

# COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

SEC(84) 1692

Brussels, 26 October 1984.

## FOOD STRATEGIES: REVIEW AND PROSPECTS

(Commission staff paper)

## Abstract

The Community has supported food strategies since 1981, particularly in Mali, Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia.

Food strategies were conceived mainly as a reaction to the deteriorating food security situation in many parts of the world, but especially in Africa. Up to now Food strategies have been largely concerned with the following issues :

- . farmers production incentives
- . marketing organization, infrastructure, role of public marketing agencies
- . agricultural support services (research, extension, inputs).

An examination of the experience with food strategies must bear in mind the structural nature of food issues and the short time period that has elapsed since the approach was started. Still, experience in the above mentioned countries reveals improvements in several areas, but also some points that so far received insufficient attention (nutrition, vulnerable groups, role of women as food producers, non-cereals crops, livestock, fisheries and data availability and quality).

The Community's experience in supporting food strategies shows how diverse cooperation instruments have been fruitfully integrated in food strategy exercises. This is particularly important because, with respect to agricultural cooperation, the new Lomé convention makes it possible to extend the food strategy approach to other ACP countries that wish so.

This provides an opportunity for the Community and its Members States to generalize the experience acquired in the four countries mentioned above in view of better serving the objective of food security in the world.

With respect to organization of the paper it is important to mention that the main text refers to specific countries only as illustration and concentrates on the possibilities to increase the effectiveness of food strategies as well as the possible role of the Community in this respect.

The annexes summarize achievements at the country level.

## C O N T E N T S

	<u>Pages</u>
<u>Abstract</u>	
1. Introduction	1
2. Basic considerations that led to the food strategy approach	3
3. Main characteristics of current food strategy efforts	3
3.1. Main objectives in food strategy documents	4
3.2. Central role of production incentives	4
3.3. Marketing organization, infrastructure and the role of public marketing agencies	6
3.4. Agricultural support services	6
4. Possibilities to increase the effectiveness of food strategies	8
4.1. Consumption and vulnerable groups	8
4.2. Strengthening the agricultural production system	10
4.3. Linking food strategies to other policy concerns	12
4.4. Data availability	13
5. The Community's support to food strategies	14
5.1. Country selection	14
5.2. Basic principles	15
5.3. Organization	15
5.4. Instruments used to support food strategies	16
6. Recommendations on the role of the Community	19
6.1. Further integration of development cooperation instruments into food strategies	19
6.2. Towards more balanced food strategies	19
6.3. Organization of food strategies	20
6.4. Linkage of food strategies to population and environment issues and regional coordination	21

Annexes on Mali, Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia and Tanzania.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

During the first two decades after the second world war, Third World development efforts focused on industry and infrastructure, the premise being that substantial manpower could be released from the agricultural sector without diminishing agricultural production. Thus, development plans, aid efforts and Third World government policies did not <sup>sufficiently</sup> encourage agriculture at a time when increased population growth was leading to a sharp rise in food demand.

In the beginning of the seventies a number of coincidences including adverse weather conditions in many parts of the world and the arrival of the Soviet Union as the largest buyer on the world cereal's market demonstrated dramatically how fragile the food situation was. In 1973-74 food prices on the world market more than doubled and famines resulted in the Sahel, Ethiopia and Bangladesh. At the same time the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) faced increased energy and fertilizer bills, making it difficult for them to buy food on the world market without serious balance of payments problems.

Third World governments and aid agencies (including the EEC) reacted by shifting their development focus towards agriculture - and by significantly increasing food aid efforts.

This reorientation brought some positive results - between 1975 and 1980 no major famine occurred. Price tensions in the world food market diminished. Nevertheless, the absolute number of undernourished people continued to rise because fundamental trends in food production, yields, consumption and imports did not change, nor did population growth. Clearly additional and different efforts were needed to improve the world food situation.

\*

\*      \*

In reaction to the state of affairs outlined above the European Parliament has, during 1980, held a special debate and organized hearings on world food issues. Following these debates, in 1981 E.C. Commissioner Pisani has launched a Plan to Combat World Hunger. A central part of that plan consists of support to the formulation and implementation of food strategies in a number of countries.

The Community has actively supported food strategies in four countries : Mali, Kenya, Zambia and Rwanda. This paper deals with what has thus far been the experience in these countries. One must realize, however, that three years is extremely short, given the structural nature of food issues. In fact, discussions on food strategies in the countries concerned started during the course of 1982 and concrete measures only got underway in 1983. It is therefore too early for a comprehensive evaluation. In particular it is too early to make a quantitative analysis of the effects of food strategies on the macro-food variables such as production and imports. Still, in view of ensuring maximum effectiveness of the food strategy efforts, it is important to examine already the main strengths and weaknesses of the approach so that modifications, if deemed necessary, can be envisaged\*.

---

\* This note draws heavily on the views of all those that have been involved in the implementation of food strategies. Extensive use has also been made of two reports that were recently completed at the request of the Commission : "Food Strategies in Four African Countries" by the Royal Tropical Institute (K.I.T.) in Amsterdam (completed in January 1984) and "African Food Strategies and the EC's Role : An Interim Review" by the Institute of Development Studies (I.D.S.) in Brighton (completed in July 1984).

## 2. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS THAT LED TO THE FOOD STRATEGY APPROACH

The basic considerations leading to the food strategies approach as a reaction to the continuing deterioration of the food situation in many developing countries despite increased allocation of development cooperation funds towards agriculture and food can be briefly summarized as follows :

- . The chances for success of projects are much greater if they are conceived within a unified framework. Such a framework can be provided in the context of food strategies.

If projects (or even programmes) are to be viable in the long run and are to become self-supporting, an appropriate policy environment must be present. One of the purposes of a food strategy is to define the most suitable policy environment.

Of course, it must be stressed that food strategies are no substitute for projects, but rather complementary.

- . Given the fact that food expenditures in many of the least developed countries account for more than fifty percent of total consumption expenditures and that agricultural employment often accounts for eighty percent of total employment, food issues are clearly important macroeconomic issues in such countries. Food strategies recognize the macroeconomic nature of food issues.
- . From the donor's point of view an assistance to policies rather than the more usual policy of assistance is needed in many LDCs. Food strategies are a way to assist countries with the formulation and execution of policies in the area of food.

## 3. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF CURRENT FOOD STRATEGY EFFORTS

When one compares the efforts to set up and implement food strategies in the four countries dealt with , it is striking that, even though basic conditions in these countries are quite different, many common elements are present. This section examines the similarities in objectives and policy interventions considered in the four food strategies.

### 3.1. Main objectives in food strategy documents

The most important objective mentioned in official food strategy documents is national food security, to be achieved via greater food self-sufficiency. This objective of food independence generally concerns "preferred cereals" : wheat, maize and rice, though Kenyan and Rwandan strategies mention other food products. Food self-sufficiency is usually considered only at the national level, however, Kenya wants this objective to be reached at the sub-regional level as well.

The achievement of adequate nutrition levels is a second objective of food strategies. However, this objective is often defined in general terms, and the nutritional status of particular population groups has not received sufficient attention in the current food strategy efforts.

A number of traditional objectives of agricultural development policy also figure more or less explicitly in food strategy documents. These apply to diversification and intensification of the agricultural sector as well as to agricultural exports. Diversification and exports are mentioned as food strategy objectives by Zambia, Kenya and Mali. Intensification is particularly stressed in the case of Rwanda.

### 3.2. Central role of production incentives

In virtually all discussions on implementing food strategies, motivating farmers to produce has been a central idea. Motivation to produce is closely related to price incentives. Farm gate prices of agricultural products need to be sufficiently high to compensate for the production efforts. At the same time consumption goods and farm inputs should be available at a sufficiently low price.

During the past five years a consensus has emerged about the fact that prevailing prices did not encourage food production in Africa. In many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa a policy has been pursued during the sixties and most of the seventies, using various instruments, to maintain low food prices in the cities. Restoring producers' incentives

through increases in farm gate prices has been an important element in food strategies.

As an example, in the case of Mali, the government together with a large number of donors, including the EEC and several of its Member States has reached agreement on a policy of restructuring the cereals market. Its main focus is on increasing the prices received by farmers. At the same time food aid is supplied to prevent urban food prices from rising drastically. The revenue from the sale of food aid allows to increase the producer prices. As the marketable surplus of farmers increases food aid can be diminished gradually.

In Zambia, a very sizeable increase of producer prices for the main crops has been put in effect in recent years. Interestingly, the price increases announced for the 84/85 crop season are more pronounced for millet, sorghum and cassava than for maize. This provides an extra stimulus for the production of crops consumed mainly by low income groups. The problem of price differences throughout this country is also very important. Given the size of the country, it is costly to maintain a unique nationwide producer and/or consumer price. However, up to now the government has attempted to keep a uniform price for major commodities such as maize. This has substantially increased the operating costs of the cereals marketing board and it has also prevented regional specialization according to comparative advantage. The food strategy proposals suggest to let regional price differences depend on cost differences.

The issue of food subsidies is closely related to price policy. In countries with a strong non-agricultural sector and a well organized labour force (e.g. Zambia), food subsidies have often been a sizeable real income component for the urban population. When the cost of imported goods rises and when at the same time the price of exports falls, such subsidies become a heavy burden for the government budget. It is not easy to devise policies that limit the cost of food subsidies without causing severe inflation that undermines the urban purchasing power and causes hardship for the vulnerable population groups. The consequences faced by countries that attempted drastic changes in this area



(e.g. Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Sri Lanka) are well-known. Thus one can see the importance of a "balanced and progressive approach" as advocated in food strategies.

### 3.3. Marketing organization infrastructure and the role of public marketing agencies

Changing the government's price policies and subsidies will not by itself be sufficient to make agriculture a rewarding economic venture, since prices at the farm gate level are low, not only as a consequence of price policy, but also as a result of inadequate marketing organization and infrastructure, for inputs as well as well as for farm output.

Even when the government does not directly intervene in food markets, there will be a sizeable difference between the retail prices in the urban areas and farm gate prices. Transport, processing, storage and other trade services account for this difference. With respect to the efficiency of marketing, both the "software" (organizational and management capacity) as well as the "hardware" (adequate roads, warehouses etc.) are important. The issue of marketing efficiency has figured prominently in the Kenyan food strategy discussions.

Closely related to marketing organization and infrastructure is the role of public marketing organizations. Such organizations have an important role to play in regulating markets such as to avoid excessive price movements. Large publicly controlled marketing institutions operate in Kenya, Mali and Zambia. Accordingly, several measures of the food strategies relate to the goal of improving the performance of these public marketing bodies.

### 3.4. Agricultural support services

Another set of policies common to all four food strategies, but particularly emphasized in the case of Rwanda, could be termed agricultural support services. Such services include agricultural research and extension as well as the provision of modern farm inputs and credit facilities.

Agricultural research facilities are often poorly equipped and face shortages of qualified staff. It is now generally known that research has focused on cash-crops and neglected important subsistence crops. However, it is less widely known that the foregone yield improvements may have considerable nutritional effects. The flow of information between existing international and national agricultural research organizations is inadequate; moreover, neither type of organization has sufficiently directed its research in the specific framework of existing farming systems.

Similar problems exist with respect to agricultural extension and the provision of new inputs. Extension services also suffer from poor organization and lack of qualified staff. As with research, the extension package that is offered does not always fit into the existing farming system.

With respect to farm credit the food strategies contain a number of reorientations. Up to now formal credit provided by development banks or similar institutions has only to a very limited extent been used for basic food crops. In Mali a cooperative credit scheme is being attempted. This has the advantage of involving farmers much more closely and may also increase mobilization of rural savings.

Most of the agricultural support measures listed above have always figured prominently in agricultural development plans. The food strategy focus is to improve the coherence of these different measures as well as to prioritize them in view of these adequate nutrition and food security objectives.

#### 4. POSSIBILITIES TO INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FOOD STRATEGIES

Notwithstanding important achievements ( see annexes ) there remain ways to increase the effectiveness of food strategies. They can be grouped in three main areas : First, there is the issue of food consumption and the problems of nutrition and vulnerable groups that are directly linked to this. Current food strategies have paid relatively little attention to food demand aspects.

Second, with respect to production, improvements can be made by giving more attention to non-cereals crops as well as to livestock and fisheries. The position of women as agricultural producers could be improved and farmers organizations could be more involved in food strategies. Also the policy package that is designed to increase agricultural production should be better-balanced.

The third area concerns the need to link food strategy efforts to the problems of population and environmental degradation. In this connection regional coordination problems must also be dealt with.

Besides these issues, there is the related issue of data availability that has to do with all the above mentioned areas.

##### 4.1. Consumption and vulnerable groups

The current food strategy efforts pay relatively little attention to the consumption side. Related to this, there is also lack of emphasis on nutritional issues and on vulnerable groups. Given sociocultural factors that determine tastes, consumption depends mainly on purchasing power. Therefore, in order to increase food consumption one must either diminish food prices or one must increase income. Diminishing food prices through general subsidies is normally a very costly procedure that probably can not be sustained by the government (cfr. the references made earlier to Zambia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). With respect to increasing income, one must first know the different income components of the population groups that one wishes to help.

Roughly speaking, there will be two major components : revenue from selling labour (i.e. wages) and revenue from selling produced commodities. Therefore, in order to stimulate food consumption one must support

income generating activities for the rural and urban poor. To the extent that food production in rural areas is the most important income generating activity there is a strong complementarity between supporting production and strengthening consumption. However, one should not neglect other important income sources such as non-food cash crops, forestry, handicrafts, processing of farm commodities, repair of farm implements, house construction etc. . Focussing also on consumption through income generating activities may thus broaden the scope of actions to support food strategies. Particularly in densely populated countries such as Rwanda and to some extent Kenya it is very important to encourage rural non-agricultural activities as a source of livelihood. This is already done in the Rwanda food strategy.

Related to consumption issues is attention for nutritionally vulnerable groups. The K.I.T. report considers the lack of attention for vulnerable groups (e.g. small children , lactating and pregnant women) as a short-coming of current food strategy efforts. More could be done in this respect even though there are some pitfalls that one should be aware of.

If vulnerable groups are broadly defined it will be extremely costly to set up programmes to support them. On the other hand if vulnerable groups are defined in a narrow way, it may be difficult and costly to reach them and special efforts may naturally end up partly with less vulnerable groups. In view of this the best approach could be to devise "self targeting" interventions. An example may clarify this. In Bangladesh an experiment was carried out to provide sorghum food aid. Coarse grains such as sorghum are not normally consumed by people who can afford rice. Also food for work projects may be self targeting : only those who have no alternative will enroll. This argument should be taken into account in the evaluation of food for work projects. Of course many other considerations enter the picture in order to decide on food for work or more generally on labour intensive rural works programmes.

With respect to vulnerable groups, it is important not to restrict action to food, but also to take into account other basic needs such as : health, sanitation, drinking water and education. Actions in the areas of nutrition, health and education generally will be mutually reinforcing. The nutritional centers for lactating and pregnant women and for small children that exist already in Rwanda could be strengthened in this direction.

#### 4.2. Strengthening the agricultural production system

As mentioned before in connection with the objectives of the food strategies there is a bias in attention towards the "preferred cereals" : rice, wheat and maize. There are a number of arguments in favour of other food crops such as sorghum, millet, cassava, sweet potatoes and pulses. The latter crops are generally consumed more intensively by low income households so that their availability at low prices is in the interest of equity. Also, from the point of view of nutritional content these crops are often superior to preferred cereals. Moreover, they are usually more resistant to drought and plant diseases.

Livestock and fishery products also received relatively little attention in food strategy efforts. At first sight one could think that animal products are "luxury items" that should not be encouraged in a strategy to combat hunger. However, one must also consider that in many cases livestock and fishery products are produced by specific socio-economic population classes for which such products constitute the main sources of livelihood. Such population groups must exchange their animal products for cereals, oils and non-agricultural necessities. A well-balanced food strategy should take into account the interest of these population classes. Also from the point of view of long term ecological balance it is necessary to fully integrate livestock and fisheries in a food strategy. Furthermore there are important linkages between the livestock and crops sectors : e.g. if certain types of animal diseases could be successfully treated, animals could provide more draft power and manure, so that crop yields can rise. Such linkages remain underexploited in many African countries.

The above remarks on other crops and animal products should not be interpreted to mean that all food strategies should focus on the full range of agricultural production. Priorities should be established in view of the basic food strategy objectives. The stress on preferred cereals should be viewed in this light.

The food strategy efforts in the four countries reviewed here pay only little attention to the role of women in agricultural production. Nevertheless it is well known that the current division of labour in African agriculture allocates major responsibility for food crop cultivation to women. Men are more intensively occupied in land clearing, cash-crops and rural non-farm activities.

The issues related to woman's role in food production are complex and one must refrain from quick generalizations. However, some suggestions can be made in the context of food strategy objectives. There is a strong argument in favour of lifting any possible restrictions on the procurement of credit by women. It is very likely that women will allocate ./. .

credit obtained towards increasing food production. It is also necessary to involve women as much as possible in the dissemination of technical know-how related to food production. Actions designed to lift time constraints for women e.g. by improved water and firewood supply and through better cooking stoves could increase their efficiency as food producers. (The Special Programme, art.958 contains some actions in this area).

Up to now farmers organizations have not been very much involved in the formulation and execution of food strategies. This became clear at a recent meeting in Brussels between representatives from European farmers organizations (COPA/COGECA) and representatives from farmers organizations in Mali, Kenya, Zambia and Rwanda.

There seem to be three areas where involvement of farmers organizations may be very beneficial :

- . they may be helpful in obtaining, in a relatively cheap way, farm level data; such data especially on the use of farm inputs, both marketed and unmarketed, as well as on farm gate prices are important to evaluate price policy measures;
- . farmers organizations may be very helpful to mobilize rural resources and to motivate farmers in view of food strategy objectives;
- . cooperative farmers organizations can also play a very important role with respect to marketing output and supplying inputs.

In attempting to involve farmers organizations one must remember that farmers are important actors, but not the only actors in a food strategy. The interests of rural non-farmers and in some countries landless farm workers must also be taken into account.

#### Towards a balanced policy package

The description in section 3 of the main characteristics of current food strategy efforts outlined three broad areas in which policy changes are important : incentives for the farmer to produce by ensuring adequate prices for farm output and input, marketing organization and infrastructure and provision of agricultural support services (research, extension, credit). Food strategies have tended to emphasize one or two of these areas, but it is necessary that efforts are made in all three areas simultaneously and in a coordinated way to improve the food situation. Price policies or marketing reform or agricultural services separately will not be sufficient. A diversified and balanced policy package is required.

### 4.3. Linking food strategies to other policy concerns

#### Population issues

At its current growth rate, Kenya's population will double in less than 20 years. To improve the quality of the diet for a population of this size without causing food imports to rise drastically, the required growth rate for food production is above 5 percent. Such high growth rates can only be achieved in extremely favourable circumstances.

A slower population growth in Kenya would greatly facilitate the attainment of food security in the future. The same can be said for Rwanda and, given available resources as well for Mali. Rural to urban migration will further aggravate the problem. Given current migration trends labour productivity in food products must increase still more rapidly than average food production, because the number of non-farmers to be supported by a farmer will increase. The migration trends will also put severe pressure on the marketing system.

A more detailed discussion of population issues has been the subject of another paper by the Commission, but the above remarks make it clear that population issues need to be examined in the context of food strategies. Policies to be considered in this area should be compatible with the cultural patterns of the population and must necessarily be decided by the countries themselves. On the basis of past experience, it seems that indirect policies such as those that influence the attitudes of people towards the desired number and spacing of children are very important.

#### More consideration for environmental issues

The issues of food availability and environmental degradation are closely interconnected. These interrelationships are less visible in the short run, become very clear in the medium and long run. One must be careful that a successful medium run food strategy does not deteriorate the future production potential through environmental damage. Thus, it is advisable to take into account environmental issues in food strategies. (Environmental issues are treated in another document of the Commission).

#### Regional coordination

Up to now, the food strategy efforts have been conceived essentially at the national level. This is not surprising since the national governments are responsible for formulating and implementing development policies suitable to their countries. However, the problem of food availability generally crosses the national borders. Three of the four food strategy countries are landlocked and therefore they directly depend on neighbouring countries for critical imports.

There have been some efforts in Africa towards regional coordination in the area of food security, the "Comité Interétat pour la Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel" (CILSS) being an important example. The countries participating in CILSS all share the same problems, so they can learn from each other's experience in coping with these problems. However, due to their similarities they have only a limited potential for trade. On the other hand there is more potential for mutually beneficial integration between the Sahel countries and the countries on the West-African coast, as there are some clear comparative advantages that could be exploited.

The "Southern African Development Coordination Conference" (SADCC) is another important regional grouping in Africa. Several cooperation efforts in the areas of food and agriculture are underway in SADCC, including an early warning system for regional food security and a regional resources inventory and information system. Community Member States are directly involved in these efforts.

\*

\*        \*

#### 4.4 Data availability

In order to allocate resources in the best way to combat hunger one needs a diagnosis of the food situation for different population classes. This will necessitate an effort of data collection and data processing. Both the KLT and the I.D.S. reports consider the weakness of currently available data as a handicap to diagnose the current food situation and to devise adequate policies. In this context it may be important to observe that the cost of processing data has been lowered significantly through the rapid progress in computer hardware and software.

Two types of data are particularly lacking at the level of socio-economic groups : consumption patterns and farm budgets. Both types of data are very important to judge the effects of food policy measures.



## 5. THE COMMUNITY'S SUPPORT TO FOOD STRATEGIES

### 5.1. Country selection

Towards the end of 1981, the Council approved the Commission's Plan to Combat World Hunger. One of the central elements of that plan consisted in support for national food strategies. Following the Council's decision the Commission has examined the possibilities to fruitfully support food strategies in a number of countries. Three criteria were used to identify the countries with which a start could be made:

- they had to be countries with a sizeable food deficit
- they had to have the capacity and willingness to implement changes in their food policies
- they had to be receiving substantial aid from the European Community and its Member States.

On the basis of these criteria, the Council has agreed, in the course of 1982, to assist four countries: Mali, Kenya, Zambia and Rwanda.

Several other countries including Benin, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Niger, Madagascar, Senegal, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaïre, Tunisia and Morocco also expressed their wish for EC support in the area of food strategies. Even though it would have been desirable to extend support for food strategies to more countries meeting the above criteria, limiting the exercise initially to a small number of countries was considered the best way to test the viability of a new approach.

However, preliminary discussions were held with some other countries. Moreover the Commission has recently accorded technical assistance for the preparation and coordination of measures to be taken in support of Tanzania's food strategy. (See Annex on Tanzania). Also a background study on the Ugandan food sector was

recently completed. This study was prepared at the request of the Ugandan Government with support from the Commission.

With respect to the ACP countries mentioned above, the third Lomé convention will provide the natural framework within which to engage future food strategy activities.

In addition, it seems important to envisage possibilities to extend food strategy support to non-ACP countries as well, insofar as these countries would satisfy the criteria mentioned above.

## 5.2 Basic principles

Some basic principles have guided the Community's approach to the support of food strategies:

- formulation and implementation of a food strategy is primarily the responsibility of the country concerned
- Community support should be complementary to national efforts
- optimal coordination is sought with Member States and other donors whose actions may contribute to the food strategy objectives
- an effort is made to reach agreement on a number of mutual commitments in view of attaining the food strategy objectives; these mutual commitments are generally pluriannual in order to ensure continuity.

## 5.3 Organization

With respect to organization, one must consider the fact that a food strategy is a complex undertaking. The problems addressed in a food strategy normally fall under the competence of several National Ministries: agriculture, economic affairs, finance, transport, public works and sometimes health and education. Also, in virtually all cases, one or more autonomous public bodies such as marketing boards and rural financial institutions are directly involved. Furthermore, other donors besides the

EEC and its Member States are involved in actions that relate to the food situation. In order to ensure optimal coordination between these numerous "actors", the Commission has favoured the setting up of special "working groups" or "consultative committees" in the ACP countries concerned. These working groups consist of representatives of the main Ministries, public bodies and donors that are involved in food strategy issues. They are conceived to be of an informal and advisory nature and are intended to be the forum for policy dialogue. In all cases, the approach to organization has been flexible and pragmatic.

Coordination and exchange of information between the Commission and Member States on food strategies has been arranged both in Brussels and in the beneficiary countries through a number of ad hoc expert meetings.

#### 5.4 Instruments used to support food strategies

With respect to instruments, it is important to mention that at the time when the Community embarked on food strategies, no instruments were specifically earmarked to support the exercise. However, over the past couple of years the Commission was able to use different existing instruments in a coherent way in the support of food strategies. This is illustrated in table 1. More country specific details are included in the Annexes.

With respect to existing financial instruments one has in the first place examined the possibilities for revising the indicative programme of the current EDF in view of food strategy objectives. This resulted in changes for Mali, Kenya and Rwanda. In addition, the margin between the upper and lower bounds of the indicative programme (bracket) has also been used to increase support in line with the food strategy.

In the case of Kenya, a STABEX transfer was used as an instrument to support the food strategy effort. The STABEX transfer for 1983 was allocated to the cereals marketing board to become part of a revolving fund that would allow to speed up payments for delivered farm produce.

The food strategy countries have also benefited from a special aid programme (art. 958). The actions envisaged in this context are all directly related to the food strategy effort (e.g. in the case of Rwanda they include a contribution to a strategic food reserve stock, assistance with the construction of district warehouses for the major marketing board, the introduction of fertilizers together with appropriate advisory services, an agricultural resources inventory and support to nutritional centres).

The country annexes contain an overview of the areas in which the funds of this special programme are used. Apart from the food strategy countries, several other countries have also benefited from this programme.

Even though such actions represent only a small fraction of total Community plus Member Countries' assistance to these countries they are very important in encouraging the full food strategy effort, because they offer a possibility to concretise the general principles.

Food aid has also become an important instrument that has been put to work in food strategies, to an important extent through the use of counterpart funds. This is fully in line with some of the original considerations that led to the food strategy approach. As mentioned already above, in the case of Mali food aid has been used to support the cereals market restructuring project. The food was provided to the cereals marketing board to improve its financial position and allow it to increase prices paid to farmers without at the same time increasing consumer prices. Similarly in Kenya and Rwanda food aid was channelled to the main marketing board to strengthen its position. With respect to triangular food aid operations Kenya has benefited, as a supplier, whereas both Mali and Zambia have benefited as receivers.

The Council's resolution on food aid of November 1983 has already endorsed a number of principles that allow to integrate food aid into a food strategy. The most important of these principles are :

Food aid should not be provided as such, but it should be fitted into the agricultural development effort and should be consistent with the general food policy pursued by the beneficiary country. Food aid should not disrupt the national market. Counterpart funds should be used to promote rural development actions. Free food distribution should specifically be geared to vulnerable groups or should take place in exchange for work.

Table 1 Community instruments used in the support of food strategies

	MALI	KENYA	ZAMBIA	RWANDA
Restructuring indicative aid programme (including use of existing bracket)	*	*		*
Use of STABEX transfers		*		
Special Programme (art. 958)	*	*	*	*
Food aid				
. direct	*	*	*	*
. counterpart funds	*	*		*
. triangular	*	*	*	

## 6. POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY

### 6.1. Further integration of development cooperation instruments in food strategies

From the description of the Community's experience in supporting food strategies in four countries, it is clear that several development cooperation instruments can be fruitfully incorporated into these strategies. Until now, the approach has been more or less ad hoc, but it would be desirable to make it more systematic as well as to generalize it to other countries.

The proposals of the new Lomé convention indicate that agricultural cooperation will "support strategies and policies" in this field. This will make it possible to use the resources of the indicative programme, in ACP countries that agree to it, in a way that contributes to food strategy objectives, thereby generalizing the experience that was gained in Mali, Rwanda, Zambia and Kenya. In a similar way, the Council's Resolution on food aid of November 1983 enables to generalize to other countries the approach applied in Mali, Rwanda, Zambia and Kenya with respect to the integration of food aid into food strategies.

It remains to be examined whether and how food strategy assistance can be accorded to non-ACP countries.

### 6.2. Towards more balanced food strategies

The experience with regard to food strategies in the four countries as described in the annexes shows important progress; however there are a number of elements that up to now did not receive sufficient attention. The Community, in collaboration with Member States, may, in particular through the coordination apparatus that it helped to set up, contribute to increase the effectiveness of food strategies.

In this respect it seems important to :

- . give more attention to consumption and the nutritional needs of vulnerable groups
- . emphasize more : crops such as sorghum, millet, cassava and pulses as well as livestock, fisheries and rural non-agricultural income generating activities
- . improve the position of women in their role of food producers
- . encourage the government to adopt a well-balanced food policy package.

It must be observed that the above mentioned issues cannot be addressed simultaneously, priorities must be established according to specific country needs.

Involvement of farmers organisations may be helpful to obtain better balanced food strategies. The experience of European farmers organisations can be very useful. The Community could promote cooperation between European farmers organisations and their counterparts in food strategy countries. A proposal to support the Rwandan food strategy has been received recently from the International Federation of Agricultural Producers.

NGO's could also be involved more in food strategies (cfr. the action already undertaken by Medecins Sans Frontières in Mali).

### 6.3. Organization of food strategies

One of the basic principles of the food strategy approach is to integrate various types of actions in a unified framework. Because of the complexity of food issues, the approach has generally been to subdivide the effort in a number of stages. Some improvements could be made in this respect through :

- . more detailed diagnosis especially at the level of particular population classes and regions
- . more refined analysis of the mechanisms that explain why particular population groups remain or become malnourished
- . further evaluation of the effects of alternative government policies on the basis of which an action programme is chosen
- . a more careful monitoring and evaluation of the policies and actions that are currently implemented.

Improvements in all the above mentioned areas will critically depend on the availability of adequate data and skilled manpower. The Statistical Office of the European Communities is already engaged in efforts to improve the statistical system in several African countries. It is very important to ensure that these efforts take into account the needs of food strategies. Farmers organizations can also have a role with respect to data especially on farm management.

Diagnosis, analysis of alternative policies and monitoring and evaluation in relation to food strategies should preferably be carried out by the countries themselves. However, skilled manpower in this respect is lacking. Lack of human resources also makes it difficult for many countries to engage in policy dialogue. Their capacity to analyse independently food policy issues and to enter into policy dialogue should be strengthened. The Community seems well placed to support efforts in this direction, particularly through institutions building activities, technical assistance and training.

One practical possibility could be to organize at regular intervals training seminars for the persons working in food strategy units.

#### 6.4. Linkage of food strategies to population and environmental issues and regional coordination

In the medium and long run, the issues of population, environmental quality and food availability are closely linked. It seems important that food strategies take these linkages into consideration.

As already explained above, several issues related to food availability cannot adequately be solved at country level. In some cases the Community and its Member States are already making contributions in this respect, particularly in the areas of agricultural research, desertification control, remote sensing and the struggle against animal diseases such as rinderpest. The Community seems well suited to support such efforts towards regional coordination of food strategies.



MALI : STRATEGIE ALIMENTAIRE

1. Née d'une réflexion sur l'intégration de l'aide alimentaire dans une politique d'autosuffisance alimentaire, la stratégie alimentaire s'est d'abord développée, dans le cadre du programme de restructuration du marché céréalier (PRMC), dans les domaines des prix à la production et de la commercialisation des céréales. Il s'agissait de relever les prix à la production pour les rendre incitatifs et donc stimuler la production. Parallèlement le PRMC était orienté vers la réduction des coûts d'intervention de l'Office céréalier (OPAM) dans le même temps où se trouvait libéralisée la commercialisation des céréales à l'exception du riz.
2. La mise en oeuvre du PRMC depuis mars 1981, époque où il a fait l'objet d'engagements réciproques de la part du gouvernement de la République du Mali et du groupe des donateurs, s'est traduite effectivement pendant les trois premières campagnes par un relèvement sensible du prix à la production (+ 60 % pour le paddy, + 44 % pour les cultures sèches), par une réduction de la distorsion entre les prix officiels de vente à la consommation et les prix réellement pratiqués, ainsi que par une baisse remarquable du déficit d'exploitation de l'OPAM passé de 4,5 à 2 milliards FM (1).
3. Par ses objectifs comme par ses modalités d'exécution, le PRMC s'inscrit dans la logique d'une politique économique orientée, en accord avec le FMI, vers une meilleure utilisation des forces du marché. Il en est également tributaire : l'objectif de relèvement progressif des prix à la production est difficile à poursuivre dans une conjoncture marquée par le blocage des traitements de la fonction publique. Pour tenir compte de cette contrainte, il a été décidé pour l'actuelle campagne de faire une pause dans le processus d'augmentation des prix à la production sans que cela remette en cause le principe de leur relèvement progressif. Il est entendu que la reprise du mouvement initié en 1981/82 interviendra dès que l'évolution de la situation le rendra possible.

./.

---

(1) 1 FCFA : 2 FM

4. Au cours de réunions tenues fin 1983 aussi bien à Bamako entre les donateurs engagés dans le PRMC qu'à Bruxelles entre experts des Etats membres et Commission, on s'est interrogé sur les meilleurs moyens d'atteindre les objectifs fondamentaux de la politique céréalière du Mali. Il fut alors question d'extension du PRMC, selon la même logique d'engagements réciproques et d'utilisation des fonds de contrepartie à l'appui des politiques structurelles conduites par les autorités maliennes. L'accord s'est alors fait sur l'opportunité d'étendre le PRMC à des programmes d'appui à la restructuration des Opérations de Développement Rural (ODR) tendant à réduire les coûts de la filière agro-alimentaire et à favoriser la croissance de la production céréalière.
  
5. Dans cette perspective, il est vite apparu prioritaire en ce début d'année 1984, au moment où le Mali s'apprêtait à rentrer dans l'Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine et où, de ce fait, il était confronté à la nécessité de revoir les bases sur lesquelles était attribué le crédit aux trois ODR rizicoles - Office du Niger, Opération Riz Ségou et Opération Riz Mopti-, de soutenir la politique malienne de libéralisation de la commercialisation du paddy. Compte tenu de l'importance et de la complexité de ces ODR d'une part, de la place tenue par ces trois ODR dans l'approvisionnement des marchés urbains en riz d'autre part, il n'était pas possible en effet pour le gouvernement malien de s'engager dans cette voie sans l'aide de la communauté internationale. Fort de son soutien il a pu prendre la décision de libéraliser progressivement le commerce du riz. Les modalités de l'engagement réciproque doivent être arrêtées prochainement.

6. Avec leur engagement à soutenir la libéralisation du commerce du riz, les donateurs, au premier rang desquels se trouve le groupe des Etats Membres et de la Commission, se trouvent une nouvelle fois confrontés à l'exigence d'agir d'un commun accord en faveur d'un programme aux aspects multiples. Il leur faudra faire la preuve qu'ils sont capables de s'entendre non seulement sur les objectifs à atteindre, mais encore sur les moyens à mobiliser sur une période pluri-annuelle pour mener à bien la politique conduite par les autorités maliennes. Cela implique un effort de concertation et la recherche d'un consensus sur l'utilisation des fonds de contre-partie de l'aide alimentaire.
7. Parallèlement à ses engagements aux côtés des autres donateurs dans le cadre du PRMC et de son programme d'extension, la Communauté attache une particulière attention à trois opérations :
  - la restructuration de l'Office du Niger;
  - la création d'emplois productifs hors du secteur d'Etat;
  - l'action de lutte contre la malnutrition.
8. L'Office du Niger tient une place centrale dans la production du riz au Mali. Ses structures de gestion et d'exploitation ne répondent plus aux exigences de la politique rizicole du Mali. Les bailleurs de fonds sollicités pour financer la restructuration de l'Office ont souhaité faire le point sur la situation financière. Les mesures à prendre dans le cadre de la restructuration intéressent aussi bien la gestion que les infrastructures hydro-agricoles et le transfert de certaines fonctions aux paysans dont le statut est à revoir. Pour contribuer à cette politique, la Commission peut mobiliser certains des crédits affectés au Mali au titre du programme spécial 1983 de la lutte contre la faim dans le Monde - 1,3 mio ECU sont prévus pour la fourniture d'intrants et d'équipement pour les ODR en cours de restructuration - et au crédit de 7,3 mio ECU prévu dans le cadre du programme indicatif pour financer un projet en faveur de l'Office. Elle le fera de façon graduelle en liaison avec les réformes de structure qui seront mises en oeuvre.
9. La restructuration du secteur d'Etat pose en termes aigus le problème des effectifs du secteur public et de l'emploi des jeunes. Si les autorités maliennes ne parviennent pas à susciter par une politique adaptée la création d'emplois productifs hors du secteur d'Etat, cette politique se trouvera vite confrontée à des tensions sociales qui remettront en cause ses orientations. La Commission a financé une expertise pour examiner les moyens d'encourager la création d'entreprises; elle a réservé un crédit d'environ 1,5 mio ECU dans le programme indicatif pour la suite à donner à cette opération.
10. La lutte contre la malnutrition au Mali tend à prendre un caractère permanent avec la persistance de la sécheresse dans la zone sahélienne. Elle est rendue extrêmement difficile par la dispersion des populations à secourir, le mauvais état des pistes rurales et la mauvaise organisation de l'approvisionnement en céréales des localités.

Une carte nutritionnelle du Mali va être dressée et des actions médico-nutritionnelles du type de celles menées par Médecins sans frontières (aide d'urgence accordée début 84) devront être entreprises pour remédier à une situation critique que la stratégie alimentaire se propose de combattre.

11. Il est à noter que, dans son action de soutien à la stratégie alimentaire du Mali, la Commission peut mobiliser, à côté des fonds de contrepartie de l'aide alimentaire et des crédits du programme indicatif dont 60% sont affectés au développement agro-pastoral, les aides d'urgence pour faire face aux conséquences de la sécheresse et les crédits de l'art. 958 dont en 1983 (1) 5 mio ECU ont été attribués au Mali soit 4 mio ECU pour les actions de soutien à la stratégie alimentaire et 1 mio ECU pour les actions thématiques.
12. La stratégie alimentaire devient au Mali un pôle de l'action publique autour duquel s'ordonnent de nombreux projets et programmes initiés par le gouvernement malien et soutenus par l'aide internationale. Dans la logique de la politique économique suivie par les autorités maliennes, cette stratégie est amenée à s'intéresser, au-delà des domaines de commercialisation des céréales qui ont constitué son champ d'application original, aux questions de production et à la restructuration des ORD qui servent d'instrument à la politique de développement rural. Elle rend impérative un engagement toujours plus ferme et concerté des donateurs au service de ses objectifs.

(1) en 1984, les crédits envisagés se montent à 3,3 mio ECU.

## KENYA FOOD STRATEGY

1. The events and considerations leading to the National Food Plan and subsequent events.

- 1.1. Like many other countries in Africa, Kenya is subject to cyclical droughts. The 1979/80 drought underlined the importance of strategic food security planning and the government responded with a National Food Policy paper which stated the government's determination to establish food self reliance, food security within the overall plan to expand agricultural output and exports. The present drought situation in the country, reminiscent of 1979/80, finds the government unprepared (despite some food security progress) to confront food shortages and in some cases serious malnutrition and famine.
- 1.2. Immediate underlying causes for the periodic but persistent food deficits are the failures of rainfall, insufficiency of incentives for marketable production, inefficient and unresponsive monopolistic marketing and other institutions and a somewhat erratic and insecure supply of critically needed agricultural inputs, equipment and fuel. In the longer term the most worrisome aspect is the relatively low level trend of food and agricultural production growth (4.5 %) against one of the highest population growth rates in Africa - around 4 % per annum. This persistent inability to assure food supplies at affordable prices in a relatively pragmatic and democratic environment has direct implications for socio economic and political stability. Thus the implementation of a food strategy deserves attention.

2. The approach adopted to implement the 'National Food Policy'.

2.1. The objectives of the NFP are to,

- maintain self sufficiency in main foodstuffs and minimise imports,
- achieve a calculated degree of food supply across the country,
- ensure a nutritionally adequate diet.

Attention is focussed on both food and export products and production and marketing systems and incentives are to be restructured so that they are consistent with a lower than previously planned rate of economic growth (3.3 %) and a high population growth (4 %).

2.2. The above mentioned paper was not followed by a plan of action nor by legislative programme. But its guidelines have been followed by the IMF standby arrangements and World Bank structural adjustment credits the second of which specifically addresses agricultural constraints. The Kenya/European Communities Food Strategy dialogue got under way in 1982.

- 2.3. Since 1980 producer incentives have been consistently improved, especially those relative to cereals, attempts are underway to avoid consumer subsidies. Tariffs have been restructured and some reduced. Management of agricultural programmes and projects is being improved.
- 2.4. The momentum of these reforms has been slowed down however by two interrelated factors. The first is the fear that radical liberalisation of the grain market, which would reduce the role of government in grain marketing, might have destabilising implications. The second factor is the crisis management underway to face the 1984 drought and the associated food deficits and at affordable prices.
3. The orientations and priorities of the EC/Kenya food strategy dialogue.
  - 3.1. Pricing and marketing policy reforms are given overriding priority because inadequacies and inefficiencies of state intervention in the grain market have immediate and serious effects on food and agricultural output and consumption as well as on the balance of payments and the budget.
  - 3.2. Recommendations of a World Bank supported study and those of an interministerial study group have been before the cabinet but there is no decision as yet on their implementation. Among other things this has hampered progress with a follow up study to reorganise the administrative and financial aspects of a restructured and redefined National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). The Commission has agreed in principle to the Kenyan government's request that they support this study.
  - 3.3. Because of the inevitable slow progress in grain marketing reforms the dialogue is being widened and diversified and attention is being directed to other priority areas.

These areas are: farm storage and reduction of post harvest losses, farm systems research including formulation of smallholder packages, rural access roads and nutrition improvement programmes. Attention to issues of provision and marketing of agricultural inputs, and credit must for the time being await the outcome of events in the grain marketing sector as well as that of studies which are already under way (supported by other donors).
4. Commission support to the Food Strategy has thus far been comprised of the following :
  - Triangular Food Cooperation. The EEC purchased 1800 T of beans from Kenya under the 1983 programme, which they then gave as food aid to Sao Tomé and Zimbabwe. In the same year the WFP purchased 20,000 T of white maize from Kenya using EEC funds, and gave this as food aid to Mozambique. The 1984 drought made it impossible for Kenya to participate in triangular operations this past year ; however, possibilities for this type of transaction will continue to be explored.
  - A contribution of 4.6 M ECU (linked to the 1981 Stabex transfer) was given at the government's own insistence to a revolving crop procurement fund of the NCPB.

- The 1983 Special Programme allocation of 4 M.ECU supplemented the NCPB crop procurement fund already established.
  - The 1984 Special Programme allocation of approximately 3 M.ECU is expected to be used for a rural access road project.
  - Special and regular provision of food aid allocations and disaster relief from 1975 to 1983 were as follows: 20.2 M.ECU were earmarked for direct food aid to Kenya, while 7.6 M.ECU were allocated for indirect aids. Exceptional aids for emergency relief totalled 2.4 M.ECU.
  - Counterpart fund utilization - see annex.
  - Training of food sector statisticians in the Central Bureau of Statistics, Kenya was continued from the Lome II indicative programme.
  - The Commission granted an additional 14 M.ECU on top of the minimum 74 M.ECU related to Lome II indicative amount bracket because of the strategy dialogue. The government has agreed to earmark most of these funds for projects related to the food strategy.
5. Coordination related to definition and implementation of the food strategy.
- 5.1. The system of committees (a Kenya/EEC Consultative Committee, sectoral donor working groups and the technical committee of the EC delegate and EC Member Country representative) set up at the launching of the dialogue is under review. This responds partly to new developments in aid coordination arising from recommendations of the World Bank Consultative Group in Kenya.

The creation of the Kenya/EEC Consultative Committee is also in part a response to the growing unease on the part of the Kenyan government which is worried that donors may be tempted to forge a common front and impose hard conditionality of policies linked to all external assistance.

There are some grounds for this latter fear, given the way that the United States has conducted itself in attempting to link macroeconomic policies to all aid requests under consideration including the appeal for disaster relief. In any case there is a considerable consensus that the responsibility for donor coordination must rest with the Kenyans themselves.

There is, nevertheless, a close coordination on all issues related to the food strategy between Member States' representatives, both in Nairobi and in the European capitals. To this end an important meeting took place in March 1984 in Brussels between Member States and Commission experts.

- 5.2. Coordination within the Kenyan government between the office of the President and other ministries continues to be fragile, and had a tendency to focus on issues of emergency assistance and needs for quick cash rather than on discussion of policy strategy and programmes.

ANNEX

Financing of food strategy projects through the use of a special food aid counterpart fund.

Implemented actions

Turkana Rehabilitation Programme (developing agricultural livestock and water resources)	1982/83	5,9 million <sup>(*)</sup>
---	---------	----------------------------

Actions under implementation

Turkana Rehabilitation Programme	1983/84	10,0 million
----------------------------------	---------	--------------

Veterinary Centres and Cattle Dips, Coast Province (aim to control tickborne and other livestock diseases)	1983/84	5,0 million
---	---------	-------------

MIDP Phase I Extension (Machakos Integrated Development Programme aims to stabilize agricultural production, develop water resources and integrate a soil conservation programme in arid area).	1983/84	25,5 million
--	---------	--------------

---

Total	46,4 million
Balance unspent	19,3 million

(\*) June 1984 : 1 ECU = 11,6170 K Sh.



## STRATEGIE ALIMENTAIRE AU RWANDA

### Etat d'avancement n° 3

Ce document constitue une mise à jour de la situation telle que présentée dans les documents Conseil 7380/84 du 24 mai 1984 et SEC(83)1711 du 27 octobre 1983, auquel il y a lieu de se référer notamment en ce qui concerne l'historique de la mise en place de la stratégie alimentaire au Rwanda.

### I. L'engagement du Rwanda en faveur de la stratégie alimentaire

Le Président, dans son dernier discours a réaffirmé son attachement à la cause de la stratégie alimentaire qu'il a fait sienne. En insistant sur ce thème majeur de sa politique de développement, il a notamment signalé que la stratégie alimentaire s'étend au delà du seul domaine agricole "stricto sensu" ("notre politique d'accroissement du pouvoir d'achat en milieu rural vise l'industrialisation rurale" qui sera "déconcentrée, de petites et moyennes dimensions").

### II. La mobilisation de l'aide communautaire au soutien de la stratégie alimentaire

#### A. Programme spécial de lutte contre la faim dans le monde (art. 958)

Pour rappel, dans le cadre de la coordination qui se fait à Kigali entre le Rwanda, les Etats membres représentés sur place et la Commission, notamment au sein du "groupe de travail euro-rwandais", un programme d'actions prioritaires pour la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie alimentaire, a été identifié en 1983.

Il s'agit :

- en matière de soutien et d'organisation de la commercialisation des produits vivriers :
  1. Extension du réseau des comptoirs de vente et d'achat de L'OPROVIA
  2. Contribution à la constitution du stock de sécurité alimentaire
  3. Schéma directeur des agro-industries.
- en matière de préparation à l'intensification agricole et de conservation des sols
  4. Introduction des intrants-fertilisants minéraux et vulgarisation associée
  5. Appui méthodologique à la vulgarisation
  6. Inventaire du capital sol
- en matière de diversification et surveillance nutritionnelle
  7. Appui au système de surveillance centres nutritionnelle.

Les actions n° 1, 2 et 4 reprises supra ayant été financées par la Commission sur le budget 83, la Commission entend prendre en charge sur le budget 84 les actions n° 6 et 7 ainsi qu'un complément à l'action n° 4.

L'action n° 3 étant financée par la Banque Mondiale et l'action n° 5 ayant été orientée sur l'introduction des intrants-fertilisants minéraux, la Commission entend prendre également en charge l'étude

sur la commercialisation des produits vivriers. L'importance de cette étude s'est dégagée des indications du colloque de mai 1984 à Kigali organisé par les autorités rwandaises et auquel participaient les représentants de la Délégation de la Commission, de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, de la Belgique, de la France et de la Banque Mondiale.

L'étude sur la commercialisation permettra d'obtenir des recommandations quant aux interventions structurelles qui se révéleraient nécessaires pour transformer l'actuelle agriculture de subsistance en agriculture de marché. Le renforcement du système nutritionnel permettra de mieux analyser le problème de l'équilibre quantitatif et qualitatif de la balance alimentaire et d'orienter les mesures prévues ou à prévoir à cet égard. Tandis que l'inventaire du capital sol fournira les éléments pour une meilleure planification à long terme de l'occupation et de l'exploitation des sols, l'introduction des fertilisants s'inscrit dans la perspective du passage des modes de production actuels à une production intensive, en complément à d'autres approches telles que l'intégration élevage-agriculture.

#### B. Programme Indicatif

Comme déjà communiqué dans l'état d'avancement n° 2 (mai 1984), 3 MECU sont réservés à l'appui direct à la stratégie alimentaire dans le volet "développement rural" du Programme indicatif réaménagé Vème FED.

Le Gouvernement veut se doter d'un programme de développement de la production de blé compte tenu de l'importance de cette culture avant l'indépendance ainsi que des développements récents de certaines variétés de blés.

Une première opération dans ce sens conçue au niveau du Groupe euro-rwandais au mois de mars, est en phase de mise au point. Compte tenu des délais d'instruction et de mise en oeuvre d'une part et de la nature du projet d'autre part, le Gouvernement a préféré en demander le financement sur le poste du P.I. mentionné ci-avant.

#### C. Conclusion

L'enveloppe financière que la Commission entend mettre en appui direct à la stratégie alimentaire s'élève donc à 10 MECU y inclus les 4 MECU déjà engagés sur le budget 83. L'engagement des autres crédits programmés est prévu entre fin 84 et mi-85.

Néanmoins, les besoins financiers de la stratégie alimentaire dépassant largement les possibilités d'intervention de la Commission, le Gouvernement rwandais a sollicité l'appui concret d'autres donateurs, notamment celui des Etats membres.

### III. La coordination entre la Commission, les Etats Membres et d'autres donateurs

La coordination entre la Commission et les Etats membres qui soutiennent la stratégie alimentaire au Rwanda, a été renforcée au niveau opérationnel, complémentirement à celle qui se fait à Kigali notamment au sein du Groupe euro-rwandais.

Dans le cadre de la coopération bilatérale, des entretiens à très haut niveau politique ont eu lieu entre le Gouvernement rwandais et ces Etats membres. C'est ainsi que l'appui des Etats membres se concrétise en phase de programmation de l'aide par la prise en compte des orientations de la stratégie alimentaire. En fonction des différents états d'avancement des programmations bilatérales, l'appui à la stratégie alimentaire a été inscrit dans certains programmes et des actions de soutien à sa mise en oeuvre ont déjà pu être identifiées.

D'autre part, le financement du schéma directeur des agro-industries (voir II.A.3. actions prioritaires) est prévu sur le fonds d'étude de la Banque mondiale et d'après les informations reçues le lancement de cette action paraît proche.

#### IV. Les aspects opérationnels de la mise en oeuvre de la stratégie alimentaire

Les actions financées au titre du "Programme spécial de lutte contre la faim dans le monde" sur les ressources du budget 1983 sont désormais bien lancées, après des délais administratifs plus longs que prévu, intervenus pour l'établissement du Protocole d'accord entre la Commission et le Rwanda. Grâce aux travaux préparatoires menés entre-temps, les marchés principaux de travaux et fournitures (construction des comptoirs de l'OPROVIA, fourniture d'intrants) ont été adjugés. Dès lors, l'achèvement des constructions et les livraisons sont prévus au cours des mois prochains. L'assistance technique prévue pour l'action d'introduction des fertilisants est en cours de mise en place.

ZAMBIA

1. Zambia's food and agriculture strategy is incorporated in the documents tabled at the World Bank Consultative meeting (Paris 22-24 May). These documents draw on and incorporate much of the material discussed and agreed between GRZ and EEC representatives in the Zambia-EEC Joint Committee, as well as the Netherlands financed 'Food Strategy' report.

However, this strategy statement still has not reached beyond the stage of policy orientation and global expenditure figures. The element of specific action has not yet been defined.

2. In some aspects however, GRZ has already taken concrete action to implement the strategies to which it is committed. The most important elements in recent Government decisions are:
  - a. regular increases in producer prices to ensure that prices remain attractive to producers;
  - b. devaluation/floating of the Kwacha to ensure that in particular imported inputs are costed realistically;
  - c. removal of transport subsidies as a step towards regional pricing;
  - d. drafting (still at a preliminary stage) of a 5 year rolling investment plan for Food and Agriculture which will set the priorities within which individual projects are appraised;
  - e. preparation (for late 1984) with the assistance of the World Bank, of an 'Action Plan for Extension and Research'.

.../...

- 3. GRZ's capacity to implement any programme of concrete action continues to deteriorate in line with the deterioration of the overall economic situation.
- 4. GRZ's intention to merge the Zambia-EEC Joint Committee into the 'Joint Monitoring Committee' agreed in Paris in the context of the World Bank Consultative Group.\*  
The JMC's precise role remains to be agreed with donors (in practice it did not prove possible in the EEC-GRZ Joint Committee to prepare projects for submission for finance; it is not clear whether this function will be exercised in the JMC).
- 5. In order not to delay further the implementation of the Indicative Programme, it was agreed in early 1984 (between GRZ and Delegation, approved by Commission services) to press ahead with the commitment of funds for projects in the broad line of Zambia's strategy objectives, e.g.:

- i. Storage 5 MECU (Japanese Aid also contributing + 5 MECU project)
- ii. Crop diversification (sorghum, millet, cassava) 5 MECU
- iii. Extension services (oxen drawn power) 2 MECU

This work is now progressing. As for storage, delegation awaits the results of a GTZ study on storage requirements (to be made available before end 1984) before launching its own ideas. GRZ's request has not yet been tabled. Implementation timetable: financial proposal - mid 85 (loan); EDF Committee - end 1985; loan agreement - mid 1986.

As to crop diversification and extension services, two feasibility studies are in the process of being launched.

.../...

An inaugural meeting took place on 8 August

TANZANIA

1. Tanzanian Government policies on agriculture were set out in the course of 1983, particularly in the White Paper produced by the Ministry of Agriculture on behalf of the Government. This re-affirmed that the main emphasis in food production would remain on the smallholder level, but two other modes of production (namely the parastatals and the private commercial sector) were endorsed by the Government, and would be encouraged. The Government recognises the need to provide a fair price to the farmer, and the importance of an adequate supply of consumer goods as part of an incentive package to reverse the trend of falling production. Input supply is also a critical element in increasing production.
2. On food crop marketing, the Government recognises four main channels - the traditional market, the cooperatives, the food marketing board, and sales or purchases direct by other institutions.
3. A National Food Strategy Report, prepared by an FAO Food Strategy team financed by DANIDA, was presented to the Tanzanian Government in 1982 and formed part of the background to the policy review outlined above. The budget presented to the Assembly in June 1984 begins the implementation of some of the new policy; an increased share of agriculture in Government expenditure, higher prices in real terms for producers (although still well below the levels of 10 years ago in real terms) and tighter controls on parastatals all figure prominently.
4. The EEC has offered support for a Tanzanian Food Strategy but there is much preliminary work to be done. The Community has agreed to provide two experts in planning in the food sector to assist with this work.

Meanwhile assistance is also being provided through support under the Indicative Programme for oxenisation and increased

crop production in Iringa region, for increased quality and quantity of coffee output (Tanzania's main export crop), and for the study of pests affecting banana production. ECU 3.9 million has been allocated from article 958 of the Community budget in 1983 and 1984 for special projects to combat hunger, including the supply of materials for making farm implements, of insecticides and of fertilisers, a pilot project in Tanga Region on environmental conservation and agricultural development, and a plant to produce fuel bricks from coffee milling wastes in order to save scarce woodfuel. Total Stabex payments to Tanzania stand at ECU 27.65 million, mainly in respect of sisal (68%).-

In 1983, food aid from the European Community to Tanzania consisted of 20,000 tonnes of cereals, 1,600 tonnes of milk powder and 400 tonnes of butteroil. In addition, 4,000 tonnes of maize was provided as emergency assistance in 1984.