EUROPEAN STUDIES

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The European Idea and the Resistance Movement

Many people do not realize what a strong influence the resistance movement of the second world war had on the formulation of the idea of a United Europe. This article by Henri Brugmans, now Rector of the College of Europe and a great European federalist, formerly a member of the Dutch resistance movement, is a personal statement on the influence of the resistance movement in various countries on the idea of a United Europe.

National "faith" declined

In the beginning of the 20th century, the traditional symbols of Nationalism were still revered as "holy". The national anthems still sounded credible: in the *Marseillaise*, the love for the fatherland was called "sacred", and the Germans were invited to believe that their country should be held "above all the world". But in 1940, there was no French patriotic upheaval, no *taxis de la Marne*, and the appeals to resist the *Boches* sounded antiquated. As for the Nazis, their "faith" was ideological rather than national in the old 19th century-sense of the word. Both Britain and Germany crusading for an idea, rather than defending a territory. As Edith Cavell had already said in 1916: "Patriotism was no longer enough."

This was particularly true for the occupied countries on the Continent, where the national flag was used both by collaborators with the Nazis and underground-workers. In 1914, the Kaiser had declared that "he no longer knew parties but only Germans". A quarter of a century later, a Dutch resister would spit on "his" national flag when used by the *Nationaal Socialistische Beweging*, since it had been degraded by the triangle of "the Movement". And in 1941, when Syria was invaded by the Allies, Gaullists and Vichy-French killed each other under the common *tricolore*. In short, the national idea had ceased to be a crystallization-point for compatriots, whatever their political or confessional conviction. Indeed, it was interpreted in the most contrasting ways. It had become a sign of contradiction.

European solidarity on both sides

By contrast, a feeling of European togetherness grew on both sides of the barricade. In Russia, the "European S.S." fought "Asiatic Bolshevism" and

claimed to defend the spiritual values of a common civilization rather than one single country, Germany. Of course, the language of command was German, but in the "Black Corps" one found Frenchmen (such as Jacques Doriot, who had been a leader of the Communist Youth) and Belgians (such as the leader of the Rexists, Degrelle), Slovaks and Croats, Lithuanians and Dutchmen; they stood together with the Spanish "división azul", with Hungarians, Rumanians and Italians who were supposed to be Fascists. A new Europe, they were told, was to arise from their struggle, a Europe based on the sound principles of nationhood, but united under the banner of the strongest nation of all, Germany. "Germany fights for Europe": on the walls of the occupied countries, this slogan appeared as the war dragged on—even if a native added a little counter-slogan: "Don't take the trouble for me". In Nazi propaganda, "Europe" was everywhere, but it was a "Europe" of a very specific sort.

On the other hand, there was a certain amount of risk involved in listening to the jammed broadcasting of the BBC especially when all sets were supposed to have been handed over to the German authorities in 1944, but those who listened experienced a feeling of immediate, militant brotherhood when they heard about the work of the resistance abroad. A bridge blown up in Yugoslavia, a convoy attacked in the woods of Poland, the swastika flag replaced by the national flag on the Acropolis, be it only for a few hours, a daring operation in Holland in order to free some political prisoners from goal, the German-controlled *Soir* in Brussels published for once as a truly patriotic paper, Italian partisans fighting in the Alps—we felt sympathy for all this—on whatever side of a frontier one happened to be. Patriotism, like Nazism, gained an European dimension.

Planning for the future

Some members of the resistance movement did not give much thought to what was to happen after Hitler's defeat. The main task was to liberate the country, to help the Allies in every respect, to revive the spirit of resistance. They did intelligence-work, published clandestine papers, organized hiding-places for the menaced Jews (as in Anne Frank's diary); they set up a network of places where Allied airmen would be looked after and sent to Spain or Switzerland, collected weapons for the great days to come, created professional groups of doctors, teachers, churchmen, civil servants, who could take action as soon as the enemy tried to infiltrate their profession. Most of them had hardly any time or energy to spare apart from those tasks. Their goal was liberation. One would think of the rest when the war was over and the fatherland free again. There were undoubtedly differences of opinion between comrades-in-arms, but they could not afford to discuss them at the time.

However, as victory came nearer, the need for planning became more and more apparent. There was a reluctance to accept that this tremendous ordeal would just lead to a return to the *status quo ante*. We had witnessed the utter collapse of our national State-system. Shameful Vichy-type collaboration and the wide-spread cowardice of so many had proved that something was rotten in our national communities. Above all: what could we do in order to prevent a return of this tragedy? Specifically: what would be the fate of Germany after her defeat? "Unconditional surrender" was the watchword that came out of Casablanca. But that would lay the whole responsibility on the shoulders of the victorious powers. Were they prepared for that task too? Many underground figures had their doubts, since the Atlantic Charter had hardly offered any new perspectives. Admittedly, the League of Nations was to be restored and renamed the "United Nations", but it seemed as if UNO might be as "toothless" as its predecessor in Geneva had been. Some original thinking had to be done under occupation, since the Western Allies seemed to lack constructive imagination.

The German Resistance

In the occupied countries, resistance was comparatively easy. One took some physical risk but politically and morally, the situation was clear enough. The Pétain régime obscured the issue in France, but elsewhere primitive patriotism inspired resisters. In Germany, however, the roles were reversed: to oppose Nazism during the war meant hardly less then high treason, and those who planned the Führer's violent death in the plot of July 20 could be accused of stabbing their country in the back. Consequently, it required an exceptional amount of moral courage to resist the tyrant in his own realm at a moment of national emergency. Some did however accept the consequences of their own ideas: most of them were Christians and Social Democrats. They first opposed Hitler on the ground that he was anti-Christ, usurper of the title of "saviour". The second group believed in a democratic "Rechtsstaat" (state of law), where the fundamental human rights would be upheld and democracy fulfilled through Socialism. Two names spring to mind: **Dietrich Bonhoeffer** and **Carlo Mierendorff**. They received some support from army officers and found their main political leader in the former Mayor of Leipzig, **Dr. Goerdeler**. They went the whole way, finally trying to establish contact with the outside world—with the "enemy"—in order to stop the slaughter and create a new European order.

For Goerdeler this had been the result of a

painful evolution. Admittedly, he had opposed Nazism from the beginning, but as a conservative patriot he had attempted to avoid total collapse for Germany. He proposed peace-terms that might be acceptable for his country, and wished to negotiate them with London and Washington on a power-to-power basis. This project failed. In spite of the efforts made by Dr Visser 't Hooft, secretary-general of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, and Bishop Bell of Chichester, the Western governments ignored these SOS calls inside the Third Reich, and decided in favour of "unconditional surrender", thus giving Herr Goebbels an unhoped-for propaganda theme.

Since it had become clear that a negotiated peace-treaty was out of the question, Goerdeler's political hopes centred more and more round European Federalism. If total capitulation was inevitable, what would happen afterwards? The foreign programme of the German Resistance suggested the creation of a United States of Europe, with a single economy and joint defence. It laid great emphasis upon this last point, since anti-communism had become one of the main themes of the resisters. Was not the Red Army steadily advancing towards the West? Where was it going to stop? Could the Western Allies wish to see Germany turn Bolshevik?

Resistance movements in France and elsewhere

Outside Germany, the political programme of the resistance movements can be divided into four main groups. On the one hand, the political "neutrals" we mentioned above. On the other, among the politically conscious and active fighters: the Communists on the Left, the traditional Patriots on the Right, and the Socialists of every shade somewhere in the Centre.

The communist parties, mentally well equipped for underground work, joined the bulk of the Resistance mainly after the attack on the Soviet Union. But already before that date, in June 1941, some of their rank and file had gone into action, in spite of the fact that Stalin still considered the Russo-German friendship treaty as valid and any anti-Nazi movement consequently as harmful. For example, when the Amsterdam dockers went on strike in February 1941, as a protest against the beginning of the persecution of the Jews (about 85,000 in the Dutch capital) there was a spontaneous rising in which many Communists participated, without waiting for instructions. In fact, it is fair to say that the Communist-led sector of the underground movement was psychologically different from the official party leadership which often kept itself in reserve for better times to come, leaving the risks to others.

The traditional Patriots, for their part, had become more and more nation-conscious. Their hatred, not only of Nazis but of Germans as such, grew as the struggle became more tense. Actually, they came closer and closer to the non-political group.

The democratic Socialists, by contrast, were strongly pro-European. A German historian, professor Walter Lipgens has counted as many as 300 Federalist manifestoes, in the French underground papers only. In their view, the old, mainly verbal "Internationalism" had had its day and the time had come to find a synthesis between what could be retained of the national heritage and what was progressive in the idea of supranationality. If no new Europe was born from the war, it would have been fought in vain. Integration and federalism became the catch words. As a Dutch clandestine paper put it: "This war is the agony of the sovereign Nation-State as we have known it in the 19th century." Similar affirmations were to be found in the other occupied countries.

The Italians: Ventotene

One resistance movement found itself in a privileged position, if one can say so: the Italian anti-fascist network. It had been severely persecuted by the secret police, the ill-famed OVRA, but it had been able to survive in spite of heavy losses. Moreover, there was a clear difference between the *confini* of Mussolini and the concentration camps Hitler organized. In Italy's Tyrrhenian islands, the situation was somewhat similar to what political prisoners had experienced in Siberia in the later days of Russian Tsarism. One could communicate with fellow-prisoners, receive books, write—even marry. Consequently, when the moment came in July 1943 and the *Duce* fell, a short period of freedom began, for which many anti-fascists were relatively well prepared. True, a few weeks later, the German troops had reconquered the peninsula, but during the "fifty days" when Italy was again breathing the fresh air of democracy, the first European Federalist pamphlets were officially circulated and a congress called in Milan.

The most important of these brochures was the famous manifesto of Ventotene; the name was derived from the island where it had been prepared by such men as **Ernesto Rossi** and, even more important, **Altiero Spinelli**, who was to become Nenni's chief adviser on European affairs when he became foreign secretary many years later. Spinelli had been imprisoned for no less than 17 years. He had entered as a young Communist; he left it a convinced Federalist and democrat; he immediately started working and organizing, trying to rally all democratic anti-fascists—Socialists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and members of the short-lived *Partito d'Azione*—around the European banner. A few months later, when Mussolini had been freed from his prison

and had been made the president of a puppet republic in the North, civil war broke out and Federalism became one of the main focus-points in the political aspirations of the *partigiani.*

Geneva, 1944

July 1944 seemed to be the decisive moment. The landing in Normandy had succeeded, and the German armies were retreating everywhere. It was high time to launch a new movement, a new hope, this time on a plurinational scale. Wherever they marched in, the Russians found their Communist friends waiting for them, ready to do whatever they were asked for. On the Western side, no perspective was opened, no programme proposed, at least not from the official governments who still toyed with the idea of reaching an agreement with Stalin... whose only aspiration was to paralyse any Anglo-American initiative.

With victory around the corner and the West politically sterile, a small band of resistance group leaders decided to send some of their representatives to an international meeting in Geneva. France, Italy, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were present, and so were some "militants" from Germany. The Federalists deserve great credit for having welcomed German comrades to their session, when the war was still raging bitterly. By contrast, the Social Democrat parties made no attempt to re-build their International until December 1947, when *Comisco* was formed at Antwerp... and similar such moves came even later for the other parties.

The final manifesto was the product of a series of preliminary meetings, in which the Italians had been the most active. The spirit of Ventotene can be felt throughout the document, as one can easily judge from a paragraph like this one:

"Peace in Europe is the cornerstone of world peace. In the course of one generation, Europe has been the centre of two world conflicts, the origin of which is the existence on this continent of 30 sovereign states. This anarchy must be cured by the creation of a federal Union between the European peoples.

Only a federal Union will allow the German people to participate in Europe's life, without becoming a danger for the other peoples.

Only a federal Union will permit solution of the problems raised by the frontiers running through regions with mixed population; which will thus cease to be the object of enraged nationalist desire and become simple questions of territorial delimitation for administrative convenience.

Only a federal Union will permit the safeguarding of democratic institutions, and thus prevent countries with insufficient political maturity from endangering the general order.

Only a federal Union will allow the economic reconstruction of the continent and the suppression of monopolies and national autarchies.

Only a federal Union will allow the logical and natural solution of the problems of access to the sea for countries located in the centre of the continent, of a rational use of rivers which go through different states, of control of the straits and, generally speaking, of most problems which have troubled international relations in the course of these last years".

For a document issued in 1944, this declaration is remarkably sensible and practical.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be said that the European idea has offered the only really dynamic and constructive prospect for the future. It came out of the resistance-movement as spontaneously as the Socialist idea came out of the Labour movement. It claimed to be—and, in fact was—a concrete answer to the problems which the post-war period was going to put before the Europeans. Admittedly, it has not yet reached fruition, but no alternative has been put forward so far.

In some form or another, the ancient and proud nations of Europe can only pool their sovereignties in so far as they can be assured that their cultural identity is safe. This is exactly what the Federalists of the European underground promised. The cultural diversity of our continent does not depend on national customs-officers, national fighting forces, national diplomacies. Those who worked for national liberation and, at the same time, for renovation of our structures, believed that Federalism was the answer: union in diversity.

Their message, I trust, is still valid.

Reading list

Hubert HALIN, *L'Europe Unie, objectif majeur de la Résistance,* Paris/Bruxelles, Editions de l'Union des Résistants pour une Europe Unie, 1967 (Paris, Maison de l'Europe, 7 rue de l'Echelle, Bruxelles 28, place Flagey).

Walter LIPGENS, *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen, 1940-1945,* München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1968 (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik EV, Band 26).

Henri BERNARD, *La Résistance européenne,* collection Marabout, Verviers, Editions Gérard, 1968.

European Studies, 10, 1970

The daily press in the European Communities and in Britain

Forty-six million copies: this is, approximately, the total circulation of all the daily papers appearing in the European Community.

That is, 249 copies per 1,000 head of population, placing it above the world average, estimated at 100 copies per 1,000, but behind Great Britain and Sweden where the figure is almost twice as high—490 copies per 1,000—and also Japan, with 476 copies per 1,000 head of population.

Extreme care should, however, be exercised in evaluating such figures. Even within the Europe of the Six, the situation is far from being the same from country to country.

I. Daily papers in the European Community

Circulation (Estimated figures 1970)

	Total circulation No. of copies	per 1 000 head of population
Germany	21,000,000	349
Belgium	2,700,000	281
France	12,500,000	251
Italy	6,000,000	114
Luxembourg	150,000	445
Netherlands	3,700,000	297
Total	46,050,000	249

While the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg has a circulation of 445 copies per 1,000 head of population, placing it almost on a level with Japan, Italy on the other hand, produces only 114 copies per 1,000 head of population, i.e. scarcely more than the world average. The circulations of the other four EEC countries are between 251 and 349 copies per 1,000 head of population.

A somewhat hasty observer might suppose the European average (249) copies to be comparatively satisfactory. But there is at present a crisis in the European press.

In search of a function

The daily press is at present rethinking its role in view of the rise of the other media—radio and television. It may seem obvious that the function, or at any rate the main function, of the press is to inform. But the fact is that today radio and television also inform and often much more quickly. The main news is known to the public before the daily papers have a chance to print them.

The daily paper must therefore look for another role; it might, for example, seek to provide background information and data to help the reader to place events in their context and to help him to form his own judgment. A noble task, no doubt, but one in which few journalists excell because they are often too close to the events they have to write about. Moreover if a newspaper adopts this role it has to compete with periodicals most of which are better equipped to produce this kind of writing.

Moreover, the daily paper is also a business enterprise. It may therefore be dangerous for it to voice opinions too openly which may run the risk of displeasing not only current readers, but also prospective readers and advertisers. It is a striking fact that within the Common Market, the Benelux countries are the only ones where the majority of dailies openly represent the opinions of political or religious groups.

Some papers—such as those known in Germany as the 'Boulevard or asphalt press' (papers in large towns with enormous circulations)—have given up dealing with big news. They rely on a dramatic presentation of events and sensationalism. Other papers have begun to concentrate more—if not entirely—on what might be called small news, local or regional news, and on a kind of current information service on matters of daily interest, and on articles written for their entertainment value. This kind of paper is proliferating in Italy. Here it is the national daily which finds itself in a vulnerable position. It has to decide whether it intends if possible to remain a national paper or whether, in aspiring also to carry regional news, it clashes with the interests of specifically regional papers which are becoming increasingly important.

The phenomenon of regionalisation

The phenomenon of the regionalisation of the daily press is so important that it deserves closer scrutiny.

In **Germany**, where there are 467 papers, only one paper with a national circulation is sold on the streets, *Bild-Zeitung*, consisting mainly of small news-items and sensational stories. It prints more than 4 million copies, but in nine separate editions each adapted to the region in which it is distributed. Only three 'quality' newspapers, sold mainly on subscription, can be regarded as having a national readership: the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt* and *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*. All three together have a circulation of the order of 800,000 copies.

In **France**, more than 70 % of the total circulation is accounted for by regional dailies. The large circulation of some of the Paris dailies—such as *France-Soir*—and the international reputation of others—such as *Le Monde*—should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, taken together, only some 31 % of their circulation is outside the Paris region; beyond this area they scarcely do more than supplement the large regional papers.

In **Italy**, a good part of the total daily circulation is concentrated entirely in Rome and Milan but a good many regional papers are to be found, printed in these two towns or elsewhere. They are very unevenly distributed between the regions as newspaper reading habits vary appreciably in this country according to whether one is in the North or the South.

In the **Benelux** countries, the Netherlands is no doubt the country which has the highest proportion of papers with a genuinely national readership, though here again there are numerous regional papers. In Belgium, even in the case of the largest papers, the linguistic division is a factor in limiting readership to specific areas. The Luxembourg press is essentially regional if we consider the small area it covers.

Thus the big dailies, which still have or would like to have a national if not international readership, hemmed in between radio and television on the one hand and between periodicals and specifically regional papers on the other, are becoming rare. Moreover they are in many cases being led to make changes which may even place in question certain ideas which were until recently regarded as fundamental.

The economics of the newspaper business

The press, as we have already said, is also a business enterprise. In other words, the daily paper is a commodity that has to be manufactured and sold.

The process of manufacture combines a number of highly disparate elements. One of these elements is obviously the information itself. The journalist who has to deal with it depends to a greater and greater extent, at least as regards big national or international news, on an important intermediary: the news press agency. Agencies, such as Reuters, with a world-wide news coverage, can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

Once the information is available, the next stage is editing. The part played by editing will obviously vary according to the type of daily; it may range from selection of news and choice of headlines to the composition of a more or less thorough commentary. In any event, while editing plays an essential part, it is by no means the heaviest item in the daily paper's budget in the EEC countries: 20 % of the cost price seems at present to constitute a maximum and the average is often far below this figure.

Since, in the last resort, the cost of editing constitutes only a small part of the expenditure of a press enterprise, there is a real danger that the management may be tempted to regard the journalists as more or less dependent employees. Hence the interest aroused in journalistic circles by certain French moves aimed at founding journalists' associations with the objective of recognising and organising the moral rights of journalists in the publication to which they contribute, through participation in the management if not in the actual ownership of the enterprise.

The printing of a daily paper is distinctly more expensive than the editing. Printing often represents as much as 45 % of the cost price, half of this going on paper and ink. Of course, big savings are possible here, at least in theory. According to the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers, a few years ago it took only 60 hours to compose an 8-page paper in the United States, 70 hours in the Netherlands, but 104 in Belgium, 132 in Italy and 168 in France. Advances in electronics are opening up considerable prospects in the field of publishing, provided of course that these advances are accepted. This must come about but it is still the subject of numerous stoppages. There is also a fear of the social problems underlying the inevitable movement forward. Certain trades are threatened, the typographers' for example. But others may come to take their place. There is, at the very least, a problem of readaptation and retraining.

We may also ask ourselves what will be the economic repercussions following the introduction of new and even revolutionary techniques. Is there not a danger that the high cost of the investment required will accelerate the present process of concentration? And at the end of the line, is there not likely to be a move towards the single newspaper, regarded by some as a sure sign of the end of freedom? Conversely, however, many claim that technical advances will safeguard the small daily. In Italy, for example, a provincial paper with a circulation of 20,000 has succeeded in installing the most advanced press in Europe. After the initial stage of big investment required by new techniques perhaps these techniques themselves will help to restore to the press vast possibilities for lessening concentration and increasing competition? Over-optimistic? It is difficult to decide.

But manufacturing is not the whole story. The paper also has to be sold. And this is by no means the least difficult part. Once again, the situation may vary widely, depending on the type of distribution. For example, if sale by number predominates much depends on whether or not the enterprise publishing the paper is responsible for unsold copies.

The type of distribution favoured by many newspaper publishers is postal subscription. But in a number of countries, this method of distribution is tending to lose ground steadily. In France, where postal subscription is less developed than in the other countries of the Community, *Le Figaro* is reported to have some 25 % postal subscribers and *Le Monde* 20 %, but *Le Parisien Libéré* is reported to have a bare 5 % and *France-Soir* less than 1 %.

Another method which is much used in the Netherlands and in Germany for regional papers and is also widespread in Northern France and Alsace, is delivery to the readers house. Distribution by this method is quicker than through the post, but, apart from the fact that it is increasingly difficult to recruit people to deliver, it is more costly than postal subscription for the newspaper publisher: the discount allowed to delivery-stockists is in most cases higher than that given to subscribers.

Sale by a newsagent, the most usual method of sale, is obviously also the most risky. The front page must attract the customer: hence the importance of the main headline which must be arresting. In addition, the paper must be on sale at the greatest possible number of points, and this increases both the cost of transport and the danger of losses on sales which, barring possible advances in forecasting techniques, is affected by a variety of factors. Thus, it is possible to have averages of 25 % unsold copies, which are as useless as stale vegetables in a greengrocer's shop.

Distribution, therefore, costs a great deal, as much as 40 % of the cost price in some cases. It plays an important part in inflating the cost price, though it must be said that the cost price itself is only one factor among others to be considered in forming an estimate.... In fact, newspapers are often offered for sale at prices below the cost price, thanks to advertising to which part (and a highly variable part) of the newspaper is in fact sold even before the reader pays his share.

The press and advertising

Advertising occupies an essential place in the financial balance of press enterprises up to 80 % in some cases, and very often more than 50 %. Without advertising many dailies would not exist, or could only be put on the market at prices distinctly higher than those now charged. This situation is permanent source of worry to many dailies.

While advertising investment is on the increase in all the countries of the European Communities, the share of the advertising budget reserved for the press is tending to decrease, except in Italy where almost half the daily papers in circulation are in any case supported to some extent by large industrial or financial groups. Is the introduction of television advertising to blame? There are some observers who deny that there is any causal connection but many people think that television advertising is to blame. In any event, the share of advertising budgets reserved for the press is not necessarily reserved for the daily press. In France, approximately 40 % of advertising expenditure is reported to be allocated to the press, but only a third of this goes to the daily press. In Germany, a little over 50 % of advertising expenditure is reported to go to the press, approximately half of it to the daily press.

Advertisers tend to be more interested in periodicals.

The daily press in the European Communities

BELGIUM

	[1]
De Standaard (Catholic)	321,288
Het Laatste Nieuws (Liberal)	300,000
Le Soir (Independent)	278,444
La Libre Belgique (Catholic Right Wing)	170,000

General trends

In Belgium there are 42 daily newspapers, of which 26 are in French with an aggregate circulation of about 1,225,000, 15 are in Flemish with an aggregate circulation of about 1,200,000, and one paper in German, *Grenz-Echo*, with a circulation of about 15,000. Ten of the Belgian dailies (6 in French and 4 in Flemish) are published in Brussels. Brussels is also an important printing centre for regional papers—41 % of all Belgian newspapers are printed there. Most of the Belgian press has a political bias. The politically neutral newspapers constitute 20.4 % of the total circulation of the country but constitute the greater part of he French press.

There has been a movement towards concentration of the industry, in 1958 there were 47 papers and now there are 42. The 42 papers are published by 18 groups of which seven produce 80 % of the aggregate circulation.

FRANCE

	[1]
France-Soir (National, popular)	1,240,000
Le Parisien Libéré (National, popular)	830,000
Le Figaro (National centre right)	515,000
Le Monde (Independent, quality of international standing)	450,000
Ouest-France (Regional)	630,000

General trends

The total number of dailies in France is 103, of which 13 are published in Paris and 90 are published in the regions. The Parisian press has been on the decline for sometime while the regional press has been expanding gradually. In 1939 the Parisian Press constituted 55 % of the national circulation figures. Today it only constitutes 30 %.

There is also a trend towards concentration newspaper industry but it is not as pronounced as in Germany. In 1946 there were 100 more newspapers in France than there are today. Joint advertising agreements between newspapers are becoming increasingly common. In France there are few newspapers which are politically committed. In Paris there are three which are overtly political—*L'Humanité* (Communist party), *Combat* (left-orientated), *L'Aurore* (Right).

GERMANY

	[1]
Bild Zeitung (popular national)	4,100,000
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (regional)	530,000
Ruhrnachrichten/Westfalen-Post (regional)	340,000
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (quality regional with national circulation)	245,000
Süddeutsche Zeitung (quality regional with national circulation)	230,000
Die Welt (quality national)	226,000

General trends

The total number of daily newspapers in Germany is 467 but of these only 149 are really separate newspapers with independent editorial departments since many of the regional newspapers belong to a Redaktionsgemeinschaft i.e. a company of newspapers under one editorial department. The trend towards concentration in the industry is continuing in Germany. The Springer group with its five dailies and two Sunday newspapers has 38.3 % of total circulation of dailies and Sunday newspapers in Germany. Most German newspapers are politically independent or neutral—very few admit openly to political affiliation.

HOLLAND

	[1]
De Telegraaf (Quality, Centre Right, national)	430,000
Het Vrije Volk (Socialist)	272,000
Algemeen Dagblad (Quality national)	210,000
NRC-Handelsblad (The quality daily in Holland)	100,000
Het Parool (Socialist independent)	162,000
Trouw (Protestant)	102,000
Volkskrant (Catholic Trade Unions)	200,000
De Tijd (Quality Catholic independent	90,000

General trends

There are 52 dailies in Holland of which about 60 % have some political or religious bias. Despite the density of the Dutch population and the smallness of the country there are many regional papers. Only about 12 of the 52 mentioned above can be said to have a national circulation. There is a trend towards concentration in the Dutch newspaper industry too. As in Germany there is integration between regional newspapers at an editorial level—e.g. the various papers which belong to the "Grote Provinciale Dagbladpers" company which together have a circulation of about one million. There have also been many mergers between the publishing houses. Today there are 52 dailies but only 35 publishing houses as against 54 in 1960 and 58 in 1950.

ITALY

	[1]
Il Corriere della Sera (Quality National Liberal)	570,000
La Stampa (Regional, Turin, quality Centre Left)	475,000
Il Giorno (National, Socialist)	275,000
L'Unità (Communist party)	150,000

General trends

In Italy the total number of dailies is 83, but of these only 77 are completely separate editions. Of the 83, 47 are published in Northern Italy (including 10 in Milan), 20 in central Italy (including 16 in Rome), 6 in Southern Italy (including 4 in Naples) and 10 in the islands of Sicily and Sardinia. There is a great difference between circulation figures in the North and South of Italy. The North having 63.5 % of the Total National Circulation and the South having 36.5 %. The number of papers sold per 1 000 inhabitants is less than 30 in some areas and approaches 250 in others. There are practically no papers in Italy which have a national circulation. The three papers mentioned above are among the few to be circulated beyond the region in which they are printed. About 15 % of the Italian dailies are politically committed but this is tending to decline. Periodicals of international reputation such as *Domenico-del Corriere* (circulation 1 million), *Oggi* (circulation 900,000) compensate for the low circulation figures of the dailies. These periodicals contain considerable amounts of information on economics and politics, while the daily papers tend to contain more popular, sensational news.

LUXEMBOURG

	[1]
Das Luxemburger Wort (Catholic)	65,000
Das Escher Tagblatt (Socialist)	34,000
Das Letzeburger Journal (Liberal)	25,000

General trends

In Luxembourg there are no specifically national papers which are independent or neutral. Each of the four political parties has its own daily as shown above. Foreign newspapers are widely read in Luxembourg. The Luxembourg papers are written in German but there are often subtitles and articles in French and the majority of advertisements are in French.

[1] Daily circulation figures.

It is often more rewarding to advertise in periodicals owing to better presentation, the longer time spent in reading them, and their more intensive circulation, not to mention the greater ease with which an advertising campaign can be organised in a comparatively small range of magazines and the increased profitability of advertising aimed at more clearly defined types of reader. Mention must also be made of the fact that there is a continual increase in the number of regional and local papers—largely, if not wholely, given to advertising—delivered free, to the detriment of the daily press. The dailies are therefore obliged to seek out advertisers and this is not without its effect on the presentation and content of the newspapers.

Owing to advertising, the number of pages in newspapers has increased appreciably: thus, in France, the average number of pages in 1946 was only four, now it is over twenty. In France, a newspaper with an income from advertising representing approximately 15 % of its budget, will print on average 8 pages while a newspaper whose income from advertising is at least five times as high, will print on average 24 pages.

The format, quality of paper and use of colour may be governed by the demands of advertising to which a newspaper must concede unless it wishes to lose certain advertisers and with them certain readers, too, who are influenced more by the form than the content. The effect of advertising on the content of the paper causes anxiety to some observers. They are worried about pressure—even tacit pressure—being exerted by advertisers on the expression of certain opinions. The term "pressure" may be inadequate. If the term 'collusion', natural and spontaneous though it may be between men whose interests coincide, is more in keeping with the facts, this is now way removes the causes for disquiet. On the other hand, it often becomes very difficult to draw the line between the product of independent editing and of advertising; between disinterested practical advice and disguised incitement to acquire this or that commodity; especially since advertisers tend to present advertising as information. The dependence of the daily press on advertising has a further important effect: it constitutes one of the most decisive factors in the movement towards concentration.

The daily press is caught in a kind of vice. On the one side, the costs of printing and distribution are high. The cost of printing can in principle be reduced but only by very little. On the other hand, readers are not disposed —at least so it is thought—to pay the real price of a newspaper which counts only on sales to readers for its income. They do not see the value of a financially independent newspaper. As for governments, they are not disposed to permit price increases, especially if, as in Belgium, these increases are reflected in a rise in the consumer price index, to which salaries and wages and social services are automatically linked.

Faced with a press whose very existence depends on it, advertising is in danger of upsetting the free play of competition. In fact it favours the papers that suit it—those which have a circulation and content that meet its needs—, and it hastens the demise of those in which it decides not to take an interest.

Of course, in the early stages, advertising often only leads to joint advertising agreements between dailies, the aim being to constitute a total readership sufficiently high to attract advertisers. These joint advertising agreements may later lead to other agreements, extending the joint activity either to certain departments or to the whole of the editorial, technical and commercial departments. But these are often no more than temporary palliatives.

Fast-increasing concentration

In Germany, the number of press units (daily papers with complete editorial departments) fell from 225 in 1954 to 149 in 1969. In France, some thirty regional dailies disappeared during the same period. The Italian press seems to be less affected, though it shows the symptoms of imminent change. In all the countries of the European Community, papers are simply disappearing.

Sometimes, papers in difficulties will be bought for their name by others in a stronger position. But this does not often happen. The powerful daily which buys the name of a weaker daily hopes, perhaps with the help of a few adjustments, to take over its readership. But the outcome is never certain. Readers are astonishingly passive about the content of the paper to which they are accustomed —to such an extent that one might suppose the purchase of a daily paper to be a matter of habit rather than a purposeful act corresponding to a real felt need—but they are strangely faithful to presentation and name and any change in either will often entail a loss of readership.

Concentration is leading, in France for example, to an effective monopoly by the big regional papers, each in its area of distribution, the boundaries of which are themselves settled by agreement between the newspapers in the various regions.

In Germany where one can speak more of mergers be tween technically under-developed and financially weak publishing houses and large firms with considerable capital at their disposal, concentration takes place in the formation of actual chains of newspapers which have a common owner, a common national editorial department, common administrative and financial departments and technical facilities, but continue to appear under different names with their own regional or local pages. The best-known chain is that of Mr. Axel Springer, who controls almost 40 % of the total circulation of daily and Sunday newspapers.

Whatever the process of concentration, whatever its rythm of development and whatever the concrete form it finally takes, it appears that, encouraged as it is by the apathy of readers, the present trends are well established and will not change. Moreover, the phenomenon is not confined to the Common Market countries.

Where does Europe come in?

But where is Europe in all this? The European press is as yet nothing but the sum of strictly separated national and regional presses.

Linguistic and political factors explain this fragmentation. In this respect, Europe is still in the making and the various national characteristics remain very marked, if not sometimes deliberately exaggerated. Furthermore, since the daily press often—as we have emphasized—shows a regional bias, it is highly improbable that a daily paper distributed in Marseilles could interest a citizen of Hamburg and vice versa.

In the matter of editorial co-operation, three interesting experiments seem worthy of attention in the field of daily newspapers:

— The formation of a regional Committee to provide contact between the directors of certain German, Belgian and Dutch dailies covering adjoining regions.

— The formation of *Top European Advertising Media* (TEAM), an international group of newspapers which at present includes 18 dailies, 11 of which are published within the Community is also noteworthy. This group is mainly concerned with the conduct of a big public relations campaign.

— Also, '*Top 5*' combines within the geographical boundaries of the Common Market, five daily or weekly newspapers specialising in economic information. These five newspapers exchange articles and have a common advertising department which offers a total fixed price for simultaneous publication of a single advertisement.

On the whole, however, it would seem that as far as the daily press is concerned, co-operation at a European level is still in its infancy. As regards concentration—which must not be confused with free co-operation—while the Commission of the European Communities is of the opinion that 'the maintenance of a varied daily press is one

of the most important obligations incumbent on a modern democracy', it is also a fact that 'the institutions of the Community are unable to keep a watch on the concentration of political power in the field of daily papers or to forbid it'.[1]

II. The daily press in Britain

Together with Sweden, Britain has one of the highest readerships of daily newspapers in the world, with 490 copies produced per 1,000 head of the population. In addition to their enormous appetite for daily newspapers, the British are also remarkable for their consumption of Sunday newspapers, one of which, *The News of the World,* has after the three main daily Japanese newspapers, the largest circulation figure in the world (6,000,000).

National papers

In Britain there are ten national morning newspapers which are on sale throughout the country. Four have provincial editions: the *Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, Daily Mirror* and *Daily Express* have Manchester editions. The *Daily Mirror* also has a Belfast edition and the *Daily Express* a Scottish edition. They are independent of political parties, with the exception of the Communist *Morning Star* which has a very insignificant circulation. They can be distinguished as papers inclined towards the right or towards the left although many take neutral positions. They fall into two groups: "quality" and "popular."

Quality:

Guardian: 304,000 *Financial Times*: 166,000 *Times*: 402,000 *Daily Telegraph*: 1,416,000 [2].

Quality newspapers have a high proportion of readers from the upper income brackets and from among the decision-makers in Government, the professions and business. They have substantially smaller circulation than popular papers but attract advertising revenue because of the wealth and influence of their readers. Quality papers draw from two-thirds to three-quarters of their revenue from advertising.

Popular:

Daily Mirror: 4,500,000 *Sun*: 1,500,000 *Daily Sketch*: 806,000 *Daily Mail*: 2,000,000 *Daily Express*: 3,500,000 [2].

Popular newspapers have large circulations and attract advertising by the numbers and total spending-power of their readers as consumers. On average popular papers draw only two-fifths of their revenue from advertising. They depend on large circulation to cover their costs.

Regional and provincial papers

There are 101 provincial and local daily newspapers in Britain: 82 in England, 61 of which are evening newspapers; 4 in Wales, 2 of which are evening newspapers; 12 in Scotland, 7 of which are evening newspapers; and 3 in Northern Ireland. Some are of national standing, *The Scotsman,* Scotland's quality newspaper (circulation: 76,000); *The Yorkshire Post* (circulation: 121,000); and *The Birmingham Post* (circulation: 70,000). Several have circulation figures which equal some national dailies: *Birmingham Evening Mail*: 400,000; *Manchester Evening News and Chronicle*: 450,000; *Daily Record* (Glasgow): 530,000.

There are 2 London evening papers which are not national in their distribution: *The Evening News* (circulation: 1,000,000) and *The Evening Standard* (circulation: 500,000). As in the EEC countries there has been a decline in the number of national daily newspapers in recent years and a relative increase in the circulation and advertising revenue of the provincial evening newspapers.

[1] *Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes*, 4 May 1968, reply to a written question No. 309/67 from M. Westerterp.

[2] 1970 figures (estimated in some cases) including the provincial editions.

The newspaper crisis [1]

The continuing and worsening crisis of the British press became increasingly apparent in the late 1960s. The acquisition of *The Times* by Thomson newspapers symbolized the shaky finances of Fleet street. People were astonished that the future of such important papers as *The Times* and *The Guardian* should be in doubt.

Formerly newspapers had failed because they had began to lose readers to competitors and so entered the downward trend of falling circulation leading to less advertising revenue and so to smaller and less interesting newspapers. But *The Times* and *The Guardian* were not failing in this sense as both were increasing their circulation figures. The analysis of the problems of the British Press written in the PEP Report in 1938 was still valid in 1966 and is still valid today.

"A relatively large number of independent newspapers of varied views is gradually being replaced by a remarkably small number of mass circulation national journals dominating the national newspaper field. At the same time the number of separate newspaper proprietors of importance has rapidly diminished owing to the growth of chains of newspapers and periodicals. The cost of launching a newspaper has recently risen to such an extent as to be virtually prohibitive so that the surviving newspapers, although competing fiercely among themselves, are largely sheltered from the competition of new entrants. Then the rise of national advertising encourages enlargement of the size of successful popular papers and in particular the expansion of features and the entertainment side in relation to news and comment."

By 1966 concentration had resulted in three groups owning two-thirds of the morning paper circulation: *Mirror* and *Sun* (left of centre) 26 %; *Mail* and *Sketch* (right of centre) 21 %; *Express* (right wing) 18 %. By 1966 of the total morning paper sales of 15,600,000 newspapers, just over 2,000,000 went to the quality papers —*The Daily Telegraph* (right wing), *The Times* (right of centre, *The Guardian* (left of centre), and *The Financial Times* (specialist finance and business). In 1969 the Mirror Group sold the *Sun* to Mr. Rupert Murdoch, the Australian newspaper proprietor and a newcomer to the British scene. Since then, the *Sun* has increased its circulation, partly at the expense of the *Mirror.*

Advertising revenue decreased in the mid-1960's because of the general economic crisis and the squeeze. The Prices and Incomes Board report on the Costs and Revenue of National Daily Newspapers Report No. 43 Cmnd. 3435 in 1967, said that the economic problems of the industry were due to the nature of competition within the industry which has caused some newspapers to be highly profitable while others make heavy losses; the industry's failure to meet competition from commercial television; and thirdly excessive costs particularly in the field of manpower.

The 1970 Report of the Prices and Incomes Board said that although some progress has been made in recent years there is still scope for more realistic manning levels, in improving productivity and in technical innovation—this will involve the co-operation of the unions and an improvement in inter-union co-operation. Thus it can be seen that the newspaper industry in Britain is still in a critical condition and perhaps in even more difficulties than the newspaper industry on the continent.

[1] The Economist Intelligence Unit, *The National Newspaper Industry: A Survey,* 1966.
THOMAS, Harford, *Newspaper Crisis: A Study of developments in the national press of Britain 1966-67.* Published: The International Press Institute, Zürich, 1967.

The urban phenomenon in Europe (I)

Webster's Third New International Dictionary tells us that the city is 'a populous place; a place larger than a village... a large, prominent or important centre of population...' Just how large a place has to be in order to be classified as 'urban', to be a town or even a city (current English usage provides no firm dividing line between the two) is in the first place a matter of official definition. 'Urban' can mean a cluster of as few as 200 people in Sweden, and even in France the lower limit is only 2,000. This study on a west European scale (the original 'Six' of the European Community plus the British Isles, Austria and Switzerland) will take as its lower limit the figure of 100,000, but special attention will be given to the metropolitan agglomerations of from one to twelve million people that dominate the human geography of Europe today.

Defining the European city

Our first difficulty is to define what is meant by a city even in the superficially simple sense of an assemblage of buildings within which a certain number of people live and work.

Delimitation

Administrative boundaries are here of little use, since cities in their growth tend to outrun them. The population of the city of Paris, for example, stands in the reference books at a mere 2.6 millions, but the 'real' agglomeration of people who consider themselves in some measure Parisians has a steadily increasing population of over 8 millions.

To make matters worse there is no consistency in the manner in which the various European countries define their cities for administrative reasons. In France the city boundaries are extraordinarily 'tight', having been remarkably static throughout all the explosive city growth of the last 150 years, so that the city populations given in works of reference are likely to be highly misleading. German cities experienced less difficulty in extending their administrative limits as they grew, so that their population figures are less misleading. The proportion of population within the politically-defined city may be as high as 60 per cent (Munich) or even 80 per cent (Hamburg). Difficulties of definition can be even greater in regions such as the Ruhr, northern France or west Yorkshire, where a number of cities grow together to form a conurbation, and it may be quite impossible to decide where one city ends and another begins.

In such circumstances, any comparative study must seek a uniform delimitation of the city, which ideally must be as near to the 'real' or 'agglomeration' population as possible. The French official statisticians, for example, use maps and air photographs to define the actual 'bricks and mortar' extent of urban agglomerations, producing (1968) 1,383 'urban units' of 2,000 people or more. The Germans define (1961) 68 *Stadregionen* of 80,000 population or more, which however include a much wider extent of territory around the central city than the French agglomerations. The British confine themselves to seven major conurbations, loosely defined by aggregating local-government areas. Useful though all these attempts are for studies restricted to a single country, they are not easily used for international comparison. Fortunately the Institute of International Studies at the University of Berkeley in California has calcul-

ated the population of cities of 100,000 population and over on as nearly a uniform basis as possible. The method of defining city populations was in most instances that of the US Census, where the population of the central city is grouped with the populations of surrounding administrative units to produce a metropolitan area population approximating to the 'real' population of the agglomeration. Figures produced in this way provide a most useful basis of comparison [1].

A place to work and live in

But a city is more than a group of a certain size of people occupying a collection of buildings. It is also 'a relatively permanent and highly **organized centre** having a population with varied skills, lacking self-sufficiency in the production of food and usually depending primarily on manufacture and commerce to satisfy the wants of its inhabitants...' (Webster). Some of these economic activities that enable a city to exist will be world-wide in character, as we are reminded most of all by the great port cities such as London, Rotterdam or Antwerp, receiving food and raw materials from the end of the earth, to be paid for in manufactured goods and commercial services. Other activities are more local: the city as a 'central place' provides an 'urban field' of surrounding territory with shopping facilities, personal services of all kinds, commercial organization, public administration, newspapers and other forms of information. Under modern conditions of transport the city's own workers may also live far out in the surrounding countryside, joining in daily commuting flows from countryside and satellite town to and from the central city. In these various ways we cannot think of the 'city' as confined to the agglomeration, however broadly defined. Cities become organizing centres for vast tracts of surrounding countryside, their radiating influence increasingly dissolving the formerly sharp distinctions between urban and rural society.

Last of all, cities are places of maximum **human interaction**, great ganglia of communication. Here the structures of an older Europe are dissolved in which each man knew his place, performing the role appropriate to his position in economy and society. In the interplay of human minds ideas are created, opinions formed, decisions taken. For many people the city is where life is lived at its fullest, where the stresses and challenges of the environment may be so great as to be at times intolerable, but where the creative response is at its highest.

City size

Rather surprisingly, Europe does not stand in particular prominence in the ranking of the world's cities. The figures prepared by the Institute of International Studies admittedly put London in third place and Paris in sixth, but one must drop to 13th for the third west European city and as low as 36th for the fourth. Only 17 of the first 100 world cities are in western Europe.

Table 1

World rank by population of western European cities

City	1970 projections 000s	West European rank	World rank
London	11,544	1	3
Paris	8,714	2	6
Ruhr	6,789	3	13
Birmingham	2,981	4	36
Rome	2,920	5	37
Manchester	2,541	6	47
Hamburg	2,407	7	54
West Berlin	2,240	8	59
Glasgow	2,008	9	67
Leeds-Bradford	1,945	10	72
Stuttgart	1,935	11	73
Vienna	1,890	12	78
Liverpool	1,823	13	81
Cologne	1,788	14	83
Milan	1,750	15	86
Mannheim-Ludwigshafen-Heidelberg	1,578	16	95
Munich	1,502	17	100

Source: K. Davis, *World Urbanization 1950-1970*, vol. 1. See footnote p. 224.

Much of this apparently low status of city development in western Europe is due to the relatively recent rise of the great cities of Asia and Latin America. These however are found in societies that, except for Japan, are still predominantly rural, cities are in some real degree isolated phenomena. In western Europe by contrast the population living in 'urban places' of one kind or another reaches 75 per cent, even 80 per cent or more in the United Kingdom and the German Federal Republic. Western Europe is characterised by an extraordinary density of urban people, and the towns and cities in which they dwell.

City distribution

Even so, the distribution of towns and cities is far from even. A map of population agglomerations of 100,000 and above (see insert) shows a marked concentration into a European 'axial belt' running from Lancashire southwards through Greater London and the Rhinelands to the cities of northern Italy. As the population of western Europe is predominently urban, it is a matter of no surprise that this axial belt of European city development is also the axial belt of European population (see the map of population density in 'The population of the European Community', *European Studies* 1, 1968). A

[1] K. Davis, *World Urbanization 1950-1970*, vol. 1. Berkeley, California (Institute of International Studies, University of California), 1969.

WEST-EUROPEAN CITIES OF 100 000 AND ABOVE



Source : K. DAVIS, *World Urbanisation*, 1969.

POPULATION CHANGES IN WESTERN EUROPE
c. 1950 — c. 1960



second belt of urban development and population density runs eastwards from the Rhine-Ruhr crossroads of Europe through the German Democratic Republic toward Polish Silesia, but is of much lesser significance than in the undivided Germany of prewar years. Away from the axial belts population density drops off sharply except where the few large cities stand as 'islands' of dense population. Typically these are either capital cities (Berlin, Vienna, Madrid, Rome) or great ports (Marseilles, Barcelona, Hamburg). These areas of high population density, whether in the main axial belt or around great cities elsewhere, are also with minor exceptions the areas which since 1945 have experienced the highest population growth. Europeans are on the move towards the cities, or more particularly towards their expanding fringes.

City development

The move from the land

Primarily the Europeans are leaving agriculture as an occupation (see 'Manpower in the Common Market', *European Studies* 2, 1968), especially in countries such as France and Italy that still have a relatively large proportion of their population in the agricultural sector of the economy. Yet occupational mobility does not always imply geographical mobility. Some areas, where dense rural populations are associated with numerous towns and cities, have a long tradition of 'worker-peasants' who combine small-scale farming with work in industry. In such circumstances it is natural to stay on in the family house even when farming is given up. As the proportion of the population employed outside agriculture grows so the village turns into a working-class commuter settlement, characteristic of areas such as Hessen, southwest Germany and parts of the Low Countries, spreading urban influence yet deeper into the countryside. Most of those who leave agriculture however, especially outside the axial belt, are obliged sooner or later to move to the cities, contributing to the 35 million people added to the urban population of western Europe in the last 20 years.

Industry and cities

The great urban expansion of the nineteenth century drew men from the land for hard physical labour in construction, especially of the railways, in mines and in factories. Today machinery has eased the strain on human muscle, the remaining jobs of this type are often left for immigrant workers. Investigations in France have shown that indigenous rural-urban migrants are today more likely to seek the lower-paid jobs in the tertiary sector, as distributive workers, postmen, caretakers and the like. Owing to the development of automation in the more advanced branches of industry, and the decline of some of the older branches, manufacturing industry as a whole is not increasing its demands for labour at anything like the rate that people are leaving agriculture.

The marked differences in the growth rates of various types of industry also influence the growth of cities. Since 1958 coal mining has been in constant decline, while a number of industries associated with coal, such as coal-based chemicals and some of the steel industry and branches of heavy engineering are also static or declining. In the years before 1914 many towns grew rapidly on the basis of these industries, especially in the Ruhr complex, Lorraine, northern France, southern Belgium, the Vosges textile district and the present British development areas. Today they have rather static or declining populations. Often their precocious industrialization has left them an heritage of industrial squalor which inhibits the establishment of new industries or even drives their more enterprising inhabitants away, like the former Ruhr miners who have gone to work in the more pleasant surrounding of southwest Germany.

In the days when these cities grew, transport was less well developed than at present, and there was a strong tendency for industry to be drawn towards the sources of coal and minerals, creating urban complexes like the Ruhr and Lorraine. Today quite new sources of energy are tapped, electricity, oil and gas, but it is no longer necessary for industry and workers to move to the places where they are found. By cable or pipeline these forms of energy can be delivered wherever they are required, especially to existing cities. At the same time industry itself has changed its nature; its prime locational attraction tends to be towards labour and other industrial plants. By labour we mean either highly skilled managers and technicians, or the largest possible pool of men and women who are accustomed to routine production-line operations. Both are likely to be found in the largest numbers in and around existing great cities. The second attraction, to other manufacturing plants, exists because the chain of production is today so long and complex that many plants produce only components that are assembled by other plants into a final product. In such circumstances proximity is clearly an advantage, and plants in such chains of production tend to group in and around urban agglomerations, very typically the old regional and national capitals of western Europe. In its way vehicle and component manufacturers cluster in and around Birmingham, Stuttgart, Paris and Turin. What is more, these newer, complex industries like electronics or vehicle assembly also have high growth rates, and these in turn are communicated to the urban complexes where the industries cluster. New arrivals leapfrog over one another to locations in suburbs and satellite towns, drawing in ever fresh waves of labour to be in turn an attaction to yet more industry, so that the exploding agglomeration expands even further.

The tertiary sector

In the negative sense the tertiary sector of the economy embraces all those not employed in agriculture, mining and manufacturing, yet we must not write off all so employed as 'unproductive'. Tertiary activities such as transport, designing, information processing, much of banking and some administration, serve industry directly, reinforcing the locational pull of the city. Head offices of industrial firms, great banks and insurance companies cluster together in distinct financial quarters, partly for ease of intercommunication, partly for reasons of prestige. Even personal services reinforce the trend; while grocers' shops, hairdressers, primary schools or general medical practitioners are distributed roughly in proportion to population, higher services such as department stores, universities or teaching hospitals may serve a population measured in millions; the centre of a great city, of a regional or national capital, is the obvious location.

The tertiary sector of the economy, then, is heavily concentrated in cities, especially the great cities: Paris, for example, with less than a fifth of French population has well over a quarter of the country's employment in the tertiary sector. Yet this is also the sector of the economy where growth is most rapid of all, a powerful motor of urban expansion. Far more than manufacturing industry, tertiary activity is concentrated in the very heart of the city: nearly a million people, for example, work in the offices of central Paris. Inevitably the employees of this expanding sector must seek dwellings ever further out in the surrounding countryside, condemning themselves to long daily journeys to and from work, and contributing to the urban explosion that is so characteristic of our century.

Controlling cities

Particularly in Britain and France, governments have attempted to combat the concentration of too much economic and urban growth into great city-regions elsewhere. The Italian government has a somewhat similar policy in an attempt to promote a balanced growth between north and south. In France, as in Britain, the government depends on a dual series of measures, discouraging the growth of employment in the capital, and encouraging the creation of employment elsewhere. New industrial or office floorspace in the Paris region can be created only by special permission, involving the payment of special levies when a permit is granted. Simultaneously employment is attracted away from Paris by a system of tax advantages, grants and loans accorded to developers. The French government has also attempted to combat the quite extraordinary dominance of Paris in the urban structure of the country by favouring the development of a number of *métropoles d'équilibre* as urban counter-magnets to Paris, cities like Lille, Lyons or Toulouse. A number of government research and educational establishments have also been transferred out of Paris.

There is some evidence that the policy has been successful. The amount of industrial floorspace allocated for new development in the Paris region has tended to be reduced, and in the period 1962-1968 industrial employment fell by 1.1 per cent at a time when in the country as a whole it went up by 6.5 per cent. As the number of new office buildings (including government offices) in Paris might suggest, results have been less impressive in the tertiary sector, which nevertheless expanded slightly less rapidly than in the country as a whole. In the same period, population immigration into the Paris region showed a marked check, contrasting with its very rapid expansion in the period 1954-1962. Outside the Paris region major growth-poles such as Lyons, Grenoble, Marseilles and Toulouse showed high rates of growth, but one of the most interesting features was the vitality of many cities of 100,000-250,000 population, particularly in the outer Paris basin and in southern France. This seems to indicate a reversal of the long process by which provincial France outside Paris became a kind of desert.

Yet too much should not be attributed to government policy, even in so centralized a country as France. Studies in Germany have shown how in the 1950s new industrial development was heavily concentrated in the agglomerations, but than since that time the agglomeration fringes and the medium-term towns have been favoured, even without government direction. These trends are reflected in population change. In the period 1950-1956 the central parts of the agglomerations were recovering their wartime population losses at the expense of the surrounding rural fringe. Since 1961 growth in the agglomeration cores has slackened, even reversed. Migrant streams both from the urban cores and from the rural areas have converged on the rural fringes of the cities, which have experienced rapid growth, thus tending to extend the influence of urbanism further out into the countryside. The medium-sized agglomerations of 80,000 population and above have also grown rapidly, but really small towns much less, since they are not attractive to industry unless close to the facilities of larger agglomerations, in which case their growth is often rapid. Under the rather decentralized decision-making system of western Germany, as in the more closely planned conditions of France and for that matter the UK, a period of massive development of the great cities in the first 15 years after the war appears to have been followed by some measure of diffusion of industry and population to their fringes, and to the medium-sized agglomerations beyond.

(*to be continued*)

Regional policy in the European Community

The article "Regional problems in Britain and the EEC" (European Studies teachers' Series No. 9) described the three types of problem-region found in the seven countries; they were frontier regions, declining industrial regions and backward agricultural regions. These represent one half of the "problem", for the social and economic attractions of the crowded more prosperous urban areas are the root cause. Policies to relieve the over-crowding of urban areas are linked to those for the revitalization of declining areas, but we shall limit ourselves here to a review of some of the methods and institutions for the promotion of regional growth in the latter type. National governments have established a number of different institutions to implement regional policies; the variety of institutions presents problems of coordination for the Commission of the EEC.

Since 1945 western European governments have paid increasing attention to regional problems within their frontiers. Post-war industrial expansion and the participation of government in industrial, commercial and social sectors of their national life are two of the dominant trends within which regional policies have developed.

To create wealth and allocate it justly is the fundamental national economic problem. To achieve maximum success in solving the problem governments have devised national plans; constituents of national plans are attempts to establish a balance between more developed and less developed regions. Clearly, underprivileged communities cannot be tolerated for humanitarian and political reasons, and yet underused manpower, capital and natural resources are viewed critically as a drain on social welfare and other services.

The planning process

There are three major stages in the process of regional planning.

Firstly, the regional problems must be carefully defined; a thorough analysis of problem regions must be undertaken.

Secondly, a policy must be determined which will provide solutions for the problems.

Thirdly, institutions must be established, with adequate resources, such as finance and personnel, to effect the solutions stated in the previous stage.

A statement of regional problems includes accurate data on productivity, employment, population trends, transport, housing and social services provision. Proposed solutions to the defined problems include financial incentives to entrepreneurs, local, national and foreign (including capital grants, cheap loans, tax relief and the cost of vocational training for workers), and the improvement of a region's infrastructure, e.g. provision of electricity, water, housing, educational and other social facilities.

In Britain and the Six there are significant differences in the ways in which policies have been implemented to solve problems which have similar characteristics in the seven countries. To indicate

these differences and the reasons for them we shall examine France and Italy. In later issues of *European Studies* it is planned to publish case studies of regions within these countries, and others, and these will supplement the comments made here.

FRANCE

The centralist tradition

For a historian, regional planning in France is a tale of ironies, where the regional reform proposed under the referendum of April 1969 attempted to reproduce an administrative structure similar to the one Louis XVI was making under the Ancien Regime: and while the "region" throughout the nineteenth centuries belonged to the dogmas of the Right, it is now part of the platform of the Left and the Radicals. At the time of the Revolution, France was the largest country in W. Europe with a population three times the size of the second largest country which was Great Britain. To administer the country Louis XVI had wished to suppress the existing feudal patchwork of local parliaments and privileges by instituting regional administration throughout the country, supervised by a representative of the king and with a representative of the social groups at this level. The fact that counter-revolutionary movements often had a regional flavour, led to the institution with the Revolution of the system of 89 *départements*, which covered a smaller area than the region and where the level of local democracy, the *commune* (38,000 in number) was submitted to a strict surveillance and dependence on Paris. The unification which the Revolution brought, abolished internal barriers to trade and created a large market. These changes contributed to the breakdown of the peasant society and the concentration of industry and urbanisation in Paris and a few regional centres which thrived on a labour force leaving the countryside. Hence, over the last century, only 20 of the 90 *départements* experienced a rise in population and certain of them now have less than one-half of the population they supported in 1850.

The reforms

The efforts of successive governments since 1945 have attempted to reverse this distribution of population and industry, which forms *Paris et le désert français*.

Like the "development areas" in Britain, the primary object of French policy towards backward regions has been to delineate their extent, and to channel resources into the areas by limiting developments elsewhere. Hence, in 1955 controls on industrial development (later extended to offices) in Paris were introduced, accompanied by the setting up of "Zones de Conversion" in both declining industrial and in backward agricultural areas. Funds were provided by the Treasury to finance public investment in these areas, in the form of financial incentives to industry or the improvement of infrastructure. Regional development corporations were set up to attract additional capital, often combining public and private capital for large infrastructure schemes such as the canal and irrigation scheme for the lower Rhone and Languedoc. In 1966 it was announced that attempts to remedy the maldistribution of population would be made through a policy favouring the expansion of eight regional metropolitan centres.

Such a series of measures for the revitalisation of backward regions takes its place in the general government policies for economic growth and the improvement of conditions of life for the population. In France, the instruments described above cannot be separated from the national Plan for the whole economy, which has dictated the evolution of the policy for backward areas.

Organisation of regional institutions

As a development of the National Economic Plan, provision was made in 1955 for regional plans to be drawn up by groups interested in the expansion of their region (*Comités d'expansion*). This initial attempt at the articulation of local interests quickly changed in orientation, however, and a uniformity was imposed, which (some would argue) served the needs of the national administration in Paris rather than the needs of local democracy. In 1956 France was divided into 21 planning regions which grouped together the *départements* (i.e. the State administration) and which had little economic rationality. Shortly after, regional administrative conferences were established to coordinate the work of the provincial services of the national ministries and in 1964, the post of regional prefect (the senior government official in the region), was created. A new body, the Commission de développement économique régional (CODER), representing the major social and economic interests, was given a consultative role, taking the place of the earlier "Comité d'Expansion".

The present situation, then, is transitional. There can be little doubt that the regionalisation of the budget of the Plan, on the basis of the regional plans, has defined the problem which backward regions pose for the allocation of public money. However, many questions remain of a technical and constitutional nature. On the one hand there are many doubts about the relevance of the regions at presently drawn to the evolution and character of an urban society, and on the other any further regionalisation will raise the question of elected regional governments. Under de Gaulle presidency, the government put forward plans for regional reforms which would have involved the direct elections of regional parliaments. These proposals were rejected in the referendum of April 1969 but this result should be regarded more as a vote of non-confidence in General de Gaulle (which subsequently resigned) than as a rejection of the regional reforms. The

present French government put forward at the end of 1970 amended proposals which are still the subject of heated controversy.

ITALY

Since unification in 1870 national governments have tried to forge a national identity for Italy, while protecting and perpetuating regional differences. For a number of reasons comparative advantage has enriched the industrial cities of the north and impoverished the agricultural settlements of the south.

The institutions: the 1948 Constitution

The Constitution stated that Italy "was divided into regions, provinces and communes". There were nineteen regions. Five of these, Sardinia, Sicily, Alto-Adige, Val d'Aosta and Friuli-Venezia- Jiulia, comprised regions which had a historic unity of a linguistic or social nature and these were described as regions of "special statute". While the Constitution authorised all regions to legislate on such matters as police, health and hospitals, vocational training, town planning, tourism, agriculture, fishing and forestry, regional bus services, roads and other public works of regional scope, the special statute regions were given greater powers in accordance with their special autonomy.

The Constitution provided for regional governments, comprising a legislature (regional council) elected by universal suffrage, with an executive body called a Junta, headed by a President, these latter being elected from the regional council. In order to fulfil their role the regions would be given control of certain taxes and would receive quotas from national taxes. To ensure that the regions neither exceed their competences nor act contrary to the Constitution there is provision for a resident commissioner, in each region, representing the national government. Finally, the Constitution provided for the election of the regional council within one year and the adjustment of the laws of the republic to the needs of local autonomy after three years. In fact, until 1970, only the regional councils of special statute had been elected.

Development of the South

With the exceptions of Sicily and Sardinia these "constitutional regions" have played little part in formulating policies for backward "economic regions". The major project for assisting the development of the Mezzogiorno (the Italian South and the Islands) has been planned by the *Cassa per il Mezzogiorno* and the Committee of Ministers for the South. Although special government funds had been directed to the South since 1947 the first radical step was taken in 1950 with the foundation of the Cassa.

Cassa per il Mezzogiorno

Given an initial budget of 1 000 billion lira for a ten-year period, the Cassa was established, after much political controversy, as a public development agency (cf. the Scottish Highlands and Islands Development Board) working alongside the existing central and local authorities. In by-passing the existing agencies traditionally competent in this field the Cassa was intended to act more speedily with more flexible procedures.

It was argued that the Mezzogiorno corresponded to an economic rather than to an administrative reality, and the planned economic development required a long-term treatment, for which short-term constraints made existing administrative agencies unsuitable. Further, it was argued that a plan of extraordinary public works required a single management for its execution.

From the outset the role of the Cassa was limited to the provision of public works, principally to improvements in agriculture and the infrastructure.

Committee of Ministers

An extra innovation in the policy for the South came in 1957 with the setting up of a Committee of Ministers for the South. This Committee had the responsibility of coordinating the activities of all ministries active in the Mezzogiorno. Until this time public policy focused on the provision of an infrastructure as a pre-requisite for industrialization. Now policy became more concerned with industrialization itself. Italian public corporations were required to place 60 per cent of all new investments in the South. Additional financial incentives to industry were made and these sought to concentrate new industry in particular growth areas. The last major change came in 1965 when a five-year plan for coordination of all public investment in the South was instituted.

Regional policies were part of the Italian five-year National Economic Development Programme published in 1962. It was intended that administrative regions should play an active part in its formulation. Thus the National Commission for Economic Planning, the body charged with formulating the plan, included in its consultations the Presidents of the special statute regions. For each of the other regions a regional economic planning committee was created, but these new organizations will be temporary given the fact that the regions of ordinary statute have now elected their regional councils.

EUROPE AND REGIONAL POLICY

Regionalisation is then very much a live issue in France and Italy today, and the same is true in most of the other European Community countries,

which we hope to discuss later in this Series. In Britain too, regionalisation is a controversial issue. The Maud Commission on Local Government in England and Wales reported in 1970 in favour of a new local government structure based on much larger areas than at present, though it seems unlikely that the present government will accept these recommendations. And of course the report of the Commission on the Constitution is still awaited, and this also may well propose changes of a regional nature. Indeed in nearly all the countries concerned, there seems to be a trend in favour of greater decentralisation and regional involvement, parallel with a growing acceptance over recent years that regional development in the economic sense must be given a higher priority in national policy making.

European Communities' role

Decisions concerning the structure of regional and local government belong of course to the national authorities, and the European Community has no say in them. It does however have a very great interest in the eonomic development of the regions. The Community Treaties do not specifically provide for the adoption of common policies nor give the Community institutions specific powers in this field. Nevertheless, they stress frequently the need to help the poorer regions, and for this purpose permit many exceptions to the Community's rules. For example the EEC Treaty lists among its principal aims "to ensure the harmonious development (of the member countries' economies) by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and by mitigating the backwardness of the less favoured". Thus it is that the Community's rules on agriculture, fair competition, state aids to industry and so on all allow exceptions in the interest of the development areas, and the Community has often not merely permitted but positively encouraged regional grants and incentives.

Regional development is however essentially in the hands of the national governments, and the Community can at the moment do little more than exhort, attempt to coordinate, and provide certain financial incentives. It has a number of financial agencies which can help here.

The European Social Fund, set up by the EEC Treaty to provide money to retrain redundant workers for new jobs is not specifically an instrument of regional aid, but inevitably most of the £15 million or so it is now spending annually goes to the Community's problem regions. In 1970 it was agreed to expand the Fund considerably and the Commission hopes it will in future be able to spend up to £100 million each year.

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), has its own similar fund which spends some £10 million a year on helping coal and steel workers, and has played a particularly important part in smoothing over the run-down of parts of the coal-mining industry, in decline in the Community as in Britain. The ECSC has also been able to use its substantial funds to encourage other industries into coal-mining areas.

The European Investment Bank, set up under the EEC Treaty, provides funds for development operations and the majority of its loans have been for projects in the less-favoured regions. And the Guidance Section of the EAGGF provides funds for agricultural modernisation.

The Commission has been urging for some years that the six governments should do much more to coordinate their regional development policies. It put forward a first memorandum in 1965, but the governments took no action. The Commission did however in that same year commission a special survey of industrialisation prospects for the Bari-Taranto area in Southern Italy, which was subsequently designated as the first European development pole. A detailed scheme was worked out and put to the Italian government which undertook to implement it, with the financial help of the various Community agencies.

In 1969 the Commission put forward another regional policy memorandum, including specific proposals for i) an annual review by the Commission and the governments of the Six on those areas which required development plans. The Commission would make recommendations so as to fit the plans into overall Community policy; ii) a permanent committee on regional development where member countries' development policies would be discussed regularly; and iii) a Community regional development fund which could stimulate investment in problem areas by providing loan guarantees and interest rebates.

The governments have not yet approved the Commission's proposals, modest as they are. But there is now a growing acceptance of the need for effective and coordinated regional policies for reasons of both social justice and economic common sense. At the moment some of the six governments are pursuing regional policies which are not just uncoordinated, but quite contradictory. These policies for instance often encourage companies to build new plant on whichever side of a frontier the greatest financial help is available, rather than where the greatest need exists. And even more important for the Community, it is becoming clear that without effective regional action progress will be blocked or hindered in many other vital fields such as agricultural reform, industrial modernisation, social policy and above all the move from the existing customs union towards a real economic and monetary union. These will not be politically acceptable, or economically workable, if the interests of the weaker parts of the Community are not safeguarded.

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