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European Community Information Service
2100 M Street, N.W.
Suite 707
Washington, D.C. 20037
telephone: 202-872-8350
277 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017
telephone: 212-371-3805

DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION
Andrew A. Mulligan
EDITOR
Walter Nicklin

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Centre européen Kirchberg
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Jean Monnet Remembers

The "Father of Europe" Looks Back 25 Years to Its Birth

May 9, 1950, marks the birth of the European Community. On that day at 6 p.m., French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman made the following declaration in the Salon de l'Horloge of the Quai d'Orsay:

"The French Government proposes to put the whole of the Franco-German coal and steel production under a joint High Authority, in an organization which is open for the other European countries to enter. By merging the basic industries and establishing a new High Authority, whose decisions will be binding on France, Germany, and the other states participating, this proposal will form the first foundations of a European federation so indispensable to the preservation of peace."

Great was the surprise of the journalists and the observers who were present on this occasion. It was clear to everyone that, with these simple words and his resolute tone, the French minister was now treading the path of concrete realization.

A REVOLUTION OF PEACE

Since the end of the war Europe had got itself bogged down in a series of endless debates, exhausting even for the most willing spirits. From the heights of the tribunal of the Council of Europe, the theoreticians waged a vain battle against each other. Thus the declaration of May 9 unleashed a veritable revolution of peace. It offered the fundamental principle of a transfer of power, effected quite voluntarily, by nations delegating a part of their sovereignty to common institutions which would exercise it in their name.

In order to understand the full significance of such a proposal, it is necessary to recall the contemporary situation in the Europe of 1950. Germany constituted a grave problem. I was convinced that the mistakes made after the 1914-18 war must be avoided at all costs. We should facilitate Germany's reintegration with the West and regard her as a partner with equal rights. For this it was necessary to create among the European nations which had determined to follow the same rules a community in which they could participate on a basis of strict equality.

On the other hand, my experience as commissioner of the Modernization and Equipment Plan had convinced me that it would be useless for France and her neighbors to expect a rapid and balanced expansion if we returned to the old rut of the past and to industrial Malthusianism. Our economies would be unable to expand except within the framework of a vast common market, which would both benefit our exports and stimulate our production.

A way had to be found out of the impasse: A concrete and resolute action, geared to a limited but decisive aim, would produce a fundamental change on this one point and gradually modify the substance of the problems as a whole. My reflections during the month of April convinced me that only a far-reaching proposition could stir the public imagination and banish the climate of insecurity that was weighing so heavily on us.

It seemed to me that if the whole of the coal and steel production of France, Germany, and the other countries who wished to join were to be placed under a common authority, independent of the states, there would be created between them a "solidarity of fact." The governments would then learn progressively to consider their own interests from the perspective of the community's interest.

I drafted the proposal, which some members of my staff then helped me to draw up, and on April 29 it was laid before French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who unhesitatingly accepted the political responsibility for it.

The French proposal aroused great hopes. With relief the Germans discovered that they would be an integral part of the Europe that was in the process of being formed. The Italians and the Benelux countries without delay agreed to cooperate as equal partners in a common organization. From then on things moved very quickly.

The negotiations for framing a treaty were begun on June 20, 1950. As head of the French delegation, I took great pains to ensure that each member must realize that he was trying to accomplish a common work of benefit to all and not negotiating special advantages for his own country.

At the beginning of the conference I stated, "If we base our discussions on the premises of national entity, then all the old rancor and resentment will come to the surface once more; only when we have eliminated particularist sentiments from our discussions, can a solution be found."

THE PROCESS OF CIVILIZATION

Looking back over 25 years, what lessons can we learn?

The organization of Europe, as initiated by the Schuman Plan and implemented by the Treaties of Paris and of Rome, has made an essential contribution to our civilization. Not only were the customs barriers which had existed between the six countries removed—something that played an enormous part in Europe's fantastic postwar economic boom—but even more, common institutions for the first time assumed the responsibility of determining the interests of a community as a whole and were vested with supranational powers.

The experiences of two world wars and my 50 years of public life have convinced me that peace can only be safeguarded and the solutions to our present problems can only be found if states are prepared to submit to the same set of rules and to institutions which administer them.

It is on this process that civilization is based. The rules do not change nature herself. But when men submit to the same rules, their attitude and behavior toward each other change. If states are prepared to apply this method, then great progress can be achieved in the sectors of energy, currency, and politics.

Jean Monnet

Remembering Monnet

A Life of Ideas and Action, from Dream to Reality

PIERRE GERBET, professor at the Institute of Political Studies, Paris

Twenty-five years to the day after May 9, 1950, Jean Monnet retired from public life. His resignation as chairman of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe—created by Monnet in 1955 as a pressure group for political unification—led to the committee's simultaneous dissolution. Unlike other architects of European unity, Monnet never held political office. Rather, his role was to influence and inspire the politicians. He was the "inventor" of the supranational method. He drew up the Schuman Plan of May 9, 1950. He negotiated the plan's implementation, in the Treaty of Paris that created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. He was the first president of the ECSC High Authority. Even after the failure of the European Defense Community, which he had also inspired, Monnet continued his work—playing a vital role in Europe's "recovery" and in concluding the Treaties of Rome that created the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1958. Now at age 86, Monnet says he will write a book and "think." There follows a biographical sketch.

For Jean Monnet, Europe was the starting point for a new conception of international relations—a conception based not solely on theoretical considerations but also on the factual experience of an outstandingly brilliant and varied career.

During World War I, Monnet, still very young, was dismissed from military service for health reasons but then took a post in the French Ministry of Commerce in London. There he was taken aback by the conflicting policies of the Allies, their competition among themselves for purchases of food and raw materials, and their arguments over the ship tonnage depleted by German submarines. Monnet suggested pooling their resources together.

An Interallied Council was established in December 1917, with an Allied Executive Committee of experts including a Briton, an Italian, a Frenchman (Jean Monnet), and an American observer. The experts did not represent their governments officially; they acted as independent persons, receiving requests from their governments and adapting them to conform with the general interest. In turn, they submitted their decisions for acceptance to their respective governments. The outcome was remarkable. Similar committees were formed for wheat, meat, oil, and sugar. The cooperation achieved for supplies contributed greatly to the military victory.

THE MONNET METHOD

This experience was what Monnet envisaged international cooperation to be. Confronted with the traditional system of trade and compromise between rival national interests, Monnet always tried to substitute collective action based on common interest toward a common solution. Only a small number of people could best achieve this—those who had the confidence of

their governments, possessed a great degree of initiative, were used to working together, and agreed on common solutions to common problems. Such was "the Monnet method" based on solidarity and efficiency.

The experience of serving as Assistant Secretary General of the League of Nations until 1923 confirmed Monnet as a man of convictions. He reproached member states for defending their own selfish points of view, without being able to look at problems as a whole. "The government representatives, all steadfast when pleading their national cause, become paralyzed when confronted with exercising common action," Monnet said, "and are only capable of proposing small answers to big problems."

But the League's failure and the resultant World War II afforded Monnet the opportunity to once again apply his method to pool resources. In 1939 the British and French Governments

Jean Monnet (left) and Robert Schuman: "The French Government proposes to put the whole of the Franco-German coal and steel production under a joint High Authority. . . ."



appointed him chairman of the Anglo-French Committee for Coordinating the War Effort.

After the French armistice in June 1940, Monnet participated in the Anglo-American War Bureau, an organization that supplied Great Britain with needed American civil and military equipment. Monnet went to the United States and played an important role in the lend-lease agreement that allowed Britain, whose reserves in gold and currency were dwindling, to procure indispensable American army supplies without having to pay for them. He was also one of the driving forces in the "Victory Program," aimed at associating the United States and England in a common war effort.

In charge of supplies and arms for the French Liberation Committee in Algeria, Monnet equipped the French North African army with American arms. Then, after the liberation, as president of the supply council of the provisional government, he obtained from the United States a loan plus lend-lease benefits.

The concern to make wise use of liberated and war-worn France's limited resources, coupled with the need not to waste American credit, led Monnet at the end of 1945 to conceive a plan for a modern infrastructure for supplies, labor, and investments in the key sectors of transportation, coal, electricity, iron, cement, and fertilizer. The French Government adopted his plan and placed him in charge of its implementation, as commissioner of the Modernization and Equipment Plan.


The plan evolved, not from a bureaucratic decision, but from constant cooperation among businessmen, technicians, union members, civil servants; their growing awareness of common problems; and, together, their defining a plan acceptable to all. Monnet and his small team (Robert Mayolin, Etienne Hirsch, Pierre Uri, Paul Delouvrier) were always there to spur them on. The Monnet method, already felt internationally, worked on the national level as well.

THE SEARCH FOR EUROPE

The idea of a united Europe never left him. In London in June 1940, he initiated the Franco-British union. Its purpose was to go beyond the cooperative war effort that Monnet himself had inspired during the two World Wars and to achieve a true merger between two countries: joint machinery for defense, foreign policy, finance, the economy; common citizenship; an association with two parliaments; a single defense department in charge of all the armed forces for both Britain and France.

Monnet undoubtedly saw a means of keeping France in the war when on June 16, the eve of the French request for an armistice, he vainly proposed his plan to the French Government. Nevertheless, Monnet's plan contained elements that could lead to the subsequent formation of a "Franco-British Europe." He even envisaged a customs union and a common monetary unit.

In Algeria on August 5, 1943, Monnet gave the French Libera-



Jean Monnet as president of the European Coal and Steel Community's High Authority —a supranational High Authority, "the most original aspect of his plan . . . a revolutionary idea."

tion Committee a note concerning the future organization for peace: "There will be no peace in Europe if countries build up their strength on a basis of national sovereignty and, with it, nationalism and economic protectionism. The countries of Europe are too limited to assure their people the prosperity that modern times afford and which is consequently necessary. Larger markets are needed. Prosperity and vital social development are inconceivable unless the countries of Europe form a federation or a European entity which in turn creates a common economic union. . . . The others, the British, Americans, and Russians have their own worlds which they can temporarily retreat to. France is bound to Europe and can not escape. France's life depends upon the solution to Europe's problem."

In 1949 Monnet again thought about a "Franco-British Eu-

rope”—this time in purely economic terms. Why not begin by harmonizing the French economic system with the system envisaged by the British Labour Party? To this effect, he established contacts with Sir Edwin Flowden, but their conversations did not bear fruit: The Labour Party was only interested in the development of commercial exchanges.

Undeterred, Monnet no longer felt Britain's consent was necessary for European construction. He would start all over again without Britain—and succeed.

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer wanted to secure the young Bonn democracy to the West with the ties of equal partners, not as a subordinate under Allied control. Also desirous to recover the Saar, Adenauer repeatedly extolled the creation of a Franco-German economic—and even political—union that would be open to other countries.

These proposals were not taken seriously by the French Government, but Monnet recognized an opportunity to act. Monnet knew that in order for the French economy to be prosperous, the European economy had to be truly organized. An organized Europe could play a conciliatory role and lessen the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union.

But a “Franco-German Europe?” Under what form? A political union? Memories of the war still lingered, and the failure of the Council of Europe showed that to start with a European federal institution was impossible. An economic union? Disparities in prices, salaries, fiscal systems were too great, and the complete opening of frontiers would involve too great a risk of economic and social disorder.

Monnet felt that it was necessary to proceed gradually from very defined sectors. He chose the coal and steel industries. Coal was then the most important source of energy. Steel was considered a vital raw material for industry and arms. By pooling the coal and steel industries in a common market, there would


be no misgivings about control over the Ruhr. This union would become symbolic and make inconceivable another Franco-German war.

It was not a question of simply opening up the frontiers to free trade in these two products. It was a question of market organization. Monnet felt that the coal and steel enterprises (whether national or private) should come under a supranational authority capable of assuring the free play of competition necessary for production rationalization and low prices, of eliminating discrimination, of preventing the reappearance of cartels, of ensuring consumers equal rights, of orienting investments to avoid over-supply.

This was the most original aspect of his plan—to place a “High Authority” at the head of the coal and steel common market. The High Authority would be formed, not by representatives of the nation-states, but by independent persons, chosen for their competence. They would not receive any instructions from their respective governments and would make their decisions only on the basis of the perceived common interest.

This revolutionary idea was the fruit of Monnet's long international experience, of his mistrust of traditional diplomatic methods, and of his preference for work by small teams outside the usual administrative structures. And Monnet went a decisive step further. More than a group of experts brought together to find common solutions to international problems to be accepted or rejected by their governments, the High Authority was a decision-making body with powers delegated by governments over common sectors.

The dynamism of Monnet's plan did not stop there. Economic sectors are not distinct. If coal and steel come under a common market, agriculture, all industrial trade, indeed the entire economy must follow, must gradually be pooled together. A united Europe, Monnet's dream, lies in this dynamic process.



May 9, 1950

What Was Happening

At one minute past midday on May 9, 1945, all fighting ceased in Europe. On that same day five years later, Europe was still licking its war wounds, but in the afternoon of that day a glimmer of hope for a lasting peace came from French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman—a name totally unknown to the majority of Europeans who opened their daily papers that bright spring morning only to be confronted with the usual picture of virtually unrelieved gloom.

The bulk of the front-page news in the European morning papers concerned the Cold War situation in which there were few signs of a thaw. To this common news was added the national problems and preoccupations of the various European states.

In France the war in Indochina took up several columns, while in Italy the plight of pilgrims flooding in for Holy Year and seeking accommodations was the day's big story alongside the dispute with Yugoslavia over Trieste.

Belgium seemed on the brink of civil war with pro- and anti-royalist factions fighting in the streets in all the major towns. The dispute over the monarchy which had kept the country divided since the end of the war was reaching a boiling point.

Although the Dutch papers were still somewhat small and thin as a result of the shortage of newsprint, the editor of the Amsterdam *Volkskrant* gave front-page space to report the transfer of British footballer Neil Franklin to Columbia. The same page carried an announcement that the price of petrol would go up the following week and a leading article to the effect that a split in the West German Communist Party had led to the formation of a break-away "Titoist" Party.

At that time Ireland was already taking a great deal of interest in what was happening on the Continent. The *Irish Times* carried a leading article on the acquittal in Paris by a military tribunal of Rene Hardy, an ex-resistance fighter accused of supplying information to the Gestapo during the occupation. Hardy's acquittal naturally made the headlines in France and received equally prominent coverage in the Italian, Danish, and German press.

By 1950 Marshall Plan aid was in full swing, and according to reports in *Die Neue Zeitung*, an American paper printed in Germany, the reconstruction of Europe was making steady progress. The *Irish Times*, covering the same subject, proudly quoted a report from the Marshall Aid Administration in Washington that Ireland's industrial output had increased by 175 per cent between 1938 and 1949—a record figure, equaled only by Sweden (bottom of the list was Germany with an increase of only 81 per cent).

The *Frankfurter Allgemeine* reminded its readers that every day over 300 people fled from the Soviet occupied zone to West Germany. Among these refugees, the paper claimed, were a number of members of the communist *Volkspolizei* ("People's Police").



French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman—"a name totally unknown to the majority of Europeans who opened their daily papers that May 9 morning."

Fears about communism were also present in Britain where Tory MP Waldron Smithers denounced two members of the Labour Government as communist sympathizers and called for their resignations. The two accused, Emanuel Shinwell and John Strachey, both denied the accusation.

In Denmark the *Berlingske Tidende* devoted part of its front page to a report that the United States was now ready to provide France with financial and military aid for the war in Indochina. The same story received prominent coverage in the Italian press, where commentators argued that the sum of \$15 million offered by the United States to the French was rather small. The *Berlingske Tidende* also told its readers that Denmark had reached agreement in principle with its Scandinavian neighbors on the creation of a Scandinavian airline (now SAS).

Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the Washington press carried headlines on the Acheson-Bevin meeting scheduled for that day in London. The two leaders had a number of important items on the agenda, including ways to win the Cold War, a review of the postwar restriction placed on German industry, and "how to speed up the unification of Europe." On this last subject the major question was how far the United Kingdom could go in joining with the rest of Europe while still heading a Commonwealth and sterling bloc.

The same day, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that US demand for oil would rise 5.7 per cent that year and that the turbo-prop could provide a US reply to the challenge posed by foreign jet airliners.

But it was not all gloom and despondency. The papers, as always, had time and space for coverage of the lighter aspects of life. Sports news in particular was good copy. In Italy the press raved about Italy's victory in the doubles of the Davis Cup, while in Belgium the news was that football club Anderlecht had won the Belgium championship for the third time in postwar years. In Germany preparations were underway for the "bout of the year" between world heavyweight boxing champion Jersey Joe Walcott and the German challenger Hein Ten Hoff.

In Ireland the major talking point was a bill before the legislature proposing the development of Lough Erne for hydro-electricity. Both Ulster and Eire were to benefit. Back in Italy the populace was just recovering from the shock posed by the film "Manon" in which French actress Cecile Aubry scandalized audiences up and down the country by appearing in various stages of undress—not really the right thing for Holy Year.

Analogy: 1950 and 1975

An American View of the European Community's Past, Present, and Future

J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL, *Head of the US Mission to the European Communities, 1966-1972*

In certain ways 1975 resembles 1950. A quarter of a century ago Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet looked out upon a radically changed world. Conventional wisdom suggested no quarter to the vanquished, a reimposition of the established order, deference to conservative voices arguing against experimentation.

Yet Schuman and Monnet elected an audacious, imaginative approach and ignored the opposition their policies were bound to provoke. And they pursued their goals with utter tenacity.

As with all heroic endeavors, the process of European unity has been made up of high ambition, rhetoric, illusion, hard fact, and mistaken reality. The latter, the current tight focus on trivia and conflict, effectively hides the accomplishments.

This twenty-fifth anniversary calls both for honor to Schuman and Monnet for their great initiative, balanced assessment, and for a view longer than the journalistic attention to the Community's internecine, technical quarrels, the petty disputes, and mindless misunderstandings between America and Europe. Fallen again into confusion and some despair, we are in sore need of Monnet and Schuman's qualities of vision and courage.

US SUPPORT AND PARTNERSHIP

The several distinct phases of European Community evolution have conditioned the enthusiasm, expectations, and judgment of those outside. The Schuman Plan was conceived at the moment when America had at long last shed its national commitment to isolationism. The nation emerged from the war swelling with economic and military power, impressed less by the wreckage of a war-torn world than by the sense that all things were possible. The Schuman Plan was eminently congenial to this optimism. Congress, as Marshall Plan appropriations were debated, was a sounding board for American opinion; tirelessly it reiterated the advantages to Europe of greater unity. The idea of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) instantly appealed to American officials responsible for European reconstruction and recovery.

The sweep of the May 9 proposal, Monnet's decisive pursuit of the project, the speed with which the treaty was drafted and ratified reflected the creativity and energy of those years. Washington applauded the imagination that lay behind the Schuman initiative as a definitive move toward the reconciliation of France and Germany, as a first but giant step toward the development of Western Europe on a continental scale, as the seed from which some future United States of Europe might emerge. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's appointment of David Bruce as the first American diplomatic representative to the European Coal and Steel Community was, and was intended to be, tangible evidence of American support.

The diplomatic effort of Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, on behalf of the ill-fated European Defense and European Political Communities gave further proof of America's commitment to a strong and expanding Community. After

the Messina Conference and the subsequent development of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC), American interest took the form of assisting the Euratom "Wisemen" in drafting their report and then collaborating in the US-Euratom joint program. Had it not been for its political implications for Europe, this program would never have been conceived or executed.

President John F. Kennedy's speech in Philadelphia in 1962 was the culmination of this expansive phase. European unification seemed the wave of the future as negotiations between the British and the EC "Six" reached the final stages. A young President, leading a strong and confident country, could easily envision a partnership between the United States and a unified Europe.

The ebb tide in these affairs began with the French veto in 1963 of the British application and as the overt evidence of General Charles de Gaulle's opposition to the theory and structure of the Community accumulated. In addition de Gaulle moved against ECSC High Authority President Jean Monnet (left) receives credentials from the first American diplomatic representative to the European Coal and Steel Community, Ambassador David Bruce.



the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), generating the alliance's first major crisis. These actions had adverse side effects on America's heretofore clear line of support for European unity. Moreover, the nation's consensus on foreign policy, so carefully constructed in the postwar years, was being lost in Indochina. Apace with American disenchantment with foreign ventures, the bitter dispute among Europeans regarding the goals and shape of the Community further cooled American enthusiasm. As if this were not enough, nasty trade problems arose, such as the infamous "chicken war," and the persistent payments deficits of the United States led to ever sharper transatlantic argument.

The departure of General de Gaulle and the advent of Georges Pompidou introduced the third phase, what might be called the "slack tide," in the European movement. Gaullist dogmatism gave way to a certain pragmatism. The Community began again to make labored progress. And, finally, the British question seemed to be settled with the entry of the three new members in January 1973. The sense of a new beginning turned out to be premature. The energy and financial crisis of 1974 posed for Europe its greatest postwar challenge. Rather than a coherent, collective response, each country sought first the national solution. That year, 1974, produced the perfect anomaly: The more interdependent became the world, the more nationalistic became European policy.

OUTSIDE HOPES AND FEARS

These several phases and the current obscurity on just what Europe is to become encourage others to find a Community which matches their expectations or, more likely, coincides with their fears.

The failure of the Community to collapse as postulated by Marxist theory has frustrated the Soviet Union, although the Community's difficulties and its uncertain future encourage Moscow to delay formal recognition. While the Russians move slowly toward accepting the Community of the Treaties of Paris and Rome, they seem determined to do all within their power to discourage the emergence of any political or defense community.

The Chinese in their enthusiasm for European unity resemble the Americans of the Fifties. Peking urges Europe along, extolling the virtues of a strong Community, one able to withstand the pressures and influence of the two superpowers. The Chinese clearly have mastered their geopolitics; their diplomacy in this respect supports exactly their own national interests, and at minimal cost.

The impact on the developing countries has been mixed. Those favored by the Community, the former colonies, now signatories of the Lomé Convention, have good reason to be pleased. Meanwhile, other states maneuver and hope for improved or future benefits, barely containing the natural resent-




The author, Ambassador J. Robert Schaetzel (left), taking the oath of office September 21, 1966, as Head of the US Mission to the European Communities, from James W. Symington, chief of protocol. George W. Ball (center) was then Under Secretary of State.

ment of the blessed by the unblessed. But the Community has meant more than trade advantages and financial assistance. The economic union of the EC "Nine" has spurred interest in common markets in Central and South America, Africa, and South Asia, and led to requests of Commission officials for technical advice. The Community stands as the one major counter-force to the debilitating fragmentation of international economic and political life.

Among the industrialized countries outside—the neutrals, and others such as Norway, which chose a free trade relationship—as the unknown became known, fear of the Community abated. The association agreements avoided what otherwise would have led to the erection of new trade barriers within Europe. The policies and programs of the Community have not proven inimical to the interests of non-member Western European countries; indeed the slow and confused development of the Community seemed to vindicate those who had argued that non-members could enjoy most of the benefits, and without sacrifice of national sovereignty.

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's pursuit of Europe contrasts remarkably with Canada's thinly-veiled opposition during Britain's first negotiations for entry. The Canadian Government now sees the Community as the only viable alternative to almost total dependence on the United States. Chinese and Canadian policy show a curious parallelism: Each country sees the Community as the indispensable alternative to a world otherwise dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States.

A common thread runs through these reactions. The Community's essentially benign behavior combined with its internal dif-



President John F. Kennedy's 1962 speech in Philadelphia: "A young President, leading a strong and confident country, could easily envision a partnership between the United States and a unified Europe."

difficulties and labored growth have eased the earlier worries of others that an unpredictable if not revolutionary force had been set loose in Europe. Accordingly, no longer are efforts mounted to divide one Community member from another or to seek means of frustrating the already painfully slow process of unification.

CONSTRUCTIVE CURRENTS BENEATH US SKEPTICISM

American policy and American attitudes toward the Community were one more victim of the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate. A diminishing band of American supporters of European unity have had to fight both rising anti-internationalist sentiment and the image of a stagnant Community. The nation's foreign policy became bilateralistic and highly pragmatic.

Europe's lack of progress, said Washington, gave proof that integration ran against the grain of history; in any event, what

folly for Americans to display more enthusiasm for the Community than that of the European members themselves! Since 1968, perhaps since President Lyndon B. Johnson's last years in office, the US Government has been both skeptical and cynical; detached, rather than involved.

The public, confused and distracted by domestic and foreign crises, sensed this official reserve and paid scant attention to the Community. Periodic expression of annoyance with Europe by the President or the secretary of state nourished the public's latent conviction that America was being put upon by ungrateful and selfish foreigners—an instinctive throwback to the country's isolationist heritage. Reacting to earlier effusive expectations for Europe and swayed by a feeling of pervasive pessimism, Americans began to fear the adverse effects of a united Europe on America and its interests. The Government made little effort

to dispell these apprehensions.

It would be misleading to leave the story here. Constructive currents flow beneath the surface. America's skepticism and proximate hostility are not indelibly set, but derive more from preoccupation with other problems and the influence of official indifference. With only slight encouragement Americans incline to identify their own national experience, no matter how tenuous, with efforts across the Atlantic to create some form of European union.

Informed Americans know that the existence of the European Community inspired the Kennedy Round and that without the Community the negotiations would have failed. The pressure and positive influence of the Community have also been felt with respect to generalized tariff preferences for the developing countries. That Europe had such a plan in operation aided the Administration when it sought authority from Congress, in connection with the Trade Act of 1974, to launch a similar program.

AN INTERNATIONAL LABORATORY

It is well to dig deeper. Despite all the vicissitudes, the painfully slow progress, and the unglamorous face that the Community presents to the world, it remains one of the most significant and constructive developments of the postwar era.

Now, when economic phenomena have become of primary importance in man's affairs, the Community has shown how these issues can be dealt with on a collective basis. The political implications of the Community have been more subtle, less direct than the inevitable progression from economic to political unification optimistically forecast in 1950. Europe has demonstrated, nonetheless, that the habit of consultation and collaboration can grow, that political cooperation becomes a natural adjunct of economic union.

The Community has become an international laboratory illustrating the vital importance of supporting institutions, rules and procedures, and the willingness of the member states to be bound by these rules. The last 25 years have offered a negative lesson as well: the extraordinary difficulty of building a supranational structure through a democratic process; the stubborn, national resistance to the changes which must be wrought if a true community is to be constructed.

An American is bound to speculate anew on the broad significance of the Community to the United States. The analysis that led Kennedy to propose an Atlantic partnership seems even more valid today. A sense of American vulnerability has replaced the equally questionable postwar notion of its invincibility. America needs the talents, energy, and latent strength of 250 million Europeans organized in effective unity; it needs a Europe able to speak with one voice. The Lomé Convention showed conclusively that when the nine EC member states are determined to come together on a major issue the result need not be at the lowest common denominator, but can be a Com-

munity response at a high level of responsibility.

A functioning and growing Community is the most effective means of avoiding the dangers implicit in the consolidation and polarization of power between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such a world order would hold no real advantage for the United States.

Most current forces work against America's commitment to international responsibility and encourage nationalistic reactions. South Asia, energy and the Mideast, the uneasy equilibrium of relations with China and Russia—all work in this direction. The contraction of American foreign assistance shows the impact of these forces. Collaboration between the European Community and the United States as genuinely equal partners can reverse this dangerous course. If this positive European influence should be denied America through the stagnation or collapse of the integration movement, then it is entirely possible that US policy will become more irresponsible and neo-isolationist.

THE ANSWER AND QUESTION

Recent years have seen fundamental shifts in international economic power—the redistribution of reserves, new patterns of world trade, revaluation of currencies, dramatic movement in the supply and value of raw materials—and America's place in this scheme of things has fundamentally changed. But as long as Europe remains only partially organized, a vacuum is created and Washington will be tempted to fill it. Witness the Administration's aggressive assumption of leadership in organizing the policies of the energy consumers and in taking sole charge of the Israeli-Arab negotiations.

Europe stands awkwardly half in the past, half in the future—in part Nineteenth Century nation-states, in part brave, new Community. Only after enormous effort, and rarely, are common European views developed. This transitional period breeds misunderstanding and irritation; America resents a Europe which complains but does not act; Europe fumes at Washington when it preempts responsibilities and, through its bilateral manipulations, makes the development of common European policy even more difficult.

It is again a time of uncertainty. Once more there is great disparity, not of victor and vanquished, but of economic activity and prospect. In an ironic reversal of roles, today one sees an economically dominant Germany and a subordinate, inflation-ridden Britain. Disparities in 1975 are rates of inflation, unemployment, balance of payments, economic growth.

This evil imbalance, if uncorrected, can carry the same dangerous virus which Monnet and Schuman detected in 1950. The answer then was one of modern history's magnificent, generous gestures. The question is whether Western Europe has the vision to sense the analogy and respond with similar statesmanship.

Portugal Today

The European Community Misunderstands Its “Uneuropean” Neighbor, and Vice Versa

EDWARD BEHR, *European editor of Newsweek*

On April 25, exactly one year after the fall of the Caetano regime, the first free elections in 49 years were held in Portugal. Ninety-one per cent of the Portuguese electorate went to the polls to pick 247 deputies for a constituent assembly. The Socialist Party, headed by former Prime Minister Mario Soares, received 2.05 million votes, 37.8 per cent of the total. The Popular Democratic Party, comparable to West European Social Democrats, got 26.4 per cent of the vote. The Communist Party ran a surprisingly poor third with less than 13 per cent of the vote. There follows a background analysis of the political situation in Portugal, focusing on that country's relations with the rest of Europe.

When Portuguese army officers, after months if not years of careful plotting, finally overthrew the Caetano regime a year ago (April 25, 1974), Western Europe greeted the news with relief, optimism, and—it now appears—extraordinary *naïveté*.

Portugal had been under the thumb of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, then of Marcello Jose das Neves Alves Caetano, for 48 years. Under Salazar's rule, stability and caution had been the rule, hand in hand with a total sclerosis of all political life save the trappings needed to provide justification for a form of totalitarian rule that emphasized absolute obedience and subservience to Salazarist doctrine.

It was not, looking back on that far-from-lamented era, the worst kind of totalitarianism Europe has known: When Caetano fled, there were less than 200 political prisoners in Portuguese jails (there are many, many more now), and in the last years of the old regime some degree of tolerance for banned left-wing parties had become visible. Many political opponents were, of course, in exile. Mario Soares, the leading socialist, was in Paris; Alvaro Cunhal, the communist leader, in Prague. But the rank and file of the banned parties were, to some extent, left alone as long as they behaved themselves. I have talked to many communists in Portugal, since the coup, who have admitted that by taking certain elementary precautions they were able to live practically normal lives, even when their friends, their entourage, and presumably the dreaded *Policia Internacional e de DeFesa do Estado* (PIDE), the secret police, knew who they really were.

But the trouble with PIDE was that, toward the end of the Salazar-Caetano era, it simply didn't know where to turn. The regime was, despite appearances, slowly coming apart at the seams. Rumors of plots just prior to April 25, 1974, were so pervasive that it was impossible for PIDE to plug all the holes.

As with nearly all dictatorships, this one came to a sticky end because dictators, it seems, simply can't devise realistic methods for transmitting and prolonging their personal power. Salazar was no exception, and Caetano, despite half-hearted attempts at liberalism, failed to effect any credible transition to a more representational kind of government.

Future historians will have plenty of fun tracing the course of Salazarism, and in present-day Portugal the old regime is referred to much as pre-Mao China is referred to in Peking today. This is an absurd simplification, of course: In the past 10 years a large middle and lower middle class has enjoyed, for the first time, standards of living comparable to those of the rest of Europe. Although huge wealth was in the hands of the famous “200 families” (perhaps only 75), Portugal did not stand completely still.

THE HIDDEN FACE

Where Salazarism—and Caetanism—stand condemned with no possibility of appeal is in their barren neglect of some of Portugal's real needs. Salazar, a miser, a fundamentally mean accountant of a man, turned a blind eye to the development needs of the rural areas. By deliberately keeping the countryside ignorant and at a low level of political awareness, he hoped to keep the whole country quiet. A mere hour's drive from Lisbon there are villages with no electricity, no drains, and only dirt track roads. By making a mockery of so-called democratic procedures, he brought about a state of affairs where, until the elections to the legislative assembly on April 25 this year, no Portuguese under the age of 70 had ever taken part in a real election. He amassed a neat egg of gold and foreign reserves but in the process compelled Portuguese workers to seek their fortunes abroad. In an obsession for keeping prices down, he turned Portuguese agriculture into the most inefficient and backward in Europe.

But because Portugal remained a relatively cheap summer playground, with a modern hotel infrastructure, no shortage of domestic help, and a wide range of every conceivable type of imported luxury goods, the foreigners who holidayed there seldom saw the hidden face of Portugal. European and American businessmen, in their dealings with the Portuguese “200 families,” were agreeably surprised by the sophisticated, urbane

The author, Edward Behr (right), at the Paris office of Newsweek. Behr's journalism career was interrupted 1954-56, when, at Jean Monnet's request, Behr became chief spokesman for the European Coal and Steel Community's (ECSC) High Authority and then opened the ECSC London office.



Portuguese entrepreneurs—and attracted by the then low wage structure and total ban on strikes. Even PIDE officials, closely cooperating with counter-intelligence services of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers, came across as civilized, moderate, reassuring individuals, in the opinion of several European intelligence officials.

Beneath this facade, of course, Portugal was quietly simmering, and perhaps the most neglected of all the social categories silently plotting against the Salazar-Caetano state were the military men. In the pre-coup days, they seemed, to their NATO allies, no different from officers of other European countries: Affable, fluent in French and English, many attended with success various courses in the United States or other NATO countries. They learned to fly American jets, to carry out complicated naval surveys. But it was remarkable that no Western embassy in Lisbon—prior to April 25, 1974—really discovered what the officers were up to.

What they became, and what they are now, is again, in great part, to be laid at Salazar's door. There's a tenable theory that had Salazar not been so pathologically mean with his army, his officers would never have turned into secretly plotting radicals of the far left. Having all his life resisted attempts to improve officers' pay and living conditions, Salazar was compelled to widen recruitment: Upper middle class and aristocratic families were no longer attracted by military service. They far preferred to make fortunes by the relatively easy exploitation of their "establishment" connections.

So, increasingly over the last 20 years, the armed forces in Portugal became the preserve of a new class: Impoverished, lower middle class, the breed of officers who carried out the coup which sent Caetano scurrying to Brazil were influenced, above all, by the colonial war they had been forced to wage in Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea and by the conditions under which they had had to wage it. Horrified at the expense of it all but unable to cut the colonial umbilical cord, Salazar and then Caetano, had kept the Portuguese expeditionary force in Africa on a tight financial rein. Not for them the rotations of the US forces in Vietnam—but long, uncomfortable years in the African boondocks. No privileged technological weaponry or status of authority—which the French military men had at least had in Algeria—but a nasty colonial war on the cheap, leading nowhere except toward the Portuguese officers' learning at first hand the doctrine of the insurgents they were supposed to fight.

If Waterloo was won, as the cliché has it, on the playing fields of Eton, the Portuguese revolution was thought out in the jungles and swamps of Africa. There Portuguese officers discovered, for the first time, the new world which had passed them by in Portugal itself. The doctrines of the African insurgents in Portuguese-held African territories became, by a process difficult to define, the doctrine of the Portuguese army whose role it was



Bank employees demonstrate on a rainy March 14 in Lisbon in favor of the Government's nationalization of the commercial banking system.

officially to fight against the rebels. Time and again, Portuguese army officers have described how, studying insurgents' documents, organization, and literature, they came to realize that the insurgents were closer to them in outlook than their own leaders at home.

It must have been a curious, odd experience. And it was accelerated by the fact that unlike Algeria—where the French army did at least virtually win the war on the ground before being compelled to pull out because Charles de Gaulle realized that only a political solution would do—the Portuguese army in Africa never did win a significant victory. Victims of a “forgotten” and hopeless war and subject to long spells of virtual exile, the Portuguese officers in Africa began to view Portugal through different eyes. In studying the left-wing, nationalist, anti-colonialist beliefs of the insurgents, the officers became fascinated with “Third World” problems and doctrines which—they saw with some justification—might become applicable to Portugal itself.

MARX AND THE CENTURIANS

Hand in hand with this gradual *prise de conscience* of the Third World was an almost total ignorance of what the rest of Western

Europe was up to. The officers who later formed the nucleus of the MFA (the Armed Forces Movement, which now virtually rules Portugal through the “Revolutionary Council”) had, and to a large extent still have, totally distorted views about Europe and the United States.

Since, by and large, the rest of Europe was “capitalist,” they tended to believe that the capitalism of Western Europe was similar to the capitalism they lived under in Portugal—a backward, monopolistic kind of capitalism which would never, for one moment, have been tolerated in present-day Britain, France, Italy, or the Federal German Republic. Since European and US firms seemed to be on such cosy terms with Portuguese capitalists, the officers could only infer that conditions were the same everywhere.

Another aspect of the Portuguese officers' budding social consciousness in the years leading up to April 25, 1974, was their own political innocence: “For a long time,” says one serving officer, “our bedside book was Jean Larteguy's *The Centurions*. It's possible that it was the only work of fiction many of my fellow officers ever read.” Larteguy's *Centurions* plus Karl Marx—such was the somewhat inadequate intellectual foundation of many, in the political field at least.

Portuguese commando soldiers in Lisbon after the abortive March 11 coup.



Currently, MFA thinking about Portugal's relations with the rest of Western Europe is based on twin principles: One is that Portugal is, if not part of, then at least associated with the fortunes of, not Europe but the Third World. Such an opinion may be misguided and false, and may in the long run prove untenable, but it's what the leaders of the ruling Revolutionary Council believe. For an answer to current Portuguese problems, then, it's no use hoping that by some miraculous process the army junta is overnight going to change its tune and become part of Europe. To the junta leaders, an example of the successful tackling of problems of underdevelopment lies not in Italy but in Algeria.

The other principle is a deep, almost pathological distrust of European "liberalism" and a complete ignorance of the advanced social mechanisms whereby the rest of Europe, Spain excepted, dealt with its own social problems. Time and again, in conversation with MFA members, it becomes clear: that they have no notion of what the aims and practices of the European Community really are; that they are unaware of the existence of any antitrust laws in Europe or the United States; that they assume the pattern of capitalism familiar to them in Portugal is the one prevalent in the rest of Western Europe.

In the intervening months since the original anti-Caetano coup, little has happened to eradicate some of the MFA's basic misconceptions about Europe—and responsibility lies with the rest of Europe as well as with the MFA's own blinkered blindness. True, British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan went to Portugal, as did EC Commission Vice President Christopher Soames. But the Portuguese leaders they spent most time with were not MFA men but civilian politicians, and part of the MFA's present hang-up is that it is almost as suspicious of its own civilian politicians as it is of Western foreign powers. True, Major Melo Antunes planned at long last to spend a couple of days in West Germany in May—but only because he has become Portugal's foreign minister.

It's my personal opinion that, in the last year, the EC "Nine" have let slip an opportunity to acquaint the MFA with the true, more creditable facts of life concerning the Community and Western Europe as a whole. The possibility was particularly good in France; for to many Portuguese, French is a second language, and the French press is read with considerable care. Now it may well be too late: Many MFA leaders have become habitués of Bucharest and Moscow, where they have been given VIP treatment.

A PAULINE CONVERSION

From a public relations point of view, Western Europe missed the boat with the MFA, for a variety of reasons: a refusal to take the army men seriously, a natural distaste for dealing with anything smacking of an army junta, or simply lack of imagination. But just as some Labour ministers in Britain achieved a sort of

Pauline conversion when confronted with certain EC realities, so it's just possible that (had the situation been properly exploited) some of the bogeys and misconceptions about Europe harbored by the MFA might have been at least attenuated. Western foreign ministers were, as usual, slow to act. The MFA personalities were not, until very recently, at all well known. They were not the sophisticated, "in" figures that Western politicians love to rub shoulders with.

In addition, the "Nine," to say nothing of the United States, completely underestimated the militancy of the MFA. "We have finally had to acknowledge that this is a real revolution," says one of Portugal's most attractive and sophisticated political leaders.

The divorce between the Portuguese MFA on the one hand and the rest of Europe on the other was exacerbated by the consequences of the March 11 coup. Until then, the "moderates" within the MFA had successfully resisted demands by the extreme radicals that the banks and the insurance companies be nationalized. Then, as an understandable but solely political means of retaliation, the banks and insurance companies were nationalized after the March 11 coup, and the consequences are still not fully understood.

For one thing, Portuguese banks and insurance companies, intertwined and linked in various trusts, did to a large extent control the whole economic life of the country, so that by nationalizing them, the Revolutionary Council has also nationalized companies and industries of all kinds. It's significant, for instance, that the banks or the insurance companies owned almost all of Portugal's newspapers and magazines. They have been nationalized, so that today only the highly respected, independent weekly *Expresso*, the afternoon daily *Republica*, and a small paper called *January One* remain outside the MFA's direct control.

The more radical MFA leaders have two obsessions in their analysis of the Portuguese situation and search for historical parallels—Chile and Cuba. Again, this may be untenable, misguided, and false. But just as it's impossible for an analyst to convince a deeply depressed patient that he has no reason for depression, what with a sizeable income, a loving wife, a happy home, and all the material possessions imagined at his disposal, so it's impossible to eradicate the MFA's emotional conviction that somehow the rest of the world, and in particular the United States, is out to "get" Portugal. In vain does one point out to radical MFA officers that there is no large-scale US investment in Portugal on the Chilean pattern and dismiss as grotesque Portuguese fears that a Cuba-type embargo may occur.

The bank nationalizations may indeed result, however, in a de facto embargo of a whole range of European goods; for, understandably, the wave of nationalizations struck fear in the minds of all European exporters to Portugal. These days all exporters, whether dealing in West German machinery or French

perfume, require payment in advance in the form of letters of credit deposited in the banks of the exporting country of origin. Since few Portuguese importers are able to meet such requirements, the long-term consequence may well be a drying-up of imports into Portugal.

This in itself is not entirely a bad thing, since Portugal is living way beyond its means, and some luxury imports are bound to suffer in any case. But the danger is that Portugal's essential imports may suffer too. Already, there's talk of possible food rationing next year or in 1977. But more important still, such a virtual embargo—caused not by government policy but by private entrepreneurs' fear—may well increase even further the gulf between Portugal and the rest of Europe. And since Portugal needs a massive injection of loans, whether from commercial banks or the World Bank, to catch up with the rest of Europe, it's obvious that the present reluctance to risk any kind of capital in Portugal is going to aggravate already serious economic problems.

TRAGICOMIC MISUNDERSTANDING

In this context, what can the European Community and/or its individual member countries do—not just to “help” Portugal but to keep European links with a country which has undergone such profound change in such a short time?

In the first place, the EC Nine should stop looking at Portugal with emotional overtones. It's easy, for Christian Democrats elsewhere in Europe, to feel a sense of indignation at the banning of the Portuguese Christian Democrat Party, especially on the flimsy grounds invoked; it's tempting for the West German Socialists to see in Mario Soares a Willy Brandt; it's almost ir-

resistible for the French left to see in the present rivalry between the Portuguese Communist Party and the Portuguese Socialists a re-enactment of the struggles and disputes which are presently a feature of the disunited French left.

True, the political language of men like Soares is sensible, profoundly “European,” imbued with Western European values; but while the Nine should never write off the Portuguese civilian democratic leaders, there must be, among Western European governments, a realization that for the time being at least power is in the hands of the Revolutionary Council. The worst thing European leaders could do would be to ostracize the MFA still further by encouraging the civilian politicians in Portugal to resist the MFA, or plot against it with European connivance.

Rather, it's conceivable that the MFA, given the necessary time and no more severe emotional jolts, may shed some of its romantic illusions and of its own accord turn to the rest of Europe for possible help in solving some of its problems. The MFA leaders may, some of them, entertain wildly fanciful ideas about the nature of Europe. But they are also pragmatic, eminently practical military men who tend to respond to the commonsensical approach. They only now are beginning to realize just how intractable some of the problems facing them are. A dispassionate explanation, at the highest level, as to how Western Europe has been tackling similar problems for years might be a first step in attempting to heal a tragicomic misunderstanding between passionately concerned left-wing military revolutionaries and the governments of the Nine, which expected, with little basis, that overnight Portugal would become a parliamentary democracy and then a possible candidate for EC membership.

Spring comes to Lisbon.



European Etiquette

Emily Post Would Throw Up Hands in Dismay

KEES MIDDELHOFF, editor of Radio Nederland Wereldomroep

Tell me how he eats his soup, and I will tell you what part of Europe he comes from. What could unite Europeans better than sharing the same meal? But in so doing, the diners reveal exactly where they are from just by the way they eat.

The subtle differences in eating soup find, for instance, a Dane, with hardly concealed astonishment, observing his German or English table companion, who delicately raises his soup bowl so as not to miss even the last drop. At the very most, will the Frenchman at the table realize to his great surprise that to raise one's plate before the last spoonful is not a barbarism just because the Dane doesn't do it either?

Further observation of this table of Europeans reveals that the Dane puts the widest part of his spoon into his mouth, as does the German (so long as there are no noodles in the soup) while the Frenchman puts the spoon into his mouth from the front. The Englishman hesitates for a moment, since in his home, which is his castle, the shape of the spoon is generally round.



But hesitation is unusual for the Englishman, who normally starts right away on his soup without waiting for the others to be served. The others at the table, particularly the Dutchman, are initially offended by the Englishman's impoliteness. Then they dismiss this unpleasant thought and remember the difficult times that Albion experienced when he was hungry. But, in fact, the Englishman has been extremely polite, for in Britain waiting to eat is considered an insult to the host as the meal would get cold. The Dane sincerely accepts this practical reasoning of hospitality, and the others make note of the distinguishing ritual.

MULTINATIONAL MARRIAGES

"When in Rome, do as the Romans do." The familiar American adage of respecting and even adopting the customs and etiquette of others when in their home becomes difficult to apply in an increasingly united Europe. Multinational marriages provide a good example.




Assume that a Norwegian woman marries a Frenchman. The French fiancé is likely to show up at the ceremony wearing a dark suit or tuxedo, while the Norwegian bride's father finds it proper to wear a simple jacket. The same is true in the case of a Spanish bridegroom and his Swedish father-in-law.

In order to avoid trouble with in-laws on or after the wedding day, the participants should pay particular attention to the following: In Italy and France the bride enters the church holding her father's right arm. The groom, holding his mother's left arm, follows the bride. In England the father escorts his daughter to the altar, where the prospective bridegroom waits impatiently on the left.

A marriage between a Belgian and a Dutch person often creates misunderstandings on the wedding day. In the Netherlands, a bride and bridegroom lead a wedding procession to the town hall or church. In Belgium they close off the streets for the wedding party. The groom and his mother drive in the next-to-last car and the bride and her father in the last. A Norwegian guest should not consider it disrespectful, or impolite, for all the members of the families to fall into each others' arms (as if impatience has truly reached its limit) as soon as the marriage vows are said.

Nine months or whatever after a Spanish wedding, a note announcing the birth of a boy or girl should not prompt a spontaneous visit to the mother's hospital bedside, so often the case in Holland. The door would be closed.

In order to call on someone, it is necessary to be familiar with local customs. Norwegians, for example, should not unexpectedly drop in on someone in the romance countries. In Italy, don't arrive before 4:00 p.m., which is the end of the siesta, even if you have already informed the host of your visit. In Spain, never be punctual, but always be late; otherwise, you will be considered early. Norwegians don't appreciate someone showing up a



half hour before expected. Unlike in the Northern Pyrenees, where it is considered to be an honest and sincere gesture to bring flowers for the hostess, in the Southern Pyrenees, a gift of flowers will give the master of the house the wrong idea and a subsequently sleepless night for fear of other advances.

TO KISS OR NOT TO KISS

In paying compliments, you can do so to your heart's content in France, but be much more careful in Austria, and remember not to overdo it in Germany. The same holds true for walking arm in arm. In Germany, it is considered impolite for a man not to offer his arm to a lady to help her across the street safely. But a German should not risk doing the same thing in England, where it is considered too intimate for public view.

In other European "street" manners, the man always takes off his hat to greet a lady, except in England, where the man must first wait for a sign of acknowledgement from the lady before taking the risk of showing his bare head.

In France—a disappointment for Northern Europeans—one does not kiss a young lady's hand. In Italy it is improper to kiss a married woman's hand, while in Spain, married women would be shocked at the idea. In Austria, the lips should gently brush against a woman's hand.

People never stop shaking hands in France but not in the same way as in the Netherlands, where the handshake (which can practically dislocate a person's shoulder) is considered the

greatest sign of friendship. Anglo-Saxons, on the contrary, do not shake hands for a very long time, just long enough to be considered a friendly, courteous gesture, as they are more reserved and more "clean" than anywhere else in Europe.

And now, to the cardinal and delicate subject of who passes first, the man or the woman, through a department store or hotel revolving door. In Italy, Norway, and Spain, the man puts the door in motion (without much effort, of course) and then stands aside to allow the woman to enter first. In Belgium, Germany, England, France, and the Netherlands, the man goes in first, in the hope, of course, that the woman will glide through the revolving door. Danes do not make a big fuss one way or the other.

More complicated still is the European way of going up or down a staircase. In the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, England, and Norway, it is perfectly natural for a man to precede a woman when going upstairs. In France and Switzerland (perhaps because of mountainclimbing?), women quietly go upstairs first. Going downstairs, women generally go first, except in France and Switzerland, unless the stairs are too steep. In this case the man can always, as a safety precaution, break her fall.

We could go on and on. . . .



FROM ANOTHER WORLD

Etiquette always makes the author think of the refined Dutch woman who found that the corner of the Frenchman's visiting card was turned down. She pinched the upper right hand corner between her fingers and bent back the card so that it was once again perfectly smooth and then let out a fastidious sigh of relief. She had absolutely no idea that the French always bend the upper right hand corner when they personally leave visiting cards.

Community News



For the youth in Europe today, all these manners, customs, and rules of etiquette are from another world. The funny thing is that they actually do come from another world—the Arab world. The West's entire system of compulsory rules of conduct (unconsciously applied) can be traced back to post-Crusade medieval courts, where rules per se were applied as a rite.

During the Renaissance, these rules were adopted by all "high" society. After the French Revolution, the European bourgeoisie also wanted to play small masters in their own domain. Thus, before World War I, etiquette booklets were published for the European bourgeois so that he could learn how to act the proper bourgeois. If the rules in this era were devised as a means of distinguishing the various social classes, most of the mannerisms associated with one class or another have disappeared, as social classes have become less stratified.

In today's Europe of greater equality, these rules have evolved into a simple sign of good manners, despite the present deemphasis on manners. As Louis XVI once said, "We play the game of grace on a volcano about to erupt, and we practice good breeding with the scaffold in view."

Over the years and through two world wars, Europe has come to realize, at its own expense, its failures in human relations. It has now come to understand that authenticity is much sounder than etiquette in playing society's games. Given man's limitations, however, good human relations still need acceptable and thus communicable forms for external expression.

Take as an example the most elementary side of human encounter. The European can always take off his hat, nod his head, bow, shake hands, or embrace. Rather than consulting a manual, Europeans today are more interested in relying on their own intuition to decide the appropriate gesture that comes most naturally to them.

US-EC Relations

American, European Legislators Meet

Twelve members of the US House of Representatives, led by Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) and Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.), arrived in Brussels April 11 for the seventh meeting in the biannual series of parliamentary exchanges between the US Congress and the European Parliament.

The American delegation visited the EC Commission with Head of the US Mission to the European Communities Joseph A. Greenwald. They met with the Commissioner Petrus J. Lardinois, Commission Vice President Christopher Soames, and Commission Vice President Henri Simonet.

Following their two-day stop-

over in Brussels, the U.S. congressmen traveled to Munich where, through April 16, they discussed current issues affecting US-EC relations.

The agenda focused on the following points:

- political developments in Europe;
- the possibilities for an international code of good conduct for multinationals;
- consequences for the Community and the United States following political developments in Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain;
- international monetary, trade, energy, and economic developments.

British Cabinet's EC Stance Welcomed

The United States "welcomes the British Cabinet's decision to recommend continued United Kingdom membership of the European Community," according to a US State Department spokesman, Robert Funseth, at a news conference in Washington on March 19.

Funseth noted that the US posi-

tion was "in keeping with our consistent support for closer cooperation in Europe," but that the decision to remain in the Community "is, of course, a matter for the British people."

On April 9, the House of Commons voted in favor of continued EC membership (see page 22).

US Senators Visit US Brussels Mission

The United States needs a viable European Community to help maintain an economically stable Western Europe, commented US Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) and Hugh Scott (R-Penn.) at a March 28 Brussels news conference.

Eight US Senators, led by Humphrey, Scott, and Jacob K. Javits (R-NY), stopped in Brussels over Easter recess on a European tour concerned with Atlantic alliance

issues. There they met with US Ambassador to the European Community Joseph A. Greenwald and top US officials from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for general briefings on the current status of the American role in Europe.

At the press conference held at the US Mission, the Senators expressed their hope that the British people would vote to remain in the European Community in the

coming June referendum. While in Brussels the group also met with Supreme Allied Commander General Alexander Haig.

Focusing primarily on military and security issues, the Senators' European tour took them from Brussels to Berlin, Bonn, Vienna,

and Madrid. During the course of their trip the Senators heard representatives of US delegations at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) report on the latest developments.

Brandt: US Support for EC Essential

"It is especially now that the European Community needs support, not only from within itself but also from outside," according to former German Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Speaking at Vanderbilt University during a March visit to the United States, Brandt said, "The political and economic unification of Western Europe is hardly thinkable if the United States does not support the process."

He stressed that Europe and the United States have identical interests, though often take different positions on issues.

Brandt also spoke of the need for more democracy in the world—"in the sense of individual and mutual responsibility"—and said: "Nobody . . . who is willing to stand up for freedom, justice, and equality . . . should be excluded from the construction of a socially sound Europe."

External Relations

Council Reviews Mediterranean Policy

Continuing delays in concluding trade agreements with five Mediterranean countries—Israel, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Spain—were subject of discussion by the EC Council of Ministers meeting in Luxembourg April 14.

Only the substance of the agreement with Israel has been finalized, and the EC foreign ministers pledged to take the necessary steps for it to enter into force on July 1. Concerning the other agreements, it was agreed to speed up internal proceedings

where a dispute has arisen among EC member states over agricultural concessions and adaptations of the EC policies on canned fruit and vegetables, wine, and potatoes.

The Council would like to see the negotiations with the Maghreb countries concluded "with all possible speed," and consequently agriculture ministers who met in Luxembourg the following day immediately took an initial look at the problem.

EC Commission President Visits India

Discussions on EC-India economic relations and their future development highlighted Commission President François-Xavier Ortoli's April 18-26 trip to India.

Traveling at the invitation of the Indian Government, Ortoli met with Indian President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and held talks with the ministers of external affairs,

agriculture, finance, industry, commerce, and energy.

In his talks with Indian leaders, Ortoli stressed the Community's effort to deepen and diversify its

relations with India, and he participated in an exchange of views on the possibilities of greater economic and commercial cooperation between the two countries.

EC-India Textile Agreement Reached

India is the first country to reach an accord with the Community under the 1974 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) multifibers arrangement.

The bilateral textiles agreement was initiated in Brussels on April

19. The arrangement aims to provide for the orderly growth of trade in all textiles.

Textile negotiations with Pakistan, Hong Kong, and Korea are underway, and others are in preparation.

Food and Development Aid

EC Humanitarian Aid for Vietnamese

Following the EC Council's April 14 approval of drafts for emergency aid measures to Vietnam, the Commission took immediate steps to begin implementation of its relief operations, the total cost of which is expected to amount to 1.13 million units of account (UA). (One UA equals one 1970 dollar.)

Intended for the Vietnamese populations in territories where the need is greatest, regardless of political control, the first stage of Community aid comprises 100 tons of powdered milk and 1,000 tons of rice to be distributed

by the Red Cross, 590 tons of powdered milk through the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and financial aid grants totaling UA 300,000 for the purchase and transportation of sugar and medicine.

In addition, the nine EC member states have agreed on the principle to coordinate their bilateral aid, so long as this does not slow down deliveries of the assistance, and to begin preparations for a second stage of Community aids, for UA 2-3 million.

Lomé Convention Begins and Expands

The inaugural meeting of the EC-ACP Interim Committee was held in Brussels on April 11 under the chairmanship of Somalian Ambassador Mohamed Omar Giama and Ambassador Brendan Dillon, Ireland's Permanent EC Representative.

The committee was set up to bring about a satisfactory start to implementing the Lomé Convention, signed in February between the Community and 44 developing countries of Africa, the Carib-

bean, and the Pacific (ACP). The trade and aid pact's trade provisions will come into effect on July 1, in advance of the financial aid and cooperation provisions which must await full ratification by all the signatories.

The forty-fifth signature was added to the ACP side of the Lomé Convention on April 10 when Seydou Keita, Ambassador from the Republic of Guinea (Conakry), signed on behalf of his Government.

Economy

Gloomy Outlook for EC Steel Industry

The latest EC Commission estimates of supply and demand in 1975 indicate an economic downturn of crisis proportions in the Community's steel industry.

Consumption is expected to drop by 2 million tons, exports to fall by 4 million, and production to fall by 9 million. These drops are expected to occur because consumers run down existing stocks rather than buy new supplies and because imports are expected to rise somewhat. The steel industry is only forecast to be working at 75 percent of ca-

capacity this year. The production drop will represent a 6 percent cut in output.

The trend is already becoming apparent in the actual statistics: EC production in January and February this year, which stood at 24.34 million tons, constituted a 5.3 percent fall compared with the same period of 1974.

The Commission is studying the day-to-day developments in the steel market and is holding consultations so that measures to counter production decline can be adopted if necessary.

Shorter Hours Add to Unemployment

As if the European unemployment situation were not bad enough (as high as 8.2 percent in Ireland), figures recently released by the EC Commission on the basis of national figures show alarming trends in short-time working.

In the United Kingdom it is estimated that the amount of persons working shorter hours was equivalent in December to an additional 25,000 persons wholly unemployed, of whom there are

currently 750,000. In the Netherlands the estimate was 9,500 on top of around 200,000 unemployed.

The increases in short-time working in the member states during the last year were: Belgium, 203 percent; Germany, 812 percent; France, 266 percent; Ireland, 312 percent; Italy, 30 percent; Netherlands, 704 percent; Britain (not including Ulster), 625 percent. Figures for Denmark, Luxembourg, and Northern Ireland were not available.

Auto Industry Gets Commission Action

With the European car industry severely hit by rising labor and raw material costs and a big consumer demand drop, the EC Commission held April talks with producer and trade union representatives in hopes of achieving mutual agreement on the different policies to be followed by the member states.

While market and production conditions for the United States look more favorable for the last

part of 1975, Western Europe will probably register a continuing fall-off in demand and a drop of about 100,000 cars in production compared to the previous year, according to Commission estimates.

Only Germany may be able to improve overall production rates by the end of the year, if orders for the luxury cars of Daimler Benz continue to recover. But Volkswagen, faced with major losses in

the export market of the United States, has already scrapped plans for a new factory in the United States and reduced its work force by one-fifth in releasing 25,000 workers.

The Commission, meanwhile, has adopted the position of safeguarding employment in the short term, such as putting more personnel on part-time, and altering production structures in the medium term. Although the Commission favors a more aggressive

policy of car exports, it has ruled out state aids in the form of export subsidies so that domestic and Community markets can be kept on an equal basis.

Trade unionists have called for a restructuring of the European transport market, including more highly developed systems of public transport. (See *European Community* No. 185, pages 13-15, for further discussion of Europe's auto industry.)

EC Has Highest and Lowest Inflation

Inflation in Italy rose from 19.1 per cent to 23.3 per cent in the period from February 1974 to February 1975, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Prices in Britain rose by 19.8 per cent in the same period, after a 16 per cent rise the year before.

Of the 24 OECD member countries, Germany has the lowest inflation rate—5.8 per cent—and Iceland the highest—53.7 per cent.

Social Policy

Commission Program for Work Safety

Guidelines for an EC program on safety, hygiene, and health protection at work were proposed by the Commission in April.

Currently around 100,000 people die and 12 million are injured on the job in the Community each year. In Germany, for example, 30 percent of all fatal accidents occur at work. Quite apart from the human cost involved, such accidents are reckoned to have an annual economic cost of over 15 billion units of account (UA). (One UA equals one 1970 dollar.)

The goals of the Commission program are to achieve concerted action among member

states, development of coordinated research, improvement of statistics, improved training and teaching, increased union and employer involvement in accident protection, promotion of safety and health protection in businesses, and development of special approaches for certain categories of workers, such as immigrants.

An EC consultative committee, on which the Commission, employers, and unions are represented, would supervise implementation of specific measures suggested by the Commission.

Council Adopts Consumer Action Plan

The Community's first four-year consumer action program was given the go-ahead by the EC

Council of Ministers meeting April 14-15 in Luxembourg. The program aims to improve the quality

of life for European consumers on five fronts:

- effective protection against risks to the health or safety of consumers;
- effective protection against threats to the economic interests of consumers;
- compensation for damages and appropriate aid and advice in obtaining compensation;
- education of consumers through keeping them informed;
- consultation and representation of consumers when decisions affecting them are being prepared.

Highlighted for priority action are better protection and safety

rules for food, cosmetics, detergents, tools, consumer durables, automobiles, textiles, toys, dangerous substances, objects which come into contact with food products, medicinal preparations, fertilizers, pesticides, and veterinary products. Other priority actions include harmonized conditions for consumer credit and consumer protection against misleading advertising; more widespread publicity on consumer protection and studies on systems of aid, advice, and channels for complaints in member states. Consumer organizations expressed "delight" at the adoption of the program.

Energy

EC Stake in Petrodollar Safety Net

The European Community will be the biggest single contributor to the "safety net" fund set up under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to help countries which have balance of payments deficits brought on by the higher oil prices and which have exhausted all other sources of credit.

EC members will be liable for 43.3 percent of the fund's 20 billion special drawing rights (SDR).

But they will also be entitled to unlimited loans when in need, although the higher the credit, the more stringent the economic strings attached are likely to be.

Of the 8.7 billion SDR's supplied by the Community, 2.5 billion SDR's will be from Germany, 1.7 from France, 1.6 from the United Kingdom, 1.4 from Italy, 0.6 from the Netherlands, 0.5 from Belgium/Luxembourg, 0.24 from Denmark, and 0.12 from Ireland.

EC Council Focuses on Raw Materials

Framing a common policy on raw materials and their role in relations with developing countries was considered "a matter of urgency" by EC foreign ministers at their Council meeting in Luxembourg April 14.

The ministers asked their EC permanent representatives to continue working out a joint policy on this issue, which was to be the subject of discussion at a num-

ber of forthcoming meetings, such as the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Commodity Committee, and a United Nations (UN) Special Assembly. The Council said that EC member states should engage in close coordination at Community level on their positions at such meetings.

Agriculture

Fisheries Policy Under Scrutiny

At their April 15 Luxembourg meeting the EC Council of Agricultural Ministers solicited Commission proposals for remedying some of the problems occurring in the fishing industry as a result of surpluses, low prices, and rising costs.

The ministers also said they would consider the effects on the EC fisheries policy of the United Nations (UN) Conference on the Law of the Sea. A British state-

ment called attention to the need to adapt the EC common fisheries policy to the potential problems which would arise if the UN conference, currently meeting in Geneva, agrees on extension of fishing limits worldwide to 200 miles.

This would mean that the Community's deep-sea fishermen would lose access to many of their traditional waters and the Community's own zone could become overcrowded.

Council Ends French-Italian Wine War

French borders were opened again to Italian wine exports following an April 15 meeting of the EC Council of Ministers for Agriculture. At the same time the EC Commission dropped plans for taking France to the European Court of Justice for a breach of the Common Market Treaty.

Borders had been closed March 28 under pressure from French wine producers upset by the glut and low prices caused by two bumper harvests in a row. Demonstrating farmers had pressured the French Government into action, it claimed, in the interests of law and order.

The EC Council recognized the difficulties in the wine sector and agreed on additional distillation into industrial alcohol of surplus quantities. During the period June

7 to July 31—or any other 55-day period in countries where these dates pose problems—distilleries will be permitted to process as much wine as capacity permits at an intervention price guaranteed by the Community. France is also to be allowed to introduce subsidized storage of excess Italian table wine already inside the country—approximately 1.5 million hectolitres of Italian wine bought by French merchants.

Having dealt with the short-term problems, the Council adopted a resolution on future policy with a view to putting a brake on the expansion of wine growing. Measures to regulate planting are to be adopted by August 1. Currently production in the Community is growing faster than consumption.

Member States

British MP's Vote to Stay in Europe

The House of Commons voted 396 to 170 in favor of continued British membership in the Euro-

pean Community on April 9.

The vote followed a three-day debate on the British Govern-

ment's "White Paper," which argued the Government's case for staying in the Community (see *European Community* No. 185, page 11). The White Paper detailed the results of the Community's March 10-11 Dublin

meeting in which terms for continued British membership were "renegotiated."

The British people themselves will now decide whether or not to remain in the Community in a referendum scheduled for June 5.

Scheel Calls for EC Constitution

German President Walter Scheel has called on the EC member states to adopt a constitution "to be the basis for a common foreign and economic policy and a common defense."

Speaking in Paris in late April

on his first official foreign visit as president, Scheel warned that unless Europe adopts common solutions to the problems it faces, the problems would soon become a matter of "life or death" for the Continent.

European Community periodically lists books dealing with Community and Atlantic topics. Prices are also given when known. This presentation does not indicate approval or recommendation of these publications, which can be purchased or ordered from most booksellers.

US Trade in the Sixties and Seventies: Continuity and Change.

Edited by Kenneth Jameson and Roger Skurski. Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1974. 137 pages with notes and tables. \$12.50.

A revised and updated compilation of papers presented at the conference on "Emerging International Trade Patterns of the United States," held at the University of Notre Dame, April 1973.

The subjects discussed by the individual authors include: the evolution of US trade with Japan; emerging US trade patterns with Western European countries; the role of multinational firms in the exports of manufactures from the developing countries; US trade with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the People's Republic of China; the determinants of the commodity pattern of US trade. The editors emphasize the need for the United States to adjust to the new developments in the international sphere, as presented in this book, because of their implications for US domestic policies.

The World in Figures. By Victor Showers. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1973. 584 pages with illustrations, tables, and index. \$14.95.

A digest of statistical information about every country in the world, 1,600 of the most important cities, and 2,000 other geographical and cultural features.

The first part of the survey contains tables relevant to physical geography, demography, climate, engineering, and education. The

second part includes data relevant to countries and cities, while the third section is a cross-referenced index to individual entries in parts one and two. The author posits that the study "gives striking evidence of a shrinking earth."

International Development Banks.

By John Syz. Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, and A. W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1974. 296 pages with notes, bibliography, and index. \$17.50.

A study of the institutional aspects and sources of funds and operations of 10 international banks and an analysis of the relationships between richer and poorer countries, the problems and solutions.

Among the institutions covered are the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, International Finance Corporation, Inter-American Development Bank, African Development Bank, and Asian Development Bank. Each institution is evaluated upon the basis of membership, functions, procedures, organization, judicial processes, resources, and financial operations.

Trade Relations of the ECC: An Empirical Investigation. By Mordechai E. Kreinin. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1974. 127 pages with tables and notes. \$12.50.

A collection of empirical investigations on selected aspects of EC trade with the outside world.

The book analyzes the theoretical, historical, and institutional background, the effect of the Community and its enlargement on world trade flows, the EC generalized system of preferences, trade relations with Francophone Africa, and the Community and US disaggregated import demand functions. Also covered are the effects of the Community on imports of manufacturers and the consequences of reverse preferences.

Community Calendar

APRIL

7-8 Negotiations between Algeria and Community continue in Brussels (see page 20).

7-11 European Parliament holds plenary session in Luxembourg.

7-15 Community participates in the Paris energy conference.

9 British House of Commons votes in favor of continued EC membership (see page 22).

10 Guinea (Conakry) signs the Lomé Convention (see page 20).

11 Lomé Convention Interim Committee meets in Brussels (see page 20).

11-16 US Congressmen travel to Brussels and Munich for biannual US-EC parliamentary exchange (see page 19).

12-15 EC foreign ministers, meeting informally in Dublin within the framework of both political cooperation and the Council of Ministers, discuss Vietnam, European union, and relations with Arab countries.

14-15 Council of Foreign Min-

isters meets in Luxembourg to discuss EC external relations (see page 20 and 22) and general affairs.

15 Council of Agriculture Ministers meets in Luxembourg (see page 22).

16-24 Commission Vice President Christopher Soames, responsible for EC external relations, visits Mexico.

18-26 Commission President François-Xavier Ortoli visits India (see page 20).

19 EC-India textile agreement signed in Brussels (see page 20).

21 Council of Finance Ministers meets in Luxembourg.

23 Mixed EC-Turkey Parliamentary Committee meets in Copenhagen.

24-27 Commission Vice President Henri Simonet, responsible for EC energy policy, visits Turkey.

28-29 Council of Agriculture Ministers meets in Luxembourg.

29-30 European Parliament holds plenary session in Luxembourg.

29-30 EC-Mexico negotiations begin in Brussels.

Publications Available

Publications listed may be obtained from the European Community Information Service, Suite 707, 2100 M Street, NW, Washington DC 20037. Persons in the New York area can order copies from the European Community Information Service, 277 Park Avenue, New York City 10017.

SECOND ILLUSTRATIVE NUCLEAR PROGRAM FOR THE COMMUNITY. EUR 5011 e, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1974, 303 pages \$4.00
Commission survey, issued in July 1972, on the development of nuclear technology, nuclear energy production targets for 1985, and investment requirements. Annexes cover the Community's activities on radiation protection, the structure of electricity production, light water, fast breeder and high-temperature reactors and fuel.

HEALTH EFFECTS OF CARBON MONOXIDE ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION. EUR 5242, Commission of European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, 437 pages \$16.00
Proceedings of a colloquium

held in Luxembourg, December 17-19, 1973. Papers and discussions in the original language with English translation on health risks from carbon monoxide pollution and guidelines for health criteria for this pollutant.

PRICES OF OIL FUELS 1970-1974. Energy Statistics No. 2, 1974 special number, Statistical Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, 193 pages \$5.00
Statistical survey of the actual market prices paid by the consumer for fuel oils, with the tax incidence calculated separately, in the nine member states. Figures are in national currencies and in U.S. dollars per metric ton. Includes a discussion of the petroleum market, price regulation, and taxation in each member.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE COMMUNITY COUNTRIES 1969-1973. Statistical Studies and Surveys, No. 1/1974, Statistical Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, 285 pages \$10.00
Analyzes the research and development appropriations by countries and by listed objectives.

Describes national, bilateral, and multilateral projects.

POSTGRADUATE DEGREES IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 1974, 79 pages free
Describes graduate programs in law, economics, political science, and multidisciplinary courses at universities and institutes in the Community.

PROBLEMS OF THE CONTAMINATION OF MAN AND HIS ENVIRONMENT BY MERCURY AND CADMIUM. EUR 5075, Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, 696 pages \$30.00
Proceedings of the symposium held at Luxembourg, July 3-5, 1974.

ANNUAL INVESTMENTS IN FIXED ASSETS IN THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1970-1972. Statistical Studies and Surveys, No. 2/1974, Statistical Office of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1974, 131 pages ... \$4.80
Detailed results of the coordinated annual inquiry into capital investment for the original six members for the years 1970-1972.

Results in national currency, subdivided by industry and nature of capital goods invested. Data is given for the new members although they were not part of the survey.

REPORT ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN STATE-TRADING COUNTRIES AND COMECON. Working Document No. 425/74, European Parliament, Luxembourg, January 9, 1975, 46 pages \$1.00

By Egon A. Klepsch on behalf of the Committee on External Economic Relations. Covers the development of trade with the East, with statistical tables, the legal aspects of the Community's commercial policy, MFN treatment, quotas, export credits, cooperation agreements, and the Commission's model trade agreement proposal.

OPERATIONS IN TURKEY. European Investment Bank, Luxembourg, 1973, 16 pages free
Brochure explaining the conditions and procedures for European Investment Bank operations in Turkey under the association agreement.

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