

the **Courier**

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union



Country reports

Somalia

Antigua and Barbuda

Dossier

The future of ACP-EU relations





DOSSIER

Green Paper on the future of ACP-EU relations

The world has changed a great deal since the Fourth Lomé Convention was signed in 1989. The old superpower rivalry has gone, the state is in retreat and free market economics dominate the global agenda. In ACP-EU cooperation, thoughts are now increasingly turning to what should happen when Lomé IV expires in less than five years' time. Most people accept that there need to be changes - and probably significant ones - to take account of the new international setting. Should aid be increased, decreased or maintained at present levels? What sort of aid should it be? Can the ACPs realistically expect the maintenance of preferential trading provisions in an increasingly liberal global trade system? How much emphasis should be placed on issues such as democracy, the rule of law and good governance? Will the ACP Group survive in its present form? These are among the questions now being posed.

Towards the end of 1996, the Commission made its first, key contribution to the debate when it published a 'Green Paper on relations between the EU and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century.' In keeping with the spirit of this document, which is intended to provoke the widest possible discussion, we feature it in our Dossier and Meeting Point.

Pages 7 to 31

COUNTRY REPORTS

Antigua and Barbuda

Antigua and Barbuda is one of the smallest - and most prosperous countries in the ACP Group, with an economy based on tourism and, increasingly, financial services. It also has a Westminster-style democracy. Unfortunately, there is a downside as well. The macro-economic indicators are worrying with a high public debt, shaky revenue collection and increasing state expenditure. The newspapers are full of stories of corruption, while the country is reputed to be a haven for drug traffickers and money-launderers. Heavy dependence on tourism means the economy is vulnerable to external factors, notably hurricanes. And as if this were not enough, Barbuda, (population 1500) is unhappy with its 'poor brother' status and contemplates going it alone.

Pages 32 to 45

Somalia

In a departure from our usual practice, The Courier recently visited Somalia - one of the few examples of a state without a government. It would be wrong to underplay the difficulties facing this ruptured society. Schools and hospitals have been destroyed, social services operate on a minimal level, and insecurity prevails in many areas. There is still a problem of malnutrition, while disease exacts a heavy toll. But, as we discovered, there is another side to the story. There are whole regions of this huge country which are at peace (the parts you never hear about in the news bulletins). And there are some remarkable examples of economic dynamism and social commitment. In short, there is a kind of 'functioning anarchy' which ensures that life can go on.

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An unusual view of the Somali landscape,
as seen from inside an EC-funded water tank
(Photo: The Courier)

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The Green Paper on relations between the EU and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century

Focusing on the options

The Green Paper takes stock of the current context of North/South cooperation and offers a response to the changes brought about by the transformation of the international scene. It pinpoints divergences between different ACP countries, and stresses the need to enhance the impact of aid, while reconciling efficiency requirements with the need for beneficiary responsibility.

As the Lomé Convention approaches its full term (February 2000), and given that negotiations with the ACP countries are due to begin in autumn 1998, the Commission has decided to embark on a wide-ranging discussion about changes to be introduced into EU-ACP relations on the eve of the new millennium.

In the words of Professor João de Deus Pinheiro, the EU's Development Commissioner; 'The Green Paper is, first and foremost, an invitation to reflect, with no preconceived ideas or prejudices. We must find the courage to call everything into question - everything apart from our political commitment and solidarity vis-à-vis the ACP countries'.

A debate of this kind is necessary in order to take stock of the new global context. How can the role of player on the world scene be assumed without a responsible strategy towards the various regions in the southern hemisphere, particularly those most exposed to the risks of poverty and marginalisation? How can development cooperation policy be adapted to the new situation in the wake of the Uruguay Round and the end of the Cold War? The Green Paper aims to stimulate reflection, addresses all those involved in development, takes account of lessons learned and presents challenges and options for the future.

The basic questions posed by the Green Paper relate primarily to the political dimension of the partnership. This has always been at the core of the Lomé Convention, and the idea is widely accepted nowadays. A closer look at this political dimension would enable us to make more of the mutual contract which binds us and which is based on facing common problems together.

The proposition that the relationship should have more differentiation raises a number of questions. It does not necessarily involve modification of the geographical coverage of the agreement as such. The principle could also be applied at other levels - perhaps in the context of a continuing global agreement with the ACP partners. A distinction could be made between priorities, or areas of intervention. For example, the European Union will obviously not be doing everything everywhere. A distinction might also be drawn at the level where aid is implemented, with moves towards greater selectivity and a principle of graduation.

There are certainly good arguments for taking particular account of the least developed nations, a great number of which are currently in the ACP Group. They face special problems, particularly in the field of trade.

Another important area raised in the Green Paper is competitiveness and the role of the private sector. These days, there is substantial agreement on the need for ACP economies to increase their competitiveness on international markets, to promote the development of their private sectors, and to enhance their ability to attract private investment from either inside or outside the country. This presupposes the creation, within the ACPs, of conditions more favourable to an upturn in private initiative, the stabilisation of their macroeconomic environment, improved credibility of their economic policies, and the pursuit of economic and institutional reforms.

The social dimension and poverty alleviation continue to be regarded as key areas of concern for the European Union. This covers not only health, education and training, but also food security and the integration of women into development efforts. In the wake of the undertakings made at the Copenhagen Social Summit, 'social and human development' are more than ever on the agenda.

Such guidelines should enable the Union to examine a more strategic approach and to ask itself, for example, how far it can go in the policy dialogue and conditionality, or whether it can commit itself to supporting current financing of social sectors.

In terms of financing, all this is inseparable from the trade debate. The Green Paper lists possible commercial approaches but does not prejudge future proposals. This analysis is, for the most part, based on an evaluation of Lomé's preferences and the latter's impact in economic and social development terms.

Public opinion both in Europe and the ACP States is increasingly demanding efficiency in our cooperation relations. This is an ongoing requirement which the parties must respect and it entails taking a fresh look at the conditions under which financial and technical cooperation is implemented. The co-management system, criteria governing the granting of aid, and the practice of conditionality, are all elements which need to be carefully analysed, on the basis of clearly defined goals. The aim must be to improve the success rate of development policy. The impact of Community aid on political, institutional, economic and social conditions must be enhanced if the economies of the ACP countries are to be assisted on the road to sustainable development.

The Green Paper aims to reduce uncertainty in all these fields, and focus on the options. In the words of Professor Pinheiro: 'We have attempted to identify the threats which exist, in order better to define and minimise them, and also to emphasise all the positive aspects whose potential we have to maximise.'

In the Meeting Point and Dossier sections in this issue, The Courier takes a look at future possible approaches. We reprint the introductory section of the Green Paper and, to stimulate debate, have also interviewed some key players and experts involved in ACP-EU cooperation or in development 'in the field'. ■ Ed.

João de Deus Pinheiro

European Commissioner responsible for relations with the ACP countries and South Africa

'The ACP-EU relationship will be even more deeply-rooted in future'

'It is necessary to give new impetus to Europe's development cooperation policy and to place it at the top of our list of priorities'. These were the opening words of Professor João de Deus Pinheiro, the European Commissioner for development, when he launched the Commission's Green Paper 'on relations between the EU and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century' at a press conference in Brussels in November. Talks between the EU countries and the ACPs on their post-Lomé IV relationship are due to begin in autumn 1998. Before that, the Commission will draw up a negotiating mandate which has to be agreed by the Council of Ministers. The consultative Green Paper is the initial step in this process - signalling the Commissioner's desire for a comprehensive debate before any formal proposals are put down on paper. The Courier met with Professor Pinheiro in January. In a wide-ranging interview, he offered his own thoughts on the likely direction of ACP-EU cooperation.

■ *The figures in the Green paper suggest that many ACP countries have not achieved significant economic and social development during the last 20 years. Does this mean that the Lomé system has failed?*


— I think that if you look only at the economic indicators, you would probably reach the conclusion that progress has been too slow. But if you look at other figures, such as life expectancy, the percentage of children in schools, or the reduced infant mortality rates, you find that very significant progress has been

achieved. This is all the more impressive when you realise that populations are still growing rapidly - which makes it difficult to accommodate all the children who want to go to school, and to keep up with the demand for maternal and infant care. I would say that the reforms implemented in the ACP countries in the last fifteen years have been very substantial indeed.

In Europe, we sometimes needed decades or even centuries to adapt to democracy and the market economy, and to make things work. The Africans are being called upon nowadays to do everything at the same time: to liberalise their economies; establish democratic institutions and make them function effectively; keep up with the rest of the world in trade and so on. So the demands have been huge. You should also bear in mind that after independence, when the colonial powers left, the expertise and technical knowledge went with them in many instances. So it has been a daunting task for the developing countries.

Having said this, I think we should be more demanding in the future - in the sense that we must demonstrate that we are efficient and are making good use of our money. What this means, among other things, is that we cannot accept malpractice or bad governance, whatever form it takes.

We have to be quite clear, for example, that corruption is unacceptable and will provide grounds for suspending cooperation. In my opinion, this should be an essential clause in any future agreement.



■ *What aspects of the Convention do you think should remain intact?*

— I think there are many good aspects which should be retained. I won't offer an exhaustive list here, but I would like to mention a few elements. For instance, there is the concept of *partnership*, which we in the EU have long supported. Indeed, there was a time when we were the only ones in the world to apply this concept fully. Today, things have changed. At the last Group of Seven meeting, it was clear that partnership is now at the

of the G7 concept for cooperation with the less-developed countries. I think this is an aspect which has to be elaborated even further in the future.

Another key element is *continuity* in cooperation assistance. The multi-annual programmes established under the Lomé Conventions will have to be even more deep-rooted if we are to achieve the targets we have set for our future cooperation. In this connection, I should emphasise that institution- or capacity-building is something that requires time. It cannot be tackled overnight and continuity is therefore an essential part of the approach.

I might also mention the essential clauses that were inserted at the time of the Lomé IV revision on *democracy and human rights*. They are worth preserving and, as I mentioned, I think they will eventually be extended to include good governance.

If I could say something about *conditionality*, this is an area where we now see the World Bank and other big donors moving towards our position, and it is something which we should certainly retain. In the past, we were at odds with other development agencies. But I think events show that we were right in viewing conditionality more broadly and not simply in terms of the macro-economic indicators.

Finally, there are aspects such as our focus on human and social development (which we put forward in our last communication to the Council and Parliament), the use of development policy in assisting conflict prevention, and the importance of gender issues.

These are some of the other key elements which will be kept. In short, there are a lot of components of the present relationship which should be retained and, if possible, developed. It is not our intention to disrupt a cooperation system which has been broadly successful. We want to keep what is good, improve what can be improved and innovate to meet new challenges for the future.

■ *You refer to both partnership and conditionality as essential principles. Isn't there a potential conflict between the two?*

– That depends on what you mean by conditionality. If you look at the Europe Union today, you will see that in order to enter the third phase of economic and monetary union, member countries have to comply with the so-called 'convergence criteria'. In effect, these are conditionalities - very strict ones - which we have applied to ourselves. When we are talking about developing countries, what we are saying is that the conditionalities should not be limited to the macro-economic aspects, which are very restrictive, but also encompass wider issues. That means putting more stress on capacity-building, the fight against illiteracy, enhanced participation of women in development, encouragement of the private sector and so on. Unfortunately, in the past, structural adjustment was so closely linked to the macro-economic indicators that the social aspects - which are crucial for development and for consolidating democracy - were sometimes forgotten. Here in the European Community, we have always tried to provide some cushion for the social sectors and we were right to do so. Without this, I suspect some of the young democracies would not have survived their structural adjustment programmes. So conditionality has to be seen in a broader context.

Another thing which is vital is coordination among the major donors. We must avoid the situation where there are as many strategies for a particular country as there are donors. What we need, instead, is a single strategy, where the country itself is in the driving seat. I am insistent about this because I think it is crucial that the ownership of development is *kept* by the beneficiary country. It wasn't always like that in the past. Sometimes we were too pushy and other times we were poorly coordinated. In some instances, the technical and administrative capacities of the beneficiary state were very weak - and where that is still the case, we need to provide technical assistance and focus more on capacity-building. So ownership of development programmes must rest with the beneficiaries. They in turn are engaged in dialogue with ourselves and other donors to try to find the best ways of offering assistance. There is no room for patronising donor attitudes here.

■ *You have focused so far on the positive aspects of cooperation. But are there any elements of the Lomé system which you think have not been very successful?*

– I think that the private sector was neglected far too much in previous Conventions. We all know the reasons for this. After independence, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa went for single party systems with the state running the economy. In essence, it was a Marxist approach - and certainly not the most propitious atmosphere in which to talk about private investment or private sector development. But this is now in the past. Today, the ACPs themselves recognise that development means investment to create wealth. So I think that we must insist even more in the future on private sector aspects - putting this at the centre rather than on the margins of development cooperation. I am talking here about encouraging the domestic private sector, from micro-enterprises right up to the big corporations, but also about attracting foreign investment from Europe and elsewhere. Both elements are essential.

■ *Within the ACP Group, there appear to be growing divergences. Some countries and regions are doing well while others are stagnating or even declining. Given this situation, what sort of geographical structure might you foresee for a post-Lomé treaty relationship with ACP countries?*

– It will be for the ACPs themselves to decide whether they want to retain the Group as a whole or to split it up. I don't think this is a particularly vital issue in terms of the kind of cooperation we agree in the future. What is clear is that we must enshrine some differentiation in the cooperation instruments. It is obvious, for example, that the problems facing Caribbean states are radically different from those that confront Central Africa. I think it is perfectly possible to have a broad framework or approach, but we certainly must also have some differentiation that allows us to respond flexibly to the particular needs of given regions or countries.

On a related aspect, we are obviously committed to supporting regional integration in the ACPs. I



think this is a must. But regional integration in West Africa, for example, is clearly different from the process that is occurring in say the Caribbean or Southern Africa. Things are developing in very different ways. In West Africa, for instance, they have started with a common currency and are now moving towards a common market. In Southern Africa, it is the other way round. There, they want to start by establishing a free trade area. So each region has its own path - its own method. Assuming that the final objectives of the process are sound, we should be sufficiently flexible to be

Busy trade at the freeport of San Pédro in Côte d'Ivoire
'When I mention that Uganda has a growth rate of 11%, or that Côte d'Ivoire is pushing 10% people are often astounded'

able to support whatever option has been chosen. So yes, there must be differentiation, but I don't think the final geographical shape of the future arrangement is necessarily crucial.

■ *From what you are saying, you would presumably encourage closer links between the EU and ACP regional organisations*

- Absolutely. We need to recognise that regional cooperation in Africa, while it looks good on paper, has been very poor in practice. Look, for instance, at the amount of ACP country exports that go to their neighbours. It comes to about 6% of the total, which is far too low a figure. Local economies need a catalyst to help them achieve economies of scale for their operations - and approaching it from the regional angle is obviously a good way of doing this. Of course, if that is the decision that is taken, then you must help to create the conditions for the regional market to develop. You need to look at the missing links: the roads, railways and other infrastructures. You should also look at the reasons why trade flows have not occurred in the past.

Regional cooperation has political as well as economic benefits. It invariably helps to consolidate democracy, while the establishment of a good atmosphere and working relationship between countries assists in avoiding conflict. Southern Africa, in my opinion, provides a very good example of where regional cooperation is helping to sustain young democracies in the region and to scale down tensions and potential conflicts. So I think regional integration will be a key theme in the next Convention.

■ *Can I move on now to another apparent contradiction? Electorates on the donor side, insofar as they think about the issue, tend to be sceptical about the ability of developing countries to manage aid. And yet there is this basic principle of beneficiary ownership and responsibility which you stressed earlier. How can you square the circle here?*

- First of all, I think European voters need to be better informed. When I am speaking to people, and I mention that Uganda has a growth rate of 11%, or that Côte d'Ivoire is pushing 10%, they are often astounded. These are the kind of figures that they expect only to see in the Asian 'tiger' economies. For them, the 'reality' is what they see in the media - the conflicts in the Great Lakes, Liberia or Sierra Leone. So there are positive economic aspects which need to be more widely advertised. There is also a lot of encouraging news on the political

front, like the fact that most ACP countries are democracies which are working. People need to be made aware of all this.

At the same time, it has to be made clear that the big effort must come from the developing countries themselves. We are willing to assist, but that is all we can do. And we are particularly keen to help those who do more to help themselves. Performance or result-oriented aspects will increasingly be on the table, because our citizens demand it. They believe, for instance, that if countries are spending too much money on armaments, we shouldn't help them as much, if at all.

■ *But isn't it the case that some EU countries have a particular interest in maintaining arms sales?*

– I don't think so, because the cost of conflict is much greater than the potential benefits that come from arms sales. I could mention here the amount we have spent on humanitarian aid and relief in the Great Lakes region. It comes to about \$1 billion. So the cost of cleaning up a conflict is always much larger than the return from the weapons trade. I mentioned conditionality earlier, and I think this is another aspect of it. Countries, if they wish, can choose to spend 20% or 30% of their budgets on arms, even if it isn't justified, but they won't be able to count on us to maintain the flows for development cooperation. This is the kind of issue of which our electorates are increasingly aware, and they are demanding closer scrutiny.

■ *You say that the EU's job is to help the ACPs to help themselves. What about the fact that so much consultancy work in development programmes goes to European companies?*

– There are various reasons for this. As you know, when jobs are put out to tender, ACP companies have an extra margin of about 10% in the contract price. I think this is probably not enough to boost the success rate of local contractors. A second aspect is that, unfortunately, many countries do not have the expertise that is needed for many of the consultancies.

But on a more positive note, we now see a clear trend towards greater participation by ACP citizens in their own projects.

Another aspect is that ACP countries used to find it difficult to accept that a neighbour might have the necessary expertise for their projects. There was a tendency to trust Europeans or Americans, but not necessarily experts coming from neighbouring countries. Happily, this is now changing and we are seeing some very good results. I hope the trend continues.

■ *What effect do you think the process of European integration will have on the future of ACP-EU cooperation? I am thinking here, in particular, of the balance between European Community cooperation in its own right, and bilateral programmes.*

– To answer the last part of your question first, there seems to be a general shift in favour of multilateral cooperation. The reason is simple - coordination is all important. Nowadays, the major donors - ourselves, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Inter-American Bank for Development and even some of the UN agencies - are coordinating their efforts in innovative ways. I should mention, in particular, our links with the World Bank. We work very closely together, using the same kind of approach to similar problems in trying to find synergies. Obviously, this has a much more powerful multiplier effect than aid which is purely bilateral. Having said this, I think there is still an important role for bilateral aid, notably for states that have traditional links with particular regions or countries - as is the case for Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal.

Experience, I might add, has shown that enlargement provides a new impetus for the EU's external policies. I think it is fair to say that when the Nordic countries and Austria acceded, we acquired a new dimension to our cooperation. These are countries which have a good tradition in development cooperation, especially in Africa. And they have enriched our work - in the financial sense of course - but more importantly in their policy input.

With the next enlargement, I believe we will see a similar phenomenon. As we expand the Union, we are simultaneously reinforcing our external policy in areas such as Africa, Latin America and Asia. I

think that the two things have to go together. And I have no doubt whatsoever, that our *special* cooperation with the ACPs is part of the identity of the Union. We strengthened the link further in the Lomé IV mid-term review: in dollar terms, the 8th EDF is almost twice as large as the previous one. This shows clearly, that despite the extra efforts needed in our own European 'backyard', the ACP relationship is still a top priority on our foreign relations agenda. So I believe our relationship will be even more deeply-rooted in future and am very optimistic about the next Convention.

■ *Now that the Green Paper has been published, how do you see things proceeding from here?*

– I think that everyone should participate in the Green Paper exercise. We have chosen an innovative approach. We want to hear from as many people as possible - governments, academics, intellectuals, journalists, entrepreneurs, trade unionists and NGOs.

And we want them to come up with their own ideas, perspectives, criticisms, and suggestions, so that we can incorporate the ideas into the proposals we present to the Council and Parliament.

Why are we proceeding in this way? Essentially because we want to ensure that what we put on the table responds to the main concerns of those who are most directly concerned by development policy. We also know, from experience, that it is better to do this at an early stage. Once the Commission has approved a proposal, subsequent modifications are extremely difficult to accommodate. So I would strongly urge people to participate in this process whether as individuals, or in the context of the regional and national seminars that are planned. We will welcome your views. ■

Interview by Simon Horner

Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century

Challenges and options for a new partnership

Below, we reprint the introductory section of the Green Paper on the future of ACP-EU relations, which was launched on 20 November 1996. This sets out some of the key themes identified by the Commission in the debate over what should replace the Lomé Convention when it expires at the end of this decade.

The world is in the throes of far-reaching changes. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and the end of the East-West conflict brought about a drastic upheaval in international relations and the world economy, opening the door to closer cooperation on the basis of common values and principles but also leading to a recasting of geo-strategic interests and new, less tangible forms of risk

Economically speaking, the spread of the market economy and the demise of exclusive or privileged ties have altered the terms of supply and demand on international markets.

The conclusion of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations created a new multilateral context which is speeding up a globalisation of the economy driven by technological change and the liberalisation of economic policies that started in the 1980s. Interdependence is growing and extends beyond the economic and financial to the social and environmental spheres.

At the same time, the margin for manoeuvre in national policies has narrowed and new fault lines are being opened up by the effects of social exclusion, by the fragmentation of the social fabric in both industrialised and developing or transitional countries, by widening inequalities and by the marginalisation of the poorest countries.

These fault lines are destabilising and lie behind the upsurge in extremism in its nationalist or fundamentalist guises.

This new international environment has prompted the EU to redefine its political and security interests and give fresh impetus to the political dimension of the European integration process. The Treaty on European Union has given an institutional basis to the framing of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP), a policy which is as yet insufficiently developed to further properly the common interests of the Member States; its machinery is currently being discussed as part of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). But the Treaty has also provided an institutional basis for European development cooperation policy.

EU gears up for major changes

The EU itself will be in the process of radical change at the time it embarks on a new relationship with the ACP countries.

It has a full programme of work in the years ahead as it readies itself to face the challenges of the 21st century: fine-tuning of the internal market and the prospect of a single currency, revision of the Treaty and other institutional reforms being discussed by the IGC, conclusion of a new medium-term financial agreement and the prospect of enlargement to em-

brace the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic States and Cyprus and Malta.

The EU's external relations have also been marked by new initiatives concerning developing countries and economies in transition.

It has concluded association agreements with most European countries of the former East bloc, which are now applying for membership.

At the same time, it is supporting the process of economic and political change in the republics of the former Soviet Union and has concluded trade agreements with several of them.

Relations with non-member Mediterranean countries are now covered by a new, long-term multilateral framework for partnership between 27 countries, which go hand in hand with closer bilateral relations and cover three sets of provisions: political and security, economic and financial (chiefly the gradual setting up of a free-trade area) and social, cultural and human.

The EU has also decided to strengthen its links with Latin America as part of a three-pronged strategy involving closer political dialogue between the two regions, encouragement of free trade combined with institutional support for the regional integration process, and technical and financial cooperation focusing on a number of priority fields.

Its new strategy in its relations with Asian countries is aimed at strengthening Europe's economic presence in this region, enhancing mutual understanding and developing a new political approach.


These new policies are the Union's response to the political and economic changes under way on the international scene and reflect the fact that the Union's external relations are not only global in scope but tailored to specific circumstances.

Relations with the ACP States are entering a new phase.

The Lomé Convention has provided the framework for trade and aid between the EU and the ACP countries, now numbering 70, since 1975. But Community development policy goes back to 1957 and has gone through a number of decisive phases since then. After the initial years, during which the aim was to establish ties with the Community's overseas countries and territories, cooperation continued under the Yaoundé Conventions and remained focused on French-speaking black Africa until the middle of the 1970s. After the Community's first enlargement, which took place in a markedly changing world economy, the EC started to extend the geographical scope of its cooperation policy by opening the first Lomé Convention to other ACP countries and forging association and cooperation ties with other regions of the developing world.

The Lomé Convention has been overhauled every five years to adjust it to economic and political developments, add new cooperation instruments and set fresh priorities. The last revision took place in 1995¹.

¹ The first three Conventions were concluded for a period of five years. The fourth covers the period from March 1990 to February 2000 and includes a financial protocol concluded for five years. At the same time as the negotiations for the second financial protocol, a mid-term review of the Convention was carried out. The text of the fourth Lomé Convention as revised by the agreements signed in Mauritius on 4 November 1995 was published in the ACP-EU Courier, No 154 of January-February 1996.



Commission

The EU has also gradually built up other, non-Lomé instruments for aiding the developing countries in the form of specific budget headings (for desertification control, AIDS, etc.) or components of other Community policies that can also contribute to development policy (scientific policy under the framework research and development programme – FRDP – is one such). The ACP countries are also eligible for these forms of aid.

New general guidelines have been drawn up for EU policies in a number of sectors or fields of cooperation as a result of the work under way since 1992 'on the outlook for cooperation in the run up to the year 2000'² to implement the new Treaty provisions on European development policy (Articles 130u to 130y of the Treaty).

On the threshold of the 21st century the future shape of the EU's relations with the ACP countries needs to be examined in depth. With the current Convention due to expire in February 2000, which is not far distant, and the two parties' contractual obligation to start negotiations at the latest 18 months beforehand, plus the need to establish against the background of the tighter disciplines of the WTO a trade cooperation framework fully in line with the new multilateral rules, we have an ideal opportunity to go ahead with this reappraisal and

² SEC(92) 915, 15 May 1992, and Council Declaration of November 1992.

The Lomé Convention has provided the framework for trade and aid between the EU and the ACP countries since 1975

embark on a wide-ranging debate on the future of relations between the EU and the ACP states.

Debate must take account of new global environment

Not only does the new global landscape alter the EU's objective interests and those of its developing partners, it also involves increased responsibilities for a player of the EU's size. These responsibilities are first and foremost political in nature: the EU must actively support the moves towards more openness that started when the cold war came to an end in the second half of the 1980s and in particular help anchor the democratisation process, which is still precarious in many ACP countries. These responsibilities are also of an economic nature: the EU must complement the effects of globalisation by making the necessary adjustments within the Union to improve job prospects and reverse trends towards exclusion by playing an active role in international economic cooperation, helping frame and enforce multilateral rules and easing the gradual integration of developing countries into the world economy. Another aspect of globalisation is the changes resulting from progress

External resource flows to all ACP countries

Net flows from all sources - US\$ million at current prices

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
ODA	8306	8647	9579	11505	13353	14968	15941	18808	18275	19561	17639
Other official	1972	2644	1583	2156	2988	2169	2370	3068	1604	1620	1126
Private flows net	2983	- 247	- 259	1006	779	436	2059	- 1057	339	1094	1439
Total	13261	11044	10903	14667	17120	17573	20370	20819	20218	22275	20204

Source: OECD - Development Assistance Committee

towards an information society. This is a new economic factor that is opening up extraordinary prospects in areas such as trade, education and health but also threatening to marginalise still further countries that are not locked into international information networks.

For the European Community – faced with the difficult task of adjusting its economic and social systems and having to frame its political action to fit a multi-rather than bipolar world and prepare for eastward enlargement – there is now a new dimension to development cooperation, particularly with the ACP countries, viz how can we take on a global role without responsible strategies for the different regions of the developing world, notably those worst hit by poverty and marginalisation?

The EU's efforts to reduce poverty and inequalities in development around the world are also closely linked to the quest for peace and stability, the need for better management of global interdependence and risks, and promotion of a kind of world development that is more compatible with European political and social values.

The EU's development policy offers Europe a gateway to regions with enormous development potential which are now starting to bestir themselves.

As the 21st century dawns, relations between the EU and the ACP countries should be put on new footing to take account not only of changed political and economic conditions for development but also of changed attitudes in Europe. The colonial and post-colonial period are behind us and

a more politically open international environment enables us to lay down the responsibilities of each partner less ambiguously.

Draw on past lessons to make cooperation more effective

In view of the patchy achievements of ACP-EU cooperation and a degree of scepticism about the scope for developing the ACP countries against the background of tight budgets in donor countries and an inward-looking tendency borne of social difficulties in Europe, partners on both sides are now seeking to place more emphasis on the effectiveness of cooperation and to review their priorities with an eye to reflecting better the concerns of European and ACP societies.

Resource flows from EU to ACP countries

Net flows US\$ million in current prices

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
ODA											
EU Member countries	2653	2812	2869	4289	5184	5906	5951	7387	6555	7081	6449
EU Institutions	591	700	657	854	915	1462	1458	1655	1713	2432	1671
Total EU ODA	3244	3512	3526	5143	6099	7368	7409	9042	8268	9513	8120
Other official flows (OOF)											
EU Member countries	752	1375	606	843	1863	1252	1290	1352	789	743	314
EU institutions	56	23	43	51	40	- 2	23	45	44	188	- 48
Total EU OOF	808	1398	649	894	1903	1250	1313	1397	833	931	266
Net private flows											
Net private flows from EU	2522	356	400	- 143	- 899	- 729	1091	- 1275	116	599	1619
Total flows											
EU Member countries	5926	4543	3875	4989	6147	6428	8332	7463	7460	8423	8382
EU Institutions	647	723	700	906	955	1460	1481	1700	1757	2620	1623
Total EU	6573	5266	4575	5895	7102	7888	9813	9163	9217	11043	10005

Source: OECD - Development Assistance Committee

Community aid is of major importance for many ACP countries and has unquestionably helped to improve living standards. It has often been a testing ground for new ideas and universally acknowledged expertise has been built up in certain areas. But like any form of aid, it has had failings, which a critical analysis of the results of ACP-EU cooperation has identified at three levels.

1. *The general framework within which development operations are carried out:* it has to be admitted that the principle of partnership has lost its substance and been only partly put into practice. Aid dependency, coping with short-term needs and managing crisis situations have increasingly coloured political relations between the two sides. Dialogue on economic and social policies has proved difficult to put into practice in countries with little institutional capacity and ineffectual public administration with the result that partnership is limited to day-to-day resource management.

2. *EU-commissioned evaluation reports* on cooperation policies have generally concluded that financial and technical cooperation matches Community objectives and the needs of the recipient countries and that effectiveness is relatively high, notably as regards infrastructure and social projects. However, the state of the institutions and economic policy in the recipient country have often been major constraints, making Community aid less effective in raising living standards and the level of development.

The impact of trade preferences has been disappointing by and large. Preferential arrangements, especially the protocols on specific products, have certainly contributed significantly to the commercial success of some countries (such as Côte d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Mauritius and Zimbabwe) which managed to respond with appropriate diversification policies. But the bulk of ACP countries have lacked the economic policies and the domestic conditions needed for developing trade. Furthermore, three new factors now have to be taken into consideration in


designing a new trade regime: (i) the Marrakesh agreements and tougher dispute-settlement procedures could put the future of differentiated, non-reciprocal preference schemes in doubt; (ii) the speeding-up of liberalisation at multilateral and inter-regional levels; (iii) the growing importance in international trade talks of new issues, such as the environment, competition policies, investment codes, technical and health standards and compliance with basic social rights. These developments affect the relative value of tariff preferences.

3. *Where financial and technical cooperation is concerned,* the fact that some financial resources are granted automatically (the proportion has now been cut) and the EU's tendency, in common with other donors, to take the initiative away from its weaker partners, have not encouraged ACP governments to display the genuine political commitment expected of them. There has been a drift towards a tendency for development instruments to dictate policy rather than the other way round. A lack of flexibility has meant that our cooperation does not adjust easily to a rapidly changing political and economic scene and is slow to produce new political initiatives reflecting the concerns of society in Europe and the ACP countries and the desire to make aid more effective in the long term.

Take account of new political, economic and social outlook in the ACPs

In a rapidly changing global and regional environment, the ACP countries have to face up to many challenges: halting their economic marginalisation and integrating into international trade, implementing the domestic, political, economic and social changes needed to build a democratic society and a market economy, and creating the conditions for sustainable development and poverty alleviation in a context of still high population growth.

The widening gap between developing countries in



Direction de l'Information, Côte d'Ivoire

Banana production in Côte d'Ivoire, one of the ACP countries that has recently improved its growth performance

general, and within the ACP group in particular, is undoubtedly a crucial factor. Political and economic transition has gone further in some countries than in others and the EU's efforts will be gauged in terms of its ability to ease the constraints on the development of the ACP countries while supporting the factors of change emerging in a growing number of countries. Above all, in more political terms, they will be judged by whether policy for the ACP countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa, regains a strong sense of purpose. The negative image that many have of a continent that has lost its way does not reflect the real Africa. Africa is not all of a pattern. The unprecedented political developments and the recent improvement in growth performance in some countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Uganda and Benin spring to mind), stemming chiefly from better management of economic policy and the implementation of structural reforms, are promising signs.

* * *

In the light of a decline in the general acceptance of the very

principle of development aid in a global environment beset with risks and new opportunities, the EU and its ACP partners must strive to make their cooperation more successful. This will entail identifying the ACP-EU cooperation achievements that are worth preserving, making further progress in refining and implementing recent guidelines and initiatives, and determining which of the various possible options for future reform are most consistent with mutual objectives and undertakings.

Stronger political relationship needed to breath new life into partnership

The difficulties of putting 'partnership' into practice should not call into question the value of this form of mutual political commitment.

The circumstances and huge challenges facing many ACP countries are good reason to preserve the strengths and qualities of the present relationship, in particular the predictability and contractual nature of the aid. But this political commitment must be made more explicit and more effective. Are the EU and its ACP partners ready to do this?

On the EU side, the political dialogue with the ACP countries must be part and parcel of its common foreign policy. A more relaxed framework for dialogue where issues of good governance, democracy and human rights, and the consolidation and maintenance of the rule of law can be broached, along with the development of a genuine European conflict prevention and resolution policy, would seem to be preconditions for a more effective European policy.

On the ACP side, commitment to push through institutional reforms and conduct economic, social and environmental policies reflecting the major undertakings made at the Rio (Earth Summit), Vienna (Human Rights), Cairo (Population), Copenhagen (Social Development), Beijing (Women),

Istanbul (Habitat II) and Rome (World Food Summit) international conferences, must be the foundation of the new partnership. The EU's aid activities, in common with those of other donors, can have major political repercussions for these countries; their relevance depends on a range of conditions, notably political conditions. The parties' respective responsibilities in the context of these activities must be expressed in political terms.

If a mutual political commitment is made on this basis, the principal subjects of the proposed dialogue (such as domestic security issues, migration, the fight against drug trafficking, etc.) and most appropriate geographical configuration (global dialogue or dialogue tailored to groups of countries) must be established.

North-South relations are part of the external face of the EU and the special relations between the EU and the ACP countries fall within this wider relationship. The link between politics and aid and with multilateral commercial policy is an application of the general principle of consistency in external action.

Strengthening the Union's capability for external action is one of the key subjects broached in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). In its opinion on the IGC, the Commission argued in favour of bringing together 'the various strands comprising foreign relations in a single effective whole, with structures and procedures designed to enhance consistency and continuity'³. Each strand should, however, retain its distinctive features. Community development cooperation policy, in particular, must retain sufficient autonomy to pursue its own objectives, which require a long-term view and continuity of action. This linkage does, however, entail greater selectivity in Community aid with a view to improving its effectiveness and this would lead to changes in the actual implementation of cooperation.

³. COM(96)90, Commission Opinion 'Reinforcing political union and preparing for enlargement'.

Adjust cooperation framework to help the ACPs open up to international trade

A number of new principles would facilitate this process. First, the principle of differentiation: not all ACP countries can at present engage in political and economic partnership with the EU on the same basis. Policies and methods of cooperation have to be suitably tailored for reasons of efficiency.

Second, European and ACP partners must strive to reconcile two requirements: (i) ultimate responsibility for reforms and development policies must be shouldered by the recipient countries; (ii) the EU, however, must be able to account to the citizens of Europe for the use made of the aid it gives. In this case, the only alternative to traditional forms of aid is to step up the policy dialogue, improve local capacity for policy-making and planning, and refocus Community monitoring of aid on results and progress rather than the means deployed. The implementation of sectoral policies that will put resources to better use and more coordination between donors is part and parcel of this process.

The EU and the ACP countries must set themselves the target of developing new forms of cooperation: the EU is unique in being able to put forward an array of instruments and promote scientific, economic and technological cooperation. New forms of partnership could be promoted in innovative fields such as new technologies; pilot projects would be a way of stimulating information flows between individual communities (research on the Internet) and providing practical opportunities for cooperation (in telecommunications services, for instance).

Finally, in a similar vein, more active participation in development by non-governmental players (private sector and other representatives of civil society) could be envisaged, either in the form of a dialogue on cooperation priorities or in the shape of direct access to some of the funding.

Geographical scope of future partnership agreement could change

The ACP group is in reality neither a political group nor an economic entity. It grew up for essentially historic reasons and exists only in the framework of relations with the EU. Will it remain a relevant partner for the Union in the future? In other words, should the present framework for relations between the 70 ACP states and the EU be maintained?

The answer certainly lies partly with the ACP countries themselves, which must adopt their position on the matter on the basis of their common interests and their desire to develop a negotiating capacity as a political or economic group on the international stage outside their relationship with the EU.

For the EU the choice is above all a political one, taking account of the way in which cooperation with the ACP countries meshes with the totality of the EU's relations with developing countries.

Other factors should also be taken into account. The geographical coverage of the cooperation agreement might be changed to take on board factors such as the diversity within the ACP group, the need for differentiation of cooperation objectives and priorities and, possibly, trade regimes, plus the prospect of reduced aid requirements for certain countries and graduation. Changing the non-reciprocal preference arrangements, which are different from those of other developing countries, could become unavoidable and involve different trade arrangements tailored to the type of economy concerned.

The importance that the EU attaches to the cooperation and regional integration process for economic as well as political reasons will also influence the shape of a new accord.

There are four possible options:

1. *The status quo*, with a few adjustments. The principle of an overall agreement with all the

ACP countries could be maintained, but with different arrangements and priorities;

2. *An overall agreement supplemented by bilateral agreements.* Differentiation would be taken a step further and the overall agreement would contain only undertakings of a very general nature;

3. *Splitting up the Lomé Convention into regional agreements.* An agreement with sub-Saharan Africa that embraced South Africa would clearly be meaningful for Europe. Where the progress of regional cooperation allowed, sub-regional agreements could also be envisaged. There are a number of options in the Caribbean, notably the idea of an enlarged cooperation arrangement for the whole of the Caribbean area leading ultimately to integration of cooperation with these countries into the framework of relations with Latin America. In the Pacific region, enlargement of the framework of cooperation to other island states would increase the effectiveness of European policy, especially as regards trade with the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) countries.

4. *A specific agreement for the least developed of the ACP countries*, possibly open to other LLDCs. This option, which does not exclude elements of the other three options, would recognise the LLDCs' special circumstances and offer the possibility of policies better suited to their problems and

needs, in the case of trade especially. But in terms of political and financial cooperation it seems an inappropriate solution. Another consideration is that a regional approach has always been adopted in relations with the ACP countries.

The global perspective of European development cooperation is not what it was in 1957 or 1975: the EU now has cooperation links with a large number of countries and is present in all regions of the world.

To be more effective, the EU should adopt a more coordinated and consistent approach to the ACPs

The general discussion about the consistency of European policies as they affect the developing countries has in recent years led to a number of initiatives to assess the effects of Community policies other than development cooperation on development objectives and to strengthen coordination between the Community and Member States and other donors in order to improve the effectiveness of cooperation overall.

Even if the current situation is often deemed unsatisfactory, consistency – in the strict sense of the term, i.e. taking into account the external effects of the other policies, cannot be the subject of an international undertak-

EDF decisions - annual shares of aid by instrument
(in ECU millions)

	1993	1994	1995
Programmed aid	1014.39	1041.94	828.58
Structural adjustment	378.00	222.35	145.50
Risk capital	53.65	214.43	256.82
Interest rebates	21.51	53.85	35.53
Emergency aid	83.15	249.98	33.68
Aid to refugees	29.30	25.61	4.40
Sysmin	50.03	57.25	84.49
Stabex	1.17	615.12	131.09
Total	1631.20	2480.53	1520.09

Source: European Commission - Infocinance 1995



The Courier

Computer room at a training college in the Caribbean
Enhancing aid for building up scientific and technical skills is one possible option

ing by the Community. Consistency is a matter for political appraisal in the face of sometimes conflicting objectives.

The lack of coordination could, on the other hand, be remedied not only by actively continuing the EU's efforts to improve coordination of policies, operations and participation in international forums but also by making specific new undertakings when the time comes to renew the ACP-EU agreement. There are two possible options here:

- the Union could set itself the objective of formulating an overall European strategy for the ACP countries which would commit both Member States in their national operations and the Community. A framework of common understanding would facilitate efforts to achieve greater complementarity, a principle laid down in the Treaty, and would gradually boost operational effectiveness across the board;

- it could also propose to its partners putting in place machinery to provide information, monitoring and coordination services for Member States' and Community development activities and policies. The Union would thereby commit itself to providing the means for better coordination.

Stepped-up European coordination could also underpin efforts to improve coordination within the whole donor community and within the multilateral sys-

tem in the framework of inter-institutional rapprochement decided at the recent G7 summit, which singled out Africa for particular attention.

New priorities to take account of new international context, past experience, and social and economic developments in the ACPs

The Union has adopted new policy guidelines in recent years that deal with new topics or redefine the objectives pursued in the various sectors or areas of co-operation⁴. These guidelines are likely to remain relevant in the year 2000 even if experience gained in the interval leads to adjustments or the development of certain facets.

But over and above this 'acquis', the EU and its ACP partners can now consider setting themselves new priorities, taking into account the overall objectives of Community development cooperation policy enshrined in the Treaty, past successes and failures, and the ACP countries' handicaps and potential for future development. ACP-EU cooperation policy can be reformulated under three broad headings: (i) economy, society and the environment; (ii) institutions; (iii) trade and investment.

Distinguishing between these three areas in Community support should not of course lead to a compartmentalised approach. On the contrary, the different components should be mutually reinforcing; for instance, the necessary improvement in the competitiveness of the ACP economies is to be achieved by a combination

4. See the texts and resolutions on:
 — gender issues — COM(95) 423;
 — health — COM(94) 77;
 — education — COM(94) 399;
 — food security — COM(94) 165;
 — the fight against poverty — COM(93) 518;
 — support for structural adjustment — COM(94) 447;
 — the environment (June 1992 report on the Rio Conference and follow-up to Agenda 21) — COM(96) 569, and;
 — the link between emergency aid, rehabilitation and development — COM(96) 153.

of external and internal policy measures. Likewise, job creation and social progress are intertwined with private-sector development and improvements in the workings of government.

Yet the EU cannot — indeed must not — do everything. Greater differentiation between the ACP countries should rather prompt it to adopt a cooperation policy tailored to circumstances and to act in fields that may differ from one country to the next.

Community aid for ACPs should promote integration into global economy

An aid strategy centred on enhancing the competitiveness of the ACP economies and developing the private sector and trade should comprise a package of measures aimed at ensuring the continuation of the reforms undertaken by these countries and boosting their credibility. The first such action should certainly involve support for the establishment of a stable, non-inflationary and growth-generating macroeconomic framework.

Among the various possible options, the following areas could be looked at in greater depth:

- a more systematic approach to the causes of low investment in most ACP countries. The EU could play a positive role by supporting administrative and institutional reforms that would encourage the mobilisation of private investment, i.e. framing of competition policies, development of capital markets, modernisation of business and property law, consumer protection, education, training and development of industrial cooperation;

- support, tailored to local circumstances, for restructuring of public enterprises and privatisation in the wider context of the changing role of the state in the economy;

- greater support for an opening-up to international trade and for regional integration. Such an overall strategy should support both

capacity building (at regional and national levels and provide aid towards the costs of transition.

- seeking partnerships between EU and ACP countries that would mobilise private-sector resources for the development of infrastructure, especially telecommunications infrastructure, and their operation in economically viable conditions;
- aid for building up scientific and technical skills;
- macroeconomic and monetary cooperation;
- support to help reduce levels of external debt, although the Community itself accounts for very little of the ACP countries' debt because its aid is highly concessional.

Community aid in the social sphere should be stepped up

There are strong arguments for focusing cooperation with the ACP countries on poverty reduction.

This objective already features prominently in current cooperation policy but in future the EU and its ACP partners should look at ways of enhancing the impact of Community cooperation on poverty.

The principle of a multi-pronged approach involving a wide range of operations should be retained, but a more strategic approach could be adopted for each of the partners by acting on two fronts.

First, the EU could support packages of reforms and initiatives designed to promote equitable and job-creating growth, improving access for all to productive resources, notably through education and vocational training.

Second, it could adopt a more comprehensive sectoral approach based on in-depth dialogue on policies with significant social impact and on aid directed towards the financing of current expenditure in the social sectors.

The effort put into achieving social development objectives could also be one of the criteria taken into account for the granting of Community aid, assuming

that the option of greater selectiveness linked to an assessment of good governance is taken up.

Environmental protection should be given greater prominence in EC aid

A clearly defined strategy would help translate into practice the principles of sustainable development. In addition to continuing the current efforts in the form of impact studies and specific positive measures, a new policy in this field would focus on certain priorities: the link between poverty and deterioration of the environment, the internalisation of environmental costs, capacity development and a participatory approach. The Protocol on the sustainable management of forest resources, which was added to the fourth Lomé Convention, is a step in this direction.

The EU could play a constructive role here by encouraging and supporting ACP governments, in the context of a policy dialogue, to develop their own capacity to assess and manage environmental problems.

There are particular issues, such as the quantity and quality of water supplies, deterioration of the soil as a result of population pressures, the destruction of forests and the problems of cities, which merit close attention.

EU could play a more active role in institutional development

The institutional aspects of cooperation need developing because of administrative dysfunctionality and governance problems in many countries and because the rule of law needs to be restored or consolidated to bring about the conditions for development and a reduction in inequality and poverty.

But the EU must also think carefully about the impact of such action. Stronger political relations between the EU and ACP countries are integral to any action to support the building of a country's institutional and administrative capacities.

As the process is essentially a political one, this type of reform affects power structures and inevitably encounters stiff resistance.

Is the EU ready to adopt a more strategic approach to its support for the necessary political and social transition?

Aside from its political dimension, support for institution building also has a more technical side. From that point of view, the

A sandstorm in the Sahel - where the loss of trees is exacerbating desertification. The Green Paper suggests a new strategy to help translate into practice the principles of sustainable development

VIVANT UNIVERS



EU is relatively well-placed to offer its services because, given the diversity of social and political organisation in the Member States, it has no one model to 'sell', because it has know-how gained from building the Community and because partnership is an appropriate framework for this type of cooperation.

EU action could be focused on themes connected with its main areas of cooperation where it could offer 'added value' compared with other donors. These themes include: promoting observance of human rights, support for regional organisations, improving capacity for economic and social-policy analysis and formulation/preparation of reforms, budget management, improving the workings of the legal system, competition rules, investor protection, education and training, environmental protection, consumer policy and developing the institutions of civil society.

The Union could also look at the development of local capacity as one of the criteria determining the choice of arrangements for implementing financial and technical cooperation.

Need for new trade arrangements that are consistent with strategic choices made by ACPs in their bid to integrate into the world economy

In most ACP countries the economic and institutional environment has not usually been propitious to the development of a competitive private sector, the growth of investment or diversification of production, and so they have not been able to take advantage of all the opportunities offered by the special preferences granted under the Lomé Convention.

ACP exports to the EU have been no exception to those countries' generally poor trade performance and their share of the EU market has declined appreciably, dropping from 6.7% in 1976 to 2.8% in 1994. Although the situation varies markedly from one country or region to another, the

EU - developing country trade (selected figures in billions of ECUs)

	1976	1980	1985	1990	1992	1994
Exports from EU						
Total ¹	141.3	221.1	380.8	415.3	436.1	539.0
ACP	9.6	15.7	17.4	16.6	17.0	14.9
Asia	7.5	13.1	29.4	41.0	47.1	70.5
Latin America	7.7	12.0	13.5	15.6	20.4	29.6
Mediterranean	12.3	19.8	29.8	28.5	28.6	33.1
Imports to EU						
Total	157.7	269.9	399.7	461.5	487.6	540.0
ACP	10.5	19.4	26.8	21.9	18.0	18.6
Asia	6.7	16.0	26.0	50.9	66.4	84.3
Latin America	8.3	13.7	25.8	25.7	24.8	27.6
Mediterranean	9.6	16.4	32.3	29.8	30.3	30.8
% share of imports to EU						
ACP	6.7	7.2	6.7	4.7	3.7	2.8
Asia	4.2	5.9	6.5	11.0	13.6	13.1
Latin America	5.3	5.1	6.5	5.6	5.1	5.4
Mediterranean	6.1	6.1	8.1	6.5	6.2	6.1

1. Figures exclude intra-EU trade.

Source: Eurostat - ODI - March 1996.

European market still accounts on average for more than 40% of ACP sales.

For the future, there are various options involving one or more trade regimes. They should be assessed in terms of their implications for ACP-EU relations and whether they can help the ACP countries diversify their external economic relations and avoid the risk of growing marginalisation.

There are four main options:

1. *The status quo.* The present contractual system of non-reciprocal preferences, specific to ACPs, could be supplemented by cooperation activities in trade-related fields (standards and certification, the environment, competition, intellectual property rights, etc.).

2. *Application of the Community's generalised scheme of preferences (GSP)* on a bilateral or multilateral basis. This would entail removing trade from the cooperation agreement, and therefore from the negotiations, as the GSP is a matter for unilateral (or perhaps, one day, multilateral) policy.

3. *Uniform reciprocity.* After a transitional period, all ACP countries would extend reciprocity to the EU in line with WTO rules. As

in the first option, cooperation could also be developed in new areas.

4. *Differentiated reciprocity.* Reciprocal preference arrangements could be envisaged between the EU and different groups of countries or between the EU and individual countries. This option could be supplemented by cooperation in new fields on the WTO agenda.

These options are not mutually exclusive and could be combined in various ways so that the arrangements can be adjusted to the level of development of the countries concerned and their willingness to strengthen relations.

Before choosing one or other of these options, we must make a detailed analysis of the potential impact on both the EU and the ACP countries.

EU could support adoption of an agreement on protecting foreign private investment

Proposals on this have already been under consideration since adoption of the fourth Lomé Convention. International agree-

ments are being negotiated and the Commission is pushing for progress in the WTO context. Negotiations are also under way in the OECD with a view to a Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment.

In the meantime, cooperation at subregional level or by groups of countries would significantly streamline negotiations, which at present take place only at bilateral level.

Such an initiative would give a significant stimulus to private investment.

EU should review procedures for implementing its financial and technical cooperation

The move towards a more 'responsible' partnership, demands for greater effectiveness and recognition of the significant differences in levels of development reached by different ACP countries all point to the need for a radical review of the arrangements for implementing Community aid to ACP countries.

A fresh look at aid instruments

The Lomé Convention today provides for a wide range of instruments designed to achieve specific objectives and subject to different, sometimes complicated, management procedures.

Their simultaneous use in the same country makes EU policy less than transparent.

We should ask ourselves whether the EU should not switch to offering overall financial packages, perhaps retaining the distinction between crisis situations and long-term operations and between public- and private-sector operations.

Greater selectiveness

The allocation of programmable aid resources is already much less automatic since the mid-term review of Lomé IV and a new performance criterion has been introduced, meaning that the amounts of aid allocated to a country are adjusted in relation to the effort made by the govern-

ACP countries exports (figures in US\$ millions)

Country ¹	Average for 1992-1994					
	USA	Japan	EU	OECD total	World total	EU as % of world
Africa	7 124.2	1316.9	21 128.3	35 762.7	45 719.3	46.2
Angola	1 453.9	20.9	1 260.3	3 466.1	3 873.3	32.5
Benin	11.8	0.9	54.2	77.1	109.7	49.4
Botswana	-	6.0	98.6	199.2	345.0	28.6
Burkina Faso	0.3	5.8	54.0	61.2	171.0	31.6
Burundi	6.0	2.3	57.1	74.0	119.0	48.0
Cameroun	76.6	10.6	1543.5	1708.6	2075.0	74.4
Cape Verde	-	0.4	6.7	7.2	12.3	54.4
Central African Republic	0.6	0.1	109.9	113.4	133.7	82.2
Chad	0.2	9.1	65.1	76.7	95.7	68.0
Comoros	6.8	0.4	18.6	27.7	29.0	64.2
Congo	331.0	2.0	785.7	1280.7	1314.0	59.8
Côte d'Ivoire	149.5	25.1	1963.9	2293.1	3525.3	55.7
Djibouti	-	0.1	4.8	5.4	59.0	8.1
Equatorial Guinea	0.1	-	40.9	41.1	41.3	99.1
Ethiopia	8.1	47.7	129.7	213.9	342.3	37.9
Gabon	583.4	118.0	1208.7	2229.5	2700.7	44.8
Gambia	1.1	47.8	121.0	173.4	198.7	60.9
Ghana	87.6	68.4	645.7	908.3	1228.3	52.6
Guinea	97.3	3.2	379.6	582.4	687.3	55.2
Guinea Bissau	-	0.1	7.5	7.9	30.3	24.7
Kenya	50.5	20.1	657.6	830.6	1387.3	47.4
Lesotho	-	0.1	23.9	27.5	68.3	35.0
Liberia	7.3	16.3	624.4	1151.9	1178.7	53.0
Madagascar	34.6	33.6	209.4	311.3	783.0	26.7
Malawi	47.2	64.9	195.3	355.3	413.0	47.3
Mali	1.2	4.6	92.8	108.3	317.7	29.2
Mauritius	96.6	3.3	1 004.6	1 198.7	1 267.0	79.3
Mauritania	7.5	132.4	296.0	444.8	552.7	53.6
Mozambique	15.0	18.2	92.3	148.8	391.7	23.6
Niger	2.7	0.2	210.0	237.2	263.0	79.9
Nigeria	3 661.2	8.6	5 571.0	12 280.6	14 190.0	39.3
Rwanda	4.3	1.0	69.8	87.5	122.0	57.2
São Tomé & Príncipe	0.1	-	3.9	4.4	14.3	27.2
Senegal	8.1	12.4	398.7	433.6	717.7	55.6
Seychelles	0.8	0.5	55.4	57.2	94.3	58.8
Sierra Leone	38.7	2.5	213.8	280.8	292.0	73.2
Somalia	1.8	0.2	28.5	32.4	131.3	21.7
Sudan	9.3	31.2	137.2	195.5	444.0	30.9
Swaziland	-	5.8	150.7	195.1	365.7	41.2
Tanzania	9.3	25.4	215.6	272.6	465.0	46.4
Togo	3.4	0.7	97.1	145.3	289.0	33.6
Uganda	11.3	4.6	147.8	177.1	197.0	75.0
Zaire	191.9	78.2	1126.7	1558.7	1767.0	63.8
Zambia	37.9	338.1	363.5	768.7	1300.7	28.0
Zimbabwe	69.4	144.5	586.9	912.2	1616.0	36.3
Caribbean	3183.7	108.4	1494.2	6905.5	8221.0	18.2
Antigua & Barbuda	3.5	0.3	10.4	17.5	26.7	39.0
Bahamas	365.1	17.3	239.3	988.2	1 038.0	23.1
Barbados	21.3	0.9	44.0	88.1	149.3	29.5
Belize	36.7	1.4	49.5	111.2	131.7	37.6
Dominica	3.6	2.0	48.2	57.2	111.3	43.3
Dominican Republic	1 488.1	18.5	182.4	2 328.5	2 418.3	7.5
Grenada	5.5	1.1	12.1	22.7	38.7	31.3
Guyana	71.3	16.3	151.4	265.9	329.0	46.0
Haiti	135.9	1.8	35.2	301.5	311.7	11.3
Jamaica	420.7	16.4	328.1	1 249.8	1 496.3	21.9
St Vincent & The Grenadines	4.1	7.2	71.5	93.0	120.0	59.6
St Lucia	17.7	0.1	103.5	131.3	147.0	70.4
Trinidad & Tobago	610.0	25.3	218.5	1 250.6	1 903.0	11.5
Pacific	83.5	456.8	448.9	1248.6	1928.9	23.3
Fiji	41.5	34.9	138.2	318.8	397.0	34.8
Papua New Guinea	35.8	358.1	272.6	798.2	1375.3	19.8
Solomon Islands	0.5	45.4	21.2	69.0	93.3	22.7
Tonga	3.3	10.8	0.7	19.1	20.3	3.4
Vanuatu	2.4	5.1	15.0	25.1	28.3	53.2
Western Samoa	-	2.5	1.2	18.4	14.7	8.1
Total ACP	10 391.4	1 882.1	23 071.4	43 916.8	55 869.2	41.0

¹ Individual figures were not available for Eritrea, Namibia, St Kitts & Nevis, Kiribati or Tuvalu.

Source: Eurostat - ODI - March 1996

ment in its sectoral and macroeconomic policies. This reflects the EU's concern to achieve greater effectiveness. It also corresponds to a new notion of partnership based on reciprocal undertakings and the view that external aid should support domestic reform efforts. The EU should therefore be inclined to continue along this road. At the same time, the advantages of programming in terms of predictability of external financial flows for the ACP countries and the fact that it builds on approved frameworks of country strategy should prompt it to maintain a multiannual programming system. In determining country allocations, the EU should decide to what extent it wishes to supplement the needs criterion – based essentially on development indicators – with performance and management criteria. It should also consider whether to make its country policy more flexible by adopting for example a system of rolling programmes.

Project aid or direct budget aid

The evaluation of Community instruments has produced a number of operational conclusions: the advantages of a more sectoral approach and support for reforms – already acted on under Lomé IV – and of focusing on improvement of the institutional framework and local capacity to devise economic and social policies integrated into a long-term strategy. This raises the question as to whether the EU should gradually abandon the project approach once and for all and instead try to create the right conditions for giving support in the form of direct budget aid for the states concerned and sectoral aid.

Any such development should certainly go hand in hand with a reform of conditionality to be coordinated with the whole donor community.

Consensus needs to be reached on a small set of essential criteria to avoid a continuation of the recent proliferation of often very specific conditions. If conditionality is to have a real impact on a country's policies, it must be



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both realistic (i.e. taking account of political and institutional as well as economic and social factors), comprehensive (the product of an assessment of all the government's macroeconomic and sectoral policies) and rigorous. The Commission has made proposals to other donors which reflect this orientation in the framework of its Special Programme for Africa (SPA), the aim being to find a new approach that best accommodates long-term development objectives and short-term imperatives, while encouraging recipients to internalise reforms.

Towards new management arrangements

Joint management as practised hitherto with Lomé has revealed its limitations. It has hampered the effective management of disbursements and has discouraged the internalisation of reforms or development programmes by their beneficiaries. It should therefore be overhauled.

What are the alternatives that will ensure both sound management of resources and the assumption of responsibility by the recipients, a *sine qua non* for more effective aid? One possibility is a differentiated, progressive approach that would enable us to find the most appropriate man-

An EDF-funded airport building in the Pacific
Should the EU gradually abandon the project approach?

agement method on a case-by-case basis, using criteria such as quality of policy dialogue, progress in implementation, the relative shares of Community aid *vis-à-vis* the national resources and the existence of machinery to coordinate external aid in the recipient country.

The Commission reiterates its recommendation that the European Development Fund (EDF) be incorporated in the Community budget⁵. 'Budgetisation' would give true Community status to the aid managed by the Commission and make for beneficial synergies between different EU policies. Similarly, EIB lending to ACP countries could then be subjected to the same procedures as used for its operations in other non-member countries, especially in respect of the replenishment of the guarantee fund for external operations. ■

⁵ Budgetisation of the EDF, which has been repeatedly proposed by the Commission, is not broached as such in this Green Paper. This issue will be discussed at the same time as the financing of a future partnership. See on this subject 'Report on arrangements and possibilities for budgetising the European Development Fund' — SEC(94) 640 final.

Carl Greenidge, Deputy Secretary-General of the ACP Group

'Partnership is important – and we should stick with it'

In last January's special issue of *The Courier*, on the revised Fourth Lomé Convention, we published an interview with Carl Greenidge, at the time, Secretary-General ad interim of the ACP Group. Then, the focus was on the changes to the system of ACP-EC cooperation negotiated in Mauritius. Almost a year to the day after our last meeting – and following the publication of the Commission's Green Paper – we had the opportunity to speak to Mr Greenidge again. This time, the emphasis was firmly on what would happen when the ten-year Convention expires.

■ *The figures published in the Green Paper suggest that most ACP countries have not seen significant economic and social development during the lifetime of the Lomé Conventions. Do you think this means the arrangement has failed?*

— I have two different responses. First, I think you should look at the figures at a more disaggregated level.

If you take any country, you find that the rate of growth and pace of development fluctuate over time. It is not reasonable to expect every state to be experiencing positive growth at the same time. And looking at the record of individual countries since 1975, you will find that some have had consistent and sometimes remarkable growth rates. These are places people tend not to talk very much about – like Botswana, Namibia, the Seychelles or Lesotho, in addition to those like Mauritius which are familiar to us. The list includes states in Central and West African such as Burkina



Faso, Benin and Mali – in an area which has had a lot of difficulties recently. So that is one aspect. It isn't sufficient to look at the aggregate statistics. One problem, of course, is that some of the largest countries have been in difficulties and clearly that skews the results.

The other point is one I raised when we last spoke¹. I mentioned an NGO publication which pointed out that if you take the Lomé IV financial package and distribute the money among the people of the ACP countries, it would be the equivalent of a pint of beer and packet of crisps per head in a British pub. I would reiterate that one cannot expect sums of this kind to lift countries suddenly out of poverty and give them sustained growth. In global terms it may seem a lot

– ECU 14 billion – but when broken down on a *per capita* basis, the amounts are small. What it does is to serve as seed money, helping to get a process going.

So we need to look at a range of indicators and at what is happening in individual countries before we judge the effectiveness of the Convention. The fact that the Group as a whole may be negative today is no indication of whether the Convention is working. The situation may have been worse without the Convention!

■ *Looking to the future, as the Green Paper seeks to do, are there any reasons for not continuing as before. Or, to approach this question from the opposite angle, are there any aspects of the Convention which you think should remain intact?*

— Obviously, if there are aspects that are either dysfunctional or not working, that may be good reason for not continuing with them. But from our own evaluations I think the ACP Group is satisfied that the Convention has helped to improve the lot of ACP countries in general. One can cite specific instances of projects and countries that have succeeded. So there is no doubt in our view that the Convention has useful dimensions and has been of great assistance in certain respects. Therefore, as a tool, it needs to be retained.

Additionally, two specific points are relevant here. First, there has been disappointment that some aspects have not yielded the anticipated results. Second, it is inevitable that there will sometimes be disputes between the partners

¹ See issue no. 155 of *The Courier*, January-February 1996, at page 22.

over how to improve some of the available instruments. It is no secret that the ACP Group has concerns about the trade aspects and I think the Green Paper shows that the EC also has concerns in this area. It was expected that the trade instruments would lead to a significant improvement of the ACP position in the European market – and that this, in turn, would be a major factor in transforming the ACP countries. That hasn't happened. One has to pause and ask why. Is it because the instrument itself is inappropriate? Or is it, as the Green Paper sometimes implies, due to poor economic policies, bad governance and the fact that we have joint decision-making? Different people have different ideas about this. But I think it needs to be said very clearly that the ACPs do not accept all of the Commission's analyses.

■ *What areas we are talking about here?*

— Staying in the area of trade, there are a number of things that we can look at. When the first Convention was fashioned, it was believed that you could provide some stability in the earnings of ACP countries. If you are a commodity exporter, and prices fluctuate enormously from one market period to the next, this will obviously have an impact on farmers' and distributors' incomes. I think everyone recognises that income uncertainty undermines investment. So a number of instruments were put in place – Sysmin, Stabex and, of course, the trade preferences and commodity protocols. These were intended to provide some certainty for producers. The question is, have they worked? It cannot be denied that the ACP share of the European market has declined. But the trouble is that very often, the analysis stops there, which I think is quite unsatisfactory. If you look more carefully, and disaggregate the figures, you get a different picture. Certain countries – notably those that have special access via the protocols like Mauritius, Jamaica and Côte d'Ivoire, have done well. Some, like Kenya and Malawi, have found new markets – in horticulture, for example. Others have made good use of the protocols to develop production and you can see investment and growth as a result. In addition to the spectacular per-



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formers, a number of countries have done quite well. A recent study has shown that during the 1990s, the trade performance of 26 ACP countries matches that of Latin America. What I am saying is that if you look at the combined performance of the group of 70, you get one picture. If you consider those that have exploited the protocols in particular, you get a different picture.

There has also been some more encouraging news arising from reviews of recent performance. In this week's Financial Times and International Herald Tribune, (this interview took place on 19 December 1996 – ed) it was suggested that public comments about Africa's performance and prospects have perhaps been too pessimistic. The 1996 World Bank Report on the economic prospects of developing countries identifies a number of states in West, Central and Southern Africa that have a good trade performance.

But I would go further and say that even if one sticks with the global picture, one cannot say that the existing instruments of cooperation are inappropriate. If countries are exporting, and the commodity prices in their markets collapse, then I don't really know what conclusion you can draw. Let me be more specific. It is estimated that between 1980 and 1992, losses from the commodity price collapse, whether it be in bauxite, cocoa, coffee or whatever, were equivalent to about twice the volume of aid going to developing countries. Now what does that say about aid? It tells you something about the quantum of the aid package – that it is relatively small – but nothing about its quality. That is an important point.

I should add that many ACP countries have adopted what we all regard as the necessary prerequisites for de-

A new factory unit in Botswana
'Some ACP countries have had consistent and sometimes remarkable growth rates'.

velopment. If you look at the Enhanced Structural Adjustment facility of the IMF (ESAPs) – in May-August 1996, 20 of the 29 countries on ESAP programmes were ACPs. This shows that the bulk of the serious adjusters are ACPs. So many of the EC's preconditions, in terms of economic policy, private sector involvement, liberalisation and so forth, are actually being implemented.

And, of course, there are a lot of ACPs which do not need to be on the list because they haven't allowed themselves to get into serious economic difficulties. In the Pacific, economic management has generally been quite conservative. Recently, some Pacific countries have had difficulties but most have done sufficiently well that they are not forced to implement severe adjustment measures. The same goes for the Caribbean. Since 1975, for example, the Eastern Caribbean States have improved their trade performance, output levels and *per capita* income. In Africa, there are places like Botswana and Lesotho that I mentioned earlier. And more recently, a range of states in West and Central Africa have been performing well, especially since the devaluation of the CFA franc: states like Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, not to mention Ghana which everybody knows about.

What I am saying is that there is a tendency to take one brush and paint everyone the same colour. – and then to conclude that everything is a disaster. I think the analysis should be a little more discriminating than that.

■ *You mention the benefits of preferential access and, in particular, the Lomé trade protocols. Presumably the ACPs are*

keen to maintain preferences in some form or another. Do you think this is realistic, given the global trend towards liberalisation? If I can give a concrete example, the European Community has tried hard to defend the Lomé banana system but they are coming under increasing pressure in the World Trade Organisation.

— The banana issue is essentially a political problem, not a trade one. The main country pushing it doesn't even export bananas and has no direct interest in the European market. I will say no more about that.

On the general issue of the trade protocols, I would draw your attention to the following. The ACP Group contains countries with three characteristics that are important in the context of the post-GATT era. First, it has a large proportion of the world's least-developed countries (LDCs). Second, most of them are trade dependent – 70% of their foreign exchange (and in some cases more), comes from commodity exports, and most depend on a very small range of commodities. Third, the majority rely on a single market, the European Union. Of course, there are other countries which are LDCs, trade-dependent and heavily oriented towards Europe for their exports. But I challenge you to find many that combine these three characteristics. This is what is special about the ACPs.

In the context of GATT and the WTO, these factors must be recognised. It is sometimes argued that you cannot prefer the ACPs over the rest of the developing world. But as I have just pointed out, there are characteristics which provide a strong argument for continuing special treatment. Equal treatment of unequals is unfair too.

Turning to the EU itself and its development policies, I will be interested to see how it reconciles its poverty focus with the pressures that exist for less favourable trade treatment for the ACPs. The Green Paper refers to the social dimension and ensuring that resources benefit the poorest. How can you say you are going to have a poverty-focused cooperation programme and, at the

same time, destroy the trade regime which is a lifeline for so many of the countries in question? Is the EU really going to undermine what it seeks to achieve with one instrument by applying contradictory policies with the other?

'ACPs will press for continuing special trade arrangements'

■ So you believe the ACPs will argue for continuing trade preferences?

— Most definitely. They will press for some form of special trading arrangement to continue, and I believe will resist anything which could precipitate export market difficulties. And I think it unlikely that the international community would want to do this. There are sometimes pressures that are well-grounded in economic and trade arguments and in these cases, we must try to fashion arrangements which meet these concerns and are consistent with the needs of development. But often, the pressures are entirely political. Very often, you know, people pursue ideological paths that are satisfactory intuitively. It is only when you see them operating in practice that you discover there is a big gap between theory and reality. The path to the ideal trade regime – like that to hell – is paved with good intentions.

■ You have highlighted the fact that different ACP countries and regions have had different success rates. One issue in the post-Lomé debate will be the geographical structure of any future arrangement, and the possibility of differentiating between countries and regions. Are there any views about this emerging on the ACP side? In particular, is there a strong commitment to the maintenance of the existing ACP Group?

— I think you have to recognise that the current Convention already has scope for differential treatment of either countries or regions. There are regional indicative programmes which allow you,

say, to have a particular focus in Southern Africa that is not the same as in the Pacific. At the country level, the national indicative programmes are negotiated between the Commission and the individual ACPs. This means, for example, that the priorities for Jamaica may be quite different from those that apply in Benin. And, of course, the special Lomé instruments such as Stabex and Sysmin relate to particular sectors. What I am saying is that the Convention as it stands is a multifaceted tool which allows for differentiation by sector, country or region.

The real issue, I think, that is subtly reflected in the Green Paper, is not differentiation but exclusion. The ACPs have not, so far, accepted that some members of the Group should be excluded because they are in a particular region or income category. And I think the views of the ACP Group should be taken into account in the question of the composition of the Group.

From my own experience as a negotiator on the ACP side – even before I took on this assignment – I believe that the current structure and size of the Group has assisted it in negotiating with the EU. I would be surprised if the ACPs were to find negotiations in smaller groups more effective. In negotiations, the Group provides a countervailing power, if you like, to Europe. And I think perhaps it has made things easier for the Union in the sense that it has not had to deal with a disparate set of negotiating entities. But of course, it means that the ACP position is strengthened. I know that some European commentators find this feature politically inconvenient.

■ So you think essentially that the broad framework should remain and that any differentiation to take account of divergences within the Group should be in the context of a single new convention rather than a series of separate agreements?

— Yes, my impression is that that is the direction in which the Group is likely to continue. Of course, I am giving you a cautious response here because the ACP Heads of Government and State will be meeting next year. This is part of their remit and I don't want to give the im-

pression that I am pre-empting what they decide. I am just giving a response on the basis of what has happened so far in the debate.

■ *Can we turn now to the role of aid. On the donor side, some people are sceptical about the ability of developing countries to manage aid. At the same time, there is the widely-held view that beneficiary responsibility is essential if aid is to be effective. How do you tackle this apparent contradiction.*

I think we need to understand that there is a potential contradiction. Development policy – and I prefer to use this term, rather than focusing solely on aid – involves the implementation of policy. Some of these policies may be popular but others will not be, because they involve choices and the reallocation of resources – often between groups within a country. Development policy therefore impacts differentially on the community. To implement the policies consistently, it is necessary to convince those directly concerned of their efficacy. They may have to be persuaded to sacrifice something today for benefits which won't appear for five or even ten years. If they are not persuaded, they may seek to undermine the policy. So it is very important for government and their constituents to be the 'owners' of the policy. An idea may initially have been hatched in a developed country, but the donor should recognise the need for acceptance by the recipient. Beneficiaries have to be involved in policy formulation and implementation.

We should recognise that there have been instances where donors have forced rubbish down the throats of developing countries. Sometimes, this is influenced by ideological positions. Often, donor proposals directly contradict the economic research actually undertaken by their research organs or multilateral bodies. Thus, for example, there have been occasions where the research of the World Bank has been at loggerheads with the work carried out by the officers in the field. It would be wrong to assume that everything coming from the donor side is sound or that donors are somehow omniscient in this respect. Traditionally, donors have behaved as though

they are omniscient and have pursued a supposedly benevolent approach.

'Countries must own the programmes themselves'

■ *A top down approach?*

— Yes. But it is now quite widely accepted that countries must own the programmes themselves, if these programmes are to be effective. This is increasingly stressed, for example in World Bank publications and evaluations. When they are working on policy framework papers, they now seek to have the issues discussed in the affected countries themselves and in their Parliaments before any concrete decisions are taken. In the old days, policy framework papers and stand-by agreements were often secret documents. Agreements were signed between the Bretton Woods institutions and the appropriate developing country minister without many others being involved.

At the level of the bureaucracy, there is a different problem. In donor countries, one has to be alert to the preferences and prejudices of the officials who are responsible for administering the programmes. I might mention here our recent experience with the Lomé mid-term review. I am not seeking to cast aspersions on individuals. This is an institutional problem. Looking at the brief prepared by the Commission for the Council, the impression was given that all the problems encountered by the Lomé Convention turned on the fact that the Commission had to consult the recipients – and that this led to inordinate delays. That is the kind of position that could be expected of a bureaucracy. As far as they are concerned, consultations and co-management are a nuisance. For them, everything would be perfect if they could be left in their omniscience to handle the decision. We have experienced this kind of attitude in other international fora as well. And whilst it may be true that dialogue sometimes prolongs processes, it

doesn't automatically follow. Indeed, studies of some EDF disbursement rates and the reasons for their delay show that aid was actually disbursed more slowly where there was no requirement for consultation (the Commission itself being the sole decision-making body) than where the Commission was obliged to consult. In any case, dialogue is necessary for that other dimension we discussed – ownership.

Another conclusion arising from various studies on the problems of implementation, which is often overlooked, is that there are inadequacies on both sides. This was acknowledged in the post-Fiji study, for example, which was adopted by the ACP-EC Council. There is inadequate decentralisation by the Commission and processes overlap or require too many overviews by different layers of the hierarchy. Not enough responsibility is devolved. But in the final analysis, the objective is not the convenience of an administration wherever it may be. The essential aim is to enhance development and that means looking at what development requires. I hope I am not going off at a tangent here, but let me give you a concrete example. A very significant proportion of the aid disbursed currently under Lomé ends up as technical assistance. Most of that work goes to European consultants. Now, if we accept that the process of development should be 'owned' by the beneficiaries, this means it ought to be managed by the recipients. We also talk a lot about sustainable development. This implies institutional development in the countries themselves. Yet capacity-building is not reflected in the pattern of resource disbursement. This has been a major area of contention between ourselves and the Community.

It was a former President of the World Bank who observed that, a quarter of a century after independence; there were about 100 000 consultants involved in disbursing billions of dollars of aid in Africa – considerably more consultants, that is, than at the onset of independence. The point he was making was that by now, we should have been in a position to utilise domestic skills to manage most of these programmes. And it

isn't because the skills are lacking. I think the source of the problem lies on the European side. Apart from seeking to find jobs for their own nationals, many Member States and the Commission have difficulty coming to terms with the idea of widespread use of ACP skills and consultants. This is an important issue which forms part of the contradiction you raised – and it needs to be addressed.

■ *To what extent will the process of European integration affect the future of ACP-EU relations? In particular, how do you envisage the role of the European Community in its own right?*

— One aspect of this issue arose in the course of mid-term review talks, especially during discussions on the size of the financial envelope. I think one has to recognise there are strengths in each mode of cooperation. Multilateral and bilateral cooperation each have certain advantages. Obviously as a multilateral group ourselves, there will be a preference on the ACP side for multilateral cooperation with the EU. This is only logical. At the same time, we should recognise that individual countries may have strengths in certain areas. For example, some countries may have particular competences in environmental protection – tackling coastal erosion or building sea-defences. One would expect bilateral aid to reflect this. By and large, integration should enable the EU directly to provide a range of such competences as well as to complement them by tackling those less glamorous but critical areas of assistance.

Another aspect worth mentioning is that the efficacy of each type of aid depends very much on how it is supervised overall. Each mode of cooperation may also be prone to weaknesses. I think we have seen enough difficulties in bilateral aid to recognise that no system is absolutely perfect.

As for the process of European integration itself, I think the Group would see this as an opportunity to improve the coherence and coordination of EU policies. We hope the process will not lead to the diversion of trade, which favours new entrants at the expense of the ACPs. The objective of integration is

to strengthen the basis for growth in the EU and to enhance internal economic development. If, at the same time, the Union is committed to overseas development, they will surely find scope to provide incremental assistance to the ACPs, and other developing countries, from the gains of integration. I think that if there is that political commitment, there will be room for expanding cooperation. And after all, there is no evidence that the European public is hostile to giving assistance to developing countries.

What they want is to be sure that the help is being put to good use. I think if we are responsible in conveying to the public that development is a difficult process, with no easy fixes, then they are less likely to be disenchanted.

If I might just come back to the Green Paper, there is one aspect that we haven't really touched on. There is a lot of talk about political dialogue in a manner befitting the growing international political and economic profile of the EU. Major subjects for such ACP-EU dialogue should, according to the Green Paper, include good governance, human rights and the implementation of international treaties and agreements. But when one is speaking about dysfunctional policies in developing countries, the Green Paper should have recognised that some EU Member States have contributed to the problems.

Member States pursuing commercial interests are major actors in many of the countries where there is currently considerable disruption, notably in Central Africa and some parts of West Africa.

Sometimes, Member States appear to be pursuing conflicting objectives. On the one hand, there is the desire for a stable social and political framework, backed up by appropriate economic policies. But some EU Member States are still selling weapons to unstable areas and these have been used to commit some horrific crimes.

Of the world's ten biggest arms exporting countries, six are EU Member States. So when we are speaking about human rights and the importance of good governance, we also have to say something about the responsibilities of



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An abandoned tank in Somalia
'Some EU Member States are still selling weapons to unstable areas'

our partners. At the moment, these issues are perceived and addressed in an entirely one-sided way.

In conclusion, I think that if we are to have a better Convention, it has to recognise that partnership is important. We should commend the prescience of those who drafted the original Convention with the concept of partnership as a fulcrum.

But I am not sure that the full import of this principle was recognised at the time. It is even more important today in a world committed to democratic practices only so long as its practice is confined within borders – and we should stick with it. We certainly shouldn't write it off because of bureaucratic inconvenience. Nothing in development is easy. There may be problems with the system but that is a reason to improve it – not abandon it. After all, the alternatives may be worse. ■

Interview by Simon Horner

Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister for International Cooperation

'The European Commission should be more courageous'

Much of the discussion on the Green Paper takes place while The Netherlands holds the Presidency of the European Union. We spoke to the country's International Cooperation Minister, Jan Pronk who will be leading the debate in the Council of Ministers.

■ *The figures in the Green Paper suggest that many ACP countries have not achieved significant economic and social development during the last 20 years. Does this mean the Lomé system has failed? Are there any aspects of the Convention which should remain intact?*

– Lomé is not a failure but it is not a great success either. I think we need to preserve the core of the Convention, which in my opinion is a unique comprehensive approach, integrating aid, trade and political dialogue. I don't know of any other model of international cooperation which is based on the combination of these three pillars. The problem is that the third element – political and institutional dialogue – has not, in fact been developed. I think this area needs to be strengthened.

As regards the commercial aspects, the Convention covers mainly countries with monocultural economies which have not benefited from international trade. In addition the Lomé instrument for trade promotion, namely tariff preferences, has constantly been eroded by the process of international liberalisation. This is almost unavoidable, unless one opts for other ways of promoting trade with the Lomé countries. In a context of international trade liberalisation, the poorest nations need extra, direct help, and the Lomé Convention has provided them with it.

Aid is the first of the three Lomé pillars. Unfortunately, as presently organised, it has serious shortcomings. It is mainly project-



based, is far too donor-centred and places a serious bureaucratic burden on the recipient countries.

The improvements that the Convention needs for the future are obvious: more macro-economic aid, which saves on bureaucracy; more specific trade promotion instruments, rather than general tariff preferences; and much more attention for the third Lomé pillar – political cooperation.

■ *What, in your opinion, are the main reasons for not continuing as before?*

– We have entered a new phase in relations between industrialised and developing countries. This means that all the existing models need to be looked at again and a number of international or regional institutions, including the Lomé system, will have to undergo reorganisation – even if there is no great enthusiasm for this.

Second, the relationship between EU and ACP countries is essentially based on links between national governments, not between societies. More recent cooperation models give more prominence to representatives of civil society. The intergovernmental emphasis in ACP-EU relations is partly due to the African partners, who have been involved in a long process of nation-building. But it is also due to the European Commission, itself a government-oriented, bureaucratic organisation, which places far too little emphasis on civil society. Yet what we have encountered in the 1990s are not so much problems of inter-state relations, but rather problems brought about by changes in society itself. In addition, in many countries, structural adjustment, democratisation and globalisation have seriously affected the position of public institutions in society.

■ *What will be the impact of globalisation on development cooperation?*

– This is a capitalistic process led by capital and technology, and it cannot be halted. But if it is not controlled, it will prove to be extremely costly. It will remove political and social considerations from the top of the international agenda.

As the international market economy finds its own funding mechanisms, development cooperation, more than ever before, must become the instrument for maintaining the socio-political aspect worldwide. It must sustain international cooperation – in areas not automatically covered by the market, such as health, education and the environment – and in tackling poverty more generally.

■ *Yet there seems to be a growing divergence between developing countries, and particularly among ACP states. How should one take account of this?*

– Without ruling out other possibilities, I favour extending the Lomé model to other developing countries, particularly the least developed ones. Under Lomé as we know it now, there is considerable economic differentiation among the partner countries.

■ *Does that mean the Lomé system should be broken up into smaller units, tailored to the needs of specific groups of partner countries?*

– I think that is too sweeping an idea. As I said, Lomé has three components. Trade policy clearly requires more differentiation, both geographically and sectorally. As far as aid is concerned, it is obvious that some countries no longer need development assistance *per se*. They are looking for other types of support to help them gain access to the international capital market. A selective approach can make development cooperation less costly, and enable donors to give priority to those countries most in need.

Political cooperation, I would think, can be dealt with for the Lomé countries as a group. There is no need for separate deals with individual states. It is clear that political differences between ACPs are increasing, but I think we should maintain the political dialogue with the Group as a whole. I would caution ACP countries against the dangers of dividing their political discussions on a national or regional basis. As a single group, their political weight is rather limited as it is. Dividing it up would probably result in smaller countries losing whatever political influence they have now.

This does not mean that mechanisms for political dialogue cannot be improved. We need to make them more efficient and speedy. Perhaps the model of the European Troika could inspire the ACP-Group.

Or they could opt for a stronger role for the bureau, as a representative body of the group as a whole. It is essential, however, that those who speak on behalf of the ACP countries be truly representative.

■ *The Green Paper also mentions beneficiary accountability as essential for aid to be effective. Yet people in the donor states are sceptical about the ability of developing countries to manage aid. How can one tackle this apparent contradiction?*

– To begin with, I think it is different in The Netherlands. I don't believe the Dutch are all that sceptical. They are confident that developing countries can manage their own affairs. Of course there are countries where the state has collapsed, but these are the exception. At any rate, it is not for donors to substitute

themselves for the authorities of the beneficiary nations. Developing countries have a right to design and implement their own policy – and even to make their own mistakes. On this point, I think European development aid has not set a good example.

In addition, we must recognise that in recent years, many African countries have seen the coming-of-age of a new generation of managers and political leaders, who are more modern, more open-minded and less clientelistic than in the past.

■ *How do you envisage the role of the EU in future relations between Europe and the ACP countries – and in international cooperation in general? In an interview with 'The Courier' in 1974, you said that your country was not keen to harmonise development policy on a European level, unless Europe made drastic changes to its own policy*

– That still holds true to a fair extent, but we have learned that it is better to move the whole of the EU a small step forward, than for us, The Netherlands, to be way ahead of the others. We have become a bit more realistic. I am all in favour of harmonisation, intergovernmental cooperation, even coordination. But it must be advocated by the Member States themselves. What I find difficult to accept is the type of coordination the European Commission tries to impose from above. There is a serious risk of bureaucracy taking over, and of EU development policy losing contact with its constituency. We must not lose public support for international cooperation. Countries which have the highest levels of development aid are those where public support is strongest. As for the Community's own policy, it should not be forgotten that political control of the Commission is very weak, and that it can often do as it pleases. Democratic control is much stronger at the national level.

■ *But in the end, it is the Council of Ministers that decides?*

– I don't believe that is true. The Council has no say over disbursements. At a policy level, it can only decide if the Commission puts down a formal proposal. One of my greatest disappointments is that the Commission has not been more coura-

geous in making proposals to the Council. I find it particularly frustrating that it has systematically refused to submit a proposal for untying aid at the Community level. One cannot expect a small country like The Netherlands continuously to bring up the subject. So at a certain point, we gave up. The same applies to the cocoa-directive, and the attempts to bring about more coherence between development and other Community policies.

So, on the one hand, the Commission lacks the political leadership to promote the harmonisation of fifteen national policies. On the other hand, it has developed a sixteenth development policy of its own. I don't think this is what we need. Emergency aid is a good example of where the Commission has used coordination as an argument for actually taking over from the Member States.

■ *Does that mean you think that the Community should avoid international cooperation, leaving it to the Member States and other donors?*

– Not at all. I believe that international cooperation, and its social implications, are so important that Europe cannot afford not to be involved. And the EU has something specific to offer. It acts as a reduced scale model for the solution of many global issues, if only because of the fact that it is made up of countries – none of them superpowers – with very diverse political views. The common positions it adopts often pave the way to global compromise. Second, it is a very credible partner in international policy because it consists of Member States that are all serious about democracy and human rights. For these two reasons, the position of the EU – if it succeeds in reaching agreement – represents considerable political weight.

But the Union needs to work on a credible international trade policy and external relations policy. Its trade policy is too protectionist; its foreign policy is practically non-existent. This is one reason why I think the Green Paper is a welcome initiative. It is a good text. It will certainly be helpful, provided the Commission accepts a truly open debate, is prepared to listen and takes account of the position of the ACP countries before it determines its own position. ■

Interview by Mark Leysen

Professor Uwe Holtz argues for new issues to be placed on the development cooperation agenda

'From *homo econoemicus* to *homo ecoleogicus*'

Professor Uwe Holtz is a veteran campaigner for development cooperation in both in his native Germany and Europe. For 22 years he was an SPD member of the German Parliament and for 20 of these, he presided over its Development Cooperation Committee. He is now a lecturer of Political Science at Bonn University, as well as being kept busy with work for various NGOs such as the International Food Policy Research Institute in Washington D.C.

The professor was recently appointed by DG VIII's Information Unit to be one of its 'Development Correspondents' in EU Member States. Their task is to explain the importance of European development activities to the public. Not surprisingly, in talking of the areas to accent in the EU's future development planning with ACP nations, he stresses that European action in the field needs to be given greater visibility. More effort, he believes, is also needed to explain how development cooperation improves the lives of EU citizens too.

Development cooperation, for Professor Holtz, is an all-embracing concept covering every aspect of the process from economics to ecological concerns – with the human being firmly at the centre. During our meeting, he underlined the need for the EU to take the lead in North-South cooperation. He argued that it should place new issues on the agenda, mentioning here in particular, 'global risks' such as those of an ecological nature.

Education

The professor said that a true picture of the success or failure of the Lomé Conventions could not

be drawn simply by looking at the basic economic and social data. This was the case, even for the 'successful' models highlighted in the Green Paper, such as Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Uganda and Mauritius. Their economic and social development, he suggested, could well be attributed to factors external to the Lomé system. Each ACP country has its own particular development history, our interviewee stressed, which makes any assessment based on a balance sheet of economic and social figures unreliable.

He acknowledged that education and training was an area where the Lomé Convention had rightly focused in the past, arguing that this should be given even greater prominence in the future. 'The Lomé Convention contains a mish-mash of development concepts but the key strategy for economic and social development must be education training, research and capacity-building.' Whilst the new watchword in development circles is privatisation, education and training have to come first. The private sector, after all, is highly dependent on a well-trained workforce.'

Turning the conversation to the impact of globalisation, Professor Holtz feared the effects of unbridled global free trade on the ACP states – who would find it difficult to compete with low-cost goods from other regions. 'The potential of regional groupings should be encouraged', he said, with their integration into world markets supplemented by regional markets in the Third World.

As to whether there should be one or more cooperation agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific nations in the future; Professor Holtz said the ACPs should be asked first. He saw 'advantages and disadvantages' in all the scenarios advanced in the Green Paper; from



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maintaining the status-quo to the more radical proposals involving new links with the burgeoning free trade blocs around the world. The strong political direction of the Lomé Convention must be kept, he said, including the political ACP/EU institutions such as the Joint Assembly. He favoured a global EU framework for the developing world, laying down the main objectives for development cooperation, trade relations and the partnership approach, as enshrined in the Lomé Convention and Maastricht Treaty. The framework convention should be followed by specific agreements with regional groupings.

But whatever the form chosen, the Professor said that the traditional aid and trade format should remain. Trade and investment could not take off without aid to bolster the social, political and economic infrastructure, he explained, returning to a point repeatedly made throughout our conversation about the need for a well-educated workforce.

Global risks

In reply to a question about new aspects to be covered in future cooperation with the ACPs, Professor Holtz put across a strong case for a more 'muscular' development policy, providing stronger North-South leadership. He predicted that the economic power houses of the next millennium would be the United States, Japan, India and Brazil but felt that the EU could become a real

global player and source of strength in North-South relations. This required a more 'political' policy designed, among other things, to tackle the global risk of 'eccocide.' He quoted the Green Paper: 'Development cooperation should be one part of foreign policy, embracing environmental aspects, defence, and economic and social aspects.'

He went on to advocate stronger promotion of the rule of law in future agreements: 'Development cooperation should promote the globalisation of the rule of law', the Professor insisted, with a particular emphasis on tackling human rights abuses and corruption. To date, he suggested, the EU has been somewhat arbitrary in implementing its human rights policy. This allows aid to be suspended where flagrant violations are uncovered, and funds to be allocated to assist good governance (for example to support the organisation of multi-party elections). 'Member States,' said Professor Holtz, have hesitated to take a stronger line because of their specific trading and even linguistic interests. Human rights violations should not be overlooked just because of an EU country's long standing trading links with a particular ACP state.'

He also expanded on his idea for an international social market economy, in which trade liberalisation would be mitigated by social standards: 'You see brutalising capitalism from Poland to South Korea reaching our countries too,' he asserted.

The concept of an international, social and environmentally sound market economy is attractive, and it must deal with issues such as child labour in developing nations. If you are talking of an international social market economy, you can't allow cheap labour, prison labour and so forth, which lead to a lowering of standards in other countries.'

The Professor also echoed one of the watchwords of Commissioner Pinheiro, who called for greater 'coherency' between the development and other policies of the EU, when he spoke at the launch of the Green Paper. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one most often called into question in this debate, not forgetting the arms export policy of some EU members.



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Poverty

Turning to the aid aspects of the Convention, the Professor advocated that real pockets of poverty should be targeted. And where aid had been suspended because of deficiencies in implementing the rule of law, it should nonetheless continue to be directed to the ordinary people through NGOs. Having said this, he cautioned that 'not all NGOs are doing good work.'

Extra resources, he felt, should be channelled too into promoting intercultural understanding and co-existence between different cultures, in order to avoid future conflicts. In this context, he cited 'The Clash of Civilisations', a famous thesis developed by *Huntingdon* which had had an impact on development concepts and American political thinking. 'Huntingdon talks about the clash of civilisations in the same way that Marx and Engels spoke of history as a class struggle. This may be simplistic, but there is an element of truth in it.'

The question I am raising is whether the old North-South rivalry could be substituted by a new conflict pitching Western Christian states against the Islamic countries.' The Professor referred to the emergence of a combined development aid initiative amongst Islamic nations. This, he felt, could be a danger. 'Development cooperation,' he concluded 'should always promote the existence of different cultures.'

Professor Holtz considers that, to date, European integration has had a positive effect on the promotion of global development cooperation: 'Look at the Maastricht Treaty. For the first time, there is a development chapter enshrined in

The concept of an international, social and environmentally sound market economy is attractive, and it must deal with issues such as child labour in developing nations

an EU Treaty.' Backing up this proposition, he noted that the EC's aid budget had bucked the trend. Most of the Member States' bilateral commitments had declined in nominal terms. He cited Denmark and Netherlands as possible exceptions here.

He also believes that the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden has been 'helpful to the development cause' although the long list of potential new EU members in Central and Eastern Europe states 'would need time to be convinced of the importance of this issue.'

This led us to a more general reflection about the development process: 'Development needs time in every country,' said Professor Holtz. 'It is not possible, for instance, for Estonia and Poland to develop in two years and reach the standard of France. So a change of mentality is required. But above all, Europe has to learn that it cannot survive if other continents are sinking into oceans of poverty. He issued a plea for a 'common strategy', quoting France's former Defence Minister, *Jean-Pierre Chevènement*, who said that the EU must look for a real political profile and that this can be found in North-South relations. 'Let us hope that this turns out to be true', concluded the Professor ■

Interview by Debra Percival

'ACP private sectors must rise to the challenge'

The private sector, says the Green Paper, needs to come to the fore in future planning of ACP-EU cooperation. We put some questions to Joe Foroma, Chief Executive of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industry (CZI) for an entrepreneur's viewpoint*.

Mr Foroma began by acknowledging that ACP countries have not, on the whole, seen any significant social and economic development during the lifespan of successive Lomé Conventions. But this did not mean that programmes had been misdirected or were irrelevant, he argued, stressing the broad range of actors affecting the fortunes of ACP states. He referred, on the one hand, to the efforts to open markets across the globe in the Uruguay Round of GATT talks, which had not drawn the necessary 'positive responses' from ACP countries. On the other hand, he observed, 'the great superpowers of the United States and Europe still consider some sub-sectors or products as sacrosanct and not subject to competitive pressures, even from the weakest in the world.'

Mr Foroma went on to recommend that it would be useful to keep the Lomé elements which have assisted ACP countries in promoting and marketing their products: 'It will also be important to retain those programmes that previously acted as safety nets for the poorest and weakest in developing societies. Activities that promote efficiency, productivity and competitiveness must be retained.' And success is essentially up to ACP states themselves, he suggested. 'Countries must ensure they work hard to create conditions for growth. External support should be seen as complementary'.

But that support should include more private sector backing: 'In almost all parts of the world today, economic reforms are taking place and the private sector is increasingly recognised as the engine of growth' he argued. 'Success will be limited if the private sectors in the ACPs cannot rise to these new challenges. In the future, emphasis



should be on assisting liberalisation in these countries and helping them to concentrate their efforts on competitiveness issues - in order to succeed in the increasingly integrated world economic system.'

Market access

As for the future design of a new agreement or, perhaps, multiple agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific nations, Mr Foroma acknowledged that a strong economic drive would steer thinking on the future: 'One should build up capacities in the slower performing states so they can address the fundamental economic issues facing their economies. The burning question is market access.' Referring specifically to his own region, he stressed: 'The peoples of Southern Africa need to be satisfied that the post-Lomé scenario will not be less favourable than the present trade arrangements.'

The current talks on liberalising trade between South Africa and the EU were a particular source of concern for the CZI Chief Executive. He would like to see more attention paid to the possible effects on South Africa's immediate neighbours. 'The EU can do the sub-region invaluable good by supporting efforts that minimise the propensity for domination of the weaker states by those currently wielding economic power in Southern Africa. It can assist us by not allowing South Africa

to forget the important role it can play in allowing its weaker neighbours to coexist with itself. Specifically, I do not believe that the EU should sign a free trade pact with South Africa if South Africa is not itself doing the same with its neighbours.'

Value for money

As for making sure that future EU aid to development cooperation is well spent, he highlighted the requirements of the private sector: 'One way of providing meaningful support is to apply the principle that, after the intervention, there should be less need for aid. It is important to provide aid in a way that targets the private sector - using value for money criteria that would be likely to show a return.' He added: 'For the public sector, aid would perhaps be most effective where it was demonstrably utilised to improve the operating environment so that private initiatives could blossom. The private sector can influence things by taking a genuine interest in matters of economic management and trying to understand issues from the perspective of the policy makers. In this way, it would be accepted as a development partner, and its proposed solutions would carry more credibility in the eyes of the Government.'

He shared the view of many of our other interviewees that states of the South should club together to meet the onslaught of economic globalisation - before it is too late: 'Globalisation appears to be shifting the world into trade blocs, and this can be observed in some of the ACP states. There will be a ferocious sharpening of capabilities as nations seek to stay in the global market place.' Mr Foroma said that countries of the South needed to recognise this, and take serious steps to group together now. If they delayed, it might end up being too late to prevent large parts of their economies being lost to external competition.'

Mr Foroma emphasised that ACP nations could learn from the European integration process in developing their own regional groupings: 'The EU can help by sharing its own experiences on the crucial process of integration, especially by demonstrating the virtues of open economies for the long term competitiveness of nations.'

* The Courier is grateful to the European Commission Delegation in Zimbabwe which arranged this interview on our behalf.

Economic integration and war on poverty

by Irène Christodoulelli*

The Green Paper has launched the debate on the new style of cooperation that will govern relations between the EU and its ACP partners once Lomé IV has lapsed. This debate is made necessary by the need for development cooperation policy to evolve in response to the major changes that have taken place on the international scene in political, economic and trade terms since EU-ACP cooperation was first set up, and for adequate allowance to be made for the diversity of situations of individual ACP countries. Faced with the squeezing of aid budgets, the main purpose of the discussion is to work out how cooperation can make more efficient use of the available resources and build a more accountable partnership.

The priorities for future EU-ACP cooperation centre around two main themes: the smooth, progressive integration of the ACP countries into the international economic system and the integration of the poor into economic and social life. The Green Paper opens a debate on these themes without prejudging the answers that will come out of the processes of listening, dialogue and negotiation.

Economic marginalisation

The first theme for deciding priorities in future cooperation arises from the observation that certain ACP countries are only involved in the very margins of world trade. Despite their position at the top of the pyramid of trade preferences granted unilaterally by the Union to the developing countries, and despite the highly favourable terms under which they have access to the Union's markets, the ACP countries have still not been able to take advantage of these benefits to diversify their economies and develop their exports. This may be explained by the nature of their exports, which are essentially primary products, or by the weakness of world prices for raw materials. But another reason for this marginalisation is the policies

practised by ACP States themselves, for in most ACP countries the economic policies and internal structural conditions, that are a precondition for the development of economic and trade activity and growth, are sometimes lacking. However, trade is as much dependent upon access to foreign markets as on domestic policies.

In the not-too-distant future the ACP countries will be facing fiercer competition because of the accelerating process of economic globalisation once the agreements reached at the Uruguay Round come on stream. Nonetheless, they will be able to benefit from new opportunities of access to markets (resulting from the lowering of import barriers by the major world markets), and to reduce the harmful effects they are likely to experience from the *erosion of preferential tariffs* on their trade position by improving their *competitiveness*.

Moreover, with globalisation, access to international markets is becoming ever more complex and depends on other considerations unrelated to tariff obstacles. Tariff levels will play a smaller and smaller role and other factors will come along to form new obstacles to market access. Which is why it is so important to increase our cooperation in these new trade-related areas so that ACP countries can be helped to

respect the new international commitments. If the economies of ACP countries are to increase their competitiveness and become part of the global market they will have to define the terms of a new *development policy*. The support of the Union for the economic, structural, political and institutional reforms embarked upon in the majority of ACP countries is more vital than ever before.

Despite the differences between the countries of the ACP area, the importance of the private sector and of investments - and their role in development - is common to all, no less than the role of internal policies. What is more, worldwide investment flows and the net contribution of private capital are seen nowadays as the main source of finance for development, and so can counterbalance the decline in foreign government aid and reduce dependence on this aid.

But unless the civil service is healthy, credible and free from corruption, there will be little to attract the private sector and local and foreign investment. This shows just how important it is for the state to uphold and keep within the law, as well as for there to be political and social stability and democracy, since these elements ensure the security of investments. The economic and political dimensions of development are therefore closely intertwined.

As to the problem of massive *external debt*, there must be progress in controlling this if the ACP countries are to re-establish a sufficient degree of financial credibility and regain access to the capital markets. External debt prevents growth and reinforces the dependence of these countries on the industrialised nations. We must do everything in our power to reduce this dependence. The financial cooperation of the Union, almost exclusively in the form of grants, has no effect on the debt of these countries. But we should also be seeking to improve the financial conditions already laid down in the revised Lomé IV and provide more technical assistance in areas such as external debt control and international financial negotiation.

* D.G. VIII-5 trainee

The main challenge to ACP countries is therefore to achieve a *durable improvement in domestic economic and political management* so that the hoped-for economic upturn can be brought about.

Future cooperation will have to help reduce the dangers and causes of instability that currently deter the development of the private sector and discourage productive investments. It must also seek to bring the ACP States into international trade because enhanced international flows will also encourage economic growth, raise living standards and create jobs.

The world is changing at an alarming rate. The accelerating spread of technological innovation, advances in computing and ever more powerful means of communication mean that there will be no alternative but progressively to cut loose the ties of scientific and technological dependence in which the majority of ACP countries are enmeshed. The consequences for any who do not participate in these changes will be disastrous and this should rouse the Union to action in this particular field.

Decision-makers and the private sector must invest in the new technologies of communication. The ability to make use of these provides a powerful incitement to development. Important here is the active part that can be played by the private sector in the financing of scientific research and the role of direct foreign investment to improve the access to technology.

Steady technological progress demands continual investment in skills and abilities. Turning human resources into better human resources and developing job skills by education and training are necessary in order to fill the gap in business ability and technical qualifications.

In certain countries, economic marginalisation is accompanied by *social disintegration*, a rise in violence and a multiplication of armed conflicts, leaving humanitarian disasters in their wake. *It should be possible to develop closer political ties between the EU and the ACP states in this area.* In those ACP states that are

unable to rise to the challenge of achieving peace, development efforts will never produce the hoped-for fruits.


Social cohesion, peace and security are the *sine qua non* of development. This is why cooperation must work to preserve an acceptable degree of social cohesion. The very prosperity of these countries will contribute to international and regional security in a world in which interdependence is defined increasingly by environmental and social issues, and not just economic and financial ones. Regarded in this light, the regional economic integration supported by the Union in its cooperative work is a powerful stabilising factor.

Social dimension

The economic and political aspects of development are only means for achieving the more fundamental ends of the well-being and freedom of mankind. Development issues are not therefore reducible to macroeconomic and financial aspects alone. An integral part of development is its social dimension. The gravity of situations of poverty and their consequences in terms of instability and the multiplication of potential conflict hotspots make it necessary to focus the work of cooperation on the war on poverty in order to prevent the disintegration of the social fabric.

This cannot be done without policies being implemented that target specific social issues and without incorporating social considerations across the board in all development programmes and projects, even if these are on a macroeconomic scale.

The combating of poverty and the improvement of economic and social living conditions is therefore first and foremost down to domestic economic and social policies. The task of cooperation will be to encourage governments to implement such policies and to provide technical assistance where needed by ACP governments, civil services and institutions to fulfil their role and provide the services the people need.



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Steady technological progress requires continual investment in skills and abilities

To help the poor begin to climb the economic and social ladder, the scope of cooperation must be enlarged to include certain new players that are influential in civil life (such as local organisations, rural co-operatives, women's groups, companies, trade unions, etc.), either in the form of dialogue on the priorities of cooperation, thus enabling them to play an active part in decisions that will affect their lives, or in the form of direct access to some of the resources available. This approach questions the very essence of the Convention, given that even today the state is virtually the only partner in the cooperation relationship.

The emphasis on participatory development, already present in the revised version of Lomé IV, will enable these influential groups and people to negotiate with the institutions and services of the state and to apply pressure to governmental action, thereby strengthening democracy. It will also enable the objective of independent development cen-

tred on the individual to be achieved more quickly. As far as technical co-operation is concerned, the same thinking stresses the importance of mobilising local expertise - in other words, making more frequent use of ACP personnel in contracts for consultancy and technical assistance.

Environmental protection, another important factor in poverty politics and an issue of planetary importance if ever there was one, demands that the ecological impact of development projects and programmes be assessed before they are given the green light. The Union also has a duty to help ACP States develop their ability to devise environmental policies and put them into practice.

Future cooperation must work to bolster the partnership relationship on the basis of more effective dialogue, greater accountability of the beneficiaries, and mutual rights and duties.

The problem is that the partnership principle has been eroded: partly because of the weakness of the institutions of the beneficiary countries and their dependence on aid, and partly because a large slice of the financial resources are put through on a kind of automatic pilot, which discourages any internal effort to make better use of the foreign aid. In addition, the growing habit of attaching strings to aid, the object of which is to encourage beneficiary countries to change policy direction, and the tendency of the EU to stand in for the defaulting party, have not encouraged ACP governments to become as deeply politically involved as was intended. A certain flexibility in the attaching of strings must therefore be hoped for by the application of realistic conditions, and global evaluations of work done must be carried out in the light of long-lasting development objectives rather than in the light of individual indicators. In the future the *political* side of EU-ACP relations must therefore be emphasised.

This political emphasis is also motivated by the need to strengthen the observance of the law, a necessary condition for inequality and poverty to be reduced, and by the

need to apply transparent principles in government, civil service and budgetary control - but also because the motivations of the Union have themselves changed. The geostrategic motivations of yesterday are no longer those of today.

Today the Union is looking for ways to increase the effectiveness of its foreign policy and its aid.

It is setting, and will increasingly set, great store by matters such as good governance, democracy, participation and the establishment of a public service and legal system

which can and will guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms.

Ways to increase effectiveness

In the face of the loss of the legitimacy of aid and of downward pressure on development aid budgets, it is imperative that the best possible use be made of the avail-

*Overgrazing in Northern Africa
The environmental impact of development projects and programmes must be assessed before approval is given*



VIVANT UNNERS

able resources. Future cooperation will therefore be decided more on the grounds of its effectiveness. To this end, the Member States of the Union, the EU itself and other donors must *act in concert* to avoid effort being dissipated at a time when the available resources are shrinking.

There must be increasing co-ordination, not only of global initiatives, but also in each beneficiary country. Donors must keep in step with each other when it comes to the practice of attaching conditions to aid.

The way aid is granted and especially how support is given for reforms, can be used to encourage governments to adapt their policies as necessary, and above all to ensure their continuity. The criteria for the allocation of aid must therefore be re-examined.

The options in the Green Paper on this subject imply an increasing responsibility on the part of the beneficiary countries. The criteria for the distribution of the projected resources between the various ACP countries should include, not only need, but also performance and good management.

This would enable effort to be concentrated on the poorest countries and on those where the impact of Community action is likely to be the greatest - which means that aid will become more selective.

A system of allocating resources in successive tranches would allow greater flexibility in the use of Community funds and would encourage good performance in the implementation of local programmes and of sector-based policies, as well as forcing the Community to keep better track of progress.

Greater dialogue on what policies should be introduced will facilitate the shift away from aid which is essentially granted as a way of financing projects, to technical and financial support for sector-based policies. Why should Community support be focused on sector-based policies rather than individual projects?

The answer is that aid for individual projects underestimates the importance of the macroeconomic

context in achieving a satisfactory impact on economic and social conditions.

Aid for one particular project, such as building a hospital, can therefore be seen to have little relevance if it is not part of a well-focused sector-wide policy. For instance, overall support for a country's health policy in the form of direct aid for the state budget, or aid given in tranches, makes it possible to control the implementation of the health policy.

This enables individual projects to interact with each other and, therefore, has a more effective impact by avoiding the useless dispersal of monies.

The choice of which sectors to prioritise with aid will be decided upon by consultation between the two partners.

Allocating Community aid in the form of general aid to the budgets of these countries will encourage the beneficiary states to be more responsible in the financial control of their policies.

The contractual, predictable nature of aid resources must be maintained because its effect is to encourage governments of beneficiary countries to undertake long-term programmes. Predictability is also a guarantee of long-term commitment, which should increase the sense of safety and confidence of investors.

The disbursements of the EDF are at present designed to run in five-year programmes. This rigid system of five-year allocations should be discontinued to enable rapid adaptation to changes in economic and political conditions and to introduce greater flexibility by switching to rolling programmes lasting three, four or five years with, say, yearly reviews.

The ACP area is far from homogeneous with some countries ever more deeply enmeshed in poverty and others on the road to economic turnaround and political democratisation.

The role, the contents and the methods of cooperation cannot therefore be the same for each



Primary health care in Kenya
It is difficult to criticise project aid which brings benefits to individuals, but to achieve a longer-term development impact, many believe that there needs to be more emphasis on the sectoral approach

country. Hence the necessity of suiting aid and assistance to the particularities of each country and to significantly different levels of development.

The principle of differentiation could thus influence the very shape of the future accord, which, in turn, may be a measure of the importance the Union attaches to the process of regional integration. ■

I.C.



Antigua and Barbuda

Paradise troubled

The Courier

The first thing to remember is to watch your pronunciation: learn to say 'Antiga' and 'Barbyuda' if you want to avoid reproaches from the local people. In the language of international tourism there are beautiful countries, very beautiful countries and tropical paradises. 'Paradises' differs from the other categories, not so much in the marvels of nature (which can be found in Cuba, the Dominican Republic and, indeed nearly all other Caribbean nations) but rather in the room that is given to tourists and the discretion of the people who actually live there. In short, the term is generally reserved for small, sparsely populated places where the small local population fades into the background.

Antigua is one of those Caribbean paradises alongside St Martin or St Vincent & The Grenadines. Paradise status can also be measured by the number of big names from the world of finance and international society who spend their holidays there and the relative expense of the destination, giving the impression that it is reserved for an élite. Antigua and Barbuda is not to be outdone here either. Diana, Princess of Wales has visited many times and Eric Clapton has a home here. Less praised, but no less prized, is the fact that these same countries are usually tax havens.

Clearly, then, Antigua and Barbuda is a paradise. But beyond the sandy beaches, deep blue sky, temperate tropical climate, music and relative moral freedom – in other words beyond being just another Caribbean country – Antigua and Barbuda offers

its citizens a rather rare privilege for a tropical paradise in the form of a relatively high standard of living. The GDP per inhabitant is US\$7500, virtually the whole population is literate, health indicators are comparable with those of developed countries and there is a parliamentary democracy modelled on Westminster. This, however, is essentially Antigua. The same indicators do not apply to smaller island of Barbuda – which could be a million miles from its more populous neighbour. Antigua, with its reasonable incomes, good standard of living and (still just) effective communications infrastructure, is not typical of a developing country. Barbuda, by contrast, suffers from underdevelopment. There is a third island in the group, Redonda, which does not make it into the country's official title (it is uninhabited).

Post-decolonisation economic success

It must be said in Antigua's favour that its rapid economic development has not been a legacy of colonisation. The big changes affecting the island have taken place since it became self-governing in 1967, and especially since full independence in 1981. It used to be a small, isolated place relying heavily on agriculture. Now it has a flourishing service-based economy. Almost a million visitors come here every year, the tourist industry contributing, directly or indirectly, about 60% of overall GDP. In 1994 the number of cruise ships increased by 17%. They come mainly from the United States as do the majority of stopover visitors. But European tourist arrivals are also up by 24%. These are largely longer-stay visitors. The country has

succeeded in specialising in the service industries, presenting itself as a kind of luxury 'outlet' for tourists. It gives an impression of offering top of the range quality, and haute couture, at relatively affordable prices. Over the last few years, the country has also seen major developments in financial services, attracting significant amounts of capital. The growth rates recorded since independence were regularly up to 7% per annum. There was a dip in the early 1990s, but it could have been a great deal worse. Growth fell to just 3% although it was rising again in 1994. And there are some real opportunities to diversify and attract foreign investment. This was illustrated in the privatisation of the air transport company, LIAT, based in Antigua.

Not everything is the garden is rosy

So much for the pluses. On the negative side are the hurricanes and depressions (in all senses) of a tropical paradise. Despite changes made to the economy, to decrease reliance on tourism, this sector is still largely dominant, making the country a hostage to changes in the weather. Violent storms, such as Hurricane Luis, which struck in September 1995, certainly have an adverse effect on the balance sheets. The figures may not be disastrous but there is no doubt that there was a decline in activity as a result of this particular meteorological event. The tourism industry is also faced with two big structural problems: a lack of expertise, and the deterioration of the road network. For some years, cash shortages have meant drastic cuts in public sector investment.

The government may have taken a series of measures to stimulate industrial production, but the effects have yet to be felt. One of the biggest obstacles here is the country's small population. Programmes designed to draw in investment have succeeded, but only in the sense of attracting capital. Banks, trusts, insurance companies, and other financial service businesses came seeking a tax haven – and expected to receive as warm a welcome as that offered to tourists. But a warm welcome for international capital may also mean a bolt-hole for dubious funds. In its issue of 6 September 1996, the opposition daily, Outlet, quoted from an allegedly reliable source, a report from the US State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and

Law Enforcement Affairs on drugs trafficking and money-laundering in this small Caribbean state. Dated March 1996, the report claims that the country has long been a transit point for drugs and is increasingly becoming a centre for money-laundering. Antigua's airport is said to be an important regional link in the drug traffickers' network, being used for smuggling operations to the United States and Europe. The report goes on to describe drugs barons using the two islands as a staging area and cache site and alleges that Antigua is developing financial services which are poorly controlled or not controlled at all. A banking service has certainly been set up near the airport, and its activities do not appear to be subject to any serious controls. Of course, opposition publications might be expected to display a lack of balance and there is a certain crudeness in the sensational way matters are reported. But Antigua's most popular newspapers, Outlet and The Daily Observer, are replete with tales of corruption which they claim go to the heart of government. The stories are rarely refuted but neither do they appear to be followed up very often by legal investigation and process against the alleged offenders. Those in power do not enter the fray and are scornful of 'rumours'. One case which did make it to the courts concerned the brother of Prime Minister Lester Bird who was sentenced in 1995 by his country's legal authorities for possessing and trafficking cocaine. Another brother has been barred from public office having been implicated in the financial scandal surrounding the construction of the Vere Bird International Airport.

The party in power is regularly re-elected and yet respects formal democracy, something which an outsider might find somewhat surprising. Legal independence is also established, as the successful prosecutions of members of the Bird family show. The government does seem to be in control, supported by a tacit *modus vivendi* and taking little notice of the rest of society. Those Chamber of Commerce officials that *The Courier* spoke to explained this paradox by the closeness of those making up a small society: the village mentality, which turns what outsiders would call 'corruption' into 'looking after one's own'. Despite this, the Chamber has some sharp things to say about government economic policy. It criticises, in particular, the mecha-



The Courier

Barbudan child at a public fountain—
Looking at the different levels of
development in the two islands, Barbuda
could be a million miles from its
more populous neighbour

nism for collecting excise duties which, it argues should have been more stringent in the wake of the decision to abolish income tax. The laxity of the tax authorities is a major cause of grief for the public revenue office. The authorities claim to be bewildered by the vast quantities of money in circulation in the country yet do not appear to be asking any searching questions about where it has come from.

Debt problems

Another problem facing the economy of Antigua is the burden of foreign debt and the current account deficit in the balance of payments. This situation has arisen despite the fact that the OECS (Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States) dollar is pegged to the US currency – which keeps inflation under control (it is running at barely 3.5% annually), and despite the growth of the economy. In 1994, foreign debt was equivalent to 80% of GDP. The government has had difficulty servicing this, and as arrears built up,

the Caribbean Development Bank and other funders stopped making loans available. Since Antigua is a relatively important country within the OECS, these problems run the risk of destabilising the whole organisation and also the ECCB (East Caribbean Central Bank).

Any measures taken by the government appear to have had little effect. Expenditure is still increasing, there is no income tax and revenue collection is generally a haphazard business. The government's diversification policy, presented as a priority, seems not yet to have received the attention it deserves.

Although efforts have been made to encourage manufacturing, above all in the craft, electrical components, building materials and drinks sectors (mainly for local consumption), support for agriculture to reduce the country's dependence on food imports has not got very far.

There has, however, been a genuine effort in some specialised sectors such as cotton production, where a seed supply programme has been launched along with a technical assistance programme. There is a tradition of farming and cattle-rearing in An-

Raising livestock in the interior
Diversification is said to be a government priority but it needs a lot more attention



The Courier

tigua, and this area has considerable potential which could be readily exploited. Recently, there seems to be renewed interest in cattle production.

The government has reacted to the macro-economic difficulties by drastically cutting infrastructure budgets. Public investment has been neglected. Rather than helping to remedy the situation, this approach could undermine the island's economy still further.

The medium and even short-term consequences of the policy have been a deterioration in infrastructures, especially roads, and in the environ-

Cruise ship setting off from St. Johns, Antigua


Economy dominated by tourism - with a warm welcome for finance companies

ment. This could lead to disastrous consequences further down the line, especially in tourism, the goose that currently lays most of the golden eggs. Work is vitally needed to clean up the waste water system, but despite official declarations nothing concrete has been done. Even the public awareness campaigns planned by the government have yet to see the light of day.

However, the 'village mentality' does have its good side. The country's economic problems have had little effect on the living standards of the population. Three out of every four 'native' Antiguan actually live abroad and they provide a 'social security' backup with their remittances. *Lionel Boulos* of the Chamber of Commerce believes that without this contribution, the standard of living would worsen visibly.

Meanwhile, many observers are of the opinion that if a financial clean-up does not take place quickly, the machinery of society will begin to run down. There is a mist hanging over paradise. ■

Hégel Goutier



The Courier


Interview with Minister of Trade, Hilroy Humphreys

No income tax, high salaries, small population, and under-development: a tough challenge

A journalist with experience of small countries, where it is usually not too difficult to arrange meetings with key personalities, might get a surprise in Antigua. When The Courier visited, there was a sense of foreboding in the air – and not just because Cyclone Hortense was looming. Political leaders, battered by the winds of adverse press comment, seemed anxious not to commit themselves. However, just before the real winds struck the island, we found one political heavyweight, Trade Minister Hilroy Humphreys, who was ready to take off the gloves and enter into open discussion with us. We began by asking him about the serious economic situation, and notably the huge external debt, with which even ordinary voters seem preoccupied. Was this due to wrong decisions in the past?

— It is not a matter of wrong decisions. When we came to office in 1976, things were very bad. There was a need to put some buoyancy into the economy and we felt that our Labour government had to provide the catalyst. In order to move the economy forward and get infrastructure in place, we had to borrow funds. These loans have proved to be of benefit to Antigua and Barbuda.

But because of our tourism base, we have a relatively high *per capita* income, certainly in comparison with Latin America or Africa. This meant that we could not tap into bilateral aid or preferential loans. And the trouble with getting funds from multilateral organisations is that it can take four or five years to come through. So we had to go for loans at a commercial rate. We needed to get things done quickly because there was a lot of unemployment (the rate was about



Hilroy Humphreys

40% at the time) and we had to bring the rate down.

■ *But now the government is trying to boost tax revenues. What do you say to those who criticise your tax policy, arguing that it places a burden on ordinary people instead of targeting people on higher salaries?*

— We abolished income tax in 1976. This was one of the election promises we made because we wanted people to have more disposable income. We recognise now that as a progressive tax, income tax has certain advantages. But what we have done is to review the whole field of fiscal measures from company taxes to customs duties. We feel that these are areas the government will have to tap to get funds to replace income tax. And once you have a proper inland revenue department and a functioning corporation tax, I don't think there should be a problem.

A lot of people have got away without paying taxes because of the laxity of the government service. To tackle this, we have just created a 'Tax Compliance Unit' which will assist us in setting up a proper revenue department. We have given

a contract to a British firm which has people who are well-versed in looking at balance sheets and accounts. So the people who have got away with it in the past will now have to start paying their taxes.

■ *Tourism is the country's economic mainstay but it is falling off. Visitors say that Antigua is expensive. What about your traditional strategy of targeting high value tourism?*

— We do foresee a drop in tourism next season. What we are trying to do now is put the proper infrastructure in place so that we can recoup some of the losses. Electricity and water are already of the highest quality. As for the product itself, the hotels will have to come up to the standard required by the tourism industry. It is also important for workers to display the right attitude. The tourist, after all, is looking for value for money and good service. We are hoping to do some retraining of taxi drivers, beach vendors, restaurant staff and others involved in the industry, so that they can realise that their work is the lifeblood of Antigua and Barbuda.

We will continue to target the high-level tourist – those that have money – but there is also a need to target the middle range. We acknowledge that Antigua is too expensive a destination. Electricity charges, wages and food costs are all very high. So we have got to find ways of getting these costs down. At the moment, we are doing a study of the port to see how we can reduce costs and make food less expensive. We now have to look at wages and see whether we can freeze them over the next couple of years to give hotel owners and manufacturers a breathing space to plan for the future.

■ *You have drawn up an economic diversification programme. What does this entail?*

— We are now looking at small manufacturing industries where we can create employment. There is also an emphasis on agriculture and agro-processing with the aim of making ourselves self-sufficient in at least some agricultural products. 80% of the economy currently depends on tourism. It would be better if we could get this down to 60% or 40% by boosting other areas. In manufacturing, we are considering new areas such as leather crafts, clay pots and figurines. We also want to see if we can manufacture parts for refrigerators and washing machines here. And we are moving into informatics and the 'information super-highway'. This is where the future lies. If we can train people to be computer literate, and get a few factories established doing data-processing, computer electronics and electrical engineering, this would assist the economy. We have scheduled a programme which we intend to implement in the next six months, starting with informatics and agro-processing.

■ *Agriculture is a field requiring human resources, yet Antigua is not very populous. Are you planning to attract workers from other countries or Antiguan living abroad?*

— No. What has happened quite recently is that a lot of young people have gone back to agriculture on their small family plots of five to ten acres. Right now we are self-sufficient in onions for at least ten months of the year and in tomatoes for seven months of the year. We also produce a lot of cereals and cotton. With just a little government help, and a reduction in the price of water for irrigation purposes, we should be able to raise agriculture's share of the economy by between 5% and 10%, thereby reducing our dependence on tourism.

A lot of Antiguan have been returning recently – including skilled citizens who have worked overseas. We are expecting many more to come back to investigate the opportunities that exist here. In the UK, Canada and the USA, the situation is very different from what it was in the 1960s. Unemployment is a problem in these places and there are no social security benefits.

■ *Turning to politics, you won 11 out of 17 seats at the last election, but in*

terms of votes, the position vis-à-vis the opposition is more evenly balanced. The governing party has suffered a big drop in the number of votes. Do you see this as the beginning of the end of ALP rule?

— When one has been in power continuously for more than 23 years there are bound to be difficulties. There are young people who weren't even born when we came to power who now have the vote. And there are a lot of things which we have done – which had to be done – that people take for granted. I do not see the end of ALP rule, but I do recognise that we will have to work even harder than we did in the past to retain power. I think it can be done so long as we work as a team and ensure the right policies are put in place.

■ *In the newspapers, we find detailed criticisms of the government, and particularly, allegations of corruption. Government ministers do not seem particularly concerned, saying they are just rumours. Is there corruption and if not, why do you tolerate newspapers writing such reports?*

— There are absolutely no ethics in Antigua's press. Most of the papers are politically motivated. Having said this, I would be deluding myself if I were to say that nothing has happened. But my main concern is about the libel laws. These should be structured so that we can refute the claims and obtain speedy redress from the Courts – and, at the same time stop the papers from printing. The problem is that with so many cases before the High Court, a libel action can take four to five years. So the papers feel free to harp on about corruption all the time. I myself have been accused by the press. But as a government minister, you must learn to take the pressure. Once in a while, it goes too far, and you have to put the record straight. But you can't spend all your time issuing denials. Of course, the opposition is bent on making corruption an issue. I hope that if they ever get into office, they will investigate all these claims.

■ *So there is no corruption in any government institution?*

— As I said, I would be burying my head in the sand if I were to claim that there is no corruption.

There is bound to be some somewhere – whether in the civil service, the private sector or in government itself. But I am not aware of any specific cases.

■ *What about the Rolls Royce case in which one of your government colleagues is said to be involved?*

— That one is very embarrassing. I have read what the papers have been writing and listened to what the minister has said. But all we can do now is wait until the investigation into the customs and port authority has been completed.

■ *Can we turn to the issue of Barbuda, which I have just visited. People there complain that the island is treated as a colony. They are also unhappy about the land issue. Apparently, there was a verbal agreement that the Barbudans should be allowed to control their land. And there appear to be ecological concerns.*

— There will always be a problem between Antigua and Barbuda, whether it is the ALP or the UPP that is in government. It is part of the Barbudan psyche that they feel we treat them as a colony. Barbuda is 62 square miles and Antigua 108 square miles. But Antigua has 70 000 people and Barbuda has just 1500. So there is no way you could have the same level of development there. They argue that they should have the same type of development, but it is never going to happen.

As for the land issue, it was laid down by the British years ago that the land must not be sold. Each Barbudan can be happy and comfortable in his house, but all they seem to want is to control the land. The Court has established that this belongs to the Crown and I don't think that is going to change right now. The Government is not going to let the land be sold to anybody. If that happens, there is a danger that people will buy up as much land as possible and indulge in speculation.

And, of course, there will always be arguments about the environment. The ecologists, the government which has to provide employment, and the people who need the jobs, will all have their own point of view. It is a question of striking a balance. The government is trying to find that balance between the environmental aspects and the eco-

Rapid fire from the opposition

conomic needs of the country. There are times when the ecology will be affected, but if it is in the interests of development, then surely there must be priorities.

■ *Why has Antigua and Barbuda's aid allocation under Lomé IV not been fully utilised? It was suggested to me at the Chamber of Commerce that the private sector doesn't receive enough information from the government about the Lomé Convention.*

— I would put the blame on the Planning Department which has been very lax. In truth, the government has been a bit lackadaisical. If you look at St Lucia, you see that they have taken full advantage of the Convention. But we hope we will be able to start accessing funds if there are any more available, and we have some projects in mind. There is, for example, the resettlement programme covering road improvements, electricity, water and some housing. We are also looking at possible heritage sites for tourism, and the whole area of agriculture diversification covering agro-processing and small business development.

In the past, I don't think entrepreneurs were properly consulted or brought sufficiently into the process. However, we recently started having monthly meetings with the Chamber of Commerce which is under my Ministry. This gives us an opportunity to tell them what has been happening: for instance the talks in Caricom or the issue of NAFTA and free trade within the Americas. We are also holding some seminars with them where we can bring them up to date on what is happening at the World Trade Organisation. So there will be a closer relationship. But I would agree with you that in the past, there has not been that synergy between the private sector and the government. ■

Interview by H. G.

Sporting a beard several days old, and with the profile of a young baseball player, opposition spokesman Baldwin Spencer has a smile that is part-innocent, part mischievous. Having plunged into Antiguan politics, he displays a steely determination about what he regards as the decayed state of the local body politic. His criticisms are sweeping, encompassing the economic, social and international policies of the current administration. But his main line of attack is against corruption, which he claims has infected the system and threatens the future of the country.



*Baldwin Spencer leads the United Progressive Party (UPP) which came into being five years ago as a result of a merger of two of the country's three pre-independence political parties. Shortly after meeting with *The Courier*, he and seven UPP colleagues organised a picket at the office entrance of a minister suspected of corruption – who is currently under investigation by a Commission of Inquiry. One of his co-protestors writes for 'Outlet', the country's largest-selling newspaper, and is renowned for the sharpness of his pen. In the event, all eight were arrested by the police and charged with public order offences. This was*

just the latest twist in the turbulent politics of Antigua. Fortunately for the economy, the controversies appear to have no effect on the hordes of cruise passengers who are met with calypso music when they disembark. When he spoke to us, Baldwin Spencer's first salvo was aimed at the government's economic policy.

— We are deeply concerned about the state of the economy and its management. More specifically, we focus on unemployment, the whole question of governance in our country, and the issue of media access.

The economy has been contracting in recent years. This is a direct result of short-sighted policies, and policies that have not been properly executed. It has to do with the poor management of scarce resources – financial and otherwise. There has been a lot of waste, some element of corruption, and a certain indifference on the part of managers in the face of some chronic problems. Another aspect that has hampered our development is the fact that the public service has become politicised. This has undermined its ability to assist effectively in managing, executing and implementing programmes and has negatively affected the delivery of services to the community. To a large extent, the public service has been marginalised and its role as the engine of administration and management has been thwarted. We believe you need to have a public service that is capable of responding to situations, and when it is politicised to the extent that it is here, that creates a problem.

■ *Do you think the public service is in a position to tackle the liberalisation of the economy?*

— Looking at it purely from an internal management standpoint, I suppose one could say that it is. But, as I say, the key problem is that it is not effective because it is too highly politicised.

■ *Is this politicisation which you say is happening a recent phenomenon or has it been taking place over a longer period?*

— It has been the practice of successive ALP governments over the years. I suppose they see it as a way of maintaining political power. What they have done is to extend the public service so far that there are now a lot of people on the payroll who are there primarily for political reasons. They are not necessarily there to perform meaningful functions or to make the service more efficient in delivering services to the public.

■ *You mentioned problems with the economy. In the light of these, how is it that the government has retained its majority in Parliament?*

The main reason is that over the years, they have effectively controlled the electronic media which is a powerful means of communicating with the public. As a matter of government policy, 'other' voices have little or no access to the publicly-owned electronic media. They have also extended political patronage so far that it has become an industry all of its own in Antigua and Barbuda. Taken together, the effect is to control the mindset of the people. A third point is that as long-standing incumbents, they basically control the political process and electoral machinery. This means that elections here are not as free or fair as they could be.

On top of these factors they could, at least until the mid-1980s, claim to have presided over an economy which appeared to be booming. In fact, those boom years have turned out to be very expensive for our society because the government took out massive loans to finance public sector projects.

Some of these were ill-conceived and others could never be considered viable. They may have created some jobs but these were short-lived and now we have the burden of having to repay these massive debts.

■ *But isn't there a contradiction in your position. You criticise the government for job-creating measures in the 1980s yet today you are arguing that they should devote more resources to reducing unemployment.*

There is no contradiction. What we are saying is that the effects of measures in the 1980s were short-lived and now we are effectively back to square one, but with the added problem of high debt. It was a lopsided strategy designed for the short-term. The medium and long-term effects are now catching up with us.

■ *You have claimed that there is widespread corruption. How do you explain this, given that Antigua and Barbuda is a democratic country and there is press freedom?*

It is true there is some degree of freedom as far as the print media is concerned. We have the Daily Observer which has now been operating for two and a half years and there is also an important weekly paper. But there is no freedom with radio and television.

As regards corruption, successive ALP administrations have been associated with a variety of scandals over the years. I don't think you will find any other government in the region that has been subjected to as many inquiries and investigations.

If this is so, then you might well ask why they win elections. But as I have just explained, they have used a combination of patronage, control of the electronic media, politicisation of the public service and tampering with the electoral process. This has helped them to secure power. Having said this, there are now signs that their stranglehold can be broken. At the last general election in 1994, the opposition significantly improved its position in terms of the popular vote. In fact the government polled about 14 000 votes and won 11 seats, while the opposition mustered 12 000 and won 6 seats (based on the Westminster system of 'first past the post'.)

■ *But have you improved your position sufficiently to win the next election?*

— This is quite possible. The situation is looking good at the moment but, of course, there's a lot of work still to be done. It is clear from the existing situation in the country that this government doesn't deserve to be returned. Our job is to convince the people of this, and we are beginning to sense that they themselves feel a change is now nec-

essary. Events since the 1994 election may well have convinced them of this.

■ *According to some observers, the opposition still lacks credibility. The suggestion is that you would lead the country in the same way, so it's better to keep the ALP team on the principle: 'better the devil you know'*


— We are often faced with this argument and it is clearly a matter that we have to address. But I don't think the sentiment is as commonly held nowadays as it was five years ago. People are saying that a new administration could hardly be worse than what we have at the moment.

■ *The opposition has been criticised for failing to make use of all the available legal means in fighting official corruption. What have you actually done?*

— That's a good question which I am happy to answer. As an opposition, we used to think we could use the courts to address some of these issues. So we tried that but we found that they are not very helpful. In truth, these are political issues which have to be addressed on the political battle front. In attempting to do that, of course, we find ourselves up against the constraints which I mentioned earlier – lack of access to the broadcasters, the government's control of the state machinery and so on. They have also spread their tentacles into the private sector.

We feel strongly that when a government minister is accused of serious wrongdoing, and investigations have to be carried out, he should not be allowed to continue in his ministerial position. At the very least, he should be suspended from office pending the outcome of the investigation. If he is exonerated, then obviously he can go back to his post. But this has only happened once, in the 'guns to Colombia' affair, when the minister was pressured into resigning.

A number of public demonstrations against corruption have been organised, but these have been largely ignored. We have had demonstrations involving thousands of people, but the government takes no notice. As far as they are concerned, they are in power and that is that.



Heritage Quay in St John's (Antigua), one of a number of centres for casinos, banks and diamond trading. *'They have been using non-nationals as a political buffer and so have encouraged the development of a situation where non-nationals are given preference'*

■ *You have also said that you believe the government's fiscal policy is disastrous for the country. Why?*

— A lot of small businesses have gone under because of the crippling tax burden, leading to job losses. The whole economy has been affected by the way fiscal policies are being pursued.

Over the years, financial resources have been put into education and yet we still don't seem to be producing enough educated nationals to man all the services. As a result, we have become heavily dependent on individuals from outside the country to manage certain key areas of the country's economic and social life. Mechanisms have not been put in place to ensure that nationals get the opportunity to manage and be involved in these key sectors.

We need to re-examine the whole approach to education and training. There is also a political aspect to the government's employment policies. They have been using non-nationals as a political buffer and so have encouraged the development of a situation where non-nationals are given preference.

One argument that has been advanced is that they are doing this to meet the criteria set by international institutions like the IMF. It is said that to damp down local wage demands, you should open the job market to non-nationals who may

be willing to work under less favourable conditions.

I should add that we are concerned with the social situation and issues such as sanitation and the environment. Health care delivery at community level leaves a lot to be desired. We see the need for more decentralisation and the provision of basic health services, catering for the real needs of the population. It is true that we have clinics and small health units in some communities, but the services provided are mostly inadequate. And there is a real problem if people need immediate attention. They may have to travel many miles to the Central Hospital to get the treatment. We believe that 'poly-clinics' should be established on a zonal basis throughout the country to take care of the immediate needs of the population.

■ *There is a lot of discontent in Barbuda. Do you think the situation could lead to secession?*

The Barbudians have always had the feeling that they are the poor relations of Antigua and that they have not been properly treated

over the years. They do not feel themselves to be an integral part of the nation – and their grievances are valid to a great extent. I am not sure whether secession would solve the problem. I think that what we need is a complete change of approach and attitude. Barbuda should be viewed as an integral part of the nation and treated as such. Frequently, when national policies are being formulated, very little attention is paid to Barbuda. It tends to be seen as a peripheral issue and that is a mistake.

The other issue is over who owns Barbuda. This is likely to remain a sticking point in the relationship because the Barbudians firmly believe they have lost control of their land. That is something the Barbudians should be able to determine themselves – but working with central government. The island, as you know, was effectively one big estate owned by the Codringtons. When the island was passed over, the covenant stated that land in Barbuda must remain communal and that there could be no individual ownership. That is the big difference between Antigua and Barbuda. In addition, there is the feeling that they have not had a fair deal in terms of services.

■ *Can you envisage a kind of federation, allowing the Barbudians control over the land or perhaps special property legislation to sort out the problem?*

— So far the courts have ruled that the land belongs to the Crown. The Barbudians have challenged this and the matter will be taken up at the Privy Council – our highest court of appeal, which is in London. I don't know where this will lead.

I am sure that you will see a significant difference in the level of development in Barbuda when compared with Antigua. They have not enjoyed the same pace of development and lag behind in the provision of basic services. It's like a different world there, and that is obviously an essential part the problem. ■

Interview by H.G.

Two families, one history

Those people who are able to frequent the two exclusive hotels on the island, with their own airport, guards and port of embarkation, have clearly realised that Barbuda is the true paradise – far from the package deals of Antigua favoured by the middle classes. The Deputy of the island and secretary of Barbuda Council, *Hilbourne Frank*, like his fifteen hundred fellow citizens, curses these preserves of luxury. Barbuda claims a right to inspect the management of its resources in the name of a special history. 'In Codrington days...' is how all stories start. The Codrington family owned Barbuda for two centuries, enforcing its own law – often to the great displeasure of the British Crown – and using this territory as a breeding ground for developing its business in Antigua. Since the independence of Antigua and Barbuda, another family, this time native to the islands, the Birds, has been at the forefront of the political scene.

The pre-colonial history of Antigua and Barbuda is like that of most Caribbean countries. Initially inhabited by the Arawaks, the first traces of whom date back to the very beginning of the Christian era, archaeological investigations have unearthed many pieces of pottery and implements which span the whole of the first millenium. The Carib Indians then arrived, on their migration from South to North America, and conquered the Arawaks. In the north-east Caribbean, they were actually based in Dominica and St Kitts, from where they carried out raids on Antigua, and then Barbuda and Redonda, which they named Waladli, Waomoni and Okanamannu respectively. The country's later history has a familiar ring too: it was Columbus himself who discovered the island in November 1493 on his second voyage to America. Without taking the trouble to moor there, he christened the island in homage to *Santa Maria de la Antigua* of Seville Cathedral, to whom he attributed the miracle of his American success in exploration. However for various reasons, such as the scarcity of permanent springs and the belligerence of the Caribbeans, colonisation took its time to turn the place into a 'chosen' destination. The Indian communities of the three islands, who had to brave only sporadic arrivals of Europeans, mainly Spaniards and Frenchmen, survived for another two centuries.

It was not until 1632 that an English expedition, led by *Edward Warner*, took possession of the island. The English held on there and Antigua has never changed hands apart from a brief French intrusion in 1666 which was ended the following

year by the Treaty of Breda. Slavery of African negroes became well-established, like everywhere else in the Caribbean. In 1674, Sir Christopher Codrington, an adventurer who had previously tried his hand at trade in other Caribbean settlements, arrived in Antigua. He was to be the one to turn everything on its head. He introduced the so-called 'cane revolution'. Over the four previous decades, the English had mainly developed the cultivation of tobacco, followed later by indigo and ginger. Codrington immediately started the Betty's Hope plantation, and its silhouette of mills dominated the history of the island until the beginning of this century. Today, its remains serve as a museum of the cane economy. Codrington's mills sprung up like mushrooms and many have withstood the test of time. Antigua is nowadays a Caribbean country which is unique for the richness of this pre-industrial colonial archaeology. To make room for wide fields of cane, Codrington swept away the local flora, destroying the forests. This gave rise to disastrous ecological consequences, including drought. For a long time, Antigua was compelled to import water. It was only after colonisation that the island was provided with local sources of supply, thanks to expensive modern techniques. Shortly after their installation, the Codringtons bought a small coastal island, *Guana Island*, and a little later, the 161 km² of Barbuda were added to their collection under a leasing contract made with the Crown. This provided that the lessees had to supply 'one pig per year, if claimed'. History does not record whether the Codringtons regularly paid this annual tribute to the British Empire. They used Barbuda as a storehouse for their sugar refiner-

ies and their stocks of raw materials, equipment and food. But above all, they turned the island into a centre for breeding slaves destined for Antigua. It is recounted that what they dreaded most was the moment of transfer – for Antigua had a terrible reputation as a 'hell on earth' for slaves.

The atrocious living conditions on the plantations owned by Codrington and his peers on this island led to numerous slave revolts. Two of the best organised were in 1736 and 1831. The former was aimed at overthrowing the colonial system on the day of the coronation of King George II, and at proclaiming independence. The later revolt was against local colonists who had refused to implement the British Government's reform policy intended to humanise slavery. In spite of troops being sent from Barbados, this rebellion was never fully subdued. In 1834, slavery was abolished on the island (four years before emancipation in the other British colonies). Some historians have suggested that before the independence of the United States, Antigua made a greater contribution to the power of the British economy than all the colonies of 'New England'. Slavery was abandoned only when the price of sugar had fallen irreversibly. Nevertheless, the British Government agreed to pay compensation of twenty million pounds to the colonists in Antigua. Nothing was provided for the former slaves.

The irony of this story is that the situation then changed to the detriment of the slaves of Barbuda. As far as the Codringtons were concerned, slavery had been abolished only in the British colonies. In their eyes, Barbuda was governed by pri



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Restored mill at Betty's Hope which has been converted into a museum
For two centuries, slave breeding on Barbuda was to provide the human stock for the many sugar cane plantations owned by the Codringtons in Antigua

vate law, and they considered themselves still entitled to 'breed' slaves and send them to Antigua. It was not until 1860, when it had become more expensive to feed slaves than to pay them the starvation wages then prevailing at Betty's Hope and other Codrington properties, that the family ended slavery on the island of its own accord. For a long time, therefore, Barbuda was a thorn in London's side. In the end, the island was officially united with Antigua after an abortive first choice in favour of Anguilla. But it took another ten years of waiting until, in 1870, the Codringtons agreed to give up their lease.

The colonial period saw no substantial improvement in the situation of the former slaves. First there was child slavery in the guise of apprenticeship. Then, at the end of the First World War, outraged by their exploitation at a time when the sugar price had risen again, the

workers took action. But the riots and attempts at insurrection were severely dealt with. Over the years, conditions deteriorated and at the end of the 1930s, Antigua was on the brink of violent conflict. Britain sent a Royal Commission to the island. One of its members, a British trade union leader, facilitated the birth in 1939 of the local trade union movement, the Antigua Trades and Labour Union (AT&LU). A certain Vere C. Bird was elected a member of the AT&LU Executive, and this is where the second family makes its entrance.

In 1943, Vere C. Bird took charge of the trade union. Despite the qualified franchise, which only allowed property owners to vote,

five trade unionists succeeding in gaining election to the local assembly in 1946. Only one, Vere C. Bird, made it on to the 'Executive Council'. When universal suffrage was introduced in 1951, the union won a decisive majority and Bird was able to consolidate his power. He was re-elected in 1961 and in 1966, he was appointed to the newly-created post of Prime Minister. Independence moved to the top of the agenda. At the 1966 election, it formed the basis for the trade union party's manifesto. A constitutional conference was then held in London which decided on the status of 'associated state' for Antigua, Barbuda and Redonda as of February 1967.

Political divisions subsequently arose within the trade union, the split of which led to the formation of a second party, the PLM (Progressive Labour Movement) which won the election in 1971. Thus, for the first time in 20 years, the rule of the Birds had been broken. George Walter, who negotiated the London agreements on autonomy alongside Vere Bird, became Prime Minister.

The third person involved in the agreements, the representative of Barbuda, also began to distance himself from the arrangement and began calling for independence for his island. The leftist and interventionist extremes of the PLM paved the way for Bird to make a comeback and he easily regained power at the 1976 election. The three political parties which then existed in the country were all calling for independence.

A second constitutional conference was held in London and spent most of the time debating the Barbuda situation, on which a compromise was worked out, which guaranteed the widest autonomy to this island within the future state. 1976 also witnessed another event which was important for the consolidation of the young nation: the tying of the Eastern Caribbean dollar to the American dollar at a fixed parity which has remained unchanged ever since. Official independence was celebrated on 1 November 1981. V.C. Bird senior remained in power until he retired in 1994. His son Lester Bird then took over. ■ H.G.

David and Goliath?

The ardent wish of 1500 people for independence

Just a short stretch of sparkling and enticing Caribbean sea, with its coral reef and sleepy lagoon, separate St. John's (Antigua) and Codrington (Barbuda), the two capitals of this 'virtual' federation. The change is extraordinary. We leave from the neat and tidy V.C. Bird Airport, close by the opulent edifices of various financial and commercial institutions.

We disembark, it seems, in the middle of nowhere. The 'airport' has no apparent boundary and the 'terminal' is a sort of workmen's hut. This is Codrington, where clusters of ramshackle buildings and small houses 'decapitated' by some previous hurricane lie dotted around, the jagged edges of the old corrugated metal roofs already rusted through. The mobile phone clipped to the belt of a North American visitor looks out of place - an anachronism in fact.

Luxury, here, is far away - almost at the other end of the island, and can be summed up in two short



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Hilbourne Frank

The man with a dream of independence for Barbuda's 1500 inhabitants

names, *Coco Point* and *K Club*. Their very mention seems to silence the island's inhabitants. For them, the two establishments are little more than a symbol of their land's subjection. It is September, the low season, when hurricanes are prone to strike. A single couple can be seen lounging

around on the *K Club* beach, which offers a rare and bizarre shade of sand - unending pink velvet. Just for us to catch a glimpse of the bungalows where the Princess of Wales and other celebrities come to unwind, *Hilbourne Frank*, the Member of Parliament for Barbuda, had to hold lengthy consultations with the keepers. They are linked by 'walkie talkie' to the authorised representatives who look after the luxury accommodation while their owners are absent. The female proprietor of one establishment is referred to mockingly by the foreign community of St-John's as the Queen of Barbuda. She has 40 rooms and bungalows, spread over 300 acres of land, which she rents out for around \$1000 a day. And she has plans to extend her property still further, having easily obtained permission on previous oc-

Barbuda's mangrove swamps
One of the reasons for the hostile atmosphere between the sand mine workers and the local authorities. The mine is reputed to have caused irreparable ecological damage

The Courier





Clarence House at Shirley Heights, built for the visit of Prince William Henry, the future King William IV, by one of his friends
Barbuda has long been exploited for the benefit of the rich based in Antigua

casions. Mr Frank is critical, saying that this flies in the face of Barbuda's tradition. He is opposed to the sale of the land, a commitment to which the negotiators of independence would have subscribed, but which is not explicitly laid out in the terms of the agreement nor in the 1981 law extending Barbuda's autonomy. Clearly the MP, who seems to believe in independence even if he does not say so in as many words, and the owner of the exclusive hotel, do not see eye to eye. But the latest target of local criticism is no less than the Princess of Wales. Rumours have been circulating that she hopes to purchase a property next to the two large hotels. Every time she visits the island, it is reported that soldiers come from Antigua to prevent local fishermen taking to sea.

Animosity towards those in charge of the sand mine, which we visited earlier, was equally apparent. The employees were openly hostile when they saw us getting out of the MP's vehicle. This mine is said to have caused irreparable ecological damage to the mangrove swamp which stretches along one side of the island, and to have salted up freshwater lakes. This is not to mention the visual pollution caused by the skeletons of abandoned machinery. 'All this,' our Parliamentary guide said angrily, 'in no way profits Barbuda, as you can see by our high level of destitution and underdevelopment. Environmental issues are the main stumbling block between Bar-

buda and the Antiguan authorities'. In fact, there are numerous bones of contention. The island may have its own Council, but laws promulgated at the behest of the central government rarely take account of this. Another issue which surfaces is the possibility of 'ceding' a portion of the island to the United States for use as a detention centre for boat people. Other visitors and residents have been less than welcome. These include the discredited magnate *Donald Trump...* and a herd of South American llamas which were supposed to be farmed commercially! It turned out that they were unable to adapt, which was probably a blessing for the local ecosystem. The possibility that there may be oil in the ground or the seabed of Barbuda is not likely to ease tensions.

The Barbudian authorities believe that their island would be self sufficient if their right to raise more local taxes was recognised. As things stand, tax receipts are low, exports from the mine escaping their control together with imports into the two hotel centres. All they receive is the landing taxes from tourists who have stayed for longer than 48 hours and the remittances of 5000 countrymen residing in the USA and the UK. If *Makeda Mikael* is to be believed, it is these latter who ensure the survival of the island. Ms Mikael is Hilbourne Frank's assistant, press attaché and advisor. She is a native of St Kitts and Nevis, a country which faces a similar separatist issue.

Mr Frank sits in the Chamber as an independent but usually aligns himself with the opposition, which he believes stands a good chance of success at the next election in 1999. Not that he rates them that highly - he judges them to be inactive if not timid. Nor does he expect much from Barbuda's Caribbean neighbours, who have shown their hand in their strong opposition to Nevis's independence.

Before becoming too involved in the political debate on the feasibility of an independent Barbuda, it is a good idea to immerse oneself in a trip on the lagoon - travelling through the mangrove swamp in a rowing boat. It offers a touch of romance - a journey on a thin strip which is neither land nor water. Above it all circle thousands - perhaps even tens of thousands of frigate birds. The male of the species inflates his neck out of all proportion in a dazzling scarlet during the mating season and performs his unending seduction ritual. I have no idea whether this magical spectacle is repeated several times a year, but I can say that it was a surprise and pleasure to witness it. It was a rare moment of contemplation. ■

H.G.

Profile

General information

Area: 442.3 km² (Antigua 280 km²; Barbuda 161 km²; Redonda 1.3 km²)

Population: 66 500 (1994 estimate) The majority of the people are of African origin. Most of the remainder have British, Portuguese, Lebanese or Syrian ancestry.

Population density: 237.5 per km² in Antigua; 9.3 per km² in Barbuda.

Average annual population growth: 0.4%

Capitals: St. John's for Antigua; Codrington for Barbuda.

Population of the capital: about 30 000

Language: English

Currency: OECS \$ (\$1 US = \$2.7 OECS - fixed rate)

Politics

Political system: Constitutional monarchy based on the Westminster model (member of the Commonwealth)

Head of State: Queen Elizabeth II, represented by Governor-General, Dr James Beethoven Carlisle

Prime Minister (Head of Government): Lester Bird


Political parties

Antigua Labour Party (ALP) - governing party which won 10 seats at the last election in 1994.

United Progressive Party (UPP) - main opposition led by Baldwin Spencer, which has six seats.

Barbuda People's Movement (BPM) led by Hilbourne Frank, which has one seat.

The next elections are due in 1999.



Legislature: Bicameral Parliament consisting of a House of Representatives with 17 elected members and a 17-member Senate. Senators are nominated by the Governor General, largely on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Economy

(Economic figures are estimates based on 1994 figures)

GDP: US\$ 494.5 million

GDP growth 3.5%

GDP per capita: US\$ 7435

Current account balance: US\$ -20.6 million

Exports: US\$ 40.9 million

Imports: US\$ 443.8 million

Trade balance: US\$ -402.9 million

Balance in services: US\$ +369.5 million

Total external debt: US\$ 396 million

Main exports: chemical products, agricultural produce and livestock, manufactured goods, petroleum products.

Main imports: food, machines and vehicles

Main trade partners:

Exports: OECS (26%), Barbados (15%), Guyana (4%), Trinidad & Tobago (2%)

Imports: United States (27%), United Kingdom (16%), OECS (3%)

Inflation rate: 3.5%

Social indicators

Life expectancy at birth: 73.4 years

Infant mortality (0 to 5 years): 17.8 per thousand

Access to health care: 100%

Adult literacy: 96%

Human Development Index: 0.866 (40th out of 174)

Sources: Caribbean Development Bank, USAID, World Bank, ECCB, UNDP

There is life after the beach

From the dockside at Heritage Quay, lit by the smouldering fires of the fast-setting Caribbean sun, you can see the baroque silhouette of St John's Cathedral. It is out of proportion to a capital city no larger than an overgrown village. But it is still dwarfed by the bulk of a cruise ship with its blaring sirens - a symbol of a country overwhelmed by an omnipresent tourist industry.

All day long, the jewellers' shops, dockside stores and alleys of the nearby market have been invaded by troupes of transient passengers, disgorged by the leviathan. Here and there, steel bands endlessly repeat tired calypso melodies, as if life has been set to music for the pleasure of the free-spending visitors. The few diners at the Hemingway and the handful of other restaurants outside the beach resorts that are open in the evening complete the picture.

At first sight, it is not a place for those who do not relish idleness or would like to discover something more about the 'real' island. The guides can only offer the tourist fare - a series of regattas, surfing competitions, catamaran tournaments - and the out-of-season carnival which

seems to have been arranged to fit the holiday-makers' calendar rather than tradition.

And yet, those who seek, find. There are the Antigua Jazz Festival, dance performances, various activities at the Antigua and Barbuda Museum and exhibitions at the Harmony Hall. The Museum of Antigua & Barbuda, housed in a fine neo-classical building, offers a historical and archaeological collection including magnificent Arawak pieces and a few works of art. Young Antiguan, for their part, pay homage to the bat used by Viv Richards in 1986 when he broke the long-standing record for the fastest ever century in a cricket Test match. A thorough search will turn up the occasional corner of outstanding beauty, away from the tourist attractions with their kitsch architecture. There are opportunities to get off the beaten track, or at least to beat it in a different way, poking around in picturesque little villages like Liberta, or in one of the many pottery shops, a craft that represents a genuine Antiguan tradition. There are Sarah Fuller's works

*'Yellow Umbrella' by Heather Doram
A production based on homesickness, subtly reminiscent of African roots, revealing then intimate aspect of a land often blurred under a commercial coating*

at the New Pottery near the airport at Coolidge, or the wonderful sienna and ultramarine pieces at Nancy Nicholson's : dishes, bowls and vases that have more in common with paintings and sculptures than with kitchen utensils.

At Harmony Hall, one can admire creations by contemporary artists, both local and foreign, but mainly Caribbean. The minor road leading there, which is lined with allamanda and varieties of orchid, offers, as it were, the first picture in the exhibition. The gallery is set in an undulating park on the top of a hill overlooking Nonsuch Bay with an unspoilt view over Antigua's undented coastline. In the inner courtyard stands a witness to a bygone era - an old cane mill converted to a bar, where you can admire the scenery as you refresh yourself. At this time of year, September, Harmony Hall was peaceful, deserving of its name. *Kirsty Dunkerley*, the manager, was staging a special exhibition - her last before leaving Antigua, having spent several years there. The works of various artists, from the Caribbean and elsewhere, were on display. We were particularly attracted to the pictures of *Heather Doram*, a teacher, who works in partnership with her husband (also an artist and carnival designer). Her paintings reflect kinship with fashion and design, not adopting their stereotypes but giving extra stature and sophistication to these genres. There is also something of the *faux-naïf*, both in the psychological sense of the term and in the sense of an association with 'naïve' painting. 'Yellow Umbrella', where she celebrates yellow in all its forms, is also a production, relying more on colour than on action. In it, she displays nostalgia for her country, subtly harking back to her African roots and uncovering an intimate aspect of a land which is difficult to perceive, blurred as it often is, under a commercial coating. It is a shame that we have to reproduce 'Yellow Umbrella' here in black and white. ■

H.G.



The Courier

Somalia

Can the jigsaw be pieced together?

Somalia could be a prosperous country with a bright future. How, the cynical reader may ask, can one say this when we all know that it is in a state of chaos, riven with clan rivalries and without a central government. Our response is that while all these perceptions are correct (or at least partially), they do not present the whole picture.

In a departure from our usual practice of avoiding 'unstable' countries, The Courier visited Somalia recently to learn what is happening beyond the headlines. And what we found was a mixture of fatalism and optimism. Few Somalis believe that 'normality' is just around the corner but many are trying to work towards that day. There is a great deal of talent here, especially for business; a reasonable resource-base with extensive livestock and banana production (though drought can be a problem), and a lot of untapped fishing potential. Moreover, the country is geographically well situated for trade – on the direct route to the Suez Canal, opposite the prosperous countries of the Arabian peninsula, and relatively close to the highly populated Indian sub-continent.

What the people need, somehow, to do, is put the pieces of the jigsaw back together and direct their undoubted capacities towards peaceful development. It sounds simple – but as we soon learned, nothing in Somalia is simple!

Looking first at the political situation, one foreign aid worker told us early in our visit that 'the country is run by the militias, merchants and mullahs'. This is a succinct summary, but it leaves a lot of people out. For in the absence of a central government, Somalia has fractured into dozens of different



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fiefdoms with all manner of competing and overlapping 'authorities'.

What this means is that while there is no democracy in the traditional sense, there is a curious kind of pluralism in operation. And people are not slow to express their views. We spoke with dozens of Somalis from all walks of life, and only once did we encounter reticence. Most were happy to talk freely about their country's problems, and about what was needed to solve them. The trouble is that everyone had their own particular solution and it was difficult to identify any possible basis for a peaceful consensus.

It would be presumptuous to suggest that a short country report, prepared on the basis of a thirteen-day mission, can do anything more than scratch the surface – for the political situation is truly byzantine. But there is no doubt that the outside world's picture of Somalia has been distorted by the natural

Members of the Somali Olympic Committee pose in front of the goals at the main stadium in North Mogadishu (see box article on next page)

tendency of the foreign media to focus on the bad news. Conflict and famine attract the reporters. A good harvest, or the fact that no guns have been fired in a given area for three months, can hardly be expected to hit the front pages.

The bad news is that people, including innocent civilians, continue to be killed and injured in clan fighting. Some children are still dying of malnutrition and preventable diseases – though fewer than before. The education system has collapsed. And of the few social services that are available, most are being provided by international NGOs (backed by funding from foreign donors).

On the other hand peace (sometimes fragile) reigns in most of the country. Fighting is largely confined to the south and specific areas

of Mogadishu where rival clans compete for territory. As a result, regional and local governments have been able to resume working in many areas, albeit on a minimal basis. And significantly, many Somalis have seized the initiative to preserve or restore not just the basics, but also some of the non-essentials which make life easier. Some of these people are driven by the profit motive, others by a desire to help their local community. Thus, we find entrepreneurs trading, providing services and even manufacturing – filling the markets with consumer goods and provided much-needed employment (see the article on Mogadishu). Foreign exchange is earned from huge livestock exports (see the article 'A tale of two ports') and banana sales to Europe. And there are doctors and health workers, teachers and local administrators, all endeavouring to plug the gaping holes left in the social fabric as a result of the civil war.

Historical background

The Somalis are an ethnically homogenous people. They make up the bulk of the population of the current Somalia, are a key group in Djibouti, and are also to be found in neighbouring regions of Ethiopia and Kenya. Descended from Arabs, who began settling the coastal areas of the Horn of Africa in the ninth and tenth centuries, they have a long nomadic tradition and a highly complicated clan structure. Writing in the 1850s, the British explorer Richard Burton described them as a 'fierce and turbulent race of republicans'.

The state of Somalia came into being on 1 June 1960. It was a merger of the previous British and Italian Somalilands, the latter being, at the time of independence, a UN trust territory administered by the former colonial power.

The post-independence history of the country has been characterised by successive conflicts: a guerilla campaign on the Kenyan border in the early 1960s, a major war with Ethiopia in the late 1970s, and internal revolution in the North-West in the late 1980s culminating in

Keeping the flag flying

'Anche sugli spalti degli stadi e sull'erba del terreno di gioco si puo costruire la pace'

(*'Peace can also be built on the stadium terraces and on the field of play' – message painted on the wall of North Mogadishu Stadium*)

The Courier encountered many unexpected things whilst in Somalia, but the most unusual was almost certainly our very first meeting in Mogadishu – with the Somali Olympic Committee (SOC). The Somali flag may not be flying outside UN buildings at the moment but *Adan Hag Yabarow*, the acting chairman of the SOC was proud that it had made it to Los Angeles, along with eight athletes and officials. The Committee groups together various athletic and sporting federations, and like everyone else, it has to use a lot of ingenuity to keep its operation on track.

The idea that sport should be assisted in a country beset with serious social problems may appear bizarre, but the acting chairman offered some persuasive arguments. Sport, he said could be a unifying force – already, football teams from both sides of the Green Line were playing fixtures against each other. And it could provide a focus for youngsters with little else to do – particularly boys who might be attracted into the militias. He even suggested that the SOC should be designated a 'peace-building institution', allowing it access to NGO funding.

It is doubtful whether this will happen, (perhaps some wealthy European football team would like to help out?) but the Committee deserves credit for their commitment. Mr Yabarow summed it up when he said: 'We are determined to show that we can do things together.'

the devastating civil war of 1990-1991. In addition, the country has suffered recurring droughts and famines.

In political terms, the dominant figure was undoubtedly President *Siad Barre*, who came to power in a military coup in 1969. Today, not many people have a good word to say about him, but he nonetheless managed to cling to power for 22 years. In the bipolar world of the time, he chose to follow a socialist path, allying the country with the USSR, which provided aid and substantial military backing in the early days. This relationship was ruptured in 1977 when Somalia went to war with Ethiopia which was also in the 'Moscow' camp. The USSR chose to support the regime in Addis Ababa and the USA stepped in to fill the gap in Somalia. In the early stages of the conflict, the Somalian army defeated Ethiopia's forces but the tables were turned when Cuban and Yemeni troops were deployed by the USSR. Somalia's army was overpowered and, shortly afterwards, President Barre survived an attempted coup.

Internal strife began with the formation of guerilla movements in the North-West and North-East in the early 1980s. In the former, this turned into a full-blown war in 1988.

The Mogadishu regime prevailed on the field of battle, but also carried out reprisals against civilians. Groups of Isaq (one of the main north-western clans) were massacred in Berbera and Mogadishu and international condemnation followed. At this stage, the USA withdrew its aid for the Barre regime. Full civil war erupted shortly afterwards, as opposition to the President spread southwards, and he was overthrown by the forces of the United Somali Congress (led by General Aideed) in January 1991. Four months later, the dominant group in the North-West announced the establishment of the 'Republic of Somaliland'.

There is very little positive to be said about Siad Barre's legacy (although he did introduce education in the Somali language using the Latin script). Like so many unelected leaders who cling to power, he appears to have lost sight of the political realities. The clan tradition makes any form of central government difficult here, but a leader who does not try to accommodate this tradition into his policy is doomed to fail. President Barre went even further in adopting what many regard as an alien left-wing philosophy involving extreme centralisation. Having traded for centuries, the Somalis are capitalists *par excellence*, and it was al-

most certainly a mistake to try to squeeze them into a communist mould. Barre, of course, also resorted increasingly to repression and casual brutality. He died in exile but his influence lives on in the extreme distrust of central authority which makes it so difficult to reach a lasting solution.

Following the collapse of central government, the situation in Somalia remained confused and chaotic until the arrival of the Americans (and subsequently, the United Nations.) The original purpose of the US action, which involved thousands of GIs, can be divined from the title of the mission: 'Operation Restore Hope'. It was transformed into a UN operation (UNOSOM II) a few months later. For a while, it looked as if a new dawn was on the horizon for Somalia but things soon went sour. Without attributing blame to one side or the other, the world body found its neutrality compromised as UN soldiers were drawn into the fighting against one particular faction (that of General Aideed). The militias had not been disarmed, as everybody had hoped and it became clear that the international forces could not impose a solution. UNOSOM accordingly withdrew from the country. The UNOSOM period, it is said, also raised false hopes and expectations among ordinary Somalis. For example, a lot of money came into the country, and the expatriates found themselves paying premium wages to local staff. This experience has apparently made life more difficult for those who came afterwards (mainly NGO workers).

The situation today

Today, with the UN no longer involved in peacekeeping operations, it is often suggested that the world has given up on Somalia. This is not actually true – various diplomatic efforts are still under way to bring the factions together. President Moi of Kenya certainly has the subject on his agenda, the Ethiopians are keen to see stability restored in their eastern neighbour, and the EU has offered some useful practical support to the peace process.

As for the position on the ground, it is not feasible to offer a detailed description of the political structures operating in Somalia – because there are so many, and the situation is so fluid. Outsiders tend to focus on what is happening in Mogadishu, and this causes resentment among Somalis from other areas. Even if the three most powerful warlords in the capital could be reconciled, the country would still be a long way from reunification. Leaders of other regions and interest groups would also have to be won round, while the authorities in Hargeisa (Somaliland) would have to abandon their claim to independent statehood.

For an initial briefing on the wider political situation, we turned to *Omar Mohalim Mohamoud*, a former Somali Ambassador to Washington and *Marian Arif Qassim*, an author who used to be a senior official in the Central Bank. Ambassador Mohalim spoke at some length about the character of the people. 'Somalis', he said, 'consider themselves to have been born free, and to them, the state equals registration, regulations and restrictions.' Suspicion of authority – which is healthy in moderation – is not just found in the Horn of Africa, of course, but it does appear to take a rather extreme form here.

The Ambassador attributed this anarchic tendency to two things: the nomadic tradition and clan structure of the country (largely unaffected by Italian and British colonisation), and the aforementioned unhappy experience of central government under President Barre. For Mrs Qassim, clan fragmentation was one of the key obstacles. There was a presumption that if one leader gained power, then his clan brethren would get the spoils, to the exclusion of other groups. Decentralisation – and more crucially, resource sharing – would therefore have to be key elements in any proposed solution (our two interviewees, whom we met in Nairobi, had just attended an EC-sponsored conference of elder statesmen and traditional leaders which explored various options for government in Somalia).

The Ambassador also had an interesting point about the role of

the private sector in the political process. He was encouraged by the emergence of entrepreneurs and the efforts they were making to create a secure environment – which is essential for their business. 'But', he continued, 'they have prospered in an anomalous situation, and their allegiance is to the dollar. They will only be inclined to help build new structures, so long as their own interests are unaffected.' This obviously creates a problem given that even the most free-market governments usually impose some corporate taxes and regulatory controls.

There is a lot of talk about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the country. Sharia courts operate in a number of areas and Islamic schools are springing up.

A number of our interviewees felt that 'extreme' fundamentalism was alien to Somalia, which had long-practised a more liberal form of Islam.

Mrs Qassim, however, did not accept this proposition, believing that the process could go a lot further. She also remarked pointedly: 'I am alive now because of the Sharia law, so I have to see it as a good thing.' Ambassador Mohalim stressed that Islam contained juridical as well as religious precepts. 'It has provided people with a framework of order, as well as solace in their pain and frustration'. He nonetheless acknowledged that many Somalis were uneasy about the fundamentalist trend.

As to how far the trend will go, opinions vary. The dress code adopted by women is thought to be a reasonable barometer, and the evidence from North Mogadishu certainly suggests that there is an increasingly strict interpretation of Islamic principles there.

From our own experience, it seems clear that women's and men's roles are strictly defined – and one rarely meets them together. On the other hand, we encountered a number of highly articulate Somali women who play an active part in the community. Indeed, the effect of the war has been to increase the burden of responsibility upon them.

Active journalism

Another, perhaps surprising, source of general information about the political situation was the journalistic community. Not many outsiders are aware that newspapers are being published (in Mogadishu and elsewhere), keeping people in touch with events. Most are produced with rudimentary technology, duplicated in standard A4 format, and it is true that they often reflect a particular political perspective. But one has to admire the commitment – and courage – of those prepared to go out and get their stories in such an insecure setting.

The *Courier* had a meeting in a crowded office with members of the Somali Independent Journalists Union (SIJU), which has five dailies and ten weeklies affiliated to it, as well as an independent Somali news agency. The Union's Information Secretary, *Ibrahim Abukir Ali*, emphasised the risks facing Somali journalists which include being kidnapped, mistreated and perhaps even killed (49 journalists including nine foreign correspondents lost their lives in the civil war). SIJU, despite its limited means, tries to protect journalists from this fate.

As Mr Ali pointed out, radio is probably the most effective way of communicating with the majority of Somalis in this 'oral society'. But this medium, he said, is currently dominated by 'factions disseminating propaganda and abusing each other.' To counterbalance this, the Union hopes to establish its own radio station. The Information Secretary also indicated that SIJU plays an active campaigning part in peace-building efforts.

Another journalist we met was *Ali Musa Abdi* the AFP (Agence France Press) correspondent in Mogadishu. He is a remarkable character who seems to have led a charmed existence. Strongly committed to the principle of free speech, he has managed to offend some powerful people with his 'provocative pen'. In 1995 he was kidnapped and held prisoner in South Mogadishu. He subsequently managed to escape and make his way back to the relative safety of the North.



The Courier

More recently, he faced proceedings before the Sharia Court having apparently caused offence with one of his articles.

Mr Abdi was pessimistic about the future for Somalia, predicting that the current situation was likely to prevail at least until the year 2000. 'The trouble,' he said, 'is that Somalis do not have the political art of give and take. Our country now has three self-proclaimed Prime Ministers and hundreds of ministers, yet virtually no government.' He praised the hard work being done by the private sector but, echoing Ambassador Mohalim, suggested that they may be 'supporting the anarchy because they enjoy no taxation and no rules.' 'The reality', he continued, 'is that you need basic state services – to run schools, build infrastructure and set consumer safety standards. Some businesses don't understand this.' He also argued strongly in favour of decentralised structures.

The Aideed viewpoint

Although *The Courier* was able to travel widely in Somalia, security concerns prevented us from visiting South Mogadishu which is controlled by the forces of Hussein Aideed. The Aideed faction is perhaps the single most powerful in the country and some observers view it as the main obstacle to peace in the

Local newspapers
Most are produced with
rudimentary technology, duplicated
in standard A4 format

South, which is essential if a wider settlement is to be achieved. We did have an opportunity, however, to quiz two spokesmen for the group, later in Nairobi. *Ambassador Liban* and *Mohamed Jama* were both anxious, as they put it, 'to set the record straight' about the policies of their group. They insisted that they longed for peace as much as anyone. They also rejected fundamentalism, arguing that women should have a bigger role, and emphasised the importance of restoring education and civic responsibility. Their main criticisms were reserved for the international community (including the EU) which they believed were no longer impartial. This belief presumably dates back to the UNOSOM period when General Aideed (Hussein Aideed's father, who died last year) was declared an outlaw by the UN Special Envoy. The feeling may well be reinforced by the fact that rehabilitation projects are only being funded in 'secure' areas – which do not include much of the territory under Hussein Aideed's control.

The basic problem is that while the armed factions say they want negotiations, they seem unable to keep their fingers off the trigger.

The key leaders in the Mogadishu area have even met to discuss a *rap-prochement*, but somehow the fighting goes on.

The local perspective

Meanwhile, in many areas, local politicians concentrate on keeping going with limited resources. *Mohamed Abshir Nur* is the Deputy Governor of Middle Shabelle Province, whose main centre is Jowhar, north of Mogadishu. He spoke of recent tensions between the regional administration and the Sharia authorities, both of which were trying to arrange revenue collection to run services. The lack of a central government meant that a key link was missing. With each regional government having to make its own arrangements (notably in dealing with donors), there was a lot of unnecessary duplication

Mr Abshir was encouraged that some regional governments were beginning to work together but he felt that a lot more coordination was needed. He was particularly concerned about the long-term effects of the collapse in the education system. But like so many Somalis, he displayed a flash of optimism when he referred, in this context, to the need for a common curriculum. 'When unity and peace are restored, can you imagine the problems that will arise with dozens of separate school systems?'

Hassan Barre, the Deputy Governor of Bari Province in the far North-East, gave us a practical illustration of authorities working together. Bari, along with the neighbouring provinces of Nugal and Mudug all have functioning regional administrations which, he said, cooperate with each other. Water revenues and income from the port of Bosasso are shared and there is a common defence structure. This approach – building up from the bottom – must surely offer the best hope for the future. Mr Barre insisted that there would have to be extensive decentralisation for any agreement to stick. As he put it, 'the one city nation' (a reference to Mogadishu) 'has gone forever.'

Another local politician who has established a good reputation for sound administration, is *Mohamed Hashi Elmi*, the former Mayor of Hargeisa (the 'capital' of Somaliland). We met him the day after he resigned to run for the Presidency of the breakaway 'republic'. Hargeisa is not immune from clan tensions (it even has its own mini-version of the 'green line') but the relative stability in this part of the country has enabled the local authority to collect revenues and embark on a series of rehabilitation measures. He expressed particular pride in the rubbish collection service and sanitary inspection system which had been reinstated.

The 'Republic of Somaliland'

Mention of Hargeisa brings us to one crucial divide (among the many) which will certainly have to be resolved one way or the other if the country is to have a lasting political settlement. Somaliland (British Somaliland in colonial times) has 'officially' seceded from Somalia and those currently in power in the North West appear determined to maintain this position. There is said to be internal opposition to the policy, with some groups favouring a loose federation rather than a complete schism. Additionally, in at least two of the five regions, the government's authority is reported as 'nominal'. But there is no doubt that the colonial history of the country has contributed an extra source of division.

It is not entirely surprising that there should be hostility to any Mogadishu-based government in the North West. As mentioned above, the people here revolted against Siad Barre several years before the full civil war broke out and the inhabitants of Hargeisa and surrounding areas suffered grievously as a result. Large numbers of people died in air raids and land battles, and there are still thousands of anti-personnel mines scattered across the countryside.

At the time of our visit, a *Gurty* ('national conference') was taking place in Hargeisa. We spoke

with *Sheikh Ibrahim Sheikh Yousuf Sheikh Madar*, who was presiding over the meeting, and other senior participants. The Sheikh claimed that the conference was fully representative of the five regions of Somaliland (other reports suggested this was not the case), and expressed confidence that the outcome would be a constitution for the breakaway state offering a sound basis for future development. But his main concern was the lack of international recognition. 'The international community should open its eyes and support us to rebuild the nation,' he insisted.

Abdillai Mohamed Duale, who is 'Minister of State' in the Presidency of the 'Republic' (and thus close to President Egal) took a similarly optimistic line, brushing aside the suggestion that the conference was not wholly representative (one powerful clan had allegedly refused to participate). And he too made a pitch for international recognition. Referring to the recent recognition of new states in Eastern Europe, he criticised the international community for 'employing double standards'.

The national conference was also entrusted with choosing a new President and government, but the Minister said that the next election would be based on universal suffrage.

There must serious doubts as to whether Somaliland can be brought back into the fold. But before this question is addressed, the fold has to be rebuilt. Or to return to our original metaphor, Somalia can only deal with its massive material and social problems once the pieces of the jigsaw have been fitted back together. Old antagonisms need to be buried and strong personalities reconciled. And all the signs are that this will be a slow process. ■

Simon Horner

Politics in Somalia

A thumb-nail sketch of the key players

As explained in the previous article, Somalia is currently divided into numerous territories of varying sizes and the situation can vary dramatically from one district to the next. Here we attempt to categorise some of the main actors in the political arena.

'Warlords'

Backed by armed clan militias – and hence the power of the gun – the 'warlords' are seen by many as the most crucial actors in Somalia. It would be foolish to deny that they also enjoy a certain amount of popular support. They are particularly strong in Mogadishu and the south of the country. There is still considerable insecurity in this area as the factions fight over territory. The three main 'warlords' in the south are:

- *Hussein Aideed*, who claims the Presidency of the entire country, though his writ does not run in the north. This faction controls South Mogadishu and large tracts of Southern Somalia.
- *Ali Mahdi* whose main power base is north Mogadishu.
- *Osman Atto* (from the same sub-clan as Aideed), who has joined forces with Ali Mahdi and others against the Aideed faction. He controls a large enclave in Mogadishu and parts of the hinterland.

The situation in the south is complicated by the presence of numerous other leaders and factions.

Militias also operate in other parts of the country, including Somaliland where the control claimed by 'President' Ibrahim Egal is disputed in some regions.

Clans

The clan system lies at the heart of Somalia's tangled politics. In one sense, the country is more homogeneous than any other in Africa (except perhaps Lesotho) but the Somali 'nation' – which includes inhabitants of Djibouti, Ethiopia and northern Kenya – then sub-divides into a series of clan families, clans and sub-clans. Rivalries between different groups go back a long way and although suppressed for a time during the dictatorship of Siad Barre, they have since re-emerged.

In the south, key groups include the Habr Gedir (Hussein Aideed and Osman Atto), Abgal (Ali Mahdi) and Murasade sub-clans – all of which belong to the Hawiye clan (Irir clan family), the Hawadle sub-clan and the Rahanwyne and Darod clan families.

In Somaliland, the Isaaq are the main clan. The rivalries here tend to be between its main components (Idagalle, Habr Jaalo and Habr Yunis).

Political groups

To add to the confusion, most clans and their militias are associated with political groupings, in the loosest sense of the term. The result is a proliferation of initials. Key groups include:

United Somali Congress (USC): The Hawiye 'party' whose forces overthrew Siad Barré in 1991. It initially included the Aideed faction but the term is now normally used in conjunction with other initials (USC/SSA, USC/SNA, USC/PM) by the groups opposing Aideed.

Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). Ali Mahdi's political faction.

Somali National Alliance (SNA). Formerly adhered to by General Aideed (Hussein Aideed's father and predecessor). Now used by Osman Atto.

Rahanwyne Resistance Army (RRA). A clan-based group which has fought Aideed for control of Baidoa.

Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Originally a resistance group operating in the north-east against the Siad Barre regime.

Somali National Movement (SNM). Originally a resistance group operating in the north-west (Somaliland) against the Siad Barre regime. Now the political organisation backing 'President' Ibrahim Egal.

Traditional leaders

Marginalised by the militias (whose members tend to be youthful), the traditional clan leaders are nonetheless viewed with respect in this hierarchical society. Some of them are actively involved in the peace process and they could play an important part in convincing more aggressive clan members of the need for reconciliation – particularly as war-exhaustion sets in among the wider population.

Religious authorities:

Like traditional leaders, the Moslem religious authorities are treated with respect. In many places, the church has already stepped in to fill the gap in primary education, offering, as one would expect, their own brand of Islamic education. They have also become active



A Moslem school in Sheik (Somaliland).
In many areas, the church is providing Islamic education to primary schoolchildren



Road repairs in Mogadishu organised by a private entrepreneur

in the administration of justice, notably in North Mogadishu, where the Sharia law is being applied. Within the church, there are strands of opinion ranging from relatively liberal to fundamentalist – and the inevitable tensions that go along with this.

Local authorities (governors, mayors, regional and district councils)

Central government may have collapsed but local administrations continue to operate in many areas, particularly in north-east Somalia.

The main success story here is Bari (far north-east) where a regional administration is consolidating its position. There are also working regional authorities in Nugal and Mudug while elsewhere, district councils are endeavouring to provide basic services. There are some functional public bodies (such as the Mogadishu Health Authority and the Somali Olympic Committee).

Some would characterise the Somaliland government as a form of regional authority, which is operational in the three most north-westerly provinces.

The Hargeisa administration (which says it is effective in all five provinces of former British Somaliland) would reject the term 'regional', having claimed full statehood.

The private sector

Not strictly part of the apparatus of authority, the private sector has intervened in many areas to provide services normally associated with government. There

is an ambivalence among entrepreneurs about the political situation.

The lack of state structures means no bureaucratic interference, and Somalis seem particularly well-adapted to operating in such an environment. But it also means a lack of security and infrastructure which limits the scope for investment and economic growth.

There are also a number of local NGOs involved in helping the poorest sections of the population

International agencies

Private NGOs from outside Somalia are heavily involved in relief and rehabilitation work, particularly in the social sectors.

They are backed by funds from their own supporters, and public aid agencies including UN bodies, the European Community and bilateral donors.

The international community's other involvement (and here the EU takes a leading role) is in seeking to bring the various Somali factions together to discuss ways of achieving a more peaceful and secure future for the country. ■

S.H.

Profile

Somalia has not had a central government since January 1991. As a result, few up-to-date statistics are available. Much of the information provided below is based on 'best estimates' by international agencies, or on figures collated before the civil war.



General information

Area: 636 000 km²

Population: Estimates vary widely. The UNDOS estimate for May 1995 was 5.44 million but one local official put the figure at 'no more than 3.5 million'. Many Somalis fled during the civil war and the total population, including the diaspora, is thought to be about 7 million.

Population density: (using UNDOS estimate) 8.5 per km².

Capital: Mogadishu. Hargeisa is the 'capital' of the self-styled 'Republic of Somaliland'



National language: Somali

Currency: The pre-war currency, which circulates in the north west and south, is the Somali shilling (S /-). In December 1996, 1 US dollar was trading at about 57000/-.

The Somaliland shilling (SL /-) was introduced by the Hargeisa administration at the end of 1994, but this currency was in free fall at the time of *The Courier's* visit, with local inflation reportedly running at 11 000%.

Politics

System of government: There is no central administration. The country is divided among a variety of competing and sometimes overlapping 'authorities' (see article on Somali politics).



Mogadishu trader

Economy

Agriculture and livestock are the economy's backbone. Nomadic farmers raise sheep, goats, cattle and camels while a variety of crops are grown in the south in the areas around the Juba and Shabelle rivers.

The country has a great many traders and, despite the conflict, the town and city markets contain a wide range of imported consumer goods.

Annual GDP per capita: \$712 (UNDP estimate for 1993)

Principal exports: livestock, bananas, skins and incense.

Italy is the main market for bananas (produced in the south).

Livestock are shipped in large numbers to the countries of the Arabian peninsula (see article entitled 'A tale of two ports')

Social indicators

Life expectancy at birth: 47.2 years (UNDP estimate)

Adult literacy: 24.9% (World Bank estimate)

Enrolment in education: all levels from age 6-23: 7% (almost entirely at the primary school level)

Human Development Index rating: (172nd out of 174)

A Somali journey

by Kyla Evans*



The car is standing at the edge of the dirt runway, engine switched off, the open bonnet signalling to the pilot that all is well on the ground and he can land. We are alongside. Peering into the sky over the hills, towards Djibouti, other countries suddenly seem very far away. I know the plane is coming: we had radio contact with it earlier, but somehow standing on the edge of an airstrip in Somalia it all seems very tenuous. Then we see it – a flash of light over the sea, a familiar blue flag with yellow stars on the tail – and ECHO Flight has landed – a skyborn intrusion from a world that has nearly forgotten the existence of Somalia.

There is the usual hustle and bustle on landing. Hugs and greetings – made warmer by the relief of seeing familiar faces. Despite the fact that there is no war in this part of Somalia, you can't help wondering when you leave if the same faces will be there when you come back. The fuel truck comes and the chat is drowned by the noise of a small hand pump attached to a rusting petrol can. The sun is burning, and we stand in the shadow of the tail as small quantities of cargo are removed from the hold. Then we are on the plane. The engines start and we bump along the runway. Up and east across the hills.

The plane is small – nine seats. Comfortable this time because

it is half empty. Feet on the seat opposite me, I flick through an old Kenyan newspaper that someone has left behind. The sky is perfectly clear. If the windows of the plane weren't so scratched you could take fantastic pictures of the changing landscape. We reach the edge of the high plateau. Erosion on the slopes of the mountains has formed shapes like the veins of leaves – huge long crevasses. I wonder how deep they are. Still, no group of tourists is likely to reach these spots for many years.

The plane circles down. Over the runway – the signal to land, a flag, is hanging listlessly from a standard on the front of a car. The red of the car and the blue of the flag stand out against the uniform colour of dust. The whole city has been invaded by the pale brownish yellow of the landscape that stretches unbroken as far as I can see. There is not a tree in sight. The plane lands in a cloud of dust, and as I step out, my first feeling is of dust and heat in my mouth and eyes. The runway is on the edge of the town. Small plaster houses with corrugated iron roofs border it on one side. Pieces of scrap metal litter the area. A few teenagers with guns are wandering around the landing strip, and an old man, hair dyed red with henna gesticulates at them. There is an overwhelming sense of lethargy. There doesn't seem to be any air. I feel grimy already.

Organising a trip in Somalia by radio, and via other people can

be nerve racking. Arrangements can so easily be misunderstood or go wrong. You can't just stand on a runway in the middle of Somalia, in a town you have never been to before, and hope that someone will show up. You would have to leave again with the plane. My colleague is there though, with a car. He has driven five hours this morning to pick me up, so that we can visit some of the projects the EC funds in the region. For security reasons, we wait until the plane has taken off again, then pile into the car.

Security is a big word in Somalia. One of the first things that anyone asks you about a region, a town or a road is 'what was the security situation like?'. Normal in a country where so many men have guns, even if they don't always carry them around. In this part of the country, you only need one security guard. He is sitting in the front of the car, his gun pointing out of the window. It has UNICEF sellotape around the barrel. The first time that you are around guns, you are very conscious of them. Surprisingly soon you cease to regard them as alien objects.

Until something goes wrong that is. Driving along a road one morning – on my second visit to Somalia – I thought the pops came from children letting off firecrackers. Stupidly perhaps I did not even think of shooting until I noticed the car was speeding up, and my colleagues were hunching down, chins sunk to

* TA Information Officer in the EC Somalia Unit based in Nairobi.

their chests. I crouched down between my two fellow passengers, grateful at the thought that their bodies might protect me from a bullet ripping through the car. Suddenly they were no longer humans and friends, but only shields. Not knowing whether to laugh or cry I did both.

We drive through the town to the offices of the NGO. A low building, constructed around a large courtyard, with small doors painted green. The rooms are small and cell-like, concrete walls and floors, local furniture that rocks a bit as we sit down. The coordinator of the project offers us coca cola. We discuss – the security situation, his project, other NGOs in the area, the growing strength of the fundamentalists. He tells me it would be better if I cover my head when we are outside.

We leave our bags, and go to visit some of the projects. Our guide is a young Somali, Ahmed, who is desperate to find a scholarship to go to England to complete his medical studies, interrupted at the outbreak of the civil war. Can we help? I promise to visit the British Council when I am back in Nairobi and tell him of a project we are preparing to assist people like him. We visit the school rehabilitated by the EC. The children are on holiday. The classrooms are empty – plain wooden desks and benches standing in orderly rows in front of a painted blackboard bearing traces of a lesson on the use of parts of speech.

Mogadishu security guard



The Courier

We visit a 'farm'; a small oasis in the middle of the dust, created and sustained by the well and water pump built by an Italian NGO a year ago. It is the only place I have seen flowers being grown commercially – sad little daisies fighting to survive harsh sunlight and saline water. The owner tells us he needs tools to expand his farm, and another well – he says there is not enough water – there is never enough water in Somalia.

Water is vital in this part of Somalia. Most nomads here live on little more than a litre a day – and being Muslims, some of that water must be used for cleaning hands and feet before the five times daily prayers.

You can see them in the bush, tall gaunt men with their trains of camels, walking one day each way to the wells to collect water for their families.

It is only in the south, around the two great rivers of Somalia – the Juba and the Shabelle – that you don't feel there is a water shortage. Even there, people break the river embankments to get water for their fields.

During the rains, much of the riverine areas are flooded. There, and in Mogadishu, you can really feel the humidity and see the swarms of mosquitoes under the trees. Surprisingly, Mogadishu is a green city – the shelling has not killed off all the thousands of trees that Siad Barre in an enlightened moment ordered to be planted every year.

Mogadishu remains a city of contrasts. The first night I was in Mogadishu North we drove around in an air-conditioned BMW, the CD player blasting out a compilation from the Beatles. Driving in a zig zag across the width of the road, around the potholes left by mortar shells, the owner, a journalist, polished his Ray Bans and talked about the press and human rights. Behind us bounced our 'security': a Land Cruiser, with three machine gun toting men sitting on the roof. Later that night we ate spaghetti with lobster on the veranda of the EC Office and talked about the end of the civil war. The next day, the shelling began again.

Curious for news


We return to the NGO's compound, much like any other in Somalia. A house, surrounded by a wall, guards at the gates. Inside it is very functional. There is a sitting cum dining room, fridge on one wall, a tall boy full of glasses and books facing it, sofas against the third wall, a television with a pile of videos pushed unobtrusively into a corner. There is a satellite dish outside, tuned to Arab channels which provide sports coverage.

Last week, last month – all seems much the same. When you are in Somalia, it is only the Somalis who have an insatiable curiosity for news. The expatriates seem to cocoon themselves from the strangeness of their lives by a lack of interest in the world outside Somalia. We are offered a drink. Ubiquitous whisky – easily transported and a good gift, most NGO compounds have a bottle brought by a guest. The question is usually, will there be ice? We chat as people of different nationalities wander into the room and sit down. At about seven a Somali lady comes in bearing a huge metal pan, covered by a plate; spaghetti with minced goat. On the coast, you get fish and lobster with the spaghetti, but inland it is usually goat. Someone once tried to start a chicken farm in Somalia, but the chickens died. In any case, nomads don't have much use for chickens. I had eaten baby goat before coming to Somalia,

Satellite technology keeps people in touch with the news



The Courier



The Courier

but there is no comparison – nomad goats are tough – like the people who breed them.

We sit around the table and drink little bottles of water from Dubai. A fan clunks overhead. After dinner, we go up onto the roof, to catch a breath of air. Here and there lights flicker. Businessmen across the country are making money by re-installing electricity for a certain number of hours a day. The sounds of Arab music and animated discussions waft on the light breeze. Millions of stars shine down. Emptiness is all around. For a moment, you feel content. All too soon it is time to go back downstairs. The generator will be turned off at ten – so if you want light to get to bed you have to hurry. You can live and die by a generator in Somalia.

At night, in a visitors room, isolated from any breeze, windows flung open to entice in air, claustrophobic under a mosquito net, you dream of air conditioning and a bedside lamp. Once the generator goes off, the world stops – until just before sunrise when Somali women start to prepare tea. Then all attempts to sleep must stop. However many spiders crawled over you in the night, however little you slept, however deep a sleeper you can be, you cannot fight the noises of a Somali town waking up.

Breakfast is rolls baked in a tin, over charcoal. You would be amazed at what cooks can produce in Somalia. Even cakes can come from the tiny hot rooms where food is cooked over a flue heated by charcoal. Many of the cooks worked for many years for the British Prison Ser-

You can live and die by a generator in Somalia

vices – roast beef, potatoes and lemon meringue pie in 48 degrees Celsius gives food a whole new meaning.

With thanks and shaking of hands, we leave the NGO. Before leaving the town, we stop at the offices of the Regional Administration to present our complements. They were not expecting us, and an impromptu meeting is organised. A concrete room, with a huge empty desk sitting expectantly in the centre fills rapidly.

Everyone is introduced. In ceremonious phrases through an interpreter, we give our thanks for the welcome and explain the reasons for our visit to the region. We elaborate on a few new projects that will be starting soon, and note down points they raise. We leave, escorted out of town by the police's pick-up truck. Beret askew, and uniform pulled tightly over his skinny shoulders, the Police Chief salutes us with great majesty as we leave his city.

Somalia is full of surprises like that. Of all the things I had expected to find there, hope was not one: people rebuilding their houses, tending their animals, replanting their fields, exporting their livestock. I didn't expect local governors, embryonic police forces, schools reopening and life continuing. The pictures I had garnered of Somalia from the television had made me think of ruined buildings, of guns, of amputees, of starving children. I found some of those things in some of the places. Some parts were even worse than I had pictured. A malnourished child,

open sores on her body, grizzling, the patient misery of a maternity ward with no electricity, medicines or even mattresses – television only lets you see – not smell, not feel. Until I saw Somalia, I did not hate those responsible for this agony.

We start our 700 kilometre drive towards the tip of the Horn of Africa. The road was built by the Italians before the war, and is in good enough condition for us to drive at about 120 km/hour. Scrubland flashes past. We stop to take some pictures of erosion along the side of the road. Something will have to be done to prevent parts of the road being eaten away.

We stop again to look at a well built with EC funding. You can hardly see the well and the water troughs that surround it for camels. Five boys have organised a rota system to pull the water out of the well into the troughs. Goats and black headed sheep are standing to one side, as if to allow the camels first access to the water. Five nomad women are idling a little away from the men. When they see us, they pull their scarves tightly over their faces. I smile at them. I am obviously hysterically funny – they start to laugh, and do not stop until I get back into the car. I am becoming used to that – women in Somalia seem to find me alternately amusing and strange. If I did not know that other western women also have the same experience, I would become paranoid. We continue along the road. Our speed is periodically broken by frantic hoots from the driver as he tries to avoid nomads and their animals wandering across the road. A string of camels stretch out along the horizon, ambling behind a woman whose flapping pink and black head covering is the only strong colour in sight.

The nomads are taking their animals towards the port – for export. They will walk for days, even weeks to reach the ships, or to find the brokers who will buy their livestock. We pull over in a village in front of a tea shop. A village – rather a conglomeration of huts in the middle of a vast expanse of void. The houses are mainly temporary accommodation – built of twigs, and large sheets of blue plastic. A woman runs out of her shelter, and we order. The



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Cowboy country?

driver and the guard drink their tea with camel milk. I have been warned to drink tea plain – camel milk does strange things to an untrained European stomach. The tea is sweet, flavoured with cardamom and other spices. It comes in glasses with metal holders – a bit like in Russia. I wonder about the water – but only after I have drunk the tea. It helps to cut the dust in my throat more than the mineral water that I have been drinking incessantly for the past few hours.

As we drive, the landscape changes. Arid flat earth gives way to arid peaks and gullies. This is real cowboy country – more like the mid-

west than the mid-west itself. You nearly expect to see John Wayne ride over the top of a hill. The road winds lonely through the hills, and we lose radio contact with our base. Suddenly I feel nervous, the thought of guns and shooting upmost in my mind. Here, you are impossibly far from everything. There is nothing to keep you safe – only a speeding car, and a man with a gun. We pass through the hills though, and the familiar crackle of the radio, detailing

Money changers with their sacks of notes



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positions of aid agency aircraft starts up again. Code words fly through the air – as you listen, slowly you work out what they mean. Understanding makes you feel safe somehow – you are part of some big aid fraternity covering the whole of the country, with tentacles reaching to Nairobi and beyond.

As we approach our destination, the driver becomes increasingly nervous – his honks and breaking increasingly sharp. He wants to get home, to buy some chat – he has not had any for a whole day now.

Like many other Somalis, he is addicted to the leaves of the chat tree which, when chewed release a mild amphetamine. Chat must be fresh to be enjoyed properly.

From twelve every day, when the fresh chat arrives on planes from Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen, Somali men can be found, sitting in the shade, drinking tea, and popping leaves from their bundle of twigs delicately into their mouths.

The twigs come wrapped in blue and pink plastic bags which are discarded once the leaves are gone. Somalia is littered with millions of plastic bags, hooked on thorn trees, houses, fences, and just blowing aimlessly in the wind. An environmentalist's nightmare!

We arrive in the town, by the sea. Chat has arrived, the market is bustling and the streets are full of trucks unloading. Traffic jams in Somalia – a new thought. We crawl through the streets while ladies thrust items from bic lighters to Taiwanese-made shoes through the windows of the car. We stop to see the money traders. Sacks full of notes – each sack worth about 50 dollars. Suddenly the idea of inflation really means something. Colours and light from the market where it seems you can buy everything. Then with relief – to the cool of UNCTAD's compound and air conditioning at last. Outside the temperature is reaching 40 degrees. ■

K.E.

Impressions from Mogadishu

City of surprises

For many, the name Mogadishu has come to be synonymous with misery and chaos. Since the civil war erupted, the Somali capital has been a divided city, and when it features in the international news bulletins, it is usually because there have been more civilian deaths and injuries in renewed bouts of clan fighting. While the city cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be regarded as functioning 'normally', *The Courier* discovered that the picture usually painted by the foreign media is less than complete. The fear of an upsurge in violence is never far away but despite this (or perhaps, because of it) there is also a remarkable dynamism.

We were told that the citizens have learned to take each day at a time, since no-one knows what tomorrow might bring, but the evidence does not fully back this up. There are surprising things happening here which show that many Somalis are planning for a brighter future. Otherwise, how can one explain the competing telephone companies that offer a full range of services at modest rates; the local businessman who got together with his neighbours to fill the potholes on the street; the boat-building company that imports fibre-glass and has kept on manufacturing throughout the troubles; or the computer company offering courses in word processing?

Before going into these aspects in more detail, it is important to set the political context, which tends to be oversimplified by foreign correspondents. To the irrita-

tion of many ordinary Somalis, the clan leaders who control various parcels of territory, get the lion's share of international publicity and attention. Some argue that this has given them an unwarranted credibility. And even when one talks about the armed factions, the focus is heavily on the two largest groups in Mogadishu. One of these, based in the south, is led by *Hussein Aideed*, the son of the late General Aideed, and a member of the powerful *Habr Gedir* clan. The other is Ali Mahdi of the *Abgal* clan, whose writ runs in the north of the city. (The *Habr Gedir* and *Abgal* are part of the wider *Hawiye* clan family)

Many outsiders have heard of the 'Green Line' which separates the two sides. But, in fact, the divisions are much more complex and even the terms 'north' and 'south' are only broad approximations. A large enclave is controlled by a breakaway faction of the *Habr Gedir* headed by Osman Atto. Last year, he joined with Ali Mahdi to fight the Aideed grouping and much of the recent conflict in the south has thus been between clan 'brothers'. Other clans are also represented in the city and the general picture is one of constantly shifting alliances.

When fighting does flare up, it tends to be quite localised and life goes on elsewhere. Indeed, because Mogadishu is so spread out (it has few high buildings), many inhabitants are unaware that the guns or mortars are in action. On the other hand, there is an efficient and speedy 'bush telegraph' which keeps everyone informed of events. Most senior Somalis, and all the international personnel (mainly from NGOs) who work in the city rely heavily on portable radios.



Youthful *joie de vivre* in the streets of Mogadishu

The tendency of the outside world to focus mainly on those who have the weapons may be understandable, certainly from a 'news' standpoint. But while the warlords may be in 'control', we were told that they carry out relatively few 'normal' governmental functions. Basic services, insofar as these exist, are provided by a variety of bodies including elements of local administration which have continued functioning throughout (with few resources), religious authorities, international agencies and private enterprise. The work they do is extremely important and certainly deserves greater recognition.

It should also be stressed that *The Courier* only visited North Mogadishu which had been calm for some time. Apparently, the situation on the other side of the Green Line is much less secure although, even here, markets are functioning and some basic services are being delivered.

To reach the Somali capital from Nairobi, we took an ECHO (European Community Humanitarian

Office) flight bound for Mogadishu North airport. This is little more than a strip of cleared land with a few rudimentary buildings clustered at one edge, but it is an important facility offering a regular link with the outside world, through EC and UN-funded flights. European Community aid to the city is channelled mainly through NGOs and the Commission has a technical support office to coordinate this task.

Hive of activity

Looking first at the private sector, it did not take long to discover that North Mogadishu is a hive of entrepreneurial activity. The Somalis have a long tradition of trading and this was brought home to us in the bustling market. There certainly seemed to be no shortage of food, although a later visit to a nutrition centre run by the French NGO *Action Contre la Faim* (ACF) revealed, sadly, that significant numbers of children still suffer from malnutrition. The markets are also well-stocked with imported foodstuffs and consumer goods. We were greeted warmly wherever we went, and no-one seemed interested in 'hard-sell' techniques. And unlike markets elsewhere (whether in the North or in other developing countries), there is little danger of falling victim to a pickpocket. The Moslem Sharia law applies here which means that punishments can be severe, including the amputation of limbs (see below).

The spirit of enterprise is not just found in the trading sector, however. We were also taken to see some manufacturing operations: a pasta factory set up in the restaurant of a former hotel and the aforementioned boat-building yard. The pasta operation is masterminded by *Sheik Ali Daud* who gave us a guided tour of his premises. The hotel having closed as a result of the war, the Sheik looked at ways of exploiting his property in the light of the new circumstances. He spotted the potential for pasta, which is almost a staple food in Somalia (thanks to the Italian connection) but generally has to be imported. Using wheat

brought in from India, and imported machinery, he is able to supply macaroni to the local markets at highly competitive prices. And like so many other Somali entrepreneurs, he has had to be imaginative to overcome the problems of operating in a difficult environment. The drying process is crucial in pasta production, which means that generators need to be kept running and drying cupboards specially constructed, adapting whatever materials are available locally. Packaging is done manually, and for this, the workers use the ordinary rolls of plastic bags that can be found in any western grocer's shop. It may not be high-tech but, as they say, necessity is the mother of invention. And, of course, it provides employment in a city where too many young men are drawn into militias for want of alternatives.

A visit to the *Al Furqaan* company, whose 35 employees make fibreglass boats and water tanks, gave us an opportunity to observe a very different kind of manufacturing process which also relies heavily on imported inputs (fibreglass and engines). With its lengthy coastline and trading tradition, Somalia has always needed shipping – which may explain why this particular concern has managed to keep its head above water. *Mohamed Ahmed Ali*, an engineering mechanic who works at the yard, explained how the boats were particularly well-suited to local market requirements. With Mo-



Sheik Ali Daud inspects the pasta packaging operation

gadishu port barely functioning, goods destined for the city have to be transferred to smaller vessels off-shore, creating a demand for the *Al Furqaan* product. The boats can also be used for fishing.

Perhaps the biggest surprise for us was the extent to which local businesses have moved in to fill the vacuum created by the absence of central government in the service

Employees of *Al Furqaan* boatbuilders



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The office of the Barakaat Telephone Company in North Mogadishu

sector. The telephone industry is a striking example of this, with private companies (linked to overseas satellite operators) offering services ranging from voice telephony and faxes to teleconferencing. Those who can afford it have portable instruments, while ordinary Somalis can get in touch with relatives elsewhere in the country and abroad using public phones installed in the companies' premises. We paid a visit to the *Barakaat* company whose offices in North Mogadishu are directly opposite those of a competitor *Kaaraan Telecom*. The firm is one of five enterprises in the Somali-owned Barakaat Group of Companies which also supplies postal, banking, computer and consultancy services. The telephone side alone employs 350 people. The link between telecoms and banking is crucial in the absence of a traditional financial sector. Currency transfers are directed through banks in Dubai and can take as little as 24 hours. This arrangement, which is based strongly on trust, oils the wheels of commerce and means that Somalis abroad can transfer funds back home.

Electricity supply is less reliable, with many operations relying on generators and imported fuel, but even here, entrepreneurial spirits have taken over parts of the network. During a night tour of the city, we noted that some areas had working street lights. The explanation was that companies provide this as an 'extra' to customers who subscribe to the service.

Some might think this is a heresy, but many of the business-people we spoke to believe that the absence of government is an advantage. There are no central taxes to pay, no forms to be completed in triplicate and no 'interference' from government inspectors. In short, it is about as close to a genuine free market as one is likely to encounter.

But this form of 'functioning anarchy' (to use the term in its proper, political science context) has its downside. Security costs are high, and it is virtually impossible to attract foreign investment (other than from the Somali diaspora). The lack of central authority and a functioning civil judicial system also gives added meaning to the maxim *caveat emptor*. If one is not satisfied with a product or service there is little one can do about it – except take one's business elsewhere.

Health challenges

Not surprisingly, the enthusiasm of certain entrepreneurs for the current lack of controls – which some view as an additional obstacle to progress in restoring a central government – is not shared by those struggling to maintain some kind of civil authority in Mogadishu at local level. If taxes are not collected, then even basic services such as schooling and health care must be paid for by the consumers themselves. And this is simply not realistic for the impoverished majority. *The Courier* met with a delegation from the Mogadishu Joint Health Authority, whose members are mainly former medical officers (under the previous regime), working on a semi-voluntary basis. Surprisingly, the authority functions across the city, although it provides few front-line services itself. It is, however, attempting to coordinate the work of the NGOs that run nutrition programmes, clinics, and mother and child health centres (MCHs).


Dr Abdikarim Asair Ali described to us how medical staff and officials had taken the initiative to re-establish the Authority and had succeeded in obtaining a consensus

among the warlords that it should operate throughout Mogadishu. While commending the important work undertaken by health-related NGOs, he pointed out that this had initially happened in a haphazard way and that coordination was vital.

The Authority had drawn up guidelines for MCHs aimed at ensuring that these were more than just feeding centres. And in a flash of optimism, he spoke of having a 'standardised system in place' for the time when a government is re-established. In order of priority, he identified the city's main health challenges as: communicable diseases (cholera, diarrhoea etc.), acute respiratory infections (such as tuberculosis), malnutrition and malaria. *Dr Abdikarim* also stressed the problem of maternal mortality. Prior to the war, Somalia had one of the best records in Africa in this area.

We visited a number of health operations in the city during our stay including one of the ACF therapeutic feeding facilities, an MCH clinic run by MSF (Spain) and the *Yaqshid* health centre which receives assistance from the European Community Humanitarian Office. At the last-mentioned, *Dr Ali Jeylani*, who is the TB coordinator for Adra,

A baby being weighed at a mother and child health clinic



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described the work being undertaken to tackle this serious disease (which is often linked to malnutrition). Despite limited resources, the centre is able to offer screening and treatment to local people, who pay a small contribution towards the cost. Careful attention is paid to maintaining patient records.

It is evident that local and expatriate health workers in Mogadishu are providing vital services under difficult conditions and their commitment is impressive. But few would argue that the resources available come anywhere near to matching the needs, and it is difficult to see how significant progress can be made on the health front while the political situation remains so chaotic.

Sharia law

Mention was made earlier of the application of the Sharia law in North Mogadishu. With the national legal system in abeyance, the Moslem church has stepped in to fill the gap.

There is talk of a rise in fundamentalism – which worries some liberal Somalis and foreigners – but the system also has many supporters (see the main article in this Report). No one disputes that, since the Sharia courts began operating, criminal behaviour has declined dramatically in the northern part of the city. Concerns about the severity of the penalties must, therefore, be balanced against the fact that people can now move around much more freely.

This has had a positive knock-on effect on the business environment. We interviewed *Sheik Sharif Sheik Muhadin* who, as Chairman of Sharia Implementation Committee, is the highest religious authority in North Mogadishu.

Viewed as a 'moderate', he was keen to emphasise that the sentences initially handed down by the Sharia courts had been necessary to restore order – a kind of 'short, sharp shock' treatment, both literally and metaphorically. The most controversial aspect, of course, is the practice of chopping off convicted



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robbers' hands and feet (usually one of each). The Sheik said that this was not an automatic penalty and was only meted out to serious offenders.

He laid particular stress on the fact that those who stole food in order to survive, or committed minor thefts, did not suffer such punishment. He also indicated that he would be happy to see the practice discontinued in the longer term.

Just prior to *The Courier's* visit there was a dispute between fundamentalist elements and clan leader Ali Mahdi over the workings of the Sharia legal system. The result was increased tension in North Mogadishu, but it appears that the latter prevailed and a number of court personnel were replaced.

Towards the end of our trip to Mogadishu, we called in on the centre run by the Kalsan Organisation for Women, a local NGO. The organisation's activities, which were described to us by *Habibe Hagi Guimale* and other members of the committee, are designed to help poor women in particular. The initial focus was on relief work – providing food and medicines for the malnourished – but the NGO has branched out into education and environmental projects. With financial support from overseas bodies, Kalsan has provided basic literacy and numeracy training for widows and displaced people, and it now plans to set up a revolving fund which will offer credits to help enhance women's earning capacity.

At the beginning of this article, we spoke of the dynamism that is to be found in Mogadishu and nowhere was this more evident than in our encounter with members of the Kalsan Committee. Taking tea with them in their peaceful courtyard, we witnessed a profound com-

Members of the Committee of the Kalsan Organisation for Women

mitment to work for a brighter future.

Mrs Guimale did say one thing with which we did not entirely agree. Expressing herself in flowing Italian, she stated quietly but passionately – '*Senza pace, non si puo fare niente*' (without peace, we can achieve nothing).

The evidence from war-torn Mogadishu actually suggests otherwise – but how much more could be achieved if the combatants could be persuaded to lay down their weapons and talk. ■

S.H.

A tale of two ports



The Courier

On most evenings, from the balcony of the European Commission's technical support office in Berbera, you can see herds of livestock on the move. It is a strange and impressive sight. Hundreds of animals pass by in the dusty half-light, moving on to the causeway that leads to the dock. It is mainly sheep, but there are also cattle, goats and camels, destined for the markets in the Arabian peninsula.

Somalia has a long history of exporting animals 'on the hoof' to its Arabic neighbours. When the livelihood of so many people depends on the trade, it is not entirely surprising that this has continued despite the recent conflict. What is surprising is the sheer scale of the operation. For despite disrupted communications and damaged infrastructures, the animals exported every year are counted, not in thousands or tens of thousands, but millions!

Crucial to the success of the trade are the ports of Berbera and Bosasso. The livestock are brought in from all over the country – and from neighbouring Ethiopia – sometimes travelling hundreds of miles overland to reach the ships. Berbera and Bosasso are very dif-

Docked at the port of Bosasso

ferent towns. The former, in 'independent' Somaliland, is the larger port, handling between two million and three million animals annually. It is run by the Berbera Port Authority under the jurisdiction of the 'government' based in Hargeisa. Indeed, it is Somaliland's single most important economic facility, providing income for herders, work for lorry drivers (transporting feedstuffs and animals) and jobs for stevedores and port officials. Above all, it generates hard currency for the cash-strapped administration. Bosasso has a more modest operation, (exports of up to 800 000 head of livestock) though the town itself is larger. Situated in the north-eastern Bari Region, it is more isolated vis-a-vis the main herding areas. On the other hand, it lies in a part of the country least affected by the civil war, with a local administration – based on the old regional governments – which is recognised to be stable. Both ports also import large quantities of foodstuffs and fuel which is distributed inland. This is said to include 'informal' trade across the border with Ethiopia and even distant Kenya.

In the competition for trade on the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti, which lies further west along the coast, has apparently lost out to the less-regulated Somali ports. Berbera seems to have been the main beneficiary. It has Russian and American-built docks and warehouses (reflecting the old Somalia's confused role in the Cold War), supplemented more recently by rehabilitation assistance from the EC. It can also take larger vessels than Bosasso. But as *Abdillahi Abdi Farah*, who is the Mayor of Berbera, told *The Courier*, 'there is a lot that could be improved'. He mentioned, in particular, the need for proper animal health checks and vaccination arrangements. 'Too many livestock are being returned,' he stated, 'because they fail to meet the health requirements of the importing countries.' This point was driven home to us when we paid a night visit to the port and found camels being unloaded from a ship – a reprieve for the animals but bad news for the traders and herders. Berbera town also has other problems which have an indirect effect on the efficiency of the port operation. Water and electricity supplies, in particular, are inadequate. The EC is involved in a major rehabilitation scheme designed to increase the amount of water available to Berbera, and this is expected to come on stream soon. In some quarters, there are fears that bureaucratic intervention could undermine the port's competitive position. Exactly how much revenue is generated for Presi-

Too many livestock are being returned.
This is one camel that got a reprieve



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dent Egal's government is not known but the figure is certainly substantial and those in power need to take care not to 'kill the goose that lays the golden eggs'.

At the time of *The Courier's* visit, inflation was another serious problem in Berbera. The value of the Somaliland shilling (SL /-) has plummeted – due it is said, to excessive printing of new currency notes. Trading may not be directly affected, since the transactions are in hard currency, but workers must be paid in local cash and confidence in the shilling appears to have fallen sharply. This could create difficulties in the longer term. When the Somaliland shilling was first introduced, residents were expected to hand in their Somali shillings (S /-) in exchange for the new currency. The latter has proved to be much more stable, among other reasons, because the amount of money in circulation is not increasing. It may have been a good deal for the authorities who acquired a stock of 'hard' (or at least, 'not so soft') currency but it is doubtful whether ordinary consumers see it in this way.

Along the coast at Bosasso, where the Somali shilling is still in use, the problems are somewhat different. *Said Jibril*, the port manager, who gave us a guided tour of the facility, explained the difficulty he faced in accommodating larger vessels and stressed that dredging was needed to prevent the dock silting up. Infrastructure problems were also cited as a major constraint by *Saeed Mohamed Raghe* of NEPCO, a company which imports petroleum products. He



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Dockworkers unloading vegetable oil in Berbera

bemoaned the absence of a pipeline, which slowed down the unloading of the fuel (shipped by tanker from Djibouti). He also referred to the 'high tax' of \$10 000/- (about 2 ECU) levied on each barrel of fuel by the local authority. He did indicate, however, that he was not overburdened with bureaucratic constraints, and this made it easier to do business. Donor aid, including funds from the EU, has been directed towards various rehabilitation actions in the port area.

Bosasso and Berbera have both benefited to some extent from the fact that Somalia's only other deep water facility, at Mogadishu, has been largely out of action since the war. Smaller southern ports have taken up some of the slack but they lack even basic facilities and

most goods have to be transferred to smaller vessels. The result has been trade diversion to the north. If the situation in Somalia stabilises soon (and it is a big 'if') the two ports we visited could lose some trade back to Mogadishu but this should be more than offset by an overall boost to the economy.

Today, goods and animals have to travel through territories controlled (and disputed) by a wide variety of groups. It is notable that they do get through but how much easier it would be if long-term stability could be restored to the region. There must also be scope for much more formal trade with neighbouring countries – in particular, landlocked Ethiopia. 'Normality' may still be some way off but, as functioning ports with plans to improve their operations, Bosasso and Berbera would appear to enjoy a head start. ■ S.H.

Trade at Berbera and Bosasso ports (selected figures)

Exports	Berbera 1995	Berbera Jan-Nov 1996	Bosasso Jan-July 1996
Sheep/goats (head)	2 684 000	2 134 000	366 000
Cattle (head)	75 000	59 000	6 000
Camels (head)	22 000	38 000	15 000
Hides/skins (pieces)	461 000	170 000	363 000
Incense (tonnes)			154
Imports	Berbera Jan-Oct 1996	Bosasso Jan-July 1996	
Sugar (tonnes)	62 900	13 300	
Rice (tonnes)	95 400	8 100	
Wheat/flour (tonnes)	21 500	5 100	
Cooking oil (tonnes)	4 400	700	
Cars	3 345	115	
Diesel oil	6 200 tonnes	1.95 million litres	

Education and training needs and the EU response

The case of Somalia 1991-1997

by Dr Michael O'Leary*

The colonial education policies of Italy and Britain had limited objectives, namely, the training of a small number of educated Somalis to fill the limited job opportunities in public administration and, to a lesser extent, the demand for trained human resources in the private sector. In 1960, the new independent state of Somalia inherited 233 primary schools and 12 secondary schools. The 1970s represented for the country the golden age of education development. In this decade, Somali became a written language using latin script, becoming the medium of instruction first in the lower grades, and later in the higher grades. A major adult literacy programme was launched. The number of primary schools increased from 287 in 1970 to 1407 in 1980; and enrolment rose from 28 000 in 1970 to 271 000 in 1982. In 1981 there were 3376 primary school teachers.

Unfortunately this momentum was not maintained in the 1980s, a decade which inherited the cost of the war lost to Ethiopia (1978). It was also a time of increasing resistance to Siad Barre's government, with the formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) guerrilla movements, both based in Ethiopia. In the late 1980s, a mere 1.5% - 2% of the national budget was allocated to the education sector. Somalia had then the distinction of having the highest drop-out rate in the world amongst

teachers, whose numbers fell from 3376 (1981) to 611 (1990). Facing shrinking resources, a great number of schools closed. In 1990, there were only 644 primary schools and 150 000 students. The education dream generated in the slip-stream of post-independence enthusiasm was shattered in yet another African country.

The secondary school system (consisting of three types, namely, general, technical and professional) also experienced a retrenchment but to a lesser extent during the 1980s. In 1980-81 there were 109 secondary schools and 65 000 students. In 1986-87 there were 103 secondary schools (20 in Mogadishu) and 42 000 students. It was estimated in 1985 that 5% of boys and 3% of girls of the relevant age groups were enrolled in secondary school. Between 13% and 15% of secondary school leavers entered University. Admissions to the Somali National University (SNU) in 1990 totalled 870 and the SNU's total

student body prior to the civil war was approximately 5500. The University was located on two campuses. The main site had eleven faculties, and apart from Islamic Studies which were taught in Arabic, and the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism (where English and Arabic were both used), Italian was the language of instruction. The second campus at Lafole, where courses were taught in English, comprised the College of Education and the Somali Institute of Development and Management (SIDEM). In addition, there were several institutes for nursing, veterinary science and telecommunications.

Impact of the civil war

The collapse of Siad Barre's government in 1991 precipitated the collapse of the entire education system in one fell swoop. What surprised outsiders was the extent of the destruction. Those schools which were not damaged in the fighting were looted down to the corrugated roofing and nails. Local communities did not perceive schools as theirs but often as symbols of an oppressive government and hence the premises were seen as legitimate and easy prey for looters. However, there were some exceptions. The former staff of the Mogadishu College of Technology protected it with arms; and an informed leadership in Garoe

The gutted assembly hall of a deserted secondary school. Schools not damaged in the fighting were looted

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(NE Somalia) were able to keep the damage to their schools to a minimum. Frequently schools which survived were occupied by returned refugees or internally displaced persons.


In short, there was need first to rehabilitate primary schools starting with grades 1-4 and continuing through grades 5-8 of the intermediate school level. More distant goals consisted of

- rehabilitating the secondary school system (ie grades 9-12), and;
- ultimately, addressing the needs of third-level students whose education was suddenly disrupted by the civil war.

Implementation of rehabilitation programmes has highlighted the shortage of trained manpower in all sectors: production and trade, the social sectors and physical infrastructure. This shortage can be attributed in part to the brain drain which began in areas such as education long before the civil war; and in part to the destruction of the education system which no longer produces qualified professionals. As an immediate response, donors in whose countries exiled Somali professionals reside, (working or depending on local social welfare systems) may wish to develop schemes to encourage a return back to Somalia, where the skills are required. It is widely agreed that security is no longer a major concern for Somali professionals who return to their home regions away from Mogadishu. Such an approach would also bolster the decentralisation process, as expatriate Somalis come back with their skills and new ideas garnered from their years overseas.

The early emergency period (1992-1994)

At the height of the emergency in 1991-1992, donor support was concentrated mainly on health and nutrition. This changed in late 1992 after the crisis had peaked and as key implementing agencies turned their minds to getting young people off the streets and into the



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more disciplined environment of the school. For example, Concern (Ireland) developed a well organised system of 22 schools, 505 teachers, and 21 620 students in the regions of Benadir (the capital of which is Mogadishu), Lower Shabelle, Bay and Bakol. Other organisations committed to primary education during the transition between emergency and rehabilitation included Trocaire, Goal, Norwegian Church Aid, Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo Dei Popoli (CISP-Italy), Save the Children Fund (SCF-UK), Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team (AMURT-India), Diakonia (Sweden), and Diakonia Caritas (Germany). In close collaboration with UNESCO, curricula and textbooks were produced, and teachers recruited and trained.

The EU was unable to provide financial assistance to education at this stage since ECHO's policy rarely includes rehabilitation of school systems during either the emergency or pre-rehabilitation phases. Implementation of the EU's first rehabilitation programme began in June 1994.

EU response 1994-1997: primary education

The first EC rehabilitation programme for Somalia was multi-sectoral and regionally-based operating only in those regions which had adequate security, an emerging public administration and a willingness to contribute towards their own rehabilitation. Education was part of

A functioning primary school... but there is a shortage of trained personnel

the programme with a budget of ECU 2.5m. The second rehabilitation programme allocates a further ECU 3m to education. Financial support for education projects can also be sought from B-7 budget lines for rehabilitation.

UNESCO's lead role in curricula development, textbook production, teacher recruitment and training was highly appreciated by donors, international NGOs and other UN agencies. Hence, it was logical that the EC Somalia Unit should finance textbook production for grades 1-4 through a contract signed with UNESCO in 1994. To support this programme, the EC assigned two consultants to UNESCO to assist in teacher training and supervision on the ground.

Unfortunately, during the course of 1994-1995, when UNOSOM forces were leaving Somalia, certain NGOs withdrew from the country for a variety of reasons - ranging from concern over security to a realisation that conditions were not really ripe for rehabilitation (particularly in Benadir region). This represented a major set-back and an inevitable loss on the original investments made in education by the donors who supported the initiatives. However, some observers believe it was inevitable given that the conditions for rehabilitation in certain regions did

not exist. This was particularly true of the Benadir and Lower Shabelle regions. Aid agencies and donors are slowly coming to understand the dynamics of conflict situations, and how optimally to time appropriate interventions at each phase of the emergency 'continuum' (pre-rehabilitation, rehabilitation and ultimately, development, as peace returns). Furthermore, there is always a risk that a region once considered suitable for rehabilitation may return to the emergency phase, if major conflict resurfaces.

Since June 1994, the EU has supported the rehabilitation of 12 primary schools in North West Somalia through SCF (UK), four primary schools in Eastern Sanag through Johanniter International (Germany), three primary schools in the North-East through UNICEF, and four primary schools in Galgadud and Mudug regions through CISP (Italy). Plans are afoot to assist in the rehabilitation of 10 primary schools in Nugal region (NE Somalia) through UNESCO, eight primary schools in Middle Shabelle through the Adventist Development and Rehabilitation Agency (ADRA-Germany) and Inter-Sos (Italy), two primary schools in Galgadud through ADRA and three schools in North-East Somalia through Aktion Afrika Hilfe (AAH-Germany).

By the end of 1997, it is expected that the EU will be supporting approximately 60 primary schools, as more European NGOs already involved in the health sector also take on commitments in education.

The typical education project involves physical rehabilitation of buildings, resources to provide teachers with incentives and training, and teaching materials. Textbooks are provided free through the EU/UNESCO textbook production project.

The EU is an active member of the Somalia education coordination group which brings together all aid agencies active in the education sector to share information, coordinate activities and develop common



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Pupils at a primary school in Berbera which has received help from the EU

policies – which are binding on all. In the absence of a state, UNESCO plays a lead role in curricula development, textbook production, and teacher recruitment and training. Parent-teacher associations are encouraged to be directly responsible for their schools, to ensure local ownership. As the number of schools increases, district or inter-district education boards are promoted; and teachers are exhorted to establish their own professional associations as a means of taking on greater responsibility in the absence of state structures. To encourage the allocation of local resources to the school system, the EU is planning a feasibility study on how best to finance the education system in the country, through a combination of internally and externally-generated resources. Fee-paying in schools is becoming more acceptable.

Apart from western-funded initiatives, resources from the Middle East are being deployed to support Arab-medium primary schools. There are also a number of private education initiatives, particularly in the urban areas, including single subject courses in English and computer science.

EU response 1994-1997: secondary and tertiary education

In 1996, the EU commissioned Africa Educational Trust (AET) of London and UNESCO to conduct two feasibility studies: one on how to rehabilitate the secondary school system in Somalia, the second on how to assist students whose university education was disrupted by the civil war, and those students who had qualified to enter university in

1991. These reports are currently being studied and, assuming the finance is available, will form the basis of two projects. The reports themselves envisage the rehabilitation of six secondary schools, the establishment of four study centres and support for 180 former students of the Somalia National University who would receive scholarships to study in quality African universities, after an appropriate preparatory period to improve English language and study skills. Priority will be given to students who are committed to working in Somalia, and in the fields of livestock husbandry, agriculture, health, education, administration, and infrastructure.

Apart from the education-specific schemes mentioned above, the majority of projects in other sectors such as health, water and sanitation, rehabilitation of infrastructure, livestock, and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) incorporate training. For example, the veterinary programme has channelled a high percentage of its resources to training Somali veterinarians and assistant vets on how to establish and manage private practices. Health projects have built-in in-service training programmes for Somali health staff. All this emphasis on training serves to highlight the key fact that there can be no rehabilitation without human resource development. It would be short-sighted to focus only on physical rehabilitation of buildings and infrastructure, and the provision of essential inputs such as drugs, water pumps, seeds and tools. ■

M.O'L.

Somalia-EU cooperation

Helping the people in their time of greatest need

by Sigurd Illing*

In the six years since the fall of the Siad Barre regime (January 1991), EC cooperation with Somalia has taken place in a very particular context. The absence of a government has made it very difficult to apply the stipulations of the Lomé Convention – which are based on partnership between the European Commission and the government of the country concerned. In fact, a whole set of new rules and regulations had to be established to adapt the instruments of the Convention to an unforeseen (and unforeseeable) situation.

At the beginning, during the period of disaster and relief operations that lasted until the end of 1993, the basic legal problem arising from the situation of a collapsed state did not pose itself in a major way. It was possible to intervene in Somalia rather efficiently through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) – following rules well adapted to dealing with extreme crises. Thus, humanitarian aid worth more than ECU 100m was channelled into the country. This mainly took the form of food and medicines, together with support for the NGOs handling the aid. It formed part of an extraordinary effort undertaken by the international aid community which safeguarded the life and health of hundreds of thousands of Somalis.

During 1993, awareness of a fundamental change in Somalia's overall situation led to a modification of attitude by the aid agencies.

It became increasingly clear that it was neither possible nor advisable simply to continue funding large relief operations – which were having negative side effects on the political development of the country. Aid materials had become a main target for the various militia and bandits. It was clearly necessary to monitor EC-funded activities more closely, as well as to respond to the growing potential for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

To meet this new challenge, the Commission decided to establish the Somalia Unit. It would be temporarily based in Nairobi, taking over the functions of the EC Delegation in Mogadishu that had been closed at the beginning of 1991. The Unit, headed, by a Special Envoy, was built up step-by-step, receiving the necessary human resources to deal with the extremely complex situation in Somalia. At the same time, legal measures were taken that would allow the use of funds from past National Indicative Programmes, despite the permanent absence of a National Authorising Officer (NAO).

It thus became possible to continue with the EC-Somalia cooperation that dates back to the very beginning of the Community's involvement in Africa. The part of Somalia formerly run by the Italians was covered by the association arrangements in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The north west (ex-British Somaliland) was included after the unification, which followed independence in 1960. A total of ECU 70m was spent in Somalia as a whole under the association agreement and the two Yaoundé Conventions.

The long-standing relationship between Somalia and the EC

continued smoothly under the subsequent three Lomé Conventions. The National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) of Lomé I and II provided ECU 63.6m and ECU 79.3m respectively for the development of the country. The total allocated under Lomé III was ECU 117m. However, the implementation of this third NIP had to be suspended due to the civil war which finally led to the downfall of the Siad Barre government.

Somalia has not had a government since 1991, and has therefore not been in a position to ratify Lomé IV or the mid-term revision that was agreed in Mauritius. Accordingly, it is not eligible for support under the 7th and 8th European Development Funds (EDFs). However, a special provision was introduced in the revised Lomé IV allowing Somalia to accede to the treaty should an internationally recognised government be established before the end of the Convention (Art 364a).

Deepest ever crisis

Due to the inability of the forces that overthrew Siad Barre to establish a successor government, the country has found itself in its deepest ever crisis. Initially, Somalia saw international involvement on an unprecedented scale. Intervention under the banner of the UN succeeded in mitigating the most severe consequences of the civil war. But it also created a number of serious problems, prompting unrealistic expectations among the population (for example, excessively high wages for local staff). These are still having a significant impact on present day rehabilitation efforts.

In 1993, it became evident that relative stability was returning to certain parts of the country. The opportunity to assist the people in reconstruction was recognised and the EC's response, as part of its post-conflict involvement in Somalia, was to set up a Rehabilitation Programme. The Commission launched this Programme with an allocation of ECU 38m funded from of the 6th EDF.

Before any financial commitments were made, Manuel Marin (the

* The EC Special Envoy to Somalia.



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Three different aspects of EC-funded assistance in Somalia

.A port building in Bosasso (above), anti-flooding measures in Borama (top right) and a child being treated for malnutrition in Mogadishu (left)

jects in Somalia, the choice of implementing partners became a crucial issue. Although an impressive number of international NGOs were operating in Somalia, most were relief-oriented and not interested in or qualified for rehabilitation activities. Furthermore, the NGOs concerned had to get used to new rules and regulations which differed considerably from those used in emergency operations. Close cooperation between the EC Somalia Unit staff and the implementing partners satisfactorily overcame these problems.

Probably the most important issue was to determine where the conditions in the country were conducive to switch from a relief to a rehabilitation approach. The criteria for such a fundamental decision could obviously not be established by the Commission alone. The other international actors, as well as Somali representatives, had to be associated. This task was accomplished during the Fourth Humanitarian Conference on Somalia in December 1993, where the Addis Ababa Declaration was adopted. This indeed, has been the only occasion where representatives of the entire Somali population, working together with donor governments, UN agencies and international NGOs, have formulated a common policy on the involvement of the international aid community in Somalia.

According to the Declaration, aid should only be given to areas where peace and security prevail and responsible regional authorities exist.

Successful coordination through SACB

In addition to defining these fundamental criteria, the Conference asked the donors and implementing agencies to establish a common body to coordinate aid activities in Somalia. Following this decision, the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) was set up in February 1994. It comprises donors, UN agencies and international NGOs who work closely together in aid related matters. Since the creation of SACB, the EC Special Envoy to Somalia has been the Chairman of its Executive Committee.

To date, the SACB has been particularly successful in formulating a common position for the international aid community in questions concerning security of aid workers. In February 1995, it adopted a Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia, which spells out in more detail the minimum conditions to be provided by Somali communities requesting aid. The SACB also began developing coordination mechanisms in different sectors covered by aid activities. So far, the health sector is most advanced in the formulation of a common health policy for the country. In other sectors functioning coordination is being established.

Commissioner then responsible for development), in his capacity as Chief Authorising Officer, assumed the authority of the NAO. He nominated a Deputy Chief Authorising Officer to act in his place. At the same time, a set of rules and regulations were adopted allowing a flexible approach – which was necessary for a country with no national authority and only fledgling administrations at regional or local level.

Since there was no question of the EC directly implementing pro-

The first projects under the EC Rehabilitation Programme were approved in June 1994, with an emphasis on livestock – the main productive sector in Somalia. Soon afterwards, actions were also launched in the social sectors (health, education, water and sanitation).

The first Rehabilitation Programme encompasses five main areas:

- Productive sectors (livestock, agriculture, fisheries)
- Social sectors (health, education, and water/sanitation)
- Infrastructure
- Income-generating activities
- Institution building

The commencement of activities in the various sectors was largely dependent on the presence of Technical Assistants (TAs). Due to the fact that there is no expertise in counterpart ministries or other government services, the EC Somalia Unit has to rely heavily on Technical Assistance. In addition, given that the Commission has a dual responsibility as donor and authorising agency, a close monitoring of the projects was indispensable.

The instrument of technical assistance has proven extremely useful, for two reasons in particular. First, it has significantly increased the number of 'eyes and ears' on the ground. Given that the EC Somalia Unit is based in Nairobi, and has to work without clearly identified counterparts, it is very time consuming to obtain the kind of information that EC Delegations have access to in most other countries. For example, it would normally be the Ministry of Health that determines the health policy for a given country. In Somalia, one has to contact various NGOs active in the sector as well as many Somali health professionals. And health facilities in the country have to be visited to get an idea of what is actually happening. Second and equally important, the contribution of the TAs has substantially increased the level of technical knowledge in various sectors within the Somalia Unit. This has made it possible for the latter to play a leading role in the definition of sectoral policies carried out together with the NGOs

and, to a lesser extent, the UN agencies. In the event, the people who have been recruited over time have worked extremely well as a team, and they have been able to provide cross-sectoral inputs that have considerably increased the efficiency of EC-funded projects.

By the end of 1996, more than 90% of the first Rehabilitation Programme had been committed in almost 140 projects and contracts for technical assistance and consultancies.

Obviously, during the two and a half years that the Rehabilitation Programme has been operational, a number of changes have had to be introduced, based on the experience gained during this period. One of the first and most important new features was the adoption by the SACB of the Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia. This Code constitutes a refinement of the Addis criteria which spelled out the principles to which the Somalis should adhere to be eligible for rehabilitation activities.

One of the main points addressed in the Code of Conduct concerns the selection and dismissal of local staff. Numerous implementing agencies ran into difficulties because they had staff forced upon them, or were not able to lay off employees because of the security risks involved. The issues of premises for implementing agencies, and the hiring of vehicles, were also addressed by the Code of Conduct in such a way that the international community could call upon local authorities to use their power to solve any problems in these areas.

Since the initial budget for the Rehabilitation Programme was designed on the basis of a number of not yet tested assumptions, it was also necessary to adjust the budget after a certain period of time, taking into account the ever-changing Somali reality.

The latest general review of the EC's strategy in Somalia was carried out when a second Rehabilitation Programme was prepared and submitted in spring 1996. In this pro-

gramme, more emphasis is put on institution-building, decentralisation and power-sharing mechanisms, and civil society. The great interest generated among the Somalis for the 'menu of options', and the follow-up workshops organised in Naivasha and Nakuru (Kenya) on future administrative and political structures in Somalia, are a clear indication of the importance of this sector.

During the implementation of the first Rehabilitation Programme for Somalia, other sources of EC funding have also been used. Thus ECU 6m was made available from the rehabilitation budget line and a food monetisation programme of more than ECU 2m was approved in early 1996. In parallel, ECHO has continued supporting relief interventions in those areas not covered by the rehabilitation programme, and where an emergency situation prevails. In 1996, it funded activities to the tune of ECU 5m. A further key component of the Humanitarian Office's work is ECHO Flight, which began operating in May 1994. This provides air transport for NGOs and other aid workers, and has made a substantial contribution to the effective functioning of aid operations in all sectors. The total cost for the period 1994-96 has been more than ECU 25m.

With the approval by the Commission of a second rehabilitation programme of ECU 47m, continued EC support to Somalia is assured for the near future. For the Somalis, who have been victims of civil war and destruction, it is essential that the international community continues to show its readiness to support them. This is particularly true for the EC which has played a key role, providing aid and advice in recent years. With new resources available, and a highly committed team of officials and technical assistants in place, it can be demonstrated to the Somali people that their old partners have not deserted them in their time of greatest need. ■

S.I.

Reforestation in Togo

Involving the rural community

by T. T. K. Tchamie*

Since early this century, Togo has implemented an environmental protection policy based on reforestation. The rural population has been involved in this difficult task at different times and to varying degrees – with greater or lesser success. Development of forestry in rural areas has come up against stumbling blocks (such as a dearth of available land, meagre financial resources and lack of incentives, minimal information for and training of the population and a number of physical constraints). Tomorrow's major challenge is undoubtedly that of encouraging those living in the countryside to participate actively in reforestation actions since there will be no future for forestry without them.

According to a 1981 FAO estimate, the rate of deforestation in Togo between 1976 and 1980 was 1140 ha per year, whilst reforestation accounted for only 255 ha per year over the same period. Amongst measures implemented to conserve, protect and restore vegetation, reforestation is of major importance and meets a dual objective: firstly, an ecological one (soil protection, conservation of water resources, etc.) and secondly, an economic one (production and supply of wood to the population).

Although it appears that today's use of forestry resources cannot exceed the current rate without giving rise to serious ecological imbalances, the rate of growth of the country's population – 2.8% in rural areas and 4.4% in towns and cities between 1971 and 1981 – means that increasing demand is being placed on existing forested areas in order to meet the nation's requirements.

Furthermore, 80% of Togo's population is directly dependent on agriculture, which in turn means that increasingly extensive areas of

forest are being cleared for cultivation purposes.

Although a region-by-region analysis of shortfalls and surpluses of wood highlights a number of areas of inequality – coastal regions, the Kara region and the savanna region are lacking in resources whereas the central and plateaux regions show a surplus – the country's total demand outstrips domestic supply.

Moreover, destruction of natural vegetation brings with it climatic disturbances (diminishing and irregular rainfall, a more intense *harmattan* wind in the south) and, therefore, degradation of soils, a lack of firewood, a reduction in water resources and the disappearance of certain species of flora and fauna.

Reforestation, therefore, has been regarded as extremely important for a number of years: Indeed, it began in Togo during the German colonial period.

In 1904, recognising the extent of degradation suffered by plant life, Governor von Zech conceived the idea of reforesting the savannas. In 1907, three large areas were selected for reforestation: Hao-Baloé (28 000 ha) at Notsé, Mô-

Kama (38 000 ha) at Bassar, and Galangashi (6 000 ha) at Mango. There were others besides, totalling approximately 80 000 ha. This involved huge efforts aimed at introducing species of flora and protecting the remaining forest against inroads made by humans.

The policy was implemented in many different ways. Firstly, local reforestation actions were conducted by the local authorities (associations and stations). Using plants grown in experimental gardens, reforestation was carried out by means of forced labour or fatigue duty. Next, a general programme for reforesting the territory was implemented and carried out by workers who were paid in kind.

Later, using financial incentives, the colonial authorities asked missionary groups to involve pupils at their schools in reforestation activities, expecting in this way to develop a respect for trees. Trees were classified into four major groups and, on this basis, the financial reward varied between 10 and 40 pfennigs per tree planted.

After the departure of the Germans, French colonisers – who found that planting carried out by their predecessors was in a very poor state – took up the challenge. The French used various methods to encourage the people to set up reforestation 'nurseries' themselves or, at the very least, to take an active interest. The first milestone was the creation, by Governor Bonnacarrère, on 28 February 1931, of an annual 'tree festival' aimed at mobilising younger members of the population to carry out reforestation work. However, this initiative, which required everyone to plant one tree each on that day and thereafter to look after it, was not as successful as expected and the idea was shelved. Other methods used consisted either in distributing plants free of charge to those who requested them, the Forests and Water Department being responsible for monitoring and subsequent maintenance work,

* Professor of Biogeography at the University of Benin.

or in entering into a reforestation contract with this Department. Individuals or the community in question continued to be owners of the land and undertook not to exploit any forest resources without authorisation from the authorities, the latter being entitled to half the produce from the plot of land to offset planting and monitoring costs.

After independence, Togo again took up Governor Bonnacarrère's formula and, in March 1977, instituted a 'Day of the Tree'. So, on 1 June each year, all Togolese citizens have to plant at least one tree and care for it until it is viable. On that day, the state distributes plants to rural and urban populations. The plants are produced by the nurseries of the Forestry Production Directorate and the ODEF (Office for Development and Exploitation of Forests) – agencies whose role is to assist the people in rural forestry development actions by training rural nurserymen and producing plants intended for use in reforestation.

The Togolese government is assisted in its efforts by the World Food Programme, one such project conducted in collaboration with *Animation rural* consisting of the distribution by the WFP in 1992 of 78 731 tonnes of provisions in return for the planting of 21 000 plants. In addition to this type of programme, which is aimed directly at involving the population in reforestation efforts, the forestry code promotes ownership of the plantations which are set up, planters becoming owners of their collective or individual plots.

On request, a proprietor may also obtain authorisation to exploit his plantations, with the agreement of the Forests, Hunting and Environmental Directorate, the Regional Directorate for Rural Development and the Chief of Police. This arrangement is intended to halt the uncontrolled felling of plantations with complete disregard for forestry production techniques.

A number of problems, however, hamper rural forestry development in Togo. Firstly, in order to replant an area with trees, not only plants but also land has to be available. The lack of land is a problem which is acutely felt, particularly in regions with a high population density ranging from 150 to 200 inhabitants per km². This is the case in the prefectures of Tône, Kozah, Binah, Yoto and Le Golfe where farmers (whose major concern is their own survival and that of their families) use the small plots of land available only to grow food (i.e. for short-term results). As a result, little heed is paid to the long-term effects of reforestation, particularly since the seasons which favour reforestation and work in the fields coincide.


Another (and not the smallest) downside of reforestation campaigns stems from the availability of funds to implement them – seeds and plants have to be purchased, land has to be dug, seedlings have to be planted and tended, and other materials and equipment have to be bought. The cost can only be covered with the help of state subsidies and aid from NGOs or international organisations.

There are other obstacles to rural forestry development which stem from traditional activities such as stock rearing, which combines the pasturing of animals during the growing season of plants and their wandering during the dry season.

Thousands of cattle, sheep and goats browse amongst the seedlings, breaking and tearing up the young plants. This occurs particularly in the savanna region which is mostly pastoral and agricultural.

Nor should we ignore the ravages of brush fires in the dry season and climatic constraints. Rainfall is a vital element in forestry. The determining factor is not so much the total annual rainfall, but rather its distribution throughout the year.

In many areas, rainfall patterns are irregular and drought can



Countryside in the north of Togo. The government is attempting to involve the population in reforestation

affect the young plants whether it occurs at the beginning or the end of a reforestation campaign. Only a major water management programme can ease the lack of water during the dry season.

Another parameter which has to be taken into account is the choice of species planted. These must be selected on the basis of the region in question and its ecological requirements. More importantly, to make local populations more receptive to participation in reforestation, the species chosen have to have a value for them – be this in terms of food, fodder, money (wood for working) or energy (firewood, charcoal).

If this essential requirement is neglected, rural populations will be reluctant to become involved in reforestation actions. Yet such actions are essential for the protection of the environment. ■ T.T.K.T.

The Netherlands Periodicals Project

Helping developing countries with scientific literature

by Birgitte Speet*

In issue no 160, we published an article (CTA Bulletin) on the promotion of rural development through book distribution. As a follow-up to this, we focus here on a long-standing Dutch project which is designed to disseminate scientific literature to developing countries.

Since 1983, the Netherlands Organisation for International Cooperation in Higher Education (Nuffic) has been managing the Netherlands Periodicals Project (NPP). It is funded by the Directorate-General for International Cooperation of the Dutch Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The purpose of the NPP is to help libraries in developing countries build up their collections of scientific literature. Surplus issues of periodicals are donated by Dutch universities, private individuals and companies. These are sent on a regular basis to developing country libraries. Nuffic acts as a mediator, matching supply and demand so that gaps in existing collections can be filled.

The NPP is intended for those countries where the Dutch Government concentrates its development cooperation efforts. Institutions that receive books and periodicals through the NPP are already partners in one of the educational development projects funded by the Dutch Government.

Organisations and higher education institutes in developing countries are asked to fill in a form on which they can indicate the titles and years that are missing from their journal collections. When the forms are returned, the information is entered into the NPP database. Thanks to this database, any time that a


Dutch institution offers books or periodicals, they can be sent quickly to a library that need them. Journal issues must meet NPP criteria before they are shipped: they must be in good condition and not too old, they must be in a language that is useful to the recipient library, and they must meet a need.

When a Dutch organisation offers literature, the titles are sorted by subject and then offered to appropriate participating libraries in developing countries. Communication with these libraries is by fax, e-mail or post. If, within eight weeks, a library responds positively to an offer, the journals in question are packed and shipped. Transport costs are paid from NPP funds, and when the literature arrives in the recipient country, the Dutch Embassy ensures that it is cleared.

In the period 1992-1996, more than 68 000 kg of materials were despatched in 133 separate shipments. The total cost amounted to 300 000 guilders (ECU 140 000).

Looking to the future

In July 1996, the third phase of the NPP was initiated. This is due to run until June 1998. The proposal for this phase took into account the developments that are taking place in the library world. As new information technologies, such as CD-ROM and access to the Internet, become more widely available, offers of printed materials will decline. The possibilities for on-line consultation of literature have increased dramatically in recent years, and will continue to do so. The vast potential that this new world of information exchange holds for researchers in the South is evident. However, access to



New information technologies such as CD-ROM (above), and access to the Internet, are becoming more widely available.

it requires local computer networks. Institutions in developing countries that have neither the money nor the infrastructure to develop these networks are in danger of being left behind with even less access to information than they have now.

These developments will have consequences for the NPP. During the next phase, 'conventional' donations of literature will continue, but at the same time, the NPP will do its best to help its 12 main partners to gain access to electronic information. This could take the form of consultancy on such subjects as library computerisation and improved inter-library lending, as well as document delivery systems. ■

B.S.

* Project Manager for the Netherlands Periodicals Project. Inquiries about the NPP should be directed to the author at the following address: Nuffic NPP, Department for Human Resource and Institutional Development, P.O. Box 29777, The Hague, The Netherlands. Tel (31) 70 4260169. Fax (31) 70 4260189; E-mail: bspeet@nuffics.nl. Web site: <http://www.nuffics.nl>

Haiti-EU cooperation

Alleviating poverty and entrenching democracy in Haiti

by Nick Costello*

In October 1994 democracy returned to Haiti after three years of dictatorship. The European Commission moved fast to restore development cooperation, signing the 7th EDF National Indicative Programme (NIP) with the Haitian Government for ECU 106m in November 1994 and mobilising the whole panoply of other instruments. In 1996, the Commission stepped up this support with an allocation of ECU 148m to Haiti for the coming Eighth European Development Fund. This level of support is making the Commission the largest donor to Haiti.

The challenge is to combine speed with support for Haiti's long-term development. Life for most people in Haiti is desperately hard. Action is urgent to address the terrible poverty, nutrition, health and sanitation conditions. But it is also essential for Haiti to use the funds that are now available to make its own economy work, encourage investment and entrench democracy. This means agricultural production, education, roads, electricity, telecommunications. It also means justice reform and efficient administration. Below we summarise the contributions the Commission has made since October 1994 to support these goals.

Social sectors

The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has stepped up its support for the health

sector in Haiti, contributing ECU 37m since October 1994. This has funded

- nutritional centres to cope with malnourishment;
- distribution of essential medicines;
- supply of drinkable water;
- rehabilitation of pharmacies and hospitals;
- the establishment of decentralised health units at commune level.

In the context of structural adjustment, the Commission is financing the Government's entire health budget (excluding salaries), which has cost ECU 13m so far. In addition, the rehabilitation budget line and programme have provided ECU 7m for health and water supply, while 'Food Security' has provided ECU 12m of food aid.

Education has likewise benefited from the structural adjustment facility with ECU 19m in budget support. This guarantees the entire education budget, apart from salaries. In addition several NGO projects have been funded in education.

Infrastructures

The Commission will finance the rehabilitation of the roads to Hinche and to Jérémie - two of the most important and at the same time two of the worst in the country. The work on the road to Hinche will start in 1997, and for Jérémie in 1998. The costs are ECU 40m and ECU 47m respectively. A further ECU 16m was provided to repair one of Port-au-Prince's main power stations

(Varreux) that burnt down in late 1994. These repairs are now completed. Finally, a multi-sector rehabilitation programme has provided ECU 25m for minor roads, agriculture, water supply and education infrastructures.

Agriculture

The land that once produced half the world's sugar can no longer feed half its own people. Deforestation and erosion in the mountains have blocked up the irrigation systems on the plains, with the result that production is low throughout. The government proposes to upgrade the irrigation systems at the same time as tackling the erosion from the mountains. This has to be accompanied by land reform (launched in 1996) to secure the tenure of small farmers in the mountains and to ensure that farmers on the plains benefit from the increased production. Support for the different elements of this strategy is one of the three focal sectors in the new NIP for the Eighth EDF, and has been allocated ECU 38m. In addition, 'Food Security' has provided ECU 15m (of which ECU 7m is to support the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture) and could supply higher levels in future years to support the same strategy.

At the same time the instrument 'Stabex' has provided ECU 32m, used mainly on rural roads (ECU 14m), to relaunch coffee and cocoa production (ECU 6m) and on rural infrastructures (ECU 7m).

Democracy and governance

1995 saw parliamentary and Presidential elections. The Commission provided ECU 2m to fund these polls, which passed off well and culminated in the first transfer of power between two democratically elected Presidents (Presidents Aristide and Préval) in the country's history, on 7 February 1996.

In 1997 a Haitian Justice Commission, nominated by the Gov-

* Desk Officer for Haiti, DG VIII, European Commission. This article follows on from the Haiti Country Report which we published in our last issue.



ernment, is receiving Commission funding to define the reform of the justice system. The implementation of this reform can then be part-funded under the 'Governance' focal sector of the new NIP, for which ECU 18m is reserved. These funds will be used, in addition, to support the decentralisation process and strengthen the administrative capacity of several ministries.

Other areas

During the 1991-94 dictatorship, many people were forced to flee their homes, and are now returning with no jobs, money or homes. The Commission is supporting the National Migration Organisation within the Haitian government, which provides support to these returnees.

Much of the European Community's support has gone through non-governmental organisations

(NGOs), mainly European but increasingly Haitian. This is true especially for the rehabilitation (ECU 13m) and NGO co-financing (ECU 6m) budget lines

Immediately after the restoration of democracy, the public authorities had little or no capacity to support the social sectors and rehabilitate infrastructures, not just because of the three years of dictatorship, but also because of a much longer tradition of a state that provided little or nothing in these areas. NGOs were therefore the only rapid and flexible channel for support.

But the Commission will continue supporting NGOs, as the capacity of the public authorities grows, to take advantage of their flexibility, commitment and participative approach. It also supports 'decentralised cooperation' which brings together and structures cooperation between the different actors of civil society.

*The City Hall of Jacmel
EC funding will be used to support the
decentralisation process and strengthen
the administrative capacity of several
national ministries*

To conclude, the Commission's heavy presence now is intended to prepare for lower levels of support in future decades. By helping the Government improve its administration and civil society to structure itself, Haiti itself will one day be able to finance and administer the maintenance of the structures whose rehabilitation and construction the EC is now financing. This will be true across the sectors: for roads, irrigation systems, health, education or water supply. ■ N.C.

Agricultural policy reform and prospects for African exports

by G. Day, P. Digges, A. Gordon and A. Marter*

With most economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) remaining heavily dependent on agriculture, the future performance of agricultural exports will be a key determinant of economic growth prospects in the region. This is especially true in an era of liberal trade policy, and taking account of

the small base from which manufacturing growth and export diversification must take place. Agricultural commodities account for more than 25% of export earnings in 29 countries of the region. And these exports are dominated by a relatively small number of commodities, especially coffee, cocoa and cotton, but also bananas, sugar, groundnuts, rubber, tea and tobacco. Agriculture is also perhaps disproportionately important to the overall balance and pattern of SSA economic growth due to its role in providing employment and income to large sections of the population and in acting as a principal engine in generating demand for wage goods.

Over recent years, agricultural export performance has been affected by a range of wider influences.

These include trends in international commodity markets, the implementation of reforms at both macroeconomic and sectoral level and changes in international trade agreements and policies.

The implications of these influences for the prospects of African agricultural exports are examined in a recent report compiled by economists from the Natural Resources Institute¹.

The main findings are discussed below, followed by a consideration of market prospects for some important export commodities, and a summary of strategic issues in relation to African agricultural exports.

Commodity price trends

Real prices for most non-fuel commodities have generally declined over the past 20 years. Price declines reflect a number of influences including the relatively inelastic demand for many food commodities, the collapse of international commodity agreements, currency devaluations in many producing countries, the role of subsidies and other agricultural policies in the EU and the USA and the expansion of supply in the face of falling or stagnant demand.

In particular, beverage crops (coffee, cocoa and tea) have suffered price drops due to expansion in supply stimulated by efficiency gains in production (especially the development of high yielding varieties), the positive effect on farmgate prices of export tax reductions and exchange rate devaluations, increased plantings following the 1970s commodity price boom, and higher production of perennial crops by lower cost Asian producers.

These trends suggest that to sustain profitable commodity production, there will have to be productivity gains in production systems and in processing, marketing and post-harvest systems.

Past experience and the views of most commentators suggest that the

prospects for sustaining real prices through the operation of active international commodity agreements are not favourable.

Impact of economic reforms

Economic reforms have been implemented in many SSA commodity-producing countries, often under structural adjustment packages advocated by the World Bank and the IMF. These reforms have impacted on commodity production both through their influence on overall macroeconomic conditions and through the microeconomic implications of reform at agricultural sector level.

At a macro level, reforms have tended to result in improved incentives for producers of tradeable goods through the effects of currency devaluations, trade policy reform, greater economic stability, less distorted prices and reductions in export taxation.

The overall effect of improved incentives has been to stimulate supply, though in many cases this has taken place following a period of substantial erosion of producer incentives. For example, by 1983, real producer prices for cocoa in Ghana had fallen to just 34% of their 1972 level.

At a sectoral level, there has been a shift towards promoting greater involvement by the private sector, with a greatly reduced role for many statutory marketing authorities. This tends to stimulate greater competition in marketing services and can be associated with higher prices for producers.

However, because greater private sector involvement is a relatively recent development in most parts of Africa, it is difficult to generalise about the long term implications.

In addition, experience suggests that privatisation of parastatal export marketing operations may need to be handled carefully to maintain the confidence of international buyers, safeguard some degree of market stability and ensure that marketing systems maintain and reward quality standards appropriately.

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¹ International Markets for African Agricultural Exports: Agricultural Policy Reform and Agricultural Exports (1996), by Philip Digges, Ann Gordon and Alan Marter.

In addition, the commitment to promoting greater private involvement in the export marketing chain has been uneven, resulting in some critical policy gaps, notably in areas such as trader credit and the legal framework governing trading conditions.

With the emphasis on export-oriented growth, there has been some selective investment in export-oriented infrastructure: in many countries road and port facilities have been dramatically improved.

However, the critical bottleneck of high transport costs in Africa remains a key structural constraint which limits the potential for regional trade within the continent.

These issues, combined with a generally piecemeal approach to implementing economic reforms, mean that the latter have had an uneven impact on commodity sectors.

In particular, the implications of sectoral reforms remain to be worked out, and this is a key area where further analysis, focused on particular commodity systems in identified countries, is likely to be instructive.

International trade agreements and policies

The effect of regional trading blocks within Africa has been, and is

likely to remain, limited. Low per capita incomes mean that African markets are small, with relatively little to be gained from preferential trading conditions. In addition, any integration measures have been hampered by uneven implementation, and a general lack of trade complementarity.

Changes to trading blocks among the countries of Europe and North America are likely to have more significant implications. The expansion of the EU to include more southern European countries (whose economies are similar in structure to middle-income developing countries) may restrict the potential for manufactured exports from developing countries and contribute to delaying SSA export diversification. However, the dynamic effects of greater European integration are likely to increase demand for primary commodities and boost prospects, particularly for well-established suppliers.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), with its current membership of Canada, USA and Mexico, is unlikely to have much effect on SSA agricultural exports. However, if NAFTA membership is extended, SSA markets in North America could be

threatened by competition from Central American suppliers.

The effects of the Uruguay Round on SSA agricultural exports are difficult to isolate, and are likely to vary significantly from one commodity to another. In general, tariff reductions are not expected to have a major impact, because on many tropical products, these are already low in major importing countries.

World prices of tropical products are not expected to change greatly, although for some ACP exporters, the value of Lomé trade preferences may decline. In the longer term, the most important effects are likely to be the stimulation of trade, specialisation and productivity gains, with the new rules governing trade relations resulting in greater transparency.

Prospects by commodity

The overall outlook for beverage crop exports is relatively flat. With generally stagnant demand in traditional markets, prospects hinge critically on developments in the markets of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the case of coffee, there appears to be limited potential for raising international prices and the trend towards the consumption of milder Arabica coffees in major importing countries will be to the detriment of most SSA exporters who grow Robusta varieties. Given the relatively demanding requirements for entry into markets for value added products, African exporters will need to make strides in improving productivity and the cost-efficiency of marketing systems in order to defend market shares.

In the case of cocoa, international markets are expected to show continued growth, but SSA exporters face heavy competition from new producers who have sharply increased supplies to major markets. Again, the defence of market share will be a priority, with the need to design careful strategies for further rationalisation of marketing institutions.

Cotton represents the only major commodity with prospects for volume growth on the part of SSA exporters. This is especially important

Cotton: the only major commodity with prospects for growth for SSA exporters.



Table 1: Key issues for selected SSA agricultural export commodity systems

Commodity	Issue	Country focus
1. Coffee	Examine processing and grading systems and assess the adequacy of incentives for farmers	Kenya Uganda Tanzania Cote d'Ivoire Cameroon Burundi Ethiopia
2. Cotton	Identify constraints to improved on-farm productivity (seed cotton yields and quality) and extension services to support farmers. Examine operation and maintenance of cotton ginneries, and identify constraints to improved quality	Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Chad Côte d'Ivoire Ghana Mali Nigeria Swaziland South Africa Tanzania Togo Zimbabwe
3. Non-traditional crops	Identify major production, marketing and quality control constraints	Tanzania Ghana Senegal Burkina Faso Côte d'Ivoire Zimbabwe Namibia South Africa
4. Cocoa	Examine internal marketing systems and their impact on farmers and incentives. Identify major constraints and scope for improved efficiency.	Ghana Nigeria Côte d'Ivoire
5. Cashew	Provision of support for farmers, particularly harvesting and marketing Quality control issues and options in terms of processing technology for the large scale plants	Tanzania Mozambique

given cotton's importance in providing broad-based income-generating opportunities for smallholders in many parts of the continent.

Africa's share of the world market is only around 14%, and, therefore, the benefits of higher production are less likely to be dissipated by supply-induced price decreases. Competition is strong in an increasingly quality-conscious market place, but Africa's reputation for high quality, associated with its largely hand-picked crop, remains a strong selling point. In future, strategies to rehabilitate and expand production will need to be de-

signed to ensure that expanded production does not compromise quality and the ability to meet the new demands of major markets.

In the edible nuts sector, prospects for groundnut exports, previously a mainstay in a number of countries, appear limited given declining demand for groundnut oil and the stringent grading requirements of major markets for hand picked selected (HPS) nuts. Nonetheless, there is potential for a revival of cashew exports, although this has more limited geographical importance in SSA (principally Tanzania and Mozambique). The international

market for cashews is growing strongly and SSA has potentially lower production costs than its major competitors.

A variety of non-traditional agricultural exports in horticultural and speciality markets represent a significant option for many SSA exporters. However, competition in many of these markets is fierce and quality issues are paramount.

Prospects here for SSA exporters depend crucially on the development of effective production and handling systems, allied with improved market intelligence and the ability to target market opportunities closely. The involvement of foreign expertise and investment in developing effective marketing linkages, and enhancing the capacity of SSA exporters to gain access to market opportunities, is likely to be crucial.

Key issues

Important strategic issues facing SSA agricultural exports may be divided into those which are commodity-specific and those which cut across various sectors. In the table, we summarise some areas where applied research could help in forming strategies to optimise the performance of specific commodities. The 'cross-cutting' issues include transport costs and export-oriented infrastructure, the potential role of regional trade in Africa and the handling of commodity price risks in liberalised systems. The latter should also encompass an assessment of the relative roles of the public and private sectors in promoting incentives and providing access to the services and technology necessary for export promotion. ■

G.D., P.D., A.G. & A.M.

The UNISTAR programme

Offering expertise for companies in developing countries

by Thomas M. Neufing*

The opening-up of many of the world's economies following the end of the Cold War has dramatically increased the need for advice and assistance in countries facing fundamental economic changes. The assistance of the European Union to Eastern European and CIS countries through their PHARE and TACIS programmes is of crucial importance for successful transformation in that region. But there is also a lot that successful executives can do on an individual and voluntary basis. The United Nations International Short Term Advisory Resources (UNISTAR) programme was created in 1985 to meet the increasing demand for short-term, highly specialised, volunteer advisory services to the private and public sectors of developing countries.

UNISTAR arranges short-term missions abroad by leading international experts and managers who can help solve many of the problems which hinder enterprises. It operates a global programme with an international network of advisors and supporting organisations including numerous multinational firms such as BASF, Fiat and the Samsung Group. The focus is on the special needs of small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries and the emerging market economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). UNISTAR has access to a broad range

of business and technical skills, in particular general management, marketing, strategic planning, production, design, and finance.

UNISTAR advisors, from more than 30 countries, have completed more than a thousand missions with private and state-owned companies in 80 developing countries. Their assignments range from one week to three months. Over 60% of UNISTAR advisors are active executives; the remainder being recently retired. They have, on average, 15-20 years of experience in their area of specialisation, with at least some of that time spent in a general management capacity. The following three examples provide evidence of how much impact these short-term consultancies can generate.

Asparagus in Lesotho

The Basotho Fruit and Vegetable Canning Factory, which was a subsidiary of the Lesotho National Development Corporation, recognised the need to adjust production to meet changing trends in the international market for its products. Its main product was canned asparagus, which was exported to the EU. However, demand for canned vegetables was in decline, while demand for fresh produce was increasing due to consumers' increasing health consciousness. The company therefore decided to export fresh asparagus to the EU on an experimental basis. The chances for success were high

given that the growing season for asparagus in Lesotho complements that of Europe.

The company encountered a problem in that fibres developed in the stems of the fresh asparagus, compromising its quality. It decided to seek a solution using the latest technology, as well as to find ways of improving the marketing of their produce in Europe. The company also wanted to explore the possibility of cultivating and exporting other fresh produce and was happy to seek advice from outside. It approached the UNISTAR programme for a consultant with a suitable background and expertise in the food processing and marketing field.

In cooperation with the British Executive Service Overseas (BESO), UNISTAR was able to locate *Theodore Rubens*, who was to bring over 35 years of experience to the mission. He travelled to Lesotho and spent six weeks working with the company, visiting plantation sites and reviewing all aspects of production. From his own observations and expertise, he concluded that the problem of fibre development was due to the harvesting condi-

An asparagus grower in Lesotho



The Courier

* UNV Liaison Officer at the UN Office in Brussels.

tions and the way the asparagus was transported to the cannery for processing and packaging.

The solution was relatively simple and Mr Rubens was able to propose suitable methods of harvesting fresh asparagus for export. He went on to identify other products suitable for Lesotho's growing conditions, highlighting the important factors to take into consideration at the trial stages. He was also able to develop easy-to-follow worksheets for the company for use in the pricing and costing of its products. The assistance supplied by the UNISTAR expert made a significant contribution to the success of the company's operations. It went on to improve its production of asparagus and establish a strong presence in the European market.

The Mongolian Stock Exchange

In May 1991, the Mongolian Parliament passed a law transferring ownership of state enterprises to the private sector. This resulted in the establishment of the Mongolian Stock Exchange. Instead of simply selling the shares on the open market, the country chose instead, a unique and egalitarian system, involving the distribution of vouchers to everyone over the age of 18. These vouchers could then be used to purchase stock in the large state-owned enterprises.

At an early stage, the Mongolian Stock Exchange approached the UNISTAR programme for an advisor who could provide guidance in the formation, management, organisation, and operation of mutual funds.

Leon Weil of the investment firm Gruntal & Co. – who has more than 35 years experience in the investment and securities industry – was chosen for this unique mission. He gave a series of lectures on mutual fund operations to train 35 employees of the Mongolian Stock Exchange. These included managers from branch offices who would later be responsible for developing mutual funds in stock brokerage offices throughout Mongolia. The

lectures dealt with key aspects of investment company operations, including the types of company that can be established, regulatory aspects and organisational questions. Mr Weil gave periodic quizzes during his lectures to see how much his audience was absorbing. He expressed satisfaction with the high level of enthusiasm and understanding displayed by the people who would be running the Mutual Funds programme.

Six years later, the Mongolian Stock Exchange is still running well. Its success is due in no small part to Mr Weil's lectures and the advice he offered during the critical transition phase when the new financial market was having to function in a vacuum of experience and infrastructure.

Many of those who attended the lectures are still key players in the Mongolian Stock Exchange. The lectures delivered by Mr Weil were translated and published as a textbook, which is required reading for any new stock broker applying for a licence.

Shrimp farming in Zimbabwe

Kariba Prawns Ltd. was formed in 1980 in Zimbabwe to produce fresh-water prawns for the domestic market. Initially, it was hoped that the company would be able to diversify its operations within a few years to rear other types of fish and develop an integrated aquaculture scheme.

However, it became clear to the management that production targets were not being met and that there was a question mark over the viability of the entire operation.

The company therefore turned to UNISTAR for expert advice. *Dr Mark Brooks*, an aquaculture specialist at the University of Hawaii, was chosen for the assignment.

Familiar with shrimp farming and pond management, he spent two weeks in Zimbabwe, analysing the company's operations records and visiting the production ponds.

He worked with his Zimbabwean counterparts, carrying out experiments on the harvesting and stocking of the ponds, and taking water samples. Finally, he conducted several training sessions with his counterparts to ensure that they had a full understanding of his proposals for change.

Dr Brook found that the prawns' hatching and early growth rates were inadequate. This was reflected in his report which set out a series of practical suggestions to improve the operation.

These included sampling programmes, wild fish and carp management, and proposals to boost harvest efficiency, water quality, the hatchery operation, processing/marketing, and feed formulation.

More specifically, he found that the practice of organising repeat harvests three days in a row resulted in very poor water conditions which put too much stress on the prawns. The company discontinued this. He also recommended that the company purchase new equipment to improve harvesting. By the end of the winter, the company had submitted a budget to purchase the necessary equipment.

The Kariba Shrimp Company found the consultancy to be very useful, helping it to get its operations back on track. It was expecting to be financially viable again by the final quarter of the year following Dr Brook's visit.

UNISTAR advisors receive their travel and living expenses, but no fees. Given the commercial nature of the assignments, there is no prohibition on advisors developing longer-term relationships with the firms they assist in developing countries. ■

T.N.

World Food Summit

A call for action

by Agostino Ambrogetti*

Government delegations from 173 nations and representatives of intergovernmental and regional organisations gathered in Rome from 13-17 November for the World Food Summit organised by the UN's Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). An NGO forum on food security, bringing together a range of actors from civil society, was staged to coincide with the Summit. For both gatherings, the main focus was on the problems of hunger and malnutrition, and on possible solutions.

Following two and a half years of negotiations, the national delegates meeting in plenary at the Summit adopted two official documents entitled *'The Rome Declaration on World Food Security'* and *'The World Food Summit Plan of Action'*. NGOs were given the opportunity to set out their position at the Summit's last working session. The Declaration contains a range of key principles and engagements aimed at ensuring 'the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food'. Meanwhile, the Plan of Action sets out the operational principles and seven basic commitments. It also lists the concrete actions that are needed to achieve the objective of reducing 'the number of undernourished people to half their present level by no later than 2015'.

The NGO Forum's statement, *'Profit for Few or Food for All'* was the outcome of discussions involving more than 1200 organisations from all of the world's regions. In simple terms, it affirms the 'basic human right to food' and calls for measures

to ensure that this right can be enjoyed by all.

In addition to the formal resolutions, the week in Rome had a more immediate and positive impact. Both meetings succeeded in making the global headlines, drawing the attention of the media to the reality of hunger and malnutrition. And it happened in a meaningful, rational and complete manner – in contrast to the usual shocking images which often only provide a superficial picture. It is true that some nations (notably G7 countries) failed to send top level delegations, but this did not prevent more than 2000 journalists from giving the events extensive coverage.

One cannot say at this stage whether the Summit was a success or a failure. This ultimately depends on whether the Declaration and Plan of Action are actually followed up, which in turn depends on the political will of the state parties. One participant, Cuban President *Fidel Castro*, was certainly ready to voice criticism. He said it was 'shameful' that the Summit should be taking place at all, pointing out that similar goals had already been set at the previous Rome Food Summit in 1974 – and that they remained unimplemented.

What does appear to have been reinforced at the Summit was a recognition that hunger and food insecurity have a world dimension (currently affecting more than 800 million people). There are a great many factors involved here – basic poverty, inadequate food supplies, the lack of personal spending power, geology, climate, gender, religion, political stability and so on. Within this already complex context, there is now the phenomenon of economic globalisation. Everyone seemed to agree, therefore, on the need for global so-

lutions, but the analyses and suggested solutions varied enormously. In some cases, people came to diametrically opposite conclusions.

Despite the point about globalisation, there are clearly no absolute truths or neat solutions that can be applied to every situation of food insecurity. However, the weak agricultural markets of the least developed countries appear to be most dangerously exposed, given the free trade principles adopted in the last Uruguay Round (leading to the establishment of the World Trade Organisation).

The hunger-population link

Demographic trends were, as expected, a focal point of discussion at the Summit. After the controversies that exploded at the Cairo Population Conference, the Rome meeting confirmed the guidelines finally agreed in the Egyptian capital. The call was for 'an early stabilisation of the world population,' the 'integration of population concerns into development strategies' and the devising of 'appropriate population policies, programmes and family planning services'.

The point was made that high population growth is a major factor in the poverty-hunger equation. But not all participants agreed with the emphasis put on this issue. The Holy See, for example, preferred to stress the need for a better distribution of the world's resources as a way to achieve food security. A high population it suggested, could contribute to development in that it led to higher demand and created new possibilities for commercial exchanges. In any case, the Vatican view was that population growth had its limits. At the Forum, some Asian NGOs also expressed the opinion that population density or growth was not the main problem. They focused on the fact that land in developing countries is frequently given over to export crops rather than local needs.

When discussing the demographic issue, it is clear that there are no clear-cut answers (the final NGO

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Intensive cultivation in China
*There are densely populated countries where
 the people are not undernourished*

statement did not tackle the subject). One has to acknowledge that there are densely populated countries such as China, where the people are not undernourished, and sparsely populated nations where food shortages occur. But it is also difficult to argue that the combination of low agricultural inputs and productivity on the one hand, and population growth on the other, does not result in the destruction of natural resources. The economic viability of a country's agricultural system may well be the decisive factor.

Role of trade

The question of international trade flows in agricultural products featured high on the agenda of both the Summit and the Forum. The NGOs spoke, in their statement, of 'food sovereignty and security to eliminate the globalisation of hunger' while the official Declaration stated that 'trade is a key element in achieving food security'. In general, the international community supported the proposition 'that agricultural trade and overall trade

policies are conducive to fostering food security for all, through a fair and market-oriented world trade system' (Commitment 4 of the Rome Declaration). This statement in favour of the free market needs to be seen in the framework of the Summit commitment to international efforts aimed at strengthening national food security actions.

The NGO side did not wholly reject this approach, but nor did they accept that national and global market forces could, by themselves, resolve the problem. Indeed, they argued that, in many cases, these forces 'may undermine or exacerbate food insecurity.' This reflects the position taken in September by the NGOs during their pre-Summit consultations with the FAO. On that occasion, 'unequal interchange' between North and South was identified as 'a direct cause of poverty', the observation being made that 'developing countries are often forced to import food from overseas'

thus making their food security subject to the vagaries of the international market. These points, which appear to contradict evaluations made during the Uruguay Round, were not accepted for inclusion in the Declaration and Plan of Action.

Despite the differences which emerged, notably on the trade issue, the two documents which came out of the Summit offer a reasonable legal basis for working towards global food security. They set out numerous basic principles with which few would disagree - the fundamental role of farmers, sustainable management of natural resources, revitalisation of rural areas, external debt relief, participation of women and so on.

Can the world be fed?

Posing the question, is it possible to feed everyone in the world, the answer must be 'yes'. In recent years, food production has increased by more in percentage terms than the population growth rate. And the planet possesses the technologies, financial means and technical expertise to ensure sufficient nourishment for all. Access to food remains the central problem. In some places, large amounts are destroyed to sustain prices. Elsewhere, farmers are paid for not producing or are fined for exceeding their quotas. But this does not mean that the solution lies in transferring production surpluses through food aid. The only viable long-term approach must be to create sound national economic systems. This requires political will within the developing countries to reverse the current neglect of domestic agricultural policy and to implement integrated and sustainable poverty eradication schemes. It needs action from the developed nations, particularly to tackle the subsidised exports which can have such high social costs in Third World markets. And it needs the input of the international organisations who have an important role in mediating conflicts. ■

A.A.

Rich cultural pickings in Burkina Faso

During *The Courier's* recent visit to Burkina Faso, we were impressed by the vitality of the cultural life which we saw there. The country seems to be carving out its own particular niche as a veritable hotbed of artistic activity. Of course, the creative phenomenon is to be found elsewhere as well but there is no doubt that Burkina Faso is in the top rank, and an increasingly important force on the international scene. The country is already well-known as a centre for cinema, hosting *Fespaco*, the prestigious biannual festival of African films. The 1997 *Fespaco* is scheduled for the end of February, and will be covered in a future issue of *The Courier*. Here, we look at two lesser-known, but nonetheless impressive, Burkinabè initiatives, which we visited.

Laongo

Deep in the countryside of Burkina there is a striking outdoor exhibition, consisting of sculptures of various sizes and subjects, carved out of the granite found in the area. The work was initiated in 1989 by Burkinabè sculptor *Ky Siriki* as an 'international symposium'.

It is an event which takes place every two years, when sculptors from around the world are invited to come to Laongo for 40 days.

During this period, they carve their works in the granite in the open air, on a subject matter of their choice. The visiting artists are provided with meals and accommodation in a village specially built for the purpose by local labour. Mr Siriki was inspired after participating in similar symposia in Italy and elsewhere. 1996 saw the third staging of this event – Laongo III. 24 sculptors from Africa, Asia, and Europe partici-

pated. Ky Siriki told us that he has a constant stream of written enquiries from sculptors who are interested in taking part, but unfortunately he does not have the administrative back-up or funds to cope.

As a full-time sculptor, with frequent exhibitions abroad, he has little spare time to dedicate to the organisation of the symposium. That, and the precarious funding, makes him fear for its future.

So far, the Ministry of Culture has backed the project but the funding has been on an *ad hoc* basis. This means that each time the symposium takes place, Mr Siriki has to look anew for money.

SIAO 96

SIAO (Salon international de l'artisanat), the International Arts and Crafts show, is staged in Ouagadougou every two years to promote African works.

The 1996 event was held from 26 October to 2 November. During the week, artists, casual visitors and professional buyers mingled, as hundreds of artisans from various countries came to display and sell their wares. Alongside the pottery, ceramics and batiks, one could find more unusual displays featuring traditional medicine, agricul-

Sculpture at Luango




tural machinery, and various inventions. The event was hugely popular, well-organised and good-natured. As well as the five pavilions where the crafts were displayed (one, the Pavilion of Creativity, was funded by the EU) there were restaurants, bars, and a children's play area. This year, 19 countries were represented. These were mostly African, but there were also exhibitors from Pakistan, Turkey and Iran.

SIAO was set up by the Burkinabè Chamber of Commerce and the Office of External Trade, who were looking for ways of redressing the unfavourable trade balance in the country. They identified this as a promising sector, confirmation coming from the 1985 census which revealed that about 500 000 people in Burkina Faso were involved in some way in the arts and crafts sector. For 94 000 of these, it was their livelihood. Testing the waters, they set up an exhibition of Burkinabè arts and crafts in 1984. This proved a success and the decision was taken to organise an international exhibition of African art on a regular basis. This could offer a meeting point for buyers and sellers, as well as a learning experience for the artisans, giving them the chance to hone their negotiating skills and exchange ideas.

The first international show was held in 1988 and attracted 150 000 visitors. In 1994, the SIAO was given a permanent site. This was also the first year in which non-

Poster for SIAO



The Courier

African exhibitors took part, with a large contingent from India.

Each fair has a defining theme. In 1992 the emphasis was on creativity, as a way of raising the quality of African art, and encouraging artists to adapt their work to an international market. UNESCO supported this by setting up an award scheme, with prizes for creativity, judged by an international jury. The 1994 theme was 'utilitarian art', with a focus on producing works which have a practical use. This was also an attempt to find a niche for African art, not only locally, but also on the international market.

The theme chosen for 1996 was, 'The craft sector as a factor in development'. In Burkina Faso alone, the sector represents about 20% of GNP. As a prelude to the fair, a conference was held on the subject of design in arts and crafts. Again, the

Award-winning exhibit at SIAO

intention was to find ways of improving the quality of African products, with an eye to the international market.

As well as the Unesco creativity award, a number of other prizes are up for grabs. One is offered by the President of Burkina Faso for the best country stand, judged on originality, quality and presentation. UNICEF has a 'young talent' prize, while the local chamber of commerce has an award for the best Burkinabè exhibit.

In a relatively short space of time SIAO has become an important fixture in Burkinabè life. Let us hope it continues to go from strength to strength. ■

Dorothy Morrissey

Africa signs up for fish farming

by Florence Lassailly*

Freshwater fish is highly rated in Africa and yet, in contrast to Asian countries, the continent has no tradition of fish farming. However, over the last 20 years, the industry has begun to develop in various forms, and today about 100 000 tonnes of fish are farmed in Africa, a figure which represents 0.4% of world aquaculture production and 2% of all the fish caught in African seas, rivers and lakes.

Africans love fish. The women know how to prepare it - either in a sauce or cooked on charcoals, accompanied by *attiéké* or rice - and the men know how to catch it, both at sea and in rivers. We just have to look at the *Somonos* fishermen of Mali, or the *Imragen* fishermen of Mauritania, not to mention those who go out to fish in their pirogues, right round the African coast.

Strangely enough though, African fishermen have not yet learnt how to breed fish; to 'farm' them, as their counterparts do in Asia. Nevertheless, the presence of aquaculture ponds, cages and enclo-

tures in some African countries proves that the industry is not totally absent from the continent. Although still carried out on a modest scale, this new activity has sometimes been the subject of agricultural speculation; this is particularly the case since the CFAF was devalued in 1994, an event which was partly responsible for making locally produced fish competitive compared with the imported product.

Pond fisheries - a safe investment

At the present time, pond fisheries represent the most widely practised form of fish farming. The techniques involved are labour-intensive, especially in the initial stages to get the ponds up and running, but require little in the way of capital investment and on-going running costs. This means that many farmers, especially in Côte d'Ivoire, have begun to dig ponds out of wetland

slopes, close to rice fields or upstream from the small dams built to irrigate crops or provide drinking water for livestock herds. *Oreochromis niloticus*, more commonly known as the carp or tilapia, is used to stock these ponds (see box). Unfortunately, however, farmers in Côte d'Ivoire have no money to buy food for their fish and so they end up pouring agricultural by-products, farm waste and even inorganic fertilisers into their ponds, the latter decomposing into micro-organisms. So, apart from the sheer toil and time needed to dig out the ponds, this form of fish farming is virtually cost-free. Of course the turnover figures involved are hardly going to set any economists' heads spinning, but as far as the African farmer is concerned, fish farming costs very little to set up and involves very little risk.

Tilapia fishing in Uganda
Freshwater fish is highly rated in Africa...
but African fishermen have not yet learnt
how to 'farm' them, as their
counterparts do in Asia



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Fish species farmed in Africa

Tilapias are native to the African continent. Of the three genera (*Oreochromis*, *Sarotherodon* and *Tilapia*), the first - and principally the species *Oreochromis niloticus* - is by far the most commonly cultivated in freshwater fish farming, both in Africa, and world-wide. This fish has the advantage of reproducing spontaneously in captivity and at a young age, without the need for artificial fertilisation of any sort. Its natural diet of phytoplankton means that it forms the first link in the food chain. Both these factors therefore offer the advantage that the species can be reared in extensive, low-energy systems. In terms of farmed species, its eating habits are extremely adaptable. It does well in ponds fertilised with organic or inorganic fertilisers, fed on raw or composite agricultural by-products, whether in loose or granule form. In ponds given over to the cultivation of these species on a commercial scale, the reproduction of alevins is kept in check by rearing only male fish (males grow faster than females) or by introducing a predator. Depending on rearing conditions, *Oreochromis niloticus* grows at a rate of 1 to 2 grammes a day.

Clarias gariepinus, the main species of catfish reared in Africa today, is also native to the continent. It needs a

helping hand to reproduce in captivity, requiring induction of the spawning season by hormone injection, artificial fertilisation and rearing of its larvae in special nursery ponds, but these are all techniques which have now been fully mastered. This species is essentially a carnivore, and it therefore requires a diet which is relatively rich in proteins. The fact that it possesses lungs in addition to gills means that it can be reared in poorly oxygenated environments, such as fertilised ponds. It grows at a rate of between two and three grammes per day.

As for *Heterobranchus longifilis*, another member of the Siluridae family, it has an even greater growth potential - about three to five grammes per day - and techniques in its cultivation have recently been perfected.

Finally, farming of *Chrysichthys nigrodigitatus*, again a member of the catfish family, is beginning to take off in certain countries where it is particularly highly rated (in Côte d'Ivoire especially).

Heterotis niloticus, which requires special nest-containing ponds to reproduce, is also an extremely useful species since it can be farmed together with tilapias on account of the fact that it shares a similar diet.

In the outskirts of urban areas, pond fisheries are dug out within existing hydroagricultural developments, with the water being diverted from these into the ponds. The quality of investment has proved to be one of the key factors in their success. Where such projects do work, they constitute a stable and practical long-term activity. And given that the infrastructure can be sold, it acquires a certain real estate value. Tilapias, the main species raised, are reared in these ponds at relatively intensive rates (1.5 to 2 fish per square metre) and are fed on rice bran. The ponds are fertilised according to whatever is available - waste from pig or poultry farms or abattoir scraps, for example. Harvests from these types of pond fisheries exceed 4 tonnes per hectare per year and may even reach double this figure.

In rural areas, wetlands represent a growing potential since they

offer the possibility of setting up stable production systems. They also generate opportunities for intensification and diversification of activities, not to mention providing a source of income for the local workforce and a means of 'mastering' the land. However, difficulties in getting supplies out to these rural areas result in lower yields - approximately 1 to 2 t/ha/year - than those achieved in regions close to urban areas.

Although tilapia remains the main species raised, with cultivation rates of less than one fish per square metre, it is absolutely vital that several other species are reared together with it and these generally include *Heterotis niloticus* and a silurid of the genus *Heterobranchus*.

The introduction into the ponds of small quantities of urea, which is easy to transport and use, has shown that yields in this type of environment can be increased considerably.

Fish farming in cages

However, not everyone in Africa is fortunate enough to have wetlands, a creek or a dam on their doorstep. In Sahel regions particularly, the inhabitants would be hard pushed just to try to maintain a permanent supply of water to their ponds. All the same, fish dishes are extremely popular here and fish is, therefore, in great demand.

Niger is currently breaking new ground with a fish-farming technique which is proving extremely successful. In the River Niger, the only abundant source of water in the entire country, fish farmers suspend cages measuring approximately 3.5 m in length and 1.5 m in depth (20m³) in which fish are farmed intensively - up to 100 fish per cubic metre. The cages are made by the fishermen themselves using planks of wood, bamboo, salvaged cans and plastic netting. Two or three men, perched on pontoons moored to the river bank, are all that are needed to carry out all the necessary operations and, whereas in pond fisheries the fish have to be harvested with a net, with the cages all the fisherman has to do is pull it out of the water and, *voilà*, he has caught his fish.

Feeding the fish cultivated in these cages, a form of farming analogous to the 'soil-less' environment of battery hens, necessarily requires the use of composite feeds, while alevins and young fish need to be reared in nursery ponds built along the river bank and tended by rice farmers or, as is increasingly the case, by the aquacultivators themselves.

In contrast to pond fisheries, cage farming requires considerable funds in order to buy fish food and to ensure that alevin stocks are kept topped up. It is therefore essential that loans be made available to the fish farmers.

This method of fish farming, which was recently introduced into West Africa, has been developed and adapted by trial and error. For example, during their first winter season, fish farmers in Niger noticed that their fish had stopped growing and,

A three-pronged professional viewpoint

Professionalism and technical skill, integrating fish farming projects into existing agricultural production systems, an entrepreneurial approach combined with the ability to manage aquaculture farms efficiently, professional organisation - these would appear to be some of the key factors in the successful development of fish farming in all its various forms throughout the African continent.

A project involving decentralised co-operation, funded and set up by the *Région Centre-Val de Loire*, aims to put these guidelines into practice in two African countries by cooperating directly with professional non-governmental organisations: the ADA in Niger and the APDRACI in Côte d'Ivoire. In addition to providing direct assistance to these associations and to the fish farmers involved, this project is aimed at fostering direct exchanges between fish farmers in Côte d'Ivoire and in Niger and the *Région Centre*, thereby establishing a professional, three-pronged viewpoint.

Certain specific themes, such as assistance in connection with fish farm management in Niger and with professional organisation in Côte d'Ivoire, both services provided by the specialist organisations within the *Région Centre*, will form the basis of the project which was launched in October 1996 and is intended to run for five years. The project has also benefited from CIRAD-EMVT and AFVP (French Association of Development Volunteers) assistance in its setting up.

even worse, were actually dying *en masse*. This was because tilapias, which are found in warm waters, go into a sort of state of hibernation when the water temperature drops below 20°C. The general slowing down of all physiological activities leads to a slowing down of digestive activity, which has to be taken into consideration by the farmers who then need to reduce the amount of food they feed their fish. Today, feeding practices are adapted to the seasons, and water temperature and turbidity, together with any other factors likely to disrupt the water in the river, are closely monitored.

The upshot of this is that about 50 Niger fishermen have returned to fish farming. Analysis of the results achieved by experimental fish farms, or those run by 'assisted' aquacultivators, has shown worthwhile results, with annual production figures of 500 kg of tilapias per cage - giving a fish farmer with four cages a profit of CFAF 200 per kg.

Over time, however, the inconsistent and unpredictable nature of the zootechnic results has led to a drop in economic performance. Experience shows that fish farmers need to be skilled technicians, capable of managing a 'risky' operation, and only a few make the grade.

The ADA (Association of Aquacultivators in Niger), which has inherited the various projects designed to develop the aquaculture industry, must, for its part, adopt a business approach and implement business strategies - the industry's future success depends upon it.

It is difficult for us today to try to imagine the future of aquaculture in Africa. Some models, namely fish farming on an industrial scale and on a subsistence level, have proved unsuccessful candidates for commercial enterprises, with the former apparently set to be the exclusive preserve of the private sector and not receiving any direct state aid, and the latter best suited to those who have access to land in wetland regions, and who are not constrained by the need to make their land profitable.

As for fish farming on a 'cottage industry' scale, it is this sector which offers the most promising prospects. Rural fish farming projects integrated into existing agricultural production systems could have considerable potential in helping to develop the wetland regions of humid tropical Africa, while the future of fish farming in the outskirts of urban areas lies in 'professionalising' activities. As for the future development of fish farming on an 'SME' type basis (ponds, cages, enclosures...), it represents the emergence of an entrepreneurial spirit in African aquaculture. ■

F.L.

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Dossier: flower growing in East Africa

A rapidly changing market

The cut flowers sector is currently undergoing massive change as a result of increased competition between producers and the emergence of new methods of distribution. Last November, the CDI organised an Industrial Partnership Meeting devoted to the development and diversification prospects for which ACP-EU professionals in the sector must prepare themselves.

The meeting, which took place from 25 to 27 November 1996 in Kenya, was organised in cooperation with the Europe-ACP Liaison Committee for promoting horticultural exports (COLEACP) and with financial support from FMO (a Dutch development finance company). It was attended by around 20 cut roses producers from Southern and East Africa and an equal number of European importers and wholesalers (see also the articles published in the CDI Partnership section of issues 151 of May-June 1995, and 144 of March-April 1994).

Since 1990, the countries of Southern and East Africa have made a considerable effort to develop their production and exports of fresh cut roses and have acquired a signifi-

cant share of the European market. Indeed, more than 600 hectares of roses are grown in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe alone, with a volume of almost 900 million stems. Kenya and Zimbabwe are among the three biggest suppliers of cut roses to the European market.

However, for the last few years, competition between producing countries has been growing and the market has been undergoing massive change. Experts are already observing surplus production for certain varieties and inadequate supply of high quality products in relation to the development of consumer

tastes and buying habits. Consequently, producers must develop new production and marketing strategies.

Sustained demand in Europe, quality requirements, emergence of new distribution companies - these are all good reasons for bringing together producers and final customers. Consequently, in parallel with the Dutch 'clock auctions', new distribution channels are emerging, mainly through direct sale by the producer to the importer or wholesaler. These different marketing methods require a clear view of the market.

East African producers of cut flowers offer high quality products and have acquired a significant share of the European market

1. Clock auction markets are the wholesale outlets created by Dutch producers and designed at the beginning for the marketing of their products, but which now also serve as auctions for imported products.



CDI

The Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) is a joint ACP-EU institution created in the framework of the Lomé Convention linking the European Union with the 70 ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific). Its objective is to support the creation, expansion and restructuring of industrial companies in ACP countries. To this effect, the Centre promotes partnerships between ACP and European companies. These partnerships may take various forms: financial, technical and commercial partnerships, management contracts, licensing or franchise agreements, sub-contracting, etc.

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Bringing together representatives of the sector

Which means of distribution should we choose? How do we improve the quality of the product across the whole sector? It was in order to provide specific answers to these questions and others emerging from them that the CDI brought ACP and European representatives around the same table.

Participants were carefully selected on the basis of their experience: rose producers from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe managing farms of sizes varying between 3 and 178 hectares and producing between 4 and 250 million stems. All of them offer very high quality products and have genuine possibilities for expansion.

The European participants came from the main consuming countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden) and represented all professions within distribution: importers, agents, sellers at clock auctions, wholesalers, producers, etc.

In-depth studies

In order to prepare for the meeting, it was also necessary to select appropriate topics and carry out in-depth studies. The selected topics were as follows: trends in the European market, diversification and marketing strategies for increasing the added value of products, the different distribution channels and the search for financing. So as to provide a specific basis for discussions, the

CDI experts carried out a detailed study of the European market which, supported by figures and statistics, describes the main trends within the cut flower sector in general, and for roses in particular.

A second study enabled the participants to establish a complete inventory of financial institutions which, in the different East African countries, could consider financing horticultural investments. The study also provides a set of recommendations for successful preparation of a financial dossier (information on the company, the market, the company prospects, marketing strategy, technical aspects, raw materials, employment, management, etc.)

The organisers also scheduled a visit to three local farms which, in terms of size, technical and commercial strategy, degree of development and diversification, provide a representative picture of local companies.

Three visits to companies producing roses were organised. These companies, in terms of degree of development and diversification, provide an idea of the potential of local companies



ACP and EU participants

Around forty participants for the Nairobi meeting were selected in East Africa and Europe.

ACP participants

Kenyan Producers: Oserian Development, Stoni-Athi, Kihingo Roses, Mosi, Bawan Roses, Sian Roses, Tanina.

Ugandan producers: NBA Roses, Tropical Flowers, Pearl Flowers.

Tanzanian producers: Kombe Roses, Continental Flowers, Tanzania Flowers, Florissa.

Zambian producers: Enviro Flor, Cherokee Ros es.

Zimbabwean producers: Bouma Farming, Olympia Flora, Florasol, Farirayi Nurseries.

Producers' associations: Exporters' and Flower Growers' Association of Zimbabwe (EFGAZ), Fresh Products Exporters' Association of Kenya (FPEAK).

European participants

United Kingdom: Interflora (importer and wholesaler), Zwetsloots & Son (importer and wholesaler), Winter Flora (importer and wholesaler of dried flowers), Ruckley (importer and wholesaler of dried flowers).

Netherlands: Bloemenvailing Holland (cooperative for clock auction sales), East African Flowers (agent and private clock auction sales).

Germany: Multiflor (importer and wholesaler), Florimex Germany (importer and wholesaler).

France: Fleurassistance (importer and wholesaler), Andines (importer and wholesaler), Queens Flowers (producer, importer and wholesaler), Rosedor (producer and wholesaler).

Sweden: Örestad Blommor (importer and wholesaler).

Financial institutions

EDESA, Kenya.

IFC (International Finance Corporation), Kenya.

CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation).

Focusing on marketing and promotion

The three days of discussions and visits to local companies enabled participants specifically to examine problems relating to the distribution and promotion of cut flowers.

So as to be better placed in a very competitive environment, ACP companies must improve the quality of their products. This is because in a market showing signs of saturation, at least for certain types of flowers, high quality guarantees good outlets at good prices. Quality may be achieved through constant renewal of production techniques, post-harvest processing and packaging. However, it also depends on mastery of logistical aspects, raised by several European importers as a crucial problem. Producers must have infrastructures which guarantee in particular, maintenance of the cold chain and use of suitable communication channels, including air transport providing appropriate capacities, frequency and destinations at competitive prices.

A set of specific solutions was drawn up by several ACP and European industrialists from the horticultural sector so as to guarantee a greater added value for products and a better quality of flowers upon arrival (see 'Improving the quality of service' on the next page). These are still, however, to be fully implemented.

Commercial strategy


Several European participants emphasised the following point: the profits which ACP exporters may draw from their production depend mainly on their commercial strategy. The two marketing methods mainly used at present are, on the one hand, the Dutch clock auction markets, and on the other, direct sales by the producer to the importer. Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages as expressed by the ACP and European participants. Most African companies tend to combine the two methods of placing their products on the market.

The first method, the clock auction markets, enables growers to

concentrate their efforts on production, without the need to worry about the commercial side which is entrusted to the seller at the clock auction market. However, businessmen trading directly observe that the prices offered are neither very high nor stable. Furthermore, producers lack information on the market and on appreciation of their products.

duction of a wider range of flowers, since importers are supplied by whoever guarantees them a minimum of floral varieties'.

According to a representative of a company selling at clock auction markets, the problem in the sector does not depend on production, but rather on the weakness of demand and consequently on the promotion of horticultural products



One aspect on which all concerned agree: producers must avoid using intermediary agents who, even if they initially enabled the expansion of flower growing in Africa, take a large percentage of the profits at the expense of the producers.

Direct sales by the producer to the importer is the second traditional commercial channel. The prices are generally higher. 'Another advantage is that direct sales shorten the distribution chain, which reduces the risk of the product losing its quality upon arrival in the shop', observes a French importer who is supplied by both the Dutch clock auction markets and directly by mainly African producers. He continues as follows: 'But that requires the pro-

duction of a wider range of flowers, since importers are supplied by whoever guarantees them a minimum of floral varieties'.

ACP producers must meet the needs of their customers, for example by widening the range of flowers offered or by preparing ready-to-sell bunches.

to the general public and good marketing.

The problem of promotion is also upstream: ACP production is insufficiently known among European professionals in the sector. The meeting was in itself an opportunity for local growers to promote their products. Many European importers and wholesalers were made aware of rose production in East Africa and were strongly impressed by the technical know-how acquired. They also made the most of their visit to Africa to establish contacts or place definite orders.

Improving the quality of service

Pierre-Luc Vanhaeverbeke from COLEACP led a round table on strategies for increasing the added value of horticultural products. The CDI asked him some questions regarding the various initiatives taken in this field.

■ *During the meeting, there has been much talk of quality.*



– Generally speaking, the average level of quality of flowers has significantly improved during the last ten years. But, in order to have access to the European market, a minimum level of quality is required. In this respect, transport is very important. Flowers are usually transported dry, in bunches of 20, packed in cardboard boxes and kept cool. New techniques such as the Aquapack system mean that flowers can be sent in a layer of water. The producer can recover the higher cost of this type of transport through lower wastage and especially through the higher selling price of the flowers due to their better quality. Use of this system is limited by the quality necessary on departure and by the type of flowers or the size of the buds. There must be a minimum number of flowers per tray to make the dispatch worthwhile. There must also be a good commercial structure to take the reusable trays back to the place of production. In this case, the company placing the flowers on

To avoid the flowers being damaged by too long a transit in dry conditions, the Tele Flower Auction company uses a new Aquapack container where the stems are steeped in a layer of water

the market charters the flights to return the trays to Africa.

■ *Could added value not also be achieved by providing an additional service?*

– Producers can distinguish themselves from rivals offering flowers of a similar quality by providing services that facilitate the work of the importer. They could, for example, prepare bunches tailored to meet the requests of the importer. These could perhaps be mixed bunches with different colours or varieties or simple bunches of five or six carnations pre-packaged with bar codes. A number of companies are satisfied with this procedure.



■ *What is the advantage in specialised markets such as dried flowers?*

– It is a mistake to think that dried flowers are second class products. Only certain varieties and colours are suitable for this type of preparation. During periods of high production, growers could easily set aside a part of their production for the dried flowers market, which in spite of everything is still very limited from a commercial point of view.

■ *Does establishing a specific brand ensure better outlets for the flowers?*

– Brands are only effective if the grower can guarantee regularity and quality of production. Several trials have been launched, in particular the 'Zafari' brand in the United Kingdom. They have not, however, been going long enough for us to assess the merits of the approach.

■ *Are labels a good way of upgrading horticultural products?*

– At present, labels are springing up everywhere. These initiatives will have to be harmonised, and coordinated for example at European level. Labels are sometimes felt to be a constraint. They enable better management of resources (inputs, work, etc.).

Everyone agrees, however, that labels reflect concern on the part of consumers and do not provide floral products with an added value.

■ *Should effort not also be directed towards promotion among consumers?*

– Flowers are one of the few products sold without promotion among the general public. Generic promotion would, however, increase consumption and resolve the question of saturated production. The problem is determining who would finance the information campaigns. The European Union has made the first move by granting a subsidy.




CDI update

Increase in number of interventions during 1996

In 1996, the CDI contributed to the development of 468 ACP companies. It organised and financed a total of 603 interventions, compared with 367 in 1995 – an increase of 64.3%. The average CDI contribution for these interventions was ECU 13 287, that is, 46% of the total cost. The institutions that concluded cofinancing agreements with the CDI contributed 15.9%, the European industrial partners 10.6% and ACP promoters 27.5%. The number of agreements with institutions increased from 32 to 40 in 1996. Total cofinancing granted to the CDI by these institutions increased to more than ECU 2.7 million – more than 16% of the total CDI budget.

The ACP companies supported by the Centre in 1996 are mainly in the private sector (85%). The rest are mixed companies (6.4%) or publicly-owned (8.6%) of which 6.6% are to be privatised. 30% of interventions were for setting up companies, 33% for expansion or diversification and 37% for rehabilitation or consolidation. The agro-industry is still the main sector with 39.3% of the total, followed by the construction materials sector (clay, stone, wood, metal) with 35.7% and finally leather and textiles with 10.7%. Other sectors account for only 14.3%.

Although CDI assistance was relatively well distributed between ACP regions as the third diagram shows, particular effort was made for a number of countries giving priority to industrial development. In this way, eight countries each received more than 20 interventions and 14 received between 10 and 20.



In 43% of cases, assistance was granted in the form of subsidies to the promoters or partners, while contracts were established with consultants in 57% of interventions.

The complete analysis of data on the activities of the Centre and the companies benefiting from them will be presented in the 1996 Annual Report.

Industrial partnerships

The programme is extended to Southern Africa and the Caribbean

Following its involvement in 1995 with industrial partnership projects between African and French companies, the CDI is launching a similar programme with Portugal and Spain.

Industrial partnerships represent an important concept of North-South cooperation, applied to the business world. Thanks to personalised individual support, the partnerships go beyond the narrow scope of the customer-supplier relationship.

The first industrial partnership programme which was launched in July 1995 brings together French and African SMEs. The programme, called '100 industrial partnership projects with Africa and the Mediterranean', involves in particular various ACP countries (Benin, Burkina-Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Senegal and Togo). The initiative, launched and led by the 'Entreprise et Développement' association (a French network of regional institutions for the North-South industrial partnership) receives financial support from four French ministries (Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, Industry and Agriculture) as well as from the Caisse Française de Développement (CFD) and the CDI.

The objective of the programme is threefold:

- to develop African companies by enabling them to acquire better

- mastery of their production tools, operating methods and market access;

- to help French companies to establish alliances with African companies that may lead to co-investment operations likely to strengthen their industrial and commercial development;

- in this way to encourage partnerships between companies practising the same 'trade', for commercial, technological and/or financial matters.

The programme has five stages: identification of African companies, selection and mobilisation of French SMEs, establishment of industrial 'pairs', financing of the first discovery mission, follow-up and assistance in setting up the envisaged partnership (technical, commercial or financial).

For selection, the African company must be an operating SME, with an already operational production facility and be committed to developing a new project based on its existing activities.

A concept bearing fruit


At the end of the first year of the programme, 18 missions have

The Franco-Senegalese Pirogues Afrique Hauchard company, created in the framework of an industrial partnership project, builds and sells aluminium fishing boats

already been carried out, 10 of which have led to specific projects. More than half of these missions took place in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Half of the French companies involved are SMEs employing fewer than 10 people, 28% employ between 10 and 40 people and 22% have between 40 and 100 employees.

A specific example of a successful industrial partnership is the Bapam company in Nouakchott (Mauritania), founded by Chantiers Hauchard (Normandy, France) and local partners. 350 of their aluminium fishing boats have already been sold. Encouraged by this experience, the same French SME has gone on to create the Pirogues Afrique Hauchard company with two entrepreneurs from Senegal, with a view to building and selling the same model of boat.

In the light of the encouraging development of this initiative, the Centre decided to extend it to other ACP countries. Since September 1996, a similar project has been linking SMEs in Portugal and Southern Africa (Botswana, Malawi, Namibia and Zambia). The programme is receiving support from the FCE (Portuguese Economic Cooperation Fund) and the ICEP (Portuguese Institute of Foreign Trade). The Centre recently developed the same project with Spain for four Caribbean countries (Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago), with support from various bodies: ICEX (Institute of Foreign Trade), COFIDES (Spanish Development Finance Company), COPCA (Catalonia) and SPRI (Basque Country).



Venture capital funds

An important financial tool for ACP countries

With CDI support, the CDC (a British development finance institution) brought together the representatives of the 12 venture capital funds from ten ACP countries at a seminar taking place in Kenya, from 9 to 13 December 1996. Among the topics discussed were the increase in venture capital financing and the assessment of results obtained up to now.

In ACP countries, venture capital funds are a precious source of investment financing. Traditional sponsors (banks, investment companies) have difficulty in satisfying the demand for capital in the local private sector. Private investors are faced with two major problems: the poor level of industrial management available locally and the non-availability of long-term capital.

In the past, to compensate for the lack of private capital, a number of international development finance institutions deployed significant financial resources, in the form of long-term credits, to small and medium sized industrial enterprises (SMEs) via local finance institutions. These financing methods contributed significantly to the growth of the SME sector. There was still, however, a problem of under-capitalisation for most SMEs.

For this reason, some European development finance institutions created venture capital funds specialising in acquiring shares in the capital of new or expanding companies. Among them is the CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) which established a set of venture capital funds in Ghana, Mauritius, Uganda, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania and Zambia. It is currently launching other funds, par-

ticularly in Kenya, Zimbabwe and the Pacific region. The European Investment Bank (EIB), DEG (Deutsche Investitions und Entwicklungsgesellschaft), PROPARGO and other institutions are involved in particular with several funds in West Africa, Senegal and Jamaica.

The CDI has given support to three venture capital funds for which it assisted in the implementation: the Acacia Fund (Kenya), the Mauritius Venture Capital Fund and the Takura Venture Fund (Zimbabwe).

Characteristics of funds in the ACP region

In practice, the venture capital funds established in ACP countries share the following characteristics:

- their objective is to invest in the equity of new or expanding companies offering good development prospects;
- their total capital varies between ECU 4m and ECU 8m;
- they spread their investments between 15 and 25 different SMEs, for amounts varying between 15% and 49% of the companies' equity;
- they invest for a maximum period of 10 years;
- in terms of organisation, there are generally two distinct legal entities, the fund itself and the company managing it in return for fees and if possible a success bonus. The shareholders of the two entities are usually identical.

These funds offer many advantages for the SMEs. The management structures are flexible and operate according to private sector regulations.

Wide scale management

Funds established in ACP countries do not develop in the same context as in Europe where capital may reach up to ECU 50 million or more per fund. Their size is considerably smaller at the outset.

Apart from the management of the fund itself, fund management companies may take responsibility for analysing investment projects on a technical and commercial level, producing feasibility studies and financial plans, assessing risk, setting up the management structure, providing support for marketing or for seeking complementary financing.

The 'extended' role given to these companies explains why at the beginning they cannot manage more than one fund at a time and why management costs significantly exceed the 3% per year of the fund capital, a rate already considered as a ceiling. External financial assistance is, therefore, necessary during the start-up period until the fund acquires more significant financial resources.

In most ACP countries, venture capital funds operate in a high risk environment. They often have to wait for several years before their efforts bear the first fruits. Through their experience in the assessment of projects and the supervision that they guarantee the SMEs in which they have invested, these companies have a calming influence on the development finance institutions and local banks which are generally involved in financing these projects.

So as to improve the management of venture capital funds, a manual will shortly be prepared with CDI assistance. This initiative on the part of the Centre, which is following up its cooperation with the venture capital funds, complements its policy of direct support for ACP companies.

Ornamental stones

Intensification of ACP contacts in Portugal

From 2 to 6 December 1996 in Borba (Portugal), the CDI held an Industrial Partnership Meeting on the ornamental stone sector. The meeting reinforced the interest Portugal has in the potential of ACP companies.

The choice of venue – Borba, in southern Portugal – was motivated by the presence in the area of almost 300 granite and marble quarries of different sizes. Portugal also has CEVALOR, a large technical and vocational training centre for ornamental stone, and ASSIMAGRA, a very active trade association.

dling of the blocks, organisation of work, investment required for different types of quarries);

- European training systems (multi-disciplinary training of quarry staff by alternating tasks, ensuring necessary competence in all stages of production);

- marketing techniques (quality of blocks and regularity of distribution, competitive prices, etc.).

Following the meeting, several requests for assistance were submitted to the CDI. The exchanges may also lead to a visit by Portuguese industrialists to Mozambique to find out about the country's



At the meeting, organised with support from ICEP (Portuguese Institute of Foreign Trade) and FCE (Portuguese Economic Cooperation Fund), 17 African and Caribbean promoters were able to visit the facilities of eight Portuguese companies, establish contact with local industrialists and join in three round tables on the following topics:

- techniques for mining quarries (production of blocks using explosives or diamond-studded wire, han-

The contacts established at the meeting may lead to partnerships, particularly in Mozambique

mining potential. The Mozambican Mining Administration took the opportunity to provide an idea of the country's granite and marble resources.

In brief

West Africa

Alongside the Caisse Française de Développement (CFD), the CDI is co-financing a training programme for the staff of around ten audit and accounting firms which are members of the Réseau de l'Entreprise en Afrique de l'Ouest (REAO). This independent network of companies was established in 1993 to facilitate the growth of a strong private sector in the region. It brings together businessmen and women who have started their own companies in a wide variety of sectors. The training will be on homogenisation of methodology, with a view to simplifying the procedures that prospective investors must follow in dealings with financial institutions and perhaps enable the CDI to provide assistance in the best possible circumstances.

New CDI publication

The CDI has launched 'CDI Dossiers', a new collection of brochures. The first edition, entitled 'Lake fishing in Uganda: the Nile perch', has just been published. The brochure takes stock of the main constraints imposed on the fishing sector in Uganda by European health standards, and of the pragmatic solutions implemented and listed during the Industrial Partnership Meeting organised by the CDI from 24 to 27 March 1996. These solutions are likely to prove useful for other fishing entrepreneurs in ACP countries. The first brochure is available from the CDI and its European distributors.

Contact: CDI – Avenue Herrmann Debroix 52, B-1160 Brussels, Belgium. Tel.: +32 2 679 18 11.

Côte d'Ivoire

ASE (Appui et Services aux Entreprises), a Management Advisory and Technical Services company (MATS) created on the initiative of the CDI and other partners in Côte d'Ivoire, participated in the Abidjan Fair from 7 to 17 November 1996. ASE had the opportunity to promote its activities and the range of assistance that it can provide for local SMEs. Around fifty promoters have already contacted ASE for assistance.

Senegal

From 9 to 13 December 1996, SONEPI, the CDI antenna in Senegal, invited around twenty Senegalese industrialists to participate in a seminar on planned maintenance.



Conflict prevention and democracy

Congratulations to the EU for coming up with 'Conflict Prevention in Africa: a new EU strategy' featured in issue 157 of *The Courier*. This is a timely move. Sometimes, one wonders how long donor countries and aid agencies will continue to carry the burden of human disasters in Africa.

Most of these disasters are caused by military or ethnic cliques seeking to expropriate all of a country's economic resources. Their struggles cause mass suffering among innocent people who have no direct interest in the quarrel.

The programme should centre on conflict prevention rather than conflict management, emphasising the development of a democratic culture in Africa. This means education in the basics of tolerance and social dynamics.

Democratic traditions and practice should be inculcated at all levels of formal education. It should be emphasised that it is not the erection of Parliament buildings or the establishment of political parties that makes for democracy. Democracy is a culture which must be nurtured from childhood.

The EU should deny aid to all countries currently under military rule. Any unconstitutional removal of a democratically-elected government should result in international ostracism.

The idea of using military means in conflict prevention is a good

one but it should not simply mean employing European forces to keep the peace. Leaders of African cliques will see this as a neo-colonialist act. Instead, the donor countries should join forces to help set up an African intervention force that is multinational and extraterritorial - posing no threat to any individual country but strong enough to maintain order where the need arises. The OAU and other sub-regional groups in Africa should recognise the need for such a force.

If the EU's conflict prevention efforts are centred on developing a democratic culture, and coup prevention and control, Africa will be able to join the march of progress towards the 21st century.

A. Uzoh, Lecturer in Business Education and Head of Department, Federal College of Education, Okene, Kogi State, Nigeria.

Need for a cultural 'transfer'

I read with great interest your Dossier entitled 'Investing in people' and, in particular, the article on capacity building by Franklyn Lisk which enumerates some of the main reasons for development failures.

The problem has also been highlighted by African writers such as Amadou Hampâté Bâ. In a style which is readable and tinged with humour, he of-

fers an excellent analysis of the difficulties that Africans face - for cultural reasons - in adapting to Northern methods of organisation and management. He notes, for example, that the technology of the developed countries is rooted in their own cultures.

It is clear that Africa cannot choose a different path. What is needed, therefore is a 'transfer' of culture. Such an approach is fraught with potential difficulties, is bound to take time and can only be achieved through sustained education and training.

Turning to an area which I am particularly involved in, I believe that an effort needs to be made to stabilise and develop the rural areas where the majority of Africans still live.

Finally, in the post-Lomé discussions, we should be reassessing development activities by reference to those who are supposed to be benefiting from them.

Pierre Colin, Mankono, Côte-d'Ivoire

Keep up the good work

As a former DG VIII official (who is getting on in years), I felt I should write to say how much I appreciate your articles. I particularly enjoyed your Country Report on Madagascar. It is pleasant to encounter a style which is not peppered with technocratic jargon, which does not shrink from evoking the early-morning atmosphere of Antananarivo or the sensuality of Nosy Bé, and which dares to use words such as 'nostalgia' and 'melancholy'.

Well done, and keep up the good work.

Louis-Luc Camier, Brussels Belgium

Ramsès 97 - Synthèse annuelle de l'évolution du monde

(Ramses '97 - Annual round-up of world events)

Under the direction of Thierry de Montbrial and Pierre Jacquet. Published for the French Institute of International Relations. Pub. Dunod (B.P. 20, F-92122 Montrouge Cedex). 1996. 400 pp. FF 219.

This autumn sees the sixteenth publication in the Ramses series and once again, it offers the reader an extensive analytical summary of world events. This year's report opens with Thierry de Montbrial's thoughts in a section entitled 'Views on the world', and is then divided into three separate parts: politics (new worlds awakening), economics (towards a new geo-economy) and a subject-specific section (the United States).

The wide-ranging thoughts on the world's current situation, with which the report opens, is memorable principally for the apposite conclusion in the section which deals with the Euro: 'The introduction of the Euro signifies a willingness to take another step forward in the integration process and to put all one's efforts into the achievement of a widely-based single market. It is the explicit acknowledgement, not found in liberal ideology, that economic integration is inconceivable without a political structure which transcends governmental

and even inter-governmental institutions'.

There is also a strong suggestion in the first part that a new concept of 'power' is becoming prevalent. Admittedly, one has to acknowledge the fact that no country, apart from the United States, fully meets Raymond Aron's definition of the various factors constituting power: space, wealth, population size, military dominance and political hegemony. But even the United States' freedom of action is not unlimited. Moreover, nuclear weapons' capabilities mean that relatively weak countries are gaining influence, although the world is currently witnessing a consolidation of regional power-bases and the restoration and regeneration of former powers such as China and Russia. 'Attempting to comprehend a shattered world' is indeed a task facing us today.

The second part deals with progress towards a new geo-economy, given that 'globalisation is reflected not only in increased economic liberalisation in terms of international trade, but also, more profoundly, in the interpenetration of national systems of production'. These various aspects of globalisation thus favour the progressive introduction of a new 'economic geography' in which a number

of developing countries, particularly in Asia, are pursuing an accelerated catching-up process, where regional centres are being consolidated and in which emerging economies are gradually finding their place in the world economy.

The third, subject-specific part, is devoted to the United States, 'a power which it is impossible to ignore. In America we can see all our concerns mirrored, as if the country were a barometer for our aspirations. That is where our future lies'. America has created jobs but has also seen a great gulf open up between the rich and the poor. According to the country's own official figures from 1994, 38 million Americans live on or below the poverty line (14.5% of the population). On the other hand, the report points out that 'only 5% of those who were in the poorest category in 1975 could still be classified as such in 1991. By contrast, over the 16 years in question, 29% of them had succeeded in joining the richest 20%'.

In terms of trade, it is interesting to note that in the world as it currently stands, two economic groupings now exert significant influence over the rest of the world: the European Union, whose structure is still evolving, and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association), which includes the United States, Canada and Mexico. These two groups' GDPs are virtually identical (7300 billion dollars) and their populations are comparable (of the order of 370 mil-

lion). It is largely the future of their relationship which will shape the world.

As in past years, Ramses includes a chronological list of events, appendices of statistics and maps, numerous tables and graphs, subject-specific bibliographies, an index and a list of acronyms, making this a reference work accessible to everyone.

Nigeria : Guerrilla journalism

by Michèle Maringues. Pub. Reporters sans frontières (5, rue Geoffroy Marie, F-75009 Paris). 1996. 127 pp. FF 80. ISBN 2-908830-26-4. Available in English and French.

A correspondent for Le Monde and RFI in Nigeria from 1992 to 1996, the author describes how a handful of journalists are challenging that country's current authorities, watched by a population whose strength has been sapped by poverty and by a weak political class which is content to leave it up to the press to question the government. Although the military regimes that have been in power in this country for 20 years, have repeatedly claimed, sometimes justifiably, that 'the giant of Africa' could pride itself on having 'the continent's most liberal press', this is not actually the situation today. Since the June 1993 presidential elections were annulled, the number of journalists detained and newspapers prevented from publishing has, in fact, in-

creased. The independent press is gradually being curtailed by laws promoting commercial profit rather than ideological discussion. The author expresses the view that in this unstable country, a free and responsible press would help Nigerians acquire a sense of citizenship beyond their 'membership' of a particular ethnic or religious group. This is important at a time when economic recession and political paralysis are tending to promote a growth in fundamentalism.

La petite entreprise africain: Mort ou résurrection?

(The small African enterprise: Death or resurrection?)

by Jean-Luc Camilleri.
Preface by Philippe Hugon (Editions Harmattan, 5-7 rue de l'Ecole-Polytechnique, 75005 Paris:). 1996 ISBN : 2-7384-4264-1. 301 pages.

At the end of the 20th century, the national product in sub-Saharan Africa is divided between the agricultural, the modern and the informal sectors.

Like the 'tiers-état' before the French revolution, the small enterprise has few rights, even when it is the key to the economy of modern states, and helps three quarters of the urban population to survive.

In order to maintain its development, three basic elements are essential: a

manager, a market and some capital. But in Africa, the road is paved with difficulties - international competition, weak demand, and a scarcity of finance.

This book takes us on a tour of small enterprises, illustrated by field studies made in rural or urban areas in Burkina Faso, Senegal, the Central African Republic and Guinea. The first part focuses on a generalised approach to entrepreneurship, describing its characteristics, its environment and the way it works. There is discussion about its sociology, financing and management.

The second part is based on an enquiry on the impact of the devaluation of the CFA franc in Burkina Faso, outlining the reasons which lay behind the decision to devalue.

A financial analysis shows that the majority of small entrepreneurs are suffering as a result (with falls in profit margins and turnover) even if they are adapting their businesses to the new situation.

In the third part, the relations between the small enterprise and the rural areas are examined.

For this, the author uses sociological tools (social cohesion, social changes, ethnic characteristics, gender issues), in coordination with economic analysis (fluctuation of market prices, evolution of demand, rural markets compared to urban).

A list of 'bankable' enterprises, mostly situated in Senegal and the Central African Republic, is proposed.

The fourth part focuses on the creation and financing of small enterprises.

The book's title, while dramatic, draws attention to the difficulties and the dynamism of small African businesses. It is a sector which has been underestimated by liberal economists. While some of the correct macro-economic steps have been taken, the question is whether this is sufficient to fight against a hostile environment. An alternative answer comes from the launching of 'bottom up' projects, which give finance to small businesses not of interest to the banks.

The author is optimistic, arguing that urbanisation, along with changing consumption habits, will reinforce the market in the long run. In addition, over the last 20 years, the informal sector has grown faster than the modern sector, despite facing many difficulties - especially a lack of training, and inflexibility.

The author suggests that small West African enterprises should look towards the dynamism of their Asian cousins, but also their English-speaking sisters in Nigeria and Ghana.

The interest of the book lies also in its solid field-research ■■■

D.M.

Publications received

The process of policy formulation: Institutional path or institutional maze?

by Joan Corkery, Anthony Land and Jan Bossuyt. European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Policy Management Report no. 3, *Onze Lieve Vrouweplein 21, 6211 HE Maastricht, The Netherlands*. ISBN 90-72908-18-X. 60 pages.

A study based on the introduction of cost-sharing for education in three African countries.

Beyond Lomé IV: Exploring options for future ACP-EU cooperation

ECDPM Policy Management Report no. 3 (address details above). ISBN 90-72908-21-X. 83 pages.

A contribution to the ECDPM's 'Beyond Lomé IV initiative' aimed at extending the debate over the future of ACP-EU cooperation as widely as possible.

IN BRIEF

South Africa seeks changes to EU trade mandate

There seems some way to go yet in discussions on the long term cooperation agreement between South Africa and the European Union – following the latest round of talks in Pretoria on January 24-25. Here, South Africa set out its response to the EU's mandate of March 1996. The EU delegation was headed by the European Commission's Director General for Development a.i, Philippe Soubestre. The South African side was led by Elias Links, Ambassador to the EU.

South Africa argued at the meeting that the EU's design for an asymmetrical free trade area, with trade concessions at the outset by both on agricultural produce and industrial goods (albeit introduced at a faster pace by the EU than by South Africa), would have harsh effects on its own economy as well as on the economies of its neighbours. South Africa is now seeking, among other things, bigger concessions amongst which, a longer 'phase-in period for tariff reductions'.

The country's main point of contention is that the mandate excludes almost 40% of the farm produce that South Africa currently sells to the European Union. In more general terms, South Africa's response to the EU mandate (contained in a paper issued on January 21) states '...the EU proposal would have meant South Africa bearing severe adjustment costs, when the economy is already undergoing a process of restructuring in order to increase the competitiveness of its industries.'

It continues: 'It has been estimated that in an FTA where 90% of mutual trade is liberalised, the EU would only have to liberalise duties on between 4% and 7% of imports from South Africa beyond its Uruguay Round commitments. By contrast, South Africa would have to eliminate duties on around 36% of imports from the EU, in addition to its Uruguay Round commitments.'

The paper drawn up by South Africa goes on to argue for an agreement

which contains the following elements, aimed at:

- assisting the Republic on a new 'development-oriented growth path' to achieve the broad socio-economic objectives defined in the country's Reconstruction and Development Programme;
- restructuring into a more balanced and mutually beneficial position, the present 'unbalanced' economic relationship by which South Africa exports mainly raw and semi-processed materials in exchange for highly processed capital goods;
- removing the 'discriminatory' treatment that applies to South African exports;
- boosting foreign direct investment in various economic sectors and in infrastructure;
- ensuring 'meaningful economic benefits' from South Africa's qualified membership of the Lomé Convention;
- promoting EU/South Africa cooperation within the limits of their respective competences; and
- strengthening political cooperation between the two sides.

The paper also warns of the 'ill-effects' of the EU mandate, as it stands, on South Africa's customs union with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS). The BLNS states, it suggests, could stand to lose customs revenue from tariff liberalisation, in addition to those losses they incur from tariff reductions in the World Trade Organisation. It also points out that any one of the SACU countries is free to veto any agreement proposed by a member with a third country or multilateral economic grouping (Article 19 of the 1969 SACU agreement).

The trade mandate currently on the table could also adversely affect SADC's ambition for a free trade area, says the South African paper. Any reciprocal concessions, it suggests, need a long 'phase-in' period so that they do not negate tariff concessions within

SADC. It goes on to argue that the EU should open up much more of its market to South Africa than vice versa. 'Opening the South African market to the EU, before opening it to our neighbours in Southern Africa, will mean that EU member states will enjoy better access to the South African market than some of the SADC countries. SADC countries would have to compete against highly competitive, and often subsidised, EU companies (particularly in the agricultural sector) in the South African market.'

According to a joint South Africa-EU press release, issued following the Pretoria meeting, it was agreed that the EU would 'generally be prepared to open its market faster and more extensively for South African products than it will ask South Africa to do for EU products, taking account of both sides' sensitivities.' It also stressed both sides' agreement that the accord should include other sectors of cooperation such as development and political dialogue, notably with a regional dimension.

Another negotiating session was due to take place in March, but this meeting was expected to focus on finalising the remaining details of South Africa's qualified membership of the Lomé Convention. Under this, South African companies are expected to become eligible to tender for European Development Fund work in other ACP countries. At the time *The Courier* went to press, hopes were high that the terms of this protocol could be agreed in time for signature at the Luxembourg meeting of EU foreign ministers on April 24-25. ■ D.P.

Safeguard clause for rice

As of 4 December 1996, the Commission has decided to apply the safeguard clause to rice imports following serious disruption in the Community rice sector.

The decision follows a request from Italy, subsequently backed by Spain. Having taken advice from the appropriate consultative committee, and on a proposal from Franz Fischler (Agriculture Commissioner) and Prof. João de Deus Pinheiro (Commissioner responsible for relations with ACP countries), the Commission has fixed a tariff quota of 42 650 tonnes for rice originating in overseas countries and territories (OCTs) for the period 1 January to 30 April 1997.

It should be recalled that the association decision concerning the OCTs (1991) provides that rice grown in ACP states may be given OCT origin when it receives further processing in the latter, thereby benefiting from free access to EC territory. If, on the other hand, the rice is exported to the Community directly from an ACP country, it obtains a 50% reduction in the customs tariff up to an annual tariff quota limit of 125 000 tonnes (subject to certain conditions).

Between 1992 and 1995, total OCT rice exports to the Community rose from 58 000 tonnes to 192 000 tonnes.

The figure reached 365 029 tonnes in 1996. One significant reason for this has been the substantial increase in exports from the Netherlands Antilles (Aruba, Bonaire, Curaçao).

The low price of this rice, and the large quantities involved, have together resulted in serious adverse effects for the Community rice sector.

A new President for the European Parliament

José Maria Gil-Robles-Delgado, a Spanish Christian Democrat (EPP) was elected President of the European Parliament on 14 January.

He will hold office until the end of the current Parliament's term in 1999.

A member of the EP since 1989, the new President – whose candidature was also supported by the Socialist (PES) Group – succeeds the German Klaus Hänsch (PES). He was elected in the first round of the ballot with 388 votes.

French member, Catherine Lalumière, who is leader of the European Radical Alliance (ERA) in the chamber, obtained 177 votes. She stood as a protest against the practice of recent years whereby the two main groups

(PES and EPP) have shared the Presidency. Her vote was higher than some observers expected.

Of 548 votes cast, 33 were void. Under the rules, this meant that a candidate needed 285 votes to win on the first round (out of a total of 515 valid ballots).

In a brief speech, the new President paid tribute both to his predecessor and to Ms Lalumière whose high vote, he said, reflected the high esteem in which she was held.

The various group leaders then spoke in turn. They underlined the integrity of Mr Gil-Robles and requested him to represent the European Parliament in this spirit. For the Socialist group, Pauline Green, urged the President to display his energy in the context of the Intergovernmental Conference, to boost the significance of the EP, and to make it more accessible to European citizens.

For the European People's Party, Wilfried Martens, praised the political courage of the new President and expressed the view that he would gain the confidence, even of those who had voted for Ms Lalumière. Jean-Claude Pasty of the Union for Europe group backed this sentiment. He nonetheless expressed the frustration of groups other than the EPP and the PES with the agreement which had operated since 1989 effectively ensuring election of a President on the first round, from one or other of the main political groups, on an alternating basis. He added that, in practice, the largest groupings were able to take the most important posts, and that since 1994, the extension of this system to the election of the Questors meant that other political forces were all but excluded, even though they made up 40% of the Parliament's membership. Mr Pasty felt that in trying to organise democracy too well, one could end up smothering it. Accordingly, he asked the new President to take an initiative to prevent this happening.

He also pleaded that decisions taken by the Parliament's Bureau, and by group leaders' meetings, be rigorously and speedily implemented by the administration to strengthen cooperation with all the national parliaments.

For the Liberal group (ELDR), Gijs de Vries stressed the importance of the independence of the EP President, while expressing confidence in Mr Gil-Robles. He urged the two main groups to take note of the protest vote registered by

a third of those who took part in the Presidential ballot. Alonso José Puerta of the Left Unity group (EUL), while denouncing the current system, praised the new President for his European commitment based on a 'critical' approach. The Green spokesperson, Claudia Roth, added her voice to the demands for a change in the system so as to ensure that small groups, small countries and women had an opportunity to occupy the highest positions. Speaking for the Radical Alliance (ERA), defeated candidate, Catherine Lalumière, believed that the new President would have to take on board the outcome of election that had just taken place, noting that her vote far exceeded the size of the political group of which she is a member. This, she, said, revealed the strong and growing dissatisfaction with a system that was becoming increasingly rigid and less democratic. It was something which, she felt, could not be ignored.

Joining in the congratulations of the elected members, Jacques Santer offered his own support, as President of the European Commission, to the new President of the Parliament.

GCA meets in Burkina Faso

The 5th Forum of the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA) was held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso on 29-31 October 1996. The Forum is held annually and its purpose is to direct the activities of the GCA, which was set up in 1990 as a North-South 'think-tank', in the face of widespread concern over Africa's bleak economic situation (see The Courier No.156, p.70).

This Forum, the fifth to have been held, brought together high-ranking ministers, and representatives of the donor community, private sector and civil society. Since the plenary session held in Maastricht in November 1995, three new co-Presidents have been elected.

The issue which topped the agenda was, 'Supply response to economic reform'.

The majority of African countries are engaged, in some form or other, in economic reforms, with varying results. The purpose of the meeting was to try to identify the factors responsible and to recommend policies to assist African countries to achieve sustained develop-

ment. Selected African countries – Mali, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique – presented their experience of economic reform.

Some reported positive results, with inflation under control and the basis for economic stability in place (Mali, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zimbabwe). In Malawi, while there had been economic gains, these remained unevenly distributed amongst the population. It was essential to make the Malawi economy more broad-based, as it is too heavily dependent on agriculture, which is very vulnerable to drought.

Representatives were invited from the private sector in Asia and Indonesia to talk about their experience of the 'economic miracle' in their countries, and the lessons for African economies. The conclusion was that, in these countries, reform was strongly state-directed after independence, instigating land distribution, education and banking reforms.

There was discussion about the administration of adjustment programmes, with a general consensus among participants that it was a 'necessary evil', and that in countries where it had not achieved results, this was often because implementation was half-hearted. 'Failure to adjust is not an indication that adjustment is a failure', was how it was summed up by the Malawi representative.

The issue of population growth was raised, with the suggestion that this should become an item on the agenda of future GCA meetings.

Private sector representatives identified a number of areas where there was potential (in the shape of natural resources) which was not being exploited. The reasons for this included general poverty, absence of domestic savings and investment, and lack of know-how. They pointed to the need to attract foreign investment and reduce dependence on aid.

The group representing NGOs and civil society issued a statement concluding that, while there were some isolated cases of economic success, there were also compelling cases of failure where quality of life had deteriorated. There was a need to involve the countries concerned and to link reform to the democratisation process. Structural adjustment programmes, they argue, have undermined the informal sector, even though it accounts for up to 60% of Africa's economic activity. As re-

gards women, it was felt that gender desegregated data should be developed and that more women should participate at senior levels. The NGOs appreciated the fact that the GCA had been consulting with them, and expressed their agreement with the idea of formalising the NGO/GCA relationship. ■ D.M.

European Year against Racism

The European Year against Racism was officially launched in The Hague on 30 January by the Council President, Wim Kok, EP President José María Gil-Robles, Commission President, Jacques Santer, and Social Affairs Commissioner, Padraig Flynn.

The aims are as follows:

- to raise awareness of the threat that racism poses to human rights and the cohesion of the European Union;
- to encourage debate on appropriate measures to counter racism;
- to promote information on good practice and effective strategies in the fight against racism;
- to increase awareness of the advantages of policies designed to integrate immigrants;
- to learn from the experience of people who have suffered from racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.

Each Member State has established a working programme and national committees will coordinate a series of events which will be staged during the course of the year. These will also involve NGOs, media organisations, political personalities, trade unions, employers' groups, educational institutions etc.

Coinciding with the launch of the Year against Racism, the European Confederation of Trade Unions is putting more emphasis on immigration and equal working rights issues. It has come out in favour of a European Observatory and a media code of practice. The former idea was proposed by EU Heads of Government at their Florence summit, but it remains blocked by the United Kingdom which takes the view that the subject does not fall within European Community competence.

For its part, the Migrants' Forum, which had a delegation at the launch ceremony, plans to take an active part in the campaign. It is urging European institutions and the Member States in particular to pass 'significant' legisla-

Festival of African Cinema in Brussels

(Palais des Beaux-Arts – 13-20 June 1997)

The Festival of African Cinema staged in Brussels has enjoyed growing success, year by year.

The programme for the fourth such event, scheduled for June, includes 16 full-length features and 19 short films. The full-length films due to be screened come from the following countries (film titles and directors indicated):

- South Africa ('Fools – Je vous demande pardon' by Ramadan Suleman and 'Soweto Green' by David Lister);
- Burkina Faso ('Buud Yam' by Gaston Kaboré and 'La traversée du jour' by Idrissa Ouedraogo);
- Cameroon ('Clando' by Jean Marie Téo);
- Cape-Verde ('Le testament de Napumocendo' by Francisco Manso);
- Côte-d'Ivoire ('Blanc de France' by Henri Duparc, 'La jumelle' by Lanciné Diaby and 'Le retour des trois bracelets' by Yéo Kozola);
- Guinea ('Le fleuve comme une fracture' by David Achkar);
- Madagascar ('Quand les étoiles rencontreront la mer' by Raymond Rajaonarivelo);
- Mali ('La genèse' by Cheick Oumar Sissoko and 'Tafe Fanga' by Adama Drabo);
- Senegal ('Mossane' by Safi Faye and 'Tableau ferraille' by Moussa Sène Absa);
- Zimbabwe ('Neria' by Godwin Mawuru).

Information about the festival can be obtained from:

Diaspora Productions ASBL,
55-57, rue Archimède,
1000 Brussels (Belgium)

Tel. (00 32 2) 732.25.69 – Fax (00 32 2) 732.15.15

tive measures to combat rising racism and xenophobia. The Forum is made up of 130 federations representing 65 nationalities

Finally, the Socialist group in the European Parliament has announced a series of more concrete initiatives for the European Year against Racism, aimed at going beyond mere declarations of principle.

THE INSTITUTIONS AT WORK

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Within the framework of its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union has recently issued a number of statements on issues of international concern, details of which are set out below:

Concern over the situation in the Central African Republic and appeal for mediation

Declaration of 12 December 1996

The European Union is deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in the Central African Republic, and especially in Bangui, where confrontations between armed forces have already left victims, particularly among the civilian population.

These confrontations have practically paralysed the country's economic activity and its administration, thus jeopardising the emergency plan that was adopted by the Government of National Unity in July 1996 with considerable financial assistance from the international community, particularly the European Union.

The Union notes the truce established between President Patasse and representatives of the mutineers following the conciliation mission carried out by four African Heads of State after the France-Africa summit in Ouagadougou.

It supports the mediation effort to be undertaken by the International Monitoring Committee led by General Toumani to find a peaceful and lasting solution to the crisis.

The EU calls on the Central African political forces to take advantage of these efforts and work together towards a lasting solution to the conflict, this being an essential precondition for the restoration of the country's financial, economic and social situation with the help of the international community.

Iceland, Norway and the Associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia align themselves with this declaration.

Ghana consolidates the democratisation process

Declaration of 16 December 1996

The European Union notes the outcome of the presidential and legislative elections held on 7 December in Ghana. In particular, it is pleased to learn that the international election observers have found that the polling and counting process was free, fair and transparent. In welcoming this consolidation of the democratic process, the Union congratulates the Government, opposition parties and the people of Ghana on the manner in which the elections were conducted.

The conduct of the elections and the high turnout by the electorate have reaffirmed the commitment of the people of Ghana to democracy.

The EU looks forward to building on its already warm relations and cooperation with Ghana and reaffirms its commitment to continued support for its social and economic development.

Iceland, Norway and the Associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia align themselves with this declaration.

Central African Republic – support for mediation reiterated

Declaration of 10 January 1997

The European Union is extremely concerned at the serious situation of instability currently reigning in the Central African Republic. It would like all parties in Bangui to reach a peaceful solution.

With this in view, the Union fully supports the mediation efforts initiated by the Presidents of Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali and led on the spot by General Amadou Toumani Touré.

The Union calls upon all parties not to endanger the democratic process begun three years ago in the Central

African Republic and to respect fully the principles of the rule of law and good governance, which are essential for the development of the country and its relationship with the European Union.

Gambia: a step towards the return of civilian democratic government

Declaration of 24 January 1996

The European Union has taken note of the National Assembly election on 2 January 1997.

The Union congratulates the people of the Gambia and the Provisional Independent Electoral Commission (PIEC) on the way the preparation and the handling of these elections have taken place. The Union considers the elections as an important step for the Gambia on its return to civilian democratic government, in spite of the ban imposed before the presidential elections, on three former political parties, their leaders and former ministers, which remains in force.

The EU hopes that the National Assembly will soon be able to fulfil the important tasks bestowed on it by the Constitution.

The EU has welcomed the release of a number of detainees in November last and urges the Government of the Gambia to release without delay those who remain in detention for political reasons.

The EU calls on the Gambian authorities to proceed further on its path to democracy, good governance and human rights in line with the new Constitution and is willing to reinforce its dialogue with the Gambia on these and other matters of common concern.

Support for more strenuous effort in Angola peace process

Declaration of 4 February 1997

The European Union welcomes recent progress towards the implementation of the Lusaka protocol, in particular the incorporation of UNITA senior officers into the Angolan armed forces. The Union regrets, however, that over the past few weeks a number of difficulties have delayed the peace process and that it was not possible either to secure the swearing-in of UNITA's

deputies or to establish a Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) as had been agreed for 17 and 25 January 1997.

The EU stresses, particularly to the UNITA leadership, the importance of their deputies, future ministers and vice-ministers getting to Luanda by 12 February 1997 as determined by the Joint Commission so that a GURN can be established as soon as possible thereafter and, in accordance with Resolution 1087 of the Security Council, without this being linked to other issues.

The EU calls upon the Government of Angola and UNITA to resolve the remaining obstacles so that a lasting peace can be achieved and programmes of economic and social rehabilitation can be fully implemented.

The European Union reaffirms its support for the efforts of the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Angola, Maitre Alioune Blondin Beye, and to the three observer states to the Angolan peace process, Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America.

Succes of African mediation in the Central African Republic

Declaration of 5 February 1997

The European Union welcomes the signing in Bangui on 25 January of the solemn declaration ending the rebellion, and the success obtained by the African mediation supported by the European Union in its declaration of 10 January 1997.

The Union hopes that the fact that African mediation, undertaken at the instigation of the Heads of State meeting at the Ouagadougou summit in December 1996, has proved successful in settling a conflict in the Central African region, will serve as an incentive for ongoing mediation in other conflict situations, particularly in the same region, and for the involvement of African mediation in crisis situations throughout the continent of Africa.

The Union also congratulates the parties which signed the military and political agreements accompanying the declaration and expresses the hope that they will scrupulously honour the undertakings given and implement the provisions adopted, in order to achieve the lasting stabilisation of the country

and the national reconciliation essential if energies are to be channelled into resuming the country's development.

The EU is proposing to consider a resumption of aid as soon as the long-term normalisation of the country's political and security situation is confirmed by application of the various measures planned.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the EFTA countries members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.

Appeal for dialogue and moderation in Niger

Declaration of 5 February 1997

The EU was concerned at the arrest of opposition political leaders and of certain participants in the demonstrations which took place on 11 January 1997 and welcomed their release on 23 January 1997.

Nevertheless, it remains concerned that the accusations against the opposition leaders have not yet been withdrawn and by the reactivation of the 'State security court'.

The EU calls on the Government of Niger to moderate its attitude to the opposition and to respect fully fundamental freedoms, including freedom of opinion and freedom of the press, and the rule of law. In this context, it notes with satisfaction the message addressed to the nation on 23 January by the President of the Republic.

It expresses the hope that all the political forces in Niger can engage in dialogue on a long-term basis with a view to national reconciliation, which is essential for the country's recovery.

The Central and Eastern European countries associated with the European Union, the associated country Cyprus and the EFTA countries members of the European Economic Area align themselves with this declaration.

Zaire: concern over military escalation and appeal for talks

Declaration of 14 February 1997

1. The European Union is greatly concerned at the military build-up in the

east of Zaire, which may well aggravate the political problems and widen the humanitarian crisis in the region. The European Union strongly condemns all interference in the conflict and calls for the withdrawal of all outside and mercenary forces. In this connection, the EU insists on full compliance with the standards and principles of international law, in particular the spirit and the letter of the Lomé Convention, and especially Article 2 thereof.

2. The EU calls on the parties to the conflict to negotiate a cease-fire without delay and to facilitate access to the region for humanitarian organisations so that they can assist those in distress. The EU fully supports the current mediation efforts of the African leaders.

3. The EU calls on all parties to seek a political solution to the problems of Zaire and of the region, on the basis of the following five principles:

- (a) respect for the territorial integrity, inviolability and security of the frontiers of Zaire and of the other countries in the region;
- (b) respect for the rights of citizens in accordance with internationally recognised principles and the relevant international legislation;
- (c) voluntary repatriation of refugees, affording them a genuine opportunity to return home without intimidation or risk to their safety on the journey or at destination, in compliance with humanitarian law;
- (d) compliance with the principle of non-aggression between States and restoration of good-neighbourly relations, including effective prevention of all illegal activity by groups in opposition to the Governments of neighbouring countries;
- (e) the process of democratisation of all countries in the region and continuation of the process of transition to democracy and holding of free and fair elections in Zaire.

4. The EU reaffirms its support for this process in Zaire, illustrated by the appointment of the head of the European Electoral Unit, who will be acting in close cooperation with the special representative whom the Secretary-General has decided to appoint for the elections in Zaire.

5. The EU reaffirms its support for the early holding of an international conference on peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes region, under the aegis of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. The conference should take its cue from the

mediation efforts of the organisations and Heads of State in the region. The EU will continue to lend its full support to these efforts, *inter alia* through its special envoy. It is also prepared to implement substantial aid for economic and social rehabilitation at regional level as soon as political circumstances and the security situation so permit.

6. The EU fully endorses the declaration made by the Chairman of the Security Council on 7 February 1997 and welcomes the appointment of Mr Mahmoud Sahnoun as joint special representative of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity for the Great Lakes region. It advocates close coordination of Mr Sahnoun's efforts with those of other mediators and representatives of regional organisations, including the European Union.

AID FOR REHABILITATION

Within the framework of the 'European Programme for Reconstruction and Development in South Africa' the Commission has recently decided on financing for the following:

ECU 750 000 for a project which involves sending 50 young European doctors to hospitals in least-favoured areas of the country's Northern province to provide medical care for the local population.

EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND

Following, where required, favourable opinions from the EDF Committee, the Commission has decided to provide grants and special loans from the 5th, 6th and 7th EDFs to finance the following operations (grants unless otherwise stated). Major projects and programmes are highlighted:

Rehabilitation

Rwanda: ECU 56 million for a second rehabilitation programme focusing on economic sectors (air transport and road infrastructures) and social sectors (health, education, the judicial system etc.)

Sierra Leone: ECU 9.2 million for a programme to repatriate displaced refugees and for rehabilitation, notably in respect of food security, water distribution, sanitation systems and infrastructures.

Economic and social infrastructure

16 countries in West Africa: ECU 5.1 million for a regional programme against drugs.

Guinea Bissau: ECU 26.5 million for the construction of a bridge on the Mansoa River at Joao Landim

Haiti: ECU 40 million for a programme to rehabilitate the road network, in particular in the Central Plateau region.

Swaziland: ECU 1.5 million to support the implementation of the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) in order to boost trade and regional investment.

Trade promotion/structural adjustment

Madagascar: ECU 27 million to support the 1997-98 structural adjustment programme.

All ACPs: ECU 1.8 million to support the 1997 programme of COLEACP (Europe-ACP Liaison Committee) with a view to developing and diversifying the horticulture sector.

Haiti: ECU 10.8 million to support the structural adjustment programme.

Agriculture/rural development

Cameroon: ECU 3 million for the shore-side population of the Lagdo reservoir, designed to achieve a sustainable balance between economic activity and the potential of the natural environment.

Madagascar: ECU 1.2 million to support training and rural development.

Malawi: ECU 15.5 million for a programme to promote soil conservation and rural production.

Health

Malawi: ECU 18.7 million to support the reform and decentralisation of the health sector.

Zaire: ECU 45 million for a health sector support programme, in particular, for the benefit of the people of Kinshasa and its hinterland, Grand Kivu and the two Kasai regions.

Education/training

WAEMU: ECU 900 000 for the 'Ecole nationale des régies financières' (Enaref) in Ouagadougou with a view to improving the skills of people planning to work in the public service of the member countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte-d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo).

Institutional support

Cameroon: ECU 1.9 million for institutional support in the road sector.

Ethiopia: ECU 2 million to support the programme for the development of road infrastructures (RSDP) established by the government.

Mali: ECU 1.9 million to support the electoral process.

Miscellaneous

Togo: ECU 450 000 to help the reintegration of people who have returned voluntarily having fled the country during the social and political troubles between 1991 and 1994.

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK

The EIB has recently provided the following loans:

Gabon: ECU 10.5 million towards a priority investment programme to improve air safety.

Namibia: ECU 8 million for the financing of private small and medium-sized enterprises in the industrial, food processing (including fish), mining, tourism and other sectors.



HUMANITARIAN AID

ACP countries

Angola: ECU 14 million for an aid plan covering primary health care, the provision of clean water, the fight against infant malnutrition and the distribution of basic essentials with a view to reintegrating displaced populations.

Non-ACP countries

Afghanistan: ECU 32.5 million to help victims of the fighting with basic essen-

tials; food, sanitary and medical aid; the rehabilitation of housing and infrastructures; and demining operations.

Iraq: ECU 20 million for food aid and to help fight epidemics. Following the deterioration of the situation in the country, the assistance will be directed towards the most vulnerable groups of the population and to Iraqi refugees in Iran.

Cambodia: ECU 450 000 for the rebuilding of villages destroyed by flooding in the Mekong Delta during 1996.

Cambodia: ECU 1.5 million for demining work and health projects in the provinces of Battambang, Preah Vihear and Kampong Thom.

India: ECU 570 000 for victims of the cyclone that caused severe damage in the state of Andhra Pradesh

Laos: ECU 550 000 to distribute rice and seeds to flood victims who have lost up to a third their crops as a result of the rains.

Burmese refugees in Thailand: ECU 2 million to provide medical and food aid to the Karen and Mon minorities.

Operational Summary

No. 96 — March 1997

(position as at February 14, 1997)



EC-ACP

European Development Fund schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of schemes funded by the European Community under the EDF (Lomé Convention).

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups:

- Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country projects.
- Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) projects
- Regional projects.

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme :

- the title of the project;
- the administrative body responsible for it;
- the estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post financing decision);
- a brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, supplies of equipment, technical assistance, etc.);
- any methods of implementation (international invitations to tender, for example);
- the stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation).

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth.: Responsible Authority
Int. tender: International invitation to tender
Acc. tender: Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. tender: Restricted invitation to tender
T.A.: Technical assistance
EDF: European Development Fund
(e.g. EDF 7 = 7th European Development Fund)
mECU: million European currency units

'Blue Pages' on the INTERNET

- 1 Enter the DG VIII Home Page
[HTTP://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg08/dgviii.htm](http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg08/dgviii.htm)
- 2 Choose the option: PROJECTS FOR TENDER

NOTE: Participation in EDF schemes is strictly confined to ACP or EU firms.

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

Mr Franco Cupini
Directorate-General for Development
Commission for the European Union
G 12 4-14
200, rue de la Loi
B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

DESCRIPTION SECTOR CODE

AAz	Planning and public administration	AEc	Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
AAa	Administrative buildings	AEd	Export promotion
AAb	Economic planning and policy	AEe	Trade, commerce and distribution
AAc	Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category	AEf	Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)
AAd	Police and fire protection	AEg	Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
AAe	Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation	AEnh	Other insurance and banking
AAf	Economic surveys, pre-investment studies	AEi	Archaeological conservation, game reserves
AAg	Cartography, mapping, aerial photography		
AAi	Demography and manpower studies	AFz	Education
ABz	Development of public utilities	AFa	Primary and secondary education
ABa	Power production and distribution	AFb	University and higher technical institutes
ABai	Electricity	AFbi	Medical
ABb	Water supply	AFc	Teacher training
ABc	Communications	AFci	Agricultural training
ABd	Transport and navigation	AFd	Vocational and technical training
ABe	Meteorology	AFe	Educational administration
ABf	Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)	AFf	Pure or general research
		AFg	Scientific documentation
		AFh	Research in the field of education or training
ACz	Agriculture, fishing and forestry	AFi	Subsidiary services
ACa	Agriculture production	AFj	Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.
ACb	Service to agriculture		
ACc	Forestry	AGz	Health
ACd	Fishing and hunting	AGa	Hospitals and clinics
ACe	Conservation and extension	AGb	Maternal and child care
ACf	Agriculture storage	AGc	Family planning and population-related research
ACg	Agriculture construction	AGd	Other medical and dental services
ACH	Home economics and nutrition	AGe	Public health administration
ACi	Land and soil surveys	AGf	Medical insurance programmes
ADz	Industry, mining and construction	AHz	Social infrastructure and social welfare
ADa	Extractive industries	AHa	Housing, urban and rural
ADai	Petroleum and natural gas	AHb	Community development and facilities
ADb	Manufacturing	AHc	Environmental sanitation
ADc	Engineering and construction	AHd	Labour
ADd	Cottage industry and handicraft	AHe	Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
ADe	Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment	AHf	Environmental protection
ADf	Non-agricultural storage and warehousing	AHg	Flood control
ADg	Research in industrial technology	AHh	Land settlement
		AHi	Cultural activities
AEz	Trade, banking, tourism and other services	Alz	Multisector
AEa	Agriculture development banks	Ala	River development
AEb	Industrial development banks	Alb	Regional development projects
		AJz	Unspecified

ACP STATES

New projects and updated information in existing projects appear in italics

ANGOLA

Rehabilitation of the Tchivinguiro Institute. 8.24 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ANG 7014 AFb

Reconstruction support programme. 55 mECU. Relaunch of economic and social activities. Improvement of basic social services and living conditions, poverty alleviation, increase of production and of basic communication possibilities, amelioration of basic infrastructures, participation in mine-clearing operations, support for demobilisation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ANG 6036/001 AGz, AHz.

Rehabilitation in rural areas of Huambo province. 3m ECU. To repair health and education infrastructure and help to get farming and other productive activities up and running again. Projects managed by Save the Children (UK), Oikos (P), Concern (Ireland) and Halstrust (UK) for mine clearance operations. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ANG 7255/012 ACz

Support for training of lawyers and academics in the Law Faculty of Agostinho Neto University (FDUAN). 0.8 mECU. Training, supply of equipment. Financing date January 97. EDF 7.

EDF ANG 7018/000 AFb

ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

Livestock development. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 0.130 mECU. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF AB 5003(7001)ACa

Upgrading and expansion of Antigua Hotel Training Centre. Construction and equipment for part new and part renovated and upgraded facilities. Estimated cost 2.200 mECU. Works, supplies, design and supervision. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF AB 7001 AFd

BENIN

Improvement works on the Sémé-Porto Nova road. (12.711 km). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. 20 mECU. Infrastructure works and installation of road signing. Work supervision by KFW (D). Works by int. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7132 ABd

Support programme for municipal development of Parakou City. Resp.

Auth.: Circonscription urbaine de Parakou. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Works and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BEN 7006 ABd

Improvement of transfusional security in the departments of Ouémé, Mono and Atlantique. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 0.700 mECU. T.A., supplies, training and evaluation. EDF 7.

EDF BEN 7007 AGa

BOTSWANA

Vocational Training Programme.

Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. Estimated total cost 15,100 mECU. Construction and equipment of a new vocational training centre in Gaborone to provide +/- 800 training places. Expand existing schools. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 5, 6 and 7.

EDF BT 7004 AFd

Sysmin - support to base metal industry (Copper-Nickel-Cobalt).

Resp. Auth.: BCL Ltd., 33.700 mECU. To deepen the shaft of the Selebi-North mine, to reach a new ore-body, equipping it and carrying out new prospective drilling to identify new ore-bodies. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SYSMIN BT 9999/001 ADa

Botswana Tourism Development Programme (Foundation phase).

Resp. Auth.: Department of Tourism (DoT) of Commerce and Industry. 1.910 mECU. Short- and long-term T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BT 5019/001 AEc

Trade Development Programme (Phase I). Resp. Auth.: Department of Trade and Investment Promotion. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. To support trade diversification and export promotion. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BT 7008 AEe

BURKINA FASO

Tougan - Ouahigouya - Mali border road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux publics. Modern earth-road. Supervision: short-list done. Estimated cost 13.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 2nd half 96. EDF 6 and 7.

EDF BK 7004 ABd

Sectoral Adjustment Programme-Agricultural-Cereals. 6.100 mECU.

Support for institutional reform,

works, supply of equipment, T.A. lines of credit. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BK 7009 ACa

Sectoral Adjustment Programme - Agricultural - Environment. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Soil map and inventory, soil management and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BK 7010 ACa

Periodical road maintenance programme. Ouagadougou-Ghana.

Bobo-Côte d'Ivoire, and Bobo-Mali. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 29 mECU. Works, supervision. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BK 6017 ABd

Support project for the reform of the pharmaceutical sector. Resp.

Auth.: Ministère de la Santé - Direction des Services Pharmaceutiques (DSPH) and CAMEG 1.6 mECU. Line of credit, works, equipment and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BK 7017 AGc

Geological cartography. Resp.

Auth.: Ministère de l'Energie et des Mines. 15 mECU. Aerial geophysical survey for the middle west, creation of a national geophysical data bank, geological mapping 1/200.000. Works, equipment, T.A. EDF 7

EDF BK SYS 9999 AAg, ADz

SYSMIN - Rehabilitation of the Poura mine. Resp. Auth.: I.G.R. International Gold Resources Corporation.

11 mECU. Works by direct agreement. Supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SYSMIN BK 9999 ADa

Construction of the 'Creativity and Export Pavilion' at the 'International Craftsmanship Fair in Ouagadougou (SIAO). 0.180 mECU.

Works by direct agreement after restr. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 70001/012 AEe

Ouagadougou dam classified forest development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement et de l'Eau. Estimated total cost 1.200 mECU. EDF part 0.300 mECU. Cofinancing with CFD (F), The Netherlands (possible). Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BK 7023 AHf

Support for decentralisation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère Administration Territoriale et Sécurité. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BK 7024 AAB

Support for the structural adjustment programme 1996-1997. Gener-

al import programme. EDF 11.400 mECU. T.A. foreseen. *Date for financing November 96.* EDF 7. EDF BK 7200/004 AAc

Support for the judicial system. Estimated total cost 1 mECU. Training of magistrates and improvement of judicial services. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF BK 7027 AAz

Feasibility and implementation studies for roadworks to be carried out under the PASECT Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs. 4.125 mECU. *Studies on road infrastructure. T.A. Project in execution.* EDF 7. EDF BK 617/001 ADz

Support for the third general registration of population. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs. 0.935 mECU. *Collection of statistical information.* EDF 7. EDF BK 7026 AAe

CAMEROON

General Import Programme. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods with negative list. 20.200 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF CM 7200/001 AAc

Lagdo fishing project. Resp. Auth.: MINEPIA. Estimated cost 3,500 mECU. Preservation and improvement of the social-economic situation around Lake Lagdo. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF CM 6002/002 ACa

Protection and sanitation for Kousseri town. Kousseri road network. Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Estimated cost 4 mECU. Dyke rehabilitation works along the Logoni river, road works and rain water drainage. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF CM 6022 AHg, Ala

Access road to the Tikar Plain. Resp. Auth.: MINTP 14 mECU. Road works over the Kakar-Sabongari-Atta-Sonkolong road. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF CM 6037 ABd

Tikar Plain development. Resp. Auth.: MINAT. 10,2 mECU. Social-economic improvement. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF CM 6004 ACa

Support for the road sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and Transport. 1.930 mECU. T.A. EDF 7. EDF CM 6031/001 AAz

Reorientation of health care in the far north province. 1.9 mECU. Social cooperation. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF CM 6030/001 AGz

CAPE VERDE

Maio island rural electrification. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Im-

provement of living conditions. Supply of electricity, Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF CV 7009/000 ABa,i

Santo Antao water supply and sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Coordination. 1.4 mECU. Works, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF CV 7011 ABb

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Support for the transport sectoral programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Transports et des Travaux Publics 50 mECU. Road rehabilitation. Works supervision, supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF CA 6008 ABd

CHAD

Relaunch of the fishing sector. Estimated cost 2.500 mECU. Sectoral study: shortlist done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF CD 7011 ACa

River Chari embankment protection. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. To improve living conditions in N'Djamena. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF CD 5027 AHf,g

Support for the electoral process. Resp. Auth.: UNDP(PNUD). Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 6. EDF CD 7015 AAc

Eré-Kélo road improvement. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des T.P., des Transports et de l'Habitat. 13.500 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 6 and 7. EDF CD 7012 ABd

Restoration of bridges that fall within the framework of the Second Transport Sectoral Programme. Resp. Auth.: MINTP Chad. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Urgent work to be carried out to restore 15 bridges under the Transport Sectoral Programme. Works, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF CD 6001 ABd

Support for structural adjustment. 10.200 mECU. *Date for financing November 96.* EDF 7. EDF 7200/001 AAc

COMOROS

Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement - Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 mECU. Works, by int.tender.T.A.for further investigations, tender dossier and works supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF COM 6006/7003 ABd

Development of cultivation for export. Vanilla and Ylang Ylang. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Dev. Rural. 1.900 mECU. Vanilla and improvement of quality (laboratory, management, marketing). Supply of non-wood ovens. Crop diversification. Equipment, T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF COM 7004 ACa

Rehabilitation of Mutsamudu-Sima-Pomoni road at Aujouan. 5,6 mECU. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'équipement (DG Travaux Publiques). Works (41 km) by int.tender, supervision by direct agreement after short-list. Project on appraisal. EDF 7. EDF COM/7001 ABd

CONGO

National Road n°1 Brazzaville-Kinkala (Matoumbou). 0.950 mECU. Resp. Auth.: Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. Environmental economical technical studies, execution project and tender dossier. Project on appraisal. EDF 4 and 7. EDF COB 7001/000 ABd

Support programme for the visual arts. 1 mECU. Global development in the visual arts sector. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF COB 7010 AEz

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support for the structural adjustment programme (GIP V). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 25.5 mECU. General import programme. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7. EDF IVC 7200/004 AAc

Provision of basic health services for Liberian refugees and local population. 0,7 mECU. *Assistance to refugees and indigenous population. T.A. Financing date January 97.* EDF 7. AGz

Improved water and sanitation facilities for Liberian refugees and local population. 1.441 mECU. *Assistance to refugees and indigenous population. T.A. and supply of equipment. Financing date January 97.* EDF 7. ABb

DJIBOUTI

Fight against desertification and development of livestock husbandry in Western-Djibouti. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. 1.665 mECU. Supply of equipment, studies, T.A. Project suspended. EDF 7. EDF DI 6008 ACa

Rehabilitation and construction of veterinary infrastructures and supply of equipment. Economical and social Investment. 0.212 mECU.

Resp. Auth.: Direction de l'Elevage et des Pêches. Renovation of existing buildings, laboratory construction, purchase of a refrigerator car. Works by acc. proc. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF DI/5002/001 ACa

Support for the structural adjustment programme 1996-1997. General import programme. 4.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF DI 7200/001 AAC

Rehabilitation and construction of school infrastructure and supply of materials for the Djibouti State Secondary School. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 0.385 mECU. Construction and modernisation of classroom facilities. Works by acc. proc. Restricted tender: supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF DI 7008 AFa

DOMINICA

Eco-Tourism Site Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade Industry and Tourism (MTIT). Estimated total cost 0.558 mECU. Works, equipment and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF DOM 6002/001 ACa

Agricultural Diversification Programme. Resp. Auth.: Diversification Implementation Unit. (DIU). 2,250 mECU. Production Credit Scheme. Abattoir Project, Citrus Processing Study, Shipping and Transportation System Project, Quality Assurance, Market Information Service, Export Credit Programme, Monitoring Evaluation, T.A. Works by acc. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF DOM 7002 ACa

Disposal of solid waste. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Communications, Works and Housing. 1.65 mECU. Restoration of two depots for household waste. Installation of a new waste disposal depot. T.A. by restricted tender. Works by acc. Proc. Project in execution. EDF 7
EDF DOM 7003 ABz

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Support programme to prevent STD/HIV/AIDS. EDF part 1.350 mECU. Training, T.A., supplies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF DO 7016 AGz

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Essential goods import programme. Resp. Auth.: Presidency of the Republic. Estimated cost 1.5 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import essential goods. Project on appraisal. EDF 5 and 6.
EDF EG AAC

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock farming, Fisheries and Forests. Directorate General for Forests. 5.070 mECU. Land Classification and Use Master Plan - National System of Conservation Units - Forest Training and Research Centre. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.
EDF EG 6001 ACc,e,i

Rural development programme in the South-East. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture. 4.500 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF EG 6005(7001) ACa

ERITREA

Sector study on national water and irrigation potential. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Water resources 4-5 mECU. Assess the various demands for those resources, determine the potential for their sustainable development, present strategies for their development, and lay the foundations for their management. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ERY 7002 ABb

Upgrading of the Nefasit-Dekemhare-Tera Imni road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. Road works. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ERY 7004 ABd

Rehabilitation of transmission lines, substations and distribution system in Massawa area. Resp. Auth.: Eritrean Electric Authority. Estimated total cost 10-12 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Feasibility study: INYPSA (Sp). Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ERY 7001 ABa,i

ETHIOPIA

Reintegration of displaced Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea. Estimated cost 2 mECU. Works, training, line of credit, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ET 7255/001 AHb,e

SME development programme. Estimated total cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ET 7003 AEz

Rehabilitation of the Addis Ababa- Jima road, Addis Ababa-Abelti (180 Km). Estimated total cost 35 mECU. Improvement of the road network. Works and supplies. T.A. Feasibility studies and dossiers projects preparation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ET 7005/002 ABd

Transport sector support project (TSSP). Estimated total cost 1.99

mECU. Works and supplies. T.A. Development transport policy, improvement of programme management road handling capacity, activities coordination. Resp. Auth.: Ethiopia Road Authority. *Financing date January 97.* EDF 7.
EDF 7005/001 ABd

Addis Ababa's water supply and sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa Water Supply Authority. AAWSA. Estimated total cost 35 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A., Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ET 5006/002 ABb

Training programme. Trainers' training, staff, supply of equipment. Estimated cost 6.900 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ET 7016 AFc

Strengthening national training and research capacity in economics. Resp. Auth.: Department of Economics. 1.05 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. T.A. by CSAE (Centre for the Study of African Economies of Oxford University). Evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ET 6101/001 AFB

FIJI

Rural Health Infrastructure, Naitasiri. Construction of a new hospital in Vunidawa, construction, modification and upgrading of various health centres and nursing stations. Estimated total cost 4.315 mECU. Study: short-list already done. Project on appraisal. EDF 4, 5, 6 and 7.
EDF FIJ 7007 AGa

Reconstruction of Delainivesi, Natua and Nacaugai bridges. Resp. Auth.: Public Works Dept. 1.895 mECU. Two bridges by direct labour. Natua bridge by acc. tender. *Project in execution.*
EDF 4, 5, 6. ABd

GAMBIA

General Import Programme. Support for Structural Adjustment. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EC goods, with negative list. 1.400 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GM 7200/002 AAC

GHANA

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. 3.8 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF GH 7003 AFz

Western Region Agricultural Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 15

mECU. T.A., buildings and training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GH ACa

Woodworking Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands and Forestry. 4.85 mECU. Training and equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GH ACc

Transport Infrastructure Programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Roads & Highways. 54 mECU. Axle load control equipment, consultancy studies, training of Highway Sector staff. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF GH 6001 ABd

Small towns water supply project. Resp. Auth.: Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation. Estimated total cost 15 mECU. Construction of water supply systems. Strengthening of institutions responsible for operations and maintenance. Works. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GH 6006 ABb

Decentralised Cooperation Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.500 mECU. Equipment, construction, training and current inputs of grassroots programmes. TA for implementation and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF GH 7008 AJz

Support for STD and HIV/AIDS control activities. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.897 mECU. Supplies (drugs, laboratory, equipment), training and specific education, studies, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF GH 7009 AGb

4th Microprojects Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 9 mECU. Intervention in the field of water, sanitation and health, education, agricultural production, processing and marketing, rural transport, socio-economic infrastructure, environment and income generation. Consultancy for T.A., supervision, audit and evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GH AHb

Support for Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. 15 mECU. Financing date November 96. EDF 7.
EDF GH 7200/005 AAc

Rural electrification programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines and Energy. 9.5mECU. Supply and erection of electricity lines, supervision, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GH ABa,i

GRENADA

Microprojects programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry Labour, Social Ser-

vice Community Development. 0.220 mECU. Water supply, road improvements repairs and extension of schools, medical and community centre and sports grounds. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GRD 7102 ABz

Rehabilitation of the Bellevue-Grenville Section of the Eastern Main Road - Grenville - Mama Cannes section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 2 mECU. Works by direct labour, small T.A. and supply of equipment for repairs. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GRD 7002/001 ABd

GUINEA

Development of secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Estimated cost 7 mECU. Buildings, market, railway stations, roads T.A. and training management, work supervision, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GUI 7008 AHab

Extension of the Family Plantation Programme in Soguipah. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forests. Estimated cost 5.5 mECU. Cultivation of rice fields and rubber plantations and the development of transport infrastructures. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GUI 6008/001 ACe, AHe, AHf

GUINEA BISSAU

João Landim bridge construction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. Estimated cost 26.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing December 96. EDF 7.
EDF GUB 7013 ABd

Support to create environmental legislation. Resp. Auth.: National Council for Environment. (CNA) 0.500 mECU. T.A., seminars, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GUB 7011 ACf

Project support to develop the livestock sector. Development and improvement of natural resources. 1.3 mECU. Consolidate programme for veterinary input distribution, improvement of epidemiological information, accompany actions and training. Services, supplies by restr. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF GUB/REG/5007/003 ACa,b

HAITI

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Finances. 23 mECU. General Import Programme with negative list. Different T.A. with individual experts. Project in execution.

EDF 7.
EDF HA 7200 AAc

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme II. 10.800 mECU. Date foreseen for financing December 96. EDF 7.
EDF HA 7200/001 AAc

JAMAICA

Credit scheme for micro and small enterprises. Resp. Auth.: Planning Institute of Jamaica. Implementation by Apex Institution and Coordination and Monitoring Unit 7 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 5, 6 and 7.
EDF JM 5020 ADz, AEz

Institutional strengthening programme. Resp. Auth.: National Water Commission (NWC). Estimated cost 3 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF JM 7005 AHa,b,c.

Agricultural sector support programme (ASSAP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture - Rural and Agriculture Dev. Auth. (RADA). 5m ECU. More sustainable farming systems, soil conservation, reforestation and Community education. Works, supply of vehicles, equipment, T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF JM 7004 ACa

KENYA

Farming in tsetse infested areas. Estimated total cost 14,600 mECU. Refine the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and develop better technologies to prevent infections. Monitor the environmental impact of the techniques. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF KE 7011 ACa

Family Health Programme. Estimated total cost 28.710 mECU. Reproduction health status of Kenyans family planning services broadened. EDF 14.810 mECU, ODA (UK) 13.900 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 6
EDF KE 7015 AGb

Technical Education. 5 mECU. Raising the level of performance of existing teaching institutions. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF KE 6005/001 AFb

Trade Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Export Promotion Council and a Special TDP Committee composed of private and public sector members and the European Commission. 4 mECU. Trade Promotion and Marketing Programme, Training, Equipment, T.A. and Monitoring and Evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF KE 7008 AEz

Small scale and informal sector enterprises. Estimated total cost 6

mECU. Development of micro-enterprises and informal sector of the economy. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7009 AEE,f

Sultan Hamud-Mtito Road rehabilitation. Estimated total cost 30 mECU. To rehabilitate priority roads and establish sustainable maintenance organisation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF KE 7010/002 ABd

Mai-Mahiu/Naivasha Road rehabilitation Estimated total cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7010/003 ABd

Community development. Poverty alleviation. Estimated total cost 12.500 mECU. Financial facility aimed at priority activities identified by local communities. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7018 AHb

Support for the establishment of key functions and programmes at the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPR). Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Planning and National Development and Finance and Office of the President. 1.993 mECU. Training, Consulting and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE/7016/00 AAb

Establishment of sustainable tourism development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. 1.970 mECU. Advice on and design of a financially self-sustainable Tourism Board. T.A., equipment, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7014. AAc

Support Services Programme (SSP). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.795 mECU. Ad hoc support and project preparation, monitoring and evaluation facility. Framework contract. Support for the office of the NAO. Training and equipment. Framework contract by rest. tender after short-list. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF KE 7012 AAc

Agriculture/livestock research programme. Estimated total cost 8.3 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF KE 6003/001 ACa

KIRIBATI

Recycling programme in South Tarawa. Resp. Auth. Ministries of Environment & Natural Resources, and of Works & Energy. Estimated total cost 0.495 mECU. Building and equipping a treatment centre for the recycling of machines and abandoned vehicles. Supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KI 7008 AHf

LESOTHO

Urban Water Supply and Sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Water and Sanitation Authority. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Implementation of urgent water-supply and sanitation systems in the urban and peri-urban areas. Feasibility study and contract document. Preparation for urgent water supply and sanitation intervention. Short-lists to be done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF LSO 7002 ABb, AHa

Fourth Structural Adjustment Programme (SASP 4) 96-97. General Import Programme. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Lesotho. 8.6 mECU. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF LSO 7200/003 AAc

MADAGASCAR

Kalmolandy Bridge Reconstruction. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics. 1.540 mECU. Submersible-type bridge. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF MAG 602 ABd

Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. Auth. Ministère des Travaux Publics. 72,500 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. *Project in execution*. EDF 6 & 7.

EDF MAG 7004 ABd

Support programme to rehabilitate social and economic infrastructures. Interventions after cyclones. EDF part 17.500 mECU. Railways and road rehabilitation, small hydraulic works. Social infrastructure rehabilitation. Technical expertise study to be done for roads. Works, supplies, supervision and control, evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAG 7009 ABd

First decentralized cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: National Authorising officer and Head of EU Delegation and authorized NGOs. 1.900 mECU. Works Purchase of equipment by direct agreement, restr. tender or int. tender. Project on appraisal EDF 7

EDF MAG 7022/000 AGz, AHz

Support-training for rural development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du développement rural et de la réforme foncière. 1.647 mECU. Developing the farmer's organisations role. Training, supplies and technical cooperation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAG 7029/000 ACb

Micro-hydraulic rice project. Resp. Auth. Ministère de l'Agriculture. 1.975 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF MAG 6001/001 AAc

Decentralized training programme for regional private

tourism operators. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Tourisme. 1.910 mECU. T.A. training, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 1, 2, 3 and 4.

EDF MAG 6039 AAc

Professional organisation of rural sector and agricultural loans. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dév. Rural. 1.910 mECU. T.A., training, evaluation. Works, supplies, T.A. and services. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF MAG 7003 AAc

Support for Training Programme (FORMFED) Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 0.9 mECU. T.A., equipment. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF MAG 7028 AFd

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme 1997-98. 27 mECU. General Import Programme. Financing date February 97. EDF 7.

EDF MAG 7200 AAc

MALAWI

Soil Conservation and rural production. Resp. Auth.: MOALD. 23 mECU. EDF 15 mECU, local 1.3 mECU, counterpart funds 5.7 mECU. Water supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. and training. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 5001/002 AAc

Information, education and communication population programme. Resp. Auth.: NAO -Ministry for Women and Children's Affairs, Community and Social Services - Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. Increase awareness and promote behaviour change as regards reproductive health, including disease prevention. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 6009/001 AAg,b,c

Support to the Forestry Department. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources. Estimated total cost 4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. *Project in execution*. EDF 7

EDF MAI 5001/003 AAc

Health Programme. Strengthening Health Ministry capacities in the framework of planning, decentralisation and equipment maintenance. Training, infrastructures, equipments and T.A. Estimated total cost 20 mECU. *Project in execution*. EDF 7.

EDF MAI 6009/002 AGE

2nd Lomé IV Micro-project Programme. Improvement of infrastructures in the farmer framework with the EC participation. Building, school's rehabilitation, health centres, water points. Estimated total cost 6 mECU. Project on appraisal.

EDF 7.
EDF MAI 7012/038 AGz, AHZ, ABb

Customary Land Utilisation Study. 1 mECU. Studies. T.A. survey. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MAL 602 AAg

Karonga-Chilumba-Chiweta Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supplies. Estimated total cost 25.200 mECU. Construction, supervision of works, training of technical staff. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF MAI 602 ABd

ASYCUDA (Automatic system for treatment of customs information) - infrastructure component. Resp. Auth. Government of Malawi. 1.885 mECU. Construction and renovation. All by Acc. Tender. Financing date November 96. EDF 7.
EDF MAI 7012 AAa

MALI

Development of livestock in the North-east. 4,5 mECU. EDF 6 and 7. Project in execution.
EDF MLI/5006/001ACa

Better use of surface waters in the 5th region. Consolidation. Resp. Auth.: Governorat de Mopti. EDF 4.300 mECU. Works, irrigation, supply of pumps, inputs, T.A. follow-up and evaluation, training, research. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF MLI 6005/002 ACa

Support for the democratic process. Resp. Auth. National Electoral Commission. Total estimated cost 14.800 mECU. Mission to study and identify an action plan. Restricted list drawn up. *Shortlist established.* EDF 7.
EDF MLI 7019AAc

Support for the 1996-97 Structural Adjustment Programme. General import programme. Estimated total cost 14.800 mECU. *Financing date November 96.* EDF 7.
EDF MLI 7200/003AAc

Support for the electoral process. Resp. Auth.: Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI). *Estimated cost 1.950 mECU.* Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MLI 7019AAc

MAURITANIA

Kaédi and Mederda water supply. Estimated total cost 2.8 mECU. Improvement of the living conditions. Works and T.A. Rehabilitation, strengthening and improvement of water systems. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MAU/7012/000ABb

Support for the programme to strengthen institutional capacity (PRCI). Resp. Auth. Ministry of Planning and Finance. 1.865 mECU. T.A. to strengthen the effectiveness of

administration. Supply of equipment. *Project in execution.* EDF 7.
EDF MAU 7200/002AAc

MAURITIUS

National solid waste management project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Quality of Life. Estimate 8.650 mECU. EDF 7mECU. Construction of a fully engineered landfill to cater for about 600 t of solid waste per day. Works and supplies by int. tender. T.A. for supervision and evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MAS 6017 AHb,c,f

First microprojects programme. 0.500 mECU. Works, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MAS 7007 AFz, AGz, AHZ

Irrigation of the Northern Plains. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. *Estimated cost 9 mECU.* Works, supplies, T.A. *Restricted tender for T.A.* Project on appraisal. EDF 7
EDF MAS 7002 ABb

MOZAMBIQUE

Socio-economic reintegration of young people. Estimated cost 1.950 mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.
EDF MOZ 7017 AHb

Rehabilitation of the rural health system. Estimated cost 22mECU. Rehabilitation and renovation of 3 rural hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of essential medicines and equipment, T.A. Project on appraisal. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF MOZ 7018 AGa,e

Support for the development of an environmentally friendly tourism sector (foundation phase). Resp. Auth.: DINATUR, EC delegation in Maputo - Ministry for the Coordination of Environmental Action. 1.500 mECU. Two T.A. teams for Institutional Support and for Physical Planning. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF MOZ 7020 AEc

Social reintegration in Zambezia and Niassa provinces. 5.600 mECU. Health, education, rural life (farming, fishing, setting up of micro-enterprises), urban economic development. The projects will be carried out by NGO's and the provincial authorities. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MOZ 7255/06 AFz, AGz, AHZ

Support for the Mozambican STD/HIV strategy within the health system. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health - National Directorate of Health, 5 mECU. Services (T.A. training supervision), supplies (educational materials, drugs laboratory reagents, condoms) and equipment (laboratory equipment, medical

equipment). Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MOZ 8000/001 AGb,c

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. GIP II. 15 mECU. Project in execution.
EDF MOZ 7200/001 AAc

Support for the judicial system. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF MOZ 7022 Alz

Computerised system for the population register and issue of identity cards. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Internal Affairs. *Estimated cost 1.995 mECU.* Supplies, T.A. Int. Tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.
EDF MOZ 7024 AAz

NAMIBIA

Namibia Integrated Health Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social Services. 13.500 mECU. Infrastructures, equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF NAM 7007 AGz

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Estimated total cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.700 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, technical training and technical consultancies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF NAM 7005 AFi

Rural Development Support Programme for the Northern Communal Areas. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural extension service, training of extension officers and establishment of a rural credit system. Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF NAM 7011 ACa

Rural Towns Sewerage Schemes. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Housing. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF NAM 7015 AHc

Namibia Tourism Development Programme. (Foundation Phase). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Tourism. 1.882 mECU. Establishment of a Tourism Board and commercialisation of the Government resorts (Namibian Wildlife Resorts). Staff training. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF NAM 7010 AEc

Livestock Marketing Project. Resp. Auth.: Directorate of Veterinary Services - Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Dept., 3,750

mECU. Construction of buildings, water and road infrastructure, provision of equipment materials, tractors for quarantine farms in the Northern Communal Areas. All by acc. tenders or restr. tenders. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF NAM 7020 ACa

Support Programme for the Trypanosomiasis and Tsetse fly regional control programme. Resp. Auth.: Department of Veterinary Services. Estimated total cost 0,390 mECU. Protection of the East Caprivi and control of the Katima Mulilo Bovine Trypanosomiasis. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/5420/003 AGe

Support for implementation of the Cross Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Industry. 5.370 mECU. To promote an strengthen Namibia's economic integration. T.A., supplies and line of credit. Financing date November 96. EDF 7.

EDF REG 70012/22 AEd,e

NIGER

Fishery development in the southern Zinder zone. Resp. Auth.: NGO under control of Ministère de l'Hydraulique et de l'Environnement. Estimated total cost 0.500 mECU. Professional sector organisation, strengthening of fish marketing. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF NIR 7014 ACa

Environmental protection programme in the lower Tarka Valley. Estimated total cost 10 mECU. To stop ecological and economical destruction of the zone. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF NIR 6002/002 ACa

Support programme for the electoral process. 1.840 mECU. Supply of voting materials by acc. Tender. T.A. and training. *Project in execution.* EDF 7.

EDF NIR 7024 AAC

NIGEPAC. Safeguarding cultural heritage. Estimated total cost 1 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF NIR 7017 AHi

Support for the 1996 Structural Adjustment Programme. General import programme. 14 mECU. Imports on basis of negative list. T.A. for implementation and institutional support. Project on appraisal. EDF 6 and 7.

EDF NIR 7200/002 AAC

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme, phase II (HRDP II). Estimated cost 20mECU. Construction of and improvements to educational

buildings. Scholarships, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF PNG 6008/002 AFb

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. 0.900 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF STP 7200/001 AAC

SENEGAL

St-Louis regional development programme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training studies. Health centres, clinics, medical equipment and consumables, training, information, T.A. to the Direction Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, sanitation. Environmental protection with wind breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering scheme in Podor. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SE 6002/7002 ACa

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme with negative list. 20.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SL 7200/002 AAC

SEYCHELLES

La Digue Environment and Transport project. Resp. Auth.: Land Transport and Environmental Divisions. 0.650 mECU. Preservation and protection of environment and transport infrastructure. Rehabilitation main road (1.8 km). Works by acc. tender, equipment and T.A. Supervision and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.

EDF SEY/7009 ABc,d

Victoria market rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 1 mECU. EDF 0.770 mECU, local 0.230 mECU. Works and improvements. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDY SEY 7011 ACb

SIERRA LEONE

Improvement of Freetown - Conakry road link. Estimated cost 30 mECU. Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL 7004 ABd

Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 22.500 mECU. To

strengthen SLRA's management capacity, to support maintenance operations, rehabilitate 160 km of road, provide training and equipment to enable local private contractors to increase their role in road works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL 7002 ABd

Management and protection of wildlife in Outamba Kilimi National Park (OKNP). Resp. Auth.: NAO. Estimated cost 1.980 mECU. Development of sound management plan for sustainable protection of wildlife and ecosystem in park. Improvement of local infrastructure and community development. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL 7003 AEi, AHi

West North West Artisanal Fisheries and Community Development, phase II. 1.98 mECU. Technical cooperation in fisheries. T.A. and training. Financing date January 97. EDF 7.

SL 6004/001 ACd

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Guadalcanal road: Aola-Matau. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Transport, Works and Utilities. Estimated total cost 6 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SOL 7001 ABd

SOMALIA

2nd rehabilitation programme. 47 mECU. Inter-sectoral approach. The project will be implemented by NGOs and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

EDF SO 6029 AAC

SURINAME

Timber Institute. Control of logging and reafforestation activities. Estimated total cost 3.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF SUR 7005 ACc

SWAZILAND

Maize marketing and storage. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 1.555 mECU. Rehabilitation and expansion works by acc. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SW 5005/02 ACa

Support for implementation of the Cross Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 1.5 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7012/024 AAz

TANZANIA

Support for Aids Control in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 4 mECU. To strengthen health and other support services. Supply of equipment and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF TA 0800/000 (7001) AGc

Mwanza-Nyanguge Road Rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated cost 35 mECU. Rehabilitation of 62 km of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study on-going. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 6021 ABd

Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and minerals. Estimated cost 11.100 mECU. Works, pumping equipment, studies and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 5005(7) ABb

Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. Estimated cost 9.100 mECU. Pumping, treatment, storage and distribution. Works, equipment, design and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7009ABz

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. General Import Programme. Phase III. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Tanzania. 35 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7200/002 AAC

Assistance for the electoral process. Estimated cost 1.700 mECU. Supply of voting material and equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7017 AAC

Ruvuma-Mbeya Environment Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Development Authorities. Estimate 10 mECU. Improvement of forest conservation and use. Supplies, T.A., studies, training, management. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7018 ACc

Support for coffee research. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Estimated total cost 1.980 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment for the research centres, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 6001/002 ACa

Road rehabilitation and maintenance (Ruvuma and Iringa Regions). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Estimated total cost 15 mECU. EDF 12 mECU, local 3 mECU. Road rehabilitation, support to regional and district engineers' offices, training of local con-

tractors. T.A. and supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7011 ABd

Rehabilitation of Bagamoyo to Wazo Hill junction road. Studies and supervision. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated total cost 15.8 mECU. EDF part 1.750 mECU. for design studies and tender documents and supervision services for the rehabilitation of the +/- 45 Km road. Short-list to be done. Rehabilitation works funded by Italy: 14 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TA 7020 ABd

Rehabilitation of the Mwanza/Shinyanga-Nzega road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Estimated total cost 70 mECU. Project at identification stage. EDF 6, 7 and 8.
EDF TA 7012 ABd

TOGO

Aid for the voluntary reintegration of refugees from Togo. Resp. Auth.: Min. Du Plan. Estimated cost 0.430 mECU. Project under the direction of CARE Togo. Socio-economic contribution for the reintegration of 17 000 Togo refugees in their place of origin. EDF 7.
EDF TO 7006 AHn

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Training project for young farmers (AYTRAP). Assistance for the young farmer to create rural enterprises. Estimated cost 7.300 mECU. EDF 5 mECU. local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. Project on appraisal. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF TR 7002 ACa

Support for Structural Adjustment Programme - General Import Programme II. Resp. Auth.: Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago. 4.300 mECU. Hard currency allowance to import ACP and EU goods with negative list. T.A. foreseen for short term missions by an international consultant and counter part local consultant, who should be trained in order to help monitoring the programme as well as with the organization and follow-up of the missions. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF TR 7200/001 AAC

TUVALU

Outer Island Primary School Rehabilitation. (Nukufetau and Nanumea). Resp. Auth.: Department of Education. 0.300 mECU. Works and supplies by restr. tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 5 and 7.
EDF TV 7004 AFa

UGANDA

Support for the External Aid Coordination Department (EACA) -

NAO's Office. Resp. Auth.: National Authorising Officer (NAO). Estimated total cost 5 mECU. T.A., training, equipment and operating costs. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDG UG 6023/001 AAC

Water supply in Hoima, Masindi and Mubende. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources. Estimated total cost 12 mECU. Rehabilitation of catchments, treatment plants and water distribution network. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF UG 7010 ABb

Support for the Microprojects Programmes Coordination Unit (MPCU). 2 mECU. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7.
EDF UG 7102 AAC

VANUATU

Expansion of the National Technical Institute of Vanuatu (INTV) - tourism section. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. Estimated total cost 0.950 mECU. Building and supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF VA 7008 AFb

ZAIRE

Rehabilitation Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Coordination and Management Unit. Estimated total cost EDF 84 mECU. and an indicative amount of 6 mECU from the Commission's budget under heading B7-5076 'Rehabilitation and reconstruction measures for developing countries'. Regions selected: Kinshasa's economic hinterland, the Greater Kivu and the two provinces of Kagai. Rehabilitation and maintenance of roads and farm access roads. Support for production and marketing, support for basic social infrastructure. T.A. and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF ZR 6033 AAC

Support programme for the resinsertion of displaced persons in the Kasai province (PARK). 2 mECU. The programme will be implemented by Caritas (NI), Oxfam (UK), Nuova Frontiera (I), Gret (F), and Raoul Follereau (F). Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ZR 7255/001 ACa

Strengthening of the provisional health support programme. Rehabilitation of health service structures in Kinshasa, Kasai and Kivu. Support for the health service at the basic and intermediate levels. Reinforcement of basic juridical services. Works, supplies and T.A. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 97. EDF 7.
EDF ZR 6029/001 AGz

ZAMBIA

Forestry management for sustainable woodfuel production in Zambia (along the railway line). Resp. Auth.:

Ministry of Environment. Estimated total cost 2 mECU. Training supply of equipment, studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ZA 7009 ACc

Rehabilitation of the Kabwe-Kapiri Mposhi and Chisamba Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supply. Estimated total cost 15.360 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ZA 6014/001 ABd

Economic Management and Planning Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 1.500 mECU. T.A. for long and short-term duration. Restr. Tender. Lists to be established. Projects in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ZA 7018 AAC

ZIMBABWE

OMAY Kanyati and Gatshe Gatshe land use and health programme. Resp. Auth.: A.D.A. 4.6 mECU. Raising the standard of living of rural population. Conservation and improved utilisation of the wildlife resources, support to agriculture and improvement of social infrastructure. Road network, water, sanitation, building of a district hospital, equipment and supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ZIM 6004/7002 ACa

Gokwe north and south rural water supply and sanitation project. 6.100 mECU. Rehabilitation of existing water-points, new domestic water points, latrines, maintenance, health education. T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF ZIM 7001 ABb

Minefield clearance in N.E. Zimbabwe. Rural development, clearance of landmines. Zimbabwe minefields survey. Shortlist to be done. Estimated 10 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ZIM 7004 ACa

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES (OCT)

ARUBA

T.A. for managerial training. 1.900 mECU. A training unit will train private and public executives and will advise companies on demand. Supplies T.A. and evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF ARU 6006 ABb

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES - ARUBA

Tourism development programme. 5 mECU. Training, T.A., marketing in Europe. *Project in execution.* Date foreseen for financing October 96. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7835 AEc

Extension of Caribbean Regional Tourism Development Programme to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Integrated tourism project to strengthen the tourism sectors by extending the scope of relevant components of the CRTDP. Estimated total cost 0.400 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/6917/001 AEc

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Bora-Bora Island Sanitation. Tourism Development. Resp. Auth.: Direction Territoriale de l'Équipement. 1.250 mECU. Lagoon environmental protection. Works by acc.tender. Project on appraisal. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF POF/6009/000 AHb, AGE

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

Water and sewerage in Providenciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works, 3.700 mECU. Water supply works and pipes. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF TC 7001 AHb,c

ST. HELENA

Wharf improvement project. Resp. Auth.: Public Works and Service Department. Estimated total cost 1.743 mECU. To increase the safety and efficiency of Jamestown Port by upgrading wharf facilities for passenger and cargo handling. Works, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF SH 7001 ABd

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Holo-Fakatoi Road in Wallis (RT2). EDF 0.600 mECU. Bitumen road. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF WF 7001 ABd

Construction of territorial road N° 1 in Futuna. 0.840 mECU. Works and rehabilitation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF WF 7003 ABd

REGIONAL PROJECTS

UGANDA - RWANDA - KENYA

Agro-forestry network for the East African Highlands. Provision of

vehicles and motorbikes, audio and office equipment, weather stations and various laboratory and field equipment. Training, workshops, monitoring, evaluation. Project on appraisal. 4.850 mECU. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7309 ACa

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania. Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU. Widening of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project on appraisal. EDF 5.
EDF REG 5311 (7) AFb

Combatting the tse tse fly in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda). 20 mECU. Evaluation, training and research. T.A., equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 736 ACa, ACE

CAMEROON - CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics (Cameroon). Rehabilitation and improvement of transport infrastructures between Douala and Bangui. Estimated total cost 50 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.
EDF REG - CM-CA-7002/001 ABd

MALI-GUINEA

Flood forecast and control, hydrological simulation for the Niger upper basin. Estimated total cost 6 mECU EDF, 5.175 mECU, France (foreseen) 0.375 mECU, Denmark (foreseen) 0.150 mECU, Mali-Guinea (foreseen) 0.300 mECU. Flood forecast system, hydrological model of local simulation with parametric regionalisation. Warning system via telecommunication and satellite teletransmission. Statistical studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6181 AHf, g

CENTRAL AFRICA

CIESPAC - Public Health Education Centre in Central Africa. 1.980 mECU. Student accommodation, equipment, scholarships. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7205 AFb

ECOFAC II - Forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan, République du Congo. Estimated total cost 12.500 mECU. To develop national and regional capacities for good management of forest resources. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6203/001 ACc

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION (IOC) - COMORES - MADAGASCAR - MAURITIUS - SEYCHELLES

Integrated Regional Programme for Trade Development (PRIDE). Resp. Auth.: I.O.C. Secretariat. EDF 9.3 mECU. Equipment. T.A., training, management. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7503 AEz

Establishment of a University in the Indian Ocean region. Resp. Auth.: Indian Ocean Commission. Estimated cost 2.150 mECU. Creation of a network of research and training institutions providing support for existing institutions. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7501 AFb

COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CBI

Standardization and quality assurance. Resp. Auth.: COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa). Estimated total cost 2.543 mECU. To develop harmonized standardization and quality control practices. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7321 AEe

Regional Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa. Assistance to COMESA Secretariat. 1.950 mECU. Training, supply of equipment, evaluation and services. T.A. short-term. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7316 AAc

Regional Telematics Network Services (RTNS). Trade development. Estimated total cost 1.930 mECU. T.A. short-term by restr. tender. Publicity for the project, network implementation, maintenance and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/RPR/517 AAc

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS

Guarantee Fund for Private Investment Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO - Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to cover partially credit risks given by Banks to the private sector. Total estimated cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU - Others: France, Germany, EIB., Commercial Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7115 AEz

Regional programme to combat drugs. Estimated total cost 5.100 mECU. Elaboration of training programmes and national plans. *First half 97.* EDF 7.

EDF REG 7135 AGz

BENIN - CAMEROON - COTE D'IVOIRE - GHANA - GUINEA - TOGO

Regional Programme to relaunch pineapple production in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: Execution unit composed of one senior expert, T.A. and one junior expert. 1.995 mECU. T.A. studies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7138 ACa

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IGAD

IGAD Household Energy Programme. Resp. Auth.: IGAD Executive Secretary. Estimated total cost 1.900 mECU. T.A. to initiate pilot projects in the area of household energy, define the role and organize the setting up of a regional unit to coordinate activities, and develop working relationships with national and sub-region institutions in IGAD's member countries. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG ABA

Development of the Artisanal Fisheries Sector. The promotion of artisanal fisheries and fisheries trade. Improvement of the level of services available in the post-harvest field of artisanal fisheries in IGAD member states. Estimated total cost 7.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7314/000 ACd, AFd

Cereals markets training programme. Resp. Auth. IGAD Executive Secretary. 1.990 mECU. T.A., equipment, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 5359 ACa

BURKINA FASO - CAPE VERDE - GAMBIA - MALI - MAURITANIA - NIGER - SENEGAL - CHAD

Regional environmental training and information programme. Resp. Auth.: Institut de Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. T.A. training, supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG. 6147/001 AFz, AHz

SAHEL COUNTRIES

Support to strengthen vaccine independence in Sahel Africa. 9.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7012 ACa

BENIN - BURKINA FASO - COTE D'IVOIRE - MALI - NIGER - SENEGAL - TOGO

Support for the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union

(UEMOA). Promotion of regional economic integration. Resp. Auth. UEMOA Commission. Estimated total cost 12 mECU. *Project in execution.* EDF 7.

EDF REG 7106/02 AAF

Support for the ENAREF. 0.900 mECU. T.A., training, equipment. *Project in execution.* EDF 7.

EDF REG 7106/003 AAc, AFd

10 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF AGM (BURKINA FASO, CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, GHANA, MALI, NIGER, NIGERIA, SENEGAL, CHAD, TOGO)

Promotion of a regional grain market in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: NAO-Mali. Estimated cost 12 mECU. Creation of a regional grain market. Promotion and strengthening of initiatives by private operators. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 6175 ACf

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF P.T.A.

Regional integration in East and Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. Estimated cost 1.500 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7316 AAb

PACIFIC ACP STATES

Pacific regional civil aviation. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 4.900 mECU. Supply of security, air traffic control, navigation and meteorology, and training equipment. T.A. *Project on appraisal.* EDF 6 and 7.

EDF REG 7704 ABC,d

Pacific Regional Waste Awareness and Education Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. 0.600 mECU. T.A. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7714 AHf

SADC

T.A. for the SADC Secretariat. Resp. Auth. SADC Secretariat. 1.700 mECU. T.A., training. *Project in execution.* EDF 7.

EDF REG 7422 AAc

SADC Hydrological Cycle Observing System (SADC-HYCOS). Resp. Auth.: SADC Secretariat. 1.964 mECU. Programme for the improvement of regional integrated water resources. Supply of equipment by int. Tender. T.A. by restricted tender. *Project in execution.* EDF 7.

EDF REG 6450 ABb

BENIN - COTE D'IVOIRE - GHANA - GUINEA - GUINEA BISSAU - TOGO

Regional programme to boost natural resource protection in coastal West African countries. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement - Togo. Estimated cost 10 mECU. Priorities: fight against bush fires and deforestation, and for soil protection. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.
EDF REG 6113 ACe

KENYA - UGANDA - TANZANIA

Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in Jinja-Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research Institute. EDF part 8.400 mECU. T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 5316/001 ACd

ALL ACP STATES

Strengthening of fisheries and biodiversity management in ACP countries. Resp. Auth.: ICLARM, Manila (Philippines). 5mECU. T.A., management, supply of equipment, data base creation. Project on appraisal. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 70012/016 ACa

COLEACP - Interim Project. Commercial development in exports and in the field of horticulture. Estimated cost 1.860 mECU. Training, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6900/002 AEe

Support for AFRISTAT (economic and statistical control). 0.900 mECU. Improvement in the quality of statistical information. T.A., supplies and equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7106/004 AAc, AFd

CARIBBEAN REGION

University level programme. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 21 mECU. To train a critical mass of Caribbean ACP nationals at masters degree level in development economics, business administration, public administration, agricultural diversification, natural resources, management and architecture, works, educational equipment, T.A., scholarships. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7604 AFb

Caribbean Postal Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 mECU. T.A. and other action necessary for the creation of the Caribbean Postal Union. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7605 ABc

Caribbean Telecommunication Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.500 MECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation on telecommunications within the Cariforum member states. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7605/001 ABc

Education policy and dialogue. Resp. Auth.: Cariforum S.G. 0.450

mECU. T.A. for regional common policies in three education areas: basic education, technical and vocational training, language teaching. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7607 AFa,d

Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 1.500 mECU. Promote cultural identity and foster mutual knowledge of the rich cultural panorama. Restoration of buildings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic fields and management. Financing date January 97. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7610 AHi

Tertiary level programme. Estimated total cost 5 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level education and teacher training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG 6628/001 AFb

Cariforum Regional Environment Programme. Resp. Auth.: SG Cariforum. Estimated total cost 11 mECU. Environmental management action, programme for protected areas and community development, management and expansion of marine and coastal park and protected areas. Terrestrial parks. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7613 AHf

Programming Unit Cariforum Secretariat. 0.725 mECU. Equipment, office supplies, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7
EDF REG 7615 AAc

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THE EUROPEAN UNION

- Austria
- Belgium
- Denmark
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Ireland
- Italy
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Portugal
- Spain
- Sweden
- United Kingdom

- France
- (Territorial collectivities)
- Mayotte
- St Pierre and Miquelon
- (Overseas territories)
- New Caledonia and dependencies
- French Polynesia
- French Southern and Antarctic Territories
- Wallis and Futuna Islands

- Netherlands
- (Overseas countries)
- Netherlands Antilles
- (Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, Saba, St Eustache)
- Aruba

- Denmark
- (Country having special relations with Denmark)
- Greenland

- United Kingdom
- (Overseas countries and territories)
- Anguilla
- British Antarctic Territory
- British Indian Ocean Territory
- British Virgin Islands
- Cayman Islands
- Falkland Islands
- Southern Sandwich Islands and dependencies
- Montserrat
- Pitcairn Island
- St Helena and dependencies
- Turks and Caicos Islands



THE 70 ACP STATES



- Angola
- Antigua & Barbuda
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde
- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Comoros
- Congo
- Côte d'Ivoire
- Djibouti
- Dominica
- Dominican Republic
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Ethiopia
- Fiji
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Grenada
- Guinea
- Guinea Bissau
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Jamaica
- Kenya
- Kiribati
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Papua New Guinea
- Rwanda
- St Kitts and Nevis
- St Lucia
- St Vincent and the Grenadines
- Sao Tome & Principe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Solomon Islands
- Somalia
- Sudan
- Suriname
- Swaziland
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Tonga
- Trinidad & Tobago
- Tuvalu
- Uganda
- Western Samoa
- Vanuatu
- Zaire
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe

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This list does not prejudice
the status of these countries and territories
now or in the future.
The Courier uses maps from a variety
of sources. Their use does not imply
recognition of any particular boundaries
nor prejudice the status of any state
or territory

Street art with a message

This poster board in Mogadishu depicts two young koranic students, with their teacher in the background. The boy on the left is saying: 'While our teacher is busy praying let's open this beautiful water container' (he thinks that it is a container that the teacher uses to carry water to the mosque to wash himself before praying).

The boy on the left replies frantically: 'Don't open it, don't open it, put it down very carefully. My mother picked up an object like this and it exploded in her face.'

In many parts of the world where conflicts are raging - and indeed in places where the fighting has stopped - innocent civilians are at risk from anti-personnel mines and other explosive devices left by the combatants.

Children, who may not understand the dangers, are often the victims.

Thousands are maimed every year. The military 'advantages' to be gained from scattering mines indiscriminately are doubtful, to say the least, and they leave a lasting legacy of suffering.

The issue recently hit the headlines following a visit by Princess Diana to Angola. There, she met

young victims of anti-personnel mines and inspected some known 'danger zones'.

Mine-clearance is a slow, painstaking and dangerous task - and it is also expensive, using up funds which could otherwise be deployed for development purposes. Treating the victims puts an added burden on hard-pressed health systems. Artificial limbs are needed for amputees along with specialised therapy and training.

The international community appears to be moving towards prohibiting the manufacture and use of anti-personnel mines, although critics argue that the process is far too slow.

Sadly, even if such a ban is introduced, it will take decades before the killing fields yield up their last explosive devices. In the meantime, the best that can be done is to warn the public (and especially the children) to avoid suspect objects and keep to well-used tracks in areas known to have been mined.

Simon Horner



Antigua and Barbuda

