

the Courier

Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union

Country Report
Papua New Guinea

Dossier
Democracy
and good governance




Publiss every two months N° 171 SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1998



COUNTRY REPORT

Papua New Guinea

One of the largest countries in the Pacific, Papua New Guinea is richly blessed with natural resources. Its annual *per capita* GDP of \$1228 qualifies it as a middle-income nation. But the social indicators, including infant mortality, life expectancy and unemployment, make troubling reading. People are largely dependent on subsistence agriculture, and there is a population drift towards urban centres. But PNG does not have the industrial base to absorb those looking for jobs. The country has also traditionally relied on primary exports, which are vulnerable to external factors, such as world price fluctuations or bad weather. The challenge is to find an appropriate development strategy that will link with its traditional economy. There are also concerns that the peculiarities of PNG's 'patronage politics' mean more attention is placed on the government's survival than on long-term economic planning.
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DOSSIER

Democracy and good governance

In general, democracy can be viewed in both 'behavioural' terms (the existence of a genuine contest of ideas, real participation and effective civil liberties) and in 'structural' terms (working electoral systems and political institutions operating in a multi-party context, law-making in accordance with agreed rules and an independent judiciary). Increasingly nowadays, 'good governance' is viewed as a keystone in the architecture of effective democracy, the concept has moved to the fore in donor thinking. The aim is to convince decision-makers about the merits of effective management and transparency, and of the need to eliminate corruption. Many ACPs, as well as countries in other parts of the world, have had to come to terms with the failings of existing state structures, and with growing pressures for democratisation. The contributors to our Dossier examine these issues more closely, provide information about practical developments and take a critical look at how the principles of 'democracy' and 'good governance' are interpreted on the ground.
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The Courier Africa - Caribbean - Pacific - European Union

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Hanuabada village,
Papua New Guinea,
with Port Moresby in
the background.

Inside front cover

Village boys in New
Britain, Papua New
Guinea (above).

The Parliament
building in Port
Moresby.
'Good governance' is
seen as a keystone in
the architecture of
effective democracy.

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Political rally in Niger.

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Caricom Secretary General, Edwin Carrington

'Leadership must pass to the younger generation'

The 25th anniversary of Caricom was celebrated in St Lucia during the 19th annual meeting of the regional group's 14 Heads of Government (June 30 - July 4). Since the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed a quarter of a century ago, Caricom has concentrated its integration efforts largely on education, health, social co-operation and economics. There are no tariffs or quotas on the bulk of goods exchanged, although less developed countries of the region have been allowed to maintain duties and quantitative restrictions on some items imported from more developed states until the year 2004. After the St Lucia meeting, Edwin Carrington, Secretary General of the Guyana-based organisation, gave us some insight into the direction he would like to see Caricom take. He spoke of the development of a single market, the common external tariff, laws relating to intellectual property, anti-dumping and competition rules, free trade within the Americas by 2005 and the prospects for a single currency. He also commented on the new partnership with the EU, negotiations for which will begin in September.

Edwin Carrington was Secretary-General of the ACP Group from 1985 to 1990. Further back in his career, he was in charge of trade and economic integration in Caricom. Leaving Brussels in 1990, Mr Carrington served a year and a half as ambassador of his country (Trinidad and Tobago), in Guyana. He was appointed Caricom Secretary-General in August 1992, initially for a five-year term. He has just completed the first year of his second term.

¹ The Caricom member states are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

■ *In your opening remarks to the conference, you said it was time for Caricom to 'shift gear'. What did you mean?*

– The 25th anniversary Conference can be seen from two main perspectives. First as an opportunity to give thanks and pass out the accolades to those who have built the organisation over the last quarter of a century. We must never underestimate the sacrifice involved and the tremendous effort and contribution by a lot of individuals. The private sector and media have also been important players in creating this feeling of 'Caribbeanness'. Having handed out the bouquets, my concern now is where we set our sights, what kind of vision we should have, and in whose hands we should place the responsibility.

It is time to move to agreements where young people are more involved. We have to develop institutions such as a regional youth forum. The ages of the people we recruit and their level of responsibility must be looked at. I was given senior responsibility at an early age - in my thirties. There are some outstanding senior people who continue to make a contribution, but my view is that the central leadership must pass to the younger generation. That is why I am so happy to be in St Lucia, where there is a Prime Minister who is not even fifty. It is the same in Barbados, St Kitts-Nevis and Grenada. There should be a decided policy shift towards younger people. We should try to get people into leadership in their forties, and then you will have twenty or twenty-five years of benefit and return on your investment. One reason why the old hands try to hold on to the reins of power is that we have not developed the institutional arrangements whereby they can continue to have an input. We need to facilitate them in moving off the front row by cre-



ating mechanisms which allow them to remain as substantive contributors.

■ *Not all Caribbean countries are in Caricom. What steps are being taken to bring in non-member states?*

– We expanded in 1995 to include Suriname. Last year, we decided that Haiti should be able to join. All that remains is to work out the terms and conditions. By the time the leaders meet again in March, at the inter-sessional, this matter could be settled. It is not the same for the Dominican Republic although we are hoping to sign a free trade agreement with them in August when all the heads of government will meet there. Cuba, of course, is the big one. They have not yet sought to join Caricom, although they have applied for membership of the ACP group. I happen to know that Cuba sees this as a first step towards full integration into Caricom, and I would not be surprised when its application comes in. I do not see how Cuba could be left out of any genuine Caribbean community. Both the Dominican Republic and Cuba belong. The question is when they take up

their positions, and under what terms and conditions.

■ *Do you think there been enough political reform in Cuba yet for this to happen?*

– We are concerned to ensure that Cuba has the right democratic credentials, human rights record and the rule of law. Looking around the ACP group, there are a large number of countries where questions might be raised. Nigeria, for example, needs to move to meet the conditions of Article 5 of the Lomé Convention. But we do not believe that exclusion is the best way forward. Constructive engagement is much more effective and in Caricom, we have had a joint commission with Cuba for many years. It functions well. Things are beginning to open up there. If you look at the private sector, many countries, including the US, are moving into Cuba. We believe that the country's cultural values in relation to human rights and law will change. What is democracy if you cannot take care of your people providing good health, good food and good education? In some countries this is merely theoretical.

■ *Is a hastening of pace towards a Caricom single market being propelled by your external commitments - to a free trade area with the Americas and future trade liberalisation with the European Union?*

– A single market is necessary, though I am not sure that the pace at which it is moving entirely reflects what is happening outside. But there is clearly a linkage especially as regards the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This is a singular agreement which could place strains on the Caribbean's interrelationships.

It is important that we deepen, and move towards the finalisation of the single market. We are on course, but haven't got as far as I would have hoped. For example, we signed two protocols here on agriculture and industrial policy. We were hoping to sign another on trade policy, but that did not happen. There is a further protocol on disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors which we

haven't yet signed. And there are three others still to come - on competition policy, transport and dispute settlement. So that makes five still in the pipeline. What is more, when you sign a protocol, that's only the first step. You then have to define, ratify and implement it. As regards the two protocols just signed, the next step is to make sure the member states are implementing them. By the end of 1999, most of the structural parts of the single market should be in place, but there is some doubt as to whether they will be functioning effectively.

■ *What will be the role of the Caribbean Court of Justice which Heads of State agreed this week to establish?*

– This has been adopted, in principle, and the issue of its headquarters has been settled. But the arrangements for operationalising and financing it have to be sorted out. It will be another 18 months before we can properly get this going. It is not only an Appeal Court, but will have jurisdiction for all matters affecting the Caricom Treaty. Many of our countries have built-in constitutional limitations in this respect. But we are helped by the fact that Britain wants us out of the Privy Council. They made this very clear when we met in February in the Caribbean-UK forum. The UK has adopted the European Human Rights Convention, which prohibits capital punishment, but the Privy Council has to handle capital cases for a number of our countries. So you have a situation where a court in the UK is being asked to adjudicate on matters to which the British government is totally opposed. There is, in any case, a general trend away from the Privy Council into our own courts, but there is quite

some way to go before we have a Caribbean Court of Justice.

■ *What about a Caribbean single currency?*

– That's even further off. What we are trying to work out now is convertibility - to get the currencies to convert at a fixed rate of exchange. For currencies like the East Caribbean dollar and the Barbadian dollar, you can get exchange rate facilities relatively easily, but with the floating ones like in Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica - and these are big countries - there are difficulties. Who will take on the risk? The size of the discount charged by the banks to cover the risk is usually so large that it discourages you from changing money. You end up converting into US dollars and back out again.

■ *Jamaica's Prime Minister, Mr Patterson, set out Caricom's joint position on a future EU partnership when he said: 'We continue to view the maintenance of ACP unity as a critical element. In that connection, we will resist any move towards regionalisation in the conduct of the negotiations.' Is this position designed to garner political support from other ACP states for the all-important trade protocols, or do you see other benefits of membership of the ACP group?*

– Both. I cannot understand anyone who wants to endanger the solidarity of the ACP. The EU has benefited from having the ACP as a powerful force in the international arena. The Uruguay Round of trade talks kicked off because the EU was able to mobilise ACP voting support to back the position the Americans wanted.

The National Insurance Building in Castries - the venue for the 19th Caricom Summit meeting.



There are many other occasions where the political weight of the ACP has been important to the EU - candidatures for international positions, for example, where ACPs have supported the EU candidate because of the nature of the relationship. The international stature the EU enjoys from being able to influence a group of 71 developing countries is not something to be sneered at. Anything that fragments that, in my view, is against the EU's own interests.



A future in services?

But let's look at our interests. A breakdown into regions reduces our clout and strengthens the hand of the EU *vis-a-vis* each part of the ACP. It is folly to think that any region will be as strong as before, or better off, if they enter individually into critical negotiations with the EU. As for the proposal that there should be an all-embracing framework accord, with sub-agreements in trade, which is a vital area for us, this is nonsense. It will result in a situation where my vital interests are here, yours are there - and the solidarity between us will dissipate. From our point of view, there is no benefit. Indeed, great harm will result. There is a theoretical argument that you will be able to focus more on the problems of a particular region. We say that countries will be exploited. Take drought for example. When we put in drought in Lomé II, we were thinking of Africa. Yet, of late, there have been droughts in the Caribbean. Stabex was added to the Convention, principally for West Africa's coffee and groundnuts. Yet in the Caribbean, we have had access to Stabex for our bananas. Where are the unique African problems that do not touch the Caribbean? So a fragmentation will weaken both the ACP group and the EU's own position internationally.

■ *In this context, what about the EU's decision to seek a free trade deal with South Africa which could eventually be extended to the wider SADC region?*

– Even under the present structure, we recognise that spe-

cial exceptions are sometimes made. The Dominican Republic, for instance, is excluded from the sugar protocol, even though it is a sugar producer. What they have been doing as regards South Africa is to say, 'you are part of the Lomé structure but with respect to the trade regime, we are asking for reciprocity'. You have to understand that those arrangements are being made within a holistic agreement.

■ *Does this mean that you oppose any free trade agreement with the EU in future?*

– It will rob us of any opportunity to develop intra-ACP trade - a cross-fertilisation which is now beginning to happen. Lomé was built, not on the principle of developing trade with Europe, but of developing our own trade. Very unfortunately in my view, we are now stepping backwards.

■ *Prime Minister Mitchell of St Vincent said at the Summit that services were the future in the Caribbean. Does this mean that the old Caribbean industries, like the banana, are on their way out?*

– No, but diversification is certainly part of the exercise. Services are undoubtedly becoming a much more significant component in the region's economy. In Barbados, Jamaica and indeed, many African countries, services are important. Even in a country like Kenya, where there are serious problems of poverty, there is a major tourist industry. The Convention does not currently provide for services, so the new arrange-

ments must respond to this development. We have stressed that we do not want a simple trade and aid agreement. What we want is development cooperation to embrace services development, human resources, science and technology (and its application to industry and economic life). In that sense, we need to ensure that the 21st century agreement is not just a replica of the previous one. At the same time, the accord should not entail a retrograde step in the trade arrangements.

■ *What about the future of the banana industry?*

– We envisage a more high-tech, efficient industry, for which we need long-term investment and technical training. Also, diversification cannot be done on the cheap... or overnight. So we need continuing arrangements. We recognise, however, that there will be changes, resulting both from the impact of the WTO and from the way our own economies are developing.

■ *Many EU citizens value being able to move freely across borders and to reside in other member states. This is seen as one of the big benefits of the single market. How far is Caricom from achieving this?*

– Caricom leaders have already recognised the need to facilitate free movement of university graduates. But we must also look at other categories. So far, there has been no clear decision with regard to people like media workers, artistes and sportspeople. They have not yet settled on the criteria and on what certification will be required. How do you decide who qualifies as a sportsman or a journalist? The fact that this work has not yet been done properly reflects, in part, the weakness of our own institutions and the fact that we lack resources. But we have now strengthened the institutions so that we can carry this kind of work forward. There are already signs of increased mobility within the region. Give us another five years. ■

Interview by D.P.

Meeting with an eye to Lomé's future

In September, talks will begin on the renewal of the partnership between the 15 EU Member States and the 71 ACP countries. Although within Member States and the European institutions, the exact content of the discussions is still being fiercely argued, the debate is making good progress within civil society. There has been a series of conferences, colloquia and seminars at universities, study centres and within NGOs, as the various interest groups have sought to provide their own input to the discussions. *The Courier*, obviously, has not been able to attend all these events, but we recently opted for two gatherings, each of which was important in its own way. The first, staged in Paris, in June, was entitled 'What should be the sphere of cooperation between European and ACP states?' This marked the end of a series of seminars organised by GEMDEV between January and May. The following week, a meeting entitled 'Couleur Lomé' was held in Brussels. The special subject here was ACP civil society, and some 15 rural organisations participated. The European Commission accepted invitations to attend both meetings.

Drawing together the strands

Although European cooperation is often regarded as the 'original' in development cooperation, it does not carry equal weight with international institutions when it comes to defining development models. This was an aspect raised (and deplored) at the Paris meeting by *François Régis Mahieu*, a lecturer at the University of Versailles. He said that developing countries appeared to be divided between two zones of influence – the *round table* countries (dominated by the UNDP) and the *programme committee* countries (dominated by the World Bank). Debate on the key aspects of development, including the definitions of indicators and what kinds of project or programme should be pursued, took place between Washington and New York, without any significant European input. How had this situation come about, he asked. Mr Mahieu's conclusion was that Europe was too involved in its own internal development, and that the Lomé Convention offered a paternalistic, public-service style of cooperation with objectives (environment, good governance, etc.) which are acknowledged but not really discussed properly.

Other speakers, also mainly researchers, spoke in similar vein at the GEMDEV seminar. In addition to considering the Commission's proposals for future cooperation, those present looked in more detail at the underlying principles of the relationship. Although the meeting was designed to draw together the various strands of the earlier conferences on future ACP-EU relations, the topics addressed were many and varied – perhaps too much so.

The proceedings of the meeting are shortly to be published by GEMDEV, but a number of contributors merit a more detailed mention here. It is worth pointing out that participants were asked to express their own, individual views, and not those of the institutions where they worked. *Jean-Baptiste Mattei* (Foreign Minister, France) was therefore able to speak freely when he acknowledged that, outside the limited circle of those with a direct concern, the Lomé Convention did not interest the vast majority of EU citizens. At the very least, it was languishing in a state of neglect. Some Member States, he said, saw support for countries in Eastern Europe as a higher priority while others advocated a more global cooperation system rather than one focused on the ACP states. Another point he raised was that Europe seemed heavily preoccupied with its own future as key deadlines approached. This preoccupation, he said, was reflected in the agenda of the Cardiff Summit which marked the end of the UK Presidency.

There was widespread criticism of the fact that the Lomé Convention had not been mentioned in the *Agenda 2000* document, the Commission's detailed strategy for strengthening and enlarging the Union. Also criticised was the continuing failure to integrate the EDF into the Community budget. These factors, it was suggested, contributed to the marginalisation of EU-ACP cooperation. There was a lot of support for the view that the EU needed a more comprehensive foreign policy component – which should embrace policy towards the ACP states.

One contributor observed that EU foreign policy appeared increasingly to be turning away from the ACP states. Despite this, and the disappointments arising from the first four Conventions, he believed the partnership had a future. Europe's 'political choice' to favour ACP links had been made, not in the interests of the ACPs, but in Europe's own interests, for the sake of its own identity. Another speaker noted that the Lomé Convention was an important part of Europe's credentials. How the system will develop is, of course, another story. There are those who believe the model advocated by the Commission (at least in terms of its commercial aspects) is completely aligned with the Bretton Woods approach. Their view is that Europe no longer has any real choice, and that it is content simply to apply rules imposed from outside.

The ACPs – a market waiting to be exploited

ACP-EU cooperation will nevertheless continue, and it is important to establish on what basis – in other words, to determine the parties' common interests. According to *Andrea Koulimah* (ECDPM, Maastricht), it was 'obviously' in the interests of the ACPs to cooperate with the EU. The EU's motives were less clear-cut. In Ms Koulimah's opinion, there were three reasons for the latter's attachment to the Convention, apart from the historical and geostrategic interests of yesteryear. The most important of these were the EU's political and security interests, or so-called 'negative interdependencies'. The Union is active in helping the ACP states to manage the instability factors that affect them. The second reason was economic. Despite the limited role of most ACPs in the world economy, they represent a market that has still to be won, and others, such as the USA and Japan, have an eye on this market. Finally, there were the development cooperation interests. The EU is keen to pursue a foreign policy in which development policy is a driving force. The desire to have more effective cooperation, geared towards poverty-alleviation, is shared by a number of Member States.

The nature of any future partnership was also much debated. The emphasis here was on political dialogue which some have argued is a virtually meaningless concept. The suggestion was made that the scope for dialogue should be made more comprehensive, and it was pointed out that the Joint Assembly was the only effective forum in this respect. *Jean-Jacques Gabas*, GEMDEV's president, said, however, that even here, the opportunities to examine the European policy mechanisms were all too rare. A number of delegates advocated 'appropriation' of the partnership by those who benefited from it and, in this context, there was widespread regret at the absence of debate within and proposals from the ACP Group itself. One of the most forceful contributions came from *Mamadou Diouf*, a research director from Senegal. He argued that while ACP states should be defining the content of the partnership, they 'continued to demonstrate their inability' to do so. Some speakers were more circumspect, maintaining that the ACPs suffered a serious lack of suitable human resources, while others spoke openly about an absence of 'homogeneity' within the Group. There is no doubt that a document similar to the Commission's Green Paper, but emanating from the ACP side, would be useful. Another significant issue raised was the need to develop a common terminology which everyone understood – which implies some form of training for those involved.

Finally, the progressive evolution of the ACP-EU partnership towards free-trade areas was much debated. *Sheila Page* (ODI, London) offered a clear exposé of the practical problems raised by the Commission's proposal. Not least of these was the absence of free-trade zones in the Pacific or Africa. She added that the existence of a preferential relationship with a group of countries at different stages of development raised problems of inconsistency between regions and preferences. She cited SADC in this context, an organisation which includes a relatively developed country (South Africa – which may well sign a free trade agreement with the EU even before wider talks begin), six developing states and seven least-developed countries (LDCs). Within the SADC area South Africa was in a customs union (SACU) with three of the developing countries and one of the LDCs. This meant that separate intermediate negotiations with the SACU were almost as complicated as talks with the group as a whole. Nor was there any immediate expectation that SADC states would be willing to pool their negotiating authority at a regional level.

A GEMDEV speaker lamented the 'gulf' that existed between the actual decision-making centres and events such as this meeting in Paris where cooperation issues were discussed in depth. Presumably, there is a similar (or even greater) gap when it comes to the debate taking place within ACP civil society? The 'Couleur Lomé' meetings, held in Brussels on 22-26 June, were an attempt to bridge this gap.

Bringing Lomé into the open

A number of rural organisations recently made the trek to Europe's capital from across the ACP world (Mauritania, Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Zimbabwe, etc.). They were in Brussels to voice the concerns of rural people, who make up almost 70% of the ACP population and have most at stake under ACP-EU cooperation. The decision to argue their case in Europe's corridors of power was taken in April, when the groups in question met in Yaoundé at the invitation of SOS Faim, and the 'Collectif de stratégies

alimentaires' (both Belgian NGOs) and SAILD (a Cameroonian NGO). The purpose of this first meeting was to set up an information system and to reflect on how renewal of the Lomé Convention would affect rural societies. The outcome was a series of proposals which the rural organisations passed on to the European Commission and the ACP Secretariat during their stay in Brussels. They also took the opportunity to meet journalists, the general public and agricultural associations from the northern hemisphere.

Given that these organisations came to Belgium to state their case, we felt it was appropriate to give them the opportunity to explain their position to Courier readers. We therefore interviewed Jacques Bonou, Secretary-General of the Benin Producers' Unions Federation (FUPRO). We began by asking him how much rural people in the ACPs knew about the Lomé Convention.

– Almost no-one is aware of the Lomé Convention in the rural areas of the ACP states. In my opinion, the same is true of the towns and cities. At the Yaoundé meeting, we were told about Lomé; that it was reaching the end of its term; and that reforms were going to be made to it. The idea was to 'bring Lomé out into the open'. But for many rural organisations, this was the first time they had even heard of its existence – despite the fact that it is a Convention from which they and their members are supposed to have been benefiting for the last 25 years! We have learned a lot from reading the Green Paper, but this exercise has highlighted how much we don't really understand, and the fact that the Convention has never been particularly transparent. We have asked associations in the North to help us get to grips with the contents of the Green Paper. We felt it was very important to gain a full understanding of what the current Convention contains, and to envisage how the Green Paper seeks to support the interests of our civil society. A number of proposals were then drawn up and we decided we had to come to Brussels to meet the political decision-makers and explain our concerns to them. I am talking here about EU staff and officials from the ACP Secretariat.

■ Why didn't you have this information before?

– I believe it is largely due to the fact that the ACP states have kept the information to themselves for too long. Lomé has become, if you like, a 'state secret', a fact which we deplored at the meeting. This morning, would you believe, Senegal's ambassador was applauding the amount of 'information work' undertaken by his government. What information, exactly, is he talking about? No doubt, it is something that has been handed down sparingly from fine offices in Europe. The truth is that our governments have never sought the involvement of civil society in the Convention. In Benin, we had to set up the FUPRO so that our rural organisations could lobby in an effort to influence national decisions. We also had to find out ourselves about Stabex – what its purpose is and who it is aimed at.

Ultimately, of course, we are talking about the involvement of civil society. This is a point which is highlighted in the Green Paper. But let's be frank. Organisations have to break down the doors of their government just to gain the minimum of information. In such conditions, how can civil society be expected to assume its full role in development? Reality is vastly different from what you hear in fine speeches.

The information shortfall has been due quite simply to an absence of will. The authorities have not wanted to involve civil society, either in the Convention itself, or in the reform of the system. But if you leave

someone for a long time without water, when they finally get the chance to drink, they will drink until their thirst is quenched. That is the reaction we are now seeing among rural organisations. Unfortunately, though, not all associations in Africa have the benefit of the structures we have in Benin or Senegal.

■ *The key thing that emerged from the Yaoundé meeting was that your organisations want to have a say. But up to now, the Lomé Convention has been negotiated at government level. Doesn't that mean that you can't become involved without backing from your governments?*

– Of course we want our voice to be heard, but it is not our intention to usurp the ACP governments' position, or to take their decisions for them. Nor do we want to replace or call into question everything that has been implemented in the past. It is too early for us, for example, to adopt a position on whether Lomé is a good thing or a bad thing overall. We have heard arguments on both sides.

We do not claim that our word is gospel, and are certainly not rejecting the Lomé Convention. However, the people are supposed to be the ultimate beneficiaries of ACP-EU cooperation and 70% of ACP citizens live in rural areas. Civil society, therefore, has a right to be heard. We want to be able to speak out when something is not right, when our people discover that their interests are being disregarded. There are a great many aspects involved and what we have done is make concrete proposals. We hope that the decision-makers, particularly in the ACP states, will take our propositions into account – although there aren't too many precedents for that!

Let me give you an example. In 1995, Benin decided to organise a round table on the rural sector. The idea was to take stock of the situation of the peasant farmers with a view to asking donors to support the country's agriculture. The donors themselves produced a huge document which was supposed to present the circumstances of our daily life – but was prepared without our involvement. Having heard that this event was planned, our federation mobilised itself in record time, obtained a copy of the document and dissected it in minute detail, with the aid of consultants. We staged the 'first forum of rural organisations in Benin' and demanded to be invited to the meeting as active participants. If we weren't invited, we threatened to 'march on Cotonou'. People were amazed that we, as peasant farmers, had been able to get together, decipher the document and react so quickly. We were invited to the meeting, though only as observers and the invitation arrived just a day or two before it took place. But the arrangements were nonetheless altered and we were able to voice our concerns and have our claims heard. It is thanks to that that we have the direct support of donors today.

We would therefore like to be associated with the EU-ACP partnership in the future, both in the context of consultations on National Indicative Programmes and in defining overall policy. Take Stabex, for example. Too often, this mechanism has been used to balance countries' trade rather than serve those who make a living from the products in question. We propose a reexamination of the priorities contained in this instrument, to include food crops. The same goes for regional integration. How can that possibly be achieved without the active participation of the people?

■ *Another of your proposals is to exclude agriculture from the WTO rules.*

– We see a review of the WTO rules and the exclusion of aspects which prevent the development of our farming as of paramount importance. Similarly, we want to take agriculture out of the free-trade areas advocated by the European Commission. We keep hearing about free trade, but Europe still subsidises its agriculture through the Common Agricultural Policy. I must confess that I really don't understand the logic behind this, any more than I do the structural adjustments imposed on us to prevent us doing the same thing! Agriculture in Europe is highly mechanised, but for us, in Africa or the Caribbean, the land is still worked as it always was, with rudimentary tools and age-old techniques. You must allow us a wry smile when people talk about the global market where everyone allegedly has the same opportunity.

It is essential to take account of the problems that are specific to Africa and to other poor countries. Just what is being discussed, exactly? Something much bigger than simple trade, that much is certain. As Mercy Karanja (KNFU chief executive, Kenya) put it so well this morning, dealing with agriculture means dealing with people's lives, with *our* lives. Farming is more than a means of production for us. It is a way of life. It is the structure on which our daily existence is built.

This does not mean that we are against liberalisation. But we want at least to have the means to 'defend' ourselves, and become integrated into global trade.

■ *Apart from the outcome of the Yaoundé meeting, is there much coordination between associations or federations, whether rural or urban, or at national or regional levels?*

– It is true that one swallow does not make a summer, but coordination is not really an issue. We owe it to ourselves to collaborate because the problems are substantially the same for all countries in Africa. Cooperation could be at the level of rural organisations, producers of a particular commodity, or even civil society as a whole. A farmer's interests are the same everywhere. He has only rudimentary tools with which to work the land, while the cost of living goes up and up. The basic problem is the same – poverty. In the Green Paper, I read that poverty alleviation was a major objective. Fine. In Africa, however, we would say that actions speak louder than words. ■ T.G.

Pipeline presents a development poser

by Nde Patrice Ateh*

Once, it would have been regarded as an ideal development project, a straightforward way of generating large amounts of money with which to reduce poverty. Today, it looks a lot more complicated. The proposal to build an oil pipeline between Chad and Cameroon promises to bring jobs, government revenues, private investment, economic growth and regional cooperation to a troubled, impoverished area of the world. The 1100 km pipeline would, of course, be costly to fund – an estimated \$350 million. But the returns could be extensive and though the price of the core commodity – crude oil – may fluctuate, the product is the basis of modern industrial society and will be in demand for the foreseeable future. In addition, several of the world's biggest companies support the scheme. So does the World Bank.

So what is the problem? None, as far as the scheme's supporters are concerned. Let's get on with it, they say, and help end the poverty which plagues the countries at each end of the pipe. Delay, warned a group of businessmen in Douala recently, would have 'enormous and far-reaching' effects on the economy, particularly in the oil and hotel sectors. A few years ago, that would have been the end of the story. The project would have been launched with a confident fanfare. Nowadays, however, getting the go-ahead is beset by difficulties.

Environmentalists such as *Jean Nke Ndihi*, leader of *Défense de l'environnement camerounais* (Defence of the Cameroon Environment) complain that construction of the pipeline will damage forests and farms. In addition, they argue, construction will produce social upheaval, leading inevitably to a variety of ills, including the spread of diseases. Lorry routes, they point out, are often almost identical with epidemiological maps tracking the spread of AIDS. The lives of vulnerable people, such as the Cameroonian pygmies, will be totally disrupted, they say, and many farmers will lose their land, almost certainly without receiving proper compensation. When the pipeline is complete, runs the argument, highly polluting leaks will occur – as was the case in the area inhabited by Nigeria's Ogoni people, which led to a popular backlash and severe repression, culminating in the execution of eight Ogoni leaders including the writer *Ken Sara-Wiwa*.

Mr Nke Ndihi accuses the governments and companies of wanting to 'maximise profit to the detriment of the people'. And just as globalisation fosters the free movement of capital for such schemes, it also brings in foreign critics. A lobby group has been formed in Germany to 'highlight the environmental effects' of the pipeline, a German foundation has sponsored seminars 'to ensure the project does not harm the two countries', and *Wilfried Telkämper*, an MEP, has voiced concerns in a letter to President *Idriss Deby* of Chad. The President is reported to have accused a French environmental organ-

isation of 'a vast campaign to torpedo the project'. World Bank involvement has come under fire from one of its most constant critics, the US-based Environmental Defence Fund. The use of aid money for what is essentially a commercial enterprise, argues Fund spokesman *Korinna Horta*, diverts funds from 'real development' – health, education and other social projects – and is tantamount to 'corporate welfare', a concealed way of supporting Exxon, Shell and Elf, the companies developing the oilfield in southern Chad. Human rights activists are now a factor in development debates, too. *Jean Nke Ndihi* accuses foreign donors of abetting corruption in Cameroon by making loans available for projects such as this.

Disillusionment over job opportunities

To the chagrin of the project's supporters in Cameroon, even some of the local people who initially welcomed the announcement of the pipeline are complaining, as they find that there may be fewer job opportunities than they thought. 'When the project was announced, the youth saw in it hope, joy and employment', says *Lucien Biang*, who recently left school in Kribi, the Cameroonian port at the end of the proposed oil link. Many have become disillusioned already, even before the plans have been finalised. Their hopes were probably unrealistically high, but the immediate cause of their discontent has been the lack of local recruitment by firms expecting to win contracts under the project.

'After several meetings with sub-contracting firms', says *Fritz Ndongje*, a chief in Kribi, 'only one person from a list of 1000 was offered a job by a construction company.' Disappointment turned to anger at one meeting when a job-seeker suggested workers would be drafted in from outside the area. 'Local people will not benefit from the pipeline though they stand to suffer from pollution and spillage', claimed one young man. The mayor of Kribi, *Samuel Minko*, said he hoped to discuss the jobs issue with the construction firms concerned. He was backed up by *Serge Benaé*, MP for Kribi, who commented: 'I believe it's an absolute priority to reserve jobs for natives of the locality'. Much of the rhetoric is intended to put pressure on companies before recruitment really gets under way. Two groups have been created – one to lobby politicians and chiefs for jobs, the other to oppose construction if job promises are not forthcoming.

Anxious to head off trouble, Youth and Sports Minister *Joseph Owona* rushed to Kribi to talk to activists. Other officials weigh in with assurances that every precaution will be taken to conserve the environment and protect the interests of affected people. 'International standards will be respected', promises *Adolphe Moudiki*, managing director of the National Hydrocarbons Corporation. 'All the necessary precautions have been taken', says *Michael Gallet*, general manager of the Cameroon Oil Transportation Company. But the arguments continue, the start-up date is delayed, costs rise. And development gets more complicated. ■

N.P.A.

* Freelance Cameroonian journalist. Text supplied by Gemini News Service, 9 White Lion Street, London N1 9PD.

The Euro, the CFA franc and the popular economy

by Karim Dahou*

In May, EU heads of government ratified the establishment of a single European currency (the *Euro*). Questions are now being asked throughout the franc zone in West and Central Africa. How will the CFA franc be affected by the integration of its reference currency, the French franc, into what will probably be a stronger currency? Will it be possible to maintain the current parity? What will be the attitude of France's European partners, and in particular Germany, to another partnership, linking France to the African economies?

These questions generally reflect a fear that there will be a second devaluation before the effects of the first one have been fully digested. Some people predict such an event and others, including a number in African political and economic circles, even welcome the possibility. Increased competitiveness resulting from devaluation, even if it is very limited and of short duration, will obviously benefit relatively inefficient companies and temporarily relieve the strain on public finances!

But do the interests of certain private operators really coincide with those of society as a whole? And can declarations of principle have much effect on a real phenomenon, the value of a currency, which is mainly determined by structural factors and market assessments? Would it not be better to act now to deal with the structural factors that ultimately determine the value of a currency, rather than speculating about the consequences of an event that is, to all intents and purposes, beyond the reach of economic regulation? There are many problems that need clearing up before there

can be any kind of meaningful and frank discussion between the various parties concerned.

The African countries of the franc area must, in principle, face the fact that their reference currency will appreciate in the short or medium term. This could force them to devalue, a step best avoided since it could do more harm than good in both the social and economic spheres. But, as pointed out, the value of a currency depends not so much on agreements and *ad hoc* declarations as on long-term measures to deal with crucial economic factors. Stimulating local production, in particular by reinforcing the popular economy, should therefore be a priority both of African countries in the CFA area and of Community institutions responsible for controlling EU monetary policy.

Will the reference currency appreciate?

As most of the CFA countries' foreign trade (about 60%) is with the EU, the future demand for Euros among these countries is likely to be greater than their current demand for European currencies, including the French franc. There are two reasons for this view.

First, the new currency will make it possible to trade without exchange risks and charges not just *vis-à-vis* France (the case at present) but with a group of countries representing a market of 290 million people. It is therefore reasonable to expect an increase in trade with France's EU partners and this, in turn, will have repercussions on the demand for currency. The second reason is that the Euro is expected to be a harder currency than the franc. Investments in Euros by operators in the franc area should therefore exceed the investments currently made in various European currencies, leading to an

appreciation of the Euro in relation to the CFA franc.

The question of devaluation will therefore have to be considered. It remains to be decided whether this is a suitable tool and what other policies should be implemented.

Is devaluation a suitable tool?

As already implied, it appears paradoxical to present devaluation as an appropriate policy for meeting Africa's current needs, when it is rejected almost everywhere else. In fact, in most cases, devaluation only occurs when no other course of action is possible. The last significant devaluation was that of the East Asian currencies, and this has weakened the financial positions of many companies. The economies of South-East Asia were not suffering a lack of competitiveness. Indeed, their enterprises dominated many markets. The devaluation actually occurred to prevent the formation of a speculative bubble; in other words, an artificial increase in the value of their assets. The loss of confidence therefore affected financial portfolios which seemed doomed to fall in value. As frequently occurs in such cases, a number of large withdrawals were sufficient, with the aid of rumour, to turn the initial prediction into a self-fulfilling one. The companies of East Asia lost a substantial proportion of their value. The shock suffered by securities markets was rapidly passed on to the foreign exchanges as a result of the interplay of withdrawals and reinvestments in assets denominated in other currencies. The currencies of the region therefore depreciated. This has been of no benefit to these very specialised economies and has resulted in an increase in the cost of imports, in particular raw materials, on which the region (apart from Indonesia), is very dependent.

The crisis facing the Mexican peso two years ago had already shown the extent to which international capital markets control monetary policy decisions. In this case, too, a psychological crisis of confidence had dramatic effects on the Mexican economy, which had been expanding at full speed. The withdrawal of foreign investors resulted in a reduction in the value of compa-

* Enda Tiers Monde, Dakar, Senegal.

nies' equity, and this effect was reinforced by the fact that they were compelled to refinance their cash requirements at extremely high interest rates, resulting in a large number of bankruptcies, higher unemployment and a reduction in the potential growth rate of the Mexican economy over the next decade or so. Devaluation was therefore imposed as the only way of loosening the stranglehold of the markets. Far from being desirable for a country that was having considerable success as an exporter and did not have problems as regards price competitiveness, its main effect was to increase inflation and make painful adjustment necessary.

Developing countries are not alone in experiencing difficulties making their economies, and therefore their currencies, credible. Even France faced this problem during the currency turbulence of 1993, despite the fact that the macro-economic indices relating to the French currency were favourable at the time. There was a foreign trade surplus and inflation was under control. Although the French franc had not been devalued for seven years, it had still not acquired a sufficiently solid reputation, and while the difference between the French and German inflation rates should normally have worked in its favour, the French franc would nonetheless have suffered the fate of the lire or the pound (which both left the European monetary system) had it not been for the support of the Bundesbank.

In these three examples, the alternative between devaluing and maintaining the current parity was presented as a way of measuring the ability of states to resist the fluctuations affecting international capital markets in an open economy. The French example shows that market adjustments or speculation can only be properly resisted with the support of powerful partners. The link between France and Germany is actually unique, as it is based on a common vision and a community of interests. It can, with some justice,



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Cobbler in Abidjan.
Priority should be given to stimulating local production, especially by strengthening the popular economy.

be claimed that this certainly does not apply to the link between France and its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. Although the ties are strong, they are not actually based on a common vision of the future, and their symbolic basis makes it difficult to see them in terms of interests. And participation in EMU will considerably reduce the 'mother' country's room for manoeuvre¹.

It seems highly unlikely that the African countries of the franc area will be able to establish a relationship with the EU that provides them with benefits comparable to those currently granted by France. This means that, notwithstanding the reassurances of the French authorities – which are little more than placebos intended to avoid significant capital outflows – French support may not be sufficient to counter any significant disturbances on the foreign exchange markets in future. Given that often, such disturbances are not solely due to economic factors, it is not enough simply to repeat the mantra that they are impossible because the economic prospects are bright. As we have seen, the risk of devaluation of the CFA franc must be taken seriously by everyone concerned over the coming months and years.

¹ When African central banks become insolvent, external payments are made thanks to the support of the French Treasury (i.e. through public financing). Participation in EMU will mean that France loses control of its monetary policy, and will only have budgetary policy at its disposal to adjust disequilibria in its own economy. Even this instrument is likely to be used sparingly given the powers granted to the European Central Bank to supervise budgetary discipline.

When a currency has depreciated, a situation which is sometimes difficult to avoid, it is necessary to take measures to mitigate the effects rather than simply speculating on when there might be a recurrence.

Should we disengage or remain in the Euro area?

What policy should be adopted to avoid a devaluation or

mitigate its effects? A first solution might be to correct a macro-economic imbalance using a macro-economic tool: the currency. The countries of the CFA area do not currently have monetary independence but it is conceivable that they might adopt a common currency of their own or even individual national currencies. Such a solution would have the advantage of cushioning economic shocks and permitting adjustments without causing hardship (here it is not enough to deal with the political and social concerns – persistent underemployment of significant material and human resources is also incompatible with optimal operation of the economy).

Such a policy would throw up a great many technical problems (coordination of economic policies still in their infancy, creation of an institution for issuing national currencies, the time required to learn how to manage an independent monetary policy etc). And it is not at all certain that this option would be preferable to that of remaining within the Euro area. The retention of the currency link with Europe ought to accelerate the economic integration of France's African partners and thus promote their integration into the wider world economy. It also has the advantage of opening the door to direct European investment, which would be possible without currency conversion charges or exchange risks. Thinking along the same lines, as more than half of the CFA countries' foreign trade is with the EU, this solution would enable them to cover themselves against the possibility of an increase in the cost of their imports. Remaining in

the Euro area would be a significant inducement to continue putting public finances in order and to maintain the fight against inflation.

Finally, the prospect of participating in a huge joint prosperity area, driven by one of the main engines of world growth, is an exciting one. A policy of withdrawal or isolation would seem to be counter to the tides of history.

The popular urban economy

Although monetary tools may facilitate adjustment, they cannot be deployed to prevent it from happening. The key problem facing the CFA countries is that they have small open economies that are extremely sensitive to external shocks. The main effort should therefore be focused on finding ways of limiting their external dependence. They actually already have a significant tool that will help them to achieve this, in the form of the urban and rural 'popular economy'.

This term, which has been taken up by the European Commission, covers a multitude of activities that have flourished in Third World countries. These activities have emerged to fill the gaps created by the modern economy (resulting from imbalanced development where growth, insofar as it occurs, only benefits a few, and where there are no safety nets). The industrial revolution has shown us that a society must produce its own forms of protection. In Europe, all aspects of society underwent modernisation at roughly the same time, resulting crucially in the emergence of trade unions. In developing countries, this protective function is generally provided by traditional links. Family-based or local community activities, involving the production of goods and the provision of services, have therefore expanded in the CFA states. What distinguishes such activities from their more 'modern' counterparts is that they are not solely based on economic considerations, though the latter do have an impact on the way such activities are organised.

Contrary to the main trends of a globalised economy – which is constantly striving to free itself from

external constraints to its development – the aforementioned activities dubbed 'popular' create an economy that remains integrated with society. Instead of controlling all social relationships, the economy is interwoven with very dense social networks, where it must take account of other considerations. Profit has its place, of course, but culture and solidarity are there to limit some of the more devastating consequences. And even if the popular economy appears unlikely to create the surplus needed for rapid and diversified growth, it still enables significant sections of the population to cope more or less successfully with the transformation imposed on them.

For example, small-scale retail trading enables many poor people to obtain what they need at a lower cost. This is partly because the items on sale are locally-produced and cost much less than imports. In addition, they are generally family businesses which provide employment and income for a large number of people. And small-scale craft organisations bring life to communities, which organise the way in which they function, collect their profits and redistribute them in line with social considerations.

But the popular economy is not confined to small-scale activities at a family or local level. Women's savings and loans banks in Senegal are an interesting example of the larger-scale development of an activity initially confined to specific areas. The first bank was created in 1987 in Yoff, a district of Dakar. It involved a few women administering a budget of CFAF 3.8 million (about ECU 6000). Within ten years, the bank's founders had trained hundreds of women managing a budget of CFAF 100m. This figure has now grown to CFAF 400m. These resources circulate throughout Senegal and enable thousands of people to draw on convenient credit facilities that would otherwise be inaccessible to them, as a result of the terms laid down by the commercial banking sector.

This is an example of the way social and economic considerations can be reconciled. In countries with persistent budget deficits, where the middle classes are poorly developed, the paucity of private

and public savings hampers the creation and development of many activities. The popular economy, which also includes a large proportion of what is termed the informal sector, is therefore no longer confined to micro-companies with little influence on national output. According to Senegal's planning ministry, the output of the informal sector accounted for between 50% and 55% of GNP in 1996.

It is clear that those responsible for administering monetary policy cannot ignore such a significant area of activity in the CFA countries. The popular economy is essentially concerned with local production at a cost that is relatively accessible to the disadvantaged sections of the population. It therefore replaces imports to a significant extent. In the long term, its development is accordingly a stabilising factor in foreign trade, which is, in its turn, an important determinant of a currency's value. That is why the authorities responsible for economic policy in the CFA states must do everything they can to stimulate activities that are likely to reduce their dependence on other countries. This is the price that must be paid to avoid the difficulties associated with the fear of devaluation in future. It is also in the interests of the EU, which will be responsible for administering monetary policy. The less dependent the CFA states are on other countries, the greater will be their tendency to develop autonomous production capacity. This, in turn, should make their link with the Euro less costly for the European institutions.

In the long term, the aim should be to create a huge joint prosperity area, of benefit both to Europe and its African partners. This goal is well beyond the reach of monetary policy, which can only be one of the tools available. Let us hope that not too much importance will be attached to it, by either side, to the detriment of real adjustment involving consolidation of the popular economy. ■■■ K.D.

Familiar themes at Caricom summit


For a seasoned observer of the EU, the 19th summit of Caricom leaders, held recently in St Lucia, gave rise to many comparisons as well as featuring some less familiar aspects. An example of the latter was the two-man show staged by local actors, *Kennedy 'Boots' Samuel* and *George 'Fish Alphonse'*. They captivated the opening ceremony with a story-telling at the 'Cosy Corner', on a set representing a typical Caribbean rum shop.

Caricom is the world's second oldest regional bloc after the EU and many of the subjects discussed had the familiar ring of a European summit: the trials and tribulations of creating a Single Market, the issue of a growing membership, forging trade ties with other regional groups, and the ultimate ambition of a single currency! There was also the question of setting up new institutions. In St

Lucia, the focus was on a Caribbean Court of Justice and where it should be sited – Trinidad or Barbados?. Like many EU meetings, there was also a dominating political issue, in this case the situation in Guyana. In the margins of the summit, the governing party led by *Janet Jagan* and *Desmond Hoyte's* opposition, managed to agree on a solution to some of the political problems facing the country.

Also refreshingly unfamiliar to those used to EU meetings was the united front presented on various topics under discussion in Caricom. Instead of the general national briefings that characterise European summits, journalists were treated to issue-based briefings. Of course, it may be that the further one moves towards integration, the more vital sovereign interests are affected – prompting ministers to wave their national flags more vigorously!

An example of the unified approach was the statement by Jamaica's Prime Minister, *P.J. Patterson* who chairs the external relations sub-committee. He spoke for all 14 Caricom members when he referred to the 'beneficial arrangements of the Lomé Convention. 'We will seek to maintain these,' he said, 'in an era where the WTO is an established reality.' Caricom is also looking closely at the likely impact of the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) which is due to be up and running by 2005 – and the special problems this might create for the smaller economies of the Caribbean.



James Mitchell advocates charges for overflying the Caribbean.

The Prime Minister of Barbados, *Owen Arthur*, suggested that the pace of Caricom's own integration should be hastened, particularly in view of trade liberalisation *vis-à-vis* the outside world. Mr Arthur, who chairs the sub-committee on the Single Market, mentioned the particular difficulties of reaching agreement on a common external tariff. Nonetheless, he was optimistic that most of the elements that make up the Caricom Single Market would be in place by 1999.

James Mitchell, Prime Minister of St Vincent and the Grenadines, also emphasised the need for Caricom to consolidate. 'At every stage in dealing with the rest of the world', he stressed, 'be it in the assertion of justice or the creation of the single market... we must have our own house in order. He continued: 'In the past two decades, there has been a flight of capital to safer havens in larger countries. I do not see the OECS competing in manufactured goods in the FTAA. No matter how many attacks are made on child labour in other parts of the world, that reality will not disappear overnight. Nor is there any way for us to compete with workers in countries with severely depreciated currencies.' He saw a 'niche' for the region in sectors such as informatics and financial services.

One novel idea presented by Mr Mitchell was that air space was an untapped economic resource. The Caricom countries lie beneath the air

routes linking the big population centres of North and South America, and St Vincent's Prime Minister believes that they are not adequately compensated by the airlines that 'pass through our territory and profit from it'. He went on: 'We should never make transit prohibitive, particularly because air-delivered tourism is so important to us. But we should share, in reasonable measure, in the good fortune provided by our geographical position. He suggested the establishment of a unitary air-space regime for the Eastern Caribbean – to be extended later to all Caricom countries – which would levy overflight charges. The money raised could be used to acquire air traffic control equipment, help tackle drug trafficking, generate employment and develop infrastructures.


In more general terms, Mr Mitchell said that in the next decade, 'we will keep our existing quality of life, only if we succeed in the second round of restructuring our economies.' This was a theme echoed by his namesake, Prime Minister *Keith Mitchell* of Grenada who argued that it was urgent to give more attention to applied science and technology. He also appealed for 'tangible support from all governments for the development of West Indies cricket.'

The St Lucia gathering welcomed a special guest in the shape of *Nelson Mandela*. The President spoke of forging new links between South Africa and the Caribbean. Possibilities include the establishment of a South African diplomatic representation in the region and a stopover for South African Airways flights en route between Miami and Johannesburg. As a much respected elder statesman, his pledge to support the Caribbean's banana production in international fora was widely welcomed. ■

D.P.

Papua New Guinea

Time to change gear?



Papua New Guinea is a relatively young country, gaining its independence from Australia in September 1975. It is one of the largest nations in the Pacific region (460,000 square km), with a relatively small population of approximately 4.3 million. There is great geographical diversity, with mountainous regions, large tracts of rain forest, volcanoes and low-lying swamps. There is also great linguistic diversity, with about 800 distinct languages spoken. PNG consists of a mainland, which is the eastern half of the island of New Guinea and makes up 85% of the country's land mass, and around 600 other islands. The most important of these are New Britain, New Ireland, Bougainville, and Manus.

PNG has often had a fascination for outsiders, viewed as a mysterious and exotic land, where stories abound of so-called 'lost tribes', untouched by modern life, still living on traditional hunting and gathering. Outside influence came late to PNG, with Germany taking the northern part of the country, and Britain occupying the south-western portion at the end of the

nineteenth century. The western half of the mainland was colonised by the Dutch, and is now a province of Indonesia, called Irian Jaya. After Germany's defeat in the First World War, her former colony was placed under Australian administration, as a League of Nations mandated territory. During World War Two, PNG was the site of fierce fighting between the Allies and the Japanese, the latter having occupied large parts of the territory. In 1945 the administration of both former colonies was unified, under Australia.

PNG would have presented a daunting challenge for any government. 85% of its population lived in rural, often inaccessible areas. There were hundreds of tribal groupings, often mutually antagonistic and unable to communicate with each other. There was a very small educated elite. And as the society was so fractured, there was no indigenous centralised authority and little sense of national identity.

Bearing all these points in mind, one could say that, after just 23 years of independence, PNG has actually done quite well. The country is relatively stable politically and economically. It has a free press, a

functioning legal system and an apparently independent judiciary (the government has lost several cases in recent election petitions brought before the courts). It also enjoys stable international relations. Problems over its one land border with Indonesia have been resolved, while the 10-year conflict on the island of Bougainville, which created tensions with the neighbouring Solomon Islands, has recently ended, following the signature of a peace agreement (see article on page 24). PNG is a member of key regional and international organisations such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

On the other hand, one might well ask why the country has not done better. PNG is extraordinarily rich in resources, exporting gold, copper, oil and timber. Yet most of its people still live on subsistence agriculture, infant mortality is high and life expectancy rates are among the lowest in the Pacific. There is also widespread illiteracy. Large numbers of people do not have access to clean water and sanitation.

There is a drift of people towards the cities and the popula-

tion of the capital, Port Moresby, has climbed to almost half a million. 40% of the city's inhabitants are squatters living on government or customary land, with no sanitation or basic services. A key problem is that there is very little formal employment to absorb the urban migrants. According to *Wayne Goulding*, Chairman of the PNG Chamber of Manufacturers, the formal sector employs just 220,000 people, and he predicts that unemployment will grow at a rate of 30-35,000 *per annum*.

In recent times, the value of the currency, the kina, has fallen sharply, prompting higher inflation, and the government is now in discussion with the IMF and the World Bank. 'PNG could be the jewel in the crown of the Pacific', insists Mr Goulding. 'Our poor economic performance is a direct reflection on government management'. He believes it is a mistake for the economy to be too dependent on exploiting raw materials, which will not last forever, and are vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices and other external events. Last year, the severe drought in PNG caused copper and gold production to fall, because of the low water levels. PNG must move into industries that will provide a future for the country, believes Mr Goulding. He thinks that opportunities to establish new industries are being lost and that there is not enough 'upstreaming' (further processing of primary products). In short, PNG is not making the best use of the resources at its disposal.

Our interviewee cited the example of coffee, one of the country's main agricultural export commodities along with cocoa and copra. Most of the local production is

exported in raw form instead of being processed and packaged in PNG. At the same time, 60% of the raw materials used in the formal sector are imported. 'This,' said Mr Goulding, is 'absurd for a developing country'.

Looking at the national budget, spending is dominated by salaries and debt servicing. As Mr Goulding put it, the state's finances are 'expense-driven, rather than programme-driven'. Recurrent expenditure has grown sharply. One important reason for this is the decline in the value of the kina, which has fallen by about 30% against the dollar since the end of last year. According to one government source, this has resulted in an increase in debt interest payments from K500m to K700m. The government is trying to tackle the budgetary imbalance by imposing a wage freeze and reducing the size of the public sector. Large infrastructure projects such as the Poreporena highway (domestically financed) and the new Jackson International Airport (financed by a Japanese loan) put additional strains on domestic credit. Debt servicing would not be such a problem if the loans had been used to address the structural weaknesses in the economy, according to Mr Goulding. Another factor which is likely to have an impact on the national finances is the phasing out of Australian aid. Since independence, PNG's southern neighbour has provided significant budgetary aid to PNG, and this has no doubt helped in balancing the books. But the amount of such assistance has been steadily diminishing over the years, and it is due to

Most of the population still live on subsistence agriculture.

be phased out altogether by 2000 (to be replaced by project aid).

Several sectors offer prospects for contributing to economic recovery. According to *Mr Anderson*, of the PNG Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, there are 'world class mineral deposits' in the country, and 'mining could go on here for decades, if it's properly managed'. The geology is very attractive for petrol and mineral exploitation, he told us, and there are enormous gas reserves. The key is to find an export market for gas. Because of its small population, demand within the country is limited. There is a project to build a gas pipeline to Queensland, and a Chevron-led consortium is expected to start construction next year. The plans are for this to be operational by the year 2000. In the minerals sector, last year's drought had a serious effect, causing the Ok Tedi and Porgera mines to lose at least half a year of production.

Upgrading infrastructure

As one of the largest and most geographically diverse countries in the Pacific region, Papua New Guinea faces some formidable challenges when it comes to developing infrastructure. Most of the limited road network was built in the 1920s and, until recently, there had been no major new construction. In May this year, however, the Poreporena highway, which was mentioned earlier, was opened. This links the country's principal port with its main airport. Meanwhile, in the north, the Ramu highway was being upgraded with EU funding. This involves 130 kilometres of road between Madang and Morobe province, allowing the latter to be opened up for agricultural development. The groundbreaking ceremony took place during our visit.

Air transport has acquired a particular significance in this vast and rugged nation. Indeed, in some places, it offers a lifeline, providing the only effective link with other parts of the country. Earlier this year, the new Jackson International Airport, serving Port Moresby, was inaugurated and the northern port of Rabaul has also had a new airport (Tokua). This replaced the old one which was destroyed, along with most of the town itself, by a volcanic eruption in September 1994.



The Courier



Pacific Tower of Babel!

In the South Pacific, there are a number of forms of Pidgin. The variant used in PNG is known as Tok Pisin. How did the language develop? The most common accepted view is that it is an amalgam of several tongues, and that it arose from the need for people, who had no language in common, to communicate. PNG, in addition to being a linguistic Tower of Babel in its own right, has been colonised by Germans, British, and Australians. The other half of New Guinea (Irian Jaya) now belongs to Indonesia, and was formerly in Dutch hands. In PNG, Pidgin is based on English, and an English speaker will recognise many words. Nowadays Australian words are also frequent: 'bagarup' means broken, 'no worries' is frequently heard.

While tok pisin is the second (or vehicular) language of most Papua New Guineans, the fact that it has some 800 other languages makes this country one of the most linguistically diverse in the world. Experts say that there are about 5000 languages in daily use across the globe – and PNG is home to one sixth of them! Some of the languages are spoken by only a few hundred people, and are in danger of dying out.

The Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a California-based religious institute, has taken on a remarkable challenge. Its aim is to translate the Bible into every PNG language. Their workers live among the people, learning the local tongues. It can easily be a lifetime commitment. One SIL worker we met said it would take him and his wife about 25 years to complete their particular project – which is to translate the Bible into Tami. This is a language spoken by just 1800 people.

Patronage politics

Since independence, no government has lasted the full five-year term in office, most having been brought down by votes of no-confidence. As a measure to promote political stability, the Constitution was amended in 1991, prohibiting the tabling of a confidence motion during the first 18 months of a government's term. Previously, the threshold was six months (in itself, an unusual constitutional provision). In a situation where governments are unlikely to last the full term, and (after a year and a half) face the constant threat of summary dismissal at the hands of MPs, it is difficult to develop a long-term vision or to see policies through. Incumbent minis-

tries are obliged to focus a great deal of their energy on retaining support. The current government, under Prime Minister *Bill Skate*, is looking particularly vulnerable after a series of scandals and corruption allegations.

During the *Courier's* visit, it was frequently stated to us that 'there is *too much* democracy in PNG'. This singular criticism, which it is difficult to imagine one would hear in many other countries, stems from the frequent use of the confidence motion (no worries here about parliamentary sovereignty being crushed by an overweening executive). Compounding the problem is the weakness of the party system in PNG. In Parliament, 'cross-

ing the floor' is commonplace. 'Once elected, MPs feel free to jump from one party to another', we were told by *Dr John Nonggorr*, a lawyer and professor at the University of Papua New Guinea. Electors tend to cast their vote for members of their tribe or community, who will look after local issues, and they are less likely to have a party allegiance. 'Politicians, in turn, generally feel accountable to their local tribe or community rather than to the country as a whole'. Thus, regional, and not national interests tend to dominate. In some parts of the country, he added, people would only vote if they were paid to do so.

Dr Nonggorr also observed that the government was the major player in business and public life. It owns important enterprises in the country including the public utilities and the airline, and has a significant influence over the private sector.

A plus point is the existence of an independent free press which is often very critical of the government. Indeed, Dr Nonggorr dubbed the press, 'the unofficial opposition party of PNG'.

Mention was made earlier of the linguistic diversity which is closely linked to the traditional tribal structures. In fact, the pidgin word 'wontok', which is the generic local term for 'tribe' or 'clan', derives from 'one-talk' indicating people who speak the same language. Members of wontoks have very strong social obligations towards each other. They are obliged to assist and support other members of the group and to share material goods. The positive aspects of this arrangement are that it provides a cultural and linguistic identity, and a support network in times of difficulty. On the other hand, obligations to one's 'wontok' follow a person into public life. The instinct to 'look after one's own' are not easily set aside and the result is a tendency towards patronage which many Papua New Guineans would not regard as improper.

Another factor contributing to the instability of government is the high turnover of MPs. At each election, large numbers of candidates compete for seats, and it has been estimated that, on average, 50% of incumbents are toppled. This does not make for continuity.

One action taken by the authorities to tackle corruption in public life, and to improve confi-

dence in the political system, has been the tabling of a bill to establish an Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). The measure is supported by the NGO, *Transparency International*. At the time of writing, it was not yet clear what powers were proposed for the ICAC, nor indeed whether the bill would get through Parliament. Some of those we spoke to expressed the view that it was simply another new body which would be expensive to run, but would not come up with solutions. One suggestion was that it would be better to strengthen existing institutions. There are also fears that the ICAC could be misused. It is supposed to be granted retrospective powers (allowing it to investigate allegations of *past* improprieties) but if this is the case, then several of our interlocutors were doubtful whether those in power would support it.

Law and order

Another problem of growing concern, especially in the cities, is law and order. 'There is a direct linkage between lawlessness and disorder, and economic prosperity' according to a report submitted to the government by the Chamber of Manufacturers. Clearly, widespread insecurity adds to business costs, as well as making life difficult for ordinary people.

A lot of media attention has been focused on the issue and there are concerns that the situation may be getting worse. This could be a serious obstacle for foreign investors who want to set up in PNG, both because of the cost entailed in security provision, and the difficulties of attracting personnel. Tourism can also be affected, and while PNG has great potential in this area, the sector remains undeveloped (an average of 42,000 visitors per year). A lot of the crime is carried out by so-called '*rascals*'. Typically, these are gangs of young single men, who come to the cities, and, finding no jobs, turn to crime. A worrying trend is that these gangs are increasingly using weapons. We were told by a senior member of the police that marijuana is cultivated in PNG, and sold for guns. Arms have also been stolen from the army, and at the beginning of this year, the defence force armoury was broken into and eight high-powered weapons were taken. The police have difficulty

getting to grips with the criminals, we were told, because the gangs hide out in the settlements where they will be protected by their *wontoks*. The consequence is that security is ever-present, with guards outside hotels, banks, and even supermarkets and restaurants. Prime Minister Skate considered using the army (Papua New Guinea Defence Force - PNGDF) to help the police quell crime, but this idea was dropped as such a move would have required special legislation. During the *Courier's* visit, a new *Police Force Act* was passed. Supported by both government and opposition, the new legislation should help to improve morale and motivation in the force. It includes provisions on equality of the sexes, and a disci-

Tragedy hits PNG

In July, tragedy struck the northern coastline of mainland PNG, as deadly ten-metre high tidal waves wiped out whole villages. Three giant tidal waves brought devastation to coastal areas. The tsunami were caused by an undersea earthquake measuring 7.0 on the Richter Scale. The epicentre was just off the northern coast. At the time of going to press, official sources reported 1600 dead, and thousands still missing. Rescue workers believe that the death toll could be as high as 5000. 8500 homeless people were being looked after in 'care centres'. International aid has been arriving in the devastated zone and Prime Minister Bill Skate, who visited the area, declared a state of national disaster.

plinary code. It was also reported that the government was planning to buy a helicopter to combat crime in Port Moresby. According to police statistics, 40% of the country's serious crime is committed here

Education

The population of PNG is about 4 million, and barely a quarter of this number has received formal education, according to Dr Non-

ggorr. Large numbers of rural people, living in isolated areas, have no access to schooling. On top of this, we were told that there are significant drop-out rates among those who do have a place, and the quality of teachers is not always up to scratch. This has an effect on the academic level of school-leavers, creating problems when they enter university. Dr Nongorr believes that the whole educational outlook needs to be changed, starting with the primary schools. He argues that there is too much expectation, built into the system, that education should lead to an office job. The result is that vocational education carries a stigma, despite the fact that technical education is exactly what PNG needs. In fact, he thinks that: 'education contributes to unemployment'. It is an opinion that is shared by *Lady Kidu*, one of PNG's two women MPs. 'Education of the masses has been neglected,' she told us, 'and this has led to exclusion.' She believes firmly in 'empowering people' arguing for more emphasis on small-scale self-employment and rural development. 'The country has been propped up by the mineral boom but that was a mistake. Now that world prices have dropped, we are facing problems.' She also thought it was 'short-sighted' to localise primary education (recruiting only local PNG teachers).

Educational opportunities are made available, argued *Peter Baki*, Secretary at the Department of Education. School attendance is not compulsory in PNG, he acknowledged, but 74% of 6 year-olds were attending school. And 70% of those who completed grade 6 (primary school) would find places at higher levels. Of those who graduated from vocational schools, 15% would find formal employment, while 10% would become self-employed.

The ministry official told us that there were proposals to change the vocational system, by getting industry involved in developing the school curriculum. 'Links must be created between industry and education', he stressed. He admitted that there was a 15% drop-out rate at vocational level, because of the lack of job prospects.

According to Wayne Goulding, education is not being geared towards industry. 'We have got to develop a syllabus that is based on our needs, and not on Australian



models', he insisted. 'Industry cannot function without skilled labour and vocational education should provide short-term courses linked to the market.'

On the subject of 'localising' school staff, Mr Baki defended the policy pointing out that expatriate teachers were very expensive. There are still pockets of other nationalities, mainly Australians and New Zealanders, working in secondary and vocational institutions.

The universities, meanwhile, face a funding shortfall, which threatens to undermine quality. *Dr Rodney Hills*, who is the Vice-Chancellor of the University of PNG, said that most of the budget was used to pay salaries, with nothing left for field work, purchase of materials or upkeep of university infrastructure. He told us that this year, term started two months late, because of an electricity shortage. Because of the irregularity of the electricity supply, the university has had to buy four new generators this year.

Women's role

Women make up half of the population of PNG and contribute

substantially to the productive capacity of the economy. Yet there are only two women MPs out of 109. Both of them are independent. 'They were elected on their own merits, with no party influence' says *Ume Wainetti*, general secretary of the PNG National Council of Women. At the last election in June 1997, she informed us, there were 55 women candidates, the majority of them first-timers. 'They did very well, many coming second to the elected candidate, and this was impressive considering that they were up against men who had money, experience, and party backing.' Ms Wainetti is hopeful that female representation will increase in the near future. The new 'Organic Law' on provincial government, enacted in 1997, provides for one nominated woman member in the provincial assembly, two at rural local level, and one at urban local level. 'There are many areas of PNG life where the woman's lot is hard', Mrs Wainetti told us. 'As a general rule, PNG society prefers to educate boys, and 67% of rural women are illiterate'.

What about the 'bride price' which is paid when a couple gets married? Did this indicate 'owner-

ship' of women, we asked Lady Kidu. She was at pains to stress that this was not a fair interpretation. 'The payment is a recognition of the worth of the woman, and that her family is losing a valuable worker. Nowadays, the practice is being commercialised, but traditionally it gave women security, as there was a sort of bargain. If her husband beat her, she had the right to leave him.'

Lady Kidu ended our discussion on an upbeat note. 'Women will be the future of PNG, if they are empowered'. By tradition, she told us, the men did the talking and negotiating – while the women put the decisions into practice. ■ D.M

Ambassador Peter Tsiamalili, Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Positive about the Bougainville peace process

Peter Tsiamalili was a former administrative secretary for Bougainville, where he spent 10 years. He was, in fact, the first 'prisoner of war' when conflict broke out on the island in 1990, but he escaped, and is now writing a book about his experiences. His first diplomatic posting was to New York, attached to the PNG mission to the UN. This was followed by three years as his country's representative in Fiji. He then spent a year as ambassador to the EU in Brussels.



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The current government of Bill Skate has given its full support to finding an enduring peace agreement in Bougainville, and when we spoke to the Ambassador, he began with a positive assessment of developments.

– As you are aware, Bougainville has been a very complex and sensitive problem. The conflict had been going on for almost 10 years, and it took the government a long time to find a resolution – because there is no ready-made solution. But last year, the leaders of the different factions in Bougainville took the initiative, by meeting in New Zealand to discuss how they could address the situation. This was facilitated by the government in Wellington who provided the venue, and assisted with funding. That, in our view, was a breakthrough. For the first time, the leaders of the different factions came together in dialogue. This was followed by a second meeting to which the national government was invited, and which resulted in a ceasefire. At a subsequent meeting, the leaders signed the permanent ceasefire accord, which is called the Lincoln Agreement.

What is important in all this is that the impetus has come

from the people themselves – from the leaders of Bougainville. That is what is helping to hold the process together at the moment. Of course, we have the assistance of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu. Our assessment is that there has been a great breakthrough in what was seen as a most complicated, sensitive and fragile situation.

■ *At the moment there is a transitional administration on Bougainville, with plans to elect a reconciliation government. When are these elections likely to take place?*

– This is part of the Lincoln Agreement. The first step was for a permanent cease-fire to be put in place. This has already happened. The next step was for the leaders to get together and discuss the framework in which the reconciliation government would be facilitated. Under the timetable, the plan is for elections to be held for a Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the end of this year. The objective is to bring all the factions together. At present, the legitimate government is the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), formed by the national government. There is also the Bougainville Interim Government

(BIG), which is the political arm of the rebels, and you've got the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). So there are now three groups on the island – and the only way to bring them together, to have one voice, is to have a reconciliation government.

■ *How much autonomy will this administration have?*


– I assume that it would have the same authority as the other provincial governments in PNG. It will be given a mandate at the appropriate time, to look at future political arrangements.

■ *Some people are hoping that a UN observer mission will be sent to monitor the ceasefire. Will this happen?*

– That proposal has already been endorsed by the Secretary General and the Security Council. They will be establishing an office on Bougainville by the end of this month (June), and will help to monitor the peace process.

■ *Relations between PNG and Solomon Islands were often strained over this conflict in the past. But the two governments worked together in trying to find a peaceful solution.*

– Since the appointment of the new government under Prime Minister Bill Skate, there has been a significant improvement in relations between PNG and Solomon Islands. We are close neighbours and we share the same socio-economic and cultural backgrounds. Some people have relatives on the other side of the border, so there is this traditional link. Because of this, there was always a cordial relationship between the two countries. The problem that arose was due to the spillover effect of the Bougainville crisis. This was a source of some concern to the Solomon Islands government. But things have changed drastically since the new administration was formed in Solomon Islands under Prime Minister Ulufa'alu. There is a lot more interaction now between the two countries. We have concluded a border treaty and are establishing a joint-border administration which will address and regulate the border issues.



The headquarters of the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG).

■ PNG recently granted an aid package to Solomon Islands in this context.

– Yes. As part of this close relationship between the two countries, and to support its near neighbour, the government has undertaken to provide development assistance to the Solomon Islands. The amount will be 10 million kina a year for a four-year period. I should make it clear that this is untied aid. The PNG government is not saying where the money should be spent. It is linked to development, as budget support, and can be used on whatever priority projects they decide on. This is different from most of the assistance we get, which is tied aid.

■ Connected with the Bougainville issue, the Sandline affair continues to haunt Mr Skate, with fresh allegations from his former adviser, Luke Lucas. What is the government's reaction to that?

– I have no comment on that. I will leave that aside completely. It is a political matter.

■ Could I ask you about current relations with another close neighbour, Indonesia? There have been difficulties in the past over the border with Irian Jaya.

– The policy of the government, since independence, has always been that the West Irian problem is an internal matter for Indonesia to deal with, and the current government reaffirms that. During his last visit to Indonesia, Prime Minister Skate made that very clear to President Habibie. We have an agreement with Indonesia which is not only about wider co-operation. There is also a Border Liaison Committee, in which a lot of the frontier matters are dealt with. That has proved quite effective in dealing with issues like the border crossing problem, and

spillover from the activities of the Free West Papua movement*. So we have been able to contain that, through a regular dialogue on border administration. The Border Liaison Committee meets every year, the location alternating between the two countries. PNG is due to host the next meeting very shortly. We have just concluded an accord on a Ministerial Joint Commission. This was signed during the recent visit of Mr Skate to Indonesia. It provides a framework for the two governments to meet regularly for consultation and dialogue. These meetings will not just be at the foreign minister level, but will also involve other government ministers responsible for specific sectors.

■ How are relations with Australia, your other close neighbour?

– Australia was the former administrator, and has always been a major donor. In fact, Australia is PNG's principal donor, although the aid will cease by the year 2000. They have been providing assistance since independence, but over the years, this has gradually been reduced, and we will have to take on these responsibilities shortly. We have had a very close, important relationship with Australia, and will continue to build on that.

■ PNG is a member of the South Pacific Forum. The economic ministers from the 16 Member States will meet next month, amid concern about the deterioration of the region's economies. What is the current state of play?

– I can only make a general statement and say that the South

Pacific is not immune from the global economic developments we are seeing elsewhere. The economies vary from country to country but one thing they have in common is that they are all relatively small – the economic base is limited. The crisis in Asia will have a significant effect on the countries of the region, including PNG. What the ministers are trying to do is see how we can work together, in close association with the various international institutions, to take advantage of some of the developments that are taking place, and to find ways of sustaining our economies.

■ PNG is also member of APEC, the organisation covering the Pacific rim.

– We are privileged to be part of the APEC group, as most of the members are advanced industrially, and have a much broader economic base. PNG has a very small economy that depends on primary products. We are confident we will continue to provide a constructive contribution and fulfil our obligations as part of that group. There is an action plan which sets out the goals of PNG within the APEC group.

■ How would you characterise PNG's relationship with the EU?

– We have benefited a great deal from the support we have received through the Lomé Convention and its various instruments. At present, the EU comes second after Australia, in terms of donor assistance.

■ What do you expect from a new ACP-EU agreement?

– Many people do not seem to appreciate the fact that most ACP countries have benefited greatly from Lomé. The ACP group has always felt that while some of the objectives of the agreement may not have been fully realised, there have been real advantages arising out of this special relationship. Most ACPs believe that the link must continue after the year 2000. As to what form it will take, that will depend on the current dialogue on what kind of successor arrangement is possible. ■

* More commonly known as the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka).

Profile

General information

Area: 461,691 km²

Population: 4.4 million

Population density: 9.5 per km²

Population growth rate: 2.3%

Capital: Port Moresby.

Languages: English, Pidgin (Tok Pisin); Motu is widely spoken in the Papua region. There are also about 700 local languages, making PNG one of the most linguistically diverse countries in the world.

Politics

Head of State: Queen Elizabeth, represented by a Governor-General nominated by the PNG parliament (currently Silas Atopare).

Prime Minister: Bill Skate

Leader of the Opposition: Bernard Narokobi

System of government: Parliamentary democracy, with a unicameral system of government based on the Westminster model. The National Assembly has 109 members elected under the 'first past the post' system.

Political parties: Political parties are loose alliances, with frequent floor crossing, and government has always consisted of coalitions.

The main parties are: Papua New Guinea First (PNGF); People's Progress Party (PPP); Pangu Pati; People's Democratic Movement (PDM).

Economy

Currency: Kina. 1 ECU = K2.32 (July 1998)

GDP: \$4.8 billion (1995)

GDP per capita: \$1228

Natural resources: gold, oil, copper, timber, coffee, palm oil.

Main exports: crude oil, gold, logs, copper, coffee, copra, palm oil.

External debt: K2.09bn (December 1997)

Annual growth rate: estimated 3.5% for 1998

Social indicators

(1900-1995 figures unless otherwise stated)

Life expectancy: 56 years

Infant mortality: 68 per 1000


Adult literacy: 71.2%

Employment rate: The formal sector employs about 220,000 people (about 5.4% of the population)

Enrolment in education (all levels ages 6-23): 38%

Human Development Index rating: 0.525 (128th out of 175)

Sources: Economic Intelligence Unit, UNDP Human Development Report (1997), Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank of PNG (December 1997).



Bernard Narokobi, leader of the opposition

'The people tolerate much more than they should from their leaders'

A striking feature of politics in PNG is the weakness of the party system. Political parties are defined, not so much by ideology, as by their individual leaders, who are expected, above all, to look after the interests of their own constituents. 'Crossing the floor' seemed to reach dizzying proportions during the Courier's recent visit, with MPs appearing to change allegiance overnight. Some parties have members both in government and in opposition! Each successive government since independence has been a coalition. Hasn't this contributed to instability, we asked opposition leader, former justice minister Bernard Narokobi?

– No. There is far too much stability in PNG. In the beginning of the independence period, there was always the possibility of changing the government after a six-month grace period. That six months was constitutionally guaranteed. In fact, there is no other Commonwealth country where that is done. Elsewhere, whenever the ruling party loses its majority, it goes. Either there is a general election or the opposition takes over. We were the only country that was conscious of the problem of instability, so we protected the administration by giving it six months to get its policies together, and put a programme of action in place. We found that that was too short a period, so the Constitution was amended to give it 18 months, during which time the government cannot face a no-confidence motion in Parliament. So stability is not the problem.

I think the real question you have rightly identified is the one of political parties. The party system is not well-developed here. For the most part, Members of Parliament are elected, not on party lines but



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on personality, and on their ability to convince people of their own merits, assisted by extended family networks. We use the 'first past the post' system, and if you look at the election results, you see that most MPs are returned on less than 10% of the total votes cast. Only a very small number get a third or more of the poll. So if there is instability, it is caused by a lack of loyalty and commitment to any ideology or particular policy direction.

■ *It has been said that Papua New Guinea's Parliament has a basic flaw, in that when something goes wrong, the opposition doesn't speak out. Is this criticism justified?*

– That may be true of previous oppositions, but under my leadership, this statement is not correct. We are very vocal. We criticise the government, constructively of course, when it makes bad policies. Let me give you an example. I have just come from a meeting with student leaders from our five universities. They have been trying to arrange a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss the shortfall of eight million kina in funding for their institutions. The Prime Minister has refused to see them, and the police would not give them permission to walk to Parliament to present their petition. So we received their petition and will be

presenting it.

■ *How would you characterise your relations with the government?*

– We have a constructive relationship. The opposition's position is not constitutionally guaranteed. However, since independence, it has been recognised as an essential feature of the government system. The opposition leader does have certain functions defined under the Constitution – notably in appointing the Chief Electoral Commissioner and the Chief Ombudsman. He is also consulted in the appointment of the Chief Justice. So, he has these constitutional obligations, which he exercises in conjunction with the government. Our relationship is evolving, hopefully for the better.

Historically, governments are reluctant to fund the opposition, and we have had our share of disappointment in financing. We do not get as much as we would like. The government can offer better attractions. It provides incentives, perks and privileges to members, promising them ministries, vice-ministries and committee chairmanships. And it offers project funding to attract members from the opposition. But in terms of political relationships, we maintain cordial relations.

■ *The government came to power after an anti-corruption campaign, promising to clean up politics in PNG. What progress has been made on this front, in your view?*

– The only progress the government has made so far is to hide its own corruption. The Independent Commission Against Corruption is little more than a cover-up. The government has also been pushing for another Commission of Enquiry but only to look at corruption by others - not by itself.

You will be aware that a number of serious allegations have

been made against top people in the administration. We have pressed time and again for a Commission of Enquiry, but each time we are thwarted, because only the Prime Minister has the power to set one up.

We have also revealed payments made in cash and in kind to newly-elected Members of Parliament. We tabled documents in the House but the Speaker ruled against us. The documents were excluded from the Hansard records. So though the government talks about transparency, things are still being covered up. Indeed, I would say there is a massive and systematic network of corruption that is very difficult to penetrate.

■ *What about the judiciary? Is it free from political influence?*

– I don't know. I am very concerned that the judiciary could be under threat and that it may become politicised, but so far, I have no evidence of that happening. I am a lawyer myself, and looking at the election cases that have gone through the courts, I believe the decisions were based on law. In fact, the seven seats declared vacant because of irregularities have all been held by government MPs. I fear it is the government that would like people to think these decisions were politically motivated. But as far as I am able to assess from the judgments, they are based strictly

on the law.

■ *Moving on to the economy, what is your view of the government's performance so far?*

– I am not an economist so I can't speak with any authority. But as a layman – and somebody who benefits or suffers from what is happening in the economy – I would say that this is easily the worst government the country has ever had. It simply doesn't understand the economic basics. The Prime Minister does not appreciate that when you have an economic downturn, you have very few choices. One is to reduce public expenditure, while not restricting it so much that there is no money available for essential programmes. That has not happened. In fact the government has increased spending by expanding the ministries. There are something like 28 ministers and 14 vice-ministers. Then you have all the departmental heads and consultancies. So there is no serious attempt to reduce costs.

On the other side, you have to increase revenue. Again, there is absolutely no conception within government about how to do this. They think that simply by slapping on taxes, that will boost the state's income. They introduced a levy on travelling, the so-called 'fly-in-fly-

Schoolchildren in Port Moresby. 'Schools and hospitals are not getting the funding they need'.

out' tax. The fringe benefits of airline workers, who get a 19% discount on their fares if there is a seat available, have also been taxed. But the monies are not actually being collected. The revenue that is supposed to be coming from aviation, forestry products and mining is drying up.

There is no overall planning to achieve growth and economic development. The kina has fallen in value since it was floated and because of the strength of the US dollar, the cost of our loans has gone up. We are having to find at least K300 million a year extra to meet our debt obligations.

At the meeting I have just attended, the students were complaining that there are shortfalls, and that universities could be closed. Schools and hospitals are not getting the funding they need. Yet there is no control on ministerial travel. Just to give a small example, the Deputy Prime Minister has been out of the country for the last two weeks. He came in for a few days and is off again for another week.

It all adds up to totally reckless management of the economy. Let me give you another example. The Rural Development Bank which was set up to assist farmers has effectively been destroyed. Its management has been amalgamated with the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation, which was established as a commercial bank to lend money at the best rates available. The Rural Development Bank was never intended to be a profit-making body. Its task was to lend money to farmers who in turn would create wealth.

Also, there are too many cases of people who have a close connection with the government involved in state enterprises.

■ *There is concern, both within and outside PNG, about the law and order situation. This appears to be deteriorating, and could be an obstacle to economic development.*

– I totally agree. I have lived here most of my life and would say that the last 12 months have been the most destabilising period I have known. We live in real fear and under constant threat. I live among



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Forests cover about 90% of PNG. *'We shouldn't just be talking about logging but also replanting.'*

the people in one of the suburbs here called Gerahu. I've always been there. People have urged me to move out but I have not done so. My car has been stolen twice, and I was forced to build a fence around my property. Even with this, we live in extreme fear.

We live in a country which has a lot of wealth in a situation that has been dubbed 'subsistence affluence'. There is enough for everyone if they are happy to live in a very basic way. But there are not enough modern facilities. While the Constitution talks about equality, participation, decentralisation and devolution of power, in fact, development is heavily concentrated in the cities with most of the emphasis on Port Moresby. People come here looking for jobs which aren't available.

It is a very complex situation, involving a combination of social and cultural issues. It is rather like the period of the industrial revolution in Europe when the manors and villages were broken up and people found it difficult to keep up with the dynamics of change. I ex-

pect this to go on for some time. Even if jobs are available, people are sometimes not psychologically or culturally geared to working for others. All their lives, indeed, for all the 40,000 years we have lived here, the people have been independent. They have worked when they wanted to work and no-one controlled their lives. They had their land and their shelter. Adjusting to a lifestyle based on possessions – be it a watch, a radio or a television – is difficult for many people. Part of the crime problem is a consequence of that upheaval.

I am often asked why a big country like ours, with good resources and a relatively small population, has so many problems. My basic answer is that we are so fragmented and diverse. People live in isolated hamlets and speak many different languages. You can't get a road to everyone. You can't build a decent school for everyone. To modernise would require a massive reorganisation – which would destroy PNG as we know it. You would have to move people from their isolated hills and valleys. In fact, you couldn't do it because people are 'glued' to their land. They want all the good things of the new life, but they also want their land.

I think the big thing here is that the people basically love democracy. They don't tolerate authoritarianism or dictatorship. They are free people, and that is the hope that we have. Secondly, the land is an issue that is a blessing but also a curse. It is a blessing in that people still own their land, and if all else fails they can still find a place called home, and make a living out of it. The third big thing is that Christianity has taken hold in this country. Through the different denominations, good things are happening which we don't always appreciate. I also believe that people here are extremely tolerant – but I think they tolerate more than they should from their leaders.

■ *As opposition leader, what would you do differently from the government?*

– I think we need to reassess and do a simple stocktake of where we are now. By that I mean establishing the basic facts and figures about our birthrate, infant and ma-

ternal mortality, and economic performance – all the key indicators of progress. Second we need to prioritise the basic needs. The next stage is to marshal the resources to address those needs. I would see maintenance and repair work as an ongoing priority, getting roads and hospitals back in operation. There is a big agenda of maintenance that needs to be tackled. Before we start building new institutions, we should reexamine the existing ones, see how they are functioning and identify the weaknesses.

On the economic front, we have to concentrate on the things that we do best, that nature has provided. I have been saying this for many years. That means focusing on agriculture, fishing and forestry. If we can improve these things, tourism will develop naturally. In agriculture I am convinced that we can achieve a turnaround. As long as people continue drinking coffee and tea, as long as they still need rubber, cocoa and coconuts, we should be concentrating on these products. We need to divide the country into production districts and regions, and give them targets to produce certain quantities. When I was agriculture minister, we had maps made on the soil content and rainfall. We tried to develop an understanding of the land and of what can be produced in different regions. As for forestry, we should not be talking just about logging but also replanting. We should also concentrate on fishing. If we can succeed in these areas, we will become the richest country in the region. Malaysia is smaller than PNG in terms of landmass and its soil is nowhere near as good as ours. But it is the biggest producer of palm oil. That is a crop that we should be producing in suitable areas.

I would give a goal to the people, suggesting that each nuclear family should aim to earn a minimum of K2000. That is not so hard to do from a small plot of coffee, two or three pigs, some vegetables and possibly some fishing. We know that prices go up and down but I think it is still achievable, and if we succeed, we can make this country prosperous.

Interview by D.M.

Bougainville – a new spirit and a new deal?

A permanent ceasefire came into effect in Bougainville on April 30 this year, ending almost 10 years of bitter fighting which claimed about 15,000 lives. It was, according to *Anthony J. Regan* of the Australian National University, 'the most serious conflict in the Pacific island states since World War II'.

Bougainville island is part of Bougainville Province, which was formerly known as the North Solomons. The remainder of the province consists of the island of Buka and some smaller atolls. It is situated about 1000 km from PNG's capital, Port Moresby and is geographically closer to the Solomon Islands, whose sea border is just a few kilometres south of Bougainville. The population of the island is estimated to be between 170,000 and 200,000 (no census has been held since 1980 because of the conflict). The people of Bougainville are also ethnically closer to the inhabitants of two neighbouring Solomon Islands, Shortlands and Choiseul, than to the rest of PNG. There are many close family and cultural ties between them. Bougainvillians are known for their blue-black skin which is said to be the darkest in the world. Many Bougainvillians feel themselves to be apart from people on mainland PNG, and some refer to their compatriots as 'redskins'. The distance from the rest of the country is perhaps another reason why Bougainvillians feel different from other Papua New Guineans.

Even before PNG became independent in 1975, there was a secessionist movement in the North Solomons, with attempts being made to break away from the Australian tutelage. This led the Parliament of the newly-independent PNG to amend the Constitution providing for a provincial government system. The system was reformed in the mid 1990s.



The Courier

Panguna Mine

In the 1960s huge deposits of copper were discovered in Panguna, in the mountains of central Bougainville. Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) was established and commercial production started in 1972. From then until its closure in 1989, the mine produced huge quantities of copper, gold and silver. It was among the 10 biggest copper extraction operations in the world during that period, and became the national government's chief source of revenue, accounting for almost 20% of GNP. Most of the profits went to central government, with 33% going to foreign shareholders, 4% to the provincial government in Bougainville, and just 1% to local landowners. But the open cast mining caused huge environmental damage, creating what was thought to be one of the biggest man-made holes in the world – measuring seven square kilometres and with a depth of 500 metres. Tailings resulted in river pollution, and large parts of the rainforest were destroyed, dramatically reducing traditional hunting and gathering activities. What was the most important source of income for central government represented environmental devastation for Bougainvillians.

The conflict has been labelled a separatist rebellion, but it appears that the grievances

No turning back.
Bougainvillians are hoping that they are now
firmly on the road to peace.

thrown up by the Panguna mine acted as a catalyst to revive dormant separatist feelings.

The mine also had an impact on traditional life in other ways. The population of the island grew rapidly from 80,000 in 1970 to 130,000 in 1980. Urbanisation followed, and the mine spawned two completely new towns, Arawa with a population of 15,000 and Panguna with 3500 inhabitants. The majority of these were young male foreign workers, so the communities were not balanced.

The landowners

The situation was exacerbated by tensions over compensation to landowners. In PNG, the traditional tenure system is community ownership of land, meaning that there is a complex pattern of rights to the territory. In this situation, compensation becomes a difficult matter, as there are no clearly identifiable individuals to whom a simple payment of money can be made. Indeed, since the land is inextricably bound up with the traditional way of life, it is not at all clear how traditional societies can be compensated for the despoliation of their tribal territories. In 1987, a new Panguna Landowner's Association (PLA) was set up, and it soon began making

more radical demands. The PLA sought compensation for environmental destruction, and demanded a 20% share of the mining project. The Association attracted enormous support from local people, but BCL and the central government rejected its claims. This led to increasingly militant action, aimed at closing down the mine. The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA), led by *Francis Ona*, was then established. Violence increased and the mine closed in May 1989. A state of emergency was declared in Bougainville, and the defence forces (PNGDF) were called in. As the conflict worsened, calls for independence began again, and the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) was formed by the BRA. An independent 'Republic of Bougainville' was proclaimed in May 1990. The main reason for this was dissatisfaction with the central government, who were seen to be getting the profits from Panguna mine, while the Bougainvillians were left with the environmental and social fallout. The Port Moresby authorities rejected the declaration and imposed an economic and communications blockade on the island.

So-called 'care centres' were set up by the central government, supposedly to 'protect' the inhabitants from the BRA. In these centres, people were provided with food and shelter, though there are claims that not everyone went voluntarily, and there were allegations of mistreatment. As the conflict dragged on, both sides were on the receiving end of accusations that they had violated human rights. In fact, as the struggle evolved, the political situation became more complicated. One aspect of this was the emergence of a 'resistance' movement which supported links with central government.

Attempts to achieve peace

In July 1990, the BRA and the government agreed to meet on board a New Zealand vessel, 'The Endeavour'. The result of this meeting was the 'Endeavour Accord' – which had no lasting effect. In the period that followed, there

were more discussions in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands, which also proved fruitless. However, at a peace conference held at the end of 1994 in Arawa, it was decided to set up a transitional authority, the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG). The idea was that this should provide a focus for the disparate elements prepared to negotiate with the PNG administration. 'The aim of the BTG was to mediate between the national government and the BRA/BIG, to get the two sides to come together', explained *Gerald Sinato*, current Premier of the BTG. 'But it was difficult to establish. The fighting was so intensive that we just couldn't do anything'. The first BTG premier was *Theodore Miriung*, a lawyer and member of the BRA, and when he was appointed, hopes were raised that progress could be achieved. As Mr Sinato told us: 'We knew he would do anything to convince the people, and to convince Francis Ona. During his time, there were a lot of peace talks overseas, but they were not successful. When he was killed, he left everything for us, and I took over as Premier'.

Mr Sinato tried to get the peace process going again, and the result was the Burnham talks of October 1997. 'At that time, the whole nation was in confusion, because of the Sandline affair' (see box). Despite this, he made contact with *John Giheno*, PNG's acting Prime Minister (Sir Julius Chan having stepped down in the wake of Sandline). 'He was also an islander, and tough. We made arrangements for the BRA/BIG and BTG leaders to come together and that was the first step in the peace process'.

Real progress

The talks held in Burnham, New Zealand, led to a breakthrough in the peace process. The Burnham Truce, an agreement which brought together the national government, the BRA/BIG and the BTG, included a ceasefire, and measures for peace and reconciliation. There were several key factors at this time which created a favourable environment for reaching agreement according to

Antony Regan. One was the election of new Prime Ministers in both PNG (*Bill Skate*) and Solomon Islands (*Bartholomew Ulufa'alu*) at about the same time. The two leaders decided to give their full support to the Bougainville peace initiative, and in August 1997, Mr Skate made an official visit to the troubled island. Also, according to *Francis Kabano*, administrative secretary of the BTG, 'a less extreme BRA/BIG grouping emerged under *Joseph Kabui* and *Sam Kauona*, providing a focus for disparate elements – and this group was prepared to negotiate'. Another important factor he mentioned was the emergence of New Zealand as an independent facilitator. Additionally, because of Sandline, public opinion was more sympathetic towards Bougainville. In turn, there was an improvement in relations between Bougainvillians and the PNG defence forces because of the latter's rejection of the mercenaries. Finally, there was enormous war-weariness – the desire of the great majority of the people was for peace.

The Lincoln Agreement

Lincoln University, New Zealand, was the venue for a meeting held in January this year. It was attended by about 200 participants from the PNG central government, the BTG, the BRA/BIG

The Sandline Affair

The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) had been stationed in Bougainville since 1989. At the beginning of 1997, the Prime Minister, Sir Julius Chan, confirmed publicly that a 'security' company, Sandline International, had been commissioned to train the PNG Defence Forces on the island, at a cost of about \$30m. The administration hoped that this would enable the conflict to be brought to a speedy end. However, the commander of the PNGDF, Brigadier General Jerry Singirok, announced on national radio that the defence forces would not cooperate with the 'mercenaries'. Singirok was dismissed, and a new commander was appointed. The defence forces refused to accept the new commander, and there was wide popular support for their stance, leading to riots and demonstrations in Port Moresby. Finally, the Prime Minister was forced to resign, and in July 1997, fresh elections were held, leading to the formation of a new government under Bill Skate.

and representatives of religious and women's groups. BRA leader, Francis Ona, was not present, although he had been invited. The outcome of this gathering was the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security, and Development. This specified that the ceasefire would continue until April 30, when a permanent and irrevocable ceasefire would be put in place. In Arawa, on April 30, a peace treaty was signed between the BRA and the PNG government. The ceremony was witnessed by some 6000 people, including foreign dignitaries and Bougainvillians who had come from all corners of the island to join in the celebrations. The agreement was signed by all parties, including the resistance. While Francis Ona did not himself put his name to the accord, the BRA/BIG was represented by the aforementioned Joseph Kabui (BIG vice-president), and Sam Kauona (the BRA commander).

'The fighting is over but a battle remains to be won', according to Francis Kabano. 'Most people desire peace, but there are still pockets of support for Francis Ona'. But he believes there is a readiness to negotiate – stressing that all levels must be involved in the dialogue, not just officials from the national government and

the BTG. The Melanesian concept of dialogue, he said, is different to that of developed nations: 'In Melanesian society, the bigger the group, the better the result'. The BTG official told us that reconciliation ceremonies had been taking place in many parts of Bougainville, and that this was a very positive sign. 'Reconciliation is part of the traditional concept of justice. When something bad happens that affects the whole clan, reconciliation is a way of getting the people back together'. A symbolic gesture is made by the parties, which can be 'a handshake, the breaking of weapons, an exchange of betel nuts, or the planting of a significant tree', he explained. And while there are still some areas that have not been reconciled, efforts are being made to bring them into the process.

Monitoring the peace

The Lincoln Agreement also specified that a neutral Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) should be put in place to monitor the ceasefire. This is made up of personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Vanuatu and Fiji. They are unarmed, and number about 300, both civilian and military. The PMG has access to all parts of Bougainville, except a 'no-go' zone

around the Panguna mine. The basic principle is that the Bougainvillians have to resolve the issues themselves, while the PMG's task is to facilitate this. It helps by providing transport, sometimes by helicopter, to bring people together. Transport and communication links in Bougainville are almost non-existent because of the conflict, and the PMG is probably the only group effectively able to get around. They talk to people, arrange awareness meetings, and answer questions. They have a newsletter, and have distributed radios to people in remote areas so that they can call them to meetings. The bush grapevine is good, we were told, but it is often a source of rumour and news can get distorted. It is important that people, often in very remote areas, are properly informed of what is going on. The longer this process goes on the better, because stronger links will be forged between people, and their confidence will be built up.

Demilitarisation

Currently, Arawa is the only demilitarised zone on

This market may be well-stocked but a lot of people face difficulties transporting their produce because infrastructures are in such a poor state.





Bougainville. Here, the operation of the 'Call Out' Act, (which allows the central government to 'call out' the defence forces in time of crisis) has been suspended. The Lincoln Agreement specifies that a gradual demilitarisation should take place and we were told that this depended on re-establishing a 'civilian authority' (providing policing and village courts). The question of policing is a delicate one in Bougainville. The BRA/BIG, understandably, is said to prefer a local constabulary, but there has obviously been no police recruitment on the island during the crisis. The Lincoln Agreement says that weapons should be destroyed, but does not specify a deadline. 'Free elections can't take place without the handing-in of arms', says Francis Kabano – and elections are due before the end of the year. At the time of our visit, a group of Bougainvillians had just set off for Cambodia to see what could be learned from their experience.

Bougainville faces a huge task of reconstruction. Infrastructure has either been damaged or has decayed through lack of maintenance. Populations have been displaced – at the time of writing, possibly 50% of the inhabitants were still living in care centres, according to Mr Kabano. People have lost their traditional livelihoods, agricultural trade having ceased during the conflict, partly because of the economic blockade

'There is no future in warfare, the future is for our children.'

and partly because farms and gardens were not maintained. *Patrick Koles*, assistant secretary in the BTG, told us that people wanted 'assistance, not handouts'. He continued: 'They especially need help with transport, so that they can get whatever produce they have to market. The priority is to rehabilitate cash crops, especially cocoa.' Another problem he mentioned was the lack of funds and human capacity to deal with the many demands. It was not the only time during *The Courier's* visit that we were to hear such worries voiced. There is a lot of frustration about not being able to deliver help to people who are in need, and are desperately eager to get back to normality. *Ben Kamda*, a liaison official with BRA/BIG says that people now realise 'there is no future in warfare; the future is for our children'. But he too is concerned about the frustration, particularly among young people. 'In return for laying down their arms, they were promised a peace package, including projects in areas such as fishing and poultry.' He says, however, that nothing has been forthcoming. He himself has no facilities, no office to coordinate programmes, and no transport. On the other hand, according to Francis Kabano 'we have to be mindful of NGO and donor intervention, and avoid a *hand-out*

mentality. We want dignity and self-respect, not a cargo-cult attitude'.

Elections

The agreement specifies that elections should take place to a Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) before the end of the year, when the mandate of the current legal authority, the BTG, will end. 'We must have the poll before the end of December', stressed Gerald Sinato. 'We must avoid a vacuum'. But according to Ben Kamda, it is too soon to hold elections. He believes more talking is needed so that people can learn to 'trust each other, forgive and forget'. The peace is still fragile, he stresses, and much more reconciliation has to take place.

There are practical constraints too that make the deadline look shaky. Decisions have to be made about the kind of representation that will be provided and the constitutional position of the new government. The BTG was established in 1995 as a new provincial authority to replace the suspended North Solomons provincial government. In the same year, the PNG Constitution was changed as part of a more wide-ranging review of provincial administration in the country and a new 'Organic Law' was instituted. The BTG was excluded from this process, however, and thus, as Mr Sinato explained, it still depends on the old Organic Law. According to an expert we consulted, the New Organic Law will probably not have any direct relevance to the new Bougainville government, as the national government has committed itself to providing special arrangements for Bougainville. The details still have to be worked out and it may be that a further constitutional change will be needed. 'I'm trying my best to see what would be a suitable political structure for Bougainville', said Mr Sinato. 'What we are doing is seeking to work out things in the spirit of new Bougainville – a new spirit and a new deal.' ■

D.M.

A wealth of art and artifacts

Mention has already been made in this report of the linguistic and geographical diversity of Papua New Guinea. With some 800 distinct languages spoken, there are about as many different cultures. Each linguistic group, or *wontok*, has its own traditions and sense of identity. Most Papua New Guineans live in villages. Settlements can vary in size from just a few huts to more substantial communities of a couple of thousand people. Traditionally, villagers had little contact with those outside their own area, whom they often regarded with hostility or fear. What contact they did have with the outside world was for trading or warfare. The diversity of the terrain – impenetrable forests, towering mountains and coastal swamps – has no doubt contributed to the isolation of the different groups,

and reinforced their strong sense of cultural identity.

Village life

The main activity has always been subsistence farming. There is evidence to suggest that crop cultivation was taking place in PNG some thousands of years before it began in Europe. Tools were made from stone and wood, and the people fashioned clay pots for storing water and foodstuffs, and bows and arrows for hunting and warfare. Despite the struggle of everyday life, not all the energy of the inhabitants was devoted to day-to-day survival. Indeed, one finds an extraordinary wealth of artistic creation, making PNG one of the world's most important sources of 'primitive' art. One factor contributing to this is almost certainly the technical skill of the people. It is often remarked that Papua New Guineans are 'good with their hands'.

As a source of artistic inspiration, traditional spiritual beliefs are thought to have had a great influence. Nowadays, PNG is classified as a Christian country, but Christianity arrived here only about 100 years ago. Before this, people worshipped supernatural powers, and various objects were created to represent these, or to ward off evil spirits. The *haus tambaran* or spirit house, was built to honour the spirits, and the building itself was often a work of art, with soaring, decorated eaves. It contained carvings which represented the spirits – and only men were permitted to enter. In some areas, mountains (and the power they represented) were objects of reverence and offerings would be made in their honour. The power of the elements also had religious significance: a storm or flood might be construed as a punishment for some human activity. Fertility, harvest and initiation rites were celebrated, with festivals where masks and traditional dress were worn. As with religious art the world over, works to honour and represent the spiritual icons of the culture were created by the most highly skilled and creative people in the community. The advent of Christianity



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
1998
John Siune / PNG.
Pisin Paradise's
givem kaikai long pikinini
oi i istap insait long haus.

The inscription on this painting roughly translates as follows: 'the bird of paradise gives food to her babies who stay inside the nest'.

The artist paints in a similar style to the renowned PNG artist, *Mattias Kauage*, who has just been awarded an OBE for his contribution to the arts in his country.

almost certainly had some effect in undermining traditional beliefs – indeed there are stories of missionaries insisting that traditional artefacts be destroyed. But *haus tam-*

Tapa cloth is made from the bark of a mulberry tree, which is beaten with a special wooden stick until it is paper thin. It is then painted with vivid designs, using natural dyes. Sometimes tapa cloth is worn, but it is also used as a decoration.



Ancestral figures



Working with clay

One of PNG's best known artists, sculptor and potter, *Mary Gole*, was born in the Northern Province. Her mother was also a potter, making clay items for cooking and storing water. Married to an Australian architect, Mary spent many years in Australia where she and her husband worked on housing projects for aboriginal people. While there, she renewed her interest in pottery, as the clay she found in Australia, which is highly suitable for pottery, reminded her of the material used by her mother.

It was on a visit to Sydney that Mary learned about the craft. Visiting potters who worked in the city, she discovered the kiln and pottery wheel for the first time. Back in PNG, she continued to develop her work and her personal style. She uses clay imported from Australia rather than local clay which she finds too fragile. Storage pots figure strongly in her work, and in this, she follows in the family tradition. But her pots are not plain objects. They feature intricate and often symbolic designs. A water storage vessel reveals the face of a woman, symbolising that it is the women who do this work in PNG. The photograph that we have reproduced is of a *sego* storage pot, decorated in a highly stylised form. *Sego* is a kind of flour, and is a staple foodstuff during the dry season.



In Mary Gole's workshop, we were shown a number of small, intricate sculptures. One is of a *lapung papa* (Pidgin for an old man). Another depicts a woman breastfeeding a baby and a piglet at the same time. This underlines the importance of the pig in Papua New Guinea.

In 1995, Mary, along with two compatriots and other artists from the South Pacific, held an exhibition of the region's contemporary art. Her work has been exhibited extensively in PNG and overseas, has featured in a number of art reviews, and is to be found in a number of private collections.


baran are still being built today, and artistic activity is as vibrant as ever.

There are two areas in PNG which are said to be particularly rich in 'primitive' art. One is the series of villages along the Sepik river basin, sometimes called the 'River of Art'. The other is the Papuan Gulf. In both areas, wood carvings, masks, house decorations, carved house posts, pottery and paintings are found in abundance. Many different styles of artwork are involved – and most of the villagers seem to be involved in creative activity. A lot of the art is produced for traditional use, such as ceremonies and decoration. Only recently have villagers begun to employ their skills for commercial purposes.

Yet another form of art is found in the Highlands region. This is one of the most densely populated parts of PNG, containing about a third of the country's population. In the Highlands, physical artefacts such as pottery or

carvings are rare. Instead, creativity finds its expression in body decoration. The two most famous 'shows' or festivals, where this art can be seen in its full glory, are those held annually in the towns of Goroka and Mount Hagen. At these events, *wontoks* vie with each other to create the most dramatic and extravagant costumes. You will see participants in these spectacles disguised as birds and other animals, covered in pale mud to signify death (called *mudmen*), or with their bodies painted in striking colours. Great inventiveness is used in creating head dresses and costumes. Often these are made from feathers, especially from the bird of paradise (the symbol of PNG). Other materials used include animal parts (skins, horns and tails) shells and plants. ■ D.M.

Mask from the Sepik region, which was probably used as decoration in a *haus tambaran*. The features tend towards the abstract; for example eyes appear as slits and the ears are asymmetrical. Sometimes particularly ugly masks were intended to frighten women and children away!





Cooperation in focus

Exploiting the forest wisely

Flying over PNG, one is struck by the density and mass of forests that cover the country. In fact, almost 90% of the country's land mass is covered in trees, and they have always been one of Papua New Guinea's most valuable resources. The majority of the people depend on the land, and make their living from subsistence agriculture. In addition, forestry is an important source of revenue for the government, with timber sales accounting for 14% of total exports in 1996. Logging has been a tempting source of ready cash for local landowners, who have often not been aware of the environmental consequences. The key question is how to preserve this rich natural resource, while at the same time use it as a source of income for the local people. The EU has created a programme to provide an alternative for the local landowners. Operating under the somewhat unwieldy title, the *Island Region Environment and Community Development Programme* (IRECD), the aim is to set up income-earning activities in forestry which are compatible with sustainable development.

The programme started in 1995, when concern was rising among communities in West New Britain (one of PNG's provinces) that their logging resources were steadily diminishing.

The EU was approached through the government, and agreed to set up a community-based eco-forestry project. The goal was to help villagers establish small-scale logging operations themselves, where they would be involved in all aspects, from felling the trees, to selling the timber. A site was found in Kimbe, in West New Britain, on a former oil-palm plantation, and a 'Nature Centre' was built, which is the headquarters of the project. An arrangement was reached with the plantation owner, and the land was made available free of charge for 21 years on condition that a Marine Research Centre would also be built on the site, which would be the location of international conferences on conserva-

tion matters. The Nature Centre, built on a former bamboo swamp, has offices, a classroom (called the '*hauswin*' in Pidgin because, for ventilation purposes it has no walls, thus letting the wind in!), staff housing and workshops. All the buildings are in the traditional style, using a locally produced, long-lasting and termite-resistant timber.

Part of the philosophy of this project is to instil in the local community a sense of responsibility and ownership of their land, and a sense of self-reliance. For this reason, the initiative must come from the landowners, and they must first contact the IRECD. This can be by letter, or orally, but to initiate a project, the IRECD requires a written letter, either in English or Pidgin which must be signed by at least two landowners. This shows that they have a commitment to helping themselves. The letter also helps to avoid problems later on, if disputes arise over land ownership, or the distribution of profits. Many of the requests come from people living in remote rural areas, where it is very difficult to make a living, find a job or even learn a skill. The IRECD does not publicise its services, but relies on word of mouth, because the initiative has to come from the landowner. A more prosaic reason is that 'if you advertise your programme, you will be contacted by thousands of people all wanting a free sawmill'!

The '*Hauswin*' classroom.



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The Courier

A walkabout sawmill in use.

When a letter is received, a project staff member visits the village to explain the programme, and assess whether the community is really in favour of the project. The meeting will be held when all the villagers are likely to be available, such as after church. This meeting helps to iron out problems such as whether there are land disputes or existing agreements with logging companies. It also clarifies what the villagers can expect from the programme, such as training and support, but also what they should *not* expect (machinery, cash). After the meeting, the villagers must send a second letter, and the next step is for the project foresters to carry out formal surveys of the land.

The IRECD encourages the group to register with the government forest authority, as going through this process will establish the ownership of the land, and its boundaries, and will clear up any disputes. It also means that clan members cannot subsequently sign agreements with other timber companies for use of the registered land.

An agreement is then drawn up between the landowners and the IRECD. This covers matters such as which equipment will be loaned, which timber can be cut, and replanting arrangements. IRECD believes in keeping strictly to the conditions of the agreement and will not tolerate lapses, such as cutting trees at a lower height than agreed, or not replanting.

With all of the formalities dealt with, the project can get under way, and training will

begin. A trainer will go and live among the community. This enables him to gain the trust of the people involved, and to understand them better. The group will begin with a chainsaw, and all equipment and fuel will be provided until they make their first sale. After this, they are expected to pay the running costs themselves. Any profits they make must be put into a bank, so that money will be available to buy their own equipment later on. At this point, a 'business development officer' will help the group to set up their enterprise. This involves learning basic bookkeeping, opening a bank account, and marketing the product. The group will have been more used to living on a day-to-day basis, and it is important for them to learn to plan for the future.

'Walkabout' sawmill

After about six months of training, the group will be given a sawmill on a trial basis. Typically, such a sawmill would cost in the region of K20,000, a lot of money for a community group. Borrowing one allows them to be really sure that this is what they want, before making a big financial commitment. The equipment used is the *Lewis* saw, one that is particularly suitable for PNG conditions. It is portable (hence 'walkabout'), safe and easy to maintain.

Once the group has enough money saved to make a deposit on their own sawmill, the 'business development officer' will help them prepare a loan request at the Rural Development

Bank. Once the group gets its own sawmill, they are ready to go out on their own. Foresters from the project will still be available to advise them on forestry management, replanting etc.

IRECD places great emphasis on teaching groups to be aware of safety. For instance, the traditional method used locally to fell a tree is to cut a v-shape in both sides of the tree trunk, called the 'butterfly' cut. The problem with this is that there is no control over where the tree will fall. Also, they teach groups methods that lose as little as possible of the wood in cutting. Timber that is produced is generally of 'certified' quality, and is exported to Australia, the Netherlands and the UK.

As well as the community-based training courses, there are also two-week intensive courses at the nature centre, covering similar areas of maintenance, safety, chainsaw handling, and forest management. Through the courses, groups are made aware of the value of their forest resources, and of the need to protect them.

At the time we visited, there were 32 projects on the go, in various stages of development. Of these, five are independent, the groups having bought their own equipment, and are now economically viable. One of these groups has been particularly successful, setting up an enterprise called '*Gibolo Timbers*', which is located near Sulu village in West New Guinea. The business involves three brothers and their families, and they have bought a tractor and a boat. As well as producing timber, they have started a small transport business, and have diversified into fishing. One offshoot of the project is that local communities are now tending to build their houses from the timber produced through these enterprises, using wood which is high quality and long lasting.

IRECD now has six projects in Bougainville. Surveys were

started there even before the fighting ended, and Bougainvilians used to come to Kimbe for training. With a permanent cease-fire now in place, a trainer will be based on the island, and as soon

as supplies of petrol and oil are available, the projects can get moving.

Gary Thomas, the field coordinator, told us that he expects to have 50 projects up and


running soon, and that they are now looking at opening a new office to deal with this expansion.

D.M.

Papua New Guinea – EU cooperation 1990-2000

Seventh European Development Fund (Lomé Convention)	(ECUm)	Focal sectors
Lomé National Indicative Programme	46.200*	Human Resources Development Rural Environment
Regional funds	1.000	Human Resources Development
Stabex	0.965	Agricultural Programme
	84.600	Palm Oil, Copra, Coffee, Cocoa
Structural adjustment support	20.500	Education
EIB Funds	64.000	Mining, Electricity
Own resources + risk capital		
Other Lomé funds	8.700	Mainly interest rate subsidies
Total Lomé funding	225.965	
Other EC budget lines	5.000	Sustainable forestry, school building
	0.963	
TOTAL	231.928	

* The sum foreseen for the NIP under the 8th EDF (covering the second half of Lomé IV) is ECU 50 million.



A supply of clean water is essential for good health. But large numbers of Papua New Guineans, living in rural areas, do not have access to drinkable water. The EU-funded rural water supply programme (RWSP) aims to remedy this by providing accessible water systems to these rural communities. The EU supplies the materials and covers the cost of training local people, while the communities provide the manpower. Methods used can vary from a simple rainwater storage tank to much more complex infrastructures. If there is a source of water in the area, a system can be set up to pump the water from a shallow well. Another arrangement, where there is a source nearby, is to pipe the water to the community, where it will be stored in a tank. In this photo, storage tanks are being delivered to a rural community.



Democracy and good governance

Looked at objectively, the collapse of communism does not necessarily prove that Western democracy is viable. Nor does the disappearance of marxism in Eastern Europe mean that more subtle tyrannies will not turn up in Latin America, Africa or elsewhere. And what of the belief that democracy, as we know it, will endure? Could this be a pipe dream. We recently witnessed a thousand US businessmen jostling to be first in the queue at the entrance to Tiananmen Square in China on the occasion of the American state visit. Is this the logic of the market prevailing over that of human rights? Small developing countries, by contrast, are likely to have democracy and good governance brandished in front of them as preconditions for any cooperation or aid agreement.

To a certain extent, the takeover of power by both *Mussolini* and *Hitler* can be regarded as events that arose out of the democratic system. As *Tocqueville* wrote, 'We should fear despotism more in democratic times', though this certainly does not

mean that dictatorship is good and democracy bad.

There is a popular belief that democracy can only be established successfully after other successes, particularly in the social and economic spheres. According to this hypothesis, economic criteria and performance levels are, therefore, preconditions. Linked to this is the view that democracy cannot be created out of a vacuum but must be the fruit of a long period of societal development – with institutions evolving over centuries against a constitutional background that guarantees freedom. Indeed, according to the literature, we first have to set up a middle class, which alone can take a couple of hundred years.

Applying a somewhat different interpretation, one might argue that the aristocracy that used to govern in Europe were forced to grant a degree of equality to other citizens, because society had reached such a level of complexity and sophistication.

Certain duties *had* to be attributed to people outside the ruling class. In other words, to avoid tyranny and anarchy, populations have to be divided into interest groups committed to peaceful competition.

History teaches us that it is precisely periods of prosperity that are the most perilous. The Greek historian *Polybius*, in the second century BC, interpreted what we regard as the Golden Age of Athens as the beginning of its decline. For *Thucydides*, the Athenians, enjoying the security and wellbeing established by *Pericles*, were blind to humanity's dark forces which ended in their downfall during the Peloponnesian War.

A variety of democratic theories have been developed over the centuries and definitions of democracy vary from the extremely restricted to the extremely wide-ranging. They encompass institutional change, socio-economic emancipation and the

development of a 'democratic' culture.

Arguably, there are three phases in the process which ends in democracy. The first involves political liberation and the establishment of constitutional guarantees for a whole range of political freedoms. This is followed by a period of increasing political accountability (which can happen even in a single-party system), and the introduction of measures aimed at increasing society's involvement in political decision-making. Finally, there is the introduction of universal suffrage and healthy political competition, with free and fair elections to decide who will assume power.

It is not enough to organise elections

Progress towards democracy is increasingly becoming a condition for the provision of development assistance, and many countries in Africa are experiencing their first taste of pluralist politics. At the same time, structural adjustment is nowadays regarded as a necessary element in the equation. All of this means that new concepts have become important on the African political scene. People are talking more and more about the links between democracy and other aspects – such as the relationship between state and civil society, multi-party systems, good governance, the rule of law, and, of course, development.

Beyond the theoretical approaches, there has been a lot more practical analysis of the specific role played by the state in the development process in Africa over the last 30 years. Conclusions have been drawn about the failure of three decades of independence and, more especially, the failure of models imposed from outside, particularly the French system in the case of French-speaking countries and the British system in the case of English-speaking countries.

Three reasons are put forward to explain such failures. The first is the authoritarian, hierarchical-style colonial legacy. Then there is the fact that the African state had a privileged and protected environment where anything was possible, without sanc-



In principle, democracy obviously requires both the existence of a civil society and respect for human rights. In reality, however, it is often seen merely in terms of the organisation of elections.

tion. Finally, it is suggested that independence movements played a role. The parties that emerged from these organisations began with mass popular appeal, and won a majority of the votes in early elections, not because they presented any particular programme, but because they had fought against colonialism. 40 years on, many of these groups are battling to survive against the odds.

After a decade, democratisation has developed differently in each of the ACP states. Overall, however, it appears that the success or otherwise of the process is gauged on the basis of whether the elections were properly organised and reasonably free and fair, on the creation of multiple political parties and on the establishment of new constitutions. For the most part, democratisation has not resulted in an economic boom.

In principle, democracy obviously requires both the existence of a civil society and respect for human rights. In reality, however, it is often seen merely in terms of the organisation of elections. The degree of success of the system should be measured with reference to how far all the actors in society are actually involved.

Now that politics equals 'show biz', another significant element is how it is all presented in the media. And the media also tends to see it purely in electoral terms, believing that things are not going too badly if there is a good choice of candidates. Never mind that certain candidates or

parties may be more equal than others! Is it realistic to believe that African democracy in the future – the democracy which is on the agenda at innumerable conferences – will be so different? And can we really expect voters, who get nearly all their information from the broadcast media, to cast their ballots in favour of 'poor but honest' candidates rather than those who are 'at the top of the tree'?

Clearly, Africans themselves must decide the course of their own history. Democracy, as it is currently perceived, does not offer an easy solution to the problems of poverty and social inequality. It is true that development based on grass roots (democratic) participation can liberate poor people, helping them to tackle their physical deprivation and to contribute to their education through their own organisation and management. But the political values of contemporary democracy are not clear cut. There is a lot of scope in modern democracy for personal interests to take precedence over respect for representation.

So is the wind of change blowing from the East, and if so, what will the landscape look like after it has passed? In December 1989, when the Berlin Wall was being torn down and the whole world wondered what lay in store for the planet in the absence of communism, political classes in Africa were expressing their indignation, mobilising and asking questions. Today, Africa is seeking to redefine its role – relying heavily on conferences, debates and seminars. Something is going on, but no one knows how to describe it in precise terms. ■

M.F.

The European approach

by Francesca Mosca*

Consideration of human rights, of respect for democratic principles and of the rule of law in Community actions has increased in step with the Economic Community's evolution towards a political entity. In the foreign relations context, the Treaty on European Union marks a decisive stage in this regard and at the same time closely links cooperation policy to the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 130u). The significance of this link has inspired the principles and objectives which are at the very basis of cooperation between the European Community and the ACP states. This is embodied in the Fourth Lomé Convention, which emphasises a participatory style of development, centred on people. The revised version of Lomé IV, signed in Mauritius in November 1995, describes such aspects as an 'essential element' of EC-ACP relations and therefore as subjects of common interest, fundamental elements in the dialogue between both parties and the objective of cooperation.

To promote this approach, provision has been made for an incentive of ECU 80m to be made available under the 8th EDF in addition to the financing of administrative and institutional reforms, in the context of democratisation and the rule of law, implemented by various countries and financed under their National Indicative Programmes (NIP).

At the same time, and as a corollary to this positive approach, the Convention provides an opportunity for appropriate measures to be taken in the event of persistent human rights violations or the interruption of democratic pro-

cesses. It has a 'non-execution' clause for this purpose and also a specific mechanism to encourage consultation between the parties on a joint, equal basis. Before any sanctions are implemented, the preferred route to a solution is dialogue, except in exceptional, urgent cases.

Such provisions represent the success of 10 years of evolution which have seen a large number of ACP states making a start on the democratic process and setting up reforms involving in-depth reorganisation of the ways in which political power devolves and is exercised.

These reforms have been achieved under socio-economic conditions which have often been difficult, given that governments in the countries concerned were also having to implement structural adjustment programmes.

Actions financed

All these processes have been supported by the European Community through the granting of finance from both the EDF and the Communities' general budget. Via this method, projects amounting to ECU 252m were financed between 1992 and 1997 in a number of areas linked not only to the exercise of public authority but also to the strengthening of civil society. In the first category, the greater part of the credits has been used to support processes aimed at more consultation of the people, more than 40% of

the total sum having been used for this purpose.

Community support has been given both to preliminary measures (preparation of an electoral code, electoral rolls, awareness campaigns, civic education) and to basic equipment and flanking measures (technical assistance for National Electoral Commissions or election observers). Over the years, progressively larger amounts have been spent on actions aimed at consolidating democracy and strengthening the rule of law, including reform of the justice system – the cornerstone of any democratic structure, giving the prison system a more human face and supporting newly-elected parliaments.

As for actions aimed at strengthening civil society, the Community has been able to support awareness campaigns and educational projects in the area of human rights and has also helped defend vulnerable groups – through schemes to reintegrate street children into society, legal assistance and psycho-social aid for people affected by conflicts. It has even helped local human rights associations gain a higher profile and mount campaigns. Special mention should be made of support for the independent, pluralist and responsible media. Funding has been provided to improve

A conference in Uganda supported by the Commission.

The creation of an environment in which democratic principles and human rights are respected is a long and laborious task.



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Positive human rights actions funded in the ACP states (1992-97)
Distribution by region and type of action (in ECUm)

	West Africa	Central Africa	East Africa	Horn of Africa	Southern Africa	Africa region	Caribbean	Pacific	Indian Ocean	Multi regional	TOTAL
Elections	14.25	38.96	10.32	0.20	36.22	0.08	3.93		2.08		106.04
Rule of law	2.15	0.02	22.54	1.29	19.34	0.68	1.67	0.24	0.10	0.63	48.66
Good governance	0.19				19.46	0.12	0.84		0.25	0.03	20.89
Promotion of human rights	1.76	0.56	3.08	1.71	3.16	0.52	0.32			2.85	13.95
Vulnerable persons	0.90	0.25	0.17	0.12	19.09	0.71	1.50	0.03	0.01	1.45	24.22
Press freedom	0.84	0.09	0.34	1.50	1.93	4.48	0.20			2.58	11.96
Local associations	0.86			0.07	20.68				0.02	0.50	22.12
Conflict prevention	0.29		1.50	0.03	0.56	0.36		0.12	0.03	1.00	3.89
TOTAL	21.25	39.87	37.94	4.92	120.44	6.96	8.46	0.38	2.48	9.03	251.74
	8.4%	15.8%	15.1%	2.0%	47.8%	2.8%	3.4%	0.2%	1.0%	3.6%	100%

legislation on press freedom and the structure of the media world, to support efforts at making it more professional, and to enhance protection for journalists.

What evolution?

Clearly, durable, balanced development cannot be generated these days in an institutional and political context which is incompetent and lacks respect for certain fundamental principles which should reflect and guarantee, at all political, economic and social levels of a country, recognition of the individual and of the latter's fundamental rights and duties.

This issue was expressly acknowledged in the Fourth Lomé Convention, which was revised in Mauritius in 1995. Nevertheless, implementation of these new parts of the Convention in the context of EU-ACP relations requires that this thinking be translated into reality and, despite the political sensitivity and the difficulty involved in understanding the concepts to which essential aspects might refer, that they become operational.

The Commission's communication to the Council and European Parliament in March 1998 attempted to take up this complex challenge and was aimed at proposing a definition of the concepts, indicating which actions and support they referred to and proposing a way of approaching such issues which would demonstrate respect for the individual cultural, social and political characteristics of the ACP states, while still

attempting to accomplish the Convention's objectives.

The creation of an environment in which democratic principles and human rights are respected is a long and laborious task and the approach that the Community is proposing is first and foremost a constructive one based on four fundamental principles: ownership, involvement, dialogue and differentiation. It revolves around a number of key aspects:

- essential elements relate exclusively to certain underlying universal principles which are interpreted uniquely and individualistically in each country, depending on a particular country's culture and history;

- there is no model and no quantifiable threshold and objective which could be set up as a benchmark and/or evaluation criterion;

- political and institutional issues and their necessary evaluation must be at the centre of an ongoing and progressive dialogue between countries and between citizens of countries. This dialogue is an essential instrument in establishing the objectives to be pursued, stages in the process, deadlines, obstacles and the priority actions needed to achieve them;

- these priority actions are drawn up by each country and depend on prevailing political, economic and socio-cultural conditions in that country. They must nevertheless respect universally acknowledged democratic principles and, if they are to be progressive, in order to

allow those involved to adapt, they must also be ongoing.

However, certain areas are mentioned in the communication as deserving particular emphasis. These include support for institutional and administrative reforms (constitutional, legal and legislative), education in civics and human rights to create a culture of democracy, support for a free and independent media (essential if a pluralistic and transparent political system is to be set up), and strengthening the role of women in public life. Finally, the campaign against corruption receives special attention, given its impact on sustainable, equitable development.

These considerable challenges will, of necessity, require major adjustments, particularly in the approach to cooperation issues which can no longer gloss over topics relating to the institutional and political environment underlying them.

Together, the EU and the ACP states are embarking on a new phase in their cooperative relationship. This is based on the recognition of certain universal values, which must be shared, and of respect for the freedom that everyone has – by virtue of these values – to give individual and collective expression to them in an original and distinct way. This includes acknowledging initiative and creativity in women, men and children, without which, ultimately, it is impossible to envisage any long-term development project. ■ F.M.

The role of parliaments in Africa

by Enie Wesseldijk*

The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the transition to democracy have left their mark, not just in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in Africa. To Western eyes, it has seemed as if countries there have been progressing at a snail's pace – three steps forward, two steps back. Some of the problems in Africa have obviously been comparable to those facing Central and Eastern Europe. The key issue has been to give substance to the magical concept that is 'democracy'.

When the political transformation began, Western nations were eager to offer assistance. They were spurred on by the euphoria of entire populations aspiring both to democracy and (perhaps more importantly) to the material gains they expected would automatically flow when a country declared itself 'democratic'. Through a plethora of organisations, the countries of the West began drawing up strategies aimed at helping various groups in the states concerned. It took them some time to realise that the task was much more complex than it had initially seemed, and that it was not enough merely to promote the establishment of democratic structures. It was at this point that Africa's circumstances were found to be somewhat different from those of Europe's former totalitarian states.

In the first place, the general level of education in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 was similar to that in Western Europe and North America, though the content of that education was different. In Africa, however, the lack of even elementary education across large sections of the population was an obstacle to setting up genuinely democratic systems of government.

Democracy is based on everyone who fulfils the criteria laid down in a country's electoral law having the right to a free vote. Literacy is not one of these criteria, but if one cannot read, it is much more difficult to vote with full knowledge of the facts and to do so freely, without any kind of constraint. Since most African countries opted, in the early 1990s, for a transition to democracy (involving the staging of free and fair elections) it was essential to mount campaigns to educate citizens and prepare them for their future role as members of the electorate. Significant progress was achieved in a number of countries thanks to massive popular education programmes implemented by local NGOs with the support of certain international schemes, notably under UN auspices.

Promoting awareness of what was at stake, together with higher levels of literacy, has enabled an increasingly large proportion of the population to acquire or begin acquiring the intellectual 'baggage' needed to be able to act as informed citizens. This is not to say that the situation is ideal yet, but there has been tangible progress in a number of places. It is to be hoped that, by widening the base, progress will be consolidated and even accelerated.

In this context, it is worth underlining that modern democracy is *representative* in nature: in other words, citizens exercise their right to take political decisions through representatives elected in free and fair ballots who are accountable to the voters. In addition, democracy requires an active commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Equally, transparency and openness are essential factors in the equation and, in this sphere, the media have an active role to play.

In African countries, power is generally concentrated in the hands of heads of state who base their legitimacy on the fact that they have been elected, either by universal suffrage or by parliament. They are usually surrounded by a relatively large 'clan', often made up of members



A session of the South African parliament.

of the president's own ethnic, religious or regional group. To maintain a semblance of democracy, the leaders allowed elections by universal suffrage to be organised for other bodies such as national parliaments, regional councils or local authorities.

What they have not accepted, or seem unwilling to accept at present, is the function that such bodies must have in monitoring the actions of the presidency, and of others elected to government. Similarly, they have failed to understand that the *government* of a democratic country is formed after legislative elections and that, in keeping with the principles of the rule of law, the roles of head of government and head of state should not be carried out by the same person, unless the independence of other state institutions is properly guaranteed.

Parliament and good governance

There is another fundamental difference between the African notion of good governance and the way the concept is interpreted by advocates of the 'modern' state. Under the former, a good leader cannot but govern well. In the case of the latter, good governance is seen to depend crucially on good institutions – in other words, 'impersonal' mechanisms that enable rules to be drawn up which meet the needs of the greatest number, with the guarantee that unbiased administrative bodies will apply such rules to all, without distinction. Another principle of democracy is that all institutions should be subject to monitoring by external authorities.

Parliament is one such authority, which has a particular

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responsibility for scrutinising government actions. The question that arises here is whether parliaments in sub-Saharan Africa are actually able to perform their legislative and monitoring functions while, at the same time, fulfilling their representational role. Once elected, parliamentarians in the governing majority tend to worry more about maintaining good relations with the president's office than looking after those who elected them.

The notion that an elected representative should be in the service of, and be ready to defend, those who sent him or her to parliament is not yet widely accepted, either among elected members or among the voters. This reflects the fact that, in traditional African societies, only one person – the chief – was the focal point of authority. He had the power to make the rules with which society had to comply, to implement them and to decide on the way they should be executed. Given that the chief was responsible for ensuring the proper functioning of the whole system, it was inconceivable that anyone should oppose him.

It is difficult to ask recently elected members who have grown up under this traditional system to change overnight into representatives who have absorbed all aspects of the rule of law and act accordingly. If we are to be honest, we must acknowledge that, even in our Western democracies, not all elected representatives achieve this, and we are all aware of the potentially disastrous consequences.

For this reason, it would seem logical for multi-party elections to be the end point of a democratisation process, rather than the point of departure. One consequence of the colonial era, and of the period of decolonisation, was that people simply did what the authorities asked of them, without asking the why or wherefore. If they were urged to go out and vote, they did just that – usually casting their ballots for those who represented the very same authorities. In this way, they sustained the system. Those they voted into office were members of an elite that had held power since the end of colonial times, and it was precisely this elite that most opposed any move towards establishing the rule of law in the modern sense.

An 'African democracy' worthy of the name could be set

up if one were to take advantage of traditional democratic elements on the continent and adapt democratic procedures as understood in the west to the special circumstances of the countries in question. This means, among other things, that African parliaments must be able to create the conditions enabling people to become aware of their role as electors and of the influence they can have on the decision-making process. Parliaments could facilitate this by adopting relevant laws, by ensuring that the legislation is actually implemented and, most importantly, by demonstrating that they are fulfilling their role in monitoring the various executive powers.

It is here that a genuine opportunity exists to provide useful help and to facilitate the correct functioning of parliamentary systems. Elected representatives in Africa need to be informed about their role as parliamentarians with an emphasis on the independence of the parliamentary institution *vis-à-vis* the executive. The role of political parties in parliament, including opposition groups, needs to be examined. It must be made clear that, in a parliamentary democracy, today's majority is tomorrow's opposition and, for this reason, the majority would do well to respect the opinions of the minority.

Parliamentarians in Central and Eastern Europe are undoubtedly well qualified to discuss such issues with their African counterparts, given that they come from countries where the transition process is still ongoing. They should be able to refer to specific problems they have encountered and the solutions they have, or have not been able to find. They can describe their own experiences of societies where much of what appears normal and established to those in the west is still being demanded by voters and has still to be set up and consolidated.

The functioning of parliament and its members will also become more efficient if a well trained and well-informed, neutral parliamentary administration supports the work done by elected representatives. This should include specialist staff to help with writing parliamentary reports and drawing up legislative amendments, and services such as a library and a parliamentary information office. These are all

necessary to help parliamentarians in their work.

The staff involved must have sufficient status to be independent of the powers-that-be and they must receive a decent wage if they are to be protected against inevitable attempts at corruption by pressure groups. Parliamentarians also need infrastructures: offices and computer systems that will facilitate the task they have taken. They need to be able to communicate with their electorate. Voters, in turn, must have the opportunity to question them on a regular basis, to ensure their interests are indeed being taken into account.

All this requires significant financial resources, but it is essential if one of the crucial institutions of the rule of law is to be effective. It is all the more important to achieve the right conditions for attracting secure foreign investment – something that entails having a parliament which functions properly. An influx of funds will help governments invest for the benefit of the population, improving education and health provision. Governments will also be able to establish genuine public services and administrative institutions that ensure the rules drawn up by the elected representatives are applied to everyone – thereby guaranteeing the equality of all citizens before the law.

It may be that these last few sentences read somewhat like a fairy tale, in which each stage is presented as an inevitable consequence of the previous one. The reasoning may indeed appear simplistic, taking no account of the time needed to complete each step. But the fact is that it *must* be achieved as rapidly as possible, if citizens are to acquire a positive image of government action, and go on to become involved in improving the way the state works.

Western democracies also still have a long way to go in terms of establishing the ideal democracy, and there must be real doubts as to whether certain countries can ever achieve this goal. But we have to hope that people at all levels of society – in Africa, the West and elsewhere – will be motivated by the recognition that they could always do better, and will continue working to improve the system for the common good. ■ E.W.

Voting systems

There are no absolutes when it comes to defining methods of political organisation. It may be convenient to portray the clash of ideologies as a kind of boxing match with 'democracy' (the good guy?) in one corner and totalitarianism (the bad guy?) in the other, but the reality is a lot more complicated. Totalitarian systems come in various guises and are often fiercely pitted against each other, as we have seen this century in the great conflicts between communism and fascism. Democracy too is a highly flexible concept and deciding whether a particular country fits the bill is essentially a subjective process. It all depends on the criteria one chooses.

The main focus of this article will be on electoral systems, which come in many different forms. But before examining this subject, it should be stressed that the *system* is not everything. While, the nuts and bolts of the ballot are important, so too is the existence of a democratic 'atmosphere'. In short, there is little point having electoral arrangements that appear highly representative on paper if campaigners cannot go on to the streets for fear of being physically attacked by opponents. There is a somewhat overworked sentence which encapsulates the principle – *'I disagree with what you are saying, but defend your right to say it'*. There are, of course, certain limits to this right of free speech. Statements that incite criminal activity are generally unacceptable, and attempts to stir up racial hatred or religious intolerance may fall under this heading in those countries that have enacted the relevant legislation.

A democratic atmosphere cannot be created overnight. It takes time to become entrenched which means that new democracies must devote special efforts to civic education. And even where it ap-


parently has strong foundations, complacency or disillusionment can pose a threat. In most established democracies, party membership and voter turnout are falling. In many, support is growing for parties whose commitment to genuine pluralism is suspect. These are worrying trends which suggest that democracy needs to be nurtured constantly.

To use another overworked phrase, there has to be a relatively level playing field for the conduct of political debate. For voters to have an informed choice, political candidates must be able to get their message across. If those who control the media (whether the state or private interests) have their own agenda, and refuse to trans-

mit certain messages, the democratic atmosphere can become polluted. The trouble is that this may be an insidious process, the electorate being left with an impression that nothing is wrong. Some countries have strict rules requiring political balance in the media (notably in broadcasting). They may also regulate the ways money can be raised for campaigns and set limits on the amount that can be spent during an election.

While the *system* may not be everything, it is clearly a major part of the democracy equation. It is, after all, possible to have a reasonably pluralist atmosphere – in the sense that there is free speech and active debate – even under an unelected ruler. There may not be many examples of benign dictatorship in history but it does sometimes happen.

Community activists in Durban, South Africa.
Political workers must be free to put their message across.



VIVANT UNIVERS

Voting and standing in elections

A number of basic criteria are widely recognised as essential for a system to be awarded the 'democratic' cachet. First and foremost, there must be *universal* adult suffrage. The definition of 'universal' may vary slightly from one place to another. For instance, the age threshold may differ (18 years is common but it can be 21 or higher). Certain categories of person may be excluded (such as people in prison). And there are usually nationality and/or residence requirements. Many countries do not give the franchise to foreign nationals, even if they are taxpayers and long-term residents. The basic principle, however, is that the great majority of the adult population must be entitled to vote. Nowadays, few would be prepared to characterise as democratic a system which excluded women.

Equally important is the *right to stand* as a candidate. It would be strange if all could vote but only members of a select few could put their names forward for positions of political power. In fact, many places have higher age limits for candidates (in the US, Senators must be at least 35 years old and the Presidency is reserved for people above 40). Again, there are usually nationality/residence criteria but any discriminatory provisions preventing the participation of specific social, religious or ethnic groups would fatally undermine a country's claim to the democratic mantle.

Although it is desirable to give as many people as possible the opportunity to stand in elections, most systems place certain hurdles in the way of potential candidates, designed to prevent a 'free-for-all'. One of the most common is the requirement to obtain the signatures of a set number of voters supporting the nomination. There may also be an obligation to lodge a financial deposit, which is reimbursed if the candidate (or party list) attracts more than a certain percentage of the total vote. So long as the various thresholds involved are not too high, such rules are not generally viewed as anti-democratic.

More problematic is the situation where party registration is

obligatory. This can have the effect of excluding individual candidates (so-called 'independents') but also groups whose views may not be palatable to those currently in power. It all depends on the registration criteria and how they are applied. Straightforward administrative formalities pose no problem if they are properly implemented. Unfortunately, there are cases where parties (almost invariably anti-government) get bogged down in bureaucracy and fail to obtain registration. It begins to look suspicious when pro-government groupings sail through the process without difficulty. *In extremis*, the administration may decide to set up its own parties (perhaps as few as two) and exclude all others. This is simply an attempt to give a pluralist veneer to a system which is fundamentally undemocratic.

What about the opposite situation, where individuals are allowed to participate freely but parties are banned? This poses a problem because it seems to conflict with the 'right of association' which many see as a basic human right. Yet the arguments in favour of 'non-party' systems cannot be dismissed entirely out of hand. A lot of countries have to live with pronounced social, ethnic and religious cleavages. This is particularly true of states with 'artificial' boundaries set in the colonial period. The western party-based model, it is suggested, may actually hamper the growth of real democracy by entrenching division and undermining national unity – so the view is taken that it is better to keep parties out of the equation. The crucial point here is whether the approach is intended to be permanent or merely temporary – until a democratic atmosphere has been created. A long-term policy of banning political parties, some would say, is simply not practicable in a society which allows *individual* political participation and free speech. Human beings are social animals and like-minded people will inevitably speak to each other and work together. This is how parties come into being. The only way of keeping people associating with each other over a longer period is by progressively removing the basic participatory rights which the system purports to guarantee. Another

aspect is that parties are the most efficient vehicle for changing governments in elections. It is very difficult for individuals to do this if they are prevented from organising together. Those in power in a non-party system are therefore less likely to be toppled by constitutional means. Having said this, a temporary 'freeze' on party activity, backed by a population which has a genuine choice of individual candidates in an election, may give a breathing space in the aftermath of a national trauma (as is the case in Uganda).

Organisation of the poll

To be properly democratic, elections must be conducted in accordance with certain organisational precepts. The most important of these is that the ballot should be secret. This enables voters to make a free choice without intimidation or bribery.

More generally, there should be a fair and objective system for administering the process from the time the election is announced up to the declaration of the result. It is important to have a reliable and up-to-date electoral register and proper procedures to record who has cast their ballots (preventing multiple voting). In some countries, voter impersonation is discouraged by stamping a harmless but indelible dye on electors' hands once they have cast their ballot (the dye fades after a few days). Ballot boxes must be kept secure on polling day and prior to the count to prevent 'stuffing'. A further safeguard against this practice is to have a careful verification at the counting stage. The number of votes in a box are matched against the records of how many were actually issued.

For all of this to work, you need to have honest personnel running the polling stations and counting the votes. They don't necessarily have to be politically neutral (they, after all, are voters too) but they should not be associated with any particular candidate or party and must be professional in carrying out their duties. Candidates or their representatives should have the opportunity to observe all aspects of the election process.

Process seen as more important

It is a curious fact that those with an academic interest in defining democracy tend to concentrate heavily on the process while neglecting the *outcome*. The same is true for those members of the international community who increasingly insist on 'democracy' as a conditionality for development cooperation and support. This approach is highlighted by the protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights whose signatories are members of the Council of Europe – and must be 'democracies'. At Article 3, 'the parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.' In other words, the people must be able to express their views during the process but they have no legal guarantee that their desires will be reflected in the outcome!

In a similar vein, when an emerging democracy holds an election, international observers are often invited to report on whether the procedure was 'free and fair'. The type of questions likely to be asked are: were the electors able to vote without hindrance?; did the candidates have an opportunity to get their message across?; was the count conducted properly? and so on. Assuming the answers are in the affirmative, the election will probably be given a clean bill of health. The question; 'did the people get what they voted for?' is rarely voiced.

Clearly, deficiencies in the process will taint the outcome, sometimes fatally, but arguably, the most important determinant of the result is the voting system that has been chosen. And when it comes to this crucial subject, the concept of democracy – or to be more specific, *representative* democracy – becomes very fluid indeed. Electoral arrangements can deliver completely different results on the basis of the same raw voting statistics. In simple terms, *Party A* might win an overall majority under one system while an identical vote breakdown would leave them firmly in opposition under an-

other. Yet both systems may benefit from the 'democratic' tag. How is this possible?

The answer lies in widely divergent interpretations of the word 'representative'. In elections to multi-member institutions (legislatures), some argue that so long as defined localities have their own elected members whose job it is to *represent* the entire population of the area, irrespective of how they voted, representativeness is achieved. Others go much further, saying that the elected body should reflect the overall pattern of votes cast in the country or territory in question. The first approach favours individuals while the second tends to give precedence to parties.

At this stage, it is useful to offer a brief description of the different voting system used by democracies. There are a great many variations but most fall into one of two broad categories based either on single-member constituencies or party lists.

Constituency systems

The least complicated form of constituency voting is the *simple plurality* system. The country is divided into a given number of single-member seats each with roughly the same electorate. Individual candidates are nominated and voters invited to place a mark against one name on the ballot paper. The candidate who gets more votes than anyone else is the winner, even if his or her share is below 50%. This is often dubbed the 'first past the post' system, a somewhat erroneous description since unlike a horse race, there is no 'finishing line' to aim at. (Mathematically

speaking, the target for the winning candidate is the number of votes cast for the runner-up plus one – but this figure is obviously not known until the election is over!).

A slightly more sophisticated variant of this is the *two-ballot* system. The first election does not result in a winner but simply reduces the field. Any candidate gaining less than a certain percentage is eliminated and those that remain take part in a run-off poll. In some two-ballot elections, only the top two candidates at the first stage go through to the second round.

Then there is the *alternative* vote where electors have the possibility of listing candidates in order of preference (1, 2, 3 etc). This is not dissimilar to the second ballot (although, as Figure 1 shows, it can sometimes lead to a different result). It is, however, less expensive to organise, since there is only one round of voting. The votes for the candidate at the bottom of the poll are redistributed to the second preferences and so on, until one candidate achieves 50%.

List systems

The simplest form of list system involves taking the whole country as a single constituency and presenting voters with lists of candidates grouped in parties. The elector is restricted to choosing his or her party of preference and seats are allocated in proportion to the votes cast for each list. If a party polls sufficiently well to win, say, ten seats, then its top ten candidates are elected.

Figure 1: How different methods of voting for single-member constituencies, or single post elections (e.g. presidential) can lead to different outcomes

Candidate system	Aherne	Bongo	Chiluba	Douglas
Simple plurality	35% - elected	30%	25%	10%
Two ballot				
1st ballot	35%	30%		
2nd ballot	45%	55% - elected	eliminated	eliminated
Alternative vote				
1st count	35%	30%	25%	10%
2nd count	36%	31%	33%	eliminated
3rd count	45%	eliminated	55% - elected	

Figure 2: Hypothetical result of a simple list system election (10 seats to be filled)

	Party A	Party B	Party C	Party D
% vote	46%	32%	12%	10%
seats won	5	3	1	1
Candidates on party list (elected candidates underlined)	1. <u>Mandela</u> 2. <u>Chirac</u> 3. <u>Abiola</u> 4. <u>Kérékou</u> 5. <u>Nujoma</u> 6. Arthur 7. Ramgoolam 8. Dehaene	1. <u>Köhl</u> 2. <u>Chissano</u> 3. <u>Compaoré</u> 4. Lubbers 5. Moi 6. Museveni 7. Prodi 8. Paterson	1. <u>Panday</u> 2. Konan Bédié 3. Rawlings 4. Mugabe	1. <u>Rabuka</u> 2. Eyadema 3. Préval 4. Aznar

There are also list systems that allow preferences to be expressed for individuals. In some cases, the voter is given a choice – either to vote for the list as a whole or to place their mark against a specific candidate. All of a party's votes (list plus individual) will be tallied to determine the number of seats it has won. Various methods can then be used to decide the actual winners. Usually, these still favour people placed high on the lists but a particularly popular candidate in a lower position can 'leapfrog' his or her party colleagues. Another possibility is to eliminate the list vote altogether, forcing electors to choose an individual from one of the lists.

List systems do not always involve a strictly proportional allocation of seats. Under the *d'Hondt* method, for example, the first seat is allocated to the party polling the most votes. Their total is then divided by two and the second seat goes to whichever party is now top. This process continues with the divisor increasing by one each time until all the seats are allocated. The effect is to favour larger parties. In some places, different divisors are used which penalise small parties even more – and the count becomes extremely complicated.

Some countries impose a minimum vote threshold designed to exclude very small parties and splinter groups. The usual range is between 2% and 5%. In addition, states often opt for regional rather than national lists. Figure 2 shows a fictitious result in a simple list system election.

There is nothing to prevent a country operating constituency and list systems side by side. Constituency representatives may be chosen for, say, half the seats with

a 'topping up' of list members so that party proportionality can be achieved.

Single transferable vote

Finally, there is one system which does not fit neatly into either of the above categories although the method of casting one's ballot is the same as in the alternative vote. This is the *single transferable vote* (STV) which involves the use of multi-member constituencies. For the elector, the process is straightforward – indeed, the usual slogan is 'STV is as easy as 1,2,3'. For the officials responsible for counting, it is a different story. To win a seat, a candidate must obtain a *quota* of the overall vote. The formula for this is:

$$Q = [x : (y + 1)] + 1$$

where *x* is the number of votes cast and *y* is the number of seats to be filled. The *raison d'être* behind this formula becomes clearer if one takes a hypothetical result using real numbers. Imagine an STV election where there are five seats to be filled and 6000 votes cast. The quota is thus 1001 – [6000 divided by (5+1)] plus 1. It is clear that no more than five candidates can achieve the quota and this therefore is the *minimum* number of votes needed for election.

The count is conducted in a series of stages. Those who have achieved the quota on the first round are declared elected and their surpluses are transferred to the voters' second preferences. Then bottom placed candidates are excluded with their votes being re-allocated. The process continues until all the seats have been filled. Figure 3 shows a hypothetical (and somewhat simplified) STV election result.

The value of a vote

There is an explanation for the fact that different democratic systems can deliver such variable results. It is all to do with the mathematical *value* that is attached to each ballot cast – or to put it in a different way, the extent to which an individual vote actually contributes to the election of someone. Under the simple plurality system, all votes cast for losers are 'wasted' – though they may well have a political value. Many votes cast for winners are also wasted in the sense that they are surplus to requirement. Thus if a successful candidate has a majority of 1000 over his or her nearest opponent, 999 of these ballots are valueless. In 'first past the post' elections with large numbers of candidates, there are likely to be a great many more wasted votes than 'worthwhile' ones.

Under the two ballot and alternative vote systems, the number of 'useful' votes is increased (because votes cast for lower-placed candidates are not discarded and the elector effectively is given a 'second chance'). The proportion of effective votes here will generally be 50% plus one (less in a two-ballot system which allows more than two candidates into the runoff).

In list voting, the number of wasted ballots is far fewer, because of the inherent proportionality of the system. If a representation threshold is imposed, however, the number of valueless votes can increase substantially. For example, if a party must win 5% overall to gain representation, and five lists in a particular election just fall short of this percentage, then almost a quarter of the votes will have been assigned no value.

Under STV, it all depends on the number of places to be filled. In a two-member seat up to a third of the votes will be wasted, in a three-member seat, the figure is a quarter, and so on.

From this simple analysis, one might draw the conclusion that list elections without a minimum threshold are the most democratic, because they assign value to more votes than any other system. There are other factors, however, which

Figure 3: Hypothetic election result under the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system

Candidate	1st count	Votes 8000 Seats 3 Quota $[8000 \div (3 + 1)] + 1 = 2001$		3rd count
		Redistribution of Comté's surplus	2nd count	
Blair	1450	+ 160	1610	1960 (elected)
Comté	2500 (elected)		(2001)	(2001)
Deby	1600	+ 20	1620	1770 (runner-up)
Diouf	1550	+ 260	1810	2210 (elected)
Ratsiraka	900	+ 40	940 (eliminated)	
Non-transferable*		19	19	59
(Total)	8000	499	8000	8000

* Non-transferable votes are those where the elector has expressed no further preference.

complicate the issue. As stated earlier, list voting focuses on the party rather than the individual and even where voters are allowed to express individual preferences, candidates who are high on the list have an advantage over their lower-placed colleagues. While voters in many democracies are motivated more by party considerations than by the quality of the individuals who are standing, the wishes of an elector who wants to vote for a specific candidate are surely no less legitimate.

Another criticism of list systems is that they tend to remove the link between the people and their elected representatives. The idea of having 'one's own MP' to whom one can turn for help has some merit, and is frequently cited by defenders of single constituency voting systems.

A third aspect raised by critics is that list voting reputedly leads to permanent coalitions and hence 'weak' government. It is also said to give disproportionate power to smaller 'swing' parties, generally found in the middle of the political spectrum. Alternatively, it enables extreme candidates to win seats. From a democratic standpoint, there are a number of counter-arguments here. If the electorate did not vote for 'strong' government – or at least for majority rule by one party – then should the system deliver such a result? And if one small party traditionally has a pivotal role following a list election, this is hardly their 'fault'. It must stem from the inability of other (larger) groupings to work together. Finally, while the fact that extremists can win seats may dismay moderate opinion, is it right to 'fix' the sys-

tem against them in a way which casts doubt on democracy itself?

System-induced distortion

Finally, it is worth noting that systems themselves may influence the way people vote. The phenomenon of tactical voting is mainly seen in elections where large numbers of votes have no value. Thus, under 'first past the post', while people may wish to see a candidate or party elected, they are *induced* to vote for someone else because they know their first choice has little prospect of winning. This risks being a self-fulfilling phenomenon, the election result being the main weapon deployed next time round to convince the same voters that their candidate is not in the running. In seats that are considered safe for a particular party, the system may also induce non-voting on all sides. Supporters of the incumbent fail to turn out because they think their party will win anyway. Opponents can be demotivated by the apparent futility of a trip to the polling station. In list systems which employ a percentage threshold, supporters of very small groupings, recognising their ballot papers may have no value, may also decide to opt for a larger party instead.

From this point of view, the STV system is probably the least distorting since a first preference for a candidate with little popular support is not one's last word. The vote will normally retain its value, assuming subsequent preferences have been expressed, until it is deployed in helping to get someone elected. STV also has some of the advantages of local representation (though the constituency will be

larger) and enables voters freely to choose among individuals. Its main disadvantage is its complexity. This means that the results may be less transparent to the electorate (particularly if literacy is not high) and highly trained officials are needed to run the poll.

In deciding which is the most appropriate voting arrangement for a particular society, one must weigh-up the various advantages and disadvantages. In countries where parties are weak and local communities are strong, a single constituency system may be the most appropriate. Where there are ethnic or other divisions, it may be better to accommodate these in proportional systems (guaranteeing minority representation). And where administrative and human resources are limited, one of the more straightforward methods might be appropriate initially ('first past the post' or simple party list).

While it may not satisfy the democratic purist, one could argue that in the final analysis, any properly organised system which gives everyone the opportunity to vote freely (and at regular intervals) is democratic – so long as a clear majority of the electorate regards the outcome as legitimate. Democracy, after all, is preferable to tyranny, even if it is loosely defined. ■

Africa's desire to be different, and transcultural values

by Mamadou Diouf*

Since the 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a dual trend. On the one hand, there has been the process of economic liberalisation. On the other, we have seen what pessimists might term political liberalisation and optimists describe as democratic transition. This dual trend merits a dual examination which seeks to review African reality differently. There is the interpretation proposed by researchers and then there is the one advanced by politicians, heads of international finance agencies and donors. The common concern behind their thoughts and prescriptions is: how can the economic, political, social and cultural gulf between Africa and the developed Western world be bridged? In other words, how can Africa be incorporated into the general economic and political system and become part of contemporary economic, political and social globalisation? Concomitant with such a review is the urgent need to adjust African economies and cultures to guarantee sound economic and commercial participation in the global economy.

For many years, Western and African politicians viewed Africa as a single entity. Many still do. Yet Africa is not ready to take on board democratic principles for organising and regulating African societies. Nor are such principles suited to it. The path of African history is completely different to that taken by Europe.

The precolonial period

This period has three main features. First, there was an all-important affinity which imbued social relationships of all types (public and private, political and economic) and formed networks of subordination, inequality and loyalty, to the detriment of responsibility and accountability and, naturally, of positive or negative sanction. Then there was a lack of clear division between public and private spheres – these tended to overlap. Finally, there was the entrenched position of religion in politics and social issues, and of economics (enrichment, accumulation, redistribution, the power to enrich or to alleviate poverty, etc.) in politics.

Such factors, emerging from specific historical circumstances during the precolonial period, varied in their intensity, providing areas for participation between certain players and groups in society which were larger or smaller depending on whether they were hierarchy-based societies (kingdoms or empires), egalitarian or segmented. But under these conditions, even in the most egalitarian or segmented systems, a

structure based on older and younger generations wholly replaced the principles of deliberation, competition for public posts and the legitimacy (or otherwise) of power. Such changing and jarring historical trends do not allow particularly for lengthy discussion or a search for consensus – a particular African feature which opposes confrontation between civilisations, and open conflict. Nor are they likely to be seen as democratic formulae or formulae that genuinely guarantee involvement by individuals or social groups at all times and in all places. At certain stages, they have undoubtedly favoured the upholding and consolidation of alternate powers, but in many different situations and in African societies, for diverse reasons, alternate powers have disintegrated when faced with the development of a centralised state and the militarisation of political systems. This was happening well before the colonial period.

This submission of local and alternate power to the logic of centralised politics is a feature that is fairly characteristic of African history, particularly between the era of the slave trade and the colonial conquest. It is probably the basis for the ideology of total subordination to the chief which was celebrated and implemented by the founding fathers' of the African nations and their heirs. The single party, the single youth movement, the single movement for women and for trade unions are its principal instruments.

The colonial period

The colonial systems that were set up, in their various guises, shared a number of common traits. They were in no sense democratic – indeed, they were completely and naturally inegalitarian, hierarchy-based and repressive. The geography of power and the machinery of French colonial rule were concerned mainly with selecting go-betweens to tie African societies successfully to the colonial state. The search for completely loyal leaders explains the extraordinary difficulty experienced by the 'Jacobin' colonial powers (France, Portugal and Belgium) in producing, through their intervention, forms of local domination in 'egalitarian' or 'fetishistic' societies.

These circumstances produce special figures who are able to survive colonial domination. It is a system characterised by strict control of all political expression, policy implementation and administration, and by the absence of any indigenous civil consciousness, beyond that of the colonisers and, subsequently, of the post-colonial elite. Special emphasis on communities and their customs – produced by manipulating traditions – has imposed an administrative justice and tradition of force and authority, as opposed to the authority of the law. The most dramatic result of this, for Africa today, is the

* Director of the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Extract from a work by the author, entitled *Libéralisations politiques ou transitions démocratiques. Perspectives africaines*. Dakar, Codesria, Nouvelles Pistes, no. 1, 1998.

complete absence of inter-ethnic political dialogue and the restriction of political, social and cultural expression to an exclusively community context. The ethnic fundamentalism of ethnology and colonial rule has thus generated a fragmentation of indigenous societies whose only link will be the colonial power. This cements the absence of a common expression and political space for the inhabitants of the same colony.

Independence

The first period, considered here as the nationalist period, was based on the key idea that it was necessary to establish a strong state to reduce diversity in African societies, mobilise the nation's strongest forces, face up to the world market, achieve national development and catch up with European societies. It was a view prevalent among Western and African researchers, and political leaders, in their common desire to modernise African societies. The undertaking to develop and modernise, which formed the core of the nationalist project, was transformed into a deliberate move to construct authoritarian states governed by corrupt elites.

This was manifested in several ways, notably by surveillance, restriction and repression. Through its administrative obsession, the state successfully instilled into Africans the idea that its institutions and ruling class¹ were the only instruments, and rightful beneficiaries, of power over society and the economy. The total centralisation of the state had incalculable consequences for the establishment of the African nations. Those holding state power faced no direct competition for leadership, having suppressed or subordinated, in one way or another, any other focus of power, enrichment or social prestige for at least two decades.

Those holding power in the post-colonial state tried to come to terms with those whose concern was not to usurp their position but to keep a low profile in order to escape their violence. Faced with surveillance, restriction and punishment, African societies constantly tried, by dissimulation, to avoid the totalitarianism they would have liked to frustrate or exploit. A number of hypotheses were tested in the academic spheres of political science and African studies, in an effort to describe and conceptualise these so called *exit options*, characterised by distortion, evasion and intractability.

According to P. Ekeh, it was the continuation of this type of government after the transfer of power, which explains the divorce between real Africa (that of communities and ethnic groups) and official Africa (that of nationalist leaders and their bureaucracies)².

Meanwhile, current political and economic discussions, which emphasise good governance (de-

fining according to the rules of the Bretton Woods organisations), make the issues of popular representation and democracy more complex still, against the background of the most serious economic depression Africa has ever known.

Contemporary projects

Three factors led to a breakdown of the nationalist project: the adoption of structural adjustment programmes; the development of social movements; and the restoration of African societies' methods of political management through institutions and constitutions. Analysis of these three factors has given rise to controversy, touching both on their nature and on theoretical issues related to good governance, civil society, democracy and popular participation. It has, in fact, resulted in a variety of paths, including pre-colonial variations, colonial traditions and post-colonial breakdown (restoration of the multi-party system/elections and national conference/elections).

Although one of the shortest sequences in African history, the contemporary situation is also one of the most dramatic and inconsistent. There are domestic economic crises, combined with and accentuated by the non-involvement of African economies in the global market (together, the ingredients of 'Afro-pessimism'). At the same time, there is a restiveness within the population. New areas are opening up to everyday, collective 'sociability' in the fields of economics and politics. Alternative circumstances and ways of political expression are being defined. Some see what is happening as a sign of the 'advent of barbarism'; others see in it, the stirrings of a 'second African independence movement'. These are African expectations which differ from the Afro-pessimism of modern Western society.

The period we are now in is a time of profound upheaval on the African political front. We have seen the restoration of democracy but also repeated attempts by former authoritarian regimes to retain their powers and privileges (Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Kenya). Meanwhile, new democratic regimes try expand the powers they have recently acquired (Benin, Niger, Madagascar). This swinging of the pendulum is one reason for the violence (ethnic, religious, domestic, public and private) and of the breakdown of the public arena which has accompanied political liberalisation processes. The violence and breakdown combine to fuel uncertainty, creating tension between the desire and ability of authoritarian powers to recover, corrupt or suffocate the democratisation process, and the intervention of societies' 'lower echelons' in the shape of legitimate counter-demonstrations, rioting, looting, murder and delinquency on a daily basis. In short,

² P. Ekeh, 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17, 1, January 1975, (91-112), p. 8. See also B. Davidson's lament, *The Black Man's Burden. Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State*. London, James Currey, 1992, in the face of the highly disappointing results of African nationalism, and M. Diouf, 'Les paroles politiques africaines. Des luttes anti-coloniales aux conférences nationales' in Gemdev (ed.), *L'Intégration régionale dans le monde. Innovations et ruptures*. Paris, Karthala, 1994, (264-272).

¹ For the moment, I disregard the fact that this social group is the 'elite' and stress only its dominant position in terms of power. In this connection, useful reference may be made to Fawzi Mellah, 'Le développement politique: Rôle et limites de l'administration publique. Eléments pour une analyse de l'Etat en Afrique'. In *Annuaire du Tiers Monde*, VIII, 1982-83, (77-85).

there are people who willingly take the side 'against democracy'.

The violence of Africa's political transition also appears closely linked to the problem of moving on from the mobilisation of social movements, which had their own interests and motivations – and which brought an abrupt end to authoritarian regimes – to the consolidation of democracy, which the literature says should be the task of the political elite. However, the ability of the latter to move around and their philosophy of division fosters systematic recourse to violence.

According to some analysts, progress towards democracy is the result of the inherent drive of African political systems. For example, the most decisive claim, that of a multi-party system, has often been no more than a phase in clan conflicts within established regimes or single parties. During the nationalist phase, social groups mobilised only to set themselves up as the preferred or 'acknowledged' partner in dialogue with the authorities. The crisis of the redistribution system caused by the reduction in public resources, and the multiplication, aggressive stance and diversity of the 'partners in dialogue' have prompted a competitive drive that, in itself, is capable of fostering chronic violence. Obviously, the state's new processes of regulation and appropriation, the privatisation of public forces (army, state police, forces of law and order, militia), and the multiplication of hidden or illegal income-generating activities (drugs, the arms trade, traffic in animals, precious stones and, counterfeiting) lead increasingly to civil war (Liberia, Sierra Leone) or to large portions of national territory being removed from the authority of central government.

In such highly complex situations, institutional and constitutional aspects are unable to keep pace. The approaches cover a broad spectrum. In some countries, certain communities wield a degree of autonomy beyond the reach of the state. In others, groups are in open and often bloody conflict with the central authority for control of power and/or certain resources. By slowing down the renewal of the ruling class and by making it difficult for the advocates of modernity to show themselves, and gain pre-eminence, the African crisis has cleared the way for new systems and major upheavals. Democracy has launched a new generation onto the African political stage, a generation born after the founding event of African nationhood – independence.

Unable to break free from reinvented traditions combined with the values of a global world, excluded from post-colonial largesse and its social components (recognition, right of expression, right to work, education, etc), numerically in the majority and, in political terms, reduced to the status of silent social juniors, they invent their own social forms in collective or religious enterprises³. All kinds of political violence are fomented – urban rioting, Islamic fundamentalist armies, warlords, criminal acts of gratuitous violence, vandalism and student strikes. Young people use violence to demonstrate their disillusionment with democracy.

Demographic change has also called into question a number of 'certainties', including the homogeneous nature of urban life and the city's ability to invent a homogenous culture in the face of individualism. The reversal which underlies this is the loss of the vision of an elite united in interests and values that were undoubtedly associated with an urban population very much in the minority in relation to the mass of networks⁴.

Inconsistency among advocates of modernity has led to the acceptance, by each of its segments, of a discourse that is specific to it. The physical breakdown of the space where authority is exercised is combined with a fragmentation of leading groups in society (government, trades unions, students, pupils, entrepreneurs). New networks (economic, political, ethnic, women, etc) are filling the spaces left by physical dispersal and ideological fragmentation and they are gaining increasing significance. They are claiming a variety of identifying references (locality, age, sexes, common objectives and so on). Their often contingent fluidity, plasticity and origin have a considerable impact on social and political demands.

The continuing break-up of the state, and the intensity of social competition within and between groups, which are less and less subject to the authority of the powers-that-be, are the expression of an increasingly radical rejection of the integrating model of the elites. This is the case for Nigerian traders, Algerian or Tunisian fundamentalists, Christian revivalists (born again Christians, Pentecostals, etc), Zimbabweans, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Zambians, the South-Sudanese, the Tuareg, Ugandans, Joola, Zulu dissidents and so on.

Two cases provide a precise illustration of the defiance of certain groups in the face of the transformations presented above: traders and women. The former have, for somewhat more than 20 years, maintained highly complex, sometimes conflicting relationships with political elites, often involving complicity in the obtaining of import/export licences and monopolies. The crisis of the 1980s, and political and economic liberalisation, have given them renewed vigour, based on their stranglehold over commerce in goods and agricultural inputs, and their control of the informal sector. This, to a considerable extent, guarantees social equilibrium and consolidates their ascendancy over peasant farmers (who, in turn, attempt to organise themselves into associations).

As for women, the major transformation of their political role and position in society appears closely linked to their newly-acquired economic status, both at home and outside, assigned them by

³ On this subject, R. Marshall, 'Power in the Name of Jesus. Social Transformations and Pentecostalism in Western Nigeria', in T. O. Ranger & O. Vaughn (eds), *Legitimacy and the State in Contemporary Africa*. Oxford, McMillan, 1993 (213-246); R. Otayek, 'Une relecture islamique du projet révolutionnaire de Thomas Sankara' in J-F. Bayart (ed.), *Religion et Modernité Politique en Afrique noire. Dieu pour tous et chacun pour soi*. Paris, Karthala, 1993 (101-160).

⁴ OECD/ADB, 'L'émergence de la compétition. Transformations et déséquilibres dans les sociétés ouest-africaines; Draft, 1994, p.6. For an analysis of demographic issues, I drew considerably on my association with the work of the Cinergie/Club du Sahel team, which carried out the WALTIPS work.

the crisis. No longer just a political resource, they have become fully-fledged players in their own right, thereby redefining both the relationship between the state and society's players and the overlap between public and private domains. The way today's African women are taking over areas freed by economic and political crisis rejects sectarian affiliations precisely because they emphasise the common memory of their exclusion from the formal economic sector, political institutions and structures, and their experience of managing informal, small and autonomous organisations. Women's organisations do not necessarily undertake to engage in a head-to-head fight with the state. Instead, they are so firmly established that they present a multitude of facets offering them varied and different possibilities from the most collective in nature to the most public.

Fighting against the state or intervening at central or local level are not decisive elements in associative activities whose mission is to assume responsibility for the diversity of individuals' and groups' lives. Consequently, the transition, regardless of its form (restoration of the multi-party system/elections or national conferences/elections), is closely linked to the diversification of social groups and to the weakening of the state in its capacity for redistribution, repression and geopolitical haggling on the international stage. This has generated a new geography and new power distribution mechanisms directly influenced by the interplay of forces between the various groups.

This new geography of the exclusive return to collective usage, including the public (groups and associations) and private (modern ruling class) area, is highlighted by a shift in the driving force behind development, from mobilisation towards technocracy. The latter, if one listens to the IMF and World Bank, postulates a reduction in the political and civic rights of individuals and of certain groups (trade unions, civil servants, pupils, students) as a prerequisite for the autonomous manifestation of market forces.

Technocracy is not the only force caught in a vice between the contradiction between political restorations and the requirements of restoration of macro-economic balance. If the context has reactivated the role of players excluded too early from the political scene (trade unions and organisations of young people and women) and the entry on to the stage of new players (religious leaders and economic entrepreneurs), the rhetoric of those in power in a nation, during discourse at national conferences, cannot, as in the case of Nigeria, conceal the marginalisation of rural society which is over-sensitive to the influence of the *ancien régime*. Organisers of national conferences, like those who take part in political activities after the restoration of a multi-party system, are recruited from those excluded from authoritarian power. As a number of observers have remarked, this is more a new redistribution of the cards amongst an élite which has been amazingly stable for 30 years.

It is difficult to draw a conclusion from these jarring, sometimes convergent, often changing but always violent paths taken by social, individual and

collective, institutional and economic players led forward by transformations they generate or experience on the basis of rival interests, forms of appropriation, motivations and resources and different sites. How can dissimilar entities be made to converge towards a common desire to live communally? Is it possible, and under what conditions, to create a sociability and civility capable of guaranteeing democratic methods of managing societies and economies in Africa? In any case, according to the Nigerian political scientist, *Claude Ake*, neither democratic procedures nor the institutions of good governance are sufficient without deep roots in the values of African societies and the ways in which they establish and legitimise forms of representation.

Between hope and violence, African societies are drifting towards a future which offers them two options: generalised violence or rebirth. African paths are challenging institutional and constitutional restoration projects, but they cannot be reduced to a dichotomous reading of the state against civil society insofar as the players concerned have strategies beyond and/or within the state, depending on their contemporary interests, memories and experiences. They are travelling between separate areas of bureaucracy, from the ruling political class and indigenous areas to multiple referents which have slowly paved the way for negotiation or confrontation.

Naturally, those involved do not limit themselves to mastery of a single language or a single mode of expression in the public area. Their plasticity, just like systematic recourse to different methods of intervention, places them at the heart of the state, but also in places where the state is absent.

Can one or should one restrict these unexpected and concomitant courses, these multiple, legal and illegal, undertakings, this diversification of public and private players and of the latter's interests to key categories of the new bilateral forms of intervention which have been imposed together with concepts of good governance, decentralisation, local development and, above all, civil society? They organise a general discourse on state reform and the redefinition of the latter's role in the economy. Most observers agree that this approach depoliticises the issue of democratisation, being concerned only with the technical aspects of good governance.

Consequently, it cannot take into consideration the inherent dynamism of African societies and the responses the latter offer both economically and politically speaking. On the contrary, it would be necessary to take account of the rationale of overlap and multiple undertakings on the part of players, who impose transactions and negotiations at all levels and places of power, in order to go beyond technical reforms and to move on to an in-depth reform of African societies. It would require a reform which takes account of internal dynamics and the historical authenticity of events specific to societies in Africa and the ways in which these can be integrated into globalisation. Neither the appropriation of income generated elsewhere (*ownership*) nor the transposition of projects which have succeeded elsewhere (*success stories*) can conceal or counteract the extraordinary energy driving local variables. ■ M.D.

Sub-Saharan Africa under pressure from the West

by Abdoulaye Niandou Souley*

'Good Governance in Africa' is an expression coined by the English-speaking world that has spread, since the beginning of the 1990s, like a powder trail across the globe. Its repercussions have been particularly far-reaching and long-lasting in Africa south of the Sahara. This part of the world is seen as having the lowest incidence of democracy, while the economic development that should have come with independence is still awaited in vain. Given these circumstances,

it came as no real surprise when France's Cooperation Minister at the time, *Jacques Pelletier*, stated in his 1990 New Year address to the press: 'Africa must not be left behind by the great freedom movement that is sweeping both through the so-called popular democracies in Europe, and through Asia and Latin America'. From that year on, the concept of good governance was to move high up the agenda in various parts of sub-Saharan Africa. But what exactly does it mean?

Good governance is an expression that should not be overworked. If it is allowed to become hackneyed, it will lose its true significance. Political experts, sociologists, jurists, economists and historians have realised, only by observing and analysing the working logic of the African state, that errors in political management are the root cause of the economic crisis currently ravaging sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, we cannot totally discount the complacency of western democracies that adopted an approach based on the notion of 'stability'. It took the disintegration of ideological models, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the democratisation of so-called

socialist political structures for western attitudes to change. This notion of 'stability' has now been replaced with 'conditionality' and 'human rights diplomacy'. And the change has given much greater momentum to the concept of good governance, the essential elements of which are as follows:

- *Openness*. This presupposes that those in power adopt transparent policies in the economic and political spheres. People must understand the reasons behind any major decision that concerns national politics, and the way in which public affairs are conducted. This leads naturally to the second element of good governance which is accountability.

- *Accountability* means that political leaders are duty-bound, in the name of openness, to answer for their political decisions. We should, however, avoid oversimplifying the concept. It is a complex issue involving the political, moral and economic accountability of those who govern towards those who are governed by them. And it is precisely because of this relationship between the 'governors' and the 'governed' that the latter are entitled to know how public affairs are being run, and to be consulted and involved where necessary. This takes us to the third element which is participation.

- *Popular participation* implies that the people must be involved, not only in the decision-making process, but also in implementing and following the decisions made by their leaders. It goes even further, encompassing what legal and political experts refer to as political participation. Taken to its logical conclusion, it implies the right to free and open elections. It is widely held that leaders who enjoy popular credibility are likely to be more efficient – the fourth facet of good governance.

- *Efficiency*. The theory here is that those who come to power as a result of free, open and multi-

party elections will, as a rule, enjoy the people's trust. If that is the case, they should be able to take decisions that are not just beneficial but essential for social progress and the economic and political development of the countries whose destinies lie in their hands. On that basis – although there is no clear scientific or empirical evidence to support such a view – some western writers have established a link between democracy and development. They have consequently set conditions for access to development aid and to structural adjustment funds.

Link between democracy and development?

'There can be no democracy without development, but neither can there be true development without democracy... By not taking an active role in the democratic revolution, Africa will condemn itself to having no part in the economic revolution – in other words, in establishing sustainable growth'.

Thus was the link between democratisation and the granting of development aid unequivocally stated by the late President *François Mitterrand*, at the La Baule Summit of African and French Heads of State. 'When I say democracy, I naturally have a ready-made scheme in mind: a representative system, free elections, multipartyism, freedom of the press, an impartial judiciary and the rejection of censorship. That is the structure available to us'. He went on to stress that it was up to sovereign African states to choose their own path and to set their own pace along that path. In conclusion, he pledged that France would commit all its resources to support the efforts made in the progress towards greater freedom.

In a similar context, we should also recall the words of *Michel Camdessus*, Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) who said that Africa was the continent most in need of economic reforms. 'Anything that encourages open political dialogue,' he insisted, 'has got to be good for economic reform in these countries'.

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Confronting the challenges of democratisation

In the light of the pressure coming from the West¹, it is not difficult to see why Africa must face up to the challenges of democratisation – with the aid of its foreign partners, of course.

Experimenting with the democratic model is a real challenge, but one worth pursuing. For a long time, it was thought that the democratisation of African political systems was not possible for cultural reasons. There was also a belief that the level of development in these countries hindered democratic progress. And yet, Senegal and more especially, Botswana, proved the contrary. All the same, it is true that Africa must deal simultaneously with the economic and the political challenges of democratisation.

On a political level, there are two main problems to be overcome. First, we have to recognise that democratisation on the continent is occurring at a time when the economic base is contracting, leading to a cash flow crisis in national exchequers. Experience teaches us, moreover,

that the democratisation process brings greater political demands than a state can satisfy. Evidently, this poses something of a challenge. There is no doubt that African economies must be integrated into the world economy, especially now that there is such emphasis on globalisation. But integration presupposes efficiency (one of the essential elements of good governance), competitiveness and increased production capacity.

Second, it is up to the African people to prove wrong the exponents of the 'culture' argument. Those who govern, and those who are governed, must show through their conduct in the political arena, that democracy is not just the prerogative of certain cultures, but that any nation can remodel itself along democratic lines.

From an economic viewpoint, Africans must realise that democracy cannot be financed by their foreign partners forever. This means they need to stop employing 'strategies' aimed at securing revenue for democratic reforms. Also, they must endeavour to maximise and use their own countries' resources to satisfy the numerous political demands that their leaders face daily from public officials, the unemployed, young marginalised people, those involved in education, and rural dwellers.

Voters in front of a polling station in Mali.

Popular participation implies the right to free and open elections.

Such measures become all the more necessary and urgent if we remember that committed and unconditional support for democratisation will not be forthcoming unless it is first proved that the experimental stage has been successful. In addition, the African people must bear in mind that, even if undeniably useful, foreign aid has its limits. It is, therefore, vital that they believe genuinely in the democratic ideal and rely on themselves to make it succeed. It is worth reiterating that African states will be obliged to face the challenges of globalisation and they should already be preparing themselves for this. Their survival will depend on it.

As we have seen, the challenges of democratisation in Africa are numerous. Western pressure may be necessary but, more than anything else, it is up to the African people themselves to realise that building democracy has become a global requirement. And if they succeed in fulfilling the requirement, they are likely to discover that it has been worth their while. ■

A.N.S.

1. Discussed by *Sophia Mappa*, in 'Développement par la démocratie? Injonctions occidentales et exigences planétaires' (Development via Democracy? Western Orders and Global Demands), Karthala, Paris 1995.

Professor Samir Amin, Director of the Third World Forum

Regulating the market to promote democracy

Samir Amin has been described variously as a 'neo-Marxist' and a 'champion of Third-World issues'. He is undoubtedly one of the greatest economists to emerge from the developing countries. He studied economics in Paris, gaining his doctorate in 1957. His thesis evolved into a book entitled 'The accumulation of capital on a world scale'. He taught in France and Senegal, worked as a planner in Mali and Egypt, and was director of the UN African Institute for Economic Development and Planning from 1970 to 1980. He describes himself as 'a campaigner for socialism and popular liberation' and his research centres on the way capitalism has generated uneven development. Since 1980, Professor Amin has been director of the African Bureau of the Third World Forum in Dakar. The Courier interviewed him at the second P7 summit in Brussels. It was an opportunity to hear his thoughts on regional integration, the Lomé Convention and globalisation. He was asked first to explain his concept of democracy and good governance as a prerequisite for receiving development aid.

– Multilateral or bilateral development organisations often advocate the principle of good governance as a prerequisite but, in my view, the phrase is inappropriate. It sounds like 'good government', which is, naturally, better than poor government. The solution is to democratise society as a whole, a multifaceted process which, in political terms, requires the organisation of normally elected government into a framework which tolerates opinions it does not share. In social terms, market regulation enables democracy to influence actual circumstances. Lastly, socio-cultural aspects have to be addressed, such as the relationship between men and women, ethnic differences and diverse religious beliefs.

But we must not allow ourselves to get caught in what I regard as a 'false dilemma'; in other words, a choice between single, autocratic party rule and a 'sub-standard' multiparty system. Taking the former, if you look at the old single party in Côte d'Ivoire, for example, you see it was just as autocratic as so-called 'socialist' parties. As for multipartyism, this is often nothing more than the division of the ruling class into competing segments. It is a power struggle without direction, the only agenda being pure demagoguery. This is what happened at the end of the Mobutu era, and it happened in certain African countries at the time of national conferences. So, a multiparty system should not, in itself, be a condi-



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tion. What we must do is give serious consideration to genuine democratisation and examine the very bases of society.

There is a corollary to good governance, you know, which is globalisation. There's nothing new about this phenomenon! The capitalist system has always been global in nature. It is worth reminding ourselves that globalisation began with colonisation, though the phenomenon we are familiar with nowadays does include new features.

The word 'market' is currently in vogue and misuse of it can lead the unwary into dangerous territory. Yet this is not a modern phenomenon either. Despite what some people think, socialist

societies were aware of it. But up to now, the 'market' has never existed outside the context of social regulation. The market is always regulated. What we should be asking is who regulates it and how.

There are two types of regulation: social and democratic regulation and 'opaque' regulation, as practised by the multinationals. The first type involves political intervention by social forces, operating within a capitalist framework. Such intervention comes not just from companies and employers, but also workers and other organisations that reflect social life in all its aspects. By its very nature, this type of regulation is transparent and democratic. It permits the adoption of 'consensus' rules which are widely accepted by society and which give a certain legitimacy to the way economies and the market function.

The second type is 'opaque', clandestine regulation, practised exclusively by companies and particularly by the biggest of them - the multinationals. This is 'underhand' regulation concealed behind business confidentiality and it is presented as 'deregulation'. But this is a misuse of language. It has nothing to do with deregulating, and a great deal to do with replacing social and democratic regulation with rules solely devised by monopolies and transnational organisations. I would even go so far as to say that it operates along the lines of a mafia, with its own internal rules.

These days, the actual negotiations take place outside the conference room, in the corridors of the WTO and, in the near future, the MIA (Multilateral Investment Agreement), where representatives from multi-national companies make their decisions and then effectively impose them on governments.

■ *Access to development aid is nonetheless conditional on a transition to democracy. Given the way you link democracy and the markets, will the ACP countries be locked into this 'everything-for-the-market' logic?*

– The two issues are indeed linked. We have to offer a truly democratic and social alternative to globalisation and not accept everything our adversaries say. We shouldn't be getting into a discussion about deregulation and its virtues, but, on the contrary, demonstrating what it conceals.

From the spatial standpoint, market regulation takes place on three levels - national, regional and global. Looking at the first of these, you can be assured that states will continue to exist - even in Europe where the EU is beginning to take shape. The nation

will still be based on the state. This is the place for debate, conflict and political decision-making and thus, the place where, ultimately, the social, democratic and transparent systems for regulating the market can be set up.

However, we recognise that this basic level is not enough and what we currently need to do is strengthen it at regional level. The Europeans have understood this and are making gradual progress, though they have run into a number of stumbling blocks. The same is true for all the world's regions. Yet regional regulation cannot be set up mechanically and exclusively by the market, because this throws up not just social but also intra-regional differences and inequalities. Such regional regulation is achieved by means of common economic policies which incorporate national regulation, and this is what we need at world level.

It would be wrong to make the link with globalisation as it is perceived unilaterally by multinational companies. They give absolute priority to their own interests to the detriment of all other social interests, whether it is those of workers in the northern hemisphere or those of people in the South. This is neo-liberal globalisation, regulated by transnational companies, and it is unacceptable. It generates poverty. Everyone talks about eradicating poverty. But we have set up a system which has created it and are now complaining about the results.

It is a utopian project on the part of directors of major companies, who think they are the world and make it what is - and that other people do not exist. This is a vision of a destructive utopianism and an absurd dream of a better society. The arrogance of this neo-liberal deregulation debate is beginning to diminish, but the consequences of it are so catastrophic in the short term that the World Bank is forced to try to compensate for it. What is needed is a positive, not a defensive, internal discussion, with suggestions for genuine alternatives rather than denunciations of neo-liberal globalisation.

■ *Negotiations on the renewal of the Lomé Convention are due to start next September. In your view, what is the future of ACP-EU relations?*

– One question that is often asked, fairly but insufficiently to my mind, relates to the choice between 'globalised universalism' and regionalism (or 'universalism' attenuated by certain precautions taken at regional level). This is the context for an examination of EU-ACP relations. For historical reasons, which are related, amongst other things, to colonisation, history has created a special relationship between certain European countries and a major part of the African continent. Moreover, decolonisation in Africa was relatively late and, according to the African national liberation movements, this delay and the absence of a modern industrial and political system have helped these relationships develop into a kind of neo-colonialism. There are still links between the former imperialist states and the African countries which emerged after independence, and these links have been codified by the various Lomé Conventions and, before that, by the Yaoundé agreements.

For certain of its supporters, Lomé was a wonderful cooperation instrument, although there are obviously some critical points of view to which I would also subscribe. The future of Europe-Africa relations has reached a critical point. The various European governments each have their own opinion and no one is able to say how things will develop within the EU itself. In Africa, some governments have regarded Lomé as nothing more than a source of finance and continue to view it as such. They are naturally defensive. My impression is that other states would like Lomé to be dismantled because they prefer the diktats of transnational companies. We ought to go much more on the offensive. This is a political battle within society both in Europe and in Africa.

We need to have some idea of what we want society to be so that we can define how markets should be regulated (European and African internal markets and open, common markets governed by Euro-African relations). This is, in fact, one of the Third World Forum's programmes and has been widely discussed by Africa's top economists and thinkers from all regions of the continent over the last two years. We would like to make Europeans aware of our discussion and invite

Processing maize in Niger.

'The ACP countries have hitherto been subject to the old system of international division of labour.'



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them to take part, just as we would like to take part in theirs. Although European organisations operate on democratic principles, the EU has a political and financial responsibility in the organisation of these discussions. In this connection, such organisations maintain that their priority is to negotiate just for the period after Lomé, which is just not acceptable. In my view, this is non-negotiation, and it would result in an empty text which avoided problems because they were not ripe for solution, whether within Europe or Africa.

Rather than burying our heads in the sand and prioritising 'non-negotiation', we should allow the diplomats to get on with their work. We ourselves should make a

enable that illusion to be nurtured, then the situation is a dangerous one.

However, other Third-World countries are beginning to industrialise and are already emerging on the world market as competitive exporters of industrial goods.

As regards the MIA, this is an instrument which does not really have any bearing on the lives of people in Africa. Speculative capital and direct foreign investment head for China, Korea, Taiwan, Brazil or Mexico, not Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya or South Africa. The MIA is a way of regulating such investment to the exclusive benefit of transnationals, and to the detri-

- This is one problem on the agenda for our Third World Forum discussions in Africa. We will be examining regionalisation and its history up to our times, again discussing in-depth the problem of regionalisation. Some 20 years ago, the predominant view of regionalisation projects was very simplistic. It involved opening up markets in a manner that was somewhat similar to what was going on in Europe, although the circumstances were fundamentally different. Europe was integrating markets which already existed. What I am talking about here is powerful, industrial economies of the most advanced type. To open up markets in Africa, without industry to underpin them, would come to nought.

We have decided to re-open the regionalisation debate, beginning with Southern Africa. The reason for this is the economic importance of South Africa and the fact that countries which were in the front line of the anti-apartheid struggle have grown accustomed to mutual cooperation. As a result, it is more likely that there can be a serious debate there on this issue.

■ *Forty years after your first work appeared, on the accumulation of capital on a world scale, what is the current position of 'Third-World' thinking? Have we come to the end of economic thought on development, with the victory of neo-liberalism?*

- Economic thought is a never-ending story linked to social interests and social relationships. Contrary to what many people, particularly neo-liberals, think, there is not just one set of economic principles which always fits the bill. Neo-liberal thought, to my mind, involves utopian, unrealistic and deductive speculation about 'pure' economics - which do not exist. However, there are socially-oriented currents of thought which make it possible to advance reflection on the economic dimension of problems. Marxists are part of this school of thought. So, as you see, the debate continues. ■

Interview by M.F.



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A Beijing street scene.

'Speculative capital and direct foreign investment head for China and Korea, not Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya or South Africa.'

serious effort to prepare for the future through debate in Europe and Africa.

■ *Thanks to the WTO, trade looks set to become increasingly liberalised, with the probable erosion of preferences. What lessons should we draw from the 'banana episode'?*

- You are perfectly correct, but I should perhaps point out that the ACP countries have hitherto been subject to the old system of international division of labour. They are still regarded as no more than exporters of primary products. Indeed, Lomé contributed to the continuation of the view in Africa that they could carry on living like that. If all the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) does is

ment of national and social interests in these countries. Africa can offer nothing but a wretched labour force, its agricultural produce and a few mining products, which, although produced, in legal terms, by African companies, are in fact controlled by the multinationals.

■ *As one possible solution, the EU suggests setting-up regional groups within the ACP system, which would lead to regional integration. Do you feel this is viable?*

Rethinking the State in Africa

Professor Etienne Le Roy is Director of the Legal Anthropology Laboratory in Paris (University of Paris I). The author of a number of books on Africa, his work has covered more than 30 countries on the continent from Senegal to the Indian Ocean. His analysis has concentrated on the State in the context of the various shocks that African nations have experienced in their history (including the slave trade and colonisation). His interest in Africa is a long-standing one – reflected in his numerous publications on justice, the formation of the State and land policy. The Courier spoke to him in Paris and in our wide-ranging discussion, we touched on the themes of the State, good governance and the future of democracy. We asked first about the establishment of democracy in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

— We have to see this in terms of the history of ideas and institutions: particularly how European societies came to ignore all human experience by inventing the monster that *Thomas Hobbes*, in 1650, called 'the State' or 'Leviathan'. That year saw the first English revolution. Charles I was beheaded in the name of a republican concept of English society. The convention up to then was that the monarch embodied the state, and the English were intelligent enough to master, control and ultimately divide up this concept in order to apply it effectively in other situations.

By that time, quite a lot was already known about other societies – African, Amerindian and Chinese (which the Jesuits had interestingly described). In inventing the State, European societies took a big risk, which immediately prompted another invention, namely the concept of human rights. The State might be portrayed as a poison with human rights as the antidote. In a very real sense, those who took these ideas forward were embarking on an adventure. It was all linked to the advent of modernity, which crystallised with the natural law movement of the 18th century, although it really dates back to the Protestant reformation between 1525 and 1535. Then there was the notion of indivisible sovereignty which emerged in the early 19th century, though it has been undermined by world wars. Now, slowly but surely, mankind is entering a new era.

I prefer to speak of 'trans-modernity' rather than 'post-modernity', in order to emphasise the gradual nature of processes spread over eight centuries. The main categories of

Roman Catholic canon law were established in the 12th century, with the first key text relating to law and the legal edifice – and hence, the State. This was *Gratian's 'Decree'*, the first pontifical document, which was written in about 1140. Its central hypothesis, which is modern in terms of its perception and the way it was written, was that a distinction had to be made between two types of human being – Christians and others. It is a way of thinking that *Louis Dumont*, an anthropologist specialising in Indian societies, referred to as the 'principle of incorporating the opposite' (*Essais sur l'individualisme, une perspective anthropologique sur l'idéologie moderne*, Paris, Seuil, 1983).

'Hierarchy and equality are contradictory principles'

While all human societies are based on the idea of hierarchies, *modern* society wishes to create a new system based on broad equality. Hierarchy and equality are contradictory principles. The principle of incorporating opposites was invented for a society that liked to think of itself as 'rational'. The commitment to equality reflects the view that we are all part of the same human family. At the same time, we absorb what we do not know and do not seek to validate the opposite. It is an approach based on duality – Christian versus pagan, civilised peoples versus savages. It is founded on the idea of developing one's own identity, culture, 'world view' and method of organisation.

■ *This approach seems to involve transferring something – say a constitution, a concept of democracy or a certain way of living, to all humankind. Isn't this the equivalent of an organ transplant?*

– It goes further than that. Taking up the imagery that you employ, humankind is a living body which is seen to have a malfunctioning organ. This is removed and a new organ is transplanted. Through the State, colonisers and developers completely reprogrammed the body, with the aim of transforming Africa and the African so completely that the latter was forced to view the world, its organisation and its vital principles in a different way. This was not so much a revolution as a transformation – the creation of a genetically modified organism. It was in the name of this modern ideology that Africa had the State imposed on it. And it happened over a very short time-scale. Previously, there was no concept of the State in Africa, and no need for it, because the African way of regulating society was built on different foundations.

The experience of the State was not made available to Africans by French colonisers until 1956. In France, the concept began to take shape in the 14th century. People were brought up to develop a devoted attachment to the idea, and to accept the fact that it was right to die for one's country. Yet this idea took four hundred years to take root. It was only in 1792, with the declaration that 'the motherland is in danger', that people were really forced to acknowledge the State's power. The African view of the world is completely different and individualistic. It is not at all connected with the Judaeo/Christian concept which justifies the ideas of unity and centrality. Because they are effective, these ideas will mobilise material and human resources, and facilitate domination over other societies and therefore the latter's exploitation. We are face to face with a system that justifies mastery of the world by the accumulation of material things, which the State machinery makes possible, through capitalism and individualism.

The basic principle underlying African society is that of the *complementarity of differences*. Unlike the Judaeo/Christian concept found in the Book of Genesis, according to which the world was created from nothing, in Africa the world is created from chaos. In African eyes, the world is a series of interactions and connections between diverse components. Ex-

changes concern relationships between humans themselves and with everything that surrounds them, be it visible or invisible.

The principle of the complementarity of differences is opposite to that of the equality of modern societies and, above all, of equality based on uniformity. African societies, trapped by three centuries of slavery and 150 years of colonisation, are faced with a principle of organisation not in keeping with the way their own system of regulation functions. There is a pluralistic, separational and segmented structure, with centralised powers divided until a balance is found between the principles of division and of complementarity of differences.

This complementarity finds expression via the African theory of chieftainship. It is a concept of society that was systematically rejected, caricatured and transformed by colonisers and then by developers/modernisers, because a number of Africans, particularly those of lower social status, rapidly came to see collaboration with the colonial power as a path to riches or a way to improve their social condition.

'Betrayal of the African elite'

Collaboration led to a betrayal, a weakening and a moral degeneration among the African elite. This process is recounted in the Story of 'Wangrin', and in the memoirs of *Amadou Hampate Bâ*, which show how intellectuals yielded to temptation, adhering to the model of the colonial and then the post-colonial State, because it served their interests. One has to ask whether it is actually possible directly to transpose the model of the State and its institutions and find a way to accommodate Africa's own modernity?

Neither the colonisers nor the African attempted to do this. The latter not only declined to take up the challenge, but actually took to themselves all the resources of the State model: notably the characteristics that are most autocratic (and therefore unacceptable) and employed them to create a unique concept of 'democracy' based on presidentialism and the single-party, unitary State. There was one system of law which denied to Africans their 'common', unwritten laws. The idea of unitarism,



(The Courier/painting by Valère Bednarczyk)

based on the modern Western model, became a caricature of itself.

The State might be portrayed as a poison with human rights as the antidote.

In the early 1990s, alienation led the system to be called into question. There was dissatisfaction within the political and financial authorities, under pressure from public opinion, for an end to the chaotic and untenable situation that had developed (cooperation organisations, including notably the World Bank decided to change the rules of the game in the late 1980s and the concept of good governance began to emerge). There was also agitation from groups claiming to represent civil society. Although these developments had the effect of undermining the most intolerable aspects of the monocratic system and presidentialism, Africans still failed to reflect on what their own State should be like, on the basis of their own innate character.

■ *Against this background, what is your perception of the 'National Conferences' that were held in Africa as part of the transition process towards democracy? Was the La Baule Summit a watershed?*

– National conferences are all very well, but their results have been disappointing. Initially, the approach seemed to be to set up never-ending discussions. Intellectuals agreed to scrutinise their own experiences. They distanced themselves from their own actions and even, in some cases, criticised them. Unfortunately, the conference participants soon began to quibble over constitutional principles and to lose sight of the essential – which is

to work out how modern Africa can live in peace. For example, Benin's national conference enabled a veil to be drawn over the past, but it made no use of the wealth of experience of Benin's centuries-old and diverse societies in its construction of the future. They contented themselves with a hollow imitation, bearing no relation to the needs of societies. The latter thus found no place in the new institutions which ended up being monopolised by a small élite. This is the syndrome in which sharing comes to an end.

La Baule then put the finishing touches to the process, especially by discrediting the positions of a number of authoritarian governments in Africa. In that continent, what the outside world sees does not always correspond to what is actually happening. The agenda set by the international community only gets taken up by a small, committed minority of people. At best, one might say that the legitimacy of certain authoritarian State models is now discredited. But this does not mean that democracy is the rule everywhere.

■ *We recently saw hordes of US businesspeople jostling for position at the entrance to Tiananmen square. At the same time, poor countries are being told: 'No aid without democracy and good governance'. Are business notions now supplanting those of human rights*

and democracy. As an observer of the international scene, how do you interpret this dichotomy?

– As in any dichotomous situation, the phenomenon of US businessmen rushing to China must first be seen in the short term context: against the background of President Clinton's visit and the opportunity to ease tension between China and the US. Above all, they have realised there is an enormous, genuinely emerging market with an extraordinary capacity for monetisation and marketing. Whoever gains control of this pool of jobs, services and sales can be sure that his future is guaranteed for several decades.

There are also other factors, such as the crisis in Asia. China, by virtue of its quasi-dictatorial structures, seems much more resistant to the turbulence than democratic-type societies. Here, we have the reverse effect of what I mentioned earlier: the very fact of being democratic creates weakness and leads to problems and even failures! This attraction to the Chinese market should not be justified without question, but there is an aspect of Asia that ought to be taken into account. This is that China is currently a refuge for those fleeing the Japanese market, which is unstable. So, you see, within Asia there is a kind of compensatory mechanism involving certain countries and China, at least for the time being, is benefiting from this.

In these processes, Africa loses out on a number of fronts. Interestingly, World Bank requirements on good governance and democracy are being applied to African societies but not to those in Asia. There are countries like Singapore, for example, which are not entirely democratic, though they are capitalist. One has to be extremely careful how one uses words and particularly how one applies them to situations which are quite dissimilar.

That is a problem with the concept of good governance. It is based on a highly subjective criterion, namely apply to others what you yourself practise. 'Good governance' is interpreted as acceptance of a 'superior' model of organisation and government.

■ *The Multilateral Investment Agreement is due to be signed soon, the WTO has now been set up and nationalism is on the rise in many parts of the world. Considering these developments, could it be that*

the democratic ideal is just a fleeting moment in the history of mankind?

– I would have to answer yes to that question. You don't need a degree, just a passing interest in social history, to understand what is going on. The age of modernity is already coming to a close, though quite slowly. The process has been going on since 1945. People have come to realise that State socialism, individualism and capitalism, the three pillars of modernity, are dangerous. We have to learn to control them and transcend them, despite the fact that, currently, they appear to rule our lives absolutely.

'We are moving towards systems other than the democratic one'

However, it will take perhaps 50 years, maybe even two or three hundred. Human society has a limitless capacity for invention, but history suggests that we tend only to be able to reach agreement on a new project at times of conflict or significant institutional crisis. But we are moving ineluctably towards systems other than the democratic one.

You might imagine that we are in the process of rediscovering pluralism – combining this with modernity's unitarian systems – along the lines of what is beginning to emerge in the South but also in the North. There is a kind of 'interbreeding' of systems which is becoming more common. This will progressively lead us to formulae in which modern unitarian models and endogenous African pluralistic models merge. South Africa is currently the continent's most impressive and important democracy, notably in the way it combines unitarian and pluralist principles. The shapes such formulae will take will depend entirely on man's genius. Differences are a source of wealth, so, on that basis, mankind is rich. But it is the complementarity of such differences which is the key to a good life.

Instead of principles being pitted against each other, they should be considered more in terms of their complementarity, on the basis of an intellectual and political, progression.

■ *What is your view of the radical neo-Marxist movement found in Anglo-Saxon cultures which advocates 'Democracy for all'?*

– One should never underestimate the importance of being able to federate, stimulate and orient societies. The African State and the Asian State are based on two different views of the world. The former has to reconcile and regulate social relationships, while the latter is professional and promotes development. The role of democracy should not be overvalued or devalued. The question is not posed as the Africans ought to pose it, because, once again, they have been unable to reflect on their conceptual and institutional heritage and have gone in search of other people's words which convey a meaning given to them by such people. The Africans use them to caricature their own reality and speak of traditional democracy, for example.

This does not mean that democracy has no place in Africa, nor that the democratic enterprise is totally inconceivable. Quite the contrary, in fact. It is conceivable insofar as Africans will put so much into this reality of popular involvement in political decision-making that they will make it their very own, describe it in their own words and employ all their resources in so doing. The fundamental idea is not to say that democracy is not a good thing for Africans, which would be totally scandalous. The genuine response should be provided by Africans on the basis of a reinvention of their experience, not of tradition as such, but of what they have gone through in order to build their society with its own cultural references. Society's problems need tailor-made solutions.

■ *Is 'African-style democracy' or 'democracy pure and simple' a political reality in anthropological terms?*

– The main problem is the establishment of African democracy – not an 'African-style' democracy – based on the innate genius of African societies. Only Africans themselves can achieve this. It is their future, their freedom and their way of thinking and living that are being challenged. I am amazed at Africans' reluctance to face these problems head on and come up with solutions to them. As an academic, I am always trying to inspire my students to enter the struggle and to make their own contribution to resolving what is for me a great enigma – the abdication of the intellectual.

It can be understood in a historical context. Africans were deprived of the means to organise modernity along their own lines by slavery

and colonisation, and much harm was done as a result. The burden has been borne by successive generations and today's new generation is very much a 'chip off the old block'. Yet it is this generation which should accept the challenge and take the historical initiative. They should not use a stereotypical, traditionalist history but instead society's current problems as

their basis for examining all kinds of experience. In this way, the solution will suit the problem. There is an extraordinary amount to be gained by looking at how one's ancestors approached life, and it is the new generation's responsibility now to seek solutions to suit the African genius.

Interview by M.F.

Civil society as a dynamic force

by Athanassios Theodorakis*

The concept of 'civil society' is defined in terms of the State. Gramsci's theory describing the respective roles and potentials of these two components of an industrial society has applied fully to and been borne out by the facts. After the 1960s, the social evolution of industrial societies demonstrated that, as far as the State (in the widest sense) was concerned, a multitude of social forces (associations, trades unions, NGOs, social solidarity groups) had developed, claiming and ultimately acquiring genuine power and considerable influence in public life. Such forces often make their presence felt well

beyond national frontiers, with the organisation of regional and even international networks. The most well-known of these associative movements and networks have acquired their high profile through spectacular initiatives in such sensitive areas as environmental protection, medical aid for refugees and humanitarian actions.

Two aspects which merit emphasis are, first, the sense of initiative and, second, the mobilisation of international public opinion. Civil society's forces thus contribute to a new distribution of political influence and thereby to the formation of a multi-polar world.

More particularly, as regards development and North-South relations, civil society as embodied in



industrial societies in Europe and North America, principally, has contributed:

- to a better understanding, awareness and revitalisation of the interest the northern hemisphere and the world as a whole has in sustainable development in the South;
- to the development models proposed by the North to the South being challenged, with all the criticism implied by such a challenge in terms of choice of methods, instruments, practices and objectives;
- to the promotion, in international debate, of new paths to solidarity and cooperation with the South (particularly at local and 'micro' level, North-South cooperation, coordination of the forces of civil society, and South-South cooperation).

As regards the role of civil society in developing countries, the debate should address three levels:

- the political level: for example, the role of civil society in the South in all its variants and forms, the 'reclamation' by the powers-that-be of societal forces (which find expression in NGOs,

in particular); and restrictions on the activity of civil society in a given context, due to objective social constraints such as the low level of citizen involvement, illiteracy and bad communications;

- the institutional and social level: the various forms of expression used by civil society in the South are *de facto* a positive element, because they help strengthen social forces and undermine political monopolies, thereby constituting a challenge to monolithic power;

- the level of the political culture: social forces project the image of a more transparent, multi-faceted society where a sense of responsibility and balance can be found, particularly among the younger generations. In this context, the dynamism of the private sector and of professional associations can have a considerable impact on the future.

The role of civil society is particularly important also in terms of promoting and monitoring the implementation of decisions taken by the international community on issues of global interest. The activities of Southern NGOs should, therefore, make a very useful contribution, as they will provide a link between local society and world evolution, act as a staging post, and promote universal values, particularly in the fields of information, human rights, and initiatives in the area of sustainable development.

Aside from these general considerations, I would like to present a few personal thoughts on more specific issues and areas, and particularly the future of EU-ACP cooperation, in the new context. Professor Pinheiro's general approach, which consists of involving *all* social and political players in the ACP-EU partnership, including civil society, may lead to a change in outlook and mutual acknowledgement

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of those involved. This is a *sine qua non* for achieving complementarity in our action, and a qualitative change in our cooperation.

The mandate recently adopted by the Council of Ministers regarding negotiations on the future of our cooperation prompts the following reflections. In the first place, there is a need to be more open about cooperation with civil society in the ACP States. This means that the partnership must be opened up realistically and specifically to the forces of civil society. New approaches, such as decentralised cooperation, local initiatives, and easier citizen involvement at grass roots level, are better responses and tools with which to tackle the problems posed by poverty in all its forms.

There is also an urgent need to take action to create an environment that is favourable to private enterprise in the southern hemisphere. Currently, the ratio of public aid to private investment is one to five. I

Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, former President of Mali, who handed over power to a civilian government to devote himself to humanitarian work with his NGO.

Civil society helps to reduce political monopolies.

believe we need to combine all our efforts (the EU, international organisations and ACP governments) so as to integrate private investment into consistent and forward-looking development strategies which ensure that the political, social and economic rights of citizens in the southern hemisphere are respected.

There is also an urgent need to open a debate, at international level, on the current contradictions of development (an explosion in the numbers of those living in poverty, increasing debt, the risk of margin-

Weaving project organised by a Somali NGO.

Civil society in the ACP states must be the expression of local traditions, cultures, principles and experience.

alisation of less-advanced countries from the global economy and, finally, the failure of programmes and macro-economic reforms to internalise social costs).


The new century will undoubtedly see a significant level of interdependence between the North and the South at all levels. All those involved in the debate must contribute to raising awareness and to defining a new context. This will allow not just a new departure on a sound basis, but also a future that is different from the one we have become familiar with from the daily news bulletins in this latter period of the 20th century (a century which has seen colonisation, independence, authoritarianism and social exclusion).

Obviously, civil society in the ACP States has to be the expression of local traditions, cultures, principles and experience. It is only by reevaluating experience and tradition that we can envisage the emergence of forces that are able to convince doubters and act credibly and effectively in the field.

Against this background, the particular importance and the role of forces in civil society should be emphasised in:

- the fight against corruption at all levels;
- transparency, responsibility and the promotion of good governance; and
- the creation of local, national and international networks to ensure consistency between development strategies. ■

A.T.



The Courier

Advancing democracy

The *International IDEA* experience in Burkina Faso

by Roel von Meijefeldt* and Carlos Santiso**

The international community began providing democracy assistance in the mid-1980s and expanding their support significantly in the early 1990s. This was in response to the 'third wave' of democratisation which brought another 60 countries from authoritarian rule to some kind of democratic government. The promotion of democracy not only focused on advancing democratic principles, but also on enforcing human rights, applying the rule of law, and on good governance. Lately, conflict prevention has been added as one of the virtues of democratic governance. Much of the assistance was initially provided with enthusiasm and benign naiveté. A lot of emphasis was put on the organisation of regular competitive elections. However, the establishment and practice of democracy has proved far more challenging, requiring a much wider time horizon than was first anticipated. With the experience gained and the lessons learned, the focus is now turning toward consolidating democracy. In this context, the *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance* (International IDEA) was created in 1995 as a new multilateral organisation with a mandate to promote sustainable democracy and to assist electoral processes. This article discusses the challenges facing international development cooperation in the effort to promote democracy and

good governance, and looks at the experience of International IDEA in Burkina Faso.

The dynamics of democracy and democratisation often fluctuate in unpredictable 'waves'. The initial euphoria early in the 1990s about the new wave of democracy on the African continent, for example, has subsided in the face of difficulties encountered in consolidating the initial gains. Of the 48 sub-Saharan states, the vast majority have held multi-party elections – of which less than half have been judged to be free and fair. In fact, scholars have calculated that a third of these states meet the minimum criteria of electoral democracy and only a fifth the criteria for liberal democracy. In short, the wave of democracy has been partly real and partly an illusion. The development of a democratic system of government, encompassing the various institutions which form the architecture of the state, the regulatory frameworks which guarantee the rule of law, political parties that function as the political conductors between civil society and the state, and a political culture conducive to the practice of democracy, is proving highly complex.

Transition to democracy cannot be properly understood if the multiple internal and external demands under which governments and political systems operate are not recognised. The factors of time and the rhythm or pace of change that provides the democratic momentum, need to be taken into account – without endangering the stability of the system as a whole (this is often incorrectly used as an argument to maintain the *status quo*).

Governments and political systems are under pressure from a variety of perspectives. Transform-

ing single party systems into democratic ones requires a different style of governance. Both governing and opposition parties need to adapt from a mentality of 'owning' the state for the benefit of particular interests to managing it in the common national interest. The polity also needs to adapt – from being passive recipients of government largesse or passive victims of government control, to energetic partners.

To ensure the political system remains dynamic, open electoral competition at all levels of public office is required at regular and set intervals. This competition must be organised in a strictly impartial manner to assure the legitimacy of those elected. The level of participation of the voting age population (not just those registered) is one significant indication of the trust of the population in their government. The competition for power requires accepted systems of alternation and provisions for dignified retirement from public office.

To enhance the stability of the political system, democracy entails the fairest representation of all groups within the major institutions of the state, and in particular the legislature. In many countries, this means that current electoral systems need to be revisited, with a view to bringing all interest groups into the process – with specific emphasis on the participation of minorities and achieving a better gender balance. The practice of designing electoral systems to consolidate the power of the incumbent government will prove self-defeating and will not guarantee stability. Political stability is a *conditio sine qua non* for attracting and retaining foreign investment to generate economic development.

It goes without saying that inclusive and participatory political systems are guarantors of long-term peace. Conflict cannot be prevented – indeed it is the fuel of any political system – but in democracies, it is *managed* through mechanisms based on such universally shared values as tolerance, equality, fairness, consensus, participation, transparency and accountabil-

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International IDEA

International IDEA, has 22 members, of which 17 are member states (Australia, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Costa Rica, Chile, Denmark, Finland, India, Netherlands, Namibia, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Africa and Sweden) and five are international NGOs (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, International Federation of Journalists, International Press Institute, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and Transparency International). In addition International IDEA has formal agreements and cooperates closely with the UNDP, the International Commission of Jurists and the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Switzerland also contributes to the work of the Institute

International IDEA's report, *Democracy in Burkina Faso*, is available on request (International IDEA, Strömsborg, S-103 34 Stockholm, Sweden. Tel: 468 698 37 00 - Fax: 468 20 24 22 - E-mail: info@int-idea.se - Web Site: www.idea.int).

Other International IDEA publications include: *Handbook on Electoral System Design* (1997), *Handbook on Women in Parliament: Beyond Numbers* (1998) and *Handbook on Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict* (forthcoming).

ity. These mechanisms allow conflict to be resolved peacefully.

The transition to democracy is taking place in parallel with the transition to open market economies, driven by the forces of globalisation. This is placing huge demands on systems of governance that must strive to find a new balance between the needs of the modern sector and the traditional sectors which most people still depend on for their livelihood.

The complexities of governance are compounded by the fast integration of global technology and communication. There is some merit in the view that many of today's problems are too big for states to handle, while states are too large to cater for the small problems. A shift has occurred in the role of the state and the pace of change is accelerating. While it took many generations to move from a farm-based to a factory-based economy, it has taken only a single generation to move from an industrial to a computer-based one. The challenge is to determine how people, their institutions and their procedures of governance can adjust to this increasing pace of change.

Recognising the shifts taking place and the complexities of the transformation is not the same as arguing for a reduced role for government. On the contrary, in today's world, this role is becoming more significant, although the style and functions will need to adapt to the changes.

A new generation of reforms is required which takes account of interrelationships at three multi-dimensional levels. The first is the relationship between a complex array of concepts including democracy, socio-economic development, peace and security, and human rights. The second is the relationship between different actors: the state, civil society and the market. The third involves the relations between the local, national, regional and international levels of governance. The promotion of democracy must be considered in all these contexts to ensure that reforms reinforce each other and are sustainable in the long-term. Key concepts in this respect are participation, inclusivity and ownership.

The international community has responded to the challenges of democratisation by making assistance for the process one of its core priorities. A key feature of the changing policy environment has been the gradual 'mainstreaming' of democracy promotion in the agendas and funding policies of donors. Increasing numbers of actors are active in the field of democracy promotion and electoral assistance.

In the past decade, the world of development cooperation has been transformed by the advancement of democracy and the promotion of good governance. The democracy assistance arena has expanded rapidly and now includes a myriad of organisations: governmental, inter-governmental, non-governmental and even private.

Their number and the scope of their reach has also gradually been expanding to include a complex range of interrelated activities, such as assistance to institution building, state and public sector reform, decentralisation, civil society development, political parties, women's empowerment, the strengthening of the rule of law, and administration of justice.

But this new international environment is also contributing to the complexities of managing political change. The need to attract foreign investment has prompted many governments to respond to donor conditionalities rather than focusing on strengthening their legitimacy and accountability in relation to their national constituencies. By no means all democracy assistance has been successful.

International IDEA's mandate is to function as an international professional resource base for democratic development, to provide an impartial meeting place for reflection, and to act as a forum for developing initiatives to strengthen democratic reform processes around the world. Its core programmes focus on establishing an international consensus about the normative framework for democratic practice (the 'Rules and Guidelines' Programme) and on strengthening local capacity (the 'Capacity Building for Sustainable Democracy' Programme.)

Capacity-building for sustainable democracy

The capacity-building programme has dual objectives. It aims, through consultation and dialogue, to widen choices and improve the performance of local institutions and actors who perform key functions in the democratisation process. It also aims to assist the international community in improving the quality of its interventions both in political support and in resource allocations to democratisation processes.

The programme started initially with a specific country focus and nine states were selected (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Burma, Guatemala, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Romania and

Zambia). In these countries, following an initial analysis of the democratisation dynamics, International IDEA's contribution is to:

- facilitate inclusive and participatory dialogues about democratic development (the *heart* of the programme)
- produce an assessment of the democratisation process, including policy recommendations for democratic reform; and,
- generate locally-driven democratic reform agendas.

These national dialogues are consolidated into new institutional capacity at the national level for promoting democratic development, either in the institutionalised form of Democracy Foundations – such as the Democracy Foundation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Center for Democratic Development of Nigeria – or in a flexible form of democracy networks – such as the task forces in Nepal, Romania and Burkina Faso.

The initiatives which arise from International IDEA's programmes are brokered to the international community, which is involved at an early stage in the process to ensure funding commitments. This stems from the fact that International IDEA has not been conceived as an implementing agency. The outcome of activities under the programme has been the establishment of a number of local institutions to promote sustainable democracy.

Burkina Faso

In 1991, after more than a decade under 'exceptional' military rule, Burkina Faso, began a transition to democracy through the introduction of a multi-party system, the enactment of a democratic Constitution and free – though highly controversial – elections. In this process, the country had the undeniable asset of political stability. The lack of ethnic polarisation¹ – reflected in the absence of an ethnic vote – and the limited recourse

¹ The two words in the country's name are from two of the three national languages. 'Burkina' is Moré, the language of the Mossi who are the largest ethnic group. 'Faso' is a Dioula word. The third national language is Fulfude, used by the Peul, while French is the official language.

to political violence explain the relative peacefulness of the process to date. In addition, Burkina Faso has a strong and dynamic civil society. Finally, although this is one of the poorest countries in the world, with an illiteracy rate of nearly 70%, the management of macro-economic policy in the last decade has contributed to well-balanced development and stability.

In terms of legal texts and institutions, the framework for democracy exists today in Burkina Faso. The political system replicates the French one. The major structural elements of the transition to a constitutional state were the restoration of the multi-party system in 1990 and the enactment of a democratic constitution, adopted by referendum, in June 1991. The latter is very liberal compared to other countries in the region. It provides for a separation of powers and two houses of Parliament, the National Assembly (*Assemblée Nationale*) and the House of Representatives (*Chambre des Représentants* – made up of members of civil society). It established direct universal suffrage as the method for electing both the President and deputies. It has taken time, however, to set up the institutions foreseen in the Constitution. The High Court of Justice, mandated to prosecute high public officials for crimes against the state, was only established in June 1998.

Section 13 of the Constitution recognises and guarantees the existence of a *multi-party* system, and the governing party generally respects the rights of the opposition. There are few barriers to the creation of political parties and, as a result, these have flourished. In 1992, there were 67 parties and groups of which 27 took part in the elections. Nine won seats in the Assembly of the People's Deputies (now the National Assembly). In 1997, the figures were 47, 13 and four respectively. The adoption of the Constitution was followed by a series of elections (presidential in 1991, legislative in 1992, municipal in 1995 and legislative in 1997). The electoral timetable has generally been respected and the next poll is the presidential contest, due in November 1998.

Freedom of expression is generally guaranteed and widely respected although human rights infringements still occur. Civil society is present and active, especially in the areas of human rights and election monitoring. The pluralism of the press is effective. Decentralisation, and the corresponding implementation of a local participatory democracy, has been initiated and is gradually expanding, even if numerous problems still exist.

Civil society, in the shape of various associations, human rights movements and NGOs, have played a crucial role in Burkina Faso's democratic transition, providing checks and balances and observing the conduct of elections. They have also monitored the operation of democracy between elections.

The authorities have clearly stated their willingness to promote democracy and strengthen good governance. Assessing what has happened since the transition process began in 1991, one may conclude that good progress has been made overall in institutional and political development. This observation has to be qualified, however. A recent assessment of the transformation process also reveals a number of concerns.

Concerns

In the first place, the move to a multi-party state and political pluralism has not yet led to any dilution of the symbiotic relation between the party in power and the state. The ruling party appears to dominate the executive, legislative and judicial branches and the civil service. It also has a strong following among prominent traditional chiefs, and is supported by the major economic actors. The opposition has thus only a very narrow political margin within which to operate. The private press, without necessarily expressing hostility to the opposition, is not yet an active counter-balance to the political establishment.

A second aspect relates to the principle of separation of powers. If this principle is not applied, there are insufficient checks and balances and a key requirement for democratic governance is missing. The *Inspection Général de l'Etat*

and parliamentary committees, which have the task of overseeing the Executive, cannot be effective in curbing corruption and ensuring accountability if they are, or are perceived to be partisan. Depoliticisation of the administration is another central element. The credibility of public institutions, and of the civil service in general, lies in their being impartial and trusted by the citizens.

A third point is that the electoral system favours the ruling party (the *Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès*). In the 1997 legislative elections, the CDP got 91% of the seats with about 70% of the vote. A system which gives the opposition a fairer share of the seats in the National Assembly, reflecting the popular vote, should be considered.

Fourth, the President has recently amended the Constitution to allow for an unlimited renewal of the presidency's seven-year mandate. This has been criticised by the opposition, which reads in it a provision for a president 'for life'. Since the amendment was hastily adopted, it leaves some doubt about the prospects for strengthening democracy. Looking at this development in the context of the CDP's dominance, the possibility of democratic alternation in power in the foreseeable future – another key element in consolidating democracy – is limited.

Fifth, the role of the legislature needs to be strengthened. The task of this relatively young institution is to prepare laws that reflect the interests of the people and to exercise a countervailing power to the authority of the executive branch. The current National Assembly, dominated by the CDP, will find it difficult to fulfil this role, although under Speaker *Maurice Traoré* (since 1997), it is in the process of asserting itself as the main forum for democratic debate.

A sixth point is that the independence of the judiciary needs to be reinforced – both *vis-à-vis* the Executive and in terms of its capacity to perform efficiently. While judicial independence is affirmed in the Constitution, the reality is more nuanced. The careers of judges de-

pend on decisions made by the government-controlled Upper Council of the Magistracy (*Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature*). Also, in the seven years of its existence, the Supreme Court has never struck down a law or executive decree on the grounds of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the proper administration of justice is inhibited by a lack of administrative capacity, both human and financial. There are only 10 High Courts (*Tribunaux de Grande Instance*) and two Courts of Appeal (*Cours d'Appel*). For democracy to consolidate, the rule of law must be upheld.

A seventh problem identified is the endemic weakness of the opposition. Democracy implies a majority *and* an opposition, yet the latter has great difficulty making its presence felt on the political scene. Opposition parties generally lack a support base, leaders and financial resources, and offer little in the way of long-term strategies and programmes. They are divided and heterogeneous. Divisions may be based on ideology, but also on deep-seated personal enmities, which makes it difficult to build the electoral alliances needed to compete with the CDP. Parties are often formed around prominent political figures rather than visions of society or policy programmes. In addition, the opposition faces an uphill struggle on a playing field which is not yet completely level. But democracy cannot subsist without countervailing powers and competition for public office. A stable majority, a credible opposition and the possibility of alternation are all key aspects of the democratic process.

Eighth, the role of the army remains ambiguous. In theory, it no longer intervenes in political matters but in practice, its presence in the shadows of power cannot be ignored. Attitudes and reflexes attributable more to exceptional rule than to the rule of law have been observed on occasion. For instance, the handling of the university crisis in the spring of 1997 raised concerns – although these were effectively addressed by the intervention of the Faso Mediator (*Médiateur du Faso*), the country's ombudsman.

Finally, there are worries about voter participation. Turnout is generally regarded as an indication of the democratic health of a country in transition, and – to a lesser extent – the legitimacy of the government. In Burkina, election turnouts remain low, although there has been a significant improvement in recent years. Participation rates in the 1991 presidential poll and in the 1992 and 1997 legislative elections were respectively 25%, 34% and 45% of registered voters. The Head of State was elected by 19% of the 3.4 million voters on the register (7% of the total voting age population of the country, estimated at the time at nine million).

So although there has been some remarkable progress towards democracy in Burkina Faso, the transition remains incomplete and fragile. On the other hand, an authentic democratic culture is gradually developing among the political elite and in wider civil society.

IDEA's capacity building programme

Recognising the significant progress made by Burkina Faso, IDEA decided to accept an invitation to visit the country and to introduce itself to the key stakeholders in the democratic process across the political spectrum. This enabled it to gauge the degree of interest in cooperating with a programme to strengthen the democratic reform process. The outcome was positive and a programme entitled '*Democratic Development in Burkina Faso*' was subsequently initiated.

This aims to assess the cadence of democratisation in Burkina Faso, identify the challenges and opportunities for further democratic development, and articulate an agenda for democratisation, through specific and practical policy recommendations. The broad objective is the long-term consolidation of democracy. Implementation entails facilitating political dialogue among the main national stakeholders about the challenges and opportunities for democratic reform, in an inclusive and participatory manner.

This dialogue has resulted in an 'assessment report' entitled '*Democracy in Burkina Faso*' which includes a democratic reform agenda with concrete suggestions for action. The various concerns and challenges enumerated above are detailed in this document.

The programme was initiated in 1996 with the consent of the national authorities, the active interest of civil society and the support of the international community. A more substantial dialogue about the opportunities for and constraints on democratic development was initiated with key resource persons across the political spectrum. This group of trusted counterparts – known as the *Contact Group* – are the main 'owners' of the programme. They determine the priority areas and design concrete initiatives, facilitated and supported by International IDEA.

After a series of consultations, the Contact Group identified the main issues in the democratic debate and drew up an agenda for action. In June 1996, a seminar, the *Dialogue for Democratic Development*, was held in Ouagadougou, with experts from the country and the region. This was chaired by *Adama Dieng*, Member of the Board of Directors of International IDEA and Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). This seminar dealt with the following substantive issues on the democracy agenda:

- the reform of the state (including good governance and decentralisation);
- strengthening the rule of law (including the Constitution, electoral law and procedures, and the administration of justice); and,
- the consolidation of a democratic culture (including the role of civil society and the political participation of women).

The objective of the meeting was to reach a shared understanding of the main challenges to democratic consolidation and to develop concrete proposals for deepening the democratisation process in Burkina Faso.

In January 1998, the assessment report (available in French

and English) was officially launched in Ouagadougou, by an international delegation under the leadership of *Grâce d'Almeida Adamon*, former Justice Minister of Benin. It was presented to the government, state institutions (including the Supreme Court), civil society organisations, political parties, the media, the university, and representatives of the international community. It received extensive press coverage.

The report assesses democratic governance critically and objectively, and offers a first comprehensive analysis of the opportunities for deepening the democratic reform process. It invites the Burkinabé to engage in political debate on the many concrete proposals developed in this local dialogue. Using actual election results, it also provides notional outcomes based on various possible amendments to the electoral system. This is intended to facilitate the debate on reforming the electoral system. The document contains an overview of current democracy assistance programmes for Burkina Faso provided by the international community. This enables an assessment to be made of the gaps that exist *vis-à-vis* the priorities articulated by the Burkinabé in the dialogue process. It thus provides the international community with a tool which should help in allocating the available resources more effectively.

The dialogue (in which the launch of the report is an important milestone), has already had some positive impact on the political process. It has been suggested that the report, and the International IDEA programme, have provided a constructive impetus for intense debate – on the professional and impartial running of elections, on improving the electoral system, and on levelling the playing field for political parties.

In February 1998, 10 opposition parties formed a coalition – the *Front Démocratique Uni pour la République* (FDR) in advance of this year's presidential election. Two of the main opposition parties have opted for full merger.

In April, an independent and permanent electoral commission was established by law after a wide debate in the National Assembly. A new electoral code was also adopted. The authorities are currently considering a reform of the electoral system and are examining the simulated results presented in the report. In addition they are considering vesting the opposition with legal status in the National Assembly.

During this year, the Assembly will hold a special plenary session to discuss the report and to advance the political dialogue a step further. The report serves as a reference document for a number of meetings and institutions – including the government's *Good Governance Action Plan* drafted with the assistance of UNDP. A radio programme is currently being considered to widen the debate and reach out to the population.

Burkina Faso sets an example of peaceful and gradual democratic change in a region of the world where conflict is all too common. The presidential poll of November 1998 and, more particularly, the next legislative elections in 2002, will be important landmarks for the consolidation of democracy in this Sahel country.

The inclusive and participatory approach of the IDEA programme, and its emphasis on identifying challenges and options for change rather than prescribing solutions, has been positively acknowledged. As one government official put it, it is an '*invitation to dialogue*' in the cause of further democratic development.

Promoting democratic reform processes is a sensitive issue. Initial experience in Burkina Faso suggests that this unique new international instrument can make a positive contribution. The international nature of IDEA's membership, together with its emphasis on impartial and professional support for complex transition processes, are the main features allowing IDEA to work effectively for the advancement of democracy. ■

R.v.M. & C.S.

Democracy in Asia

Human rights are more than an election

by Lotte Leicht* and Jean-Paul Marthoz**

Drawing a distinction between 'democratic' and 'non-democratic' governments in Asia can be very misleading. The word 'democracy' tends to be applied to countries that have had meaningful elections and a peaceful transfer of power to the opposition, but there are problems with that definition. The focus on elections often obscures ongoing human rights violations, so that countries that have had successful elections are often also successful in escaping international censure for a variety of abusive practices. It was the high turnout in the 1993 UN-sponsored elections in Cambodia that led the international community to effectively declare victory and turn a blind eye to the deep political problems just beneath the surface. Even experiments with elections at a very local level can earn a government the positive cachet of 'democratising,' so that the much-touted village elections in China are presented by the EU and Commission as positive proof that the country is opening up politically.

The 'democratic' label applied to a political system too often implies that the system is a monolith - the cliché of 'India, the world's largest democracy', for example, ignores the fact that some parts of India are under 'president's rule,' where the local legislature is suspended, or subject to draconian laws that effectively remove basic civil rights. The cliché also ignores the fact that for many tribal and lower

caste segments of society, the rule of law hardly exists. Other difficulties with the label are that once applied, it tends to survive even when democracy is clearly in retreat, as was the case in Sri Lanka under the United National Party during most of the 1980s and early 1990s, and that it often fails to take the political representation of women into consideration.

In Asia, there are two other problems with the democracy label and how it is applied. One is that Asian governments often see European promotion of democracy as meaning the effort to establish a carbon copy of Western political institutions rather than as a way of supporting indigenous efforts at political and social change. A second is that the two countries that seem to have emerged as nascent democracies after long periods of authoritarian control, Taiwan and South Korea, are seen by many to provide a model for other countries in the region. That model posits that, by putting economic development first, political openness will inevitably follow. There are both serious flaws with that model, and serious questions as to how applicable the Taiwanese or Korean experience is for the rest of Asia.

Rather than trying to group countries into categories such as 'democratic', 'non-democratic' and 'democratising', it would be more useful to look at respect for basic civil rights that are often identified with democracies: the freedoms of expression, association and assembly. Expanding the protection of these rights is often seen as critical to the development of civil society, another term that is fast becoming a meaningless

buzzword. In fact, it means all those social organisations and networks operating outside the official sphere, including professional associations, trade unions, charitable groups, women's organisations, political parties, the press, social clubs, and NGOs. At the same time, the various elements of civil society can themselves become an important source of pressure on a repressive government. But in Asia, there are no obvious trends or patterns.

In Cambodia, the political space established during the brief UN transitional administration allowed a wide range of NGOs to emerge, as well as trade unions and newspapers. Without restricting the ability of those NGOs to function, however, the government began a gradual stifling of freedom of expression and assembly, and there was an escalation of political violence. No amount of support for NGOs or judicial institutions, and there was a lot, could by itself have prevented the coup in July last year. What was needed was more sustained international attention to and pressure on the executive branch of the Cambodian government. The mistake now is to assume that this month's post-coup elections, in the absence of pressure to secure full freedom of expression, assembly, and association which should have been applied well before the polling date, will do anything but further entrench *Hun Sen* in power.

In China, Vietnam, and Burma, freedom of association is tightly controlled by the state, and NGOs as such do not exist. In China, during periods where state controls have relaxed somewhat, 'social groups,' some of them taking on the functions of NGOs, particularly in the social welfare and community development fields, have emerged. But almost all have government sponsorship or links to official government bodies. Such groups run into trouble as soon as they are seen as a challenge to the party. Likewise with freedom of expression: any public challenge to the political system remains a highly risky undertaking. In such a climate, programmes which support

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Vient Univers

the rule of law or provide technical assistance to village elections are useful, but there should be no illusion that they will fundamentally alter the political landscape without significant change at the top.

Sri Lanka is sobering evidence of the fragility of the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly, even when a democratic tradition, a long history of NGOs, and a strong legal system are all in place. In this case, the manipulation of ethnicity by politicians looking to expand their popular vote led to an increase in political tensions and then to civil war. The war was then used by a determined executive branch as a pretext for curbing basic freedoms.

It is important to note that throughout Asia, we are no longer dealing just with problems of repression within particular national boundaries. In East and Southeast Asia in particular, there is an increasing tendency of the more authoritarian countries to try and export their controls on basic rights to their neighbours - Indonesia's efforts to stop meetings on East Timor taking place in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia in 1994 and 1996 are cases in point, as was the pressure by Singapore on the Foreign Correspondents Association there to cancel a scheduled speech by

Indonesian opposition leader, *Megawati Soekarnoputri*. Malaysian Prime Minister *Mahathir's* call during the July 1997 meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to review the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with a view to making it more compatible with 'Asian values', was greeted with horror by human rights activists in the region. Almost every country in Asia seems to be undertaking efforts to control access to or material on the Internet. The uncritical acceptance by governments in much of Asia of the thesis that trade liberalisation brings about the greatest good for the greatest number has led to incentives being offered to foreign investors that directly undermine freedom of association, particularly insofar as it involves labour organising. Even India, with one of the strongest trade union movements in Asia, has not been immune from corporate pressure in this regard. If the struggle of Asian NGOs in the 1980s and early 1990s was largely focused on developments inside their own countries, the effort in the late 1990s, by necessity, was extended to the wider region - to ensure that their own gains were not undermined by government leaders in the name of Asian solidarity.

Campaign poster for Hun Sen in the recent Cambodian elections. Pressure to secure full freedom of expression, assembly, and association should have been applied well before polling day.

All this raises questions about various 'democracy promotion' programmes sponsored by individual EU countries and the European Commission. The question is not whether they are intrinsically valuable, because most of them are. The question is rather whether they do, in fact, contribute to democratic change. Too often, power relations that underlie and in many ways determine a country's political life are ignored - for example, in the area of judicial reform. Cambodia is undoubtedly a case in point. There is no question that help for building up the legal structure in the aftermath of the destruction wrought by the Khmer Rouge was, and remains, badly needed. But that assistance loses much of its potential impact when the EU does not speak out forcefully on the failure of the government to prosecute officials suspected of human rights abuses.

Funds are currently supporting a wide range of NGOs in Asia. The money is, by and large, well spent and provides both support and, in some senses, protection to the recipient organisations, many of which are

highly critical of their governments. But it is illusory to think that the NGOs by themselves will be a catalyst for political change. Asia shows us that strong civil societies can exist in a highly repressive political atmosphere. Like the economists who said it was impossible to have stagnation and inflation at the same time until confronted with the phenomenon of 'stagflation', the people who believed that a lively NGO movement and authoritarianism could not survive together may also, unfortunately, be proved wrong. Again it should be emphasised that such programmes are useful and should not be set aside. But if the aim is to bring about protection of basic rights, more attention needs to be directed to the source of those abuses - and that is the executive branch of government.

In China, those who are genuinely concerned about human rights, but worried about offending China or jeopardising EU-China relations, have focused on rule of law programmes as a constructive way of addressing both concerns. Again, these programmes are useful. Legal education, support for legal aid clinics, exchanges of judges and so on are unquestionably desirable, but their impact should not be overestimated. Despite some tentative steps toward reform, the legal system in China remains highly politicised, the judiciary still serves the Party, and penalties

for political dissent have, if anything, increased. Moreover, it is not clear that less arbitrary application of the law would constitute a step toward democratisation. Singapore is a good example of a legal system that manages both to meet the needs of the business community in terms of impartial resolution of contract disputes and of the state on political or freedom of expression cases, in an overall political environment that is anything but democratic. It should be noted that entrenched political power structures are not the only obstacle to protection of basic human rights. Corruption, emergency legislation, and civil war are others.

In highly corrupt governments, programmes aimed at judicial reform, strengthening civil society, or supporting elections may be wasted efforts unless the corruption issue is tackled head-on. In China, for example, businesspeople have been detained by police upon pressure from business rivals. Trafficking of women and children takes place across the region with the complicity of corrupt police and immigration officials. In Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Nepal, police act as the henchmen of rural landowners, often helping keep


Political activists in the Philippines at the time of the fall of the Marcos régime. Asia shows us that strong civil societies can exist in a highly repressive political atmosphere.

agricultural labourers from scheduled castes or tribal groups in conditions akin to slavery.

Subversion laws and other forms of internal security legislation can also act to undermine any gains in the protection of civil rights, one reason why the recent spate of laws passed by the provisional legislature in Hong Kong is so distressing. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in India, the Anti-Terrorism Act in Pakistan, the National Security Law in Korea, the Internal Security Act in Singapore and Malaysia - all these have been used to highly negative effect by the powers-that-be in Asia.

It is civil war or strife that tends to cause the most severe human rights violations and give a pretext to governments to curb democratic freedoms. Some of the worst human rights abuses in the region have been committed in the context of such conflict in Kashmir, the northeast of India, Sri Lanka, East Timor, Cambodia, and the Thai-Burmese and Bangladesh-Burmese border. Some of the perpetrators have been militaries and paramilitary groups attached to ostensibly democratic governments, but the distinction between democratic and authoritarian systems quickly gets lost. Democratic governments may not make war on each other, but they frequently make war on their own people with disastrous consequences.

In conclusion, the promotion of democracy in Asia is not necessarily the same as protection of human rights. Elections do not guarantee that protection, nor do they always secure a democratic form of government. Democracy assistance programmes are important, but they are not a substitute for sustained, direct pressure on the sources of human rights abuse. As already mentioned in the case of China, there has been a tendency to support programmes that would strengthen human rights without offending the Chinese government. An in-offensive programme, however, may ultimately be one without impact. ■ L.L. & J.-P. M.



Vikant Unwers

Women and democracy in Africa

by Satta Niang*

For many years of secondary importance in Africa, women are now linking up to form a united front to put an end to all the unequal treatment they have received since the dawn of time. For slightly more than a decade now, they have, slowly but surely, made resolute progress in economic life. They are waging their campaign on all fronts: equality of rights in terms of access to employment, working conditions, social protection and a fairer distribution of power. Gone forever is the era of the

submissive woman with no mission in life other than to take care of her home. This is the age of the independent woman who is finding the time to bring up children, have a career, campaign and take an interest in the wider issue of women's concerns. In short, she is broadening her field of vision. Nevertheless, such 'superwomen' account for only a very small proportion of the female population, a fact borne out by statistics. There is still a great deal of work to be done in this area. In the 1990s, women in Africa are entering centre stage and making their presence felt everywhere. Their involvement in economic life, long concealed, is now to the fore, in the full, cruel light of the generalised crisis.

Omnipresent in the domestic sphere, women are now to be seen on many fronts in society. Solidarity associations, economic interest groups and women's rights associations are springing up everywhere – women have entered civil society *en masse* and, to a lesser extent, public life. They are no longer restricted to 'social' activities, which keep them 'in their place' as good wives and mothers. They are also enjoying a higher profile in politics.

* Development consultant

Yesterday's reality in today's images

Contrary to accepted stereotypes, African women have always had real power within their household and extended family, despite the formal hierarchy of gender-based roles which might appear to subordinate them. Literature on the role of women during the democratisation process is sparse, despite the fact that huge numbers took part in the heated demonstrations that rocked Africa's towns and cities from 1989 to 1993. Nonetheless, women in Africa are still discriminated against both politically and socially.

Attempts to establish democracy in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s illustrated women's firm determination to become involved in the process of change. Freedom of speech was a necessary consequence of the national conferences that were held and there was a veritable blossoming of independent media in certain countries. As a result, women and their groups had a vehicle for expressing themselves as never before. In some countries, albeit faltering democratic practices provided them with further scope for expression through the ballot box – 'One woman, one vote'.

The role of electoral systems

One only has to look at the statistics to see that the countries with the highest number of women involved in politics are those with a proportional/mixed systems, conversely, countries with low female participation in politics usually operate majority/mixed systems. But the electoral system alone does not fully explain the differing levels of women's political representation. Other factors come into play. These include:

— *Political parties:* Aspects here include their ideological affiliation, selection criteria and processes, the party structure and the amount of encouragement given to promoting women within the political hierarchy – including how far it is willing to enable women to gain places on electoral lists;

— *Quotas and anti-discriminatory measures:* At both national and party level, there can be voluntary or legally binding measures, aimed at guaranteeing a specific number of female representatives, giving women positions of executive power, and ensuring their position on electoral lists;

— *Cultural and socio-economic factors:* These include education and profession, family responsibilities, the existence of child-minding services and patterns of work that are compatible with family life.

The concept of democracy cannot take on its full dynamic meaning until political decisions and those relating to national

Women have entered civil society *en masse* and, to a lesser extent, public life



Commission

legislation are taken jointly by men and women, with fair consideration of the interests and aptitudes of these two components of society. If the concept of democracy is to mean that all groups are equally represented, men and women, both of whom have something to offer to society, should be involved in decision-making bodies on as near to a 50/50 basis as possible. 'Fair' democracy also implies that men and women should genuinely share family responsibilities and reconcile their working lives with family life.

The recommendation adopted in Beijing seeks a commitment from governments to establish a system under which men and women are represented equally in governmental bodies and committees (as well as in public authorities and the judicial system). This objective must be achieved by applying quotas and other forms of positive action. It is a matter of working out what type of actions will have a long-term effect on the numbers of women involved in politics.

Mechanisms adopted by the parties

One of the main functions of political parties is to nominate and support their candidates. This gives them a key role in determining who ultimately gets elected. The candidate-selection process is thus crucial in terms of women's involvement. Many parties, however, have no specific strategy for encouraging women to put their names forward.

Various measures could be adopted by parties with a view to encouraging women to take part in political and public life. At the lowest level, these could be organisational, educational or logistic. The purpose of government-imposed quotas is to influence the result of an election, i.e. to guarantee that a certain number or percentage of seats are reserved for women. When positive action programmes were introduced (by national governments and political parties), the number of women successfully chosen as candidates and obtaining positions of responsibility within government increased significantly.



However, the use of quotas remains controversial. Criticisms based on equity have been raised. There can also be a dichotomy between those elected on 'merit' having gone through the successive phases of the electoral process and the female representatives who have been elected to reserved seats.

Those who attack quota systems talk of their discriminatory, interventionist and fundamentally non-democratic nature. In French-speaking Africa, many countries have eschewed the use of quotas at national level, declaring that they are contrary to the precept of equality of the sexes written into their national laws or constitution. Moreover, quotas aimed at increasing the number of women involved in politics would discriminate against other under-represented groups in society.

The case of Senegal's legislative elections illustrates the obstacles faced by women in political life. The COSEF (Senegalese Women's Council) has launched an awareness campaign to 'normalise' the position of women in political and decision-

The level of representation of women in politics is higher in countries with a proportional electoral system

making spheres. Women have long been under-represented, rarely appear at the top of electoral lists and have held few posts of political power. Despite their superiority in numbers, they remain a minority in political formations.

In the May 1998 legislative elections, the percentage of women nominated on electoral lists was 30% for the opposition parties and 20% for the party in power – reflecting the numbers involved at the grass-roots. The Senegalese Socialist Party has four women out of 12 members in its political bureau, 110 out of 600 on its central committee and one minister out of 27 in government. 33% of the opposition's political bureau, national secretariat and management committee are women.

A similar situation is seen in the legislature. From 1957 to the present, Senegal has had eight five-year parliaments. The first had no women at all; the second had one, the third two and the fourth four (out of 80

Numbers of women in executive and legislative posts in selected African countries

Country	Proportion of women in government (%)		Proportion of women in parliament (%)	
	1993	1997	1993	1997
Senegal	7	5.3	8	7.7
Burkina Faso	17	12	6	3.7
Togo	5	4.3	6.4	1.2
Benin	6	5.3	6	4.6
Côte d'Ivoire	8	9.6	5	8.3
Cameroon	3	4.5	12.2	12.2
Guinea	9	14.8	-	8.8

Source: UNDP 1995, Women and decision-making power in Africa

Globalisation, transition and international security

by Claude Nigoul*

When the Berlin Wall and the political order established at Yalta crumbled in the late 1980s, Europe celebrated the victory of democracy and of security rediscovered after 40 years of communist dictatorship and nuclear anxiety. Francis Fukuyama announced the end of history. The driving force of ideological confrontation had been halted, central Europe was embarking on the reforms needed for transition to democracy, and Russia itself, exhausted but resolute, was turning to the models she had fought against throughout the 20th century. Thus, even before the term had become fashionable, globalisation now seemed to be part of everyday reality – in the shape of a universal model of a political society which all states were invited to imitate.

It was a rosy but all too brief illusion. On the world's 'peripheries', there were still the disputes stemming from the break-up of the former empires – the legacy of unthinking colonial division. There were still the age-old, indigenous hatreds. Very few of the conflicts that one assumed had been fuelled by superpower rivalry actually came to an end. In Europe, nationalist aspirations, temporarily subdued by even more implacable forces, awoke, engulfing Yugoslavia in bloody conflict, while in the Caucasus, memories of genocide reopened wounds that had never totally healed. In Africa, entire regions, delivered up to gang leaders, were sinking into anarchy while ethnic massacres on a large scale were being prepared elsewhere. Meanwhile, in Asia and Latin

America, states whose entire economies were based on the proceeds of drugs trafficking were in decay.

With the spectre of nuclear war fading, the world now discovered a primitive violence against which it was helpless. The end of the Cold War meant that the two pillars of international security had been irreversibly weakened. The order set up at Yalta, based as it was on a simple 'balance of terror' formula, had crumbled away. Previously, the two superpowers divided the world into spheres of influence and effectively agreed to maintain a mutual balance of forces, embodied in the two 'defence' organisations – NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There were arms limitation accords for which negotiations were ongoing. Despite a number of hitches, it was possible under this system to prevent an escalation.

It was just as well that various institutional and diplomatic mechanisms were in place to manage crises. The principle of the inviolability of frontiers in Europe was written into the very foundations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Both camps took steps to prevent an unstoppable increase in the level of the peripheral conflicts with which they were involved. Thus, they avoided the risk of uncontrolled escalation which might result in direct confrontation going beyond the 'point of no return'.

With the conversion of the Soviet camp to the virtues of democracy and the free market, there was no longer any purpose to the communist system. The Warsaw Pact disappeared, NATO came up with an improvised, vague reform, the CSCE tried to fill the gaps by becoming a structured organisation geared to managing security problems, and the European Union worked

elected representatives). For the fifth set of elections, the size of the legislature was increased to 100 of whom eight were female members. The last three parliaments have had 13, 18 and 14 women, respectively, out of a total of 120.

Women see their under-representation as the result of internal democracy and believe it would be worse without the quota system which is currently in place. They also acknowledge the rearguard role played by traditional customs and practices, which are justified and legitimated not only by religion but also by illiteracy (68% among women as against 38% among men).

This political situation is thus unfavourable to women and is unacceptable from the following standpoints:

— *The practical standpoint:* complementarity between men and women no longer has to be demonstrated and women have proved they understand the changes that are occurring at the core of modern life;

— *The democratic standpoint:* women should be present where political decisions are taken and should be accorded their full demographic weight since, in a democracy, influence is a form of power;

— *The legal standpoint:* men and women are defined biologically as human beings and, as such, their rights converge in the unique nature of the universal values of law.

A single alternative is therefore available to women if they are to solve the problem of their marginalisation: a democratic struggle. If they do not fight, there will be no change.

S.N.

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on its inchoate ideas about autonomous security.

It looked like a good opportunity to restore the system of collective security born out of the Second World War. Conceived at a time when the outlook was one of global peace, the system was established by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council was the central cog of the organisation, responsible for condemning aggression and reconciling aggressors, through diplomacy initially and, if necessary, by the mobilised force of the international community. Only the division of the world into two opposing blocs had prevented this arrangement from functioning.

It is worth recalling that when Iraq invaded Kuwait, it provided an exemplary case for the unprecedented application of the system. The act of aggression was undeniable and it involved two sovereign states as defined under the Charter. Unfortunately, although the diplomatic stage went exactly according to the rules and procedures of Chapter VII, and gave a fine illustration of the way the mechanisms provided were linked together, it did not allow for the stubbornness of Iraq's dictator. Force, therefore, had to be envisaged and the international community mobilised.

The system then began to show its limits, revealing that the UN was incapable of setting up its own force in a still divided world. Unable to act as the world's policeman, the United Nations had to content itself with sanctioning the intervention of a coalition which was little more than the United States in disguise. President *George Bush* was then able to call for the establishment of a 'new world order' which bore a remarkable resemblance to an American world order.

The ambiguous nature of the concept of globalisation suits the universal and instant success accorded to it. This 'fair idea, fixed idea, vague idea?' conceals complex and disparate realities, the least controversial being that, in the wake of revolutions in physical and other means of com-

munication, space and time have contracted. Globalisation is, first and foremost, the instantaneous connection of people and organisations around the world and the phenomenal multiplication of the opportunities for exchange which arise from this. The concept of 'humanity' has hitherto been the prerogative of poets, philosophers and prophets, but it is now being given concrete form.

Admittedly, international law began some decades earlier to give it a legal formulation through concepts such as 'crimes against humanity' or 'humanity's common heritage', but humankind specifically can now begin to think in global terms of its solidarity and dependence and no longer only in terms of the narrow limits of sovereign states.

This awareness that the whole of humankind belongs to one and the same global entity is only expressed occasionally (for example, more than a third of the planet's inhabitants watched the World Cup Final on television). But, by manifesting itself through shared moments of emotion, it is a good illustration of the emergence of a common cultural system of reference. The globalisation of culture was anticipated by *Marshall MacLuhan* 30 years ago. But in the global village, there is more than just a range of universally standardised products, of which Coca Cola, McDonalds and CNN are symbols. There is also a general rallying to forms of societal organisation based on the Western concepts of human rights, parliamentary democracy and the market economy.

Economic globalisation has the capacity to spread itself over these cultural substrate using modern technical means. The factors have become more fluid with an emphasis on maximising the efficiency of circulation. Those who use the optimum and most rapid routes can take advantage of the best opportunities wherever these arise. Economic globalisation is not, therefore, just the huge capital flows (\$1300 billion daily – more than 40 times world trade) set in train by a mere hundred or so financial operators. It is also the move-

ments inspired primarily by the concern to obtain an optimum return on investments.

It includes the appearance of globalised enterprises ('mega-firms') which adopt competitive strategies to enable them to integrate their resources and products by mergers, alliances or global networking. These financial and economic giants are becoming major players in international relations and even some nation states do not carry as much weight as they do.

Set out in this way, globalisation appears to be the emergence of a partition-free global area in which new players, by virtue of their power or widely accessible technical performance levels, escape the control of states and international organisations, and confront one another on the world market with no rules other than the ones they themselves set, and no constraints other than the inherent limitations of the market.

Before attempting to assess the impact of such phenomena on international security, it is important to view what is happening in relative terms. A global awareness is perhaps taking shape, but an awareness of differences which sometimes appear blurred at continental level is easily exaggerated when laying claim to a local identity.

While most are concerned with celebrating a world where images, ideas and, therefore, knowledge circulate instantaneously, others, such as *Jean Christophe Ruffin*, point, with concern, to the appearance of new *terrae incognitae*, which spread patches over the surface of our planispheres where the benefits of a globalised civilisation never penetrate.

If one remembers that half the world's population has never dialled a telephone number, it is easier to understand why the Club of Lisbon preferred the word 'triadisation' to 'globalisation'. It was referring to 'the fact that the technological, economic and sociocultural integration amongst the three most developed regions of the world (Japan plus the NICs from South East

Asia, Western Europe and North America) within the general context of the globalisation of human and social development, is a more prevailing tendency than integration between the most developed countries and the less-developed or poor countries themselves'.

This analysis implies a 'de-linking' phenomenon – a process whereby, on account of globalisation, certain countries and regions gradually loosen their ties with the most economically developed countries and regions. It is a hypothesis that is hotly disputed by others, who draw attention to the formidable impulse that the emergence of a global free market brings to the global economy and the inevitable, according to orthodox liberalism, spin-offs from which the most deprived should necessarily benefit.

A factor for integration or a factor for exclusion? This is the first question arising from an examination of the effect of globalisation on international security. One cannot seriously claim to be unaware of the social consequences of a planet-wide economy abandoned solely to market forces. The OECD Secretary-General, *Donald Johnson*, recommends that we should beware of the social consequences of globalisation.

James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank Group, regards the current situation as a

time bomb which might explode in our children's faces, adding that, if world leaders do not take appropriate measures immediately, the number of people living in poverty will perhaps increase from three to five billion over the next 30 years and environmental degradation and the threat of war will also increase during that period.

In economic terms, the development of an unplanned globalisation process would obviously be significant for both international and domestic instability – even for the most powerful, as appears to be demonstrated by the current evolution of the Japanese situation. While waiting for an invisible hand 'equitably to distribute the product of worldwide global growth', it is the logic of maximum profit at any price which prevails. After all, what is the essence of the market? *Michel Camdessus*, Director-General of the IMF, has a clear response to this, saying that pricing is as free as possible, but if the market were left entirely to its own devices there would be a high level of danger. He goes on to say that it is not necessary to look back to the nineteenth century for evidence of this – the weakest are trodden underfoot. In pure terms, pricing may be killed off.

The number of people living in poverty will increase from 3 to 5 billion over the next 30 years

The picture which emerges therefore seems a long way from the promise of near-universal support for human rights – when we were offered a glimpse of a historic victory of democracy over dictatorship. Abandoned solely to the antagonistic forces which inhabit it, the globalised market is destined for the social and political shocks that flow from exclusion, inequality and the confrontation of large predators. Is this different in any meaningful way from the existing world of sovereign states? That, in effect, is the paradox. A world which is fought over by the strongest and which tramples the weakest underfoot mirrors the contest among states and warlords who are incapable of subordinating their egotistical interests to the general good of the planet.

This is undoubtedly the most worrying challenge to international security brought by advancing globalisation. Alongside a world of nation states which, admittedly, is sometimes unjust and uncontrolled, but which is regulated by international law and diplomacy, a second world is emerging in which unbridled violence appears to be the only rule of the game between unpredictable and often elusive players. The latter monopolise skills for their own benefit, pursue their ambitions of commercial, ideological, criminal or small-group conquest and domination, with no regard for the territorial or legal divisions which hitherto kept them in check.

The major economic operators are developing globalised strategies to impose their presence and take on the worldwide competition, in the process confronting even the strongest states, investing in the most vulnerable and ignoring the weakest. Meanwhile, another space for violence is opening up – that of a planet-wide den of thieves. Disregarding devalued frontiers, a changing, terrorist nebula combines with organised crime to weave a *mafioso* web across the planet, as can be seen in the Italian *mezzogiorno* and big cities in the USA.



(ANSA/EPIC)

Terrorism – one-off acts of extreme violence carried out for a ‘just’ cause by minority groups against non-combatant targets, with a view to influencing opinion – is now in the throes of change. First, in the means it employs, which combine traditional and sophisticated, cyber-terrorist techniques. Change is most evident, however, in its inspiration. The cause of a people fighting for independence and attacking the symbols of the oppressive state is being replaced by extraordinary motives that drive sectarian fanatics, advocates of technical purity and of a purified nature.

One rung up are the guerrilla fighters. Once able to bask in extended Guevarist romanticism and imbued with ideologies supported by allied powers from abroad, such fighters have achieved independence. In Africa, South East Asia or Latin America, they no longer defend any particular cause and their strategy has been reduced to accomplishment through violence.

The terrorist or *guerillero* is now little removed from the criminal, pure and simple, engaged in a reverse process of rationalising his activities. Using technological change in the information sector, it has been possible for criminal gangs to extend their field of illicit operations and maximise their profits. By becoming Transnational Criminal Organisations (TCOs), the Italian, Turkish and Russian mafias, Colombian and Mexican cartels, Japanese yakusas and Chinese triads are setting up a crime economy where drug trafficking and the laundering of dirty money are taking over from traditional criminal activities. The superpowers of crime no longer have any connection with the gangsterism of past decades. The most significant of them are genuine multinationals, operating according to a flow chart which would do Exxon or Coca Cola justice and generating colossal sums in turnover.

These new participants in this type of unbridled violence are, without doubt, the products of globalisation. Better than any other, they have been able to

take advantage of the removal of divisions and the ease of exchange which ensues to extend and develop their markets, refine their processes and frustrate state regulation. Dirty money is now laundered as part of the huge capital flows of daily financial transactions.

A further paradox of globalisation arises here in that it has created the right conditions for the democratisation of violence. The processes of history have been slow but they finally led to a situation where the state was seen as the only repository of legitimate violence. The idea may not have become fully entrenched but, by and large, the state obtained a legal monopoly over violence, to be used for its own benefit. This is the supreme attribute of sovereignty. But the monopoly seems now to be breaking down. Undoubtedly still illegal, violence is increasingly being privatised because states do not have the means to oppose its expansion in the hands of players both new and old. The uncontrollable violence which is the natural *modus operandi* of such actors prospers in the face of the powerlessness of national or international security systems – which are ill-adapted to an increasingly globalised theatre.

Towards an era of chaos?

As we have seen, a number of forces are in competition. Unleashed by globalisation, they are seeking to fill a planet-wide space. Usually driven by the search for profit at all costs, any notion of a general global interest is foreign to them and their incorporation into an organised order can only be imposed on them by a forceful, federating power. Could this emerge from the parallel order of states? Globalisation has revealed a process which has long been in operation: the decline of the state as the exclusive structure of any political organisation. So, is it about to disappear? This must be doubtful. Absolute, unchecked sovereign rule belongs to a by-gone age, but the universal federation has not yet arrived.

So the state continues to underpin the various levels at which the human solidarity movements which transcend them are confirmed. Certain regional spaces, such as the European Union, provide original models of organisation which seek to manage the general continental interest, leaving grass-roots communities essential freedom of action. This method has been seen to work: a Europe continually torn apart by international war has become a security-oriented community where, for a good half century, weapons have been silenced. So, is global subsidiarity conceivable?

The universal pseudo-democracy of states that the UN attempted to set up is being replaced by ‘boards of management’ consisting of the major regions of the world, themselves freely recomposed, which should become the guarantor of mankind’s general interests and thus of international security. *Samuel Huntington*, for one, sees such a future as constituting a violent shock for civilisation. Others, such as *Boutros Boutros-Ghali*, in his *Agenda for Peace*, has a more harmonious view of ‘the UN cooperating with regional agreements and organisations’.

What if the worldwide empire forming before our eyes becomes the order known as ‘globalisation’ and its existence the only alternative to chaos? We would then do well to remember the appeal made by *Javier Pérez de Cuéllar*, UN Secretary-General at the height of the Gulf Crisis: ‘It is unclear to me what President Bush means by a ‘New International Order’. To my mind, this means worldwide democracy, that is to say a fairer distribution of wealth. Unfortunately, this is not the case for countries in the Third World and, over ten years, we have made extremely poor progress. None of the world’s problems can be solved if there is no resolution of the North-South imbalance. World peace does not just flow automatically from the ending of the Cold War’.

C.N.

The situation in the countries of the former Soviet-Union

by Yevgeny Kozhokin*

In this article, the Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in Moscow analyses the state of democracy in the countries of the former Soviet Union.

The USSR had a unified structure of government with a clear system of interdepartmental coordination in the decision-making process. Actual decisions were taken in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), elevation to these top bodies being based on personal loyalty, bureaucratic intrigue and promotion of the interests of the 'most important' republics. However, in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the political and governmental decision-making process became slow, with long delays, and decisions were tied to compromises. The near chronic inability of the Head of State to act during that period (the sick Brezhnev was followed by the ailing Andropov and the ill Chernenko) paralysed the system. In the end the country was going nowhere.

There was a deep dichotomy in Soviet society in the period before Perestroika. All aspects of political life and any analysis of political and economic reality had to fit in with clearly defined ideological canons. Meanwhile, the everyday life of society, including culture, was not only estranged from ideology but was actually opposed to its dogmas to a significant degree. The deeply rooted consumerism of society was strengthened by the lack of normal intellectual analysis of what was going on and by the oppression of new spiritual aspirations.

One aspect of the 'quasi' consumer revolution imprudently set in train by Gorbachev was a vague aspiration on the part of the Soviet intelligentsia for a more effective and just form of government. However, society was not ready for the creation of a new political and administrative regime. There were no figures like Rousseau or Montesquieu in the Soviet period. The system collapsed incredibly quickly. The initial building blocks for the new state order were structures from the recent past. The soviets (representative bodies) at various levels were opposed to the Communist Party, and free elections gave them renewed legitimacy and genuine power.

The intellectually impoverished Communist Party feebly opposed the emerging democratic soviets in 1989 and 1990. Gorbachev soon became the first victim of the dismantlement of party power he had himself initiated. The top-level move to establish the post of President of the Union contribute nothing fundamentally new to the break-up of the Soviet state. The degradation of the party and state system opened up opportunities for those bent either on getting rich quickly or on seizing power using nationalistic and democratic slogans.

The disintegration of the USSR was the consequence, not of a national liberation struggle, but rather of the cumulative effect of structural economic crisis and the long-term decay of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The 1991 crash and the Gaidar reforms of 1992 were victories for a counter-revolution that came 70 years late. The dangers of such a futile counter-revolu-

tion were described as far back as the 1930s by the great Russian philosopher, Nikolai Berdyaev, in his book *'The sources and sense of Russian communism'*, finally published in Moscow in 1990. Though a staunch opponent of Bolshevism, he considered even at that time that, in the absence of an organised force capable of assuming power (not to carry out a counter-revolution but for the purpose of creative development, building on the social achievements of the revolution) the sudden collapse of Soviet power would constitute a danger for Russia and bring with it the threat of anarchy' (*ibid.* p.120).

The peak of anarchical democracy in the post-Soviet area came in 1991-1993. Having obtained genuine power and legitimacy in the Gorbachev period, the Supreme Soviets of the various states strove for more than just legislative powers, and found themselves fighting rearguard actions against presidents who had established tight control over the entire state apparatus. With the exception of Ukraine and Moldova, the new parliaments were outmanoeuvred in all the CIS countries. Eastern authoritarian regimes were strengthened in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Slightly more moderate regimes, with a genuinely functioning, though powerless, opposition, were established in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

During the 1990s, Russia has not determined the type of political development in the other countries of the CIS, although the general direction, the constitutional set-up and the political institutions in many post-Soviet countries were established not without a certain Russian inspirational influence.

The instruments used in Russia in the transition from anarchical democracy to authoritarian democracy were subsequently taken up by many leaders of CIS countries in order to solve their own problems, different from those of Russia. The most striking example was the use of referendums to strengthen personal power. Following the Russian referendum in 1993, which led to the replacement of the country's constitution in the second half of that year, referendums were held in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These plebiscites prolonged the extensive powers of the respective presidents for a period of several years. The Presidents of Kazakhstan and Belarus followed the example of Yeltsin, who, in his struggle with the Supreme Soviet, had used an unconstitutional body, the Constitutional Convention. This brought together representatives of various political and social organisations, local self-government and state institutions. N. A. Nazarbayev relied on the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan he had convened himself, while A. G. Lukashenko convened the Congress of the People of Belarus as a counterbalance to that country's Supreme Soviet.

Russia, Ukraine and Moldova share similar problems regarding the paralysis of left-wing forces. The Communist opposition draws its support from the dissatisfaction of the population but is unable to exploit its political capital to work out an alternative solution to the crisis. In the final analysis, the Communists are unable to exert effective influence on government in terms of establishing a more rational economic regime. Their political activity simply worsens an already difficult situation. The archaic Communist opposition is unwittingly creating the conditions for a postponed political crisis. Boris Yeltsin won the 1996 presidential contest largely because the Communist candidate was a 'non-

starter'. But the incumbent did not enjoy sufficient support in the country, even in 1996, to govern effectively. His lack of political backing has become evident long in advance of the next presidential election scheduled for 2000 – being clearly revealed during the first major domestic shock, the 1998 financial crisis. The political extent of this crisis was obvious from the demand made by many demonstrators for the President to resign, and the unprecedented pressure exerted on him by financial groupings. The latter obtained the government team they wanted, as well as a firm commitment from Yeltsin that he would not seek a third Presidential term. In Ukraine, a situation is developing that echoes, in many respects, the position in Russia, only one cycle later. The most likely winner of the 1999 presidential poll is the somewhat unpopular incumbent *Leonid Kuchma*. His chances of victory were boosted by the partial setback suffered in parliamentary elections by two of his opponents, former Prime Ministers *E. Marchuk* and *P. Lazarenko*, and by the failure of his main rival, Socialist leader, *A. Moroz*, to become parliamentary speaker. The unfortunate actions of certain Ukrainian Communists contributed to Moroz's defeat. However, at regional level, in the autonomous area of Crimea, the Communists succeeded in reaching a compromise with the governing party leading to the formation of a coalition government. Given Ukraine's dire economic situation, a Kuchma victory in 1999 may well be followed by a crisis similar to the one currently being experienced by Russia.

The fact that the Communist opposition in Russia, Ukraine and Moldova exists quite legally and has been incorporated into the ruling class to a certain degree (through parliamentary structures) makes it less dangerous and far more predictable than the underground, radical Islamic opposition in Uzbekistan and other Central Asian Republics.

As far as the situation in Central Asia is concerned, the threat is not so much to democracy but rather to the minimum level of human rights still being observed in eastern authoritarian states such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This human rights baseline must be nurtured because, while the situation could well get worse in the foreseeable future, it will certainly not get any better.

The regimes in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan may turn out to be short-lived, as their stability depends largely on the personal qualities of their heads of state. However, there is no chance of their being replaced either by Western-type democracies or by authoritarian democratic systems along Russian lines.

To preserve stability in Central Asia, it is essential that Russia becomes stronger rather than weaker. The advocates of secular government in this region continue to look to the north for support, from Russia.

The main threat to democracy in Russia is basically the same as the threat to the existence of the Russian state itself, namely the moral decay that affects a significant proportion, not just of the ruling class, but of the people as well. No-one has managed to pull the nation together. In fact the very concept of nation has no generally accepted meaning among Russians. They undoubtedly have a tremendous will to survive, but there is no basic set of shared ideas to underpin wider efforts to re-establish the state – and to organise a new national economy sufficient not only for extensive regeneration of Russian society but also for its rapid modernisation. There is no doubt that Russia has a sound moral core. The difficulty lies in finding a political will to express this. Efforts are being made to find common national ideas and to formulate them in a generally comprehensible way. And yet, none of the country's present leaders aspiring to become president in the year 2000 has a clearly formulated set of ideas. It is

no secret to the Moscow elite that *Alexander Lebed* is unprincipled and that *Georgy Zyuganov* is slowly but surely losing his character of champion of the downtrodden and disinherited (and that his red Communist colours are turning pink). It is not so much Zyuganov himself as the Communist Party which continues to garner a considerable proportion of the Russian protest vote, but neither he nor his party has been able to draw up a positive programme, and they are unlikely to be able to do so in the future.

Y. M. Luzhkov and *G. A. Yavlinsky* have more clearly defined sets of ideas. The former is associated with a series of colourful symbols: the Orthodox Church of Christ the Saviour, Sevastopol as the town of Russian glory, the protection of Russians in the Baltic states, and an economic approach designed to renew Russian industry (on closer examination, his economic ideas and practices may be described as communal statism.)

The latter, in the view of many in Russia, is the most consistent supporter of democratic values and principles, and is capable of reforming the social safety net for the poor. He is the idol of members of the intelligentsia who are deeply disappointed with Yeltsin and who reject *Chubais* and *Gaidar*. They see him as a conscientious, honest person capable of conducting a sensible economic policy with the support of the West.

However, Luzhkov, Yavlinsky and Zyuganov share one drawback – they are too well understood. The population basically knows what to expect from them. The vast majority of the people are completely confused and their mood is one of 'a bad end is better than an endlessly bad situation'. In these circumstances, an enigmatic and charismatic figure has a greater chance of becoming a national leader. Ordinary Russians want to see an end to the interminable crisis. The simple, crude, but always somewhat insinuating aphorisms of Lebed, with his fierce appearance and aggressive facial expressions, largely meet these hopes for a sudden change – if not for the better, then at least for something different.

Lebed is a myth and has a colourful exterior, but he has no substance. More precisely, his substance boils down to an absolute hunger for power. In this respect, he is following exactly in the footsteps of Yeltsin. However, his experience in Afghanistan and Transdniestria prepared him mentally for more radical approaches to problem-solving than Yeltsin has ever used. What is more, in the foreseeable future, Lebed will be far more active than the current President, who is ill and periodically shows complete indifference to matters of state.

The country will find out just how tough a military disciplinarian Alexander Lebed is if he ever comes to power. He has already created a new deep division in society, with a significant number of people refusing to believe the myth, having decided what this general and governor is really like. Many in the Russian Federation, who have already become accustomed to freedom, have no yearnings whatever for despotism.

Democracy, in spite of all the threats it faces, remains vital for the countries of the CIS, not least for Russia and Ukraine. The success of democracy in these two states is imperative if there is to be gradual progress towards systems based on the rule of law in the Central Asian area. It is essential that the specific Eurasian characteristics be understood if the dialogue between Western Europe and the CIS countries is to help the people of the post-Soviet region to recognise the merits of democracy for themselves. ■

Y.K.

Momo Wandel Soumah

Back to the roots of African jazz

Momo Wandel Soumah is part of the network of African musicians condemned by circumstances to years of painful anonymity. He may not be as well known as *Youssou N'Dour*, *Mory Kanté* or *Alpha Blondy*, but, if you look more closely, his humility and the sheer depth of his talent will captivate you and you will be irresistibly seized by a desire to know more about him and his music. Wandel very quickly understood that a mixture of genres was the way forward in music, but success, for him, was late in coming. The perfect combination he has achieved of different musical styles was worth *The Courier* going to meet him during a recent trip to Guinea.

He is a large, cheerful man with an engaging personality. His face still looks young, with few signs of age, as if Nature were indulging him so that he can play his music for as long as possible. Now 73, the Guinean saxophonist *Momo Wandel Soumah*, better known as *Wandel*, delights in the international recognition his musical style is receiving, a style accomplished by dint of talent, work and, in particular, his thirst for creativity. Wandel has little trouble achieving a fusion between traditional African music and jazz. With him, this is a new genre which, some time ago, had only a virtual existence, but has since become very real. It is well known that jazz was essentially *black* music, but, until recently, it was unusual, on the African music scene, to find a combination of different rhythms and, above all, different instruments and sounds. This artist, who has made a number of attempts to seize centre stage, is known in Guinea for his skilful mix and amalgam of tunes, cadences and other melodies borrowed from his country's cultural, ethnic, linguistic and historical diversity.

Wandel took up music in 1947, well before his country

gained independence. Sent by the colonial authorities as head of post at Labé, in Fouta Djallon, he began to play the *Bailôl*, a traditional *Peul* instrument, moving on to the banjo and subsequently the mandolin. 'At that time, we were playing a lot of rhythms from abroad, such as the biguine, paso doble or mazurka', he told us. His first contact with wind instruments also dates from that period. He explained that, one day, when his group was getting ready to play, the clarinetist had still not turned up. 'I was really angry and went up to our band leader. I asked him just how difficult it was to play this 'piece of wood'. I told him I would like to try, so he demonstrated the first few scales to me and I began to play'. It was an easy move for him to take up the majestic saxophone, playing the intoxicating jazz tunes he himself composes. 'Jazz is in my blood', says Wandel, without any hint of boastfulness. He is a disciple of some of jazz's most prestigious personalities: Coltrane, Armstrong, Gillespie, Parker, Miles Davis and Hawkins, to mention just those who have inspired this Guinean musician.


With Guinea's independence in 1958 and the confirmation of a certain national identity, the great majority of Guinean musicians returned, not without problems, to the grass roots of traditional music, particularly music from the country's folklore. Hitherto, this type of music had been largely the preserve of *griots* and folklore ensembles. As a member of the 'Kelitigui' National Orchestra, Wandel was also to discover, with his African group *Sex Tet*, the joys of mixing the tonal qualities of African instruments (bolon, balafon, kora, flute, percussion instruments, etc.) with the graceful sound he could produce on the saxophone. The composition of his group, which is a comprehensive representation of his country's cultural and musical styles, counts for a great deal. The artist chose his musicians with great care.

In 1988, at the first MASA (African Art and Entertainment Market) in Abidjan, the Guinean composer's creative genius was a revelation to all. He won first prize for his successful marriage of traditional instruments and modern melodies, thereby opening up new vistas for music in Africa. Yet tuning traditional instruments successfully to achieve this musical 'graft' is by no means easy. He had to juggle skilfully with hundreds of scales. 'That's all there is to the secret of my success', Wandel confesses, making it sound easy! Invited several

Momo Wandel Soumah.

The Courier





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The wealth of Guinea's musical landscape needs no further illustration.

times to play abroad, he has graced the stages of a number of festivals (Limoges, Nantes, Taiwan, Bogotá...) Meanwhile, he trained at the International Music Centre in Paris and at the School of Jazz, and played in *New Morning*. 'Matchowé', his first album on compact disc, is now widely available in Europe. To avoid the copyright infringement to which many African musicians fall victim, it has unfortunately not been possible for the album to appear on cassette – illegal cassettes are common in Africa.

Momo Wandel is optimistic about the future. His long years of experience have not made him any less eager to pursue and refine his art. He is currently seeking a serious, experienced promoter to help him gain a higher profile. Many Western musicians have already shown an interest in this original type of music and some have indicated they would like to meet him. Technical and financial support would enable him to play, and, above all, share the result of his work throughout the world. Wandel's serious side means that he is now a member of a group of creative artists and is involved in Guinea's most prestigious selection boards.

Momo Wandel Soumah urges the new generation of Afri-

can musicians to follow in his footsteps. Aware that he has to pass on his knowledge and skills as soon as possible, he has taken a few young talents under his wing with a view to schooling them in the tricks of the trade. His message to them is clear: courage, patience and work, backed up by the will to learn music in depth and without taking shortcuts. These, he believes, are the keys to success. He deplores the attraction held for young people by the piano or the guitar, which are easier to master than wind instruments. 'Ten good years of regular and assiduous practice are needed to be able to claim a thorough knowledge of the saxophone', he stresses, echoing the remarks of *Manu Dibango*, Africa's greatest saxophone virtuoso from Cameroon.

Wandel is therefore campaigning for the establishment of a major music school in Guinea and he is confident that his ideas will be taken up. However, he is fully aware of the problems that culture in his country currently experiences. Funding is extremely limited and the priorities of the government, concerned with consolidating the economic upturn of the last few years, lie elsewhere (a Country

Report on Guinea is planned for the next issue of *The Courier*).

Guinea's rich musical landscape needs no further illustration. Talents such as *Mory Kanté*, now settled in Europe, completed their apprenticeship in that country. Guinea has also produced very good percussionists. Next year will see the organisation of an international percussion festival, with EU funding, which could lead to the setting-up of an 'international percussion centre'.

As far as dance and ballet is concerned, Guinea can boast one of the most prestigious if not *the* most impressive *corps de ballet* in Africa. The African Ballet of the Republic of Guinea has danced throughout the world for more than 40 years and has no cause to be jealous of the famous *corps de ballet* of London or even the Bolshoi. The crop of medals it has won abroad is proof enough of this. The choreographer and composer, *Italo Zambó*, who has directed the company for over a decade, also urges the establishment of a music and dance centre to develop the enormous potential Guinea possesses.

It cannot be repeated enough: music and dance in Africa express the entire continent's *joie de vivre* and charm. They are still one of its most lively means of expression and the incarnation of its historical and cultural heritage which are essential to its wider recognition. To try to dissociate them from development targets would be the world's misfortune.

K.K.

The Africa Centre in London

by Anthony Acheampong

In the thirty years or so since independence, says *Dr Adotey Bing*, Africa has chalked up some impressive advances in literacy, education, the output of raw materials, science and technology, and enlightened social policy. And it has had some notable achievements in the artistic, intellectual and sporting fields. Despite this, he bemoans the fact that the rest of the world tends to ignore the continent or to focus almost exclusively on the negative aspects. Africa persistently suffers from an unfavourable media profile, he acknowledges, portrayed as a place wracked by political crisis, endemic corruption, social disintegration and self-induced penury.

Dr Bing, who is the Director of *The Africa Centre* in London, is unhappy about this one-sided view of his native continent. And he is in the business of trying to redress the balance. He believes that the Centre he runs has a special role to play in ensuring that Europe gets a more balanced picture of African affairs, and in offering a platform for African opinion leaders (outside the usual diplomatic channels) to get their views across.

The Africa Centre is an independent charity located at Covent Garden in the heart of the British capital. For more than three and half decades, it has been a focal point for African culture in the UK. Leading African artists, writers, politicians, business-people and musicians have met there over the years to draw inspiration from each other and to share their vision with people in the host country.

The Centre was set up in 1961 with the aim of informing the British public about Africa. It was officially opened in 1964 by *Kenneth Kaunda*, the first Presi-

dent of Zambia. Over the years, it has become something of a 'home from home' for members of the African community in London including artists, musicians, writers, intellectuals and political exiles. It is also a focal point on Africa for the British population.

The Centre houses, among other things, a gallery, two meeting halls, an African restaurant and bar, a craft centre, and a bookshop specialising in publications from and about the continent. It is also home to the African Education Trust. Around 80,000 people make use of its facilities every year.

The Centre has attracted many notable speakers including President *Yoweri Museveni*, *Julius Nyerere*, OUA Secretary-General *Salim Ahmed Salim*, Archbishop

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Desmond Tutu, *Sir Shridath Ramphal*, *Wole Soyinka*, *Maya Angelou*, *Graça Machel*, *Chinua Achebe* and *Bernard Chidzero*. Among the British politicians who have addressed meetings there are *Malcom Rifkind*, *Baroness Chalker*, *Barbara Castle* and *David Steel*. Its exhibition of Zimbabwe stone sculpture, staged at the Barbican in 1988, was opened by *Prince Charles*.

Mary Robinson, the former Irish President, who is now UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, was a recent visitor. She delivered a lecture entitled: 'Africa

Dr Adotey Bing welcomes *Mary Robinson*, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Centre.



and a Rights-Based Approach to Development'.

The Centre was also instrumental in organising the European musical tour *Women of Africa* featuring *Oumou Sangare*, *Hanitra Rasoanaivo*, *Sally Nyolo* and *Sibongile Kumalo*.

Objectives

The objectives of the Centre, as set out in its mission statement, are to:

- organise performances and exhibitions of African art and culture;
- provide opportunities for collaboration between African and European artists, and between leaders in cultural and intellectual circles;
- encourage the cultural activities of African communities in Britain and Europe;
- organise talks, lectures, briefings and conferences on social, political, and economic issues concerning Africa;
- act as a resource centre for information on African art, culture, and society.

Its programme is organised around four areas:

- A *Resource Centre* providing information on Africa, including newspapers, magazines and journals. There is a reading room with seating for 15 people;
- *Performances and exhibitions* of African art and culture;
- *Talks, lectures and conferences* on social trends in contemporary Africa;
- *Talking Africa*, a weekly radio discussion and phone-in programme, broadcast on Saturdays on Spectrum Radio (558AM/MW).

New projects

Recently, the Centre has embarked on a number of new initiatives in pursuit of its objectives. In 1997, it launched *Managing Contemporary Africa*, a series of lectures by eminent Africans. The aim here is to facilitate dialogue between decision-makers in Africa and those in Britain and other Eu-

ropean countries whose actions have a bearing on the continent. Keynote speakers so far have included *Cyril Ramaphosa* and Prime Minister *Hage Geingob* of Namibia. 1997 also saw the establishment of a monthly literature forum called *'Kulture Klash'*.



Africa's shop window in London.

Key initiatives begun this year have included a monthly seminar on investment and trade prospects in Africa (especially for small and medium sized enterprises), the establishment of the *'Africa Centre Business Club'* which is open to firms with business interests on the continent, and a further forum entitled *'Under the Baobab - talking till we agree?'* This last is a monthly discussion meeting led by a prominent African journalist which explores contemporary issues and developments.

From focal point to flagship

The Council of Management recently agreed that the pro-

file of the Centre should be raised. They want to make it a 'flagship' for Africa in Europe, promoting the best of the continent's art, culture and opinion. The decision is based on a business plan that seeks to ensure the Centre's long-term financial viability in Covent Garden - which some regard as the cultural heart of Britain. Detailed work by architects and consultants has produced a package combining programme ideas (some of which are outlined above) and an architectural scheme. The intention is to redevelop the attractive listed building where the Centre is located to provide modern conference facilities, a cinema, an art gallery, a business club, a music venue and a modern computerised information centre. There are also plans to refurbish the restaurant, cafe, bookshop and craft centre. The total cost is estimated at around £4.3 m. The proposals, designed to take the Centre into the new millennium, have already attracted interest from bodies as diverse as the Organisation of African Unity, the UK Government, the EU and the Covent Garden Trust. The Centre has obtained a provisional award from National Lottery Funds, through

the Arts Council of England, for updating the feasibility study. The Centre, for its part, must demonstrate a strategy to raise £1m towards the redevelopment. Assuming all goes according to plan, the work should be completed by early 2000.

It is an ambitious scheme which Dr Bing hopes will enable the Centre to build a bridge to a new era of relations between Africa and Europe. ■ A.A.

All the world's a stage at the *Couleur Café*

No, not everyone necessarily spent the last few days of June glued to the World Cup football. Proof of this was the large number of people who flocked to the *Couleur Café* weekend in Brussels on 26-28 June – just as the second round matches were being played. In its ninth year (held for the fifth time in succession at the *Tour & Taxi* site), there was a full house on the Friday evening, 15,000 people having crowded through the doors of the former bonded warehouse.

Couleur Café is not, of course, the only event of its kind. All over Europe, countries stage similar festivals. In Belgium alone, for example, the *Sfinkx* festival (held in the north of the country at the end of July) has become something of a model for this type of event. Like the other festivals, *Couleur Café* offers a chance for

anyone and everyone to sample what is rather too broadly termed *world music* (basically, any music which comes from outside the American-European 'region'). Many people brought their children along, sometimes even in prams and pushchairs. This was an interesting development, particularly given that, with the arrival of summer, certain radio and television stations have begun bombarding our ears with world music smash-hit style (enough to put you off it for good, some might argue!) – guaranteed to last two whole months. This is not to say that there were no internationally renowned artists at this year's festival – far from it. Other participants, less well-known in Europe, delivered some very pleasant surprises to the Brussels audiences.


The three evenings each had a different theme. Friday was dedicated to *World Beat for Percussion*. It could equally have been called *African Beat*. The impact of the continent's drum-beat was so powerful that it is probably still reverberating today in the ears of listeners! The highlight of the evening was a '*Djembe follies*'. To celebrate the tenth anniversary of his group *Sewa Kan*, the Guinean *Mamady Keita* had invited a number of his associates to join him on stage for a fabulous show lasting nearly three hours. Guest artistes included a number of notable performers – *Doudou N'Diaye*

Rose, Mory Kante, Manu Dibango and Khadja Nin.

The warm-up was provided by *Jean-Louis Daulne*, who delivered a much talked-about version of *Brel's Vésoul*. Other bands, including the one led by Madagascan *Jaojoby*, performed

on the two adjacent stages, and the reggae group *Steel Pulse* brought the proceedings to a close. Rasta hats and dreadlocks were in evidence again on the following day in the shape of the

One of the grandads from *Vieja Trova Santiaguera* with his claves.



(The Courier)

legendary Jamaican, *Jimmy Cliff*. He performed as stylishly as ever, with his cap pulled tightly down on his head. In fact, devotees of music from the Caribbean were thoroughly spoilt this year, particularly on the second evening which was entitled *Fiesta Mundial*. This was essentially a celebration of Cuba, and was a reflection of Europe's current passion with *sound*, a type of music exported from the largest island in the Caribbean. It was also evidence that, very often, the best surprises come from the supporting stages. *Candido Fabre* and *Sin Palabras* were two such revelations – not to mention the five grandads who make up *Vieja Trova Santiaguera*? These are genuine 'senior citizens' with an average age somewhere in the region of 75, who delighted listeners with their skilful manipulation of guitar, double bass, maracas, *tres* (a guitar typical of Cuba) and *claves* (small wooden sticks). Haiti was not forgotten,

either, represented by one of its brightest bands, *Tabou Combo*, a leading exponent of *Compas* and its furious rhythms (strongly influenced by the *merengue* of Santo Domingo).

The third keynote of this festival was *women*. The Sunday evening was entirely devoted to them, in a programme of varied styles, origins and tones. On the main podium the Belgo-Anglo-Moroccan, *Natacha Atlas*, served up a cocktail of oriental dance melodies. This was followed by the salsa-rumba-chacha mix of the all-female Cuban group *Anacaona*. Then we had *Daniela Mercury*, the 'queen of Bahia', whose presence on stage was not so much regal as tornado-like. On other stages, the six Moroccan Berber women of *B'net Houaryiat* were impressive but I particularly liked the warm, 'groovy' voice of the British singer

Daniela Mercury, tornado of Bahia.



Chezeré – another exciting discovery in 1998 Couleur Café vintage.

Talking of vintages, I might as well come clean and admit that I sampled a rather special little Cape Verde rum, which was not at all bad. For this festival was not just about the music. The huge venue contained what the organisers called a 'global village' – an area of stalls and restaurants set out in a more intimate way. All kinds of traditional foods were available from Mexican tacos to Congolese maombe. Those with a strong constitution could wash down their Indian curry with an explosive cocktail straight from Havana before moving on to demolish the sweet pancakes.

The village was also a *souk* offering an enormous selection of artefacts and other goods. In anything from a Berber tent to an Indian tipi, you could find an infinite variety of musical instruments, fabric lanterns, second-hand clothes and wooden masks. A number of organisations such as Amnesty International, Oxfam and Max Havelaar were represented – all seeking to heighten awareness among visitors just a little. SOS Faim had even set up a 'Lomé Village'. There, around a palaver tree, you would find *Thomas Dorn's* 'Drums and Colour' photo exhibition, featuring renowned African musicians (such as *Youssou N'Dour*, *Myriam Makela*), and less well-known ones. You could even start learning *Lingala* in the village, or get yourself an African haircut.

The people who attended may have decided to try and escape from the World Cup for an evening or two, but I noted that the football had not been entirely forgotten (for some reason, Brazilian jackets sporting a number 9 on their back seemed to be in fashion at the festival this year). Football fanatics had the benefit of a giant screen (set somewhat apart). This meant that we were able to witness the fourth goal hammered past the Nigerians from the boot of the Danish striker *Helveg*. More than a few crestfallen faces were visible round about. As for me, one last little glass of rum and I back was off to imbibe the intoxicating dance steps of Daniela Mercury.

T.G.

Mother knows best in fight against child deaths

by Dan Palmer*

Nutrition experts are closely studying a project in the Gambia which offers hope of greater life expectancy for children from poorer regions. The scheme is based on something that expectant mothers around the world have always known – that 'eating for two' makes sense.

Researchers' findings – outlined in June at a 'New Frontiers in Science' exhibition at the Royal Society in London – should help to target limited aid resources to where they can best protect child health.

Medical workers used to believe that improving a mother's diet after pregnancy would produce a better quality of breast milk and, in turn, a healthier baby and a longer-living adult. 'That, unfortunately, was a simplistic assumption,' said *Ann Prentice*, head of micronutrition for the British Medical Research Council's *Dunn Nutrition Unit*. This government-funded agency, based in Cambridge, UK, has been conducting extensive research in the Gambian village of Keneba.

The region has two main seasons: dry and wet. In the dry season, lasting from November to April, food is plentiful and babies have good birth weight. In the wet season, food is scarce and infants are born lighter. Yet in both seasons, the quality of breast milk does not change because the mothers' metabolism slows down, compensating for the lack of food in rainy months. The team believes that natural hormonal changes regulate the metabolic rate in this way.

They discovered that improving diet during pregnancy did not help because mothers' milk was already good enough during both seasons. The quality was as good as breast milk in Britain. The only things that increased were the women's own weight and their fertility. Consequently, many soon became pregnant again – defeating the natural contraception of the fallow wet season. The team found that the best way to boost children's survival rate was to prevent foetal growth retardation by improving the mother's diet during, rather than after, pregnancy.

Tim Cole, a statistician for the unit, said they were lucky to be able to refer to research work carried out in the area in 1949 by Sir Ian McGregor, who had been studying malaria for the Medical Research Council. McGregor, now in his 80s, recorded local births. This provided current researchers with a database of 6000 people, and allowed team members to study links between month of birth and child mortality.

Infants born in both seasons were found to have similar mortality rates early in life – many times



The best way to boost children's survival rate is to improve the mother's diet during pregnancy.

higher than in the West – but there was a big difference between wet – and dry-season babies when they reached later childhood and adolescence. Those born during the wet season, when food is scarce, were ten times more likely to die of a range of illnesses. This finding suggests that the immune system is influenced by birth conditions and that more resources should be directed at improving diet during pregnancy.

The unit put their discovery to the test by improving Gambian mothers' diets. The team gave expectant mothers peanut biscuit supplements: three a day during the dry season and four during wet months. They found that birth weights increased and the infant mortality rate fell – particularly during the rainy season.

Now the unit plans to study the long-term effects of these supplements on children born in the wet season to see how they match with the records from McGregor's database, and whether overall life expectancy is substantially increased. They would also like to pinpoint the exact cause of such increased life expectancy. *Ann Prentice* explained that the biscuits could be countering a specific vitamin deficiency, or some other factor may have been overlooked. But, she said: 'The most likely bet is nutrition. ■' D.P.

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Sexual equality: a legitimate demand

by Joséphine Marthe Mòuko*

Many African countries are undergoing adjustments that have had a negative impact on the most vulnerable sections of the population, including women. Most people depend for their survival on the informal sector, which is kept going mainly by women. And yet, in many respects, they still lack full citizenship rights.

The participation of African women in socio-economic development is no longer in doubt. From early childhood to the end of their lives, women now toil in a wide range of social and economic sectors. This has come about because of the changing structure of African societies and the resulting division of labour. There is now a need to reappraise the female role and give it a value, taking account of the new requirements thrown up by a society undergoing change.

The speed with which jobs are being created in a city such as Yaoundé in Cameroon, for example, provides a clear indication of the increasing power of women on the labour market. As noted by *F. Roubaud*, 45% of new jobs are occupied by women, even though they only account for 40% of the total workforce at present. *J.P. Lachaud* estimates that in African urban areas, depending on the country, between 50% and 80% of women operate in the informal sector. For all its dynamism, the sector only provides them with insecure, marginal and unprotected employment. This is a significant factor in their social exclusion. Women doing 'informal' work therefore continue to operate on the margins of the wage-earning workforce, frequently on a freelance basis. They make themselves felt solely as a result of the amount of labour they contribute. Like most African conurbations, Yaoundé has come to depend very much on their services. The problem is no longer to ensure their

full involvement in economic activity, but rather to guarantee them proper recognition in their role as economic agents. This includes their genuine integration into social, economic and political structures.

As a number of authors have pointed out with regard to the Caribbean, the phenomenon of 'female heads of household' is leading to a change in social relationships, making it necessary to establish new forms of family and social organisation. To return to Yaoundé, the results of the survey carried out in 1993 by *Roubaud* revealed that the percentage of families with a female head of household had increased from 21% to 25% (between 1983 and 1993). *C. Tichit* provides further details, distinguishing between single-person households (24%), non-family households (21%), lone-parent nuclear households (20%), extended lone-parent households (32%) and other types of household (3%).

Moreover, thanks to their commercial and agricultural activities and in particular their contribution to the informal sector (sale of food surpluses, handicrafts, clothes workshops, small restaurants, tontine arrangements etc.), women are starting to take charge of financial matters such as rent and water payments, and education and health costs. Traditionally, these have been a male preserve. They come to the aid of brothers, husbands or boyfriends who have been destabilised by a lack of demand for their export goods, or have lost their jobs as a result of cutbacks in the public and parastatal sectors, which used to be big employers. This structural change at the level of the family unit is a kind of labour redistribution, which will inevitably alter wider society, although the alteration is taking place slowly because of various obstacles.

Too many obstacles

The need to reconcile the commitments of family and working life is one such obstacle. It is quite clear there needs to be a redistribution of responsibilities within family and working life,

between men and women. The increasing involvement of women in the labour market means they are becoming less available for domestic work, for childcare and education, or for voluntary work in the community interest (all of which have been dubbed 'non-productive'). What is required is a reassessment of domestic activities and of activities carried out in the general interest – both hitherto female preserves. The work involved seldom receives much attention and is undervalued.

The weakening of family ties is making life difficult for many women, who are obliged to reconcile domestic and family commitments with paid work performed in a structure originally conceived for men. Sharing roles in the family/household and improved time management would make it possible to increase the supply of female labour, encourage better use of human resources, promote equality of opportunity and improve the quality of life. This conclusion, reached by the OECD, in fact applies to women in both the southern and northern hemispheres. In other words, it will not be possible to raise the status of women's work without a revision of their social status (involving a change in social relationships and organisational structures within family units and within society as a whole). Political decision-makers and governments need to take account of the contributions, ideas and views of women. Considerable socio-cultural and structural obstacles will have to be faced, however.

Because of their role as bearers of children, African women are more highly valued by society as wives and mothers than as producers. It is also generally the case that the level of education and training of women (and the level of education and training in their families of origin) essentially determine the type of jobs that they do. This means facing up to the sensitive question of cultural barriers. One could, for example, draw attention to unequal access to school of boys and girls in most African societies. The number of girls in school is growing, th

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serious differences between ethnic groups, regions and religions. UNESCO studies have shown that almost everywhere, fewer females than males attend school. In Cameroon, 72% of boys go to primary school as against 59% of girls. The equivalent figures at the secondary level are 32% and 23% respectively. 57% of adult women are illiterate as against 34% of men.

There is also little doubt that stereotypes and other prejudices make it more difficult for women to develop. Experts sometimes take a rather blinkered view of women, and this has repercussions on certain types of action. Analyses and evaluations essentially based on a one-dimensional interpretation of reality really do hinder the socio-cultural development of women. In the case of illiterate women, for example, we find that analyses by people from other cultures frequently fail to take account of local complexities. These analyses are often based on different cultural standards and codes; ideological baggage stemming from obsolete historical views or simply entrenched prejudices. Confusion often arises because of a failure to understand the difference between a lack of knowledge of facts due to the inability to read a language (illiteracy) and a basic lack of intelligence. From the outset, the illiterate's view of the world is devalued and discredited, and hence, rarely taken into account. There may also be frustrations and complexes that prevent illiterate women from developing themselves to the full.

Another substantial obstacle is that women still do not have any real control over the social, economic and political forces that govern their lives, despite now being a pillar of economic activity in Africa. The problem is underlined by the fact that women are under-represented in the decision-making structures of their countries. Taking Cameroon again as an example, and looking at the public sector, one finds female representation in all departments, but heavily concentrated at the lower levels. This is a conclusion that does not just apply to less-developed countries. One also notices a lack of women in certain types of profession, such as pure science, statistics, engineering, industrial management, mining/geology, civil engineering and agricultural engineering. By contrast, the so-called

social professions (nursing, social work, teaching) have a high level of female representation. Positions in the hierarchy, such as governorships, prefectships and sub-prefects' posts are never occupied by women. These jobs seem to be reserved exclusively for men, despite the fact that they require intellectual and moral qualities rather than physical attributes such as strength and endurance.

It is interesting to look at the distribution of female workers within Cameroon's industrial workforce. In 1985, 96.7% of the total were employed in manufacturing. The extraction industries, utilities (electricity, gas and water) and housing/civil engineering only accounted for 0.3%, 0.4% and 2.6% respectively. This situation reflects the paucity of women in scientific and technical disciplines.

What it shows is that there is a need to widen the choice of professions open to women and to tackle the disparities between male and female employment (the segregation of jobs according to gender). Work codes should be revised and, in particular, more resources should be devoted to female education (with no 'ifs' or 'buts'). Special measures are required to boost the numbers of women at decision-making levels, and especially in posts of a representative nature. It is not a question of giving women *pro rata* representation automatically. It must be based on their suitability – enhancing their skills and know-how to enable them to make an effective contribution to economic and structural decision-making in their countries. I certainly do not wish to defend the widespread idea of 'a battle of the sexes'. I am concerned in particular with the legitimate demand for equal rights between the sexes – in other words, the right to full citizenship, which will be brought about, in my opinion, by changing attitudes and adopting a consensual approach.

Need for intelligent cooperation

Women's demands should not be seen as a desire to 'take the helm at all costs'. Nor does it involve reducing men to the status of adversaries who need to be 'seen-off'. All change is slow and this change should be accompanied by a comprehensive process of reflection. For this to work, we

must not make the same mistakes as men, who for a long time excluded women from their discussion groups and public debates.

There is a need for intelligent cooperation between men and women on the one hand, and women and society on the other. This means that men should be involved in women's discussion groups, and their support must be sought to enable us to act more effectively. It also involves advocating full citizenship for women, by creating new rights to take account of their abilities and responsibilities in dealing with current economic problems. In other words, women will only be able to manage resources effectively on a permanent basis if there is a true concentration of all social forces: initiatives from men and women within civil society, and the support of national and international institutions.

The performance of structural adjustment will not improve until decision-making systems are able to respond to structural changes. There must be new rules, involving the setting of minimum standards and conditions, so as to eliminate endemic discrimination in the way that societies are organised. It is also essential to ensure fairness and justice in working life.

The scale of the challenges we face regarding the status of women requires us to restructure the relationship between the sexes in society, and the legal system. We must view the current situation in a different light and rearrange matters in the social, economic and political spheres. This is vital to create a new order that is not imposed on people. It can only be a change in response to genuine aspirations and ideals resulting from the social and economic constraints on a particular group. The search for a social equilibrium is mainly a task for women – but if we are not to repeat past mistakes, men cannot be excluded.

J.M.M.

Local involvement in tourism

by Dr Auliana Poon*

Warm weather, spectacular scenery, secluded beaches, accessible wildlife, cultural attractions, a wide range of quality accommodation and good value for money: just some of the ingredients that make a successful tourism destination. Other man-made factors – safety and security, a warm welcome and good service – are also vital.

Indeed, successful destinations are those where visitors feel a complete sense of welcome – where the locals that smile are not only those paid to do so. Yet, so little energy is spent on creating the reasons for locals to smile. Much of the effort of tourist authorities goes into awareness and 'smile training'. They do not realise that unless local people feel tourism in their pockets and on their tables, all the smile training will not help. It is not surprising that when a journalist asked a Johannesburg resident why he stole a handbag from a tourist, he replied: 'They say we should benefit from tourism, so I am just benefiting.' According to *Sabelo Mahlalela*, head of Mpumalanga Tourism Development in South Africa, 'you do not teach people to eat; you just give them the food'. Similarly, you do not teach locals to smile at tourists, you give them the reason to do so!

There is a belief that responsibility for involving local communities in tourism lies with the government. Many private operators give little thought to the relationship they should be building with their neighbours. Yet, they expect their guests to be safe, with everyone smiling at them. The evidence suggests that far-sighted entrepreneurs, who build up local links, are most successful. A good example of this is *Umngazi River Bungalows* in Eastern Cape, South Africa. This facility has an annual average occupancy rate of about 85% – one of the highest in the country. The management has taken decisions designed to ensure happy workers and a happy commu-

nity. All staff are drawn from the surrounding communities, workers get a 13th month's salary and share in the annual profits, the hotel has helped financially with the building of a local school, it provides free space for locals to sell their crafts to tourists, and it is committed to buying produce locally. Every morning sees a procession of people arriving at the hotel with baskets on their heads. Continuous training and skills upgrading is also provided. Not surprisingly, the staff and community are content and a safe and happy environment is created for visitors. There is no staff turnover and 70% of Umngazi's guests are repeat visitors. This all translates into a better bottom line.

The management has a number of other ideas. It would like to support a community entrepreneur to develop a piggery (the kitchen waste makes good fodder). It aims to encourage a campsite development where one family would be responsible for taking care of each unit. Umngazi would supply the fresh water and assist with reservations. And it foresees a cultural village where guests can learn about the local culture first hand. These are the types of initiative that sustainable, responsible tourism are made of.

Missing ingredient

Involving local people is surely one of the missing ingredients undermining the success of many tourist destinations. In South Africa, where there is an urgent need to involve previously disadvantaged communities, many initiatives have not, unfortunately, brought in the private sector. NGOs and donor agencies have tried to work with local people, identifying their needs and supplying them with what they want. But without private sector input, the sustainability of these supply-based initiatives is questionable. Associating the private sector is one of the keys to unlocking the potential of local communities in the tourism industry. It may be a good idea to set up a craft village, but if you involve an established tour operator in the project, you can help ensure that the products suit the

needs of the market, that the centre is in an optimal location, that it has the services guests are looking for, and that tour buses will stop to enable visitors to make a purchase. Where hoteliers 'buy-in' to a community project (such as horse riding), this can go a long way to ensuring its success (the hotel then advertises the attraction to its guests).

There are a number of unexplored ways in which the private sector can support community involvement in tourism. These include:

- advertising community products and services;
- sourcing goods and services from the community (e.g. eggs, bread);
- providing training and 'mentoring' for small businesses that supply the hotel;
- out-sourcing certain services (laundry, gardening, water sports);
- employing persons (e.g. nannies) as free agents, to build entrepreneurship;
- ensuring that community services are employed in building and construction;
- training and skills upgrading;
- employing people from surrounding communities;
- identifying key opportunities for local producers (e.g. fresh herbs, organic vegetables);
- introducing new services to guests (e.g. cooking classes for the preparation of local food, local language training, story-telling, traditional games, catch and release fishing, and offering local cuisine on the menu);
- identifying career opportunities for locals;
- encouraging staff and local schools to experience being a tourist at the hotel.

The key approach to local involvement in tourism should not be aid, but private sector development in the relevant communities. In other words, to paraphrase a well-worn saying, 'don't give people fish but teach them how to fish'. The future of tourism in South Africa and indeed, elsewhere in the world, will be more secure when the Umngazi experience ceases to be just a 'good example', and becomes 'best practice'. ■

A.P.

* Economist with a D. Phil. in Tourism from the University of Sussex, UK. Leader of the team that developed the tourism policy and strategy for the new South Africa in 1996.

The APFT

A project for the people of the tropical forests

by Serge Bahuchet*

In 1995, three years after the Rio Summit, the European Union decided to launch the APFT programme (Future of the Peoples of Tropical Forests), an original and ambitious five-year anthropological scheme, financed through the 'tropical forests' budget.

The programme aims to combine natural and social sciences to work towards a single goal: promoting greater awareness of the human element and ensure sustainable development. We all agree that action is needed to preserve the tropical forests. But good intentions

on their own are not enough. They need to be founded on a thorough knowledge of the facts – and of the human facts first and foremost. There are many preconceptions concerning tropical forests that only hinder the effectiveness of any action that is taken. For example, we talk of 'virgin forests', conjuring up an image of an immaculate environment. Yet many people have been living in the forests for thousands of years, a point we just cannot ignore. Any project designed to create protected areas, that does not also take account of the people who actually live there, is doomed to fail. The APFT goes a step further, firmly believing that to achieve sustainable development we need to *work together with these people*. Indeed,

the programme's most distinguishing characteristic is the importance it attaches to the *inhabitants* of the forests.

Our initial aim is to assess the extent to which the human and natural environment have become integrated, in order to establish environmental management models:

- Ethnoecology within the forest environment; extent of use and disturbance of the forest environment;
- Ecology of agricultural practices: impact of agricultural activities on forest dynamics;
- Relationships between urban and forest areas: impact of the pressures exerted by towns on the forest environment and the way in which city dwellers perceive forests;
- Social, environmental and developmental dynamics: social impact of operations to develop participative management of forests and protected areas.

APFT action in ACP countries is focused on achieving four major objectives. First, to expand our

Pygmy people in Central Africa.

'Aiming to promote greater awareness of the human aspect, and ensure sustainable development.'

* APFT Science Director and Research Director at the CNRS (National Centre for Scientific Research).

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knowledge of the inhabitants of tropical forests and find the best way of developing forest resources. Second, to make decision-makers more aware of and sensitive to the social and cultural realities of the forest environment. Third, to conduct specialist research and studies into the imbalances created by the outside world (demographic and urban pressures, but also through the creation of protected areas) and provide means of adjusting to such pressures. Finally, to set up a data bank accessible via the Internet.

At the end of the first three years, an initial assessment of the work carried out shows broadly positive results. With a presence in 10 ACP countries, 60% of the APFT budget has been used to fund field projects. Numerous specialist studies have been conducted. A close-knit institutional network, made up of 90 researchers – including 32 from ACP countries – and 35 official partner institutions, has been set up. In addition, there are various information networks (APFT News, colloquia, briefings, etc.). As a result of all this, the specialist work undertaken has gained international recognition.

In the years to come, we will be concentrating our efforts on establishing operational tools to help development and conservation professionals. An information session is already being planned in DG VIII specifically for that purpose. It will give the officials responsible for the programme the opportunity to highlight the special features of the APFT project and, more importantly, to stress its support for those working in the development field. ■ S.B.



VIVANT UNIVERS

Clinical waste incinerator for rural hospitals

by Nigel Wakeham*

In 1992 I went to the Solomon Islands for the UK's Department for Overseas Development (DFID), to manage two rural construction projects in the health sector. I was also asked to look at providing a clinical waste incinerator for the main hospital in Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands. There had been a project in existence for several years to supply an incinerator but a suitable one had not been found. A large diesel-run incinerator had been proposed but the hospital could not afford to run it. I had come across similar problems when working in Southern and West Africa and had been looking for some time for a simple incinerator suitable for rural health centres or hospitals that could use wood or other locally available biomass materials as fuel.


I eventually contacted a firm in Australia, *Biomass Energy Services and Technology* PTY Ltd (BEST), who specialise in renewable energy technology. They expressed interest in the problem and were commissioned to develop an incinerator that could use wood, coconut shells or similar materials as fuel.

DFID (then still known as ODA) agreed to enlarge the project in order to supply all the provincial hospitals as well as the main hospital in Honiara with incinerators. Information on the quantity and nature of the waste materials to be disposed of was collected and sent to BEST. The waste consists mainly of a mixture of bandages, syringes, sharps (hypodermic needles, scalpel blades etc.), paper and body tissue. The nature of the waste is such that highly toxic substances such as dioxins and furans are generated when it is burnt in the open and poor combustion can lead to some of the con-

taminated waste not being fully burnt or sterilised.

BEST developed two sizes of incinerator, a large one for the main hospital and a smaller one for the provincial hospitals, both of the same basic design and constructed of an outer skin of stainless steel lined with fire-clay bricks. The principle behind the design is that, in order to avoid the formation of dioxins and furans, it is necessary to burn the waste in an oxygen-starved environment and to break down the long chain and ring molecules by passing them through a bed of char

closes into a water seal) at the top of the first chamber with alternate layers with dry wood or similar combustible material until the chamber is full. The ash door at the bottom of the chamber is opened and a small fire started. Once the first layer of fuel is burning the ash door is closed. Secondary air is introduced in the second, smaller combustion chamber that links the first chamber to the third, much larger one where the final reaction between the volatile gases takes place. The resulting gases are then discharged through a flue at the top. Once the incinerator is started it requires no further attention until the burning process is completed (in approximately three hours) and the incinerator has cooled down. The ash door is then opened and the ash and remaining materials that are completely sterile are removed. Even sharps are reduced in size and strength and can be safely handled.



with superheated steam. Once the plastics and other hydrocarbons have been decomposed, then oxygen is introduced to convert the volatile gases to carbon dioxide and water vapour. For complete combustion, it is necessary to ensure high levels of air turbulence, high temperatures and sufficient combustion chamber volume to allow oxidation reactions to be completed.

The incinerators consist of three combustion chambers. The waste material is put in small plastic bags and fed through a door (which

A series of tests was carried out on a prototype and it was found that after combustion was started, the temperature rapidly reached 1000 degrees C, there was no visible smoke and no measurable hydrocarbons (<10ppm). The incinerators therefore provide a cheap, safe and very effective method of disposing of medical waste, which is badly needed in many rural areas. They have now been installed in most of the hospitals in the Solomon Islands and are working very successfully. ■

N.W.

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Communication network to promote tropical timbers and forests

The case of the Tropical Timber Network

by Jean Clément*

A workshop jointly organised and financed by SILVA, the CTA, the European Commission (DGVIII), the FAO, the French Cooperation Ministry and the Ministry of the Environment of the Republic of Niger.

The creation of the Tropical Timber Network

It is now increasingly acknowledged that trees and forests play a major cultural, social, economic and ecological role in the daily life of millions of men, women and children and of future generations. Food security, which is still one of the major challenges of our age, largely depends on trees and forests in many rural communities. Climatic balance, soil

fertility and water resources depend on the future of the trees and forests and two billion human beings rely on wood for their daily domestic fuel. There are myriad other examples. However, despite this level of awareness, the importance accorded trees and forests in international and national budgets and programmes remains extremely limited. It appears that, although political decision-makers are often aware of the significance of the problem, they are yet to be persuaded that proposed actions are relevant and genuinely feasible.

* President of the International Tropical Timber Network, Director of the FAO's Forestry Resources Division.

Development of the Network

On the basis of these objectives, the Tropical Timber Network progressively developed, achieving, in 1994, a total of approximately 4000 members, annual renewals amounting to approximately 200 members. Of the 4000, 3500 are in Africa, the rest being concentrated in Europe, principally France. Fewer than 150 members are located outside Africa and Europe. Approximately 16% of members are from the authorities, 17% from training establishments, 22% from NGOs which disseminate information and organise actions and, finally, 29% from NGOs, cooperatives, individual enterprises and projects working directly in the field.

By setting up the Tropical Timber Network in 1987, the French Cooperation Ministry wanted to make a contribution to resolving this paradox and promoting both reflection on the role of trees and forests in society in tropical countries and, above all, proven actions and methods. The Network is a forum for information and the exchange of experience and also offers action-oriented training and education.

Designed as a grouping together of people and organisations interested in receiving, providing and analysing information on conservation and forestry in forest or woodland/pastoral ecosystems and on the use of timber in agriculture, the Network's objectives were as follows:

- to encourage meetings in developing countries between representatives of the authorities, civil society and international cooperation organisations; and
- to promote individual or collective reflection with a view to implementing new development strategies and practices.

To provide a link with the work of the technical secretariat, national representatives were appointed in 35 African countries. About 15 of these have duties in addition to those of representatives and act as national or sub-national organisers. Via their work, it was possible to set up fully-fledged secondary networks which, at national level, have a function similar to that of the technical secretariat based in France, which is the focal point of the Network. Its essential functions are; to maintain up-to-date files on members; organise meetings of the Management Committee, technical committee and various working groups; arrange other meetings, study trips, colloquia and training courses; provide a question/answer service on technical matters; maintain the link between members of the Network; visit the countries and support national networks; provide a link with other networks, other organisations and other technical journals and reviews; prepare and



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The Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation (CTA) was established in 1983 under the Lomé Convention between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and the European Union Member States. CTA's tasks are to develop and provide services that improve access to information for agricultural and rural development, and to strengthen the capacity of ACP countries to produce, acquire, exchange and utilise information in these areas.

distribute technical information to be used by field workers; and, finally, prepare and edit the Network's technical journal (*Le Flamboyant*) which is sent to all those involved. The contribution provided by African members has continued to grow in terms of the material they provide for the journal, and national or sub-national organising committees have been set up in a number of countries.

The need for a review: the Torodi workshop

The Tropical Timber Network, managed by a dynamic team supported by the SILVA Association, the Forestry Department of the Centre for International Cooperation in Agronomical Research for Development (CIRAD) and the French Association of Volunteers for Progress (AFVP), has worldwide representation, particularly in Africa, and is achieving positive results.

Nevertheless, a new stage is now beginning which will see the setting-up of genuinely autonomous national networks which, in each country, will implement initiatives, ideas and actions developed in the international framework of the current Network. These national networks will thus be able to work to the benefit of a greater partnership to promote each country's timber and forests. This need to create further partnerships is a response to the current objectives of the EU and its Member States and organisations such as the CTA. The need for a review and to collaborate with other partnerships led Network organisers to suggest an international workshop on the general topic of communication networks to promote tropical timbers and forests.

The upshot of this was a workshop held from 17 to 23 November 1997 in Torodi (Niger). This was attended not just by representatives of bodies associated with its organisation (Niger's Ministry for Water Supplies and the Environment, European Commission DG VIII, French Cooperation Ministry, FAO, CTA, ODI, CIRAD, AFVP) but also 30 or so national delegates representing 14 African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo

and the Democratic Republic of Congo).

The two main motivations behind this workshop were:

- to carry out a review of the Network and highlight original experiences which might be useful for other networks, such as, for example, the Rural Development Forestry Network organised by the UK-based ODI and the FAO's 'Timber, Forest and Rural Communities (FTPP)' network; and

- to study, as closely as possible, ways of promoting the structural independence of national networks, specifying their individual potential and role in the fields of communication and information management. This is a key topic for the CTA, whose objectives are improved access to information on agricultural and rural development and a strengthening of the ACP states' information-management and communication capabilities.

The first three days were devoted essentially to a review of the Tropical Timber Network and to establishing future objectives. The four topics for reflection were: the objective of a network; rights and obligations of a network member; the financing and structure of a national network; and communication and exchange both within and outside a network.

Remaining days provided the opportunity for an exchange of 'original' experiences in the area of promotion and management of timber and forests in tropical regions (there were some 20 contributions on this subject by delegates) and for field visits to current project sites.

This workshop laid the foundations for the future of the Tropical Timber Network, which includes a number of key elements (see below).

The Network's future

Now that it is ten years old, the *raison d'être* of the Tropical Timber Network was confirmed by all participants, for whom the Network's global objective is 'to make a significant contribution to the exchange and dissemination of information relating to relationships between trees and man on the one hand, and between society and the forest on the other, with a view to sustainable management of tropical forest resources'. The Network will thus



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Tropical forests in Africa (Gabon), in the Caribbean (Trinidad) and in the Pacific (Fiji).

The Network's area of interest is not limited to tropical Africa

continue to provide a forum for exchange and communication to promote trees and forests in tropical regions. Its area of interest is therefore not restricted to tropical Africa. The Network is able to bring together people interested in timber and tropical forests in Africa, Asia and America, and indeed, throughout the world.

Specific objectives were identified to provide guidance for activities to be carried out by national networks in the short, medium and long term, on the basis of a precise communication strategy. The Network needs the support of dynamic, organised and

well-structured national networks, each of which carry out work in their respective country in collaboration with the technical secretariat. The secretariat acts as coordinator for any national networks and sub-regional bodies set up by the national networks and it also has to publicise the Tropical Timber Network and maintain its high international profile. The concept of national networks involves the setting-up of well-structured, independent units which have their own identity and receive due recognition.

A Network charter

The Tropical Timber Network's charter, drawn up in Torodi, defines the Network's objectives and the undertakings supported by all members. Although there is a distinction between active and passive members, no one is excluded, because it is acknowledged that all individuals can be involved to a greater or lesser extent in the running of the national network (every situation evolves). Admittedly, specific actions requiring a degree of availability can be implemented only by the more active members, but other members also have a role to play, albeit behind the scenes (distributing information, for example).

Increasingly autonomous, well-structured national networks

If national networks are to have an ongoing, long-term existence, they must be structured in such a way as to have a specific identity and to be able to find sufficient financing. There are several possible structures (with or without a specific legal set-up) and it is for each country to choose the formula best suited to its circumstances. A recognised legal structure is not necessarily a priority in certain countries, but, in the long term, all national networks must be based on a recognised legal structure or set themselves up such that their structure has legal status. It was also stipulated that national networks should opt for a structure that is compatible with the Network's objectives (which *a priori* excludes profit-making organisations).

Various methods of financing (self-financing or external support) were discussed. Each net-

work chooses the way in which it is financed, although it was agreed that several national networks still need financial support from the technical secretariat. However, this outside aid will be only a part of the funds they receive. National networks will have to work towards a degree of self-financing (contributions in kind or cash) as soon as possible, and, according to the circumstances, identify external sources of funding.

A communication and information-distribution strategy

The Tropical Timber Network's communication strategy was addressed at various levels. First, there is a need to improve *communication within the Network*: members need to be better acquainted with one another, to receive information that is useful to them both in technical terms and in terms of experiences and ideas, and to be able to produce information relating to the life of the Network and the topics of interest to it.

Next, it is necessary to *communicate with the outside world*, not only nationally, but also regionally and internationally, by publicising the Network's existence, and by distributing information about experiences and Network members' opinions, so as to influence decisions in the field of management of timber and natural resources. The content of the message to be put across needs to be tailored to suit the recipient; for example an awareness-raising campaign for the general public and information/training/proposals for those actively involved in promoting tropical forests and timber, ranging from the 'populariser' to the political decision-maker.

A number of tools were proposed as communication supports, again left to the choice of the individual country. Recommendations for the technical secretariat (international level) were formulated. In addition to written information, which is always recommended, a desire was expressed for increased use of modern audiovisual and traditional oral communication techniques. In addition to actual tools and products, organised meetings must be the preferred method of communication for national networks and the secretariat. The provision

of basic communication equipment for local branches of national networks will become necessary at some point if national networks are to run smoothly, their mission, first and foremost, being to gather and disseminate information. A strengthening of relations between the technical secretariat and national networks will probably also require an overhaul of the secretariat's means of communication.

Expansion into other languages appears to be essential. At international level, in parallel with French, it was recommended that English be used for information purposes. At national-network level, it was recommended that local languages also be used.

National and international undertakings

As a corollary to recommendations regarding the running and communication strategy of the Tropical Timber Network, both internationally and locally, the budget allocated by the technical secretariat to the national networks will initially, inevitably, have to be increased to allow them to implement certain recommendations. In parallel, the national networks must actively seek ways to diversify their sources of funding and of becoming independent of the technical secretariat.

It was agreed that each country should set up a work programme and budget for such activities. Co-funding proposals will then be submitted to the technical secretariat which undertook, through the Network president, to contribute as much as it can to financing national network structuring activities and to supporting national organisers when the latter are seeking funds and distributing information.

Aside from these financial aspects, each national delegation undertook, via national guidelines drawn up at Torodi, to inform members about decisions taken at the workshop and to encourage them to implement the activities proposed for each national network in the short term. The technical secretariat will implement the workshop's recommendations at international level and organise a new international meeting between now and 2000.

After Torodi?

The technical secretariat will act more as international co-ordinator while the national networks will play a greater, more visible role in decision-making, both as regards *Le Flamboyant* and in their own day-to-day running and internal financing. The technical secretariat will no longer be the only body to decide what each network does, but will decide on the level of means available for an individual country and each country will decide how to allocate these resources. The national networks will play a greater part in selecting the information for inclusion in the journal, the latter's editorial stages being taken care of later on in the process.

The international Network intends to collaborate with professional associations in Europe and at international level. The initial steps in this process were taken at Torodi. It will also approach various bodies, particularly the EU, with a view to seeking funding.

Although the Workshop's recommendations apply to the Tropical Timber Network, the participants are convinced they will be of relevance to other networks working to similar ends.

Conclusion

Clearly, development now covers a wider range of topics than those originally envisaged when the Tropical Timber Network was set up, the global environment and the long-term management of resources undeniably having become topics of interest for everyone. However, within the context of global efforts to understand and reorientate development processes, one of the main features of the Tropical Timber Network is that it listens to people on the ground. When meeting the major challenges of the next century, the key to success probably lies in the ability to move away from the traditional policy-making processes which are often autocratic, sector-based and fragmented towards *participatory, inter-sectoral and continuous processes*. With this in mind, networks will have to be wide-ranging in the topics they cover, receptive and non-institutional, to circulate and exchange information, to promote the interaction of those involved with due regard for their diverse nature and to support partnership in all its guises. Any partnership must be an expression of the varied nature of those involved in network activities, of rights and obligations and of responsibilities.

J.C.

they cannot yet satisfy the level of demand for printed information on agriculture and rural development. Among the hindrances are the lack of equipment and trained staff, the absence of national book policies, linguistic diversity, low public purchasing power and under-developed book distribution channels.

The principal objectives of CTA's publishing and distribution programmes are:

- to improve the availability of scientific and technical information, and information for development, by providing appropriate information mainly in the form of publications sent directly from CTA (there are currently over 700 publications available);
- to improve the access of potential ACP readers to such information through co-publication with ACP and EU publishers, whilst at the same time establishing co-publishing partnerships;
- to provide information to CTA's partners about the Centre's products and services;
- to promote awareness of the help others can offer;
- to encourage networking among CTA's partners.

Whilst the work of the Publications and Dissemination Department centres around publishing, co-publishing and distribution, it also embraces a broader range of activities. The Department is responsible, for example, for the formulation of policies and strategies for book production and distribution, and for the development of partnerships, which will advance CTA's publishing objectives. A significant part of the work involves evaluating manuscripts, whether they have arisen from CTA's own activities or from elsewhere. The predominant activity is the supervision of such specialist work as compilation, editing, photo searching and editing, translation, post-translation editing, design, layout and printing – most of which is contracted out to specialist organisations. The Department also compiles CTA's list of subscribers and promotes its publications through the Centre's Publications Catalogue, its bimonthly bulletin *Spore* (see below) and its Website, as well as through targeted mailings and book fairs. Finally, the Department contracts a fulfilment agency to dispatch its publications according to CTA's requirements.

CTA – Completing the picture

The previous CTA-Bulletin (In issue 170 of *The Courier*) carried the third of a series of four articles which explain how CTA's operational Departments contribute to the Centre's overall aims and objectives. In the last of this series, we outline the work of the Publications and Dissemination Department.

Providing information on demand: CTA's Publications and Dissemination Department

The value of the written word has been acknowledged by the great and the good not just in recent centuries, but for several millennia. 'Without books, history is silent, literature is dumb, science is crippled, thought and speculation at a standstill', wrote the 20th century historian Barbara Tuchman. A century earlier another historian, *Thomas Carlyle*, observed: 'All that mankind has done, thought, gained or been: it

is lying as in magic preservation in the pages of books'. Predictably, therefore, the production and distribution of books and other publications has long been the cornerstone around which CTA's programmes to meet the demand for agricultural information from the ACP countries have been built.

Weaknesses and operational difficulties currently facing the publishing and bookselling sectors in ACP countries mean that



CTA publications at its headquarters (Wageningen, Netherlands).

The Department's output, which is mainly in French and English with some Portuguese, may be summarised as follows:

— *CTA Publications*. These are of two kinds, institutional and technical. Institutional publications include the Centre's Annual Report and its Publications Catalogue. The wide range of technical publications includes the CTA bulletins *Spore* and *Espero* (published every two months in English, French and Portuguese), the proceedings and summary reports of CTA seminars and co-seminars, CTA study reports and study visit reports.

— *Co-publications*. Co-publications consist mainly of periodicals, stand-alone titles and series. The most important serial co-publications include *The Tropical Agriculturalist/Le technicien d'Agriculture Tropicale* (with Macmillan in the

UK and the French-based publisher Maisonneuve et Larose) and the *Agrodok* series, which is produced with the Dutch-based organisation Agromisa. These series now account for a combined total of 57 titles in English, 61 in French and 8 in Portuguese.

Co-publishing enables CTA to benefit from the pre-press and commercial production facilities of commercial publishers and allows access to their distribution and marketing channels. It has also enabled a great many titles on agricultural development in ACP countries, which would have been rejected on normal commercial criteria, to get into print; and it has helped many ACP authors to find publishers.

Potential authors and publishers, especially those based in ACP countries, are encouraged to submit proposals for co-publishing with CTA. In assessing these proposals, CTA considers many aspects, among them their relevance to CTA's sphere of activity; their cost-effectiveness and geographical relevance; the technical level, style and reliability of the content; and the practicality of the information given. Innovation is valued, whilst duplication is always avoided.

CTA nowadays operates a subscription system for the distribution of its publications, with each publication being valued in credit units and each subscriber being given an annual allocation of credit points. Details of the availability of this service can be found in *Spore*; alternatively, readers are invited to write to CTA or to consult CTA's Website (<http://www.cta.nl/>).

The orientations of the Department's work are constantly evolving. Among the current pre-occupations are the establishment of partnerships with organisations in ACP countries to enhance the effectiveness of our book distribution; the development of closer co-publishing links with ACP publishers and writers; the completion of a major new co-publication which will facilitate self-help in veterinary medicine; the development of two new series on agribusiness and opportunities in food-processing; the establishment of an electronic photo-archive facility; efficiency improvements (time and cost savings) in the publication production process; and, of course, Websites and other

forms of electronic publishing. The Department's initial priorities have been to use the CTA Website to enhance the availability of *Spore* and the Publications Catalogue and to make available basic information about CTA's publication policies; reports of CTA seminars, workshops and studies will follow.

Ten to fifteen years ago there was widespread speculation that electronic information and communication technologies would so decrease the demand for books worldwide that their unit cost would become prohibitively expensive and thus hasten their demise. This was a false prophesy indeed. The electronic and printed media each have their niches, and are complementary. Both struggle to meet the worldwide demand for information. Besides being new additions to the information scene which have diversified its character, electronic information sources have actually facilitated the compilation, production and distribution of the conventional printed word. Publishing in all its forms goes from strength to strength and becomes ever more accessible. The good news is that the benefits are reaching the ACP countries and that CTA will continue to ensure that they are directed towards the needs of the agricultural development sector.

Improved sales: the objective of CDI's assistance

By providing varied and tailor-made assistance to ACP enterprises, the CDI enables them to better target their markets, whether regional or international, with the aim that enterprises sell more, thereby helping to boost the ACP private sector.

Public aid generally deals with the enabling environment of the enterprise and provides it at this level with all the assistance that will allow it to grow. The CDI has chosen, for its part, to assist the enterprise directly by giving preference to direct contact. In order to achieve this, it uses its own expertise, specialised consultants, and the resources of its European and ACP network as well as fostering collaboration between the enterprises themselves. In fact, experience shows that the best support one can offer a private enterprise comes from a client or partner enterprise with a complementary activity. Furthermore, it is in doing business that the ACP enterprise can best improve. Indeed this CDI approach is complementary to other aid programmes which aim to foster a proper entrepreneurial environment. It is worth noting that often enterprises backed by CDI decide to create or strengthen their sectoral association.

Helping to sell

It is thanks to the strict selection of enterprises or consultants who have direct knowledge of distribution circuits and through which CDI provides its support that the ACP enterprise receives assistance adapted to its commercial needs. It can be the definition of the products themselves, technical production assistance, rehabilitation of obsolete installations or their upgrading to required standards, the implementation of a quality assurance or personnel training. In any case, intervening within the enterprise guarantees the mastering of competence which allows it to tackle international exports – if it so desires – or, at the very least, to improve its performance in its niche and in a chosen region. It is indeed much more effective to develop a niche – for instance, passion fruit in Germany – than to launch exports in all directions without a well-devised strategy.

A first conclusion is clear: the commercialisation of the ACP products on the local, regional and international markets is the real goal of any technical, commercial or managerial assistance provided by the CDI.

Identifying profitable markets

Export promotion is naturally easier in markets where international demand is strong. This is the case for marble and granite exported to Europe, Caribbean or Pacific wood, tropical fruit, sashimi tuna to Japan, etc. In that context, the CDI organises Industrial Partnership Meetings, putting ACP enterprises in direct contact with EU firms which have distribution channels in Europe. The CDI was able, however, to associate European enterprises also with sectors whose market is strictly ACP. For instance, by putting poultry farming entrepreneurs from Senegal, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire in contact with European counterparts, the CDI has contributed to the development of a modern poultry-breeding industry in these countries. Thanks to their greatly improved production methods, the ACP enterprises are able to produce cheaper poultry which helps reduce the protein deficiency in the region. It also contributes to increased use of local raw materials (corn, millet, etc), gives work to laboratories – thus supporting their activity – and even generates interest from Eur-

opean industrialists. In fact, these industrialists have found poultry-farming in West and Central Africa to be a profitable outlet for a complete series of products: input for chicken feed (premix), disease control, inoculation of chickens, construction of buildings, etc.

The enterprise: a development role

The means used by the CDI to help ACP enterprises are numerous and complementary. A prerequisite to any action undertaken by the CDI is the knowledge of regulations and major trends in markets of interest to ACP operators. Another factor of success: the CDI has for many years established a large network of consultants – both European and ACP, independent or operating within the framework of an enterprise – in a number of key sectors. Furthermore, the CDI has learnt from experience that European enterprises in direct contact with their local market constitute an excellent means of transferring know-how. Who, indeed, knows the market and its nuances better than the importer himself? It is equally he who can better advise the ACP firm on the required standards and the quality to be achieved, the right packaging, etc. By becoming technical, commercial or financial partners, these European enterprises are called upon to play an effective development role.

To be more specific, the assistance provided by the CDI to ACP enterprises (about 450 every year) indirectly benefits European companies as about half of the ACP enterprises export to two or three European operators. The latter, in turn have the opportunity to specify their needs and help the ACP enterprises bring their products up to standard, thus securing themselves a supply of quality products. The process works both ways: a European importer who is after raw material, semi-finished or finished quality products, and the ACP enterprise which is seeking export outlets. It should be noted that the CDI endeavours to find partners whose operations are of a similar size so as to facilitate balanced exchanges.

As a privileged tool to bring together potential partners, more and more Industrial Partnership Meetings are being organised by the CDI. The principle: 20 to 25 ACP enterprises representative of their sector are put in contact with an equivalent number of EU operators in the same sector which are interested in cooperating. CDI experience has shown that these selective and targeted meetings promote rapid commercial and technical contacts as well as both North-South



CDI

The Centre for the Development of Industry (CDI) is a joint ACP-EU institution created in the framework of the Lomé Convention linking the European Union with the 71 ACP countries (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific). Its objective is to support the creation, expansion and restructuring of industrial companies in ACP countries. These partnerships may take various forms: financial, technical and commercial partnerships, management contracts, licensing or franchise agreements, sub-contracting, etc.

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and South-South cooperation. In the medium term, such links, built on the basis of solid business relations, frequently lead to genuine technical or financial partnership.

As a result of these meetings, and the seminars frequently organised as a follow-up, the CDI increases its knowledge in the specific industrial sub-sectors in the targeted region. Using specialised consultants, it has thus built a state-of-the-art competence in a whole range of sectors: wood, poultry farming, fisheries, leather, ornamental stones, ceramics, fruit and vegetable processing, etc. Finally, another result is worth mentioning: the relationship built with the professional associations of the sector in Europe as well as the dynamics established in the ACP countries themselves, where very often, a national or regional sectoral association is created as a result of a partnership meeting.

A wide range of facilities

Direct assistance to existing enterprises in the framework of 'Facility 3' is certainly not the only kind of assistance to the private sector that the CDI provides. Experience shows that many ACP promoters appreciate being supported well before the investment, namely, between the time the feasibility study has been completed, the financial package approved and the start-up of the factory. There are many who need *ad hoc* assistance: launching of invitations to tender (for the production equipment), choice of equipment, granting of licences and authorisations from the national authorities, etc. If the ACP promoter is in partnership with a European enterprise, it is often this enterprise which carries out such operations. If not, he appreciates the help that the CDI can bring at this level.

The same approach applies to commercialisation of products. One role of the CDI is to enable ACP promoters to participate in Commercial Fairs (see page 98 on the SIAL). The CDI helps the ACP enterprise to identify European clients or the distribution channel, and also helps it to adapt its product to the demand and, for instance, to develop suitable packaging.

Individual or grouped assistance

The CDI targets individual enterprises or whole sectors for assistance. Everything depends on the size of the enterprise and the sector in question and on the circumstances which triggered the CDI's intervention. In all cases however, the ultimate goal of the assistance is illustrated by the better

The training of 6500 farmers in Madagascar

In Madagascar, Lecofruit produced gherkins in small quantities (it used to buy the production from about 100 farmers) but wished to develop its export markets. Not only was it put in contact with the French company Segma Maille which assured regular outlets for the company's gherkins in Europe, but Lecofruit also began to diversify its production – with the help of the CDI – in the feasibility study and in the training of farmers. Today Lecofruit is firmly established in Madagascar and produces string beans, snow peas, asparagus and mini vegetables so as to ensure an annual production. As a result, Lecofruit has multiplied its turnover by five in five years. Better still, the company buys the production of 6500 farmers and itself employs about a hundred permanent workers, 200 seasonal workers and 1300 day labourers depending on the season. Between now and 2000, the company will increase its cultivated area from 250 to 350 hectares and the number of farmers from 6500 to 8300.



capacity of the enterprise to sell. Two good examples of *ad hoc* assistance, where the competence of specialised CDI consultants was used to enable enterprises to export, are *Lecofruit* and *Phael Flor*, both based in Madagascar (see box).

The CDI also frequently assists several enterprises belonging to the same sector. This has occurred, for instance, with the textile sector in Fiji, Mauritius, Ethiopia and Madagascar. In Mauritius, the CDI has supported the EPZDA (Export Processing Zones Development Authority) in a three-year programme offered to around 20 textile companies. At EPZDA's request, the CDI provided consultants to implement the training programme. The objective: to increase the productivity of selected enterprises to counterbalance the rising cost of local labour, improve the quality and the design and, eventually, to offer higher added value products. The repercussions of this programme are significant. The enterprises increased their productivity by 30% on average. Additionally, they have diversified their export markets – traditionally confined to France, the UK and Germany – as a result of an Industrial Partnership Meeting organised in February 1997 by the CDI. This brought together Spanish, Belgian, Finnish, Italian and

other importers and led to trial and firm orders to the value of more than ECU 8m. Finally, the EPZDA technicians are themselves now able to provide sound advice to other local enterprises.

In Madagascar, the CDI has made a significant contribution to the consolidation of the textile industry. Following a study by the European Commission which emphasised the development potential of the clothing sector in Madagascar, the CDI has brought about a major transfer of technology over a five-year period (particularly for the training of supervisory staff) and has encouraged the creation of many mixed enterprises – mainly

Adapting to the export market

The CDI consultant for essential oils in Madagascar was used to organise training on the techniques of extraction of concrete and resin oils for the *Phael Flor* company. In collaboration with the CDI and Protrade, this company was able to participate in a professional fair and to establish contacts with the importers. As a result, *Phael Flor* has increased its turnover in one year and has also signed interesting contracts with the United States.



with French enterprises – or investments in the free zones. Once more, the CDI objective has been to ensure that the production from Madagascar is 'in tune' with the demand from the European markets and that the enterprises enjoy a high profile on the international scene (for example, during the Industrial Partnership Meeting organised in Mauritius). Since 1988, the CDI has helped 22 enterprises in all and has thus contributed to the revitalisation of the sector in which the work force in the free zone has expanded from 5000 to approximately 40,000.

Cooperation with European sectoral associations

There are numerous examples of assistance given by the CDI in cooperation with professional associations, chambers of commerce, co-operation institutions or export promotion organisations. Clearly, complementarity of means and competence are targeted. This is particularly illustrated by the export promotion of tropical products from the Caribbean (see box below).

Moving from 'ethnic' to large-scale consumer markets

Traditionally, sauces, spices and jams made from Caribbean tropical fruits were sold as 'ethnic products' on the North-American and British markets and were virtually unknown elsewhere. In association with Protrade, which encourages the import of products from developing countries onto the German market, the CDI has selected some 15 enterprises in five countries likely to develop their exports towards Germany. Already used to selling to occasional German tourists, the Caribbean companies made the effort to improve their packaging (the CDI had in fact provided ad hoc aid to this effect). But with the new assistance, they have had the opportunity to participate in the Anuga Fair and to conclude trial orders for an amount of ECU 1m. CDI is pursuing its interventions in 1998, by continuing to improve the products and the packaging following the advice of the German importers and by helping to introduce the tropical products as 'current consumption items' in the major distribution circuits.



The CDI has encouraged about a dozen Ugandan fisheries to form an export group.

Very often the CDI encourages ACP companies to form their own professional association. A case in point is lake-fishing companies in Uganda. Facing new sanitary standards enacted by the EU (HACCP and others), several of these companies which specialise in Lake Victoria Nile perch, approached the CDI for technical assistance. Exports of Nile perch have been steadily picking up for three or four years, generated by a shortfall of fish on the EU markets. Calling on the services of veterinary experts who are fully aware of the new standards, the CDI supplied the necessary assistance. It also encouraged the 12 or so companies concerned – including the six leading ones – to form an Export Group, the Ugandan Fish Processing Exporters Association. In 1995, the CDI organised an Industrial Partnership Meeting to attract the European investors and buyers on the spot. And twice since then, when major problems hit the sector, the CDI provided specific assistance which resolved the difficulty. The

The first African Leather Fair

In Europe, the growing demand for finished leather and semi-processed tannery products (crust and 'wet-blue') offers unprecedented development potential for African leather, on condition that the skins are treated with care, as the European importers had already expressed during the industrial partnership meeting that the CDI organised in 1994, in Zimbabwe. At that time, it was clearly unrealistic to expect local companies to meet the requirements of the export market: rather, they were to be directed towards the local and regional markets for finished products and CDI was to focus on tanneries. To achieve this, the CDI cooperated closely with Italian and European leather tanners associations (UNIC and COTANCE) as well as with ESALIA (East and Southern Africa Leather Industries Association). The aim was to encourage 45 tanneries from West, East and Southern Africa to participate in two important events which were organised in 1997: the Lineapelle Fair in Bologna (Italy) and the 'African Leather Fair' in Johannesburg (South Africa), this being the first international fair in the leather sector to take place in Africa.

same approach was used for the poultry-farming sector in Central Africa: The Poultry and Animal Feed Producers Association of Cameroon, set up at the close of an Industrial Partnership Meeting organised by the CDI, almost immediately succeeded in securing a reduction in customs duty on inputs coming into the country.

Sustained assistance to the enterprise

To support an economic sector efficiently, it is often important to provide sustained assistance over a long period. The ornamental stone sector is a case in point. In the first phase, the CDI realised that there was strong demand for top quality stone blocks at reliable prices by the European marble industry and granite producers. Since 1992/93, the Italian firms became aware of environmental problems and a growing scarcity of quality stones in Europe – and have prospected several African countries to find new supply sources. Soon afterwards, the CDI took the first step and drew up an inventory of marble producers in the Caribbean, East and Southern Africa. In the second phase, it assisted the producers (mainly ACP) to improve their products and to exhibit them, particularly at the specialised fairs in Carrare and Madrid. Today, the CDI has entered a new phase, namely, the organisation of sectoral missions of European industrialists to ACP countries. This was done for Ethiopia, last year, Namibia, this year (see

A new cash crop

Ten years ago, only a few wholesale markets (notably Alsemeer in the Netherlands) were accessible to the producers of cut flowers from East Africa. By providing them with technical and marketing assistance, and helping them to adapt their products to the specific requirements of the EU markets, the CDI has enabled them to access direct markets. To achieve this, the CDI has employed the services of a specialised consultant in the field. In November 1996, a first Industrial Partnership Meeting attracted European industry leaders to Nairobi (Kenya). As a result, thanks to the creation of several partnerships and the setting-up of joint ventures, the CDI contributed to the development of an atypical agricultural sector in an ACP country and encouraged a significant transfer of technology. In certain areas of East Africa, rose cultivation is a real cash crop, allowing farmers to remain on the land, secure their basic income and be in a position also to grow food crops. Here, the CDI's support was not only technical but also marketing, notably, by encouraging the producers to adhere to the 'eco-marketing' label which guarantees the protection of the environment.




page 95) and one is planned in the Caribbean in November. The results: the CDI convinced the Europeans of the quality of ACP products and on that basis, technical partnerships were concluded. Several Italian firms are now ready to enter a joint venture to develop production in Namibia, Ethiopia and Eritrea and have already placed firm orders for blocks. Among the ACP industrialists invited to the Industrial Partnership Meeting in Borba (Portugal), some have decided to create Afristone, an association regrouping the producers of African marble and ornamental stones, and the CDI organised for its President a visit of European sectoral organisations to discuss with them and to learn from their opera-

tions. Finally, the local markets for general construction and hotels are being developed for marble slabs and squares.

Promote whole sectors

The CDI has also provided several types of assistance to an entire sector. This has been done for cut flowers (see box above), processed fruit and vegetables, leather (see box 'The first African Leather Fair'), poultry farming and

In Suriname, *Artline* is one of those companies which has received technical assistance thus allowing it to produce more sophisticated products to satisfy market requirements.



wood. In the area of processed fruits and vegetables, the CDI has contributed to improving production techniques, introducing total quality programmes, meeting sanitary standards (HACCP) and, above all, developing new packaging. Since 1996, several Industrial Partnership Meetings, seminars and workshops which have encouraged technical and commercial partnerships and presented new packaging techniques have been organised particularly in West Africa, East and Southern Africa as well as in the Caribbean.

The wood sector is also one of the CDI's priorities – it has been active for a long time in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. Companies at different stages of wood processing have received technical assistance from the sawing of logs to the finished product. In 1996, an Industrial Partnership Meeting organised in Suriname stressed the interdependence of wood operators, drying being by far the most important process as it determines the final quality of the wood and hence its exportability. To guarantee this step, the CDI called on specialised consultants in wood drying and installed new drying kilns in several companies in the Caribbean and in the Pacific. The CDI has also provided varied technical support which will allow them to diversify their production: management control to monitor production costs, better plant layout, the installation of new equipment (saws, lathes, etc). This will help create more sophisticated products, introduce design to establish a brand image (furniture), provide marketing assistance and the introduction of new clients with clearly defined technical specifications.

And as the markets are constantly evolving, the CDI continues to keep watch for new elements which can help ACP products consolidate their position. This is particularly so for recently-developed labels: the green label which guarantees proper forest management, the social label which guarantees that the products did not involve child labour, the environmental label which prevents the use of pesticides or weed-killers harmful to the environment, the ISO 9000 and HACCP standards. All these technical aspects have become part of the selling equation – and naturally, the CDI wants to pass them on to ACP operators.

Regional Focus

Namibia, springboard into Southern Africa

At present, CDI is supporting two major programmes involving Namibian companies and authorities: a partnership initiative with German companies in selected sectors and a partnership initiative with Italian companies in the natural stone sector.

Namibia has developed an excellent reputation as an all-round investment location. Factors such as infrastructure, availability of finance, minimal red tape, licensing rules, economic risk and foreign exchange constraints are quite favourable and result in attracting many foreign investors. The two areas where room for improvements have been identified are availability of local promoters and skilled labour. Short-term investment risks are considerably lower in Namibia than in its African competitors. The country's credit risk rating tells a similar story. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit in London, Namibia has the lowest risk rating among countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

Much of Namibia's attractiveness is due to coherent economic policies and visibly favourable economic indicators. For instance, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is relatively high at approximately US \$1750. Foreign aid as a percentage of GDP is amongst the lowest in the region and the ratio of debt to GDP is the lowest.

The incentives for manufactures were introduced in 1993-94 and are applicable to existing as well as new manufactures. They include tax abatements or deductions amongst other incentives. Moreover, the newly opened Walvis Bay Export Processing Zone offers freedom from corporation tax and from stamp and transfer duties.

With the improved facilities in Walvis Bay and the construction of the new TransCaprivi and TransKalahari highways, Namibia may be regarded as a springboard to neighbouring countries in Southern Africa.

Current CDI interventions in Namibia are two-fold: participation in the German-Namibian Business Initiative and the organisation, together with the Italian Foreign Trade Institute (ICE), of a mission on natural stone that took place last June.

Key facts about Namibia	
Area	824,269 square kilometres
Population	1.6 million
Language	English (official language)
Capital	Windhoek (pop 182,000)
Political system	Multiparty parliamentary democracy
GDP growth	3.5% (1992)
Currency	Namibian dollar
Exchange rate	US\$ = N\$5.2 (July 1998)
Main exports	Diamonds, other minerals, fish products, meat and meat products

German-Namibian Business Initiative

The overall purpose of this initiative is to assist the Namibian Government in its efforts to promote investment, encourage the development of industry and create jobs. Through a German-Namibian partnership, it aims at economic development in the areas of technology transfer, training of staff and operators, technical assistance and possible financial cooperation as well as the establishment of new companies and joint ventures.

It is expected that the project will support export of products to Germany, in particular. Special attention will be given to quality control and to creating value-added activities in Namibia. CDI supervises the initiative together with the Namibia Investment Centre.

Italian Mission on Natural Stone

Given the availability of high-quality granites and marbles in Namibia and the rising demand in Europe for these types of ornamental stone, CDI organised a sectoral mission from 15 to 19 June together with the Italian Trade Commission (ICE) and the Namibia Investment Centre, the CDI antenna. Representatives of 15 Italian marble and granite companies visited 12 marble and granite quarries and one processing plant in the regions of Karibib, Usakos, Swakopmund and Omaruru. The Port Authority in Walvis Bay also organised a visit of the port's infrastructure. The Italian companies expressed an interest in the Namibian marble and granite, especially the white, pink and Palissandro marble which commands high commercial value in Europe. The visitors also had an opportunity to explore the excellent physical infrastructure such as transport and telecommunications, as well as take cognisance of the attractive investment climate. The on-site visits brought about negotiations between Italian and Namibian companies and as a result, two joint ventures and ten technical and commercial agreements were negotiated. Three Italian companies have expressed readiness to acquire mining licences in order to start the mining of block stones for export. Another two Italian firms ordered blocks for the European and South African markets. All participants considered the mission very successful in generating promising prospects and CDI is planning a follow-up programme that will assist the Namibian counterparts in their future business and partnership negotiations with the Italians.

The assistance programme will be discussed and implemented in coordination with the Ministry of Mines and Energy and under the SYSMIN financing facility. The first assistance activities are expected to take place during September 1998 and will involve geological and drilling campaigns, marketing of some types of granite, feasibility studies and training of personnel.

CDI Contacts: Jorge Borges (German Initiative), Sid Boubekur (Natural Stone)

In the sectors

United Apparel: it's only the beginning

Thanks to CDI's support, United Apparel (Fiji) has been successfully developing export markets. Now it is inaugurating a brand-new state-of-the-art factory and plans to expand its workforce by 40%.

It was in the presence of the President of Fiji, *Ratu Sir*

clean, modern and comfortable environment. United has plans to expand its workforce even further in the near future, adding another 400 workers to cope with the increased business that will be gained from new orders.

The CDI's first assistance package to the company dates back to 1991. Since then, United Apparel has received a number of different types of assistance (to suit the



Kamise Mara, and of about 600 guests that the new Nadawa plant of United Apparel was inaugurated at the end of April 1998. The plant is the outcome of thorough research around the world. United's Managing Director, *Ramesh Solanki*, travelled throughout Europe and Asia to identify the technology that would meet his factory needs. The result is a complex which boasts state-of-the-art equipment including computerised precision pattern-making and cutting machines, fully automatic computerised cloth spreaders, computerised pressing equipment, high-tech sewing machines and a complex rail network to move garments around the factory.

Created in 1989, United Apparel is the leader of the Fijian textile industry which employs a total of 14,500 people and generates more than 20% of domestic exports. United itself currently employs some 1000 people who work in a

From left to right, Ramesh Solanki, Managing Director, Ratu Sir Kamise Mara, President of Fiji and Josephine Solanki, Director, visiting the new installations.

evolution of the company's needs) including marketing help (participation in various international Garment Fairs in Europe), travel assistance (to South Africa to select appropriate production managers), diagnostics of the operations, a full feasibility study (resulting in the establishment of the new factory complex in Nasinu), technical and training assistance (attachment of two South African production managers).

The overall development of Fiji benefits from United's results: additional foreign export earnings, creation of local jobs, and the projection of a very good image of the country through the export of high quality garments to international markets. ■

CDI contact: *Vana Catsica*

Nylacast: new industry, state-of-the-art production

Producing composite materials, Nylacast Southern Africa is the first operation of its kind in Swaziland and is the result of an efficient technology transfer from Nylacast Ltd UK.

Nylacast Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd is a joint venture created by Nylacast Ltd (UK) with a 56% majority equity, Swaziland Development Corporation (24%) and Multiplex Engineering (Pty) Ltd, a local mechanical workshop (20%). After a feasibility study co-financed by CDI in 1996, the partners decided to invest in Swaziland and to construct a state-of-the-art manufacturing plant producing self-lubricated cast nylon products to be used in almost every industry for plain gears, bearings and slideways in machinery and equipment of many types. The Swaziland plant is able to produce 250 tonnes per annum when operating at full capacity on a single shift basis. When demand requires, additional tonnage can be generated by increasing the number of shifts.

Swaziland provides a very limited market. Instead, South Africa is the major market for the Nylacast products. Demand there for plastics, including engineering plastics, has been growing steadily. The total South African market was estimated at 740,000 tonnes in 1994, up by 21% from 1993 and it is currently value at 10 billion rand (ECU 175.2 m). The neighbouring countries are not included in this figure, but these will benefit from all actions resulting in further growth in the South African market.

Nylacast produces 250 tonnes of self-lubricated cast nylon per annum when operating at full capacity.



The value of total sales during the first year of operation was R6.5m (ECU 1.14m) and the figure should reach R11.8m (ECU 2.07m) in year five. Test sales on the South African market have shown positive results and the management has positive expectations for the future of the new company.

Although the key raw materials are imported, the project will have a positive development impact on the country as practically all the production will be exported. Indeed, it not only brings a new industry to Swaziland but also transfers technology, creates job opportunities and generates foreign exchange earnings. CDI's assistance has been threefold: the feasibility study carried out successfully during the first half of 1996, the technical assistance for inspection of production equipment and the training of personnel at start-up.

CDI Contact: Peter Alling

Cercle des Sécheurs: Moving towards extensive exports

With the joint technical and financial assistance of CDI and the European Commission, the Cercle des Sécheurs (Burkina Faso) intends to professionalise its production and analyse the European export markets.

Burkina Faso is a major producer of mangoes, its annual production exceeding 150,000 tonnes. Most of the mangoes are consumed in the country itself and about 20% are exported to neighbouring countries, particularly Niger and Côte d'Ivoire. About 1000 tonnes are exported to Europe.

Founded in 1995, under the aegis of a Swiss NGO, the Cercle des Sécheurs (CDS) regroups eight small companies which are engaged in drying fruits and vegetables and which have taken on the form of an economic interest group (GIE). Its objective is to carve a niche in the international dry fruits and vegetables markets while building a solid base in national and sub-regional markets.

Together, the eight firms have a drying capacity of 160 tonnes for one full year of drying. However, mango drying only uses the infrastructure for six months of the year during the production periods. This has led to the search for other products such as papaya, banana, onions, tomatoes for the purpose



Together, the eight firms forming the Cercle des Sécheurs have a capacity to dry 160 tonnes of mangoes per annum.

of making the equipment profitable. Together, the firms employ 152 people and export a quarter of their production.

To move into top gear as regards exports and move away from the only current distribution channel through 'Magasins du Monde' in Switzerland, Belgium, the UK and Sweden, the CDS must professionalise its production and make every effort to respect the hygiene rules as stipulated by the EU. This was the basis of one of five requests that CDS made to CDI: namely the training of a person to be responsible for quality and the development of a HACCP system (Hazard Analysis & Critical Control Point) as well as the implementation of quality management in conformity with ISO 9000. Other interventions are underway: CDI support for modifications to the current management system as practised by NGOs for commercial enterprise management, support in drawing up a development strategy of activities as well as a marketing strategy, training those responsible for the technicians so that they are able to better master technical and administrative management. Finally, CDI will assist CDS with its marketing plan by carrying out a study of the local market in dry fruits, the bio market in three EU countries – France, Germany and Belgium – by making a market test on a sample of targeted consumers and by drawing up a Communication Plan on the products to be exported.

CDI Contact: Alioune Badara Ndiaye

Atlas, the leading industrial unit of concrete components in Haiti

With the technical support of a French partner company and CDI, Atlas Construction has just opened its doors in Haiti. Already, development perspectives seem excellent.

Returning from France where he had worked for several years, a Haitian property developer quickly realised that the property market was 'profitable'. In fact, since the lifting of the embargo, several projects have started, notably, port construction in different towns by private enterprises, road rehabilitation, repairs to shops and homes, and construction of public buildings, social housing and private homes.

To be sure of the feasibility of his project, the Haitian entrepreneur approached CDI for the first time in 1996 and a study was co-financed with the *Caisse Française de Développement*, the results of which proved promising. On this basis, he set up his company, Atlas Construction, and contacted one of the specialists in the sector, *PPB Saret International (France)*, which is well known for its manufacturing method of pre-stressed and reinforced concrete structure components.

In the light of the interest of this project to the construction sector in Haiti, the French partner immediately took up equity in the new Haitian company (10%) and offered its technical assistance, notably by providing production techniques and training the technical and commercial staff.

At the beginning of the year, the equipment used to produce concrete girders was mounted with the assistance of PPB and with the CDI-backed support for the training of technicians. This summer, a second training session to improve commercial skills has been co-financed by the CDI so as to allow the commercial staff to draw up a sales brochure integrating the technical and commercial elements. Computer software has been set up to facilitate production follow-up, the management of raw materials and finished product inventories as well as to make sales and order forecasts.

CDI Contact: Sid Boubekeur

In brief

CDI Cooperation with Inter-American Institutions

Fernando Matos Rosa, CDI Deputy Director, went on mission to Washington to meet with the officials of the Inter-American Bank (IDB) and to discuss those countries which are of interest to both institutions in the Caribbean region. During the discussions, the question of extended cooperation was broached with the MFI (Multilateral Investment Fund) and the IIC (Inter-American Investment Corporation), two institutions linked to the IDB. The first joint initiatives are being prepared.

Institutional Cooperation for Africa

During his mission to the USA, the Deputy Director also participated in a meeting with the institutions of the World Bank Group, the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. One of the first concrete results of the meeting is better coordination between the institutions participating in the follow-up of projects in Africa. A follow-up meeting in Luxembourg is planned.

UK-Caribbean Industrial Twinning Programme

The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), in cooperation with the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom are participating with the CDI in a new partnership programme between companies in the UK and in Jamaica, Guyana and Dominica. The objective is to allow the Caribbean companies to benefit from a transfer of technology in the form of technical, commercial and financial partnerships. The targeted sectors are metal-mechanics, agro-industries, plastics, wood, building materials, leather and textiles. The programme developers hope to conclude about fifteen partnership agreements shortly. The CDI will be mainly responsible for the identification and diagnostic reports of the Caribbean and British enterprises as well as the on-the-spot sectoral missions. It will also follow up the evaluation of these visits and the recommendations in terms of granting assistance for setting up or rehabilitating companies.

CDI Contacts: *Orlando Perez Diaz and Paolo Baldan*

Participation of African companies in International Food Fair

To promote their exports to the EU, it is vital that ACP companies involved in fresh and out-of-season products and processed and semi-processed products have access to the most important food fairs in Europe, including the SIAL (Salon International de l'Alimentation) which will be held from 18 to 22 October at the *Parc des Expositions de Paris-Nord Villepinte*. This fair is organised every two years in Paris at the same time as the IPA (The International Week of Manufacturing Processes and Equipment for the Food Industry). For the company manager, this is a unique opportunity not only to present their products but also to find out about the latest technologies in the sector. In association with ADEPTA – a group of 200 French companies responsible for agriculture, agro-industries, lumber, fisheries and packaging – the CDI selected ten ACP companies, primarily in the fisheries sector as well as in fruits and vegetables and processed cereals. These firms already have export experience and have also acquired a certain reputation on the European markets. During the fair, they can exhibit their products at the ADEPTA stand. ADEPTA has devised and published a brochure presenting the exhibitors, their particulars, the list of their products and a photograph of these as well as the type of partnership which is being sought. Furthermore, ADEPTA will organise an African cocktail reception in its own pavilion for the purpose of forming or strengthening contacts and enhancing the image of the exhibiting companies. During and after the trade event, the CDI will be able to provide its know-how by giving assistance in the field of marketing and its technical support for the setting up of industrial partnerships identified during the event.

CDI Contacts: *Paolo Baldan and Paul Chotard*

The 'Briefs' on the Internet

As from this summer, the briefs which appear in Partnership will be available on CDI's website on the Internet. The address is: www.cdi.be

Twinning Programme – Austria-Ghana-Zimbabwe

The CDI, jointly with the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Federal Chamber of Commerce, has launched an industrial twinning programme between Austrian industrialists and SMEs in Ghana and Zimbabwe. The programme aims at consolidating and developing selected existing companies in Ghana and Zimbabwe by enabling them to gain better control over their unit operating methods. In addition, the programme is expected to allow the

Austrian companies to develop close partnership strategies with Ghanaian and Zimbabwean companies so that they can improve their competitiveness and their global performance.

CDI Contact: *Paolo Baldan*

ACP-EU Seminar on Poultry in West Africa

The meeting between industrial partners in the poultry farming sector in West Africa held in June, in Abidjan, which was a follow-up to those organised in the Western Sahel and Central Africa, was a remarkable success. There was a record participation of 18 European businesspeople and 51 African counterparts from Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Togo. This meeting confirmed the undeniable economic weight of the poultry farming sector in the sub-region: 20,000 workers, 1.1 billion eggs produced each year and 22,000 tonnes of chicken meat for a group turnover of CFAF 57bn. Besides the North-South perspectives, the seminar focused on setting up or strengthening national and regional professional associations as well as South-South technical and commercial cooperation. During the seminar, participants had the opportunity to visit several local companies – including modern farms – and to discuss with potential partners. The CDI expects to receive about 20 requests for technical assistance and it has also encouraged certain group initiatives which have been decided by the professionals. These include setting up a common abattoir in Cameroon, and establishing – at sub-regional level – a factory unit for fish meal and a laboratory for pest pathology, analysis and the control of raw materials and food. A follow-up programme will be implemented.

CDI Contacts: *Chérif Touré and Alioune Badara Ndiaye*

Assistance to the Wood Sector in the Caribbean

In June, the CDI and the Export Development and Agriculture Diversification Unit (EDADU), the agency for the promotion of exports and investment in the islands of the East Caribbean, concluded a financial cooperation agreement. Under this, the two organisations will jointly support about 15 key companies in the wood sector in the six countries in the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis, St Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). The OECS is a common market that offers favourable conditions for commercial exchanges between the islands. The assistance will essentially be technical and commercial and will allow the selected companies to improve the quality of their production so as to attain the standards required by international markets.

CDI Contact: *Orlando Perez Diaz*

Forestry policy in the Congo Basin

A nine-day workshop on Forest Policy Development was held in May in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Funded by the European Commission and conducted by the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, the workshop is part of a series of activities designed to foster a common vision of the sustainable

Conférence sur les Ecosystèmes de Forêts Denses et Humides d'Afrique Centrale (CEFDHAC). Experts on various aspects of tropical forests from Canada, France, Belgium, Senegal, Cameroon and Congo (Republic) supported the Economic Development Institute of the World Bank in conducting the workshop. This event allowed par-

Participants at the Yaoundé workshop.



Commission

management of the forest in six Congo Basin countries.

This eighteen-month effort was launched in January 1998 with a meeting in Brussels of forestry ministers from the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea. Critical areas were identified in which senior policy and management staff needed strengthening to enable them to develop and coordinate national forest policies. As an indication of the support of the governments, the Ministers approved the outline of a training/cooperation programme.

The Yaoundé workshop brought together senior policy and management officials from the six countries, as well as two important regional organisations involved in promoting the development of forest policies in the Congo Basin: the *Organisation Africaine du Bois* (OAB), and the

participants to explore the themes of industrialisation, sustainable management, and participation in the development and institutionalisation of forest policies. The need for cooperation among policy makers and managers throughout the Basin was an underlying component of the discussions and technical presentations.

The next step in the programme will expose these same senior African officials and managers to the ongoing efforts to achieve sustainable management of the Amazon basin forest. A study tour in Brazil later this year will be an opportunity to assess how others have addressed issues of sustainable management of the forest. African managers will also assess the extent to which Brazilian strategies can inform forest policy formulation in the Congo Basin.

A final workshop will synthesise these options to create a possible 'road map' for develop-

Corrigenda

In issue 169 of *The Courier* (page 14), the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Basdeo Panday, was quoted as saying that his country has 'a minimum wage of TT\$7 a day...' (page 14). In fact, the minimum wage in Trinidad and Tobago is TT\$7 an hour. Our apologies for this error which was introduced during editing.

On page 22 of issue 170, we stated that Mauritius had a child mortality rate of 17% (17 per hundred). The correct figure is 17 per thousand. Our thanks to Doctor David Stevenson of Edinburgh for pointing out this error.

ing and coordinating forest policies in the Congo Basin. It is the expectation of both the EC and the World Bank that the report, which the participants will prepare at the end of this series of activities, will be received by the governments of the region and will contribute to concerted efforts to promote rational management of the forest. It is also expected that, as a result of participating in the programme, this small group of officials and managers will have a catalytic impact as the ministries and governments of the region are called upon to articulate coherent forest policies over the next few years. ■ M. Wachira (EDI/World Bank)

World Bank poverty probe

Michael Walton, Director for poverty reduction at the World Bank, briefed EU officials in June on a new approach within his organisation to combating poverty. Given economic globalisation and its associated growth, the opportunity for tackling poverty had never been so good, he said, yet new inequalities were appearing. The Bank's findings will be published in its World Development Report 2000, and the subject will be the focus of the September 2000 meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Mr Walton spoke of a favourable international situation to reduce poverty: most trade barriers had fallen, central eco-

conomic planning was in retreat and the costs of communication had shrunk. The proportion of the world's population living on less than a dollar a day had considerably diminished from 60% in 1975 to just 20% by the mid-1990s.' Never has there been such an improvement in human history,' he claimed.

Yet, almost in parallel, the last 30 years have seen a rise in inequality. This subject 'is back on the agenda of the World Bank,' stressed Mr Walton and it is not simply a question of consumption and income levels. The Bank is also taking a long hard look at other factors engendering poverty: health, education, vulnerability, crime, violence, drug-taking, social integration and exclusion. Mr. Walton drew attention to the high level of insecurity linked to the march towards globalisation. He noted, in particular, a big increase in the perception of (economic) insecurity in the UK. As for the East Asian crisis, he noted that in just one year, capital losses had amounted to \$109 billion – about 10% of the region's GDP.

Consultation with civil society in the fight against poverty has also moved up the World Bank's agenda. Mr Walton cited the Bank's efforts to consult with indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Peru. 'They want to engage in the global economy, but on their own terms', he stated.

Finally, he emphasised the importance of 'good governance' – including the strengthening of legal and institutional frameworks to deal with poverty, and the need for greater World Bank coordination with EU member states and other donors. The Bank, he said, was determined that its ongoing research into poverty should 'link up the thinking with innovative project-work.' ■ D.P.

Commission approves HIPC grant for Uganda

Commissioner João de Deus Pinheiro, responsible for the relations with the ACP countries confirmed, on Wednesday 22 July,

The HIPC Debt Initiative

The principal objective of the HIPC Debt initiative is to ensure that the adjustment and reform efforts of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries are not constrained by continued high debt and debt service burdens. Analyses undertaken by the IMF and the WB show that, even after the full application of existing mechanisms for debt relief and in spite of their efforts to pursue growth-oriented policies, the debt burdens of a group of HIPCs will remain above sustainable levels over the medium term. The HIPC Debt Initiative is based on a commitment by the international financial community to take action to reduce these countries' debt burdens to sustainable levels, provided that the countries complete a period of strong economic policy performance. A key element of the initiative is its aim to deal with the debt problems of the HIPCs in a comprehensive way, including coordinated action by bilateral, commercial and multilateral creditors. Another key element is the new approach of assessing debt sustainability. On 6 July the Council, acting on a proposal of the Commission, adopted the regulation for the implementation of this initiative.

the participation of the European Community in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. This announcement was immediately followed up by the first concrete Commission action under the HIPC initiative, namely, the approval by the EC of a grant of ECU 4.59 million to relieve the debt of Uganda. This amount is the equivalent of the Net Present Value of special loans of the EC to Uganda.

With this grant, Uganda will be the first country to benefit from the EC's participation in the

HIPC initiative. The initiative will enable poor countries with good policy performance, which pursue or adopt economic reform programmes supported by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, to escape from unsustainable debt. Thus, they can focus all their energies on striving for sustainable development and reducing poverty.

The following countries are at the moment eligible for HIPC support: Uganda, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Côte d'Ivoire and Mozambique.

The EC confirms, with this comprehensive package of debt relief through the HIPC initiative and the emphasis on structural adjustment, the importance it attributes to good economic management and governance as a credible way to reduce poverty.

Guinea Bissau: Commission approves emergency humanitarian aid

The Commission has approved a decision granting ECU 1 million of emergency humanitarian aid to people in Guinea Bissau affected by the conflict that broke out on 7 June. The aid, organised under the auspices of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), will enable European NGOs to put into operation programmes to meet the needs of displaced people inside the country as well as the local population directly affected by the fighting.

Since the beginning of the conflict some 250,000 people have fled fighting in the capital towards the main provincial towns (Mansôa, Bissora, Bafata, Gabu) and towards the Bijagos Archipelago. Most of these people are given shelter by their families or friends.

The Commission has reminded all those involved of their obligation to respect international law, particularly as regards the right of access to victims and the distribution of aid.

ECHO has set up an operational centre at Dakar to follow

events on the ground, which will be overseen by the Commission delegation to Senegal. The Commission may decide to make further aid available, depending on further developments in the situation.

Humanitarian aid for Sierra Leone

In June, the European Commission approved a package of humanitarian aid worth ECU 1 million for civilian victims of conflict in Sierra Leone. The aid, managed by the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), is to enable four European NGOs to carry out emergency programmes over a two-month period.

Sierra Leone's seven-year-old internal armed conflict entered a new phase at the beginning of 1998. A Nigerian-led West African intervention force (ECOMOG) removed the country's military junta from power in February, allowing elected President *Ahmad Tejan Kabbah* to return to Freetown. He had fled to Guinea following his overthrow in May 1997. Fierce fighting between ECOMOG troops and soldiers of the military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF rebel movement) was reported in the east and north of the country,

resulting in widespread insecurity. Junta and RUF soldiers have embarked on a grim operation of 'no living thing', deliberately targeting civilians who are victims of arbitrary violence, killing and mutilation. Amnesty International has described the atrocities as among the worst it has recorded in Africa. Around 70,000 internally displaced people have fled either into the bush or to the main provincial cities under ECOMOG control.

This funding is to enable the NGOs to continue work on behalf of civilians sheltering in the country's big cities. It covers basic and emergency medical aid, surgery and rehabilitation for the injured and mutilated, as well as remedial feeding for infants.

ECHO's partners in this action are Concern Universal, Médecins sans Frontières-Belgium, Action contre la Faim-France, Merlin (United Kingdom) and Handicap International (France).

Some 150,000 Sierra Leoneans have also fled rebel attacks and atrocities into Guinea-Conakry and Liberia over the past four to five weeks. Several agencies including the UN High Commission for Refugees are currently responding to their most pressing needs.

South African essay prize-winners visit Brussels

As part of the activities to mark Europe Day in South Africa during the recent UK Presidency, the British Council, in collaboration with the Commission's Delegation in South Africa, the Read Educational Trust and the Independent Newspaper Group, arranged a national essay competition on the subject of 'Europe and South Africa in Today's World'. The first prize, sponsored by British Airways, Hilton Hotels and Eurostar, was a week in London, including a visit to the EU headquarters in Brussels.

The joint first prize winners were two 16-year olds – *Thembsa Fulani* and *Leonid Stoliarsky*. They travelled to London in early July. For their day trip to Brussels, they took Eurostar trains operating through the Channel Tunnel. Their itinerary in the Belgian capital began with a visit to the European Parliament, followed by lunch at the Commission. In the afternoon, they toured the *Mini Europe* park which features small-scale replicas of many famous European buildings and monuments.

EU foreign policy declarations

Under its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has recently issued a number of declarations relating to ACP countries, including the following:

Local elections in Mozambique (Declaration of 29 May)

The EU believes that the building of democracy in Mozambique is a process in which all Mozambicans should be involved. It regrets that the government and opposition were not able to reach agreement on the issues blocking wider participation in the municipal elections, but acknowledges the right of RENAMO and other political parties, which was exercised freely and democratically, not to participate in the polls.

As the major donor for the election process, the EU is particularly concerned at the potentially adverse effect on Mozambique's international image that any interruption in the reconciliation process might bring about, and urges all parties to continue dialogue with a view to consolidating democracy as a prerequisite for economic and social development.

Violence in Niger (Declaration of 29 May)

The EU has learnt with disappointment about the fresh eruption of violence in Niger and about the subsequent reaction of the Nigerien authorities such as restrictions to the freedom of the press.

The EU further deplores the arrest of members of the opposition and of the independent press and welcomes the release of some of them. It hopes that thorough investigations will be conducted into the accusations against the persons still remaining in custody and that they will have the benefit of due process of the law. The EU also expresses its concern about the initiatives of some over-zealous services who seem to act without the knowledge of the competent authorities. These incidents can only disrupt or further delay the democratisation

process in Niger to which the EU attaches the utmost importance.

The EU calls on all parties to refrain from any actions which could undermine efforts to end the present political impasse and to engage in a constructive dialogue with a view to restoring full democracy in the country. It hopes that the forthcoming local elections could prove to be a turning point in this respect.

Attempted coup in Guinea Bissau
(Declaration of 8 June)

The Presidency, on behalf of the EU, strongly condemns the attempted military coup by some elements of the armed forces against the duly elected democratic institutions and representatives of Guinea Bissau.

The EU wishes to stress that, within a democracy, disputes should only be settled in compliance with democratic principles.

The EU calls for the rapid re-establishment of constitutional order and security in Guinea Bissau to prevent further bloodshed, and commends the efforts made by the Guinea Bissau authorities to avoid any further loss of civilian lives and to ensure protection to all EU nationals residing in Bissau.

(Declaration of 16 June)

The EU is gravely concerned at the further deterioration of the situation in Guinea Bissau, following the recent attempted military coup.

The EU is particularly concerned at the reports of civilian casualties, both in Bissau and amongst those fleeing the fighting. It calls on the mutineers to lay down their arms, thus enabling the immediate re-establishment of constitutional order and an end to further bloodshed.

The EU further states its readiness to provide humanitarian assistance as soon as the conditions on the ground make it possible to reach those who need it.

Progress in Burundi
(Declaration of 11 June)

The adoption on 4 June by the Burundi National Assembly of a Constitutional Act and a political platform of transition is an important step towards peace and national reconciliation. It is a significant gesture which offers hope that the Burundians will pursue the efforts which they have begun. This important step towards national reconciliation must be complemented by negotiations between all the Burundi parties, without exception, from both inside and outside the country. At this crucial juncture for the future of Burundi, the EU calls on all the parties due to be in Arusha on 15 June in the framework of the regional peace initiative led by Tanzania's former President Julius Nyerere, to assume the important responsibilities they have to the people of Burundi, who have already endured so much suffering and are hoping for peace.

(Declaration of 26 June)

The EU welcomes the progress achieved at the first session of the Burundi peace talks conducted from 15 to 21 June in Arusha (Tanzania), and the commitment made by all parties represented at the talks to engage in serious negotiations with the aim of resolving the conflict in Burundi.

The Union welcomes the unanimous adoption by the parties of a declaration which includes a commitment to resolve the crisis by peaceful means and to put an end to all forms of violence. The Union calls on all armed parties to honour the commitment to suspend hostilities by 20 July 1998 at the latest.

The EU strongly encourages all parties to return to the negotiating table on 20 July, ready to start a second round of talks in the spirit of goodwill and commitment to dialogue indicated by their declaration. The Union will continue to support the peace process and the efforts of Julius Nyerere to bring about a durable solution to the Burundi crisis.

Nigeria post-Abacha
(Declaration of 12 June)

The EU attaches great importance to its relationship with Nigeria in recognition of its pivotal regional and international role. Following the unexpected death of General Abacha, we hope there will now be an early and peaceful return to democracy with the election of an accountable civilian government which will restore peace, respect human rights and bring, at last, to the Nigerian people the benefit of the country's great wealth.

The EU welcomes General Abubakar's call to all Nigerians to join in a process of reconstruction and reconciliation. This, together with the release of detainees and the restoration of the rule of law, would be important steps in a process leading to Nigeria's return to its rightful place in the international community.

The EU reiterates its wish for constructive dialogue with Nigeria, including in the context of the forthcoming ACP-EU post-Lomé negotiations. The Union remains ready to support Nigeria in its efforts to establish a democracy representative of the Nigerian people in all their diversity.

Concern over Togo elections
(Declaration of 24 June)

The EU is deeply concerned at reports that authorities in Togo have suspended the counting of votes from the Presidential elections of 21 June.

In view of the EU's assistance to the electoral process in Togo, the Union urgently appeals to the authorities to resume the counting without delay, and to publish official election results which accurately reflect the voting of the electorate.

Death of Maître Beye
(Declaration of 29 June)

The EU was shocked and deeply saddened to learn of the death of the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Angola, Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, with five of his colleagues and two pilots, in an air crash near Abidjan on 26 June.

The EU pays tribute to Maître Beye's determination and ceaseless efforts over the last five years to bring about a peaceful solution to the Angolan conflict.

The EU hopes that the death of Maître Beye will spur the Angolan Government and UNITA to early completion of the Lusaka Protocol. A fitting memorial to Maître Beye would be a genuine and lasting peace in Angola.

ODA flows fall in 1997

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has reported that in 1997 – a turbulent year for developing and transitional countries alike – both aid and other financial flows declined.

ODA flows fell overall from \$55.4bn in 1996 to \$47.6bn in 1997, a slump of more than 14%. More than half of this was due to falls in the exchange rates of other national currencies against the US dollar. It was noted that G7 members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) contributed just 0.19% of their collective GNP to official development

Official Development Assistance flows in 1997

EU DAC members		
Country	ODA \$m	ODA/GNP%
Denmark	1,635	0.97
Netherlands	2,946	0.81
Sweden	1,672	0.76
Luxembourg	87	0.50
France	6,348	0.45
Finland	379	0.33
Belgium	764	0.31
Ireland	187	0.31
Germany	5,913	0.28
Austria	531	0.26
United Kingdom	3,371	0.26
Portugal	251	0.25
Spain	1,227	0.23
Italy	1,231	0.11
Non-EU DAC members		
Norway	1,306	0.86
Canada	2,146	0.36
Switzerland	839	0.32
Australia	1,076	0.28
New Zealand	145	0.25
USA	6,168	0.08

assistance. This was in stark contrast to the other DAC countries (smaller industrialised countries) whose average contribution amounted to 0.45% of GNP (see table)

As for private flows, having reached an all-time high of \$286bn in 1996, the figure for 1997 was an estimated \$206bn. The big drop is attributed largely to the Asian financial crisis which began during the second half of the year.

Investing in Cape Verde

Carlos Viegua, the Prime Minister of Cape Verde, paid an official visit to Brussels on 22 June for meetings with the various European institutions. In the course of a round table, organised with the assistance of the Belgium-Luxembourg/ACP Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, he delivered a presentation praising the economic situation in Cape Verde and underlining its 'enormous business potential'. He made no secret of his aim which, like many other ACP states, is to attract as much private European investment as possible to his country. The development of the private sector and the encouragement of investment – described as a fundamental element in the government's strategy – should, he believes, in conjunction with the reforms undertaken since 1991, enable the country to look to a brighter economic future and to face up to the demands of globalisation.

The Prime Minister emphasised political stability and social cohesion – two aspects which he said had been consolidated in Cape Verde following the re-establishment of democracy and the adoption of a new constitution. He went on to describe the various facilities available to investors. These included reforms which had been implemented in the financial sector. Tax advantages and administrative improvements were in the pipeline, he indicated, and a 'one-stop-shop' had been instituted to simplify the procedure for foreign investors. There were now guaran-

tees for the protection of capital, foreign exchange transfers and the repatriation of profits. A number of legal obstacles had been removed and there was virtually no risk that assets would be nationalised or expropriated. Legislation relating to the workplace, he argued, was particularly attractive. Efforts were continuing to strengthen the infrastructural framework as well as to improve training.

Mr Viegua was particularly anxious to underline his country's 'rigorous' macro-economic policy which, he said, was designed to meet the imperatives of effective management. The principles being applied were similar to the convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty (elimination of debt, better budgetary control, a more effective mastery of inflation and a coherent monetary policy). 'It is our hope that investors will come to Cape Verde and take advantage of the excellent conditions we can offer,' he concluded.

K.K.

Togo elections

In July, the Commission sent a communication to the Council of Ministers proposing that the Togo government be invited to consultations under Article 366a of the revised Lomé IV Convention. This would be the first use of the provision, which was agreed in Mauritius following the mid-term review.

The aim of the talks would be to undertake an in-depth examination of the situation following Togo's Presidential election – and if appropriate – to find a solution. Grave doubts have been expressed over the conduct of the poll and about the credibility of the published results.

The article 366a procedure is available 'where one party considers that another party has failed to fulfil an obligation in respect of one of the essential elements referred to in Article 5 of the Lomé Convention'. These essential elements include 'the recognition and application of democratic principles'.



Freedom of the Press throughout the World, 1998 Report

By Reporters Sans Frontières. Distribution: Dif' Pop, 21 ter, rue Voltaire, 75011 Paris. Fax (33 1) 43 72 15 77. 334 pp. ISBN 2-908830-36-1.

This publication, the Annual Report of Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), aims 'to break through the isolation pressing in on journalists languishing in jail', 'reassure those battling every day to preserve press freedom that their struggle has not gone unnoticed' and 'make the authorities guilty of violence and harassment face up to their crimes.'

The bulk of the Report is devoted to alleged attacks on the news media during 1997, broken down by region and country. Those who believe such activities are the preserve of a small number of repressive regimes might be shocked to find entries for no fewer than 129 countries (including 54 ACP and 8 EU states). Clearly, the scale of the problem varies enormously. Some states have several pages devoted to them, detailing a consistent practice of violence and repression. Others appear on the 'roll of shame' because of a single incident – such as the sacking of an employee in the state broadcasting service. However, according to RSF, no more than 30 countries fully respect press freedom with another 50 respecting it 'more or less'. The situation is said to be poor in 80 states and extremely poor in at least 30 others. 'The map of press freedom', we are told, 'coincides with that of democracy and respect for human rights'.

In 1997, 26 journalists were killed in the course of their work. This is two fewer than in 1996 and about a quarter of the figure for 1994. While welcoming the decline in fatalities over the past few years, RSF argues

there is no cause for complacency. It is particularly critical of the fact that those guilty of killing journalists are rarely prosecuted.

The organisation also condemns the emergence of what it calls 'the privatisation of repression'. According to the Report: 'Political parties, trade unions, big companies, criminal gangs and religious fundamentalists – with the backing of unofficial police or private militia – have taken over from weakened central governments to silence recalcitrant journalists.'

Fighting Corruption in Development Aid: Supply Tenders

by Roberto Provera, 110 pp (no publisher's imprint)

In this booklet, based on the author's 'personal experience of thirty years in the field', Roberto Provera argues trenchantly against the 'large-scale corruption' that he says exists in many bilateral development projects. He prefaces his case with the poignant tale of a young and idealistic manager in a manufacturing firm. The manager ends up losing his job because he refuses to 'lubricate' the tender process with payments to well-placed local agents and his company fails to win valuable contracts. He is accused of 'tilting at windmills' (this theme is featured on the cover which shows Don Quixote brandishing his sword at a windmill sail).

The booklet provides some interesting details of how the tender process is said to be corrupted in practice. Depressingly, the author argues that the situation has worsened over the past 20 years. And while the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD issued a recommendation 'on anti-corruption proposals for bilateral aid-funded procurement' in 1996, he suggests that many OECD countries have done little to translate this into practical action.

Undaunted, he goes on to make recommendations about how to tackle the problem. The most important role, he believes, should be played by the financing institutions who must 'exercise strict and rigorous controls through all phases of the tender.' In a special 'pat on the back' for the European Commission, he observes that 'this is precisely what is done by DG VIII for tenders financed

by the EDF.' The EC is often lambasted for its bureaucratic procedures – but Mr Provera suggests there is another side to this particular coin. He is concerned that a loosening of controls, advocated by many, could make corruption easier.

He also urges the industrialised donor countries to 'search their own consciences and admit that the responsibility for corruption is largely theirs. He offers some detailed suggestions for maximising the transparency of tender operations, including effective sanctions against those who transgress.

Economies africaines – 2ème édition: Analyse économique de l'Afrique subsaharienne

(African Economies – 2nd edition: Economic Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa)

by Michel Norro, Ed. De Boeck & Larcier, 1998, 295 pp, Brussels, 165 FF, ISBN 2-8041-2757-5


Africa has the essential human and material resources that it needs for its development. But before embarking on a new economic policy, it is necessary to analyse the reasons for past failures. This is the main focus of Michel Norro's volume, which takes an in-depth look, from both a historical and a comparative perspective, at the main factors of the sub-Saharan economy (agriculture, industry, external debt, the international environment)

African economies have been unable to break free of structures inherited from the past, based heavily on the exploitation of a limited range of natural resources. A dynamic development policy, however, requires a sustained effort to diversify economic activity, boost efficiency and increase productivity. There are signs that attitudes have been changing. In a continent that has suffered too many conflicts and laboured under the burden of corrupt and inefficient regimes, people are demanding something better. With its young and dynamic population, public administration (lacking at the time of independence) natural resources and open spaces, the continent has the means and the ambition to succeed. The question that arises, therefore, is why hasn't the renaissance begun? ■

Operational summary

n° 104 - September 1998

(position as at 5 August 1998)



European Development Fund schemes

The following information is aimed at showing the state of progress of schemes funded by the European Community under the EDF (Lomé Convention).

Geographical breakdown

The summary is divided into three groups

- Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) country projects.
- Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) projects.
- Regional projects

The information within each of these groups is given by recipient country (in alphabetical order).

Information given

The following details will usually be given for each development scheme:

- The title of the project.
- The administrative body responsible for it.
- The estimated sum involved (prior to financing decision) or the amount actually provided (post-financing decision)
- A brief description of projects envisaged (construction work, equipment supplies, technical assistance etc.)
- Any methods of implementation for example, international invitations to tender).
- The stage the project has reached (identification, appraisal, submission for financing, financing decision, ready for implementation)

Main abbreviations

Resp. Auth.	Responsible Authority
Int. Tender	International invitation to tender
Acc. Tender	Invitation to tender (accelerated procedure)
Restr. Tender	Restricted invitation to tender
T.A.	Technical Assistance
EDF	European Development Fund (e.g. EDF 7 = 7th European Development Fund)
mECU	million European currency units
Est.	Estimated

Blue Pages on the INTERNET

<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg08/pabli-en/introbp1.htm>

Correspondence about this operational summary can be sent directly to:

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B-1049 Brussels

Please cover only one subject at a time.

Note: Participation in EDF schemes is strictly confined to ACP or EU firms.

SECTOR CODE DESCRIPTION

AAz Planning and public administration

- AAa Administrative buildings
- AAb Economic planning and policy
- AAc Assistance to the normal operations of government not falling under a different category
- AAd Police and fire protection
- AAe Collection and publication of statistics of all kinds, information and documentation
- AAf Economic surveys, pre-investment studies
- AAg Cartography, mapping, aerial photography
- AAi Demography and manpower studies

ABz Development of public utilities

- ABa Power production and distribution
- ABai Electricity
- ABb Water supply
- ABc Communications
- ABd Transport and navigation
- ABe Meteorology
- ABf Peaceful uses of atomic energy (non-power)

ACz Agriculture, fishing and forestry

- ACa Agriculture production
- ACb Service to agriculture
- ACc Forestry
- ACd Fishing and hunting
- ACE Conservation and extension
- ACf Agriculture storage
- ACg Agriculture construction
- ACH Home economics and nutrition
- ACi Land and soil surveys

ADz Industry, mining and construction

- ADa Extractive industries
- ADai Petroleum and natural gas
- ADb Manufacturing
- ADc Engineering and construction
- ADd Cottage industry and handicraft
- ADe Productivity, including management, automation, accountancy, business, finance and investment
- ADf Non-agricultural storage and warehousing
- ADg Research in industry technology

AEz Trade, banking, tourism and other services

- AEa Agriculture development banks
- AEb Industrial development banks
- AEc Tourism, hotels and other tourist facilities
- AEd Export promotion
- AEe Trade, commerce and distribution
- AEf Co-operatives (except agriculture and housing)

- AEg Publishing, journalism, cinema, photography
- AEnh Other insurance and banking
- AEi Archaeological conservation, game reserves

AFz Education

- AFa Primary and secondary education
- AFb University and higher technical institutes
- AFbi Medical
- AFc Teacher training
- AFci Agriculture training
- AFd Vocational and technical training
- AFe Educational administration
- AFf Pure or general research
- AFg Scientific documentation
- AFh Research in the field of education or training
- AFi Subsidiary services
- AFj Colloquia, seminars, lectures, etc.

AGz Health

- AGa Hospitals and clinics
- AGb Maternal and child care
- AGc Family planning and population-related research
- AGd Other medical and dental services
- AGe Public health administration
- AGf Medical insurance programmes

AHz Social infrastructure and social welfare

- AHa Housing, urban and rural
- AHb Community development and facilities
- AHc Environmental sanitation
- AHd Labour
- AHe Social welfare, social security and other social schemes
- AHf Environmental protection
- AHg Flood control
- AHh Land settlement
- AHi Cultural activities

Alz Multisector

- Ala River development
- Alb Regional development projects

AJz Unspecified

ACP STATES

New projects and updated information in existing projects appear in italics

ANGOLA

Reconstruction support programme. 55 mECU. Relaunch of economic and social activities. Improvement of basic social services and living conditions, poverty alleviation, increase of production and of basic communication possibilities, amelioration of basic infrastructures, participation in mine-clearing operations, support for demobilisation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ANG/6036/001 - AGz, AHZ.

Support for training of lawyers and academics in the Law Faculty of Agostinho Neto University (FDUAN). 0.8 mECU. Training, supply of equipment. Project in execution.

EDF ANG/7018/000 - AFb

BAHAMAS

Road Rehabilitation of Queen's Highway on Acklins Island. Est. cost 5.2 mECU. EDF 2.2 mECU. Government of the Bahamas 3 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF BM/7001/001 - ABd.

BELIZE

Improvement of Hummingbird Highway (2nd segment - Sibun River Bridge to Belmopan). Resp. Auth.: Govt. of Belize. Est. cost 13.7 mECU. Construction, T.A., studies. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF BEL/6001/002 - ABd

Drugs Demand Reduction Programme. Est. cost 1 mECU. EDF part 0.3 mECU; Government of Belize 0.7 mECU. Training, T.A., supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF BEL/7004/000 - AGc

BENIN

Improvement works on the Sémé-Porto Nova road. (12.711 km). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics et des Transports. 20 mECU. Infrastructure works and installation of road signing. Work supervision by KfW (D). Works by int. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7132 - ABd

Support programme for structural adjustment (PAS - 1997/99). Resp. Auth.: Ministre des Finances. 27,5 mECU. Strengthen the country's macro-economic policy. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BEN/7200/003 - AAc

BOTSWANA

Sysmin - support to base metal industry (Copper-Nickel-Cobalt). Resp. Auth.: BCL Ltd., 33.7mECU. To deepen the shaft of the Selebi-North mine, to reach a new ore-body, equipping it and carrying out new prospective drilling to identify new ore-bodies. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SYSMIN/BT 9999/001 - ADa

Botswana Tourism Development Programme (Foundation phase). Resp. Auth.: Dept of Tourism (DoT), Commerce

and Industry. 1.91 mECU. Short- and long-term T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BT 5019/001 - AEc

Trade Development Programme (Phase I). Resp. Auth.: Department of Trade and Investment Promotion. Est. cost 1.7 mECU. To support trade diversification and export promotion. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BT/7008 - AEe

Vocational training programme, Francistown. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education. Est. cost 17 mECU. Vocational Teacher Training College and Vocational Training Centre (VTTC/VTC). Construction, supplies of equipment, T.A., works, feasibility study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF BT/7004/001 - AFd

Wildlife Conservation and Management Programme. Est. cost 7 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8

EDF BT/6001/002 - ACz

Community forestry development. Est. cost 2 mECU. Supplies of equipments; T. A., incl. studies; training, NGO and community co-operation. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: July 1998. EDF 8.

EDF BT/6021/001 - ACc.

BURKINA FASO

Support project for the reform of the pharmaceutical sector.

Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Santé - Direction des Services Pharmaceutiques (DSPh) and CAMEG 1.6 mECU. Line of credit, works, equipment and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BK/7017 - AGc

SYSMIN - Rehabilitation of the Poura mine. Resp. Auth.: I.G.R. International Gold Resources Corporation. 11 mECU. Works by direct agreement. Supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SYSMIN BK/9999 - ADa

Ouagadougou dam classified forest development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Environnement et de l'Eau. Est. cost 1.200 mECU. EDF part 0.300 mECU. Cofinancing with CFD (F), The Netherlands (possible). Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BK/7023 - AHf

Support for decentralisation. Resp. Auth.: Ministère Administration Territoriale et Sécurité. Est. cost 2 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF BK/7024 - AAb

Support for the structural adjustment programme 1996-1997. General import programme. EDF 6.4 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF BK/7200/004 - AAc

Support for the judicial system. Est. cost 1 mECU. Training of magistrates and improvement of judicial services. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF/BK/7027 - AAz

Support for rural development. Est. cost 24.2 mECU. Financing of action for rice-growing, for support action, financing the rural environment and for information about markets. T.A, works and supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8

EDF BK/7032/000 - ACa.

Periodical maintenance of asphalt roads (594 km). Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Infrastructures, de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme. Est. cost 44 mECU. T.A., Works. Financing decision taken in July 1998. Project in execution. EDF - 8

EDF BK/6017/002 - ABd.

CAMEROON

Support for the People of Lagdo. esp. Auth.: MINEPIA. 3 mECU. Preservation and improvement of the social-economic situation around Lake Lagdo. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF CM/6002/002 - ACa

Regional economic integration programme in Central Africa - regional infrastructures. 98 mECU. Building of the Bertoua-Geroua Bulai road. Project in execution. EDF 6,7 and 8.

EDF CM/7002/001 - ABd.

Rural development project in the Lagone and Chari regions. Food supply security. Combatting poverty. Est. cost 9 mECU. Construction, T.A., studies, supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CM/5004/002 - ACh

Programme of road maintenance (PERFED II). Resp. Auth.: MINTP. Est. cost 55 mECU. Construction, T.A., studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CM/6031/002 - ABd

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme 1998-1999. Est. cost 25 mECU. Budgetary support. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CM/7200/002 - AAc.
08.06.98.

Urban Development Programme (FOURMI II). Est. cost 3.5 mECU. Construction, T.A. incl studies, supply of equipment, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CM/7006/001 - AHb.

CAPE VERDE

Maio island rural electrification. Est. cost 1.945 mECU. Improvement of living conditions. Supply of electricity. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF CV/7009/000 - ABa,i

Santo Antao water supply and sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Coordination. 1.4 mECU. Works, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF CV/7011 - ABb

Water distribution and sanitation in Praia - Phase 2. Est. cost 6.5 mECU. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economic Coordination. Construction - infrastructures; T.A., including studies. Project on

appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: September 1998. EDF 8.

EDF CV/5002/001 - ABb, AHc.

Road Infrastructure for Santo Antão Island. Construction of the Janela road at Porto Novo. Resp. Auth.: NAO. Est. cost 12.7 mECU; EDF part 9.6 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CV/7010/000 - ABc.

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. Est. cost 9.4 mECU.

Budgetary support, T.A. incl. studies.

Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CV/7200/000 - AAb.

CHAD

Restoration of bridges that fall within the framework of the Second Transport Sectoral Programme. Resp. Auth.: MINTP Chad. Est. cost 4 mECU. Urgent work to be carried out to restore 15 bridges under the Transport Sectoral Programme. Works, T.A. Project in execution. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in September or October. EDF 7.

EDF CD/6001 - ABd

Support for Health Programme in Mayo Kebbi. 1.98 mECU T.A. Training of doctors, medical supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

Support for Water Policy. Est. cost 17 mECU. Construction/ infrastructure, supply of equipment, T.A. incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7-8.

EDF CD/7003/001 - ABb

Support for National Health Policy. Est. cost 35m ECU. T.A. incl. studies, supply of equipment, training, construction/infrastructure. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CD/5011/003 - AGz

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme 1998-1999. Est. cost 16.8 mECU. Budgetary support. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF CD/7200/002 - AAc

COMOROS

Sea-access to Moheli island. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Équipement - Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. 3.250 mECU. Works, by int.tender.T.A.for further investigations, tender dossier and works supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF COM/6006/7003 - ABd

Technical Management Unit for the NAO for managing and coordinating Community aid. 1.7 mECU. Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF COM/7009/000 - AAz.

CONGO (REPUBLIC)

All projects suspended

CONGO (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC)

Rehabilitation Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Coordination and Management Unit. Est. cost EDF 84 mECU. and an indicative amount of 6 mECU from the Commission's budget under heading B7-5076 'Rehabilitation and

reconstruction measures for developing countries'. Regions selected: Kinshasa's economic hinterland, the Greater Kivu and the two provinces of Kagai. Rehabilitation and maintenance of roads and farm access roads. Support for production and marketing, support for basic social infrastructure. T.A. and evaluation. Project suspended. EDF 6 & 7.

EDF ZR/6033 - AAc

Strengthening of the provisional health support programme. 45 mECU Rehabilitation of health service structures in Kinshasa, Kasai and Kivu. Support for the health service at the basic and intermediate levels. Reinforcement of basic juridical services. Works, supplies and T.A. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing 1st half 98.

Support programme for the preparation of elections. Resp. Auth.: Commission Nationale des Elections (CNE). 30 mECU. T.A., support for democratisation. Project suspended. EDF 7.

EDF ZR/6034/00 - AAc

COTE D'IVOIRE

Support for the structural adjustment programme (GIP V). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 25.5 mECU. General import programme. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7.

EDF IVC/7200/004 - AAc

DJIBOUTI

Support for the structural adjustment programme. General import programme. 4.100 mECU. T.A. foreseen. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF DI/7200/001 - AAc

DOMINICA

Eco-Tourism Site Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade Industry and Tourism (MTIT). Est. cost 0.558 mECU. Works, equipment and training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF DOM/6002/001 - ACa

Agricultural Diversification Programme. Resp. Auth.: Diversification Implementation Unit. (DIU). 2.25 mECU. Production Credit Scheme. Abattoir Project, Citrus Processing Study, Shipping and Transportation System Project, Quality Assurance, Market Information Service, Export Credit Programme, Monitoring Evaluation, T.A. Works by acc. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF DOM/7002 - ACa

Elimination of solid waste. Resp. Auth.: Min. of Communications, Works and Housing. 1.65 mECU. Restoration of two depots for household waste. Installation of a new waste disposal depot. T.A. by restricted tender; works by acc. process. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF DOM/7003 - ABz.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Support programme to prevent STD/HIV/AIDS. EDF part 1.350 mECU. Training, T.A., supplies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF DO/7016 - AGz

Water supply and sanitation in the poorest areas of Santo Domingo. Est. EDF part 26 mECU.

Construction/infrastructure, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

ABb, AHc.

Project for the improvement of technical and professional education. Est. EDF part 13 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, supplies, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

AFd

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Conservation and rational utilisation of the forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 5,070 mECU. Land classification and use master plan, national system of conservation units, forest training and research centres, T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF EG/6001 - ACc, ACe, ACi

ERITREA

Sector study on national water and irrigation potential. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Energy, Mines and Water resources 4.5 mECU. Assess the various demands for those resources, determine the potential for their sustainable development, present strategies for their development, and lay the foundations for their management. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ERY/7002 - ABb

Upgrading of the Nefasit-Dekemhare-Tera Imni road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Construction. Est. cost 20 mECU. Road works. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ERY/7004 - ABd

Rehabilitation of transmission lines, substations and distribution system in Massawa area. Resp. Auth.: Eritrean Electric Authority. Est. cost 10-12 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Feasibility study: INYPSA (Sp). Financing decision foreseen in July 1998. Int. tenders no. 4320 and no. 4321 for supplies and tender no. 4318 for works launched with a conditional clause. Respective deadlines for submission: 22.07.98. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ERY/7001 - ABa,i

Livestock Promotion, support for the Improvement of the Sanitary Environment of the National Herd. Est. cost 1.2 mECU. Equipment, infrastructure, vaccines, training of veterinary services personnel. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ERY/7005/000 -AGz, AFd

Short-term assistance programme for reconstruction and restoration. 20 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ET/7001/000.

ETHIOPIA

Rehabilitation of the Addis Ababa-Jima road, Addis Ababa-Abelti (180 km).

Est. cost 80 mECU. Improvement of the road network. Works and supplies. T.A. Feasibility studies and dossiers projects preparation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ET/7005/002 - ABd

Support programme for the transport sector (TSSP). Resp. Auth.: Ethiopian Road Auth. 2 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ET/7005/001 - ABd

Addis Ababa's water supply and sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Addis Ababa Water Supply Authority. AAWSA. Est. cost 35 mECU. Works, equipment, T.A., Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ET 5006/002 - ABb

Higher education development support. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education, NAO. Est. cost 1.999 mECU. Equipment, works. Project in execution. EDF 6, 7.

EDF ET/7016/001 - AFz, AFb

Rehabilitation of the Addis Ababa/Desse/Weldiya road. Est. cost: 120 mECU. Construction/infrastructure. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

ET/7020/000 - ABd.

FIJI

New Rewa River Bridge and Town Bypass. Est. cost 12.3 mECU; EDF part 10 mECU. Construction/infrastructure; T.A., incl. studies. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in September 1998. EDF 6, 7.

EDF FIJ/7012/000 - ABd.

GABON

Support for the rehabilitation of the territory. Construction of the Lalara-Mitzié road. Auth. Resp.: Ministre de l'Équipement et de la Construction. 23.4 mECU. Mainly works, some supplies and service contracts. Project in execution. Tender for works to be launched in May 1998. EDF 8.

EDF GA/7006/000 - ABd.

GHANA

Human resources development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. 3.8 mECU. Supply of equipment, T.A., evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF GH/7003 - AFz

Western Region Agricultural Development Project. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Food and Agriculture. 12 mECU. T.A., buildings and training, supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF GH - ACa

Woodworking Sector Development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Lands and Forestry. 4.85 mECU. Training and equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GH - ACc

Transport Infrastructure Programme Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Roads & Highways. 54 mECU. Works, supplies, supervision, training. Axle load control equipment, consultancy studies, training of Highway Sector Staff. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.

EDF GH 6001 ABd

Small towns water supply project. Resp. Auth.: Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation. Est. cost 15 mECU. Construction of water supply systems. Strengthening of institutions responsible for operations and maintenance. Consultancy

services, including community mobilisation, preparation of tender documents and supervision of works, works contracts.

Works. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF GH/6006 - ABb

Decentralised Cooperation Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.5 mECU. Equipment, construction, training and current inputs of grassroots programmes. TA for implementation and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GH/7008 - AJz

4th Microprojects Programme, 2nd tranche. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 4 mECU. Improvement of health, water and educational facilities. T.A., evaluation and contingencies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GH/6102/000 - AHb

Support for Structural Adjustment Programme, GIP V. 15 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GH/7200/005 - AAc

Rural electrification programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Mines and Energy. 9.5 mECU. Supply and erection of electricity lines, supervision, training. Project on appraisal. Financing decision expected in May 1998. EDF 7.

EDF GH - Aba,i

GRATIS (Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service), Phase III. Est. cost 3 mECU. Project on appraisal. Financing decision expected at the beginning of 1999. EDF 7.

EDF GH - ABai

Support to the Ghana Audit Service. Est. cost 3.6 mECU. T.A. incl. studies, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF GH/7020/000 - AAc.

GUINEA

Pilot programme for the development of secondary towns. Resp. Auth.: Direction nationale de la décentralisation. 1.91 mECU. Technical cooperation, TA and training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GUI 7008/000 - AHa,b

Diversification Aid. The Agriculture Component. Extension of the Family Plantation Programme in Soguipah. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water & Forests. 5.5 mECU. Cultivation of rice fields and rubber plantations and the development of transport infrastructures. Works, supplies, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF SYSMIN GUI/9999/000 - ACe, AGe, AHf

Diversification Aid. The Road Infrastructure Component.

Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works and the Environment. 74.5 mECU. Works, T.A., supervision, studies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SYSMIN GUI/9999/000 - ABd.

Urban health support project. Est. cost 1.2 mECU. T.A., studies Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF GUI/6005/000 - Agz

The Dabola-Dinguiraye Programme (High Guinea). To increase the revenues of agricultural producers. 13 mECU. Training, construction/

infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies, supplies, support fund. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF GUI/6002/002 - ACa.

GUINEA BISSAU

Bridge construction in Sao Vicente. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Est. cost 27 mECU. Works and works supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF GUB/7014/000 - ABd

Support for road maintenance. Est. cost 8 mECU. Construction, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF GUB/6013/001 - ABd

Institutional support for the road sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Est. cost 1.950 mECU. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF GUB/6003/002 - ABd

Construction of Municipal Slaughterhouses at Bissau, Gabu, Bafaté. Est. cost 1.91 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A. incl. studies, budgetary support. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

ACH

Rural and Semi-Urban Hydraulics Project. Est. cost 4 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A. incl. studies, budgetary support. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

ABb

GUYANA

Rehabilitation of sea defences and shore zone management. Est. cost 20 mECU. Construction, T.A. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF GUA/6003/004 - ABd

Support Programme for Economic Reforms. 5.29 mECU. T.A., feasibility study, training. Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF GUA/7200/003 - AAb.

HAITI

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme II. 10.800 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF HA/7200/001 - AAC

Support for the structural programme. Utilisation of satellite imagery for the exploitation of Haitian territory. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (MPCE). Est. cost 1.8 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF HA 7007/000 - AAz

Support for decentralised cultural initiatives. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Culture. Est. cost 0.75 mECU. T.A., supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF HA/7155/000 - AHi

Road rehabilitation in the western area of the South Peninsula. Est. cost 47.36 mECU. Works, T.A. Project on appraisal. Project on appraisal. EDF 7,8.

EDF HA/7012/000

Support Programme for Local Initiatives. Est. cost 1 mECU. T.A. incl. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF HA/7013/000 - AAb.

JAMAICA

Northern coastal highway improvement project. Segment 3 (Ocho Rios - Port Antonio - Fair Prospect - 116 km). Resp. Auth.: Government of Jamaica. Est. cost 80 mECU. Construction, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7, 8.

EDF JM/9999/000 - ABd

Regional project - University of the West Indies. International tender no. 4268 already launched for supply, in four lots, of electronic equipment for administration. *Project in execution.*

Institutional strengthening and road rehabilitation. Auth. Resp.: Ministry of Transport and Works. Cost 13.5 mECU. Works, supervision and supply of vehicles and equipment. International tender no. 4279 already launched for supply, in ten lots, of various equipment.

Public sector modernisation. Est. cost 1.95 mECU. Feasibility study, T.A. and training; institution building Project in execution. The feasibility study is currently being prepared. EDF 7 - AAb

Savanna-La-Mar waste water project. Est. cost 15 mECU. Feasibility, works and supervision. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in 1999. EDF 8 - AHb

Rural water supply - Phase 2. Est. cost 10 mECU. Feasibility, works, supervision and T.A., incl. studies. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: 1st half of 1999. EDF 8.

EDF JM/6003/001 - ABb

Trade and Investment Promotion Programme. Est. cost 6 mECU. T.A., incl. studies; training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: end of 1998. EDF 8. EDF JM/5021/001 - AEe

Small and Micro Enterprise Credit Scheme, 2nd Programme. Est. cost 5 mECU; EDF part 4 mECU. T.A., incl. studies; training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: 2nd half of 1999. EDF 8.

EDF JM/5020/001 - AAb.

Poverty Reduction Programme (Social Investment Fund/Micro Projects Programme). Est. cost 53.6 mECU; EDF part 6 mECU. Supplies of equipment/inputs; T.A., incl. studies; training. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: end of 1998. EDF 8. EDF JM/7001/001 - AHe.

KENYA

Farming in tsetse infested areas. Est. cost 14.6 mECU. Refine the techniques to trap the tsetse fly and develop better technologies to prevent infections. Monitor the environmental impact of the techniques. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE/7011 - ACa

Family Health Programme. Est. cost 28.710 mECU. Reproduction health status of Kenyans family planning services broadened. EDF 14.81 mECU, ODA (UK) 13.9 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 6 EDF/KE 7015 - AGb

Technical Education. 5 mECU. Raising the level of performance of existing teaching institutions. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE 6005/001 - AFb

Trade Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Export Promotion Council and a Special TDP Committee of private and public sector members and the European Commission. 4 mECU. Trade Promotion and Marketing Programme, Training, Equipment, T.A. and Monitoring and Evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF KE/7008 - AEz

Small scale and informal sector enterprises. Est. cost 10 mECU. Development of micro-enterprises and informal sector of the economy. Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7. EDF KE/7009 - AEe,f

Sultan Hamud-Mtito Road rehabilitation. Est. cost 30 mECU. To rehabilitate priority roads and establish sustainable maintenance organisation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF KE/7010/002 - ABd

Mai-Mahiu/Naivasha Road rehabilitation. Est. cost 25 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF KE/7010/003 - ABd

Community development. Poverty alleviation. Est. cost 12.5 mECU. Financial facility aimed at priority activities identified by local communities. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE/7018 - AHb

Support for the establishment of key functions and programmes at the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA). Resp. Auth.: Ministries of Planning and National Development and Finance and Office of the President. 1.993 mECU. Training, Consulting and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE/7016/00 - AAb

Establishment of sustainable tourism development. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. 1.97 mECU. Advice on and design of a financially self-sustainable Tourism Board. T.A., equipment, training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF KE/7014 - AEc

Support Services Programme (SSP). Resp. Auth.: NAO - Ministry of Finance. 1.795 mECU. Ad hoc support and project preparation, monitoring and evaluation facility. Framework contract. Support to the Office of the NAO of EDF. Training and equipment. Framework contract by restr.tender after short-list. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF KE 7012.

Agriculture/livestock research programme. 8.3 mECU. *Works and supplies.* Project in execution. EDF 6. EDF KE/6003/001 - ACa

LESOTHO

Urban Water Supply and Sanitation. Resp. Auth.: Water and Sanitation Authority. Est. cost 4 mECU. Implementation of urgent water-supply and sanitation systems in the urban and peri-urban areas. Feasibility study and contract document. Preparation for urgent water supply and sanitation intervention. Short-

lists to be done. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF LSO/7002 - ABb, AHa

Transport infrastructure programme, phase I. 18 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A., studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF LSO/6016/001 - ABd

Transport infrastructure - axle load control. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. 0.850 mECU. Construction, evaluation. T.A., equipment - restricted tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF LSO/6016/000 - ABd.

Urban water supply for six towns. Resp. Auth.: Government of Lesotho; Water and Sewage Authority (WASA). Est. cost 1.996 mECU. Works, T.A. Project in execution. EDF LSO/7002/000 - ABb

Assistance for the 1998 General Election. Resp. Auth.: Government of Lesotho; Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Est. cost 0.5 mECU. Supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7. EDF LSO/7009/000

LIBERIA

Freeport of Monrovia emergency rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Government of Liberia. Est. cost 1.95 mECU. Supplies, engineering services and works. Project in execution. EDF 6.

EDF LBR/5019/001 - ABd

2nd Rehabilitation Programme for Liberia. Resp. Auth.: European Commission on behalf of the Government of Liberia. 27 mECU. Works, supplies, services. Resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Project in execution. EDF 6. EDF LBR/7001/002 - AAC.

MADAGASCAR

Road infrastructure rehabilitation. Resp. Auth. Ministère des Travaux Publics. 72.5 mECU. Rehabilitation works, supervision. Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7.

EDF MAG/7004 - ABd

First decentralised cooperation programme. Resp. Auth.: National Authorising officer and Head of EU Delegation and authorised NGOs. 1.9 mECU. Works. Purchase of equipment by direct agreement, restr. tender or int. tender. Project in execution EDF 7 EDF MAG/7022/000 - AGz, AHz

Support-training for rural development. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du développement rural et de la réforme foncière. 1.200 mECU. Developing the farmer's organisations role. Training, supplies and technical cooperation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAG/7029/000 - ACb

Decentralised training programme for regional private tourism operators. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Tourisme. 1.900 mECU. T.A. training, evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 1, 2, 3 and 4.

EDF MAG 6039 - AEc

Professional organisation of rural sector and agricultural loans. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Dév. Rural.

1.910 mECU. T.A., training, evaluation. Works, supplies, T.A. and services. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAG/7003 - ACa

Support for Training Programme (FORMFED) Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 0.900 mECU. T.A., equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAG/7028 - AFd

Support for the Structural Adjustment programme 1997-98. 27 mECU. General Import Programme. Project in execution.

EDF MAG/7200 - AAC

Improvement of the income of the coastal population in the South-Western region. Resp. Auth.: Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural. Est. cost 0.613 mECU. Increasing seaweed production. Recruitment, shipbuilding, T.A., equipment and training. Project in execution. EDF 6.

EDF MAG/7024/001 - ACd, AHd

Priority Health Action Programme. Support for a national health policy to alleviate poverty. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.95 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 6.

EDF MAG/6041/000 - AGe

Priority health project. Support for a national health service to alleviate poverty. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Est. cost 15 mECU. EDF 8. Project on appraisal.

EDF MAG/6041/001 - AGe

Rehabilitation of the customs system. Resp. Auth.: Direction Générale des Régies Financières. Total cost 0.42 mECU. T.A., supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAG/7200/001 - AAC

Support for Structural Adjustment Programme II.

Est. cost 43.4 mECU. T.A. including studies, budgetary aid. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: September 1998. EDF 8.

EDF MAG/7200/002 - AAb

MALAWI

Soil conservation and rural production. Resp. Auth.: MOALD. 23 mECU. EDF 15.5 mECU, local 1.3 mECU, counterpart funds 5.7 mECU. Water supply, sanitation, supply of fertilizers, T.A. and training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/5001/002 - ACa

Support to the Forestry Department. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources. 4.4 mECU. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF MAI/5001/003 - ACa

Health Programme. Strengthening Health Ministry capacities in the framework of planning, decentralisation and equipment maintenance. Training, infrastructures, equipments and T.A. 18.7 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/6009/002 - AGe

2nd Lomé IV Micro-project Programme. Improvement of infrastructures in the farmer framework with the EC participation. Building, school's rehabilitation, health centres, water points. Est. cost 6 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/7012/038 - AGz, AHz, ABb

Land Utilisation Study. 1 mECU. Studies. T.A. survey. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/6029 - AAg

Karonga-Chilumba-Chiweta Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supplies. Est. cost 25.2 mECU. Construction, supervision of works, training of technical staff. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAI/6022 - ABd

Physical assets management in the health sector. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supplies. 6.45 mECU. Construction, supervision of works, training of technical staff. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/7018/000 - AGe

Rehabilitation of Chipoka Port - Lake Malawi. Est. cost 3 mECU. Construction, supplies of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF 6022/001 - ABd

Urgent maintenance to roads and bridges. Resp. Auth.: Government of Malawi. 1,994 mECU. Works. Supervision - restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/6022/002 - ABd

Programme for the prevention of HIV/AIDS among high risk groups. 0.780 mECU. T.A., equipment, training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/7001/000 - AGz

Community education programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs and Community Services (MOWCAS), Ministry of Information, Broadcasting, Posts and Telecommunications (MOIBPT). Est. cost 1,55 mECU. Training, workshops, equipment, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/6009/003 - AGb, AGc

Feeder Roads Rehabilitation Programme. Est. cost 30 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, T.A., incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAI/6021/004 - ABd.

Safe Motherhood and Child Welfare Initiative.

Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. 1.52 mECU. Works, supervision of works, supplies of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/6009/004 - AGz.

Private Sector Development Programme. Est. cost 1.8 mECU. T.A. incl. studies, training, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAI/7024/000 - AAb.

MALI

Support for the electoral process. Resp. Auth.: Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI). Est. cost 1.95 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MLI/7019 - AAC

Geological and mining sector survey. Adm. Resp. Ministère de l'Energie et des mines. Est. cost 15 mECU. Aerial geophysical prospecting, geological mapping, mining prospecting, sector-based survey. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MLI/9999 - ADA

Support for the central unit of the National Authorising Officer.

Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Est. cost 1.88 mECU. Improving the services of the National Authorising Officer in the programming, management and follow-up of the projects financed by the EDF. T.A., training, supply. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MLI/6007/002 - AAC

Support for decentralisation. Resp. Auth.: Mission de Décentralisation (MDD). 1.3 mECU. Training, T.A., study. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MLI/7009/001 - AAz

Support for the Planning and Statistics Unit of the Ministry of Rural Development and Environment.

Est. cost 0.8 mECU. T.A. *Financing decision taken in June 1998.* Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MLI/7024/000 - AAC.

Support for the Transport Sector Programme. Est. cost 85 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, supplies, T.A. incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MLI/7004/001 - ABd.

Support for the Coordination of Development Activities in the Northern Regions. 1.85 mECU. Supplies, T.A. incl. studies, training. *Financing decision taken in June 1998.* Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF MLI/7025/000 - AIB.

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme V. 29.4 mECU. *Financing decision taken in July 1998.* Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF MLI/7200/004 - AAC.

MAURITANIA

Kaédi and Mederda water supply. Est. cost 2.2 mECU. Improvement of the living conditions. Works and T.A. Rehabilitation, strengthening and improvement of water systems. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAU/7012/000 - ABb

Support for the programme to strengthen institutional capacity (PRCI). Resp. Auth. Ministry of Planning and Finance. 1.865 mECU. T.A. to strengthen the effectiveness of administration. Supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAU/7200/002 - AAC

Rural development in rainy areas. Est; cost 4 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAU/7014/001 - ACb, ACg

Oasis rural development in the Atar region. Est. cost 5 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAU/7025/000 - ACb, ACg

Diversification of irrigated agriculture. Est. cost 4 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAU/7015/001 - ACa

Support for Structural Adjustment (Phase III). Est. cost 11.2 mECU. T.A., incl. studies; budgetary aid. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAU/7200/003 - AAb.

Coordination Unit for Programmes financed by the EU. Est. cost 1.9 mECU. T.A. incl. studies, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAU/6007/004 - AAc.

Support for Population Censuses. Est. cost 3 mECU. Supplies, T.A. incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAU/7200/004 - AAI.

Gold Survey. Est. cost 2.75 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies, supplies, budgetary support. Project on appraisal.

EDF 8.

EDF MAU/7002/001 - ADA.

MAURITIUS

Irrigation of the Northern Plains. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. 9 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Restricted tender for T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF MAS/7002 - ABb

Mahebourg market. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government. Est. cost 1.85 mECU. To promote agricultural diversification, and also to upgrade the city centre. Feasibility study. Works, supplies, TA. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MAS/7008 - ACe

Phoenix-Nouvelle France road. Est. cost 4 mECU. Upgrading the existing Phoenix-Nouvelle France road to a dual carriageway. Works, T.A. Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAS/7010/001 - ABd

Upgrading of sewerage infrastructure of housing estates. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Est. cost 7.4 mECU. Rehabilitation/provision of sewerage infrastructure to 10 housing estates. Works. T.A. for supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAS - AHA

Training of police officers. Est. cost 0.43 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF MAS - AAd

St. Martin sewage treatment plant. Provide adequate treatment of sewage from the Plains Wilhems area. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Quality of Life. Est. cost 15 mECU. T.A., services. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDFD MAS/7005/000 - ABz

Technology Development in Private Firms. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Est. cost: 2.9 mECU. T.A., monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MAS/7013/000

Anti-Erosion Programme in Rodrigues. Est. cost 5 mECU. EDF part 3.3 mECU; Government of Mauritius 1.7 mECU. Construction, T.A., supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAS/6003/002 - ACb.

Support for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Est. cost 7 mECU. Budgetary aid, T.A. incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF MAS/7011/001 - AAb.

MOZAMBIQUE

Socio-economic reintegration of young people. Est. cost 1.95 mECU. Supplies, T.A. and pilot actions. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF MOZ/7017 - AHB

Rehabilitation of the rural health system. Est. cost 22 mECU. Rehabilitation and renovation of 3 rural hospitals and 2 health centres. Supply of essential medicines and equipment, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MOZ/7018 - AGa,e

Social reintegration in Zambezia and Niassa provinces. 5.6 mECU. Health, education, rural life (farming, fishing, setting up of micro-enterprises), urban economic development. The projects will be carried out by NGO's and the provincial authorities. Project in execution. EDF 7.

Support for the structural adjustment programme GIP II. 15 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF MOZ 7200/001.-. AAC

Support for the judicial system. Est. cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF MOZ/7022 - Ajz

Computerised system for the population register and issue of identity cards. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Est. cost 1.995 mECU. Supplies, T.A. Int. Tender. Project in execution. EDF 6.

EDF MOZ/7024 - AAz

Private sector development. Resp. Auth.: Mozambican Government, NAO. Est. cost 1.98 mECU. Studies, training, TA. Project on appraisal. EDF 6,7,8.

EDF MOZ/7023/000 - AEe

Support for municipal elections. Resp. Auth.: National Electoral Commission. Est. cost 9.5 mECU. T.A., equipment and materials. Tender no. 4298 already launched. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF MOZ/7027/001 - AAC

GIP III - General Import Programme. Resp. Auth.: Government of Mozambique. Est. cost 60.9 mECU. Structural adjustment support. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: June 1998. EDF 8.

EDF MOZ/7200/002

NAMIBIA

Namibia Integrated Health Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health and Social Services. 13.5 mECU. Infrastructures, equipment, training and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7007 - AGz

Expansion of NBC transmitter network and production facilities for educational broadcasting. Resp. Auth.: Namibian Broadcasting Corporation. Est. cost 5.7 mECU. EDF 5 mECU, local 0.7 mECU. Works, supply of equipment, technical training and technical consultancies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7005 - AFi

Rural Development Support Programme for the Northern Communal Areas.

Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. 7.7 mECU. Strengthening of the agricultural extension service, training of extension officers and

establishment of a rural credit system. Supply of office equipment, vehicles, agricultural inputs, T.A., training, evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7011 - ACA

Rural Towns Sewerage Schemes. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Local Government and Housing. 1.88 mECU. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7015 - AHC

Namibia Tourism Development Programme. (Foundation Phase). Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment and Tourism. 1.882 mECU. Implementation of programme. Staff training. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7010 - AEC

Livestock Marketing Project. Resp. Auth.: Directorate of Veterinary Services - Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Dept., 3.75 mECU. Construction of buildings, water and road infrastructure, provision of equipment materials, tractors for quarantine farms in the Northern Communal Areas. All by acc. tenders or restr. tenders. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7020 - ACA

Support for the regional control programme against the Tsetse fly and trypanosomiasis (RTTCP), phase II. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Veterinary Services, Min. of Agriculture, Water and Rural Devt. 3.9 mECU. Construction of buildings and infrastructures, provision of equipment, vehicles, tractors. All by acc. tender or restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NAM/7020 - ACA

Support for implementation of the Cross Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Trade and Industry. 5.370 mECU. To promote an strengthen Namibia's economic integration. T.A., supplies and line of credit. Project in execution. Int. tender no. 4319 for supplies launched. Deadline for submission: 07.07.98. EDF 7.

EDF REG/70012/22 - AEd,e

AIDS Programme. Est. cost 1.5 mECU. Reduction of sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF NAM/(REG)/8000/003 - AGz

Seed production project. To support the establishment of an efficient, sustainable staple crop seed production system. Est. cost 2 mECU. Feasibility study to be carried out. Project on appraisal. EDF 8

EDF NAM/7011/002 - ACA

Rural development support programme (RDSP), Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development. Est. cost 7 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen at the end of 1998. EDF 8.

EDF NAM/7001/001 - ACA

Education programme. Est. cost 12 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A., training. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in July 1998. EDF 8.

EDF NAM/7001/001 - AFa, AFb, AFd, AFi

NIGER

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme 1997-98. Est. cost 15.8 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7,8.

EDF NIR/7200/004 - AFe, AGe

Institutional support for the NAO.

Assistance to maximise the effectiveness of Community aid. Sectoral reforms and macro-economics. Est. cost 1.3 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NIR/7110/003 - AAB

Strengthening basic education in the Tillabéri department in the framework of the large-scale irrigation programme in the Niger valley.. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of National Education. 1.77 mECU.

Construction, training, equipment, T.A., evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NIR/7011/000 - AFa

PROFORMAR II. Resp. Auth. Ministère de l'Artisanat. Est. cost 1.85 mECU. T.A., supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NIR/7101/011

Support for Structural Adjustment. Est. cost 15.8 mECU. Budgetary support, T.A. incl. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8. EDF NIR/7200/005.

AFz, AGz, AHz.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Human resources development programme, phase II (HRDP II). Est. cost 20mECU. Construction of and improvements to educational buildings. Scholarships, training and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF PNG/6008/002 - AFb

RWANDA

Return and social reintegration of students currently still in the central and east European states. Est. cost 0.996 mECU. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF RW/7012/002 - AAC

The First Priority Programme for of Employment Creation (PPGE). Est. cost 1.99 mECU. Construction/ infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF RW/7012/003 - AHb

SAMOA

Rural water supply programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. Est. cost 16.7 mECU. Preparatory study, works, supplies, project management. Project on appraisal. EDF 7 and 8.

EDF WSO/7002/000 - ABb

SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

Support for the Structural Adjustment Programme. 0.9 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF STP/7200/001 - AAC

SENEGAL

St-Louis regional development programme. 22.5 mECU. Job creation, lines of credit, T.A. to the S.M.E's, training studies. Health centres, clinics, medical equipment and consumables, training, information, T.A. to the Direction Régionale in St-Louis and to the Service des Grandes Endémies in Podor. Drainage network, sanitation. Environmental protection with

wind breaks. T.A. Study of a water-engineering scheme in Podor. Works by acc. tender. Supplies by int. tender. T.A. by restr. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SE/6002/7002 - ACa

Support for the PNLS-MST (Phase III).

Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Economics, Finance and Planning. Est. cost 3 mECU. T.A., works. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing end of 1998. EDF 8.

EDF SE/7003/001 - AGz

Direct Budgetary Support for Structural Adjustment. Est. cost 27.9 mECU. T.A., including studies, budgetary aid. Project on appraisal. Date foreseen for financing: June 1998. EDF 8.

EDF SE/7200/003 - AAb

Rural Development in Podor. Transitory Phase 1998. Est. cost 0.7 mECU. Resp.

Auth.: NAO. Formation, travaux, A.T. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SE/6002/002 - ACa, Alb

SEYCHELLES

Victoria market rehabilitation. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture. Est. cost 1 mECU. EDF 0.770 mECU, local 0.230 mECU. Works and improvements. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDY SEY/7011 - ACb

Anse Royale landfill. 2.85 mECU.

Construction of a fully-engineered landfill. Works, supplies, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF SEY - AJz

Le Niol water treatment plant extension.

1.35 mECU. Rehabilitation and extension of water treatment works. Works. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF SEY - AFh

SIERRA LEONE

(All projects suspended)

Improvement of Freetown - Conakry road link. Est. cost 30 mECU.

Reconstruction of about 120 kms of road from Masiaka in Sierra Leone to Farmoreah in Guinea. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL/7004 - ABd

Sierra Leone roads authority (SLRA) support programme. Resp. Auth.: SLRA. 22.5 mECU. To strengthen SLRA's

management capacity, to support maintenance operations, rehabilitate 160 km of road, provide training and equipment to enable local private contractors to increase their role in road works. Rehabilitation works, equipment, T.A. to SLRA. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL/7002 - ABd

Management and protection of wildlife in Outamba Kilimi National Park (OKNP).

Resp. Auth.: NAO. Est. cost 1.98 mECU. Development of sound management plan for sustainable protection of wildlife and ecosystem in park. Improvement of local infrastructure and community development. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SL/7003 - AEi, AHi

North West Artisanal Fisheries and Community Development Phase II. 1.98

mECU. Technical cooperation in fisheries. T.A. and training. Financing date January 97. EDF 7.

SL/6004/001 - ACd.

SOLOMON ISLANDS

Guadalcanal road: Aola-Matau. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Transport, Works and Utilities. Est. cost 6 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. Tender for a study expected to be issued in June 1998. EDF 7.

EDF SOL/7001 - ABd

Population Census 1997. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance. 1.885 mECU. T.A. and training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SOL/6001/000 - AAi.

Programme Management Unit. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Development Planning. Est. cost 1.2 mECU. Institutional support. Supplies, works, services, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF SOL/6022/000 - AAz

SOMALIA

2nd rehabilitation programme. 47 mECU. Inter-sectoral approach. The project will be implemented by NGOs and T.A. Project in execution. EDF 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.

EDF SO/6029 - AAC

SURINAME

Timber Institute. Control of logging and reforestation activities. Est. cost 3.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7

EDF SUR/7005 - ACc

Road from Nickerie to the Suriname-Guyana ferry terminal.

Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Public Works. Est. cost 8.4 mECU. Construction of 29.5 km road. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF SUR/5602/001 - ABd

Sysmin programme to upgrade and expand the electricity and telecommunications sectors. Est. cost 20.72 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in June 1998. EDF 7.

EDF SUR/9999/000 - Abai, ABc

Rehabilitation and extension of the Port of Paramaribo, the 'Nieuwe Haven Terminal'.

Est. cost 20.5 mECU; EDF part 13.5 mECU. Construction/infrastructure; supplies of equipment/inputs; T.A., incl. studies. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in January 1999. EDF 7, 8.

EDF SUR/7013/000 - ABd.

SWAZILAND

Maize Marketing and Storage. Resp.

Auth.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 1.555 mECU. Rehabilitation and expansion works by acc. tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SW/5005/02 - ACa.

Support for implementation of the Cross Border Initiative. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 1.5 mECU. T.A., training, supply of equipment. EDF 7. Project in execution.

EDF REG/7012/024 - AAz

Development of smallholder irrigation in the Lower Usuthu River. Est. cost 16 mECU. Construction, supplies, studies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF SW/7007/001 - ACa

TANZANIA

Mwanza-Nyanguge Road and Mwanza urban roads rehabilitation, and Nyanguge-Musoma overlay. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Transport and Communications. Est. cost 55 mECU. Rehabilitation of 67 km of trunk roads (Nyanguge-Mwanza and Mwanza airport) and rehabilitation of Mwanza sewerage system (main works). Design study on-going. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF TA/6021 - ABd

Mwanza Water Supply. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water energy and minerals. Est. cost 21 mECU. Works, pumping equipment, studies and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF TA/5005(7) - ABb

Iringa Water Supply. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Water, Energy and Minerals. Est. cost 22 mECU. Pumping, treatment, storage and distribution. Works, equipment, design and supervision. Short-list done. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF TA/7009 - ABz

Mwanza/Shinyanga-Nzega road rehabilitation. Resp. Auth. Ministry of Works. Est. cost 70 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 6, 7 and 8.

EDF TA/7012 - ABd

Institutional strengthening for the education sector development programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Education and Culture. Est. cost 1.91 mECU. T.A. (short term), training and equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF TA/7023/000 - AFd

Special programme for refugee-affected areas. Resp. Auth.: Prime Minister's office. Est. cost 22 mECU. Rehabilitation of the Mwanza Airport runway, contribution to the Kagera road maintenance programme, improvement of the Kigoma-Nyakanasi gravel road (335 km). Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF TA - ABd

Institutional strengthening for improved water supply and sewerage services in four towns. Est. cost 1.985 mECU. T.A., training, works and supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7

EDF TA/7014/000 - ABb

Support for the introduction of Value Added Tax. Resp. Auth.: Government of Tanzania. Est. cost 1,945 mECU. TA (restr. tender), training, taxpayer education, publicity, testing of procedures. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF TA/7200/003 - AAz, AAb

Rehabilitation of the Mwanza Sewerage System. Est. cost 2.5 mECU, EDF part 2 mECU. Construction/infrastructure; supply of equipment/inputs; T.A., incl. studies; training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF TA/7014/001 - ABb.

Emergency (El Nino) Road Repairs. Est. cost 10 mECU. Construction/ infrastructure, T.A. incl. studies. *Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution.* EDF 7.
EDF TA/7027/000 - ABd.

Structural Adjustment - SAF IV. Est. cost 61.9 mECU. Budgetary aid, T.A. incl. studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF TA/7200/004 - AAC.

TOGO

Aid for the voluntary reintegration of refugees from Togo. Resp. Auth.: Min. Du Plan. Est. cost 0.43 mECU. Project under the direction of CARE Togo. Socio-economic contribution for the reintegration of 17,000 Togo refugees in their place of origin. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF TO/7006 - AHn

Support for a group of producers in the Savanes region. Est. cost 1.8 mECU. Construction, supplies, T.A., training. Project in execution. EDF 5.

EDF TO/6003/002 - ACa

Development of basic mining information. 1.11 mECU. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan et de l'Aménagement du Territoire. Studies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF SYSMIN/TO/9999 - ADA.

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Training project for young farmers (AYTRAP). Assistance for the young farmer to create rural enterprises. Est. cost 7.3 mECU. EDF 5 mECU. local 2.300 mECU. Line of credit, T.A. and monitoring. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.

EDF TR/7002 - ACA

Support for Caribbean Business Services Ltd. (CBSL). Resp. Auth.: NAO. Est. cost 0.347 mECU. Support for SMEs through management advice and the transfer of technology. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF TR/7006/000 - ADE

Rehabilitation of the L'Anse Fourmi - Charlotteville road. Est. cost 3.5 mECU. Construction, T.A., feasibility study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF TR/5013/000 - ADc

UGANDA

Water supply in Hoima, Masindi and Mubende. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Natural Resources. Est. cost 12 mECU. Rehabilitation of catchments, treatment plants and water distribution network. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF UG/7010 - ABb

Third structural adjustment support programme (SASP 3). Resp. Auth. Ministry of Finance. Est. cost. 51.06 mECU. T.A. *Project in execution.* EDF 7,8.
EDF UG/7200/002

Uganda Blood Transfusion Service. Phase 3. Est. cost 2.5 mECU. Supplies, T.A. incl. studies, training. *Project on appraisal.* EDF 8.

EDF UG/6012/004 - AGz.

Human Resources for Health. Est. cost 12 mECU. Construction/infrastructure, T.A.

incl. studies, supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF UG/6012/002 - AGz.

AIDS and Reproductive Health. Est. cost 8 mECU. Grants to NGOs and costs of Project Implementation Unit. *Project on appraisal.* EDF 8.

EDF UG/6012/003 - AGz.

VANUATU

Education development programme. Est. cost 7.5 mECU. To increase enrolment in junior secondary school and to improve the quality of education delivered. T.A., supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF VA/7005/001 - AFa.

ZAMBIA

Forestry Support Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Environment. Est. cost 1.6 mECU. Training supply of equipment, studies and T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ZA/7009 - ACc

Rehabilitation of the Kabwe-Kapiri Mposhi and Chisamba Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works and Supply Est. cost 26 mECU. Works and supervision. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF ZA/6014/001 - ABd

Capacity building in the Bank of Zambia. Strengthening of the banking and financial sector. Macroeconomic management and planning. Resp. Auth.: Bank of Zambia. 1.15 mECU. T.A., supplies and training. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7020/000 - AEh

Technical assistance to the Roads Department. Resp. Auth.: Dept. of Roads. Est. cost 1.9 mECU. Provision of long-term T.A. to the Roads Department and implementation of a formal training programme for the department's professional and technical staff. T.A., studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7022/000 - ABd

Educational capacity-building programme. To plan and deliver effective and relevant education and training. 10 mECU. Feasibility study, T.A., construction, budgetary aid and training. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7003/003 - AFz, AFh, AFi

Urban Market Development. Est. cost 1.9 mECU. Construction, T.A. including studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7011/000 - ACf

Private sector development programme. Trade and enterprise support facility/micro-credit project. 8 mECU. T.A., studies and training. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7010/001 - AEz, AEe

Export Development Programme Phase II. To increase exports of non-traditional goods. Est. cost 6 mECU. T.A. and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/5017/002 - AEd

Assistance to the wildlife sector, phase II. Improvement in management of wildlife

resources. Est. cost 10 mECU. Feasibility study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7002/001 - AEc

Agricultural private sector development (SME) - microprojects. Est. cost 0.5 mECU. T.A., study, credit facility. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7023/000 ACa

Economic management support programme, phase II. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. Est. cost 4 mECU. T.A., feasibility study, financial aid, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7018/001 - AAC

Rehabilitation of the Monze-Zimba road. Est. cost 37.5 mECU. Construction, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF REG/7323/001 - ABd

Improvement of the Zambian Safe Blood Transfusion Programme. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Health. Est. cost 3.735 mECU. T.A., equipment, training. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7003/002 - AGd

Drugs Master Plan Implementation. Est. cost 1.100.000 ECU. Supplies of equipment, T.A., miscellaneous. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7019/000 - AGz

Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF IV). 53.69 mECU. Financing decision taken in July 1998. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF ZA/7200/005 - AAC.

ZIMBABWE

Minefield clearance in N.E. Zimbabwe. 10 mECU. Rural development, clearance of landmines. Minefields survey. Works, supervision. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF ZIM/7004 - ACa

Trade development programme - import/export. Est. cost 9 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/6001/002 - AEd, AEe

Tourism development programme - master plan. Resp. Auth.: Government of Zimbabwe. Est. cost 1 mECU. Feasibility study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/6008/002 - AEc

Health sector development programme. Est. cost 14 mECU. Feasibility study. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/7002/000 - AGe

Education sector support programme. Improvement of education system. Est. cost 14 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/7009/000 - AFa, AFe

Natural resources project. Est. cost 2 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/7012/000

Agricultural services and management project (ASMP). Est. cost 25 mECU. Works, supplies, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/7011/000

Decentralised cooperation programme. Est. cost 5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/7013/000

Support Services Framework Contract. Est. cost 1.2 mECU. T.A., incl. studies. Improved effectiveness of NAO's office. Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 8.

EDF ZIM/7016/000 - AAC

OVERSEAS COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES

BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS

Beef Island airport terminal. Est. cost 16.84 mECU. Works, supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.

EDF REG/6631/001

Hamilton Lavity Stoutt Community College Learning Resource Centre. Resp. Auth.: Territorial Authorising Officer, Road Town. 2,484,200 ECU. Works. Construction of a learning resource centre for the existing HLS Community College. Project in execution.

EDF 7.

7 OCT VI/005/6 - Afb

FRENCH POLYNESIA

Management of land and hydraulics to install young farmers. 1,234 mECU. Study. Project in execution. EDF 6.

EDF POF/6010/000 - ACg

MAYOTTE

Water supply. Est. cost 7.2 mECU. Works, T.A., study. Main works completed. Supervision completed. Study on remaining works in execution. Project in execution. EDF 6 & 7.

EDF MY - ABb

NETHERLANDS ANTILLES - ARUBA

Tourism development programme. 5 mECU. Training, T.A., marketing in Europe. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7835 - AEc

Technical Assistance to the National Authorising Officer. Technical assistance will be given to promote sound and effective management of external aid. 1.3 mECU. T.A supplies Restricted tender. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NEA/7012/000

Netherlands Antilles social action programme. Est. cost 13.2 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7,8

EDF NEA/7011/000

Small Enterprises Stimulation Programme in the Netherlands Antilles (SESNA). 7.488 mECU. Financing decision taken in July 1998. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NEA/7009/000 - AAb.

NEW CALEDONIA

New aquarium. To increase the capacity and improve the infrastructure of the aquarium. Est. cost 4 mECU. Construction, T.A. and supplies. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF NC/6009/001 - AEc

ST. HELENA

Wharf improvement project. Resp. Auth.: Public Works and Service Department. Est. cost 1.743 mECU. To increase the safety and efficiency of Jamestown Port by upgrading wharf facilities for passenger and cargo handling. Works, supplies. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen at the end of 1998. EDF 7.

EDF SH/7001 - ABd

TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS

Water and sewerage in Providenciales. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works, 3.7 mECU. Water supply works and pipes. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF TC/7001 - AHb,c

WALLIS AND FUTUNA

Creation of improved structures for pig-rearing. Resp. Auth. EDF authorising officer for the territory. Est. cost 0.11 mECU. To establish viable production structures adapted to market conditions. T.A., training, follow-up. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF WF/7009/000 - ACa

REGIONAL PROJECTS

AFRISTAT

Support for AFRISTAT (economic and statistical control). 0.9 mECU. Improvement in the quality of statistical information. T.A., supplies and equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7106/004 - AAC, AFd

10 MEMBER COUNTRIES OF AGM - BURKINA FASO, CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, GHANA, MALI, NIGER, NIGERIA, SENEGAL, CHAD, TOGO

Promotion of a regional grain market in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: NAO-Mali. Est. cost 12 mECU. Creation of a regional grain market. Promotion and strengthening of initiatives by private operators. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/6175 - ACf

INTRA-ACP

Strengthening of fisheries and biodiversity management in ACP countries. Resp. Auth.: ICLARM, Manila (Philippines). 5mECU. T.A., management, supply of equipment, data base creation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/70012/016 - ACa

COLEACP, Interim Project. Commercial development in exports and in the field of horticulture. Est. cost 1.86 mECU. Training. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/6900/002 - AEe

Business Assistance Scheme for Exports (BASE) Est. cost 30 mECU. To expand receipts from exports and tourism by improving enterprises' export competitiveness and trade facilitation skills. T.A. training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF REG/70001/020 - AEd.

Support to regional cooperation for HIV/AIDS control. Est. cost 20 mECU. T.A., studies, supplies, equipment, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF REG/8000/004 - AGz, AGc, AGe

Interuniversity support programme - Level 3 - in French-speaking sub-Saharan countries. Est. cost 1.976 mECU. Training, equipment and educational material. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7004/014 - AFb

Support for Regional Economic Integration. Est. cost 1.75 mECU. T.A. incl. studies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/6929/003 - Alb.

Installation of the African Virtual University (AVU). Est. cost 1.1 mECU. Institutional capacity building, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF REG/70012/35 - AFb.

CARIBBEAN REGION

Caribbean Postal Union.

Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.5 mECU. T.A. and other action necessary for the creation of the Caribbean Postal Union. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7605 - ABc

Caribbean Telecommunications Union. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. 0.5 mECU. T.A. for the accomplishment of the C.T.U. and the harmonisation of legislation on telecommunications within the Cariforum member states. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7605/001 - ABc

Education policy and dialogue. Resp. Auth.: Cariforum S.G. 0.45 mECU. T.A. for regional common policies in three education areas: basic education, technical and vocational training, language teaching. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7607 - AFa,d

Cultural Centres. Resp. Auth.: S.G. Cariforum. Est. cost 1.965 mECU. Promote cultural identity and foster mutual knowledge of the rich cultural panorama. Restoration of buildings, supply of equipment, T.A. in artistic fields and management. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7610 - AHi.

Tertiary level programme. Est. cost 5.946 mECU. Upgrading tertiary level education and teacher training. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/6628/001 - AFb

Cariforum Regional Environment Programme. Resp. Auth.: SG Cariforum. Est. cost 11 mECU. Environmental management action, programme for protected areas and community development, management and expansion of marine and coastal park and protected areas. Terrestrial parks. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7613 - AHf

Programming Unit Cariforum Secretariat. 0.725 mECU. Equipment, office supplies, T.A. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG 7615 - AAC.

CARIFORUM Programming Unit. Resp. Auth.: CARIFORUM. 3.94 mECU. T.A. to the Secretary General of CARIFORUM to help in the allocation, preparation and implementation of regional funds under Lomé IV. T.A., supply. Project in execution. EDF 7 and 8.

EDF REG/7615/001 - AAb

Caribbean News Agency Development Programme. Resp. Auth.: Regional Authorising Officer. Est. cost 4.179 mECU. Establishing a CARIFORUM Information Network by setting up a coordinating centre and mechanisms and archives and increasing radio, TV and Cana wire services. T.A., supply. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7605/003 - ABc

COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE CBI

Standardisation and quality assurance. Resp. Auth.: COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. Est. cost 2.543 mECU. TA and training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7321 - AEe

Regional Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa. Assistance to COMESA Secretariat. 1.95 mECU. Training, supply of equipment, evaluation and services. T.A. short-term. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7316 - AAC

Regional Telematics Network Services (RTNS). Trade development. Est. cost 1.93 mECU. T.A. short-term by restr. tender. Publicity for the project, network implementation, maintenance and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/RPR 517 - AAC.

CENTRAL AFRICA

CIESPAC, Public Health Education Centre in Central Africa. 1.98 mECU. Student accommodation, equipment, scholarships. T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7205 - AFb

ECOFAC II, Forest ecosystems. Resp. Auth.: Ministère du Plan. Rep. of Congo. Est. cost 16 mECU. Develop national and regional capacities for good management of forest resources. Works, supplies and T.A. Project in execution EDF 7.

EDF REG 6203/001 - ACc

CHAD-CAMEROON-CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Ngaoundéré-Toubo-ro-Moundou Road. Est. cost 85 mECU. Construction, T.A. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.

EDF REG/7203/001 - ABd.

EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Statistical training centre for Eastern Africa in Tanzania.

Resp. Auth.: Secretariat of the centre. 5 mECU, Widening of capacity. Construction of class-rooms, offices and housing. Project in execution. EDF 5.

EDF REG/5311(7) - AFb

Combatting the tse tse fly in East Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda). 20 mECU. Evaluation, training and research. T.A., equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/736 -ACa, ACE

Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (Phase II). Project headquarters in Jinja, Uganda at FIRI-Fisheries Research Institute. EDF part 8.4 mECU. T.A., supplies, training, monitoring and evaluation. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/5316/001 - ACd

Tanzania rehabilitation programme for refugee affected areas and related infrastructure. Est. cost 20 mECU. Rehabilitation of roads and conserving the environment in refugee areas. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7322/001 - ABd

Uganda - Kampala by-pass. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Road construction. Est. cost 35 mECU. T.A. works. Project on appraisal. EDF 7,8.

EDF REG/6304/001 - ABd

Support for economic integration. Est. cost 1.95 mECU. T.A., incl. studies; training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7162/000 - AAb.

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF ECOWAS

Guarantee Fund for Private Investment Financing in Western Africa. FGIPAO, Lomé. Creation of a Guarantee Fund to cover partially credit risks given by Banks to the private sector. Est. cost 22.5 mECU. EDF 3.8 mECU, Others: France, Germany, EIB., Commercial Banks (E.U.). Development Agencies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7115 - AEz

Regional programme to combat drugs. Est. cost 5.1 mECU. Elaboration of training programmes and national plans. Project in execution. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7135 - AGz

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IGAD

IGAD Household Energy Programme. Resp. Auth.: IGAD Executive Secretary. Est. cost 1.9 mECU. T.A. to initiate pilot projects in the area of household energy, define the role and organize the setting up of a regional unit to coordinate activities, and develop working relationships with national and sub-region institutions in IGADD's member countries. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG - ABa

Development of the artisanal fisheries sector. The promotion of artisanal fisheries and fisheries trade. Improvement of the level of services available in the post-harvest field of artisanal fisheries in IGADD member states. Est. cost 7.8 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/7314/000 - ACd, AFd

Grain marketing training programme. Resp. Auth. IGADD Executive Secretary. 1.99 mECU. T.A., equipment, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.

EDF REG/5359 - ACa

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN COMMISSION (IOC) - COMORES, MADAGASCAR, MAURITIUS, SEYCHELLES

Integrated Regional Programme for Trade Development (PRIDE). Resp. Auth.: I.O.C. Secretariat. EDF 9.3 mECU. T.A. training, management. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG 7503 - AEz.

Indian Ocean University. Resp. Auth.: IOC. Est. cost 1,925 mECU. Training. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7506/000 - AFd

Technical Unit for the Management and Coordination of Community Aid in the Indian Ocean Region. 1.3 mECU. Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 8.
EDF REG/7509/000 - AAz.

PACIFIC ACP STATES

Pacific regional agricultural programme. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat - Fiji. 9.265 mECU. Improvement and dissemination of selected crops, agricultural information and techniques to farmers. T.A. and supply of equipment. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG 6704/001 - ACa

Pacific regional civil aviation. Phase II. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. Fiji. 4.9 mECU. Supply of security, air traffic control, navigation and meteorology, and training equipment. T.A. Project in execution. EDF 6 and 7.
EDF REG/7704 - ABc,d

Pacific Regional Waste Awareness and Education Programme. Resp. Auth.: Forum Secretariat. 0.600 mECU. T.A. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7714 - AHf

Air communications - upgrading of Fua'amotu Airport in Tonga. Resp. Auth.: Ministry of Works. Est. cost 0.340 mECU. Construction, supplies of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7704/001 - ABc

MEMBER COUNTRIES OF PT.A

Regional integration in East and Southern Africa. Assistance to PTA Secretariat. (Preferential Trade Area). Short and long-term. T.A., studies, training. Est. cost 1.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7316 - AAb.

SADC

SADC Intra-regional Skills Development Programme. Est. cost 12.5 mECU. Training. Skills development through specialised courses. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen in May 1999. EDF 8.
EDF REG/7435/000 - AFb, AFd.

SADC Water and Land Management. Est. cost 4 mECU. Training, T.A. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen early 1999. EDF 8.
EDF REG/6415/001 - AFci.

SADC Regional Vegetation Project. Est. cost 1.8 mECU. T.A., supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF REG/7410/000 - ACb.

SADC - Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania. Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) of Fishing Activities. Resp. Auth.: SADC - Sector Coordinator for Marine Fisheries. Est. cost 13.3 mECU. To improve national and regional management capacity of marine fishery resources. Feasibility study, T.A., supplies. Project on appraisal. Financing decision foreseen by the end of 1998. EDF 8.
EDF REG/6406/000 - ACd.

SADC - ECOWAS - ECOCAS

Pilot project for sectoral industrial Forums: EU - SADC. Mining Forum - MAT-CONSTRUCT-AGRO-IND. Admin. Resp.: CDI, Brussels. Monitoring and follow-up. 0.5 mECU. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7428 - ADb.

ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, NAMIBIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND TANZANIA

SADC monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing activities. Resp. Auth.: SADC - Sector Coordinator for Marine Fisheries. Est. cost 13.3 mECU. To improve national and regional capacity to manage marine fishery resources. Feasibility study, T.A., supplies. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF REG 6406/000 - ACd

SAHEL COUNTRIES

Support to strengthen vaccine independence in Sahel Africa. 9.5 mECU. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7012 - ACa

MISCELLANEOUS

CAMEROON, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Bertua-Garoua Boulai Road. Resp. Auth.: Ministère des Travaux Publics (Cameroon). Rehabilitation and improvement of transport infrastructures between Douala and Bangui. Est. cost 50 mECU. Prequalification for services. Project on appraisal. EDF 6.
EDF REG/CM/CA/7002/001 - ABd

MALI-GUINEA

Flood forecast and control, hydrological simulation for the Niger upper basin. Est. cost 6 mECU. EDF, 5.175. mECU. France (foreseen) 0.375 mECU. Denmark (foreseen) 0.15 mECU. Mali-Guinea (foreseen) 0.3 mECU. Flood forecast system, hydrological model of local simulation with parametric regionalisation. Warning system via telecommunication and satellite teletransmission. Statistical studies. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG. 6181 - AHf, AHg.

BURKINA FASO, CAPE VERDE, GAMBIA, MALI, MAURITANIA, NIGER, SENEGAL, CHAD

Regional environmental training and information programme. Resp. Auth.: Institut de Sahel in Bamako. 16 mECU. T.A. training, supply of equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG/6147/001 - AFz, AHz

BENIN, BURKINA FASO, COTE D'IVOIRE, MALI, NIGER, SENEGAL, TOGO

Support for the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Promotion of regional economic integration. Resp. Auth. UEMOA Commission. 12 mECU. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7106/02 - AAf
Support for the ENAREF. 0.900 mECU. T.A., training, equipment. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7106/003 - AAc, AAf, AFd

BENIN, CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE, GHANA, GUINEA, TOGO

Regional Programme to relaunch pineapple production in West and Central Africa. Resp. Auth.: Execution unit composed of one senior expert, T.A. and one junior expert. 1.995 mECU. T.A. studies, evaluation. Project on appraisal. EDF 7.
EDF REG/7138 - ACa

GUINEA, GUINEA BISSAU, SENEGAL, MALI

Support for the Rational Management of the Natural Resources of the Niger and Gambia Basins. Est. cost 23 mECU. T.A. incl. studies, construction/ infrastructure, supplies, training. Project on appraisal. EDF 8.
EDF REG/6137/001 - AHf.

ETHIOPIA, KENYA, TANZANIA, UGANDA, BURKINA FASO, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC, CHAD, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

African Wildlife Veterinary Project. Resp. Auth.: OAU - Inter-African Bureau of Animal Resources. 1.6 mECU. T.A., training, evaluation, contingencies. Financing decision taken in June 1998. Project in execution. EDF 7.
EDF REG/5007/004 - AHf.

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Tel. (230) 2116295 (6 lines)
Fax. (230) 2116624
E-mail. Europe@bow.intnet.mu

Mozambique

1214 Avenida do Zimbabwe,
C.P. 1306, Maputo.
Tel. (258 1) 490266 - 491716 - 490271
Telex 6-146 CCE MO
Fax (258 1) 491866

Namibia

4th Floor, Sanlam Building, 154
Independence Avenue,
Windhoek.
Tel. (264 61) 220099
Telex 419 COMEU WK
Fax (264 61) 235135

Niger

B.P. 10388, Niamey.
Tel. (227) 732360 - 732773 - 734832
Telex 5267 NI DELEGFED - NIAMEY
Fax (227) 732322

Nigeria**Lagos**

Knorr House,
Ozumba Mbadawe Avenue (opposite 1004
flats)
Victoria Island
P.M.B. 12767, Lagos
Tél (234 1) 2617852, 2610857
Fax (234 1) 2617248
E-mail: ecnig@infoweb.abs.net

Abuja

Tel. (234 9) 5233144 - 5233145 - 5233146
Fax (234 9) 5233147

**Pacific (Fiji, Kiribati, Western Samoa,
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu)**

4th Floor, Development Bank Centre,
Victoria Parade,
Private Mail Bag, Suva.
Tel. (679) 313633
Fax (679) 300370
e-mail: eudelfiji@eu.org.fj

Papua New Guinea

The Lodge (3rd Floor), Bampton street,
P.O. Box 76, Port Moresby.
Tel. (675) 213544 - 213504 - 213718
Fax (675) 217850

Rwanda

Avenue Député Kamuzinzi 14,
B.P. 515 Kigali.
Tel. (250) 75586 - 75589 - 72536
Telex 22515 DECCE RW
Fax (250) 74313

Senegal

12 Avenue Albert Sarraut,
B.P. 3345, Dakar.
Tel. (221) 231314 - 234777
Fax (221) 236885

Sierra Leone

Wesley House, 4 George Street,
P.O. Box 1399, Freetown.
Tel. (232 22) 223975 - 223025
Fax (232 22) 225212

Solomon Islands

2nd floor, City Centre Building,
P.O. Box 844, Honiara.
Tel. (677) 22765
Fax (677) 23318

Somalia

EC Somalia Unit,
Union Insurance House (first floor),
Ragati Road, Nairobi, Kenya.
Tel. (254 2) 712830 - 713250 - 713251
Fax (254 2) 710997

Sudan

3rd floor - AAAID Building,

Osman Digna Avenue,
P.O. Box 2363, Khartoum.
Tel. (249 11) 775054 - 775148
Telex 23096 DELSU SD
Fax (249 11) 775393

Suriname

Dr. S. Redmondstraat 239,
P.O. Box 484, Paramaribo.
Tel. (597) 499322 - 499349 - 492185
Fax (597) 493076

Swaziland

Dhlan'Ubeka Building (3rd floor),
Cr. Walker and Tin Streets,
P.O. Box A 36, Mbabane.
Tel. (268) 42908 - 42018
Telex 2133 EEC WD
Fax (268) 46729

Tanzania

38 Mirambo Street,
P.O. Box 9514, Dar es Salaam.
Tel. (255 51) 117473 (pilot) - 117474 -
117475 - 117476
Telex 41353 DELCOMEUR TZ
Fax (255 51) 113277

Togo

Avenue Nicolas Grunitzky 37,
B.P. 1657 Lomé.
Tel. (228) 213662 - 210832
Fax (228) 211300

Trinidad and Tobago

The Mutual Centre,
16 Queen's Park West,
P.O. Box 1144, Port of Spain.
Tel. (1 868) 6226628 - 6220591
Fax (1 868) 6226355

Uganda

Rwenzori House, 1 Lumumba Avenue,
P.O. Box 5244? Kampala.
Tel. (256 41) 233303 - 233304
Telex 61139 DELEUR UG
Fax (256 41) 233708

Zambia

Plot 4899, Los Angeles Boulevard,
P.O. Box 34871, Lusaka.
Tel. (260 1) 250711 - 251140
Telex 40440 DECEC ZA
Fax (260 1) 250906

Zimbabwe

6th floor, Construction House,
110 Leopold Takawira Street,
P.O. Box 4252, Harare.
Tel. (263 4) 707120 - 707139 - 752835
Telex 24811 DELEUR ZW
Fax (263 4) 725360

**OFFICES OF THE
COMMISSION IN ACP
COUNTRIES AND OCTS****Antigua and Barbuda**

Upper St George's Street,
P.O. Box 1392, St. John's.
Tel. (1 268) 462 2970
Fax (1 268) 462 2670

Bahamas

2nd floor, Frederick House, Frederick
Street,

P.O. Box N-3246, Nassau.
Tel. (1 242) 325 5850
Fax (1 242) 323 3819

Belize

1 Eyre Street,
P.O. Box 907, Belize City.
Tel. and Fax (501 2) 72785
Telex 106 CEC BZ

Comoros

Boulevard de la Corniche,
B.P. 559, Moroni.
Tel. (269) 732306 - 733191
Telex 212 DELCEC - KO
Fax (269) 732494

Equatorial Guinea

Route de l'Aéroport,
B.P. 779, Malabo.
Tel. (240 9) 2944
Telex DELFED 5402 - EG
Fax (240 9) 3275

Netherlands Antilles and Aruba

Scharlooweg 37,
P.O. Box 822, Willemstad (Curaçao).
Tel. (599 9) 4618488
Fax (599 9) 4618423

New Caledonia (OCT)

21 Rue Anatole France,
B.P. 1100, Noumea
Tel. (687) 277002
Fax (687) 288707

Samoa

4th floor, Loane Viliamu Building,
P.O. Box 3023, Apia.
Fax (685) 24622

São Tomé and Príncipe

B.P. 132, São Tomé.
Tel (239 12) 21780 - 21375
Telex 224 DELEGFED ST
Fax (239-12) 22683

Seychelles

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Tel. (248) 323940
Fax. (248) 323890

Tonga

Malle Taha, Taufua'ahau Road,
Private Mailbag n° 5-CPO, Nuku'Alofa.
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Telex 66207 DELCEC TS
Fax (676) 23869

Vanuatu

Ground floor, Orient Investment Building,
Kumul Highway,
P.O. Box 422, Port Vila.
Tel. (678) 22501
Fax (678) 23282

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom

France
(Territorial collectivities)
Mayotte
St Pierre and Miquelon
(Overseas territories)
New Caledonia and dependencies
French Polynesia
French Southern and Antarctic
Territories
Wallis and Futuna Islands

Netherlands
(Overseas countries)
Netherlands Antilles
(Bonaire, Curaçao,
St Martin,
Saba, St Eustache)
Aruba



Denmark
(Country having special
relations with Denmark)
Greenland

United Kingdom
(Overseas countries and
territories)
Anguilla
British Antarctic Territory
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Falkland Islands
Southern Sandwich Islands
and dependencies
Montserrat
Pitcairn Island
St Helena and dependencies
Turks and Caicos Islands

THE EUROPEAN UNION



THE 71 ACP STATES



Angola
Antigua & Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo
Congo (ex-Zaire)
Côte d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Grenada
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Jamaica
Kenya
Kiribati
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Papua New Guinea
Rwanda
St Kitts and Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent
and the Grenadines
Samoa
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa*
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad & Tobago
Tuvalu
Uganda
Vanuatu
Zambia
Zimbabwe

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This list does not prejudice
the status of these countries and territories
now or in the future.
The Courier uses maps from a variety
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nor prejudice the status of any state
or territory.

*Not all provisions of the Lomé
Convention apply to South Africa

Betel juice leaves its mark

Violence may be a problem in Papua New Guinea but the blood-red stains you see on the pavements of Port Moresby and other towns in this Pacific nation are not as grisly as they might first seem. The 'culprit' is saliva, spat out by people who have been chewing betel nuts.

These are widely consumed in PNG, and long-time chewers have strikingly red-stained teeth, revealed by their frequent broad grins. The nut comes from the areca palm and is said to be a mild narcotic as well as an aid to digestion. In pidgin it is called buai. It is never chewed alone, but is mixed with crushed-coral lime (*cumbung*) and mustard stick (*daka*).

It is not illegal to consume betel nuts – indeed, as our picture shows, they are sold openly on the streets and in the markets – but the authorities are keen to curtail the habit in public areas. Prominent notices, displayed in government buildings and at airports, inform the public that betel nut chewing is banned in these places.

The reason for these prohibitions has nothing to do with wider social concerns about the narcotic effects of the nut. The problem is that chewing stimulates the production of red-coloured saliva and the mixture eventually has to be spat out. If swallowed, it can provoke nausea. One doesn't need to be particularly fastidious to understand why such a habit is deemed to be anti-social in public buildings! ■

D.M.



Democracy and good governance

