

Brussels, 11.7.2007 SEC(2007) 962

COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

Accompanying document to the

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

on market reviews under the EU Regulatory Framework (2nd report)

{COM(2007) 401 final}

ANNEX I

THE ARTICLE 7 PROCEDURE

Under the procedures set out pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive (2002/21/EC), NRAs must define the boundaries of relevant markets in accordance with competition law principles, taking utmost account of the SMP Guidelines and the Recommendation on relevant markets. If they find that relevant markets are not effectively competitive, NRAs are obliged to propose appropriate regulatory measures to address market failures. A market is not effectively competitive if one or more players is dominant (or has significant market power, "SMP") in this market. Where operators are found to be dominant, NRAs are required to propose appropriate regulatory remedies to ensure effective competition. In the event of effective competition on the market, existing regulation has to be lifted. The market analysis has to be carried out in cooperation with the national competition authorities.

Before adopting final measures on market definition, market analysis and the imposition of remedies NRAs must not only carry out a national consultation but are also required to notify their draft measures to the Commission. Once an NRA notifies the Commission of its proposed measure for a particular market, the case is registered, and an ad hoc case team comprising officials of the services of both the Information Society and Media and the Competition Directorates General is appointed. The case team analyses the notification and may ask the NRA concerned to provide further information or clarification for the purpose of conducting the assessment. The team must carry out its assessment and comply with the necessary internal checks and balances, within the legally binding deadline of one month. At the end of this period, and provided that the notified measure does not raise "serious doubts" as to its compatibility with Community law, the Commission may decide to make comments. NRAs are to take utmost account of comments issued by the Commission before adopting the draft measure in question.





Table 1: Overview of the Phase 1 investigation

In the event that the Commission expresses serious doubts, the investigation period is extended by a further two months ("phase two" investigation) during which the NRA may not adopt its proposed measure. During these two months, the case team resumes an in-depth examination of the case and invites third parties to make known their views. What follows thereafter is an intense exchange of information between all interested parties (including the NRAs and industry players); all data provided and views expressed are carefully considered by the Commission. At the end of the investigation period, the Commission may withdraw its serious doubts (in which case the NRA may adopt the draft measure), make comments (of which the NRA must take utmost account when implementing the draft measure) or require the NRA to withdraw its proposed measure. In such an event, the Commission, before issuing its decision, submits its draft decision to the Communications Committee for an opinion. The NRA in question may decide to withdraw its draft measure at any stage of the notification procedure.

Table 2. Overview of the phase 2 investigation



ANNEX II

TABLE CONCERNING COMPETITION/REGULATION IN THE EU (31/03/2007)

Status of notifications

	AT	BE	CY	CZ	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	DE	EL	HU	IRL	IT	LT	LU	LV	MT	NL	PL	PT	SE	SI	SK	UK
1	а		а	а			а	а	а	X		а		а	а	а		а	а		X	а	а	а	а
2	а		а	а			а	а	а	X		а		а	а	а		а	а		X	а	а	а	а
3	а		а	а			а	а	а	X		а		а	а	а		а	а		X	а		а	а
4	а		а	а			а		а	X		а		а	а	а			а		X	а		а	а
5	а		а	а	а		а	а	а	X		а		а	а	а		а	а		X	а		а	а
6	а		а	а	а		а		а	X		а		а	а	а			а		X	а		а	а
7	а		а	а	а		а	а				а		а	а	а		а	а			а	а		а
8	а		а	а	а		а	а	а	X	а	а		а	а	а	а	а	X	а	X	а	а	а	а
9	а		а	а	а		а	а	а		а	а		а	а	а	а	а	X	а	X	а	а	а	а
10	а		а	а	W	w	а	а	а	X	а	а		а	а	X	а	а	X		а	а			а
11	а		а	а	а			а	а	X	а	а	а	а	а		а		X		а	а	а	а	а
12			а	а	а		а	а	а	X	а	а	а	а	а		а	w	а		а	а	а		а
13	а		а	а			а	а		W	а	а		а	а	а		а	X				а	а	а
14	а		а	а	w		а	а		W	а	а		а	а	а		а	а			а		W	а
15	а		а	а	а		а	а	w			а	а	а	а			а	а	W		а	а		а
16	а		а	а		а	а	а	а	а	а	X	X	а	а	а		а	X	а	а	а	а	а	а
17	а				а			а																	
18			а	а			а		а	\geq			Å						а	а		×	а		а



Separated notification for remedies

Final measure adopted



Withdrawal (totally or partially) not yet re-notified

Notified



Partly notified

ANNEX III

1. MARKETS OVERVIEW

This document highlights the main trends and conclusions of all markets assessed before 31 March 2007.

1.1. Retail access for residential and non-residential users (markets 1 and 2)

Retail access can be described as the provision of a connection to the fixed public telephone network for the purpose of making and/or receiving telephone calls and related services (such as faxes and dial-up internet). 24 NRAs have completed and notified their analysis of the retail access markets¹.

In line with the Recommendation, most NRAs defined separate markets for residential and non-residential customers, while the British, Dutch, Greek, Cypriot, and Irish NRAs defined the retail access markets on the basis of different levels of access (mainly PSTN or ISDN). Some NRAs included alternative means of access into the market, including optical cable and local area networks. In most cases, this inclusion did not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation. Nevertheless the Commission requested the Polish NRA, UKE, to withdraw its measures concerning markets 1 and 2 because UKE had not provided sufficient data to support the inclusion of xDSL access services in markets 1 and 2.

All NRAs that notified the markets for retail access thus far found the incumbent operators dominant on these markets. Even if NRAs generally imposed the full set of remedies, including price control², carrier selection and carrier pre-selection obligations, as well as wholesale line rental³ the application of remedies raised some concerns.

In particular, the Commission commented upon the absence of effective ex-ante price control obligations in Germany, the Czech Republic and – with the exception of carrier (pre-) selection – in Finland. Additionally, it considered the "retail-minus" approach chosen by the NRA in Luxemburg insufficient. The Commission also questioned the effectiveness of the expost price control in Germany and reminded Germany of Article 19(3) of the Universal Service Directive which foresees that CS/CPS must be provided on a cost-orientated basis; it also commented on the missing cost accounting methodology in Slovakia.

¹ The Estonian NRA has not yet notified markets 1 and 2. The Commission requested the Polish NRA to withdraw its measure on 10 January 2007.

² The Czech NRA (CTU), however, decided that the imposition of a price control obligation was not necessary. Given the strong position of the incumbent on the market, the Commission invited CTU to verify whether the remedies imposed at the wholesale and retail level are effective at addressing the market failures in the retail access markets.

³ Customers may be allowed to opt for calls to be carried by another operator than the one providing the access line. Such an alternative operator can be selected either in advance without having to dial a routing prefix for each call (carrier pre-selection) or on the basis of a routing prefix for each call (carrier selection). Wholesale line rental makes it possible for alternative operators to offer retail access services together with calls services to end customers in a way that the customer only receives one single bill from the alternative operator. The alternative operator resells to the end customer the access line that it rents from the incumbent at the wholesale level.

Further, the Commission had doubts whether the NRAs in Hungary, France, Slovenia and Spain had sufficiently assessed the impact of wholesale remedies in addressing market failures at retail level. According to Article 17(1) of the Universal Service Directive, obligations at retail level can only be imposed if remedies at wholesale level would not result in the achievement of the objectives defined in the Framework Directive (including the promotion of competition, the completion of the internal market for electronic communication services and benefits for users). The insufficient consideration of wholesale remedies when defining retail obligations could create barriers to the single market. In particular, the Commission commented on wholesale line rental in Portugal and Spain and asked Poland to specify its wholesale line rental obligation.

1.2. Retail local, national and international voice calls for residential and nonresidential users (markets 3 to 6)

These markets comprise all outgoing telephone calls from a fixed location. Publicly available telephone services for residential and non-residential customers are still commonly provided over traditional fixed telephone networks. 24 out of 25 NRAs notified their analysis in 2006. A second phase examination was launched by the Commission issuing doubts on the exclusion of calls made 0708 numbers via calling card operators from the Polish market. After additional information was provided by the Polish NRA, the Commission decided to withdraw its serious doubts.

In a majority of notifications, the fixed line incumbent was found to have SMP in all calls markets. However, the following number of national markets was (partly) found competitive: two markets for national calls for residential customers (market 3); eight markets for international calls for residential customers (market 4); three markets for national calls for non-residential customers (market 5) and nine markets for international calls for non-residential customers (market 6).

1.3. Retail leased lines (market 7)

A leased line is a permanently connected communications link between two premises dedicated to the customer's exclusive use. The market for retail leased lines corresponds to the minimum set of leased lines, as defined in the Commission Decision 2003/548/EC^{4.} Thus far, 24 NRAs have notified their review of market 7. Most NRAs defined the retail leased lines market in line with the Recommendation, while the Austrian, Portuguese and British NRA chose a broader market. Additionally, the Irish NRA defined a separate market for international leased lines, beyond the recommended market, in order to lift previous regulation, whereas the Maltese NRA included international leased lines market into six separate national and five separate international markets, while the French NRA demonstrated that the inclusion of leased lines above 2 Mbit/s and leased lines with alternative interfaces was justified by specific national circumstances.

It can however be assumed that competition of the retail market of leased lines will be achieved by the regulation of the corresponding wholesale markets (markets 13 and 14) in most Member States.

⁴ Commission Decision 2003/548/EC of 24 July 2003 on the minimum set of leased lines with harmonised characteristics and associated standards referred to in Article 18 of the Universal Service Directive, OJ L 186, 25.7.2003, p. 43.

Regarding regulatory remedies, Annex VII of the Universal Service Directive provides that NRAs shall ensure that the provision of the minimum set of leased lines follows the basic principles of non-discrimination, cost orientation and transparency. With the exception of the Finnish, Dutch, Spanish, Slovak and Hungarian NRA, NRAs imposed all the regulatory remedies foreseen by the Universal Service Directive.

1.4. Wholesale fixed call origination (market 8)

Provision of wholesale call origination enables alternative operators to provide end users with retail fixed telephone services, including dial-up Internet services. All but one NRA have notified their analysis on call origination at a fixed location. NRAs defined the market in line with the Recommendation, with the exception of the British, German, Dutch and Danish NRAs⁵.

The incumbent operator was found to have SMP in all notified cases, which indicates that wholesale fixed call origination remains one of the bottlenecks in electronic communications. When regulating this market effectively, through carrier selection, carrier pre-selection obligations and wholesale line rental obligations, barriers to enter the downstream retail access and calls markets may be lowered so that retail regulation could be phased out. In this context, it is of paramount importance that NRAs impose effective and proportional remedies. Therefore the Commission commented upon the fact that the Polish NRA had not specified the details of the price control obligations before the introduction of a new cost accounting model and noted that the Slovenian NRA should introduce cost oriented tariffs within the shortest timeframe possible. Further, the Commission expressed its concern regarding the non-imposition of (i) WLR in Spain and (ii) of a cost-orientation obligation in the Slovak Republic. In Hungary, the NRA allowed the four local incumbents to charge origination rates 40% higher than those of Matáv, which might impede further decreases of retail charges in the view of the Commission.

1.5. Wholesale fixed call termination (market 9)

Wholesale call termination can be defined as the wholesale service offered by operator A to operator B in order to enable the subscribers of operator B to call subscribers of operator A. In line with the Recommendation, all NRAs defined each individual fixed telephone network to constitute a relevant market for call termination. It follows that fixed termination markets are natural monopolies. With the exception of an initial notification by BNetzA – which was vetoed by the Commission – NRAs designated all the terminating operators as having SMP. In most cases the full set of remedies set out in the Access Directive were imposed on large SMP operators. Many NRAs applied asymmetric remedies, for example by imposing lighter cost control obligations on newly established operators.

As outlined in Chapter 4.2.2. of the Communication, the Commission emphasised the need for a coherent EU approach. It underlined that the imposition of asymmetric remedies necessitates an adequate reasoning. The Commission also stressed the importance of efficient cost-orientation and cost-accounting obligations. To the extent that it would be considered disproportionate to impose costly cost-orientation and cost-accounting obligations on a small

⁵ The Maltese NRA proposed to include broadband wireless access in ist draft measure, albeit without a full substitution analysis. The Commission noted that although such inclusion was questionable, it would not have any effect on the finding of SMP.

operator, other forms of cost-control for such operators, such as benchmarking, could be considered.

In several cases price control obligations were imposed in a way that does not guarantee legal certainty, such as ex post price control⁶, "reasonable" prices⁷, unclear cost accounting systems⁸ or the freedom of the SMP operator to choose the accounting system. Further, the Commission underlined the importance (i) of accounting separation in order to ensure transparency⁹. Accordingly, the Commission asked NRAs to modify the remedies in order to provide for transparency and consistency among Member States. In addition, the Commission commented on reviewing the need for asymmetric application of remedies¹⁰. For instance in Hungary, four local incumbents were allowed to charge termination rates that are 40% higher than those of Matáv; in Poland, alternative operators were not made subject to any form of price control.¹¹ Although such asymmetry might be justified in exceptional cases because of objective cost differences which are beyond the control of the operators concerned, they must be adequately reasoned. If asymmetries in termination rates are not based on objective cost differences, they must be phased out within a reasonable time frame. In this context, it is of paramount importance for the purpose of guaranteeing legal certainty that glide paths for the reduction of termination rates are specified in the regulatory measures¹².

1.6. Transit services in the public fixed telephone network (market 10)

Transit services refer to the (long distance) conveyance of switched calls on the public fixed telephone network. Depending on the network topology, the delineation between transit services and call origination may vary. Most NRAs defined the market in line with the Recommendation. The British, Dutch and German NRA, however, proposed more narrow market definitions; additionally, the British, Irish, Maltese, Cypriot and French¹³ NRA segmented national and international transit services. In the case of the Austrian NRA, the Commission required the NRA to withdraw the draft measure on the basis of a flaw in the market definition¹⁴.

In a large number of Member States, new entrants are still dependent on the incumbent for the provision of transit services on many routes. Out of the 24 NRAs¹⁵ that have notified the market thus far, 16 NRAs designated operators as having SMP¹⁶. In addition, BNetzA found certain of the more narrowly defined transit markets to be effectively competitive. Some of the notifying NRA imposed the full set of the remedies, whereas the Commission commented

 $^{^{6}}$ See the notification from the German NRA in case DE/2005/0239.

⁷ For example in the case of a notification from the Slovenian NRA. The Commission stressed that a price control based on cost oriented wholesale charges should be introduced as fast as possible.

⁸ For example in the case of a notification from the Finnish NRA.

⁹ See case DE/2005/0234.

¹⁰ For example in the case of notifications by the Italian, Swedish and Portuguese NRAs.

¹¹ See case PL/2006/0502. The Commission therefore invited UKE to monitor the market closely and to impose a cost orientation obligation on ANOs, if appropriate.

¹² See the case IT/2006/0384.

¹³ The French NRA distinguished between intra-territorial and interterritorial transit markets and defined 10 separate markets for the latter, on a territory-by-territory basis.

¹⁴ The Austrian regulator has challenged the validity of that decision before the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") via a preliminary ruling request. (See case C-256/05, Telekom Austria). On 6 October 2005, the ECJ ruled that the regulator's request for preliminary ruling was inadmissible. The Austrian NRA has re-notifed the market in January 2007.

¹⁵ The Estonian and Danish NRAs withdrew their notifications.

¹⁶ In Finland 14 operators were found to have SMP.

upon the non-imposition of price control obligations in Slovenia. Further, the Commission invited the Spanish NRA to consider imposing differentiated remedies given that alternative operators have gained significant market shares on some routes, while Telefonica still enjoys a quasi-monopoly on others.

1.7. Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to local loops (market 11)

This market covers wholesale access to the metallic local loops and sub-loops, i.e., to the "last mile" of the public fixed telecommunications network connecting the subscriber to the local exchange and to the main distribution frame, respectively.¹⁷ Once access is granted, new entrants can provide both voice and data services to end users over the local loop rented from the incumbent. Owing to the financial and social cost of duplicating this very last section of the fixed network, barriers to entry to this market are generally considered to be very high. All 24 notifying NRAs found that this market is not effectively competitive and designated the incumbent operators as SMP operators.

1.8. Wholesale broadband access (market 12)

Wholesale broadband access, ("bitstream" access or equivalent wholesale access), enables new entrants to provide retail broadband access services to end users by relying on their own backbone network in combination with access to the middle and lower parts of the incumbent's network. Bitstream access is generally considered as an essential stepping stone for new entrants towards investment in full-scale own network roll-out on the basis of local loop unbundling (so-called "ladder of investment" theory¹⁸). The question whether wholesale bitstream access products provided over non-PSTN infrastructure, typically cable but also other networks, currently or prospectively form part of this market continues to be debated. The Dutch and Maltese NRAs have defined the markets in this encompassing way¹⁹, so that the outcome of the market analysis was affected. Several other NRAs have included cable in the market but in none of these cases the inclusion of cable had any impact on the SMP finding or the remedies proposed.

24 NRAs have completed and notified their analysis; the large majority of them found the incumbent PSTN operators dominant²⁰. In most cases, the designated SMP operators were made subject to the full set of remedies under the Access Directive. Access obligations were not always imposed at several network levels.

¹⁷ Local loops were already subject to ex ante regulation prior to the entry into force of the New Regulatory Framework. Council Regulation 2887/2000 on unbundled access to the local loop sets harmonised conditions for unbundled access to the local loop.

¹⁸ There are three types of wholesale services that a new entrant can build on to offer retail broadband services: (i) a pure resale service, where the new entrant resells the incumbent's broadband connection to the end user and does not invest in own infrastructure, (ii) bitstream, where the new entrant builds its own backbone but relies on the incumbent's infrastructure for the lower and middle parts of the network, and (iii) local loop unbundling where the new entrant relies on the incumbent's infrastructure only for the so-called "last mile". The ladder of investment theory implies that new entrants pass gradually from relying on (i), via (ii) to (iii). In order to undertake investments in network development, they first need to be able to develop a sufficiently large retail customer basis relying on the network infrastructure of the incumbent.

¹⁹ In the Dutch case the market that encompassed cable was declared competititve.

²⁰ Belgium's notification is still missing, whereas the Maltese NRA has withdrawn its notification. In Luxemburg those markets were not analysed separately de spite the lack of sufficient evidence demonstrating that trunk and terminating segments of leased lines belong to the same market.

The Commission had to comment in a number of cases on the proposed remedies imposed by the NRAs. Among other things the Commission asked Germany²¹, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic²², Luxemburg and Finland to adopt effective ex ante price regulation²³. Luxemburg, Lithuania, Poland²⁴ and the Czech Republic²⁵ were invited to grant access at appropriate levels / specify the level of access in order to enable the development of competition.. The Commission asked Germany and Spain to apply access obligations to VDSL infrastructure and Germany and Luxemburg to implement stand alone bitstream access (in particular "naked DSL"), which enables alternative operators to provide broadband to end customers without the obligation to rent a telephone line from the incumbent. The Commission also stressed the importance of accounting separation with a view to ensuring transparency²⁶.

The Commission had to ask the German NRA to accelerate its notification of remedies, as Germany submitted a belated market analysis without notifying final remedies for more than one year afterwards.

1.9. Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines (market 13) and wholesale trunk segments of leased lines (market 14)

Wholesale leased lines consist of dedicated unmanaged connections between two points. Operators use them either to complete their own network infrastructure or to provide retail leased line services (see market 7 above). Under the Recommendation, the precise delineation between trunk and terminating segments of leased lines is recognised as being highly dependent on the network topology specific to the Member States concerned. Consequently, the determination of the boundaries between trunk and terminating segments varies significantly among Member States²⁷. Further, the Explanatory Memorandum to the recommendation does not exclude segmentation between high and low capacity leased lines, provided such segmentation is justified pursuant to the principles of competition law. Some NRAs (including the British, Dutch, Greek and Lithuanian NRA) thus segmented wholesale leased lines markets according to bandwidth²⁸. Finally, it should be recalled that the Recommendation does not restrict the markets for terminating and trunk segments of leased lines to any particular interface or technology. Therefore some NRAs included wholesale leased lines with alternative interfaces (in particular Ethernet) in the wholesale leased lines

²¹ In particular, the Commission stated that (i) ex post price control is not appropriate to remedy the competition problems identified in the wholesale market, and that (ii) price control should be based on cost orientation.

²² The Commission therefore invited the Slovak NRA to consider imposing IP and ATM access and possibly also access at the DSLAM.

²³ Concerning a notification from the Greek NRA, the Commission recalled that a margin squeeze analysis should not depend on unrealistic assumptions about the ability of new entrants to benefit from increased margins over time.

²⁴ In particular, the Commission reminded the Polish NRA of the importance of defining the scope of obligations imposed in an exact way.

²⁵ In the Czech Republic, the NRA proposed to impose an access obligation only at the IP level, but no ATM access.

²⁶ For example in the case of a notification from the Dutch NRA.

²⁷ The Commission commented on the lack of a clear definition of the boundary between the two markets in Poland.

²⁸ Additionally, the Italian NRA excluded trunk segments below 2 Mbit/s from regulation because in its view that market was marginal. Although the Commission disagreed with this approach, it did not believe that such exclusion would affect trade between Member States.

markets because they are functionally equivalent to wholesale leased lines with traditional interfaces.

24 NRA have notified the market for terminating segments for leased lines²⁹. All notifying NRAs found that the fixed incumbent operator(s) had SMP on this market, although the British NRA found that there was no SMP on the more narrowly defined market for very high capacity terminating segments of leased lines, whereas the Lithuanian NRA designated the incumbent operator as having SMP only on the market for low capacity leased lines.

The market for wholesale trunk segments of leased lines was notified by all NRAs with the exception of the Polish and the Estonian NRA³⁰. Most of the NRAs notifying the market found it to be effectively competitive, whereas NRAs in the UK, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Malta, France, Greece, Lithuania, Cyprus, Spain and Luxemburg designated operators as having SMP.

Regarding remedies in the market for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines, the Commission commented upon price control obligations in several cases in order to ensure the consistent application of remedies across the Community, in particular because the Commission was not convinced that the proposed draft measures contained sufficiently effective mechanisms for the implementation of cost accounting methodologies. Further, the Commission invited the Spanish NRA not to limit the scope of the remedies to leased lines with traditional interfaces.

1.10. Access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks (market 15)

Currently, access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks are typically supplied together by mobile network operators as part of the same market at wholesale level. These services allow new entrants to make use of the infrastructure of a mobile network operator to provide mobile telephone services to retail customers. The 22 NRAs having notified this market thus far³¹ did not deviate from the market definition contained in the Recommendation.

Although the Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation states that "... the level of competition generally observed in this market at the retail level indicates that ex-ante regulatory intervention at a wholesale level may not be warranted", the Irish³², Spanish and Maltese NRAs found joint dominance on this market, whereas the Slovenian and Cypriot NRAs designated one operator as having single SMP on this market. Further, the Commission required the Finnish NRA to withdraw its notification following a veto decision; in its final measure the Finnish NRA concluded that the market is effectively competitive.

The fact that at the wholesale level no access to third parties is granted does not *per se* mean that the market is non – competitive. Where the majority or all supply on the relevant market is captive, i.e. provided internally by vertically integrated mobile network operators, the structure of supply at the wholesale level can be derived from supply at the retail level. Competitive conditions at retail level are of crucial importance: they may provide an indicator of a rent to protect by the refusal to grant access at the wholesale level.

²⁹ The German NRA withdrew its notification.

³⁰ The German and Slovak NRA withdrew their notification.

³¹ It should be recalled, however, that the French and Polish NRAs withdrew their notification.

³² The decision of the Irish NRA was annulled by an appeals body.

In order to find joint SMP in the wholesale market of mobile access and call origination, it is not indispensable to find joint SMP at the retail level, but – among the other criteria defined in the "Air Tours" case³³ – it must be shown that (i) fringe competitors, such as emerging mobile network operators, do not have the ability to challenge any anticompetitive coordinated outcome and (ii) that pent-up demand exists, which means that it must be demonstrated that third parties have been denied access to the networks of mobile network operators despite their reasonable request.

1.11. Voice call termination on individual mobile networks (market 16)

Termination services are described under market 9 above. When provided on a mobile network, they are referred to as mobile termination services. 25 NRAs have notified the markets so far, having defined the market in line with the Recommendation, i.e. voice call termination by each individual network operator was found to constitute a separate relevant market. It follows that termination markets are natural monopolies and all NRAs found that all mobile network operators had SMP on their respective markets.

In all countries price control have been imposed on the operators, albeit in a number of countries, asymmetrical remedies have been applied, i.e. certain operators benefited from a higher regulatory termination fee.

Remedies have been highly heterogeneous throughout the EU, which cannot be explained solely due to different costs of the termination, but among other things to different costing models and highly different glide paths leading to a "cost oriented" level. As a consequence the regulatory outcome has been fragmented, despite the consistent method of SMP finding described above, leading to significantly different termination rates within the EU.

The Commission had asked in several cases to bring termination rates down by shortening glide paths and ending asymmetric treatment (i.e. favourable treatment for specific operators) earlier. Moreover, the Commission asked not to let termination rates being negotiated by operators, in order to avoid further delay and the lack of transparency. Enforcement of the Commission's comment would not only have led to more harmonisation but also to lower termination fees in a number of Member States which can be expected to translate into lower calling costs for consumers and enterprises.

1.12. Wholesale national markets for international roaming on public mobile networks (Market 17)

When a mobile subscriber travels abroad, his home operator needs to have negotiated with a mobile network operator in that country a network access agreement in order to enable the subscriber to make and receive calls. The network access corresponds to the provision of wholesale international roaming services. All of the 11 NRAs that have notified this market thus far found it effectively competitive. This market will be regulated via an EC Regulation.

³³ Judgment of 06.06.2002 of the Court of First Instance, case T-342/49, *Airtours vs Commission*. The Court considered that for collective dominance to be tenable in the long run, the market must be conducive to tacit coordination (in particular because of a high level of transparency), there must be a credible and enforceable retaliation mechanism and it must not be possible for competitors or customers to undermine the co-ordinated behaviour.

1.13. Broadcasting transmission services to deliver broadcast content to end users (market 18)

This market includes the transmission of broadcasting signals (radio and television signals) on behalf of the content providers to the end users. The 16 NRAs that have notified the broadcasting market thus far have segmented it into various more narrowly defined product markets on the basis of the platform used (cable, satellite or terrestrial), the transmission mode (analogue or digital), the geographical coverage of the network (local or national) and/or the signal transmitted (radio or television). Concrete market circumstances, underlying the market definition, appear to vary substantially from one Member State to the other. A considerable number of submarkets were found to be competitive. Where NRAs wanted to exempt parts of the market from regulation (for example cable transmission networks and satellite networks), the Commission has carefully analysed whether such an approach was justified on the basis of the three criteria test not being met and/or on the basis of no operator having SMP the market.

National terrestrial TV transmission systems seem to remain a bottleneck, in particular due to barriers to entry. Most cable submarkets were found to be competitive, the Netherlands and Germany being the exception, were SMP in the cable markets was found.

However, on a forward looking basis competitive conditions can be expected to improve considerably in all Member States due to increased platforms competition, given the emergence of terrestrial digital television and internet television.

The type of remedies imposed is subject to significant variations in the Member States, which was commented upon in several cases by the Commission in order to safeguard the consistency of regulation in the broadcasting transmission market. In particular, the Commission was concerned about the fact that some NRAs did not impose transparency and price control obligations. Further, the Commission services commented upon the implementation of price control obligations, either because they were not accompanied by an appropriate cost accounting methodology or the use of benchmarking, or because the timeframe foreseen for the introduction of price control was excessively long.

ANNEX IV

Market 1: Access to the public telephone network provided at a fixed location for residential customers

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed						
			Carrier (Pre) Selection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation		
Austria****	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	NO	YES	YES		
Denmark	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO***	NO		
Finland	YES	43 operators	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO		
France	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO		
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Portugal	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO		
Slovenia****	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	NO	YES	NO		

Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	NO	NO	YES
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	NO	YES	YES	YES****	NO
Netherlands	NO	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Malta	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES
Italy	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Germany	NO	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cyprus	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES
Belgium	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES
Greece	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Poland	NO	1 operator		The decisi	on was vetoed by the	e Commission	
Luxembourg	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO

*Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

**Imposition of WLR

- *** Universal service-based price control obligation only
- **** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

***** second market review

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 1: Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for residential customers Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation	
				1 - Non-discrimination		
1112/2002/0000	and line services and (ii) the	LUZ (analadiaa	BT and Kingston	2 - Publication of charges, terms and conditions of supply	The Commission made a comment on:	
and		UK (excluding the Hull area) and the Hull area		3 - BT only: annual ceiling for charges equivalent to RPI increase	Markets defined more narrowly than in the Recommendation: A broader market definition, in line with the Recommendation, is not likely to lead to a different SMP outcome. Therefore the conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not relevant.	
				4 - BT only: cost-accounting in respect of residential analogue access	exact scope of the markets is not relevant.	
FI/2003/0020	Similar to the Recommendation.	Regional	43 regional operators	1 - Users' right to a connection to fixed telephone network	The Commission made a comment on:	
				2 - Obligation to publish standard agreement terms and tariff information on services	Remedies at retail level: No further obligations are imposed on the SMP operators at retail level in addition to CS/CPS and other non-SMP obligations based on the Universal Service Directive. NRA should assess the impact of regulation at wholesale level and of CS/CPS on the market and consider additional regulation at retail	

				3 - User's right to pre-selection / carrier pre-selection	level.
				1 - Transparency	
				2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
PT/2004/0053	Similar to the Recommendation.		PT Group	3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	Wholesale line rental
and PT/2004/0091		National		4 - Accounting separation	Wholesale line rental is an appropriate remedy to address the lack of competition in the relevant retail market. The
				5 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	need for Wholesale Line rental should decrease, as competitors to the incumbent invest in their
				6 - Price affordability	infrastructure.
				7 - Wholesale line rental	

AT/2004/0109 AT/2005/0303 AT/2007/0579	In the second round of market review retail broadband access has been included	National	Telekom Austria	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	TheCommissionmadecommentson:Inclusion in the accessmarkets of broadband accesslines over which VoB services are providedTKK includesbroadband access lines over which VoBservices are provided in the retail accessmarketsessentially on the basis of the argument that such lines areeffectively being used, inter alia, to make and receivecalls in full connectivity with the PSTN network. ³⁴ However, the functionality of narrowband access linesand broadband access lines in general overlap only partly.Although broadband connections are also capable offacilitating delivery of telephone services, customersgenerally will not switch from a narrowband to abroadband connections primarily to get access to higherspeed Internet services. From a functional viewpoint,broadband access therefore tends to be only partiallysubstitutable with narrowband access lines.Moreover, in accordance with competition law principles,product characteristics and intended use are insufficient
--	--	----------	--------------------	---------------------------	---

		2 - Wholesale line rental	to show whether two products are substitutes. Functional interchangeability or similarity in characteristics may not, in themselves, provide sufficient criteria, because the responsiveness of customers to relative price changes may be determined by other considerations as well. ³⁵ Before including certain broadband access lines within the same relevant markets as PSTN and ISDN access lines, TKK should therefore examine the prices of the various products and investigate what the impact would be if a hypothetical monopolist on the narrowband access markets would impose a small but significant non-transitional price increase of 5 to 10%. Only if such a price increase causes customers to switch to broadband access that the price increase becomes unprofitable, should broadband access be included in the relevant market. ³⁶
			Even though broadband access services, however, may not be part of the relevant markets, such services, when offered by alternative operators, may have an impact on TA's market power since competitive constraints can, in particular circumstances, also stem from neighbouring

		3 - Non-discrimination	 markets. TKK could therefore have taken the provision of broadband access lines over which VoB services are or can be offered into account at the stage of the SMP finding. In any event, since TA does not provide any such broadband access lines as TKK has included in the relevant market, the exclusion of such services from the relevant market would not affect the SMP finding in this case nor on the scope of the remedies imposed.³⁷ Should TA, however, within the period of this review start offering broadband access lines over which it offers VoB services, the remedies currently imposed should not be extended to cover such broadband access lines without TKK justifying on the basis of further evidence that the inclusion of such lines in the relevant markets is justified on the basis of competition law principles. Such a finding would be subject to the procedure foreseen in Article 7 Framework Directive. Efficiency of wholesale regulation
--	--	------------------------	--

		TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant changes in the competitive conditions in the retail calls markets since the first market review. This calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of the current wholesale regulation. The Commission already commented upon this issue in the context of TKK's second market review of the fixed wholesale markets ³⁸ . With regard to the present notifications, the Commission services would like to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail access markets, could be lowered.
	4 - Accounting separation	

		5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
		6 - Ex ante approval of end- users tariffs	

SE/2004/0112	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TeliaSonera	 1 - Wholesale line rental (including reference offer and price regulated on a retail minus basis) 2 - Non-discrimination 3 - Accounting separation 4 - Carrier(Pre)Selection, also in respect of access supplied via Wholesale line rental to another operator 5 - Obligation to supply calls not covered by carrier pre- selection (freephone, emergency, premium rate calls) 6- Provision of unbundled broadband access (no requirement to purchase 	No comments made by the Commission.
				telephone subscription)	
HU/2005/0130	Similar to the Recommendation.	Regional	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The Commission made a comment on:
	Includes public		Távközlési		Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the

	payphones.		Szolgáltató, Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon Társaság	2 - Not to increase prices in excess to the consumer price index.	corresponding wholesale markets: Retail market remedies are supposed to be imposed after it has been recognised that remedies imposed on the wholesale market do not provide for effective competition. When carrying out the review of the relevant wholesale markets, the NRA should assess the effectiveness of remedies imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail market.
	Access for residential and non- residential customers are included in one market. Lower			 1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and Wholesale Line Rental, including price control in the form of retail minus 2 - Access obligation 	
				3 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2005/0158	narrowband access (PSTN, FWA,	National	Eircom	4 - Transparency	Further consultations planned by ComReg on details of cost accounting and accounting separation are required to
	ISDN) and higher narrowband access			5 - Accounting separation	be notified to the Commission.
	(ISDN2 and ISDN30) are in different markets.			6- Cost orientation and cost accounting	
				7 - Not to unreasonably bundle services	
SK/2005/0172	Similar to the	National	Slovak Telecom	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The Commission made comments on:

	Recommendation.			2 - Price control (not allowed to charge unreasonably high or low prices)	Proper national consultation on each draft measure when the measure has a significant impact on the relevant market. Give all interested parties the opportunity to comment on draft measures.
				3 - Non-discrimination	Implementation of price control and cost accounting: Details on the implementation of price control and cost accounting have to be specified in the final measure. Reference to Art. 17(4) of the Universal Service Directive.
				4 - Prohibition of bundling of products	Implementation of cost orientation related to CS/CPS: The Commission pointed out that cost orientation on CS/CPS should be implemented with an appropriate cost accounting method.
				1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	
DK/2005/0183	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TDC	2 - Price regulation (due to the Universal service obligations)	No comments made by the Commission.
FR/2005/0221	Similar to the Recommendation.	Metropolitan France, overseas territories and Mayotte (except	France Télécom	1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and Wholesale Line Rental	The Commission made a comment on: Remedies and next market review: ARCEP is invited
		the territory of Saint-Pierre-et-		2- Non discrimination	to ensure full, effective and appropriate enforcement of the obligations imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit

		Miquelon)		3 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of access and call products	reviewing the present market analysis following such enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.
				4 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory pricing	
				5 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-vis the NRA	
				6 - Accounting separation	
SI/2005/0231 SI/2007/0600	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Slovenije	1 - Obligation to offer wholesale line rental (WLR)	Concerning the first round of market review, the Commission made comments on:
				2 - Carrier Selection (CS) and Carrier Pre-selection (CPS	Remedies at retail level: When carrying out the forthcoming review of the corresponding relevant wholesale market, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures at retail level.
				3 - Prohibition to charge excessive prices: price cap for subscription fees and maintains the cost-oriented price obligation with regard to the other end-user prices linked to access to the public telephone network.	Obligation to provide ADSL services not only to end- users who subscribe also to ISDN: The remedy imposed (non-discrimination) would be more appropriate if it included a general prohibition to oblige end-users of fixed access products to subscribe to a particular type of access product under any circumstances unless it is technically necessary for the provision of a given service.

	 4 - Prohibition to limit competition by setting predatory pricing: As mentioned above, APEK maintains the method of cost oriented prices for those prices which are not regulated by price cap. The cost oriented prices methodology is based on fully allocated costs (FAC) and current cost accounting (CCA) 5 - Obligation not to 	
	discriminate among end-users purchasing access to the fixed telephone network, namely to	

offer ADSL services to endusers irrespective of whether

				services.	
				6 - Prohibition of unjustified bundling of services. APEK imposes on TS the obligation not to make certain services conditional upon the purchase of another service which the user does not need/want.	
				1 – Wholesale Line Rental	
				2 – non discrimination	
IT/2005/0260	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Telecom Italia	3 - transparency	No comments made by the Commission
				4 – not to unduly bundle products and services	
				5 – price control	
NL/2005/0287	OPTA distinguishes two retail access markets, (1) a low capacity access market that	National	KPN	1 – cost accounting	The Commission made a comment on:
	includes telephone connections with no more than two voice channels -i.e.			2 – price regulation	Narrow market definition OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly than

	analogue, ISDN1 and ISDN 2 connections; and (2) a high-capacity			3 – non discrimination	foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, OPTA defines isolated markets for fixed-to mobile calls, narrowband data services, calls to information numbers and calls to personal assistant numbers. The Commission is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is
	access market that includes those connections with more than two telephone lines -i.e. ISDN 15, ISNDN 20, and ISDN 30 connections			4 - transparency	justified. However, in these particular cases, as it does not have any impact on the finding of SMP, nor on the remedies imposed, the exact market definition can be left open.
DE/2005/0306 DE/2006/0402	the markets for access to the public telephone network at a fixed location as a single market for all customers using analogue access lines, ISDN lines and ISDN-PMX lines	National	DTAG	1 - CS/CPS	Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in resolving the identified market failure in the fixed access market The Commission considers that in view of the fact that DTAG hence faces limited (potential) competition on the retail access market, the risk of excessive pricing by DTAG cannot be excluded. Ex post price control may not be effective in protecting consumers against that risk, in particular in view of the fact that the ex post price control foreseen in the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) only prohibits tariffs that would be <i>manifestly</i> abusive. Therefore BNetzA should consider imposing a more

				2 - The obligation to notify new tariffs	 efficient price control mechanism. Non-imposition of cost orientation for the CS / CPS obligation Article 19 (3) of the Universal Service Directive provides that CS and CPS must be offered on a cost oriented basis. On the basis of this provision and Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the Commission reminds BNetzA of Article 19(3) of the Universal Service Directive which provides that CS/CPS must be provided for on a cost oriented basis and asks BNetzA to indicate how it will implement this obligation. Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission also considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, BNetzA should impose on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive
ES/2006/0336	Similar to the Recommendation	National	TESAU	CS/CPS	Remedies at retail level: Article 17 of the Universal Service Directive provides that if, as a result of a market analysis carried out in accordance with Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive, an NRA determines that a

				Price control for analogue access lines	given retail market is not effectively competitive and concludes that wholesale obligations imposed under the Access Directive or the obligation to provide CS and CPS do not result in the
				Non-discrimination	achievement of the regulatory objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the NRA shall impose appropriate regulatory obligations on undertakings identified as having SMP on a given retail market.
				Prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour	The Commission notes that CMT has not yet completed the review of the related wholesale markets, in particular markets 8 and 11 of the Recommendation.
				transparency	In that respect, the Commission would like to remind CMT that when carrying out the forthcoming review of the corresponding relevant wholesale markets, it should assess the impact, appropriateness and the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail market.
				Accounting separation	Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail remedies as currently proposed in this notification, CMT is required to notify any possible resulting modification of retail
					remedies to the Commission pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
	Similar to the				The Commission made a comment on:
CZ/2006/0356	Recommendation.	National	CTU	1 - CS/CPS	Efficiency of the proposed remedies in resolving identified market failures:
					CTU considers that the proposed retail remedies, in combination with the remedies imposed on related

				2 – accounting separation	 wholesale markets, in particular wholesale unbundled access to metallic loops and sub-loops, are sufficient to remedy the market failure on these retail markets. Therefore, CTU does not intend to impose any pricing conditions neither in relation to the provision of access for resale by third parties nor in relation to the retail access market for non-residential customers. The Commission notes that the incumbent still has a very strong position on both retail access markets.
				3 - provision of access services to the public telephone network at a fixed location for resale by third parties	CTU is invited to closely monitor the development of competition on these markets, to verify whether the remedies imposed at wholesale and retail level are effective in addressing the market failures in the retail access markets. In case the development of competitive conditions would not be satisfactory, CTU should consider before the end of the three year period of review whether to amend the retail remedies as currently proposed in this notification
				4 – cost orientation (only market 1)	
MT/2006/0394	The inclusion of Broadband Wireless Access (BWA).	National	Maltacom	CS/CPS	The Commission made a comment on:

				Wholesale Line Rental	The inclusion of BWA in the same market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines	
				Cost orientation	The MCA considers that BWA is a potential substitute to fixed access services over	
					Cost accounting and accounting separation	the PSTN and over cable-TV networks. Within the timeframe of the review, the MCA expects the roll-out of the BWA networks to be at an advanced stage and predicts that BWA networks will have the capability to
				Non discrimination	offer access services. Therefore, the MCA includes BWA in the same relevant	
				Transparency	market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines. As regards BWA, the Commission notes that the MCA has not conducted a substitution analysis before defining the relevant market.	
					In particular, the MCA has neither assessed whether end- users would consider switching from a fixed narrowband access product to a BWA product in case of small but non-significant price increase, nor the functionality of the BWA product.	
				Prohibition to bundle services	However, the Commission recognises the fact that in this particular case the inclusion of this technology in the relevant market does not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.	
BE/2006/0400	Similar to the	National	Belgacom	CS/CPS		
	Recommendation.			transparency		

				Non-discrimination Wholesale Line Rental	
				Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission
				Accounting separation	
				Information and notification obligation	
LT/2006/0411 and LT/2006/0512	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TEO LT AB	CS/CPS	The Commission made a comment on: The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cable and local area networks in the same market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines RRT considers that cable TV networks, wireless radio,

	Price control and cost accounting	optic cable and local area networks could provide a potential substitute to fixed access services over PSTN and ISDN. Within the timeframe of the review, RRT expects the further growth of cable TV networks and an increased ability to offer access services. For the other alternative platforms, RRT does not provide a forecast that would show that, within the timeframe of the review, these access technologies would effectively develop as alternative access platforms. Also, as regards wireless radio, optic cable and local area networks and cable TV networks, the Commission notes that RRT has not conducted a substitution analysis before defining the relevant market. In particular, RRT has not assessed whether end users would be able to switch from the metallic loop to any of the other access platforms in case
	Accounting separation	of a small but significant price increase in the metallic loop access prices. In order to assess the substitutability, RRT is invited to examine <i>inter alia</i> the functionality of these alternative access technologies and include the result of this analysis in its final measure. However, the Commission notes that, in this particular case, the inclusion of any of the alternative access technologies in the definition of the relevant market does not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.
	Wholesale Line Rental	

				CS/CPS and WLR	No comments made by the Commission
	low level			Non discrimination	
	narrowband access including PSTN and			Transparency	
CY/2006/485	ISDN BRA and (ii) high level narrowband access	national	СҮТА	Accounting separation	
	including ISDN PRA due to the differences in quality			Price control and cost accounting	
	of service and speed			Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	
				WLR	No comments made by the Commission
	(i) lower			Non discrimination	
	level narrowband			transparency	
EL/2006/0500	and (ii) higher level narrowband access.	national	OTE	Price control	
				Unbundling of services	
				Cost accounting and accounting separation	
PL/2006/0518	An access through x DSL included in the market definition	national	TP SA	a prohibition of excessive pricing	
	market definition			an obligation to refrain from distorting the market entry of other undertakings	

				 an obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision an obligation to refrain from applying preferential treatment to end users an obligation to refrain from obliging the end users to use unnecessary services cost orientation and cost accounting obligation an obligation to submit for approval prices and other conditions of service provision 	The Commission vetoed the draft measure based on: Lack of evidence that ISDN/PSTN access and broadband access in Poland are substitutable products
LU/2007/0526	analogue access and basic digital access included. ISDN PRA excluded from the market	national	EPT	 Wholesale obligations: 1 – access (CS/CPS and WLR) 2 – non discrimination 3 – transparency 3 – accounting separation 4 – price control Retail obligations: 1 – non discrimination 	The Commission made a comment on: Price control obligation ILR intends to base the price control obligation for WLR on the "retail minus" methodology. It should be recalled that retail access prices for residential and non residential customers are above the EU average in Luxemburg. A retail minus methodology might result in WLR prices that exceed costs. Given the fact that the cost orientation obligation at retail level is proposed to be removed, it is all the more important that WLR prices are set at cost. Consequently, the Commission invites ILR to impose a cost orientation obligation concerning WLR prices. This would ensure that users are offered attractive prices,

				2 – transparency	whilst allowing EPT to recover its costs.
				3 – price control	
					Lack of details concerning price control obligation
					The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of
				1 - CS/CPS	the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the
					Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its final measure the details of the price control remedy imposed.
			Lattelecom	2 – price control	Non-imposition of accounting separation
LV/2007/0565	Similar to the Recommendation				The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures
					identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such
					an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a
					cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the
					Access Directive

Market 2: Access to the public telephone network

provided at a fixed location for non residential customers

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed					
			Carrier (Pre) Selection Non-discrimination		Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria****	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	NO	YES	YES	
Denmark	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO***	NO	
Finland	YES	43 operators	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	
France	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Portugal	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	
Slovenia****	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	NO	YES	NO	
Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES	NO	NO	YES	
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	NO	YES	YES	YES****	NO	

Netherlands	NO	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	
Malta	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Italy	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Germany	NO	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Cyprus	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Belgium	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES**	YES**	YES	YES	YES	
Greece	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Poland	NO	1 operator	The decision was vetoed by the Commission					
Luxembourg	NO*	1 operator	YES**	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	

* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

** Imposition of WLR

*** Universal service-based price control obligation only

**** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

*****second market review

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

EN

Market 2: Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for non-residential customers Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
	3 segments defined: (i) business retail			1 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
UK/2003/0009 and	analogue exchange line services; (ii) business retail ISDN2 exchange	UK (excluding the Hull area) and the	BT and Kingston	2 - Publication of charges, terms and conditions of supply	Markets defined more narrowly then in the Recommendation: A broader market definition, in
UK/2003/0010	line services and (iii) business retail ISDN30 exchange line services.	Hull area	Kingston	3- BT only: annual ceiling for charges equivalent to RPI increase	line with the Recommendation, is not likely to lead to a different SMP outcome. Therefore the conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not relevant.
				1 - Users' right to a connection to fixed telephone network	The Commission made a comment on:
FI/2003/0021	Similar to the Recommendation.	Regional	43 regional operators	2 - Obligation to publish standard agreement terms and tariff information on services	Remedies at retail level: No further obligations are imposed on the SMP operators at retail level in addition to CS/CPS and other non-SMP obligations based on the Universal Service Directive. NRA
				3 - User's right to pre-selection / carrier pre-selection	should assess the impact of regulation at wholesale level and of CS/CPS on the market and consider additional regulation at retail level.

				1 - Transparency	
PT/2004/0054			PT Group	2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on: Wholesale line rental: Wholesale line rental is an
PT/2004/0054 and PT/2004/0091	Similar to the Recommendation.	National		3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	appropriate remedy to address the lack of competition in the relevant retail market. The need for Wholesale Line rental should decrease, as competitors to the incumbent invest in their infrastructure.
				4 - Accounting separation	
				1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The Commission made comments on: Inclusion in the access markets of broadband
			Telekom Austria	2 - Wholesale line rental	access lines over which VoB services are provided TKK includes broadband access lines over which
		of market review		3 - Non-discrimination	VoB services are provided in the retail access markets essentially on the basis of the argument that such lines are effectively being used, <i>inter alia</i> ,
AT/2004/0110 AT/2005/0303	In the second round of market review retail broadband			4 - Accounting separation	to make and receive calls in full connectivity with the PSTN network. However, the functionality of narrowband access lines and broadband access lines in general overlap only partly. Although
AT/2007/0580				5 - Cost orientation	broadband connections are also capable of facilitating delivery of telephone services, customers generally will not switch from a
			6 - Ex ante approval of end-users tariffs	narrowband to a broadband connection for the sole purpose of accessing voice services. Consumers switch from narrowband to broadband connections primarily to get access to higher speed Internet services. From a functional viewpoint, broadband access therefore tends to be only partially substitutable with narrowband access lines. Moreover, in accordance with competition law	

I			
			principles, product characteristics and intended use
			are insufficient to show whether two products are
			substitutes. Functional interchangeability or
			similarity in characteristics may not, in themselves,
			provide sufficient criteria, because the
			responsiveness of customers to relative price
			changes may be determined by other considerations
			as well. Before including certain broadband access
			lines within the same relevant markets as PSTN
			and ISDN access lines, TKK should therefore
			examine the prices of the various products and
			investigate what the impact would be if a
			hypothetical monopolist on the narrowband access
			markets would impose a small but significant non-
			transitional price increase of 5 to 10%. Only if such
			a price increase causes customers to switch to
			broadband access so that the price increase
			becomes unprofitable, should broadband access be
			included in the relevant market.
			Even though broadband access services, however,
			may not be part of the relevant markets, such
			services, when offered by alternative operators,
			may have an impact on TA's market power since
			competitive constraints can, in particular
			circumstances, also stem from neighbouring
			markets. TKK could therefore have taken the
			provision of broadband access lines over which
			VoB services are or can be offered into account at
			the stage of the SMP finding.
			In any event, since TA does not provide any such
			broadband access lines as TKK has included in the
			relevant market, the exclusion of such services
			from the relevant market would not affect the SMP
			finding in this case nor on the scope of the
			remedies imposed. Should TA, however, within the
			period of this review start offering broadband
			access lines over which it offers VoB services, the
			remedies currently imposed should not be extended

					to cover such broadband access lines without TKK justifying on the basis of further evidence that the inclusion of such lines in the relevant markets is justified on the basis of competition law principles. Such a finding would be subject to the procedure foreseen in Article 7 Framework Directive. Efficiency of wholesale regulation TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant changes in the competitive conditions in the retail calls markets since the first market review. This calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of the current wholesale regulation. The Commission already commented upon this issue in the context of TKK's second market review of the fixed wholesale markets. With regard to the present notifications, the Commission services would like to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail access markets, could be lowered.
SE/2004/0113	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TeliaSonera	1 - Wholesale line rental (including reference offer and price regulated on a retail minus basis)	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 - Accounting separation	

				 4 - Carrier(Pre)Selection, also in respect of access supplied via WLR to another operator 5 - Obligations to supply calls not covered by carrier pre-selection (freephone, emergency, premium rate calls) 6- Provision of unbundled broadband access (no requirement to purchase telephone subscription) 	
HU/2005/0131	Similar to the	Pagianal	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató,	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The Commission made a comment on: Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the corresponding wholesale markets: Retail market remedies are supposed to be imposed after it has been recorrised that remedies imposed
HU/2005/0131	Recommendation.	Regional	Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon Társaság	2 - Not to increase prices in excess to the consumer price index.	after it has been recognised that remedies imposed on the wholesale market do not provide for effective competition. When carrying out the review of the relevant wholesale markets, the NRA should assess the effectiveness of remedies imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail market.

				1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and Wholesale Line Rental, including price control in the form of retail minus	
	Access for residential and non- residential			2 - Access obligation	
	customers are included in one market. Lower			3 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2005/0159	narrowband access (PSTN, FWA, ISDN) and higher	National	Eircom	4 - Transparency	Further consultations planned by ComReg on details of cost accounting and accounting separation are required to be notified to the
	narrowband access (ISDN2 and ISDN30) are in			5 - Accounting separation	Commission.
	different markets.			6 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
				7 - Not to unreasonably bundle services	
STZ /2005 /0152	Similar to the		Slovak		The Commission made comments on:
SK/2005/0173	Recommendation.	National	Telecom	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	Proper national consultation on each draft measure when the measure has a significant impact on the relevant market. Give all interested parties
				2 - Price control (not allowed to	the opportunity to comment on draft measures.
				charge unreasonably high or low prices)	Implementation of price control and cost accounting: Details on the implementation of price control and cost accounting have to be specified in

				3 - Non-discrimination	the final measure. Reference to Art. 17(4) of the UniversalServiceDirective.Implementation of cost orientation related to CS/CPS: The Commission pointed out that cost costCS/CPS: and the intervention of the cost
				4 - Prohibition of bundling of products	orientation on CS/CPS should be implemented with an appropriate cost accounting method.
DK/2005/0184	Similar to the	TDC	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	No comments made by the Commission	
DK/2005/0184	Recommendation	National	IDC	2 - Price regulation (due to the Universal service obligations)	No comments made by the Commission.
				1 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and Wholesale Line Rental	
		Metropolitan	France Télécom	2- Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on: Remedies and next market review: ARCEP is invited to ensure full, effective and appropriate enforcement of the obligations imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing the present market analysis following such enforcement, in any
FR/2005/0222	Similar to the	France, overseas territories and Mayotte (except		3 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of access and call products	
	Recommendation.	the territory of Saint-Pierre-et- Miquelon)		4 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory pricing	
				5 - Ex ante tariff information vis-à- vis the NRA	case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.
				6 - Accounting separation	

SI/2005/0231 SI/2007/0601	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Slovenije	1 - Obligation to offer wholesale line rental (WLR)	Concerning first market review, the Commission made comments on:
				2 - Carrier Selection (CS) and Carrier Pre-selection (CPS	Remedies at retail level: When carrying out the forthcoming review of the corresponding relevant wholesale market, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures at retail level.
				3 - Prohibition to charge excessive prices: price cap for subscription fees and maintains the cost-oriented price obligation with regard to the other end-user prices linked to access to the public telephone network.	Obligation to provide ADSL services not only to end-users who subscribe also to ISDN: The remedy imposed (non-discrimination) would be more appropriate if it included a general prohibition to oblige end-users of fixed access products to subscribe to a particular type of access product under any circumstances unless it is technically necessary for the provision of a given service.
					As regards the notification SI/2007/0600 (second market review) the Commission made no comments .

		 4 - Prohibition to limit competition by setting predatory pricing: As mentioned above, APEK maintains the method of cost oriented prices for those prices which are not regulated by price cap. The cost oriented prices methodology is based on fully allocated costs (FAC) and current cost accounting (CCA) 	
		5 - Obligation not to discriminate among end-users purchasing access to the fixed telephone network, namely to offer ADSL services to end-users irrespective of whether they also subscribe to ISDN services.	

				 6 - Prohibition of unjustified bundling of services. APEK imposes on TS the obligation not to make certain services conditional upon the purchase of another service which the user does not need/want. 	
				1 – Wholesale Line Rental	
				2 – non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
IT/2005/0260	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Telecom Italia	3 - transparency	
	Recommendation			4 – not to unduly bundle products and services	
				5 – price control	
NL/2005/0288	OPTA distinguishes two retail access markets, (1) a low capacity access market that	National	KPN	1 – cost accounting	The Commission made a comment on: Narrow market definition
	includes telephone connections with no more than two voice channels -i.e. analogue,			2 – price regulation	OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly than foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, OPTA defines isolated markets for fixed-to mobile calls, narrowband data services, calls to information numbers and calls to personal assistant

ISDN1 and ISDN 2 connections; and (2) a high-capacity access market that includes those	3 – non discrimination	numbers. The Commission is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is justified. However, in these particular cases, as it does not have any impact on the finding of SMP, nor on the remedies imposed, the exact market definition can be left open.
connections with more than two telephone lines -i.e. ISDN 15,		
ISNDN 20, and ISDN 30 connections	4 - transparency	

DE/2005/0306 DE/2006/0402	the markets for access to the public telephone network at a fixed location as a single market for all customers using analogue access lines, ISDN lines and ISDN-PMX lines	National	DTAG	CS/CPS	 The Commission made comments on: Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in resolving the identified market failure in the fixed access market DTAG has a market share of approximately 94% in the retail access market. Competitive pressure resulting from LLU may be limited in particular in certain geographic areas. On a prospective basis, WLR is not available in Germany rendering it more difficult for alternative operators to climb the ladder of investment towards full unbundling. The Commission considers that in view of the fact that DTAG hence faces limited (potential) competition on the retail access market, the risk of excessive pricing by DTAG cannot be
------------------------------	--	----------	------	--------	---

				The obligation to notify new tariffs	 excluded. Ex post price control may not be effective in protecting consumers against that risk, in particular in view of the fact that the ex post price control foreseen in the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) only prohibits tariffs that would be <i>manifestly</i> abusive. Therefore BNetzA should consider imposing a more efficient price control mechanism. Non-imposition of cost orientation for the CS / CPS obligation Article 19 (3) of the Universal Service Directive9 provides that CS and CPS must be offered on a cost oriented basis. On the basis of this provision and Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the Commission reminds BNetzA of Article 19(3) of the Universal Service Directive which provides that CS/CPS must be provided for on a cost oriented basis and asks BNetzA to indicate how it will implement this obligation. Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission also considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, BNetzA should impose
--	--	--	--	--------------------------------------	--

		on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost- orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

				The Commission made a comment on:
				Efficiency of the proposed remedies in resolving identified market failures: CTU considers that the proposed retail remedies, in combination with the remedies imposed on related wholesale markets, in particular wholesale unbundled access
CZ/2006/0356	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	СТИ	to metallic loops and sub-loops, are sufficient to remedy the market failure on these retail markets. Therefore, CTU does not intend to impose any pricing conditions neither in relation to the provision of access for resale by third parties nor in relation to the retail access market for non- residential customers.
				The Commission notes that the incumbent still has a very strong position on both retail access markets. CTU is invited to closely monitor the development
				of competition on these markets, to verify whether the remedies imposed at wholesale and retail level are effective in addressing the market failures in the retail access markets. In case the development of competitive conditions would not be satisfactory, CTU should consider before the end of the three year period of review whether to amend the retail remedies as currently
				proposed in this notification.

		2 – accounting separation	

				3 - provision of access services to the public telephone network at a fixed location for resale by third parties	
MT/2006/0394	The inclusion of Broadband Wireless Access (BWA).	National	Maltacom	CS/CPS	The Commission made a comment on: The inclusion of BWA in the same market as fixed residential analogue and
				Wholesale Line Rental	cable access lines The MCA considers that BWA is a potential substitute to fixed access services over
				Cost orientation	the PSTN and over cable-TV networks. Within the timeframe of the review, the MCA expects the roll- out of the BWA networks to be at an advanced stage and predicts that BWA networks will have the capability to offer access services.
				Cost accounting and accounting separation	Therefore, the MCA includes BWA in the same relevant market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines. As regards BWA, the Commission notes that the MCA has not conducted a substitution analysis before defining

			Non discrimination	the relevant market. In particular, the MCA has neither assessed whether end-users would consider switching from a fixed narrowband access product to a BWA product in case of small but non-significant price
			Transparency	increase, nor the functionality of the BWA product. However, the Commission recognises the fact that in this particular case the inclusion of this technology in the relevant market does not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.
			Prohibition to bundle services	

DE/2005/0306 DE/2006/0402	the markets for access to the public telephone network at a fixed location as a single market for all customers using analogue access lines, ISDN lines and ISDN-PMX lines	national	DTAG	CS/CPS	The Commission made comments on: Effectiveness of the proposed remedies in resolving the identified market failure in the fixed access market DTAG has a market share of approximately 94% in the retail access market. Competitive pressure resulting from LLU may be limited in particular in certain geographic areas. On a prospective basis, WLR is not available in Germany rendering it more difficult for alternative operators to climb the ladder of investment towards full unbundling. The Commission considers that in view of the fact that DTAG hence faces limited (potential) competition on the retail access market, the risk of excluded. Ex post price control may not be effective in protecting consumers against that risk, in particular in view of the fact that the ex post price control foreseen in the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) only prohibits

		The obligation to notify new tariffs	 more efficient price control mechanism. Non-imposition of cost orientation for the CS / CPS obligation Article 19 (3) of the Universal Service Directive9 provides that CS and CPS must be offered on a cost oriented basis. On the basis of this provision and Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the Commission reminds BNetzA of Article 19(3) of the Universal Service Directive which provides that CS/CPS must be provided for on a cost oriented basis and asks BNetzA to indicate how it will implement this obligation. Non-imposition of accounting separation
			 Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission also considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, BNetzA should impose on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a costorientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

ES/2006/0336	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TESAU	CS/CPS	The Commission made a comment on: Remedies at retail level: Article 17 of the Universal Service Directive provides that if, as a result of a market analysis carried out in
				Price control for analogue access lines	accordance with Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive, an NRA determines that a given retail market is not effectively competitive and concludes that wholesale obligations imposed under the Access Directive or the obligation to provide CS and CPS do not result in the achievement of the regulatory objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, the NRA shall impose appropriate regulatory obligations on undertakings identified as having SMP on a given retail market.
				Non-discrimination	The Commission notes that CMT has not yet completed the review of the related wholesale markets, in particular markets 8 and 11 of the Recommendation. In that respect, the Commission would like to remind CMT that when carrying out
				Prohibition of anti-competitive behaviour	the forthcoming review of the corresponding relevant wholesale markets, it should assess the impact, appropriateness and the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail market. Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail remedies as currently proposed in this notification, CMT is required to notify any possible

				transparency	resulting modification of retail remedies to the Commission pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
				Accounting separation	
				CS/CPS	
	BE/2006/0400refined the non- residential customers market into (i) analogueBE/2006/0400access, (ii) basic digital access (ISDN-2) and (iii) primary digital 		Belgacom	transparency	
				Non-discrimination	
BE/2006/0400		National		Wholesale Line Rental	
				Price control and cost accounting	
				Accounting separation	
				Information and notification obligation	No comments made by the Commission

LT/2006/0412 and LT/2006/0513	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TEO LT AB	CS/CPS	The Commission made a comment on: The inclusion of wireless radio, optic cable and local area networks in the same market as fixed residential analogue and cable access lines RRT considers that cable TV networks, wireless radio, optic cable and local area
				Price control and cost accounting	networks could provide a potential substitute to fixed access services over PSTN and ISDN. Within the timeframe of the review, RRT expects the further growth of cable TV networks and an increased ability to offer access services. For the other alternative platforms, RRT does not provide a forecast that would show that, within the timeframe of the review, these access technologies would effectively develop as alternative access platforms. Also, as regards wireless radio, optic cable and local area networks and cable TV networks, the Commission notes that
				Accounting separation	RRT has not conducted a substitution analysis before defining the relevant market. In particular, RRT has not assessed whether end users would be able to switch from the metallic loop to any of the other access platforms in case of a small but significant price increase in the metallic loop access prices. In order

				Wholesale Line Rental	 to assess the substitutability, RRT is invited to examine <i>inter alia</i> the functionality of these alternative access technologies and include the result of this analysis in its final measure. However, the Commission notes that, in this particular case, the inclusion of any of the alternative access technologies in the definition of the relevant market does not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.
	low level	5	СҮТА	CS/CPS and WLR	
	narrowband access including PSTN			Non discrimination	
	and ISDN BRA and (ii) high level			Transparency	
CY/2006/486	narrowband access including ISDN	national		Accounting separation	
	PRA due to the differences in			Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission
	quality of service and speed			Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	
EL/2006/0501	(i) lower	national	OTE	WLR	
	level narrowband and (ii) higher level			Non discrimination	
	narrowband access.			transparency	
				Price control	
				Unbundling of services	No comments made by the Commission

				Cost accounting and accounting separation	
				a prohibition of excessive pricing	
				an obligation to refrain from distorting the market entry of other undertakings	
An access through x PL/2006/0524 DSL included in the market definition				an obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision	
	national	TP SA	an obligation to refrain from applying preferential treatment to end users	The Commission vetoed the draft measure based	
				an obligation to refrain from obliging the end users to use unnecessary services	on: Lack of evidence that ISDN/PSTN access and broadband access in Poland are substitutable products
				cost orientation and cost accounting obligation	
				an obligation to submit for approval prices and other conditions of service provision	
	(i) analogue access, (ii) basic			Wholesale obligations: 1 – access (CS/CPS and WLR)	The Commission made a comment on:
LU/2007/0527	digital access, and (iii) primary digital	national	EPT	2 – non discrimination	Price control obligation
	access.			3 – transparency	ILR intends to base the price control obligation for WLR on the "retail minus"

				 3 – accounting separation 4 – price control Retail obligations: 1 – non discrimination 2 – transparency 3 – price control 	methodology. It should be recalled that retail access prices for residential and non residential customers are above the EU average in Luxemburg. A retail minus methodology might result in WLR prices that exceed costs. Given the fact that the cost orientation obligation at retail level is proposed to be removed, it is all the more important that WLR prices are set at cost. Consequently, the Commission invites ILR to impose a cost orientation obligation concerning WLR prices. This would ensure that users are offered attractive prices, whilst allowing EPT to recover its costs.
LV/2007/0566	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Lattelecom	1 - CS/CPS	 Lack of details concerning price control obligation The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify

	2 - Price control	 in its final measure the details of the price control remedy imposed. Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a costorientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

Market 3: Publicly available local and/or national telephone services

provided at a fixed location for residential customers

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed					
			Carrier (Pre) Selection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria****	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	
Finland	YES	43 operators**	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	
France	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO	
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Portugal	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Sweden	YES			NC	SMP FOUND			
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	NO	YES	YES	YES***	NO	
Netherlands	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Belgium	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	

YES	1 operator	NO					
	1	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	
YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	
YES	1 operator	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	
YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
NO*	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	
YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	
YES	1 operator	No remedies imposed					
NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	
NO	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	
YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	
YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	
	YES YES NO* YES YES NO* YES NO YES YES YES	YES1 operatorYES1 operatorNO*1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorNO*1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operatorYES1 operator	YES1 operatorNOYES1 operatorNONO*1 operatorNOYES1 operatorYESYES1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorNOYES1 operatorNO	YES1 operatorNOYES1 operatorNOYES1 operatorNONO*1 operatorNOYES1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorYESNO*1 operatorNOYES1 operatorNO	YES1 operatorNONOYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESNO*1 operatorNONONOYES1 operatorYESNONOYES1 operatorYESNONOYES1 operatorYESYESYESNO*1 operatorYESYESYESNO*1 operatorYESYESYESNO*1 operatorNOYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESNO1 operatorNOYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESNO	YES1 operatorNONOYESNOYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESNO*1 operatorNONONONOYES1 operatorYESNONONOYES1 operatorYESNONONOYES1 operatorYESYESYESYESNO*1 operatorYESYESYESYESNO*1 operatorNOYESYESYESNO1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESYESYESYES1 operatorNOYESNOYESYES1 operatorNOYESNOYESYES1 operatorNOYESNOYESYES1 operatorNOYESNOYESYES1 operatorNOYESNOYES	

* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

** On local calls. No SMP for national calls.

*** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

****second round of the review

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 3: Publicly available local and/or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
2003/0007, UK/2003/0008 and UK/2003/0045	Separation in local, national, calls to mobile phones and operator-assisted calls.	Separate markets: Hull area and UK outside Hull	Hull area: Kingston; UK outside Hull: BT	1 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made comments on: Reliance on comments from parties other than the Commission and other NRAs: The Commission stresses the fact that any material
				2 – Transparency	modification to the notified draft measure will require the draft measure to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
				3 - BT only: price control implying price freeze (adjusted for inflation)	Markets defined more narrowly than in the Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel defined retail narrowband markets more narrowly than in the Recommendation on relevant markets. However, a broader market definition is not likely to lead to a different result of the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not relevant in this specific context for the
				4 - BT only: cost accounting	purposesofSMPassessment.Publicationof a statementconcerningcompliancewiththecostaccounting

					 systems: It is necessary for a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting system to be published annually, following verification by a qualified independent body. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
FI/2003/0022 and FI/2003/0023	Local and national calls are included in separate markets.	National calls: national market; local calls: regional markets	On local calls for the 43 regional operators. No SMP found for national	On local calls:	The Commission made comments on: National calls: NRAs should assess whether

			calls		effective competition is or is not a result of
			2 - T	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	regulation in place and whether the status of competition is likely to be different in the absence of regulation. In this specific case, to what extent the competitive conditions could be different without CS/CPS-Regulation? Local calls: NRA's intention to impose more remedies on wholesale level: NRA does not sufficiently analyse how remedies on
				2 - Transparency (obligation to publish a reference offer)	wholesale level would influence competition on retail level. Commission doubts that remedies at retail level are sufficient.
				1 - Transparency	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
PT/2004/0055,	Broadly similar to the Recommendation. Additionally a market for non-geographic (service)	National		3 - Cost orientation (for geographic numbers only) and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
PT/2004/59 and PT/2004/0091	numbers. This additional market includes both residential and non-residential customers.		PT Group	4 - Accounting separation	
				5 - Price affordability (geographic numbers only)	
				6 -Numbering plan (non- geographic service numbers	

				only)	
AT/2004/0127 AT/2007/0581	Similar to the Recommendation. All types of calls included.	National	Telekom Austria	1 – price control 2 – accounting separation	The Commission made a comment on: Efficiency of wholesale regulation TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant changes in the competitive conditions in the retail calls markets since the first market review. This calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of the current wholesale regulation. The Commission already commented upon this issue in the context of TKK's second market review of the fixed wholesale markets ³⁹ . With regard to the present notifications, the Commission services would like to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail access markets, could be lowered.
HU/2005/0132	Similar to the Recommendation. Public payphones and prepaid cards included.	Regional	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató, Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The Commission made comments on: Consideration of additional retail remedies: In view of the continuing high market shares of the incumbents and their relatively high retail prices compared to EU best practices,

			Társaság		the Commission invites NHH to consider whether the notified remedies (CS/CPS) over a given period are sufficient to address the market failure in the four retail calls markets under review. Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the corresponding wholesale markets: The Commission reminds NHH that it should assess the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail markets. Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail remedies, particular attention should be paid to the possibility of a price or margin squeeze?
SE/2005/0149		Notific	cation withdrawn by t	he National Regulatory Authority.	
SE/2005/195	Similar to the recommendation. Explicitly including IP-Telephony.	National	No SMP found, due to regulation in the wholesale and retail access markets	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: PTS has included IP-telephony in the notified markets without supporting this conclusion by a substitutability analysis. When assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine -

					taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services.
				1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) Selection	The Commission made a comment on:
	Residential and non-			2 - Access obligation	Further consultations planned by ComReg: The Commission reminds ComReg that draft
IE/2005/0160	residential together, public payphones excluded.	National	Eircom	3 - Non-discrimination	measures relating to the details and implementation of accounting separation and cost accounting obligations are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive
				4 - Transparency	
				5 - Accounting separation	
				6 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
FR/2005/0223	VoIP calls offered by access providers ("managed VOIP") are included, VOIP calls by	Metropolitan France and overseas territories except for	France Télécom	Remedies only for PSTN calls, no remedies for VOIP calls	The Commission made comments on: Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the notified calls markets: The Commission recalls that, when assessing whether IP- telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-telephony services,
	non-access providers are <u>not</u> included in the market.	the territory of Saint-Pierre-et- Miquelon		1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of access and call products	

		2 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory pricing	as well as their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services. The Commission believes that, in the present case the inclusion of managed IP- telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail calls markets is not inconsistent with the Recommendation.
	3 - Ex ante tariff informatio vis-a-vis the NRA	3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-vis the NRA	Remedies and next market review: The Commission considers that the decision not to extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The Commission notes the existing wholesale remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as ARCEP's commitment to monitor this part of the retail markets closely for any anti-
		4 - Accounting separation	competitive practices and considers that should such practices occur, ARCEP has the right and the obligation to intervene as appropriate. The Commission invites ARCEP to ensure full, effective and appropriate enforcement of the obligations imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing the present market analysis
		5 - Price control on fixed to mobile calls	following such enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.

				6 - Non-discrimination	
				1 – prohibition to restrict competition by setting predatory prices	The Commission made a comment on:
SI/2005/0264	IP telephony excluded	National	Telecom Slovenije	2 – price control and cost accounting obligation	Impact of wholesale obligations on the relevant retail markets: The Commission would like to recall APEK that in accordance with the Universal Service Directive NRAs should intervene at retail level only if remedies imposed at the wholesale level together with the obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier pre-selection do not render the relevant retail markets competitive. The Commission notes that in Slovenia there are no alternative operators present on the relevant markets yet. It furthermore acknowledges that the current level of retail prices in relation to the relevant wholesale prices may risk leaving too low a margin between the retail and wholesale prices and that therefore the proposed retail price control appears to be justified. However, the Commission would like to invite APEK to closely monitor the impact of the proposed wholesale obligations, in particular the implementation of cost-oriented wholesale charges and non-discrimination obligation, on the relevant retail markets and to reassess the need to intervene at retail level accordingly

					when reviewing the notified markets.
DK/2005/0268	IP telephony excluded	National	NITA	No remedies imposed	 The Commission made comments on: The exclusion of IP-telephony from the relevant markets: The Commission considers that the justifications given by NITA for its decision to exclude IPtelephony from the notified markets are insufficient. NITA states that IP-telephony currently does not have the same functionalities as PSTN and ISDN, without describing these differences in functionality. When assessing whether or not IPtelephony should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services, NRAs must examine – taking national circumstances into account – the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-telephony services, as well as their demandside and supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony services. However, the possible inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets would seem to change neither NITA's assessment of SMP,
					nor its decision not to impose any remedies in these markets. NITA considers that the remedies imposed on PSTN wholesale markets (call origination, call termination and transit) solve the identified competition problems in the retail markets. Including IP- telephony in the relevant retail markets would

		only further reduce barriers to market entry. Any provider of broadband connection can, in principle, provide IP-telephony as an alternative service to PSTN or ISDN telephony. The Commission services also note the existing wholesale remedies on markets 11 and 12 in Denmark, which can be expected to facilitate market entry for IP-telephony operators.
		Monitoring of effects of wholesale regulation on the notified retail markets: Considering NITA's intention not to impose any retail remedies despite the fact that TDC is deemed to have SMP in the two notified markets, it is imperative that NITA monitors market developments closely in order to verify whether the wholesale remedies imposed in markets 8 to 12 have the desired effect on the notified retail markets. Should any anti-competitive practices occur in these markets, NITA has the right and the obligation to intervene as appropriate.

NL/2005/0289 NL/2005/0293 NL/2005/0294 NL/2005/0295 NL/2005/0296	Separate market for fixed to mobile calls, narrowband data services, calls to information numbers, calls to information assistant numbers. VoB included.	National	KPN	1 – cost accounting and accounting separation	The Commission made comments on: Narrow market definition OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly than foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, OPTA defines isolated markets for fixed-to mobile calls, narrowband data services, calls to information numbers and calls to personal assistant numbers. The
				2 – price control	Commission is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is justified. However, in these particular cases, as it does not have any impact on the finding of SMP, nor on the remedies imposed, the exact market definition can be left open. Inclusion of VoB – appropriateness of remedies The Commission believes that in the present case and in the light of the market
				3 – non discrimination	characteristics of the access and voice calls market in the Netherlands, the inclusion of managed VoB- telephone in the relevant retail access and calls markets is not inconsistent with the Recommendation. The regulation of VoB should not prevent the SMP operator from switching to a new, more cost-efficient, technology. In this context, the Commission notes the flexible regulatory approach proposed by OPTA, which is introduced via the price floor taking into account the different cost structure of the products based

				4 - transparency	on VoB.
DE/2005/0308	No distinction between residential and non-residential customers. Exclusion of F/M calls.	national	DTAG	an obligation to notify new tariffs to BNetzA two months in advance of commercialisation to allow BNetzA to supervise the <i>ex</i> <i>post</i> price control obligation.	The Commission made a comment on: Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission also considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, BNetzA should impose on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost- orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

ES/2005/0326	IP telephony excluded	National	TESAU	 1 - TESAU must communicate to CMT any changes to applicable prices and conditions of the relevant services at least 10 days before their effective date of application/launch date; 2 - TESAU must make available to CMT (within 10 days, on request) prices and conditions applicable to personalised offers offered by TESAU to those customers whose overall billing with TESAU exceeds €600,000 per year. 	The Commission made a comment on: Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: The Commission considers that the justification given by CMT for its decision to exclude IP-telephony from the notified markets is insufficient insofar as CMT's arguments are based on the fact that IP- telephony currently does not have the same functionalities as (and are thus not regulated like) publicly available telephone services (provided over PSTN and ISDN). When assessing whether or not IP-telephony should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services, the NRA should duly examine – taking account of national circumstances – the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony services.
				1 - Price control 2 – non discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
SK/2006/0347	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Slovak Telecom	3 - Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and	National public consultation: The Commission would like to remind TÚSR that according to Article 6 of the Framework Directive, NRAs must conduct a national
				services	consultation on each draft measure taken in accordance with the Framework Directive or the Specific Directives which have a

					significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the draft measures.
CZ/2006/0350	VoIP excluded	national	Cesky Telecom	1 – CS/CPS	Impact of the proposed wholesale remedies CTU considers that wholesale price regulation7, in combination with the proposed retail remedies, is sufficient to remedy the market failure on this particular market. In this context, the Commission notes that the retail prices in the Czech Republic are high compared to other EU Member States8 and that the incumbent still has a very strong position on the market. Therefore, the Commission invites CTU to closely monitor the impact of the proposed wholesale obligations, in particular the implementation of cost-oriented wholesale charges and the non-discrimination obligation, on the relevant retail markets and in particular to complete the review and adopt the final measures on the related wholesale markets (markets 8, 9 and 10) as soon as possible. The full and effective enforcement of appropriate wholesale obligations on these markets is necessary to achieve CTU's aim of remedying the lack of competition at the retail level.

				1 – cost orientation	
			Maltacom 2 - transparency and non-discrimination Maltacom 3 - cost accounting and accounting separation 4 - measures to counter unreasonable bundling of prices No comments made by the Commission Telecom Italia 1 - non - discrimination Telecom Italia 1 - non - discrimination		
MT/2006/0392	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Maltacom		No comments made by the Commission
				unreasonable bundling of	
					The Commission made a comment on:
IT/2006/0407	AGCOM defines markets for (i) local, (ii) national and (iii) fixed to mobile calls	national	Telecom Italia	1 – non - discrimination	Ū.

	2 - transparency	call on an ANOs network whereas the ANOs may not be charged more than 0.84€ cent/minute at single national commuters level. AGCOM intends to remove this asymmetry in termination charges by means of a 4-year glide path towards equivalent charges for both TI and the ANOs, but did not specify the detailed implementation of such glide path in its draft regulatory measure. In order to increase legal certainty for all parties involved, the Commission invited AGCOM to specify the glide path in its final measure and to develop a cost model as soon as possible for calculating ANO's termination rates taking into account
	3 – price control	the necessity for ANOs to become efficient over time.11. The Commission notes that in the present retail calls market, AGCOM does not allow TI to differentiate its prices of local, national and fixed to mobile calls (residential and nonresidential), according to the termination network of the ANO.12 AGCOM maintains that the obligation of non-discrimination between generalised on-net and off-net rates is motivated by demands for transparency of the rates for the end-users and the need to avoid anticompetitive effects. AGCOM believes that TI's dominant position in the relevant markets

	4 – submission of other offers to the price test	may induce it to adopt discriminatory pricing strategies to the advantage of its own users with the dual objective of raising barriers so as to make market entry unprofitable for new entrants and of recovering market shares to the detriment of competitors present on the market. The Commission does not primarily object to retail price differentiation. However in this particular case it has to be noted that 95% of all traffic in Italy is terminated on TI's network illustrating the still small size of ANOs. Therefore, the Commission agrees with AGCOM that it may be justified not to allow operators with a very high market share
	5 - Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	compared to their competitors, to price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. At the same time, the Commission is of the view that operators should have the ability to recoup their higher regulated wholesale costs by setting the appropriate retail price, without having to have recourse to restrictive practices. The Commission notes that in the present case AGCOM stated in its draft regulatory measure that TI is able to recoup through appropriate retail prices the wholesale costs for terminating calls on the ANOs' networks. In any event, considering the difference in termination rates between TI and

				6 – cost accounting	ANOs at wholesale level, which is expected to be reduced progressively over the next four years, the Commission invites AGCOM to monitor the proportionality of the retail regulation for local and national calls markets on the basis of the market's evolution.
				1 – non discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - transparency	Review of the national calls markets
	no distinction between local			3 – reporting obligation	Review of the national calls markets The Commission takes note that the revie period for the notified markets is set for years. Taking into account Belgacom's declini market shares in the national call market remedies proposed in the retail access market (in particular wholesale line rental and carried
BE/2006/0435	and national calls	National	Belgacom	4 – cost accounting	Taking into account Belgacom's declining market shares in the national call markets,
				5 – accounting separation	remedies proposed in the retail access markets (in particular wholesale line rental and carrier- selection/carrier pre-selection) and in fixed
				6 – prohibition to charge excessive or predatory prices	wholesale markets, the Commission invites IBPT to review the competitive situation in the national call markets within a shorter timeframe.

LT/2006/0425	Similar to the	National	TEO LT AB	1 – price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission
	Recommendation			accounting 2 – accounting separation CS/CPS and WLR Non discrimination transparency Accounting separation Price control Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services Non discrimination transparency Output Output Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services Non discrimination transparency obligation to provide	
				CS/CPS and WLR	
				Non discrimination	
	No distinction between		TEO LT ABaccounting2 - accounting separationNo comments made2 - accounting separationCS/CPS and WLRNon discriminationNon discriminationtransparencyCYTAAccounting separationNo comments madePrice controlPrice controlProhibition of unreasonable bundling of products and servicesNo comments madeOTENon discriminationNo comments madetransparencyobligation to provide separately each component of a		
CY/2006/0487	residential and non-residential customers	National	СҮТА	accounting No comments made by the Commission 2 - accounting separation CS/CPS and WLR Non discrimination Accounting separation 1 transparency Accounting separation No comments made by the Commission Price control Price control Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services No comments made by the Commission Non discrimination No comments made by the Commission Image: transparency No discrimination Image: transparency No comments made by the Commission Image: transparency No discrimination Image: transparency No discrimination Image: transparency No comments made by the Commission Image: transparency No comments made by the Commission Image: transparency No comments made by the Commission Image: transparency Image: transparency Image: transparency <t< td=""></t<>	
EL/2006/0503	Similar to the Recommendation	national	OTE	Non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission
	Recommendation		CYTA	transparency	
				separately each component of a	
				Accounting separation	

				Price control	
PL/2006/0528	Similar to the Recommendation	national	TP SA	an obligation not to impose excessively high prices;	Inclusion in the final measures of the additional data and arguments provided to the Commission
					The Commission invites UKE to include the data and arguments that UKE provided to the
				an obligation not to hinder market entry;	Commission in the course of the second phase procedure in the final measures. UKE is invited to indicate in particular TP's market shares including calls <i>via</i> 0 708 numbers and <i>via</i> pre-paid calling cards in the relevant
				non discrimination	markets. Monitoring of the market dynamics and the next review
				an obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision;	The information available suggests a certain dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in particular in the international calls markets. This is indicated <i>inter alia</i> by the increasing market shares of alternative providers and the availability of various methods of call placing

				obligation not to force end customers to purchase unwanted services;	(direct call, call selection and pre-selection, calls via 0 708 numbers, emergence of VoIP services). In the short to medium term, it can be expected that wholesale line rental ⁴⁰ becomes operational and other wholesale regulation should become effective as well. In
				an obligation of regulatory cost accounting and cost orientation based on FL-FDC;	view thereof, UKE is invited to closely monitor the market trends and to undertake a new market analysis at the latest within one year following adoption of the final measures.
				an obligation to present retail call tariffs and conditions of provision for UKE's approval.	
				Non discrimination	
LU/2006/0532	Similar to the	national	EPT	Transparency	No commente modo hu the Commission
LU/2000/0552	Recommendation	national	EFI	Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission
				Price control	

				CS/CPS	 Lack of details concerning price control obligation The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its final measure the details of the price control remedy imposed. Non-imposition of accounting separation
LV/2007/0567	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Lattelecom	Price control	The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost- orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

Market 4: Publicly available international telephone services

provided at a fixed location for residential customers

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	r Remedies imposed				
			Carrier (Pre) Selection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria	YES	NO SMP FOUND					
Finland	YES			NO SMI	P FOUND		
France	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sweden	YES			NO SMI	P FOUND		
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	NO	YES	YES	YES***	NO
Netherlands	NO*			NO SMI	P FOUND		
Belgium	YES		NO SMP FOUND				
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES

Lithuania	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Spain	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
Italy	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Germany	NO*			NO SMI	P FOUND		
Denmark	NO*	1 operator		N	o remedies imp	posed	
Cyprus	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Poland	NO	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Greece	NO*	NO SMP FOUND					

*Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets /**At a prior notification the Commission issued a Veto on the Non-SMP-finding / *** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators/ Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 4: Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for residential customers Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0007, UK/2003/0008 and UK/2003/0045	Separation (i) a market with competitive input at wholesale level ("category A") and (ii) many markets on a route-by-route basis with non- competitive input at wholesale level ("Category B"). Operator-assisted calls are not included (together	Separate markets: Hull area and UK outside Hull	Hull: Kingston; UK outside Hull: BT	1 - Non-discrimination	The commentsCommissionmade on:Reliance on comments from parties other than the Commission and other NRAs: The Commission stresses the fact that any material modification to the notified draft measure will require the draft measure to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.Markets defined more narrowly than in the Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel defined retail narrowband markets more narrowly

with national calls a separate market, see market 3).	2 - Transparency	than in the Recommendation. However, a broader market definition along the lines of the Recommendation on relevant markets is not likely to lead to a different result of the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not relevant in this specific context for the purposes of SMP assessment.
		Finding of SMP in the IDD calls markets: Oftel does not have sufficiently detailed market share information to calculate both residential and business market shares in each of the relevant IDD calls markets. However, the Commission considers the other, non market- share-related assumptions made
	3 - BT only: price control implying price freeze (adjusted for inflation)	regarding the finding of significant market power to be convincing. In any event, in this particular case, the Commission does not consider that any measure concerning these markets would affect trade between Member States.

				4 - BT only: cost accounting	
FI/2003/0024	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP	No remedies imposed	The Commission vetoed the draft measure based on: Lack of evidence to support the finding of the absence of SMP: Ficora has submitted neither sufficient facts nor sufficient reasoning to rebut the presumption of dominance in the presence of a market share in excess of 50%.Ficora failed to provide 1) any market data related to the exact degree of changes in market shares over the past years, 2) market data related to price levels and 3) market data related to other factors which are relevant to the assessment of market power. Lack of consideration of existing remedies: Ficora did not justify its conclusions in light of existing regulatory obligations, and did not consider what the outcome of the market analysis is likely to be in the absence of such obligations. Conversely, Ficora did

					not consider how the justification for existing regulatory obligations, which are imposed on undertakings in the same or other closely related markets, and which may have a substantial competitive effect on markets for publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location, would be affected by the conclusions of its market analyses.
FI/2005/0201	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
				1 - Transparency	
PT/2004/0057	Similar to the			2 - Non-discrimination	
and PT/2004/0091	Recommendation.	National	PT Group	3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Accounting separation	
AT/2004/0125 AT/2007/0582	Similar to the Recommendation. Public payphones and calling cards included.	National	No SMP: decreasing market share of the incumbent, low entry barriers	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.

HU/2005/0133	Similar to the Recommendation. Public payphones and prepaid cards included.	Regional	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató, Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon Társaság	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The commentsCommission on:Consideration of additional retail remedies: In view of the continuing high market shares of the incumbents and their relatively high retail prices compared to EU best practices, the Commission invites NHH to consider whether the notified remedies (CS/CPS) over a given period are sufficient to address the market failure in the four retail calls markets under review.Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the corresponding wholesale markets: The Commission reminds NHH that it should assess the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail markets. Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail remedies, particular attention should be paid to the possibility of a price or margin squeeze?	
SE/2005/0147	Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority.					
SE/2005/196	Similar to the Recommendation. Explicitly includes IP-Telephony.	National	No SMP found, due to regulation in the wholesale and retail access markets	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: PTS has included IP-telephony in the notified markets without supporting this conclusion by a substitutability analysis. When assessing whether IP- telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national	

					regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP- telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services.
IE/2005/0161	Residential and non- residential in one market, public cell phones excluded.	National	Eircom	1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) Selection	The Commission made a comment on: Further consultations planned by ComReg: on details of cost accounting and accounting separation: Possible further measures must be notified to the Commission.
				2 - Access obligation	
				3 - Non-discrimination	
				4 - Transparency	
				5 - Accounting separation	

				6 - Cost orientation and cost accounting					
FR/2005/0224	VoiP calls offered by access providers	Metropolitan France and	France Télécom	<u>Remedies only for PSTN calls, no</u> <u>remedies for VOIP calls</u>	TheCommissionmadecommentson:				
	("managed VoiP") are included, VOIP calls by non-access providers are <u>not</u> <u>included.</u>	overseas territories except for the territory of Saint-Pierre-et- Miquelon		1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of access and call products	Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the notified calls markets: The Commission recalls that, when assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well as				
								2 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory pricing	their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services. The Commission believes that, in the present case the inclusion of managed IP-telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail calls markets is not inconsistent with the Recommendation. Remedies and next market review: The
				3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a- vis the NRA	Commission considers that the decision not to extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The Commission notes the existing wholesale remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as ARCEP's commitment to monitor this part of the retail markets closely for any anti-competitive practices and considers that should such practices occur, ARCEP has the right and the obligation to intervene as appropriate. The Commission invites ARCEP to ensure full, effective				

				4 - Accounting separation	and appropriate enforcement of the obligations imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing the present market analysis following such enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.
				5 - Price control on fixed to mobile calls	
				6 - Non-discrimination	
DK/2005/0269	No distinction between residential and non residential customers	National	TDC	No remedies imposed	The Commission madecommentson:The exclusion of IP-telephony from the relevant markets: The Commissionfrom the relevantconsiders that the justifications given by NITA for its decision to exclude IP telephonyfrom the notified markets are insufficient. NITA states that IP-telephony currently does not have the same functionalities as PSTN and ISDN, without

		describing these differences in functionality. When
		assessing whether or not IP telephony should be
		included in any of the retail markets for fixed
		telephony services, NRAs must examine – taking national circumstances into account – the objective
		characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-
		telephony services, as well as their demand-side and
		supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony
		services.
		However, the possible inclusion of IP-telephony in
		the notified markets would seem to change neither
		NITA's assessment of SMP, nor its decision not to
		impose any remedies in these markets. NITA considers that the remedies imposed on PSTN
		wholesale markets (call origination, call termination
		and transit) solve the identified competition problems
		in the retail markets. Including IP-telephony in the relevant
		Torevant
		retail markets would only further reduce barriers to
		market entry. Any provider of broadband connection can, in principle, provide IP-telephony as an
		alternative service to PSTN or ISDN telephony. The
		Commission services also note the existing wholesale
		remedies on markets 11 and 12 in Denmark, which
		can be expected to facilitate market entry for IP- telephony operators.
		Monitoring of effects of wholesale regulation on
		the notified retail markets:
		Considering NITA's intention not to impose any
		retail remedies despite the fact that TDC is deemed to
		have SMP in the two notified markets, it is imperative that NITA monitors market developments closely in
		order to verify whether the wholesale remedies
		imposed in markets 8 to 12 have the desired effect on

					the notified retail markets. Should any anti- competitive practices occur in these markets, NITA has the right and the obligation to intervene as appropriate.
SI/2005/0298	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telecom Slovenije	Prohibition to restrict competition by setting predatory prices Prohibition to grant unjustified priority to certain end-customers, prohibition to implement the unjustified bundling of various services.	The commentsCommissionmade on:Impact of wholesale obligations on the relevant retail markets:The Commission recalls that in accordance with the Universal Service Directive10 NRAs should intervene at retail level only if remedies imposed at the wholesale level, together with the obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier pre- selection, do not render the relevant retail markets competitive.Therefore, the Commission would like to invite APEK to closely monitor the impact of the proposed wholesale obligations11, in particular the implementation of cost-oriented wholesale charges and non-discrimination, on the relevant retail markets and to reassess the need to intervene at retail level accordingly when reviewing the notified markets.The exclusion of IP telephony from the relevant markets: The Commission notes that APEK will monitor the development of IP-telephony and in its next market analysis (which according to national law is to be carried out within one year) assess whether IP-telephony, from a demand and supply-side perspective, should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services.

					Taking into account the early stage of development of IP-telephony in Slovenia and the low level of broadband penetration, IP-telephony is not expected to have any significant impact on the market before APEK's next market review. In this context, the Commission further notes that full and effective enforcement of the wholesale obligations, in particular those in market for LLU and market for wholesale bitstream access, could have an impact on the entry for IP-telephony operators, and therefore invites APEK to complete the review of the related market for wholesale broadband access, market 12 of the Recommendation, as soon as possible.
NL/2005/0290		1	No comments made by the Commission		
DE/2005/0309	No distinction between residential and non residential customers	national	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made comments on:Exclusion of fixed-to-mobile calls from the relevant marketsBNetzA defines the calls markets more narrowly than foreseen in the Recommendation.In particular, BNetzA defines isolated markets for fixed-to-mobile calls. The Commission is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is justified. Since BNetzA indicates that it would analyse the fixed-to-mobile calls markets separately,

		omitting a proper analysis of it in the context of the present notification might be acceptable. However, the Commission would propose to request BNetzA to analyse the separate markets for fixed-to-mobile calls and to propose remedies, if appropriate, within the shortest possible timeframe. Fixed-to-fixed calls and fixed-to-mobile calls are generally offered as a bundle, in particular by DTAG. Regulation of fixed- to-fixed calls without regulation of fixed-to-mobile calls may therefore be only partly effective. VoIP
		When assessing IP-telephony services, national regulators should examine in the light of national circumstances objective product characteristics, prices and intended use of VoIP services, as well as their demand- and supply-side substitutability. Indicators such as broadband penetration rates, price elasticities, VoIP penetration, VoIP connection costs or the incumbent's position should be taken into account when performing such analysis. The Commission takes the view that the technology
		for VoIP services is progressing dynamically and the large majority of those services will ultimately emerge as substitutes for traditional fixed telephony services. At present, unmanaged VoIP-services do
		however seem to have different product characteristics6, which may call for special

		analytical diligence whenever they are proposed to be included in a market definition. Since the exclusion of unmanaged VoIP from the
		relevant markets in the present case would not have any impact on the SMP-finding, the issue might, however, be left open.
		Effective competition of international calls
		On the basis of the information provided, the Commission concurs with BNetzA's finding of effective competition on the market for publicly available international telephone services. However, the competitive status of this market is dependent on the existence of mandated carrier selection/carrier pre-selection ("CS/CPS") obligations.
		These obligations, which are currently imposed by BNetzA on DTAG on the basis of the previous legal framework, are to be imposed under the current regulatory framework on the basis of finding SMP in a closely related retail access market7. As BNetzA finds DTAG to have SMP in the retail access market it will maintain the obligations to provide CS/CPS.

ES/2005/0327	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TESAU	 1 - communication to CMT any changes to applicable prices and conditions of the relevant services at least 10 days before their effective date of application/launch date; 2 - communication to CMT (within 10 days, on request) of prices and conditions applicable to TESAU's personalised offers to customers whose overall billing with TESAU exceeds €600,000 per year. 	The Commission made a comment on: Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: The Commission considers that the justification given by CMT for its decision to exclude IP-telephony from the notified markets is insufficient insofar as CMT's arguments are based on the fact that IP-telephony currently does not have the same functionalities as (and are thus not regulated like) publicly available telephone services (provided over PSTN and ISDN). When assessing whether or not IP- telephony should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services, the NRA should duly examine – taking account of national circumstances – the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony services.
SK/2006/0344	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Slovak Telecom	Price control	The Commission made a comment on: National public consultation: The Commission would like to remind TÚSR that according to Article
				Non discrimination	6 of the Framework Directive, NRAs must conduct a national consultation on each draft measure taken in accordance with the Framework Directive or the Specific Directives which have a significant impact

				Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	on the relevant market, i.e. including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the draft measures	
				Submission of all offers to AGCOM		
IT/2006/0398	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telecom Italia	transparency	No comments made by the Commission	
				Non discrimination		
LT/2006/0427	Similar to the	National	TEO LT AB	Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission	
L1/2000/0427	Recommendation.	Inational	ILO LI AD	Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission	
BE/2006/0436	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission	
CZ/2006/0444	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Cesky Telecom	Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission	
				CS/CPS and WLR		
				Non-discrimination		
CY/2006/0488	No distinction between residential	national	СҮТА	transparency	No comments made by the Commission	
	and non residential customers			Accounting separation		
				Price control		
				Prohibition of unreasonable		

				bundling of products and services	
EL/2006/0504 (withdrawal of notification) EL/2007/0556 (market re- notified)				No SMP found	
PL/2006/0528	Similar to the Recommendation	national	TP SA	an obligation not to impose excessively high prices;	Inclusion in the final measures of the additional data and arguments provided to the Commission The Commission invites UKE to include the data and arguments that UKE provided to the Commission in
				an obligation not to hinder market entry;	the course of the second phase procedure in the final measures. UKE is invited to indicate in particular TP's market shares including calls <i>via</i> 0 708 numbers and <i>via</i> pre-paid calling cards in the relevant markets.
				non discrimination	Monitoring of the market dynamics and the next review The information available suggests a certain dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in particular in the
				an obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision;	international calls markets. This is indicated <i>inter alia</i> by the increasing market shares of alternative providers and the availability of various methods of call placing (direct call, call selection and pre- selection, calls via 0 708 numbers, emergence of
				obligation not to force end customers to purchase unwanted services;	VoIP services). In the short to medium term, it can be expected that wholesale line rental ⁴¹ becomes operational and other wholesale regulation should become effective as well. In view thereof, UKE is

				an obligation of regulatory cost accounting and cost orientation based on FL-FDC; an obligation to present retail call tariffs and conditions of provision for UKE's approval.	invited to closely monitor the market trends and to undertake a new market analysis at the latest within one year following adoption of the final measures.
				Non discrimination	
LU/2007/0533	Similar to the	National	EPT	transparency	No comments made by the Commission
10/2007/0355	Recommendation	Tutional		Accounting separation	The comments made by the commission
				Price control	
LV/2007/0568	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Lattelecom	1 – CS/CPS	Lack of details concerning price control obligation The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its final measure the details of

			the price control remedy imposed.
			 Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an elifective of severative wides to severate the severative wides to severate the severate se
		2 – price control	obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a
			cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

Market 5 : Publicly available local and/or national telephone services

provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed				
			Carrier (Pre) Selection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Denmark	YES				NO SMP FOUND		
Finland	YES	43 operators**	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO
France	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sweden	YES				NO SMP FOUND		
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	NO	YES	YES	YES***	NO
Netherlands	NO*	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Belgium	YES	NO SMP FOUND					

Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	
Spain	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	
Italy	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Germany	NO*	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	
Denmark	NO*	1 operator		No remed	ies imposed			
Cyprus	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO	
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	
Greece	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Luxembourg	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Poland	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO	
* On local calls. No SMP for national calls.								
** Differentiated or n	o remedy imposed on c	ertain SMP operators						
***second round of th	ne review							

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 5: Publicly available local and/ or national telephone services provided at a fixed location for non - residential customers

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0007, UK/2003/0008	Separation between local, national, calls to mobile phones and operator- assisted calls.	UK excluding Hull area and Hull area	Hull: Kingston; UK excluding Hull: BT	1 - Non-discrimination	The commentsCommissionmade on:Reliance on comments from parties other than the Commission and other NRAs: The Commission stresses the fact that any material
				2 - Transparency	modification to the notified draft measure will require the draft measure to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. Markets defined more narrowly than in the Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel
				3 - BT only: price control implying price freeze (adjusted for inflation)	defined retail narrowband markets more narrowly than in the Recommendation on relevant markets. However, a broader market definition is not likely to lead to a different result of the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not relevant in this specific context for the

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

				4 - BT only: cost accounting	purposes of SMP assessment.
UK/2004/0045 (further amended by cases UK/2005/0217- 0218)	See Cas	se UK/2003/0007-00	08	Financial reporting obligations (in addition to the remedies imposed in Cases UK/2003/0007-0008).	The Commission made comments on: Publication of a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting systems: It is necessary for a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting system to be published annually, following verification by a qualified independent body. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
FI/2003/0025	Local and national	National calls :	Local calls:	On local calls:	The Commission made comments on:

and FI/2003/0026	calls are included in separate markets.	national market; local calls: regional markets	SMP for 43 regional operators. No SMP found for national calls.	1 - Users' right to a connection to fixed telephone network	Relationship between existing regulation and finding of lack of SMP (national calls): The Commission invites Ficora to consider what the competitive conditions in the defined markets would be like in the absence of an obligation to provide CS, CPS or their equivalent. The Commission also prompts Ficora to make explicitly clear in their final measures whether its findings rely principally on the existing regulatory obligations (i.e. CS and CPS for all types of calls) imposed as a result of a finding of SMP in the retail access and local calls markets.
				2 - Obligation to publish standard agreement terms and tariff information on services	Remedies at retail level (local calls): Ficora does not impose any further regulatory obligations on SMP undertakings at retail level, in addition to CS/CPS and other non-SMP obligations based on the Universal Service Directive. Therefore, the Commission has doubts as to whether the notified remedies over a given period are sufficient to remedy potential market failure at retail level and, in view of the continuing high market shares, recommends that Ficora also consider appropriate additional regulatory measures at the retail level.

				3 - User's right to pre-selection / carrier pre-selection	
				1 - Transparency	
	Broadly similar to the Recommendation.			2 - Non-discrimination	
PT/2004/0056,	Additionally, includes a market for non-geographic			3 - Cost orientation (geographic numbers only) and cost accounting	
PT/2004/0091 (service) number This additiona market include both residential a	(service) numbers. This additional	(service) numbers. This additional market includes both residential and	PT Group	4 - Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.
	market includes both residential and non-residential			5 - Price affordability (geographic numbers only)	
	customers.			6 -Numbering plan (non-geographic service numbers only)	

AT/2004/0126 AT/2007/0583	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Austria	1 - Price control / Cost orientation	The Commission made comments on: Efficiency of wholesale regulation TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant changes in the competitive conditions in the retail calls markets since the first market review. This calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of the current wholesale regulation. The Commission already commented upon this issue in the context of TKK's second market review of the fixed wholesale markets ⁴² . With regard to the present notifications, the Commission services would like to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail access markets, could be lowered.
------------------------------	-----------------------------------	----------	--------------------	--------------------------------------	---

		2- Accounting Separation	

HU/2005/0134	Similar to the Recommendation. Public payphones and prepaid cards included.	Regional	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató, Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon Társaság	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The commentsCommission made or:Consideration of additional retail remedies: In view of the continuing high market shares of the incumbents and their relatively high retail prices compared to EU best practices, the Commission invites NHH to consider whether the notified remedies (CS/CPS) over a given period are sufficient to address the market failure in the four retail calls markets under review.Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the corresponding wholesale markets: The Commission reminds NHH that it should assess the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail markets. Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail remedies, particular attention should be paid to the possibility of a price or margin squeeze?			
SE/2005/0148		Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority						

SE/2005/197	Similar to the Recommendation. IP-Telephony explicitly included.	National	No SMP	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: PTS has included IP-telephony in the notified markets without supporting this conclusion by a substitutability analysis. When assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP- telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services.
				1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) Selection	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Access obligation	
IE/2005/0162	No distinction between residential and non-residential markets.	National	Eircom	3 - Non-discrimination	Further consultations planned by ComReg: The Commission reminds ComReg that draft measures relating to the details and implementation of accounting separation and cost accounting obligations are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
		esidential		4 - Transparency	
				5 - Accounting separation	
				6 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	

DK/2005/0208	Similar to the Recommendation, VOIP excluded.	National	No SMP found: decreasing market share of the incumbent, falling prices, no significant entry barriers.	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.		
FR/2005/0225	VoIP calls offered by broadband access providers	Metropolitan France and	France Télécom	Remedies only for PSTN calls, no remedies for VOIP calls	The Commission made comments on:		
	("managed VOIP") included in the product market.	overseas territories except for the territory of Saint-Pierre-et- Miquelon	territories except for the territory of Saint-Pierre-et-	territories except for the territory of Saint-Pierre-et-		1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of access and call products	Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the notified calls markets: The Commission recalls that, when assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well as their demend aide and events and events with
				2 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory pricing	demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services. The Commission believes that, in the present case the inclusion of managed IP-telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail calls markets is not inconsistent with the Recommendation. Remedies and next market review: The Commission considers that the decision not to		

		3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-vis the NRA	extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The Commission notes the existing wholesale remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as ARCEP's commitment to monitor this part of the retail markets closely for any anti-competitive practices and considers that should such practices occur, ARCEP has the right and the obligation to intervene as appropriate. The Commission invites ARCEP to ensure full, effective and appropriate enforcement of the obligations imposed in
		4 - Accounting separation	markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing the present market analysis following such enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.
		5 - Price control on fixed to mobile calls	

				6 - Non-discrimination	
	IP telephony	National		1 – prohibition to restrict competition by setting predatory prices	Impact of wholesale obligations on the relevant retail markets: The Commission would like to recall APEK that in accordance with the Universal Service Directive NRAs should intervene at retail level only if remedies imposed at the wholesale level together with the obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier pre-selection do not render the relevant retail markets competitive. The Commission notes that in Slovenia there are no alternative operators present on the relevant markets yet. It
SI/2005/0265	excluded	National	Slovenije	2 – price control and cost accounting obligation	furthermore acknowledges that the current level of retail prices in relation to the relevant wholesale prices may risk leaving too low a margin between the retail and wholesale prices and that therefore the proposed retail price control appears to be justified. However, the Commission would like to invite APEK to closely monitor the impact of the proposed wholesale obligations, in particular the implementation of cost-oriented wholesale charges and non-discrimination obligation, on the relevant

					retail markets and to reassess the need to intervene at retail level accordingly when reviewing the notified markets.
NL/2005/0289 NL/2005/0293 NL/2005/0294 NL/2005/0295 NL/2005/0296	Separate market for fixed to mobile calls, narrowband data services, calls to information numbers, calls to information assistant numbers.	National	KPN	1 – cost accounting and accounting separation	The Commission made comments on: Narrow market definition OPTA defines certain markets more narrowly than foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, OPTA defines isolated markets for fixed-to mobile calls, narrowband data services,
	VoB included.			2 – price control	calls to information numbers and calls to personal assistant numbers. The Commission is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is justified. However, in these particular cases, as it does not have any impact on the finding of SMP, nor on the remedies imposed, the exact market definition can be left open. Inclusion of VoB – appropriateness of

				3 – non discrimination	remedies The Commission believes that in the present case and in the light of the market characteristics of the access and voice calls market in the Netherlands, the inclusion of managed VoB- telephone in the relevant retail access and calls markets is not inconsistent with the Recommendation. The regulation of VoB should not prevent the SMP operator from switching to a
				4 - transparency	not prevent the SMP operator from switching to a new, more cost-efficient, technology. In this context, the Commission notes the flexible regulatory approach proposed by OPTA, which is introduced via the price floor taking into account the different cost structure of the products based on VoB.
DE/2005/0310	No distinction between residential and non-residential customers. Exclusion of F/M calls.	national	DTAG	an obligation to notify new tariffs to BNetzA two months in advance of commercialisation to allow BNetzA to supervise the <i>ex post</i> price control obligation.	The Commission made a comment on: Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission also considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, BNetzA should impose on DTAG an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for BNetzA to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost- orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive.

ES/2005/0328	IP telephony excluded	National	TESAU	 1 - TESAU must communicate to CMT any changes to applicable prices and conditions of the relevant services at least 10 days before their effective date of application/launch date; 2 - TESAU must make available to CMT (within 10 days, on request) prices and conditions applicable to personalised offers offered by TESAU to those customers whose overall billing with TESAU exceeds €600,000 per year. 	The Commission made a comment on: Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: The Commission considers that the justification given by CMT for its decision to exclude IP-telephony from the notified markets is insufficient insofar as CMT's arguments are based on the fact that IP-telephony currently does not have the same functionalities as (and are thus not regulated like) publicly available telephone services (provided over PSTN and ISDN). When assessing whether or not IP-telephony should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services, the NRA should duly examine – taking account of national circumstances – the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of IP- telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony services.

				1 - Price control	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 – non discrimination	National public consultation: The Commission would like to remind TÚSR that
SK/2006/0349	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Slovak Telekom	3 - Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	according to Article 6 of the Framework Directive, NRAs must conduct a national consultation on each draft measure taken in accordance with the Framework Directive or the Specific Directives which have a significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the draft measures.
				1 – cost orientation	
	Circulture to the			2 – transparency and non - discrimination	
MT/2006/0397	Similar to the Recommendation	National Maltaco	Maltacom	3 – cost accounting and accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission
				4 – measures to counter unreasonable bundling of prices	

BE/2006/0437	no distinction between local and national calls	National	Belgacom	1 – non discrimination	The Commission made comments on: Review of the national calls markets The Commission takes note that the review period for the notified markets is set for 3 years. Taking into account Belgacom's declining market
				2 - transparency	shares in the national call markets, remedies proposed in the retail access markets (in particular wholesale line rental and carrier- selection/carrier pre-selection) and in fixed wholesale markets, the Commission invites IBPT to review the competitive situation in the national call markets within a shorter timeframe.
				3 – reporting obligation	

				4 – cost accounting	
				5 – accounting separation	
				6 – prohibition to charge excessive or predatory prices	
LT/2006/0426	Similar to the Recommendation	National	TEO LT AB	1 – price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission

				2 – accounting separation	
CZ/2006/0445	VoIP excluded	national	Cesky Telecom	Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission
CY/2006/0489	No distinction between residential and non-residential	National	СҮТА	CS/CPS and WLR	No comments made by the Commission

customers		Non discrimination	
		transparency	
		Accounting separation	
		Price control	
		Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	

IT/2006/0408	AGCOM defines markets for (i) local, (ii) national and (iii) fixed to mobile calls	national	Telecom Italia	1 – non - discrimination	The Commission made a comment on: Monitoring of the proportionality of retail regulation The Commission recalls that AGCOM imposed an asymmetric termination charge regulation in the related market of wholesale call termination following the designation of TI and 11 ANOs each as having SMP on their respective networks. The wholesale obligation entails <i>inter alia</i> that TI will be charged maximum 1.54€ cent/minute for terminating a call on an ANOs
				2 - transparency	network whereas the ANOs may not be charged more than 0.84€ cent/minute at single national commuters level. AGCOM intends to remove this asymmetry in termination charges by means of a 4-year glide path towards equivalent charges for both TI and the ANOs, but did not specify the detailed implementation of such glide path in its draft regulatory measure. In order to increase legal certainty for all parties involved, the

			3 – price control	Commission invited AGCOM to specify the glide path in its final measure and to develop a cost model as soon as possible for calculating ANO's termination rates taking into account the necessity for ANOs to become efficient over time. The Commission notes that in the present retail calls market, AGCOM does not allow TI to differentiate its prices of local, national and fixed to mobile calls (residential and non residential), according to the termination network of the ANO. AGCOM maintains that the obligation of non-discrimination between generalised on-net and off-net rates is motivated by demands for transparency of the rates for the end-users and
--	--	--	-------------------	---

4 – submission of other offers to the price test	 the need to avoid anticompetitive effects. AGCOM believes that TI's dominant position in the relevant markets may induce it to adopt discriminatory pricing strategies to the advantage of its own users with the dual objective of raising barriers so as to make market entry unprofitable for new entrants and of recovering market shares to the detriment of competitors present on the market. The Commission does not primarily object to retail price differentiation. However in this particular case it has to be noted that 95% of all traffic in Italy is terminated on TI's network illustrating the still small size of ANOs. Therefore, the Commission agrees with AGCOM
5 - Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	that it may be justified not to allow operators with a very high market share compared to their competitors, to price discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. At the same time, the Commission is of the view that operators should have the ability to recoup their higher regulated wholesale costs by setting the appropriate retail price, without having to have recourse to restrictive practices. The Commission notes that in the present case AGCOM stated in its draft regulatory measure that TI is able to recoup through appropriate retail prices the wholesale costs for terminating calls on the ANOs'

				6 – cost accounting	networks. In any event, considering the difference in termination rates between TI and ANOs at wholesale level, which is expected to be reduced progressively over the next four years, the Commission invites AGCOM to monitor the proportionality of the retail regulation for local and national calls markets on the basis of the market's evolution.
				Non discrimination	
				transparency	
EL/2006/0505	Similar to the Recommendation	national	OTE	obligation to provide separately each component of a service package	No comments made by the Commission
				Accounting separation	
				Price control	
PL/2006/0530	Similar to the Recommendation	national	TP SA	an obligation not to impose excessively high prices;	Inclusion in the final measures of the additional data and arguments provided to the Commission
					The Commission invites UKE to include the data and arguments that UKE provided to the
				an obligation not to hinder market entry;	Commission in the course of the second phase procedure in the final measures. UKE is invited to indicate in particular TP's market shares including calls <i>via</i> 0 708 numbers and <i>via</i> pre-
				non discrimination	paid calling cards in the relevant markets. Monitoring of the market dynamics and the next review

				an obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision;	The information available suggests a certain dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in particular in the international calls markets. This is indicated <i>inter alia</i> by the increasing market shares of alternative providers and the
				obligation not to force end customers to purchase unwanted services;	availability of various methods of call placing (direct call, call selection and pre-selection, calls via 0 708 numbers, emergence of VoIP services). In the short to medium term, it can be expected that wholesale line rental ⁴³ becomes operational
				an obligation of regulatory cost accounting and cost orientation based on FL-FDC;	and other wholesale regulation should become effective as well. In view thereof, UKE is invited to closely monitor the market trends and to undertake a new market analysis at the latest
				an obligation to present retail call tariffs and conditions of provision for UKE's approval.	within one year following adoption of the final measures.
				Non discrimination	
LU/2006/0534 Similar to the Recommendation	Similar to the	national	EPT	transparency	No comments made by the Commission
	Recommendation			Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission
			Price control		

				1 – CS/CPS	Lack of details concerning price control obligation The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its final measure the details of
LV/2007/0569	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Lattelecom	2 – price control	 the price control remedy imposed. Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

				1 – CS/CPS	 Lack of details concerning price control obligation The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its final measure the details of
LV/2007/0569	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Lattelecom	2 – price control	 the price control remedy imposed. Non-imposition of accounting separation The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the Access Directive

Market 6: Publicly available international telephone services

provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed				
			Carrier (Pre) Selection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria***	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Denmark	YES			NO SMP F	OUND		
Finland	YES			NO SMP FO	OUND**		
France	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sweden	YES	NO SMP FOUND					
United Kingdom	NO*	1 operator NO YES YES NO N					NO
Netherlands	NO*	NO SMP FOUND					
Belgium	NO*		NO SMP FOUND				

Czech Republic	YES	NO SMP FOUND					
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Spain	YES	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Italy	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
Germany	NO*			NO SMP F	OUND		
Denmark	NO*			NO SMP F	OUND		
Cyprus	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Greece				NO SMP FO	UND		
Poland	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Luxembourg	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

** At a prior notification the Commission issued a Veto on the Non-SMP-finding

***second market review

Market 6: Publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location for non-residential customers

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0007 and UK/2003/0008	Separation (i) a market with competitive input at wholesale level ("category A") and (ii) many markets on a route-by-route basis with non- competitive input at wholesale level ("Category B"). Operator-assisted calls are not included (together with national calls a separate market, see market 3).	Separate markets: Hull area and UK outside Hull	Hull area: Kingston; UK outside Hull: No SMP removal of existing obligations on BT	1 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made comments on: Reliance on comments from parties other than the Commission and other NRAs: The Commission stresses the fact that any material modification to the notified draft measure will require the draft measure to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. Markets defined more narrowly than in the Recommendation on relevant markets: Oftel defined retail narrowband markets more narrowly than in the Recommendation. However, a broader market definition along the lines of the Recommendation on relevant markets is not likely to lead to a different result of the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the markets is not relevant in this specific context for the purposes of SMP assessment. Finding of SMP in the IDD calls markets: Oftel does not have sufficiently detailed market share information to calculate both residential and business market shares in each of the relevant IDD calls markets. However, the Commission

	2 - Transparency	considers the other, non market- share-related assumptions made regarding the finding of significant market power to be convincing. In any event, in this particular case, the Commission does not consider that any measure concerning these markets would affect trade between Member States.

FI/2003/0027	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission vetoed the draft measure based on: Lack of evidence to support the finding of the absence of SMP: Ficora has submitted neither sufficient facts nor sufficient reasoning to rebut the presumption of dominance in the presence of a market share in excess of 50%.Ficora failed to provide 1) any market data related to the exact degree of changes in market shares over the past years, 2) market data related to price levels and 3) market data related to other factors which are relevant to the assessment of market power. Lack of consideration of existing remedies: Ficora did not justify its conclusions in light of existing regulatory obligations, and did not consider what the outcome of the market analysis is likely to be in the absence of such obligations. Conversely, Ficora did not consider how the justification for existing regulatory obligations, which are imposed on undertakings in the same or other closely related markets, and which may have a substantial competitive effect on markets for publicly available international telephone services provided at a fixed location, would be affected by the conclusions of its market analyses.
--------------	-----------------------------------	----------	--------------	---------------------	--

FI/2005/0202	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
				1 - Transparency	
PT/2004/0058 and	Similar to the	National	PT Group	2 - Non-discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
PT/2004/0091	Recommendation.	National	r i Gioup	3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Accounting separation	
					The Commission made a comment on:
AT/2005/0124 AT/2007/0584	Similar to the Recommendation. All types of calls included	National	ТА	1 - Cost orientation, ex-ante approval of tariffs	Efficiency of wholesale regulation TKK's analysis does not indicate any significant changes in the competitive conditions in the retail calls markets since the first market review. This calls for the reassessment of the effectiveness of the current wholesale regulation. The Commission already commented upon this issue in the context of TKK's second market review of the fixed wholesale markets. With regard to the present

				2 - Accounting separation	notifications, the Commission services would like to invite TKK in particular to supervise closely the standard WLR offer of TA and to reassess whether the upfront payment applied by TA, that TKK considers to constitute a barrier to enter the retail access markets, could be lowered.
HU/2005/0135	Similar to the Recommendation. Public payphones and prepaid cards included.	Regional	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató, Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon Társaság	1 - Carrier(Pre)Selection	The Commission made comments on: Consideration of additional retail remedies: In view of the continuing high market shares of the incumbents and their relatively high retail prices compared to EU best practices, the Commission invites NHH to consider whether the notified remedies (CS/CPS) over a given period are sufficient to address the market failure in the four retail calls markets under review. Remedies imposed at retail level prior to analysing the corresponding wholesale markets: The Commission reminds NHH that it should assess the effectiveness of remedies to be imposed at wholesale level in addressing market failures in the relevant retail markets. Should this review lead to a need to amend the retail remedies, particular attention should be paid to the possibility of a price or margin squeeze?

SE/2005/0146		Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority.							
SE/2005/0198	Similar to the Recommendation. Explicitly includes IP-Telephony.	National	No SMP found, due to regulation in the wholesale and retail access markets.	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Inclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: PTS has included IP-telephony in the notified markets without supporting this conclusion by a substitutability analysis. When assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services.				
				1 - Carrier Access and Carrier (Pre) Selection					
						2 - Access obligation	The Commission made a comment on: Further consultations planned by ComReg:		
IE/2005/0163	Residential and non-residential in one market	National	Eircom	3 - Non-discrimination	The Commission reminds ComReg that draft measures relating to the details and implementation of accounting separation and cost				
				4 - Transparency	accounting obligations are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.				
				5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting					
DK /2005/0194	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found: decreasing	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.				

	VOIP excluded.		market share of the incumbent, falling prices, no significant entry barriers.		
FR/2005/0226	VoIP calls offered by access providers ("managed VOIP")	Metropolitan France and overseas	France Télécom	Remedies only for PSTN calls, no remedies for VOIP calls	The Commission made comments on:
	are included, VOIP calls by non-access providers are <u>not</u> included into the market.	territories except for the territory of Saint-Pierre- et-Miquelon		1 - Prohibition of abusive bundling of access and call products	Inclusion of managed IP-telephony in the notified calls markets: The Commission recalls that, when assessing whether IP-telephony services are part of any of the markets for publicly available fixed telephony services, national regulatory authorities must examine - taking national circumstances into account - the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of the IP-telephony services, as well as their
				2 - Prohibition of excessive or predatory pricing	of the IP-telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply side substitution with other fixed telephony services. The Commission believes that, in the present case the inclusion of managed IP-telephony (VoB) in the relevant retail calls markets is not inconsistent with the Recommendation.
				3 - Ex ante tariff information vis-a-vis the NRA	Remedies and next market review: The Commission considers that the decision not to extend PSTN obligations to VoB is justified. The Commission notes the existing wholesale remedies on markets 11 and 12 as well as ARCEP's commitment to monitor this part of the retail markets closely for any anti-competitive practices and considers that should such practices occur, ARCEP has the right and the obligation to

				4 - Accounting separation	intervene as appropriate. The Commission invites ARCEP to ensure full, effective and appropriate enforcement of the obligations imposed in markets 8 to 12 within the shortest possible timeframe, and accordingly to commit reviewing the present market analysis following such enforcement, in any case at an earlier timing than the proposed 2008 review.
				5 - Price control on fixed to mobile calls	
				6 - Non-discrimination	
NL/2005/0292	No SMP found				No comments made by the Commission

SI/2005/0299	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telecom Slovenije	Prohibition to restrict competition by setting predatory prices	Impact of wholesale obligations on the relevant retail markets: The Commission recalls that in accordance with the Universal Service Directive10 NRAs should intervene at retail level only if remedies imposed at the wholesale level, together with the obligations to provide carrier selection/carrier pre-selection, do not render the relevant retail markets competitive. Therefore, the Commission would like to invite APEK to closely monitor the impact of
				prohibition to grant unjustified priority to certain end-customers,	 the proposed wholesale obligations11, in particular the implementation of cost-oriented wholesale charges and non-discrimination, on the relevant retail markets and to reassess the need to intervene at retail level accordingly when reviewing the notified markets. The exclusion of IP telephony from the relevant markets: The Commission notes that APEK will monitor the development of IP-telephony and in its next market analysis (which according to national law is to be carried out within one year) assess whether IP-telephony,

				prohibition to implement the unjustified bundling of various services.	from a demand and supply-side perspective, should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services. Taking into account the early stage of development of IP-telephony in Slovenia and the low level of broadband penetration, IP-telephony is not expected to have any significant impact on the market before APEK's next market review. In this context, the Commission further notes that full and effective enforcement of the wholesale obligations, in particular those in market for LLU and market for wholesale bitstream access, could have an impact on the entry for IP-telephony operators, and therefore invites APEK to complete the review of the related market for wholesale broadband access, market 12 of the Recommendation, as soon as possible.
DE/2005/0311	No distinction between residential and non residential customers	national	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	 Exclusion of fixed-to-mobile calls from the relevant markets BNetzA defines the calls markets more narrowly than foreseen in the Recommendation. In particular, BNetzA defines isolated markets for fixed-to-mobile calls. The Commission is not convinced that such a narrow market definition is justified. Since BNetzA indicates that it would analyse the fixed-to-mobile calls markets separately, omitting a proper analysis of it in the context of the present notification might be acceptable. However, the Commission would propose to request BNetzA to analyse the

	separate markets for fixed-to-mobile calls and to propose remedies, if appropriate, within the shortest possible timeframe. Fixed-to-fixed calls and fixed-to-mobile calls are generally offered as a bundle, in particular by DTAG. Regulation of fixed-to-fixed calls without regulation of fixed-to- mobile calls may therefore be only partly effective.
	VoIP When assessing IP-telephony services, national regulators should examine in the light of national circumstances objective product characteristics, prices and intended use of VoIP services, as well as their demand- and supply-side substitutability. Indicators such as broadband penetration rates, price elasticities, VoIP penetration, VoIP connection costs or the incumbent's position should be taken into account when performing such analysis.
	The Commission takes the view that the technology for VoIP services is progressing dynamically and the large majority of those
	for traditional fixed telephony services. At present, unmanaged VoIP-services do
	however seem to have different product characteristics6, which may call for special
	analytical diligence whenever they are proposed to be included in a market definition.

		Since the exclusion of unmanaged VoIP from the relevant markets in the present case would not have any impact on the SMP-finding, the issue might, however, be left open.
		Effective competition of international calls
		On the basis of the information provided, the Commission concurs with BNetzA's
		finding of effective competition on the market for publicly available international
		telephone services. However, the competitive status of this market is dependent on the
		existence of mandated carrier selection/carrier pre-selection ("CS/CPS") obligations.
		These obligations, which are currently imposed by BNetzA on DTAG on the basis of the previous legal framework, are to be imposed under the current regulatory framework on the basis of finding SMP in a closely related retail access market7. As BNetzA finds DTAG to have SMP in the retail access market it will maintain the obligations to provide CS/CPS.

ES/2005/0329	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TESAU	 1 - TESAU must communicate to CMT any changes to applicable prices and conditions of the relevant services at least 10 days before their effective date of application/launch date; 2 - TESAU must make available to CMT (within 10 days, on request) prices and conditions applicable to personalised offers offered by TESAU to those customers whose overall billing with TESAU exceeds €600,000 per year. 	Exclusion of IP-telephony in the notified markets: The Commission considers that the justification given by CMT for its decision to exclude IP-telephony from the notified markets is insufficient insofar as CMT's arguments are based on the fact that IP-telephony currently does not have the same functionalities as (and are thus not regulated like) publicly available telephone services (provided over PSTN and ISDN). When assessing whether or not IP- telephony should be included in any of the retail markets for fixed telephony services, the NRA should duly examine – taking account of national circumstances – the objective characteristics, prices and intended use of IP-telephony services, as well as their demand-side and supply-side substitution with other fixed telephony services.
				Price control	National public consultation: The Commission would like to remind TÚSR that
				Non discrimination	according to Article 6 of the Framework Directive, NRAs must conduct a national
SK/2006/0345	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Slovak Telecom		consultation on each draft measure taken in accordance with the Framework
				Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	Directive or the Specific Directives which have a significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the

					opportunity to comment on the draft measures
				Submission of all offers to AGCOM	
IT/2006/0399	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telecom Italia	transparency	No comments made by the Commission
				Non discrimination	
LT/2006/0428	Similar to the	National	TEO LT AB	Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission
L1/2000/0428	Recommendation	National	IEO LI AB	Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission
BE/2006/0438			No comments made by the Commission		
CZ/2006/0446			No SMP found		No comments made by the Commission
CY/2006/0490	No distinction between residential	national	СҮТА	CS/CPS and WLR	No comments made by the Commission

	and non residential customers		Non-discrimination	
			transparency	
			Accounting separation	
			Price control	
			Prohibition of unreasonable bundling of products and services	
EL/2006/0504				
(notification withdrawn)				
EL/2007/0556		No SMP found		No comments made by the Commission
(re-notified market analysis)				

				an obligation not to impose excessively high prices;	Inclusion in the final measures of the additional data and arguments provided to the Commission
				an obligation not to hinder market entry;	The Commission invites UKE to include the data and arguments that UKE provided to the Commission in the course of the second phase procedure in the final measures. UKE is invited to indicate in particular TP's market shares including
	PL/2007/0531 Similar to the Recommendation.			non discrimination	 calls <i>via</i> 0 708 numbers and <i>via</i> pre-paid calling cards in the relevant markets. Monitoring of the market dynamics and the next review
PL/2007/0531		National	TP SA	an obligation to refrain from limiting competition by fixing prices below the costs of their provision;	The information available suggests a certain dynamic in the Polish calls markets, in particular in the international calls markets. This is indicated <i>inter alia</i> by the increasing market shares of
				obligation not to force end customers to purchase unwanted services;	alternative providers and the availability of various methods of call placing (direct call, call selection and pre-selection, calls via 0 708 numbers, emergence of VoIP services). In the
				an obligation of regulatory cost accounting and cost orientation based on FL-FDC;	short to medium term, it can be expected that wholesale line rental ⁴⁴ becomes operational and other wholesale regulation should become effective as well. In view thereof, UKE is invited to closely monitor the market trends and to
				an obligation to present retail call tariffs and conditions of provision for UKE's approval.	undertake a new market analysis at the latest within one year following adoption of the final measures.
LU/2007/0535	Similar to the	National	EPT	Non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission
	Recommendation			transparency	

				Accounting separation	
				Price control	
					Lack of details concerning price control obligation
				CC/CDC	The Commission notes that SPRK has not clearly specified in its measures details of
				CS/CPS	the imposed price control obligation. In order to enhance legal certainty, the
			Lattelekom		Commission would like to invite SPRK to clarify in its final measure the details of
					the price control remedy imposed.
LV/2007/0570	Similar to the	National			Non-imposition of accounting separation
1	Recommendation	ation Transmit La			The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures
				Price control	identified on the retail access and local and national calls markets, SPRK should impose on Lattelecom an obligation of accounting separation. Without such an obligation, it seems difficult for SPRK to exercise effectively any price control. Such
					an accounting separation obligation seems also necessary to implement effectively a
					cost-orientation obligation for CS/CPS services as required by Article 19(3) of the

Access Directive

Market 7: Minimum set of leased lines

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed				
			Supply of minimum set	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Denmark	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Finland	YES	42 operators	YES	NO	NO	NO	NO
Hungary	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
Ireland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	NO
The Netherlands	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

T. 1	VEC.	1	MEG	MEG	MEG	MEG		
Italy	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Malta	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
France	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Germany	YES	1 operator	NOT YET NOTIFIED					
Cyprus	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Greece	YES	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Austria	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Poland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Belgium	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Luxemburg	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	

* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

Market 7: The minimum set of leased lines

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0035- 0036, UK/2004/0123 (modification of remedies)	Retail low bandwidth traditional interface leased lines (up to & incl. 8 Mbps).	UK excluding Hull area and Hull area	BT (UK excluding Hull), Kingston (Hull)	 1- Supply minimum set of leased lines (BT & Kingston) 2 - Not to discriminate unduly (BT & Kingston) 3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting (only on BT) 4 - Publish reference offer (BT & Kingston) 	No comments made by the Commission.
				5- Publish information on delivery and repair times (BT & Kingston)	

UK/2004/0045 (further amended in UK/2005/0217- 0218)	See Cases	UK/2003/00.	35-0036.	1 - Financial reporting obligations	The Commission made comments on: Publication of a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting systems: It is necessary for a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting system to be published annually, following verification by a qualified independent body. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
UK/2004/0077	See Ca	use UK/2003/0	0035.	1 - Amendments to the interim charge control obligation imposed on BT	No comments made by the Commission.
UK/2004/0123	See Case UK/2003/0035.			Slight modification of the remedies already notified because of the establishment of the Telecommunications Adjudicator.	No comments made by the Commission.
SE/2004/0048	Similar to the	National	TeliaSonera		No comments made by the Commission.

				minimum set of leased lines	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
	Recommendation.			3 - Cost orientation	
	Recommendation.			4 - Accounting separation	
				5 -Requirement to publish a reference offer, delivery conditions and technical information	
FI/2004/0079	Similar to the Recommendation.	Regional	42 local operators	1 - Obligation to provide the minimum set	The Commission made a comment on: Regulatory obligations reminding Ficora of the obligations set out in Annex VII of the Universal Service Directive requiring NRAs to ensure that the provision of the minimum set of leased lines referred to in Article 18 follows the basic principles of non-discrimination, cost orientation and transparency and asking Ficora to adapt its proposed remedies accordingly.
AT/2004/0097	Minimum set of retail leased lines +	National	Telekom Austria	Minimum set of leased lines:	No comments made by the Commission.
	(i) all leased lines with a capacity of a multiple of			1 - Provision of a minimum set of leased lines	
	64 kbit/s up to an upper limit of 2048 bit/s; and			2 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	

	 (ii) unconnected copper double wire between network termination points, which have been leased by communications 			3 - Non discrimination4 - Publication of information with regard to the minimum set	
	network and service operators			5 - Accounting separation	
				Other leased lines:	
				1 - Cost orientation	
				2 - Approval of terms and conditions	
				1 - Non discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2005/0137	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Eircom	2 - Cost orientation (pricing model based on fully distributed historic costs)	Further consultation planned by ComReg: the draft measures relating to the
	Recommendation.			3 - Transparency	details and implementation of accounting separation and cost accounting obligations are required to be notified under Article
				4 - Cost accounting and accounting separation	7(3) of the Framework Directive.
PT/2005/0155	Minimum set of retail leased lines +	National	PT Group	1 - Non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
	services supported by symmetric xDSL technologies with			2 - Transparency	

	capacity ≤ 2 Mbps			3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
HU/2005/0167	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Matáv	1- Provision of the minimum set of leased lines based on non- discrimination and transparency principles	No comments made by the Commission.
				1 - Non discrimination	
				2 - Transparency	
DK/2005/0177	Similar to the Recommendation	National	TDC	3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting (based on modified historic cost method)	No comments made by the Commission.
NL/2005/0279	Six relevant retail national product markets: (i) analogue leased lines; (ii) <2Mbit/s digital	National	KPN on the national analogue leased lines; national leased lines	Market for national analogue leased lines: - price regulation.	The Commission made a comment on:

leased lines;	<2Mbit/s	Market for national leased lines	Market analysis methodology: Without
(ii) 2Mbit/s digital leased		<2Mbit/s	contesting OPTA conclusions as to the
lines;	and international	Minimum package obligations:	identification of retail markets which are
(iv) >2Mbit/s digital	analogue leased lines	- obligation to deliver;	not part of market 7 as defined in the
leased lines;		- price regulation;	Recommendation on relevant markets, i.e. a
(v) data communication		- transparency;	market for international analogue leased
services over copper;		Non minimum package obligations:	lines, the Commission invited OPTA to
(vi) data communication		- non-discrimination;	justify in its final measure why it considers
services over fibre.		- unbundling;	the market for international analogue leased
		- transparency;	lines susceptible to ex ante regulation taking utmost account of the three criteria test.
		- price regulation.	
Five international		Market for international analogue	
analogue leased lines		leased lines:	
markets:		obligation to supply;	
markets.		non discrimination;	
(i) international analogue		transparency.	
leased lines market			
icused mies market			
(ii) international <2Mbit/s			
digital leased lines;			
ulgitul iousou illios,		Market for international analogue	
(iii) international 2Mbit/s		leased lines:	
digital leased lines,		leased lines.	
		- obligation to supply;	
(iv) international		conguton to suppry,	
>2Mbit/s digital leased		- no discrimination;	
lines,		no aborninimutori,	
		- transparency.	
(v) international data		autopatonoj.	
communication services.			

IT/2005/0315	Notification withdrawn by the NRA (re-notified under case number IT/2006/0371)						
				1 - Provision of a minimum set of leased lines			
		National	Telefónica de España, S.A.U and Telefónica Servicios Audiovisuales, S.A.U (jointly "TESAU Group")	2 – Price cap			
				3 - Cost accounting and accounting separation			
ES/2006/0352	Similar to the Recommendation.			4 – Non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.		
				5 - Prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour such as price squeeze or predatory pricing, abusive bundling (e.g. abusive bundle prices, non- replicability of wholesale elements), and abusive contractual clauses (e.g. loyalty agreements and exclusivity agreements).			
IT/2006/0371	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Telecom Italia	1 - Provision of the minimum set of	No comments made by the Commission.		
				leased lines on a transparent, non- discriminatory and cost-oriented			

				basis	
				2 – Price control	
				1 - Non discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	The inclusion of international lines in the wholesale and retail market definitions:
				3 - Transparency	By including international lines in the retail markets for the provision of leased lines and wholesale trunk segments of leased
MT/2006/0373	Minimum set of retail leased lines including both (i) retail national leased lines and (ii) retail international leased lines	National	Maltacom	4 - Accounting separation	lines respectively, the MCA deviates from the Recommendation. In its notification, the MCA did not conduct the three criteria test considering this unnecessary as in its view the two markets as defined in the Recommendation include international leased lines. Without contesting the MCA's conclusions, the Commission invited the MCA to clarify in its final measure (i) that two new markets have been defined by including international lines, thereby deviating from the Recommendation, (ii) that the three criteria test has been carried out for these markets and (iii) that the cumulative criteria of this test are fulfilled. Remedies imposed in the market of the international segments of leased lines MCA considered that prices would inevitably rise if not regulated. Accordingly it proposed to maintain the current price

176

				regulation on the retail market of the international leased lines (cost-oriented prices approved by the MCA). The Commission invited the MCA to consider whether imposing a less stringent type of price regulation rather than maintaining the current cost-oriented prices would be more justified and proportionate in relation to the achievement of the regulatory objectives - taking into account both the short term objective to protect consumers and the longer term objective to induce effective c competition.
Four retail leased lines			Minimum set of leased lines 1 - Non discrimination;	The Commission made a comment on: The inclusion of leased lines above 2
markets: (i) the			2 – Transparency;	Mbit/s in the retail leased lines market
lines other than the minimum set, up to and including 2			3 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	The evidence provided by ARCEP in its notification showed that (i) the described ruptures in demand and supply side substitutability might diminish as
Mbit/s, (iii) leased lines	National	France Telecom		technology develop and (ii) the definition of the separate markets (in particular leased
leased lines with			Other leased lines markets:	lines with traditional interfaces up to and including 2 Mbit/s, and leased lines with traditional interfaces above 2 Mbit/s) would
			1- Non discrimination;	not have led to different results as regards the finding of SMP or the fulfilment of the
interfaces.			2 – Price control (prohibition of predatory pricing);	three criteria test. Moreover, the Commission noted that ARCEP will closely
			3 – Cost accounting	monitor the market and remove <i>ex ante</i> regulation in the retail market once effective wholesale regulation has proven to have a substantial impact on the
	markets: (i) the minimum set, (ii) leased lines other than the minimum set, up to and including 2 Mbit/s, (iii) leased lines above 2 Mbit/s, and (iv)	markets: (i) the minimum set, (ii) leased lines other than the minimum set, up to and including 2 Mbit/s, (iii) leased lines above 2 Mbit/s, and (iv) leased lines with alternative	markets: (i) theminimum set, (ii) leasedlines other than theminimum set, up to andincluding 2Mbit/s, (iii) leased linesabove 2 Mbit/s, and (iv)leased lines withalternative	Four retail leased lines markets: (i) the1 - Non discrimination; 2 - Transparency; 3 - Cost orientation and cost accountingminimum set, (ii) leased lines other than the minimum set, up to and including 2NationalFrance TelecomMbit/s, (iii) leased lines above 2 Mbit/s, and (iv) leased lines with alternative interfaces.NationalFrance TelecomOther leased lines markets: 1- Non discrimination; 2 - Price control (prohibition of predatory pricing);- Price control (prohibition of predatory pricing);

					downstream market.
	Similar to the			1 - Non discrimination 2 - Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
L1/2006/0429	LT/2006/0429 Recommendation. Nation	National	ational TEO LT AB	3 - Price control and cost accounting 4 – Accounting separation	
				1 - Non discrimination2 - Provision of the minimum set of leased lines	
CZ/2006/0447	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Český Telecom a.s	3 - Price control 4 – Cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				5 – Accounting separation	

SK/2006/0463	2006/0463 Similar to the Recommendation. National	National	Slovak Telekom	 1- Non-discrimination 2 – Price control (prohibition of predatory and excessive prices) 	The Commission made a comment on: Appropriate justification of remedies The data provided by TÚSR indicated that the competitive situation may not be homogeneous within the whole minimum set of leased lines. In particular, competitive constraints faced by Slovak Telekom seem to be more stringent in the provision of high capacity digital leased lines.
			3 – Obligation not to unreasonably bundle services4 - Transparency	Therefore, without contesting the SMP finding, the Commission invited TÚSR to reconsider before adopting the final measure whether the competition problems identified would justify a differentiated application of remedies for different types of leased lines, taking also into account the development of retail prices for leased lines within the minimum set.	
DE/2006/0479	Similar to the Recommendation	National	DTAG		No comments made by the Commission.

				Remedies not yet notified	
				1 - Non discrimination	
				2 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer, including Service Level Agreements),	
				3 - Provision of the minimum set of leased lines	
CY/2006/0484	Similar to the Recommendation	National	СҮТА	4 - Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				5 – Accounting separation	
				6 – Prohibition of unreasonably bundling products	
EL/2006/0491	Similar to the Recommendation	National	OTE S.A.	1 - Non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Transparency	

				 3 - Price control and cost accounting 5 - Accounting separation 	
AT/2006/0507	Minimum set of leased lines + n*64 kbit/s leased lines up to 2048 kbit/s	National	Telekom Austria AG	Minimum set of leased lines1 - Provision of the minimum set of leased lines on non-discriminatory and cost-oriented basis2 - Publication of information related to the minimum set3 - Obligation to submit prices and standard contracts conditions to TKK for ex-ante approval4 - Accounting separationLeased lines n*64 kbit/s up to 2048 kbit/s1- Non-discrimination2 - Obligation not to unduly increase 	No comments made by the Commission.

				accounting	
				4 - Accounting separation	
					The Commission made a comment on:
PL/2006/0550	Similar to the	National	Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. ("TP")	1- Provision of the minimum set of leased lines on non-discriminatory and transparent basis	Remedies at retail level
	Recommendation.				UKE has not yet completed the review of the related wholesale market for trunk segments of leased lines (i.e. market 14 in
				2 – Price control (prohibition of predatory and excessive prices)	the Recommendation). Therefore the Commission invites UKE to finalize this review as quickly as possible in order to ensure effective wholesale regulation if the
				3 – Ex ante approval of pricelists and conditions	wholesale trunk segments of leased lines market is found not to be effectively competitive. Moreover, UKE is invited to ensure full and effective implementation of the obligations imposed on the wholesale market for terminating segments of leased lines (i.e. market 13 in the Recommendation) within the shortest
				4 - Transparency	possible timeframe.

				5 – Cost accounting and accounting separation	
				1- Provision of the minimum set of leased lines	The Commission made a comment on:
					Cost accounting for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines:
BE/2006/0551	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Belgacom	2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission notes that currently IBPT does not apply a cost accounting system for all products included in market 13 as defined by IBTP and that a consultation on the cost modelling methodology is planned to take place six months after adoption of
				3 - Transparency	the final measures in market 13. Given the relevance of a cost accounting system in relation to all products included in market 13 and in particular alternative interfaces,
				4 – Price control and cost accounting	the Commission invites IBPT to shorten the timeframe for elaborating the details of the cost accounting model and its implementing measures.
				1 - Provision of the minimum set of leased lines	
				2 - Non discrimination	
LU/2006/0559	Similar to the Recommendation	National	IPT	3 - Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	

				1 - Provision of the minimum set of leased lines	
LV/2007/0571	Similar to the Recommendation	National	SIA Lattelecom	2 - Transparency (publication of the reference offer for the minimum set of leased lines)	No comments made by the Commission.
				3 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	

Market 8: Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed					
			Access / interconnection	Carrier (Pre)Selection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria****	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Denmark	NO*	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Finland	YES	46 operators	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES**	YES**
France	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Germany	NO*	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES**	YES

Ireland	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES
Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
The Netherlands	NO*	1 operator	YES***	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES***	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Latvia	NO*	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES

Poland	YES	1 operator	YES***	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Italy	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Malta	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Belgium	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cyprus	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Greece	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Luxemburg	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
Austria	YES	1 operator	YE	ES	NO	YES	YES	YES
Estonia	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO

* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

- ** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators
- *** Imposition of WLR
- **** second market review

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 8 - Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation								
				1- Provide network access on reasonable request									
			BT (UK excluding Hull), Kingston (Hull)	Hull), Kingston	2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made comments on:							
					Hull), Kingston	Hull), Kingston	3 - Cost orientation of charges and cost accounting	Reliance on comments from parties other than the Commission and other NRAs: Any material					
		UK excluding					4- Charge control	modification to the notified draft measure wil require the draft measure to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive					
UK/2003/0011- 0012	Similar to the Recommendation.	Hull area and Hull area					Hull), Kingston	Hull), Kingston	Hull), Kingston	Hull), Kingston	Hull), Kingston	5 - Transparency	Flat rate Internet access call origination
								7 - Carrier (Pre) Selection and indirect access in relation to call origination	market identified, unmetered wholesale products, like FRIACO, may also be used for the provision of retail services other than the provision of unmetered Internet access.				
				8 - Flat rate Internet access call origination (FRIACO) - only on BT									

UK/2004/0045 (further amended in UK/2005/0217- 0218)	See Cases UK/2003/0011-0012.	Financial reporting obligations (in addition to the remedies imposed in Cases UK/2003/0011-0012).	The Commission made comments on: Publication of a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting systems: It is necessary for a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting system to be published annually, following verification by a qualified independent body. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
UK/2004/0071	See Case UK/2003/0012.	Provision of a CPS local calls option service by BT Wholesale	No comments made by the Commission.
UK/2004/0072	See Case UK/2003/0012.	Modifications to the charge control obligation already imposed on BT in case UK/2003/0012.	No comments made by the Commission.

UK/2004/0115 (amended by UK/2005/0180)	See Case UK/2003/0012.	Directions on BT's ability to use Cancel Other functionality (dispute resolution)	No comments made by the Commission.
UK/2004/0122	See Case UK/2003/0012.	Modifications to BT's charge control obligation (details of measurement of compliance)	No comments made by the Commission.
		1- Revised charge control	
UK/2005/0165	See Case UK/2003/0012.	2 - Amendments to the requirement (i) not to unduly discriminate and (ii) to notify charges, terms and conditions.	No comments made by the Commission.
UK/2005/0166	See Case UK/2003/0012.	1 - Modifications to the amounts that BT can charge for providing CPS facilities	No comments made by the Commission.

UK/2003/0013- 0014 (wholesale exchange line markets)	Fixed narrowband wholesale exchange lines market: a new market.	UK excluding Hull area and Hull area	BT (UK excluding Hull), Kingston (Hull)	1 - Wholesale line rental - only on BT	The Commission made comments on: Market definition for wholesale exchange line markets: The Commission stated that more consideration could have been given to assessing potential merchant wholesale demand and supply (i.e. demand from, and supply to, independent purchasers of wholesale exchange lines). Wholesale line rental (WLR): The Commission considers that WLR may also be imposed as a retail remedy in the retail access markets, since it serves to introduce additional sources of competition at that level.
FI/2003/0028	Similar to the Recommendation.	Regional	46 local operators	Asymmetrical regulation between 4 groups of operators	The Commission made comments on:
				1 - Access and interconnection	Geographic divide of the market for call origination: The Commission invites Ficora to monitor the development of the market for signs of a common pricing constraint which may permit the delineation of larger geographic markets in the future.

	2 - Publication of delivery terms and tariff information	Exemption from certain ex ante obligations: The imposition of different remedies on different operators within similarly defined markets should be adequately reasoned. To the extent that it would be considered disproportionate to impose costly cost orientation and cost accounting obligations on a small operator, the Commission is of the view that other forms of cost control for such operators,
	3 - Obligations concerning pricing and other terms (cost orientation and non discrimination)	such as benchmarking against the larger operators who are under a cost orientation obligation, could be considered. Cost orientation and cost accounting obligations: The Commission expresses concerns on the approach not to specify the method on
	4 - Cost accounting	which cost-orientation will be assessed, which it believes will limit the measure's contribution to consumer benefit, the enhancement of competition and the development of the internal market.
	5 - Accounting separation	

				1 - Obligation to meet reasonable request for interconnection (including via direct connections), network access, network capacity	
SE/2004/0049	Similar to the Recommendation.	National		2 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				3 - Non-discrimination	
				4 - Accounting separation	
			5 - Transparency (reference offer)		
				1 - Transparency - publication of a reference offer, prices, terms and conditions, technical information and relating to the quality of service	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non discrimination	Asymmetrical application of remedies: The
PT/2004/0060, PT/2004/0092 (remedies)	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	PT Group	3 - Accounting separation	Commission invites the NRA to monitor closely the development of the cost structures of the operators on which the obligation to charge "fair
				4- Access on reasonable request	and reasonable prices" is imposed and to assess whether its current assumptions on "fair and reasonable prices" will remain relevant over the period of the market review.
				5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
				6- Price control	

				1 - Transparency (publication of reference offer, technical specifications);	The Commission made comments on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	CS/CPS obligation and non-imposition of cost orientation in the wholesale market for call origination: The Commission invites TÚSR to
SK/2004/0103	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Slovak Telekom	3 - Accounting separation	consider explicit imposition of cost orientation obligations in the wholesale call origination market. National public consultation: According to
			4 - Obligation to provide access to certain network components	Article 6 of the Framework Directive NRAs must conduct a national consultation on each draft measure which have a significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the	
				5 - Carrier selection/carrier pre- selection (CS/CPS)	opportunity to comment on the draft measure.
AT/2004/0105 AT/2006/0543	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Austria	1 - access	No comments made by the Commission during first round of market review.
				2 – non discrimination	The Commission made the following comment during second market review: The Commission made a comment on:
				3 – transparency (including the obligation to publish a Reference	

				Interconnection Offer)	
				4- cost orientation and cost accounting	Reduction of minimum interconnection loads Minimum interconnection loads, depending on their level, might imply an unjustified refusal to
				5 – accounting separation	supply in the markets for wholesale voice call origination and termination markets. The Commission is of the opinion that it would be more effective that the TKK decides upon minimum loads in the present SMP decision, and not in a dispute settlement procedure. Therefore the TKK is invited to address this issue in the present SMP decision, for instance through reducing the minimum number of traffic minutes to the extent that the minimum interconnection loads would exceed the level which TA is able to economically and/or technically justify
DK/2005/0141	DK/2005/0141 Wholesale access (connections) is included in the market for call	National	TDC	1 - Access to i) wholesale call origination, ii) wholesale purchase of services for resale, iii) co-location	The Commission made a comment on: Inclusion of wholesale access connections in the product market definition: The Commission expressed doubts that wholesale access forms part of the wholesale origination market (market 8). Access services are not substitutes but rather
	origination on the public telephone network at a fixed location.			2 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
			3 - Non-discrimination	complementary to call origination services. In addition, the Commission noted that the proposed remedies do not necessarily require the delineation of a separate access market, since they may be	
				4 - Reference offer	imposed in respect of the call origination market alone.

				5 - Transparency	
				6 - Accounting separation	
DK/2005/0205 (modification of a remedy)	of See case DK/2005/01/1			1 - Retail minus price regulation on Wholesale Line Rental	No comments made by the Commission.
	Three separate			1 - Access (including interconnection services, collocation)	The Commission made comments on:
DE/2005/0143 (market analysis), DE/2005/0233 (remedies) DE/2005/0254	DE/2005/0143 (market analysis), DE/2005/0233 (remedies)markets for wholesale call origination: i) call origination for carrier (pre-) selection services;National	DT AG	2 - Non-discrimination	Remedies to be determined at a later stage: The Commission reminded RegTP of the need to notify remedies in accordance with Article 7(3) of the FrameworkFrameworkDirective.Accounting separation: Given the risk of cross- 	
(further remedies)	and iii) call origination for dial-up internet services.			3 - Price control (in relation to interconnection, conveyance and collocation)	vertically- integrated company, the Commission invites BNetzA for the purposes of enhancing transparency and legal certainty to consider imposing accounting separation as a separate
				4- obligation to make internal transfer prices transparent and to make them accessible to BNetzA upon request	measure.

				1 - Transparency (reference offer)	The Commission made a comment on:
HU/2005/0151	Similar to the	Regional	5 regional operators: Matáv, Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató,	2 - Accounting separation	The obligation of cost orientation on the designated local incumbents: The Commission was not convinced that the fact that, Invitel,
110/2003/0131	HU/2005/0151 Recommendation.	Regionar	Hungarotel Távközlési, Emitel, Monor Telefon Társaság	3 - Obligation related to access and interconnection	Hungarotel, Emitel and Monortel would be entitled to set their origination charges at a level which cannot exceed by more than 40% would effectively contribute to further decrease the
				4 - Price control and cost- accounting	relevant retail charges.
				1 - Transparency	
				2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2005/0190	IE/2005/0190 Similar to the Recommendation.	National	eircom	3 - Provision of access to and use of specific network elements and associated facilities on reasonable request	Further consultation planned by ComReg: The Commission reminds that draft measures relating to the details and implementation of accounting separation, cost accounting and wholesale price caps are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
				4 - Price control and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
FR/2005/0227	Similar to the Recommendation.	Territory of metropolitan	FT	1 - Access to, and use of specific network facilities	No comments made by the Commission.

	Includes also non- switching based	France, the French over-		2 - Non-discrimination	
	interconnection (mainly IP).	seas territories and Mayotte		3 - Transparency	
				4 - Accounting separation	
				5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
SI/2005/0257	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Slovenije	1 - Provision of access to and use of specific network elements and associated facilities on reasonable request	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	Implementation of the proposed price control obligation
				3 - Transparency	The notified draft measures provide that until the application of cost-oriented wholesale call origination and call termination charges, Telekom Slovenije would be obliged to provide wholesale call origination and call termination services at a "reasonable" rate subject to APEK's approval. The
				4 - Price control and cost accounting	Commission however notes that the current level of these wholesale charges does not seem to be

				5 – Accounting separation	appropriate to foster competition, which is also clearly demonstrated by the current 100% market share of Telekom Slovenije in the two relevant wholesale markets. Accordingly, the application of the non-cost oriented wholesale charges (including the "reasonable" character of the wholesale charges to be applied during the transitional period) should be replaced by cost oriented wholesale charges within the shortest timeframe possible.
				1 – Access (including imposition of Wholesale Line Rental*)	
NL/2005/0286 and	Similar to the Recommendation			2 - Non-discrimination	
NL/2006/0511	except for the exclusion of local conveyance	National	KPN	3 – Transparency (publication of the Reference Offer)	No comments made by the Commission.
(further details of remedy*)	conveyance			4 - Carrier (pre) selection	to comments made by the commission.
of remety)				5 – Cost orientation	
				6 - Accounting separation	

				1 - Transparency	The Commission made a comment on:
			Český Telecom	2 - Non-discrimination	
CZ/2006/0351	Similar to the Recommendation.	National		3 - Provision of access to and use of specific network elements and associated facilities	Price regulation applied only to minute based prices Considering that the incumbent will be obliged to provide flat rate origination services at the wholesale level, and since CTU's concerns for potential excessive pricing by the incumbent
				4 - Price control	would seem to be valid also for flat rate
				5 – Accounting separation	services, CTU is invited to consider imposing to flat rate origination services a price regulation equivalent to that applying to services billed on a per-minute-basis. This will avoid relying on multiple dispute resolutions that could result in a lack of certainty in the market.
		National	TESAU	1 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	Non-imposition of wholesale line rental remedy
ES/2006/0355 and ES/2007/0589 (further	Similar to the Recommendation.			3 - Provision of access to and use of specific network elements and associated facilities (including imposition of Wholesale Line Rental*)	CMT does not consider imposing a wholesale line rental ("WLR") obligation on TESAU arguing that such a remedy would not promote investments in infrastructure, in particular in local loop unbundling ("LLU").
remedy*)				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	The Commission welcomes CMT's objective to encourage infrastructure competition but would like to emphasise that WLR could also support
				5 – Accounting separation	such competition in the short run by making it easier for alternative operators to climb the ladder of investment. The Commission therefore considers that WLR can be an appropriate remedy

					to address the lack of competition in the relevant retail markets. It allows the incumbent's competitors to bundle their products and services in the retail markets as they deem most efficient, complementing carrier-selection/carrier-pre- selection ("CS/CPS").
					Therefore, taking into account the market failures identified at the retail level and the fact that the use of CS/CPS has been significantly decreasing over the last years in Spain, and presuming that this is not only due to the increasing market shares of alternative operators providing services on the basis of LLU, the Commission invites CMT to consider imposing a WLR remedy on TESAU bearing in mind that the need for market entrants to rely on inputs such as WLR, should decrease over time as their investment in alternative network infrastructure is increased.
				1 - Access	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
LT/2006/0364	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Lietuvos Telekomas	3 – Transparency (publication of the Reference Offer)	No comments made by the Commission.
			AB	4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	
				5 - Accounting separation	
LV/2006/0365	Similar to the Recommendation except for the	National		1 – Access to call origination services and unbundled access to local loop	The Commission made a comment on:

	exclusion of calls to non-geographic numbers.		SIA Lattelekom	2 – Non-discrimination	Obligation of local loop unbundling:
				3 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	In principle, the Commission agrees with SPRK's finding that the lack of access to the end customer is a significant obstacle to enter the wholesale markets for fixed origination (and termination) and
				4 – Price control and cost accounting	an impediment to the development of competitive electronic communication markets. However, wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to the local loops and sub-loops for the purpose of providing broadband and voice services
				5 – Accounting separation	is identified as a separate market susceptible to ex ante regulation in the Commission's Recommendation on the relevant markets (market 11). Indeed, access to local loops is neither from the demand-side nor from the supply-side substitutable with wholesale call origination services. The Commission hence considers that LLU (including the publication of a reference offer for access to local loops) should not be imposed as a remedy in market 8 without prior proper analysis of market 11. Instead, pursuant to Article 16 of the Framework Directive, SPRK is invited carry out an analysis of the market for wholesale unbundled access to the local loops market in view of determining whether this market is effectively competitive and, if one or more undertakings are found to have SMP on this market, impose appropriate regulatory obligations.
PL/2006/0380	Similar to the Recommendation.	National		1 – Access (including the provision of Wholesale Line Rental)	The Commission made comments on:

		2 – Non-discrimination	Price control before approval of LRIC cost calculation
	komunikacja a S.A. ("TP") 3 -	- Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	UKE has not clearly specified in its measure on which criteria it will verify the appropriateness of call origination charges proposed by TP prior to
		4 – Price control and cost accounting	the approval of its LRIC-based cost calculation by an independent auditor. This approach fails to provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market
		5 – Accounting separation	players, in particular since no timing is foreseen by which the LRIC-based cost calculation of the SMP operator must be approved. The Commission therefore invites UKE to clarify in the final measure which verification method it will use to approve the call origination charges proposed by the SMP operator before the cost calculation has been conclusively approved. The verification method that UKE will use in this interim period should ensure that the SMP operator, without delay, offers wholesale origination services at prices which allow
			competition to develop. UKE may in particular want to consider imposing retail-minus price regulation pending the approval of LRIC based prices.
			Wholesale Line Rental The Commission notes that Wholesale Line Rental (WLR) is imposed on TP on the basis of TP's SMP status in the relevant market and understands that this obligation will replace any WLR

					 obligations that may have been imposed on TP under the old regulatory framework. The draft measure, however, fails to specify on which conditions WLR must be provided. When determining the conditions for the provision of WLR, UKE should take into account the objectives set out in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, namely the promotion of competition as well as the encouragement of efficient investment. The Commission hence invites UKE to ensure that the imposition of mandated WLR which increases competition in the short-term does not reduce incentives for competitors to invest in alternative facilities that will secure more competition in the long-term. Specifically, WLR conditions must leave a sufficient margin with retail prices to avoid margin squeezes, but on the other hand must not discourage investments in LLU in areas where such investment is economically feasible.
IT/2006/0383	Similar to the Recommendation.	National		1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
	icecontinentation.		Telecom Italia	2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 – Transparency (publication of the Reference Offer)	
				4 – Price control (based on the network cap) and cost accounting	
				5 - Accounting separation	

				6 – CS/CPS	
				1 - Access	The Commission made comments on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	The inclusion of BWA networks in the wholesale call origination market
				3 – Transparency	BWA has been included in the wholesale call
	Similar to the	National	Maltacom	4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	origination market without conducting a full substitution analysis. Furthermore, the conclusion that it cannot be determined whether BWA
MT/2006/0387	F/2006/0387 Recommendation.			5 - Accounting separation	operators will offer voice services and hence cal termination services over their own individua networks during the lifetime of this review would seem to cast equally doubts as to whether cal origination services will be provided over the life time
					of the review. However, in this particular case the inclusion of BWA networks in the relevant market does not affect the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.
BE/2006/0439		National		1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
			Belgacom	2 - Non-discrimination	
	Similar to the Recommendation.			3 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	
				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	

				5 – Accounting separation	
				1 - Access	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 – Transparency including the obligation to disclose all information needed and to	
				publish a Reference Offer (including additional facilities such as co-location)	
CY/2006/0473	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	АТНК		No comments made by the Commission.
	Recommendation.				
				4 – price control and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
EL/2006/0493		National	OTE	1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
	Similar to the Recommendation.				

				2 – CS/CPS	
				3 - Non-discrimination	
				4– Transparency (including the obligation	
				publish a Reference Interconnection Offer)	
				5 – Price control and cost accounting	
				6 – Accounting separation and auditing	
LU/2006/0541	Similar to the	National	EPT	1 – Access and interconnection	No comments made by the Commission.
	Recommendation.			2 - Non-discrimination	

2 - Non-discrimination

EN

				3 – Transparency	
				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
				1 - access	
	Similar to the		Elion	2 – non discrimination	
EE/2007/0597	Recommendation	National		3 – transparency (including publication of a reference offer)	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 – price control and cost accounting	

Market 9: Call termination on individual public telephone network provided at a fixed location

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed					
			Access / Interconnection	Non-discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria	YES	9 operators	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**	
Denmark	YES	6 operators	YES	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**	
Finland	YES	50 operators	YES	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**	
France	YES	21 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES**	
Germany	YES	53 operators*	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	
Hungary	YES	8 operators	YES**	YES**	YES	YES**	YES**	
Ireland	YES	12 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES**	
Portugal	YES	8 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES	
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Sweden	YES	22 operators	YES**	YES	YES**	YES**	YES**	

United Kingdom	YES	63 operators	YES	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
The Netherlands	NO	Several operators	YES	YES**	YES	YES**	YES**
Czech Republic	YES	Several operators	YES	YES	YES**	YES	YES
Latvia	YES	17 operators	YES**	YES**	YES	YES**	YES**
Italy	YES	12 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES**
Poland	NO*	29 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Malta	YES	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES**
Belgium	YES	9 operators	YES	YES	YES**	YES**	YES**
Cyprus	YES	3 operators	YES**	YES	YES	YES**	YES**
Greece	YES	14 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES**
Austria	YES	12 operators	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**	YES**
Luxemburg	YES	9 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES**
Estonia	YES	12 operators	YES**	YES	YES	YES	NO

* On 17 May 2005, the Commission vetoed draft measures by RegTP (now BNetzA) for not designating alternative network operators to have SMP. On 29 August 2005, BNetzA renotified draft measures designating the ANOs to have SMP. However, remedies notified so far cover only DT AG.

Partially withdrawn by UKE as to call termination services to non-geographic numbers

** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 9 - Call termination on individual public telephone network provided at a fixed location Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation			
				1 - Provision of call termination on reasonable request (on all)				
							2 - Cost orientation of call termination charges (LRIC) and cost accounting (on BT and Kingston)	
	Geographic	BT	3 - Accounting separation (on BT and Kingston)	TheCommissionmadeacommenton:				
UK/2003/0003 Operator-specific relevant markets. Operator-specific each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	1 1	coverage of each network =	Kingston 61 other		4 - Non-discrimination (on BT and Kingston)	BT's countervailing buyer power: The Commission		
	alternative network operators ("ANO")	5 - Publication of a reference interconnection offer (RIO) (on BT and Kingston)	notes that a detailed assessment of the competitive effects of obligations to be imposed on BT as a result of finding BT to have SMP is important for the finding that all other PECNs have SMP as well.					
				6 - Notification of new charges 90 days before changes become effective (on BT and Kingston)				
				7 - Call termination charge control setting the annual ceiling for charges at retail price index (RPI) increases less				

		10% (RPI –10) (on BT)		
UK/2004/0045 (further amended by cases UK/2005/0217- 0218)	See Case UK/2003/000 :	Financial reporting obligations (in addition to the remedies imposed in Cases UK/2003/003).	TheCommissionmadecommentson:Publication of a statement concerning compliancewith the cost accounting systems: It is necessary for a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting system to be published annually, following verification by a qualified independent body.National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.	
UK/2004/0072	See Case UK/2003/0003	• Modifications to BT's charge control obligation	No comments made by the Commission	
UK/2004/0122	See Case UK/2003/0003	. 1 - Modifications to BT's charge control obligation (details of measurement of compliance)	No comments made by the Commission.	
UK/2005/0165	See Case UK/2003/0003	. 1- Revised charge control	No comments made by the Commission.	

				2 - Amendments to the requirement (i) not to unduly discriminate and (ii) to notify charges, terms and conditions.	
				Asymmetrical regulation between 4 groups of operators	
	FI/2003/0029 Operator-specific relevant markets. Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market 50 SM operator		1 -Provision of interconnection	The Commission made comments on:Exemption from certain ex ante obligations:The impositions of different remedies on different	
		coverage of each		2 - Publication of delivery terms and tariff information	operators within similarly defined markets should be adequately reasoned. To the extent that it would be considered disproportionate to impose costly cost orientation and cost accounting obligations on a small operator, the Commission is of the view that other
FI/2003/0029		operators	3 - Obligations concerning pricing and other terms (cost-orientation and non discrimination)	forms of cost control for such operators, such as benchmarking against the larger operators who are under a cost orientation obligation, could be considered.	
				4 - Cost accounting	Cost orientation and cost accounting obligations: The Commission expresses concerns on the approach not to specify the method on which cost orientation will be assessed, which it believes will limit the measure's contribution to consumer benefit, the
			5 - Accounting separation	enhancement of competition and the development of the internal market.	

IE/2004/0050	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	22 SMP operators	1 - Access and interconnection: meet reasonable request of access & interconnection (all operators); meet reasonable request for a direct billing agreement (all operators); meet reasonable request for interconnection via direct connections (TeliaSonera, Tele2, Telenor); meet reasonable request for access to network capacity (only TeliaSonera)	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Price regulation: cost oriented pricing (TeliaSonera); to charge reasonable & fair prices (others)	
				3 - Non-discrimination	
				4 - Accounting separation: accounting separation and obligation to submit separated accounts to PTS annually or on PTS' request (TeliaSonera, Tele2, Telenor); obligation to submit separated accounts to PTS on its request (others);	

				 5 - Transparency: publish reference offer (TeliaSonera); compile and publish information necessary for interconnection, direct connections and direct billing purposes (Tele2, Telenor); compile and publish information necessary for interconnection and direct billing agreements (others) 	
			PT Group	1 - Transparency	
	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each	Cabovisão Coltel	2 - Non Discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
PT/2004/0061,			Jazztel	3 - Accounting separation	Asymmetrical application of remedies: The Commission invites ANACOM to monitor closely the
PT/2004/0092 (remedies)			Novis Telecom		development of the cost structures of the operators on which the obligation to charge "fair and reasonable
		relevant market	OniTelecom	4 - Access on reasonable request	prices" is imposed and to assess whether its current assumptions on "fair and reasonable prices" will
			Refer Telecom		remain relevant over the period of the market review.
			Vodafone Telecel	5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
SK/2004/0102, SK/2005/0187	Operator-specific	Geographic coverage of each	Slovak Telecom	1 - Transparency (technical	The Commission made comments on:
(further details	relevant markets.	network =		specifications)	Implementation of the proposed cost orientation

of a remedy)		geographic extent of each relevant market		2 - Non-discrimination ;	obligation in the call termination market: The Commission invited TÚSR to notify pursuant to Article 7(3) of the framework Directive these implementing draft measures setting out the
				3 - Transparency	timeframe and stages applicable for the reduction of termination charges. By notification SK/2005/0182 TÚSR notified these measures.
				3 - Accounting separation	National public consultation: According to Article 6 of the Framework Directive NRAs must conduct a national consultation on each draft measure which has a significant impact on the relevant market, i.e.
				4 - Obligation to provide access to certain network components	including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the opportunity to comment on the draft measure.
				5 - Cost orientation based on LRAIC	
AT/2004/0106	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each	Telekom Austria AG	Telekom Austria:	No comments made by the Commission.
		network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Information- Technologie Austria GmbH	1 - Non Discrimination	
			Colt Telecom Austria GmbH Tele.ring	2 -Publication of a Reference Interconnection Offer ("RIO")	

Telekom Service GmbH Telekabel Wien GmbH	3 -Accounting separation	
eTel Austria AG Equant Austria GmbH UTA Telekom AG LIWEST Kabelmedien GmbH	4 -Access on reasonable request	

DE/2005/0144 (market analysis),	Operator-specific relevant markets. Geograp coverage o network geograp extent of relevant m	each operators = ("ANO"s) ic because of ach claimed		The Commission vetoed the draft measures concerning ANOs: No justification for the considered strict Greenfield approach: Any Greenfield approach must ensure that absence of SMP is only found and regulation only rolled back where markets have become sustainably competitive, and not where the absence of SMP is precisely the result of the regulation in place. This implies that regulation which will continue to exist throughout the period of the forward-looking assessment independently of a SMP finding on the market concerned, must be taken into account. No convincing evidence of absence of SMP under the so-called "modified Greenfield approach": RegTP asserts that DTAG's buyer power limits the ability of each ANO to behave independently of its customers and competitors (at the retail level). RegTP does, however, not present concrete evidence that DTAG has effectively exercised such buyer power. In view of DTAG's own termination rates being regulated and given that it cannot realistically threaten to stop purchasing termination services, DTAG would therefore be deprived of any bargaining tool in the form of a corresponding increase in its own tariffs when negotiating termination rates on that ANO's network. For the above reasons, the Commission considers that also under the modified Greenfield approach, RegTP has not provided convincing evidence to support the absence of SMP of each ANO. No analysis of ANOs' market power vis-à-vis cach other and vis-à-vis MNOs: RegTP has limited its
---------------------------------------	--	--	--	---

		SMP analysis for ANOs mainly to an analysis of negotiation powers between DTAG and each of the ANOs. However, it appears that a number of direct interconnection agreements between ANOs exist and. An analysis of these agreements could have provided further information on the market power of ANOs.

				DT AG:	Commission made comments on:
DE/2005/0234 (remedies)			DT AG	1 - Access (including interconnection services, collocation)	Remedies to be determined at a later stage: The Commission reminded RegTP of the need to notify remedies in accordance with Article
				2 - Non-discrimination	7(3) of the Framework Directive.Accounting separation: Given the risk of cross- subsidisation arising from the operations of a
				3 - Price control (in relation to interconnection, conveyance and collocation)	vertically- integrated company, the Commission invites BNetzA for the purposes of enhancing transparency and legal certainty to consider imposing accounting separation as a separate measure.
	(market analysis, notification owing a veto in caseGeographic coverage of each network geographic extent of each relevant markets./2004/0144)Operator-specific relevant markets.Geographic coverage of each network geographic extent of each relevant market		52 ANOs	1 - Access	The Commission made comments on:
				2 – Non-discrimination	Price control mechanism: The Commission reminds BNetzA that the provisions of the TKG referring to a "double dominance" test and
DE/2005/0239 (market analysis,				3 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	restricting BNetzA's power to impose remedies are currently subject to examination in the
DE/2004/0144) DE/2006/0343 (remedies on		coverage of each network =		4 – Ex post price control	context of infringement proceedings accordance with Article 226 of the EC Treat The Commission points out that the possibili of imposing ex ante price control on a wholesa market is provided by the Access Directiv independently of the SMP status of the operat in the corresponding retail market(s). Secondl the Commission invites BNetzA to monit whether in the absence of <i>ex ante</i> pri- regulation ANOs attempt to increase their fixe termination rates. If this is the case BNetz should reconsider imposing ex ante price contr instead of relying on multiple dispute resolutio that result in a lack of certainty in the market.

HU/2005/0152	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Matáv Invitel Hungarotel Emitel Monortel Pantel GTS Datanet BT	Matáv, Inivitel, Hungarotel, Emitel and Monortel:1 - Transparency (reference offer)2 - Accounting separation3 - Access and interconnection4 - Price control (4 operators are authorised to set their termination charges up to 40% higher than the level of the termination charges of Matáv)5 - Cost accountingPantel, GTS Datanet and BT: 1 - Transparency2 - Non discrimination	The Commission made a comment on: The obligation of cost orientation on the designated local incumbents: The Commission is not fully convinced that allowing for the four local incumbents to charge 40% higher termination charges than Matáv (and therefore, the possibility for not submitting a LRIC-based cost model) would effectively contribute to further decrease the relevant wholesale charges.
DK/2005/0171			No	otification withdrawn by the NRA	
DK/2005/0207	Operator-specific relevant markets. The market definition includes dial-up internet calls to geographic	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	TDC TeliaSonera Sonofon Consorte	TDC: 1- Access (requirement to provide network access at reasonable request) 2 - Cost orientation (LRAIC) and cost accounting	The Commission made a comment on: Asymmetric application of remedies: Where it is intended to impose different remedies on different operators within similarly defined markets, the asymmetrical application of

	numbers on PSTN or ISDN with a speed of up to 128 Kbit/s.		Danmark Tele2 Colt Telecom	 3 - Accounting separation 4 - Non-discrimination 5 - Publication of a reference offer 6 - Transparency Others: Obligation to provide network access 	remedies should be adequately reasoned. The Commission is of the view that NITA has not duly substantiated its intended decision not to impose certain obligations on the ANOs, e.g. non-discrimination. Consequently, the Commission would invite NITA to reconsider its position on this matter.
				on fair and reasonable terms at reasonable request	
			eircom	1 - Transparency (all)	
			Access Telecom	2 - Non-discrimination (all)	
			Budget Telecom	3 - Requirement to provide access to and use of specific network facilities on	The Commission made a comment on:
		Geographic coverage of each	Cable & Wireless	reasonable request (all)	Further consultation planned by ComReg:
IE/2005/0191	Operator-specific relevant markets.	network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Chorus Communications	4 - Price control (eircom: FL-LRIC, others : benchmarking)	The Commission reminds that draft measures relating to the details and implementation of accounting separation, cost accounting and wholesale price caps are required to be notified
			Colt Telecom		under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
			Energis	5 - Cost-accounting (eircom)	
			BT Ireland		

Swift Call Centre	
FR/2005/0228 Operator-specific relevant markets. Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market FT + 20 ANOS FT: The exclusion of termina geographic mumbers from m ARCEP should conduct, as so market analysis pursuant to A Framework Directive with termination 2 - Non-discrimination 3 - Transparency Asymmetric imposition of markets should be adequately in a continuing in the would disproportionate to impose or imposition and cost accounting (LRAIC) Asymmetric imposition of excess and interconnection 3 - Transparency Asymmetric imposition of excessive pricing 5 - Cost-orientation and cost accounting isonal cos	tion to non- arket analysis: on as possible, a rticle 16 of the regard to call numbers of non- users. pricing related fferent remedies imilarly defined easoned. To the be considered costly cost obligations on a n is of the view ontrol for such ing against the

				3 - Transparency	
				4 – Prohibition of excessive pricing	
		Geographic coverage of each network	28 operators	1- Non-discrimination	The Commission made comment on: Asymmetrical application and legal certainty of remedies :
				2 - Transparency	The Commission reiterates that obligations imposed under the Access Directive should be based on the nature of the problem identified proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. The remedies should provide adequate transparency and lega
ES/2005/0250	Similar to the Recommendation			3 - Accounting separation	certainty for market players. In respect of price control obligations imposed on ANOs (reasonable price) the Commission invites CMT:
				4 - Cost orientation of prices	i) to define in detail in the adopted measure the scope of the remedies imposed, including the criteria to be used in order to assess whether the termination prices charged by ANOs are reasonable, and ii) to monitor closely the development of the cost structures of the operators on which the obligation to charge reasonable prices is imposed, and to assess whether its current assumptions will remain relevant over the period of this market review.

	SI/2005/0258 Operator-specific relevant markets. geograp extent of		Telekom Slovenije	1 – Access to particular network facilities and the use of these facilities	The Commission made comments on:
				2 – Non-discrimination	Implementation of the proposed price control obligation:The notified draft measures provide that until the application of cost-oriented wholesale call origination and call termination charges,
SI/2005/0258		Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each		3 – Transparency	Telekom Slovenije would be obliged to provide wholesale call origination and call termination services at a "reasonable" rate subject to APEK's approval. The Commission however notes that the current level of these wholesale
		relevant market		4 – Price control and cost accounting	charges does not seem to be appropriate to foster competition, which is also clearly demonstrated by the current 100% market share of Telekom Slovenije in the two relevant wholesale markets. Accordingly, the application of the non-cost
				5 – Accounting separation	oriented wholesale charges (including the "reasonable" character of the wholesale charges to be applied during the transitional period) should be replaced by cost oriented wholesale charges within the shortest timeframe possible.
LT/2005/0263	Operator-specific relevant markets.	National	LTAB	1 - Access	The Commission made comments on:
				2 – Non-discrimination	MarketdefinitionandSMPassessmentrelating to other providers of call terminationservices in fixed networksThe Commission notes that RRT did not define

				3 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	relevant markets with regard to call termination services provided by other operators of fixed networks in Lithuania. The Commission would like to urge RRT to conduct the market
				4 – Price control and cost accounting	assessment with regard to those other operators who provide wholesale fixed termination services in Lithuania as soon as possible. If appropriate and justified, RRT could impose
				5 – Accounting separation	differentiated remedies on those operators, by taking into account (for example) the size of the undertakings.
	four distinct relevant product markets susceptible			KPN+ANOs: 1 – Access in markets (i), (ii) and (iv)	
	to <i>ex ante</i> regulation: (i)			KPN: 2 - Non-discrimination in markets (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)	
	termination on geographical numbers on individual			KPN+ANOs: 3 – Transparency in markets (i), (ii) and (iii)	
NH /2005/0204	telephone networks, (ii)	Geographic coverage of each network =	KPN + ANOs	KPN: 4 - Reference Offer in markets (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)	
NL/2005/0284	termination on 088-numbers	geographic extent of each		KPN: 5 – price cap in all markets	No comments made by the Commission.
	(companies or institutions) on individual	relevant market		ANOs: 6 – delayed reciprocity in markets (i), (ii) and (iii)	
	telephone networks, (iii) termination on 084- and 087- numbers (personal assistance services)			KPN : 7- Accounting separation	

	on individual telephone networks, and (iv) termination on 112 number (emergency services) on individual telephone network				
				All operators	
		Geographic coverage of each	Cesky Telecom + ANOs	1 - Access	-
				2 – Non-discrimination	-
CZ/2006/0358	Operator-specific relevant markets.	network = geographic		3 – Price control	No comments made by the Commission.
		extent of each relevant market		4 – Accounting separation	
				Cesky Telecom	
				5 - Transparency	
		Geographic coverage of each		SIA Lattelekom	The Commission made a comment on:
LV/2006/0366	Operator-specific relevant markets.	network = geographic extent of each	SIA Lattelekom + 16 ANOs	1 – Access to call termination services and unbundled access to local loop	Obligation of local loop unbundling:
		relevant market		2 – Non-discrimination	In principle, the Commission agrees with

		3 – Transparency	SPRK's finding that the lack of access to the end customer is a significant obstacle to enter the wholesale markets for fixed origination (and termination) and an impediment to the development of competitive electronic communication markets. However, wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to the local loops and sub-loops for the purpose of
	4 – 0	Cost orientation and cost accounting	providing broadband and voice services is identified as a separate market susceptible to ex ante regulation in the Commission's Recommendation on the relevant markets (market 11). Indeed, access to local loops is
	5 -	Accounting separation	neither from the demand-side nor from the supply-side substitutable with wholesale call origination services. The Commission hence considers that LLU (including the publication
		ANOs	of a reference offer for access to local loops) should not be imposed as a remedy in market 8 without prior proper analysis of market 11. Instead, pursuant to Article 16 of the Framework Directive, SPRK is invited carry out an analysis of the market for wholesale unbundled access to the local loops market in view of determining whether this market is
		1 - Transparency	effectively competitive and, if one or more undertakings are found to have SMP on this market, impose appropriate regulatory obligations.

IT/2006/0384	 call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location; Internet dial-up call termination; call termination on international networks. 	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Telecom Italia ("TI") + 11 ANOs	TI 1 – Access 2 – Non-discrimination 3 – Transparency (publication of the Reference Offer) 4 – Price control (based on network cap) and cost accounting 5 – Accounting separation 6 – CS/CPS	The Commission made comments on: Legal certainty of regulatory obligations Obligations imposed under the Access Directive should be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. Where an NRA intends to impose different remedies on different operators within similarly defined markets, such differential treatment should be adequately reasoned. In order to increase legal certainty AGCOM should reconsider the need to specify the glide path preferably in the final measure. Moreover, in order to better safeguard the interest of consumers, the AGCOM is invited to develop a cost model as soon as possible for calculating ANOs' termination rates that, while being based on costs takes into account the necessity for ANOs to become efficient over time. Obligations related to the wholesale market for Internet dial-up call termination After conducting the three criteria test, AGCOM concludes that this market is not susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation. AGCOM therefore proposes to withdraw the existing regulation on this market. However, the Commission notes that AGCOM,
--------------	---	--	---------------------------------------	--	--

	ANOs 1 – Access 2 – Non-discrimination 3 – Transparency 4 – Price control through imposition of a maximum termination rate.	 while proposing to withdraw the cost orientation obligation on TI's dial-up termination service, intends to maintain the transparency, non-discrimination and accounting separation obligations at least until the review of the retail market for Internet dial-up access (which is presently regulated). AGCOM considers this necessary in order to avoid cross subsidies. Without contesting the conclusion reached by AGCOM on the wholesale market for Internet dial-up call termination, the Commission invites AGCOM to analyse its retail market for internet dial-up access in the shortest delay possible and notify it in accordance with Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive, and reminds AGCOM that appropriate obligations can only be imposed upon finding of SMP in a particular market. Since the market for wholesale internet dial-up call termination has not been found susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation, AGCOM is obliged to lift all obligations previously imposed on this market. Withdrawal of obligations on the market for call termination on international networks While confirming the intention to remove the current regulations imposed on TI, AGCOM believes that it is necessary to begin an analysis of the international directions that do not pass
--	--	--

					the criteria set out in the Recommendation, due to specific, non transitory problems. The Commission reminds AGCOM to notify the results of such market analysis in accordance with Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
	Deviation to the Recommendation: inclusion of call			1 - Provision of Access on reasonable request.	The Commission made a comment on: Price control before approval of LRIC cost
	termination to non- geographic			2 - Non-discrimination	calculation
PL/2006/0381	numbers	Geographic coverage of the incumbent network = geographic	Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. ("TP")	3 – Transparency (publication of Reference Access Offer)	UKE has not clearly specified in its measure on which criteria it will verify the appropriateness of call termination charges proposed by TP prior to the approval of its LRIC-based cost calculation by an independent auditor.
	Partially withdrawn by the	extent of its relevant market		4 – Price control and cost accounting	This approach fails to provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market
	NRA as to - call termination to access numbers for intelligent network services			5 - Accounting separation.	players, in particular since no timing is foreseen by which the LRIC-based cost calculation of the SMP operator must be approved. The Commission therefore invites UKE to

	including audio text services (0- 300, 0-400, 0-70X, 0-80X); - call termination to numbers used for special subscribers services.				clarify in the final measure which verification method it will use to approve the call termination charges proposed by the SMP operator before the cost calculation has been conclusively approved. The verification method that UKE will use in this interim period should ensure that the SMP operator, without delay, offers wholesale termination services at prices which allow competition to develop. UKE may in particular want to consider imposing retail- minus price regulation pending the approval of LRIC based prices.		
MT/2006/0388	Similar to the Recommendation.	Geographic coverage of		Maltacom:	The Commission made comments on:		
		each network = geographic	Maltacom and Melita cable	1 - Access	Level of termination charges –		
		extent of each relevant market		2 - Non-discrimination	implementation of cost orientation		
						3 – Transparency	Currently, Maltacom is obliged to implement a cost-based accounting system using a fully
				4 – Cost orientation and cost	allocated cost methodology on a historic cost base. The MCA is considering a move to a		
				accounting	current cost regime, which would, according to the MCA, reduce the impact of legacy costs and thus reduce these charges but does not specify when such a change could be implemented.		
				5 - Accounting separation	Considering that Maltacom's interconnection charges for call termination are among the highest in the EU17 the Commission invites the MCA to revise its price control obligations as soon as possible in order to accelerate interconnection tariff reduction. As an intermediate solution, until a new price control		

					model is implemented, the MCA could temporarily base its price control obligations on international benchmarking.
				Melita cable	
				1 – Access	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 – Transparency	
				4 - Price control through imposition of a maximum termination rate.	
BE/2006/0440	Similar to the Recommendation.	Geographic coverage of cach network =	Belgacom +	Belgacom	

				geographic extent of each relevant market	8 ANOs	1 – Access and interconnection 2 – Non-discrimination 3 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 4 – Accounting separation ANOs 1 - Access and interconnection 2 – Non-discrimination 3 - Cost orientation interconnection 1 - Access and interconnection 3 - Transparency 4- Prohibition of excessive pricing	No comments made by the Commission.
CY/2006/0474	Similar	to	the	Geographic	ATHK, Primetel	АТНК	The Commission made comments on:

Recommendation.	coverage of	and	1 - Access	
	each network = geographic	OTEnet	2 - Non-discrimination	Remedies imposed on D.Y. Worldnet, Callsat
	extent of each relevant market		3 – Transparency including the obligation to disclose all information needed and to publish a Reference Offer (including additional facilities such as co-location)	and Telepassport OCECPR proposes to decide, already at this stage, on the set of obligations to be imposed on the three alternative operators once they become active in the market for wholesale call termination. OCECPR's decision is based on the assumption that the three operators will start to provide wholesale call termination within the 12 to 18 months timeframe of the review.
			4 – Price control and cost accounting	The Commission reminds OCECPR that
			5 – Accounting separation	remedies may only be imposed on undertakings which are considered to have SMP on the relevant market after an analysis of their position on that market, which normally
			Primetel and	presupposes that these undertakings are already active on the market (either by supplying the
			OTEnet	product internally and/or to third parties) when the SMP assessment is made. Therefore, the Commission invites OCECPR to reassess and notify the call termination markets of the three
			1 - non-discrimination,	alternative operators referred to above as soon as they enter the market and not to adopt the
			2 - transparency,	proposed measures at this stage.
			3 - accounting separation (when the operator's annual turnover reaches 50 million €)	
			4 - price control (fair and reasonable prices	

				OTE 1 – Access 2 – CS/CPS	
EL/2006/0494	Similar to the Recommendation.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	OTE + 13 ANOs	2 - CS/CPS 2 - Non-discrimination 3 - Transparency (including the obligation publish a Reference Interconnection Offer) 4 - Price control and cost accounting 5 - Accounting separation and auditing	No comments made by the Commission.

		ANOs	
		1- provide wholesale termination to other providers of public telephone networks;	
		2 - transparency, (including an obligation to announce interconnection charges to other providers and EETT with a 1-month prior notice);	
		3 - non-discrimination;	
		4 - price control through the imposition of maximum termination and cost accounting.	

LU/2006/0546	Notification withdrawn by the NRA								
PL/2006/0502	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	29 ANOs	1 - Access	The Commission made a comment on: Non-imposition of price regulation on the alternative operators The Commission reiterates that obligations imposed under the Access Directive should				
				2- Non-discrimination	be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. The remedies should provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players. Furthermore, where an NRA intends to impose different remedies on different operators within similarly defined markets, such differential				
				3 - Transparency	treatment should be adequately reasoned. The Commission takes note of the reasons why UKE does not consider it necessary to impose price regulation on the alternative operators under the given national market circumstances, in particular the limited degree of asymmetry in cases where it exists, the decreasing termination rates of alternative operators even in the absence of price regulation				

					and their higher cost of terminating a call, as well as the significantly smaller scope of operation than that of the incumbent operator. However, the Commission invites UKE to closely monitor the development of alternative operators' termination rates. If the expected trend of further price decreases does not materialise or if the level of asymmetry with TP's termination rates increases, UKE should intervene and impose effective price regulation also on the alternative operators. Generally, the most appropriate means to achieve effectively regulated termination rates would be to base their calculation on a cost model that takes into account the necessity for alternative operators to become efficient over time. Given the EU-wide importance of such a model, UKE is invited to work in close co-operation with the European Regulators Group in order to arrive at a coherent approach that also takes into account the work of other NRAs.
AT/2006/0544	Similar to the Recommendation.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Telekom Austria + 11 ANOs	Telecom Austria 1 – Access	The Commission made a comment on: Implementation of the proposed cost- orientation obligation According to the Recitals 5 and 6 and Article 4 of the Access Directive, undertakings should negotiate their access and interconnection agreements in good faith. Nevertheless, the Commission services would like to reiterate that the competitive problems

3 – Transparency (including obligation publish a Reference Interconne Offer)	transparency and legal certainty. In particular, it
4 – Cost orientation and cos accounting	decision how the cost-orientation obligation of TA should be implemented in practice. Regarding the possibility of ANOs to request higher termination rates, the
5 – Accounting separation	Commission recalls that such termination rates, while being based on costs, take into account the necessity for ANOs to become efficient over time.
ANOs 1 – maximum termination rates on benchmarking	Reduction of minimum interconnection loadsMinimum interconnection loads, depending on their level, might imply an unjustified refusal to supply in the markets for wholesale voice call origination and termination markets. The Commission is of the opinion that it would be more effective that the TKK decides upon minimum loads in the present SMP decision, and not in a dispute settlement procedure. Therefore the TKK is invited to address this
	issue in the present SMP decision, for instance through reducing the minimum number of traffic minutes to the extent that the minimum interconnection loads would exceed the level which TA is able to economically and/or technically justify.

				EPT	
LU/2006/0560	Similar to the Recommendation.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	EPT + 8 ANOs	EPT 1 – Access and interconnection 2 – Non-discrimination 3 – Transparency (including the obligation publish a Reference Offer) 3 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 4 – Accounting separation ANOs	No comments made by the Commission.
				1 - Access and interconnection	
				2 – Non-discrimination	
				3 - Transparency	

				4 - Price control (obligation to charge reasonable prices).	
BE/2007/0588 (related to case BE/2006/0440)	Similar to the Recommendation.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	11 additional ANOs	1 – Non-discrimination 2 – Transparency 3 – Price control	No comments made by the Commission.

EE/2007/0598	Similar to the Recommendation Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Elion and 11 ANOs	1 – access (only Elion)	 Non-imposition of an access obligation on the market for call termination on ANOs' networks. On the market for call termination in Estonia SIDEAMET does not intend to impose an access obligation on ANOs. In its response to the request for information SIDEAMET explains that, according to the Estonian Electronic Communications Act ("EECA"), operators providing network services are required, at the request of another operator, to negotiate the interconnection in
--------------	--	----------------------	-------------------------	---

	2 – non discrimination	 good faith if this is necessary for the provision of communications services. Further to the obligation to negotiate, the EECA provides, according to SIDEAMET, that an operator may terminate contractual negotiations and refuse to enter into an access or interconnection agreement only if the creation of technical conditions for interconnection or access is unreasonably burdensome or the interconnection or access damages the integrity of its network, while in other cases an undertaking is obliged to provide
		cases an undertaking is obliged to provide access. SIDEAMET considers that the

			3 - transparency	 above provisions of the EECA are sufficient in the case of ANOs to prevent the problem of access denial. While recognising that ANOs in general have an economic interest to interconnect, the Commission is of the view that any general interconnection obligation that might stem from the Estonian legislation would not resolve swiftly eventual access problems such as delaying tactics compared to a more specific access obligation imposed as a result of a market analysis. SIDEAMET itself
--	--	--	------------------	--

		3 – price control and cost accounting	admits that the general legislation as such is not sufficient to guarantee access when justifying the access obligation imposed on Elion. Therefore the Commission invites SIDEAMET to impose effective access obligations also on ANOs. Asymmetry of termination rates The Commission reiterates that obligations imposed under the Access Directive should be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. The remedies should provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players. Where an NRA intends to impose different remedies on different operators within similarly defined markets, such differential treatment should be adequately reasoned. In the present case the Commission notes the
			should be adequately reasoned. In the present case the Commission notes the arguments put forward by
			SIDEAMET- <i>inter alia</i> ANOs' weaker economies of scale and scope and large

		differences in volumes of terminated traffic – to justify asymmetric remedies.
		However, the fact that an operator has a smaller
		market share can only justify
		higher termination rates for a limited transitory period. The persistence of higher
		termination rate would not be justified after a period long enough for the operator
		to adapt to market conditions and become more efficient.
		Consequently, in order to increase legal certainty and to better safeguard the
		interest of consumers, the Commission invites SIDEAMET to consider the
		development of a cost model for the calculation of termination rates of ANOs,
		which, while being based on costs, takes into account the necessity for ANOs to
		become more efficient over time

Market 10: Transit services in the fixed public telephone network

Member State Market definition similar to Recommendation		SMP found for	Remedies imposed				
			Access / interconnection	Non-discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria*	YES			No SN	AP found		
Finland	YES	14 operators	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
France	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Germany	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Hungary	YES			No SN	AP found		
Ireland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES			No SN	AP found		
Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
United Kingdom	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO

Estonia			asure. TKK re-notified i	Withdrawn by the NH	RA			
Denmark				Withdrawn by the NI	RA			
Luxemburg			Not su	sceptible to ex ante ro	egulation			
Greece	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Cyprus	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Czech Republic	YES	No SMP found						
Belgium	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Malta	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Italy	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Netherlands	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 10: Transit services in the fixed public telephone network Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
	Local tandem conveyance and			1 - Provision of network Access on reasonable request.	
	transit on fixed public narrowband networks (Case	ansit on fixed public narrowband tworks (Case X/2003/0015) ad market for sit services on fixed public narrowband	BT	2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
				3 - Cost-orientation and cost accounting	Reliance on comments from parties other than
16	and market for transit services on			4 - Charge control	the Commission and other NRAs: Any materia modification to the notified draft measure wi require the draft measure to be re-notified under
1	narrowband			5 - Transparency	Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
	(UK/2003/0016).			6 - Accounting separation.	

UK/2004/0045 (further amended by cases UK/2005/0217- 0218)	See Cases UK/2003/0015-0016.	Financial reporting obligations (in addition to the remedies imposed in Cases UK/2003/0015-0016).	The Commission made comments on: Publication of a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting systems: It is necessary for a statement concerning compliance with the cost accounting system to be published annually, following verification by a qualified independent body. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
UK/2004/0072	See Cases UK/2003/0015-0016.	Modifications to the charge control obligation already imposed on BT in cases UK/2003/0015-0016.	No comments made by the Commission.
UK/2005/0164- 0165	See Cases UK/2003/0015-0016	In relation to the market for ITC/ITT services, all SMP obligations imposed previously on BT were withdrawn	No comments made by the Commission.

			In the market for LTC/LTT services previous obligations are maintained (see cases UK/2003/0015-0016). In addition, the following amendments to previous obligations were made:	
			1- Revised charge control	
			2 - Amendments to the requirement (i) not to unduly discriminate and (ii) to notify charges, terms and conditions.	
FI/2004/0043	12 separate local transit markets and one market for nationwide transit services	National transit: not analysed	1 - Interconnection	The Commission declared the notification incomplete on the following grounds: The analysis presented by Ficora was not sufficiently reasoned for the purposes of allowing the Commission to carry out its tasks, and to evaluate the notified draft measures.
		Following SMP operators in local transit markets:	2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms and tariff information	The notification lacked the appropriate argumentation for excluding national transit traffic from the market analysis.

			Auria Networks Oy, Elisa Oy, Kesnet Oy, KPY Verkot Oy, Kymen Puhelin Oy, Länsilinkki Oy, Mikkelin Puhelin Oy, Oulun Puhelin Oy, Satakunnan Puhelin Oy, Sonera Carrier Networks Oy, Soon Net Oy, Telepohja Oy, Tikka Networks Oy, Vaasan Läänin Puhelin Oy	3 - Non-discrimination obligations concerning pricing and other terms	
FI/2004/0075	Similar to the Recommendation.	12 separate local transit markets and one market for	Auria Networks Oy, Elisa Oy, Kesnet Oy, KPY Verkot Oy,	1 - Interconnection	No comments made by the Commission.

		nationwide transit services	Kymen Puhelin Oy, Länsilinkki Oy, Mikkelin Puhelin Oy, Oulun Puhelin	2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms and tariff information	
			Oy, Satakunnan Puhelin Oy, Sonera Carrier Networks Oy, Soon Net Oy, Telepohja Oy, Tikka Networks Oy, Vaasan Läänin Puhelin Oy	3 - Non-discrimination obligations concerning pricing and other terms	
			TeliaSonera	1 - Obligation to meet reasonable requests for interconnection	
				2 - Cost-orientation	The Commission made a comment on:
	Similar to the			3 - Non-discrimination	National consultation run in parallel with
SE/2004/0051	Recommendation.	National	Sverige AB	4 - Accounting separation	Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the
				5 - Transparency (reference offer)	framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
				6 - Obligation to meet reasonable requests for direct billing and cascade billing agreements	
AT/2004/0090	Market including self-supply	National	No SMP found	No remedies were imposed	The Commission issued a veto decision, on the following grounds: insufficient evidence for the

AT/2007/0590 (re-notification of a vetoed draft measure)	through direct interconnection.		 inclusion of self-provision through direct interconnection in the market, results of the market analysis and on the importance of applying a thorough greenfield analysis. As regards re-notified market analysis (AT/2007/0590), the Commission made the following comment:
			Tendency towards effective competition
			Considering the specific features and developments as set out below of the Austrian
			wholesale market of transit services (low barriers to entry in view of the relatively
			limited number of local switches in TA's network and the existing collocation of various
			alternative operators in those switches, the existing degree of duplication of the TA's
			network, the presence of alternative operators supplying nation-wide transit services in
			competition with the incumbent and the existence of countervailing buying power) the
			Commission agrees with TKK's proposal to withdraw <i>ex ante</i> regulation from that
			market.
			On the basis of the information provided by TKK, it would seem that there are no high

					 and non-transitory barriers to enter the transit market in Austria and that the market, in the absence of regulation, would tend towards effective competition within the meaning of the three criteria test set out in the Recommendation. The Commission services are therefore of the opinion, on the basis of the up-to-date market information provided, that the market for transit service in Austria does not meet the three criteria that render a market susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation. In view thereof, the precise scope of the relevant market and the question whether TA has SMP on the relevant market can be left open.
DE/2005/0145, DE/2005/0235 (remedies)	Five separate markets for transit services: i) transit services in the fixed public	National	Deutsche Telekom AG	1 - Access (including interconnection services, collocation)	In case DE/2005/0145, the Commission made a comment with regard to the determination of remedies at a later stage.
	telephone network plus call origination for carrier (pre-)		No SMP was found in the market for transit services	2 - Non-discrimination	In case DE/2005/0235, the Commission made a comment on:

	in the fixed public telephone network plus call origination for dial-up internet services; iv) transit services in the fixed public telephone network plus call termination in national networks excepting calls originating and terminating in national mobile networks and			3 - Price control (in relation to interconnection, conveyance and collocation)	Accounting separation: Given the risk of cross- subsidisation arising from the operations of a vertically- integrated company, the Commission invites BNetzA for the purposes of enhancing transparency and legal certainty to consider imposing accounting separation as a separate measure.
	v) transit services in the fixed public telephone network for calls originating and terminating in national mobile networks.				
HU/2005/0153	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies were proposed	No comments made by the Commission.

				1 - Transparency	
		National (international transit services		2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2005/0192	Similar to the Recommendation.	are distinguished from the	Eircom	3 - Access to and use of specific network facilities on reasonable request	Further consultations planned by ComReg: The draft measures relating to the details and implementation of the obligations of cost
		market for national transit services)		4 - Price control and cost accounting	accounting, accounting separation and wholesale price caps are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
				5 - Accounting separation	
PT/2005/0154	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies were imposed	The Commission commented that the elements provided by Anacom to find that the relevant market would not meet the three criteria test should be further developed. Irrespective of whether, as a result of the three criteria test, the Portuguese market for transit services in the fixed public networks could be found to be susceptible to ex ante regulation, the market analysis in this particular case would still not have led to a finding of SMP.

				1 - Access to, and use of specific network facilities	
				2 - Non discrimination	
FR/2005/0229	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	France Télécom	3 - Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Accounting separation	
				5 - Price control and cost accounting obligations	
				1 - Non-discrimination	
DE/2005/0255		2005/0145 and DI	7/2005/0225	2 - Transparency	
(remedies related to case	See cases DL/.	2005/0145 and DI	2/2005/0255	3 – Price control	No comments made by the Commission.
DE/2005/0145)	DE/2005/0145)			4 - obligation to make internal transfer prices transparent and to make them accessible to BNetzA upon request	
SI/2006/0274	Similar to the Recommendation, except for the			1 - Access to and use of specific network facilities on reasonable request	The Commission made a comment on:
	exclusion of transit services provided			2 - Non-discrimination	Appropriateness of remedies

	via direct interconnection since routed through the mobile network without using switches.			3 - Transparency	As regards APEK's justification for not imposing any price regulation, the Commission would like to point out that the mere fact that no complaints have been made concerning pricing does not necessarily mean that a problem of excessive pricing could not exist in the relevant market, in particular taking into account that Telekom Slovenije is currently in practice the only provider of transit services. The Commission notes the limited competition in the retail markets for telephony services in Slovenia. For a potential new entrant in retail markets which has not yet rolled out its own infrastructure, the reliance on direct interconnection is not likely to be feasible in the short term. Furthermore, full and effective enforcement of the wholesale obligations imposed in related wholesale markets have impact on the competitive conditions of supply at the downstream retail level. Therefore, the Commission would like to invite APEK to closely monitor the wholesale transit market, in particular with a view to potential pricing problems and to intervene if any such problems occur.
NL/2006/0285	three distinct product markets: (i) wholesale local conveyance	National	KPN	in the market for local conveyance services: 1- provision of access, 2 - non-discrimination, 3 - provision of reference offer,	No comments made by the Commission.

				4 - cost orientation,5 - accounting separation	
	conveyance services, defined as conveyance between regional switches, and (iii) wholesale transit services, defined as the transmission of traffic from one	gional		in the market for regional conveyance services: 1 - acceptation of reasonable requests for access under similar conditions as KPN has provided in the past, 2 - cost orientation and report to OPTA of new or changed	
				wholesale interregional services, including bundles containing such services	
	network to another network by a third party			in the market for transit services: 1 - access, 2 - non- discrimination, 3 - provision of a reference offer, 4 - no	
				price discrimination	
				1 - Access to, and use of specific network facilities	
	LT/2006/0319 Similar to the Recommendation			2 - Non discrimination	
LT/2006/0319			LTAB	3 - Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Price control and cost accounting	
				5 - Accounting separation	

				1 - Access to, and use of specific network facilities	
			-	2 - Non discrimination	
LV/2006/0367	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	SIA Lattelekom	3 - Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Price control and cost accounting	
				5 - Accounting separation	
				1 - Access	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
			Telecom Italia	3 – Transparency (publication of the Reference Offer)	No comments made by the Commission.
IT/2006/0385	Similar to the Recommendation.			4 – Price control (based on the network cap) and cost accounting	
				5 - Accounting separation	
				6 – CS/CPS	
				1 - Access	
MT/2006/0389	2 distinct markets for national and		SMP found only in the market for international transit services: Maltacom	2 - Non-discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
	international transit services	National		3 – Transparency	
	services			4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	

I		1	1		
				1 - Access	The Commission mode comments on
				2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made comments on:
				3 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	Consideration of differentiated remedies The ability to provide geographically ubiquitous transit services in Spain still depends on the transit
				4 – Cost orientation and cost	services provided by TESAU. Due to <i>inter alia</i> low traffic volumes, there are routes and services
ES/2006/0404	Similar to the	National	TESAU	accounting	which are exclusively or almost exclusively provided by TESAU. However, at the same time
13/2000/0404	Recommendation.	1 varionar	TEORO		alternative operators appear to have gained a substantial share of the market in some part of the
				5 - Accounting separation	overall transit market, most likely corresponding to certain thick routes (seemingly without constraining TESAU's behaviour on the thin routes). Therefore, the Commission would like to invite CMT to explore the possibility to take these different competitive conditions into account in designing the final remedies in the notified market, in particular as regards the scope of the cost orientation obligation.
BE/2006/0441		National		1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
	Similar to the Recommendation.	e	Belgacom	2 - Non-discrimination	
	Recommendation.			3 – Transparency (publication of a Reference Offer)	
				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	

				5 – Accounting separation	
CZ/2006/0448	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Additional information provided: The Commission would like to invite CTU, in order to motivate its findings, to include in its final measure the additional information provided in the course of this procedure, relating to, <i>inter alia</i> , market shares excluding captive sales, tariffs, and provision by alternative operators of transit services to third parties.
				1 - Access	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
SK/2006/0470	Similar to the	National	Slovak Telecom	3 – Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
514/2000/04/0	Recommendation.	Ivational	Slovak Telecolli	4 – price control and cost accounting	to comments made by the commission.
				5 – Accounting separation	
CY/2006/0475		National		1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Non-discrimination	

	2 distinct markets for national and international transit services		АТНК	3 – Transparency including the obligation to disclose all information needed and to publish a Reference Offer (including additional facilities such as co-location)	
				4 – price control and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
EL/2006/0495		National	OTE	1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
	Similar to the	Tuttonar	OTE	1 - 740055	The comments made by the commission.
	Recommendation.				
				2 – CS/CPS	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 – Transparency (including the obligation	
				publish a Reference Interconnection Offer)	

			4 – Price control and cost accounting	
			5 – Accounting separation and auditing	
LU/2006/0542	Not s	sceptible to ex ante	regulation	No comments made by the Commission.
DK/2006/0525			Notification withdrawn by the NRA	
EE/2007/0599				

Market 11: Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access)

Member State	Market definition similar to	SMP found for	Remedies imposed					
Recommendation			Access / interconnection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Denmark	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Finland	YES	44 operators	YES	YES**	YES	YES**	YES**	
France	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Germany	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Ireland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Portugal	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovakia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES**
Italy	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
The Netherlands	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cyprus	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Greece	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Poland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Luxemburg	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Austria***	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

272

Malta	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Finland***	NO*	39 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES**		
Estonia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
* Includes cable com	* Includes cable connections.								

** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

*** Second review

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 11: Wholesale unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops for the purpose of providing broadband and voice services

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
				1 - Obligation to lease part of a local loop and equipment facilities (on all SMP operators)	The Commission made comments on:
				2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms and tariff information (on all SMP operators)	Imposition of remedies: Where Ficora intends to impose different remedies on different operators within similarly defined
FI/2003/0030	Similar to the Recommendation.	44 local markets	44 former local monopolies	3 - Obligation concerning pricing and other terms (cost orientation and non- discrimination) (on certain SMP operators)	markets the reasons for such differential treatment should be adequately reasoned. Further, Ficora should monitor market developments.
				4 - Cost accounting procedures (on certain SMP operators)	Cost orientation and cost accounting obligations: The Commission expresses concerns on the approach not to specify the
				5 - Accounting separation (on certain SMP operators)	method on which cost orientation will be assessed, which it believes will limit the measure's contribution to consumer benefit, the enhancement of competition and the development of the internal market.

				1 - Access obligations	The Commission made comments on: Costing methodology for the
			nal eircom	2 - Non discrimination	implementation of the cost orientation obligation: In view of the relatively high prices and low penetration rate of LLU in Ireland, ComReg was invited to monitor market developments carefully, and especially (i) how the implementation of the proposed forward-looking long run incremental cost
IE/2004/0046	004/0046 Similar to the Recommendation. National	National		3 - Transparency	methodology would be more effective at addressing the lack of effective competition in the provision of fully unbundled lines, shared lines, collocation and associated facilities, than the current obligation of fully distributed costs and (ii) how and to what extent these would positively impact on the level of prices
				4 - Accounting separation	and the numbers of fully unbundled and shared access lines in Ireland. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a
				5 - Price control and cost accounting	consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
SE/2004/0084	Similar to the	National	TeliaSonera AB	1 - Access obligation	No comments made by the Commission.

	Recommendation.			2 - Cost orientation (LRIC) and cost accounting	
				3 - Non-discrimination	
				4 - Transparency (reference offer)	
UK/2003/0094	The wholesale local access market, in addition to traditional copper local loops also including cable	2 separate markets (the UK excluding the Hull area and respectively the Hull area)	BT (UK excluding the Hull area) and Kingston (the Hull area)	1 - Provision of access on reasonable request	The Commission made a comment on: Product market definition, including both copper loop-based and cable-based wholesale local accesses: When including
	connections.	fruit area)		2 - Non-discrimination	cable-based wholesale services in the relevant market, consideration should be given to the technical, practical and economic feasibility for cable operators to offer facilities equivalent to unbundled local loops. The indirect pricing constraint stemming from the
				3 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	substitutability at the retail level and the potential competition of cable-based wholesale local access could have been taken into account at the stage of assessment of SMP. Notwithstanding, while this approach may have led to a narrower market definition
				4 - Transparency	and there remain doubts as to whether cable- based wholesale products (whether currently or prospectively) form part of the market, the exclusion of cable-based wholesale services from the market definition in this particular case would not have led to a different result in

				5 - Collocation	the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the market was not relevant for the SMP assessment.
				6 - Accounting separation (on BT only	
UK/2004/0123	See C	Case UK/2003/00	94.	Slight modification of the remedies already notified because of the establishment of the Telecommunications Adjudicator.	No comments made by the Commission.
AT/2004/0098 (dispute settlement	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Austria	1 - Provision of access to metallic loops and sub-loops on reasonable request by a third party	No comments made by the Commission.
AT/2005/0318)				2 - Publication of a Reference Unbundling Offer within one month of issue of TKK's decision	
				3 - Cost-oriented prices according to the cost of efficient service provision	
				4 - Non-discrimination	
				5 - Accounting separation	

				6 - Cost accounting providing for the cost of efficient service provision	
				1 - Transparency (including the publication of technical specifications)	The Commission made comments on:
SK/2004/0107		National		2 - Non-discrimination	Implementation of the proposed cost orientation obligation: As TÚSR failed to provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players by specifying the details of the proposed cost orientation
	Similar to the Recommendation.		Slovak Telecom	3 - Accounting separation	obligation, the Commission had concerns as to whether the proposed price control obligation will be effective at addressing the lack of effective competition in the relevant market, and requested that once adopted, TÚSR will notify the relevant implementing measures.
				4 - Access to, and use of, specific network facilities	National public consultation: NRAs must conduct a national consultation on each draft measure taken in accordance with the
				5 - Price control, including the obligation of cost-orientation	Framework Directive or the Specifi Directives which have a significant impact o the relevant market.
PT/2004/0117	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	PT Comunicações	1 - Provide access to and use of specific network facilities	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	Costingmethodologyfortheimplementationofthepricecontrolobligation:Anacomwasinvitedtofollow

				3 - Transparency	market developments carefully and to assess whether a forward looking approach long-run incremental cost model would not be more
				4 - Accounting separation	appropriate than the fully distributed historic costs model, originally proposed by ANACOM.
				5 - Price control and cost accounting	
				6 - Provide accounting information	
DE/2004/0119, DE/2005/0150	The wholesale market for unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub-loops	National	Deutsche Telekom	1 - Fully unbundled access to the local	In case DE/2004/0119 , the Commission made comments on: Consideration of fibre glass connections to end-users: Relying on the Recommendation
DE/2005/0150 (remedies)	for the purpose of providing broadband and voice services, also including unbundled access to local loops on the basis of OPAL and	National	Deutscne Telekom	loop in the form of a copper pair and shared access	and the SMP Guidelines, RegTP excluded fibre glass connections from the scope of the relevant market (and thus from the market analysis). However, to the extent that fibre glass connections can be used to offer wholesale unbundled access to local loops and

ISIS2 at the main distribution frame or subloops.	2 - Bundled access to the local loop in the form of a copper pair at the main distribution frame, including to the OPAL/ISIS variant	sub-loops for the purposes of providing broadband and voice services, like metallic loops and sub-loops, they may thus, on the basis of specific national circumstances, form part of market 11. Fibre glass connections or part of them may also be found to belong to a separate market which is not in the Recommendation, subject to the three criteria test. In any event, since fibre lines are currently regulated in Germany, it needed to be emphasised that the possible maintenance, withdrawal or modification of current regulation needs to be based on a new market analysis in accordance with Article 16 of the
	3 - Collocation	FrameworkDirective.Remedies to be determined at a later stage: The Commission highlighted that RegTP will have to notify the remedies it intends to imposeimposein the markets concerned under Article 7(3) of theIn case DE/2005/0150, the Commission made commentson:

		4 - Non-discrimination	 Scope of the proposed remedies: As glass fibre connections in Germany may form part of market 11, the Commission questions whether the remedies notified on 25 February 2005 in relation to that market should not also extend to glass fibre connections. Withdrawal by RegTP of DT's obligation to provide access to its glass fibre connections: Despite the Commission's comment in case DE/2004/0119, RegTP
		5 - Transparency (reference unbundling offer)	intends to withdraw DT's existing obligation to provide access to its glass fibre connections without a market analysis as required by Article 27 in conjunction with Article 16 of the Framework Directive. In the absence of such a market analysis notified to it, the Commission is not in a position to assess the proposed withdrawal of existing regulation. Commission considers that the proposed withdrawal of the existing regulation for access to pure glass fibres is not made pursuant to a market analysis based on a market definition that has been duly notified
		6 - Price control, based on the costs of the efficient provision of services	to the Commission.

				7 - Communication of the location of local loops and of collocation spaces to interested parties on request	
				1 - Access on reasonable request	The Commission made a comment on:
		National	Telekom Slovenije	2 - Non-discrimination	Choice of an appropriate cost accounting methodology to prevent margin squeeze: APEK indicated that the price for fully unbundled access to the local loop in Slovenia
	Similar to the Recommendation.			3 - Transparency	is substantially higher than retail access price and gives rise to a likely margin squeeze creating thus an obstacle for operators to enter
SI/2005/0142				4 - Cost accounting (fully distributed common costs)	the market and preventing the existence of effective competition at the retail level. APEK considered the forward looking LRIC cost accounting method to be the most appropriate for the evaluation of cost oriented prices for unbundled access to the local loops, but
				5 - Price control	concluded, however, that this model would represent an excessive burden on Telekom Slovenije and is therefore not proportionate in the current conditions. However, the Commission had concerns as to whether the
				6 - Accounting separation	cost accounting methodology proposed will be effective at addressing the lack of effective competition in the relevant market, at least in the medium term.

				1 - Price control and cost accounting obligations (prolongation by 6 months of the period for implementing the cost orientation obligation)	The Commission made a comment on Choice of an appropriate cost accounting methodology to prevent margin squeeze: In its revised notification APEK indicated that a possibility of price squeezes between the wholesale and retail prices of local loop cannot be fully excluded in Slovenia. APEK considered the forward looking LRIC cos
SI/2005/0181	See Case SI/2005/0142 .			2 – Accounting separation obligation (requirement on Telekom Slovenije to render transparent its wholesale prices instead of both wholesale prices and internal transfer prices)	accounting method to be the most appropriate for the evaluation of cost oriented prices for unbundled access to the local loops, but concluded, however, that this model would represent an excessive burden on Telekom Slovenije and is therefore not proportionate in the current conditions. However, the Commission had concerns as to whether the cost accounting methodology proposed will be effective at addressing the lack of effective competition in the relevant market, at least in the medium term.
FR/2005/0174 (further details	Recommendation.		France Télécom	1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
of remedies				2 - Non-discrimination	

FR/2005/0301)				3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer)	
				4 - Accounting separation	
				5 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	
	Similar to the Recommendation.			1 - Requirement to provide wholesale unbundled access at reasonable request	
	The market comprises additionally the services provided in those cases	National	TDC	2 - Price control and cost accounting (LRAIC)	
DK/2005/0176	where a retail end- user stops using the narrowband service (voice) provided			3 - Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.
	over the local loop, but still keeps his broadband connection			4 - Non-discrimination	
	provided by his broadband operator.			5 - Requirement to publish a reference offer	
HU/2005/0185	Similar to the Recommendation.	5 markets corresponding to the former	Matáv Rt., Invitel Távközlési	1 - Transparency	The Commission made comments on:

		concession areas of the former concession operators	Szolgáltató Rt., Hungarotel Távközlési Rt., Emitel Távközlési Rt. Monor Telefon Társaság Rt.	2 - Non-discrimination	Non-imposition of ex ante regulatory obligations concerning "out of use local loops": Unless it is technically not possible or economically not viable to unbundle a	
				3 - Accounting separation	particular local loop that has been out of use, "out of use" loops should be included in the relevant market, and made subject to the remedies proposed for local loops in use.	
					4 - Obligation to provide access and interconnection	Choice of an appropriate cost accounting methodology: NHH should follow market developments carefully and assess whether a forward looking approach long-run
				5 - Particular obligations concerning facility sharing and co-location	incremental cost model would not be more appropriate in addressing the lack of effective competition than the fully distributed cost model, originally proposed by NHH.	
				6 - Price control and accounting separation		
IT/2005/0244	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telecom Italia	1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.	
				2 - Non-discrimination		
				3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU reference offer including a service level agreement		
				("SLA"))		
				4 - Accounting separation		

				5 - Cost orientation (based on a network cap) and cost accounting	
NL/2005/0280	Similar to the Recommendation.		KPN	1 - Access on reasonable request	The Commission made comments on: Determination of the price cap: OPTA has devised four scenarios which are
				2 - Non-discrimination	intended to reflect varying degrees of infrastructure competition. OPTA considers that the higher the degree of infrastructure competition, the
		National		3 – Transparency (publication of a reference offer)	greater should be the freedom of KPN to determine its own access prices. OPTA declares that the 2nd scenario – prospect of development of infrastructure competition that should lead to durable competition after the time of revision" – is the most relevant
				4 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	scenario in this case. However, OPTA does not justify in concrete terms why it considers the 2nd scenario to be the most pertinent. In particular, OPTA states that wholesale access to cable networks, mobile networks, wireless networks or fibre-optic networks currently do
				5 – Accounting separation	not constitute substitutes to the local loop of KPN. In the light thereof, OPTA does not indicate why it believes that these infrastructures should lead to durable competition in the future. The Commission considers that OPTA should elaborate in its final measure its reasons for choosing
					the 2nd scenario.

					Scope of accounting separation obligation: In order to facilitate the monitoring market for low quality wholesale broadband access ("WBA") (case NL/2005/0281)and the application of competition law, OPTA should consider extending the scope of the accounting separation obligation proposed for the LLU-market to cover also the provision of low quality WBA.
				 1 – Access on reasonable request including supplementary services such as co-location, and provision of updated information on the availability of network resources 	
CY/2006/0331	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	СҮТА	2 - Non-discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
				3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU reference offer)	
				4 - Accounting separation	
				5 - Cost orientation	

CZ/2006/0340	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Český Telecom	 1 – Access on reasonable request including supplementary services such as co-location, and provision of updated information on the availability of network resources 2 - Non-discrimination 3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer) 4 – Price control 	No comments made by the Commission.
EL/2006/0353	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	OTE	1 – Access on reasonable request	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU reference offer including a Service Level Agreement ("SLA"))	

4 – Price control and cost accounting

				5 – Accounting separation	
				1 – Access on reasonable request	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU reference offer)	
ES/2006/0368	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TESAU	4 – Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				5 – Accounting separation	
LT/2006/0391	Similar to the	National		1 – Access on reasonable request	No comments made by the Commission.

	Recommendation.		Lietuvos Telekomas	 2 - Non-discrimination 3 - Transparency (publication of a LLU reference offer) 4 - Price control and cost accounting 5 - Accounting separation 	
PL/2006/0418	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekomunikacja Polska SA ("TP")	1 - Access on reasonable request	The Commission made a comment on:
			()	2 - Non-discrimination	Price control before approval of LRIC cost calculation
				3 – Transparency (publication of a reference access offer)	UKE has not clearly specified in its measure the basis of the
				4 – Price control	verification of the appropriateness of local loop unbundling charges proposed by TP prior to the approval of its FL LRIC-based cost

				5 – Accounting separation	calculation by an independent auditor. This approach might affect the transparency and legal certainty for market players, in particular since no timing is foreseen for the FL LRIC- based cost calculation and approval thereof by the auditor. Therefore, UKE is invited to precisely clarify in the final measure which verification method it will use to approve the charges proposed by the SMP operator before the cost calculation has been conclusively approved.
				1 - Access on reasonable request	The Commission made a comment on: Details of the proposed price control obligation
LU/2006/0509	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	EPT	2 - Non-discrimination	The cost-orientation obligation should be based on the costs of an efficient operator. However, the notification does not specify how the costs of an efficient operator will be calculated and which cost model will be used.
				3 – Transparency (publication of a reference access offer)	In order to enhance the effectiveness of the price control obligation imposed and to ensure legal certainty and transparency, the Commission invites ILR to clarify without
				4 – Price control and cost accounting	delay the details and the timing of the implementation of the cost orientation obligation.
SI/2006/0519	Similar to the Recommendation.	National		1 – Access on reasonable request	No comments made by the Commission.

			Telekom	2 - Non-discrimination	
			Slovenije	3 - Transparency	
				4 – Price control and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
AT/2006/0537	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Austria	1 - Provision of access to metallic loops and sub-loops on reasonable request by a third party	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 – Transparency (Publication of a Reference Unbundling Offer)	
				3 – Price control	
				4 - Non-discrimination	

				5 - Accounting separation	
				1 – Access on reasonable request	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
	Similar to the			3 – Transparency (including the publication of a Reference Unbundling Offer)	
LV/2006/0539	Recommendation.	National	SIA Lattelekom	4 – Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				5 – Accounting separation	
MT/2006/0549	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Maltacom	1 – Access on reasonable request	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 – Transparency (including the publication of a Reference Offer)	

				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
FI/2006/054	F7 Similar to the Recommendation.	Regional	39 operators	All 39 SMP operators: 1 - Access on reasonable request	The Commission made comments on: Cost-orientation and cost accounting obligations
				2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission recalls the comment made in the first round notification with regard to the fact that FICORA did not specify the method on which cost orientation would be assessed. In the context of the adoption of the final
				3 – Transparency (publication of delivery terms and tariff information)	measure, FICORA justified it by explaining that since the Finnish Communication Market Act leaves each operator free to select the cost-accounting procedures, it cannot decide on the cost-accounting methodology. The Commission continues to believe that this
				4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	limits the measure's contribution to consumer benefit, the enhancement of competition and the development of the internal market.

				Only 15 SMP operators:	
				5 – Accounting separation	
				1 - Access and interconnection	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
				3 – Transparency (including the publication of a Reference Offer)	
EE/2007/0577	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Elion	4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
				5 – Accounting separation	

Market 12: Wholesale broadband access

	Market definition		Remedies imposed					
Member State	similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Access / interconnection	Non-discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Denmark	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Finland	NO*	43 operators	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	
France***	YES	1 operator	YES ****	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Hungary	YES	5 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sweden	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	YES
Italy	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Germany	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Netherlands	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO
Austria	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Cyprus	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Greece	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Slovakia	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Poland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Luxembourg	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Estonia	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Finland****	NO*	39 operators	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO

* Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

** Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators.

***Including the notification concerning the market for "Wholesale broadband access delivered at national level in France."

**** This remedy was not imposed in the market for "Wholesale broadband access delivered at national level in France."

*****Second review of the market

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

	Market 12: Wholesale broadband access Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007							
Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation			
UK/2003/0032, 0033 and 0034	Wholesale asymmetric broadband origination (in the UK excluding the Hull area and in the	Two separate markets for broadband origination (UK excluding the Hull area	BT (broadband origination and broadband conveyance in the UK excluding the Hull area) and	1 - General obligation to provide network access on reasonable request (both for BT and Kingston)	The Commission made comments on: Product market definition of asymmetric broadband origination including both DSL- and cable-based wholesale: Although it was			
	Hull area, including both cable and PSTN networks) and broadband conveyance (in the UK excluding the	and the Hull area) and one separate market for broadband conveyance	Kingston (broadband origination in the Hull area)	2 -Non-discrimination (both for BT and Kingston)	not seen as possible to provide asymmetric broadband origination services over the cable networks, given the indirect pricing constraint exercised by cable-based services at the retail level, Oftel concluded that the wholesale market for asymmetric broadband origination includes			
	Hull area).	(for the UK excluding the Hull area)		3 - Transparency (reference offer) (both for BT and Kingston)	both DSL-and cable-based wholesale services By including cable-based wholesale broadband access services in the relevant market, Ofcom should have given greater consideration to the technical, practical and economic feasibility for cable operators to offer facilities equivalent to			
				4 - Transparency (requirement to notify terms and conditions) (both for BT and Kingston)	bitstream access. Notwithstanding, while this approach may have led to a narrower market definition, and there remained doubts as to whether cable-based wholesale services from the market definition			

			 5 - Requirement to notify technical information (both for BT and Kingston) 6 - Accounting separation (both for BT and Kingston) 	would not have lead to a different result in the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the market was not relevant for the purposes of the SMP assessment. National consultation run in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re partified
			7 - Retail minus pricing approach for network access (for BT only)	re-notified.
			8 - Requirement to provide quality of service information (for BT only)	
			9 - Obligations relating to new network access (for BT only)	
UK/20040064	See Cases UK/2003/0032	2-0034.	Details of transparency obligations (publication of Quality of Service and information in the form of Key Performance Indicators)	No comments made by the Commission.

FI/2004/0062	The market for wholesale broadband services, comprising bitstream services and services alike (provided by any technology), but excluding the access link to the customer premises in the PSTN network.	Regional	43 local operators	1 - Obligation to lease transmission capacity (including necessary equipment) to the other operators as a wholesale broadband product	The Commission made comments on: Definition of wholesale broadband services markets: Ficora's market definition does not cover the access link to the customer premises. Therefore, in order to be able to provide broadband services to end-users, a third party must acquire a further local loop product, in addition to the wholesale broadband product. However, since the local loop product is regulated, and the wholesale broadband services markets are proposed to be regulated, the availability of "access to data transmission services to be supplied to an end user at a fixed location" in Finland would not be different to a situation where the wholesale broadband access market would be defined in accordance with market 12 of the Recommendation. The Commission trusted that the combination of regulation of unbundled local loops and the wholesale broadband services will provide access seekers with a seamless service both in
--------------	---	----------	--------------------	--	---

	2 - Transparency (publish delivery terms and tariff information)	respect of technology and in respect of the commercial contracts involved. Ficora will need to examine any change in the regulatory measures in the local loops markets also in terms of their impact on the market for wholesale broadband service and vice-versa.
		Prices and conditions: Regulating the wholesale broadband access market in a way which requires a third party to acquire two separate wholesale products may not be the most effective way to promote competition. Although the provision of two separate products instead of one will not lead to any competitive disadvantage for access seekers, Ficora should ensure, however, that the two wholesale products in combination are provided on conditions and at prices which are comparable to a situation where a regulated single wholesale input were available.
		Inclusion of cable in the definition of the

				3 - Non-discrimination	wholesale broadband access market: Despite the fact that the evidence provided does not seem to sufficiently support the conclusion that wholesale broadband services provided over a PSTN network and a cable network belong to the same market, the exclusion of cable-based wholesale services from the market definition would not have led to a different result of the SMP analysis in this particular case.
SE/2004/0083	Wholesale broadband access in the form of bitstream access (including cable-TV networks and Local Area Networks).	National	Teliasonera AB	 1 - Access obligation 2 - Price regulation (retail minus) and cost accounting 	The Commission made a comment on: Cable-TV networks as alternative infrastructure for the provision of wholesale bitstream access: No bitstream connections are currently provided over cable-tv networks in Sweden. Consequently, PTS is invited to make clear in its final decision that cable-TV networks are excluded from the relevant product market, and to consider concluding that it is unlikely for

				3 - Non-discrimination4 - Transparency (reference offer)	cable-TV operators to enter the market for wholesale bitstream access in the near future. Potential competition from cable-TV operators could only constrain to a very limited extent, if at all, the market behaviour of the current providers of wholesale bitstream access.
IE/2004/0093	Bitstream access permitting the transmission of broadband data in both directions and other wholesale access provided over other infrastructures, if and when they offer facilities equivalent to bitstream access. Includes cable networks and Fixed Wireless Access (FWA).	National	eircom	1 - Access to and use of specific network facilities 2 - Non-discrimination 3 - Transparency	The Commission made a comment on: Self-supply by cable operators and FWA operators in the relevant product market: ComReg explicitly excludes any potential direct constraint exercised by providers of cable- or Fixed Wireless Access (FWA)-based wholesale inputs and bases its conclusions on market definition entirely on an assumed indirect pricing constraint derived from substitutability at the retail level. In the presence of evidence excluding demand side substitutability at the wholesale level, such an indirect competitive constraint could have been taken into account subsequent to the definition of the relevant market, i.e. at the stage of assessment of SMP. In the case of FWA platforms, the limited capacity carried on these networks may even call into question the existence of an indirect pricing constraint, as one of the assumptions of the "indirect pricing constraint" approach is the ability of providers to increase output in case of

				4- Accounting separation	a retail price increase by the competing network operator.
				5 - Price control and cost orientation (pending a further decision on wholesale price control, retail minus pricing is applied)	
PT/2004/0118	Wholesale broadband access services (supported by the PSTN and the cable-TV-network).	National	The PT Group	1 - Access obligation 2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on: Inclusion of cable in the definition of the wholesale broadband access market: Before including cable networks in the relevant market definition, the NRAs should give due consideration to the technical, practical and economic feasibility for cable operators to offer facilities equivalent to bitstream access. There are specific aspects of the Portuguese market which should be taken into account when assessing whether cable should be included in the market, such as the fact that the national cable network is to a large extent already upgraded to provide interactive services.

FR/2005/0175	Similar to the Recommendation.	Metropolitan France, the	5 - Price control (retail minus) and accounting 6 - Information requirements 1 - Access obligation	assessment. However, should the PT Group decide to divest of its cable-TV-business, the use of the current definition of the relevant product market may have a major impact on the SMP finding. Therefore, Anacom was asked to re- conduct its market analysis and the proposed remedies in case PT Group decides to divest of its cable business.
			3 - Transparency and reference of 4 - Accounting separation	requested, and been denied, access to the cable network might suggest that there is a certain degree of demand-side substitutability in the market. It may be questioned whether wholesale broadband access via the cable network should be included in the relevant product market. However, in this particular case the exclusion from the relevant product market of wholesale bitstream access provided via cable-TV networks would not lead to a different result in the SMP analysis. Consequently, a conclusion on the exact scope of the relevant product market is not relevant for the purposes of SMP

And	French over- seas territories	2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission recalls Article 5 of the Accounting Recommendation, which states that
FR/2006/0520	and Mayotte, excluding the territory of Saint-Pierre-	3 - Transparency - obligation to make public information regarding access	"national regulatory authorities make relevant accounting information from notified operators available to interested parties at a sufficient
	et-Miquelon	4 - Quality of service	level of detail [] In providing information for these purposes, national regulatory authorities should have due regard for commercial
		5 - Price control (prices should be cost- oriented reflecting "the long-run costs of an efficient operator")	confidentiality. In this respect, the publication by the notified operator of sufficiently detailed cost
		6 - Accounting separation	statements showing, for example, the average cost of network components will increase transparency and raise confidence on the part of competitors that there are no anticompetitive cross-subsidies " Therefore, the Commission invites ARCEP to better substantiate the reasons for which it considers that accounting information should, or not, be published, taking into account commercial confidentiality. This consideration applies in particular for regulatory statements describing the cost of network elements.

delivered at a national poin presence, rega of whether (i	IbandFrance, theoductsFrench over-singleseastofterritoriesrdlessand Mayotte	France Télécom	1 - A form of price control (i.e. "interdiction de pratiquer des tarifs d'éviction")	The Commission made comments on: Market definition: In previous cases notified pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive, the product market in question has been considered by some NRAs to be part of market 12 of the Recommendation. In the
used is IP or and (ii) the pro- are meant to provided ultim to residential our residential custo at retail excluding who access techno other than DSL	butts be nately non- omers level, lesale logies			present case, however, and on the basis of the notification and the additional information provided by ARCEP, the Commission is of the view that ARCEP has demonstrated specific national circumstances justifying that the notified market constitutes a separate market susceptible for ex ante regulation. SMP assessment: Market shares in the present

as cable.	2 - Non-discrimination	information on the competitive level of supply on the relevant market. ARCEP accords great importance to France Télécom's economies of scale and scope following Wanadoo's reintegration (i.e. to the essential role of these economies in France Télécom's production cost structure). The Commission considers that, should the upstream remedies be already properly enforced, these economies could be constrained, to a certain extent. ARCEP should consider reflecting better this point in the final measure. ARCEP should also consider explaining in more detail in the final measure the obstacles that could limit a self-supplier's ability to enter the market. Moreover, imminent structural changes and their effects on the competitive conditions on the market need to be addressed in ARCEP's analysis.
	3 - Accounting separation	Remedies: When the obligations on LLU and regional bitstream will be properly enforced and in particular accounting separation, regulation as proposed in this notification would no longer be necessary. In this respect, given the uncertainties as to how market conditions will evolve beyond the next 12 months and the effect of upstream remedies being properly enforced, the Commission invites ARCEP (i) to ensure full and effective enforcement of existing LLU and regional bitstream obligations within the shortest possible timeframe; (ii) to commit reviewing the present market analysis once the full enforcement of the remedies referred to in (i)

				4 - Obligation to formalise and transmit to ARCEP the tariffs and technical conditions of internal transactions between the wholesale "network" branch and the retail "ISP" branch.	above is ensured and at the latest within one year following adoption of the final measure resulting from this notification, and (iii) to limit the validity of the obligations proposed in the present draft measure accordingly.
HU/2005/0186 HU/2006/0363	Similar to the Recommendation.	5 markets correspondin g to the former concession areas of the former concession operators	Matáv Rt., Invitel Távközlési Szolgáltató Rt., Hungarotel Távközlési Rt., Emitel Távközlési Rt. Monor Telefon Társaság Rt.	1 - Transparency 2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made comments on: Implementation of the proposed "retail minus" obligation: NHH is invited to adopt the draft measure setting out the details of the "retail minus" formula as soon as possible in order to provide adequate transparency and certainty for the market players concerned. In this respect, NHH is reminded that once adopted, the measure setting out the margin between the retail and wholesale offerings should be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
				3 - Accounting separation	Offerings other than local and national bitstream access: In case there would be unsatisfied market demand for other types of wholesale bitstream access, in particular at ATM level, NHH should consider the use of the

				 4 - Access and interconnection 5 - Price control and cost-orientation (local bitstream access to be provided on cost-oriented prices, based on FDC methodology; national bitstream access to be provided on retail minus basis) 	regulatory means available to it, including particularly the launch of a market review procedure.
					Provision of voice services using a bitstream access product: NHH should ensure that there are no unjustified limitations imposed by the SMP operators on third parties such as preventing them from using local bitstream access to offer voice services.
DK/2005/0182		Withdraw	n by the National Re	gulatory Authority (renotified under case nur	nber DK/2005/0209)
DK/2005/0209	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	TDC	 1 - Requirement to meet reasonable requests to provide wholesale access and co-location with associated facilities 2 - Non-discrimination 	No comments made by the Commission.

				 3 - Cost accounting and accounting separation 4 - Transparency 5 - Price control in the form of uniform national pricing based on modified historic costs for the access products 	
IT/2005/0253	services based on satellite technologies included in the market	National	Telecom Italia	1 - obligation to supply wholesale broadband access on copper as well as on fibre optic lines	Inclusion of satellite connections in the definition of the wholesale broadband access market The notified market definition for wholesale broadband services equivalent to bitstream services includes the provision of such services over alternative technologies including via satellite networks. In AGCOM's opinion, the inclusion of a satellite-based wholesale product in the relevant market is justified by the existence of an indirect pricing constraint exercised by the corresponding retail xDSL broadband products. The Commission questions the inclusion of wholesale broadband access products based on satellite connections in the relevant market definition for the following reasons:

	2 - transparency (publication	- AGCOM considers that the indirect pricing constraint from the retail market would lead to
	of the bitstream reference interconnection offer	the inclusion of satellite in the wholesale market. However, as the Commission has previously
	Unci	pointed out such an approach does not focus on
		the actual demand and supply side substitutability between the different wholesale
		inputs. Considering that, in this specific case, wholesale products over satellite are actually
		available for sale to third parties, AGCOM's analysis should have focused on a detailed
		analysis of the wholesale products, including a comparison of the actual prices of the different
		wholesale products concerned. AGCOM has however not provided any analysis of the actual
		prices of these products.
		- AGCOM has also not demonstrated that wholesale broadband access product supplied via satellite connections "offers facilities
		equivalent to the bitstream access" based on

	3 – non discrimination	xDSL technologies.
		AGCOM itself states that it is difficult to find a correspondence between wholesale broadband services based on satellite technologies and wholesale services based on xDSL technologies.
		Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the ANOs can shape the parameters of the satellite- based service offered to end-users. Although, AGCOM states that in principle, ANOs could differentiate their retail services from the services offered by their wholesale suppliers, AGCOM does not provide any evidence showing that wholesale offers based on satellite technologies are not in reality pure "resale offers", the latter being expressly excluded by AGCOM from the relevant market definition.
		AGCOM further does not analyse to what extent the difference between, from a demand side perspective, the purchase of mono-directional and bi-directional satellite wholesale products

		4 – price control and cost accounting	would affect the market definition. However, since in the light of the market position of satellite operators the exclusion of satellite wholesale access services from the market definition would not have led to a different result as
			regards the SMP analysis, the Commission considers that a conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not relevant in this particular case.
		5 – accounting separation	

DE/2005/0262 DE/2006/0457 DE/20070576	BNetzA defines two separate markets on wholesale level: 1) a wholesale bitstream access market	national	Deutsche Telecom	1- Obligation of access for the purpose of interconnection and collocation.	The future treatment of VDSL connections in the context of emerging new retail services; the need to base any prior exclusion of products from the wholesale broadband access markets on a proper substitutability test
	with handover at ATM-level and 2) a wholesale bitstream access market with handover at IP-level (including hybrid fibre-coaxial network ("HFC") cable broadband access at IP-level).				The Commission notes that the emergence of new retail services may give rise to the emergence of a new derived wholesale market to the extent that such new retail services cannot be provided over the existing wholesale products. The new retail services may in such a case generate a wholesale demand for broadband access services with different characteristics from the currently existing wholesale broadband access services. Such new wholesale products should not be subjected to inappropriate obligations. When examining differences between retail services, BNetzA should therefore examine in particular to what extent they necessarily require different wholesale inputs, before excluding the derived wholesale inputs from the wholesale bitstream access markets. In this context, the Commission invites BNetzA to examine to what extent the mere bundling of distinct retail products would in itself give rise to the existence of a new retail product belonging to a separate retail market. A mere upgrade of an existing service is not considered in itself to constitute a new market. The lack of substitutability of a product has to be established from both demand- and supply- side perspectives before it can be excluded from the markets in question.

		2 - No discrimination	
			Imposition of remedies
			Given that wholesale bitstream access is not yet available in Germany, given that there has hardly been competition between broadband infrastructures, given that there have been a number of competition problems in the German broadband markets and that the level of competition in and the penetration of the German broadband markets are still relatively low, the Commission invites BNetzA to impose appropriate remedies in the notified markets without delay and to notify them to the Commission under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. In this context the Commission considers that BNetzA
			should ensure that no form of wholesale broadband access is negatively affected by DT's roll out of VDSL/fibre infrastructure.
			Scope of the access obligation
			The Commission welcomes the fact that the access obligation as imposed by BNetzA includes bitstream over all variants of infrastructure, including ADSL2,
			ADSL2+, SDSL and VDSL unless they are not substitutes to other bitstream access products. This corresponds to the practice of all NRAs which have notified their analysis of the wholesale broadband access market so far. The Commission invites BNetzA to apply the appropriate remedies without delay.

		3 – accounting separation	The Commission recalls that in case DE/2005/0262 concerning the market
			definition and analysis of the wholesale broadband access market in Germany it
			was originally disputed between BNetzA and the Commission to which extent the recently established VDSL connections of the incumbent were included in the
			relevant market. The Commission refers to the withdrawal of its serious doubts
			letter of 23 December 2005 where it is stated that bitstream access to VDSL
			connections is included in the wholesale bitstream access markets unless it proves
			not to be a substitute for the existing kinds of bitstream access.
			Against this background and in order to provide regulatory certainty the Commission finds it appropriate for BNetzA to set out explicitly that remedies in the present case also relate to the VDSL network. In view of the VDSL-based retail products that DT has recently launched, such an application of remedies should no longer be postponed.
			As indicated in the Commission's serious doubts letter of 11 November 2005, the Commission has at present no indication of a lack of substitution between VDSL

		4 – obligation to issue a reference offer	and other xDSL products, whether at retail or at wholesale level. It is recalled in
			particular that a mere upgrade of an existing service (such as an offering with a
			higher bandwidth) is not considered in itself to constitute a new market. The
			Commission hence considers that the question about the substitutability between
			bitstream access to VDSL connections and other forms of bitstream access should
			be answered positively from the outset.
			Excluding DT's VDSL-based infrastructure from the access obligation would
			jeopardise the effectiveness of that obligation to the detriment of competition in
			the downstream market and of the consumer. In the presence of such exclusion, if DT upgrades its ADSL infrastructure in a given city to VDSL technology by rolling out its fibre to the remote concentrators or street cabinets and dismantling its ADSL equipment, there is a risk that end users in that city become unreachable for any alternative DSL-operator as the alternative operators could not rely on DT's wholesale access product to provide retail broadband access services in that city. Even if DT were required to keep its ADSL infrastructure operational

The Commission welcomes that in its answer to the request for information
--

	to stand alone bitstream.
	The Commission asks BNetzA to impose this remedy without delay in order to enable competitors to offer broadband connections to end customers without an obligation to buy a telephone connection from DT. This would stimulate competition in particular in rural areas less susceptible to local
	loop unbundling, where competition on the retail services is particularly weak in Germany. Such an offer will also provide an adequate means to increase competition in the retail voice markets via Voice over IP Effective price regulation
	The Commission points out that a finding of non-SMP on the retail broadband
	access market is not per se sufficient to remove the ex ante price control obligation at the wholesale level.
	In line with the practice of other Member States and given DT's refusal to offer
	bitstream access in the past, the Commission notes that ex-post price control is not appropriate to remedy the competition problem identified in the wholesale
	market in question. The Commission underlines moreover that when assessing
	the incumbent's market power at retail level, it

	should be taken into account that
	part of the retail market share of alternative operators represents pure reselling of
	DT's broadband access products.
	Concerning the implementation of the ex ante price control, the Commission invites BNetzA to indicate in the definitive measure which method the price control will be based upon in order to ensure transparency and legal certainty in the market. The Commission notes that the German law provides that price control can be implemented in form of cost-orientation or benchmarking. In this context, the Commission is concerned that benchmarking may not allow
	for the specific national circumstances that may have an impact on costs to be taken into
	account, in particular network topology and differences in the point of interconnection. Benchmarking may also not ensure an appropriate margin with the retail prices applicable in the German market, on the one hand, and with the regulated local loop unbundling rates in Germany, on the other hand, which margins are essential to encourage alternative operators to climb the ladder of investment and to avoid a price squeeze between the various rungs of the ladder.
	Therefore, the Commission asks BNetzA to impose either retail minus or costoriented
	price control. If BNetzA chooses cost-

		orientation, it is invited, in order to increase transparency, to communicate to the market players a cost model on which cost-orientation will be based. Notification of remedies concerning ATM bitstream access to be submitted
		without further delay
		The Commission reminds BNetzA that bitstream access has already been
		available in the vast majority of EU Member States for a number of years.
		BNetzA notified the market definition and market analysis of the bitstream market only in October 2005 after a reminder from the Commission services. The Commission notes that eight months have elapsed since the Commission's withdrawal of serious doubts in this case asks BNetzA to notify the related remedies for ATM bitstream access without further delay.

				elements and/or facilities; (ii) negotiate in good faith with other undertakings, not	
				to withdraw access already granted; and (iii) provide all other measures necessary	
				for the provision of broadband access to end-users;	
				2 - price control and cost accounting:	
				3 – accounting separation	
				4 – non discrimination	
				5 – transparency	
NL/2005/0281 OF	PTA differentiates etween the market	national	KPN on the market for high	1 – access	The inclusion of low quality WBA provided over cable networks in the

NL/2006/0377	quality WBA and the market for WBA	quality WBA		definition of the relevant product market
	with low quality WBA			In its notification, OPTA considers that the pricing constraint exercised by cable-based
			2 – non discrimination	broadband services at the retail level has a sufficiently significant impact at the
				wholesale level to justify its inclusion in the WBA market.
			3 – obligation to publish a reference offer	OPTA's approach to defining a wholesale market on the basis of the competitive conditions in the corresponding retail market is not in principle inconsistent with the methodology set out in the Recommendation and in the Commission's Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of SMP.
				However, for the definition of the relevant market, demand side substitution represents the most immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product, in particular in relation to their pricing decisions. Basically, the exercise of market definition consists in
				identifying the effective alternative sources of supply for the customers of the undertakings involved.16 OPTA does not provide evidence of any direct demand side substitution, and states that to its knowledge there has been no
				switching at the wholesale level between neither DSL-operators and cable operators, nor between DSL-operators mutually. Such demand side substitution would rest on the assumption that
				operators currently buying DSL based wholesale bitstream products could readily switch to a bitstream product offered on an alternative technological platform, i.e. a cable network, in

		response to a price rise of the DSL based product. In practice, such switching could be restricted by considerable switching costs. Such switching costs should have been assessed by OPTA prior to the inclusion of a cable based bitstream product into the relevant market.
		Even if one were to ignore actual switching possibilities for existing wholesale
		customers and focus on substitutability between both products for new entrants (which have not committed to either DSL or cable infrastructure yet), there appear to be limits in the substitutability between both products. Cable- based WBA products in the Netherlands offer a much more limited coverage than the DSL- based WBA product of KPN or, for example, Versatel. This appears to restrict substitutability from the
		demand perspective (having to combine WBA products from different cable suppliers may not only increase transaction costs but also network and product integration
		costs). Despite having been available, according to OPTA, for several years, ISPs using third party access based on cable represent today only []% of the retail market.
		Furthermore it must be noted that even if some degree of substitution between both
		products may exist for new entrants, this would not protect existing customers of KPN as KPN is in a position to price discriminate between new entrants and existing customers. KPN may very

	well price its WBA product competitively in order to attract new customers, while raising its price for existing customers once these customers, due to the high switching costs, have become tied to KPN.
	Also from the supply-side, substitution is limited as a cable operator cannot readily switch to supplying DSL-based WBA and <i>vice versa</i> .
	Possibly aware of these limitations as regards direct substitutability, OPTA bases its finding of a single wholesale market for DSL and cable based bitstream products on an assumed indirect pricing constraint derived from substitutability between cable and DSL at the <i>retail</i> level. The Commission considers that such an indirect competitive
	constraint should not have been taken into account at the stage of the definition of the
	relevant market. Moreover, for the theory of indirect pricing constraint to be applied at all, it would have to be shown that i) ISPs do not absorb such a price rise at the wholesale level but were forced to raise prices at the retail level, that ii) even in case ISPs pass on the price increase, all or most of the customers of the ISPs forced to raise prices would switch to retail cable operators and not, for example, to the retail arm of
	the WBA provider, in particular if the latter does not raise its own retail prices. This has not been demonstrated by OPTA. Account should, for example, have been taken

327

ΕN

ΕN

		of demand elasticity in order to substantiate the claim of an indirect pricing constraint coming from demand side substitution at the retail level. In this respect it is also noteworthy that KPN applies distinct tariffs for its WBA product in so-called A-zones and B-zones,21 despite cable operators being present in both zones and retail prices being uniform throughout the country. For the reasons indicated above, the Commission has strong concerns as to whether low quality WBA provided over cable and DSL form part of the same market.22 The finding of no SMP on the market as
		defined by OPTA Even if one were to accept OPTA's broad market definition, including cable-based WBA in the relevant market, the Commission has strong concerns about OPTA's finding that KPN would not hold SMP. On such a broadly defined market, KPN's market share would be 44%. KPN's market share has increased strongly over the past four years (coming from 3% in January 2001). Even if KPN's share of both DSL and cable based broadband connections seems to have decreased by [] percentage points in the past five months, OPTA expects that KPN's market share will grow to 48% in 2008; according to the alternative operators, KPN's market share of KPN's largest competitor (UPC) is substantially lower, around 13%.23

ΕN

r		
		tional elements seem to point in the tion of KPN having SMP. OPTA
		nizes for example that KPN controls structure which cannot easily be
	alterr opera Com maxi ensur this i Dutc have place	cated. Alternative operators are investing in native infrastructure, but KPN is the only tor which has ensured national coverage. beting DSL operators have today mally []% of the investment in place to e national coverage ([]), even though nvestment enables them to cover 60-70% of n households. Competing cable operators maximally []% of the investment in to ensure national coverage (UPC) and maximally []% of Dutch households.
	of sc fixed	A also recognizes that KPN has advantages ale and scope, linked to the high level of costs and the broad product portfolio of
	vario these	enabling it to distribute fixed costs over us retail products. OPTA indicates that advantages of scale and scope may reduce time (especially taking into account that the
	whol	esale input – access to the local loop – is ded to alternative operators at cost-oriented s), but in view of the fact that KPN's retail
	mark Intern certa	et share is expected to increase on the retail net access market and remains very high on n neighbouring markets (such as retail
	disap furth	it is uncertain that these advantages will pear over the period of the review. OPTA ermore recognises that the barriers to enter
	has n	/BA market are high, but indicates that this ot impeded alternative operators to become e on this market and gain substantial market

		share (15% <i>combined</i> on the market including cable; 25% <i>combined</i> on DSL-based WBA only). The Commission points out that KPN's market position has to be assessed against the position of each of its
		competitors taken individually; moreover, the presence of alternative operators on the market does not exclude that barriers to entry are high.
		For the reasons indicated above, the Commission has strong concerns as to whether KPN does not have SMP in the market for low quality WBA.
		The non-imposition of ex ante regulation in the market for low quality
		WBA
		With regard to the particular features of the Dutch market (i.e. high broadband
		penetration; high penetration of cable infrastructure; high penetration of alternative, LLU-based DSL operators in the absence of regulation of low quality WBA24;
		competitive retail broadband market) taken cumulatively, the Commission does not
		contest OPTA's proposal at this stage not to impose ex ante regulation to the low
		quality WBA market in the Netherlands. On the basis of the information provided by

	OPTA, it would seem that behind the high barriers to entry, the market for wholesale DSL- based bitstream access <i>tends</i> towards an effectively competitive outcome (within
	the meaning of the three criteria test set out in the Recommendation)25, even in the absence of regulation on the low quality WBA market. In particular, the fact that LLU
	is already in place in the Netherlands with coverage up to 70% of the population,
	which is expected to increase to 85% in 2006, enables alternative operators to provide a wholesale DSL-based bitstream product in competition with KPN. In addition, the competition between cable operators and DSL- based operators on the retail internet access market further reduces the need for ex ante regulation of the low quality WBA market in the specific case of the Netherlands.
	Nevertheless, since the above assessment is based on a likely market tendency over the period of the review, the Commission asks OPTA to carefully monitor market
	developments, to re-conduct a market analysis and to notify its results within one year from the date of this letter. In monitoring market developments, OPTA should closely examine whether KPN is not leveraging its market power on the low quality WBA market into
	downstream markets where it is present as well (in particular into the retail internet access market and the retail calls markets), for example

	by refusing to supply low quality WBA in response to a reasonable request, by supplying low quality WBA on discriminatory terms (for example, by making the provision of low quality WBA conditional upon an undertaking on the part of purchasers not to invest in LLU) or by raising the price of low quality WBA. OPTA should also monitor whether KPN is not engaging in anti-competitive behaviour such as predatory pricing or price squeeze in order to protect its position on the low-quality WBA market, in particular in those areas where LLU is in place.
	OPTA should also consider imposing accounting separation on KPN on the basis of finding SMP in the market for local loop unbundling that would also cover the provision of low quality WBA in order to facilitate the above monitoring and the
	application of competition law
	The non-imposition of accounting separation in the market for high quality WBA
	The Commission invites OPTA to impose the obligation of accounting separation on KPN in the market for high quality WBA in order to be able to monitor KPN's compliance with the non- discrimination obligation. Such remedy should ensure that KPN makes transparent its wholesale prices and its internal transfer prices for high quality WBA.

AT/2005/0312	inclusion of WBA provided over cable networks	national	Telekom Austria	1 - access	The inclusion of WBA provided over cable networks in the definition of the relevant product market: TKK bases its conclusion to include cable-based
					broadband access into the same product market as DSL-based wholesale access on
				2 – non-discrimination	the existence of a cable-based wholesale offer and the consideration that the pricing
					constraint exercised by cable-based broadband services at the retail level has a
				3 – price control	sufficiently significant impact at the wholesale level to justify its inclusion in the WBA market.
					TKK's approach to defining a wholesale market on the basis of the competitive conditions in the corresponding retail market is not in principle inconsistent with the methodology set out in the
					Recommendation and in the Commission's Guidelines on market analysis and the

	4 – reference offer	assessment of SMP. However, for the definition of the relevant
		market, demand side substitution represents the most immediate and effective disciplinary force on the suppliers of a given product, in particular in relation to their pricing decisions. Basically, the
		exercise of market definition consists in identifying the effective alternative sources
		of supply for the customers of the undertakings involved. TKK does not provide evidence of any direct demand side substitution but admits that
		the demand and supply side substitution at the wholesale level is limited. TKK does not
		provide any evidence on switching at the wholesale level between DSL-operators and cable operators and states that due to limited
		coverage of individual cable networks, the

	5 – cost accounting	possibilities of ISPs to switch from a DSL-based wholesale products to cable-based
		products are limited. In addition the switching costs should have been assessed by TKK prior to the inclusion of a cable based bitstream product into the relevant
		market. Considering the limitations as regards direct substitutability, TKK bases its finding of a single wholesale market for DSL and cable- based bitstream products mainly on an assumed indirect pricing constraint derived from substitutability between cable
		and DSL at the <i>retail</i> level. The Commission considers that such an indirect competitive constraint should not have been taken into account at the stage of the definition of the relevant market. Rather it should have been taken into account at the SMP assessment stage.

	6 – accounting separation	Moreover, for the indirect pricing constraint to be effective it would have to be shown that i) ISPs do not absorb such a price rise at the wholesale level but are forced to raise prices at the retail level and that ii) even in case ISPs pass on the price increase, a significant number of customers of the ISPs forced to raise prices would switch to retail cable operators and not, for example, to the retail arm of the WBA provider, in particular if the latter does not raise its own retail prices.15 This has not been demonstrated by TKK. Account should, for example, have been taken of demand elasticity in order to substantiate the claim of an indirect pricing constraint coming from demand side substitution at the retail level. For the reasons indicated above, the Commission is of the view that TKK has not
		provided sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that WBA provided over cable form part of the same market.
		In case of a "DSL-only" market definition, Telekom Austria's market share would
		be around 87% of DSL based broadband connections. Therefore, while there remain
		doubts as to whether cable-based WBA or other technologies form part of the
		relevant market, their exclusion from the market definition would not have led to a
		different result in the SMP analysis. Consequently, the Commission considers that a

					conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not relevant in the present case for the purposes of SMP assessment.
CY/2006/0332	Similar to the Recommendation	National	СҮТА	 1 - Provision on reasonable request of bitstream access to interested parties, including supplementary services such as colocation; 2 - Transparency and publication of 	No comments made by the Commission.
				Bitstream Reference Offer;	

				3 – non discrimination 4 – accounting separation 5 – price control	
SI/2006/0346	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Telekom Slovenije	 1 - requirement to meet reasonable requests for wholesale access to bitstream products, use of certain network elements and related facilities; 2 - non-discrimination 	No comments made by the Commission.

				3 - transparency, including a requirement to publish a reference offer;	
				4 – price control and cost accounting	
				5 – accounting separation	
ES/2006/0370	Similar to the Recommendation	national	TESAU	1 - access	Definition of the relevant product market The Spanish market is characterised by the existence of two categories of wholesale broadband access products offered by

	2 – transparency and obligation to publish a reference offer	 the incumbent: (i) the regional wholesale product (GigADSL) which delivers traffic at 109 regional POI and (ii) the national wholesale product (ADSL-IP) which delivers traffic at 1 national POI. Both products fall under the definition of bitstream and are candidates for <i>ex-ante</i> regulation. CMT considers that the national and the regional wholesale offers are substitutable in a prospective manner, despite the important investments for the regional offer on behalf of a new entrant in order to reach TESAU's 109 POI (compared to the national offer). The Commission notes that in a previous case notified to the Commission6, this market has been segmented in two product markets: (i) the regional wholesale market or the market for bitstream access market with handover at the ATMbackbone and (ii) the national wholesale market or the market for bitstream access market with
		with handover at the ATMbackbone

	3 – price control	higher is the barrier to entry for new entrants.
		The Commission considers that the actual characteristics and the conditions of the
		Spanish broadband market could potentially justify a refinement of the wholesale
		market for broadband access in two relevant product markets.
		Notwithstanding, while this approach may have led to a narrower market definition, the refinement of the definition of the market at hand in this particular case would not have led to a different result in the SMP analysis. Consequently, the Commission considers that a conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not relevant in the present case for the purposes of SMP assessment.
		De facto limitation of the remedies to ADSL technology
		Despite the fact that CMT includes all xDSL technologies (ADSL, ADSL2, ADSL2+, VDSL, etc) in the relevant product market on which it finds TESAU to have SMP and despite the fact that TESAU bases its different retail services (internet access, TV over DSL, VoIP) on its DSL infrastructure, CMT intends to oblige TESAU to provide access only in order to guarantee the replicability of retail broadband internet access services in Spain.
		The Commission would like to underline that any wholesale broadband access

	4 – non-discrimination	product that the remedies oblige TESAU to
		provide shall be made available
		regardless of the use that the buyer of such a service wishes to make of it (internet
		access, VoIP or TV over DSL).
		As a principle the same remedies imposed by CMT should cover the entire relevant market on which TESAU is found to have SMP (i.e. including ADSL to VDSL) if
		CMT cannot justify in accordance with Article 8(4) of the Access Directive9 and in
		the light of the regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework
		Directive why the remedies cover only part of the market and how such remedies
		nevertheless remedy the market failure identified.
		Considering the information provided and the competition problems identified by
		CMT it would seem proportionate in this case to ensure access to all infrastructures
		including TESAU's ADSL, ADSL 2+ and future VDSL infrastructure, unless the
		products delivered over these infrastructures do clearly not act as substitutes to the retail products derived from the wholesale bitstream

		market.
		Asymmetrical application of remedies
		CMT indicates in its draft measure that it may introduce some asymmetry in the
		remedies imposed on TESAU, based, inter alia, on geographic criteria. CMT
		explains that it would take into account the particular conditions of the relevant
		market with respect to the development of local loop unbundling in order not to
		impose unjustified or disproportionate requirements on TESAU.
		In its reply to the request for information, CMT explained that the asymmetry
		relate in particular to the price control obligation. CMT considers that the retail minus methodology should take into account the fact that the operator designated as having SMP faces greater competition constraints in the areas where some alternative operators use local loop unbundling. Geographical criteria might be
		used, to model the cost structure of the efficient operator, with the aim of allowing Telefónica to align appropriately on the prices of its competitors and sending
		signals to new entrants about the need to develop alternative infrastructure ensuring

		sustainable competition in the long term.
		However, the Commission notes that although the number of unbundled local loops significantly increased during 2005 it still remains relatively low in relation to the
		incumbent's activated ADSL lines (less than 3%). In addition, when analysing the
		potential competition in the relevant market from operators using local loop unbundling, CMT refers to a series of disputes between TESAU and its competitors regarding delaying tactics in the provision of the services relating to local loop unbundling. CMT considers that a high number of those conflicts of access are the result of a multitude of TESAU's practices.
		In that context, the mere fact that some alternative operators are connected to some
		of TESAU's local exchanges does not mean that they are able to switch rapidly
		from a wholesale broadband access offer to the offer of unbundling of the local loop. Consequently, the geographical approach that CMT would use in implementing the margin squeeze test on TESAU's retail tariffs might deliver inappropriate results. The remedy envisaged would then fail to tackle the problem identified (margin squeeze) and would not be proportionate, nor justified (contrary to the principles and objectives laid down in the Access Directive).

	Therefore, the Commission invites CMT to re- consider its geographical approach to the margin squeeze test and, in any event, to submit to consultation such remedies and thereafter notify them the Commission.

EL/2006/0372	Similar to the Recommendation	national	OTE	1 - access	The Margin squeeze test
	Recommendation				EETT proposes to subject OTE's wholesale broadband prices to a "retail-minus" based
					on the costs of a reasonably efficient operator using the DCF methodology. In this context the Commission would like to point out the following as regards the different methodologies for assessing profitability in a margin squeeze test.
					There are basically two main different methodologies for assessing such profitability:
					a) Matching every year (or in shorter periods) the observed revenues and costs
					extracted from the undertaking's accounts in which investment expenditure have been amortised over appropriate periods.
					b) Aggregating the future revenues and costs of the company during an adequate
					period (generally the lifetime of the infrastructure) in order to arrive at a single

2 – non-discrimination	measure, the net present value ("NPV"). Such method, referred to as DCF only looks at the profitability of a business over the adequate period (several years) and does not specify how costs should be recovered in distinct sub- periods.
	The Commission invites EETT to avoid the following shortcomings in the DCF
	methodology when used to detect a potential margin squeeze:
	- Firstly, the outcome of the test risks relying on unreasonable forecasts about the ability of a new
3 - transparency	entrant to benefit from an increasing margin over time, thus leading
	to a "false positive" result.
	- Secondly, the DCF method would only show whether OTE is expected to earn a
	positive NPV over the period employed for the analysis, but it would not specify how
	costs should be recovered in distinct sub- periods. Consequently, a positive NPV
	could be interpreted not as evidence of absence of an anticompetitive price squeeze but, quite on the contrary, as an evidence of a successful exclusion making possible the recoupment of the initial losses.

	4 – accounting separation	 The use of the DCF method to detect a possible margin squeeze would allow a dominant firm such as OTE to incur substantial initial losses (that would be compensated for in the future) while its competitors may not be able to absorb losses during several years. Therefore, EETT should to ensure that a positive outcome for the margin squeeze
	5 – price control and cost accounting	analysis does not depend on unrealistic assumptions about the ability of a new entrant to benefit from an increasing margin over time. In other words, the Commission invites EETT to ensure that assumptions on future costs and prices included in the analysis for future years are plausible and are sustainable in a competitive market. The Commission also invites EETT to submit the retail minus model based on a DCF methodology to national consultation, and to notify it to the Commission.

CZ/2006/0449	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Cesky Telecom	1 – access	Access obligation at the IP level only
					In the framework of the access obligation, CTU only requires CTc to provide access to alternative operators at the IP level, which is an option where the alternative operator cannot alter the parameters of the BRAS (broadband
				2 – transparency	remote access server), which is operated by the incumbent, and has, therefore, very limited possibilities to determine the characteristics of the bitstream and differentiate the services provided to its customers. CTU does not intend to mandate more advanced forms of bitstream
				3 – non-discrimination	access, i.e. access at the ATM or corresponding technology level and/or access at the DSLAM level.
					The Commission would like to recall that when determining the appropriate access level to be mandated, the NRAs must balance the technical
				4 –accounting separation	and operational conditions resulting from the incumbent's network architecture with the level of
					competition in the market. The assessment regarding the appropriate point of
					access should also take into account the perspective of the beneficiaries and the
					forms of access sought. By enabling alternative operators to choose from different access levels, infrastructure competition is promoted as it enables them to climb up the ladder of investment by migrating from one form of access to the next higher step, investing more and more in their own infrastructure.

	The Commission is not convinced that CTU's arguments regarding non-imposition of the ATM and/or DSLAM access are satisfactory. First of all, CTU should have analysed the architecture of the incumbent's network to establish whether the prevailing technical and operational conditions make the provision of the ATM and/or DSLAM access possible. The fact alone that CTc considers a specific technology as outdated and is not willing to invest therein is in itself not sufficient for drawing a conclusion that mandating access over the technology concerned would be disproportionate. Concerning the DSLAM access, it should be noted that local loop unbundling is generally not to be considered as a
	substitute in view of the additional costs to be made by an alternative operator when purchasing LLU. Further, the Commission notes that one alternative operator specifically requested CTU within the national consultation procedure to determine concrete forms of mandated access, including the DSLAM access, ATM access and access at the IP level. CTU did not adequately respond to this
	request. Given CTc's very high market share as well as the fact that in terms of self supplied broadband access its market share has been

	i F E T	growing over the recent years, the Commission nvites CTU to impose on CTc an obligation to provide also more advanced forms of bitstream access at connection points further down in the network, which allow third parties to differentiate their services more from
		hose of the incumbent than access at IP level, without requiring them to build out
		heir infrastructure at local exchange level. The Commission notes in this regard that a vast majority of Member States have granted access to bitstream at the ATM level in addition to access at IP level.
	I	No price regulation
		CTU does not propose any price regulation, which it justifies by the fact that both
		wholesale and retail prices have been falling over the recent years due to indirect
		pressure exercised by the competitive retail proadband access market.
		As regards the competitive pressure from alternative infrastructures at retail level,
		he market analysis indicates, however, that kDSL is rapidly gaining market share
		at the expense of cable (the geographical coverage of which is limited) and WiFi.
		The Commission notes, moreover, that whereas

	it is true that prices have been
	falling, it is also true that, as the data provided in
	the market analysis show, the
	margin between the wholesale and retail prices
	applied by the incumbent has decreased
	significantly over the analysed period. Further, CTU states in the market analysis that recurring
	special offers by the incumbent at the retail
	level, which were not matched by adequate
	wholesale offers, are among the reasons that have lead to a situation where, unlike in other
	Member States, CTc's market share in terms of
	self-supplied broadband access has been steadily
	rising over the recent years. Despite these facts, CTU does not address the apparent margin
	squeeze problem in the market analysis and does
	not consider imposing price regulation, such as a
	retail-minus remedy.
	In the reply to RFI, CTU provides more recent
	data showing that as of February
	2006 for certain products11 the margin
	increased to 31% and as of July 2006 to
	41%. Whereas these data may indicate that the apparent margin squeeze problem
	apparent margin squeeze problem
	observed over the recent years currently
	becomes less significant, the
	Commission notes that a broader analysis of
	data relating to all broadband access services
	provided by the incumbent would be necessary to determine whether or not a potential margin
	squeeze continues to distort competition at the

					 wholesale market. Moreover, without effective price regulation in place, normally retail minus, it cannot be excluded that CTc's future pricing policy may result into a decreasing margin again. The Commission is not convinced that the non-discrimination obligation as such, even if coupled with accounting separation obligation, can effectively remedy the market failure identified. Therefore, CTU is invited to impose an appropriate price control mechanism such as retail minus.
SK/2006/0465	TÚSR analyses the relevant market on the basis of competitive conditions in the retail market taking also alternative technologies into account. Slovak Telekom is only active on DSL based services	national	Slovak Telekom	1 - access	Defining the scope of the access obligation imposedIt is not clear from the notification and the additional information provided at whichlevel of the network Slovak Telekom will be required to provide access to alternative operators. It is therefore not clear whether, <i>inter</i> <i>alia</i> , TÚSR intends to mandate – apart from access at IP level – also more advanced forms of bitstream access, i.e. access at the ATM or corresponding technology level8 and/or access at the DSLAM level.The Commission recalls that access at (managed) IP level should enable alternative

2 - transparency	operators to offer bitstream access with relatively moderate investments. However this is an option where the alternative operator cannot alter the parameters of the BRAS (broadband remote access server), which is operated by the incumbent, and has, therefore,
	very limited possibilities to determine the characteristics of the bitstream and differentiate the services provided to its customers.
	The Commission recalls furthermore that when determining an appropriate access level to be mandated, the NRAs must take account of the technical and operational conditions resulting from the incumbent's network architecture as well as of the
3 – non-discrimination	level of competition in the market. The assessment regarding the appropriate point of access should be made from the perspective of the beneficiaries, who should be able to define the product. By enabling the alternative operators to choose from different access levels, infrastructure competition is promoted as these can climb up the ladder of investment by migrating from one form of access to the next higher
	step, adding more own value when going deeper in the value chain and investing
	more and more in their own infrastructure. Against this background, TÚSR should therefore

				4 – accounting separation	analyse, before adopting its final measure, the architecture of the incumbent's network to establish whether the prevailing technical and operational conditions make the provision of the ATM and/or DSLAM access possible. Given Slovak Telekom's very high market share, the Commission invites TÚSR to consider imposing the obligation on the incumbent to provide bitstream access in the form of IP, ATM and possibly also DSLAM access.
				5 - ex ante price control	
PL/2006/0472	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Telekomunikacja Polska SA	1 - access 2 – non-discrimination	Defining the scope of the obligations imposed In the draft measure as notified, UKE did not clearly identify the precise scope of the remedies. Taking into account the additional information provided by UKE in response to the request for information, the Commission invites UKE to specify in the definitive measure in particular at which level in its network TP is
					obliged to provide access (ATM, DSLAM, IP,) and for which bitstream access products TP is obliged to prepare a reference offer, to keep separate accounts and to charge cost

	3 - transparency 4 – accounting separation	oriented prices. In case the access obligation and related remedies do not apply to access at DSLAM and/or IP-level in the same way as they apply to access at ATM-level, UKE should for the sake of transparency and legal certainty of all operators clarify what TP's obligation to accept reasonable requests to access at the DSLAM and IP level in practice entails.
	5 – price control	

LU/2006/0510	Similar to the Recommendation	national	EPT	1 - access	Access obligation
					The Commission takes note of ILR's justifications, that are based inter alia on the
					specific network topology in Luxembourg, for limiting the access obligation to IPbased
					access. It does also note that Cegecom is providing wholesale broadband
					access on the basis of unbundled local loops. However, the Commission notes that retail broadband prices in Luxembourg remain relatively high.
					The obligations imposed under the Access Directive should be based on the nature
					of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives

	2 – non-discrimination	 laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. The access obligation imposed by ILR should be effective in ensuring effective competition in the broadband market, in ensuring that users derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality and in encouraging efficient investment in infrastructure. In light thereof, and if retail prices remain high despite the wholesale measures imposed, ILR should consider imposing access also at a lower level than IP11, in particular taking into account the fact that there is demand for access at levels which allow a more substantial differentiation of the retail services. Stand alone bitstream access The Commission notes that there is a demand for a stand alone bitstream which
--	------------------------	---

		3 - transparency	would enable competitors to offer broadband connections to end customers without an obligation to buy a telephone connection from EPT. Such a product would
			stimulate competition in areas, where competition on the retail services is particularly weak. It may also provide an adequate means to increase competition
			in the retail voice markets via Voice over IP. Therefore, the Commission invites
			ILR to design the access obligation to enable both the delivery of a broadband
			access to Internet only, and the bundled delivery of a broadband access and voice
			services or video services.
			Price control obligation

4 – accounting separation	 ILR proposes to implement the price control obligation on the basis of a "retailminus" methodology. The Commission notes however that the "retail-minus" approach may not be effective in this particular case. Indeed, as indicated by ILR, the prices applied by EPT at retail level are above the prices in neighbouring Member States (without such price distinctions being caused prima facie by objective cost differences). The application of retail minus methodology may consequently not lead to effectively regulated wholesale prices. Under these circumstances, the Commission invites ILR to impose an obligation of price
5 – price control	control based on costs. Such an obligation would ensure both the equality in the conditions of competition between alternative operators (buyers of the wholesale offers) and EPT as retail provider, as well as guarantee attractive prices for consumers. Indeed, wholesale pricing based on costs allows the SMP operator to recover its costs while allowing alternative operators, which have not yet reached the same critical weight, the benefit of its economies of scale.

EE/2006/0522	Sideamet includes cable TV networks in the market definition on the basis of retail demand-side substitutability, as in densely populated areas cable exists in parallel with the PSTN network and may act as a substitute	national	Elion	1 - access 2 - transparency	Inclusion of Cable infrastructure into the market definition Sideamet's market definition includes services provided over the cable TV network. The Commission would like to draw Sideamet's attention to the definition of wholesale broadband access as provided in the Annex to the Recommendation, which covers both PSTN-based bitstream access and <i>"wholesale access provided over other infrastructures, if and when they offer facilities equivalent to bit-stream access."</i> It follows thereof that, before including cable TV networks in the relevant market definition, the NRAs should give due consideration to the technical, practical and economic feasibility for cable operators to offer facilities equivalent to bitstream access.
					Sideamet has not assessed in sufficient detail demand-substitutability considerations at the

	3 – non discrimination	 wholesale level. Furthermore, the above test whether cable offers facilities equivalent to bit-stream access has not been carried out. It may therefore be questioned at this stage whether these conditions are met and whether broadband access via the cable networks can indeed be included in the relevant product market. However, in this case the inclusion or exclusion of bitstream access provided via cable TV networks from the relevant product market of wholesale bitstream access would not lead to a different result in the SMP analysis.
	4 – accounting separation	Consequently, the Commission considers that a conclusion on the exact scope of the relevant product market is not relevant for the purposes of SMP assessment.
		Timeframe for the review Sideamet intends to review the notified market in three years. The Commission considers this timeframe to be unreasonably long, especially taking into account that Sideamet itself refers to changing terms of competition at the retail level. Therefore, the

				5 – price control	Commission would invite Sideamet to consider a shorter review period.
LV/2006/0540	Similar to the Recommendation	national	Lattelekom	1 – access	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 – transparency	
				3 – non-discrimination	
				4 – accounting separation	
				5 – price control	

FI/2006/0548	FICORA confirms the conclusion reached in its previous market review that the market includes wholesale broadband services provided over the PSTN and cable network.	regional	39 operators	1 - obligation to lease transmission capacity (including necessary equipment) to the other operators as a wholesale broadband access;	Cost-orientationandcostaccountingobligationsThe Commission recalls the comment made in the first round notification with regardto the fact that FICORA did not specify the method on which cost orientation wouldbe assessed. In the context of the adoption of the final measure, FICORA justified itby explaining that since the Finnish Communication Market Act leaves each operator free to select the cost-accounting procedures, it cannot decide on the cost- accounting methodology. The Commission continues to believe that this limits the measure's contribution to consumer benefit, the enhancement of the internal market.Lack of price regulation for wholesale bitstream accessFICORA does not propose any price control obligation in the wholesale broadband

		factors raised by FICORA that may call for price regulation. First, FICORA indicates that prices have recently increased in the retail market. Secondly, FICORA indicates that the national competition authority has been investigating potential price squeezes in the broadband market
		since 2003. Price squeezes in the oroadband market since 2003. Price squeezes can be avoided through effective wholesale price regulation. FICORA also recognises that the prices for wholesale broadband access
		vary greatly from one region to the other. This coupled with the fact that especially in
		sparsely populated areas wholesale broadband access from the SMP operator remains the only cost-effective way of competing in the retail market raises concerns that without proper price regulation it is difficult for a new entrant to build a competitive retail offer on a nationwide basis. Against this background the Commission invites FICORA to consider imposing appropriate price regulation in the wholesale broadband access market.
	2 – transparency	Inclusion of cable in the definition of the wholesale broadband access market
	2 – transparency	The Commission reiterates its comment made in the first round notification about the
		concerns related to the inclusion of cable into the market definition for wholesale
		broadband access. However, the Commission maintains that the conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not relevant in the present case

			for the purposes of the SMP assessment.
		3 – non-discrimination	

Market 13: Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines

Market definition Member State similar to		SMP found for	Remedies imposed					
Weinder State	Recommendation	Sivir lound for	Access / interconnection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Finland	YES	43 operators	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	
Hungary	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Ireland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Portugal	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Sweden	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
United Kingdom	NO**	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	YES*	
Austria ***	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Belgium	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Cyprus	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	

Czech Republic	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Denmark	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
France	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Greece	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Italy	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Latvia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Lithuania	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Luxemburg	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Malta	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Netherlands	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Poland	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Slovakia	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES		
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO		
Spain	SpainYES1 operatorYESYESYESYESYES								
*Differentiated or no	*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators								
** Refinement, broa	der/narrower market an	d/or merger of markets							

*** Second round

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 13: Terminating segments of leased lines Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0037- 0038	Refinement of the market definition in the Recommendation,	National market with local characteristics (UK excluding	BT (with the exception of the very high capacity segment, where no	1 - Provision of network access on reasonable request	The Commission made comments on: Market definition: On the basis of the
	four wholesale markets in the UK excluding the Hull area and in the Hull area:	the Hull area and the Hull area)	the Hull area) and Kingston (with the exception of the very high capacity segment 3 - Bas orientation 4 -Tran	2 - Non-discrimination	existence of different competitive conditions, Oftel has refined the leased line product markets as defined in the Recommendation, allowing proposing the removal of existing regulation on the
	 wholesale low bandwidth traditional interface symmetric 			3 - Basis of charges obligation (cost orientation and a cost accounting system)	market for very high bandwidth circuits. Oftel has defined a national market with local characteristics taking account of certain variations in the level of competition in different areas. Oftel's
	broadband origination (up to and including 8Mbit/s); – wholesale high			4 -Transparency (reference offer and technical information)	analysis is consistent with the methodology set out in the Recommendation and in the Commission's Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power. Ofcom is invited to monitor closely the market developments and examine whether the proposed wholesale obligations (and in particular the ability for tariffs for wholesale trunk
	bandwidth traditional interface symmetric broadband			5 - Price control (BT only)	

	origination (above 8Mbit/s up to and including 155Mbit/s); - wholesale very	6 - Accounting separation (BT only)	segments to be geographically de- averaged) change the geographic variations to such a degree as to make the definition of an alternative geographic market more appropriate in the future.
	high bandwidth traditional interface symmetric broadband	7 - Requirement to provide advance notification of changes to (or introduction of) prices, terms and conditions (BT only)	
	origination (above 155Mbit/s) in the UK excluding the Hull area; – wholesale	8 - Requirement to provide quality of service information (BT only)	as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
	alternative interface symmetric broadband origination.	9 - Obligations relating to requests for new network access (BT only)	,
UK/2004/0077	See Cases UK/2003/0037-003	Amendments to the interim charge contro obligations imposed on BT	No comments made by the Commission.

UK/2004/0123	See Cases UK/2003/0037-0038.			Slight modification of the remedies already notified because of the establishment of the Telecommunications Adjudicator.	No comments made by the Commission.
	Leased lines including a connection to the			1 - Obligation to provide line rental of a leased line	
FI/2004/0080	end-user (similar to the	Regional	43 operators	2 - Obligation to publish delivery terms and tariff information	No comments made by the Commission.
	Recommendation).			3 - Non-discrimination	
				1 - Provision of access to terminating segments on reasonable request	
				2 - Cost orientation and cost accounting	The Commission made a comment encouraging TKK to make clear that the proposed remedies would apply to all
AT/2004/00100	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Austria	3 - Non-discrimination	products within the relevant market and that the specific obligations set down in national legislation relating to leased lines
				4 - Transparency (reference offer)	used for the purpose of network interconnection are above and beyond those proposed for this market.
				5 - Accounting separation	

				1 - Transparency	
				2 - Non-discrimination	
HU/2005/0168	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Matáv Rt.	3 - Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Access obligation	
				5 - Price control (retail minus)	
				1 - Access obligation	
				2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2005/0139	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	eircom	3 - Transparency	The further consultation planned by ComReg: The draft measures relating to the details and implementation of the accounting separation and cost
				4 - Accounting separation	accounting obligations are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
				5 - Price control and cost accounting	
PT/2005/0156	Similar to the Recommendation	National	PT Comunicaçõnes	1 - Access obligation	No comments made by the Commission.
	(in addition to traditional terminating leased			2 - Non-discrimination	

	lines, the market definition covers also symmetric			3 - Transparency	
	xDSL technologies with capacity up to and including 2			4 - Accounting separation	
	Mbps).			5 - Price control (cost orientation and retail minus) and cost accounting	
				1 - Provision of terminating segments on reasonable request	
	Facilities providing for transparent		TeliaSonera	2 - Price regulation of certain terminating segments (cost-orientation based on fully distributed costs)	The Commission made a comment on:
	symmetric transmission capacity between	National		3 - Obligation to interconnect networks on reasonable request	Market share data: The market share data collected by PTS indicate an aggregated market share with regard to all types of wholesale leased lines i.e. terminating and trunk segments considered jointly. When notifying the market for trunk segments, PTS is encouraged to provide more specific figures or estimations for that market, excluding terminating segments.
SE/2005/0200	network termination points which do not include on-demand			4 - Notification of price changes and submission of accounts statements	
	switching (similar to the Recommendation).			5 - Non-discrimination	
				6 - Publication of important terms and conditions	
				7 - Accounting separation	
SI/2005/0219			Withdraw	n by the National Regulatory Authority	

DK/2005/0245	Similar to the Recommendation	National	TDC A/S	1 - Requirement to provide wholesale access to terminating segments of leased lines regardless of transmission capacity and underlying technology and co-location on reasonable request; 2 - Price control (based on modified historic costs); 3 - Cost accounting; 4 - Non-discrimination; 5 - Requirement to publish a reference offer; 6 - Accounting separation	The Commission made a comment on: Conditions of competition in low and high bandwidth terminating segments, and scope of remedies: Since NITA indicates that there are different competitive conditions for high and low capacity terminating segments of leased lines, the Commission invited NITA to consider whether such different conditions would justify a differentiation of the remedies imposed on the operator designated as having SMP.
NL/2005/0282	Three separate markets: (i) wholesale terminating segments of leased lines of <2Mbit/s; (ii) wholesale terminating segments of leased lines of 2Mbit/s;	National	KPN	wholesale terminating segments of leased lines of <2Mbit/s 1- Access, 2 - Non-discrimination, 3 - Obligation not to unreasonably bundle	No comments made by the Commission.
EN				3 - Obligation not to unreasonably bundle services, 4 - Transparency (publication of a reference 375 offer) 5 - Price regulation	

ΕN

				6 - Accounting separation	
				wholesale terminating segments of leased lines of 2Mbit/s	
				1- Access,	
(iii) wholesale	terminating			2 - Non-discrimination,	
	segments of leased lines of >2Mbit/s			3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer)	
				4 - Price regulation	
				5 – Accounting separation	
				wholesale terminating segments of leased lines of >2Mbit/s	
				1 – Access obligation	
IT/2005/0272	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telecom Italia	1- Access and use of specific network resources,	No comments made by the Commission.

				 2 - Non-discrimination, 3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer) 4 - Price control (based on a <i>network cap</i> mechanism) and cost accounting 5 - Accounting separation 	
SI/2005/0305	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Telekom Slovenije	 1- Access and use of specific network resources, 2 - Non-discrimination, 3 - Transparency, 4 - Price control 	No comments made by the Commission.
MT/2006/0374	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Maltacom	1- Access,	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Non-discrimination,	

				 3 – Transparency, 4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 5 – Accounting separation 	
				1 - Access, including the obligation to maintain the wholesale offers currently in place	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	Remedies for terminating segments of leased lines
				3 - Transparency (including the publication of service quality indicators and a reference offer)	ARCEP proposed to differentiate remedies relating to price control for terminating segments of leased lines, depending on bandwidths.
FR/2006/0416	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	France Telecom	4 - Price control	Although the Commission does not object to the imposition of a differentiated set of
					remedies in the market for terminating segments of leased lines, such differential treatment should be adequately reasoned.
				5 - Accounting separation	Further, Article 8.2 (c) of the Framework Directive states that NRAs shall encourage efficient investment in infrastructure. Nevertheless, the roll-out of new infrastructure for all terminating segments which require a bandwidth of more than 10 Mbit/s might not be

					economically viable in all geographic areas, in particular in rural areas. Therefore the Commission invited ARCEP to consider extending the obligation not to charge excessive prices imposed on the market for trunk segments also to terminating segments of leased lines above 10 Mbit/s.
				1 - Access obligation	The Commission made comments on: Inclusion of optical and wireless
				2 - Non-discrimination	networks in the market for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines
	The market definition includes	ncludes ed via ical as vireless ich as vireless National	Slovak Telekom	3 - Transparency	Despite the absence of the demand- and supply-side substitutability analysis based on competition law that would justify the
	loops provided via metallic, optical as well as wireless			4 - Accounting separation	inclusion of these technologies in a single market for wholesale terminatin segments of leased lines, the exclusion of
SK/2006/0386 networks fixed access	networks (such as fixed wireless access networks ("FWA"") and				these technologies from the market definition would not have affected the finding of SMP or the scope of regulation.
	microwave networks)			5 – Price cap and cost orientation: prices	Parallel imposition of cost orientation obligation and price cap
				cannot exceed a maximum level and shall be oriented to costs on the basis of the fully allocated historical costs method)	In accordance with Article 13 of the Access Directive, where an operator has an obligation regarding the cost orientation of its prices, the burden of proof that prices are based on costs, including a reasonable rate of return on investment, shall lie with the operator concerned. TÚSR may require Slovak Telekom to provide full justification for

					its prices, and may, where appropriate, require prices to be adjusted. However, this is without prejudice to the possibility for Slovak Telekom to adopt prices that are higher than currently valid prices, provided of course, that the adopted prices are derived from fully justified and relevant costs. This may be the case, in particular, if there is reliable evidence from cost accounting analysis as approved by TÚSR that the price cap would result in a price level below the efficient costs of the underlying network elements and the services being requested including a reasonable rate of return.
EL/2006/0422	Two separate relevant markets: (i) up to and including 2 Mbps; (ii) above 2 Mbps.	National	OTE	 1 - Access (as well as co-location and use of special facilities) 2 - Non discrimination 3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer, including Service Level Agreements) 	No comments made by the Commission.
	2 110ps.			4 – Cost orientation and cost accounting 5 – Accounting separation	
CY/2006/0482	Similar to the	National	СҮТА	1 - Access (as well as co-location and use of	No comments made by the Commission.

				special facilities)	
				2 - Non discrimination	
	Recommendation			3 - Transparency	
				4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting	
				5 – Accounting separation	
	Similar to Recommendation.			1 - Access	
	Two separate markets:		TEO LT AB	2 - Non discrimination	
	(i) low speed terminating			3 - Transparency	
LT/2006/0430	segments of leased lines (leased lines below 2048 kbps	National		4 – Price control and cost accounting	No comments made by the Commission.
	including 2048 kbps), and			5 – Accounting separation	
	(ii) high speed terminating segments of leased				

	lines (leased lines above 2048 kbps).				
CZ/2006/0450	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Český Telecom a.s.	1 - Access 2 - Non discrimination 3 - Transparency 4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) and accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.
ES/2006/0458	Similar to the Recommendation	National	TESAU	 1 - Access 2 - Non discrimination 3 - Transparency (publication of a 	The Commission made comments on: Limitation of the scope of the remedies in the market of terminating leased lines to services based on traditional interfaces Although CMT includes both traditional interfaces and Ethernet technologies in

	 4 – Price control (based on cost orientati and accounting separation 5 - Obligation to report the qualit parameters for the supply of the relevant services. 	or the remedies to the services based on traditional interfaces. The Commission notes that some alternative operators raised concerns during the national consultation regarding their inability to compete with TESAU's retail offers
		In accordance with Article 8(4) of the Access Directive, the obligations imposed on SMP operators shall be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive.
		In the light hereof, the Commission invites CMT to assess, before adopting the final measure, whether alternative operators can compete efficiently with TESAU in the retail market – both from a technical and an economic point of view considering the high prices for terminating segments in Spain and the lack of wholesale offers with speeds
		corresponding to those Ethernet services offered by TESAU at retail level – on the basis of the wholesale products actually offered by TESAU. In the case such analysis would show that alternative operators are not able to efficiently compete at retail level on the basis of the existing wholesale offers, the Commission invites CMT to reconsider

					the scope of the remedies.
DE/2006/0480			Withdrawn	by the National Regulatory Authority	
				Terminating segments of leased lines with bandwidth up to 155 Mbit/s and with a bandwidth < 34 Mbit/s only in the 9 capital cities of the Austrian Länder	
AT/2006/0508	Similar to the Recommendation	National	Telekom Austria	1 - Access 2 - Non discrimination 3 - Transparency (publication of a Reference offer) 4 - Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting 5 - Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.

				1 - Access	The Commission made a comment on:
	Leased lines connecting the end customer with the Point of		Telekomunikacja	2 - Non discrimination	Market definition As a consequence of the market definition the exact boundaries of the market for trunk and terminating segments are not
PL/2006/0516	Presence (PoP) of the requesting	National	Polska S.A. ("TP SA")	3 - Transparency (publication of a Reference offer)	stable, as they will depend (in each case) on the location of the PoP of an
	operator in the network of an operator providing leased lines.			4 – Price control and cost accounting	alternative operator within the network of TP SA. Assuming that different alternative operators interconnect at different points
				5 - Accounting separation	and at different levels in TP SA's network, the same network components of TP SA's network may be characterised as trunk or terminating segments

					depending on the customer. Such market definition does not have an impact on the SMP assessment in this market, but it may have some undesirable side-effects if UKE would find it appropriate to impose less stringent regulation in the market for trunk segments of leased lines or would find that market to be competitive. In such circumstances, alternative operators may be discouraged from interconnecting with TP SA at a lower (i.e. local) level in the network, as interconnection at higher (i.e. regional or national) level would enable them to benefit more from the (stricter) regulated terminating segments. Most other Member States have defined terminating segments of leased lines as leased lines between the end customer and the nearest point of interconnection <i>offered</i> in the incumbent's network, independently of whether the alternative operator effectively makes use of that offer.
BE/2006/0552	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	Belgacom	1 - Access obligation	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non-discrimination	Cost accounting for wholesale terminating segments of leased lines:
				3 - Transparency	The Commission notes that currently IBPT does not apply a cost accounting system for all products included in

				4 - Price control and cost accounting	market 1316 as defined by IBTP and that a consultation on the cost modelling methodology is planned to take place six months after adoption of the final measures in market 13. Given the relevance of a cost accounting system in relation to all products included in market 13 and in particular alternative interfaces, the Commission invites IBPT to shorten the timeframe for elaborating the details of the cost accounting model and its implementing measures.
--	--	--	--	---------------------------------------	---

justifies this approach in particular with the absence of the emergence of a trunk leased lines market given that the tarification system of EPT does not provide incentives to alternative operators to duplicate the infrastructure between the points of presence of EPT (five points of interconnection). The Commission however takes the view that the market delineation should be based on a thorough assessment of demand and supply side substitutability. In this respect the inclusion of the trunk segment into the terminating segment of the leased lines market is not well justified. In particular, the Commission is not convinced about ILR's argument to define one market on the
basis of supply side substitutability given that operators offering the trunk segment would still need to duplicate relevant infrastructure if they wanted to offer terminating segments as well.

				 3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer) 4 - Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting 	Notwithstanding that further evidence should have been provided by ILR that trunk and terminating segments of leased lines are (currently or prospectively) in the same market, the SMP analysis of the trunk segment of the leased lines market would not
					have led to a different result. Consequently, the Commission considers that in the present case a conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not critical for the
				5 – Accounting separation	designation of SMP. Furthermore, the Commission notes that ILR intends to modify the tariff structure of EPT such as to allow for the emergence of a trunk leased line market. If, as a consequence of the modification of the tariff structure, ILR observes
					the development of a product offer in the trunk part of the wholesale leased line market, the Commission invites ILR to reassess the market boundaries and to analyse the competition conditions for the market(s) identified without delay.
LV/2006/0572	Similar to the Recommendation	National	SIA Lattelecom	1 - Access	No comments made by the Commission.
				2 - Non discrimination	

	3 - Transparency (publication of a Reference offer)	
	4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting	
	5 - Accounting separation	

Market 14: Wholesale trunk segments of leased lines

Marchae Stat	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed				
Member State			Access / interconnection	Non-discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Austria	YES			No SN	1P found		
Finland	YES		No SMP found				
Hungary	YES	No SMP found					
Ireland	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Portugal	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
United Kingdom	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Austria ***	YES			No SN	1P found		
Belgium	YES			No SN	1P found		
Cyprus	YES	1 operatorYESYESYESYES					YES
Czech Republic	YES	No SMP found					
Denmark	YES			No SM	IP found		

France	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Greece	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Italy	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Latvia	YES	No SMP found					
Lithuania	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Luxemburg	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Malta	NO**	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
The Netherlands	YES			No SN	1P found		
Slovenia	YES	No SMP found					
Spain	YES	1 operator	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO
Sweden		No SMP found					

*Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

** Refinement, broader/narrower market and/or merger of markets

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 14: Wholesale trunk segments of leased lines - notifications assessed until 30 September 2005 Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0039	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	BT	1 - Obligation to provide network access on reasonable request	The Commission made comments on:
				2 - Requirement not to discriminate unduly	Market definition: The Commission invites Ofcom to monitor closely the market developments and examine whether the
				3 - Basis of charges obligation (cost orientation and a cost accounting system)	proposed wholesale obligations (and in particular the ability for tariffs for wholesale trunk segments to be geographically de- averaged) change the geographic variations to
				4 -Transparency (reference offer and technical information)	such a degree as to make the definition of an alternative geographic market more appropriate in the future.
					National consultation run in parallel with
				5 - Price control	Article 7 consultation: Any materia modification to the draft measure as consequence of comments made by intereste
				6 - Accounting separation	parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework

				7 - Requirement to provide advance notification of changes to (or introduction of) prices, terms and conditions;	Directive.
				8 - Requirement to provide quality of service information	
				9 - Obligations relating to requests for new network access	
UK/2004/0123	See Cases UK/2003/0037-0038.			Slight modification of the remedies already notified because of the establishment of the Telecommunications Adjudicator.	No comments made by the Commission.
FI/2004/0081	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.

AT/2004/0074	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.	
HU/2005/0169	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.	
IE/2005/0140	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	eircom	1 - Access obligation	The Commission made a comment on:	
				2 - Non-discrimination	Further consultation planned by ComReg ComReg states in its draft measures that a further consultation will be held on the details and implementation of accounting separation and cost accounting obligations. The Commission services would like to remine	
				3 - Transparency		
				4 - Accounting separation	ComReg that draft measures relating to the regulatory obligations are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.	

				5 - Price control and cost accounting		
				1 – Access obligation		
				2 – Non-discrimination		
PT/2005/0157	005/0157Similar to the Recommendation.National	PT Comunicaçõnes	3 – Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.		
				4 – Accounting separation		
				5 – Price control		
SI/2005/0220	Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority					
NL/2005/0283	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.	

				1- Access and use of specific	The Commission made a comment on:
				network resources,	
					Exclusion of trunk segments below 2 Mbps from the definition of market for trunk
					segments of leased lines
				2 – Non-discrimination	AGCOM hereafter concludes that circuits with transmission capacities below 2 Mbps only constitutes a marginal part of the market, and that
IT/2005/0273	Analogue and digital circuits from 2 Mbps to 2,5 Gbps	National	Telecom Italia ("TI")	3 – Transparency (publication of a reference offer)	consequently the wholesale market for trunk segments of leased lines should not include circuits below such capacities. AGCOM does not provide any further argumentation as to why trunk segments below 2 Mbps, from a demand-side or a supply-side perspective, should be excluded from the relevant market.
				4 - Price control (based on a <i>network cap</i> mechanism and cost accounting	The Commission considers that the fact that trunk segments with transmission capacities below 2 Mbps only constitute a marginal part of the whole offer in the trunk market does not seem sufficient to exclude such segments from the market definition. Therefore, the Commission would like to invite AGCOM to reconsider its conclusion and include circuits
				5- Accounting separation	with transmission capacities below 2 Mbps in the definition of the relevant market in itsfinal measure. In any event, as the Commission has previously pointed out in other cases, it does not consider that in these particular circumstances the exclusion of such marginal segment from the definition of the relevant market would affect trade

					between Member States within the meaning of Article 7 (4) and recital 38 of the Framework Directive. Such measure is not likely to have an influence on the pattern of trade between Member States in a manner which might create a barrier to the single market. Therefore, the Commission has limited its reaction to the above comment.
SE/2005/0341	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Additional information provided: The Commission would like to encourage PTS to consider strengthening the motivation of its final decision by including the additional information provided to the Commission in the course of this procedure, mainly relating to the availability of alternative supply at the regional exchanges and the absence of significant switching costs. Susceptibility to ex ante regulation: On the basis of the information provided by PTS, the Commission considers that the market under consideration does not meet the three criteria test and hence is not susceptible to ex ante regulation. In particular, the market seems to exhibit relatively low barriers to entry, due inter alia to the widespread existence of dark fibre infrastructure which can be utilized by alternative operators as a wholesale input to provide trunk segments of leased lines. Alternative operators have moreover entered the market and are capturing customers from TeliaSonera, which is reflected in decreasing market shares of

					exercised on the pricing behaviour of TeliaSonera. Under those circumstances, it might be concluded that the market tends towards effective competition. Non-SMP finding: The factual data provided by PTS are insufficient for the Commission to reach a definitive view on whether TeliaSonera has SMP
					on the relevant market or not (in particular the market share information, market share trends and pricing data are too vague). However, the Commission is of the view that a detailed SMP analysis with more factual evidence would not have led to a different regulatory outcome in this particular case since in any event the market for trunk segments of leased lines in Sweden does not exhibit the features that make it susceptible to ex ante regulation.
SI/2005/0362	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
SK/2006/0414			With	drawn by the National Regulatory Authority	, ,

FR/2006/0417	Two markets for trunk segments of leased lines:	in and between: mainland France, the	France Telecom	1 - Access, including the obligation to maintain the wholesale offers currently in place	No comments made by the Commission.
	(i) intra-territory trunk segments and (ii) inter-territory	erritory French overseas ents and departments erritory and Mayotte		2 - Non-discrimination	
	trunk segments.			3 - Transparency (including the publication of service quality indicators and a reference offer)	
			4 - Price control- the prohibition of predatory prices for all services in the wholesale markets;		
			 a cost orientation obligation for (i) terminal segments of leased lines below 10 Mbit/s, (ii) the connecting links between cable landing points and the first node of leased lines, and (iii) the inter- territory trunk segments linking mainland France and Réunion; 		
			 the prohibition to charge excessive prices for all intra-territory and inter- territory trunk segments (with the exception of the segments linking mainland France and Réunion); 		

				5 - Accounting separation	
				1- Access,	The Commission made a comment on:
				2 - Non-discrimination,	The inclusion of international lines in the wholesale and retail market definitions : By including international lines in the retail markets
				3 – Transparency,	for the provision of leased lines and wholesale trunk segments of leased lines respectively, the MCA deviates from the Recommendation. In its
				4 – Cost orientation,	notification, the MCA did not conduct the three criteria test considering this unnecessary as in its view the two markets as defined in the Recommendation include international leased
MT/2006/0375	International segments included	National	Maltacom	5 – Cost accounting and accounting separation	Recommendation include international leased lines. Without contesting the MCA's conclusions, the Commission invited the MCA to clarify in its final measure (i) that two new markets have been defined by including international lines, thereby deviating from the Recommendation, (ii) that the three criteria test has been carried out for these markets and (iii) that the cumulative criteria of this test are fulfilled.
					Remedies imposed in the market of the international segments of leased lines
					MCA considered that prices would inevitably rise if not regulated. Accordingly it proposed to maintain the current price regulation on the retail market of the international leased lines (cost- oriented prices approved by the MCA). The
					Commission invited the MCA to consider whether imposing a less stringent type of price regulation rather than maintaining the current cost-oriented prices would be more justified and proportionate

					in relation to the achievement of the regulatory objectives - taking into account both the short term objective to protect consumers and the longer term objective to induce effective competition.
EL/2006/0423	Similar to the Recommendation	National	OTE	 1 - Access (as well as co-location and use of special facilities) 2 - Non discrimination 3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer, including Service Level Agreements) 4 -Cost orientation and cost accounting 5 - Accounting separation 	No comments made by the Commission.
LT/2006/0431	Two markets for trunk segments of leased lines:	National	TEO LT AB	1 - Access	The Commission made a comment on:
	(i) national		ILO LI AD	2 - Non discrimination	The wholesale market for international leased lines
	trunk segments and (ii) international trunk segments.			3 - Transparency	RRT defines and analyses a separate wholesale market for international trunk segments of leased lines (i.e. trunk leased lines with one point in

				4 – Price control and cost accounting 5 – Accounting separation	Lithuania and the other point abroad), which deviates from the Recommendation. NRAs may identify markets that differ from those of the Recommendation, but they should carry out the three criteria test, i.e that: (1) there are high and non-transitory entry barriers, (2) the structure of the market does not tend towards effective competition within the relevant time horizon and (3) the application of competition law alone would not adequately address the market failure(s) concerned. In its notification, RRT does not conduct the three criteria test for the international trunk leased lines market taking the specific national circumstances into account. However, since RRT does not find any undertaking to have SMP on this market, the possible exclusion of the relevant market from market analysis on the basis of the three criteria test would not have led to a different regulatory outcome in this particular case.
CY/2006/0483	Similar to the Recommendation	National	СҮТА	1 - Access (as well as co-location and use of special facilities)	
	(including trunk segments of partial leased lines and			2 - Non discrimination	
	backhaul services connecting with the international			3 - Transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
	submarine cable systems reaching Cyprus)			4 – Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting	

				5 – Accounting separation	
CZ/2006/0451	Similar to the Recommendation	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
ES/2006/0459	Similar to the Recommendation	National	TESAU	1 - Access 2 - Transparency (publication of a Reference offer)	No comments made by the Commission.
DE/2006/0481			With	drawn by the National Regulatory Authority	,

AT/2006/0467	Similar to the Recommendation	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
BE/2006/0553	Similar to the Recommendation	National	No SMP found		No comments made by the Commission.
				No remedies imposed	
LU/2006/0562	One product market including terminating and	National	EPT	1 - Access obligation	The Commission made a comment on: Lack of sufficient evidence for not separating the markets for terminating and trunk
	trunk segments of leased lines			2 - Non-discrimination	segments of leased lines ILR proposes to define one single wholesale
				3 - Transparency (publication of a reference offer)	market for terminating segments and trunk segments. ILR justifies this approach in particular with the absence of the emergence of a trunk

4 - Price control (based on cost orientation) and cost accounting	leased lines market given
5 – Accounting separation	that the tarification system of EPT does not provide incentives to alternative operators to duplicate the infrastructure between the points of presence of EPT (five points of interconnection). The Commission however takes the view that the market delineation should be based on a thorough assessment of demand and supply side substitutability. In this respect the inclusion of the trunk segment into the terminating segment of the leased lines market is not well justified. In particular, the Commission is not convinced about ILR's argument to define one market on the basis of supply side substitutability given that operators offering the trunk segment would still need to duplicate relevant infrastructure if they wanted to offer terminating segments as well. Notwithstanding that further evidence should have been provided by ILR that trunk and terminating segments of leased lines are (currently or prospectively) in the same market, the SMP analysis of the trunk segment of the leased lines market would not
	have led to a different result. Consequently, the Commission considers that in the present case a conclusion on the exact scope of the market is not critical for the designation of SMP. Furthermore, the Commission notes that ILR intends to modify the tariff structure of EPT such as to allow for the emergence of a trunk leased line market. If, as a consequence of the modification of the tariff structure, ILR observes the development of a product offer in the trunk part of the wholesale

					reassess the market boundaries and to analyse the competition conditions for the market(s) identified without delay.
LV/2006/0573	Similar to the Recommendation	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
DK/2007/0586			With	drawn by the National Regulatory Authority	

Market 15: Access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks

Member State	Market definition	SMP found for	Remedies imposed							
	similar to Recommendation	SIMP IOUND IOP	Access / interconnection	Non-discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation			
Austria	YES	No SMP found								
Finland	YES	No SMP found*								
Hungary**	YES	No SMP found								
Ireland	YES	2 operators (joint SMP)	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES			
Slovenia	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO			
Sweden	YES			No SMP for	ınd					
United Kingdom	YES			No SMP fou	ınd					
Luxembourg	YES			No SMP for	ınd					
Denmark	YES			No SMP for	ınd					

Netherlands	YES		No SMP found					
Czech Republic	YES		No SMP found					
Spain	YES	3 operators (joint SMP)						
Italy	YES		No SMP found					
		2 operators						
Malta	YES	(joint SMP)	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Cyprus	YES	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Slovakia	YES			No SMP for	ınd			
Lithuania	YES			No SMP for	ınd			
Greece	YES		No SMP found					
Latvia	YES			No SMP for	ınd			

* In its notification FI/2004/0082, Ficora proposed to designate one operator with SMP. The notified draft measure was vetoed by the Commission on 5 October 2004. On 13 October 2004, following the veto decision, Ficora adopted a final measure taking into account the Commission veto decision and concluded that the market is effectively competitive. Therefore, there is no operator with SMP in the market.

** second round of a market review

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Market 15: Access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks Overview of notifications assessed until 28 February 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definitio n	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
UK/2003/0001	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made comments on: Reliance on comments from parties other than the Commission and other NRAs: Any material modification to the draft measure as a result of comments from third parties will require re- notification. Inclusion of 3G telephony in the market definition: Market definition should be technology-neutral. 3G voice and SMS services offered at present or in the near future are, from demand-side perspective, not distinguishable from their 2G equivalents, and appear to be part of the same relevant market. Market share analysis: The use of derived market shares is broadly in line with the Commission's practice when assessing hypothetical markets or markets with a high degree of vertical integration. When calculating market shares, preference should be given to volume based as opposed to

					value-based calculation. Use of international benchmarking and concentration measures: The fact that the UK market has a lower Herfindahl-Hirschmann-Index ("HHI") score than markets in other Member States is not in itself an indication of its propensity towards or away from collective dominance.
AT/2004/0063	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made comments on: Monitoring of the market: Opinions from competitors and the conduct of undertakings should be monitored very closely and be taken into consideration when assessing this market in a future review. National consultation running in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.

FI/2004/0082	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	Sonera Mobile Networks Oy*	1 - Obligation to relinquish access rights	The Commission vetoed the draft measure based on : Lack of taking into consideration the apparent market dynamics: Even though there is currently no regulatory obligation for mobile network operators ("MNOs") to provide access, both service providers ("SPs") and mobile virtual network operators ("MVNOs") have been able to conclude agreements on a commercial basis with each of the three nationwide-operating MNOs.
				2 - Interconnection	 Lack of evidence of capacity constraints: There is not sufficient evidence as to the existence of barriers to expansion in the relevant market. Lack of evidence as to high switching costs and the absence of countervailing buying power: The incentives of MNOs to bear the costs of switching themselves was not considered. The largest SP has made an MVNO agreement with two MNOs. SPs ask for competing offers from different MNOs. Undue weight given to evidence of network

				3 - Non-discrimination (pricing and other terms)	effects, economies of scale and scope, and substantial financial advantages: Differences in capacity utilisation do not offer a sustainable competitive advantage to an operator and can be overcome by attracting a larger number of customers onto existing capacity. Network effects are claimed to be particularly strong due to differences in prices for on-net and off-net calls, which are mainly relevant for the assessment of the retail mobile market. Concerning financial advantages, TeliaSonera's competitors are also parts of large vertically and horizontally integrated telecommunications groups.				
				4 - Obligation to negotiate on national roaming with a network operator that has a license for a third generation mobile network					
*) On 13 October	*) On 13 October 2004, following the veto decision, Ficora adopted a final measure taking into account the Commission veto decision of 5 October 2004 and concluded that the market is effectively competitive. Therefore, there is no operator with SMP in the market.								
HU/2004/0096 HU/2007/0594	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Absence of analysis of the wholesale market:				

					The fact that at the wholesale level no transactions are taking place on the merchant market does not exclude the possibility to analyse the relevant market. NHH is invited to monitor the relevant market, especially with regard to the fact that it can be presumed that within the timeframe of its review market players will appear on the demand side of the relevant market.
HU/2004/0108 (Re- notificatio n related to HU/2004/0 096)	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made a comment on: Comment made in previous case: As the re- notified draft measure does not contain any changes of substance, the comment made in case HU/2004/0096 remains valid in the context of this case.
IE/2004/0121	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	Vodafone and 02 (joint SMP)	1 - Provision of network access following a reasonable request by an access seeker	The Commission made comments on: Analysis based on the retail market: Where all supply on the relevant market is captive, the structure of supply at the wholesale level can be derived from supply at the retail level.

		2 - Non-discrimination obligation	Fringe competitors: ComReg should monitor the effective developments of the emergent competitors very closely in the near future and, when appropriate, review its SMP analysis and the regulatory measures imposed. For a competitor to be able to disrupt tacit collusion, it is not necessary to be a strong competitor of the tacitly colluding parties.
	3	3 - Price control - cost orientation and cost accounting	 Further consultation planned by ComReg: Draft measures relating to price control and cost accounting obligations are required to be notified. tional consultation run in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the
		4 - Accounting separation	national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
FR/2005/0179	Withdrawn	by the National Regulatory Authority	

SE/2005/0203	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.		
Similar to the Recommendati on. National			1 -Provision of access in response to a reasonable request	The Commission made comments on: Effectiveness of the proposed wholesale remedies in light of the competitive situation at the retail level: Remedies imposed on the mobile access and call origination market should be complemented as soon as possible by effective regulation of			
	National	Mobitel	2 –Obligation of non-discrimination	the wholesale markets for call termination on mobile networks. The Commission stresses the importance of measures taken under competition law to avoid restrictions of competition at retail level.			
			3 –Price control	Implementation of the proposed price control obligation: Price regulation should be applied only if commercial negotiations between parties do not result in an agreement. The benchmark analysis for termination rates does not seem to form an appropriate point of reference for assessing the reasonability of wholesale access and call origination prices.			
SK/2006/0248	Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority						

LU/2005/0320	Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority							
DK/2005/0243	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.			
NL/2005/0242	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.			
SK/2005/0248		Withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority						

					The Commission made comments on:
					Close monitoring of market developments
IT/2005/0259	Similar to the Recommendati on	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	 It is only recently that the market has started showing evidence of a more competitive functioning. In fact, in its reply to the Commission's request for information, AGCOM provided more recent market data in order to further substantiate its conclusions as to the improvements of market conditions. The further information supplied to the Commission by AGCOM shows that i) the third MNO (in terms of market share) has decreased prices in a considerable manner in 2004 and its prices are no longer aligned with the prices of the first and second MNOs, and that ii) the fourth MNO has increased its market share (4,6 million customers according to recent data for 2005), to the detriment especially of the larger MNOs. Overall, the recent data supplied by AGCOM show that at least since 2003 onwards, there have been some positive developments in terms of price evolution and market shares. Given that these are recent market developments and that MNOs have so far not granted access to MVNOs so that these could have been in a
					 position to offer competitive retail services like convergent fixed/mobile services, the Commission strongly recommends and invites AGCOM to closely monitor the market so as to identify whether the market irreversibly tends towards a competitive structure in
					which any tacitly co-ordinated outcome is unlikely to happen.

					 Finally the Commission invites AGCOM to analyse the wholesale market of access and call origination for non-geographic numbers and notify it according to Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive in the earliest possible timeframe. Assessment of the notification and the additional information provided The Commission reiterates that the assessment of a notified draft measure should be based on the most recent information and data available. Therefore, AGCOM should complement its final measure with the more recent information supplied to the Commission in its reply to the latter's request for information
				Access	The Commission made comments on: The competitive conditions at the retail level
					CMT does not find collective dominance at the retail level and states that the retail
ES/2005/0330	Similar to the	National	Telefónica,		market for mobile telephony services develops in a "competitive environment".
	Recommendati	Trational	Vodafone and Amena		Nonetheless, CMT also argues that there is a "failure of competition" in the retail
	UII UII		and America	Obligation to charge reasonable prices	market and identifies certain market "defficiencies", such as: i) the high level of
					prices, ii) the limited evolution of prices, iii) parallel marketing strategies as well as
					iv) high levels of profitability sustained by the three operators over a longer period of time.


		It should be noted that in order to find joint SMP in the wholesale market of mobile access and call origination, it is not indispensable to find joint SMP at the retail level.
		Retail market conditions may inform an NRA of the structure of the wholesale
		market, but they may and need not in themselves be conclusive as regards the finding of SMP at the wholesale level. However, in order to render credible the finding of collusion at the wholesale level CMT had to demonstrate that the level of rents at the retail level is sufficiently high to provide incentives to collectively refuse access to third operators. If at the retail level there were no rents to protect, then the incentive of mobile network operators not to grant access to MVNOs is difficult to demonstrate.
		A finding of collective dominance raises particularly complex issues of an economic nature notwithstanding the guidance given both in the regulatory framework and the recent case law of the EU. Within that framework, for a finding of collective dominance to be sustained, there must be an incentive not to depart from the common policy.
		CMT's analysis of the dynamics of the retail market mainly relies on the evolution of Average Revenue per Minute (ARPM) data on an aggregate basis. While such data is both valuable and informative, data regarding the evolution of prices on a less aggregate basis would provide a better indication of the dynamic of the retail market given the fact

		that operators are not always equally represented in the individual market segments (e.g. pre-pay/post-pay, high, medium, or low usage).
		The Commission would therefore invite CMT to monitor for the purpose of a future
		market review the evolution of retail prices by market segment and/or customer
		profiles.
		In the present case the Commission nonetheless notes that the retail market appears to be characterised by a number of structural features, such as the high level of prices, the limited evolution of prices, and most notably high levels of profitability sustained by the three operators which appear to provide sufficient incentives to the three
		operators, Telefónica, Vodafone and Amena, to collectively refuse access to MVNOs at the wholesale level.
		The focal point
		According to the case law of the Court of Justice, for a finding of collective
		dominance in the form of tacit collusion, members of the dominant oligopoly must be aware, sufficiently precisely and quickly, of the way in which the other members'market conduct is evolving. The degree of transparency is important for the purpose of permitting each member of the oligopoly to detect deviation from the common policy and to ascertain whether it is necessary to react to any such deviations by punishing them.

I I		ſ	
			CMT defines one focal point consisting in the denial of wholesale access to third
			parties. The Commission services consider that this focal point is transparent and that non deviator MNOs can easily detect any deviation resulting in the entry of a new competitor at the retail level.
			CMT does not explicitly identify a focal point at the retail level which, although not
			indispensable, could have further supported the finding of sustainable coordinated outcome at wholesale level since it may allow operators to directly observe the commercial implications of their conduct at the retail level. CMT has, nevertheless, demonstrated an alignment of commercial strategies of the three operators Telefónica,
			Vodafone and Amena and that it seems plausible that a deviation of any one operator towards a more aggressive (and less profitable) price competition should be easily detected by the non-deviating MNOs.
			The retaliation mechanism
			For a finding of collective dominance, there must be an incentive not to depart from the common policy. Demonstrating the possibility and sustainability of a common line of action presupposes, in particular, proof of the existence of efficient, credible retaliatory measures against any company that deviates from the common policy/strategy (i.e. the focal point). For a retaliation mechanism to be credible, it needs to be easily and quickly implemented.

		CMT considers that the most credible retaliation would occur at wholesale level. If an MNO were to grant network access, the other firms could retaliate by granting access to another MVNO.
		The Commission notes that the networks of all three MNOs are dimensioned to support only forecasted traffic in the short to medium term. However, according to CMT, all three MNOs appear to have sufficient spectrum enabling them to adapt rapidly the capacity of the network to the evolution of the traffic. Hence the retaliation mechanism can be implemented as there is scope for increasing capacity in a short period of time for all the MNOs.
		It appears that signing an access contract may, however, require negotiation on
		pricing, commercial and technical terms of supply. In consequence retaliation may be
		less immediate and the "cheating" firm may benefit from a certain first-mover
		advantage.
		CMT could have provided further evidence which would have allowed it to assess whether such mechanism would be more immediate and is sufficiently strong to discipline the deviating firm. Specifically, NRAs are invited to assess in a market review whether the non deviator MNOs could easily conclude a contract with a MVNO, whose entry and specific commercial strategy is likely to discipline the deviator MNO.
		As regards retaliation at the retail level, CMT

suggests that non deviator MNOs could start a price war in the retail market or, more generally, deviate from the principles of the commercial strategy followed by all three MNOs to date (complex and non transparent pricing schemes, high prices subsidised handsets). The Commission considers that a reduction of retail prices through specific offers (be it through effective reduction of the nominal prices or through a more aggressive promotion policy) and also the deviation from the common principles of the commercial strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect on the deviating from. In particular, such retailation mechanism appears to be quickly implemented based on the level of number portability in Spain. Portability and churn rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch. From oen operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could here show that a bigh price substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of Spain.	1		1	
 generally, deviate from the principles of the commercial strategy followed by all three MNOs to date (complex and non transpernt pricing schemes, high prices subsidied handsets). The Commission considers that a reduction of retail prices through specific offers (be it through effective reduction of the nominal prices or through anore aggressive promotion policy) and also the deviation from the ecomomor principles of the commercial strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect on the deviation mechanism appears to be quickly implemented based on the level of number portability in Spain. Portability and charm rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers are to preach and the retailiation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail 				
Image: Commercial strategy followed by all three MNOs to date (complex and non transparent pricing schemes, high prices subsidised handsets). The Commission considers that a reduction of restall prices through specific offers (be it through effective reduction of the nominal prices or through and also the deviation from the common principles of the commercial strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect on the deviating from. In particular, such retallation mechanism appears to be quickly implemented based on the level of number portability in Spain. Portability and churn rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments: could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular faces set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviator and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium faceurs				
MNOs to date (complex and non transparent pricing schemes, high prices subsidised handsets). The Commission considers that a reduction of retail prices through specific offrex (be it through effective reduction of the nominal prices or through and also the deviation from the common principles of the commercial strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect on the deviating firm. In particular, such retailation mechanism appears to be quickly implemented based on the level of number portability and churr rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retailation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the mon deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibition in factors entire.				
Image: section of the subscription of consumers are able to Image: subscription of the subscription of consumers are able to Image: subscription of the subscription the subscription of the subscription of th				
The Commission considers that a reduction of retail prices through specific offers (be it through effective reduction of the nominal prices or through a more aggressive promotion policy) and also the deviation from the common principles of the commercial strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect on the deviating firm. In particular, such retaliation mechanism appears to be quickly implemented based on the level of number portability in Spain. Portability and chum rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could have Further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator firm.				
Image: set in the				handsets).
Image: Second				The Commission considers that a reduction of
Image: Section of the section of th				
Image: series of the common principles of the commor principles of the common principles of the common principles of the commor principles of the common pr				
interview				
strategy is likely to have a disciplinary effect on the deviating firm. In particular, such retaliation mechanism appears to be quickly implemented based on the level of number portability in Spain. Portability and churn rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
Image: Second				
Image: set of the set of				
Image: Section				
Portability and churn rates show that a high proportion of consumers are able to switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the not eviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
Image: set of the				portability in Spain.
switch from one operator to another in the Spanish market. Data on the extent of SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				Portability and churn rates show that a high
Image: Simple set in the set				proportion of consumers are able to
SIM-locking, and presence of operators in the various market segments could havefurther substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level.Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that theinitial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
 various market segments could have further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail 				market. Data on the extent of
further substantiated the assumed responsiveness of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level.Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that theinitial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
 of consumers to price changes, and hence the credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail 				various market segments could have
credibility of the retaliation mechanism at the retail level. Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
Image: second				
Overall and on the basis of particular facts set out above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
above it seems plausible that the initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
initial deviation and the subsequent response of the non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
non deviator MNOs could result in a new market equilibrium featuring lower retail				•
market equilibrium featuring lower retail				
				prices and subsequent lower profitability with



					Therefore, CMT should complement its final measure with the more recent information supplied to the Commission in its replies to the request for information. In any event, CMT should base its final measure on the most recent available information.
CY/2006/0333	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	СҮТА	 1 - carrier selection; 2 - provision of call origination services (to carrier select operators) under the conditions of transparency, non-discrimination, price control and cost accounting; 3 - accounting separation; 4 - obligation to provide co-location; 5 - obligation to provide national roaming. 	 Effectiveness of remedies in the mobile access and call origination market The retail mobile market in Cyprus has been opened for competition only in September 2004. It still is in the early stage of transition from a monopoly situation to a competitive situation, with the incumbent operator having a market share well above 90%. The new entrant, Areeba, has entered the market relatively recently and is still rolling out its network. Under such circumstances OCECPR argues that it would be ineffective at this stage to oblige CYTA to provide MVNOs access to its network, since this would undermine Areeba's chances to develop into a sustainable competing MNO on the market. Indeed, in a market which is more or less mature, the arrival of MVNOs would make it more difficult for Areeba to acquire the necessary customer base to support the further roll out of its network. In absence of mandatory MVNO access, however, OCECPR should ensure through stringent and effective wholesale regulation that the two MNOs currently on the market in Cyprus are able to compete at arms length. In particular, the Commission would like to invite OCECPR to impose price regulation with

1	1	
		regard to the roaming services which CYTA
		is obliged to offer to Areeba16. Such price
		regulation should, in the opinion of the
		Commission, ensure cost-orientation and an
		appropriate margin between CYTA's retail
		tariffs and its wholesale national roaming
		tariffs.
		Exclusion of 3G termination from the voice call
		termination markets
		OCECPR justifies the exclusion of 3G termination
		from the voice call termination markets by the
		fact that at the time of the analysis both
		MNOs terminated calls to their respective
		networks using a 2G interface only. The
		Commission would like to remind OCECPR
		in this context that market definition should
		be technology-neutral, i.e. based on the nature
		of the products or services provided, not on
		the technological platform used to provide
		them. To the extent that a MNO operates both
		a 2G and a 3G network, there seems to be
		substitution from the supply-side between 2G
		and 3G termination services (at least for calls
		to customers with a dual mode handset). In
		such a case, both services would also from the
		demand-side appear to be substitutable.
		Therefore, the Commission would like to
		invite OCECPR to reconsider whether on a
		forward-looking basis 3G termination services
		do not already at this stage belong to the same
		market as 2G services, or at least to monitor
		closely the market and to analyse 3G
		termination services as soon as these services
		become available in Cyprus. An additional
		market analysis and/or separate remedies
		imposed for 3G termination services should
		be notified to the Commission under Article
		7(3) of the Framework Directive.
		(0) of the Figure of the Directive.

LU/2006/0369	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission
PL/2006/0378			Withdra	wn by the National Regulatory Authority	
CZ/2006/0405	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found.	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
LT/2006/0406	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission
SK/2006/0442	Similar to the Recommendati on	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	The Commission made comments on: Absence of analysis of the wholesale market While TÙSR concludes that it is impossible to assess the degree of market power on the market for wholesale mobile call origination and access, the Commission points out that the fact that at the wholesale level no transactions are taking place on the merchant

market (i.e. no sales to independen parties) does not exclude the possil analyse the relevant market. In fact absence of such transactions merel that all supply on the relevant mark defined by TUSR, is captive, i.e. pr	bility to t, the ly indicates ket, as rovided
analyse the relevant market. In fact absence of such transactions merel that all supply on the relevant mark defined by TUSR, is captive, i.e. pr	t, the ly indicates ket, as rovided
absence of such transactions merel that all supply on the relevant mark defined by TUSR, is captive, i.e. pr	ly indicates ket, as rovided
that all supply on the relevant mark defined by TÙSR, is captive, i.e. p	ket, as provided
defined by TUSR, is captive, i.e. p	orovided
	4 . 1 4
internally by vertically integrated r	
network operators. In such a case t	
of supply at the wholesale level (e.	
shares of the undertakings active of	
relevant market) may be derived fr	
at the retail level, and the relevant	
would need to be analysed on the b	
competitive conditions at the retail	
Nevertheless, on the basis of the inform	
provided by TUSR regarding the re	
market, the Commission considers	
conclusions reached by TUSR in the	he draft
measure remain unaffected.	
Monitoring of market developments	
TUSR's conclusion on the absence of co	ollective
dominance is mainly based on the	absence of
pent-up demand at the wholesale le	evel.
Indeed, TUSR considers that even though	gh some
companies might have shown a pot	tential
interest in concluding MVNO agre	ements,
this was never proven by starting b	oinding
negotiations. The Commission take	
in those circumstances TÙSR has n	
indication of a tacitly coordinated in	refusal to
provide access which could support	rt a finding
of collective dominance. It observe	es that there
are moreover a number of indication	ons that T-
Mobile and Orange may not have p	parallel
interest in refusing access should a	
demand arise, such as the significa	
different profitability margins of be	
operators.	

	Но	wever, in the light of potential future developments in the market, such as the
	ma	rket entry of a third operator which may give rise in the short term to a demand for national roaming, the Commission invites TÙSR to closely monitor the market developments. Should pent-up demand for MVNO or roaming access arise in the future and should there be indication of rents to be protected at retail level, then TÙSR is invited to review the relevant market.

					The Commission made comments on:
MT/2006/0443	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	Vodafone Malta Ltd and MobIsle Communicati ons Ltd ("Go mobile")	1 – access	 The competitive conditions at retail level Although MCA does not find collective dominance at retail level, MCA states that Vodafone and go mobile have incentives to limit competition on the retail market. MCA considers that i) the high level of prices compared to other EU countries, ii) the fact that nominal prices have remained stable since 2004, and iii) retail rates which are on average three times higher than wholesale rates point to high levels of profitability by the two operators, which is "not consistent with an effectively competitive market". It should be noted that a finding of joint SMP at retail level is not indispensable in order to find joint SMP in the wholesale market of mobile access and call origination. Retail market conditions may, however, inform an NRA of the structure of the wholesale market, but they may and need not in themselves be conclusive as regards the finding of SMP at wholesale level. In order to render the finding of collusion at wholesale level credible, MCA had to demonstrate that the level of rents at

	2 – non discrimination	retail level are sufficiently high to provide incentives to collectively refuse access to third operators at wholesale level. MCA's analysis has shown that this appears to be the case in Malta thus far, given in particular that the high price level and the limited evolution of prices have resulted in high levels of profitability of the two MNOs. MCA points out, however, that the impact of recently launched cheap on-net tariffs on the overall revenues of both operators still needs to be examined. Further, full number portability, introduced in March 2006, might alter the equilibrium on the retail market during the timeframe of the market review. The Commission therefore invites MCA to monitor the aforementioned developments closely for the purpose of a future market review.
		The existence of pent-up demand The Commission understands from the notification and in particular from the additional information provided that there is actual and credible demand for access which so far has remained unsatisfied. It invites MCA to

	3 - transparer	 MVNO hosted by the deviating MNO to the network of the non-deviating MNO; or • host another MVNO on its network. The Commission services would like to remind MCA that the first option is only credible if (i) the hosting agreement between the deviating MNO and its MVNO contains no exclusivity clauses and that (ii) transaction costs (including costs of negotiations with the non-deviating MNO) might deter the MNVO from switching the hosting MNO.
		Regarding the second option, it should be recalled that according to the MCA, it takes 6 month

			to conclude a MVNO agreement, provided that the MNO is willing to negotiate on reasonable terms. Since retaliation does not occur immediately (unless the non-deviating MNO has already progressed far in ongoing negotiations with another MVNO), the deviating MNO might enjoy a first mover advantage. The Commission invites MCA to substantiate in further detail why this first mover advantage would not suffice to render the retaliation mechanism at wholesale level incredible.
		4 – price control and cost accounting	The Commission notes, however, that the non- deviating MNO could also retaliate at retail level by decreasing its prices. In the past, price reductions by one MNO (since 2004 only through special offers) were matched by the other MNO within a few days. It can be expected that the same would be true in the event a MNO deviated from the common policy. As the retail market in Malta is relatively mature, the MVNO hosted by the deviating MNO would most likely be obliged to offer prices below the levels of the two existing MNOs in order to attract customers.

				5 – accounting separation	 The non deviating MNO would respond by decreasing its own prices to prevent its customers from switching to the MVNO of the deviating MNO. Market shares would remain the same, albeit at lower prices. Given that this outcome would lower the profitability levels of the MNOs, the retaliation mechanism at retail level constitutes a credible incentive not to deviate from the common policy. Market entry of a third MNO MCA states in its reply to the RFI that the entry of a third operator with a successful strategy could possibly destabilise the market equilibrium that allows Vodafone and go mobile high levels of profitability. The Commission notes that a third operator has requested frequencies and invites MCA to monitor closely the impact of a possible market entry of a third operator on the future sustainability of the collectively dominant position. ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARKET NOT LINKED TO THE REGULATORY MEASURES IMPOSED THAT WOULD CAST DOUBT ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE COLLECTIVELY DOMINANT POSITION WILL REQUIRE A REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT MARKET.
EL/2006/0492	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission

LV/2006/0545	Similar to the Recommendati on.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission	
--------------	---------------------------------------	----------	--------------	---------------------	------------------------------------	--

Market 16: Voice call termination on individual mobile networks

M. L. St. t	Market definition		Remedies imposed					
Member State	similar to Recommendation	SMP found for access/interconnection		Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria	YES	6 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Denmark	YES	5 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	NO	
France	YES	8 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Greece	YES	4 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	NO	
Hungary	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Ireland	YES	4 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	YES*	
Lithuania	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Malta	YES	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Netherlands	YES	6 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	NO	
Portugal	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Slovakia	YES	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Sweden	YES	5 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	YES*	
United Kingdom	YES	6 operators	YES*	YES*	YES	YES*	NO	
Belgium	YES	3 operators	YES	YES*	YES	YES	YES*	

Luxembourg	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Finland**	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Germany	YES	4 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Poland	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Greece	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Italy	YES	4 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES*	NO
Hungary	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Latvia	YES	4 operators	YES*	YES	YES	YES*	YES*
Spain	YES	3 operators	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES
Cyprus	YES	2 operators	YES	YES	YES*	YES*	YES*
Estonia	YES	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO
Slovenia	YES	3 operators	YES*	YES*	YES	YES*	YES*

* Differentiated or no remedy imposed on certain SMP operators

** the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court annulled the decisions issued by Ficora on 6 February 2004 (notified the Commission and registered under the ref. number: FI/2003/0031 relating to the position of significant market power

Overview of notifications assessed until 31March 2007

Market 16: Voice call termination on individual mobile networks

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
FI/2003/0031	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Sonera Mobile Networks Oy Radiolinja Origo Oy Finnet Verkot Oy Ålands Mobiltelefon Ab	1 - Interconnection	The Commission made comments on: The limitation of the remedies to the termination of calls originating on mobile networks in Finland or originating abroad: The remedies imposed should not be limited on the basis of the originating network. By limiting the remedies as is proposed, Ficora does not base the remedy on the nature of the problem identified. It is recognized that the basis for excluding calls originating on a fixed network in Finland from the proposed remedies is the
				2 - Transparency - publish delivery terms and tariff information	Finnish Communications Act. The primacy of Community law requires any provision of national law which contravenes a Community rule to be disapplied.

	3 - Obligations concerning pricing and other terms - Non-discrimination	The asymmetrical application of certain remedies, which are imposed on three SMP operators but not on Ålands Mobiltelefon Ab: In circumstances where it is likely that the market failure identified will be the same in all markets, where a NRA intends to impose different remedies on different operators within
	4 - Use of cost accounting procedure	similarly defined markets, such differential treatment should be adequately reasoned. Cost-orientation and cost accounting obligations: Where each operator is to select the cost-accounting procedures it wishes to use, this limits the measures' contribution to consumer benefit, the enhancement of competition and the development of the internal market.
	5 - Accounting separation	
	Ålands Mobiltelefon Ab: only the first 2 remedies and non- discrimination	

UK/2003/0040	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Hutchison 3G UK Ltd O2 Ltd Orange plc	1 - Provision of network access	The Commission made comments on: The appropriateness of the proposed set of obligations: Termination of voice calls on 3G networks is not as such to be considered as a
			T Mobile Ltd Vodafone Ltd Inquam Telecom Holdings Ltd	2 - Non-discrimination	novel service or a newly emerging market. It might be appropriate for Ofcom to impose in certain transparency obligations on "3", O2, Orange, T-Mobile and Vodafone regarding 3G termination.
				3 - Control of charges	Designation of Inquam as an operator having SMP: As Inquam's subscribers are predominantly small- and medium-sized enterprises sensitive to the cost of customers calling them, this could limit Inquam's freedom to set termination charges at an excessive level.
				4 - Transparency - to publish access contracts	National consultation run in parallel with Article 7 consultation: Any material modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested
				5 -Transparency - to publish charges and an advanced notice of changes to charges	parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.

				Hutchinson 3G UK and Inquam Telecom Holdings Ltd.: only the obligation to publish charges and an advanced notice of changes to charges.	
UK/2004/0087 (Remedies related to case UK/2003/0040)	See	e case UK/2004/00	40.	Amendment of the charge controls set for 2G voice call termination.	No comments made by the Commission
UK/2005/0199 (Remedies related to case UK/2003/0040)	See	case UK/2004/00	41.	Prolongation of the charge control imposed on Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile, foreseen to expire on 31 March 2006, until 31 March 2007.	No comments made by the Commission
SE/2004/0052	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network	TeliaSonera Sverige AB	1 - Provision of network access and interconnection on reasonable request	The Commission made comments on:
		extent of each relevant market	relevant Vodafone Sverige	2 - Transparency	Asymmetrical application of remedies: PTS is invited to monitor closely the development of the cost structures of the operators on which the obligation to charge 'fair and reasonable prices'
		market	Hi3G Access AB	3- Non-discrimination	is imposed and to assess whether its current assumptions on 'fair and reasonable prices' will remain relevant over the period of the market
			Telenor Mobile	4 - Accounting separation	review.

			Sweden AB	5 - Control of charges and cost orientation obligation (LRIC Model)	Parallel consultation: Any material
				6 - Accounting separation obligation (provide PTS with specified cost and revenues for interconnection services, including internal prices)	modification to the draft measure as a consequence of comments made by interested parties in the framework of the national consultation will require the draft measure to be re-notified.
				7 - Obligation to apply a fair and reasonable price	
				Asymmetrical application of remedies: remedies 1 - 3 for all five operators, 4 & 5 to TeliaSonera, Tele2 & Vodafone and 6 & 7 to Hi3G/3 and Djuice	
				1- Access (all operators)	
		Geographic coverage of	Vodafone Ireland Ltd	2 - Non-discrimination (all operators)	The Commission made a comment on:
IE/2004/0073, IE/2005/0216 (remedies)	Operator-specific relevant markets.	each network = geographic extent of each	O2 Ireland Ltd Meteor Mobile	3 - Cost orientation (all operators)	The further consultation planned by ComReg: The draft measures relating to the details and implementation of the accounting
(remeares)	relevant Communications market	Communications Ltd Hutchison 3G	4 - Cost accounting (Vodafone and O2)	separation and cost accounting obligations are required to be notified under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.	
			Ireland Ltd	5 - Accounting separation (Vodafone and O2)	

EL/2004/0078	Operator-specific relevant markets.	of Info-Quest AEBE ic Stat Hallas SA	1 - Price control: cost orientation for the first 3 operators but only an obligation of fair and reasonable price for Q-Telecom	The Commission made comments on: Formal notification ahead of transposition: EETT is entitled to carry out any market analysis prior to transposition of the EU regulatory framework into national law. The validity of the outcome of the present assessment is based on the assumption of a correct transposition of the EU regulatory framework into national law to the extent that the provisions concerned by this assessment are relevant. Asymmetrical application of remedies: EETT is invited to monitor closely the development of the cost structures of the operators on which the obligation to charge "fair and reasonable prices" is imposed and to assess whether its current assumptions on "fair and reasonable prices" will remain relevant over the period of the market review. Obligation of non-discrimination in respect of GSM gateways: EETT is invited to demonstrate that the non-discrimination obligation in respect of GSM gateways either pertains to the finding of SMP in the relevant product market or is sufficiently justified as an essential element without which the proposed obligation of cost- orientation imposed on the relevant market would be ineffective. National consultation on details of generic
--------------	--	---	--	---

	remedies: When an NRA intends to provide details linked to a generic ex-ante regulatory obligation, interested parties should be given the opportunity to comment on the draft measure within a reasonable period.

EL/2005/0178 (renotification of case EL/2004/0078	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Cosmote SA Info-Quest AEBE Stet Hellas SA Vodafone-Panafon SA	 Price control obligations: obligation of cost orientation for the first 3 operators but only an obligation of fair and reasonable price for Q-Telecom Obligation of non-discrimination Obligation of access to, and use of, specific network facilities Obligation of transparency Obligation to publish a reference interconnection offer 	The Commission made a comment on: Formal notification ahead of transposition: The validity of the outcome of the present assessment is based on the assumption of a correct transposition of the EU regulatory framework into national law to the extent that the provisions concerned by this assessment are relevant to the current infringement proceedings pending against Greece. The time period between the market reviews, the national and Community consultations and the adoption of the resulting final measure should be kept as short as possible.
AT/2004/0099	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Mobilkom Austria AG & Co KG T-Mobile Austria GmbH One GmbH tele.ring Telekom Service GmbH	 Obligation to interconnect on reasonable request Non discrimination concerning quality & external non discrimination obligation concerning prices Transparency - publication of reference offer 	The Commission made a comment on: Implementation of the proposed cost- orientation obligation: Leaving the setting of cost oriented termination charges to commercial negotiations between operators does not seem the most effective way of dealing with the identified competition problem. By not specifying the LRAIC model and the costs which can be taken

			Hutchison 3G Austria GmbH	4 - Price control: cost orientation (on the basis of LRAIC)	into account in advance, there is no guarantee that termination rates will be oriented on efficient costs only.
				1 - Obligation to interconnect on reasonable request	
AT/2005/0238	Operator-specific relevant markets.	National	Vational Tele2 (in addition to the five operators designated as having SMP in Case AT/2004/0099)	2 - Non discrimination concerning quality & external non discrimination obligation concerning prices	No comments made by the Commission.
	relevant markets.			3 - Transparency - publication of reference offer	
				4 - Price control: cost orientation (on the basis of LRAIC)	
HU/2004/0101	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network	T-Mobile Magyarország Távközlési Rt	1 - Provision of access and interconnection	The Commission made a comment on:
		= geographic extent of each relevant market	Pannon GSM Távközlési Rt Vodafone Magyarország Mobil Távközlési Rt.	2 - Transparency	Implementation of the proposed cost- orientation obligation: In order to be able to assess the compatibility of the implementing measures with the requirements of Article 8(4)
				3 - Non-discrimination	of the Access Directive, NHH is invited to notify, once adopted, the implementing measures setting out the timeframe and stages applicable for the reduction of termination charges.

				4 - Accounting separation	
				5 - Cost orientation and "controllability" of charges	
FR/2004/0104 FR/2007/0592 (details of remedies)	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Bouygues Télécom s.a. Orange France s.a SFR s.a.	1 - Access to, and use of, specific network facilities	The Commission made comments on: Formal notification ahead of full transposition and of adoption of secondary legislation: The resulting measure will need to be re-notified as a draft measure, should any meters of ATT and any
				2 - Transparency	 material/substantial elements of ART's analysis be altered due to further delays in the transposition process, given that data and market structure may still change by a later date of transposition. Market analyses in overseas territories: The
				3 - Non-discrimination	compatibility with Community law of the analysis of the relevant markets in the overseas territories will be assessed when ART notifies the corresponding SMP analyses pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. Market definition and GSM gateways: While

				4 - Accounting separation (modalities of which and costing methodologies to be notified)	there remain doubts as to the inclusion of termination of fixed-to-mobile calls through GSM gateways in the relevant market, its exclusion from the market definition in this particular case would not have led to a different result in the SMP analysis.
				5 - Price control	Accounting separation and price control obligations: Decisions setting (i) the modalities of the accounting separation obligation and the costing methodologies, and (ii) the price ceiling for the year 2007 in respect of SMP undertakings are required to be notified.
				6 - Cost accounting obligation	
FR/2004/0120 (French Overseas Territories) FR/2007/0592	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant	Bouygues Télécom Caraïbe s.a., Dauphin Télécom s.u., Orange Caraïbe s.a. and Saint-Martin Mobile s.u.	1 - Provision of access to, and use of, specific network facilities	The Commission made comments on: Market definition and GSM gateways: While there remain doubts as to the inclusion of termination of fixed-to-mobile calls through
(details of remedies) FR/2007/0596		market	Mobile s.u. in Guadeloupe, Martinique and Guyane; Société Réunionnaise du Radiotéléphone s.a. in Mayotte; Orange	2 - Transparency	GSM gateways in the relevant market, its exclusion from the market definition in this particular case would not have led to a different result in the SMP analysis.

			Réunion s.a. and SRR in Réunion; Saint-Pierre-et- Miquelon Télécom s.a.s. in Saint-Pierre- et-Miquelon, Outremer	3 - Non-discrimination	Accounting separation and price control obligations: Decisions setting (i) the modalities of the accounting separation obligation and the costing methodologies, and (ii) the price ceiling for the year 2007 in respect of SMP undertakings are required to be notified.
				4 - Price control	
				1 - Access obligation	
		Geographic coverage of each network	Telecomunicações Móveis Nacionais, S.A. Vodafone Portugal - Comunicações Pessoais, S.A. Optimus -	2 - Non-discrimination	The Commission made a comment on: Further consultation planned by Anacom: Draft measures relating to implementation of the final cost orientation and cost accounting obligations are required to be notified.
	Operator-specific			3 - Transparency	
PT/2004/0129	PT/2004/0129 Operator-specific relevant markets. = geographic extent of each relevant market	extent of each relevant		4 - Accounting separation	
		Telecomunicações, S.A.	5 - Price control and cost accounting. Pending adoption: progressive set of price reductions based on an international benchmark		
SK/2005/0136	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic	Orange EuroTel	1 - Access obligation	The Commission made comments on: Implementation of the proposed cost

		extent of each relevant market		2 - Non-discrimination	orientation obligation: It is necessary to specify a cost model and the level of wholesale charges as soon as possible. By doing so, TÚSR will provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players, without causing
				3 - Transparency	further delays in bringing termination rates to the cost oriented level.
				4 - Accounting separation and cost accounting	Scope of access remedies: TÚSR should make clear that the proposed access obligations aim exclusively at remedying the lack of competition in the wholesale markets for voice call termination on individual mobile networks and
				5 - Price control, including cost orientation	would apply only to these relevant markets. National public consultation: NRAs must conduct a national consultation on each draft measure which have a significant impact on the relevant market, i.e. including the market definitions, and to give all interested parties the opportunity to comment the draft measures.
				1 - Price control obligations based on FL-LRIC	
LT/2005/0189 Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network	Omnitel	2 - Non-discrimination		
		= geographic extent of each relevant market	Bite GSM Tele 2	3 - Access to, and use of, specific network facilities	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 - Transparency	

DK/2005/0204	Operator-specific relevant markets.	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	TDC SONOFON TeliaSonera "3" Tele 2 (MVNO)	1 - Price control obligations based on benchmarking for TDC, Sonofon and TeliaSonera, and an obligation to charge fair and reasonable prices for "3" and Tele 2	The Commission made comments on: Price control based on comparison with other countries: If a NRA decides to impose price regulation on the basis of a comparison with other countries, it should carefully select the objective criteria and clearly justify the reasons for which it believes that the relevant market(s) in these countries are, on the background of those criteria, most suited as the basis for the comparison taking into account differences between conditions prevailing on the relevant market(s) in the countries compared and its home market. Asymmetric regulation of Tele 2 (MVNO) and "3": In circumstances where it is likely that the market failure identified will be the same in all markets and where a NRA intends to impose different remedies on different operators within similarly defined markets, the asymmetrical application of remedies should be adequately reasoned. NITA has not duly substantiated its intended decision not to impose price-control on Tele 2 and "3".
--------------	--	---	---	---	---

				1 - Price control and cost accounting	
		Geographic coverage of	Vodafone Malta Ltd.	2 - Non-discrimination	
MT/2005/0214	Operator-specific relevant markets.	each network = geographic extent of each	Mobisle Communications	3 - Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.
		relevant market	Ltd.	4 - Transparency	
				5 - Access	
			KPN Mobile	 Price control on the basis of cost orientation (FL-LRIC for all operators except for Tele2 Mobiel) 	
NL/2005/0215	O service services	Geographic coverage of each network	Vodafone T-Mobile	2 - Provision of access upon reasonable request	
NL/2006/0420	Operator-specific relevant markets.	= geographic extent of each relevant	Orange	3 - Non-discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
		market	Telfort Tele2 Mobiel	4 - Transparency	

DE/2005/0249 DE/2006/0421	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	T-Mobile Deutschland GmbH ("D1-Netz"), Vodafone D2 GmbH ("D2-Netz"), E-Plus Mobilfunk GmbH Co. KG ("E1-Netz") and O2 (Germany)	1 – interconnection obligation	Implementation of the proposed cost- orientation obligation In view of this finding and in view of the fact that mobile termination rates in Germany are at present, three years after the entry into force of the EU regulatory framework on electronic communications, still not regulated BNetzA should without further delay ensure effective
			GmbH & Co. OHG ("E2- Netz")	2 - Obligation to terminate incoming calls on their relevant network	(price) regulation in these markets. The approach chosen by BNetzA, namely to let mobile network operators propose termination charges that are then subject to authorisation by BNetzA fails to provide legal certainty and transparency to operators and consumers over a longer period of time. Therefore, BNetzA is invited to decide in an expedient manner on the requests for authorisation of their termination
				3 - Obligation to provide co-location	charges made by the various operators. In addition, in order to better safeguard the interest of consumers, BNetzA should further develop a cost model for calculating the termination rates of the mobile operators as soon as possible. This costing model should reflect the fact that operators may have different cost structures which can inherently be linked to different technical conditions of their network or can be a

	result of different economies of scale due to different market shares. Operators should, however, become more efficient over time, especially if they gain market shares.
4 – non discrimination	Finally, the Commission invites BNetzA to take into account any specific
	characteristics of products such as T- Mobile@home, Genion and Vodafone
<i>4 - Ex ante</i> price control for access and co-location	Zuhause when calculating the costs and to examine whether the underlying costs for termination as part of those products would justify the setting of specific tariffs for those mobile termination services.
	Non-imposition of accounting separation
	Although tariff authorisation together with the annual reporting obligation might allow BNetzA to implement non-discrimination and to prevent cross subsidisation, the imposition of an obligation of separate cost accounting might nevertheless be necessary and proportionate to achieve further regulatory objectives such as rendering the tariff authorisation more efficient and making financial transactions more transparent. The Commission considers that in order to effectively remedy the market failures identified on the mobile termination markets,
	identified on the mobile termination markets

				6 - Indication of sites for the access and the co-location to interested undertakings at their request.	obligation it intends to impose.
SI/2005/0276 SI/2007/0591 (second round of market review)	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Mobitel, Si.Mobile	1 – access	In case SI/2005/0276 the Commission made the comment on: Proposed wholesale price control mechanism on Mobitel: APEK intends to address the problems for Mobitel's competitors to effectively compete with Mobitel's retail prices, in part, by proposing a remedy which links Mobitel's termination rate to its retail on-net prices. This approach

			2 - transparency	might nevertheless result in indirectly regulating retail prices through a remedy imposed at the wholesale level. The Commission reminds APEK that problems identified by APEK in this wholesale market at first stage should be remedied by the implementation of an effective price control mechanism ensuring cost-oriented level of Mobitel's termination rate at wholesale level. If APEK comes to the conclusion that the remedies available at wholesale level are not sufficient to solve the competitive problems identified at retail level but that there is also a need for price control of the retail prices, it may be appropriate to consider whether an intervention is required at that level. The Commission would like to emphasise that the retail prices of Mobitel may not be
--	--	--	------------------	---

and the Access Directives and that delaying the implementation of this obligation until 1 January 2008 would not allow consumers to derive the
--

	4 – price control	 maximum benefit in terms of price. The Commission would like to emphasise that a unique termination rate for calls from mobile and fixed networks should be achieved without any excessive delay in order to ensure that the obligations imposed are effective and appropriate to address the competitive problems identified. Asymmetric application of remedies on
	5 – accounting separation	 Si.Mobil and WWI: The Commission invites APEK to monitor in the context of the annual market review provided for by national law, whether the remedies imposed on Si.Mobil and WWI will, in the longer term, be sufficient in the light of the competitive problems identified. Taking into account the bilateral nature of the termination agreements, the Commission in particular invites APEK to ensure a coherent and non-discriminatory development of the termination rates in Slovenia. In case SI/2005/0276 the Commission made the comment on: Proposed retail price control mechanism on Mobitel and Si.mobil: APEK intends to address the issue of asymmetric on net/off net tariffs in the Slovenian retail mobile market by proposing a remedy which links the MNOs' termination rate to their retail on-net prices. This approach would nevertheless result in retail regulation through a remedy imposed pursuant to market analysis on a wholesale market.

					 Directive, the obligations imposed on SMP operators shall be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. In the present case APEK does not demonstrate as to how the linkage of MNOs' termination rates and their retail on-net prices would resolve the lack of competition in the termination market nor does it show how the imposition of such a remedy would render other proposed obligations in the termination market effective. Therefore the Commission asks APEK not to impose the proposed internal non-discrimination obligation. The Commission reminds APEK that problems identified by APEK in this wholesale market should be remedied by the implementation of an effective price control mechanism ensuring costoriented level of Mobitel's and Si.mobil's termination rate at wholesale level.
IT/2005/0316	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network	TIM, Vodafone, WIND, H3G	1- access	Cost orientation and cost accounting obligations
		= geographic extent of each relevant		2 - transparency	The Commission encourages AGCOM's intention to monitor the consistency of the imposed annual reduction of MTRs with the

		market		3 – non discrimination	costs and, in the event that there will be differences between the actual cost evolution and the price cap, to consider such differences with the view to ensuring the cost orientation of
				4 – price control and cost accounting (except for H3G)	MTRs.
LU/2005/0321	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	EPT, Tango and Voxmobile	1- access and interconnectin	The Commission made comments on: Timely implementation of the price control obligation ILR intends to implement the price control obligation on the basis of an international benchmarking no sooner than end of 2007 or 2008 following a separate national consultation. In the meantime, ILR will apply a 6% price reduction every six months for a period of at least two years and possibly three years.
				2 - transparency	The implementation period envisaged by ILR appears disproportionate in light of these requirements, considering in particular that a price control model based on international benchmarking should not require that much time to implement. Consequently, the Commission invites ILR to implement by the end of 2006 its price control obligations based on an international benchmarking.

	3 – non-discrimination	Price control based on comparison with other countries: Regarding the use of an international benchmarking to implement price control, the Commission considers that if an NRA decides to impose price regulation on the basis of comparison with other countries, it should carefully select on the basis of objective criteria the most appropriate countries of reference.Therefore, the Commission invites ILR to consider the development of a cost accounting model applicable to each SMP operator.
	4 – price control	Level of reductions The Commission urges ILR to further reduce the MTRs in Luxemburg already in the course of 2006, in order to achieve a cost oriented level as quickly as possible.

CY/2006/0334	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	CYTA, Areeba	1 - access	Effectiveness of remedies in the mobile access and call origination market The retail mobile market in Cyprus has been opened for competition only in September 2004. It still is in the early stage of transition from a monopoly situation to a competitive situation, with the incumbent operator having a market share well above 90%. The new entrant, Areeba, has entered the market relatively recently and is still rolling out its network.
					Under such circumstances OCECPR argues that it would be ineffective at this stage to oblige CYTA to provide MVNOs access to its network, since this would undermine Areeba's chances to develop into a sustainable competing MNO on

the two MNOs currently on the market Cyprus are able to compete at arms length, particular, the Commission would like to invite OCECPR to impose pr regulation with regard to the roaming servi which CYTA is obliged to offer to Areeba Such price regulation should, in the opinion				2 - transparency	the market. Indeed, in a market which is more or less mature, the arrival of MVNOs would make more difficult for Areeba to acquire the necessary customer base to support the further roll out of its network. In absence of mandatory MVNO access however, OCECPR should ensure throug stringent and effective wholesale regulation that the two MNOs currently on the market in Cyprus are able to compete at arms length. If particular, the Commission would like to invite OCECPR to impose price regulation with regard to the roaming serviced which CYTA is obliged to offer to Areebald Such price regulation should, in the opinion of the Commission, ensure cost-orientation and a
---	--	--	--	------------------	--

		appropriate margin between CYTA's retail tariffs and its wholesale national roaming tariffs.Exclusion of 3G termination from the voice call termination markets
	3 – non discrimination	OCECPR justifies the exclusion of 3G termination from the voice call termination markets by the fact that at the time of the analysis both MNOs terminated calls to their respective networks using a 2G interface only. The Commission would like to remind OCECPR in this context that market definition should be technology-neutral, i.e. based on the nature of the products or services provided, not on the technological platform used to provide them. To the extent that a MNO operates both a 2G and a 3G network,

				4 – price control	there seems to be substitution from the supply- side between 2G and 3G termination services (at least for calls to customers with a dual mode handset). In such a case, both services would also from the demand-side appear to be substitutable. Therefore, the Commission would like to invite OCECPR to reconsider whether on a forward- looking basis 3G termination services do not already at this stage belong to the same market as 2G services, or at least to monitor closely the market and to analyse 3G termination services as soon as these services become available in Cyprus. An additional market analysis and/or separate remedies imposed for 3G termination services should be notified to the Commission under Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
--	--	--	--	-------------------	--

				5 – accounting separation	
UK/2005/0348	See	case UK/2004/00	40	Extension of remedies imposed in previous measures	No comments made by the Commission.
		Casarahia	Eurotel Praha, spol.	1 - access	
		Geographic coverage of each network	s.r.o., T–Mobile Czech	2 - transparency	
CZ/2006/0359 Operator-specific relevant markets	=	= geographic extent of each relevant market	Republic, a.s. Oskar Mobil, a.s.	3 – non discrimination	No comments made by the Commission.
				4 – price control	
				5 – accounting separation	

PL/2006/0379	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Polkomtel SA, Polska Telefinia Cyfrowa Sp. z o.o., Polska telefonia Komorkowa Centertel Sp. z o.o.	1 - access	 Price control obligation The Commission considers that the price regulation proposed by UKE is not sufficiently precise to address the identified concerns effectively. In particular, the draft measures do not specify the method on the basis of which the cost-orientation obligation will be implemented. The Commission invites UKE to impose a cost-calculation obligation, and to assess whether a forward looking long-run incremental cost (FL-LRIC) model would not be the most appropriate model (notably in terms of tariffs, and potential excessive costs and inefficiencies of the mobile operators), and to identify such model in the adopted measures. If cost orientation will only be achieved over time, the delay must not be unreasonably long. In such a case, moreover, UKE should foresee how mobile termination rates will already be reduced in the interim period so as to effectively remedy the market failures identified. If for this interim period UKE decides to impose price regulation on the basis of comparison with other countries, it should
--------------	---------------------------------------	---	---	------------	---

		2 – non discrimination	carefully select the objective criteria and justify the reasons for which it believes that relevant market(s) in these countries are, on the background of those criteria, most suited as the basis for the comparison, taking into account differences between conditions prevailing on the relevant market(s) in the countries compared and its home market. Furthermore, under the current circumstances of the provision of mobile call termination, only where the prices for those services have been set on the basis of an appropriate cost accounting model and relevant cost accounting data to reflect cost orientation, the prices can be considered as appropriate to serve as a basis for comparison.
			Transparency The Commission invites UKE to include in the transparency obligation an obligation to publish a reference offer. In the absence of such a reference offer, interconnection negotiations may be unduly prolonged and multiple disputes may arise rendering the access obligation imposed on this market less effective.

			 Non-imposition of an obligation of accounting separation: The Commission considers that further imposition of an accounting separation obligation is necessary as an appropriate complement to the other proposed obligations. Only an accounting separation obligation allows internal transfers to be rendered visible, and permits UKE to check compliance with obligations of non-discrimination. Entrance of new market players The Commission invites UKE to analyse the market of wholesale call termination in the networks of new MNOs when they commence operations, and to notify the results of that analysis in accordance with Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive.
		3 – transparency	

				4 – price control	
EL/2006/0392	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of	Cosmote SA	1 - access	Timeframe for reduction of the MTRs and non-imposition of accounting
		each network = geographic	("Cosmote"), TIM/Q-Telecom SA	2 - transparency	separation

extent of each relevant market	("TIM"), and Vodafone-Panafon SA ("Vodafone")	 3 – non discrimination 4 - requirement to publish a reference interconnection offer, service level agreements and performance indicators 	Taking into account the recent voluntary reductions of the MTRs which already ensure a significant part of the reduction towards EETT's target, the Commission invites EETT to implement a shorter glide-path period for the remaining decreases in order to reach EETT's target levels before June 2007. In addition, the Commission invites EETT to reconsider the need for keeping the minimum period of 30 seconds charged by mobile operators for terminating a cell
		5 – price control and cost accounting	 operators for terminating a call. Such a minimum charging period is generally passed-through at the retail level creating confusion and lack of transparency for end-users (in particular residential consumers), since the nominal retail tariff announced is not reflected in the final bill. Moreover, in view of the proposed costorientation obligation, the Commission reiterates that further imposition of an accounting separation obligations. An accounting separation obligations. An accounting separation obligation would permit EETT to easily obtain updated cost data from the operators based on an enforceable obligation and thus to ensure the cost-orientation obligation efficiently.

FI/2006/0403	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Finnet, Elisa, Sonera	1 - interconnection	The exclusion from remedies of voice call termination in mobile networks when a call is originated in a fixed telephone network in Finland not using carrier selection or carrier pre-selection: a significant proportion of traffic from fixed to mobile networks – i.e. calls originated in a fixed telephone network in Finland not using carrier selection or carrier pre- selection – can still not be subject to any form of price regulation. The Commission points out that the Finnish law in this respect, in spite of the amendment of the
				2 - transparency	 CMA, continues to be in breach of Community law as set out in detail in case FI/2003/0031 and in the reasoned opinion issued by the Commission in the ongoing infringement case. The Commission also reminds Ficora of the comment made in case FI/2003/0031 regarding the primacy of Community law in line with the settled case law of the Court of Justice. Implementation of the proposed costorientation obligation: Despite the imposed cost-orientation obligation,

	3 – non discrimination	Ficora does not intend to propose to control the level of termination rates ex ante. In practice the termination rates are negotiated between undertakings and Ficora controls the cost- orientation and non discrimination of termination rates <i>ex post</i> on a case-by-case basis. The Commission acknowledges that the current, commercially negotiated, termination rates applied by MNOs in Finland are well below the EU average. Nevertheless, the Commission invites Ficora to monitor the evolution of termination rates and in
	4 – accounting separation	monitor the evolution of termination rates and in case the commercial negotiations in future fail to yield cost-oriented termination rates and would not resolve the current asymmetries in termination rates, Ficora should consider imposing a proper ex ante price control obligation supported by an appropriate cost- accounting methodology
	5 – price control	

				1 – access and interconnection (all operators)	The Commission made comments on: Price control obligation
Geographi coverage				2 – external non discrimination (all operators); internal non discrimination imposed on Belgacom Mobile and Mobistar)	The Commission considers that termination rates should normally be symmetric and that asymmetry, acceptable in number of cases, requires an adequate justification. It recognizes that, in certain exceptional cases, an asymmetry
		Belgacom Mobile,	3 – transparency (all operators)	might be justified by objective cost differences which are outside the control of the operators concerned.	
BE/2006/0433	BE/2006/0433 Operator-specific relevant markets e	each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Mobistar and Base	4 – price control and cost accounting (all operators)	
				5 – accounting separation (Belgacom Mobile and Mobistar)	

			Latvia Mobilais	1 - access	Market analysis relating to mobile call termination services provided by BITE Latvija :
LV/2006/0464 Operator-specific relevant markets		Geographic		2 - transparency	The Commission notes that SPRK did not analyse the relevant market with regard to call termination services provided by <i>BITE Latvija</i> . Therefore it urges SPRK to conduct the market analysis with regard to this particular undertaking as soon as possible.
	coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Telefons, Tele2, Telecom Baltija and BITE Latvija	3 – non discrimination	Effective cost accounting methodology: In order to ensure effective price regulation, the Commission invites SPRK to develop as quickly as possible its own cost model. In this context, the Commission would like to stress that	
				4 – price control	termination rates should normally be symmetric and that asymmetry, acceptable in number of cases, requires an adequate justification. Therefore, in order to ensure the fulfilment of this principle in Latvia in the future, the cost model (for example based on the FL-LRIC methodology) should take into account costs of an efficient operator.
HU/2006/0478	· ·	Geographic coverage of	Magyar Telekom, Pannon GSM and	1 - transparency	No comments made by the Commission
	each network = geographic	Vodafone	2 – non discrimination		
		extent of each relevant		3 – accounting separation	

	market	4 – access and interconnection	
		5 – price control and cost accounting	

ES/2005/0251 ES/2006/0471	Operator-specific Geographic relevant markets Geographic each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Telefonica Mobile SAU, Vodafone SA, Amena	1 - access	 Imposition of remedies to the termination of calls originating on fixed networks only The Commission considers that CMT's approach to regulate only the wholesale voice termination of fixed-to-mobile calls may not allow consumers to derive the maximum benefit in terms of price. Accordingly, the Commission invites CMT to consider regulating the provision of mobile voice call termination services regardless of the origination of the call (M2M or F2M). Finally, the Commission invites CMT to specify as soon as possible all necessary details concerning the implementation of the cost-orientation obligation (cost accounting methodology, glide paths, if necessary, objectives and time-table. Minimum charging period of one minute for Amena The Commission invites CMT to reconsider the flexibility allowed to Amena to charge a minimum period of one minute for terminating a call. Such a minimum charging period is generally passed-through at the retail level creating confusion and lack of transparency for end-users (in particular residential consumers), since the nominal retail tariff announced is not reflected in the final bill. Consequently, such a tariff scheme may not be fully in line with the
------------------------------	---	---	------------	--

		2 – price control	regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive as well as Article 13(2) of the Access Directive, while not ensuring that the end-users derive the maximum benefit of the proposed regulatory obligations.
		3 – accounting separation	

UK/2006/0498 UK/2006/0499	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each relevant market	Hutchison 3G UK Ltd O2 Ltd Orange plc T Mobile Ltd Vodafone Ltd	access	3G spectrum costs The value of 3G licences should be calculated at current value on a forward looking basis and not on the basis of spectrum values which approximate year 2000 levels. Termination rates should be set at the cost which would be faced by an efficient operator to provide the relevant service. What should be
			Inquam Telecom Holdings Ltd	Non-discrimination	 considered in the LRIC model, from today's perspective, are all the cost elements that are not sunk today. It is important that LRIC models use current costs and not historical costs which risks overestimating the appropriate costs considerably. This consideration is particularly relevant for spectrum fees which have been written off by operators since the relevant frequencies were auctioned and for which
				transparency	Ofcom considers that they may be an overstatement of the opportunity cost of 3G spectrum. In light of the above and with a view to fulfilling the objectives of the framework and allowing end-users, in particular retail fixed customers to obtain the benefits of the wholesale regulation proposed, the Commission invites Ofcom to reconsider the valuation of 3G licences.

				Price control and cost accounting	
UK/2006/0499	H3G's network (market redefined and assessed following the Appeal Body's decision)	Geographic coverage of its network = geographic extent of its relevant market	H3G	transparency	No comments made by the Commission.
AT/2006/0538	Operator-specific relevant markets	Geographic coverage of each network = geographic extent of each	Mobilkom Austria AG & Co KG ("Mobilkom"), T- Mobile Austria GmbH ("T-Mobile"),	interconnection	Implementation of the proposed cost- orientation obligationCost- cost- cost- while in principle the undertakings should themselves negotiate in good faith their access
		relevant market	One GmbH ("One") and Hutchison 3G Austria GmbH ("Hutchison 3G"), Tele2UTA.	Non-discrimination	and interconnection agreements, the Commission would like to reiterate that the competitive problems identified should be tackled as soon and as efficiently as possible. In view of the monopoly power of MNOs over
				Internal non-discrimination concerning prices for those convergent services allowing to terminate a call made to a geographical number onto a mobile network,	termination on their network, the absence of countervailing buying power and, in particular, in view of the number of dispute settlements procedures regarding mobile termination tariffs that the TKK continuously has to face, the Commission is of the opinion that it would be more effective for the TKK to specify already in

		Obligation to publish RIO	this SMP decision rather than in the context of a dispute resolution how the cost-orientation obligation is to be implemented.
		Obligation to allow interconnection partners to contract out of an agreement within a period of maximum two months at any time	
		Price control	

Market 17: The wholesale national market for international roaming on public mobile networks

	Market definition				Rem	edies imposed			
Member State	similar to Recommendation	SMP found for		Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation		
Slovenia	YES			No SMP	found				
Czech Republic	YES	No SMP found							
Finland	YES			No SMP	found				
Austria	YES			No SMP	found				
Italy	YES			No SMP	found				
Spain	YES			No SMP	found				
Denmark	YES			No SMP	found				
Poland	YES		No SMP found						
Ireland	YES	No SMP found							
Sweden	YES	No SMP found							

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
-------------------	------------------------------	------------------------------------	------------------	------------------	--

EN

SI/2006/0477	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	Addressing high prices in the international roaming market The Commission notes that APEK has not found SMP in the market and therefore has not been in the position to regulate it despite concerns related to high prices. To deal with such difficulties, the Commission adopted on 12 July 2006 a proposal for a regulation of roaming on public mobile networks within the European Union
PL/2006/0517	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.

CZ/2006/0452	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
FI/2005/0304	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	Development of effective IOTs net of discounts: Ficora concludes in its analysis of the wholesale national market for international roaming services that foreign MNO's ability to direct traffic onto preferred partner networks in Finland has not led to price competition at the wholesale level. Ficora expects, however, that traffic direction will lead to price competition in the future and considers the market to be effectively competitive. The factual evidence about the developments of average IOTs expressed in revenue per minute as well as a basket of wholesale prices does not seem to lend support to Ficora's assertion that prices will soon start to decline. Over the period of implementation of traffic direction techniques (2002-2005) prices have risen by 7% on average. Over the period of the first quarter 2003 until the third quarter 2005 prices (expressed as a basket of prices) of the two smaller of the three nationwide operators have risen disproportionately by []% and []% respectively. Operators with higher shares of directable traffic on their network should according to Ficora also face a greater competitive constraint. Contrary to these expectations, operators with higher shares of directable traffic on their networks appear to

					have raised prices to a greater extent. Further to that average wholesale prices (as expressed as revenue per minute) have over the period 2004 until June 2005 been aligned and are now within a narrower range and at a higher average level. The Commission acknowledges that discounts are yet to be included in the calculation of effective IOTs and that price baskets and average revenues may be overstating the true level of prices at least for the year 2004/2005. The Commission therefore asks Ficora to monitor the development of Finnish operators' effective IOTs net of all discounts and analyse very closely these findings. Should effective IOTs net of discounts continue to rise or remain at their present level despite the ongoing implementation of traffic direction techniques, then Ficora is invited to review the effectiveness of competition without any undue delay in close co-operation with the National Competition Authority ("NCA").
AT/2006/0466	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	Addressing high prices in the international roaming market The Commission notes that TKK has not found SMP in the market and therefore has not been in the position to regulate it despite concerns related to high prices. To deal with such difficulties, the Commission adopted on 12 July 2006 a proposal for a regulation of roaming on public mobile networks within the European

					Union.
					Calculation of market shares
					According to the practice of the Commission11 and the case law of the Court of First Instance12, the inclusion of captive sales into the relevant market may depend on whether the traffic generated by the foreign subsidiary would be made available in the open (noncaptive) market in case of an increase or decrease of market prices, or in other words, whether captive sales would be switched to the open market as a response to a change in competitive conditions. In the absence of such an analysis, the analysis of SMP should also be based on market shares excluding intra-group sales. In the present case, as changes in the market shares of operators depending on the inclusion
					or exclusion of intra-group sales would not materially alter the analysis
					provided by TKK, the exclusion of intra-group sales would not lead to a different outcome in terms of single or joint SMP findings.
SE/2006/0496	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.

IT/2006/0393	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	Addressing high prices in the international roaming market AGCOM recognises the high level of international roaming prices for end-users which may limit the use of mobile communication services outside national boundaries and which may constitute an obstacle to the development of the single European electronic communications market. The Commission notes in this respect that it has not so far been possible, for a national regulator alone, also because of the cross-border nature of international roaming services, to act effectively to address the high level of wholesale international roaming charges. The Commission is therefore considering the adoption of EU measures to address the high international roaming prices. The inclusion of captive sales When calculating the total size of the market as well as the market shares of the MNOs, AGCOM includes not only merchant sales (i.e. sales to third independent parties) but also (captive) intra-group sales. The Commission notes firstly that the traffic direction techniques available today allow the MNOs to direct a large majority of their traffic and secondly that contrary to TIM and WIND, Vadafone has a nan-European footprint and
					direction techniques available today allow the MNOs to direct a large majority of their traffic

I		
		alliance of different undertakings, such as the
		Freemove alliance, and a group subject to sole control, which forms a single undertaking.
		Indeed, in an undertaking such as Vodafone,
		retail and wholesale prices are coordinated with
		the sole objective of coordinating the
		undertaking's overall profit. Partially owned
		subsidiaries may also subscribe, depending on
		circumstances such as, the degree of influence or
		control and/or commercial agreements, to the common strategy. In an alliance only mutually
		advantageous agreements can be reached. The
		alliance capability to coordinate in a similar
		manner as a sole undertaking like Vodafone and
		to apply prices independent of market conditions
		is therefore more limited and the sales between
		the alliance members are therefore in general not considered as captive.
		considered as captive.
		According to the Commission's practice and the
		case law of the Court of First Instance, the
		inclusion of captive sales into the relevant
		market may depend on whether the traffic
		generated by the foreign subsidiary of the group
		would be made available in
		the merchant market in case of an increase or
		decrease of market prices (i.e. whether the
		captive sales would be sufficiently quickly
		switched to the merchant market in response to a
		change in the competitive conditions).
		Therefore, the analysis of SMP should cover
		also the development of market shares of the
		MNOs excluding captive sales.
		Depending on whether captive sales are included

					or not in the market, TIM's market share would be in a range between 38.8% and 51.2%. In this particular case the Commission notes that the market share of TIM based on a market excluding captive sales would amount to slightly above 50% both in volume (voice) and revenues (voice and SMS)11. This market share is slightly declining from 2003 to 2005. Furthermore, for both SMS and voice, TIM's market share is higher in volume than in revenues indicating that TIM has not been able to maintain higher IOT than its competitors. Consequently, the exclusion of captive sales from the market definition would not have led to a different result in the SMP analysis in this case.
ES/2006/0460	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.
DK/2006/0419	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	Addressing high prices in the international roaming market The Commission notes that NITA has not found SMP in the market and therefore has not been in the position to regulate it despite the concerns related to high prices. To deal with such difficulties, the Commission has adopted on 12 July 2006 a proposal for a regulation of roaming on public mobile networks within the

		Community.
		Calculation of market shares
		According to the practice of the Commission18 and the case law of the Court of First Instance19, the inclusion of captive sales into the relevant market may
		depend on whether the traffic generated by the foreign subsidiary would be made
		available in the open (non-captive) market in case of an increase or decrease of
		market prices, or in other words, whether captive sales would be switched to the
		open market as a response to a change in competitive conditions. In the absence
		of such an analysis, the analysis of SMP should also be based on market shares
		excluding intra-group sales and both methods of calculation (i.e. including and
		excluding intra-group sales) should be included in the final measure.
		In the present case, market shares vary between []% and []% for the largest
		operator, between []% and []% for the second largest operator and between
		[]% and []% for the third largest operator,

					 depending on the calculation method used. The relative sizes of the operators change depending on the inclusion or exclusion of intra-group sales. Most notably, the difference in market share between the first and the second largest operator increases from [] to [] percentage points when intra-group sales are excluded. However, the Commission agrees with NITA that these relative changes do not alter its analysis, i.e. the absence of a single company having SMP and the unlikelihood of the three large operators jointly dominating the market ("collective SMP"). Consequently, the exclusion of intra-group sales would not lead to a different outcome of the SMP analysis in this case.
IE/2006/0477	Similar to the Recommendation.	National	No SMP found	No remedies imposed	No comments made by the Commission.

Member State	Market definition similar to Recommendation	SMP found for	Remedies imposed
--------------	--	---------------	------------------

			Access / interconnection	Non-discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation	
Austria	NO*	SMP analysis not yet notified	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Finland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	
Sweden	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	NO	YES	YES	
United Kingdom	NO*	2 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Czech Republic	NO*	1 operator	YES	NO	NO	NO	YES	
Spain	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	
Netherlands	NO*	5 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES**	NO	
Ireland	NO*	1 operator	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO	
France	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	NO	
Lithuania	NO*	1 operator	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	
Slovakia	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Germany	NO*	3 operators	Remedies not imposed					
Poland	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	
Slovenia	NO*	1 operator	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	

Italy	NO* 2 operators		Remedies will be imposed at the later stage.			
Cyprus	brus NO* No SMP Remedies not imposed					
*Refinement, broad	ler/narrower market and/or merger	of markets				
** only on certain operators						
Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007						

Market 18: Broadcasting transmission services, to deliver broadcast content to end users Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

Case reference	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation
	Terrestrial television broadcasting.				The Commission declared the notification
AT/2003/0002 (notification limited to market definition)	Terrestrial FM radio broadcasting.	National	No SMP analysis	Not included in the notification	 incomplete on the following grounds: No information was provided on essential information such as the number of undertakings in the market, market shares and price levels. No information was provided on the degree of competition at retail level. No information was provided to support the conclusion on the geographic scope of the markets.

AT/2003/0018 (notification limited to market definition)	Terrestrial television broadcasting.	National	No SMP analysis	Remedies not yet notified	The Commission made a comment on: Exclusion of the market for satellite television broadcasting transmission services from market analysis: Should a decision identifying trans-national market(s) under Article 15(4) of the Framework Directive be taken in the future, and/or should such decision provide guidance on how to treat the market for satellite broadcasting transmission services, NRAs concerned will be required to conduct the market analysis of these markets accordingly.	
IE/2004/0042	Radio broadcasting transmission services on analogue terrestrial networks.	National	RTE Transmission Network Limited	1 - Transparency	The Commission made a comment on: Market definition: The lack of competitive pressure exerted by cable transmission services on satellite transmission services and vice versa raises doubts as to whether transmission services	
				2 - Non-discrimination	raises doubts as to whether transmission services provided over these platforms constitute a single market.	

IE/2004/0114 (additional remedies related to case IE/2004/0042)	See case IE/2004/0042.			1 - Accounting separation	No comments made by the Commission.
FI/2004/0076	Digital television transmission services in terrestrial	National, except for the autonomous	Digita Oy	1 - Obligation to relinquish capacity in a terrestrial mass communication network	The Commission made comments on:
	digital television network in multiplexes A, B and	area of Åland		2 - Transparency - publication of delivery terms and tariff information	Monitoring the appropriateness of proposed remedies: In light of the review by the Finnish authorities of the market for television activities
	C in compliance with the network licenses.	e k ue		3 - Cost-orientation cost accounting	in the course of 2007, the Finnish authorities are invited to monitor the appropriateness of the remedies imposed on Digita.
	National analogue television transmission services in the terrestrial analogue television network.				4 - Non-discrimination
	National digital radio transmission services in the terrestrial digital network.			5 - Accounting separation	Directive and, to the extent that such decision may affect the Finnish authorities' current approach, the Commission invites them to revisit their current analysis with regard to wholesale satellite transmission.

	National analogue radio transmission services in the terrestrial analogue radio network.				
UK/2004/0111				1 - Provision of network access on fair and reasonable terms (markets 1, 2 & 4)	Draft measures concerning managed
	1/ Access to masts and sites operated by ntl.	Market 1: Coverage area of ntl		2 - Non-discrimination (markets 1, 2 & 4)	transmission services withdrawn by NRA
	2/ Access to masts and sites operated by Crown Castle.	Market 2: Coverage area of Crown Castle	Market 1/ ntl	3 - Cost-orientation (markets 1, 2 & 4)	The Commission made a comment on: Exclusion of satellite broadcasting transmission services from market analysis: Ofcom is invited to have regard to any future Commission decision on trans-national satellite broadcasting transmission services under Article 15(4) of the Framework Directive. Should such a decision be taken, and should Ofcom be an NRA concerned by such a decision, it is required to conduct the market
	3/ Access to other masts and sites used for the provision of broadcasting services.	Market 3: National	Market 2/ Crown Castle	4 - Transparency (reference offer) (markets 1 & 2)	

	4/ National managed transmission services.	Market 4: National	Market 4/ ntl and Crown Castle (joint SMP)		analysis with regard to wholesale satellite transmission services with other NRAs identified in such a decision in line with Article 16(5) of the Framework Directive.
	5/ Regional/metropolita n/local managed transmission services.	Market 5: National			
SE/2005/0188 (notification limited to market definition and SMP analysis)	Analogue terrestrial television. Digital terrestrial television. Analogue terrestrial radio.	National	Teracom AB	access	The Commission made comments on: Broadcasting transmission services via satellite: Assuming that the market is trans- national as stated by PTS, the Commission invites PTS to take into account any future decision by the Commission concerning the trans-national nature of the market for satellite broadcasting services under Article 15(4) of the Framework Directive. Should such a decision be taken and should PTS be concerned by it, PTS

		Price regulation	 would – in accordance with Article 16(5) of the Framework Directive - be required to conduct the market analysis jointly with other NRAs concerned by the same decision. The exclusion from ex ante regulation of broadcasting transmission services via cable television networks: PTS considers that the barriers to enter the cable transmission market may not be sufficiently high and permanent (the first criterion) that this market would warrant ex ante regulation. The evidence provided by PTS does not enable the Commission to fully concur
		Non discrimination	with such a conclusion. However, PTS has demonstrated to a sufficient extent that the structure of this market in Sweden is such that it tends towards effective competition (the second criterion) and therefore that no ex ante regulation is warranted.
		Accounting separation	

					The Commission made a comment on:
					Exclusion of other than nationwide analogue terrestrial broadcasting
				1 - Access	transmission services from market analysis
			RADIOKOM UNIKACE as		In the current notification, CTU has defined and analysed only the wholesale market for nationwide analogue terrestrial radio and television broadcasting transmission services,
CZ/2006/0453	National analogue terrestrial radio and television broadcasting services.	nd []			which can be considered as part of the wider market 18, as defined in the Recommendation. Concerning other broadcasting transmission services, CTU declares that these do not belong to the same market as nationwide analogue terrestrial broadcasting transmission services but CTU does not carry out any further analysis as to whether these separate markets are susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation.
					The Commission does not contest the market definition proposed by CTU (i.e. the
				2 – Accounting separation	division into various separate markets) but it would like to recall that each of these markets is part of market 18 as defined in the Recommendation. Whereas
					NRAs have the possibility, after having taken due account of particular national
					circumstances, to subdivide market 18 into a number of separate markets,
					whenever they do so, they have to determine

	which of the individual markets
	fulfil the three-criteria test and, thus, are susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation and
	they have to carry out a market analysis of all markets they have determined as
	susceptible to ex ante regulation.
	With regard to the above, the Commission would like to invite CTU to analyse
	those broadcasting transmission services that have been excluded from the
	current notification, to determine which markets are susceptible to <i>ex ante</i>
	regulation and notify their analysis to the Commission. This concerns in particular nationwide digital terrestrial television broadcasting transmission services, where it follows from the notification that these services have started to develop in the Czech Republic while the geographical coverage will further develop in the coming years. The Commission points out that despite the fact that digital terrestrial broadcasting transmission services are still developing in the Czech Republic, CTU may want to ensure that certain market failures resulting from RADIOKOMUNIKACE's control over the analogue market (including the
	control over a nationwide network of masts and sites) do not jeopardise the

	development of effective competition in the digital market.
	Non-imposition of transparency, non- discrimination and price regulation
	obligations
	The Commission would like to invite CTU to consider the imposition of
	transparency and non-discrimination obligations in order to make the access
	obligation more effective.
	Further, the Commission notes that the reasons put forward by CTU to justify its
	intention not to impose any price regulation are not convincing. Whereas CTU
	refers to the fact that the market analysis has not produced any evidence of
	application by RADIOKOMUNIKACE of excessive prices in the past, it seems to
	be difficult to make predictions as to its future pricing policy based on its past
	pricing behaviour given that RADIOKOMUNIKACE was subject to price
	regulation so far. Concerning CTU's argument that RADIOKOMUNIKACE's

					 market power will erode due to the planned switch-off of analogue terrestrial television broadcasting, this may only be relevant for a part of the market given that the relevant market, as defined by CTU in the current notification, includes both radio and television broadcasting transmission services. Therefore, the Commission would like to invite CTU to impose on RADIOKOMUNIKACE an obligation to charge fair and reasonable prices for the purpose of the implementation of the access obligation.
NL/2005/0246	1. broadcast cable transmission	National		access	Exclusion of satellite broadcasting transmission services from market analysis
NL/2005/0270	services of free radio and television		UPC, Essent, Casema	Cost orientation	The Commission invites OPTA to have regard
NL/2005/0277	packages			Non-discrimination	to any future Commission decision on trans- national satellite broadcasting transmission services under Article 15(4) of the Framework Directive. Should such a decision be taken, and should OPTA be an NRA concerned by such a decision, it is required to conduct the market analysis with regard to wholesale satellite
	2. broadcast cable transmission services of pay radio and television packages			transparency	
			Multikabel,	access	

			Delta	Non-discrimination	transmission services with other NRAs identified in such a decision in line with Article 16(5) of the Framework Directive.
				transparency	
ES/2005/0252	Terrestrial analogue and digital television broadcasting transmission services	national	Abertis	1 - access	The Commission made comment on: Inappropriateness of the proposed price control obligation: In accordance with Article 8(4) of the Access Directive8, the obligations imposed on SMP operators shall be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework
					Directive, in particular the promotion of sustainable competition and efficient

	2 – obligation to charge reasonable prices	 investment in infrastructure. The Commission considers that the requirement to charge reasonable prices, would not be effective without setting out the relevant details on the methodology and use of benchmarking. The Commission also invites CMT to set a clear framework for the commercial negotiations between operators and for the resolution of any dispute resulting there from. Non-imposition of a transparency obligation: CMT should also consider the imposition of a transparency obligation in order
	3 – non-discrimination	to make the overall access remedy more effective. Moreover, where an SMP operator has to comply with the non- discrimination obligation, the NRA may also require the publication of a reference offer (Article 9(2) Access Directive).

	1 - Delivering transmission services of analogue AM radio signals (high power) to broadcasters (i.e. radio stations)				The Commission made comment on: Although OPTA has not explicitly applied the three criteria test as regards the infrastructure markets, it appears from OPTA's argumentation that competition law (including the structural separation imposed as a
NL/2006/0410	2 - Delivering transmission services of analogue FM radio signals (high power) to broadcasters (i.e. radio stations)	national	no SMP	No remedies imposed	 (including the structural separation imposed as a remedy in a merger control context) together with other legislative provisions can be deemed sufficient to address market failures that may arise on these markets. Hence, the Commission, in view of the elements set out above, agrees with OPTA's conclusion that the infrastructure markets are not susceptible to ex ante regulation. However, the Commission invites OPTA to monitor the development of competition in the transmission services market in order to
					in the transmission services market in order to ensure that the alternative mechanisms to redress possible market failures on the infrastructures markets are effective.

AT/2006/0360	1 - The market for terrestrial television broadcasting;	national	SMP found for Österreichisch e Rundfunksend er GmbH & Co	access	Time lag between market definition and market analysis: The Commission draws attention to the fact that the present market analysis on wholesale broadcasting transmission services is notified
	2 - The market for television broadcasting via cable networks;		Co KG5 ("ORS") in markets 1 and 4	Non doscrimination	more than two years after the notification o market definitions. Therefore, the Commission invites KommAustria to consider in the future to conduct and notify all stages of a market review (market definition, market analysis and the imposition of regulatory obligations) as close to
	3 - The market for satellite television broadcasting;			Accounting separation	each other as possible.
	4 - The market for terrestrial FM radio broadcasting;			Price control	

	5 - The market for terrestrial AM radio broadcasting;			Obligation to provide a reference offer	
FR/2006/0335	Downstream wholesale market for TV broadcasting transmission services offered to broadcasters or multiplex operator Upstream wholesale market for radio and TV broadcasting transmission services	Metropolitan France and its overseas territories.	TDF	1 - access	 Lack of analysis of the market for broadcasting transmission services offered to broadcasters or multiplex operators: Market 18 of the Recommendation is the wholesale market for broadcasting transmission services, to deliver broadcast content to end users. This market comprises commercial relationships where providers of broadcasting transmission services offer the delivery of broadcasting content to broadcasters (individual channels, multiplex operators or other content providers). ARCEP excludes these commercial relationships from its market analysis mainly on the ground that it claims not to be competent under French law to carry out such an analysis.

			2 – non discrimination	 Pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Framework Directive, national regulatory authorities shall carry out an analysis of the relevant markets identified in the Recommendation. Pursuant to Article 3(1) of the Framework Directive, Member States shall ensure that each of the tasks assigned to national regulatory authorities in the Framework Directive is undertaken by a competent body. The Commission therefore notes that the market or markets for radio and TV broadcasting transmission services provided to broadcasters still need(s) to be analysed by a competent body and that the results of that analysis must be notified to the Commission, in accordance with the provisions of Article 3(1), 7(3) and 16(1) of the
--	--	--	------------------------	---

			Framework Directive. In assessing the level of competition in the market(s) for broadcasting transmission services provided to broadcasters, the competent body should take into account the effect of i) any must carry, must offer or must deliver
		3 - transparency	 obligation imposed under national law and ii) the regulatory remedies proposed in the draft measure notified by ARCEP under case FR/2006/0335. Competitive conditions in the wholesale market for terrestrial FM radio
			broadcasting transmission services offered to other broadcasting transmission service providers: ARCEP defines the wholesale FM radio transmission market as being national and considers this market to be effectively competitive due to the easy replicability of TDF's sites (where the infrastructure such as masts with antennae are installed). ARCEP

				4 – price control	 concludes that barriers are neither high nor transitory and considers that competition law is capable of tackling market failures should these occur, ruling out as such the pertinence of <i>ex ante</i> regulation on this market. The Commission, however, points to concerns raised by third parties during the national consultation relating to what potentially could be a number of nonreplicable TDF sites. The Commission invites ARCEP to closely monitor the evolution of the competitive conditions in this market, especially as regards these potentially non replicable sites, and to do so notably in the context of the forthcoming call for tenders for broadcasting transmission services organised by Radio France. ARCEP is further reminded that Article 12 of the Framework Directive allows Member States to impose the sharing of facilities or property on operators where undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives to a certain infrastructure because of the need to protect the environment, public health, public security or to meet town and country planning objectives without the need to find SMP.
--	--	--	--	-------------------	---

		Obligation to provide tariffs and conditions to ARCEP	

LT/2006/0376 mark 2 - terrestrial satell LT/2006/0468 analogue radio radio	lite TV and		Exclusion of digital terrestrial radio and TV broadcasting transmission servicesfrom market reviewAccording to the Decision No 1492 (25 November 2004) of the Government ofLithuania on the approval of the model concerning the implementation of digital TVin the Republic of Lithuania, it is planned that by 2009 95% of the territory ofLithuania should be covered by at least one terrestrial digital television network. TEOLT AB (formerly Lietuvos Telekomas AB) and LRTC have undertaken to installdigital terrestrial transmission networks in
--	-------------	--	--

 3 - terrestrial analogue television (TV) broadcasting transmission services where the radio frequency is allocated to the broadcaster; 4 - terrestrial analogue TV broadcasting transmission services where the radio frequency is allocated to the broadcasting transmission service provider; 5) wire radio broadcasting transmission services; 6) radio broadcasting transmission services via cable TV networks; 7) cable TV broadcasting transmission services; 		Price control	other major cities no later than 31 December 2007. Therefore, the Commission would like to invite RRT to assess digital terrestrial radio and TV broadcasting transmission services, as has been done by other NRAs, and notify such an assessment to the Commission as soon as these services are provided based on the above timeframe. Remedies in the markets for terrestrial analogue radio and TV broadcasting transmission services where the radio frequency is allocated to the broadcaster In its notification, RRT assumes that the access to masts and sites ("broadcasting transmission facility services") is a part of the markets for terrestrial analogue radio and TV broadcasting transmission services where the radio frequency is allocated to the broadcaster. It should be taken into account that as much as 93% of radio hours broadcast and 69% of TV hours broadcast are not transmitted through the broadcasting transmission services of LRTC, whereas most broadcasters do use the broadcasting transmission facility services of LRTC. Without contesting the delineation of these markets, the Commission however invites RRT to reconsider whether the imposition of the same set of remedies for both transmission services and transmission facility services would
--	--	---------------	--

 8) satellite radio broadcasting transmission services; 9) satellite TV 		be proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives in Article 8 of Framework Directive. In particular, RRT is encouraged to consider lighter regulation for the broadcasting transmission services.
broadcasting transmission services.		obligation and price control In accordance with Article 8(4) of the Access Directive7, the obligations imposed on SMP
		operators shall be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the regulatory objectives laid down in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, in particular the promotion of sustainable competition and
		efficient investment in infrastructure.
		The Commission considers that the period LRTC is allowed for introducing FDC
		based cost accounting is overly long, specifically in the light of the time normally
		required for an undertaking of the size of LRTC to develop such a cost accounting
		model (i.e. from six to twelve months).
		Further, the Commission is of opinion that the glide path of four years is too long
		because the switch-off of the analogue transmission will start from 2012, which means that analogue transmission will be of limited

		interest for broadcasters by then.
		Therefore the Commission invites RRT to impose a considerably shorter period both for i) LRTC to introduce FDC based cost accounting and ii) the glide path.

				Non discrimination	defined in the Recommendation, covers all types of broadcasting transmission services. NRAs have the possibility, after having taken due account of particular national circumstances, to subdivide market 18 into a number of separate relevant markets. However, whenever they do so and exclude some of these markets from the analysis, they have to demonstrate that individual markets excluded from the analysis do not fulfil the so called three-criteria test and, thus, are not susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation. NRAs have to carry out a market analysis of all markets they have determined as susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation. With regard to the above, the Commission
--	--	--	--	--------------------	--

		invites TÚSR to analyse those
		broadcasting transmission services that have been excluded from the current
		notification, to determine which markets are susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation and
		notify their analysis to the Commission. This concerns: (i) cable transmission
		services, which are, according to information provided by TÚSR, provided by
		cable network operators that broadcast content to end users, thus in principle
		falling under the scope of market 18 as defined in the Recommendation, and in
		particular (ii) nationwide digital terrestrial television broadcasting transmission
		services, where it follows from the notification that these services have already
		started to develop in the Slovak Republic even if the geographical coverage will
		further develop in the coming years. The Commission points out that despite the
		fact that digital terrestrial broadcasting transmission services are still in a pilot
		stage in the Slovak Republic, TÚSR may want already at this stage to ensure that

Accounting separation

		Access	certain market failures resulting from Slovak Telekom's control over the analogue market (including the control over a nationwide network of masts and sites) do not jeopardise the development of effective competition in the digital market.
		Price control	

DE/2006/0469	 cable operators feeding broadcast signals into their networks; 2) cable operators delivering broadcast signals to network level 4 ("L4") clusters, with a further refinement on the basis of the importance of the cluster; provision of satellite transponder capacity for the transmission of broadcast signals to content providers; provision of terrestrial transmission facilities for broadcasting analogue television signals to content providers; provision of terrestrial transmission 	national	KDG, KBW and UM,	Remedies will be imposed in a separate decision.	
--------------	---	----------	---------------------	--	--

	facilities for broadcasting digital television signals to content providers; 6) provision of terrestrial transmission facilities for broadcasting analogue VHF radio signals to content providers; 7) provision of terrestrial transmission facilities for broadcasting digital radio signals to content and telecommunication service providers;				No comments made by the Commission
PL/2006/0455	(1)the provision of analogue transmission of television and radio	national	TP Emitel	access Non discrimination	Scope of the remedies Market 18 of the Recommendation is the wholesale market for broadcasting transmission

programmes services,		Accounting separation	services (for radio and TV) to deliver broadcast content to end users. This market comprises commercial relationships where providers of
(2) the prov		transparency	broadcasting transmission services offer the delivery of the content to broadcasters
digital televis radio prog transmissions	grammes		(individual channels, multiplex operators or other content providers).
		Price control	UKE, after analysing the market, identified a number of competition problems present in the relationship between TP Emitel and the broadcasters, <i>inter alia</i> excessive pricing for those services which are not provided by alternative operators, while offering low prices on those segments of the market where there is competition, as well as discrimination of certain broadcasters. UKE indicates, however, that in accordance with Polish law it does not have the power to intervene in the relationship between transmission operators and broadcasters, as the latter are no electronic communications operators. In addition, UKE states that the competition problems identified as regards the provision of transmission services to broadcasters will be solved over time by the measures taken to foster the development of effective competition on the transmission services market, in particular by the obligation imposed on TP Emitel to offer alternative transmission operators access to its infrastructure at regulated conditions which should generate more competition between alternative suppliers of transmission services to broadcasters. The Commission shares UKE's view that, where possible, competition law problems such as excessive pricing should be regulated by

	1	
		fostering more competition rather than by imposing price regulation. However, where the development of effective competition on the transmission services market may take some time (which could be the case in view of the investment required), it may be necessary to impose for a transitory period of time, until the proposed regulatory obligations as regards access to infrastructure prove to be sufficient to remedy the identified competition problem, some form of price regulation which immediately prohibits TP Emitel from continuing its excessive pricing policy. For such excessive pricing, if continued, may lead to TP Emitel cross-subsidising those services for which it faces competition, which could undo
		the effectiveness of the access regulation imposed.
		The Commission therefore, in view of the concrete competition problems identified on the Polish market, invites UKE to reconsider the possibility to impose price regulation on TP Emitel for the provision of transmission services to broadcasters. On the basis of the EU regulatory framework, UKE (or another competent body assigned for this purpose) must have the legal power to do so.
		Exclusion of cable broadcasting transmission services from the market analysis
		In the current notification, UKE has identified the market for cable broadcasting transmission services as a market separate from terrestrial broadcasting transmission services. UKE

		concludes that it is not appropriate to impose
		remedies on the cable transmission market,
		however, without carrying out any analysis as to
		whether that separate market meets the three
		criteria test.
		enterna test.
		The Commission does not context the model
		The Commission does not contest the market
		definition proposed by UKE (i.e. that cable
		broadcasting transmission services belong to a
		market separate from terrestrial broadcasting
		transmission services) but it would like to recall
		that market 18, as defined in the
		Recommendation, covers all types of
		broadcasting transmission services. While NRAs
		have the possibility, after having taken due
		account of particular national circumstances, to
		subdivide market 18 into a number of separate
		markets, whenever they do so, they have to
		determine which of the individual markets fulfil
		the three criteria test, and they have to carry out
		a market analysis of all markets susceptible to ex
		ante regulation.
		The Commission takes note of the limited
		coverage, the limited penetration and the
		fragmentation of the cable networks in Poland. It
		0
		*
		does not meet the three criteria test (as it seems
		to tend towards effective competition) and
		therefore is not susceptible to <i>ex ante</i> regulation.
		Nevertheless, the Commission invites UKE to

		clarify its views on this issue in the final measure.
		Possible differentiation of remedies as regards local terrestrial radio and television transmission services
		UKE identifies a single market for terrestrial radio and television transmission services, without distinguishing between local and national transmission services. The absence of a distinction between local and national services is in line with the Recommendation and the Commission does not have any indication that specific Polish circumstances should have led UKE to a different conclusion. However, in view of their experiences with notifications from other Member States, the Commission invites UKE to consider carefully whether it may be appropriate to differentiate the remedies imposed on this market so as to provide for more lenient access regulation regarding local broadcasting transmission infrastructure which may potentially be more easily duplicated than national broadcasting transmission infrastructure.
		Price control before approval of the cost calculation
		The Commission notes that UKE has not specified in its measure the basis of the verification of the appropriateness of charges for broadcasting transmission services proposed by

					TP Emitel prior to the approval of its FL LRIC- based cost calculation by an independent auditor, enumerating various possible methods it may decide to use. This approach affects the transparency and legal certainty for market players, in particular since TP Emitel has not prepared cost calculation in the past, which may make swift implementation of this obligation difficult, and no timing is foreseen for the FL LRIC-based cost calculation and approval. The Commission therefore invites UKE to precisely clarify in the final measure which verification method it will use to approve the charges proposed by the SMP operator before the cost calculation has been conclusively approved.
SI/2006/0476	 Transmission of content through terrestrial broadcast transmitters; Transmission of 	national	RTV Slovenija	access	
	 2) Transmission of content through cable networks; 3) Transmission of content through MMDS4 systems; 			Non discrimination	

	 4) Transmission of content through satellite; 5) Transmission of content through Internet (IP) networks. 			transparency	No comments made by the Commission
IT/2006/0424	 a) National market for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting services, b) National market for digital terrestrial television broadcasting services, c) National market for terrestrial radio broadcasting services, d) Local market for terrestrial television broadcasting services, e) Local market for terrestrial radio broadcasting services, 	national	RAI and RTI in the market for national analogue terrestrial television	Remedies will be imposed at the later stage.	 Demand for analogue TV broadcasting transmission services In the absence of any past or current demand for analogue TV broadcasting transmission services, the Commission understands that any claimed tacit coordination can in principle be exercised vis-à-vis potential demand. However, AGCOM has not assessed the existence of such demand, in particular taking into account the forthcoming switch off of the analogue transmission. Therefore, the Commission invites AGCOM to make an assessment of the potential demand of analogue TV broadcasting transmission services. Basis for the calculation of the market shares AGCOM bases its estimation of market shares in the relevant market mainly on the number of installations/transmitters combined with the number of frequencies used in various transmission areas held by RAI and RTI18. According to the notification,

services,		15.000 and above 500.000 viewers. The
		Commission therefore considers that the
f) National mark	et	absolute number of transmitters is not in itself
for cable television	on	the most appropriate indicator of market power
broadcasting		in the relevant transmission market.
services,		
501 11003,		AGCOM also uses the share of advertising
a) National mark	at	revenue as an indicator of market power.
g) National mark		revenue as an indicator of market power.
for satelli	ie	
television		Parties seeking access to transmission networks
broadcasting		are exclusively interested in reaching a
services.		maximum coverage of the population and the
		audience (and hence advertising revenues) might
		differ significantly depending on the content of
		the TV programmes broadcasted.
		In the light hereof AGCOM should therefore
		strengthen its reasoning as to why the
		revenues from the advertising market should be
		an appropriate indication of market power on the
		upstream market. Programmes of vertically
		integrated operators with the same
		position/coverage in the broadcasting
		transmission market may achieve completely
		different shares of audiences (and hence
		advertising revenues) due to the attractiveness of
		the programme.
		Since coverage provided by transmission
		facilities is one of the most appropriate
		Tr-r-
		indicators of the position of each transmission
		provider, and considering that AGCOM does not
		today have fully reliable figures on this
		parameter, AGCOM is invited to continue
		monitoring the development of coverage in the

	market and to re-notify this
	market in case the coverage of RAI and RTI a opposed to alternative networks do not
	any longer lead to the presumption of joint SMI
	Ownership of facilities (masts and sites an antennas)
	The Commission understands that not a transmission facilities used by transmission
	service providers are owned by them, but an also rented from third parties. Therefore, th Commission invites AGCOM:
	(1) to clarify in its final measure to what exten the transmission service providers designate with SMP rely on facilities rented from thir parties and to assess the duration and condition of these contracts and their impact on the possible new entry (for example the presence of exclusivity clauses).
	(2) to assess to what extent new entrants woul also have the possibility to rent facilities.
	Objective of collusion
	Considering the vertical integration of RAI an RTI, revenues from third parties are at presen collected in the downstream advertising marke Rents to be protected by the colluding parties an at present only situated in that market. Howeve in its notification AGCOM does not give an indication of the level of rents achieved in the

					 advertising market. Therefore, the Commission invites AGCOM, in its final measure to define the boundaries of the advertising market (digital vs. analogue TV advertising, terrestrial vs. satellite vs. Internet-TV advertising) and to assess the level of rents and the development of price levels in that market, also in comparison to other EU Member States. Remedies to be notified The current notification does not contain remedies, which AGCOM intends to notify at a later stage. If, taking into account the comments above, AGCOM adopts the proposed measure, the Commission invites AGCOM to notify as soon as possible the appropriate remedies concerning the national analogue terrestrial television market.
CY/2006/0497	 local analogue terrestrial radio broadcasting services; nation-wide analogue terrestrial radio broadcasting services; local analogue terrestrial television broadcasting services; 	national	As all defined markets are considered as non susceptible for ex ante regulation, no SMP had been found	No remedies imposed	

4) nation-wide analogue terrestrial television broadcasting services;		
5) digital broadcasting services		No comments made by the Commission

New Markets

Member State	Market	SMP found for	Remedies imposed				
			Access / interconnection	Non- discrimination	Transparency	Price control / cost accounting	Accounting separation
Ireland	Retail international leased lines	No SMP found					
Ireland	Retail leased lines above 2 Mbps	No SMP found					
United Kingdom	Wholesale	2 operators*	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO

	international services to termination points outside the UK						
France	SMS termination	3 operators	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Austria	Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location in Austria/convergent services	2 operators	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO
* 235 separate marke	ets, 118 competitive						

Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

New Markets Overview of notifications assessed until 31 March 2007

	Product Market Definition	Geographic Market Definition	SMP found for	Remedies Imposed	Results of Community Consultation		
IE/2005/0194	Wholesale Market for call termination services to service providers at a fixed location.	Notification withdrawn by the National Regulatory Authority.					
IE/2004/0128	Retail international leased lines.	National	No SMP found	NONE, withdrawal of regulation	The Commission made a comment on: NRA's finding is based on wholesale national leased lines. The Commission notes that the NRA will analyse possible leverage from wholesale markets when analysing this wholesale market and proposing remedies for these markets.		

UK/2006/0354	Wholesale international services	235 route by route markets	No SMP found	Withdrawal of ex ante obligations	No comments made by the Commission
FR/2006/0413 FR/2007/0592 (details of	SMS termination	Operator- specific relevant markets	Bouygues Télécom ("Bouygues"), Orange France	1-access	Accounting system and price control Obligations imposed under the Access Directive should be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in
remedies)			("Orange") and SFR	2-transparency	Article 8 of the Framework Directive. The remedies should provide adequate transparency and legal certainty for market players. In order to increase legal certainty the Commission invites ARCEP to specify the way towards a symmetric price cap in the final
				3-non discrimination	measure. Moreover, the Commission invites ARCEP to specify the accounting system to be imposed on the SMP operators as well as the cost model for calculating the MNOs' SMS termination rates, giving an incentive for all MNOs to become efficient as soon as

				4-accounting separation	possible
				5-price control	
AT/2006/0432	Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location in Austria/convergent services	National	T-Mobile and One	an obligation to charge prices based on benchmarking, the reference price being the fixed termination rate charged by Telekom Austria at the regional level	No comments made by the Commission