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**FOOD STRATEGIES  
A NEW FORM OF COOPERATION  
BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE COUNTRIES  
OF THE THIRD WORLD**

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FOOD STRATEGIES

A NEW FORM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD  
WORLD

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"Our aim is not the structure we are  
setting up but the people whom this  
structure is intended to serve"

Edgard Pisani, addressing the  
European Parliament.

In less than twenty years' time - by the year 2000 - Rwanda will have had to double its agricultural production in order to be able to feed its entire population. How will it manage to do so?

This example - it is just one of many in the Third World - shows that the question we shall have to face by the end of the twentieth century will be whether we have made it possible for the developing countries to feed their populations themselves.

In most cases, they are capable of doing so. But they must be given the means of exploiting their full potential - and besides, if more and better food is to be produced, the peasant must want to make it happen.

The facts are disquieting:

- (i) The state of food supplies in the Third World, and especially in Africa, far from improving in recent years, has become even worse.
- (ii) The way things are going, the situation will be even more disastrous in twenty years' time.

The policies implemented by Third World governments hitherto and the aid which the rich countries have contributed in support of these policies have not been what was required. The mistakes add up to millions of human lives, so it is not a matter of sorting out the good from the bad aspects, or of taking a figure from a set of statistics to show that "when all is said and done ..." or "compared with the others ..." such and such is the case.

Why not just admit that the methods used were not necessarily the right ones? If they had been, it would have shown.

Some of the efforts made have been very substantial - but they have not all been channelled in the same direction, and have sometimes cancelled one another out.

It is no long possible to continue working in this uncoordinated way. It is not a matter of changing policy, but of working out a logical development pattern.

That is the aim of the "Food Strategies" which the European Community is drawing up with certain African countries.

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FACTS AND FIGURES

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The food situation is critical in most African countries owing to the lack of progress in socio-economic development in general and rural development in particular: that is the starting point for any reflection on the subject.

A few figures illustrate this situation:

- (i) In Africa, per capita food crop production fell by an average of 1.2% a year in the seventies;
- (ii) Per capita agricultural production, which during the sixties had remained constant, fell even more rapidly by an average of 1.4% a year.
- (iii) In some twenty African countries, the average growth of per capita gross national product did not exceed 1% a year over the period 1970-75. In fifteen countries, there was even negative growth.

The inhabitants of the African countries signatory to the Lomé Convention do not have the daily calorie intake which every human being requires. On average they get only 93.6% of what they need and there has been no improvement in this situation over the last decade. Obviously, these percentages vary greatly from one region to another: while they are better - but still inadequate - in coastal West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa (98-99%), they drop to 9.7% in central Africa and are as low as 85% in the Sahel countries.

It should also be stressed that within the same country low-income groups living in the towns suffer more from malnutrition than groups with comparable incomes living in the country. Given Africa's rapid urban growth rate, this fact becomes very important. Between 1950 and 1975 the African countries' urban population increased almost fourfold and a further increase on the same scale is predicted by the year 2000. By then, 30% of Africa's population should be living in the towns. What are they to live on?

This question is all the more pressing since urbanization has changed consumer habits and imported cereals are gradually replacing local ones.

The result of the reduction in per capita availabilities of food in African countries has been:

- (i) a drop in average per capita consumption of certain basic foodstuffs: an average 10% drop compared with average consumption ten years ago;
- (ii) an increase in imports of basic foodstuffs. In ten years, cereals imports have doubled and now amount to 11m tonnes. Between 1969-71 and 1978-80, cereal imports by the African countries signatory to the Lomé Convention rose from 2.3m tonnes to 5.7m tonnes (the

proportion of rice in these imports fell over the same period from 26% to 23%).

For Africa as a whole, cereal imports should double between 1980 and 1985. As a result, the African countries' cereals bill will probably rise to \$6 000, which is about a fifth of their export earnings.

Lastly, a significant increase should be noted in purchases of other foodstuffs - oils and fats, milk products, meat, etc. - and African countries are expected to have a shortfall in fish in the near future.

Table: Food production indices

	Food production index		Per capita food production index	
	1970	1979	1970	1979
World	100	125	100	106
Developed countries	100	121	100	112
Developing countries	100	130	100	106
Asia	100	137	100	119
Africa	100	116	100	90
Latin America	100	135	100	106
Middle East	100	132	100	103
Far East	100	125	100	101
Other dev. countries	100	126	100	102

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FROM THE NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS' MANIFESTO TO THE FOOD STRATEGY VENTURE

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"We the undersigned, men and women of science, letters, men and women of peace, of different religions, history and culture ... we appeal to all men and women of goodwill, appeal to the powerful and to the humble to act ... for tens of millions of people on the point of dying from hunger and underdevelopment to be restored to life ...

It is essential that a suitable method and procedure from the many possible ones that exist or can be imagined, should be devised, adopted and implemented immediately ...

It is essential that the highest international authorities, the governments, the people ...

Now is the time to act, now is the time to create, now is the time for us to live in a way that will give life to others."

On 24 June 1981, 53 Nobel Prize winners issued this manifesto as an appeal to the whole world. The members of the European Parliament - spurred on by Marco Pannella, leader of the Italian Radicals - were among the first to want action to be taken in response to this appeal.

On 30 September 1981, Parliament adopted a resolution in Strasbourg requesting the Commission to draw up an emergency plan to save at least five million people from hunger and malnutrition in 1982, and consequently to provide for a special supplementary budget in 1982 of 5 000m ECU (see Annex).

The European Community has not hitherto had cause to be ashamed of what it has done to help poor countries. Since it was set up in 1957, it has always involved the Third World in its activities. The Lomé Convention (signed and later renewed by the Ten and nearly sixty countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific) is still held up as a model of its kind. Europe could therefore have continued in the same direction - and who would have reproached it?

However, the realization that the food situation in the developing countries and more especially in Africa was worsening - and a political incentive, namely the appeal by the Nobel Prize winners and the European Parliament Resolution - compelled the Commission to devise guidelines for a new policy.

On 2 October 1981, the Commission drew up a "plan of action against hunger in the world" based on the following three types of action:

- (i) emergency operations designed to deal with the most urgent problems by providing immediate food aid;
- (ii) operations with specific themes designed mainly to safeguard the developing countries' natural assets;
- (iii) the formulation of food strategies.

The debate in the European Parliament was a lively one, with those who favoured rapid, exceptional action and the immediate injection of substantial funds up against those who advocated a longer-term policy. It was concluded as follows by Edgard Pisani, the European Commissioner responsible for development cooperation: "The Commission considers that hunger will not be vanquished by temporary expedients, but rather by a process of economic development, which will be slow and difficult, because development is not just building roads, dams, hospitals, schools, irrigation systems and factories: it is all those things, but it is first and foremost the mobilization and the organization of an entire nation which wishes finally to take in hand its economic and social destiny after it has taken its political destiny in hand. Development is not simply transferring technology and technical assistance; it is the acquisition by the poorest countries of the ability to develop techniques suited to their own needs, to train men capable of governing them, of administering their affairs, of managing their economy and of guiding their efforts."

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THE FOOD STRATEGIES: A BLUE PRINT FOR SUCCESS

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Sixty per cent of the population of the Third World are peasants. Seventy per cent of the population of Africa are peasants. Eighty-seven per cent of the inhabitants of Mali are peasants, and 90% of the inhabitants of Rwanda. And yet...

...And yet these peasants, as creatures of flesh and blood, not the theoretical and abstract creations of ideological speeches, have been neglected by development activities - and need one mention those African

countries which happened to be endowed with considerable mineral wealth and which have ruined their agriculture, and consequently their entire economy, as a result. Mines are often run as a kind of enclave outside the economy as a whole, and while they are owned by the state, the nation does not benefit from them. But when agricultural projects have been implemented, usually with the help of rich countries, how often has the essential question been forgotten: will it encourage the peasant to produce more?

Unless this question is asked and an attempt made to find a satisfactory answer to it, the peasant will not produce enough. It is as simple as that.

- (i) He does not produce enough for himself. In rural Africa, self-sufficiency is not always attained.
- (ii) He does not produce enough for his family. Given the rise in the population, food production will be more and more inadequate and the peasants will have to abandon their land for the towns.
- (iii) He does not produce enough for the rest of the population - that is, for those already living in the towns and all those who will be joining them.

What will the towns of the Third World be like in the year 2000?

It is not hard to work out the consequences: malnutrition, constant hunger, death in many cases, with food aid from the rich countries and commercial food imports the only way out.

Are the Third World countries therefore going to continue to import what they can produce? Would it not be better to buy oil, fertilizers and machinery rather than cereals? Especially as these imported agricultural products only serve to disrupt their agricultural economies even further.

The food strategies' number one objective is to establish conditions which will enable the peasant to produce more and better food.

"A food strategy", declared Edgard Pisani on 16 June to the European Parliament, "must start with the adoption by governments of rigorous economic policies. This means that they must decide to give farmers, and the vast number of small farmers, even more than commercial undertakings, an incentive to produce foodstuffs by offering to buy them at prices which offer the prospect of a profit, and on that basis we can hope to guide production using the vast number of means open to us."

It is therefore a matter initially of identifying and taking into account all the many aspects of the food problem, from the producer to the final consumer, and of integrating them into a coherent development policy. This would provide a framework for organizing better coordination between domestic policies and contributions from abroad and would be a step towards better use of all available resources.

### 1. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MUST FORMULATE THEIR OWN STRATEGIES

This is not an easy task, so great is the overlap between the many different factors of development and their interdependence. It is first of all necessary to make an honest diagnosis - the success of the entire strategy depends on it. Then objectives have to be set, and policies and programmes adopted to attain them.

For example: the diagnosis reveals that among the many constraints on a country is a lack of arable land with all its consequences, namely erosion and excessive pressure on the land under cultivation. The implications of this are that the land should be made as fertile as possible, all available land worked, measures taken to combat erosion, and production systems organized.

Since the purpose of the strategy is to organize agriculture so that it meets the population's requirements, the objective is therefore to make the land more productive and to diversify crop and livestock products. The policy will be to promote production and the efficient use of inputs. The programmes will be geared to acquiring selected seeds, tools, fertilizers, and soil ameliorators. This example, which is incomplete since it does not include all the other constraints, could be extended.

### 2. THE PEASANTS MUST BE ENCOURAGED TO PRODUCE

This approach to production should be based essentially on market forces. In order to increase production to any substantial degree and on a lasting basis, the policy to be implemented must give producers the incentives and security they need in order to accept a system of production not aimed at mere subsistence. If prices are too low, the peasants will be discouraged from producing any more than they need themselves. Only the prospect of obtaining an income from their surplus production will make the African peasant move out of the vicious circle of subsistence farming. The peasant must have reasons for producing and be certain he can sell his produce.

Are farmers in the Third World prepared to operate in a market economy system such as this? Are they not going to continue with their old habits of subsistence farming? Although there is a risk of this happening in the case of the older generation, it is only slight in the case of young people. If they receive attractive prices for their produce and if they find it useful to have a money income - because if there is nothing to buy, why want money? - they will increase production. Will they increase it too much? Hardly.

### 3. THIS INCENTIVE IS NOT ENOUGH

Increased production stands a chance of being maintained only if supplementary measures are taken to back up the process set in train.

"An increase in production" wrote the Commission in a paper intended for the Development Ministers of the Ten "presupposes an equivalent increase in storage capacity (at farm, village, regional or national level) or an adequate procurement system; alongside the will to produce more there must be the possibility of placing at the producers' disposal, when needed, the required agricultural inputs; the gradual integration of the producers into a trading economy must go hand in hand with the establishment of suitable rural credit facilities; growing mechanization must be accompanied by the setting-up of improved maintenance facilities, etc."

If farmers produce more and if storage facilities enable them to sell some of their surpluses, they can use the money they obtain in this way to improve their production system further. However, the necessary distribution system does not yet exist, or at any rate is not sufficiently operational. In order to form part of a more modern economic chain, the farmer must have received training, hence the need for extension services. Similarly, the capacity for saving may be deflected from its purpose if a system of agricultural credit is not gradually set up, not to mention the need for infrastructure, equipment for the villages, and the setting up of small businesses.

"And if, as all the evidence suggests, rising prices result in a corresponding increase in production," as Edgard Pisani told the European Parliament, "we must, on the one hand, see that we have the physical means of storing farm surpluses, in the villages and in the cities, and on the other hand, we must see that money is available to buy up the surplus produce that comes to market. To do that, the government in question needs budgetary support in order to build, or have built, silos, and to make seasonal loans, and it needs technical and financial support to see that the produce is marketed. If all that is accomplished - and it will be - farmers will have money. They will be prepared to buy manure, pesticides and tools and to build themselves modest houses in which to live. They will need better equipped villages and paths to transport products along. Very soon, they will also need the help of competent advisory officers, present on the spot and ready to help them."

Overall development will therefore come from greater readiness to produce.

#### 4. AID OR A PACT?

"But how much extra money are you going to give us?"

"None. Because, supposing I don't give you any, are you going to let yourselves die of hunger?"

This was the jesting way in which Edgard Pisani replied to members of the Kenyan Government. It is obvious that Europe will use all the means available to it to help those countries which have chosen to seek its help in attaining the objectives set by their food strategies. Pisani's answer shows, however, that the key to success lies above all with the Africans themselves. It is for them to define their food strategies - although they may have to request external assistance to do so - and for them to find ways of motivating the population.

From that stage onwards, the rich countries can provide constructive criticism and support.

A pact will be concluded between a developing country and those which have chosen to help it; under this pact the country will be helped to overcome the difficulties it will encounter. The country must, however, observe the objectives and rules which it laid down when formulating its food strategy. Otherwise, the pact will lose its justification. This method may be summed up as follows:

"We have concluded a contract. You apply a given measure and we shall give you our support. You slacken in your efforts to give up, and we shall do the same." It amounts to co-piloting an experiment to ensure its success, and this will to succeed is the main bond between the two partners. This system of joint administration presupposes flexibility on both sides so that the action taken can be adjusted in line with changing circumstances.

Does this approach appear neocolonialist. Is it neocolonialist to establish clearly with a partner the objectives of joint action and how they are to be achieved?



And is it neocolonialist to put a stop to operations if the other side is not honouring its contract?

Co-piloting of food strategies is perhaps the most advanced form of cooperation between rich and developing countries, since for once the latter are considered not as recipients of aid but as real partners - i.e. responsible for the success of an operation undertaken jointly.

It is significant that the European Community should have been the first to propose this step.

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#### WHY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?

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Europe is therefore the first to start adopting this blueprint for success, albeit tentatively. Why?

- (i) Given the continuing failure of the Soviet Union to contribute to development cooperation, the rather embryonic state of Japanese aid, and the tendency of US aid to be politically selective, Europe must face up to its responsibilities vis-à-vis the Third World.
- (ii) These responsibilities are political and economic. Let us forget the moral aspect, although it does have a role to play - after all, the impact of the appeal by the Nobel Prize winners and the information campaigns on hunger in the world certainly contributed to the food strategies proposal. But leaving aside this moral aspect, it must be realized that Europe cannot live with a politically unstable or - the two are linked - economically weak Africa.
- (iii) In the short term, there are some who could benefit from this situation. Via development aid, European firms can sell their machines or products to poor countries, which also absorb some of our agricultural surpluses. All is therefore for the best. But for how long? Will the hungry remain silent for ever? Will they not call us to account one day?
- (iv) Will European public opinion not do the same? "If development aid does not do any good, since all the figures show that the situation in the Third World is going from bad to worse, why bother to make an effort, why not channel the money spent on it into our own development?" The economic crisis can only add weight to this kind of reasoning.
- (v) In the long term, Europe's real interest does not lie in having an African market that is "at its disposal" but in ensuring that Africa becomes a trading partner of substance. This will not happen unless its development is comprehensive, and embraces the entire population.

If we reflect upon the policy followed by the European Community hitherto, we can see that the food strategies do not constitute a complete break with its activities up to now. In many ways, they even form the culmination of those activities.

- The Community has always emphasized the contractual nature of its cooperation with the Third World - from the signing in 1963 of the Yaoundé Convention with the eighteen Associated African States and Madagascar to the renewal, in 1979, of the Lomé Convention with over sixty African, Caribbean and Pacific States, not to mention the many agreements it has concluded with the Mediterranean countries. It has even gone so far as to state when the contract has not been fully honoured - the Commission did so officially when taking stock of the agreements with the Mediterranean countries.

In the case of the food strategies this contract goes even further.

- In recent years, the share of European aid funds earmarked for agriculture has increased steadily, going up from 16% under the first European Development Fund (1958) to over 39% under the fifth Development Fund. Within this percentage, the share earmarked for crops for export fell from 45% to 30%. Between 1976 and 1980 over 2.5m hectares of land were planted with new crops; stock-farming, fishing and forestry have been stepped up, and many projects of value to rural areas have been conducted in the spheres of training, health, and water engineering infrastructure.

Europe is also placing growing emphasis on microprojects and integrated rural development. The former are of particular benefit to the poorest sections of the rural population (irrigation, storage of foodstuffs, building of schools, dispensaries, etc.). The latter focuses on the human factor in addition to the technical and economic aspects of development. Through basic training, campaigns to eradicate certain diseases, the use of renewable sources of energy (such as solar energy, etc.), the improvement of seeds and fertilizers, irrigation, storage, the processing and marketing of agricultural products, yields are increased and dietary standards, producer prices and living standards in general are raised. The setting up, under the Lomé Convention, of a Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation should enable technical assistance, research and dissemination of know-how to be stepped up still further.

- The technical and financial aid which the Community grants Mediterranean countries with which it has concluded cooperation agreements is also channelled into agricultural development, albeit to a lesser extent than in the case of the ACP countries. The recipient countries have hitherto allocated 8% of the grants of 18% of the loans from the EEC to the rural sector.
- Almost 90% of the aid granted by the Community to some thirty non-associated countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa is allocated to agriculture. The emphasis is placed on increasing production and the availability of foodstuffs. As in the ACP countries, many of the activities upstream and downstream of the production stage involve welfare and educational back-up, irrigation or storage infrastructure, processing and marketing structures, rural credit and agricultural research. Here too, the trend is more and more towards integrated rural development.
- The Community cofinances many projects with non-governmental development aid organizations and these projects focus mainly on the poorest sections of the Third World population, living largely in rural areas.

Although these efforts are very substantial, in order to be successful they must now be backed up by an overall strategy. The Community has the wherewithal, the experience and the people required to help with such a strategy.

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HOW IS THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY GOING TO DO THIS?

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Edgard Pisani, the Member of the Commission responsible for development cooperation, has already visited five African countries to find out whether they were prepared to embark with the European Community on the food strategy venture.

Before an initial evaluation is made of these meetings, two questions must be asked:

- What means does the European Community have at its immediate disposal to support these countries' efforts?
- Can other developed countries join in the exercise?

As we have seen, a big financial input is not the main prerequisite for the success of the food strategies. The main factor is the motivation of the African peasant to produce more and better food. The food strategy contains the seeds of its own success. Europe will nevertheless conclude a pact with those countries, and while it will be demanding for them, it will also be demanding for the Community and its Member States, which will be called upon to make a special effort along the following lines:

- (a) they must accept an efficient system of coordination;
- (b) they must be prepared for constant adjustment of the aid mechanisms so that appropriate solutions can be found to specific questions arising as the strategy is implemented;
- (c) they must seek ways of helping these countries to proceed through the various stages of the development process thus set in train.

At the end of his first round of visits (to Kenya, Mali and Zambia), Mr Pisani outlined in a memo to the Council of Ministers initial steps which the EEC could take to help countries with a food strategy. In his opinion, it was necessary:

- (i) to re-examine the indicative programmes which are used to programme the aid from the European Development Fund to the countries signatory to the Lomé Convention;
- (ii) to use the counterpart funds from food aid. When the Community sends foodstuffs to a country, to avoid disrupting local economic channels these products are not distributed free of charge to the population apart from in exceptional cases. The funds obtained in this way are placed at the country's disposal;
- (iii) to use the "projects" component of the transfers made under the system for stabilizing export earnings;
- (iv) to seek ways of establishing lines of credit to support or promote the system of national and rural credit, possibly through the use of European Investment Bank facilities;
- (v) to use any additional resources becoming available under the special programme to combat hunger in the world;
- (vi) to allocate or, if necessary, re-allocate Member States' aid.

The point of the exercise is obviously not to place countries which do not undertake a food strategy, or which are not earmarked by the Community for assistance, "at a disadvantage", but to enable the Community to obtain the resources required to help towards the success of the initial experiments.

The Community and its Member States will perhaps not be the only "co-pilots" in these food strategy experiments. A number of developed countries have expressed their interest in this operation and the Community keeps them regularly informed of progress. Contributions from them would increase the chances of success. The first batch of countries implementing food strategies are getting over 50% of their aid from the Community and the Member States alone. If there were to be other donors as well, the capacity and impact would be increased.

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AN INITIAL EXPERIMENT WITH FIVE AFRICAN COUNTRIES

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When the idea of food strategies was launched, a large number of African countries expressed interest.

Three criteria were adopted by the Commission for identifying the countries with which a start could be made:

- (i) they had to be countries with a large food shortfall;
- (ii) they had to have the capacity and will to conduct valid food strategies for themselves;
- (iii) they had to be receiving substantial aid from the European Community and its Member States.

Many African countries met the first and third criterions. The question was whether they were prepared to formulate and undertake a food strategy. The Commission chose five countries and Mr Pisani visited them in order to take stock of the possibilities. The five countries are Mali, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda and Tanzania.

These countries differ in many ways - in location, language, economic potential and social organization. It is interesting to note that the food strategies can be implemented irrespective of a country's socio-political organization, and irrespective also of the legal status of its farms. There is just one condition, namely that it must be possible for the country's farms to fit into a trading system, which is the foundation for any prosperous agricultural economy.

The initial contacts have been too brief for any definitive conclusions to be drawn as yet; the meetings were designed mainly to enable the Community's representatives to explain the strategies more fully and allow the African authorities to provide a better picture of their countries' exact situations.

One thing is certain, however. The five countries have clearly expressed their desire to conduct a voluntary food policy. Some of them have already embarked on such a policy, while others are about to. The authorities with whom meetings were held were also in agreement with the new approach proposed by the Community. All this is of course subject to certain provisos: there are many matters which have to be clarified on either side, and many questions still unsettled.

The process has nevertheless started - and in the manner agreed, i.e. with ongoing cooperation between the Community and the countries concerned.

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MALI: HELPING TO MAKE ITS EFFORTS SUCCESSFUL

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On 2 and 3 June 1982, Commission officials started their "food strategy" tour in Bamako. Their meeting with the Malian authorities was particularly encouraging, since about two years ago Mali undertook a policy of reorganizing its agriculture, with development based on the traditional village communities and on a progressive increase in the prices paid to producers. Since Mali had embarked on a particular process itself, the Commission representatives had to decide whether it should be helped to attain its objectives and, if so, they had to determine with the Mali authorities what form their cooperation ought to take.

The reorganization was necessary. Mali is able to produce enough food for its population - more than enough, in fact - but as a result of the climate and also for political reasons a food shortfall was tending to become a permanent feature.

Largely owing to the rivers Niger and Senegal, Mali has great natural potential for producing cereals (it is the only country in this region of Africa where cereals can be grown), groundnuts, fruit and vegetables, and for stock-farming and fisheries. The country also has peasants, stock-farmers and fishermen who use traditional methods and have a wealth of experience acquired over many years and an undoubted ability to adapt.

It has nevertheless suffered very marked failures in its attempts to develop arable and stock-farming. They do not stem from the climate alone, and the consequences have affected the country's economy as a whole. The food shortfalls have tended to become permanent and the country now depends systematically on food aid from the developed countries. These poor results have had a domino effect, impoverishing the other sectors of the economy, reducing the tax base, worsening the financial imbalances and creating increasingly serious social tension.

In order to get out of this impasse, the Malian authorities decided to change direction. Certain measures have already been taken, the most important being the reorganization of the cereals market. This operation is to take five years, and is based on higher producer prices, consumer subsidies and the liberalization of trade. These measures have already produced results: the production of millet, sorghum and maize exceeded 1 million t in 1981, as against 800 000 t in 1980. For the first time in years the towns have been properly supplied, either via private channels or by the "Office étatique" (state board), which no longer monopolizes marketing.

The reform of the cereals market is only a first step, one factor in the food strategy which Mali is in the process of elaborating. This strategy has three main objectives:

- (i) To ensure that the population is better fed, in terms of both quantity and quality.
- (ii) To avoid having to choose between importing foodstuffs and importing energy or equipment.
- (iii) To enable the population to stay in the productive regions.

Since they supply over half the aid Mali receives and most of that is channelled into agriculture, the European Community and its Member States have the means to contribute towards the success of this strategy -

especially as the Malian authorities have decided to take the co-piloting idea right to its logical conclusion. Indeed, the Head of State, General Moussa Traoré, went so far as to suggest during his meeting with Edgard Pisani that an "inspector" should be appointed by the Commission to correct any mistakes made!

"If", as the Commission wrote in the report it put before the Council, "Mali confirms that it is resolved to maintain and develop this policy, and if it enters into an agreement with the Community on support for this policy, the Member States (and any other donors joining in the exercise) will have to indicate their readiness to give it as much support as possible, in line with what will have been agreed by the Government."

In order to ensure that the process gets off the ground, and to keep a constant look-out for problems to be solved as they arise, a coordination and evaluation structure will have to be set up which will enable the necessary checks and adjustments to be made.

The trend towards increased production, induced by a policy of more attractive prices for the peasants, must be backed up by a package of measures and programmes:

- (i) once they have succeeded in producing more, the peasants should also be able to sell their surplus without the danger of its being "confiscated";
- (ii) labour productivity must be improved, since a lack of inputs, equipment, training or credit could cancel out the incentive to produce. It is necessary to want to produce more, but it is also necessary to be able to do so;
- (iii) uses should be found for the savings induced by the increase in marketed output;
- (iv) a system of agricultural credit should be introduced to facilitate the implementation of all these attendant measures.

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KENYA: GETTING BACK TO SELF-SUFFICIENCY  
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Before 1970, Kenya was not only able to feed its population but even produced exportable surpluses. This situation gradually deteriorated and once in the red, the country had to resort to imports and food aid. The reasons for this decline in production and the drop in the level of consumption are manifold: the drought and the rise in the cost of imports, the population growth rate - at 4% a year one of the highest in Africa - and lastly the decline in the amount of good land given over to food crops owing to erosion, the extension of the areas under cash crops, and the population drift to the towns.

These "natural" factors do not explain everything, however. All observers agree that the drop in production is also due to a number of political errors: an inadequately planned and diversified pricing policy, the rigidity of the semi-public marketing boards, relative inefficiency and a lack of coordination at administrative level.

It would seem that, in adopting its National Food Policy in 1981, Kenya understood the need to adopt new tactics in order to boost its agricultural production.

The scale of the aid granted by the Community and its Member States (which

in 1979 and 1980 accounted for 53% and 43% respectively of the total aid received by Kenya) gives them an important strategic position in helping Kenya to refine and develop this policy. Its preparation does not seem to have reached as advanced a stage as in the case of Mali, and the various courses which the food strategy could follow are still very vague.

Where the Kenyan authorities would like to receive Community support now is in the following spheres:

- (i) Marketing. The increased production that higher prices will generate should be marketable. In order to make this possible, the Kenyan authorities are insisting on the need to create substantial storage facilities (for a total of 200 000 t) and on building the rural tracks necessary for organized marketing.
- (ii) Establishment of an efficient credit system.

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ZAMBIA: RESTORING AGRICULTURE'S ROLE

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Of the labour force, 65% depends on agriculture, but contributes only 12% to the formation of gross national product: the explanation for the imbalance in the development of Zambia's economy lies in these two figures. The Government's policy of making agricultural development subordinate to the interests of the mining sector has resulted in the stagnation of agricultural production and hence an increase in agricultural imports and heightened dependence on food aid from the developed countries.

The experts nevertheless consider that Zambia has the potential to cover its domestic cereals requirements and even produce exportable surpluses. The development of stock-farming could also provide the population with an appreciable protein complement, and the conditions for grazing are very favourable.

The major difficulties encountered by Zambia's agriculture lie in the fact that the prices paid to producers are not attractive. They are uniform throughout the country, whereas production costs, and in particular transport costs, vary greatly from one region to another.

The Government has already taken certain measures to make prices more attractive, particularly in the case of maize. While good weather admittedly helped, this policy produced results very quickly in the form of a maize crop of 690 000 t in 1981 (as against 330 000 and 382 000 t in 1978 and 1979 respectively), enough to cover domestic demand.

The Zambian Government realized it had failed in agriculture. In its ten-year (1980-1990) Operation Food Production programme, it criticized past policy very severely and laid down the guidelines for a more coherent agricultural policy.

The Zambian Government seems aware that the future of agriculture cannot be assured by creating large state-owned farms but that what is needed is a policy of remunerative prices. They have expressed interest in participating in a dynamic production process. A coherent food strategy should also comprise the following measures:

- (i) Development of food crops other than maize (manioc, sorghum, millet). Priority has hitherto been given to maize, which has been marketed in the largest quantities despite the fact that 50% of the population lives off other crops.
- (ii) Coherent policies as regards storage, credit, etc.

Now is a particularly opportune time for the European Community to support the elaboration and implementation of this policy (with its Member States it accounts for over 50% of the total aid granted to Zambia).

Following Mr Pisani's visit, an EEC-Zambia Joint Committee was set up on 24 June. It set itself the objective of determining the present production plans, the constraints and the measures to be taken to overcome them, and also the role which external aid will be called upon to play.

The Community's support should be channelled mainly into the following areas:

- rural extension services;
- storage facilities for the surpluses accumulated in normal years and setting up of buffer stocks at regional and national levels;
- measures to encourage the prevention of wastage (which in the case of maize amounts to 50% of the crop in some cases);
- the setting up of an efficient credit system geared to the requirements of small family holdings;
- applied research with a view to improving productivity.

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RWANDA: IMPROVING ON SUBSISTENCE FARMING  
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"The balance is precarious and in danger of being completely upset not because of any particular weather conditions or institutional instability but as a result of an exceptional population density, which in the end will render present production methods useless." This is the Rwandan Government's own diagnosis of the country's future as regards food supplies.

Rwanda's national output has hitherto been sufficient to cover the country's food requirements.

From 1967 to 1979 food production increased, but this balance may be disrupted under the combined pressure of two factors:

- (a) The limits of natural potential. Land is becoming scarcer, the soil is deteriorating (only 8% of the potential is still unused), and the tree cover is declining.
- (b) Population growth. The present population, numbering 5.2 million, is growing at a rate of 3.7% a year. By 2005 it will have almost doubled to over 10 million. Of this number, 40% (as against 5% at present) will live outside the primary agricultural sector. Rwanda's population density is exceptionally high: at 350 inhabitants per square kilometre of land suitable for cultivation, it is the highest in Africa, second only to the Nile Valley in Egypt. Consequence: if it is to continue to keep its population self-sufficient in food, Rwanda's food crop production needs to increase by more than 3% a year,



which means that the yield from the land in use has to be doubled between now and the year 2000.

In order to make this challenge a little - but only a little - less daunting, the Rwandese authorities are planning the following measures:

- (a) emigration to neighbouring countries: Tanzania has been contacted about taking a "colony" of possibly as many as a million people;
- (b) gentle encouragement - with no element of compulsion - in the use of birth control.

Irrespective of the results of these measures, they will not enable the Rwandan authorities to avoid having to seek ways of considerably increasing their agricultural production, and they are well aware of this. "The time has come", as is stated in the reference document on Rwanda's food strategy, "to initiate measures not only to improve the productivity of a system but also to change that system".

This change will be the transition from subsistence production to market-oriented production.

In order for this transition to take place under favourable conditions, the following steps must be taken simultaneously:

- (i) the producer must be guaranteed stable and remunerative prices, so that he can increase his productivity. The peasant will use external 'inputs' (fertilizer, etc.) only in so far as he knows they constitute a worthwhile investment;
- (ii) high-yield production systems must be developed which are light on imported inputs and make optimum use of the manual labour force.

If this policy is successful, i.e. if production increases significantly, a range of cohesive measures will have to be implemented to consolidate this success, which might otherwise be short-lived and thus dash all the producers' hopes. The three main measures to be taken are as follows:

- . arrangements for the peasants to be given proper access on favourable terms to the necessary agricultural inputs and the results of applied research, in order to improve productivity;
- . improvement of the trading channels, in conjunction with the improvement of storage, processing and the return on products;
- . setting up of an appropriate credit system.

European Community support for Rwanda's food strategy would seem to be justified for two reasons.

One is that the Rwandese authorities, including the highest echelons, are perfectly aware of the need to embark upon this new policy. The broad lines of the policy are set out in their economic and social development plan, and most of their development efforts are devoted to the rural sector.

The other reason is that the Community and its Member States account for some 60% of the total aid received by Rwanda, and agricultural and rural development absorbs an important share of this European aid (38% of the fifth European Development Fund).

Europe's aid should now be channelled mainly into the following areas:

- (i) Continuation and stepping up of rural extension services through the implementation of appropriate programmes.
- (ii) Promotion of production and efficient use of agricultural inputs.
- (iii) Restoring ground cover and soil fertility.
- (iv) Stepping up and channelling of research on improving productivity.
- (v) Efforts to raise efficiency of trading channels at both national and regional levels.
- (vi) Improvement of the preservation and market value of products.
- (vii) Setting up of an efficient credit system corresponding to the requirements of small family holdings.

In order to ensure that the whole operation gets off the ground properly, a coordination system must be set up. An EEC-Rwanda working group - which any other aid donors could join - has already been set up to work out the details of such cooperation.

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TANZANIA - A GENERAL POLICY REVIEW

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Tanzania has the potential to be self-sufficient in foodstuffs, but, despite considerable external aid (one of the highest per capita levels in the world) it has had difficulties with food supplies for many years. Cereals production fell from 1.6m t in 1978 to 1.3m t in 1980 and food imports have more than quadrupled over the same period. The resulting burden on the state budget meant that the necessary investment could not be made to encourage agricultural production. The rural sector nevertheless employs 80% of the labour force.

This poor performance is partly the result of wars and the vagaries of climate - but only partly. International experts, like many members of the Tanzanian Government, think that it can also be attributed to the following:

- (i) the lack of political incentives for agricultural development;
- (ii) failure to conduct the right kind of research;
- (iii) the cumbersome procedures and mismanagement of the many semi-public bodies and in particular of the National Milling Corporation responsible for the production and marketing of cereals;
- (iv) the poor transport infrastructure.

In 1981, the Government, realizing these difficulties, launched its National Economic Survival Plan, the objective being to boost agricultural production by financing irrigation projects, introducing more resistant seeds, etc. The Government is also in the process of preparing a longer-term food strategy.

These efforts on the part of the Tanzanian authorities to give new impetus to their agricultural development can be accompanied by a parallel effort on the part of the Community, which is contributing 30% to 40% of the total aid granted to Tanzania. It is still too soon to determine the exact form the Community's contribution is to take, as the Tanzanians will have to give details of their own policies first.

One thing is certain: this policy will have no hope of success unless it provides small farmers with proper remuneration for their produce. It is therefore necessary to introduce drastic reforms in the semi-public organizations. It will also be necessary to take a number of supplementary measures to guide, back up and encourage this operation; the establishment of an agricultural inputs programme and credit system, the improvement of storage facilities, etc.

ANNEXES

The other two sections of the Commission's plan

Definition of the ECU

## I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS

The aid granted by the European Community for Third World countries' food strategies should therefore enable those countries to feed themselves and hence no longer need food aid from the developed countries. Edgard Pisani declared to the European Parliament: "This food aid is intended to cope with emergencies, but it must contribute to its own abolition, for lack of which, in the event that it should perpetuate itself, it will probably create new and intolerable relationships of dependency."

The emergency operations advocated by the Commission in its communication of 3 June 1982 concerning a special programme to combat hunger in the world are designed to meet a different requirement, since it is a question of helping refugees or displaced persons, of whom there is a constant flow as a result of the events in Afghanistan, Central America, southern Africa and the Horn of Africa. These people - there are more than four million of them! - are among the worst off in the world and are almost entirely dependent on external aid (food, health, clothing, shelter) for their survival.

The Commission therefore intends to mobilize 35m ECU for this category of people, who already receive aid amounting to 29m ECU from the Community, and this will help to ensure the survival of over 3 million people in 1982.

## II. OPERATIONS WITH A SPECIFIC THEME

The developing countries are running the serious risk of a dangerous deterioration of their natural assets, which nevertheless have to remain the basis of their growth. If appropriate corrective measures are not taken, their agricultural base will gradually contract over the years, and the whole future of their agricultural and food production system will thus be endangered. The pressure of immediate requirements has often made the authorities of these countries neglect the need to conserve or replenish resources by exploiting them too heavily. Hence a decline in natural potential (land, water, etc.) or in plant and animal life.

For the European Community it is a matter of giving the authorities of those countries which are threatened resources which, without jeopardizing the short-term operations, will enable them to include in their plans measures designed to safeguard and develop their assets. The objective is to persuade the population to modify or change what are in some cases deeply ingrained habits and make it take into account the environment in which it finds itself. These measures must be defined precisely but they must also be adaptable so that adjustments can be made for differences in social systems and habits, and even for taboos. They must take place in a national context since they must have the weight of governmental authority behind them. Local grassroots organizations - ranging from women's organizations to cooperatives - can nevertheless make a significant contribution to their formulation and execution.

### The first four themes selected

In order to mark the importance and urgency of these operations, and so as to impress upon the developing countries the need to act, and act quickly, while also informing them of the support they can expect from the Community, the Commission has immediately proposed four initial schemes, of a largely experimental nature, to enable a more substantial programme to be launched.

1. Efficient use of fuelwood

Between 75% and 95% of the energy available is wasted when wood is used in the traditional way, even though it is the commonest source of energy in Africa. The poorest people are obliged by sheer necessity to destroy the forests.

It is therefore necessary to run a number of parallel schemes to make the population - particularly the women - aware of the problem, to motivate people and to disseminate cooking methods using economical ovens.

2. Desertification control

The desert is gradually gaining ground (over 2 000 metres a year). It must be stopped. An impressive range of measures is required for this campaign. The Commission considers that here again there is an urgent need to undertake certain schemes now - ones that can be embarked upon at short notice and which will pave the way for the implementation of a longer-term policy: the creation of stocks of plant material in village nurseries and the preparation of remote sensing operations in order to gain a more thorough knowledge of the ground cover, support for national research programmes, and the training of skilled personnel.

3. Village water engineering

The sinking of a well meets an essential requirement and can trigger off a more general development process by adapting human behaviour in dealing with basic needs. It is not just a question of creating a water point - a prerequisite for survival - but of using this to set in train a whole social and economic development process.

4. Development of animal production

Diseases are a serious threat to animal production in vast areas of the world. Efforts must be made to eradicate them, but such efforts must be followed up by measures designed to improve animal nutrition and make better use of livestock for the purposes of agricultural production. To that end, the Commission wishes to undertake, at a cost of some 10m ECU, a campaign to control rinderpest, another campaign to control the diseases caused by the tse tse fly, and lastly to step up the resources at the disposal of research institutes.

Definition of the ECU

In accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No 3180/78 of 18 December 1978, published in the Official Journal of the European Communities (No L 379) of 30 December 1978, the ECU is defined as the sum of the following amounts of the currencies of the Member States of the European Economic Community:

0.828	German mark,
0.0885	pound sterling,
1.15	French francs,
109	Italian lira,
0.286	Dutch guilder,
3.66	Belgian francs,
0.14	Luxembourg franc,
0.217	Danish krone,
0.00759	Irish pound.

The equivalent of the ECU in any currency is equal to the sum of the equivalents in that currency of the amounts indicated above. It is determined by the Commission of the European Communities on the basis of the daily exchange market rates.

The daily rates for conversion into the various national currencies are available every day; they are published at regular intervals in the Official Journal of the European Communities.

Any change in the composition of the ECU decided on pursuant to Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 3180/78 is automatically applicable to this definition.

Abandonment of the ECU

If the European Monetary System as defined in the European Council Resolution of 5 December 1978 were to cease to exist and/or if the ECU were no longer used by the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, the ECU would be replaced by the amounts of the currencies which make it up, fixed by the definition of the ECU in force immediately before its abandonment.