population. 1.800 mECU. Buildings, warehouses, Health centres, medical equipment, vehicles, medicines, T.A. evaluation, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF CA 7004 A7, A8

Support for the transport sectoral programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 50 mECU. Road rehabilitation. Works, supervision, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF CA 6008 A2d

COMOROS

Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement — Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 mECU. Works, by int. tender. T.A. for further investigations, tender dossier and works supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF COM 6006/7003 A2d

Development of cultivation for export. Vanilla and Ylang Ylang. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dev. Rural. 1.900 mECU. Vanilla and improvement of quality (laboratory, management, marketing). Supply of non-wood ovens. Crop diversification. Equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF COM 7004 A3a

Support for the establishment of the 'Centre National de l'Artisanat Camorien'. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie, du Plan, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat. 0.300 mECU. Works, equipment and T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF COM (REG) 6502/001 A4d

CHAD

Re-launch of the fishing sector. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral study: short list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF CD 7011 A3a

River Chari embankment protection. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. To improve living conditions in N'Djamena. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF CD 5027 A8f,g

Support for the electoral process. Resp. Auth.: UNDP (PNUD). Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF
EDF CD 7015 A1c

CONGO

Support for the Health Development National Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé. 10 mECU. Construction and rehabilitation works, T.A., training, supply of equipment and medicines. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF COB 7005 A7

Support for population and housing general census. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Économie et du Plan - Centre National de la Statistique et des Etudes Économiques. EDF part 0.500 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF COB 7008 A1g,h

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support programme for the 'pineapple market'. Estimated cost 7.780 mECU. EDF 6.100 mECU, O.C.A.B. (Organisation Centrale des Producteurs - Exportateurs d'Ananas et des Bananes), 1.680 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A., training, studies, line of credit. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF IVC 6016 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Phase III. 28.800 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF 7200/002 A1c

Irrigated rice-growing areas in the Central and Northern Central regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. EDF 15.700 mECU. Infrastructure, organization, training. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A., studies, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF IVC 5021/001 A3a

Support for the establishment of a service company. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. Support structure for SME's. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF IVC 7012 A5d,e

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Phase IV. Estimated cost 20.500 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF IVC 7200/003 A1c

Emergency rescue centre in ABOBO. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Medical and fire rescue centre for the North-Eastern zone of Grand Abidjan. Building, vehicles and equipment. Identification study for the centre: short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF IVC 6019 A1d,A7d

DJIBOUTI

Fight against desertification and development of livestock husbandry in Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, T.A. Project suspended. 7th EDF.
EDF DI 6008 A3a

Health training programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique et des Affaires Sociales. 0.750 mECU. T.A., scholarships, seminars, training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF DI 7101/002 A7e

DOMINICA

Eco-Tourism Site Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism (MTIT). Estimated total cost 0.558 mECU. EDF 0.500 mECU, local 0.058 mECU. Works, equipment and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF DOM 6002/001 A5c

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Geological and mining development programme. 23 mECU. Studies, programmes management, works, T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF DO SYS 9999 A4a,e

Los Toros Hydroelectric project. Construction of a hydroelectric power station. Civil works, supply of electromechanical and hydromechanical equipment.

Capacity 9.2 Mw. Annual output 57.27 Gwh. Estimated cost 25.4 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF DO 7005 A2ai

Support programme for the private sector. Estimated total cost 7 mECU. EDF 4.2 mECU, local 0.950 mECU, local private sector and SME'S 1.4 mECU, C.D.I. 0.450 mECU. EDF part: line of credit and T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF EG 0000 A1c

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classification and Use Master Plan — National System of Conservation Units — Forest Training and Research Centre. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF EG 6001 A3c, e, i

Rural development programme in the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF EG 6005 (7001) A3a

ERITREA

Rehabilitation Programme. 3.7 mECU. NGO projects for health, veterinary services, water supply and demobilization of soldiers. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ERY 7255 A7,A8

ETHIOPIA

Strengthening of water supply and sanitation in Addis Ababa. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa Water Supply and Sewerage Authority. Estimated cost 1.990 mECU. Supply of metering and control equipment. T.A. and consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ET 5006/7 A2b,A8c

Rehabilitation of the Addis-Ababa - Modjo - Awasa Road. Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Road Authority. Estimated cost 40 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ET 7005 A2d

Social Rehabilitation Programme. EDF 6.868 mECU. Rehabilitation of health (including water and sanitation) services and of agri-pastoral activities. Works, supplies, T.A. and training. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ET 7012 A3-A7-A8

Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, training, line of credit, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ET 7255/001 A8b,e

SME development programme. Estimated total cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ET 7003 A5

GABON

Mining development programme and diversification. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Mines, de l'Énergie et des Ressources Hydrauliques. Estimated cost 14 mECU. Works by direct labour and int. tenders. Equipment by int. tender, T.A., follow-up and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF/SYS/GA 9999 A4a

Rural water supply and micro-projects in 3 provinces. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Eau et de l'Énergie. 8.600 mECU. 300 new wells and rehabilitation of 210 existing water points. Drinking water for Haut-Ogooué, Ngounié and Woleu-Ntem provinces. Works, supply of equipment, T.A., training, follow-up. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GA 6015 A2b

GAMBIA

General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 1.400 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GM 7200/002 A1c

GHANA

Human resources development programme. 5 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH 7003 A6

Western Region Agricultural Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 15 mECU. T.A., buildings and training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH A3a

Lomé IV - Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 7 mECU. T.A., transport equipment, materials and supplies. *Project in execution. 7th EDF.* EDF GH A3a

Protected Area Development in South Western Ghana. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Land and Forestry. 5 mECU. T.A., buildings, equipment and supplies. *Project in execution. 6th EDF.* EDF GH 7005 A3a

Woodworking Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 4.5 mECU. Equipment, T.A., overseas training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GH A3c

Transport Infrastructure Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Roads & Highways. 70 mECU. Works, supplies, supervision, training. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF GH A2d

General Import Programme III. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. 32.2 mECU. T.A. for monitoring. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GH A1c

University Link. University of Ghana - Vrije Universiteit Brussel. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. 1.2 mECU. T.A., equipment, scholarships, evaluation. *Project in execution. 7th EDF.* EDF GH 7101/001 A6b

GRENADA

Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Labour, Social Service, Community Development. 0.220 mECU. Water supply, road improvements, repairs and extension of schools, medical and community centre and sports grounds. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GRD 7102

Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Grenville Section of the Eastern Main Road - Grenville - Mama Cannes portion. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply of equipment for repairs. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GRD 7002/001 A2d

GUINEA

Development of secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, roads, T.A. and training, management, work supervision, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUI 7008 A8a,b

General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment. 19 mECU. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF GUI 7200 A1c

GUINEA BISSAU

João Landim bridge construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 23 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7013 A2d

Livestock development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural. Estimated cost 1.200 mECU. Zootechnical actions, privatisation, veterinary profession. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 5007/003 A3a

Support to create environmental legislation. Resp. Auth.: National Council for Environment. (CNA) 0.500 mECU. T.A., seminars, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF GUB 7011 A8f

Conservation and rational use of fragile eco-systems. Resp. Auth.: Secrétariat d'Etat au Tourisme, Environnement et Artisanat. 1.350 mECU. Buba region and Cufada region. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. *Project in execution. 7th EDF.* EDF GUB 7011/001 A8f

GUYANA

Pouderoyen water supply system. Resp. Auth.: Guyana Water Authority (GUYWA). 6 mECU. Raw water supply, treatment process, storage reservoirs, site work, transmission main, distribution main, T.A., supervision, evaluation. Date June 95. 7th EDF. EDF GUA 7003 A2b

HAITI

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Finances. 23 mECU. General Import Programme with negative list. Different T.A. with individual experts. Date June 95. 7th EDF. EDF HA 7200 A1c

JAMAICA

Credit scheme for micro and small enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex Institution and Coordination and Monitoring Unit. 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 5th, 6th and 7th EDF. EDF JM 5020 A4,A5

Institutional strengthening programme. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF JM 7005 A8a,b,c

Agricultural sector support programme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture - Rural and agriculture dev. Auth. (RADA). 5 mECU. More sustainable farming systems, soil conservation, reafforestation and community education. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF JM 7004 A3a

KENYA

Strengthening of STD and HIV/AIDS Programme in Nairobi and Mombasa. Special Treatment Clinic (STC) in Nairobi and the Ganjoni clinic at Mombasa. 1.577 mECU. Works, supply of equipment by int. tender, T.A. training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF KE 08000 A7b,c

Farming in tsetse infested areas. Estimated total cost 14.600 mECU. Refine the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and develop better technologies to prevent infections. Monitor the environmental impact of the techniques. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF KE 7011 A3a

Emergency Repair of Nairobi-Mombasa Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Horning (MoPW&H). 1.966 mECU. Works, by acc. tender. Supervision. *Project in execution. 7th EDF.* EDF KE 7010/001 A2d

Family Health Programme. Estimated total cost 28.710 mECU. Reproduction health status of Kenyans family planning services broadened. EDF 14.810 mECU, ODA (UK) 13.900mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF. EDF KE 7015 A7b

KIRIBATI

Airport development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. 1.200 mECU. Upgrading of airport operations and security in Tarawa, Kiritimati and Kanton atolls. Small scale building works and minor supplies with associated training and short-term expertise. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF KI 7005 A2d

LIBERIA

Rehabilitation Programme. Resp. Auth.: EC aid coordination office in Monrovia. 25 mECU. Essential repairs to water and power supply systems, restoration of basic health and school facilities, distribution of seeds and tools, improved access to isolated regions, assisting the re-integration of ex-combatants and returning refugees. Implementation by local NGOs and European NGOs. Project in execution. 6th

and 7th EDF.
EDF LBR 7001

A1c

MADAGASCAR

Kamolandy bridge reconstruction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MAG 6027

A2d

Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimate 72.500 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7004

A2d

Support programme to rehabilitate social and economic infrastructures. Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 17.500 mECU. Railways and road rehabilitation, small hydraulic works. Social infrastructure rehabilitation. Technical expertise study to be done for roads. Works, supplies, supervision and control, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7009

A2, A8

Bemaraha Project. 2nd phase. Resp. Auth.: Ministère d'Etat au Dév. Rural. 0.700 mECU. Training and awareness-raising for the protection of cultural and environmental wealth of the 'Tsingy de Bemaraha' region. Classified world property site by Unesco. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95. 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7020

A3a

First decentralized cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: National Authorising officer and Head of EU Delegation and authorized NGO's. 1.900 mECU. Works, purchase of equipment by direct agreement, restr. tender or int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAG 7022/000

A7,A8

MALAWI

Poverty alleviation programme-Pilot project Agroforestry. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development MOALD. 1 mECU. Sustainable land utilisation on catchment area level achieved and water supply and sanitation at household and village level improved. Equipment and T.A. T.A.: short-list done. Project in execution. 7th EDF
EDF MAI 5001/001

A3a

Poverty Alleviation Programme-Agroforestry component. Resp. Auth.: MOALD. Estimated total cost 47 mECU. EDF 22 mECU, local 2 mECU, counterpart funds from food aid 94 23 mECU. Water supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAI 5001/002

A3a

Structural Adjustment Programme 1995. Estimated cost 26.100 mECU. General Import programme. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF MAI 7200

A1c

Information, education and communication population programme. Resp. Auth.: NAO-Ministry for Women and Children's Affairs, Community and Social Services - Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Increase awareness and promote behaviour change as regards reproductive health, including disease prevention. Supply of

equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAI 6009/001

A7b,c

MALI

Support to develop rural credit. Resp. Auth.: Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole. BNDA. EDF part 1.910 mECU. T.A. and line of credit, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001/002

A5a

Better use of surface waters in the 5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: Gouvernorat de Mopti. EDF 4.300 mECU. Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, T.A., follow-up and evaluation, training, research. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6005/002

A3a

Support for the programme for the rehabilitation and maintenance of priority roads. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement et de Transport. Estimated cost 43.4 mECU. Rehabilitation and strengthening of 380 kms of bitumenised roads (Ségou-Koutiala-Burkina Border-Ouan-Sévaré) and strengthening of 180 kms of the Diéma-Didiéni road. Supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7004

A2d

Support for the decentralisation programme. Estimated cost 0.600 mECU. T.A., studies, communication campaigns, equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7009

A1b

Support for 'Crédit Initiative - S.A.' Resp. Auth.: Crédit Initiative S.A. under control of Ministère des Finances. Estimated cost 3 mECU. Credit to SME's, management, project studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6001/006

A4d,c-A5

Support for the Ministry of External Affairs. Resp. Auth.: Ordonnateur National. 0.300 mECU. Support for the ACP/EC cooperation unit and for the delegation for African integration. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 6007/001

A1c

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme 95-96. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Finances et du Commerce. 25 mECU. General Import Programme with negative list. T.A. foreseen. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7200

A1c

Support for HIV/AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé - Centre National de Transfusion Sanguine (CNTS). 1.410 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, T.A., training T.A.: CRTS Anger (F). Medical equipment, equipment procured by CRTS Anger (F). Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MLI 7015

A7b,c

MAURITANIA

Second Road Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 7.350 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Studies, auditing, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 6004-7004

A2d

National measures to support the Solar Regional Programme. Estimated cost 2.520 mECU. Infrastructural works (tanks, wells, pipes) and awareness-raising, training and follow-up for the recipient communities, works and T.A. Project on

appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 6116/001

A2a,ai,b

Aleg lake region economic development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de l'Environnement. 3 mECU. Irrigation in 2.000 ha. Works, studies, evaluation, T.A. 7th EDF. Date financing June 95.
EDF MAU 7014

A3

Support for farmers in Gorgol and Trarza regions. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Développement Rural et de l'Environnement. 1 mECU. Equipment, T.A. evaluation, follow-up. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU 7015

A3a

S.N.I.M. rehabilitation and rationalisation. Resp. Auth.: SNIM - Soc. Nat. Industr. et Minière. 58 mECU. Nouadhibou port dredging, supply of specialized equipment for mining. Works, supplies and T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF MAU-SYSMIN 9999

A4a

Institutional support for the rural and economic development of the Tagant region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dév. Rural et de l'Environnement. 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. **Project in execution. 7th EDF.**
EDF MAU 7007

A3a

MAURITIUS

National solid waste management project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Quality of Life. Estimate 8.650 mECU. EDF 7 mECU. Construction of a fully engineered landfill to cater for about 600 t of solid waste per day. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. for supervision and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 6017

A8b,c,f

AIDS programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.423 mECU. Prevention of sexual transmission, maintenance of safe blood supply, rationalisation of patient management. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF MAS 7004

A7b,c

MOZAMBIQUE

Socio-economic reintegration of young people. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7017

A8b

Supply of voting material. Estimated cost 13 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7004/001

A1c

Rehabilitation of the rural health system. Estimated cost 42 mECU. Rehabilitation and renovation of 7 rural hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of essential medicines and equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF MOZ 7018

A7a,e

NAMIBIA

Namibia Integrated Health Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastructures, equipment, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95. 7th EDF.
EDF NAM 7007

A7

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU,

local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, technical training and technical consultancies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7005 A6i

Rural Development Support Programme for the Northern Communal Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural extension service, training of extension officers and establishment of a rural credit system. Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7011 A3a

Rural towns sewerage schemes. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7015 A8c

Namibia Tourism Development Programme. (Foundation Phase). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Tourism. 1.882 mECU. Establishment of a Tourism Board and commercialisation of the Government resorts (Namibian Wildlife Resorts). Staff training. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NAM 7010 A5c

NIGER

Road infrastructures and telecommunications. 40 mECU. Rehabilitation of Tillabery-Ayorou (Tender launched), Fari-Tera and Say-Tapoa roads. For telecommunications: earth station in Arlit and administrative centre in Niamey. Works and supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7005 A2d, c

Integrated development programme in the sheep-farming zone. (Azaouak, Tadress and Nord-Dakoro). Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement, de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage, de la Santé Publique et de l'Éducation Nationale. 18 mECU. Rehabilitation works, wells, drilling, supply of equipment, T.A., training, evaluation and follow-up. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7012 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7200 A1c

Decentralized cooperation programme. Rural development and creation of private companies. 1.5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7013 A3,A5

Fishery development in the southern Zinder zone. Resp. Auth.: NGO under control of Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Professional sector organisation, strengthening of fish marketing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 7014 A3a

Environmental protection programme in the lower Tarka Valley. Estimated total cost 10 mECU. To stop ecological and economical destruction of the zone. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF NIR 6002/002 A3a

NIGERIA

Human resources development. Institutional support for community development and vocational training. Estimate 17 mECU. Supplies, T.A. training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7006 A6b,c,d

Basic health care programme. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Improve provision of primary health care. Preparation of Health Master Plans. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7010 A7b

Drugs demand reduction programme. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Improved health of young people. Reduction in drug usage. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7013 A7e

AIDS programme - Phase II. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Improved health care provision, to reduce incidence of AIDS. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7014 A7b,c

Regional Road Programme, Borno and Yobe States. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. Construction/rehabilitation of regional road linking Nigeria and Niger. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7002 A2d

Middle Belt rural water supply. Estimated total cost 15 mECU. Improve health and diet. Improve drinking water supply to rural communities. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 7012 A2b

Yobe State Rural Development Programme (NEAZDP II). Estimated total cost 16.5 mECU. Poverty alleviation. Increased rural supply of drinking water. Improved provision of health and education services. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF UNI 6002/001 A3a

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: National Dept. of Education (NDOE) and Commission for Higher Education (CHE). 15 mECU. Works: building renovation, university construction, rehabilitation works, works supervision, scholarships, training. Works for the university by int. tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 6008/7001 A6a,b

Environmental Monitoring of Mining. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of the Environment and Conservation. EDF 1.6 mECU. T.A. for 30 man/months and technical consultancies. Training. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 7001 A4a

E.U. Programme Management Unit in support of the National Authorising Officer (NAO). Estimated cost 1.200 mECU. T.A., training and auditing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 6001 A1c

ENB High School Emergency Upgrading Programme. 2 mECU. Enlargement of existing schools. Works by acc. tender. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF PNG 7004 A6a

SENEGAL

St-Louis regional development programme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of

credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training, studies. Health centres, clinics, medical equipment and consumables, training, information. T.A. to the Direction Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, sanitation. Environmental protection with wind-breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering scheme in Podor. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SE 6002/7002 A3a

Support for the economic development of the Ziguinchor region. 1.990 mECU. Line of credit for SME's and support for artisanal fisheries. Supply of equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SE 5024/7001 A3a

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme with negative list. 20.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. EDF SE 7200/002 A1c

SIERRA LEONE

Improvement of Freetown - Conakry road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SL 7004 A2d

Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 22.500 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's management capacity, support maintenance operations, rehabilitate 160 km of road, provide training and equipment to enable local private contractors to increase their role in road works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SL 7002 A2d

SOMALIA

Rehabilitation programme. 38 mECU. Project in execution. 6th EDF. EDF SO 6029

SURINAME

Rice research and breeding station. Resp. Auth.: Suriname National Rice Institute (SNRI). 3.215 mECU. Construction of research facility, laboratory, research, field equipment, office and transport equipment, T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. T.A. short-list done. Works by acc. tender, supplies by int. tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF SUR 60002 A3a

Tourism development programme. Resp. Auth.: Suriname Tourism Foundation. Estimated total cost 0.849 mECU. Institutional strengthening, statistics and research, product upgrading and development, tourism awareness programme, marketing and promotion, human resource development. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF SUR 7003 A5c

SWAZILAND

Technical Cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Swaziland (N.A.O.) 1.860 mECU. T.A. 12 person-years to selected agencies in the public and parastatal sectors. Project on appraisal. 7th

EDF.
EDF SW 7001 A1f

Science and Mathematics Advice and Regional Training (SMART). Resp. Auth.: The University of Swaziland - Training Dept. 0.720 mECU. Supply of equipment and materials by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF SW 6101/7 A6b

TANZANIA

Support for Aids Control in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4 mECU. To strengthen health and other support services. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 08000/000 (7001) A7c

Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 35 mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 km of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study ongoing. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 6021 A2d

Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. Works, pumping equipment, studies and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 5005(7) A2b

Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, treatment, storage and distribution. Works, equipment, design and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 7009 A2

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Phase III. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Tanzania. 30 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 7200/002 A1c

Assistance for the 1994-95 electoral process. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. Supply of voting material and equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 7017 A1c

Ruvuma-Mbeya Environmental Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Development Authorities. Estimate 10 mECU. Improvement of forest conservation and use. Supplies, T.A., studies, training, management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 7018 A3c

Support for coffee research. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 1.98 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment for the research centres, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 6001/002 A3a

Road rehabilitation and maintenance (Ruvuma and Iringa Regions). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated total cost 15 mECU. EDF 12 mECU, local 3 mECU. Road rehabilitation, support to regional and district engineers' offices, training of local contractors. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TA 7011 A2d

TOGO

Educational project AIDS/STD. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé.

0.625 mECU. Training, pedagogical equipment, supplies audit, T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF TO 7003 A7b,c

TONGA

Vava'u Airport Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Civil Aviation 2.130 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and training. Works by direct labour, supplies by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 5th and 6th EDF.
EDF TG 5003-6001 A2d

Upgrading Neiafu Harbour. Improved harbour access, wharf functions and mooring facilities. Estimated total cost 1.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TG 6002 A2d

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Training project for young farmers (AYTRAP). Assistance for the young farmers to create rural enterprises. Estimated cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF TR 7002 A3a

TUVALU

Outer Island Primary School Rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 0.300 mECU. To improve the physical state of the primary school facilities on the outer islands, Nukufetau and Vaitupu. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TV 7004 A6a

UGANDA

Smallholder Tea Development Programme. (STDP). Resp. Auth.: Uganda Tea Growers Corporation (UTGC). 20 mECU. Increase in the production and quality, management improvements, infrastructure development, institutional and financial sustainability, environment conservation and regional development. Works, supply of equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 6002/7002 A3a

Support to the Uganda Investment Authority. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.950 mECU. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7005 A5e

Road maintenance programme in the South West. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 22 mECU. Works, supplies and supervision. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7004 A2d

Animal water supply in Karamoja. To establish water retaining structures in selected strategic areas. 1.950 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7008 A2b

Support for Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. Resp. Auth.: UNDP. Estimated total cost 1.950 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF UG 7009 A1c

ZAIRE

Temporary assistance programme for health care (P.A.T.S.). Rehabilitation programme. Estimated cost 18.500 mECU. To ensure that the health-care

services that are still operating survive. Implementation by NGOs and local organizations. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZR 6029 A7a,b

ZAMBIA

Reorganisation and restructuring of the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Services. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife services. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7002 A3c,d

Rehabilitation of main runway at Lusaka International Airport. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport. Estimated cost 5 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG - ROR 7319 - ZA A2d

Feeder roads rehabilitation programme. 5 mECU. To rehabilitate rural feeder roads in the central and copperbelt provinces. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 6027 A2d

Editing and printing of geological maps. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines. 0.950 mECU. To produce 20 geological maps and 10 structural maps. To assist with training the Zambian geological survey department. T.A.: a full-time cartographer for 2 years and a geological map editor for 1 year. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 5029 A1g

Support for the development of the crafts sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Community Development and social services. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Training for technical skills and management provision of grants and loans for tools, materials, transport. Supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7004 A4d

Management training for the ministries of health and education. Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Health and Education. Estimated total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF 1 mECU, local 0.200 mECU. T.A. multi-sectoral: management/administration, planning, accounting-training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7003/001 A6/A7

Forestry management for sustainable woodfuel production in Zambia (along the railway line). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Training, supply of equipment, studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZA 7009 A3c

ZIMBABWE

OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe land use and health programme. Resp. Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the standard of living of rural populations. Conservation and improved utilisation of the wildlife resources, support to agriculture and improvement of social infrastructure. Road network, water, sanitation, building of a district hospital, equipment and supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 A3a

Support for the Faculty of Veterinary Science of the University of Zimbabwe. Resp. Auth.: Faculty of Veterinary Science. 9.1 mECU. Supply of vehicles and equipment. T.A., University link, fellowships, scholarships. For Zimbabwe

and SADC region. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 5004/7001 A6b

Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. Auth.: Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. EDF 1.500 mECU. Increase of wildlife population, particularly of endangered species: black and white rhino — tourism development, works, supplies, T.A., training and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF ZIM 6018 A5c, A8f

Gokwe north and south rural water supply and sanitation project. 6.100 mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-points, new domestic water-points, latrines, maintenance, health education, T.A., training, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ZIM 7001 A2b

Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT)

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES

Support for the Public Library in Curaçao. Resp. Auth.: Public Library Curaçao. 0.650 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, training. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF NEA 7003 A6g

ARUBA

T.A. for managerial training. EDF 1.900 mECU. A training unit will train private and public executives and will advise companies on demand. Supplies T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF ARU 6006 A6b

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES — ARUBA

Tourism development programme. Estimated total cost 6-6.5 mECU. EDF 4-5 mECU, local 0.100 mECU, local private sector 1.400 mECU. Training, T.A., marketing in Europe. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7835 A5c

NEW CALEDONIA

Construction of a vocational training centre for apprentices. Estimated total cost 2.95 mECU. EDF part 0.830 mECU. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF NC 7002 A6d

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

Water and sewerage in Providenciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 3.700 mECU. Water supply works and pipes. T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF TC 7001 A8b,c

ST. HELENA

Wharf improvement project. Resp. Auth.: Public Works + Service. Department. Estimated total cost 1.743 mECU. To increase the safety and efficiency of James-town Port by upgrading wharf facilities for passenger and cargo handling. Works, supplies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF SH 7001 A2d

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Holo-Fakatoï Road in Wallis (RT2). EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF
EDF WF 7001 A2d

Construction of territorial road n° 1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and rehabilitation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF WF 7003 A2d

Regional Projects

BENIN — BURKINA — NIGER

Regional project for the management of the 'W' national park and adjoining game reserves. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. To establish three management units, 10 bridges and 20 observation posts with their equipment. Building and rehabilitation of administrative, technical and social buildings, tracks and bridges. T.A., training and studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 6122 A5i, A8f

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU. Widening of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project on appraisal. 5th EDF.
EDF REG 5311 (7) A6b

PALOP COUNTRIES — ANGOLA — MOZAMBIQUE — GUINEA BISSAU — SAO TOMÉ & PRINCIPE — CAPE VERDE

Bibliographic Fund. Resp. Auth.: Bibliographic Fund-Maputo. 2.500 mECU. Development of human resources. Editing, circulation, reading promotion. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7901/008 A6g,i

CAMEROON — CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics (Cameroon). Rehabilitation and improvement of transport infrastructures between Douala and Bangui. Estimated total cost 50 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th and 7th EDF.
EDF REG — CM — CA — 7002/001 A2d

MALI — GUINEA

Flood forecast and control, hydrological simulation for the Niger upper basin. Estimated total cost 6 mECU EDF 5.175 mECU, France (foreseen) 0.375 mECU, Denmark (foreseen) 0.150 mECU, Mali-Guinea (foreseen) 0.300 mECU. Flood forecast system, hydrological model of local simulation with parametric regionalisation. Warming system via telecommunication and satellite teletransmission. Statistical studies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 6181 A8f,A8g

CENTRAL AFRICA

CIESPAC — Public Health Education Centre in Central Africa. 1.980 mECU. Student accommodation, equipment, scholar-

ships, T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7205 A6b

ECOFAC II - Forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. République du Congo. Estimated total cost 12.500 mECU. To develop national and regional capacities for good management of forest resources. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 6203/001 A3c

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF I.O.C. — INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION COMORES — MADAGASCAR — MAURITIUS — SEYCHELLES

Technical cooperation framework programme. 1.800 mECU. T.A., auditing and evaluation, equipment, training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7501 A1b

Integrated Regional Programme for Trade Development. (PRIDE). Resp. Auth.: I.O.C. Secrétariat. EDF 9.3 mECU. Equipment. T.A., training, management. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7503 A5

BURUNDI — RWANDA — TANZANIA — UGANDA — ZAIRE — KENYA

Northern Corridor-Rwanda. Rehabilitation of the road Kigali-Butare-Burundi border. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 8 mECU. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF.
EDF REG 6310 (RW....) A2d

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF CBI

Support for the Technical Working Groups and Policy Implementation Committees under the Initiative to facilitate Cross-Border Trade, Investment and Payments in Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (CBI). To improve regional economic coherence in the areas of trade, investment and macro-economic policies. 2 mECU. T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 70012/001 A5c

Standardization and quality assurance. Resp. Auth.: COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). Estimated total cost 2.543 mECU. To develop harmonized standardization and quality control practices. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7321 A5e

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS

Guarantee Fund for Private Investments — Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO — Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to cover partially credit risks given by banks to the private sector. Total estimated cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU — Others: France, Germany, E.I.B., Commercial Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF.
EDF REG 7115 A5

Consumer price index in the UEMOA countries. Resp. Auth.: EUROSTAT & EUROSTAT 1.620 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF.
EDF REG/ROC/7106/001 A1c

**BURKINA FASO – CAPE VERDE –
GAMBIA – MALI – MAURITANIA –
NIGER – SENEGAL – CHAD**

Regional environmental training and information programme. Resp. Auth.: Institut du Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. T.A. training, supply of equipment. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6147/001 A6/A8

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A.

Regional integration in East and Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. Estimated cost 1,500 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7316 A1b

PACIFIC ACP STATES

Pacific regional agricultural programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement and dissemination of selected crops, agricultural information and techniques to farmers. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6704/001 A3a

Cyclone Warning System Upgrade. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Project coordinator at the Tropical Cyclone Warning Centre in Nadi-Fiji: 1.950 mECU. Supply of specialized equipment, T.A., training evaluation. *Project in execution. 7th EDF.* EDF REG 7709 A8g

SADC

SADC Regional Customs Training Programme. Long-term. T.A. to the Botswana, Lesotho, Namibian and Swaziland customs services. Training and equipment. 1.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5412/7 A1b

SADC Language Training Programme. Resp. Auth.: Institute of Languages in Maputo as Regional Project Coordinator (RPC). 2 mECU. English language training and Portuguese language training. Monitoring-evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6415/6430/6433/7 A6

Regional training programme for food security. Resp. Auth.: Food Security Technical and Administrative Unit (FSTAU) in Harare. 5 mECU. Training and T.A. Supply of equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6420/7 A6ci

S.I.M.S.E.C. – SADC Initiative for Mathematics and Science Education Cooperation. To establish a professional unit, called SIMSEC Unit for information exchange, teacher training curriculum development, staff development, research cooperation and support for teachers' organisations. Project on appraisal. 5 mECU. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6428 A6b

Wildlife Management Training Project. Resp. Auth.: SADC Sector for Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife. 8 mECU. Staff training, equipment and teaching materials, long-term T.A. evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6408/002 A3e, A6b, A8f

SADC – MOZAMBIQUE

Beira port dredging contract. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction and Water. 15 mECU. Dredging for two years of the access channel to the port of Beira. Works: 2 years, 4 million m³/year. Supervision and training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7401 A2d

**BENIN – COTE D'IVOIRE –
GHANA – GUINEA – GUINEA
BISSAU – TOGO**

Regional programme to increase awareness in western coastal African countries of natural resources protection. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement-Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Priorities: fight against bush fires and deforestation and for soil protection. Project on appraisal. 6th EDF. EDF REG 6113 A3e

KENYA – UGANDA – TANZANIA

Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in Jinja-Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research Institute. EDF part 8.400 mECU. T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and evaluation. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 5316/001 A3d

CARIBBEAN REGION

Regional Tourism Sector Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 12.8 mECU. Marketing, Promotion, Education, Training, research and statistics, product development and protection of cultural heritage. Works, equipment and T.A. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7601/001 A5c

Regional Trade Sector Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 14 mECU. Access of Caribbean firms to identified markets, strengthen the competitiveness of export oriented firms, improve the availability of trade information and support institutional development. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date financing June 95. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7601/002 A5d,e

Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC) – Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Registrar of CXC in Barbados. 2.500 mECU. T.A., external consultancies, equipment. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7603 A6a

University level programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at masters degree level in development economics, business administration, public administration, agricultural diversification, natural resources, management and architecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., scholarships. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7604 A6b

Caribbean Postal Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. and other action necessary for the creation of the Caribbean Postal Union. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605 A2c

Caribbean Telecommunication Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation on Telecommunication within the Cariforum member states. Project on appraisal. 7th

EDF. EDF REG 7605/001 A2c

Regional Airports Project. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 2 mECU. Upgrading of equipment and improvement of training of staff. Improved safety and air navigation standards in two airports in Suriname and one in Guyana. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7605/002 A2d

Caribbean Regional agriculture and fisheries development programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 22.2 mECU. Creation of an agricultural credit revolving fund, research and training activities to support commercial opportunities, establishment of an information network and subprogrammes in the fisheries, livestock and rice subsectors. Supply of equipment, T.A. and programme management short studies. Credit Fund. Project in execution. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7606 A3a

Education policy and dialogue. Resp. Auth.: Cariforum S.G.. 0.450 mECU. T.A. for regional common policies in three education areas: basic education, technical and vocational training, language teaching. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7607 A6a,d

Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 1.500 mECU. Promote cultural identity and foster mutual knowledge of the rich cultural panorama. Restoration of buildings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic fields and management. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7610 A8i

Tertiary level programme. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level education and teacher training. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 6628/001 A6b

Cariforum Regional Environment Programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. Estimated total cost 11 mECU. Environmental management action, programme for protected areas and community development, management and expansion of marine and coastal park and protected areas. Terrestrial parks. Project on appraisal. 7th EDF. EDF REG 7613 A8f

**MEDITERRANEAN
COUNTRIES**

ALGERIA

Structural Adjustment Support Programme. Sectoral Import Programme for building materials to finish 100,000 social housing units. 70 mECU. hard currency allowance to cover CIF imports. Management by Crédit Populaire d'Algérie (C.P.A.). Special accounts in the Central Bank. Banque d'Algérie (B.A.). Purchase by a positive list (electrical equipment – spare parts). 1st int. tender launched. Project in execution. SEM AL 688-92 A1c

Support for the Algerian rural sector. 30 mECU. Project in execution. SEM AL A3a

EGYPT

Private Sector Development Programme. PSDP. 25 mECU. Improvement

of performance of private companies in domestic, regional and international markets. Business support programme. Information, T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 898/94 A5

Veterinary Services Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MDALR). 20 mECU. Line of credit training, T.A., equipment. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 932/94 A3a

Upper Gulf of Aqaba Oil Spill Contingency Project. Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA), Ministry of Environment for Israel and Aqaba Ports Authority for Jordan with a representative from the EC. EC 2.900 mECU, Egypt 0.200 mECU. Procurement of the equipment, development of local infrastructure, training and T.A. Project in execution.
SEM EGT 1171/94 A8f

Gulf of Aqaba Protectorates Development Programme (GAPDP). Resp. Auth.: Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA). Estimated total cost 12 mECU. EC contribution 10 mECU, local 2 mECU. T.A. to the EEAA Division for natural sites protection. Supply of equipment, T.A. for a specific training programme: natural sites protection. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 95.
SEM EGT 537/95 A8f

JORDAN

Support for Structural Adjustment. Phase III. Hard currency allowance with negative list. 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM JO 279/95 A1c

MALTA

Strengthening educational and economic relations with the Community. 1.7 mECU. Scholarships and traineeships, establishment of a Euro-Information Centre, integrated marketing programmes and tourism promotion. Different T.A. and purchase of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM MAT 91/431 A5c, d

MOROCCO

Support for Mother and Child Care. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé Publique. 9 mECU. Works by int. tender, studies, T.A., evaluation. Supply of equipment. Project in execution.
SEM MOR 930/94 A7b

Private sector development programme. 30 mECU. Provision of consultancy and training services to private enterprises delivered through a business centre in Casablanca 'Euro-Maroc Enterprise' staffed by expatriate and local consultants. A small office will also be established in Tangiers. Credit line for small enterprise creation in north Morocco. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95. 7th EDF.
SEM MOR 299/95 A4/A5

SYRIA

Banking Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Syrian Central Bank (SCB) and the Commercial Bank of Syria (CB). 4.5 mECU. Supply of T.A., computer

equipment, training monitoring and evaluation. Major equipment by int. tender. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 899/94 A1

Demographic sector programme in Syria. 2 mECU. Provision of quality Mother and Child Health/Family Planning services, population and housing census, strengthening civil registration system. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 890/94 A7c

Private Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Syrian-European Business Centre. 7 mECU. To improve the performance of indigenous business in local, regional and international markets. Establishment of the SEBC. T.A., monitoring, evaluation and audit. Project in execution.
SEM SYR 1189/94 A5d,e

TUNISIA

Support for Structural Adjustment Programme. Hard currency allowance with negative list. Management Central Bank of Tunisia. 20 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 95.
SEM TUN 518/95 A1c

Private Sector Development Programme. 20 mECU. Creation of Euro-Tunisie Entreprise. External consultant will be appointed as Euro-Tunisie Entreprise director. Aid programme for firms, institutional development, investment/trade promotion, consultancy, training, joint ventures. Followups, evaluation and financial control. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 95.
SEM TUN 526/95 A1/A5

TURKEY

Programme to broaden relations between EC and Turkey. EC contribution 3.6 mECU. Scholarships, supply of equipment for the Universities of Ankara and Marmara. Training centre and language laboratory in Marmara. Establishment of a Euro-Turkish 'Business Council'. Project in execution.
SEM TU A6b

WEST BANK AND GAZA OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Gaza City solid waste disposal - completion. Resp. Auth.: Municipality of Gaza City. EC contribution 5 mECU. Provision of technical services and supply of rolling stock and equipment. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
SEM OT/95/02 A8b,c,f

Programme of institutional capacity-building for the Palestinian Authority. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Authority with the European Commission Representative to the Occupied Territories and the European Commission T.A. Office. EC contribution 2.500 mECU. Provision of assistance to seven Ministries. T.A., supply of equipment training. Project in execution.
SEM OT/95/03 A1c

Municipal Support Programme, Gaza and West Bank. EC Contribution 25 mECU (Budget 95: 10 mECU - Budget 96: 15 mECU) Municipal infrastructure rehabilitation and expansion within the road, water supply, building and sewage sectors. Supply

of equipment for infrastructure maintenance and solid waste management. Municipalities: Rafah, Khan Younis, Gaza, Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus and Jenin. T.A. will include full-time secondment in 95/96 and half time in 97 of municipal engineers with a project manager and short-term specialist input. Works by acc. tender. T.A.: short lists to be done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM OT 95/96 - 300/95 A1c

Gaza Hospital. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. To meet the final completion date of January 96, further financing is urgently required. This financing will cover the execution of the utility connections, the remaining construction works, the provision of the main medical equipment and T.A. for the initial operation. Operation initially by UNRWA. Expatriate T.A.: short list to be done. Medical equipment by int. tender. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM OT 302/95 A7a

Private Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Palestinian Business Services Centre (PBSC) in Ramallah. EC contribution 6 mECU (1995 Budget 3 mECU - 1996 Budget 3 mECU). Programme of consulting information and training services. Consulting services by EC consultants. T.A.: short lists to be done. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM OT 95/96-342/95 A4,A5

EGYPT - PALESTINE - JORDAN - ISRAEL

Middle East Peace Projects. 33 mECU (Budget 95: 13 mECU, Budget 96: 20 mECU). Planning and consulting support measures for major regional investments: water infrastructure projects on the Jordan and Yarmouk, development of Gulf of Aqaba area, transport infrastructure and the interconnection of electricity grids, integrated economic development of Gaza, Sinai and parts of Israel. Regional veterinary cooperation and the establishment of an integrated water data system. Feasibility studies, detailed plans, engineering designs. T.A. by restricted tender or direct agreement. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing May 95.
SEM REG 95-96/298-95 A9a,b

MED-CAMPUS

Multiannual support programme for development cooperation actions between European universities and higher education institutes those from Mediterranean non-Community countries. EC contribution for 96-98 35 mECU. Training courses for managers, university teaching staff and post-graduates in MNC. Practical training in EC and MNC. Applied research. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing July 95.
SEM REG 521/95 A6b,c

A.L.A.
developing
countries
ASIA and LATIN
AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Integrated development Ramon Lista. EC contribution 5.500 mECU. T.A. Support for indigenous populations. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95.
ALA ARG B7-3010/94/152 A3a

BANGLADESH

New Options for Pest Management (NOPEST). Resp. Auth.: CARE Bangladesh 6 mECU. To motivate and assist 32,000 farmers in rice growing areas of Mymensingh and Comilla districts. Training, equipment, T.A. by CARE, monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution.
ALA BD 9431 A3a

PROMOTE* Female Teachers in Secondary Schools. (*Programme to Motivate, Train and Employ). 36 mECU. Date financing June 95.
ALA BD 95/7 A6a

BOLIVIA

Ministry of Development and Environment. T.A. to support the execution of programmes. 1 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/42 A3a

Rural development in the Mitzque and Tiraque valleys. 16.410 mECU. Different, T.A. for bridges, canals, improvement of cultivated soils. Date financing May 95.
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/49 A3a

Support for export promotion. 0.980 mECU. T.A. and training for 30 Bolivians trade representatives. Establishment of 2 trade promotion offices in Europe. Information data system. Project in execution.
ALA BOL B7-3010/94/52 A5d

Support for artisanal fisheries and aquaculture. T.A. to improve know-how. 4 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd quarter 95.
ALA BOL B7-3010-94/53 A3a

Job promotion. 3 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA BOL B7-3010/95/25 A5

Seeds integrated development project. 5 mECU. Increase of the national productivity by improvement of seed quality. Project on appraisal.
ALA BOL B7-3010/95/070 A3a

BRAZIL

Cooperation for quality improvements in the industrial sector. EC contribution 0.400 mECU. T.A. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal.
ALA BRA B7-3011-94/65 A4g

Action group for telecommunications. Studies, seminars. Short-lists to be done. 0.570 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 95.
ALA BRA/B7-3010/95/125 A2c

Support for underprivileged populations in Rio and Sao Paulo regions. 10 mECU. Housing, health, education, training, support for micro-enterprises. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November-December 95.
ALA BRA/B7-3010/95/115 A8c

CAMBODIA

Support for the agricultural sector and primary education. EC contribution

49.800 mECU. Supply of equipment, different T.A. studies. Project on appraisal.
ALA CAM 94/14 A3a

CHILE

Study to create a technological centre in Santiago. 0.500 mECU. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal.
ALA CHI B7-3011-94/172 A6b

COLOMBIA

Basic social services in Ciudad Bolivar. 8 mECU T.A. to the local services. Training. Project in execution.
ALA COL B7-3010/94/101 A8b

Support for the creation of basic technological enterprises. 0.900 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal.
ALA COL B7-3011/94/41 A5c

ECUADOR

Rehabilitation of the Paute zone. 12 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. Project in execution.
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/44 A3a

Environmental impact of oil exploitation in the Amazone region. 7.313 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/130 A8f

Ministry of External Relations modernization. 0.400 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal.
ALA ECU B7-3011/94/161 A1c

Improvement of crop production and use of phyto-genetics products. 0.995 mECU. Training research promotion, T.A. Project in execution.
ALA ECU B7-3010/94/103 A3a

EL SALVADOR

Health and basic health programme in the western region. EC participation 10 mECU. Drinking water, sanitation, health centres, infrastructures, training, T.A. Project in execution.
ALA ELS B7-3010/93/91 A7c

Training in the geothermic energy sector. 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution.
ELS B7-3011/94/36 A2a

Support for the Informal Sector. Phase II. EC contribution 7 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA ELS B7-3010/94/83 A5e

Support for agricultural reform. 0.975 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA ELS B7-3010/95/06 A3a

Institutional support for the national academy of public security. 0.950 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. Short-list to be done.
ALA ELS B7-5076/94/194 A1c

Support for the productive process in the San Vicente department. 13 mECU. T.A., line of credit, integration of ex-servicemen. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September-October 95.
ALA SLV/B7-3010/95/88 A9b

GUATEMALA

Programme to help street children in Guatemala City. EC contribution 2.5 mECU. T.A. and training. Short-list to be

done. Project in execution.
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/109 A8e

Support for the informal sector. 7.500 mECU. T.A. training, line of credit. Project in execution.
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/47 A5

Rural development programme in the Totonicapan Department. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution.
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/81 A3a

Rural Development in Baja Verapaz. EC contribution 8 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution.
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/89 A3a

Rural Development in Alta Verapaz. EC contribution 7 mECU. Works, supplies, line of credit, T.A. Project in execution.
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/90 A3a

Export strengthening towards European Union. 0.500 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal.
ALA GUA B7-3011/94/01 A5d,e

Episcopal Conference and Broadcasting Institute. 0.890 mECU. Training and T.A. Project in execution.
ALA GUA B7-3010/94/95 A5g,A6

Self-sustained development programme in the Atitlan Lake valley. Phase II. 8.800 mECU. T.A., support to small-farmers, handicraft and environment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing October 95.
ALA GTM/B7-3010/95/85 A3a

HONDURAS

Programme to help street children. EC contribution 0.600 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal.
ALA HON B7-3010/94/118 A8e

Programme to support SME's and farmers in the Olancho area (PRO-LANCHO). Resp. Auth.: National Planning Ministry (SECPLAN). EC contribution 9.860 mECU. Supply of equipment by int. tender, T.A., monitoring. Project in execution.
ALA HON B7-3010/94/124 A3a

National Centre for Market and Trade Promotion. 0.900 mECU. T.A., studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95.
ALA HND/B7-3011/95/077 A5e

Support for vocational training. 5 mECU. T.A. to improve technical training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 96.
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/79 A6d

T.A. to promote specific projects for electricity production. 0.700 mECU. T.A. for management. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end 95.
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/80

T.A. to develop the institutional programme for a legal framework and energy saving. 0.500 mECU. To develop a specific programme for efficiency and energy saving. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 95.
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/81 A2ai

Support for production in the Copan and Sta Barbara zones. 7 mECU. T.A. for production, line of credit, local management and organization. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 96.
ALA HND/B7-3010/95/116 A3a

INDIA

Transfer of Technologies for Sustainable Development (BAIF). Resp. Auth.: NABARD — National Bank for Agricultural and rural Development. Project management BAIF (Indian NGO) EC contribution 19.5 mECU. Wasteland development, Wadi programme, sericulture, cattle development, T.A., training, monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. ALA IN 94/32 A3a

Saline Land Reclamation in Maharashtra. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Irrigation Department's Khar Lands Development Circle (KLDC) EC contribution 15.5 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. ALA IN 94/27 A3a

INDONESIA

EC-Indonesian Forest Sector Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning — Ministry of Forestry. EC contribution 25.882 mECU. Forest Inventory and monitoring, T.A. for detailed forest survey and mapping, training. Integrated Radio Communication Systems: T.A. for installation and training. Short-lists done. Project in execution. ALA IND 9242 A3c

EC-Indonesian Forest Programme: Forest Fire Prevention and control in South Sumatra. Resp. Auth.: Directorate General for Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning Ministry of Forestry. EC contribution 4.050 mECU. T.A. for establishment of fire prevention analysis and procedures, 3 pilot projects for fire management units and equipment. Short-list done. Project in execution. ALA IND 9212 A3c

Gunung Leuser development programme. Resp. Auth.: Indonesian Planning Ministry-BAPPENAS. EC contribution 32.5 mECU. Works, infrastructures, supply of equipment, T.A. training, monitoring evaluation. Project in execution. ALA IND 94/26 A3a

LAOS

Micro-projects in Luang Prabang. Phase 2. 12.800 mECU. Date financing June 95. ALA LAO 95/8 A3a

MEXICO

Improving living conditions for children and young people. 0.800 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. ALA MEX B7-3010/95/23 A8c

NICARAGUA

TROPISEC — Development of small rural production in the dry tropical zone. EC contribution 7 mECU works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-3010/93/144 A3a

Urban water supply and sewerage. Resp. Auth.: Instituto Nicaragüense de Acueductos y Alcantarillados (INAA). EC contribution 11 mECU. Three drinking water supply projects in Chichigalpa, Masatepe — two towns in the Pacific region and Camoapa. Two sewerage networks plus provisional basic drainage in the towns of El

Viejo and Jinotepe. Works, equipment, T.A. monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-3010/94/123 A2b

Roads and bridges rehabilitation. 2.6 mECU. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-3010/94/123 A2d

Roads rehabilitation. 4 mECU. Project in execution. ALA NIC B7-5076/94/144 A2d

Support for underprivileged children. 0.857 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA NIC B7-3010/94/167 A8c

Housing construction in Managua. 9 mECU. Works, supervision, equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 95. ALA NIC/B7-3010/95/90 A8a

Support for vocational training. 5.200 mECU. To improve technician and teacher training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 95. ALA NIC/B7-3010/95/109 A6c

PAKISTAN

Post-flood rehabilitation and protection project. 20.5 mECU. T.A., road works, dam construction. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. ALA PK 94/04 A8g

Palas conservation and development project. 4.800 mECU. Date financing June 95. ALA PK 95/05 A3a

PANAMA

Support for rural SME's in the central region. 5 mECU. Supply of T.A. and line of credit. Project in execution. ALA PAN B7-3010/94/137 A3a

PARAGUAY

Durable development of the Paraguayan Chaco (protection of the indigenous zones and ecosystem). EC contribution 14.800 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. ALA PAR 93/40 A3a

PERU

Support for export promotion. EC contribution 3.774 mECU. T.A. Short-list done. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/93/175 A5d

Colca valley development programme. EC contribution 5 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA PER B7-3010/94/33 A3a

Women in rural situations. EC contribution 5 mECU. Piura and Ayacucho regions. Improvement of the women's conditions. Social services. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/94/106 A3a

Vocational training programme. 9 mECU. T.A. training technical qualifications for non qualified young people. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/94/55 A6d

Street children. 7 mECU. Project in execution. ALA PER B7-3010/94/127 A8c

Framework programme for vocational, technological and pedago-

gical training. 7 mECU. To improve secondary education quality and support teacher training. Project on appraisal. ALA PER/B7-3011/95/004 A6c

Sustainable development of the Manu National Park and Biosphere Reserve. 6.600 mECU. Project on appraisal. ALA PER/B7-5041/95/128 A8f

PHILIPPINES

Rural integrated development programme in the Aurore zone. EC contribution 13 mECU. Works, supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. ALA PHI 9326 A3a

Tropical forest protection in Palawan. EC contribution 17 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. ALA PHI 9337 A3a

Partnership for Women's Health and Safe Motherhood (P-WHSM). 17 mECU. Date financing June 95. ALA PHI 95/4 A7b,c

URUGUAY

Integrated development programme for rural communities. 5.150 mECU. T.A. and housing construction for poor families. Project in execution. ALA URU B7-3010/94/39 A3a

Cooperation Programme for Aromatic Plants and Essential Oils. 1 mECU. T.A. for production development, industrialisation and commercialization. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing October 95. ALA URY/B7-3011/95/72 A3a

VENEZUELA

Support for the establishment of the National Centre for Energy and Environment. EC contribution 1 mECU. T.A., local services, training, seminars. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal. ALA VEN B7-3011/94/15 A2a,A8f

Social Structural Adjustment in Venezuela. Resp. Auth.: The Foundation set up to oversee the Experimental Vocational Training Centre. Estimated total cost 12.2 mECU. EC contribution 5.3 mECU, Provincial Government of Guipuzcoa (Spain) 0.959 mECU, local 5.941 mECU. EC contribution. Equipment and furniture by int. tender. T.A. Project in execution. ALA VEN B7-3011/94/112 A6d

PETARE PROJECT — Fight against drugs. 0.998 mECU. Project in execution. ALA VEN B7-5080/94/113 A8c

B.I.C. Barquisimeto. 0.500 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. ALA VEN B7-3011/94/99 A5d

Support for the Health Sector. 9 mECU. Improvement of the health systems, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 95. ALA VEN/B7-3010/95/56 A7e

Articulation and development of social economy. 8 mECU. T.A. training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing November 95. ALA VEN/B7-3010/95/57 A5f

VIETNAM

T.A. programme for transition to market economy. EC contribution 16 mECU. Project in execution.
ALA VIE 9336 A1b

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Cooperation programme with European Union towns, regions and local collectivities. 4 mECU. T.A., training. Project on appraisal.
ALA AML/B7-3010/94/168 A5

Fight against cancer. 10 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALR B7-3010/95/03 A7

B.I.D. Special fund for small production projects. 15 mECU. T.A. in the framework of B.I.D. activities. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 95.
ALA AML/B7-3010/95/113 A5b

ALURE: Optimum use of energy resources. 7 mECU. Support Unit-financing of action to modernize institutions and specialized companies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 95.
ALA ALR/B7-3011/95/42 A2a,i

AL-INVEST - Consolidation phase. 41 mECU. Liberalization of the economic

structures and market integration. (Commercial exchanges promotion, technology transfer, direct investments, joint-ventures). Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing October 95.
ALA AML/B7-3011/95/138 A5e

Special Funds for European T.A. in Latin American countries. 4 mECU. T.A. in the framework of B.I.D. activities. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing September 95.
ALA AML/B7-3010/95/114 A5b

ANDEAN PACT

Programme to eradicate foot and mouth disease. EC contribution 1.800 mECU. Project on appraisal.
ALA PAN B7-3010/94/63 A3a

T.A. programme for customs. 5 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st quarter 1995.
ALA-AND B7-3011/94/163 A1b

Support for the Tribunal A. de Cartagena. 0.617 mECU T.A. Project in execution.
ALA REG AAN B7-3011/94/51 A8b

CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES

EUROTRACE. 0.500 mECU. Computerized system and data bank for external trade and commerce. Project in execution.
ALA REG AMC B7-3011/94/151 A5c

Sustainable development programme in rural border zone. 11.160 mECU. Regional programme to exchange experiences in sustainable development, project promotion. T.A. monitoring supply of equipment. Project on appraisal.
ALA REG AMC B7-5041/1/94/17 A3a

Development aid to the indigenous populations in Central America. EC contribution 7.500 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution.
ALA REG ACR/B7-3010/93/172 A3a

SOUTHERN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Pilcomayo River. 0.850 mECU. Study. Short-list to be done. Project on appraisal.
ALA REG AMS B7-3010/94/147 A2d

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Géopolitique des Petites Antilles — Influences européenne et nord-américaine

(The Geopolitics of the Lesser Antilles — European and North American influences)

By François Taglioni. Editions Karthala. Collection Hommes et Sociétés, 22-24, boulevard Arago — F-75013 Paris. 1995. 312 p., 160 FF. ISBN 2-86537-568-4.

The author is a Doctor of Geography who has taught the geopolitics of the Lesser Antilles — a geographical area which has not been greatly studied — at the University of Paris X-Nanterre. Although they vary in some respects, the geopolitical situations of these islands have a large number of similarities. These include the constraints of insularity and the consequences of being an economic, political and human patchwork with structures inherited from the past. These factors help to keep the territories in question in a state of dependence, limiting their opportunities for development. This work adopts a comparative approach and seeks to determine the room for manoeuvre which the Lesser Antilles have with regard to the geopolitical blocs of Europe and North America.

Organisations Economiques Mondiales — 2ème édition

(International Economic Organizations — second edition)

By Jacques Fontanel. Editions Masson. Collection Droit — Sciences économiques. (120, boulevard Saint-Germain, F-75280 Paris). 1995. 186 p. ISBN 2-225-84690-1.

The author is an expert attached to several international organisations and director of a research centre at the Pierre Mendès France university in Grenoble where he teaches. In this work he introduces the large number of international organisations which have proliferated in our century, and in particular the little known ones of the developing countries. These are the bodies that organise production and international exchanges, define the international system of payments and development financing, set up consultative, cooperative and integrative structures and initiate permanent discussions which reduce the sources of conflict between states.

Balance sheet and outlook for industrial development in the ACP countries — Eighteenth

annual meeting of the ACP-EU economic and social partners.

Economic and Social Committee of the European Community (2, rue Ravenstein — B-1000 Brussels). 1994. 130 p. Catalogue no CES-95-005-FR.

In addition to the action announced at the inaugural session of the 1994 meeting of the ACP-EU economic and social partners, this publication also contains documents for discussion purposes submitted by the ACP and the Economic and Social Committee and the final declaration which includes the recommendations made after the work had been completed.

L'Entrée en vie féconde — Expression démographique des mutations socio-économiques d'un milieu rural sénégalais

(Reaching child-bearing age — the demographic effects of socio-economic changes in a rural Senegalese environment)

By Valérie Delaunay. Editions Ceped (Centre français sur la Population et le Développement). Les Etudes du Ceped no 7, 15, rue de l'Ecole de Médecine, F-75270 Paris. 1994. 326 p. 90 FF. ISBN 2-87762-068-9.

The author, a Doctor of Demographics, conducted her research into changes in the matrimonial system in response to sex before marriage in a rural Senegalese environment under the auspices of the Niakhar population observatory in Senegal. She takes stock of changes in the social and economic context of this environment resulting from the agricultural crisis (lower rainfall, lower international commodity prices, over-exploitation of the land) which resulted in more widespread seasonal migration to the towns. This is something which mainly affects young people, and young women in particular.

Moving to the Market: The World Bank in Transition

By Richard W. Richardson and Jonas H. Haralz. Overseas Development Council, 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 1012, Washington DC 20009 USA. 1995. 96 p. \$ 9.95. ISBN 1-56517-023-7.

This book looks at the changes taking place in the sphere of development at a time when the private sector is becoming the most favoured engine of economic development. Over the past few years, the World Bank has been asked by member governments to reconsider its role in private sector development. This

essay reviews the initiatives taken in this area by the IBRD and the IFC (International Finance Corporation) and makes recommendations for the future.

Countrysides at risk: The political geography of sustainable agriculture

By Robert L. Paarlberg. Overseas Development Council, 1875 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 1012, Washington DC 20009, USA. 1994. 99 p. \$ 9.95. ISBN 1-56517-021-0.

This work reviews agricultural practices in Asia, Africa and Latin America, regions which have food supply problems which are already acute and are rapidly becoming more so. Almost 700 million people do not have sufficient food to permit normal growth in these three continents. How then can sufficient food be produced without leading to further deterioration of the environment? The essay suggests several courses of action to be taken by the international community by way of aid.

Multinational Development Banks — An Assessment of their Financial Structures, Policies and Practices

By Percy S. Mistry. Fondad (Forum on Debt and Development), Noordeinde 107 A, 2514 GE The Hague, Netherlands. 1995. 284 p. HFL 47.50 or \$25.00. ISBN 90-74208-05-3.

As its title indicates, this work evaluates the financial structures, policies and practices of the multilateral development banks and tries to make them accessible to those who are not financial specialists.

World Credit Tables — Creditor-debtor relations from another perspective

Eurodad, 10 square Ambiorix, B-1040 Brussels. 1994-95. 237 p. US\$ 25. ISBN 90-802408-1-8.

The main aim of this work is to review the financial profiles of the countries to which the Southern states are in debt, and the 'creditor-debtor' statistics which are never available in the official publications of governments and international financial organisations. It also contains an analysis of the 'debt strategy' and an evaluation of financial flows to Southern countries. ■

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