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a survey

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

General directorate of parliamentary
documentation and information

In addition to the official acts published in the Official Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of the European Communities are reported on in publications appearing at regular intervals.

Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publishes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communities while the European Parliament issues a periodical Information Bulletin on its own activities.

The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a special section of the Bulletin of the European Communities.

The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve as a supplement to the above publications. It deals with salient features of the process of European integration taking place outside Community bodies.

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
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P a r t I

DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

at the National Level



I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

Austria

Austria and the EEC

Introduction

Austria applied for negotiations to be opened with the EEC as far back as 1961. Five rounds of negotiations were held in 1965 and the sixth in February 1966, when the 'negotiating mandate' given to the Commission by the Council of Ministers expired. It was only at the beginning of December 1966 that a new mandate, which did not, however, yet cover all the subjects of negotiation, was granted by the Council of Ministers.

1. Problems and viewpoints

On 11 November 1966, a few days before the official visit to Austria of President Podgorny of the USSR, Federal Chancellor Klaus gave an assurance in Linz that Austria would not sign any treaty with the EEC incompatible with the State Treaty and Austrian neutrality. The substantial balance-of-payments deficit was, however, forcing the Austrian Government to seek a special arrangement with the EEC. In many sectors Austrian exports were becoming increasingly sensitive to tariff discriminations. The enormous import surplus could not be dealt with only through government planning; what above all else was needed was to improve the competitive capacity of Austrian exports. In an interview with the Paris journal 'Combat', Dr. Klaus again pointed out that Austria aimed at concluding a special treaty with the Common Market which would take Austrian neutrality fully into account.

Prior to President Podgorny's arrival in Vienna, Soviet papers renewed their attacks on any association of Austria with the Common Market. In the past the Kremlin had on a number of occasions made it quite plain to Vienna that it would regard Austrian entry into the Common Market as an 'indirect economic link with Germany' contrary to the provisions of the Austrian State Treaty. The argument that a link with the EEC was economically vital to Austria and would threaten neither its neutrality nor its political independence had not been accepted by Moscow. The Kremlin in particular referred to the 'Atlantic character' of the Rome Treaty and to Germany's strong position in the Common Market.

In the talks between Dr. Klaus and Mr. Podgorny, Russian opposition to an association of Austria with the EEC played a crucial rôle. Podgorny warned against any link with the EEC, which was an alliance of six NATO States. In Moscow's eyes, Austrian neutrality could not be reconciled with an organization whose members were bound by military ties. Mr. Podgorny, however, hinted that Russia might tolerate a trade agreement between Vienna and Brussels. He referred to Article 4 of the State Treaty which forbade Austria to establish any link, in whatsoever form, with Germany. This Article would have to be considered by the Austrian Government in the event of any agreement in Brussels, since Germany was clearly the leading member of the EEC.

At the close of his visit Mr. Podgorny warned against any approach by Austria to the Common Market. In a radio and television broadcast on the eve of his departure, he put forward the Russian view that any arrangement with the EEC would result in Austria's being bound not only by economic but also by certain political obligations; this would amount to a departure from the Austrian State Treaty and from the course of neutrality. This out-of-hand rejection of any form of arrangement with the Common Market aroused all the more resentment in Vienna because President Podgorny did not even any longer leave the door open for a trade agreement between Vienna and Brussels.

After Mr. Podgorny's departure, Dr. Klaus announced at the Carinthian Industrial Conference in Klagenfurt on 24 November 1966 that Austria would go on as before seeking an arrangement with the EEC because its very existence depended on it. Austrian exports to the EEC had already dropped from 50 to 45 per cent, and trade with Eastern Europe provided no substitute. Dr. Klaus emphasized that President Podgorny's remarks had altered nothing as far as Austria's negotiations with Brussels were concerned. 'We shall always, and with great patience, discuss the EEC arrangement with the Soviet Union, but we shall not enter into negotiations with Moscow on the subject. The negotiations are strictly between Brussels and Vienna and nobody else.' In an interview with the 'Industriekurier' Dr. Klaus repeated that the statements

that had been made on T. V. and on other occasions by the Russian visitors regarding Austria's efforts to reach an agreement with the EEC were devoid of any influence.

On 7 December 1966 the EEC Council of Ministers handed the EEC Commission a fresh mandate to negotiate with Austria; this covered guidelines for two-way tariff cuts, trade with the Eastern countries, and agriculture.

Before the discussions, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had briefed his EEC colleagues on the talks held with Mr. Joncic, the Austrian Foreign Minister, when the latter met Mr. Couve de Murville in Paris in the interval between Mr. Podgorny's State visit to Austria and Mr. Kosygin's visit to Paris. As one of the three signatories to the Austrian State Treaty, France reminded its EEC partners that in any negotiations with Austria, that country's obligations in respect of neutrality would have to be considered at every phase.

The fresh mandate granted to the EEC Commission was warmly welcomed in Austrian Government and industrial circles. The Austrian People's Party, which carries the responsibility for government, dwelt on the fact that France had approved the mandate; France was the only EEC signatory to the 1955 Austrian State Treaty and had therefore undertaken to supervise compliance with the provisions of that treaty. In Government circles it was underlined that French consent had made it quite clear that the 'special arrangement' with the EEC which Austria was seeking was reconcilable with the State Treaty.

At the end of the first phase of the new round of the Brussels negotiations on 16 December 1966, the EEC and Austria confirmed the need for a 'large degree of autonomy' for Austria in developing an independent commercial policy towards Eastern Europe in order to 'establish a harmonious development of trade' with East European countries. The second round of the new phase of negotiations between the EEC and Austria began in Brussels on 30 January 1967 with a discussion of agricultural questions. Two-way tariff reductions, Austria's alignment on the EEC's external tariff and the special case of Austria's trade with the Eastern countries were among the subjects discussed.

Austria was prepared, in the event of a future agreement with the EEC, to adopt the common external tariff within two years. Once the agreement came into effect Austria would bring its external tariff towards non-member countries closer by 25 per cent to that of the EEC, by a further

35 per cent a year later, and by the remaining 40 per cent in the following year. This proposal was put forward by the Austrian delegation in the round of negotiations with the EEC Commission concluded on 2 February 1967. Austria is thus prepared to approximate its external tariff towards non-member countries to that of the EEC more rapidly than the Community expected. The EEC had suggested that the process be spread over a period of three years in four stages.

At this point the negotiating mandate received by the Commission from the EEC Council of Ministers therefore expired. As, however, the Council of Ministers is already preparing a 'partial mandate' covering questions of economic policy, it appears possible that negotiations will be resumed at a fairly early date.

Following the end of the second phase of the negotiations and before leaving for Vienna, Dr. Bock, Vice-Chancellor and Economics Minister, said that he saw no insuperable difficulties in the way of the 'special arrangement' sought with the EEC by Austria. He felt that the will to conclude such an arrangement existed in the Community.

In an address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg on 25 January 1967, Dr. Bock said that Austria wished to conclude with the European Economic Community an agreement relating purely to economic problems. Austria's permanent neutral status debarred it from sharing in the EEC's political decisions. Dr. Bock also mentioned that his country would expect to have the right to give notice. Customs duties between Austria and the EEC should be eliminated over a four-year period; Austria itself would like to approximate its tariff to the EEC's common tariff over a period of two years.

On 15 December 1966 Austria applied to the ECSC for the speedy opening of negotiations on a special agreement between Austria and that Community. As stated in Vienna, an agreement with the ECSC would have to be concluded alongside of the negotiations for Austria's arrangement with the EEC since the EEC Treaty would upset the conditions of competition for Austria without simultaneous provision for the products of industries producing and using iron and steel.

Austria's interests in the ECSC sector lie mainly in special and high-grade steels. In 1965 about 40 per cent of Austria's iron and steel exports went to ECSC countries from which, in turn, it imported some 56 per cent of its requirements of iron and steel products. Austria purchased 26 per

cent of its hard coal and 53 per cent of its coke on the Community market. In addition, 77 per cent of Austria's total imports of machinery and vehicles were from ECSC countries. Dr. Bock referred to the ECSC's importance for Austria, reflected in these figures, in a letter to the ECSC Council of Ministers in which the Austrian Government conveyed its official application for the opening of negotiations between Austria and the European Coal and Steel Community.

In an interview with Austrian journalists in May 1967 Dr. Klaus explained that the EEC remained the key to integration for Austria, which saw no other way of avoiding discrimination against its external trade. Trade with the Eastern countries offered no alternative for Austrian industry. Austria, however, must realize that events in Brussels would not move as rapidly as the Austrians imagined. In further negotiations on the special arrangement with the EEC desired by Austria, political factors would come more and more to the fore.

2. Italy vetoes Austrian association with the EEC

It is a circumstance of great political importance that Italy had decided to oppose Austrian association with the ECSC and the EEC. This is Rome's answer to the outrage at Cima Vallona in which four Italian soldiers were killed close to the Austrian border.

It was realized in Rome that this form of sanction was the one Austria feared most of all. Austria had been asking for association with the Common Market for a very long time; its trade and industry and its development programme were completely geared to this prospect.

A section of the Italian press attributed the veto against Austria's association with the ECSC to an initiative of Mr. Fanfani, the Foreign Minister.

The Austrian public is greatly dismayed to find that Italy has officially linked up the problem of South Tyrol with the Austrian request for an arrangement with the EEC and ECSC and is trying to exert pressure on Vienna via Brussels and Luxembourg. Vice-Chancellor Bock, the Minister responsible for integration policy, issued a statement to the effect that up till now the attitude on both sides had been that the problem of South Tyrol should

have no influence on any other relations between Austria and Italy. It would be a very great pity if any link were established between the reprehensible events in the Sextental and Austria's negotiations with the EEC and the ECSC.

The Austrian Federal Government is determined to put up strenuous resistance to the Italian policy of blocking Austria's negotiations with the EEC because of terrorist activities in the South Tyrol. Austria has fully briefed all friendly governments on its attitude in this matter. Vice-Chancellor Bock summoned the Ambassadors of Italy's five EEC partners and argued against any link between the South Tyrol problem and Austria's hopes of integration. It is understood that it was made plain that Austria would never accept the coupling together of these two problems, which had nothing in common, and that it looked to the Governments of the other five EEC countries to adopt the same attitude.

The Federal Government of Germany continued to maintain a positive attitude towards Austria's efforts to secure a special arrangement with the EEC. An assurance to this effect was given to Dr. Bock by Foreign Minister Brandt on 3 July 1967. Dr. Bock has asked Mr. Brandt, who from 1 July 1967 had presided over the Council of Ministers of the European Community, that negotiations between the EEC and Austria be speeded up. During the conversation, reference was made to the Italian Government's intention to permit a link between Austria and the EEC only if the Government in Vienna showed signs of good behaviour on the question of South Tyrol. As announced by the spokesman of the Federal Foreign Office on 3 July 1967 to the press, the Federal Government intends to exchange views with the Italian Government in the near future. The fact that the German Foreign Minister largely supports Austria's interest in the EEC means, in the view of political observers, that the Federal Government does not consider the link-up of the EEC problem with the South Tyrol question reasonable.

Asked by Mr. Ertl (F. D. P.) in the Bundestag whether the Federal Government was prepared to support the admission of Austria even if Italy applied its veto on the grounds that Austria's conduct in the South Tyrol issue was open to criticism, Mr. Brandt, the Foreign Minister, replied that his Government would back Austria's application for association with the EEC and ECSC to the hilt. He expressed the hope that the difficulties raised by the Italian statement at the end of June on the incident in South Tyrol and relations between Austria and the European Communities would soon be disposed of so that negotiations with Vienna could be continued.

Since the visit of Mr. Pompidou, the French Prime Minister, to Vienna in mid-September, Austrian ideas about the course of integration,

long entertained by the public in Austria and carefully nurtured by Dr. Klaus' Government, had become somewhat irresolute. What the repeated attacks from Moscow and the Italian veto had not achieved, the marked reserve displayed by Mr. Pompidou to Austria's hopes of integration had in part brought about. The Austrian public had had to admit that it had underestimated the obstacles standing in the way of a 'special arrangement' between the EEC and Austria.

A process of reappraisal has now begun in Austria. Alternatives to such an arrangement are being sought, or - since these do not present themselves - at least intermediate solutions.

An interesting discussion on integration problems, in which Dr. Bock and Dr. Kreisky, former Foreign Minister, took part, was recently shown on Austrian television. Both these gentlemen had for years backed the integration policy during the Grand Coalition but today faced each other as bitter opponents. Dr. Kreisky called for immediate alternative arrangements from the Government. He suggested that Austria should first seek a preliminary arrangement with the EEC which, while leaving all doors open, would take the edge off tariff discrimination against Austrian exports in the EEC. Kreisky still feels that agreements must be entered into in the foreseeable future between EEC and EFTA countries, and that these could be bilateral and need not necessarily be regional in character. This would leave more room for an arrangement between Austria and the EEC. A further step towards the Common Market could follow as a third stage, but only if tension in Europe was substantially eased.

In his reply, the Austrian Chancellor stated that the 'special arrangement' with the EEC sought by Austria was the bare minimum of anything approaching integration. A great deal had been achieved in the Brussels negotiations and it would be wrong to allow this to be jeopardized by the political difficulties that always arose in international negotiations. Austria should follow the example of Britain which was not allowing itself to be put off by France's negative attitude.

(Die Welt, 12 and 22 November 1966, 4 February 1967;
Le Monde, 13/14 November 1966, 5/6 February 1967, 29 June 1967;
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16, 17 and 26 November 1966,
3 February 1967, 29 June 1967, 5 July 1967, 8 August 1967;
Combat, 17 November 1966;
Industriekurier, 6 December 1966;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 13 December 1966;
Europa No. 1, 15 January 1967)

Belgium

1. The celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Treaties of Rome

On 24 May 1967, Mr. Radoux (Socialist) addressed two urgent questions to the Prime Minister and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

- a) 'Are they determined to take advantage of the opportunity of the Rome summit meeting to propose that a vigorous effort be made to bring about a monetary union and a common policy for energy, these being essential to the establishment of the European Economic Union ?'
- b) 'Is the Belgian Government determined to propose that the quarterly meetings of the Foreign Ministers, which were discontinued at the beginning of 1961, should be resumed, without prejudice to improving the consultation arrangements on the Western European Union ?'

In reply to the first question, Mr. Harmel, Foreign Minister, stated: 'It goes without saying that on this occasion every member State, or at least Belgium, will indicate what further steps appear to them to be necessary and possible, particularly in the economic sphere, to which you referred by mentioning energy, transport, taxation, company law, monetary problems and in short the whole range of questions that are on the drawing board but in relation to some of which progress is slow.'

From Mr. Harmel's reply to the second question, the following passage may be quoted: 'We believe that this unification of foreign policies - and our views in this matter are certainly the same - must be effected within the Treaty framework and with all our partners. The normal context for progress with regard to the political Europe is the Treaty of Rome because this Treaty established the setting - which is not a political one - for the construction of Europe.'

This being the case, we believe that this political unification is the final stage and that one important aspect of it is the integration of foreign policies. This does not mean it must necessarily be regarded as remote. It is our intention that it should be as close as possible, but it is the final stage, as I was saying, in European integration.

On this long road, this road of European integration - which seems to several of us to have been so long already - we believe that it would be desirable at the Rome meeting for the Foreign Ministers to be asked at least to determine, at subsequent meetings, how discussions between them might lead to a greater harmony between the policies of the member States.

We believe that informal meetings can be of great value. We believe that if we wish to give a certain solidity to the means employed in unifying foreign policies, the Foreign Ministers should begin by discussing how unifying foreign policies can be made to progress in an organic manner and we believe that this would be a valuable point for discussion at their future meetings.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Parliamentary Records, Session of 24 May 1967)

A month later, on 29 June 1967, Mr. Moreau de Melen (Christian Democrat) put an oral question to Mr. Harmel concerning what was said at the Rome meeting. Indeed the Belgian Senator referred to the official Gazette of the French Republic, quoting the reply of Mr. Couve de Murville to Mr. Pleven; this called into question the attitude of Belgium. The French Minister stated, *inter alia*, in the National Assembly :

'I am sorry that Mr. Pleven was not present at the Rome meeting; perhaps he would have been convinced after hearing the statements made by my Dutch and Belgian colleagues : in reality these countries do not want political co-operation. They do not want it because they fear it for the very reason which Mr. Pleven gave and that is the fear of being obliged to fall into line with the opinion of powers greater than they are. So they take cover behind the United Kingdom. This it, in fact, invoked as an alibi for refusing to make a start on this political co-operation and we are told : accept the United Kingdom and the political Europe will become possible.'

The Belgian Foreign Minister thanked the Senator for giving him this opportunity of giving a precise definition of Belgium's attitude:

- a) 'The Belgian Government is deeply attached to the ideal of political unification and would support any move which would make it practically possible to achieve this end.'
- b) 'Would this co-operation which would spring from the initiative of the six Governments be open to other States? We would add in this connexion that without prejudice to the accession to the Rome Treaty of those countries

which have recently made their applications, we feel it is necessary to have prior consultations with them on these matters, so that they should not subsequently find themselves a party to political deliberation arrangements - for which there is, furthermore, no provision in the Treaty of Rome - which they would subsequently be obliged to accept simply because they had acceded to this Treaty.'

- c) 'How would such deliberations be prepared ? Who would take the chair ? Would there be a permanent Secretariat or not ? These are procedural questions that require to be answered.'

Lastly, with reference to enlarging the Economic Community, Mr. Harmel stated : 'Europe will continue to be incomplete if it does not include the United Kingdom which appears to us to have been one of the "original" instruments of Europe . . . this, because of its parliamentary tradition and its geographic position in the world. This concept, however, does not mean that we cannot look into political co-operation on the present bases on the conditions to which I have referred . . . we believe that it will only be possible to build a political Europe by recourse to the method of Community endeavour and deliberations. This Community concept implies that we should have the greatest respect for one another, whatever the size of our country, and that there is no tendency for any one State to be predominant in these institutions - this will certainly not be the case as regards Belgium and I hope it will not be the case for any other country'.

(Senate, Parliamentary Records, Session of 29 June 1967)

The future of Euratom

Mr. Tindemans (Christian Democrat) addressed an oral question to the Government to ask what was its position with reference to the crisis in the European Atomic Energy Community, particularly with reference to its budget. In his view 'energy supplies and the cost price of these will become an increasingly decisive factor in the economy. Events in the Middle East have clearly shown how much Europe depends on oil. This vulnerability can only be overcome by developing the other sources of energy and, for the future, by generalizing the industrial applications of nuclear energy'.

In reply Mr. De Clercq, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Budget, replied : 'It is true that Euratom is at present in a critical situation. Belgium has put forward several compromise proposals but unfortunately there has been no favourable sequel to these so far; they were designed to resolve the whole problem of Euratom's budget for 1967 and at the same time to allow for a start to be made on drawing up Euratom's future programme.

We have to admit that, in future, the position of nuclear energy will no longer be something that can be dealt with separately from the other energy sectors, such as coal, gas and oil. As the honourable member so rightly stressed, recent efforts in the near east have shown how far the economy of Western Europe depends at present on oil resources.

We can only hope that the merger of the Executives (on 1 July) will enable us to revive the Community spirit so that it may be possible to achieve a comprehensive energy policy which will allow Europe to determine its economic future itself. We cannot, however, fail to recognize that the realization of an independent European policy for energy will oblige the member States to make major sacrifices to acquire the basic raw materials.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Summary of Proceedings, Session of 22 June 1967)

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

On 16 May 1967 Mr. Perin (Walloon Party) put a question to Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Prime Minister, on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. When Mr. Humphrey, Vice-President of the United States of America, visited Belgium, the Prime Minister was thought to have spoken of almost complete agreement between the viewpoints of the two countries on this issue. Mr. Perin could not accept that Belgium should assume an attitude of resignation with regard to the power of the USA. The treaty could only be prejudicial to its economic development and to its technological future.

The Prime Minister replied : '..... I am glad to hear you say that pacifism must not mean stupidity. I must make it clear that the treaty concerns the use of nuclear weapons and does not cover the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Americans and the Belgians were furthermore in

agreement concerning the need to set up international control on all sides, so that the states signing the treaty could not subsequently get out of their obligations. Lastly, what is of capital importance is to ensure that nuclear disarmament does not - using control as a pretext - curtail the economic potential and the production potential of the European countries. We stated this formally and with the greatest clarity.

Moreover, we formally stated that as regards Belgium and Europe, we had decided that the prerogatives of Euratom and the nuclear development of Europe could not be prejudiced.

We said that we did not wish to be reduced to begging either for information or for assistance from the two great powers. Mr. Humphrey gave an assurance that the supplies of nuclear fuels would be maintained and that this would go through Euratom, thus quickening the pace of its operation. . . .'

(Chamber of Representatives, Summary of Proceedings, Session of 16 May 1967)

2. The Belgian Government and the United Kingdom application for membership of the European Community

Speaking for the Belgian Government, which met in Council on 19 May 1967, Mr. Vanden Boeynants, Prime Minister, told the press about the position of Belgium concerning the request for accession submitted by several countries to the European Community :

'With the forthcoming summit conference in Rome in prospect, the Council discussed the applications for membership of the European Communities submitted by the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark.

The Belgian position with reference to these applications is well known : the Government is making every effort, in conjunction with its partners, to bring about the creation of a Europe which is strong, which has a solid structure and which is based on solid institutions.

In so far as the essential conditions are respected, the Council is in favour of enlarging the Community in compliance with the terms of the Rome Treaty. It considers that, bearing in mind the statements made by the

Heads of these Governments, particularly Mr. Wilson, the conditions obtain for initiating negotiations. For its part, the Belgian Government will participate in the firm resolve of finding Community solutions to the difficulties arising.'

(Le Soir, 20 May 1967)

3. Statement by Mr. Harmel on Britain's application for accession to the Common Market

In a statement to a French Newspaper, Mr. Harmel, Belgian Foreign Minister, explained Belgium's attitude to Britain's application for accession to the Common Market. In his view, this application had to be seen in relation to the fresh efforts that had been made to unite the EEC member states politically: '... the Six ought therefore not to begin trying, in an underhand manner, to create a political union only a few moments after London has made known its desire to sign the Treaties which founded the European Communities. A resumption between the Six of the talks on the subject, which were broken off in April 1962, could not take place - this is the least we can do - without talks being engaged with the British at the same time.'

The Belgian Minister was in favour of British accession for several reasons :

- a) the European Community is open. The countries which founded this Community expressed their desire - at the outset - to welcome other European countries to their number. The possible enlargement of the Community therefore raises no new political issue:
- b) the Europe of the Six is liable to become too small if one of its members tends, by the action it takes to carve out for itself a pre-dominant position and if another endeavours to follow its example:
- c) it would be almost incomprehensible if the United Kingdom, which is drawn both to the United States and to Europe, were thrown back from the latter to the former:
- d) the economic and social situation in the United Kingdom cannot be used as an argument for rejecting its application. 17 years ago such an argument would have made it impossible to create the Community Europe.

Mr. Harmel, therefore, felt that talks should be initiated. He could not accept the argument, based on Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, that the opinion which the Commission had to express at the request of the Council should necessarily precede the opening of negotiations which would then be decided upon by the Council. If they were placed in such a situation, the Commission and the Council would not be able to pronounce with a full knowledge of the facts or give a reasoned opinion. It would be preferable for the Commission's Opinion and the Council's Decision to come at the end of the negotiations. Under the Treaty, the member States had a 'legal obligation' to begin negotiations the moment an application was made, in so far as the States applying,

1. accepted the ultimate political objective of European unification laid down in the Treaty of Rome,
2. endorsed what had already been achieved without calling into question the guiding principles underlying the regulations and decisions that had come into force, and
3. accepted the Community institutions.

(Le Monde, 25-26 June 1967)

France

1. Statements by General de Gaulle on European problems

a) at his press conference on 16 May 1967

'... It is not the first time, it is the third time that the six States of the European Community are to hold a summit meeting. At the instance of France, summit meetings were held in Paris and then in Bonn in 1961. At that time our view was that since the Six had been able to organize their economy; to begin to organize their economy, it was conceivable that they would agree to make arrangements between themselves to make a start on political co-operation. It is also well known that this attempt was unsuccessful because our partners as a whole did not at that time envisage that Europe could exist on its own or that it could deal with questions concerning defence and politics outside the NATO framework, that is to say, independently of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Now the Italian Government has taken the initiative to bring together in Rome the six Heads of State or Government, firstly to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome and also to discuss subjects they will choose, including political issues. France will go willingly to Rome.

I will not of course prejudice what might be dealt with at this summit meeting; I would simply say that it would appear that an impression of solidarity between the Six has for some time now been emerging. I am speaking of the solidarity vis-à-vis the world at large. This stems perhaps partly from the large-scale tariff confrontation which finished last night and at which an agreement was reached by reciprocal concessions and which showed that the Atlantic States, the most Atlantic States, I mean the United States, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, have interests which differ essentially from those of the continentals.

This was perhaps also due to the very strong pressure which the Americans and the British brought to bear on Europe to accept the creation of artificial monetary reserves, which were described as liquidities, at the expense of Europe and to the benefit of the Anglo-Saxon deficit balances.

These liquidities would in fact no longer have to be backed by gold and would constitute a new source of inflation and of inexhaustible inflation which add to that which already stems from arbitrary and excessive issues and exports of dollars under the cover of the Gold Exchange Standard. Lastly this strengthening of the European spirit among the Six stems perhaps also from the threat with which they are faced in the technological sphere from the sweeping advance of the Americans.

Yet it is above all in the political sphere to be seen of course in conjunction with defence that the attitude of the United States, supported by the British, has shown the Six what purely European reason they could find for acting together whether in regard to Europe's security or easing tension or to finding an agreement and in co-operation with the East European countries so as to open the door to a settlement of the German problem. Or again in regard to the war which is ravaging and getting worse in Asia or again to the assistance to be given to the third world by the developed countries etc.

In short, it would appear that a favourable juncture for new and, if I may say so, less formal contacts, has now been reached between the Six. France will once again willingly accept the invitation to go to Rome while fully understanding just up to what point and for what reason the clear truths and realities with which we are faced may still appear to be complex and diverse to each of the partner States.

I would now like to reply to you on the question of the United Kingdom in relation to the Common Market.

You asked me this question some months ago. Well, now I am going to tell you what I think. Naturally I should not like to prejudge what might possibly - I say possibly - ensue in regard to negotiations. I am not referring to this, I am simply referring now to general ideas and to an overall review of the subject. And I believe it is necessary to make things clear. I should like to begin by saying that the trend in the United Kingdom which appears to be impelling it to form links with Europe instead of keeping well away, is one that can only satisfy France; and this is why we note sympathetically what would appear to indicate the intention manifested by and the approach made by the British Government.

For our part, there could be no question of a veto; nor has there ever been any question of a veto. It is simply a matter of deciding whether a successful conclusion is possible within the framework and under the conditions of the present Common Market without introducing a destructive disturbance. Or else under what other conditions and in what other case this could

be so. Unless we are willing to safeguard what has just been built until one day it appears conceivable to welcome a United Kingdom which had for its part and on its own account undergone a profound transformation.

I have referred to destructive disturbances in the Common Market. We all know that a ten year gestation period has been necessary to build it and that it has required a sustained effort in the field of co-operation on the part of the Six. No one has forgotten how critical for example the discussions were which resulted in the agricultural community, for indeed, it was not just a question of the Treaty of Rome; it was above all a matter of adding a great many regulations to the Treaty which involved a scrupulous balance between the various interests of the member States.

With reference to the agricultural community, an extraordinary adjustment was made which affected production, prices, trade, financial conditions, etc. Then again, the Six have not completed their construction work for they now have to deal with some very tough problems: energy, taxation, social charges, transport, etc. And then, when they have completely constructed the edifice they must live together, that is to say, that from year to year they will submit to the regulations, compromises, and sanctions which are and which will be established. In short, the Common Market constitutes a kind of prodigy.

To introduce, at this stage, massive and new factors into the midst of those that we have had such difficulty in bringing into unison, would obviously be calling into question both the whole and the details and it would raise the problem of a totally different enterprise. If it has been possible to build this famous edifice, it is because the countries involved were continental States which were the immediate neighbours of each other, which were different from each other in size but which were complementary in the structure of their economy and whose territories together formed a compact geographic and strategic whole.

It should be added that despite and perhaps because of their great battles of former times - I am naturally speaking mainly of France and Germany - they came to give each other mutual support instead of opposing each other. They realized, they also realize now, the potential of their material means and their human value and they all wish at every level, that they may one day together constitute a factor which could be a balance to any other power in the world.

In contrast to the reasons which led the Six to organize their own group, it is very easy to understand the reasons why the United Kingdom,

which is not continental, and which, because of its Commonwealth and its own insularity, is committed beyond the seas, and which is linked with the United States by all sorts of special agreements, should not have been able to merge with a community of definite dimensions and strict regulations.

As the Community began to get organized we saw that the United Kingdom was refusing to be a party to it, even assuming a hostile attitude because it thought that it constituted an economic and political threat. Subsequently, the British Government endeavoured to negotiate membership of the Community but under conditions such that the Community would have been smothered by Britain's accession.

Subsequently another British Government stated that it no longer wanted to enter into the Community and endeavoured to strengthen its links with the Commonwealth and with the other countries grouped with it in a free trade area.

Now the United Kingdom appears to be in a different state of mind and states its readiness to subscribe to the Treaty of Rome, provided it is accorded exceptional and very extended time-limits and that essential changes be made in its application as far as Britain is concerned.

There are many reasons for thinking that to reach this end the obstacles to be overcome are formidable, as was indeed the view stated by the British Prime Minister, because of his profound experience and great perspicacity.

Thus, it is for the agricultural regulations. It is well known that these regulations are designed to ensure that the Community feeds off what it produces and to compensate by what are known as financial levies, the advantage that one or other might gain by importing cheaper foodstuffs from elsewhere. Now the United Kingdom is to a large extent - to a very large extent - supplied with food which it buys cheaply everywhere in the world and particularly in the Commonwealth. If it were to submit to the regulations of the Six, its balance of payments would be shattered by levies and it would be obliged at home to increase the price of foodstuffs to the price level adopted by the Six and it would therefore be obliged to increase the wages of its workers and to sell its products at correspondingly higher prices with correspondingly greater difficulty.

Obviously, Britain cannot do this but to bring Britain into the Community without its being obliged to accept the agricultural dispensations of the Six

would be to destroy this regulation, to shatter it completely; and consequently it would be disrupting the balance of the whole Common Market. As far as France is concerned, this would take away one of her main reasons for belonging to it.

Another essential difficulty stems from the fact that in Britain the rule is that capital should circulate freely to promote expansion. How could this problem be solved? How could the United Kingdom abolish the locks which stem the outflow, the movement of capital out of Britain and conversely how could the Six bring into their organization a partner which would be isolated in such an exorbitant system? How indeed is it not possible to see up to what point and for what reasons the position of the pound sterling alone prevents the Common Market from incorporating the United Kingdom? Indeed, if the Six abolish all trade barriers, this will naturally imply that their currencies shall have a constant relative value and that if one of these currencies were threatened, the Community would re-establish it at once. But this is only possible because the European currencies are in a solid position.

Without there being any need to despair about the pound holding its own, the fact is there will be no assurance, for a long time to come, that it will do so. There is even less of an assurance to be found in the fact that in relation to the currencies of the Six, its special feature is that it is a reserve currency which means that an enormous number of countries in the world and notably the Commonwealth hold enormous credit balances in sterling.

How should we approach this subject? I know that it is sometimes said that a distinction can be made between the position of the pound as a national currency and that of the pound as an international currency. It is sometimes also said that once the United Kingdom, with the pound sterling, were in the organization, the Community would not be obliged to answer for what happened to its currency. This cannot be taken seriously. Monetary solidarity is one of the essential rules, one of the essential conditions of the Common Market. It cannot be extended to our neighbours across the Channel unless one day the pound sterling is in quite a different situation in which its defined value appears secure, unless it ceases to be a reserve currency and unless the debit sterling balances of the United Kingdom within the sterling area are liquidated.

But when and how will this come to be the case? What is true at present from the economic standpoint could also come to apply politically. The idea, the hope which no doubt led Europeans to unite was the idea, the hope of constituting an entity which would be European from every point of view, that is to say, that it would not only carry its own weight in terms of trade and production, but would also be able politically to act for itself and by itself in relation to all comers.

In view of the special relationship between Britain and the United States and its dependencies and the resulting benefits for them and in view of the existence of the Commonwealth and Britain's privileged relationship with it, and since the British still assume or believe they must assume special obligations in various parts of the world, which is where they are fundamentally different from the continentals, it is easy to see how the policy of the Six, on condition that they have one, could in certain cases, in many cases, be associated with that of the British. But it is not possible at all to see how the one policy could become identified with the other.

Lastly, it is true that the British - and this is quite natural - envisage that their participation in the Community would have the effect of inducing the EEC gradually to become something quite different from what it is at present. And in fact when their representatives were seated in the directing bodies, the Council of Ministers, the Council of Deputies, the Committees, the Assembly, representing in its ranks the whole range of economic obligations and interests and the policy of their own countries; if the United Kingdom were immediately joined within this context by the delegations from a certain number of other countries which are with Britain in the free trade area, and which had an equivalent status in terms of numbers and influence, as soon as this came about, it goes without saying that the inspiration, the dimensions and the decisions of what is today the Community of the Six would give way to a completely different inspiration and to completely different dimensions and decisions.

The British furthermore do not conceal the fact that if they were in the Community they would endeavour to obtain changes, particularly in agriculture. But the conditions under which France is at present in the Common Market, both as regards its industry, its agriculture, its trade, its currency and lastly its policy, would bear no relation to those it would find in the new organization to which I am referring.

In fact it would appear that the position of the British in relation to the Six - if one envisaged changing it, if one were in agreement in envisaging changing - would involve, for both sides, one or other of three arrangements.

Either one could accept the United Kingdom's accession with all the exceptions that would be bound to accompany it, with the introduction of new factors both in kind and number that this would inevitably imply and with the participation of new States which would certainly be a corollary to this - this would in fact compel us to construct a quite new edifice and raze what has just been built. What then would be the end result, if not perhaps the creation of a free trade area of Western Europe, pending an Atlantic area which would deprive our continent of its own personality!

Or else, we could create between the Community on the one hand and the British and the EFTA States on the other, an association system for which, furthermore, provision is made in the Treaty of Rome which would multiply and facilitate the economic relations between the contracting parties.

Or else we could wait, in order to change the present state of affairs, until the internal and external development of which the United Kingdom appears to be showing signs is brought to its conclusion. In other words, when this great people which is so magnificently endowed in fact with ability and courage, has accomplished by itself and for its own account the profound political and economic transformation which would enable it to join the Six on the continent.

I believe that this is what is wanted by many of those who would like to see Europe acquire its natural dimensions and who have the profound admiration and sincere friendship for the United Kingdom. If one day this stage were reached, how wholeheartedly France would welcome this historic conversion. '

(Le Figaro, 18 May 1967)

b) in his speech of 10 August 1967

'... However powerful may be the attraction which the United States has for Europeans, our work is to ensure that the Community of the Six becomes for its part on its own account a political reality and hence an essential factor in a peaceful international balance.

... The fact that France, without in any way repudiating its friendship for the Anglo-Saxon nations, but throwing aside the out-of-date and absurd conformism of standing back, is assuming a strictly French attitude about the war in Vietnam, or the conflict of the Middle East, or the construction of a Europe that is European or of the upheavals for the Community of the Six following the accession of the United Kingdom and four or five other States, or relations with the East European countries, or the international monetary question or - no later than yesterday - the unanimous and indescribable determination to be free expressed by the French people in Canada around the President of the French Republic, stupefies and angers the apostles of decline. '

(Le Figaro, 11 August 1967)

c) to the Polish Diet on 11 September 1967

'... It is our conviction that Poland must be for us a partner of the first water in the great world game of the second half of this century, where what is at stake is either peace and progress for all or war and complete destruction.

It is first of all the case, naturally enough, in Europe where everything induces Poland and France to concert their respective efforts with a view to security - their own and that of others. Yet true security for each State in our continent is obviously not going to be the result with two armed blocs facing each other or when there is a confrontation between rival pacts. On the contrary, let there be between all of us, from the Atlantic to the Urals, a deliberate policy and practice of détente, understanding and co-operation for then there would be a chance for everyone, under the new conditions and in the new atmosphere that would ensue, for every one of the European peoples jointly to tackle and themselves to settle the questions that concern them, the main one of which is the future of the German people.

France which like Poland is a neighbour of this great country, and which has throughout history and particularly in this century, greatly suffered as a result of German ambitions, should however undertake, following the collapse of the Reich and now that Germany condemns its misdeeds, to have a frank relationship of reconciliation with its neighbour beyond the Rhine. At the same time, it is endeavouring to consolidate its friendly and constructive contacts in every sphere with the East and Central European States as it has done with those of Western Europe. Is it not reasonable to hope that gradually a European order is gradually coming into being for the common security, involving all the countries of the continent and guaranteed jointly by them all? Yet to achieve such an objective must not Poland and France take the road leading to this goal side by side?

After all a Europe that was no longer divided what an influence it would be able to exert to uphold and maintain peace in every part of the world. If there were a war in Asia, if there were one in the East, if our continent had organized its co-operation ... As for the impetus which our continent, if it were united, would be able to impart to the economic, technological and scientific progress of the whole human race and as for the assistance to the development of peoples that stand in need, it only remains for our two countries, by concerting their efforts in these fields, to give the lead.

- To provide a reciprocal support in their national development, to contribute to the union of Europe, to promote peace and progress for all man-

kind, it would seem that fate is offering Poland and France a unique opportunity for joint action. Ladies and Gentlemen, we, the French, are ready to take such action with you, the Polish.'

(Le Monde, 12 September 1967)

2. Debates in the French Parliament on the Government's policy with regard to the Common Market

a) The National Assembly

During the debate on the Government's policy, which took place in the National Assembly on 20 April, several speakers raised the question of Europe.

Mr. Jean de Lipkowski (Union for the New Republic) was the first to make a major speech, stressing in particular that as regards foreign policy the disagreement between the majority and the opposition was, to a large extent, based on a false controversy.

Are we going, with reference to Europe, to continue to clash during this session over problems that no longer exist, he asked? To build the Common Market or not to do so? Ten years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome, the construction of Europe has progressed further than its initiators predicted. Ten years ago Mr. Giscard d'Estaing spoke in support of the Treaty but asked that an economic and financial recovery policy be applied as a matter of urgency. Mr. Mendes France (.) said that France could not implement the Common Market at the date laid down. Yes, it may be said, but there is Europe and Europe and you have compromised that which gave the enterprise its real meaning, that is to say that you have ended by braking up the machinery by impairing the principle of integration. This criticism is without foundation.

Now Europe has reached a point of no return at the level of economic integration, the cement for which is the common agricultural market. Community solidarity exists. It has already manifested itself. As time goes by the question that will arise to an increasing extent will be whether we wish to create a Europe of responsibilities'

The path of the agricultural Europe leads to such an overlapping of interests that the freedom of manoeuvre of governments is bound to get smaller.

But to record the progress made by the economic Europe should not lead us to evade its natural extension, that is to say the problem of political Europe.

Mr. Bernard Destremau (Independent Republican) then took the floor to speak of the political construction of Europe. He said:

'I would recall that in 1961, at a time when the economic construction of Europe was a long way from having the stability that it has today, the French Government was already beginning to try and find the appropriate framework for its political construction

The recent rapprochement between the six European powers, with reference to certain diagnostics and certain orientations, should induce us to resume talks on political Europe. It would in fact be neither logical nor appropriate for us, after acceding to the economic Europe, to put the brake on the political Europe by our silence, our passive attitude, our lack of conviction

It is also desirable, and this is as true for our partners as for ourselves, not to use the entry of the United Kingdom - which is so desirable but which is so hesitant - into the European Community as a pretext for postponing our enterprises.'

Lastly Mr. Paul Balmigère (Communist) asked if 'the Common Market has measured up to the promises made to the farmers. Germany was to absorb our agricultural surpluses but it is continuing, to a large extent, to obtain its supplies from third countries. Italian competition with regard to fruits and vegetables is something that no longer needs proving

Mr. Edgar Faure has confirmed to us that it will only be with difficulty that we shall be able to change existing trade habits and the present flow of trade. This has always been our answer to those who sought to present the Common Market to the farmers as "the great chance for French agriculture".'

In reply, Mr. Pompidou, French Prime Minister, pointed out: 'And Europe? Heaven knows that we have been accused of wanting to kill Europe, of being the enemies of Europe! Today even though everyone says he is European - everybody or nearly everybody - it seems that the subject is no longer of current interest. Could it be that the completion of the Common Market, the most recent conferences in Brussels and Munich and the announcement of the Rome Conference, have, to some extent, discouraged the critics on the point?'

(French Official Gazette, National Assembly Proceedings, 21 April 1967 - Le Monde, 22 April 1967)

b) The Senate

On 18 April, Mr. Pierre Dumas, Secretary of State, stated in the Senate: 'France intends to pursue the construction of Europe and has demonstrated this by its initiatives, whether it is a question of finalizing the Economic Community, merging the Communities, the action to be taken with regard to harmonizing policies on taxation, energy, etc. It was in this spirit that the President of the Republic willingly accepted the invitation of the Italian Government and will go to Rome This summit meeting of the leaders of the six countries should provide an opportunity for a general, frank discussion which should make it possible to determine the present prospects for political co-operation between the Six. It is equally true that the economic construction and, *à fortiori*, the political construction of the Europe of the Six still calls for sustained efforts and a great deal of careful consideration.'

The debate on this statement opened on 25 April.

Mr. Antoine Courrière, President of the Socialist Group, was the first to speak; he regarded as suspect 'The sudden European fever which the Government seems to have caught. Your Europe is only that of the nation States, that of safes. The Europe we must have is the Europe of the peoples.'

Mr. Jacques Duclos, President of the Communist Group, was the next to take the floor. He said that the Common Market was now appearing 'in its true light' because now unemployment was 'rightly attributed to the exacerbated competition caused by the opening of customs barriers'. Mr. Pinton of the

Democratic Left, felt that the Europe with which the Government was satisfied was a 'simple customs union ; we want, he said, a political union based on universal suffrage'.

A different opinion was expressed by Mr. Bousch (Union for the New Republic) who said 'the European customs union is advancing more quickly than the economic union and we regret this. The harmonization of fiscal and social burdens is still pending, as is the definition of an energy policy. On these points we are expecting much from the forthcoming Rome meeting and we shall judge the European spirit of our partners by their practical proposals.'

Replying very briefly, Mr. Bettencourt, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, concluded: 'The Government will pursue its task, its desire being to ensure the prosperity of all, the construction of Europe, a rapprochement between peoples and peace.'

(French Official Gazette, Senate Proceedings, 25 April 1967; Le Monde, 27 April 1967)

3. Extracts from a Government statement on foreign policy

On 15 June 1967, Mr. Couve de Murville made a statement in the National Assembly on the Government's foreign policy.

'... The situation in Europe offers a striking contrast with the violence unleashed in Asia, in the East as in the West. For the first time for a long time it is not in our continent that there lies a risk that the germ of a world conflict will appear.

The German problem

'It is true that not all the problems arising in this connexion have been resolved. There is still at least one of them whose ultimate solution dominates the future of all of us: the German problem, which others describe as the problem of European security. Even if in this respect nothing is settled, at least a first step has been taken: it is generally recognized that a solution can only be found by means of an agreement to be discussed freely between all in-

interested parties. The cold war is in no way the right context for the negotiations which will have to take place one day; the correct context is a détente, which we have often said should lead to co-operation and understanding.

This has been the position taken by the Federal German Government since the constitution of Chancellor Kiesinger's Government. We attached importance to this statement which is in line with our own view; we also welcomed Bonn's determination to try and normalize its relations with all the East European countries. The Government knows that it can only be a question of the beginning of a long process. But it is important that the process should be started,

France sees this as a further reason for pursuing with renewed vigour the application of the Franco-German co-operation Treaty of January 1963. We have been very pleased at our contacts with Mr. Kiesinger and Mr. Brandt and we are looking forward with interest to the next meeting, which will be a summit meeting, to be held on 12 and 13 July.

Relations with the East European countries

'Such co-operation, if it is based on parallel views concerning international realities, is in no way inconsistent, quite the contrary, with France's policy in its relations with the USSR and the other East European countries; this policy is also to a large extent that of our West European partners and it is recognized by them as being the only one that is at once desirable and possible.

It has become commonplace to say that our relations with the East European countries are satisfactory and are developing steadily. In support of this, there is the evidence of figures, which are still very inadequate but which are growing all the time, of our trade and the efforts made with regard to teaching and using the French language; lastly there is the complex of committees and regular meetings which we have instituted with Russia to work together in every area of industrial, technical and scientific co-operation. This is a comprehensive operation which will bear fruit in the long-term because in fact everything still had to be done or done again; but the start we have made holds out serious prospects.

After the visits made last year by General de Gaulle to the USSR and by Mr. Kossyguine to France, the President of the Republic will go to Poland early in the Autumn and a little later to Rumania; these two nations are united with France by particularly friendly links in many respects. The Prime

Minister will, furthermore, go to Russia in July. It is in this way that we are pursuing the contacts which bear witness to the renewal of our relations with the East European countries.

The Common Market as a whole is a success

'The third aspect of our policy in Europe is the European construction, that is to say the close association, initially at the economic level, of a certain number of States of Western Europe.

For the moment this involves the Common Market, which is on the whole a success. On the eve of the complete opening of the frontiers between the Six and the creation of a single agricultural market, France is beginning to realize what a revolutionary cycle it entered into in 1957.

..... The major international tariff negotiations, known as the Kennedy Round, which have just ended in Geneva will, because of its outcome, accelerate the trend towards economic modernization and an ever-increasing participation in international trade. The only condition we had the right to lay down - and we did this - was that nothing should be concluded except on a basis of strict reciprocity. On the whole - and this is why the Government gave its approval - what was agreed was well balanced; at the same time our sensitive production sectors were afforded adequate protection This was without a doubt a happy outcome with respect to their first steps in international life.

Tribute to Mr. Rey

'It is for me a duty to add that we were represented by a member of their Commission, Mr. Jean Rey, whose ability, loyalty and hard work were to a large extent responsible for the ultimate success. The Government is happy to pay tribute to him in public. These qualities are not unrelated to the fact that Mr. Rey was the choice of the six Governments when it came to appointing the first President of the single Commission which will, on 1 July, take the place of the existing Common Market and Euratom Commissions and of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community.

Political virtualities

'How can one explain that these virtualities have not yet led to a start being made - I do not even mean in terms of action - but towards a form

of organization, even if it were only to involve the consultations and discussions that we outlined six or seven years ago...?

Not all the Six have either the same traditions, the same orientations, or the same concerns. France could easily reach an agreement with Germany and Italy on the value of trying to define a European policy and to make the necessary arrangements for this purpose. The Benelux countries have the feeling that this is neither possible nor even desirable. They have traditional reservations here and their orientation is much less continental; in this they differ from their three main partners. The fear of becoming involved continues to make their attitude one of doubt if not of negation even though, in the economic field, all their interests urge them to associate with us as closely as possible. This is also no doubt why Belgium and the Netherlands are among the Six those who consider imperative the accession to the Common Market of a United Kingdom in which many of the views of their own policy recur and which they regard as a factor for balance in their favour in relation to France and Germany.

The British application

'I come to the problem with which we have been faced since the outset, that is to say since the Common Market was founded without the United Kingdom because the latter refused to join. Many things have changed, not only in the judgments of British Governments but also as regards the United Kingdom itself....

The British application raises formidable problems, to use Mr. Wilson's expression. In the first place the United Kingdom stands before us accompanied by other applicants - Ireland, Denmark and Norway and perhaps others too. The entry of this group of countries would make the Community into something that is different from what it is now. The number would on its own make the Community much more difficult to manage and it would therefore change it into an infinitely looser group. The much greater diversity of interests would make it much more difficult to reconcile them and it would give a different turn to what we call the economic harmonizations. Lastly, different political and economic orientations would bring the continental States into opposition with the other nations grouped around the United Kingdom. In short, the relatively homogeneous system we have now would be completely changed, approximately to that of a free trade area. It would have its own merits but we must recognize that it would be something quite different.

Secondly there is the question as to whether, in the essential spheres, the policy of the Community can become that of the United Kingdom.

It is first of all a question of currency because the sterling area system would appear difficult to reconcile with the operation of our Common Market. Then there is agriculture, for we cannot envisage any change in the principles or in the conditions of application of a policy which constitutes an essential factor in the whole scheme and which it took so much effort to establish and which France would never envisage allowing to fall into disrepair.

Such are the basic factors which the Six have to study. The United Kingdom has applied for membership although in 1961 it simply asked that discussions should be engaged to determine whether the conditions for possible membership existed. Hence the procedure laid down in the Treaty of Rome must be applied: the Council has to decide unanimously what reply shall be given, after consulting the Commission. This is what we shall do. A first discussion will be held in Brussels at the Council meeting of 26 June. This will be continued and we shall have to ask the opinion of the new Commission as soon as it is constituted on 1 July.

Nobody will fail to recognize that it will involve a prolonged and complicated discussion and that the decision to be taken by the Six is of great importance. It is this importance which should induce us to assess with the greatest care all the consequences or all the implications of our conclusions
.....'

(Le Monde, 17 June 1967)

4. Statement by Mr. Couve de Murville on 12 September 1967 on French Radio (ORTF) and on Radio Luxembourg

Summing up the results of General de Gaulle's visit to Poland, Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister, stated, inter alia, in interviews on French radio (ORTF) and Radio Luxembourg:

'With reference to the German problem, which is the major issue in Europe, just as it has been for twenty years, this is not something we were going to settle in a few weeks or in a few months. France has long since laid down the conditions for re-unification. We knew that there were divergencies of view with the Polish Government just as we knew there were divergencies with the German Government. France was not called upon by anyone to bring the Polish Government round to its point of view. We discussed the whole range of problems arising in connexion with Germany frankly and unequivocally. The positions were well-known. We noted once again that these have not changed. But, may I repeat, the purpose of this visit was not to change Poland's viewpoint within a few days.'

'France is a friend of Poland and consequently it would like Poland to assert itself as a nation and as a State. This has nothing to do with a reversal of alliances. It considers it normal that those European countries which have for a long time been bereft of the means of expressing their national personality should begin to do so.'

'This appears to us to be the beginning of a solution to Europe's problems and it is one of the necessary conditions for agreement, for a détente, for co-operation and finally, it is the main condition for a solution to the European problem and in particular the German problem, for it is only the alert and free European peoples which will together be able to achieve something lasting.'

(Le Figaro, 13 September 1967)

5. Extracts from the communiqué published following Mr. Pompidou's visit to Vienna

EUROPE: The two heads of Government 'expressed satisfaction at the progress made towards normalizing and consolidating East-West relations. They expressed their confidence in the result of the initiatives taken by France and by Austria towards a détente and towards closer co-operation between all the countries of Europe, while respecting their sovereignty'.

EEC: 'On this occasion Chancellor Klaus again stressed the importance that this country attaches to establishing close economic relations between Austria and the Community, while bearing in mind Austria's permanently neutral status and the obligations stemming from its Treaty of State. The Prime Minister emphasized that he understood the Chancellor's viewpoint, bearing in mind the political conditions and the problems arising from Austria's economic situation and the needs of its development. In this spirit it was agreed that the two Governments would keep in close touch on this subject.'

(Le Monde, 17 September 1967)

Federal Republic of Germany

1. The Bundestag discusses European policy

On 22 February 1967 the German Bundestag discussed the chances of enlarging the European Economic Community. The debate arose from a question (1) put by the SPD Group in October 1966 on the statements regarding the EEC made in Oslo by Dr. Erhard, the former Federal Chancellor. Although the SPD regarded the question in that form as already out-of-date, it felt it desirable, following the visit of Prime Minister Wilson to Bonn, to hold a discussion on the general theme of Europe.

In addition the Bundestag discussed the motion of the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP Groups concerning the Federal Government's half-yearly report on the activities of the European Community, the Council of Europe and Western European Union (2), and the written report of the Budget Committee (13th Committee) on the SPD Group motion concerning the effects which the EEC's arrangements for financing agriculture would have on the Federal Budget (3).

During the debate Foreign Minister Brandt explained that German policy aimed at strengthening the unity of the European peoples so as to enable Europe to assume its rightful place in the world. The European Economic Community - the economic mainstay of European unification - would have to be built up, consolidated and widened and open its doors to all States that accepted this principle.

Turning to the talks held with Mr. Wilson during his Bonn visit, Mr. Brandt stated that the Federal Government would welcome British entry into the European Economic Community. The Federal Government was ready to put forward this viewpoint in Paris within the context of Franco-German relations. Mr. Brandt pointed out, however, that the talks with Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Secretary Brown had not been in the nature of negotiations but had been of a political and exploratory character. The British Government would not arrive at any decisions until after the visits to Holland and Luxem-

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- (1) Question involving debate put by the SPD Group on European policy, Publication V/1042
 - (2) Publication V/1010
 - (3) Publication V/687, V/1383

bourg. Mr. Brandt added that the talks with Mr. Wilson had clearly indicated Britain's determination to enter the EEC as an equal partner. Another issue was that of transitional arrangements for British agriculture, for which British entry would mean radical changes.

Mr. Brandt went on to say that the Treaty of 8 April 1965 setting up a single Council and a single Commission of the three European Communities had now been ratified by all member Parliaments. The merger of the institutions of the European Communities - which was the aim of that Treaty - would make for greater efficiency and already represented a first step towards the merger of the Communities. Nevertheless there was a long way to go between the merger of the institutions and the merger of the Treaties. The merger would, however, help to solve many problems at present facing the Communities.

Mr. Apel (SPD) pointed out that the British Government sought full membership of the EEC and declined any alternative. The SPD rejected the 'europeanization' of Britain's foreign and defence policies as a condition for its admission into the EEC. Dr. Apel added that it must be possible, given sufficient good will, to smooth the way for Britain's entry. It was certainly clear to the British that, as members of the European Economic Community, they would have to accompany their partners on the road to full political integration.

Dr. Apel pointed out that progress in the European Economic Community had not been uniform. The agricultural market was now almost complete and the 'EEC Customs Union' would be in existence by the middle of 1968. So far, however, no economic policy instruments existed to ensure that the EEC would continue to operate satisfactorily, to organize it and thus shield it from critical situations. The absence of a common economic policy had two major consequences; in the first place the EEC would become more prone to crises; secondly, distortions in the conditions of competition would be aggravated. Dr. Apel went on to point to the lack of an energy policy, which was having an adverse effect on the steel industry and becoming apparent in other sectors where it was also tending to distort competition. What was needed was not a common external trade policy in the shape of uniform customs legislation. The EEC Treaty called rather for an external trade policy covering the standardization of export aids and of overall export policy, as well as common safeguards against dumping and low-priced imports. In the external trade policy field it was also becoming clear to what extent external trade policy and foreign policy influenced each other.

Dr. Apel said that the SPD Group welcomed the fact that the Kiesinger/Brandt Government had not in recent months held a discussion on

the 'true European creed', on questions of supranationality or of the 'democratization' of the Community, or on the upgrading of the European Parliament but, instead, had discussed ways and means of making real progress in Europe.

Dr. Apel welcomed the Federal Government's intention to urge on efforts to merge the three European Executives into a single European Commission. The merger would bring advantages for Europe, although it would not automatically solve all problems. The speed with which Europe would become integrated depended far more on the political readiness of member States to shape the new Europe and to take common decisions. Above all else, it was essential to speed up the geographical enlargement of the EEC and the adoption of a common economic policy, so as to impart a fresh impetus to the European movement.

Mr. Furler (Christian Democrat) was glad to see that the new foreign Minister's statements on European policy did not clash with those made on the subject by the former Federal Government. He, too, stressed that the difficulties which Britain's admission to the EEC would entail were not insuperable. He dwelt on the importance of Britain for other States contemplating membership, a fact highlighted by the position taken up by Norway. He further urged the need for the closest possible association with Austria and an agreement between Spain and the EEC. Turning to the merger of the Executives, he hoped that the first President of the single Commission would be Professor Hallstein. Mr. Furler wound up by discussing the problems of Euratom and warned against the possible risks of the Treaty of the non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

Dr. Mende, FDP Chairman, spoke of shattered hopes in European policy, describing the Community of the Six as a torso of Europe. Now that Britain was making its second attempt to enter the EEC, it was not enough for the Governments to say they would do all in their power to enable it to join. The Federal Government ought rather to do its utmost to prevent a new French veto. Mr. Brandt retorted that the Federal Government could not solve European problems with resounding statements. It had to consider its French partner; in any case the French Government had not yet said 'No'. During his last visit to Paris he and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had arranged to meet again in April when the British Government would have concluded its exploratory talks in the six capitals.

Professor Fritz Burgbacher (CDU) called for suitable instruments for a common short-term economic policy, adding that the Federal Government's short-term economic policy measures could only be effective from the external trade point of view if they had been agreed upon with the EEC. Trade policy towards the Eastern bloc would also have to be co-ordinated in an

EEC context. The customs and agricultural union could only survive in the long run if parallel progress was made in economic and social policies.

Mr. Metzger (SDP) pressed for an early and satisfactory conclusion of negotiations for Israel's association. Israel could not remain satisfied with a relatively insignificant trade agreement. Mr. Metzger also expressed the hope that the efforts of Austria, Morocco and Tunisia to enter into association with the EEC would prove successful.

After a political and economic debate lasting nearly five hours the Bundestag turned to agricultural policy problems. Mr. Röhner (CSU) spoke of the heavy burdens that the Federal budget would in future have to bear. He outlined the discussions of the Budget Committee on an SPD motion in which the Federal Government had been asked to say whether its approval of the financing of agriculture was based on preliminary estimates of the future burden on the budget. On this point Mr. Röhner pointed out that the German contribution to the Agricultural Fund, whose total expenditure in 1968/69 would amount to DM 7,000m., would be around DM 2,200m., an increase of about DM 1,200m. over the figure shown in the current year's draft budget. It should also not be forgotten that settlement in Brussels in the form of refunds was subject to considerable delays. Settlement for 1965 was expected to take place in 1967; only after a time-lag of three years would it be possible to establish whether too heavy an economic burden had been taken on.

Mr. Staratzke (FDP) dwelt on his party's fears that Germany's one-sided concessions in the common agricultural policy could not be honoured. Mr. Dichgans (CDU), a member of the European Parliament, retorted that the Free Democrats always fell into the error of comparing what was achieved with what they wanted to happen instead of with the progress that could reasonably be expected of the EEC. He requested the Foreign Minister to see that after the abolition of internal tariffs the following year, the Federal Government would set an example by not levying the turnover equalization tax at least in the tourist sector. He also urged the Federal Government to back the European Parliament's proposal for the minting of European coins in the form of a new Eurofranc worth DM 4.

Mr. Richarts (CDU) warned that German agriculture was facing a very difficult year of transition, entailing further losses of income owing to the entry into force of the new cereals price and the unreasonably large cuts in the agricultural budget. In addition, transitional difficulties would arise with certain processed products when the Common Market came into force. Mr. Richarts stated that in spite of budget difficulties it was essential to stand by the common system of agricultural financing to avoid adding yet another uncertainty at European level to that already existing as to the agricultural

budget. Such a situation would be equally intolerable to German agriculture. He asked, however, that the massive sums going to and coming from Brussels should be subjected to the closest scrutiny. That this was necessary had been clearly shown, particularly by the scandals recently made public.

At the close of the debate on Europe, the Bundestag called upon the Federal Government to submit in future half-yearly reports in writing on the activities of the European Communities, the Council of Europe and Western European Union. The Federal Government ought also to report on EEC agricultural operations financed out of the Federal Budget.

During a discussion on the Foreign Ministry budget held in the Bundestag on 8 June 1967, several members expressed their views on European policy. Mr. Metzger said that European integration had proved its worth since the European Economic Community had been able to speak with one voice during the Geneva Kennedy Round negotiations. It was to be hoped that the EEC would be able to do so again at the next conference on world trade to be held in New Delhi in the spring of 1968, the Commission having been entrusted with the negotiations. The Commission's presence as a negotiating party would enhance its prestige throughout the world, particularly in the developing countries.

On Britain's entry into the Common Market, Mr. Metzger stressed the Federal Republic's interest in such a development. The EEC member States were expected to consider one another's interests. In this connexion Mr. Metzger referred to the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund which collected substantial funds from which agricultural countries derived the benefit. The Federal Government paid in DM 2,000m. to the Fund, getting back only DM 1,000m. In its turn the Federal Republic, as an industrial nation, was keen to expand its trade, particularly with Great Britain and other EFTA countries. It must be given an opportunity of earning the money which, in turn, it gave out again for the purpose of balancing out interests within the Community. Although the Rome Treaties contained no legally binding provisions on the entry of new States, their sense and spirit implied that other European countries should be permitted to enter it. Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, for example, spoke expressly of the need to permit adjustments for an applicant State, provided, of course, that the State in question accepted not only the Treaty but also any regulations subsequently issued.

With regard to the association of Israel, Mr. Metzger said that its people, who were fighting for their very existence, had a right to be associated with the EEC. The trade agreement that had been in force to date was far from being sufficient. On the association agreement with Greece, he pointed out that the partners were obliged to do their utmost to serve the aims of the

agreement, for example, a future entry. A prerequisite, however, was that the country should be a democratic one in which freedom to form a coalition existed. It was therefore essential from the European point of view that Greece restore a democratic system as soon as possible.

In the same debate Mr. Schmidt (SPD) urged Economics Minister Schiller, Foreign Minister Brandt and Federal Chancellor Kiesinger to define more clearly the German attitude to Britain's application. It must be brought home to the French Government that Britain's entry, and that of Denmark and Ireland, was necessary not only for European progress but also for German interests.

Professor Furler (CDU) made a brief reference to the results of the Rome Conference. Something has been achieved - including the merger of the Executives - but difficult questions still remained to be cleared up. He went in great detail into the position and authority of the Commission as a central institution of the European Communities. The Commission enjoyed the right of initiative and was the driving force behind the policy of the EEC. Whatever decisions had been made in the course of the past nine years had been arrived at on the initiative of the Commission. Professor Furler therefore urged the Federal Foreign Minister to issue constant warnings at ministerial meetings against any undermining of the Commission's position - a main pillar of the European Treaties which, though it might be somewhat lacking in strength in a legal sense, was nevertheless substantial and a factor to reckon with in real terms.

On British entry into the Common Market, Mr. Furler said that the Bundestag and all the Governments had always supported it. The fact remained that at the time the Treaties were ratified Britain had not wanted to enter. Britain had been invited to join at the Council of Europe, in the ECSC and in Messina but British policy at the time had not been ready to accept a European policy such as was now embodied in the EEC. In the meantime the international scene had witnessed changes which now further complicated the problem. No effort ought to be spared to achieve the objective; it would be unwise, however, to look only for external effects. Today a realistic policy was necessary: Britain could only be admitted with the consent of all six States. It was therefore the task of German policy, in the course of long and calmly conducted negotiations, to clear away certain objections and resistance to the entry of Great Britain.

(German Bundestag, 5th Electoral Period, 96th Session, 22.2.1967; German Bundestag, 5th Electoral Period, 111th Session, 7.6.1967)

2. Franco-German consultations in Bonn

The Franco-German consultations held in Bonn on 12-13 July 1967 led to practical arrangements for wider co-operation between the two Governments. On 13 July 1967, at the end of the talks between Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and President de Gaulle, the Government spokesman announced the following decisions by the two delegations:

- a) A joint committee on economic, industrial and technological co-operation is to be set up. It will consist of members of the Governments and of leading public and industrial figures. Detailed proposals as to the composition of the committee are to be made by a minister on each side, in the case of the Federal Republic by Professor Karl Schiller, the Economics Minister.
- b) A responsible person is to be appointed on each side to take charge of co-operation in all sectors. For this purpose, both of these persons can enlist the services of the interministerial committee provided for in the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship.
- c) An investigation is to be carried out into the political and strategic situation likely to exist in the seventies, taking into account the needs of European peace and security.

Dr. Kiesinger described the results of the tenth series of Franco-German consultations as encouraging. The meeting of the two government delegations was to be regarded as a continuation of the revival of the Franco-German Treaty decided upon in January: 'the special and outstanding collaboration between the German and French peoples has proved a success and is both beneficial and necessary for Germany and France.'

The exchange of views held on 12 and 13 July between Economics Minister Schiller and Mr. Debré, French Economics and Finance Minister, was described by political observers in Bonn as thorough and likely to serve as a useful guide. The economic situation in the Federal Republic and France was discussed at the first meeting, and Mr. Debré showed particular interest in the Federal Government's new short-term economic programme. The French Government thought that an upswing in the economic situation in Germany was of great importance for France, particularly as on 12 July the French Government also had decided on measures for putting new life into its own economy.

The two Ministers announced their intention to meet at regular intervals in order to discuss economic co-operation. France and the Federal Republic were aiming at continuous economic growth and stability.

The talks between Dr. Schiller and Mr. Debré were not however confined to economic policy as such. Co-operation in the fields of industrial policy and international monetary policy was also discussed, and this was of particular significance in view of the fact that the Group of Ten were meeting in London a week later.

As announced at the end of the Franco-German talks, discussions on European policy had shown that the deep-seated anxieties of President de Gaulle about admitting Britain to the Common Market had not been lessened in any way. President de Gaulle is understood to have told his German colleagues that the Europe of the Six should not be allowed to break up or the existing European order to expand into an Atlantic system. Great Britain would have to undergo a radical transformation before it became a truly European country. While General de Gaulle did not expressly oppose British entry, he stressed that it would lead to the EEC's losing its present character. The six EEC member States must therefore realize that if Britain did enter, something other than the existing EEC system would emerge.

Dr. Kiesinger and President de Gaulle also agreed that additional ad hoc consultations would be held between Bonn and Paris should special circumstances arise, particularly in times of crisis. No further details were issued on the subject.

It appears that these additional consultations were arranged at the request of Dr. Kiesinger who had complained of a lack of contact between Bonn and Paris, particularly during the Middle East crisis. During a discussion on the Middle East situation the two delegations agreed that joint action by the Federal Republic and France in that area was at present ruled out.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 July 1967; Bulletin der Bundesregierung, 13 July 1967)

3. Federal Finance Minister Franz-Josef Strauss on European integration

Speaking at the annual meeting of the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Zurich on 3 April 1967, Mr. Strauss said that only a united Europe which could bring its full economic strength to bear on the world market would in the long run have any chance to share in technological progress.

Mr. Strauss dealt mainly with the harmonization of taxes in Europe, which he regarded as an important step in creating a unified European market. Only thus could tax barriers be swept away following the abolition of customs barriers on 1 July 1968. The unification of Europe - and that of the Six - was the task of a generation that could not afford to slacken its efforts. Mr. Strauss regarded a vast European internal market - not indefinitely confined to the present EEC member States - as a permanent driving force for the political unification of Europe.

So far different levels of taxation in the various countries had led to discrepancies in their terms of trade. Mr. Strauss thought that a compensatory adjustment in exchange rates, though possible in theory, would not be the answer because its incidence would be general, whereas the tax burden varied from case to case. Tax harmonization on the lines contemplated in the Community therefore held out the best prospects of success. Harmonization of turnover taxes, which accounted for a quarter of the tax revenues of the Six, had been merely the first step. Excise duties and direct taxes would also have to be brought into line. Mr. Strauss favoured uniform taxation of concentrations and capital markets, and harmonization of certain transaction taxes (capital, transport, insurance, motor vehicles).

At the Tenth International Bodensee Conference of Christian Politicians held in Lindau, Mr. Strauss earnestly advocated the welding of Europe into a really efficient unit. He urged the six EEC member States to negotiate without delay on British entry. 'It would be a tragedy,' he said, 'to cut off Great Britain from the Continent by force.' Referring to General de Gaulle's European policy, Mr. Strauss stated that the General's mistake - whether conscious or not - was that of believing that a venerable past and tradition could take the place of something that was being forced upon Europe by the law of numbers. Even an efficient and respected country like France simply lacked the magnitude to enable it to press its claims. This had been brought home forcibly to France in its Moscow negotiations when Russia had declined to accept it as an equal partner.

Europe must be able to present to the world dimensions that would earn it recognition and respect. He blamed the 'allotment-type' political set-up for the daily widening technological gap between the USA and Europe. Unless Europe organized its scientific, research and technological activities on community lines, it would eventually be left standing.

At the Fifth Symposium of the European Union of Free and Private Housing Enterprises in Hamburg on 26 May, Mr. Strauss stressed the urgent need for industrial, scientific and technological competitiveness to further the cause of European unity. No one European nation today had the financial,

industrial or individual resources to master the tasks of the present and the future. Europe was lagging farther and farther behind the USA and the USSR in ultrasonic flight, space travel and electronics. It would vanish completely from the field of civil aviation unless it pooled its efforts. The drain of young German scientists to the United States was due to the pull not only of money but also of interesting work. Mr. Strauss again spoke out for the admission of Britain to the Common Market and urged that Europe as a whole, including Eastern Europe, should not be lost sight of.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 April 1967; Die Welt, 22 May 1967)

United Kingdom

United Kingdom and the Common Market

1. Prime Minister Wilson's tour of the capitals of the Six

On 16 January 1967 Mr. Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, set out on a tour of the six EEC capitals. The purpose of his visit was to sound the prospects for Britain's admission to the European Economic Community. Before his departure Mr. Wilson stated : 'This is no empty probe. We mean business. . . . We are going into these talks to overcome problems if they can be overcome.' Mr. George Brown, asked how public opinion in Great Britain felt about the Common Market, replied : There has been an enormous shift in recent times in public opinion and in Parliament. I think there are those who still have worries about it.' Asked whether he expected the Rome talks to be easier than those in Paris, the British Foreign Secretary replied : 'I don't think one will be easier than another. The same issues arise in all the capitals, but there may be a difference of emphasis in the different countries.'

(a) Talks in Rome

On 16 January 1967 the Italian and British heads of Government reached agreement in principle on Great Britain's entry into the EEC. At the opening of the talks Mr. Wilson spoke of its being a historic moment, not only for Great Britain but also for Europe as a whole. The problems that existed would have to be solved not only from an economic but also from a political point of view. On the Italian side Britain's intentions were welcomed and an assurance was given that it could count on Italy's support.

'The creation of a wider European Community is much more than a matter of totting up the debit and credit columns of our European balance sheet,' said the British Prime Minister at a reception given by the Italian head of Government, 'necessary and important though that is. What we are trying to do is to make a practical reality of a vision - a vision of Europe which, strong and united, will be able to play an effective part in the world.'

After the talks Mr. Wilson stated that London was interested not only in the economic integration of Europe but also in its political integration. He offered to bring into the Community the technological achievements of his country. Mr. Moro, Prime Minister, and Mr. Fanfani, Foreign Minister, pointed out that no-one in Europe could make as substantial a technological contribution as Britain.

In a final statement after the close of the talks Mr. Moro described the meetings as particularly friendly and constructive. They had been conducted with great frankness and cordiality and all problems had been thoroughly aired.

The position of the Italian Socialists, which was explained by Mr. Pietro Nenni on 4 January 1967, is quite clear. If the French elections brought about no change in the situation - Mr. Nenni had said - the Five and Great Britain, as well as any other countries ready to accede to the Community, ought to go forward on the road to political and economic integration without allowing themselves to be held back by General de Gaulle. In other words, Europe would have to be created without Gaullist France but with socialist Britain. This attitude is shared by Mr. La Malfa's Republican Party. It is echoed in the journal l'Avanti of 15 January which thinks it quite natural that Great Britain should seek to benefit from safeguard clauses similar to those invoked by the Six during the original negotiations. These are 'marginal questions which do not effect the substance of the problem' and it would be 'glaring evidence of bad faith and political ill-will' to treat them as conditions. For the socialist journal it goes without saying that Europe should give London the firm undertaking for which the British Prime Minister hopes.

Domenico Bartoli sums up the situation in the Corriere della Sera, in which he points out that 'Italian foreign policy is the fruit of corporate decisions contributed to by the head of State, the President and Vice-President of the Council, and the Foreign Minister. It is reasonable to assume that President Saragat's influence and Mr. Moro's real power will be brought into play somewhere between the more clearly defined positions of Mr. Nenni and Mr. Fanfani.' Mr. Bartoli concludes that 'Great Britain's accession to the Common Market will not consist in filling up a vital place left vacant by France.'

(b) Talks in Paris

Prior to his visit to Paris, Mr. Wilson broke his journey at Strasbourg where he delivered before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe an address which made a considerable impression.

The Prime Minister opened with an avowal that his country formed part of Europe. Mr. Wilson went back in history to the time when Anglo-Saxon, Danish and Norman invaders from the European continent conquered the British Isles and, together with the Native Celts, laid the basis of British national consciousness and democracy. The great democracies across the Atlantic had sprung from the same European roots. This common spiritual basis was the essential condition for today's efforts to create a united Europe, a great vision which dominated the history of our century.

Mr. Wilson referred to his speech in the House of Commons on 10 November 1966 when he had announced the decision to open new talks with the EEC with a view to Britain's entering the Community. He criticized the view that to enlarge the EEC was at the same time to weaken it. Britain would bring a large number of assets with it into the Community, so that there could be no question of inflicting a burden on the EEC. Mr. Wilson went on to point to the reduction in the deficit and the improvement in the balance of payments achieved by Great Britain in the last two years. Progress had also been made in modernizing British industry. Finally, the United Kingdom would be bringing with it into the EEC the full potential of its scientific research and technology.

As regards Britain's wishes and conditions for entry, Mr. Wilson did not go beyond what he had already said in addressing the House of Commons on 10 November 1966. Great Britain must be willing to accept the Treaty of Rome, subject to the adjustments necessary for the admission of a new member and to account being taken of Britain's concern over points in which it saw difficulties. Mr. Wilson also spoke of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty which stated that the admission of a new member shall be the subject of an agreement between the member States and the applicant State. Agreement would, for example, have to be reached on the number of votes to be allotted to Britain in the EEC Council of Ministers. In addition, new arrangements would have to be made for sharing the budget of the European Economic Community.

Provided these matters raised by Britain could be satisfactorily dealt with, the Treaty of Rome would not form an obstacle to its entry. Although the Treaty presented a number of thorny problems for Britain, the same had been the case with the original signatory States. While Britain, like these, had to sign a document of which it could not foresee the ultimate practical results, it had the advantage that it had carefully studied developments during the ten years of the Treaty's existence, and that its findings had been proved to be both satisfactory and encouraging.

At a press conference given on 25 January 1967 following his talks with President de Gaulle, Mr. Wilson stated that his visit to Paris had not been intended to bring about a decision on Britain's entry. He had not gone to Paris to put questions that could be answered only by a Yes or a No. It was only natural that the members of the European Community should want to consult among each other before any decision was taken.

Discussions in Paris concentrated mainly on two points : monetary questions, into which Mr. Wilson and Prime Minister Pompidou went in great detail together, and the problems of agriculture. The French view, which is known far and wide, is that membership of the EEC cannot be used as a cure for Britain's economic and financial ills. France demands that the pound be restored to health before the question of British entry is considered. It does not share British optimism as to the likelihood of the balance of payments being brought into equilibrium by the year's end. Moreover Paris feels that sterling's claim to share with the dollar the privilege of a world reserve currency must be abandoned. As regards agriculture, Paris was not alone in demanding that London should give up its system of guaranteed prices and subsidies in favour of the EEC's common agricultural policy and should accept increases of 10 - 14 per cent in the prices of farm products.

Foreign Minister Couve de Murville displayed far more reserve, in a radio interview at the end of the talks, than the British Prime Minister at his press conference. Mr. Couve de Murville stated that the talks had been extremely frank and misunderstandings between the two sides would in future no longer be possible. An investigation would have to be made into the obligations and risks entailed for the Six in the event of a British application, since the pound sterling was an extra-European currency.

Back in London, Mr. Wilson gave only a brief report on his Paris visit during Question Time in the House of Commons. Despite the Opposition's wishes, he declined to report in detail on the matter. The Parliament merely learned, therefore, that the talks had turned out fairly satisfactory and better than expected. Political questions had been aired at least as thoroughly as purely economic problems. It would have been out of place, however, to have discussed projects for the future political structure of Europe, such as the Fouchet Plan. Defence questions and the problem of severing Britain's ties with the United States had played a smaller part than had been expected. In reply to a question by Mr. Edward Heath on the problem of sterling, Mr. Wilson pointed out that, despite his efforts, misunderstandings still existed on the French side regarding the operation of the sterling area and the compatibility of the rôle of sterling as a reserve currency with British membership of the EEC.

On 1 February 1967 the French Council of Ministers, presided over by President de Gaulle, carried out a first, guarded review of the EEC talks with the British Prime Minister. Acting as rapporteur, Mr. Couve de Murville emphasized that their purpose had been only to exchange views and not to discuss the opening of negotiations.

(c) Talks in Brussels

Mr. Wilson's two-day exploratory talks in Brussels came to an end on 1 February 1967. As expected, contacts between Mr. Wilson and the Belgian Government did not bring any tangible results. Although the British Prime Minister encountered interest in Brussels, it did not appear that he had already secured firm promises from Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants and Foreign Minister Harmel. The Belgian view, which had already been made clear prior to Mr. Wilson's visit, was that a European Community must also be based on Great Britain. This did not mean, however, that Britain's entry would be secured at any price. Mr. Wilson was carefully given to understand that Belgium did not wish to be isolated from the other EEC member States.

The talks with the Belgian Government covered, in particular, monetary, financial and institutional questions. The rôle of sterling was discussed on rather less dogmatic lines than in Paris, but the sweep of the problem was not played down. Moreover, it appears that during the Brussels talks Mr. Wilson did not react on the subject of sterling as he had done in Paris, where he had stated that the fact that the pound was regarded as a reserve currency had no bearing on membership of the Community.

At the end of the talks Mr. Harmel stated that the obstacles to British entry lay not so much in political as in technical factors. Nevertheless the chances of successful negotiations for Britain's entry were greater than they had been four years ago.

Following the talks with the Belgian Government, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Brown met the two EEC Vice-Presidents, Mr. Mansholt and Mr. Marjolin, as well as Commission member Mr. Jean Rey. The general problems thrown up by the enlargement of the Community and special treatment for the Commonwealth in the event of Britain's entry were discussed. The Commission's conviction that the Community needed to be enlarged was again confirmed. Mr Mansholt pointed out that the procedures introduced and the decisions taken by the EEC in the agricultural sector could hardly, if at all, be altered in the event of Britain's accession. The same applied to the arrangements for financing agriculture. Problems of monetary policy were not touched on during these talks.

In the course of a press conference Mr. Wilson stated : 'So far as the question of sterling is concerned, there are no doubts at all in Europe. There are some deep regrets, not among governments but among those speculators who last July decided to sell short and now have to buy sterling back at a higher price.' Mr. Wilson said he believed he had dealt completely with the economic and sterling questions raised by the Belgian ministers. Sterling balances were and had been particularly stable. The sterling problem and the problem of management of sterling balances created no difficulty now and would not create any difficulty for the Common Market.

As for the French Foreign Minister's remarks that the pound was not a European currency, Mr. Wilson said : 'The pound is the currency of Britain; Britain is a European nation; therefore the pound is a European currency.' No doubt, he added, the French Government's recent measures would lead to the French franc's being accepted over a wider area than it was today.

(d) Talks in Bonn

The Anglo-German talks held in Bonn on 15 and 16 February 1967 were exclusively devoted to the problems of Britain's entry. According to diplomatic sources Britain's concern about its agriculture and foreign exchange position played a major part in the talks. Attention was drawn at an early stage to the difficult problems that would be raised for the British budget and balance of payments by an annual transfer of approximately £200m. to the Community's Agricultural Fund.

The Federal Government would continue to work for Britain's entry into the EEC. This promise was given by the Federal Chancellor to the British Prime Minister shortly before his return to London. Dr. Kiesinger stated that his Government had been 'strengthened in its conviction' that it should continue to work for British entry into the European Economic Community. 'We hope that future talks and endeavours will lead to positive results.'

Another result of the Anglo-German talks is that the existing joint Anglo-German Economic Commission will in future meet more often. It will discuss the economic problems raised by British entry into the EEC, as well as questions connected with the Kennedy Round.

Following the talks in Bonn Mr. Wilson stated that the main purpose of his Bonn visit had been to make it quite clear that Britain was determined to join the Community, provided that its vital interests were safeguarded.

Certain problems and difficulties naturally existed. The point of the talks had been not only to explain the difficulties on the British side, but also to hear 'what our friends had to say.' Mr. Wilson added that the Federal Government had been 'very helpful' in this respect.

Asked whether the Federal Government had made a definite suggestion as to when Britain should put in an application for entry, Mr. Wilson said this question would only arise at the end of his exploratory tour of EEC capitals. The British Government would then establish further contacts with the EEC member States and with the EFTA countries.

Mr. Wilson went on to say that his talks in Bonn had been just as 'outstandingly useful' as all other soundings in Europe -this in answer to the question whether the Bonn talks had given Britain more encouragement to put in an official application for entry into the EEC. Mr. Wilson confirmed Britain's determination to co-operate with the other European countries in the political field, too, with a view to integration. In Bonn, as in the other EEC capitals, he had spoken 'in the same spirit and with the same words' as during the address on Europe he had delivered in January before the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Mr. Wilson emphasized that he had not perceived any differences in attitude in the capitals of the Six. During the talks with Dr. Kiesinger and Mr. Brandt neither side had tried to change the other's standpoint in the matter of a British entry. The talks had served for an exchange of views.

Speaking in the House of Commons on 16 February 1967, Mr. Wilson stated that the Bonn talks had confirmed the identity of views of the two countries, 'which was demonstrated by the German Government's prompt and friendly response to my statement of 10 November'. British views on the German position in the matter of British entry, said Mr. Wilson, were proved to be fully justified by the talks.

Mr. Ahlers, deputy spokesman of the Federal Government, stated at a press conference in Bonn that the Federal Republic would endeavour, within the context of Franco-German consultation, to dispel French misgivings about British entry into the Community. In a report to the Cabinet on Mr. Wilson's visit to Bonn, Dr. Kiesinger advocated, according to Mr. Ahlers, patient efforts to achieve a swing-round in the French attitude in favour of Britain. On 17 February 1967 the Federal Government informed the French Government of the subject-matter of the talks with the British Prime Minister.

(e) Talks at The Hague

The exploratory talks held at The Hague on 27 February 1967 brought no indication as to whether and when Britain would apply for EEC membership. Neither Mr. Wilson nor Dr. Luns, Netherlands Foreign Minister, gave clear-cut answers when these questions were put to them by the press.

Mr. Wilson stated at a press conference that after his next visit - to Luxemburg - the British Government would pursue its soundings among the EFTA countries. Foreign Minister George Brown would report to EFTA on the talks with the EEC countries. Mr. Wilson added that Great Britain would not be presenting definite decisions. No decision would be taken until the discussions were over. He added: 'With every talk we held with the EEC member States, the picture became clearer. We were able not only to explain our own standpoint but also to learn by the experience gained by the EEC member States from the Common Market. We know now how the EEC works.' He would not and could not, however, yet commit himself as to when a British decision would be taken.

Foreign Minister Luns, speaking on the same question, said that he did not think of the likelihood of entry either in months or in years. As to Britain's chances in view of France's attitude, he was no prophet. Since France's first rejection, Britain's position had substantially improved, both as regards the support of the other member States and the climate of opinion in Britain itself.

The British Prime Minister, who flew back to London on 28 February 1967 after the press conference, in a reference to the rôle of sterling as a reserve currency for the international monetary system, stated that as the state of the British economy improved, the pound would prove to be a means of strengthening rather than an obstacle to the Common Market. The question of a unitary monetary system had not cropped up during the exploratory talks.

Back in the House of Commons, Mr. Wilson retorted to Conservative criticism that British support for the Treaty for the non-proliferation of nuclear arms was damaging Britain's chances of admission to the EEC by pointing out that this Treaty was of outstanding importance and that it would be dangerous not to go ahead with it. The Common Market and non-proliferation were two entirely separate issues. Moreover, the European governments were anxious about the inspection procedure contemplated and not about going without nuclear arms. As a member of the European Communities Britain could help in finding an answer that would strengthen Euratom.

(f) Talks in Luxembourg

The visit to Luxembourg formed the last lap of the tour of EEC capitals made by Mr. Wilson and Mr. Brown.

Prime Minister Werner stated that the Grand Duchy believed that the European Communities would acquire strength and greater political and economic influence through British membership. The talks in Luxembourg centred on institutional questions, agriculture, Commonwealth trade, the freeing of capital movements and monetary problems in general. It was learned that the question was raised whether Britain should not undertake, in a special protocol to an agreement for entry, to abstain from resorting to the provisions of the Rome Treaty on reciprocal monetary aid in the event of payments difficulties where balance of payments problems arose specifically from sterling's key rôle. As regards Commonwealth problems, the hope was expressed that an international cereals agreement to be concluded within the context of the Kennedy Round would go far towards reducing difficulties that might result for Commonwealth producers from Britain's entry. The question of association of African and Caribbean Commonwealth countries with the enlarged EEC was also touched upon. Mr. Wilson once again confirmed that he was ready to accept the institutional procedures of the EEC Treaty.

On the subject of the steel industry, Mr. Wilson stated that Britain also wished to join the European Coal and Steel Community and that this, in his view, presented no major difficulties. This applied irrespective of the proposed re-nationalization of the steel industry in Great Britain. One got the impression that the High Authority today saw the main difficulties in the steel sector rather than in coalmining. Britain's exports to the Common Market had dwindled to insignificant proportions. It was indeed felt that Britain, which this year would produce rather more hard coal than all the ECSC countries put together, would have to decide upon a more liberal imports policy, and this not only towards the Six but also at the international level, along the lines planned for a future common energy policy. Moreover, coal subsidies would no doubt have to be made subject to the common rules of the ECSC. In addition, British participation in the ECSC's financial equalization scheme for the reduction of coking-coal prices, recently decided upon, appeared to be essential.

Britain's entry into the European Economic Community has long been under discussion, particularly since the formal application was handed in in Brussels. The objections against Britain's entry - particularly those of France - are familiar to all. The problems and difficulties also have been clearly spelled out in the EEC Commission's report on the enlargement of the Community.

On 4 July 1967 Great Britain again announced before the Council of Ministers of Western European Union at The Hague its wish and readiness to become a member of a Europe economically and politically united. The British declaration on Europe presented in the form of a document by Foreign Secretary George Brown at The Hague was subsequently published in London as a White Paper. The British Government regarded Mr. Brown's address at The Hague as an introductory statement to negotiations for entry into the EEC.

Speaking before the WEU Assembly at The Hague, Mr. Brown stated that his Government would accept the Treaties of the European Communities without reserves and wanted to work with the six EEC member States in the continued development of the Community not only in the economic but also in the political and military fields. He proposed that the first year of the transitional period should be a standstill period for mutual adaptation. The necessary measures of adaptation could to a large extent be taken in Britain immediately at the end of the standstill period. But some of the changes, particularly in the agricultural field, would require an adequate period of adaptation, the length of which would have to be discussed with the Six. As regards the Commonwealth, Mr. Brown mentioned two special problems: the sugar market and New Zealand. Britain had an agreement with Commonwealth sugar producers which would not expire until 1974. During their visits to the capitals of the Community he and Mr. Wilson had found general recognition that New Zealand's case was of an altogether special kind. As regards Britain's dependent territories, association would no doubt be the most appropriate arrangement. Britain was prepared to negotiate on exceptions such as Hong Kong.

Turning to the capital market, Mr. Brown stated that Britain was ready to accept the obligations of membership of the Community subject to a transitional period during which it could bring its policies into line with those of the Community. So far as tariffs were concerned, Britain would be prepared to accept the common external tariff as it would stand after the Kennedy Round reductions had been made. It would, of course, be necessary to discuss how Britain's tariff structure would be adjusted to that of the Community within the transitional period.

No individual European country, said Mr. Brown, was today big enough to provide all the resources needed under present-day conditions. With 300 million people, the future Community market would be bigger than that of the USA. Europe had made a remarkable recovery since the war but had not played a big rôle in recent political crises. There was no alternative to a large market in which European enterprises could work unhampered by customs barriers. Mr. Brown added : 'The fundamentals of the Communities will remain unaffected, for we shall be accepting precisely the same treaty aims and obligations in letter and spirit as yourselves.' Britain wanted to keep the negotiations as short as possible so that it could start work in the Communities at an early date. The questions to be settled before entry - he said - were few. All Britain needed was a transitional period for mutual adaptation, with at first a one-year period of standstill. During this time Britain could make the necessary adjustments and other EFTA countries seeking membership or association would have time to conclude their negotiations.

Mr. Brown went on to state that his Government would be perfectly ready to discuss any questions that member States of the Community might wish to raise. His own list of issues which he believed required attention in negotiations was not a formidable one. It presented no questions to which reasonable answers could not be found. He hoped that, when the Community came to respond, it would be as full and frank as he had been and would mention any additional points which it felt should be covered by the negotiations. Mr. Brown wanted to avoid a situation where, after the points raised had been finally settled, fresh requirements would be successively imposed on his country. Finally, he expressed the hope that the statement he had made would help the Community in its consideration of the British application and enable negotiations to open as soon as the opinion of the Commission had been submitted to the Council of Ministers.

Mr. Brandt, Federal Foreign Minister, hailed Mr. Brown's statement as an event of an historic importance which should not be underestimated. Mr. Bettencourt, French Secretary of State, spoke of an important decision by Great Britain. The European Community should now deal with the British application in accordance with the Treaties and take the appropriate action.

At the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities on 10 July 1967, Mr. Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister, reaffirmed the French Government's view that enlarging the Community by four or five members would change its character. It would change the political setup in Europe and would not be without consequences for East-West relations and for the German question.

After referring once again to the state of the pound and the problems of agriculture, Mr. Couve de Murville stated that enlarging the circle of African associated States by admitting English-speaking countries would create fresh difficulties, all the more so because the Latin American countries would feel discriminated against. In the EEC itself the development of a common transport policy and of a common energy policy would be still further complicated by British entry.

In an interview published in 'France Soir' on 31 July 1967, Mr. Debré, French Foreign Minister, stated that if Britain and other European countries were allowed to join in the near future, this could substantially endanger the French economy. Britain's entry would carry with it a great risk unless that country was prepared to accept the development of the Common Market in its present state without exceptions or reserves of any kind. Over the last ten years EEC member States had reached agreement on currency questions and capital movements; the current situation ruled out British entry on a basis of equality.

In an article published in 'Le Monde' Mr. Callaghan, Chancellor of the Exchequer, hailed the successes scored in the International Monetary Fund, adding that his country was ready to negotiate on the rôle of sterling as a reserve currency. This rôle was a practical matter and not one of prestige. An enlarged Community could lead to the creation of a European currency incorporating all currencies, including sterling.

In a radio interview Lord Chalfont, the new 'Minister for Europe', spoke of the possibility of an Atlantic free-trade organization as a counterpart to the European Economic Community, in the event of a breakdown in the negotiations for Britain's entry. 'We could picture a kind of Atlantic grouping, and we could even stand on our own. Other countries in the world do this, and we are strong enough to do the same. We do not, however, desire anything like that.'

In August Mr. Wilson reshuffled his Cabinet. It is significant that, in doing so, he himself took over the Department of Economic Affairs. A major change was the discarding of Mr. Douglas Jay, till then President of the Board of Trade and the bitterest opponent of British entry in the Cabinet. Mr. Jay was replaced by Mr. Anthony Crosland, previous Secretary of State for Education and Science, who is regarded as a convinced European.

Following the Cabinet's reshuffle, the opposition to Mr. Wilson's European policy - daily growing more and more insistent in the Labour party - found in Mr. Jay an eloquent and well-informed spokesman. In two articles

published in the 'Guardian' he argued, on the basis of a wealth of facts and figures, that British entry would step up foreign exchange requirements. Agricultural arrangements in the EEC, the foreign exchange needed for contributions to the EEC Agricultural Fund, and the loss of markets expected in EFTA, the Commonwealth and the rest of the world, seemed likely to bring up the burden on the British balance of payments closer to £ 1,000m. than to £ 500m. a year, the estimate given by the Labour Government. The ability of British goods to compete on world markets would be reduced as a result of the increases in the cost of living, wages and production costs to be expected following British entry. Mr. Jay thought it unnecessary for Britain to join the EEC because, by virtue of Commonwealth preferences and the EFTA Stockholm Convention, Britain could already draw on a free trade area of 250 million people. A lengthy transitional period prior to a possible entry into the EEC would be of no use as it would not only leave the problems unsolved but would at the same time put a severe strain on the balance of payments and entail the loss of markets in the Commonwealth, EFTA and the world as a whole.

On 12 October 1967 General de Gaulle discussed with Mr. Jean Rey, President of the European Commission, the problems posed for France and the EEC by the British application. It is understood that the French President once again voiced his now familiar misgivings. A week earlier, on 6 October 1967, he had already suggested, in talks with Sir Patrick Reilly, British Ambassador, that association with the EEC might be a more appropriate solution. The farthest President de Gaulle now appears to be ready to go would be some loose form of association with the Common Market, a suggestion which the Labour Government has already rejected outright.

(The Guardian, 16, 26, 27 and 30 January, 21 February, 7 March, 11 July 1967;

The Times, 17 and 26 January, 8 and 17 February, 8 March, 5 July 1967;

Le Monde, 26, 27 and 28 January, 5 and 18 February, 3 March, 9, 10 and 12 July, 12 August 1967;

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 February 1967;

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 and 28 February, 10 March, 30 August 1967;

Industriekurier, 21 September 1967)

Italy

1. Mr. Saragat, President of the Italian Republic, celebrates the Tenth Anniversary of the Rome Treaties

The 10th anniversary of the founding of the EEC and Euratom was the occasion of formal ceremonies in Rome on 29 May; these took place in Campidoglio and were attended by President de Gaulle and the Heads of Government of the six member States. In his address, Mr. Saragat, President of the Italian Republic, outlined the historical and political undercurrents which had, since the end of the second world war, found expression in various significant initiatives which had led the six countries of the Community to the signing of the Treaties of Rome. He stated: '.... the balance sheet of the Communities after ten years has surpassed the most optimistic predictions by a long way.'

President Saragat then went back over the achievements of the Community; '.... these results were evidence of the emergence and affirmation in the minds of our peoples of the idea of European unification; this idea is bound up much more with our Greek, Latin, Germanic and Christian traditions than with any geographical concept; the ideal which it postulates among our peoples is of a man fashioned by Roman law, by Christianity, by the Renaissance, by the age of Enlightenment and by the political and social revolutions of the last three centuries; a man eager for freedom, truth and justice and who rejects oppression. We are aware that the causes which may lead us to have differences of opinion are nevertheless numerous but we are, at the same time, convinced that the reasons which unite us are of even greater moment and this should encourage us to turn to advantage our previous experience to initiate new contacts and to move with prudence and a sense of proportion but also with faith and with a clear purpose, towards our objective.'

Going on to discuss the problems still awaiting solution, President Saragat stated: 'New problems await us, including that of the geographic and historic dimensions of Europe, with the accession of other countries and, first of all, the United Kingdom whose name is almost synonymous with political freedom: we hope that it will soon be possible to begin the negotiations. It is in fact a question of an application for accession not only from one party but from a whole nation. Socialists, conservatives and liberals are united in supporting the application and the House of Commons approved it by a majority that verged on unanimity.'

A further problem is that of community relations with the United States, on the one hand, and with the other European countries, particularly Eastern Europe, on the other. There is also the increasingly urgent problem of relations between industrialized and developing countries.

Let us not lose sight, I would ask you, of the historical origins of the EEC and the political goal it is our intention to achieve by pursuing a lateral, economic course. As the years have gone by it has perhaps become clear to many that economic progress is not enough of itself to take us all the way on the path to European political unity. For this to be achieved, what we need above all is a strong, common political resolve. Even if the political goal is common to us all, there are still many difficulties to be overcome in the choice to be made in terms of implementing machinery and in the order of priorities. And yet I think that the experience of this last decade should have taught us all something, including the fact that the point of departure is not the point of arrival and that gradualness is sometimes an appropriate method for overcoming difficulties which appear at first sight to be insurmountable.

We are aware that there exists no incompatibility between the European ideal and the ideal of the mother country just as there can be no inconsistency between freedom, the rights of the individual and the latter's duty to serve his own country. Another lesson, to be learned from our past experience is that any order on this continent that is founded on the idea of power is an illusory one, encouraging antagonism between states, causing anarchy and ending in a betrayal of the spiritual heritage, the very structure, of our countries.

I believe, therefore, that we should pay a tribute to the prime movers and promoters of the European idea and express our sincerest good wishes to those who, today, have taken up the torch and are carrying on with this undertaking. These wishes are particularly addressed to those taking part in the summit conference tomorrow, following today's formal ceremonies; I should stress, however, that the six Governments have come to Rome not only to celebrate the successes they have achieved together, particularly in the economic field, but also to resume, full of goodwill, the political dialogue which was broken off in the spring of 1962.

The pace of our forward progress can be maintained to the extent that we are able to preserve that spirit of renewal, that grasp of the essential and that faith in Europe which we have learned to have and which the habits which have grown up through what has happened have fostered in us. Our success could constitute a decisive factor in world peace and make a decisive contribution to the balanced development of our international life provided we do not forget that only a united and democratic Europe, which fully realizes that its future is bound up with the other great democracies of the Atlantic area, and primarily the United States - which has, twice in this century, made a decisive contribution towards saving the freedom of Western Europe - only a Europe that is open to all peoples having ideals, values and principles in common and mindful of the urgent need for Europe to make its presence felt in the world once again.'

At the close of his speech, President Saragat stated that the meeting in Rome of so many leading politicians to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Treaties was also bound to have a decisive influence on the future of Europe. He added : '..... In this Assembly indeed are represented at the highest level all men of goodwill in the Six countries in a gathering which makes us realize, in view of the immense value of what has been achieved, the still greater range of work that awaits us and which will remain, for all those who have lived through this moment in time, as evidence of the moral cultural and political greatness of Europe; of a Europe we look to as an independent power which will indeed maintain its links of friendship, co-operation and alliance with the United States but which will pursue its own course of action in the conduct of international affairs.'

(Relazioni Internazionali, No. 22, 3 June 1967)

2. A motion by the Italian Senate for reviving European integration

A group of 70 Senators, including Messrs. Angelini, Battino Vittorelli, Battaglia, Carboni, Gronchi, Micara, Moro, introduced on 11 April 1967 in the Italian Senate a motion for reviving European integration. This motion urges the Government to promote and support an organic plan for the gradual achievement of a supranational and democratic Europe in the conviction that only such a Europe can serve not only 'deep European interests but also the truest Italian interests'.

The proposed plan should include :

A. in the institutional field

- an invitation to the European Executive to :
 - a) consider the broad lines of a commercial policy aiming at and open to non-member countries which the Six undertook to achieve before 1970;
 - b) foster a common monetary policy with a view to the rapid introduction of a European currency;
 - c) give a vigorous impulse to the Community's social policy in respect of social security, assistance and health protection;

- d) ensure that this work should be of benefit to European integration.
- a truly common energy policy based on the principle of competitiveness and the lowest possible price for energy sources;
 - a common policy for transport and basic structures relating thereto.

This plan should also provide for:

- early transformation of Euratom in accordance with Italian proposals on the subject. Euratom should be changed into a new structure with wider powers in the whole field of scientific and technological research, as well as in the space sector, to which the United Kingdom will bring the indispensable contribution of its own achievements and its own capacity;
- the direct election by universal suffrage of the European Parliament, with increased powers. Until such time as appropriate conditions obtain for the unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers of the Community of the draft convention approved by the European Parliament, the Senate requests the Committees concerned (1 and 3) which have been made responsible for draft law No. 989 concerning the election of Italian delegates to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, to take this into account;
- the immediate setting up of the European University in Florence to which the United Kingdom should be associated from the very beginning and which will testify, in a tangible manner, to the resolve of the Six, meeting on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Rome Treaties, to pursue the work undertaken.

B. As for the political aims, the plan should provide for the gradual introduction of a common European defence and foreign policy, entrusting the task of drawing up precise proposals to the single Executive of the three Communities whose powers for this task should be adequately increased. The Executive should make practical suggestions concerning the reform of the Atlantic Alliance and the achievement of an equal partnership, as well as proposals for organizing European defence, as repeatedly suggested by European parliamentary bodies and in particular by Western European Union Assembly. The single Executive, in addition, put forward proposals for a common European policy vis-à-vis the United States, the East and the developing countries, as well as on the problem of German reunification, bearing in mind, here again, suggestions made by European assemblies and in particular the Council of Europe.'

3. Italy reaffirms its support for the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market

Mr. Aldo Moro, Italian President of the Council, paid an official visit to London from 27 to 29 June; he was accompanied by Mr. Amintore Fanfani, Italian Foreign Minister. At the close of their talks with Mr. Wilson, British Prime Minister and Mr. Brown, British Foreign Secretary, a joint communiqué was issued in which, *inter alia*, it was stated: 'Mr. Moro and Mr. Wilson discussed the question of the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community. They reaffirmed that Britain's entry would strengthen the political and economic unity of Europe and would enable the west European States to act more effectively to preserve peace and to improve East-West relations. Mr. Wilson stressed the importance that the British Government attached to an early opening of negotiations with the EEC concerning Britain's application.

Mr. Moro and Mr. Wilson particularly emphasized - bearing in mind the proposals already put forward on various international occasions by Mr. Fanfani and the warm support given to the idea of European technological co-operation which had been repeatedly expressed by the British Government - that it was a matter of importance and urgency for the European countries to make a co-ordinated effort in the field of technological co-operation, industrial developments of this type, if they were to be profitable and effective and keep Europe in the vanguard of technological progress, could only be achieved on a European scale. The two Prime Ministers agreed that co-operation in this field was essential to strengthening Europe, not only industrially but also politically. They pointed out that it was in the very best interests of the EEC to take advantage (through British accession) of the major contribution Britain could make in terms of advanced technology. To this end, it had been agreed that bilateral contacts between the two countries should, in the meantime, be stepped up Mr. Moro and Mr. Wilson discussed the problem of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. They agreed that the conclusion of this treaty would be a contribution to world peace and stability of the greatest importance, provided that adequate steps were taken to ensure that it won acceptance by the greatest possible number of States. They also hoped that the negotiations now in progress in Geneva would be brought to an early and satisfactory conclusion'

4. A memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connexion with Austria's association with the EEC

. With regard to Italy's veto on negotiations between the European Community and Austria following terrorist attacks in the Alto Adige region,

the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a memorandum in reply to the statement by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs complaining on 29 June 1967, before the Austrian Parliament, about the lack of enthusiasm on Italy's part for the co-operation offered by the Vienna authorities for arresting the terrorists. The memorandum reads as follows:

'In connexion with the statement made in Vienna by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Toncic-Sorini, in reply to a parliamentary question concerning the offer made by the Vienna Government that the Italian Government should take part in enquiry committees and other initiatives of that kind with a view to looking into the circumstances under which terrorist attacks were made in the Alto Adige area, Italian official circles pointed out that our Government has always maintained that the co-operation of the Vienna Government is essential to prevent terrorist attacks originating in Austria.

The suggestions made so far in connexion with the memorandum issued by the Italian Embassy in Vienna on 6 October 1966 are rather evasive. The Italian Government had requested the Austrian Government to take practical measures for putting an end to the terrorist aggression in the Alto Adige area. Vienna only replied on 19 June 1967, merely refuting the Italian allegation concerning the Austrian Government's responsibility for terrorist acts in that area and making a further offer of participation in an enquiry committee.

In official circles, it is pointed out that this is not a matter of setting up joint enquiry committees or establishing the responsibility for criminal acts in the Alto Adige area. It is essential that the Austrian authorities responsible for security, should take adequate steps and police action in respect of Austrian terrorists and give full support to the Italian police. To achieve this, there is no need for further Austrian offers or suggestions for bilateral negotiations through diplomatic channels. What needs to be done is to arrest and prosecute terrorists on Austrian soil.'

(Relazioni Internazionali, 8 July 1967)

5. Mr. Zagari, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, discusses the larger Europe and its world-wide responsibilities

In an article in 'Relazione Internazionali' Mr. Zagari, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, began by analyzing the international situation, in the light of which he emphasized that Europe must acquire the strength to make its voice heard on world problems on which peace between peoples was contingent.

'Europe was absent at Glassboro and absent at Yalta, thus demonstrating its inability to take a leading part in world affairs. This is not the first time that this has happened and we might even say that this is the basic characteristic of the Europe of today. If, in the past, some pretended that far-off conflicts such as the war in Vietnam were alien to Europe, such an excuse fell clattering to the ground when it came to the Middle East crisis. The war knocked at our gates and, close at hand, the balance of the world threatened to crumble and Europe stood and stared, a non-participant today as it was yesterday. And once again the solution to the crisis - if there is going to be a solution in the near future - will be based on a direct agreement between the two powers which hold the world in balance. What we need is a power that can straighten the rudder and to couple the great powers to an international policy embracing all today's problems, from nuclear non-proliferation to disarmament, from collective security to a plan for giving the third world a new lease of life and such a comprehensive policy could only be promoted by a new power, that is one at the level of a Europe strengthened in its structure, integrated politically and widened, first of all, to include the United Kingdom

'... The central issue is thus the accession of the United Kingdom. Only with the United Kingdom will Europe be able to strengthen its democratic structure, achieve political and economic dimensions commensurate with its history and face up to the problem of the technological gap. We are, therefore, at a stage in the development of international relations when solving the problem of Europe's political and economic unity cannot be deferred any longer; and this can only be solved by enlarging the Europe of the Six to take in the United Kingdom.....'

Mr. Zagari refuted arguments wholly opposed to this and he refuted the arguments of those who supported British exaction to the Community unconditionally. He went on: '... we should go forward boldly and perseveringly to achieve the aims laid down in the Rome Treaties which the United Kingdom has accepted unconditionally; we should discuss the individual problems that will come up in negotiations; we should wholeheartedly demonstrate that we have the political will to overcome the technical obstacles that may still stand in the way of British entry

In conclusion, we stand at one of the major turning points in history. If Europe succeeds in overcoming the passive resignation with which it has opted out of the sphere of international affairs in the post-war era, it will then be able to play a decisive part in solving the basic problem of our time which is to promote economic development and social progress, not in a vacuum or in a desert oasis but in the whole world by means of long-term peace strategy.'

(Relazioni Internazionali, No. 29, 22 July 1967)

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

The foreign policy of the Luxembourg Government

On 13 July 1967, Mr. Pierre Grégoire, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a statement in the Chamber concerning the foreign policy of his Government; this was in answer to a parliamentary question.

Among the problems which he discussed, it is worth quoting those concerning security and the European Communities.

'As far as we are concerned, European security could not in any way be taken to imply a unilateral dismantlement of our defences, or the withdrawal of Europe from the forces assigned to the Atlantic Alliance at a time when we are still confronted within a very close radius with a considerable military potential, which is endowed with the most modern and the most powerful technical resources. Nor could there be any question of swapping, as it were, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact for the dissolution of NATO. Indeed, we are well aware that the Warsaw Pact is backed up by a close network of bilateral agreements, to which one must add the close links between the political parties in power in the East European countries, so that the disappearance of an apparent superstructure would not necessarily change the reality of a solidly established political and military situation. There are some who are attempting, with reference to European security, to reach a settlement between the European States, leaving the United States out; in our opinion no balance is possible in Europe unless we remain firmly grounded on Atlantic solidarity.

Hence European security could not mean either a unilateral abandonment, however it were dressed up, nor negotiations entered into on unequal conditions. It must involve a two-way effort designed to eliminate the deep-seated political and military causes for the present tension.

To begin with the political causes, this means first of all a just solution to the German problem or, in more concrete terms, that progress should be made towards the reunification of this artificially divided country. Only by eliminating this quite abnormal situation left over from the second world war will it be possible, once and for all, to consolidate the Eastern frontiers of Germany and thus make it possible to create within central Europe a stable territorial situation which is recognized by everyone.'

'.... Our own relationships with the East European countries also need to be liberalized, both with respect to the movement of persons and to economic exchanges. Much has already been done to this end but any further progress predicates a modification by the East, of a whole range of ideas and practices which are inconsistent with the development of free movement and of trade.

This normalization of political and economic conditions in Europe should be accompanied by a disarmament which will only be meaningful if it goes all the way, involving every category of armaments, whether conventional or nuclear.'

The Minister then recapitulated the broad outlines of the French theory on the weakening of the Six through the accession, to the Treaties of Rome and Paris, of other European States, which Mr. Couve de Murville had put forward at the meeting of the Councils on 10 July 1967.

Mr. Grégoire explained the reasons why his Government could not endorse this theory: 'For my part, although I recognize the validity of some of the arguments of the French Government, I stated in the Council that we now have to make a choice between the present Europe and what we regard as the "best Europe", taking care only to apply economic, monetary and agricultural criteria. I further stated in the Council that the problems raised with Mr. Couve de Murville could, in my view, be overcome if they were set in the context of the Community's general policy and future objectives. It should not be forgotten, first of all, that the European Treaties are open agreements because Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, for example, provides for the accession of other European countries. These countries must naturally accept the Treaties as they are and the regulations issued in pursuance of the Communities constitutional texts. In my opinion the only changes acceptable would concern the institutional provisions such as, for example, the balance of votes and the budgetary and financial stipulations, notably the different contribution scales.

Any further derogation from the Treaties and the way they are applied should be transitional in character. In relation to the number and degree of such transitional derogations, the member States could judge whether the applicant should be admitted at once or if that State had to have a provisional period before its complete accession.'

'..... In the opinion of the Luxembourg Government, a Community comprising ten or eleven members would be more difficult to operate than one of six, but we believe that the real difficulty lies in an extensive application of

the unanimity rule. If, on the other hand, the qualified majority rule was strictly applied in the Community with reference to all but vital issues, then the latter would, in our opinion, be able to operate perfectly satisfactorily.'

'..... Our Government also recognizes that the present Community of the Six will find it difficult to assimilate three or four new States at the same time but conditions could be envisaged, for example, for a phasing of the accessions or else in the first stage for creating a free trading area between the Community and certain of the applicant States.'

(Bulletin de documentation du service luxembourgeois d'information et de presse, 15 July 1967)

Netherlands

1. Government investiture statement on Dutch foreign policy

On 18 April Mr. de Jong, the Dutch Prime Minister, delivered a Government statement of which extracts follow :

'In the field of international relations Government policy continues along the main lines followed by previous Cabinets in close collaboration with the States General. This applies in particular to the important issue of European affairs. The policy pursued for years by the Government in the European Communities and in Western European Union will be continued as before. The Cabinet hopes to be able, jointly with other countries, to take advantage of the increased scope for easing tension between the East and West. With this in view, and in order that the problems existing at the heart of Europe can be progressively solved, the Government will continue to treat a powerful Atlantic Alliance - adapted to any changes in the situation and capable of pursuing an effective common policy - as an important positive factor .

The Government attaches great weight to the early conclusion of a world treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms. It does not feel that such a treaty would necessarily hamper the objectives of the Euratom Treaty or the prospects it opens up. This is why it will negotiate with confidence both in Euratom and in any other alliance. In this field the Government has taken initiatives - particularly in the context of Benelux - which should help to smooth over the differences that still exist.

In its programme the Cabinet accords a high degree of priority to the expansion of development aid and closer co-operation with the developing countries. Development aid should be still further increased in the years to come, both in an absolute sense and in terms of national revenue. The best way of doing this would be to bring aid up gradually to 1 per cent of the national income.

The Government is going to submit to the States General a four-year plan covering development aid from the Netherlands. This will allow for greater support for the anti-hunger campaign in Asia and Africa.

With a view to encouraging Dutch industry to share in these efforts of ours, the Government intends as soon as possible to introduce a Bill for the covering of the political risks attendant on investment in the developing countries. It hopes that such a system of guarantees will stimulate the flow of private investment to the developing countries.

The strengthening of economic structures is the object of an overall policy. This means:

- a) creating a favourable climate of investment and the encouragement of national savings with a view to maintaining a high level of investment;
- b) anti-inflationary measures and keeping a watch on our country's competitive position;
- c) accepting foreign undertakings likely to strengthen the structure of our economy.

The Government will also strive to improve economic structures by continuing to devote attention to research and development.

The Government also recognizes the value, both in the regional sphere and in certain other sectors, of more specific policies to supplement its overall policy.'

(Debates of the Second Chamber, extraordinary session 1967, meeting of 18 April 1967)

2. Extracts from the speech from the throne at the opening of the States General

On 17 September, in a speech from the throne at the traditional opening of the session of the States General, Queen Juliana sketched out the broad outlines of the policy the Netherlands Government intended to pursue. With regard to European and international problems, the Queen said:

'Our country is co-operating fully in the work of completing the Common Market and constructing the European economic union. In the meantime the Government attaches prime importance to the manner in which the applications for entry into the EEC submitted by the United Kingdom, Ireland and

the Scandinavian countries are handled. A further barring of these accessions, which will maintain the existing division in Western Europe, would arouse great concern in the Government and, without doubt, adversely affect the progress of European integration.

The Government looks to the next Benelux Conference to usher in a period of even closer co-operation.

The position of the developing countries calls for closer and closer attention by the Government in framing its policy. The Government intends in 1968 to make a substantial increase in the Netherlands' contribution to aid for the developing countries. Moreover, it will make better use than in the past of the resources and talents of our people. Assistance will be all the more effective for being concentrated on a smaller number of countries.

In the international sphere - for example, at the forthcoming Second World Conference on Trade and Development - the Government will press for measures to ensure social and economic growth in the developing countries. . . .

(Joint meeting of the two Chambers for the opening of the 1967-68 session of the States General)

3. Speech by Mr. De Jong, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, before the Congress of the European Movement

In the introduction to a speech made in Nijmegen on 20 May 1967 before the Congress of the European Movement, Mr. De Jong briefly outlined the efforts that had been made to achieve European integration.

Despite all shortcomings, he thought there had been real progress. '1968 will see the completion of the customs union and of the common agricultural market; in 1970 we should have a harmonized turnover-tax system; more than twenty countries are associated with the EEC, and a single supranational Executive will occupy itself with the running of the three Communities.

As to the future, the Government considers that European integration ought to extend to all free Europe and not merely to the Europe of the Six. Integration must be rooted in democracy. This means endowing the Communities

with a highly democratic constitutional structure. It follows that the position of the Executive must be strengthened to the utmost. Finally it is essential to interweave the economies of the European States as closely as possible, customs union being only a first step; in the field of transport, energy and social and commercial policy little progress has so far been made.

The Kennedy Round negotiations have shown how the Commission can serve as the driving force. The merger of the Executives can go a long way towards strengthening this Community institution. However, as decisions affecting the fortunes of European citizens are taken more and more in Brussels, the more pressing will become the need for greater parliamentary control at European level, this having lagged far behind the process of integration as a whole. The Government attaches great importance to a rapid strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament, even if, because of the views held in certain European countries of the duties and position of national Parliaments, the necessary agreement cannot be reached in the near future as it should be in the view of the Netherlands.'

As regards the outward-looking character of the European Communities, the Prime Minister said: 'The basic principle of European integration has always been that a united Europe should embrace the greatest possible number of democratic countries. Only six States signed the European Treaties in 1957. Following the example set by the United Kingdom a number of European countries went their own way. Today, ten years later, Britain can be considered, from the political point of view, to have made at that time a serious mistake. The EEC Treaty lays down that any European country may apply for membership of the Community. The Netherlands Government has always urged the Six to take a constructive attitude to requests for accession. The virtual refusal to admit Britain in 1963 therefore came as a shock to our country. Today almost the entire population of Britain supports its Government's new application, a circumstance that gives it all the more force. Obviously there are a number of difficulties to be overcome before Britain can be admitted to the Community, and on these the President of the French Republic has not failed to dwell at some length. Unlike the French head of State, we believe that, given sufficient political will among all the Six, it should certainly be possible to find a technical answer to these problems within the context of the Treaty of Rome.

It is said that the character of the Communities would be changed if other countries join it, and that these new members would act as obstacles to European integration. We have no idea as to how these obstacles would arise. Inasmuch as the new member States wish to take part in the work of European integration, their accession can only strengthen the Communities and impart a fresh impetus to European affairs. It is also argued that the accession of several members would hamper the taking of decisions in the Community.

The Netherlands does not regard this risk as so great, provided all are willing to apply the procedure laid down for the purpose in the Treaties. In the institutional field, the United Kingdom is ready to accept everything which the Six themselves at present accept.

We can look to Great Britain and the other applicants to support balanced relations between the members of the European Communities, and this will have a stabilizing effect on European co-operation.

The policies of the Netherlands and of the United Kingdom with regard to the Atlantic Alliance run on parallel lines; and, finally, there exist between the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries striking similarities of approach towards a number of political and administrative problems.'

Turning to the Community's policy on co-operation with the developing countries, and in view particularly of the fact that the Yaoundé Convention is due to expire in 1969, Mr. de Jong asked whether, in view of Europe's world status, it would not be desirable to abolish any discrimination between the developing countries and, for the sake of fairness, to extend the tariff preferences accorded by the industrialized countries to all developing countries. In his view, the position of the developing countries had not been given sufficient consideration during the Kennedy Round negotiations. Greater attention would therefore have to be paid in GATT, too, to the interests of these countries.

'European federation and the Atlantic Alliance,' concluded Mr. De Jong, 'are, I am firmly convinced, complementary rather than opposite. They strengthen each other and are both needed for the vigorous and peaceful development of our continent. This is why I oppose the tendency to see an insuperable contrast between them and therefore to segregate European countries in an Atlantic and a continental camp. Europe will indeed have to put its house in order before it can become an equal partner in the Atlantic Alliance. But this does not mean that in order to get over Europe's internal troubles we have to move away from the Atlantic Alliance - still less that we should make a foolish retreat into a helpless and dangerous isolationism. In that way we would tarnish the ideal of a united Europe - a Europe united not only in itself but also with the other countries of the free world, a power in the world serving the cause of peace and stability and the preservation of freedom, and dispensing aid to the needy peoples of the earth.'

(Nieuw Europa , No. 5, May 1967)

4. Mr. Luns on European integration

On 5 May 1967 Mr. Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, was awarded the Charlemagne Prize by the city of Aachen. On this occasion he delivered an address in which he stated that the main shortcoming of the European Community was its limited membership and that the accession of Britain and countries like Denmark and Norway would help to overcome this.

Admission of those countries was such a glaring necessity for European unification that it could not be further delayed.

Mr. Luns went so far as to speak of the limitations of the existing set-up and dwelt on the inadequacy of a Community that comprised only half of Western Europe.

'A further weakness,' he went on to say, 'is that the powers of the Parliament have clearly not kept pace with general progress in the Community, a fault which will make itself felt more and more as integration progresses.'

'The lag, particularly at institutional level, underlines the danger of marking time, but there is yet another danger - that of Europe being so engrossed in its own problems as to neglect its vitally important relations with the rest of the world. All the efforts made will serve no purpose if Europe turns in upon itself and encases itself in a shell of isolationism. To escape into isolationism in the world of today would in any case be as illusory as to believe that from a position of isolation - that is, without the help of the United States - Europe could solve its major problems. We want to be not only Atlantic Europeans but also world Europeans.'

Finally Mr. Luns said he saw political unity coming to Europe in the more distant future. 'The ultimate goal is the political union which will bring us to the threshold of the United States of Europe. We should therefore not allow ourselves to be sidetracked but move forward along the highway to integration we have so far followed.'

'As to my own country, I can tell you,' wound up Mr. Luns, 'that we are ready to take part in a European federation not in the distant future but tomorrow, even today. We are not losing sight of this objective and all our efforts are directed towards it.'

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 5 May 1967)

5. Standing Committee on External Affairs

During the Commission's public debate on the report concerning the implementation of the EEC and Euratom Treaties in 1966, Mr. Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, spoke of the meeting held in Rome on 29 and 30 May 1967 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the two Treaties. In the course of that meeting Mr. Luns made the following remarks on political co-operation:

'In the field of political co-operation in Europe, which we regard as essential for real European unity, we can achieve far more by not confining ourselves to the narrow scope offered by the Six. A truly European voice can never, in the opinion of my Government, be the voice of the Six alone. This is why the Dutch Government has always believed that it would be useless to open political consultations in which the United Kingdom did not take part from the outset. That the United Kingdom is ready to do this you all know.' The Dutch Government starts off with the assumption that such co-operation ought to be intergovernmental. Within the Six, the Netherlands is prepared to co-operate at political level only on the basis of integration.

During the ensuing discussions the Netherlands representative stressed that to resume consultations between the Six would be a step towards a divided Europe and would draw the European countries still further away from their ideal of a united Europe and from the principles on which co-operation should have been based. This was all the more unacceptable to the Netherlands because Britain has signified its intention of signing the Rome Treaties and of abiding by all the rules. 'I should like to point out that there is not the slightest need to create a special forum for political discussions between the Six, because we have regular meetings in Western European Union and whenever such a discussion is necessary, we also come together constantly in Brussels. To institutionalize these meetings would be to accept the French concept of political union in a restricted Europe, something which runs absolutely counter to our own views.

We have, after all, agreed to a new meeting of the Heads of State or Government, probably in the course of 1967. This summit conference will not be prepared by the Ministers, following the Netherlands' express request that even the faintest suspicion of "institutionalization" should be avoided.'

Mr. Luns confirmed that Mr. Moro had stated during the conference that an 'institutionalized' meeting of the Heads of Government could widen the range of instruments available to the Community. According to Mr. Luns, it could do so only if the Six as a whole wanted to strengthen the Community through this type of consultation.

The original text of the communiqué tended towards the 'institutionalization' of political discussions. In the end the Netherlands representatives agreed, as a final concession, that the possibilities could be explored. 'I can certainly state before this Chamber', went on Mr. Luns, 'that these possibilities are extremely limited. I cannot see much being achieved in that direction. Months may pass before we realize that there is still a paragraph 5 in the communiqué.' Mr. Luns gave the following reasons for rejecting institutionalized political discussions: 'We are undermining the importance of the Community institutions and, in addition, the chances of their gradual transformation into political bodies, although this has always been our aim and what we had in mind when we signed the Treaties of Rome.'

If, against all expectations, Britain's entry was blocked by the obstinacy of one member of the Community, Mr. Luns foresaw not only a crisis in the Community but even more determined opposition from the Dutch Government to political consultations.

Mr. Luns recalled his Government's attitude during the discussions of what it had been agreed to call the second Fouchet Plan. 'At that time we had gone a long way towards accepting the institutionalization of political discussions on the basis of the sovereignty of member States. However, we stipulated a condition which would undoubtedly be put forward again today - namely, that at a given moment intergovernmental co-operation must give place to co-operation at supranational level. We succeeded then in winning over the other countries to our way of thinking. Nevertheless - and I still think it was a mistake - the French Head of State rejected this proposal on 23 April 1962.'

In answer to a question regarding the possibility of political consultation between the Seven in Western European Union, Mr. Luns said that such discussions would be of no real use because his French colleague, for example, never attended them. The fact remained that Mr. Luns was in favour of extending political discussions to the Seven.

Finally Mr. Luns expressed his readiness to co-operate closely with the Parliamentary Committee regarding any proposals that might be made on political consultations among the Six.

The question of British entry was also raised at the summit conference. At first an attempt had been made to make this the main item on the agenda, but the Netherlands had resisted it on the grounds that the procedure for studying a request of this sort was quite clearly laid down in Article 237 of the Rome Treaty. It could therefore be regarded as a step forward that the Six agreed to follow the procedure specified in Article 237 and to refer the question to the Council of Ministers in Brussels.

The Dutch Government did not share the concern felt in Paris about the position of the pound or about the commitments the EEC would have to take over in view of the pound's rôle as a reserve currency. Opinion in Paris was not, indeed, opposed to an analysis of how Article 108 came to be inserted in the EEC Treaty.

General de Gaulle was considering the possibility of an association between Britain and the EEC. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Governments of the Netherlands, Belgium and the Federal Republic saw any advantage in that.

As to whether the Community's economy might be slowed down by Britain's entry, Mr. Luns stated that Britain would have to accept the EEC as it was - a view which was indeed shared by that country. Even if Britain was not at the moment economically one of the strongest countries, this had been just as true of France in 1958. Mr. Luns therefore did not regard the situation of an applicant country as a sufficient reason for barring its entry.

Merger of the Executives

As regards the rotation in office of Presidents of the European Commission, Mr. Luns said that at one time an attempt had been made to have a single President for the Benelux countries. This proposal was again raised when the President of the new Executive was appointed; but the Netherlands had turned it down in both cases.

With regard to 'democratizing' the Community and, in particular, strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, the Government promised to do all in its power to that end. 'I must, alas, repeat at this meeting of the Commission that, although the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, Italy, are in favour of democratization, the Parliaments and citizens of these countries show no marked enthusiasm about it, at all events far less than we.'

Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) reminded Mr. Luns of the promise he had made two years previously to try, during the preparation of the Council's new rules of procedure - which have to be adopted by a simple majority - to insert an article providing for publication of the minutes of that institution. Mr. Luns took note of this.

The question of the association of third countries with the Community was also discussed at the meeting. The Foreign Minister stated that his Government had informed the Council that he saw no point, under existing circumstances, in going ahead with the association of Algeria and other Maghreb countries.

As regards Algeria, Mr. Luns said it was unfair always to treat that country as a French Department; this situation was devoid of legal foundation and some other arrangement ought in fact to be found.

In general, like Mr. Berkhouwer (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), Mr. Luns felt that it was unreasonable to set up as special philosophy of association. Each request for association should be judged on its particular merits.

The Committee decided to submit to the Chamber a motion presented by Mr. Oele (Labour Party) regarding the action to be taken on the association agreement between the EEC and Greece. The Committee considered that the absence of democratic and parliamentary standards in Greece had blotted out an essential factor in the implementation of the agreement. It requested the Government to use its influence to suspend negotiations on the application of the agreement so long as restrictions were placed, for political reasons, on the freedom of movement of the elected representatives of the Greek people and parliamentary democracy could not function (1).

In a motion tabled by Mr. Berkhouwer (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) on relations with Israel, the Committee called for an association between the EEC and that State (1). The Government saw in that motion support for its policy.

As regards harmonization in the social sector, the Minister for Social Affairs, Mr. Roolvink, replied to questions on the Council meeting of 5 June. 'It is an open secret,' he said, 'that France is trying, not unskillfully, to restrict the Commission's freedom of movement to a minimum and even to suppress it entirely.' The Dutch Government had opposed this attitude. The views of the other members of the Council lay somewhere between these extremes. In particular, the Dutch Government has tried, with backing from Luxembourg, and, to a lesser degree, from Italy, to oppose procedural arrangements for consultations between workers and employers which, in practice, could have narrowed down the Commission's powers.

Mr. Berkhouwer advocated introducing a 'European passport' which could replace national passports. This would bring 'Europe' home to the man-in-the-street.

In reply to a question by Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) on the primacy of Community law over national law, Mr. Polak, the Minister of Justice said that in this respect Italy presented a problem because no

(1) Both motions were carried on 28 June by the Second Chamber.

uniform body of case-law yet existed there. He added that he would refer the matter to the Council of the Ministers of Justice. Because he was not very optimistic about the possibility of his Italian colleague modifying his country's basic law, he felt that the matter should be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Communities, which had delivered a number of judgments somewhat on the lines suggested by the Netherlands.

Referring to the European Parliament's resolution on the primacy of Community law, the Minister of Justice said he shared the view of Mr. Westerterp who had - without success - argued in Strasbourg for wider use of the facilities for delegating the powers of the Parliaments to the national Governments once the European Parliament's powers had been increased. The need for greater delegation of powers would be used by the Minister in support of his plea for widening the powers of the European Parliament.

Finally, discussion turned to the lack of progress in Euratom. A motion tabled by Mr. De Goede (Democracy '66), suggesting that Euratom should be transformed into a European technological Community in which Britain would have a place and which - through a widening of its powers - could become the instrument for pooling activities, was then carried.

Mr. De Block thought that the motion ought to be rejected because Euratom had reached a state of deadlock and no progress had been made towards solving the general problems of technology, one of the major tasks which Euratom had set itself in 1965.

Moreover, Mr. De Block asked whether it was really advisable to seek the answer in Euratom rather than in the wider context of the OECD.

(Second Chamber, Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs, Extraordinary Session of 1967, meeting of 7 and 8 June 1967)

6. Parliamentary questions

a) Application of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty

Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) put a number of questions to the Government on the application of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. He wanted, in particular, to know its views as to the legality of the following agreements

entered into by representatives of the Governments of EEC member States meeting in Council:

- i. Agreement of 9 July 1961 on the measures and the procedure to be followed to give effect to the agreement setting up an association between the European Economic Community and Greece;
- ii. Internal agreement of 20 July 1963 on the measures and the procedure to be followed to give effect to the association agreement between the European Economic Community and the Associated African and Malagasy States;
- iii. Agreement of 12 September 1963 on the measures and the procedure to be followed to give effect to the agreement setting up an association between the Economic Community and Turkey.

Mr. Luns, the Foreign Minister, replied that these should all be considered as agreements within the meaning of the constitution. This was why the Government had submitted them to the States General for approval. No article of the EEC Treaty prohibited member States from entering into such agreements or laid down any condition as to what form they should take. The Government therefore believed that the agreements had been lawfully entered into.

The same applied, for example, to the agreements concerning the financial protocol annexed to the agreements setting up an association with Turkey and with Greece.

Mr. Vredeling also asked the Government to say whether it considered that the agreement concluded between the member States to give effect to Articles 95 to 97 of the EEC Treaty were binding as far as the Community institutions were concerned. The agreement had not been published and the European Parliament had not been consulted on it.

Mr. Luns replied that the procedure adopted by the Council on 21 June 1960 concerning a standstill arrangement for the refund of internal taxes on exports to another member State and the levying of compensatory taxes constituted merely a policy agreement between the member States. It was not therefore binding on Community institutions. According to Mr. Luns the agreement in question could not be published because the minutes of Council meetings in which it was embodied could not be disclosed.

Mr. Luns added that the Government view was that member States were free to enter, among themselves, into policy agreements which did not necessarily have to satisfy the formal requirements of the EEC Treaty. An appeal could always be made to the Court of Justice in respect of the agreements first mentioned but not in respect of policy agreements entered into between the member States.

(Second Chamber, Extraordinary Session 1967, Annex, 179)

b) Tariff situation of Algeria vis-à-vis the European Communities

The following statement was made by the Dutch Government in reply to a question by Mr. Westerterp (People's Catholic Party) on the non-application to products from Algeria of reductions in import duties which had been made in the course of intra-Community trade:

'Since Algeria acquired its independence, its status vis-à-vis the EEC has not been regularized. During the preliminary talks held in the Council of Ministers on 29 and 30 November 1965 on the subject of changes to be made in import duties with effect from 1 January 1966, a discussion took place as to the extent to which reductions in internal EEC tariffs should once again be accorded to Algeria. The Benelux countries pointed out that the situation then prevailing, in which Algeria received the treatment of a member State, lacked any legal basis, was contrary to the provisions of GATT and could only be accounted for in terms of historical and political factors. The Benelux countries have however, never wanted to confront Algeria suddenly with the import duties applied to non-member countries.

In this connexion reference is made to the request addressed by the Algerian Government to the President of the EEC Commission on 28 December 1962 for the opening of talks on economic relations between the EEC and Algeria. Algeria also asked that, pending the results of these negotiations, the existing situation should be maintained. A similar request had been made in the letter addressed by the Algerian Foreign Minister to the President of the EEC Council on 18 December 1963.

The ensuing exploratory talks between the European Commission and Algeria have not yet led to negotiations.

The EEC Council of Ministers has not taken a formal decision on the tariff system to be applied to Algeria because the EEC member States have not reached agreement among themselves. Member States consequently decided to act as each individually thought fit, pending a definite arrangement with Algeria. Italy and the Benelux countries decided to continue to levy on Algerian products duties identical to those in force on 31 December 1965 on products imported from member States.

As regards agricultural products subject to the system of levies, Algeria is treated as a non-member country.

Germany applies to Algeria the same treatment as to EEC member States.

In France the existing system is maintained. With the exception of wine, Algerian products are free from any kind of duty and agricultural products to which the levy system applies benefit from a duty-free quota.'

(Second Chamber, Extraordinary Session 1967, Annex, 453)

c) Draft trade agreement between the EEC and Spain

In reply to a question by Mr. Nederhorst (Labour Party) regarding the draft trade agreement between the EEC and Spain and the priority to be granted to Israel, the Foreign Minister stated that the Government was in principle ready to collaborate in an agreement between the EEC and Spain on the basis of which each would accord the other preferences, taking account of the economic development of Spain.

The Netherlands had always thought the scope of the existing trade agreement between the EEC and Israel to be inadequate. In the meantime Israel itself had announced that the agreement did not offer it sufficient advantages and had therefore asked for association with the EEC. The Government felt that every effort should be made to meet Israel's request.

The Minister was ready to ask that priority should be given to Israel's plea for association.

In Brussels the Netherlands had always championed the view that the advantages which could be granted to Spain in respect of products which were also major items of Israel's exports to the EEC, should not be allowed to harm Israel's export trade. The Minister readily confirmed that this attitude would continue to be maintained in the future.

(Second Chamber, Extraordinary Session 1967, Annex, 267)

Scandinavian countries

The Scandinavian countries and the Common Market

Introduction

Great Britain's attempts to gain admission to the European Economic Community have had a marked influence on the policy of the Scandinavian countries. Although Denmark, Norway and Sweden today display a more positive attitude towards the Common Market than five years ago, their basic anxieties remain the same. The keenest champion of rapid entry into the EEC is Denmark; Norway follows somewhat hesitantly, while Sweden continues to be as concerned as ever about its political neutrality, and Finland, now associated with EFTA, is waiting on the sidelines.

Since 1961/62 the situation has been changed by the progress made in EFTA. Trade between the Nordic countries, in particular, has expanded beyond expectations. The long-desired Nordic customs union has, with the aid of EFTA, been practically achieved. Trade between the four Nordic countries, for example, has been stepped up by 170 per cent since EFTA came into being, and among members of the Free Trade Area as a whole by 110 per cent. Total exports from EFTA countries have risen by about 70 per cent.

Sweden today is for Norway a more important market than Western Germany and far and away the biggest outlet for its industrial products. Within EFTA the 'Nordic market' is acting as a steadily growing counterweight to the Common Market. Swedish imports from Norway and Denmark alone reached Skr. 713.2m. (625.4) and Skr. 592.8m. (537.8) respectively, while Swedish exports to Denmark increased to Skr. 908.7m. (794.2) and to Norway to Skr. 1,117m. (904.6). Imports from Great Britain fell slightly (Skr. 1,570.3 as compared with 1,572m.), while Swedish exports to Great Britain increased to Skr. 1,274.2m. (1,064.8) (1). Sweden itself had a surplus of Skr. 1.5m. in trade with its Scandinavian neighbours.

(1) Source: 'Industriekurier', 22 June 1967, 25 July 1967; 'Neue Zürcher Zeitung', 17 May 1967

Attitudes of the individual Scandinavian countries

1. Norway

In October 1966 Prime Minister Per Borten stated that his country rejected the Danish proposals for a common Scandinavian approach to entry into the EEC. In a speech before Danish students he explained that Norway was interested only in a joint approach by the EFTA States; it would not therefore lend its support to any move that might threaten the solidarity of the EFTA countries. Joint Scandinavian negotiations with the EEC would merely lead to the erection of new customs barriers in Europe.

On 20 October 1966 the Norwegian Minister of Trade, Kaarl Willoch, also warned against the threat to the solidarity of the EFTA countries entailed by individual approaches to the EEC. He rejected the Danish proposal that the Scandinavian countries should seek association with the EEC without Great Britain. He put forward the same arguments during talks held in Brussels in 1966 with the EEC Commission and the Belgian Government.

Britain's new application for entry had a positive effect on Norway's European policy. On 13 July 1967 the Storting approved by 136 to 13 votes the Government's proposal to put in a new application in Brussels for entry into the EEC. Whereas the first Norwegian approach to the EEC in 1961/62 had been preceded by heated debates, on this occasion the crucial problem - that of surrendering sovereign rights - was very soberly dealt with. Mr. Lyng, the Foreign Minister, argued that, in exchange, greater influence would be gained by Norway in an enlarged Community.

Characteristic of the change in attitude were the statements of Prime Minister Borten, whose Centre Party (Agrarians) put up very stiff resistance and who himself five years ago vigorously opposed Norwegian entry into the Common Market and pleaded for association. He now argued, in contradistinction to his own party, that as part of Western Europe Norway ought to help in overcoming the present economic division. Moreover, Norway had to follow in the wake of Britain and Denmark in order to avoid the consequences of a possible break-up of EFTA. The Social Democrats showed themselves to be particularly keen on an approach to Brussels, whereas among the anti-labour parties making up the Government some preoccupation with the anxieties of voters was discernible.

On 24 July 1967 the Norwegian Government expressed its desire to enter the EEC under Article 237 of the Treaty in a letter addressed to the President of the EEC Council of Ministers. In this formal application Norway refrained from going into details, thus demonstrating its conviction that individual questions could be solved in subsequent negotiations.

2. Denmark

In a speech at Aarhus on 7 October 1966, Anders Andersen, President of the Danish Agricultural Council, put the case for Denmark's making an isolated approach should a joint application with Britain, or with the other Scandinavian countries, not soon prove possible. He emphasized that he had nothing against a joint entry by Denmark, Britain and the other Nordic countries; indeed that was the solution he preferred. Should it, however, turn out to be impossible, then Denmark would have to enter into negotiations on its own. An isolated move by Denmark could not harm the interests of Danish agriculture. 'Reports that an isolated entry would have disastrous results for our agricultural exports merely betray ignorance of the problems involved.' Denmark's membership of EFTA had not - he added - been of any advantage for its agricultural exports.

On 11 October 1966 Prime Minister Krag held talks in Brussels with President Hallstein and some members of the EEC Commission. The following day he gave an address on 'Europe and Denmark' before the 'Institut Royal des Relations Internationales'. He did not feel - he said - that isolated Danish entry into the EEC was feasible under present conditions. It would neither solve Denmark's problems nor be desirable from the general European point of view; nevertheless the deadlock in European policy would have to be broken. Great Britain and France alone held the key to the situation, and an initiative by the Nordic countries could have an important bearing on a fresh dialogue between Britain and France. British entry into the Common Market was a crucial political problem for Europe.

A few days following the Swedish-Danish conference held in Copenhagen during the latter half of October 1966, and a meeting of the Nordic Council in Oslo, there was little evidence of unanimity among the four Nordic countries on the questions of the EEC. Something of a political storm had been let loose in the Scandinavian countries by statements made by the Danish Prime Minister and Minister of Trade. Prime Minister Krag had spoken before the Council of Europe of some sort of joint approach to the EEC by the Nordic countries, while indicating that an isolated Danish move towards association was, under prevailing conditions, out of the question. Mr. Dahlgard,

Minister of Trade, had announced a separate move by Denmark unless EFTA shortly took concerted action.

Mr. Willoch, the Norwegian Minister of Trade, retorted in a speech delivered before the Storting in Oslo that he could not believe that a Nordic country could contemplate breaking up EFTA in this way. It was unthinkable that the Nordic countries should consider a link-up with the EEC that excluded Britain and the other EFTA countries. Whether in the Kennedy Round or in the Brussels talks, the Scandinavian countries could negotiate only on a common basis.

Mr. Willoch returned to the subject in a radio broadcast in which he said that the Danish approaches to the EEC were being followed with growing anxiety. Mr. Dahlgaard, the Danish Minister of Trade and EFTA Minister, retorted that Denmark could give no assurance that it would always belong to the same trading bloc. Denmark could not tie itself down for years to come but was nevertheless seeking a joint solution of the problem of the European market.

In July 1967 the Danish Government handed the EEC Commission in Brussels a memorandum requesting admission to the Common Market. The Danish application of 1967 differs, as far as the industrial sector is concerned, in an important respect from that of 1961. In 1961 Denmark had requested a transition period for the reduction of duties on a number of products, particularly those of the metal-using industries and leather and rubber goods. Danish industry was now, however, no longer asking for any special transition period to enable it to adjust to the Common Market. According to reports from Copenhagen, the Danish Government statement covers in particular the following points:

- 1) In the industrial sector Denmark can manage with a brief adaptation period.
- 2) In the agricultural sector Denmark requires no transition period.
- 3) Denmark wishes to have a reasonable say in any negotiations between Britain and the EEC on the adaptation of the British food market.
- 4) Denmark desires consultations on certain aspects of economic union, in particular on the EEC rules on the freedom of establishment.

- 5) The special position of Greenland and of the Faroe Islands leads to a reservation regarding these two territories for which some arrangement will have to be considered on lines similar to those followed in the case of certain French Overseas Departments.

This State - still young and with only 4,600,000 inhabitants - has greatly expanded its external trade since EFTA was founded seven years ago. Today the view has come to prevail that the much-vaunted market of 100 million consumers would not in the long run make up for the losses feared on the 170-million-strong Common Market.

Danish farmers are becoming increasingly sensitive to the EEC's protectionist attitude towards agriculture, and is therefore the driving force on the question of entering the EEC. At the same time Denmark has long ceased to be an agricultural country; the crucial point, however, is that it is very much an exporter of agricultural products. Its farmers need the foreign markets on which they have to dispose of some two-thirds of their total output, and the country itself needs the large amount of foreign exchange earned by these exports. By far the biggest outlets for Danish farm products lie in Britain and Germany.

Danish industry too is now driving deeper into the EEC and has almost entirely abandoned its reservations and in particular its fear of competition from the EEC countries. This is due to the great success it has had on EFTA markets which has inspired a wide measure of confidence among Danish enterprises. In spite of wage increases such as have been experienced in scarcely another European country, and high interest rates, Danish industry has achieved successes in the export sector undreamt of at the time EFTA was established. Yet another fact of crucial importance is that agricultural exports were recently overtaken by industrial exports.

These achievements have encouraged Danish industry to refrain from asking for special arrangements for specific branches of industry in the event of EEC entry; it is in fact prepared to accept the Rome Treaty and any regulations so far issued without exception, all the more so in order not to leave itself entirely unprotected against competition from the other EEC countries. Farmers want immediately to take full advantage of the chances offered by the EEC, without any transition period, in order to be able to win back lost markets.

3. Finland

In November 1966 Mr. Rafael Paasio, the Prime Minister, pointed out that his country could not link up with the European Economic Community. Before the Congress of the Social Democratic Party in Helsinki he stated: 'It is very difficult for neutral countries to join the EEC since this amounts to recognition of a supranational power of decision.' His party's foreign policy, which set the pattern in the Popular Front Government, aimed at maintaining good relations with all countries, of which those with the Soviet Union were a cornerstone.

4. Sweden

With an allusion to 'new EEC shocks' the Swedish Association of Industries noted that in future Swedish suppliers would have to cope with tariff rises of 2-6 per cent owing to the approximation of the domestic rates of the Federal Republic and the Benelux countries to the EEC's common external tariff. The Association also feared that in 1968 the Federal Republic would, in accordance with general EEC policy, go over to the value-added tax system. Imports would then - according to the results of the Association's investigation - lose the small margin of advantage they had till then enjoyed on the German market. Swedish exports to Germany would have to bear a tax of about 10 per cent whereas German goods would, on crossing the frontier, enjoy a corresponding relief because they were not subject to added value tax.

At the opening of the Jönköping Fair, Mr. Tage Erlander, the Swedish Prime Minister, made known his reservations about the moves that were being considered, particularly in Denmark, to make a joint Scandinavian approach to the Common Market, if need be before or without Britain. Mr. Erlander said that he saw no advantage for Sweden in negotiating separately with the EEC. The same attitude was taken by Mr. Gunnar Lange, Swedish Minister of Trade, in a Swedish radio broadcast on 27 September 1966. A separate approach by Sweden, Denmark and Norway without Great Britain was - said Mr. Lange - at present ruled out. Some form of co-operation between the two economic blocs other than association would perhaps be conceivable if it turned out that the political momentum of the EEC Treaty lost ground to economic priorities.

On 4 October 1966 the Danish and Swedish Heads of Government discussed policy in Copenhagen. The talks covered tariff cuts in the Kennedy Round and the future pattern of a common European market. According to po-

litical observers the two statesmen failed to reach full agreement on the lines along which the market would be likely to develop. At all events, the proposal of Mr. Krag, the Danish Prime Minister, that the Scandinavian countries should make a direct approach to the EEC (a suggestion put forward by him before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg) met with a measure of scepticism. At a dinner Mr. Erlander remarked: 'I doubt whether the Nordic countries ought at the moment to make approaches to the EEC on their own initiative.' Many economic problems of the EEC had recently been solved but considerable problems still remained. The two heads of Government agreed that Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland, should adopt a common line in the Kennedy Round.

Mr. Gunnar Lange, the Swedish Minister of Trade, who presided over the EFTA Council during the first six months of 1967, gave his views on integration and tariff problems at a press conference held on 9 February 1967. He pointed out that EFTA, one of whose principal aims was the creation of a large West European market, was not an end in itself. (The same views had been expressed by Mr. Nilsson, the Swedish Foreign Minister, at the opening of the international St. Erik's Fair in September 1966). A long time would have to pass before this market could be set up, and in the meantime co-operation between the EFTA States ought to be consolidated. The London EFTA manifesto, which dated back to the summer of 1961, was as valid as ever. Under its provisions, any EFTA State wishing to enter into exploratory talks or negotiations on integration had first to consult its EFTA partners.

On 28 July 1967 Sweden applied for the opening of negotiations for membership of the EEC. In handing over the application, Mr. Lindh, Ambassador to the European Communities, stated that the Swedish Government did not exclude any of the formulas provided for in the EEC Treaty for participation in an enlarged EEC. Actual membership had already been regarded with favour by the Swedish Government in 1961/62. In handing the letter by Mr. Lange, the Minister of Trade, to the President of the Council, Mr. Lindh said that Sweden hoped for negotiations that would enable it to take part in enlarging the European Economic Community in a way that was compatible with continuing Swedish neutrality. The Swedish Government was also ready and willing to enter into negotiations with the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom.

The three Opposition parties, a number of Ministers of the Socialist Government and the Association of Industries had come down firmly in favour of applying for full membership under Article 237 of the EEC Treaty. The current application, on the other hand, reflects a certain hesitation on the part of the Swedish Government. Sweden is not, in principle, prepared for full membership, but does not want to admit this too openly because of the attitude of its industry and the criticisms of the anti-Labour Opposition. Stockholm's statement that Sweden wishes to play a part, on the broadest possible

basis, in an enlarged Economic Community, while hanging on to its policy of neutrality, is regarded as much too vague in the other capitals. While it is true that the various parties in Sweden agree that the policy of neutrality must be pursued unchanged, opinion in the Centre and on the Right Wing is that, with adequate guarantees from the EEC, this could be reconciled with full membership. The Government has of course made it known that the weakening of supranational trends in the EEC appears to make it possible for Sweden to become a full member. The fact remains that the Community's ultimate aims are political ones. These, however - as Mr. Lange made quite plain - cannot and will not be subscribed to by Sweden. What Stockholm would like best of all would be a combination of the advantages offered by the Community and absolute independence, including the right, for example, to conclude unrestricted trading agreements with third countries.

(Die Welt, 1 September, 28 and 29 November 1966; 13 January, 21 September 1967;
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 September 1966; 9 February,
15, 24 and 25 July 1967;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 September, 2 December 1966; 12 February,
17 May, 30 July 1967;
Industriekurier; 29 October 1966; 25 July 1967;
Le Monde, 7 February 1967)

Switzerland

Switzerland and political integration

Dr. Schaffner, member of the Federal Council, informed the press on 7 July 1967 that the Federal Council had conveyed its views on the problem of integration - as announced in the National Council on 27 June - through diplomatic channels both to the EEC institutions in Brussels and to the Governments of the six EEC member States.

Replying to an oral question (with debate) put by Mr. Weber on the Kennedy Round, Dr. Schaffner explained that the positive outcome of these negotiations had not finally solved Switzerland's integration problem. The senseless division of the European market remained; nevertheless it should now be easier to find appropriate solutions. By dismantling its external tariffs the EEC had shown that it intended to develop into an outward-looking world trader, and that it took into account the interests of its closest trading partners. The deadlock in external trade relations appeared, therefore, to have been overcome.

As ever, Switzerland aimed at the creation of a broad-based, free and outward-looking European market. If progress in this direction was to be made by enlarging the EEC, then Switzerland was determined to play a part in this development. Its central geographical position and the range of its economic and cultural relations provided ideal conditions for such a contribution. In view of the uncertainty at present prevailing regarding integration, Switzerland did not therefore consider it necessary to issue another special statement in Brussels, even if other EFTA countries were to take such a step. It would also be prepared to consider new lines of approach to the problem, provided they allowed Switzerland a say in the matter in keeping with its economic importance, and were compatible with Switzerland's constitution.

In its 75th report on external economic measures and other trade policy matters, the Federal Council also expressed its views on developments in the EEC.

The report went on to explain the Swiss position in the drive for European integration, already outlined at the EFTA Conference held in Stockholm on 2 and 3 March 1967. This included the following points: since all EFTA countries continued to share the wish to form part of a large European

market, the freedom of movement already existing in the EFTA market must be preserved and later incorporated smoothly in a wider Community. Although the dogma of neutrality had lost some of its edge, no fully satisfactory solution was in sight to the problems of neutral countries. It was important, therefore, in a complex situation of uncertainty and rapid change, to remain as flexible as possible and to keep an open mind towards any possible solution of the problem of European integration.

After quoting the EFTA statement issued in London on 28 April 1967, the section of the report devoted to EFTA points out that during the first six months of 1967 its internal activities were centred on the problems presented by non-tariff trade barriers and by the application of the rules of competition laid down in the Stockholm agreement. With the abolition on 31 December 1966 of the last duties still levied on industrial products, tariff problems have receded into the background.

In September 1967 the external policy committee and the external trade committee of the Council of States held a joint meeting at which integration policy was discussed.

Following this meeting, Dr. Schaffner outlined the situation before journalists accredited to the Federal Council. He pointed out that no radical changes had occurred in the situation since replies had been given to various questions involving debate during the spring and June sessions. Following Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden had asked for the opening of negotiations last summer without specifying the ways and means. The EEC, however, had not issued its comments. The Swiss attitude to integration was direct and constant and not subject to day-to-day fluctuations. The Federal Council's objectives had been presented seven years previously in the statement on Switzerland's entry into EFTA, which had been designed as only the first stage towards the creation of a comprehensive European market. Ever since, Switzerland had concerned itself with finding some reasonable way of doing away with the absurd division of the European market.

Federal Councillor Schaffner pointed out that events to date clearly showed that Switzerland had neither missed a chance nor harmed other non-member States in any way through its caution. No one, not even the least patient EFTA country or any other European State, had been able to conclude a comprehensive agreement with the EEC.

Switzerland, on the other hand, had used its influence in a field where progress could, under the circumstances, be reasonably expected, namely in the Kennedy Round.

Before a clear-cut answer could be given to the question as to what form Switzerland's relations with the EEC could take, it would be necessary to know exactly what possibilities the EEC was considering for regulating its external relations. According to Dr. Schaffner it could not be ruled out that questions connected with an enlargement of the Community, which preoccupations with the internal consolidation of the EEC had allowed to recede very much into the background, would now have to be more carefully investigated in Brussels. The new single Commission of the European Communities had been asked to submit a memorandum by the end of September. This would presumably start out from the British application for entry and analyse the effects which an enlargement of the Community would have on the efficiency and mode of operation of the present Community. The attitudes adopted by the EEC member States to all these questions would also furnish Switzerland with valuable clues for assessing the situation.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 and 20 July, 30 September 1967)

II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS

1. The Left Wing Gaullists and Europe

The Left Wing of the Fifth Republic comprises several organizations with allegiances both to the Left and to Gaullism; the Convention of the Left is headed by Mr. Louis Joxe and Mr. Edgar Pisani. On 26 January it published a political manifesto in which it stated its attitude to the construction of Europe.

'Since the war Europe has been urged along the wrong course by men and by parties who have sought to make it a closed unit and who, out of anti-Communism, have thrust towards building a federal system directed against the Eastern Bloc. This policy did not last long because it was in no way consistent with the hopes of the peoples and because it threatened the identity of the individual nations. European unification must be the work of men who stand for progress and reason. It should bring together all those countries which belong to the historical and geographical Europe and which accept the common regulations established by unanimous agreement.

It is indeed out of the question for Europe to be united while certain countries in the West are in a position - more often than not intentionally - of depending on the United States of America, constantly calling for the establishment of an Atlantic Community which would be fatal to Europe.

As far as Europeans are concerned, the benefits resulting from the Common Market cause them to direct their attention to increasingly close co-ordination, to programmes discussed and carried out together in the economic, scientific, technological, agricultural and social spheres. The needs of European planning must have priority over the interests and claims of the major companies of international capitalism. Only concerted socialism will give the European peoples an awareness of their community of interests and guarantee their independence.'

The Gaullists of the Left consider that 'The nation is a fundamental reality in the political context' and, whatever the circumstances, 'it must retain control over its means of production and equip itself when it can with those armaments which are today the only decisive ones.'

(Le Monde, 28 January 1967)

2. The last message of Gaetano Martino

Mr. Gaetano Martino, former Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was asked to contribute to a special edition of 'L'Europe en formation' on the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome. The following are extracts from his article which was entitled: 'The promoters of the Treaty were aiming at political unity'.

'When we look at Europe as it was ten years ago, it is impossible not to see the great, or should I say miraculous, results due to economic and social unity. The Common Market - as the European Economic Community has come to be called - has not only accelerated, stimulated and increased Europe's economic progress but has also served as a model and as an example to other countries and other continents

Having said and established this, one should, however, point out that economic development did not go hand in hand with political development. The explicitly political clauses of the Treaties of Rome have not so far been applied

There is a tendency at present to be satisfied with the results achieved, to restrict one's attention to consolidating these results and to avoid taking any further steps forward which might involve dangers, and creating within a much wider context the same conditions as those that bind the national economies. Admittedly, this is not the true course towards political unification but this could be its beginning

The greatest politicians in Europe, who carry some measure of responsibility, are perfectly aware that not only are all the reasons which underlay the elaboration of the Treaties of Rome still valid but that they have been supplemented by other reasons which should logically quicken the movement towards unity. I refer in particular to the re-emergence or recrudescence of nationalist myths and to the scientific and technological gap which separates Europe from the United States and the Soviet Union.

Now, as the Treaties of Rome enter their second decade, I think we all need to remind ourselves of Robert Schuman's famous comment: "L'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup, ni dans une construction d'ensemble." We must therefore arm ourselves with patience and prudence; we must step up our work within the limits of the conditions laid down by this moment in time; we must not neglect any favourable opportunity which may help us to overcome the major numerous obstacles which we shall meet on the road which we still have to travel

(L'Europe en formation, No. 85, April 1967)

3. Several leading French politicians state their views on the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market

Mr. Jean Lecanuet, President of the Democratic Centre said: 'I am extremely pleased at the United Kingdom's decision to apply for membership of the Common Market; it is one for which I have been waiting for a very long time.'

It goes without saying that Britain's entry implies that she will accept the Treaties and subsequent regulations regarding the European economic organization and leading to a stage beyond economic unity that is the political unity of the free Europe. If these conditions are fulfilled, I trust that the six countries of the Common Market and France in particular, will favour Britain's entry into the EEC.

With the United Kingdom, Europe will be stronger and more democratic. Strengthened in this way, Europe will be able to assert itself both in the Atlantic Alliance and in efforts to achieve a détente with the east.'

Mr. Gaston Deferre, President of the Federation of the Left Group in the National Assembly said: 'The accession of the United Kingdom could enable us to restore the balance. If we reject the United Kingdom she will not remain alone. She will join the American camp. This will further aggravate the imbalance between the Europe of the Six and the Anglo-Saxon world. Some say that Europe will then become the "world's Switzerland".'

The most recent public opinion poll on this subject shows that more than 50 per cent of the French people are in favour of Britain's accession to the Common Market.

It would be inadmissible and it would be to ignore the wishes of a majority of the French people to refuse to begin negotiations or to refuse to take them to a point where it can be seen whether the various viewpoints are reconcilable.'

Mr. Jacques Vendroux, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly stated: 'The United Kingdom has thus confirmed, as expected, its desire to enter the EEC.'

No one will doubt that it is our own wish to welcome the United Kingdom to the EEC. But how far will London go in its determination to obtain,

from its possible future partners, a re-phrasing of certain Articles in the Treaty of Rome? Is it a question of reaching a compromise on provisions of secondary importance or is it, on the contrary, to be a question of changing the spirit and the letter of the texts to the point of setting up a real free trade area?

In the first case France will no doubt have to make its contribution in the general interest and to adopt an understanding attitude. In the latter case, the general interest would, on the contrary, require that France should call upon its partners to join with her in carefully safeguarding the Treaties which at the present stage in their application can no longer be allowed to undergo any change of direction.'

Lastly Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, former Finance Minister, told the Daily Mail that General de Gaulle 'would not this time veto Britain's entry into Europe; this is quite certain'.

During the Congress on Europe which was organised by the Federal Trust for Research and Education and the Britain in Europe Group, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing added: 'We must realize, when we tackle the problems raised by Britain's entry into the EEC, that reciprocal interests are involved. In 1950, Europe was already trying to find solutions to past difficulties. The Europe of today is looking towards the future. We expect the United Kingdom to come and join its voice to that of Europe.'

(Le Monde, 6 May 1967)

4. Mr. Spaak's attitude to certain European problems

Mr. Spaak, former Belgian Foreign Minister, has published several articles in a leading Brussels newspaper stating his views on some current European issues, including, in particular, the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome and the complexes and weaknesses of Europe.

a) The Tenth Anniversary of the Treaties of Rome

Mr. Spaak was invited by the Italian Government to take part in this event but he felt that he could not associate himself with the celebration of the

signing of the EEC and Euratom Treaties. He found it regrettable that 'France's partners should give way in the face of an unjustified and unjustifiable whim' which consisted in twice thrusting aside Mr. Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission; France had denied him the right to speak on the occasion of the anniversary of the Treaties celebrated in Rome on 29 May 1967 and had had him replaced at the head of the single commission which had resulted from the Treaty of 8 April 1965.

In his opinion 'the German Government is quite as guilty as the French Government'. By agreeing to thrust aside Mr. Hallstein for reasons that had nothing to do with the calibre of the man and the sound operation of the organization, it was creating a situation which is full of dangers for the future.

By refusing to lend his support to the scheme that was proposed to him, Mr. Hallstein rendered the European Community a further service. But this gesture would be in vain if, in official and responsible quarters the state of affairs thus created were accepted without a protest.

'Will the European Parliament, which has always been asking for more rights and more responsibilities, allow to be thrust aside without a protest a man who had its esteem and its confidence? Will it, by saying nothing, be the accomplice of a policy that is anti-European, both in its spirit and in the way that it is carried out?'

General de Gaulle's press conference of 16 May did no more than confirm Mr. Spaak's attitude. 'Injustice and ingratitude make me indignant whether they relate to a man who has given good service or to a people, the greater part of whose difficulties are a consequence of the efforts that it has made for our general benefit.'

b) Europe's complexes and weaknesses

Mr. Spaak found that the States of Western Europe had taken refuge in a position of weakness, neutrality and egoism. 'At the most recent meeting in Luxembourg of the Atlantic Alliance, its fifteen members were agreed that they should consult each other about the problems of the Middle East but they abandoned the idea of trying to reach an agreement and they even propounded the peculiar theory that it might be better if there were certain divergences of view between them. They could not at any price allow it to be thought that

the Western States constituted a bloc. A peculiar modesty, a peculiar form of prudence. As soon as a conflict breaks out, the USSR brings the Communist countries together and endeavours to obtain their agreement with its policy and itself takes credit for having done so. The leaders of the Arab States meet to try to reach an agreement. The African States and those of Latin America do not conceal their efforts to co-ordinate their action and the unaligned countries are particularly active, if not particularly successful, in their initiatives. There is only one allegiance which it appears necessary to conceal : that of the Atlantic Alliance.'

Mr. Spaak 'attributed this confusion to the action taken by the French Government, which preferred Europe to play a secondary role in cooperation with the USSR than for it to be a partner in an alliance with the United States and which, for the same reason, refused to welcome the United Kingdom to the European Community'. He rejected the argument that the supporters of European unification and the Atlantic Alliance had taken up an attitude of resignation with respect to the United States. 'Living in fear of the Russians and off the charity of the Americans, it was our desire to recover Europe's economic wealth and restore its economic importance.' Lastly, he expressed the hope that 'such an economically united Europe would recover the sense of its political grandeur and the resolve to play its part'.

(Le Soir, 18 April, 3, 4 and 5 June, 21 June, 30 and 31 July 1967)

5. The attitude adopted by the Independent Republicans

Paris (EU), Thursday 1 June 1967 - The 'Europe' Study Group of the French Independent Republican Party adopted an important report a few days before the Rome Summit Conference, in which it came out 'in favour of a re-launching of Europe', laying special stress on the following points:

1. Britain's application: The Independent Republicans 'trust that the six Governments will adopt a procedure which will enable the British Government to give concrete proof that it is ready to enter the Common Market without impairing the results achieved and without prejudice to its ultimate political objectives'.
2. The political Europe: 'The economic achievements of the Common Market demonstrate the value of its institutional methods. The very progress of the work undertaken will, to an increasing extent, call for arbitration and action that will, in fact, be political. The institutional structure of the Common Market is perfectly adapted to this: it only has to be used

for this purpose; was it not seen how, in the Kennedy Round, it was possible for the Council of Ministers to indicate to the Commission the broad outlines of the action to take and how effectively Europe's single representative was able to defend European interests in a confrontation with the American negotiator.' They, therefore, consider it necessary to use the Institutions 'of the Common Market in tackling the problems arising no longer from a purely economic angle but in their political dimension' It is in this way they consider that 'common, or at least concerted answers should be found' to the three problems which constitute 'a common challenge' for the Six: the American balance of payments deficit, American investments in Europe and Europe's technological leeway.

3. Relations with the East: 'The Common Market Treaty makes provision for setting up a common trading policy and in particular, therefore, with regard to the so-called "popular democracies". It would be a bad thing to oppose the definition of such a policy in the Common Market on the grounds that the Common Market Treaty is purely economic: it would be an equally bad thing if this political task were tackled from a purely economic angle.' They therefore considered that it would be 'desirable to institute a European policy vis-à-vis the East European countries bringing together, within an overall design, the diplomatic positions, trade, long-terms loans, the cultural presence and the tourist exchanges of the main Western powers'.
4. Relations with countries in the Mediterranean basin: A purely mercantile approach is not good enough. A Mediterranean policy should be laid down preparing 'the long-term conditions for political and economic stability'.
5. The institutions of the Common Market: The successes of the Common Market make it imperative 'to go beyond the purely economic stage and to consider European problems in their political dimension even if, for the moment, the common means of action are still mainly economic'. 'This presupposes a change of attitude with respect to the institutions of the Common Market: provided they do not try to take the place of the legitimate national authorities, there is no reason for keeping them on a leash. It is, on the contrary, a question of using them, by adapting them, to solve the new problems arising.' This implied an immediate strengthening of the Institutions. The Report therefore called upon the Council to entrust the Commission with 'a growing number of technical dossiers' so that it can itself 'devote itself to the more purely political dossiers'; then again legislative business (a European-type company statute, a European patent) 'would gain by being entrusted rather to the European Parliament'.
6. The Ministers of the Six: The 'technical Ministers' should not be used to coming to sit 'together in Brussels as naturally as they may sit in Paris or Bonn in their national cabinets'. Then again, since 'national ministers

cannot sit too long in Brussels without inconvenience', it would be desirable to provide 'a standing political representation vis-à-vis the Commission of each country, ministers or secretaries of state being appointed for this purpose and having a special responsibility for European affairs'.

7. European Parliament: 'Its work should be concentrated on tasks of a general nature; it should consolidate its responsibilities and a method of electing its members should be devised 'so as to strengthen its democratic legitimacy.'

(Agence Europe, 1 June 1967)

6. Statements made by Mr. François Mitterrand

a) at his press conference on 26 May 1967

1. ' It would be desirable to give the Europe of the Six, as it stands and taking it as it is, a new economic and social content. The representatives of the workers and agricultural workers trade unions should play a much greater part within the common institutions ... no measure, exclusive in its effect, can be tolerated with respect to the political parties present in the national Parliaments. The trade unions must have access to the Parliament and to the Council of Europe in compliance with constitutional rules. No properly representative trade union should be refused membership of the Economic Council in Brussels; each one should have a place consistent with its real importance.

The political groups of the democratic and socialist Left agreed to the initial impetus being given to Europe and to its first foundations being constructed without any prior definition of its future economic structures; it did this because it considered it of paramount importance to begin by breaking up the obsolete framework of nationalisms. But starting from the present construction, it becomes a vital objective to reduce and then eliminate the domination of the cartels, the trusts and the international pressure groups.

2. We must progress towards multiplying the number of common sectors. To the Europe of the agricultural and industrial market and those of

atomic energy, coal and steel, we should add, for example, the Europe of the Plan, that of technology, that of health and that of currency.

3. The Europe of today must accept its territorial enlargement through the accession to the industrial and agricultural market and to every other sphere common to the six countries, of any country which, like the United Kingdom, wishes to accede to the Treaties which constitute the very character of the European construction and which lay down, subject to provisional adjustments, the common obligations.

Against this background, an analysis should be made without delay by the European authorities to measure the Common Market's short and medium-term absorption and enlargement capacity, bearing in mind the economic and demographic realities.

4. It is impossible to conceive of the success of the Europe that is being built if its constituent countries engage in economic competition originating in the case of each one of them in a spirit of national domination. Each country must at the same time secure its own expansion and see to it that it does not disturb the balance of the new community even if this be to its own advantage. The lack of a common economic policy, laid down and planned in advance, which would take precedence over national initiatives spells the failure of Europe. The social democrats will therefore never forget, in the interests of their twofold community and socialist objective, to strive towards the ultimate goal of a common, political, federal power.'

(Le Monde, 28 and 29 May 1967)

b) to the press on 16 August 1967

'..... Whether we like it or not, France is involved in the European process. Gaullist diplomacy itself, despite the beating about the bush that it engaged in, was compelled by the unshakable nature of the facts eventually to sign the agreements which gave birth to the Common Market. In an undertaking on this scale, any nation looking back will be turned to stone.

Without Europe, France and its five associates would fall into the hands of the hegemones. Unless it expands within a Community whose internal frontiers have been abolished, France will fall a prey to its own partners.

Expansion within Europe and through Europe, in the Common Market and through the Common Market, is therefore the only prospect for real and honourable independence open to our country. We have passed the point of no return. Any other policy would pre-suppose the mobilization of the French people in an autarchic adventure, the cost of which one hardly dares to imagine.

It is true that there could be no question of building just any Europe. On this point the Federation of the Left has expressed its views clearly: it has opted for the Europe of the peoples and of universal suffrage, as against the Europe of technocrats and cartels; similarly it has come out in favour of the accession of the United Kingdom in order to be more closely in line with the economic, geographical and historical realities and to give greater weight to Europe at the level of world competition. In this respect, it is paradoxical to see General de Gaulle opposing Britain's entry into the Common Market on the pretext that it would be desirable first to make the Community of the Six effective and cohesive at a time when he is trying to deprive this very Community of unity and authority.....'

(Le Monde, 18 August 1967)

c) on the position of the French Federation of the Left with regard to Europe

Mr. Mitterrand, French opposition leader, gave an interview to 'L'Express' on 11 September. He was asked about his relations with the Communist Party which shared General de Gaulle's wish to take France out of the American orbit at a time when Mr. Mitterrand regarded this as impossible unless Europe were organized. He replied as follows: - 'I would begin by pointing out that while the Federation takes the fullest possible account of the other parties of the Left, it intends to make up its own mind and to propose to the French people those aims which its own analysis shows to be reasonable. Starting there, it considers that history will find General de Gaulle guilty of a capital error in having barred the way to the construction of Europe. The General has thus, in practice, become the ally of the American penetration he has denounced in words.

He has opened the Common Market to the uncontrolled influx of American economic power. It would be impossible to take the Left along such a course. I myself would not assume such a responsibility. I have told everyone this, including the leaders of the Communist Party.

A rapprochement with the East and an organization of peaceful co-existence will be neither possible nor lasting unless there is a European personality and no longer a Europe broken up into small and medium-sized States.

Europe was conceived at a time when the democracies of the West were participating in the Cold War on the American side. I voted in favour of the Treaties that were signed. But I can understand that this situation, which no longer exists, has left the Communist Party with a reflex of reticence. This reflex must be overcome.

Even so I would say, as I did a moment ago, that it is in the power of no one to oppose the inevitable. . . .

Europe is the very undercurrent which will take us out of the Cold War away from the rivalry between the blocs and the multiple risks of a hot war. '

(L'Express, 11 September 1967)

7. Statement of the European Movement in the Netherlands on the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities

The European Movement in the Netherlands has taken note with concern of French statements on the United Kingdom's application for admission to the European Communities.

The European Movement feels that the alleged technical arguments put forward by France against enlarging the European Communities must in fact be designed to mask the French Government's political refusal to comply with the provision of the Paris and Rome Treaties - to the effect that the Communities are open to all - on which the British Government has based its application.

The problems raised by the entry of Britain and other applicants, such as Denmark, Ireland and Norway, should first be studied in the course of negotiations between the six member Governments and the Governments of the countries applying for membership, with the European Commission playing the rôle assigned to it by the Treaties.

The French demand for a thorough preliminary study of the question will greatly delay the opening of negotiations. The European Movement has put up a vigorous stand against this proposal.

The European Movement confidently awaits the report on the accession of new members to be submitted by the Commission of the European Communities before the end of September. It hopes that this report will provide a new starting-point for the enlargement of the European Communities. It invites the Parliaments and Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to continue their efforts in this direction with determination.

(Nieuw Europa, July-August 1967)

8. French Communist leader discusses Europe at press conference

On 6 September, Mr. Waldeck Rochet, Secretary-General of the Communist Party gave a press conference on which he broached the problem of European unification.

'The Common Market, which has come into effect, is today dominated by capitalist cartels and monopolies.

We are suggesting to the other parties of the Left that we concert our efforts to ensure that the institutions governing the Common Market lose their technological character and to ensure that the interests of workers in the Common Market six countries are safeguarded.

This predicates in particular that the industrial and agricultural trade unions should be represented in the Community institutions and have real powers and that the national Parliaments should be able to exercise real control over the policy of the Common Market

The French Communist Party is in favour of ever closer economic and political co-operation between all the European States, provided that national independence is respected.

We are opposed to the setting up of a supranational Government at the level of Little Europe because this would bring to an end our national independence, place Western Europe under a German hegemony and, at the same time, bring it under the tutelage of the USA, for it is known that West German leaders are in favour of close links between the Europe of the Six and the United States.

Such a political arrangement would ultimately split Europe in two at a time when the safety of our peoples and the peace of our continent demand that close co-operation be developed between all the European nations, irrespective of their social system, whether they are of the East or of the West.'

After making this preliminary statement, Mr. Waldeck Rochet was asked about the Communist Party's attitude to the entry of the United Kingdom into the Common Market. He replied as follows:

'I will answer your question directly. As far as we are concerned, the solution for the future does not lie in one of two more countries joining the Common Market; on the contrary we think, I would repeat, that going beyond the Common Market, our aim should above all be to develop economic co-operation between all countries including, of course, the United Kingdom.'

(L'Humanité, 7 September 1967)

9. Statement by Mr. Piccoli, Vice-Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party in connexion with the problem of Austria's association with the EEC

Mr. Piccoli, Vice-Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party, expressed his opposition to an article published in the weekly 'L'Europa' concerning Italian-Austrian relations and problems following Italy's veto to the opening of negotiations for Austria's association with the EEC. Mr. Piccoli wrote the following:

'Italian and Austrian political leaders have been given the opportunity to put an end to terrorist attacks. Terrorists may try to continue their brutal and absurd acts but will eventually find increasing opposition from public opinion in that part of the country. We know the obstacles to a solution of these difficulties. Some are of a diplomatic nature and relate above all to our sovereignty. It is clear that the powers of minorities should be under constant and strict control by the national authority. It is also certain that the presence

of a multi-racial population does not mean a lessening of Italian sovereignty over the Alto Adige area. With goodwill these obstacles may be overcome in the next few weeks. The "No" to Austria's association with the Common Market, until such time as Austria has taken measures to stop terrorism, is a firm, legitimate and fair act. The Austrian Government cannot fail to reflect on its heavy responsibility and cannot close its eyes to the dangers of an aggravation of the situation. It is true that in other spheres efforts will be made to prevent an honourable solution to the problem. This is a mentality of the past. There are men on either side of the border who are not prepared "to change their skin", who pretend to believe that violence is the only answer to border problems. I stated in Parliament a month ago and I repeat it now that if we could possibly obtain the opinion of our soldiers who died half a century ago in the First World War (next year will be the anniversary of the immense sacrifice made by the Italian people for Trento and Trieste) their reply would be that peace should be sought and that a patient effort must be made for greater understanding and that the difference of culture and language should be regarded as a contribution and not as an obstacle.

I hope that we shall ultimately reach a peaceful aim and that justice will prevail over this long and painful affair.'

(L'Europa, no. 2, 22-29 September 1967)

10. An article by Mr. Carlo Russo, critical on the idea of a Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals'

The idea of a Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' was analyzed by Mr. Carlo Russo, a leading figure in the Italian Christian Democrat movement, in an article published in the review 'L'Europa'.

'No-one will deny,' he wrote, 'that the compass of Europe goes far beyond the borders of the present Community, not only from the geographical standpoint but also at the cultural and historic levels; but the idea of transferring this reality to the political level is today wholly Utopian. While, indeed, the Urals represent the geographical extremity of Europe, they are in the centre of the Soviet Union where, in this post-war period, Asiatic interests have grown appreciably in importance, for economic as well as for political reasons. If the term "Europe to the Urals" is to have any meaning, it can only mean a Soviet disengagement from Asia and although this might be in line with the Chinese objective of "Asia for the Asians", it would certainly not be in line with the intentions of the Soviet leaders, nor would it serve the cause of peace and international balance.'

Mr. Russo then pointed out that this idea conflicted with the French objections to the accession to the Communities of the United Kingdom and other countries, allegedly for fear that an undue enlargement of the Community would change its nature and deprive it of its political content. He continued: 'To explain how it is possible to reconcile the "No" to Britain with a Europe extending to the Urals would be going beyond the limits of human comprehension and justify the suspicion that the French President's proposal is a classic example of "retreating forwards". If, on the other hand, Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals means that Community Europe should realize that Lenin-grad and Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are a living and integral part of European history and culture and therefore that the "Little Europe" should pursue an understanding and outward-looking policy, not as a closed citadel but as a part of a wider and more attractive reality, there could not but be full agreement.'

Referring to the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market, Mr. Russo recalled that from time to time it was proposed, as a reaction against France's stubborn opposition to Britain's accession to the European Community and against the probability of a further veto, that the Five should together make an agreement with the United Kingdom. He went on to say: 'It is difficult to assess whether this proposal is regarded by its advocates as valid in itself or whether it was devised as a way of exerting pressure to overcome unjustified opposition. In both cases it is groundless because the United Kingdom itself rejected it.' Mr. Russo drew attention to the great progress made by the British in reaching the stage of applying for entry into the Community and he pointed out that the British choice was 'in favour of Europe as it exists today, including France, because Europe without France would be void of substance and cease to have any attraction for the United Kingdom'.

(L'Europa, 26 September - 6 October, no. 3)

III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS

1. Views of Dutch industry on transport and energy policies

In its annual report on the year 1966 the Association of Dutch Employers outlines the views of Dutch industry on the common transport policy.

The Association dwells on the need for flexible transport arrangements. Transport must be able to move freely throughout the market. The Association therefore rejects any proposal that aims too directly at protecting domestic carriers. It advocates the introduction of highly flexible procedures for ratemaking and control of capacity; facilities for special freight agreements between shippers and carriers within the laid-down limits; liberalization of cross-frontier traffic; sounder management of railways; standardization of freight documents and conditions of carriage; the abolition of the system of cargo division practised by shipping exchanges; and modification of return freights also in other EEC countries.

The Association calls for an open energy market capable of supplying energy at minimum prices and in which goods are absolutely free to circulate. In principle such a market should be based on free competition between energy sources with a view in the long run to reducing energy prices to a minimum. This will necessitate minimum intervention by the authorities and as uniform rules of competition as possible for all the energy products concerned.

(Handels- en Transport Courant, 15 June 1967)

2. Views of the Council of Dutch Employers' Organizations on European integration

The Council of Dutch Employers' Organizations contacted the official responsible for preparing the ground for the formation of the new Government, following the Dutch elections of February 1967, to draw his attention to a number of problems and to acquaint him with their requirements in the economic and social policy sectors.

On European integration the Council made the following comments :

'As the customs union is due for completion on 1 July 1968 - in itself a desirable thing - the removal of technical and administrative obstacles to intra-Community trade and the adjustment of monopolies ought to be speeded up. The maintenance of the current rules on temporary importation for processing is particularly important for the Dutch economy.

Steps should be taken to facilitate the concentration of undertakings in the EEC so as to make them more competitive.

Liberalization of capital movements, abolition of discrimination, and harmonization of domestic provisions governing the capital market, should be completed as soon as possible.

Measures taken at national level to overcome difficulties in certain sectors or areas, while sometimes necessary, are likely to slow down integration. Member States should therefore coordinate their efforts in this sphere.

The progress made in introducing a common market in agricultural products - already at an advanced stage following the issue of regulations on various products - should not be jeopardized by grants - now or in the future - of national aid.

The EEC should forthwith bring into force a common commercial policy and ensure that the Kennedy Round negotiations lead to positive results. Moreover, steps should be taken to prevent non-tariff or quasi-tariff obstacles from standing in the way of new export possibilities.

It is essential to co-ordinate the Community's policy on developing countries. All European countries operating a free market economy are intended to become full members of the EEC, and steps should be taken to facilitate their entry. In certain special cases, a mere association could be considered.

Close co-ordination of external economic relations at official level is desirable.'

(De Katholieke Werkgever , No. 5, 1 March 1967)

DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

At the Community and International Level

I. GOVERNMENTS

1. Statements of the attitudes of the Foreign Ministers of the six member States of the Community

During a television programme, Mr. Maurice Ferro, representing the French Radio and Television Corporation, put the following questions to the Foreign Ministers of the Common Market countries: 'Is the Economic Community an end in itself? Do the six Ministers not think that it should be complemented by institutions of a political nature? If so, which?' From their replies it emerged that they were all advocates of the political union of Europe but that they did not think that it was necessary to create new institutions.

Mr. Joseph Luns (Netherlands), who is regarded as the most enthusiastic advocate of an integrated Europe, gave the most negative reply. 'Contrary to what you think, my reply is negative. The Economic Community has no need to be controlled by political institutions. The existing institutions, the Council and the Commission, are perfectly able to carry out their task as laid down by the Treaty. It might even be dangerous to complement the Common Market by political institutions. There is a danger that the Community bodies would thereby be weakened.'

Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville (France) expressed an almost identical opinion: 'The Common Market, as it is at present, already comprises political institutions. Both the Council of Ministers in Brussels and the Commission are political institutions. The question is whether what has been undertaken in the economic sphere between the six countries of the Common Market can and must be pursued in the political sphere.'

There is no doubt that in the minds of the authors of the Treaty and in the minds of those who have put it into effect,' he added, 'the reply would be in the affirmative. That is to say that, normally speaking, what has been initiated at the economic level should be developed at the political level.'

Mr. Willy Brandt (Federal Republic of Germany) would like to see a secretariat or a commission set up which would help to bring the policies of the six Governments closer into line with each other. 'From the German point

of view, we have always considered that co-operation in terms of economic policy ought to be complemented by political integration in the strict sense of the word. But I have got out of the habit of thinking in terms of plans and projects'

Mr. Amintore Fanfani (Italy) considered that there could be no doubt as to the ultimate objective which was 'the political unity of the Six' but this was still a long way off. This was why, he said, 'the Italian Government has addressed to the Governments of the other Common Market countries an invitation to a summit meeting in Rome with a view to resuming a constructive discussion between leaders on the occasion of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.'

Mr. Pierre Harmel (Belgium) stated: 'I think we should first of all remember that the Common Market is already a political institution. Unifying social legislation immediately after fiscal legislation and then trade legislation, perhaps culminating in monetary unification, will be covering more than half and perhaps the major part of the action of the States with regard to merging them one with another. Consequently we are patient and we believe that the progress made is irreversible.' He also thought that with a common defence and a common policy the unification of Europe would be complete.

Lastly, Mr. Pierre Grégoire (Luxembourg) was in favour of a political Europe but without technocratic institutions equipped with automatic machinery.

(Le Monde, 13 April 1967)

2. The Rome Summit on 29 and 30 May 1967

The Heads of States and Governments of the Community countries met in Rome on 29 and 30 May 1967 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the EEC and Euratom Treaties.

At a meeting held at the Farnesina Palace on 30 May by the Heads of State and Governments and Foreign Ministers, the President of the Italian Council, Mr. Moro, stated the following:

'Increases in the gross national product, individual output and trade, both within and without the EEC, have exceeded to a very large extent those recorded in the same sectors and within the same period of time by other countries outside the Community and also enjoying a high economic potential. This means that the progress achieved cannot only be ascribed to the favourable international situation but that it is largely due to co-operation and solidarity, i.e. the result of the gradual integration of the different national economies. I should like to add that the value of our system proved correct on various instances. We now know that the opening of markets made it possible to counteract effectively the negative effects of internal imbalances arising in the single States. This experience and these results should encourage us to continue the work begun until it is completed..... The economic progress achieved so far and still to be completed will remain void of any human significance if we do not succeed in fully extending it to all the categories of the Community's population, if we do not succeed in carrying out a fair and appropriate distribution of wealth. Particularly apposite in this respect would be the preferential principles to be adopted for Community workers in connexion with the revision of the European Social Fund whose operation was not found to meet, in every respect, the conditions for which it was created.....

As for Euratom - basic instrument of the Community's technological progress - it is essential to increase its powers and effectiveness so that the scientific and technical results achieved by it should be of equal benefit to all the member countries. This applies, in particular, to the more general duties that will have to be discharged by a single Community in the technological field in order to sustain normal competition from outside.

With regard to cultural co-operation, we hope that further consideration will be given to the question of a European University in Florence which should become the prime mover for close co-operation between our countries, above all in the technological field, where Europe must, with all the means at its disposal, fill the gap that separates it from the more advanced countries. I refer to those initiatives which the Italian Government has recorded as necessary and significant.....

Finally, I am convinced that as a result of our ten-year experience and in view of future prospects, a unified European force, increasingly aware of its potentialities and its responsibilities, may find its place in the system of balance between East and West with an authoritative voice in the political field and with the necessary vigour in the economic field. This is why we are in favour of further contacts between the Foreign Ministers for these will foster and extend co-operation and gradually create conditions for a common denomination in all matters where a European stand is particularly necessary and where it could prove a factor of world stability.'

This statement by President Moro was followed by a statement by General de Gaulle dealing with Britain's proposed accession to the Community.

'There is no doubt that we have to determine whether we can remain what we are. It is necessary for the Community to consider in the fullest possible way where all this may lead up to before accepting external negotiations. We believe that our Governments should consider together in Brussels, and with all the time required, the consequences of this application for accession. It is desirable that an extensive examination of the matter should be made among the Six in view of the vastness of the problem and differences of opinion among us. The way in which such a negotiation should be conducted is provided for by the Rome Treaty, under Article 237. We therefore agree that the Ministers should look into this matter. The Council of Ministers will study the position when it meets in Brussels and it will take a unanimous decision. We also agree that the Council should request the Commission's opinion.'

Referring subsequently to possible periodical meetings of Foreign Ministers, the French President said:

'You know that France has always felt it necessary that there should be contacts between the Six. We have made proposals to this effect in the past. We believe that for "a European Europe" these contacts would be useful. If the Six wish to proceed towards a political Europe, as they have gone towards an economic Europe, then we hope that periodical meetings will be held.'

At the close of the Summit meeting, the following communiqué was released:

- a. On 20 and 30 May at the invitation of the President of the Italian Council, Mr. Aldo Moro, a meeting was held in Rome between the President of the French Republic, General de Gaulle, the President of the French Council of Ministers, Mr. Pompidou, the President of the Belgian Council of Ministers, Mr. Vanden Boeynants, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Kiesinger, the President of the Luxembourg Council of Ministers, Mr. Werner, the President of the Netherlands Council of Ministers, Mr. De Jong; they were accompanied by their respective Foreign Secretaries, Messrs. Fanfani, Couve de Murville, Harmel, Brandt, Grégoire, Luns and the Belgian Minister for European Affairs, Mr. Van Elsdale.

The Heads of State or Governments of the Six countries took part on 29 May at the Campidoglio in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of

the signing of the Rome Treaties setting up the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community under the chairmanship of Mr. Giuseppe Saragat, President of the Italian Republic. The celebration was also attended by representatives of the institutions and organizations of the European Communities as well as by representatives of associated countries and signatories to the Rome Treaties. The celebration of this historical event constituted further and solemn evidence of the solidarity of the member States and of their will to continue on the path opened by the Rome Treaties.

- b. On 30 May the Heads of State or Governments and their Foreign Ministers were presented with an introductory report by President Moro on the basis of which they exchanged views on the Community's development. They agreed that the results hitherto obtained proved the success of the new spirit of co-operation created between the member countries which has made it possible to reconcile their own interests with higher common interests. With the approval of the Parliaments and public opinion in the respective countries, the Heads of State or Governments resolved to pursue the necessary efforts with a view to reaching the final aims of the Rome Treaties.
- c. The Heads of State or Governments expressed their intention to enforce, from 1 July 1967, the Treaty of 8 April 1965 on the merger of the institutions of the three Communities. They emphasized, on this occasion, the importance of that decision which constitutes a further stage towards the merger of the three Communities.
- d. The Heads of State or Governments exchanged views on the applications for accession received from the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark and agreed that, in accordance with the Treaties, these should be examined by the Council of Ministers of the Community.
- e. The States taking part in the conference agreed to look into the possibility of gradually resolving their political differences by means and methods based on experience and circumstances. The Foreign Ministers accepted responsibility for pursuing the examination of that problem.
- f. The Heads of State or Governments agreed to meet again, presumably in the course of the current year.

- g. The Heads of State or Governments also agreed to give further consideration to the project submitted to the Joint Conference on 18 July 1961 in connexion with the setting up of a European University in Florence.

(Le Monde, 1 June 1967; Relazioni Internazionali, no. 23, 10 June 1967)

II. THE COMMUNITY EXECUTIVE

1. Mr. Coppé on European technology

Speaking in Rotterdam on 13 April 1966 Professor Coppé, as Vice-President of the High Authority, launched a plea in favour of a European technology.

According to Mr. Coppé, if Europe was to catch up with the United States in the technological sector it would have to adopt American methods. It was not enough for the Community to lower customs barriers and co-ordinate the economic policies of its member States. It must 'think big' not only in the economic field but also in others, particularly in the field of defence.

Mr. Coppé then specified the three main sectors he had in mind. First, scientific and technological research needed a market of a continental scale. Secondly, the entire industrial set-up would have to be adapted to the new enlarged market; this in turn meant bringing the policy on industrial concentration and the capital market up to a European scale. Finally it had to be borne in mind that in the field of research the State, as well as the universities and enterprises, had a rôle to play. The State ought to step in in two cases: when prices were too high or the risks too great to be borne by individuals or private institutions.

In drawing up its research programmes the Community had to consider two possibilities. The first lay in choosing priority sectors, e.g. nuclear science, space research, aviation or electronics; the second, in putting the emphasis on new sectors, such as techniques for improving facilities in the social, transport and educational sectors.

Technical research was called upon to play a crucial rôle in the economic expansion of Europe. If it was to maintain a reasonable annual rate of growth of 3 to 4 per cent, Europe could not afford to neglect technology. If it did not wish to become an economic satellite, it would have to carry out research for its own account and not on the basis of licences granted by third countries.

Mr. Coppé hoped that Euratom would rapidly become in the technological sector what the ECSC has long been for the Community in the economic sector, that is, a prototype community which would have three objectives:

- a) to enable the Six to compete with non-member countries;
- b) to breathe new life into weak or vulnerable economic sectors, particularly key-sectors on which a number of other industries and occupations depended;
- c) to forecast the broad lines of future trends - according to some experts, in 1975 40 per cent of American industrial production would consist of products that had not yet been discovered.

Mr. Coppé wound up by saying that it would be enough to amend, at the most, two articles of the Rome Treaty to enable a united scientific Europe to be established.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 14 April 1967)

2. Exclusive interview with Mr. Jean Rey, new President of the European Commission

After his election as President of the single European Commission, Mr. J. Rey gave an exclusive interview to a Belgian newspaper.

The first question put to Mr. Rey concerned the various applications for membership of the Community which constituted proof of its attraction but which also occasioned concern. Indeed Mr. Rey was in agreement that 'the Community will be less manageable if the number of its members increases. The more members there are, the more unwieldy it will be It is clear that this will make the machine slightly more cumbersome. Should this occasion anxiety? We, European Commissioners, have always replied that this depends on the institutions and that if the institutions were weakened, it would indeed be a very sorry state of affairs; in that eventuality the accession of a certain number of States to the Community might actually paralyse it; this might not be their intention, but it would, none the less, be the result; but if on the other hand, the Community institutions retain their full authority and vigour, then the whole apparatus will be able to function equally well with a larger number of member States. Mr. Harold Wilson and Mr. George Brown, were told this by nearly everybody during the talks they had between January

and March with the European Ministers. The majority vote system, which must be able to operate on the Council, must remain unimpaired and the powers of the Parliaments must be strengthened. The British were very impressed by this demonstration which was made to them'.

The new President then went on to refute the theory that the merger of the Executives might be liable to hamper the current examination of new applications. 'I believe that these two processes can go forward together. The revision of the three European Treaties, with a view to unifying them, must be done on the basis of the setting-up of the single Commission. But this revision is going to take three years. It is therefore a long-term undertaking which must be done calmly and which will, I hope, go through without too many difficulties. There will be some, but they do not appear to be related to the problem of enlarging the existing Communities by the accession of new members.'

He was then asked to comment on the current chances for political union; 'What is certain,' he said, 'is that it is necessary and that everybody realizes it is necessary. This was recognized in May at the Rome summit meeting but events in the Middle East made it abundantly clear that Europe had to begin to have a real political authority and to speak with some measure of unity on foreign policy Neither the Russians nor the Americans can become economically associated with the Israelis and the Arabs. Only we can do this Since discussions have been going on at great length for years without agreement being reached on what form political union should take, on how it should be achieved and on what powers a body, speaking for the six countries, should have, it would seem to me that the best way to demonstrate movement would be by going forward. If we were to harness ourselves to a European undertaking such as this, the problems would gradually solve themselves.'

To achieve political union, Europeans could do nothing more effective than to apply themselves to a practical task and to endeavour to carry it through.'

The example of the Middle East is a clear illustration of a case where the Six Governments were unable to adopt a common position. 'It is obvious,' he said, 'that the Six could have taken a more pragmatic view of the construction of Europe, instead of engaging in theoretical discussions as to whether one should begin with Six or Seven and as to what machinery and what authorities should be employed. If, on the other hand, the Six had said: "We all agree that something must be done, let us tackle these problems, let us see how we can solve them", then the institutions already in existence could have done this. The Common Market Commission would be in a better position

to engage in negotiations - if the Ministers so decided - with Israel and with the Arab States We do not ask as much of these institutions as we do for a common resolve. It is the lack of a common resolve that we should endeavour to remedy.'

Mr. Jean Rey was then asked whether plans for a united Europe were liable to be paralysed by France's position.

He replied: 'I will not comment on the policies of the member States. I consider that it is our function to reconcile them and not to judge them If ever we do pass judgements, I believe that good sense demands that we should keep these to ourselves; we should, on the contrary, try with constant patience to find points of agreement Our function is rather one of trying to find the means, the formulae, the transitions, the procedures which will give the initial impetus to negotiations which are not getting under way, and, consequently, to make compromises. I believe that that is our job. This does not prevent us, quite apart from this conciliatory rôle, from endeavouring to get things moving by indicating the course which, in our opinion, should be followed and the things that ought to be done. In this respect, I have often told my colleagues and I say it again, that we cannot be content to be the clergy of Europe; we must also remain its prophets.'

All in all, Mr. J. Rey was optimistic about Britain's entry: 'I am quite convinced that things will sort themselves out In my opinion, the force which is impelling the British towards the Continent and which is impelling the Continent to unite is an irresistible one; it is a reflection of so deeply-felt a need that while it may on occasion be hampered or paralysed, it can never be stopped for good by the vagaries of politics.'

He was asked if he expected one day to see Europe talking to the United States as an equal partner. 'Europe is doing so already' he replied. 'At the Kennedy Round we were talking as equals with the United States and we were no more than the Community. From a military, financial and industrial point of view, they are much more powerful than we are. In the field of trade we are their equals. The Community's trade is equal if not greater in volume and in value than that of the United States. We are the largest purchasers of industrial and agricultural goods in the whole world. We buy more of these than the Americans. For this to be the case in other fields, depends on our union. Obviously we are a long way behind but leeways can be made good. If the Europeans, of whom there are 180m. in the Community, could succeed in bringing in the British, the Scandinavians and the Swiss, for example and form a Community of 250m. people, with all the industrial power and production capability that this would involve, we would genuinely be a partner to whom the Americans would speak as one equal to another.'

In the next question, reference was made to Mr. Rey's reputed 'Atlanticism'. He recognized, in fact, that 'the whole Commission - this was the case under the guidance of Mr. Hallstein - has never concealed firstly, that Europe had to be constructed; secondly, that Europe had to play its part in the world, in agreement with, and not in opposition to, the United States and, consequently, that co-operation in every field between a united Europe, on the one hand, and the United States on the other hand was essential However, if I am asked if I am or not a supporter of a single Community embracing the United States and Europe, I do not remember having argued in favour of such an idea which does not seem to me to be sound We wish to become the United States of Europe, we have no wish at all to become the United States of Africa, America or the World.'

In conclusion, Mr. Rey was asked on what in his opinion, the future of Europe depended. 'Primarily on its union,' he said, 'I see no reason for being pessimistic; Europe has made so much progress We are completing our customs union; we are beginning to form a common policy; we have hammered out the agricultural policy; we have overcome the violent political crisis of 1965-66 to the point of having been able to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome together. We have succeeded in creating that balance which was so strongly demanded in the Community: to build, on the one hand, a common agricultural policy and on the other (through the Kennedy Round) to liberate external trade. Under these conditions, I consider that Europe's affairs are not going badly at all. It is at the political level that Europe is still much too weak and I believe that the efforts in the next ten years will really be to go forward to further stages in that area. This appears to be quite possible.'

(Le Soir, 11 July 1967)

III. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES

1. The European Left and the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC

The Congress of the European Left which was held in Paris on 4 and 5 February 1967 adopted a resolution in which it 'noted with satisfaction the resolve of the Labour Government to apply for British entry into the European Economic Community and to become a full member of a wider Europe - a resolve which was again emphasized recently by Mr. Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister'. Mr. Mitterrand, Mr. Karl Mommer and Mr. Mario Zagari attended the Congress at which Sir Geoffrey de Freitas took the Chair.

'The European Left is convinced that Britain's accession to the EEC will represent a valuable contribution in every respect, particularly in the scientific and technical spheres.

The European Left has decided to rely on British traditions in support of efforts to democratize the Communities, which must culminate in a genuine United States of Europe.

The European Left formally declares that since the United Kingdom accepts the Treaty of Rome and its implications for the future political unification of Europe, the main condition of its accession has been met and that therefore nothing further should stand in the way of its entry into the Community.'

(Courrier socialiste européen, No. 2, 1967)

2. The European Movement defines Europe's responsibilities with respect to Europe itself

This was indeed the theme of a conference held by the European Movement in Bad Godesberg from 21 to 22 April 1967. The following resolution was passed:

'The European Movement, advocating the creation of a united Europe based on maintaining and developing democracy, on economic expansion and on social justice

Unanimously emphasizes the contribution towards a united Europe that would be constituted by the entry of the United Kingdom and other democratic, European countries into the EEC whose democratic capital, economic, financial and technical resources and ability to play a decisive part in the world towards easing tension and in the field of co-operation would receive a new impetus.

Recommends accession, the special conditions attaching to which should be reduced to a transitional period of adjustment.

Stresses the urgency of a new effort in the field of research and in the advanced technological industries and the major contribution that the accession of the United Kingdom and other European countries would represent in this connexion.

Requests that the European Executive and the European financial institutions be entrusted with the task of developing joint research and contributing towards financing the development of new industries

Stresses the need to adopt a more active policy in the economic and social fields to promote full employment, accelerated expansion, monetary stability, regional development and the improvement of the living standards and security of workers.

Re-emphasizes that these objectives predicate strengthening the Community institutions and a strict respect for the spirit and letter of the Treaties of Rome.

Asks that decisions be taken on setting up the single Commission and that the initiatives of the single Executives should be wide-ranging and attract encouragement, that closer contacts be established with representatives of the Economic and Social Committee and with the European Parliament whose powers should be increased.

Asks that the idea of the political union of Europe should be re-examined mainly in order to achieve a common foreign policy which, in turn, would lead to a pooling of defence capabilities.

Declares, however, that periodical meetings between Governments could not be regarded as an adequate arrangement for shaping a policy or for bringing about a progressive co-ordination : a Community body responsible for keeping a continuous watch on developments, for working out solutions and calling meetings as and when problems arise, is a minimal condition without which there could be no meeting of wills and without which unity would not be possible.

As economic, technical and political tasks come up which can only be tackled at the European level, it is increasingly essential to strengthen democratic control by an assembly elected by the direct suffrage of the people, ensuring that the people participate more directly in the decisions governing their everyday life, by a decentralization of power and by a renaissance of the autonomy, the means and the cultural life in the local collectivities.'

3. The Fourth Conference of the Agricultural Workers Trade Unions in the EEC

On 25 and 26 May the EEC Agricultural Workers Trade Unions (CISL) held their Fourth Conference in Narbonne; several resolutions were passed.

The first resolution concerned trade union integration. The conference : 'expresses its satisfaction at the accelerated realization of the agricultural common market in the EEC and confirms the determination of the affiliated organizations to ensure that economic and social integration go hand in hand with trade union integration and a common policy of the agricultural workers trade unions and to take anticipatory steps with a view to this economic and social integration'.

With reference to the applications for accession from the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, the Conference 'expects the responsible bodies of the EEC to make an immediate and positive examination of these applications. It considers that the entry of these countries would constitute a positive factor for the political unification of Europe. It expects to see this accession consolidate the democratization of a wider Community, both through the allocation of much wider powers and supervisory rights to the European Parliament and by the co-operation which the powerful free trade union organizations of these countries will bring to the preparation and application of Community policy at every level'.

Lastly, in its general resolution, the conference : 'notes with regret the lack of the essential development - which was to have gone hand in hand with the markets and prices policy - of a common policy for structures and a common social policy in agriculture. The lack of decisive progress in these spheres means that the common agricultural policy is still incomplete and lacking in balance'

'The conference calls for a wider participation on the part of the professional organizations of agricultural workers and operators in the preparation and execution of Community measures in the matter of markets and prices policy, trade policy, structure policy and social policy. In this connexion, it recalls the inadequacy of the work done by and the powers given to, the consultative committees for individual products and the consultative committee for problems of agricultural structural policy.'

4. The 20th economic congress of the Benelux countries

On 26 May the Benelux Committee of the Grand Duchy organized a congress in Luxemburg under the chairmanship of Mr. A. Weicker. In his opening address, he drew attention to the lack of cohesion between the three Benelux countries within the European Community. It was in his opinion more essential than ever for the three countries to co-ordinate their economic, financial and social policies and to work within the Benelux group towards a common viewpoint on all the questions raised in the wider context of the EEC .

Mr. V. Leemans laid emphasis on the institutional aspect which, he felt, should lead to a consolidation of policy co-ordination between the three States. In this connexion, he quoted a basic text which was taken from the report on the realization and the operation of the Benelux Economic Union and relating to 1965-1966 : 'realizing the special responsibility of each of the Benelux countries in this matter, the three Governments have decided during the coming year to concert their efforts in terms of future co-operation between the Benelux countries. The Governments are also considering whether intergovernmental consultations are suitable with regard to a tightening of collaboration between the partner countries and even extending this to other fields while bearing in mind that the Benelux Economic Union should be appraised in the light of world events, the political and social pattern of which has undergone profound changes since 1958, the year in which the Benelux Treaty was signed'.

Following these statements, the Congress passed a resolution in which it :

- ' a) stresses the growing urgency of joint action by the Benelux countries within the Common Market ;
- b) draws attention to the need to spell out the economic and social problems which have priority claims in the context of such action;
- c) calls upon the Governments, for this purpose and in order to achieve closer collaboration between the three countries, to set up an executive body endowed with adequate powers within the framework of the Benelux Treaty;
- d) urges that the intergovernmental institutions should become more effective decision-taking bodies, subject to adequate parliamentary control, with regard to matters within the terms of reference of the union. '

The Congress also heard a report by Mr. H. J. de Koster, a member of the Dutch Parliament, on the position of the Benelux countries in the economic and social development of the EEC. After this, the Congress passed a second resolution in which it stated its view that the completion of the economic union would bring the three countries closer together economically, which necessarily implied considering the economies of these countries as a single unit. Consequently, it asked that medium-term programmes, which are at present being drawn up separately by each of the countries, should be collated in a single Benelux-Programme. Lastly, it suggested that regional programmes should be drawn up with respect to the frontier areas between the three countries and including a common policy for ports and a common "Delta" programme.

(Notes by an observer)

5. Pope Paul VI again stresses the Church's interest in building a united Europe

On 30 May, Pope Paul VI received the members of the EEC and Euratom Commissions in special audience. He expressed the satisfaction he shared with them at the excellent work done towards achieving European unity '...which many right-thinking people now consider not only desirable but urgently necessary, above all at the economic level and, if this be possible - while naturally respecting the diversity fashioned by history - at the political level...'. He stated: '...the Church is following everything connected with building Europe with very close attention. The statements made in this context by our predecessors - whether by Pope Pius XII or by Pope John XXIII - were given a wide diffusion and are known to you. And you know that we too have, more than once, given encouragement, insofar as we have been able to do so, to those whose action has been directed towards European unity. Is this, on the part of a spiritual power such as the Church, a political objective? Indeed. But there is harmony and there is a meeting point between a great political objective and the general principles concerning man and society of which the Church is the designated guardian, endeavouring with all its might to foster these principles for the good of mankind'.

'... You are working for peace,' Pope Paul VI continued, 'the Church, too, is working for peace. This is our meeting point. And if the Church acts in this way by virtue of higher principles and following methods that are appropriate to a society whose nature is spiritual, it considers that in the order of things in this world, the means which you use are among the most suitable for achieving the desired end... You and your predecessors have, day by day, created and perfected a practical network of relationships no longer based on the predominance of the strongest but on common interests, leading to the conclusion of agreements and to the exchange of services. By removing barriers and antagonisms, you aim to ensure a lasting order in western Europe and to make it impossible in fact - and this time there are grounds for such hope - for any further European war to break out. And by building peace in this way on one continent, you are helping to consolidate peace in the rest of the world. This is why the Church approves and encourages you. This is why it offers you the wholehearted support of its moral principles and its spiritual strength and, in building the Europe that is under construction, these are a factor for cohesion of the greatest importance.'

The importance which the Church attaches to the European unification movement was again underlined by Pope Paul VI on 31 May on the occasion of General de Gaulle's official visit to the Vatican. After praising the contribution made by France '...to the auspicious emergence of the European Community', the Pope stated, however, that this could only be '...one stage on the road to peace and a true brotherhood between all the peoples of the world'. He

continued : 'We need to look further, to widen our horizons to the dimensions of the world. This is what we wished to recall in our recent encyclical on "development", which is "the new name for peace" in our century. Our sons in France have fully grasped the implications of this act of our ministry and we remind Your Excellency of this the more willingly because we know how much Your Excellency personally shares our concerns and hopes in this field.... This is a wisely realistic attitude and well worth stressing. Who is there who does not indeed realize that only by means of an active and courageous solidarity will the economic divergencies between people be attenuated and a solid and lasting peace be established in justice and freedom? This peace, Your Excellency knows, is the subject of our constant concern as it was for our two predecessors, Pope Pius XII and Pope John XXIII, whom Your Excellency also visited.'

6. The Eighth States General of the Council of European local authorities and European unification

The Eighth States General of the Council of the European local authorities held a session in Berlin from 8 to 10 June, 1967. This was attended by about 4,000 mayors and other officials of local authorities in the six EEC countries and other European States.

The proceedings were presided over by Mr. Cravatte, Vice President of the Council of Ministers of Luxembourg, and the speakers included the German Foreign Minister, Mr. Willy Brandt, and the President of the European Parliament, Mr. Alain Poher.

At the close of the Conference, a resolution was passed. This read, in part as follows :

'The Eighth States General of the local authorities of Europe which comprises 4,000 elected administrators representing 50,000 local authorities, provinces and other local communities, find that the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Rome Treaties could not conceal the difficulties that are slowing down and, in fact, hampering the construction of an authentic political Europe; pointing out that the results hitherto obtained in the economic field are due to the European institutions and in particular, to the Executive Commission of the EEC; that the existence and the part played by a Community organization, independent from the States, is essential for resolving the problems and making it possible to complete the construction of Europe; fear that

the spirit that moved the merger of the three European Executives would weaken the authority and independence of the Community body at a time when the latter needs reinforcing; aware of the fact that a political authority is necessary for taking major decisions which are essential to Europe for dealing on an equal footing with the major powers; find that owing to the lack of a common political authority, Europe's weakness in connexion with the Middle East leaves once again the political and diplomatic initiative to the two world powers on matters that jeopardize the maintenance of peace in respect of the rights of the people and in particular the right of the State of Israel to a normal existence; Declares: 1) that the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community would be an important contribution to the economic and political status of Europe; 2) that the only means of finding out whether the Government of the United Kingdom accepts the Rome Treaty is to initiate negotiations between the Six and the United Kingdom; Hopes that a united Europe will be a link between east and west and contributes to closer relations between the nations and the maintenance of peace in the world.'

7. Statement by the Monnet Committee of its attitude on the major European problems

Taking its cue from the international crisis which erupted following the Israeli-Arab conflict the Action Committee for the United States of Europe issued a communiqué on 15 June in which it deplored Europe's inefficiency at a time so crucial for world peace and again drew attention to the need for decisive steps towards unification:

The communiqué stated in particular :

'Europe will only be able to play the essential part which is its due, particularly in organizing peace between East and West, if it is organized and if it intervenes with a single voice on international issues, as it recently did with success at the Kennedy Round. At the present stage Europe could create new conditions which would enable it, in a practical way, to tackle (1) the political and democratic unity of Europe, (2) the democratization of the existing European institutions, (3) the organization of peace and, *inter alia*, (4) the solution of the German question by welcoming the United Kingdom, becoming economically strong and united, establishing an equal-footing relationship with the United States and initiating economic co-operation with the Soviet Union and the East European countries. In pursuing these objectives, we should change the context in which the difficulties concerning foreign policy and defence arise and where at present the problems are insoluble.

With regard to these questions, the Committee has therefore adopted the following resolutions which the member political parties have decided to submit for approval to their respective parliaments in the near future :

a) Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community

In response to the application for accession submitted by the United Kingdom in compliance with Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome, the Assembly is in favour of initiating and speedily concluding negotiations, on the terms to be agreed, for Britain's accession to the European Economic Community in its present form, with the same rights and obligations as the six countries which are already members. The Assembly is in favour of the accession of the other democratic countries of the European Free Trade Area which agree to enter and belong to the EEC in its present form with the same rights and obligations as the six countries which are already members and, should this not prove possible, to arrange some suitable form of association or agreement with these countries.

b) Organization of the technological development of the European Community

The Assembly calls upon the Governments to request the EEC institutions :

1. To take the necessary measures for creating a European-type company which would, inter alia, remove the fiscal difficulties that stand in the way of mergers, and to do so before 31 December 1968; the rights granted to workers under existing legislation should not be impaired;
2. To organize a European financial market;
3. To establish without delay the technological areas which are to be regarded as essential to Europe's future, particularly with a view to the entry of the United Kingdom;
4. To draw up, as soon as possible, a European technological development programme in these areas, laying down the aims to be achieved and the joint funds needed to finance it and establishing which joint bodies should have executive powers - to be decided upon beforehand.

c) Establishment of equal-footing relations with the United States

The Assembly requests that, as European unification goes forward, the organization of an equal-footing relationship between the United States and a Europe in the process of becoming united should be negotiated without delay. The Assembly expresses satisfaction at the success of the Kennedy Round which proved that Europe can negotiate on an equal-footing with the United States; it requests that the setting-up of a "Liaison Committee" should be negotiated as of now between the United States and the European Economic Community; this should comprise representatives of the common institutions and the American Government in equal numbers. The function of this Committee would be to enable the Community and the United States - before taking decisions - to explore and, possibly, to discuss the American and European viewpoints on important issues of mutual interest, such as the international monetary system, the balance of payments, American investments, technological exchanges and assistance to developing countries.

d) Co-operation between the European Economic Community and the USSR and the East European countries

The Assembly calls upon the Governments to ask the EEC institutions to make the necessary approach to the USSR and East European countries with a view to setting-up a co-operation committee, whose function would be to allow for standing consultations on economic and cultural questions of mutual interest. The first aim of such consultations would be to seek an expansion of trade, particularly by means of multi-lateral arrangements, to look into the possibilities of credit and to step up the exchange of technological knowledge. Such a widening of the material basis of relations with the East would facilitate a growing co-operation between East and West in other spheres and would, above all, contribute towards settling the issues which at present divide them. '

(Relazioni Internazionali, 24 June 1967, No. 25)

8. The attitude of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) to the problems of European unification

The Atlantic Treaty Association held its XIIIth General Assembly in Luxembourg from 11 to 15 September under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak.

ATA's attitude concerning European unification problems is illustrated by the following two paragraphs from the resolution which was passed unanimously : 'The most suitable framework within which to pursue European unification is the Common Market. We therefore urge the Governments forthwith to initiate negotiations in earnest between the Six and the United Kingdom which has accepted the provisions of the Rome Treaty and its political objectives. Such negotiations should likewise be pursued with Denmark, Norway and any other country which has given the same undertakings as the United Kingdom. Failing this, the hope of European unity would vanish and the Atlantic Alliance would inevitably be weakened. . . . It must be stressed that Europe cannot and will not be confined by the River Elbe and the frontiers of the Communist States. On the contrary, we urge all European Governments in the West and East alike to become more conscious of the civilization we have inherited, and of the riches of our common history and culture. We also urge them to realize what efforts have to be made to maintain peace through co-operation and to foster economic progress throughout Europe.'

(Relazioni Internazionali, No. 38, 23 September 1967)

Part II

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