


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EU Schengen Catalogue



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EU Schengen Catalogue

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External borders control, Removal and readmission:

Recommendations and best practices

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Spain, which has held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union since 1 January this year, is giving priority treatment to the enlargement of the European Union to include the candidate countries, which is the cornerstone of European integration.

The building of a common area of freedom, security and justice and the creation of the Schengen area occupy a prominent place in the process of consolidating and strengthening the Union and raising the profile of its institutions, not only internally in relation to the citizens of Europe, but also externally, in relation to the candidate countries, enabling them to acquaint themselves with the legal and institutional framework which constitutes the acquis in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).

In the same effort to clarify and highlight the requirements which the candidate countries will be called upon to meet on accession, we are presenting to them today, at this Joint Council meeting, this "*Catalogue of recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best practices*".

The Catalogue has been drawn up by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation, at the initiative of Belgium and with the assistance of experts of various nationalities who have pooled their knowledge so as to achieve a result which can be pronounced highly commendable. At present the Catalogue refers exclusively to border control and expulsion and readmission procedures, without prejudice to the work which successive Presidencies carry out in other fields such as visas, SIS/SIRENE, police cooperation, etc.

The purpose of the Catalogue is explanatory and it has no legally binding status. It shows, set out in separate columns, on the one hand, the levels which may be required in order to comply with the acquis and, on the other, the best practices already being recorded in some of the Member States, although, however desirable, they are not mandatory at present.

It is with great satisfaction that the Council of the European Union presents this working tool, which is intended to dispel the uncertainties to which introduction of the Schengen acquis gives rise in practice. The Spanish Presidency is confident that the Catalogue will constitute an additional instrument for ensuring the successful integration of the Union's new members in due time and in the appropriate manner.

Mariano Rajoy Brey Brussels, 28 February 2002

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SCHENGEN CATALOGUE

INTRODUCTION

 At its meeting on 28 May 2001, the Council set as an objective for further work by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation the identification of "... best practices, particularly as regards border controls, so that they can serve as examples for those States acceding to Schengen but also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. These evaluations and the identification of best practices shall serve as inspiration for the establishment of standards defining the minimum application of the Schengen acquis (e.g. essential equipment at each border post) in the relevant working groups" (mandate for the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation) (8881/01 – SCH-EVAL 17, COMIX 371).

On the basis of this mandate, the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation worked out the principles and procedure for drawing up the Catalogue of recommendations for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and best practices, hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue of recommendations and best practices, or Catalogue.

The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis and to indicate recommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States acceding to Schengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. With this in mind the Catalogue gives a good indication to the candidate countries for accession to the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the "EU") (at their request) as to what is expected of them, particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen. The aim is not to give an exhaustive definition of the whole of the Schengen acquis but to put forward recommendations and best practices in the light of the experience gained by the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation in verifying the correct application of the Schengen acquis in Germany and in evaluating Greece and the Nordic countries.

The text of the Catalogue does not seek to introduce new requirements but should also make it possible to draw the Council's attention to the need where appropriate to amend certain provisions of the Schengen acquis so that the Commission and, where appropriate, the Member States take the recommendations and best practices into account when putting forward proposals or formal initiatives. This exercise is inter alia the first stage of the process of defining minimum standards by the Council.

Moreover, the Catalogue will serve as a reference tool for future evaluations undertaken in the candidate countries. It will therefore also serve as an indicator for these countries of the tasks which they will be assigned and in this respect should be read in conjunction with the Common Manual.

2. The Working Party on Schengen Evaluation adopted the following definitions to conduct this exercise:

<u>recommendations</u>: non-exhaustive series of measures which should make it possible to establish a basis for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and for monitoring it. <u>best practices</u>: non-exhaustive set of working methods or model measures which must be considered as the optimal application of the Schengen acquis, it being understood that several best practices are possible for each specific part of Schengen cooperation.

3. Where the Catalogue mentions the Member States which apply the Schengen acquis, this is currently to be taken as meaning the thirteen Member States of the EU referred to in Article 1 of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter the "Schengen Protocol"), to which must be added Iceland and Norway, pursuant to the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union, the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, signed on 18 May 1999 (these 15 States are hereinafter referred to as the "Schengen States").

The United Kingdom and Ireland expressed the wish to participate in certain provisions of the Schengen acquis. The Council has not yet adopted a decision on Ireland's request to participate. The arrangements for the United Kingdom's participation were adopted in the Council Decision of 29 May 2000 (2000/365/EC). The Council has not yet decided on the implementation of the provisions in question.

The Schengen acquis and the other measures taken by the institutions within the scope of the acquis are, under Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol, regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full by all States candidates for accession.

 The Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU framework by the Schengen Protocol. The extent of the acquis is defined in Council Decision 1999/435/EC, published in OJ L 176 of 10 July 1999. Since its integration into the EU, the Schengen acquis has undergone developments and amendments which lend it an evolutionary character.

The Schengen acquis has also taken on board the results of the evaluations which have been conducted within the framework of the Standing Committee for the application and evaluation of the Schengen acquis, now called the "Working Party on Schengen Evaluation". Under the Working Party's mandate, reports are submitted to the Council to establish whether the conditions required for the entry into force of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in a country wishing to participate in those provisions (or in some of them) have been met and, secondly, to monitor the correct application of the Schengen acquis by the Schengen States, in particular by detecting problems and proposing solutions.

- 5. The current Catalogue deals primarily with the issues of borders and removal. Free movement as introduced within the territory of the Schengen States (this term and the expression "Schengen States" refer to the territory of the Schengen States in which the Schengen acquis applies) is a freedom which as a counterpart requires the strengthening of the external borders of that area and a policy for the removal of illegally resident aliens which is effective and dissuasive. The fight against illegal immigration is a major preoccupation for the whole of the EU. It is indeed this double axiom which guides EU action in this sphere. Accordingly, the measures adopted in this context seek to strengthen European integration and in particular to enable the EU to become more rapidly an area of freedom, security and justice.
- 6. The Catalogue refers to ideas or concepts connected with the administration of borders, the terms of which are not uniformly defined or codified in the Schengen States. In the interests of ease of understanding, the following definitions apply to the terms used:
 - a. Integrated Border Security Model: name of the system covering all aspects of border policy. This system is spread over four complementary tiers (filters) which are: activities in third countries, countries of origin and transit, bilateral and international cooperation, measures at the external borders and further activities inside the territory.

- b. Border Management: this concept covers both the surveillance of borders and checks, the latter being defined in Article 6 of the Schengen Convention:
 - Border checks: checks carried out at authorised crossing points. It should be
 noted that checks on persons shall include not only the verification of travel
 documents and the other conditions governing entry, residence, work and exit but
 also checks to detect and prevent threats to the national security and public policy
 of the Schengen States. Such checks shall also be carried out on vehicles and
 objects in the possession of persons crossing the border.
 - Border surveillance: surveillance carried out between authorised crossing points.
- 7. In the Catalogue the reader will find the following sections: the Catalogue currently comprises two main chapters, one on borders and the other on removal. A general section describes the basic concepts underlying the policy and is followed by recommendations and best practices presented in tabular form, with recommendations on the left and best practices on the right, alongside the relevant recommendations. Where one of these recommendations applies only to one or two types of border this is mentioned in the text.

* * *

PART ONE : BORDERS, BORDER SURVEILLANCE AND BORDER CONTROL

A. INTEGRATED BORDER SECURITY MODEL (A MECHANISM OF DIFFERENT TIERS/FILTERS)

1. INTRODUCTION

An overall border model is an important tool to safeguard internal security and in particular prevent illegal immigration. It means in simplified terms that a set of complementary measures has to be implemented on different tiers. In this respect four tiers can be identified.

- Activities in third countries, especially in countries of origin and transit, including the collection of information by liaison officers as well as the key role of the consular post abroad in the process of issuing visas.
- (2) International border cooperation.
- (3) Measures at external borders: border management (border checks and border surveillance).
- (4) Further activities inside the territory of the Schengen States and between Schengen States.

The coherence between these measures and the way they are applied by Schengen States is a key to the success of the general border model.

2. THE FOUR TIERS

2.1. Activities in third countries, in countries of origin and transit

(a) The first measure required in terms of time and place is advice from liaison officers and document experts in third countries of origin or transit which are the source of the risks generated by illegal immigration (Article 47 (4) of the 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (hereafter the "Schengen Convention") and SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev). Officials working abroad for the Schengen States' consular posts and carriers will be trained by specialists in order to detect document forgeries before actual travel has started.

When visas are issued and when passengers are transported by air and sea, it is of great importance to detect false and falsified documents in order to prevent unauthorised entry into the territory of the Schengen States. The training given by document advisers makes a vital contribution to the detection of such forgeries by officials working for the Schengen States' consular posts and for carriers.

(b) In the second stage, a thorough inspection of the application documents submitted should be carried out by the Schengen States' consular representations when issuing visas (see Articles 15 and 17 of the Schengen Convention and the provisions of the Common Consular Instructions on Visas). This includes inspecting documents and making database queries pursuant to Article 96 of the Schengen Convention. Consulates should guarantee that sensitive information and blank documents are adequately protected and stored.

The systematic implementation of EC/Schengen visa regulations should enable the phenomenon of illegal immigration to be effectively tackled at its roots. The importance of intensive consular cooperation should be stressed in that context.

- (c) Carriers are also obliged pursuant to national legislation on the basis of Article 26(1)(b) of the Schengen Convention to take all necessary measures to ensure that third-country nationals carried by air, sea or land, (see Article 26(3) of the Schengen Convention), have the travel documents necessary for entry into the territory of the Schengen States. If third-country nationals are set down in a Schengen State without the prescribed documents, the carriers will be subject to sanctions and compelled in principle to take back those passengers. Staff of carriers should be trained. This article of the Schengen Convention has been supplemented by Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 – L 187, 10.7.2001, p. 45.
- 2.2. Bilateral and international border Cooperation
 - (a) International co-operation in the field of border security can be divided into multilateral, bilateral and local cooperation. In this respect, agreements with neighbouring countries on the cooperation in the field of border management are an efficient tool to increase border security. This can be realised by establishing appropriate working mechanisms such as exchange of information, establishing appropriate communication channels, local contact points, emergency procedures, handling incidents in an objective manner in order to avoid political disputes, etc.

Regional cooperation structures across external borders should also be established in sea areas. These initiatives should bring together all countries in the region.

(b) As regards cooperation with adjacent states, it is considered necessary that transit states lend their active assistance by ensuring that their borders are thoroughly secure and by taking measures away from the border, i.e. consistent repatriation practice – if there is no right of admission and there are no impediments based on serious humanitarian grounds or international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, European Convention on Human Rights).

2.3. Measures at the external borders

The core area of general border strategy is a functioning border management consisting of border checks and border surveillance, based on a risk analysis. Article 6 of the Schengen Convention sets out clearly the framework to be implemented by the Common Manual, the two being complementary. Essential elements of border management are: (1) that all persons crossing the external borders are checked systematically and (2) effective border surveillance is ensured between border crossing points.

In this respect all appropriate measures should be taken in order to safeguard internal security and prevent illegal immigration:

Coherent legislation based on the EC/Schengen requirements in the area of border management is needed (for example: border guard act, data protection rules). With regard to infrastructure, appropriate facilities for carrying out border checks and surveillance have to be available. Officials carrying these tasks have to be professional and specially trained. Adequate human resources are required. Exact requirements depend on several factors (geographical situation, volume of border traffic, etc.). Moreover, a clear concept of training (basic and further) is required covering operational skills, knowledge of legislation, languages, etc.

Equipment should be appropriate to the border situation. Functioning **internal coordination** is needed at all levels (which authorities are competent for which task, no competence "black holes"). Information exchange between competent authorities (border guard, customs, police, judicial authorities, prosecutors) is essential, including a mechanism to solve possible disputes of competence between the authorities. Furthermore, operational issues should be covered (for example use of compatible communication equipment).

Agreed international/bilateral cooperation should be implemented in practice on the spot (examples: exchange of information, joint controls, handling of readmission situations). The special requirements for the three different types of border (air, sea, land) should be fulfilled (for example: at airports a separation of passenger flows – extra Schengen and intra Schengen flights – should be made by physical means or, for minor airports, by a systematically monitored and accompanied flow of passengers).

- 2.4. Further activities inside the territory of the Schengen States
 - (a) Measures to prevent illegal immigration and cross-border crime should be pursued inside the territory of the Schengen States by enhanced search, checks and surveillance measures based on national information and in accordance with national law, where possible on the basis of police cooperation agreements pursuant to Article 39(4) and (5) of the Schengen Convention. Given that the problems of migration and crime are not subject to geographical restrictions, international traffic routes should in future become main areas of activity for national police forces in accordance with domestic law. However, where public policy or national security so require, a Schengen State may, after consulting the other Schengen States, decide that for a limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation shall be carried out at internal borders.
 - (b) The last stage in the geographical and time sequence is repatriation in accordance with national law (see Article 23 of the Schengen Convention and Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 L 149, 2.6.2001, p. 34) of third-country nationals who have entered the Schengen territory without authorisation, if no right to stay exists and if there are no obstacles based on compelling humanitarian grounds or international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention on Refugees, European Convention on Human Rights).

3. KEY ELEMENTS FOR THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE INTEGRATED BORDER SECURITY MODEL

Emphasis should be placed on the coordination of duties between the responsible government bodies in dealing with information, reports and training and in responding to irregularities. Coordination in these fields should extend to regional and local levels too.

Another key element of the method is to pay attention to the assessment of the situation. Thus, the performance of a border management system should be adjusted in accordance with the prevailing conditions along all its borders. Valid and reliable data should form part of a permanent evaluation which could be shared by other Schengen States. Where necessary, the allocation of resources should be adapted accordingly.

As a general rule, persons performing border police duties should be specialised trained professionals. Persons with less experience can be used only for auxiliary duties assisting professionals temporarily. No exception is allowed in respect of duties that require any use of personal data, making searches in confidential registers or decisions interfering with an individual's physical integrity or freedom.

To facilitate mutual trust, any Schengen State should be able to provide valid and reliable data concerning the situation at all its borders and also the border checks and surveillance measures applied. Knowledge of the situation at the border relies on knowledge of the performance of border management systems. Reliable estimates concerning border checks and surveillance measures should be based, among other things, on complete knowledge of regional and local circumstances. To attain the above aims and to facilitate cost-effective use of resources, various methodologies should be applied at the borders. Terms such as risk analysis, intelligence, data-flow management, situational awareness, reaction capability and information exchange with other Schengen States can be used when evaluating and developing these methods.

Risk analysis can be seen as a tool for optimisation of border management and a way of providing reliable information on the border situation. It should be adapted to the type of borders.

At practical level this means evaluation of the persons, vehicles, vessels or flights to be checked. This evaluation is made in the context of a real time tactical situation and thus the methods can be called **tactical risk analysis**. At the external border, all persons should be checked according to the Common Manual. To detect cross-border crime, extra emphasis should be placed on the checking procedure for suspect objects. Personnel should be provided with knowledge of risk indicators, risk profiles and typical modi operandi of cross-border crime. Named special targets of surveillance and checks should also be known to personnel. The risk analysis and management of borders need to be backed by systematic intelligence. Border management systems should be able to gather intelligence, analyse it and, finally, utilise the products in field work.

To have a realistic picture of prevailing irregularities for the **purposes of medium and long-term operative management**, estimates should be made of:

- the level of risk defined by the authorities in respect of illegal crossing of the border
- the level of detected irregularities
- the level of estimated undetected irregularities.

This is to ensure that resources will be allocated optimally along the border in order to maintain a reasonable risk level in respect of illegal crossing of the border. Further, at all managerial levels, the management system should be evaluated in order to find out shortcomings or gaps in the system. These exist where a border can predictably be crossed illegally with very low risk or no risk at all.

B. DETAILS OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES

RECOMMENDATIONS/BEST PRACTICES

Recommendations		Best practices
1	Strategy and organisational structure	
	1.1 general strategy for border management + risk assessment	
-	establishing a national plan defining the steps to be taken in the countries of origin and transit, at external Schengen borders and inside the individual Schengen States	
-	border management is a task which requires a high level of professionalism	
-	streamlined and functional ministerial competences for border management. Centralised supervision and instructions for border checks and surveillance under the auspices of a ministry working in the field of justice and home affairs.	 the competent public authority is a specialised Police/Border Guard force (not a military force)
-	effective border management is ensured by supplementing strategy with technology, equipment and staff; mobile and stationary, airborne or on land/sea, uniformed or plain clothed.	 border checks and surveillance should be executed by professional officials of the same administration organising border management if possible under a single national ministry.

Recommendations	Best practices
 permanent analysis determines the allocation of personnel and technical resources; 	
- an evaluation is to be made to ensure that border management matches the requirements of Article 6 of the Schengen Convention and to consider whether border management has to be adapted. Article 7 requires exchange of all relevant information.	
- at international level border management should be governed by bilateral agreements	
- cooperation and coordination of the responsibilities of the different bodies should be regulated by an official Act	These agreements/Acts should cover the whole spectrum of cross-border cooperation, i.e. joint risk analysis, exchange of experience, cooperation on training, cooperation on investigation
1.2 Intelligence and data-flow management	
- a two-way information exchange should be arranged between central and local levels of the border management authority.	A secure database is established to exchange experience between units and to distribute information on intelligence objects. This database is available for use in border management.
- the local authorities should be instructed to gather information on illegal immigration and other cross- border irregularities, analyse it locally, and pass it on to central level.	For specified analysis and exchange of information, a network of intelligence liaison officers is established to connect different units and different organisational levels.

Recommendations		Best practices
-	the central level should compile all	
	information country-wide, process it	
	into usable form and deliver it to local	
	authorities to be used as a tool for	
	tactical risk analysis and operational	
	planning.	
-	data-flow management can be used as a	Information in the intelligence database is
	means of evaluating the effectiveness of	hidden, until a specific inquiry is made. The
	information exchange within and	right to make searches is controlled by a
	between authorities involved in border	supervisory unit.
	management. Availability of and	
	access to vital data and data protection	
	are also elements to be evaluated.	
	1.3 regional or local strategy	
-	where appropriate, establish regional	
	plans based on risk assessment	
	intensive cooperation between all law	
	enforcement agencies in the national	
	border region	
-	cooperation with law enforcement	
	agencies of neighbouring states	
-	reception of information from the	- creating access points for information
	population should be encouraged and	from and to the public (Internet, etc.)
	transformed into risk analysis and	
	operational activities if necessary	

Recommendations	Best practices
1.4 organisational (functional) structure	
 coordination of all activities at central, regional and local levels 	 creating a local and regional coordination mechanism or organisation
 establishing capabilities to fight successfully against illegal crossing of the border 	 establishing specialised officers/teams/units to fight illegal crossing of the border crime at different levels if needed
- the organisation should provide highly specialised services required for border checks/surveillance - for example on false documents	- the organisational structure provides for a specialised officer for false and falsified documents and one with the necessary linguistic skills to be available on every shift or at every border crossing
- specify a lapse of time within which the squad should reach the border in the event of an alarm	point (hereafter "BCP")
1.5 availability and permanency	
- depending on the situation, ensure availability and permanency of staff	
1.6 Situational awareness and reaction capability	
In green and blue border management, terms of situational awareness and reaction capability can be used to define the level of risk to be confronted with illegal border crossings. Situational awareness measures how the	At land borders, the border is subject to constant monitoring (human or technical devices). Where this is not feasible, specialised sniffer dogs may extend surveillance time. The dogs should not be aggressive or uncontrolled when meeting

Recommendations	Best practices
authorities are capable of detecting	illegal border crossers.
cross-border movements and finding	
reasoned grounds for control measures.	
In practice, situational awareness depicts how	
the authorities define the lapse of time and	At sea a VTMIS (or compatible) system
area for three functions:	covers the entire maritime area and ports
- detecting movements that could	under evaluation. All vessels are detected
possibly be attempts to cross the border	and identified by the system. Once
illegally	identified, a vessel remains constantly known
- identifying the detected targets	by the system. The system is backed up by
- analysing the previous identifications in	offshore craft and airplanes. These mobile
due time	units make close identification, fill in gaps
	and retrieve information from outside the
	system. At ports, based on a risk analysis,
	the port area may be fenced off and
	monitored constantly. In such cases all
	persons entering or leaving the port area are
	checked.
	- deploy stand-by squads
	At sea, constant readiness to dispatch a
	mobile unit, in order to maintain any vessel
The reaction capability at sea or land	trying to reach the coast under constant
measures the lapse of time required to reach	surveillance.
any cross-border movement to be controlled	
and also the time and the means to react	
adequately to unusual circumstances. The	
latter also applies also to the situation at	
airports.	

Recommendations	Best practices
2 Infrastructure	
2.1 entrance and exit checks	
- facilities should be in place to carry out	
the compulsory entrance and exit	
checks.	
- at land borders, entering and exiting	
cross-border traffic of all kinds should	
be separated. This applies also to sea	
borders between the vessel and the	
border checks.	
2.2 organisation of border surveillance	
- border surveillance can be carried out	
by human resources (supported by	
technical means) or mainly by highly	
sophisticated man-operated techniques.	
To ensure efficiency, the means are	
adapted to the density of population,	
number of personnel, equipment and	
migration risk.	
- deployment and spread of infrastructur	8
facilities (buildings, etc.) adapted to	
mobility, number of staff, regional	
traffic infrastructure and migration risk	

Recommendations	Best practices	
2.3 organisation of the border crossing point		
exchange of information with the neighbouring country on building a BCP, aiming at a certain degree of coordination (land)	- building BCP installations with the neighbouring country in a coordinated way to achieve adequacy of means (dimensions, lanes, installations) (land)	
 constructing border crossing points, using common experience among Schengen States, depending on regional conditions, in perhaps two versions, one large model and another a small BCP. Travellers should be made familiar with similar procedures 	- signposts to provide information for users in different languages (depending on type of BCP and neighbouring country) or by internationally used drawings (pictograms)	
- the delimitation of the BCP and the applicable regulations should be readily visible to all	- a fence around the BCP (land)	
border checks to be carried out in special control booths or at desks or, where appropriate, with mobile equipment.	- these installations to be provided to all relevant national services/authorities	
inside buildings special dedicated desks or booths shall be provided for the different tasks and be built accordingly		

Recommendations	Best practices
Outside buildings, control booths	
containing the necessary equipment	
- unauthorised observation (especially of	
computer systems) should be prevented	- control booth from which officers can
	oversee the queue of passengers waiting
- to define standardised criteria for the	
manufacture of control booths (having	
regard to security; technical equipment)	
- control booth should be facing the	
passengers (air, sea)	
- communication	
a suitable communication system	
should provide instant information on	
each important situation at any time for	
all units	
2.4 separation of passenger flows	
Structure	
Separation at ports	
Ferry passengers to be separated so that	
external border traffic can never mix with	
internal traffic between the vessel and the	
border check. As a general rule, this must be	
guaranteed by means of physical fixtures	
(walls, fences, etc.). In minor ports with only	
a limited amount of passengers, constructions	
can be supplemented by surveillance.	

Recommendations	Best practices
Separation at airports	
Airports should be (re-)arranged in order to avoid the possibility of persons or documents, passing from the non-Schengen zone to the Schengen-zone and vice-versa by physical separation.	Separate terminals for Schengen and non-Schengen traffic Separate and dedicated levels for Schengen and non-Schengen traffic Watertightness may be obtained by walls, glass, metal grid,, reaching from the floor to the ceiling - checks at the gate for high-risk flights
Aerodromes where the volume of traffic allows to do so may separate flows by organising systematically monitored and accompanied flow of passengers.	
Procedures	
Identify Schengen and non-Schengen flights	
Cooperate as closely as possible with third parties at airports, with special attention to connecting flights	Monitor the flights accordingly through a real time system, agreed upon with the civil aviation authority
Provide the necessary information in due time for the border management authorities. Establish a link with the flight aviation information system	Plan buses for transporting passengers from remote parking areas to the dedicated area of the airport.

Recommendations	Best practices
2.5 lanes for checks	
Separation between (a) EU and EEA	- separate lanes for checks on EEA
nationals and (b) non-EU/non-EEA nationals	nationals, for third-country residents and
(airports and sea)	depending on the situation, a third lane for citizens of the neighbouring country
Number and capacity of lanes should fulfil	can be provided in order to facilitate
the need for fluid and quick but	traffic. Where possible adapt the
Schengen-compliant checks and surveillance	situation to the required checks on EEA and non-EEA nationals.
- hand-in-hand management of traffic	
flows by all competent authorities of	Lanes must be marked clearly for use of
both neighbouring States.	travellers (private cars, pedestrians, lorries,
	buses, CD/CC if necessary. Markings may b
- flexible organisation of lanes for checks	adapted to needs in a flexible way.
and securing a quick and effective	
reaction. Separate lanes for the	
different types of traffic crossing the	
border	
- organisation of border checks with	
priority on entry into the State	
3 Staff	
3.1 Adequacy	
- effective border checks and surveillance	- study comparable situations in other
require that the number of staff must be	Schengen States which could serve as a
adapted to risk assessment, based on	example
analysis	
3.2 selection criteria for recruiting new	
staff	

Recommendations	Best practices
 written rules for recruiting new staff physical suitability meet moral and legal requirements (criminal (judicial, legal) records, etc.) 	
3.3 professionalism	
 high level of professionalism based on successfully completed training. (The requirements for this topic are presented under "Training", see 1.4) 	
 provide for regular evaluation in which e.g. job satisfaction, effectiveness, social conditions and liability are measured 	- provision for rotation of staff. This is considered most useful at the beginning of the career for reasons of effectiveness
4 Training	
4.1 basic training	
Operational staff should have successfully completed a training course covering their future tasks, which should include:	
 knowledge of relevant Schengen and EC/EU provisions basic rules and procedures document checks (valid, falsified documents) rules for entry, stay and exit 	 programmes should adapt flexibly to risk assessment

Recommendations	Best practices
- coordination and cooperation with other	
agencies	
- special cooperation between Schengen	
States in the internal border zone	
(Dublin, readmission, etc.)	
- police cooperation	
- Schengen Information System	
- judicial cooperation	
4.2 further continuing education	
- a training programme must be	The organisation should provide programmes
established with a regular training/briefing	and facilities at central and local level to
hours for officers as part of working hours	accompany officers during their career by
	offering them education and training on
	issues which are relevant to their work
4.3 linguistic training	
- ability to speak a foreign language	encourage staff to learn other languages
useful for their work	necessary for their work, languages of the
	neighbouring countries or the countries of
	origin
4.4 specialised technical training	
counterfeits and forgeries	
- specialised training in recognising false	Specialist officers should train officers at all
travel documents	BCPs
4.5 Specialised training for management	- international experience of a similar
levels	responsibility is an asset
	- participation in the CEPOL training
	programme will in future be advisable

5 Equipment 5.1 Recommended equipment 5.1.1 Introduction The following paragraphs will mention equipment which is deemed necessary and should be permanently optimised in the first line and additional requirements in the second line, in trains as well as mobile equipment. It should be stressed that SIS connection and stamps are considered to be key equipment S.1.2 In the first line: Upon entry and exit at the BCPs access to the following equipment should be provided: - terminal for consulting SIS and national systems. There will be mobile terminals at ground checks on passengers in vehicles in sea ports with ferry traffic and in airports with limited traffic; otherwise fixed terminals. Car numberplate imaging system - document examination instrument, with UV light, white overhead light, transmitted light, etc. magnifying glass x 8/10 - retro-reflective lamp Number of stamps should be listed for the different officers - stamps. Pursuant to the Common Manual, Schengen entry and exit stamps will be provided to all BCPs. Information on lost or stolen stamps	Recommendations	Best practices
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stamps will be provided to all BCPs. Information on lost or stolen stamps	-	different officers
Information on lost or stolen stamps		
-		
must be given as guidely as possible to		
must de given as quickty as possible to	must be given as quickly as possible to	

Recommendations	Best practices
Schengen States	
5.1.3. For in-depth checks in the	
second line	
Questioned Document Examination System	
for authentication of travel documents with	
infrared and ultraviolet light, filters, etc.	- image transmitting device
- stereo magnifying glass, for example	
x 40	
- identification equipment and material	
(including template to compare stamps)	
- Common Manual	- availability by electronic means of the
- handbook containing genuine and false	Common Manual
passports and ID documents	
	- availability by electronic means of
communications equipment	images of genuine, false/falsified
	documents
- availability of sets and telephones to	
communicate during border checks to	
consulates or other authorities in the	
Schengen States	
5.1.4. Mobile equipment	
Mobile equipment should be used at border	
crossing points where there are no fixed	
positions. The mobile equipment should	
contain:	
- hand-lamp with UV light	
- mini-microscope x 30	
- magnifying glass x 8/10	
- retro-reflective lamp (3M laminate)	

Recommendations	Best practices
- hand-lamp for overhead light,	
transmitted light (Mini Maglite or	
similar)	
- template to compare stamps, etc.	
- stable access to SIS should be provided	- mobile SIS terminal
	- mobile document readable device
5.2 Border surveillance	
Observation and detection material which	
provides adequate surveillance of terrain in	A highly centralised technical surveillance
all seasons and weather conditions (day and	system that detects and identifies (camera)
night)	the target and enables immediate reaction
	(patrol). The system is based on sensor fields
	that consist of different types of sensors
	(stable and portable) such as active and
	passive IR-beams, radars, cameras, seismic
	sensors, etc. The sensor fields and/or
	individual sensors are installed in accordance
	with the existing local situation. The system
	itself is controlled centrally with or by a
	computer in the OP centre that is capable of
	commanding and controlling active patrols
	and requesting reinforcements when
	necessary.
	thermographic cameras (portable, stationary
	and/or vehicle-based)
	binoculars, short and long-range versions
	depending on the local situation, compatible
	devices based on radio transmission,
	telephone system and/or data connection are
	advisable with the neighbouring country

Recommendations	Best practices
5.3 Transportation/Mobility	
Providing transportation depending on local	
infrastructure, regional conditions (weather,	
topographic situation, density of population)	
manpower and migration flows	
Transportation services should be available	
day and night	
5.4 Communication and encryption	
Make provision for procedures for secured	
communications between services	
6 Internal coordination	
- coordination between different	
national services	
(police-customs-border guard,	
transportation authorities)	
- direct and immediate interchange of	- meeting between heads of services, at all
information between BCPs and border	levels especially at international airports,
surveillance force	regular meetings between heads of
	services, including airport authorities
	and civil aviation authorities
	- joint database
	- joint risk analysis
	- joint training
	- integrated approach involving all
	authorities for tackling the problems of
	illegal immigration
	agree on a decision-taking mechanism
	at the appropriate level

Recommendations	Best practices
	common operations with joint
	leadership
7 Different kinds of international	
cooperation	
According to the type of borders (land, sea,	
air) international cooperation can be shaped	
through bilateral or multilateral agreements,	
regional cooperation, liaison officers and	
networks as well as transportation authorities.	
These agreements should preferably be	
concluded in a written form.	
7.1.1 At international level,	
border management should be regulated	
in bilateral agreements (land borders)	
7.1.2 information exchange with	
other Schengen States on maritime	
borders (sea)	
7.1.3 information exchange with	
the immigration authorities at the airport of origin/transfer	- Document advisors/Liaison officers to
an port of originations of	detect false or falsified documents in the
	consulate or airports of origin and transit (cfr. $SCH/Com \text{ or } (08)$ 50 rev)
	SCH/Com-ex (98) 59 rev)
	Participation in the IATA Control Authority
	Working Group
	Build up a working group of specialised
	immigration officers at the main international
	airports for tackling illegal immigration by

Recommendations	Best practices
	air.
	In order to allow a better cooperation and a
	better exchange of information between the
	Border Guard services and the air travel
	companies, as well the services that have to
	ensure the security of the air space it is
	advisable that Airport Border Guard Units
	participate in the ECFALIS system
	(European Civil Aviation Conference
	Facilitation Information System on Illegal
	Immigration). In this context, it must be
	stressed that all information with police
	interest should be diffused to friendly
	agencies after sensitive or classified items
	have been erased.
7.2 Regional cooperation	
support the neighbouring border	
authority through exchanging	
information and transmitting facts of	
interest to it.	
7.3 Liaison Officers	
	accompanying hotographic and account
establishment of a liaison office for the	- cooperation between liaison officers
exchange of information	Nordia apparation between ligioan officers
on the basis of conventions or national	Nordic cooperation between liaison officers
law	could serve as an example for a future
	network.

Recommendations	Best practices
	Use of EISICS is seen as a meaningful
	practice.
8 Rules and procedures	
8.1 General aspects	
It should be stated that entry and exit checks	
are to be performed systematically.	
Exceptions to border checks are possible only	
under special circumstances (this applies only	
at sea and land borders)	
National legislation to allow the relevant	
authorities for border checks and surveillance	
the legal possibility of patrolling, surveying	
and investigating border-related crime,	
without limiting it to the close border area	
8.2 Rules for minor border traffic	
Bilateral agreements are the basis of minor	
border traffic between neighbouring	
countries; in any event, information should be	
communicated to other Schengen States.	
8.3 Rules for issuing visas at the border	
(B and C visas)	
Visas should in principle be issued at	• decision to be made by a senior officer
consulates. Only in exceptional	or official of a higher authority
circumstances may they be issued at BCPs.	
There should be a general manual valid for all	In addition to the compulsory use of SIS and
BCPs describing the steps to be carried out	the national database, recourse should be had

Recommendations	Best practices
for a visa to be issued at the BCP.	to information from other services
all available national and Schengen State	
information should be used to make a proper	
decision	
the decision and the major reasons underlying	
it should be placed on file	
necessary contacts and participation	
involving other Schengen States to be carried	
through in a standardised way	
8.4 Seamen in transit	
The rules applicable for seamen in transit are	
described in Schengen Com-ex decision	
(96) 27	
Operational aspects of fighting	
cross-border crime	
The operational dimension in fighting	
cross-border crime is important in border	
management.	
It is therefore important to have logislatic-	set up specialised multidisciplinary units for
It is therefore important to have legislation which affords all relevant authorities	fighting border-related crime
winen attorus all relevant authornies	
	<u> </u>

Recommendations	Best practices
(Border Guard, police, customs, judiciary,	
etc.) the legal possibility of preventing and	
detecting border related crime, without	
limiting it to the close border area.	
Schengen States should describe the	
framework they have adopted to fight	
cross-border crime, which:	
- should be based on an analysis of the	
different types of crime and	
- should include an overview of all relevant	
factors, such as personnel, equipment and	
training as well as cooperation between	
national and international services	
9 Particular cases for certain types of	
border	
9.1 Maritime borders	
0.1.1 Diele enclusie	
9.1.1 Risk analysis	
The volume of vessel movement is usually	VTMIS or similar system is used to cover
high in relation to the resources available for	large maritime areas, where all major traffic
checks. Tactical risk analysis is therefore	remains as identified targets. The authority
essential at blue border surveillance to meet	responsible for maritime border police duties
the demands set out under the Common	has real-time access to VTMIS. For details, it
Manual Part II, point 2.2. Vessel movements	is referred to the best practice described under
should be monitored and vessels identified.	1.1.6. "Situational awareness and reaction
Identifications (names of vessels) should be	capability"
checked against background information	

Recommendations	Best practices
containing knowledge on risky vessels. The	
level of checks on each particular vessel	
should be decided according to this reference.	
The same procedure should be applied to	
crew and passenger lists.	
The command with operative responsibility	
for a defined area should maintain reasonable	
risk levels against known or possibly	
prevailing irregularities. This should take	
place in all areas and on all flows of traffic.	
To this end, the performance of border	
management authorities' duties should be	
adjusted in accordance with fresh knowledge	
of risk factors. This basically concerns	
medium-term planning in the operational	
command. Medium-term methods of	
evaluating the situation and adjusting	
countermeasures can be called operative risk	
analysis.	
The operational command should have a	
realistic picture of prevailing irregularities in	
the area of responsibility. To that end,	
figures or estimates should be arrived at for	
the following:	
• type and volume of all vessel movements	
between the open sea and coast	
volume of actual checks directed at different types of years! mayament	
different types of vessel movement	
• (based on above) the level of risk of being	Formalise where possible cooperation with
caught illegally crossing a border	carriers in Memoranda of Understanding or in
• volume and type of detected irregularities	Agreements

Recommendations	Best practices
• volume and type of estimated undetected	
irregularities.	
Cooperation with third parties	
Cooperation with all type of carriers should	
be strengthened	
9.1.2 Cargo ships	
100% administrative checks should be carried	Participation in the EISICS system
out in advance. Based on these checks and	
available intelligence, a risk analysis should	
be made. High-risk vessels to be checked	
physically, immediately upon arrival.	
Control duties consisting of face-to-face	
checks of persons on board and/or physical	
search of ship.	
If information concerning the crew and	
passengers is not available in advance, the	
ship should be physically met immediately	
upon arrival.	
Passengers should always be checked face to	
face.	
In cases of special risk, vessel to remain	
under constant control of authorities during	
its stay in a Schengen port. All persons	
boarding and leaving the ship to be checked	
face to face. Information on high-risk vessels	
to be relayed to the ship's next Schengen port	
of destination through the CIREFI	
early-warning system.	

Recommendations	Best practices
9.1.3 Cruise ships	
In principle, the Schengen acquis requires a	
face-to-face check to be made for all	
passengers on board cruise ships at first and	
ast port of entry. As a general rule, the	
passenger must meet all necessary entry or	
exit preconditions. However, the regulations	
concerning special circumstances will	
warrant a lower level of checks if:	
• there is a very large number of passengers	
on board,	
• only limited time is available for checks,	
and	
• there are good grounds for believing the	
vessel with its passengers to be low-risk.	
Under these conditions, administrative checks	
only in the first and last Schengen port are	
acceptable. This requires, at the very least,	
hat an SIS query is made on third-country	
nationals and their passports stamped.	
If the check shows on-board persons to be	
refused entry to the Schengen territory,	
special measures are necessary and in the	
mutual interests of Schengen States and	
shipping companies. The authorities should	
ensure that the person remains on board and	
eaves the port on the vessel. Information on	
such persons should be relayed to the next	
Schengen port of destination of the ship,	
schengen port of destination of the ship,	

Recommendations	Best practices
If a cruise ship is a risk in terms of illegal	
crossing of the external border, special	
measures are necessary and in the mutual	
interests of Schengen States. Such a vessel	
should remain under constant control by the	
authorities during its stay in a Schengen port.	
All persons boarding and leaving the ship	
should be checked face to face. In order to	
embark or disembark, each passenger should	
meet all necessary preconditions of entry or	
exit. Information on such ships should be	
relayed to the next Schengen port of	
destination of the ship, through the CIREFI	
early warning system. In the next port, a	
similar procedure will apply.	
The lighter checks described above should in	
no way prevent authorities from carrying out	
more thorough checks anywhere in	
subsequent ports.	
Cruise passengers should hold a visa	
complying with the same rules as other	
persons when entering the Schengen territory.	
9.1.4 Fishing vessels	
Monitoring should be carried out to ensure	Exchange of information is arranged between
that fishing vessels coming from third	Schengen States and neighbouring third
countries follow the correct procedure.	states. The third state reports inter alia
	vessels that are leaving its territory and,
The Schengen acquis allows administrative	especially, boats that have avoided exit
checks on crew members, if they can be	checks when leaving Schengen territory.
regarded as seamen. Nevertheless, recourse	

Recommendations	Best practices
should be had to face-to-face checks and/or	
physical search of the vessel whenever	
deemed necessary by risk analysis.	
In addition, coastal fisheries mentioned in the	
Common Manual, Part II, point 3.4.4.4	
should be checked occasionally in accordance	
with proper risk analysis.	
9.1.5 Pleasure boats	
Monitoring should be carried out to ensure	Exchange of information is arranged between
that pleasure boats coming from third	Schengen States and neighbouring third
countries follow the correct procedure.	states. The third state reports inter alia boats
	that are leaving its territory and, especially,
	boats that have avoided exit checks when
	leaving the Schengen territory.
9.1.6 Ships with a large number of	
illegal immigrants on board	
Emergency plans should be set in place to	A government body is nominated for inter-
handle ships with a large number of illegal	ministerial and inter-agency coordination.
immigrants on board, covering the following	This body possesses the necessary parallel
aspects:	representative sub-bodies at regional and
• apprehending the persons responsible for	local levels to facilitate coordination and the
illegal transportation with a view to	clear division of responsibilities. Adequate
further judicial measures	powers and resources are made available to
• apprehending all persons on board in	this structure and especially to those regional
order to take responsibility for the	bodies responsible for carrying out physical
immigrants with a view to repatriation	measures.
and in order to guarantee their health and	
	This structure is held in readiness to facilitate

Recommendations	Best practices
protection rights	implementation of recommended practice.
• relaying information on high-risk vessels	
to other Schengen States by EISICS and	Local and regional authorities maintain
the CIREFI early warning system	consistent plans for their participation and
	cooperation. These plans are regularly tested
	and developed as instructed by the
	government coordinating body.
9.1.7 Stowaways	
In order to combat the phenomenon of	
stowaways, authorities should adopt	
preventive measures against unauthorised	
boarding/leaving of ships.	
9.1.8 Fake crews	
In order to combat fake crews as a means of	
illegal entry, authorities should carry out	
intelligence operations, exchanges of	
information, investigative measures and	
prosecution.	
9.1.9 Seamen's identity document	
1771	
When issuing seamen's identity documents,	The security features of the document are as
close attention should be paid to the security	for national passports.
features of the document.	
9.1.10 Transiting seamen	
9.1.10 Transming Seamen	
Under the acquis, the captain or the	The captain or the shipowner's agent should
shipowner's agent should inform the	inform the border management authorities as
	morm the object management authorities as

Recommendations	Best practices
authorities in charge of border management at	soon as possible and always at least three
the port of entry of the arrival of seamen in	days prior to the arrival of the seamen, in
need of a transit visa and any other changes in	order to expedite procedures for issuing
crew composition.	transit visas.
The border management authorities should	A unit on duty 24 hours a day will be set up
check the accuracy of the data provided by	to give swift, coordinated answers to requests
the captain or the shipowner's agent.	for transit visas for seamen made at the
	border.
The authorities can issue transit visas to	
seamen only after careful verification of the	
data provided by the shipowner and	
confirmation by the authorities of the place	
where the ship is moored or is expected to	
moor .	
9.1.11 EISICS	
Vessels and their crew and passengers should	All Schengen States should join the EISICS
be thoroughly checked in the first port of	system, which should be computerised, in
arrival in the Schengen territory. If the	order to ensure that information is protected
vessel's next stop will also be in a port of a	and sent on quickly to the relevant border
Schengen State using the EISICS system,	management authority.
then the border management authority of the	
first Schengen State should, when the vessel	
is leaving that state, fax the EISICS form to	
the next port. The EISICS form should list	
all the relevant information gathered by the	
border management authority on the vessel.	
The border checks in the next port can be less	
-	
thorough, based on the information received	
in the EISICS form.	

Recommendations	Best practices
Electronic data interchange	
Schengen States should encourage the use of	
electronic data interchange (EDI) at their	
maritime borders. Electronic data, inter alia	
to identify crew members, passengers,	
stowaways – as well as their travel	
documents - on board a vessel, transferred in	
good time, should act as a binding substitute	
for all paper documents in use at the border of	
a Schengen State.	
Use of EDI should be facilitated by	
harmonising and standardising legislation on	
binding force or consequences. Border	
authorities of the Schengen port where a	
vessel is leaving its berth should transfer the	
updated electronic data in good time to the	
authorities of the next Schengen port of	
destination.	
9.2 Air borders	
9.2.1 Crews	
Crews should be checked systematically	have a special facility for priority checks on
	crews
9.2.2 Cargo flights	
Systematic check should also be applied for	officers should go to cargo flights to meet the
crews of cargo flights	staff
9.2.3 Procedure for transit passengers	
(airport)	
A separate transit area for non-Schengen	Possibility to perform checks in the
passengers should be available	(international) transit zone

Recommendations	Best practices
9.2.4 General aviation	
9.3 Checking of trains	

Trains should be under proper and continuous surveillance from border to border check point. Actual border checks may be carried out on the moving train, or at the railway station either on board the train or in the fixed premises used specifically for those purposes. Border management authorities should have effective tools to check travel documents and consult online databases at their disposal in all cases. All passengers and crew (and train) should be checked according to Schengen rules (Art. 6 of the Schengen Convention). Trains should be under continuous surveillance from border to border check point (e.g. patrols, technical surveillance, video).

Platform area for external traffic trains to be physically separated from internal traffic ones. Possibilities of avoiding border checks should be prevented and arrival area should be under proper control.

Pre-frontier checks together with border authorities of neighbouring third countries may be effective, if the relevant jurisdictional requirements are met and reciprocal trust exists between (a) neighbouring countries and (b) between the Schengen partners. Agree on cooperation with train carriers. This cooperation should, where appropriate, be formalised by providing a list of passengers to border authorities in good time beforehand.

mobile SIS equipment on trains (checks before crossing the border and on hotspots)

PART TWO: REMOVAL AND READMISSION

1. INTRODUCTION

The fight against illegal immigration is a major concern for all the Member States of the Union. Freedom of movement within the Schengen territory requires a corresponding reinforcement of the external borders around that territory, and an effective and dissuasive policy on the removal of illegal aliens.

Article 23(1) of the Schengen Convention states that third-country nationals (ie non-EU and non-EEA nationals) who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the short-stay conditions applicable within the territory of a Schengen State shall normally be required to leave the territories of the Schengen States immediately. When departure is not voluntary, or if the immediate departure of the third-country national is necessary for reasons of national security or public order, removal is to be carried out in accordance with the national law of the Schengen State in which he was apprehended.

Thus, while the Schengen Convention clearly states the need for removal, the Schengen acquis on the subject is very limited as the Schengen States are free to define the circumstances and implementation of such measures.

Some harmonisation of legislation has taken place in the context of Directive 2001/40/EC, cited above, on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third-country nationals, the aim of which is to ensure more effective enforcement of these measures and better cooperation between Member States.

The method used to draw up the document was firstly to establish a snapshot of existing national practices and then to choose from this range those practices which seemed to be moving in the direction of greater effectiveness. The list thus drawn up is indicative and non-exhaustive.

RECOMMENDATIONS	BEST PRACTICES
2. REMOVAL MEASURES	
These should comply with the rule of law and be based on law. These should be adopted in compliance with the provisions laid down in:	Effective removal from the territory. To achieve this, combine the measure, if appropriate, with a ban on the third-country national returning to the territory for a sufficiently long period and incorporated into the SIS in order to be dissuasive.
 the European Convention on Human Rights of 4 November 1950, 	Failure to comply with a ban on returning to the territory could incur sanctions.
 the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, 	
 the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967, 	
 the International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989, 	
 the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 13-14 October 2000. 	
- <u>Objective</u> : To achieve the return of the third-country national subject to the measure to his country of origin or to a country which will admit him.	

- <u>Two types of decision</u> :	
 Administrative based on: 	
the failure to comply with rules on entry or residence of third-country nationals,	
a threat to public order or national security.	
 Administrative or judicial sanction in connection with criminal offences of a certain level of seriousness. 	
Guarantees granted	
Possibility for the detained third-country national to appeal against the measures imposed on him.	Allow the third-country national to exercise the rights granted to him.
3. PERSONS CONCERNED	
3.1. Illegal third-country nationals	
If the third-country national does not comply with this decision, he should be removed.	In this case the decision requesting him to leave the territory may be followed up with a check on departure from the territory.
	If the third-country national does not comply with the requirement to leave the territory, he should be placed on both the national and, if appropriate, SIS wanted persons lists.
	To ensure the credibility of the system, deliberate resistance to removal may be subject to specific sanctions, which will

	obviously not affect the initial removal order,
	which should be enforced.
	which should be enforced.
3.2 Third country notionals whose	
3.2. Third-country nationals whose	
presence constitutes a threat to public	
order or national security	
(1-2): Particular case of unaccompanied	
minors	
The following recommendations or best pra-	ctices are only applicable to the extent that
they are allowed by the national legislation of	of each Schengen State.
- The removal of unaccompanied minors	- The removal of unaccompanied minors as
while ensuring the best interests of the child	soon as possible while preserving the interests
and respect for the provisions of the	of the child. As far as possible ensure that
International Convention on the Rights of the	minors are accompanied and taken charge of
Child of 20 November 1989.	upon arrival.
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF REMOVAL	
MEASURES	
4.1. Identification	
- Identification, particularly by the finger-	Establishment of a national third-country
printing of third-country nationals subject to a	nationals file.
removal measure.	
- Inclusion in a data file of third-country	
nationals who apply for a visa or	
residence permit. To be implemented	
in the future. (Conclusions of JHA	
Council on 20 September 2001).	

- For the purposes of non-admission, complete the record by indicating grounds.

4.2. Detention

Third-country nationals who constitute a threat to public order or national security must be detained during the period preceding implementation of the removal order.

This is necessary when the person cannot be removed rapidly, in particular because he does not possess a travel document.

Detention may be used to prevent the third-country national avoiding a measure for his removal and to prepare for implementation of the measure.

- Need for specific premises Third-country nationals subject to a removal order must in principle be held in special centres with a proper legal status distinguishing them very clearly from prison institutions, equipped with facilities which guarantee accommodation and hygiene conditions respecting human dignity. The facilities should also allow those detained there to exercise their rights (interpreters, visits, health care, etc.).

- Guarantees

Possibility for the detained third-country national to appeal against the measures imposed on him.

[1
- Minors	
They can be detained only in specific cases	It would be appropriate to provide for
and in compliance with the International	alternatives to detention for minors.
Convention on the Rights of the Child of	
20 November 1989.	
- Duration	
The duration of the period of detention of	This objective justifies an appropriate period
third-country nationals is a decisive factor in	of detention.
the removal measure, the aim being to allow	
the service responsible for removal the time	
strictly necessary for practical organisation of	
the departure.	
4.3. Issue of consular laissez-passers	
Laissez-passers obtained from consular	Use all appropriate means, including consular
authorities within time limits compatible with	authorities visiting detention centres.
the periods of detention.	
To this end, strengthen consular cooperation	
4.4. Financing removals	
Examination of the possibility of the costs of	Examination of the possibility of the costs of
removal being borne by:	removal being borne by:
the third according to the set him set for	the third country notional himself
- the third-country national himself;	- the third-country national himself;
- the facilitators.	- the person who provided accommodation for
	the third-country national or by whoever sponsored the third-country national in a
	sponsorship declaration when the
	third-country national was issued with a visa
	or residence permit;
	- the person employing the third-country

	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	national illegally;
	- the facilitators.
	Possibility of charging the removal and
	detention costs to the abovementioned people.
	- Possibility of sanctions if they do not pay.
4.5. Escort	
Where necessary, escorts are provided by	
officials specially trained for the task.	The introduction of special European charters
	could contribute to improving the removal
The removing State should conduct a risk	arrangements.
assessment of the person being removed to	
determine whether the use of escort is	
required, and if so, the number of escorts	
necessary.	
The carrier involved in the actual execution of	
the removal should be informed about the	
results of the risk assessment in accordance	
with the Chicago Convention of	
7 December 1944 and the standards and	
recommendations adopted by ICAO.	
- Readmission	
Readmission agreements generally provide	Develop cross-border cooperation between all
for two categories of persons who may be	of the competent authorities concerned.
readmitted: the country's own nationals, and	-
nationals of third countries. There may also	
be provisions on transit.	

Readmission makes the Member States and	Introduce effective readmission policies using
the third States responsible for controlling	all means available whether in legal
their borders efficiently.	instruments (readmission agreements,
	introduction of readmission clauses into other
This special procedure consists of removing	kinds of agreement, etc.) or in practical terms.
illegal third-country nationals in State A to	
State B which is their State of origin and/or	
transit, and of requiring the latter to receive	
them.	
Readmission takes place at particular points	Response to the readmission request as soon
determined in each agreement. It is	as possible.
indispensable that the authorities of the	
readmitting State should be physically	
capable of accepting returnees as soon as the	
decision of acceptance is taken.	

The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis, to provide an example for those States acceding to Schengen and also those fully applying to the Schengen acquis. With this in mind the Catalogue gives a good indication to the candidate countries for accession to the European Union as to what is expected of them, particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen.